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Where the inchoate seeks form: Autobiographical curriculum inquiry in women's rowing

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WHERE THE INCHOATE SEEKS FORM:
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL CURRICULUM INQUIRY IN WOMEN'S ROWING

BY

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DISSERTATION

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

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in

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
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
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
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my best friend and partner in life, Fred Loucks, for making me laugh when I need it, and for helping me remember every day what it is that really matters.

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I am deeply grateful to Dr. Paula Salvio for her persistence and encouragement during the process of writing this dissertation. Paula challenged me, believed in me and helped me find the courage to take risks in my work. She was my professor when I walked in the door at the University of New Hampshire to take my first class, she has been there for me throughout the ups and downs of this long process and she has become a dear and valued friend.

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ABSTRACT

WHERE THE INCHOATE SEEKS FORM:

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL CURRICULUM INQUIRY IN WOMEN'S ROWING

By

Jennie Anne Marshall

University of New Hampshire, May, 2008

In 1976, four years after the Title IX act was passed by the Federal Government, a group of female rowers at Yale University attempted to reveal the university's discriminatory practices toward their team. On March 3, 1976, team captain, Chris Ernst, secured an appointment with the assistant athletic director Joni Barnett. Members of the Yale Women's Crew filed silently into the athletic director's office wearing sweats that said "Yale Women's Crew," then stripped to the waist, revealing the words "Title IX" written on their bare chests and backs. Chris Ernst read a 300-word statement (*New York Times*, 3/4/76) while a *New York Times* reporter took notes. Using archival data and the 1999 film, *A Hero For Daisy*, by Mary Mazzio which documents the Title IX protest at Yale University, I explore the rhetorical moves these women used when the conventional modes of address failed them. I identify and analyze the rhetorical tactics they used in order to contest the dominant ideologies about female athletes and to make a claim about the ways the university was discriminating against them by "exploiting their bodies" (Ernst in Mazzio, 1999). Through this

study, I draw on feminist studies, philosophy, composition studies and curriculum theory to pursue a set of concerns related to my work as an educator. What lessons does an exploration of the rhetorical tactics used by the women in this event offer educators committed to educational equity? How can we return subjectivity to curriculum studies, to research in education and to history? In particular, I am concerned with situations where issues of injustice go unrecognized and unaddressed because of the way that oppression is embedded into the available language and forms. I explore the ways historical and present power structures maintain narratives that “preclude a genuine public discussion that might advance the cause of justice”(Kastely, 1997). This dissertation is not an argument in the rational empiricist tradition; the trajectory of the work may not be clearly linear, nor clearly located in a disciplinary or theoretical territory. Like the rower, this research takes a path that is defined, but not definite.

PROLOGUE

I'm not sure of the moment that I knew I was falling in love with rowing. It could have been at the end of an evening practice on the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia, passing the Three Angels statue along Kelly Drive, the sun going down and the pinkish orange light making my hands, my arms, and the back of the woman in front of me glow. It could have been the first time I felt the boat "click," when I and seven other women, the oars and the boat all found the sweet balance of individual power and unified effort, allowing the boat to practically skim over the top of the water. I must have known pretty early in my first year, because I kept doing it, despite the raw blisters on my un-calloused hands, despite the freezing cold practices during our March break. I just know that once I found rowing, it became the place where I found myself.

In rowing, you sit facing the stern. You are looking backward as you are moving forward. With each pull of an oar you surge forward into space, but your eyes are locked onto the oars and bodies in front of you so that you can maintain a fragile attunement to the boat, the water, the oars and the others in the boat with you. The act of rowing in a shell with others is always a discovery, and always requires that you examine and critique your own place in the boat, and your own motions *in relation* to others.

Learning to row helped me to learn to think in this way. I learned, or I should say I practiced daily, a kind of thinking that required attunement to others,

to wind, water, breath, boat and to self. Rowing in a crew required of me that I keep open. I needed to learn to loosen my focus, so that I could see, and feel, and hear myself at the same time that I continued to see, feel and hear the world and people around me. This kind of thinking was new to me; it was scary, and full of possibility. And it was not easy. It took me forever and forever to learn to do it, and even then sometimes the harmony of that attunement might not even last for a mile on the river. But those moments when we all felt things click were powerful and it kept us coming back for more. That kind of non-duality was beginning to seep into my consciousness, and was changing me in ways that I couldn't name or even understand. Craig Lambert (1999), in *Mind over water*, describes what it means to be a practiced, or in his words "accomplished" rower.

A fine rower can keep the boat set up, or nearly so, even with unskilled crewmates. Accomplished rowers listen to both the boat and crew, then precisely answer the needs of the moment. In making their responses, they can summon a wide repertoire of adjustments . . . Thus, high level teamwork, even in something as synchronized as rowing, avoids homogeneity . . . In rowing, fast crews combine endurance, power, and perhaps finesse. Their diversity—including diversity *within* each athlete—is their strength (p. 101)

My first lessons in what I later came to know as feminist epistemology came in the rowing shell. I began to learn to try to think like my boatmates, so that I could understand what was needed in a certain situation. My community of rowers, as undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania and then later as members of the national team, was made up of women bringing a diverse set of needs, abilities, goals and desires to a shared project. We were literally all different, but in the same boat. We learned how to negotiate, to listen, to put forward suggestions and advocate for certain ways of doing things. Competition

was the ultimate form of collaboration. We would only go fast if we could do it together. Rowing allowed me to inhabit a body collective, to be a part of a group of women who individually felt a lack of power within the University of Pennsylvania, but as a collective could find a way to be heard in this male-dominated institution.

The project of rowing, and this dissertation project share common requirements; the characteristics of good rowers may prove useful for educators. I think the boundaries we are asked to negotiate and respect in rowing may offer some answers for educators. Lambert (1999) describes this negotiation in rowing:

In the shell we occupy a liminal area between sky and water, between carp and cormorant. The rower is both fish and bird – a flying fish, or else an aquatic condor with a staggering wingspan, skimming across the water's surface. Suspended between liquid and air, we inhabit a transitional zone that opens a window on mysteries hidden from those with solid ground beneath their feet. Sliding between dark and shadow, between sunlight and the obscure, is the region of discovery. Here the inchoate seeks form. Every area of creation has such a penumbra: venture capital, avant garde arts, courtship. In such crucibles, imagination creates the future (p. 15).

It is my hope that this dissertation will be the “region of discovery” for some of my questions about language, literacy, teaching, and learning. My approach to the research will be a form of reflexive inquiry, the kind of looking backward while moving forward that I have done in a rowing shell for many years.

Rowing

A story, a story!
(Let it go. Let it come.)
I was stamped out like a Plymouth fender
into this world.
First came the crib
with its glacial bars.
Then dolls
and the devotion to their plastic mouths.
Then there was school,
the little straight rows of chairs,
blotting my name over and over,
but undersea all the time,
a stranger whose elbows wouldn't work.
Then there was life
with its cruel houses
and people who seldom touched -
though touch is all-
but I grew,
like a pig in a trenchcoat I grew,
and then there were many strange apparitions,
the nagging rain, the sun turning into poison
and all of that, saws working through my heart,
but I grew, I grew,
and God was there like an island I had not rowed to,
still ignorant of Him, my arms and my legs worked,
and I grew, I grew,
I wore rubies and bought tomatoes
and now, in my middle age,
about nineteen in the head I'd say,
I am rowing, I am rowing
though the oarlocks stick and are rusty
and the sea blinks and rolls
like a worried eyeball,
but I am rowing, I am rowing,
though the wind pushes me back
and I know that that island will not be perfect,
it will have the flaws of life,
the absurdities of the dinner table,
but there will be a door
and I will open it
and I will get rid of the rat inside of me,
the gnawing pestilential rat.
God will take it with his two hands
and embrace it.

As the African says:
This is my tale which I have told,
if it be sweet, if it be not sweet,
take somewhere else and let some return to me.
This story ends with me still rowing.

Rowing by Anne Sexton, from The Awful Rowing
Toward God (1975)

INTRODUCTION

The Awful Rowing at Yale University in 1976

The image of Sexton's rower, exerting effort to overcome the friction of rusty oarlocks and a rolling sea, fighting the wind that is pushing her backwards, but continuing to row, despite the imperfections of the place she is trying to go, conjures images of another rowing event that took place the year after Sexton's poem was published. It was a cold March day in 1976, when twenty women went forward, into the offices of the Yale Athletic Department, to try to find a door that would open.

Four years after the Title IX Act was passed by the federal government guaranteeing equal opportunity for men and women at any institution receiving federal funds, this group of female rowers at Yale University attempted to reveal the discriminatory practices by the institution toward the women's crew. Although it might appear that these women occupied a privileged social position as students at the prestigious Yale University, they felt powerless within the institution when they resorted to conventional approaches for bringing their concerns to the administration: letters, petitions and meetings had not been effective in changing the conditions for the Yale Women's Crew. Their concerns were not being taken up by the administration at Yale University. Consequently, on March 3, 1976, the captain of the crew, Chris Ernst, secured an appointment with the assistant athletic director for women's sports, Joni Barnett. The nineteen

members of the Yale Women's Crew silently filed into the athletic director's office wearing their sweats that said "Yale Women's Crew" and they stripped to the waist, revealing the words "Title IX" written in grease marker on their bare chests and backs. Chris Ernst read a 300-word statement while Joni Barnett, the assistant athletic director, stood silent and a *New York Times* reporter, whom the team had invited to attend this spectacle, took notes. The speech reads as follows:

These are the bodies Yale is exploiting. We have come here today to make clear how unprotected we are, to show graphically what we are being exposed to. These are normal human bodies. On a day like today the rain freezes on our skin. Then we sit on a bus for half an hour as the ice melts into our sweats to meet the sweat that has soaked our clothes underneath. We sit for half an hour chilled... half a dozen of us are sick now, and in two days we will begin training twice a day, subjecting ourselves to this twice everyday. No effective action has been taken and no matter what we hear, it doesn't make these bodies warmer, or dryer or less prone to sickness. We can't accept any excuses, nor can we trust to normal channels of complaint, since the need for lockers for the Women's Crew has existed since last spring. We are using you and your office because you are the symbol of Women's Athletics at Yale; we're using this method to express our urgency. We have taken this action absolutely without our coach's knowledge. He has done all he can to get us some relief, and none has come. He ordered the trailer when the plans for real facilities fell through, and he informed you four times of the need to get a variance to make it useable, but none was obtained. We fear retribution against him, but we are, as you can see, desperate. We are not just healthy young things in blue and white uniforms who perform feats of strength for Yale in the nice spring weather; we are not just statistics on your win column. We're human and being treated as less than such. There has been a lack of concern and competence on your part. Your only answer to us is the immediate provision of the use of the trailer, however inadequate that may be. (Speech made by Chris Ernst before the Yale Assistant Athletic Director, May, 1972)

The rhetorical tactics employed by the women involved in this event transcend the text of this speech, through their use of the office of the assistant athletic director whom they call the "symbol for women's athletics at Yale

(location), through their use of the *New York times* reporter (multiple and invisible audiences), through their use of clothing, disrobing and the use of the female body as text (performance), unconventional citation of the law, and the through the use of multiple, but non-vocal participants in a demonstration of solidarity. The use of language in the short, 300-word testimonial speech, read by team captain Chris Ernst, both acknowledges and challenges the objectification the women face as female athletes at Yale. For example, the first line of the speech objectifies the women with the words, "these are the bodies," but in the next line, they appear as the grammatical subject of the sentence "we."

This event served as a catalyst for other women athletes, in public schools, colleges and universities across the nation to challenge the discrimination they faced and the weak interpretations of the Title IX law. Those who knew about the event understood that the importance of it was the fact that when the conditions for the women rowers and other athletes changed at Yale University as a result of this protest, things changed around the nation. And, although this event has been compared to some of the other iconic civil rights protests that have been well documented (John Kerry, in Mazzio, 1999), the Yale Women's Crew protest was preserved and reflected upon in the cultural memory only through word of mouth (Mazzio, 1999) until very recently.

More than twenty years after the protest, Mary Mazzio, also an oarswoman, made a film documenting this event. Her intention was to make a film that would not only document what she believed was an important protest at Yale University, but to challenge the images of women that permeate our culture,

hoping to offer her daughter, Daisy, a more positive image of women as a role model. She called the film *A Hero for Daisy* (1999).

I was a rower at the University of Pennsylvania from 1978 through 1982, and then later as a member of several US National and Olympic Rowing Teams where I had the opportunity to row with both Chris Ernst and Mary Mazzio. While I was an undergraduate, I felt the effect of the Yale event, and in the face of similar discrimination at the University of Pennsylvania, my teammates and I drew on the Yale women's experience as a source of inspiration and courage to voice our own claims of discrimination. The "women's" addition to the "men's" boathouse at the University of Pennsylvania in 1982 was, indirectly, a result of the protest that took place six years earlier at Yale University.

What interests me now about this event, "now, in my middle age," over thirty years later, is the way this event provides a fruitful site for the exploration of my own understanding of what it means to be a literacy educator and researcher, and to explore the mutually enabling and constraining effects of the kinds of literacy practices that are taught in schools. I draw on the work of Lorraine Code (1995) whose concept of "rhetorical spaces," provides me with a framework in which to situate this event in feminist philosophy.

