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CLASSICAL INSIGHTS AND TODAY'S WORLD

The title of this essay raises philosophical eyebrows. What is meant by 'insight', and what is meant by 'today's world'? We shall approach answering these questions in a round-about way. In the first section a view is sketched about the study of the history of philosophy in general and classical Greek philosophy in particular. In the second section we review briefly some of the key stages in the history of Plato and Aristotle scholarship in the XX century, concentrating - for lack of sufficient space/time, -on Anglo-American works. In the final section examples are presented of singling out some key insights of Plato and Aristotle. Such presentations pose a challenge to current philosophy and some current views of laypersons in modern societies.

All of this has to be done in a cursory way, since our allotted time is much too short to be doing anything except sketching skeletons of how our topics should be approached. But though we are immersed in doing philosophy by looking at trees very carefully, as if through a microscope, it is necessary also to take a view, from time to time, at the forest. The kind invitation of this Society for me to deliver one of the millennial lectures motivated me to undertake this task, since it seems so appropriate for the occasion.

I

Studying the History of Philosophy. When I was an undergraduate I took a botany course. In the first lecture our professor answered the question of why we should study botany. The preface of the textbook gave answers like how useful this is in the long run, and how this study can help us in life, and so on - all of which our instructor ignored. "I will tell you why we study botany" he said, "to know more and more about plants".

We can generalize this reply to many other fields, such as physics, chemistry, mathematics, and many others. In each of these cases we can interpret the subject matter as being about a certain set of objects; domains, as one might say today. Animals, chemicals, numbers, geometrical shapes, can all be construed as constituting such domains. But in this sense philosophy does not have a domain of entities to study. To say that its object is reality is of little help, since the conception of reality itself changes from one philosophical system to another. A more adequate answer is to say that to study philosophy is to study what philosophers have said; i.e., the history, of philosophy. Questions emerge from reflecting on the history of the subject, and not from looking at specific regions of space-time and some peculiar inhabitants. This study will direct us to "reality", but not directly. It directs us to a variety of ways of construing reality, and the various considerations that led philosophers to one or the other of these interpretations.

Studying classical Greek philosophy has a special place in this undertaking, because so many key questions and proposals in our field have its roots in that period. From the point of view of modern architecture, studying archeology may not be crucial. But philosophy is not like architecture. Ideas have lives of their own, and understanding them in some way is like understanding people. Maybe knowing where their origin is not important, but what ideas and beliefs provided their start is most of the time very revealing.

In our study of classical philosophy we must be careful to avoid the dichotomies of concepts and arguments, and again form and content. These are useful in context, but become only a hindrance when taken in an absolute sense. We certainly want to recover concepts such as Forms, Eros, Substance, Potentiality and others. And it is also true that we want to recover the arguments and considerations that philosophers produced in defense of any one of these concepts.

Recently, however some historians and systematic philosophers have coined the slogan: "it is the argument that counts". As it stands, this is patently false. Over and over again, in the history of philosophy the key changes did not come about because of elaborate arguments, but because new insights were produced. The arguments help to explain why the insights seemed to some "insightful", but cannot exhaust the contents of the insights and related new concepts. This can be understood if we realize that most of the key philosophic concepts introduced throughout history were meant to be explanatory concepts. In modern philosophy we are used to think of the explanatory as psychological/mental. When surveying ancient Greek thought we should realize that these allegedly fundamental concepts and insights were meant to be given a "realistic" interpretation.¹ Explanations, however, must have objects. But we must not interpret this in a simplistic "Fido=Fido" manner. It is not as if there were naked facts "out there" waiting for explanation by philosophers. As I argued elsewhere² I see the basic ingredients of human cognition as

- (i) what we take for granted (not to be argued for),
- (ii) what we take to be problematic,
- (iii) what we take to be of explanatory value, and
- (iv) the result of applying (iii) to (ii).

Thus behind the effort to reconstruct the concepts and arguments of a Greek philosopher lie the haunting questions of what he took to be problematic (and why?) and what was seen by him as having explanatory value. Furthermore, we have not succeeded in reducing explanatory value to mere piles of propositional knowledge. Thus a concept or ontological correlate is always more than just what we can analyze as propositional knowledge. There is a residue that we label "insight" without being able to give a reductionist analysis of that. We are reduced to metaphors, just as Plato was. At the same time, it is a bad mistake to think of insight as pure "seeing" or intuition. Ultimately something like that is needed, but as we see in both Plato and Aristotle, these are very educated "seeings"; surrounded by much theorizing that does involve propositional knowledge.

