


12-1972

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Recommended Citation

Chen, Chung-Hwan, "Aristotle and Plato's Theory of Transcendent Ideas" (1972). *The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter*. 76.

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SAGP
Boston meeting 1972

ARISTOTLE AND PLATO'S THEORY OF TRANSCENDENT IDEAS

I

Jaeger found evidence of Platonism in Aristotle's Eudemus, and commented that "at that time Aristotle was still completely dependent on Plato in metaphysics".¹ Further, he discovered a fragment of Aristotle's Protrepticus (since then numbered 13)² and showed in detail that ὑπερβαίνειν there refers to Plato's Ideas.³ Thus, for the first time in the history of the study of Aristotle it was asserted that there was a Platonic period in the development of his thought. Among the opponents to this view was I. Düring, who wrote repeatedly to the effect "that Aristotle never accepted the theory of ideas" of Plato.⁴

1. In discussing Düring's position, Cornelia J. de Vogel reformulated his question by adding the word "transcendent" to make his meaning more explicit. Thus, she asks: "Did Aristotle ever accept Plato's theory of transcendent ideas?"⁵ This addition is correct because Plato's Ideas, according to Aristotle in Book M of the Metaphysics, are the universals of Socrates made transcendent.⁶ Since transcendence is the distinguishing mark of Ideas, "Plato's Ideas" implicitly means "transcendent Ideas".

2. She is also correct from a methodological standpoint in taking into consideration such matters as Aristotle's positive theory in the second book of the Physics when she discussed whether or not Protr. Fr. 13 contains Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.⁷ Since the question is Aristotle's acceptance or non-acceptance of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, it is unjustifiable from a methodological standpoint to limit oneself in discussing the problem to Aristotle's criticism of Plato and yet neglect the positive part of Aristotle's own thought. One should examine the constructive part as well as the destructive part to see whether or not there are any remnants of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas contained in it, not just in any respect, but solely in respect of transcendence. Such a carry-over constitutes evidence of acceptance, while the inference from the unfavorable criticism to the rejection of the theory criticized is indirect and subject to erroneous inference in many ways, e.g. one may overlook the distinctions involved in Aristotle's discussion of the problem of χωρισμός. Let us consider the distinctions in question.

3. I have taken the term "transcendent Ideas" directly from de Vogel. The meaning of the phrase, however, requires elucidation in order to reach an unambiguous answer to the question proposed. I understand it in the following way, without assuming that de Vogel does, too: "Transcendent Ideas" is a translation of ὑπερβαίνειν ἰδέαι. The original phrase was not Plato's, but rather was coined by Aristotle. The linguistic basis of the coinage is most likely the passage in the Parmenides: χωρὶς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἕτερα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ αὐτῶν αὐ μετέχοντα.⁸ This is an extreme type of χωρισμός, the reciprocal χωρισμός between Ideas and their particular instances. Plato's usual form, though not expressed in technical terminology, is, e.g. the opposition between τὰ ἴσα and ἕν τὸ ἴσον with the stress laid on the χωρισμός of the Idea⁹. The παρά in a context like this Phaedo passage indicates transcendence. The Idea of the Equal transcends the corresponding instances of equality in the sense that it is separate from them. So do other Ideas.

This is one sense of "transcendent Ideas". Although it is the most prominent sense, and almost the only sense which is usually understood

-or stressed, there are two other senses which must be distinguished from it. E.G., when a carpenter looking to the Idea of Shuttle makes a shuttle,¹⁰ the idea transcends not only the wooden shuttle to be made (and even the one which has been made), but also the mind of the carpenter. This is the realism of Plato; the attempt in another passage to make Ideas subjective is immediately refuted.¹¹ This is the second sense of "transcendent Ideas": Ideas transcend the human mind.

There is still a third sense. According to the Platonic story of "creation" in the Timaeus, God created the world looking to the intelligible pattern.¹² Since a παράδειγμα necessarily implies χωρισμός, there is another sense of "transcendent Ideas": They transcend the divine mind.

But if, when one discusses whether Aristotle ever accepted Plato's transcendent Ideas, he keeps in view only these three senses, it will be far from sufficient. The problem of χωρισμός for Aristotle was very complicated. He distinguished three main types of χωρισμός (designated χωριστὸν ἀπλῶς, χωριστὸν ἕκαστον, and χωριστὸν νοήσει, the expressions for the first two being again various).¹³ If "transcendent" is an appropriate translation of χωριστὸν it is appropriate for the first type only. The present paper will be limited to the first type of χωρισμός since that will be enough to accomplish its purpose and to take all the three types into consideration would far surpass its scope.

Even within this limitation one has to pay attention to three other points in Aristotle's treatment of the problem of χωριστὰ ἰδέαι ἢ χωριστὰ εἶδη. One must on each occasion specify the following points in the given context: (1) What that is which is separate (τί χωριστόν), (2) From what it is separate (τίος χωριστόν), and (3) How it is separate (πῶς χωριστόν).¹⁴ The three senses of transcendence in Plato's theory all fall under point (2), but they do not coincide completely with it. There are also further distinctions among the τίων in the sense of "what those things are from which the particulars are separate."

4. From the foregoing considerations it follows: (1) In order to prove the thesis that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, one has to show that wherever in the Corpus Aristotelicum the author is concerned with the problem of the χωρισμός of εἶδη (whether in the sense of Plato's Ideas or his own forms), he denies χωρισμός absolutely or at least he does not affirm it even relatively. (2) In order to disprove the same thesis, one has to show that in at least one passage¹⁵ where Aristotle is concerned with the same problem (whether with regard to Plato's Ideas or his own forms) he does not deny the χωρισμός absolutely or at least affirms it relatively. By "absolutely" is meant "without regard to what those εἶδη are whose separation (χωρισμός) is in question, what those things are the separation from which is at issue and what are the ways in which the separation of the former from the latter is to be ascertained." By "relatively" is meant "with regard to the specification in each case." It is in terms of these methodological requirements that the present paper will evaluate Düring's thesis.