In her book, *Rhetorical spaces: Essays on gendered locations* (1995), Code is looking for a philosophical theory of epistemology that takes subjectivity into account, to understand the "mutually enabling and constraining effects" of knowledge and power. She conceived of the term rhetorical spaces to locate and explore "the particularities of the spaces where knowledge and subjectivity

are reciprocally constitutive, yet where cognitive resources and positions of authority and expertise are unevenly distributed.” To contest the dislocated conception of objective knowledge and knowledge making, Code calls for something she call a “storied epistemology.” Code’s critique of the western, Anglo-American epistemology identifies the inadequacy of the dislocated, objective knower, and his conceptual apparatus for knowledge which relies on the *individual* autonomous exercise of reason cleaned of affect, embodiment, and human experience (Code, 2006). She calls for an epistemology that takes subjectivity into account for the knower and the known and she proposes a new kind of “conceptual apparatus” to do this, which she call a “storied epistemology” (Code, 1995). She explains that:

Stories shift epistemic inquiry from the lofty, extraterrestrial places that many theorist have claimed to occupy, into the localities, situations, and specific academic “disciplines” where people seek to produce knowledge that will make it possible for them to act well, in their circumstances, with the resources at their disposal (p. 158).

Instead of the voiceless process by which the conceptual apparatus of Anglo-American philosophy operates, Code is suggesting that telling the story of how knowledge is made avoids a split between theory and practice, keeping knowledge situated in context and emphasizing the importance of *both* the product and process of knowledge making.

Through a reading of the Yale Protest, the film *A Hero for Daisy* (1999), which documents that protest, and my own experience, I perform a method of curriculum inquiry that emerged in the 1970’s as response to what Madeline Grumet (1990) describes as “the anonymity of the quantitative research

paradigm” (p. 323). While currere at that time was focused on bringing back the biographical, or specifically autobiographical voice to curriculum studies, the method I am using could be called post-currere, in that I acknowledge the work in autobiographical studies that has been done in the last thirty years that troubles the notion of the fixed subject.

I explore the 1976 protest at Yale University to uncover some of the rhetorical tactics¹ used by marginalized members of an institution when faced with the limiting and structuring pressures that institution places on their use of language, oral and written, for making claims against the institution. James Kastely (1997) whose rereading of the ancients Plato, Sophocles and Euripedes allows us to situate the problem of the Yale Women’s Crew in composition and rhetoric studies. He takes up this concern with the failure of rhetoric, rather than the failure of the rhetor and by explains that these ancient thinkers were neither

¹I draw on Michel de Certeau’s *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1984) to categorize the rhetorical moves made by the Yale Women in their protest as “tactics.” Code explains that the purpose of her book, *Rhetorical Spaces* (1995), is to develop “an epistemology of every day life.” She explains: “My approach is to examine conditions for the possibility of constructing and using knowledge in analyses that move away from more common philosophical preoccupations with what ideal knowers ought to do, and move toward deriving normative principle from what real, variously situated knowers actually do” (p. xi). The terms used by de Certeau, “strategies and tactics,” lend themselves to Code’s approach. Both de Certeau and Code are interested in “everyday life.” Although their disciplines are different – de Certeau is a French historian, and Code is a North American Canadian feminist philosopher, and the “objects” of their study are seemingly unrelated – de Certeau’s is consumer production, including the signifying practices of representation, and Code’s is epistemological practices, the connections I have made by weaving their work into my own study of the Yale protest have informed my exploration of the event. Code is forging a distinction between analytic philosophy’s abstracted, “idealized knower” and the more contextualized “variously situated knower” that become some of the examples in her book. She is looking not at an institutionalized version of what knowers “ought” to do, rather she is interested in exploring and learning from what her contextualized knowers actually do. De Certeau draws a distinction between strategies and tactics, somewhat military terms, but useful for understanding the differences in approach. Strategies are used by someone who “belongs” to an institutions, who is located in a place of power and influence, and can be used for defining a relationship to an other. He explains that political, economic and scientific rationality area users of strategies. Tactics are used by those who are not located (i.e. variously situated) in powerful places, who must rely on something other than strategies to be “recognized” by those in power. “A tactic insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance.” (xix). It is the tactics of the Yale Women, the “variously situated knowers” at Yale University in 1976, that are the focus on my study.

opponents nor disciples of rhetoric, but thinkers worried about the role of public discourse. He explains:

Seen from this perspective, Plato and Sophocles appear more sympathetic to rhetoric than has often been acknowledged, and Eriepedes seems far from being an uncritical disciple. The issues engaging these three thinkers were not the problems of the corruption or incompetence of individual rhetoric but the more endemic problems of the way injustice is rooted in the very nature of language and of the way past and present operations of power effectively preclude a genuine public discussion that might advance the cause of justice. The point of these challenges was not to discredit rhetoric or to create a hierarchy of discursive forms but to deal with deep problems of injustice that did not respond to normal practical discourse. (Kastley, 1997, p. 3)

Kastley uses the history of rhetoric to explore the current moment in the field, what he calls the new rhetoric, which is “no longer attempting to develop a practical discourse for civic life but rather marking what it means to be a creature born into language” and he claims that the current linguistic skepticism and concerns for social justice that occupy the attention of composition and curriculum studies, were concerns for these three ancient thinkers as well.

But to understand the ways in which classical rhetoric can speak to a postmodern rhetorical theory, we need to turn not to the positive theorists within the classical rhetorical tradition but to Plato and the Greek tragedians, for, in their skepticism, they saw more clearly both the need for and the difficulties encountered by rhetoric. And it is their posing rhetoric as a philosophical problem that provides an opening for a productive dialogue between past and present (p. 3).

This connection between past and present linguistic skepticism and concerns for social justice situates the problem of the Yale Women’s Crew in multiple fields of inquiry: philosophy, composition and rhetoric, feminist studies and curriculum studies. The Yale Women’s Crew protest was an attempt to deal with the need

for and the limits of language, and therefore provides a specific location to explore ways of acting in a world in which the limits of language are inevitable.

The members of the Yale Women's Crew were human beings located in a specific historical time and space who wanted to engage their community in a process of reasonable and fair inquiry. Their community, Yale University, their inquiry subject, gender discrimination, and the specific location of time and space—1976, the athletic department at a formerly all male institution—came together to frame what Code (1995) refers to as a “rhetorical space.” Because of these kinds of specific structuring/limiting aspects of their rhetorical space, which included the recent matriculation of women at Yale University, the civil rights movement, the feminist movement, and the passing and interpretation of the Title IX Act, the possibilities for these women to get uptake and “choral support”² were slim. It was the means by which the women decided to challenge the “territorial imperatives” of their situation and the rhetorical tactics they used to get uptake and choral support that draws me to study this event.

How did Title IX relate to the civil rights movement and the feminist movements of the 1960's and '70's? What was it about the law that both brought these important initiatives for social change together, and caused more than 30-year struggle to extend and block its impact, particularly in athletics?

Title IX, Gendered Locations and Rhetorical Spaces

It is no accident that Sexton's poem, “Rowing toward God” serves as the epitaph for my dissertation project. Her protagonist, the rower, is now in her

²Code explains that she borrowed this term from Patricinio Schweikart, who used it in a presentation at the conference on “Knowledge, Gender, Education and Work,” at the University of Calgary in June, 1991.

middle age, but nineteen in her head. She is rowing a boat, engaged in a journey to find meaning, in God, in her life, but we know that when one is rowing, one faces the stern, or the back of the boat, as the front or the bow, is propelled forward by the motion of the oars. I too, spent hours and hours in boats, looking backward as I moved forward. I learned to navigate by using landmarks and indicators of things I had already passed in order to provide a steady course for my rowing endeavor. It was that experience in boats, on the women's rowing team at the University of Pennsylvania that introduced me to the politics of gender discrimination, the power of Title IX, and the complexities of using the law to make a discrimination claim.

Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 became law on June 23, 1972. The law was part of the civil rights statutes aimed at eradicating discrimination in our society (Davies & Bohon, 2007). Title IX targets discrimination based on a person's gender. It was just fifty years prior to its passage that women could not even vote. The law prohibits sex discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Thus, the law applies to virtually every school district and college in the United States. "It is a strong and comprehensive measure which . . . is needed if we are provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training for later careers" (*Cannon v. University of Chicago*, 1979, p. 704 n. 36). A Title IX action can only be brought against an entity such as a school or university. Title IX enforcement is the province of the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at the United States Department of Education. The pivotal language of Title X reads,

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance (20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000)).

The passing of this act meant that any institution receiving federal funds had to examine its practices in regard to gender discrimination. In both the regular and what is often referred to as the extra-curriculum Women could rely on citation of this law to attempt to open doors for themselves that had previously been closed because of their gender. Athletic departments were just one of the places where institutions would eventually feel the implications of Title IX; the impact of the law would extend to issues like access to higher education, career education, employment, sexual harassment and standardized testing, in addition to many other areas within educational institutions receiving federal funds (Title IX at 30, Report Card on Gender Equity, 2002). Since the law passed, interpretation and the means of implementation have been in dispute. For example, the Feminist Majority Foundation's web site explains:

under Presidents Reagan and Bush, the agencies in charge of enforcing the law dragged their feet. Then, in a 1984 decision, *Grove City v. Bell*, the U.S. Supreme Court gutted Title IX. In that ruling, the court said Title IX did not cover entire educational institutions—only those programs directly receiving federal funds. Other programs, such as athletics, that did not receive federal funds, were free to discriminate on the basis of gender.

That interpretation was answered three years later by The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 which “undid” the *Grove City v. Bell* ruling “by outlawing sex discrimination throughout an entire educational institution if any part of the institution received federal funding. In addition to the Act, the OCR [Office for Civil Rights] publicly renewed its commitment to ending gender discrimination,

calling Title IX a 'top priority,' and publishing a 'Title IX Athletic Investigator's Manual' to strengthen enforcement procedures."³

While the protest at Yale University took place over 30 years ago, and the conventional wisdom offers a rosy picture of the current status of the fight against gender discrimination in education, the issue remains relevant today. The National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education published a report in June of 2002 called "Title IX at 30: Report Card on Gender Equity" which paints an entirely different picture of the current state of gender equality in athletics and also in many other areas of education as well. Although there has been tremendous growth in opportunity and participation in women's athletics since the Yale Women's Rowing Team staged their protest, according to the National Women's Law Center, "discrimination against female athletes still exists and must be addressed by aggressive enforcement of Title IX. Women's and girls' participation opportunities, operating budgets and recruitment and scholarship dollars are still vastly lower than men's." (See the National Women's

³Some of the key players in the attempts to soften the impact of Title IX in athletics are familiar names: Senator Jesse Helms, for one, who was also a key player in blocking anti-discrimination laws meant to protect gay Americans, was one of several republican senators who were attempting to protect athletic departments from having to increase spending on women's sports in order to have "equity" with male sports. The *Grove City v. Bell* case was one in which a private institution, Grove City College, sued the Department of Education for a decision in which federal funds, in the form of federal Guaranteed Student Loans and Basic Educational Opportunity Grants, were withdrawn from students at the college because the school refused to sign an "assurance of compliance with Title IX." The case went to the Supreme Court which found that, although the school was indeed receiving federal funds through individual student grants, the compliance requirements for Title IX did not extend beyond the department in the institution receiving aid: in this case, the financial aid department. This finding meant that if an athletic department at any college or university did not directly receive federal funds, even if other department or programs in the institution did receive funds, that athletic department would not be held to the gender equity requirement of Title IX. It took an act of Congress, literally, to overturn that decision with the Civil Rights Restoration Act. Congress responded to the 1984 *Grove v. Bell* Supreme court ruling with this act, which restores the application of Title IX compliance to all departments and programs of an institution receiving federal assistance where *any* department or program in that institution receives federal assistance. Congress was forced to override a Presidential Veto of this Act by Ronald Regan, and when the legislation finally passed in 1988.

Law Center web site: <http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm?id=1582§ion=newsroom>, 2003). In ten key areas examined by the National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education in their *Gender Equity: A 30 Year Report Card* (2002), *career education* and *technology* have seen little progress, and *athletics*, *employment*, *learning environment*, *sexual harassment*, *standardized testing*, and *the treatment of pregnant teens* experienced some progress addressing some barriers, but more improvement is needed. Only two areas, *access to higher education* and *math and science*, were rated as having made substantial progress in eliminating gender-based barriers (NCWGE 2003 report card).

It is the process by which those barriers are addressed by the law, and the process by which gender bias is identified and addressed by the advocates of Title IX that tie the Yale Women's Crew Protest to work being done in curriculum, composition and feminist studies and philosophy on the knowledge, subjectivity, power relationship (e.g., Salvio 1997; Code, 1995; Kastely 1997). In rhetorical spaces where discriminatory practices are maintained, barriers are imposed that limit and structure participation: in sports, in specific aspects of education like math and science, and, as Code (1995) is attempting to address in her work, in the communal inquiry process that helps us to name the truth of a situation.

This project offers me a way of understanding the problems of access which, through literacy, language and power, informed the type of rhetorical tactics these highly literate women composed to claim the discrimination by Yale University, and to "tell their story" in a way that would allow them to be heard. They were in essence demonstrating their refusal to be made invisible, even if

they remained voiceless and objectified. In Chris Ernst's own words from the *A Hero for Daisy*, they were saying, in effect, "Yoo hoo, we're here and we're not going away" (Mazzio, 1999).

