

University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository

Master's Theses and Capstones

Student Scholarship

Winter 2015

THE GRAND ALLIANCE: FROM NECESSITY
TO SUSPICION, DEVELOPMENT TO
DECLINE

Robert M. Umholtz

University of New Hampshire, Durham

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis>

Recommended Citation

Umholtz, Robert M., "THE GRAND ALLIANCE: FROM NECESSITY TO SUSPICION, DEVELOPMENT TO DECLINE" (2015). *Master's Theses and Capstones*. 916.
<https://scholars.unh.edu/thesis/916>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses and Capstones by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.

THE GRAND ALLIANCE: FROM NECESSITY TO SUSPICION, DEVELOPMENT TO
DECLINE

BY

ROBERT M. UMHOLTZ

Master's Degree (MA), Norwich University, 2012

THESIS

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire

in Partial Fulfillment of

the requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In

History

December, 2015

THESIS COMMITTEE PAGE

This thesis has been examined and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History by;

Thesis Director, Cathy A. Frierson, Professor of History

Kurk Dorsey, Professor of History

Marion Girard Dorsey, Associate Professor of History

On 15 December 2015

Original approval signatures are on file with the University of New Hampshire Graduate School

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I must acknowledge Jesus as my Savior from Whom all wisdom and knowledge flow. I pray for wisdom to apply the knowledge I have gained in my studies to serve Him and my country. I pray that I have been faithful to His calling. I also thank the professors, especially Professor Cathy Frierson, that have guided me on this journey and put up with my stories of flying over Russia when I was procrastinating, and that goes for Lara and Laura as well. Thank you to my family for all of their love and support. I would not be here without them.

Thank you specifically to my wife, Melissa, my daughter, Emmy, and my son, Bobby for moving halfway across the country for sixteen months, encouraging me, and reminding me of why I am doing this, and enjoying New Hampshire while I sat in a library – I love the three of you so much!

Table of Contents

THESIS COMMITTEE PAGE	II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	III
ABSTRACT	V
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: THE NEED FOR AN ALLIANCE	6
CHAPTER 2: NORMALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP	45
CHAPTER 3: THE TIDE BEGINS TO TURN	62
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION	111
BIBLIOGRAPHY	118
Primary Sources:	118
Secondary Sources:.....	122
APPENDIX - A	126
APPENDIX - B	127
APPENDIX - C.....	128
APPENDIX - D.....	129
APPENDIX - E	130
APPENDIX - F.....	131

ABSTRACT

THE GRAND ALLIANCE: FROM NECESSITY TO SUSPICION, DEVELOPMENT TO DECLINE

By

Robert M. Umholtz

University of New Hampshire, December, 2015

This thesis analyzes the development and decline of the relationship among the members of the Grand Alliance during World War II. The primary questions I answer are: what led to the creation of the Grand Alliance, and what caused the alliance to begin to decline at the peak of its effectiveness? To answer these questions, I begin with the events that took place prior to the war and describe how world leaders addressed Hitler's aggression as individuals in lieu of an alliance; thereby showing the importance of an alliance after the war began. The study then proceeds chronologically, analyzing the correspondence among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to identify how these men worked together, despite their ideological differences to achieve victory over Hitler. Primary sources are used as both evidence and as a means of understanding public opinion to show how the decisions made by the two leaders of democratic nations may have been swayed by public opinion. Understanding the dynamics of the relationship leads to a better understanding of the irreconcilable differences among the objectives of the Big Three that ultimately led to the Cold War, despite their effectiveness as partners in terms of war planning. Ultimately, bargaining power varied among the members throughout the war, and created an atmosphere in which postwar plans were made by individuals with the best military position at the time of the decision making.

INTRODUCTION

The Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945, marked the end of the most lethal war in history. It had been over six years since the war had started, longer if the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 represented the beginning of the war, and the toll on life and morale had been beyond comprehension. The end of the war also marked a dramatic shift in international relations that redrew political borders and shaped modern society. Historical facts and personal opinions ever since have been used to argue about what happened after the war that caused the relationship between the U.S. Britain and the U.S.S.R. to deteriorate into the Cold War. It is important, however, to recognize how that relationship was created and sustained throughout the war and what state the coalition was in when the war was over in order to understand what transpired after the war. There has not been a coalition since World War II that was guided with such primacy by the leaders of the nations involved as the Allied forces were by the Big Three. It can be concluded that the relationship between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.K. Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and U.S.S.R. Premier Joseph V. Stalin united their respective nations and led to an Allied victory over the Axis Powers. Unfortunately, that unity was not perfect and was achieved at a high price. This study will show that the birth of the Grand Alliance was forged out of necessity, sustained by dependency, and at its peak moment of effectiveness was permeated with mistrust and suspicion. Ironically, concerns over the postwar world were the primary points of contention during the war. The end result was victory and the cost was a fragile balance of powers, which has vexed the world for over seventy years.

In the process of researching the Grand Alliance, three books were instrumental in shaping the way I approached this topic and guiding my conclusions. The first was Hugh Ragsdale's *The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II*, 2004. Ragsdale

argued the Soviet Union had been prepared to confront Hitler prior to Munich, but without an alliance Stalin was unwilling to face Hitler alone.¹ His argument, which is cited early in this work, helped me evaluate the importance of a working coalition during World War II despite the coalition's many flaws.

The second book that influenced the way I analyzed the working relationship of the Big Three was Mark Stoler's *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II*, 2000. Stoler argued "To a great extent, the history of military concern with U.S. strategy and policy during World II is thus a history of military concern with the strategies and policies of Britain and the Soviet Union as both present allies and potential adversaries."² Through Stoler's argument I was able to recognize the problems facing the Grand Alliance were not divided strictly between the East – Stalin – and the West – Churchill and Roosevelt, but to a degree there was mutual mistrust among all the members of this coalition. This mistrust significantly affected how they interacted and worked with one another.

Finally, Euginia Maresch's *Katyn 1940: The Documentary Evidence of the West's Betrayal*, 2010, provided evidence that helped me conclude the Grand Alliance was dedicated above all else to victory over Nazism, and the Big Three were willing to go to any length to ensure that success. I must also note that I rely heavily on contemporary press reports throughout this thesis. The reports are not used as direct evidence of events or rationale for actions that occurred, but rather to provide insight into the public atmosphere and public opinion that would have surely swayed the decisions making process of Roosevelt and Churchill.

¹ Hugh Ragsdale. *The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 186-192.

² Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 2000), XI-XII.

International diplomacy requires the development of relationships. Trust and compromise are critical to forming healthy relationships. On the eve of World War II there were countless relationships beginning, as well as ending, throughout the world. By the end of World War II there was one relationship that proved more critical than any other. This relationship provided the foundation for ending Nazi aggression and defeating the Axis powers in Europe and Asia. The relationship between President Franklin Roosevelt – leader of an isolationist nation, Winston Churchill – the British Bulldog, and Joseph V. Stalin – mistrustful authoritarian of the Soviet Union was the most critical relationship formed during the war. As important as this relationship was, it would never have formed if it were not for significant events that transpired prior to 1942, such as the U.S. entry into the war. How did the events that unfolded between Munich and the bombing of Pearl Harbor develop the relationship that was so critical to victory over the Axis powers? The tripartite relationship that defeated Nazi Germany would have seemed preposterous to imagine prior to 1941 because each nation pursued individual interests that conflicted with the others. Yet, it would be firmly established by the beginning of 1942, despite constant suspicions among its members. The events from 1938 to December 1941 were decisive in forging this kindling relationship and deserve analysis to understand how the Grand Alliance came into existence.

Prior to the Munich agreement, and even before troops began amassing on the border of Czechoslovakia, there were mixed emotions among the leaders and the public within the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union over how to curb aggression on an international level. Those who harbored fear and malevolence among these nations, particularly between the West and the Soviet Union, outweighed the hopes of those who hoped that a working relationship could be obtained amongst them. Some historians have gone so far as to argue war could have

been avoided if the strongest nations opposing Hitler had taken action prior to September of 1938. For example, historian Hugh Ragsdale, who tried to explain Soviet intentions and desires prior to World War II, argued that if an alliance among Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. could have been obtained prior to the Munich Pact, the history of the late thirties and early forties would have been much different. He argued that an alliance against Hitler prior to Munich would certainly have led to war, but at that time Hitler's war machine was not yet ready to fight and would have been quickly defeated. He stated, "If the fight had occurred in September 1938... World War II as we know it simply could not have happened."³ One of the most significant figures of the Second World War believed this and more. In his memoirs, Churchill recalled his belief that World War II could have been avoided. He wrote, "One day President Roosevelt told me that he was asking publicly for suggestions about what the war should be called. I said at once 'the Unnecessary War.' There never was a war more easy to stop than that which has just wrecked what was left of the world from the previous struggle."⁴ Churchill made this statement to the president because he believed in hindsight, much as Ragsdale argued, that a united front against Germany at Munich would have disrupted Hitler's plans enough to prevent the war. Hitler was able to initiate his war plans because there was not a formidable relationship in place to stop him.

As Churchill's statement above shows, it is easy to look back on events from the past and see how different actions by world leaders could have produced a better outcome. However, it would be inappropriate for a historian to act as an armchair quarterback judging the decisions of

³ Hugh Ragsdale. *The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xix.

⁴ Winston Churchill, *Memoirs of the Second World War; an Abridgement of the Six Volumes of the Second World War* (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), vii.

world leaders with the plethora of information now available to determine right from wrong and good from bad. Even Churchill, who was a part of this history and did in fact advocate against appeasement at the time,⁵ should not have been so fast to judge his peers. By looking at the position of each power it will be easier to understand why a partnership before the war did not happen.

⁵ For more on Churchill's policy toward British appeasement see David Reynolds, *Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 102.

CHAPTER 1: THE NEED FOR AN ALLIANCE

Unlikely Relationship

In England and the United States there was hostility, ideologically, toward the Soviet Union.⁶ These concerns were based on the belief that communism could spread its territorial domain throughout mainland Europe as well as its ideological position into Britain and the United States. The Soviet Union was also hostile toward the west, but its fear was rooted more deeply in its territorial vulnerability than in its ideological point of view. Historic Russia, the centrally located country that connected Europe and Asia, had a millennium of war and territorial advances and losses to etch the fear of invasion into its ethos. As a result, it was the official and instinctive Soviet position to resist any agreement with Western powers that would, in any way, threaten the territorial boundaries of the Soviet Union, and especially of historically Russian territories.⁷ This concept was reinforced while the Bolsheviks fought for control of Russia and continued into the 1930s during a time in which the United States would not recognize the Soviet Union as a nation under Soviet control. The result of the U.S. not recognizing Soviet leadership surely strained the relationship between the two.⁸ This however, was just the beginning of the

⁶ For further information see Steven Merritt Miner, *Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Grand Alliance* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), p. 4 and John Lukacs. *The Duel: The Eighty-day Struggle between Churchill and Hitler*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 14, 72, 146.

⁷ For more information on this see below or reference Joseph V. Stalin in *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940*, translated by Tatyana Sokokina and Edited by E. N. Kulkov and O.A. Rzheshesky, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 263.

⁸ In November 16, 1933 President Franklin Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union but the cordial relationship was not long lasting. The relationship quickly deteriorated before the end of the year. For more information see Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State, "Recognition of the Soviet Union, 1933," <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/ussr>, accessed April 23, 15.

problems that faced each of these nations which made an alliance in 1938 seem impossible. It is critical to understand each nation and its leaders individually to see what helped and hindered the development of their relationship at the beginning of 1942.

The United Kingdom

In Britain, the anti-communist sentiment was not as strong as it was in the United States, but British leaders were nonetheless hesitant to join arms with the Soviet Union on the eve of World War II. The relationship between Great Britain and the Soviet Union got off to a rocky start when the United Kingdom supported anti-Bolshevik forces in the same way the United States had during the Civil War following the Bolshevik Revolution. However, international events caused the British Government to change its position toward the USSR to gain diplomatic support as old alliances began to become strained. Historian Keith Neilson argued a changing balance of power within Europe, exacerbated by Japanese aggression and Germany's rearmament in the 1930s, forced the British Government to work more closely with the Soviet Government.⁹ Despite the official position of the government, however, there were many politicians in Britain who did not have a favorable view of the Soviet Union during the 1930s. Political scientist William Taubman described one specific Briton's attitude toward communism stating, "Winston Churchill yielded to no one in his anticommunism."¹⁰ Ironically, Churchill would be essential to creating the alliance with Stalin as a chief member, but during the prewar years he was dead set against it.

⁹ Keith Neilson, *Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 43-87.

¹⁰ William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy*, 33.

In the years leading up to the war, there were more significant threats to the British position, internationally speaking, than an anti-communist sentiment. Still recovering from the First World War, the British people feared having to go to war again. This fear was manifested in Britain's official position toward France and Germany. For example, in the wake of the Armistice of 1918, relations between Britain and France were strained because Britain harbored resentment toward France for the war. Britain also felt the reparations Germany was forced to pay could only lead to greater instability in Europe. England thus continually argued with France over issues concerning Germany. In attempting to stabilize Europe "London had become *de facto* the champion of German rights."¹¹

The British government was not only resentful toward the French, but it also harbored angst toward the entire international community. According to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, half a year prior to Munich British policy was being guided by a belief that the League of Nations had become incapacitated in terms of preventing war.¹² This attitude, albeit justified in many ways, led Chamberlain to a 'go it alone' mentality in which he tried to settle international affairs in two-party talks. Not only did Chamberlain believe he did not need the help of others in preventing war, but he also pushed away the help of the United States, Britain's single most effective ally in the First World War, and ironically soon to be Britain's greatest ally in the Second World War.

British leaders went to great lengths to avoid becoming entangled in an alliance that they thought could draw Britain into another war. Ragsdale pointed to evidence that proved this point. He wrote, "in July 1937, U.S. President Roosevelt proposed to Chamberlain an Anglo-

¹¹ Hugh Ragsdale. *The Soviets*, p. 2.

¹² "Mr. Chamberlain's Statement on British Foreign Policy," 1938. *Bulletin of International News* 15 (7) (Apr. 2): 13-6, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642237>, 13.

American consultation on international threats to the peace. Without consulting his foreign secretary, Chamberlain abruptly refused – he did not like Americans.”¹³ Despite the neutral position maintained by the United States, Chamberlain refused to burden himself with alliances he felt would hinder his ability to prevent war.

In addition to rejecting proposals from the United States, Chamberlain refused to work with the Soviet Union leading up to Munich.¹⁴ Neilson provided evidence for this by describing Chamberlain’s efforts on the seventeenth of September, eleven days prior to the Munich meeting, to stop the efforts of a Soviet diplomat named Ian Maisky from establishing a rapport with the British government that may have prevented the Munich Agreement. Describing Maisky’s efforts Neilson wrote, “For one thing, Maisky’s lobbying had produced, particularly among the Labour MPs [Members of Parliament], a popular belief that Moscow both could and would support Prague.”¹⁵ Clearly, Chamberlain did not want, or trust, others meddling in his affairs. Historian and columnist Arthur Bryant wrote an article in 1941 in which he also showed the Soviets had approached the British Government for an alliance before they made one with the Nazis. He claimed the British Government was not willing to work with the Soviets because of their poor showing in World War I and because they believed Russia would quickly fall if they faced the Germans again.¹⁶ The repercussions of this decision obviously impacted the first

¹³ Hugh Ragsdale, *The Soviets*, 39-40.

¹⁴ For more on this topic see “Mr. Chamberlain’s Statement on British Foreign Policy,” 15.

¹⁵ Keith Neilson, *Britain*, 248.

¹⁶ Arthur Bryant, 1941, Our Note Book. *Illustrated London News*, July 12, 1941 Issue 53334: 37, <http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/iln/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ILN&userGroup=unh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&docId=HN3100326939&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>, Accessed March 2015.

two years of World War II significantly. The position of the Soviet Union will be discussed below, and as stated above there is no purpose in dwelling on what could have been, but rather focus should remain on what did happen. As competent a leader and a man as Chamberlain may have been, taking on the duty of preventing an international crisis proved to be too great of a job for one man. That being said, Chamberlain did everything he could to appease Hitler in the years leading up to war with the belief that he was saving mankind from another brutal war.

Not everyone in British society, let alone the government, believed appeasement was the proper way to handle Hitler, though. Winston Churchill, the man who would replace Chamberlain as Prime Minister in 1940, was a staunch critic of Neville Chamberlain's position toward Germany prior to the war. David Reynolds, renowned British historian, argued the meeting at Munich was one of the most significant events in the twentieth century. He contrasted the way Chamberlain and Churchill saw appeasement. In a poignant statement, Reynolds showed Churchill's contempt for Chamberlain's appeasement policy by writing, "Churchill believed the prime minister should have stood firm and stayed at home, rather than flying off to woo the dictator with a Czech dowry."¹⁷ While Chamberlain believed Great Britain could handle Germany on its own diplomatically, Churchill believed it was necessary to involve other nations and not give in to German demands. A strong alliance was what the world needed. This was exemplified by the relationship between Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt that began in early September of 1939 while Churchill was still First Lord of the Admiralty.¹⁸ The

¹⁷ David Reynolds, *Summits*, 102.

¹⁸ For more information on the personal relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt see Roosevelt, Franklin D., and Winston Churchill. *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, ed. Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975), 3-13

relationship that Churchill fostered in the early years of the war not only proved some parts of the British Government were willing to work well with others, but it also helped create a bond that would consist of two-thirds of the winning alliance. Be that as it may, in 1938 Churchill only represented a faction within the British Government and not its official policy.

The position Great Britain took during the interwar years facilitated a situation for Europe that was bleak at best. However, when considering nations that could have done the most to stop Hitler, the United Kingdom and France are the countries that failed Europe and the world the most. The position these nations took prior to the war in many ways led to the war. Author and historian Williamson Murray described the dismal position prior to the war in this way:

At every turn in the long road from the Abyssinian crisis to the beginning of the Second World War, they had preached caution, seen dangers where none existed, prophesied doom, and agreed to the abandonment of every position. Largely because of their self-fulfilling prophecies Britain and France faced Germany alone in May 1940.¹⁹

The Soviet Union

The interwar period for the Soviet Union was much different than it was for Western powers. World War I had been devastating worldwide, but Russia had additional interwar problems. In addition to suffering unfathomable losses during the war, Russia, which dropped out of World War I by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, was in the middle of a revolution at the time that evolved into a civil war. By the time the Bolsheviks gained control of the country the rest of the world was enjoying the highlife of the roaring twenties. By the end of the 1920s, Lenin, the first leader of the first communist nation in history, had died and Joseph V.

¹⁹ France is not discussed in depth because they did not have a representative in the Grand Alliance. For more information see Williamson Murray *The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 369.

Stalin was the supreme leader of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R). Politically, the Politburo governed the Soviet Union, but no official decision would be made without Stalin's approval. The position of the U.S.S.R. was perilous. Not only did a totalitarian leader who feared for the future of this budding union lead the Soviet Union, but also nations that posed the greatest threat to the Soviet Union feared the spread of the Soviet Union's burdens and politics. With few friends, and a struggling economy, there was little reason for optimism for the Russians.

Above all else, it was the personality and character of Joseph Stalin that dictated the position of the Soviet Union leading up to World War II. While Stalin's excessive defensiveness, which one is tempted to call paranoia, may have gotten the best of him frequently and adversely affected the Soviet Union, his concerns were not necessarily unfounded. The anticommunist sentiment has already been discussed above, and therefore there was reason for Stalin to believe it existed. For example, after Operation Barbarossa began in 1941 and Russia made requests for international help "it occurred to some, including Senator Harry S. Truman, that the West could do worse than follow Stalin's example by standing aside, or even fanning the flames, while its two totalitarian enemies killed each other off."²⁰

Stalin's personality was directly reflected in the way he ruled the U.S.S.R. Robert Service, of Oxford University, wrote a biography of Stalin in which there are reoccurring themes that show Stalin as a man who needed to be seen as the victor of every struggle he encountered and constantly driven by his ego. Service went as far as to describe him in this way: "Nastiness to acquaintances had been his hallmark since he had been a youngster. Ambition too had been a characteristic. But he wanted to rise to revolutionary eminence on his own terms; and whenever

²⁰ William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy*, 34.

others balked him, he told them they were wrong and stupid.”²¹ It was with this attitude, and as head of one of the largest populations of people in the world, that Stalin began to establish his foreign policy leading up to the war. The central principle of that policy was that the Soviets would work with any party that could ensure the safety and protection of the Soviet Union, even if it meant cooperating with anti-communist nations and leaders.

It is difficult to know what Stalin’s true end game was in 1938. What is unquestionable is that the Soviet Union was willing to do whatever it took to ensure a positive outcome in its own future. In this light, Ragsdale argued that prior to Munich the Soviet Union was willing to work with the West in order to stop German aggression.²² In fact, Russia’s cunning diplomat Vyacheslav Molotov remarked on the failure of the West to come to a suitable agreement with the Soviet Union just prior to the Soviet decision to sign the nonaggression pact. He stated, “As the negotiations had shown that the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance could not be expected [with Britain and France], we could not but explore other possibilities of ensuring peace and eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the USSR.”²³ Molotov’s argument made it clear the Soviet Union blamed the British and the French for the lack of an alliance, at least publicly.

On the other hand, some observers and historians have speculated that Stalin had been willing to wait out the war, if that were possible, as Senator Truman recommended for the U.S.,

²¹ Robert Service, *Stalin: A Biography*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 49.

²² For Ragsdale’s argument on this see Ragsdale, *The Soviets*, 29.

²³ Vyacheslav Molotov, “Speech to the Fourth (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet on the Negotiations with Britain and France and the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany,” 1939, in *Soviet Documents*), 363-4.

not only to protect the Soviet Union, but also to increase its territory. Demaree Bess, reporter for the popular *Saturday Evening Post*, argued in 1939 that Stalin only postponed joining either side of the war to make sure that there was a war: “With events in Europe rushing headlong toward disaster, the Russian dictator waited for the precise psychological moment to spring his coup upon a stunned and bewildered world.”²⁴ Bess’s attitude toward the Soviet Union, and specifically Stalin, was very suspicious and perhaps an overstatement of Stalin’s actions. However, it was not without some merit. Stalin’s decision to attack Finland and start the Winter War was an example of his plan to create a buffer territory between Western Europe and the Soviet Union.²⁵ I will discuss the Winter War in greater depth below, but the concept of a buffer territory has been significant throughout Russian history.

Expansion has been a centerpiece of Russian authority and foreign policy since the Fourteenth century. In the sixteenth century Ivan IV, also known as Ivan the Terrible, gained his reputation, in part, because of the work he did to expand the territory of Russia. Imperial Russian foreign policy relied heavily on expansion as a means of ensuring safety for the hinterland. In addition to creating a cultural revolution, Peter the Great reinforced this policy of expanding Russian territory as had Ivan IV.²⁶ Peter’s self-proclaimed admirer Catherine II subsequently followed this policy by annexing Poland and Crimea, and so the history of the Russian Empire continued. As a land of what seemed like unlimited borders, located between Europe and Asia, the Russian psyche developed amidst continually changing frontiers. It had

²⁴ Demaree Bess, "Stalin Over Europe." *Saturday Evening Post* 212, no. 16 (October 14, 1939): 5-50. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2015), 47.

²⁵ Joseph V. Stalin, “Seventh Session: 17 April 1940, Evening” in *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War*, 263.

²⁶ For more information see James Cracraft, *The Revolution of Peter the Great*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003) chapters 2, 3, and 4.

been over one thousand years since the first Russian dynasty, the Rurikid Dynasty, claimed territory East of the Danube when the Bolsheviks rose to power. The concept of security that had been engrained in the Russian people was as important to Stalin and the Soviet Union as it had been to Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century. Soviet policy followed the practice of expanding its authority into neighboring lands in order to regain the territorial claims of Imperial Russia lost at the end of World War I. This was especially true for the Baltic states and Poland.

The United States

The position of the United States in 1938 was not nearly as precarious as that of the Soviet Union or Great Britain. With a successful showing in World War I, an ocean on each side of the continent to separate it from the rest of the world, and a political policy that insisted it stay out of European issues that could bring war, the United States had little to be concerned about as far as physical security was concerned. However, physical security did not protect American interests abroad. The concept of an international community and globalization were notions that would be fully developed after World War II, but nonetheless international trade and economic markets were already interconnected, exemplified by the fact that the Great Depression affected nations worldwide. There was no way in which the United States could remain fully isolated from Europe.

