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Shifting alliances and fairweather friends: Luso-American relations, 1941--1951

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SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND FAIRWEATHER FRIENDS:
LUSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1941-1951

BY

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DISSERTATION

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
In Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

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


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
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
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
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25 July 2012

25 July 2012/

This study is dedicated in memory of my father,

Domingos Martins Novera,

and to my mother,

Eva Gomes Vilaça Novera.

The more I know of Portugal, the better I understand them.

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ABSTRACT

SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND FAIR WEATHER FRIENDS:
LUSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1941-1951

by

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University of New Hampshire, September, 2012

This dissertation analyzes the diplomatic relations between Portugal and the United States from 1941 to 1951, a decade that resulted in a tremendous and permanent shift in Luso-American relations. It examines the wartime and postwar goals of both Portugal and the United States. It reveals how these two nations overcame their differences during the war and worked towards mutually beneficial ends after the war. Moreover this dissertation asserts that António Salazar, Portugal's Prime Minister, permanently altered Portuguese-American relations and managed to supplant the assurances found in the flagging Anglo-Portuguese alliance with a series of American initiatives--the European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

Up until WW II, Portugal's oldest ally had been Great Britain. Beginning in 1373, their alliance brought them commercial, political, and military benefits. Though never abandoning her commitments to Great Britain during WWII, the

reality of Portugal's security needs—the fourth largest colonial empire of the time--demanded the protection of a great naval power. Prior to World War II, Luso-American relations were based on long, but tenuous, commercial ties and a small steady Portuguese immigration stream to the United States. Portugal's importance during WWII lay in her geographical position, particularly the Azores archipelago. It soon became clear to the United States that the geopolitical significance of Portugal, her Atlantic Islands, and her colonies would be felt for decades to come.

This study is driven by an analysis of the national interests of Portugal and the United States both during and after WWII. This thesis enhances the field of Portuguese diplomatic historiography by examining this crucial decade in the area of Luso-American relations, 1941-1951. Studying this diplomatically dense period in Luso-American relations as a whole is fundamental to understanding the Portuguese shift away from the Anglo-Portuguese alliance towards stronger Luso-American relations. This study's significance also lies in the fact that, as a post Cold War study of the period, it is not encumbered by superpower analogies.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The year 1943 witnessed the first of a series of diplomatic actions between the United States and Portugal which, within one decade, would permanently alter the relationship between the two. At the start of 1943, the tide had not yet turned in favor of the Allies in the Battle for the Atlantic. Their losses were high. They needed the use of Portugal's Atlantic Islands for an airbase to protect shipping lines from predatory German submarines. Yet, Portugal understood that the Allies could offer no assurances. One misstep could spell disaster for the Portuguese. They were vulnerable to the Germans, particularly by air. Throughout the course of the war, several factors combined to preserve Portuguese sovereignty: Portuguese neutrality, though conditional; Portuguese geography and its importance to the Allies; Portugal's ability to draw Spain into a neutral block; and, finally, Germany's decision not to invade Iberia. By December of 1943, the Americans were granted the use of the Lagens airbase on the island of Terceira, Azores—albeit under British command. Thus began

the remarkable shift in relations between these two countries from one of indifference and sometimes suspicion, to that of forbearance and even a sense of necessity.

By 1952 Lisbon, at the request of the United States, was playing hostess to a key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) meeting. Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State, described the importance of this meeting in his work *Present at the Creation* where he stated, "Lisbon was to be the supreme gamble upon which we would stake our whole prestige, skill, and power."¹ For Acheson, the significance of the Lisbon meeting lay in the success of its American-driven agenda. Key to that agenda was a discussion of the future role of Germany in N.A.T.O. and German rearmament, which the United States thought essential for the future defense of Europe but France was resisting. For Portugal, the significance of the Lisbon meeting lay in the location of the meeting. Portugal was a founding member of N.A.T.O. Hosting a N.A.T.O. meeting reaffirmed her sense of prominence in the world, while membership in N.A.T.O. gave her government political legitimacy, and favorable international status. After nearly two centuries of periphery, Portugal was once again center stage.

To fully comprehend the changes that occurred in the relationship between Portugal and the United States from 1941 to 1951, it is critical to understand the rise and decline of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Six hundred years in the making, this alliance was a quintessential part of Portugal's foreign policy. The alliance itself grew out of a common Atlantic perspective, was

¹Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1969), 609.

reinforced by a series of treaties and marriages, and was put to the test time and again. Yet, in all that time, Portugal and Great Britain remained allies. It is not until the advent of the Second World War that this unique relationship was permanently altered. The circumstance that hastened this transformation was the decline of British world influence—economic, political, and military--in the face of ever-increasing American preeminence and the costs of two world wars. Without a strong Atlantic partner, Portugal could not protect her empire. Thus, it was only natural that when faced with an ally who could no longer protect her interests, Portugal cautiously sought out another who was both willing and able.

Prior to World War II, Luso-American relations were based on long, though tenuous commercial ties, as well as steady, though relatively small Portuguese immigration streams to the United States.² For the United States, Portugal's importance during the Second World War lay in her geographical position, particularly that of the Azores archipelago. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was made painfully aware of this during the first few years of the Battle for the Atlantic where Allied losses at the hands of German submarines were difficult to counter.

It soon became clear that the geopolitical significance of Portugal, her Atlantic Islands, and her colonies would be felt for decades to come. Though never abandoning her commitments to Great Britain, the reality of Portugal's security needs demanded the protection of a great naval power. After all,

²The prefix Luso means Portuguese. It is derived from the ancient Roman name for the province of Lusitania. Its people were known as Lusitanians. For the purposes of this thesis the terms Luso-American and Portuguese-American will be used interchangeably.

Portugal had the fourth largest colonial empire of the time but did not have sufficient resources to protect it. Thus, even after World War II, the global repercussions of this new relationship would be keenly felt. The resultant economic, political and military ties between Portugal and the United States were remarkable.

In February of 1943, George Kennan wrote the following analysis for the U.S. State Department:

Every great conflict between a major continental power and a major extra-continental maritime power has found Portugal a bone of contention between the two, if not a battle ground... Its security, in consequence, has always depended on its ability to maneuver, to play one force off against the other, to 'sell' itself to both belligerents in the capacity of a neutral. But the success of this policy has depended in turn on the firmness and astuteness of the regime in power in Lisbon. And this—in view of the lack of a dependable and permanent ruling class—has depended for the most part on chance.³

Assigned to the American Embassy in Lisbon, he was writing to explain Portugal's position of neutrality in the face of ever increasing pressure by the Allies for her cooperation. Although this assessment reflected an understanding of Portugal's geopolitical situation, it did not reflect an understanding of the broader historical context of those events. At best Kennan's evaluation portrays Portugal as a weak power sacrificing her own interests to the interests of bigger powers; at worst, it strips Portugal of her political will.

³National Archives, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, Letter, George F. Kennan to Department of State, 4 February 1943; quoted in Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question and World War II [Part One]," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 23, n.s. 1 (Summer 1986): 110.

This dissertation analyzes the diplomatic relations between Portugal and the United States from 1941 to 1951. It demonstrates how the Portuguese play a role in foreign affairs greater than their population or economy might suggest. It examines the wartime and postwar goals of both Portugal and the United States, and shows how these two nations overcame their differences during the war and worked towards mutually beneficial ends after the war. This study reveals the building blocks of Luso-American relations in the second half of the Twentieth Century to be the European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

Finally, this dissertation argues that policy makers in Portugal had a coherent foreign policy plan. The Portugal's Estado Novo government was not simply reacting to international events. They held fast to their wartime goals and, after the war followed a policy meant to supplant the commercial, political, and military assurances found in the centuries old Anglo-Portuguese alliance with those found in the E.R.P., N.A.T.O., and the M.D.A.P. Thus, primary to understanding the Estado Novo's foreign policy is an understanding of the elements of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, particularly those found in the treaties of 1373, 1386, 1661, and 1703.

Methodology

This thesis will enhance the field of Portuguese diplomatic historiography by examining a crucial decade in the area of Luso-American relations, 1941-

1951. Studying this diplomatically dense period in Luso-American relations as a whole is fundamental to understanding the Portuguese shift away from the Anglo-Portuguese alliance towards stronger Luso-American relations. This study's significance also lies in the fact that, as a post Cold War study of the period, it is not encumbered by superpower analogies, i.e. superpower vs. small power.

At the start of the Second World War the United States was a capitalist powerhouse, but its political and military influence was in large part limited to the Western Hemisphere. It had great potential, but that potential was restricted by the habit of clinging to certain Early Republic virtues such as the maintenance of a small peacetime army and no "entangling alliances." Concurrently, Portugal was a small continental power but a large colonial power with interests in both Africa and Asia. Ironically, prior to the Second World War, the United States tried its best to stay out of European political interests—and intrigues--worldwide, whereas Portugal struggled to maintain some prominence in the same.

This study will be driven by an analysis of the national interests of Portugal and the United States both during and after the Second World War. Portugal's foreign policy decisions during World War II were meant to achieve her three key wartime foreign policy goals. First and foremost, the Portuguese sought to maintain Portuguese continental sovereignty. Second, Portugal acted to preserve Iberian neutrality throughout the war. Finally, Portugal insisted on the defense of her colonial empire. Meanwhile, as a belligerent, the United States

had winning the war at the lowest cost in American casualties as her primary goal.

After the Second World War, Portugal sought to fulfill her postwar foreign policy goals. The Portuguese government wanted to secure a place in the postwar European economy. She needed to not only maintain her continental sovereignty, but also preserve her empire. Lastly, she wanted to modernize her armed forces—i.e. better weapons, and better training. This dissertation will contend that these goals were unattainable via Portugal's waning Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The political and military guarantees of the Anglo-Portuguese treaties of 1373, 1386, and 1661 and the commercial guarantees inherent to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1703 could no longer be met by the British. Instead, Portugal met these goals by participating in a series of American initiatives--the European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

For the United States, postwar goals were evolving throughout the war. Many of the ideals inherent in the Atlantic Charter were lost to the realities of the Cold War. In the end, the United States had two key postwar goals. First, she desired an economically strong capitalist Western Europe to thwart the possibility of communist subversion in the region. America also wanted to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union. In order to achieve these goals, the United States entered into a new dynamic diplomatic era in which she assumed a leadership role. For the first time in her history, America linked the long-term economic, political and military stability of Western Europe with her own future.

As a result of this new vision she initiated several multinational programs meant to secure the stability of Western Europe—the European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

The archival sources which drive this dissertation were found in Portugal and in the United States. The Torre do Tombo in Lisbon, Portugal is the main national archive of Portugal. Located in Lisbon as well, the Arquivo do Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros (AMNE) is separate from the national archive, and is home to the records of Portugal's Foreign Ministry. Nearly all of the Portuguese archival documents in this dissertation were found at the A.M.N.E. Most of these documents are part of the Portuguese Embassy in Washington, D.C. Collection. The vast majority of the American archival documents came from the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. These documents included the Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Records of the Department of State, the Records of the Office of Strategic Services as well as a few documents from the Records of the Treasury. Other sources, such as Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, were found at the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. Beside the archival sources there were many collections of public documents used. For the war years (1939-1945), *Foreign Relations of the United States* was essential to this study as was *Dez Anos de Política Externa*.

Historiography

Until recently, Portuguese historians have shown little interest in their nation's diplomatic relations. Probably the best-known Portuguese diplomat-turned-scholar is Franco Nogueira. He published a number of books on twentieth century foreign relations topics such as Portugal and the United Nations, and the Portuguese-African colonial wars. Interestingly, Nogueira's study of the Portuguese African colonies, *The Third World* (London: Johnson, 1967) included a "Foreword" by Dean Acheson. His most recent scholarship, a multivolume biography of António de Oliveira Salazar (Portuguese Prime Minister/Dictator, 1933-1968), quickly became the definitive Portuguese-language biography of Salazar.⁴

In terms of an English-language biography of Salazar, Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses' recent work, *Salazar, a Political Biography*, stands alone. His outstanding use of the Salazar Archive at the Torre do Tombo combined with an easy writing style have resulted in a what is sure to become the classic study in the life of António de Oliveira Salazar. Meneses' focus on domestic pressures and how those issues come to bear on the foreign policy decisions of Salazar, even at the height of World War II, offer an interesting perspective on both the man and his policies.⁵

The state of diplomatic history in Portugal began to change in the mid 1980s. In his work, *Portugal e as Regências de Argel, Tunes e Tripoli*, Fernando

⁴The original titles by Franco Nogueira cited above are: *As Nações Unidas e Portugal: Estudo* (Lisbon: Atica, 1962); *Diálogos Interditos* (Lisbon: Intervenção, 1979) and *Salazar: Estudo Biográfico*. 6 vols. (Coimbra: Atlântida Editora, 1977-1985). Although a biography, this work devotes quite a bit of time to foreign policy analysis, particularly from 1936-1944 when Salazar intermittently took over the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and War.

⁵Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar, A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009).

de Castro Brandão stated that as early as the 1970s he had argued before the faculty of the History Department at the University of Lisbon for the promotion of monographs dealing with Portuguese diplomatic history.⁶ In the next decade, both descriptive and analytical signed articles or chapters began appearing in major Portuguese reference works, e.g. Franco Nogueira, "A Política Externa," a chapter in *História de Portugal*, II Suplemento (Porto: Livraria Civilização, 1981). These early works really set the stage for what was to come.

No discussion of Portuguese diplomatic historiography would be complete without a succinct examination of Nuno Severiano Teixeira's work. He has published extensively in the field of Portuguese foreign affairs and has contributed greatly to the study of nineteenth and twentieth century Portuguese history. His chapter in António Costa Pinto's work, *Modern Portugal* is of historiographical significance because Teixeira is clearly attempting to go beyond the narrative when he argues:

Portugal is both a European and an Atlantic country. As a small, semi-peripheral power with only one land border, it has always experienced an unstable geopolitical balance, caught between the devil of continental pressure and—literally—the deep blue sea. Geopolitical conditions, as well as the constant search for balance, have informed the strategic options and historical characteristics of Portuguese foreign policy.⁷

⁶ Fernando de Castro Brandão, *Portugal e as Regências de Argel, Tunes e Tripoli: Subsídios para a História Diplomática Portuguesa* (Porto: Secretaria de Estado da Emigração, 1985), 9.

⁷ Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy, 1890-1986," in *Contemporary Portugal: Politics, Society and Culture*, ed. António Costa Pinto, 2nd edition, (Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs, 2011), 95.

Teixeira interprets the historically difficult geopolitical position that Portugal is in vis-à-vis her location along the Atlantic and her shared border with Spain. He then applies that struggle within Portugal's national conscious to be either European or Atlantic to Portugal's long-term foreign policy decisions.⁸

Another diplomat turned scholar is José Calvet de Magalhães. Beginning his diplomatic career just after World War II as Portuguese Consul in New York City, he experienced a stellar career in the Portuguese diplomatic corps and is currently Visiting Lecturer at the Universidade Nova in Lisbon. He has published too many books and articles to list here. Of most interest to this dissertation was his work, *Portugal: an Atlantic Paradox*. This succinct but intriguing co-authored work was meant to spur interests in the study of Luso-American relations on both sides of the Atlantic. The authors argue that one of the key historiographical problems in the field of Luso-American relations is that they tend to be limited to geopolitical studies, which they contend has resulted in a general lack of understanding between the people of both nations.⁹

⁸Teixeira's titles include: *O Poder e a Guerra, 1914-1918: Objectivos Nacionais e Estratégias Políticas na Entrada de Portugal na Grande Guerra* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1996); *Portugal e a Guerra: História das Intervenções Militares Portuguesas nos Grandes Conflitos Mundiais, séculos XIX-XX* (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1998); *A Primeira República Portuguesa: entre o Liberalismo e o Autoritarismo*, in coordination with António Costa Pinto (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 2002); and A. Barreto and M. F. Mónica, *Dicionário de História de Portugal*, vol. IX, Suplemento P/Z (Porto: Figueirinhas, 2000), s.v. "Política Externa," by Nuno Severiano Teixeira.

⁹José Calvet de Magalhães, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, and Joaquim Ramos Silva. *Portugal: An Atlantic Paradox, Portuguese/US Relations after the EC Enlargement*. Lisbon: IEEI, 1990. A very interesting, though brief, work that seeks to combine and reveal both Magalhães diplomatic experience with his academic insights is *Conversas com José Calvet de Magalhães, Europeístas e Isolacionistas na Política Externa Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Editorial Bizancio, 2005) by Álvaro de Vasconcelos. Through a series of interviews Vasconcelos questions Magalhães regarding these two elements in post-WWII Portuguese foreign relations—Europeanists v. Isolationists.

Portuguese diplomatic studies of Luso-American World War II era diplomacy have focused on the negotiations over the development and use of the Lagens and Santa Maria bases in the Azores. José Freire Antunes distinguished himself by being the first to attempt a broader series focusing on Luso-American relations. *Os Americanos e Portugal*, was initially intended to analyze the course of Portuguese-American foreign relations from 1941 to 1976. Presently, he has published three volumes in that series, *Os Anos de Richard Nixon, 1969-1974* (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1986), *Kennedy e Salazar: o Leão e a Raposa* (Lisbon: Difusão Cultural, 1991), and *Nixon e Caetano, Promessas e Abandono* (Lisbon: Difusão Cultural, 1992). These volumes detail the diplomatic relations between the United States and Portugal from 1961 to 1976.

Antunes also published *Roosevelt, Churchill e Salazar: a Luta pelos Açores* (Lisbon: Ediclube, 1995) which should have been a part of the *Os Americanos e Portugal* series but was instead published as a separate monograph. This series garnered Antunes a great deal of publicity in Portugal when it was first published because of its polemic analysis of contemporary political figures such as Mario Soares—then President of Portugal. Here in the United States, Antunes was praised because of his extensive use of American classified documents, and his grasp of the workings of the United States diplomatic corps.¹⁰ This monograph argues that, although Great Britain did everything possible to convince the United States to enter the Second World War, once the United States had entered the war Britain realized she had

¹⁰Howard J. Wiarda, review of *Os Anos de Richard Nixon, 1969-1974*, by José Freire Antunes, in *Luso-Brazilian Review* 25, n.s. 2 (Winter 1988), 117-119.

awakened a sleeping giant and would pay for the consequences of that act with an ever-diminishing role in world affairs. Antunes uses the negotiations over the Lagens base in the Azores as a case study of that developing rivalry between the United States and Great Britain.

Lúis Nuno Rodrigues has also written a focused study on the negotiations between the United States and Portugal for the establishment of a base in the Azores, *No Coração do Atlântico*.¹¹ In this work he argues that the signing of the 1944 Accord between the United States and Portugal constituted both a point of arrival and a point of departure for the two nations. This was a point of arrival because it marked the conclusion of a long series of negotiations. It was also point of departure because this Accord allowed American Armed Forces direct access to the Azores, a situation which has continued uninterrupted to this day.

This dissertation differs from both Antunes' and Rodrigues' works on several levels. First, this work does not use the Azores base negotiations as a case study for understanding the relationship between two other powers—i.e. the United States and Great Britain—as does Antunes. Second, unlike Rodrigues' study, this work does not limit itself to one event in Luso-American relations. This dissertation contends that to understand the development of Luso-American relations during World War Two it is not enough to simply study the bilateral (or trilateral) events of the time in isolation. The declaration of neutrality by Portugal, the strategic importance of the Azores, and the rise of American naval

¹¹Lúis Nuno Rodrigues, *No Coração do Atlântico: Os Estados Unidos e os Açores (1939-1948)* Defesa e Relações Internacionais (Lisbon: Prefácio–Edição de Livros e Revistas, Lda., 2005).

dominance are all simply the elements of this complicated story. In and of themselves, they do not make up the history of Portuguese-American relations during WWII. There is more at play here because during the war every government involved was thinking of and planning for their postwar roles. Thus, although these studies offer a good analysis of the events that they narrate, by the very nature of their focus they cannot see the broader diplomatic picture. In contrast, this thesis argues that the only way to fully understand Luso-American relations in the mid-twentieth century is to analyze a broader length of time taking into account both the wartime and postwar interests of both Portugal and the United States.

In terms of American historiography, Luso-American relations is usually relegated to a footnote, a few paragraphs of a chapter in a work dealing with the history of World War II, or a brief journal article. American historians tend to focus on the Big Four, and the subsequent Cold War. Even the recent interest in the wartime neutrals has been limited to Switzerland and its banking scandal.¹²

Most recently, David Reynolds has emerged as one of the leading scholars in World War Two diplomacy. His study, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor*, offers a keen analysis on the formation of President Roosevelt's foreign policy and his abilities to shape Allied policy. Reynolds argues that Roosevelt's foreign

¹²There are only three exceptions to this rule. The first is the dissertation by Jerry K. Sweeney, "United States' Policy toward Portugal during the Second World War" (Ph.D. diss., Kent State University, 1970). The second is "American Foreign Policy and the Portuguese Territories" (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, 1975) by Andrew R. Raposa. The third, twenty-five years later, is the dissertation by Luis Nuno Rodrigues, "To the 'Top of the Mountain' and 'Down to the Valley': The United States and Portugal during the Kennedy Presidency" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2000).

policy reflected a combination of both geopolitics and ideology. Geopolitics is described as “an expanded geography of U.S. security.” Reynolds identifies American ideology as “the assertion of U.S. principles of liberal, capitalist democracy.” Furthermore, Reynolds argued “FDR insisted with growing fervor that, in the age of airborne warfare, the world could and did threaten America.”¹³ This dissertation builds upon this perspective noting that the very reason for America’s continued interest in Portugal after the war was precisely because of her Atlantic islands and the strategic value that they added to N.A.T.O. as a whole and to America’s new airborne vulnerability.

Without question, the leading American Cold War historian is John Lewis Gaddis. His most recent monograph on the subject is *The Cold War: A New History*. In this work Gaddis looks at the Cold War as a whole. He admits that there is nothing new in terms of interpretation when he argues that conflicting ideologies were the basis for and the constant within the Cold War. He argues that this assessment, however, comes from looking at the Cold War from start to finish, something he was not able to do when he first began writing about the Cold War. Looking at this historical event from this perspective, he said, “produced new ways of looking at its parts.”¹⁴ This dissertation follows that line of logic when it argues that only by examining Luso-American relations from 1941-1951 can the interconnectedness of the events fully understood.

¹³David Reynolds, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of the Second World War*, The American ways Series (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 4.

¹⁴John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), xi.

In the United States, the most common venue for an historical discussion of Portuguese-American relations is a journal article. Here two American historians stand out, Douglas L. Wheeler of the University of New Hampshire and Jerry K. Sweeney of South Dakota State University. Both scholars have published articles on the subject of Portuguese-American relations since the 1970s. Wheeler's focus has been the political aspects of Luso-American diplomacy. Meanwhile, Sweeney has concentrated on the strategic aspects of the relationship.¹⁵

Otherwise, it is the social scientists—political scientists and economists—on both sides of the Atlantic who have found this topic worthy of lengthy study. Beginning in the 1970s, a series of books and articles was published by authors such as Howard Wiarda in the United States, Luc Crollen in Brussels, and, more recently, Fernanda Rollo in Portugal. In each case the author used Portugal as a case study in small power geopolitical strategy, i.e. how does a small power maintain itself as a sovereign nation in a world community which is divided by two superpowers?

Although the works listed above were significant to this study in terms of the narrative and as sources for further study, none of the monographs served as

¹⁵For the purposes of this study, several articles by Douglas L. Wheeler stand out: "The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question, and World War II [Part One]," *Luso-Brazilian Review* XXIII, n.s. 1 (1986): 107-127; "The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question, and World War II [Part Two]," *Luso-Brazilian Review* XXIII, n.s. 2 (1986): 97-111; and "The Azores and the United States (1787-1987): Two Hundred Years of Shared History," *Boletim do Instituto Histórico da Ilha Terceira* 45, n.s. 1 (1987): 55-71. Jerry Sweeney has also written several key articles: "Portugal, the USA and Aviation," *Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal* 9 (1972): 77-84; "The Framework of Luso-American Diplomatic Relations during the Second World War," *Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal* 10 (1973): 93-100; and, most recently, "A Matter of Small Consequence: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Tragedy of East Timor," *Independent Review* 7.1 (Summer 2002): 91-102.

a historiographical model for this study. As a work of historical inquiry, as opposed to one of political science or economics, the approach to this topic differs dramatically from that of the social scientists listed above. In this study, Portugal is not viewed as a case study, a paradigm for understanding the behavior of other small powers, nor is the United States viewed as motivated exclusively by issues of power and dominance.

It also differs from the works of historical inquiry heretofore mentioned for a variety of reasons. First, this study probes the historical elements that comprised the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance because they are essential to understanding traditional Portuguese national interests and the formation of her foreign policy. Ultimately, those elements will serve as a standard by which Luso-American postwar relations can be judged. Second, this thesis examines this period as a whole, not as a series of significant, yet segmented, independent events. World War II, the Marshall Plan, N.A.T.O., and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program are all significant events of the twentieth century, worthy of individual study. Yet, studied separately, they cannot show the dynamic shift that was taking place in Luso-American relations. Finally, Portuguese-American relations from 1941 to 1951 are examined within the context of their respective national interests. By 1951, the United States had in place several key multinational organizations which they hoped would ensure the development of an economically stable and peaceful Western Europe. Concurrently, Portugal had supplanted the then flagging Anglo-Portuguese alliance with a series of multilateral agreements that served the same economic, political, and military

purpose. These agreements laid the foundation for stronger Luso-American relations in the second half of the Twentieth Century.

Outline

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter defines the thesis. It presents the methodology used. It speaks to the historiography of the period, and serves as a chapter outline of this study.

Chapter two offers a succinct analysis of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance from the fourteenth century up to the creation of Portugal's New State regime in the 1930s. During this six hundred year period numerous treaties were signed, marriages were made, and economic ties were formed between Great Britain and Portugal. This chapter focuses on four essential Anglo-Portuguese treaties-- 1373, 1386, 1661, and 1703. Established in 1373, the political and military elements of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance are renewed and strengthened with the signing of the 1386 treaty and the consequent marriage between the two royal houses. The Treaty of 1661 expands the both the political and military obligations of both parties to include their colonial empire. Finally, the Treaty of 1703 sets the commercial standard for both parties for nearly a century after. Consequently, an analysis of these four treaties reveals the political, military and commercial elements of this alliance.

In the mid nineteenth century, the African colonial issue began to put a strain on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The second half of Chapter two studies

the growing distance between the two peoples. In 1890, the British Ultimatum challenged the alliance bringing the two nations to the brink of war. By the early twentieth century, it became clear to the Portuguese that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was deeply flawed. Accordingly, Portugal began to reassess this alliance and weigh her options. It is only at the end of World War II that a possible substitute for Great Britain emerged. By chapter's end the reader will fully understand both the essential components of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and its significance in terms of meeting Portugal's foreign policy goals. This is vital in order to comprehend the postwar shift that occurs in Luso-American relations.

Chapter three considers the relative lack of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and Portugal prior to the nineteenth century. In place of formal diplomatic relations, traditional commercial interests and migratory streams linked these two nations. These economic and social ties date back to the 1700s and form the basis of early Portuguese-American relations. This study clearly reveals how a promising start in Luso-American relations turned sour when American diplomats failed to follow international protocol during early treaty negotiations. This led to a period of scant diplomatic relations, as both parties realized that neither served their foreign policy goals. For the Americans, Portugal was an imperial power who could not see beyond her need to protect her colonial interests. For the Portuguese, the American example of successful colonial revolt was a real threat to her control over her South American colony, Brazil. This chapter then turns its attention to Portuguese-American relations

from the nineteenth century to the 1930s. During this contentious period in Portuguese history, diplomatic relations between the two countries was still weak. Although Portugal was a republic by 1910, this political change had come at a radical cost. There was a dramatic rise in political and social violence within Portugal prior to the establishment of the republic, the most notable being the assassination of Portugal's king and his heir in 1908. Although the United States recognized the new government, she certainly was not enthusiastic in her support for what was the third European republic—France and Switzerland being the other two. Even co-belligerency during the First World War failed to bring these Atlantic powers any closer together.

Chapter four sets the stage for the shift in Portuguese-American relations by surveying Portuguese diplomatic affairs during the early years of World War II. Portugal declared her neutrality at the request of Great Britain, a neutrality to be understood within the constraints of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Thus, she was publicly neutral while, privately, she acted as an Allied collaborator. Walking a fine line between the interests of the belligerents was not a new strategy for Portugal. Her ability to maintain her position of neutrality while negotiating the sale of wolfram to all parties while concurrently directing the protracted secret negotiations for the development of a military airbase in the Azores for the Allies speaks volumes to the deft skill of her diplomats.

Meanwhile, the United States was granted access to the Lagens airbase in the Azores although it would remain under the control of the British for the duration of the war. This period was remarkably frustrating for American

negotiators because they chose to pursue diplomacy with Portugal through the prism of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, i.e. they allowed the British to take the lead on all negotiations with Portugal. This method resulted in dissatisfaction for the Americans. It also left the Portuguese suspicious of American wartime intentions, since they were never privy to them.

Chapter five offers an analysis the key events in Luso-American relations during the latter half of the war. America's early frustration with the negotiations for the use of the Lagens base in the Azores led to direct talks between the Americans and the Portuguese. From the American perspective, the purpose of the talks was to secure the right to construct and use another airbase in the Azores--this time in Santa Maria—which would come under the direct command of American forces. For the Portuguese, the negotiations for the base revolved around the issue of the liberation of Portuguese Timor. The Japanese had occupied Portuguese Timor. The Portuguese desire to participate in this Allied action became one of her key wartime goals, and the cornerstone of the Santa Maria negotiations. The completion of this treaty was the first step towards a permanent alteration in Portuguese-American relations.

Chapter six explores post World War II Luso-American relations by examining three major events. These events were: first, the offer of Marshall Plan funds to Portugal; second, the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and third, the establishment of a Mutual Defense Assistance Pact between Portugal and the United States. This chapter examines the rationale in Portugal that led her to participate in the Marshall Plan, but opt out of receiving

funding during its first year. The Portuguese chose to do so in order to allow other nations who were in more dire financial straights than they to gain immediate access to Marshall Plan funds. The decisions made by the Portuguese government clearly reflect that something other than economic determinants were at play. Instead, the Portuguese were trying to place themselves in a stronger political position in relation to the United States.

Chapter six then probes one of the pivotal moments of the twentieth century, the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States led the fight for Portugal's admittance to N.A.T.O. as a founding member. Portugal's status was based on strategic necessity. Her Atlantic Islands were seen as vital to both American air and naval interests. Her vast colonial possessions were an added bonus. On the other hand, in terms of international standing, Portugal had everything to gain and nothing to lose by her involvement in N.A.T.O. Becoming a founding member of N.A.T.O. satisfied each of Portugal's postwar goals.

Finally, chapter six also considers the impact of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact between the United States and Portugal. At face value, this treaty satisfied Portugal's colonial security needs. What had once been safeguarded by the British Royal Navy would now be protected by the United States Armed Forces. Concurrently, this satisfied America's strategic needs in her new role as protector of the free world. Moreover, this military component completes the shift from the British-centered alliance to a new American-centered alliance which would furnish Portugal with the military equipment and

military expertise that she needed—something that for centuries had been the role of the British.

The final chapter assesses the shift in Portuguese-American relations in a post World War II world. For the United States the events of World War II resulted in a tremendous change in U.S. foreign policy, particularly in terms of American military involvement on a global scale. Indeed, this change was indicative of the post war shift in the balance of power worldwide. For Portugal, however, World War II was not nearly the watershed event that it was for the United States. After World War II, Portugal found a willing substitute for her old ally in the United States. Portugal may have changed partners, but she was still dancing to the same tune, i.e. she had found a means by which to meet her economic, political and military needs. This dissertation will then conclude with a concise examination of Luso-American relations since 1951.

CHAPTER II

OLDEST ALLIES

“I have an announcement to make to the House arising out of the treaty signed between this country and Portugal in the year 1373...”¹ So began Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s statement to Parliament on 12 October 1943 regarding the recently finalized secret negotiations between Great Britain and Portugal for the use of certain military facilities in the Azores. In his work, *The Second World War*, Churchill reflected,

I spoke in a level voice, and made a pause to allow the House to take in the date, 1373. As this soaked in, there was something like a gasp. I do not suppose any such continuity of relations between two Powers has ever been, or will ever be, set forth in the ordinary day-to-day work of British diplomacy.²

Indeed, Portugal and England have enjoyed the longest alliance between two nation states in the world. The expansion of this relationship was vital to the development of Portugal’s foreign policy over the centuries. They first gained

¹Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 5, *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), 165.

²Ibid.

each other's respect as brothers-in-arms during the Crusades. Then, beginning with the treaty of 1373, these two nations chose to bind their country's futures time and again by periodically renewing their ties of friendship and perpetual alliance. These bonds were deepened by frequent marriages among the aristocracy of both realms. They also shared a common Atlantic experience, including a rather stellar maritime history. Finally, they often shared common continental enemies—Spain and, sometimes, France. Throughout the centuries, Portugal and England have experienced substantial political, commercial and strategic advantages because of this partnership. Nevertheless, at times, they have also had to pay a great price for the distinctive moniker—oldest allies.³

Strange Bedfellows

At first glance, no two European nations could seem more dissimilar in both tradition and history than Portugal and Great Britain. Beside the obvious linguistic differences, Portugal and Great Britain have dissimilar religious, political, social and economic histories. Portugal was a distinctly Roman Catholic nation born of the *Reconquista* and the Crusades and, later, home to the Inquisition.⁴ Although England began as a Roman Catholic nation and sacrificed

³Douglas L. Wheeler, *Historical Dictionary of Portugal* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1993), 37.

⁴The *Reconquista*, or Reconquest, refers to that part of the Crusades in which Christian knights fought against the armies of Islam in an effort to retake Iberia. Initiated in 711 A.D. by the assault on Iberia by the Moors, this period of Reconquest ends in 1492 when the Islamic Kingdom of Granada falls to King Ferdinand.

many soldiers to the Crusades, by the sixteenth century she was a decidedly Protestant nation. After the Catholic Reformation, these religious differences became the root of some friction, not between the two governments per se, but between their peoples. This uneasy state of affairs was most keenly felt by the merchant families of both realms who, for commercial purposes, sometimes had to take up residence in the other kingdom.⁵

Another distinction between the two powers was their respective political developments. Portuguese law was founded upon Roman Law, which helped shape her political tradition. The father ruled the family with absolute authority. Likewise, the Portuguese king ruled as an absolute monarch. Only in the mid-nineteenth century, after the Peninsular War and nearly a decade of fratricidal civil war, did Portugal become a constitutional monarchy. On the other hand, England spearheaded the Liberal movement. From the recognition of the *Magna Carta* in 1215 by the English monarchy to the publication of John Locke's "Second Treatise on Civil Government" (1690), no other western nation so clearly expressed and executed the concept of a constitutional monarchy held in check by the rule of law. This dissimilarity in political development became yet another barrier to understanding or sympathy between these two peoples.⁶

In terms of social and economic development, again there is a clear difference between the two nations that can be traced back to Portugal's

⁵L. M. E. Shaw, *The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and the English Merchants in Portugal, 1654-1810* (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998), 4.

⁶Manuel Cardozo, "England's Fated Ally," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 7, no.1 (1970): 49.

Germanic heritage.⁷ In Portuguese families, when the father died, property was divided equally amongst his male heirs, which is a Germanic tradition. This tradition led to the splintering of both wealth and political power. Traditionally, the aristocracy did not pay taxes on their lands. Instead, taxes were paid by the lower classes. This tax system reinforced the traditional medieval distinctions between the upper and lower classes, or the nobles and the peasants. It also discouraged members of the nobility from engaging in commerce because that would then require them to pay taxes. In great contrast, since the twelfth century, British Common Law enforced the system of primogeniture which gave the first-born son the right to all titles and properties held by the father. Younger sons were then compelled to find other occupations--service to the crown or commerce. Regardless of station or occupation, everyone paid taxes. There also was no social stigma attached to participating in trade. Thus, in Great Britain, members of the aristocracy often directed the interests of their younger sons to the business world.⁸

One nation developed into a Roman Catholic, absolutist kingdom whose aristocracy held fast to the medieval concept of a rigidly stratified society and, as a result, developed a great disdain for engaging in commercial activities. Meanwhile, the other became a Protestant, Liberal constitutional monarchy whose aristocracy played an active, though not exclusive, role in its nation's

⁷In the late 5th century, during the collapse of the Roman Empire, both the Suevi and the Visigoths established kingdoms within the Iberian Peninsula.

⁸Shaw, 3.

commercial development. Yet, throughout these disparate developments the two governments remained true to the spirit, if not always the letter, of their alliance.

The Anglo-Portuguese alliance can be divided into four distinct phases. At the beginning of the relationship, these allies were equals in terms of political standing and overall military strength. For most of the 16th century, Portugal held the upper hand because her navy's strength far surpassed that of England. That all changed rather abruptly in 1580 when King Philip II of Spain gained the Portuguese crown and secured it for his heirs until 1640. After 1640, Portugal emerged independent but greatly weakened. It is during this second phase that the formal relationship between the two kingdoms deepened with not only renewed defensive treaties, but also several commercial treaties. The third phase begins and ends in the nineteenth century, a century in which Portugal was at its political nadir, while Britannia ruled the seas. True to her word, Great Britain came to Portugal's aid and defended her shores many times. Ironically, the price of this defense was that for the rest of the century Portugal was a virtual dependent of Great Britain. Finally, the last phase of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance began in 1890 and continues until today. This was a period of initial disillusionment between the two allies rooted in conflicting African interests. Had it not been for the challenges of World War I and World War II the alliance might have ended then and there. Instead, it has mellowed like a good, tawny port into a comfortable undemanding friendship.

This chapter examines the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance from the fourteenth through the early twentieth centuries. For the purposes of this dissertation it is

not necessary to study in detail the long and complex diplomatic history that shaped this alliance. Instead this chapter offers an analysis of four treaties-- 1373, 1386, 1661 and 1703--which formally bound the two nations together. The first three treaties reveal the political and military elements that are fundamental to this alliance. The latter was a commercial treaty that laid the foundation for Anglo-Portuguese trade in the eighteenth century. These treaties are examined within their historical context—i.e. the overall European political setting, the societal connections, and even the familial bonds. The focus of the chapter then shifts to a study of the crisis of 1890, the British Ultimatum. This event challenged the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and nearly brought these two realms to the brink of war. Although the Alliance survived it was greatly weakened. The challenges of World War I and continued rivalry in the African continent only served to remind Portugal that her oldest ally could no longer meet her security interests—i.e. the preservation of both continental sovereignty and empire.

The Ties that Bind

With the Cross of Saint George Inscribed on Their Hearts...:

From the Crusades to the Hundred Years War

Although it was the Treaty of 1373 which initiated the formal diplomatic ties between England and Portugal, the main historic event that began the social-military connection between these two realms was the Crusades. It was not uncommon for crusaders en route to the Holy Land to put into port at the mouth

of the Douro River before continuing on their way to Palestine. In his part of the Reconquest efforts in Iberia, King Afonso Henriques often requested the aid of these same crusaders. In his first strike at Lisbon (1140), he received the aid of a fleet of seventy ships. Originally bound for Palestine, these English and Norman crusaders agreed to help the new King. The combined attack resulted in the sacking of Lisbon's surrounding areas and the payment of tribute to the Portuguese King, but no decisive victory.⁹

Seven years and many successful campaigns later, Afonso Henriques was in a better position to take the city of Lisbon from the Moors. As good fortune would have it just before the start of this new expedition, a fleet of 164 vessels arrived in the Douro carrying three groups of crusaders: English; Germans; and Flemish and Boulogners. King Afonso Henriques appealed to these crusaders to join him in the fight. In recompense, he offered them all the spoils of the city and land to any crusader who wished to stay in Portugal. The siege of Lisbon resulted in a great victory for the Portuguese. As for the crusaders, more than a few took the King up on his promise and settled near Lisbon. After the siege of Lisbon, it was also not uncommon for Gilbert, Bishop of Lisbon, to travel to England to preach the Crusade in Iberia. Consequently, by the time Faro was taken in 1249 and the Kingdom of Portugal had reached her modern boundaries, Portuguese and English knights had formed strong bonds in Iberia based on blood and sacrifice in the name of the Christian God.¹⁰

⁹Livermore, 54-55.

¹⁰Ibid., 54-80 passim.

The formal beginning of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance is set against the drama of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453). A series of dynastic marriages between the royal houses of England and France set the stage for this complicated and protracted series of hostilities. Thus, when the male line of the French Capetian dynasty ended with the death of Charles IV in 1328, King Edward III of England laid claim to the throne. As the nephew of Charles IV and the grandson of Philip IV (the Fair), Edward III was a legitimate pretender to the French throne. Nevertheless, the French nobility preferred Philip of Valois as their next monarch.

As both claimants searched for allies throughout the continent to strengthen both their political and their military positions, the kingdom of Castile and Leon became increasingly significant. What attracted these adversaries to Castile was her naval fleet. Designed by Genoese experts, Castilian galleys were fast and maneuverable. Unlike their French and English counterparts, the Castilian fleet was commanded by experienced and professional captains and admirals. Thus, a treaty with Pedro I, King of Castile, would bring with it an immediate military advantage.¹¹ Pedro, however, had his own domestic troubles which resulted in his death in 1369 by his brother's own hand. Enrique of Trastámara was now King Enrique II of Castile.¹²

King Enrique II thus set about the task of meeting his obligations to France while also securing the legitimist towns—i.e. those towns who still showed

¹¹Russell, 5.

¹²Ibid., 147.

support for other legitimate pretenders to the crown--within his reign. The latter was no easy task for there were others who claimed the legitimate right to the title, King of Castile. These pretenders openly courted the loyalties of these towns. Amongst them were John, Duke of Lancaster, and Fernando, King of Portugal.

Pedro died with no surviving sons. However, he left two daughters, Constanza and Isabella. Constanza was the eldest of the two and, therefore, next in line for the throne. A widower, John of Lancaster wasted no time in arranging a marriage between himself and the Infanta, Dona Constanza. They were married in Roquefort in September of 1371. By early December, the Duke and new Duchess of Lancaster, along with Dona Isabella, were off the continent and safely back on English soil. Once there, John immediately added King of Castile and Leon to his titles.¹³

Meanwhile, as the nephew of King Pedro of Castile, King Fernando of Portugal (1367-1383) was yet another legitimate pretender to the throne of Castile and Leon. Unfortunately, he was also young, impetuous, and easily manipulated. In his sixteen-year reign, he managed to squander much of the royal coffers and earn the ire of the people of Lisbon. During his brief reign,

¹³ John's brother, the Earl of Cambridge would later marry Isabella. See C.H. Williams, "The Expedition of John of Gaunt to the Peninsula," in *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, ed. Edgar Prestage (Watford: Voss and Michael, Ltd., 1935; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 32.

Fernando made and then broke a series of treaties, including the first political treaty between Portugal and England.¹⁴

The treaty of peace, friendship and alliance was initiated by King Fernando and Queen Leonor of Portugal to King Edward III of England, and signed in London by their respective representatives on 16 June 1373. Each party was clearly named and their respective titles reveal much about the ongoing regional conflicts. King Fernando was rightly referred to as the King of Portugal and Algarve. King Edward III was named King of England and France. Finally, there was a reference made to the affection between the Portuguese monarchs and the King's son, John, King of Castile and Leon and Duke of Lancaster. Clearly, at the signing of the treaty, Fernando had renounced his claim to Castile in favor of John of Lancaster. Edward III still claimed France for himself, and John still asserted his right to Castile and Leon.¹⁵

This treaty was primarily a treaty of friendship and alliance. In Article I, the monarchs of both realms asserted that they and their successors would

...henceforth reciprocally be Friends to Friends and Enemies to Enemies, and shall assist, maintain, and uphold each other mutually by sea and by land against all Men that may live or die of whatever dignity, station, rank, or condition they may be, and against their Lands, Realms, and Dominions.¹⁶

¹⁴Fernão Lopes, *Crónica do Senhor Rei Dom Fernando Nono Rei destes Regnos*, *Biblioteca Histórica—Série Régia* (Porto: Livraria Civilização, 1966), 153-173 passim.

¹⁵Foreign Office, "Portugal: Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance between England and Portugal—Signed at London, 16 June, 1373," *British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-1814*, 1-Part 1: 462.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 465.

It follows then that in Article II both parties agreed that they would not “form Friendships with the Enemies, Rivals or Persecutors of the other Party; or knowingly himself or through others advise, aid or favor the Enemies, Rivals or Persecutors of the other Party...” Moreover, each of the signatories agreed to keep the other informed of and forewarned against any possible plots and schemes.¹⁷

Additionally, this was a defensive treaty. Article III called for each party to send “...armed Troops, Archers, Slingers, Ships and Galleys sufficiently supplied with all requisites and other kinds of defence....”¹⁸ Military aid was to be rendered in support of the other in the case of invasion or proposed invasion by their enemies. However, this support should be offered “...without great injury to his Country....”¹⁹ Thus, neither party was expected to weaken its own defenses in the aid of the other. Yet, both were left confident that they could rely on the other in time of war. For the English, Portugal's naval defenses were paramount not only because of the French threat to their own coastline but also because England's plans to invade France required the assistance of a greater naval power. On the other hand, Portugal alone could not repel a Castilian invasion. Thus, they could only hope to fend off the Castilians until an English army was brought ashore to provide assistance.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., 466.

¹⁹Ibid.

By necessity then, the Treaty of 1373 was negotiated and signed under a veil of secrecy. The English wanted the advantage of surprise when they invaded the continent—be it Iberia or France. Portugal wanted this pact kept secret because she knew the consequence of its revelation would be an invasion by Enrique II before English aid could arrive. At this point, the Portuguese were risking far more than they were gaining. Nevertheless, Portugal needed an ally as a countermeasure not only to Castile itself, but also to the threat posed by the Franco-Castilian alliance. England was the logical choice.

Enrique II's reaction was both swift and harsh. In that same year, he ordered the blockade of the port of Lisbon with a Castilian fleet, and then personally led an invasion of Portugal. Needless to say, both Fernando and Edward III were ill prepared to handle such quick action. The result was that Fernando was forced to sign a degrading peace treaty at Santarem in 1374. In it he renounced his alliance with England and pledged instead to support Castile and France. This came at the worst possible time for England because fighting had just again begun in earnest between herself and France. England could have benefited from Portugal's fleet. Instead, Portugal sent no less than five galleys to serve in a Luso-Castilian fleet under the command of the Castilian Fernan Sanchez de Tovar. Its task was to harass the English coastline. Portugal also sent other galleys to sail directly with the French fleet.²⁰

Fernando's commitment to the French cause diminished greatly once Enrique withdrew his forces from Portuguese soil. When Enrique II died in 1379,

²⁰Marques Guedes, 79.

the Portuguese monarch saw an opportunity for renewed negotiations with the English. After Fernando fell ill, however, control of the Portuguese government shifted from Fernando's hands to that of his wife Leonor and her closest advisor, Juan Fernández de Andeiro, the Count of Ourem. They negotiated the marriage of Beatriz, Fernando's only heir, to the newly widowed King Juan I of Castile.²¹

The nuptial mass was celebrated on Sunday 17 May 1383. The father of the bride refused to attend, nor did he allow his *chancellor mór*, Lourenço Anes Fogaça, to attend in his stead. According to Fernão Lopes, the king's chronicler, the king stated that both he and Fogaça had "the cross of Saint George inscribed on their hearts" and so it was fitting that Fogaça should remain with the king.²² This, of course, was a reference to their amity to the English crown and their disapproval of the marriage. Fernando sent word to Richard II that this marriage was not of his doing and that he continued to regard the Treaty of 1373 as valid. In England only the Duke of Lancaster remained convinced.²³

Less than a month after her marriage, Fernando died at the age of 38 from tuberculosis.²⁴ According to the nuptial agreement, Beatriz would succeed to the throne and her consort, Juan I, would bear the title of King of Portugal. If they

²¹Originally, Beatriz was to marry King Juan's son. However, the King's consort died in the midst of the negotiations. This created an extraordinary opportunity for the Castilians. The marriage of the Castilian King to the Portuguese Infanta meant the possibility of a union of the two realms in the near future. It is hard to imagine that Fernando did not foresee the inevitable consequence of such a union, and its detrimental effects upon Portuguese independence. Yet, he could do little once the negotiations were finalized. See Russell, 352.

²²Originally, "que tinha a cruz de Sam Jorge scripta no coração como elle..." Translation mine. See Lopes, 447.

²³Russell, 354.

²⁴Marques Guedes, 83.

had a son or daughter, he or she would rule Portugal as a separate kingdom; if not, the Castilian heir would rule the two kingdoms as one realm with two separate Cortes.²⁵

Upon Fernando's death, Leonor ruled in Portugal as regent for her daughter, Beatriz, and her son-in-law, Juan. Much to the annoyance of the people of Lisbon, she filled her court with Castilians and Galicians. Almost immediately the King of Castile added the royal symbols of Portugal to his own standard. Then, in December, he led an army to secure personally the Portuguese city of Guarda along the border. These events proved more than the lower nobility could stand. With the overwhelming support of the *Olisipianos*, they devised a plan.²⁶ They proposed that João, the Master of the Military Order of Avis, and illegitimate son of Pedro I, take control of the palace in Lisbon. On 6 December of the same year, João entered the palace and murdered the Count of Ourém. Leonor fled. When she finally met up with Juan and his forces in Santarém, she formally handed over the reins of the Portuguese government to him.²⁷

The people of Lisbon urged João to accept the title "defender of the realm." He hesitantly accepted this title, and then began making plans for what

²⁵Russell, 353.