II

1. We begin with the Eudemus, whose interpretation first raised the question whether Aristotle had a Platonic period. Jeager found in the fragments of this writing evidence of Platonism in the earlier thought of Aristotle.¹⁶ Düring objects to this, his chief ground being that in Fr. 5 it is not Aristotle but Proclus (the man to whom the fragment owes its preservation) who is speaking.¹⁷ So Düring does not deny the Platonic content of the fragment since

(as a Neo-Platonist) Proclus' theory so far as the content of the fragment is concerned has its ultimate source in Plato; rather Düring denies only the Aristotelian authorship. Hence we may be brief here and content ourselves simply with pointing to the fact that in Fr., 5, the τῶν ἐκείνων θεμάτων which is based upon Plato's Phaedr. 247a4, 248b4, 250b7, 247e3, 249a5, is Aristotle's usage¹⁸ and thus shows the Aristotelian authorship of the fragment. Even if we suppose that Düring is right in denying Aristotle the authorship of Fr. 5, what would this interpretation contribute to his general thesis? It proves only that Fr. 5 cannot be used to prove that Aristotle ever accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, but this is far from proving that he never accepted the same theory or even that he did not accept it at the time when the dialogue was written. (Düring does not deny that Aristotle once wrote a dialogue called the Eudemus.)

2.a. The classification of beings into categories is fundamental in Aristotle's metaphysics. Although the number and designation of categories given are not always the same, the contrast between the category of substance and the other categories is constant. Scholars of Aristotle usually designate the former the primary category and the latter the secondary categories. When relating the members of the secondary categories to substance, Aristotle usually calls them συμβεβηκότα .

In the short treatise Categoriae¹⁹ οὐτα are divided into four groups and there are two principles of division, in esse and predicability. On the first principle beings are distinguished into substrata and accidents (attributes); on the second, into subjects and predicates. In esse is characteristic only of accidents in relation to substrata, which are individual substances, while predicability or prediction in the proper sense is found in every category, no matter whether it is primary or secondary.²⁰ The ultimate subjects of prediction in the category of substance are particulars, the individual substances; the predicates are εἶδη and γένη .²¹

From the viewpoint of the Categoriae Platonic Ideas must be assigned to various categories. Since the members of secondary categories are all inherent in the individual substances, it might be thought that here Aristotle rejected Plato's transcendent Ideas, and since the Categoriae (if it is authentic) must be an early writing of Aristotle,²² one might conclude that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas. But such a conclusion would be too hasty. One must first ask whether Aristotle developed his theory purposely to refute Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.

Although the negative answer is more likely than the affirmative, let us grant the affirmative answer for the sake of the argument. One still has to consider the question what those things are whose κατηγορίας is at issue here. The answer is: They are universals in the secondary categories of being. What about such Platonic Ideas as the Idea of Shuttle, the Idea of Table, and Ideas of natural objects such as the Idea of Man? (Although the Socrates in the Parmenides did not positively posit the Ideas of natural objects,²³ Aristotle reports that Plato limited the Ideas to these alone.²⁴) These became secondary substances in the scheme of the Categoriae. They are not regarded there as inherent in their particular instances.²⁵ For the holder of a substantio-centric metaphysics²⁶ the immanence of these Ideas in the individual substances is more important than the inherence of the universals of secondary categories in them. Only inherence in the first case is denied.

From here we may see that the supposition that Aristotle in the Categoriae purposely refuted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas is very unlikely. For had he really had this purpose, he would have attacked the transcendence of the Ideas of substances rather than those of qualities, quantities, etc.

b. A passage in the Analytica Posteriora where Aristotle criticizes Plato's Ideas as being "mere sounds without sense"²⁷ receives undue emphases from Düring.²⁸ In terms of our problem this passage is not very significant for there Aristotle is still referring to "these predicates which do not signify substance," i.e., to accidental attributes, e.g. λευκόν, and not to the Ideas of substances²⁹; ipso facto he shows that he does not intend to deny the latter.

c. In one of the passages on demonstration in this same Analytics Aristotle criticizes Plato by saying that demonstration does not necessarily imply εἶδη or "a One beside Many,"³⁰ but it does necessarily imply the middle term in the syllogism. "A One beside Many" refers not only to the Ideas of qualitative, quantitative nature, etc., but also to the Ideas of substances, shuttle, table, man, etc. However, the status of Ideas is considered not from the ontological viewpoint but from the logical: Their transcendence is regarded as unnecessary for purposes of demonstration. Again one cannot draw the conclusion that Aristotle did not accept Plato's transcendent Ideas by pointing to this criticism. The legitimate interpretation is that Aristotle did not use Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas as the basis of demonstration. That is entirely different from rejecting it.

3.a. Among Aristotle's physical writings we shall first consider the second book of the Physics because de Vogel attaches considerable importance to "the theory of teleology in nature" in this book as decisive for the question of Aristotle's rejection of Platonic transcendent Ideas. She does not discuss this book in detail, but assumes the theory as well-known and uses it finally in an attempt to prove that αὐτῶν θεατῶν in Protr. Fr. 13 cannot refer to transcendent Ideas. Let us quote her own words: "The theory of teleology in nature" in Phys. II is "the theory of an immanent 'end', which is realized in the natural objects, which is their 'essence' and their 'good'--this theory which for Aristotle took the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas is already clear in the Protrepticus."³¹ For the moment we shall omit the part of this quotation which concerns the Protrepticus, and concentrate on the teleology in nature in Phys. II.

