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# SAGP/SSIPS 2008 Abstract Collection

Anthony Preus

*Binghamton University--SUNY*

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## SAGP/SSIPS Fordham 2008: Abstract Collection

-A-

**Vishwa Adluri**, *Hunter College*, [vadluri@hunter.cuny.edu](mailto:vadluri@hunter.cuny.edu),

Panel Organizer, Chair, Respondent, two panels:

**Greek Thought in Continental Philosophy**, Sun 9 Room 8

This panel addresses the enduring influence of Greek Philosophy in the Continental Tradition. It focuses on three thinkers: Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger.

**The Architecture of Thinking: Sacrifice and Narrative in Indian Epic**, Sun 11 Room

8: Liminal actions such as sacrifice and war articulate a comprehensive structure of reality; this interpretation of reality is preserved in the literary form of epic narrative as well as the philosophy that informs it. This panel explores resonances between the structure of a sacrifice and that of epic text. Themes to be discussed include: the structure and philosophy of sacrifice, ritual texts, myth, and genealogical accounts.

**Shabir Ahsen**, *Lahore University*, Pakistan, and *University of Kentucky*,

[sahsen@lums.edu.pk](mailto:sahsen@lums.edu.pk), Sat 9 Room 4: "Iqbal's Conception of Self: A Critical Analysis"

*Abstract Pending*

**John Anton**, *University of South Florida*, [hanton1@tampabay.rr.com](mailto:hanton1@tampabay.rr.com), Friday Evening Commentator.

**Alejandro Arango**, *Binghamton University*, [a.a@binghamton.edu](mailto:a.a@binghamton.edu), Sat 4 Room 7:

"Ion Resists, Socrates Refuses"

This paper defends the idea that the *Ion* constitutes a failure for Socrates. This failure depends on an epistemological conception that only takes as knowledge what can be rendered as objective propositional representation of universals, and therefore rejects artistic performances as valid instances for the discovery of knowledge about art.

Methodologically, this paper focuses on the discursive situation of the *Ion* rather than focusing on the positive conclusions Plato might be said to draw about art or poetry. Accordingly, this paper pays special attention to two types of discursive occurrences present in the dialogue. On the one hand, Socrates directly or indirectly makes the validity of any account about art dependent on the philosophical rational discourse, as opposed to the artistic performance. I will call these, the Socrates-refusing cases, in which Socrates refuses even to consider the artistic performance as source of knowledge. The second type I will call the Ion-resisting cases. In these situations, Ion simply resists yielding to Socrates' conclusions, based on the inner experience of his art, and therefore maintains the validity of art as confirmed precisely by his particular experience.

This analysis finishes with an analysis of the end the dialogue, in which strangely enough Plato seems to draw a fallacious conclusion that apparently favors Socrates' position. However, this paper shows how this doubtful ending gives us reason to maintain the unsolved antagonism between the philosophical and the artistic accounts about art. Thus, the conclusion will not only show the philosophical discourse as inimical to art, but

Plato's implicit acknowledgment of the unsolvable tensions between these two types of human activities and their expressions.

**Anne Ashbaugh**, *Towson University*, [aashbaugh@towson.edu](mailto:aashbaugh@towson.edu), Sat 2 Room 8:  
"The Rhetoric of Virtue (Plato)"

The expression "the rhetoric of virtue" often appears in connection to political science and in particular studies of Jefferson. In this paper, however, I reclaim to phrase to capture Socrates' discussion of virtue in *Gorgias* and *Protagoras*—two dialogues wherein the investigation of the acquisition of virtue and the good life become irremediably entangled with rhetoric as an art and with the use of rhetoric by Socrates and the sophists portrayed in those dialogues.

Chair Sat 4 Room 5

**Emily Austin**, *Washington University St. Louis*, [eaustin@artsci.wustl.edu](mailto:eaustin@artsci.wustl.edu), Sat 2 Room 3:  
"Prudence and the Fear of Death in Plato's *Apology*"

In the *Apology*, Socrates argues that the members of the Athenian jury could greatly benefit from fearing death less. A marked fear of death tempts one to act cowardly or unjustly, as a petty injustice can often prove sufficient to save one's life. Socrates, then, in order to explain his current predicament and to justify his refusal to save himself by committing injustice, must convince his audience that death is a better choice than a minor injustice. This is no small task. Socrates offers two arguments for this effort, the first at 29a5-b6, and the second at 40c5-41c6. The first I call the "Epistemic Modesty Argument," and the second is the infamous "Two Things Argument."

At the most general level, commentators have raised two objections to Socrates' arguments against the fear of death. First, the arguments seem mutually inconsistent, since the second argument breaches the epistemic modesty upon which the first argument depends. Second, the "Two Things Argument" is a mess, leading scholars to judge it either a very bad argument [Roochnik (1985)] or no argument at all. Instead of an argument, they contend that Socrates offers his audience "consolation" or "reasons for hope." [cf. Brickhouse and Smith (1989: 260, 267), Reeve (1989: 182), Armleder (1966: 46), and Strycker (1994: 216-7)].

I argue that Socrates is fully committed to the "Two Things Argument" and that he has good reason to believe it is sound. Once one reconceives Socrates' aims and interprets his arguments with due attention to his changed circumstances, the "Two Things Argument" proves epistemically warranted and fully consistent with the "Epistemic Modesty Argument." In this paper, I contend [pace Rudebusch (1999:66)] that both arguments are prudential arguments meant to justify Socrates' dedication to acting justly at the risk of death.

The "Epistemic Modesty Argument" is intended to show that one should choose justice at the risk of death, even if one does not know whether death is beneficial, since choosing a known harm is less prudent than choosing something likely to be beneficial. The "Two Things Argument," though also prudential, follows a marked change in Socrates' circumstances—the sentence has been handed down. Instead of risking death, Socrates now faces it. This new circumstance and the new evidence from his *daimonion* provide sufficient warrant for his claim that those who consistently act justly at the risk of death can expect death to be beneficial. Choosing justice gives one the advantage of

facing death confidently, as does Socrates, while choosing injustice does not.

In both arguments, then, Socrates offers his audience the best advice available given his current epistemic situation—it is better to choose justice at the risk of death, and those who choose justice can face death fearlessly.

**-B-**

**Allan Bäck**, *Kutztown University*, [back@kutztown.edu](mailto:back@kutztown.edu), Sat 9 Room 6:  
“Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of Accident”

Elsewhere I have argued that the fallacy of accident results from confusing being per se with being per accidens. Here I wish to examine Aristotle’s explanation of why people actually commit the fallacy. Accordingly, I shall explore the connection of the fallacy of accident to per accidens sense perception and to the practical syllogism. It turns out that they all have the same logical form. The cause of error comes from perceiving per accidens. However, perceiving per accidens is needed also for having experience and science—and indeed for all practical reasoning.

So I will be exploring the similarity of the structure of reasoning implicit in judgments of per accidens perception to the practical syllogism. Understanding this similarity helps to clarify the distinction that Aristotle makes between experience and knowledge. It also gives a perspective on the scope and strength of practical reasoning, which turns out, sadly, to be all too human.

**Joydeep Bagchee**, *New School University*, [jbagchee@gmail.com](mailto:jbagchee@gmail.com), Sun 9 Room 8:  
“Heidegger's Interpretation of *Phusis*”

In this presentation I will trace Heidegger’s understanding of *phusis* in Pre-Socratic philosophy based on two of his texts: *An Introduction to Metaphysics* and *On the Essence and Concept of phusis in Aristotle’s Physics B, 1*.

My argument will consist of two parts: In the first, I will show that the term *phusis*, as used in Pre-Socratic philosophy, is irreducibly polysemic and that this polysemy is reflective of an essential indeterminacy intrinsic to *phusis* itself. I will contrast the Pre-Socratic insight into this indeterminacy with the Aristotelian attempt to define *phusis* as “the *substance* of things which have a principle of motion in themselves qua what they are” (Metaphysics Δ IV, 1015a14ff.)

In the second, I will discuss Heidegger’s interpretation of *phusis*, attempting to show that Heidegger is caught in an inextricable bind between adhering to the Aristotelian attempt to find a common meaning that would underlie the others, a commitment to foundationalism some authors (Sheehan et al.) have argued is the origin of Heidegger’s troubling engagement with politics, and turning to or returning to the Presocratic experience of the boundlessness and essential indeterminacy of *phusis* as reflected in the Heraclitean fragment (*phusis kruptesthai philei*) with which Heidegger concludes his interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of *phusis*.

My aim is thus to show that the original, inceptive Greek experience of *phusis* negates every attempt to appropriate concepts such as “being,” “essence,” or “destiny” for political ends, referring instead to a personal, indeed, singular relation to being.

**Michael Barkasi**, *Kutztown University*, [mbark551@kutztown.edu](mailto:mbark551@kutztown.edu), Sat 2 Room 5:  
“Plato’s Generation of Number in the *Parmenides*”

In the *Parmenides*, at 143c-144a, Plato gives what is often called the generation of number. Here I present what I call a “pictorial” interpretation of this generation.

The thesis of my paper is that a correct interpretation of this generation takes Plato to be generating the Pythagorean odd and even number figures described in Aristotle’s *Physics* at 203<sup>a</sup>10-15. This differs from standard interpretations of the generation, which read into Plato a modern conception of number and take him to be generating the natural numbers. While I argue in the paper that a correct interpretation requires some sort of pictorial understanding of the generation, I offer two different plausible interpretations. The first interprets the passage as a straightforward “generation” of the odd and even figures. The second interprets the passage as generating not only the odd and even figures, but also the three objects of mathematics—length, breadth, and depth—mentioned by Aristotle at *Meta. M* 1077<sup>a</sup>24-26.

Though textual support for any interpretation of this generation is sparse, there are other considerations that support the given pictorial interpretation. The first is that given Plato’s major Pythagorean influences it is reasonable to assume that he had a Pythagorean conception of number in mind. The second is that there are several other passages, *Rep.* 510c, 533b, *Phaedo* 96e-97b, in which Plato expresses the need for a foundation to Pythagorean number theory. The third consideration is that the pictorial interpretation, unlike other interpretations, does not take Plato to be using arithmetical operations that were largely unavailable to the Greeks. The standard view seems to be that Plato first generates the numbers 2 and 3, and then multiplies these numbers together in varying ways to produce the rest of the number sequence (the primary problem then being that Plato misses the primes in his generation). The pictorial interpretation though takes Plato to have geometric operations in mind (and on this account Plato does not miss the primes). The final consideration is that the pictorial interpretation is not only able to account for every inference made in the generation, but also able to explain apparent redundancies—such as Plato’s use of even and odd—and shortcomings—such as the “missing” primes.

Finally, on the pictorial interpretation Plato succeeds in actually *generating*, as opposed to merely showing the existence of, number. Other results of the interpretation are that (1) Plato succeeds in establishing an order for the numbers that is inherent in the even and odd figures, and (2) in agreement with Sayre, that Plato makes use of a quite abstract notion of set in the generation of the number 2. Though no attempt to provide a more general interpretation of the dialectic of the *Parmenides* or Plato’s motivation for the generation is made, attention is paid to both.

**Geoffrey Batchelder**, *Catholic University*, [peitho@verizon.net](mailto:peitho@verizon.net), Sat 9 Room 8:  
“Socrates and Moral Corruption”

This paper draws on several dialogues to articulate a general Platonic theory of moral corruption and argue that its pervasiveness in the corpus reflects a conscious effort to vindicate Socrates’ legacy by exonerating him of the charges that led to his execution. The main cause of moral corruption is false popular opinion about the best way to attain the true ends of human life, but sophistic rhetoric shares the blame for encouraging instead of responsibly correcting such opinion. Philosophy holds the key to preventing and curing moral corruption because it grounds its practical teaching in a rigorous course of theoretical studies.

Chair: Sat 11 Room 8.

**Stefan Baumrin**, *CUNY*, [bbaumrin@tiac.net](mailto:bbaumrin@tiac.net), Chair Sat 4 Room 3

**Martha Beck**, *Lyon College*, [mbeck@lyon.edu](mailto:mbeck@lyon.edu), Sat 2 Room 2 **Majumdar panel.**

“Aristotle’s First Principles and Environmental Ethics”

A number of contemporary scholars, including Lisa Newton, Geoffrey Franz, Thomas Hill, and Bill Shaw, recognize and emphasize the connection between Aristotle’s virtue theory and environmental ethics. As Newton says, “The development of an Aristotelian treatment of the land ethic requires...a ‘paradigm shift,’ a new way of perceiving the world as well as recognition of new priorities... . Once we know the natural world as a community of purposes, just as is the human world, environmental moral consciousness follows immediately. This is the orientation of ‘holism’: it is the whole biotic and non-biotic natural community that has value...” (36) (Newton, Lisa H. *Ethics and Sustainability: Sustainable Development and the Moral Life*. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003).

My paper will focus on Aristotle’s view of the most basic underlying principles of reality. I show the link between the principles and causes (*archai* and *aitia*) articulated in the *Metaphysics* are either implied or restated throughout Aristotle’s works. These principles provide the connections between his theories of language, logic, ethics, politics, tragedy, physics, biology, and psychology.

Describing these connections and reaffirming Aristotle’s position today is important. The rejection of all of Aristotle’s science in favor of Copernicus and Darwin was based on a false understanding of Aristotelian science. The rejection of Aristotle’s metaphysics in favor of empiricism, skepticism, Kant, or other modern philosophers was also a mistake. Some of Aristotle’s view of reality is still true and should not have been rejected or ignored. As Alfred North Whitehead points out, “there can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an *Order of Things* and, in particular, of an *Order of Nature*...Aristotle...must have been endowed with the full scientific mentality, which instinctively holds that all things great and small are conceivable as exemplifications of general principles which reign throughout the natural order” (3-5) (Whitehead, Alfred North. *Science and the Modern World*. New York: The Free Press, 1925).

The application of Aristotle’s principles to environmental issues today can bridge the gap between religion and science as it has been popularized and exploited by politicians who set up a false dichotomy between the two ways of understanding reality and the meaning of human life. Aristotle’s principles can be compared to the metaphysical beliefs of philosophers and theologians from all over the world, today and in the past. They can provide the foundation for the union of science and religion, for the nature and existence of God, for a form of humanism that includes the power of the human spirit, for the union of nature and culture, for a necessary connection between art and education, and for a definition of the human psyche that includes many kinds of intellectual activities that go beyond the categorization of empirical data.

Although a short paper can only touch on these issues, I will try to provide a basic outline through which to examine the most important and applicable aspects of Aristotle’s thought to our own time.



**Mischa Beckett**, *Simmons College*, [mischa.beckett@simmons.edu](mailto:mischa.beckett@simmons.edu), Panel Organizer, Sat 9 Room 1: **Socratic Philosophy: Socrates and His Students**

*Theme of Panel:* This panel seeks to address the following questions: How does Plato understand Socrates as a teacher of philosophy? In what sense can Socrates be said to be a friend to those he teaches? How does Aristophanes, a famous contemporary critic of Socrates, understand the ancient philosopher's role as teacher? What do these reflections allow us to see about the nature of Socratic philosophy itself? This panel proposes to analyze and discuss these questions through the writings of Plato and Aristophanes. Paper on this panel: "Aristophanes' Socrates"

This paper argues that Aristophanes uses the *Clouds* to mount a coherent, two-part attack on Socrates and philosophy more generally. Drawing out the substance of this attack allows us to see how Aristophanes understood philosophy, its effect on Socrates' students, and its effect on the political community more generally. This allows us to better understand the rationale behind the charges Socrates faced in the *Apology*, as well as illuminating Aristophanes' understanding of what philosophy essentially is, and shedding light on the relationship between philosophic teacher and student.

Aristophanes' *Clouds* articulates the same basic charges outlined in Plato's *Apology* and mounts a coherent theoretical attack against Socrates specifically and philosophy more generally. Aristophanes understands Socratic philosophy as a two part enterprise, composed of both natural science and rhetorical studies. First, natural science destroys belief in Zeus and the traditional Olympians, replacing them with a belief in necessity and a scientific causality. Thus, the ancient theology is destroyed and with it the foundation for traditional views of justice and morality more generally. This natural science is the necessary prelude to the second element of philosophy, a rhetoric which enables its possessors to triumph over custom by reducing it to unfounded convention, itself understood as opposed to nature. Traditional virtue – by which Aristophanes means chiefly justice, piety, and moderation – used to restrain human nature and direct citizens toward the common good. Socratic philosophy replaces the common good with the private good, neglecting the family, the city, and the gods in favor of its own new private community. Thus, philosophic inquiry is an essentially destructive enterprise, aimed at the heart of custom and thus at the city itself. Philosophy detaches its students from all social, moral, religious, and familial restraint, leaving simply hubristic bodies bent on fulfilling their own desires.

**Jeremy Bell**, *DePaul University*, [jbell94@hotmail.com](mailto:jbell94@hotmail.com), Sat 9 Room 8: "A Glance at the Gorgian Head"

"Speech (*logos*)," Gorgias claims, "is a powerful ruler. . . . I shall prove that this is so; I must also prove it by opinion (*doxei deixai*) to my hearers." We must ask what is meant in this last line: what does it mean that the power of speech must be proven *by* the *doxa* of one's audience? What, in short, is meant by the word "by" here? In order to answer this question it may be helpful to first note what Gorgias did not write: the proof is not to be given *kata doxan*, "according to opinion." The suggestion here is something stronger—the proof is to be made *doxei*, "by opinion." The use of the dative here is to be understood in an instrumental sense. The proof that Gorgias offers will not be simply in

accordance with the *doxa* of his audience; rather, it will be the case that precisely this *doxa* shall be the instrument by which the proof will be made.

Now, if *logos* has power over the soul, this is due in large part to the finitude of the human psyche. For, Gorgias notes, this finitude determines the soul's susceptibility to false speech (*pseudē logon*) and to frequently taking *doxa* as its leader. *Logos*, Gorgias argues, holds such preternatural sway over us precisely because we lack the wisdom and knowledge of the divine—its divinity, that is to say, is sustained by our humanity. If our memory of the past were more expansive, our understanding of the present more thorough, and our knowledge of the future more precise, we would be justified in relying upon these things; but, as they are not such—as they are finite and we, accordingly, are for the most part ignorant—we take neither knowledge nor understanding, but rather *doxa*, to be our leader.

Moreover, Gorgias turns his understanding of the nature of *logos* on philosophical discourse as well, arguing that it too deals in an economic exchange of *doxai*. He writes: “conflicts of philosophical speech (*philosophōn logōn*), in which it is shown that quick-wittedness too makes the opinion which is based on belief changeable.” Philosophical *logos*, then, would be essentially and irreducibly linked to rhetorical *logos*—either as a species to its genus, if we understand rhetoric to be identical to persuasive speech, or as two species within the same genus, if we understand both philosophy and rhetoric to be species of the genus of persuasive speech. In either case the result is the same: philosophical *logos* would be nothing more or other than a type of persuasive speech, and would, as such, be incapable of rising above the mercuriality and instability of *doxa*. Moreover, just as the formal function of rhetoric is to replace one *doxa* with another, and of the rhetorician, to enact such an exchange in the soul of her interlocutor through a skillful and technically proficient deployment of *logos*, so too would philosophy have as its formal function the exchange of one opinion for another, and the philosopher, the technical skill to enact such an exchange in the soul of her interlocutor. We see, then, that what is at stake Plato's confrontation with the sophists and rhetoricians is nothing other than a certain possibility of philosophy, i.e., that possibility whereby it would be capable of being anything more or other than sophistry or rhetoric—but this is to say that what is at stake in this confrontation is nothing other than the possibility of philosophy itself as Plato understands it.

**Brad Berman**, *University of Pennsylvania*, [bradb@sas.upenn.edu](mailto:bradb@sas.upenn.edu), Sat 4 Room 4:  
“Backyard Biology and Aristotle on the Unity of Form”

Organisms are composites according to Aristotle, composed of matter and form. The matter of an organism is, in turn, quite complex itself. Its organic body is composed of a variety of functional parts. Yet, organisms are also, on Aristotle's account, paradigm cases of unities.<sup>1</sup> Their parts, whatever they might be, are emphatically not just so many independent things heaped together. In tandem, these two commitments pose some difficulties. What is it, we should like to know, that explains the unity of an organism in spite of its complexity? As Aristotle frames the problem, “it must be stated what it is that makes it one ‘out of’ many” (*Meta. H. 3*, 1044<sup>a</sup>4-5, trans. Furth).

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<sup>1</sup> Substances, of course, are beings in the principal sense. And, as Aristotle regularly reminds his audience, unity and being are convertible (e.g., *Meta. Γ. 2*, 1003<sup>b</sup>22-34).



In recent years, Aristotle's treatments of the issue have garnered a good deal of attention in the secondary literature. Some commentators have urged a non-explanatory reading, in which organic unity is taken as a primitive. On this interpretation, the parts of an organism are argued to be in various senses posterior to it and so to pose no threat to its unity.<sup>2</sup> The more dominant trend, however, has instead been to explain both the hylomorphic and material unity of an organism. In each respect, the favored candidate for a principle of unity has been the form of an organism, its soul.<sup>3</sup>

In the paper, I raise a challenge to the latter, explanatory class of interpretations, specifically insofar as they propose form as the principle of organic unity. While I agree that Aristotle regards organic unity to demand an explanation, these views typically take the unity of form as a primitive in order to provide it. And it is this claim—that the form of an organism is primitively one—that I argue cannot be Aristotle's considered position.

To do so, I examine Aristotle's discussions of a family of biological observations involving the physical division of a living organism. Notable among them are his discussions of plants and certain types of insects, the divided segments of which continue to live after severance. I argue, most directly against Simplicius, that Aristotle understands such phenomena to show that, in at least some cases, the soul of an organism, just like its matter, though "actually one, [is] potentially many," or divisible (*De An.* II. 2, 413<sup>b</sup>18-19, trans. Smith). But if the soul is divisible, then it cannot, I argue, be a primitive unity, for we shall need to ask what makes it to be actually one.

Since, so far as organisms are concerned, Aristotle does not consider the unity of form to be primitive, form cannot be the ultimate principle of organic unity. I conclude the paper, then, by sketching some possible ways of buttressing and emending the explanatory interpretation of Aristotle on organic unity.

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Sellars, W. (1967). "Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: An Introduction," *Philosophical Perspectives*, pp. 73-124

Simplicius (1995). *On Aristotle's "On the Soul 1.1-2.4,"* trans. J. Urmson, Cornell Univ. Press

<sup>2</sup> W. Sellars (1967) and M. Loux (1991) are notable proponents of this view.

<sup>3</sup> Proponents of this view include, among others, D. Charles (1994), M. L. Gill (1989), V. Harte (1996), S. Haslanger (1994), F. Lewis (1996), and T. Scaltsas (1994). Form is usually considered a principle of unity when viewed as a formal cause, but some have stressed its role as a final or efficient cause to the same end. These positions may be brought closer together by noting Aristotle's decision to treat soul as "the cause of its body alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize. It is the source of movement, it is the end, and it is the essence of the whole living body" (*De Anima* II. 3, 415<sup>b</sup>8-12, trans. Smith).

**Laurence Bloom**, *University of Georgia*, [loom@uga.edu](mailto:loom@uga.edu), **Wiener Panel Sat 2 Room 1:**  
“The Rule of Reason and the Unity of the Soul in Plato’s *Republic*”

Socrates argues that the soul is a plurality in *Republic* IV using some version of the principle of non-contradiction (or non-opposition). The division is necessary to preserve the soul/state analogy, an analogy essential to the argument of the text. Although the subject of the soul’s division has received a large amount of scholarly attention in recent years a major overarching problem has been largely neglected. The problem is that once we determine that the soul is some sort of plurality we need some way of understanding what it is that makes the soul be *one* soul. If the soul is not itself a pure unity, what is it that unifies it? This question, to an ancient philosopher, is relevant for any plurality and, as the soul is itself usually taken to be a principle of unity, it is even more pressing in this case. In this paper I examine the division of the soul in book IV with this question in mind. Plato, it seems, is aware that the division of the soul is problematic. As is often noted in the literature he makes reference to a longer road through these issues. Less often noted is that the principle of the soul’s division, contradiction, as well as all that follows from it are *explicitly* hypothetical in the text. In other words, the division of the soul is merely hypothetical. Yet, is this not all merely posturing on Plato’s part? It is obvious to even a casual reader of the *Republic* that it is justice that holds the parts of the soul together. This answer is fine as far as it goes- which is, I argue, only as far as the hypothesis that gave rise to the question- but it does lead to some surprising conclusions about justice. Most significant of these, perhaps, is that justice cannot be an attribute or predicate but must be connected to the being of that which participates in it. More importantly, I argue, Plato is subtly suggesting another answer to be superimposed over the first. The other answer is that it is the rational part itself that unifies the soul. The rational part is, in a sense, beyond hypothesis and is both part and whole with respect to the soul. This later, deeper answer is merely alluded to in the passages in book IV. Though he is careful to leave space for it, Socrates cannot yet affirm this answer as it depends upon the metaphysical position developed at the end of book V and beyond for which, I suggest, the arguments in book IV pave the way.

**George Boger**, *Canisius*, [boger@canisius.edu](mailto:boger@canisius.edu), Sat 9 Room 6  
“Translating *Prior Analytics* A.1-2, 4-6”

This discussion compares a new translation of early parts of *Prior Analytics* with that of Robin Smith’s 1989 translation to suggest an adjustment to our understanding of what Aristotle took to be a *sullogismos* and his purpose in writing *Prior Analytics*. Attention focuses on the verbs he uses to establish syllogistic patterns with concludent results in A4-6 and to treat their reduction in A7. In addition, the discussion shows that Aristotle uses a method different from the method of counterargument for establishing independence, or the inconcludence of certain syllogistic patterns.

Chair: Sat 11 Room 7

**Anne-Marie Bowery**, *Baylor*, [Anne\\_Marie\\_Bowery@baylor.edu](mailto:Anne_Marie_Bowery@baylor.edu), Sat 9 Room 3:  
“Functions of the Narrative Structure of the *Republic*”

Plato’s *Republic* begins with Socrates narrating an account to an unnamed audience at an unspecified place and time. In addition to conveying the dramatic events to the auditor, Socrates provides his auditor with important insights about the

psychological states of the characters he encounters and also reveals aspects of his own inner state of mind. Socrates' narrative commentary intercedes at regular intervals throughout Book I. However, Socrates' narrative commentary diminishes over the course of the dialogue. This tapering off begins in Books II and III. After a brief reemergence at the opening of Book V, Socrates' narrative commentary largely disappears. In this paper, I suggest that narrative continues to serve important rhetorical, pedagogical, and thematic functions throughout the *Republic*. On the rhetorical level, Socrates' narrative comments, even though they diminish in frequency, still call attention to crucial passages in the text such as the city and soul analogy (368d) and the introduction of the three waves (449a). On the pedagogical level, Socrates tells narratives to his interlocutors at pedagogically significant moments. The soul's journey to the intelligible place (Book VI), the allegory of the cave (Book VII) and the Myth of Er (Book X) are all narratives. In Books VIII and IX, Socrates tells narratives to characterize the various political regimes and soul types. On the theme level, narrative itself receives intense scrutiny. In Book II and III, Socrates and his interlocutors analyze simple, imitative, and mixed narrative styles and assess the relative merits of each. This philosophical analysis of narrative provides a model by which we can analyze Socrates' own philosophical narrative and assess the philosophical value of the narrative structure of the *Republic* itself.

Chair: Sat 2 Room 4.

**Tom Brickhouse**, *Lynchburg College*, [brickhouse\\_t@mail.lyncburg.edu](mailto:brickhouse_t@mail.lyncburg.edu), & **Nick Smith**, *Lewis & Clark College*, [ndsmith@lclark.edu](mailto:ndsmith@lclark.edu), Jenks Panel Sat 11 Room 2  
"Socrates on Virtues as Skills"

*Abstract Pending*

**Sara Brill**, *Fairfield University*, [sbrill@mail.fairfield.edu](mailto:sbrill@mail.fairfield.edu), Brill Panel Chair Sat 11 Room 1: "Criminal Corpses and Suffering Souls: Civic Ideology in Plato's *Laws*"

The *Laws*' candid emphasis on the politically salutary work that is accomplished by belief in the gods, the cosmos and the human soul strongly advises caution when assessing whether the theology, cosmology and psychology espoused in this dialogue convey what Plato believes to be true. The dialogue does, however, offer insight into Plato's conception of the expedience of certain beliefs for the sake of maintaining the specific political program outlined in it. This paper explores the interaction between ideology and punishment that it as at work in Plato's *Laws*.