The other dichotomy is that of form and content. Popular as it may be, it is easy to see through this as a red herring. In both Plato and Aristotle the two are interwoven. Bonitz argued already in the 19th century for the "outer shell - inner content" form of many of the dialogues, including the SOPHIST, and I have argued for the intertwining of form and content in the PHAEDO.³ How much of the form should we interpret as having philosophical importance? There is no general answer to such a vague question; one has to take it dialogue by dialogue, and even within a dialogue part by part.

Among the insights some will be of more "local" (i.e. historical period) relevance, and others become part of what Karl Jaspers called the perennial scope of philosophy.⁴ Views about concrete political structures are more likely to be local, and views about what is number or what are fundamental ontological elements more perennial.

We are still left, after these sketchy comments, wanting an explanation of why doing the history of philosophy, and especially Greek philosophy, should be a part of the perennial ingredients of philosophy. My answer rests on the analogy between historical recovery of past insights and bridge building. Our bridge building is, however, a special kind, because one side of the river bank is constantly moving. This is the "modern side", the terrain into which we try to

translate and to which we want to build connections. It moves because for each stage of intellectual history, the concepts with which we operate undergo change. Hence the futility of the myth of "getting the job done definitively". We need to explain the heritage to each generation in different ways, sometimes with greater sometimes with less drastic change in terms of the concepts of the day. We try to recover the original thought with as much adequacy as possible. There are great and important epistemological problems here into which we cannot go in this essay but will have to be addressed at another occasion. Explication requires the philosophical framework into which we translate, and this cannot remain constant. Hence the perennial nature of our calling. And since, as we said above, philosophy has only itself, and not an independently specifiable domain as its object, our recoveries are needed for every generation.

There maybe several bridges even within any one historical stage, At times it is useful to attempt a reconstruction of an argument with as much precision as our age allows, even if much of this must be seen as only implicit in the text, At other times it is important to show how the concepts used in the original argument differ from ours. The fourfold distinction among ingredients of cognitive processing sketched above is helpful here. In our recovery attempts we need to try to see what the conceptions of the problematic were for a philosopher and what he/she saw as problematic, given that conception. We need to ask, then, not only what, e.g. Plato and Aristotle saw as problematic, respectively, but also what intellectual structures - construed by them in "realist" terms -were seen as having explanatory power. A key problem that the scholarship of the near future should address is: how does the explanatory change from Plato to Aristotle, and why do the changes emerge? (E.g. Forms vs. substances).

Having laid the foundation of at least one way of construing the methodology of our discipline and the perennial need for its existence, let us turn to a brief sketch of what went on in the XX century in the Anglo-American tradition, and how we got to where we are.⁵

II

Historical Sketch of XX Century Work. Even if we stick just to the Anglo-American stage, we need to divide the history of work in the XX century into three stages; work prior to the impact of positivism, work during and shortly after positivism, and the last few decades including our own.

The "pre-positivist" era offers a split picture. On the American Scene most of the outstanding work on Plato was done by researchers who were primarily classicists such as Paul Shorey and Harold Cherniss. Paul Shorey's magnificent book "Platonism, Ancient and Modern"⁶ is a splendid tracing of Platonistic strains in philosophy and literature from classical times into the modern age. It is the kind of synoptic and yet precise work that would be very difficult to duplicate in our age of specialization (overspecialization?). There was also more philosophically oriented work on Aristotle by the Thomists and R. McKeon. In the meantime, we find a very different picture in England, primarily in Oxford. For there the study of Plato and Aristotle came out of the work of those who were in the "Greats" program that united the study of classical languages with the study of philosophy. This had a real impact on the work done. Up to WWII, the outstanding philosophers like Cook-Wilson, A.E. Taylor, Joseph, and others were assumed to be equally proficient in both the classical languages and philosophy. To my knowledge the first significant philosopher in post WWII Oxford who was not a part of that tradition was P.F. Strawson who came out of the new "modern Greats" training (PPE).

