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Is ἀγαθόν a pros hen equivocal in Aristotle's Ethics?

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In his (early 5th C. A.D.) commentary on Metaphysics, Γ.2. 1003a22, having explicated the doctrine of the focal meaning of 'being' in now familiar fashion with the help of the standard examples of 'healthy' and 'medical', Syrianus suggests that the phenomenon of pros hen equivocation is found in "many other cases also, for example that of the good; for, god and the opportune are good and virtue and form are good".¹ This ready extension to the case of to agathon of Aristotle's creative solution (in Meta, ΓΕΚ) to the problems posed by the multiple application of to on is typical of a long tradition of commentary stretching down to our own day. Even John Ackrill, as cagey an exegete as one might wish for, confesses that [i]t is tempting to invoke the former explanation [i.e. pros hen equivocation] for the predicative use of 'good' in which, e.g. knowledge, virtue pleasure may be called good . . .² The basis for the standard affirmative answer to this paper's main question is, of course, N96b26-9³ which (in Bywater's text alongside a rather literal English translation) reads as follows:

ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ
γὰρ εἴοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ
τύχης ὁμωύμοις.. ἀλλ'
ἀρὰ γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι
ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν,
ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν;
ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις
ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς καὶ ἄλλο
δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ.

But, how, indeed, is it [i.e. agathon] said? For, it does not seem at any rate to be a case of chance equivocation. Is it then by being [derived] from one [good] or by everything contributing to one, or is it rather by analogy? For, just as sight is in the body, intelligence in the soul, so also one thing accordingly in another.

The passage above is more than typically crabbed and confusing. It uses quasi-technical expressions without explanation and asks questions rather than asserts conclusions. Even more disconcerting is the fact that, having teased us into thinking he will resolve the question of which of the two options he endorses, if either, Aristotle goes on to say: "But, perhaps, one should leave such things alone for now since to render them accurately is more properly the task of another branch of philosophy" (N 96b30-1). Notoriously, when we ransack the rest of the corpus looking for the appropriate discussion adjourned here we come up empty. The question is never framed in quite the way it is here in the NE and it is anyone's guess which passages from the Metaphysics, for example, might be relevant. Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties posed by the passage, it does seem to justify the claim G. E. L. Owen made for it when he noted that it makes "its own constructive suggestion about the senses of 'good'" by adding "the redeeming afterthought that all uses of 'good' may be connected either by affiliation to some central use or else by analogy".⁴ One of Owen's goals in this famous paper was to suggest that in its positive proposal the NE has surpassed the EE discussion of agathon by not only restating the criticism of Plato's over-simplified account but by a judicious application of the device of foral meaning found so useful in Meta. TEK for resolving the equivocity of on. As Owen develops the suggestion, although the EE (in its treatment of philia) had introduced foral meaning, Aristotle had

not seen its application to such wholly general expressions as 'being' or 'good'. When he uses it he takes pains to explain it, and it is characteristic of his earlier work--the work of a young man fond of schematic argument--that the explanation he gives in the Eudemian Ethics is far more clearcut than the arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Metaphysics which rely on the same idea.⁵

Owen's main concern in the rest of his article is to demonstrate a development in Aristotle's logic and metaphysics, not his meta-ethics; he argues that the EE, in its seeming denial of the possibility of a single science of being (E 17b25-18a1) contradicts

the argument of Meta. If that the focal meaning of 'being' allows for a reinstatement of such a science, the Aristotelian science of 'being-qua-being', however, and not its discredited Platonic ancestor.

Now, if Anthony Kenny's recent treatment of the EE as a possibly later-than-NE work⁶ is taken seriously, much of Owen's powerfully persuasive picture of Aristotle's development needs critical re-assessment. In the recent Owen symposium at Florida State, I tried to begin this project with an examination of the case for the claim that the EE firmly proscribes a single science of being in the manner that Owen describes.⁷ In that paper I admit that "the silence of the EE" on the NE's "redeeming afterthought" is "troublesome and a satisfactory explanation of this difficulty belongs in any complete discussion of" N 96b26-9. That is, if we agree that the EE lacks, while the NE contains, a "constructive suggestion" about agathon, and posit that the EE is later than the NE, how are we to account for the apparent anomaly of Aristotle's dropping a promising idea? Various explanations are possible, of course, all of them awkward, but for those sympathetic to Kenny's program,⁸ some account of the EE's failure to suggest focal meaning as a strategy for dealing with the equivocity of agathon is called for. In this paper I wish to explore some of these possible explanations, assuming only as a working hypothesis what certainly needs detailed support, viz. that the EE is, indeed, later than the NE and represents to some extent an attempt to streamline and firm up the argument of the earlier work. As Kenny in particular has developed the proposal, the EE is more systematic,⁹ more inclined to supply premises needed for deductive arguments;¹⁰ it is a tighter, leaner work than its more famous counterpart, omitting much in the way of anecdote and digression that makes the NE "a more pleasant read". In its comparative austerity, then, the EE deserves its characterization as "quasi-mathematical" in character, a stylistic feature stressed in D. J. Allan's pioneering work on the treatise.¹¹ Unlike Owens, however, who saw in this the signs of an early work done by "a young man fond of schematic argument" (see p. 2 above),

Allan's view was that "the systematizer is the later Aristotle".¹² Whether the Allan-Kenny thesis about the EE bears up better under examination than the Owen treatment is, of course, a large and quite controversial issue. All I can hope to do here is to probe one important aspect of that larger question by concentrating on the question of the purported pros hen equivocation of agathon.

