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SAGP SSIPS 2016 Abstracts

Anthony Preus

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The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP)

with

**The Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy
and Science (SSIPS)**

Abstracts Collection

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**Fordham University, Lincoln Center, New York
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The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP)
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Claas Lattman, CAU Kiel, clattmann@email.uni-kiel.de

1A (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 502: “The Art of Land-Measuring. Diagrammatical Knowledge Between Egypt and Greece”

Thales brought geometry from Egypt to Greece. Therefore he was the first Greek mathematician, wasn't he? At least some of the ancients tell us so.

The earliest authentic first-hand testimonies for Greek mathematics, however, date from the fourth century BCE. Our assessment of Thales' contribution therefore relies on relatively late authors – who, to be sure, were no “objective” historians, but looked back through the lens of the state-of-the-art of their own times, i.e. “Euclidean” mathematics.

“Euclidean” mathematics, though, was, as a modern philosophy of science perspective can show, separated from its predecessor(s) by a scientific revolution that took place in the fourth century BCE. This in particular relates to the fact that “Euclidean” mathematics invented and made use of abstract universal diagrams (“triangles” etc.), whereas before that “mathematics” had operated on the basis of numerically determined, particular “diagrams” that primarily represent only material, physical objects (which, e.g., were triangle-shaped). In this regard, it was similar to oriental, especially Egyptian mathematics.

Against this backdrop, this paper will reassess early Greek “mathematics,” with a focus on Archaic Ionia (including Thales and other Presocratics). It will be suggested that this approach – including the knowledge it yielded – was, despite its impressive sophistication, less theoretical than practical in nature. This will lead to the insight that, after all, in Archaic Greece, too, “geometry” was still nothing but some (even if general) art of “land-measuring,” pursued not by scientists, but by engineers and craftsmen – whose impressive achievements, nonetheless, did lay the foundation for the eventual invention of abstract “Euclidean” geometry.

Robert Hahn, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, hahnprog@gmail.com

1A (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 502: “Why Thales Knew the Pythagorean Theorem”

Once we accept that Thales introduced geometry into Greece, having traveled to Egypt, as Proclus reports on the authority of Eudemus, who also credits Thales with a number of theorems, we understand that Thales was making geometrical diagrams. From where did he see such diagrams? Egypt is one place, having measured the height a pyramid there. Diagrams that reflect measurements when the shadow was equal to its height, and un-equal but proportional – the doxography credits him with both techniques -- suggest that Thales understood similar triangles – ratios, proportions, and similarity. We begin with the diagrams associated with the theorems, and place them next to the ones that reflect the measurements of the pyramid and distance of a ship at sea. Then, we introduce, on the authority of Aristotle, that Thales posited an archê, a principle, from which all things come, and back into which all things return upon dissolution – there is no change, only alteration – a big picture begins to form. Suppose, then, Thales investigated geometry as a way to solve the metaphysical problem of explaining HOW this one underlying unity could appear so divergently modified but not changing? Geometry offered a way to find the basic figure into which all other figures resolve, that re-packed and re-combined, was the building block of all other appearances. We might see a lost narrative of the relation between philosophy and geometry.

There are two proofs of the Pythagorean theorem, not one, preserved by Euclid. The one we learned in school was I.47 that Proclus reports was Euclid's own invention. But, the other one, in book VI.31, by similar figures, by ratios and proportions, plausibly points back to Thales himself, perhaps taken up and perfected in proof by Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. That proof shows that the right triangle is the fundamental geometrical figure, that expands or contracts in a pattern that came to be called continuous proportions. The argument that Thales knew the hypotenuse theorem is that, surprisingly, this was what he was looking for to explain the HOW of his metaphysical speculation. The plausibility rests on following the diagrams as evidence.

Michael Weinman, Bard College, Berlin, mdweinman@gmail.com

1A (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 502: "Ionia between Babylon and Philolaus: No More 'Greek Miracle' "

To date, most important interpretive accounts of the work early Pythagorean Philolaus (including Huffman 1993, McKirahan 2011, and Graham 2015 in Huffman 2015) all leave the interpreter to decide between the possibility that Philolaus, as a mid-fifth century Greek mathematician/ cosmologist, would base a certain key finding (his "Great Year" of 729 months) on either (a) its fit with an overarching theoretical commitment or (b) its fit with observational data. This leaves aside a possibility worth serious consideration, even if it is difficult to substantiate fully. Namely, is it not possible that solar year and lunar month periodicity presses itself on these fifth-century Greek sources because of the way these are determined by the Babylonian astronomical work of the seventh and sixth centuries, through the mediation of Ionian procedural knowledge practices? After all, the entire enterprise that would lead you to posit a "great year"—which Huffman (1993: 276) identifies as "an attempt to harmonize two important ways of measuring time, the lunar month and the solar year"—is not sui generis within Philolaus's cosmology, or within Pythagoreanism. Both the observational data, and the values with which Philolaus and his Greek contemporaries were working came to them from Egypt and Mesopotamia, through the flourishing of wisdom traditions in 6th century Ionia. Given this fact, it seems well worth the effort to attempt to draw out how Philolaus might have been borrowing from these near Eastern precedents through the mediation of Ionian practical and procedural (i.e., technical in the root sense).

Eunsoo Lee, Stanford University, eunsoo@stanford.edu

1A (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 502: "With or Without Numbers in ancient Greek Diagrams"

To modern students, geometry is reduced to calculations using the arithmetic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and exponentiation. Given the development of analytical geometry, elements of geometry have been digitized or quantified; points are positioned by coordinates, lines are measured by length, and areas and volumes are represented by numbers found with arithmetic operations. This synchronization of geometric elements with numbers has established an arithmetic framework for geometric inquiries. However, numbers are absent from ancient Greek geometry. Indeed, in the ancient Greek mathematical corpus, diagrams are presented without numbers whatsoever. In that framework, geometric inquiries are resolved only with diagrammatic elements such as lines, angles, and areas, not with numbers conferred to them. In particular, the application of area in Euclid's Elements, in which one figure is transformed into another with the same area, shows how ancient Greek mathematicians sought to compile their mathematical knowledge and shape its deductive structure without depending upon numerical calculation.

The absence of numbers in the ancient Greek geometrical discourse shows a contrast with Greek practical mathematics. By practical mathematics, I mean any mathematical practices that require counting, measuring, and weighing etc. Some fragments from ostraka, papyri rolls and parchment codices show that numbers are ubiquitous in many aspects of daily life, yet strangely silenced in theoretical geometry. Three questions should be raised: 1) How the use of numbers enables folk mathematicians to secure an objectivity of their practices? 2) Why were numbers disqualified to prove the core essence of the geometric relationship of figures? 3) How was ambivalent value conferred upon numbers in Classical Greece?

My paper starts from comparing ancient Greek diagrams from practical fields and those from theoretical fields. The difference between geometrical diagrams and practical diagrams confirms a distinctive communicative situation in ancient Greek theoretical mathematics that allows only abstract diagrams, as per Aristotle's term *aphaeresis* ('abstraction'), referring to the isolation of mathematical characteristics as objects of thought distinct from perceptible, thus measurable, objects. Next, the paper investigates how knowledge from practical mathematics could be applied for theoretical mathematics or vice versa. Diagrams in the book II of Euclid's Elements and Archimedes Method are introduced as an example to prove that the passage between practical mathematics and theoretical mathematics was not impassable.

Doug Shepardson, Fordham University, Dshepardson@fordham.edu
1B (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 504: "Recollection and Innatism in the *Meno*"

One of the most salient features of Plato's epistemology is his commitment to the doctrine of recollection. Although voluminously discussed in the literature, it is notoriously difficult to ascertain precisely what Plato thinks recollection entails. One particular aporia relevant to this discussion is that of Plato's commitment to innatism, the details of which have been discussed on-and-off for the past twenty or so years by Dominic Scott and Gail Fine. The particular disagreement in which I am here interested concerns two questions. (1) What, if anything, is innate in Plato's theory of recollection? And (2) how, if there is something innate, does it relate to Plato's positing of prenatal knowledge? Scott holds that Plato believes in latent innate knowledge, and that we have this latent innate knowledge because of our prenatal knowledge: we once knew and then forgot; but in forgetting, the content of our prenatal knowledge remained latent in the soul. ¹ But Fine denies that Plato has any such commitment to innate knowledge; indeed, she argues that Plato rejects even innate true beliefs. Instead, Fine claims, prenatal knowledge either favorably disposes us to prefer truth to falsehood, or it has no function at all. As I hope to show, both Scott's and Fine's accounts are problematic. For Scott ignores several passages that speak strongly against innate knowledge, and Fine ignores several passages that speak strongly in favor of innate true belief.

In section 1, I review some of the terminology used in discussing the various sorts of innatism in the literature. In section 2, I briefly review Scott's and Fine's respective accounts of innatism and its relation to prenatal knowledge. In section 3, I provide a close reading of the recollection segment in the *Meno* (81a-86c), pointing out where Fine's and Scott's interpretations fail. By the end of this section, I hope to have demonstrated, *pace* Fine, that Plato is committed to Latent Content Innatism about True Belief, and, *pace* Scott, that Plato is not committed to Latent Content Innatism about Knowledge. In section 4, I overturn Fine's claim that prenatal knowledge is either purposeless or serves (merely) to dispose the soul towards preferring truth to falsehood. In contrast, I examine an overlooked passage in the *Phaedrus* that

might explain why Plato thinks the soul had prenatal knowledge (or something like it), 2 but only has innate true belief upon birth. In concluding, I deal with some possible objections to my argument.

Ian McCready-Flora, University of Virginia, ian.flora@gmail.com

1B (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Knowing, Precisely: Epistemic Value in Aristotle”

Concerns about precision (*akrib*—) shape Aristotle’s discussion of first principles in *APo* 2.19 and should therefore guide our reading. Comprehension (*nous*), for instance, must be how we grasp first principles because it is the only state more precise than understanding (*epistêmê*). Platonic nativism absurdly claims that we have this precise grasp of principles without being aware of it. Aristotle furthermore bases his own account of how we come to first principles on perception (*aisthêsis*), because it is open to all but “not too worthy in terms of precision.” Much therefore turns on precision, but it receives little attention in this context. I argue that this sense of precision represents the power a state or process has to put someone safely beyond doubt about something. This makes it a kind of epistemic value. I infer this account from several key passages, then apply it to a new reading of *APo* 2.19.

(1) We should not (DA 3.3) say something appears to us when we are “functioning precisely about the perceptible.” This differs from the accuracy of HA 7.2. *Akribêia* there is physiological, the organ’s ability to receive stimuli. At DA 3.3 the question is whether something is a person, which is not a sensory quality. The functioning must therefore be cognitive or epistemic. Appearance-talk is inappropriate because it hedges when genuine perception puts us safely beyond doubt.

(2) Some say, compromising with Socrates (NE 7.3) that true belief—but not knowledge—is vulnerable to *akrasia*. For this argument to work, belief as such must be freighted with doubt, but some believers think they know precisely. These people feel beyond doubt, and so think they have a precise grasp. The compromise fails, and the way Aristotle argues that it does implies that precise cognition is what puts us safely beyond doubt.

(3) It makes no sense to deliberate matters of precise knowledge (NE 3.3) because we have no doubt about them. Cognition is therefore precise to the extent that it dispels doubt. This is also why Aristotle argues (NE 1.3) that ethics should not pretend to the same precision as geometry. Even a perfected science of the good cannot dispel doubt about various ethically-relevant particulars; that is a job for perception. Grasping such a science cannot, therefore, put us safely beyond doubt about such cases, making it imprecise.

Returning now to *APo* 2.19, I argue first that an initial distinction (99b35-100a3) among creatures with perception, memory and reason (*logos*) is taxonomic, not developmental. The account that follows (100a3-100b5) therefore applies only to rational souls, whose perceptual experience is structured by conceptual apparatus. It does not therefore describe how sophisticated cognition and/or content develops from more primitive forms thereof. The content pertains throughout to first principles, which means the account instead describes an epistemic transition from an imprecise grasp of the principles—via perception, which has little power to remove doubt about such things—to a grasp that enables demonstrative understanding.

Anne Ashbaugh, Towson University, aashbaugh@towson.edu
1B (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Consuming Knowledge”

A skeptic is someone courageous in inquiry and not given to easily assenting to a belief. In Plato’s dialogues, which I take to be skeptic exercises, two specific practices support courageous inquire and withholding assent: recollection and dialectic, respectively. The first ensures the possibility of inquiry. The second functions as a locus for examining knowledge claims and speeches, an ἀγγεῖον wherein we can test beliefs and determine, before consuming them, whether they are healthy or harmful to the soul (Protagoras, 313d-314a). It is in this context that I’ll re-examine recollection aiming to show that it plays a role in Meno and Phaedo in ways not yet recognized but important for unraveling the knotted problem concerning how humans know. Dialectic, in turn, will be discussed particularly as defined and dramatized in the Republic. More specifically, I intend to re-examine its power testing a belief’s ability to foster health or induce illness in the soul. This portion of the study concludes with an examination of how dialectic can be ‘container’ in the metaphorical way I recommended, and also ‘knowledge,’ as suggested in R 533a ff. I propose that the divided line holds the key to this tangle.

Joseph Bullock, St. Edwards University and Trinity University, joseph.b.bullock@gmail.com
1B (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Skeptical Suspension in the Face of Disagreement”

When Sextus Empiricus distinguishes between dogmatic philosophers and skeptics in the opening section of his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (PH), he says that the dogmatist thinks he has found the answer, while the skeptic keeps investigating (PH I 1). A few lines later he also says that the skeptic suspends judgment in the face of oppositions (PH I 8), and that the skeptic does not assent to anything unclear that she investigates (PH I 13). Many scholars have found these passages puzzling: How can you keep investigating once you have decided that the appropriate response to a disagreement is the suspension of judgment? In this paper, I will explain how the skeptic's investigative activity harmonizes with her suspensive response due to a certain practical norm that governs the skeptic's reaction to disagreement, namely that the skeptic suspends judgment once she is aware of a disagreement before she begins to investigate what can be said on behalf of either side. I claim that this norm marks the fundamental difference between the skeptic and the dogmatist, who will typically stick to his beliefs while he looks into the issue. In this paper, I discuss those places where Sextus suggests that he holds the norm that I claim he holds. I show how my interpretation helps to explain several puzzling features of Pyrrhonian philosophy, including the idea that one could both suspend judgment and continue investigating. Finally, I consider and dismiss some objections to my view.

J. J. Mulhern, University of Pennsylvania, johnjm@sas.upenn.edu
1C (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 506: “A Different *Politics* of Aristotle? The Influence of Translation on Interpretation”

Modern English translations of Aristotle’s *Politics*, going at least as far back as Gillies, whose third edition appeared in London in 1813, sometimes seek to render words which had multiple historical senses by a single word in English or by using a word or phrase which resonates with later readers but whose sense is not consistent with Aristotle’s language. These translations can exclude interpretations that are plausible and, on reflection, perhaps preferable. The former case is exemplified by uniform or nearly uniform translations of *politeia* by ‘constitution’ even though *politeia* has four main senses in its 522 occurrences in the *Politics* as well as in other Greek literature and

inscriptions, as I have shown in my chapter in the recent *Aristotle's Politics: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge, 2015). The latter case is exemplified by the translation of *ktēma* by 'property', though Aristotle typically intends what we would mean by 'possession' and though 'property' in English has a different sense from 'possession', as I showed in my 2014 NPSA paper which refers to the Penguin translation. Another signal case is the casual use of "form of government" or "form of constitution" in, for example, the Loeb translation, although the phrase *eidos tēs politeias* rarely occurs in the *Politics* and rarely if ever means form of government or form of constitution. Likewise, where Aristotle says that he seeks the citizen *haplōs*, or simply [speaking], in 1275a19, the Loeb gives "in the absolute sense" and the Penguin "proper," neither of which brings out Aristotle's logical point. In this paper I shall give examples in which more sensitivity to Aristotle's language may suggest material changes to our understanding of the *Politics* and so of the history of political thought overall.

Christos Evangeliou, Towson University, cevangeliou@towson.edu
1C (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 506: "Aristotle on the Best Polity"

With the exception of the First Book, where the political community is set apart from other forms of association, especially the family, the rest of Aristotle's *Politics* is devoted to the search for the "best polity" (*ariste politeia*). Following his familiar method of inquiry, he felt compelled to criticize Plato's and other theoretical conceptions of the ideal polis, as well as actual states with a reputation of being durable, with well-formed constitutions. He would do so not only in the name of truth and for the benefit of students of political theory as he had done in the *Ethics*, but also for the practitioners of the difficult political art. It is my purpose in this paper to examine the results of Aristotle's search for the best polity among those which he judged as good forms of constitutions, as opposed to the bad or corrupt constitutions. It will be shown that his critique aimed at Plato's polity as articulated in the *Laws* and considered as more realistic than the ideal polity as presented in the *Republic*, with its community of women, children, and property.

The main target of Aristotle's critique was Plato's polity, that is, the mixed constitution that aims at a balanced political mesotes by 'mixing' different aspects of democratic and oligarchic constitutions in some judicious manner. By criticizing the Platonic "second best" polity as leaning toward the oligarchy, Aristotle clearly suggested that his preference was for the predominance of the democratic elements in the mixing of the various constitutions in order to achieve the "*ariste politeia*" which is the most durable and just, based on a strong middle class with equitable property and aiming at the life of virtue (*aretē*). The opposite of it is Tyranny, on which both philosophers agreed that it is the most unjust and worst of all.

George Harvey, Indiana University Southeast, whgeorge@ius.edu
1C (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 506: "The Cosmic Purpose of Political Life in Plato's *Laws*"

In book X of the *Laws*, the Athenian provides an argument to show that the gods care about human affairs. This is followed by a long speech that is intended to charm and persuade the impious who believe that the gods are indifferent about human affairs, in which the Athenian describes how each individual soul is treated according to its ethical character. That the gods' care for the goodness of the whole cosmos extends to the souls of individual human beings gives us good reason for thinking that it also includes much larger parts of the universe, especially those that are a major factor in determining the ethical character of individuals. Specifically, it would seem to follow from the Athenian's remarks that the gods' care for the whole cosmos includes the political communities that both represent significant parts of the cosmos and play a crucial role in determining the character of individual souls. Of particular relevance is the Athenian's account in book III where he briefly

discusses the repeated cycle whereby civilizations come into existence and are destroyed by major catastrophes, as he find in these events evidence of divine care. The cycle the Athenian describes here is similar to phenomena described in the *Timaeus* and *Statesman*, which suggests that Plato takes seriously the idea that events of this kind are features of the world in which we live and play an important role in shaping the course of human life. What I will argue is that the details of the account presented in *Laws* III provide evidence that these events represent a significant part of the gods' care for human affairs. The obvious impact these disasters have on human existence is the elimination of political life and the prolonged periods of primitive life that follows, but when considered in light of the details found in the Athenian's speech in book X, I will show that these events are also a major component of the process whereby the rewards and punishments given to individual souls contribute to the good of the cosmos. Moreover, in doing so, I will show that this component of divine care is compatible with interpretations of the cosmology and eschatology of *Laws* X that fall along more 'scientific' lines. Specifically, what I have in mind is best expressed in Trevor Saunders' view that in the eschatology of *Laws* X, we have a 'physical, spatial, and [...] scientific eschatology, covered by a thinnish veneer of mythical motifs in deference to the ostensible literary form.' That the view I present here is an expansion of, and therefore consistent with, the scientific interpretation means that we need not rely on any of the mythical elements that portray the gods as actively intervening in human affairs in order to establish that the recurring disasters have their origin in divine reason.

Christopher Sauder, Collège Universitaire Dominicain, christopher.sauder@dominican.ca
1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: "Providence, Ἐπιμαρμένη and Gnosticism in the Late Treatises of Plotinus"

Plotinus' detailed critique, in treatise 33 (II,9), does not make entirely clear exactly what ethical and cosmological worldview he sought to uphold against the Gnostic position. Those viewpoints are more concisely articulated in his final treatises, where he defends the notion of providence and rejects the "hard" version of astrological determinism. Though these late treatises ("On Providence" 47-48 (III.2-3) and "On Whether the Stars are Causes" 52 (II.3)) emerge primarily out of a debate with Stoic positions, they nevertheless contain a number of positions with a distinctly anti-gnostic thrust. This is unsurprising given that, as Plotinus himself tells us, the Gnostics reject the notion of Providence and that, as we know from the Nag Hammadi texts, the Gnostics held positions that could be characterized as astral determinism.

Kevin Corrigan, Emory University, kcorrigan@emory.edu
1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: "Plotinus and the Gnostics: The Peculiar Impact of the Tripartite Tractate and Similar Works"

Our paper argues that the Valentinian Tripartite Tractate had a decisive influence on the formulation of some of Plotinus' most influential ideas and images, for example—darkness, matter, emanation as generative power, the nature of God.

John Turner, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jturner2@unl.edu
1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: "Plotinus and the Gnostics: The Peculiar Impact of the Tripartite Tractate and Similar Works"

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Francis Lacroix, Université Laval, Francis.lacroix.2@ulaval.ca

1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: "The Gnostic Influence in Plotinus' Early Treatises: The Case of *Ennead* IV 8 [6]"

Treatises 30-33, where Plotinus criticizes the Gnostic thesis, clearly demonstrate that he was himself influenced by his antagonists when he wrote that which was a single large work before Porphyry separated it in four parts (see John Turner, *Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic Tradition*, 2001). The disciple of Plato has certainly borrowed from Greek philosophy to elaborate his own theories, in which we can analyze some magnificent innovations, but the gnostic point of view must also be considered, at least from *Treatises* 30-33 to the last of Plotinus' work.

In this paper, we will argue that the Gnostics must also be considered in Plotinus' early treatises. *Ennead* IV 8 [6], entitled *On the Descent of Soul into Bodies*, where Plotinus presents a striking theory of the partial descent of the soul, is manifestly more than just a Platonist development. Indeed, we cannot find any trace of this thesis in Plato's dialogue. It may therefore seem to be a whole *ex nihilo* creation from Plotinus. Nevertheless, he seems to address an implicit critic to the gnostic belief that they are God, or at least a consubstantial part of Him. Our conference will expose the gnostic background of Plotinus' theory of the descent of soul. We will argue that some words that he uses in this very dialogue are also Gnostic terms, inter alia ἐφάπτεσθαι (ch. 2, 2) and τὸ προνοεῖν (ch. 2, 26), which we can find in *Ennead* II, 9 [33], but respectively in *Zoetrian* and in the *Tripartite Tractate* as well. We will also note that Plotinus cites more than usual Greek philosophers in IV 8 in order to present, against the gnostic interpretation of the Greek philosophy, the adequate comprehension of it. Thus, we can ponder about Plotinus' theory of the descent of soul that even though the philosopher presents a singular theory, gnostic thinkers gravitated around him at the very beginning of his writing career.

Jean-Marc Narbonne, Université Laval, Jean-Marc.Narbonne@fp.ulaval.ca

1D (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 508: "The Partly Undescended Soul in Plotinus: Again, on its Source and Meaning"

In his typical way of writing, Plotinus does not declare precisely who are the 'others' he is referring to when he boldly dares to state that part of our Soul is not down here but still stayed somehow in the Noetic world. Who are exactly the opponents he is referring to, some Platonists? But who are they, characters unknown to us but yet very significant, hardly plausible? Platonists known to us? But then again, we know of no well know Platonists who upheld a precise thesis in relation to this topic. Isn't it then more plausible to think of a special group of Platonists, that is 'Gnostic Platonists', who advocated a sort of collapse and tragic decline of ordinary human Souls (the case of the 'elected' being of course different)? In light of some recent research on this subject, I want to ascertain if the suggestion I made earlier about the 'gnostic identity of those 'others' is not only defensible but still clearly convincing today.

Zita Toth, Fordham University, ztoth@fordham.edu

1E (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 510: "Is There a Necessary Connection Between Cause and Effect?"

Many contemporary Aristotelians claim, and arguably so did Aristotle, that for a powers-based

view of causation to be explanatorily successful, it needs to posit that causal powers and their manifestations are necessarily linked. This presented a special problem for the medieval Aristotelian, who was working in a theistic framework: there are certain stories reported in the Bible, which, if they are at least logically possible, seem to exclude such a necessary connection. In short, the problem comes from so-called miracles against nature, where a natural thing retains its disposition or causal power and nevertheless does not produce its characteristic effect (or, even worse, it sometimes produces the opposite of its characteristic effect) -- the most famous example is perhaps Nebuchadnezzar's fire and the three young men not burning in it. So what can the theist Aristotelian do with such cases? Do we need to give up the necessary connection requirement? I argue that depending on what general view of divine concurrence we adopt (occasionalism, mere conservationism, or concurrentism), we have different resources to deal with the problem. I will show that although mere conservationism might be an intuitively plausible theory of divine concurrence, it cannot account well for miracles against nature without giving up an important tenet of divine omnipotence; concurrentism, on the other hand, can handle these cases more easily, and can successfully reconcile the necessity requirement with miracles against nature.

Machessa Samz, Fordham University, msamz@fordham.edu

1E (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 510: "Aristotle and Aquinas on Singular Thought: A Unified, Non-Descriptive Account"

Most commentators acknowledge that for Aristotle and Aquinas, the paradigm of thought is general thought, not singular thought. That is to say, according to them, our thoughts are primarily about kinds such as human beings or dogs, rather than individuals such as Socrates or Fido. This has led many commentators simply to neglect the question of whether Aristotle and Aquinas have an account of singular thought at all, while it has led others quickly to point out the shortcomings of their accounts. Nevertheless, there have been recent attempts to argue that Aristotle and Aquinas have successful, non-descriptivist accounts of singular thought that can overcome the problems of contemporary, Neo-Fregean descriptivist accounts.

But, unfortunately, these attempts have not put Aristotle and Aquinas in sufficient dialogue with each other. So, it has appeared that Aristotle and Aquinas offer two diverging, non-descriptivist accounts of singular thought, where one is superior to the other. However, as I will show, by considering the texts of Aristotle and Aquinas together, a unified, non-descriptivist account emerges that can address problems confronting not only Neo-Fregean descriptivist accounts, but other contemporary, non-descriptivist accounts.

Shane Wilkins, Fordham University, wilkins@fordham.edu

1E (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 510: "Is Existence a First-Order Property After All?"

Like many medieval and modern philosophers, Aquinas held that existence is a first-order property of objects. This claim underlies at least three central ideas of Aquinas's metaphysics:

- the distinction between essence and existence,
- the claim that existence is a kind of activity, and
- the claim that existence is analogous among a variety of senses rather than univocal.

Each of these claims has fallen in disrepute in contemporary philosophy on the grounds that it is not possible to construe existence as a first-order property.

According to the orthodox interpretation of the birth of analytic philosophy (recently reiterated in (Inwagen 2009) for instance), Russell and Quine decisively refuted the idea that existence could be first-order in their refutation of Meinong. Aquinas's fundamental position on existence is assimilated to Meinong and consequently the rest of his distinctive theses about existence are dismissed out of hand.

My goal in this paper is to show that this orthodoxy is wrong. I will draw on some lessons about the construction of such theories from (Linsky and Zalta 1994) and (Williamson 2002) to help develop such a non-Meinongian view. The crucial defect such theories are supposed to face is that they require existence to be universal, which is supposed to entail that, for instance, that the "carnivorous cattle do not exist" is false because there are such cattle who merely happen to be non-actual.

I will argue we can avoid this consequence, by endorsing something like Adam of Wodeham's *complexe significabilia* as a kind of sui generis entity like a state of affairs. On my view, it is this state of affairs, rather than some existing, but non-actual cows which make "carnivorous cattle do not exist" true. Finally, I will argue that this is a view which Aquinas could in principle accept, despite his occasional hesitations about entities like *complexe significabilia*.

Lastly, in the third section of the paper, I will try to put my new non-Meinongian view of existence to work, attempting to show how that view allows us to offer perfectly plausible construals of the three central ideas of Aquinas's metaphysics mentioned above. I will not argue directly for the truth of the three claims here; it is enough simply to show they can be coherently stated pace the orthodox view.

Twyla Gibson, University of Missouri, gibsontg@missouri.edu

1F (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 513: "The Dark Sea and the Lake of Heaven: Representation and Rhetoric in *Zhuangzi*, I-V, and Plato"

A significant development in ancient studies has been the growing recognition that many early texts from different cultures are organized by way of a rhetorical figure known as parallelism. In parallelism, an initial sequence of topics a-b- c is repeated in identical order a-b- c-a- b-c. Though progress has been made in identifying parallelism in ancient writings, much work remains to be done. With respect to the *Zhuangzi*, traditional interpretation has focused on the content; few studies have looked at the text in terms of its form. A comparative analysis of the order and arrangement of topics in the *Zhuangzi* I-V and the series of topics described and explained in Plato's Sophist shows that the latent order of the topics in the narrative sequence in the inner chapters of *Zhuangzi* corresponds point by point to the topics in the series of definitions presented by explicit instructions in Plato's Sophist. In fact, the series for the definition of representation occurs three times in the opening chapters of the *Zhuangzi*, making it unlikely that the series occurs by chance or accident. This evidence points to significant cross-cultural influence and borrowing between the early Greek and Chinese traditions. I end with some remarks about the implications of these findings for our understanding of the information communicated by the text.

Hyun Höchsmann, East China Normal University, hhochsmann@gmail.com

1F (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 513: "Confucius and Leibniz on the Common Good"

In Confucius' principle of reciprocity ('Do not do to others what you do not wish for yourself') and in Leibniz's conception of the common good, individual moral life and communal life are regarded

as a continuum. The principle of reciprocity, in requiring that we take into consideration our well-being as well as that of others, provides a practical rule and a starting point of striving for the common good. Leibniz advocates the active pursuit of *commune bonum* (common good) as the foremost goal of all ethical and political endeavours.

Confucius and Leibniz emphasise the moral responsibility of all to contribute to general well-being. Confucian political philosophy stresses the well-being of the people as having the foremost importance. The significance of Confucius' and Leibniz's ethics in the areas of moral epistemology, moral cognitivism, moral realism and moral universalism as well as in the application of moral theory to practice can be clearly demonstrated from their philosophical writings.