²⁶The term *Olisipiano* refers to the people of Lisbon also known as *Lisboetas*. It harkens back to the Roman period of Portuguese history when the city of Lisbon went by its Roman name *Olisipo*. It is not uncommon for the Portuguese, like so many other people, to identify themselves by their city of residence. However, in the case of the Portuguese, often the reference is to the Roman name rather than its modern Portuguese name. This dissertation will use both the Roman and the contemporary reference.

²⁷Livermore, 100.

he knew would be a difficult campaign. Although the revolution had spread to Porto and then to other cities and towns throughout the kingdom, Juan made ready for a siege of Lisbon which he thought was key to breaking the rebellion. He had the support of nearly fifty-four castles and other small areas, which were controlled by the Portuguese landed nobility. They stood by their word in support of Queen Beatriz and her consort.²⁸

Unfortunately for the Castilians, Juan's siege of Lisbon in the fall of 1384 was doomed from the start. What had begun as brief outbreaks of disease within the Castilian ranks soon turned into an epidemic. Juan's advisor begged him to retreat. He stubbornly refused. Not until he began to lose an estimated two hundred men a day, was Juan finally convinced to abandon the siege. The *Lisboetas* rejoiced at the obvious hand of God in their salvation for they had nearly run out of food and could not have held out much longer.²⁹

Meanwhile, João sent Fogaça, now his *chancellor mór*, to England to seek assistance from the English crown. The results of this diplomatic mission were two-fold. First, they were allowed to recruit anywhere from 400 to 700 English and Gascon mercenaries—at least one hundred of whom were English archers. Second, Fogaça's diplomatic mission sparked a renewed interest in the Kingdom of Castile and Leon by John of Gaunt.³⁰

²⁸Russell, 363.

²⁹Ibid., 368.

³⁰The exact figures of English and Gascon mercenaries varies depending on the source from two hundred to eight hundred. For a lengthy discussion of the historiography surrounding this issue see both the text and footnotes of Russell, 383-386.

The mercenaries left Plymouth to Portugal sometime in March of 1385, and they arrived one month later in Portugal as the Portuguese Cortes concluded that João was Portugal's legitimate heir to the throne. They came to assist the King with his up-coming campaigns to secure the loyalties of certain cities and prominent castles in northern Portugal. This he did with great aplomb. By the time Juan entered Portugal with his Castilian armies--again bent on taking Lisbon--João was well prepared for the defense of his crown. The pivotal moment came on the 14 August 1385 at Aljubarrota when a force of 35,000 Castilians led by Juan himself met with a crushing defeat at the hands of João's army of only 6,400 men. The English archers proved essential to this victory. Juan quickly withdrew his remaining forces traveled down the Tejo River and then embarked with the entire Castilian fleet to Seville.³¹

João's victory at Aljubarrota secured Portugal's independence for the next two hundred years. It confirmed his position as King of Portugal, lent authority to a new diplomatic mission from Portugal to England meant to secure a stronger alliance between the two crowns, and furthered John of Gaunt's interests in the Kingdom of Castile and Leon. After Aljubarrota, Juan's hold on power seemed much more vulnerable and his kingdom all the more attractive to John of Gaunt who now saw in João a worthy ally who had proven himself in battle against the common enemy, the King of Castile.

Negotiations between Portugal and England progressed at a rapid pace and resulted in the signing on 9 May 1386 of the Windsor Treaty between King

³¹Marques Guedes, 87.

João of Portugal and King Richard II of England. Like the Treaty of 1373, Article

I of this treaty ensured a perpetual state of amity between the two parties:

...between the above Kings [João and Richard] now reigning, and their Heirs and Successors, and between the Subjects of both Kingdoms, a solid, perpetual, and real League, Amity, Confederacy, and Union, not only in behalf of themselves, and their Heirs and Successors, but also in favour of the Kingdoms, Lands, Dominions, and Countries, and their Subjects, Vassals, Allies, and Friends whatsoever, so that either of them shall be bound to succour and afford aid to the other, against all Men that may live and die who shall attempt to violate the Peace of the other, or injure his State in any way....³²

The only exceptions to this rule were Pope Urban and his canonically elected successors, the Lords Wenzeslas, and John of Gaunt.³³

The next six articles of the treaty specified the extents and limits of this league for both signatories. It gave complete freedom of movement for the representatives of the king within each other's realm. As in the Treaty of 1373, it stipulated that upon request either side should provide both military and naval assistance to the other. This assistance would be provided within six months of the request.³⁴ Furthermore, the discovery of any plots or schemes against the other should be treated as though it were an injury to himself and dealt with immediately. In this case it was not enough to merely inform your ally of the planned deception. Instead, Article VII stipulated that, "he shall prevent it as

³²Foreign Office, "Portugal: Treaty of Alliance between England and Portugal,--Signed at Windsor, 9th May, 1386," *British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-1814*, 1-Part 1: 469.

³³*Ibid.*, 470. Ironically, it is John's son, Henry of Bolingbroke, Earl of Derby, who will later usurp Richard II making himself King of England in 1399 and reigning as Henry IV. This stipulation allowed for the simple reaffirmation of the treaty by the House of Lancaster. See Anthony Goodman, "John of Gaunt, Portugal's Kingmaker," *History Today* 36 (June 1986): 16.

³⁴Windsor, 9th May, 1386, 470-472.

much as in him lies, as though he were desirous of preventing the injury and contumely intended to his own interest....”³⁵

One of the unique elements of the Windsor Treaty of 1386 was the inclusion of merchant interests in what should have been a strictly political-military alliance, including complete freedom of movement to “Merchants or others, of whatever rank, dignity, or condition soever... .” Whether Portuguese or English, Article II also guaranteed “either Party safely and fearlessly to enter the Kingdom, Lands, Dominions of the other, and mutually to have intercourse and trade with his Subjects, ... [and go] as freely and as peacefully as they would be allowed to do in their own Country....”³⁶

This latitude of freedom granted to the merchant class reflected the strong commercial ties which already existed between the two realms. Trade between Portugal and England dates back to the early thirteenth century. Early Portuguese merchants sold national products such as wine, cork, salt, olive oil, and wax.³⁷ Early imports from England included wheat and woolens. By the mid sixteenth century, Portuguese merchants offered a dizzying array of exotic goods from eastern markets such as the Persian Gulf, India, Indonesia, China and Japan. These goods were often immediately re-exported to points north from London to Danzig. Portugal, however, also became an integral part of an

³⁵Ibid., 472.

³⁶Windsor, 9th May, 1386, 470. It is interesting to note that prior to the Treaty of Windsor, Portuguese merchants in Lisbon and Porto had negotiated a separate treaty with Edward III to these same ends. This treaty, signed in 1353, called for the protection of Portuguese merchant interests in England. This was quite common for the time. Goodman, 17.

³⁷Williams, 40-42.

extensive network connecting Italian merchants—primarily Genoese and Venetian—with northwest Europe. English merchants made regular stops in Lisbon. Their Portuguese counterparts frequented not only London, but also Southampton and Bristol.³⁸

Finally, it is the Windsor Treaty of 1386, not the Treaty of 1373, which has been reaffirmed countless times. The treaty itself required such action. Article XII specified “that all Heirs and Successors of...[João and Richard II], each in their time, shall, within a year, to calculate always from the day of his Coronation, be obliged, ...to swear to. renew, ratify, and confirm by a Public Attestation, as well as by their Great Seal, the present Alliance....”³⁹ Thus, King João and King Richard II chose to bind their kingdoms, their heirs, and their subjects to the other in perpetuity.

At this time, each had a good deal to gain from this pact. For João the alliance brought with it legitimacy. Aljubarrota and the Portuguese Cortes notwithstanding, the new King of Portugal understood that he needed international recognition to further secure his position among the other European monarchs. The Treaty of Windsor brought that and more. It brought a sense of continuity to the realm by ensuring that, although a new dynasty had been established, the House of Avis would continue to support long established political and commercial ties with England. Last, but certainly not least in the

³⁸Goodman, 17. For further analysis, including a map detailing the extent of the Portuguese trade network see, A. J. R. Russell-Wood, *The Portuguese Empire, 1415 – 1808: A World on the Move* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 124-130.

³⁹Windsor, 9th May, 1386, 473.

mind of the King, it guaranteed military aid should Juan, or his successors, turn their attentions once again towards Portugal

This alliance was just as important to England. The Franco-Castilian fleet had been wreaking havoc on English galleys. In this same year, the English feared rumors of a concentrated French attack upon her coast. The Franco-Castilian naval alliance was at the core of their fears. A naval alliance with Portugal would offset this imbalance. No sooner had the Windsor Treaty been signed by the kings' representatives, than Richard II invoked it to request the use of Portuguese galleys. The Portuguese complied by sending ten large galleys to serve with Richard's fleet for six months at the expense of the Portuguese crown. After this period, expenses were to be born by the English crown. The squadron remained in the service of England for the next four years.⁴⁰

Beside this squadron, another Portuguese fleet made up of transport ships and galleys was making its way to Plymouth, England. Their orders were to transport John of Gaunt, Pretender to the Castilian crown, his family, and his army to the Portuguese coast. Upon their arrival, these forces would be joined by João's army in an attempt to once and for all secure the Kingdom of Castile and Leon for the Duke of Lancaster and his wife Dona Constanza.⁴¹

While these plans ultimately failed, the mission itself had a tremendous impact on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance because it resulted in the marriage of

⁴⁰Russell, 417.

⁴¹Ibid.

King João of Portugal to Philippa, the eldest daughter of John of Gaunt.⁴² This union resulted in the creation of the most dynamic royal family in the annals of Portuguese history. Queen Philippa had a great influence on the moral standards of the Portuguese royal court. She also instilled in her children a great sense of intellectual curiosity which had been markedly absent among the Portuguese nobility prior to her arrival.

João and Philippa's children--Duarte, Pedro, Henry, John, Fernando, and Isabel--distinguished themselves in both letters and the arts. The most famous, of course, was Henry "the Navigator." He was Master of the Order of Christ and thus possessed both the intellectual desire and the wherewithal to initiate the era of the discoveries.

This marriage also had political ramifications in England. It was Queen Philippa's brother, Henry, who would eventually usurp the crown of England. He then sought out international recognition of this new title. His brother-in-law João was more than happy to oblige. Throughout Henry's reign, he maintained a warm correspondence with Philippa, and encouraged many marriages between the noble houses of Portugal and England. These good relations continued between the Houses of Avis and Lancaster well into the fifteenth century.⁴³

⁴²Although John of Gaunt failed in his attempt to secure the Castilian crown for himself, his Iberian campaign cannot be viewed as a failure. While in Iberia, he managed to marry his eldest daughter Philippa to João of Portugal. When the military campaign went badly, he secured a separate peace with Juan. Although John had to relinquish all future claims to the Castilian crown, for this he received from Juan a sizable indemnity. He also negotiated the marriage of his second daughter, Catherine, to Juan's son, Enrique. Thus, although he did not secure the crown, he left Iberia no worse for the wear. See Goodman, 19.

⁴³A good measure of this amity is the number of Portuguese kings and princes who were thereafter inducted into the famed Order of the Royal Garter, beginning with Pedro, Duke of Coimbra in 1427. Ibid., 20.

At this point, England and Portugal were allies in every sense of the term. Earlier military ties forged at the expense of Moorish blood, were formally recognized in two succeeding treaties, 1373 and 1386. At the signing of the Windsor Treaty, they had two common continental foes, France and Castile. They came to each other's defense on both land and sea against those same enemies. Politically, they recognized each other's dynastic claims at critical moments, thereby, facilitating international recognition of those claims. They strengthened these political ties with a variety of aristocratic marriages, the most significant being that of João of Avis to Philippa of Lancaster.

Commercially, they guaranteed not only the safe conduct, but also the interests of each other's merchants within the other's realm. This was essential to the economic development of both kingdoms. By the fifteenth century, Portugal and England had developed a kind of symbiotic relationship. Portugal imported English woolens and wheat. Meanwhile, the English elites desired exotic goods from the Mediterranean which Portuguese merchants adeptly provided. English manufacturers also needed a dyestuff known as *grain* which they purchased directly from Portugal. This is what gave English woolens their famed brilliant red coloring. Thus, both Portugal and England reaped the economic benefits of this league in terms of both imports and exports.⁴⁴

Over the next century, the Portuguese realm expanded exponentially. Under the direction of the House of Avis, Portugal spearheaded the European

⁴⁴Ibid. The Portuguese also provided wine, which--because of French and Castilian interference coupled with the English loss of Gascony -was otherwise difficult for the English to obtain. For further discussion of Anglo-Portuguese trade in the fourteenth see also Williams, 40-42.

discoveries. Her ships were the first to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, the first to secure an overseas route to the Spice Islands, and the first to sail into Asia. Not only was she the first to sail into blue waters, her sons were also the first to discover and chart the winds and currents of the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. Consequently, she was also the first European power to establish a worldwide trading-post empire.

The next two hundred years of leadership in European expansion seemed to fulfill Portugal's destiny. They brought to Portugal extraordinary wealth and fame. Continental Portugal was small and constantly threatened by her larger neighbor, Castile. On the open ocean, however, Portugal was dominant—at least for a few centuries. After having wrenched herself from Castile, she continued the fight to distance herself from Castile. Her experiences as a nation—the Battle of Ourique, the siege of Lisbon, the Battle of Aljubarrota, and her accomplishments at sea—imbued her with a sense that Portugal was a great power. Given this context, her alliance with England makes all the more sense. They were both on the periphery of Europe. They were Atlantic powers who allied with each other against a common continental enemy—Spain and France.

In the Shadow of Mine Enemy: Spanish Iberian Hegemony and the Fight for Portuguese Independence

In 1557, João III of Avis died, leaving his three-year-old son Sebastião as heir to the Portuguese throne. Raised on the glorious tales of crusading knights, Sebastião was determined to add his name to the ranks of his forefathers. When he reached the age of maturity and assumed the crown, he began planning a

Moroccan campaign. In 1578, at the age of twenty-four and childless, Sebastião led his army into Morocco. Sebastião's lack of experience and inadequate military intelligence led to an overwhelming defeat at Alcácer-Quivir. Portugal's next generation of leaders was either lost or held for ransom. King Sebastião himself was never found and, thus, presumed dead.⁴⁵

What began as a horrible military defeat ultimately resulted in a loss of sovereignty for Portugal. When the dust settled, it was King Philip II of Spain who secured the legitimate claim to the Portuguese crown. From 1580 to 1640 the Philips of Spain ruled Portugal and her empire. Initially Portuguese autonomy was guaranteed. Each succeeding Philip became less interested in governing Portugal and all the more disinterested in upholding the original terms of the agreement. The final blow to Portuguese prestige came from Philip IV and the appointment of the widowed Duchess of Mantua as governor of Portugal. One of her first acts was to arbitrarily increase both taxes and troop requisitions in Portugal. Portuguese anger and resentment over these actions was on the rise. They needed only the right opportunity.⁴⁶

Opportunity for a Portuguese revolt came in the form of a Catalanian uprising. Philip IV's forces were thus occupied on the other side of the peninsula. On 1 December 1640, the Portuguese conspirators mounted the palace steps,

⁴⁵Walter C. Opello, Jr. *Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy*, Westview Profiles. Nations of Contemporary Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 44.

⁴⁶Livermore, 171. Philip II never won the hearts of the urban Portuguese, the lower nobility, or the lower clergy. It was these sectors of Portuguese society that would later foment revolution. See also Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Siân Reynolds, vol. II (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1949; reprint, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1973), 1176-1185

shot and defenestrated the Aide to the Duchess, Vasconcelos. They then arrested the Duchess and awaited their king. Their choice was D. João, the Duke of Bragança--the wealthiest and most powerful aristocrat in Portugal. Five days later João arrived. Ten days after, he was crowned João IV, King of Portugal.

What of the Spanish? There were only three small Spanish garrisons in Portugal. Each had almost immediately quit the country. The revolt in Catalonia was going splendidly for the Catalonians, poorly for the Spanish Hapsburgs. Thus, the "restoration" was complete. While intermittent attempts by Spain to reincorporate Portugal into the realm failed, formal Spanish recognition of Portuguese independence would not be realized until a treaty was signed in 1668.⁴⁷

While gaining the title of King may have come easily, securing the Kingdom would prove much more difficult. The real crisis faced by João was not domestic, but diplomatic. Portugal needed to reassert herself internationally. Yet, she had an empty treasury, no army, no navy to speak of, no allies and one relentless enemy--Spain. The military problems were quickly resolved. A new tax was levied whose funds were tasked for the refitting of arms and ships. The diplomatic situation, however, took much more time and effort than had been expected.

⁴⁷Livermore, 172. When finally signed on 13 February 1668, the treaty of peace between Spain and Portugal called for the mutual restitution of all conquered territories—with the exception Ceuta which chose to remain loyal to Spain. See Calvet de Magalhães, 90.

Meanwhile, in England, the Stuarts had succeeded the Tudors. Domestic unrest consumed the Stuarts from 1642 to 1660. For Portugal, *The Treaty of Peace, Commerce and Alliance, between Great Britain and Portugal (1642)* was significant in that it recognized João IV as King of Portugal and offered assurances of British neutrality in the current state of hostilities between Portugal and Spain. On the other hand, the English sought and gained commercial concessions in the Portuguese colonies similar to those granted the Dutch, as well as liberty of conscience and worship to English merchants trading in both Portugal and her colonies.⁴⁸

Twenty years would pass before full diplomatic ties were reestablished between Portugal and Great Britain. The treaty signed on 28 April 1660 went straight to the heart of the matter. Portugal was still at war with Spain. Article II stated explicitly that, "His Majesty of Portugal, or anyone whom he may depute, shall be permitted to raise and procure, in this Commonwealth, Soldiers and horses, to defend and secure himself against the King of Castile."⁴⁹

⁴⁸Foreign Office, "Portugal: Treaty of Peace, Commerce and Alliance between Great Britain and Portugal,--Signed at London, 29th January, 1642," *British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-1814*, 1-Part 1: 473-480. For an insightful analysis of the three treaties of the seventeenth centuries see, Edgar Prestage, "The Treaties of 1642, 1654 and 1661," in *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, ed. Edgar Prestage (Watford: Voss and Michael, Ltd., 1935; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 140.

⁴⁹Foreign Office, "Portugal: Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Portugal,-- Signed at Whitehall, 28th April, 1660," *British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-1814*, 1-Part 1: 492-494. It should be noted that before this treaty could be ratified in Portugal the Stuarts regained the throne in England. Representatives of the Portuguese crown remained in London and immediately initiated negotiations for a treaty of marriage between the two kingdoms. The Treaty of 1661, the treaty of marriage, ratified and confirmed all treaties signed between the two realms from 1641 to that date. See. Foreign Office, "Portugal: Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, of Marriage between His Majesty Charles the Second and the Princess Catherine, Infanta--Signed at Whitehall, 23rd June, 1661," *British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-1814*, 1-Part 1: 495.

The following year, 1661, the alliance was confirmed and strengthened by a treaty of marriage between Charles II and the Portuguese Infanta, Catherine of Bragança. If the treaty of 1660 fulfilled Portugal's current military needs, the treaty of 1661 went far in satisfying Portugal's diplomatic concerns. Not since the Windsor Treaty of 1386 did the language used in a treaty between Portugal and Great Britain specifically bind the two Kingdoms' interests and futures. This treaty signed 23 June 1661 contained nineteen published articles and one secret article. Of the nineteen articles, only five deal directly with the Infanta and her needs. The rest spoke to the distribution and reorganization of Catherine's extraordinary dowry, and to the commercial, military and diplomatic interests of both realms. Plainly stated, it made clear the expectations of England regarding trade within the Portuguese colonies, while concurrently guaranteeing Portugal much needed military and diplomatic assistance in regards to both the Dutch and the Spanish.

The treaty begins, as expected, by specifying the details of the marriage itself—i.e. who gets what, when, and where.⁵⁰ This was, however, no simple treaty of marriage. British merchants were granted wide commercial rights in Portuguese India and Brazil, as well as extensive personal liberties. Indeed, it specified that British subjects engaged in commerce in these locations would

⁵⁰The King of England received Tangier, Bombay and two million crowns Portuguese. For her part, the Infanta was assured "free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion..." and to this end her own chapel. She would also receive "a jointure of £30,000 of English money by the year, together with at least one such Palace or House as Her Majesty may make her ordinary residence in...all which Her Majesty shall enjoy during her life, if she survive His Majesty." Keep in mind that the Queen Mother had been a French Roman Catholic. Consequently, these assurances of religious freedom and independent income were each repeatedly framed within the following phrase "in the same manner as the Queen Mother enjoyed." This served as a gentle reminder to an Anglican parliament that this union posed no new threat. *Ibid.*, 497.

“enjoy all privileges and immunities...which the Portuguese themselves enjoy....”⁵¹ Meanwhile, the Portuguese Crown received clearly detailed military commitments from the British crown concerning the defense of Portugal from invasion. Furthermore, in the published articles of this treaty, the King of Great Britain promised to “take the interest of Portugal and all its Dominions to heart, defending the same with his utmost power by sea and land, even as England itself....”⁵²

Yet, it was in the *Secret Article* of the treaty of 1661 that the true nature and extent of this union was revealed:

...His Majesty of Great Britain, in regard of the great advantages and increase of Dominion he hath purchased by the above-mentioned Treaty of Marriage, shall promise and oblige himself...to defend and protect all Conquests or Colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal, against all his Enemies, as well future as present: moreover, His Majesty of Great Britain doth oblige himself to mediate a good Peace between the King of Portugal and the States of the United Provinces, and all Companies or Societies of Merchants subject under them, upon conditions convenient and becoming the mutual interest of England and Portugal; and in case such a Peace ensue not, then His Majesty of Great Britain shall be obliged to defend, with Men and Ships, the Dominions and Conquests of the King of Portugal.⁵³

The interests of Great Britain and Portugal were now mutual; the preservation of empire, both British and Portuguese. Since British merchants enjoyed the same immunities as the Portuguese within the Portuguese Empire, Portuguese colonial interests were *de facto* British colonial interests.

⁵¹Ibid., 498.

⁵²Ibid., 499.

⁵³Ibid., 501.

Thus, after twenty-one years, Portugal was once again not only a recognized independent European sovereignty, but also an international commercial and political power. Prior to 1580, that status was based on her ability to project power across every navigable ocean. After 1661, the Portuguese monarchy recognized her limitations vis-à-vis the ever-increasing reach of the French, the Dutch and the British. In terms of empire, Portugal gave up hope of regaining her position in the Far East and instead began to focus her attention on Brazil.

The Portuguese understood that their international status was largely tied to their colonial holdings. Again, continental Portugal was small, but her empire—the losses in Asia notwithstanding—was vast. Portuguese development of Brazil brought direct wealth to the Portuguese crown in the form of precious metals. It also brought tremendous wealth to the realm in terms of goods for re-export via the metropole.

This period of Spanish domination reaffirmed the clear and present danger that Spain posed for Portugal. Accordingly, after 1640, the Portuguese found themselves reasserting their Atlantic identity, fighting to preserve their colonies, and standing shoulder to shoulder with the other great European colonial powers in their development of the New World. Portugal was not simply a European power. She was a colonial power. Beside continental sovereignty, Portugal also had as a key national interest the preservation of her empire. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance would prove essential to defending the political and military interests of Portugal.

Woolens for Wine: The Methuen Treaties

The defensive treaties notwithstanding, it was the commercial treaty of 27 December 1703 that had a long-lasting impact on Anglo-Portuguese relations. Indeed, it remained in effect for over one hundred years. Initiated by the Portuguese, the treaty was negotiated and signed by John Methuen, a British minister to Portugal, and dealt primarily with commercial exchanges between the two countries.

Historians point to the Methuen treaties of 1703 as evidence that Portugal was already a quasi-dependent of Great Britain. Careful reading of the treaties and an understanding of the continental circumstances under which they were negotiated and signed, however, allows for a different interpretation. Contrary to common interpretation, during the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713), Portugal was not in a weak political position. Indeed, Portugal was in a position of power as evidenced by the language of the treaties signed. They offer no sign of dependency on the part of Portugal, but instead offered Portugal some distinct advantages.

Paul Methuen was appointed British minister to Portugal in 1697. He replaced his father, John Methuen, who had served in the same capacity from 1691 to 1696. Soon after Paul Methuen's appointment, Europe was on the brink of yet another dynastic conflict known as the War of Spanish Succession. Once again, Portugal found herself unwillingly involved in a continental conflict yet in a position of power due to her unique geographic location. Both father and son worked tirelessly in 1703 to negotiate no less than three treaties with Portugal

within that year. The first two brought Portugal into the Grand Alliance. The last was a commercial treaty between Portugal and Great Britain.⁵⁴

Negotiated and signed by John Methuen, the treaty of 1703 was comprised of only three articles. The first article of the treaty stated that Portugal, from that moment forward, would admit “the woollen [sic] cloths and the rest of the woollen [sic] manufactures of the Britons...”⁵⁵ This was important to the British because for nearly eighteen years there had been a variety of restrictions placed on the importation of British woolens into Portugal. As stated earlier, the

⁵⁴A. D. Francis, *The Methuens and Portugal, 1691-1708* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 41. The Grand Alliance—made up of Great Britain, Holland, and Austria—recognized that war with the Bourbons would involve hostilities on both land and sea. If Portugal could be convinced to join the Alliance, it would gain a great geographic advantage. Portugal's position along Spain's western border would make Spain vulnerable to several avenues of attack. Likewise, Portugal, or more specifically Lisbon, was seen as critical for use as a careening port in the expected naval contest over control of the Mediterranean Sea. After months of negotiations two treaties were prepared for signing in Lisbon on 16 May 1703. One was the *Defensive and Offensive Alliance between the Emperor and Portugal and Great Britain and the Netherlands*, sometimes known as the *Offensive Quadruple Treaty*. This treaty brought Portugal into the Grand Alliance. Of the twenty-nine treaty articles, twenty dealt exclusively with the conduct of war in the peninsula. Each of the allied powers was required to provide and pay for men, arms and ships. Once these men arrived in Portugal, they were under the command of the Portuguese king and suffered under Portuguese law. The Portuguese crown was to be in full control of the Peninsular Campaign. This treaty was not signed by Great Britain because of her unique relationship with Portugal. Instead a separate treaty was signed by Portugal, Great Britain, and Holland. This separate treaty was the *Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Portugal*, sometimes known as the *Defensive Triple Treaty*. Although containing only twenty articles, this treaty mirrored the same military concerns of the *Offensive Quadruple Treaty*. Whereas, the focus of the former treaty was on land-based operations in Iberia, the latter treaty focused on the naval challenges confronting the allies. For a classic study of the treaty negotiations see, Sir Richard Lodge, “The Treaties of 1703,” in *Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, ed. Edgar Prestage (Watford: Voss and Michael, Ltd., 1935; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971). To view the *Offensive Quadruple Treaty* see, Clive Parry, ed., *The Consolidated Treaty Series*, vol. 24 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1969), 389-398. Finally, to view the *Defensive Triple Treaty* see, Foreign Office, “Portugal: Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Portugal,--Signed at Lisbon, 16th May, 1703,” *British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-1814*, 1-Part 1: 501-506. For a discussion of the small territorial gains made by Portugal in South America as a result of these events see, Pedro Soares Martinez, *História Diplomática de Portugal* (Lisbon: Editorial Verbo, 1986), 180.

⁵⁵Foreign Office, “Portugal: Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Portugal,--Signed at Lisbon, 27th December, 1703,” *British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-1814*, 1-Part 1: 507.

import of British woolens to Portugal went back centuries and was an important staple of the English economy.⁵⁶

The treaty, however, also dealt with another item of common interest to England and Portugal--wine. The second article placed a condition upon the importation of these British goods into Portugal. It stated that Britain would "be obliged for ever hereafter to admit the wines of the growth of Portugal into Britain....deducting or abating a third part of the Custom or Duty [placed on French wines]." Consequently, the duty imposed on Portuguese wines was two-thirds that of French wines. While this offered the British an alternative to French wines, now costly and difficult to come by because of the war with France, it also gave Portuguese wines a tremendous market advantage in Great Britain. From this point forward, Portuguese Port and Madeira wines--both fortified wines--became the wines of choice in Great Britain and her colonies.⁵⁷

Article two also stipulated that should the British government ever attempt to alter this "abatement of Customs... it shall be just and lawful for His Sacred Royal Majesty of Portugal again to prohibit the woollen [sic] cloths, and the rest of the British woollen manufactures." This stipulation gave Portugal not only a substantial guarantee of continued preferential treatment, but also a clear form of redress of grievances should the British Crown, for whatever reason, ever decide to reverse that standing.⁵⁸

⁵⁶Lodge, 165.

⁵⁷Lodge, 164.

⁵⁸Lisbon, 27th December, 1703, 507.

Finally, the last article of the Methuen treaty required ratification of the treaty by both parties within two months time.⁵⁹ This they both did without reservation. For the British, regaining the Portuguese woolens market was critical to the continued expansion of their manufacturing sector. Lisbon was, after all, an entrepôt for Mediterranean trade. For the Portuguese, this treaty went a long way in helping Portugal correct the balance of trade between herself and Great Britain. In fact, the long term effect of this treaty was that Portugal could now pay for British imports in goods rather than gold. The increased demand for Portuguese wines also helped develop and expand that industry in northern Portugal.⁶⁰

The English Century

The Third Empire: Africa and the “Rose Colored Map”

On 11 January 1890, Her Majesty, Queen Victoria sent a brief but compelling note to the Portuguese government in regard to a recent skirmish

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Lodge, 164. For a further discussion of the negotiations see also Francis, 184-218 and, for a broader perspective see Shaw, 33-44. This treaty has been a bone of historiographical contention among both Portuguese and non-Portuguese historians. Some argued that the Methuen Treaty favored Great Britain and led to Portugal's dependent status in the nineteenth century, others that it favored neither signatory. For a brief overview of the historiographical question see Marques Guedes, 310-315. For a detailed presentation of the economic dependency theory read Sandro Sideri, *Trade and Power, Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1970), and António Lopes Vieira, "A Política da Especulação—uma Introdução aos Investimentos Britânicos e Franceses nos Caminhos-de-ferro Portugueses," *Análise Social* 24, no.2-3 (1988): 723-44.. For a response to this theory read chapters one and two of Gervase Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).

between Portuguese troops and African natives. The fighting took place in a part of central Africa in which Portuguese interests and British interests collided, the Valley of Shire in Nyasaland. The note insisted that the Portuguese withdraw their troops from the area immediately and also withdraw all claims to this area. It began,

What Her Majesty's Government require and insist upon is the following: [Send instructions to the Governor of Mozambique to withdraw all troops from the specified areas]... Mr. Petre [British Ambassador to Lisbon] is compelled by his instruction to leave Lisbon at once with all the members of his legation unless a satisfactory answer to the foregoing intimation is received by him in the course of this evening, and Her Majesty's Ship *Enchantress* is now at Vigo waiting for his orders.⁶¹

This became known as the British Ultimatum. The tone and language used in this memorandum made clear to Portugal—and, later, the world—that the relationship between these two allies had shifted dramatically over the course of the nineteenth century.

At the root of this change in the alliance was the growing disparity in power—both economic and military—between the two realms. In the 19th century, Great Britain reached her acme as a world power. By the end of the century Britain dominated one-quarter of the world's land and one-fifth of the world's population. She was a commercial powerhouse, with vast global interests. Her Majesty's Royal Navy adroitly protected both her landed empire and her commercial empire. Britannia did indeed rule the sea.

⁶¹The memorandum is quoted in its original English as found in Basilio Teles, *Do Ultimatum ao 31 de Janeiro, Esboço de História Política, Obras de Basilio Teles* (Porto: Lello & Irmão, 1905; reprint, Lisbon: Portugalia Editora, 1968), 88

Concurrently, Portugal was at her political and commercial nadir. By the 19th century, Portugal had already lost most of her holdings in Asia, and would soon lose Brazil as well. During the Peninsular Wars, Napoleon's armies laid waste to Portugal until finally being expelled by an Anglo-Portuguese army in 1813. This turbulent period was followed by a long civil war between rival Portuguese princes for the Portuguese crown and, shortly thereafter, a popular uprising. All of this turmoil had a detrimental effect on Portugal. Commercially she was devastated. Politically she was fragile. Relations between Great Britain and Portugal began to sour with Britain seeming more the bully and less the ally.

From 1850 to 1870, the period known as the "Regeneration," Portugal was politically more stable. Her economy had begun to turn around. She looked to her African colonies as both an assertion of her continued prominence in the world and as a region not yet fully exploited for its commercial value. Even before the traditional timeframe for the Scramble for Africa (1879-1895), Portuguese and British interests clashed because both had a plan to develop central sub-Saharan Africa.

In 1851, the *Conselho Ultramarino* was created within the Portuguese government. It had two primary tasks. First, it was to promote and reinforce the ties between the metropole and the colonies through both commercial expansion and capital investment. Second, it was to stop or at least diminish the intrusion of other European powers into Portuguese territories, particularly that of Great Britain in the lands between Angola and Mozambique.⁶² Between 1785 and

⁶²Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "Política Externa e Política Interna no Portugal de 1890: o Ultimatum Inglês," *Análise Social* 23, n.s. 4 (1987): 690.

1877, Portugal had made no fewer than twelve expeditions into the hinterland between Angola and Mozambique. She therefore claimed these territories by right of "prior discovery." Prior discovery was the accepted method for claiming new territories in international law until 1875⁶³

The following year, an international conference was held in Brussels. Attendees were very critical of historical claims to the interior of Africa. Instead, they propose the view that "effective occupation" should be the standard for recognition. This, of course, was problematic for Portugal. That same year Luciano Cordeiro founded the Geographic Society of Lisbon. Its mission was twofold: to invigorate Portuguese public opinion regarding the issue of colonialism, and to fund large expeditions into central Africa.⁶⁴

On 26 February 1884, the Treaty of Zaire was signed in London between Portugal and Great Britain. In it the British recognized Portuguese claims to territories along the Zaire River. They based their decision on the fact that Portugal had more established trading posts than the Belgians who had their own claims to the Congo Basin. When details of the treaty were released in the press, tremendous pressure was brought to bear upon the British government to abandon their position. They did. The Portuguese were stunned at this reversal and called for an international conference to resolve the question once and for all.⁶⁵ This led to the Berlin Conference in November 1884. The conference

⁶³Ibid., 688.

⁶⁴Ibid., 690-91.

⁶⁵John Eppstein, "Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1373-1973," *World Survey* 54 (1973): 9.

found against Portugal and, instead, recognized the sovereign territory of the international Association of the Congo. One week later, 23 February 1885, the independent state of the Congo was founded, as a Belgian colony. Worse yet, the Berlin Conference resolved that “effective occupation,” not prior discovery, would be the standard for international recognition of sovereignty within the interior of Africa.⁶⁶

This was particularly discouraging for Portugal because it placed her at a distinct disadvantage. Up until the Berlin Conference, what had been her advantage in Africa was time. Simply stated, she had been the first to create a trading-post empire and earlier commerce had not necessitated the development of the interior. Portuguese expansion into the African hinterland would require a large investment of capital, and the introduction of new technology, e.g. the extension of a well-planned railroad system from the port cities to the interior. She would also need enough men to both secure these vast areas and then to fill the bureaucratic ranks necessary to maintain control over these same territories. In comparison to her European rivals, Portugal was easily outmanned and outgunned. Much to her dismay, Portugal’s greatest rival in Africa was her oldest ally, Great Britain.

Portugal had a definite vision of her place in Africa. She called it *Africa Meridional Portuguesa*. In 1886, Portugal met with representatives from both France and Germany to discuss her plans for sub-Saharan Africa. In two separate treaties the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Henrique Barros Gomes, had

⁶⁶Teixeira, 692.

fixed the frontiers of this new empire. In the following year, a map that showed this new expansive area linking Angola to Mozambique in shades of rose was presented to the Portuguese Chamber of Deputies. They accepted Portugal's plans for a West–East transcontinental empire, the "Rose Colored Map."⁶⁷



Figure 1: The Rose Colored Map⁶⁸

⁶⁷Eppstein, 9.

⁶⁸Figure 2 show the "Mappa" or map illustrating Portugal's designs on central Africa. <http://www.africafederation.net/Rose-map.htm> [accessed 12 February 2012].

Great Britain had a very different reaction. When presented with coast-to-coast Portuguese African claims, Lord Salisbury dug in. He argued that Britain would only accept Portuguese claims to sovereignty in effectively occupied African territories. Why did Britain take such an uncompromising stance with Portugal? It turns out that Britain had her own vision of sub-Saharan Africa, one that included an extraordinary Cape to Cairo British Empire. This South to North transcontinental empire represented two aspects of British imperialism in Africa. In the northern regions, British goals were strongly supported by both English missionaries and Scottish Presbyterian missionaries. While in Cape Town, white settlers and prospectors tied their fate to the expansion of British rule in Africa. Thus, Portuguese and British ambitions in Africa were at crosscurrents.⁶⁹

Tensions between the two countries came to a head in December of 1889. While traveling in the Valley of Shire (in Nyasaland), Major Serpa Pinto—on expedition in the service of the King of Portugal—found a raised British flag and the native peoples, the Makololos, in revolt against Portugal. The governor of Mozambique sent João de Azevedo Coutinho to subdue the natives and required their African chiefs to submit to Portuguese sovereignty. The British government viewed this Portuguese action as an act of war because these tribes were supposedly under the protection of the British—hence the raised Union Jack.

⁶⁹David Birmingham, "Britain and the African Background to the Ultimatum of 1890," *STUDIA* 54/55 (1996): 31.

After a brief exchange of diplomatic notes, Her Majesty's Navy was positioned along key ports in Mozambique and Portugal.⁷⁰

Finally, on 11 January 1890, Queen Victoria's government sent a memorandum to the Portuguese government, historically known as the British Ultimatum of 1890. It was brief and to the point. It insisted that the governor of Mozambique was to be telegraphed that same day with instructions to withdraw all Portuguese military forces from Shire and all lands pertaining to the Makololos and the Machonas. It then went on to state that, should a satisfactory response not be received that afternoon, Her Majesty's government would be forced to withdraw her legation from Lisbon. Added to this was the not so subtle threat (reminder) that the H.M.S. *Enchantress* in Vigo was awaiting orders to take the minister home as part of closing the legation. The Portuguese government felt it had no choice but to accede to the demands of the British. This it did that afternoon. However, in its response, the Portuguese government noted that it had the right to pursue the matter further by seeking outside arbitration in the near future.⁷¹

Great Britain did not accept Portugal's claim to a right of arbitration or mediation. Therefore, negotiations proceeded directly between both countries. The immediate diplomatic results of the British Ultimatum was the negotiation of two treaties—one on 20 August 1890, the other on 11 June of 1891. Portugal did not ratify the former, but did ratify the latter "with a view to settle definitively the

⁷⁰Teixeira, 693.

⁷¹Marques Guedes, 459-60. The author quotes the full text of the British Ultimatum and the Portuguese response.

boundaries of their respective spheres of influence in Africa....”⁷² Portuguese dreams of a transcontinental Luso-African Empire were lost to other ambitions such as the establishment of Rhodesia, Malawi, and Zambia.⁷³

Besides establishing the boundaries for Angola and Mozambique, this treaty also satisfied religious and commercial considerations. According to Article X, “missionaries of both countries shall have full protection...[and] all forms of divine worship and religious teaching are guaranteed.”⁷⁴ Article XI put a twenty-five year, three percent duties cap on British goods being transported across Portuguese territories. It guaranteed “freedom for the passage of subjects and goods of both Powers across the Zambesi....” It also allowed one Power the right “for the purpose of communication” to construct roads, railways, bridges, and telegraph lines “across the district reserved to the other.”⁷⁵ In essence, the majority of the sixteen articles that make up this treaty sought to foster and facilitate trade across colonial boundaries in sub-Saharan Africa.

The same government that acceded to the British Ultimatum, Minister Barros Gomes' government, did not sign this treaty. That government failed. It resigned in disgrace. Whereas prior to the British Ultimatum the merits of the African colonies were debated among the Portuguese elite, now it became a

⁷²Foreign Office, “Portugal: Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, defining the Spheres of Influence of the two Countries in Africa,—Signed at Lisbon, June 11, 1891,” *British and Foreign State Papers, 1890-1891*, LXXXIII: 27.

⁷³Douglas Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 60.

⁷⁴Lisbon, June 11, 1891, 33.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 34.

question of national pride. The Portuguese had been humiliated on an international stage.

The political consequences of the British Ultimatum in Portugal cannot be overstated. There was the failure of the Barros Gomes' government and the call for new elections. Concurrently, there were widespread anti-British public demonstrations. Across Portugal newspaper editorials called for an end to the alliance, an end to the Progressive government, and, in some cases, an end to the Portuguese monarchy itself. There was even a patriotic call for funds to be raised for the construction of warships to defend Portugal's national honor.⁷⁶

Current patriotic sentiment was best expressed in a song titled, *A Portuguesa*. In the lyrics there is an unnamed "enemy," that enemy was Great Britain. The chorus follows,

To arms, to arms
On land and sea!
To arms, to arms
To fight for our Homeland!
To march against the enemy guns!

This song is Portugal's current national anthem. Composed in 1890, it was adopted as the national anthem in 1911 by the new Republican government. On 31 January 1890, there was a Republican Revolution in Porto. Although it failed, it foreshadowed things to come.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Teixeira, 697-700.

⁷⁷Douglas L. Wheeler, "Diplomacy's Odd Couple. England, Portugal and Their Alliance (1373-1993)," [unpublished draft] [photocopy] 1999, quoted here by permission of the author, 27.

There were both immediate and long-term political consequences as a result of the British Ultimatum. Overall a new sense of nationalism reinvigorated the colonial movement in Portugal. The colonies were not simply a matter of national interest, they were now tied to Portugal's sense of national pride and national identity. The Republican Party--formerly anti-colonial—expertly used the British Ultimatum time and again to wear down the opposition. Finally, it was this issue which set the stage for the demise of the Portuguese monarchy in 1910 and the establishment of the First Republic.

In the two decades that followed the British Ultimatum, the drive for African colonies among the European powers reached its apex. Of particular concern for Portugal was the German desire for “a place in the sun.” Germany coveted the Portuguese colonies in particular because she felt that Portugal was not developing those areas to their full potential. To this end, she approached Great Britain many times regarding the partition of Portuguese Africa.

Meanwhile, Portugal strove to maintain effective control over her African territories. Political instability coupled with several economic crises restricted Portugal's options.⁷⁸ Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau all required extensive development of their infrastructure to reach their full mercantile

⁷⁸The Portuguese economy had experienced a decline beginning around 1870. The intense political instability of the First Republic hampered Portuguese economic development. By 1916 the Portuguese economy was extraordinarily weak. Agricultural production was down. Industrial expansion was limited due to a lack of capital, poor communications systems, and a lack of natural resources. Adding to the problem was the high amount of emigration from Portugal to both Brazil and the United States. The result was a marked trade imbalance. See John D. Vincent-Smith, “Portuguese Economy and the Anglo-Portuguese Commercial Treaty of 1916,” *Iberian Studies* 3, n.s. 2 (1974): 49.

potential. Yet, Portugal lacked the funds to do so herself. Worse still, fear of defaulting on foreign loans kept her from seeking funds elsewhere.⁷⁹

Publicly, Anglo-Portuguese relations were at the breaking point. The regicide of the Portuguese King, Carlos I, and his heir, Prince Luis Filipe, in Lisbon on 1 February 1908 strained relations between the two governments. After only two years, King Manuel II's monarchy fell victim to a successful Republican revolution. The revolt began on 3 October 1910 with the assistance of two compromised military units in Lisbon. Fighting continued throughout the next day between monarchist units and both compromised military units and revolutionary gangs of Lisboetas who relentlessly harassed the loyalist troops. By 2 p.m., 5 October 1910 King Manuel received word that his troops had surrendered. He and his family retired to England where he eventually abdicated.⁸⁰

This revolt marked the end of the monarchy in Portugal and the beginning of the Republic. A clear sign of the strained relations between the two powers was the delay on the part of Great Britain in recognizing Portugal's new government. Great Britain reserved formal recognition of the Portuguese Republic until 11 September 1911. She did so for three reasons. First, the Republican Party was closely associated with the earlier regicide. Second, Britain's government—along with many other European powers—took a dim view

⁷⁹John D. Vincent-Smith, "Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese colonies in Africa, 1911-1914" *Historical Journal* 17, n.s. 3 (1974): 620.

⁸⁰Wheeler, *Republican Portugal*, 49-52.

of the new Republic's anti-clerical laws. These laws were so harsh that they appeared to be aimed at suppressing religion altogether, rather than simply separating church from state. Finally, they delayed recognition as an expression of criticism of Portugal's failing colonial administration, especially in Mozambique where British commercial interests were concentrated.⁸¹

Ironically it was Mozambique, or more precisely the location of its capital Lourenço Marques, which privately brought the two allies back to the negotiating table. In 1899, the republics of the Transvaal and the Orange River Free State went to war with Great Britain. An earlier treaty (1875) signed between the Boers and Portugal would allow the use of Lourenço Marques for the transport of arms and munitions. Seeing an opportunity to regain some lost confidence, Portugal's Minister in London, the Marquis of Soveral, opened secret negotiations with Britain for a new treaty.⁸²

By 14 October 1899 that treaty was signed in London. Remarkably, the Treaty of 1899 confirmed the first article of the Treaty of 1642 and the final article of the Treaty of 1661. Thus, it reaffirmed the perpetual peace and amity between both nations, while it also reaffirmed the commitment of Great Britain to defend Portugal's colonies as though they were her own. For Portugal this was critical because she knew full well of the details of the secret treaty between Germany and Great Britain (1898) in which both nations planned to offer Portugal financial assistance with the caveat that should she default on her loans her African

⁸¹John D. Vincent-Smith, "The Portuguese Republic and Britain, 1910-14," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10, n.s. 4 (1975): 713-715.

⁸²Calvet de Magalhães, 206-207.

colonies would be divided up between them. At the time, Portugal had understandably turned instead to France for financial assistance. With this new treaty signed between herself and Britain, she no longer had to fear that her old ally had abandoned her colonies to the desires of the Germans.⁸³

For her part, Portugal also had several commitments required of her by the Treaty of 1899. Contrary to the aforementioned Treaty of 1875, Portugal would not allow the Boers to use Lourenço Marques as a port for the transport of arms and munitions. Instead, Britain would gain that exclusive right. Beyond this, Portugal also agreed to not declare herself neutral for the duration of the Boer War. Given the nature of the alliance, this turned out to be a great tactical advantage for the British.⁸⁴

This advantage was not lost upon the British Foreign Office and was most clearly revealed in a series of letters dated 1911 exchanged between Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, and British Foreign Secretary Grey over the issue of recognition of the Portuguese Republic. Churchill had no love for the newly established Portuguese Republic or its government. In a private letter to his wife dated 25 June 1911, he referred to that government as “sanguinary swine.”⁸⁵ On 21 June 1911, Churchill sent Grey a letter in which he argued that Spain was strategically and militarily more important to Britain than

⁸³Caetano, 1268.

⁸⁴Calvet de Magalhães, 207.

⁸⁵Winston S. Churchill, *Winston S. Churchill, vol. II, Young Statesman: 1901-1914*, ed. Randolph S. Churchill (Toronto: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1967), 357.

Portugal.⁸⁶ The Foreign Office compellingly retorted that Britain's best interests were still served by an independent Portugal and the subsequent continuation of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.⁸⁷

In late 1912, Churchill was joined by Prince Louis Battenburg, First Sea Lord, in arguing once again that Spain could be the better ally for Britain. These discussions resulted in a memorandum from the Admiralty War Staff to the Foreign Office which was highly critical of a continuation of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. In February of 1913 Eyre Crowe, a senior Foreign Office official, wrote a counter-memorandum. In this memorandum Crowe noted that an independent Portugal (and her colonies) were paramount to British interests. He argued that British withdrawal from the alliance would not only leave Portugal's colonies vulnerable to both Germany and France, but also leave Britain with no legal recourse to defend them. He then reminded the Admiralty that the appeal of the alliance was not merely strategic. Continuation of their role in the alliance assured Britain extensive political and economic privileges in these regions, for example granting Britain privy access to Portuguese coaling stations and wireless stations around the globe.⁸⁸

⁸⁶Winston S. Churchill, *Winston S. Churchill, vol. II, Companion, Part 2: 1907-1911*, ed. Randolph S. Churchill (Toronto: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1969), 1091-1092.

⁸⁷Tom Gallagher, "Anglo-Portuguese Relations Since 1900," *History Today* 36 (June 1986): 40.

⁸⁸Glyn A. Stone, "The Official British Attitude to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1910-1945," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10, n.s. 4 (1975): 729-731.

Old Alliances, New Challenges

The Threat of a Greater Germany

This debate on the merits of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was temporarily interrupted by the start of World War I. On 7 August 1914, Portuguese Prime Minister Bernardino Machado publicly announced that Portugal would attempt to maintain friendly relations with all nations while fulfilling her obligations to Great Britain. Although many of Portugal's elite wanted her to join in the fight against Germany, Foreign Minister Freire d'Andrade was in complete agreement with the British Foreign Office in their assessment of Portugal's lack of military preparedness to do so. Portugal's Navy consisted of five ships. Her Army was ill equipped and ill trained. Morale within the armed forces was low due in large part to the political divisions still present since the inception of the Republic—the officers were monarchists; the non-commissioned officers were Republicans. Worse yet, the government had made a habit of using political spies within the armed services. Promotions were commonly politically based rather than performance based. These political machinations only served to further demoralize the troops.⁸⁹

Portugal maintained her nominal neutrality, while discretely giving aid to Great Britain and France in the European theatre, and engaging in outright armed conflict with Imperial German forces in both Angola and Mozambique.⁹⁰ In December of 1915, Britain invoked the treaty and requested that the

⁸⁹ John D. Vincent-Smith, "Britain, Portugal, and the First World War, 1914-1916," *European Studies Review* 4, n.s. 3 (1974): 209-210. For a more nuanced discussion of the politicization of the Portuguese Army see Wheeler, *Republican Portugal*, 111-116.

