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David Keyt

University of Washington, keyt@u.washington.edu

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INTELLECTUALISM IN ARISTOTLE

David Keyt
University of Washington
1978

I

When Aristotle returns to the topic of happiness at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics (X.6-8) presumably to give us his final and best thoughts on the matter, he says that perfect happiness (hē teleia eudaimonia) is theoretical activity (theōretikē energeia), that happiness and contemplation (theōria) are coextensive, and that the life of reason (ho kata ton noun bios), also called the philosophic or theoretical life (I.5.1095b19, E.E. I.4.1215b1-2, et passim), is the happiest life (X.7.1177a12-18, 1178a4-8, 8.1178b7-32). He goes on to say that the life in accordance with the other excellence (ho kata tēn allēn aretēn bios)--namely, the life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral virtue, elsewhere called the political or practical life (I.5.1095b18, Pol. VII.2.1324a40)--is the second happiest life (X.8.1178a9-22). And he draws a sharp contrast between the activities that characterize the two lives: theoretical activity is leisured, aims at no end beyond itself, and is loved for its own sake whereas practical activity is unleisured, aims at an end (other than itself), and is not chosen for its own sake (X.7.1177b1-26). As for the relation between the two sorts of activity, Aristotle implies that practical activity is merely a means to theoretical activity: "...we work in order that we may have leisure and wage war in order that we may have peace" (X.7.1177b4-6).

These remarks raise a major and well-known interpretive problem about Aristotle's ethical ideal and his conception of the best life for a man, for they seem to conflict with things he says earlier in the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere. They seem to conflict, in particular, with his account of the distinction between making (poiēsis) and doing (praxis) and with the conclusion of the function argument. In distinguishing making and doing, Aristotle says that "the end of making is something different from the making, but not the end of doing; for good action (eupraxia) itself is an end" (VI.5.1140b6-7); and in arguing that the goodness of an action is unlike the goodness of a product of one of the arts, he insists that for an act to be good it must be chosen for its own sake. The goodness of a product of one of the arts (a shoe or a statue) is a quality of the work itself; but, Aristotle argues, the goodness of an act is not a quality of the act itself. One must also consider the agent's state of knowledge, his motive, and his character. For an act to be good it must be done with knowledge, it must be chosen and chosen for its own sake, and it must issue from a stable character (II.4.1105a26-b9). This account of good action appears to directly contradict Aristotle's statement in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics that practical activity, in contrast to theoretical, aims at an end (other than itself) and is not chosen for its own sake.

The conclusion of the function argument is that "the good for man turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue (kat' aretēn), and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most final" (or "most complete", teleiotatēn) (I.7.1098a16-18). There are two interpretations of teleiotatē aretē.

According to the exclusionary interpretation,² Aristotle uses the expression to single out the highest excellence, theoretical wisdom, from among the rest; and the conclusion of the argument thus foreshadows the view of the tenth book that perfect happiness (hē teleia eudaimonia) is theoretical activity. According to the inclusive interpretation,³ Aristotle uses the expression to refer to complete virtue--that is to say, to the combination of all the virtues, both moral and intellectual--and the conclusion of the argument at least prima facie conflicts with the view of the tenth book. The latter interpretation must be the correct one, for both the conceptual analysis that immediately precedes the function argument and the force of the argument itself require it.

In the passage immediately preceding the function argument Aristotle distinguishes three types of end (telos) (I.7.1097a25-b6). First, there are ends such as wealth, flutes, and instruments in general that are chosen only for the sake of other things. Secondly, there are ends such as honor, pleasure, and reason that are chosen both for their own sake and for the sake of other things. And, finally, there are ends such as happiness that are always chosen for their own sake and never for the sake of anything else. I shall call an end of the first type a "subservient" end, of the second type a "subordinate" end, and of the third type an "ultimate" end. An ultimate end is more final (teleiotes) than a subordinate end, and a subordinate end than a subservient end. Furthermore, an ultimate end cannot be made more worthy of choice by the addition of anything. For if two ends are each chosen for their own sake but both together are more worthy of choice than either separately, then there is a compound end that embraces both to which each is subordinate (see X.2.1172b23-34, and compare Top. III.2.1171a16-24 and Rhet. I.7.1363b12-21). Happiness is such an inclusive end (I.7.1097b17-20) and as such is the most final (teleiotes) end (1097a30). The subordinate ends mentioned by Aristotle--honor, pleasure, and reason (nous)--are the ends of the three lives, the political, the apolaustic, and the philosophic respectively (see I.5, 6.1096b23-24, and E.E. I.4). The thrust of the entire passage is thus that theoretical activity, the activity of nous, is a subordinate end that is included as one component among others of the ultimate end, happiness. It would seem, then, that the activity in accordance with the most final virtue referred to in the conclusion of the function argument must be the activity that constitutes the most final end--namely, activity in accordance with all the virtues, moral and intellectual.⁴

A second reason for favoring an inclusive rather than an exclusionary interpretation of the conclusion of the function argument is that the argument itself entails that the good for man is activity, not only in accordance with philosophical wisdom, but also in accordance with moral virtue and practical wisdom. In interpreting this argument I have attempted, by supplying its implicit premisses, to cast it into the form of a valid deductive argument.

Aristotle distinguishes four general functions in the animate world: to reproduce and to use food, to perceive, to move from one place to another, and to think (see De An. I.1.402b12-13, II.4.415a26, III.9.432a15-17). These four functions define three general forms of life: the nutritive and reproductive life, which is shared by all (mortal) living things (zōnta); the perceptive life, which is shared by all animals (zōa); and "the practical life of that which has a rational principle," which is special to man (I.7.1098a1-4, G.A. I.23.731a24-b8, Pol. VII.13.1332b3-5). In describing this third life as a praktikē zōē, a practical life, Aristotle is presumably using the word praktikē in a generic sense that includes theoretical activity as well as practical activity in the specific sense (see Pol. VII.3.1325b14-21). Practical activity in the specific sense must be included since "man

alone of animals is capable of deliberation" (H.A. I.1.488b24-25), and theoretical activity is implied since that which has a rational principle (ho logon echōn) is part practical and part theoretical (Pol. VII.14.1333a25-27). Aristotle does not distinguish a locomotive life since, except for a few immobile marine animals such as the oyster (P.A. IV.7.683b4-11, H.A. I.1.487b6-15), locomotion and perception are coextensive (De An. III.9.432a15-17).