First we have to ascertain what she means by "the theory of teleology in nature". If she means the theory which holds that the γένεσις of natural objects is telic, that is correct. However, Aristotle speaks not of "an immanent 'end' which is realized in the natural objects," but of a plurality of "ends," one for each species. The generation of a human being has the εἶδος ἀνθρώπου and the generation of a horse has the εἶδος ἵππου for their respective ends, but there is no common "end" οὐ εἶδος in the sense of that toward which (εἰς ὃ) the development of human beings, horses, etc., proceed.

This is a general explanation, but we need a more exact exposition of the theory of natural generation. For this purpose the following passage will serve as the basis of our interpretation: μέχρι δὲ πόσου τὸν φυσικόν
δεῖ εἶδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶ . . . μέχρι τοῦ τίος [γὰρ] ἕνεκα
ἑκάστου, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ ἐστὶ γνωριεῖται μὲν εἶδελ, ἐν ἡμῶν δέ .32

To know the form to the extent of knowing the end is justified by the frequent coincidence of formal, final and efficient causes.³³ *ταύτα* is not clearly explained by Ross; it refers to the ends of generations of natural objects. In respect of their being forms³⁴ they are separate from the *γενόμενα*, i. e., from the substrata which undergo the processes of generation, but they are immanent in the bodies of the generators. The form of man as the end of generation of a human being is separate from him who has not yet come to be, but immanent in the male parent. Thus, this passage denies the transcendence of the *εἶδος ἀνθρώπου* as the form of man from the male parent, but affirms that the *εἶδος* as the end transcends that which is becoming but has not yet come to be. It must be *χωριστὸν τοῦ γινόμενου*, for (to borrow a word from de Vogel) it is not yet "realized". If it were not *χωριστὸν*, the *γινόμενον* would no longer be what it is; instead it would be a new human being. But, as a matter of fact, at the moment he is not yet there. How can it be in a thing which has not yet come to be or which does not yet exist?

To understand Aristotle's view still more precisely, one must take into consideration the difference between actuality and potentiality. The form is potentially in, and actually transcends, the substratum, the *γινόμενον*, so long as the latter has not reached the end of the process of generation. Since for Aristotle actuality is prior to potentiality,³⁵ the actual separation should be stressed rather than the potential immanence.

The alternation of two kinds of status, *χωρὶς εἶναι* and *ἐν εἶναι*, of one and the same *εἶδος* as the *τίπος* and the *τινι* vary, is still clearer in the sentence following the above quotation: *ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἀνθρώπων γεννᾶται* ...³⁶ This sentence is best explained by a passage in *Met. Z37* where it is repeated in order to explain that *φύσις* in the sense of form³⁸ as the efficient cause of natural generation is the same *φύσις* in a different member of the same species (in the case of human generation the efficient cause is the form of man immanent in the male parent). In this passage the transcendence of efficient cause is not brought out as clearly as its immanence, but in *Met. A* both are equally clearly stated. *ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τῆν συνδραμὴν οὐσίαν, οἷον*

οὐκίνας τὸ εἶδος ...³⁹ *ἀλλ' ἕπτερ, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει* ...⁴⁰ We ask: πῶς ?
 Aristotle answers: *τὰ μὲν οὖν κινούμενα αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα, τὰ δ'*
ὡς ὁ λόγος ἄλλα ...⁴¹ Efficient causes (the *εἶδος*) as they precede
 the final results of the process, the *γεγονότα*, are separate from the latter
 and as formal causes are at the same time with, i. e., immanent in, *τὰ καθ'*
ἕκαστον

To sum up concerning the *εἶδος* in the sphere of natural generation Aristotle's view is: (1) *εἶδος* in the sense of formal cause is immanent in its particular instances (*τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον*), but not without qualification. It is immanent in those which are actually existent as such, but separate from those which are undergoing the process of generation and have not yet come to be. (2) As efficient cause it is (a) immanent in the generator as its form and (b) separate from (i) that which is undergoing the process of generation and (ii) that which is generated. (3) As the final cause, it is similar to the efficient with respect to its transcendence and immanence in (a) and (b) (i) but different from (ii), namely, it is immanent in the *γεγονός* as its form. In any case Aristotle's "theory of teleology in nature" did not take the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas; both transcendence and immanence, find their place side by side in this theory, though not without qualification in each case. A more adequate interpretation would be that Aristotle

retains Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas with such modifications as the distinctions in the subject-matter itself require.

b. The primary substances in the Categoriae in fact comprise both natural and artificial objects, though no example of the latter is given there. (Such examples are abundant in other places in the Aristotelian corpus.) We may consider Aristotle's theory of genesis in the first book of the Physics to help us understand his view on the problem of γενεσις in the sphere of artificial production. According to the result of his analysis change is a process between contraries;⁴² what changes is always coupled with one of the contraries at the terminus a quo and with the other at the terminus ad quem. It is never something simple, but always a duplex of ὑποκείμενον, and στέργος or εἶδος.⁴³ In the case of the substantial change or "simple genesis," e.g., the building of a house, before the house is built, its materials (ὑποκείμενον) such as bricks and stones lie asunder, and when it has been built they are arranged in such a way that the form of the house is embodied in it.⁴⁴ εἶδος taken together with στέργος to form a contrariety in any kind of change is employed in a general sense; when it is used to refer to change in the primary category it has the narrow sense of substantial form.⁴⁵ So the form of house is inherent in the house built. That this is Aristotle's view is testified to by his describing the house as σύνθετον.

However, we cannot infer from this that Aristotle here rejected Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas because--as Solmsen properly notes here the problem of the status of the form, whether it is transcendent or immanent, is not even under discussion.⁴⁷ The theory as it stands deviates from Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, but it was not meant to deny the Platonic theory.