Portuguese government seize and transfer to her seventy-six German vessels (totaling 240,000 gross tons) which were in the Lisbon harbor at the time.

Portugal complied with the request on 24 February 1916 knowing full well the consequences of her actions. As expected, on 9 March 1916, the German Minister to Lisbon delivered an ultimatum to the Portuguese government which became their *de facto* declaration of war against Portugal.⁹¹

Battlefield losses for the Portuguese were high both in the European and in the African theatres of war. The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps was sent to Flanders where it served with no relief from April 1917 to April 1918. At the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, the Portuguese presented staggering figures for losses, particularly those of non-combatant Africans used for portage and labor duties. It is also estimated that Portuguese spending for the war ranged from £60,000,000, conservatively, to possibly £80,000,000. The costs of the war were such that it remained as one of the underlying factors which contributed to the financial crisis of 1926 and the consequent coup of 28 May 1926.⁹²

Yet, for all of their sacrifices they received little in reparations at the Peace Conference. In the end, the Reparations Commission deemed that Portugal--like Japan, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia--would receive 0.75% of the total German reparations payment.⁹³ Beside reparations, Portugal demanded the

⁹⁰Wheeler, *Republican Portugal*, 127.

⁹¹Vincent-Smith, "Britain, Portugal and the First World War," 235-236.

⁹²Wheeler, *Republican Portugal*, 128-133.

⁹³Marques Guedes, 507.

southern portion of German East Africa, but was denied. Instead, they were granted a small portion of territory known as the Kronga Triangle. This small addition extended Mozambique's northern frontier to a natural barrier, the Rovuma River.⁹⁴

Portugal's early neutrality was a direct result of her alliance with Great Britain. Military weakness notwithstanding, many within the Portuguese government did not want to remain neutral in large part because they thought that real neutrality would be impossible to maintain. They also argued that Portugal would be in a better position to protect her interests, particularly her colonial interests, after the war if she participated as a belligerent. Finally, many also wanted to join the fray out of a sense of national pride, i.e. they wanted the newly established Portuguese Republic to prove herself internationally by participating in the Great War.⁹⁵

These setbacks at the negotiations table did nothing to bolster support of the First Republic at home. Indeed, the Portuguese government seemed incapable of solving the critical economic and social ills of the time. Of course this task was made all the more difficult because politically its Parliament was a hotbed of ideological discontent and personal rivalry. The First Republic lasted fifteen years and eight months. In that time the Portuguese saw the rise and fall of no fewer than forty-five governments.⁹⁶

⁹⁴Stone, "Official British," 732.

⁹⁵Vincent-Smith, "Britain, Portugal and the First World War," 214.

⁹⁶Wheeler, *Republican Portugal*, 253

The British were highly critical of Portugal's political instability, as well as the ongoing social and economic turmoil in Portugal. Their main concern stemmed from fears over the safety of British investments in Portugal and in the Portuguese Empire. Indeed that instability was one of the key factors in the continued call for a reassessment of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. In 1927, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote the Foreign Office asking for clarification regarding the benefits for Great Britain in the centuries old alliance. He argued that not only was the Portuguese government far too volatile, their constant suspicion of British motives in Portuguese Africa undermined the relationship. The Foreign Office reiterated Crowe's counter-memo of 1913 and then continued with a lengthy discussion of all the benefits derived by the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Included was Portuguese assistance rendered during both the Boer War and the First World War. It also argued that the stability of the alliance allowed Britain to create defensive plans in which their warships, submarines and aircraft had access to and use of the Tejo River and the Portuguese Atlantic Islands. The Foreign Office response then went on to say that ending the alliance could potentially lead Portugal into the arms of a British enemy. Finally, the counter-memo closed with the *rather insightful* observation that continuing in the alliance gave the British Foreign Office "a certain measure of control" over Portuguese foreign relations. In effect, the counter-memo argued that with Portugal Great Britain had a sure thing—militarily, politically, strategically, and commercially.⁹⁷

⁹⁷Stone, "Official British," 733.

By the time of this exchange, Portugal's political situation changed rather dramatically. Her political instability led to a military coup on 28 May 1926. What followed was a military dictatorship lasting from 1926 until 1933. In the last years of the military dictatorship a young economics professor from the University of Coimbra was recruited to act as the Minister of Finance. From this post, António de Oliveira Salazar began establishing his own power base. By December of 1932, he was appointed Prime Minister. The following year he helped write a new constitution for Portugal which was accepted in a general national plebiscite. This new form of government was known as the *Estado Novo* (New State). From this point forward, Salazar ruled as dictator of Portugal until his incapacitation resulting from a cerebral hemorrhage in September of 1968.

Salazar's regime was welcomed in more than a few British circles. First as Minister of Finance, then as Prime Minister, Salazar had a clear plan to bring monetary stability to Portugal. Later, his ability to establish political and social order in Portugal came as quite a relief to many members of the British Parliament. By 1937, the same Sir Austen Chamberlain who a decade earlier had called for British withdrawal from the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was now willing to provide a foreword for a book of translated published interviews of Prime Minister Salazar.⁹⁸

Portuguese-German Colonial Rivalry of the 1930s

The British historian Glyn Stone has argued that "the single greatest threat to the Portuguese empire during the 1930s came from the revival of German

⁹⁸Gallagher, 41.

colonial ambitions which had surfaced during the Weimar period.”⁹⁹ Between 1933 and 1935 Adolf Hitler pursued a public policy which seemingly dismissed the idea of colonial expansion. He did so in an effort to gain an alliance between Germany and Great Britain. Although his efforts failed, the British did begin to favor the idea of revising the Treaty of Versailles so as to placate Germany. They knew that any European conflict involving Germany would eventually lead to another world war. With their military resources already strained, the British knew they must try to avert this outcome at all costs.¹⁰⁰

From 1936 on, the German government began to reverse its original policy by demanding colonial revision. Hitler launched a new propaganda effort in which Germany was made to appear the victim in the colonial arena. Although publicly Germany claimed to want only the restitution of its former colonies, in private conversations with French and British representatives its demands included the colonial possessions of many nations, but especially those of Portugal.

When Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister of Great Britain many British officials were already sympathetic to German grievances. This is not to say that they were prepared to pacify Germany by surrendering British colonies. They were not, however, indisposed to reorganizing the whole of central Africa to assure peace on the European continent.

⁹⁹ Glyn A. Stone, *The Oldest Ally: Britain and the Portuguese Connection, 1936-1941*. Royal Historical Society Studies in History, no. 69 (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1994), 82.

¹⁰⁰ Andrew Crozier, “Imperial decline and the colonial question in Anglo-German relations 1919-39,” *European Studies Review* 11 (1981): 208.

The Portuguese were quite sensitive to this type of plan. Back in January of 1936, Armindo Monteiro, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, had met with Anthony Eden, United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations, for a rather frank conversation regarding the state of Anglo-Portuguese relations and the future of Portugal's colonies. Eden then relayed the details of the conversation to Sir C. Wingfield, British Ambassador in Lisbon. In speaking with Eden, Monteiro argued that his government desired better relations with Great Britain with regard to both cultural and military exchanges. The focus of the discussion then shifted to the Portuguese Empire, "...Speaking with the greatest emphasis, he [Monteiro] stated that in no circumstances would Portugal yield one inch of her colonial territory. They would fight to the last, if need be, for the preservation of their colonial territories."¹⁰¹

To discuss renewed German colonial demands as well as other pressing issues, an Anglo-French Conference was held on 29 and 30 November 1937 at 10 Downing Street. Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, the First Earl of Halifax and Lord President of the Council, presented a summary of a two-hour conversation he had had with Adolf Hitler and Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, a few weeks earlier. At that meeting, Schacht had suggested to Viscount Halifax the return of Togoland and the Cameroons from the French, as well as "a block made up of parts of the Belgian Congo and Angola, under something like a

¹⁰¹"Geneva, "Mr. Eden to Sir C. Wingfield, United Kingdom Delegation to the League of Nations (22 January 1936)," Inclosure in Foreign Office, "Anthony Eden, Despatch No. 1 to Lisbon (24 January 1936, Geneva)," Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs—Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II: from the First to the Second World War, Series F, Europe, 1919-1939. vol. XXIV Portugal, 1919-1939* (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1993), W771/762/36.

mandate.” He intimated that besides appealing to these countries’ desire for international peace, Britain might “consider compensating Portugal on the east coast from Tanganyika.”¹⁰²

After hearing this report, the consensus among the French and British delegates was that this proposal was indeed sound. However, they also noted that because of the nature of the concessions this issue needed to be handled in a very delicate manner. Indeed, the statement released to the press stated only that, “A preliminary examination was made of the colonial question in all its aspects. It was recognized that this question was not one that could be considered in isolation and, moreover, would involve a number of other countries...(and) would require much more extended study...” The smaller European colonial powers, sensing that they were the unnamed “other countries,” were outraged.¹⁰³

Contrary to public assurances, on 3 March 1938, Neville Henderson, British Ambassador to Germany, presented Hitler with a British proposal for German recolonization. Basically a new central German Africa was to be created. The northern parameter was to be established by granting small portions of the southern British and French territories. The demarcation line was drawn below the Sahara, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Abyssinia, and Italian

¹⁰²Foreign Office, “Record of conversation between British and French Ministers held at No. 10 Downing Street on November 29 and 30, 1937,” *European Affairs; July 1, 1937-August 4, 1938*. vol. XIX, *Documents on British Foreign Policy: 1919-1939, Second Series* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1982) C8234/270/18.

¹⁰³ As quoted in, Wolfe W. Schmokel, *Dream of empire: German colonialism, 1919-1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 112.

Somaliland. The southern parameter, however, fell just beyond Portuguese West Africa, the Belgian Congo, Tanganyika, and Portuguese East Africa. The only significant qualifier was that Hitler accept an arms limitation agreement, and pacification in Czechoslovakia and Austria.¹⁰⁴

Hitler did not accept the proposal. He would not agree to any proposal based on *quid pro quo* in Europe. He told Henderson he would reply in writing to the plan. He did not.

Anschluss put an end to all formal discussions of German pacification via the redistribution of African colonies. British public opinion would no longer allow for it. Nonetheless, Hitler did not dismiss the idea of German expansion into Africa. Students at German universities continued to study "colonial science," German colonial police forces were undergoing training in Italian colonies, and Franz Xaver von Epp, head of the German Colonial Policy Office, received instructions to continue to formulate a strategy for the occupation of colonial territories in Africa.¹⁰⁵

Conclusion

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was already four hundred years old. As kindred spirits in a Crusade against the

¹⁰⁴Foreign Office, "Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) to Viscount Halifax (Received March 4, 9:30 am)," C1474/42/18. Henderson repeated to Hitler the instructions given to him in a note from Eden dated February 12, 1938. Foreign Office, "Mr. Eden to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin)," *Documents on British Foreign Policy: 1919-1939*, C995/42/18.

¹⁰⁵Helmuth Stoecker, ed., *German Imperialism in Africa: From the Beginnings Until the Second World War*, Translated by Bernd Zollner (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1986), 375.

Moors, they had joined forces in Iberia and elsewhere. These early experiences forged an initial bond between the two realms that was reinforced by their collaboration in all of the major European conflicts of this period. Throughout their involvement in the Hundred Years War, the Thirty Years War, and the War of Spanish Succession, these two kingdoms depended upon one another both politically and militarily.

This mutual dependence was first evidenced by the Treaties of 1373 and 1386, which established their perpetual friendship and alliance. In 1386 this legal union was further enhanced by the marriage of King João of Portugal to Philippa of Lancaster. Even the Spanish hegemony of the Iberian Peninsula from 1580 to 1640 was not enough to permanently breach this alliance. Although at first circumstances were difficult, these ties were reinitiated in the Treaty of 1640.

With the reestablishment of the Stuart monarchy, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was reaffirmed once more in the Treaty of 1661 and the marriage of King Charles II of Great Britain and Catherine of Bragança. The Treaty of 1661 not only reaffirmed the former treaties, but also brought into the relationship a formal recognition of the importance of Portugal's colonies to both realms—i.e. the promise of the British monarchy to protect Portugal's colonies in perpetuity against all enemies as though they were her own.

While political and military concerns were paramount throughout this period, commercial ties were evident from the very start. Portugal's geographic location made her a commercial center for the exchange of Mediterranean goods. This was a great draw for British merchants who engaged in both the

sale of British goods to Mediterranean markets and the transport of Mediterranean goods to British markets. Formal commercial ties were furthered by the Treaty of 1703, also known as the Methuen Treaty, which established the British woolens for Portuguese wines exchange. This understanding lasted for well over one hundred years. It stimulated the rapid expansion of British manufacturing, while allowing for the development of one of Portugal's most important exports, Portuguese wine—particularly port. The development of this export and the reforms of the late 1700s allowed for the stabilization of Portugal's economy and for the first time a balance of trade between the two realms which favored Portugal.

Thus, in the first two phases of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, Great Britain and Portugal were equal partners, in the sense that both gained great advantages from the alliance—militarily, politically, and commercially. Both called upon the alliance at critical moments in their kingdom's history. At times this assistance took the form of direct military support or tactical advantage. At other times, it was the simple recognition of the legitimacy of an ally's claim to their realm. Ultimately, both nations also gained from having access to reliable commercial markets.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Portugal faced formidable challenges. Napoleon's Continental System, the Peninsula War, and the consequent withdrawal of the royal family to Rio de Janeiro, placed tremendous pressure on the Portuguese monarchy and his subjects. Thus began the English century, a century of military, political, and commercial dependency which

relegated Portugal to second-rate status worldwide. By the end of the nineteenth century, British influence was felt in virtually every sector of Portuguese society. While the political scene in Portugal remained chaotic, resentment over British interference was the one sentiment common to all Portuguese parties. This dependency coupled with feelings of resentment permanently altered the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The British lost all respect for their ally, and the Portuguese mistrusted British intentions at every turn.

The “Scramble for Africa,” with its inherent geopolitical and commercial demands, only intensified this early rift. Portuguese claims to vast territories in central Africa were based on “prior discovery.” After the Berlin Conference of 1885 territorial claims had to be based on “effective occupation.” Due to financial instability and political unrest at home, the Portuguese were hard pressed to meet this new standard abroad. Moreover, she found herself at loggerheads with the very ally she depended on to protect her colonies, Great Britain. Rather than protecting Portuguese colonies as though they were her own—as promised in the Treaty of 1661—Britain protected her own interests. Sometimes this meant supporting Portuguese claims. At other times, this meant using Portuguese claims as a tool for manipulating potential threats in the region, like the Boers and later the Germans. Indeed, in the end, what preserved the alliance was once again a common enemy—this time Germany—and a call to arms. Portugal faced this challenge and suffered markedly for it.¹⁰⁶

Portugal’s Napoleonic experience had relegated her to the position of a second-rate power. The only thing that saved her from slipping any further in

international status was her African colonies. She had to preserve her colonies in order to preserve her status. Ironically, it is the British Ultimatum and the events surrounding it, which bring home this key point to the Portuguese. Prior to 1890 some Portuguese elites had questioned the role of the colonies. After 1890, there was little question as to the vital importance of the colonies—not necessarily from a practical sense, but from a sense of national honor. After World War I, Portugal's attention once again shifted to her African colonies where she hoped to reap some commercial benefit and build economic stability at home. Instead of facilitating her colonial goals in Africa—the new standard of greatness and prestige in European circles—Britain was thwarting or, at the very least, undermining Portugal's efforts. In its centuries old existence, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance came under its greatest scrutiny at this time because rather than furthering Portugal's national interests, it hampered them.

At the end of the World War II, Portuguese policy-makers came to the conclusion that they could no longer rely on the assurances of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance to further their political, military and commercial interests. Consequently, they cautiously began to shift their diplomatic energies towards the United States. By 1951, Portugal came to embrace a series of American initiatives—the Marshall Plan, N.A.T.O., and M.D.A.P.—in order to meet those interests and supplant the waning Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

¹⁰⁶Shaw, 5.

CHAPTER III

FAIR WEATHER FRIENDS

Well-established commercial ties between Portugal and Great Britain facilitated the establishment of early trade networks between Portugal and the British colonies in North America. The strongest commercial ties for the United States economy—Great Britain excluded—were those that stretched across the Atlantic into the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas. This voyage required a stop in Portugal's Atlantic islands for refitting. Both Portuguese and British merchants in Lisbon, Porto, and other Portuguese port cities negotiated with colonial merchant houses. More often than not, Portuguese merchants negotiated for British colonial goods meant for re-exportation to Portuguese colonies, principally Brazil. Though not remarkable in terms of tonnage, these early trade networks had a permanent impact on the growth of the trans-Atlantic shipping lines and, to a point, defined the extent of future Luso-American relations prior to WWII.

Prior to 1760, Portuguese imports from the North American colonies included cod, grains, rice, timber, and barrel and pipe staves. After 1760, there

was a steady increase of grain exports to Portugal from the colonies. New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland sold wheat, maize and flour. Indian corn and bread was also shipped from both New York and Maryland. For a brief time, South Carolina traded in rice. Meanwhile, timber and pipe staves were shipped from New Hampshire.¹ In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Portuguese exports to the British North American colonies included—but were not limited to—salt, olive oil, fruits, wines (primarily from the island of Madeira, and Port), and some Asian spices.

The Azores became an outpost of the Mediterranean trade. American ships bound for the Baltic stopped in the Azores to top off their cargoes with oranges, whale-oil, and wine. Whaling vessels also made port in the Azores for several critical reasons. First, they were able to unload early oil acquisitions which were then shipped back to Boston. Second, they needed to pick up both supplies and men.²

Consequently, these family business connections had an impact on the development of the North American trans-Atlantic shipping lanes. These islands became part of the route. They were a regular port of call, not the exception. New Englanders became familiar with the place-names Madeira, Azores, St. Michael, and Fayal. Likewise, Madeirans and Azoreans alike knew the New England place-names Boston, Providence, Newport and New Bedford. This may

¹Harold Edward Stephen Fisher, *The Portugal Trade, a Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce 1700-1770* (London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1971) 18. Rice was an enumerated commodity from 1705 to 1735 and as such could not be traded outside of the British Empire.

²Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Maritime History of Massachusetts 1783-1860, A Northeastern Classics Edition* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1979), 293-294.

have eased the minds of those young men who left these isolated islands and joined the crews of American merchant vessels.

Indeed, it was not until the whaling industry took root in 19th century New England that a steady stream of Portuguese began to arrive on American shores.³ Conditions on whaling vessels were harsh—long voyages, meager rations, and low wages. It became difficult for American captains to find the necessary crewmen at home to fit out their ships. Instead they would set out with only a minimal crew of about twelve. Once they reached a way station in the Atlantic, they would take on supplies and sailors. The two most frequent stops were on the islands of Fayal (Azores) and Brava (Cape Verde)—both part of the Portuguese realm. After the voyage, many of the Bravas remained as seamen, but most of the Fayalense turned to other means of employment in New England. They became a part of the history of Portuguese immigration to the United States.⁴

These early commercial exchanges led to the development of several immigration streams from Portugal to what would become the United States. It was not until the post-Civil War period, however, that the Portuguese began to

³The earliest known Portuguese settler was Mathias de Sousa, a resident of Maryland in 1634. Leo Pap, *The Portuguese-Americans* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1981), 9. This work, as well as other studies, has argued that the Portuguese explored the eastern American coastline as early as 1502 with the voyage of Miguel Corte-Real. The controversy arises from the fact that D. Miguel never returned from his voyage. In 1928, Edmund B. Delabarre published a work, *Dighton Rock* (New York: Walter Neale) in which he claimed to have discovered evidence of D. Miguel's travels in the form of stone markings left on a rock in the Taunton River in Massachusetts in 1511.

⁴Morison, 322-323. For a thorough discussion of Azorean immigration to the United States see, Jerry R. Williams, *In Pursuit of their Dreams: A History of Azorean Immigration to the United States* (Dartmouth, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, 2005).

migrate to the United States in what can be called a mass migration. Totalling 250,101, his first mass migration began circa 1870 and continued until 1921 when quota restrictions reduced migration to a minimum. A second wave, now nearly matching the first, began in the 1960s and continues to this day.⁵

These early trade networks between the two nations and the resultant immigration streams affected the development of Luso-American diplomatic relations. Given her long-standing alliance with Great Britain, it should come as no surprise that Portugal was the first European power to close her ports to rebel ships during the American Revolution. Yet, no sooner had hostilities ended between the belligerents than Portugal entered into talks for a favorable treaty with the new Republic. These discussions resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Commerce and Friendship of 1786. Although neither government ever ratified this treaty, both parties lived up to the spirit of the treaty.

The nineteenth century was a remarkably turbulent period for both the United States and Portugal. At times it seemed as though events were conspiring to keep these potential allies apart. For the United States, it was the War of 1812. During the course of the war, the *General Armstrong* incident of 1814 caused American diplomats and the American public to question Portugal's integrity. For Portugal, her loss of Brazil in 1822 led to violent and troubling times

⁵*Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1976 Annual Report*, (Washington, D.C., 1977), 86-88. For information regarding Portuguese-American relations regarding the issues of extradition and naturalization see, Department of State, "Convention and Exchange of Notes Regarding Extradition Between the United States of America and Portugal," 7 May 1899, TIAS no. 512, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*, vol.11, 314-321; and Department of State, "Convention on Naturalization Between the United States of America and Portugal," 7 May 1899, TIAS no. 513, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*, vol.11, 322-323.

at home. These domestic issues were both a distraction and a drain on the Portuguese economy. Nevertheless, by the mid-nineteenth century Luso-American relations reemerged once again based on the completion of a solid commercial treaty, *The Treaty of 1840*.

Ironically, it is the very nature of this relationship, which seems to be the problem. By the end of the nineteenth century, Luso-American relations are still by and large limited to trade and immigration. There is a brief period of political and military interaction during World War I, and just after with the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. With these exceptions in mind, Portugal did not place great stock in the importance of a traditional political/military alliance with the United States; nor did the United States want to pursue the same with Portugal—or any European power for that matter. It was not until the Second World War that the United States became a significant element of Portuguese foreign relations, and vice versa. Until then, they remained fair weather friends.

This chapter provides a synthesis of Luso-American diplomatic relations prior to the Second World War. It examines these relations from the Early Republic to the 1930s. It gives evidence to the fact that, although there are persistent commercial ties, these ties never bridge the political gap between the two nations. Understanding the limits of Luso-American relations gives insight to their strained relations during the Second World War. Moreover, it makes the postwar shift in Luso-American relations clearer and more significant.

Enter the Diplomats

The American Revolution

Formal diplomatic relations between Portugal and the United States of America got off to a shaky start. When the British colonies of North America rebelled, it stood to reason that Portugal would not be receptive. First, although a colonial rebellion would be considered an internal matter, support for the rebels would run counter to the spirit--if not the letter--of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Second, early Portuguese recognition of American independence might hinder Portugal's attempts in South America to gain more favorable terms regarding her borders with her rival Spanish colonies. Why would Britain advocate Portuguese colonial expansion in the Western Hemisphere, if concurrently the Portuguese were promoting British losses in the same region? Lastly, Portugal was concerned that revolutionary ideas might be contagious and spread south to Brazil, a colony she could not afford to lose. Consequently, the American Revolution challenged Portuguese foreign policy from both a practical as well as an ideological standpoint.

The timing of the American Revolution could not have been worse for the Portuguese. Brazil's significance within the Portuguese Empire was nearing its apogee. During the eighteenth century, Brazil had become the key to Portugal's Atlantic trade. Not only did she provide the metropole with a wealth of in-demand commodities such as sugar, brazilwood, and tobacco but, beginning in 1699, she provided Portugal with a steady stream of gold and diamonds. Within fifteen years, Lisbon received as much bullion from her mines in Brazil as Seville had

received from all her colonies in the Americas combined since the arrival of the conquistador in 1493 until 1660.⁶

The rapid influx of gold brought tremendous wealth and prestige to João V, the King of Portugal, and his court. It paid for the New World grains that Portugal so desperately needed. It drove the extraordinary increase in demand for foreign manufactured goods and luxury items in Portugal. Most importantly, it paid for the reconstruction of Lisbon after the devastating earthquake of 1755.

As such, Portugal maintained strict control over Brazil. This had not always been the case. Portuguese claims to Brazil were challenged by the Dutch in the seventeenth century, and then again by the French in the early eighteenth century. Portuguese forces in the region successfully met both these challenges. Yet, they were heavily criticized by their British allies for their apparent lack of strong defenses. The security of Brazil being paramount to Portuguese foreign relations, the Marquês de Pombal set about the reorganization of Brazil's defenses. In a note dated 20 June 1767, the Marquês de Pombal made clear the significance of Brazil to Portugal, "[on the defense of Rio de Janeiro]...depended the security of this precious continent."⁷

By 1775, for the most part, Portuguese territorial claims in South America went undisputed. The one exception to this was the area between Brazil and present day Uruguay. This region had been a point of conflict between Spain

⁶Godinho, 535.

⁷"Instruções," 20 June 1767, Carneiro de Mendonça, *O Marquês de Pombal e o Brasil* (São Paulo, 1960): 64; as quoted in Kenneth Maxwell, *Conflicts & Conspiracies, Brazil and Portugal 1750-1808* (New York: Routledge, 2004): 43.

and Portugal since the Portuguese had regained their independence in 1640. Borders were negotiated and established in various treaties only to be tested and breached. In May of 1774, Spain sent an overwhelming force along the Rio de la Plata to try, once and for all, to establish Spanish dominance over this region. Although at first highly successful, this assault became bogged down at the Rio Grande de São Pedro.⁸

Portugal requested British support in order to repel the Spanish. Unfortunately for the Portuguese, the British were pre-occupied by their own American colonial problems. In an effort to show support for British action in their North American colonies, the Marquês de Pombal convinced the King José of Portugal to issue a royal decree ironically dated 4 July 1776. The decree closed all ports within the Portuguese Empire to American shipping. It required that American ships currently in port set sail within ten days. Furthermore, the edict ordered that, while in Portuguese waters, American ships “may not be given any assistance in any form whatsoever,” including those in distress.⁹

This tactic failed miserably. The British were not willing to bring any pressure to bear on the Spanish whatsoever in regard to South America because it did not suit her needs. With a colonial rebellion on her hands, the British did not want to antagonize Spain. Spain was allied to France, and France was still

⁸Maxwell, *Pombal*, 127-128.

⁹“Decree of King D. José, Lisbon: Palácio de Nossa Senhora da Ajuda, 4 July 1776,” Conselho de Fazenda, Repartição da Índia e Ordens, Decretos, mç. 4, nr. 1 [provisionary number] Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo: as quoted in Timothy Walker, “Demands of Empire: The Portuguese Reaction to the American War of Independence: Early Trade Considerations on Diplomatic Relations Between Portugal and the United States, 1750-1800,” [1997] [photocopy] International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, 1500-1800, Working Paper no. 97-031, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

seeking ways in which she could regain some of her losses from the Seven Years War.¹⁰ Thus, by assisting Portugal in her South American border dispute, Britain might have delivered two powerful European allies into the hands of her enemy.

On the other side of the pond, the Americans were not pleased with the harshness of the edict. Eighteenth century communications being what they were, it was unclear to the Americans whether the rumors of the edict were true or not. Some Americans, such as Silas Deane, the American representative at Versailles, clamored for aggressive action. A declaration of war might be enough to win over the Spanish and then the French. Fortunately for future Luso-American relations, Congress hesitated.¹¹

In the spring of 1777, Congress asked Benjamin Franklin, resident American diplomat in France, to compose a response to the edict. In true Franklin style, the response was both insightful and persuasive. It began:

As a long Friendship and Commerce has subsisted between the Portuguese and the Inhabitants of North America, whereby Portugal has been supplied with the most necessary Commodities in Exchange for her Superfluities, and not the least Injury has ever been committed or even attempted or imagined by America to that Kingdom, the United States cannot but be astonished to find not only their commerce rejected, but their Navigators who may need a Port when in Distress refused the common Rights of Humanity, a Conduct towards

¹⁰With the Peace of Paris of 1763, France lost Canada and Spain lost Florida to the British. Spain gained some compensation at the negotiations' table by being granted Louisiana. Nevertheless, both kingdoms sought any and all opportunities to weaken Great Britain. For a succinct analysis of the Seven Years War, see Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, eds., *The Reader's Companion to American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991): 984-985.

¹¹Piecuch, 25-26.

the said States not only unprecedented, but which we are confident will not be follow'd by any other Power in Europe;¹²

As the first official communication between the United States of America and Portugal, the response takes on added importance. Franklin's appeal for revoking the Edict of 1776 was not based on support for the ideals of the revolution—which certainly would have fallen on deaf ears. Instead, he first appealed to the common commercial interests of both nations--trans-Atlantic trade being crucial to the economic security of both countries. He then went on to appeal to Portugal's sense of standing within the other seafaring nations of the world when he voiced American dismay over the breach in common nautical protocol regarding ships in distress.

Although Franklin's appeal went unanswered by the Portuguese government, events in Portugal itself led to a series of changes in Portuguese foreign policy. Most significant of these events was the death of King José I on 24 February 1777. Queen Maria I succeeded King José. One of her first acts as monarch was to dismiss Pombal. As Pombal had been the key architect of Portuguese foreign relations, his dismissal allowed for not only a change in the direction of Portuguese foreign policy but also a quickening of the pace of that change.

Queen Maria ordered the initiation of negotiations with Spain. This resulted in the conclusion of two treaties. First on 1 October 1777, both parties

¹²Ministério de *Negócios* Estrangeiros. "North American Formal Protest against the Portuguese Edict of 5 July 1776, Paris: 16 July 1777," cx. 550, nr. 1, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo: as quoted in Walker, 16-17.

signed the Treaty of Santo Ildefonso which definitively set the colonial boundaries of South America. This treaty was quickly followed by the Treaty of Pardo, signed 11 March 1778, which conclusively ended hostilities between Spain and Portugal in South America. Thus, in just over a year of her predecessor's death, Queen Maria had diffused what she saw as the greatest threat to the Portuguese state, i.e. open conflict with Spain.¹³

By 1779, Portugal managed to gain from Great Britain formal recognition of her neutral status in the American Revolution. Regardless, the British continued to use Portuguese ports and harbors as hunting grounds for French, Spanish and American merchant ships. In the summer of 1780, after a series of bold, and in fact illegal, actions taken by British privateers in Portuguese waters, Queen Maria was forced to bar all privateers from her ports. In referencing British privateers her edict specifically cited Article 18 of the 1654 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. Such assertiveness on the part of the Portuguese monarch was necessary in order to convince the Americans, French and Spanish of the validity of Portuguese neutrality.¹⁴

Beyond this formal response, Queen Maria decided to finance the rescue, housing and eventual repatriation of captured American sailors on several occasions. When Franklin approached the Portuguese government with an offer to reimburse the government for expenses, the offer was cordially rejected. It

¹³Ibid., 18.

¹⁴For a lengthy discussion of these activities and the reactions of the belligerents, see José Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas entre Portugal e os Estados Unidos da América (1776-1911)* (Mem Martins: Publicações Europa-América, 1991), 15-23.

was explained to him that the Queen enjoyed helping sailors in distress. This response was interpreted by Franklin as clear evidence of a distinct change for the better in Luso-American relations.¹⁵

Of course it was Cornwallis' defeat at Yorktown on 19 October 1781 that opened the door to Portuguese recognition of American independence. On the 1 July of the following year, Portugal finally joined the League of Armed Neutrality. Since negotiations for a peace between Britain and the United States had begun four months earlier, it was a foregone conclusion that America would indeed gain its independence. Confident that Britain had come to terms with the loss of her North American colonies and anxious to resume trade with North America, on 15 February 1783, Portugal formally opened her ports to the United States of America. By issuing this edict, Portugal—along with France and Holland—became one of three nations in the world to recognize American independence prior to the Peace of Paris (3 September 1783).¹⁶

The events of the American Revolution had placed Portugal in a precarious diplomatic position. Her geographic position had facilitated the development of strong commercial ties with Britain's North American colonies. The Atlantic Ocean—and to a great extent Portugal's Atlantic archipelagoes (Madeira, Azores, and Cape Verde)—was the link between these two regions. It helped shape their relations. Nevertheless, in order to maintain her position in

¹⁵Piecuch, 30. For further discussion of the unofficial efforts of Queen Maria's government to ease the mounting tension between Portugal and the United States, see Walker, 24-28.

¹⁶Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 23.

the world and preserve her empire. Portugal could not have entered the fray as a belligerent for either side.

Neutrality was her only option. It preserved the metropole and the empire, particularly Brazil. As quoted above, Pombal thought the security of Portugal depended on that of Rio de Janeiro. His political fall from grace did not alter this perspective, just the opposite. Queen Maria's new Secretary of State for the Overseas Dominions, Martinho de Melo e Castro, made clear the significance of Brazil in a letter of instruction dated 1779. In this letter to the Viceroy of Brazil, Luís de Vasconcelos e Sousa, regarding the governance of Brazil, de Melo e Castro stated emphatically, "It is demonstrably certain that Portugal without Brazil is an insignificant country."¹⁷

Thus, Portugal's actions during the American Revolution have little to do with commerce and even less to do with enlightenment philosophy. Instead, her actions can best be understood as the actions of an Atlantic power placing the interests of her empire before all else. Brazil, and all she had to offer, was of paramount importance to Portugal. After Portugal's losses in Asia, Brazil helped her regain her status as a colonial power, not just economically but also politically. Portugal was a great power because she controlled Brazil, a vast and rich land.

The colonial gains or losses of Great Britain were of no direct consequence to Portugal unless the resultant hostilities placed her own colonies

¹⁷"Instruções de Martinho de Melo e Castro to Luís de Vasconcelos e Sousa acerca do governo de Brasil," *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro* XXV (1862): 479-483; as quoted in Maxwell, *Conflicts and Conspiracies*, 78.

at risk. Portugal had a small navy and a huge empire. She depended on Great Britain to uphold the military commitment sworn to her in the *Secret Article* of the Treaty of 1661. Yet she could not and did not allow this naval dependency to dictate her foreign policy because to do so would not only place her sovereignty at risk but more importantly it would jeopardize her standing as a European power. To this end, Portugal maintained her neutrality during the war. At war's end, she could consider herself, if not an ally to all, at worse an enemy to none.

The Treaty of Commerce and Friendship of 1786

Early recognition of the United States of America removed any final barriers to direct diplomatic contact between the two nations. America took the first steps towards establishing normal relations. In a letter dated 7 June 1783 and addressed to Vicente de Sousa Coutinho, the Portuguese Minister to Versailles, Benjamin Franklin began to lay the groundwork for a commercial treaty.¹⁸ In the same month Congress resolved "that the treaty with Portugal be entered on immediately."¹⁹ By the end of the summer, John Adams, the American representative in the Netherlands, opened discussions with the Portuguese minister, João Theolonica de Almeida, regarding common commercial interests between the two nations. Thus, by the time the Peace of Paris was signed in September of 1783, it was clear that the United States was anxious to resume normal relations with Portugal. For both nations, normal relations meant business relations. It comes as no surprise then that the focus of

¹⁸Walker, 30.

¹⁹Piecuch, 31.

these negotiations was on drafting of a commercial treaty with the goal being the quick resumption of trade.²⁰

Yet for all their enthusiasm, negotiations for the treaty dragged on for three years. Both parties shared fault for the delay in part because the parties approached the negotiations from a different political perspective. Portugal negotiated from the position of an empire. The United States did not. In the spirit of the *Model Treaty of 1776*, American negotiators in both Paris and London pushed for direct trade with Brazil.²¹ From the start, Portuguese negotiators stated emphatically that direct access to Brazilian ports was not possible. Only Portuguese merchants and their vessels had direct access to Brazilian goods and ports. Portuguese negotiators noted on several occasions that no nation, not even Great Britain—who was granted extraordinary privileges within the Portuguese realm—had direct access to Brazil. This position reflected not only Portugal's mercantilist policies towards her colonies, but also the real fear held by the Portuguese court regarding America's revolutionary influence in the region.²²

This fear was evidently well founded. While serving in Paris, Thomas Jefferson was twice approached by José Joaquim Maia e Barbalho, a native of

²⁰Ibid., 31-32.

²¹For a discussion of the *Model Treaty of 1776* and how it shaped early negotiations between the United States and Europe, see Warren I Cohen, ed. *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), vol. 1, *The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865*, by Bradford Perkins, 24-26.

²²Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 25-27.

Brazil. Originally Maia had written to Jefferson under the alias "Vendek." In his letter he spoke of the potential for a Brazilian revolution based on the same ideals as that of the American Revolution. When the two men finally arranged a meeting, Maia posed the question of American support for a Brazilian uprising directly to Jefferson. While privately exhibiting enthusiastic support for such a rebellion as expressed in a letter dated 4 May 1787 to the Secretary for Foreign Relations John Jay, Jefferson told Maia that the United States could not risk another war.²³

Besides her demands for equal access to Brazilian ports, the United States also wanted Portugal to accept imports of American flour rather than cereals. The United States argued that flour kept longer and therefore was a less risky commodity for trans-Atlantic transport. Portuguese negotiators pointed out that they needed to protect the interests of their own domestic mills which ground American cereals into flour for a fee. As in the case of access to Brazilian ports, neither the Portuguese nor the Americans was willing to compromise on this issue.²⁴

After negotiations in Paris came to a standstill, London was chosen as a new venue for talks. Negotiators were selected: John Adams representing the United States; and Luís Pinto de Sousa representing Portugal. From the onset these diplomats made a clear case for the primary commercial interests of their respective countries. Portugal desired American grain, barrel staves, wood for

²³Maxwell, *Conflicts and Conspiracies*, 80-83.

²⁴Walker, 32-33.

use in naval construction, masts and spars, pitch, potash, hides, ginseng and, above all, salted cod. On the other hand, the United States wanted wines from Madeira, Carcavelos, and Oporto, fruits, olive oil, and salt. By initiating the negotiations based on what each nation wanted to purchase from the other rather than what they wanted to sell, these talks moved forward at a quick pace.²⁵

By 25 April 1786, *The Treaty of Commerce and Friendship* was signed by both representatives in London. Of the twenty-eight articles of the treaty, twenty dealt directly with the issues arising from trade. These issues included a declaration in support of freedom of the seas (with some restrictions), the standardization of trade regulations, and the establishment of consulates, as well as the mutual granting of most favored nation status. Two more articles dealt with foreign merchants in residence and their right to freedom of conscience—with a direct reference to Article 17 of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1642—as well as the protection of merchants, their families and their goods in the case of war.²⁶

One article of the treaty clearly stood apart from the others in terms of both context and motive. Article 24 demanded the humane treatment of prisoners of war. It maintained that prisoners should be well fed, housed befitting their rank, and quickly repatriated. Contrary to contemporary Portuguese practice, the article also prohibited the transfer of prisoners to “the East Indies, or

²⁵Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 27-28.

²⁶Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Treaty of Commerce and Friendship between Portugal and the United States of America, Signed at London, 25 April 1786,” cx. 550, nr. 13, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo.

any other parts of Asia, or Africa.”²⁷ In a report to his superiors, Luís Pinto de Sousa argued that the principles represented in the article were “very just, and very advantageous for humanity...” and so he could not in good faith suggest their alteration.²⁸

In part, Article 24 reflected each nation’s cultural framework at work. The idealism inherent in this article spoke to America’s early Republic sensibilities. Thus, although desirous of a world absent of violent revolution, the United States chose to limit the negative consequences of war—i.e. the mistreatment of prisoners of war. The quote above from Luís Pinto de Sousa reflected a desire by the Portuguese to go beyond the standard negotiated self-interests inherent in most treaties and, instead, to produce a document which served the greater good.

Idealism aside, this treaty also plainly demonstrated what was most important to these two Atlantic nations at this time, commerce. The mutual benefit of trade is what originally drew them to each other, and that is what brought them back together. All that was necessary now was the formalization of relations via the exchange of diplomatic representatives and the ratification of the treaty. Portugal made it clear that without this exchange she would not ratify the treaty. Jefferson and Adams both understood this fact. Yet the Continental Congress could not or would not act.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Attachment to *Ofício* Nr. 676 from Luís Pinto de Sousa, “Observações sobre alguns artigos do Tratado ajunto.” London, 15 May 1786, cx. 550, nr. 12, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo; as translated and quoted in Walker, 35.

The United States was challenged by the dilemma of trying to establish a working government at home while at the same time trying to negotiate treaties with several foreign powers. The Articles of Confederation stood for a weak federal government which consequently made foreign relations difficult at best. Early on Portugal stated her desire to appoint a minister to the United States. She then expected the United States to reciprocate in kind. Much to her chagrin, the United States hesitated, wanting instead to appoint only a chargé d'affaires. Given Portugal's quick recognition of American independence and the fact that Queen Maria I had issued orders protecting American vessels in the Straits from Barbary pirates, both she and her court interpreted this hesitation on the part of Congress as an affront.²⁹

In reality, this decision had more to do with the pecuniary virtues of the early Republic as well as an attempt by anti-federalist Congressmen to rein in the powers of the executive, than a critical assessment of Portugal. Even after establishing a new constitution which granted the executive body new sweeping powers, Congress insisted on limiting the number of ministries. It was not until 21 February 1791, that David Humphreys received Senate confirmation of his post as American Resident Minister to Portugal. Humphreys was selected by President George Washington himself. Colonel Humphreys, a Yale graduate,

²⁹It should be noted that at this time there were four classes of heads of diplomatic missions: ambassadors; ministers plenipotentiary; resident minister; and chargé d'affaires. Consequently, Portugal's insistence on a resident minister was not excessive. See, Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 48-50.

had distinguished himself during the Revolutionary War and was a close friend of President Washington.³⁰

It was Portuguese action, however, that led to Humphrey's appointment as resident minister. Growing impatience in Portugal forced the Portuguese to take the lead in this tug of war between the Congress and the Executive. In 1790, Queen Maria appointed Cipriano Ribeiro Freire as Portuguese Resident Minister to the United States. Freire was a well-respected member of the Portuguese diplomatic corps and had been serving as chargé d'affaires in London prior to this new appointment. Once Portugal appointed Freire at this diplomatic level, eighteenth century protocol dictated that the United States reciprocate in kind. President Washington sent a message to the Senate explaining the circumstances and the need for a diplomat of this rank in Portugal. Only then did Congress finally accede to the request. In terms of the treaty, this action was too little, too late. Neither government ever ratified the Treaty of 1786. Instead, both governments soon became preoccupied by other world events.³¹

For the United States that situation was the conflict erupting between themselves and the Dey of Algiers, commonly known as the Barbary Pirate Crisis of 1793. Thus, although Humphreys' appointment did not have its intended results--i.e. ratification of the commercial treaty with Portugal--it was nevertheless advantageous to have a well-trusted individual of high diplomatic rank at the

³⁰Walker, 37-42.

³¹Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 50-51.

ready during the crisis. Whenever possible, during this regional crisis Portugal's fleet did its best to help the United States merchant fleet.

The perilous events at the end of the eighteenth century foreshadowed the violence of the nineteenth century in which both nations faced the possibility of loss of national sovereignty. The United States would once more be challenged by Great Britain in the War of 1812, sometimes known as the "Second American Revolution," whereas Portugal faced possible destruction at the hands of Napoleon's armies.

Challenging Times: the Nineteenth Century

The War of 1812

In the first half of the nineteenth century Portugal faced a series of formidable challenges--the Napoleonic invasions with the consequential transfer of the seat of power from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, the loss of Brazil, and the War of the Two Brothers. In aggregate these events weakened Portugal politically, socially and economically. She spent the remainder of the century trying to reassert herself internationally.

Meanwhile, the United States was drawn into yet another war with Great Britain, the War of 1812. The end of this war reaffirmed American independence around the globe, and initiated a period of tremendous expansion for the United States. Domestically, expansion meant sweeping territorial gains across the North American continent which culminated in the United States reaching her

continental boundaries, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Externally, expansion resulted in an ever-increasing American presence in world trade.

Until 1820, Portugal and the United States maintained strong relations at the highest diplomatic levels. Both the United States and Portugal raised the rank of their respective ambassadors to Minister Plenipotentiary—the highest level in the foreign service. President John Adams invited Portugal to select the location of her residence in Washington, D.C. along the much-esteemed Ellipse (the area between the White House and the Washington Monument). Although this project was never completed, it marked the acme of Luso-American relations in the nineteenth century. Soon historical events would conspire to spoil the good will built up between these two nations during the Barbary Pirate Crisis.³²

The greatest challenge to Luso-American relations during the War of 1812 involved an American privateer, the *General Armstrong*. Samuel Chester Reid commanded the *General Armstrong*, a brigantine of 246 tons carrying nine guns and a compliment of ninety men. Captain Reid was Connecticut born and began his life at sea at the age of eleven. By the time he took command of the *General Armstrong*, he had already spent nearly twenty years at sea. After slipping past the British blockade of New York, the brig began her search for prizes.³³

On 26 September 1814, Captain Reid made the fateful decision to put in to the port of Horta on the island of Fayal (Azores) for fresh water and other provisions. Portugal was a neutral power in the War of 1812. Yet Captain Reid

³²Walker, 55.

³³C. M. Robinett, "Guns Diplomacy and Litigation," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute* (November 1950): 1225.

made a special visit to American Consul John D. Dabney to gain assurances of both the safety of his ship and his men. Consul Dabney informed the Captain that it had been weeks since a British man-of-war had been spotted in Fayalense waters.³⁴

That very evening three British warships arrived--the 74 gun *Plantagenet*, the 38 gun frigate *Rota*, and the 18 gun war brigantine the *Carnation*. Worried, Captain Reid moved the *General Armstrong* closer to the protective guns of the fort at the port of Fayal. Under a beautiful moonlit sky, Captain Reid watched with increasing trepidation the movement among the British vessels. When he finally saw several British boats being lowered and approaching his vessel, Captain Reid gave orders to open fire upon them with both grape and musket fire.³⁵

These boats retreated only to be followed by many more in a full-fledged attack by the British. Twice that night the *General Armstrong* repelled boarders. At roughly 3 a.m., during an extended lull in the fight, the Portuguese governor implored Captain Lloyd of the *Plantagenet* to respect Fayal's status as a neutral port. Much to the governor's chagrin, this request was soundly rejected. Instead, the *Carnation* moved into position for a direct assault. After her second

³⁴Ibid., 1226.

³⁵T. W. Sheridan, "The American Marine Themopylae," *Proceedings of the American Naval Institute* (April 1937): 504. The actual number of boats and their intent—whether to reconnoiter or to attack the American vessel—is disputed among the participants' reports.

attack, Captain Reid ordered all aboard to abandon ship and then he scuttled his ship.³⁶

Captain Lloyd, not content with the scuttling of the *General Armstrong*, pressed the Portuguese governor to send a force into the hills to collect the American sailors. He argued that among them were British deserters. When they were rounded up, it was determined that none of the men of the *General Armstrong* was a British deserter. Soon after the affair, Captain Reid and his men returned home. Meanwhile, Captain Lloyd resumed his original mission which was to deliver three thousand British regulars to re-enforce General Pakenham in preparation for the attack on New Orleans; he arrived ten days late. The time spent waiting for re-enforcements might have cost the British the battle.³⁷

The attack upon the *General Armstrong* in a neutral port was naturally seen as a gross indiscretion on the part of Captain Lloyd. The Americans looked to the Portuguese for reparations and argued that the port authorities were responsible for the safety of the vessels therein moored. At first the Portuguese agreed. They in turn looked to the British for reparations in payment for damages done to private homes along the shore as well as the cost of the *General Armstrong*. The British agreed to make good on Portuguese losses, but not American losses. They argued that, according to the provisions of the Treaty of Ghent, the United States had relinquished all such claims against Great

³⁶Robinett, 1227.

³⁷Sheridan, 506.

Britain. Thus, the legal issues came full circle with the United States once again pressing Portugal for compensation.³⁸

The *Convention on the Settlement of Certain Claims* was signed in Washington, D.C. on 26 February 1851 by Daniel Webster of the United States and J. C. de Figanière e Morão representing Portugal. It clearly and succinctly stated the United States' claims against Portugal and the indemnity for which it was suing. By signing the *Convention* Portugal accepted the terms and accepted the right of the United States to bring this case up for arbitration. Louis Napoleon, acting as arbitrator, decided against the United States.³⁹

In the United States, the *General Armstrong* affair was a public relations disaster for the Portuguese. Captain Reid and his men had received a hero's welcome upon their return. As such, the affair stayed in the public memory for quite some time. At first, the Portuguese government was sorely criticized for not providing the proper defense of Fayal, one of her key ports in the Atlantic. American shipping lanes, established during the colonial period, depended on this secure and friendly port. Later, the American public seemed confused over Portugal's inability or unwillingness to demand the funds from Great Britain. Finally, American criticism centered on Portugal not taking responsibility for American losses suffered while in her port and ostensibly under her protection. The United States was clearly disappointed in Portugal's actions.

³⁸Robinett, 1228.