Despite the interconnectedness of the world that eventually brought the United States into the war, however, there were many reasons for the U.S. to choose not to fight once the war began in Europe. The results of World War I (WWI) had left feelings of angst rather than peace in the hearts of world leaders. Woodrow Wilson, champion of the Fourteen Points, used his position at the end of WWI to create the League of Nations and try to prevent future wars from occurring. However, those in the U.S. who opposed the League of Nations “feared the consequences of

involvement in Europe's tangled politics, now even more complex because of the 1919 peace settlement. They adhered to a vision of the United States returning to its traditional aversion to commitments outside the Western Hemisphere."²⁷ Thus, the United States refused to join the League of Nations even though Wilson had introduced the concept. In many ways this was the first step toward the policies that would lead it to be considered an isolated nation at the beginning of the war.

While history had made the United States wary of its relationship with Europe, it had to assess the events that were transpiring in the East. The Pacific may have created a buffer between the United States and Asia but the U.S. had interests in the Pacific from Hawaii to the Midway Islands. The growing communist influence in China presented economic and ideological problems for the United States. Simultaneously, Japan's growth as a militaristic and imperialist nation presented a physical threat to the United States. It was from the East that the notorious attack on Pearl Harbor that forced the U.S. to join the war came.

China's situation was one of internal division amidst external occupation. The fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912 had left China unstable and divided. In 1927, a civil war erupted in which the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-Shek were battling the Chinese Communists, which would eventually be led to victory by Mao Zedong. Additionally, the Japanese, spreading their empire throughout the Pacific, took advantage of the Chinese instability and began a brutal annexation of the Chinese mainland. The scope of brutality and destruction that was caused by the civil war and occupation are too great to detail here, but it was during this time that the United States sent representatives to China to help the struggling anti-communist leader Chiang

²⁷ Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. "Milestones: 1914-1920: The League of Nations, 1920" <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league>, Accessed March 18, 15.

Kai-Shek.²⁸ China was a significant problem facing the United States in the East; however, there was another menacing power in the East that was overlooked by some, but not all, in the years leading up to the war.

Japanese aggression in the East was not limited to China. In 1941, historians Joseph Barnes and Harriet Moore made an almost prophetic statement. They said, “To permit the Soviet Far East to fall into Axis hands – whether German or Japanese – would mean the loss of control over the north Pacific as well as the encirclement of China.”²⁹ They were not the only ones to see the danger posed by Japan in the Pacific Ocean. Political scientist Stewart Bryant believed there was the possibility of “a trans-pacific [*sic*] war” and therefore America “must be armed not only with military power but also with comprehension of the unprecedented forces set loose in this world.”³⁰ He added, “It is time to use large maps and to assess the consequences of coming terrific impacts which threaten our security.”³¹ Others were more specific. William Magistretti, writing for the journal *Pacific Affairs*, went as far as to argue there was a possibility that “Japan will continue her southward movement, come what may, until eventually America is forced to take action.”³² It is clear that there was much to be concerned with during the build up to war. It

²⁸ For more information on the Chinese Communist movement see Mark Selden, *China in Revolution: The Yen-an Way Revisited* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).

²⁹ Joseph Barnes and Harriet Moore, 1941, “America and the Soviet Union” in *Far Eastern Survey* 10 (15) (Aug. 11), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3023187>, 176.

³⁰ Stewart F. Bryant, 1941, “Conflict? – Aspects of an American-Japanese War,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 215 (America and Japan) (May): 1715, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1022616>, 171.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 171

³² William Magistretti, 1941. “Japan's new order in the pacific.” *Pacific Affairs* 14 (2) (Jun.): 198-206, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2751711>, 198.

is important to remember that the United States took an official policy that is now referred to as isolationism but that was not a strict rule by which leaders and policy makers remained fixed regardless of the situation. The United States still participated as member of the global community as far as trade and diplomacy were concerned, but it did all it could to remain neutral toward situations that would drag it into another armed conflict.

On the eve of the Munich Agreement the necessity did not exist to draw Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States into an alliance to prevent Hitler's aggression. Great Britain, led by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1938, was set on going-it-alone and trying to work a deal that would prevent war and provide security for most of Europe and especially the British Empire. The Soviet Union on the other hand, led by Stalin, was willing, if necessary, to work with Western Europe to form an alliance to stop Nazi aggression as long as that alliance could ensure the security of the Soviet Union. Stalin was by nature mistrustful and on the defensive and did not trust any capitalist nation, but he trusted a fascist nation even less. However, Russian history was all too familiar to this Georgian and he would sign an agreement with anyone he thought could help protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Soviet Union. The United States, under Roosevelt, was determined to prevent the spread of communism and not to become a part of future wars that could easily be avoided due to the protection provided by two great moats – the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Judging by the position each of these nations took leading up to the war it would seem there was little more than a glimmer of hope, once war broke out, that an alliance among them could be created capable of conquering Hitler and his allies.

Appeasement

What happened in 1938 that caused Chamberlain to work out an agreement with Hitler? Leading up to the Munich Agreement, Adolf Hitler worked to rearm and reunite the German-speaking people. His goal was to vindicate Germany after World War I. He believed her leaders had betrayed Germany in the aftermath of World War I, and the only acceptable redemption was to renew Germany's international position through the domination of Europe. As European leaders worked to prevent Germany from undermining the unstable balance of power in Europe, Hitler moved troops onto the Czechoslovakian border. His public plan was to help German-speaking peoples in a region of Czechoslovakia, known as Sudetenland, separate from Czechoslovakia. It is now clear that his final objective was to consolidate all of Czechoslovakia into his domain.³³ At that time, however, there was no way to know Hitler's plan. There is no doubt that Chamberlain had good intentions when he went to Munich to work out a peaceful solution with Hitler. It was with the highest hopes for peace that Chamberlain said, "If the problem of Czechoslovakia could be solved it would go far to re-establish stability over an area much wider than that immediately concerned."³⁴

The possibility of war was recognized around the globe. On the eve of the Munich Agreement, the *Bulletin of International News* reported on a message Roosevelt sent to other world leaders, "On September 26 President Roosevelt sent a telegram direct to Herr Hitler and to

³³ David Reynolds, described Munich as "one of the notorious clichés of modern diplomacy. "From the Suez crisis of 1956 to the Iraq War of 2003 statesmen have cited the sell-out of Czechoslovakia to Hitler as a dreadful reminder of what happens if democracies fail to stand up to dictators." See David Reynolds, *Summits*, 37.

³⁴ "Mr. Chamberlain's Statement on British Foreign Policy," 14.

Dr. Benes [President of Czechoslovakia] in which he appealed for a settlement of their differences by methods other than those of force.”³⁵ The president sent similar letters to Chamberlain and the French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier. In these letters President Roosevelt stressed the neutral position of the United States and also stated that he believed cooler heads could find a peaceful agreement that would prevent war. Chamberlain and Daladier each responded by assuring they were doing all they could to help resolve the situation on the German-Czech border. Daladier went so far as to say, “remaining faithful to the spirit and letter of these pledges, we continue with unfailing tenacity to look for any procedure or form of agreement which may be compatible with the dignity and vital interests of the nations involved.”³⁶ Hitler, however, justified his actions by complaining about the effect that the Treaty of Versailles had on Germany. He then wrote, “never in history has the trust of a nation been so shamefully disappointed as was then the case.”³⁷ Roosevelt simply responded by emphasizing the importance of negotiating and avoiding war.³⁸

Roosevelt’s letter to European leaders in which he called for a resolution that would ensure future peace confirms that while the United States pursued policies that avoided the quagmire of European politics it was, nonetheless, aware of the implications war would have for America. Relations worldwide had become strained by September 28, 1938. Japan had begun its occupation of China and Korea and was increasing its influence throughout the Pacific, and

³⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Roosevelt’s Messages to European Statesmen. 1938. *Bulletin of International News* 15 (20) (Oct. 8): 24-8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642343>, 24.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 25-26.

³⁸ See Franklin, D. Roosevelt, *President Roosevelt’s Messages*, 24.

Germany was on Czechoslovakia's doorstep. The signs appear clear now, but at the time world leaders were uncertain what the future would hold. It was in this state of affairs that Chamberlain decided to appease Germany by pressuring Benes to make concessions.

Hours before he made an agreement with Hitler in Munich, Chamberlain addressed Parliament. As he saw it, there were three options for the British people to choose from leading up to the Munich Agreement. The first, go to war. The second, let things play out and see what happened. The third, head to Germany and try to work out an agreement between the Germans and the Czechs that would be sufficient to prevent hostilities.³⁹ In Parliament several shouts of praise went up for Chamberlain's plan.⁴⁰ Many believed he was doing a great thing by preventing Hitler from sending his military into Czechoslovakia to claim Sudetenland by force. However, admiration for Chamberlain was not unanimous.

One Member of Parliament, a Mr. Gallacher, spoke up and said, "No one desires peace more than I and my party, but it must be a peace based upon freedom and democracy and not upon the cutting up and destruction of a small State. I want to say that the policy of the National Government has led to this crisis."⁴¹ Words such as these have led some historians to build their argument that Chamberlain's government created an atmosphere in which Hitler raised his nation from the defeat of World War I to the overwhelming force it was at the beginning of World War II. Chamberlain's name has thus become synonymous with appeasement. Therefore, it could be

³⁹ See Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister's Statement, HC Deb 28 September 1938 vol 339 cc5-28: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>

⁴⁰ Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister's Statement, HC Deb 28 September 1938

⁴¹ Ibid., <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>

argued that Chamberlain's appeasement policies were the primary reason the international community was unable to stop Hitler's aggression before the war began.

Even before war had begun in Europe there were critics among the British people who believed Chamberlain's policies would not prevent war; additionally, these policies had reduced the character of the British people in the eyes of the international community. A few months after Munich the *Royal Institute of International Affairs* published an article that made such claims. Historian Arnold J. Toynbee wrote, "a pound of flesh was cut out of Czechoslovakia the other day, and I think a good deal of the life-blood of the British Empire flowed from that wound, though the flesh was not cut out of our body, but out of somebody else's body."⁴² In an even more pointed statement, he provided several examples of why he expected Chamberlain's appeasement plans to fail. He wrote,

Today we English people wear a medal with 'Peace' inscribed on it, but this peace-medal has some bars, and, when we look closely, we can see on the top bar engraved 'Manchuria,' on the next 'Abyssinia,' on the next 'Spain,' and then 'China' and 'Czechoslovakia.' So far, all the bars to our peace-medal have been cast out of other people's coin.⁴³

Political figures of the early to mid-twentieth century were surely as aware then, as they are today, that any decision made would be second-guessed by others. So Chamberlain proceeded with what he saw as the best option, supported by the majority of his constituency. Other world leaders, such as the French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, also supported Chamberlain, and together they proceeded with their plan to give Hitler little bits of what he wanted in an attempt to stop him from using force to claim more.

⁴² Arnold J. Toynbee, 1939. After Munich: The world outlook. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 18 (1) (Jan. - Feb.): 1-28, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3019238>, 14.

⁴³ Ibid.,15.

Of the three future allies against Nazi Germany, only one was represented at Munich. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were consulted, which reaffirmed Stalin's concerns that the capitalist powers were unwilling to work with the Soviet Union. The four members present during the negotiations at Munich included Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who represented the Great Britain; Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, who represented France; Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, who represented Italy; and the Fuhrer Adolf Hitler, who represented Germany. Interestingly, there were no Czech representatives present when the fate and dismemberment of their nation was at hand. Historian Keith Eubank addressed this point by writing, "Chamberlain and Daladier asked for a Czech representative to be present ... Hitler dismissed the request ... with the announcement that no Czech was immediately available to speak with authority for the Prague government."⁴⁴ Eubank also discussed the fact that the Soviet Union had not been invited to the meeting at Munich which worked out to their benefit. He argued Russia's "leaders claimed that because they had been ignored, they were not responsible for the consequences."⁴⁵ Munich was not only a failure because of the decisions made but also because of who was, and more importantly who was not, invited to the meeting. Chamberlain and Daladier made the mistake of not inviting other nations that could have formed an alliance to oppose Hitler at Munich.

Still, it must be remembered, "for nearly all the strategic missteps there were seemingly good and logical reasons for taking what in retrospect was the wrong course."⁴⁶ Chamberlain

⁴⁴ Keith Eubank, *The Summit Conferences, 1919-1960* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 42.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁴⁶ Williamson Murray *The Change*, XIX.

and others who supported appeasement should, to a limited degree, be lauded for their attempt to prevent the immediate and long-term effects that war causes. Eubank concluded; “Yet, in the final analysis, Hitler more often than not made correct strategic decisions, while the Allied leaders did not.”⁴⁷ Churchill and Roosevelt, however, would have been wise to learn from Chamberlain’s experience with Hitler.

Munich to Poland

Late in the evening, September 29, 1938, the leaders of four nations – Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain – made an agreement. In the interest of international peace, these leaders decided Czechoslovakia would lose something more important than the land it was also required to relinquish. Along with Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia was forced to give up its national sovereignty – the most critical element of the modern nation state, the ability to decide what takes place within its borders – when the leaders at Munich took it upon themselves to break Czechoslovakia apart. With their actions, Chamberlain and Daladier unknowingly gave Hitler permission to cross any border he desired to fulfill with his ambitious plans. Chamberlain was unaware of the evil he had unleashed on Europe with the wave of a pen. He said in a speech, “the first and the most immediate object of my visit was achieved. The peace of Europe was saved...What was the alternative?”⁴⁸

Many believed Chamberlain had prevented war; however, there were a few members of the British Government that believed Neville Chamberlain had failed the people of Czechoslovakia and the international community. Parliamentary member Duff Cooper, for

⁴⁷ Ibid., XIX.

⁴⁸ The Prime Minister's Speech at Birmingham. 1939. *Bulletin of International News* 16 (6) (Mar. 25): 13-7, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642437>, 246.

example, was appalled by Chamberlain's actions. In a speech of resignation in parliament he argued Germany's annexation of Austria, which had taken place in March of that year, should have been warning enough and Czechoslovakia should have been a call to arms against Hitler's actions. Cooper still hoped Chamberlain could be proved right but did not think that would be the case. He said, "The Prime Minister may be right. I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, with the deepest sincerity, that I hope and pray that he is right, but I cannot believe what he believes. I wish I could. Therefore, I can be of no assistance to him in his Government."⁴⁹ With that Duff Cooper resigned, but he would later find himself working once again for his government under Winston Churchill and supporting the principles he valued so highly.

In the wake of Munich, President Roosevelt was able to see the writing on the wall as well. In his annual address to Congress he made reference to what going on in Europe and showed his concern for the future. He believed what was happening around the world was a direct threat to the principles upon which the United States stood. Interestingly, his speech was made before war had begun, but it was clear that the President was willing to work toward an alliance against aggression. He also wanted to change current 'neutrality laws' to ensure those who threatened freedom could not use these laws to their advantage. The *Bulletin of International News* published President Roosevelt's speech in this way:

He began by saying that there was need for further warning of the storm signals from across the seas, as, while a war which threatened to envelop the whole world had been averted, it had 'become increasingly clear that world peace is not assured,' and he went on, 'All about us rage undeclared wars, military and economic. All about us are threats of new aggression, military and economic' ...Mr. Roosevelt then intimated that the Neutrality Laws might need

⁴⁹ Duff Cooper, Personal Explanation. HC Deb 03 October 1938 vol 339 cc29-40: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>.

alteration, since they might operate unfairly, or even give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim.⁵⁰

Nearly three years would pass before the United States officially entered the war, and it was over three years until American soldiers fought for the Allies. It was still over half a year until France and Great Britain would declare war on Germany, but President Roosevelt was already preparing for the possibility of another world war. The events that occurred between the President's message to Congress and the outbreak of war created an environment that made the Grand Alliance necessary.

Non-Aggression Pact

During the time leading up to Munich Pact, the Soviet Union was courting France and Britain while simultaneously seeking Germany's hand for peace. However, as time passed Russia began to feel a decision had to be made in the interest of national security. In August of 1939, Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim Von Ribbentrop made their terms of agreement public and signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. This quick change was unwarranted, as far as the West was concerned, but it revealed a great deal about Stalin's personality and his decision making process. Historian Geoffrey Roberts described Stalin's plan in this way:

Stalin's decision to do this deal with Hitler on the very eve of a new European war was a dramatic, last-minute improvisation. Only a few days before this radical turn in Soviet policy Stalin had been negotiating the terms of military alliance with Britain and France, but he feared London and Paris were manoeuvring [*sic*] to provoke a Soviet-German war that would allow them the luxury of standing aside while the Nazis and the communists slugged it out on the Eastern Front.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Mr. Roosevelt's Message to Congress. 1939. *Bulletin of International News* 16 (1) (Jan. 14): <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642403>, 22-23.

⁵¹ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 5.

Stalin's willy-nilly collaboration with whichever side promoted his position was haphazard, and would have great repercussions on the Grand Alliance later. At the time, however, this action was not recognized as a significant loss to the West. The leaders of the Soviet Union were foresighted enough to know Hitler might turn his back on them. Therefore, they offered several explanations – some public and some private – as to why they had decided to pursue a non-aggression pact with Germany. Their explanations justified why they had once condemned German fascism only to sign a pact with Hitler. The explanations were also meant as plausible excuses in the event that the Soviet Government needed to pursue an alliance with the West in the future.

Molotov said in a speech to the Supreme Soviet: “We appreciated the fact that it was difficult for the Governments of Great Britain and France to make an abrupt change in their policy from the unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Union, which had existed until quite recently, to serious negotiations with the USSR.”⁵² Regardless, Molotov concluded that the capitalist powers did not go far enough to ensure they would provide the Soviet Union with mutual support, and for that reason, the Soviet Government had to pursue their pact with Germany. Mutual support and assistance was a reoccurring concern of the Soviet Union once the Alliance was formed as well, and in August of 1939 it was such a motivational factor that it prevented the Soviet Union from working with Great Britain and France.

This was publicly reaffirmed by the Soviet military leader Kliment Voroshilov in a press interview when asked about the pact with the Axis powers. His answer was interesting because he referred to Germany as the aggressor and claimed the Soviet Union offered support to France

⁵² Vyacheslav Molotov, “Speech to the Fourth (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet on the Negotiations with Britain and France and the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany,” 1939, in *Soviet Documents*, 363.

and Great Britain in the event of war if Poland allowed Soviet troops to pass through her.⁵³ However, at that time “the government of Poland was suspicious of the Soviet Union at best and hostile to Czechoslovakia.”⁵⁴ Therefore, no pact was made with Great Britain and France, according to Voroshilov. However, Poland’s fear of what would happen if Soviet troops crossed the border was not absurd, as they soon found out.

Poland to Barbarossa

On September 1, 1939, German forces moved into Poland and set off a series of events that would determine the fate of millions and change the international balance of power. France and the United Kingdom responded by reaffirming their promise to defend Poland and declared war on Germany on the September 3, 1939. This put the Soviet Union at odds with Great Britain and France since these nations had promised to defend Poland should she be attacked, but the Soviet Union did not go to war with Great Britain or France. On the same day that Britain and France declared war on Germany, half a world away, President Roosevelt took to the air and addressed the nation. He said, “Until four-thirty this morning I had hoped against hope that some miracle would prevent a devastating war in Europe and bring to an end the invasion of Poland by Germany.”⁵⁵ The president then went on to reaffirm to the country the importance he and the nation placed on freedom of religion and of thought, as well as recognizing that the United States was not completely isolated from world events, and that the war would have an

⁵³ Kliment Voroshilov 27 August 1939 in *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo*, in *Soviet Documents*, 361.

⁵⁴ Hugh Ragsdale. *The Soviets*, 78.

⁵⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Roosevelt's Radio Address: September 3, 1939, *World Affairs* 102 (3) (September), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20663300>, 147.

impact on American lives. He then went on to address the position of neutrality the United States was going to take. He stated:

Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields. At this moment there is being prepared a proclamation of American neutrality. This would have been done even if there had been no neutrality statute on the books, for this proclamation is in accordance with international law and with American policy.⁵⁶

The President further stated, “I have said not once but many times that I have seen war and that I hate war. I say that again and again. I hope the United States will keep out of this war... And I give you assurances that every effort of your Government will be directed toward that end.”⁵⁷ To that end, on the September 5, 1939, the United States officially declared its neutrality. It must have appeared to Britain and France that their hope of relying on the United States, as they had in the previous Great War, was slim. Additionally, Hitler must have found this statement to be quite encouraging.

By dawn on the sixth of September, in Paris, the outlook for France and England was utterly dismal. The United States had just declared its neutrality and the most formidable power east of Germany, Stalin’s USSR, had made an agreement with Germany. No one at that time could possibly have conceived that the Grand Alliance that would bring the war to a close would consist of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. However, despite the all-encompassing darkness that seemed to be closing in on the allies, a beacon of hope, like a lighthouse in a storm, sounded out from the United States to the U.K. On the eleventh of September, days after affirming American neutrality, the American president did something that changed the outcome of the war. Editors of a book containing the correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill describe the action in

⁵⁶ Ibid., 148.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 148.

this way; “Franklin D. Roosevelt...in an extraordinary and virtually unprecedented move, the President of the neutral United States invited Winston Churchill...to enter into direct correspondence with him.”⁵⁸

The initiative taken by Roosevelt was significant because of the neutrality declared by the United States, but even more so because Winston Churchill was not the head of His Majesty’s Government. It would be nearly eight months before Churchill became Prime Minister of England. Perhaps the president chose to contact Churchill because they had held similar positions during the First World War as mentioned in their first correspondence.⁵⁹ It was most likely because of Churchill’s willingness to work with the United States in the past, while Neville Chamberlain believed the United Kingdom could handle Hitler on their own, that the President reached out to Churchill. As in any new relationship, the starter had been ignited and the wartime affair had begun between the leader of the U.S. and the future leader of the U.K.

It would be another month before the two leaders continued their correspondence, and even then it was a matter of protocols at sea to avoid confusion over freedom of navigation in open waters.⁶⁰ As the war raged, events began unfolding from Washington to London to Moscow that helped build the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill and eventually Stalin. However, there were barriers that had to be overcome and events that had to transpire before the actual alliance was formed. The first barrier was American neutrality.

⁵⁸ Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas. *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 79.

⁵⁹ See Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Doc 1” September 11, 1939, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 89.

⁶⁰ See Winston S. Churchill, “Doc 2” October 5, 1939 and Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Doc 4” December 25, 1939, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 89.

Despite Roosevelt's inclination to help the Allies battle tyranny, he was still the President of a democratic and isolationist nation. Public support was essential to his presidency. The United States continued to remain neutral and Roosevelt continued to sign various forms of legislation and agreements to reinforce neutrality. For example, in October of 1939 the United States signed in support of the Neutrality of Inter-American committee and Pan American Union.⁶¹ However, that same month the *Congressional Digest* printed an article in which President Roosevelt argued that Congress must change the 'Neutrality Law' which he claimed would enable him to help England and France, whereas if the laws were left unchanged he would be unable to help prevent war (the debate happened prior to the first hostile action). In true political fashion, Congress decided, due to disagreements, they would postpone the debate and in the meantime war erupted in Europe.⁶² The nation was divided, but despite Roosevelt's public claims, it was clear where his heart was. He cared for the American people and their wishes, but he desired peace even more so, peace that was free of oppression. Stalin was able to act upon his own convictions regardless of what the Soviet public desired, but Churchill and Roosevelt were both accountable to public opinion. Therefore, Roosevelt took the steps he thought necessary to protect the United States from German aggression and skirted the thin line between support and neutrality, pushing the U.S. ever closer to war.

⁶¹ Reinforced in the *American Delegations to International Conferences, Congresses and Expositions and American Representation on International Institutions and Commissions, with Relevant Data: Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1941*, Publication 1718, Conference Series 51, Washington: G.P.O., 1942, 64-66.

⁶² For more information on American Neutrality see "Congress Tackles Neutrality." *Congressional Digest* 18, no. 10 (October 1939): *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2015), 225-227.