Even if we ignore Solmsen's warning, another point must be taken into consideration: The establishment of inherence is ultimately based upon the acceptance of the γεγονός as a σύνθετον. Since that which changes is never a simplex, but always a duplex, then just as it is coupled with the form at the terminus ad quem of the process it is coupled with the στέργος at the terminus a quo. That is, at this terminus the form transcends the substratum. Here in the sphere of artefacta as in the sphere of natural generation, transcendence and immanence, with the necessary modifications, are found side by side; one cannot conclude in simplistic fashion that Aristotle here either did or did not accept Plato's theory of transcendent ideas.

We must also ask how the form of a manufactured object as efficient cause is related to the τεχνικός. The relation is more complicated than that of the form as efficient cause of natural generation to the male parent. In a certain sense, it is true that in the one case as in the other the form is not transcendent. But the πῶς is different. The efficient cause of building a house is immanent in the house-builder not as his substantial form but as an art; the efficient cause of human generation is immanent in the male parent not as a τέχνη but as his εἶδος. Since art or science is an εἶς, a quality, the form of the house⁴⁸ is immanent in the τεχνικός in the way that an accidental attribute is in an individual substance. This is still not the whole explanation of the relation between the form of an artefactum and the artisan; it is only the first half, and the second half still remains.

4. In order to complete the unfinished discussion, let us consider first a passage from Met. Z7 and then in the following section we shall discuss the Protrepticus. (This order should not be taken as having any chronological implications.) In the passage from Met. Z7 Aristotle analyzes another kind of artefacta, namely, health. The production of health is a process consisting of

two parts, the first of which is νόησις and the second ποιησις. The problem is how to restore health to the patient. The νόησις starts with the definition of health, the art of medicine, in the physician's mind. "Since this is health, if the subject is to be healthy this must first be present, e.g., a uniform state of body, and if this is to be present there must be heat; and the physician goes on thinking thus until he reduces the matter to a final something" which he can do and then he does it.⁴⁹ Here the νόησις stops and the ποιησις begins. The second process runs in the direction opposite to the first process and ends in the presence of health in the patient's body. In the whole process of restoration of health the ποιησις depends upon the νόησις. So far, this is the same as the conclusion we reached at the end of the previous section, i.e. the efficient cause of artificial production is the εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ or the τέχνη.

The νόησις is strictly determined by the essence of health, whose definition is the medical art in the physician's mind, for if he deviates even a little in his thinking from the essence of health the actual health could not be produced in the body of the patient. The essence of health is the cause in the strict sense of the health which is restored;⁵⁰ if the medical art is said to be the cause, it is simply for the reason that the science works in virtue of its objective content, i.e. the essence of health. The essence of health as the object of knowledge transcends the mind of the physician.⁵¹ It is an ὄν κυρίως τὸ ἔξω ὄν, καὶ χωριστόν.⁵² Thus we are referred first from the ἰδέα as a form of quality to art of knowledge, and then from knowledge referred again to form as an ἔξω ὄν, καὶ χωριστόν. The second reference is just the one Plato made in the refutation of a possible subjectivization of Ideas in the Parmenides.⁵³ In view of this similarity, one can hardly say that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.

What is true of the εἶδος of health is equally true of the εἶδος of house and the like. These are also ὄντα κυρίως, which do not depend on the knowledge of artisans, but rather the knowledge of artisans depends on them. From this we can see quite clearly how the second reference is necessary in Aristotle's metaphysics. The knowledge of building a house or architecture as the efficient cause precedes the house to be built. Since knowledge is an εἶδος and house a substance, it would follow that quality is prior to substance - and this is impossible according to Aristotle.⁵⁴ By the second reference the efficient cause is referred to the essence of house, essence being a substance. Thus the possibility of a contradiction to his substantio-centric metaphysics is avoided. The result is that the essence of house as efficient cause transcends the house to be built.

5. The Protrepticus, especially Fr. 13, is the passage most often debated so far as the question "Did Aristotle ever accept Plato's transcendent Ideas?" is concerned. Jaeger paraphrases αὐτῶν γὰρ ἐστὶ θεατής as the spectator of Ideas. Düring, among others, objects quite strenuously to Jaeger's interpretation. He understands the word αὐτῶν in the phrase in question as αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπιβῶν ("that which is exact in itself")⁵⁵ and advises us that "the expressions αὐτὰ τὰ ἀκριβῆ and αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα should be interpreted against the background of Anal. Post. A 2".⁵⁶ Supposing we follow his advice, what can the μέγιστος in Fr. 13, (which in his view is the μέγιστος of αὐτὰ τὰ ἀκριβῆ), mean? Among the principles of the demonstrative science (according to Analytica Posteriora) are: Axioms (such as the law of contradiction, the law of excluded middle), and definitions peculiar to each special science. Are the laws made by the philosopher the copies of such axioms or definitions? Could such imitations make up the laws of any state? Moreover, the original form from which the philosopher copies his laws is by implication⁵⁷ θεῖον. Aristotle, however, never called axioms and definitions "divine". Of which of the two is this an appropriate epithet, the first principles

of demonstrative science or Platonic Ideas? Finally, in the next sentence we read *μόνος γὰρ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν βλέπων ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον*. According to Düring, *φύσις* and also *θεῖον* refer to the *αὐτῶν* in line 16 or to *αὐτῶν τῶν ἀκριβῶν* in line 15. How can *φύσις* in the sense of "the principle of order and stability"⁵⁸ and *αὐτὰ τὰ ἀκριβῆ*, interpreted "against the background of Anal. Post. A 2" in the sense of principles, axioms, definitions, etc., of demonstrative science, mean the same thing? No such difficulties occur if *αὐτῶν* refers to Platonic Ideas and *φύσις* is used in the vague sense of "reality", and referring to Plato's theory of Ideas in the sense of "the World of Ideas".⁵⁹