That there are these four general functions in the animate world so distributed is the material premiss of the function argument. The conclusion follows when this premiss is combined with four general principles. First, one kind of mortal⁵ living thing is lower than another if, and only if, normal members of the one kind lack a function that normal members of the other possess (De An. II.2.413a20-b13, III.12); moreover, mortal living things are lower than immortal (Met. Θ.8.1050b6-7). Thus plants are lower than animals; animals with fewer sense modalities (say, touch alone) lower than those with more (say, touch and sight); and animals other than man lower than man. Secondly, a form of life or an activity of the soul⁶ is the distinctive function⁷ of a kind of living thing if, and only if, every normal member of this kind and no member of a lower kind can perform it (see I.7.1097b33-34). Thus to reproduce and use food is the distinctive function of plants; to perceive, that of the lower animals; and "activity of soul in accordance with rational principle (kata logon) or not without rational principle" (I.7.1098a7-8), that of man. It would seem to follow from this second general principle that God has no distinctive function since God's life consists entirely of theoretical activity, an activity in which man can share (X.8.1178b7-23, Met. Λ.7.1072b13-30). This is a problem that needs to be addressed, and I will return to it below. Thirdly, a good member of a kind is one that performs the distinctive function of its kind well (compared with other members of its kind) (I.7.1098a8-12). Thus a good man (spoudaios anēr) is one whose rule governed activity accords with excellence (1098a12-15). Finally, the good for--that is to say, the ultimate end of-- a member of a kind is to be a good member of its kind. Thus the good for a particular man, his most choice-worthy end, is to be a good man. This is a consequence about which one might be sceptical⁸ since there are occasions when a good man might be called upon to sacrifice his life (see IX.8.1169a18-26). But the last principle, though problematic, is absolutely crucial to the argument. For the function argument is introduced to give content to the characterization of happiness as "something final and self-sufficient, being the end of action" (I.7.1097b20-25). And without this final principle there will be no connection between the argument and this characterization. The conclusion now follows that the good for man is practical and theoretical activity that accords with excellence. Aristotle's own statement of the conclusion--"the good for man turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with excellence, and if there are several excellences, in accordance with the best and most final" (1098a16-18)--should, if possible, be interpreted as saying this; for Aristotle obviously intended the conclusion of his argument to be entailed by its premisses. Since, as we have seen, it is possible to take Aristotle to be referring in the last phrase to the combination of all the virtues or excellences and since Aristotle does intend to assert that there are several virtues, his conclusion must be that the good for man is activity of soul in accordance with the best and most complete (teleiōtatēn) virtue--namely, the combination of all the virtues, moral and intellectual. To return now to the point that led to this lengthy discussion of the function argument, this seems to contradict Aristotle's assertion in the tenth book that perfect happiness (he teleia eudaimonia) is theoretical activity alone.

II

The issue raised by the apparent conflict of Aristotle's remarks in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics with those expressed earlier in the treatise and in other works⁹ is that of the relation of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue to the best life for a man--the relation of moral action to happiness. Does Aristotle abandon in Book X the view of Book I and elsewhere that moral activity is a subordinate end, a component of happiness, in favor of the view that it is merely a subservient end, only a means to happiness?

The difference between a component and a means may be illustrated by the difference between the activity of an ancient choregus in selecting the members of a chorus, outfitting it with costumes and masks, and providing for its training, which is one of the means to a dramatic performance, and the activity of the chorus in the performance of a play, which is a component, though perhaps a secondary component, of the dramatic performance itself.¹⁰ This distinction is similar to one that Aristotle himself draws between a part (meros) and a necessary condition¹¹ that is not a part (E.E. I.2.1214b11-27, Pol. VII.8.1328a21-b4, 9.1329a34-39). A citizen, for example, is a part of a polis (Pol. III.1.1274b38-41) whereas property is not a part but only a necessary condition (Pol. VII.8.1328a33-35). Eating meat and taking a walk after dinner are for some people necessary conditions of health without being themselves parts of health (E.E. I.2.1214b14-24).

In Book X Aristotle seems to be espousing the view, which I shall call "strict intellectualism," that theoretical activity is the sole component of the best life for a man and that practical activity has value only as a means to theoretical activity. Some scholars have attributed this view to him without hesitation: Alexander Grant,¹² for example, in the nineteenth century and John Cooper¹³ today.¹⁴ But some hesitation is in order. For strict intellectualism, as is well known,¹⁴ in addition to being inconsistent with the doctrine of Book I, has unpalatable moral consequences, which Aristotle (at least in his more worldly moments) would not accept. According to strict intellectualism it would be right for one person to steal from or to defraud another in order to obtain the wealth required to have the leisure for theoretical activity, for on this view the end justifies the means. But Aristotle says that theft is always wrong: "It is not possible ever to be right with regard to these things [namely, such things as adultery, theft, and murder], but to do them is always to be wrong" (II.6.1107a14-15). Aristotle may be espousing strict intellectualism in Book X without being aware of its unpalatable consequences or in spite of them. Still, it may be worthwhile to try once more to rescue Aristotle's ethical philosophy from inconsistency and immorality.

One possibility is that Aristotle is embracing a moderate rather than a strict intellectualism in Book X. By "moderate intellectualism" I mean the view that theoretical activity is the primary but not the sole component of the best life for a man, moral action being a secondary component. Moderate, unlike strict, intellectualism is consistent with the doctrine of Book I. But there are several versions of moderate intellectualism corresponding to the various ways of combining moral and intellectual activity while preserving the primacy of the latter. And some of these have consequences almost as unpalatable as those of strict intellectualism. So it will be well before turning to Book X to sort and grade the various possibilities.

Suppose that moral action, as moderate intellectualism affirms, has value in


itself and not simply as a means to theoretical activity. The value it has independently will then either be commensurable¹⁵ with the value of theoretical activity or not. Suppose it is commensurable. In this case the independent value of moral action can always be weighed against the value of theoretical activity; and when a situation arises in which one must choose between engaging in contemplative activity and performing some moral action, the activity of lesser value can be sacrificed for that of greater value with the aim of maximizing the total value in one's life. I shall call this the "trade-off" view. According to it, the value of theoretical activity, which for Aristotle resembles the activity of God, is related to the independent value of moral activity, activity that is wholly human, as the value of gold is to silver. The details of this view--namely, how to measure the value of moral and theoretical activity and how to balance the value of the one activity against the value of the other--are difficult to envisage, but the view is sufficiently precise for one to see some of its consequences. Since on the trade-off view the value of a moral action can sometimes exceed that of a competing theoretical activity, an adherent of the view will sometimes sacrifice theoretical for moral activity. He might, for example, trade an hour of contemplative activity for an act of liberality or munificence. Similarly, the owner of a silver mine might pay his workers in gold. On the other hand, it would be right according to the trade-off view for a person who is poor but intelligent to steal from or to defraud another person if this were the only means he had to obtain the wealth required to have the leisure for theoretical activity. For the value of an act of honesty (in this case refraining from theft or fraud) can, on this view, be outweighed by the value of a certain amount of theoretical activity. An adherent of the trade-off view will, of course, have scruples in many cases where the strict intellectualist will not since the former, unlike the latter, needs always to consider whether the end of theoretical activity can be achieved without acting contrary to the moral virtues and, if not, whether the theoretical activity sought is worth the moral cost.