Before attempting an analysis of the central NE passage already noted, it will be helpful to get clear about some preliminary presuppositions concerning Aristotle's approach to agathon as well as indicating the common ground that NE I.6 and EE I.8 share in their criticism of Platonic metaethics. The simplest possible account of the meaning of 'agathon' (customarily and correctly translated by our 'good' in English¹³) would treat it as an unambiguous predicate (adjective) standing for a quality or character common to all things that are properly called 'good'. In the language of the Categories τ' ἀγαθά, goods or good things, would be said on this view to be συνώνυμα, literally, 'named along with or together with', hence, 'of like or same name'. Just as a man and an ox are unambiguously called 'animal' since they both belong to the same genus, so too the things that are good, e.g. honor and virtue would be called 'good' in the same sense (Cat. 1a 6-8). They would be alike first of all insofar as they share a common designation, the word itself. But, more importantly, they would be alike in that "the definition or account of being according to the name" (ὁ κατὰ τ' οὐνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας -- 1a7) would be the same (ὁ αὐτός) in each case. When we have one word (e.g. ζῶον or ἀγαθόν) applied to different objects, which are nevertheless definitionally equivalent with respect to the character indicated by the word itself (κατὰ τ' οὐνομα), we shall say that the word in question is univocal or that the things similarly called are univocals. This use of 'univocal' to render συνώνυμος is preferable to the transliterated 'synonymous' since the latter expression in English connotes not one word's having the same meaning throughout a variety of uses but rather the situation where two (or more) words are said to have identical meanings. Thus, just as men and

oxen share in the common quality of animality, good things would share in a common quality of goodness if ἀγαθόν were univocal. They would form the various species of a common genus of goodness. The definition or account of their goodness in each case would be the same. It is this possible position that Aristotle has in mind in NE, I, ch. 6, where he considers the Platonic approach to the analysis of agathon. Using typically Platonic phrases he represents this position as maintaining that there is a common idea of goodness over all good things (κοινή τις ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ἰδέα - N 96a22-23) or something universally common and single present in them (κοινὸν τι καθόλου καὶ ἓν - N 96a28). His most general label for this view of 'good' as a predicate standing for a common property of all good things is what may be called καθ' ἓν predication; that wherein a predicate is ascribed καθ' ἓν εἶδος (1096b10), "according to one form" or κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν, "according to a single idea" (N 96b15-16, cf. Republic 507b6). Ignoring the special problems raised by the form or idea of the Good in a Platonic sense, one can isolate those arguments targeted specifically at the view that ἀγαθόν is predicated καθ' ἓν.

Initiating the example of John C. Hall,¹⁴ it is useful to divide up selected portions of the parallel NE and EE passages expressions of similarities and differences in the two names with the use of labels, as below.

<u>NE</u>	<u>EE</u>	<u>order in EE</u>
(A1) <u>N</u> 96a17-23	(α1) <u>E</u> 18a1-a9	(γ)
(A2) <u>N</u> 96a23-29	(α2) <u>E</u> 17b25-34	(α2)
(A3) <u>N</u> 96a29-34	(α3) <u>E</u> 17b34-18a1	(α3)
(A4) <u>N</u> 96a34-65	(α4) <u>E</u> 18a10-15	(α1)
(B) <u>N</u> 96b7-26	--	(α4)
(C1) <u>N</u> 96b26-29	--	(δ)
(C2) <u>N</u> 96b30-97a14	(γ) <u>E</u> 17b16-23	(ε)
--	(δ) <u>E</u> 18a15-24	
--	(ε) <u>E</u> 18a24-30	

(A1)-(A4) and (α1)-(α4) are arguments directed against what Aristotle takes to be Plato's univocalist position on the question. (B) is Aristotle's own version of a possible Platonic defence against his arguments (the subject of Hall's article) while (C1), but not (γ), includes the constructive and puzzling suggestion about ἀγαθόν already introduced. (C1) takes some parting shots at the ethical impracticality of Plato's Form of the Good.

Two observations about (C2) and its relation to EE are worth making immediately. First, its position has moved from the end of the discussion in NE to the beginning in EE. That could suggest that Aristotle in the EE was more conscious of the need to indicate clearly (and before any detailed criticisms of Plato's position are given) what should and should not be expected in the sequel. A thorough discussion (τὸ διασκοπεῖν) of the forms and their difficulties belongs to a different discipline (ἑτέρας διατριβῆς b16-17, ἀλλ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην - b19), one that deals in logoi at once both destructive and general (b18). If, however, he is to speak in an abbreviated fashion (συντόμως - b19) Aristotle says that to posit a Form of good or, indeed, of anything else is to speak abstractly and vacuously (λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς - b21; cf. Meta: 991a21-22 and 1079b26 which use κενολογεῖν). As many have noted, this brutal and abrupt early dismissal of the theory of Forms, with its bibliographical reference to frequent discussion elsewhere in both exoteric and esoteric works (ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν - b22-3), contrasts sharply with the apologetic tone of NE I. 6 where Aristotle indicates how painful (yet necessary) it is to put truth before friendship. Here, one gets the impression that the author is weary of battles over the Forms, and wishes, without taking anything back from the general critique, to concentrate only on those criticisms especially relevant to the Form of the good. Second, the theme of (C2), viz. that it is not easy to see how practical men - doctors, weavers, carpenters, etc. - would be helped by a study of the Form itself, is picked up not only in (γ) at E 17b24-5 but also later in EE I. 8 at E 18a34-b4 where there is an apparent backward reference to our NE passage, viz. the

phrase ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον - E 18a36. (For a defence of the received text containing this phrase against Cook Wilson's and Susemihl's excision, see Woods ad loc¹⁵). The claim that Plato's Form should either be useful to no science or to all equally (a36-7) seems to be a very compressed reminder of N 97a4-6 while the even more curt E 18a37-8 (ἐτι οὐ πρακτόν) condenses (C2)'s claim about practitioners to the barest possible formulation.

Of the remaining parallel passages, viz. (A1) - (A4) and (α1) - (α4) we can afford to mention half of them only in passing, since their essentially ad hominem attacks on Plato's Forms raise no particular difficulties for the Form of the good. The problem of the separability of Forms [(A4) and (α4)], then, and the special difficulty for Platonists of positing a common form over any series of things standing in the relation of prior to posterior [(A1) and (α1)] may thus be side-stepped in favor of the other brace, viz. (A2)-(α2) and (A3-α3). A glance back at the table on p. 5 above suggests that the EE regrouping of the arguments it shares with the NE may reflect a similar evaluation. That is, (α2) and (α3) are discussed first since they contain the central claims about the logic of agathon, while (α1) is placed third, just before (α4). Taken together with the Eudemian newcomers [(δ) and (ε)] the progression of anti-Platonic arguments in I. 8, then, appears to move from claims closest to Aristotle's own observations, e.g. those drawn from his own doctrine of categories, through challenges to Plato's emphasis on the eternality of the Form of the good down to contemporary (note the repetition of ἄν in E 18a16) "mathematicizing" Platonists such as Xenocrates.¹⁶ Prefaced as this series is by the harshness of (γ) and followed by the almost perfunctory passage discussed above, viz. E 18a34-b4, it is hard to resist the impression that the EE, in contrast with the relative warmth of the NE chapter, exhibits, as Flasher puts it, "eine kühle Reserve".¹⁷ One way of contrasting the two chapters as wholes, then, is to observe that the NE's critique is in many ways an internal as opposed to an external critical examination of Platonic metaethical doctrine. [To use Jaeger's discredited, but still suggestive, way of contrasting the early critique of

Plato's Forms in (Meta A.9) with later versions (e.g. M. 4), the NE has the "we" flavor while the EE smacks of "they".] In spite of these differences in tone, however, it would be a mistake to make too much of such nuances in comparing the NE and EE. We need to return to the specific arguments.