Matthew Walker, Yale-NUS College, Matthew.walker@yale-nus.edu.sg

1F (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 513: "Zhu Xi on Knowing for the Sake of Acting"

According to Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), knowing and acting virtuously are deeply interconnected, even if they are distinct activities. "Knowledge and action are normally mutually dependent," he says. "It's like this: if a person has eyes but no legs, he cannot walk; if he has legs but no eyes, he cannot see. As for their order, knowledge comes first. As for their importance, action is more significant" (G/148:4). 1 Elsewhere, he asks, "[I]f you cannot see, how can you walk?" (152:14). Zhu Xi accounts for knowing as akin to seeing: just as one's acting well in certain domains (e.g., walking) requires sight, so too acting well in general requires knowing the li 理 (i.e., the pattern, coherence, or principle) that unifies the cosmos as a whole and which is manifest as attached to different clarities of qi 氣 (sometimes translated "vital energy").

According to Zhu Xi's investigation thesis, then, virtuous agency, practically speaking, requires that we investigate li in things (gewu 格物) (150:9). True, the sage kings, such as King Wen, may well have been born naturally and effortlessly knowing li (G/132:12). But most of us are not natural-born sages. So, we should investigate the Pattern as it has been preserved in books and as it manifests itself throughout nature.

In upholding the investigation thesis, however, Zhu Xi faces worries. In particular, his account of knowing and acting might seem overly intellectualist and aside the point. On this worry, if we want to act virtuously, investigating li throughout nature is useless and ultimately irrelevant. Systematic investigation of li is neither necessary nor sufficient for acting well. Call this the irrelevance worry about Zhu Xi's view. Instead of investigating li in the world, we would do well to focus on ourselves and seek ways to make ourselves better directly, by working on ourselves. (Wang Yangming [1472-1529] suggests the irrelevance worry about Zhu Xi's view.)

In this paper, I investigate Zhu Xi's investigation thesis in the light of the irrelevance worry. On what basis does Zhu Xi propound the investigation thesis? Does Zhu Xi have good reason to think that acting well requires the sort of exhaustive investigation of things that he proposes? And to what extent can Zhu Xi respond to the irrelevance worry?

Glenn Rawson, Rhode Island College, grawson@ric.edu

1G (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 514: "Heraclitus and Three Rationalisms"

Heraclitus has been variously interpreted as a mystic, a relativist, an empiricist, a proto-skeptic, and

even a precursor to postmodernism. There is some evidence for each of those interpretations in the provocative fragments that remain. But I argue that overall, Heraclitus is better understood as a pioneering rationalist, in each of three increasingly specific senses.

First, Heraclitus is a momentous early rationalist in the broadest sense, which distinguishes the beginnings of intellectual theory from previous literature. Such “rationalists” reject traditional appeals to conventional authority or divine revelation, and ground claims about unseen reality in argument and explanation, with common human reasoning abilities. This broad sense of rationalism is discussed more in disciplines outside philosophy, but it's crucial for understanding the special early position of Heraclitus. He was the first to be explicit about it, with the first recorded re-purposing of common words to signify a knowing mind (*psyche*) that can recognize something's nature (*physis*) through some universal rational language (*logos*). It's his particular, often puzzling uses of those very terms that contain evidence for his rationalism in the more specific and controversial senses.

Next, I contend that Heraclitus was also a rationalist in the somewhat general, more typically philosophical sense opposed to empiricism. Among the earliest philosophers, Parmenides was the most conspicuous to hold this kind of position. But Heraclitus too maintained that the content of some knowledge cannot be derived from sense perception, and comes instead from some special faculty of reason -- an interpretation I'll support with key fragments about right thinking, and about how sense experience can't apprehend the *physis* that “loves to hide” (such as DK1, 17, 34, 40, 54, 107, and 123).

Finally, I argue that Heraclitus is a philosophical rationalist in the specific version subscribing to knowledge that's determined innately, as contrasted with knowledge acquired by intuition and deduction. Parmenides is best interpreted on the model of rational intuition; Heraclitus is best interpreted as an innatist, and particularly in a variety maintaining that the use or production of innately determined knowledge requires triggering by sense-perception. Here I'll compare fragments about the importance of learning through experience, with fragments about how the *logos* belongs to the *psyche* and “increases itself” (such as 35, 45, 55, 101, 107, 116, 115).

Rose Cherubin, George Mason University, rcherubi@gmu.edu
1G (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 514: “Zeno's Paradoxes and Parmenides”

Ancient accounts of the relationship between Zeno's work and Parmenides' work conflict fundamentally. There was general agreement that Zeno was a student of Parmenides and that he sought to support the findings of his teacher. But did Zeno argue for the same points as Parmenides, argue against the opposition to Parmenides without arguing for the same points as Parmenides, or something else? Did Zeno argue that what is is one, that it is not many, that it is not one, that being one is unintelligible, or something else? Did Zeno argue that what is is at rest, that it does not move, or something else? On these questions, there was no ancient consensus.

In addition, there is a general question about the relationship between the work of Zeno and that of Parmenides: What if any is the significance of paradoxes as a way of supporting Parmenides? That is, whatever Zeno was trying to establish, he did not simply show that the points he and/or Parmenides challenged led to contradictions. He showed that they led to paradoxes.

I propose to show that Parmenides also developed or indicated paradoxes. These are not the same as the paradoxes of Zeno, as those come down to us. The paradoxes in Parmenides are Liar-type paradoxes: for example, on the basis of mortals' opinions, and framed through mortals' opinions, the goddess shows that mortals' opinions are flawed. The paradoxes of multiplicity attributed to

Zeno support this feature of Parmenides' work by illustrating how mortals' opinions are flawed. Zeno's paradoxes show how these flaws are central to a worldview that involves negation, distinction, unity, and inference.

The account that I propose fits well with Plato's portrayal of Zeno at *Parmenides* 128c-d. Time permitting, I will try to show as well that this account helps us make sense of another aspect of Plato's portrayal of the Eleatics: Plato's *Parmenides* and Zeno are very interested in continuing inquiry. Both in antiquity and today, many commentators understand the Eleatics as having brought philosophical inquiry to a halt, or at least as having discovered something that brought their own inquiries to a halt. If the account of their implications that I will propose is correct, we will be able to see several ways in which their work supports and motivates further inquiry.

Daryl Tress, Fordham University, tress@fordham.edu

1G (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 514: "Early Greek Philosophy and the Missing Greek Past"

I discuss some ways in which the "Dark Age" era of Greek history (the collapse, circa 1200-950 BCE, that followed the end of the Bronze Age palace societies) may shed light on the beginnings of philosophy.

Samuel Ortencio Flores, College of Charleston, floresso@cofc.edu

1G (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 514: "Socrates and Anaxagoras: Plato's Criticism of Anaxagorean Physics"

In Plato's *Phaedo*, Socrates famously narrates the origins of his philosophic interests in natural philosophy, and his subsequent turn towards ethics (96a-100a). He was especially interested in Anaxagoras' claim that nous "both orders things and is the cause of everything" (97c, trans. Sedley and Long), since he believed this claim would lead to discussion of all things in their best state. Despite his excitement, Socrates was quickly disappointed in Anaxagoras' reliance upon the material causes of things, rather than on further explication of nous as the final cause (99a-b). He thus turned from the study of natural philosophy to the study of logoi (99e). In this paper, I examine Anaxagoras in the broader context of Plato's corpus. I suggest that Socrates turns away from Anaxagoras and natural philosophy because of the latter's logical and ethical inconsistencies.

In the first section of this paper, I examine the role of Anaxagoras in the *Apology*. In his cross-examination of Meletus, Socrates suggests that his accuser's charges are appropriate for Anaxagoras rather than for himself (26d). In this section, he does not just defer his charges onto another: he also establishes a link between physics and ethics. Socrates interprets the two charges of his accusers—(1) corrupting the youth and (2) not believing in the city's gods, but introducing new daimonia into the city—as interrelated and interdependent. Socrates corrupts the youth, they claim, through teaching his impious theological teachings (26b). Through his response to these charges, Socrates shows that Anaxagoras' godless worldview is deficient not because it is in itself impious, but because it fails to develop a system of ethics stemming from its natural explanations of the cosmos. Socrates, in contrast to Anaxagoras, uses his new *daimonia* as a protreptic tool for a virtuous life.

In the next section, I discuss Anaxagoras' influence on Pericles in the *Phaedrus*. In his discussion of rhetoric, Socrates links the great orator Pericles with Anaxagoras. He suggests that Pericles was "filled with star-gazing theorizing," came to "understand the nature of mind (nous) and

mindlessness – the very things Anaxagoras discussed at great length,” and “drew from all this and applied what fit to the art of speech” (270a, trans. Scully). Socrates pairs Anaxagoras’ natural philosophy with Pericles’ rhetorical style, suggesting a link between physics and rhetoric. The link highlights the negative qualities of both. Periclean rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* demonstrates the same logical and ethical deficiencies as Anaxagorean physics in the *Phaedo*: both fail to account for the ethical consequences of their theories.

I conclude by suggesting that Socrates opposes himself to Anaxagoras through the common link he sees among natural philosophy and rhetoric, i.e. ethics. Anaxagoras made key advances in natural philosophy, and his student Pericles applied these advances to rhetoric. Socrates was dissatisfied with both, because they failed to acknowledge the impact of their respective areas of expertise on the soul and how one ought to live. Their failures thus demonstrated the need for Socrates’ philosophic project.

Jisean Kim, Binghamton University, 6072223851@vzwpix.com

1H (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 307: “The Ancient Asian Heritage of the Korean Self-Identity and its Encounter with Western Modernity and the Phenomenon of the Global Self”

This paper examines the challenges faced by integration of the constituents of the present complex Korean identity: the classical ancient Asian heritage, the contemporary nationalistic persona, the Western modernity, and finally the new Global Self of the 21st Century.

Jesse Schupack, University of Notre Dame, jschupack@nd.edu

1I (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 311: “Justice as Psychic *Dunamis* in the *Gorgias* and *Republic*”

In the *Gorgias* and *Republic* Socrates is challenged by interlocutors who speak disparagingly of conventional justice and in praise of the life that rejects it. On at least a superficial level the answers Socrates gives in the dialogues are consonant: we should never be unjust but instead should discipline our desires and pursue wisdom: this is the path to true happiness. As many read the *Republic*, however, this apparent similarity is only superficial. On this reading, an orientation toward philosophy is an orientation toward the highest objects of wisdom, to wit, the Forms, and especially the Form of the Good. One becomes a philosopher by gaining knowledge of these Forms. Thus the metaphysics of the central books is essential to filling out the defense of justice and the ethical project of the work as a whole. The *Gorgias*, by contrast, does not hold forth on metaphysics as such: there is no worked-out theory of the soul, no clear evidence of the theory of Forms, and more generally the Socrates we find in its pages lays claim only to a basic “human” kind of wisdom: knowledge of one’s own ignorance. On these interpretations the dialogues are plainly inconsistent: in the *Gorgias*’s view one strives to obtain justice by striving to avoid injustice, and this through an orientation that is fundamentally Socratic, which is to say, negative. In the *Republic*, however, to supplant desire with wisdom is to orient one’s pursuits toward the study of philosophy, achieving the kind of wisdom that the Socrates of the *Apology* calls divine.

My aim in this paper is to call this supposed inconsistency into question. I focus, in particular, on both dialogues’ characterization of justice as a kind of psychic power (*dunamis*) that is intrinsically beneficial to the agent. My argument is that, though indisputably the Forms provide a new account of the grounds of goodness, it is not at all evident that in doing so they offer a new account of what it is for a person to be good.

Nowhere in the *Republic* is the reader straightforwardly told that virtue now requires a positive kind

of knowledge that is incompatible with the Socratic ethical theory found in the *Gorgias*. The metaphysics of the middle books, I argue, serves rather to provide an account of what it is that makes a just soul good and to describe the degree of wisdom that would be required for a philosopher to be justified in turning her attention to politics—and how that sort of wisdom might be acquired. The dialogues are distinguished, then, not in terms of what they say justice is—the kind of power that it is in the soul of the one who obtains it—but rather in terms of the accounts they give of the grounds of justice. An interesting consequence of this is that the *Republic* proves far more consistent with the ethics of the early Socratic dialogues than is generally thought.

Lee Franklin, Franklin & Marshall College, lee.franklin@fandm.edu
1I (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 311: “Shadow Pleasures in the *Republic*, IX”

In the “Olympian Argument,” of *Republic* IX, Socrates argues that the pleasures of the non-intelligent are “neither entirely true or pure but like a shadow painting.” (583b). On a first reading, Socrates’ goes on to show that some experiences are perceived falsely to be pleasures (or pains) due to the contrast with prior conditions. In this paper, I argue that beyond this claim, Socrates seeks more broadly to reject an analysis of pleasure as perceptual and relativistic, and for a doxastic account, one on which many pleasures and pains are to be understood as like judgments in their content and structure.

For this, I offer a new reading of the opening section of the Olympian Argument, where Socrates examines the judgment of the sick that the state of health is most pleasant (583c-584c). Surprisingly, in considering this judgment, Glaucon suggests that in such moments “health comes to be pleasant for them...” (583d-e) As I argue, Glaucon’s suggestion is that pleasures and pains are perceptual becomings, entirely relative to individual perceivers at the moment of perception. This analysis is incompatible, however, with the fact that such pleasures involve comparisons between one moment and another, so as to entail the stability, as objects of contemplation, of both the person pleased and his or her states.

Put another way, the experience of pleasure depends on the possibility of one and the same person rendering an assessment of one and the same personal condition at different times. Furthermore, the argument links the conditions that make such diachronic assessment possible to the conditions that make interpersonal communication about pleasures and pains possible as, for instance, in a disagreement about which experiences or lives are most pleasant. Thus, while the argument most overtly analyzes illusory pleasures, which involve a mistake resulting from juxtaposition, it reveals a broader class of pleasures to be shadow-like in that they are doxastic images of states and processes occurring within the pleased individual.

Revealing the doxastic structure of pleasure explains not just why the pleasures of the non-intelligent lack the hedonic value they appear to have. Moreover, it explains why the intelligent experience the same states and processes so differently. As I suggest in closing, the Olympian Argument reveals the extent to which, on Plato’s view, understanding can permeate and shape our felt experience from moment to moment.

Joseph Forte, The Catholic University of America and Northeast Catholic College,
jforte@northeastcatholic.edu

11 (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 311: “The Psychic Influence Principle and *Republic*, 8-10”

This paper will explore the transformations the soul undergoes in books 8-10 of the *Republic*. I will be highlighting especially the role that external influences play on the various alterations of the soul's constitution, and I will venture the hypothesis that in these later books, Plato provides the framework for a “Psychic Influence Principle,” which essentially states that under certain circumstances, the soul may be easily transformed by outside factors. This principle gives us a window not only to the degradation of the soul, but also the remedy for such degeneration. Most of the paper will explain this principle as it is outlined in books 8 and 9, and then the final two sections will examine the discussion of art in book 10 and the remedy for soul-degradation, respectively. I hope to provide some detail about the degree to which the soul is sensitive to outside influences and, on the other hand, resilient in the face of them, depending on various factors.

Mark Moes, Grand Valley State University, moesm@gvsu.edu

11 (Saturday 9:00) ROOM 311: “Not an 'Exact Grasp' but Not a 'Complete Falsehood': The Status and Function of the Tripartite Model of City and Soul in the *Republic*”

The paper begins by summarizing some recent work on the theoretical limitations and deficiencies of the *Republic's* tripartite model of city and soul, work that makes clear the implausibility of considering the model as an unqualified expression of Socratic (or Platonic) political or psychological doctrine. Then it attempts to get clearer about what rhetorical work Socrates (and Plato) aims to accomplish in using such a theoretically deficient model. Along the way it attempts to explain, with the help of a thesis about the compositional structure of the Platonic dialogue, why Plato has Socrates introduce the tripartite model in the first place, why it disappears in the *Republic's* digression on philosophy, and why it reappears in Books 8-9 (not to mention Book 10) doing several kinds of rhetorical work. The paper argues that Plato depicts Socrates using the model in Book 4 as a tool for leading Glaucon and Adeimantus into a self-scrutiny capable of leading them to insight into the deficiencies of their political and moral conceptions and practices (and that Plato authors the depiction in order to lead his audience to similar self-scrutiny and insight). It argues that the meaning and function of the model shifts in Books 8-9, books that depict Socrates making a critical return to the model after the digression on philosophy.

Finally, the paper explains, by distinguishing between an epistemic sense and an ontological sense of ‘truth’, why the model of the tripartite soul is true in one sense (not a “complete falsehood”) and false in another (not an “exact grasp”). The tripartite model has epistemic truth (is not a complete falsehood) insofar as it represents a set of really existing and prevalent flawed political and moral practices, and represents certain forms of psychological disorder. But the model is (ontologically) false in the sense that it does not adequately represent the structure of a soul that realizes the true Form of a good soul. The “more exact grasp” of that Form, a Form defining the normative order of the good human life and hence of the good soul, is only found in the “incorporeal order that rules harmoniously over soul-and- body” yielded by the dialectical division of the intermediate forms of human life at *Philebus* 64b.

Julie Ward, Loyola University Chicago, jward@luc.edu

2A (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 502: “Aristotle's Virtue and the Sorites Paradox”

The paradox called the “Sorites,” or the “Heap,” traditionally attributed to Eubulides of the

Megarian School, seems to have been posed against Aristotle's theory of moral virtue as a mean. This paper examines how the paradox might work against this account of moral virtue, and, since Aristotle did not specifically reply to the paradox, whether his theory has resources with which to combat it.

Angela Curran, Independent Scholar, Acurran123@gmail.com

2A (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 502: "Aristotelian *Catharsis*: A Reconsideration of the Purgation Account"

This paper presents a reconsideration and defense of a purgation account of catharsis in Aristotle's *Poetics*, through developing the discussion of catharsis in *Politics* 8.7, where it is suggested that catharsis lightens or relieves the emotional state of everyone. It is argued that a modified account of dramatic catharsis as purgation can meet the objections posed to the earlier analysis of dramatic catharsis as purgation of the emotions offered by Jacob Bernays. In particular the purgation account has been open to several objections. First, it seems to suggest that the emotions of pity and fear are impure and dirty states that need to be purged. This conflicts with the way in which Aristotle thinks of the emotions as necessary aspects of a fully human life. Second, it also suggests that catharsis applies to one in need of healing and therapy, but there is no suggestion in the *Poetics* that this is true of the audience of tragedy. Indeed in *Poetics* 26 and elsewhere in the *Poetics* Aristotle argues that tragedy is superior to comedy because it appeals to a better audience ((1461b25f.; *Poetics* 13.1453a30-36; and 6.1450b16-19).

This paper works with an idea in *Politics* 8.7, where Aristotle discusses musical catharsis. There is suggested that catharsis lightens or relieves in some way the emotional state of everyone, including the virtuous person, whose emotions are not in excess and are felt just as they should be.

I draw on Aristotle's writings of a healthy soul in his writings on medicine, as well as the account in the *Poetics* of the nature of the emotional experience of tragedy, to show that there is a therapeutic aspect to dramatic catharsis, but not in the way Bernays described. It does not remove a pathological tendency to feel excessive emotion, though it is possible that it can help spectators who feel emotions excessively or incorrectly. Catharsis, nevertheless, has a therapeutic aspect, something that is available to all spectators, because the cognitive benefits it provides can lighten the burden of the painfulness of their experience of pity and fear, providing a pleasurable relief.

Susan B. Levin, Smith College, slevin@smith.edu

2A (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 502: "Aristotle's Moral Psychology v. Current Advocacy of Cognitive Enhancement"

If Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane's Principle of Procreative Beneficence were implemented regarding cognitive enhancement, a primary focus of enhancement advocates' attention, the result would be highly impoverishing for future children. For, apart from being inadequate to rationality itself, advocates' view of cognitive enhancement severs reason from the input to judgments and decision-making provided by faculties other than reason proper. When handling desire, supporters of vigorous cognitive enhancement frame conflicts between reason and the nonrational in terms of self-governance or akratic failure, depending on which one triumphs. Advocates also discuss the nonrational apropos of so-called negative emotion, and, again, what is other than reason is assumed to be irrational such that an alliance with reason toward shared ends is out of the question. Far from seeking a fruitful balance between rational and nonrational dimensions of us as anchoring individual

and communal flourishing, proponents of cognitive enhancement valorize the ceaseless elevation of rational capacity per se and hint at an ideal of self-sufficiency. Reflection on Aristotle's handling of pathê and moral virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics* not only reinforces and deepens an independent line of critique of current advocacy of cognitive enhancement but helps to anchor a richer account of the pertinent psychic terrain.

Max Robitzsch, Sungkyunkwan University, jmrobitzsch@gmail.com

2B (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 504: "Epicurus on the Ontological Status of Color"

In this paper, I propose to examine key passages in the Epicurean corpus that deal with the ontological status of color (*Letter to Herodotus* 68, Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* II.730-841, and Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1008f-1111d). I argue that for the Epicureans, color is best understood as a kind of accidental property (*sumptomata*) that is predicated of compounds (*sunkriseis/ sunkrimata*). In doing so, I raise some broader issues pertaining to predication and the ontological schema in Epicureanism. Furthermore, I systematically engage with and ultimately reject the Giusanni/Conche/Morel-reading, according to which color, depending on context, is to be understood both as an essential property (*sumbebekos*) and as an accidental property.

Benjamin Rider, University of Arkansas, brider@uca.edu

2B (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 504: "The Ethical Significance of Gratitude in Epicureanism"

The idea of gratitude (*charis* in Greek) appears, both explicitly and by implication, in many Epicurean texts (including the *Letter to Menoecus*; *Vatican Sayings* 17, 19, 39, 55, 69, and 75; and *De Rerum Natura*, especially Book 3). On its face, it seems odd for Epicureans to place such emphasis on gratitude (and ingratitude) because unlike, say, a Christian, an Epicurean does not seem to have anyone to whom to be grateful. Epicurean gods are responsible neither for the good nor the bad in human lives, and while Epicureans might well be grateful to Epicurus, that does not seem to be what these passages mean. I propose that Epicureans think of gratitude as a general virtue, directed toward no particular benefactor, but characterizing the best kind of life. In particular, it represents the proper disposition or mental stance toward the goods in one's life. As a virtue, it is a state of character that one must cultivate, by daily habits of reflection. With this virtue, one is able to maintain the proper attitude toward the objects of one's desires, thus avoiding the unnatural, empty desires that make a life of *ataraxia* impossible. My proposed virtue of gratitude thus illuminates the Epicurean taxonomy of desires, its relation to *ataraxia*, and the Epicurean mindset more generally. I also suggest that the idea of a virtue of gratitude has great promise for contemporary virtue theory—it is valuable for us today for the same reasons it is valuable for Epicureans.

Kelly Arenson, Duquesne University, arensonk@duq.edu

2B (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 504: "Non-Cognitive Epicurean Therapies"

According to Epicureans, unhappiness is caused primarily by false beliefs, especially about the gods, the nature of desire, and death. For this reason, many scholars claim that Epicurean therapy is entirely cognitive: it employs arguments aimed at replacing false beliefs with true ones. Although cognitive therapy will hopefully lead to behavioral changes, it has been argued that behavioral changes and other non-cognitive strategies are not in themselves Epicurean therapeutic tools. In this paper, I argue there is some evidence that Epicurean therapists did employ non-cognitive treatment techniques, which are not necessarily aimed at the removal of false beliefs and/or do not involve the use of arguments. Some of these techniques include physically removing oneself from the people

and situations that create insatiable desires, and distracting oneself from current pain. Although we may suspect that such strategies would have been reserved for those who fail at cognitive therapy, such does not appear to be the case: there are reports that Epicurus himself utilized distraction therapy on his deathbed. I consider how Epicureans could have justified on Epicurean grounds the use of non-cognitive therapeutic techniques, given their claim that false beliefs are the cause of unhappiness.

Kelsey Ward, Duquesne University, wardk1@duq.edu

2C (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 506: “A Teleological Interpretation of *De Finibus*, V”

At *De finibus* v 55 Piso claims that all of his philosophical predecessors ‘visit the cradle’ to determine what is natural for human beings and what constitutes good or proper human behavior. Featured most prominently in the cradle argument and the corresponding notion of *oikeiosis*, teleology has a strong influence in Cicero’s *De finibus*. Together the cradle argument and *oikeiosis* offer an ethics that depends on the unity of *telos* as observed by physics and the *telos* prescribed in ethics. Stoics, Epicureans and Antiochians alike deduce the proper human end from the earliest observable desires and aversions, and dictate what kinds of things ought to be pursued and avoided as we mature to attain that end. Thus they accept that human development in accord with nature is morally good. I argue that Cicero subtly resists the cradle argument and its theoretical attachments in *De fin* v. I propose that he uses the dramatic setting of *De fin* v to interrupt the natural temporal sequence of the text and to disrupt an expected philosophical or conceptual advancement. In other words, he disrupts two kinds of *telos* vis-à-vis the textual progression he devises. I conclude that Cicero crafts the text in this way in order to resist endorsing teleology in its physical and ethical manifestations, and to reject the common *telos* in physics and ethics accepted by the other schools.

Chelsea Harry, Southern Connecticut State University, Harryc1@southernct.edu

2C (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 506: “The Role of *Phantasia* in Non-Human Animal *Telos*”

Despite that Aristotle limits *phantasia* to certain non-human animals, I argue that *phantasia* is an integral, indeed necessary part, of certain non-human animal function. In short, it allows animals with distant perception to benefit especially from this perception, not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. My proposal is that excellent non-human animal functioning, in the sense that teleology means not only biological development but also the proper functioning of the developed form, is achieved through distant sensing, which requires an external object, helped by *phantasia*.

James Ambury, King’s College (PA), jamesambury@kings.edu

2D (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 508: “Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave”

In this essay I argue that Plato’s famous allegory of the cave is as much about what it is to know oneself as it is about knowing the objects of philosophical cognition. I divide the paper in accordance with the four principal types of self-knowledge I identify in the passage, each of which corresponds to a distinct level of the divided line. I argue that the final model of self-knowledge is best understood as self-knowing, an active psychic condition in which the soul is disclosed to itself in the performance of its most essential activity. I conclude with some remarks about the nature of philosophical education and Socrates’ insistence that the philosopher return to the cave.

Alan Pichanick, Villanova University, alan.pichanick@villanova.edu

2D (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 508: “Eros, Soul, and Self-Knowledge in the *Charmides* and *Symposium*”

In discussing *sôphrosunê* with Critias in the *Charmides*, Socrates makes objections against both the possibility and the benefit of self-knowledge there presented. The objections Socrates makes are devastating to this account of self-knowledge, and another approach is needed. Such an approach is given by Socrates in the *Symposium*, through Diotima’s speech about the origin and nature of *eros*, which elaborates Socrates’ claim to know “the erotic things” (177d8). This account of *eros* is what underlies Socratic inquiry and lays the groundwork for distinguishing Socratic wisdom from Critias’ conceit of wisdom.

Boris Hennig, Ryerson University, hennig@ryerson.ca

2D (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 508: “On a Specifically Medieval Form of Self-Knowledge”

Aristotelians distinguish two kinds of knowledge: theoretical and practical knowledge. Within this framework, self-knowledge can be either theoretical or practical knowledge of a special sort of object, namely the “self.” The question I want to raise is whether self-knowledge should be defined in terms of its object, or rather as a special kind of knowledge.

When Aquinas, for instance, defines *conscientia* (conscious awareness / moral conscience) as the application of knowledge to an action (*S.Th.* 79,13 c.a.), he includes (a) the knowledge of an agent that they performed a certain action, (b) knowledge of what should be done, and (c) knowledge of the moral value of an action. The third (c) is knowledge that is both theoretical and practical. In a different tradition, Bonaventure will describe *conscientia* as knowledge that informs the affective part of the soul (*In II Sent* 39,1,1 c.a.), and this in turn goes back to Hugh of St. Victor’s distinction of three faculties of the soul: (1) sense perception, (2) the intellect, and (3) a certain capacity for spiritual knowledge (*De Sacramentis* I,10,2). This kind of knowledge occupies a middle position between conscious awareness and moral conscience, and it seems to be neither theoretical nor practical knowledge. It is directed neither at knowing the facts nor at prescribing or evaluating actions. As Hugh of St. Victor puts it, knowledge of the third kind aims at the restoration of the soul. This kind of knowledge is hard to make sense of within an Aristotelian framework. To mention only one challenge, it is difficult to differentiate this kind of self-knowledge from others in terms of its direction of fit. It may seem that self-knowledge either registers or determines the state of the self, and there seems to be no conceptual space for a third kind of self-knowledge, which does neither of these. I will examine Hugh’s *Didascalicon* and *De Sacramentis* in order to get a sufficiently clear picture of what he has in mind.

Ted Arnold, Columbia University, eaa2143@columbia.edu

2E (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Uncertain Grounds, Certain Fruits: Tibetan Buddhist Responses to Fundamental Discrepancies on Human Physiology in the Guhyasamāja and Kālacakra Tantras”

Here I consider qualms and responses from various Tibetan Buddhist masters of the dGelugs order, from the 15th to 20th centuries, with respect to anomalous presentations of human physiology in two important Unexcelled Yoga Tantra systems, Guhyasamāja and Kālacakra. According to general presentations of tantra, the foundation of existence, ordinary or enlightened, is posited as non-dual but conceptually distinct: the mental aspect arising from the extremely subtle mind, and the physical aspect arising from the extremely subtle wind, which give rise to a buddha’s wisdom body and form body, respectively. These would seem to be, given the natural correlation between unenlightened and

enlightened states of being, basic facts of biological existence validated by the inner science of tantric practice. However, Kālacakra differs significantly in its presentation of the extremely subtle wind and, by extension, its transformed aspect, the product of perfection stage meditations. These fundamental discrepancies raise serious implications for Unexcelled Yoga Tantra theory and practice, which are supposed to be naturally, biologically correlated. Is the very ground of human physiology, which is the material of tantric transformation, variable, according to these systems? Could perfection stage practices transform that natural physiology, in dependence on the particular meditative system? And are there different fruits of these systems, i.e., two different types of buddhahood that result? Tracing the comments of Gendun Gyatso in his *Mañjuśrī-nāma-saṃgīti* commentary, I will discuss these tantalizing possibilities.

Marie Friquegnon, William Paterson University, FriquegnonM@wpunj.edu

2E (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Reflections on Khenchen Palden Sherab Rinpoche and Khenpo Tsewang Dongyal’s commentary on Santaraksita’s *Tattvasiddhi*”

Santaraksita has offered a unique and extraordinary argument for the feasibility of the Tantra. In their new book, *The Tattvasiddhi* and the *Madhyamakaalamkara* with commentaries, Rinpoches’ explore this argument and its ramifications, which are most notably, that when understood properly, happiness, joy and pleasure rather than asceticism are the path to enlightenment. I will describe the subtleties of this view, and open the discussion to the audience in order to glean insights and rebuttals.