Suppose, to take the other alternative, that moral action has value in itself and not simply as a means to theoretical activity but that the value it has independently is incommensurable with (and thus cannot be weighed against) the value of theoretical activity. One will want to consider in this case whether theoretical activity is absolutely prior to moral activity or not. If it is, we have the "absolute priority" view. An adherent of this view will act on the precept, Maximize theoretical activity first; then maximize moral activity. Thus he will perform moral actions for their own sake but only when they do not interfere with his theoretical activity. He will never, for example, sacrifice a moment of theoretical activity, however uninspired, for a disinterested moral action, however noble. The consequences of this view are only slightly less unpalatable than those of strict intellectualism. Unlike the strict intellectualist, whose attitude toward any action that neither promotes nor hinders his theoretical activity is indifference, an adherent of the absolute priority view will act in accordance with the moral virtues when unable to contemplate or to do anything that will promote his theoretical activity; but, like the strict intellectualist, he will do anything, however base, that promotes his theoretical activity.

Suppose, to take the final case, that theoretical activity is the primary and moral action a secondary component of the best life for a man, that the value that moral action has in itself is incommensurable with the value of theoretical activity, but that theoretical activity is not absolutely prior to moral action. There is a view that fits this description. According to it,

theoretical activity is more desirable than moral activity--one would spend all of one's time engaged in it if that were humanly possible, which it isn't--and is in this sense the primary component of happiness. But what is most desirable must be pursued within the constraints placed upon a person by his bodily nature, by his family and friends, and by his polis. The idea is that theoretical activity is to be maximized but only within the constraints of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue. Moral activity is the foundation and theoretical activity the superstructure of the best life for a man. Moral action will not, on this view, be absolutely prior to theoretical activity. This view is not simply the converse of the preceding one. The demands of civic and domestic life are so indefinite and potentially so all consuming that there would be few, if any, opportunities for contemplation if moral activity were given absolute priority over theoretical. Such a priority would violate the primacy of theoretical activity. According to the "superstructure" view, the moral life sets certain minimum requirements that must be satisfied before one is to engage in theoretical activity; but the view does not demand that one should never shirk a duty, however trivial, for an opportunity to contemplate. Where the line is drawn will presumably be determined by the moral intuition of the practically wise man (ho phronimos).

The following table displays the various possibilities:



III

Ackrill's and Cooper's acute but divergent discussions of Aristotle's account of eudaimonia exemplify in various ways each of the four specific possibilities.

Ackrill maintains that "the question [how theoria and virtuous action would combine in the best human life] is incapable of even an outline answer that Aristotle could accept" ("Eudaimonia", p. 357). Ackrill reaches this conclusion because it seems to him that Aristotle's theology and anthropology together

yield a consequence that is irreconcilable with his respect for ordinary moral views. Ackrill's argument, as I interpret him, goes like this. According to Aristotle's theology, the divine is incommensurably more valuable than the merely human. And, according to his anthropology, man is "a compound of 'something divine' and much that is not divine"(p.358). Theoria is the activity of man's divine component while virtuous action belongs to his earthly nature. Therefore, theoria is "incommensurably more valuable" than virtuous action (p. 357) and in the best life for man must be given absolute priority over it (pp. 357-58). Aristotle's anthropology and theology thus lead to what I called the "absolute priority" view. But this view, Ackrill points out, has the consequence "that one should do anything however monstrous if doing it has the slightest tendency to promote theoria..."(p.358)--a consequence that Aristotle must find "paradoxical" (*ibid.*) since he wishes to adhere "reasonably closely to ordinary moral views" (p. 357).

"The only way to avoid such paradoxical and inhuman consequences," Ackrill believes, "would be to allow a certain amount of compromise and trading between theoria and virtuous action, treating the one as more important but not incomparably more important than the other" (p. 358). Ackrill thus for his own part endorses the trade-off view. But he seems to be mistaken in supposing that this view does not share some of the paradoxical consequences of the absolute priority view and in supposing that the trade-off view is the only alternative available.

Cooper, in fact, attributes to Aristotle a view different from any that Ackrill considers. He finds what I have called the "superstructure" view in the Eudemian Ethics, in Books VII and VIII of the Politics, and in the middle books of the Nicomachean Ethics--namely, "a conception of human flourishing [eudaimonia] that makes provision for two fundamental ends--morally virtuous activity and intellectual activity of the highest kind. Neither of these is subordinate to the other; moral virtue comes first, in the sense that it must be provided for first, but once moral virtue is securely entrenched, then intellectual goods are allowed to predominate" (*op. cit.*, pp. 142-43). Cooper believes, however, that Aristotle adopts an intellectualist ideal of the best life in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics and that he paves the way for this ideal in Book I (pp. 100, 147-48, *et passim*). By "intellectualism" Cooper means "the view that human flourishing consists exclusively in pure intellectual activity of the best kind" (p. 90)--the view that I have called "strict intellectualism." What leads Aristotle to embrace strict intellectualism, according to Cooper, is his doctrine that "one is his theoretical mind" (p. 168). Aristotle does not, on Cooper's interpretation, completely abandon the superstructure view; the life described by this view is simply downgraded in the final book of the Nicomachean Ethics from best to second best (pp. 177-80).

Cooper is led to this interpretation of Book X partly by a philological consideration--namely, by what he thinks Aristotle can and cannot mean by the Greek word bios ("life"). This matter needs to be examined since it raises a fundamental issue of how Aristotle is to be read.

IV

What does Aristotle mean by a "life," a bios? The traditional answer is that each of the various "lives" that Aristotle mentions--the apolaustic,¹⁶ the

political,¹⁷ the philosophic,¹⁸ the agricultural,¹⁹ the military,²⁰ and so forth-- is a personification of an abstraction.²¹ On this interpretation none of these lives need be more than one aspect of the total life led by some particular person. Thus the life of a person like Xenophon might combine the military, the political, the agricultural, and the literary.²²

Cooper has challenged this idea (op. cit. pp. 159-60). He denies that the word bios can be used in Greek to refer to an aspect or phase of a person's total life. According to Cooper, the word "means always '(mode of) life', and in any one period of time one can only have one mode of life." "Hence," he concludes, "when Aristotle contrasts an 'intellectual life (bios)' with a 'moral life (bios)', he cannot mean...the intellectual life and the moral life of a single person. The Greek expression can only mean two different lives led by two different kinds of persons." Cooper here is making two distinct claims. The first and weaker claim denies that one person can live two or more distinct bioi synchronously but does not rule out the possibility that a person might lead one bios at one time and another bios at another time--that a person might, for example, lead an agricultural life during one part of the year and a military life during another. The second and stronger claim denies, or seems to deny, that one person can live two or more distinct bioi either synchronously or successively.