(A2) and (a2) in particular are crucial since they contain the thesis that 'good' (τ'ἀγαθόν, τὸ ἀγαθόν) is said in many ways (senses) (πολλαχῶς λεγέται), indeed in just as many (ἴσαχῶς) as 'being' (τῷ ὄντι - N-196a23-4, E 17b26). This strict parallel between τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ ὄν bears underscoring in view of the fact that one noteworthy commentator has attacked the customary interpretation that Aristotle is extending to 'good' "the focal analysis by which 'being' and 'one' are analyzed in the central books of the Metaphysics".¹⁸ In sharp contrast with other scholars, especially Owen, Fortenbaugh interprets the pros hen equivocation invoked at N 96b27-8 as a case of "generic affiliation" familiar from the biological and logical works so that the disputed passage (ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἀπαντα συντελεῖν) is taken to mean "all [goods] being from one genus or belonging to one genus".¹⁹ The trouble here is that he has to take the class of things desirable in their own right as a genus and treat the various kath hauta goods as species within a common genus. Fortenbaugh appeals to Posterior Analytics II.14, 98a14 ff. for a parallel treatment involving natural kinds. Another problem with this suggestion, however, as Enrico Berti has pointed out, is that

every time Aristotle uses the expression πρὸς ἓν to explicate a case of homonymy, he rules out any question of its being a simple difference among various species of the same genus, a difference which is indicated rather by the expression καθ' ἓν. See above all EE VII 2, 1236a16-18, a passage recognized as one of the first and most clear on the subject of the πρὸς ἓν, where being ὡς εἶδη ἑνὸς γένους is equated with being καθ' ἓν, and is opposed to λεγεσθαι πρὸς μίαν . . . τινὰ καὶ πρώτην [ἰλίαν].²⁰

Fortenbaugh's interpretation is also vulnerable to the charge that he fails to take note of the twice-mentioned explicit phrase ἴσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι which, at the very least, is prima facie evidence that Aristotle is indeed suggesting for ἀγαθόν the treatment found

so helpful for ὄν and εἶναι. In view of these problems, then, the more traditional interpretation deserves a closer examination than Fortenbaugh provides. The close connection between ἀγαθόν and ὄν is developed in the two passages at hand. (α2) recalls (ὡςπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διήρηται) the doctrine of the different senses of τὸ ὄν which from the Categories to the Metaphysics forms the backbone of Aristotle's ontology. It (τὸ ὄν) signifies or stands for (σημαίνει) substance (οὐσία - Cat 1b26 = τί ἐστὶ - E 17b27-8 = τόδε τι - Meta 1028a12), quality, 'how qualified' (ποιόν), quantity, 'how much' (ποσόν) and so on for the other categories. The various existents (things that are - τὰ ὄντα) or of which 'being' (τὸ ὄν) can be truly predicated fall into the different categories or highest genera while not themselves sharing any common universal feature univocally designated by 'being' (cf. Austin's phrase - "like breathing, only quieter"). Aristotle's usual way of putting the point is expressed in the dictum "Being is not a genus" (Meta 998b22, Post. Anal. 92b13). There is nothing common to Socrates, his bravery, his height, his color, his being shod or barefoot, lying or sitting and so on (Cat., ch. 4); when we say that each of these things is the 'is' must be taken as elliptical for 'is a quality', 'is a relative', and so on. Now, that which is good or the good is found in each of the categories according to (α2) (τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐν ἑκάστη τῶν πτώσεων ἐστὶ τούτων - E17b30). (A2) tells us that 'good' is predicated in each, e.g. of good and intelligence in the category of substance, of the virtues in that of quality, of the moderate in that of quantity, of the opportune in that of time, and so on (N 96a24-7). The same or similar examples are mentioned in (α2). Given this categorial diversity of goods, Aristotle says it is clear (δῆλον - α27) that there could not be some one common universal character shared by them all (οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινὸν τι καθόλου καὶ εἶναι - N 96a27-28). If there were such a character it could not be predicated in all the categories but only in one of them (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγεται ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ - N 96a28-29). That is, if ἀγαθόν were predicated καθ' ἓν εἶδος or in just one way (μοναχῶς λεγομένον - Physics 185b31), it would

signify items in a single category; e.g., 'a year long' (ἐνιαυσίαν - Cat. 5b5) is predicated only in the category of time or white (λευκόν) in that of quality.²¹ But, since ἀγαθόν is so obviously promiscuous - it can mate with an item in any category - Aristotle concludes that it could not be a καθ' ἑν predicate.

The argument advanced in (A3) and (α3) is closely related to the foregoing and depends on the principle that for anything predicated κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν there should be a single science (μία ἐπιστήμη) which studies it (N 96a29-30). But, as a matter of fact, there are several sciences of the good, e.g. medicine, gymnastics, military strategy, not just one (E 17b36, N 96a29ff.).