³⁹Ultimately, Captain Reid and his youngest son filed a suit against the United States government for compensation. This case dragged on for decades. Finally, in 1882, the United States Senate passed legislation authorizing compensation for Captain Reid's losses. Reid died before receiving any of the funds. Ibid., 1229. For the text of the *Convention* see, Department of State, "Convention on the Settlement of Certain Claims," TIAS no. 290, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*, vol. 11, 304-306.

Brazil

Portugal, however, had more pressing concerns at the time. During this period the Portuguese monarch, King João VI, was still in residence in Brazil. In the King's absence, Marshall Beresford, British Army Commander in Portugal, governed Portugal. The Portuguese Cortes pressed for the return of their King. Meanwhile, in Brazil, rumors of independence worried King João and his heir, Prince Pedro.

The crisis of Brazilian independence revealed the weaknesses in Luso-American relations. This situation was made all the more remarkable given the fact that the initial transfer of power from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro was well received in the United States. On 22 January 1808, Prince Regent João VI declared Brazil's ports open to international commerce. Thus, the ports of the largest colony in the Americas were now open to non-Portuguese vessels. Direct access to Brazilian ports was a concession American merchants had hoped to gain during the negotiations for the *Treaty of Commerce and Friendship between Portugal and the United States of America* of 1786. Americans were also pleased that João VI had granted the United States most-favored-nation status in Brazil.⁴⁰

The transfer of power from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro also meant that all diplomatic negotiations with the Portuguese crown would take place in Brazil. The United States wasted no time in selecting Thomas Sumter, Jr., as Minister to Portugal with residence in Rio de Janeiro. Thus, Sumter became the first

⁴⁰Calvet de Magalhaes, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 69.

American diplomat to serve in Latin America receiving his commission in March of 1809.⁴¹

On 16 December 1815, then Prince Regent João VI raised Brazil to the status of kingdom. In the following year, when João VI finally ascended the throne, he did so as King of the United Kingdoms of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves. The decision to elevate the status of Brazil from colony to kingdom was praised in both Europe and in the United States, though for differing reasons. In Europe, the elevation of a colony to a kingdom was seen as a possible solution to the destabilizing influence of both the American Revolution and the French Revolution. By making Brazil an integral and equal member of the Portuguese realm, it was thought that the House of Braganza could suppress the liberal forces within Brazil. On the other hand, the United States saw this as a step forward in the gradual progression of Brazil from colony to independent nation.⁴²

On the surface, diplomatic relations between Portugal and the United States seemed cordial. Over the next five years, however, the issue of American privateers stalking the waters off the coast of Brazil troubled the relationship. This practice of hiring American privateers for actions against the Portuguese began shortly after Portuguese forces in South America conquered Montevideo and threatened the *Banda Oriental* (the "Eastern Shore" of the Plata River, which is modern Uruguay) in 1816. Both the Spanish and the Portuguese had claimed

⁴¹Arthur Preston Whitaker, *The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1964), 35.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 192.

this region for centuries. After the conquest of Montevideo, local insurgents hired American privateers to harass Portuguese shipping.⁴³

Almost immediately the Portuguese Minister to the United States, Abbé Correia da Serra, initiated an extended discourse with the American Secretary of State—first, James Monroe and then, John Quincy Adams—and sought either intervention by the American government or satisfaction for losses suffered by Portuguese citizens at the hands of these American privateers. The United States argued that it could do neither to satisfy Portuguese demands. In 1818, after the capture of three Portuguese vessels, Correia da Serra wrote a more forceful note to Adams. In his reply Adams argued that the United States was doing all that it could to stop the outfitting of privateers in her ports. He concluded by reminding the Portuguese Minister of the fate of the *General Armstrong* in Horta and of Portugal's own stand regarding her nation's responsibilities towards American citizens' claims.⁴⁴

In 1820, even after being called to Rio de Janeiro to take up his new post as Finance Minister, Abbé Correia da Serra was still trying his utmost to sway both President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams on the issue of indemnities. In his argument he often linked the indemnities issue with the possibility of a new commercial treaty, or more directly with the possibility of commercial reprisals against the United States if the latter did not comply with Portugal's request to act in concert with Portugal in condemning what she considered acts of piracy. He left instructions with the Portuguese Chargé

⁴³Ibid., 210.

⁴⁴Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 81.

d'Affaires Amado Grehon to continue to bring pressure to bear upon the United States. In an effort to put this question to rest, John Quincy Adams wrote a succinct and forceful letter to Grehon indicating:

It is a principle well known and well understood, that no nation is responsible to another for acts of its citizens, committed without its jurisdiction, and out of the reach of its control... When brought within the jurisdiction of the United States the pirates have been punished by their laws and restitution has been made to its owners of property captured by them. Should any citizen of the United States, guilty of piracy, be captured by the Portuguese government, the United States will in no wise interfere to screen them from punishment... The laws and the tribunals of the United States are adequate to the punishment of their citizens who may be concerned in committing unlawful depredations upon foreigners on the high seas; at least to the same extent as the laws and tribunals of other nations... [Finally, to the issue of reprisals] your government will perceive that they cannot grant commercial favors to any other nation to the detriment of the United States, without injuring their own subjects more than the people of this Union.⁴⁵

Both men failed to convince the other of the validity of their arguments. John Quincy Adams understood full well Portugal's frustration over the losses. Nonetheless, up until this point, the United States had declared herself as a neutral in the face of a series of Latin American revolutions. The leaders of these movements and their cohorts were the very individuals who were hiring the American privateers. Consequently, any joint action against the privateers might be interpreted as a stand by the United States against the revolutionary movements in Latin America. This possibility was unacceptable to Adams. Yet this position remained incomprehensible to Correia da Serra who failed to see

⁴⁵Adams to Grehon, Washington, D.C., 30 April 1822, *Writings of John Quincy Adams*, vol. VII 1820-1823, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford, (Macmillan Company, 1917; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), 247-250.

how an American might come to view the Latin American revolutions as mirror images of their northern counterpart's.

Despite mounting concerns regarding the stability of South America, the Portuguese Cortes insisted on the King's return. Finally, on 26 April 1821, King João VI quit Rio for Lisbon. Upon his arrival in Lisbon in early July, he was presented with a new liberal constitution as a *fait accompli*. Nonplussed, King João swore an oath to uphold this new constitution.⁴⁶

The Portuguese Cortes never fully accepted Brazil's new status. Finally, on 7 September 1822, Prince Pedro received word that the Lisbon Cortes had reduced his powers in an effort to induce him to return to Portugal. Riding along the banks of the Ipiranga River, Pedro was suddenly overwhelmed by a sense of his own—and by extension, Brazil's—destiny. He unsheathed his sword and cried out "Independence or death!"⁴⁷

Within three months he was crowned, "Constitutional Emperor and Perpetual Defender of Brazil." Unlike her South American counterparts, Brazil's independence movement was initiated by a European prince. In some ways this seemed inevitable since it was the Braganzas who had acted as a unifying force in Brazil. Prior to their presence in Brazil, this colony had had several distinct disjointed regions which vied for power. After the royal family settled in Rio de Janeiro, Brazilians gained the habit of turning to Rio for direction. Therefore, the

⁴⁶Livermore, 263.

⁴⁷E. Bradford Burns, *A History of Brazil*, Third Edition (New York: Columbia University, 1993), 122.

Braganzas gave Brazilians a sense of political continuity and stability even as Brazil changed from colony to kingdom to empire.⁴⁸

American recognition of Brazilian independence came rather swiftly in 1824—a year before Portugal recognized the loss of one her kingdoms. By 27 May 1824, José Silvestre Rebelo stood before President James Monroe with his credentials in hand as the first Brazilian ambassador to the United States. Joaquim Barroso Pereira, interim Portuguese minister to the United States, quickly protested this act. In his response, John Quincy Adams stated that the United States was merely recognizing the *de facto* status of Brazilian independence and that this should in no way effect the progress of negotiations on the Luso-American commercial treaty currently under way in Lisbon.⁴⁹

This rather unenthusiastic response reflected John Quincy Adams' view of Brazilian independence or, more to the point, it reflected America's view of what shape the governments of the western hemisphere should take. In 1822 the United States gave full recognition to Argentina, Chile, Gran Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In a letter of instruction to Richard C. Anderson newly appointed American ambassador to Colombia, John Quincy Adams eloquently penned America's view of the South American revolutions. He stated that "The revolution which has severed the colonies of Spanish America from European thralldom,

⁴⁸The new constitutional monarchy was established in Brazil on 25 March 1824. It lasted until the monarchy fell in 1889. It was not until the end of 1825 that Portugal recognized Brazilian independence. For this recognition Brazil paid Portugal £2 million pounds sterling, allowed King João to use the honorary title "Emperor of Brazil," and promised not to try to draw any other Portuguese colony (especially Angola) into the Brazilian empire. *Ibid.*, 122-130.

⁴⁹Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 109.

and left them to form self-dependent governments as members of the society of civilized nations, is among the most important events in modern history....”

Furthermore, he argued that, “voluntary agreement is the only legitimate source of authority among men, and...all just government is a compact.”⁵⁰ Thus, the only legitimate system of government in the western hemisphere was that of a republic.

In Adams' vision of the Americas, Mexico and Brazil were only temporary exceptions to this republican vision of the future. This vision becomes clearer still when later in the same letter, Adams commented on the on-going conflict between “Buenos Ayres and Brazil for Montevideo and the Oriental Band of La Plata...[Here Adams affirmed that,] the republican hemisphere will endure neither emperor nor king upon its shores.”⁵¹ Thus, from America's perspective, Brazil's transformation from colony to kingdom to empire was incomplete. The final stage of metamorphosis would take it from empire to republic; only then would Brazil have achieved a truly legitimate form of government.

The first fifty years of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and Portugal reveal the dynamic elements of this relationship. Both nations shared a common commercial interest, which could have served as the basis for good diplomatic relations. Yet their differing political systems and consequent differing world views resulted in a distinct lack of common ground.

⁵⁰Adams to Anderson, Washington, D.C., 27 May 1823, *Writings of John Quincy Adams*, vol. VII 1820-1823, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford, (Macmillan Company, 1917; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), 441.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 471.

With the exception of the Edict of 1777, Portuguese-American relations were relatively strong in the eighteenth century. The actions of Queen Maria almost immediately mitigated the effects of this edict. The *Treaty of Commerce and Friendship between Portugal and the United States of America* of 1786 reflected both countries' commitment to fair and open trade across the Atlantic. The Barbary Pirate Crisis of 1793 further emphasized their common maritime interests and concerns by presenting them with a common enemy, the Dey of Algiers. Early correspondence by Franklin, Jefferson, and even Adams emphasized the commonalities between the two nations, e.g. common trade interests and an adherence to a generally accepted code of international law. In sharp contrast to this cordial correspondence were the letters penned by John Quincy Adams which although erudite were cool and, sometimes, condescending. Although apprehensive towards violent revolution, the United States was invigorated at the thought of the western hemisphere becoming a home to free republics. Brazil simply did not satisfy this vision. While a kingdom, her ports offered great commercial potential to American merchants. As an empire that commercial gain still existed, but was not sufficient to overcome the American ideal of liberty in the New World.

The End of a Turbulent Century

The new commercial treaty so desired by the United States would not be concluded until 1840. In part, treaty negotiations were slowed by Portuguese domestic upheavals. On the other hand, so tenuous were the relations between Portugal and the United States at this time that it took a breach in Anglo-

Portuguese relations to create a sense of urgency on the part of the Portuguese. After all, Edward Kavanagh, Minister Plenipotentiary to Portugal, had been attempting to initiate talks leading to a commercial treaty since his arrival in Lisbon in July of 1835. Although Kavanagh was well respected not only within Portuguese diplomatic circles, but also by members of the Portuguese Parliament, personal reputation alone would not be sufficient to convince the Portuguese monarch of the need for a commercial treaty. Instead, what facilitated these negotiations was the rupture in Anglo-Portuguese relations resulting from the infamous Lord Palmerston bill of 1839.⁵²

In July of 1839, Kavanagh was informed that the Queen had selected João Baptista d'Almeida Garrett as her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. Almeida Garrett was one of the leading figures in Portugal's elite society. He was the Historian to the Queen, a published poet and dramatist and an experienced diplomat. Almeida Garrett was granted all rights to negotiate and sign a reciprocal commercial treaty with the United States, save only that of ratification. With these broad powers in hand, and as a credit to the abilities of both men, the provisions of the *Treaty of 1840* were negotiated and concluded within a month.⁵³

The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America and Portugal was signed in Lisbon on 26 August 1840. Comprised of 14 articles, it dealt largely with commercial matters. It was a treaty of reciprocity

⁵²This bill called for the unilateral authority of British captains to board Portuguese vessels at sea suspected of trafficking slaves. For a fuller discussion, see above *Chapter III*.

⁵³Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 125-136.

with nearly every article calling for equal treatment or reciprocal treatment of vessels and goods. It also addressed the installation of representative agents—i.e. Consuls, Vice-Consuls, etc.—as well as their jurisdiction, and their rights as private citizens/subjects. It stipulated that the provisions of this treaty would not be applicable to those ports within the Portuguese Empire that were closed to foreign vessels.⁵⁴

There was one exception to the general commercial tone of the treaty.

Article 9 dealt with granting safe-haven to both merchant and war vessels:

Whenever the citizens or Subjects of either of the Contracting Parties shall be forced to seek refuge or asylum in any of the Rivers, Bays, Ports or Territories of the other, with their Vessels, whether Merchant, or of War, through stress of weather, pursuit of Pirates, or Enemies, they shall be received and treated with humanity, giving to them all favor, facility and protection for repairing their ships, procuring provisions and placing themselves in a situation to continue their voyage, without obstacle or hindrance of any kind.⁵⁵

The expectation was that both parties would provide the others' vessels with safe-haven regardless of cause of distress and that they would take responsibility for the care of said vessels while in port. This was a rather undisguised reference to the *General Armstrong* incident which at this time remained unresolved. The *Treaty of 1840* remained in effect for more than fifty years.⁵⁶

It was not until 22 May 1899 that another Treaty of Commerce was signed between the United States of America and Portugal. Signed in Washington,

⁵⁴Department of State, "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America and Portugal," 26 August 1840, TIAS no. 289, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*, vol.11, 293-299.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 296.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 293. On 31 January 1891 Portugal gave notice of termination. Pursuant to the stipulations within the *Treaty*, the agreement remained in effect until one year after the date of termination

D.C., this treaty was negotiated by John A. Kasson for the United States and the Visconde de Santo Thyrso for Portugal. Composed of only four articles, this treaty placed a cap on the rates of duty for goods from Portugal, the Azores and Madeira—particularly wines and art work. Reciprocally, it also placed a cap on rates of duty on goods to Portugal, the Azores, and Madeira—particularly grains, agricultural machinery and manufacturing machinery.⁵⁷

Before the termination of the *Treaty of 1899*, there was a formal exchange of notes in Washington, D.C. on 28 June 1910 which granted both nations reciprocal most favored nation status. This status was maintained and extended throughout the twentieth century. It was at this same meeting that the United States formally recognized the names “Porto” and “Madeira” as designations of origin. Consequently, in the United States the Douro region and the island of Madeira became recognized demarcated wine producing zones. Accordingly, wines labeled “Porto” for sale in America had to have been produced in the Douro region of Portugal. Likewise, by law, wines labeled “Madeira” for sale in America had to have been produced on the island of Madeira.⁵⁸

As discussed in Chapter Two, the nineteenth century saw a steady decline in Anglo-Portuguese relations. African policy, including but not limited to the slave trade, furthered tensions between Portugal and Great Britain. Overall, a

⁵⁷This treaty was terminated on 7 August 1910, notice having been given one year prior by the United States. See, Department of State, “Treaty of Commerce Between the United States of America and Portugal,” 22 May 1899, TIAS no. 291, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*, vol.11, 307-309.

⁵⁸Department of State, “Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and Portugal,” 28 June 1910, TIAS no. 514 ½, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*, vol.11, 324-328.

marked trade disparity between the two realms also contributed to resentment on the part of the Portuguese. José Estêvão Coelho de Magalhães best expressed this mounting frustration over Anglo-Portuguese relations during the ratification process of the *Treaty of 1840*. A well-known, out-spoken member of Portugal's Parliament he passionately declared, "I vote for the Treaty...because it contributes to the emancipation [of Portugal]...from that Nation [Great Britain], that has vexed us."⁵⁹

The bilateral agreements of 1899 and 1910 served to strengthen the traditional commercial ties between Portugal and the United States. Although they did nothing to expand trade—i.e. the types of goods exchanged remained the same—they did ensure that established trade goods would be protected by treaty. For Portugal, American recognition of the Douro River and the island of Madeira as areas of demarcation were significant since the wines of both regions were key national exports.

The regicide of 1908 did not hamper commercial relations between Portugal and the United States; nor did the revolution of October 1910. The United States did wait a full year before recognition of the newly established republic. However, this delay in recognition did not coincide with any official statements either in favor of or denouncing the new government. Instead, the United States waited for the election of the Portuguese Constitutional Assembly. This Assembly met for the first time on 19 June 1911. At that first meeting it abolished the monarchy and announced Portugal's new form of government as

⁵⁹Originally, "eu voto pelo Tratado... porque elle contribue para a emancipação... d'aquelle Paiz, que nos tem vexado." Translation mine. *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, vol. 2 (February 1841), 16 as quoted in Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 139.

that of a Democratic Republic. That same day the United States formally recognized the new Portuguese government.⁶⁰

Although the United States had waited for the Constituent Assembly to meet, they acted well before their European counter-parts. France was the first European country to recognize the new Republic on 24 August 1911. By that time, Edwin V. Morgan had already presented his credentials and become the first American Minister to the Portuguese Republic.⁶¹ Thus, throughout this violent and tumultuous period in Portuguese history, there was no withdrawal or reduction in American diplomatic personnel in Portugal nor was there a suspension of most favored nation status. Instead the United States government took a wait and see attitude and then, when the provisional government made good on its promises of a Constituent Assembly, America quickly established full diplomatic ties.

The Twentieth Century

World War I

World War I should have been the acme of diplomatic activity between the governments of Portugal and the United States. After over one hundred and fifty years of diplomatic relations, a common enemy and a common fight should have been all that was needed to finally bind the two Atlantic powers. Nothing of the

⁶⁰Calvet de Magalhães, *História das Relações Diplomáticas*, 327.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 330.

kind happened. Instead, formal diplomatic communication was minimal. This fact is made all the more remarkable when the story of the World War I American Naval installation on the island of St. Michael, Azores is told.

At the behest of the British government, Portugal had remained neutral at the start of World War I. Portuguese and German forces had clashed in Angola as early as October 1914.⁶² It was not until the spring of 1916, however, that Portuguese action forced Germany's hand. In December 1915 Great Britain invoked the Treaty of Windsor and requested that her oldest ally confiscate seventy-six German vessels—some 240,000 tons—then in Portuguese ports. On 24 February of 1916, Portugal obliged. Within two weeks, Germany declared war on Portugal. Portugal would now face her enemy, not only in Africa but also in Flanders.⁶³

Portugal's decision to go to war was initially met with mixed reviews. As the war progressed and the cost of the war was increasingly felt, public opinion turned more hostile. This situation brought great pressure to bear on the Portuguese government which was already at its tether. Even with the assistance of British loans, the Portuguese economy was on the brink of disaster. Throughout the course of the war, there were continuous food riots, social unrest, attempted revolutions, and governmental reprisals.⁶⁴

⁶²Douglas L. Wheeler, *Republican Portugal, A Political History 1910-1926* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 127.

⁶³Germany declared war on Portugal on 9 March 1916. *Ibid.*, 128.

⁶⁴Portugal's war policy has been a topic greatly debated among Portuguese historians. Some historians have argued that Portugal entered World War I to protect her colonies. Others think it has more to do with the new Portuguese Republic trying to gain a positive reputation among its European neighbors. Finally, some scholars think that it was Portugal's way of

Nevertheless, America's entry into World War I on 6 April 1917 was very well received in Portugal. Within a week the Portuguese Minister in Washington was meeting with his counterpart at the U.S. State Department. At that meeting he said his government was prepared to offer the American Navy the use of Portugal's global network of ports for the purposes of re-supplying its ships. All the Portuguese government needed to know was what supplies were needed and where they were needed. They would then do their best to comply. This message was forwarded to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy who answered that no such plans were in place but that the Navy would keep Portugal's offer in mind.⁶⁵

In the following month, the U.S. State Department began negotiating with foreign governments for permission to establish overseas American coaling depots. To this end, the American consul in St. Michael, Azores was asked for an analysis of the storage facilities in the Azores. On 4 June, the consul replied that Ponta Delgada (on the island of St. Michael) had the best protected harbor in the archipelago and, therefore, was the best choice. This information was then passed on to the Navy Department. Much to the surprise of the State Department and the American consul in St. Michael, on 18 June the American collier *Orion* arrived off the shores of Ponta Delgada with ten thousand tons of coal. More surprising still was the fact that local coal companies had received instructions from the British Admiralty as to the handling of the *Orion's* coal

containing the "Spanish peril." For a succinct but thorough examination of this historiographical question see, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "1914-1918: To Die for One's Country? Why Did Portugal Go to War?," *Portuguese Studies Review* 6, n.s. 1 (1997-1998): 16-25.

⁶⁵Seward W. Livermore, "The Azores in American Strategy: Diplomacy, 1917-1919," *Journal of Modern History* 20 (September 1948): 198.

shipment. Much to the chagrin of the American consul, the validity of these instructions was confirmed by the British consul in St. Michael.⁶⁶

The appearance of the *Orion*, though off-putting for the American consul, proved fortuitous for the Michaelenses. On 4 July 1917, a large German submarine, which had been hunting the waters around the Azores, surfaced just outside of the Ponta Delgada harbor. She used her deck guns to open fire upon the unsuspecting town. The Portuguese garrison was caught off-guard and was unable to return fire. Instead, it was the guns of the *Orion* which fired back and quickly drove the U-boat below surface. The entire exchange only lasted twenty minutes. Still, the effects of this skirmish were far-reaching.⁶⁷

From that point forward the local leaders could not do enough for the American sailors who frequented their island. The men of the *Orion* were given a parade in their honor. The following year, the Fourth of July was celebrated on the island of St. Michael with great enthusiasm. The Portuguese government in Lisbon was a bit unnerved by the outpouring of goodwill, and eyed with suspicion any overt increases in the number of sailors stationed on the island.⁶⁸

At an Allied Naval Conference, held in London on 4 September 1917, the Allies came to two resolutions concerning the Azores. First, It had been agreed that, because of its critical position along the Atlantic shipping lines, the Azores should be defended against possible German attack. Second, it was also

⁶⁶Ibid., 199.

⁶⁷Ibid., 200.

⁶⁸Edward W. Chester, *The United States and Six Atlantic Outposts: the Military and Economic Considerations*, (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1980), 162.

determined that an American Naval base should be established in the Azores to help counter U-boat activities in the area. The British also agreed to establish a high-powered radio station in the same archipelago to help track those U-boat operations.⁶⁹

In October of 1917, the State Department inquired once again as to the intentions of the Navy Department in regards to the Azores. They wanted to know whether or not there was a concrete plan of action so that the Portuguese government in Lisbon could be brought on board. In their response the Office of Naval Operations was still quite vague:

The Navy desires only such facilities ashore and privileges afloat during the war which will enable them to efficiently prosecute the campaign against the submarine. . . If the Portuguese government would only understand just what we intended to do, and that it is only a base for the duration of the war, and that we are working with them and not against them in the campaign against the submarine.⁷⁰

Several telegrams later it was agreed that Ponta Delgada would be the site of an operating base. On 19 January 1918, the army transport *Hancock* arrived at Ponta Delgada with Rear Admiral Herbert O. Dunn, his staff, and fifty marines. The next day Dunn assumed command of the Azores Detachment of the United States Naval Forces Operating in European Waters. According to naval records,

⁶⁹Seward W. Livermore, 202.

⁷⁰Comdr. Charles Belknap, U.S.N., to Gordon Auchincloss, Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State, Oct. 12, 1917, 811.345/40, S.D.A., as quoted in Seward W. Livermore, 203.

when the war ended, there were twelve vessels present at the Azores base—two yachts, one tender, one oiler, two minesweepers, five submarines and one tug.⁷¹

During the course of the war, however, there were many more vessels and a greater variety of vessels present at the base. The quantity and variety of vessels required a substantial number of shore facilities to store the necessary equipment and supplies. Remarkably, the United States never received formal permission from the Portuguese government for the establishment of a base. Early discussions regarding the base were stalled when Premier Afonso Costa's government was ousted by a revolutionary coup d'état on 8 December 1917. The new Premier, Sidónio Pais, offered no formal objections to the project, nor did he give written consent for it.⁷²

In typical fashion, the Department of the Navy moved forward and hoped that at some point the State Department would catch up. This *modus operandi* for Luso-American relations during World War I was not well received by the Portuguese. At times, it seemed to the Portuguese people that their government was being too conciliatory to the Americans. This was used as a political tool against the Costa regime and was one of the contributing factors leading to the December coup.

Regardless of how it may have seemed to the Portuguese, the Costa government and later the Pais regime cooperated with the Americans not because they were pawns, but instead to serve the common cause of winning

⁷¹Thomas G. Frthingham, *The Naval history of the World War: The United States in the War, 1917-1918* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 285.

⁷²Seward W. Livermore, 207.

the war. By doing so, Portugal once again fought beside her old Atlantic partner, Great Britain, in the European theater, while simultaneously fighting for the protection of her colonies in Africa. For President Wilson, winning the war had everything to do with ideology. This was the war to end all wars and armed with his "Fourteen Points" Wilson hoped to shape the world in the image of the United States without territorial gain, without revolution, but instead through international agreements establishing the rule of law. This vision ultimately failed. America was not fully prepared to take a direct role in global politics and European leaders were not prepared to put aside past rivalries. Yet the next two decades would bear witness to an American foreign policy that was beginning to envision a causal link between global political and military tensions and American wellbeing.

Luso-American Relations, 1920s and 1930s

Between the Great War and the Good War, Luso-American relations could be described as minimal at best. During this twenty year period, Portugal and the United States concluded two treaties of Arbitration, both of which were merely extensions of the Convention of 6 April 1908.⁷³ On the part of Portugal, this diplomatic inertia was quite understandable as she was wrestling with ever-increasing political and social unrest. Between November 1918 and 30 May 1926, Portugal's First Republic saw the rise and fall of no fewer than thirty-one

⁷³For the text of these two agreements, see: Department of State, "Treaty of Arbitration Between the United States of America and Portugal," 14 September 1920, TIAS no. 656, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*, vol.XI, 336-337; and Department of State, "Treaty of Arbitration Between the United States of America and Portugal," 5 September 1923, TIAS no. 735, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*, vol.XI, 338-340.

governments. From 1920 to 1925, she also experienced an unprecedented 325 bomb incidents. As discussed in Chapter Two, Portugal's First Republic came to an abrupt end with the successful military coup of 28 May 1926.⁷⁴

After the military coup of 1926, a Military Junta governed Portugal until 1932. Although relations between Portugal and the United States were not broken off, they were subdued. On 24 July 1929, when the *Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928* became effective, Portugal was one of the thirty-two additional parties to that *Pact*.⁷⁵ Later that same year, President Hoover proclaimed the signing of a new broader *Treaty of Arbitration* between both nations. The language of the *Treaty* itself reinforced the ideals of the Kellogg-Briand Pact stating:

Eager by their example not only to demonstrate their condemnation of war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, but also to hasten the time when the perfection of international arrangements for the pacific settlements of international disputes shall have eliminated forever the possibility of war among any of the Powers of the world;
[Portugal and the United States] Have decided to conclude a new treaty of arbitration....⁷⁶

Thus, Luso-American relations at the time reflected the interests of both parties in achieving world peace. American foreign policy, however, targeted those nations who presented the greatest threat to world peace by their aggressive

⁷⁴It should be noted that although Portugal's first experiment with a republican form of government failed, it has continued to experiment with variant forms of republican government to the present. Hugh Kay, *Salazar and Modern Portugal*, (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1970), 26.

⁷⁵"Kellogg-Briand Pact," August 27, 1928, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/kbpact/kbpact.htm> (accessed 16 May 2008).

⁷⁶Department of State, "Treaty of Arbitration Between the United States of America and Portugal," 1 March 1929, TIAS no. 803, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*, vol.XI, 344-346.

weapons development programs. This policy was best reflected in the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922. The resulting *Four Power* and *Five Power Treaties* had several favorable effects. They placed the United States on a more equal footing with Great Britain while eliminating the threat of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and, just as important, they reduced the tonnage of those nations which the United States identified as a threat to world peace. Portugal's military global impact was limited. She posed no real threat to world peace.

She did, however, have possessions in Asia which explained her presence in the Nine Power Treaty. In Article I of this Treaty, signed on 6 February 1922, the powers agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."⁷⁷ For the United States this treaty supported her foreign policy measures in Asia known as the "Open Door Policy." China, by this time, had already been carved into many spheres of influence by a number of European powers. America hoped to level the playing field, so to speak, so that her merchants could gain equal access to the China market. American diplomats also felt that the Nine Power Treaty might ease not only the commercial tension in Asia, but also the ever-increasing military tensions in that region. For the United States, the development and implementation of these treaties were informed by their desire to spread the ideal of liberty by limiting the possibility of a global arms race. For the Portuguese, participation in the Nine Power Treaty confirmed her place at the table with other

⁷⁷Treaty Between the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal" February 6, 1922. http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/tr22-01.asp (accessed 10 August 2011)

colonial powers, while also ensuring recognition of her colonies by those same nations.

Conclusion

Relations between the United States and Portugal prior to World War II can be characterized by two elements, commerce and immigration, and one common factor—the Atlantic Ocean. Throughout her long history with the United States, Portugal's Atlantic Islands served as a common point of commercial interest. These commercial interests also served as a framework for early migratory patterns of the Portuguese to the United States. The end of the eighteenth century saw the continuation of good relations between the United States and Portugal. In the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, commercial and migration ties all centered on the Atlantic Ocean. Portugal was still one of America's top five trading partners—surpassing both Sweden and Denmark. Although these relations were founded on mutually beneficial commerce, during this time the balance of trade favored the United States nearly two to one. Minister Freire prepared a detailed annual report of all Portuguese imports to the United States—wine, salt, spirits, cheese, coffee, cotton, wax, coal, soap, pepper, shoes, bindings and cordage—their point of origin and their value in U.S. dollars. Consequently, the Portuguese government was well aware of the trade situation. Trade continued unaltered between Portugal and the United States because Portugal was experiencing an overwhelmingly favorable

balance of trade with her European partners. These earnings more than made up for the trade imbalance with the United States.⁷⁸

For Portugal, the United States showed great potential as a compatible ally. Like Portugal, the United States was clearly affected by her proximity to the Atlantic Ocean. This great ocean framed the entire length of her eastern border. America's trade network was developed on the Atlantic Ocean. Her economic survival depended on the expansion of that network. Those Atlantic shipping lanes, discussed earlier in this chapter, took her past Portugal's Atlantic islands, making them a favorite port-of-call for American merchant ships.

Yet for all that the United States brought to the table as a potential Atlantic ally, Portugal would not allow America direct access to her colonies. This is something that American negotiators desired from the start, particularly direct access to Brazilian markets. Portugal's colonial empire was a key national interest. She could not allow another country to gain a foothold in what had become her most precious possession, Brazil. Furthermore, The United States was a former British colony turned democratic republic. Portugal saw the potential for that spark of liberty and did not want Brazil to be consumed by it.

By the late nineteenth century all of this had changed. Brazil was an independent kingdom. Portugal was focused on her African colonies. America spanned the North American continent. America's commercial interests were

⁷⁸Walker, 49. As noted above, for a detailed account of the value, tonnage and list of goods exported from the United States to Portugal, see Thomas Jefferson's "Report on Commerce." in Catanzariti, 568-569.

becoming global. She had her own navy and a strong sense that she had to stand up for herself. A century of expansion taught her that lesson.

Just after the turn of the Twentieth Century, political events changed again for Portugal when she became a troubled, weak and flawed republic. She had spent much of the last century embroiled in war, as well as intense periods of civil and social unrest. Worse yet for the United States, Portugal's entrance into the small circle of republics—the others being France and Switzerland--was a bloody mess--first a regicide, followed by a coup. Some Americans questioned the legitimacy of such a government. The constant change of governments and the seemingly endless acts of political terrorism during Portugal's First Republic did nothing to convince those Americans that the Portuguese were ready to embrace the rule of law.

For the Portuguese, the turn of the century had wrought wrenching political changes complete with political and social violence at a pitch never before experienced and, worse yet, her economy was nearing collapse. On the other hand, unlike Spain, she was now a republic. Politically, she stood with France, Switzerland and, of course, the United States of America. Although controversial at the time, when Great Britain invoked the provisions of their medieval alliance, Portugal did not hesitate to enter World War I. She fought the good fight in the Great War and won. She fought in defense of her African colonies and won. Portugal was still able to not only maintain her sovereignty, but also ensure the protection of her colonies during World War I. Colonial

interests would shape Portugal's foreign policy well into the latter half of the Twentieth Century and impact its relations with the United States.

Unlike the British, Americans had no sympathy or empathy for Portuguese colonial woes. Prior to the Second World War, with some exceptions noted in the previous chapter, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance affirmed not only Portuguese continental sovereignty, but also Portugal's empire. Both Portugal and Great Britain had overseas empires. The policies of both nations were shaped so as to, at the very least, conserve their empires and protect their interests around the globe.

The United States was a democratic republic whose foreign policy did not support the concept of empire. Its desire for "free trade" and "open seas" ran counter to the mercantile system of colonial empire. This was a real stumbling block for Luso-American relations prior to the Second World War. Yet, after the Second World War, American policy-makers will put aside this issue in the face of what they perceive as a much greater threat, Communist Soviet expansion. In order to check this threat to the West, they launch a series of initiatives—the Marshall Plan, N.A.T.O., and M.D.A.P. Portugal avails herself of these proposals in order to fulfill her own postwar goals of economic, political, and military security. This marks the beginning of the shift in Luso-American relations.

CHAPTER IV

“COLLABORATIVE NEUTRALITY”¹

On 1 September 1939, the Portuguese government declared its neutrality in the impending war by stating: “Happily the obligations of our alliance with England, which we do not wish to shirk from confirming at so grave a moment, do not oblige us to abandon our position of neutrality during this crisis.”² The immediate crisis that Prime Minister Salazar was referring to was the German assault on Poland. Many European nations feared that German action would lead, at the very least, to a continental war. The decision to declare neutrality was not a quick decision for Portugal. During the course of the year,

¹During a speech before the Portuguese National Assembly on 18 May 1945, Salazar used the term “collaborative” to describe Portugal’s neutrality at the start of the war. Recently, historians described those nations that sided with the Axis as “collaborators.” In this case, however, the term was meant to describe Portuguese neutrality within the constraints of its alliance with Great Britain—at that point nearly 600 years old. António de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas, 1943-1950*, vol. 4 (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, n.d.), 105.

²Originally, “Felizmente os deveres da nossa aliança com a Inglaterra, que não queremos eximir-nos a confirmar em momento tão grave, não nos obrigam a abandonar nesta emergencia a situação de neutralidade.” Translation mine. “Nota Oficiosa do Governo Português (Lisboa, 1 Setembro de 1939),” Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. II (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional—Casa de Moeda, 1973), document number 917.

Portugal had been engaged in talks with many nations including Great Britain. Both the British and the Portuguese understood the likely results of growing tensions within continental Europe because together they had experienced it many times before.

In 15 February 1939, the British Ambassador handed a *Memorial* to Salazar on the subject of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. It offered to open discussions relative to the provisions of the alliance with the hope of amending it to suit the current political exigencies in such a manner so as to benefit both parties.³ In his response in June of that same year, Salazar stated that the events of March 1939, particularly the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Third Reich had absorbed the attention of the Ministries of Europe, Portugal included. After much consideration, Salazar communicated the following in regards to the alliance:

Of all the other treaties in existence, the anglo-portuguese [sic] alliance has distinct characteristics—one of which is her age. This is not only a matter of historical interest, but in the opinion of the Portuguese government an element of practical reach because it gives value to the alliance and it presents itself in the eyes of both populations as a permanent factor in their foreign policy, and not an accidental instrument of both countries' diplomacy... For the Portuguese Government it seems preferable... to interpret them [the clauses of the treaty] in whatever manner may be strictly necessary.... [Although some clauses may be obsolete and others vague] taking from the alliance that elasticity which has made it possible over the centuries to adapt itself to the most divergent circumstances would not be suitable.⁴

³Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros. "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres (Lisboa, 18 de Fevereiro de 1939)," *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. II, document number 553.

⁴Originally, "A aliança anglo-portuguesa tem características distintas de todas as outras existentes—uma delas a sua antiguidade. Esta não é somente elemento de interesse histórico, mas na opinião do Governo Português elemento de alcance prático porque dá valor á aliança e a

In their reply dated 16 August 1939, the British government completely agreed with Salazar's conclusion adding that recent joint declarations reasserting the alliance were satisfactory.⁵

On 1 September 1939 at 5 pm, The German Minister to Portugal met with Salazar. In this meeting the German Minister explained that he was obliged to render a communiqué to Salazar similar to a communiqué being rendered to other nations such as Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg. He stated that up to this point Germany had maintained friendly relations with Portugal and hoped to continue to do so. He stated that, if Portugal remained neutral in the current Polish-German conflict, Germany would respect that neutrality and the integrity of Portuguese territory both continental and abroad. If, however, Portugal broke with that neutrality, Germany would defend her interests with every means possible. Salazar retorted that Portugal had already communicated in May her desire to remain aloof from continental conflicts that did not directly affect her, while still remaining faithful to her British alliance. The German Minister requested clarification on the British issue to which Salazar replied that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was a defensive alliance, the text of which was

apresenta aos olhos dos dois povos como factor permanent da política externa, e não apenas como instrumento accidental da diplomacia dos dois países... Parece por isso ao Governo Português que seria preferível... interpretá-los no que for estritamente necessário... Não conviria tirar à aliança certa elasticidade que lhe tem tornado possível adaptar-se no decorrer dos séculos às mais diversas circunstâncias." Translation mine. Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros. "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros à Embaixador Britânica em Lisboa: Memorial (Lisboa, 5 de Junho de 1939," *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. II, document number 745.

⁵Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros. "Da Embaixada Britânica em Lisboa ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros: Nota verbal (Lisboa, 16 de Agosto de 1939," *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. II, document number 814.

public—i.e. this was not a secret pact. The German minister continued this line of conversation by stating that Portuguese neutrality today could later be abandoned—an unstated, but clear reference to Portuguese action in World War I. Deciding to take the bait, Salazar fully agreed with the Minister citing the historical precedent of the past war in which nations freely entered into the war in succession. At this point the German Minister repeated his earlier statement regarding the assurance of a German response to Salazar, but this time in a tone which Salazar interpreted as a veiled threat to Portugal. Nonplussed, Salazar replied that, “If Portugal was at war with Germany, [evidently] Germany would be at war with Portugal.”⁶ Thus, Salazar was making it clear to the German Ambassador that Portugal’s decision not to enter the war was based on Portuguese national interest, not fear of German attack. When, and if, Portugal entered the war she fully understood that German reaction would be harsh.

Portugal would indeed be neutral throughout all of the Second World War. Throughout the war, she would always remain an ally to Great Britain. This tightrope performance would demand the very best of her diplomats and, at times, a little luck.

Over the past two centuries the concept of neutrality has changed. In its simplest form, neutrality can be defined as “non-involvement in war.”⁷ For Portugal during World War II, this concept was inadequate. In a radio broadcast

⁶Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros. “Apointamento de conversa entre o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros e o Ministro da Alemanha (Lisboa, 1 Setembro de 1939,” *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. II, document number 897.

⁷Peter Lyon, *Neutralism* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963), 20.

of 25 June 1942, Salazar stated, "...the desire for neutrality cannot be superior to the interest of the nation."⁸ Salazar's form of neutrality carefully balanced national interests, international alliances, and international law

The consequences of this declaration of neutrality would be felt in every corner of the Portuguese empire. The geographic location of both mainland Portugal and her Atlantic islands once again placed her in a precarious position. Spain was Portugal's first concern. Should General Francisco Franco decide to ally Spain with Germany, Portugal's entire eastern border would be open to invasion. Beside Spain, Portugal had a very real fear of assault by Germany. Her western coastline and her islands were open to blockade and/or bombardment by the German Navy and, in particular, by her Air Force. German air raids from bases in France would be facile and, as for land-to-air defensive weapons, Portugal had little to none. By using her submarine forces, Germany could blockade Portuguese ports which were also virtually defenseless. Portuguese colonies, so long coveted by the Germans, were too far away and too vast for Portugal to protect them.

Portugal's Prime Minister, António de Oliveira Salazar, directed Portuguese foreign policy from 1936 to 1947. In fact, throughout World War II, he held the posts of both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. As such, the importance of Salazar's role in shaping Portuguese foreign policy during

⁸"...o desejo de neutralidade nao pode ser superior ao interesse da Nação." Translation mine. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas, 1938-1943*, vol. 3 (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, n.d.), 342. Salazar gave this broadcast four months after Portuguese Timor had been overrun by Japanese forces intent on expelling a Dutch-Australian force that had crossed into Portuguese territory two months earlier. The events surrounding the Japanese invasion of Portuguese Timor are discussed in the next chapter.

WWII cannot be overstated. While publicly proclaiming Portugal's adherence to her old alliance with Great Britain, he guided Portugal on a path that would eventually lead her towards closer diplomatic relations with the United States.

Though keenly suspicious of American motives, Salazar had early on concluded that only the United States could assist Portugal in reaching her wartime goals. These were threefold. First, she needed to protect her own sovereignty. Second, she had to maintain both herself and Spain as neutrals for as long as possible. Finally, she wanted to protect her empire. Salazar's wartime neutrality, and her postwar diplomatic actions would reflect this new vision of Luso-American relations.

Concurrently, and to Portugal's benefit, policymakers in the United States had concluded that Portugal, particularly her Atlantic islands, was a valuable asset to America's wartime strategic goals. Access to airbases in the Azores would not only help protect United Nations convoys from submarine attack, but could also serve as a staging area for sorties to Europe and Asia. Consequently, Portugal went from being a friendly, yet marginalized country in the 1920s and 1930s, to both a wartime and post-war ally.

This chapter will examine the start of this dynamic shift in Luso-American relations. It will begin with a brief look at British and German attempts at courting favor with the Portuguese in the 1930s. This period of Anglo-German rivalry in Portugal was a bit unnerving to the British, and the Portuguese sometimes played upon this to their advantage. Portugal's wartime policies will then be studied through an analysis of the *Iberian Pact of 1939*, *Operation Bracken*, and

the sale of Portuguese wolfram. The results of the Spanish Civil War had both short and long term consequences throughout Iberia. For the Portuguese government General Franco's regime was preferable to a communist regime.⁹ Nevertheless, Franco's new military machine and his debt to Germany and Italy made Spain a real threat to Portugal. Portuguese diplomats sought a peaceful solution to what might have been a volatile problem, which resulted in the *Iberian Pact of 1939*. Furthermore, prior to 1944, in adherence to her policy of "collaborative neutrality," Portuguese policies favored the British—and by extension the Americans. First, during *Operation Bracken* Portugal built the Lagens airbase in the Azores. The British were then given command of the base, while later the Americans were given the use of it under British command. The Portuguese also sold wolfram to both the Allies and the Axis, but did so in such a manner as was advantageous to the Allies, until its complete embargo in June of 1944.

Anglo-German Cultural and Military Rivalries

While from 1936 on Germany secretly pushed for the acquisition of Portuguese territories, publicly she engaged in a policy of courting favor with the people of Portugal. In 1937 and 1938, there was a tremendous increase in

⁹The Spanish Civil War pitted the Nationalists (center-right) against the Republicans (center-left). Both groups had support from foreign powers. The Nationalists received support from Fascist Italy and the National Socialist Germany. The Republicans received support from the Communist Soviet Union. Although they also received support from more centrist nations, the fact that the Republicans received support from the Soviet Union confirmed Salazar's fears of a radical element too close to home.

German activity in Portugal. These actions were all approved and coordinated by the German Embassy in Lisbon. New German cultural centers were established at Portuguese universities. German social clubs became quite popular. Even German nannies were becoming more common among Portugal's elite.¹⁰

Most disturbing to the Portuguese government was the slow and steady co-option of the Portuguese news media outlets by the Germans. The latter was being pursued by two methods. First, a major German agency called D.N.B. had begun selling international news at a very low price to a majority of the Portuguese news agencies. This meant that the average Portuguese citizen was getting his international news from German correspondents, not British correspondents—as he had been accustomed to. Besides this attempted manipulation of the international news, small local Portuguese newspapers were being kept afloat through the sale of advertising space to German merchants. Thus, German name brands were now becoming more commonplace in Portuguese households than ever before, and German imports were slowly increasing in Portugal.¹¹

¹⁰Lord Elibank, "Memorandum: Conversation with Portuguese Ambassador, Dr. Armindo Monteiro (19 October 1938)," Inclosure in Foreign Office, "Viscount Halifax to Sir W. Selby (28 October 1938, Lisbon)," *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, W14364/153/36.

¹¹Ibid. The British did not immediately grasp the particulars of this increase in German-Portuguese trade which was not a broad general increase in commodities, but instead an increase in certain areas, such as coal and automobiles. For a more detailed study of the German economic influence in Portugal see, Arthur H. King, "Memorandum by the Commercial Secretary, Lisbon, respecting Portuguese Trade (16 November 1938)," Inclosure in Foreign Office, "Sir W. Selby to Viscount Halifax—(received November 30)," *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, W15733/152/36.

Besides the cultural rivalry, there was also the possibility of a German-British military rivalry. Portugal's military preparedness, or lack thereof, was keenly felt by the Portuguese and quite obvious to the British. In 1935 Sir Charles Wingfield, British Ambassador to Lisbon, described the current military state of the Portuguese as follows:

The equipment and armament of the Portuguese army have been allowed to fall into a scandalous state, so that it is no longer capable of taking the field; its rifles are the war ones which are now worn so smooth as to be unfit even for target practice. whilst the equipment is so old, worn out and exiguous that not one out of the four divisions of the army could be put on a war footing.¹²

Soon thereafter, the Portuguese Parliament voted 5 million pounds sterling for the re-equipment and modernization of the Portuguese army. It was their hope to eventually have at the ready a small but well-equipped army of eight divisions.¹³

In order to meet these goals the Portuguese made inquiries at various munitions houses in Great Britain. They were, at first, rebuffed. In September of 1936, Armindo Monteiro, Portugal's Minister of Foreign Relations, wrote directly to the British Ambassador in Lisbon requesting that the British government facilitate these purchases. He reminded Wingfield of the long-standing alliance between the two countries. He then went on to argue that, given that they were allies, it was preferable to have both armies similarly outfitted so as to facilitate

¹²"Sir C. Winfield to Sir Samuel Hoare (14 October 1935, Lisbon)," *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, W9280/387/36.

¹³Mr. Eden to Sir C. Wingfield, United Kingdom Delegation to the League of Nations (22 January 1936, Geneva)," Inclosure in Foreign Office, "Anthony Eden, Despatch No. 1 to Lisbon (24 January 1936, Geneva)," *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, W771/762/36.

any possible future cooperation between the two. Moreover, Monteiro stressed the importance of acting in a timely fashion.¹⁴ The British hesitated in part because they were trying to create their own stockpile of weapons for possible future action on the continent.

The Portuguese became anxious and began feeling out German and Italian arms dealers. By the middle of 1937, these activities were brought to the attention of the British government in a memo by Robert Vansittart of the British Foreign Office. He argued that both Germany and Italy were trying to take Britain's place in Portugal. Not only did he see them replacing British influence in the cultural and political realms, but he also saw them encroaching upon the traditional British role of supplying Portugal with arms and trained instructors.¹⁵

Losing patience with perceived British indifference to Portugal's vulnerable status, Armindo Monteiro—now Portuguese Ambassador in London—wrote what he called an “entirely unofficial letter” to Sir Robert Vasittart, Permanent Undersecretary to the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He hoped to remind Vasittart of the strategic significance of Portugal and her colonies to the British Empire. This note was a clear, concise, and dramatically forceful argument for joint Anglo-Portuguese military planning. Monteiro affirmed:

I am of the opinion that now, more than ever before, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance is a vital element of security to the British Empire,

¹⁴Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. “Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de S. M. Britlanica em Lisboa (4 September 1936, Lisbon),” Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. I (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1973) document number 1.

¹⁵Stone, *The Oldest Ally*, 60.

and, simultaneously, to Portugal. It is an essential element of common defence.

If you look at the map, you will easily see that the great lines of communications between the United Kingdom and the British Dominions and over-seas possessions may without difficulty be dominated by sea and by air from Portuguese territory. There are three positions to be considered at the present time:

- a) The Portuguese coast, in the Mother-Country;
- b) The port of Lisbon;
- c) The line Lisbon (or Lagos)—the Azores—Cape Verde Islands. To these should be added, in certain eventualities, the Port of Lobito and its railways connection with the Indian Ocean (Beira).