There are passages in Plato and Aristotle that refute both claims. In his discussion of domestic economy in the first book of the Politics Aristotle lists five lives (bioi) that procure their sustenance through their own work rather than through the exchange of goods--the pastoral, the agricultural, the piratical, the life of fishing, and the life of hunting (I.8.1256a40-b1). Aristotle goes on to say that some people combine one mode of life with another when the one is insufficient for their needs--for example, "some live a pastoral and piratical life at the same time (hama), others an agricultural and hunting life, and similarly with the others" (1256b2-6). This passage shows that the stronger claim about the word bios, that one person cannot live two or more distinct bioi either synchronously or successively, is clearly false. But in spite of the occurrence of the word hama, it probably does not refute the weaker claim as well. For Aristotle presumably does not mean to say that some people hunt while they plow but rather that within some interval of time--a year, say--they both hunt and plow.

That the weaker claim is also false is demonstrated by a passage in Plato's Laws (V.733D7-734E2). Plato considers four lives (bioi)--the temperate, the brave, the wise, and the healthy--and their opposites--the profligate, the cowardly, the foolish, and the diseased--and maintains that each of the first four is pleasanter than its opposite. He concludes from this that the life of excellence with respect to the body or the soul--that is to say, the life that combines, and of course combines synchronously, the first four lives--is pleasanter than the life of depravity, which combines the four opposite lives.

Thus it is clear that the Greek word bios can be used to signify, not only a person's total life, but also one particular phase or aspect of it. Furthermore, there are positive indications that Aristotle intended, at least in Nicomachean Ethics X.7-8, to signify two distinct aspects of a total life by "the life of reason" (ho kata ton noun bios) (1178a6-7) and "the life in accordance with the other excellence" (ho kata ten allēn bios) (1178a9). For he says that a person lives the one life "as possessor of something divine" (hē theion ti en autō huparchei) (1177b28)--that is to say, as demigod--while he lives the other "as he is man" (hē anthrōpos estin) (1177b27, 1178b5). And Aristotle uses this hē ('as',

'qua') locution as part of his standard terminology to signify one aspect of a thing in abstraction from all others. He says, to take a simple example, that "the infinite qua infinite is unknowable" (Phys. I.4.187b7; see also III.6.207a25-26) meaning by this that an infinite object need not be completely unknowable but only in the respect in which it is infinite: if a surface were infinitely long but only an inch wide, one could know its width but not its length. Or, to consider another example, speaking of natural science Aristotle says that "there are many statements about things merely qua moving (hē kinoumena), apart from what each thing is and from their incidental properties" (Met. M.3.1077b23-24).

There is now an answer, or a sort of answer, to a puzzle that arose in analyzing the function argument. It seemed that of all living things God alone lacked a distinctive function since his only activity, contemplation, is an activity in which man can share. The answer is that man does not engage in this activity as man but only as possessor of something divine--namely, reason or nous.²³ In so far as man can contemplate he is a god himself.

V

The way is now clear for an interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics X.6-8 that minimizes the conflict between it and the rest of the work. Aristotle begins his final and consummative discussion of happiness by considering whether happiness lies in play (X.6). This preliminary discussion raises at least two interpretive questions. First, what exactly is the view that Aristotle is considering? And, secondly, what contribution, if any, does this discussion make to Aristotle's ultimate conclusion that perfect happiness is theoretical activity?

The word paidia, along with two other words that figure in the discussion in chapter 6, paidikos ('childish')(1176b33) and paizein ('to play like a child'-- then: 'to play', 'to jest', 'to dance', 'to sing', 'to play at a game')(1176b30, 33), is derived from the word pais ('child')(1176b22, 23). This derivation undoubtedly assists the conclusion of chapter 6 that happiness does not lie in play (1176b27-28): since a pais is atelēs (undeveloped)(see Pol. I.12.1259b3-4), paidia can hardly be the telos (end) of a man (see E.E. II.1.1219b4-8).

The range of application of the word paidia is very wide. In Plato, for example, paidia covers among other things children's games (Polit. 308D3-4, Laws 643B4-D4, 793E3-794A4), war games (Laws 829B7-C1), singing and dancing (Laws 803E1-2), the mimetic arts from dancing to drama (Soph. 234B1ff., Rep. 602B6-10, Polit. 288C1-10), religious sacrifices (Laws 803E1), puns (Crat. 406C3-4), and carousing (Prot. 347D6, Laws 673E8ff.). Human life for Plato is divided into just two phases--play (paidia) and seriousness (spoudē)(for the dichotomy see Rep. 602B8, Polit. 288C9-10, Laws 643B6, 647D6-7, 732D6, 797A7ff., 942A8)--play being a preparation for, a means to, or a relaxation from serious endeavors (Laws 643B4-D4, 796A1-D5, Phil. 30E6-7). It is not so clear what activities Aristotle counts as paidiai, for he is not as lavish with examples as Plato. But a few examples may be gleaned from the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. He mentions children's games (Pol. VII.17.1336a21-30) and urbane and witty conversation (eutrapelia)(E.N. II.7.1108a23-26 and IV.8) and reports the common view that the purpose of sleep, drink, music, and dance is play and relaxation (Pol. VIII.5.1339a14-21). Interestingly, in chapter 6 Aristotle alludes to the things valued among boys (1176b22), to those who are ready-witted (eutrapeloi) in the

pastimes of tyrants (1176b12-16), and to the bodily pleasures (1176b19-21, 1177a6-7) (under which would fall the pleasures of sleeping, drinking, and dancing).

The association of play with the bodily pleasures connects the discussion in chapter 6 with that of the apolaustic life in I.5.²⁴ The two discussions are also connected by one of Aristotle's reasons for considering the view that happiness lies in play--namely, that the pleasures of play seem to be chosen for their own sake (1176b9-11). For it is Aristotle's view that the apolaustic life is the only life, besides the political and the philosophic, that is chosen for its own sake. Aristotle notes in the Eudemian Ethics that there are other modes of life besides these three--for example, that of the laborer (ho thēs), the artisan (ho banausos technitēs), and the trader (ho agopaios)--but he believes that they are always entered into for the sake of the necessities of life (ta anagkaia) (E.E. I.4.1215a25-32), not for their own sake (see I.5.1096a5-7). All who happen to have the means, he remarks, choose to live either a political, a philosophic, or an apolaustic life (E.E. I.4.1215a35-36). It seems, therefore, that the life of play and the apolaustic life are the same.