Karsten Struhl, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, kastruhl@tiac.net

2E (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Buddhist Compassion and Righteous Anger”

It is generally taken as axiomatic that Buddhism sees anger as a thoroughly destructive emotion that needs to be extinguished. Buddhist practice has as its intention to extinguish the illusion of the self and cultivate compassion for all living beings, whereas anger is generally regarded as reinforcing the idea of a separate self and an emotion which prevents compassion from arising. Furthermore, anger is sometimes a translation of “dosa” which, for Buddhism, is one of the three poisons (the other two being greed and delusion). While “dosa” is perhaps more often translated as “ill will” or “hatred,” it is still assumed that anger is always a manifestation of hatred and tends to increase hatred. Finally, in the *Dhammapada*, anger (“kodha”) is unambiguously described as a destructive and negative emotion which must be “conquered by love” and held in check.

In my paper, I shall question these assumptions, specifically in regard to what is sometimes referred to as “righteous anger,” by which I mean anger against injustice, and I want to question them within the context of engaged Buddhism. I shall argue that righteous anger has within it the seeds of insight and an energy which can be harnessed by compassion – what has been called “fierce” or “confrontational” compassion – to challenge systems of injustice. To make this argument I shall consider Aristotle’s analysis of the “good-tempered” man who is angry at the right thing and not led by vengeful passion, the use of wrathful energy to confront oppressive social structures in behalf of everyone, the difference between productive and reactive anger, and the possibility of a selfless anger guided by compassion. I shall, however, also make clear that the development of fierce compassion needs to reorganize and transform the energy of anger so that it can be subordinated to compassion.

Rick Repetti, Kingsborough Community College, Rick.Repetti@kbcc.cuny.edu
2E (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Applying the Tibetan Causal Criterion for Ontological Substantiality to the Issue of Agency”

In Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, and in elements of its precursors in Indian Buddhism, there are strands of thought according to which what is real must have, or be amenable to, some sort of causal impact, function, or influence. This ontological criterion is explicitly employed by Nagarjuna and others in the refutation of the atman as causally inert, is implicit in similar lines of reasoning in the earliest Buddhist sutras, and continues into Tibetan Buddhism. In this paper, I explore the potential application of this reasoning to the analysis of agency. Although all Buddhists reject the ultimate reality of the agent/self, except perhaps the Pudgalavadins, if the above-mentioned causal-ontological criterion is valid, then a case may be made for the claim that while there is no ontologically independent entity that can constitute an agent, the causal/functional processes exemplified in the sort of control certain individuals apparently exert over themselves, particularly advanced tantrikas, then it is reasonable to conclude that such individuals nonetheless instantiate a highly powerful form of agentless agency.

Michael Boylan, Marymount University (VA), Michael.Boylan@marymount.edu
2F (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 513: “Blood, Nature, and Magic in Early Greek Medicine”

This essay will explore early Greek scientific accounts about blood and magic regarding the nature of the account and a critical appraisal of such. The approach will combine medical history and philosophy of science. It will be the contention of this essay that in this early period there is a transition from explanations weighted heavily upon magic and the divine to those that are more materially based. The treatment of ‘blood’ is used to observe this transition. This essay is based upon my recent book.

Tiberiu Popa, Butler University, tpopa@butler.edu
2F (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 513: “Hippocratic Echoes in Aristotelian Biology”

Aristotle’s indebtedness to early medical schools with respect to some of his scientific theories and natural philosophy. The Hippocratics thought that they could explain physical constitutions and the onset and evolution of diseases by relying, among other things, on their observation of climatic and meteorological conditions, of geographical features and of the quality of the water available to the inhabitants of a certain region. They claimed that our understanding of how the elementary materials making up the world interact and are altered can also help us to gain insight into our temperament and mental capacities, a connection invested with moral significance. Most of the studies on *Airs, Waters, Places* – and other writings where such causal accounts are put forth – tend to explore their therapeutic and their ethnographic content, whereas I am more interested here in their methodology and in the context in which those methods were crystallized. The explanatory apparatus deployed there seems to share important features with several accounts offered by Aristotle in his biological corpus, notably in the handling of material causation in *his History of Animals* VIII(IX) and in *Generation of Animals* V. While a filiation between Aristotle’s views and method and early medical authors cannot be established with certainty, I would argue that certain types of causal inferences which can be found in the Hippocratic texts (*Airs*... primarily, but not only) were very probably part of a reservoir of ideas and methods that left their imprint on Aristotle’s method of inquiry.

Adriel Trott, Wabash College, trotta@wabash.edu

2F (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 513: “Is Vital Heat an Elemental Force in Aristotle's Biology?”

In this paper, I investigate to what extent vital heat—the power that brings life through the semen into the menses—is an elemental power in Aristotle’s biology. On the one hand, it seems clear that it is. Vital heat warms the blood thereby concocting it to the degree where it is able to produce life. On the other hand, it seems that it cannot be because it is the source of formal power and not material power. I argue that Aristotle’s biology hinges on this question insofar as the role of vital heat points to the way that form is differentiated from matter in material, and that Aristotle needs to be able to describe it as formal and thus different from heat, but over and over again relies on the descriptive accounts of heat to show how it works. That is to say, in the biology, the formal principle is differentiated from the material principle in matter through a process of heat. How this heat works—whether it is formal or material—will elucidate how form originates in relation to material. I conclude that vital heat is an elemental power, and that this shows that the formal principle is distinguished from material through a material process located in heat.

To make this argument, I examine how semen comes to be or fails to come to be through a process of concoction with reference to passages in *Generation of Animals* I.18 and II.1. Concoction occurs through proper or vital heat, οἰκείου θερμότης. I examine this process of concoction in the *Meteorology* where Aristotle describes the process in terms of the work of elemental forces or powers, and the proper heat corresponds to proper matter, ἡ οἰκεία ἐκάστῳ ὕλη, of a natural thing. In *Generation of Animals*, the same term for heat becomes that by which semen becomes that which has a life-giving capacity out of blood. This process is based on a movement in the blood from something that already has this power and this movement produces the heat in the blood to produce soul within it. Aristotle says explicitly at GA 736b29-737a6 that this heat is not fire or any such force, but breath. In *Parts of Animals* Aristotle speaks of: fire as the tool the soul uses, concluding that all animals have an amount of this heat; breath as feeding the “internal fire,” where fire or cognates of it are repeated three times in association with the breath; and natural heat that concocts as coming from the soul, which is “as it were, set aglow with fire” (PA 652b8-16, 473a4-9, and 469b11-17). In this paper, I draw on these passages from *Meteorology* and *Parts of Animals* to develop a coherent account between the discussion of concoction in the *Meteorology*, fire and heat in *Parts of Animals* and the development and work of semen through vital heat in *Generation of Animals*.

David Squires, University of Notre Dame, dsquires@nd.edu

2F (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 513: “Organicism and Classical Hylomorphism on the Principle of Unity of Organisms”

In this paper I argue that the Principle of Unity of organisms at the heart of van Inwagen’s contemporary Organicism—one which he says is “Aristotle’s picture”—is in fact significantly different from the Principle of Unity of organisms employed in Classical Hylomorphism and that it faces a problem that the principle employed by classical hylomorphism does not face—namely the Problem of the Unity of the Principle of Unity.

The paper has two parts. In the first part I argue that van Inwagen goes in search the “ground” of the unity of organisms and answers in a way that is not plausible unless his notion of “life” is a Principle of Unity in a manner similar to Aristotle’s notion of soul. I then raise a problem for organicism’s principle of unity: since life is a complex “event” according to van Inwagen, organicism’s principle of unity of organisms is admittedly a whole of parts. What then is its

principle of unity and should the organicist even need to answer this question? I argue that they should and that it will not be easy.

In the second part of the paper I argue that the soul—classical hylomorphism’s principle of unity of organisms—is significantly different from van Inwagen’s notion of “life” despite his saying otherwise. Though even some famous Aristotelian scholars such as David Balme have said otherwise, the soul is not a complex event, change, or process. I demonstrate this from Aristotelian texts; a look at the definition of change in Physics Book 3 shows that form—the soul included—is used in the explanation of change in a manner that precludes its being identical to change—complex or otherwise. I then support from Aristotelian and Thomistic texts the claim that the soul is without parts. Since it is without parts, it does not face the Problem of the Unity of the Principle of Unity. Classical hylomorphism, then, fares better than organicism when it comes to explanations of the unity of complex items, since it does not have to arbitrarily cut off inquiry into the principle of unity of wholes consisting of parts. It cuts the inquiry off where it naturally ends—when one arrives at something that is without parts.

Mohammadjafar Shokrollahzadeh, Cornell University, mjshokrollahzadeh@yahoo.com
2G (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 514: “Modern Translation Studies and Medieval Persian Literature”

This presentation begins with a tripartite delineation of methodology in Western theories of Translation Studies: Historical, Textual Analyses, and Comparative Studies. Next, we shall apply our Western framework to Medieval Persian Literature. A Particular Focus will be the Fitzgerald's translation of Omar Khayyam, Rubaiyat. Finally we shall discuss the pragmatic imports of the comparative values for the global age and the potential value of the study of Persian literature: classic, theological, philosophical, and mystical.

Loli Tsan, SUNY Oneonta, loli.tsan@gmail.com
2G (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 514: “Can a Global Vision of a Person Lessen the Current Conflict Between the Muslim and French Sense of Identity in France?”

This inquiry examines how a medieval Islamic perspective of a "religion self in context of a spiritual community," and a modern vision of "a secular national self," clash in their encounter in the 21st Century globalization that include mass digressions and refugees across the contents. In addition the audience are invited to share reflections on the possibility of a global self -expressed in many philosophies, as well as arts -Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*?

Seokyung Han, GSP, Binghamton University, shan3@binghamton.edu
2G (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 514: “Buddhism, Filial Piety, and Women In-Between”

This project aims to trace the unique aspects of the Mahayana Buddhism associated with filial piety in East Asia. As revealed in a wide range of source materials of antiquity through premodern East Asia, the ways of conceptualizing and concretizing this virtue serve as an underlying factor in diversifying yet unifying the philosophical and religious traditions and practices of the East Asia. Among the sources, the filial piety-related Buddhist literature epitomizes how the virtue plays a role in reproducing the Buddhist sutras in a secularized and/or popularized version and circulating the apocryphal texts across locales and eras and, eventually, characterizing the East Asian Buddhism.

The project accordingly focuses on the development of the premodern Korean Buddhist work Pumo Ŭnchunggyōng (Sutra on Honoring Parental Love, circa. 10 th cen.). This Buddhist apocryphal text, yet appreciated as a Sutra always in Korea, has been noticed for its sole representation of the child-devoted mother. Its various versions, accessible in the worldwide museums and libraries, support that the Korean Pumo ŭnjunggyōng is adapted in early Koryŏ Korea (918-1392) the Chinese Buddhist sources that depict filial children and, during the following Chosŏn (1392-1910), translated from Classical Chinese into the Korean script Han'gŭl (promulgated in 1446) and adapted to various forms of literature, performance, and art. The Korean versions also suggest that, unlike the Chinese versions, the adapted Korean versions should always pictorialize the mother. This pictorialization, arguably, visualized or materialized narrative, appears comparable with representations of (the ideas and ideals of) women of the filial piety-discussed Chinese Buddhist works, including the Fumu en nanbao jing (Sutra on the Difficulties in Repaying Parents' Debts), the Yulanpen jing (Ullambana Sutra), and the Dunhuang manuscripts. At the same time, this Sutra's way of employing the specific female figure, more pointedly, the mother figure as medium to explain filial piety of the most essential virtue of the East Asia, differs from the representations of various female figures in other Mahayana Buddhist sutras, including the Lotus Sutra and the Flower Adornment Sutra.

Thus, the close examination of the Korean Pumo ŭnjunggyōng and its relevant Buddhist literary sources enables me to argue how Buddhism adopts, adapts, and even appropriates filial piety while its ideas and ideals are transmitted, translated, and transformed across the East Asia; how Buddhism interacts with the East Asian text or book culture and how the authorities of scriptures and varied apocrypha as well are established; and how the Mahayana Buddhism recognizes the roles of the mother, mother's body (womb) and motherhood (reproductivity), similarly or differently from how Buddhism understands the roles of the women and the ideal womanhood.

Michael Vazquez, University of Pennsylvania, vazm@sas.upenn.edu

2H (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 307: "*Quo warranto?* Real Definition and the *Euthyphro* Argument"

Today it is universally recognized that the argumentative structure of the exchange at 10a-11b of Plato's *Euthyphro* is highly sophisticated. Despite the vast literature on this topic, most commentators assume that Socrates' argument is about the identity of piety (with a few rare exceptions). Instead I argue that Socrates' argument concerns what contemporary metaphysicians would call "real definition." To show this I argue that most interpreters miss the point of Socrates' quest for definitions in the early dialogues, and furthermore that they overlook decisive textual evidence that Socrates is not interested in the identity of piety. I then outline my own account under which the argument is about real definition and the metaphysical grounding relation. More specifically, I propose that Socrates' crowning inference in the *Euthyphro* argument is not about the substitution of identical terms, but the substitution of real definitional *relata* by means of the principle of the priority of *definiens*.

Cristina Ionescu, The Catholic University of America, Ionescu@cua.edu

2H (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 307: "Images and Paradigms in Plato's *Sophist* and the *Statesman*"

At the heart of two Platonic dialogues, one of which is generally accepted to be the sequel of the other, the Eleatic Stranger draws two related distinctions: in the *Sophist* 234a-d he draws a distinction between two types of images (*eidola*): *eikona* (likenesses) and *phantasmata* (appearances), and in the *Statesman* he draws a distinction between two kinds of paradigms (*paradeigmata*): perceptible

paradigms and verbal paradigms at 277a-c and 285d-286b. My present paper has two purposes: (1) to examine the relevance of each of these two distinctions in their respective contexts and (2) to suggest a way to understand the relation between them.

Regarding purpose (1): As far as the distinction drawn in the *Sophist* is concerned, contrary to the superficial impression that philosophers use only likenesses, while sophists use only appearances, I argue that both philosophers and sophists alike use both appearances and likenesses. The difference between the sophist and the philosopher resides not in the fact that each one would use only one of the two types of images, but rather in the specific ways in which each uses them and the differing motivations behind their respective uses. As far as the *Statesman* is concerned, I argue that the difference between perceptible and verbal paradigms is not that Forms can only be depicted through verbal paradigms, but rather that Forms are more adequately depicted through verbal paradigms, while both visible and verbal paradigms are helpful in education and both can depict, with different degrees of accuracy, both Forms and particulars. The skilled dialectician knows when to use paradigms of one sort and when of the other sort, depending on his interlocutor's intellectual astuteness and his own state of the soul.

Regarding purpose (2): I argue that Plato likely expects us to understand the continuity between the two distinctions, i.e. to see the two types of paradigms in light of the earlier distinction between likenesses and appearances. I argue that the *Statesman* takes up the distinction drawn in the *Sophist* and amplifies its account, such that, through the three paradigms used in the *Statesman* – the herdsman, the myth, and the weaver - he uses both likenesses and appearances in his dialectical search for the statesman. In particular, the visual paradigm of the herdsman is based on visible likeness with the statesman, while the paradigms that come through the images of the Demiurge and the ages of Cronus and Zeus in the myth are based on appearance; finally, the image of the weaver is a verbal paradigm based on likeness in account and not on visual resemblance with the statesman.

What is at stake here is to show that Plato proposes a complex metaphysical and epistemological account of images, an account that explains the possibility of our advancement from opinions to knowledge. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with using images and paradigms as long as we know the type of images or paradigms we use them as and at what level of understanding we use them.

David Talcott, The King's College (NY), dtalcott@tkc.edu

2H (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 307: “Metaphysical Grounding in *Euthyphro*, 9e-11b”

Matt Evans and Fabrice Correia have recently offered analyses of *Euthyphro* 9e-11b according to which Plato was utilizing concepts of metaphysical ground or ontological dependence. These analyses are difficult to carry out first because metaphysicians are exploring multiple different concepts of grounding and dependence, and second because the structure of Plato's argument itself is confusing. In this paper I examine and compare these analyses, assessing first how carefully they distinguish their conception of ground or dependence, and second how accurately they fit Plato's argument.

Heather Reid, Morningside College and Fonte Aretusa Organization, reid@morningside.edu

2I (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 311: “Aristotle Versus Xenophon on *Kalokagathia*”

In his exhaustive survey of the term *kalokagathia* (beautiful goodness), Felix Burriot argued that in the 4th century BCE, it was primarily a social designator for a group of non-aristocratic elites

seeking to establish their political position in Athens. Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, a book about household management, is often used to illustrate the nature of this ideal. But the portrait of *kalokagathia* that emerges in *Oeconomicus* seems much at odds with Aristotle's discussion of the ideal in Eudemian Ethics 8.15, where *kalokagathia* emerges as a kind of "perfect excellence" (ἀρετῆ τέλειος) (1249a15-17). In this paper, I will challenge both Burriot's narrow understanding of the term, and the idea that *Oeconomicus* represents Xenophon's considered view of *kalokagathia*. Drawing, instead, upon other works such as *Symposium*, *Memorabilia*, *Cyropaideia* and *Hiero*, I will argue for a Xenophonian view of *kalokagathia* not only compatible with Aristotle's account but achievable through Aristotelian education. The political point about *kalokagathia* is that it is the result of training rather than birth. The philosophical point is that it amounts to the discernment of moral beauty, rather than exhibition of physical beauty. It is Socrates, not Ischomachus who emerges (perhaps ironically) as the real *kaloskagathos* in Xenophon's works. More specifically, it is Socrates' erotic attraction to true beauty, his ability to discern and act in accordance with it, that constitutes his personal beauty. This contrasts educationally with conventional understandings of attractiveness linked to wealth, noble birth, and physical beauty—all of which Socrates lacks. Yet the old man manages to attract even the beautiful athletic youth Autolykos with his "goodness." *Kalokagathia* in Aristotle and Xenophon is more than a nickname for a social group, it is an educational ideal that has little to do with how one looks and much to do with what one sees.

Nikolaos Dimitriadis, American College of Thessaloniki, Greece, nikosdim@act.edu
2I (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 311: "Plato and Divine Beauty: What Can One Learn?"

The present proposal is part of a larger research project which aims to Plato sees no limit to the power of the ability to see and capture the 'privilege' of beauty, one that is a recognized beauty of divine nature. However, Plato's theory of the beautiful (and in particular of divine beauty) is not a purely moralistic theory. To some extent, beauty holds an intrinsic value on its own. A preliminary investigation on the topic suggests that there is a novel way of approaching the topic that can further inform our understanding of the Platonic work. Further study of the beauty suggests that it is acknowledged as power and plays a crucial role in relation to the divine. It places the gods firmly in the physical world and it holds an ethical aspect which associates the good and the beautiful, a link which has recently revived the interest of scholars around the world as special journal issues can show. In *Phaedrus* the divine is beautiful, wise and good and with these qualities it feeds the soul.

Back in 1907, Arthur Fairbanks has stated that the contemporary faith has much to learn from ancient Greek religious views as he concludes that (119): "We may learn from Greece that nothing gives religion such a hold on humanity, that no single ideal is so universally and subtly elevating, as the beautiful." Plato's work with his aesthetic and moral elements suggests that beauty is godlike or an imitation of an idea; it brings human and divine nature close to each other. Combining this with the platonic imitation of an idea, the *Genesis* passage 'Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness' comes to mind. But in Plato's case one can see a reversal of the passage. In *Phaedrus* is stated plainly that we choose our objects of desire according to our preferences: "τὸν τε οὖν ἕρωτα τῶν καλῶν πρὸς τὸ ὅτι κλέγεται ἕκαστος" [Every one chooses his love from the ranks of beauty according to his character], as a reflection of who we are but also as an expression of which god best fits our character. There is likeness between gods and humans but it is the human intellect that recognizes this likeness and in this sense, humans have shaped their gods according to their image.

Maria Kyriakidou, American College of Thessaloniki, Greece, markyria@act.edu
2I (Saturday 11:15) ROOM 311: “Plato and the Senses: Re-Reading *Phaedrus*?”

The present paper explores aspects of Platonic concepts of aesthetics and the concept of beauty in different Platonic works but mainly focusing on the analysis of *Phaedrus*. Plato has often been considered a philosopher who overlooked the realm of the senses in contrast to that of abstract ideas, while my reading of *Phaedrus* suggests that there seems to be no clear cut distinction between the senses and the intellect; the boundaries seem blurred and are not necessarily hierarchically set, despite a preference towards the intellectual mind and philosophy.

The dialogue of *Phaedrus* suggests an emphasis on the senses and aesthetics. It is a quite sensual dialogue, since many of the senses are present in the scenic setting but one of them, vision, dominates the dialogue as the most clear of all, the one that give access to the beauty and starts the mania which leads to eros. In fact, senses are serving the most acute apprehension of the world which can make us see through someone’s beauty of the soul and inspire the welcomed mania and desire. In Plato’s work the senses are projected as tools in our stride towards high forms of love and attachment. Means and end (the senses and the object) are inextricably linked and the role of vision in particular, is recognized in *Phaedrus* as a key factor in human interaction with particular references to soul and love affairs. The lover is the mirror of the beloved and they are both beautiful (or better) beautified by this process, as they are beautified by the loving sight and the memory of the primeval divine beauty. The dialogue is quite clear as to our preferences and associated loving urges (we recognize beauty as we see it onto the body of the other and we are (or rather) become beautiful as a result.

The aforementioned process is often associated with desired goals which are linked to beauty, virtues and morality. In *Phaedrus* it is stated that we cannot use vision and the senses to explore wisdom (which is not instantaneously visible/evident), thus we only have beauty to guide us to the good. In this same dialogue, there is no limit to the power of the ability to see and capture the ‘privilege’ of beauty. As hinted in *Phaedrus*, we are only left with vision to see beauty and remember an original, primeval, situation of the human existence. The ideas (the epitome of the platonic oeuvre), in particular the idea of good, do not necessarily outshine the materiality of aesthetics, the senses, knowledge and its worth. The purpose that Plato see in the value of aesthetics is closely linked to issues of beauty as the later could not be conceptualize without the senses and the aesthetic world.

Rose Cherubin, George Mason University, rcherubi@gmu.edu
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou)

Heather Reid, Morningside College, reid@morningside.edu
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou)

Linda Ardito, Independent Scholar, linda351@optonline.net
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou)

John Murungi, Towson University, jmurungi@towson.edu
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou)

Christos Evangeliou, Towson University, cevangeliou@towson.edu
3A (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 502: Author Meets Critics (Christos Evangeliou)

Matthew Walker, Yale-NUS College, Matthew.walker@yale-nus.edu.sg
3B (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 504: “Psychic Immortality in Aristotle’s *Eudemus*?”

According to some scholars (including Jaeger, Dancy, Gerson, and Hutchinson), fragments from, and testimony about, Aristotle’s lost *Eudemus* provide strong evidence for thinking that Aristotle, at least at some point, accepted the soul’s literal immortality (either in whole or in part). By the soul’s “literal immortality,” I mean the soul’s capacity for eternal existence as a numerically identical individual in separation from the body.

In this paper, I examine the existing fragments from, and testimony about, the *Eudemus*. On the basis of the (scant) available evidence, I argue that we need not infer that Aristotle was committed in this work to the soul’s literal immortality. In making this claim, I pay special attention to the work’s dialogue format. Hence, while the evidence suggests that the *Eudemus* somehow addresses the soul’s literal immortality, it does not follow that Aristotle himself, as its author, was committed to the soul’s literal immortality. On the contrary, the existing evidence is consistent with the view that, as a dialogue, the *Eudemus* at best presents reputable beliefs about the soul that the *De Anima* addresses more scientifically.

Brian Julian, Boston University, bjulian@bu.edu
3B (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 504: “Finding the Definition of Soul in Aristotle’s *De Anima*”

Early in *De Anima* Aristotle gives what looks like a very Aristotelian definition of soul: soul is the “form of a natural body having life potentially.” However, many commentators think that this is not his ultimate definition, since at the end of the chapter he says that his presentation has been sketched in outline and then he starts afresh by describing the proper way to define. If these commentators are correct, then Aristotle’s real definition must be found elsewhere. I argue instead that there is no need to search, because the initial statement that looks like a definition is in fact that—Aristotle’s considered definition of soul. What is potentially misleading, and what has misled the majority of commentators, is the transitional material that follows. I focus on explaining this transition, arguing that Aristotle does not intend by it to qualify or reject the definition he initially gives. Specifically, by looking at Aristotle’s use elsewhere of ‘in outline’ (τύπω), I argue that he is not using this label to say that his initial definition is deficient. Recognizing this explains several features in the chapters on either side of the transition, including how Aristotle’s initial definition fits his description (in both *De Anima* and *Posterior Analytics*) of a definition that shows the cause.

Octavian Gabor, Methodist College, ogaborus@gmail.com
3B (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 504: “Psyche: The Actuality of Matter or of a Particular Natural Body”

In *De Anima*, psyche is defined as the first actuality of a natural body. The first problem that appears here is the question of whether soul is correlated with the *sunolon* or with matter. This problem has been debated from the earliest stages of Aristotelian commentaries. Thomas Aquinas believes that Aristotle considers form to be the actuality of matter. Themistius takes the opposite view, claiming

that soul is the first actuality of the composite. He says, “the soul is like a first entelechy of something that is already alive and that can live in this way, and this is the compound, that which is from both [matter and form], and this can only be the animal. For forms come to exist in matter, but they are not forms of matter but of the compound.”

In his recent commentary on *De Anima*, Ronald Polansky sides with Aquinas, claiming that in his definition of soul Aristotle “speaks of the form of the matter in order to prepare to understand the relationship of soul and body” (155). The definition in question here is at 412a19-21: “It is necessary therefore that soul is substance as form of a natural body having life in potentiality.”

In this paper, I defend Themistius’ view. After I look at textual evidence, I focus on showing how the Thomistic interpretation leads to incongruities in Aristotle’s theory. The claim that soul is the form of matter leads to the idea that soul, just like prime matter, has only conceptual existence. Neither Aquinas nor Polansky would be ready to accept such a claim. The final part of the paper shows that, following Themistius’ view, we can claim that potentiality and actuality both refer to a particular entity, the same particular entity, which is potentially and actually. The body of Socrates is Socrates-being- potentially-human, while the soul of Socrates is Socrates-being- human. Potentiality and actuality seem well suited as terms to designate matter and soul. They emphasize the unbreakable connection between these two and a particular. Both matter and soul are of the particular and cannot be as such by themselves. If we consider potentiality and actuality, one cannot grasp what they would be by themselves, independent of a particular, for they are always the potentiality and the actuality of some particular thing. The view that psyche is the actuality of a particular natural body emphasizes that actuality is that which can never be changed in the life of a particular. Particular humans can change their aspects, can engage in moral/immoral activities, but they cannot do anything about what they are: human beings.

Claudia Luchetti, Universität Tübingen, clauluch@tin.it

3B (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 504: “The Divine Fire of Prometheus (Phil., 16c), Philolaus and Plato: On Ideas, Soul and Principles”

This paper aims at giving an account of Philolaus’ heritage in Plato’s conception of the primary realities. At first I will try to highlight the background of Plato’s theory of Philosophy as “exercise to die” in the *Phaedo* (61d ff.). Plato’s understanding of the Pythagorean askesis as liberation from the boundaries with the bodily “prison”, earns here the further dialectical complexity that will characterize his whole ontology. Philolaus’ vision of the Monad as Mnemosyne (A13 D.-K.), constitutes the foundation of Plato’s theory of knowledge as recollection. Reacquiring the vision of the Monad laying behind and beyond every ideal Unity through a non-temporal anamnestic process, whose proper use is only for Initiated (*Phaedr.* 249B-c), discloses not only the structure of objective reality of Being, but also the profound affinity existing between objective and subjective dimension of knowledge (A29, *Phaed.* 78c ff.).

From the viewpoint of its Pythagorean background it is possible, on the one hand, to recognize in the *Phaedo* clear anticipations of the vision both of the Soul and of the Ideas as realities endowed with an inner dialectical structure, a conception that will be characteristic for the later dialogues (especially the *Sophist* and the *Timaeus*), and on the other hand to grasp the coincidence existing for Plato between knowledge of Ideas and Self-knowledge.

Further considering the nature of Soul as such, my attempt will be to show how completely misleading is interpreting the refutation of the identity between Soul and Harmony (*Phaed.* 85e ff.), as a platonic critic against Philolaus. Seeing the ‘generation’ of the psyche in *Timaeus* (35a ff.),

derived from a mixture of categorial and dimensional elements, there are evidences for a complete assimilation of Philolaus vision of the psychical dimension as a harmonic principle of mediation and conjunction of the primary opposition between Limit and Unlimited (B6 D.-K.).

Finally, I will examine Philolaus' influence on Plato's view of the foundations of the intelligible world itself: as stated in *Philebus*, Beings truly existing are conceived as synthesis of Limit and Unlimited (16c ff., to compare with B1-4). It follows that knowledge of Ideas equals the knowledge of a determined 'measure' within the mixture between *peras* and *apeiron*, i.e. the knowledge of a certain Number. Within this context I will propose the analysis of a relevant passage of Plato's *Parmenides* (157d-158d, to compare with B7, 8, 17), which seems to provide us with a proper reconstruction of the 'creation process' of the intelligible *kosmos* as a result of the interaction of the Monad/Limit with that 'nature other than the Idea'/Unlimited/Undetermined Duality.

The usefulness of this overview on Plato's assimilation of Philolaus' thought, does not concern only the speculative relationship between the two philosophers, but it consists also in delivering, though indirectly, a further evidence for the deep interconnection and interdependence of the different facets of Pythagorean Philosophy itself.