Positivism was a great blow to the study of the history of philosophy, especially to the study of Plato and Aristotle. It heralded in an allegedly brand new way of doing philosophy, and a purported sharp break with historical traditions. A fair sample of this attitude can be found in Hans Reichenbach's "The Rise of Scientific Philosophy" in which Platonic and Aristotelian teachings appear as mere "charming stories". The study of the history of philosophy was suddenly on the defensive. Researchers felt compelled to defend "the relevance of Plato, Aristotle, etc." (Strange formulation; relevance to what? Relevance is a two-place predicate; x is relevant to y. Most people were asking how e.g. Plato was relevant to some problem in analytic philosophy.) Few, (except some pesky graduate students like me in the 50's) asked how is analytic philosophy relevant to some of Plato's puzzles that turned into perennial problems.⁷ Unfortunately, the defensive stance taken by so many also led to the neglect of some excellent works. An obvious example is not only Werner Jaeger's PAIDEIA, but also his excellent "The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers."⁸

Two factors contributed to the decline of this defensive posture. One of these was the failure of the effort of the positivists to establish a "bugfree" "verification criterion of meaning". The other was a couple of extremely imaginative essays by Gilbert Ryle in which he aimed to show how some of Plato's worries in the later dialogues can be seen as predecessors of some ideas of Frege and perhaps Russell.⁹ Even if not in details, the general tone of Ryle's work found many echoes in the writing of others. It also helped to bring the study of Plato and Aristotle back to be practiced in philosophy departments. A key figure in this "reunion" in America was Gregory Vlastos who worked on detailed and semi-formalistic ways of representing classic arguments, and whose interpretations had frequently also systematic philosophical edge.

Today the writing of the history of ancient Greek philosophy is practiced on a much larger scale in the USA than in many decades past. (See APA programs). But even if "relevance" need not be argued much, there are two very different ways of seeing continuity between what systematic philosophy does today, and what the Greeks were up to. One approach can be described, though a bit too much in caricature, as showing that the Greeks occasionally were doing already what "we" are doing except not that clearly and thus not that well. In my view this description, even when one throws in all the refinements, is false. It is fortunate that this is so. For if they did what we do except not so well, then WHY STUDY IT? On that reading the study of ancient Greek philosophy is either a kind of condescending and self-congratulatory exercise ("see how much more clever we are") which I find worthless, or it is strictly of interest like interest in Ford Model T. In my view the study of Plato and Aristotle has - or should have- a far deeper impact on systematic philosophy. This leads us to the second way of viewing the continuity between past and present. Starting with the premise that philosophic concepts are by and large designed as explanatory concepts (or picking out explanatory elements in reality) the historian looks at the variety of ways in which concepts are seen as explanatory, and the variety of phenomena that at one time or another seemed to some as problematic. At times there is overlap between the historically unearthed notions and at times not. When not, the reason may be that the problem has been resolved, at least within a certain conceptual framework. But at times the unearthed concept with its problematics and mode of explanation may be very useful for studying some contemporary problems, even if it is not a part of the conceptual arsenal of today's philosophers. We must not confuse the questions of what is of interest to today's philosopher and what is of interest to someone interested in today's ethical, scientific, or epistemological issues. This kind of historical work, then, can revitalize systematic philosophy, and point to the need of

forging concepts and modes of explanatory patterns not yet found in the contemporary philosophical arena. Thus in her exciting work on the philosophy of physics Nancy Cartwright has come to the conclusion that physics deals primarily with powers. It turned out that this notion of power is closely related to Aristotle's notion of potentiality.¹¹ In this case historical recovery and current systematic philosophy help each other. In the remaining section I shall deal in more detail with two examples in which historical recovery presents also a challenge to contemporary systematic philosophy.

III

Two Examples of Conceptual Excavation and Rejuvenation. One of our examples involves the much discussed mind-body relation. Reading contemporary philosophy one might think that there is one such distinction, and philosophers have been attempting to clarify it since ancient times. The absurdity of this outlook can be unearthed when we look at Aristotle's views, and see that the problems he sought to solve with his theory of soul are quite different from those that Descartes and the post-Cartesian epistemology attempts to solve.

Although the Cartesian epistemology is often construed as standing on purely secular grounds, a more careful look reveals that in some of its presuppositions it draws on the Christian tradition within which there is a sharp dichotomy between soul and body. The former is not material and immortal, the latter is not. It is easy to move from that to a "two-substance" theory in which soul=mind and constitutes one of two basic substances, while body, construed as extended bits of matter, defined monolithically across the variety of natural kinds, constitutes the other substance. This picture forces the question of how the two are interrelated.