I argue that the dialogue's characterization of vice as a form of disease is decisive for its conceptions of crime and the aims of legislation. Crime is understood to introduce a context of pollution in which the entire city is implicated. Penal law, with its division into a preventive prelude designed to shape belief and a 'therapeutic' punishment, is conceived as an instrument for ensuring civic health on both ideological and practical fronts. Such a collusion between punishment and belief is particularly evident in the discussion of laws pertaining to murder and impiety (Books 9 and 10), wherein an elaborate account of the fate of the immortal soul is espoused as a preventive treatment for actions the punishment of which involves not only death but a series of strict prescriptions for the handling of the corpse of the criminal. It is my claim that the punitive treatment of the criminal's corpse and the advocacy of belief in an immortal soul collaborate in producing an ideological framework that is amenable to the state's model

of civic health; moreover, they do so by affirming the city as the arena wherein personal identity is granted permanence and place.

**J. Eric Butler**, *Villanova*, [james.butler@villanova.edu](mailto:james.butler@villanova.edu), Chair Sun 9 Room 4; Sun 11 Room 4: “Aristotle and Clinical Psychology: The Explanation, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Anxiety”

I argue that an attentive reading of Aristotle can contribute to our understanding of the nature of anxiety, understood as a clinical psychological disorder. I begin by considering some difficult remarks he makes in *de Anima* I.1 about the relationship between soul and body. There he argues that the psychic affections [*ta tēs psychēs pathē*] all appear to be accompanied by, or conjoined with, body [*meta sōmatos*] (403a16-17). At 403a19-24, he supports this claim by reference to a phenomenon that, I argue, we would recognize as clinical anxiety: “sometimes even without the occurrence of anything fearful men exhibit all the symptoms of fear.”

I argue, first, that Aristotle presupposes, at least in this context, a strictly physiological conception of the various psychic affections. In several different contexts, for instance, he defines fear [*phobos*] as a chilling of the blood. These claims, taken in conjunction with several passages where he explicitly connects fear (and other psychic affections) with imagination [*phantasia*] (which is bodily and results from perception), allow us to conclude that Aristotle has a strictly physiological conception of the psychic affections—especially, for our purposes, fear. Second, I attempt to differentiate his conception of anxiety from that of cowardice, which he also describes as inappropriate fear.

Having provided an Aristotelian account of anxiety, I turn from issues of nosological explanation and diagnosis to the topic of therapy, or treatment. The most successful, and most orthodox, method of treatment for anxiety in contemporary clinical psychology is Cognitive Behavioral Therapy [CBT]. The CBT model asserts that the behavioral and physiological component(s) of a psychological pathology cannot be considered independently of its cognitive, or rational component. Thus, CBT as a clinical methodology consists in correcting both of these components. CBT ought to be seen as a compromise between purely physiological treatments (i.e., the alleviation of physiological symptoms by the administration of anxiolytic medication) and purely cognitive ones (therapy that would consist in correcting inappropriate thoughts).

Attempting to establish an Aristotelian model of therapy, I turn to the topic of courage. “The brave man,” he writes, shows himself fearless toward <things that are frightening *per se*> [...], these being frightening to him in one sense but in another not [...]. This is the reason, by the way, why the habit of the brave man is praised; his condition is analogous to that of the strong or healthy (*Eudemian Ethics* III.1, 1228b22-32).

CBT does not aim at the wholesale elimination of the physiological symptoms of anxiety (as would a strictly pharmacological approach). Rather, it aims at the management of, and adjustment to, those symptoms. Likewise, as we see here, Aristotle recommends for courage (which is analogous health) *not* that one eliminate all fear (which, again, is usually physiological for him). Rather, the key—from both an Aristotelian and a CBT perspective—is the management of physiological symptoms through attentiveness to their cognitive or rational causes and effects.

**Miriam Byrd**, *University of Texas-Arlington*, [mbyrd@omega.uta.edu](mailto:mbyrd@omega.uta.edu), Sat 11 Room 3  
“Plato’s Elenctic Examination of the Reader in the Early Dialogues”

The practice of elenchus is central to Plato’s early works. Dialogue after dialogue we see Socrates elicit the opinions of his interlocutors for the purpose of showing these men the inconsistency of their own beliefs and bringing them to a state of *aporia*. We even see Socrates himself undergo elenchus by the Laws in the *Crito*. Socrates’ description in the *Apology* of his divine mission to the citizens of Athens reveals the great significance Plato attributed to this process.

Reading the dialogues, we observe Socrates’ application of the method of elenchus to his interlocutors, but this is of limited benefit to us unless we happen to share the beliefs of those being examined. I propose that, since Plato views elenchus as being so crucial to learning, it is plausible that he designed the dialogues in such a way that the readers may themselves undergo the beneficial effects of this method. The thesis of my paper is that apparent contradictions in the early dialogues, such as the tension between Socrates’ beliefs as expressed in the *Apology* and those he puts into the mouth of the Laws in the *Crito*, or the inconsistency between Socrates’ apparent endorsement of hedonism in the *Protagoras* and rejection of it in the *Gorgias*, are Plato’s attempts to engage the reader in elenchus.

My argument can be broken into the following stages. First, I examine Socrates’ discussion of the benefits of elenchus and the role of *aporia* in this process. Second, I present three examples of apparent inconsistencies in the early dialogues which lead to *aporia* in the attentive reader. Third, I provide an account of how the *aporia* arising from these cases is of philosophical benefit to the reader and show parallels between this elenctic examination of the reader and that experienced by characters in the dialogues.

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**Richard Cameron**, *DePauw University*, [rcameron@depauw.edu](mailto:rcameron@depauw.edu) Sun 9 Room 3:  
“Socratic Recollection in the *Meno*”

It is a scholarly commonplace that Plato’s introduction of recollection in the *Meno* marks a transition from an “early” or “Socratic” period in his development toward the more “mature” or “Platonic” views paradigmatically on display in the *Republic*, *Phaedo*, and *Symposium*. It is no part of my aim to argue that this view is false, but I do maintain that recollection has an important and heretofore unrecognized Socratic guise. The position I defend could therefore be called a ‘dual aspect’ theory of recollection, and my dissent from the received view is limited to asserting that our focus on recollection’s Platonic aspects has left the full richness of the doctrine unacknowledged. The current essay is part of a larger work in which I argue that the Socratic theory of recollection I uncover is philosophically rich and illuminates aspects of Socrates’ virtue epistemology in profitable ways. But given time constraints my present argument will be limited examining the text of the *Meno* with the goal of articulating a textually sensitive theory of recollection which is fully “Socratic” in the developmentalist’s sense.

The paper begins by placing the doctrine of recollection in the context of the paradox of inquiry and Socrates’ first response to it – that it is a “debater’s argument.” Given a standard understanding of its failures (inspired by a well known parallel in the

*Euthydemus*), I extract two substantive epistemological insights gained by recognizing the paradox as fallacious. First, Meno is right if we are *completely ignorant* of our subject matter inquiry is impossible. As a corollary, inquirers having some pre-existent knowledge<sup>4</sup> of their subject matter is a necessary condition on the success of any inquiry. But such pre-existent knowledge isn't sufficient for successful inquiry, the paradox also reveals that in order for inquiry to succeed inquirers must *place trust in* their pre-existent knowledge. They must not only have some knowledge of the subject matter, they must meet certain virtue epistemological requirements involving their honestly and sincerely using that knowledge as a basis for their inquiry.

With these lessons from the paradox of inquiry in mind, we are (I argue) in a good position to read the doctrine of recollection anew, this time through a thoroughly Socratic lens. Socrates' discussion with the slave boy illustrates the possibility of inquiry long before the boy actually 'solves' the geometrical puzzle. But his solving the puzzle also reveals an important way in which inquiry is very much like (literal) recollection: both involve a persons' *seeing one thing and coming to think of another*. Seeing this parallel between literal recollection and Socrates' 'teaching' of the slave boy in the *Meno* yields a philosophically rich and textually sensitive understanding of the central passages of the *Meno* while also grounding Plato's literal embrace of the doctrine in Socratic soil. The Platonic aspects of recollection are well known and voluminously studied. Its Socratic aspects are overdue for greater attention.

**Scott Carson**, *Ohio University*, [carsond@ohio.edu](mailto:carsond@ohio.edu), **Prince-Jost Panel Sat 4 Room 2**

**Lew Cassity**, *Binghamton University*, [lewcassity@hotmail.com](mailto:lewcassity@hotmail.com), Sat 9 Room 7:  
"Plato on the Nature of Moral Error"

In the *Laws* Plato raises the fundamental question of why human beings commit moral error. One possible answer suggested by the *Laws* is that we do wrong out of *amathia* (ignorance) and that the proper understanding of *phusis* is what we need most in order to act correctly (X.886a-b). While it is right to claim that Plato believes that intellectual confusion is a major source of moral error, Plato also claims that "the weakness of human nature" is a cause of moral error (IX.853d-854a). In this paper I will investigate 1) how the wrong philosophical concept of *phusis* is a cause of moral error, 2) how human nature itself is a cause moral error, and 3) how these two causes of moral error relate to one another. My hope is to articulate a small part of Plato's complex understanding of human nature as something that is both inherently fallible and yet able to observe and participate in the beautiful nature of the whole.

Chair: Sat 2 Room 5

**Chung Yue Chang**, *Montclair State*, no email, **Hochsmann Panel Sat 9 Room 2**:  
"Philosophical Approaches to the Unsayable: Wittgenstein, Whitehead and Classical Daoism"

In philosophy there is the sayable and there is the unsayable. Mostly philosophy deals with the sayable: to say what and how it is the case. Yet at its very root, philosophy, at

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<sup>4</sup> Understanding 'knowledge' to mean roughly *acquaintance* (as in "I know the chair of my department.") rather than *propositional knowledge*. The requirement is emphatically *not* that one must have justified true beliefs regarding one's subject matter in order for inquiry to be successful.



some point, must confront the unsayable, an impossible task. Chinese and Western philosophies have their differences. Ostensibly, they differ in the ways they carry out their separate and different philosophical sayables. More significantly, they radically differ in the ways they confront the unsayable. This paper, by way of Wittgenstein, Whitehead and classical Daoism, focuses on the Chinese and Western approaches to the unsayable. These separate approaches to the unsayable may provide means to understand why China and the West express their philosophical sayables differently.

**Rose Cherubin**, *George Mason University*, [rcherubi@gmu.edu](mailto:rcherubi@gmu.edu), Sat 4 Room 5:

“Inquiry, Causes, and the Unconditional: A “Third Way” Before Plato (Parmenides)”

Gonzalez and others have recently renewed and strengthened the case for a “third way” of interpreting Plato, a way that reads Plato neither as univocally propounding a doctrine nor as merely criticizing others’ doctrines without offering any positive philosophical legacy.<sup>5</sup> Did Plato have any philosophical antecedents or respondents in this?

Most modern and late ancient interpretations of the earliest philosophers would suggest not, for they present the earliest Greek philosophizing as an attempt to state directly that which is, how it works, and why it is as it is.<sup>6</sup> But while Anaximander and Anaximenes, e.g., do seem to have attempted to state directly how things are and why so, it is more difficult to establish this as the project of some of their successors. If we do not begin by assuming that an early philosopher’s fragments are part of an attempt to articulate directly and to explain unconditionally the nature of what is, we find material that diverges from or challenges such a project. Xenophanes and Heraclitus pose caveats concerning the possibility of attaining to unconditional knowledge through the use of human sensory apparatus and conceptual schemes. Parmenides both undermines the feasibility of a direct and unconditional account of what-is, and also suggests an alternative way of presenting discoveries.

Parmenides shows the sources of deficiencies in direct claims about the nature of what is, and in claims to unconditional knowledge. He does this through an exploration of the requisites of inquiry. His exposition suggests that in contexts of inquiry, we must assume that what-is is complete and ungenerated; that the assumption that what-is is as we say or conceive it to be results in contradictions and paradox; and that we cannot by means of inquiry discover whether unconditional knowledge is possible.

If, as I argue, Parmenides saw serious problems with claims to unconditional knowledge and with attempts to state directly the nature of what is, questions arise as to how if at all he proposed to avoid these problems in his own work, and what he sought to accomplish. Did his writing reflect the concerns I have mentioned? I argue that it did, both through its form and through its choice of words and figures. Moreover, his work advances our understanding through delicate and careful exploration of the parameters of the points from which we begin to search for understanding. (Time permitting, I will indicate ways in which Zeno and Aristotle took up Parmenides’ project.)

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<sup>5</sup> F.J. Gonzalez, ed., *The Third Way* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. D.W. Graham, *Explaining the Cosmos* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006): 8-14; A.A. Long, “The Scope of Early Greek Philosophy,” pages 1-21 in A.A. Long, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

If the account I offer is correct, at least some ancient Greek philosophy took directions that cannot be understood as attempting to state directly and unconditionally the nature of that which is. These directions are not only of historical interest, but also address problems that contemporary philosophy encounters. For example, these ancient Greek inquiries suggest a search for alternatives to both absolutist and relativist accounts of knowledge and of value.

**Christopher A. Colmo**, *Dominican University*, [farabi@dom.edu](mailto:farabi@dom.edu), Chair **McBrayer**

**Panel Sat 4 Room 1:**

“Infinity in Aristotle and Islamic Philosophy”

Aristotle always puts the actual before the potential. The actual activates the potential. An exception would seem to be Aristotle's understanding of the infinite. Aristotle argues against the possibility of an actual infinite while admitting the existence of a potential infinite. But in this case the potential is not only prior to the actual; the potential exists without the possibility of becoming actual. My thesis is that both Alfarabi and Averroes noticed this anomaly and thought it significant. Indeed, it becomes an opening wedge in providing an alternative to Aristotle with respect to the eternity of the world. This has wider implications for the understanding of what philosophy is as well as for the understanding of politics.

**Craig Condella**, *Salve Regina University*, [craig.condella@salve.edu](mailto:craig.condella@salve.edu), **Majumdar panel**

**Sun 9 Room 2:**

“Why Aristotle Matters in Environmental Philosophy”

Though Martin Heidegger often demonizes Aristotle as a founding father of the metaphysics of presence, his reading of the *Physics* puts forth an understanding of nature that runs importantly counter to the modern conception of the natural world as a stockpile of resources available for our perpetual use. Key to this resistance is Aristotle's distinction between *phusis* and *techne*. Whereas technically produced artifacts are brought to their completion by their human makers, natural beings, emerging forth from out of themselves, come to their own completion in a way that remains importantly incomplete. This perpetual incompleteness – unique to natural beings – accounts for the perpetually cyclical processes evident in all of nature. In emphasizing this dimension of natural beings, Aristotle effectively sees nature in a way that has become all but lost within the modern technological mindset. Working from Heidegger's analysis, I therefore maintain that Aristotle's view of nature as a *way of being* rather than a *collection of beings* provides fertile soil from which a deep ecology can readily grow. Once we begin to see nature as self-sustaining and, as such, inherently resistant to our misguided attempts to manipulate and even dominate it, we will not only gain a healthier respect for the natural world, but further come to see our obligatory yet increasingly precarious place within it.

Chair: Sun 11 Room 4

**Clinton Corcoran**, *High Point University*, [ccorcora@highpoint.edu](mailto:ccorcora@highpoint.edu), Sat 4 Room 5:

“Aristotle and Heidegger on the Anaximander Fragment”

Heidegger's famous redaction (*Early Greek Thinking*, 1946) of the Anaximander Fragment (DK12B1), which is itself a passage taken from Simplicius' (6<sup>th</sup> cent. CE)

commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. (24, 17) where Simplicius is, in turn, quoting from a lost section of Theophrastus' history of pre-Socratic philosophy, *Phusikon Doxa*, presents itself as a hermeneutic goldmine, or nightmare, depending on one's interpretation. While I agree with the so-called 'vertical interpretation' of the fragment, I will argue that Heidegger's final rendition of the fragment "...along the lines of usage; for they let order and thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder" goes too far in omitting the phrase, "according to the ordinance of time" (*kata tou chronou tazin*). Thus, time does not order the process of change; it becomes, rather, another type of order created by and dependent upon the process of change. Hence, Heidegger's translation assumes, somewhat ironically for him, a totalizing and a-temporal metaphysical monism that is inconsistent with Theophrastus' and Aristotle's understanding of the *apeiron* as an *arche*.

**Phil Corkum**, *University of Alberta*, [phil.corkum@ualberta.ca](mailto:phil.corkum@ualberta.ca), Sat 11 Room 6:  
"Are Aristotle's Universals Sortals?"

Sortals are kinds which provide criteria of identity for individuals falling under that kind. Contemporary metaphysicians often appeal to sortals: sortals allow objects to be identified, distinguished from other objects, and re-identified, and so allow for objects to be counted. Some have argued that identity claims are intelligible only under a sortal, so that apparently two individuals can be called one and the same only if it can be specified what kind of thing it is of which they are the same. Many contemporary sortal theorists have looked to Aristotle for a historical precedent, citing Aristotle's universals, and in particular secondary substances, as sortals. Some Aristotle scholars—for example, Benson (1988)—have also held that Aristotle is a sortal theorist. In this paper, I'll argue that Aristotelian universals cannot play any of the roles played by sortals in contemporary metaphysics.

The paper comes in four parts. In the first part, I'll discuss in detail the role of sortals in contemporary metaphysics and survey the initial evidence supporting the ascription of sortals to Aristotle. In the second part of the paper, I'll argue that Aristotle holds that individuals can be identified and re-identified demonstratively, since it is a characteristic mark of individuals that they are demonstrable. So sortals are not necessary for providing identity criteria and Aristotle would disagree that identity claims are intelligible only under a sortal. If this part of the paper is correct, then Aristotle lacks the underlying motivation for sortal theory.

In the third part of the paper, I'll argue that, even were Aristotle to allow that individuals fall under sortals, universals cannot play this role. For experience requires the identification and re-identification of individuals, yet universals are the objects of art and scientific knowledge and not experience. Recently, Gregic and Grgic (2006) have argued that experience involves rudimentary universals which allow the classification of individuals yet, unlike the full-blown universals which are the objects of knowledge, lack explanatory power. I'll respond to this view, arguing that Aristotle does not hold that all experience requires universals. If this part of the paper is correct, then Aristotle lacks altogether the resources to advocate sortal theory.

In the fourth and final part of the paper, I discuss the relation holding between individuals and universals for Aristotle. Although universals do not provide identity

criteria allowing individuals to be identified and re-identified, knowledge of a universal is a disposition to recognize essential features of antecedently identified individuals.

**Peter R. Costello**, *Providence College*, [pcostell@providence.edu](mailto:pcostell@providence.edu), Sat 4 Room 6:

“Love as Hermeneutics: Moving Between the Couches in the *Symposium*”

*Every one would choose to have got children such as these rather than the human sort—merely from turning a glance [apoblephas] upon Homer and Hesiod (209 D)*

At 202E in the *Symposium* Diotima claims that love is the power of interpreting or “*hermeneuon*.” In this paper, I would like to follow up on Diotima’s claim by reading the circle of people on the couches as a version of the hermeneutic circle. What I would like to argue is that love is the process of reading each of the speeches within the context of the whole dialogue and thereby making explicit their relations to one another. Love is the process, in other words, of getting the “whole story,” which Apollodorus desires at the very beginning.

For Diotima, the hermeneutic project of love suggests that the one who successfully enacts it is, like Hermes himself, a “*daimonios aner*” or “spiritual man” (203A). There are several examples of hermeneuticists or daimons in the dialogue. Surely Socrates, who is widely reported to listen to his own personal daimon, is one of them. But there are others. In fact, even Alcibiades, Socrates says later, is “my good soul” or “*daimonie*” (222E). Assuming that his daimonic character qualifies Alcibiades for the role of hermeneuticist, and assuming I can prove that Alcibiades is a divine preserver and relater of parts and wholes in his, the final, speech at the *Symposium*, it seems we are forced to ask a difficult question: How would Alcibiades, for whose transgressions Socrates (arguably) dies, and Socrates himself have become entwined within a single project? How on earth could they both be hermeneuticists of love?

In fact, this question indeed is posed from the beginning, for it is Apollodorus’ companion who asks what it is that truly “brought together [*synousia*] Agathon, Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the rest of that party” (172A-B). Surely it was not just the banquet, not just the occasion for giving speeches on love. Rather, it seems to be something within the speeches themselves, a kind of dovetailing of content, a way in which each speech calls for the other, as Aristophanes’ images of the halves and Alcibiades’ image of the Silenus statues suggest.

In this paper, then, I will provide a reading of the *Symposium* that shows in fact how each speech does a hermeneutic of love by both preserving and surpassing the previous speeches. I will argue that the speeches occur in order of sophistication and that the final speech, Alcibiades, initiates a re-reading of the others since it returns, more than the others do, the things that have been repressed or skipped over in order to make the progress that has been made.

As certain as we are that Alcibiades is the one who leaves quickly at the end of the dialogue, just as certain should we be, I think, that the ones who enter, i.e., the “great crowd of revelers” (223B), the ones who sit anywhere and are placed under necessity [*anagkazomenous*] to drink, are indeed we, the readers of the dialogue. We are the multitude that now must make sense of the dialogue, the lovers who are placed at any of multiple perspectives. It is up to us to craft the whole story, and to take a stand in its telling<sup>1</sup>.

If love is a hermeneutics, as Diotima says, then it must see the parts by means of the whole, and the whole by means of the parts. Love must commit not to letting go too quickly or holding on too tightly to any of the particular speeches in order to hold the dialogue to its commitments to offer a set, a multiplicity of speeches together. The lover that seeks to follow the beloved wherever it may lead him (*Euthyphro*) must also be aware that she or he is a self who expresses the dialogue anew, who expresses herself therein. We must negotiate a role for ourselves here too. For love is not the position of a reader who offers nothing to the text.

Love cannot run “about at random” (173A), but neither can it simply ape what it thinks Socrates says or does. Love does not simply report, and it is aware that it does not do that. Love isn’t about fact-checking, as Apollodorus suggests in his report at 173 B, but about connecting knowledge and goodness, transforming the story in our mastery of it into something that is good for the others, that enables the others who hear to make their way into the story, too.

**Anna Cremaldi**, *University of Pennsylvania*, [Cremaldi@sas.upenn.edu](mailto:Cremaldi@sas.upenn.edu), Sat 2 Room 7: “Aristotle on Work and Freedom”

The working person can be a free person. Yet, Aristotle claims that the worker cannot be free. What are his reasons for thinking so?

Two assumptions underlie Aristotle’s claim. First, there is an assumption that there are two kinds of work. Aristotle sets up a scenario in which the city is divided into two basic groups, each of whom performs different jobs. There are those who are involved in the political functions of the city. There are also those who produce necessities for the city’s functioning: food, arms, goods – all the “instruments of living” (Pol. 1328b5-14). The latter group includes: farmers, blacksmiths, manual laborers, traders, etc.

Undergirding this picture of the different kinds of work are two sets of distinctions. First, there is the distinction between being ‘for the sake of another’ (*pros allon*) and ‘for the sake of oneself.’ The people who provide the city with its necessities work for the sake of others, whereas the people who participate in the political functions of the city work for the sake of themselves. Second, there is the distinction between necessary conditions and parts. The people who provide the city with its necessities are providing the necessary conditions for the city’s functioning. However, they are not truly part of the city. Rather, those involved in the political functions of the city are part of the city. Aristotle conceives the difference between necessary conditions and parts as a difference in degrees of essentialness. Whatever is part of the city is more essential to the city than what provides the city with its necessary conditions for functioning.

The second assumption is the idea that freedom is measured by the extent to which one works on behalf of himself, rather than another. As Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics*, a man is free who exists for himself and not for another (982b24). The mark of a free person is “not to live at another’s beck and call” (*Rhet.* 1367a32). Work itself does not make one unfree. Rather, working for others makes one unfree.

These two assumptions allow Aristotle to conclude that one group of workers in the city is unfree: those who produce on behalf of the city. But there is a problem with Aristotle’s characterization of those who produce for the city. This group is defined solely by its economic function. Indeed, the free laborer and the slave are



indistinguishable according to this criterion, since the slave, too, by Aristotle's lights, provides necessities for the city. Aristotle neglects to consider free laborers as having both an economic and political function because of the principle of specialization, according to which everyone performs, at most, one job. But Aristotle does not give an adequate defense of the principle of specialization.

**Pat Curd**, *Purdue University*, [zeno@purdue.edu](mailto:zeno@purdue.edu), **Jost-Prince Panel**, Sat 4 Room 2:

An analysis of Sedley's claims about Anaxagoras (in *Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity*), offering alternate interpretations of his accounts of the basic ingredients and of *Nous*, and hence rejecting Sedley's attribution to Anaxagoras of a theory of 'providential design' (as Malcolm Schofield refers to it).

-D-

**Daniel Davenport**, *Boston College*, [davenpda@bc.edu](mailto:davenpda@bc.edu), Sat 9 Room 3:

"A Line of Ascent in Plato's *Republic*"

Somewhat surprisingly, Socrates' depiction of the divided line in Plato's *Republic* provides substantial insight into what the best life might be. Both Socrates' elaboration of the divided line, and the way in which this elaboration is dramatically situated, point to the need for humility with regard to political ambitions despite what might seem to be the *Republic*'s more general call to radical political alteration. More significantly, though, the presentation of the divided line imparts some understanding of what it means to be a philosopher. The description of the divided line contains no remarks about humility or about the philosopher's life specifically. However, as is often the case with Socrates' analogies, the divided line provides a frame of reference for ideas beyond what it explicitly indicates. The portrayal of the divided line in Plato's *Republic* ultimately directs us to a better understanding of the philosophical life embodied by Socrates.

**Ryan Drake**, *Fairfield University*, [rdrake@mail.fairfield.edu](mailto:rdrake@mail.fairfield.edu), Sun 11 Room 4:

"Wonder and the Ends of Tragedy in the *Poetics*"

While the primary end or effect of tragedy in Aristotle's *Poetics* has been generally taken by commentators to be a form of cathartic pleasure, the focus on a drama's intellectual impact on its audience has been largely relegated to secondary consideration. In this paper I argue that Aristotle's references to wonder as a necessary aspect of the tragic experience points to a more extensive role for intellectual participation and provocation than is appreciated in the literature on the *Poetics*. In connection with his discussions of wonder in *Metaphysics* and *Rhetoric*, it becomes clear that tragic wonder enjoys an essential kinship with its philosophical counterpart, and is operative most forcefully in the poet's use of *peripeteia*, in which events are said, paradoxically, to occur "on account of one another" yet "contrary to expectation." My claim is that while pleasure is necessarily one dimension of tragic works, it shares its status as a primary effect of drama alongside the incitement of an audience's faculties of understanding and inquiry.


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**Terry Echterling**, *Michigan State University*, [echterl1@msu.edu](mailto:echterl1@msu.edu), Sat 9 Room 3:  
 “Diagrammatic Proof in Plato: the Divided Line”

Like Greek mathematicians long before Euclid, and some mathematicians today, Plato used diagrams as proofs. This fact has not been adequately appreciated because algebra has superseded geometry, but I argue that understanding some of the geometrical principles with which Plato was operating can help us understand Plato’s text better. I take as my example a geometrical problem in *Republic* VI that is so persistent that its solution has evaded scores of attempts to diagram the line accurately: namely, there is an inconsistency between the initial instructions for dividing the line (509d6–8) and the later description of the line’s divisions (511e2–4). That is, Socrates tells Glaucon to divide a line AB into two unequal segments at C, then to divide *each* of the two segments, AC and CB by the same ratio as the original division. Whatever proportion one uses to divide the line, an unavoidable consequence is that the two middle segments are exactly the same length. When Socrates later says that one’s cognitive clarity increases in relation to the truth of the *object* of cognition, he is taken to mean that one experiences physical objects less clearly than one understands mathematics because, e.g., a chair cannot express truth as well as a theorem does—implying that the mathematical segment should be longer than the objects segment.

The most common approach to the problem has been to translate the prose description into modern algebraic notation to establish the relative lengths of the various segments. But this algebraic method was not available to Socrates or Plato. I argue that the solution lies in going back to geometry (my handout illustrates the steps I here describe). To establish the basics, I explain briefly how the slave’s doubling the area of the square (*Meno* 82b–85b) introduces sophisticated mathematical concepts including the Pythagorean theorem, irrational numbers, and the notion of a continuous geometrical proportion. Then I take a hint from Aristotle (*De anima* 413a19 and *Metaphysics* 996b21) that finding the square root of a number is the same as finding the mean proportional between that number and the unit. In fact, the second and third cuts on the divided line *require* the use of the mean proportional. Finally, I construct the continuous geometrical proportion that demonstrates how Plato’s divided line would have been “completed” by those familiar with Plato’s methods. The divided line would be construed as rays of an angle within a triangle, one ray corresponding to cognition and the other to the objects of cognition. This results in a divided line where increasing *areas*, rather than segments alone, demonstrate the increase in truth between d and e, and the increase in clarity between d’ and e’.