The use of the term rhetorical tactics comes from work of Michel De Certeau (1984) and although he doesn't use the term "territorial imperatives," he does explain that the conditions that make tactics necessary include spatial or institutional barriers. For the Yale women, their lack of a place, literally, to inhabit as athletes at Yale University was the impetus for the 1976 protest.

When the knowledge that is recognized in education is recognized by a narrow set of requirements, and if the purification of knowledge excises human experience, what rhetorical tactics are available for students whose practices and language use are located outside institutionalized norms? What rhetorical tactics are available to teachers and students whose practices are rendered invisible or seen as grotesque versions of the normative modes of address. In Chapter One, I introduce the method of *currere*. Drawing on the work of Douglass McNight, who uncovers the roots of *currere*, a seemingly radical approach to curriculum research in the 1970's, and ties it to the early American practice of *curriculum vita*. The development of the method in the 1970's was a response to the quantitative, objectifying approaches in the field of curriculum, and drew upon autobiographical and biographical data. I show how recent work in autobiography problematizes the notion of the "autobiographical I" resulting in an approach to *currere* that is sometimes referred to as "post-*currere*."

In chapter two, I perform a review of the literature, situating the problem faced by the members of the 1976 Yale Women's Crew in a philosophical, historical and feminist tradition. I cross disciplinary boundaries by drawing on the work of Lorraine Code (1995, 2006) in Philosophy, Pinar and Grumet (1976), McNight (2006) and Salvio (2007) in curriculum studies, Kastley (1997), Jung (2005) and Glenn (2004) in composition studies and educational theorists Delpit (2003), Ladson-Billings (1994), Purcell-Gates (1997) and others. I draw on an interdisciplinary critique of what is understood as the universal knower, detached from any context, devoid of any feeling, relying on a hyper intellectual conceptual apparatus that promises a proficient user uptake for any claim (Code, 2007), to explore the 1976 event and the rhetorical tactics used by the Yale Women's Crew to learn more about how people subvert "normal discourse" to challenge the oppressive master storylines and narratives of our educational institutions.

I further explore education, composition, teaching and learning in an attempt to return history to particular locations, users, and situations and attempt to avoid the seduction of dichotomous thinking that would lead us to believe that by taking subjectivity into account, we are denying any universalist value.

In Chapter 3, I perform another "step" in currere, which is to look backward; Pinar and Grumet (1976) call this the regressive step. I explain how I understand, and use, the notion of the archive to perform this regressive step, to learn more about the rhetorical situation of the Yale Women's protest. I discuss the importance of the archive as another kind of rhetorical space, and how this

study illuminated for me the complexities of (re)writing history through archival research. The film, *A Hero for Daisy*, the artifacts of the event and news articles that describe the event, and the story of Roderick Jackson, a high school girls' basketball team coach whose Title IX case went to the Supreme Court in 2005 serve as three sets of (auto)biographical narratives about gender discrimination in women's sports which all contain sediments of my own autobiographical experiences. This chapter both describes my understanding of "archive," explains the methods I use in the rhetorical space of the archive and lays out for me, and for the readers, the "data" that I will be using to analyze this event.

In Chapter 4 I perform the methodology of juxtaposition, placing the text of the testimonial speech next to the Roderick Jackson's testimony before the Supreme Court in Jackson vs. Birmingham, Alabama, School Board. By placing the testimonial speech from the 1976 protest next to the Roderick Jackson's Supreme Court testimony from the 2005 hearing, I illuminate concerns about making gender discrimination claims using patriarchal language and systems including the law, and the means by which the silencing of these claims can be overcome.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I read my (auto)biographical data: the synthetic step in *currere*. I analyze the event in Chapter 5, using data from the archives, the film and my own experience. These "abundant texts," the event itself and the film, allow me to consider rhetorical moves that the women used that we don't or can't quantify in the current climate of scientifically based approaches and randomized quasi-experimental design research. I explore the way these moves helped the

women both use and transform their subjectivity positions in the particular rhetorical space of the Yale University Athletic Department in 1976. In chapter 6 I show the way these moves exceeded their temporal and geographical rhetorical space through the film. I perform a close reading of the film, making connections between the rhetorical tactics used by Mazzio to document the story of the 1976 Yale Women's Crew Protest, and the rhetorical tactics used by the women themselves in the 1976 protest. I point toward the implications of my study in the final sections of this paper

CHAPTER 1

CURRERE: RUNNING (OR ROWING?) THE COURSE

I perform currere, in this dissertation, starting with the (auto)biographical data from the archives, the narrative from *A Hero for Daisy*, and weaving in my own experience of the experiences narrated in the film. I look back at the event and at Mary Mazzio's narrative of the event, and then move forward to my future teaching and studies in literacy. I pull those together into the present moment, through analysis, to synthesize the meaning for the present moment.

Thus currere refers to my existential experience of external structures. The method of currere is a strategy devised to disclose this experience, so that we may see more of it and see more clearly. With such seeing can come deepened understanding of the running, and with this, can come deepened agency. (Pinar & Grumet, 1976, p. vii)

In this chapter, I explain this methodology, its roots and how I will be using it in my study. I draw on the work of curriculum theorists to explain the method, its purpose, and what it responds to in curriculum studies and to trace its historical roots and to show how currere has changed in the last thirty years.

What is Currere?

Currere is a method of studying curriculum using autobiographical narratives as "data." It is a method that creates a dialogic relationship between specificity and generality, personal and social. The method was developed by Madeline Grumet and William Pinar (Pinar, 1975; Pinar & Grumet 1976; Grumet,

1981) in the early seventies as a response to the paradigm that viewed the curriculum as an object. Grumet (1991) explains that, "At first, the work was motivated by the desire to correct the anonymity of the quantitative research paradigm and to return to the complexity, specificity, rhythm and logic of the biographical voice to studies in education" (p.323). The reconceptualist movement in curriculum studies, rather than conceiving of curriculum as a map of the course itself, an object to be studied for its outcomes and results, came to look at curriculum as text, to be experienced, read, and interpreted. The study of curriculum, then, became not a knowledge producing text, with predictable and pre-determined outcomes, but a text for interpretation, translation, and application. Given this understanding of curriculum as text, the focus of curriculum studies shifts from a study of curriculum development and outcomes to a study of understanding curriculum, raising issues that, as Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman (2004) claim "are otherwise ignored." Those issues, they explain, include questions about ways of reading and writing curriculum, historically and in the present moment, and what analytic tools might be employed in the reading/writing of curriculum text. This use of the term "text" for curriculum carries underlying assumptions about the multiple and various discourses, language systems, traditions, histories, and politics in the field of curriculum studies (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery & Taubman, 2004).

The method takes its name from Latin, in the infinitive form of the verb *to run the course*. Curriculum as a noun means "race course" or "career" (Pinar, et al, 2004, p. 25). However, the *experience of curriculum*, what that experience

means to the student and the teacher, is a verb: not a thing, but a process. This conception of the curriculum resonates with a conception of literacy that is embraced by many progressive educators who conceptualize literacy not as a noun, a thing to get or have, but as a verb, *a thing to do*, a social practice (Dyson & Lewis, 2001; New London Group, 1996; Barton, Hamilton & Ivani, 2000).

Currere is curriculum experienced as both private and social practice.

While the method of currere and the focus on the study of the curriculum as text was revolutionary, this approach to understanding curriculum has historic roots in American education. Partly influenced by the work of John Dewey, currere is a method for understanding the experience of curriculum, defined by Dewey as where the content and the child meet. In his 1902 book *The child and the curriculum*, Dewey explains that we are too focused on an understanding of subject matter as “something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside the child’s experience” and he implores educators to “cease thinking of the child’s experience as something hard and fast; see it as something fluent, embryonic, vital; and we realize that the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process” (as quoted in Fletcher, 2000). Therefore, a scope and sequence, or a curriculum map, and studies of how best to parcel out information and sequence learning, miss the critical aspect of learning: the interaction of information and ideas and the person learning. While Dewey may not have questioned the more narrow definition of curriculum as knowledge separated into disciplines for a learner to master, he did “bring the concept of experience to the curriculum” (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, & Taubman, 2004).

The roots of currere can be traced even further back, however, before the turn of the century and John Dewey's influence. Douglas McNight, in his essay called "The Gift of a Curriculum Method: Beginning Notes on William Pinar," which appeared in *Curriculum and teaching dialog* (2006), explores the historical roots of Pinar's work in curriculum theory, and shows how, although from the current political perspective requiring scientifically based research in education that is replicable and generalizable, Pinar's method of currere offers nothing to the field, Pinar's work *does* offer an important alternative with roots in a tradition of understanding curriculum that takes the individual, or subjectivity, into account.

His curriculum theory does not seek such homogenization in service of social control, but rather pushes to the other side of the register. Pinar certainly attempts to generate data with which to ponder and understand educational existence. However, his data reveals idiosyncrasies, differences, singularities, or, in Derridean terms, incommensurability—all conditions to be handled and/or reconciled by the individual and not homogenized and formalized in a way that erases the existent concrete person. Pinar's work in autobiography and curriculum focuses on how the individual's particular and existential experience of curriculum shapes and guides one's race, class, gender, political, spiritual, and even economic perspective on and actions within the world. Pinar's research trajectory in curriculum does not fall within the fantasy of social control and reproduction of the dominant culture. But at the same time, it also does not steer radically away from certain functions that curriculum has served over the course of American educational history (discussed more below). In other words, Pinar's concentration on the individual does follow a possible curriculum path that, while currently not privileged, has before and can again be a legitimate means to understanding the nature and practice of curriculum (173).

McNight traces the roots of Pinar's work centuries back, to the Reformation and John Calvin's *Institutes*, in which Calvin used the Latin phrase *curricula vitae* as a description of the journey that an individual takes in response to a call from God

(McNight, 2006). This journey was meant to uncover one's calling, and demanded a certain kind of work, or study of self, to understand this calling.

Curriculum was not a part of the process. Curriculum, rather, was the intensive, rigorous, even empirical process of an individual studying his or her interiority in an effort to identify a purpose and meaning in life. In some ways, *curricula vitae* (italics added) was the act of listening to all of the competing voices within one's embodied existence and hearing and acting upon a particular call. Call (or calling) and vocation are significant in a discussion about perceiving curriculum as something beyond, for each generates obligations and responsibilities on the individual's part, as well as on the cultural institutions within which people dwell (McNight, 2006, p. 175).

The idea of *curricula vitae* found a home in early American history at Harvard, where the colonial Puritans promoted an education in which the individual focused on the private, through his spiritual relationship with God, and on the public through a study of academic and theological texts and with others. The "method" was to learn from the "course" or path set out in the spiritual autobiographies and biographies of their leaders (McNight, 2006). McNight explains, however, that "it was up to each individual to interpret and apply those writings to his or her particular historical condition and situation" (p. 176).

It is partially in this method of *curriculum vitae* in which Pinar's *currere* has its roots. *Currere* emerged from this notion education as a journey of discovery, a calling, made understandable and articulated through intensive study. This study consisted of both the individual's experience of the journey and the interpretation and application of content learning to that experience. The reconceptualization movement "returned" to this idea in the early nineteen seventies in response to an approach to curriculum theory which focused its studies on the mapping of a linear, step-by-step, uniform course for learning, and

which failed to take into account the complexity, contextuality and subjectivity of the process of becoming educated. Like Sexton's protagonist in her poem *Rowing* (1975), curriculum vitae is a journey to be closer to God, and to discover the meaning of one's own life in relation to God. It is the journey for meaning and the reflection on one's own life experience to find meaning that *currere* has in common with both Sexton's rower and Calvin's curriculum vitae. However, rather than embracing the Calvinist religious underpinnings for the theoretical foundations of *currere*, the reconceptualists drew on phenomenology, psychoanalytic theory, and existentialism, calling into question the nature of reality, the reliability of the empirical methods used for producing truth. The journey, then, becomes one of understanding one's own place in the present moment, how it is shaped by the past and present discourses surrounding it, and what it might mean for the future.⁴ The method to understand that reconceptualized curriculum became *currere*.

Unlike mainstream educational research which focuses upon the end products of the processes of consciousness as described by Husserl, those end products we call concepts, abstractions, conclusions and generalizations, we, in accumulative fashion, call knowledge. *Currere* seeks to slide underneath these end products and structures to the preconceptual experience that is their foundations. *Currere* is designed to act as the phenomenological epoche, slackening the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus bring them to our notice. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, quoted in Grumet, 1976, p. 41)

Currere serves as a method in curriculum theory to produce the epistemology that takes subjectivity into account, the storied epistemology (Code, 1995); it is

⁴James Kastely's book *Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition: From Plato to Postmodernism* (1997) performs a similar reflexivity in another field, as the author seeks to understand the relationship of present discourses in rhetoric and composition theory to historical discourses in rhetoric.

the method to compose a narrative of how the subject has come to know, and the narrative of how knowledge was produced.