Aristotle attempts to solve within his theory quite different questions.¹² First, he does not inherit the kind of intellectual atmosphere as Descartes did, for obvious reasons. He precedes the Christian era and nothing analogous to it emerges in the Greek religious traditions. Secondly, he does not start with immortal soul and perishable body, but with the notion of "nature" ("physis"), and he includes in this both of we call material and what we call psychological. The soul is whatever makes living things living. Aristotle's task is to spell out in as much detail as he can how this takes place. Crucial to his account is the notion of potentiality. There is nothing corresponding to this is modern analytic philosophy. It cannot be reduced to the universal, or the statistically predominant, or what happens to take place all the time.¹³ The soul is what actualizes (bringing to actuality) certain bodily potentialities. (Potentiality not used in analytic philosophy, but clearly in biology, medicine, and as Cartwright suggests maybe also in physics.) Thus Aristotle's key question cannot be stated precisely in modern analytic philosophy, but it is a key question for today's sciences, even though some may want to restate it in other terms.

Another key element in the Aristotelian scheme that does not correspond to anything in the post-Cartesian epistemology and philosophy of science is his notion of matter. Matter in Descartes and thereafter in physics and philosophy, is a monolithically defined entity, ranging across and underlying all so-called material entities. But we find no such notion in Aristotle. For Aristotle the form-matter dichotomy has to be reinterpreted over and over again for each natural kind. The relations between matters in different natural kinds are based on analogies. Hence the impossibility of expressing within the Aristotelian framework the three views dominating contemporary philosophy, namely materialism, dualism, and functionalism.

At this point someone might say that even if what I sketched is true, this hardly shows the importance of Aristotle's views for philosophy. They might say that we should ignore all

descriptions of soul and matter that do not include a rigid monolithic conception of matter across the different natural kinds. But this view seems to me very strange, especially if stated at the beginning of the XXIst century. What happened to the conception of matter in modern physics? Are strings, photons etc. matter in the Cartesian sense of this term? Of course, as Chomsky suggested, one can always preserve the monolithicity of matter by definition. Instead of saying either that the notion of matter is no longer central to physics, or is admittedly pluralistic, one can just by definition keep enlarging what is included under "matter" by including again and again anything new that physicist talk about in their theories. In my view this is saving the monolithicity by "cheating". Of course, giving up the traditional monolithicity of matter as extension in the Cartesian sense is not to force us back to positing Aristotelian natures for all kinds. But it opens up our horizon so as not to be tied to just three types of theories and only one conception each of mind and matter. When I argue against materialism people typically respond by saying: "you mean we should all be dualist?" My argument against materialism rests mainly on the claim that the notion of matter as a key monolithic explanatory notion has vanished from physics, and thus materialist analytic philosophers are climbing, with great and at times ingenuous efforts, aboard a sinking ship. To the challenge whether I wish to embrace dualism, my reply is that dualism is not the only alternative to materialism (and the related variation of functionalism.) Viewing Aristotle's work makes one open up the question both of how to construe mind and matter so-called, in a variety of new ways, and why we should regard Aristotle's question any less "relevant" to modern thinking than the Cartesian one (even more so?) In this way, we reconstruct different concerns, different explanatory notions, and thus stimulate the mind towards formulating novel ways of approaching some of the phenomena that fall under "living" and "mental".

The other example is taken from epistemology. We shall compare some salient features of Plato's epistemology with modern, post-Cartesian epistemology. An argument will be sketched that shows the two to have basically different orientations, both in terms of what they want to explain and in terms of what their key explanatory concepts are. Plato's main interest is to describe how insight and understanding underlie the sound theoretical human disciplines, while modern epistemology is concerned primarily with distinctions between knowledge and belief where both of these are characterized in terms of propositional units. Plato's search involves primarily contrasting different kinds of objects or entities, while the modern enterprise is concerned mainly with the examination of different kinds of evidence on the basis of which one could distinguish a priori from empirical claims, and uncover the extent to which humans can attain certainty, thus answering the skeptics.¹⁴