Hwa Yeong Wang, Binghamton University, Hwang8@binghamton.edu
3C (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 506: "Metaphysics of Korean Ritualism"

Recent scholarship on Chinese philosophy has challenged the meanings of metaphysics that have been defined largely by Western traditions and has attempted to redefine the meaning, focusing on reality, process and the connection between the realities and meanings. Scholars like Angela Zito and Michel Puett stress the inseparability between the physical and the metaphysical in Confucianism. They also focus on the process of ritualization and its metaphysical assumptions in Confucian philosophy. Their works not only challenge the western defined metaphysical claims, but also restore externality within Confucian philosophy by bringing ritual back into the central discussion, while also revealing the construction of gender in Confucian processual ontology. Based the newly defined metaphysics, I will analyze the 17th century Korean neo-Confucian philosopher, Song Siyöl (宋時烈, 1607-1689), and his metaphysical arguments on mourning ritual. Through the analysis, I will discuss why they were important for his theories of rituals and explore the way humans substantialize their being and participate in the cosmos through rituals.

Bongrae Seok, Alvernia University, Bongrae.Seok@alvernia.edu
3C (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 506: "Xunzi's Theory of Mind"

According to many schools of faculty psychology (Christian von Wolff, Franz Joseph Gall, Thomas Reid, Jerry Fodor) the mind consists of specialized psychological modules or faculties such as perception, reasoning, imagination, and memory. According to them, the mind is an ensemble of specialized mental functions, as the body consists of different muscles. Ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi developed a similar understanding of the mind. According to Xunzi, different sensory organs serves different cognitive functions. They are faculties of sensory perception. However, xin (心, the mind) plays special functions. As the eyes distinguish colors and shape, xin distinguishes reasons, emotions, and desires. In addition, xin regulates sensory organs and develops new knowledge. Interestingly, in some passages in the book of Xunzi, xin is discussed as if it is one of the faculties of the mind. If xin is the mind, then how is it possible for xin to be a part (a faculty) of itself? This paper analyzes Xunzi's theory of mind and compares it with Western theories of faculty psychology,

such as Franz Joseph Gall's, Thomas Reid's, and Jerry Fodor's theories of mental faculty.

Suk G. Choi, Towson University, suchoi@towson.edu

3C (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 506: “A Reflection on the Confucian Idea of *Cheng*”

Zhang Dainian once expressed that *cheng* is “the most unintelligible notion in Chinese philosophy.” On the one hand, I understand that “unintelligible” means that the notion contains various meanings and thus it is hard to connote the term by adopting a single English word. Contemporary leading commentators have rendered the word, *cheng*, into ‘sincerity’ ‘integrity’ ‘truthfulness’ ‘creativity’. Although each translation puts its weight on different implications of the word, they seem to share the idea that *cheng* means more than simply a state of being sincere. On the other hand, the idea of *cheng* has been for a long time discussed as one of the most important notions in the Confucian philosophical system like the notion of *ren*. I ask how this notoriously hard notion has played an important role in a philosophical system and furthermore, whether it can be available in contemporary philosophical discourses.

As a step toward these questions, I re-pay attention to such implications of *cheng* and its significant role in the Confucian ethics from a contemporary and comparative perspective. In this paper I will note Neo-Confucian interpretations of the word, focusing on that of Zhu Xi who has been respected as a completer of Neo-Confucianism. I will also examine critically recent researches on the idea of *cheng*. In doing so, I will argue that the Confucian idea of *cheng* should be understood as a unique concept of virtue based on a comprehensive vision of human nature.

L. Kelson A. Law, University of Pittsburgh, kelsonlaw@gmail.com

3C (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 506: “Gaozi’s Maxim as a Recipe for the Unwavering Heart”

In *Mencius* 2A:2, when Meng Ke is asked for the difference between his unmoved heart-mind and that of Gao’s, he quotes Gao’s maxim: ‘Not attaining in saying (*yen*), do not seek in the heart-mind (*xin*); not attaining in the heart-mind (*xin*), do not seek in *qi* (a Chinese notion usually understood to mean something like vital energies).’ Meng then approves of the latter half but rejects the former half. The obscurity of what Meng goes on to say, the scarcity of what we know about Gao’s thought, and the terse formula of the maxim itself invite many interpretations of this maxim. Points of controversy include (a) what goals are implicitly referenced by each occurrence of ‘attain’ and ‘seek’ and (b) what the syntax (that I translate as) ‘attaining in *x*’, ‘seek in *x*’ signify in each clause.

Many of the existing readings either take the heart-mind and *qi* mentioned in the maxim to be those of someone else’s (e.g. Zhao Qi), interpret ‘attaining in the heart-mind’ as satisfaction in the heart-mind (e.g. Zhu Xi), or read ‘seek in *qi*’ as seeking satisfaction in one’s *qi* (e.g. D. C. Lau). As Kwong-loi Shun points out, these readings are unsatisfactory in two ways. First, they fail (i) to show the connection between Meng’s rejection of the maxim’s first half and his apparently related criticism of Gao – that he takes propriety (*yi*) as external – which would soon come in the same conversation. Second, they do not (ii) make good sense of how Meng’s immediate elaboration on the relationship between aim (*zhi*) and *qi* is supposed to explain his approval of the second half of the maxim.

On these two counts, an alternative existing interpretation (e.g. by Huang Zhongxi), to which Shun himself is inclined, fares much better: ‘not obtaining propriety from doctrines, do not seek it from one’s heart-mind; not obtaining it from one’s heart-mind, do not seek it from one’s *qi*’. However, this approach gives up on one important thing the other approaches manage to do, namely, (iii) making good sense of each half of the maxim as itself a recipe for an unmoved heart-mind.

My goal in this essay is to discern what the ‘unmoved heart-mind’ is about and, on this basis, reconstruct what Meng understands to be Gao’s maxim that satisfies all the criteria aforementioned: (i), (ii), and (iii).

Jessica Deal, The Catholic University of America, 12dal@cua.edu

3D (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 508: “Letters and Music in the *Philebus*: Paradigms of the Philosopher’s Due Measure in Dialectic”

This paper is a close examination of the paradigms of letters and music in Plato’s *Philebus*. Presuming these paradigms are not chosen at random, the author reflects on each explicit mention of these arts in the dialogue, with the eventual aim of demonstrating how the examples of music and letters show what is meant by the proper use of and due measure in dialectic. The first appearance of music and letters occurs after the introduction of the divine method at 16c–19a—uncovering the ontological underpinnings of these two arts serves as Socrates’ model of dialectical investigation. At the end of the dialogue, music and letters make curious re-appearances in the forms of harmonics, flute-playing, the art of persuasion, and dialectic at 25e–26a, 51d–e, 56a–c, 55e–57b, and 58a–b respectively. These re-appearances consider music and letters as arts in themselves and in comparison with other arts rather than their ontological “roots.” The author argues that these parallel examples of music and letters at the beginning and end of the *Philebus* manifest the greater and lesser degrees of measurement present in the arts; furthermore, the measurement present in each art is determined by whether the art is ordered more towards pure intelligibility or pure sensibility. The latter point is especially clear when Socrates sets up the hierarchy of the less and more precise arts and kinds of knowledge, for the hierarchy is determined by how well each art participates in intelligibility and measurement (55c–58d). Finally, the author concludes that the reappearances of music and letters show a progression in the *Philebus* towards the harmonization of the lesser and higher arts through the art of dialectic. That is, the paradigms of music and letters foreshadow and show the very possibility of the philosopher’s “letting in,” with due measure, both the less precise and more precise arts, those governed by sensibility and those governed by intelligibility, into the good philosophical life. Such a close examination of music and letters thus yields the following Socratic insight (at least in the context of the *Philebus*): as long as each art form depends on and is ordered towards the most pure and precise art of dialectic, the arts beneath dialectic can be judiciously admitted into the good philosophical life and are even necessary for attaining it (62c–d).

William Evans, Saint Peter’s University, wevans@saintpeters.edu

3D (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 508: “On Teaching Plato on Music in the *Republic*”

In this paper I explore how to incorporate Socrates’ examination of music in Book III of the *Republic* into the teaching of the central topics in the dialogue. When I teach the *Republic*, and as we begin to examine the topic of music Book III, I ask students what sort of music they like and why they like it. On reflection they are quite aware that music does profoundly affect their passions, emotions, moods, and ideals; indeed, that is why they like what they like. But Socrates links music with the formation of character in children and argues that some music, because of its powerful effect on the emotions of children before they can think and reason, harms the souls of children and promotes vices such as disrespect, insolence, greed, and irresponsible freedom. Socrates divides music into that which is beautiful and promotes virtue love of learning, and that which is ugly and promotes vice. I then invite students to begin to examine whether this is true, and what

consequences this might have on what music young children should hear. The question then is, how to link what Socrates says about music, beauty, and virtue, on the one hand, and music, ugliness and vice, on the other, with what he says about key topics later (and here I draw upon recent work by Stephen Halliwell, Sophie Bourgault, and Malcolm Schofield): the nature of the soul in Book IV; the lovers of sights and sounds, and of spectacles, in Book V (music is one of our favorite spectacles), and how the lovers of spectacles (and we, too) differ from those Socrates calls philosophers; Socrates' discussion in Book VI on why the nature of smart young people is corrupted by the overwhelmingly noisy praise and blame in assemblies, courts, and theaters (and here is a connection with our obvious contemporary fascination with rock stars as some sort of ideal); and the allegory of the prisoners in the cave in Book VII, where the shadows cast on the wall of the cave, and the sounds resounding from the wall – the prisoners' sights and sounds -- are made up by the creators of the most popular and dominant images in the culture, and here there is a key link with music as part of our popular cultural images. For Socrates, philosophers, because they understand the nature of those images, very much including music, and their effects on the soul, are immune to their harmful effects and so are free to pursue the truth by turning their souls away from what would harm them toward a better reality. In the end I ask students to evaluate what truth there might be in Allan Bloom's claim that contemporary music is "junk food for the soul."

Eric Perl, Loyola Marymount University, eperl@lmu.edu

3E (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 510: "Notes Toward a New Translation of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*"

The Oxford translation of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* by E. R. Dodds (Clarendon Press, 1933, 2 nd ed. 1963) is a classic of Neoplatonic scholarship, but the time has come for a new translation, serving somewhat different purposes. Dodds' work has the defects of its merits: as a facing-page translation of the critical Greek text with an elaborate commentary (and therefore prohibitively expensive), it is ill-suited for use in classroom instruction. There have been tremendous advances in the understanding of Neoplatonism in general, and Proclus in particular, since 1963 (to say nothing of 1933), in part as a result of Dodds' own work as well as that of many others. The commentary, while often helpful, is marred by a steady undercurrent of disparaging remarks: Dodds manifestly despises his subject even while being fascinated by it. Most importantly, the translation itself is open to correction at a number of significant points. These include among others Dodds' translation of *agathotes*, with reference to the henads, as 'excellence' rather than 'goodness,' and his translation of *holikoteron/merikoteron* as 'more universal/more specific,' which both reflects and supports his (mis)interpretation of terms such as being and life as hypostatized Aristotelian abstractions.

Increasing recognition of both the intrinsic value of Proclus' thought and his prominent place in the history of philosophy demands that he be more fully incorporated into the "canon" of major philosophers. The *Elements of Theology* is bound to remain, for most students, the principal introduction to his system and to Athenian Neoplatonism in general. An up-to-date, affordable, philosophically informed but more "user-friendly" translation will promote more widespread study and teaching of this vital moment in the history of philosophy.

Dmitry Biriukov, National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia); Padova University (Italy), dbirjuk@gmail.com

3E (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 510: "Neoplatonism of Arius: New Findings"

In my report I want to continue a discussion which there was a while ago about Neoplatonism of Arius, who was leader of Arian movement in Christianity in the early 4 th c. AD. Rowan Williams in

his studies (R. WILLIAMS, *The Logic of Arianism*; R. WILLIAMS, *Arius: Heresy and Tradition*, London 1987, p. 31 etc.) already attempted to find Neoplatonic ground for the formulas used by Arius. These attempts were criticized in the article by Christopher Stead (C. STEAD, *Was Arius a Neoplatonist?*, “*Studia Patristica*”, 32 (1997), pp. 39–51). I will offer my own arguments for Neoplatonic background of Arius’ teaching.

According to Arius, the Son was not “begotten” by God, but was created by His volition, as well as all created beings “from nothing.” In order to emphasize the created nature of the Son, the Son was described as participating in the divinity of the Father which was understood in the sense that the Son did not possess divinity according to His nature. In order to emphasize this account, Arius claimed that the Son does not participate in any way in the Father. Arius stated that God, on the one hand, is non-participated, but, on the other hand, He is participated in through His own Power, Logos and Wisdom.

The emergence of the concept of non-participatedness in the Arian doctrine make it possible to discern the Neoplatonic triad of participation, the participating – the participated – the non-participated. The participated principles in the Godhead (Power, Wisdom, and Logos), which Arius taught about, can be associated with the participated henads in the philosophical system of Iamblichus. In addition, there is also a similarity in terms of specific ways of apophatic description of the highest principle in Iamblichus and Arius.

The concept of non-participation was introduced in the philosophical language by Iamblichus. Accordingly, Iamblichus is the leading figure in the formation of the participation triad in the philosophical thought of the Late Antiquity and the likely author of the doctrine of henads, later elaborated in detail by the Neoplatonists Syrianus and Proclus. I can summarize my arguments in the following way: 1) Iamblichus introduced the concept of non-participation as applied to the highest principle into the philosophical language. This concept with connotations similar to those used in Platonism (impossibility to correlate the cause with the caused) appears in the doctrine of Arius. 2) The introduction of this concept by Iamblichus triggered the emergence of the participation triad: participating–participated–non-participated in the later Platonism; accordingly, this triad can also be found in Arius. 3) The subject of participation in the doctrine of Iamblichus was associated with his concept of the participated henads which were the causes of various realms of beings. The theological system of Arius also reveals the entities similar to the Neoplatonic henads. 4) There is also a similarity in terms of specific ways of apophatic description of the highest principle in Iamblichus and Arius.

If we keep in mind all the above as well as the fact that Iamblichus (ca. 240–ca. 325 A.D.) was an older contemporary of Arius (256–336 A.D.) we may suggest that Iamblichus might have had an impact on the philosophical and theological language of the Arian doctrine.

Deepa Majumdar, Purdue Northwest, North Central Campus, dmajumda@pnw.edu
3E (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 510: “Plotinus’ Mysticism and *Advaita Vedanta*—Universality Amidst Particularity”

In this paper I explore some concrete aspects of Plotinus’ rendering of mystical union with the One, in the *Enneads* – his paths of ascent, the nature of the *unio*, and Plotinus’ own experience. I compare these with concrete aspects of mystical experience in two texts from *Advaita Vedanta*. In this comparison, I focus on basic paradigmatic differences (the conception of the Divine, the structure of the human person, degrees of monism, etc.) between the two, even as I point to the

universal character of each. When it comes to Plotinus, I conclude more in favor of direct inspiration than historical influence.

Abraham Jacob Greenstine, Duquesne University and Universität Kassel, ajacobgg@gmail.com
3F (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 513: “Not-Being and the Most General Principles in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Γ”

Although there cannot be any Aristotelian science of what is not, we still might wonder about the concept and status of not-being in Aristotle's philosophy. Indeed, since not-being was a contentious problem for his predecessors – Parmenides, Democritus, Gorgias, and Plato all engage with the topic – we would expect Aristotle to have some theory as well. We can find the rudiments of an Aristotelian theory of not-being in the discussion of the “principles of demonstration” (Γ.3 1005b6) in *Metaphysics* Γ, as well as the complementary discussions found in *De interpretatione*. These two principles – non-contradiction and excluded middle – belong to all beings (1005a22), and touch upon the question of how being and not-being are to be distributed among the things that are. The first and most certain of all axioms, the principle of non-contradiction, primarily concerns the necessary exclusivity of being and not-being, such that either one eliminates the possibility of its corresponding other: “it is impossible at the same time to be and not be” (Γ.4 1006a3-4).

Further, the principle of excluded middle requires that, of being and not-being, one of these must be distributed, or else there would be “something besides being and not-being.” This paper thus has three aims: (1) to investigate how Aristotle utilizes a conception of not-being in constructing and defending the principles of demonstration both in *Metaphysics* Γ and *De interpretatione*, (2) to examine the consequences we can take from these principles for a theory of not-being, and (3) to consider some possible exceptions to these principles. We can further subdivide the pursuit of the first goal into two separate sections, one dealing with the principle of non-contradiction and the other with the principle of excluded middle. Hence I begin (1a) by focusing on not-being in the articulation and defense of non-contradiction, considering especially how not-being relates to the topics of contradictories, affirmation & denial, and necessity. I then (1b) turn to the principle of excluded middle, paying particular attention to the problems of truth & falsity, articulated in Γ.7 in terms of being and not-being. In the subsequent section (2) I consider how these two principles restrict the role that not-being can have, to the point where we might wonder whether and how we can admit of any not-being at all (as Aristotle in fact does, e.g. at Γ.1). Finally, (3) I conclude by exploring a possible exceptions Aristotle makes to these two principles: (a) what Aristotle labels as the indeterminate, or potentiality, (in Γ.4-5 and *De interpretatione* 13) and (b) following from this, the failure of the bivalence in future-tense propositions (*De interpretatione* 9).

Riin Sirkel, University of Vermont, Riin.sirkel@gmail.com
3F (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 513: “Question of Fit: Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Gender”

Aristotle's metaphysics has recently received considerable attention in contemporary metaphysics. Questions concerning ontological dependence, priority, and essence have become hotly discussed issues in metaphysics, and this shift of interest has been characterized as ‘Aristotelian’ or ‘Neo-Aristotelian’. Further, in recent years, there has been a surge of interest in feminist metaphysics, and Aristotle's metaphysical views can be shown to have considerable bearing on the issues of interest to feminist philosophers. But how does the use of Aristotle's metaphysics in feminist philosophy fit with his reputation of having views that are “antifeminist to the core”¹? My aim is to address this question by exploring whether Aristotle's metaphysical views are compatible with his claims in *Politics* I. More specifically, I will focus on his views on ontological hierarchy and essentialism, as

they emerge from *Categories* and *Topics* (and leave the discussion of his hylomorphism, and its connection to the above-mentioned views for another occasion).

In *Categories*, Aristotle speaks of particular things like humans and horses as “primary substances”, and argues that they are primary because all other things depend on them (by being “in” or “said of” them as subjects), while they do not depend upon anything. I will show that his discussion assumes that there could not be further dependence relations among primary substances, and that one primary substance could not be more of a substance than another (Cat. 3b33-4a10). Further, I will show that Aristotle’s essentialism commits him to the view that humans are essentially the same. His essentialism implies that the members of the same species share the same essence, i.e. there are no essential differences between members of the same species, but only between different species. All humans are of the same species, and so there are no essential differences among them. In sum, his metaphysical views commit Aristotle to holding what Julie Ward has terms “metaphysical equality” among humans as members of the same species: are humans are equally “primary substances” and all are essentially the same.

I will argue that these views do not fit with Aristotle’s claims in *Politics* I, where he privileges men over women, and associates their different place in a social hierarchy with a difference in essence or nature. Specifically, I suggest that in *Politics* I 12-13 he revises his view that all humans are essentially the same by holding that their different degrees of rationality make them essentially different.

However, the most interesting result of comparing his metaphysical views with views expressed in *Politics* I is that there are several structural similarities between them, and they invoke similar questions. Let’s take one example. Aristotle wants to paint a hierarchical picture of both reality, as well as of a household. Although he clearly intends to ascribe to particular things priority over other types of things, it is far from obvious what notion of priority would make this priority claim on behalf of particulars plausible. Likewise, although he wants to privilege men over women by insisting that the relation between men and women is that of a ruler to the ruled (1254b13–14), it is not clear which account of relation delivers the desired result.

Mina Fei-Ting Chen, National Tsing Hua University, ftchen@mx.nthu.edu.tw

3F (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 513: “Presence of the Thing: On Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, IX.6”

In *Metaphysics* IX Aristotle considers two kinds of δύναμις (translated as power, capacity, or potentiality): the capacity for change (κίνησις), which is most proper to the word δύναμις, and the potentiality for actuality (ἐπέχειν) that goes beyond change. While Aristotle gives a clear account of the former in IX.1-5, he reminds us that we ought not to seek a definition (ὄρον, IX.6, 1048a36) in every case and comprehend the latter through the analogy. Michael Frede (1994) and Stephen Makin (2006) suggest that Aristotle has been pessimistic about discovering one unifying account of actuality and potentiality that go beyond change.

In this paper I argue that the passage at IX.6, 1048a31-35 comes closest to the definition of actuality and potentiality: actuality should be construed as τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ προᾶγμα (the presence of the thing), in which τὸ προᾶγμα refers to a class of things that covers actions and states, in particular, those in their own right; and ὑπάρχειν refers to the presence or manifestation of such a state or an action. The instances mentioned in the passage, i.e., the herm in the wood and the half-line in the whole line, suggest that the notion of actuality involves the principle of separation, which also works for the case of contemplating. This line of interpretation explains why the passage at 1048a31-35 offers only one criterion, not two. More importantly, it helps reshape the current

interpretations of the five analogies (1048a37-1048b4) and the whole IX.6-9: instead of a juxtaposition of the change-capacity relation and the substance-matter relation (the Frede-Makin juxtaposition view), the five analogies suggest a unifying story for actuality and potentiality that concerns the presence of states and actions (the unity view). Accordingly, Aristotle's discussion of herm, half-line, and contemplating at 1048a31-35 and his discussion of the five analogies at 1048a37-b4 should be read as a whole: the former offers a general account for the latter, while the latter serves as instances for the former.

In the second half of this paper, I examine the common assumption that underlies the juxtaposition view: some of the five analogies are brought up to illustrate the change-capacity relation and others the substance-matter relation. It follows that the change-capacity relation is seen as one instantiation and the substance matter relation as another instantiation of the actuality-potentiality relation. I argue that the analogies that involve the substance-matter relation illustrate the presence of states rather than the substance-matter relation and the analogies that involve the change-capacity relation illustrate the presence of actions rather than the change-capacity relation. I also argue that *Metaphysics* IX.8 suggests how the actuality-potentiality is in relation to the change-capacity relation and the substance-matter: the latter requires the former. While x 's being entitled to be called substance requires x 's being in a state in which its matter is in the form (i.e., substance requires state), and x 's producing a change requires x 's exercising his own apparatus (i.e., changerequires actuality).

Allan Bäck, Kutztown University, back@kutztown.edu

3F (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 513: "A Simple Interpretation of Aristotle's Syllogistic"

It is hard to find a way to reconstruct Aristotle's syllogistic, especially so as to justify such claims as that a necessary conclusion can follow from a necessary and an assertoric premise. Some interpretations today just discard some of Aristotle's claims as hopeless. Other, more sympathetic interpretations attempt to save the phenomena, the claims that Aristotle makes about valid and invalid syllogistic forms, by distinguishing types of terms, based upon importing Aristotle's theory of the predicables and the categories, and/or by distinguishing different types of predication, like the essential and the accidental.

The problem is that Aristotle offers no such doctrines in his syllogistic for having different copulae or predication relations, or for having the validity of the inference depend upon the material content of the terms. Perhaps we can indeed do no better than to supplement his explicit doctrine by importing other of his doctrines, which he would be assuming implicitly. But, *ceteris paribus*, an interpretation that gets Aristotle's results by using only his explicit doctrines would be preferable.

So here I begin to offer such a simple approach for understanding Aristotle's claims about categorical and modal syllogisms. This approach assumes that Aristotle has an aspect theory of predication, unlike the other interpretations that assume, wrongly I think, that Aristotle has a copula theory. My goal is to have the syllogisms follow that Aristotle says follow, and combinations of premises that Aristotle says do not yield valid syllogisms do not, by using only the doctrines that he states explicitly. I shall illustrate the approach with a few major examples.

Parviz Morewedge, Global Scholarly Publications/SUNY Old Westbury, pmorewed@gmail.com
3G (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 514: “Is the Plotinus-ibn Sina- Tusi- Leibniz System Logically Compatible with Monotheistic Theology?”

This study depicts sharp logical differences between two cosmogonies: the standard monotheistic view of a transcendent deity with the ibn Sinan, on the one hand, and the Necessary Existent (*al-wajib al-wujud*) and its variation of some of its features in theologies of Plotinus, Leibniz, and N. Tusi, on the other hand. The four foci include: the ritualistic ontology of creation vs. the monism of emanation, the total dependence of love for human salvation vs. pre-destination, the possibility of a mystic union in sense of "no-otherness" vs. the transcendent nature of a monotheistic deity, and the meaningless of "free will" in the ibn Sinan system vs. the divine omnipotence in creation cosmogonies. It is proffered- contrary to the views of a majority of scholars in Islamic studies -that ibn Sina's system is not compatible with the religious orthodoxy.

Ruziev Bunyodjon, Academy of Science of the Republic of Tajikistan, Khmr01@mail.ru
3G (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 514: “Problems of science and cognition in Sufism”

SUFISM - one of the five main areas of classical Arab-Muslim philosophy, which took shape after the others. It gets the mature form from the works of al-Muhai Dina Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240). Sufism as a philosophical trend is rethinking the basic approaches to the solution of the central problems of the classical Arab-Muslim philosophy, using the experience of mystical revelation. In a broader sense, Sufism (tasavvuf) represents a mystical branch of Islam. The term “Sufi” derives perhaps from suf – “wool” because of the wool produced sackcloth for ascetics, although this is not the only hypothesis as to its etymology. Sufism originated in the 8th century. Mystical experiences are gradually starting to get the theoretical understanding by al-al- Hasana Basri, Zu n Nuna al-Misri (8-9 in.), Al-Harrāza (d. 899), trace the philosophical ideas in Abu Yazida al-Bistāmi (d. 875), al-Abu Mansura Hallādza (d. 922), al-Ab̄y Kāsima al-Kushayri (986-1072), and others.

The discussion will include the following topics as well: Principles of dual unity and other things, Eternity and time, Casuality, Methodology of cognition, Ethical teachings.

Rustamjon Abdullaev, Academy of Science of the Republic of Tajikistan, Khmr01@mail.ru
3G (Saturday 2:00) ROOM 514: “Problems of Cognition in Natural Philosophy of Abu Ali Ibn Sino (Avicenna)”

The natural philosophy in Ibn Sina is physics - the science of inorganic and organic world, which includes the totality of natural science, known in the first third of the XI century. Therefore, in Ibn Sina's concept should distinguish broad and narrow understanding of natural philosophy. In the broad sense of the word natural philosophy at the Avicenna is the study of animate and inanimate nature of the materials world, plants, animals, including humans. In a narrow sense, the natural philosophy of Ibn Sina can be interpreted as a philosophical propaedeutic of natural science as a philosophical doctrine on the general principles of nature and its knowledge. The general ontological principles of natural philosophy, which is a reflection of the most common properties of natural existence and condition of all scientific knowledge, Ibn Sina attributed the doctrine of the substantiality of bodies of movement, space and time, causality, the eternity of the world, finitude and infinity, the relationship between body and soul and et al. Analysis of the principles of natural philosophy of Ibn Sina is important to establish the nature of his world view and determine the scientific value of the points of view of that thinker ontology, in contrast to his epistemology is

clearly idealistic, that prince of philosophers replaced by flexible, lively, sometimes naive, approach depending on the individual processes in the whole world dogmatized teleological and theological view.

Naomi Reshotko, University of Denver, nreshotk@du.edu

4A (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 502: “Between Knowledge and Ignorance: *Doxa*, Reason, and Truth in the *Meno* and *Symposium*”

I argue that, through the interaction between Socrates and Diotima in the *Symposium*, Plato shows that Socrates’ epistemic states are complex networks of diverse beliefs that vary with respect to quality as understood with respect to the criteria (reason and truth) for belief evaluation that are given to us in the *Meno* and *Symposium*. *Meno* 98-100, appears to provide a rubric for ranking beliefs with respect to these criteria. However, the discussion of *doxa* at *Symposium* 200-212 makes it look impossible to actually perform such a ranking on individual, isolated, propositional beliefs, let alone on complex doxastic networks. This leads me to conclude that Plato actually thinks our epistemic states are always in between ignorance and knowledge and always fall short enough of knowledge that no one should be considered significantly wiser than anyone else—or at least that no one should be assumed to know anything. I will further suggest that *Republic* 475-480 and 508-511 (the divided line) confirm this suspicion.

Matthew Evans, University of Texas at Austin, evansmatt@austin.utexas.edu

4A (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 502: “Rational Causes in the *Phaedo*”

Nearly all of us accept that at least some of our thoughts —such as our desires, beliefs, and intentions —can be causally responsible for certain movements in our bodies. Starting in antiquity, and especially since Descartes, this has been used as the pivotal premise in an increasingly popular line of argument against dualism. For if the psychological domain and the material domain are as fundamentally distinct from each other as the dualist thinks they are, then it is mysterious how thoughts can interact with bodies in the way we all seem to think they can. This is why it would be interesting, and perhaps also instructive, to find a great philosopher who draws from the phenomenon of psychological causation a lesson precisely opposed to the one typically drawn today. That philosopher, I believe, is Plato. If my reading of the *Phaedo* is right, then in this dialogue Plato gives us a surprisingly powerful two-part argument to the effect that, because there is psychological causation, dualism —indeed, a fairly robust version of dualism — is true. This paper is an attempt to spell out that argument, and to gauge its importance for our understanding and assessment of Plato’s broader dualist commitments.

Scott Berman, Saint Louis University, contingently@gmail.com

4A (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 502: “A Scientific Basis for Socrates’ Ethical Truths”

Socrates’ ethical theory, as we see it in the early dialogues of Plato and especially in the *Gorgias*, requires that ethical truths are objective. The fundamental objection to there being objective ethical truths, I argue, is that ethical facts are not observable in the way that scientific facts are. I shall use results from the burgeoning field of complexity science to show how the ethical facts are in fact observable in exactly the same way as scientific facts are and hence that the ethical truths argued for by Socrates are more defensible than previously thought possible.