While the United States was tackling the neutrality debate, the Soviet Union was embarking on its own mission. In traditional Russian form, the Soviet Union approached Finland with a request that was meant to provide security for the U.S.S.R. from the Baltic states. According to the *League of Nations Official Journal*, on the fourteenth of October 1939, the Soviet Union presented a proposal in which it would work with Finland to give the U.S.S.R. some of its land near Leningrad in order to create a safety buffer for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union agreed to give up land in exchange for that territory.⁶³ The strategic military significance of Leningrad had been established in the 18th century. Formerly St. Petersburg and Petrograd, the city was built by Peter the Great and remained the capital of Russia until the fall of the Russian Empire, and it is easy to see why the Soviets wanted to ensure its safety. However, it is equally clear why the Finns would not want to give up any of their territory. Stalin, however, would have his wish fulfilled one way or another. On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish War, also known as the Winter War, began.

The Winter War lasted a mere three and a half months, but it had serious implications for the events that followed. The Soviet Union won, but it was not an easy victory, and it caused significant problems for the Soviet Union with nations on both sides of the war. H. Shukman, British historian, wrote, “On 14 December the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. The United States declared a ‘moral embargo’ and prohibited trade with Russia...”⁶⁴ The relationship between the West and the Soviet Union was already strained, it was stretched to a greater extent when the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed, and it seemed this move

⁶³ “Soviet Proposals to Finland on Territorial Changes and Defence: Memorandum to the Finnish Minister Paasikivi.” In *League of Nations Official Journal*, 14 October 1939, in *Soviet Documents*, 382.

⁶⁴ H. Shukman in *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War*, p. xxii.

was the last one needed to forever pit the West against the Soviet Union. However, German reactions to the Winter War prevented the Soviet Union from severing all ties with the West. Hitler had praised Finnish resistance despite their loss.

Addressing whether or not the Soviet Union should have attacked Finland, Stalin stated, “I think that the war was inevitable. The war was necessary since the peace talks with Finland had produced no results. We had to protect Leningrad because its safety is the safety of our Fatherland.”⁶⁵ Stalin’s victory over Finland was a strategic misstep. The Red Army’s poor performance revealed to Hitler that the Soviet Union was not yet ready for war. Shukman described the Germans as praising the Finns for their resistance despite their loss.⁶⁶ On the other hand, Stalin believed the Winter War was nothing more than practice for what was to come. He knew the future held the possibility for war with Germany and he wanted not only a buffer but also a test run of his military in the West. He said, “We knew that the Finns had France and England behind them and that the Germans, Swedes and Norwegians were supporting them in an underhanded way, America supported them, and Canada, too.”⁶⁷ Stalin was so suspicious that he believed the entire world was against him. The question that remained was: how would the Allies convince Stalin to trust them, or if not trust at least work with them?

Shortly after Stalin explained the rationale for the Soviet-Finnish War a significant event took place in Great Britain that proved crucial for the formation of the Grand Alliance. Little communication had taken place between Roosevelt and Churchill until mid May 1940. On May

⁶⁵ Joseph V. Stalin, “Seventh Session: 17 April 1940, Evening” in *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War*, 263.

⁶⁶ H. Shukman. *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940*, p. xxii.

⁶⁷ Joseph V. Stalin, “Seventh Session: 17 April 1940, Evening” in *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War*, 273-74.

10, 1940, Neville Chamberlain left the office of Prime Minister of England and Winston Churchill assumed leadership of the nation along with the war effort to defeat Hitler. Unfortunately for Churchill, when he took office his country was struggling to slow Hitler's progress and their position became more precarious with each day that passed. On May 15th, five days after assuming his new role, Churchill resumed his correspondence with President Roosevelt. The messages between the two leaders increased in frequency while the duration between messages decreased, thus bonding Churchill and Roosevelt and their respective nations.

In his first letter to Roosevelt as Prime Minister, Churchill did not delay in laying out his requests to the United States. The first request was that the United States change from a position of neutrality to 'nonbelligerency' [*sic*]. In Churchill's opinion this would have given the United States the ability to help the United Kingdom in every way short of combat.⁶⁸ He then presented a list of requests he had for the United States. His request included "forty or fifty" destroyers, "several hundred of the latest types of aircraft," "anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition," a "visit of a United States squadron to Irish ports" and finally that the U.S. "keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacific."⁶⁹ It was clear from the start of his term that Churchill was going to do everything in his power to save Europe from Hitler. He made his requests to Roosevelt at the risk of demanding too much too soon of a new friend. Great Britain was desperate and needed help as soon as possible.

The President responded by reminding Churchill that his requests would have to be vetted through Congress; however, he was working to get it pushed through the right channels.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Winston S. Churchill, "Doc 8" May 15, 1940, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, p. 94.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 94-95.

⁷⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Doc 9" May 16, 1940, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 95-96.

Perhaps Churchill understood Roosevelt's desire to stop Hitler and he was able to use that to his advantage, but this was a gamble, and his gamble eventually paid off. The budding relationship was taking root and as events continued to unfold, the two leaders continued to work together regardless of the official position of the United States. However, President Roosevelt was still limited in what he could do to help the Allied cause. The President concluded his letter, in response to Churchill's requests, with the only thing he currently had to offer, words of encouragement. On a separate line he wrote, "The best of luck to you."⁷¹

The rest of the month unfolded with little correspondence between the two. Much had been taking place, however, on the European continent as Hitler pushed his troops westward into France. By the middle of June the outlook for France had become very poor, and Churchill wrote several letters to the Roosevelt requesting greater assistance. Roosevelt responded by praising the Prime Minister and ensuring him "that we are doing our utmost in the United States to furnish all the materiel and supplies which can possibly be released to the Allied Governments."⁷² He added, because he feared his previous messages had been misinterpreted, that the United States would not go so far as to put troops into combat. He then discussed a topic that would resurface throughout their correspondence; if an armistice were to be signed between Britain and Hitler the ships under the British Navy's command must not go to the Axis powers, thus ensuring their American built ships would not be used against the United States in the future. Roosevelt explained this in terms that were most certain to be received and understood by Churchill. He wrote:

⁷¹ Ibid., 96.

⁷² Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Doc. 16" June 14, 1940, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 102.

As naval people you and I fully appreciate the vital strength of the fleet in being, and command of the seas means in the long run the saving of democracy and the recovery of those suffering temporary reverses... On the other hand, if a general seeks an armistice for his land forces, he does not control or include the disposition of naval forces.⁷³

Shortly after this letter France capitulated and signed an armistice with Germany. A month would pass before Churchill sent another letter off to Roosevelt. Then, it took another month for Roosevelt to respond, but he did so with good news. He wrote, "It is my belief that it may be possible to furnish to the British Government as immediate assistance at least fifty destroyers."⁷⁴ It would take some time, and there were stipulations that had to be agreed upon, but at this point, hope began to rise between these two leaders that they could work together to overcome the Axis powers. Churchill responded by saying, "I need not tell you how cheered I am by your message or how grateful I feel for your untiring efforts to give us all possible help."⁷⁵

Roosevelt's messages were more than a promise to furnish the British with the materials needed to fight the war; his words also encouraged Churchill and strengthened their relationship. Meanwhile, Churchill kept Roosevelt up to speed on what was happening in Europe and reassuring him that the U.S. warships would, under no condition, be handed over to the Germans. As the New Year began, Congress started debating how much support should be given to the British if the U.S. were to stay out of the war.

In January of 1941, Congress addressed a bill that was expected to defend the United States by aiding the Allied Governments. The bill would, if passed, provide any Allied nation the materials as well as money and foodstuffs, required to help them overcome the enemy. The

⁷³ Ibid., 103.

⁷⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Doc 20" August 13, 1940, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 108.

⁷⁵ Winston S. Churchill, "Doc 21" August 15, 1940, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 109.

greatest concern discussed during the debate was whether or not this bill could be used by the Axis powers to bring the United States into the war. While interviewing Joseph Kennedy, a staunch anti-communist and ambassador to the United Kingdom, Representative James Shanley, from Connecticut, said to Mr. Kennedy “I am wondering how far we can travel along that narrow ledge without some day tripping and getting us in this conflict.”⁷⁶ Kennedy agreed that the U.S. risked being dragged into the war, but believed help should still be given to the British Government. He said, “There are advantages and disadvantages. I think after long consideration, and I assure you I have slept and lived with this problem, thinking exactly how I felt about it, I think this is by far the least risk to run for the greatest good.”⁷⁷ On the eleventh of March 1941 the Lend-Lease Bill, approved by Congress and signed by Roosevelt, went into effect. The United States took a significant step toward supporting the war effort while simultaneously avoiding armed conflict by signing Lend-Lease.

Barbarossa to Pearl Harbor

Eleven days before the Lend-Lease Bill was signed, events unfolded in Eastern Europe that would end up being more significant, arguably, than an agreement to increase support for the Allies. Germany moved into Bulgaria on March 1. At the beginning of the year, the Nazis and the Soviets had renewed their non-aggression pact, but their relationship had begun to fall apart. German troops had moved into Bulgaria, one step closer to the U.S.S.R., which caused great concern in the Soviet Union. Once again, the concept of a buffer zone became the main concern

⁷⁶ James Shanley, *Lend-lease Bill Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-seventh Congress, First Session, on H.R. 1776* (Washington: U.S. Government Print Office, 1941), 281.

⁷⁷ Joseph Kennedy, *Lend-lease*, 281.

of the Soviets. On March 1, 1941, Molotov sent a strongly worded message to the German Ambassador describing Soviet anxiety. He said:

It is regrettable that despite the warning given by the Soviet Government in the *demarche* of 25 November 1940, the Government of the German Reich deemed it possible to take the course of violating the security interests of the USSR and has decided to occupy Bulgaria militarily...the German Government must understand that it cannot count on support from the USSR for its actions in Bulgaria.⁷⁸

On June 13th, the Soviet Union denied there were any hard feelings harbored between the Germany and the U.S.S.R in *Izvestia*.⁷⁹ The report was part of the Soviet charade to cover up the uncertainty they felt about their relationship with Germany. Nine days later, without warning, Operation Barbarossa commenced and German troops entered Soviet territory. The fighting that followed was intense and the Soviet resistance valiant. The number of lives lost battling for the heart of Russia, now estimated at 26-28 million, is unfathomable and most deplorable. Little good can be said about it, but it did lead to the final piece of the puzzle; the Grand Alliance that would win the war was forced together by the man trying to overthrow them all. Hitler's own overzealous ambitions gave the Soviet Union no choice but to partner with Stalin's ideological nemeses.

Winston Churchill was not slow to recognize the significance of Hitler turning on the Soviet Union. Churchill, in his typical and moving style, made a speech declaring his support for the Soviet Union. He stated, "Any man or State who fights against Nazism will have our aid.

⁷⁸ Vyacheslav Molotov, "Memorandum from Molotov to the German Ambassador on the Entry of German Troops into Bulgaria," 1 March 1941, in *Soviet Documents*, 483.

⁷⁹ "Soviet Denial of Reported Disagreements Between the USSR and Germany – 13 June 1941." in *Izvestia*. 14 June 1941, in *Soviet Documents*, 363-4.

Any man or State who marches with Hitler is our foe.”⁸⁰ He then went on to encourage all the allies to support Russia as well. Unlike Chamberlain, although under much different circumstances, Churchill was not going to lose Stalin as a partner. He recognized the importance of an Eastern front in terms of relief for the Western Allies as well as the significant role a force as large as the Soviet Union could be even if it only lasted, as many predicted, for only a few months against Hitler. Stalin, encouraged by Churchill’s words, and before Roosevelt had made any statement of support for the Soviet Union, declared his hope for a future alliance that would defeat Hitler. He stated:

In this war of liberation we shall not be alone, we shall have faithful allies in the people of Europe and America, including the German people itself oppressed by Hitler's satraps. Our war for the freedom of our Fatherland is merged into the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independent freedom. It is the united front of the peoples who stand for freedom and against the threat of enslavement by Hitler's Fascist armies.⁸¹

Stalin was confident that the United States was their partner in the fight against Hitler and would assist the U.S.S.R. in their fight against the Nazis. The president, however, was limited by what he could do to help the Soviet Union. He could not declare war to help, but he could do something else. According to biographer Susan Butler, Roosevelt asked his cabinet what could be done to aid the Soviet Union since they had not been part of Lend-Lease, and he found his answer. “Two days after the invasion Roosevelt released \$39 million of frozen Russian assets.”⁸² The country as a whole may not have been behind Russia, but Roosevelt shared

⁸⁰ Winston, S. Churchill, "The New War." *Vital Speeches Of The Day* 7, no. 18 (July 1941): 551. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2015), 552.

⁸¹ Joseph V. Stalin. M. Stalin's Broadcast, July 3, 1941, *Bulletin of International News* 18 (14) (Jul. 12), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25643061>, 890.

⁸² Susan Butler, ed, *My Dear Mr. Stalin the Complete Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 4.

Churchill's opinion and was doing all he could to pass good will along to Stalin. In his "Letter of Transmittal" to Congress regarding the Lend-Lease Act, the President addressed what was being done to help the Soviet Union. He said, "The gallant resistance of the Russian people has been of enormous help to all peoples resisting the Nazi war machine... We are using the energies of our Government to make available supplies which are urgently needed by Russia."⁸³

Interestingly, however, the president mentioned that the Soviet Union was, unlike Britain and other allied nations, paying for the wartime and war related components they were receiving from the United States. In November, the U.S.S.R. was equally included in the Lend-Lease Act, which signified the creation of a mutual coalition.

As political scientist Amos Perlmutter put it, "now the wily Stalin, whose war goals were clearly territorial, became the ... ally of the Anglo-Americans, especially of President Roosevelt."⁸⁴ As reasonable as this statement was, it was made nearly fifty years after the war. At the time President Roosevelt was trying to rally American support for the war against Hitler and if he had to make a deal with a fox, or more precisely a bear, he was willing to do so and handle the consequences of this relationship later.

Stalin's new partnership with Roosevelt and Churchill, however, did not change the fact that his country was under attack. During the first week of Barbarossa an unusual incident occurred. Analyzing this event helps build an understanding of the authority Stalin held over the Soviet Union as well as show him at his lowest point of confidence during the war. During the

⁸³ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Letter of Transmittal," *Second Report Under the Act of March 11, 1941 (Lend-Lease Act)*, September 11, 1941, III-IV.

⁸⁴ Amos Perlmutter, *FDR & Stalin: A Not so Grand Alliance, 1943-1945* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993), xiii.

initial onslaught of German attacks, Stalin was preoccupied with directing the order of battle and trying to defend territory under Soviet control. However, less than a week after the attack Stalin suddenly disappeared from the Kremlin. Chris Bellamy, professor of military science and doctrine, addressed the commonly accepted possibility that Stalin had a nervous breakdown in the immediate aftermath of Operation Barbarossa. In the middle of the night after a day full of meetings Stalin apparently left the Kremlin and went to his dacha outside the city and stopped issuing orders. Bellamy concluded that a breakdown was possible as well as understandable, but it was more likely that Stalin's actions were theatrical. He then compared Stalin's actions to Ivan the Terrible who abdicated his throne twice, thereby forcing his nobles to request Ivan's return after agreeing to his terms. Bellamy's argument was in line with Stalin's paranoia described by biographer Dmitri Volkogonov, because Stalin's decision-making skills were put into question when the Germans attacked. Stalin certainly had reason to fear this would be the end of his tenure as Soviet leader. His last option was to leave the Kremlin, with no designated leader left behind, and hope he would be asked to come back. According to Bellamy, men were sent to Stalin's dacha to bring him back and with that the Soviet Union was firmly under his control.⁸⁵

'All for one' to 'all in'

By the beginning of November 1941, two of the three nations that would form the Grand Alliance were actively fighting in the war. However, all three nations were dedicated to one cause: the defeat of Axis Powers. It would not be long before all three nations were 'in the war.' On November 26, 1941, Roosevelt wrote a letter to Churchill discussing Japan's aggression in

⁸⁵ For more information on Stalin's possible breakdown see Chris Bellamy, *Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 221-228.

China and his fear that the Chinese would be forced to surrender.⁸⁶ In response, Churchill gave what can now only be seen as an eerie warning. He recommended that the United States make a declaration that warned the Japanese “that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences.”⁸⁷ Seven days later was the ‘Day that will live in infamy.’

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor drove the United States into the war wholeheartedly. The next morning Roosevelt sent two letters to Churchill informing him of the dedication the United States now had to their shared cause. In his words, “Today all of us are in the same boat with you and the people of the Empire and it is a ship which will not and cannot be sunk.”⁸⁸ Since Operation Barbarossa, Roosevelt had been in communication with Stalin, but their letters were predominantly limited to discussions of logistics and concerns about U.S. support for the Soviet Union.⁸⁹ On December 14th, Roosevelt, determined to overcome Hitler, wrote to Stalin stressing the importance of a meeting between “Chinese, Soviet, British, Dutch and American representatives.”⁹⁰ The meeting did not happen because Stalin had not received the message by the deadline set by Roosevelt for a response, but the alliance among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin was being strengthened. Additional problems were bound to arise. Multilateral decisions have always been difficult to formulate on an international spectrum. This

⁸⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Doc 83” November 26, 1941, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 108.

⁸⁷ Winston S. Churchill, “Doc 84” November 30, 1941, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 108.

⁸⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Doc 86” December 8, 1941, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 168.

⁸⁹ To read the correspondence between FDR and Stalin see Susan Butler, ed. *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 35-55.

⁹⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 169-170.

was especially true for the nations at hand. Nevertheless, all the pieces had come together. The Grand Alliance had been formed.

The most significant events that unfolded between September of 1938 and December of 1941 could not have been foreseen. Leaders, such as Chamberlain, bent on preventing war, did more to aid Hitler in his quest for European domination than they did to stop it. Versailles had been a tremendous failure before Chamberlain tried to conquer world peace himself. As the Bible reads, and Abraham Lincoln famously repeated, 'a house divided cannot stand.' The global community was not able to prevent Hitler's aggression because of the fracturing that had not been properly repaired after World War I.

By the middle of 1941 the British Empire was struggling to survive and willing to work with anyone that could help slow Hitler's advances. The Soviet Union, at that same time, had been mercilessly stabbed in the back by the Germans and would do whatever it took to eject the Germans from their territory and push them back to Berlin. The United States was not engaged in conflict but had irrefutably decided which side she supported. It was at that point hope began to emerge among Hitler's opponents.

The only way the world could defeat the Axis powers was to form a coalition of capable nations. It was an ironic turn of events that the three countries that formed the coalition could not have been further apart at the beginning of the war. However, times of extreme necessity are often overcome by extraordinary means. This was certainly the case by the time the United States entered the war. The tripartite relationship that defeated Nazi Germany, which prior to 1941 seemed preposterous to imagine because each nation was pursuing individual interests that conflicted with the others, was firmly established by the beginning of 1942. It was not a perfect relationship because the leader of each nation still had his own interests at hand that led to

concern and suspicions of the other members, particularly between the two capitalist leaders and the one communist leader. These fears would have long-term effects both during the rest of the war, and for decades to follow. On the bright side, for the first time since the beginning of the war, the possibility of victory seemed more likely than the overwhelming fear of defeat because Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin were beginning to work together.

CHAPTER 2: NORMALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP

The years 1942 and 1943 were years of mutual dependency among the Allies. The Soviet Union depended on her allies for survival. The British and Americans had made progress in Africa but depended on the Red Army as a fighting force to distract Hitler while they grabbed a foothold in Europe and amassed the troops and equipment required to adequately enter the interior of Europe. The United States Air Force has borrowed Bruce Tuckman's "Stages of Development" to explain relationship building within its units. There is not an officer or airman who cannot recite the four main stages in their sleep: Forming, Storming, Norming [*sic*] and Performing. These terms relate to how a group of people comes together and works through their differences in order to form a productive unified body dedicated to fulfilling their goal. The Grand Alliance was formed out of necessity and maintained by mutual dependency, but this dependency required an excessive amount of storming before it was normalized. And "normal" is a relative concept in this context. The spring of 1942 was marked by setbacks for the Allies in both Europe and the Pacific. Communication among the three was minimal as each leader had to assess his position. The U.S., recently attacked and officially in the war, had to begin raising and moving troops. The British, grateful to have a new ally, were not making sufficient gains on their own, and the Soviet Union was struggling to survive. The first milestone to normalizing the relationship required forming an official Alliance.

Anglo-Soviet Alliance

As the summer of 1942 approached, six months since the U.S. officially had entered the war, little progress had been made on the front lines. Germany still controlled most of Europe, the Mediterranean, and North Africa. Axis forces were deeply embedded in Soviet territory and there was concern that the Soviets might be forced to sign another treaty with Hitler to avoid

extermination. In this dark hour, *The Times* in London reported on June 12, 1942, “Mr. Eden was cheered repeatedly by a crowded House of Commons when he rose to-day [*sic*] to announce the conclusion of the treaty between the Russian and British Governments.”⁹¹ The Alliance was a guarantee that neither country would abandon the other in their pursuit of victory.

Interestingly, the majority of *The Times* article was dedicated to discussing the postwar world. It began with “The two countries also agree that they will, when peace is re-established, work together for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.”⁹² The author recognized the significance of a ‘Twenty-Year Treaty with Russia’ as the essential element needed to ensure victory. The author ran with the concept, which he described as both welcomed and a relief. The Anglo-Soviet Alliance was an agreement that took the better part of six months to come to fruition. If victory was the common goal, why did it take six months to come to an agreement? The need for active cooperation was undeniably immediate, even urgent. Yet still the Allies devoted half a year to overcoming disagreements before they could sign an alliance agreement. The problems that plagued the Grand Alliance at the end of the war were the same ones that plagued them at the beginning. The most prevalent problems in 1942 were a second front and postwar boundaries.

The Soviet Union had been led by a vanguard of the proletariat under Lenin; however,

⁹¹ "Twenty-Year Treaty With Russia." *Times* [London, England] 12 June 1942: 4. *The Times Digital Archive*. Accessed 16 June 2015.
<http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&docId=CS67320524&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>, p. 4.

⁹² Twenty-Year Treaty With Russia, 4.

under Stalin it had become a “Communist autocracy.”⁹³ Historian Derek Watson argued Stalin was the sole author of Soviet foreign policy, but that he was greatly influenced by Molotov who had considerable leeway to work with other nations.⁹⁴ Stalin’s faith in Molotov was essential to his interaction with the West. While Stalin communicated through his correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill, he did not meet Churchill until August of 1942, after the Anglo-Soviet Treaty had been signed, and he did not meet with Roosevelt until the Tehran Conference in 1943. Molotov was therefore the mouthpiece for Stalin when he interacted with Roosevelt and Churchill. While Secretaries Hall and Eden interacted with Stalin as well, Molotov was perhaps the most central figure amongst all negotiators who helped guide the negotiations of the Grand Alliance. Despite the importance Watson placed on Molotov, he concluded Molotov only pursued the policy Stalin instructed him to pursue. As the top negotiator for Stalin in 1941 and 1942, Molotov had the difficult task of convincing Roosevelt and Churchill to accede to Stalin’s requirements for the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

As the three powers worked to normalize relations they faced two issues that challenged their alliance and prevented the treaty from being signed before the middle of 1942. The first was the opening of a second front, and the second was determining postwar boundaries. During the negotiations to conclude the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, Molotov flew to Britain, the United States, and back to Britain to complete the treaty. While the treaty was specifically between the British and the Soviets, the two nations recognized they needed the approval of the United States in

⁹³ See Leonard Schapiro, *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy; Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase, 1917-1922* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1955), 360-361.