Despite de Vogel's expression of gratitude to Düring "that on this point [his interpretation of Protr., Fr. 13] he led the way to a better understanding",⁶⁰ she does not follow his lead. Instead she offers her own view on the fragment. Her interpretation is based upon her interpretation of Fr. 11 of the same work. On the latter she comments: "Here, then, we have essentially the whole theory of teleology in nature, known to us from Phys. II. The theory of immanent 'end'... which for Aristotle took the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas, is already clearly present in the Protrepticus".⁶¹ Then she says of Fr. 13: "Seeing ...Fr. 11 behind I feel almost sure that we have to understand the author in this sense [in the sense of immanent forms], not in that of Plato's transcendent Ideas."⁶²

If what we said above (Pt. II, 3 a) about her interpretation of the theory of teleology in nature in Phys. II is correct, this theory did not take the place of Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas in Aristotle's thought. Hence, we may be brief⁶³ and content ourselves with asking a simple question: If *αὐτῶν* refers to immanent forms, *ἐν τίνι* are they immanent? Surely they cannot be immanent in the existing laws, "whether of Sparta or of Crete or of any other state". To copy from empirical laws is just what a good lawgiver will not do.⁶⁴ Immanence in the laws yet to be made is sheer nonsense. How can the lawgiver copy anything from the laws which are not yet made? Does he copy from his thoughts? This subjective interpretation already shows the transcendence of Ideas; they transcend (in the sense of preceding) the laws to be made. His thoughts are "borrowed" (i.e. "copied") "from nature and reality". Finally, in replying to the question of *ἐν τίνι* the Ideas are supposed to be immanent, one must answer *ἐν τῇ φύσει*. Thus the forms in question are just Plato's transcendent Ideas, "viz., the forms in nature [Düring]".⁶⁵

The forms involved in Fr. 13 are forms of another kind of artefacta; they are *εἶδη* of value. They together with the *εἶδος* of health and the like form a group of forms of non-substantial artefacta different from the forms of substantial artefacta, such as the *εἶδος* of house. Both kinds are *παραδείγματα* in imitation of which artefacta are made. The archetypal character implies their *χωρισμός*. The forms of value differ again from the *εἶδος* of health and the like by being at the same time ideals, standards of value. As such, they can only be approached: they are never perfectly reach by human creation. This ideal character guarantees that they always transcend human creation and the created.

III

Before concluding this paper we wish to go a step further so as to see what was the chief difficulty Aristotle found in Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas and what he really did in his treatment of the problem of *χωρισμός*. This procedure will result in a more positive explanation of Protr. Fr. 13 than what was indicated earlier in Pt. II, no. 5.

In Met. A 9, which is the main source of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's metaphysics, he says: ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΔΙΑΠΡΟΨΟΙΣΙΝ ἄν τις τί ποτε συμβάλλεται τὰ εἶδη τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ τοῖς γινόμενοις καὶ ὑφαιρούμενοις; for (1) they cause no change in the physical objects nor (2) help towards (a) the knowledge of these objects or (b) their being.⁶⁶ The reason for "(2)" is that Ideas are not forms immanent in the physical objects. The reason for "(1)" is that Ideas are neither causes of the motion of heavenly bodies nor of the generation of perishable objects. The causes of change are God in the first case and the generator or artisan in the second. They are particulars; they are not Ideas. But, as we saw above, in natural generation the efficient cause should be extended further to ψυσις, the form which is immanent in the generator; in artificial production the efficient cause is instead the Ideas (e.g. ἰδέα τῆς ὑγείας) in the sense of the science which as a quality is immanent in the mind of the artisan. Except in the case of cosmic motions, the difficulties of Plato's theory all lie in the χωρισμός of the Ideas. This χωρισμός is an impossibility: ἀδύνατον εἶναι χωρὶς τῆς οὐσίας καὶ οὐ ἢ οὐσία. Then Aristotle concludes with a rhetorical question πῶς ἂν αἱ ἰδέαι οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσίαι χωρὶς εἴη; ⁶⁷

But why did Plato hold to the χωρισμός of Ideas? To answer this question we must begin with an analysis of Plato's Ideas. They are, using Aristotelian terminology, formal causes, the principles of particulars being so-and-so. Let us call this aspect of Ideas the aspect of essence.⁶⁸ τῷ κατὰ πάντα τὰ κατὰ κατὰ. Beauty itself is the cause of bodies, minds, institutions, etc., being beautiful, or the Idea of Equality is the cause of sticks and stones being equal. But there is no beautiful instance which is not also ugly; equal sticks and stones always fall short of the Idea of Equality. Ideas are perfect. This is another aspect of Ideas. Let this aspect be called the aspect of ideal. This double aspect is most obvious in the Idea of the Good, the chief Idea among all Ideas, which is itself the highest value and at the same time the ἀρχὴ αἰτιότητος of being and becoming.⁶⁹

Plato was attracted by the fact that things are so-and-so, but no one of them is perfectly so-and-so. In order to explain this phenomenon he posited Ideas with the double aspect of essence and ideal. His explanation is the theory of μέθεξις. Particulars are so-and-so because they partake of the nature of their Ideas. E.g., equal sticks participate in the Idea of Equality; hence they are equal. Their participation, however, involves a limitation of their possession of the attribute of being equal to a certain extent and is, therefore, an approximation to the Idea; they can never reach its perfection. The approximation is due to the double aspect of the Idea. The aspect of essence makes them like the Idea, and the aspect of ideal keeps their likeness to the Idea from coinciding with the ideal perfection.