Charlene Elsby, Indiana University-Purdue University, Fort Wayne, celsby@gmail.com
4B (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 504: “Aristotle’s Physiognomy and the Virtuous Mean of Materiality”

The pseudo-Aristotelian text *Physiognomonica* is often cited as the origin of and ancient precursor to later works on the often disparaged art or science of physiognomy. It remains part of the corpus despite a general consensus that it was written by an Aristotelian in the 3rd century B.C. Still, Aristotle gives physiognomical theories also in the *History of Animals*, *Parts of Animals*, *Generation of Animals*, *De Anima* and the *Prior Analytics*, where he writes at 70b: “It is possible to infer character from physical features, if it is granted that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural affections.” In this paper I suggest an Aristotelian physiognomy that accurately represents the hylomorphic structure of the organism. An Aristotelian physiognomy should not so much dictate what feature corresponds to what character trait as it should describe the materiality of an organism as an aspect of its hylomorphic structure. The material aspect, as the embodiment of the character trait, should serve as an indication of the character trait; however, it cannot be formalized as any kind of science dictating a one-to-one correspondence between a character trait and a physical feature. Rather, the virtuous material mean, as the embodiment of the virtuous mean about which we are used to speaking relative to the soul, is just as subjective; i.e., just as Aristotle claims that the mean between an excess and a deficiency must be calculated relative to the particular individual (*Nic. Eth.* 1106b), so is a physical mean relative to a particular individual. I conclude that while a kind of physiognomy seems necessary, given Aristotle’s conception of the organism as the hylomorphic structure constituted of body and soul, it is impossible to formalize the ideal material virtuous mean—to be properly Aristotelian, we must accept that the same character trait may inform various material embodiments.

Victor Saenz, Rice University, victor.saenz@gmail.com
4B (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 504: “Non-Rational Desire in *EN*, IV.3: Re-Thinking *Megalopsuchia*”

Despite the attention modern scholars have devoted to the *Ethica Nicomachea* in the last several decades, relatively little sustained attention has been given to his specific accounts of the moral virtues or ethical excellences (*ethiké areté*). Moreover, fundamental questions about the nature of the moral virtues remain unaddressed. I here want to focus on one.

Aristotle writes that moral virtues—as opposed to intellectual virtues—are virtues of the non-rational (alogon) parts of the soul (*EN* I.13). Training in the moral virtues is training in getting these non-rational desires to accord with right reason. But how do each of the different moral virtues—10 or so of them—relate to Aristotle’s two main sources of rational desire, *thumos* (often translated ‘spirit’) and *epithumia* (often translated ‘appetite’)? How are the moral virtues precisely excellences of these parts? I want to begin to answer this question by looking at the case of *megalopsuchia* (often translated ‘magnanimity’).

My purpose in this paper is two-fold. (1) I argue that the main source of non-rational motivation in *megalopsuchia* is *thumos*, so that *megalopsuchia* is a distinctive excellence of *thumos*. (2) I show that a recent, largely critical account of *megalopsuchia* by Howard Curzer in his *Aristotle and the Virtues* (OUP, 2012) is importantly mistaken, and mistaken precisely because it neglects the role of non-rational desire—as do several other interpreters.

First I present Curzer’s two main criticisms: (i.) that *megalopsuchia* does not have the necessary conditions for moral virtue; and (ii.) that the main aspects of *megalopsuchia*—a certain self-knowledge, the practice of the virtues at the grand scale, and a certain self-sufficiency—are not united in any

principled way. Second, after sketching Aristotle's *thumos*, I will show how this account responds to the claim that *megalopsuchia* does not have the necessary conditions for moral virtue. Third, I argue that *thumos* elucidates the kind of self-knowledge that *megalopsuchia* presupposes. Fourth and finally, I show that *thumos* also helps us understand the *megalopsuchos'* relation to the practice of the virtues on the grand scale and ultimately the unity of the different, seemingly disparate components of this virtue. This account of *thumos* and *megalopsuchia* not only begins to clarify Aristotle's thesis that the moral virtues are the virtues of the non-rational parts of the soul, it also helps us to see *megalopsuchia* in a fresh light.

Dana Munteanu, Ohio State University, munteanu.3@osu.edu

4B (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 504: "Ethical Complications: Tragic *Exempla*"

Defining the superiority of the noble characters of tragedy, the *spoudaioi*, has remained a notoriously difficult subject, because of the concision of the statements in the *Poetics*. My paper proposes to examine examples that appear to refer to tragedies in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Eudemean Ethics*, in order to shed a new light on the moral implications of the agents involved in tragic action. Not knowing the universals means not knowing what one must (*dei*) do or avoid, and every bad person is ignorant of that (*Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1110b 28-9). Conversely, not knowing the particulars regards various details (of who or how or with what consequence), so it is possible for a person hit to be your father but that you know only that he is a man (*Nicomachean Ethics* 5.1135a24-30). This example surely brings to our mind king Oedipus, although no tragedy is mentioned by name. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle gives a list of actions found in tragedies and the degrees of ignorance of the characters performing them (14.1453b39-1454a9). Of these, the recognition-reversal in Euripides' *Chresphontes* is mentioned, in which Merope is about to kill her son but comes to recognize him (14.1454a5-6). The same example is given in the *Nicomachean Ethics* among involuntary actions (*Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1111a10-11: "one might take one's son for the enemy, as Merope did"). An illustration of not knowing particulars is also linked to tragic myths in the *Eudemean Ethics* (2.1225b2-5), referring to the daughters of Pelias (possibly from a lost tragedy by Euripides) who thought they were giving their father a good potion when in fact it was hellebore. Generally, tragic characters in Aristotle's view have to know the universals (what one must do and avoid), which perhaps ought to be qualified as better than most of us. Yet, they may act because of ignorance (not knowing the particulars), for which it is both pity and excuse (*Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1111a2). But complications do occur. Orestes, for example, in Greek tragedies knows exactly what he is doing when he decides to kill his mother. However, overall, Aristotle chooses not to treat such complicated examples in the *Poetics*. He does however bring up some difficult cases in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: Alcmaeon (in the a Euripidean play) gives reasons for killing his mother that appear to be ridiculous (3.1110a24-9; 5.1136a13). The excuse in such cases may come from the heroic code: not killing one's kin would cause greater harm to the family or community. Yet, not all these tragic actions seem justifiable to Aristotle (*Echeñique* 2012, 147). An analysis of the complexity of the idea of voluntary action in Aristotle's ethical treatises (Charles 2012) indicates that a coerced action may, in a sense, be considered not voluntary, even if the agent knows what he is doing. In this sense, we could argue that an Orestes is compelled by circumstances, fate, and Apollo to commit matricide.

Silvia Carli, Skidmore College, scarli@skidmore.edu

4B (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 504: "Completing Activities"

In Aristotle's philosophy, complete activities (*teleiai energeiai*) are "doings" that realize their telos in their exercise. Seeing and theorizing, for instance, are their own end. As such, they are distinguished from incomplete activities (*ateleis energeiai*), whose goal is other than, and beyond, their exercise. The

goal of housebuilding, for instance, is not the building process but the finished house, which is realized only when the activity of the craftsman has ceased. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.4.1175b14–31, however, Aristotle specifies the conditions under which a *teleia energeia* is most complete (*teleiotatē*). The implication appears to be that there are circumstances in which *teleiai energeiai* are less complete and are thus lacking in something or, in some sense, incomplete.

Some scholars (e.g., David Bostock and Christine Olfert) argue that this implication is problematic for Aristotle's conceptual scheme and does not necessarily follow from the *Ethics*' passage. They offer interpretations of it that are compatible with the notion that there is a single state of completeness, which does not admit of degrees.

This paper rejects these proposals and suggests that *teleiai energeiai* can indeed be more or less complete in the sense of being more or less successful in attaining their ends in their exercise. It further argues that the concept of degrees of completeness plays an important role in explaining some of Aristotle's characterizations of *teleiai energeiai*, with particular emphasis on the exercise of theoretical wisdom (*sophia*).

Joshua Blander, The King's College, jblander@tkc.edu

4C (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 506: "Dependence, Grounding, and Fundamentality: A Medieval Proposal"

Questions about the nature of dependence have gained traction in recent work in metaphysics. For example, Kit Fine, E. J. Lowe, and Kathrin Koslicki have all authored important work on the topic of metaphysical dependence. These authors, along with others – including Jonathan Schaffer and Fabrice Correia – have examined the connections between dependence and cognate notions such as grounding and fundamentality. These authors rely not merely on contemporary work for their inspiration; they find insight in reflection on Aristotle and Aristotelian ideas. This emphasis yields helpful criteria for whether something is dependent or independent, often derived from Aristotle's account of the categories. Primary substances, which are the independent entities, would presumably be fundamental; while qualities and quantities would be dependent entities and non-fundamental.

The work being done on dependence, grounding, and fundamentality reflects the natural outlook that dominates both contemporary and Aristotelian metaphysics, focusing on dependence and grounding relations in the natural world. By contrast, many medieval Aristotelians developed theistic conceptions of dependence that capture both natural and non-natural dependence relations; as a result, they examine both the fact that and the way in which everything depends on God, enabling us to discover ways of thinking about grounding relations that are notably absent from current discussion. Understanding these relations can help us make sense of what difference it makes to the world when we answer the question of what in the world, if anything, depends on God.

In this paper, I develop William Ockham's account of dependence and priority in order to evaluate its implications for the contemporary discussion. In a variety of writings, Ockham discusses these notions, and similar ones, in order to make sense of the ways in which one thing depends on another. Ockham discusses two primary notions of dependence – existential and essential dependence. Briefly, existential dependence involves an account of what is required for a thing to be or continue in existence; while essential dependence explains what is needed for the thing to be the thing that it is, or its identity conditions. Though some philosophers think there is an important difference between existential and essential dependence, there are many philosophers who think there is no sharp distinction between them. I believe that Ockham falls in the latter group. At the

very least, he thinks that essential dependence is one kind of existential dependence, or entails existential dependence (even if not vice versa).

Perhaps more significantly, Ockham carefully examines the ways in which the world (and everything in it) depends on and is grounded in God. For Ockham, this seems to entail that God is what (alone) is fundamental. By contrast with the contemporary discussion, then, if the world depends on God, no facts or features about the world would be metaphysically fundamental – not even the world itself, contra Jonathan Schaffer’s holism. Like Schaffer, however, Ockham seems interested in affirming a sparse basis for the fundamental. Regardless of the similarities with particular contemporary theories we might find in Ockham, the value of examining his proposals stems primarily from his ability to expose us to ways of thinking about dependence in ways that are not under consideration in current discussion.

Milo Crimi, UCLA, mcrimi@humnet.ucla.edu

4C (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 506: “Demonstratives and Signs of Materiality in Late Medieval Supposition Theory”

From the late twelfth through the sixteenth centuries, medieval logicians developed sophisticated semantic theories under the heading of the ‘‘properties of terms.’’ One such property a term could exhibit was material supposition. This occurs, roughly put, when a term is used in a proposition to stand for itself, as ‘*hircus*’ might in ‘*Hircus est nomen*’. In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, theories of material supposition began to incorporate linguistic devices such as demonstrative pronouns and the Old French article ‘*li*’ (or ‘*ly*’) as so-called ‘‘signs of materiality’’ to indicate when terms exhibit material supposition. Here I explore this practice. Although signs of materiality share some common features with some modern uses of quotation marks to indicate mention, I will show that they also have many differences. I will argue in particular that Marsilius of Inghen uses demonstratives metalinguistically, and I will consider whether a similar practice can be ascribed to Paul of Venice and Paul of Pergula.

Bernd Goehring, Medieval Institute, University of Notre Dame, bernd.goehring@gmail.com

4C (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 506: “Truth as Rightness in Anselm of Canterbury and Henry of Ghent”

In this paper I examine how the thirteenth-century Parisian master Henry of Ghent (†1293) integrates Anselm’s notion of truth as rightness (*rectitudo*) into his comprehensive account of truth in God and creatures. In his magisterial *Summa* or *Quaestiones ordinariae* Henry explores whether and how there is truth in God. In the first question of article 34, Henry refers to the complex account of truth in Anselm’s *De veritate*, which he understands as distinguishing the truth of a thing from the truth of a sign, and as subdividing the latter into the truth of speech, of thought, of the will and of action (ed. R. Macken, Leuven 1991, p. 164). Henry explicates what he takes to be Anselm’s basic, twofold distinction in the following way: “For just as the truth of a sign (*veritas signi*) obtains when a sign does what it ought to do, or what its nature requires it to do, namely that it does everything that pertains to its signification, i.e. that it indicates its significate according to what is in the external thing, similarly the truth of a thing (*veritas rei*) ought to be what is, when a thing exists in such a way its nature requires that it be, namely that it contains in itself everything that belongs to its nature and essence” (*ibid.*). After establishing that God meets this definition to the highest degree because he is maximally what his divine nature requires him to be, Henry moves on to distinguish in the second question a twofold being of truth – in the thing and in an intellect that is conceiving it, thus capturing Anselm’s definition of truth as a rightness perceptible only to the mind (*veritas est*

rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis). I will show how Henry incorporates Anselm's notion of the truth of essences and its relation to a mind into his own account of God's conceiving ideal exemplars of all essences, from which creatures derive their actual existence and indeed their truth.

Cristóbal Zarzar, University of Cambridge, cristobalzarzar@gmail.com

4D (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 508: "Epicurus' Theory of Perception and the Problem of Conflicting Appearances"

The Epicurean dictum 'all *phantasiai* are true' has struck ancient and modern philosophers as strongly counterintuitive. Consider the following case: the tower looks round (to some perceiver, when seen from afar) and square (to some perceiver, when seen from close up). The tower, we assume, cannot have at the same time opposite properties such as 'round' and 'square'. Given Epicurus' epistemological position, it seems that the only options available to him are (a) to embrace the apparent contradiction, or (b) to endorse perceptual relativism. But surely, Epicurus does not hold that the tower is actually round and square (*simpliciter*), nor he does away with objective reality. What does he mean, then, when he affirms that all *phantasiai* are true? In this paper I will address the question of how this epistemological claim should be understood within the framework of Epicurus' theory of visual perception. After motivating the problem, I will present an interpretation of the claim that all *phantasiai* are true which allows Epicurus to (dis)solve the problem of conflicting appearances without committing himself to (a) or (b). On this reading, all *phantasiai* are true in the sense that they infallibly report the nature of their respective immediate causes, that is, of the films or images (*eidōla*) emanating from the solid bodies and resembling their shape. However, the Epicureans also claim that we perceive the solid bodies via the *eidōla* they cast off. In the remainder of this paper I will show that this is an unstable position: on the one hand, if we are only directly perceiving some intermediary *eidōla*, we have no way to confirm whether those *eidōla* do indeed correspond in a robust way with how the source-object (i.e. the solid body) is. On the other hand, as I will explain, if we are actually perceiving not merely the *eidōla* but the solid body via the *eidōla*, then positing the *eidōla* as intermediate entities does not suffice to (dis)solve the problem of conflicting appearances. Finally, I will introduce some proposals to dissipate this tension.

Michael Fournier, Dalhousie University, michael.fournier@dal.ca

4D (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 508: "Epicurus and Aristotle on Contemplation"

In this paper I consider Epicurus' continuous contemplation of the principles of nature for the purpose of achieving tranquility as an attempt to replicate the Aristotelian idea that happiness must be some form of contemplation. In the relation between being and thinking that is at the center of his philosophy Epicurus reproduces a version of the Aristotelian idea that the intellect becomes each thing that it understands, that actual knowledge is the same as its object.

Abdulbasit Abdulhameed, Defense Language Institute-DOD-CA-USA, Socialleader@gmail.com

4E (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 510: "AlGhazali's Dual Approach to the Dilemma of Causality Between Metaphysics and Science"

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the historical development of causality as understood by the *falāsifa* and Al-Ghazālī and to demonstrate it using linear-regression analysis, aided by an application and graphs. The primary source for this research is a section on causality in *The Incoherence of the*

Philosophers, in which Al-Ghazālī debates the falāsifa by presenting two opposing views of causation (illustrated in Figure 1.3) that are important to study for their implications today.

Janne Mattila, University of Helsinki, janne.mattila@helsinki.fi

4E (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 510: “Ethical Progression of the Philosopher in Avicenna”

While Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) is undoubtedly the most influential figure in the history of Arabic philosophy, he is not known as an important moral philosopher. In fact, his writings seem to convey a relative lack of interest in practical philosophy in general. Against this background, it is perhaps not very surprising that Avicenna’s ethical thought has received very little attention from scholars. Still, while Avicenna offers little explicit discussions of ethics, his philosophy as a whole is ethically oriented. Given Avicenna’s unrivalled position in the history of Islamic philosophy, his ethical thought should therefore be studied. While refusing to accord ethics an independent place within his philosophical summas, Avicenna discusses ethical themes, such as virtue and happiness, in the psychological and metaphysical parts of *Al-Shifā’* and *Al-Ishārāt wa-l- tanbīhāt* in particular. In addition, Avicenna wrote various smaller treatises on ethical themes, although their authenticity is not certain. The different treatments of ethics, however, appear to convey a certain tension as to man’s ethical goal. Whereas in the *Shifā’* Avicenna draws from Plato and Galen in defining virtue as a psychical disposition in which reason controls the lower faculties, in the last sections of the *Ishārāt*

Avicenna dispenses of the notion of moral virtue to present the philosopher’s ethical goal as purely contemplative.

I will argue that the tension is resolved when Avicenna’s ethical thought is interpreted as a gradual progression towards the philosopher’s ultimately contemplative goal. Whereas the *Shifā’* account represents the general ideal of virtue relative to all human kind, the last part of *Ishārāt* addresses the ethical and intellectual progression of the philosopher. For the latter, the ultimate ethical goal is not only rational control of affections, but a disposition of apathetic ambivalence regarding them.

Shalahudin Kafrawi, Hobart College and Smith College, skafrawi@gmail.com

4E (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 510: “New Perspectives on Ethics of Self-Realization and the Practice of Islamic Hermeneutics”

It has been observed that a main vehicle of Qu'anic agenda concerns text refers to hermetic ways (logoi) such as witnessing in one's heart, reading -reflecting the intentional significance of Qur'anic rich symbolism. This study proffers a basic set of principles for an hermetic path-Dao-logos to experience the potentials of Qur`nic reading for the believers.

Jeffrey Gower, Wabash College, gowerj@wabash.edu

4F (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 513: “On Poets and Pigs: Exile and Normalization in Plato's *Republic*”

Since its inception in Plato’s thought, Western metaphysics has defined itself and demarcated the field of investigation proper to it vis-à-vis a series of other discourses or vocations. Philosophy is not rhetoric, sophistry, politics or poetry. Plato’s strategy of defining philosophical thinking, a thinking rooted in reason or logos, vis-à-vis other discourses seems to culminate in the exile of poetry from the ideal city in Book X of the *Republic* (606e-607c). Plato exiles the poets from the city because poetry liberates dangerous affects that threaten to usurp the sovereignty of reason. In Book IV of the *Republic*, Socrates and his interlocutors establish that in a well-ordered city just as in a well-

ordered soul, reason allied with spirit should govern appetite or desire, which are closely associated with our embodied condition. If Homer and the other tragedians are allowed to retain their pride of place as the educators of Greece, then the affects will depose the sovereignty of law (*nomos*) and reason (*logos*) and “pleasure and pain will jointly be kings” in the city. The tragic poets must therefore be exiled, and may only return when and if they learn how to behave by organizing their lives according to the dictates of *nomos* and *logos*.

The poets must be exiled to assure that the ideal city (*kallipolis*) will be governed according the rule of reason. While Plato excludes other discourses like rhetoric and sophistry from the proper field of philosophical investigation, this essay contends that the exclusion of the poets from the ideal city has a certain priority among these other exclusions. This priority comes to light when we consider how Plato’s exclusion of the poets parallels another exclusion that seems equally foundational for the Platonic inception of Western metaphysics, namely, the exclusion of animality from the *kallipolis*. In the midst of the first attempt to discover justice by constructing a city in thought, in Book II of the *Republic*, Glaucon accuses Socrates of proposing a city fit only for pigs. Glaucon’s rebuke occasions a transition from the city of pigs (or the healthy city) to the city of luxury (or the city with a fever), the latter of which is made possible by unleashing excessive desire. While excessive desire allows for a specifically human city to emerge, according to Glaucon, it also introduces new problems like war over neighboring territory. On the terms established by Glaucon, the properly human city must both transcend animal life – thus risking martial violence – and somehow capture and normalize the excessive desire that makes such transcendence possible. Capturing and normalizing excessive desire occasions the first systematic treatment of poetry in the *Republic*. Through an exploration of the structural parallel of the exile of the poets and the exile of the animal from the city, this essay argues that the initial disciplining of poetry and the eventual exile of the poets is rooted in Glaucon’s skepticism about non-human animal life.

Coleen Zoller, Susquehanna University, zoller@susqu.edu

4F (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 513: “Rejecting the Logic of Domination: Plato on Justice, Leadership, and Peace”

Feminist Wendy Brown (1994, 177-8) criticizes Plato, claiming that he “could not imagine power that was not domination but only the dominance of the powerful or collective powerlessness.” Often Plato is accused of beginning the philosophical tradition advocating a logic of domination. Here I will argue against this interpretation of Plato’s view of justice. In particular, I will examine both Plato’s and Eco-Feminists’ attitude toward the logic of domination, which always involves the acceptance of and expectation of dominance and subjugation. It comes in various forms, such as the expectation that men should dominate women, that white people should dominate people of color, that people with more resources should dominate those with less, that human civilization should dominate over the natural environment and the other animals, and so on. Eco-Feminists reject the logic of domination writ large, arguing that peace is impossible while any logic of domination is allowed to remain in operation. Plato does not consistently reject the logic of domination; in some moments he uncritically accepts it as we see with his repeated casual mention of slavery. Nevertheless his theory of justice and peace rejects the logic of domination and is offered on more than one occasion in order to stand in opposition to interlocutors who endorse the logic of domination, such as Thrasymachus and Callicles, as conducive to their goal of satisfying immoderate desires. Plato’s point of view is rather paradoxical. On one hand, he has Socrates reject the logic of domination when interlocutors like Thrasymachus or Callicles assert that might makes right, trying to convince them instead that just people do not want to “outdo” other just people (R. 349b-c) because they realize that we achieve more together by being just with each other rather than

by being agonistic (R. 351b-d). On the other hand, he simultaneously has a theory of justice that consists of a hierarchical account of the power dynamics both within an individual soul and within a political community (R. 441d-444a). This follows from his view that parts of souls and kinds of souls have different natures, some fit to rule. However, in spite of his hierarchical attitude toward the nature of the soul and of the polis, I disagree with the presumption of Plato's use of the logic of domination. I will demonstrate that Plato's hierarchy among unequals ultimately is not predicated upon the logic of domination. Rather, Plato's model for peace is one of cooperative harmony instead of domination. We see this especially in the *Republic*, *Gorgias*, and *Phaedrus*. In order to understand Plato's philosophy of peace we must understand the nuances of the power dynamic he recommends in key passages in these dialogues. This project will demonstrate that Plato offers a conception of peace—both personal and political—that entails an approach to leadership focused on harmonious cooperation rather than domination. On my interpretation, Ecofeminists have a little less about which to disagree with Plato.

Catherine McKeen, Southern Vermont College, cmckeen@svc.edu

4F (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 513: “What is a City? And Why is the *Kallipolis* a Happy One?”

Socrates stresses that a main goal of the *Republic's* enterprise is to theoretically construct a “happy city” (420b6-8 and 420c1-4). The prime example of a happy city in the *Republic* is, of course, the *kallipolis*. Commentators have differed strongly on what the happiness of the *kallipolis*, or any city, involves in the *Republic*. So-called “individualists” or “reductionists” such as Gregory Vlastos, Julia Annas and Jerome Neu have held that the happiness of a city simply consists in all or most of the city's inhabitants being happy. The ontology underlying this view is one on which the city is identical to the aggregate of all or most of its citizens. In contrast, so-called “organicists” or “holists” such as Benjamin Grote, R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, and Karl Popper have held that the city is an entity that is non-identical to the aggregate of citizens. On this view, the city is a distinct entity and thus may have properties and states that are independent of those possessed by the aggregate of citizens. A city, on the organicist interpretation, may be happy independently of whether all or most of its inhabitants are happy.

Curiously, both the individualists and the organicists rely on the same *Republic* texts in the attempt to support their radically divergent views. In my paper, I demonstrate that the oft-cited texts fail to support either the strong individualist or the strong organicist interpretations. I argue that there are also good philosophical reasons for rejecting both the strong individualist and the strong organicist positions.

I argue for a modified organicist interpretation. I argue that, in the *Republic*, a city is a distinct entity from the aggregate of its citizens. A city, then, may have properties and states that are different from those possessed by the aggregate of its inhabitants. However, I also show that, in the *Republic*, the states and properties of cities strongly depend on states and properties possessed by that city's inhabitants. Contrary to the strong organicist view, the city's happiness strongly depends on the happiness of the city's inhabitants. Contrary to the strong individualist view, the city's happiness is not identical to the happiness of the city's inhabitants.

Finally, I suggest an answer to the question of what makes a city happy, according to the *Republic's* account. For any entity to be happy, that entity must realize its proper function in an excellent and consistent way. The proper function of a city is to enable its citizens to achieve lives of virtue, to the extent to which they are capable of living such lives. The *kallipolis* enables its inhabitants to achieve lives of virtue, and does so in the most excellent way possible. It is appropriate, then, to call the *kallipolis* a “happy” city. Furthermore, the *kallipolis's* happiness and the happiness of its inhabitants,

while distinct, are strongly linked in the *Republic*. Among other things, this link helps to justify Socrates use of the city- soul analogy in the *Republic*.

Etienne Helmer, University of Puerto Rico, etiennehelmer@hotmail.fr

4F (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 513: “To Be a Stranger in Plato’s *Laws*”

It is probably in Plato’s works that we find the most extensive ancient philosophical meditation on what it means to be a stranger in a city. But this topic has not been studied so far with the close attention it deserves. What are the main reasons for that?

First, most of the scholars who have dealt with the topic of “being a stranger in Plato’s works” have focused on the main speakers. Their concern was to understand why Plato made a stranger lead the conversation in those dialogues, instead of the more familiar Socrates. The main reason they give for this change has to do with a shift in the way of asking and answering, that is in how Plato considers a dialogue and dialectics should be. This aspect of the topic of the strangers in Plato’s works nonetheless leaves aside the political aspect of the issue, which remains to be studied.

Second, the topic of being a stranger has been overlooked probably because the *Kallipolis* of the *Republic* and the city of Magnesia in the *Laws* have often been considered paradigms of close societies, as Sir K. Popper called them in the first volume of *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Such a reading amounts to saying that the topic is in itself irrelevant and, above all, inexistent, as there cannot be strangers in Plato’s best cities.

This interpretation, however, does not resist the teaching of Henri Joly in his short book *Platon et la question des étrangers* (Paris: Vrin, 1992). According to him, Plato’s political statements on the strangers fall into three categories: descriptive statements, based on the prejudice that most Athenians had against specific foreigners, and that Plato and Socrates do not necessarily share; critical or reflexive statements on the alleged differences between the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks and the Barbarians, as it is the case in the *Statesman* and the *Menexenus*; and prescriptive statements, mostly to be found in the *Laws*.

It is on this last category and last dialogue I want to focus on. Relying on a close study of the four groups of strangers Plato presents in *Laws* XII, 952d-953e, and specifically on the economic role he gives to one of these groups in *Laws* VIII, 848a-850c, my claim is the following: the strangers are kept at the border of the political body of the best city, being accepted only for very limited and specific missions; but at the same time the lawgiver of Magnesia needs the inhabitants of foreign cities to serve as a mirror of the perfect virtue of the inhabitants of Magnesia, a mirror without which Magnesia itself seems unable to have a reflexive idea of itself.

Joyce Mullan, Stevens Institute of Technology, jmullan@stevens.edu

4G (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 514: “The Women Speak Up: Speaking Truth to Power Through Aristophanes”

As is well known, Aristophanes wrote three antiwar plays during the Peloponnesian War and three plays where women figure prominently challenging the existing male status quo. At the intersection of the two is *Lysistrata*, where women take over the treasury on the Acropolis and go on a sex strike so as to ‘starve’ men of their desire to continue the Peloponnesian War and cut off their supply of new recruits. Much has been fruitfully written about Women as female intruders in the Public

Sphere (see Shaw and Foley's rebuttal), on Women as defenders of more traditional forms of justice and virtue (see, for example, Justina Gregory on Hecuba). In this paper, I am more interested in women's defense of their right to participate in collective decision-making based on their equal contributions to the Polis. They contribute the sons and husbands that go to war, but often never get a good return on their 'investment'. They have been silent up to now, obeying their husbands and steering clear. But, matters have gone way too far, it is time for peace.

Anthony Preus, Binghamton University, apreus@binghamton.edu

4G (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 514: "Philosophy and Rhetoric in Western Greece: Focus on Empedocles and Gorgias"

Ancient sources tell us that Empedocles of Acragas was the first to promote the study of rhetoric, though the first textbooks on rhetoric were supposedly written by Corax and Tisias of Syracuse, but they were followed by Gorgias of Leontini, who is reputed to have been a student of Empedocles. We don't have significant text by Corax or Tisias, but we do have many fragments of Empedocles' poetry, and we have significant rhetorical pieces by Gorgias, as well as an extended report of his spoof on Eleatic philosophy. Aristotle takes Empedocles very seriously as a philosopher, but has little to say about his contributions to rhetoric; Plato represents Gorgias as so completely dedicated to the art of rhetoric that he has no inclination (any more?) to engage in philosophical discussion. We read Empedocles as a gifted in natural speculation and passionate for a Pythagorean religious vision; the Gorgias that we see has little to say about natural science and appears to be at most skeptical about religion. How can we bracket these two so-disparate individuals together? What are the philosophical and rhetorical ties between Empedocles and Gorgias? My objective here is to look for some connections in the literary remains of these two giants of Sicilian philosophy.

Zoli Filotas, University of South Dakota, zoli.filotas@usd.edu

4G (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 514: "Xenophon on Subordination, Trust, and the Art of Rule"

Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* suggests that the head of a household ought not to rely just on command and punishment to direct the behavior of his subordinates but instead to use honours and persuasion (*timai* and *logoi*) to win loyalty and to persuade them of the value of doing good work. It argues, moreover, that the craft of the ruler—an art of rule that Socrates says pointedly is the same as the art of kings and generals—sometimes involves training subordinates in that very *techné*, so that, for example, a slave foreman will learn the royal art allowing him to rule over other slaves. Thus the *Oeconomicus* departs from the common sense of fifth- and fourth-century Athens in depicting the cooperation and interaction of householders with their wives and slaves in terms of education, trust, delegation, and cooperation. Many scholars have thought this makes it clear that Xenophon is taking steps, however faltering, toward the view that all rational beings have a fundamental moral equality that ought to structure their interactions.