⁹⁴ See Derek Watson, 2002, in “Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942” *Europe-Asia Studies* 54 (1) (Jan.): 51-85, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/826217>, 51-52.

order to ensure mutual assistance in the future. Thus, Molotov had to travel first to the United Kingdom to come to an agreement with Churchill, then fly to the U.S. to get Roosevelt's approval before heading back to the U.K. to sign the treaty. A record of Molotov's meeting with Roosevelt stated, "Molotov said he had been informed that Roosevelt was not sympathetic to the article in the former drafts of the Soviet-British treaty which mentioned Soviet frontiers."⁹⁵ Roosevelt's response revealed another issue that emerged among the Big Three. "Roosevelt replied that indeed he did not want the question of frontiers mentioned in the treaty, in view of US public opinion. He believed that a proper moment should be found to raise this question, but it had not come yet."⁹⁶

Roosevelt, leader of a democratic nation, had cited not the interests of the people who would be subjugated to Soviet rule during a possible redistribution of land at the end of the war, but rather to U.S. public opinion as the reason he refused Molotov's request. In 2009 Anna Cienciala, a historian who wrote extensively on Polish issues during World War II, argued that President Roosevelt had agreed shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor to give the Soviet Union the 1941 border it desired, which incorporated much of Poland, when the war was over.⁹⁷ However, this part of her argument was flawed because the Soviet documents found in Stalin's archives and presented by Olga Rzheshesky prove Roosevelt was not willing to hand the Polish people over to the Soviets in 1942, let alone shortly after Pearl Harbor had been attacked.

⁹⁵ Oleg A. Rzheshesky, Document 68 in *War and Diplomacy: The Making of the Grand Alliance, Documents from Stalin's Archives*, Translated by T. Sorokina (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996), 173.

⁹⁶ Oleg A. Rzheshesky, Document 68 in *War and Diplomacy*, 173.

⁹⁷ See Anna M. Cienciala, 2009, "The United States and Poland in World War II." *The Polish Review* 54 (2), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25779810>, 174.

Anne McCormic, contemporary columnist for the *New York Times*, wrote an article on the Anglo-Soviet Treaty a day after Mr. Eden's speech to the House of Commons was published in *The New York Times* in which she argued President Roosevelt prevented any mention of postwar boundaries in the treaty. However, she was under the impression that Mr. Churchill was willing to concede to Stalin's desire that the western border of the Soviet Union be established in the treaty.⁹⁸ The final draft of the treaty did not mention any borders. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom remained steadfast in all their positions toward the Soviet Union, but their positions were not as clear-cut as Ciencela and McCormic argued. Each leader recognized the importance of keeping the Soviet Union on his side because victory without the Soviet Union seemed impossible, and Churchill and Roosevelt were willing to rethink and reword their positions to find a compromise that kept all parties at the negotiating table throughout the war. Stalin was in the same position and was committed to saving the Soviet Union in the midst of the German onslaught.

Since the negotiations that had taken place in the midst of the Munich Agreement, Stalin had been working with and through Molotov to defend the physical security of the Soviet Union and, when possible, increase the Soviet Empire's territory. Historian Richard Overy argued that Stalin's desire was to build the Soviet Union to the size and scale of the Russian Empire. Referencing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Overy wrote, "Above all Germany offered something the Soviet Union could only dream about in 1939: the possibility of rebuilding the old Tsarist empire in Europe."⁹⁹ Throughout the war Stalin worked to take advantage of strategic and

⁹⁸ Anne, O. McCormick, 1942, in "Mr. Molotoff [*sic*] Came to Plead for a Second Front," *New York Times (1923-Current file)*, Jun 13, 1942. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106404102?accountid=14612> (accessed June 16, 2015).

⁹⁹ Richard Overy, *Russia's War: 1941-1945* (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 50.

ideological weaknesses to expand the influence of the Soviet Union into Europe, particularly Poland. In the late spring of 1942, however, his greatest concern was the immediate survival of the Soviet Union.

Stalin's desires were sidelined by his needs when final negotiations over the Anglo-Soviet Treaty commenced. On the night of May 29, 1942, Roosevelt and Molotov discussed the possibility of opening a second front in 1942. Roosevelt informed him at the time there were not enough transport ships to support a full-scale invasion, but that there was a possibility "of landing 6-10 divisions in Europe."¹⁰⁰ By revealing both the inability to open a successful second front, and his desire to land some troops in France despite the likelihood of failure, Roosevelt was doing what he could to keep Molotov's faith that the U.S. would support the Soviet Union in every way they could. Roosevelt went on to show Molotov the sacrifice he was willing to make in support of the Soviet struggle; "It is possible that we shall have to live through another Dunkirk and lose 100,000-200,000 men. Nonetheless...it would ease the situation and raise the spirit of the Red Army even higher."¹⁰¹ Roosevelt's comment was very interesting, because he had previously refused to negotiate boundaries of other nations due to public opinion, but it was clear he was willing to sacrifice a few hundred thousand lives for the sake of encouraging the Soviets.

On June 9, 1942, Molotov met with Churchill and discussed the meeting he had had with Roosevelt. The conversation brought out two significant points. The first was the idea to land troops in Europe to distract the Germans despite the likelihood that they would be lost. Churchill

¹⁰⁰ Franklin Roosevelt, Document 70, in *War and Diplomacy*, 177.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 177.

argued against the plan; he refused to have another Dunkirk on his hands. Molotov then discussed the postwar world. He informed Churchill that Roosevelt believed all nations should be disarmed with the exception of the four policing states. Apparently, this was news to Churchill who quickly remarked on the unlikelihood that it would be possible to disarm all nations. Clearly, there were miscommunications among the three powers. Additionally, the interaction between Molotov and Roosevelt followed by the one between Molotov and Churchill shows the alliance had problems that resulted from wartime planning and postwar interests.¹⁰² In the end, the cross-channel plan was postponed until the odds of success were greatly increased.

The boundary/second front discussions continued among Roosevelt, Molotov, and Churchill, with Molotov reporting back to Stalin until someone yelled uncle. During the negotiations, conditions in the Soviet Union became much worse, and some form of assistance was required regardless of the cost. According to historian Remi Naedau, “A second front in the west to draw German divisions from the Russian front was far more critical than British recognition of frontiers.”¹⁰³

During this time Molotov received a note from Moscow that showed how the declining position in the Soviet Union had been further exacerbated since he had left the United States for Britain. The note read, “It is necessary to work out quickly and submit to us the draft of the joint communiqué with Britain. This communiqué must include, besides the question of the Treaty [*sic*], also the questions of the second front in Europe and war supplies to the USSR.”¹⁰⁴ Watson

¹⁰² For more information see Oleg A. Rzheshesky, Document 109 in *War and Diplomacy*, 267-273.

¹⁰³ Remi Nadeau, *Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 25-26.

¹⁰⁴ See Joseph V. Stalin, Document 106, in *War and Diplomacy*, 264.

showed the gravity of the situation when he discussed a letter from Stalin to Molotov. The letter informed Molotov that he was expected to sign the treaty as long as there was an agreement that a second front would be opened and to forget about the Polish border issue for the time being.¹⁰⁵ Did this mean Stalin was willing to forget about the boundary issue altogether for the sake of survival, or did Stalin hope to be in a better position to present his plan in the future?

English historian David Reynolds presented an argument in 2002 in which he presented Stalin's two main objectives for his alliance with Roosevelt and Churchill. Reynolds's first argument supports the majority of historians and the idea that territorial security was Stalin's primary objective.¹⁰⁶ Reynolds's second point presented Stalin as a man of great forethought. Reynolds believed that Stalin wanted to sign the alliance without mention of boundaries to keep in good graces with Roosevelt and Churchill, so that he would have a better bargaining position at the end of the war.¹⁰⁷ Once a second front was agreed upon, and the survival of the Soviet Union was more certain, Stalin would be able to readdress boundary issues. Even if Stalin's decision to postpone the boundaries discussion was done begrudgingly, it was a wise decision. Therefore the boundary issue was temporarily postponed, and the Grand Alliance drew strength from its temporary unity. The three leaders were able to release a sigh of relief. The agreement was finalized and the alliance was able to press on toward victory.

¹⁰⁵ See Derek Watson, 2002 in "Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942" *Europe-Asia Studies* 54 (1) (Jan.): 51-85, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/826217>, p. 68-69.

¹⁰⁶ See David Reynolds, 2002 "From world war to cold war: The wartime alliance and post-war transitions, 1941-1947." *The Historical Journal* 45 (1) (Mar.), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3133637>, 215-218.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

The sense of elation was heralded in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. From Moscow, Ralph Parker, writer for the *New York Times*, cabled to the U.S. a story proclaiming the joy that filled Moscow with the signing of an agreement between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union that had occurred three weeks prior in May of 1942. This certainly gave the Russians a great morale boost after months of devastating blows from the German invaders. Parker stated, "It is impossible for any one outside Russia to understand the sacrifices these people made during the past Winter [*Sic*]. Even Russians, now looking back at those heavy days, wonder at their own endurance."¹⁰⁸ In London, *The Times* proclaimed, "The Anglo-Soviet treaty of Alliance was published in all the free countries of the world yesterday, and was heard by the enslaved people of Europe...Few treaties have been more widely or more warmly welcomed."¹⁰⁹ Finally, in the U.S. the treaty was referred to as "a document of transcendent importance."¹¹⁰ However, despite the outpouring of joy and hope by the press, the friction that delayed the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty had only been temporarily ignored. There was more to come that would strain the Grand Alliance.

¹⁰⁸ Ralph Parker, Wireless to The New York Times. 1942, "Pact Is Welcomed by Russian People." *New York Times (1923-Current file)*, Jun 12, 1942, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106407027?account=14612>, (accessed June 12, 2015), 2.

¹⁰⁹ Our Special Correspondent. 1942, "Eager Crowds in Moscow," *The Times*, 06/13; 2015/11, 1942, <http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=&docId=CS68238029&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>

¹¹⁰ Barnet Nover. 1942, "Toward A new world," *The Washington Post (1923-1954)*, Jun 12, 1942. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/151592907?accountid=14612> (accessed November 16, 2015), 11.

Operation Torch

As soon as an agreement had been made between the British and the Soviets reality set in. Churchill and Roosevelt quickly realized they had to go back on their word, which could alienate Stalin putting the Alliance in jeopardy. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty had promised a second front that was expected to open in western France in 1942. Shortly after Molotov returned to Moscow, Churchill began reworking his war plans. His new plans were not exactly what Stalin had wanted or been planning on during their negotiations. In early July, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that he believed “premature action in 1942 while probably ending in disaster would decisively injure the prospect of well-organised [*sic*] large-scale action in 1943.”¹¹¹ He then went on to argue that Gymnast, the code name before Torch for the North African invasion, would have a better chance for success and help the Russians more than a failure in France. With Roosevelt’s approval, Churchill went to Moscow to inform Stalin of the news that he was postponing a second front in Europe for an invasion of North Africa and then the Mediterranean.¹¹²

By the time Churchill went to Moscow he had Roosevelt’s support, but this had not always been the case. According to Brian Farrell, Professor of History at National University of Singapore, the British war plan was to ‘wear down’ the Germans by keeping pressure on the periphery of the Axis Powers. The United States, however, wanted to get onto the mainland as

¹¹¹ Winston S. Churchill, “Doc 107” July 8, 1942, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 222.

¹¹² For more information on Churchill’s plan for Africa and the Mediterranean see John Lukacs. 2011, “The Importance of Being Winston.” *The National Interest* (111) (January/February): 35-45, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42897727>, accessed 3 July 2015, 40-1.

soon as possible and confront Germany directly.¹¹³ Historian Mark Stoler argued in 2000 that U.S. military planners, and specifically Eisenhower, believed a campaign in North Africa was a ‘sideshow’ and not ‘politically motivated’ and not helpful to the European or Pacific causes. He referred to the British plan as ‘peripheral strategy.’¹¹⁴ However, U.S. planners had not yet designed a comprehensive plan as an alternative and had to yield to the British.

On the 12th of August, the day Churchill left for Moscow, Stalin signed and sent a letter that became the primary topic of their time together. In the letter Stalin complained that the Anglo-Soviet treaty called for a second front. He then wrote, “It will be readily understood that the British Government’s refusal to open a second front in Europe in 1942 delivers a moral blow to Soviet public opinion, which had hoped that the second front would be opened, [and] complicates the position of the Red Army...”¹¹⁵ Churchill responded by stating, “The best second front in 1942, and the only large-scale operation possible from the Atlantic, is ‘Torch.’...No promise has been broken by Great Britain or the United States.”¹¹⁶ During their meeting in Moscow an amicable conversation developed. Negotiations throughout the day had been unfavorable for both parties. After dinner, however, Churchill had been invited to Stalin’s private quarters for conversation, which ended at three in the morning. During the meeting,

¹¹³ See Brian P. Farrell, "Symbol of paradox: The Casablanca Conference, 1943." *Canadian Journal Of History* 28, no. 1 (April 1993): 21. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed July 17, 2015), 24.

¹¹⁴ See Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 2000), 71-72.

¹¹⁵ Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 65, 13 August 1942, in *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman: 1941-1945*. Translated by Foreign Languages Publishing House and Moscow. (New York: E.P. Dutton An Co., Inc., 1958), 1:60-61.

¹¹⁶ Winston S. Churchill, Document Number 66, 14 August 1942, in *Stalin's Correspondence, I: 61-63*.

Stalin and Churchill came to a favorable agreement in which Operation Torch was given Stalin's blessing during 1942 and the second front was moved to 1943.¹¹⁷

The camaraderie established in Stalin's residence put Churchill in an advantageous position over Stalin for the time being. Through the next month, Churchill wrote to Stalin three more times discussing Operation Torch. In the letters there was no mention of a second front and no complaint from Stalin that one had not been planned. On September 7, 1942, one month prior to the landing on North Africa, Stalin wrote a brief letter to Churchill and ended it with, "I wish you success in the operation against Rommel in Egypt and all success in 'Torch.'"¹¹⁸ As long as the Red Army remained committed to the fight, Churchill and Roosevelt held all the bargaining chips. The Soviet Union was still desperate for the support Lend-Lease provided and had to accept a submissive role in the Grand Alliance. Additionally, the U.S.S.R.'s only options were to continue fighting for survival while waiting for a second front in Europe, or submit to the Germans and accept defeat. Stalin had to bide his time and wait until he had the upper hand.

On November 24, 1942, Churchill wrote Stalin; in his letter he attempted to further postpone a second front in West Europe. His letter to Stalin explained the advantage of additional military actions in the Mediterranean. It also discussed a plan to bring Turkey into the war on the side of the allies in order to secure the Mediterranean for safe navigation of the military. He wrote, "We can bring the war home to Mussolini and his Fascist gang with an intensity not yet possible" and concluded by stating, "The glorious news of your offensive is

¹¹⁷ For more information on the meeting between Churchill and Stalin in August of 1942 see John Lukacs, "The Importance of Being Winston," 43.

¹¹⁸ Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 72, 13 September 1942, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:66.

streaming in. We are watching it with breathless attention. Every good wish.”¹¹⁹ Churchill’s comments suggesting a move via Italy to the Balkans, devoid of any mention of a second front in Western Europe, were certainly planned to encourage Stalin without promising anything that would tie U.S. and Britain a second front before they were prepared. Churchill was universally recognized for his use of English prose to muster up the courage and support of the British people and troops during the war, but he was equally well versed in the use of prose when it came to diplomatic correspondence. Every word, translated for and reread by Stalin, had the potential to strengthen or ruin the relationship Churchill was building with Stalin. Clearly Churchill was trying his best to salvage the relationship while denying Stalin’s most ardent request, nay demand, ‘a second front must be opened!’ Stalin, a poor public speaker according to biographer Dmitri Volkogonov, was sharp enough to read between the lines and see that Churchill was attempting to circumvent the topic of a second front in Western Europe.¹²⁰ On November 27, 1942 Stalin wrote:

Thank you for your message...I fully share your view that it is highly important to promote our personal relations...I agree with you and President Roosevelt concerning the desirability of doing everything to bring Turkey into the war on our side in the spring. That, without a doubt, would mean a great deal for the speedy defeat of Hitler and his accomplices...I have carefully read your communication saying that you and the Americans are continuing the preparations along your southeastern and southern coasts in order to keep the Germans pinned in Pas de Calais, etc., That, I hope, does not imply renunciation of your Moscow promise to open a second front in Western Europe in the spring of 1943.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Winston S. Churchill, Document Number 88, 24 November 1942, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:78-79.

¹²⁰ For more on Stalin’s public speaking see Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*. Translated by Harold Shukman (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 21.

¹²¹ Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 89, 27 November 1942, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:80.

Churchill did not respond to Stalin's comment on the second front until Stalin specifically requested a reply. Churchill did so by stating, "In your message to me of November 27th in the last sentence of paragraph 5 and also in your message of December 6th, you ask specifically about a second front in 1943. I am not able to reply to this question except jointly with the President of the United States."¹²² Over a year had passed since the United States had been bombed by Japan, and a year and a half had passed since Germany had attacked the Soviet Union. Winston Churchill promised to aid the Soviet Union in every way possible. In the minds of the British and the Americans every step had been taken to support the Soviet Union as long as the chance of failure for the allies was minimal. To Stalin, however, not enough had been done to fulfill previous promises.

Each position was rational. The Soviet Union had been under invasion for nearly eighteen months, while Britain and the United States had suffered air attacks but remained safe when compared to German attempts to exterminate the Communist Slavs. On the other hand, even if Roosevelt was willing to suffer a loss of 100-200,000 men, Churchill greatly feared another Dunkirk and knew the damage a loss of such great proportion could inflict on the morale of the military as well as the civilian public. Churchill did not want to lose an ally, but he was willing to do his best to postpone a Western European invasion until it was absolutely necessary and chances of survival were as high as they could be.

Tense Times Among Friends

The predominantly smooth relationship between the United States and Britain began to show strains at the Casablanca Conference in January of 1943. During the negotiations among

¹²² Winston S. Churchill, Document Number 94, 12 December 1942, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:82.

the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States, Molotov had tried to pit his draft of the treaty with Churchill that mentioned Soviet borders against Roosevelt's plan. His plan failed, but inconsistencies between Roosevelt and Churchill began to emerge shortly afterwards.

During the Casablanca conference Churchill and his military advisors wanted to access Europe through the Mediterranean and continue knocking Hitler out in the Balkans. Roosevelt, conversely, felt a need to fulfill his promise to Stalin. Furthermore, Roosevelt's military advisors wanted to engage the enemy head on and with full force on mainland Europe.

An interesting first hand account of the negotiations that took place at Casablanca helps bring a clearer understanding of how the difference of opinions began to wear on the relationship between the U.S. and U.K. General Jacob E. Smart was on General Arnold's staff during World War II. He was also a German prisoner of war after being shot down flying a B-17. While on General Arnold's staff, Smart accompanied the Chief of Staff of the Army Air Force to Casablanca for the conference as an advisor. Smart later wrote an article for *Air Power History* that presented a few interesting bits of information. First, as historians such as Farrell and Stoler have pointed out, Smart recalled, "British thinking stemmed from the determination to preserve the British Empire ... at the least cost in human terms, notably British personnel...[and] The British Chiefs of Staff came prepared to defend their requirements for American aircraft, armaments, equipment, supplies, and for support in training."¹²³

Smart also included the decisions made at Casablanca. The most significant was timing for the second front. He concluded eight decisions were made for operations in 1943 leading through the invasion of Sicily. Among the decisions made he recalled one was "to plan the

¹²³ Gen. Jacob E. Smart, "The Casablanca Conference, January 1943." *Air Power History* 46, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 36. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed July 17, 2015), p. 36.

invasion of France in 1944.”¹²⁴ The military leaders at Casablanca even, according to Smart, planned the invasion specifically for June 6. Smart’s statement was significant because, if accurate, it would validate the argument that the British and Americans, specifically Churchill and Roosevelt, were using the promise of a second front as a carrot to keep Stalin moving forward in the direction the Anglo-American plan was heading. After the conclusion of the Casablanca Conference, Churchill wrote to Stalin promising a second front in August or September of 1943. Was Churchill lying to Stalin?

According to State Department records, the Casablanca Conference did not conclude that a second front would not happen in 1943, but the records did indicate an invasion of France would require a miraculous event in order to occur then. Discussions between the Joint Chiefs and Joint Planning Staff continuously mentioned the desire to relieve the Red Army and place troops in Western Europe. However, they recognized that if Husky were to be successful, the troops transport vehicles required in Sicily would take away from those required for an invasion of France. Therefore, the answer was provided in vague terms. On January 22, 1943, the British Joint Planning Staff concluded:

With the resources available in 1943, neither the size of the seaborne and airborne assault forces nor the rate of build up can approach the requirements of the Combined Commanders. It is clear, therefore, that no operation to seize and hold a footing in the Cotentin Peninsula has any prospect of success unless the German reserves have been very greatly reduced. Similar considerations would apply to a limited operation anywhere on the French Coast... Unless the Germans are forced to reduce their reserves and their beach defenses in Northwest Europe substantially, no limited operation to seize and hold a footing in France is practicable with the resources likely to be available in 1943.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Gen. Jacob E. Smart, "The Casablanca Conference," 36.

¹²⁵ *Report by the British Joint Planning Staff – January 22, 1943 in Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942 and Casablanca, 1943.* Department of State (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968) , 787-788.

Two days later, at the conclusion of the conference, Churchill and Roosevelt prepared a statement for the press that was incredibly vague. It addressed the problems facing the Soviet Union and implied a second front was being prepared. However, it clearly acted as another action by the Anglo-American alliance to keep the bear hoping, all the while not committing them to a hard date. The report stated:

The President and the Prime Minister realized to the full the enormous weight of the war which Russia is successfully bearing along her whole land front, and their prime object has been to draw as much of the weight as possible off the Russian Armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best selected points.¹²⁶

As vague and noncommittal as the statement may have been, it also revealed a hidden meaning. The Allies needed the Soviet Union, and as weak as the Soviet Union's position may have been up to this point, Roosevelt and Churchill needed to keep the Red Army alive. In order to protect their adversarial ally they were willing to go to great lengths to help. While 1943 would not bring the promised second front in western Europe, it would bring a British and American contribution of a very different sort: willingness to cover up Soviet atrocities to protect the alliance and the hope of victory.

¹²⁶ *Draft Communiqué Prepared at Casablanca, January 24, 1943 in Foreign Relations... Casablanca, 844-845.*

CHAPTER 3: THE TIDE BEGINS TO TURN

Stalingrad

Soviet victory at the Battle of Stalingrad was a critical moment in the war that would reshape the balance of power within the Grand Alliance. It lasted nearly six months and cost the lives of between 1.5 and 2 million soldiers and civilians. If one tried to conceive the loss of life beyond mere facts and figures on a page it would be unfathomable, yet for the Soviet Union, the loss of life was not in vain. From that point on the Red Army was no longer on the defensive. The German invaders had been broken; it proved to be only a matter of time until Soviet forces reclaimed their lost territory and pushed farther west. Historian Warren F. Kimball accurately argued, “Keeping the Soviets in the war had been a concern in American assessments during 1942, but the emphasis in that year had been on Soviet *capabilities*. In 1943 the emphasis shifted to *intentions*.”¹²⁷ Before the war began there was concern that Communism, if left undeterred, had the potential to spread beyond the Soviet borders. Once the Red Army defeated Hitler’s forces at Stalingrad Roosevelt and Churchill realized the spread of Communism, as an ideology, was not their only concern. It became clear that the Soviet Union had the potential to spread their physical domain in addition to their ideological beliefs throughout Europe.

The tremendous loss of life and subsequent victory proved the resilience of the Slavic people. It also showed, for the first time, the capabilities of the Red Army. When Stalingrad began, the losses suffered by the Soviet Union were overwhelming and the Germans came within fifty miles of Moscow, but under Georgy Zhukov they fought back from the verge of ethnic extermination. Churchill and Roosevelt understood that when the Red Army expelled the last

¹²⁷ Warren F Kimball, 1996. “Stalingrad: A chance for choices,” *The Journal of Military History* 60 (1) (Jan.): 89-114, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944450>, 91.

German soldiers from their homeland, and took the offensive, there would be little that could stop them from reaching Berlin.