Aristotle offers two reasons for supposing that happiness lies in the pleasures of play: the one just mentioned, that they seem to be chosen for their own sake, not for the sake of anything else; and, secondly, that they are pursued by persons deemed happy such as tyrants and others in positions of power (1176b9-17). Both reasons are rejected: tyrants are not trustworthy judges any more than (immature) boys (1176b17-27); and in the proper ordering of life play is a relaxation from toil and a means to further exertion, not an end in itself (1176b28-1177a1).²⁵ Aristotle rounds off his discussion of play with the following argument, the major premisses of which play a leading role in the discussion in chapters 7 and 8. "The happy life seems to be a life in accordance with excellence." The activity of one's higher faculties accords more with excellence and is thus more conducive to happiness than that of one's lower faculties. But play does not engage one's higher faculties. Therefore, happiness cannot lie in play (1177a1-11).

The stage is now set for the discussion of chapters 7 and 8. One of the three nominees for happiest life has been eliminated. Thus if one of the two remaining candidates can be shown to be happier than the other, it will follow that this one is also the happiest life possible.

VI

In chapter 7 Aristotle considers in turn six attributes that seem (dokei) to characterize the activity that constitutes happiness or the happy life. (For the form of the various conjuncts of the major premiss of Aristotle's argument see 1177a1-2, b4.) The six are collected from different sources. The first comes from the conclusion of the function argument and reflects a philosophical thesis; the others reflect various common opinions (endoxa) about happiness and goodness. Thus the activity that constitutes happiness seems to be:

- (1) in accordance with excellence (kat' aretēn) (1177a1-2, 12; compare I.7.1098a16-17).
- (2) continuous (sunechēs) (1177a21-22; compare I.10.1100b11-22, IX.9.1170a4-8, and Rhet. I.7.1364b30-31).

- (3) pleasurable (hēdus) (1177a22-23; compare I.8.1099a7-31, VII.13.1153b14-15, IX.9.1170a4, and Rhet. I.7.1364b23, 1365b11-13).
- (4) self-sufficient (autarkēs) (1177a27-28; compare I.7.1097b6-16, IX.9.1169b4-5, and Rhet. I.7.1364a5-9).
- (5) loved for itself (di' hautēn agapasthai) (1176b2-5, 1177b1-2; compare 1097a34-b6 and Rhet. I.6.1362a21-22, 7.1364a1-5).
- (6) leisured (scholastikon) (1177b4, 22).

If the attribute under consideration admits of degrees, Aristotle argues that theoretical activity (theoria) possesses it to a higher degree than practical (that is moral and political) activity (praxis) (1177a12-b1). If the attribute does not admit of degrees, he argues that it characterizes theoretical but not practical activity (1177b1-15).²⁶ Aristotle then infers (1177b16-26) that perfect (or complete) happiness (hē teleia eudaimonia) is theoretical activity or, alternatively expressed, that the life of reason--the theoretical life--is the happiest life.²⁷

As it stands, this is not a valid argument. For one thing it does not rule out the possibility that some third type of activity--making pots, writing dramas, or reveling in the bodily pleasures--is superior to both theoretical and practical activity in respect of the six attributes under consideration. For another it allows the possibility that the list of attributes is incomplete, that the six considered do not include all that are essential to an activity that constitutes happiness. Furthermore, the conclusion is categorical--"The life of reason is the happiest life" (1178a7-8)--whereas the conjuncts of the major premiss are qualified--"The happy life seems to be a life in accordance with excellence" (1177a1-2). The solution of the first weakness is to add the implicit conclusion of chapter 6, that happiness consists of either theoretical or practical activity, as an additional premiss. As for the other two weaknesses, I shall simply assume, in order to raise a more interesting question about the argument, that Aristotle intended his major premiss to be read in a strengthened form--that he intended to assert that the attributes he considers actually do characterize, rather than merely seem to characterize, any activity that constitutes happiness and that the six he considers include all that are essential to an activity that constitutes happiness.

The more interesting question concerns the interpretation of Aristotle's conclusion--that he teleia eudaimonia is theoretical activity or, alternatively expressed, that the theoretical bios is the happiest bios. What exactly is the force of this assertion? Does Aristotle mean to assert, as Cooper claims, "that the best plan of life is to pursue constantly the single end of theoretical contemplation in preference to all else" (op. cit., p. 156)? Does he mean that the best total life for a man is one in which theoretical activity is constantly, exclusively, and (of course) successfully pursued? Or is he making the more modest assertion, as Stewart and Gauthier claim, that the best element of the best total life for a man is its theoretical activity?²⁸ As I have argued in section IV above, Aristotle's use of the word bios coupled with hē not only permits but supports the latter interpretation. The word teleia in hē teleia eudaimonia, on the other hand, is perfectly ambiguous and allows either interpretation. In Metaphysics Δ.16 Aristotle distinguishes three senses of teleios:

- (1) having all of its parts: captured in English by the word 'complete', as the complete time (chronos teleios) of a thing (1021b12-14).
- (2) being best of its kind: captured in English by the word 'perfect', as a perfect doctor (teleios iatros), perfect thief, or perfect circle

(1021b14-23, *Phys.* VII.3.246a13-16).

- (3) having reached its end (*télos*): captured in English by such expressions as 'fully realized' and 'fully developed' and predicated, for example, of an adult in contrast to a child (1021b23-30, *Pol.* I.12.1259b3-4).²⁹

If *teleia* has sense (1) in the expression *hē teleia eudaimonia*, then Aristotle's conclusion expresses the strict intellectualist view that complete (or total) happiness is theoretical activity. If *teleia* has either sense (2) or sense (3), then his conclusion can be given a weaker, moderate intellectualist interpretation--that perfect or fully realized, as distinct from complete, happiness is theoretical activity.