I argue for a different interpretation, reading the *Oeconomicus* in light of the repeated discussions of the art of rule in the *Memorabilia*. I argue that one important resource in his discussion of education in both works is the science of animal training. Xenophon's argument is that the usual levers of animal behaviour—pleasure and pain—ought to be supplemented with honors and persuasive arguments when they are adapted for use on human beings. And this innovation contributes to a larger Athenian rethinking of the role of logos in cooperation, in a way that leaves room for a gentleman (*kalos kagathos*) to give his subordinates lots of room for deliberation, thereby increasing their usefulness to him without undermining his special station. Xenophon's position, I argue, yields

a troubling account of human interaction of considerable historical significance: it is a tradition that would reach one high water mark in Aristotle's doctrine of the master-architect—*architektonikos*—who imposes a telos on the deliberative capacities of his inferiors without thereby restricting them.

Sviatoslav Dmitriev, Ball State University, dmitriev@bsu.edu

4G (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 514: “A Ruler as 'Animated Law' in Antiquity and Early Byzantium”

While both the ancient Greeks and the Romans developed the idea of the ruler as “animated law,” they presented it in the form of two vastly different theories. The first was a philosophical view, developed by Plato and followed by Anaximenes, Diotogenes, Dio, Plutarch, and Aristides, among others, in which the ruler was the source of law because his virtues enriched him with philosophical knowledge about how to rule himself and others, and how to organize his state in the likeness of the divine model. This ruler was a philosopher, whose knowledge and virtue molded his conduct and turned him into “animated law” for his subjects, who followed his way of life. Cicero, the younger Seneca, Musonius Rufus and other Romans who were versed in Greek philosophy also shared this perspective.

The other theory, which we only see in Roman works, held the ruler as a living law because he was the sole source of all laws. My presentation explores the idea that the Roman theory of the ruler as “animated law” existed in two forms. One was the senatorial stance that, although the source of all laws, the emperor should also be bound by them like any other citizen (Tacitus, the younger Pliny,

Cassius Dio). The other, which was promoted in Roman legislation, including the *Digesta* and imperial constitutions, held the emperor to be exempt from the force of laws. According to the latter view, the emperor was both the source of laws, and separate and independent from laws. Although offering directly opposite views, both sides argued for them along the same lines: they rationalized the ruler's legal status in purely legal terms, ignoring his philosophical and moral qualities.

Both theories survived into the Byzantine Empire. Byzantine legal texts, like the *Novellae*, *Institutes*, and *Codex* of Justinian I in the sixth century, as well as subsequent Byzantine legislation, proclaimed the emperor as the only source of law and exempted him from the force of law. However, evidence from the early Byzantine period shows that the intellectual and imperial elite of the Byzantine Empire departed from the Roman senatorial stance that held the emperor as the only author of all laws and expected him to be bound by them. The works by Themistius, Synesius, Lydus, Damascius Diadochus, and Paul Silentarius displayed neoplatonic views when they supported the theory that rationalized the legal status of the emperor in philosophical terms. In their opinion, the ruler was the ultimate source of law by virtue of his knowledge of philosophy and exemplary morality. His wisdom and moral qualities aligned his behavior with divine providence, thus turning the ruler into “animated law” for his subjects. This philosophical rationalization of the ruler's legal status by the Byzantine cultural and imperial elite marked both a departure from the traditional Roman senatorial view and the emergence of a separate identity for the Byzantine Empire.

Ignacio De Ribera-Martin, The Catholic University of America, deriberamartin@cua.edu

4H (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 307: “Incomplete Being and Degrees of *Dunamis* in Aristotle's *Generation of Animals*”

When it comes to identifying the different kinds of potentiality and actuality, readers of Aristotle

usually have in mind the standard modes of being distinguished in the *De anima* and in the *Metaphysics*. In *De anima* II.1 and II.5 Aristotle distinguishes two different kinds of actuality and two different kinds of potentiality. Two Aristotelian terms correspond to the two kinds of actuality: *entelecheia* (having, but not exercising; “actuality”) and *energeia* (having and exercising; “activity”), but we only have one Aristotelian term for the two corresponding modes of potentiality (*dunamis*), namely, potentiality to become (“potentiality”) and potentiality to exercise (“capacity”). In the *De anima*, the category of “having” is the key notion articulating those distinctions, and as a result *entelecheia* becomes the main term unifying actualities and activities. On the other hand, in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle focuses on “being,” rather than on “having,” distinguishing between “being in *dunamis*” and “being in *energeia*” and giving the primacy to *energeia* as the notion unifying all modes of being. These two approaches to potentiality and actuality (i.e. the perspective of “having” and the perspective of “being”) are consistent with one another and can be correlated into one unified picture that disclose three different modes of being: (1) Mode of potentiality (not having, but being capable of having) and incapacity (not yet being in *dunamis*), (2) Mode of actuality (having, but not exercising, i.e. *entelecheia*) and capacity (being in *dunamis*), and (3) Mode of activity (having and exercising; being in *energeia*). In this paper I will show that this picture is not complete: there are more ways in which Aristotle approaches potentiality and actuality that disclose other modes of being that are not apparent in this picture. In order to do so, I will consider some passages from the *Generation of animals* where Aristotle uses the expressions “having in *dunamis*” and “being nearer or farther away in *dunamis*,” expressions that refer to incomplete modes of being and to degrees of *dunamis*. In a similar way, Aristotle’s qualification in defining change in the *Physics* (cf. “in so far as it is in *dunamis*”) also points to incomplete and gradual modes of being. While in the *De anima* and in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle uses the expressions “(not) having X” and “being X in *dunamis*,” nowhere in these treatises does he use the phrase “having X in *dunamis*” or consider a mode of being in between “having” and “not having;” nor does he suggest that there are different degrees of “being X in *dunamis*,” either something “has X” or it “does not have X;” either something “is X in *dunamis*” or it “is not X in *dunamis*.” In contrast, the expressions used by Aristotle in the *Generation of animals* suggest otherwise: there seems to be a mode of being between “having X” and “not having X,” as well as degrees of “being X in *dunamis*.” The paper explores what those modes of being are.

Alireza Saati, Saati.philosophy@gmail.com

4H (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 307: “Aristotle's Mathematical Ontology and Merging the Two Discussions of Matter”

Aristotle’s intriguing discussion of “matter” in the *Physics* on the one hand, and his completely different discussion of the same subject, namely “matter”, in the *Metaphysics* on the other hand always play an elusive role in Aristotelian Corpus. In this paper, I should like to discuss these two concepts of “matter” and by presenting my supposition in follow; after giving some comments over Aristotle’s commitment on dimensions matter have, I wish to argue how the root idea of these two discussions might be surveyed in Aristotle’s Mathematical Ontology.

The texts would be discussed: Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Z (3) – *Physics* Book 1 (7) The very first account of matter in Aristotle could be followed up in the argument Aristotle establishes in his theory of substantial change. A series of paragraphs in *Physics* presents this: in 190 a31 – b9, for example, Aristotle talks about becoming and example of “things which turn in respect of their matter”. As an upshot coming after number of premises Aristotle concludes that “It is plain that these are all cases of coming to be from some underlying thing”, in addition, “from what has been said, whatever comes to be is always complex”. Here there is quite apparent evidence that supports the idea that through any complexity and change something should always persists. The levels of Aristotle’s argument through these certain passages involve the fact which has always been the core

of Aristotle's metaphysics. A scrutiny look into the complex form of change mentioned above shows that the relation between substance and what underlies change is still unanswered!

The most related discussion that substantial change sets forth here is the relation which exists between matter and substance. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1049 b9 – 11 tells us what underlies a change is the matter of that change. This is the very dark obscure account of matter we can have metaphysically! But some fix specific passages of *Metaphysics Z* can lead us towards concluding considerations. In the book three of *Metaphysics Z* when Aristotle speaks about substance and its applications, four main subjects are recognized as if not senses but schemes through which at least we can survey what substance is. Some implications of this question outline the nature of substance as the compounding of the matter and form, and in continue in describing what matter is – after giving some examples – Aristotle states that “By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined. Such a determination makes us to conclude that Aristotelian concept of matter basically concerns a notion which is entirely non – corporeal. Hereafter we should looking for a realm in which matter could be surveyed. The realm of geometry, I believe, could be the first supposition that supports the only direction through which we can trace to find what Aristotle thinks about matter. The rest of my paper concerns some critics Aristotle envisages and then I will expand my idea on Aristotle's mathematical ontology. In my opinion, Aristotle's justifications on matter in *Physics* are chiefly rest on mathematical concepts enrooted in ontological contexts in *Metaphysics*.

Andrea Tschemplik, American University, atschem@american.edu
4H (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 307: “In Defense of Teleology”

Aristotle famously opens his *Metaphysics* with the claim that “all human beings by nature desire to be in the know (πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰ δέναι ὁρῶνται φύσει 980a).” It is entirely appropriate that this announcement should occur in the *Metaphysics*, because the ensuing pages provide ample proof of the claim. What better proof than the pursuit of the science of being, which can in no way ease the burden of everyday life, but is sought merely for the sake of knowledge. The fact that we delight (ἄγαπησις) in having “disinterested” perceptions and knowledge is indicative of a certain kind of freedom.

In this paper I will examine the desire to know and explain how it fuels both our attempt to gain a theoretical understanding of the cosmos as a whole, to think architectonically, as Aristotle puts it, and make possible our pursuit of *eudaimonia*, a way of living that is the result of choices we make. The desire to know is the source of intelligibility and freedom, allowing us to construct a meaningful world and life. Aristotle indicates as much when he writes that the goal of the desire to know is to be able to articulate the purpose of each thing/event/practice, to arrive at an understanding of the highest good (ὄλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάση) (982b5). The desire to know demands teleological explanations and cannot be satisfied by mere mechanical elaborations.

Syeda Komal Gilani, University of Texas at Austin, komal.gilani@utexas.edu
4I (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 311: “Ethical Realism in the Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo”

In several of his writings, Sri Aurobindo expresses skepticism toward ethical principles and theories. For example, in *The Synthesis of Yoga* (1955/1999) he states that they are always formulated by the 'inferior powers' of the lower nature, that is, the parts of the nature that are in the *Ignorance* or

Avidyā. He characterizes ethical theories and principles as 'blind and gross formulations' and efforts to formulate them as 'faltering steps' (p. 202), and makes it clear that an advanced Yogi does not aim to live an ethical life. Additionally, he offers a teleological evolutionary account of the origin of moral intuitions, claiming that they emerged to fulfill a certain function, but will lose their utility as the evolutionary process advances. For example in *The Life Divine* (1949/2005) he describes ethical practice as a means of rising above the animal nature, but one that is temporary and destined to end when its goals have been attained (e.g. p. 105).

In this paper I make some progress toward addressing the question of whether Sri Aurobindo's remarks support ethical irrealism. In the first part of the paper I offer an explication of some of Sri Aurobindo's relevant metaphysical and meta-ethical views, with a focus on his evolutionary explanation for the origin of ethical practice and his claim that spiritual advancement involves a loss of the will to be ethical. Then I consider two ways in which such views may be taken to support irrealism: first, by an interpretation of his evolutionary explanation as challenging the reliability of ethical intuitions, that is, by an interpretation of his position as a type of evolutionary debunking argument. Second, by an inference from the negative correlation between evolutionary and individual advancement and deliberate engagement in ethical practice to the conclusion that ethical practice is misguided. On this interpretation, the fact that the advanced Yogi – a being with greater knowledge and who is evaluated by Sri Aurobindo as superior in some respects – is supra-ethical implies that ethical principles lack objectivity. Finally, I give reasons for rejecting both challenges: for the first, that Sri Aurobindo's theistic teleological conception of evolution does not justify the debunking interpretation of his evolutionary explanation. As evolution is a purposive and guided process for Sri Aurobindo, that something evolved to further that process is not evidence against its objectivity. For the second, that the advanced Yogi's being supra-ethical can be explained better by their lack of need for ethical deliberation to engage in right action, and by the possibility of ethical normativity being superseded by a higher form of normativity, than by the wrongness of ethical principles. I suggest an interpretation of Sri Aurobindo's meta-ethical views on which his challenge is not to the truth of ethical principles, but to their ultimateness. On this interpretation his conclusion is that ethical principles and judgements partially express higher and more total truths – from which they derive their authority and by which they can sometimes be superseded – than that they lack objectivity altogether.

Elyor Makhmudov, Institute of Oriental Studies, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, emakhmudov@gmail.com
4I (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 311: “The East Asian Heritage of Ancient and Medieval Central Asia”

The interactions between Central Asians and the Chinese has has a long history as well as the rich potentials in the present. This research depicts a few of the key elements of this link in light of the historical study of the silk road. In addition, we proffer new approach of linguistic studies of the syntax of Chinese, Uzbek and a few Turkic languages.

Abrigul Abrigul Lutfaliev, Global Scholarly Publications, Independent Scholar,
 alutfaliev@gmail.com

4I (Saturday 4:15) ROOM 311: “Some Ancient Sources of Present Central Asian Philosophies of Ecology”

The present inquiry depicts the differences between the Medieval Islamic view of nature than embedded ecology and the 21st Century environmental studies. For the Islamic perspective- norms were necessary dimension of experience -analogous to the views of Plato, Spinoza, Whitehead and Heidegger. In contrast, contemporary perspectives presuppose a fact-value dualism that prevent a

cognitive account of ecology. Finally, our paper applies the theoretical issue to the present case of "water for life" problem at the UN and Central Asian nations.

Annie Corbitt, Northwestern University, anncorbitt2020@northwestern.edu

5A (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 502: "The Absurdity of the Body-Lover's Virtue in the *Phaedo*"

In his defense speech in the *Phaedo*, Socrates distinguishes between the genuine virtue of the lovers of wisdom and the apparent virtue of the body-lovers. He says that temperance and courage are appropriately attributed to philosophers, who in their love and pursuit of wisdom, disregard bodily delights in favor of those of the soul, and have no fear of death. But the story is different for ordinary people, the non-philosophers, who pursue not wisdom, but the delights of the body, and who resent harm that should come to the body. When we consider their temperance and courage, we should find these to be ἄτοπος - strange, or absurd - and even illusory, containing "nothing sound or true." Socrates explains this strangeness as the fact that it is by fear that a body-lover is courageous, and it is by intemperance that a body-lover is temperate. The argument appears to be that the body-lover may bravely face death, but she does so for fear of losing something else that she holds dear to her bodily existence. And a body-lover may abstain from one set of bodily pleasures, but he does so only because he places greater value on some other set of claims his body makes on him.

But what exactly is so absurd or objectionable about being made courageous by fear, or temperate by intemperance? How does a body-lover's being courageous through fear or temperate through intemperance make that courage or temperance any less real than the courage and temperance of the philosopher? In this paper, I argue that, while the absurdity of the body-lover's virtue has been traditionally understood in light of Plato's thesis that opposites cannot cause opposites, I think the absurdity is simpler and more clear than that. It is that the body-lover's virtue is simultaneously vice. I argue that this interpretation is supported by the reasoning provided later in the dialogue that opposite properties cannot be characterized by opposite properties, and I connect this feature of the body-lover's illusory virtue to the notion in the *Phaedo* that one's virtue is true only if the act is done in the pursuit of wisdom, as opposed to bodily concerns.

Sean Driscoll, Boston College, driscose@bc.edu

5A (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 502: "The Methodological Function of Memory in Plato's *Phaedo*"

In the *Phaedo*, Plato's Socrates guides his interlocutors through an assortment of approaches to the question of the immortality of the soul, and readers are left to understand this shifting of methodological ground. Do the various methods that Socrates discusses conflict with each other or are they united? Which methods, if any, are to be taken seriously? Does the dialogue as a whole follow any of them? Does it follow all of them? Despite the resulting sophisticated discussions of dialectic, hypothesis, logoi, and second sailing in the *Phaedo*, there is widespread disagreement concerning these questions.

The search for a unifying methodology, especially in this dialogue, has so far failed to simultaneously accomplish two things: (1) to explain how the various "methods" discussed by Socrates are or are not played out in the dialogue in a way that makes sense of the dialogue's narrative and mythological dimensions, and (2) to explain the function (and conclusions!) of the immortality arguments in light of the dialogue's method. I argue that this inability results from an underlying commitment to a narrow version of dialectic as Plato's method. Indeed, the assumption that dialectic is simply the

way Plato delivers his form of logical argument (διαλεκτική διαλεγῆσθαι λέγω λογος) contradicts what is actually at work in the dialogue. Whatever λόγος is in the *Phaedo*, it must be understood more broadly.

This point is perhaps rather well known. But to recover what is really at work in the λόγοι of the *Phaedo*, I will introduce a new methodological player—one that will unite the dialogue’s arguments with its complex use of myth and drama: ἀνάμνησις (memory). That is, I will show how the dialogue’s procedure is less suited to the presentation of arguments, strictly speaking, and more suited to a movement proper to ἀνάμνησις—looking through something to something else.

In this way, I will show how what is usually considered an epistemological point in the overall argument is actually the methodological key to understanding how to interpret the immortality arguments. Hence, the method of the *Phaedo* works like a metaphor, by presenting one thing as a means to encourage the vision of another. By linking the λόγοι with the μῦθοι in this way, Plato brings his readers to know philosophical truth, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου (97b).

Michael Wiitala, Cleveland State University, mwiitala@gmail.com

5A (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 502: “Forms, Causes, and Why-Questions in the *Phaedo*”

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates relates how his search for why things are the way they are eventually led him to posit the forms as causes (aitiai). The sense in which the forms are causes, however, is not obvious. Building on the recent work of David Sedley and Fiona Leigh, I will argue in this paper that forms are causes in the sense that they structure their participants. In particular, I will show that if forms are understood as structuring-causes, their four-fold status (1) as that at which why-questions aim, (2) as distinct from their participants, (3) as repeatable in their participants, and (4) as normative for their participants becomes clear.

Consider some specific way, F, that some object, x, is. “Why is x F?” is Socrates’ question concerning the way x is F. He claims that the “safe answer” to questions of this sort is that x is F because it participates in F. Say x is something beautiful, for example. Socrates’ question is “why is x beautiful?” He argues that the safe answer to this question is that x is beautiful because it participates in the form beautiful (100c3-e3). Given Socrates’ claim that x is F because it participates in F, what must a form be on his account and what kind of causality does it exercise? My proposal is that a form is that which structures its participants. Form F is a cause, I will argue, in the sense that it is the structure in terms of which x is structured insofar as x is F.

Sensible objects are structured in various ways. Each property that a sensible object possesses is an instance of some particular structure. Justice, for example, is, on Plato’s view, a certain harmonious arrangement of the parts of a soul, a city, or whatever else is just. Every just thing is just insofar as it is an instance of the structure that simply is justice itself—the form justice. The same applies to beauty and to any other property. Consider a rather simple property, like being ten-fingered. Any entity, insofar as it has ten-fingers, is an instance of the structure “ten-fingered entity.” The structure ten-fingered entity, however, is distinct from all the various entities that have ten-fingers, and would be intelligible even if none of those entities happened to exist. This holds for any structure. Structure F is distinct from instances of structure F. Likewise, structure F is repeatable, whereas any particular instance of structure F is not. After all, structure F is that according to which instances of structure F are structured. Moreover, structure F is normative for its instances. By asking why x is F, Socrates was searching for the norm according to which x, insofar as it is an F thing, is structured. That norm simply is structure F—that is, form F.

Edith Nally, University of Missouri, Kansas City, nally3@umkc.edu

5A (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 502: “Socrates' Wager: The Otherworldly Rewards Premise in Plato's *Phaedo*”

In the final moments of his life, Socrates does something quite unexpected: he delivers a myth. At the end of the *Phaedo*, he weaves a tale, describing the route that different souls take into the afterlife and the rewards and punishments that await them (113d-114b). Socrates' mode of discourse is extremely puzzling: why should he, of all people, in his last conversation on earth, tell a tale ripe with religious and scientific claims about the soul and its journey into the next world? We would expect a defender of philosophy to prefer a different mode—we would expect him to deliver an argument.

This puzzle is made stronger by the fact that, immediately following the myth, Socrates claims that a man “possessing reason” ought not to affirm what he has just said, but that he might nevertheless coax himself into believing it (114d1-6): It is not fitting for a man possessing reason to confidently assert these things are just so, as I have described them: but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal, and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale.

Why does Socrates think “it is not fitting for a man possessing reason to confidently assert” what he has said? (114d1-2) What exactly causes his hesitation, and what ought we to take away from his tale? Moreover, why does Socrates think it is fitting to “risk” a belief in what he has said, repeating it like an “incantation” or “charm” (114d6)?

This paper examines the function of the *Phaedo* myth and the disclaimer that follows it. Socrates introduces the myth, I argue, because he is aware of having overlooked a key premise in his argument against fearing death. Having dwelt on the immortality of the soul, the myth is the first discussion of what I call the “otherworldly rewards premise” (ORP). The ORP establishes that, in the afterlife, souls are rewarded according to their earthly character; good souls fare well, whereas bad souls fare poorly. The argument against fearing death, it turns out, relies just as much on the ORP as on the immortality of the soul. If good souls were not treated in a way befitting of their character—if the afterlife were bad or unpredictable—then one would have every reason to remain fearful.

The *Phaedo* myth describes what the afterlife would be like if the Otherworldly Rewards Premise were true, yet it does not prove that the ORP is true. This is why, I argue, Socrates ends with a disclaimer: it is still an open question whether the soul of the philosopher—whether his own soul—goes to a fate befitting its earthly merits. For all we know, for all Socrates knows, even the best souls survive death only to be cast into the depths of Tartarus. This is why it is fitting to repeat Socrates' tale as if it were an “incantation” (114d5-6). In order to achieve tranquility in the face of death, one must convince oneself that the afterlife is governed by just principles, rewarding the good and punishing the wicked.

John Fredrick Humphrey, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University,
jfhumphr@ncat.edu

5B (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Did Socrates Have to Die?”

This paper focuses on the question: Did Socrates have to die? In Plato’s *Crito*, Crito arrives early in the day at the prison in which the philosopher has been confined to announce that the ship returning from Delos has been sighted at Sunium and should arrive in Athens on that day. When the ship returns, Socrates is to die [Cr. 43 c-d]. Crito explains that he has come to the prison to encourage Socrates to flee. He argues that had he and Socrates’ friends acted properly, Socrates’ case would not even have come to trial. However, since Socrates was tried and convicted, Crito argues, the philosopher should now allow him (Crito) and Socrates’ friends to bribe the guards and arrange for his escape from the prison to another city. Although Crito gives several reasons that Socrates should allow Crito and Socrates’ friends to orchestrate his escape, these reasons can be categorized under two broad headings: 1) Crito’s concern for Socrates and his family (at least his sons) and 2) Crito’s concern for his own and Socrates’ friends’ reputations because they have let their friend go to court, be found guilty, be sentenced to death, be imprisoned, and now be only a day before his execution.

In the course of the dialogue, however, Socrates appeals to what Stephen Nathanson has called “super patriotism” and argues that if he were to violate the sentence determined by his jurors and the court by escaping he would be harming his fellow citizens, the city, and the laws. Since, Socrates argues, it is always wrong to harm others even if one received harm, he ought not to follow Crito’s advice to escape to another city; rather, he should stay and accept his punishment whether just or not. While this argument may seem cogent at first glance, indeed, it appears to be a defense of the social contract, on examination the argument is weak. Does Socrates actually wish to claim that one should always follow orders regardless of the consequences? Does a citizen not have the right, even the obligation, to challenge and disobey unethical, authoritarian regimes?

In this paper, then, I will argue that while Socrates does make the argument that a number of readers have attributed to him, namely, that he is obligated to accept the punishment mandated by the court, there is another more important reason for Socrates’ choosing to suffer the penalty of death. I will argue that had Socrates acceded to Crito’s arguments and fled the city, his pursuit of philosophy, indeed, his life would be meaningless and instead of his name being associated with the love of wisdom, he would only be remembered, if at all, as someone who had been tried in Athens in 399 B.C.E. and was sentenced to death; hence, I will argue, Socrates had to die for his principles so that his life would have meaning. It is only by choosing death that Socrates can achieve a kind of immortality for himself and his way of doing philosophy while at the same time challenging the citizens, the laws, the constitution, and the city.

Toomas Lott, New York University/University of Tartu, tl1972@nyu.edu

5B (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 504: “Is Socratic *Epistêmê* Knowledge or Understanding?”

Is *epistêmê* for Socrates, in Plato’s early dialogues, knowledge or understanding? I will argue that *epistêmê* has features of both knowledge and understanding and that that explains certain features of Socratic epistemology.

Knowledge, understanding, and Socrates. In contemporary epistemology it is often argued that knowledge and understanding are distinct mental states. This is what I will also be assuming. Knowledge (i) involves being justified in believing that p; (ii) is transmitted via testimony; (iii) is the aim of belief/norm of assertion/reason for action. Understanding: (i) involves grasping explanatory

relations as to why p is true, (ii) can't be transmitted via testimony.

I'll argue that Socratic *epistêmê* has features of both understanding and knowledge: *epistêmê*: (A) involves explanation; (B) requires justification; (C) can't be transmitted via testimony; (D) is the aim of belief/norm of assertion/reason for action.

What this means for Socratic epistemology. Since Socrates does not distinguish between knowledge and understanding, he tends to treat explanation as justification. For Socrates, a true belief that x is F becomes *epistêmê* by adding a grasp of x's explanatory relation F-ness (*Meno* 97E-98A, *Euth.* 6D). However, Socrates also treats grasping F-ness as the only acceptable justification for believing that x is F. (e.g. *Hip. Maj.* 304E). Thus, the Socratic 'priority of the definition' is the result of Socrates confusing explanation with justification. Moreover, Socrates assumes that all facts of the form 'x is F' have a single explanation (i.e. x's relation to F-ness). Consequently, Socrates thinks that if a person grasps the explanation for some x's being F, then the person grasps the explanation of any x's being F. Since Socrates takes explanation and justification to coincide, grasping the single explanation for x's being F yields justification for S's all other beliefs about things that are F. This means that S can't be justified in thinking that this x is F unless S is justified in all her other beliefs about F things. For example, S can't be justified in believing that Socrates is brave, unless S is justified in believing, e.g. that Laches is brave and that Nicias is not brave (as long as S has holds the relevant beliefs). Since Socrates takes *epistêmê* to involve justification, this turns *epistêmê* into an implausibly demanding cognitive state.

Thus, Socrates is, on the one hand, pushed towards skepticism (since it is unclear how a human being could reach this highly demanding cognitive state). On the other hand, since Socrates, by (D), takes *epistêmê* to be necessary for action and belief guidance, he is forced to seek to achieve this cognitive state.

Later developments. Plato and Aristotle react to this tension between understanding and knowledge in Socratic philosophy in different ways. Plato restricts *epistêmê* to the non-empirical domain (e.g. *Rep.* 529A-C) since, e.g. in mathematics, explanation and justification coincide. Aristotle distinguishes clearly between knowing that something is so and understanding why it is so (e.g. *Met.* 981A, *An. Post.* 89) resolving the Socratic tension in a different manner.

Tylor Cunningham, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Cunningham14@gmail.com
5B (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 504: "In Dialogue with Dialogues: Are Plato's Aporetic Dialogues Actually Unsuccessful?"

Often, a philosophical text explicitly claims to speak some truth to the reader through its thesis and carefully crafted arguments. By working through this argumentation, the text reaches a concluding point that can be interpreted and understood. While many authors break this mold through their use of aphorisms or other means, such as Heraclitus and Nietzsche, Plato's aporetic dialogues stand apart by asking a question and leaving that question completely unanswered by the end. In this paper, I argue that the lack of success for the conversations between interlocutors within the texts does not translate to a lack of success for the dialogues as a whole.

Since the dialogues are both conversations and texts, I begin by exploring why the conversations that happen within the dialogues are unsuccessful according to Hans-Georg Gadamer in *Plato's Dialectical Ethics* (PDE). I then turn to the Phaedrus and analyze the complications of a written text. Namely, a written text cannot be engaged with because it can only speak one way for eternity, unable to

respond to interpretations or questions. However, since Plato's aporetic dialogues are both, at one and the same time, a conversation and a text, I argue that they are a strange medium of understanding that find their place somewhere between simple conversations among individuals and philosophical treatises to be interpreted.

This leads to a complication of differing goals within the dialogues. On the one hand, there is the goal of the conversation within the dialogue: to determine the nature of whatever virtue is being discussed. On the other hand, there is the goal of the dialogue as a text, which A.K. Cotton argues for in *Platonic Dialogue and the Education of the Reader*: to promote philosophical inquiry beyond the bounds of the dialogue itself. This second goal, that of the text, is necessitated by the aporia that arises when the first goal, that of the conversation, is not achieved.

In order to reach both of the goals present within an aporetic dialogue, an elevated hermeneutic standpoint is needed. This standpoint requires the readers to become full participants in the dialogue by understanding their own historical standpoint and the 'moods' of the text. Moods, in PDE, are non-verbal cues used in conversation that are necessary to forming appropriate interpretations. I argue that 'moods' in the dialogues include the aspects of character, time, and place employed by Plato. These tools allow the reader to interpret the conversations within the dialogues in a way that the characters themselves cannot. The reader can ask new questions and raise new objections that are not present in the conversation as it is written. This paper explores how the reader is to traverse this new hermeneutic standpoint, exploring the dangers of proper interpretive distancing that Cotton talks about and the fusion of horizons that Gadamer advocates for in *Truth and Method*. The result is that the dialogues are successful in both of their goals, allowing for continued conversations that lead to ideas of the original topics explored.

Jay Bregman, University of Maine, Jay_Bregman@umit.maine.edu

5C (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 506: "Body, Soul, Cosmos in Synesius of Cyrene"

Synesius is included in the Patristic corpus because he became a bishop. But his thought remained that of a Hellenic Neoplatonist. Synesius of Cyrene: Body, Soul, Cosmos. Synesius is included in the Patristic corpus, because he was a bishop. But his thought remained that of a Hellenic Neoplatonist. Few Patristic authors who make use of Hellenic philosophy follow his line of thought. His stance, like that of Dodds' Plotinus, is one of maintaining a late Platonic form of Hellenic rationalism, in an age of extreme asceticism and 'irrationalism'. This attitude is best represented in the Dion (4.5; 5.1).

Descending from nous, souls are refreshed by letters, rather than descending further into matter. Synesius juxtaposes his balanced spiritual ideals and love of literature against those who oppose his eloquence: He opposes both contemporary Greek as well as Christian ascetics, who...think it fitting that the philosopher...concern himself exclusively with divine matters' (Ep. 154.301).