The Method of Currere

The method that Grumet and Pinar (1976) developed to understand curriculum has four parts, or phases: they are regressive, progressive, analytic and synthetic. The “data” for the method was originally derived from a kind of free associative brainstorming about one’s educational experiences: the regressive stage. Those experiences become autobiographical narratives, which are then laid out for reflection. This form of reflexivity, looking back on one’s thinking, provides a historical context for the study. As more recent studies in autobiography have complicated the genre, calling into question the reliability of the subject, and the possibility of writing an “auto” biography, the method of currere has been complicated. The autobiographical narratives that serve as the data rely on the archive, a notion which Derrida (1995) has complicated and explicated by drawing on Freudian psychology and the etymology of the word *archive*, and complicating the “space” of the archive with notions of individual and cultural memory, a search for the origin of things and the law. I will return to this complication of the archive, and its relationship to (auto)biography and currere in the next chapter. However, this complication of the concept of archive involves cultural and personal memory, a concept that complicates what it means to write a “reliable” autobiography, and calling into question the “reliability” of the data produced using autobiographical narratives.

The tradition of autobiography carries with it certain demands of the genre that can make official forms of self-representation treacherous: the demand for a reliable “I,” a subject who stands for others; the demand for truth-telling; and the demand for evidence. These demands place autobiography into a frame of jurisprudence (Gilmore, 2001). One of the tools of the autobiographer is memory, and testing the reliability of memory is a difficult business. Further, for the writer(s) who is/are representing an autobiography of trauma or social injustice, the discursive means by which to represent trauma are inadequate. While the testimony of trauma demands a listener who can bear witness, the location of autobiography within the frame of jurisprudence puts the listener in a position of judge, and the speaker in a position where the veracity of an untellable story is, by definition, in question and in need of evidence. If memory, that unreliable tool, is where the speaker is finding evidence, she can never be a reliable speaker, and she is in danger of never having her story heard by one who will listen. Gilmore (2001) writes:

. . . I have shown how autobiography functions as a judicature, how self-representation exists within a juridical frame through mechanisms of judging and assessment, which inform its production of knowledge. Testimony names both a discursive demand in self-representation and the knot of resistance with which it contends: one is both abjured to speak and exposed to scrutiny, but the demand may be met with some degree of agency. In this context, not writing an autobiography can mark a movement toward an alternative jurisdiction within an enlarged frame of justice (p. 43).

Gilmore explains that, when the autobiographical narratives push the subject into the position of unreliable speaker, telling the story is dangerous. Paula Salvio’s book, *Teacher of weird abundance* (2007) draws on the this

(auto)biographical mode for a biographical exploration of the teaching life of Anne Sexton, and an exploration of Salvio's own teaching life. Madeline Grumet, who wrote the foreword to the book, explains that Salvio's approach has enlarged the earlier approaches she and Pinar outlined for *currere*.

At that time, we argued for autobiographical narratives as a form that could express the complexity of teaching, the way it is rooted in personal and social history, the way it gathers up our hopes and relentlessly requires us to play out the compelling issues of our lives in classrooms, day after day. Each of the methods we suggested involved a form of distancing from the story told, so that we might see how the ways that we constructed this work of teaching were saturated with past experience, ideology, personal desire and self justification. It was the analytic reading of these narratives that generated the most information. In choosing to make the teaching life of Anne Sexton the Figure of this study, and her own autobiographical associations part of the analytic background of her interpretation, Paula Salvio has created a remarkable generative form for the analysis of teaching and curriculum. Taking the work of this brilliant poet as one instance of teaching, Salvio reveals the links that connect Sexton's teaching to the rest of her life. And as she explicates these themes of loss and reparation, narcissism and courage, she situates them so well in social history and psychoanalytic theory. (Grumet, in Salvio, 2007, pp. x-xi)

While this complication of autobiography has implications for understanding the rhetorical moves the Yale women chose in their protest, I draw on the work of Salvio and Gilmore to show how the story of the Yale women, and the film *A Hero for Daisy* are the "not autobiographical" autobiographical narratives that I draw on in my regressive phase of *currere*. I am creating a counterdiscourse for myself in writing my autobiographical narratives, and pushing the normative definition of autobiography to the limit, by drawing on texts that are "not autobiographical" forms of self-representation.

The problem of memory, and the ways in which the autobiographical "I" stands for others is complex in relation to my own connection to the story of the

Yale Women's Crew protest. I sometimes feel like I was there, like I watched the spectacle of these women contesting the limits of official discourses, rivaling the conventions of autobiography, and challenging the power structures within the Yale Athletic Department and Yale University. While I was not physically present in that office on that campus, the event and the film *A Hero for Daisy* do represent my experiences in an uncanny way, both as a rower and then later as a mother. I have been in that gendered location and I have felt the struggle to say that which cannot be heard. The story of the Yale women and my own stories inhabit my work as a literacy educator and researcher and problematize the ways in which I am complicit in passing on literacy practices that are decontextualized from their histories, their politics, their limits and the bodies that use them.

The Regressive Step

For my study, the (auto) biographical narratives are captured in the artifacts from news articles and information I've found online, from the film *A Hero for Daisy* and in the text of the testimonial speech which Chris Ernst read during the protest. By pulling together this set of (auto)biographical narratives I perform the process of "archivization" (Derrida, 1995): that is taking the sediments of the particularities of lived experience, pulling them together in one place and making them accessible to others for the purpose of finding something generalizable and "worth knowing" in them. The rhetoric of the event, the artifacts, the film all serve as the data for (auto)biographical experiences I shared with Chris Ernst and the Yale Women's Crew, and which was shared by other

female athletes and oarswomen of that generation and for many of those that followed. What I perform, in this dissertation, is a kind of “post currere,” built on the original method and complicated by the postmodernist problem of a single, unified subject and the impossibility of a true *autobiography*. The film, *A Hero for Daisy*, is in many ways, someone’s autobiographical narrative. It is Mary Mazzio’s own narrative of the biography of her hero, Chris Ernst, but Mazzio performs an (auto)biographical narrative for a collective of female athletes and rowers through the narration of Chris Ernst’s life experiences as a female athlete/rower, and by the ways in which Chris Ernst’s story is Mary’s story is my story.

The Progressive Step

The second step, or phase of currere, is the progressive step. After this generative phase of representing one’s past experiences, the next step is to look forward, to imagine what might be.

One thinks of the future . . . Since our interest is what we are calling educational experience, gently bring attention back to matters associated with our intellectual interests, your career, and allow your mind to work free associatively . . . If a teacher, focus on your teaching, on your relationship to students and to colleagues, especially on the emotional content of these, and on the intellectual content. Discern where these appear to be going. (Pinar & Grumet, 1976, pp. 58-59)

My intellectual interests, and my career, involve literacy. I imagine a pedagogy that values the subject of learning, without devaluing the objects of learning. I imagine a literacy that is mutable, and takes its shape from its users as its users learn about its shape. I imagine research that values the “outliers” in statistics, and colleagues with the courage to engage in the complicated, and

sometimes frightening conversations about all of this. This imagining is part of how I came to be studying the rhetorical moves of the Yale Women's Crew, currere, and the archive.

The Analytic Step

The third step is analytic: the student is placing the artifacts and data from past and future outside of herself for examination. The phenomenological roots of currere influence the use of the concept of "bracketing," the distancing of oneself from lived experience in order to reflect upon it, and to "produce knowledge grounded in the lived experience of the subject" (Grumet, 1976; van Manan, 1984). Pinar describes the data from the past, future and present moments as "photographs" to be placed next to one another, in order to uncover their complex, multi-dimensional interrelations, and to discover how the future emerges in the past, the past in the future, and the present in both (Pinar, 1994).

In this present moment, I am writing a dissertation in which I am both learning about an historical protest, about composition and curriculum and about my own subjectivity(ies) in relation to history, curriculum and compositions studies. I am writing a dissertation in which I am demonstrating my understanding of who I am in this moment as a teacher and researcher. Studying the Yale Women's Crew protest offers me a rich text by which to learn something about what it means to be a member of an institution, a marginalized member of an institution, and an educated person. But the complex connections to my own experience, and to how I was and how I continue to be influenced by that 1976 protest at Yale University offer me a way to understand how I have experienced

my own education journey. Although perhaps not consciously, I have tested the authors and researchers I have studied against something I learned from the Yale Event that I had not yet articulated. Conversations with professors and fellow students have been haunted by the inchoate knowledge the Yale Event produced for me. When the film *A Hero for Daisy* came out in 1999, that which was absent was made present to me; the importance of that event in a private sphere became more clear, even if still very complicated, in terms of my understanding of my self, my longings and frustrations. Just as the current movement in education for objective, standardized approaches was gaining momentum, the importance of that event was becoming clearer to me in terms of the public space in the field of curriculum studies and composition.

How I read the event as a text, in my looking backward, which I will perform in Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation, is influenced by the present moment, by what is happening in education in the current moment, and by the future, in which I imagine a different kind of public/private relationship with scholarship, teaching and learning. The “photographs” that Pinar describes in *currere* look like this: in the past we see one snapshot of the Yale Women standing before the assistant athletic director, chests bare and bearing “Title IX,” and one with me, standing at the door of the University of Pennsylvania Boathouse, wanting to go inside for shelter, water and warmth but not welcome. In another there are images of women in boats rowing silent in perfect synchrony attuned to each other, the water, the boat, the wind, all breath and power; and the photographs of the future, a student, a teacher, a researcher and a policy

maker with heads together engaged in a conversation about what learning has been, and what it might be. The photograph of the present moment, me with eyes blank, at work with teachers, brows furrowed, over a set of numbers representing the scores of students' performance on the last test, and another with a picture of a building in Washington, DC, with Secretary Spelling there telling us what we should be doing, thinking and saying in the classrooms and institutions of higher education.

The Synthetical Step

Pinar explains that in the synthetical step, the student puts the photographs aside and looks at herself to ask, "What is the contribution of my scholarly and professional work to my present? Do they illuminate the present? Obscure it? What conceptual gestalt is finally visible?" (Pinar, 1994) In a traditional study, the final chapter is implications for the field. While I will consider the implications of my study for the field, I will be also considering the implications for myself, a teacher/researcher/student of the field. The following chapters will continue the synthesis process toward a conceptual gestalt, which I hope to uncover and make visible for myself and for my readers.

CHAPTER 2

USING THE LANGUAGE OF THE CRIMINAL

I recently sat with my daughter as she struggled over an essay for her high school English class in which she was to respond to one of the arguments made by Jamaica Kincaid (1988) in *A Small Place*. My daughter struggled with which argument to choose, with her own position—would she agree or disagree—and how to approach this essay. As we talked, it became clearer to me that she wasn't lacking an opinion or a sense of her own thinking, but rather the experience of reading that story was unsettling. Kincaid's direct address, in particular and the details of her complaints put cracks in the foundations of my daughter's thinking. While she had trouble taking a position on what Kincaid was claiming about tourism and slavery, colonization and internal oppression, my daughter was able to articulate the fact that the experience of reading *A Small Place* illuminated some of the invisible assumptions she'd held, and some of the absolutes of her white middle-class Can-American world were placed into question. Finally, she chose one argument to respond to. She started with the following quote in which Kincaid (1988) articulates the problem of how to shift the master narratives and move foundational thinking:

. . . for isn't it odd that the only language I have in which to speak of this crime is the language of the criminal who committed the crime? And what can that really mean? For the language of the criminal can contain only the goodness of the criminal's deed. The language of the criminal can explain and express the deed only from the criminal's point of view (pp. 31-32).

My daughter disagreed with Kincaid's position that the language of the criminal can only express the deed from the criminal's point of view because Kincaid's rhetorical tactics, her mode of addressing the reader, among other things, expressed more than the goodness of tourism and colonialism for my daughter. Her rhetorical tactics allowed her to "dismantle the master's house using the master's tools' (Lorde, 1984) But Kincaid's concern with language resonates with the problem of the members of the 1976 Yale Women's Crew and with concerns I have as an educator who is "making people literate."

Consider some of the narratives around writing, past and present, from the perspective of some of the marginalized members of our educational systems. To inform our readings of these educational narratives with the words of Kincaid, and to consider what it means to write in the language of the criminal, or the oppressor, or the master allows for a different kind of reading of these narratives. For example, in 1975, people were asking why students couldn't write and what's happening to English in our schools?

If your children are attending college, the chances are that when they graduate they will be unable to write ordinary, expository English with any real degree of structure and lucidity. If they are in high school and planning to attend college, the chances are less than ever that they will be able to write English at the minimal college level when they get there. If they are not planning to attend college, their skills in writing English may not even qualify them for secretarial or clerical work. And if they are attending elementary school, they are almost certainly not being given the

kind of required reading material, much less writing instruction, that might make it possible for them eventually to write comprehensible English. Willy-nilly, the U.S. educational system is spawning a generation of semiliterates (Sheils, 1975, p. 58).

Are these students really semiliterates? Could students be choosing some other kind of English because this “ordinary, expository English” is really not as benign and neutral as that phrase suggests? And consider a contemporary narrative about the writing of students in schools.

In 2002, between 24 and 31 percent of the students in each of the three grades [4,8,12] performed at or above the *Proficient* level. Fourth and eighth graders made overall gains since 1998 in reaching the Proficient level. There was no significant change detected in the percentage of twelfth-graders at or above *Proficient*; however, the percentage of twelfth-graders at or above *Basic* decreased since 1998. (US Department of Education, 2002)

What does it mean to be Proficient? Or Basic? Certainly this data must be capturing something about students and their writing abilities, but what could it be leaving out? How are we asking them to use a language that may or may not feel like the language of the criminal, one that can express things only from the criminal’s point of view?