In addition to recognizing that the Red Army would, in time, occupy vast areas of Eastern Europe as they approached Berlin, Roosevelt and Churchill must have recognized the subtle but alarming difference between the ways Stalin addressed his concerns prior to February 2, 1943 and after his victory at Stalingrad. For example, in October of 1942 Stalin wrote to Roosevelt explaining the needs of the Soviet Union and the ever-increasing demand for war materials. However, his request was humble and passive. He wrote, “Availing myself of the opportunity to send you a personal message afforded by Mr. Standley proceeding to Washington, I would like to express a few considerations to the military supplies from the United States to the USSR.”¹²⁸ His gratitude, after receiving some of the material he had requested was equally polite. His letter to Roosevelt in early January of 1943 stated: “Please accept my appreciation of your willingness to send 100 bombers for the Soviet Union to the Far East.”¹²⁹ Even in regard to the second front Stalin’s words show he recognized he needed to remain respectful toward his allies to ensure he did not offend them during his time of need. He penned these words to Roosevelt in regard to opening a second front sometime in 1943, “I should be very obliged to you for information on the concrete operations planned in this respect and on the scheduled time of their realization.”¹³⁰

Immediately after the Red Army’s victory at Stalingrad, Stalin was able to change his attitude toward the war and toward the other members of the Grand Alliance. The Soviet Union was no longer fighting purely for survival. The enemy was still on their native soil, but the turn

¹²⁸ Joseph V. Stalin, October 7, 1942 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 87.

¹²⁹ Joseph V. Stalin, January 5, 1943 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 108.

¹³⁰ Joseph V. Stalin, January 30, 1943 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 114.

of events at and around Stalingrad helped reassure Stalin that the Allies were going to be victorious and that he could start negotiating like a victor, rather than someone in desperate need of assistance. His first letter to Roosevelt, after victory at Stalingrad, one that wasn't related to thanks for his victory, demanded an explanation for Churchill and Roosevelt's decision to delay actions in Tunisia. The change in tone from January 30, to February 16, 1943 was apparent. "There is no need to prove at length how undesirable is this postponement of operations against the Germans and Italians. Precisely at this particular moment...the activities of Anglo-American troops in Northern Africa are imperatively essential."¹³¹ One last comparison shows the complete change of tactics Stalin used when writing to his allies. The second front, which Stalin had meekly requested information on in January, was readdressed in another letter penned on February 16, 1943. In this letter Stalin demanded action on the second front. He wrote, "Nevertheless, I think I must give a most emphatic warning, in the interest of our common cause, of the grave danger with which further delay in opening a second front in France is fraught."¹³² Stalingrad was a victory that changed the way the Big Three interacted for the rest of the war.

The West had to begin weighing which of their objectives were most critical to postwar plans and which they could compromise to ensure their objectives were accomplished. Stalin was still not in a position to demand his own terms in negotiations, because he still needed the second front, but there were immediate repercussions from the Red Army's victory at Stalingrad. Within two months of German surrender in Stalingrad, the British and U.S. had to concede Stalin's expanded power in the crisis over the discoveries in Katyn forest near Smolensk.

¹³¹ Joseph V. Stalin, February 16, 1943 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 117-118.

¹³² Joseph V. Stalin, March 16, 1943 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 121-122.

Katyn Massacre

Historically, politicians have been recognized as compromising in values in order to achieve their objectives. War certainly heightened the magnitude of concessions politicians were willing to make to beat Hitler. In April of 1943 the Big Three denied a request by the Polish Government-in-Exile that the International Red Cross be permitted to investigate the discovery of mass graves containing the remains of Polish Soldiers in the Katyn Forest on Soviet territory. Their decision further cemented their relationship, proving loyalty to one another for the greater good, regardless of the moral implications of their actions. The request of the Polish Government-in-exile was based on an incident that had occurred in 1940, but whose details only the Soviet state knew. This action also supplemented Stalin's growing ability to manipulate any situation and use the mire of war and an unholy relationship to take advantage of Churchill and Roosevelt. The Polish request was that the Red Cross be permitted to look into the mysterious disappearance of some 15,000 Polish officers from the Katyn Forest in Russia. Susan Butler described the beginning of the situation in this way: "As the Germans retreated in April 1943, they announced that they had found the bodies...and charged that the Russians had killed them in 1940. The Soviet Union countered with charges that the officers had been killed by the Germans in 1941."¹³³ The incident would later become known as the Katyn Massacre.

When the Polish Government-in-exile learned of the whereabouts of the bodies they requested an International Red Cross investigation, which the Big Three stonewalled. Stalin immediately refused the request and threatened to cut off relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile. He then sent a request to Roosevelt for help in squelching the request. Whether or not Roosevelt believed the Russians at the time of the request is uncertain, but his response shows

¹³³ Susan Butler, ed. *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 122.

his dedication to finding a diplomatic response that was meant to satisfy Stalin despite the possibility that he was helping with a cover up. Roosevelt's response was: "I can well understand your problem...I am inclined to think that Churchill will find ways and means of getting the Polish Government in London to act with more common sense in the future."¹³⁴

Roosevelt's actions were intended to protect the alliance, but they also had dramatic consequences. Roosevelt, like Churchill, believed it was important to maintain a unified front both diplomatically and publicly to prevent the seeds of doubt from finding their way into this perilous relationship and threatening its future. Stalin understood this as well and emphasized the collective goal. He responded by writing, "I, too, believe that Premier Churchill will find a way to bring the Polish Government to reason and to help it in future to act according to the dictates of common sense."¹³⁵ Stalin knew far too well how to work the well being of the collective over any individual, and he emphasized it here. In this case, his war partners were all too quick to work with him.

While sending his remarks to Stalin, Roosevelt sent a copy to Churchill, who was able to put a spin on it and convince the Polish Government-in-Exile to change the tune of the investigation to one that would be less condemning. As he phrased it, "You will see that we have persuaded them to shift the argument from the dead to the living and from the past to the future."¹³⁶ Not only did Churchill believe he was helping the immediate cause; he believed this action would provide unity in the postwar effort. He proceeded to declare, "I and my colleagues look steadily to the ever closer cooperation and understanding of the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A.,

¹³⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 26, 1943 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 126.

¹³⁵ Joseph V. Stalin, April 29, 1943 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 127.

¹³⁶ Winston S. Churchill, "Doc 222" April 28, 1943, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 329-330.

and the British Commonwealth and Empire, not only in the deepening war struggle but after the war.”¹³⁷

Three questions must be addressed to understand how the Katyn Forest Massacre influenced the relationship of the Big Three and tied Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s hands in future negotiations with Stalin. The first question is why would Stalin authorize the execution of prisoners of war? The second question is what evidence was provided to Roosevelt and Churchill in 1943 that these atrocities were committed by the Soviet Union? The third question is why did Roosevelt and Churchill agree to block further investigation into the deaths of so many Polish officers and civilians if Britain had gone to war to defend Poland in 1939? The answers to these questions shed light on one of the most controversial topics of ethics in war and wartime relationships during World War II.

Since the rise of the Bolshevik Party as the dominant party in Soviet Russia through the end of Stalin’s life, it was standard practice to minimize and eliminate dissidents. Lenin argued in 1921 about the importance of party unity. He believed anyone who was not for the party was against the party and slowed the progress of Communism.¹³⁸ Under Stalin, the Soviet Union underwent several political purges to eliminate anyone who could have questioned his authority. For example, Stalin authorized show trials, the elimination of kulaks (petty bourgeoisie peasants, often of little actual threat to the party), and even a purge of the Communist Party to prevent

¹³⁷ Ibid., 329-330.

¹³⁸ For more on Lenin and Party Unity see V.I. Lenin, “Preliminary Draft Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the RCP on Party Unity” in *Lenin and the Making of the Soviet State: A Brief History with Documents*, by Jeffrey Brooks and Georgiy Chernyavskiy (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2007)108-111.

opposition and promote his authority throughout the Soviet Union.¹³⁹ Stalin's actions against his own people provided the template for how he would treat the people of nations he intended to annex during and after the war. Stalin's plan to acquire Polish territory after the war motivated him to eliminate elements of the Polish population who could oppose his authority after the war. Stalin gained the opportunity to eliminate Polish opposition when the Red Army occupied Poland in 1939 under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and began rounding up Polish prisoners of war.

In April of 1943, members of the Polish Red Cross had been invited by German authorities to investigate the mass graves at Katyn.¹⁴⁰ They worked from mid-April to June 1943 and concluded the executions were carried out in 1940.¹⁴¹ The British Ambassador to the Polish Government-in-exile Owen O'Malley, who had been given a copy of the initial report but did not see the massacre site first hand, wrote a letter to Anthony Eden and described what the report detailed. He also offered his opinion. In his letter O'Malley explained quite bluntly why he believed the murder of prisoners of war had occurred. O'Malley compared the Polish officers to horses, considering them 'good breeding stock' that Stalin wanted to get rid of so they could not

¹³⁹ For more on how Stalin eliminated rivals see Peter Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 104-106.

¹⁴⁰ For more on the German invitation and the Polish Government-in-exile's belief in the impartiality of the Polish Red Cross members see Halik Kochanski, *The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 275.

¹⁴¹ See Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski, eds. *Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment*, Translated by Marian Schwartz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 222-223.

“live to sire a herd of hostile Christian thoroughbreds.”¹⁴² His description was vivid and almost morbid, but it provided a logical rationale for why Stalin chose to eliminate prisoners of war when they were of no immediate threat. In fact, Stalin had done the same thing when he insisted on exiling or imprisoning the Soviet wives and children of men he deemed “enemies of the people” in the late 1930s.¹⁴³

The massacre and cover up were simple actions for Stalin to eliminate many of Poland’s best men. These men could have been the most capable leaders to oppose Stalin after the war.¹⁴⁴ Concealing the evidence seemed simple enough. In the haste and confusion of retreat in 1941 no one questioned why prisoners of war had gone unaccounted for in the immediate aftermath of Operation Barbarossa. However, victory at Stalingrad proved to be a blessing and a curse for the Soviet Government. With their affairs being put in order and counteroffensives being planned, the Soviet Government could no longer brush off Polish requests for the location of prisoners of war. When retreating Germans found the bodies they took the news to the press immediately and accused the Soviet Union of the atrocity. The Soviet Union countered and claimed the Germans had committed the atrocity.

After the bodies had been located and their existence made public, efforts were made to both find out who had committed the murders and turn it into a propaganda tool. The Polish

¹⁴² Owen O’Malley, Official Letter to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, May 24, 1943, in *Katyn 1940: The Documentary Evidence of the West's Betrayal*, by Eugenia Maresch (Stroud: History Press, 2010), 41.

¹⁴³ For more on Stalin and ‘enemies of the people’ see Cathy A. Frierson, *Silence Was Salvation: Child Survivors of Stalin's Terror and World War II in the Soviet Union* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 4-10.

¹⁴⁴ For this argument and other possible explanations for Stalin’s decision to murder the Polish POWs see Halik Kochanski, *The Eagle Unbowed*, 131.

Government and the Germans issued a request to the International Red Cross (IRC) on the same day to investigate the Katyn Massacre in April of 1943.¹⁴⁵ The Polish Government was looking for answers, but the Germans saw this as a moment to undermine the Allies. According to author Eugenia Maresch, the German plan was effective. She stated, “The Soviets interpreted this as collusion against them by the Poles and the Germans.”¹⁴⁶ Roosevelt and Churchill had been working to defend the Polish Government and protect as much of their territorial claim as they could against Stalin. When the Germans and the Polish Government-in-exile made the requests to the IRC on the same day, Stalin did not hesitate to use the opportunity as an example of the unwillingness of the Polish Government-in-exile to work with the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁷ It is important to address what Churchill and Roosevelt knew in the spring and summer of 1943 before addressing what steps were taken to silence the Polish Government on the issue.

Roosevelt and Churchill may not have had overwhelming evidence by May of 1943 that clearly implicated the Soviet Union as the responsible party for the murder of Polish prisoners of war. However, evidence from Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s letters alone proved the two leaders were aware that it was most probable that the Soviet Union was guilty of these executions. In addition to the correspondence among the Big Three, Maresch’s work revealed contemporary evidence that showed there was little room for doubt by the end of May 1943 for Roosevelt and Churchill to understand Stalin was behind the massacre. The primary document Maresch used in her argument was O’Malley’s letter to Anthony Eden.

¹⁴⁵ Eugenia Maresch, *Katyn 1940*, 32.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁴⁷ Joseph V. Stalin, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 123.

In this letter O'Malley began by laying out the evidence like an unbiased mediator. He stated, "We do not know for certain who murdered a lot of Polish officers in the forest of Katyn in April and May 1940..."¹⁴⁸ He admitted that the prisoners of war had been under Soviet control when they were scheduled to be transferred to a new location. It was at that time, March of 1940, that they disappeared. According to O'Malley the officers had been corresponding with their loved ones until March 1940, and they had not been heard from since. He wrote, "The Germans overran Smolensk in July 1941, and there is no easy way to answer the question why, if any of the 10,000 had been alive between the end of May 1940 and July 1941, none of them ever succeeded in getting any word through to their families."¹⁴⁹ The evidence began to paint a clearer picture of what had happened in 1940.

O'Malley then connected the evidence and showed it was a reasonable assumption the Polish men had died at the hands of their Soviet captors. O'Malley continued his argument by questioning why the Soviet authorities were unable to furnish any answers to the Polish Government in regards to the whereabouts of the missing Polish soldiers. He also argued that execution of prisoners of war was not consistent with the Germans. He admitted they had done horrible things, but murder of prisoners who could be used for labor was not typical. His next argument was circumstantial, but if true very alarming. He wrote, "in conversation with the Polish Ambassador, a Russian official who had drunk more than was good for him, once referred to the disposal of these officers as 'a tragic error.'"¹⁵⁰ If loose lips sink ships, then these

¹⁴⁸ Owen O'Malley, Official Letter to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, May 24, 1943, in *Katyn 1940*, 34.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

intoxicated lips revealed a dark secret. With the evidence he gathered in May of 1943, O'Malley concluded, "The cumulative effect of this evidence is, as I said earlier, to throw serious doubt on Russian disclaimers of responsibility for a massacre."¹⁵¹ O'Malley's conclusion read like a verdict.¹⁵²

The bodies in Katyn were undeniably executed Polish prisoners of war, and the Allies were aware of this fact. The timing of the murders placed the prisoners under Soviet control. The Soviet Union's inability to account for the prisoners was alarming, and their own officer had admitted to the "tragic error." This was the evidence presented to Anthony Eden who shared the information with Winston Churchill. According to Maresch, "Churchill sent a copy of O'Malley's dispatch to ... Roosevelt on 13 August 1943 with a note that the first two pages were 'grim' but it was a well written story; and he asked for its return!"¹⁵³ They may have been unwilling to admit what they knew, but it was obvious that their ally was guilty. It is important to understand why Roosevelt wrote, "I am inclined to think that Churchill will find ways and means of getting the Polish Government in London to act with more common sense in the future."¹⁵⁴ Understanding why they wanted to hide the Katyn Massacre reveals the change that had taken place in the balance of power among the Big Three.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 38.

¹⁵² The Soviet Union conducted its own investigation in January of 1944, the Burdenko Commission, but its findings had no known impact on the relationship of the Big Three because they had already moved on by that time. Not to mention the NKVD had contaminated the evidence and instructed "witnesses" on how to answer when questioned by the commission. See Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski, eds. *Katyn*, 226-229.

¹⁵³ Eugenia Maresch, *Katyn 1940*, 33.

¹⁵⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 26, 1943 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 126.

Prior to the revelation of the Katyn Massacre and the Soviet victory at Stalingrad the Soviet Union had been completely reliant upon the West. That began to change as early as February and became fully evident in April. If all things had remained the same in the relationship and Stalin was still subservient to Churchill and Roosevelt, there would have been no harm in allowing the IRC to investigate the mass graves in Katyn Forest. Allowing the investigation would most likely have meant the Grand Alliance did not appear as united as they wanted the public to believe, but preventing the investigation represented, if nothing else, a change in the relationship. Had recent events truly placed the Soviet Union on equal footing with Roosevelt and Churchill? Editors Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski conducted their own investigation into the Katyn Massacre. They concluded that there was serious concern at the time that the Soviet Government would be unwilling to work with the Polish Government after the war if the Polish Government-in-exile continued to press for an investigation and thus the cover-up was necessary for postwar cooperation. Cienciala et al. described the first meeting between Churchill and General Sikorski after the news release of the Katyn Massacre. At the meeting “Churchill said he could believe in Soviet guilt, but warned the Poles against raising the issue publicly.”¹⁵⁵ This was certainly a hard blow to the Sikorski, who believed the British Government was still concerned with defending Polish interests.¹⁵⁶

Ceenciala et al. used the *Congressional Committee Investigation of the Katyn Forest Massacre, 1951-1952*, to show the U.S. Government was also involved in the cover up. They wrote, “Like the British government [*sic*], the Roosevelt administration also suppressed media

¹⁵⁵ Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski, eds. *Katyn*, 217.

¹⁵⁶ For an explanation for the cover-up and as well as condemnation for the length of the cover-up See Halik Kochanski, *The Eagle Unbowed*, 343.

coverage of Katyn in 1943-1945 in the interest of Allied unity...¹⁵⁷ They also used testimony from members of Roosevelt's Office of War Information to show that any news that would prove detrimental to the alliance was officially prohibited. According to the argument made by Cienciala et al., "[Journalist Julius] Epstein had worked in the Office of War Information ... and became interested in Katyn at that time, but did not write about it owing to the government's policy of suppressing media discussion of the topic."¹⁵⁸ Roosevelt and Churchill had certainly not approved of Stalin's actions, and they were not implying he would never be held accountable. However, they were placing the unity of the Grand Alliance above the investigation of a crime that in peacetime would certainly have been publicized and investigated. O'Malley's letter, read by Churchill and Roosevelt, clearly spelled out the ethical dilemma:

In handling the publicity side of the Katyn affair, we have been constrained by the urgent need for cordial relations with the Soviet Government to appear to appraise the evidence with more hesitation and leniency than we should do in forming a common sense judgement [*sic*] on events occurring in normal times or in the ordinary course of our private lives; we have been obliged to appear to distort the normal and healthy operation of our intellectual and moral judgements [*sic*]; we have been obliged to give undue prominence to the tactlessness or impulsiveness of Poles, to restrain the Poles from putting their case clearly before the public, to discourage any attempt by the public and the press to probe the ugly story to the bottom. In general we have been obliged to deflect attention from possibilities which in the ordinary affairs of life, would cry to high heaven for elucidation and to withhold the full measure of solicitude which, in other circumstances, would be shown to acquaintances situated as a large number of Poles now are. We have in fact perforce used the good name of England like the murderers used the little conifers to cover up a massacre; and, in view of the immense importance of an appearance of Allied unity and of the heroic resistance of Russia to Germany, few will think that any other course would have been wise or right.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 235.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 235.

¹⁵⁹ Owen O'malley, Official Letter to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, May 24, 1943, in *Katyn 1940*, 42.

O'Malley understood what would come of his report. He was right to believe few would condemn the decision to silence coverage of the massacre. That, however, does not justify their actions. Churchill and even more so Roosevelt thought they could gain Stalin's support and goodwill after the war if they helped him during the war. This included becoming accessories to Stalin's crime. They were overconfident in their beliefs. The balance of power had already begun to shift when the Germans presented evidence of Katyn. They recognized it and feared losing Stalin's support during the war. It only became more difficult for the Big Three to work out their differences from that point on. Often, it would mean conceding to Stalin to keep his support. It is easy to understand why Roosevelt and Churchill made the decisions they made, but they should have taken the higher ground. Of course, one could argue that condemning the Soviet Union for the Katyn Massacre could have had detrimental effects on the unity of the Grand Alliance, but it will never be known. At the time, as O'Malley argued, it was more important to the Allies to show unity against the Germans than it was to condemn Stalin's decision to execute prisoners of war. Forty-nine years later, the Soviet Union would publicly admit guilt for the Katyn Massacre, but the damage had already been done. Roosevelt's and Churchill's actions in the spring and summer of 1943 encouraged Stalin to see how far he could push the alliance in his favor.

Stalin fully recognized in the summer of 1943 he was no longer completely reliant upon the West, and the relationship made a dramatic shift from dependency to suspicion. Shortly after O'Malley's letter had been passed onto Roosevelt, Stalin wrote a letter to his Allies that said, "To date it has been like this: the U.S.A. and Britain reach agreement between themselves while the U.S.S.R. is informed of the agreement between the two Powers as a third party looking

passively on. I must say that this situation cannot be tolerated any longer.”¹⁶⁰ Roosevelt and Churchill had to find a way to give Stalin what he wanted while maintaining, in their minds, the principles of the Atlantic Charter. In the Atlantic Charter the President had said smaller nations, such as Poland, “wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”¹⁶¹ He reinforced his belief to the press in the summer and fall as well.¹⁶² However, at the Quebec Conference, in August of 1943, Anthony Eden and Cordell Hull discussed the inevitability that the Soviet Union would not concede its claim to part of Poland. Despite the promises made in the Atlantic Charter in 1941, 1943 presented new challenges. Secretary Eden admitted that until the Soviet Union made headway on the Polish border issue they would be difficult to work with, but he also admitted that it would be “difficult...for this or any Polish Government...to accept any surrender of former Polish territory.”¹⁶³ In order to ensure postwar Soviet involvement Eden and Hull did entertain the notion of partitioning part of Poland to the Soviet Union leaving most of Poland intact. They were under the impression that denying Stalin this concession would make it harder to save any of Poland if it were occupied by the Soviet Union when the Red Army pressed west.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 174, 22 August 1943, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:149.

¹⁶¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, “The Atlantic Charter,” August 14, 1941, 1.

¹⁶² For examples in the press see “President Renews Pledges To Poland.” *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Sep 01, 1943, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106509429?accountid=14612> (accessed August 6, 2015) and “‘Square Deal’ Held Needed for Poland.” *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Nov 22, 1943, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106599547?accountid=14612> (accessed August 6, 2015).

¹⁶³ Anthony Eden “The Soviet-Polish Boundary” August 23, 1943 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, Department of State (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), 1115.

¹⁶⁴ See “The Soviet-Polish Boundary”, August 23, 1943 in *Foreign Relations...Quebec*, 1115.

Tehran

The time had finally come for the Big Three to meet face to face! *The Times* first reported on the meeting in Tehran on December 4, 1943, three days after the conference had ended. In a brief article the author emphasized the importance of the alliance and the necessity that the three heads had to meet in person by stating, “But nothing can take the place of the rapid exchange of views around a table. It is there that strategy is knitted together and extended; and in no other way can political partnership be developed beyond simple agreement into a sturdy, living growth.”¹⁶⁵ The press publicly praised the meeting.

Early reports from London were very interesting too, because neither paper had any information to report from the conference at Tehran. In previous meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt there had been much fanfare after the meetings because officials at the conferences had published communiqués on what had transpired for the press. The first meeting of the Big Three was recognized as significant merely because the three had met together. There seemed to be little concern, in the media, that no communiqués were issued. There were two likely reasons for the relative silence; one, any war plans would have been classified to prevent the enemy from gaining any advantage; and two, the political sensitivity of any agreement would have ramifications in the three nations at hand, not to mention any nation affected by the agreements.

A search of the Parliamentary Debates provided evidence that it was the British Ministry of Information’s intent to keep the conversations and agreements at Tehran a secret. During a

¹⁶⁵ “Three-power meeting at Teheran,” *The Times*, 12/04; 2015/9, 1943.
<http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=&docId=CS67321220&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>, 4.

Parliamentary meeting on December 8, 1943, Tom Driberg, a journalist by trade and Member of Parliament, asked if he could address complaints “against the mishandling of the public relations and Press facilities for the North Africa and Teheran conferences; and whether he can make a statement?”¹⁶⁶ To which Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information, told Driberg that he could respond and inform them “that conferences of this sort cannot be at one and the same time major security concerns and the subject of world news.”¹⁶⁷ A random tidbit of information that is at the very least interesting, if not relevant, according to historian Philip Michael Hett Bell, is that Stalin feared flying. The first time he ever flew was to get to the Tehran Conference, and the last time he flew was to return to Moscow.¹⁶⁸

The Cairo Conferences and the Tehran Conference revealed significant information regarding the dynamics of the relationship of the Big Three. The first Cairo Conference was held from November 22, to November 26; the Tehran Conference was held from November 28 to December 1; and the second Cairo Conference was held from December 4, to December 6, 1943. Stalin, preoccupied with driving the Nazis from his territory was unable to attend the Cairo Conferences, but was able to attend Tehran. Stalin’s delay gave Churchill and Roosevelt a chance to meet with one another and plan their wartime strategy, as well as ensure they were in accord on their plans before meeting Stalin.