Literature adorns the spiritual eye within us, and rouses it little by little until it is accustomed to its [proper] objects of vision, that it may '...contemplate a higher object, and not blink...looking intently upon the sun' (8.3). The Hellenic upward path is ordered, the barbarian way is 'like a Bacchic frenzy...an irrational motion to the realm beyond reason' (8.5). The active life concerned with paideia and civic virtue is to be combined with the contemplative. He contrasts philosophy and monasticism (8.2), rather than turning monasticism into philosophy (as does Evagrius of Pontus.) Thus the philosopher-bishop's approach was unique and reflected a late Classical sensibility in an era which had already witnessed the transformation of + the old Greek and Roman outlook under a new dispensation.

Bjorn Wastvedt, University of Arizona, wastvedt@email.arizona.edu

5C (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 506: “The Punishment of the Descending Soul in Plotinus' *Enneads*”

This paper addresses the coherence of metaphysical and ethical ideas throughout Plotinus' works and their inheritance from Plato. The argument focuses on the descent of the individual soul in Plotinus' *Enneads*: with respect to the descent, Plotinus' metaphysics and his theory of justice cannot be reconciled in several respects. After an explanation of the metaphysical and historical context of the soul's descent, it is argued that the ontological progression of the descent leaves much less responsibility to the soul than Plotinus admits. A comprehensive treatment of Plotinus' writing on the descent follows, concluding that the moral character of the descent limits the soul's culpability for its actions in the descent itself. Several standard objections and possible solutions to the problems raised are then explained; discussion of these ideas covers related issues in Plotinus' corpus concerning the justice of the soul's responsibility for its descent. A concluding section determines that the considerations offered show that Plotinus cannot accommodate the punishment of the descending soul without either compromising fundamental metaphysical principles or revising his theory of justice. Arguments are made with reference across the *Enneads* and to Plotinus' sources in Plato.

William Wians, Merrimack College and Boston College, wiansw@merrimack.edu

5D (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 508: “Making the *Ei Esti* Clear in *Posterior Analytics*, II.8”

According to *Posterior Analytics* B.1-2, the *ei esti* is the third of the four things we seek, with the *ti esti* as the fourth. These two are contrasted with the other two things we seek, the *hoti* and the *dioti*—the fact and the reason why. The *hoti* and *dioti* have to do with predications, with one thing being said of another. The *ei esti* and *ti esti*, by contrast, carry metaphysical or ontological implications, having to do with the subject of the predication (the *hupokeimenon*): the moon or the earth, or the sun, a centaur, a god. Does such a thing exist? If so, what is it? The issue in B8 is crucial to the possibility of any scientific knowledge because, as Aristotle says often (most immediately in B7), one cannot have scientific knowledge of something that does not exist. I shall take as my entry the brief but dense passage at B8, 93a3-6. This passage makes a series of distinctions relevant to stating something's *aition*. I shall argue that it identifies three possibilities arising from a series of two mutually exhaustive dichotomous divisions:

That which is the explanation (to *aition*) of the fact that something is (to *ei esti*), is either:

A. the same thing (*to auto*) or

B. something else (*allo*).

When *to aition* is the same thing:

When *to aition* is something else, then either:

It is immediate and a principle.

It is demonstrable or It is indemonstrable

(=the conclusion of a demo) (=an immediate definition).

The chart makes clear that there are three ways in which the existence of a scientific subject can be established or made clear. In doing so, it clarifies the purpose and structure of the preceding

dialectical chapters. To know the *ti esti* presupposes knowing the *ei esti*. But this is precisely where “current methods of definition” (92b19-20) fail: quasi-mathematical convertible axioms (B4), division (B5), and a method of hypothesis (B6). None of these—as the mock handwringing at the start of B7 tells us—proves the *ei estin*. It is this failure that motivates Aristotle’s positive account of definition in B8-10.

Unpacking the passage in B8 will reveal how the positive account in B.8-10 relates not just to the puzzles developed in B.3-7 but to the distinction between the *ei esti* and the *ti esti* announced in B.1-2, and will allow a more complete understanding of Aristotle’s different types of definition and the nature of the unfolding exposition by which Aristotle develops and reveals his own position.

L. Kelson Law, University of Pittsburgh, kelsonlaw@gmail.com

5D (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 508: “How are Causes Shown Through the Middle Term?”

Aristotle thinks that we understand (*epistesthai*) something when we know its cause (*aitia*) as its cause. He also thinks that we understand things by possessing demonstrations (*apodeixeis*) at least when the things to be understood are demonstrable. Presumably, then, in possessing demonstrations, syllogisms of a prestigious kind, we know causes of things. But what is special about a demonstration that makes possessing it amount to knowing a certain cause? Causes of all four kinds ‘are all shown through the middle term’, states A. in II.11 of the *Posterior Analytics*. What does this thesis mean? For three of the four kinds of causes, A. presents syllogisms to illustrate the thesis. But it is far from transparent what substantial idea they are meant to illustrate and if they can even illustrate any same one. Sir David Ross considers this chapter ‘one of the most difficult in A.’ For one, while in two of the syllogisms the middle term clearly picks out cause of the kind in question, in the third example what is clearly cause of the kind in question – health, as an end of walking about after dinner – figures as an extreme term rather than the middle term. Thus these examples – especially the last one – appear to many to have failed to illustrate, if not contradict, A.’s own thesis. They see A. as being sloppy here; some try to help him fix the third example. E.g. Ross says of this chapter that ‘its doctrine is unsatisfactory, and its form betrays clearly that it has not been carefully worked over by A...’

While I am not the only one who disagrees with the above assessment and attempts to interpret the examples as they are (rather than fixing them), I find the existing attempts either problematic (e.g. Mariska Leunissen) or incomplete (e.g. Monte Ransome Johnson). My goal in this paper is to give a substantial, satisfactory reading of the thesis and show how the final-causal example illustrates it. This chapter makes sense, I argue, given A’s own understanding of causality. It is no news that his conception of cause is quite different from our modern ones, but its interrelation with his epistemic syllogistics may not have been appreciated enough. Thus, this paper will also gesture at the relevant aspects of what I take to be A.’s notion of cause. It is the beginning, I hope, of an helpful and authentically Aristotelian account of the relationships between cause, the *explanans*, that for which the cause is a cause, and the *explanandum*.

Adam Woodcox, University of Western Ontario, awoodcox@uwo.ca

5D (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 508: “The Hunt for Definitions: *Posterior Analytics*, B 13”

This paper focuses on two questions that arise from Aristotle’s account of division in the *Posterior Analytics*. First, what place does division occupy in Aristotle’s account of scientific inquiry? Second, how does division relate (if at all) to the picture of cognitive development presented in B 19? I argue that Aristotle sees division as part of a formal method for generating definitions of the natural kinds

of a given domain of knowledge. It thus occupies a preliminary stage in his account of scientific inquiry, since demonstration - by which we arrive at scientific knowledge - must proceed from definitions. As to the second question, I argue that the process of cognitive development described in B 19 - the ascent from perception to experience - secures the species and genera required to get the method of division going.

In his critique of division in *APo.* B 5, Aristotle questions the resources of division to ensure that we arrive at a real definition without positing additional non-essential predicates or omitting predicates that are essential. This problem motivates Aristotle to formalize division – a task that he carries out in B13. I argue that this chapter is not simply a catalogue or list of the different and unrelated ways that division can be used in scientific inquiry. Rather, it articulates a single continuous method for generating real definitions of natural kinds. In this chapter, Aristotle develops a number of formal rules to ensure that division will include all and only predicates that are essential to the subject in question. The divider first locates a cluster of predicates that belongs uniquely to the species under consideration. Division then acts as a correctional procedure that we perform on this cluster to ensure that essential predicates are properly ordered so that we arrive at a real definition. The rest of B 13 expands on this method and discusses the divisional safeguards used to prevent the errors that the traditional Platonic method of division is prone to make. Accordingly, division is not merely a pedagogical device used to present the results of an inquiry into the essence of a kind, as some scholars have argued. Aristotle is interested in division not merely as a tool for classification and taxonomy, but as a method that will actually assist us in the search for definitions.

Cecilia Li, University of Western Ontario, Cecilia.z.li@gmail.com

5E (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 510: “Aristotle on Desire and *Phantasia* in Animal Locomotion”

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of *phantasia* in Aristotle’s account of animal locomotion (*kinesis kata topon*). The question regarding the role of *phantasia* in animal locomotion has received considerable scholarly attention for a number of reasons. First, there is a lack of scholarly consensus on Aristotle’s general account of *phantasia*. Difficulties on this topic range anywhere from its proper translation, the precise role it plays in animal life, and whether there is a unified account of *phantasia* in Aristotle. As a result, the discussions of *phantasia* in respect to animal locomotion are often complicated by different underlying understandings of *phantasia* in general. Second, Aristotle emphasizes in many places that *phantasia* plays a necessary role in the explanation of animal movement, often claiming that animals are not capable of desire without *phantasia* and vice versa (*De Anima*, 433b28-29, 433a22-23). However, it is not immediately clear why *phantasia* is needed and what it uniquely contributes to locomotion that is not supplied by perception itself. Third, it is unclear what role *phantasia* plays in respect to the object of desire. In particular, is *phantasia* necessary to represent something as pleasant or good to us in stimulating locomotion?

In this paper, I will begin with a brief discussion of some of the standard and important literature on this topic. I will argue that in Aristotle’s account of animal locomotion, *phantasia* does not supply the ‘content’ lacking in perception nor does it exclusively represent an object as pleasant or painful as argued by Nussbaum (1978) and Modrak (1987) respectively. In section II, I will offer an account of Aristotle’s model of animal locomotion. I argue that desire, considered on its own, is insufficient for movement because it needs some further ‘preparation’ from the animal’s cognitive faculty (perception, *phantasia*, or thought) to determine its object. In section III, I argue that *phantasia* is needed in two cases: when the object of desire is not present and when the perceptual faculty lacks sufficient information for determining the object.

J. Noel Hubler, Lebanon Valley College, hubler@lvc.edu

5E (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 510: “Neither a Spiritualist Nor a Literalist Be: Physical Reduction in Aristotle's Theory of Perception”

Sense perception presents a special problem for Aristotle. On the one hand, he confronts well respected and nearly universal claims among the wise that sense perception is a kind of motion. At the same time he is aware of Plato's devastating critique of sense perception as motion in the *Theaetetus*. Aristotle very much wants to restore sense perception as the basis for empirical science but knows the limitations of the earlier theories of sense perception as motion. The modern interpreter faces an analogous problem. Well-known and respected commentators, beginning with Sorabji and Burnyeat but extending much further, disagree about the nature of sense perception in Aristotle. For Sorabji, sense perception occurs through a qualitative change in the sense organ by which the eye becomes literally colored. Burnyeat denies that there is any qualitative change involved in sense perception. Instead, perception is an “extraordinary change” that is not the result of any processes, but is instead an awareness based upon “standing material conditions.”

Sorabji is correct that physiological changes are necessary for sense perception; however, Burnyeat is correct that sense perception does not involve a qualitative change whereby the eye becomes colored or the ear rings. The changes are subtle heating and cooling in the innate spirit surrounding the heart that account for all forms of sense perception. The heating and cooling fall short of alteration because the nature of the innate spirit is not changed, nevertheless, they are genuine physical changes in the form of expansions and contractions.

The difficulty for commentators is that Aristotle never sets out the function of the innate spirit in sense perception in great detail in the extant corpus. However, he does explain its role in animal movement and draw a parallel to sense perception so there is indirect evidence for the mechanics of perception in the innate spirit. In addition, there are numerous other references to the innate spirit's role, as well as references to the operations of heat and cold in perception. Perhaps more importantly, examining sense perception in the light of Aristotle's physics reveals an overall continuity to his thought. He does not see biology and physics are radically distinct, but intimately interconnected. Both Burnyeat and Sorabji, as well as many others, assert that Aristotle takes color, sounds, and smells to be irreducibly real. They are not. Aristotle is explicit that on the side of the object, each can be reduced to the operations of hot and cold and on the side of the percipient, each functions by heating or cooling the innate spirit.

None of which is to say that Aristotle is a simple materialist. Aristotle also rejects the view that sense is a form of motion because it takes place through an immaterial soul. Instead, sense perception is an immaterial reception of a sensible form. Neither the sensible form in the object nor the perceived form in the soul are in motion. Instead, each is an unmoved principle of motion thereby overcoming the objections raised by Plato in the *Theaetetus*.

Evan Strevell, Duquesne University, strevelle@gmail.com

5E (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 510: “What Happens When Aristotle Remembers His Prior Seeing of Coriscos?”

In *De memoria* (DM), Aristotle defends a view of memory as indirect perception, where remembrance of prior cognition is the awareness of a *phantasma* that functions as a copy of the prior cognition. The commitment to indirect perception gives rise to an impasse: why should the remembering animal perceive its *phantasma* to be a representation of its past rather than a thing

presently imagined?

According to the now-predominate view first advanced by Richard Sorabji (1972), Aristotle's solution is that because the memory *phantasma* is a veridical copy of prior cognition, the soul is able to consider the *phantasma* as of past cognition. If Aristotle's solution is merely that the soul can and sometimes does perceive the memory *phantasma* as a copy, then we are left wondering why the soul ever does. The prevailing reading has Aristotle punt on the wanted explanation.

Tony Roark (2011) does better, arguing that memory *phantasmata* are assertoric due to their derivation from sensation that is also assertoric in character. When an animal becomes aware of a memory *phantasma*, the assertoric character of the memory *phantasma* collides with the assertoric character of concurrent sensation. The sense power judges that only sensation is the case now so that the memory *phantasma* must pertain to the past. Here too questions arise. Roark posits as the cause of a sense of past time the assertoric character of memory *phantasmata*, but Aristotle asserts that memory *phantasmata* may occur separately from a sense of past time. The assertoric character of memory *phantasmata* does not guarantee an additional perception of past aspect. Roark carves out a necessary, but not sufficient condition for remembering.

I show that DM satisfactorily explains why an animal is moved to perceive its present memory *phantasma* as a representation of its past. I argue that remembering is analogous to sensation. The memory *phantasma* is a compound motion that contains a likeness to prior cognition and a motion proportionate to some length of time prior to now. When the *phantasma* acts on the sense power, the sense power takes on the activity of the *phantasma* such that it perceives the *phantasma* as a likeness of prior cognition. In contrast to Roark, I argue that the assertoric character of memory *phantasmata* is caused by the temporal character of the memory *phantasma* acting on the sense power; without the character of past aspect, the *phantasma* is perceived as fictional rather than assertoric. The assertoric character of the memory *phantasma* and sense of past time are co-implicatory.

My reading corrects the prevailing consensus and explains why an animal perceives its *phantasma* as representing an animal's past. The strength of my account is confirmed by its ability to explain additionally why some *phantasmata* have an assertoric character, but others do not, and why false remembering occurs.

Allison Murphy, Notre Dame, amurphy@nd.edu

5F (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 512: "There is No View from Nowhere: Plato's Defense of Philosophy in the *Gorgias*"

My paper will suggest that in the dialogue *Gorgias* Plato focuses on a question at the intersection of ethics and epistemological worries about skepticism: if we are incapable of transcending the particular context that we inhabit, to what extent are we able to adjudicate between competing claims about the good life?

The possibility of adjudicating between different positions presupposes, of course, that one can maintain a distinction between the different positions and their respective grounds. Yet it is precisely this point that the *Gorgias* calls into question. Callicles is an interlocutor whom Socrates is repeatedly at pains to distinguish from himself; at a key moment in the dialogue, however, Plato has Socrates and Callicles adopt the roles of Amphion and Zethus, two protagonists from Euripides' lost play *Antiope*, protagonists whom an ancient audience would have immediately recognized as twins. This is no accidental reference, I argue, but signifies a theme that runs throughout the dialogue: that of

Socrates' deep similarity to those to whom he is diametrically opposed.

The *Gorgias* explores this theme in three ways. First, Socrates' interlocutors repeatedly accuse Socrates of being no different from themselves, and further insist that philosophy has no more hold on the truth of things than their own rhetorical presentations. Second, the theme emerges in the form of what I call a logos reductionism: while Socrates presents himself as an advocate of the life marked by a robust form of justice and temperance, the only view of the human good that his argument actually commits one to is minimally robust, requiring a certain degree of consistency and order but nothing that would require one to abandon the life of tyranny. Finally the theme emerges at the level of the dramatic interplay between Socrates and his opponents. Socrates distinguishes himself from his interlocutors on the grounds that he neither argues to be competitive nor seeks to persuade by means of pandering to the prejudices of his auditors. And yet, in spite of this insistence, he himself appears to engage in precisely these forms of behavior.

The striking similarity between Socrates and his opponents raises the question of whether or not Socrates himself engages in the very sort of rhetoric he condemns and, if so, to what extent we can ultimately distinguish him from someone like Callicles. I argue that the dialogue forces the reader to confront the possibility that one may not be able to transcend the particular perspective of a given speaker in order to attain some neutral vantage point. In light of such a prospect Plato invites us, I suggest, to consider the possibility that philosophy is not exhausted at the level of objective argument geared towards a neutral auditor, but that its efficacy presupposes in its listeners some degree of prior orientation towards the good.

Geoffrey Batchelder, Montgomery College, gmbatch@verizon.net

5F (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 512: "Plato's *Phaedrus* and the Fate of the Humanities"

The *Phaedrus* anticipates contemporary debates over the role and value of the humanities in higher education. Of course, even in translation Plato's terms differ from our own, so the point bears explaining. This paper examines key passages to support a holistic reading of the dialogue as an expression of Plato's firm convictions about the social utility of philosophically grounded education in the humanities.

Christopher Roser, Humboldt University of Berlin, Christopher.n.rosier@gmail.com

5F (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 512: "Gorgias and Plato on the Distinction Between Being Rational and Being Irrational"

In this paper I consider Gorgias' conception of rational and irrational states and Plato's reception of it in the *Gorgias*. First, I argue that Gorgias puts forward certain rational states as a solution to problems and shortcomings of human life. This means, he develops the idea of such rational states in contrast to problems and shortcomings of most humans. To develop this novel interpretation, I criticize the still dominant interpretation of *Gorgias* that Gorgias is an anti-intellectual and anti-rational. (Untersteiner 1954, Guthier 1971, Gronbeck 1972, Wardy 1998, Gagarin 2001, Higgins 2008).

In particular, I argue that Gorgias conceives of two kinds of problems or shortcomings. First, he faces the problem of *doxa*, i.e. the problem that *doxa* are instable, unreliable, untrustworthy and therefore unsuitable means to reach the truth. Second, he faces the problem of heteronomy, i.e. the problem that many actions of humans are governed and caused by something external to them. I argue, that as solution to the first problem Gorgias develops a conception of stable and reliably

intellectual state and process, namely knowledge and reasoning. Furthermore, I argue that Gorgias indicates that this state is reachable. Thereby, I explore in detail which way Gorgias describes the stable and reliable state and how he differentiates it from the unreliable state of *doxa*. In particular, I argue that Gorgias conceives of a *logos* and a *logismos* as being based on *doxa* and as being epistemically shortcoming. As a solution to the second problem, I argue, Gorgias invokes an intellectual account of autonomy. According to which deliberation and art (*technê*) enable one to act autonomously. My interpretation primarily concerns Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* and the *Defence of Palamedes*.

Second, I consider how this novel interpretation of Gorgias leads to a revision of how Plato's reception of Gorgias. In particular I consider how Plato receives the two problems, the problem of *doxa* and the problem of heteronomy, in the *Gorgias*. First, I argue, that Plato overtakes Gorgias' description of *doxa*. However, he evaluates the epistemic significance of *logoi* differently. To do that he differentiates between two kinds of *logoi* in his argumentation: *logoi* which are merely persuasive and *logoi* which are necessary for knowledge and art. Thereby, he directly criticizes Gorgias, who merely conceived of *logoi* as being persuasive. This differentiation allows Plato to conceive of *logos* as something which is not based on *doxa* and which is the mark of knowledge. Second, I argue that Plato overtakes decisive elements of Gorgias intellectual account of autonomy in his account of power (*dunamis*). In particular, he overtakes the principle that an intellectual ability is a prerequisite of acting powerfully or autonomously. However, he differs in which power it is: according to Plato it is the knowledge of the good, according to Gorgias it is the art of speaking.

David J. Murphy, david.murphy20@verizon.net

5G (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 513: "Aeschines of Sphettus and Ps. Andocides, *Orat.*, IV"

In the fourth century B.C.E., one figure who straddled the border between philosophy and rhetoric was Aeschines of Sphettus, writer of both Socratic dialogues and speeches. In this paper I refine the hypothesis of Paolo Cobetto Ghiggia that Aeschines wrote [Andocides] *Orat.* 4, *Against Alcibiades*.

The speech purports to address the Athenian Assembly, which is to vote on candidates for ostracism. The speaker describes the career of Alcibiades as so fraudulent and tyrannical that Alcibiades should be the one ostracized.

Inaccuracies, coupled with veiled *vaticinia ex eventu*, rule out the ostensible date, c. 415 B.C.E., as the date of composition. The nature of the errors and the speech's style point away from Andocides as author. Against the dominant view that the speech is a political pamphlet of the 390s: 1) the speaker's self-description matches the career of the statesman, Phaeax, of the 420s-410s, but we have no hint that Phaeax's memory had political impact in the 390s; 2) Alcibiades' career after 416 is not described, while silence about the disasters he brought to Athens would be incongruous in a later political pamphlet. On the other hand, Plutarch tells us that many people wrote about Alcibiades. The best explanation is that the speech is a declamation written later, when Alcibiades' memory elicited reactions from intellectuals.

Diogenes Laertius reports that Aeschines of Sphettus wrote a "defense of the father of Phaeax" (2.63). This sounds like garbled reference to our speech. If not, it must refer to some other declamation set in the past, for Aeschines lived too late to have written for Phaeax's father. Diogenes says that Aeschines returned from Syracuse to take up speech writing in Athens (2.62). That return occurred between 380 and 357. The hypothesis that Aeschines sought to advertise his skills by writing one or more display pieces covers the bases better than does its rivals. A way to test it would

be to compare our speech's style to that of Aeschines' known fragments. Because those are dialogues, however, genre differences will qualify the applicability of results.

Our speech exemplifies a fourth-century phenomenon: representation of Alcibiades by Socratic writers. Polycrates' *Accusation* had charged Socrates with corrupting that young man. Focusing on Alcibiades' early career, our speech depicts him as vicious from the beginning. Thus, Socrates was not to blame. A cryptic allusion late in the speech (Andoc. 4.38) to citizens whom the city unjustly put to death recalls Socrates and contrasts his character implicitly to Alcibiades'. Aeschines had portrayed Alcibiades in poor light in his dialogues as well.

This speech, however, is not a philosophical production. Aeschines, if he wrote it, is diverging from those Socratics who formed philosophical schools. Going back to his initial calling to rhetoric (D.L. 2.20), but sprinkling a hint of Socrates' memory onto this speech, Aeschines, like Isocrates, shows us a speech writer reacting to Socrates' complex literary portrait a generation later.

Dmitry Biriukov, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia; Padova University (Italy), dbirjuk@gmail.com

5G (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 513: "The Hypotheses of Plato's *Parmenides* in Clement of Alexandria"

The report focuses on Clement of Alexandria's usage of the hypotheses of Plato's "Parmenides" and analysis of how the lines of Plato's "Parmenides" were refracted in Clement's discourse of ascent. In his *Stromates* Clement of Alexandria sometimes uses the hypotheses of Plato's *Parmenides*. He uses the first hypothesis of *Parmenides*, when he describes God as One, nameless, and limitless in *Stromateis* 5 XII 81.6 in the sense that God has no beginning nor end, and similarly to Plato states that the One is not the whole; It is formless, and we cannot say that It has parts. This passage is probably the earliest evidence of the theological interpretation of the *Parmenides*' first hypothesis, which was based on the application of the notion of limitlessness (ἄπειρον) to God. From the historical and philosophical perspective, by calling the One limitless Clement anticipates the intuition of Neoplatonism and can be considered to be a precursor of Plotinus in his interpretation of the One. Nevertheless, Clement's logic in the interpretation of the One is not quite the same as Plato's, since on the basis of the first hypothesis Clement departs from the logic of Plato, deriving the limitlessness of the One from the notion that It has no parts and is indivisible. Clement also does not use Plato's premise that limits are parts of that whose limits they are (*Parmenides* 137c), and therefore says that the One is limitless not in the sense that it is impossible to reach its end, but as indivisible, that is, in a stronger sense.

In his doctrine of the Monad and the Son Clement continues to use the philosophical language which goes back to Plato's *Parmenides*. According to Clement, the Son does not simply become one as one, nor many as a part, but becomes one like all. Thus, belief in Him results in being monadic and unifying; lack of belief to be divided into parts (*Strom.* 4, XXV, 156, 2; 157, 2). Here Clement uses the terminology and gives references to the first hypothesis (the One as one), the second hypothesis (the One as many) (*Parmenides* 143c), and the fourth and eighth hypotheses (Many as many) (*Ibid.*, 158c, 165bc). Accordingly, for Clement there are two grades of infinity in God – corresponding to the monad and "the One". Limitlessness corresponding to the Monad is limitlessness which Clement denies in respect to the One – limitlessness in the sense of inability to reach its end (the topic of ascent appears here; *Strom.* 5 XII 81.6).

As to the concept of multiplicity in the statement that the Son becomes One like all" (*Strom.* 4 XXV 156.2), it is possible to understand this multiplicity either literally in the sense of the second

hypothesis of Plato's Parmenides as multiplicity in general, or in the sense of Son's relationship with the world He created, or (and this solution seems to be the most correct) we can assume that Clement speaks about a monad-like quality as something which is acquired by the faithful who have believed in the Son. This phrase may be interpreted in the sense of the existence of the faithful in their unity with the Son, and of the Son's unity with the faithful. This understanding is confirmed by the passage from the Exhortation to the Gentiles 88 which discusses the Monad (the Son) in the context of the ascent of faithful to unity with the Son. In this way in Clement's teaching the topic of ascent appears in the connections with the second hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides.

Christopher C. Paone, Sacred Heart University, paonec@sacredheart.edu

5G (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 513: "Diogenes as *Kosmopolitēs*"

When Diogenes the Dog was asked where he was from, he replied that he was a citizen of the world (*kosmopolitēs*) (D.L. 6.63, 72). But what does "citizen of the world" mean for the Cynic philosopher, infamous for his biting wit and contempt for convention? Are there substantive philosophical commitments or argumentation supporting his self-identification as *kosmopolitēs*? Or, is this another among many of his parodic jibes?

There are generally two scholarly fronts on this question. On the first front, scholars are concerned with whether Diogenes' world citizenship is negative or positive. If his world citizenship is negative, then his self-identification is a rejection of life in the typical Greek city, and of the social and political duties attached to it, and nothing more than that. If his world citizenship is positive, then the rejection of the typical Greek city may also imply the character of a life that bears with it other kinds of duties, perhaps even of the universalist character that modern conceptions of cosmopolitanism advocate.

On the second front, scholars are concerned with the degree to which the evidence for Diogenes' world citizenship is already re-interpreted by Stoic intermediaries in order to represent him as a forebear of Stoicism. Since Zeno, the Stoa's founder, was a pupil of Diogenes' follower Crates, Diogenes and his alleged teacher Antisthenes are central to the Stoic's claim to Socratic succession. But Diogenes' character and thought may have required some modification to fit the later Stoic understanding of virtuous practice. Some Stoics, for example, describe Diogenes' way of life as a short cut to virtue (D.L. 7.121).

The thesis defended in this paper is that Diogenes' world citizenship is a positive claim supported by philosophical argument and that it may be distinguished from Stoic views of world citizenship. The principal considerations in favor of this thesis are a reevaluation of the controversial syllogism concerning *nomos* reported by Diogenes Laërtius (D.L. 6.72) and a reinterpretation of the syllogism in the context of Diogenes' philanthropic mission and as a paradigmatic example of his moral imperative to re-stamp the currency (D.L. 6.20–1, 70–1).

Surit Mishra, Hunter College, Surit.Mishra09@myhunter.cuny.edu

5H (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 514: "Breaking the Hegemony: Nietzsche, Schurmann, and *The Nay Science*"

Friedrich Nietzsche disdained Luther, the progenitor of modernity, for hindering the rebirth of the ancient tragic perspective. He framed modernity, a 'secularized' Lutheran Protestantism, as the polar opposite of the tragic perspective ("Dionysus versus the Crucified"). He targeted this on an

institutional level in *We Philologists*, where he vociferously attacked his contemporaries for subsuming classical texts under modern concerns of nationalism and progress, thereby trivializing their tragic essence. In the spirit of Nietzsche's project, Reiner Schurmann critiques modern philosophers for providing epistemic foundations for the modern self and the state ("consoling the soul and consolidating the city"). Schurmann is especially critical of Hegel for absolutizing the modern state and the modern self through his historicist narrative of self-consciousness. Such dubious philosophizing, which degrades thinking to legitimizing authority, counteracts and represses questions about the tragic fragility of principled constructions. This paper will approach Vishwa Adluri and Joydeep Bagchee's *The Nay Science* as a case study of Schurmann's and Nietzsche's indictment of modern scholarship. Its critical analysis of the nineteenth-century German Indologists reveals that the Indologists affirmed the Lutheran paradigm — a paradigm, as Nietzsche argued, inextricably linked to the anti-tragic tendencies of nationalism and historicism. By paving over the tragic message of the Bhagavad Gītā and the Mbh, German Indology serves as a microcosm of the epistemic issues that define and pervade modernity.

David Cereguas, Hunter College, dcereguas@post.harvard.edu
5H (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 514: "Psyche, Atman, and die Seele der Indologie"

Circulating among the discourses that share an interest in the period it covers are variations on a narrative about the "Axial Age" (*Achsenzeit*). One recurring feature of these stories is the notion of a peculiar translatability between the Platonic *psuchê* the Vedantic *ātman*. Trust in the stability of that notion established a ground from which to launch a long series of colonialist treatises on the primacy and privilege of 'Western' reason; postcolonial political tracts critiquing those views; counter-colonialist disquisitions reversing the priority of cultures; and even, quite recently, attempts to defuse all sides of the argument without abandoning—or questioning—the founding premise (Seaford 2016). Almost entirely absent from these discussions, however, is any acknowledgement of the necessary, anachronistic, and often parenthetical third term by which the equation of *psuchê* and *ātman* was affected: *soul* or, more accurately, *Seele*. This essay undertakes a genealogy of that translatability to explore the conditions of its construction. Tracing the lines of influence and inheritance, I locate a critical nexus at the *Ursprung* of Indology and the theological and nationalistic interests informing its development. In the end we find that the common source for *ātman* and *psuchê* is neither Greek nor Indian but German, and its heritage gives us cause to reexamine our hermeneutic principles.