The first passage came from an article entitled “Why Johnny Can’t Write,” which appeared in *Newsweek Magazine* on December 8, 1975, just a few months before the Yale Women’s Crew protest, marking what some people felt was a crisis in American education, particularly in literacy. Almost thirty years later, the US Department of Education’s National Assessment of Educational Progress issued a “report card” for the results of the writing assessment. While the language describing the state of writing is different in the two passages, the

message is similarly critical of what students are learning about writing Standard English in U. S. schools.

The Yale women, members of an elite private institution, had top grades and top SAT scores, and excelled academically achieving at a level that would allow them to compete for spots as undergraduates at Yale University. They would have most likely been in that 24 to 31 percent of American students at or above *Proficient*. They had proved themselves capable of performing on the presumably objective measure of knowledge and literacy, and would not have been considered “semi-literate.” When faced with a situation where they were not being recognized, however, they resorted to a text that exceeded the conventions of expository English, and comprehensible prose. Because of the rhetorical space the women found themselves in at Yale University in 1976, conventional forms of language failed them. In this chapter, I situate this problem of the members of the Yale Women’s Crew in a larger historical context drawing on the literature from curriculum and compositions studies, feminist studies and philosophy. I cross disciplinary boundaries to situate in a theoretical, historical context this issue of the structuring and limiting conditions that prevent speakers from getting uptake.

Rhetorical Spaces, Gendered Locations

My study is located in the “text” of an historic event, the Yale Women’s Crew protest. I found myself interested in this event for multiple reasons. First, the story of this event is, in many ways, my own story. I rowed, I came of age as an athletic female in the 1970s when women were struggling to redefine their

place in society, in educational institutions and on the playing fields. I also attended an Ivy League school which had only recently opened its doors to women and, like many of the Yale Women, I had obeyed the rules of the education game; I internalized the messages about what it means to be an educated person, a literate student, and performed the demonstrations of that self on the requisite tests, the SAT, the schools transcript and through the college admission process. I “passed” as literate, in the same way these women “passed” as literate and educated. They would not have gained admission to Yale University, an exclusive private school with a competitive admissions process, and which had only seven years before opened its doors to women, had they not been good readers, writers and thinkers.

And yet, the conventional rhetorical strategies used by these educated young women, failed them. James Kastely (1997), in his book *Rethinking rhetoric: From Plato to postmodernism* takes up the concern of many postmodern thinker, and one that was important for the Yale women: when language fails, what is the cause and what can be done? Kastely recognizes that modern conversations in rhetorical studies are not necessarily new ones. He traces these concerns with the limits and failures of language back to the ancients: Plato, Sophocles, and Euripedes.

The problem of rhetoric’s failure is further examined by a growing body of scholars studying the rhetorical practices of those who rejected conventional modes of address, and because of what Code has referred to as “territorial

imperatives,” and Kastley (1997) calls “the injustices rooted in language,” they have developed “other” rhetorical practices. Cheryl Glenn (2004) writes:

Those of us trained in rhetoric have most likely learned the history of rhetoric, that history of aristocratic, agonistic, and, most of all, eloquent males. In the last fifteen years, however, that history has been unsettled and transformed by the inclusion of “other” rhetorical practices and theoretical contributions. White and nonwhite women and men of nearly every social class and theoretical stripe continue to be written into the rhetorical tradition (p. 150).

These “other” rhetorical practices often emerge in response to the constraints of rhetoric when power and resources are unequal. When the constraints of their specific context of Yale University in 1976 for female student-athletes made it difficult for them to identify the discriminatory practices of the athletic department to the institution, the women on the rowing team in 1976 invented a mode of address, which actually involved “undress,” to both contest the discriminatory practices of the institution, and the limits of the “language of the criminal.” Being a female athlete at Yale, no matter how literate and educated you had proven yourself to be, rendered your voice unheard, your claims not taken up, your interests invisible, particularly when your voice was being used to challenge the institutional norms.

In *Rhetorical spaces: On gendered locations* Lorraine Code (1995) explores the role of subjectivity in relation to knowledge. Knowledge and subjectivity have been treated, or understood, in the western tradition of analytic philosophy as mutually exclusive concepts. Knowledge and knowledge making (telling, producing— the verb itself is tricky) has been understood as an objective process, made by a person without an identity, in a location without a context.

This knowledge, then, can be universally transferable to all people, in all places. What Code attempts to do is interrogate an understanding of the relationship between knowledge and subjectivity, specifically by attempting to explore specific subjects and locations where knowledge is being made. The language that situates her work, she explains, “picks up a late twentieth century concern with location: with territories, mappings, positionings where resources are variously enacted, and identities are constructed and continually reconstructed in the enacting...” (p. 1). Feminist philosophers in particular have taken up a concern with “location” in their work, and the tropes that enable inquiry into the importance of context and the relationships between public and private domains (Rich, 1984), situated knowledge (Haraway, 1991), and standpoint epistemology (Harding, 1991), for example.

In her 1995 book, Code’s project is specifically concerned with the relationship between knowledge and subjectivity that Anglo-American theories of epistemology have neglected to address. Code addresses what she calls the “multiple enactments” of knowledge and subjectivity, and “their mutually enabling and constraining effects—in legitimizing and discrediting structures of late twentieth century western societies” (1995). The Yale women experienced these multiple enactments of knowledge and subjectivity at Yale. On the one hand, they were members of the institution, which they signified in their protest by wearing the Yale Crew sweats. On the other hand, they were somewhat unwelcome, members of the institution, female objects, which they signified by their naked chests.

Code pulls poststructuralist notions of a mutable, shifting subject into the field of epistemology to show how subjectivity and power function in different context in the production of knowledge. The work of her book is to contest the idea that knowledge is indisputable, neutral, and “objective.” Code (1995) is challenging the notion that knowledge can be understood and analyzed as “a single and presumably self-contained utterance pronounced by no one in particular and as though into a neutral space.” The concept of neutral and objective knowledge has a corollary; the means of producing and claiming knowledge is tied to language, therefore language, too, is must be neutral and objective.

Objectivity and rationality, and the ideal truth that are produced through them, assume a knowledge that is made by interchangeable subjects who are abstracted from the particularities of their circumstances. That assumption has had the effect of masking the links between power and knowledge that inform hierarchical social structures (Code, 1995). The unmasking of this relationship in knowledge making has been addressed by educational theorists studying language and literacy. For example, in *The silenced dialogue: Power and pedagogy in educating other people’s children* (1993), Lisa Delpit named the “culture of power” in the classroom, and the effect is has on African American children who do not learn the language and culture of power in their homes. She defines five aspects of power:

1. Issues of power are enacted in classrooms.
2. There are codes or rules for participating in power; that is, there is a “culture of power.”
3. The rules of the culture of power are a reflection of the rules of the culture of those who have power.
4. If you are not already a participant in the culture of power, being told explicitly the rules of that culture makes acquiring power easier.
5. Those with power are frequently least aware of—or least willing to acknowledge—its existence. Those with less power are often most aware of its existence. (Delpit, in Weis & Fine, 1993)

Delpit goes on to explain that the first three are now “basic tenets in the literature of the sociology of education” but the last two are areas that need to be addressed. The assumption that knowledge is made by and taught to, interchangeable subjects who are abstracted from the particularities of their circumstances renders invisible the culture of power in Education. By locating those assumptions in particular context—the whole language classroom for African American children—she problematizes the objectivity/knowledge relationship in Education. She explains:

My guess is that the white colleagues and instructors of those previously quoted [in the essay] did not perceive themselves to have power over the non-white speakers. However, either by virtue of their position, their numbers, or their access to that particular code of power of calling upon research to validate one’s position, the white educators had the authority to establish what was to be considered “truth” regardless of the opinions of the people of color, and the latter were well aware of that fact. (Delpit, in Weis & Fine, 1993)

In *The skin that we speak* (Delpit & Dowdy, 2002), a range of theorists in the field of education begin to examine their experience of rhetorical spaces and the role of “spoken skin” there. The interchangeable knower of Anglo-American Philosophy has no skin because, as Code explains, this autonomous man of reason’s “hyperintellectual philosophical practice relies on an excision of affect,

embodiment, and the modalities of human experiential specificity.” Speaking one’s skin might suggest something autobiographical, something embodied, something affective, and the interchangeable knower cannot account for these things. What these theorists do, then, is to embody the speakers and knowers about whom they write, and by doing so, challenge the often unspoken assumptions about who can know, what can be known, and the practices by which knowledge is made. Skin, gender, and class all become part of the territorial imperatives in the rhetorical spaces of knowledge production.

In her essay, “I ain’t writin’ nuttin’: Permissions to fail and demands to succeed in urban classrooms,” Gloria Ladson Billings (2002) addresses the ways African American students are oppressed by these territorial imperatives such as language codes, cultural norms, and rigid notions about the process of becoming an educated person. She explains that students who resist literacy assignments may be experiencing “the alienating effects of education where school-based learning detaches students from their home culture.” (Ladson-Billings, in Delpit & Dowdy, Eds., 2002, p. 111). She explains that culturally relevant pedagogy is a theoretical construct that rests on three propositions: (1) Successful teaching focuses on students’ academic achievement; (2) Successful teaching supports students’ cultural competence; and (3) Successful teaching promotes students’ socio-political consciousness. She maintains that academic achievement represents intellectual growth and the ability to produce knowledge” and that in order for students to interrupt the pattern of positions that blame students lack of success in schools on a lack of effort, they must “develop a sense of mutuality

and reciprocity toward others with whom they share cultural solidarity” and to ask “questions about how schools and the society work to expose ongoing inequity and social injustices” (Ladson-Billings, in Delpit & Dowdy, 2002). Ladson-Billings attempts to address the issues of oppression in the rhetorical spaces of school and classroom through a focus on pedagogy. Her work is an attempt to educate and arm teachers with tools to acknowledge and work with the kinds of differences that exist in classrooms. Both Delpit and Ladson-Billings attempt to address through this concept of a culturally sensitive pedagogy the problem of uptake and choral support that Code explains is denied in certain rhetorical spaces.

While the concepts around culturally sensitive pedagogy are useful for situating this notion of territorial imperatives and the postmodern curriculum theorist or compositionists notion of the problem of language, the appeal of Code’s work for me is her poststructuralist approach. She defines rhetorical spaces as not fanciful or fixed locations. Like Delpit and Ladson-Billings, I am interested in exploring the problems of difference in these rhetorical spaces, and the ways that difference can result in oppressive practices, which is what draws me to feminist philosophy, the reconceptualists in curriculum theory and postmodernism and feminism in composition studies. However, the idea of a fixed cultural location upon which culturally sensitive pedagogy appears to rest is problematic to me. The subjectivity that feminist theorists are bringing to the table is not fixed; the location of the subject is mutable. For Code, and others, the subject is positioned in context, in a rhetorical space, and experiences the

territorial imperatives within that space, but the rhetorical space, the territorial imperatives and subjectivity are never fixed. Culturally sensitive pedagogy appears to be based on an assumption of a fixed subject, and predictable rhetorical spaces and territorial imperatives. Poststructuralism shows how a subject and the spaces and conditions in which the subject speaks are mutable, and it is because of that mutability that Code (1995) is calling for a different kind of epistemology, one that challenges the status of an “interchangeable knower” and the universal truths he produces, Jung (2005) is calling for a revisionary rhetoric and Pinar (1976) is calling for a reconceptualized curriculum theory. The concept of a cultural solidarity that remains fixed and predictable enough on which to rest a pedagogy depends on an underlying affiliation with an epistemology that assumes universality and interchangeability of knowers and the known. While I share the concerns from which the concept comes, and while I do not claim to have an approach that will solve the concerns, culturally sensitive pedagogy appears to be based on underlying assumptions about universality and interchangeability that are problematic from a poststructuralist, feminist perspective.

The scholarship of Victoria Purcell-Gates involves the issues of language, literacy and power for an Appalachian family in “. . . As soon as she opened her mouth!”: Issues of language, literacy and power (Purcell-Gates in Delpit & Dowdy, 2002).

A fourth-grade teacher grinned up at me knowingly as she condemned a young mother: "I knew she was ignorant just as soon as she opened her mouth!" This teacher was referring to the fact that Jenny, the mother of Donny, one of her students, spoke in a southern mountain dialect, a dialect that is often used to characterize poor whites known variously as "hillbillies," "hicks" or "ridgerunners." As this teacher demonstrated, this dialect is strongly associated with low levels of education and literacy as well as a number of social ills and dysfunctions. And sure enough, Donny, the child of parents who could neither read nor write anything except for their names, was failing to become literate in school as well. (Purcell-Gates, in Delpit & Dowdy, 2002, p. 125)

When their home cultures differ from the dominant culture that is valued in school, students and their families are positioned as deficient. The language dialects and codes mark the speakers, whether African American or Appalachian, as "ignorant." The marking of ignorance, the language and cultural differences that are read in certain rhetorical spaces structure and limit the possibility for uptake and choral support, and reduce the expectation that these marked speakers can have of being heard, understood or taken seriously (Code, 1995). The "skin that we speak" is tied to subjectivity; it helps both mark and define one's subjectivity in a certain place and time. Schools and classrooms are rhetorical spaces in which power attaches to language, and for some, as soon as they open their mouths, the capacity for uptake and participation in knowledge production ceases—not because they don't know, but because they can't say what they know in the ways that those in positions of power can or will hear them. The power/knowledge/subjectivity relationship structures and limits who has the authority and position to participate as knowers in schools, classrooms and institutions of higher education.