**Maureen Eckert**, *U. Mass Dartmouth*, [meckert@umassd.edu](mailto:meckert@umassd.edu), Sat 11 Room 4:  
“Eugenics on the Vertical Axis of Plato’s *Republic*”

The eugenics program of *Republic*, Book V has tended to be a source of irritation to commentators. As a social program, commentators such as Annas have noted that the breeding program conflicts with the meritocracy at the basis of the class-system: “We do best to ignore the confused eugenics and regard the class system as an abstract expression of the idea that social justice requires that the wise have absolute power over the less gifted” (Annas, 176). C.D.C. Reeve, in a full examination of the connection between the “Noble Lie” of Book III and the lies that promote and make possible the eugenics program (the sacred marriages and fixed lottery), finds Plato’s intentions “less than well realized here.” Moreover, there is even less said with respect to what eugenics might represent in terms of the psychological model presented in the *Republic*—its “vertical axis.” Not only have commentators shied away from this subject, but some have denied that the analogy of the polis and psyche can work for the eugenics program (among other ideas) at all. Recently, Simon Blackburn remarked that the notorious proposals concerning property, equality of the sexes, eugenics policies, and banishment of the poets couldn’t be a part of the positive analogy between the polis and psyche:

How would we model them in a well-ordered mind? ...It cannot be because one module or feature lies to another about the right person with whom to have a baby. These features belong to the negative part of the analogy. We cannot transport them across to gain any illumination about the individual mind and what would make it just or well-ordered. (Blackburn, 57-8)

It may be the case that much of the controversial proposals in Book V, especially the eugenics program, can only be made sense of in very broad strokes. Yet, the topic is connected textually to earlier topics like the “Noble Lie” and later issues such as the degeneration of the Kallipolis in Book VIII. It is difficult to ignore entirely, while being such a notoriously bad fit on both sides of the polis-psyche analogy. It is interesting that Blackburn fails to note that if the eugenics program were to be considered as applying to the psyche, it would not regard making a baby, but would more likely regard something like the generation over time of new psychological states. Given the broad interpretations about the meaning of the eugenics program in the social model of the *Republic*, the eugenics program applied to the individual just psyche might minimally regard the control of the reasoning (logistic) part of the psyche over the spirited (thymoedic) and appetitive (epithymetic) parts although the appetitive part of the psyche seems its main target of control, and would depict this situation over time (instead of representing a static time-slice). If anything like this is correct, eugenics on the vertical axis might describe an aspect of maintenance and/or preparation against akrasia. In Book VI, Socrates describes the preparations a healthy and moderate person should take when falling asleep, a recipe for taming dreams, which he claims “make clear that there is a dangerous, wild and lawless form of desire in everyone, even those of us who seem to be entirely moderate or measured” (*Rep.* 572b). These proactive preparations could be something of a clue to positioning the eugenics program broadly in the psychological model. Although Blackburn cannot imagine a part of himself, reason, lying to another part, I will provide a simple example of how it may be entirely reasonable and responsible to prepare proactively against akratic situations, deceiving or tricking other parts of the psyche.

**Ariane Economos**, *Fordham University*, [arianeeconomos@gmail.com](mailto:arianeeconomos@gmail.com), Sat 2 Room 6: "Interpretations of *Nous* in Medieval Commentaries on the *Posterior Analytics*"

In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle claims that we come to know the first principles of science through induction. After a few descriptions of the process of induction, Aristotle concludes the *Posterior Analytics* with the mysterious claim that it is *nous* (traditionally translated as "intuition") which apprehends first principles.

Jonathan Barnes notes that contemporary scholars' attempts to get at just what Aristotle means here typically lead them to adopt one of the following positions. First, they may simply "accept it as a sad truth that Aristotle entertained two mutually inconsistent views about our knowledge of the principles, and could not decide between them." Scholars who are not prepared to accept this may take one of two routes to reconcile Aristotle's discussion of induction and intuition:

- (1) They may argue that Aristotle recognizes that induction alone is insufficient to provide us with knowledge of principles, and that he introduces *nous* or intuition as a faculty which enables us to go beyond induction and "just see" principles, without any further rational process being required. Barnes calls this the "orthodox" view, and claims that the distinction between "intuitive" and "demonstrative" knowledge used by the rationalists and empiricists is ultimately based upon this interpretation of what Aristotle means by "intuition."
- (2) The other interpretation of these passages in Aristotle is the one accepted by Barnes himself. *Nous*, he argues, is not a "faculty or method" of attaining knowledge of principles, rather it is simply the "state or disposition" of grasping the principles which have been acquired through induction. An "intuitive leap," on this view, plays no role whatsoever in the actual acquisition of the principles; it is simply the state attained after the inductive process is completed. Barnes calls this the "unorthodox" view.

Barnes divides scholars into these two camps based upon contemporary interpretations of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, but the division is actually one which can be found much earlier. Medieval commentators on the *Posterior Analytics* struggled to reconcile *intellectus*, the Latin translation of *nous*, with Aristotle's account of induction.

Interestingly, it is the earlier commentators, such as Robert Grosseteste, who adopt a view akin to Barnes's "unorthodox" one and claim that *intellectus* is simply the state of possessing knowledge of first principles. In a later commentary by John Buridan, on the other hand, *intellectus* is interpreted in a manner which closely resembles the "orthodox" view, and serves as a kind of intuition that perfects the process of induction.

In my paper, I examine some medieval interpretations of the relationship between induction and *intellectus*. Grosseteste was widely held to be an authority on the *Posterior Analytics*, and so a brief presentation of his view sets the stage for later differences in interpretation of this text. I then discuss two other commentators: Thomas Aquinas, as a representative of the "unorthodox" interpretation, and John Buridan, as a representative of the later, "orthodox" view. I conclude with a brief account of how a commentator's ontological commitments would compel him to take a particular interpretive stance on this topic.

**John Edelman:** see **Heidi Northwood**

**Kumiko Endo**, *New School & SUNY Old Westbury*, [kumikoendo@gmail.com](mailto:kumikoendo@gmail.com), Giannetti Panel, Sun 11 Room 1:

“The Ethics of Mahayana Buddhism and Some Classical Chinese Traditions”

*Abstract pending*

**Christophe Erismann**, *Cambridge University*, [ce271@cam.ac.uk](mailto:ce271@cam.ac.uk) Sat 11 Room 6:  
“Maximus the Confessor on Universals”

Maximus the Confessor (ca. 580-662) is a good example of those late Ancient Christian theologians who had a strong philosophical background in Aristotelian logic. In support of his theological work, Maximus builds an ontology – i.e. a theory of the different types of entities which exist in the world. He inspires himself from Aristotle’s *Categories*, Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and from the Neoplatonic commentaries on these two texts on the one hand, and from the thought on logic, which was developed by earlier Christian authors (in particular by the Cappadocian Fathers Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa and by Maximus’ master Leontius of Byzantium) on the other hand. Maximus reinterprets some key concepts of Aristotelian logic – primary and secondary substances, universals and particulars. More precisely, he reformulates the ontology of the *Categories* on the basis of the notion of hypostasis, which replaces the notion of primary substance or individual (*atomon*). Maximus also sets out a philosophical theory of immanent universals, which will be the subject of my paper. This doctrine of universals, which is not a general theory of properties, but rather, in the line of thought of the questions Porphyry enunciates at the beginning of the *Isagoge*, a consideration of the ontological status of the genera and species of the sensible world. It may be distinguished from his exemplarist theory of the *logoi* of beings, i.e. divine ideas.

Maximus develops a theory of essence (*ousia*). A specific essence is common to all individuals of the same species and therefore does not belong properly to any one of them. Essences are real, universal and immanent. According to Maximus, “essence” (*ousia*), “form” (*eidos*) and “nature” (*physis*) refer to the same reality, i.e. the immanent universal. As in the case of most Christian theologians who work on logic, what Maximus refers to by the word *ousia* is the Aristotelian secondary substance; the primary substance is referred to by *hypostasis*. This allows him to state in *Letter 15* (PG 91, 545A) and in *Opusculum 14* that essence and nature are the same thing, and they are common and universal. If universality is understood in a traditional sense as the fact of being predicated of several individuals which differ in number, “community” refers to the fact that an entity exists simultaneously in several spatially and temporally different individuals. The essences do not exist separately from the individuals, but in them. In consequence, Maximus endorses the suppression argument which dates back to Alexander of Aphrodisias: if all the individuals of a specific universal – all its instantiations – disappeared, then that universal would also disappear (*Ambigua 10*, PG 91, 1189 CD).

Following Leontius of Byzantium, Maximus introduces a lexical innovation, later to be taken up by John of Damascus. He uses the term *enhypostaton* – which is also used in another sense in Christology – in order to qualify the way in which a species is in individuals. In this sense, *enhypostaton* means that “which by no means subsists by itself,

but is considered in others, as a species in the individuals subordinate to it” (*Letter 15*, 557D-560A). In the *Opusculum* 14, (149 BC), Maximus adds that “that which is common according to the essence, i.e. the species, is that which subsists really (*pragmatikōs*) in the individuals which are subordinate to it, and it is not considered in a pure concept”. This definition uses the vocabulary of Porphyry’s first question about the status of universal entities in the *Isagoge*, which indicates that Maximus’ theory of universals is also a *philosophical* answer to this problem.

Chair: Sat 2 Room 6

**Christos Evangeliou**, *Towson University*, [cevangeliou@towson.edu](mailto:cevangeliou@towson.edu) Sat 4 Room 5:  
“Building the Perfect City between Earth and Sky (Aristophanes’ *Birds*)”

Is it possible for human beings, given the restlessness of their nature, to find peace in some kind of political utopia? This paper will attempt to provide an answer to this question by considering the case of *The Birds*.

As Aristophanes presents the comic case of the two Athenian friends, Pisthetairos and Euelpides, the human condition would seem to be hopeless. The two citizens of Athens at the apex of its political and military power, are fed up with the sight of their busy-body fellow citizens, their court-trials, their political committees, their state missions, etc. To avoid all this noise and nonsense, and to find some peace of mind and enjoy the simple joys of a life free from care, the two men decided to join the seemingly happy company of the Birds.

But instead of sharing in the peaceful life of these “feathered friends,” the two men ended up persuading the Birds to do something unheard of. They advised the birds to build a city up in the clouds, with strong walls, and to start a rebellious war against the ruling Gods, whose power and happiness the humans in their miserable mortality have always envied and coveted. Through political intrigue and sophistic demagoguery, Pisthetairos succeeded in his grand scheme and was crowned at the end as the Master of the Universe, with Power as Miss Universe in his side. His dream has come true, all power is in his hands, but his troubles are far from over. Compared to this dream-like, monarchic, and absolute power, the power of imperial Athens over the other tiny Greek city-states would seem small and rather insignificant.

In this play Aristophanes has hit on certain salient characteristics of the human psyche and its contrary desires, yearning for peace, as it is engaged in the pursuit of political power. In this pursuit of happiness, human beings make constant use of the double power of **logos**, persuasive argument and intelligent design. For Athenians and for other Hellenic descendants of Odysseus, as for other Europeans or Americans who followed on their steps, **polypragmosyne** (busibodiedness, being concerned with many things at the same time) would seem to be a kind of fate that follows them like their shadow.

Even democratic Athens was really an aggregate of citizens, each of which wished to be a tyrant. On this essential point the Athenian comic poet and Plato, the Athenian philosopher, were in agreement.

**William Evans**, *St. Peter’s College*, [wevans@spc.edu](mailto:wevans@spc.edu), Chair: Sat 2 Room 3



**Mehdi Faridzede**, *ISIC, Islamic Philosophy I*, Sat 11 Room 9: **Panel Chair**

**Owen Flanagan**, *Duke*, [ojf@duke.edu](mailto:ojf@duke.edu) **Friquegnon Panel 2** Sat 4 Room 9:  
“Eudaimonia and the Emotions – Buddhist Style”

Buddhism offers a distinctive theory of human flourishing. Like other theories of flourishing, e.g., Confucian & Aristotelian, the Buddhist view calls for certain adjustments to the natural economy of emotions. How is this emotional adjustment supposed to work? Towards what end? Are the means and ends of Buddhist emotional adjustment similar to those of Aristotelian and Confucian?

**Marie Friquegnon**, *William Paterson University*, [friquegnonm@wpunj.edu](mailto:friquegnonm@wpunj.edu), **Panel Organizer: Three panels: Sat 2, Sat 4 Room 9, Sun 9 Room 7**

“Santaraksita’s Ultimate and Kant’s Noumenal Compared and Contrasted” Sat 4 Room 9

There is a striking resemblance between the philosophy of Santaraksita and Kant, especially with regard to ultimate reality. Although at first sight Kant’s noumenal may not be considered to have religious significance, there is a passage in the Critique which seems to belie this. I will investigate the similarities and differences between the two philosophers on this point.

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**Gary Gabor**, *Fordham University*, [garygabor2002@yahoo.com](mailto:garygabor2002@yahoo.com), Local Arrangements  
Saturday

**Octavian Gabor**, *Purdue University*, [ogabor@purdue.edu](mailto:ogabor@purdue.edu) Sat 4 Room 4:  
“Soul and Body as Formulas (Aristotle)”

In this paper I present a view which clarifies the Aristotelian concept of *soul*. I argue that *soul* and *body* are not entities, but formulas used to distinguish in analysis the different ways in which a particular functions. In other words, only the individual particulars, the composites, can be said to *be* in an existential sense from Aristotle’s point of view. Conceptually, we understand both soul and body, but there is only one thing as an entity: the particular substance.

This view does not imply, as it might be considered, that Aristotle is a materialist, and by this I mean the simple claim that the only things that exist are material things. In the account that I am proposing, matter remains on the same level with soul, in the sense that it exists only as formula which is used to make sense of individual particulars. Matter and form, body and soul, oppose each other not in the sense that one is material while the other immaterial. They are in opposition only at the conceptual level, because it is only at that level on which they function.

The paper is structured in two parts. The first one explains away the entity theory, by looking at Aristotle’s definitions of soul and his axe-analogy. The second one argues for the formula theory in two ways. First, it offers indirect evidence by considering the Homeric understanding of *psyche*. I claim that the soul-body distinction was not a Greek problem. In fact, *soul* and *body* are not two elements which come together to form a particular. *Psychē* and *soma*, the two Greek words that came to be translated as *soul* and *body*, are not used for humans who are still alive, but designate two independent things



which become real at the moment of death: that which goes to Hades and the corpse. The reality of these two entities after death does not presupposes their being prior to this moment of crisis. Before death, there is no *psychē* and no *soma*. There are only human beings which have limbs and manifest faculties. The limbs do not designate a body nor do faculties designate a soul. They both designate individual humans.

Second, for the textual evidence, I look at the first two chapters of the second book of *De Anima*. Through this, I show that, as entity, there is no soul, as there is no body. In a different sense, as formulas, both soul and body are. Primary substances, individual particulars, are engaged in activities and we explain these activities by making reference separately to their formal aspect and to their material aspect.

**Jason Giannetti**, *Framingham State College*, [jasongiannetti@yahoo.com](mailto:jasongiannetti@yahoo.com), **Panel Organizer**. Sun 11 Room 1.

”Dialectical Method in Plato and Nagarjuna”

It could be said that nothing is more important and, at the same time, nothing more mysterious than what is meant by “dialectic” in Plato’s works. Socrates, in the *Phaedrus*, lays out very clearly what is meant by dialectic and the dialectical method, but in the crucial passage on the Good in the *Republic*, Socrates approaches dialectic, makes very provocative statements about dialectic, and yet ultimately redirects Glaucon and the reader away from a real engagement with dialectic, as if some prophylactic device was necessary first, just as it is when one attempts to gaze directly at the sun.

The great Madyamaka philosopher, Nagarjuna, also engages in what has been called “dialectic” in order to lead the reader to a proper understanding of Emptiness. It is my contention that, contrary to most Plato scholars and their interpretations of “Plato’s Dialectical Method,” Plato and Nagarjuna, though separated by centuries, geography, and culture, are actually very close in their use of dialectic and its “mystical” goal.

**Jonathan C. Gold**, *Princeton*, no email, **Friquegnon Panel 2** Sat 2 Room 9:  
“An Early Yogācāra Critique of Subjectivity”

Chief among the innovations of Yogācāra Buddhist philosophers are three concepts that contribute a fresh perspective on issues of causality and personal identity as they have been articulated in the modern West. This paper shows how (1) the notion of mental events as “non-dual” (*advaya*), (2) the “store consciousness” (*ālayavijñāna*), and especially (3) the doctrine of the “three natures” (*trisvabhāva*) provide a way to conceive of the appearance of subjectivity that successfully circumvents Kantian and related phenomenological “proofs” of the self, and at the same time promotes a quintessentially Buddhist conceptual methodology for clarifying the causes of the illusion of self.

The paper draws upon the *Saṅghinirmocana-sūtra* and the independent works of Vasubandhu (320-400). Vasubandhu’s radical denial of subjectivity is far more thoroughgoing than previous Buddhist views of no-self, denying not just the diachronic or synchronic unity of the person, but the very “first-person” quality of experience in any given moment. Crucial to Vasubandhu’s argument is his use of the “three natures” of reality to distinguish the causes of illusions from their appearances. The paper formalizes this theory and applies it to a critique of claims as to the foundational character of “intentionality” in mental events. It also hypothesizes that this critique of intentionality is present in later Tibetan, specifically Sa-skya, philosophy of language.

**Owen Goldin**, *Marquette University*, [owen.goldin@marquette.edu](mailto:owen.goldin@marquette.edu), Sun 9 Room 4:  
“Certainty, Likelihood, and Scepticism in *De Caelo*”

In this paper I consider an odd sequence of arguments in Aristotle’s *De Caelo*. These arguments lead to the conclusion of 2.2 that the universe as a whole has a top and a bottom, and, for any point on the cosmos, one direction is to the right and the other is to the left; the cosmos as a whole turns from right to left. Aristotle’s conclusion is on the face of it somewhat silly, and philosophers have tended to avert their eyes from it. But it is precisely such arguments that, on account of their strangeness, allow us the philosophical distance to better understand the nature of an Aristotelian concerning the principles of the natural world: what it is meant to accomplish, and whether it does so successfully.

This sequence of arguments might be particularly instructive for another reason, as well. *De Caelo* is full of remarks that show Aristotle is aware of how creaky the foundations of many of his arguments are. Then why does he follow them through? What does he think that he has accomplished? My hope is that working through Aristotle’s arguments and trying to answer these questions may help us learn from Aristotle what it is to do metaphysics, and what purpose it serves. After working through the argument, I try to understand Aristotle’s sporadic expressions of uncertainty and epistemological humility in light of his general theory of scientific understanding. Aristotle’s argument is not meant to justify a questionable thesis. It is rather a way of revealing the ontological and methodological presuppositions of his physical science as a whole. When Aristotle draws attention to the uncertainty that infects our knowledge concerning the heavens, it is primarily to show us how much we do not know about them, not to challenge the main import of his conclusion. This conclusion itself is not immune to skeptical challenges, but such challenges, to be effective, would be directed towards the whole web of argument and presuppositions that Aristotle offers in regards to the celestial and terrestrial worlds. They would have little force for Aristotle, who would see little to be gained in dropping his accounts in the face of such a challenge.

**Francis Grabowski**, *Rogers State University*, [fgrabowski@rsu.edu](mailto:fgrabowski@rsu.edu) **McBrayer Panel** Sat  
4 Room 1:

“Suhrawardi’s Platonic Nominalism”

The philosophical conversion of Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi (1154–1191) is well attested. Once a student of Avicennian Peripateticism, Suhrawardi was enticed to Platonism through a series of mystical experiences and a philosophically-laced dream. Of his mystical experiences, little is known other than that they involved his alleged acquaintance with the Platonic Forms. About Suhrawardi’s dream, however, we can speak in more detail and with greater assurance. Its content Suhrawardi himself relates in a work entitled *The Intimations (Kitab al-talwihat)*. He tells us that long had he been preoccupied with the “problem of knowledge,” when one night, as he lay asleep, Aristotle appeared to him in a dream. Within no time, the two begin to discuss Suhrawardi’s philosophical struggles, to which Aristotle offers the advice: “Consult yourself, and it will be solved for you.” The upshot of Aristotle’s response, as their subsequent exchange makes clear, is that all knowledge is akin to knowledge of the self: that is to say, we come to know things with the same directness and immediacy that we come to know ourselves.

Suhrawardi uses the word “presence” (*hudur*) to describe this relationship – what philosophers today refer to as “knowledge by acquaintance.” But this prompts the intriguing question: of what nature are the objects of knowledge – what kinds of thing must they be – if we are to know them through acquaintance? This question becomes even more pressing if we consider that Suhrawardi was a Platonist who believed that, with the proper training, we could come to apprehend and know the Forms. For if the Forms were universals, then they presumably could not be entities known through acquaintance; and, if knowledge were strictly a matter of acquaintance, as Suhrawardi holds, then the Forms, being universals, would seemingly escape our detection.

It may seem as though Suhrawardi’s theory of “knowledge by presence” is at odds with his metaphysical Platonism, yet this is simply not the case: the two fit together quite naturally. Indeed, Plato himself formulates his theory of Forms in the light of epistemological considerations of his own: specifically, how knowledge is possible in a changing world. Following the recommendation of Aristotle, many contemporary philosophers contest that Plato resolves this problem by appealing to the Forms as mind-independent universals; however, this interpretation is mistaken. In point of fact, Plato conceives of the Forms not as abstract truths or universals, but rather as immaterial particulars; and this, it can be shown, is largely on account of his preference for the acquaintance model of knowledge. There is, consequently, nothing inconsistent with a Platonist favoring an epistemology that lays emphasis on knowledge by acquaintance, as long as he is prepared to follow Plato in conceiving the Forms to be particulars. Suhrawardi, as it so happens, does precisely this: adopt a nominalist position as regards the Forms. Thus, not only is Suhrawardi’s theory of “knowledge by presence” squarely in line with his metaphysical Platonism, but, as a “Platonic nominalist,” he is more closely aligned with Plato’s own conception of the Forms than are so many ancient and medieval “Platonists” undeserving of the name.

**Anna Greco**, *University of Guelph*, [agreco@uoguelph.ca](mailto:agreco@uoguelph.ca), Sat 11 Room 4:

“Natural Inclinations and the Normative Force of the Principle of Specialization in Plato’s *Republic*”

According to Plato’s Principle of Specialization, each person should do the job for which he is best naturally suited. Accordingly, many scholars attribute to Plato the conviction that people have fine-grained ‘natural inclinations’ that uniquely predispose them to given jobs. I propose instead a different interpretation of what it is for Plato to have a ‘natural inclination’ for a job. Once one has acquired a *techne* with high levels of proficiency in it, then that *techne* can be seen as one for which the individual has a natural aptitude. But this is because one’s natural general abilities and dispositions would then support and facilitate both the acquisition and the application of the *techne*, not because they would predispose the individual to that *techne* only. This understanding of ‘natural inclinations’ is totally consistent with the importance that Plato places on the proper education of the young, whether it will lead to guardianship or to any other occupation in the state.

Plato clearly distinguishes between the exercise of one’s profession (*techne* in the precise sense) and the use of the art of wage-earning (*misthotike techne*). I argue then that the Principle of Specialization applies to one’s profession independently of the concomitant application of the *misthotike techne*, and that its normative force is

minimally the obligation to abide by the standards of one's profession. At the same time, the Principle of Specialization applies only to *productive activities* geared to the satisfaction of social demands – and not to any activity one might find oneself 'naturally inclined'. A proper understanding of the normative force of the Principle of Specialization goes a long way to explaining the work ethics underpinning Plato's conception of social justice.

**James Griffith**, *DePaul University*, [jgriff20@depaul.edu](mailto:jgriff20@depaul.edu), Chair: Sat 9 Room 7; **Brill Panel**, Sat 11 Room 1:

“Obedient Judgment: The Relations between Sovereignty, Rationality, and Nature in Plato's *Laws*”

Certain defenses of the *Laws* emphasize the sovereignty of law and, thus, the importance of education and socialization as the primary means of developing reason to understand that law. In a colony ruled by rational law, education and socialization will allow citizens to judge rationally, thus guaranteeing that the law which rules over them will be rational. Yet insofar as the rule of reason in this colony and its citizens must be developed, the earliest stages of education must focus on being ruled, on obedience as such. Only by first obeying will a child develop the requisite rationality for judging the rule he or she obeys. Obedience in early education is thus of primary importance because it guarantees both the stability of the nature of the citizens across generations and the stability of the colony itself. But if the capacity to judge rationally is developed by means of obedience to rules that cannot yet be judged rationally, then what is the rational ground for the sovereignty of reason? This paper claims that this ground is obedience as such, which has no reason outside of itself and so cannot be rationally judged. Even if, as Plato would seem to suggest, such obedience is ultimately grounded in the *natural* rule of the wise over the ignorant or the old over the young, political sovereignty, I will argue in conclusion, must still be based on a fundamental obedience to this natural rule and not to the rule of reason.

**Edward J. Grippe**, *Norwalk Community College*, [EGrippe@ncc.commnet.edu](mailto:EGrippe@ncc.commnet.edu), Sun 9 Room 5:

“The Ironic Pythagorean Influence on Plato's Republic”

This paper will argue that in Plato's *Republic* Plato replicates the socio-political structure of the Pythagorean cult by promoting the tripartite division of Guardian, Auxiliary, and Commoner as a means to insure social justice. The paper's claim is that Plato did this replication consciously [following the example of the Pythagoreans in Croton] and ironically [well aware, as were all in Greater Greece] of the Pythagorean failure due to their tendencies for cloistering, hierarchical elitism, secrecy]. Hence, the *Republic's* message is, in part, a warning against this sort of political tyranny, and by implication a promotion of Socratic democracy.

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**Khalil M. Habib**, *Salve Regina University*, [khalil.habib@salve.edu](mailto:khalil.habib@salve.edu), **Beckett Panel**, Sat 9 Room 1: Chair, Discussant, and:

“Plato's *Theaetetus*”

In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates provides a famous digression that has puzzled many readers. One such puzzle is the odd depiction of the “philosopher” Socrates presents there. Is the “philosopher” in the digression Socrates himself? Some readers believe this is so. Building on the work of Sandra Peterson, I argue, that it is not. In many ways the philosopher in the digression differs from the Socrates we know from Plato, especially as he is depicted in the *Apology*, but also as Socrates conducts himself in the body of the *Theaetetus* itself. Like Peterson I see the philosopher in the digression as a depiction or characterization of Theodorus, a famous teacher of mathematics and an unwilling participant in dialectics who has repeatedly refused to be examined by Socrates. Theodorus’ unwillingness to provide and defend a self-justification of his activity forces Socrates to extract Theodorus’ soul for examination, in a way which Theodorus is oblivious, and in a way that enables Socrates, Theaetetus, and Theodorus to examine the claims to knowledge the latter assumes but cannot defend. Unlike, Peterson, however, I argue that this move not only allows us to question Theodorus, but it also reveals the fact that the path to Theodorus’ self-knowledge is blocked by his powerful attachment to his reputation as a teacher, to a love of his own, which is in conflict with self-knowledge. Hence, Socrates must present his examination of Theodorus’ soul by de-personalizing him, and therefore such a dramatic move offers us a window into Socratic self-knowledge, which requires one to overcome the attachment of one’s own. Unlike Peterson I shall also argue, moreover, that the philosopher Socrates depicts in the digression also recapitulates Aristophanes’ version of him in the *Clouds*, and therefore presents a Platonic response to the very charges that led to Socrates trial. I conclude that Aristophanes’ critique of Socrates fits the pre-Socratic Socrates, but not the Platonic one. The digression therefore contains Plato’s critique of both the mathematical soul and the pre-Socratic life rejected by Aristophanes in the name of the supremacy of poetry over philosophy.

Chair: Sat 11 Room 3

**John Hendrix**, *The University of Lincoln, UK*, [jhendrix@rwu.edu](mailto:jhendrix@rwu.edu), Sat 2 Room 6:  
“The Philosophy of Intellect of Robert Grosseteste”

Robert Grosseteste was appointed the first chancellor of Oxford University in 1221. He lectured in theology there from 1225 to 1230, and became the first reader to the Greyfriars in 1230. In 1235 he became the Bishop of Lincoln, which he remained until his death in 1253. Grosseteste’s first studies were probably at the cathedral school in Lincoln in the late 1180s, after which he was active at the cathedral school of Hereford in the 1190s, which was a center for Arabic learning at the time. In early treatises such as his *Hexaemeron* and *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*, written between 1228 and 1235, Grosseteste developed a philosophy of intellect, influenced by Greek and Arabic commentaries on Aristotle’s *De anima*, which contain Neoplatonic influences. In the *De anima* of Aristotle, Book III, a productive intellect is distinguished from a potential intellect. In the *De Anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias, the productive intellect is the active intellect (*nous poietikos*), and the potential intellect is the material intellect (*nous hylikos*). The material intellect is perfected as intellection (*intellectus in habitu*) in discursive reason (*dianoia*), which Grosseteste follows. In the *Liber Naturalis* of Avicenna (Ibn Sina), sensory thought, *virtus cogitativa*, is illuminated by the active intellect. In the *Long Commentary on the De anima* of Averroes (Ibn Rushd), active



intellect is compared to light as entelechy. In the *Liber de Causis*, thought to be a work of Aristotle, active intellect is seen as eternal. In the principal source of the *Liber de Causis*, the *Elements of Theology* of Proclus, active intellect is “unparticipated intelligence,” which informs participated intelligence, potential intellect, in a process of irradiation. For Grosseteste, the cosmic, active intellect, makes forms intelligible to the human, potential intellect, in the *virtus intellectiva (nous)* and the *intellectus in habitu (dianoia)*.