Should an eventual common enemy ever obtain possession of any of the three positions mentioned, the danger to Great Britain during a conflict might be of the gravest character. Imagine for one moment that during the last war the enemy had succeeded in gaining a foothold in any of them, from which to carry on the fight at sea. Would the easy and constant passage first of arms and munitions which came from the United States in such large quantities, and, later, the actual transport of troops, have been possible in such circumstances? Would it have been possible to maintain, without grave difficulties and risks, the regular supply of food to the troops at the front and even to the civil population of the British Isles?¹⁶

As a result of these exchanges and many more, the British Chiefs of Staff requested approval by the Cabinet for a military mission to Portugal. After a series of delays the mission date was confirmed for February of 1938. The British saw this as an opportunity to establish personal contacts with Portuguese "naval, military, and air authorities," with an end towards "the appointment of resident attachés to [their] respective Embassies." The Portuguese hoped to arrange for a Portuguese military mission to Britain to continue these talks. Meanwhile, both parties regarded the mission as a necessary step towards

¹⁶Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Subsecretário de Estado permanente britânico dos Negócios Estrangeiros (20 July 1937, London)," *Dez Anos de Política Externa* vol. I, document number 37.

planning joint military action, including measures to "improve facilities available for Great Britain in the joint defence of the two countries in a war in which they were engaged as allies."¹⁷

One month prior to the mission's scheduled arrival in Lisbon, Sir W. Selby, British Ambassador to Lisbon at the time, reiterated the importance of the mission to the Portuguese in a note to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. He closed with a rather somber reminder of what was at stake, "Finally, I would point out that the eyes not only of Portugal, but of most of Europe, will be on the mission while they are here, and that failure to accomplish something will have consequences that it is not pleasant to contemplate."¹⁸ For the Portuguese, there were severe consequences from the very start. Germany, Italy, and Japan reacted harshly to the news. The Portuguese minister in Berlin was personally harangued by Hermann Goering. Both the German and Italian Ambassadors to Lisbon protested vehemently. Japanese newspapers went so far as to publish articles claiming that the true goal of the mission was the establishment of British air and naval bases in Macau.¹⁹

Despite the protests, the British mission continued as planned. It left Portugal on 12 August 1938 confident that it had achieved its goals. Upon reading its report, the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that there should be a

¹⁷Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. "Draft letter," Annexed to Foreign Office, "Do Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros Britânico ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres (14 October 1937)" W18366/4864/G, *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. I, document number 91.

¹⁸"Sir W. Selby to Mr. Eden (5 January 1938, Lisbon)," *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, W445/146/36.

¹⁹Stone, *The Oldest Ally*, 63-64.

renewed emphasis placed upon the strategic importance of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. They also concluded that a Portuguese mission to Britain should be encouraged.²⁰

Unfortunately for the Portuguese military, the mission report failed to convince the committee of Imperial Defense to expedite certain arms requests made by Portugal. In a telegram from the Foreign Office to Selby, the Office of Imperial Defence and Cabinet had determined that some of Portugal's military needs could be met by 1939. In reality, most of her requests would not be filled until 1940 or, in the case of 45mm field guns, not until 1941.²¹ In the meanwhile, the Portuguese grew increasingly dismayed and frustrated at what they viewed as the British simply dragging their feet. As a result, Portugal awarded a contract to Italy for a shipment of 75mm guns. The order itself was not large, but it did send a message to the British that the Portuguese government would not simply stand by while her equipment needs went unsatisfied. Finally, in the turbulent month of March 1939, Selby met with Salazar and they came to a general agreement over munitions, a schedule, and prices.²²

The military mission report did come to some conclusions regarding the defense of Portugal and her empire. After careful reading of the report, His

²⁰Ibid., 71-72.

²¹For example, the British began delivery of the 45mm field guns at a rate of 4 per month starting in June of 1940 and at an increased rate of 12 per month in 1941. "Foreign Office: Viscount Halifax to Sir W. Selby (18 May 1938)" *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, W6124/1172/G.

²²"Apontamento de conversa entre o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros e o Embaixador Britânico em Lisboa (3 March 1939, Lisbon)," *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. II, document number 560.

Majesty's Government made clear to Portugal that, in the event of an attack, Great Britain would be prepared:

- a) To make such British naval dispositions as would secure Portugal and her overseas possessions from seaward attack. It is understood that the Portuguese authorities realize that in the opening phases of a war against Germany they cannot expect help by British land forces.
- b) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom... would be prepared to assist Portugal with air forces in addition to naval forces in fulfilment [sic] of their Treaty obligations.

Two things can be discerned by this statement. First the British were willing and able to render aid by sea and air. As expected, this assistance was extended to Portugal's colonies. Later in the note it was argued that land support would only arrive if circumstances allowed. Second, and most significant, in this scenario naval assistance was offered to fend off an assault by Germany, not Spain.²³

All of this anxiety over the state of the Portuguese armed forces came as a consequence of both international and domestic factors. Germany's marked increase in mobilization resulted in much of Europe mobilizing for war. This was quickly followed by events in Spain. The Spanish Civil War and the consequentially better equipped and well-seasoned Spanish armed forces stood in stark contrast to Portugal's ill-equipped and poorly trained armed forces. Finally, Salazar and the New State government understood that the Portuguese Army was their greatest supporter. Accordingly, Salazar exerted as much

²³Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Da Embaixada Britânica em Lisboa ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros: Nota verbal (Lisboa, 16 de Agosto 1939), " *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. II, document number 814.

pressure as possible upon the British government to follow up with a military mission and a supply schedule that would satisfy the Portuguese Officers Corps.

The Iberian Pact of 1939

Portugal observed the Spanish Civil War with great trepidation. On the one hand Portugal had not wanted what might become a Soviet supported government along her eastern border. During the Spanish Civil War, many Portuguese volunteers fought beside Franco's forces. Although they were not recruited by the Portuguese government, they were allowed to exit the nation freely for the express purposes of entering the war.

Portuguese foreign policy throughout the Spanish Civil War was based on two concepts—one ideological and one practical. The driving force behind Salazar's support of Franco's cause was his deep-rooted revulsion towards communist ideology. Another legitimate fear was that a leftist Spanish government would give aid to leftist elements in Portugal. Back in 1934, Portuguese exiles had not only found safe haven in Spain, but had also been offered covert assistance to help overthrow the Portuguese New State. Thus, Salazar's position regarding the outcome of the Spanish Civil War was based on both philosophical ideals as well as simple self-preservation.²⁴

On the other hand, General Franco's Nationalist Army had quickly become an experienced fighting force complete with modern equipment—supplied by

²⁴Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar: a Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009), 190.

Germany and Italy. Franco naturally felt indebted to those countries that had supported him. For this reason, Salazar remained acutely concerned over Portugal's weakened military state even after General Franco's forces were victorious. Salazar viewed Portugal's weakened military status in stark contrast to Spain's newly upgraded military machine. Without the proper equipment and training, Portugal's army could not protect the 750 mile border shared with Spain. The British mission officers had emphasized that Britain could not ensure ground support for Portugal²⁵

If Spain became the aggressor in another world war, continental Portugal would once again be at risk of invasion from her traditional peninsular rival. Even before the British mission, Salazar understood that Portugal and England had differing military concerns. In a meeting in January of 1938 between Sir W. Selby and Portugal's Prime Minister, Salazar illustrated these counter-perspectives. Selby later related this point to Anthony Eden:

[Salazar said] that while we [Britain] had appointed an admiral to lead our mission, he had appointed a Portuguese general as chief of the Portuguese representatives. The reason was simple. While so far as we were concerned, naval considerations were pre-eminent, with Portugal it was otherwise. In matters of defence, the land forces took precedence over the naval.²⁶

Beyond these strategic considerations, Franco's regime was also viewed as a potential threat to the New State's political stability. Extreme rightist elements

²⁵" Interim Report on the Work of the British Military Mission in Portugal, Rear-Admiral Wodehouse to Sir W. Selby (6 May 1938, Lisbon)," Inclosure in "Lisbon: Sir W. Selby to Viscount Halifax (13 May 1938, Lisbon)," *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, W6321/146/36.

²⁶"Lisbon: Sir W. Selby to Mr. Eden (18 January 1938)" *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, W1087/146/36.

in Portugal were quite excited by Franco's successes, and hostile towards Salazar's domestic and foreign policy positions. At home Salazar opted to downplay the return of those volunteer forces that had fought in the Spanish Civil War—i.e. there was no victory parade. He also refused them government benefits for their military service, a move that caused some of them to ask for Spanish citizenship and remain in Spain. Abroad, Salazar needed a diplomatic solution.²⁷

The result was *The Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between Portugal and Spain*. Copies of the treaty—one in Portuguese and the other in Spanish--were signed in Lisbon on 17 March 1939. It contained six articles in total. The first article stipulated that both parties would respect the other's borders and territories. Furthermore, both signatories were obliged never to assist another country in an act of aggression against the other, "whether by land, by sea, or by air." Both nations also agreed that any future alliances made with a third party would not compromise the terms stipulated in this treaty. This treaty was set to expire in ten years.²⁸ In the language of both the original *Treaty* and the subsequent *Protocol*, this Luso-Spanish alliance did not in any way

²⁷De Meneses, 191. For Salazar's public statements regarding the Spanish Civil War see, Antônio Salazar, *Discursos e Notas Políticas: v. II, 1935-1937*, second edition (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, L.^{da}, 1945). Nearly the entire volume is dedicated to the Spanish Civil War.

²⁸Originally, "tanto por terra como por mar ou pelo ar." Translation mine. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. "Tratado de Amizade e Não-Agressão entre Portugal e Espanha, assinado em Lisboa a 17 de Março de 1939," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa, (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, vol. V*, (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1967), document number 1978.

compromise the obligations of the signatories to prior alliances—notably the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.²⁹

Within six months, German troops invaded Poland. Salazar understood that this invasion meant the beginning of another world war, one in which Portugal could ill afford to participate. Portugal issued a proclamation of neutrality on 1 September 1939. Within two days, Britain and France declared war on Germany. World War II had begun, and Portugal's hopes for self-preservation lay in the hands of her diplomats.

The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 19 August 1939, which provided for the exchange of goods between Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as the Non-Aggression Pact signed between the same parties only days later, seemed to give both the Spanish government and its public cause for pause in regards to their own relationship with Germany. Theotónio Pereira, Portugal's Ambassador to Spain, reported that while German officials tried to dismiss the ideological concerns of the Spanish government, "the shock suffered by public opinion was quite severe and they remain unconvinced."³⁰ This may have created a better diplomatic environment for Portugal to further convince Franco's government of the need for Iberian solidarity.

²⁹Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. "Protocolo Adicional ao Tratado de Amizade e não Agressão entre Portugal e Espanha (Lisbon)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa, (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. VII (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1971), document number 1066.

³⁰Originally, "o choque sofrido pela opinião pública foi muito grande e esta não se covece." Translation mine. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Espanha ao Ministro de Negócios Estrangeiros (San Sebastian, 30 Agosto de 1939)" Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa, (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. II, document number 887.

As Europe became an increasingly volatile continent, both Portugal and Spain decided to reinforce and extend the terms of the Luso-Spanish treaty. To this end, a Protocol was signed in Lisbon between Portugal and Spain on 29 July 1940. This agreement obliged both parties to protect the interests of the other. It also provided for the possibility of periodic meetings by the signatories to discuss events and possible joint action. The *Protocol* attempted to strengthen solidarity of the Iberian Peninsula. It also sent a clear message to other European nations that both Portugal and Spain were determined to maintain peace in the peninsula.³¹

The Iberian Pact worked well in terms of keeping Iberia neutral, but it did have its drawbacks. Franco's interpretation of neutrality was not as legalistic as Salazar's. Salazar's frustration with Franco are not well known, but are documented. One of the earliest and most telling documents was an intelligence report for the Office of Strategic Services dated 1 October 1941. It was a recounting of a conversation between Salazar and a friend on 13 September of that year. The friend of the friend stated that,

- (i) He (SALAZAR) was dissatisfied with the way SPAIN had been behaving to PORTUGAL and had seen to it that FRANCO should know how he felt.
- (ii) He had allowed goods of various kinds to be exported to SPAIN and, in order to avoid trouble had turned a blind eye to the fact that in many cases they did not remain in SPAIN. The SPANIARDS appeared to wish to disregard the sacrifices PORTUGAL was making. Whether they did so owing to GERMAN pressure or out of sheer bad

³¹Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. "Protocolo Adicional ao Tratado de Amizade e não Agressão entre Portugal e Espanha (Lisbon)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa, (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. VII (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1971), document number 1066.

faith, should any threats be made to PORTUGAL or any attempts at 'shameful impositions,' the PORTUCUESE government would remove to some safer and more convenient locality than LISBON.

(iii) In his opinion, FRANCO was pursuing or permitting a foolish policy, with a consequent waning of prestige. He had a low opinion of FRANCO'S capacity.³²

Regardless of Salazar's personal opinion of Franco, Franco's habit of taking Portuguese goods and covertly transporting them across the Pyrenees was a point of irritation between the two. It became an issue not only to the Portuguese, who thought it needlessly placed them in a precarious position, but additionally to the British and the Americans who could not agree on how to solve the problem. As much as they both may have wanted to simply cut off supplies to Iberia they could not risk pushing these neutrals—especially Spain--into enemy hands.

Operation Bracken

The *Protocol* of 1940 came at a particularly critical moment. France had fallen only one month earlier. Tensions ran high throughout Europe. Rumors were already circulating that Spain would be the next target, followed by Portugal. On 17 December, Portuguese Ambassador Armindo Monteiro met with Lord Halifax to discuss the possibility of the Iberian Peninsula being drawn into the war. Monteiro thought that the most probable sequence of events would be an invasion of Iberia in support of, or in consequence of, a German assault on

³²Office of Strategic Services, "PORTUGAL: DR. SALAZAR on GENERAL FRANCO (1 October 1941)," file 3053, microfilm (M1499) reel 11, RG 226, National Archives.

Gibraltar. He noted the “not very successful efforts since 1937 to obtain armaments which might serve as the basis of [Portugal's] military preparation.” He then went on to state that, given Portugal's lack of preparation, “we are under no illusion as to the need for very considerable aid on land and the air from the onset.”³³

The perceived urgency of the situation on the continent resulted in Halifax meeting with Prime Minister Churchill later that same day. Churchill agreed that immediate steps should be taken and then authorized Halifax to welcome a Portuguese military mission to England. Due to the politically charged nature of such an exchange, it was suggested that the Portuguese send only one trusted military representative in plain clothes. The exchange should begin immediately and under the veil of secrecy.³⁴ On 28 January of 1941, the British Ambassador to Portugal met with Salazar to discuss a variety of issues of mutual interests. During that meeting, he extended an official invitation to the Portuguese to visit England to study their defense works, in particular their anti-aircraft and coastal defenses.³⁵

³³Aide-mémoire. Guia da conversa referida no ofício de 19 de Dezembro de 1940, Annexed to: London: Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Conversas com Lord Halifax acerca da posição de Portugal em face dos perigos que ameaçam o País, em 17 e 18 de Dezembro de 1940, no Foreign Office, às 3 horas e 30 minutos da tarde (19 December 1940, London), *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. VII, document number 1376.

³⁴“Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros (18 December 1940, London),” *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. VII, document number 1371.

³⁵First mentioned in: “Telegrama do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres (29 January 1941, Lisbon),” Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. VIII (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1973), document number 1462; and, later, in more detail in “Telegrama do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em

This mission left Portugal on 20 February 1941. Contrary to earlier British thinking, Colonel Santos Costa, the Portuguese Minister of War, had concluded that the mission should be composed of six officers under the command of Staff Colonel José Filipe de Barros Rodrigues. They were airmen, and engineers, as well as artillery and infantry officers. Their goal was to study British defenses in order to emulate the British model in Portugal, particularly in the defense of Lisbon against aerial assault and in the defense of the Portuguese coastline. Colonel Santos Costa had also concluded that there was no reason to keep the mission and its goals secret. For security reasons the newspapers were notified of the mission two days after its departure, but were given all pertinent information at that time.³⁶

The British delegation, which met with Colonel Barros Rodrigues, was led by the former military attaché in Lisbon, Lieutenant Colonel G. A. Fenton. Colonel Fenton was chosen not only because of his former position in Lisbon, but also because of his ability to speak Portuguese. Nevertheless, Ambassador Monteiro indicated that his government preferred the discussions to move forward in English. António Potier of the Portuguese Embassy in London served as interpreter.³⁷

Londres (3 February 1941, Lisbon)," *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. VIII, document number 1468.

³⁶."Do Secretário-Geral do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Sua Majestade britânica em Lisboa (5 February 1941, Lisbon)," *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. VIII, document number 1473.

³⁷"Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Conversa com o Subsecretário de Estado Parlamentar para os Negócios Estrangeiros, Butler (4 March 1941, Lisbon), *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. VIII, document number 1555

The talks progressed slowly. In the following month the Portuguese delegation received the British mission in Lisbon. In both cases these talks focused primarily on the defense of Portugal and her Atlantic Islands. A second series of meetings between the British and Portuguese took place in London between October and November of 1941. As a result of these deliberations a plan for the defense of Portugal and the Atlantic Islands was adopted. This plan had two phases. The first, and most vehemently debated phase, required the Portuguese government remove itself to the Azores when it could no longer remain neutral. This meant the virtual abandonment of the continent prior to an enemy attack. The second phase required Britain to assist Portugal in the development of her defenses in the Azores, especially the airfields.³⁸

The Portuguese immediately placed certain limitations on the development of phase two. No British officers were to be allowed on Azorean soil. Instead, the Portuguese would furnish the British with all the necessary information. The British would then delineate the course of action. The Portuguese would oversee the work and make certain it was completed according to British specifications. The British code name for this operation was *Bracken*.³⁹

³⁸Stone, *The Oldest Ally*, 179-180.

³⁹R. E. Vintras, *The Portuguese Connection: the Secret History of the Azores Base* (London: Bachman & Turner, 1974), 35. Told as a first person narrative, this work renders the reader extraordinary insight into this operation. With the rank of Wing Commander in the Royal Air Force, Vintras was an original member of the British delegation. He not only played an essential role in operation *Bracken*, but also in the immediate negotiations for the British use of the Azorean base.

Wing Commander Vintras, an original member of the British mission, was to work with Staff-Major Humberto Delgado, of the Portuguese Army Air Force, in the construction of a runway capable of taking “very long range reconnaissance aircraft.” Since Major Delgado was only responsible to Salazar and Santos Costa, there was no foreseeable bureaucratic stalling to hold up the project.⁴⁰

The island of Terceira was chosen because it had an existent airstrip and a port at Angra. Work commenced immediately. Delgado was summoned by Minister Santos Costa and asked to explore the feasibility of constructing an aerodrome on the island of Terceira. This included requests for detailed surveys of ports, highways, medical supplies, water supplies and so on. Major Delgado left for Terceira on 10 December 1941. Working alone he completed his study and within one month had returned to Lisbon. By the end of January 1942, “Delgado’s Blue Report Number One” was in R.A.F. headquarters.⁴¹

Two months later he was handed a second set of questions. On 26 March 1942 Major Delgado was back on Terceira. This time he was creating extensive survey and relief maps—incredibly enough, with contours given to the nearest yard. He was also reporting on the electrical installations, sewerage and other general facilities available on Terceira. Several months later, he was back in Lisbon putting the finishing touches to “Delgado’s Blue Report Number Two.” He arrived in London in mid June. There he remained for the next three months

⁴⁰ Vintras, 37. For an insightful account of Major Delgado’s experience see “Chapter 10: O Homem Dos Açores, 1941-1945” in, Frederico Delgado Rosa, *Humberto Delgado, Biografia do General Sem Medo* (Lisbon: A Esfera dos Livros, 2008).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 39.

while collaborating with Wing Commander Vintras on the final technical agreements.⁴²

By 1943 most of the work had been completed on the air base in Lagens, Terceira. However, these new facilities were useless to the British. Portugal, as a neutral, could not offer Britain the use of the base. Britain would have to request or even demand the use of the base by invoking the Treaty of 1373. Portugal waited for Britain to initiate the process by invoking the provisions of the Treaty.

Unfortunately, Churchill was unaware of anything that had transpired after his initial agreement to military talks back in March of 1941. Consequently, there followed several months of diplomatic confusion on the part of the British. Because of the veritable pounding the British convoys were experiencing along the coast of Europe, elements of the British Navy and the United States' government exerted pressure for the seizure of the Atlantic Islands.⁴³

As early as 22 February 1943, a memorandum by Admiral Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord to the War Cabinet, summarized the need for the Atlantic bases. Admiral Pound began his assessment by stating that:

So long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, U-boats cannot operate effectively... Air facilities in the Islands would therefore have a vital and, possibly, decisive effect on U-boat operations, (sic) would very greatly increase the security of the lines of supply to all our overseas forces.

⁴² Ibid., 40.

⁴³ Ibid., 43. More about American plans for the seizure of the Azores will follow in *Chapter V, 1944: the Turning Point*.

He then continued with a detailed list of the advantages which facilities on the Atlantic Islands would offer. The most significant disclosure made by the Admiral was:

We are now confident of mastering the enemy on sea, land and in the air, but the U-boats are undoubtedly delaying the development of the full offensive required for final victory. Dr. Salazar's assistance in helping us to combat the U-boats by the grant of facilities in the Portuguese Islands would be a decisive factor in the anti-U-boat campaign and would measurably shorten the war.⁴⁴

These arguments were reiterated in the aide memoire of 16 June 1943 from Sir Ronald Campbell, contemporary British Ambassador to Portugal, to Salazar. In paragraph twelve of this note, Campbell invokes the Treaty of Alliance and asks "the Portuguese Government to extend to them their collaboration by according to them the facilities of which they stand in need in the Azores."⁴⁵ These included "facilities in S. Miguel and Terceira for operating general reconnaissance aircraft... (and) unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either S. Miguel or Fayal." Unfortunately, Campbell could not give any assurances as to Britain's ability to assist Portugal should an angry Germany unleash her bombers on Lisbon in retaliation.⁴⁶

In his response dated 23 June 1943, Dr. Salazar asserted that Portugal would, in principle, allow the British the use of its facilities in the Azores. Of

⁴⁴War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff, "Use of the Portuguese Islands. Memorandum by the First Sea Lord (22 February 1943) as published in *Appendix X* of Vintras, 164.

⁴⁵"De Sir Ronald H. Cambell ao Doutor Oliveira Salazar (16 June 1943, Lisbon)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeirs, *Documentos Relativos aos Acordos entre Portugal, Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da América para a Concessão de Facilidades nos Açores durante a Guerra de 1939-1945* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional de Lisboa, 1946), 4.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 3.

course, the conditions for this would first have to be negotiated until a mutual accord could be signed by both parties. The Prime Minister also expressed his gratitude in regard to the assurances made by His Majesty's Government: First, that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from Portuguese territories as soon as the hostilities ceased; second, that Portuguese colonial sovereignty was assured by both the British government and the Union of South Africa. However, Salazar noted that these guarantees were not sufficient. He insisted that the Australian government and the government of the United States of America make these same assurances.⁴⁷

Before Campbell's aide memoire was sent to Salazar, a British military mission—in plain clothes—had already been assigned to the British embassy in Lisbon. It was composed of three officers and one civilian representing the Foreign Office. Wing Commander R. E. Vintras was included in the group because of his earlier involvement in *Operation Bracken*. The mission was instructed to assist Ambassador Campbell in whatever way necessary, but specifically to help with the negotiations for the use of the base.⁴⁸

Talks began in early July. Progress was slow. Commander Vintras noted that "the Portuguese Chiefs of Staff appeared to be influenced by all manner of political and pseudo-chauvinistic pressures, while neither Salazar nor Santos Costa was inclined to intervene." The talks took place with the Portuguese Chiefs of Staff because they attended to the necessary military considerations.

⁴⁷"De Doutor Oliveira Salazar a Sir Ronald H. Cambell (23 June 1943, Lisbon)," *Documentos Relativos aos Acordos*, 12.

⁴⁸Vintras, 52.

These negotiations identified which of the military facilities in the Azores would be used by the British, as well as to what extent they would be used. Salazar had already agreed that the base would be conceded; that was the political consideration. By the end of July, Churchill was growing impatient. He sent Campbell a note threatening to take matters into his own hands if an agreement were not reached by 15 August.⁴⁹

On 17 August 1943, the *Accord Relative to the Use of the Facilities in the Azores* was signed in the Naval Ministry. Later that same day, Dr. Salazar approved the *Accord*. The most significant features of the *Accord* were that: British troops were allowed full use of several Island installations in the Azores, not just the airfield at Lagens, Terceira; and the *Accord* was effective as of 8 October 1943.⁵⁰ Portugal did not receive the assurances regarding the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty which it had demanded from Australia and the United States until September and October of that year respectively.⁵¹

Surprisingly, in a city filled with spies, there were no leaks during the entire negotiations process. Consequently, several days after the signing, many Axis nationals were shocked to find themselves ousted from the Azores with neither warning nor explanation given. Secrecy, however, came at a price. Portugal

⁴⁹Ibid., 61.

⁵⁰"Acordo Relativo ao Uso de Facilidades nos Açores," 17 August 1943, *Documentos Relativos aos Acordos*, 19-23.

⁵¹"Do Senhor H. L. Hopkinson ao Doutor Oliveira Salazar (14 September 1943, Lisbon)," *Documentos Relativos aos Acordos*, 24-25; and "Do Senhor George Kennan ao Doutor Oliveira Salazar (25 October 1943, Lisbon)," *Documentos Relativos aos Acordos*, 30. These assurances were important to Portugal given the events of 1941/1942 in Portuguese Timor. Again, see "Chapter V" for a discussion of those events.

now had to contend with what it considered two potential diplomatic crises—its relationship with Spain and the reaction of Germany. Salazar felt that the Protocol required him to inform Spain before the public announcement. Meanwhile, a team of Portuguese and British officers developed a plan to counter a possible Spanish attack. As of 5 October 1943, three Portuguese divisions were sent to reinforce the border. Two British divisions were placed on alert to be sent in support of the Portuguese divisions.⁵²

Two days later, Salazar met secretly with Count Jordana, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The two men spoke alone for three hours. When the two emerged, Jordana stated that he fully understood Portugal's decision and that he did not believe it conflicted with Spanish interests. He assured all present that not only would Spain maintain her neutrality, but she would also repel—by force, if necessary—any German forces which crossed the Pyrenees with the intent of besieging Portugal's frontier.⁵³

Finally, Portugal was ready to face Germany. The German Ambassador to Portugal, Baron Hoyningen-Huene, was notified that Britain had played the Alliance card and had asked for the use of the facilities on the Azores. Portugal, he was told, could not refuse. Huene asked many questions but stated that final judgment would be left to Berlin. Several days later, Huene handed Salazar a note of strong protest. Although he accepted the note, Salazar rejected its accusation that Portugal had succumbed to British pressures and had,

⁵² Damiao Peres, *Historia de Portugal*, supl. 2, *Historia de Portugal: 1933-1974*, by Franco Nogueira (Porto: Livraria Civilizacao, 1981), 212.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 213.

consequently, relinquished its status as a neutral. This diplomatic measure was the only action taken by the Germans who were now preoccupied with a Soviet offensive and the defection of Italy to the Allies.⁵⁴

On 12 October 1943, Churchill informed Parliament of the *Accord*. Similar announcements were made in Portugal. By the time the *Accord* was made public, British troops had already spent several nights in their new Azorean barracks. In Portugal the news of the *Accord* was well received, and was a boost to Salazar's public standing. An American spy reported, "Salazar, for whom the people had accumulated the feeling that he was coasting on his past reputation, has now strengthened and re-established his position by the Azores deal."⁵⁵

More important than public prestige, with the signing of the *Accord* Salazar was closer to achieving a key wartime goal, protecting the empire. In the aforementioned September note from H. L. Hopkinson, acting in the absence of the British Ambassador to Portugal, he wrote:

I am authorized to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia are glad to associate themselves with the assurance already furnished by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the Union of South Africa regarding the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonial possessions after the war.⁵⁶

⁵⁴Ibid., 214.

⁵⁵Office of Strategic Services, "MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION W.D G.S., Current Events #013—Portugal (30 November 1943)," RG 226, file 50748C, microfilm (M1499) reel 388, National Archives.

⁵⁶"Do Senhor H. L. Hopkinson ao Doutor Oliveira Salazar (14 September 1943, Lisbon)," *Documentos Relativos aos Acordos*, 24-25.

More than a month later, George Kennan delivered a very brief note stating that “in connection with the agreement recently concluded between Portugal and Great Britain the Government of the United States of America undertakes to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies.”⁵⁷ Thus, Portugal now had written assurances of Portuguese sovereignty over her colonial possessions from Great Britain, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, and the United States.

Portuguese Wolfram

The final test of Portuguese neutrality was the wolfram question. Wolfram is a tungsten ore that has a wide variety of military uses, the most significant being its use in the production of armor-piercing shells. The largest deposits of tungsten ore are found in the Far East—China, Burma, and Korea. The German invasion of the Soviet Union, however, blocked access to the trans-Siberian route, which was the established wolfram trade route from the Far East to Europe.⁵⁸ Thus, the smaller deposits in Spain and Portugal became disproportionately significant. The following map shows the regions of Spain and Portugal in which there were wolfram deposits.

⁵⁷“Do Senhor George Kennan ao Doutor Oliveira Salazar (25 October 1943, Lisbon),” *Documentos Relativos aos Acordos*, 30.

⁵⁸W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, vol. 1, *The History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series*, edited by W. K. Hancock (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office and Longman, Green and Co., 1952), 526.




Figure 2: Wolfram deposits in Spain and Portugal.⁵⁹

Accordingly, the majority of the wolfram producing mines were in Portugal.

⁵⁹W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, vol. 2, *The History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series*, edited by Sir Keith Hancock (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office and Longman, Green and Co., 1959), insert 304-305.

Portugal allowed both British-owned and German-owned mining companies to continue to operate in Portugal during the war. In 1941 and 1942, Portugal's output amounted to nearly eighty percent of European production. During that time, the price of wolfram soared from 300 pounds sterling to 6000 pounds sterling per ton. This had a tremendous impact upon the Portuguese economy.⁶⁰

In an attempt to contain inflation, Salazar created a system of governmental controls to monitor the mining, sales, pricing and export of wolfram. These controls were to be enforced by a new governmental agency, the Metals Regulatory Commission established in February of 1942. Only the Metals Regulatory Commission could purchase and sell wolfram to exporters.⁶¹

The Germans felt certain the Metals Regulatory Commission would be advantageous to them because of their intimidation tactics. They knew that the Portuguese government was feeling particularly vulnerable after German U-boats sank several of her freighters. Consequently, German negotiations for wolfram usually included veiled threats against the Portuguese.⁶²

An example of this negotiation tactic was the *Corte Real* incident. In the fall of 1941 German-Luso talks regarding wolfram purchases had stalled. The Germans were growing impatient. On 11 October 1941, a German submarine sank the Portuguese freighter, the *Corte Real*. The freighter had only sailed

⁶⁰Stone, 142-143.

⁶¹Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question, and World War II," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 23:1 (1986): 117.

⁶²Between 1941 and 1942 German U-boats sank three Portuguese cargo freighters. *Ibid.*, 119.

about eighty miles off the coast of Portugal before being signaled to stop by cannon fire from the submarine. Once stopped, her manifests were vigorously examined. Her captain, José Narciso Marques Júnior, was informed that she was carrying contraband goods whose final destination was Canada. The fact that the *Corte Real* would take these goods only as far as New York was inconsequential. Captain Marques was given half an hour to abandon ship. Both crew and passengers fled the freighter in a small whaleboat. After the sinking of the *Corte Real*, the passengers—two women and two children—were taken aboard the submarine and remained there while the submarine towed the whaleboat twenty miles towards land. The passengers were then transferred back onto the whaleboat, and Captain Marques was given a flare gun. The submarine captain assured Captain Marques that the proper Portuguese authorities would be notified of their exact location. Thirteen hours later the exhausted and frightened crew and passengers were found by a Portuguese vessel and returned to Lisbon.⁶³

Although the Portuguese launched an investigation and filed a strong protest, the German government stood by its U-boat captain's decision. This incident reinforced the notion of Portuguese vulnerability. The German military machine could easily attack Portuguese interests both at sea with their U-boats and on land with their bombers. Portuguese merchant vessels were particularly vulnerable because Portugal no longer had the capacity to protect her own

⁶³"Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Ministro de Portugal em Berlim (31 October 1941, Lisbon)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, (1936-1947), *A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. IX (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1974), document number 2492

vessels at sea. Both the Portuguese people and her government feared German reprisals. This incident proved to them that this fear was not paranoia but the reality of war.

Negotiations for Luso-German wolfram accord were finalized on 24 January 1942. The terms of the accord were set to terminate on 1 March 1943. By the terms set in this accord, the Germans would receive a total of 2,800 tons of wolfram distributed over a twelve month period. This wolfram would be culled from German owned mines. In payment for said deliveries the Portuguese would receive a variety of necessary supplies, such as: 60,000 tons of partially finished steel products (wire, plates, etc...); 2,000 tons of paper for newspapers; 10,000 tons of ammonium sulfate; as well as some of the necessary equipment and tools for wolfram mining (at 10-15 installations). The prices for these goods were set at 1938 levels. The Germans would also be given the opportunity to buy fifty percent of any "free" wolfram for that same period.⁶⁴

It was the British and, by association, the Americans, however, who held the real advantage. They owned the largest mines. More significantly, the Germans had to pay in cash or kind. The British, on the other hand, were allowed to purchase on credit because of the special commercial advantages traditionally granted to the British within the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. On 24 August 1942, after a lengthy exchange of notes between all three parties—the

⁶⁴"Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Acordo por trocas de Notas sobre volfrâmio celebrado a 24 de Janeiro 1942 entre a Alemanha e Portugal," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, (1936-1947), *A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. XV, A Guerra Económica (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1992), 13-15. The term "free" wolfram refers to wolfram which was mined in excess of the negotiated amounts.

Portuguese, the British, and the Americans, Salazar sent a final settlement of the terms regarding the sales of Portuguese wolfram to both the United States and the United Kingdom. The latter would be allowed to import up to four thousand tons of wolfram per year. They would also each be granted at least one-quarter of the "free" wolfram produced in that year.⁶⁵

While the Germans were required to pay in cash or kind, the British negotiated the terms of wolfram sales to her government based on credit, she then could reserve her hard currency for preemptive purchases of wolfram. These purchases were made by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the United States Commercial Company. The former was a business front created by Britain's Ministry of Economic Warfare. The latter was a similar corporation developed by the American government. They shared the same office in Lisbon. Their purpose was to deny Germany wolfram by purchasing as much of it as they could.⁶⁶

They were quite successful. In a memorandum from the Committee of the Combined Boards (Combined Chiefs of Staff) dated 21 August 1943, this program of restricting the enemy's access to Portuguese wolfram was clearly spelled out:

The continuance of supplies from the United States and United Kingdom is essential to the maintenance of Portuguese economy and,

⁶⁵State Department, "Document Setting Out the Results of the Negotiations Regarding the Supply of Wolfram From Portugal to the United Kingdom and the United States From March 1, 1942, to February 28, 1943," enclosure in "The Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Salazar) to the American Minister in Portugal (Fish)," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942, vol. III, Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), 811.29 Defense (M) Portugal/194.

⁶⁶Wheeler, "The Price of Neutrality," 121.

therefore, both on political and strategic grounds, the British authorities consider that the necessary materials should be made available.

Moreover, in exchange for the supplies made available to them, the Portuguese would be required to furnish to the United States and the United Kingdom certain materials such as sisal, wolfram, rubber, sardines, beeswax, etc., which are required by the United States and the United Kingdom on supply grounds. In addition, the bargaining power which is put into the hands of the United States and the United Kingdom by furnishing supplies to Portugal is being used to restrict the export to the enemy of Portuguese supplies which are of great importance to him. Thus it is hoped that if the supplies on the attached lists can be offered to the Portuguese they will continue the present interim agreement under which Germany's share of Portuguese wolfram would be limited to about one-third of the quantities available and the balance would go to the United States and the United Kingdom.⁶⁷

Indeed, by the end of 1943, Germany had not received more than thirty-seven percent of its negotiated portion of Portuguese wolfram. Meanwhile, the Allies acquired both the British negotiated quota as well as that wolfram which the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the United States Commercial Company had purchased.⁶⁸

The Germans were understandably irate. Yet, it was the Allies who were more insistent in their demands. They wanted nothing less than a wolfram embargo against Germany. Remarkably, on 29 May 1944, Sir Ronald H. Campbell, the British Minister to Lisbon, wrote Salazar a note requesting an embargo of wolfram sales to Germany. He stated, "I have been instructed to make on the behalf of His Majesty's Government a solemn and earnest appeal to

⁶⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Combined Chiefs of Staff, Trade with Portugal, Report by the Combined Administrative Committee, Appendix A, (21 September 1943)" RG 218, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I: 1942-1945, European Theatre* (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1982) microfilm, reel VI, C.C.S. 352.

⁶⁸Wheeler, "The Price of Neutrality," 118.

the Portuguese Government, in the name of the Alliance, to take the necessary steps to prevent any further export of wolfram from Portugal to Germany....⁶⁹ In his reply of 3 June 1944, Salazar argued that Portugal could not claim neutrality while instituting an embargo against a single belligerent. Furthermore, he stated that the Portuguese Council of Ministers expressed “great doubt” as to the legitimacy of invoking the Alliance over the question of wolfram exports. Consequently, Salazar was writing to inform His Majesty's Government of Portugal's decision to close all of the wolfram mines.⁷⁰

This was a difficult decision for Portugal. She had opted for a total embargo rather than risking her status as a neutral. Portugal was well aware of the economic cost to herself. In his note to the British Ambassador, Salazar had clearly and succinctly expressed the cost to Portugal in pounds sterling. Closing the mines meant that eighty thousand Portuguese would lose their employment. The national economy would lose an estimated 9 to 10 million pounds sterling per year. The national Treasury would lose approximately two million pounds sterling. The news of the embargo did not hit the Portuguese newsstands until 7 June 1944—one day after the Allied landing in Normandy.⁷¹

⁶⁹ “Do Embaixador Britânico em Lisboa ao Presidente do Conselho e Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros (29 May 1944, Lisbon),” *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. XV, document number 382.

⁷⁰ “Do Presidente do Conselho e Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador Britânico em Lisboa (3 June 1944, Lisbon),” *Dez Anos de Política Externa*, vol. XV, document number 386.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* For a detailed analysis of the economic impact of wolfram sales see, Douglas L. Wheeler, “The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question, and World War II, Part 2,” *Luso-Brazilian Review* 23:2 (1986): 104.

Conclusion

By declaring herself neutral at the beginning of the war, Portugal knew that she had placed herself in an uncertain position. This was especially true since that declaration had also included a reaffirmation of the 600 year old alliance with Great Britain. However, time would show how even neutrality could be molded to maintain national sovereignty while rendering assistance to an old ally.

Portugal's first diplomatic feat was inviting Spain to enter into the "Iberian Pact," followed by the "Protocol." After the Spanish Civil War, Franco was quite indebted to both Germany and Italy. If Spain had joined the Axis at the beginning of the war, both Portugal and Gibraltar would probably have fallen with dire consequences for the British. The Iberian Pact offered Spain more diplomatic flexibility. She now had a partner with whom she could confer and rely on. In theory, Portugal and Spain would work together throughout the war, i.e. they would not have to stand alone, as most neutrals do, over the course of the war. These treaties also gave Portugal the diplomatic means to influence—and limit—Spanish participation in the war.

Indeed, before the war had even begun, the British Ambassador to Portugal confided to Salazar that, "maintaining Spanish neutrality in the case of war is the greatest service which [Portugal] could render."⁷² This she did and did

⁷²Originally, "conservarmos Espanha neutral em caso de guerra é o melhor serviço que podemos prestar." Translation mine. "Do Ministro de Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de

well. In 1943, E. R. Stettinius, Jr., the U. S. Under Secretary of State, laid out the “political considerations” involved in America’s economic policy towards Spain and Portugal. In his note to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, Stettinius reaffirmed this wartime policy by stating, “As you know, a principal objective in our policy toward Spain and Portugal has been to keep the Iberian Peninsula neutral.”⁷³ This policy of trying to maintain a neutral Iberia would remain constant up until 1944.

The lease of the airfields in the Azores to the British came at a critical juncture in the “Battle of the Atlantic.” The fall of France in June 1940 meant that U-boats could roam freely along the Atlantic coast of Europe. Their favorite hunting grounds spanned from France west to the coast of the United States, north to Iceland, and just south of the Atlantic Islands. There were no particular targets. As Admiral Karl Doenitz wrote in his U-Boat Command War Diary on 15 April 1942:

The enemy’s shipping constitutes one single, great entity. It is therefore immaterial where a ship is sunk. Once it has been destroyed, it has to be replaced by a new ship; and that’s that. In the long run the result of the war will depend on the result of the race between sinkings and new construction... I am therefore of the opinion that tonnage must be sought in those localities where, from the point of view of U-boat operations, it can most readily be found,

Portugal em Londres (Lisboa, 25 Augusto de 1939)” Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa, (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, vol. II*, document number 850.

⁷³Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Chiefs of Staff, FORMULATION ON POLICY ON TRADE WITH THE IBERIAN PENINSULA, Report by the Joint Logistics Committee, Enclosure A, Appendix C (9 November 1943)” RG 218, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I: 1942-1945, European Theatre*, microfilm, reel VI, J.C.S. 538/1.

and where, from the point of view of keeping down our own losses, it can most easily be destroyed.⁷⁴

This plan had worked with spectacular success for the Germans up until the spring of 1943.

Throughout the war, the Allies were slowly gaining a series of practical and technological advances which effectively countered the U-boats. First, they began rerouting their convoys. Then, in December of 1942, the British broke the U-boat code. Concurrently, they developed a better radar system. Merchant ship escorts were made more effective by reorganizing them into permanent support groups of five, with two escort carriers including twenty anti-submarine aircraft. By May 1943 U-boat losses reached forty-three (more than twice the number launched for that year.).⁷⁵ In his *Memoirs*, Doenitz recalled, "Wolf-pack operations against convoys in the North Atlantic...were no longer possible. They could only be resumed if we succeeded in radically increasing the fighting power of the U-boats....I accordingly withdrew the boats from the North Atlantic."⁷⁶

When the reequipped U-boats returned in October, the allies were established in the air bases in the Azores. This meant that the "air gap" was finally closed.⁷⁷ Allied merchant ships would enjoy air escorts throughout their

⁷⁴Karl Doenitz, *Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days*, translated by R. H. Stevens (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959), 228.

⁷⁵John Keegan, *The Second World War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 120.

⁷⁶Doenitz, 341.

⁷⁷See the attached map regarding the additional coverage which would be gained from bases in the Azores. This study was prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee for the consideration of the J.C.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Chiefs of Staff, Seizure or Peaceful

voyages. Many of the British aircraft were fitted with a Leigh Light for night operations. The Germans could no longer refuel and restock U-boats by using their “milch cow” submarines in the surrounding waters of the Azores.⁷⁸

Finally, although Portugal did sell wolfram to the Germans, she did so at a disadvantage to them: The Germans were never allowed to purchase on credit, whereas the Allies purchased on credit. The embargo, which the Allies demanded, would have constituted a clear breach of neutrality. According to Chapter 1, Article 7 of the Hague Peace Conference, “A neutral power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet.”⁷⁹ In the case of wolfram sales, Salazar chose to follow the letter of the law.

In June of 1944, Portugal opted for a complete embargo on wolfram sales. This hurt her economically and also placed her at risk of Axis reprisals; albeit that risk had diminished significantly. Since the summer of 1943, the Allies had made great gains in the war effort. They were victorious in North Africa. They had made great gains in Russia—where wolfram mines also existed. Consequently, the Allies had greater stores of Portuguese wolfram and possible access to Russian wolfram mines. The Germans had little reserves, and were facing a two

Occupation of the Azores, Appendix A, (16 May 1943)” RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 10, folder: CCS 381 Azores (5-7-43) Sec. 1. National Archives.

⁷⁸Dan Van der Vat and Christine Van der Vat, *The Atlantic Campaign, World War II's Great Struggle at Sea* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), 352.

⁷⁹James Brown Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907*, vol. 2, *Documents* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1909), 405.

front war. In a telegram from then Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. to R. Henry Norweb, Ambassador to Portugal, Stettinius stated that this, "action of the Portuguese Government should prove a factor in shortening the war, inasmuch as it will deprive the enemy in Europe of important quantities of a vital war material...The United States has been active in the negotiations which have led up to this satisfactory conclusion...."⁸⁰

The choice of a complete embargo rather than a limited embargo was the logical choice for Portugal. The Portuguese were not privy to D-Day plans. Even if they had been, the Portuguese were well aware that there are no guarantees in war. They could not have projected a swift Allied victory, nor could they have projected the timeframe for Germany's withdrawal from France. At this point, American forces had proven themselves in Africa, but Africa is not Europe. The embargo allowed Portugal to maintain her status as a neutral in Europe, while it did not diminish her role in the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

From 1939 to 1944, Portugal never waived in her adherence to the alliance. She worked with the British in developing a policy of Iberian neutrality. Great Britain was fully engaged in the design and construction of the Lagens airbase in the Azores. Beyond that, Great Britain was also offered numerous military resources in the treaty for the use of the bases that followed. Finally, in terms of wolfram sales, Great Britain had a tremendous advantage over the

⁸⁰"The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb), Washington, 8 June 1944," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1944*, vol. IV, *Europe* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966) 811.29 Defense (M) Portugal/1549.

Germans in that she was able to buy on credit. These three elements—political, military and commercial—were all fundamental to the alliance.

Meanwhile, by 1944, Portugal had also met two of her three wartime goals. She had maintained both herself and Spain as neutrals, and in so doing had protected Portuguese sovereignty on the continent. Although this came at a cost, the benefit was that Portugal was not a battleground as she had been in so many previous continental wars. Portugal also gained assurances from Great Britain, Australia, South Africa and the United States for the protection of her colonial possessions. These assurances came in the wake of a severe blow to Portuguese national self-esteem. The loss of Timor, in February of 1942, to the Japanese was shocking. Publicly, Salazar's response, i.e. diplomatic action, diminished his standing with the Portuguese masses who expected him to take stronger action, or at the very least make a case for stronger international condemnation of the Japanese. Behind the scenes Salazar worked tirelessly to achieve a military solution to the situation. Portuguese participation in the United Nations liberation of Timor became the Portuguese foreign policy goal of 1944. It was also the issue that ultimately led to direct negotiations between Portugal and the United States.

CHAPTER V

1944: THE TURNING POINT

The year 1944 is often referred to as a turning point for the Allies during the Second World War. The successful invasion of Normandy spelled eventual victory for them. The phrase “turning point,” however, may also be applied to 1944 when referring to Luso-American relations. As stated earlier in this study, prior to the Second World War, relations between the United States and Portugal were at an all-time low. It is not that the two countries were hostile towards one another. Rather, neither country met the needs of the other—politically, economically, or strategically. World War II changed that but that change came slowly.

For all intents and purposes, from 1939 to 1944 Luso-American relations were largely indirect. From the President of the United States to the Secretary of State to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the general consensus was that Great Britain should take the lead in talks with Portugal because of their special relationship. Ultimately, this resulted in American frustration and Portuguese suspicion

because neither side was engaging in direct diplomatic talks. As shown in Chapter IV in both *Operation Bracken* and in the negotiations regarding wolfram, talks with Portuguese officials were primarily handled from London.

This chapter will first show how this method failed to produce a satisfactory end, particularly when applied to the securing of American use rights in the Azores. While the British were initiating talks with the Portuguese regarding the Azores, in the United States the strategic significance of the Azores was a topic for media discussion. Demands for the occupation of the Azores by a variety of high placed public officials did nothing to ease the minds of Portuguese leaders regarding the good intentions of the United States. It was, however, the 1941 crisis in Portuguese Timor which became a fulcrum for Luso-American relations in the second half of the twentieth century. The negotiations for the creation of an American airbase on the island of Santa Maria, Azores hinged upon Portuguese participation in the liberation of Portuguese Timor. These talks brought to the forefront many challenges for both the Americans and the Portuguese. Nonetheless, the results were that both parties were not only satisfied with the final agreement, but had also established the foundation for stronger diplomatic ties in the future.

American frustration, Portuguese suspicion

From the beginning of the war, the Portuguese government was wary of American intentions and did everything possible to respond quickly to even the

hint of American encroachment. Take for instance when, in 1941, rumors began circulating in the news service agencies of an impending American invasion of the Azores. Between January and July of 1941, there were literally hundreds of articles in the *Washington Post*, *The New York Times* and other newspapers. Some of these articles reflected the perspective of the foreign press. Of those, the reports in Italian and German newspapers made various claims on either the British intent on a pre-emptive strike in the Azores, or on the plan to establish American air and naval bases in the Azores.¹

Most articles, however, focused on the strategic importance of the Azores. As early as 5 January 1941, *The Washington Post* reported that, according to a bulletin from the National Geographic Society, "the Azores are a crossroads between North America and Europe...a busy center of commerce between two hemispheres, the main junction point of transatlantic cables and a regular stopping place for clipper planes flying between New York and Lisbon."² Later, Hanson W. Baldwin, a *New York Times* reporter, spelled out the air and naval base needs of the Western hemisphere. Several maps, such as the one below

¹See, "Designs on Azores Charged," *New York Times* (1923-Current File), 18 February 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012); "Germans Say They Hear British Will Grab Azores," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 16 March 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012); "British Menace Portugal, Says Roman Press," *The Washington Post* (1923-1954), 17 March 1941 <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012); and "U.S. Accused of Azores Designs," *The Washington Post* (1923-1954), 29 January 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012), respectively.