Although this double aspect explains certain facts, it fails to explain certain other facts. So far as the aspect of essence is concerned, the nature of the Idea is shared by the particular instances. The Idea cannot be apart from them. If it were not in them, they would not be what they are. So far as the aspect of ideal is concerned, the Idea cannot be reached by them; it must be apart from them. This dilemma of εἶναι and χωρὶς εἶναι is obvious in certain Ideas, e.g. in the Idea of Shuttle or Bed or the like. But Plato did not speak about these Ideas in detail; he was rather interested in such Ideas as Just Itself, Good Itself, Beauty Itself, etc., which are also ideals. Such a one-sided emphasis is quite understandable in terms of the origin of his Ideas in the objects of Socrates' definition which are τὰ ἡθικά.⁷⁰ Aristotle saw the difficulty, and pointing, e.g. to a house, says: This house would not have come to be if the form of house were apart from it,⁷¹ and we have already discussed his general formulation of the difficulty.⁷² In cases like these Plato's theory must be modified.

Aristotle's modification was to separate the two aspects, retaining the aspect of essence for his substantial forms and leaving out the aspect of ideal.⁷³ Substantial forms can be reached by particulars; when they are reached, they are immanent in the actually existent particulars. E.g. this animal is either a man or not a man. If it is a man, there is no variation of his being more or less a man.⁷⁴ So long as the *κίνημα* is undergoing the process of development, the form Man transcends it, or more exactly actually transcends it. As soon as it reaches the end of the process, it is actually so-and-so formed, i.e. the form is actually immanent in it. The transcendence refers to the *γινόμενον*; the immanence refers to the *γεγονός*. There is an alternation in terms of the end having or not having been reached, but there is no alternation of the end in terms of having been reached in a higher or lower degree, since essence is divorced of value. The same is true of the forms of artefacta. When Aristotle criticizes Plato's transcendent Ideas, he means that the exclusion of the aspect of essence in the substantial forms is necessary.

There is another group of forms. They are Ideas of value. They are ideals and can only be approximated, never reached. Hence they are transcendent. The objects which the philosopher or the true statesman beholds in Protr. Fr. 13 are such Ideas. That they are Ideas of value is evident from their status as standards of value judgments.⁷⁵ That they cannot be reached is clear from the fact that the good lawgiver does not look to the empirical laws for legislation. The reason for this is that no empirical laws reach the ideal perfection. They approach the ideal more or less; what most fully conforms to it is the best.⁷⁶ The aspect of ideal entails transcendence. Here, Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas as having a double aspect is perfectly correct; it needs no modification and Aristotle simply accepted it in Protr. Fr. 13.⁷⁷

IV

1. We may sum up the results reached as follows:
 - A. Ideas without regard to categorial distinction: -
They are transcendent without further specification (Eud.)
 - B. Ideas with regard to categorial distinction: -
 - I. as universals in the secondary categories:
They are inherent in the primary substances (Cat.)
 - II. as substantial forms:
 1. as *εἶδη* (or *γένε*) they are not inherent in the primary substances (Cat.)
 2. as forms of natural objects:
 - a. as formal cause the *εἶδος* is -
 - (i) immanent in the generator
 - (ii) transcending the *γινόμενον* ;
 - (iii) immanent in the *γεγονός* ;
 - b. as efficient cause:
 - (i) immanent in the generator as its form;
 - (ii) separate from
 - (α) what is undergoing the process;
 - (β) the generated;
 - c. as final cause:
 - (i) immanent in the generator as its form;
 - (ii) separate from
 - (α) what is undergoing the process of being generated;⁷⁸
 - (β) immanent in the *γεγονός* as its form (Phys. II, Met. Α, Ζ);
 3. as forms of artificial production, e.g. house, parallel to 2 (Phys. I, Met. Α, Ζ);
 - a. with the exception that as efficient cause and as final cause the *εἶδος* is immanent in the *τεχνικός* as art or science in his mind (Met. Α, Ζ);
 - b. with the peculiarity that as essence of the artefactum it transcends his knowledge or skill (Met. Γ, Ε).

Appendix: as forms of non-substantial artefacta -

- a. as forms of physical qualities created by man, e.g. health; the same as 3.
- b. as forms of value: they transcend the particular instances and the minds of agents (Protr.)⁷⁹

Aristotle did not discuss the third type of transcendence of Plato's Ideas, (Ideas transcending God's mind). But his view may be obtained from Met. Λ : They are separated from God's mind in the sense that God does not think of them at all.⁸⁰

2. The table shows clearly that in none of the passages discussed does Aristotle deny the $\chi\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ of $\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$ absolutely. He denies it relatively and also affirms it relatively. Only a failure to analyze the problem will lead one to the proposition that Aristotle always accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas or that Aristotle never accepted it. One is no more tenable than the other. The A-proposition is not made by anyone. The E-proposition is fought for by Düring. To disprove the E-proposition a single I-proposition is enough, and each of the cases discussed above provides the basis for an I-proposition. The historical truth is not what Düring supposes it to be, but rather that Aristotle accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas with modifications as the distinctions in the subject-matter under discussion on each occasion required. In so far as Ideas were ontological forms they were modified. The modifications are seen in Pt. II, nos. 2-4. In so far as Ideas of value were ideals, no modifications were needed; Plato's theory was simply accepted (Pt. II, no. 5). As for the Eudemus (Pt. II, no. 1) which was one of Aristotle's early writings, it appears likely that at the time of its composition he had not distinguished $\tau\acute{\iota}$, $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, and $\pi\acute{\omega}\varsigma \chi\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ in attacking the problem of $\chi\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ of Ideas - in fact this did not constitute a problem in this dialogue at all, at least not in its extant fragments - Aristotle simply followed Plato.