Both formulations of Aristotle's conclusion will thus bear a moderate intellectualist interpretation. Although such an interpretation even seems indicated for one of the two, the perfect ambiguity of the other makes one hesitate to claim on the basis of an analysis of the verbal formulations alone that such an interpretation of Aristotle's conclusion is demanded. One must also consider Aristotle's argument. What sort of intellectualism does it entail--moderate or strict? If Aristotle's argument entails one view but not the other, this is a good reason for attributing the one rather than the other to him.³⁰

On one interpretation strict intellectualism is entailed by that part of Aristotle's argument which is based on the philosophical idea that the activity that constitutes happiness is activity in accordance with excellence. This subargument opens (1177a12-21) and closes (1177b26-1178a8) chapter 7, though its leading ideas are introduced at the end of Aristotle's discussion of play (6.1177a1-11). Most English translations of these passages obscure the simple relations between the key terms of the argument and make it almost unintelligible, so a few elementary comments about its terminology are in order. The argument is based on the noun *aretē* ('goodness', 'excellence', 'virtue')(see 1177a2, 10, 12, 17, b29) and three forms of the comparative and superlative of its simple adjective *agathos* ('good'):

comparative: 'better'
beltiōn (1177a3, 4, 6)
kreittōn (1177a6, b26)
ameinōn (1178a3)

superlative: 'best'
beltistos
kratistos (1177a13, 19, b34, 1178a5-6)
aristos (1177a13)

Rendered literally, the argument of 1177a1-21 runs as follows:

1. Happiness is activity in accordance with goodness (a1-2, 12).
2. And the activity of the better part of a man is better and hence more conducive to happiness (a5-6).
3. So the activity of the best part is best and most conducive to happiness (see a12-13).
4. Reason (*nous*) is the best thing in us, and its objects are the best of knowable objects (a20-21, see Stewart, *ad loc.*).
5. Therefore, the activity of reason is the best activity and the one most conducive to happiness. As Aristotle expresses it, "...the activity [of reason] in accordance with its proper goodness will be *hē teleia eudaimonia*" (a16-17).

The premisses of this argument entail, not that theoretical activity is complete happiness, but only that it is perfect or fully realized happiness.

But when Aristotle returns to this theme at the end of chapter 7, he seems to advance beyond his earlier claim that reason is the best (but not the only) thing in us and to claim now that a man and his reason are identical: "This [viz. reason] would also seem to be each man, since it is the authoritative and better part. Thus it would be odd if he were to choose not his own life but that of someone else" (1178a2-4). Similar assertions occur in two earlier passages in Book IX (4.1166a10-23, 8.1168b28-1169a18). However, the element or faculty with which a man is (or seems to be) identified is not the same in the two books. In Book IX the thinking or reasoning element (to dianoētikon, to nooun, nous) with which a man seems to be identified (1166a16-17, 22-23, 1168b35), since it has the ability to guide action and to control the passions, must be either his practical reason³¹ or his intellect as a whole³²--practical, productive, and theoretical. In Book X, on the other hand, the reason in question must be the theoretical reason alone.³³ For its activity is said to be theoretical (1177a17-18 et passim), and practical wisdom (prōnēsis) is explicitly distinguished from it (8.1178a16-22).³⁴ But, in spite of these differences, the passages in Book IX, as we shall see, provide the clue to the proper interpretation of 1178a2-4.

Now, if a man is strictly identical with his theoretical reason and if practical reason is not a part of theoretical reason, then practical reason is not a part of a man. On the strict-identity hypothesis practical reason will be merely something without which a man cannot exist, like food (Met. A.5.1015b20-22)--not a part of man but only a necessary condition of his existence.³⁵ Practical and theoretical reason will be related as the lower and higher order in Aristotle's ideal state (see Pol. VI.4.1291a24-28 and VII.8-9). The warriors, officeholders, and priests who compose its higher order are its parts. The farmers, craftsmen, and tradesmen who compose its lower order, though the state cannot exist without them, are not parts of it: their role is to serve the members of the higher order. On the strict-identity hypothesis practical reason will be subservient to theoretical in just the same way; and Aristotle will, as Cooper claims (op. cit. pp. 162-63), be embracing strict intellectualism.

But does Aristotle really mean to claim that a man is strictly identical with his theoretical reason? There is good reason for thinking not since his statement that reason "would also seem to be each man" (1178a2) is immediately qualified: "...for man, then, the life according to reason [is best and pleasantest], since this [viz. reason] most of all (malista) is man" (a6-7). To be most of all man is to be less than, and so nonidentical with, man.³⁶ That this reservation is seriously intended is indicated by its earlier appearance in the two passages in Book IX where a man is identified with his thinking faculty. In the first of these Aristotle says that "the reasoning element would seem to be, or to be most of all (ē malista), each man" (4.1166a22-23); and the reservation is repeated in almost the same words in the second--"That this [viz. reason] is, or is most of all (ē malista), each man is clear" (8.1169a2). But to claim that reason is the most important, but not the sole, part of a man is simply to reiterate a premiss--namely, line (4)--of the argument of 1177a1-21, an argument that does not entail strict intellectualism.

Other parts of the overall argument of chapter 7 that need to be examined are those in which Aristotle tries to show that theoretical activity is leisured and alone loved for its own sake whereas military and political activities (the pre-eminent practical activities) are not chosen for their own sakes and are unleisured (1177b1-24). Aristotle offers the same consideration in support of both conclusions--namely, that military and political activities aim at an external end but

theoretical activity does not, a claim that seems to conflict with his earlier assertion that "good action itself is an end" (VI.5.1140b7).³⁷ The conclusion that theoretical activity alone is loved for its own sake in conjunction with Aristotle's earlier requirement that the activity that constitutes happiness must be chosen for its own sake (X.6.1176b2-5) entails that theoretical activity is the sole component of happiness (strict intellectualism). Given the association of theoretical activity with leisure and military and political activities with work, Aristotle's statement that "we work in order that we may have leisure and wage war in order that we may have peace" (1177b4-6) points to the same interpretation; for it seems to imply that practical activity has value only as a means to theoretical.

In examining these two subarguments the first thing to notice is that the conflict between Aristotle's various remarks on action is only apparent. Good action on Aristotle's theory is typically double-barreled, the target of one barrel being different from that of the other. A man may act in accordance with a particular virtue such as temperance, bravery, or justice for the sake of the particular temperate, brave, or just act itself; and he may also at the same time seek an end apart from the action--a telos para tēn praxin--such as health or victory or the reform of a wrongdoer. Although this distinction between an internal and an external end is never drawn explicitly by Aristotle, it underlies his treatment of bravery³⁸ and once drawn provides a key to several puzzles in Aristotle's ethics. The brave man on the field of battle wishes to do two things: to attain the morally beautiful (to kalon) while avoiding the morally ugly (to aischron)³⁹ and to defeat his enemy while avoiding death and wounds.⁴⁰ And like Hector facing Achilles he may attain the one goal but not the other.⁴¹ (Failure to attain the external goal may mean, as it did to Hector and his family, the destruction of happiness [see I.10.1100b22-1101a8].) Aristotle's remarks on action appear to conflict because some refer to the internal, some to the external end.⁴²

Unfortunately, Aristotle does not always keep this distinction clearly in mind. Otherwise he would not have inferred that theoretical activity "alone"⁴³ would seem to be loved for its own sake" from the premiss that "nothing arises from it apart from the theorizing, whereas from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action" (1177b1-4). Even the statement that theoretical activity alone is loved for its own sake alone, which Hardie says is "what he ought to say, and must mean,"⁴⁴ does not follow from the premiss; for there are actions such as bravely facing death from a terminal illness that have no external end but are performed entirely for their own sakes.⁴⁵ Thus even though the conclusion of this subargument in conjunction with the requirement that the activity that constitutes happiness must be chosen for its own sake entails strict intellectualism, Aristotle's reason for accepting the conclusion itself is inadequate. To my mind, the invalid conclusion of this subargument is the only basis Aristotle provides for a strict intellectualist interpretation of chapter 7.