²"Canaries, Azores Important in U.S. Defense Strategy," *The Washington Post* (1923-1954), 5 January 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

that clearly showed the importance of the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific and the Azores Islands in the Atlantic, accompanied this article.³




Figure 3: Importance of Hawaiian Islands and Azores Islands

Concurrently, there was loose talk in the Senate regarding American military action. On 6 May 1941, on the floor of the Senate, Senator Claude Pepper (Democrat) of Florida gave a long and bellicose speech demanding that the United States occupy Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, the Cape Verde and

³Hanson W. Baldwin, "Defense of Our Ocean Ramparts: A map on the two pages following illustrates the strategic principles of America's sea and air defenses. The article on this page discusses those principles," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 30 March 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

Canary Islands, Dakar and Singapore.⁴ In a radio address that very evening, American Secretary of War Stimson called for the use of the Navy to “render secure all of the oceans...which surround our continent.”⁵

To the Portuguese, these rumors seemed confirmed by President Roosevelt’s fireside chat of 27 May 1941. In the now famous “We Choose Freedom” radio address, Roosevelt made a compelling argument for an increased American air and naval presence in the Atlantic, even though the United States was not yet a belligerent in the war. Roosevelt argued:

...the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, if occupied by Germany, would directly endanger the freedom of the Atlantic and our own American physical safety. Under German domination those islands would become bases for submarines, warships, and airplanes raiding the waters that lie immediately off our own coasts and attacking the shipping in the South Atlantic. They would provide a springboard for actual attack against the integrity and the independence of Brazil and her neighboring Republics.⁶

Thus, the loss of the Portuguese Atlantic islands would not only endanger the United States, but also put into question the security of the entire Western Hemisphere. It stood to reason then that Roosevelt felt the necessity to:

...extend our patrol in North and South Atlantic waters. We are steadily adding more and more ships and planes to that patrol... These ships and planes warn of the presence of attacking raiders, on the

⁴Robert C. Albright, “Florida Senator Asks Occupation of Dakar, Azores and Singapore,” *The Washington Post* (1923-1954), 7 May 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

⁵Turner Catledge, “Sea Crisis is Seen: War Secretary Urges Action While British Fleet Has Power,” *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 7 May 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

⁶Franklin D. Roosevelt, “We Choose Freedom—A Radio Address Announcing the Proclamation of an Unlimited National Emergency, 27 May 1941,” in *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. X, *The Call to Battle Stations: 1941*, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Russell & Russell, 1950), 188.

sea, under the sea, and above the sea... We are thus being forewarned. We shall be on our guard against efforts to establish Nazi bases closer to our hemisphere.⁷

The United States was willing to protect those islands with force, if necessary.

This speech was well-received by the American press. Two days after Roosevelt's speech, *The New York Times* devoted a full page to excerpts from newspapers across the United States supporting the President's stand.⁸

The problem with Roosevelt's reasoning was that it did not take into account that the islands were the sovereign territory of Portugal. Furthermore, the implication was that Portugal was unable, or unwilling, to protect her own territories. On 30 May 1941, the Portuguese Embassy in Washington issued a stern diplomatic note taking exception to these statements, and firmly declared to what lengths Portugal would go to defend her sovereignty. "From their own part, the Portuguese Government reassert their indefectible {sic} determination to defend to the limit of their forces, their neutrality and their sovereign rights against all and any attack to which they may be exposed..."⁹

The events that followed offer insight as to the gap in communication between the Executive Office and the State Department, and the same between the State Department and the Portuguese Embassy. In an article dated 11 June 1941, *The New York Times* reported that at the recent press conference

⁷Ibid., 189.

⁸"Nation's Press Strongly Supports the President's Stand," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 29 May 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

⁹"The Portuguese Legation to the Department of State, Washington 30 May 1941," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers*, vol. II, 1941, *Europe* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1959) S53B.014/36.

President Roosevelt confessed that he had not been informed of the Portuguese protest, nor had he been informed of the response to that note by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In that response, Hull assured the Portuguese government that the United States "harbors no aggressive intentions against the sovereignty or territorial integrity of any other country....Our policy today is based upon the inalienable right of self-defense."¹⁰ Portuguese newspapers published a series of editorials decrying the response as both insufficient and unclear.¹¹ Portuguese Ambassador to the United States João António de Bianchi reflected that same sentiment when he asked for clarification. To that end, on 14 June 1941, Hull and Bianchi met for half an hour to finally put this issue to rest.¹²

In the meantime, German submarines had the upper hand in the Battle for the Atlantic. According to the Joint War Plans Committee, Allied use of the Azores could change all that.¹³ Negotiations between Portugal and Great Britain regarding base rights in the Azores were progressing at a snail's pace. President Roosevelt had chosen the arbitrary deadline of 22 June 1941 for Anglo-Portuguese negotiations to bear fruit.

¹⁰Bertram D. Hulen, "Portugal Protest Roosevelt Talk; Hull Assures Against Aggression," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 11 June 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

¹¹"Portuguese Advise Hands Off," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 11 June 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

¹²"Portugal Queries Again: Minister Seeks Clarification of Hull's Assurance About Isles," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 13 June 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

¹³See Chapter VI for an assessment of the value of the Azores in the Battle for the Atlantic, including the Joint War Plans Committee map which shows how the Atlantic air gap could be closed.

If not, Roosevelt had ordered that an American expeditionary force prepare to invade the Azores. Under the direction of Major General Holland M. Smith USMC, a force of no fewer than 25,000 ground troops—both Army and Marines—was training along the eastern coast of the United States. A change of orders was delivered on 4 June 1941 when it became obvious that British forces in Iceland were in need of relief. One month later, these same troops traded in their tropical attire for cold-weather gear, and were landing in Iceland.¹⁴

In broad terms, American concerns centered on maintaining open shipping lines in the North Atlantic. More particularly, they were determined to maintain the flow of munitions to Britain. German submarines were making this more difficult by the day. The location of the Azores was perfect. Iceland, however, was a good runner up. The establishment of American troops in Iceland moved the region under U.S. protection decidedly to the East and within the German war zone. Concurrently, American forces were also deployed to Trinidad and British Guiana. This action seemed to temporarily ease some of the tension between the United States and Portugal.¹⁵

¹⁴For a brief but detailed account of the mission see, Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of the United States Naval operations in World War II*, vol. 1, *The Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939 – May 1943* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947) 67; and Kent Roberts Greenfield, gen. ed., *United States Army in World War II. The War Department: Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943*. (Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995) 70. For a much more comprehensive and well documented study of American interests in the Azores during the Second World War see, Norman Herz, *Operation Alacrity: The Azores and the War in the Atlantic* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2004).

¹⁵Frank L. Kluckhorn, "Navy Forces Land: Roosevelt Holds Move, on Reykjavik's bid, Bars Triple Threat," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 8 July 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).




Figure 4: American troops in Iceland.¹⁶

Throughout these events, Portugal's concerns centered around maintaining international recognition of her status as a neutral and her sovereign rights. Publicly, Portugal needed to maintain a strict sense of neutrality. Portugal was not as concerned about the British—and, to a limited extent, to her wartime allies—because the Anglo-Portuguese alliance offered mutual assurances.

¹⁶Ibid.

Nonetheless, give an inch to the Allies and the Germans might want to take a mile. The British Foreign Office seemed to be more sensitive to Portugal's predicament, probably because she and Portugal had danced this waltz before. The State Department did not always share the Foreign Office's sense of forbearance. This resulted in a sense of mistrust between Portugal and the United States.

What added to the growing misunderstanding between the two nations was the lack of communication between American diplomats stationed in Portugal and the Portuguese government. Upon his arrival in 1942 in Lisbon, George F. Kennan assumed the duties of counselor of legation. He was immediately stunned at the lack of diplomatic contact between the two nations concerning the war. In his *Memoirs*, he stated that:

So far as I could learn from the official files...at no time since the entry of the United States into the war had there taken place anything resembling a political discussion between the American Minister and the Portuguese Prime Minister. At no time had we discussed with the Portuguese at a responsible level such things as the compatibility of our interests generally, in the face of the wartime situation, or the prospects for our postwar relationship.¹⁷

When Kennan questioned American Ambassador Bert Fish as to why there had been no discussions between himself and Salazar, the southern gentleman simply replied, "Ah aint goin' down there and get mah backsides kicked around.

¹⁷George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1967; repr., New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 144.

He's too smart for me." Kennan decided that it was best not to pursue the issue with Ambassador Fish.¹⁸

Ambassador Fish's sentiments aside, this indifference on the part of the United States can be explained by their propensity to allow the British to act as an intermediary between the two. Nevertheless, Kennan fully realized that Portugal's position as a neutral could change rather rapidly and not necessarily at the time of Portugal's choosing. Thus, he had concluded that stronger diplomatic ties could and should be established between the two as soon as possible. As Kennan would soon realize, however, this was easier said than done. Another major stumbling block towards better diplomatic relations between Portugal and the United States was the rather pronounced lack of communication and coordinated action between the State Department and the Executive.

As stated earlier, on 17 August 1943, an *Accord* was signed between the British and the Portuguese for the use of the Lagens Airfield in Terceira, Azores as well as other island installations within that same archipelago. Portugal had asked for assurances regarding the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty. Yet it took several months before the United States could decide what steps to take. In Kennan's *Memoirs*, he recalled the evident lack of coordination between the State Department and President Roosevelt on this issue and the resultant diplomatic difficulties which he faced.

¹⁸Ibid., 145.

On 5 October, Kennan was forwarded instructions giving him permission to grant Portugal every assurance that the United States respected Portuguese sovereignty in all her possessions. The caveat was that Kennan was only to offer those assurances "If (but only if) Dr. Salazar should approach the Chargé d'Affaires {Kennan} with a request for such an undertaking"¹⁹. Three days later, Kennan was forwarded new orders telling him to proceed at once with the assurances.²⁰ Kennan left immediately for Portugal's Foreign Ministry to arrange for a meeting between himself and Salazar. The meeting was set for that Sunday at 10 am.²¹

That Sunday, before his scheduled meeting, Kennan stopped at the American Embassy and, much to his consternation, found new instructions stating that under no circumstances was he to give those assurances to Prime Minister Salazar. Kennan decided to meet with Salazar and explain—as best he could—what had happened. He then decided to take the time to initiate a dialogue regarding Luso-American common security interests in the Atlantic. Kennan described Salazar as cautious and a bit puzzled at the turn of events—as was Kennan!²²

¹⁹"The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Washington 4 October 1943," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, vol. II, *Europe* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1964) 741.53/124a. Ambassador Fish had died in July of 1943, and no replacement had yet been appointed. This left Kennan as Chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon.

²⁰The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Washington 8 October 1943," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, vol. II, *Europe*, 741.53/130a.

²¹Kennan, 148.

²²*Ibid.*, 149.

The following Sunday, 17 October, Kennan was astonished to find new instructions from Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, this time by direction of President Roosevelt himself. The orders indicated that Kennan was to approach Salazar immediately with a request for the use of

- a. For U.S. Naval surface craft: São Miguel Island. One operating and supply base at Ponta Delgada.
- b. For U.S. Naval aircraft:
 - (1) Fayal Island. One seaplane base at Horta.
 - (2) São Miguel Island. One landplane base.
- c. For U.S. Army Air Force aircraft.
 - (1) Terceira Island. One landplane base at Lagens Field for air transport and ferry operations, and accommodations for personnel.
 - (2) Flores Island. One landplane base for air transport and ferry operations. If the terrain of Flores Island does not permit adequate air base construction, the base may be placed on Santa Maria Island. Housing facilities to be provided to accommodate personnel.
- d. Existing cable systems and communications facilities...
- e. Observation posts, Radar, etc., as required...

In connection with these {Lagens Airfield and Rabo de Peixe Airfield} facilities we shall require:

- (1) Unrestricted port facilities;...
- (2) Prompt admission of necessary American personnel for the improvement, construction and operation of these facilities;
- (3) Prompt customs clearance for necessary material and supplies...

The telegram went on to state that "the request for these facilities should be based upon the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1373 and particularly upon the 'Friends to Friends' phrase therein."²³

²³"The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Portugal (Kennan), Washington 16 October 1943," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, vol. II, Europe 811.34553B/4a.

This new set of instructions clearly reflected the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluation of the 1943 Anglo-Portuguese *Accord*. In a meeting of the J.C.S., General Arnold acknowledged that,

the Americans had carried out their agreement not to approach the Portuguese while the British and Portuguese negotiations were being carried out but the result of these negotiations was certainly not satisfactory and...the possible results to be obtained were well worth the effort to open up the matter again with the Portuguese.²⁴

The Joint Staff Planners also found the 1943 *Accord* unsatisfactory because they felt that the rights granted the British only satisfied the anti-submarine aspect of the Atlantic problem. Their October "Memorandum" asserted that the "importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United Nations war effort cannot be overemphasized, but, as indicated by results, appears not to have been recognized in British-Portuguese negotiations." It then listed what was to be gained by the addition of the new air route in terms of savings in fuel consumption, engine hours, as well as a release of transport aircraft and ground personnel for duty elsewhere.²⁵ This same argument was reiterated nearly word for word in a letter dated 10 October 1943 from the J.C.S. to the President.²⁶

²⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Suply. Minutes, JCS 118th Mtg., 10-12-43," in "Joint Chiefs of Staff, Occupation and Use of Azores, Memorandum from the Joint Staff Planners (9 October 1943)," RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 10, folder: CCS 381 Azores (5-7-43) Sec. 2., J.C.S. 319/5. National Archives

²⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Chiefs of Staff, Occupation and Use of Azores, Memorandum from the Joint Staff Planners (9 October 1943)," RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 10, folder: CCS 381 Azores (5-7-43) Sec. 2., J.C.S. 319/5. National Archives.

²⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Chiefs of Staff, Occupation and Use of the Azores, Memorandum from the Joint Staff Planners, William D. Leahy, Admiral U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff

Nonetheless, Kennan was unaware of the J.C.S. assessment. The combination of these extraordinary demands and the fact that Portuguese sovereignty had not, as yet, been guaranteed by the United States would not-- Kennan surmised--sit well with Salazar. Kennan feared the worst. If Salazar agreed, the situation in the peninsula could turn volatile depending on the reaction by Spain and/or the Axis powers. If he refused, the United States might decide to invade the islands by initiating operation *Alacrity*. The latter might then lead to the case of Portugal invoking the same Anglo-Portuguese Treaty and calling for Great Britain to assist in defending her islands against the United States. What a diplomatic quagmire!²⁷

Kennan wired the State Department requesting a meeting with President Roosevelt to personally explain his reservations. The President instructed him to cable his views. Kennan sat down and wrote one of his classic long messages detailing not only why he thought this approach would fail, but also what in his view was the best course of action. Simply stated Kennan thought the best the United States could hope to gain was equal use of the facilities which had been granted the British. Kennan also thought it was ill advised to use American assurances regarding Portuguese sovereignty as leverage for use of the

to the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy to the President, Enclosure C (9 October 1943)" RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 10. folder: CCS 381 Azores (5-7-43) Sec. 2., J.C.S. 319/5. National Archives.

²⁷Kennan, 150-152.

installations in the Azores. Instead he thought those assurances should be offered first and without condition.²⁸

Unknown to Kennan, British Prime Minister Churchill had telegraphed Roosevelt with a similar—though much more succinct—conclusion. Churchill noted that upon learning “from Lisbon” of the demands, they came as quite a surprise. He reminded Roosevelt that these same demands had been rejected months earlier by the Joint Staff Mission as unreasonable. Churchill concluded by stating that Britain could not assist the United States in her request.²⁹

In Portugal, the lack of assurances regarding Portuguese sovereignty had already become a roadblock to further communication between the two countries. When Kennan tried to schedule a second meeting between himself and Salazar—as instructed by the President—he was told point blank that unless he was delivering American assurances in hand no meeting would take place. At that point Kennan made a remarkably bold decision. He returned to the American embassy and typed out a communication in which he assured the Portuguese government that “in connection with the agreement recently concluded between Portugal and Great Britain the United States of America undertakes to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies.” After dispatching this communication to Britain’s Foreign Office, Kennan sent a wire to Washington explaining what he had just done and why. The next day, Kennan

²⁸Kennan, 153-154.

²⁹“The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt, London 19 October 1943,” *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, vol. II, *Europe*, 741.53/10-2143.

received word that Salazar would receive him on Wednesday next. That meeting never took place because that same day Kennan received word that he was to take the very next plane out of Lisbon. He was being recalled to Washington.³⁰

In reality Kennan had nothing to fear regarding his hasty recall to Washington. When Kennan was finally able to meet with President Roosevelt to discuss his perspective on Luso-American relations, he found the President both open to his interpretation and supportive of him personally. The President then suggested that he would write a letter to Salazar to try and ease any misgivings regarding American intentions in the Atlantic. Kennan left Washington for Lisbon letter in hand and hopeful that he could drive the negotiations with Portugal regarding the use of the Atlantic island bases towards a positive end.³¹

Upon his arrival in Lisbon, Kennan hastened to meet with Salazar. As he had surmised, American assurances regarding Portuguese sovereignty had eased tensions between Portugal and the United States. True to his usual style, President Roosevelt had written a letter, which was both charming and poignant. He reminded Salazar of the importance of the Azores to the United States during the First World War. He also spoke of the good relations between both nations both during and just after the war. He placed the issue of trust on a personal level by reminding Salazar that he had been Under Secretary of the Navy during World War I and:

³⁰Kennan, 155-156.

³¹Kennan, 161

In those days there was never any question about the good faith of the United States in carrying out their pledge that as soon as possible after the war the bases would be dismantled and the shore batteries abandoned. I personally inspected everything and the relationship at that time between Portugal and the United States was on a basis of mutual confidence and great friendship... I do not need to tell you that the United States has no designs on the territory of Portugal and its possessions.³²

When Kennan next met with Salazar, on 23 November 1943, the Prime Minister was much more open to pursuing direct Luso-American negotiations. At the meeting, Salazar seemed deeply impressed by the President's letter. After Kennan expressed the nature of America's needs, Salazar explained that he had always expected the American fleet to make use of any naval facilities in the Azores granted the British. In terms of the facilities in Terceira, Salazar proposed that American aircraft:

being delivered to England by Ferry Commands {could have the} status of British craft from {the} time they left our country {the United States} until they had passed through Portuguese territory... {in which} case he {Salazar} would not care about nationality of crews or of ground forces which might serve them... {including} engineering and construction crews.

At the end of this two hour meeting, Salazar reminded Kennan that, as a neutral, he could not extend to the United States facilities in the Azores beyond those granted the British. In his lengthy discussion regarding Portuguese neutrality, he

³²"President Roosevelt to the President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers (Salazar), Washington, 4 November 1943," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, vol. II, *Europe*, 564-565

brought up the case of Timor.³³ He reminded Kennan that Portugal could have maintained civil control over Portuguese Timor if she had willingly allowed the Japanese to use the airfield on that island. Salazar said "he could not see Portugal as a neutral starting out to bargain with the belligerents over the facilities of the Portuguese Empire." Then again, Kennan reported, that when and if Portugal were to enter the war, "he would as a matter of course extend to us every facility we might need in his colonies." Everyone involved, both British and American, agreed that it was best to keep this momentum going by first following the suggestion laid out by the Portuguese—i.e. in Portuguese territories American airplanes would fly with British markings—and then asking for more.³⁴

By year's end, Kennan was reassigned to London. R. Henry Norweb, who replaced Ambassador Bert Fish, arrived in Lisbon on 22 November 1943.³⁵ It was simply a matter of protocol to have the final negotiations carried out by the American Ambassador in Lisbon rather than one of his subordinates. On New Year's Eve, Norweb was happy to report that the Portuguese government had accepted the U.S.-British formula for Lagens. The key to the formula was set out in paragraph three of Cordell Hull's telegram to Norweb which stated, "United States and United States personnel activities at Lagens will be directed toward

³³This is the first time that Timor was mentioned in high-level diplomatic talks between Portugal and the United States.

³⁴"The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, Lisbon, 23 November 1943," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, vol. II, *Europe*, 811.34553B/26.

³⁵Ambassador Bert Fish died in Lisbon on 21 July 1943. "Bert Fish is Dead; U.S. Diplomat, 67," *New York Times* (1923-Current File), 22 July 1943, <http://proquest.com> (accessed 17 January 2012).

the assistance of the British, under whose control those operations will be."³⁶

With these constraints in place, Norweb assured the State Department that the Portuguese felt confident that they could maintain their claim to neutrality while upholding their responsibilities as Britain's oldest ally.³⁷

The Americans were finally in. As stated earlier, gaining access to the facilities in the Azores was a top priority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the letter from Admiral William D. Leahy to President Roosevelt in October 1943, the importance of the Azores to the United Nations war effort was clearly spelled out:

- a. A saving over a six month period (November 1943 - April 1944), if the route {the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route} were in full operation, of approximately fifty-one and one-half million gallons of high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one month's consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and USAAF in and from the United Kingdom.
- b. A saving, under the same circumstances, in engine hours of each bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more additional combat missions before engine over-haul.
- c. The release of approximately 150 transport aircraft, which could thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area or other theaters of operation where they are so urgently needed.
- d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty elsewhere.

³⁶"The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb), Washington, 23 December 1943," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, vol. II, *Europe*, 811.34553B/42b.

³⁷"The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, Lisbon, 31 December 1943," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, vol. II, *Europe*, 811.34553B/44.

Obviously, this assessment of what was to be gained by the United States went far beyond the initial desire to use the Azorean facilities as a base to monitor and curtail German submarine action in the Atlantic. Instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were already foreseeing the value of the central air route and the island facilities in preparation for operation *Overlord*, and in the execution of the consequential Allied offensive action in both Europe and the Pacific theatres.³⁸

Santa Maria

The next diplomatic task for the Americans was to convince the Portuguese to build a second airfield in the Azores this time under American control. Given Salazar's legalistic nature, at face value this might have seemed a daunting task for the Americans. Indeed, at the meeting between Salazar and Kennan on November 23, Salazar had explained that the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance gave the Portuguese the necessary diplomatic out to allow for British control of a base on Portuguese soil. There was no such agreement between Portugal and the United States. Yet, in this same conversation it was Salazar himself who revealed what was for Portugal a critical wartime goal—the preservation of her

³⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Chiefs of Staff, Occupation and Use of the Azores, Memorandum from the Joint Staff Planners, William D. Leahy, Admiral U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy to the President, Enclosure C (9 October 1943)" RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 10, folder: CCS 381 Azores (5-7-43) Sec. 2., J.C.S. 319/5. National Archives.

empire. More to the point, it was at this meeting that Salazar spoke at length regarding the loss of Portuguese Timor.³⁹

Unbeknownst to Kennan, more than a month before his conversation with Portugal's Prime Minister, Salazar had sent the British Ambassador to Lisbon a secret note. In this note he reiterated an earlier request on the part of the Portuguese Armed Forces to be included in a joint action with United Nations forces against the Japanese Army of occupation in Timor. He concluded this note by asking, "how and with whom can this subject be addressed?..." Of course it was the Americans who coordinated and controlled Allied action in the Pacific theatre. Thus, for the Portuguese, the Timor issue became the cornerstone for negotiations regarding the construction of an airfield on the island of Santa Maria, Azores.⁴⁰

Timor is an island which sits four hundred miles northwest of the northwest coast of Australia and is part of the Indonesian archipelago. The Portuguese had established a trading post in Timor in the sixteenth century. In the nineteenth century, the island was divided into two colonies. The western portion was controlled by the Netherlands. The eastern half, with an area of 18,989 square miles, was a colony of Portugal.⁴¹


³⁹"The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, Lisbon, 23 November 1943," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, vol. II, *Europe*, 811.34553B/26.

⁴⁰Originally, "como e com quem pode ser o assunto tratado..." Translation mine. "Do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros à Embaixada Britânica, Lisbon 4 October 1943," *Documentos Relativos aos Acordos*, 34.

⁴¹Wheeler, "Timor, East," *Historical Dictionary of Portugal*, 168.

The Japanese assault on Portuguese Timor needs to be placed in the context of the Pacific theater in December of 1941. The initial attacks of the Japanese occurred on December 7 and 8 of that year, beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor, and then continuing the next day with Hong Kong, Singapore, the island of Wake, the island of Guam, as well as the Philippine islands of Luzon and Mindanao. The sheer breadth of the attacks was a shocking blow to the region.

Figure 5: Initial Japanese attacks.⁴²



⁴²For the map, see Warren F. Kimball, ed., *Churchill & Roosevelt, The Complete Correspondence*, vol. 1. *Alliance Emerging, October 1933 - November 1942* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Although they later declared war, this Japanese action was a *de facto* declaration of war. On 8 December 1941 the United States declared war on Japan. Two days later, the United Kingdom declared itself in a state of war against Japan. Under the obligations of the Tri-Partite Pact, on 11 December 1941 Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. Yet, even before the attacks, tensions were very running high in the Pacific theater.

On 5 December 1941, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, Armindo Monteiro, sent a reply to a British *Aide-mémoire* dated 2 December. In it he stated that the Portuguese government would consent to send an "officer to Singapore to discuss with a representative of the British High Command, Far East, the question of the defense of Timor in the event of a Japanese attack." It went on to state that the Portuguese Government would also allow this officer "to exchange views with a representative of the Netherlands East Indies."⁴³ The tone of this note was cautious. Three days later Salazar sent a telegram to Monteiro to further clarify Portugal's position. In this telegram, he asserted that direct talks could "only take place between Portuguese and Englishmen." The British High Command could transmit to the Portuguese any information that the Dutch wished to communicate. Monteiro was also instructed to speak directly

⁴³Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Da Embaixada de Portugal em Londres ao Foreign Office, *Aide-mémoire* (5 December 1941, London)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947)*, *A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. X (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda 1974) document number 2679.

with the Foreign Office to try and ascertain where this line of thinking was leading.⁴⁴

On 10 December, as instructed, Monteiro sought out Eden in the British Foreign Office. Unfortunately for Monteiro, most higher level British officials were absent. He met instead with Sub-Secretary Sargent and communicated Salazar's instructions. Furthermore, he asked for the British Government's opinion regarding the offer from the Australian and Netherlands governments regarding military aid in the event of a Japanese attack upon Portuguese Timor. In his response Sargent stated that he thought it was simply a matter of proximity, i.e. the Australian and Dutch forces were there in the region and therefore could quickly offer aid to the Portuguese. Monteiro agreed but, in the same breath, questioned whether the offer was being directed from the British government or the Dutch government. Sargent hesitated and then argued that this was simply a diplomatic technicality. Monteiro replied this was not a technicality, but fundamental. He pointed out that while the Anglo-Portuguese alliance has mutual obligations, it also has mutual safeguards—Portugal has no alliance with the Netherlands and, consequently, no safeguards in place. In his telegram to Salazar relating the conversation with Sargent, Monteiro confided that his concern was two-fold. First, Monteiro feared that once Dutch or Australian troops were in Portuguese Timor they would never leave. In addition,

⁴⁴Originally, "só entre Portugueses e Ingleses." Translation mine. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixada de Portugal em Londres (8 Dezembro 1941, Lisboa)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. X, document number 2701.

Monteiro added "it seems to me absolutely inconvenient that we should be dragged into war by virtue of Dutch intervention or due to motives which, above all, are in the interests of the defense of the Netherlands or of Australia."⁴⁵

Ironically, that is exactly what happened. On 17 December 1941, a joint Dutch-Australian force landed in Portuguese Timor. The next day the following communiqué was published by the Information Bureau of the Government of the Netherlands Indies "In view of Japanese submarine activities off Portuguese Timor, it became an unavoidable necessity to take steps to safeguard this territory against Japanese aggression and to forestall use of it as a base from which attacks could be made on Allied territory and communications." The communiqué asserted that this action on the part of the Allied nations was "purely a measure of defense."⁴⁶ The Portuguese government was irate. Monteiro went to the Foreign Office that same day. In a heated discussion with Sargent, Monteiro pointed out that the Portuguese governor neither asked for assistance from the Dutch-Australian force, nor did he acquiesce to their


⁴⁵Originally, "parece-me absolutamente inconveniente sermos arrestados para a guerra por virtude de uma intervenção holandesa ou por motivos que, sobretudo, interessam à defesa de Holanda ou da Austrália." Translation mine. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros (10 Dezembro 1941, Londres)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. X, document number 2741. On 15 December 1941, Monteiro received a telegram from the Foreign Office which, among other things, stated that in the case of an attack by the Japanese, the British government was willing to offer and organize assistance to Portuguese Timor upon the request of (or acquiescence of) that government through the use of their Australian forces in alliance with Dutch forces. This offer was accepted by the Portuguese government in a formal note dated 17 December 1941. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros (16 Dezembro 1941, Londres)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. X, document number 2813.

⁴⁶"Netherland," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 19 December 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012)

presence. When pressed by Sargent, referring to the defensive needs of the British realm and Portuguese loyalties vis-à-vis the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, Monteiro retorted "We in Portugal have been for many years under the impression of little loyalty in the relations of England with us."⁴⁷

What was at stake was Australian security. As stated above, Timor sits only 400 miles off the coast of Australia. It was her proximity to Australia, in the context of the earlier Japanese surprise attacks, which caused the pre-emptive

Figure 6: The ABDACOM area.⁴⁸



⁴⁷Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros (18 Dezembro 1941, Londres)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. X, document number 2839.

⁴⁸For the map, see Kimball, 1: 311.

move by the Allies. One glance at the American, British, Dutch and Australian Command (ABDACOM) area map above and the potential risk to Australia becomes clear.

As could be expected, the Portuguese government filed a series of formal protests. These protests went to the British and Dutch governments for their incursion on Portuguese Timor. In a long statement by the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Cambell, to the Portuguese Government, the British government shifted responsibility for the incident on the Allied military commanders in Timor. They recognized the fact that this assistance was unwelcome by the Portuguese Timorese government. Furthermore, His Majesty's Government was "especially grieved to have caused this offence to the Government of their ancient ally, the success of whose policy in the present conflict has won both their approval and their admiration."⁴⁹ Portuguese newspaper editorials reflected an acceptance of the British apology, avowing to not let this misunderstanding over Timor prejudice their centuries old friendship.⁵⁰ The Portuguese public, on the other hand, did not seem convinced. In an unusual public demonstration of protest, the Portuguese movie going public boomed when presented with the screening of

⁴⁹Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Anexo: Text of statement communicated by His Majesty's Ambassador in Lisbon to the Portuguese Government (19 December 1941, British Embassy)" in "Do Subsecretário de Estado Britânico dos Negócios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em Londres (20 Dezembro 1941, Londres)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. X, document number 2865.

⁵⁰"Portugal Still Friendly," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 23 December 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

views of Sydney, Australia. The uproar was such that it caused the cessation of presentation of the film in several theaters in Lisbon.⁵¹

In an effort to contain the situation, and in coordination with Britain, Portugal decided to send its own troops from Mozambique to Timor.⁵² Upon their arrival, it was expected that all foreign forces would be withdrawn. The Portuguese transport ship, *João Belo*, sailed from Lourenço Marques and was expected to arrive in Deli—the capital of Portuguese Timor, on 27 February 1942.⁵³ The *João Belo* never arrived in Timor. On 20 February 1942, Japanese Army and Naval forces invaded Portuguese Timor. The Japanese government declared that “it is prepared to insure the integrity of Portuguese Timor and will withdraw... from the said territory on the attainment of the objective pursued in self-defense so long as the Portuguese Government maintains a neutral attitude, as Japan harbors no design on Portugal.”⁵⁴

The events surrounding the Japanese invasion of Timor in February of 1942 caught the Portuguese government completely off guard. Even as Salazar addressed the National Assembly on 21 February to explain the events

⁵¹“Strange Act in Lisbon,” *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 24 December 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

⁵²“Portugal Acts on Timor, In Agreement with Britain, She Sends Troops to Her part of Isle,” *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 23 December 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

⁵³“Lisbon Sends More Men, Troops on Way to Timor---Others Sail Today for East Africa,” *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 14 February 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

⁵⁴“Foe Invades Timor in ‘Self-Defense,’ Japanese Promise to Respect Portuguese Rights as They Tell of Landings on Isle,” *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 21 February 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012)

surrounding the assault, he admitted that he was not yet fully satisfied. Besides giving a synthesis of the December events in Timor, Salazar appraised the Members of the recent Japanese communications. On 19 February, the Japanese Ambassador to Portugal informed Salazar that the Japanese were obliged to initiate operations in Portuguese Timor out of self-defense because of the presence there of an Anglo-Dutch force. Salazar unequivocally and forcefully denied the legitimacy of Japanese military action in Portuguese Timor. He contended that the Portuguese reinforcements were en route from Mozambique and that their installation would lead to the withdrawal of any foreign troops on her sovereign territory. Salazar concluded his speech by stating that the government would continue to reaffirm Portugal's legitimate rights in Timor.⁵⁵

The occupation of Timor was not only a source of outrage for the Portuguese government, but was also a source of both anger and fear on the part of the Portuguese public.⁵⁶ A British intelligence source commented that, "the situation strikes at the foundations of their carefully preserved policy of absolute neutrality."⁵⁷ Portuguese territory had been transformed into a battleground. This was exactly what a policy of strict neutrality was supposed to

⁵⁵"Presidência do Conselho, Gabinete do Presidente: Exposição feita pelo Presidente do Conselho e Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros na sessão da Assembleia Nacional, reunida em 21 de Fevereiro de 1942, sobre o incidente ocorrido na colónia portuguesa de Timor (21 Fevereiro 1942, Lisbon)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. X (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1974) document number 3170.

⁵⁶"Japan Denounced by Lisbon's Press, Invasion of Portuguese Timor Viewed as Aggression That 'Cannot be Accepted,'" *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 23 February 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

⁵⁷Office of Strategic Services, "Report From the British Secret Service on Timor (21 February 1942)," RG 226, file 12375C, microfilm (M1499) reel 40, National Archives.

avoid. Most of 1942 was spent in fruitless diplomatic pursuits trying to convince the Japanese government to work in coordination with the Portuguese government to find a peaceful end to this crisis.⁵⁸

In early 1943 things went from bad to worse in Timor. The Governor of Timor was imprisoned and incommunicado. There were numerous reports of mass executions. Finally, although some women and children had been granted refugee status in Australia, many more were thought to be hiding and foraging in the jungles of Timor.⁵⁹ By late 1943, there were rumors circulating in Mozambique linking the loss of Timor with Portugal's imminent entrance into the war on the side of the Allies.⁶⁰ These rumors were, of course, unfounded but they did reflect the sense of dissatisfaction and resentment that was growing

⁵⁸The Portuguese troop ship en route to Timor was rerouted to Mormugão in Portuguese India. "Halt at Portuguese India," *New York Times* (1923-Current File) 26 March 1941, <http://proquest.com/> (accessed 18 February 2012).

⁵⁹All of volume eleven in this series is devoted to the extraordinary diplomatic activity regarding Timor. Document after document attest to the dire straits that Portuguese officials faced on the island as the Japanese forces sought to eradicate the Australian presence. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. XI (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1980). The Portuguese government requested the right to send an observer, Captain Costa da Silva, to investigate early claims of abuses against her citizens. This request fulfilled, but with many limitations. After the war, however, all suspicions were justified in the findings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The report listed no less than six localities in Timor that had been the site of war crimes, including the use of torture and mass executions against the civilian population—Tatu Meta, Lautem, Aileu, Laeluta, Ossu and Dili (the capital). Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "JUDGMENT INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST—PART B—CAPTER [sic] VIII—CONVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES (Atrocities) copied in 'Portuguese Consul (A. Franco Nogueira) to Minister of Foreign Relations (Salazar)' (20 January 1949, Tokyo) 2º piso, M44, A49, TIMOR. Processo 34. 27. Arquivo do Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros.

⁶⁰Office of Strategic Services, "Rumors in Mozambique of Portugal's Participation in the War and Change in Government (10 October 1943)," RG 226, file 48181C, microfilm (M1499) reel 359, National Archives.

within the Portuguese empire. The Portuguese government needed to take some action, particularly in relation to the war in the Far East.

It was under these circumstances that direct negotiations began between the United States and Portugal for the construction of a base in the Azores. During that 1943 New Year's Eve conversation between Norweb and Salazar mentioned above, Norweb was struck by the "spirit of personal and official cordiality" expressed by Salazar. He also noted that during this meeting the conversation had turned to Timor. Upon relating the context of this conversation to Cordell Hull, Norweb stated that,

The participation of Portugal in a Timor expedition was discussed and Salazar wanted to know when a reply would be furnished....{Salazar} drew a contrast between the position of his country and that of Switzerland, Sweden and other neutrals of Europe by stating that for the others the war would end with the termination of the war in Europe, but that for his country it would continue until the close of hostilities in the Pacific.⁶¹

Thus, at this point, the Portuguese government clearly was determined to participate in some future military action in the liberation of Timor.

On the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their interest in the Azores remained constant. They wanted extended facilities which would allow them to use the Azores for, among other things, large air ferrying services. Yet, the J.C.S. remained unconvinced of the necessity to link the construction of the airbase in Santa Maria with American assurances of eventual Portuguese participation in

⁶¹Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Enclosure 'B', Paraphrase of Telegram received, 'American Legation to the Secretary of State (31 December 1943)" in "Joint Chief of Staff, Azores Negotiations, Note by the Secretaries (5 January 1944)," RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 11, folder: CCS 686 9, Azores (7-5-43) Sec. 3, J.C.S. 589/5. National Archives.

Timor. Regardless of several petitions by the State Department and an *Aide Memoire* by the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the diplomatic and military advantages of offering Portugal these assurances, Admiral William D. Leahy wrote a short, clear response to Cordell Hull in which he asserted:

In their consideration of your letter the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that the military implications of the proposed action were such as make unilateral action at this time undesirable.

These military implications are now under consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and when a decision has been reached, a definitive answer to your letter will be forwarded.⁶²

In the months that followed, while the Combined Chief of Staff Planners studied the possible advantages and disadvantages, negotiations for the Santa Maria base lagged. Finally, in May 1944, Admiral Leahy informed Cordell Hull that the Combined Chiefs of Staff "perceived no military objection to Portugal's participation in any eventual operation to liberate Portuguese Timor....[the C.C.S. proposed that] conferences be held in Lisbon...to determine Portuguese capabilities and logistical and other problems involved in Portuguese participation ..."⁶³

⁶²Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Enclosure: Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to Secretary of State (29 January 1944)" in "Joint Chiefs of Staff, Possible Declaration of War on Japan by Portugal (31 January 1944)" RG 218, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I: 1942-1945, European Theatre*, microfilm, reel VI, J.C.S. 651/5

⁶³Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Enclosure 'B,' Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to the Secretary of State (19 May 1944)" in "Joint Chiefs of Staff: Possible Entry of Portugal into the War under Anglo-Portuguese Alliance (19 May 1944)," RG 218, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I: 1942-1945, European Theatre*, microfilm, reel VI, J.C.S. 715/2.

The American Military Attaché and the American Naval Attaché in Lisbon handled preliminary discussions regarding the technical aspects of Portuguese participation. By August the combined British-American delegation had been formed and talks would soon pick up where the Attachés left off. Meanwhile, in Santa Maria, technicians were arriving on site to gather intelligence and then return to the United States to develop the plans for the base. In a conversation between Norweb and Salazar, Norweb came to several conclusions which he shared with Cordell Hull,

(1) An expedition to Timor is all-important to {Salazar}... (2) {Salazar} continues to connect Santa Maria with Timor... (3) It is {Salazar's} desire to postpone major decisions on matters of Santa Maria until staff conversations commence... (4) It is clearly understood {by Salazar that} we prefer such discussions {regarding Santa Maria} to be kept between Portugal and the United States alone.⁶⁴

Salazar was willing to allow preliminary work regarding the planning of the base, and even allowed construction supplies to arrive on sight. He was, however, unwilling to allow actual construction work to commence until he had in hand a written assurance that the Portuguese would participate in the liberation of Timor.

Although the J.C.S., had full understanding of the same and still thought the Azores vital to their global military plans, as of 11 October 1944 the Portuguese government had not yet received from the United States government confirmation in writing of their acceptance of Portuguese participation in the Far

⁶⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Appendix, Paraphrase of Telegram, American Ambassador to the Secretary of State (30 August 1944)" in "Joint Chiefs of Staff: Staff Conversations with Portugal (3 September 1944)," RG 218, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I: 1942-1945, European Theatre*, microfilm, reel VI, J.C.S. 953/6.

East theatre of war. This was, in part, due to the fact that the J.C.S. was trying to sort out British colonial interests and Portuguese colonial interests in the region. The Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) was a theatre of war that was dense with postwar colonial concerns for the British. British military designs clashed with American directives, which called for a Central Pacific advance upon Japan. On this the J.C.S. would not budge. In this case, close association with the British due to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and mutual colonial interests worked against the Portuguese in their negotiations with the Americans.⁶⁵

In spite of the delay, on that same day, Salazar drafted and transmitted a cable to Santa Maria authorizing the "construction work of the global project."⁶⁶ All along Salazar had argued that the two governments had to find a "juridical and political basis" for the Santa Maria airbase accord.⁶⁷ Yet, in the end, Salazar relented on the basis of the "personal assurance" of Ambassador Norweb, who promised that the letter would be forthcoming.⁶⁸ Norweb wrote a draft of the

⁶⁵Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006) 224.

⁶⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Appendix 'B,' Paraphrase of Telegram, American Ambassador to the Secretary of State (11 October 1944)" in "Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreement for the Construction and use of Airport on the Island of Santa Maria (16 October 1944)," RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 11, folder: CCS 686.9 Azores (7-5-43) Sec. 3, J.C.S. 586/6. National Archives.

⁶⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Appendix 'C,' Paraphrase of Telegram, American Ambassador to the Secretary of State (11 October 1944)" in "Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreement for the Construction and use of Airport on the Island of Santa Maria (16 October 1944)," RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 11, folder: CCS 686.9 Azores (7-5-43) Sec. 3, J.C.S. 586/6. National Archives.

⁶⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Appendix 'B,' Paraphrase of Telegram, American Ambassador to the Secretary of State (11 October 1944)" in "Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreement for the Construction and use of Airport on the Island of Santa Maria (16 October 1944)," RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 11, folder: CCS 686.9 Azores (7-5-43) Sec. 3, J.C.S. 586/6. National Archives.

letter that he would suggest to his superiors, and Salazar handed Norweb a draft of the Santa Maria base accord.⁶⁹

This action demonstrates an important shift in the relationship between Portugal and the United States. Long conversations between first Kennan (and then Norweb) and Salazar had had the intended results. Both parties now had a clearer understanding of each other's wartime goals. In this case, both the United States and Portugal had something the other desired and could, therefore, act in a mutually beneficial fashion.

Under the direction of Pan American Airways, the new airfield in Santa Maria was constructed for the Portuguese government. Before a Luso-American agreement was signed regarding the construction and use of this airfield, a statement was released by each of the powers—Portugal, Great Britain and the United States—regarding Timor. Each statement was dated 28 November 1944 and had virtually the same message regarding Timor. The American statement read:

The Government of the United States, conscious of the legitimate desire of the Portuguese Government to put an end to the Japanese occupation of Timor and recognizing that this Portuguese territory lies within the large area of operations undertaken in the Pacific by the Government of the United States and other allied governments, accepts and agrees to the participation of Portugal in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor in order that that territory may be restored to full Portuguese sovereignty. It recognizes that such participation can be effected in direct and indirect form: direct participation by the use of Portuguese forces...indirect participation, by the concession to the Government of the United States of facilities for the construction, use

⁶⁹Ibid.

and control of an air base on the Island of Santa Maria, for the purpose of facilitating the movement of American forces to the theatre of war in the Pacific....⁷⁰

That same day Portugal and the United States signed an agreement regarding the form of Portuguese participation in the Pacific. Not surprisingly, Portugal and the United States had opted for indirect participation. Composed of only four articles, this Luso-American agreement was concise and to the point. Article one of the agreement indicated that the "Portuguese Government and the Government of the United States shall cause to be constructed on Santa Maria Island an airdrome to serve as an air base." The construction of the airbase and the cost of that construction would be borne by the Portuguese government and, consequently, the base would be "considered the property of the Portuguese State." In article two Portugal granted the United States, "the utilization without restrictions of the air base at Santa Maria which shall be, in respect of operations, administration, and control under the command of the American Air Forces." Article three then went on to state that the "utilization of the field by them {the Americans} shall terminate within six months after the termination of hostilities or signature of an armistice with powers with which the United States is at present at war in the Far East." The last article of the Luso-American

⁷⁰"Do Embaixador dos Estados Unidos da América ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, (28 November 1944, Lisbon)," Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. XIII (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1986), document 532.

agreement noted that the final details of the exchanges in command would be concluded in a "complementary accord."⁷¹

This agreement marked a significant step forward in Luso-American relations most notably because the Americans took the initiative in the negotiations. Unlike the wolfram issue and the Lagens airbase negotiations—both of which were driven by the British Foreign Office—negotiations for the Santa Maria airbase were conducted between Ambassador Norweb and Prime Minister Salazar. The result was a notable improvement in each party's estimation of the other, as well as a greater sense of mutual trust. Post-war Luso-American relations would build upon this new foundation

Conclusion

Between 1939 and 1944, Portugal managed to meet two out of three of her wartime goals. She entered into a *Pact* with Spain and managed to convince

⁷¹ "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Portuguese Government establishing the form of indirect participation of Portugal in operations in the Pacific (28 November 1944, Lisbon)," *Dez Anos de Política Externa, vol. XIII*, document 537. On 7 November 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a *Memorandum* in which it recommended that the United States begin negotiations with the Portuguese government in order to facilitate the withdrawal of British forces from the Lagens base in Terceira—pursuant to the Anglo-Portuguese base agreement. The J.C.S. recommended that the United States shift its operations from Santa Maria to Lagens in order to "enable present air transport operations to continue without interruption." On 14 November 1945 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved the recommendation and forwarded it to the State Department. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 7 November 1945," Enclosure in "Withdrawal of British Forces From the Islands of Terceira and Fayal under the Azores Agreement, 15 November 1945," RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 11, National Archives.

Spain of the need to keep Iberia neutral throughout most of the war. This was important not only for Portugal and Spain, but also for Great Britain and the United States. She had also managed to maintain her own sovereignty even after granting the use of the Lagens airbase to Great Britain--thanks in some measure, to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Nevertheless, during this same period the weaknesses of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance were evident.

No nation voluntarily enters into an alliance to their detriment. The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance was meant to be mutually beneficial---politically, militarily and commercially. In the preceding chapter it had been noted that the benefit to Portugal had been limited. Britain could no longer provide support if continental Portugal were attacked. This was a weakness, not a benefit. Britain could no longer meet the supply needs of the Portuguese. Shared armaments and training was something that both parties had for centuries. They were fundamental to Portugal's defense. Because of Britain's own war efforts, she was incapable of meeting these needs which placed Portugal at a distinct disadvantage. Worse yet, in the case of Timor, Britain's actions precipitated the attack of the Japanese which then led to the wartime loss of Timor--with all the horrible consequences that followed for the people of Timor. This is a clear weakness of the alliance that the Portuguese surely considered. Portuguese resentment of the failings of the alliance was reflected in the heated conversation on 17 December 1941 between Monteiro and Sargent when Monteiro stated "We in Portugal have been for many years under the impression of little loyalty in the

relations of England with us.”⁷² That was a remarkably blunt and critical assessment of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

During this same time period, in her relations with the United States, Portugal’s interpretation of neutrality sometimes ran counter to American interests. As a consequence, early wartime relations between Portugal and the United States were, at best, strained. In part, this was because Salazar distrusted the Americans and, therefore, instructed his diplomats to move at a snail’s pace. Portugal also justifiably feared retaliation by Germany should her actions be viewed as a breach of neutrality. Likewise, Portugal had to consider Spain’s reaction vis-à-vis the two *Protocols* signed in 1939 and 1940.

The United States, for her part, did not help the situation. Loose talk in the U.S. Senate and in the American press regarding an impending American assault on the Azores seemed only to be confirmed by Roosevelt fireside chat in 1941. Worse yet, Portugal was continuously kept in the dark regarding American intentions. The United States deliberately failed to give Portugal timely assurances regarding her sovereignty and the sovereignty of her possessions. American officials, including Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seemed to think that pressure tactics would make the Portuguese more malleable.

Although Salazar was keenly aware of Portugal’s military weakness, he was also aware of the strategic value of the Azores. He understood that each of the principle belligerents—Germany, Great Britain and the United States—had

⁷²Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros (18 Dezembro 1941, Londres),” Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, *Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936-1947), A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, vol. X, document number 2839.

developed a plan for the invasion of those islands.⁷³ By handing over control of key military facilities in the Azores to the Allied powers, Salazar reinforced an age-old treaty while ensuring the safe return of that property after the war. This he did, not because of pressure from the Allies, but to render from them an assurance of Portuguese sovereignty.

The loss of Timor to the Japanese in early 1942, however, brought to the forefront Portugal's final wartime concern—conservation of her empire. From 1942-1943, negotiations with Japan over the issue of Portuguese Timor had borne no results. By 1944 this issue was the major foreign policy issue of Salazar's regime. First, his policy of neutrality had not kept Timor safe. Second, reports of Japanese abuses were creating an atmosphere of heightened dissatisfaction throughout the empire.⁷⁴ Finally, at the 11 October 1944 meeting between Norweb and Salazar, the Prime Minister himself "stressed that Portuguese participation in the liberation of Portuguese territory was indispensable to the honor and prestige of Portugal."⁷⁵

⁷³For a comprehensive study of the German Plan see H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., *Blitzkrieg to defeat: Hitler's war directives 1939-1945* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964). Both the British and the American plans are examined in Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 1, *The Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939-May 1943* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947).

⁷⁴In September of 1944, Raphael da Silva Neves Duque, Portugal's former Economic Minister told a friend that based on the reports by Captain Costa da Silva, Salazar was ready to break off relations with the Japanese. Office of Strategic Services, "Portugal and Japan, Remarks by Raphael Duque (11 September 1944)," RG 226, entry 21, file L47461. National Archives.