Notes:

1. Aristotle, translated by R. Robinson, 2d edition, 1948, p. 53.
2. This fragment (Jambl. Protr. 10) was not included in V. Rose Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta; R. Walzer numbers it as Fr. 13 in his Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta, 1934. Sir David Ross includes it as Fr. 13 in his Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, 1945.
3. Op. cit., pp. 90-91, especially note 2 on p. 91.
4. Düring's other writings besides his Aristoteles, 1966, are "Problems in Aristotle's Protrepticus", Eranos, 52 (1954), 139-171; "Aristotle in the Protrepticus", Autour d'Aristote, 1955; "Aristotle the Scholar", Actus, Acta Philologica Fennica, 1954, 61-77; "Aristotle on Ultimate Principles" from "Nature and Reality", Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, 1961, pp. 35-55.
5. Archiv. für die Geschichte der Philosophie, 47 (1965), 261-298.
6. 4, 1078^b 30-32.
7. Op. cit., pp. 181-184. My approval applies only to her method; with (1) her interpretation of Phys. II, (2) the application of her interpretation to Protr. Fr. 11 and (3) the inference on the question of the Platonic element in Protr. Fr. 13, I can in no way agree. For (1) cf, below II, 3a; my comments on (2) and (3) will be reserved for another occasion.
8. 130b 2-3. Cf. e.g. Met A 9, 991b 1-3.
9. Phaed. 74 a 9-12.
10. Crat. 389b ff.

- 11. Parm. 132 b-c.
- 12. 28e - 29a.
- 13. See H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, p. 860^a 22 ff.
- 14. Plato did not make a distinction among Ideas with respect to χωρισμός ; all of them are equally transcendent.
- 15. See Anal. Post., I 26, 43a 6-7.
- 16. Op. cit., p. 39 ff.
- 17. Eranos. 1956, p. 115 (ap. de Vogel, op. cit., p. 273.)
- 18. Cf. Bonitz, Op. Cit., 253^b 21-24 and J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle, p. 31, on Eth. Nic. I6, 1097^a 10-11.
- 19. I regard the first part of the Categoriae as authentic, but my justification of
- 20. 2, 1^a 20-^b6. /this view cannot be given in just a note.
- 21. 3, 1^b 10-15.
- 22. The example of ἐν Ἀυκείῳ) Cat. 4 2^a1) need not be taken as referring to Aristotle's own school. Ἀυκείον is also mentioned in Plato's Euthyd. 271d. Protagoras was said to read his book On the Gods in the Lyceum (Diog. Laert. IX 54). So the Lyceum must have been a well-known place in Athens. Hence Aristotle made use of it as an example to illustrate the category of place.
- 23. 130c.
- 24. Met. A 3, 1070^a 18-19.
- 25. Cat. 2, 1^a 20-22.
- 26. Such a metaphysics is already there in Cat. 5, 2^b 6-6c (Oxford Edition).
- 27. I22, 83^a33, Oxford translation.
- 28. Ap. de Vogel, op. cit., p. 296.
- 29. 83^a 30-35. The same example (Ἀυκείον) is used here as in Cat. 2.
- 30. I 11, 77^a 5-9.
- 31. Op. Cit., p. 282.
- 32. 2, 194^b 9-13. Ross' reading.
- 33. Ibid 7, 198^a 24-26.
- 34. 194b9-15 is a "difficile passage", as A. Mansion observes in his Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne, 2d e., p. 204, n. 17.

"The reading and punctuation of this sentence [194^b 10-11] were debated by the ancient commentators [See Ross ad loc., Aristotle's Physics. p. 510-511] ..." (F.M. Cornford's note to P. H. Wicksteed's edition and translation of Aristotle's Physics, vol. I, p. 125, n.d.). I accept Ross' reading and punctuation, but this does not remove all the difficulties. The clause, καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄ εἶσι χωριστὰ μὲν εἶδει, ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ (b12-13) still needs explanation. What does τὰ ἄ refer to? What does εἶδει mean? The translations of R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (The Works of Aristotle, vol. 2), H. Carteron (French translation) and W. Charlton (Aristotle's Physics, I, II) do not suggest any answer to the first question. Wicksteed translated it by "forms"; Ross understands it the same way in his commentary (op. cit., p. 510, on 194^b 10-15). If they are correct, the text would mean καὶ περὶ τὰ εἶδη ἄ εἶσι χωριστὰ μὲν εἶδει ...this leads to the second question, what does εἶδει mean? εἶδει cannot refer to the same thing as εἶδη refers to. If it did, what could the whole expression mean? Ross interprets χωριστὰ εἶδει by "separable in thought"; Wicksteed by "conceptually...detachable"; Charlton by "in account". It is true, of course, that Aristotle often uses the expression χωριστὸν λόγῳ. But in such contexts λόγος means a definition (cf., e.g. Met. H 1, 1042^a 28-29) which is objective, and not the same as "in thought", which is subjective. εἶδει is even further removed from the notion "conceptually". Aristotle's standing terminology for these English translations is rather νοήσει (e.g. Phys. II 2, 193^b34). If these translators and commentators are correct, why should Aristotle have not written καὶ περὶ τὰ εἶδη ἄ εἶσι χωριστὰ μὲν νοήσει ...? That would be his usual style and its meaning would

also be clear. He had no reason to prefer the obscure expression to the clear one. εἶδει has an objective sense; it means in respect of species or form, in contrast to ἀριθμῶ (e.g. Met. Δ 9, 1018^a 6; cf. ibid. 6 1016^b 31-32), e.g. two members of the same species, which have the same form, are ταῦτα εἶδει and ἕτερα τῶ ἀριθμῶ; two members of two different species, which have different forms, are ἕτερα εἶδει; one and the same individual is ἐν ἀριθμῶ.

In the clause in question εἶδει must mean the same as εἶδος in ^b10 means, namely "form". Then ταῦτα cannot refer to forms. Its meaning follows from the preceding clause ^b11-12 with supplementation as suggested by Mansion (op. cit., p. 204, n. 17). It refers to τὰ ἔνεκα τοῦ, the ends of generations of natural objects. It may seem that εἶδει could have its usual meaning "in respect of species", because the τέλος of the generation of man and the τέλος of the generation of horse are separate in kind. But it cannot have this meaning here because in the context Aristotle does not speak of the different kinds of species. From ^b9 on, he is speaking of the coincidence of formal and final causes. I understand the clause in question as meaning "in respect of their (ends' of natural generation) being forms, they are separate" - but from what? From those whose ends they are, i.e. from the γυγόμενα. But these ends in the sense of forms are immanent in the bodies of the generators.