The distinction between an internal and an external end of action is also helpful in interpreting Aristotle's remark that "we work in order that we may have leisure and wage war in order that we may have peace" (1177b4-6). If an action can be performed for its own sake as well as for an end apart from the action, then work can have value both in itself and as a means to peace and leisure. The munificent man who uses his wealth to outfit a trireme (IV.2.1122a24, b23), though he wishes to help secure the safety of his polis, acts also for the sake of the morally beautiful (1122b6-7, 1123a24-27).⁴⁶ Moreover, Aristotle's distinction between work and leisure does not correspond to his distinction between practical

and theoretical activity. The moral virtues have a role to play in both phases of life: "Bravery and endurance are needed for work, philosophy for leisure, temperance and justice at both times, and more especially when men observe peace and have leisure; for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the possession of leisure accompanied by peace makes them rather insolent" (Pol. VII.15.1334a22-28). Aristotle's remark that work is for the sake of leisure thus does not imply strict intellectualism.

VII

Chapter 8 contains three additional arguments for the conclusion that perfect happiness is theoretical activity. (1) The gods are paradigms of happiness but their lives consist entirely of theoretical, rather than practical or productive, activity; "so of human activities that which is most akin to this is the most conducive to happiness" (1178b7-23). (2) The whole of the life of the gods, consisting as it does of ceaseless contemplation, is blessed (makarios); so too is the life of man in so far as it is spent in such activity; but none of the lower animals are happy since they in no way share in contemplation. "As far, then, as contemplation extends, so also does happiness; and to those to whom contemplation more fully belongs happiness also more fully belongs, not incidentally but in virtue of the contemplation." Therefore, happiness is a kind of contemplation (b24-32). (3) He who exercises his (theoretical) reason is most loved by the gods; those most loved by the gods are the happiest; therefore, the wise man is the happiest (1179a22-32).

The second argument requires examination, for the part of it that is directly quoted seems to identify happiness and contemplation straightforwardly and, consequently, to be an unambiguous expression of strict intellectualism. But the argument will, I think, bear another interpretation. The second argument follows directly upon the first and begins with the words "A proof, too, is that..." (sēmeion de kai...). This indicates that it is intended to establish the same conclusion as the first--namely, that hē teleia eudaimonia is theoretical activity (1178b7-8). Now, if hē teleia eudaimonia means, as it seems to, perfect or fully realized rather than complete happiness throughout X.7-8 and if makarios and eudaimonia mean teleia eudaimonia in argument (2), then Aristotle's statement that happiness and contemplation are coextensive will mean simply that perfect or fully realized happiness is coextensive with contemplation. But this assertion is compatible with a moderate intellectualism that allows a place for the secondary happiness of moral and political activity. This interpretation also resolves a small puzzle about the argument--namely, that Aristotle's explanation of the fact that happiness is not attributed to the lower animals seems inadequate. They are incapable of happiness, one would suppose, not simply because they are incapable of contemplating but also because they are incapable of practical thinking.⁴⁷ But if Aristotle is thinking only of perfect or fully realized happiness, his explanation is completely adequate.

VIII

Thus with the exception of the one statement that theoretical activity "alone would seem to be loved for its own sake" (1177b1-2) there seems to be nothing in X.6-8 that is inconsistent with a moderate intellectualism and with the rest of

the Nicomachean Ethics. This is a fairly weak conclusion. Can it be strengthened? Is there anything in these three chapters that can be taken to be an expression of moderate intellectualism? In particular, can anything be taken to be an expression of the only reasonable version of moderate intellectualism--namely, the superstructure view according to which theoretical activity is to be maximized within the constraints of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue?

Aristotle's famous injunction "as far as possible to immortalize oneself and to do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best thing in oneself [viz. the theoretical reason]" (7.1177b33-34) is an expression of the superstructure view if the restriction signified by the words "as far as possible" includes moral restrictions as well as those of mind, body, and estate. Does it? The answer to this question can be gleaned, I think, from a passage in chapter 8 where Aristotle is discussing the extent to which the theoretical life and the life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral virtue need external equipment and where he seems for once to combine the two lives: "The person who contemplates has no need of such things [viz. external goods] for his activity; but they are ~~so~~ to speak even impediments, at least to contemplation; however, as he is a man and lives with a number of others, he chooses to do those things that are in accordance with [scil. moral] virtue; he will therefore need such things with a view to living as a man" (1178b3-7). Here Aristotle states explicitly that the person who contemplates (ho theōrōn), qua man, chooses to act in accordance with moral virtue.⁴⁸ Arthur Adkins in a recent article remarks, however, that Aristotle "does not tell us when he chooses: he may well mean 'chooses when theoria is not available.'⁴⁹ On Adkins' interpretation the author of this passage might without inconsistency condone the conduct of a man who refused to interrupt his theoretical activity in order to rescue a neighbor from a burning building. Thus Adkins believes the passage to be consistent with what I have called the "absolute priority" view--the view whose precept is, Maximize theoretical activity first; then maximize moral activity. But there are at least two reasons for rejecting Adkins' interpretation. First, Aristotle says that the person who contemplates, qua man, chooses to act in accordance with moral virtue. But a person is not a man--that is to say, a human being--at one moment and at another not. He is a human being all of his life just as he is always an animal and always a living thing. Thus once the moral virtues are acquired he is always prepared to act in accordance with them. Secondly, possession of the moral virtues would seem to be inconsistent with their erratic exercise. The brave man defends his polis whenever the enemy attacks, not just at his convenience. Thus if the person who contemplates, qua man, chooses to act in accordance with bravery, he must always be prepared to sacrifice theoretical activity for battle. So this passage does not seem to be consistent with the absolute priority view. It seems better to take it as picking up the theme of the function argument, the centerpiece of Book One: namely, that the various aspects of a person's total life--his life as a living thing, as an animal, as a man, and as a demigod--form a hierarchy with the higher aspects resting on and presupposing the lower.