But, it may be asked, just what is the force of these arguments that Aristotle mounts against a καθ' ἑν account of the meaning of ἀγαθόν? Hardie has balked at any interpretation which rests content with saying that "'good' is predicated in different categories" merely means "that it is predicated of subjects which are in different categories."²² Assuming that the sentences Aristotle suggests in his list would be "God is good", "courage is good", "the useful is good", etc., Hardie labels such sentences "definitions" in which the predicate is "inevitably in the same category as the subject".²³ But is difficulty to see why he brings in the notion of definition here. They would be strange definitions, indeed, ones in which the definiens is in each case nominally the same, whereas the definienda are known to be categorially different. Perhaps he is drawn to this interpretation because of a certain feature that each of the definienda share - that within their own categories they are essentially good things. That is, it would seem to be analytic that in the category of time, the right time or the opportune (ὁ καιρός) is good or that in that of quality the virtues are good. But, this feature is very likely a result of a too narrow choice of examples on Aristotle's part, a tendency to use those which are obviously and naturally termed 'good'. They are all, perhaps, good simply or tout court i.e. 'without qualification' (ἀπλῶς) as opposed to good at certain times or under certain conditions (τινι).²⁴ In the present context, though, τὰ ἀγαθὰ τινι might do just as well as long as different categories were suitably chosen, e.g. the spanking of a naughty

child (in the category of πάσχειν). A more cautious interpretation than Hardie's is certainly defensible textually. What is needed is the recognition that the goodness of things in different categories will differ sharply from category to category. The type of goodness appropriate to substances does not have much in common with that of relations or quantities or places. What 'good' signifies in each case is as different as the very things themselves. Categorical differences will be found in the characteristic excellences of each category. An early text that seems to incorporate this suggestion for ἀγαθόν can be found in the Topics 107a6ff., where it is said to mean 'productive of health' as applied to medicine, 'a quality' such as courage or justice as applied to the soul, 'the right time' as applied to some events, etc. There is no suggestion that there is any link between these usages. In fact, they are given as examples of predicates so obviously disparate as to make the common word clearly homonymous (δῆλον ὅτι ὁμώνυμον τὸ λεγόμενον - 107a5).

Further support for this interpretation can be gleaned from the concessions Aristotle offers in (B) to a real or imagined Platonic rebuttal of his criticisms. One might restrict the application of the univocal thesis to things good in themselves (καθ' αὐτά) or as ends and not as a means to something else (διὰ τὰύτα). Even if this is done, however, it will still be fruitless to look for some common quality that the καθ' αὐτά goods of τιμή, φρονήσις and ἡδονή share (NE, I. vi. 9-11). For the accounts (λόγοι) one would give of them as goods (ἢ ἀγαθά) differ considerably. What makes honor good is not what makes practical wisdom or pleasure good. They share no common characteristic. As Hall puts it in his useful discussion of (B), "The account (λόγος) we give of the goodness of each good thing will consist of the listing of the properties that make it good . . . actualized honor is thought good."²⁵ This account harmonizes with that of Austin, as against Prichard, when he observes that "Aristotle does not say he 'cannot find' a common character denoted by ἀγαθόν in these instances: he says that he knows ἀγαθόν stands for different characters."²⁶ The whole section of chapter 6, then, which criticizes

the Platonic approach to explicating the meaning of ἀγαθόν, forms a unified attack on the search for a καθ' ἑν account of the predicate 'good' making all good things univocally good. A possible weakness of Aristotle's criticism is that it is still open to the univocalist to try to find a suitably general definiens for ἀγαθόν, there is no a priori argument to the effect that a καθ' ἑν account is, in principle, impossible. But, in view of the more plausible accounts that Aristotle turns to briefly, this may not be a fatal weakness. It seems to be another example of "Aristotle's commonest complaint against other philosophers" - "that they oversimplify".²⁷ The simplest possibility, that ἀγαθόν stands for one single quality or character common to all good things, is just too simple to account for the phenomena. 'Good', unlike simple predicates such as color words, will not abide such an analysis. Thus far, in its negative treatment of the univocalist position the NE and EE are in substantial agreement.

If τὰγαθά are not συνώνυμα what other possibilities are there? The most comprehensive term is that which opens the Categories, ὁμώνυμα, which designates things having only a common name, differing in that different senses of the name are applicable. The senses may be completely different, as the example at NE. 2129a30, κλείς, which may mean either 'key, or 'collar-bone', was intended to show. Aristotle calls this sort of homonymy chance (ἀπὸ τύχης) homonymy and rejects it straight off as the sort that the use of ἀγαθόν exemplifies (1096b26-7). That is, when one calls honor, pleasure, and practical wisdom all 'good' he is not just purely equivocating. There must be some connection between these uses; they are good according to something common or κατὰ τι κοινόν (Metaphysics, 1060b35) if not καθ' ἑν. He then goes on to list three more possibilities, the first two of which are probably equivalent: ἀφ' ἐνός ("derived from one thing") or, more commonly, πρὸς ἑν ("related to one thing") and κατ' ἀναλογίαν ("according to analogy").

Aristotle's technical terminology for classifying the phenomena of ambiguity fluctuates, especially from the earlier works (e.g. Categories or Topics) to the later (chiefly The Metaphysics),

and can give rise to confusion. Joseph Owens, for example, following the Topics, tends to equate the expressions τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα and τὰ ὁμώνυμα ('the equivocals') and to juxtapose them as a pair to the corresponding equivalent pair τὰ μοναχῶς λεγόμενα and τὰ συνώνυμα ('the univocals').²⁸ He then subdivides the class of "equivocals" into at least three sub-classes depending on whether the homonymy is one (a) by chance, (b) by reference or (c) by analogy.²⁹ G. E. L. Owen, also, supports this general scheme.³⁰ Hintikka, on the other hand, in an unduly neglected discussion of ambiguity in Aristotle, has argued that "Aristotle consistently distinguishes homonymy from multiplicity of applications and uses the terms ὁμώνυμος and πολλαχῶς for this purpose".³¹ τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα is found to be a wider class than τὰ ὁμώνυμα, by which, according to Hintikka, "Aristotle meant τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμώνυμα" (p. 139), i.e. accidental or chance equivocation. In this he is following a tradition that goes back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who explicitly identified τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα (equivocals in the primary sense) with τὰ ἀπὸ τυχῆς.³² Among the many Aristotelian passages brought forth by Hintikka in support of this interpretation, one from EE is worth repeating here, viz. E 36b25, where the different sorts of friendship are called φιλία neither καθ' ἓν εἶδος nor ὡς ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχουσαι πρὸς αὐτάς but μᾶλλον πρὸς ἓν. Solomon translates the key phrase 'as possessing a common name accidentally without being specially related to one another' while Rackham renders it 'as having a common name by accident and standing in a merely chance relationship to one another.' Both translations would be strengthened if the καὶ here is taken, as is likely, explicatively. The main point is that the non-homonymous, non-synonymous cases, those which, as Alexander puts it, "have some reason for their being similarly named" (αἰτίαν τινὰ ἔχει τοῦ ὁμοίως ἀλλήλοις ὠνομάσθαι - 11. 26-7) are classed alongside the (chance) equivocals as different types of τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα. The following chart incorporates Hintikka's suggestion and classifies the technical terms needed for further discussion of Aristotle's treatment of the alleged ambiguity of ἀγαθόν. Examples of each are given below.