Language and culture are some aspects of the “territorial imperatives” in rhetorical spaces. Gender, as the title of Code’s book suggests, is another kind of territorial imperative. There has been much work in Education around the role of gender and knowledge in the classroom. David and Myra Sadker (1995) have researched, published on and advocated for gender equity in the classroom. Their influential book entitled *Failing at fairness: How our schools cheat girls* challenged educators to examine practices in classrooms and schools around the framing of gender, opportunity and participation in areas like classroom “talk time” and text book portrayals of girls and women. Carol Gilligan (1982) and Annie Rodgers (1992) explore the role of “voice” in understanding and assessing what female students can know. Gilligan explains that girls need to be understood, “to bring one’s own inner world of thoughts and feelings into relationship with the thoughts and feelings of others” and the need is a pressing one for “girls who fight for authentic relationships and who resist being shut up, put down, turned away, ignored.” But, Gilligan asserts, the pressure to be “the perfect girl,” is often too much to bear for many young women. They struggle with wanting to give voice to what they know, yet when that knowledge is a challenge to the dominant culture, or the status quo, they fear the conflict that may ensue, and fear losing themselves.

At the intersection between political resistance and psychological resistance, at the time of adolescence, girls’ psychological development becomes indelibly political. If girls know what they know and bring themselves into relationships, they will be in conflict with the prevailing authorities. If girls do not know what they know and take themselves out of relationship, they will be in trouble themselves. The ability of girls to tell it from both sides and to see it both ways is not an illustration of relativism

(the abandonment of absolute truth) but rather a demonstration of girls' understanding of relationship raised to a cultural level and a provisional solution to a difficult problem of relationship: how to stay connected with themselves and with others, how to keep in touch with themselves and the world. (Gilligan, in Weis & Fine, 1993, p. 164)

Gilligan rallies female educators to “join the resistance” and to support young women as they begin to experience and understand how power/ knowledge and subjectivity are linked. The fear that girls face when they take themselves out of relationship to “know what they know,” is another of the aspects of the territorial imperatives in Code’s rhetorical spaces. Gilligan’s rally to join the resistance may be another way of saying that young girls (and others) need choral support and uptake as they begin to participate in epistemic communities and those in more powerful positions, here women teachers and other adults, have a responsibility to join them.

By locating her discussion of this complicated set of relationships with/among/between knowledge/power/subjectivity in particular locations and using specific examples, Code identifies the ways that stereotyping operates as the infrastructure in rhetorical spaces to “structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can be voiced” in those locations and the kind of uptake an audience might have for that utterance in that location. Delpit and Ladson-Billings are just two examples of the curriculum scholars who address the kinds of stereotyping that take place in classrooms between teachers and students because of skin color and cultural differences (Butt, 1988; Deyhle 1986; Weiss 1983). The Sadkers, Gilligan, Rodgers and many other scholars identify ways that gender contributes to stereotyping (Belenky et al, 1988; Miller, 1988,1992;

Grumet 1988,1990; Pagano 1990,1992). Purcell-Gates reveals the stereotyping that language and discourse differences can promote.

Code (2006), herself trained as an analytic philosopher, is drawn to the concepts of ambiguity and skepticism because of their productive potential for bridging what she calls the divide between Anglo-American and Continental Philosophy which is, she explains:

. . . integral to the self definition of Anglo-American philosophy, with its emblematic figure in the autonomous man of reason whose control over his own bodily and intellectual processes are legendary and whose status as an interchangeable knower acquire content from a conceptual apparatus of which the central pillar is a form of ideal objectivity in knowledge and morality, possible only through the *individual* autonomous exercise of reason His hyperintellectual philosophical practice relies on an excision of affect, embodiment, and the modalities of human experiential specificity as essential to deriving rational normative theories of knowledge and action (p. 224).

Code's critique of Anglo-American philosophy brings to mind Parker Palmer's critique of a competitive and individualistic worldview that is held by some educators and education policy makers, which he has referred to as a "bloodless epistemology" (1993). (See Palmer's *Change: Community, conflict and ways of knowing to deepen our educational agenda.*) He is calling for a way of relating community and learning, particularly in colleges and universities. Palmer explains that how we learn is related to how we know, and that there is an ethic to how we know.

I do not believe that epistemology is a bloodless abstraction; the way we know has powerful implications for the way we live. I argue that every epistemology tends to become an ethic and that every way of knowing tends to become a way of living. I argue that the relation established between the knower and the known, between the student and the subject tends to become the relation of the living person to the world itself. I argue that every model of knowing contains its own moral trajectory, its own ethical direction and outcomes(2003).

I am drawn to Palmer's work, and to Code's theories of epistemology because they allow me to uncover the conceptual frameworks about knowledge that were embedded in many of my educational experiences as a student and a teacher. I began to see what had influenced some of the beliefs I held about knowing, learning, teaching and human relationships. Parker's "bloodless epistemology" and Code's description of Anglo-American philosophy's "man of reason" have given me language to name what I have been struggling to learn more about as a literacy educator. What does it mean to be a knower? To be literate? What role does affect have in, language use, literacy and the process of learning?

Code shows the value of ambiguity, or skepticism, in a theory of epistemology and moral philosophy because of its potential for disrupting the lack of affect and moral accountability that she, and many other feminist philosophers find problematic, even oppressive, in the analytic philosopher's truth-testing conceptual apparatus driven by reason, logic, objectivity, and autonomy. Palmer takes that interest in disrupting the lack of affect and moral accountability into the academe, where many of us teach and learn, engaging in relationships with other people around this thing called knowledge. Kastley (1997) explores the roots and value of skepticism in rhetoric and Pinar and Grumet (1976) engage in a more skeptical approach to curriculum theory. These scholars, and the

educational narratives that are part of my history, including the Yale Women's Crew protests, have caused me to examine literacy pedagogy, to question the lack of affect and moral accountability in some of the current conversations about reading, writing and learning, and to trouble the certainty of the objective, scientific methods for researching reading and writing.

Code introduces the concept of rhetorical space to frame her critique of the "hyperintellectual practices" which do not take into account affect, embodiment and human experience and which, according to Code, participate in an oppressive practice of essentializing and rendering invisible the realities of everyday life.

Rhetorical spaces, as I conceive of them here, are fictive but not fanciful or fixed locations, whose (tacit, rarely spoken) territorial imperatives structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can be voiced within them with a reasonable expectation of uptake and "choral support": an expectation of being heard, understood, taken seriously. (Code, 1995, p. ix)

In *Rhetorical spaces*, Code explores and complicates this knowledge/subjectivity concern in a number of situated examples and across a number of rhetorical spaces where gender operates as one of the factors that determine who can speak, who will get uptake, and how one will be heard. The use of Code's term, rhetorical spaces, to explore the specific locations of knowledge production, ties her exploration of the subject/knowledge/power relationship to issues that have been, and are currently being explored and contested in literacy. Rhetoric, text, language use, voice, context and their relationship to the power/knowledge/subjectivity relationship are currently issues for literacy educators.

Code's analysis shifts the location of the discussion about knowledge and subjectivity; "the view from nowhere" that partners with the concept of universal truth is no longer an acceptable or epistemically responsible location. Code takes her work on epistemology to the local, not the universal places where knowing affects subjectivity and subjectivity affects knowing, where power and authority are always uneven, and where the narratives about knowledge, subjectivity and power circulate in ways that determine what and who can know and be known. The study of the Yale Women's Crew Protest is a study of the local, not universal place where knowing affects subjectivity and subjectivity affects knowing, where power and authority were uneven and where narratives about knowledge, subjectivity and power were circulating in ways that structured and limited the ability for the members of the Yale Women's Crew to be recognized.

Territorial Imperatives

Code identifies the concept of "territorial imperatives" which operate in these theorized location to "discipline" speech and knowledge production by structuring and/or limiting what can be claimed or voiced with a reasonable expectation of uptake and support. Kastley claims that Plato, Sophocles and Euripedes were taking up something like Code's territorial imperatives, and their inevitability. What causes a rhetor to fail to deal with problems of injustice through "normal practical discourse (Kastely, 1997)? And what are the territorial imperatives that affect the knowledge/power/subjectivity relations (Code, 1995) in these instances?

One of the projects of this paper is to return to history, to look backward to the Yale Women's Crew Protest to attempt to learn about the rhetorical tactics used by the members of the Yale Women's Crew to disrupt the territorial imperatives of that rhetorical space and the narratives that limited their ability to get uptake. Lorraine Code explores "gendered locations" in particular to explore territorial imperatives. Code's gendered locations resonate with Michel de Certeau's *propre* (1984), which he explains is a place which "can be circumscribed and . . . thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it" (p. xix). For those who are members, for those who have the power and authority of that institution or that particular rhetorical space behind them, it is possible to use strategies to negotiate and make knowledge claims there. De Certeau (1984) explains that within these spaces/places, strategies are the means by which a "subject of will or power . . . generates relations with an exterior distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, "clienteles," "targets," or "objects" of research)." For the Yale women, the strategies available to Yale University students who are assumed to be subjects of will or power were those conventional modes of address: the letter, the meeting, the petition. Merrill Sheils laments the lack of instruction in this kind of "comprehensible expository English" in the 1975 essay, *Why Johnny Can't Read?*

The territorial imperatives that Code identifies through her examples in the essays of the book also surround the book itself. Code (1995) herself finds that within the discipline of analytic philosophy and epistemology, the strategies available to her for making her inquiry about knowledge, power and subjectivity

part of the “mainstream” of philosophical inquiry fail her. She explains that “it is as much about privileged access as about theoretical positioning” (p. 191). There are territorial imperatives in the discipline out of which and into which this book is written. These essays do exist on the pages of a book by a feminist philosopher, written to contest a way of thinking in philosophy, specifically in epistemology, that has been oppressive to women and others. Binary oppositions like mind/body, reason/emotion, theory/practice, objective/subjective that are associated with analytic philosophy and its sub-discipline, epistemology, serve “to produce and maintain the regulative ideals of present-day epistemology” (p. 191). It is their alignment with the male/female dichotomy that results in oppression as a result what Code calls “the positive valuation for the first term of the pairs and the negative valuation for the second” (p. 191). This is the first example of the kinds of territorial imperatives that Code explains operate in rhetorical spaces. Territorial imperatives are written and unwritten rules about speech, behavior, bodies, positions and power that govern the space Systems of control are limiting and structuring, here by exclusion, the kinds of discourses and behaviors that count as epistemology. Non-conforming discourses and behaviors will result in exclusion, invisibility, and lack of access. The excessive bodies of the female athletes, the non-conforming discourses and behaviors of the Yale women’s rowing team were resulting in exclusion, invisibility and lack of access. It was the rhetorical tactics used by the Yale women that disrupted the systems of control that limited and structured discourses and behaviors, in order to be are recognized within the institution against whom they were lodging a

complaint. Like Kincaid (1988) in *A small place*, the language of the oppressor becomes transformed through invention and a certain avant garde use of it. Although the Yale women were mostly white, upper class and well-educated members of a privileged community, they were also female undergraduates at an institution that had only recently, and with resistance from alumni and faculty, accepted women. They were marginalized others in a land that was occupied and dominated by men.

Code is suggesting that categories of subjectivity are never simple or unified (female/male, black/white, educated/uneducated, powerful/oppressed), and the stereotyping that maps into rhetorical spaces is not fixed. It happens *in relation*, and *in a context*, and becomes a part of the (mutable) territorial imperatives that determine rhetorical authority, and make subjectivity integral to knowledge. -Being an undergraduate at Yale University meant that the members of the Yale Crew had access to certain kinds of privilege and power, but to be a muscular, athletic women resulted in being stereotyped as excessive and non-conformist.

Knowing Other People Well

In one of Code's readings of a rhetorical space, she uses the example of a character from May Sarton's (1973) book, *As we are now*. The protagonist, Carolyn Spencer, is stereotyped as a crazy old lady, demented, unable to function properly. Code (1995) explains that her keepers have not shown "respect-for-persons" in their treatment of her because they "seem to be irresponsible in failing to make any attempt to know Miss Spencer for who she is,

despite her fluctuating personality and sense of self. She is simply a patient, who must fit into the routine and conform; a category who, thus categorized, can be forgotten as a person” (p. 101). The members of the Yale Women’s crew felt the territorial imperatives about “fitting into the routing and conforming,” to be women in a certain way. Although women had been allowed into this prestigious educational institution in 1969, the categories that sustained routines and promoted conformity were operating powerfully on women, and other minorities at Yale University and other colleges and universities around the country at that time? (See <http://www.arachives.upenn.edu/histy/features/sports/basketball/big5/wideman/wideman7.html> for an account of the experiences of African American writer and athlete John Edgar Wideman at the University of Pennsylvania in the 1960s.)