⁷⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Appendix 'B,' Paraphrase of Telegram, American Ambassador to the Secretary of State (11 October 1944)" in "Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreement for the Construction and use of Airport on the Island of Santa Maria (16 October 1944)," RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 11, folder: CCS 686.9 Azores (7-5-43) Sec. 3, J.C.S. 586/6. National Archives.

Thus, Salazar could allow the United States command of the air base at Santa Maria for action in the Far East as a part of Portugal's efforts to regain her own territory. It was a simple quid pro quo. Portugal would agree to grant the use of the Santa Maria airbase, while simultaneously the United States would agree to allow Portugal to participate in the liberation of Timor.⁷⁶ This seems simple, but was made complex because the Joint Chiefs of Staff were looking at the issue of Timor from a military perspective, not a political one. Caught in the middle of this diplomatic dilemma was Ambassador Norweb. Through a series of long talks with Salazar, Norweb was able to gain his trust and convince Salazar to take a leap of faith. Once Salazar committed to the final construction of the base, everything else fell into place.

By the autumn 1944, Norweb had come to a conclusion regarding Luso-American relations which differed radically from that of his superiors at the White House and in the Pentagon. In a telegram to Secretary of State Hull regarding the progress on the Santa Maria island airbase negotiations, he wrote, "Persuasion, reason, frank thrashing out of issues—and not the big stick which to this neutral {Portugal} imbued with all the juridical considerations of the traditional neutral could well place us, in his mind, in the position of using our superior

⁷⁶The United Nations forces never liberated Timor. Japan eventually occupied all of the Dutch East Indies and remained in control of this region until their surrender in September of 1945. After the surrender, Portugal resumed control of East Timor. Wheeler, *Historical Dictionary*, 169.

power to impose our demands—have triumphed.”⁷⁷ Portugal would not be bullied, but could be persuaded if the results benefitted her own interests.

⁷⁷“The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, Lisbon, 12 October 1944,” *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1944*, vol. IV, *Europe*, 811.34553B/10-1244.

CHAPTER VI

A NEW WORLD ORDER

In August 1941, even before the United States entered World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt expressed his vision of the post-war era in a public document, known as the Atlantic Charter. This statement was issued jointly by FDR and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and proposed a postwar world in which the ideals of self-determination, freedom, justice, and world peace would become the standard, not the exception. In terms of the Atlantic Charter, David Reynolds, a leading historian of this period, has noted, "Churchill ensured plenty of loopholes, but in a broad sense he had signed up to American goals."¹ The Atlantic Charter was based on the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the rule of law and would be established by the cooperation of all nations. This would include even those nations that did not have the same political traditions of the United States. This would be their opportunity to follow the American model of a democratic-republic. All this would be accomplished

¹David Reynolds, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War*, The American Ways Series (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001) 182.

without violent revolution, but instead through the conquest of Nazi tyranny.

Thus, although the Atlantic Charter was issued as a joint Anglo-American vision of a postwar world, it was a clear reflection and balance of American interests and political ideology.

President Roosevelt died before witnessing the end of the war or the implementation of this world vision. The successful end of hostilities brought new challenges in international affairs, especially the spread of world communism and an emerging super-power rivalry. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) stood as the champion of communism. The Soviet Union had been an ally during World War II in the fight against the Axis powers, but now that the war had been won, America's wartime ally proved to be an ever-increasing threat to America's post-war vision.

By the time former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made his "iron curtain" speech on 5 March 1946, President Harry Truman was convinced that the Soviet Union was a threat to America's postwar vision of Europe. In the following year, events in Greece and Turkey reached a point of crisis. To address this situation and clarify America's national interests in the region, Truman spoke before a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947. His speech, often referred to as the Truman Doctrine, permanently altered American foreign policy when he stated, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Furthermore, in the same speech, Truman asserted that the United States was obliged to act because, "If we falter in our

leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.”² Hence, Truman linked the economic and political stability of Greece and Turkey with world peace and, more significantly, with American security. President Roosevelt’s understanding of modern warfare—i.e. airborne warfare—had extended the geography of American security during the Second World War, but with this speech President Truman expanded the geopolitical interests of the United States in peacetime.

To combat this new peril, the United States was willing to participate more directly than ever before in both European and world affairs. This reflected a shift in American foreign relations. The European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program were coordinated in synch with a new American imperative. While each of these measures was meant to check Soviet expansion, they simultaneously promoted the spread of the ideal of liberty, while thwarting the possibility of subversive communist revolution in Europe. With the aid and guidance of the United States, the recipients of her assistance would overcome their own economic shortcomings and rebuild western Europe, come to embrace democratic values and participate in a defensive union that could protect the North Atlantic region against an enemy—read Soviet—threat.

This chapter will explore each of these foreign policy events through the prism of Luso-American relations. Accordingly, it will examine Portugal’s

²Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine. March 12, 1947,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1947*, edited by Warren R. Reid (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1963),180.

participation from the perspective of her own foreign policy interests. By participating at this level of international affairs, Salazar's government regained a sense of prestige within Portugal and her empire. During this period Portugal's foreign policy needs were met by a shift in alliance from Great Britain to the United States. This is not to say that Portugal abrogated her commitment to the Windsor Treaty; Portugal remains to this day an ally of Great Britain. Instead, this chapter will show how Portugal's post-war national interests--commercial, political and military—were satisfied by her participation in the European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Through a series of coordinated diplomatic actions, Portugal was able to supplant her flagging Anglo-Portuguese alliance with a series of agreements with the United States. These are the building blocks of Luso-American relations in the second half of the twentieth century.

The Marshall Plan

In June 1947 George C. Marshall, United States Secretary of State, spoke before Harvard University's graduating class. He seized this opportunity to present an argument for a broad post-war European economic recovery plan, later known as the Marshall Plan. He convincingly tied European recovery and stability to world peace, and spoke directly to America's fear of violent subversion:

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of food and other essential products—principally

from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character. ... Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace....³

Secretary Marshall ended his speech with an appeal to the public's sense of America's historic role in the world by stating, "With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome."⁴ Since that responsibility was to encourage economic stability while spreading the ideal of liberty, Marshall implied America's commitment to this plan was fully justified. As historian Michael J. Hogan has asserted, "The Marshall Plan rested squarely on an American conviction that European economic recovery was essential to the long-term interests of the United States. These interests were interdependent and mutually reinforcing...."⁵

³Press Release Issued by the Department of State June 4, 1947, "Remarks by the Honorable George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, at Harvard University on June 5, 1947," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1947, vol. III, British Commonwealth: Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972). Lot 64 D563, Box 1 (20027), 1947-50/237.

⁴*Ibid.*, 239.

⁵Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, *Studies in Economic History and Policy: The United States in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Louis Galambos and Robert Gallman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 26.

On 28 January 1948, in his speech before the House Committee on Foreign Relations, Dean Acheson further clarified the plight of the European people and the breadth of American responsibility when he said:

They [Europeans] and we want them independent of outside dictation and of inside dictatorship, self-supporting and healthy in their individual and national lives...At the end of the war we thought that everyone believed that enduring peace and economic recovery from the war was most assured by political settlement and economic programs which were firmly founded on agreement between the great powers...It is now plain that the Soviet Union does not intend to join in the task of political settlement or economic recovery on any basis which the other powers, or any nation wishing to maintain its own integrity, can accept.⁶

The Soviet Union, through her own actions, had become the enemy of liberty and, consequently, the enemy of the United States.

Over the course of four years (1948-1951) the Marshall Plan, a.k.a. the European Recovery Program (ERP), distributed over 13 billion dollars to sixteen countries. In order to accomplish this goal, Congress enacted the European Cooperation Act on 3 April 1948 (Public Law 472, 80th Congress, 2d session). This legislation created the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). The ECA, acting as an agent of the United States Government, administered the European recovery program.⁷

⁶Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Statement of the Honorable Dean Acheson Member of the Executive Committee, Committee for the Marshall Plan Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs," 26 January 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M139, Processo 85,5 "Plano Marshall." Arquivo do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (A.M.N.E.).

⁷The Marshall Foundation, "The Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-1952," under "Creation and Authority," http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/doc_eca.html [accessed June 15, 2010].

The organization of the ECA was fairly straightforward. In the United States, the ECA ran under the direction of the Administrator for Economic Cooperation. The President appointed both the Administrator and his deputy Administrator by the consent of the Senate. Like any other head of an executive department, the Administrator was directly responsible to the President. The Administrator also served as a member of the national Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems.⁸

In Europe, the United States Special Representative Abroad represented the Administrator. Once again, the President of the United States appointed both the U.S. Special Representative Abroad and his deputy by the consent of the Senate. The Special Representative Abroad carried the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. His duties included acting as the chief American representative to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and synchronizing the undertakings of the ECA missions throughout Europe. Each ECA participant was assigned a special mission for Economic Cooperation. The job of the special mission was to work with both governmental and private agencies in execution of the ECA goals.⁹

By most standards, the Marshall Plan was a great success. Devastated by years of war, many European countries were quick to accept America's generous offer. Portugal supported the concept of European recovery. She fully embraced

⁸The Marshall Foundation, "The Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-1952," under "The Administrator for Economic Cooperation," http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/doc_eca.html [accessed June 15,2010].

⁹The Marshall Foundation, "The Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-1952," under "U.S. Special Representative Abroad," and "Special ECA Missions Abroad," http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/doc_eca.html [accessed June 15,2010].

the idealism of the Marshall Plan. On 5 June 1949, Pedro Theotónio Pereira, Portugal's Ambassador to the United States, made some revealing remarks at a Washington D. C. dinner honoring George C. Marshall. He stated,

General Marshall, I have recently re-read your Harvard speech. Recalling the world picture of that time, and the efforts made by this country [the United States] to put your ideas into practice, I believe that the United States could hardly have found a nobler and more exacting symbol of their idealism of these days. The Harvard speech reflects much that we find in the American spirit: Christian fraternity, understanding and respect for others, the generous impulse, and an honest and realistic sense to go directly to the root of the problem.¹⁰

To be sure, Portugal was part of the European Recovery Plan right from the beginning. She was also a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Thus, Portugal's desire was to be fully engaged in the process of rebuilding Europe. The key is that Portugal's hope was to not only participate in postwar European recovery, but also assist in that recovery—albeit in a limited capacity.

As such, Portugal chose not to request Marshall Plan funds in the first year—1948-1949. During that same dinner, Ambassador Pereira had gone on to characterize Portugal's decision to not request funds in the first year:

As a tribute of our understanding to those ideas, it was happily possible not to ask that Portugal benefit from aid in the first year of the Plan. Even with some sacrifice, we were thus able to cooperate, within our limitations, so that others more directly affected by the war effort or its sufferings might pass ahead of us.¹¹

¹⁰Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Remarks by the Portuguese Ambassador, Senhor Pedro Theotónio Pereira," 5 June 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M153, Processo 85 "Plano Marshall." A.M.N.E.

¹¹Ibid.

This explanation is idealistic, humble and self-sacrificing. Yet, this is not exactly the same thinking that Ambassador Pereira had expressed a year earlier in his letter to Prime Minister Salazar regarding the benefits of Portugal's participation in the European Recovery Plan. In that letter he stated,

The fact that Portugal will not now receive financial assistance, places us in a truly exceptional condition. Along American lines of thought, I do not know of other circumstances which could have placed us in better standing, when the bigger nations of western Europe are in reality living off of the help from the United States... Even from an economic perspective, it is my belief that it would only have hurt us to stay outside of the Marshall Plan. All of the materials for Europe are practically within its sphere and we would run the risk of having to skimp on certain essential supplies.¹²

Thus, by signing the bilateral agreement known as the Economic Cooperation Agreement signed in Lisbon on 28 September 1948, Portugal did not receive financial support from the United States, but from her perspective she gained much more.

Politically, she cast herself in a better light vis-à-vis the United States than many other now dependent European powers. Privately, American confidence in Portugal was clear. In May of the same year, in a memorandum to George

¹²Originally, "O facto de Portugal não ir receber agora ajuda financeira, colocou-nos em condições verdadeiramente excepcionais. Perante a mentalidade Americana, não sei de outra circunstância que pudesse passar mais na sua consideração quando as maiores nações da Europa Ocidental estão vivendo na realidade da ajuda dos Estados Unidos... Mesmo no aspecto económico é meu parecer que só nos prejudicaria ficar à margem do Plano Marshall. Todos os fornecimentos para a Europa passam praticamente a estar na sua esfera e correríamos o risco de nos ver regateadas certas mercadorias essenciais." Translation mine. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Carta do Senhor Pedro Theotónio Pereira ao Senhor Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros sobre o Acordo Plano Marshall," 29 September 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M140, Processo 85,7 "Plano Marshall." A.M.N.E.

Marshall, John Dewey Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs, stated,

Portugal's financial condition is sound; its budget has been balanced for the past 15 years and the escudo is one of the firmest currencies in Europe.

Portugal is participating in the ERP but is receiving no financial assistance, Portugal has offered to make loans to other countries to assist in the purchase of Portuguese goods, mainly fish, fish products, naval stores, citrus fruits and cork. In view of the relative soundness and stability of the Portuguese economy, the aim of the ERP in Portugal will be primarily that of maintaining rather than rehabilitating the economy.¹³

Months later, at the press conference in Washington D.C. held the morning after the signing of the bilateral agreement, Acting Secretary Lovett echoed that same confidence:

Although the Portuguese Government is receiving no financial aid under the European Recovery Program, they have given their firm support to the Program from the very beginning. The signing of the ERP Agreement and the cordial remarks of the Portuguese Foreign Minister on that occasion have shown again the spirit of good will and cooperation of the Portuguese Government in participating in the huge task of European reconstruction.¹⁴

Commercially, Portugal gained a foothold within Europe which would have evaded her had she not participated in the European Recovery Plan. This was obvious from the onset since, at the time of the signing of the bilateral agreement, there was also an exchange of notes between the United States and

¹³Department of State, "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 10 May 1948," *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1948*, vol. III, *Western Europe* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1974) 711.53/5-1048.

¹⁴Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Department of State--Acting Secretary Lovett's Statement," 29 September 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M140, Processo 85,7 "Plano Marshall." A.M.N.E.

Portugal relating to Most-Favored-Nation status. Thus, Portugal gained this preferred trading status with not only all of the other ERP nations, but also the United States, the Free Territory of Trieste, and western Germany.

Consequently, Portugal hoped to both support other Europeans in their purchases of Portuguese goods and to avoid being excluded from the trading block established by the ERP.¹⁵

This commercial advantage was not enough to keep Portugal's finances afloat. The very next year Portugal would submit a request for ERP funds. In actuality, there were several factors leading to Portugal's sudden increase in deficit spending. First, Portugal's desire to increase and expand her infrastructure required the purchase of an extensive amount of equipment, particularly in the areas of railway construction and telecommunications. This, however, was not meant to transform Portugal's agricultural economy into an industrialized economy. "On the contrary, the conditions of the country [Portugal] lead us rather to seek to develop and to strengthen the agricultural characteristics of our economy."¹⁶ Consequently, investment in the expansion of Portugal's hydro-electric system, for example, was meant to both harness

¹⁵The mutual exchange of Most-Favored-Nation status was discussed concurrently with the ERP agreement. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Carta do Senhor Pedro Theotónio Pereira ao Senhor Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Plano Marshall—Acôrdo Bilateral com Portugal," 6 May 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M140, Processo 85,7 "Plano Marshall." A.M.N.E. For the English text of the final agreement see, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Department of State, FOR THE PRESS--Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of America and Portugal," 29 September 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M140, Processo 85,7 "Plano Marshall." A.M.N.E.

¹⁶Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "1949/1950 Programme," May 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M153, Processo 85,8 "Plano Marshall," 4. A.M.N.E.

Portugal's "national water power [but also to improve] irrigation, transport and the control of floods,"--the latter being strictly agricultural not industrial goals.¹⁷

Along with a marked increase in imports, there were "difficulties arising in the field of external purchasing power (through the vertical fall of Portuguese home exports and the freezing of part of the Portuguese available resources)"¹⁸

In other words, these "difficulties" were the results of a marked post-war contraction in the demand for Portuguese goods (exports). Compounding the situation was the "freezing" of Portuguese assets (gold) by the United States.¹⁹

The American government had frozen Portugal's assets in the United States over the issue of German looted gold. By 1948 this issue was hampering American efforts to gain long-term base rights in the Azores. Pressure was brought to bear on the Secretary of the Treasury to unblock Portuguese assets in the United States in order to facilitate diplomatic action. On 2 September 1948, Secretary Snyder issued an amendment to General License No. 53 which included

¹⁷Ibid., 3.

¹⁸Ibid., 1.

¹⁹Ibid. Sir Stanley Wyatt, Financial Counsellor of the British Embassy in Lisbon compiled a report on would-be illicit gold transactions made through the Bank of Portugal from 1942 to 1944. He gathered this information from a series of "reliable" sources. This report was then sent to both his superiors in London and to his counterpart, James E. Wood, at the American Embassy. This report served, in part, as the evidence for the action taken by the United States towards Portugal regarding her assets. Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs (OASIA), "Memorandum No. 131, Gold Imports into Portugal—Two Aspects, 10 September 1944," Appended to "Financial Attache, American Embassy (James E. Wood) to Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (Harry D. White), 25 October 1944, Lisbon," RG 56, Box 20, folder Portugal (Incoming) Letters, May '43 – Dec. '44. National Archives.

Portugal in the generally licensed trade area and unblocked Portuguese assets in the United States.²⁰

Thus by 1948, without having had access to all of her assets, Portugal found herself in a disadvantaged economic position. Although the gold issue was eventually resolved, the deficit spending resulting from the necessary trade imbalances would continue. This situation did not raise alarm among American leaders because Portugal's reserves were thought to be substantial enough to cover her debts.²¹

By 30 June 1952, Portugal had received 51.2 million dollars in grants and loans through the Marshall Plan. These funds were used for everything from improving her infrastructure and national hydroelectric system, to building schools and hospitals. Portugal had even had a hospital-tender ship constructed for her cod-fishing fleet with equipment and materials purchased with ERP funds.²²

These Marshall Plan funds did not represent a large portion of the overall funds allocated for European recovery. Portugal as a neutral had not experienced the devastation that other continental European powers faced as a consequence of the war. The industrial economies of Germany and France, for

²⁰For a discussion of the gold issue and its diplomatic impact, see State Department, "Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovette)," Washington, August 11, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1948, vol. III, Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), 840.51/FC 53/8-1148; and see *ibid.*, Annex.

²¹"Relations of Individual Western European Countries with the Western Hemisphere." *Federal Reserve Bulletin* 34 (February 1948): 151

²²The Marshall Foundation, "Marshall Plan Information," under "Funding Amounts and Examples," http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/doc_eca.html [accessed June 15, 2010].

example, were nearly destroyed. They required tremendous inputs of cash to rebuild their larger though much more damaged infrastructure. One of the key goals of the Marshall Plan was to bring the aggregate industrial levels of Western Europe to 30 percent above 1938 levels by 1951. Not only did it succeed, the new levels actually reached 41 percent above 1938 levels. Nevertheless, Portugal, as noted above, was an agricultural economy. The Marshall Plan never met its intended goals for European agricultural output. Consequently, in 1951, Western Europe remained dependent on outside sources for nearly 30 percent of its foodstuffs.²³

In the end, Portugal had participated in the Marshall Plan, embracing both the vision of the plan and the practical financial assistance that it had rendered. Beyond direct assistance, participation had also afforded Portugal entry into the ERP trading block. Lastly, Portugal's participation resulted in her enjoying Most-Favored-Nation status with many western European countries as well as the United States. These were tangible commercial advantages that could offset the limited commercial advantages of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.)

The same could be said of Portugal and N.A.T.O. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington D.C. on 4 April 1949. There were twelve

²³Immanuel Wexler, "The Marshall Plan in Economic Perspective: Goals and Accomplishments," in *The Marshall Plan, Fifty Years Later*, edited by Martin Schain (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 150.

original members--the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Portugal. For the other European powers, signing a multinational defense treaty was nothing new. For the United States, however, N.A.T.O. marked the start of a significant paradigm shift. In his recent work, *From Munich to Pearl Harbor*, David Reynolds addressed this issue by arguing that Roosevelt came to believe that airborne warfare left America vulnerable to attack. Roosevelt, according to Reynolds, also believed that American values, i.e. "liberty and capitalist democracy," could and should transform the world. Roosevelt concluded that only in a world which embraced American ideology could the United States be safe.²⁴

This policy was adopted and applied in the post war era. In the United States, there was a persistent and consistent assessment of the strategic value of global air and naval bases. A 1947 National Security Council (NSC) report on base rights in Greenland, Iceland and the Azores assessed the strategic value of each of these bases. These areas were already judged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as primary base areas, with base rights "required" to meet American security needs. The NSC assessment was determined by the "consideration of their use for four purposes...." These purposes were: "bases for offensive operations; bases forming a part of the defensive system about the U.S.; areas to be denied the enemy; and as bases for the staging of air transport and combat aircraft." The most critical role for the Azores was in the last classification, air

²⁴Reynolds, 4.

transport and combat aircraft. Here the Azores was listed as "The most vital single spot in the world in this respect, exclusive of the war zone and the U.S. proper. These islands are the key to our primary air line of communication." The continued value of the Azores in American military defensive plans would play a significant role in furthering Luso-American relations.²⁵

Before Roosevelt's presidency, the United States felt itself geographically protected by two oceans. After the First World War, the United States Senate refused to join the League of Nations in 1919. On the one hand, it was unnecessary because the United States still felt that the Western hemisphere was insulated by its surrounding waters. On the other hand, Article 10 of the League Covenant seemed to threaten the United States Congress' role in directing American foreign policy. It stated that, if a member state were threatened, the Council would advise how that threat would be met. In theory then, powers constitutionally held by the United States Congress were to be handed over to an international body, i.e. the League of Nations. These powers might include the appropriations of funds, arms limitations and treaty negotiations. The most critical of these powers, of course, was the power to declare war which would now be in the hands of the League Council. This was unacceptable to some members of Congress.

After experiencing the horrors of a second world war, the idea of collective defense began to take hold in the United States. As stated above, Roosevelt

²⁵"A Report to the President by the National Security Council on Base Rights in Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores (25 November 1947, Washington)" in "Memorandum for the President (25 November 1947, Washington)," President Secretary's Files, Box # 203, National Security Council Files—Meetings, NSC 2/1. National Archives - President Truman Library.

had a different vision of how America would be threatened in the future and how she would have to meet these threats. In 1945, the United States hosted the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in order to draw up the United Nations Charter. By October of that same year, America was a founding member of the United Nations (U.N.).²⁶ According to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, participation in the U.N. did not “impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member.”²⁷ Thus, participation in the U.N. did not place any restrictions on the U.S. Congress in terms of either a declaration of war or the right to conclude bilateral or multilateral defense treaties. The U.S. Senate then went one step further when, on 11 June 1948, it passed Resolution 239, more commonly known as the Vandenberg Resolution. Of its six objectives, the most relevant to this discussion was the second objective, which stated: “[The U.S. government should pursue the] Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the purposes, and provisions of the [U.N.] Charter.”²⁸

²⁶The United Nations, “Welcome-English,” under “History of the United Nations,” <http://www.un.org.htm> [accessed July 13, 2010]. It should be noted that Portugal was not a U.N. member until 1955 because of certain veto by the Soviet Union. The Salazar regime was vehemently anti-communist. Portuguese Communist members were often jailed or exiled. The consequence of this treatment was that the Soviet Union barred Portuguese admission to the U.N.

²⁷North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,” under “e-library,” under “basic texts,” under “Part I—The Antecedents of the Alliance,” <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm> [accessed July 12, 2010].

²⁸North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “U.S. Senate Resolution 239—80th Congress, 2nd Session—(“The Vandenberg Resolution”),” under “e-iibrary,” under “basic texts,” under “Part I—The Antecedents of the Alliance,” <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm> (accessed July 12 2010).

At this time, Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg, the U.S. Senator from Michigan, was at the peak of his political power. He was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate President pro tem, and the leading Republican spokesman in Congress.²⁹ In conjunction with Robert A. Lovett, George Marshall's Undersecretary of State, Vandenberg developed Resolution 239 out of growing concern over mounting Soviet aggression and influence in Western Europe. From 1948 to 1949, the West held its collective breath while bearing witness to the Berlin Crisis. Concurrently, direct Soviet pressure was brought to bear in Czechoslovakia, while indirect pressure was felt in both Finland and Greece. Meanwhile the national Communist parties of both France and Italy seemed to be gaining ground. All the while, the Soviet Union held veto power within the U.N.'s powerful Security Council.³⁰ In April of 1948, Vandenberg voiced his concern directly in a letter to one of his constituents:

I agree with you that the United Nations must be used in every possible way to create collective security through peaceful means. The great fundamental difficulty is that practically all our American efforts in these directions are aggressively opposed by Soviet Russia and her satellites. This is true in the United Nations where we are constantly met by Russian veto. It is true in connection with our economic recovery programs. In the case of the European programs, for example, the Soviet states immediately met together in Yugoslavia and publicly announced their purpose to "wreck" these economic programs....³¹

²⁹Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., editor, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952) 405. Interestingly, prior to World War II, Senator Vandenberg had been a staunch isolationist. However, on 7 December 1941 all that changed. Upon reflection of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Senator later wrote, "That day ended isolationism for any realist." As quoted in, *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 399.

³¹*Ibid.*, 401-402.

Thus, the Vandenberg Resolution was not meant to weaken the U.N., but instead to strengthen both it and the Marshall Plan. The Vandenberg Resolution politically helped pave the way for N.A.T.O. by making it clear that the U.S. Senate was open to multilateral defensive alliances in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

The ideals of the North Atlantic Treaty were clearly expressed in its preamble. It affirmed:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.³²

These ideals mirrored those of the Atlantic Charter, seeking collective peace, self-determination, liberty and the rule of law. The establishment of N.A.T.O. would allow those nations benefitting from the Marshall Plan but still frightened by the constant threat of outside coercion to feel more secure. Thus, N.A.T.O. would work in tandem with the Marshall Plan to bring about both political and economic stability to the region.

Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were all signatories of the Treaty of Brussels. The Treaty of Brussels was, among other things, a defensive pact between these countries. Signed on 17

³²North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty." under "e-library," under "basic texts," under "Part II—Juridical texts and formal agreements," <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm> (accessed July 12 2010).

March 1948, it served as the predecessor of the North Atlantic Treaty.³³ With America's help and support this coordinated action could be extended and strengthened. Europe could be transformed from a splintered, self-interested, volatile region--which sporadically dragged the world into war--into a brotherhood of nations which embraced liberty, rejected violent revolution and worked towards a mutually beneficial future through the rule of law.

Portugal was not among the first circle of nations to be approached by the United States regarding this new vision of European defense. In July of 1948, representatives from the United States, Canada, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in Washington, D.C. to discuss the possibility of a multinational Atlantic defense treaty. At this initial meeting it was agreed that "certain other North Atlantic countries, such as Portugal, Norway, Iceland and Denmark [would later be approached]...to ascertain whether those Governments would be prepared to become parties to the projected North Atlantic Security Pact."³⁴

Although the press followed these talks closely, it was only in October of that year that Portugal was approached regarding possible membership. Hesitancy on the part of the United States may have been due to Prime Minister Salazar's negative view of European federation. On 28 April 1948, during a

³³For the text of the treaty see, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Brussels Treaty—Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence," under "e-library," under "basic texts," under "Part I—The Antecedents of the Alliance," <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm> (accessed July 12 2010).

³⁴Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Pro Memoria," [Note from Sir Nigel Roland, the British Ambassador to Portugal to J. Caeiro da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations], 6 October 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, "Pacto Atlantico." A.M.N.E.

speech "The West in the Face of Russia" delivered before an assembly of the senior Portuguese officers, Salazar voiced his concern regarding the possibility of European federation by stating, "the organization of a world interested in maintaining the basis of western civilization clearly cannot make itself whole on a supra-national basis, but only through the understanding and cooperation of national sovereignties... The idea of a federated Europe seems to me to be outside the possibility of realization for many reasons. ..."³⁵

On 31 December 1948, Foreign Minister Caeiro da Matta responded with no less than three pages of Portuguese observations regarding the projected Atlantic Pact. The Portuguese government had three main reservations. Portugal's first concern was the use of the term "European Federation" which Portugal felt denied the cultural integrity of individual nations in Western Europe. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister argued that under the pressure of political and economic conformity, the spirit of trust among these parties would soon be lost. Portugal's second concern had to do with the construction and use of strategic bases throughout Europe for the exclusive defense of the Atlantic. Portugal thought the latter exceeded the intent of the United Nations. She also suggested that some national governments might not accede to N.A.T.O. if this was its primary goal. Finally, the question of Spain was brought to the forefront. Portugal pointed to the indisputable fact that in terms of the defense of the

³⁵Originally, "A organização do mundo interessado em manter as bases da civilização ocidental não pode fazer-se integralmente, como é visível, no plano supranacional, mas apenas no entendimento e concerto de soberanias nacionais... A ideia de uma Europa federal parece-me fora das possibilidades de realização por muitas razões..." Translation mine.) For a published edition of the speech see, António Oliveira Salazar, "O Ocidente em face da Rússia," in *Discursos e Notas Políticas: 1943 – 1950*, vol. IV, (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, L.da, 1951), 332.

Iberian Peninsula, Spain was critical. Consequently, Portugal insisted that there had to be some type of “revision of Spain’s situation within the western concert”—i.e. Spain could not be continuously or, worst yet, permanently excluded by the Western powers.³⁶

Back in September of the same year, these same fears had already been voiced in conversations between Minister Caeiro da Matta and the American Ambassador to Portugal, Lincoln MacVeigh. Later that month, John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs, reassured MacVeigh that American and Portuguese thinking were “running on not dissimilar lines.” He agreed that the term “Western Union” was a poor choice in describing what America hoped to achieve through this Pact because it could easily be confused with the “unofficial projects looking toward unification of Europe....” In terms of Spanish reintegration, Director Hickerson hoped that, on the one hand, the Portuguese might help guide the Spanish government in the right direction—at least from an international perspective. On the other hand, he also informed Ambassador MacVeigh that America had been sounding out her allies around the globe regarding the issue of Spain and that she was moving towards an easing of her current official position towards Spain. At this point, the United States of America was operating under the United Nations Assembly 1946

³⁶Originally, “...revisão da situação da Espanha no concerto ocidental.” Translation mine. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “Pro Memoria,” [Note from J. Caeiro da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations to Sir Nigel Roland, the British Ambassador to Portugal], 31 December 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, “Pacto Atlantico.” A.M.N.E.

Resolution which prohibited diplomatic missions to Spain. Hickerson stated that the United States was ready to support a modification of this Resolution.³⁷

Clearly, there was once again a problem with Luso-American communication. The United States wanted Portugal to participate in the Pact. Portugal was willing to participate in the Pact but voiced a few reservations. The United States chose not to address these reservations directly. Instead, Portugal was fed information on a need-to-know basis via Ambassador MacVeigh. Given the attention these talks were getting from the international press, Ambassador MacVeigh mused that this would not bode well for the negotiations. As he pointed out in a note to the Secretary of State, "[Salazar's] experience of government does not lead him easily to conceive that press 'leaks' in connection with top secret matters can be unintentional."³⁸

It is no wonder that in November of 1948, in response to a press release by the Agence France-Presse regarding the possible entry of other European nations into the Atlantic pact, the Portuguese government used the Portuguese press outlets to "stir up the pot." The Portuguese report stated that:

[certain circles in Portugal viewed the possibility of] the adherence of Portugal to this Pact...with skepticism... These circles state that it is precisely because of Portugal's ancient alliance with Great Britain, and of the facilities which she has granted to the United States that formal

³⁷State Department, "The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeigh), Washington, September 22, 1948," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1948, vol. III, Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), Lisbon Embassy Files, Lot 56F159.

³⁸State Department, "The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeigh) to the Secretary of State," Lisbon, November 8, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1948, vol. III, Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), 840.20/11-848, No. 412.

adhesion by Portugal to the pact would, in practice and for the time being, be little more than superfluous.³⁹

Ambassador MacVeigh was convinced that Prime Minister Salazar himself wrote the press release, and that his use of the press did not bode well for future negotiations regarding Portuguese membership in the Atlantic Pact.⁴⁰

On 10 January 1949, Portugal received formal responses to Foreign Minister Caeiro da Matta's *Pro-Memória* of 31 December 1948 by both the British Ambassador to Portugal and the American Ambassador to Portugal. In both cases Portugal was reassured that the proposed pact was a defensive Treaty, nothing more—i.e. that the issue of European political and/or economic integration were outside of the parameters of the proposed Treaty. The American *Aide Memoire* noted that, “[the Treaty] would in no way derogate from the full sovereignty of the parties; and that it will not be applicable to the colonial possessions of any party except through providing for consultation should they be threatened.” Both countries also assured her that the Treaty itself would not make specific provisions for the establishment of strategically significant bases—neither military bases, nor air bases. The American *Aide Memoire* went one step further, “Obviously, no party could be required under the Treaty to grant facilities on its territory to all or any of the other parties without its full consent.” As to the question of Spain, both countries agreed that they fully understood Portugal's strategic doubts regarding the conclusion of a defensive pact in which Spain was not a member. The American *Aide Memoire* added that,

³⁹ibid.

⁴⁰ibid.

[America] would like to see Spain included whenever this may become politically possible, but that under present circumstances Spain's inclusion is not politically possible for most European participants....[Nevertheless,] non-inclusion of Spain at this time should not be a deterrent to Portuguese participation in the proposed Treaty, but rather that Portugal's defense problems, including the Spanish element in the strategic picture, could be dealt with more satisfactorily if Portugal were a party.⁴¹

Thus, Portuguese worries over European federation and the possible blanket use of bases within members' territories were laid to rest. At its root, both of these concerns reflected a fear of loss of national sovereignty. It also brought to the forefront Portuguese concern over the future role of her colonies within the context of an Atlantic defense treaty. Spain remained a sticking point. Spain was important to Portugal. Nonetheless, both America and Great Britain were very clear in distinguishing that whereas Spain was important to Portugal, Spain was not as important to them as Portugal.

On 8 March 1949, at 3:40 pm, an oral message was delivered to the Portuguese government informing them that a draft text was nearing completion—within a day or two. The Portuguese were given a timeframe of roughly one week to consider whether or not they wished to be an original signatory. After a week's time, the text would then be made public. They were

⁴¹Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Aide Memoire," [Lincoln MacVeigh, the American Ambassador to Portugal to J. Caeiro da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations], 10 January 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, "Pacto Atlantico." A.M.N.E. For the British note see, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Aide Memoire," [Sir Nigel Roland, the British Ambassador to Portugal to J. Caeiro da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations], 10 January 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, "Pacto Atlantico." A.M.N.E.

also informed that the "conference for final consideration and signature will be held in Washington about April 4."⁴²

That same day, Foreign Minister Caeiro da Matta composed a *Memorial*. He insisted on further clarification regarding several issues before Portugal being publicly invited to join N.A.T.O. Portugal could not see herself signing an alliance that would compromise her for more than twenty years. He explained that within a twenty-year period he could well envision an attack on the West by the Soviet Union. Beyond that period, however, he could just as easily imagine a European rivalry escalating to the brink of war. Portugal did not want to participate in a European war similar to the past two world wars as

the experience never rendered any advantages in correspondence to the sacrifices made [by Portugal]... Further [from Portugal's perspective] this new web of alliances was similar to those in existence prior to September 1939 and, in the event of a conflict or the weakening of the United Nations, the mechanism of N.A.T.O. could be activated as a consequence of an act of aggression not originating in Soviet Russia. In which case, the Portuguese Government and, in all likelihood other governments, could not compromise themselves by intervening.⁴³

Thus, the question of the duration of the treaty was for Portugal fundamental to her decision to participate in the alliance.

⁴²State Department, "Oral Message, 8 March [1949]," RG59, Box 1, folder "Papers Relating to North Atlantic Pact, 1949 to International Working Group. National Archives.

⁴³Originally, "... a experiencia não lhe advieram nunca vantagens correspondentes aos sacrifícios que uma ou outra vez lhe custaram... Com efeito, por virtude de uma rede de Tratados semelhantes à que existia antes de Setembro de 1939, e que na hipótese de fracasso ou diminuição de vitalidade da UNO pode de novo florescer na Europa, o mecanismo do Pacto do Atlântico Norte pode vir a ser posto em funcionamento em consequência de uma agressão não originária da Rússia Soviética." Translation mine. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, "Memorial," [Note from J. Caeiro da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations, to both the Ambassador from the United States to Portugal and to the Ambassador from England to Portugal], 8 March 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150. "Pacto Atlantico," proc. 33,12/no. 2. A.M.N.E.

The question of Spain also remained a serious issue to the Portuguese. Once again, Caeiro da Matta reiterated that the Iberian Peninsula was a geographic and strategic unit. An attack from the east would cross into the peninsula via the Pyrenees. It was essential that Spain be a part of the defensive pact. He then went one step further by pointing out that, "a profound alteration of the actual political conditions in Spain could in the blink of an eye represent the installation in that nation of an extremist Government with political and strategic consequences that are easy to foresee."⁴⁴ The conditions for that change could be external, i.e. direct assault by the Red Army. To the Portuguese government, however, in a much more probable scenario this change would be internal via a communist revolution in Spain. Thus, Portugal's Foreign Minister was arguing that as hard as it was for some western countries to support General Franco's regime in Spain, the alternative could be a strategic nightmare. In an earlier conversation with Ambassador MacVeigh, Caeiro da Matta had stated as much when he asserted, "I don't like Franco and I don't like his regime, but stability in Spain is a necessity for us all."⁴⁵

Lastly, the March 8 *Memorial* also brought up the issues of both colonial possessions and territorial guarantees. Caeiro da Matta noted that the United States had stated that the tenets of the Treaty would be applied to a participant's

⁴⁴Originally, "...uma alteração profunda das actuais condições políticas em Espanha poderia representar a breve trecho a instalação naquele país de um Governo extremista com consequências políticas e estratégicas faceis de prevêr." Translation mine. Ibid.

⁴⁵This remarkable statement by Caeiro da Matta was quoted in a note from MacVeigh to the American Secretary of State. State Department, "The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeigh) to the Secretary of State, Lisbon, September 8, 1948," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1948, vol. III, Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), 840.00/9-848, No. 332.

colonial possessions, if those possessions were being threatened and then just for consultation. Since Portugal had possessions outside of the Atlantic theater, would the United States--and other pact nations---come to her assistance if those colonies outside of the Atlantic were threatened?⁴⁶ Furthermore, Portugal thought that in one form or another there should be "a guarantee of the territorial integrity of each of the adherents [to the Pact]."⁴⁷

Despite these concerns, eight days later Portugal received a formal invitation to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. The invitation from Secretary of State Dean Acheson was also sent to the Embassies of Rome and Copenhagen. It included the final text of the North Atlantic Treaty. Concurrently, Foreign Minister Caeiro da Matta received a separate letter from Acheson addressing Portugal's concerns as expressed in his "Memorial" dated 8 March.⁴⁸

In this note, Acheson claimed that Articles 12 and 13 should allay any fears that Portugal may have in terms of the duration of the Treaty. Article 12 stated: "After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty...." Furthermore, Article 13 stated: "After the

⁴⁶It should be noted that Caiero da Matta made a point of excluding Britain from the need for any further clarification on this point because of Portugal's alliance with her, i.e. the Windsor Treaty of 1386. Ministério dos Negócios Éstrangeiros, "Memorial," [Memorandum from J. Caeiro da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations, to both the Ambassador from the United States to Portugal and to the Ambassador from England to Portugal], 8 March 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, "Pacto Atlantico," proc. 33,12/no. 2. A.M.N.E.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸This "Note" from Acheson included the formal invitation to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, the final text of the Treaty, and a response to Caeiro da Matta's memorandum dated 8 March. State Department, "Secretary of State to the Embassy of Portugal," Washington, March 16, 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150. Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.

Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation....” Consequently, although this was a twenty year treaty, after ten years concerns could be addressed by any member—leaving open the door to possible revision.⁴⁹

Acheson in some ways skirted the issue of Spanish non-inclusion by simply arguing that Portuguese adherence to the Pact would not infringe upon their commitments to existing Spanish-Portuguese agreements. However, he could not have been clearer when it came to Portuguese concerns over the security of their colonies. To this end he assured Caeiro da Matta, “It is clearly understood that the obligation to consult covers threats to any party in any part of the world, including its overseas possessions.” As for Portuguese concerns regarding her own territorial integrity, Acheson went on to maintain that, “the Treaty offers all parties much more effective assurances for security than does the Charter of the United Nations...[in that] Article 4 expressly mentions a threat to the ‘territorial integrity’ of any of the parties as a cause for consultation among all.”⁵⁰

Not surprisingly, the following day a note was sent from the British Embassy in Lisbon to the Portuguese Foreign Minister which mirrored American sentiments precisely.⁵¹ Much more revealing was the British note dated 19 March:

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Foreign Office, “British Embassy to Portuguese Foreign Ministry,” Lisbon, 17 March 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.

The United Kingdom Government have always regarded a duration of twenty years as highly desirable and would have welcomed a longer period if there had been any chance of obtaining it. In their view a duration of twenty years emphasizes that this is a long term association for peace and security and not merely an ephemeral alliance against the Soviet Union. It commits the United States and Canada more fully to military cooperation with Western Europe and to this extent will not only break isolationist habits on the other side of the Atlantic, but also give far greater confidence to Europe than any short term arrangements could do. In view of the United Kingdom Government interdependence has become an inescapable condition of survival of the countries of Western Europe.⁵²

If authorities in Portugal were still unconvinced that the twenty year term was a condition of the European contingent and not a condition of the United States, the rather frank telegram that followed from Acheson would dispel that notion. Dated 21 March 1949, Acheson was responding to comments made to him by both the American Ambassador to Portugal, Lincoln MacVeigh, and the Portuguese Ambassador to the United States, Pedro Teotónio Pereira, regarding Portugal's concerns as to the duration of the Treaty. Both men had repeated to Acheson Portugal's traditional reluctance to become embroiled in "continental conflicts," to which Acheson replied:

I well understand your preoccupation. My own govt has, since the early days of its independence, always endeavored similarly to avoid involvement in Eur conflicts, such an important change in our historic policy that we too have given most careful thought to the question of the duration of the treaty. Brit, Fr, Belg, Neth, and Lux govts strongly preferred a duration of fifty years but my govt was reluctant, as is yours, to accept such a long-term commitment. After the most careful consideration, however, my govt reached the conclusion that twenty years with provision for review after ten years represented the best

⁵²Foreign Office, "British Embassy to Portuguese Foreign Ministry," Lisbon, 19 March 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.

term... We believe that a shorter duration would not be adequate to provide in Eur the necessary long-term stability and confidence of security.⁵³

This statement not only reaffirmed and clarified British interest in a long-term Treaty—i.e. they would have preferred a fifty year commitment—but also served to communicate the importance of this commitment. The British wanted to break the North American nation's habit of isolation. The Americans were reluctant, but accepted a compromise of twenty years—a truly historic shift in policy. As misery loves company, Portugal was asked to join in order to ensure long-term stability and security in the region regardless of her traditional reluctance to bind herself to long-term continental affairs.

Acheson's telegram could not have come at a better time.⁵⁴ After several Cabinet meetings and several discussions with the Spanish Ambassador to Portugal, Portugal accepted the invitation to join the North Atlantic Pact on 30 March 1949.⁵⁵ On 2 April 1949, Foreign Minister Caeiro da Matta as well as four other Portuguese representatives attended the private meeting of the signatory

⁵³State Department, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Portugal," Washington, March 21, 1949," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1949, vol. IV, Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 840.20/3-2149: Telegram.

⁵⁴MacVeigh informed Acheson that the Portuguese Cabinet had already met twice and twice the invitation had been rejected. The Cabinet was set to meet again to discuss the issue once more, and MacVeigh knew that Salazar would have this telegram in hand before the meeting. State Department, "The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeigh) to the Secretary of State, Lisbon, March 22, 1949," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1949, vol. IV, Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 840.20/3-2249: Telegram.

⁵⁵In this note, Caiero informed Sir Nigel Ronald that Portugal had that very day notified Ambassador MacVeigh of her acceptance of the invitation to join N.A.T.O. Unfortunately, the note to MacVeigh was no where to be found. Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros. "Caiero da Matta to Sir Nigel Ronald" Lisbon 30 March 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.

powers of the North Atlantic Treaty held in Washington, D.C. This session finally allowed the representatives of all the signatory powers to meet to discuss any lingering questions. The one question that Portugal had was whether or not Portugal's treaties with Spain—the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression of 17 March 1939, and the Additional Protocol of 29 June 1940—were compatible with Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty stated: "Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty."⁵⁶

This question had already been posed to both the United States and Great Britain. Still, Portugal thought it best to ascertain how the other signatory powers interpreted the wording of Article 8 and its application to her situation. After a lengthy discussion, Portugal was finally satisfied. All present agreed that, based on their understanding of Portugal's treaties with Spain, these two treaties were not incompatible with the North Atlantic Treaty.⁵⁷

The next day, Acheson received a letter from Caeiro da Matta stating that Portugal was now prepared to sign without reservation.⁵⁸ On 4 April 1949, the

⁵⁶State Department, "Secretary of State to the Embassy of Portugal," North Atlantic Treaty text, Washington, March 16, 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.

⁵⁷State Department. "Conference of the Foreign Ministers..." Transcript. Washington, April 2, 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3, 3-10. A.M.N.E.

⁵⁸Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Portuguese Foreign Minister (Caeiro da Matta) to Secretary of State (Acheson)" Washington 3 April 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.

United States and Portugal--along with 10 other powers--signed the North Atlantic Treaty forming the North Atlantic Pact. This had been a difficult journey for Portugal because she was not party to the drafting of the original text. Nevertheless, in the end she could be content with what she had gained and what she had learned.

In its simplest form, what she had secured for herself by signing the Treaty was recognition of her sovereignty and her colonial possessions. Moreover, whereas within the constraints of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance Portugal could expect assistance from Great Britain if she or her colonies were threatened, within N.A.T.O. Portugal had a concert of nations to aid her in her defense. Ultimately, what she had learned was that her Atlantic position and her Atlantic possessions made her a significant partner in this organization. That realization was soon made apparent.

After the signatures and the ceremonies were completed, the Foreign Ministers present agreed that a Working Group would be organized in Washington, D.C. "to study and recommend the nature of the organization to be established under Article 9." That Group began its work on 23 August and continued until the N.A.T.O. Council convened on 17 September. The Council met to establish a Defense Committee and to take the necessary steps to implement the terms of the Treaty. The Working Group created the organizational plan for N.A.T.O. and finished its report on 9 September. Accordingly, the North Atlantic was to be divided into four geographic blocks.

These geographic blocks were to be coordinated by four Regional Planning Groups.⁵⁹ The flow chart below illustrates the organization of N.A.T.O.




Figure 7: N.A.T.O. organizational chart.⁶⁰

Portugal was made part of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group. From an American security perspective, this decision made perfect sense. A Central Intelligence Agency report on Portugal in October 1949 confirmed that:

⁵⁹"Working Group Report" in "Memorandum for Mr. Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary, National Security Council, Subject: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 12, September 1949, Washington," in "A Report to the National Security Council by the Under secretary of State on North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 13 September 1949, Washington," President Secretary's Files, Box # 206, National Security Council Files-Meetings, Meeting 45, 15 September 1949. National Archives - President Truman Library.

⁶⁰"North Atlantic Treaty Organization." President Secretary's Files, Box # 163, Conferences; Paris Conference, October - November 1949. National Archives - President Truman Library.

From the point of view of US security, the importance of Portugal lies mainly in the strategic location of the Atlantic islands, the homeland, and the African colonies... Of foremost importance are the Azores, which lie on a major sea and air route across the North Atlantic. Possession of air and naval bases in the Azores would be highly desirable to the US in the event of war with the USSR to afford protection for US lines of communication and forestall possible attacks on the US from such bases... In continental Portugal there is one first-class airfield... Furthermore, the port of Lisbon is one of the finest harbors in the world, and is close to the Atlantic entrance to the Mediterranean.⁶¹

Thus, Portugal's position in the Atlantic, and her air and naval facilities made her an asset to N.A.T.O. Beyond regional security, these same qualities made her an asset to American security. For the Portuguese, her selection for this particular Group could only have served to further reinforce her Atlantic identity.

Many issues were raised during the NATO negotiations. One issue that was brought to the forefront throughout the negotiations was the obvious distinction that the other signatory powers made in relation to Portugal and Spain. Portugal's insistence on Spanish inclusion in the Pact was based on military strategy. As she pointed out many times in these talks, Portugal feared invasion from the east. Portugal's recent treaties with Spain were meant to strengthen her security. Spanish inclusion in N.A.T.O. would have added to that sense of security.

Portugal's assessment of Spain was in some ways later supported by General Eisenhower's own appraisal of Spain. In a 1951 meeting with President Truman and his Cabinet regarding N.A.T.O., Eisenhower noted that "Spain had

⁶¹"Central Intelligence Agency, Portugal, Situation Report 31 (13 October 1949, Washington)," President Secretary's Files, Box # 261, Intelligence File. Situation Report (30-31), National Archives - President Truman Library.