τὰ μοναχῶς

ἀπλῶς
καθ' ἓνα τρόπον
καθ' ἓν εἶδος
κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν
τὰ σθνήνυμα
e. γεννιάσιος
'a year long'

all
equivalent
expressions

τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα

(διχῶς | τριχῶς ...)
(a) τὰ ὁμώνυμα (τὰ ἀπὸ τυχῆς)
e. γκλείς
'key' 'collarbone'
(b) τὰ πρὸς ἓν (ἀφ' ἑνός)
e. γ. τὸ ὄν
'being'
(c) τὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν
e. ὄψις ἐν σώματι
egg· νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ
sight in body:
intelligence in soul

Aristotle explicitly rejects (a) for the case of ἀγαθόν and mysteriously offers both (b) and (c) as possible alternatives, abruptly refusing to go into any further discussion. The commentator's task, then, is to try to fill in what he might have said at this juncture, examining the various alternatives in turn. That is, the main task is to consider the relative theoretical advantages of (b) and (c) and then check to see if Aristotle's actual usage of ἀγαθόν tips the scale one way or the other. Unfortunately, there is room here only for treatment of (b).

A model for (b) is provided by Aristotle's favorite example of a πρὸς ἓν adjective, 'healthy' (ὑγιεινόν), discussed at Meta, 1071a1ff. and elsewhere. Various things, e.g. the actual healthy state of an individual, the sign of it in his rosy hue, the constitutionals that keep him that way, are called 'healthy' in different but clearly related senses. They all refer to the state of health itself (πρὸς ὑγίειαν), either directly or to what indicates its presence or tends to preserve it. ὑγιεινόν has 'focal meaning' in Owen's phrase, always pointing to "one definite kind of thing" (μίαν τινα φύσιν Met. 1003a34).³³ Further specifications for πρὸς ἓν equivocation are offered in the EE, which does not consider its application to ἀγαθόν. There, in the account of φιλία, the primary sense of a πρὸς ἓν word is "that of which the definition is implicit in the definition of all" (πρώτον δ' οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει - E 36a21-22): "its definition reappears as a component in each of the other definitions".³⁴ For example, in defining 'scalpel' one would have to include mention of the surgeon that uses it, but the reverse need not hold. That is, one could define 'surgeon' without mentioning his tools. If we could not do this we would have to say that were no surgeons until scalpels were invented. This "logical priority" - priority in λόγος or definition - of the primary sense of a πρὸς ἓν word seems to be a necessary condition of πρὸς ἓν equivocation.

A further condition is suggested by Joseph Owens, viz. that the "nature expressed in each case is found in only one of the instances." Only the art of surgery is by nature surgical; other instances can only derivatively share in the nature of the surgical. This condition, while not being altogether clearly expressed, seems justified by Aristotle's procedure with regard to τὸ ὄν or

'being'. For, while things from all the categories can be said to be, only the first category of substance is in the fullest sense (Cat. 2a11-12); all other things that are, are attributes, processes, etc. of substances. The notion of the natural (or ontological) priority of οὐσία remains one of the thorniest problems of modern Aristotelian scholarship and I cannot resolve the issue here. But since "natural priority" together with "logical priority" seem to form defining characteristics of πρὸς ἐν homonymy a quick, no doubt crude, attempt to formulate both conditions is in order. Then, the problem will be to find a suitable candidate for focal meaning for ἀγαθόν, if (b) is taken as representing Aristotle's true choice.

Before doing that, however, it may help to briefly characterize the general logical properties of the πρὸς ἐν relation. Any such account of the connection between various items linked in this way will be expressed by relational propositions of the form sketched on the next page. A diagram using the simple example of ἰατρικός ('medical') for the common predicate P as described at Met. 1061a3-5 and 1003b1-3 is provided alongside to indicate the "focal" character of the relation as emphasized by Owen.

The main points are that (1) quite different individuals (b, c, d, . . .) (2) all of which share a common predicate (P), are (3) related in different ways (R_1, R_2, R_3) to (4) the very same thing (a) which is (5) the primary instance of P. One key feature, (4), that distinguishes πρὸς ἐν from κατ' ἀναλογίαν equivocation is clearly expressed at Meta. 1061a3 - πρὸς ταῦτ' ὁ ἕκαστον - "each refers to the same thing". Another such mark, (3), is implicit in the repetitions of πρὸς together with the specific examples of different relations that he does specify (e.g. ἔχειν, χρήσιμον, ἀπό). (1), (2), and (5) are familiar by now.

be an accepted one (ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται - N 97b22-3; cf. N 95a15-20). Happiness, then, would be an obvious and unproblematic good. It may, perhaps, even have some claim to being primarily and most properly called 'good' (τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν - D 44b7). The suggestion would be, then, that all good things will be found to bear some definite relation to happiness in that they cannot be fully understood without seeing the reference to happiness as providing the focal meaning of ἀγαθόν.