In the *Commentary* of Grosseteste, as light emanates from the sun, intelligibles are illuminated in the mind (*oculus interior*). The *intellectus* in mind abstracts universal ideas from the particulars of sense to form principles, but *intelligentia* functions without a corporeal agent. *Species sensibilis* is apprehended without matter; *species apprehensibilis* creates a likeness in understanding, as in Plotinus’ *Enneads* V.3.2. This is also described in the *Hexaemeron*. The same process is described in the *Theology of Aristotle*, a paraphrase of the *Enneads*. *Ratio* is seen by Grosseteste in the *Commentary* as a mirror reflecting the *virtus intellectiva*, as in *Enneads* I.1.8 and I.4.10. In the *Shifa: De anima* of Avicenna, intelligibles are differentiated in the compositive imaginative faculty, as in *Enneads* IV.3.29 and IV.3.30. In the *al-Madina al-Fadila* of Alfarabi, active intellect is compared to the sun, and light imprints *species* in the material intellect. Active intellect transforms sense perceptions into principles, which are the first intelligible thoughts, as in *Enneads* I.3.5. For Grosseteste, light (*lux*) is the first corporeal form, and the cause of all becoming of natural things. Through *lux*, the mind is able to know the *principia essendi*, the intelligibles, as for Plotinus. As illuminated, the *principia essendi* become the *principia conosciendi*, the principles upon which reason is based. In the *Hexaemeron*, light is the instrument by which the form or species apprehended by the particular sense, the *species sensibilis*, corresponds to the form apprehended in the common sense, *sensus communis*, as *species apprehensibilis*. Imagination is the process of making that correspondence.

**Alf Hildebeitel**, *George Washington University*, [beitel@gwu.edu](mailto:beitel@gwu.edu), Chair, Sun 9 Room 8

**Beverly Hinton**, *West Virginia University*, [WHELENTZ@aol.com](mailto:WHELENTZ@aol.com) Sat 11 Room 6:  
“Chance and Spontaneity in Aristotle II”

Aristotle sets out four criteria for identifying chance and spontaneous events in the second book of the *Physics*, and these are (a) that spontaneous events occur within the realm of the for the sake of which, (b) that spontaneous events are associated with accidental causes, (c) that spontaneous events are irregular, and (d) that spontaneous events are indefinite. In Part I of this work, which was presented at SAGP’S meeting at the Eastern Division of the APA, I addressed the first two criteria. With regard to the first criterion I argued that chance and spontaneous events should be understood as goal-directed processes which achieve something other than their primary goal. The accidental element of a spontaneous event is then referenced to the fact that a concomitant feature of a substance is realized upon coincidence with an external cause, and to the fact that this feature is not irrelevant to the nature of substance but is indeed explained by that nature. As non-teleological products of teleological causes, the spontaneous events are ultimately given explanations in terms of the natures of complex substances. By retaining the concept of teleological causes in the explanation of chance events Aristotle avoids Empedoclean reduction.



In Part II of this paper, presented here, I show that the features of (c) irregularity and (d) indefiniteness that Aristotle attributes to spontaneous events are also best explained by invoking the concomitant features of a teleological cause. I argue that in introducing criteria (c) and (d) for spontaneous events, Aristotle is simply drawing out the implications of the model set up by his first two criteria. I also argue that in the latter parts of the second book of the *Physics*, Aristotle shows how simple necessity conceived of as operating without teleological guidance in the coming-to-be of complex substances fits his model of spontaneity. As such, he begs no questions in assimilating necessity to spontaneity, and so begs no questions in his argument against the sufficiency of simple necessity to explain the coming-to-be of complex substances.

**Hyun Höchsmann**, *New Jersey City University*, [hhochsmann@njcu.edu](mailto:hhochsmann@njcu.edu), **Panel Organizer** Sat 9 Room 2:

“The Universe within the Mind: the Idealism of Wang Yang Ming”

*The mind of man constitutes heaven in all its profundity within which there is nothing not included.*

With a declaration that “There is nothing under heaven external to the mind”, Wang Yang Ming (1472-1529) launches the theory of knowledge which led to the culmination of the Idealist School (also known as the “Mind School”) of Neo-Confucian philosophy. In Wang’s view things are not external to the mind. Things “cease to exist” if I stop thinking about them in my mind.

Wang recognizes the oddity of the claim that all things are inside the mind. A friend points at the flowers and trees on a cliff and asks, “You say there is nothing under heaven external to the mind. What relation do these high mountain flowers and trees, which blossom and drop of themselves, have to my mind?” Wang replies, “When you do not see these flowers, they and your mind are both in the state of calm. But when you look at them, their color at once becomes clear. From this fact you know that these flowers are not external to your mind.”

In what sense can it be true that the universe is in the mind? From the point of view of metaphysics, the ultimate structure of reality is reflected in the mind. From the point of view of common sense, when we can grasp the qualities of the objects and hold them in our mind, the mind can be said to contain the universe.

From the point of view of science the undifferentiated manifold of phenomena is clearly discernable only with the individuation of things by the active rational mind. Distinct forms, colors, and relations are only perceived when we bring the concepts and the categories of understanding to perceive them vividly. The concepts and the categories are not part of the external physical world but features of the mind. The universe is in the mind in the sense that the knowledge of the universe is in the mind.

The temptation to draw a parallel between Wang’s idealism and Kant’s transcendental idealism is almost irresistible. Wang’s idealism is different from the subjective idealism of Fichte in which the individual subject constitutes the basis of reality and all certainty. In Wang’s idealism, the mind that contains the universe within is not the individual mind of a “small man” but the universal mind of the sage.

The culmination of the Idealist School in Wang Yang Ming’s philosophy led to the full identification of the mind with reason. Wang asks “Is there any event or any reason in the universe which exists independent of the mind?” He asserts, “The mind

itself is identical with reason.” Wang’s idealism combines the empirical idealism of Berkeley and the rational idealism of Hegel.

Sat 2 Room 5:

“The Creation of the Kosmos in the *Timaeus*: Logos and Mythos”

*We still do not know one thousandth of one percent of what nature has revealed to us.*

*Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a judge of truth and knowledge is shipwrecked by the laughter of the gods.*

These remarks about the difficulty of knowing the nature of the universe have come down to us not from a Greek philosopher but from Einstein. They echo Plato’s remarks on the origin and the nature of the *kosmos* in the *Timaeus*: all that can be related about the *kosmos* is only a resemblance. Timaeus’ narration is “*eikos logos*”, a probable explanation and “*eikos mythos*”, a probable story, an “image” (*eikôn*) of the eternal model. But Timaeus also announces that there is only one and not multiple or infinite *kosmos*.

Is there a contradiction between presenting the account of *kosmos* as only a likeness and the claim that what has been presented is the only possible *kosmos*? The assertion that Timaeus’ narration is only a verisimilitude invites alternative and conflicting narrations regarding the universe – a plurality of narratives. The conviction that what has been described is the only actual universe claims the uniqueness and singularity of the *kosmos*. Is there not a tension between these two claims?

If Timaeus’ narration is only a probable description, how can he be certain that it is a description of the only *kosmos*? It will not do to argue that the first assertion is an *epistemological* caution about the uncertainty of knowledge regarding the universe and the claim that only *kosmos* can exist is an *ontological* claim about the uniqueness of *kosmos*. It will not do to argue that the descriptions are many but there is only one thing described, for the only way we can speculate about the *kosmos* is through descriptions. Any claim about ontology is an epistemological claim.

The answer is forthcoming in Socrates’ exhortation to Timaeus to call upon the gods at the beginning of his narration and in an interpretive reading of the *Timaeus* as presenting a “unified theory” of *kosmos*. With the presentation of Timaeus’ narration as both “*eikos mythos*” and “*eikos logos*”, Plato brings *mythos* and *logos* together in his philosophical cosmology. Timaeus’ narration of the origin of the *kosmos* begins with a daring reconciliation of *mythos* and *logos*. In the unfolding complexities of the work of the *demiurgos*, Plato sets forth a unified theory of *kosmos* up to his time by reconciling the best of all Pre-Socratic cosmologies.

*Timaeus* purports to present a single unified system which explains the *whole* of *physis*. But where does the *Timaeus* stand today? In current discussions of particle physics and in the symmetry analysis in inorganic and physical chemistry Plato’s significant contributions in the *Timaeus* continue to be emphasized.

**Mark Holowchak**, Muhlenberg College, [mholowchak@hotmail.com](mailto:mholowchak@hotmail.com), Sat 11 Room 8:

“Misfortune as a Rite of Passage: Stoic Sagacity and the ‘Unfortunately Fortunate’ Sage”

In this paper, I address the following questions. Is misfortune a needed component of a virtuous life for a Stoic sage? If so, to what extent? I examine such questions first from a conceptual slant and then from one that is empirical. I draw chiefly from, and restrict my comments principally to, the works of Seneca and Epictetus.

**Noel Hubler**, *Lebanon Valley College*, [mnhubler@comcast.net](mailto:mnhubler@comcast.net) Sat 9 Room 6:  
“Identity and difference: Aristotle’s analogous notions of truth”

Famously, Tarski characterized Aristotle’s definition of truth as a correspondence between a sentence and reality, but Tarski misidentified Aristotle’s central notion of truth. Aristotle’s central notion of truth is identity and although Aristotle never explicitly says so, there are compelling textual and philosophical reasons to believe that Aristotle considered truth as an analogous notion. So 1) there is a core meaning of truth from which many other notions of truth are derived in various ways; and 2) the derived meanings are defined in relation to the core meaning. At its core, truth for Aristotle is the identity between an intellect and its immaterial object. From that identity Aristotle derives the formal identity that exists between the understanding and its objects and sensation and its objects. Also derived from the core identity is linguistic truth that is defined by the identity between what is said to exist and what actually exists. So at its core, Aristotle does not present a correspondence theory of truth, but an identity theory of truth that is articulated through various types of identity, analogously related.

**John Humphrey**, *North Carolina Ag & Tech*, [jfh47@yahoo.com](mailto:jfh47@yahoo.com) Sat 2 Room 3:  
“There is Good Hope that Death is a Blessing”

In Plato’s *Apology* (29a-b), Socrates argues that he does not fear death; indeed, to fear death is a sign of ignorance.<sup>7</sup> It is to claim to know what one does in fact not know. Perhaps, Socrates suggests, death is not a great evil, but “the greatest of all goods.” At the end of the dialogue, after the judges have voted on the final verdict and Socrates has received the death penalty, the philosopher considers two common views of death: that death is a long dreamless sleep and that death is a journey to another place. According to Socrates, either of these views of death would be acceptable to him. In this paper, I will examine Socrates’ view of death, and I will argue that, according to Socrates, there could be a third perspective on death that will not only make him truly immortal in a certain way, but will also immortalize the practice of Socratic philosophy. Hence, Socrates embraces his sentence because dying at the right time and dying in the right way provides him the possibility of “a good death.”

**Hugh Hunter**, *Oklahoma University*: See **Rusty Jones**

**Tim Hyde**, *SUNY Stony Brook*, [Timothy.hyde@stonybrook.edu](mailto:Timothy.hyde@stonybrook.edu) Sat 2 Room 4:  
“Dirigisme in the Kallipolis: The Economics of Plato’s *Republic*”

It has oft been remarked how central the so-called rule of specialization is for the argument of *The Republic*. What has not been discussed so often is the far-reaching implication of the rule of specialization for the relationship between the economic and political spheres. Each person is to perform his own tiny task, so small that he

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<sup>7</sup> Plato, *Apology* in: Plato and Aristophanes, *Four Texts on Socrates: Plato’s “Euthyphro,” “Apology,” and “Crito” and Aristophanes’ “Clouds.”* Translated, with notes, by Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986.

For to fear death, men, is fact nothing other than to seem to be wise, but not to be so. For it is to seem to know what one does not know: no one knows whether death does not even happen to be the greatest of all goods for the human being; but people fear it as though they knew well that it is the greatest of evils. And how is this not that reproachable ignorance of supposing that one knows what one does not know? But I, men, am perhaps distinguished from the many human beings also here in this, and if I were to say that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this: since I do not know sufficiently about the things in Hades, so also I suppose that I do not know (*Apology*, 29a-b).

presumably wouldn't need constant supervision. All economic interactions between these units—how much work, when, what rewards, and so forth—would be controlled by the auxiliaries on the basis of their philosophically controlled education. Under this scheme, the household has disappeared not only as a political unit but also as an economic unit. This is not to say that traders and producers would not live in houses. On a practical level, houses in the Kallipolis might seem very similar to many Athenian houses. Philosophically, however, each person would be a single economic unit tied to every other by a political relationship based on a mechanism that runs everything as is best for the whole.

**-I-**

**-J-**

**Amir Jabini**, *Rutgers U.*, [djabini@rci.rutgers.edu](mailto:djabini@rci.rutgers.edu), Sat 11 Room 9:  
“Ancient Philosophical Themes in Contemporary Media: Iran and China”  
*Abstract Pending*

**Rod Jenks & Alex Santana**, *University of Portland*, [jenks@up.edu](mailto:jenks@up.edu), [santana@up.edu](mailto:santana@up.edu),  
**Jenks Panel Sat 11 Room 2:**

“Unity and Diversity Among the Virtues in the *Protagoras*”

This paper examines the unity of virtue passages in the *Protagoras* and some of the leading views in the scholarship on this issue. After assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each scholarly view, we present our own view. We argue that Plato has a definite view in mind regarding the unity of virtue, but we maintain that our own logical categories, like biconditionality and identity, are inadequate to the task of explicating what that view is. We submit that Plato uses argument as well as imagery *to gesture towards* the view he wishes to propose. In the end, we suggest a new analogy that we think captures the unity and the diversity of the virtues.

**Russell E. (Rusty) Jones & Hugh Hunter**, *Oklahoma University*, [rustyjones@ou.edu](mailto:rustyjones@ou.edu),  
[hhunter@ou.edu](mailto:hhunter@ou.edu), Sun 9 Room 3:

“Plato’s Rhetorical Proof of the Immortality of the Soul”

Plato’s proof of the immortality of the soul (PPIS henceforward) in *Republic X* has met with near universal dismissal. Julia Annas, for example, writes that “this is one of the few really embarrassingly bad arguments in Plato”. We maintain that there is at least one route of charitable interpretation which has been left unexplored. PPIS is an argument from probability (*eikos*), a standard form in the Sophistic repertoire first used to come to a conclusion during a trial when evidence was in short supply. The *eikos* argument saw wider application to situations where certainty was difficult to achieve. *Eikos* arguments, though inductive, are certainly not fallacious.

PPIS neither has nor claims to have deductive certainty. However, if it is granted that there is a soul, PPIS gives us good reason to think that it is an immortal one. This essay thus falls into two sections. The first is historical, wherein we are concerned to define an *eikos* argument more precisely. The second is philosophical, and concerned to show that PPIS is a cogent argument.

Sun 11 Room 4:

“Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* 9”

According to the most traditional view of *De Interpretatione* 9, Aristotle denies the fatalist conclusion that the future is fixed by denying bivalence. The argument structure of the chapter is a reductio: Bivalence is assumed, and the absurd fatalist conclusion follows. Whitaker argues instead that Aristotle accepts bivalence, but rejects: [RCP] *Of every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false*. I argue that both of these interpretations are flawed, but that important insights from each should be preserved. I then offer a fresh interpretation of the chapter that shows that RCP is the refutand of the argument, and that Aristotle explains the failure of RCP with respect to future contingents by the failure of bivalence for future contingents. Unlike other interpretations, my interpretation is consistent with the text of chapter 9, with the larger context of *De Interpretatione*, and with central principles of Aristotelian philosophy.

**Lawrence Jost & Susan Prince**, *University of Cincinnati* [lawrence.jost@uc.edu](mailto:lawrence.jost@uc.edu) **Panel Organizer on David Sedley, *Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity***, Sat 4 Room 2:

“Just how Platonist is Aristotelian Teleology? Does Sedley overdo it?”

One possible, perhaps extreme, reaction to Aristotelian teleology as Sedley sees it, would be to accept his account of global or cosmic teleology as the *right interpretation* of Aristotle’s texts but to urge that it represents another – comparable to the extreme “intellectualism” of *NE* X.7-8 - veritable “Platonic lapse”, a reversion to his teacher’s view when his own natural investigations seem to lead elsewhere. This charge could be mounted in light of Sedley’s view of global teleology as based on “a theologically motivated decision to insulate god” from any need to intervene, either as creator or administrator. If this is correct, however, why not just chuck the whole framework, especially if we agree with Sedley that “Aristotle is no creationist” (p. 204)? Drawing on *Metaphysics* Lambda and many other passages in the physical and biological works, Sedley seeks to show that nature as a whole aims at what is best, a clearly optimizing view of cosmic teleology but without an optimizer. Rejecting any moving cause for this order such as Plato’s Demiurge provides, and, with it, any conscious purpose Sedley seeks to retain the world’s goodness – assumed by Plato as the goal of creation – entirely in terms of final causality and a “cosmic teleology over [and above?] that of individual natural processes” (p. 196). By considering recent critics of global or cosmic teleology such as Monte Johnson and Lindsay Judson, I would like to try to show that Sedley goes too far in his attempt to assimilate Aristotelian teleology to his Platonic antecedent, that an immanent and not transcendent teleology is all we need to make sense of Aristotle’s cosmic teleology. In other words, rather than a Platonic lapse in this area, Aristotle does succeed in breaking away from his teacher on a crucial matter with theological implications.

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**Shalahudin Kafrawi**, *Hobart & William Smith Colleges*, [skafrawi@gmail.com](mailto:skafrawi@gmail.com), Chair:  
Sat 9 Room 4: Sat 11 Room 9:



“Razi on the Necessary Existent” *Abstract TBA*

**Errol Katayama**, *Ohio Northern University*, [e-katayama@onu.edu](mailto:e-katayama@onu.edu), Sat 4 Room 2:

“David Sedley and Aristotle’s Craft Analogy” **Prince-Jost panel**

In his book *Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity*, David Sedley defends the view that Aristotle rejected the natural world as the product of divine craftsmanship (*pace* Plato) but retained the craft-analogy to explain the workings of nature; that is, by appealing to the underlying isomorphism between the causal structures of craft and nature, Aristotle preserved teleology while abandoning creationism. In this paper, I shall explore two issues that Sedley raises in the course of his analysis of Aristotle’s craft analogy: 1) his claim that Aristotle uses craft example to “demarcate” the four causes; and 2) his interpretation of Aristotle’s “dark remark” on *Physics*: “craft does not deliberate” (II 8, 199b28). I shall argue that Sedley overestimates the use that Aristotle makes of craft example and I shall offer an alternative and more obvious interpretation of the “dark remark”.

**Brian Keady**, *University of Denver and Iliff School of Theology*, [bkeady@du.edu](mailto:bkeady@du.edu), Chair:

Sat 9 Room 5; Sat 11 Room 5:

“Moral Conduct and the Dialectical Method of the *Philebus*”

In recent years, scholars have given increased attention to Plato’s conception of “becoming like God” (*homoiôsis theôi*) and the role it plays in his moral philosophy and metaphysics. Accompanying this development has been a growth of interest in the *Philebus* and recognition of the dialogue’s importance in elucidating key features of Godlikeness. This paper continues in this direction by offering an analysis of the relationship between *homoiôsis theôi* and the dialectical method of the *Philebus*.

The *Philebus* sets a very high bar for full-fledged knowledge and proper use of the ‘divine method.’ In addition to knowing the unitary and unlimited nature of a given monad, the dialectician must also know the exact number and nature of the intermediates subsumed under it. These intermediates will, of course, often have their own set of intermediates, which, in turn, must themselves be understood according to the same rigorous criteria. The task is a daunting one, and the method’s full scope is made clear by Socrates’ specification that the primary concern of dialecticians is with eternal realities (59a-d, 61e). The divine method is not only a tool for acquiring a systematic understanding of the arts and sciences; it is also a means for developing a deeper awareness of Forms.

Aspiring dialecticians, however, will not get far if their search for truth remains entirely in the abstract. Use of the method requires movement from the unlimited number of a form’s instantiations, to its determinate plurality, and then to its unity, and *vice versa* (18a). Understanding a form’s relation to the *apeiron* is, then, both a crucial first and last step of the process. To initiate the dialectical ascent with any firm grounding, one must strive to discern the divine insofar as it is instantiated *within* the objects and relationships of the natural world. Like the true rhetorician of the *Phaedrus*, who knows the nature and number of the different kinds of soul, matches them correctly with the people he meets, and delivers the appropriate kinds of speech to each (271e-272b), the dialectician of the *Philebus* must also be able to map his understanding of various unities and their intermediates onto the sensible world and shape his actions accordingly. An essential



aspect of becoming like God thus involves using *nous* to arrive at mixtures within oneself and in the world that are most reflective of Forms.

**Achim Koeddermann**, *SUNY Oneonta*, [koeddea@oneonta.edu](mailto:koeddea@oneonta.edu), Sat 11 Room 9:  
“Ethical Dimensions of Law: Islamic and Western Traditions”  
*Abstract Pending*

**Emilie Kutash**, *Boston University*, [eeekut@optonline.net](mailto:eeekut@optonline.net) Sun 9 Room 8:  
“The Tragic Age of the Greeks and Reiner Schürmann’s Tragic Differing”

Nietzsche in *Philosophy and the Tragic Age of the Greeks* said that the philosopher’s gift “is the rarest gift of all” for he stands “on the wide spread pinions of all time.” Reiner Schürmann stood on those wide spread pinions in his philosophical scope. From the Parmenides’ poem to Meister Eckhart, from the Greeks to Nietzsche and Heidegger, he knew best the philosophers who were ‘pathbreakers.’ Path breaking, he claimed, implies a view of temporality wherein radical futurity and tactical events can break though any time the will to make (*poiein*) asserts it’s power. Schurmann made us appreciate the radical otherness of the Greek beginning and the willful nature of philosophical assertion... and thus the drama of the origins of all philosophical beginnings. He saw all true philosophy as an-archic; thus, he saw the diversity within philosophy and its historical periods as both related to and opposed to fundamental ontology. Each period was for him a different species of epochal doxic positing which posits a ruling *arche* good only for a limited time or epoch: the tragedy of being in time. Reiner Schürmann had a panoptic gaze upon historical epochs as well. He could also see the history of philosophy much as Parmenides saw the timeless present: an eternal Now that at the same time preserves singularity. The Greek word “*syn-echia*,” holding together was a word Reiner Schürmann was fond of... The divine gaze holds together singulars without universalizing them. Schurmann saw Parmenides and Nietzsche as singularizers, pathbreakers, claiming in *Tragic Differing* that “[t]he law of the One... understood as the law of contraries, as their *synechia*, neither consoles nor consolidates...” The otherness of the Greek beginning was for Schürmann an event but an event in the compass of a “*Tragic Differing*.”

-L-

**Anna Lännström**, *Stonehill College*, [anna\\_lannstrom@yahoo.com](mailto:anna_lannstrom@yahoo.com), Sat 9 Room 5:  
“Socrates, the philosopher in the *Theaetetus* digression (172c-177c), and the ideal of *homoiôsis theô*”

In the digression in the *Theaetetus* (172a1-177c4), Socrates introduces the *homoiôsis theôi* ideal and describes a philosopher who is very different from himself. While Socrates is fascinated by his city, the philosopher stays ignorant of it and immerses himself fully in thought. Given that it would seem odd for Socrates to deeply value that which his ideal philosopher disdains, scholars have asked what Socrates’ attitude really is towards particulars and towards the philosopher in the digression. Does he think an interest in particulars is desirable? Is the point of his exhortation to be godlike that we should withdraw from the world? Scholars disagree. On the traditional view, Socrates believes that an interest in particulars is detrimental to the philosophical life and that

flight is the only appropriate response. And then, the philosopher of the digression is well suited to be Socrates' ideal. More recently, some scholars have rejected this view, instead arguing that Socrates believes that in order to be a good philosopher, it is necessary to pay attention to particulars, and that flight from the city is wrong. On this view, the *homoiôsis theôi* passage must be reinterpreted, and the philosopher must be a caricature rather than Socrates' ideal (or, despite appearances, he must not really be withdrawn from the city). This paper will argue for a third view: Socrates believes that interest in particulars makes the person neither better nor worse as a philosopher, provided that his interest does not prevent him from studying being and what really is. Indeed, Socrates' mission as a teacher makes it necessary for him to attend to particulars.

**Susan Levin, Smith**, [slevin@sophia.smith.edu](mailto:slevin@sophia.smith.edu), Chair: Sat 4 Room 6; **Panel Organizer, Levin Panel**, Sun 9 Room 1:

“Eryximachus' Tale: The *Symposium*'s Role in Plato's Critique of Medicine”

In this paper I maintain that the *Symposium*, above all Eryximachus' *logos* therein, plays a crucial transitional role in Plato's engagement with medical practice between the *Gorgias*, which valorizes medicine as a *technê* by comparison with rhetoric and cookery, and the *Republic*, where—as I argue elsewhere (Levin 2007)—Plato is committed by implication to a retraction of that status. In the dialogues, Plato combats the claims to governing authority in the domain of nature and flourishing by rhetoric/sophistry, poetry, Presocratic natural philosophy, and medicine. Plato demotes the first two to the rank of *empeiria*, and, while not proffering his critique via the framework of *technê*, he castigates the so-called *archai* of his predecessors as mere necessary conditions in the *Phaedo*. Among the members of the aforementioned group, the case of medicine is unique insofar as 1) Plato valorizes it initially in a pointed manner; and 2) having lauded medicine as a *technê* in the *Gorgias*, such later criticisms as Plato offers do not contain an express demotion of it from that rank. In my view, this difference regarding overtness centrally involves the fact that Plato's conception of the soul-body tie lies at the crux of his critique of medicine in a distinctive matter—about the nature of whose link, however, despite his general move toward interwovenness, he retains ambivalence. Nonetheless, such a demotion—which is required by the path taken by Plato's ongoing reflections on the nature of philosophy—does in fact occur.

Commentators have typically treated Eryximachus' *logos* as Plato's parody, or caricature, of the self-important physician that precedes speeches that are far more salient from his philosophical standpoint. This dismissal represents a great oversimplification and undervaluing of the salience of his *logos*. Despite Edelstein's challenge thereto in 1945, constructions of the speech as a parody have endured (e.g., Nehamas and Woodruff 1989; Dover 1980). While this remains the dominant view, several recent scholars have contested it (e.g., McPherran 2006, Hunter 2004).

Though this stance is salutary as a corrective to earlier dismissals, I believe that it goes too far in its depictions of the merit and cogency of Eryximachus' presentation. I argue here that, like the author of the Hippocratic treatise *Ancient Medicine*, Eryximachus lauds medicine as the preeminent *technê*, one whose overarching vision of reality permits its practitioners to ascertain—though not as such to implement—the good in all particular arenas. In this way, it rivals directly philosophy as presented in the *Republic*. In the *Symposium*, Plato indicates why, most fundamentally, medicine—though remaining a

*technê* at this juncture—cannot lie at the apex of the hierarchy in question. Among the factors addressed in this paper as especially significant in this regard are Eryximachus’ deployment of *mousikê*—his discussion of which surpasses that of medicine in length—to support his general thesis, crucially including his semi-polemical engagement therein with Heraclitus. Also considered is Eryximachus’ handling of virtue, specifically, self-control and justice, along with what is from Plato’s standpoint his deeply flawed construction of the tie between desire and self-indulgence (*akolasia*). I will indicate, in conclusion, how Plato’s rejection here of medicine’s rank as the *technê* par excellence sets the stage effectively for his wholesale withdrawal of that designation in the *Republic*.

**Donald Lindenmuth**, *Penn State*, [dcl1@psu.edu](mailto:dcl1@psu.edu), Chair: Sat 2 Room 8; Sat 4 Room 6: “Phaedrus’ Speech on Eros and Human Fulfillment”

Phaedrus’ speech in Plato’s *Symposium* has been almost universally condemned as a contradictory, confused and trite account of eros that is only accorded merit for introducing themes that are handled better by other speakers. This characterization has led to this speech never being subject to a careful and adequate analysis. I propose two aims in this paper. My provisional aim is to show that the speech is not only free of contradictions almost throughout but also a clever piece of deconstructive analysis of the poetic and political traditions of his time. My ultimate aim is to present Phaedrus’ alternate way of viewing human interactions and the human types that characterize those interactions and to show how they are meant to redefine human and political excellence. In order to be effective in this endeavor Phaedrus must use standard tropes even as he distorts their meaning in terms of his understanding of eros and how to control it.