¹⁶⁶ Tom Driberg, in Conferences, North Africa and Teheran (Press Arrangements). HC Deb 08 December 1943 vol 395 cc983-4W: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>

¹⁶⁷ Brendan Bracken, in Conferences, North Africa and Teheran (Press Arrangements). HC Deb 08 December 1943 vol 395 cc983-4W: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>

¹⁶⁸ See Philip Michael Hett Bell, *Twelve Turning Points of the Second World War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 149 and Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*, 488.

According to First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union Charles E. Bohlen, discussions between the British Prime Minister and Soviet Premier bordered on hostile at times. Bohlen recorded a conversation in which Stalin alluded to the difference between his relationship with Roosevelt and his relationship with Churchill: “At the dinner in the British Legation, Stalin referred to both the President and Churchill as his ‘fighting friends’ or ‘comrades-in-arms’, but in the case of Churchill he added the observation, ‘if it is possible for me to consider Mr. Churchill my friend.’”¹⁶⁹ The two certainly struggled to work cordially together due to stubborn type-A personalities and ideological preferences:

Later on in the discussion, in reply to the Prime Minister’s statement that he must admit that after the last war he had done everything in his power to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in Europe and the setting up of Communist regimes, Marshal Stalin said ironically that Mr. Churchill need not have worried quite so much, as they (the Russians) had discovered that it was not so easy to set up Communist regimes.¹⁷⁰

The shifting struggle for power and dominance in the international community was noted by Bell as well. He contended this shift was recognized at Tehran. “The Soviet Union had established its military predominance on the Eastern Front, while the United States was outstripping Britain not only in economic power but also in military capacity.”¹⁷¹ Bell went as far as to conclude that Roosevelt began to believe the Soviet Union was more important to the U.S. for the present and the future than the United Kingdom was. This argument, however, lacks

¹⁶⁹ Charles E. Bohlen. “Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union” in *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: Conferences At Cairo And Tehran, 1943*, Department of State, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 837.

¹⁷⁰ Charles E. Bohlen, “Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union” in *Foreign Relations...Tehran*, 837.

¹⁷¹ Philip Michael Hett Bell, *Twelve Turning Points*, 152.

the evidence necessary to marginalize the British-American relationship, which was reinforced at the Second Cairo Conference.

It is true that Stalin and Roosevelt had a much better relationship at Tehran than Churchill and Stalin had, which was exemplified during the dinner meeting mentioned above; this contributed to Churchill's decision often to defer to Roosevelt's plans in the future in order to ensure the longevity of the Anglo-American relationship. The social interactions and hidden meanings found within conversations were critical to the Allied relationship. Equally important were the direct conversations regarding war planning. During the Tehran conference there were several topics discussed but two appeared more than any others, the stubborn issues of borders and a second front.

Since the first conversation had been initiated between Stalin and his Western Allies, the issue of a second front had been his primary concern. In his first meeting at Tehran he did not miss the opportunity to keep this point at the forefront of his conversation. In a meeting recorded within the Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes on November 28, 1943, the first day of the conference, the Prime Minister explained to Stalin that there would be no second front in 1943 but that the allies were "resolved to do so in 1944."¹⁷² He added "It would take a long statement to explain why the U.S. and U.K. have not been able to strike against France in 1943."¹⁷³ Surprisingly this did not seem to frustrate Stalin, at least as far as the official record was concerned. It is impossible to know if his temperature rose, or he squeezed the arm of his chair in frustration. Outwardly, however, Stalin remained calm and asked what else could be done to

¹⁷² Winston S. Churchill, "Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes" in *Foreign Relations...Tehran*, 501.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 501.

help draw troops away from the Soviet border without prolonging the time it took to build up troops for the second front? From that point on, the second front was referred to as Operation Overlord, or the landing in the North or Northwest of France. By the conclusion of the conference the powers had all agreed when Operation Overlord would commence. The “Military Conclusion of the Tehran Conference,” signed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, stated;

Operation Overlord would be launched May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France...the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front.¹⁷⁴

During a meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin at Tehran, accompanied only by W. Averell Harriman (U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union), Charles E. Bohlen (Roosevelt’s interpreter), Molotov and V. M. Pavlov (Stalin’s interpreter), Roosevelt revealed his opinion about the Polish border at the end of the war as well as what was driving his public position at that time. Historians have argued that Roosevelt gave the Soviet Premier his blessing to annex part of Poland during the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, which my evidence disputes.¹⁷⁵ However, at Tehran Roosevelt waded into the murky confluence of domestic politics, international relations, and cultural anthropology and attempted to find a solution that would please Stalin on the Polish border issue. According to the notes taken by Bohlen, Roosevelt had become willing to concede the fate of several culturally distinct populations to the Soviet Union in contradiction with the Atlantic Charter he had signed in 1941. The questions that must be addressed are: what had changed since Roosevelt’s proclamation that all nations that existed

¹⁷⁴ “Military Conclusions of the Teheran Conference” in *Foreign Relations...Tehran*, 652.

¹⁷⁵ See Anna M. Cienciala, “The United States and Poland...,” 174. For the evidence to the contrary, see above, pages 45-53.

before the war remain self-governing after the war, and what did Roosevelt hope to gain by changing his position?

During the private meeting between Roosevelt, Stalin, and their top men, Roosevelt recognized that the Red Army, though still driving the Germans from historic Russian territory, would quickly occupy Eastern Europe in the race for Berlin. He even went so far, according to Bohlen, as to joke about the situation. At that moment Roosevelt must have decided future peace that was worldwide and maintained by a small group of powerful nations was more important than the desires of a few of the smaller states/cultures. The President did not completely abandon the hope that nations currently under German occupation would regain their sovereignty. He stated, that “insofar as public opinion went, would be the question of referendum and the right of self-determination.”¹⁷⁶ In an apparent move to satisfy Stalin, however, Roosevelt immediately backtracked and told Stalin he was “confident that the people would vote to join the Soviet Union.”¹⁷⁷ These comments significantly contradict the President’s public position toward Poland. What motivated the president to publicly claim self-determination and confidentially undermine it at the same time? The answer to that question was made blatantly apparent at the beginning of Roosevelt’s conversation with Stalin.

When Stalin and Roosevelt met at Tehran, the U.S. elections of 1944 were less than a year away. The President told Stalin “there were in the United States from six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction...he did not want to lose their vote.”¹⁷⁸ The President then went on to tell the leader of the Soviet Union that he was willing to concede more than Stalin had

¹⁷⁶ Charles E. Bohlen. “Bohlen Minutes” in *Foreign Relations...Tehran*, 595.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 595.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 594.

asked for in terms of the eastern border of Poland and the Baltic states as well, but he could not do so until after the election. Without further analyzing, it would be easy to claim Roosevelt had sold out the Polish people at Tehran and intentionally kept his actions a private matter to ensure his fourth term as president. However, over a year and a half would pass before the end of the war and nothing had been put down in writing. For the time being Roosevelt had gained Stalin's support for a postwar governing body, which Stalin had been hesitant to agree to in the past, and more importantly, gained Stalin's confidence that the two of them were allies in the fight against Germany.

An important question that appears to remain unanswered is why did the President bring this up in a meeting with Stalin without Churchill present? Records show that Churchill was less concerned with Poland than the President, despite the fact that the Polish Government-in-exile was located in his country. There seems to be no clear answer to this question. The most rational explanation was the tension between Churchill and Stalin did not facilitate an atmosphere in which the President could discuss such matters without being driven to put them in writing. By speaking privately with Stalin, Roosevelt was able to assuage Stalin with open-ended promises. This was something Stalin was unwilling to accept from Churchill. Whether or not Churchill's absence was planned, at Tehran Stalin and Roosevelt developed a more cordial relationship than did Stalin and Churchill. After the conference Churchill's decision to support the U.S. position on cross-channel operations must have been a direct result of the antagonism between Churchill and Stalin, especially compared to the more congenial interactions that marked the relationship between Stalin and Roosevelt. What happened that caused Churchill to feel his position was in jeopardy if he did not regain Roosevelt's confidence?

Later there was no mention of Roosevelt and Stalin's meeting as the three leaders conversed. Churchill ran the early part of the discussion informing Stalin that Great Britain had gone to war to defend Poland and felt obligated to support her. He said he would present Soviet recommendations to the Polish Government-in-exile, but if they were unwilling to work with the U.S.S.R., he would agree to anything the Soviets presented that was within reason. At that point the three men sat around a table and began redrawing international borders with a colored pencil.¹⁷⁹ This image makes the decisions the Big Three were making seem almost trivial; however, as trivial as their decision-making process may have been, the results affected the lives of millions, and can still be felt today.

Despite uncomfortable moments between the Premier and the Prime Minister, Stalin left Tehran satisfied with the outcome. Tehran had given him the opportunity to meet with Roosevelt for the first time, as well as to defend his positions in terms of how the future of the war should be fought and to make sure a second front was coming. The meetings also provided a sense of unity with the other leaders that he had been lacking, as noted in his letter to Churchill and Roosevelt where he complained of all decisions being made with the Soviet Union as an after thought. Matloff summed the Tehran Conference up comprehensively:

At the conclusion of the Tehran conference the Allied coalition appeared to have reached the high-water mark in international collaboration. Not only had key decisions been reached to bring about the speedy defeat of Germany but also, on the political level, discussions had been held, generally on an amicable basis, that seemed to promise much for the eventual peaceful solution of the problems of the postwar era.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ For more on their dinner meeting see "Tripartite Political Meeting, December 1, 1943, 6 P.M., Conference Room, Soviet Embassy" in *Foreign Relations...Tehran*, 596-605.

¹⁸⁰ Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1959), 367.

As the year progressed events were unfolding that would further challenge the Grand Alliance. For the time being, however, the three nations were able to enjoy a sense of satisfaction, all things being considered, for the war was beginning to turn, and it appeared the future might be distinguished by mutual respect which is often formed by uncommon groupings of people when they are forced to overcome great odds with one another. According to Bellamy “Tehran was in some ways the high point of the Grand Alliance.”¹⁸¹ The Allies had gained Stalin’s trust and support for their war plans, despite postponing Operation Overlord. Bellamy concluded that Stalin did not walk away from Tehran empty handed. For his support, “The Soviet Union would be free to occupy whatever the Red Army conquered. Henceforward, ‘Allied’ agreement would focus on the division of spoils, rather than on saving Russia.”¹⁸² Bellamy was to some degree correct in his assessment that Tehran marked the high point of the relationship, but only in terms of cordial negotiations and wartime strategies required to defeat the Nazis. Unfortunately for the West, at Tehran Stalin was able to use his recent victories over the German forces as leverage in his negotiations. Roosevelt and Churchill had to begin compromising with Stalin to ensure he worked with them in the future. For the millions of East Europeans that had been handed over to the Soviet Union, Tehran marked an ultimate low.

Less than three hours after Roosevelt met with Stalin, they reconvened with Churchill for a final meeting. During this meeting Roosevelt wanted to address two topics, the partition of Germany and the Polish border. The discussion over German partitioning was short. All agreed that it should be broken up but there was no consensus as to how it should be broken up. This topic would become paramount to future relations between the East and the West with the Berlin

¹⁸¹ Chris Bellamy, *Absolute War*, 438.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 438-439.

Wall representing the center of the Cold War, but at the time it was agreed only that something should be done. Instead the topic turned again to Poland.

The benefits of Anglo-American consensus prior to meeting Stalin are obvious, but Churchill and Roosevelt took their unanimity to the next level at the second meeting at Cairo in which they were able to readdress their initial plans. Helmuth von Moltke's commonly paraphrased saying claimed "no plan survives first contact with the enemy." In the same vein Churchill and Roosevelt were able to regroup and plan a new attack at the Second Cairo Conference after their first joint contact with Stalin. Stalin had wedged himself between Roosevelt and Churchill. Churchill recognized the gap between him and his closest ally and took immediate steps to unite the two again. The same day Stalin left Tehran for Moscow, Churchill and Roosevelt had dinner. The Editorial Note from a summary comprised by Admiral William D. Leahy in the *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers on the Second Cairo Conference* articulated this point very well:

During the dinner Roosevelt and Churchill compared their reactions to Stalin and reviewed the military and political discussion with our Russian ally that had just ended. The Prime Minister clearly indicated that he was inclined toward the American Point of view on matters that up to then had produced much controversy between the U.S. and British staffs, particularly on the timing of the cross-Channel attack on Germany.¹⁸³

Churchill's comments, as recorded by Leahy, show he recognized how the meeting had changed the dynamics of the Grand Alliance and he was ready to defer to the Americans whenever necessary to prevent Stalin from wedging a larger gap between himself and Roosevelt. As the leaders of the coalition against Hitler and his allies met, the Soviet Union was continuing to take back the ground they had lost in 1941; the Americans and British had made great strides

¹⁸³ William D. Leahy, "Proceedings of the Conference, Thursday December 2, 1943" in *Foreign Relations...Tehran*, 668.

in the Mediterranean, including the surrender of Italy, and they were beginning to see the tide turn in the Pacific. When the leaders of the Big Three returned to their respective nations, their correspondence for the remainder of the calendar year was minimal and mostly focused on congratulations, well wishes for birthdays – Stalin’s birthday was in December – and recognition that they needed to meet again as often as possible. As the New Year kicked off and the Yuletide spirit passed, the letters amongst the three began to pick up. This was particularly true for Roosevelt and Churchill.

In January 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill began discussing what they needed to alter in order to make sure Overlord happened as scheduled. This included ship movements, changes in allotments of supplies, and a determination of whether they could fulfill their promise to hand the Italian fleet over to Stalin before Overlord. During their communications, they displayed overwhelming concern that they would compromise their trust with Stalin if they began amending the commitments they had made at Tehran. Roosevelt shared his concern by writing, “I think you will agree that we must not go back on what we told U.J. (Uncle Joe, Roosevelt’s nickname for Stalin).”¹⁸⁴ The leaders also recognized that future partnership with the Soviet Union would only be maintained if the West were able to do all they could to keep their word. Who could blame the Soviet Union for walking away from its promises if the West did not keep theirs? To that degree, the Soviet Union had gained the upper hand as the more potentially aggrieved partner in the three-way relationship and Tehran represented the pinnacle of the relations in terms of war planning and postwar planning. Yet, at the same time it was the moment where the West had to pay a heavy price for not calling Stalin to account for what happened at Katyn.

¹⁸⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Doc 437” July 8, 1944, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 413.

New Year – Old Grievances

Between Tehran and Yalta significant events transpired among the Big Three. The time period between the first and last meeting of the original members of the Grand Alliance was a little more than a year. In that time the second front was opened, Paris was liberated, and the Germans lost what proved to be their final offensive. The war was not over, but the beginning of the year was smooth among the three because of the cordial relationship that developed between Churchill and Stalin. However, the relationship among the three quickly declined. As great as their hope may have been for the future, the Cold War's prospect was visible in the correspondence among the "friends" in 1944. The relationship began to chill due to Stalin's suspicious nature and his expectations that the West keep their word. In addition, Churchill and Roosevelt were vacillating on their position toward the Polish border. The Soviets viewed Churchill's and Roosevelt's noncommittal stance on Poland to be intentional, planned deception.

On the first of February, 1944, less than two months after the Tehran conference, Stalin received a letter from Churchill in which the British Prime Minister informed the Soviet Premier that the Polish Government-in-exile was unwilling to accept the Polish-Soviet boundary as agreed upon at Tehran. Churchill also informed Stalin that His Majesty's Government intended to support the exiled government, which he had previously said was not an issue upon which the United Kingdom would take a stand.¹⁸⁵ Historian Halik Kochanski clearly described Polish reliance upon Britain in 1944 by stating, "With relations severed between Poland and the Soviet

¹⁸⁵ See Winston S. Churchill, Document Number 235, 1 February 1944, in *Stalin's Correspondence, 1:192-194*.

Union, [Polish Prime Minister Stanislaw] Mikolajczyk's government was entirely dependent on the goodwill of Britain and the United States to act as intermediaries."¹⁸⁶ This, of course, was not taken well in the Soviet Union. Whatever Stalin's faults may have been and whatever inadequacies he may have had as a leader, he was not forgetful.

Three days later Stalin responded to Churchill, although Churchill did not receive his response until the end of March. Stalin abrasively reminded him that both he and Roosevelt had committed to the Curzon line at Tehran. He stated, "I have no doubt that if you had continued to stand firmly, as before, by the attitude you adopted at Teheran, the dispute with the Polish Émigré Government would already have been settled."¹⁸⁷ He then went to rub the point into the wound he had intended by stating, "As for myself and the Soviet Government, we continue to stand by the attitude we adopted at Teheran and have no intention of departing from it."¹⁸⁸ Stalin said this "method of threats and discreditation [*sic*], if it will be used in the future as well, will not favor this cooperation."¹⁸⁹ Both Stalin and Churchill sent a copy of this letter to Roosevelt, hoping that Roosevelt would take their side. However, Roosevelt recognized his relationship with both sides was in the balance, and being the expert politician he was, simply said that they must all do their best to work out an equitable solution.¹⁹⁰ Was Stalin's frustration justified?

Stalin as a persona of history has been overwhelmingly portrayed as one of the most illustrious villains of all time. Of course, there is little to be said for him that could counter that

¹⁸⁶ Halik Kochanski, *The Eagle Unbowed*, 349.

¹⁸⁷ Winston S. Churchill, "Doc 343" April 1, 1944, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 479.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ Joseph V. Stalin, 23 March 1944 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 224.

¹⁹⁰ See Franklin D. Roosevelt, 26 March 1944 in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 224.

argument, but in the early months of 1944 he certainly was no better or worse than his allies. Roosevelt and Churchill were willing to compromise their principles, at least in their correspondence, to appease Stalin. The question remains, were they speaking the truth when they made their promises or were they were they deceiving Stalin from the start? Stalin was not above deception, but he was willing to call others out if he felt he had been deceived. It was at this point Stalin put his foot down. Perhaps he felt it was his obligation to abide by the directive he had given his men in 1942: Order No. 227 – not one step back.¹⁹¹

During the same time period the Soviet position on Poland was being publicized through the press. In February the Associated Press in London produced an article from Soviet news that was published in the *New York Times* stressing that the Soviet Union desired normal relations with Poland, but it would not work with the government-in-exile.¹⁹² Journalist Joseph Levy took the argument to the next step. Writing from Ankara, Turkey, he claimed the Turkish belief was, “Russia will never agree to the reestablishment of Poland within the 1921 boundaries.”¹⁹³

Levy’s reference to 1921 related to the border created after the Polish-Soviet War that ended in 1921. As a result of that war, the Soviet Union had been forced to cede territory beyond what had been lost when the Curzon Line was established as their western frontier. These articles show there was public knowledge that Stalin wanted Polish territory after the war, but there was still hope that the other members of the Allies would fight for Poland’s autonomy and territorial

¹⁹¹ See Richard Overy, *Russia's War*, 158,160-161.

¹⁹² See The Associated Press. "Russia Seeks Treaty with Poland, but Not with Her London Regime." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Feb 07, 1944, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106752668?accountid=14612>.

¹⁹³ Joseph M. Levy, "Turk Sees Russia Reducing Poland." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Dec 26, 1943. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106663452?accountid=14612>.

protection along the same lines as the prewar boundaries.¹⁹⁴ The activity of the press, however, did not act as a catalyst among the Big Three; in fact their correspondence began to wane as the summer began.

After meeting at Tehran, the Big Three quickly realized their missives did not convey the same meaning as face-to-face conversations did, much like *The Times* had predicted in 1943.¹⁹⁵ The messages from Stalin to Roosevelt in particular seem to have slowed. For the most part, their letters discussed the movement of ships from one theater to another in order to support Operation Overlord. There was little discussion of anything other than victories and ships in the build up to D-Day. Then June 6th came, and D-Day went, and little more was said than a brief congratulations. The sad irony cannot be ignored that the most pivotal topic upon which the alliance had originally hinged received no more mention in their personal notes than the passing of a birthday. Stalin had told Molotov to reach an agreement on a second front even if it meant conceding to all other demands in 1942, but that was before Stalingrad, before the Katyn Massacre site had been found, before Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to give up Poland to achieve their goals. Poland had become the single most important point of contention. Volkogonov argued Stalin had returned to the Polish issue, even though it had been left out of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. He wrote, “The Polish question was not only one of honour [*sic*], but was also one of security.”¹⁹⁶ In Stalin’s mind the second front had become secondary. The

¹⁹⁴ Roosevelt still hoped to fulfill the promises he made to his Polish-American constituents. See Charles E. Bohlen, “Bohlen Minutes” in *Foreign Relations... Tehran*, 595.

¹⁹⁵ See “Three-power meeting at Teheran,” *The Times*, 12/04; 2015/9, 1943. <http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=&docId=CS67321220&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>, 4.

¹⁹⁶ Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*, 489.

landing at Normandy that led to the second front was a significant moment in the war and has been celebrated ever since, but the men who made it happen were forward thinkers. They had a war to win and a future world to plan.

The future became more political and imminent than theoretical. Once the troops had secured the beaches of Normandy, there was little doubt that victory would be achieved over Hitler. Roosevelt and Churchill recognized they needed to begin resolving the Polish issue as soon as practicable. Attempting to resolve the issue, Roosevelt met with Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk in June of 1944, and sent a letter to Stalin to describe his thoughts. In his letter, Roosevelt described how important Poland was in the fight against Germany and that Mikolajczyk would be willing to work with the Soviet Government.¹⁹⁷

Roosevelt's attempt to promote a positive Polish-Soviet relationship, however, was sandwiched between statements that claimed he would not intervene between the Polish Government-in-exile and the Soviet Union. At the beginning of a letter to Stalin Roosevelt stated, "His [Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk's] visit was not connected with any attempt on my part to inject...between the Polish Government-in-exile and the Soviet Government."¹⁹⁸ He concluded by stating, "I am in no way attempting to press upon you my personal views in a matter which is of special concern to you and your country."¹⁹⁹ Roosevelt's comments were not even passive-aggressive. He was being incredibly passive. If he wanted to see a strong Poland

¹⁹⁷ For more on the Polish resistance during German occupation and operations in conjunction with the Red Army see Halik Kochanski, *The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 386-97.

¹⁹⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt, 17 June 1944, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 237.

¹⁹⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, 17 June 1944, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 238.

in existence after the war he needed to take a stronger position with Stalin. A week later Stalin responded and agreed to work with Mikolajczyk, given that Mikolajczyk agreed to Stalin's idea of where the border was to fall.²⁰⁰ Stalin was determined to uphold his self-appointed name – man of steel – and the Allies would have to find out what his Achilles heel was if they wanted to weaken his position.

In the meantime, the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt was coming under greater stress. In the aftermath of Overlord, Eisenhower decided it was more important to press on through France than it was to focus efforts on the Mediterranean. Churchill wrote a dramatic plea to Roosevelt asking that he weigh in on the issue and stick to the plan they had decided upon at Tehran. He finished by penning a desperate conclusion: “It is with the greatest sorrow that I write to you in this sense...I send you every good wish...my personal gratitude to you for your kindness to me and for all you have done for the cause of freedom that will never be diminished.”²⁰¹ Roosevelt responded the same day and said plainly that he was going to support his Chiefs of Staff and allow them to reinforce France rather than moving more troops into position into the Mediterranean. He concluded by stating “I always think of my early geometry: ‘A straight line is the shortest distance between two points.’”²⁰² Considering their history, Roosevelt's decision must have seemed like a kick in the head to Churchill. After all, Churchill surely felt victorious when the D-Day landing was successfully accomplished after having prevented Roosevelt from inviting a possible massacre two years earlier.

²⁰⁰ See Joseph V. Stalin, 24 June 1944, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 239-240.

²⁰¹ Winston S. Churchill, “Doc 400” July 1, 1944, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 548.

²⁰² Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Doc 401” July 1, 1944, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 549.