The roots of Platonic epistemology do not lie in comparing different kinds of evidence or statements, but in investigating the question: how do we distinguish between legitimate disciplines within which justification is grounded in theory, from disciplines, or better described as "arts and crafts", that lack such solid foundation. (GORGIAS). Plato hammers out the difference primarily in terms of the objects with which the two kinds of disciplines are concerned. The legitimate enterprises, like mathematics and philosophy, have invisible, eternal and unchanging objects as their domain, while the others deal with changing, empirically graspable, and qualified objects that we learn about in our activities that involve know-how, but are left ultimately on the level of the sensible and the conventional. One could try to translate the Platonic investigation into modern terminology, though I doubt that this can be done adequately. But within the confines of this paper I restrict myself to stressing that the MAIN CONCERNS are different. Even if there is some overlap between claims made within the classical and the modern enterprise, the key

problems are different, and the mode of answering (one primarily in terms of different domains, and the other in terms of kinds of evidence) is also different in the two undertakings. The discussion of what is a *techne* turns in the middle dialogues to hammering out the "episteme"-*doxa* distinction. But a survey of the relevant texts shows that that distinction does not correspond to the distinction between a priori knowledge and empirical belief, "Episteme", even if we interpret the Platonic usage as restricted to knowledge expressed by propositions, covers much less than the modern notion of a priori knowledge. For example rhetoric is excluded from the category of "*techne*" in the *GORGIAS*, even though it is easy to show that it includes a priori knowledge, e.g. of some definitions. Only some of what we call today humanistic and scientific disciplines fall under the Platonic notion of "*techne*". Likewise, various conventional definitions and alleged conventional truths fall under "*doxa*" and not "*episteme*".

But I wish to argue for something more fundamental. Plato wants to illuminate a notion that we label insight or understanding, and construes it as the foundation of the human cognitive enterprise. To be sure, both the words "insight" and "understanding" admit also of propositional object. (understand that..., and the insight that...). But Plato is concerned with our discovery of certain objects he calls "the Forms". He thinks that there is a "transpropositional" grasp of these entities that enables us to see what they are, their characterization admitting infinite many varieties, and that they are both fundamental since all order and harmony depends on all else being to various extents related to them, and that they are self-explanatory.¹⁵ The following is a sketch of how we reach these entities and what made them seem to Plato as both fundamental to all else and self-explanatory.

The story is well known to all scholars, but perhaps not the particular moral that I want to draw from it. Plato noticed that the terms he saw as crucial to many disciplines that he construed as bringing us to genuine theoretical insight had application in the spatio-temporal realm only with qualifications of various sorts. Nothing is just two or three nothing is just equal, good, healthy, etc. Plato takes it as an important insight when we interpret these phrases as pointing beyond themselves. To explain all of the qualified uses, we need to reach a level of understanding that includes the grasp of the entities to which the unqualified related expression points. These entities are the Forms. Once we understand these, and see how the relations between the unqualified and the qualified explain the natures of the latter, we have adequate understanding both of the fundamental and the derivative elements of reality. What in modern times we call definitions are only partial illuminations of a given Form. Forms have an infinite number of attributes and can be conceptually divided in an infinite number of ways.

This view is very different from modern views of universals - e.g. Russell, Moore, -and recent variations e.g. Armstrong, do not change the story in ways that would mitigate against the points made here. In these views a universal is what any given spatio-temporal collection of particulars have in common, and the properties of these first-level universals. The explanatory roles of these universals is much more limited that the ones ascribed by Plato to the Forms.

Even apart from theoretical ontological considerations we can see intuitively what Plato found so exhilarating about the Forms. Let us consider concepts like health or number. These are basic entities for the sciences of medicine and mathematics. According to Plato we must explain why it is that one grasps their fundamentality, and self-explanatory nature once one understands these. World Health organizations are exploring different kinds of health deficiencies, rather than worrying about how to define health. Even when logicians try to define number in the terms of logic, this does not take away the intuition that NUMBER is the metaphysically and cognitively

fundamental entity, regardless of logical reductionistic techniques. Similar considerations hold for values and morality.

This analysis defies history, and is still with us. It poses a challenge to modern thinking that not only failed to come up with satisfactory replacements, but in many cases does not even face up to the problems. Thus to the question of what is insightful, explanatory, they try to give an answer that psychologizes and relativizes these concerns and what one should say about these.