This paper involves three parts. First, I present his account of the cosmos that reduces it to levels of pretended stability. This is the Phaedrean understanding of knowledge as perception resting on an ontological condition of eternal becoming. The importance of this is to highlight the human way through art, especially the art of rhetoric, to secure a safe blessed isle in the midst of a sea of instability. Secondly, I present his understanding of the lover-beloved dynamic that seems to favor the lover while actually favoring the beloved and I explain the rhetorical rationale for this approach. Thirdly, I show how myth and poetic language are being employed by Phaedrus to focus on the private individual over that of the public.

Phaedrus’ account of eros is basically individualistic, hedonistic and techno-manipulable. The primary examples he provides of Alcestis, Orpheus and Achilles *inter alios* are meant to reveal various types of human attitudes that function with, run counter to and most effectively use eros. The issues that Phaedrus raises deal with the limits of human potential and interactivity from an erotic perspective as well as how one can successfully turn fragile humanity into a source of temporal and eternal good for oneself.

His speech is meant to portray both the power of the human to be surpassed by eros as well as the benefits that accrue to those who choose to operate free of eros: the beloved of his speech as distinct from that of the lover. The beloved is the free human, who freely chooses for himself his goals, especially including that of sempiternal fame. The effect of eros on the lovers is transmitted through the power of poetry, which for Phaedrus is a form of rhetoric. The best poet is the one who praises the beloved and transforms the power of eros into speech. As the “father of the speech” Phaedrus is the arbiter of

successful erotic discourse, the paradigm of which he offers the symposiasts in and by his speech as to what an encomium of eros must be.

**Yihong Liu**, *Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing*, Sat 11 Room 9:  
“Salient Philosophical Themes in Islamic Chinese Traditions”  
*Abstract Pending*

**Thornton Lockwood**, *Boston University*, [tlock@bu.edu](mailto:tlock@bu.edu), Sat 11 Room 7:  
“The Values of Friendship and Contemplation”

Aristotle famously notes in his *Nicomachean Ethics* that although a characteristic of the human good is “self-sufficiency” (*autarkes*), we do not consider what is self-sufficient only for a solitary person, but what suffices for one’s parents, children, spouse, and more generally those to whom one is dear (*EN* I.7.1097b8-10). In *Ethics* IX.9 Aristotle goes further and concludes that friendship—more specifically, the friendship of two virtuous individuals—is necessary for happiness. Thus, one is surprised to read in *EN* X.8 that “The self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) we spoke of will be a feature of the contemplative life most of all...the wise person will be able to engage in contemplation (*theôrein*) even when by himself, and the more so, the more wise he is. Perhaps (*isôs*) he will do it better if he has fellow-workers (*sunergous*), but nonetheless he will be most self-sufficient” (1177a27-77b1). At first glance, the claim that friendship is necessary for happiness seems at odds with Aristotle’s account of the self-sufficiency of the contemplative life.

Following Gabriel Richardson Lear’s *Happy Lives and the Highest Good* (Princeton, 2004), I argue that Aristotle endorses a monistic interpretation of the highest good according to which goods such as virtuous activity, practical reasoning, and pleasure are chosen for their own sake and insofar as they “approximate” the highest good of contemplation. Richardson Lear’s book only applied her model of “teleological approximation” to the goods of virtuous activity and practical reasoning; in my paper, I extend her analysis to the good of friendship (more specifically, the good of virtue friendship) and show that the activity of friendship approximates the activity of contemplation. Such a monistic interpretation not only provides insight into the relationship of other goods to the highest good in Aristotle’s *Ethics*; it also can account for the apparent tension of Aristotle’s remarks about friendship in a fashion superior to those of inclusivist interpretations of Aristotle’s highest good.

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**William Magee**, *Dharma Drum Buddhist College, Taiwan*, no email **Friquegnon Panel 2**, Sat 2 Room 9:

“Does Candrakīrti Assert ‘Non-Dependence on Another’ to be the Object to be Negated in the View of Emptiness?”

In Indian and Tibetan presentations of Mādhyamika, it is considered that innate ignorance superimposes a certain look and feel onto reality that reality does not actually have. This imaginary look and feel is called the object to be negated (*dgag bya*, *pratiśedyā*) and in the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika school it is also referred to as inherent existence or own-being (*rang bzhin*, *svabhāva*). This paper looks at the precise

identifications of the object to be negated according to Candrakīrti—who asserts it to be “non-dependence on another”—and Dzong-ka-ba—who defines it as “establishment by way of own entity”—to examine Dzong-ka-ba’s claim that the two identifications are the same. Also discussed are six separate usages of the term “dependence” in Dzong-ka-ba’s Geluk system.

This paper is based in part on my translation of a portion of Nga-wang-bel-den’s *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets,”* addressing these issues.

**Tim Mahoney**, *Providence College*, [tmahoney@providence.edu](mailto:tmahoney@providence.edu), Sat 11 Room 5:  
“Why No Assimilation to God in the *Philebus*?”

In the famous digression of the *Theaetetus* (as well as some other dialogues) assimilation to god appears to be the key to happiness: to become happy humans should assimilate themselves to god as much as possible. The statement of the *Theaetetus* is important for an understanding of Plato’s ethics (as I have argued in print). But the doctrine of assimilation to god is absent from the *Philebus* even though the *Philebus* is, in the words of Robin Waterfield, “unique in being Plato’s most deliberate attempt to describe the ‘good life.’”<sup>8</sup> How could the doctrine be absent where the notion of the good life is center stage, unless the doctrine is not really that important to Plato? That’s a fair question, and the first aim of this paper is to provide an answer. In addition, one could argue that the *Philebus* actually *undermines* the assimilation to god doctrine because the dialogue highlights differences between gods and humans, differences that make the divine model inappropriate for humans striving for happiness. This would be another reason that the doctrine is not explicitly affirmed in the dialogue. The second aim of the paper is to counter this argument by showing that, when one takes into account both the similarities and the differences that Socrates draws between gods and humans, one can even better appreciate the validity of the assimilation to god doctrine.

**Roopen Majithia**, *Mount Allison University*, [rmajithia@mta.ca](mailto:rmajithia@mta.ca), Sat 4 Room 3:  
“On the Allegedly Excessive Moral Flexibility in Aristotle’s *Ethics*.”

The vaunted flexibility of Aristotle’s virtue ethics comes at too steep a price, or so some critics say; for on Aristotle’s view there seems to be no way in which to adjudicate disagreements in value that are bound to arise in the moral life of a community. There has been a tendency in modern times to think that the arbiter of such disagreements should be an impersonal rule, whereas it seems for Aristotle that the final authority on right action is the good person. But problems arise when two good people disagree on what is to be done, or, so goes the critique. Such proclivity for rules in moral matters on which this objection is based has been fruitfully traced to the influence of the physical sciences and their relentless quest for principles or laws that govern variegated natural phenomena. I will attempt to show that Aristotle thinks there is a place for principles and rules in the moral realm, even in a virtue-centric ethic. My argument is concerned to show that a purely character-based ethic neglects the external, social evaluation of actions important not only to Aristotle, but also to any ethical theory. On the other hand, a purely rule-

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<sup>8</sup> *Plato Philebus* (Hammondspoint, England: Penguin Books, 1982) tr. by Robin Waterfield, 7.



driven ethic is faced with the danger of neglecting internal considerations of motive central to the agent's own assessment of the moral worth of her action.

**Deepa Majumdar**, *Purdue North Central*: [dmajumda@pnc.edu](mailto:dmajumda@pnc.edu), Sat 9 Room 7:  
"The Apprehension of the One in Plotinus"

Plotinus (ca. 204–270 A.D.), the philosopher of Lycopolis, has been described as the "father of Western mysticism."<sup>9</sup> Pointing to the difference between Plato and Plotinus, Hadot uses mysticism to ascribe novelty to the Plotinian experience: "What is new about the Plotinian experience is that it is, first and foremost, mystical." Hadot contrasts further the "masculine tonality" of Platonic love – "it is uneasy, possessive, eager to act, and hungry for posterity" – with Plotinian love, which he claims has a "feminine tonality" because it is, "first and foremost" mystical.<sup>10</sup>

Plotinus uses a variety of terms to describe his First Principle. These include the One and the "Good" – a term coined by Plato in the *Republic*. Tracing back the theory of the One as Supreme Entity, before Moderatus to Eudorus (ca 25 B.C.), or even before him, Meijer notes that it was Plotinus who created and introduced the concept of the "Superone."<sup>11</sup> Even though the Plotinian One is *transcendentally* immanent, or "everywhere and nowhere," the *Enneads* abound in *epistrophic* exhortations to renounce this world (which is part of the "everywhere") and ascend to the One.

The One is "apprehended" not just by the implicit "self," which ascends *through* the hypostases, but independent of the self, also by the two lower hypostases, Intellect (*nous*) and the hypostasis soul (*psuchê*). There are, in effect, two somewhat indistinct trajectories of ascent – that of the self and those of the hypostases. The ascent of the self culminates in its lone stance before the One, when it is bereft of even Intellect and soul, its former bearers (VI.7(38).35).<sup>12</sup> Does the self reach higher than the hypostases and if so, what does this imply about the relationship between the self and the hypostases? How the ascent of the self *compare* with those of the two lower hypostases?

Plotinus conceives the order of the hypostases as a hierarchy in degrees of multiplicity and otherness. Given its lower multiplicity and lower interior otherness, Intellect is higher than the hypostasis soul. Embedded in this order is a corresponding order of dependence, with the hypostasis soul dependent on Intellect for its being and subsistence. Yet, in VI.7(38).34, its love of the One is so empowering that an intoxicated soul grows hypernoetic, when it breaks the strictures of the hierarchy of the hypostases and flings away even the intelligible shape that was once its prop. What impact does the scope of the ascent of the two lower hypostases have on the order of hypostatic dependence?

**Panel Organizer. *Cosmology and Environmentalism in the Ancient World*. Panel 1:**  
Sat 2 Room 2; **Panel 2:** Sun 9 Room 2.

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<sup>9</sup> J.M. Rist, *Plotinus. The Road to Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 213.

<sup>10</sup> P. Hadot, *Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision*, trans. M. Chase (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 54, 56.

<sup>11</sup> P.A. Meijer, *Plotinus on the Good or the One (Enneads VI,9): An Analytical Commentary* (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1992), 4, 9.

<sup>12</sup> G.J.P O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1973), 89. O'Daly observes that when Plotinus describes the *apokatastasis* of the individual soul in VI.7(38).34, what is transformed is neither *psuchê* nor *nous*.



The twentieth-century will perhaps be remembered best for the *enshrined* cause. For many, the political cause replaced religion. Relatively innocuous amidst the super-phenomena (scientific progress, mechanized wars, etc.) of this era, the cause became an icon, a harbinger of social justice – why, a demigod! Yet it paved the way also for the diffusive multiplicity of ideology. The cause of environmentalism is no exception. Environmental creeds can range from the materialist holism of Leopold’s *Land Ethics* to virtue ethics, each with its own definitions of nature and the universe.

An inquiry into its theological underpinnings is one way to rescue environmentalism from the travails of ideology. Is nature identical with the universe, are they different, and does this matter? Are Creator and creature separated by substance? Is the Creator wholly transcendent or is it transcendent *and* immanent? Is monistic pantheism a better model? Given the Platonic divide between the realm of real beings and that of becoming, what bearing (if any) does ontological status have on environmental status? Does well-being gain salvific potential when it transcends the “biologism” inherent in theories of “intrinsic worth”? Queries like these anchor environmentalism to a metaphysics beyond politics. They confer a holism otherwise impossible.

In this panel we explore doctrines from the ancient world (theological cosmologies, cosmic religiosity, divine providence, cosmic sympathy, etc.) to see how these impinge upon contemporary concerns in environmentalism.

**Anne J. Mamary**, *Monmouth College*, [ANNEM@monm.edu](mailto:ANNEM@monm.edu), Sat 4 Room 7:  
“Plato’s *Ion*: A *Hymnos* to the Whole”

The occasion for Plato’s *Ion* is the Panathenaia in honor of Athena, titular goddess of Athens and goddess of weaving. The rhapsode, Ion, who has just come to Athens after competing at the festival of Asclepius, god of healing, in Epidaurus, will compete under the category of *mousike*, sacred to Apollo. The immediate topic of Plato’s *Ion* is whether or not there is an art (*techne*) of rhapsody. Invoking Athena, Apollo, and Asclepius without mentioning their names, Socrates pushes the dialogue in the direction of the fabric of society, the tuning of the self, and the healing of both. When Ion is unable to give an account of his *techne* to Socrates’ satisfaction, the dialogue’s discussion shifts to the topic of inspiration, or, better, divine gift or lot (*theia moira*), which Ion seems not to have, although he’ll claim it for the sake of his reputation.

With Athena, Apollo, and Asclepius always present, always invoked, Plato offers a *hymnos* to all of his work, to his Socrates’ life as weaver, builder, and healer of souls and cities. Socrates’ questions to Ion suggest a restringing of the cultural loom, in which human-divine partnership—a kind of *daimonic mania*--replaces human *agon* as the driving force. The *Ion* might be seen as the *hymnos* to Plato’s collected works, in which Socrates acts as rhapsode (we might better say as a revolutionary rhapsode or ancient singer), as weaver of cultural fabric, tuner of souls and healer of both, authorized not by the state, the Homeridai, or even Plato but by (a reconceptualized) Athena, Apollo, and Asclepius and their interactions with mortals, who both recognize the limits of human wisdom and have the audacity to push beyond those limits.

**Siobhan Nash-Marshall**, Mary T. Clark Chair in Christian Philosophy, *Manhattanville College*, [sfnml@yahoo.com](mailto:sfnml@yahoo.com).

**PLENARY SPEAKER, Friday Evening**

“Are Essences Existing Things? A Boethian Response”

**Gregory A. McBrayer**, *Gettysburg College*, [gmcbrayer@gvpt.umd.edu](mailto:gmcbrayer@gvpt.umd.edu) **Wiener Panel**,  
Sat 2 Room 1:

“The Primacy of the Good and the Unity of the Soul: A Critical Account of Socrates’  
Tripartite Division of the Soul”

*Abstract Pending*

**Panel Organizer: Greek Roots of Islamic Philosophy**, Sat 4 Room 1:

“Practical Wisdom, Cosmology, and Political Rule: An Interpretation of Plato’s  
*Epinomis*”

The answer to the political problem for Plato is the bringing together of wisdom and political power. Yet turning to the *Republic*, where one would expect to find an examination of the wisdom necessary for ruling, leaves one dissatisfied because it is so insufficiently practical. Wisdom must be qualified, supplemented, or replaced by practical wisdom or prudence. When trying to understand prudence, we are led, then, from the *Republic* through the *Laws* to Plato’s *Epinomis*, because this dialogue takes as its explicit aim the understanding of practical wisdom or prudence. Yet the *Epinomis* is a most curious dialogue, as it contains a lengthy account of what might properly be called cosmology. This paper takes as its aim trying to understand Plato’s account of prudence as it is discussed in the *Epinomis* and its inseparability from his understanding of the cosmos.

**Marina McCoy**, *Boston College*, [mccoyma@bc.edu](mailto:mccoyma@bc.edu) Sun 9 Room 6:

“Vulnerability and the Myth of Judgment in Plato’s *Gorgias*”

The paper will be about how the final myth in the *Gorgias* centers on the notion of vulnerability, or literally woundedness. I argue that the myth is intended as an answer to Callias’ argument that the unjust are stronger; Socrates argues that they are weaker. The image of wounds on the soul of the unjust man builds upon the previous images Socrates uses such as a “leaky jar” and relies on the use of moral imagination as part of Socrates’ argumentation.

**Thomas McEvilley**, *Rice University*, [mcevilley@mindspring.com](mailto:mcevilley@mindspring.com), **Giannetti Panel**, Sun  
11 Room 1:

“The Shape of Ancient Philosophy”

Discussion of my book, *The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies*, Allworth Press, 2002. I shall present a general introduction to the book and describe the circumstances that led me into it. In so doing I will review the contents of the book and its conclusions briefly, but in particular I will focus on the analysis of the development of the theory of reincarnation – East and West, the relationship between the argumentation of Sextus Empiricus and Nagarjuna, and other comparative figures in the histories of ancient philosophy.

**Catherine McKeen**, *Clark*, [cam3@williams.edu](mailto:cam3@williams.edu), **Levin Panel**, Sun 9 Room 1:

“An Ambiguity in the *Republic*’s Principle of Specialization”

The Principle of Specialization is the main organizing principle of the *kallipolis* explicated in Plato’s *Republic*. In addition, Plato regards the Principle of Specialization

(PS) as intimately related to civic justice. In Book IV, for instance, Plato has Socrates claim that each citizen's "doing his own" is precisely what civic justice consists in (433b).

However, other discussion in the *Republic* reveals that PS is ambiguous between two possible interpretations. The main statement of the PS has it that individuals should do the jobs for which they are best naturally suited (370a, 374b, 433a, 433d). But "best naturally suited" can be understood in at least two ways. On one understanding of PS, individuals should specialize in the jobs for which they are best qualified relative to all jobs. That is, whatever job an individual is best suited for, relative to other jobs, is the job the individual should train for and pursue in the *kallipolis*. On another understanding of PS, individuals should specialize in the jobs for which they are best qualified relative to other citizens. That is, those individuals who are best suited for a particular job, relative to all other citizens, are those who should train for and pursue that job. (I hold that the ambiguity in PS is particularly evident in the discussion of women and their occupations in Book V.)

The second formulation of PS seems more friendly to meritocracy, whereas the first formulation seems to invite mediocrity. Here's how: The first formulation allows it to be the case that an individual could qualify for a given position, even if that individual was relatively untalented at that position. Let's assume that there are citizens in our *kallipolis* who are unusually talented in many areas. Let's also assume that there are citizens in our *kallipolis* who are relatively untalented and are more or less mediocre at all available jobs. By the first formulation of PS, members of the second (untalented) group might be placed in certain occupations before members of the first (talented) group, even if some (or all) members of the second group are more talented at those occupations. Since talent is measured on the first formulation relative to the individual, this allows the relatively mediocre to qualify for positions over those who are more talented.

In contrast, the second formulation of PS tests individuals relative to each other. Thus, those who show themselves to be more gifted at a particular occupation than others in the *kallipolis* will qualify for that occupation. The second formulation appears to invite the kind of occupational competition that characterizes a meritocracy.

If we are to understand civic justice in terms of PS, an ambiguity in PS will infect the account of justice given in the *Republic*. It seems, then, that the ambiguity in the PS must be resolved if the *Republic* is going to deliver a useful account of justice. We might think that Plato would uncontroversially favor the second formulation of PS, since Plato seems to wish to construct the *kallipolis* as an aristocracy – a rule of the best. But the textual evidence seems, rather, to come down in favor of the first formulation. This is problematic as it suggests that those who are less talented at ruling, relative to others, may qualify as Guardians over those who are more talented, relative to others.

I argue that Plato is caught in the *Republic* between the value of inclusivity and the value of perfectionism, and that the conflict between these two values is what gives rise to the ambiguity in the Principle of Specialization. I further argue that the ambiguity in PS can be resolved, at least in the case of the Guardians, by close attention to the conceptions of talent and expertise that Plato gives us in the *Republic*. On Plato's account, talent is not uni-valent but multi-valent. That is, talent is not simply a matter of one type of aptitude, but involves a complex bundling of cognitive, affective, disposition,

somatic, psycho-somatic and emotional features. Thus, being qualified at a particular occupation (such as ruling) involves, in effect, scoring highly on several measures. Training further develops these diverse capacities into expertise, such that expertise is also multi-valent for Plato. I contend that seeing that talent and expertise are multi-valent helps to resolve the ambiguity in the PS in a way that preserves the *kallipolis* as an aristocracy, if not a meritocracy.

Chair Sun 11 Room 3

**Chet McLeskey**, *Michigan State*, [mcleskey@msu.edu](mailto:mcleskey@msu.edu), Sun 9 Room 6:

“Plato’s Unhypothetical Principle: Putting the Form of the Good in Its Place”

In this piece I argue that the common practice of placing the form of the good (FOG) at the top of the top segment of the divided line at Republic 509c-511e is misguided. The role that the unhypothetical first principle of everything (UPE) mentioned in this passage must play in Plato’s metaphysics, along with comments made about the nature of the FOG and other forms and the predication of formal attributes (good, beautiful, bad, ugly, etc.) in Republic (as well as other dialogues) precludes the FOG’s being this first principle. I argue that the UPE should be seen as a distinct entity that is higher on the divided line than the FOG (or any other forms). This position has the virtue of not only being supported by the text, but also making more sense of Plato’s metaethics (seen as the combination of metaphysics and epistemology in an ethical context).

The identification of the FOG and UPE stems largely from comments made at 508d and 509b. Here, Plato’s Socrates discusses the nature of the good, and how one can see the good as the source of existence and knowledge of things. The question to be asked here is “what things?” I argue that the conversation to this point has been normative in nature, discussing things like the good, justice, beauty, etc. This puts a normative spin on the whole discussion, providing a context in which to see the “things” in question not as just any things, but normative things. So, the form of the good is responsible for the existence and knowledge of some things (i.e. good things), but not all things. What Plato is doing here is setting up a template for the understanding of any form; for example, the form of beauty allows for the existence and knowledge of beautiful things, and so on with other forms.

The scope of the conversation changes when we move to the divided line. Socrates vows to omit nothing in his account. Here, forms are relegated to a different role. Forms are now seen as stepping stones to a larger goal — the UPE (510b). The role of the UPE is that of a fundamental principle; a principle which is to be the cause of all other aspects of reality. We get this from the way Plato discusses the approach one needs to take when striving for this principle. One is to use as stepping stones those things that are below this principle, seeing them as hypothetical or dependent upon that which is higher in the hierarchy (represented by the line); forms are among these stepping stones. The fundamental nature of this principle means that it is responsible for the existence of all that falls below it on the line.

This allows for progress to be made on several issues. If the FOG can only issue in good things, and the FOG is atop the divided line (i.e. serving as the principle fundamentally responsible for the whole of reality), then it is not clear how one can claim that bad things exist. Even if the FOG is nonmoral, as some claim, the problem remains; if the FOG is the source of a nonmoral benefit there can equally be nonmoral harm.

Combined with areas in the text where Plato describes the attribution of 'good' as something that can involve good, bad, and neither good nor bad, the claim that the good involved is nonmoral provides no hope of a solution to the issue. If the FOG is not responsible for the whole of reality but the good in reality, then issues surrounding the predication of good and how one can come to know the many aspects of reality are less mysterious. This also allows for a more coherent view to form across dialogues with respect to the ways in which people come to know and how things can be seen as good.

**Keith McPartland**, *Williams College*, [kem1@williams.edu](mailto:kem1@williams.edu) **Majumdar Panel 2** Sun 9  
Room 2:

“Two Conceptions of Aristotelian Matter”

Contemporary commentators on Aristotle have rightly emphasized the ways in which Aristotle's conception of matter differs from that dominant in modern science. Contemporary scientists often aim for bottom-up explanations of various phenomena. Psychological processes, for example, are implemented by neurophysiological, chemical, and, ultimately, physical processes. According to this view of the unity of science, all processes will be grounded in the basic interactions between the entities of our most basic and comprehensive science of matter.

In contrast, Aristotle seems to have a top-down conception of matter, according to which both the identity and nature of a thing's matter are relative to its form. Matter, in itself, is thought to be pure potentiality devoid of the sort of determinate nature capable of grounding any sort of explanation. For example, what it is to be blood is to be a stuff that plays a certain functional role in the life of an organism. While he takes blood to come from and resolve into the elements, Aristotle doesn't seem to explain the behavior of blood in terms of its more basic constituents. In fact, Aristotle even denies that such constituents are actually individually present in blood. On the most extreme version of the top-down interpretation of his thought, Aristotle doesn't have any story about *how* blood is able to causally interact in the ways that fulfill its function. Blood's doing what it does is explained solely by reference to the form or soul of the organism.

However, proponents of the top-down view have often overlooked a side of Aristotle's thought friendlier to the bottom-up conception of matter. In discussing hypothetical necessitation, for example, Aristotle tells us that the function of a thing dictates its matter. At first glance, this seems to be an example *par excellence* of the top-down conception of matter. However, attention to the details of Aristotle's examples suggests matters are not so simple. When Aristotle says that a saw needs to be made of iron (or of some similar stuff) in order to do its job, he seems to be involved in bottom-up reasoning. The function of a saw is to cut wood. But, to cut wood the material of the saw must causally interact with the wood in a certain way. This sort of causal interaction is not possible unless the saw has teeth with a certain consistency. Iron has this consistency. Therefore, iron is the right sort of thing for a saw to be made of. This argument that a saw needs to be made of iron (or something similar) relies on facts about how the characteristic function of a saw must be implemented in lower-level causal processes.

We can extend this sort of reasoning to biological and psychological cases. The argument that the form of an organism hypothetically necessitates certain matter relies on views about the lower-level implementation of the processes essential to the organism. In the biological works, Aristotle seems concerned to explain *how* it is that certain matter is

capable of realizing a thing's form. A bottom-up conception of matter, therefore, seems to play a role in Aristotle's biological thought. Aristotle's conception of matter thus seems more nuanced and complex than the traditional interpretation would lead us to believe.

**Corey Miller**, *Purdue University*, [cmiller2000@juno.com](mailto:cmiller2000@juno.com), Sat 9 Room 4:  
"Moses Maimonides and Natural Law Ethics"

Perhaps most thinkers in Judaism deny that Moses Maimonides's ethical theory is a species of natural law. But given a proper understanding of Maimonides, evidence fails to support their conclusion. I defend the claim that his overall ethical theory is, in principle, quite compatible with natural law and when compared to a paradigm natural law theory it is evident that his view is actually of a natural law type.

Given the body of literature on natural law ethics, I take Aquinas's theory as the paradigm case to compare since it is mentioned foremost in most any discussion on the topic. His paradigmatic view involves two basic features. When compared, Maimonides's theory fits remarkably well in terms of satisfying these two broad features as criteria for a natural law ethic. By considering both Maimonides's intellectual heritage and his objective in his major works, we seem to have *prima facie* justification for the claim that Maimonides ethic is at least consistent with natural law ethics. By examining particular texts, it becomes clear that natural law is part of his overall ethical theory even if he never uses the terminology.

I consider three major objections to my thesis. Some object on theological grounds that natural law undermines the value of special revelation. But I argue that this objection fails since there is no relevant distinction in the objection that afflicts natural law receptivity without also afflicting revealed law receptivity. Others object on legal grounds that natural law theory couldn't possibly discern by unaided reason all the laws of the Torah, especially those of the cultic or ritualistic type. But this is only problematic if the natural law theorist here claims that reason grasps *all law* without special divine aid, which needn't be the claim for natural law theory in general, as it is not for Aquinas or Maimonides in particular. The area of "Noahide laws," the major disputed territory of natural law in Maimonides, provides the third area for an objection. I argue that those who find objection to my thesis in this territory are simply misguided historically about the nature and purpose of Noahide law. As history presupposes nature, so also, revealed law presupposes natural law. Natural law is therefore a precondition to the rational acceptability of revealed law. The error of some is to confuse the pre-condition of revelation (human reason), with its ground (God).

As a concession, there may be conflict with particular natural law dogma, but it doesn't follow from this that there is necessary conflict in Maimonides with natural law theory in general. Given that Maimonides's views fit well with the two characteristic features of natural law and providing that there is no other objection that is successful aside from the theological, legal, or historic objections considered unsuccessful here, Maimonides is thereby be counted a proponent within the mainstream of natural law ethics.

**Dana Miller**, *Fordham University*, [millerquis@gmail.com](mailto:millerquis@gmail.com), [dmiller@fordham.edu](mailto:dmiller@fordham.edu), Sun 9  
Room 3:



### “Empiricism and Rhetoric According to Plato”

Plato thinks there many reasons to criticize rhetoric as practiced in the public arena of Athens. Many of his criticisms, such as the claim in the *Gorgias* that rhetoric has no concern for the truth or for the public good, have been treated on many occasions. In this paper I shall discuss his criticism of rhetoric as being “stochastic.” I examine in detail Plato’s brief account of the mental operation he calls “stochastic.” I argue that this term refers to the making of an empirical judgment that is essentially an inductive inference based on previous experience supplemented by a mental disposition formed by repeated practice. As such, “stochastic” thinking should seem to most of us to be a perfectly appropriate way for humans to confront many of the complexities of human life. But Plato dismisses it as “paltry” and argues, in the *Phaedrus*, that rhetoric can only be a good thing when it is based on dialectic, not experience. Thus the nature of rhetoric becomes, in Plato’s eyes, a battleground between a form of empiricism and Plato’s anti-empiricism. I then examine the precise sense in which rhetoric, as criticized (i.e., not as reconceived by Plato), is empirically grounded and why its empiricism is so alarming to Plato. My explanation of Plato’s alarm is that Plato makes the recognition of what is good fall solely within the domain of *nous* and *nous* does not draw its conclusions from empirical data. Therefore empirical judgments about what is to be done are made without *nous*. Therefore empirical judgments are blind to what is good, and this, Plato might say, is the “source of all evil.” Rhetoric, as criticized, is a clear example for Plato of an empirical science that is blind to what is good and whose bad effects are everywhere to be seen in Athens. I end by arguing that Plato’s account of rhetoric is not coherent.