Edward P. Butler, Independent Scholar, epb223@gmail.com
5H (Sunday 9:00) ROOM 514: "Polytheism as Methodology in the Study of Religions"

Historical contingencies have resulted in a peculiar disciplinary organization of the Western academy such that 'Theology', which on the analogy of other similarly-named disciplines such as 'Biology', one might expect to study the diverse manifestations of divinity in general, instead practices a methodological monotheism, presupposing not only that 'theos' is necessarily existentially singular, but also that it denotes primarily if not exclusively the Christian's God. The study of the Gods of other faiths qua Gods is taxonomically excluded, and the study of these religions instead is relegated to the field of Religious Studies, which, as an anthropological discipline, is assumed to practice methodological atheism and to study religions purely as forms of historical human behavior. Two recent developments shed new light on this problematic. One is the emergence under the rubric of Religious Studies of the field of 'Pagan Studies', which has been criticized for insufficient fidelity to the ideals of anthropology by virtue of positing a trans-historical integrity of historically sundered and revived faiths directed at the same deities, and thus implicitly positing the existence of those

deities. Another is the emergence of Dharma Studies, dedicated to the study of Indian religious traditions beyond the historicizing reductions of anthropological methodology, which has been criticized for its 'insider' perspective, or as embodying a proselytizing methodology, albeit these criticisms may not even be mutually consistent. Both of these new academic disciplines are born out of the dilemma in the Western academy between the methodological monotheism of Theology and the methodological atheism of Religious Studies. The paper proposes resolving this dilemma through a turn toward methodological polytheism, either through a comprehensively reconceived Theology, or through a proliferation of object-oriented regional studies on the model of Dharma Studies.

Jay R. Elliott, Bard College, jelliott@bard.edu

6A (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 502: "Aristotle on the Voluntariness of Vice"

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle puts forward two appealing but apparently inconsistent claims: first, that virtue and vice are "up to us" (III.5 1113b6-7); and second, that in order to become virtuous "we need to have been brought up in a certain way right from childhood" (II.3.1104b11). Aristotle wants to insist that vice is voluntary, since he believes that otherwise it will not be an appropriate object of blame. The problem is that this insistence seems to be at odds with his emphasis on the importance of upbringing. Vice will not be up to us, and so will not be blameworthy, if it is simply the product of a misguided upbringing. In response to this problem, Susan Sauvé Meyer has recently proposed that Aristotle does not intend to argue that virtue and vice are voluntary for everyone, but only for the members of his audience, who have had a proper ethical upbringing. In her interpretation of Aristotle, those who have been educated well but nonetheless become vicious are vicious voluntarily and so can be appropriately blamed. But in the case of those who did not receive a proper education, vice will not be voluntary and so not an appropriate object of blame. I argue that Sauvé Meyer's interpretation removes the apparent inconsistency in Aristotle's views, but at too great a cost. Aristotle wants to hold that voluntary vice is a possibility for people in general and not only for the members of his audience. Sauvé Meyer goes wrong, I suggest, by assuming too close a fit between Aristotle's audience and his topic. In addressing his audience of well-brought up young men and future statesmen, he seeks to describe not only these prospective rulers themselves, but also those whom they will go on to rule, many of whom have not had the advantages of their education. Citing the precedent of existing legislation, Aristotle aims to assure his audience that vice in general is voluntary and cannot be excused on the grounds that the vicious person is ignorant or unfortunate. I conclude that Aristotle scholars should continue to be puzzled about how he can hold together his insistence on the voluntariness of vice with his emphasis on the essential role of upbringing in the formation of character.

Carissa Phillips-Garrett, Rice University, cpg@rice.edu

6A (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 502: "Aristotle on Blame and Moral Responsibility"

One argument against the view that Aristotle's account of responsibility is moral in nature is that all voluntary agents are responsible on his account, which includes even very young children. But since young children cannot be blameworthy and morally responsible for their actions, blame must be instrumental and Aristotle's account of responsibility must be causal. Contrary to this view, however, I will argue that children are not blameworthy on Aristotle's account on the grounds that voluntariness is a necessary condition for blameworthiness on Aristotle's account, not a sufficient condition. For an agent to be blameworthy, she must be an agent for whom choice or decision (*prohairesis*) is possible. Since bestial agents, children, and non-rational animals all fail to meet this

standard, they are not blameworthy for Aristotle. As a result, I conclude that objection does not show that Aristotelian responsibility is merely causal.

Anna Cremaldi, Appalachian State University, Cremaldiam_at_appstate.edu

6A (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 502: “Aristotle on Benefaction and Friendship in *NE*, 9.7”

In *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.7, Aristotle explains why we benefit or “do good” (*eu poiein*) for others, a paradigmatic act of friendship. This account is neglected, and wrongly so, since it suggests, contrary to the standard view, that the causal origins of friendship cannot be comprehended entirely by appeal to rational and non-rational desire.

The account opens with an *aporia*—namely, that benefactors love those that they have benefitted more than their beneficiaries love them in return. This is surprising, Aristotle notes, and requires explanation. Commentators have assumed that the benefactor’s greater love is the central puzzle regarding benefaction. Yet, as I argue, Aristotle is ultimately moved by a deeper puzzle about benefaction—a puzzle concerning the difficult labor in benefitting others. If benefitting others is difficult work, as Aristotle owns, why does the benefactor undertake that work so assiduously and unfailingly, particularly if the benefactor can expect no recompense or repayment in doing so?

Appreciating that this is Aristotle’s puzzle guides us to a fuller understanding of Aristotle’s explanation of benefaction and its contribution to friendship. That explanation turns on an analogy between parents and benefactors. Aristotle notes that all living things are moved by self-love, or a desire that they “exist and live,” and that this self-love explains why animal parents persist in the difficult work of giving birth to their young and sustaining them. The case of the parent is instructive for benefaction, Aristotle suggests, since benefaction seems to be a kind of reproduction. Just as self-love sustains the animal parent in the arduous labor of reproducing and rearing children, so does self-love sustain the benefactor in the arduous labor of assiduously benefitting others and, ultimately, friends.

Yet this explanation of benefaction is curious. It appeals to self-love—here, a desire to exist and live—that is shared among all living things. But such a desire seems to play a superfluous role in explanation of benefaction, since the rational desire for friendship or the non-rational desire for the company of others should be sufficient to account for our tendencies to persist through the hard work of benefaction. In offering the explanation from self-love, Aristotle nevertheless suggests that some further element is required to account fully for the causal origins of friendship. What more needs to be explained?

Drawing inspiration from Diotima’s discussion of reproduction in the *Symposium*, I suggest that self-love is needed to account for the consistency and directionality of our pursuit of friendship. I close the paper by situating this explanation of self-love’s role in friendship with respect to Aristotle’s *allos autos* thesis in *NE* 9.4 and his account of self-love in *NE* 9.8. The upshot of the paper is that self-love plays an important role in friendship and that Aristotelian friendship has more exotic causal origins than has typically been thought.

Giulio Di Basilio, University College Dublin, giulio.di.basilio@gmail.com

6A (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 502: “The Definition of *Prohairesis* (Decision) in Aristotle’s Ethics”

At *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN) 1113a10-11 Aristotle defines *Prohairesis* (Decision) as “deliberative desire of things that are in our power”. At first this looks as a well-formed definition meeting the relevant

Aristotelian standards (as far as this is possible in *Ethics*). A first problem to be dealt with, however, is the fact that if this were the case (and *Prohairesis* were a kind of desire) it should appear in Aristotle's list of different kinds of desire; but this is never the case (see EE 1223a26-7; 1225b24ff; MM 1187b36-7). Furthermore, to make things worse, in EN VI 2 *Prohairesis* is puzzlingly defined as both “desiderative intellect” and “deliberative desire”. I suggest that this wavering is no coincidence and that *Prohairesis* should not be conceived as a desire alongside with wish, spirit and appetite (contra Irwin, 1999, p. 322 and most recently Nielsen, forthcoming). Rather, I argue that Aristotle conceives of *Prohairesis* in hylomorphic terms, desire providing the matter whereas intellect the form, respectively. This sheds light on the obscure remark that follows the alleged definition at EN 1113a10-11 where *Prohairesis* is said to be man. My interpretation follows Aspasius' remarks on this issue and credit him with a plausible reading of the matter at hand that contemporary interpreters, too, should look carefully at.

Vishwa Adluri, Hunter College, vadluri@hunter.cuny.edu

6B (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 504: “Hindu Studies in a Christian Secular Academy”

The concept of dharma is central to Hinduism, underpinning its ideas of rebirth, existence, salvation, and even cosmogenesis. Yet this concept is seldom understood and frequently misrepresented. One of the key sources of difficulty is the confusion between substantive and normative senses of dharma, and the tendency to represent dharma as merely a social construct. More importantly, scholars have viewed dharma on analogy with Judeo-Christian ideas of the law, and drawn, from its seeming inability to provide justification, the negative conclusion that dharma is inefficacious in salvation. Yet this conclusion is premature, as this article will argue. I will focus on a recent interpretation of dharma in the Mahābhārata, *Disorienting Dharma: Ethics and the Aesthetics of Suffering in the Mahābhārata* (Hudson 2013) to show how Judeo-Christian ideas of the law—more specifically, a Protestant critique of Jewish law—stand at the background of many contemporary accounts of dharma.

Joydeep Bagchee, Freie Universität Berlin, jbadchee@gmail.com

6B (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 504: “Academic Philology, Anti-Semitism, and Indian Philosophy”

German academic Indology significantly shaped the Western reception of Indian philosophy (Adluri and Bagchee 2014). It established the key approaches to reading the Indian canon such as periodization, search for original texts, and focus on historical context, as well as the key themes in reading this canon (e.g., questions of theism versus pantheism, whether Indian philosophy was rational or mystical, etc.). Many enduring misconceptions concerning Indian philosophy can be traced back to the work of nineteenth-century German Indologists like Richard von Roth, Richard von Garbe, and Hermann Oldenberg. In this presentation, I trace the dominance of the motif of “priestly corruption” in their work. I show that this anti-Judaic motif was a commonplace of Protestant theology (Gerdmar 2009). As theologically educated Protestants, the three scholars could not have been unaware of the consequences of claiming that the Brahmans had corrupted the texts. I will support this argument by reading their work alongside archival sources (letters, official correspondence, unpublished notes) that indicate the extent of their anti-Semitic prejudice. I will also discuss how many of the concerns they raised (e.g., the significance of ritual in the Gītā) were germane only in the context of Protestant critiques of Judaism. I argue for reconsidering philology's role in relation to ancient texts out of an awareness of its anti-Semitic uses (Kugel 1986; Sheehan 2005).

Kevin Kambo, The Catholic University of America, Kkambo3@gmail.com
6C (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 506: “Moral Exemplarism in Plato's *Symposium*”

It is here argued that the account of the successful moral agent given in the *Symposium*, is part of a morality of inspiration, contrasted against a morality of obligation or disqualification. The latter is understood as a moral account whose focus is on establishing thresholds for acceptable moral behaviour, chiefly by explaining what kinds of actions are forbidden for the moral agent. Such a moral account—as found, for example, in forms of deontology or consequentialism—often lacks motivational power. A remedy to this (potential) defect can be had in the moral vision offered in the *Symposium*.

In the dialogue Plato weaves together different views of love and portraits of the characters that make such views possible (and even probable). Special attention is due to the speeches of Socrates and Alcibiades, which provide a stereoscopic view of the person of Socrates and thereby deliver fuller experience of Plato's conception of the good moral agent. The ascent of the soul in Socrates' speech, it is claimed, describes the experience of the elevation through contemplation, while Alcibiades testifies to the moral agency (the imagination, the disposition, the actions, etc.) that is the fruit of that contemplation. Plato is thus concerned more with presenting and displaying a successful moral agent—one worthy of admiration and imitation—than with proposing and defending a moral system.

Also, in exploring Plato's depiction of Socrates as a moral exemplar, an attempt will be made to answer concerns that Plato's theory of love is impersonal or ultimately blind to individual persons by stressing that 1) by reading the last two speeches together and 2) by attending to the actions (and not just the words) of Diotima and Socrates, the stated concerns are significantly attenuated.

Hyun Höchsmann, East China Normal University, hhochsmann@gmail.com
6C (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 506: “The Tripartite Soul in the Ascent of Eros in the *Symposium*”

The steep ascent of eros in Diotima's teaching in the *Symposium* begins with the love of one beautiful individual, moving up to the contemplation of the beauty of 'laws and institutions' and culminates in the capacity to bring forth beauty which enables one, if it is ever possible for a mortal approach 'immortality', to become 'the friend of god'. The distinct and seemingly disjunctive stages of eros in the *Symposium* can be interpreted as a continuum of the scope and extent of eros linking up the three parts of the soul (the appetitive, the spirited and the rational). While there is no specific reference to the tripartite division of the soul in the *Symposium* as in the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, the stages of eros can be elucidated as corresponding activities of the tripartite soul.

The expansion of eros in *Symposium* presents a wider horizon of anticipation for the harmony of the soul when read in conjunction with the resurrection of eros in the paideia of the soul in the *Laws* and the demiourgos' creation of the cosmos in the *Timaeus* as beautiful order for souls to emulate and attain 'immortality to the full extent it is possible for human nature'.

Owen Goldin, Marquette University, Owen.Goldin@Marquette.edu
6D (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 508: “*Pistis* in Aristotle”

Within the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle argues that the first principles of a science must be grasped with a higher level of *pistis* than the propositions that are demonstrated on their basis. If we interpret *pistis* as conviction or certainty, this is a perplexing claim, as it would seem that a conclusion

inferred on the basis of certain principles, alone, would be likewise certain. How is the cognitive grasp off a principle stronger or more secure than that of a derivative conclusion?

In this paper I shed light on this issue through an examination of Aristotle's use of the term *pistis*, primarily within the *Rhetoric*. When employed in regard to a psychological state (in contrast to a logos that leads to this state) the term does not refer to an epistemological state of certainty, as we understand it in light of the sorts of arguments entertained by the ancient skeptics and Descartes. *Pistis* is a psychological state of reliance, providing a support for action. The rhetorician does not try to instill a belief impervious to doubt, but to provide a basis that is considered reliable or secure enough for *doing* something – whether making a legal judgment (which ramifications for the parties to a case), a political decision, or verbal praise or blame. *Pistis* is a crucial element in the psychology of *praxis*; it is not, primarily, an epistemological matter. In the context of science, too, *pistis* is reliance on demonstrative arguments as providing grounds for doing something, in this case, for making certain statements and offering certain arguments, in pedagogical or dialectical context.

António Pedro Mesquita, University of Lisbon, apmesquita@netcabo.pt
6D (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 508: “Aristotle on Dialectic and First Principles”

Over time, several authors have defended that for Aristotle dialectic is a method of discovery or establishment of the principles of science in general. Four reasons speak, in my opinion, against this thesis.

The first is that although for Aristotle each science has, besides the common principles it shares with other sciences, certain principles that are proper to it, dialectic is never seen by him as a method for discovering, establishing or even justifying proper principles of particular sciences, but only as a method for discussing (and sometimes upholding) common principles.

The second is that if dialectic were a general method of discovery or establishment of the principles of all sciences, it would have to discover or posit not only their common principles, but also those that are proper to each one. And, since the task of discovering or positing the proper principles of each science belongs to the science to which the principles are proper, dialectic would become the science to which all principles are proper and therefore a “common” or “universal” science. But the fact is that Aristotle is adamant that there cannot be a common science and moreover that specifically dialectic is not such a common or universal science.

The third reason has to do with the very special sense under which, according to Aristotle, a universal character can be attributed to dialectic. This sense is the following: dialectic, albeit not being a universal science, has nonetheless a universal scope insofar as it addresses matters about which everybody knows and on which everyone may give an opinion. Hence, it is only while it addresses issues that everyone has some knowledge of and can speak about – that is to say, only when it addresses them at a level that everyone can access and in such a way that everyone can give their opinion – that dialectic has a universal character. Now, principles are by their very nature “more knowable in themselves than they are for us”; thus, it is not by discovering or establishing the principles of science, which few people know about and no inexpert opinions count on, that dialectic is acknowledged by Aristotle as a comprehensive and transversal, all-encompassing (and, in this sense, universal) method.

The fourth and last reason to contest that dialectic is a method of discovery or establishment of the first principles of science in general is rather trivial. It is nevertheless important to recall it, given

that some advocates of the thesis under analysis appear to sometimes forget it. Aristotle repeatedly mentions the process by which (proper) principles of science are posited and this process is not dialectic, but rather (some kind of) experience. Regardless of the way we wish to interpret this doctrine, what is a fact is that for Aristotle the discovering or establishing of principles is not within the powers of dialectic.

In my paper I will at length expose these four arguments and, in a final more positive section, disclose and argue for my own view on the role of dialectic in this matter, namely the defense of common principles against potential eristic attacks. The conclusion will therefore not be that dialectic has no function as regards the principles of science, but that its intervention is much more limited and modest than those campaigning for the thesis under analysis believe, as that function is primarily limited to common principles and only consists of supporting and not of discovering or establishing them.

Sister Anna Wray, O. P., The Catholic University of America, 07wray@cua.edu
6D (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 508: “Classifying the Indivisibles of Aristotle's *De Anima*, III.6”

This paper argues that the classification of indivisibles (ἄδιαίρετα) in Aristotle's *De Anima* III.6 must be interpreted as a specification of the chapter's initial contrast between infallible and fallible thinking, conducted in light of III.4's account of the thinking of singular composites and their forms (429b22-430a9).

The opening lines of III.6 distinguish the thinking of indivisibles (τῶν ἀδιαίρετῶν νόησις) from thinking that involves some synthesis of objects of thought (σύνθεσις τῶν ἡδη νοημάτων) (430a26-28): in the former there is no falsity, while the latter is either false or true. The chapter concludes with the same distinction, only specified and stronger: thinking the ‘what it is’ in the sense of essence (τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) is true, while thinking something about something (τι κατὰ τινοσ) is not always true, but is in every case true or false (430b26-28, 30). In the lines between these two distinctions (430a28-b26), Aristotle offers a classification of indivisible objects of thought that some have regarded as disjointed both in itself and with respect to the chapter of which it is a part. What role did Aristotle intend this classification to play within the argument of III.6?

Recent Aristotelian commentary on III.6 has suffered from neglect of this question. The interpretation commonly given to the passage implies that Aristotle is guilty of both logical sloppiness and vain classification: (1) the proposed classes, failing to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, do not account for all the things that can be thought; (2) the proposed classes merely display differences among what can be thought infallibly, rather than explaining what objects correspond to each of the two kinds of thinking mentioned at the chapter's outset. Attempts to exonerate Aristotle from the latter charge vary. Sorabji, Polansky, and Berti read into III.6's classification a discussion of definitions and predications, taking these respectively as the objects of infallible and fallible thinking. Hicks, Ross, Hamlyn, and Shields, understanding III.6's classification as an opposition between concepts and propositions, criticize the chapter's initial distinction between kinds of thinking: Aristotle should not have opposed what is not false to what is either false or true, but what is not yet true or false. These additions and amendments are ad hoc and unnecessary, as exemplified by the interpretation of Pritzl and, to a lesser extent, Aubenque and Biondi. This paper makes the case that the classification of indivisibles in III.6 is logically exhaustive and crucially relevant to the chapter's initial contrast between infallible and fallible thinking: Aristotle's classification distinguishes between intellectual objects whose unity is received, on the one hand, and made, on the other hand, by the intellect (νοῦς). The classification exhausts the kind of objects that can be thought, and the objects whose unity is received correspond exactly to singular

composites and their forms, recently discussed in III.4.

Daniel Regnier, St. Thomas College, Canada, dregnier@stmcollege.ca

6E (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 510: “The Arabic Plotinus on the Relationship Between Soul and Intellect”

The texts of the Arabic Plotinus often depart from their Plotinian source in rather subtle but significant ways. One topic to which the author of the Arabic Plotinus devotes extensive attention is that concerning the relationship between soul and intellect. Crucial developments on this question going well beyond the texts of Plotinus, are elaborated in the *Theology of Aristotle*, the most significant part of the Arabic Plotinus. These developments seem to be motivated by the fact that the author of the Arabic Plotinus has concerns about epistemology and philosophy of mind that do not correspond exactly to those of Plotinus. Furthermore, the author of the Arabic Plotinus also seems to wish to situate the soul as self clearly in relation to a creator God compatible with Islamic thought. In this paper I propose to identify and analyse the original philosophical contributions that the author of the Arabic Plotinus makes concerning the relation of soul to intellect. I will, finally, also suggest how these contributions might have been significant for subsequent philosophers of the Islamic world.

Alfred Ivry, New York University, ai1@nyu.edu

6E (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Maimonides’ Relation to Muslim Theology and Philosophy”

Maimonides’ indebtedness to the Muslim philosophers who preceded him has been studied by Shlomo Pines in the introduction to his translation of the *Guide of the Perplexed*, as well as by myself in the *Cambridge Companion to Maimonides*. As much as he was attracted to the doctrines of the philosophers, notably Alfarabi, Avicenna and Ibn Bājjā, he was repelled by the world-view held by the *mutakallimūn*. Maimonides’ own theology nevertheless paralleled that of the Kalām to a certain extent, even as he was determined to distinguish himself from crucial metaphysical tenets held by the philosophers.

This paper will test Maimonides’ avowals and disavowals in his capacity as a theologian and philosopher. His exoteric statements will be weighed against the esoteric meanings that can be elicited from them. Particular areas to be interrogated will be his position on creation, eternity, conjunction and immortality.

Beau Shaw, Columbia University, Bcs2104@columbia.edu

6E (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 510: “Esotericism and Egalitarianism in Strauss’s Farabi”

This paper examines Leo Strauss’s interpretation of Farabi’s esotericism in “Farabi’s Plato” and the “Introduction” to *Persecution of the Art of Writing*. I argue that Strauss’s interpretation of Farabi’s esotericism is significantly different from the one usually attributed to him; and I argue that this esotericism carries egalitarian consequences, contrary to many critics of Strauss, who believe that his view of esotericism carries inegalitarian consequences.

According to most commentators, Strauss views the esotericism practiced by ancient and medieval philosophers as a political technique whose purpose is the defense against persecution by non-philosophers. I call this type of esotericism “defensive esotericism.” I argue that, while Strauss

attributes this esotericism to Farabi, he also attributes to him what I call “aggressive esotericism.” This esotericism “replaces” the non-philosophers’ “accepted opinions,” which do not “point towards the truth,” with opinions which do “point towards the truth.” Strauss suggests that, for Farabi, this aggressive esotericism means to “destroy” the non-virtuous cities of the non-philosophers, and helps to bring about the “virtuous city” ruled by the philosophers. This aggressive esotericism is therefore significantly different from defensive esotericism. It does not react to persecution, but actively tries to change a political community; and its purpose is not to help philosophers escape persecution but to give them political power.

I also consider why most commentators overlook this interpretation of Farabi’s esotericism. I suggest that it is because Strauss esoterically conceals it in his texts on Farabi. He does this, specifically, in the “Introduction” to *Persecution and the Art of Writing*. This “Introduction” is based on an earlier article, “Farabi’s Plato.” I show that, in the “Introduction,” Strauss makes a number of changes to “Farabi’s Plato,” which both conceal and point to Farabi’s aggressive esotericism. For example, Strauss omits the word “destruction,” which, in the earlier article, he consistently uses to describe the purpose of Farabi’s esotericism. I suggest that Strauss esoterically conceals this aggressive esotericism because, in order to function, it must be kept secret.

Finally, I consider whether Strauss’s interpretation of Farabi’s esotericism leads to inegalitarian positions. This is the view taken by most commentators. They claim that, for Strauss, Farabi’s esotericism entails the unequal communication of the truth—it communicates the truth only to philosophers not non-philosophers; and that it is based on the view that people are naturally unequal in respect to the ability to understand the truth. I argue that Strauss’s interpretation of Farabi’s esotericism implies these inegalitarian positions only if this esotericism is understood to be defensive esotericism. I suggest that, to the contrary, if it is understood as aggressive esotericism, it does not imply these positions. Aggressive esotericism teaches the truth equally to philosophers and non-philosophers; it replaces the non-philosophers’ accepted opinions which do not point to the truth with opinions which do. And, for this reason, it presupposes that non-philosophers are as naturally capable of understanding the truth as are philosophers.

Doug Al-Maini, St. Francis Xavier University, dalmaini@stfx.ca
6F (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 512: “Courage and Risk in Plato’s *Laches*”

At 192e-193e the title character of the *Laches* accepts the claim that any act of courage entails a certain amount of risk taking. But risk is something that *technai* are meant to do away with: the art of navigation, for example, is employed to reduce the risk of a ship falling afoul of a storm or foundering on rocks. The inclusion of risk-taking in courage thus subtracts from our ability to conceive of courage as a *techné* and this has serious ramifications. We cannot, for example, think of courage as a practical skill that has a particular body of knowledge associated with it or as something that might be taught to others. Indeed it is debatable whether we can talk about courage intelligibly at all, if we are to assume that it is not a *techné*. Given these problems, it is worthwhile considering if *Laches* is right about the relationship between risk and courage, and this paper will argue that Plato is using the character of *Laches* to show that in fact risk should not be considered a proper part of courage.

Ryan Drake, Fairfield University, rdrake@fairfield.edu
6F (Sunday 11:15) ROOM 512: “Love and Compulsion in Plato’s *Protagoras*”

While the *Protagoras* begins with manifold references to *eros*, desire, and beauty, these philosophically

rich themes appear to give way, not long after Socrates and Protagoras begin to speak, wholly to the dramatic entanglement of philosophy and sophistry; the unity of the virtues, the proper mode of dialogue, and various Socratic paradoxes seem to dominate the theoretical terrain, all but pushing questions of love out of sight for the duration.

However, in attending closely to the connection between the titular sophist and his would-be patron, Hippocrates, I wish to claim on the other hand that love – especially in its senses of *eros* and *philia* – tells us something about the implications of the sophist's practice as well as the notion of the political art on which that practice is founded. I argue that in the Protagoras sophistic *eros* is intimately bound up with force and violence, not just theoretically but as well in the sophist's pedagogical bearing. Sophistry's vaunted political education, on my reading, promotes prudent action on the part of the wise individual where the dictates of law are to be regarded as secondary to the individual's power over others, and hence civic unity is secondary to the interests of the clever political student. I claim, furthermore, that Socrates' poetic interpretation of the poem at the heart of the dialogue, and particularly his brief outline of the behavior of the truly educated citizen, provides a counter-image of sophistic *eros* and sophistic education that does not reject but rather inverts or internalizes three central aspects of sophistic practice: entrancing speech, self-concealment, and compulsion. What Socrates reserves as an answer to Protagoras' wisdom of individual prudence in the city is essentially the cultivation, through that inversion, of power over oneself, where one forces oneself to love (in the sense of *philia*) and praise precisely those typically regarded as undeserving of such treatment. In so doing, the educated citizen's actions of self-development and self-mastery work at the same time to promote the coherence of the community as such. This paper concludes with an analysis of Socrates' notion of civic *philia*.

Alphabetical list of participants with their session numbers.

Abdulhameed	4e	Goldin	6d	Regnier	6e
Abdullaev	3g	Gower	4f	Reid	2i, 3a
Adluri	6b	Greenstine	3f	Repetti	2e
Al-Maini	6f	Hahn	1a	Reshotko	4a
Ambury	2d	Han	2g	Rider	2b
Ardito	3a	Harry	2c	Robitzsch	2b
Arenson	2b	Harvey	1c	Roser	5f
Arnold	2e	Helmer	4f	Saati	4h
Ashbaugh	1b	Hennig	2d	Saenz	4b
Back	3f	Hochsmann	1f, 6c	Samz	1e
Bagchee	6b	Hubler	5e	Sauder	1d
Batchelder	5f	Humphrey	5b	Seok	3c
Berman	4a	Ionescu	2h	Schupack	1i
Biriukov	3e, 5g	Ivry	6e	Shaw	6e
Blander	4c	Julian	3b	Shepardson	1b
Boylan	2f	Kafrawi	5e	Shokrollahzadeh	2g
Bregman	5c	Kambo	6c	Sirkel	3f
Bullock	1b	Kim	1h	Squires	2f
Bunjodjon	3g	Kyriakidou	2i	Strevell	5e
Butler	5h	Lacroix	1d	Struhl	2e
Carli	4b	Lattman:	1a	Talcott	2h
Cereguas	5h	Law	3c, 5d	Toth	1e
Chen	3f	Lee	1a	Tress	1g
Cherubin	1g, 3a	Levin	2a	Trott	2f
Choi	3c	Li	5e	Tsan	2g
Corbitt	5a	Lott	5b	Tschemplik	4h
Corrigan	1d	Luchetti	3b	Turner	1d
Cremaldi	6a	Lutfaliev	4i	Vazquez	2h
Crimi	4c	Majumdar	3e	Walker	1f, 3b
Cunningham	5b	Makhmudov	4i	Wang	3c
Curran	2a	Mattila	4e	Ward K.	2c
Deal	3d	McCready-Flora	1b	Ward L.	2a
DeRibera-Martin	4h	McKeen	4f	Wastvedt	5c
DiBasilio	6a	Mesquita	6d	Weinman:	1a
Dimitriadis	2i	Mishra	5h	Wians	5d
Dmitriev	4g	Moes	1i	Wiitala	5a
Drake	6f	Morewedge	3g	Wilkins	1e
Driscoll	5a	Mulhern	1c	Woodcox	5d
Elsby	4b	Mullan	4g	Wray	6d
Elliott	6a	Munteanu	4b	Zarzar	4d
Evangelidou	1c, 3a	Murphy A.	5f	Zoller	4f
Evans	3d, 4a	Murphy D.	5g		
Filotas	4g	Murungi	3a		
Flores	1g	Nally	5a		
Forte	1i	Narbonne	1d		
Fournier	4d	Paone	5g		
Franklin	1i	Perl	3e		
Friuegnon	2e	Phillips-Garrett	6a		
Gabor	3b	Pichanick	2d		
Gibson	1f	Popa	2f		
Gilani	4i	Preus	4g		
Goehring	4c	Rawson	1g		