This problem of putting people into categories that sustain routines and promote conformity is addressed by a number of contemporary educational researchers who describe a variety of ways that students find themselves categorized and stereotyped in their educational settings (Delpit 1988; Ogbu 1990, 1997; Purcell-Gates 1995; 2005; Solorzano & Yasso 2001). The results of this kind of stereotyping in schools is acting out, alienation or shutting down. But the impact of stereotyping does not just affect the one being categorized. Code (1995) explains that stereotyping contributes to sloppy understanding and a rush to certainty.

The problem and the paradox about stereotypical characterizations is that they are often useful and sometimes, in fact quite, accurate. But they are more problematic than they are useful. Cultural, racial and sexual stereotypes are crude epistemological tools which fail to

fit all but a few cases... Stereotypes are morally troubling in that they are damaging to the person stereotyped, and corrupting for the person who does the typing. They contribute to the illusion that things are summed up, understood, and under control. Hence they produce a cognitive and moral laziness on the part of those who employ them: a practice of not bothering to know well, and to act accordingly (p. 101).

One of the problems of education is to both acknowledge the student and foster the uniqueness of each individual while also making sure students who are typically marginalized also have access to power. Hilary Janks (2000) describes the problem, which she calls the paradox of access, this way:

How does one provide access to dominant forms, while at the same time valuing and promoting the diverse languages and literacies of our students and the broader society? If we provide students with access to dominant forms, this contributes to maintaining their dominance. If, on the other hand, we deny students access, we perpetuate their marginalization in a society that continues to recognize the value and importance of these forms. This is what Lodge (1997) refers to as the 'access paradox'.

Members of the Yale Women's crew found themselves in a situation where they both had access to power and were marginalized. They understood and could use dominant forms, but were marginalized because of their gender. Janks raises an interesting paradox for literacy educators; if pedagogy is focused on teaching students dominant forms, Delpit's (1992) "language of the master" in order to ensure that they might have access to power, it perpetuates the dominance of the master. If pedagogy is focused on acknowledging the varied and non-conformist languages and literacies of students, it perpetuates their marginalization.

Difference is objectified and marginalized in the rhetorical spaces of analytic philosophy, classical rhetoric and curriculum studies, when rationality is

the privileged discourse and objectivity is the privileged cognitive location; under these circumstances, the potential for objectifying others is troublesome. Code (1995) explains that

Women—and other “others”—are produced as “objects of knowledge— as— control” by “S-knows-that-p” epistemologies and by the philosophies of science/social science that they inform. When subjects become objects of knowledge, reliance upon simple observational paradigms has the consequence of assimilating those subject to physical objects, reducing their subjectivity and specificity to interchangeable, observable features (p. 44).

Code is taking up a concern of feminist researchers about “the view from nowhere” in science and social science research. It is this “view from nowhere” that inform the current conversations in education; for example, scientifically based reading research draws on a similar conceptual apparatus for knowledge production to the one Code critiques. The rigorous, systematic and objective procedures to obtain valid knowledge relevant to reading development, reading instruction, and reading difficulties demand objectivity and reproducibility. (See <http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/gui/states/index.html#reading> for definitions of Scientifically Based Reading Research (SBRR). This dislocated “objective” cognitive location of the researcher and the objectification of that which is under study have been challenged by feminist scientists and social scientists.

Ruth Behar (1996), a feminist, cultural anthropologies who writes about research methodologies advocates a researcher position that she calls the “vulnerable observer,” which is also the title of her book *The vulnerable observer: Anthropology that breaks your heart* (1996). She explains how the work of other

feminist researchers contributed to her understanding of what feminist research is.

Feminist writers with the academy have devoted a considerable amount of energy to reflection on biography and autobiography, and the difficult questions of how women are to make other women the subjects of their gaze without objectifying them and thus ultimately betraying them. The rethinking of objectivity being carried out by feminists who study the sciences - among them Evelyn Fox Keller, Sandra Harding, Donna Haraway and Hillary Rose—as likewise put at the top of the agenda Devereux’s dream of doing social science more subjectively so it will be more objective. As Sandra Harding puts it, ‘the beliefs and behaviors of the researcher are part of the empirical evidence for (or against) the claims advanced in the results of research. This evidence too must be opened up to critical scrutiny no less than what is traditionally defined as relevant evidence.’ Or, in the words of Donna Haraway, “Location is about vulnerability; location resists the politics of closure, finally” (pp. 28-29).

Theorists in a variety of disciplines are calling for a vulnerable knower who takes subjectivity into account—both the subjectivity of the knower and the subjectivity of the known. Many feminist philosophers contest the belief that “epistemologists need only to understand the conditions for propositional, observationally derived knowledge . . . and the belief that epistemologists need only to understand how such knowledge claims are made and justified by individual, autonomous, self-reliant reasoners” (Code, 2006). Theorists taking up this problem in composition studies frame the concern around creating a revisionary rhetoric that listens for what is not said (Jung, 2005). In curriculum theory, scholars using *currere* and *post-currere* (Casemore, Salvio 2007) embrace a methodology that resists closure and attends to the vulnerability of location. The vulnerability of location and its resistance to politics of closure allow for ambiguity, interpretation and a different kind of knowing. In the current moment, the master narratives around literacy research, and the reading and writing of students in schools leave little

room for ambiguity and interpretation. The students in our classrooms who find themselves outside the norm, unable to produce or demonstrate knowledge in the rhetorical spaces of our educational institutions are rendered invisible or grotesque.

These theorists suggest that this different the kind of knowing takes subjectivity into account—knowing other people well. Code (1995) identifies the importance of knowing other people responsibly and well as a means by which to approach the problems of stereotyping and the relationship between knowledge/subjectivity and power. The problem of knowing other people well is not simple; knowledge of other people can “risk creating its objects in its own image,” for example. While Code (1995) claims that it is important to know other people well and act responsibly toward them, she is not naïve about the difficulties in knowing others.

I have said that I regard some version of respect for persons as a fundamental moral imperative, and have suggested that attempts to fulfill it invoke a set of cognitive imperatives which center around questions about what it means to know another person, and how it is possible to do so well enough to engage in responsible interactions with that person. The constant interplay of opacity and transparency (or semi-transparency) that marks people’s efforts to know one another, and indeed that permeates efforts to achieve an interim sense even that one knows oneself, shows that these questions admit of no easy answers. Recognition of the extent to which a person’s identity and sense of self at any point in her/his history is shaped by fluctuating circumstances, both “subjective” and “objective,” makes it clear that any responses articulated will at best be tentative. But in view of the violations that merely stereotyping people enacts, there is no doubt that more responsible knowledge has to be sought, however tentative and corrigible it may be, and however ephemeral the notion of a fixed or impermeable identity has become in consequence of postmodern demonstrations of the instability of what hitherto has passed for unified, transparent, self-certain subjectivity (p. 87).

Postmodern and poststructuralist theorists across the disciplines recognize the Other as subject, and not object. Acknowledging one's own location as knower rather than posing as an objective knower in a dislocated context is a question of epistemic or pedagogical responsibility. In fact, Code (1995) claims that

although the ideal objectivity of the universal knower is neither possible nor desirable, a realistic commitment to achieving empirical adequacy that engages in situated analysis of the subjectivities of both the knower and (where appropriate) the known is both desirable and possible (p. 44).

Educational theorists have addressed the issue of knowing other people well through multiple areas of inquiry. Delpit and Ladson-Billings' work on racial issues in education names a way of taking subjectivity of students into account through "culturally sensitive pedagogy" which is meant to avoid racial stereotyping by "communicating across cultures and in addressing the more fundamental issues of power, of whose voice gets to be heard in determining what is best for poor children and children of color" (Delpit, in Pinar 2004, p. 334).

Knowing other people well within this conceptual framework entails a process which goes beyond the "normal" and privileged processes for the production of scientific knowledge that entail quantifying and observing objects and controlling for variables (and limiting variability). Knowing other people entails an openness, a disposition of inquiry that is about both self as subject/object and other as subject/object. Knowing others well "requires constant learning: how to be with them, respond to them, act toward them" (Code, 1995, p. 46). Knowledge, of other people and of the world, is clearly "qualitatively variable" when drawn from the kinds of situations where people

have to learn to know. Therefore, knowing other people is always about *learning* to know.

This knowledge, knowing other people well, relies on different types of data and on a different type of interpretive process than standard, Anglo-American epistemology has privileged. It requires a kind of listening, an attunement to self-other relationships which some educational theorists have explored (Moss 2005; Qualley 1997). In her 1997 book *Turns of thought*, Qualley describes a kind of thinking she calls reflexivity. “By reflexive, I mean the act of turning back to discover, examine and critique one’s claims and assumptions in response to an encounter with another idea, text, person, or culture” (p. 3).

In the prologue to this study, I drew on Craig Lambert’s description of what it means to be an accomplished rower to describe how my approach to this project was influenced by my participation in the sport of rowing. Lambert’s explanation of the accomplished rower defines this sort of attunement that is required to take subjectivity into account in schools, classrooms and other educational settings. Epistemic responsibility requires knowing other people well; knowing other people well requires attunement and responsiveness. While Lambert’s (1999) description is in the context of rowing, his description of this process is useful for settings in education:

A fine rower can keep the boat set up, or nearly so, even with unskilled crewmates. Accomplished rowers listen to both the boat and crew, then precisely answer the needs of the moment. In making their responses, they can summon a wide repertoire of adjustments... Thus, high level teamwork, even in something as synchronized as rowing, avoids homogeneity . . . In rowing, fast crews combine endurance, power, and perhaps finesse. Their diversity—including diversity *within* each athlete—is their strength (p. 101).

In classrooms, schools and universities, issues of difference become important in this kind of knowledge. Many theorists point to the importance of knowing other people, but Code offers a specific demand for *listening well*, which is what makes this kind of knowledge epistemically responsible. For Code, and perhaps for many educational theorists, this is where the disciplines of knowledge and morality intersect; this is where the power differences in classrooms are mutually enacted with knowledge and subjectivity.

For some students, attention and concern for language and culture and caring relations with others are lacking in their school experience through the structures of school, the curriculum and relations with teachers. For students who are alienated in school and who are acting out against the “imperative” to assimilate to the dominant culture, a relationship with someone who wants to know them can make a difference between success and failure in school. In a report issued for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation entitled *The silent epidemic: Perspectives of high school dropouts* (Bridgeland, DeJulio, & Morison 2006) students who had dropped out of school were asked what might have made a difference. The most common response was that the school curriculum needed to have better connections to their lives, “making what is learned in classes more relevant to their lives, having better teachers who keep classes interesting and having smaller classes involving more one-to-on instruction, involvement and feedback.” One student explained that being unknown to her teachers played a big part in her leaving school:

If they related to me more and understand that at that point in time my life was...what I was going through, where I lived, where I came from. Who knows? That book might have been in my book bag. I might have bought a book bag and done some work (Bridgeland, DeJulio & Morison, 2006, p. 12).

The report helps explain why students leave schools, and what it is that might keep them there. Being known, working in a curriculum that takes subjectivity into account, being listened to are all things that they explain might have made them want to stay, and it is those things that inform Code's notion of epistemic responsibility and knowing other people well.

This critique of Anglo-American epistemology theorists from across the disciplines addresses the limits of a view of knowledge that objectifies it, and that masks the relationship between power and knowledge. They are calling for epistemic responsibility, a term that draws us to the regions where binaries fuse, where moral theory and epistemology merge into a relationship. And out of this new conception of knowledge and subjectivity, and epistemic responsibility emerges a new concept for the process of making knowledge, the means by which we might unmask the relationship between knowledge and power, and the method by which we might take subjectivity into account. For the students in the Gates' report (2006), it is the difference between having someone teach a content area such as English, math, or history, and having someone teach *them*, in a way recognizes their personal histories—"what I was going through, where I lived, where I came from." For the women on the Yale University rowing team in 1976, it is the difference between allowing women access to a Yale education,

and recognizing women in all their various forms, including women athletes, as equal members of the Yale University community.

The method Code (1995) is calling for is “a storied epistemology” which “grants epistemic force to narratives that tell of the construction of knowledge, of theories of knowledge and of subjectivities” (p. xiv). This is the method which Code offers in an attempt to locate the knower/known and the process of knowledge production, to “resist the politics of closure” (Haraway, 1988, p. 590). In other words, explaining how one came to know, through autobiographical, testimonial and performative modes and, in Behar’s words, taking a vulnerable stance, is the means by which Code hopes to unmask the relationship between knowledge and power.

Storied Epistemologies

Code (1995) explains that Anglo-American epistemologies maintain an “allegiance to an older empiricism that privileges first-person, observational reports” grounding evidence in experience and observation. But that very same tradition has no means by which to account for the kind of experience that include the process *and* the products of knowledge, or that tell “how it is for cognitive or moral agents to be located as they are, and to experience the world from there” (p. 159). These first-person stories are dismissed as biased and treated as mere folklore or gossip. “Historical, gendered and other locational differences” are reduced to “individual bias, aberration; to errors that have to be eradicated and thence discounted in verification or justification procedures”

(p. 159). They are called outliers in statistical analysis, and are not counted. These epistemologies, methods and approaches are voiceless and without context.