**Mark Moes**, *Grand Valley State University*, [moesm@gvsu.edu](mailto:moesm@gvsu.edu), Sat 9 Room 5:

### “Plato’s Craft Analogy and the Digression in the *Theaetetus*”

Plato’s analogy between expertise in a particular “first-order” craft such as carpentry or medicine, on the one hand, and the “second-order” practical wisdom of the moral sage or the statesman, on the other, is an important leitmotif of a number of dialogues both early and late. This paper attempts to show the relevance of the craft analogy to the interpretation of the *Theaetetus* Digression. It begins with an outline of Sandra Peterson’s account of ways in which Socrates’ speech to Theodorus in the digression poses interpretive problems about the consistency of the character of Socrates and about Plato’s intentions as author of the Digression. Socrates’ portrait of the philosopher, for example, contrasts sharply with Socrates’ own practice as he describes it in the closely related work of Plato’s, the *Apology*. Furthermore, the speech fits ill with the rest of the *Theaetetus*, and Socrates’ pronouncements often seem incoherent. Peterson’s solution to the interpretive problems is that Socrates is extracting the content of the Digression—the flawed portrait of the philosopher and the dubious life-guiding advice—from Theodorus, giving a speech to him rather than questioning him because Theodorus has refused to be examined. On her account, Socrates’ aim is that the flawed views become available for later examination by Theaetetus and others. While agreeing with her that the Digression speech is to a significant degree a formulation of views that Socrates does not straightforwardly and fully endorse, this paper articulates a way to solve her interpretive problems while at the same time giving an account of the pedagogical purpose of the speech with greater explanatory power than hers. With the aid of Kenneth Dorter’s reading of the *Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman* trilogy as an extended

application of the method of hypothesis in defense of the theory of forms and of a conception of philosophy as a concrete way of life, it argues that the Digression's portrayal of philosophy as impractical and otherworldly theorizing has the status of a hypothesis that is to be criticized and transcended by a better and higher one as the trilogy proceeds. A higher hypothesis worthy of Socrates' endorsement does not emerge until the *Statesman*, where the Eleatic Stranger articulates the ideas of the mean, of essential measure, and of philosophic sage and statesman as *craftsmen* of a certain sort, who *unite* theoretical with practical knowledge. The philosopher unites theory and practice in two ways and, so to speak, in two directions:

(1) *Theory is rooted in practice*, because the theory that matters most for a philosopher is the theory of the Good., and to understand the Good theoretically is to become motivated to imitate the divine in realizing it (according to the *Statesman* myth read in conjunction with the early parts of the *Timaeus*).

(2) *Practice is oriented to theory*, because the Forms that would-be philosophers most want to grasp--the moral forms and the form of the good--they can begin to grasp only to the extent that they follow a way of life that pursues not the external goods of the pleasures of appetite and ambition but rather the goods internal to both ordinary crafts and to the second-order craft of morality (*Republic*, *Euthydemus*, *Charmides*).

**Christopher Moore**, *University of Texas, Austin*, [Chris.moore@mail.utexas.edu](mailto:Chris.moore@mail.utexas.edu), Sat 9 Room 9:

“Chaerephon in Plato's *Gorgias*”

“Chaerephon here is to blame, Callicles,” Socrates says, explaining the two friends' lateness to Gorgias' rhetorical display; “he made us use up our time in the agora.” Chaerephon apologizes: “No matter, Socrates, I'll cure it.” (447a7-b2). This exchange needs close attention. (i) Callicles and Socrates had just likened speeches to battles and feasts; now they're likened to balms. Medicine comes up again, when Gorgias claims his physician brother often needs his help. (ii) Socrates gets Chaerephon to ask the first examining questions. (iii) Chaerephon is the man who evidently asked the Oracle the question that confirmed Socrates in his philosophical conversational mission. And (iv) Chaerephon seems to be paraphrasing a different oracle, what Telephus was told after being wounded by Achilles (that the wounder, in fact the spear, would cure the unhealing wound). Given Socrates' frequent-enough analogies of himself to Achilles, and given our suspicion that Socratic conversation seems both to hinder and to help, the fact that Chaerephon reminds us of this one oracle and quotes the other seems especially important.

In this paper I argue that it is: it reveals Chaerephon's relationship to Socrates, makes a judgment on types of persuasive speech, and gives us a more coherent vision of the *Gorgias*. This vision includes realizing the importance of political *diagnosis*—as revealing a person's commitments—as prior to political decision (i.e., providing a cure). Chaerephon wants to act *too soon*, and with the wrong *drug*, and in this he must learn just what Socrates later tries to teach Callicles.

**Parviz Morewedge**, *Hofstra U. & SUNY Old Westbury*, **Conference Co-Director**;

**Panel Organizer:** [pmorewed@gmail.com](mailto:pmorewed@gmail.com), Sat 11 Room 2:

“Tusi's Concept of the Mystical Ethics of Surrender”

*Abstract Pending*

**John Mulhern**, *University of Pennsylvania*, [johnjm11@verizon.net](mailto:johnjm11@verizon.net) Sat 2 Room 7:  
“*Politeia* in Aristotle’s *Politics*”

It has been customary in rendering the *Politics* into English and other modern languages to use ‘constitution’ (although sometimes ‘government’ or ‘regime’) and its equivalents for *politeia*, despite the cautions of scholars including Pohlenz and Morrow that the Greeks did not have in hand or in mind the modern written constitution. In the present paper I shall suggest that ‘citizenship’ might be more correct and more informative in some places.

Since *politeia* is the abstract noun cognate with *politēs* (‘citizen’), ‘citizenship’ has some initial standing as a translation. Further, the context sometimes excludes ‘constitution’ and calls for ‘citizenship’. This exclusion is especially clear where Aristotle uses or approximates idioms that one finds in well recognized discussions of citizenship in earlier Greek authors known to him, from Herodotus forward, not only in the *Politics* but also in the *Politeia of the Athenians*. And *politeia* in the sense of ‘citizenship’ does not disappear from later Greek literature after Aristotle; it occurs in an appropriate context, for example, in Diodorus Siculus in the age of Augustus. Further, *politeia* in the sense of ‘citizenship’ occurs also in archaeological remains which record grants of citizenship. The use of *politeia* in the sense of ‘citizenship’ seems to have been basic, widespread, and enduring.

That said, in some places *politeia* is used by Aristotle for an arrangement in which sharing in rule would be for the benefit by agreement of the city as a whole—that is to say, for the benefit by agreement of the multitude of the citizens. In other places, he uses it for the ways citizens commonly expressed their preferences in institutions, even if these ways were not for the benefit of the city as a whole but for the benefit of some party.

While Aristotle himself seems never to have lost sight of *politeia* in the sense of citizenship, his analysis of citizenship in Book III, which leads up to the definition of *politeia* as the arrangement of the principal *archai*, has made it easier for his successors to see the *politeia* as nothing more than a *taxis* or structural arrangement which might be captured more or less in a written document. While the *taxis* is important for him, the *politeia* includes much more than structural arrangements. Thus discussions of the *politeia*, and especially of the best *politeia*, might do well to consider the customary, technical, and affective features of the *politeia* as well as the structural arrangements.

**Mary Mulhern**, *Brookside Institute*, [brookside@verizon.net](mailto:brookside@verizon.net), Sat 11 Room 7:  
“Aristotle on the Musical Modes”

This paper explores Aristotle’s remarks in *Politics* VIII, in Fragment 43, Bekker (preserved in Plutarch’s *de Musica*, § 226-230), and in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problemata* on ancient musical modes. Of particular interest are Aristotle’s positions on the varying moral effects of the various modes, notably the Dorian, especially in view of the small differences among them in the actual distribution of pitches. Fragment 43, undoubtedly at least contemporaneous with the *Harmonic Elements* of Aristoxenus, shows that Aristotle himself espoused a number of the important details that Aristoxenus’ system preserves and establishes that the principle of equal measure was known to and relied upon by him.

Reference is made to the work of Peter L. Phillips Simpson, notably to his *The Politics of Aristotle* (1997) and *A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle* (1998) and to his recent paper “The Sound of Music and the Soundness of Morals” (presented to the New England Political Science Association’s April meeting) which explored what the Greek modes were and how they could have had the moral effects that are alleged. Reference is also made to Kathleen Schlesinger, *The Greek Aulos* (1939), whose extensive commentary on Fragment 43 sets its place—and the place of Aristotle’s student Aristoxenus—in the history of music right up through the Middle Ages.

Music of a serious kind occupied a far more central place for the ancient Greeks than for us and Aristotle gives it serious attention. Since the archeological remains are so few and their condition so problematic, scholars have often been reluctant to give music the weight it deserves in Aristotle’s portrayal of the good life and how to attain it. Schlesinger has given us trailblazing work on weaving together what seem at first glance to be slender resources with a wealth of information not at first glance relevant. Although not herself philosophically inclined or trained, she has assembled sources that promise to shed light on what appears to have been the Greeks’ unique and pervasive interest in music as they conceived it in all phases of life.

This paper, therefore, attempts to determine what unique factors influenced in the ancient Greeks the development of a characteristic musical profile that set the tone, literally and figuratively, for a wide range of their population for many centuries and that drew the attention of their leading thinkers.

**Joyce Mullan**, *New Jersey City University*, [jmullan1@njcu.edu](mailto:jmullan1@njcu.edu), [mullanjl@njit.edu](mailto:mullanjl@njit.edu),  
Majumdar Panel 2, Sun 9 Room 2, Chair:  
“From Animal Gods to Animal Sacrifices”

We often locate the transition to a more anthropocentric view of the universe with the difference in focus and orientation between the Presocratics and Socrates and his followers. The Presocratics we know were interested in finding whether there was some basic substance or ‘stuff’ that the cosmos was made of whether it be earth, air, fire, or water. Or, later mind or atoms. With Socrates and Plato, the emphasis shifted from outward to inward. At the end of the *Phaedo*, when Socrates recounts his early dabblings in the cosmology practiced before him, he thought his predecessors were studying things they could not have exact knowledge of. So he left it off. He then became interested in what it is to be human, and took seriously the injunction handed down by the Oracle of Delphi to know himself, qua human. One of the things he learned is that though humans can control their instincts and therefore act moral in ways we don’t hold animals to, we are not quite divine either. We locate ourselves in that intermediate realm between the divine and bestial.

We also often credit Socrates with making the first serious critique of traditional Greek Religion, too. Hence in Plato’s *Euthyphro*, Socrates asks him, ‘do you really believe all those stories about the gods? Skeptics credit Socrates with beginning the long difficult attempt to free humans from religious superstition. Yet, others, claim he was more interested in stripping Greek Religion of its superstitious and incredible elements.

In many of the religious beliefs that came much before the Greeks, they often venerated animals as gods. In early Greek mythology, Zeus sometimes did take the form of a Bull, Athena took the form of an owl, and Socrates refers to the ‘dog of Egypt’

Cerberus who is said to guard the underworld. In Ancient Egypt and other Mesopotamian religions, they worshipped many animal gods including the jackal god Anubis. They depicted many deities as taking animal shape including cats, crocodiles, falcons, and ibises. The Greeks were somewhat innovative in that they could conceive of beings that were half human and half animal. Thus, centaurs, minotaurs, sphinxes, and the goat god Pan.

In much early history, humanity was at the mercy of nature, and apparently attributed supernatural power to forces they could not control. Animals often possessed unusual attributes they admired or feared causing them first to wonder then to adore. As we began to understand nature, and tame and domesticate the animals in it, our attitudes towards them changed. We were still afraid of hurricanes, and tornadoes and earthquakes, and thought they were expressions of some divine retribution. To appease those more powerful gods, we began to offer sacrifices. Some early cultures did use human sacrifices. What could be more precious than a member of your own species or family? We would also offer the first fruits of a harvest, or the choicest parts of an animal killed for food. We then substituted animal sacrifice for human sacrifices. How are we to understand, however, the Greek depiction of half human and half animals as well as half divine and half mortal beings?

What further have we gained and what have we lost since then in this disenchantment of the world and instrumentalization of our animal companions in it? Was the world untouched by humans better preserved when we stood in greater awe of it? By shifting from herbivores to carnivores, have we unwittingly made it even more difficult to feed the world's population? These are the questions that will guide this inquiry.

-N-

**Michael Naas**, *DePaul University*, [mnaas@depaul.edu](mailto:mnaas@depaul.edu), **Brill Panel**, Sat 11 Room 1:  
“Heads of State: Sovereignty and Salvation in Plato’s *Laws*”

In the final book of the *Laws* the Athenian argues that the salvation of the state for which they are legislating can be secured only through the institution of a sovereign body of citizens known as the Night Synod. Just as an individual’s salvation is secured through the combination of the finest senses (hearing and sight) with reason, so the state can be saved only through a political body that combines clear and accurate perceptions of the state (those provided by the young men of the Synod) with the wisdom to interpret and orient those perceptions (a capacity embodied in the elders of the Synod). This paper will analyze in detail the appropriateness of this analogy between the body of the individual and that of the state, in particular, the appropriateness of the human head as an image of political sovereignty, and, finally, the reason why such an analogy risks making the members of the Night Synod into either a sophisticated security apparatus within the state or else “heads of state” totally detached from the body they are supposed to oversee and govern. I will conclude by arguing that this tension must remain unresolved in Plato’s dialogues so long as analogies for political sovereignty and salvation continue to be taken from the natural realm, that is, so long as *descriptions* of the natural order continue to be elided through such analogies with *prescriptions* in the political realm.



**Jean-Marc Narbonne**, *Laval University, Quebec*, [Jean-Marc.Narbonne@fp.ulaval.ca](mailto:Jean-Marc.Narbonne@fp.ulaval.ca),

Sat 4 Room 4:

“A new type of causality: the Plotinian contemplative demiurgy”

The integration of *praxis* into *theôria* is considered to be one of the major innovations of Plotinus’ philosophy.

Basically, this theory is in fact closely connected with the doctrine of the two acts or activities (especially treatise 25 [II 5]) and with the general process of emanation. It is of course difficult to incorporate this doctrine into the exposition of the creation of the world by the Demiurge exposed by Plato in the *Timeaus*, to which nonetheless Plotinus wants to stay trustworthy.

In this communication, I would endeavour to show:

- 1) that the doctrine of contemplation is in fact a late discovery of Plotinus, appearing only from 30<sup>th</sup> treatise.
- 2) that this ‘invention’ is closely connected with the Gnostic interpretation of the Demiurge, from which Plotinus wants to dissociate himself radically.
- 3) that the *contemplation* conceptual elaboration is nicely fit to incorporate the speculative component of the platonic exposition in the *Timeaus*.

**Heidi Northwood & John Edelman**, *Nazareth College of Rochester*,

[hnorthw6@naz.edu](mailto:hnorthw6@naz.edu), [jedelma3@naz.edu](mailto:jedelma3@naz.edu), Sat 11 Room 7:

“Aristotle on History: Neglecting the Muse”

History, Aristotle writes, lacks the gravity and philosophical import of poetry (*Poetics* IX, 1451b6). This seems to be because history is the telling of singular events and peoples and so lacks the sort of essential connections between events that Aristotle reserves for tragedy. Instead, history involves us in the indeterminate that is found in all chance events, as he explains in *Physics*, II.4-6. As a result, it cannot provide the same opportunity for us to ‘gather the meanings of things’ (*Poetics* 4, 1448b17). On the other hand, Aristotle does admit some unity in the telling of history just as he admits the possibility of learning from history (e.g., *Rhetoric*, *Politics*). Our question is whether the unity he allows is sufficient for the learning he allows. Our answer is that it does not, and that what he neglects is the role of the Muse in the art of History.

**Joseph Novak**, *University of Waterloo*, [jnovak@watarts.uwaterloo.ca](mailto:jnovak@watarts.uwaterloo.ca), Sat 11 Room 5:

“Recollection, Methodology, and the Late Platonic Dialogues”

The paper argues that the doctrine of recollection, when interpreted from a methodological point of view, can be seen as operative even in the late dialogues of Plato. The first part of the paper reviews the various forms of dialectic in the Platonic corpus. The second part summarizes the results of computer searches on key terms associated with memory and recollection (the MNE root) and then illustrates how these terms are employed in the late dialogues (especially the *Philebus*). The last part of the part raises possible objections to the proposal.

-O-

**Matt Ostrow**, *Skidmore College*, [mostrow123@aol.com](mailto:mostrow123@aol.com), Sat 11 Room 10 (Friquegnon

Panel 1):

“The Two Truths in Comparative Perspective”

Discussion of problems about the Two Truths in some Tibetan Buddhist traditions with analogies to selected western philosophies.

**Darcy Otto**, *Cal State San Bernardino*, [dotto@csusb.edu](mailto:dotto@csusb.edu), Sun 9 Room 4:

“Solving the Likeness Regress with Asymmetrical Resemblance”

*Abstract Pending.*

-P-

**Linda Patrik**, *Union College*, [patrikl@union.edu](mailto:patrikl@union.edu), Sat 11 Room 10: Chair, Friquegnon

Panel 1:

“The Two Truths in Comparative Perspective”

Discussion of problems about the Two Truths in some Tibetan Buddhist traditions with analogies to selected western philosophies.

**Terry Penner**, *University of Wisconsin*, [tmpenner@facstaff.wisc.edu](mailto:tmpenner@facstaff.wisc.edu), **Jenks Panel Sat**

11 Room 2:

“Socrates on Virtue as a Single Skill”

*It is expected that Professor Penner will comment on the previous papers in this panel.*

**Eric Perl**, *Loyola Marymount University*, [eperl@lmu.edu](mailto:eperl@lmu.edu), **Majumdar Panel Sat 2 Room**

2:

“*Eros Pronoetikos*: The Role of Man in the Dionysian Hierarchy”

The idea that reality is hierarchically ordered, and that in this order man is superior to sub-rational nature, is often seen as a major factor in modern man’s destructive exploitation of the natural world. But in the thought of Dionysius the Areopagite, who coined the word ‘hierarchy,’ hierarchical superiority conveys not a right to exploit or manipulate the inferior, but, on the contrary, a responsibility of beneficent providence to it. Following Proclus, Dionysius says, “Love, whether we are speaking of divine or angelic or intellectual or psychic or natural, let us consider a certain unitive and combining power, moving the higher to providence for the needier, those again of the same sort to communion with each other, and, finally, the inferior to reversion of the better and superior” (*On Divine Names* IV.15, 713AB). From this it follows that the higher any being is in the order of reality, the more—not the less!—it is in the service of those below it. For Dionysius, this hierarchically ordered love of beings for one another is the love of God at work in all levels of reality. Thus, God’s productive love for all things is realized in the providential love of the higher for the lower. Further, Dionysius explains that providence does not violate, but rather works in accordance with, the nature of that for which it provides. Consequently, man’s hierarchical superiority, far from making us “masters and possessors of nature,” implies an obligation for us to be the beneficent presence of divine love to it.

**Alan Pichanick**, *St. John’s College, Annapolis*, [Alan.Pichanick@sjca.edu](mailto:Alan.Pichanick@sjca.edu), Sun 11 Room

3:

“*Sôphrosunê* as *Aidôs*: The ‘Courageous’ Introspection of Young Charmides?”

In Plato's *Charmides*, Socrates' search for *sôphrosunê*, the virtue commonly translated as "moderation" or "self-control", begins in an unusual way. The inquiry commences not with a question about the nature of this virtue, but with a direct interrogation of Charmides' possession of it. From the outset the emphasis is placed on the psychological rather than the metaphysical, the personal rather than the universal. It is only after a blushing Charmides is unable to answer Socrates' question that the dialogue seems to take a more conventional turn. Socrates releases Charmides from the position of having to answer the question "Do you have *sôphrosunê*?" and suggests that the two of them search for the quality together. It should be kept in mind, however, that Socrates remains concerned with the prior question. For though he has softened the blow of his interrogation by joining Charmides in this quest, his goal still remains to determine whether or not Charmides has *sôphrosunê*. It is noteworthy that Socrates does not seem to openly voice this concern regarding the virtues in any other dialogue. In this paper I aim to explore the significance of Socrates' interest in young Charmides' *sôphrosunê* by looking closely at Socrates' examination of the second definition Charmides offers for this virtue (*sôphrosunê* as *aidôs*).

For it is at this moment, after encountering a slew of problems in the first interchange between Charmides and Socrates, that there is an immediate positive result in the dialogue, yet I will show that this positive result is short-lived in a profound and disturbing way of paramount concern to both Socrates and Plato. Socrates' opening question of the dialogue, although personal, actually concerns the well-being of the polis itself. The answer he receives from his interlocutor, the budding tyrant, points the way to the lessons of the dialogue.

**Nathan Powers**, *University at Albany*, [npowers@albany.edu](mailto:npowers@albany.edu), Sat 11 Room 8:  
"The Stoic Argument for the Rationality of the Cosmos"

In Book 2 of *De natura deorum*, Cicero presents (through his Stoic spokesman Balbus) a series of connected arguments for the main tenets of Stoic theology, culminating in the claim that the world is governed by divine providence. One of the key arguments in the series infers that the cosmos, taken as a whole, possesses rationality (*ND* 2. 29-30). The importance of this inference for Stoic doctrine is clear: it paves the way for both the identification of the cosmos as a god and the view that there is a unified, rational world-order with which human rationality can cooperate (or fail to cooperate). But the *basis* for the inference has been little examined by modern scholars. This paper investigates how the Stoics support their claim that the cosmos is rational by bringing to bear, in the analysis of Cicero's argument, parallel Stoic material preserved in Sextus Empiricus' *Adversus mathematicos* Book 9.

Cicero presents the inference in question as dependent on a previous claim that the cosmos as a whole possesses a definite nature; the argument that the cosmos is rational is, strictly speaking, an argument that the *nature* which the cosmos possesses is a rational nature. The argument turns out to hinge on certain Stoic views about the relationships that obtain generally, in entities that have a nature, between the nature's *hêgemonikon* or "ruling faculty" and that entity's other parts. I contend, however, that Cicero represents these views inadequately. The argument in Cicero runs as follows: [1] for anything that has a nature, its ruling faculty is its best part; since [2] the cosmos includes all other natures as parts of itself, [3] its ruling faculty is better than any of its other parts, including those other natures; but [4] some of those other natures are rational;

therefore (assuming, apparently, that [5] the rational is comprehensively better than the non-rational), [6] the cosmos' ruling faculty is rational.

The relevant material in Sextus derives from a more detailed Stoic discussion of the same topic. This fuller account states grounds for holding [1]: if a thing has a nature, its ruling faculty is its "best" part in that it possesses causal primacy with respect to the thing's other parts. The account also does not rely on premises [3]-[5] as stated above; instead we find the following line of thought. Every power possessed by a natured thing's parts is contained in its *hégemonikon*, in the form of plans or instructions as to how that thing's various parts are to develop. Now, to contain the plans for something is not to possess that something's properties—unless, crucially, the property in question is rationality. The Stoics think that plans for a rational being (a planner) can be present in a nature only *as* planning, i.e., as explicit rational thoughts. Since the ruling faculty of the cosmos contains plans for rational beings (such as humans), it must then itself be rational. I propose this is the original Stoic line of thought that Cicero compresses (and so deforms) in *ND* 2.

**Anthony Preus**, *Binghamton University*, [apreus@binghamton.edu](mailto:apreus@binghamton.edu), Sat 2 Room 7:  
"Aristotle on the Causes and Remedies for the Disease of Oligarchy"

Aristotle suggests that the oligarchical form of government is like a disease of the state, a degenerative form of an aristocratic government (*Politics* III.11, *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.10). This essay explores Aristotle's account of the etiology and potential therapy of oligarchy, as presented in the *Politics*, in the context of Plato's parallel analysis in *Republic* VIII and the Hippocratic analysis of (physical) diseases, particularly in the *Epidemics*. Suggestions made by K. Kalimtzis, in *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease* (Albany 2000) are explored and extended.

**Susan Prince**, *University of Cincinnati*: **Panel Organizer and Discussion Participant**:  
[susan.prince@uc.edu](mailto:susan.prince@uc.edu), **Prince-Jost Panel on Sedley**, Sat 4 Room 2:

"Socrates and the Divine Creator in Xenophon and Plato"

David Sedley in *Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity* agrees with two recent scholars, C. Viano (2001) and M. Johnson (2005), in reading two passages on divine providence in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (1.4 and 4.3) as evidence for a serious position held by Socrates on divine teleological design of humans and their environment. The passages are supposed to provide a triangulated perspective, so to speak, on the doctrine in Plato's *Timaeus*, which is then importantly Socratic, and Socrates' intellectual autobiography in Plato's *Phaedrus*, where Socrates explains how he discovered "the good" to be missing from Anaxagoras' book. In their emphasis on biological creation, especially the purpose of body parts, Xenophon's passages are supposed to provide historical background for Aristotle's departure from divine teleology to inherent natural teleology. This paper will argue that the passages are part of Socratic ethics according to Xenophon, and their central concepts and oppositions, taken separately, are either typical to Xenophon's way of showing that Socrates was a pious man and a useful citizen teacher or typical to pre-philosophical thought of the time. They probably represent Xenophon's memory of what Socrates said, or plausibly would have said, to certain interlocutors in certain discursive situations, but they are neither so original that they must be Socratic, nor do they imply the pre-existence of Atomist arguments against intelligent design, both core theses in Sedley's history of creationist thought. If we compare Xenophon's account of Socrates' treatment of the divine creator with his accounts of Socrates interviewing human artists, and with Plato's portrayal of a specifically Socratic account of a divine creator in *Cratylus*, we are more likely to see Socrates'

position.

The main question Socrates investigates with Aristodemus in *Mem.* 1.4, in trying to persuade him to recognize the divine, is whether living beings came to exist *tuche tini*, “by some chance,” or *upo gnomes*, “at the hands of intelligence.” In typically Socratic fashion, this opposition is then revised into various apparently equivalent forms until the case is made. This is Socratic method, and the gradual progress from the interlocutor’s first statement to a derivation which states Socrates’ correction of the interlocutor is precise and detailed enough that Xenophon had either a good perception and memory of Socratic discourse or a written source. But the basic difference between *tuche* and *gnome* is not a recognizably Atomist thesis, but can be found neatly made in Thucydides, in tragedy, and in traditional Greek thought. The key opposition Socrates derives, benefit versus harm, stands at the heart of Socratic ethics in many passages in Xenophon and Plato alike. The role of the creator or artisan, meanwhile, which is actually the main thesis at stake, pops back into the discussion by its association with the wisdom, *sophia* and craft, *technema*, displayed in creation. An alternative explanation for these phenomena, such as we must suppose the Atomists offered, is not available. Socrates’ interest in artisans and their crafts, meanwhile, is of course visible throughout the Socratica of both Xenophon and Plato, and Xenophon, unlike Plato, offers us a set of direct representations of Socrates’ interrogation of the artists (*Mem.* 3.10). In these discussions, Socrates is typically skeptical of artisans’ real knowledge and control over their creations. When Socrates in Plato’s *Cratylus* assumes for the purpose of argument that language must have a maker, he is there, too, puzzled by how the maker went about creating language with such design and function as it has. I would posit that these more inquiring and finally aporetic or provisional images of creators in the Socratic corpus are more typically Socratic, and that it is more likely to be the religious attitudes of Xenophon and Aristodemus which motivate the clear statement of divine providence we find in the episode in *Memorabilia* 1.4. Similar account can be given of the 4.3 passage, and the full paper will treat this passage as well.

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**Habibeh Rahim**, *St. Johns*, [rahimh@stjohns.edu](mailto:rahimh@stjohns.edu), Sat 11 Room 9:  
“Iqbal’s Perspective of Imam ‘Ali in the Context of his Search for Indian-Muslim Identity”  
*Abstract pending.*

**Shoni Rancher**, *Binghamton University*, [sranchel@binghamton.edu](mailto:sranchel@binghamton.edu), Sat 4 Room 6:  
“Plato’s *Symposium*: The Erotic Affinity Between Socratic Philosophy and Aristophanean Comedy”

Aristophanes’ speech in praise of love in Plato’s “*Symposium*” exhibits an ambivalence, tension and ambiguity that contributes to its aesthetic worth; and interestingly enough, the work exhibits Aristophanes’ potential to be the poet, the praises for whom Socrates closes the dialogue, who is able to write both comedy and tragedy. That Aristophanes meets the demands of Socrates’ praise, further supports my reading of Aristophanes’ parabasis in “*Clouds*,” that rather than making fun of Socrates the comedian is somehow siding with him. In light of my readings of “*Symposium*” and “*Clouds*” I attempt to establish a parallel between Aristophanes’ myth about love and human nature and the operations of the Socratic method. At once tragic and comic, the myth creates a tension not unlike the effect that many of Socrates’ examinations have on



his interlocutors. The myth, like the method, appears as essentially erotic in that each promotes a sustained desire for our completion, which is essentially facilitated by another. This admittedly loose comparison here, however, is worth being developed through the question it raises about the relationship between philosophy and tragic/comic poetry; and more specifically, to what extent does the task of philosophy share a specific affinity for the tension that tragedy and comedy is able to evoke?