Very few philosophers undertake the difficult work of meeting Plato's challenge, and contribute to the unearthing of the objective basis of insight and understanding. In that field Kenneth Manders' work stands out among our contemporaries.¹⁶ Adequate illuminations of the key concepts presuppose that abstract entities have at least as much ontological legitimacy as physical objects. This legitimacy, defended in Plato's dialogues, is defended once more in the XX century by outstanding philosophers such as Kurt Goedel.¹⁷ The legitimacy is needed especially for universal-like entities that are beyond universals for sensibles, since those are of no help to the logician working on the foundation of mathematics.¹⁸ This corresponds, roughly, to the interpretation of the Forms as presented in this essay. The Forms do not include what in modern parlance we call universals for sensible properties.

Another philosopher, Paul Bernays stresses as a distinctive feature of the Platonism he endorses, that within that conception the objects and their natures are "cut off from the thinking subject".¹⁹ Unfortunately, under the influence of current materialist/naturalist tendencies in analytic philosophy, this situation has been represented as the "two world problem". But the great philosophers of mathematics of the XX century like Goedel and Bernays, did not see this as a problem at all, and nor did Plato. Rather they saw it as a crucial ingredient in some of the wonderful aspects of human nature. We are creatures who can relate both to the realm of the Forms and to sensible appearances. This fundamental fact needs no apologies or "explaining away" but rather should be stressed with admiration and excitement.

In conclusion let me make two points. One of these is that there are many other notions that are important for Plato, and should be important to science and common sense and the humanistic disciplines today, even though contemporary philosophy seems to ignore these. One of these is the problem of articulating the human cognitive endowment, an effort that started with Plato's "recollection" theory. Another is the Aristotelian notion of potentiality, already mentioned, that defies current analytic logical tools, and yet is useful in science and common sense reasoning. We also need to reexamine the Aristotelian notion of the golden mean. We involve it in everyday deliberations. For example, how much disciplining is good for a child? How firmly should one defend one's professional views? We agree that there are better and worse ways of answering such questions. But we do not have a good explanation of the capacities that underlie the "good" answers. Is it intuition? Is it a non-conscious rule system? Neither of these seems acceptable answers. We confront her an aspect of our rationality that is yet to be illuminated for our generation.

Calling this practical wisdom is not solving the problem, but only labeling it. It is also worth while to attempt to give further clarifications of Plato's ontology and epistemology in light of what we can discover about how the Greeks viewed their mathematics and geometry.²⁰ Analogous studies of Descartes and Kant have proved to be very beneficial for understanding those philosophers. We can expect similar gains from placing Plato into the context of the science of his time, either to detect some notion that he takes over from his contemporaries, or to understand some of his views as opposing what were some contemporary tendencies for him.

Needless to say, the various themes that we uncover from Plato's time have their echoes in today's philosophy of mathematics.

We should also reconceptualize what friendship is, why it was at the center of ethics for some many centuries, and why it is no longer seen as so central. (This raises also the question whether it should be restored to its previous royal position and if so, how.) These examples can be multiplied.

The second point is that though this activity places the history of philosophy at the center of one's philosophic interest, and allows us to go once more on the offensive, and not worry about how we can be relevant to other parts of philosophy, clearly it is only one of the tasks that we can undertake. There is much else left, such as further careful exploration of specific passages, and seeking what held the thought of this or that philosopher together. But what was said in the early section about our work being like bridge building, with one of the bridge-heads constantly moving applies also to these additional endeavors. Finally, this essay has as its chief end to reflect on what has been done and what could be done in such a way that it will inspire others to come up with additional exciting projects. If philosophical reflection does not spawn new ways of looking at things, what good is it?

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FOOTNOTES

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- 2) J. Moravcsik, Meaning, Creativity, and the Partial Inscrutability of the Human Mind, CSLI Publications, 1998.
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- 5) For expanded discussion of this point see Moravcsik, 1998, chapter 1.
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- 13) Moravcsik 1994 Op. cit.
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- 17) Goedel, K. "Russell's Mathematical Logic" in Benacerraf and Putnam, ed., Philosophy of Mathematics, 1944, pp. 211-232.
- 18) Ibid.
- 19) P. Bernays "On Platonism in Mathematics" in Benacerraf, Putnam Op. cit. Pp. 274-286.
- 20) Reviel Netz, forthcoming.