A recent paper that appears to involve the suggestion contained in the last paragraph puts the point as follows:

eudaimonia is good in a primary sense: other practical goods are so called 'homonymously', not by a mere play on words, but in secondary senses that forms on eudaimonia . . . all lesser practical goods are so called because they are components of eudaimonia, or produce or preserve components of eudaimonia, and the like . . . So we needn't doubt that distinctive of Aristotle's semantics of goodness is its holism, the focality of practical goods on eudaimonia, i.e. on the whole life that they provide for or constitute. ³⁶

As Price would have it, then, when we call wealth, friends, the practice of virtue 'good' we must be understood as making an implicit reference to the notion of happiness, to which these various human goods all contribute (ἅπαντα συντελεῖν N 96b28). The logoi (or definitions) of each of these, then, must contain as a component the logos of happiness if (LP) is to be satisfied. But, is this plausible? Is it not quite conceivable that one could define pleasure, virtue, health, friends, etc. without any mention of happiness itself? It would seem that the list of the good things that make up the happy life could be drawn up after an independent consideration of each element in it. That is, one might construe Aristotle's development of the concept of εὐδαιμονία as a construction using the ordinary understanding of undeniably good things which may have, even in respect of their goodness, little, if anything, in common. This is suggested in the criticism and of the Academic tendency to begin discussion of the Good itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν) with talk of the One or numbers (E, 18a15-24). He recommends that they should "start from things admitted to be good, for instance health, strength, sobriety

of mind, and prove that value (τὸ καλόν) is present even more in the unchanging."

Clearly, the concept of happiness is far closer to ordinary ethical speculation than Academic mathematicizing theories, but the interpretation now being considered conflicts with what we have seen of Aristotle's own approach. This is borne out by the fact that Aristotle's own analysis of happiness proceeds by breaking it down into εὐπραξία ("well-doing") and εὐζωία ("welfare") and the various subcomponents of these component goods (N 98b21-22). The suggestion that εὐδαιμονία is the common reference-point for all good things threatens to undermine Aristotle's own recommendation to Plato and, indeed, the whole positive account, by introducing a vicious circularity. That is, the goodness of happiness would be invoked to account for any similarities between good things, a primitive understanding of the goodness of which would be necessary to understand happiness itself.

Furthermore, it is not clear that the nature of goodness is to be found in only one case, i.e. happiness, and not in the other instances as Owens' second requirement would suggest. Pleasure or intelligence or virtue would all seem to have claim to being kath hauta good for man apart from their connection with happiness, (cf. especially N 96b7-26, D 51blff.). If we accept the more primitive notion of "natural priority" as defined by (NP) it seems clearly possible that the relation between happiness and the other goods need not reflect this pattern. We could have instances of pleasant, intellectual, and virtuous activity without instantiating thereby the complete notion of happiness that we possess. The best evidence that Aristotle himself recognized this point can be seen in the fact that children and animals cannot be said to be happy (N, 00a1-5) yet they can and do experience pleasure (D 44b8-9 and N 76b19-27). Austin's quip that "it would be silly to say 'call no man pleased until he is dead'" (cf. N 00a10-11 where this is said of 'happy') would also highlight the differences here.³⁷ Thus, there seems no clear parallel in the case of happiness to the situation with respect to substance where the πρὸς ἑν treatment of τὸ ὄν includes the "claim that statements about non-substances can be reduced to - translated into - statements about substances."³⁸

It would seem, rather, that statements about happiness would require translation into statements about some set of its component goods and not vice versa. For instance, the popular view of happiness, with which Aristotle strives to square his own account in NE, Bk. I, ch. 8, has pleasure as forming "part of the concept" of εὐδαιμονία. Again, as Austin expresses it, the "full analysis of εὐδαιμονία includes that of ἀγαθόν."³⁹ Therefore, since the suggestion that happiness is the focal meaning of ἀγαθόν apparently fails to meet either of the defining characteristics of πρὸς ἓν homonymy in a straight-forward way, it seems unlikely that a πρὸς ἓν interpretation using other focal goods would be successful. Of course, the exclusion of one candidate cannot be expected to prove this more general claim; still, the fact that εὐδαιμονία is the most comprehensive, inclusive concept that Aristotle provides in his Ethics would tend to mitigate the chances for any others. How could it be seriously suggested that all good things center on pleasure by itself or intelligence or virtuous action? Each of these seems at best only a partial answer on Aristotle's view.

We have already mentioned (see p. 1 above) Ackrill's suggestion that a modified pros hen account might work for a restricted class of cases, viz. those involving predicative as opposed to attributive uses of agathon. This would appear to be in the spirit of the NE's (B) (see p. 5 above), a passage that deploys a Platonic, univocalist account to handle a restricted class of kath hauta goods, e.g. knowledge, virtue, and pleasure, and lacks a counterpart in the EE. Even for the restricted class, however, the question raised above still applies. There seems to be no reason to hold that (LP) and (NP) can be met by cases of knowledge, virtue, or pleasure - their logoi qua goods (cf. N 96b24-25) differ after all. It is true that it is only two lines later that the pros hen possibility is raised and we may think that we are entitled to amend the claim of difference by saying that they will all have a common reference to the focus of eudaimonia. But, given the fact that the suggestion is put in the form of a question and that another, presumably weaker relation of analogy is also brought up, we cannot be confident in this inference. Even if we could make

some rough sense of the suggestion that kath hauta goods have different relations to the same focus - e.g. knowledge may facilitate the pursuit of eudaimonia, virtue express it, pleasure top it off, thus perhaps bringing us closer to satisfying (LP) - (NP) remains a stumbling block. As noted above, it would seem as though any of the three goods in question could exist in the absence of their supposed focus. When Aristotle considers the three lines, for instance, in both the NE and EE - those of pleasure, honor, and intellect - and he argues against them as partial and incomplete accounts of happiness, he is presupposing that these goals can exist and be pursued in isolation. If not, what point would there be in arguing against such foes? When Aristotle recommends a complex blend of balanced pursuits, when he calls for us to set up a target to shoot for in forming our life-plans, he is assuming that other, lesser goals than eudaimonia in all its rich complexity could be sought, perhaps even achieved, without thereby ensuring that one become fully eudaimon. The situation in a practical science is not like that in a purely theoretical one. If Aristotle's ontology is correct, colors, weights, etc. cannot exist by themselves, without somehow inhering in primary substances. But, Aristotle's ethical theory could be persuasive and penetrating without having a similar ontological result of the actual natural priority of eudaimonia to other agatha. Even, then, if we grant the possibility of a full-strength pros hen account for agathon as certainly envisaged in the NE, we have seen why Aristotle might well put off definitive remarks on the subject until an appropriate opportunity in "another brand of philosophy" presented itself. The ontological implications of such an account, the precise ways in which (NP) and (LP) would need modification and development, present conceptual difficulties that we have no good evidence were ever met head on.