**Glenn Rawson**, *Rhodes Island College*, [grawson@ric.edu](mailto:grawson@ric.edu), Sun 9 Room 5:  
“Presocratic Roots of Theories of Innate Knowledge”

Plato’s theory of learning as a kind of “recollection” has long been considered the first theory of innate knowledge, and treated as if it were the unprecedented origin of our great and variegated tradition of epistemological innatism. But in fact, innatism in theories of knowledge did not begin with Plato. This paper sketches how philosophers before Plato originated that tradition with these overlapping philosophical developments: (a) naturalism in explanations of the world and the human mind; (b) incipient skepticism about sense-perception; (c) allegations of prenatal sources of knowledge; and (d) explorations of a priori justification. This early history of epistemological innatism proves to be somewhat surprising. Although Pythagoras’ brand of alleged reincarnation is superficially the most obvious precursor to Platonic innatism, it is epistemologically opposite. And while Parmenides’ momentous rationalism greatly influenced Plato’s epistemology, it seems to make no provision for innate sources of knowledge. Empedocles’ physicalist theory came much closer, with a remarkable analogue to a theory of innate concepts. And Heraclitus, three generations before Plato, produced the first theory of innate knowledge; he even anticipated Plato’s strategy for identifying innate contributions, which Chomsky calls the “argument from the poverty of the stimulus.”

**Daniel Restrepo**, *New School*, [restd245@newschool.edu](mailto:restd245@newschool.edu), Sat 2 Room 4:  
“Where is Justice in the Myth of Er?”

There is something unsettling about the way Plato’s *Republic* ends. Perhaps the notion of an afterlife consisting of both heaven and the world below is too similar to Christianity, and on this note seems an appropriate end to a dialogue about justice. Those who do good receive heavenly rewards, and those who do evil face eternal damnation. Yet, this is not quite how the *Republic* ends, nor should we see Plato as a prologue to Christianity. While the dialogue indeed ends with souls who have been punished or rewarded in accordance to their deeds on earth, Plato offers a twist. These souls are reincarnated, yet, the souls themselves choose their own next lives and the order of the choosing is done through chance as if there were no difference now between the just and unjust. How then does the Myth of Er fit with a dialogue on justice?

In this paper I argue that the Myth of Er is meant as the final blow against Glaucon and Thrasymachus’ conception of justice. It is Socrates last effort to show that the happy life—by happy I mean eudaimonic—is associated with the justice of the soul. I begin by examining Glaucon’s political community and his myth of Gyges’ ring. Here is where the challenges begin. The first made by Glaucon and the second by Adeimantus. Here the very problem of justice begins as a problem of recognition or failure of recognition. It is here where the unjust person is mistaken as the just person and vice

versa. Thus, Socrates challenge is to show that the just life is worth living even without being recognized as just.

Then I turn to the demonstration of the souls' immortality and its function in the dialogue. While the state purpose of the dialogue is to see the soul writ large, i.e. the polis, it is not until the final book that the discussion turns to the immortality of the soul. Yet, what is said about the soul seems to turn and the tripartite soul is established as immortal. Yet the demonstration of its immortality is quickly followed by a mythical analogy, not a further proof and the discussion returns to Glaucon's question: what are the rewards and prizes of virtue. I argue that the immortality of the soul is not at stake here, but rather that the Socrates is employing the demonstration and analogy to make Glaucon recognize something about himself, thus the myth of the Glaucon.

Finally, I discuss the Myth of Er and the implications of its dramatic features. There I argue that Socrates' purpose is clearly tied to living a just life. While Socrates begins by discussing the rewards and prizes of virtue, it becomes manifestly clear that any such rewards and prizes would undo all of Socrates' hard work. Glaucon suspected earlier that people only act justly to either avoid future pains or for future rewards and prizes, thus while Socrates premises the myth of Er on rewards and prizes there are none to be found in the story. Instead, Socrates tells a tale of justice and of one's most important duty in life: seeking and living the just life; such a life does not seek after rewards and prizes but instead seeks primarily the eudaimonic life for its own sake.

**Philip Richman**, *Independent Scholar*, no email **Friquegnon Panel 2**, Sat 2 Room 9: "Symbolism and Reality in the Tibetan Buddhism Treasure Tradition of the Ancients"

Objective: This paper discusses a unique solution to the problem of archival communication of the key values of a civilization. While the problem of preserving spiritual and intellectual traditions during European Dark Ages concern the survival of documents and traditions of scholarship, the Tenth Century "dark" period of the Ladarma prohibition of Buddhism in Tibet involves a very a different response. The school of the ancients (*snga gyur*) of Tibetan Buddhism uses the power of contemplation to reveal previously conceal "treasures" (*gter ma*). These discovered texts serve as the principle source of scripture and philosophical realization in the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism. The resulting solution to the problem of archival preservation goes beyond the dualities of miracle vs. the natural, remnant vs. relic, and even living saint vs. ancient author. It elevates the problem of archival communications to demonstrate an ideal for how the values of a culture might be propagated for the benefit of future generations.

Method: While current critical analysis of the Terma tradition tends to turn on the issue of authenticity, the approach here is to examine the Terma tradition as a subset of general communication theory. In this case, it is archival communication over time, as opposed to "real time" communication over space. Viewed in this way, the analysis depends not on whether the received Terma "really is" an actual object from the past, but on whether the criteria for valid communication have been adequately fulfilled. Rather than ignore or edit out elements that seem fantastical or impossible, the means of rediscovery (*Kha Byang*) are taken at face value as narrative justification for the validity of the received communication. Looked at in this way, we discover that the Terma tradition is grounded not just in beliefs about the past, but in an adequate grounding of disciplines undertaken with care and confirmation in the present. With this focus, the

Terma tradition is seen as an integration of contemplative power with the skillful means of beneficent intent.

Sources: The main Tibetan source is the definitive study of the Terma tradition, the *las 'phro gter brgyud kyi rnam bshad nyung gsal ngo mtshar rgya mtsho*, by rdo grub chen 'jigs med bstan pa'i nyi ma (1865-1926). Secondary sources include the works of Tulku Thondup, Janet Gyasto and Andreas Doctor. References for modern communication theory and semiotics include Claude Shannon and Thomas Sebeok's study of how to warn future generations of the hazards of nuclear waste dumps.

**Nicholas Riegel**, *University of Toronto*, [Nicholas.riegel@utoronto.ca](mailto:Nicholas.riegel@utoronto.ca), Sat 2 Room 8:  
"To Kalon in the *Hippias Major*"

The *Hippias Major* is examined with the goal of finding out as much as possible about *to kalon*. The three main sources of information for this are: 1. The proposed definitions themselves. What does it say about *to kalon* that its definitions can be as varied as 'the appropriate' and 'being pleasant through sight and hearing?' 2. Obiter dicta. Things are said in passing which are not necessary to the argument, but shed light on how each interlocutor thinks about *to kalon*. And 3. The arguments themselves. Which definitions are definitely refuted? Are there any which may be understood in such a way that they survive refutation? If some of the proposed definitions fail, can they still describe properties of *to kalon*?

1. The proposed definitions reveal that *to kalon* has both an aesthetic and a practical sense. Hippias' understanding of *to kalon* is primarily aesthetic, while Socrates' is primarily practical. 2. Obiter dicta reveal, among other things, a strong connection between the *Hippias Major* and the *Symposium*. I suggest the problem of the identification of *to kalon* with the beneficial is solved in the *Symposium*.<sup>13</sup> 3. It is argued that the only proposed definition which definitely survives refutation is the appropriate (*to prepon*). This is so because Socrates never attempts a refutation of the thesis that *to kalon* is the appropriate, as long as what is *kalon* does not also have to appear *kalon*. While the other definitions are refuted, nothing prevents many of them from describing properties or qualities of *to kalon*. E.g., while being beneficial cannot be the definition of *to kalon*, nothing prevents *to kalon* from being beneficial.

**David Robertson**, *Felician College*, [djd\\_r Robertson@hotmail.com](mailto:djd_r Robertson@hotmail.com), Sat 9 Room 8:  
"Gorgias and Plato on Communicating Inner Experiences"

The possibility of communication figures in several 'transitional' dialogues of Plato (*Gorgias*, *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*). My argument is that in these dialogues, Plato engages Gorgias on the issues of discourse and psychological experience, against the background of the Parmenidean view that philosophical *logos* makes a uniquely privileged appeal to our reason. Plato claims in several passages (*Gorg.* 481C5–D5; *Gorg.* 482C4–486D1; *Prot.* 347E1–348E3; *Euth.* 295B7–C11) that fundamental matches in prior experiences and desires make linguistic understanding possible on virtue and truth (psychological transparency of discourse), the positive side of his general view that linguistic understanding is limited by the prior experiences of the interlocutors. Gorgias

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<sup>13</sup> It is argued that the beneficial fails because it is valued as a means (it leads to or produces the good), while *to kalon* must be valued as an end. Diotima's speech in the *Symposium* shows how *to kalon* can be beneficial and yet still be valued as an end in itself.

sees the matter from the other end—experiences and desires are constituted by the manipulative techniques of rhetoric, since the soul manifests no stable internal states (psychological distortion of discourse). There is an interesting comparison here with Gorgias' argument in his "On What is Not" that communicating anything (including internal states) is impossible, since *logos* is different than the things that are spoken about. Plato concedes that speakers cannot understand a sharply alien experience solely by talk exchanges, even by the rigors of philosophical *logos* (the elenchus). But this is ascribed to difficulties bringing 'philistine souls' into proper alignment with fundamental goods, not to intrinsic limitations in the philosophical interrogations pursued by Socrates. This engagement with Gorgias shows why the role of the prior experiences of interlocutors is no trivial claim—it provides part of the psychological basis of Plato's development of the traditional Parmenidean link between rational inquiry and reality. For only souls who are primed for philosophical inquiry will bear the fruit of rational appeals and discover the truth. Under Gorgias' assumption that souls are infinitely malleable by technical discourse strategies, it would follow that Socrates' failure to win hard cases over to the philosophical life reflects technical deficiencies in Socratic *logos*.

**David Roochnik**, *Boston University*, [roochnik@bu.edu](mailto:roochnik@bu.edu), Sat 4 Room 7:  
"Adverbial Play in Plato's *Ion*"

This paper explores Plato's use of a particular part of speech, the adverb, in a single dialogue, the *Ion*. With it I hope, first, simply to reinforce a conviction most readers of the dialogues already share: Plato is a consummate literary artist who uses his medium brilliantly. Second, and more important, this one case illustrates how Plato is able to utilize his literary skill in the service of his larger project, namely raising philosophical questions.

I demonstrate that there is a consistent pattern to the way Plato has Socrates and Ion use their adverbs, and how this pattern, once uncovered, draws the reader into the crucial question of the dialogue, Is it philosophical or poetic language that constitutes the perfection, the highest achievement, of the human capacity for *logos*?

**Dan Rudmann**, *George Washington University*, [danrud1@gmail.com](mailto:danrud1@gmail.com), Sun 11 Room 8:  
"Rishis and Authority in the *Mahabharata*"  
*Abstract Pending*

**Regan Rule**, *Binghamton University*, [regan.rule@gmail.com](mailto:regan.rule@gmail.com), Sun 11 Room 3:  
"‘I Shall Not Resist You Then’: Socrates in the Charmides"

The dramatic elements of the dialogue supplement and support the 3rd definition of sophrosyne that Critias offers. I contribute an analysis of the significance of Socrates' curious last statement to Charmides: "I shall not resist you then." The paper uses this last statement as its starting point to explore Socratic irony.

**Michael Russo**, *University of Maryland and George Washington University*,  
[mprusso@umd.edu](mailto:mprusso@umd.edu), Sun 11 Room 4:

"Aristotle on the Psychosomatic Sources of Action"

In this paper I examine some of the physiological underpinnings of Aristotle's moral psychology. More specifically, I address issues pertaining to the practical

syllogism and *akrasia* by focusing on passages where Aristotle assigns a critical explanatory role to physiological functions and material causes. These passages show that, contrary to some prominent interpretations, the connection between the premises and conclusion of a practical syllogism is not one of logical or conceptual necessity. Rather, I argue, the action (represented by the conclusion) is necessitated *physically* by material causes that embody the agent's thoughts and desires relevant to the action (represented by the premises). Thus, it is on account of the physiological processes that support our psychological functions that, if nothing prevents the action, when an end is desired and a means to that end is discovered, the agent acts "straightaway" and the body moves "like an automatic puppet." Furthermore, in cases of *akrasia* the action motivated by rational deliberation is prevented by irrational passions that render one's knowledge ineffective by "deranging the body." (*EN VII.3*, 1147a16) This is because "the instrument by which desire causes motion is already part of the body" (*DA III.10*, 433b19) and "at one time this desire wins out and knocks away that one, and at another time that one wins out and knocks away this one, like a ball." (*DA III.11*, 434a16) In instances of weakness of will, the [irrational] desire takes the lead, since it is able to set in motion each part of the body. (*EN VII.3*, 1147b1) Thus, the ineffectiveness of the weak-willed person's knowledge is explained by changes in the *physiology* that supports psychological functioning, just as in the case of a drunken person becoming sober or sleeping person waking up. (*EN VII.3*, 1147b5)

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**Alex Santana**, *University of Portland*, [santana@up.edu](mailto:santana@up.edu), see **Jenks**.

**Thanassis Samaras**, *George Washington University*, [samaras@gwu.edu](mailto:samaras@gwu.edu), Chair: Sat 11 Room 4; Sat 2 Room 4:

"The question of the Athenian Constitution in Plato's late political philosophy"

In this paper I address the following issues:

1. What is the place of the *Laws* in Plato's political philosophy as a whole?
2. What is the exact version of the 'mixed constitution' advanced in the *Laws* and how does it relate to previous Athenian history?
3. In terms of contemporary Athenian history, to whom is Plato's argument directed?

I argue that:

1. The *Laws* represents a departure from Plato's middle-group political constructions and in particular the *Republic*. The philosopher's gradual realization that the ideal of the Perfect Ruler cannot materialize in the present era and his increased interest in history make him turn to a more practical approach to politics.
2. The overall character of the constitution is a moderate oligarchy, with the citizen-body consisting of a leisured landowning class (roughly, the first and second classes) and smaller landholders working their own land (the third and fourth classes), but excluding manual workers, *banausics*, and thus being distinctly different from Athenian democracy. Apart from the fact that this is explicitly a 'mixed constitution', the overall character of the constitution, the exclusion of *banausics* from citizenship, the assertion that the latter should be restricted to those able to provide arms, the denial of payment for



public service and the creation of powerful magistracies are all ideals of the moderate oligarchs. Viewed from the perspective of both its constitutional and its social structure, there can be no question that the *Laws* falls within the Theramenean tradition of the 'mixed constitution' in Athens.

3. The argument of the *Laws* is directed to what is sometimes called the 'middling' farming class in Athens, a class coming between the leisured aristocracy and the demos. When transferred from the abstraction of an imaginary Cretan colony to the reality of Plato's native city, the *Laws* can be read as an invitation to this class to join forces with the aristocracy in disenfranchising the lower classes of free adult males and transform the Athenian constitution to a moderate oligarchy.

**Krisanna Scheiter**, Penn, [scheiter@sas.upenn.edu](mailto:scheiter@sas.upenn.edu), Sat 2 Room 6:  
"Aristotle and the *Nous Poietikos*"

In *De Anima* III.5 Aristotle claims that understanding requires both a material cause that is potentially all things and a productive cause that makes all things (*DA* 3.5, 430a10-14). The productive cause is commonly referred to as the active intellect (*nous poiētikos*). Aristotle's account of the active intellect is brief, and so it has been subject to a wide variety of interpretations. In this paper I offer a deflationary interpretation of this passage. Most commentators claim that the active intellect is an efficient cause of understanding. I argue that the active intellect is in fact a final cause of understanding. I claim that the active intellect is the unmoved mover and causes understanding simply by being an object of desire. Thus, the reason that the passage in *De Anima* III.5 is so brief is because Aristotle explains how the unmoved mover acts a final cause in his *Metaphysics* XII.7.

Some commentators interpret the active intellect as the unmoved mover (ex. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna, Victor Caston, Charles Kahn). Among these commentators there is even further disagreement about how the unmoved mover causes understanding. Some think that the unmoved mover contains all thought and we come to have understanding by participating in the mind of the unmoved mover. Others claim that the unmoved mover grants us understanding whenever we are ready to receive it. There are also those who argue that the active intellect is part of our intellect (ex. Theophrastus, Thomas Aquinas, Franz Brentano).

All of these interpretations (except for Caston) agree that the active intellect, whatever it is, is an efficient cause of understanding. In this paper I show that making the active intellect an efficient cause always results in some kind of inconsistency in Aristotle. If we make the active intellect a final cause, not only do we achieve a consistent picture, we can also make sense of his light analogy. Aristotle claims that the active intellect is like light, which makes potential colors into actual colors. Light is not a final cause of visual perception, but it has all the important properties of a final cause. Light does not act on visible objects or on the perceiver. Instead it causes visual perception by simply being actual. Light makes the medium (air) transparent through its activity, not through movement. Vision is possible only when light is actualized. Likewise, thought is possible only when the active intellect (the unmoved mover) is actualized. Because of the unmoved mover we desire to actualize our potential. Our potential (as human beings) is fully actualized only when we are thinking. We desire to

understand because of the unmoved mover and in this way the active intellect is a cause of understanding.

**Bongrae Seok**, *Alvernia College*, [Bongrae.Seok@alvernia.edu](mailto:Bongrae.Seok@alvernia.edu), Hochsmann Panel Sat 9 Room 2:

“Shame and Self in ancient China and ancient Greece”

The paper discusses how human behavior was understood and morally evaluated in ancient China and ancient Greece. The author of the paper specifically focuses on shame. Many ancient Chinese philosophers (most notably Kongzi and Mengzi) and ancient Greeks (most notably Homer) saw and understood human behavior from the perspective of self imposing emotion of shame. What is shame and why is it important in their understanding of human behavior and morality? The author of the paper approaches the issues from the perspective of moral philosophy, moral psychology, and attribution theory.

According to attribution theory in psychology, there are two different ways to interpret and understand human behavior. One is to see it as the expression of inner thoughts and intentions. The other way is to interpret it as the influence deriving from external environments. Often, these two patterns of causal attributions associate with specific interpretations of self, responsibility, and moral judgments. The author argues that shame comes out of the external pattern of attribution; under this attribution, people tend to ask more about what others think about themselves than what they really are. Based on the hypothesis of how shame is related to a pattern of attribution, the paper analyzes ancient texts and develops an interpretation that connects ancient Chinese and ancient Greek thoughts about self and responsibility.

**Mark Shiffman**, *Villanova University*, [mark.shiffman@villanova.edu](mailto:mark.shiffman@villanova.edu), Sat 9 Room 7: “Plutarch’s Second Sailing”

Like Plato’s *Symposium*, in which Socrates offers a portrait of his young self learning important lessons in philosophy, Plutarch in his dialogue “The E at Delphi” depicts his youthful philosophical enthusiasms and the response and foil of his teacher Ammonius, as well as a brief characterization of his later philosophical style at the time of the narrative frame. For the “pre-Academic” Plutarch, cosmology and numerology hold center stage, whereas the more mature philosopher places central emphasis on self-knowledge and the speeches of interlocutors, having made a turn much like that described by Socrates in the *Phaedo* as his “second sailing.” Careful comparison of “The E at Delphi” with the *Symposium* reveals the significance of this transformation within the context of the history of Platonism and the subjugation of Greece by Rome, shedding light on Plutarch’s break from the exegetical tradition in “The Generation of the Soul in the *Timaeus*” as well as on the philosophical import of the project of the *Parallel Lives*.

**David Shikiar**, *Providence College*, [dshikiar@providence.edu](mailto:dshikiar@providence.edu), Sun 9 Room 4: “The Complementariness of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Zeta 3 and 4”

The basic thesis to be defended is that Zeta 3 and 4 of the *Metaphysics* present two basic characteristics of ousia that cooperate to characterize that in which being a substance consists. These two characteristics are being a subject and being (or having) an essence. In different words, being a substance consists jointly in being something

absolutely basic and in being (or having) an ontologically unified, yet structurally complex, principle in virtue of which a thing is a definite individual that belongs to a definite kind.

The two characteristics belong to one set of concepts and relative to that set exhaustively characterize what it is to be a substance. The set of concepts is advanced at the beginning of 7.3 as candidates for answering the question ‘what is substance?’ These candidates are essence, genus, universal, and the subject. I will argue that these four concepts, when taken together, share the status of being ‘logical’ insofar as they correspond directly to linguistic distinctions that are assumed to mirror distinctions between aspects of being.

This distinguishes them from the four grounds and from the modal distinction between *dunamis* and *energeia* (which in the *Metaphysics* is coextensive with *entelecheia*). In Zeta through Theta, these three sets of concepts – logical, etiological, and modal – are marshaled to explicate the structure of primary being, ousia, and through this analysis, posterior being, accidents.

Being a subject and having an essence determine the substantiality of the three modes of substance: primary substance (form), secondary substance (the composite), and tertiary substance (matter). Form is a subject as that for the sake of which the body is as it is, so that everything that belongs to the composite ultimately pertains to the form as the ontological center of the individual’s being. It is identical with the essence of a composite. The composite is a subject of essential and accidental properties and *has* an essence. Matter is the subject of form and is an essence in potentiality, as it has all of the properties that suffice for it to serve as the basis for the realization of the form of the individual of which it is the matter.

**Joel Smith**, *Skidmore College*, [jsmith@skidmore.edu](mailto:jsmith@skidmore.edu), Sat 11 Room 10, Friquegnon panel 1:

“The Two Truths in Comparative Perspective”

Discussion of problems about the Two Truths in some Tibetan Buddhist traditions with analogies to selected western philosophies.

**Nick Smith**, *Lewis & Clark College*, [ndsmith@lclark.edu](mailto:ndsmith@lclark.edu), & **Tom Brickhouse**, *Lynchburg College*, [brickhouse\\_t@mail.lyncburg.edu](mailto:brickhouse_t@mail.lyncburg.edu), Jenks Panel Sat 11 Room 2:

“Socrates on Virtues as Skills”

*Abstract Pending*

**Richard Sorabji**, *King’s College, University of London, and CUNY Graduate Center*, **PLENARY SPEAKER**, Friday Evening

“Is Gandhi a model for the Stoic wise person?”

**Moris Stern**, *New School University*, [stern997@newschool.edu](mailto:stern997@newschool.edu), Sun 9 Room 8:

“Socrates and Kant as Philosophers of Inwardness: Care of the Soul, Autonomy, and Immortality”

Socrates’ agent-centered ethics sheds light on the Kantian ethics of self-regulation, and Kant’s ethics-based metaphysics helps us understand Socrates’

metaphysics. The presentation will examine three aspects of resonance between the two thinkers.

Firstly, Socrates' notion of justice primarily insists on care of the soul, on the basis of which one interacts with others in society. Kant's notion of the good will is also primarily an ethics of self-relation and inwardness. This avenue of inquiry enables us to challenge popular readings of Kant that examine his account of morality on the basis of whether it reflects our external relations to others without taking into account the deeper foundation of inward autonomy. Just as the harmonization and purity of the soul is not a means to but the end of the proper actions toward others, Kantian autonomy as the good will is also not a means to but the end of the interaction with others. The ethics of Kantian autonomy is thus a kind of a Socratic ethics of the purity of the soul.

The metaphysical idea of the immortality of the soul provides a further context in which to compare Kant and Socrates' argument. Kant argues that any argument for the soul is undecidable for an object-cognizing, externally directed, theoretical thinking. However, Kant grants that we can meaningfully speak about the soul through inward directed, will-cognizing, ethical thinking. I will demonstrate that Kant's approach provides a rich perspective on Socrates' arguments regarding the immortality of the soul.

Finally, I show that the Socratic reading of Kant's ethics productively brings to the foreground Kantian autonomy as an end-in-itself. Autonomy of reason guides Kant's entire philosophy. This Kantian perspective brings into focus the practical and ethical, rather than theoretical, nature of Socrates' commitment to immortality. Thus we can understand Socrates who often points out that he speaks of immortality in the mode of hope and opinion, rather than knowledge.

**Paul Stevens**, *Prince George's Community College*, [PaulAnthStevens@aol.com](mailto:PaulAnthStevens@aol.com) Sun 9 Room 6:

“Plato's Theory of Forms as Seen through the Lens of the *Theaetetus*”

One of the difficulties in scholarship on the Platonic dialogues is based on a difference between academic mediums, ancient and modern. The original dialogues are represented as conversations. Ancient schools, such as the peripatetic one, are based on the concept of a living exchange of words. By contrast, the modern approach is hugely influenced by the mechanisms associated with the printed word. It is reasonable to suppose that this difference might account for a difference in the way that philosophy itself is practiced.

A huge topic in Platonic scholarship has to do with the so-called theory of the forms. Efforts are made to give a precise account of this theory, to defend, revise, or reject it, and to assess Plato's position with respect to it. However, Plato presents his theory as a hypothesis, and he does so in a context that is thoroughly pedagogical, namely, in Socrates' attempt in the *Phaedo* to demonstrate that the soul is immortal. By contrast, there is another dialogue, which is also explicitly pedagogical in its intention with respect to the soul, but where the forms are famously neglected. It is curious that the *Theaetetus*, the first extant systematic epistemology in human history, leaves the forms unattended.

This presentation will attempt to give an account for this obvious and astonishing fact about the *Theaetetus*. Taking into account the caution indicated above, I will first present a new interpretation of the theory of the forms. In order to illustrate this theory

more precisely, I will draw comparisons between the mathematics of the *Theaetetus* at 147d-148b and the thematic content of the dialogue, especially in terms of the contrast between mathematics and dialectic. In order to explain the mathematics at 147d, I will refer to Euclid's *Elements*, and more specifically, to the correlative proposition, 10.9. I will argue for a similarity: Proposition 10.9 has an important role in the *Elements* and the mathematics at 147d has an important role in the *Theaetetus*. I will attempt to show that the mathematical lesson of the *Theaetetus* is a template for the construction of the entire dialogue and that 147d contains the closest mathematical analogue to Plato's proposed upward path of dialectic.

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**Tang Xiaoyang**, *New School for Social Research*, [tangxyang@gmail.com](mailto:tangxyang@gmail.com), Chair: Sat 9 Room 3; Sat 2 Room 4:

“The Good of Going Down the Cave”

In *Republic*, after telling the cave allegory, Socrates concludes that the person who has seen the true beings outside the cave is no longer willing to run the human stuff (517b). However, shortly after that, Socrates rejects this idea and claims that he is not entitled to stay outside, but must come down to the cave to the bounded and share their labor and glory (πονῶν καὶ τιμῶν 519d). The change of Socrates' attitudes reflects the dialectic understanding of the good. In this paper, the good of going down the cave will be discussed from three perspectives.

*1. Ontological perspective*

The change shows the dichotomy of the ontology. On the one side, being and truth are beyond the individual beings; on the other side, the being and truth are in no place else than in the concrete things and deeds, thus the understanding of being and truth can never be separated from the concrete beings.

Consequently, the good as the source of being and truth meanwhile enables the knowledge of the concrete beings. The view of concrete beings is not limited outside of the cave, but also includes the view of the things inside. Although the eyes may need some time to get used to the dimness at the beginning, they will become much sharper in the end. (520c)

However, this perspective only explains the possibility/ideality of going down. Another perspective of pathos should be brought in to explain the necessity of going down.

*2. Pathological perspective*

The human beings do not live directly under the sun. They were born and destined to live in the cave, therefore they are inclined to mistake the shadows for the real beings and mistake the candle for the sun as the origin and the ultimate of life. The freed person has seen the true sun due to some unknown divine force, but he is still a human being and cannot dwell completely out of the cave. The fact of being a pathological being in the material world forces him to return to the cave.

However, with the return, the cave is for him no longer the whole world. The view of the true beings beyond the cave enables him to understand the necessary dwelling in the cave as a part of the true world (neither the entire world nor a separated world). Now, determined to dwell in the cave, his love for the truth and being drives him to



pursue the truth, but more importantly, to show the truth and to guide the bounded companions to pursue the truth as well. That is to say, he must take political actions.