Despite the frustration Churchill must have felt, he picked up his pen and conceded to his younger partner the plans for attack across Europe. There was still a bigger battle to win, he could not lose his closest ally, and over the next month events continued to unfold in favor of Stalin's position in the east. On July 20, 1944, Churchill wrote a letter to Stalin covering details about military awards, convoys, admiration for Soviet victories, and a plea that Stalin work with Mikolajczyk. In his wording Churchill was very passive. He wrote:

With respect to Poland I have avoided saying anything because I trust in you to make comradeship with the underground movement if it really strikes hard and true against the Germans. Should Mikolajczyk ask to come to see you, I hope you will consent.²⁰³

Stalin's response revealed he knew he had taken the hill, in terms of strategic positioning for postwar plans, and he did not plan to budge until he had all he desired. He started with "Events on our front are going forward at a very rapid pace. Lubin, one of Poland's major towns, was taken today by our troops, who continue their advance."²⁰⁴ Stalin went on to say the Soviet Government had no desire to set up its own government in Poland, and that he supported a democratic Polish government, but he did not believe there was any group assembled at the time capable of governing Poland. In other words, until there was a favorable government that the Soviet Union approved of Stalin would not accept an alternative.²⁰⁵ Volkogonov believed this was true of Stalin as well and wrote, "Stalin made it plain that he was more concerned about governments than

²⁰³ Winston S. Churchill, Document Number 299, 20 July 1944, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:241.

²⁰⁴ Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 301, 23 July 1944, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:241.

²⁰⁵ See Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 301, 23 July 1944, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:242.

borders.”²⁰⁶ Mikolajczyk visited Moscow, but it was to no avail. He and Stalin could not come to an understanding. As the summer of 1944 neared an end Warsaw was under attack and the Soviet Premier began to divert troops and munitions from that fight.

Stalin’s actions against Warsaw were so drastic that Roosevelt and Churchill immediately sent a letter to the Premiere requesting that he support Warsaw.²⁰⁷ Stalin composed a response that put the blame on the residents for the Warsaw Uprising. He argued, “Sooner or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking criminals who launched the Warsaw adventure will come out.”²⁰⁸ Stalin had no qualms over redirecting blame to promote his plans. In this case, Stalin went so far as to free the Germans of blame of the fight in Warsaw. He concluded by stating the Red Army itself would liberate Warsaw, which also indicated that he would not provide the Polish residents any of the requirements they had requested to continue the fight themselves. Stalin was unwilling to jeopardize his grasp over Poland. Even as he was vowing to protect the Polish people, he was unwilling to give them the ability to strike back at the Soviet Union in the future as they had during the Russian Civil War, or as they had throughout history.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, Roosevelt and Churchill had shown they were not willing to

²⁰⁶ Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*, 489.

²⁰⁷ See Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, Document Number 322, 20 August 1944, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:254.

²⁰⁸ Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 323, 22 August 1944, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:255.

²⁰⁹ For more on the Warsaw Uprising see James W. Blackwell, 2011, “The Warsaw Uprising: The View from Lublin,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 89 (2): 274-300, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.unh.edu/stable/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.89.2.0274>.

stand up for Poland when Stalin pushed back in April of 1943, why should Stalin have concerned himself with their position toward Warsaw?

The rest of the summer was conflict-free for the Big Three, but as the ground around Moscow began to harden, so did Stalin's position toward Poland. Prime Minister Mikolajczyk continued to meet with Churchill, and whether from a sense of honor, justice, or political security, Churchill continued to implore Stalin to work amicably with Mikolajczyk.²¹⁰ Stalin made it clear in early December that he was unwilling to do so, and put the blame on the Polish Prime Minister in Exile. He wrote to Churchill, "It has become obvious since my last meeting with Mr [*sic*] Mikolajczyk in Moscow that he is incapable of helping a Polish settlement. Indeed, his negative role has been revealed."²¹¹ Stalin then went on to argue that those associated with Mikolajczyk had 'treacherous designs.' Perhaps this accusation was completely unfounded, like Stalin's accusation that the Germans were responsible for the Katyn Massacre. Stalin was willing to distort the truth to any degree required to ensure his ambitions were accomplished. In this case his accusations went unchallenged, and the next message from Stalin that related to Poland discussed the formation of the Provisional National Government of the Polish Republic, which had been approved by the Soviet powers overseeing Poland during the war.²¹²

²¹⁰ After the war, Churchill still believed Mikolajczyk and Stalin could have worked together had they come to an agreement on the Polish border. See Winston S. Churchill, *Memoirs of the Second World War; an Abridgement of the Six Volumes of the Second World War*, (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1959) 891 and 911.

²¹¹ Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 367, 8 December 1944, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:282.

²¹² See Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 381, 27 December 1944, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 1:289.

Stalin's actions in Poland brought Roosevelt great consternation.²¹³ He had been attempting to appease Stalin as often as he could to ensure the international community was protected by an international organization after the war. Roosevelt believed that was the only way to ensure peace. When he found out that Stalin had recognized a government other than the one in exile, he was flabbergasted and immediately sent his concerns to Stalin and a copy of the message to Churchill. In the letter Roosevelt argued there had been an agreement to make sure the Polish people decided their own fate, and that only part of Poland had been freed from Hitler's grasp. Thus, any decision made by those who were free was not representative of the whole of Poland. He finished his letter by urging Stalin not to delay meeting in person.²¹⁴ At Tehran Roosevelt believed he had persuaded Stalin to work equitably, but Stalin's recognition of a Polish Government other than the one in exile proved he was pursuing his own interests and Roosevelt's efforts, to a degree, had been futile.

Since the conclusion of Yalta, in February of 1944, those who documented contemporary events and the historians who followed have argued that Yalta was the place and time that the West abandoned Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe, and that from that point Cold War problems began to emerge. The redrawing of Polish boundaries and the existence of a joint agreement between outside nations on who would make up the Polish Government in the aftermath of Yalta came as a great surprise to the Polish-Americans who had just reelected Roosevelt to his fourth term in office. Their concerns were presented in an article in the *New*

²¹³ In a letter to Editor Morgan Hoyt of the *Beacon* Roosevelt mentioned his attitude toward dealing with Stalin. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*. Edited by Elliott Roosevelt. Vol. 2 (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950) 1572.

²¹⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Doc 494" December 30, 1944, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 640-641.

York Times. According to the *New York Times*, “John A. Giminski, president of the Pulaski Republican League of New York State, said...[Roosevelt] ‘with his usual artful dodging’ had failed to ‘satisfy any of the demands’ made to him by a group of Polish Americans.”²¹⁵ The public was unaware that the decision to divide Poland had been conceded at Tehran.

At that time, however, Roosevelt was concerned with the election. By the time the press announced what had transpired at Yalta, Roosevelt’s health was declining, and he surely had no intentions on running for a fifth term in 1948. Therefore, Roosevelt was less concerned with public opinion and allowed a more thorough release than he had after Tehran. There was also backlash in the United Kingdom. An article published in *The Times* of London two weeks after the conclusion of Yalta recognized not only American frustrations, but also those of several Roman Catholics over the agreement in regards to Poland, placing blame on Churchill and Roosevelt. According to the *Times*:

The Roman Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of Scotland [had] issued a statement condemning the Yalta decisions on Poland which they describe[d] as a ‘blow between the eyes’ to the people of an empire which voluntarily went to war to honour [*sic*] its pledge to defend Poland against aggression.²¹⁶

The misconceptions in the aftermath of Yalta have led historians to believe Yalta was pivotal in deciding the fate of millions of East Europeans. Historians such as Serhii Plokhyy have argued, “Every major geopolitical sticking point...and the legitimacy of territorial acquisitions –

²¹⁵ "Says Roosevelt Dodges." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Oct 13, 1944, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106765747?accountid=14612> (accessed December 4, 2015).

²¹⁶ "Yalta Decisions On Poland." *Times* [London, England] 27 Feb. 1945: 2. The Times Digital Archive, Web. 25 June 2015, <http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&docId=CS34685019&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0, 2>.

came together in the debate on Poland.”²¹⁷ However, in the same year Plokhy’s book was published, 2010, historian Fraser J. Harbutt published a book that more accurately countered traditional opinions. Harbutt argued that the accepted historiography of the World War II alliance and how it led to the Cold War was based on inaccurate assumptions that Roosevelt and Churchill pitted the East against the West, and Yalta was when the Allies divided Europe and created the problems that led to the Cold War.²¹⁸ Harbutt’s position was that Roosevelt’s actions at Yalta led rather to the emergence of American hegemony over Europe and gave Stalin permission to dominate East Europe and most of Asia.²¹⁹ Once the most critical moments have been addressed, it is clear Harbutt’s argument more closely followed the path of truth. However, one point Harbutt did not linger on was that Roosevelt sidestepped Churchill completely when it came to planning for postwar Asia.²²⁰

During the first day of the conference Roosevelt decided to meet with Stalin alone. Perhaps, he was still attempting to assuage Stalin during the war to make postwar relations friendlier, reinforcing his idea of the Four Horsemen, and promoting the United Nations as the protector of an unending international peace. Whatever his goal was, he was going to pursue it whole-heartedly even if that meant threatening the ailing relationship he had with Churchill. Bohlen recorded the private message between Roosevelt and Stalin:

²¹⁷ Serhii Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace*, (New York: Viking, 2010) p. 152.

²¹⁸ See Fraser J. Harbutt, *Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), XIII-XXII.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 398-400.

²²⁰ See Fraser J. Harbutt, *Yalta 1945*, 398-400.

The President said he would like to tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill, namely that the British for two years have had the idea of artificially building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British army. He said the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake and eat it too.²²¹

The President then went on to discuss the partition of Germany, an opinion that fell in line with what Stalin and Churchill desired, but admitted he had hoped the U.S. could have occupied the Northwest. According to the record, Stalin made no comment about the British plans. Roosevelt and Stalin met again on February 8, without Churchill, for a meeting that focused on the Far East. In this meeting they discussed a joint trusteeship of Korea, which would also include China, and Roosevelt believed the British should not have a part in the stewardship. Stalin was willing to accept the plan, but both agreed the British would be upset to have no part in running Korea.²²²

Why was Roosevelt willing to cut Churchill out of the East and inform Stalin of their intent to use the French as a buffer between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union until British forces had returned to full strength? There were three reasons. First, Roosevelt wanted to make sure the Red Army would pick up the fight in and around the Pacific as soon as possible after Germany surrendered. Second, the U.S. Government had been concerned about British intentions from the beginning of their involvement in the war.²²³ Finally, Roosevelt desired to prevent any hegemony, especially British hegemony, of international power that could lead to

²²¹ Charles E. Bohlen, "Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, February 4, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace" in *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: Conferences At Yalta and Malta, 1945*, Department of State, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 572.

²²² Charles E. Bohlen, "Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, February 8, 1945, 3:30 P.M., Livadia Palace" in *Foreign Relations... Yalta*, 766-771.

²²³ See Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 71-72.

another war. The British Government had traditionally dominated the international scene and His Majesty's Government had done little to prevent the Second World War, some even argued they allowed it to happen. Therefore, Roosevelt took it upon himself to work with the Soviet Union, which prior to Roosevelt's presidency had not even been officially recognized by the U.S., to protect the future.

While the Yalta Conference produced a successful agreement between Stalin and Roosevelt for the Red Army to fight Japan after victory in Europe, it revealed the growing disparity between British and American postwar plans in Europe. During the conference Roosevelt met with Churchill the same number of times he met with Stalin; however, the meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill were not recorded, according to Bohlen. Great speculations could be made from the lack of notes during these meetings, but conjecture about this situation is not research. Rather, it is important to recognize that Churchill would not have felt slighted during Yalta by the meetings between Roosevelt and Stalin, because he was meeting with the President as well and had no idea, supposedly, of what Roosevelt and Stalin had discussed. Whatever Roosevelt and Churchill discussed was not to be shared with anyone outside of the meeting. There was an increasing disparity emerging between what Roosevelt and Churchill felt was important after the war.²²⁴ Churchill focused on Europe and the Mediterranean, the remnants of the British Empire and the areas closest to the British Isles. Roosevelt, on the other hand, was increasingly concerned with how Asia was going to fit into the new international society he was planning.

²²⁴ See Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 2000) p. 167-169 and 211.

Roosevelt must have left Yalta with a sense of accomplishment over his interaction with Stalin. The agreements they had reached encouraged Roosevelt to feel he and Stalin were more than comrades-in-arms. Unfortunately, Roosevelt's confidence continually gave Stalin the advantage in their discussions. It would soon become clear that Stalin was not as much of a straightforward negotiator as he had imagined. The Big Three knew that they were close to victory, fewer than three months in fact, and over the next month the letters shared between Roosevelt and Stalin were very cordial. This certainly reinforced Roosevelt's false sense of comradeship with Stalin. Roosevelt even congratulated Stalin on the "twenty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the Red Army."²²⁵ He concluded the letter by commenting on his expectations for a "world based upon mutual understanding and cooperation."²²⁶ Then reality set in. A month later it must have hit hard when Roosevelt received Stalin's response to a request that American planes be permitted into Soviet air space to help with the search for and return of American prisoners of war and soldiers who had been separated from the army. Specifically, they hoped to look for Americans in Polish hospitals. Stalin wrote:

With regard to your information about allegedly large numbers of sick and injured Americans in Poland or waiting evacuation to Odessa, or who have not contacted the Soviet authorities, I must say that the information is inaccurate. Actually, apart from a certain number who are on their way to Odessa, there were only 17 U.S. servicemen on Polish soil as of March 16. I have today received a report which says that the 17 men will be flown to Odessa in a few days.²²⁷

²²⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Document Number 274, 23 February 1945, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 2:193.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 279, 22 March 1945, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 2:196. For more on American POWs in territories occupied by the Red Army see Timothy K. Nenninger, 2002. "United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities," *The Journal of Military History* 66 (3): 761-81, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.unh.edu/stable/3093358>.

When Roosevelt read Stalin's reply it must have made his heart sink. After all he had done to conceal the Katyn Massacre, Roosevelt was receiving the same message from Stalin about his own men. This topic shows that as the Red Army continued to make its way to Berlin, and Stalin had the Polish issue in writing, along with a planned partition of Germany and a generous sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe, he became more difficult to work with. He displayed little regard for Roosevelt's concerns. Roosevelt then received more devastating news. The State Department had been informed that Molotov would not be attending the Conference on the United Nations; instead the Soviet Union was planning to send another representative. Roosevelt was concerned "Mr [*sic*] Molotov's absence will be construed all over the world as a lack of comparable interest in the great objectives of this Conference on the part of the Soviet Government."²²⁸ Less than two months after Roosevelt confided in Stalin his aspirations for the world after the war free of any form of hegemony, Stalin had denied Roosevelt's request for support finding missing and injured Americans, and had started to undermine international cooperation before it began. The alliance that was formed out of necessity and sustained through dependency had regressed in practice, not just in morality.

The elation experienced at Yalta continued to wear off, and sober reality set in. Churchill and Roosevelt both came to realize that cultivating a relationship with Stalin had come at a great cost, and they were not likely to regain their losses. On the March 27, 1945, Churchill wrote two letters to Roosevelt. In these letters Churchill acknowledged Stalin had quickly become difficult to work with considering how agreeable he had been at Yalta. The primary concern of Churchill's letters was Poland. He wrote of Stalin, "He persists in his view that the Yalta

²²⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Document Number 280, 25 March 1945, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 2:197.

communiqué merely meant the addition of a few other Poles to the existing administration of Russian puppets and that these puppets should be consulted first.”²²⁹ The harsh reality that these two politicians, perhaps two of the best politicians in the world, had been duped, by the leader of a backward society of agricultural communists, must have been extremely painful. Roosevelt believed that he could woo Stalin by opening up to him and agreeing with his many requests. Churchill was less willing to cater to Stalin’s personality, but he still believed he could trust Stalin to honor their agreements as Churchill saw them. The greatest problem the Big Three faced in their relationship was contradictory goals. They shared the same strategic goal of defeating Hitler. However, each individual had divergent postwar plans. None of their postwar plans would bear the fruit the leaders of the alliance had envisioned.

Churchill admitted in his letters that if he could not save Poland he would have to inform the House of Commons. He wrote, “There I advised critics of the Yalta settlement to trust Stalin. If I have to make a statement of facts to the House, the whole world will draw the deduction that such advice was wrong.”²³⁰ Churchill also agreed that it appeared as though Stalin was undermining the creation of the United Nations by not intending to send Molotov to San Francisco, as Roosevelt had stated earlier. The content of Churchill’s follow-up letter read like a carbon copy of his first of the day. He and Roosevelt were extremely concerned with Stalin’s actions. The end of the war was near, and the future of the world depended on how successful they were negotiating with Stalin.

As March concluded, Roosevelt had two weeks left to live. Certainly his heart was heavy as his health was failing. The American president had brought the United States through the

²²⁹ Winston S. Churchill, “Doc 528” March 27, 1945, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 684.

²³⁰ Winston S. Churchill, “Doc 528” March 27, 1945, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 685.

Great Depression and led troops to German soil as World War II neared the end. However, it was unmistakable that he had misjudged Stalin. A heated exchange then began between Stalin and Roosevelt that had to do with whether or not Anglo-American forces had been accepting the surrender of German Armies without Soviet representation. On April 1, 1945, Roosevelt stated, "...It seems to me that, although both of us are in agreement on all the basic principles, the matter now stands in an atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust."²³¹ Stalin then opened his response by stating, "You are quite right in saying...that 'the matter now stands in an atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust.'"²³² Over the next nine days the two 'allies' wrote back and forth discussing their positions in regards to Poland and the ways in which each felt he had been deceived by the other. Their relationship that had been forged in necessity, sustained by dependency, and cemented through complicity at Katyn had certainly been falling apart and was nearly undone by the middle of April. Two days before he died, Roosevelt sent what would be his final message to Stalin; ironically Stalin received it the day Roosevelt passed away. It stated:

Thank you for your frank explanation of the Soviet point of view of the Bern incident which now appears to have faded into the past without having accomplished any useful purpose. There must not, in any event, be mutual mistrust and minor misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the future. I feel sure that when our armies make contact in Germany and join in a fully coordinated offensive the Nazi Armies will disintegrate.²³³

²³¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Document Number 285, 1 April 1945, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 2:204.

²³² Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 286, 3 April 1945, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 2:205-206.

²³³ Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 April 1945, in *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 321.

The same day Roosevelt penned a letter to Churchill. He was responding to a question Churchill had on how to deal with the House of Commons when he addressed them on the Soviet-Polish issue. Roosevelt's response to Churchill did not match his letters to Stalin. It was confident and optimistic. Perhaps Roosevelt, in a moment of hope and levity, believed he could still entice Stalin to work cordially with Poland and work jointly on an international organization at the conclusion of the war. His last letter to Churchill read as follows:

I would minimize the general soviet [*sic*] problem as much as possible because the problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten out as in the case of the Bern meeting. We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct.²³⁴

Roosevelt's death was a blow to the United States, the world, and the Grand Alliance. The *New York Times* published an article that that declared, "A great and gallant wartime leader has died almost in the very hour of the victory to which he led the way...It is a hard and stunning blow to lose the genius and inspiration of his leadership in this decisive moment of the war."²³⁵ The correspondence among the Big Three and their actions indicated that the alliance was quickly falling apart. Perhaps Roosevelt had a plan to revive it, or maybe he assumed the meeting in San Francisco that would be the birthplace of the United Nations this could convince Stalin to work cordially with the West. Whatever his plans were, they would go unfulfilled. The first man in line to fill in for Roosevelt was Vice President, and former Senator, Harry S Truman, who, like Churchill, had been very open prior to the war about his anticommunist sentiment. It was also sad that less than a month would pass before victory in Europe was achieved, and Roosevelt was unable to see the partial fruit of his work. During that time Truman took over and

²³⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Doc 548" April 11, 1945, in *Roosevelt and Churchill*, 709.

²³⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt. (1945, Apr 13). *New York Times (1923-Current File)* Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/107245795?accountid=14612>, 16.

continued the work that needed to be done. The correspondence that took place primarily between Truman and Stalin between the time Truman took over for Roosevelt and Potsdam was cordial and focused on the partitioning of Germany, the link-up of troops, and the fate of Poland. Interestingly, there was next to no contention within their letters. However, Volkogonov argued Stalin did not trust Truman, but hid his concerns at the time.²³⁶

Before his death Roosevelt had feared an “atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust” was developing between the West and the Soviet Union.”²³⁷ His words accurately summed up the relationship between East and West for the next forty-six years. Between Roosevelt’s death and the end of the war in Europe, Churchill sent a message to Stalin requesting that he work to overcome their differences because they were, in Churchill’s opinion, more significant than Stalin made them out to be. In fact, part of Churchill’s letter read like a precursor to his famous ‘Iron Curtain’ speech of 1946. He wrote to Stalin:

There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist parties in many other States, [*sic*] are all drawn up on one side, and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and the Associates [*sic*] or Dominions [*sic*] are on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history...But do not, I beg you, my friend Stalin, underrate the divergencies [*sic*] which are opening about matters which you may think are small to us but which are symbolic of the way the English-speaking democracies look at life.²³⁸

²³⁶ For more on Stalin and Truman see Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*, 497-501.

²³⁷ See again Franklin D. Roosevelt, Document Number 285, 1 April 1945, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 2:204.

²³⁸ Winston S. Churchill, Document Number 450, 28 April 1945, in *Stalin's Correspondence*, 2:343-344.

Churchill recognized the deterioration of the Grand Alliance was taking place before victory and attempted to stop it. A week later, On May 8, 1945, after many letters discussing which day was most appropriate to make a public announcement, the Allies officially declared victory in Europe. Truman stepped into the office just before victory in Europe, but he still had a long battle ahead. Most important, he had to figure out how to work with the men Roosevelt had spent years corresponding with and meeting in person. Six days after V-E Day, Eleanor Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt's widow, addressed a letter to Truman. She offered words of wisdom her husband had shared with her in regards to dealing with Churchill and Stalin. She wrote:

Your experience with Mr. Churchill is not at all surprising. He is suspicious of the Russians and they know it...Of course, we will have to be patient, and any lasting peace will have the Three Great Powers behind it. I think, however, if you can get on a personal basis with Mr. Churchill, you will find it easier. If you talk to him about books and let him quote to you from his marvelous memory...you find him easier to deal with on political subjects. He is a gentleman to whom the personal element means a great deal. Mr. Churchill does not have the same kind of sense of humor that the Russians have. In some ways the Russians are more like us. They enjoy a practical joke, rough-play and they will joke about things which Mr. Churchill thinks are sacred. He takes them dead seriously and argues with them when what he ought to do is to laugh. That was where Franklin usually won out because if you know where to laugh and when to look upon things as too absurd to take seriously, the other person is ashamed to carry through even if he was serious about it.²³⁹

Eleanor and Franklin may not have had an ideal marriage, but it is obvious that he confided in her and shared his understanding of how best to deal with such opposing personalities. Her words to Truman also revealed how Roosevelt was able to work better with

²³⁹ Eleanor Roosevelt, Private Letter to Harry S. Truman, May 14, 1945, [Electronic Record]; Series: Personal Files, 1945-1953, Collection: President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration), 1945-1960, National Archives Identifier: 4708669; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO [retrieved from the Access to Archival Databases at www.archives.gov, May 15, 2015], 1-3.

Churchill and Stalin each on an individual basis than Stalin and Churchill were able to work together. Roosevelt believed he knew how to placate each man when they did not see eye to eye to achieve his objectives. However, their correspondence showed Roosevelt and Stalin had stopped trusting each other. Perhaps, had he not passed away, he could have developed a better relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after the war after all. Believing that Roosevelt could have cemented a better relationship with the Soviet Union, however, is a far stretch. Most likely, once Stalin had achieved his primary goals he would have continued to antagonize the West regardless of who the President was.

Roosevelt's passing was a tremendous loss, but the Allies had to continue planning for victory. The next meeting of the heads of the three primary powers that had united to defeat Germany and Japan was scheduled for July. A month later the two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan and on September 2, 1945 – six years and one day after Hitler invaded Poland – the Japanese officially surrendered, and the war was over. Potsdam, like Yalta, has been used as an example of failed diplomacy between East and West that led to the Cold War. Historian Michael Neiberg argued otherwise. He saw those events as successes and blamed the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union on the use of the atom bomb and Stalin's belief the U.S. intended to use that bomb against the Soviet Union.²⁴⁰ Whether Potsdam was a success or a failure, the damage had been done before the war was over.