If these speculations, then, about how difficult a pros hen account would be to work out in detail, perhaps even impossible, we can see why the escape hatch of analogy is so quickly added to focal meaning as possibilities to be explored. When he wrote the NE, then Aristotle was certainly not sure of how to

proceed. If the EE is later than the NE, it is perhaps just as likely that he has quietly dropped the idea than that it, too, somehow conveys the same conclusion that the NE does, although differently expressed. This latter suggestion has been made by Berti and defended by David Robinson in their contributions to the Symposium Aristotelian on the EE. As the latter puts the view, for example, in his reply to Berti

M. Berti seems to me to be perfectly correct in finding the notion of 'logical priority' or 'focal meaning' applied to the senses of ἀγαθόν in EE I. Aristotle distinguishes between means and end, points out the 'natural' priority of end to means, and suggests that there is also a 'logical' priority of end to means, such that the end is called 'good' in a 'truer' sense than the means are called 'good', and also in a sense which is prior in definition, since the means are only called good derivatively from their relation to the end which is the 'first good', πρῶτον ἀγαθόν, or the 'good itself', αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. The 'natural' priority of end to means results from that fact that means are good only in so far as they promote a good end, whereas the end is good by its own nature and 'for its own sake'; the end is good whether or not the means exist, but if the end were destroyed the means would cease to be good. The 'logical' priority of the end results from the fact that means can only be shown to be good and defined as good by reference to the end to which they are means; the definition of the goodness of a means must contain a reference to the goodness of the end to which it is a means.⁴⁰

By putting heavy stress on the means/end relation, then, Berti and Robinson reinterpret the doctrine of focal meaning so as to have both the NE and EE compatible with such an interpretation. But, as Jonathan Barnes has argued in his review of Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik "talk about means and ends need have no connexion with the sense of 'good'; and neither in EE nor in EN is any connexion overtly made".⁴¹ The basic point seems to be that if we construe the means/end relation causally and "x is good because it is a means to y, and y is good", there is no reason to think that goodness of x and y, while remaining different qua goods, need to be "analytically connected".⁴² The "logical priority" of ends to means is not strong enough to support an instance of (LP). Nor would (NP) be upheld either. If jogging is good as a means to health and health is a kath auton good, it is easy enough to imagine the means without the end. (Jim Fixx

may be a case in point). Whether reinterpreting the means/end relation along the lines of those who distinguish between constitutive, intrinsic conceptions of means and instrumental, extrinsic accounts would be preferable to the interpretation Barnes offers are perhaps worth exploration. But, nothing in Berti or Robinson suggests that they had such a distinction in mind and we may be initially skeptical that this move would preserve anything like pros hen equivocity in its strongest form.

At this point all we can claim is the fabled Scotch verdict. To our leading question of whether agathon is a pros hen equivocal in Aristotle's Ethics we can only reply: "not proven". The NE does not unambiguously endorse it and we have seen reasons for thinking it a difficult doctrine to defend. If this view of the matter is plausible, then the EE's silence on the question is certainly compatible with our tentative, but still largely negative, conclusion. There are signs, however, especially in E 18a30-2 that the analogy option from N b26-9 is still open. Flesher, for one in an important footnote to his paper preserved in the English translation available in the second volume of Articles on Aristotle, argues that the alternative of focal meaning is "rejected still more decisively than in EN"; he suggests that the EE endorses the analogy option "even if the word 'analogy' is missing" when it says "each thing is drawn to its own proper good, the eye to sight, the body to health, and so another to another"⁴³E 18a31-2). Thus, the EE may share with the NE a preference for the analogy solution although it, too, offers very little evidence that this is so. But, the subject of a possible kat' analogian account, how it differs from a pros hen treatment, if, indeed, it does, and whether it would be sufficient to unify the various uses of agathon is a topic best left to another occasion.⁴⁴

Footnotes

¹ οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, ὅτιον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ καιρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ <η> ἀρετὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ εἶδος (Syriani in Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. (S. Kroll Berlin, 1902), p. 56, ll. 24-6.

² The other, "latter," explanation Ackrill considers, viz. by way of analogy, which also appears in the crucially relevant text (NE I, 1096b27ff.), is tentatively assigned the task of unifying "The attributive uses of 'good' in which it works like 'e (a good knife does its job successfully, a good chair does its - different - job successfully . . ." (J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Ethics [London: Faber and Faber, 1973], p. 243, ad loc. Actually, Ackrill's suggestion, while brief and unargued, is, indeed, "tempting". It deserves serious consideration, along with other possibilities for reconciling Aristotle's apparent hesitation in his positive account of agathon.

³ References to the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (NE and EE hereafter) will be shortened versions of the familiar practice, with one exception. That is, 'NE 1096b26-9' is the expanded form of the citation in the text and should cause no difficulty, while 'EE 1217b6', for example, will be shortened to 'E 17b6'. The more debatable departure from standard practice, viz. that of abbreviating 'NE 1129a3 - 1154b34' to 'D 29a3 - 54b34' needs some explanation. Since I believe with Kenny [See The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford 1978)] that the so-called disputed or "common" books of these treatises [NE V, VI and VII = EE IV, V and VI] should not be arbitrarily awarded to one course lectures over the other, material from these books will be labelled neutrally. For an outline of Kenny's case for their originally belonging to the EE (together with discussions of other issues related to current controversy about the EE/NE connection)² see my "Aristotle's Ethics: Have We Been Teaching the Wrong One?",

Teaching Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 4 (October, 1983), pp. 331-340, especially pp. 333-336.

⁴G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, Düring and Owen (eds.) (Goteborg, 1960), pp. 167, 166.

⁵Ibid., p. 169.

⁶In addition to The Aristotelian Ethics (footnote 3 above) see also his Aristotle's Theory of The Will (New Haven, 1979), a brief synopsis of which can be found on p. 338 of the article also mentioned in footnote 3.

⁷See "Owen and the 'Single-Science' Argument in the Eudemian Ethics", forthcoming in a collection of essays from the 1983 conference to be edited by Russell Davey and Jaakko Hintikka and published by the University Presses of Florida.

⁸Further support for Kenny's position drawing on the differing treatment of friendship in the two works can be found in my March, 1984 contribution to the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association entitled "Testing Kenny's Hypothesis About the Eudemian Ethics: The Case of Philia" (copies available upon request).