35. For the sake of convenience, cf. Met. θ 8; priority is not limited to the temporal (for the different senses of priority cf. Met. Δ11).
36. 194^b 13.
37. 7, 1032^a 24-25.
38. Phys. II 1, 193^a 30-31.
39. For the omission of 1070^a 14-15 cf. below p. 6.
40. 1070^a 13-17.
41. Ibid. ^a21-22.
42. 5, 188^a 19-b8. For the sake of brevity we may neglect the intermediate states.
43. 7, 190^a 13-16, ^b23-24, ^b11-13.
44. In general, see 190 ^b9 ff. The example of οἰκία is mentioned in 190^b8; εἶδος is mentioned in ^b28 and μορφή in ^b20.
45. This sense of εἶδος is confirmed by the term μορφή in 190^b20. For the sense of μορφή see Met. Z 8, 1033^b6.
46. Phys. I 7, 190^b11.
47. Aristotle's System of the Physical World, p. 86.
48. Met. Λ 3, 1070^a 14-15. That the εἶδος of an artefactum is the τέχνη is also asserted in Met. Z 7. See the following section for the discussion of this passage.
49. 1032^b 15 ff., Ross' translation.
50. Met. Z 7, 1032^b5-6, 11-14. ἰατρική is a λόγος, a λόγος τῆς ὑγείας. This λόγος has an objective content, which is the essence of health. Therefore the ὑγίεια ἀνευ ὕλης is the cause of ὑγίεια ἔχουσα ὕλην. For the relation of the medical art, the λόγος τῆς ὑγείας, to its objective content, see the following note.
51. Cf. Met. π 5, 1010^b 30-1011^a1. There Aristotle speaks of the priority of the ὑποκείμενα which cause sensation over the sensation. For the sensation is not of itself but of the substrata. Parallel to this perceptual realism there is in his epistemology an intellectual realism. Intellectual knowledge, like perceptual knowledge, is an affection by the intelligible (De an. III 4, 429^a 13-15). In the case of ἰατρική, the art is determined by the essence of health. So the latter is τὸ ἀριον τὸ ἀπρότατον of the restoration of health. For the concept of the "most precise cause", see Phys. II 3, 195^b 21-25, though there (for the sake of illustration) the ascent is only from the τεχνικός to the art.

- 52. Met. E4, 1027^b 31, K8, 1065^a 24.
- 53. 132 b-c.
- 54. See, e.g. Met. Z13, 1038^b 26-28. For the argument for the priority of substance, see Z1, 1028^a 30ff.
- 55. Mid-Fourth Century, p. 47.
- 56. Ibid. p. 48.
- 57. Ross, Fragmenta, p. 48, lines 23-26.
- 58. Mid-Fourth Century, p. 49.
- 59. See James Adams' Interpretation of ἐν τῇ φύσει in his Plato's Republic, vol. II, p. 390.
- 60. Op. cit., p. 284.
- 61. Ibid. p. 282.
- 62. Ibid. p. 284. She interprets the fragment against the background of Phys II rather than "against the background of Anal. Post. A2" as Düring advises.
- 63. Her interpretation of Fr. 11 is also questionable; I shall reserve my comments on it for another occasion.
- 64. Ross' Fragmenta, p. 48, lines 19-23.
- 65. The quotation is from De Vogel, op. cit. p. 281.
- 66. 991^a8-14.
- 67. Ibid. 991^b1-3.
- 68. The term "essence", τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, is borrowed from Aristotle, but it is not an anachronism since the Aristotelian concept is traceable to Plato (cf. Crat. 386a d-e).
- 69. Rep. VI 511b.
- 70. Cf. Met. A6, 987^b 1-7, M4, 1078^b 30-31.
- 71. Met. Z8, 1033^b 19-21.
- 72. Pt. III, second paragraph.
- 73. In this way, one group of Plato's Ideas, i.e. ontological Ideas, were turned into Aristotelian essences. By "separate" is not meant that the essence is not good, but that value does not belong to essence although it does belong concomitantly.
- 74. Cat. 5.2^b26-27, 3^b33-4^a9.
- 75. Ross' Fragmenta, p. 48, lines 5-7.
- 76. Ibid. p. 49, lines 19-23, 8-9.
- 77. This interpretation is not incompatible with the general theory in the Categoriæ that the universals in the secondary categories are immanent in the primary substances. There Aristotle does not have Ideas of Value in view. This is evident from his regarding δικαιοσύνη as a διάθεσις (8, 10^b 30-32). His approach is ontological or psychological, but not from the viewpoint of value.
One might object by pointing to the definition of moral virtue in Eth. Nic. as an ἔξις προαιρετική... II6, 1106^b36.) But virtue as ἔξις is only one of its aspects, the ontological aspect; it still has another aspect, the aspect of value. The double aspect is most clearly seen in Aristotle's additional explanation given after the definition of moral virtue in order to prevent a possibly one-sided conception. He says διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀριστόν καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης (Ibid. 1107^a 6-8).
- 78. For the distinction between δύναμις and ἐνεργεία, see above, p. 5.
- 79. The passages treated are selective. Some of them are discussed by others in the controversy over the question of Aristotle's Platonic period; some are important for an adequate answer to the question formulated by De Vogel. The order of the passages discussed is not intended chronologically. The effectiveness of this paper does not depend on the selection or the ordering of its materials. For any one of these passages provides a basis for a proposition contradictory to Düring's thesis that Aristotle never accepted Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas.
- 80. 9, 1074^b23-27, 33-34.

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