When Stalin and Churchill met with Truman at Potsdam they were already one member short of the original alliance. On the twenty-sixth of July 1945, Churchill's Conservative Party was defeated, and Clement Attlee took over as Prime Minister. At that point Stalin was the only

²⁴⁰ For more on Potsdam see Michael Neiberg, *Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 255-256.

original member of the Grand Alliance left. Lines had already been drawn for reshaping international boundaries, and the Big Three had already decided Germany was to be occupied. The biggest decision made by the three leaders at Yalta was that Japan surrender unconditionally, and this they all agreed to. Neiberg argued that the atom bomb created suspicion between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. but Roosevelt and Stalin knew that fear and mistrust had already started forming between the two in March. It may have been that the atomic bomb ensured no hot war took place between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R, throughout the period now known as the Cold War because of the mutually assured destruction doctrine. Regardless, the Grand Alliance had accomplished its primary objective; the war was over. The last question to address is, was it worth the cost?

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

In 2014, I was on a flight out of Kiev. I am a navigator by profession, and during the flight, weather conditions dictated that we cut our flight short and head back to Boryspil (the international airport in Kiev). As we came within fifty miles of the airfield, it became clear that the storm had grown and we would need to take immediate action to land somewhere else. Our primary alternative was located in L'viv, a city in western Ukraine. During our descent, the architectural beauty of the city amazed me. Having spent a great deal of time flying at low altitudes over Russia and Ukraine I often noted how dreary the cities looked as a result of Soviet city planning. In particular, the high rises meant to house thousands of proletarians have fallen into disarray and take away from the natural beauty of the land. When we had landed in L'viv the people who met us to help with refueling the plane and filing for a return to Kiev were friendly and excited to see the unexpected group of Americans. I mentioned to a friend, "This city looks more European than ex-Soviet." At that time I was unaware that the city I was standing in was part of the debate that had taken place between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill during the Second World War.

At Yalta, L'viv was discussed several times. It was referred to at the time in its Russian form L'vov. At Yalta Roosevelt recommended placing L'vov on the Polish side of the new border being decided. He stated, "I raised the question of giving them [Poland] Lvov [*sic*] at Tehran. It has now been suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov [*sic*] might be given them."²⁴¹ There were obvious economic reasons that drove the allies to push for the

²⁴¹ H. Freeman Matthews. "Third Plenary Meeting, February 4, 1945, 4 P.M., Livadia Palace" in *Foreign Relations...Yalta*, 677.

positioning of L'viv to the east or the west. In fact, L'viv was an incredibly important topic to the three leaders.²⁴² In the end, L'viv was given to the Soviet Union.

L'viv was not particularly more important than any of the other cities discussed during the partitioning of lands, but it was a clear example of how important the partitioning was to the people who would have their nationality changed in the name of peace despite their cultural realities. Appendixes A-E show why L'viv appears today drastically different from prominent cities in the former U.S.S.R.²⁴³ In 1900 L'viv was part of the Austria-Hungary Empire.²⁴⁴ The creation of Independent Poland placed L'viv in Polish territory from 1918-1940, until the Red Army occupied much of Poland.²⁴⁵ The ethnicity of those in the repartitioned areas was not changed when the lines were redrawn.²⁴⁶ In many cases, when groups of people with long histories of conflict were placed within the same boundary, this caused serious problems that led to numerous wars, battles, and even genocides. Did Roosevelt and Churchill make too many concessions for the sake of peace or were they appeasing Stalin the same way Chamberlain had appeased Hitler in 1938 only to create a Cold War that would last seven times longer than World

²⁴² To see more on L'viv see L'viv and Lwów in *Foreign Relations...Yalta*, 208-209, 211, 230, 233, 510-511, 677-678, and 680.

²⁴³ Appendixes A-E from Richard Crampton, and Ben Crampton, *Atlas of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 98, 104, 147-149.

²⁴⁴ See Appendix A, Richard Crampton, and Ben Crampton, "Eastern Europe in 1900" in *Atlas*, 147.

²⁴⁵ See Appendix B and C, Richard Crampton, and Ben Crampton, "The Composition of Independent Poland, 1918-1921" and "Eastern Europe, 1923" in *Atlas*, 98 and 148.

²⁴⁶ See Appendix D, Richard Crampton, and Ben Crampton, "Interwar Poland: Ethnic Composition" in *Atlas*, 104

War II? Deciding who was responsible for poor decisions made before and during World War II is difficult.

There were several missed attempts to prevent war in 1938. As World War II approached Roosevelt had offered to help mediate between Hitler and Chamberlain but was denied the opportunity. Churchill warned against working with Hitler but was unable to persuade his predecessor. Finally, Stalin had attempted to form an alliance with France and Britain, but due to arrogance and hostility toward the ideology of the young Soviet Union, he too was denied the opportunity to confront Hitler before the Second World War. Thus the war began.

The fog of war descended upon Europe, and the British Empire as well as the Soviet Union found themselves in desperate positions. Churchill was elected Prime Minister of a nation under siege, and he feared without immediate help the Nazis would bring the British way of life to an end. Stalin, on the other hand, was far too crafty to sit by idly while Hitler overran Europe. By negotiating a pact with Hitler he was able to create a physical buffer between Moscow and the Germans that likely saved Moscow by a mere fifty miles after they were attacked. Had he not aligned with Hitler in 1939 the Soviet Union would most likely not have been able to withstand the assault that occurred in 1941. However, this victory was short lived, and in 1941 all of Europe, from west to east, was engaged in the war. Many variables have been mentioned throughout this paper that historians have argued might have changed the course of the war. If Chamberlain had denied Hitler the Sudetenland, the war may not have occurred: or if Hitler had not attacked the USSR and focused his efforts on Great Britain, he may have forced Churchill to surrender. By the time the Japanese attacked the United States, however, the leaders of the three most powerful non-Axis powers in the world had a common enemy and therefore a reason to join forces.

The problems facing the Big Three were colossal. The people of the United States had been drawn into the war when they were attacked, but an ocean on each side of the country was a physical representation of how far removed the U.S. was from the Soviet Union ideologically and from Great Britain tactically speaking. Despite these problems Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin came together out of necessity and formed an alliance to stop the German forces. Stalin proved the exigency of the alliance when he told Molotov to yield all prerequisites for the Anglo-Soviet Alliance in order to gain a promise on the second front he so badly needed. In the midst of Soviet desperation, Churchill and Roosevelt sidelined the second front for as long as they could, as long as the Soviet Union was able to remain in the war, in order to pursue their own plans and the safety of their own people. This provided the Anglo-American leaders the opportunity to choose their battles based on the probability of success, while the Red Army was forced to face the brunt of Hitler's force on their own wherever the Germans attacked in order to survive. Stalin, known for his vendettas against opponents as well as those that threatened his position, did not forget how long his allies delayed their promises. From that point on he held Churchill and Roosevelt accountable for every word they spoke.

Roosevelt and Churchill made the right decision waiting for the appropriate time to open the second front. They were responsible first to their respective nations and their troops and then to the Grand Alliance. A failed landing in France would have been a serious loss of life and a morale setback for the allies and conversely a huge victory for the Axis. War called for hard decisions and there were certainly few opportunities where any of the leaders made a decision and were able to feel there were no negative consequences to their decisions. In the second front scenario Churchill and Roosevelt had to live with an irritated and increasingly suspicious Stalin. In the winter of 1942 and spring of 1943 the Allies began to see their first real victories and must

have considered the alliance a great success. However, at the same time they were all compliant in covering up a massacre.

In the spring of 1943, the Big Three added postwar planning to the difficult task of war fighting. As the Soviet Union began repelling the German forces Roosevelt and Churchill were forced with a difficult ethical and political dilemma. Victory at Stalingrad had been turning point for the Red Army. After this victory, Stalin was able to recognize his forces would recover and he was not as reliant upon the West as he had been while survival was far from assured. However, the decision to cover up the massacre at Katyn represented the dramatic shift that had taken place as a result of victory at Stalingrad. Revelation of the Katyn Massacre would have created a public outcry that could have forced Roosevelt and Churchill to put their relationship with Stalin in jeopardy. The decision was made by Roosevelt and Churchill to cast their lot with Stalin. They decided victory over Hitler and a chance to work amicably with the Soviet Union after the war were more important than providing justice for those killed in Katyn as well as their families. The West's complicity in covering up Katyn did give Stalin the ability to push his allies further than he had been able to prior to Katyn. He was far more confident and therefore willing to put pressure on his partners than he had been in 1942 when they were negotiating.

In doing so, Roosevelt and Churchill must have weighed their responsibilities to the soldiers, whose lives were in their care, to the men and women of their respective nations who they represented, and to the Polish people and émigrés who had lost loved ones and fellow countrymen in the massacre against victory and Stalin's necessary support for future peace. However, it is possible that these issues did not cross their minds. Churchill had lost thousands of soldiers at Dunkirk and Roosevelt had been willing to lose hundreds of thousands in order to

open a second front in 1942. The thousands of lives that had already been lost in the Katyn Forest may not have weighed heavily on the minds of Roosevelt and Churchill at all.

By the time the Big Three met at Tehran, Roosevelt, concerned with forming an international organization dedicated to ensuring peace, began to sideline Churchill and work more directly with Stalin. Roosevelt recognized that the Soviet Union would have a significant sphere of influence after the war and he wanted to gain Stalin's trust for the postwar world. At the same time Roosevelt wanted to block British Imperialism, which he believed had done little to prevent war in the past. This decision was Roosevelt's greatest tactical mistake. Roosevelt believed he could outwit Stalin by appeasing him during the war and assuming his goodwill would be repaid after the war. When the war was over and the final battle scene played out the iron curtain had already begun to descend.

Could there have been a different outcome after the war? When Roosevelt and Churchill used a second front and Poland as figurative carrots to keep Stalin in the war, they were unaware of the ramifications their promises would have. Their actions were not empty gestures, since they did plan on a second front and to give the Soviet Union some of the spoils of war, but they were simultaneously taking advantage of the desperate position the Soviet Union was facing. This had serious ramifications. They certainly were unaware that Stalin would hold them accountable and take advantage of his superior position at the end of the war when the Red Army had control of all the territory from the Soviet Union to Berlin.

The greatest error the West made dealing with the East was concealing the Katyn Massacre. By allowing the Soviet Union to get away with such an atrocious act against humanity, the West lost the moral high ground on any future acts of barbarism, and they gave Stalin the confidence he needed to continue his quest for Polish territory after the war. However,

had the allies taken the moral high ground and pressed Stalin to allow an investigation into the massacre, he certainly would have been even more difficult to work with during the war. In the end, however, it would not have mattered if relations were tense during the war since relations deteriorated after the war anyway and the Soviet Union played a very small role in pacifying Japan after victory in Europe had been achieved.

The end result, however, was victory. Was that enough to justify all the mistakes? There are no simple decisions in war. People will lose their lives and those in the unfortunate position of making tactical and operational decisions have to base their decisions on what they think will achieve the maximum objective with minimum cost with the knowledge they have at the time. Roosevelt and Churchill saw no way to win the war without Stalin, and they were certainly correct in their belief. Prior to his death in 1953, Stalin claimed political authority over much more than the parts of Poland he gained through negotiations with the President and the Prime Minister. In that sense the two were justified in giving him part of Poland because they did attain victory and Stalin still achieved his objective of increasing his territorial domain. Perhaps on a more theoretical level their relationship with Stalin led to a Cold War rather than a hot war, and in that way a form of peace, as hostile and apprehensive as it may have been, was obtained for the rest of the twentieth century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

- American Delegations to International Conferences, Congresses and Expositions and American Representation on International Institutions and Commissions, with Relevant Data: Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1941*. Publication 1718, Conference Series 51. Washington: G.P.O., 1942. 64-66.
- Barnes, Joseph, and Moore, Harriet. 1941. "America and the Soviet Union." *Far Eastern Survey* 10 (15) (Aug. 11): 172-8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3023187>.
- Brendan Bracken, in *Conferences, North Africa and Teheran* (Press Arrangements). HC Deb 08 December 1943 Vol 395 cc983-4W Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Millbank Systems: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>
- Bess, Demaree. "Stalin Over Europe." *Saturday Evening Post* 212, no. 16 (October 14, 1939): 5-50. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2015).
- Brooks, Jeffrey, and Chernyavskiy, Georgiy. *Lenin and the Making of the Soviet State: A Brief History with Documents*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2007.
- Bryant, Arthur. "Our Note Book." *Illustrated London News*, July 12, 1941 Issue 53334:37. <http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/iln/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ILN&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&docId=HN3100326939 &type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>. Accessed March 2015
- Bryant, Stewart F. 1941. "Conflict? – Aspects of an American-Japanese War." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 215 (America and Japan) (May): 1715, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1022616>.
- Butler, Susan, ed. *My Dear Mr. Stalin the Complete Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
- Chamberlain, Neville. Prime Minister's Statement. HC Deb 28 September 1938 Vol. 339 cc5 28 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Millbank Systems: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>
- Churchill, Winston S. *Memoirs of the Second World War; an Abridgement of the Six Volumes of the Second World War*. Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.
- Churchill, Winston, S. "The New War." *Vital Speeches Of The Day* 7, no. 18 (July 1941): 551. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2015).

- Cienciala, Anna M., Lebedeva, Natalia S., and Materski, Wojciech, eds. *Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment*. Translated by Marian Schwartz. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
- "Congress Tackles Neutrality." *Congressional Digest* 18, no. 10 (October 1939): 225-227. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2015)
- Cooper, Duff. Personal Explanation. HC Deb 03 October 1938 vol 339 cc29-40. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Millbank Systems: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>
- Degras, Jane. *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: Conferences At Cairo And Tehran, 1943*. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*. Washington: United States Printing Office, 1968.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at at Washington and Quebec, 1943*. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1955.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: Conferences At Yalta and Malta, 1945*. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference, 1945)*. Vol. 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference, 1945)*. Vol. 2. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960.
- Driberg, Tom. Conferences, North Africa and Teheran (Press Arrangements). HC Deb 08 December 1943 Vol. 395 cc983-4W Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Millbank Systems: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>
- Frierson, Cathy A. *Silence Was Salvation: Child Survivors of Stalin's Terror and World War II in the Soviet Union*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015.
- Harriman, W. Averell, and Abel, Elie. *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin: 1941-1946*. New York: Random House, 1975.

Lend-lease Bill Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-seventh Congress, First Session, on H.R. 1776. Washington: U.S. Government Print Office, 1941

Levy, Joseph, M. "Turk Sees Russia Reducing Poland." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Dec 26, 1943.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/106663452?accountid=14612>.

Loewenheim, Francis L., Langley, Harold D., and Jonas, Manfred. *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence.* New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975.

Magistretti, William. 1941. "Japan's new order in the pacific." *Pacific Affairs* 14 (2) (Jun.): 198-206, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2751711>.

Matloff, Maurice. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944.* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1959.

Mayer, Milton S. "I Think I'll Sit this One Out." *Saturday Evening Post* 212, no. 15 (October 7, 1939): 23-100. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2015).

McCormick, Anne, O. 1942. Mr. "Molotoff Came to Plead for a Second Front." *New York Times (1923-Current file)*, Jun 13, 1942.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/106404102?accountid=14612> (accessed June 16, 2015).

Mr. Chamberlain's Statement on British Foreign Policy. 1938. *Bulletin of International News* 15 (7) (Apr. 2): 13-6, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642237>.

"Mr. Roosevelt's Message to Congress." 1939. *Bulletin of International News* 16 (1) (Jan. 14): 214, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642403>.

Nover, Barnet. 1942. "Toward A new world." *The Washington Post (1923-1954)*, Jun 12, 1942.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/151592907?accountid=14612> (accessed November 16, 2015).

Our Diplomatic Correspondent. 1942. Anglo-Russian Treaty Widely Welcomed. *The Times*, 06/13; 2015/11, 1942.
<http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=&docId=CS68631245&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>

Our Diplomatic Correspondent. 1943. "Three-power Meeting at Teheran." *The Times*, 12/04; 2015/9, 1943.

<http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TD A&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=&docId=CS67321220&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>.

Our Special Correspondent. 1942. "Eager Crowds in Moscow." *The Times*, 06/13; 2015/11, 1942.

<http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TT DA&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=&docId=CS68238029&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>

Parker, Ralph. Wireless to The New York Times. 1942, "Pact Is Welcomed by Russian People." *New York Times (1923-Current file)*, Jun 12, 1942, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106407027?account=14612>, (accessed June 12, 2015), 2.

"President Renews Pledges To Poland." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Sep 01, 1943, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106509429?accountid=14612> (accessed August 6, 2015).

Roosevelt, Eleanor. Private Letter to Harry S. Truman. May 14, 1945. [Electronic Record]; Series: Personal Files, 1945-1953, Collection: President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration), 1945-1960. National Archives Identifier: 4708669; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO [retrieved from the Access to Archival Databases at www.archives.gov, May 15, 2015].

Roosevelt, Franklin D., Churchill, Winston S. "The Atlantic Charter," August 14, 1941.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*. Edited by Elliott Roosevelt. Vol. 2. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950.

Roosevelt, Franklin D., "Letter of Transmittal," *Second Report Under the Act of March 11, 1941 (Lend-Lease Act)*, September 11, 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt. (1945, Apr 13). *New York Times (1923-Current File)* Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/107245795?accountid=14612>

Roosevelt, Franklin, D. "President Roosevelt's Messages to European Statesmen." 1938. *Bulletin of International News* 15 (20) (Oct. 8): 24-8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642343>.

Roosevelt, Franklin, D. "President Roosevelt's Radio Address: September 3, 1939." 1939. *World Affairs* 102 (3) (September): 147-8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20663300>

Rzhsheshevsky, Oleg A. *War and Diplomacy: The Making of the Grand Alliance, Documents from Stalin's Archives*. Translated by T. Sorokina. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996.

- "Says Roosevelt Dodges." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Oct 13, 1944, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106765747?accountid=14612> (accessed December 4, 2015).
- Smart, Gen. Jacob E. "The Casablanca Conference, January 1943." *Air Power History* 46, no. 3 (Fall99 1999): 36. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed July 17, 2015)
- "'Square Deal' Held Needed for Poland." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Nov 22, 1943, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/106599547?accountid=14612> (accessed August 6, 2015).
- Stalin, Joseph, V. "M. Stalin's Broadcast, July 3. 1941". *Bulletin of International News* 18 (14) (Jul. 12): 888-90, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25643061>.
- Stalin, Joseph, V. *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940*, translated by Tatyana Sokokina and Edited by E. N. Kulkov and O.A. Rzheshesky. London: Frank Cass, 2002.
- Stalin, Joseph V. *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman: 1941-1945*. Translated by Foreign Languages Publishing House and Moscow. 2 vols. New York: E.P. Dutton An Co., Inc., 1958.
- "The Prime Minister's Speech at Birmingham." 1939. *Bulletin of International News* 16 (6) (Mar. 25): 13-7, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642437>.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. 1939. "After Munich: The world outlook." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 18 (1) (Jan. - Feb.): 1-28, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3019238>.
- "Twenty-Year Treaty With Russia." *Times* [London, England] 12 June 1942: 4. *The Times Digital Archive*. Accessed 16 June 2015. <http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&userGroupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&docId=CS67320524&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0>.

Secondary Sources:

- Bell, P. M. H. *Twelve Turning Points of the Second World War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.
- Bellamy, Chris. *Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.

- Blackwell, James W. 2011. "The Warsaw Uprising: The View from Lublin." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 89 (2): 274-300, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.unh.edu/stable/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.89.2.0274>.
- Churchill, Winston. *Memoirs of the Second World War; an Abridgement of the Six Volumes of the Second World War*. Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.
- Cienciala, Anna M. 2009. "The United States and Poland in World War II." *The Polish Review* 54 (2): 173-94, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25779810>.
- Cracraft, James. *The Revolution of Peter the Great*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Crampton, Richard, and Crampton, Ben. *Atlas of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Eubank, Keith. *The Summit Conferences, 1919-1960*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966.
- Farrell, Brian P. "Symbol of paradox: The Casablanca Conference, 1943." *Canadian Journal Of History* 28, no. 1 (April 1993): 21. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed July 17, 2015).
- Harbutt, Fraser J. *Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Kenez, Peter. *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Kimball, Warren F. 1996. "Stalingrad: A chance for choices." *The Journal of Military History* 60 (1) (Jan.): 89-114, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944450>.
- Kochanski, Halik. *The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012.
- Lukacs, John. *The Duel: The Eighty-day Struggle between Churchill and Hitler*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Lukacs, John. 2011. "The Importance of Being Winston." *The National Interest* (111) (January/February): 35-45, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42897727> accessed 3 July 2015.
- Maresch, Eugenia. *Katyn 1940: The Documentary Evidence of the West's Betrayal*. Stroud: History Press, 2010.
- Miner, Steven Merritt. *Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and*


- the Origins of the Grand Alliance*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
- Murray, Williamson. *The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Nadeau, Remi. *Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe*. New York: Praeger, 1990.
- Neiberg, Michael. *Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe*. New York: Basic Books, 2015.
- Neilson, Keith. *Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Nenninger, Timothy K. 2002. "United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths and Realities". *The Journal of Military History* 66 (3): 761-81.
<http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.unh.edu/stable/3093358>.
- Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. "Milestones: 1914-1920: The League of Nations, 1920".
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league>. Accessed March 8, 15.
- Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. "Recognition of the Soviet Union, 1933".
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/ussr>. Accessed April 23, 15.
- Overy, Richard. *Russia's War: 1941-1945*. London: Penguin Books, 1997.
- Perlmutter, Amos. *FDR & Stalin: A Not so Grand Alliance, 1943-1945*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993.
- Plokhy, Serhii. *Yalta: The Price of Peace*. New York: Viking, 2010.
- Ragsdale, Hugh. *The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Reynolds, David. 2002. "From world war to cold war: The Wartime Alliance and Post-war Transitions, 1941-1947." *The Historical Journal* 45 (1) (Mar.): 211-27,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3133637>.
- Reynolds, David. *Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century*. New York: Basic Books, 2007
- Roberts, Geoffrey. *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

- Schapiro, Leonard. *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy; Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase, 1917-1922*. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1955.
- Selden, Mark. *China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.
- Service, Robert. *Stalin: A Biography*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Stoler, Mark A. *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 2000.
- Taubman, William. *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War*. New York: Norton, 1982.
- Volkogonov, Dmitri. *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*. Translated by Harold Shukman. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.
- Watson, Derek. 2002. "Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942." *Europe-Asia Studies* 54 (1) (Jan.): 51-85, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/826217>.

APPENDIX – A




APPENDIX – B



APPENDIX – C



APPENDIX – D



APPENDIX – E



APPENDIX – F

Timeline of Events

September 29/30, 1938 – Munich Agreement

August 23, 1939 – Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed (Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact)

September 1, 1939 – Germany invaded Poland

November 13, 1939 – Winter War began (Soviet Finnish War)

September 17, 1939 – Soviet Union occupied eastern Poland

April and May 1940 – Katyn Massacre occurred

May 10, 1940 – Winston S. Churchill took office as Prime Minister

March 11, 1941 – Lend-Lease Bill signed by Roosevelt

June 22, 1941 – Operation Barbarossa began

August 14, 1941 – Atlantic Charter signed

December 7, 1941 – Pearl Harbor attacked by the Japanese

May 26, 1942 – Anglo-Soviet Treaty signed

August 12-17, 1942 – Moscow Conference (Churchill and Stalin)

August 23, 1942 – Battle of Stalingrad began

November 8, 1942 – Operation Torch began

January 14-24, 1943 – Casablanca Conference

February 2, 1943 – Battle of Stalingrad won by Soviet Union

April 17, 1943 – Polish Government requested investigation into Katyn Massacre

July 9, 1943 – Operation Husky commenced

August 14-24, 1943 – First Quebec Conference

November 22-26, 1943 – First Cairo Conference

November 28- December 1, 1943 – Tehran Conference

December 4-6, 1943 Second Cairo Conference

June 6, 1944 – D-Day

January 30-February 2, 1944 – Malta Conference

February 4-11, 1944 – Yalta Conference

April 13, 1944 – Franklin Roosevelt passed away

May 8, 1945 – V-E Day

July 17-August 2, 1945 – Potsdam Conference

August 9, 1945 – Red Army began occupation of Manchuria

September 2, 1945 – World War II officially over