⁹Aristotle's Theory of the Will, p. 69.

¹⁰Michael Woods, for instance, notes that the 13-premised "formal argument" about happiness in Book II, chapter 1, is considerably more elaborate than the corresponding [NE] argument" [Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics: Books I, II and VIII (Oxford, 1982), p. 93.

¹¹"Quasi-mathematical method in the Eudemian Ethics", in Aristote et les problèmes de Méthode, ed. S. Mansion (Louvain, 1960), pp. 303-18; "Aristotle's Criticism of Platonic Doctrine Concerning Goodness and the Good", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, v. 64 (1963/4), pp. 273-86; review of Dirlmeier's Eudemische Ethik, Gnomon, v. 38 (1966), pp. 138-49.

¹²Allan, "Quasi-mathematical method in the Eudemian Ethics", p. 318.

¹³The traditional translation of ἀγαθόν by 'good' will be followed here and in itself is certainly not controversial. A glance at Liddell and Scott's entry for ἀγαθόν surely bears out P. T. Geach's observation that while Aristotle "did not talk English" the Greek word he did employ "had ambiguities quite parallel to those of 'good'." ("Good and Evil", Analysis, V. 17 (1957), p. 35). In particular there are Greek equivalents for colloquial expressions such as 'my good friend', the infinitival construction 'it is good to ____', 'a good' 'the good', 'goods' in the sense of 'wealth' and the like. The difficulties that are encountered in unraveling 'good' or ἀγαθόν are mainly conceptual or philosophical and not matters of translation. Thus, Geach adds that it is "possible that the uses of ἀγαθόν and 'good' run parallel because they express one and the same concept; that this is a philosophically important concept, in which Aristotle did well to be interested . . ." (p. 35). The discussion which follows assumes that this point of view is justifiable, at the very least for occurrences of ἀγαθόν in Greek philosophical authors, especially Plato and Aristotle.

¹⁴John C. Hall, "ἈΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΗΤΙΣ ΤΙΣ (Aristotle, EN, 1096b7-26)", Classical Quarterly, v. 60, no. 1 (1966), pp. 55-64.

¹⁵Woods, p. 84. In spite of Woods' attempt to find a source for the reference "in some early work", it is defensible for those in the "Kenny-camp" to refer to the NE, as in the later cases of E 20b10-11 (cf. N 05b20 ff.) or, possibly, E 44a20 (cf. NE VIII.3). See Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics, pp. 226 ff. for further discussion of the EE's habits in referring to other Aristotelian works.

¹⁶For discussion of (δ) and (ε) see Jacques Brunschwig, "EE 187, 1218a15-32 et Le ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ", in Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik (Moraux and Harlfinger) (eds) (Berlin, 1971),

pp. 197-222. While Brunschwig argues it is Plato himself, not an earlier or later figure, that is targeted in the EE, other scholars (e.g. Hans von Arnim and Helmut Flashar) are more inclined to see Xenocrates, for one, as the target of (ε) in particular. See Woods, pp. 82-3 as well as Flashar's "Die Kritik der Platonischen Ideenlehre in der Ethik des Aristoteles", in Synusia: Schadewaldt Festschrift (Flashar and Gaiser) (Eds) (Pfullingen, 1965), pp. 232, 243-4 (footnotes 40 and 41).

¹⁷Ibid., p. 233.

¹⁸W.W. Fortenbaugh, "Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1096b26-29", Phronesis, v. XI, no. 2 (1966), pp. 185-94.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 188-9.

²⁰Berti, "Multiplicité et unité du bien selon EE I 8", in Moraux and Harlfinger (eds) (see footnote 16 above), p. 180, footnote 70.

²¹Burnet maintains in The Ethics of Aristotle (London, 1900), p. li, that the "phrase μοναχῶς λεγόμενον (ὄpp. πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον) is exactly equivalent to ἐν μιᾷ κατηγορίᾳ κατηγορούμενον."

²²W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1968), p. 57.

²³Ibid.

²⁴This distinction is drawn quite clearly at D 52b26 ff. in connection with good and pleasures. A typical example might be the contrast between the healthy state of an organism and the foul-tasting medicine needed to restore such a condition to a sick man.

²⁵Hall, p. 61.

²⁶J. L. Austin, "ΑΓΑΘΟΝ and ΕΤΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ in the Ethics of Aristotle", in J.M.E. Moravcsik (ed) Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, 1967), p. 288. This essay was reprinted in the second edition of Austin's Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1970), p. 24.

²⁷G.E.L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology", in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (R. Bambrough) (ed) (London, 1965), p. 69.

²⁸J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1963), pp. 115, 113 footnote 28. It should be noted that later in the chapter (pp. 121 ff.) Owens does amend this view in the light of other passages.

²⁹Ibid., p. 118.

³⁰Owen (see footnote 4 above), p. 166, footnote 1.

³¹Jaakko Hintikka, "Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity", Inquiry, v. 2, no. 3 (Autumn, 1959), pp. 137-51, reprinted in his Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality (Oxford, 1973), pp. 1-26 (revised).

³²Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria (M. Haydrück) (ed) (Berlin, 1891), p. 241, ll. 25-6.

³³Owen (see footnote 4 above), p. 169.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Owens, p. 119.

³⁶A.W. Price, "Aristotle's Ethical Holism", Mind, v. 89 (1980), p. 344.

³⁷Austin, pp. 280-1 (p. 18).

³⁸Owen (see footnote 4 above), p. 180.

³⁹Austin, p. 279 (p. 17).

⁴⁰D. B. Robinson, "Ends and Means and Logical Priority", in Moraux and Harlfinger (see footnotes 16 and 18 above), pp.185-6.

⁴¹J. Barnes, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, v. 55 (1973), p. 336.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³H. Flashar, "The Critique of Plato's Theory of Ideas in Aristotle's Ethics", in Articles on Aristotle 2. Ethics and Politics (Barnes, Schofield and Sorabji) (eds) (London, 1977), p. 9, footnote 15; the quote in the original version (see footnote 16 above) can be found on p. 243, footnote 37.

⁴⁴I am indebted to the Center for Hellenic studies and its director, Prof. B.M.W. Knox, for providing a matchless Arbeitsplatz during 1982/3 when I began to work on following up Kenny's approach to the EE/NE relationship.