If my interpretation is correct, Aristotle does indeed subscribe to the superstructure view: one should seek to immortalize oneself but only within the bounds of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue.⁵⁰

Footnotes

1. All Aristotelian references are to the Nicomachean Ethics unless otherwise identified.
2. W. F. R. Hardie, "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics," Philosophy, XL (1965), p. 280 and John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975), pp. 99-100.
3. J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," Proceedings of the British Academy, LX (1974), pp. 351-354.
4. In this paragraph I am following Ackrill's lead.
5. For the restriction see De An. II.2.413a31-32, 3.415a7-11.
6. For the equation of zōē and psuchēs energeia see I.7.1098a13.
7. Its ergon idion (Pol. II.5.1263a40) as distinct from its koina erga (G.A. I.23.731a30-31).
8. See P. Glassen, "A Fallacy in Aristotle's Argument about the Good," The Philosophical Quarterly (October, 1957) and J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Ethics (New York, 1973), pp. 20, 244.
9. Most notably in E.E. II.1 especially 1219a35-39. See Cooper, op. cit., pp. 116-118.
10. For other illustrations of the distinction see L. H. G. Greenwood's commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, 1909), pp. 46-47.
11. hou aneu ouk endechetai, literally: "that without which it is not possible."
12. "sophia, while producing happiness, is identical with it: but politikē is to happiness as means to end" (The Ethics of Aristotle [London, 1885], vol. II, p. 336).
13. See below.
14. See Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," p. 358 and Cooper, op. cit., pp. 149-50.
15. sumblētos, compare Pol. III.12.1283a3ff.
16. ho apolaustikos bios, I.5.1095b17.
17. ho politikos bios, I.5.1095b18.
18. ho philosophos bios, E.E. I.4.1215b1.
19. ho geōrgikos bios, Pol. I.8.1256b5.
20. ho stratiōtikos bios, Pol. II.9.1270a5.
21. See J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1892), vol. II, pp. 443-445.

22. This last life is not mentioned by Aristotle.
23. For the divinity or quasi-divinity of nous see X.7.1177a13-17, b30-31 and De An. I.4.408b18-31.
24. See the note to 1177a6-9 in R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, Aristote: l'Ethique à Nicomaque² (Louvain and Paris, 1970).
25. But for Aristotle, unlike Plato, life has three phases, not two: work (ascholia) relieved by play, and leisure (scholē). Play is for the sake of work, which is in turn for the sake of leisure (X.7.1177b4-6; Pol. VII. 14.1333a30-36, 15.1334a14-16, VIII.3.1337b28-1338a1, 5.1339b15-17). See also Friedrich Solmsen's perceptive article "Leisure and Play in Aristotle's Ideal State" in Kleine Schriften (Hildesheim, 1968), vol. II.
26. For the comparison of theoretical and practical activity, which runs throughout the argument, see 1177a21-22 (theōrein-prattein), a28-34 (ho sophos versus ho dikaios, ho sōphrōn, and so forth), b2-4, 16-24, 29; and in chapter 8 see especially 1178b20-21.
27. For the various formulations of Aristotle's conclusion see 1177a16-18, b24-26, 1178a7-8, b7-8, b32, 1179a31-32.
28. "...la vie contemplative est pour Aristote un élément de la vie idéale, elle n'est pas, à elle seule, toute la vie idéale" (Gauthier-Jolif, op. cit., tome II, p. 862). See also Stewart, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 59-62, vol. II, pp. 443-445.
29. It has often been pointed out that when Aristotle says that happiness requires a teleios bios or a teleios chronos or a mēkos biou teleion (I.7.1098a18-20, 10.1101a8-16, X.7.1177b24-26), he must be using teleios in this third sense. If happiness can be lost and regained (1101a8-16), the mēkos biou teleion required for happiness must be somewhat less than the span of life from birth to death--the teleios bios required for happiness cannot be a complete life. It seems rather to be a span of life that is sufficient to attain the telos of human life. See Stewart and Gauthier-Jolif, ad. loc.
30. Cooper complains that the six reasons Aristotle gives at 1177a18-b26 do "not tend to show that [contemplative] activity would reasonably be pursued as a dominant end in anyone's life" even though, according to Cooper, this is just what Aristotle infers from them (op. cit., pp. 156-57). Cooper thinks, however, that the immediately succeeding passage, 1177b26-1178a22, contains a more intelligible reason for endorsing strict intellectualism (pp. 157ff.).
31. ho praktikos nous (De An. III.10.433a13-15).
32. This possibility is suggested by Aristotle's use of to dianoētikon to describe it, dianoia being Aristotle's generic term for thinking in general (see VI.2.1139a26-31 and Met. E.1.1025b25).
33. ho theōrētikos nous (De An. III.9.432b26-28, 10.433a14-15).
34. For a detailed analysis of the differences between the passage in Book X and the two in Book IX see Cooper's excellent discussion, op. cit., pp. 169-175.

35. See p. 4 above.
36. See Daniel Devereux, "Aristotle on the Active and Contemplative Lives," Philosophical Research Archives 3, no. 1138 (1977), p. 7.
37. See p. 1 above.
38. See D. F. Pears, "Aristotle's Analysis of Courage," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, III (1978).
39. On to kalon as an end of action and to aischron as an object of avoidance see III.7.1115b11-13, 23-24, 1116a11-12, 15; 8.1116a28-32, b2-3, 19, 30-31, 1117a8, 16-17; 9.1117b9, 14-15; 12.1119b16; IV.1.1120a23-24, 1121b4-5; 2.1122b6-7, 1123a24-25; IX.8.1169a21-22, 28, 32, 35; X.8.1178b13; and E.E. III.1.1229a2, 1230a29-33.
40. See I.1.1094a6-9 and III.9.1117b7-8. When Aristotle says in speaking of bravery that "it is not the case, then, with all the virtues that their exercise is pleasant, except in so far as one attains the end" (III.9.1117b15-16), the end in question is the external end. See also III.3.1112b33.
41. On Hector's motivation see III.8.1116a21-29.
42. On this topic see also Ackrill's notes on 1139b1, 1176b7, and 1177b1-26 in Aristotle's Ethics.
43. scil. of the two pre-eminent human activities. Happiness, of course, is loved for its own sake.
44. Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1968), p. 356.
45. See Pears, op. cit., p. 274.
46. If it be objected that Aristotle, in giving his final account of happiness in X.6-9, seems to have forgotten his (implicit) distinction between an internal and an external end of action, the reply is that the internal end of action is alluded to twice in the course of these chapters: see X.6.1176b6-9 and 8.1178b12-13.
47. See Ackrill, Aristotle's Ethics, ad. loc.
48. Stewart, ad. loc.
49. "Theoria versus Praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics and Republic," Classical Philology (forthcoming).
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