### 3. *Political/practical perspective*

The revelation outside the cave shows the origin of the true world and the self-enjoyment is no longer the concern. The enjoyment (ευδαιμονία) under the sun is actually the ultimate enjoyment of the whole. This universal enjoyment is thus also to obtain in the place assigned for human beings, i.e. the cave. This enjoyment in the cave is not the whole, but is the concrete part for every individual being in this world.

Consequently, for the philosopher the conflict and the hardship with the shadow and the wrong views are not burdensome any more, because they necessarily belong to the human experience of the universal enjoyment. Moreover, the ultimate enjoyment/good commands the philosopher to confront with the shadow views and to guide others to see the truth, because the universal good expresses itself as well in the expansion of the good to others as much as possible.

The ultimate good (ειδαιμονία / αγαθόν) is of course in itself not deficient, but it has to express itself in the human world through concrete determined condition. The approaching to this ultimate good thus consists in continuous effort to expand the good and enjoyment. Since the human beings are political animals, this effort expresses itself above all in the political activity, i.e. in helping others to approach to the ultimate good. Therefore, going down to the cave is actually the essential expression of the good and the accomplishment of the philosophical pursuit. This understanding is proved by the political and practical endeavors of Plato and Aristotle.

**Christie Thomas**, *Dartmouth*, [christine.thomas@dartmouth.edu](mailto:christine.thomas@dartmouth.edu), Levin Panel, Sun 9 Room 1:

“Expertise and Craftsmanship in Plato’s *Cratylus*”

According to Socrates, “it is not for every man to give names”, but “only <for> the one who possesses the skill” (*Crat.* 388e4-5). Only the one who has the requisite expertise “may be called a namemaker, and he, it appears is the lawgiver, the rarest kind of craftsman among human beings” (*Crat.* 389a1-3). The depiction of the skilled craftsman of language in Plato’s *Cratylus* raises a number of intriguing but difficult questions: How seriously does Socrates take the proposal that there is a form of linguistic craftsmanship? Who (or what) is the namemaking lawgiver? In what, exactly, does expertise in the construction of names consist? Are actual names the product of craftsmanship? Why is this particular kind of craftsman identified as the rarest among human experts?

As a start toward answering such questions, it is helpful first to clarify the model of craftsmanship presupposed by the *Cratylus* and to consider how that model resembles (and departs from) models of craftsmanship operative in other Platonic dialogues. Moreover, in examining how the activities and abilities of Socrates’ namemaker contrast with those of his interlocutors’ “namemakers” in the *Cratylus*, we can better understand the sort of expertise Socrates attributes to a genuine namemaker - the ability “to look to the name which belongs by nature to each thing and to put its form in letters and syllables” (*Crat.* 390e3-5).

**Andrey Tikhonov**, *South State University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia*,  
[equilibre2003@yandex.ru](mailto:equilibre2003@yandex.ru) Majumdar Panel Sat 2 Room 2:

“*Philebus*: The Common Principles of the Coincidence of Microcosm and Macrocosm”

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate Plato’s main ontological positions in *Philebus*. Keeping in mind the variety of interpretations, I intend to make an attempt to stress the main philosophical principles of Plato’s doctrine. In *Philebus*, Plato’s ontology is more detailed and obvious than in the earliest dialogues, and from my point of view we face here with Plato’s description of the knowledge of Being, knowledge of the right way of its comprehension. *Philebus* contains the descriptions of the role of the “ideal” Being, which are presented in other dialogues as another type of Platonic narration. The main conclusion that we can extract from *Philebus* is about the common principles of the coincidence of microcosm and Macrocosm.

1. *The specific character of the form of the dialogue*: Plato axiomatically supposes the correlation of the soul and cosmos: otherwise how he can assume that the life of the soul depends on “the finite” and “the infinite,” that are “classes” of the Universe by themselves?

2. *“The Good” in Philebus*: The specific character of Plato’s philosophy is that obvious contradictions of his notions are explained by the combination of different meanings in one discussed subject. The statement that there is “the pure Good” and there is “the mixed Good” gives us an explanation that “the pleasure” also is considered by Plato in two ways. There are ordinary “pleasures” and there are “pleasures” combined with “wisdom”.

3. *The nature of the ideal Being*: The idea of the Good that is the highest form of the being by its own status includes immanently other ideas. These ideas can be discovered in the analysis of the idea of the Good. We can say that the highest idea comprehends the secondary parts of the being because it is the basis for the all aspirations of the visible cosmos to copy the “incorporeal Cosmos.” And the secondary ideas are the moments of the discussion or understanding of “incorporeal Cosmos.”

4. *A man*: In the *Philebus* a man is the result of “the mixing” of “the classes” which are described in the beginning of the dialogue. Man’s life must be “a mixture” in every moment. And the experiences of the soul are in accordance with that character that was given by “the classes” in “the mixing.”

5. *Ontological position*: In *Philebus* “the Intelligence is represented as the cause of the harmony and as the component of the harmony in the same time.” This double-sided conception about the Cosmos, being, and man, is a very important notion in the process of understanding Plato’s philosophy.

**Adriel Trott**, *University of Texas, Pan American*, [adriel.trott@villanova.edu](mailto:adriel.trott@villanova.edu), Sat 4  
Room 3:

“Friendship and the Priority of Political Life in Aristotle’s *Politics*”

In this paper, I argue that we can have deeper insight into Aristotle’s account of the virtuous life if we read the *Nicomachean Ethics* in light of the *Politics* rather than supposing that the *Politics* follows and has no bearing upon how we understand the *Ethics*. From the outset, there are the clear references in *Nicomachean Ethics* I to political science as the architectonic science (*EN* 1094a26-27) that aims at the highest goods achievable by action (*EN* 1095a15-16) and the best end—making citizens to be of good

character (*EN* 1099b29-31). We should not take this lightly but look at how political life is the site in which virtue is developed and how the pursuit of virtue is fundamentally political. Toward this end, I argue that we must understand the development of virtue to follow from the political nature of the human being as described in *Politics* I.2.1253a8-18 as having language. In that passage, Aristotle defines the human as political because she considers the world not only in terms of pleasure and pain but in terms of what is beneficial and harmful, just and unjust, and these are not merely signaled to one another but achieved and understood in political life, that is, in pursuit of living well and not just living (1252b28-29). This reading, I argue, overcomes our tendency to read an atomistic pre-political subject into Aristotle's ethics.

It seems to me that this tendency to locate a pre-political subject in the *Ethics* comes to the fore in the traditional readings of friendship in the *Ethics*. In this paper, I extend the linguistic argument mentioned above to the notion of friendship in the several places it is mentioned in the *Politics* (1262b7-10, 1280b29-1281b6, 1295b20). I argue that these passages can help us understand friendship in the *Ethics* from already within a political community. Such a reading, I believe, will further show how virtue is a community project and the criteria of friendship are consistent with the criteria for the community that is truly political: equal and free and aiming at the virtuous life. This account illuminates Aristotle's account of community and suggests that his account of friendship is fundamentally political, where we think "political" beyond that which pertains to the community, but as a more fundamental disposition of human beings to consider their lives and the good of their lives in relation to and with others, a relation that is indicative of political life (a view which I believe follows from the linguistic argument in *Politics* I.2).

**Andrea Tschemplik**, *American University*, [atschem@american.edu](mailto:atschem@american.edu), Sat 9 Room 5:  
"Maieutics and Mathematics (*Theaetetus*)"

Socrates reveals his secret craft of midwifery to the young mathematician Theaetetus in an attempt to motivate his interlocutor to continue his search for a definition of knowledge. In this paper I examine the relevance of the maieutics passage in the context of mathematical knowledge: what is it that Socrates sees in Theaetetus which leads him to reveal the rather peculiar image of himself?

Despite the dialogue's concluding *aporia* Socrates proclaims success for accomplishing what he set out to do qua midwife: he has delivered and examined for viability all of Theaetetus' children. In contrast to his mathematical accomplishments regarding the surds Theaetetus appears unable to translate his mathematical acumen into philosophical success. I will show that the major accomplishment of maieutics is to lead the interlocutor to self-knowledge and that in the absence of self-knowledge Theaetetus cannot arrive at a satisfactory definition of knowledge. However, the lack of self-knowledge does not present a stumbling block to his mathematical constructions which reveals important insights into the differences between philosophical and mathematical knowledge.

**Toy-Fung Tung**, *John Jay College SUNY*, [ttung@jjay.cuny.edu](mailto:ttung@jjay.cuny.edu), Friquegnon Panel 3 Sat  
4 Room 9:

“The *Alaya-vignana* and Buddhist Morality: Lonchenpa’s *Grub mtha’ mdzod* and Mipham’s Commentary on Vasubhandu’s Twenty Verses”

In the *Grub mtha’ mdzod*, Rabjam Longchenpa affirmed the necessity of the Cittamātra view for Buddhist morality, while many centuries later Jamgon Mipham wrote a commentary on Vasubhandu’s “Twenty Verses” on the Cittamātra tenets. This paper examines the significance of the *alaya vignana* in formulating a theory of moral accountability within the context of the Great Perfection View of the Nyingma School. Since no Tibetan term exists for “free will,” the nature of moral responsibility will be examined in light of the various Cittamātra ideas about habitual tendencies (*bag chags*), the aspects of perception (*rnam pa*), and the nature of human choice.

**Tom Tuozzo**, *University of Kansas*, [ttuozzo@ku.edu](mailto:ttuozzo@ku.edu), Sat 11 Room 3:

“Unitarianism in Plato Interpretation: Kahn, Rowe and Beyond”

I shall be concerned to defend and give expression to a unitarian methodology in the interpretation of Plato. There are three general points that a complete defense of a unitarian methodology must address. First, it must give an account of Plato’s authorial strategy. Whereas a developmentalist approach may simply suppose that Plato expresses his own philosophical position through the arguments offered by the main character in the dialogue, the unitarian, faced with *prima facie* differences between those positions, requires a more sophisticated interpretation of Plato’s authorial strategy. Second, the unitarian must give an explanation of why Plato should have adopted that sophisticated strategy. Third, the unitarian must give some account of what she takes the unitary philosophical position presented throughout the various dialogues to be.

In this talk I first examine the position on these points of two book-length defenses of unitarianism: Charles Kahn’s *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue* (CUP 1996) and Christopher Rowe’s *Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing* (CUP 2007). While Rowe is committed to a unitarianism that encompasses the whole corpus, Kahn argues for a more limited unitarianism encompassing only the Socratic aporetic dialogues and the great “middle” dialogues. In their interpretation of this set of dialogues there is a good deal of common ground between Rowe and Kahn. The main difference between them is that (on point three above) Kahn weights the shared doctrine of the early-to-middle dialogues towards the *Republic*, while Rowe weights it towards the so-called Socratic dialogues. While on some details Rowe is more persuasive, I shall argue that Kahn’s overall position is closer to the truth than is Rowe’s. I shall argue, however, that Kahn does not go far enough. Satisfactory answers to points one and two above require a more thorough investigation of the relation of language to the objects of knowledge that is discussed in *Phaedrus* and the *Seventh Letter*. Doing so will allow us to adopt Kahn’s account of the unity of the Socratic and middle dialogues, while also providing a firmer philosophical grounding than Rowe has done for a comprehensive unitarianism across the corpus.

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**Ann Ward**, *University of Regina*, [ann.ward@uregina.ca](mailto:ann.ward@uregina.ca), Sat 4 Room 3:  
“Friendship and Politics in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*”

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that friends are necessary for life as “[n]o one would choose to live without friends, even if [they] had all other goods” (*NE* 1155a4-5).<sup>14</sup> Aristotle thus begins what is often considered his mini-treatise on friendship, encompassing books 8 and 9 of the *Ethics*. Among various types of friendship, Aristotle initially characterizes political friendship or concord as that which expels faction and holds political communities together (*NE* 1155a23-26).

Problems emerge, however, in Aristotle’s presentation of political friendship. First, friendship among citizens initially seems unlike Aristotle’s understanding of true or perfect friendship. Conceived as artisans who relate to each other through money, citizens appear to engage in friendships of utility whose object is material advantage rather than goodness of character, and which views the end of the city as economic prosperity rather than noble actions. Yet, Aristotle argues that unfettered pursuit of material advantage and economic prosperity causes an isolated individualism to emerge that threatens to produce the faction that political friendship seeks to dispel. Second, in Aristotle’s discussion of the different political regimes that can exist within cities, the citizen is no longer spoken of as an artisan engaged in mutual exchange, but as a member of a particular family in a web of different relationships. With this shift Aristotle suggests that it is possible for political friendship to aspire to or resemble the perfect friendship Aristotle describes. However, the distinction between political justice and political friendship may cause the legislator to establish different regimes depending on what they pursue; kingship in the case of justice and timocracy in the case of friendship.

The third problem with political friendship is that it appears less than completely natural and thus unable to point to a good beyond the regime. Although scholars have typically observed that Aristotle points to friendship within the family as natural, I will argue that the bodily basis of friendship thereby implied is an even more limited understanding of friendship than its political variety suggests.

I will conclude by arguing that an exploration of Aristotle’s discussion of conflicting obligations points toward the possibility of resolution to some of the problems raised. The possible tension between what we owe to parents versus what we owe to persons of wisdom and goodness opens up two grounds of natural friendship: our relations to persons connected to us through body, and our relations to persons who are virtuous and good. Moreover, Aristotle suggests that citizens can relate to each other through the latter form of natural friendship, thereby implying that political friendship, especially between timocrats, can closely resemble the perfect friendship that facilitates the pursuit of the noble that is the end of the regime, and allows for the appearance of the good that is the object of philosophy.

**Julie Ward**, *Loyola of Chicago*, [jward@luc.edu](mailto:jward@luc.edu), Chair: Sat 9 Room 6.

**Lee Ward**, *Campion College University of Regina*, [lee.ward@uregina.ca](mailto:lee.ward@uregina.ca), Sat 2 Room 3:  
“The Relation of Philosophy and Politics in Plato’s *Apology of Socrates*, 31c-32e”

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<sup>14</sup> Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Martin Ostwald trans. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1999.



At one point during his trial in Plato's *Apology of Socrates*, Socrates raises a hypothetical objection to the philosophic life, which asks why he, the philosopher, never became involved in active politics to counsel the city publicly? Socrates' two part response is striking. First, he claims that a daemonic voice has warned him since childhood against political activity. Second, he insists that a philosopher must lead a private life because anyone "who really fights for the just" will be destroyed for opposing "either you or any other multitude" (31e). Thus, philosophy must be an essentially private activity.

This paper will reexamine Socrates' claims about the relation between philosophy and the political community in this important, but puzzling, passage by considering some of the crucial ambiguities embedded in his argument. Primarily it will focus on Socrates' discussion of his role on the Council during the trial of the ten generals of Arginusae and his refusal to participate in the arrest of Leon, a "just man," during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. This paper will argue that Socrates' actions in these situations reveal the complex relation, as opposed to the complete separation, of politics and philosophy. With the Trial of the Generals, Socrates presents philosophy in conflict with the democratic political community's conception of the sacred. Underlying Socrates' technical objections to the irregularity of trying all of the generals collectively, as opposed to separately as required by Athenian law, is his effort to advance the rationalist claims of military necessity against the religious, and in his view essentially irrational, commitments of the *demos*. We will argue that Socrates' position in the Trial of the Generals is consistent with, and reflective of, his account of the foreign policy of the philosopher ruled city in speech in Book V of the *Republic*.

With the arrest of Leon, Socrates displays a different aspect of the relation of politics and philosophy. Here the philosopher opposes not the democratic "multitude," but rather a repressive oligarchy, through an act of civil disobedience. While Socrates' civil disobedience is more properly conscientious objection and does not directly produce political activism, it nonetheless encourages the principle of public contestation in the city, and thus limns the intellectual framework of a vision of democracy that would be open to free philosophic inquiry.

This paper concludes by arguing that Socrates' account of the relation of philosophy and politics at *Apology* 31c-32e does not, as he claims, illustrate the incompatibility of politics and philosophy, but rather their complex relation. In this crucial passage, Socrates shows indirectly what philosophically informed politics would be like in an actual city. By revealing the rational basis of justice in the city, Socrates' very public project in the *Apology* parallels in important respects his private philosophic activity in the *Republic*. In both cases Socrates exposes a range of possibilities about political life that are typically not understood by the *polis* itself without philosophic instruction.

**Elliot Welch**, *University of Maine, Farmington*, [elliott.welch@maine.edu](mailto:elliott.welch@maine.edu), Sat 2 Room 8: "Explanation in Plato's *Euthyphro*: Two Arguments"

Most commentators agree that Plato's *Euthyphro* demonstrates a commitment to explanation for Socratic definitions. The difficulty, however, is that there appear to be two arguments against Euthyphro's definition of the pious as what all the gods love in the context of this demand for explanation. More troubling is that each of these arguments

depends on implausible principles. What I call the “Substitution Argument” for example, depends on a substitution instance which is usually explained by attributing to Socrates a principle that allows substitution into explanatory contexts, for which there are a number of counterexamples. What I call the “Transitivity Argument,” on the other hand, relies on a principle of transitivity in explanatory contexts, for which there are also a number of counterexamples. In this paper, I reconstruct these arguments, clarifying their structure, and pointing out that only the Transitivity Argument relies on the explanation requirement as a premise in the argument. This should lead us to adopt the Transitivity argument as the main argument of this passage, whatever its other defects, because it demonstrates Socrates’ commitment to explanation in definitions. My main point is to show that if we maintain that Socrates is committed to the explanation requirement, then there must be an argument that depends on this requirement as a premise. The argument that demonstrates this commitment is the Transitivity Argument.

**William Wians**, *Merrimack College*, [wwians@mac.com](mailto:wwians@mac.com);

[William.wians@merrimack.edu](mailto:William.wians@merrimack.edu), Sat 4 Room 5:

“Aristotle and Protagoras” (Will in fact be presenting “Virtue, Practice, and Perplexity in Plato’s *Meno*” instead)

There is a widespread belief, reinforced by a recent important book (Lee 2005), that Aristotle regards the sophist Protagoras as a serious thinker whose ideas command respect. I think this belief is mistaken. In this paper, I intend to show that Aristotle distinguishes between those few positions of the sophist’s that cannot be dismissed out of hand and the sophist himself, for whom Aristotle has little respect and less patience. In fact, Aristotle tends to dismiss Protagoras as a serious thinker, finding value in his position only to the extent that it echoes or anticipated by natural philosophers like Anaxagoras.

My ultimate purpose is not an assessment of the historical Protagoras or of Aristotle as historian of philosophy. Rather, I hope to come to a better understanding of important philosophical positions in Aristotle, an understanding impeded rather than aided by the recent scholarly rehabilitation of the historical Protagoras. The historical Protagoras is not, of course, necessarily the person represented by Plato and Aristotle. Still, this leaves open what exactly Aristotle’s attitude was (and to a lesser degree the extent to which Aristotle’s attitude toward the sophist is independent of Plato’s) and what it reveals about Aristotle’s own philosophy.

In contrast to Plato, Aristotle refers to Protagoras by name in relatively few contexts. The most important of these references come in the three passages in the *Metaphysics* (*Metaph.* Γ 5, 1009a7-22; I 1, 1053a35-b3; Γ 6, 1062b12-34) and one at *Rhetoric* B, 1402a23-28. Of these four, the passage from Γ 5 has drawn the most attention by far. There Aristotle turns to thinkers who, without necessarily meaning to deny the principle of non-contradiction, have held doctrines that are inconsistent with it, stating explicitly that Protagorean phenomenalism entails the denial of the PNC, for “if all opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be at the same time true and false” (1009a7-9). The question then becomes whether Aristotle treats Protagoras as one of several predecessors sincerely misled by appearances and deserving of respectful correction, or as one of a group of eristic propounders of controversy requiring harsher treatment. Recent scholarship tends to favor the former view. But to understand

Aristotle's point in  $\Gamma$  5 as a whole, it is necessary to examine all four passages in which Protagoras figures. Doing so will reveal a consistent—and consistently critical—attitude toward to sophist. Once this is recognized, several important misunderstandings about the contexts in which Protagoras is mentioned can be corrected, allowing Aristotle's own positive position to stand out more clearly.

**Chad Wiener**, *Portland State U.*, [wienerc@pdx.edu](mailto:wienerc@pdx.edu), Wiener Panel Sat 2 Room 1:  
“Plato on Thumos as Part of the Soul, *Republic* IV 439e-441d”

Plato's division of the soul into three parts in the *Republic* has received and deserves close attention. This paper explores why *thumos* is a separate part of the soul distinct from both appetite and reason. I will focus on two controversies. First, I will argue that the principle which Plato employs in these arguments is a version of the principle of non-contradiction and not a principle of conflict, as scholars like Annas support. The principle of conflict is necessary for the argument but not sufficient to produce the conclusion. The problem is that Plato conceives of the opposites in this argument both as contradictories (437c8-10) and as contraries (e.g., 439c5-7). I will argue that this treatment of opposites as both helps distinguish the parts in respect to their function or work. This leads to the second controversy: is *thumos* really a distinct part of the soul? Using the above assumption that opposites help characterize the work of each part of the soul, I will show how Plato distinguishes *thumos* from both appetite and reason (439e-441d). Part of Plato's trick, as I will argue, is that the first argument (437b-439e) which shows that appetite and reason are distinct presupposes *thumos* as distinct from both.

**John Wolfe**, *University of South Florida*, [jrwolfe@gmail.com](mailto:jrwolfe@gmail.com), Sat 2 Room 5:  
“Is Timaeus' Account of Creation to be Taken Literally? An Ancient Controversy Revisited”

The question of whether Timaeus' account of the generation of the cosmos should be taken as describing a literal creation in time or instead be treated as an allegory is one which dates back to the earliest phase of Platonic interpretation and continues until the present day. The question has not been settled and likely never will be; like so many issues in ancient scholarship any answer given will inevitably remain underdetermined by the available evidence. Nevertheless the question remains both compelling in itself and vital for determining the meaning of one of Plato's most enigmatic works.

Throughout antiquity the interpretation of the *Timaeus* creation narrative as figurative seems to have been prevalent both in the Academy and in the later Neoplatonic tradition. There were however occasional notable dissenters such as Plutarch. More recently the literalist position has been defended by Vlastos and Guthrie while the metaphorical interpretation has been upheld by Tarán, Taylor, and Cornford.

We argue that the *Timaeus* is not a straightforwardly dogmatic work. Its structure mirrors the aporetic structure of the Socratic dialogues. Plato has Timaeus articulate a dilemma: the cosmos is a visible and tangible thing; hence it must have a beginning at some point in time. Yet, the very notion of time without a cosmos is incoherent; hence the cosmos is such that it cannot have a beginning. The *Timaeus* then functions not as a simple cosmology, but as an illustration of the problems which must be solved in order for us to understand how it is that there is a cosmos at all. Assuming that this

indeterminacy is built in to the dialogue, that the *Timaeus* is incomplete by design allows us to understand the early (and continuing) controversy surrounding the dialogue to be a part of the functioning of the work. The clashing “interpretations” put forward by Aristotle, Speusippus, and Xenocrates are not what we would understand as attempts to come up with “readings” of the dialogue, but rather attempts to address the fundamental problems that the dialogue raises.

**James Wood**, *Boston University*, [woodj@bu.edu](mailto:woodj@bu.edu), Beckett Panel, Sat 9 Room 1:  
“Socratic Failures”

In this paper I offer an account of Socrates as a philosophical teacher and friend through three failed relationships outlined in Plato’s dialogues: Socrates’ relationships with Alcibiades, Clitophon, and Crito. Each of these relationships fails, though in different ways and to differing degrees, to measure up to the standard Socrates sets for them as truly philosophical friendships. But who is at fault for these failures? Everyone, though in different ways: Alcibiades is too proud, Clitophon too passive, and Crito too decent, for any of them to become Socratic philosophers; while Socrates cannot condescend to the limits of his companions without betraying his own deepest philosophical convictions. The upshot is that Socrates fails his companions, but he cannot help it. His failure is the tragedy of philosophy to bridge the gap between ordinary and extraordinary men. Nevertheless, Plato’s portrayal of these failures indicates both the progress possible for ordinary men and the one extraordinary example of Socratic success: Plato himself.

**Fernando Wulff**, *University of Malaga*, [wulff@uma.es](mailto:wulff@uma.es), Sun 11 Room 8:  
“Confronting Divine Massacres: *Iliad* and *Mahabharata*”  
*Abstract Pending*

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-Y-

**Mostafa Younesie**, *Tarbiat Modares University, Iran*, [yunesie@modares.ac.ir](mailto:yunesie@modares.ac.ir), Sat 9 Room 4:

“A Profile of Ancient Persian Loan Words in Ancient Greek”

In the context of the classical intercultural and Interlingua interactions (as broad and many-faceted phenomena) between ancient Persia and Greece, I want to represent a sectional image of the ancient Persian loan words in the classical Greek. By limiting the duration of the time to the classical period and also the quantity of the words in the form of only 5000 ones from Liddell and Scott Lexicon there shapes a profile of the Persian loanwords in the ancient Greek - although the entire has not a common status, some are based on guesswork and research work has been done more on the reverse side i.e. the ancient Greek ones in the ancient Persian.

A ) αβυρτακη (10),  
αγαροσ / αγγελς, αδις, ακινακιη / κινακιη, ακταια, αναξυριδεσ, αρταβη, ασπα  
ραγοσ, ασφαλτοσ, αξανη

B) βελενιον (2), βομβυξ

- Γ ) γαζα (2), γυψος  
Δ ) δαπης / ταπης (2), δαρεικος  
Ε ) ευμαρις (1)  
Κ ) κανδυς / κανδυταλις / μανδυη (11), καπιθη , κασας, καστωρ , καυνακ  
η, κινδος / μινδαξ, κινναβαρις / τιγγαβαρι , κιταρις , κρασπεδον / μαρσιπος, κυπα  
σσις, κυρβασια  
Λ ) λαβρωνιον (2) , λειριον  
Μ ) μαγος (2) , μυρσινη / μυρτος  
Ο ) οα (2) , λυρα  
Π ) παρασαγγης (1)  
Σ ) σαγαρις (7), σαλαμανδρα , σανδαλον , σαννακιον , σαραπις , σατραπ  
ης, σιδη  
Τ ) ταβαιτας (5) , ταως , τερμινθος , τιγρις , τηρης  
Ψ ) ψαλιον / ψελιον (1)

-Z-

**Coleen Zoller**, *Susquehanna University*, [zoller@susqu.edu](mailto:zoller@susqu.edu) 11 Room 4:  
“Honest Cakes: Plato on Health, Justice, and Peace”

Book II of Plato’s *Republic* contains a sketch of what it means to be ethical in a globalized world. Even though Plato focuses his attention primarily on justice, it is fair to construe Plato’s overall project as the quest for peace, which he contends will be manifest wherever human beings are provided for in a just and moderate fashion (*R.* 372a-d). I propose to present a paper that demonstrates the applicability of Plato’s philosophy of peace to the contemporary world.

I will argue that Plato is right to claim that when human beings are provided for in a just and moderate fashion “they’ll live in peace and good health, and when they die at a ripe old age, they’ll bequeath a similar life to their children” (*R.* 372ad). Furthermore, I will show that this can only occur in an environment where citizens learn the value of reflecting on the impact one’s lifestyle has on the global network of political associations. In the course of theorizing about the formation of cities, Socrates offers a central example of how meat-eating affects political life, namely, if the inhabitants of a city eat meat, then war concerning land will arise and armies will follow (*R.* 373c-374a). My presentation will focus on the impact of including in one’s lifestyle certain commodities, such as meat or gasoline.

Peace continues to elude us precisely because this sort of reflection about the consequences of one’s lifestyle on not only oneself but also the rest of the world’s citizens is so rare. Plato makes clear that the appetite for a just and moderate lifestyle does not come easily to human beings. He has Glaucon say to Socrates that this moderate kind of lifestyle (which includes “honest cakes” and the like) sounds good enough only for pigs (*R.* 372d), and Socrates replies, “All right, I understand. It’s not merely the origin of a city that we’re considering, it seems, but the origin of a *luxurious* city. And that may not be a bad idea, for by examining it, we might very well see how justice and injustice grow up in cities. Yet the true city, in my opinion, is the one we’ve described, the healthy one, as it were” (*R.* 372e). Just as Glaucon considers Socrates’ healthy city (in which people are provided for justly and moderately) a “city for pigs” and his own notion of a luxurious city the only one fit for human beings, so too does contemporary culture typically feature the view that we ought to



live luxuriously rather than moderately. Yet, Plato goes to great lengths to convey the message that when one lives immoderately (as a result of not properly caring for the soul), both the individual and the global network of political associations suffer from the ensuing injustice. To rise above the injustice that leads us into war time and again, we must acknowledge the need for cross-cultural dialogue about which lifestyle choices promote luxury, injustice, and war and which actually foster health, social justice, and peace.