20 divisions and she hated Stalin." In typical Eisenhower style he added "I feel about the question of keeping Spain out the same as I feel about keeping a sinner out of church. You can't convert the sinner unless you let him get inside the front door." Eisenhower was a general, not a politician. His assessment of Spain was a military assessment of Spain.⁶²

Portugal's position on Spain notwithstanding, at this time the other powers were not willing to entertain the idea of Spanish inclusion due to the politics of Spain's current reputation. At his press conference on the Atlantic Pact on 18 March 1949, Dean Acheson answered questions regarding Spain and Portugal. When asked about Spain, he pointed out that members of the Pact have to be unanimous in agreeing to accept any nation. In this respect, members of the Pact would have to consider two matters. "Firstly is such a nation in a position to further the democratic principles of the treaty. Secondly is such a nation in a position to further the security of the North Atlantic area." When asked in what category Portugal fell, Acheson replied that, "he could not speak for the other negotiators but his own vote was cast for Portugal on both counts."⁶³

Throughout these talks the Portuguese Ambassador to the United States, Pedro Teotónio Pereira, had worked tirelessly to gather as much intelligence as possible for the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Relations. By March, he was

⁶²"Meeting of General Eisenhower with the President and the Cabinet, Wednesday January 31, 1951," in "Memorandum for the President (February 6, 1951)," President Secretary's Files, Box # 113, Cabinet—Secretary of State—Misc. (re NATO 1951), National Archives - President Truman Library.

⁶³Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Dean Acheson... Press Conference on the Atlantic Pact," [Portuguese Embassy in the United States to Portuguese Foreign Ministry] Washington, 19 March 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.

sending several telegrams daily with information regarding both formal and informal talks with members of the State Department, press releases made by the same and by Congressmen, as well as summaries--sometimes, actual copies--of editorials from leading American newspapers. As an experienced and trusted member of Salazar's diplomatic corps, Pereira understood the need to add context to the on-going negotiations between the two governments.

In the last two weeks leading up to the formal signing of the Treaty, Ambassador Pereira became aware of what he would later term "the Spanish deception."⁶⁴ He related his stunning findings to Caeiro da Matta in a brief letter. Pereira told Caeiro da Matta that, while the Minister had been meeting with Spanish officials in Lisbon regarding the possible effect inclusion in the Pact might have on existing Portuguese-Spanish treaties, in Washington

...the Spanish were circulating rumors with the intended effect of convincing others that Portugal was not in a position to individually join the Pact... Spain, who in all these years have purposely publicly ignored the exact extent of the peninsular accords... appeared suddenly to present 'the block as a formal alliance capable of linking the two countries in a singular polity'... As Your Excellency knows the telegrams that were profusely circulated between 20 and 25 [of March] came to state that Portugal had been officially warned by Spain that she was not at liberty to join the Atlantic Pact... So disastrous and barefaced was this game that we were made aware of the fact that the [American] State Department thought it necessary to intervene. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires was summoned to the State Department and was told that these events would only serve to complicate matters more for Spain.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Portuguese Ambassador in the United States (Pereira) to Portuguese Foreign Minister (Caeiro da Matta)," Washington, 20 April 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Proc. 70,2/No. 242. A.M.N.E.

⁶⁵Originally, "tratava a Espanha de fazer circular cá por fóra rumores que tinham por fim fazer crer que Portugal não estava em situação de aderir isoladamente ao Pacto. A Espanha que durante tantos anos fez menção de ignorar em público a exacta extensão dos acordos peninsulares. .aparaeceu de repente a apresentar o 'bloco com urna aliança formal capaz de ligar os dois paizes numa mesma politica [sic]. E sabe V. Exa. que telégramas [sic] profusamente

Thus, while Portugal had good reason to promote Spanish inclusion in the Pact, it was clear that Spain did not have Portugal's interests at heart. Once again, Portugal's neighbor had proven herself difficult at best. This experience could only serve once again to remind the Portuguese that despite geography and recent close relations they were, indeed, distinct from Spain.⁶⁶ Portugal was, as Caeiro da Matta confirmed in his press conference on 2 April, "an Atlantic country."⁶⁷

Mutual Assistance & Mutual Defense Agreements--the Azorean Connection

Articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty required a clear military commitment by the United States of America on a rather extensive basis. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states, "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of

espalhados por tôda a parte, entre 20 e 25 do corrente chegaram a dizer que Portugal tinha sido oficialmente advertido pela Espanha que não era livre de se juntar ao Pacto do Atlantico... Tão desastrado e calvo foi este jogo que viemos logo a saber que o Departamento de Estado se julgou na necessidade de entevir. Foi o Encarregado de Negócios de Espanha chamado ao Departamento de Estado e foi ali ditto que tais reacções [sic] só serviriam para dificultar a posição de Espanha." Translation mine. Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Portuguese Ambassador in the United States (Pereira) to Portuguese Foreign Minister (Caeiro da Matta)," Washington, 5 April 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Proc. 70,2/No. 204. A.M.N.E.

⁶⁶Spain would not be admitted into N.A.T.O. until 10 December 1981, six years after General Francisco Franco's death. See, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain," under "The North Atlantic Treaty," under "e-library," under "basic texts," under "Part II—Juridical texts and formal agreements," <http://www.nato.int> (accessed July 12, 2010).

⁶⁷Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Caeiro da Matta... Press Conference on... the signing of the North Atlantic Alliance," Washington, 2 April 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.

continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”⁶⁸ Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty obliges all parties to agree “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all....”⁶⁹ To this end, six months after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman signed into legislation the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.⁷⁰ The intent of the law was made clear in its first paragraph which reads:

The Congress hereby finds that the efforts of the United States and other countries to promote peace and security in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations require additional measures of support based upon the principle of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. These measures include the furnishing of military assistance essential to enable the United States and other nations ...to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles.... [Furthermore, under “Title I” of this law, it] authorized to be appropriated to the President for the period through June 30, 1950, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for carrying out the provisions and accomplishing the policies and purposes of this title, not to exceed \$500,000,000, of which not to exceed \$100,000,000 shall be immediately available upon appropriation, and not to exceed \$400,000,000 shall become available when the President of the United States approves recommendations for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area which may be made by the Council and Defense Committee to be established under the North Atlantic Treaty.⁷¹

⁶⁸North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty.” under “e-library,” under “basic texts,” under “Part II—Juridical texts and formal agreements,” <http://www.nato.int> (accessed July 12, 2010).

⁶⁹*Ibid.*

⁷⁰Public Law 329, 81st Congress, 1st Session (H.R. 5895); Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXI, No. 538 (October 24, 1949).

⁷¹*Ibid.*

Hence, under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), the President could—without Congressional oversight—offer funds to those nations who were seeking military aid—presumably under the recommendations of the NATO Defense Committee.⁷²

The U.S. State Department then initiated a series of negotiations with the other signatory powers to offer military assistance to them and to conclude defense treaties which would eventually offer American military access to bases around the globe. Portugal, of course, was one of these nations.⁷³ The Mutual Defense Assistance agreement between Portugal and the United States was signed in Lisbon on 5 January 1951.

The Treaty is brief, with only seven articles. It begins by affirming that both Portugal and the United States are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and, that Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty required that they work towards collective security. It then goes on to make specific reference to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and to assert that this Treaty will “govern the transfer of such assistance.”⁷⁴ It is important to remember that this was meant to be a bilateral agreement, i.e. a mutual exchange of assistance. Thus, not only

⁷²This Act would later be amended and then extended. Finally, it was replaced by the Mutual Security Act of 1951—by then appropriations had risen to \$7,500,000,000. This Act was extended each year by appropriations until the early 1960s. For a detailed early analysis of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program see, Robert H. Connery and Paul T. David, “The Mutual Defense Assistance Program,” *The American Political Science Review* 45, no. 2 (June 1951): 321-347. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951465> (accessed March 10, 2011).

⁷⁴“Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States of America and Portugal,” January 5, 1951, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 2, pt. 1, 438

was Portugal meant to gain from the agreement, the United States of America was also meant to gain something in the exchange.

The importance of tying this mutual assistance directly with the mandates of the North Atlantic Treaty cannot be overstated. Article I stated that the intended goal of such assistance is,

to promote an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area and to facilitate the development of, or be in accordance with, defense plans under Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty.... [Furthermore, it required that] Each Government undertakes to make effective use of assistance received...in accordance with defense plans formulated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization recommended by the North Atlantic Treaty Defense Committee and Council, and agreed to by the two Governments.⁷⁵

According to the Treaty, all assistance had to be used in accordance with the aforementioned plans, and the common security interests of both parties had to be maintained.⁷⁶

The terms of this exchange of assistance were spelled out in the first two articles of the Treaty. In Article I, the United States offered "equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance" to Portugal.⁷⁷ In return, in Article II, Portugal agreed to "facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States of America...raw and semiprocessed materials...which may be

⁷⁵"Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States of America and Portugal," January 5, 1951, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 2, pt. 1, 439.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid., 438.

available in Portugal or dependent territories under its administration."⁷⁸ The next four articles dealt with the more mundane details of the exchanges such as public relations, patent issues, taxation, and the status of personnel.⁷⁹ The last article dealt with the manner in which the Treaty could be amended as well as the duration of the Treaty. In the case of the latter, the Agreement was to remain in force "until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it."⁸⁰

The first six months after the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty were taken up with the process of creating the necessary bureaucracy to facilitate the exchanges. Both parties had to agree on the ports to be used to ship goods abroad. Each country had to hire shipping agents. These agents then had to present their papers to the governments to which they were discharged because each agent was "to operate as a part of [his respective] Embassy."⁸¹

⁷⁸Ibid., 439. Among other things, of particular interest to the United States were Portuguese uranium ore deposits. Whether it was a concern over securing it for the United States or keeping it from America's enemies, Portuguese uranium mines were a constant topic of diplomatic conversation from 1949 on.

⁷⁹Ibid., 440-441.

⁸⁰Ibid., 441.

⁸¹Ibid. Four ports in the United States were selected for MDAP transport goods, New York, Seattle, San Francisco, and New Orleans. The agent for New York was António da Cruz Chambel of the Portuguese Commercial Office in New York. The Acting Consul for Portugal in San Francisco, Guilherme Armas do Amaral was responsible for both the ports of San Francisco and Seattle. While Fisher G. Dorsey, Vice-Consul for Portugal in Houston, was selected as the shipping agent for New Orleans. For the selection of the ports, see State Department, "Secretary of State (Acheson) to Portuguese Ambassador to the United States (Luis Esteves Fernandes)," Washington, 8 September 1951, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M218, Acôrdo de Assistência e Defesa Mutua, Processo 15/51-52. A.M.N.E. For the designation of the agents, see Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Portuguese Ambassador to the United States (Luis Esteves Fernandes) to Vice-Consul for Portugal at Houston, Texas (Fisher G. Dorsey),"

By August of 1951 shipments from the United States to Portugal began in earnest. By year's end 1952, Portugal had received 16,237 tons of supplies from the United States Army. These shipments included radios, ordinance, motor transport vehicles, small arms and machine guns, as well as artillery and artillery ammunition. Portugal received 4,000 antipersonnel mines, 12,000 antitank mines, and an astounding 42,000 rockets (ostensibly, to go with the 442 rocket launchers). Nearly 500 cargo trailers, and over 700 trucks were sent to Portugal during this short time period, including 5 ambulances.⁸²

Additionally, from September of 1951 to December of 1953, Portugal also accepted 94,959 tons of supplies from the United States Air Force (USAF). These supplies included 240 aircraft, including 166 Republic F-84 Thunderjet jet fighter planes and fifty Republic P-47D (F47) Thunderbolt fighter planes. This USAF shipment also included twenty North American Aviation T-6 Texan single engine trainer aircraft, one Sikorsky H-19 Chickasaw multi-purpose helicopter, and three Grumman air-sea rescue flying boats--altogether a remarkable boost to Portugal's air corps. Beside the planes, the USAF also provided Portugal with more radar sets, more motor vehicles, a twenty-ton crane and 2,900 aircraft rockets.⁸³

Washington, 22 December 1951, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M218, Acôrdo de Assistência e Defesa Mutua, Processo 15/51-52. A.M.N.E.

⁸²Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Quarterly Estimates of MDAP to Port— Consolidated FY '50 and FY'51 (Selected Items)/Department--ARMY," Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M218, Acôrdo de Assistência e Defesa Mutua, Processo 15/51-52. A.M.N.E.

⁸³Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Quarterly Estimates of MDAP to Port— Consolidated FY '51 and FY'52 (Selected Items)/Department--AIR FORCE," Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M218, Acôrdo de Assistência e Defesa Mutua, Processo 15/51-52. A.M.N.E.

The quantity and quality of military assistance that Portugal received in the first few years of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program clearly reflected the State Department objectives enumerated in its 1950 policy statement regarding Luso-American relations:

(1) to maintain and improve existing cordial relations; (2) to ensure continuation and development of the facilities now granted to us in the Azores; (3) to encourage Portuguese participation in efforts to achieve economic, political and military integration in western Europe and coordination in North Atlantic area; and (4) to aid in the economic and strategic development of Portugal's large African possessions.⁸⁴

With a mind to these stated objectives, it was noted that Portugal's "low level of industrial development' limited Portuguese capacity to produce the necessary military equipment to bring her armed services up to anticipated N.A.T.O. levels. This industrial underdevelopment necessitated a strong American investment in Portugal's military development.⁸⁵

The range of equipment—nearly six times the weight for the air force—reflects Portugal's position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the role that she would play in the defense of the Atlantic. In the organizational flow chart above it was noted that Portugal fell within the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group. The C.I.A. report dated October 1949, cited earlier, also confirmed that Portugal's importance lies in her Atlantic position. These M.D.A.P. funds were meant to facilitate and coordinate "military integration" of

⁸⁴State Department, "PORTUGAL: RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH PORTUGAL," Washington, October 20, 1950," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1950, vol. III, Western Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 611.53/10-2050: Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

the Portuguese armed forces into the joint defense of the North Atlantic area, which in the case of Portugal meant a focus on the air force.

In this same policy statement, the importance of the Azores was again repeated. It was, however, the "Top Secret" supplement to the policy statement on Portugal that plainly spelled out American interests in that region of the Atlantic. This supplement confirmed, "The JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] have established a requirement for long term base rights in the Azores. Immediate plans call for the development and expansion of existing operational and storage facilities for the Air Force and ultimately for naval anchorages and facilities for naval aircraft."⁸⁶

Unfortunately for the U.S., Portugal remained reluctant to allow peacetime foreign bases on its territory. The cause of this hesitation stemmed from the question of sovereignty: if foreign troops were allowed on Portuguese soil, would they willingly quit that region when asked? The supplement went on to note that the Portuguese "indicated that any further discussion of this question should take place within the NAT [North Atlantic Treaty], a preference which we believe stems from their desire to tie any extension of Azores facilities to the satisfactory development of NAT plans for Portugal's defense."⁸⁷ American frustration over Portugal's position and the determination and confidence of the analysts to change Portuguese policy in this regard was palpable as the statement concluded,

⁸⁶ibid., [Annex].

⁸⁷ibid.

Their [Portugal's] unwillingness to extend such facilities in peacetime remains to be overcome and it will be necessary to convince them that arrangement for the utilization of these facilities, which are the most important contribution Portugal can make to the strengthening of the collective defense of the North Atlantic Region, as well as of western Europe, must be completed as soon as possible before it becomes too late....⁸⁸

The analysts' solution was to continue negotiations directly with Portugal to develop and expand the extant facilities as much as possible within the terms of the 1948 Agreement.⁸⁹ Which is exactly what they did.

On 6 September 1951, Portugal signed the Defense Agreement Between Portugal and the United States of America authorizing the use of the Lagens airbase, and to a lesser extent the Santa Maria airbase, in the Azores. As stated earlier, the Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the signatories "are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense ..."⁹⁰ The Preamble of the 1951 Luso-American defense treaty makes direct reference to the North Atlantic

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Ibid. As discussed in Chapter V, the 1944 Agreement allowed the United States to construct the aerodrome at Santa Maria, while also having transit rights at Lagens until the end of hostilities in the Far East. The terms of this treaty ended on 2 June 1946. On 7 September 1946 a temporary agreement was reached between Portugal and the U.S. This agreement allowed the U.S. to use the Lagens facilities for another 18 months. Meanwhile, U.S. led negotiations were on-going for both the use of and extension of the facilities at Lagens. A new Luso-American Agreement was finally reached on 2 February 1948. For the text of the 7 September 1946 agreement see, State Department, "Portuguese-American Military Conversations in the Azores, 7 September 1946," RG 59 Records of the Spanish and Portuguese Desk Officers, Box 1, folder 1943-1951 AZORES NEGS. (Documents). National Archives. For the negotiations leading up to the 1948 Agreement, see State Department, "PORTUGAL," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1947, vol. III, The British Commonwealth; Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 1019-1052. For the text of the 1948 Treaty—including the technical annex with maps etc—see Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Acordo Técnico de 2 Fevereiro 1948" P.E.A., 459, and Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros, "Acordo Técnico, Anexo ao Acordo, entre os Governos de Portugal e dos Estados Unidos da América, de 2 Fevereiro 1948" P.E.A., 459. A.M.N.E.

⁹⁰North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty." under "e-library," under "basic texts," under "Part II—Juridical texts and formal agreements," <http://www.nato.int> (accessed July 12 2010).

Treaty stating, "Having in mind the doctrine and obligations arising from Articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty...[the parties have] resolved, in accordance with the preamble of that Treaty, to unite their efforts for the common defense and for the preservation of peace and security."⁹¹ Consequently, this treaty put into practice the obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty for collective defense, while also fulfilling one of the stated objectives of American foreign policy toward Portugal.

The Preamble to the Luso-American defense treaty also referred to N.A.T.O. plans regarding the Azores vis a vis Portugal and the United States by stating,

...according to the dispositions adopted within the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty, the area of the Azores directly interests Portugal and the United States and that between them they must establish agreements for the determination and utilization of the facilities which it is possible for the first of the mentioned Governments to grant in those islands.⁹²

The 1951 defense agreement spelled out the terms in which the United States would be allowed access to the facilities in the Azores while still preserving Portuguese sovereignty in that region. The Treaty itself was only twelve articles long. Article 1 went to the heart of the matter by stating, "The Portuguese Government grants to the Government of the United States in case of war in which they are involved during the life of the North Atlantic Treaty...the use of

⁹¹"Defense Agreement Between Portugal and the United States of America," September 6, 1951, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* 5, pt. 3, 2264.

⁹²*Ibid.*

facilities in the Azores...."⁹³ Since the United States had been using Azores' facilities since 1944, wartime use of the facilities was not the problem. Peacetime use of the facilities was.

In order to fit into N.A.T.O. strategic planning, Portugal was compelled to allow a foreign nation (the United States) to use her bases while still maintaining her own sovereignty over those islands. Article 2 dealt directly with this issue by delineating what role the United States would play in this theatre. It also set a timeframe for the proposed project. As such, Article 2 began,

The Governments of Portugal and the United States, in technical and financial collaboration...will construct new installations and enlarge and improve those existing... These preparatory works shall include, among other things, the storage of oil, munitions, spare parts and any supplies considered necessary for the purposes in view.⁹⁴

Thus, with the aid of the United States, the facilities in the Azores would be expanded. The timeframe for this expansion project was fixed from the date of the signing of the current treaty until 1 September 1956.⁹⁵

Article 3 was intended to put to rest the question of sovereignty that so disturbed Portuguese sensibilities by stating, "All construction and materials incorporated in the soil will from the start be considered property of the Portuguese State without prejudice to the recognized right of the United States to use such constructions and materials in time of war or in time of peace to the

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid., 2264-2265. Article 7 set the life of N.A.T.O. as the term under which this stockpiling of materials and supplies at the Azores bases could continue.

⁹⁵Ibid., 2265. Article 7 granted the United States six to twelve months for the complete evacuation of the island facilities. See, Ibid., 2266.

extent and in the manner provided in this Agreement....” Accordingly, the base itself was Portugal’s. The United States simply had the use of the base until 1 September of 1956. However, this article further stipulated that, “the United States may raze or remove for its account technical equipment belonging to it and not necessary to the future functioning of the bases.”⁹⁶ Hence, Portugal owned the base, but not necessarily all of the equipment that the Americans planned on bringing to it.

Articles four and five addressed the question of who would maintain the bases after 1956. Subsequent to American withdrawal, Portugal would maintain the facilities. To this end, the United States also agreed to, “provide facilities necessary for the apprenticeship and training of Portuguese personnel having in mind the perfect functioning of the bases....”⁹⁷ This is not to say that after 1956 there would be no American presence on the bases. In time of peace, any American personnel that remained after the 1956 withdrawal and pursuant to “the plans established by...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization... [would act] under Portuguese direction.”⁹⁸

Since there were two aerodromes in the Azores, one at Lagens and one on Santa Maria, it was necessary for the diplomats to distinguish between the uses of both. From September of 1951 until the completion of the American evacuation, Article 6 specified that, “the transit of American military aircraft

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Ibid., 2266.

through the Lagens Airdrome... [would be] permitted and there will be authorized on that base, during the same periods, the training of United States aviation and naval personnel....”⁹⁹ Thus, the Lagens airbase would not only be the site of an expansion and improvements program, but also the location of a training center for both American and Portuguese personnel. Meanwhile, access to Santa Maria’s airdrome was vaguely worded: “There will also be permitted the eventual visit to the airdrome of Santa Maria of some military aircraft which will be provided for by technical arrangements to be concluded between the Ministers of Defense of the two Governments.” Evidently, the real focus of the treaty was the expansion and use of the Lagens airbase, whereas the Santa Maria airdrome would serve in a dramatically reduced, supportive role.

Article 8 was, in effect, the U.S. escape clause. It reflected the traditional fear of the United States to enter into long-term bilateral military commitments. It declared, “The Government of the United States may at any moment renounce the concessions granted under the present Agreement in which case the obligations assumed in this respect by the Portuguese Government will likewise cease.” At first glance, it seems to contradict the stated objectives of both the J.C.S. and the State Department. Those objectives, however, were subject to change based on the ever-changing geo-political world situation. This Article allowed the United States the flexibility, if necessary, to shift focus.

The last quarter of the Agreement reflected the strategic importance of the bases; its language went beyond the limits of a bilateral agreement. Articles 9

⁹⁹Ibid.

and 10 allowed N.A.T.O. use of the Azores in time of war and in time of peace— although the latter, only after the American evacuation. This makes perfect sense since the goal of the treaty was to incorporate Portugal into N.A.T.O. defense plans. It was clear that long after the initial expansion of the bases, and even after the expected American evacuation of the bases, the Azores would remain central to N.A.T.O. defense plans in the North Atlantic. Article 9 reaffirmed Great Britain's position as Portugal's oldest ally, by extending to her the right to "facilities analogous to those granted [the U.S.]." ¹⁰⁰ Finally, Article 12 noted that on the effective date of this treaty (1 September 1951), the "Agreement of February 2, 1948 will cease to have validity." ¹⁰¹

Conclusion

The period between 1947 and 1951 was witness to a truly intense period of diplomatic activity, most of it initiated by the United States of America. The U.S. was driven to alter the future of Europe. Two world wars had taught her that she could no longer stand idle and hope that Europe could recover from the devastation of modern warfare. Those five years saw the implementation of a new world vision, an American vision in which economic stability and liberty stood preeminent, while communist subversion was minimized and the Soviet expansion was kept in check. In order to achieve those goals, the United States

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 2266-67.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 2267.

spearheaded the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

The Marshall Plan brought economic stability and, later, growth to Western Europe. This economic stability would go a long way in maintaining political stability in the region for as President Truman pointed out, "The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife."¹⁰² Secretary of State Marshall went one step further when he avowed, "our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."¹⁰³ American policymakers of the time acted upon the belief that economic stability and political stability were inextricably linked, the consequence of both being the extension of liberty.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a defensive treaty which united 12 founding members behind one common goal—security in the region. Consequently, if the Marshall Plan moved Western Europe towards economic stability (and by extension political stability), N.A.T.O. steered it towards military stability. With the establishment of N.A.T.O. came joint planning and a joint

¹⁰²Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," 180.

¹⁰³Press Release Issued by the Department of State, June 4, 1947, "Remarks by the Honorable George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, at Harvard University on June 5, 1947," *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1947, vol. III, British Commonwealth: Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), Lot 64 D563, Box 1 (20027), 1947-50/238.

vision of defense, not only for Western Europe but also for the entire North Atlantic region. Thus, with the stroke of a pen, each of the N.A.T.O. members was forced to view their role in the region from a common perspective rather than a national perspective. At least among the twelve, the rule of law would govern their military development and actions.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program was the next logical course of action. If the original twelve were going to act in concert, they would need to be prepared to do so in terms of both military supplies and training. Each would be expected to bring something to the defense of her neighbor. The cost of the war and the differing levels of industrial development made it necessary for the United States to render military assistance to these countries in order to bring the entire group up to a certain level of preparedness. The final feature of this integrated plan was the completion of a series of Mutual Defense treaties that reinforced the ties initiated in N.A.T.O. These bilateral treaties gave the United States military access to bases throughout the Atlantic region. In the short term, it allowed for the expansion of and improvement of these foreign bases in order to accommodate American equipment and weapons. In the long term, these bases were designed and equipped to serve the needs of N.A.T.O.

Portugal was party to each of these steps. Without a doubt, in terms of Luso-American relations this period was extraordinary. Portugal's decision to participate in the Marshall Plan was a direct result of her national interests. For Portugal, the Marshall Plan had in its design some of the commercial safeguards and privileges inherent in the commercial aspect of the Anglo-Portuguese

alliance. She now enjoyed Most-Favored-Nation Status with a variety of countries including the United States, as well as guaranteed access to the European market which the ERP created.

Portugal's sense of regional importance was further augmented by her invitation to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a founding member. Although not a member of the draft committee, Portugal was courted by the United States. Her larger neighbor to her east, Spain, was not. Due to Franco's and Spain's politics, and to the West's associating Franco's regime with repression and failed fascism, Spain was left out of N.A.T.O. Portugal was viewed by the U.S. and by the European community as distinct from Spain. Her strategic significance came from her position in the Atlantic, including her Atlantic islands and her African colonies.

More to the point, it was the Azores that gave Portugal her bargaining power at this time in history. Negotiations for the continued use of the airbase in Lagens were a constant foreign relations issue during the planning and implementation of both the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Even the issue of looted German gold—so important to the United States—had to be sidestepped in order to ensure that the Lagens airbase would become and remain home to several thousand American military personnel.

This base was seen as critical to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, later, to N.A.T.O. defense planners. As such it was critical to not only have Portugal join N.A.T.O., but also to give her the military assistance necessary to strengthen her relatively weak defense forces. Consequently, the year 1951 witnessed first the

Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Portugal and the United States, followed shortly by the Mutual Defense Agreement. The former offered Portugal an infusion of much needed modern weapons, military equipment and training. The latter, ensured that the Lagens (Lajes) airbase would receive the necessary improvements so that American and, later, other N.A.T.O. forces including the newly American trained Portuguese aviators could use it

Portugal's Atlantic, African and Asian colonial possessions continued to remain essential to her during these N.A.T.O. negotiations. Right from the start, she insisted on clarification from both the United States and Great Britain regarding the defense of her colonies. She was given all assurance that even those possessions outside of the North Atlantic region would be protected in case of attack. It was only after these assurances were made that Portugal would proceed to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Portugal's national interests demanded the security, preservation and defense of her colonies.

By 1951, Portugal had supplanted the commercial, political and military assurances she had traditionally received through the Anglo-Portuguese alliance with a series of American initiatives. In doing so, both nations had made great strides towards extending their diplomatic relations. Not since the founding of the American Republic, had both nations engaged in direct negotiations that went beyond the issues of commerce and immigration. The Atlantic was their common ground. Its stability, and defense their common interests. This remains true to this day.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION:

COMMON GROUND—THE ATLANTIC

The purposes of this dissertation were two-fold. The main purpose of this dissertation was to offer an analysis of the paradigm shift in Portuguese-American relations from one of estranged tolerance to one of mutually beneficial alliance within the timeframe of 1941 to 1951. This study also argued that in order to understand the shift in Luso-American relations it was necessary to first examine the Anglo-Portuguese alliance because Portugal's foreign policy was rooted in the development of that alliance. Established with the Treaty of Windsor in 1373, the essential elements of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance are commercial, political, and military. In its six hundred year history, it has been renewed numerous times and invoked repeatedly by both parties. By 1951, each of these elements had been supplanted by a post-WWII American initiative--specifically the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Consequently, the shift in Luso-American

relations is not simply the case of Portugal--a small power--looking for protection from or acquiescing to the will of the United States--a big power. It is the result of Portuguese policy-makers realizing the limits of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance in fulfilling Portugal's national interests and making a series of decisions that then resulted in Portugal meeting her postwar goals

The Anglo-Portuguese alliance served Great Britain and Portugal well. Portugal's alliance with Great Britain seemed inevitable given their common geographic position along the Atlantic Ocean--both located along the western fringe of Europe. From the onset this position facilitated contact and, in particular, commercial exchange. It is clear that geographic location played a key role in the development of the Portuguese mindset. The long-standing dynastic rivalries between England and France, and Portugal and Castile, contributed to the development of close military ties. Consequently, although Portugal often sought to remain apart from European conflicts, more often than not her alliance to Great Britain made her a pivotal figure in Europe's most significant wars--the Hundred Years War, the Thirty Years War, and the War of Spanish Succession. Portugal's participation in these events was essential to her national development.

Before 1810, Portugal's long-standing association with Great Britain satisfied her foreign policy needs. The treaties, the marriages, the military action, and even the commercial ties all served to facilitate Portugal's foreign policy goals. At several critical moments in her history, Portugal's relationship with

England had secured for her both political legitimacy, international status and the protection of colonial empire—for example, the Treaty of 1661.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conflicting interests in Africa and grossly unequal international standing strained this long-standing alliance to the breaking point. This situation was particularly true from 1810 to 1910, from the Peninsular Wars to the establishment of Portugal's First Republic. Great Britain's prominence in Portuguese politics, both domestic and foreign, was such that this century has at times been referred to in Portuguese history as the "English Century." In an encyclopedic article published in 1963, Marcello Caetano went so far as to call Portugal a protectorate of England during this period. Though ideologically disparate, the governments of both the First and the Second Republic worked diligently to free themselves of this dependence. During the Twentieth Century World Wars, Portugal reasserted herself as a valued partner in the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, not simply a weak dependent. Indeed, it was only by the middle of the twentieth century that a new pattern emerged based on mutual respect, mutual interests, and once again mutual enemies.

Initially, relations between Portugal and the United States had everything to do with geography and commerce. The Atlantic Ocean served as a conduit for early contact between the two nations. America's trade network developed on the Atlantic Ocean and Portugal's Atlantic islands were an important part of that network. During the period of the Early Republic relations between the United States were stable. Whenever possible, Portugal assisted in the protection of

American merchant shipping. Yet, the eighteenth century did not witness an expansion of the diplomatic ties in large measure because of each nation's political ideology. America was a republic which, particularly in the western hemisphere, wanted to spread the ideal of liberty. Portugal, on the other hand, was a colonial power with a vast territorial possession in South America--Brazil. Indeed, Portugal recognized that spark of republican liberty in the region as a threat to her holdings. These differing political perspectives as well as differing commercial interests shaped the extent of their diplomatic relations and kept them at arm's length.

The tumultuous events of the early nineteenth century set the stage for the steady decline in Portuguese-American relations. The Napoleonic invasions of the Iberian Peninsula, the transfer of the seat of power from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, the elevation of Brazil from colony to kingdom, the forced return of the Portuguese monarchy to Lisbon as a constitutional monarchy, Brazilian independence, and the on-going conflict between Portugal (later Brazil) and Spain (later Buenos Ayres) over Montevideo and the Banda Oriental of the Plata River--all these events occurred within the first quarter of the nineteenth century and served to detract from the friendly development of Portuguese-American relations. Concurrently, in the United States, the consequences of certain actions taken during the War of 1812 overshadowed the goodwill that two decades of positive relations had created. One example of such an unfortunate event was the sinking of the *General Armstrong* in 1814 by British warships while moored in Horta. The inability of Portugal to protect foreign vessels in her own

ports coupled with her consequent unwillingness to make reparations left the American public, and her political representatives, with a dim view of the Portuguese.

This opinion did not alter with the radical events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While the United States had spent the better part of the nineteenth century focused on continental expansion, Portugal was focused on maintaining her own sovereignty and that of her colonial empire. Coming, as it did, on the heels of a regicide, American policymakers speculated whether or not Portugal's First Republic could be accepted as a legitimate government. Therefore, even though Portugal had joined that exclusive club of republics, it was not enough to gain the confidence of America.

Portugal's decision to participate in the Great War was as much a result of her desire for international recognition as her need to preserve her African colonies. After Great Britain invoked the alliance, Portugal entered the war. She fought in Flanders and in Africa. At the Portuguese tomb of the unknown soldier, visitors today can view the huge wooden cross that her soldiers carried onto the battlefields of Flanders. Riddled with bullets, it bears silent witness to Portugal's wartime sacrifices.

When faced with the prospects of a Second World War, Portuguese officials, particularly Salazar, took steps early on to evaluate the political situation and plan Portugal's wartime position. Her wartime goals reflected her national interests. First, Portugal hoped to uphold continental sovereignty. Second, she wished to maintain Iberian neutrality. Lastly, Portugal wanted to protect her

colonies. They executed this plan while in continuous collaboration with Great Britain and the United States. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance facilitated this coordination in part because it is a defensive alliance which does not oblige either party to act automatically. It must be invoked. Consequently, Portugal was able to maintain her neutrality even after the air raids of London began.

Prior to the German invasion of Poland, Great Britain and Portugal had decided that the best plan of action for the good of the alliance was Portuguese neutrality. Moreover, in line with British thinking, Portugal was to draw Spain into the circle of neutrals. This led to the *Iberian Pact*, followed by the *Protocol* which secured Iberian neutrality for the duration of the war in Europe. In the face of mounting pressure from German submarine hunting in the Atlantic, Great Britain asked for the creation of a new airbase in Lages, Terceira. Portugal obliged. Once built, Great Britain requested the use of it. After a relatively short period of negotiation, Great Britain was granted command of the airbase as well as access to a variety of other facilities in the Azores. Portugal was at ease with each of these decisions because these military considerations fell within the parameters of the "special relationship" that she shared with Great Britain. This base closed the air gap in the Atlantic. Its contemporary and future significance was understood by both the British and the American Chiefs of Staff. Finally, in this early phase of the war Portugal provided wolfram to Great Britain, the United States and Germany. She adroitly organized the sale of wolfram to the advantage of the Allies. The Germans had to pay in cash or kind whereas the British paid on credit. By the time of the wolfram embargo of 1944, Germany had

only received delivery of a third of the total wolfram supply. This was a definite blow to the German military-industrial complex.

Thus, as a neutral, Portugal had collaborated with the Allies in a series of actions that rendered positive results for the Allied cause. In effect, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance had served to further the interests of the Allies by giving Portugal the legal out she so desperately clung to when harassed by the Germans. This same alliance, however, had failed the Portuguese. More to the point, the loss of Portuguese Timor to Japanese forces in February of 1942 was a direct failure on the part of the British. Consequently, by 1944 Portugal was faced with a simple reality. From 1939 to 1944, Portugal had done her part to meet the needs of British.

Yet, from the start the British were unable to do the same. Again, Portuguese wartime goals were straightforward: continental sovereignty; Iberian neutrality; and preservation of empire. The 1939 British Military Mission had unequivocally concluded that they could not provide ground forces for the protection of continental Portugal in the event of war. Thus, in terms of British support, the first of Portugal's wartime goals was off the table before the war had even begun. Worse yet, the bungled Australian-Dutch operation in the Pacific theater in December of 1941 led to the Japanese attack on Portuguese Timor. The Portuguese were furious with Britain for several reasons. First, as a Commonwealth nation, Australia was presumed to act in close coordination with Great Britain. Second, earlier talks between Portugal and Great Britain indicated that something was about to happen in Timor, yet Portugal was kept in the dark

by her oldest ally. Finally, beside the obvious and needless loss of life and property in Portuguese Timor, a vital Portuguese wartime goal was compromised. This event was the catalyst for the shift in Luso-American relations.

For the Americans, this shift in perspective really began a year earlier with the signing of 1943 *Accord* for use of the Lagens airbase. Much to the surprise of the Americans that document made no mention of their use of the base. As with the negotiations regarding Iberian neutrality and the wolfram issue, the Americans had been content to allow the British to run the negotiations. In doing so they were trying to respect the six hundred year history of diplomatic relations between the Portuguese and the British. It was now clear, particularly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that this simply would not work. Concurrently, George Kennan, on staff at the American embassy in Lisbon, had come to the same conclusion. While Kennan worked to better diplomatic relations between the United States and Portugal and also secure American use rights at Lagens, Salazar seized this opportunity to bring the issue of Portuguese Timor to the forefront.

Ambassador Norweb was able to conclude those negotiations regarding use rights at Lagens on New Years Eve in 1943. After their conclusion, he immediately initiated negotiations for the construction of yet another aerodrome in the Azores on the island of Santa Maria. The vital difference in these talks is that they were direct Luso-American negotiations. Salazar insisted that the cornerstone of these talks be Portuguese participation in

the liberation of Portuguese Timor. The slow start to these talks seemed to stem from the fact that there was no political foundation from which to build this relationship. Instead, long talks between Kennan and Salazar, and later Norweb and Salazar, built a sense of mutual trust and understanding between these men where there had been none before. Ultimately, each party received exactly what they hoped for. Portugal, Great Britain and the United States simultaneously released statements to the effect that Portugal would in some way participate in the liberation of Portuguese Timor, and to that end an airbase would be constructed on the island of Santa Maria under the command of the United States.

At the end of the Second World War, the Portuguese and the British were still allies. There was no breach in diplomatic relations over the Timor incident. There was, however, a clear change in the world arena. The United States and the Soviet Union had emerged from World War II with differing world perspectives. The United States had two primary postwar goals. First, they wanted to help rebuild the European economy. Second, they wanted to keep the Soviet Union in check. In order to meet these goals the United States fostered three initiatives: the Marshall Plan; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Ironically, these plans, once applied in joint cooperation with Portugal, met the same elements as that of the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance—economic, political, and military.

The thought behind Marshall Plan funding in Europe was to rebuild the countries of Europe—friend and foe alike—to strengthen not only the economic

fabric of Europe, but also the political fabric. The reconstruction of the European economy was important for the American economy because of the strong commercial and banking ties between the two. Beyond these concerns, however, the economies of these countries were meant to be reconstructed so that the citizens of these countries would not fall prey to the tyranny of communism through acts of subversive revolution.

Portuguese participation in the Marshall Plan was limited in that they did not to apply for funds in the first year, but still participated as members of the O.E.E.C. The economic network that the Marshall Plan erected in Europe created a kind of commodities exchange system. In order for Portugal to trade in Europe she needed to participate in the Marshall Plan. In the second year of the plan she also received funds. What this did for Portugal was that it gave her commercial entrance into the European market from which she would have been excluded.

The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a marked evolutionary leap in American diplomatic thought. For the first time in American history, American politicians were willing to agree to a defensive alliance with not one but a variety of European powers. The United States now extended her security interests far beyond the western hemisphere to include Western Europe and the North Atlantic region. For Portugal, being a founding member of N.A.T.O. also satisfied one of her postwar goals. With the stroke of a pen, her political needs on an international level were completely safeguarded.

Finally, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was meant to facilitate the coordinated efforts of N.A.T.O. The weapons and training that the United States provided was to be used only for the purposes of meeting N.A.T.O. goals. The M.D.A.P. between Portugal and the United States gave Portugal the military support she had only dreamed of receiving from Great Britain. These planes and munitions were all top of the line. They had to be because again this was an extension of N.A.T.O. goals. Each of the member states had to be at a certain minimal level of preparedness. Portuguese servicemen also received training from their American counterparts.

By 1951, Portugal had supplanted the commercial, political and military assurances she had traditionally received through the Anglo-Portuguese alliance with a series of American initiatives. Portugal and the United States had made great strides towards extending their diplomatic relations. Not since the founding of the American Republic, had both nations engaged in direct negotiations that went beyond the issues of commerce and immigration.

The foreign policy of the New State was a success for Portugal throughout most of the 1950s. Portugal's membership in N.A.T.O. meant that military aid in terms of both arms and training would continue with dramatic results for Portugal's armed forces. This was important for Portugal in terms of her own military readiness, and all the more so later when her African colonies were in open rebellion. Domestically, this aid was also important for the Salazar regime because it allowed the New State to placate the Armed Forces. Without their continued support, the regime's future would have been uncertain or seriously

threatened. The critical nature of the career military's support of the dictatorship was demonstrated in the contentious 1958 Presidential elections campaign when Air Force General Humberto Delgado ran in opposition to the regime's candidate but was defeated in a rigged election. Essential to the defeat and eventual exile of Delgado was the career military support for the regime.

In December 1955, with American support, Portugal was finally admitted to the United Nations. Portugal's admission to the United Nations had complex consequences. On the one hand, the regime's opposition was unhappy about the international recognition United Nations membership signified for a Salazar-dominated Portugal. On the other hand, Portugal's membership in the United Nations exposed Portuguese rule over its African and Asian colonies to greater anti-colonial pressures which now could be brought to bear directly by the Soviet bloc and by the newly independent Asian and African members in the United Nation's session.

This period of goodwill began to change after 1954-55, when newly independent India applied great pressure to try to force Portugal to de-colonize "Portuguese India." Ironically, the same issue that had strained the Anglo-Portuguese alliance became the key bone of contention between Portugal and the United States. Colonialism or in this case, decolonization was the main issue of divergence for these two nations, reaching its peak in the 1960s. Beginning in 1958 Portugal began sending its newly trained officers off to anti-guerilla training camps. These camps were not in Great Britain, nor were they in the United States. Instead, they were in countries like Belgium and France. These nations,

like Portugal, had a vested interest in maintaining their overseas empires and fighting anti-colonial insurgents, particularly in Africa. Nevertheless, in 1959 both Belgium and France had decided to de-colonize their tropical African colonies, while France continued to fight a colonial war in their North African colony of Algeria.

While President John F. Kennedy embraced the ideal of self-determination as defined by the United Nations, Prime Minister Salazar rejected it and, instead, mounted armed resistance to it in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. African insurgencies began in Angola (1961), Guinea-Bissau (1963), and Mozambique (1964). Kennedy first tried offering aid, then political pressure to force Portugal to begin decolonization; neither caused Salazar to budge on the issue of empire. For his part Salazar, angered by what he viewed as American interloping in Portuguese business, refused to enter into serious negotiations to extend American base rights in Lagens after 1962. At the very last moment, Salazar granted American forces the right to remain until negotiations were concluded.

After the anti-colonial insurgencies began both the United States and the Soviet Union provided support to various African nationalist parties. As time passed this situation became all the more convoluted as the war in Vietnam led American officials to turn a blind eye to the use of N.A.T.O. trained Portuguese troops and arms being used to fight the anti-colonial insurgents in Portuguese Africa. As of the April 25, 1974 coup and Revolution, this war had lasted thirteen years. Luso-American relations had reached their nadir in the early years of the

Kennedy administration but beginning in late 1962 in United Nations' voting, the United States took care not to oppose Portugal openly on many colonial issues due to the need for continued American access to the Azores bases.

Base talks were not resumed until 1969, and were concluded only in 1971. By that time Richard M. Nixon was President and now sought to end the Vietnam War. In 1968 an ailing Prime Minister Salazar was replaced by Marcello Caetano. Portugal confronted yet another crisis of empire yet Caetano wanted to resume talks with the United States. Unlike Salazar, he wanted economic aid from the United States and felt that the base talks were a good point of departure for those negotiations.

Regardless of the increased diplomatic tension between Portugal and the United States over the issue of Portuguese decolonization, commerce and immigration continued between the two countries. Portuguese exports to the United States were small—a trend that remained true even after the end of the Estado Novo. Portuguese imports from the United States, particularly agricultural products, remained steady.

In 1990 Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island summarized Luso-American relations in these terms:

Today, Portugal and the United States, though greatly different in size, stand fully allied, joined by a transatlantic bond of common values and shared principle, a bond made all the stronger by the wonderfully constructive role that is played out by the Portuguese-American community. I am proud to regard myself as an honorary member of that community and as a dedicated friend of Portugal.¹

¹Mário Soares and Claiborne Pell, "Introduction: Portugal's Democracy," in *Portugal: Ancient Country, Young Democracy*, edited by Kenneth Maxwell and Michael H. Haltzel (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson center Press, 1990), 8.

The people of Massachusetts and Rhode Island share a special bond with Portugal and, in particular, with the Azorean archipelago. Early trade and whaling connections were strengthened during the first wave of Portuguese immigration, 1890-1920, when these communities played host to tens of thousands of Azorean immigrants. Due to strict immigration laws in the United States after 1921, this immigration stream decreased to a mere trickle. It was not until the late 1950s that this pattern would change.

Portuguese immigration to the United States began increasing after passage of the Azorean Refugee Act of 1958. Sponsored by Senators John O. Pastore of Rhode Island and John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, this legislation was initiated after a devastating volcanic eruption on the island of Faial caused extensive damage. It allowed some 1500 new non-quota visas to be issued to heads of families in Faial to immigrate to the United States. This was then followed by the Azorean Refugee Act of 1960 which allowed another 2,000 non-quota visas to be issued. These Acts resulted in the arrival of nearly twenty thousands new Portuguese immigrants to the United States, most of whom took up residence in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. On the heels of the 1960 Act there followed a revision of the immigration law of the United States, which resulted in a markedly increased number of Portuguese immigrants to the United States, particularly from the Azores. This number—over 226,000 as of 1990--has now nearly matched that of the first wave, 1890-1920.²

²Jerry R. Williams, *In Pursuit of Their Dreams: A History of Azorean Immigration to the United States* (Dartmouth, MA: University of Massachusetts, 2005), 110-111.

The Azorean Refugee Acts of 1958 and 1960 were beneficial to the Portuguese government in the short term for obvious humanitarian reasons. Nevertheless, in the long term these Acts also provided these islands with quite tangible relief from years of overpopulation and underdevelopment. Meanwhile, as a whole the Portuguese economy benefitted from the constant, increasing flow of remittances.

In the end, Salazar was able to follow through on most but not all of his postwar goals. Portugal's participation in the Marshall Plan allowed it access to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Portuguese trade in the European market has been much more significant to its economy than trade with the United States. European investment in Portugal has also been markedly more significant than American investment in Portugal.

In terms of military support, Portugal has reaped millions in grants and loans from the United States. Portugal's participation in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the Military Assistance Program, and a variety of other programs over the years has not only supplied modern arms to Portugal but, just as significantly, has trained her armed forces. Since the 1983 base agreement, Portugal has also received substantial economic aid. Part of that aid went towards the creation of the Luso-American Development Foundation which has fostered cultural exchanges between Portugal and the United States.

The one key failure of the Salazar regime in terms of meeting its postwar foreign policy goals was its inability to maintain the empire. Entrance into the United Nations did nothing to help Portugal secure her African or Asian colonies.

Renaming the colonies "overseas provinces" did nothing to placate U. N. critics of Portuguese overseas holdings. Beginning in 1954-1955, a newly independent India began supporting a campaign of passive resistance in Portuguese India. By and large this method failed until, in 1961, the Indian army invaded and conquered Goa, Damão, and Diu. Naturally, Portugal turned for help to her oldest ally, Great Britain, but she refused. India was part of the British Commonwealth and, therefore, Britain felt she could not render aid to Portugal. Although Salazar never recognized the legality of Indian action, these colonies were lost.

When the anti-colonial insurgencies began in Portuguese Africa, Portugal could not count on her N.A.T.O. membership to help her, as this was an internal issue not an external threat. Nor could Portugal expect help from the very agency that was promoting global decolonization, the United Nations. As mentioned above American covert action in Africa only served to further muddy the waters for Portugal. Thus, in Africa, Portugal fought a long, complicated and costly colonial war without an ally. Ironically, it is the consequences of these colonial wars that resulted in the coup that ended the New State regime.

The coup that took place in April of 1974, beginning the Carnation Revolution, resulted in a new system of government, new policies and a new constitution for Portugal. Between September 1974 (Guinea-Bissau), and November 1975 (Cape Verde, S. Tome/Principe, Mozambique and Angola), Portugal had de-colonized its African territories. The new democratic regime continued Portugal's ties within N.A.T.O. and improved relations with the United

States. With Portuguese assent, American armed forces under N.A.T.O., largely Air Force and Navy, have maintained their presence in the Azores to this day.

These good relations both prior to and after the Carnation Revolution have played a significant role in American foreign policy as well. This is particularly true in two instances in which Portugal has allowed American use of the Lagens base at two decisive moments. First, in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War as Americans gave critical aid to the Israeli armed forces. Second, in 2001 when the United States began its bombing raids over Afghanistan.

At the start of the Second World War, the decision to move away from a reliance on the guarantees inherent in the 600 year old Anglo-Portuguese alliance were well founded. While, British political, military and commercial strength was declining, Portugal still needed the assurances that she traditionally gained this alliance. Concurrently, the United States was emerging as a global power. By participating in key American initiatives, Portugal strengthened its diplomatic ties with the United States while also gaining those political, military, and commercial assurances that it recognized as fundamental to its survival. What the Marshall Plan rendered Portugal was the right to Most-Favored-Nation status with a number of European powers as well as the United States. This commercial relationship was necessary to Portugal's postwar economy. Being a founding member of N.A.T.O. offered Portugal greater international standing, recognition of her empire, and a strong defensive alliance. Finally, the M.D.A.P. increased Portugal's military capacity in every sense and at levels that the British would never have been able to sustain.

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