Code (1995) uses the word *story* in a particular way. She explains that stories are “primarily historical-genealogical rather than fictional” (p. 159). Her stories are both simple—sequences of events with one or more characters—but also, she explains, her definition of story is expanded to

emphasize the poesis (=making) function of stories, where the ‘character(s)’ are at once artificers and artifacts of “their” actions and experiences. And I am amplifying the definition with the assumption that stories manifest a certain coherence—both internal and external, both spatial and temporal—that holds them together as stories rather than mere assemblages of statements. Coherence is at once produced by narrative structure, and can have the effect of disrupting, interrogating, reconfiguring other alleged coherences, even including its own (p. 159).

Stories allow for “changing the subject” of epistemology, by allowing for subjectivity, by acknowledging the importance of location in knowledge, and by allowing for multiple voices in the making of knowledge (Code, 1995). The members of the Yale Women’s crew were artificers and artifacts of their own story of exploitation. And, while the “story” of their exploitation was told through a performative, multi-genre, bricolaged method, there was a coherence produced by their narrative structure, which allowed them to disrupt the accepted narratives about the place of women in the Yale Athletic department in 1976.

For other researchers, autobiographical narratives offer discursive forms that allow for the changing subject of knowledge, for expression of forms of knowing that may be gendered, or that may derive meaning from unobservable

data, like feelings. Paula Salvio (1990) explains her use of autobiographical narratives with students in a course entitled Education and the Arts.

I would like to suggest that the knowledge we derive from aesthetic experience is understood in the same way that we come to understand the meanings that are generated through intimate social relationships. In such relationships, as in aesthetic experience, the look, the touch, the distance we keep from one another and the objects framing our lives are all meaningful, and this meaning is grasped in a moment. As we read the relations around us we do not work through the less important ideas and less meaningful implications first without a vision of the whole. In contrast, discursive reasoning calls upon us to work deductively, and an understanding of the ways in which elements relate comes at the conclusion, like a prize. (Langer, 1953, p. 397)

In art, as in the spaces where we live, knowledge is bound by our sensibilities.

The knowledge we acquire through aesthetic experience furnishes an understanding of the inner life that Susanne Langer maintains is the "inside story of our own history, the way living in the world feels to us" (Langer, 1957, p. 7).

Salvio explains that by using autobiography, she offers her students a means by which to "transgress the perceived limits of aesthetic knowledge" and to discover the ways their thinking is embedded in a tradition of "gendered logic," and the kinds of binaries that are part of what Code describes as the conceptual apparatus of Anglo-American epistemology: feelings/reason, subjectivity/objectivity, product/process. Through the use of autobiographical narratives, students are able to make strange their own epistemological assumptions and the place of a (gendered) aesthetic knowledge within those assumptions. They create, and then examine their own "storied epistemologies" through the creation of and reflection on these narratives.

Annie Rogers (1993) writes about the importance of voice in the educational lives of girls. Drawing on the work of Gilligan (1982), Rodgers, writes about the development of women's ability to speak out in what is often perceived as a man's world in a Harvard Educational Review essay entitled "Voice, Play and Practice of Ordinary Courage in Girls' and Women's' Lives." Her etymology of the word "courage" is associated with speaking out, and saying what is in one's heart.

I begin with the life history of the word courage, its etymology in the English Language. Courage came from the Latin word *cor*, meaning "heart," and from a common Romantic word, *aetaticum*, or "age." In its original English form, in 1051, courage meant "the heart of an age." Yet by 1300, courage had lost its association with age, and therefore with time and with development. Taken out of time, courage simply meant "heart." In 1300, courage was also linked very closely with speaking. One definition of courage was "to speak one's mind by telling all one's heart." (qtd. in Rodgers) At this time, the definition of courage drew speaking into relation with mind and heart, intellect and love. (Rodgers, 1993)

In her interviews of adolescent girls, Rogers observed them as they "find" their voices through working and playing together. She describes it as a poetic process, and draws on poetry to report her findings. The epistemology described by Salvio and Rogers in their use of aesthetic forms in knowledge production echoes the work of Code. Rodgers draws on the etymology of the word courage—to tell the (his)story of the present meaning of the word—in order to show her own understanding of speaking in its relation to reason, feeling, and knowledge. The use of autobiographical narratives and poetry ties to Code's work in epistemology as well. Code (1995) explains in rhetorical spaces where the particularities of everyday life bear "directly on the possibility of knowledge claims, moral pronouncements, descriptions of "reality" achieving

acknowledgement, going through . . . discourse become a poesis, a way of representing experience, reality, that remakes and alters it in the process” (p. x).

These examples demonstrate that some of the stories in a storied epistemology, which tell of location, subjectivity and the process by which knowledge is made, draw on the poetic register. It is the poetic register, the poesis, that makes it possible to represent experience and reality when dominant language and forms are imbued with the territorial imperatives that keep the claims, pronouncements and descriptions of experience from “going through” or getting uptake. And it is this poesis that often gets ignored in the concern for giving students access to dominant forms and cultural capital.

These stories of how one comes to know and the particles and particularities of their specific locations and subjectivities become the dust of epistemology, as they are rooted in the particular context and located in relation to human lives. And, despite the momentum and power of current Anglo-American epistemology, and the current narratives in education, with its neat and tidy objectivity, wiped clean of location, subjectivity, particularity and history, the messiness and ambiguity of the knowledge making of everyday lives returns, like dust, and circulates through these narratives again and again, challenging the seduction of the certainty, universality and objectivity that we have come to associate with what it means to know.

CHAPTER 3

TRANSFERRING HISTORY IN THE ARCHIVE

Recall the lines from Anne Sexton's "Rowing" from her 1975 collection of poems, *Rowing toward God*. The speaker in the poem is a rower who locates herself in middle age as she makes her way on a journey toward an island:

and now, in my middle age,
about nineteen in the head I'd say,
I am rowing, I am rowing

The method of *currere*, which was developed in the 1970's, is coming into its "middle age." And like Sexton's rower, the Yale women rowers who staged the protest and the Title IX Law itself are in their middle age. The women who protested their lack of facilities at Yale University in 1976 are now in their fifties. Title IX was passed over thirty years ago, when I, also "now, in my middle age," was twelve years old.

Currere relies on many of the concerns that about certainty and objectivity that have been raised in other fields. The attempt to locate knowledge inexperience, a concern for taking subjectivity into account in the production of knowledge and the method of looking backward to reflect and construct the narratives that locate us in the present moment are all methods by which Code (1995) is working toward what she calls "epistemic responsibility" and Kastely (1997) is making connections in rhetoric between Plato and Postmodernism; they

are also defining characteristics of the method of currere (Pinar 1976,1988,1994; Grumet 1990,1992; Graham 1991,1992). Poststructuralism offers a theoretical grounding from which Currere, in the study of curriculum theory and epistemology in feminist epistemology, employ these methodologies and contest the universality of the disembodied, objective knower. Code (1995) and the scholars of currere (Grumet 1990,1992; Miller, 1992; Pinar, 1988,1994; Salvio 1990, 1999) rely on the notion of reflexivity: that is, the capacity to reflect upon the ways one's particular locations, (including intellectual, theoretical, physical, historical, and cultural) influence the production of knowledge in order to study, understand and even change both the process and the products of knowledge production. The archive serves as both a concrete and metaphorical tool in this process of reflecting on and understanding one's own intellectual, theoretical, physical, historical and cultural locations.

To learn about the Yale event and the law now, in the present day, requires a regressive step, a turn backward into history and through the door of the archive. Documents related to Title IX law, the court challenges to it, and its interpretations are part of the historical record contextualizing my questions about the rhetorical tactics of the Yale Women's Crew protest. Those government documents are part of the institution of the United States Government and of the United States court systems, and are categorized and sorted and maintained in our national archives. Finding the door to that archive is not so difficult. But accessing the door to an archive that might not yet exist, or might not exist as a geographic location, under a specific catalogued title such as

Yale Women's Crew Protest, is not as easy. It is the particles of knowledge that come from the less powerful, less articulate, less entitled that interest me, and that define my work through a postmodern, feminist approach. For example, Eugenia Keisling, a member of the 1976 Yale University Women's Crew, was interviewed by a high school student, Emily Clark, in 2001 for an oral history project entitled *Leveling the Playing Field: The Road To Title IX*.⁵ A high school students' interview with a member of this team, 25 years after the event, is the sediment of the story of this event which has not made its way into to the mainstream of cultural memory.

It is the sediment of the stories that have not yet been told, and the particles that have not made their way into the main stream of cultural memory that require a particular approach to archival research. By attending to the gaps in the documents, the texts and the master narratives, this approach points toward other things that might be worth knowing, and worth keeping; things the text knows that the writer hasn't said yet. For example, in a letter from the Yale University Archivist, Mary Caldera, I learned that "most of the record groups that would include records on the incident are closed for at least thirty-five years from their creation as per University Policy" (personal correspondence, 2002). This gap in the archive is related to access. I learned also that the archivist looked through the folders for the Office of Education for Women 1973-1977, Athletics

⁵ The manuscript is part of a collection of Oral History projects completed by students as an 11th Grade History course assignment, at St. Andrew's Episcopal School, beginning in 1999. The project comprises seven phases including: (1) Interviewee Selection, (2) Biography, (3) Historical Contextualization, (4) Interview and Transcription, (5) Historical Analysis, (6) Public Presentation, and (7) Assessment. For more information or a complete copy of the oral history and interview, see <http://www.doingoralhistory.org/>.

1971-1977, Athletic Executive Committee 1976-1977, University Council–
Athletics, 1972-1977 and the Special Committee on University Problems, 1974-
1976, “but found nothing relevant to your request.”

Sexton’s middle-aged rower does not have an easy time on her journey.

Though the oarlocks stick and are rusty
And the sea blinks and rolls
Like a worried eyeball,
But I am rowing, I am rowing
Though the wind pushes me back
And I know that that island will not be perfect,
It will have the flaws of life,
The absurdities of the dinner table,
But there will be a door
And I will open it

For me, too, in this study the rusty oarlocks and the rolling sea, the flaws of life and the absurdities of the dinner table stand between me and the door to the records of the Yale Women’s Crew protest. That protest was not part of a government system; it occurred outside the courts so the artifacts and remains of that event have a very different place in our cultural memory. Finding the particles of the 1976 Yale Women’s Crew protest, which has become part of the dust of cultural memory, is a more challenging job. While the Yale University Archives hold some of the particles of that event, they are not categorized and identified specifically as documentation of the event. The papers, photographs and artifacts that might hold the narrative of that event are fragmented, dispersed throughout separate categories of archival material. The Yale Daily News archives contain photographs and the story of the event as it was reported in the

school newspaper.⁶ The *New York Times* archives contain two short articles on March 4 and March 11th (*New York Times*, 1976). The archives of the Yale Athletic Department hold the text of the speech read by team captain Chris Ernst during the protest. All of these artifacts, photos and documents, have subsequently become available digitally, and are available on the vast storehouse of information called the internet.

The film, *A Hero for Daisy* (1999) drew on many of these archives as well as personal collections and video of interviews to create the documentary film featuring Chris Ernst. That film has become, in effect, a moving, digital archive of Christ Ernst's' struggle for the right to participate in her sport, and her struggle for gender equity.

What is an Archive?

The Society American Archivist defines the archive in an article on their web site entitled "So You Want to Be an Archivist: Overview of the Archive Profession":

Archives are the non-current records of individuals, groups, institutions and governments that contain information of enduring value. Formats represented in the modern archival repository include photographs, films, video and sound recordings, computer tapes, and video and optical disks, as well as the more traditional unpublished letters, diaries, and other manuscripts. Archival records are the products of everyday activity (2003, SAA). (See C:\Documents and Settings\User\Desktop\jennie'sdesktop\archival methodology\SAA Overview of the Archival Profession.htm.)

⁶Yale University Archivist Mary Caldera wrote to me in response to my request for help locating documents related to the event. She was very helpful, and suggested "you may also want to review the Yale Daily News for 1976. It is on microfilm and available via interlibrary loan. I perused the Yale Alumni Magazine but found no articles or letters to the editor regarding the incident. Finally, are you aware of the documentary film on the event? It is called *A Hero For Daisy*, and you can get more information at (www.aherofordaisy.com). The Archives has a copy on order." It is interesting to note that the Yale University archivist pointed me to the film and in 2002 had just ordered the film for their own archive.

In this chapter, I define the archive as a place of history that holds cultural memory. Drawing on the scholarship of Lorraine Code (1995) and Michel Derrida (1995), I propose a conception of the archive as a rhetorical space, one that calls for specific methodologies that are attuned to 'knowing other persons well,' and that are contingent upon possessing sufficient rhetorical authority to compose what Code defines as a 'storied epistemology.'

The archive is a place where the particles that are left behind from the experience of everyday life are stored. But even in that sentence, what is not there, the negative space, holds some important information. Because "are stored" is a verb without an actor. And yet, the acts of selecting, storing and categorizing require decision-making about what is worth keeping, and by default, what is worth knowing. Feminists and poststructuralists in philosophy, curriculum theory and composition theory critique the conceptual apparatus for knowledge making that is excised of affect, emotion and a real person in a real context; it is Code's concept of the storied epistemology that puts knowledge production back into a context of everyday life, with its flaws and absurdities, and that builds a bridge between knowledge, and the who/what/when/where/how that produced it. In the archive, it is the passive voice sentences, and the gaps in meaning that point to what might be worth knowing, as much as those things that are present and accounted for. The gap in time between the text of the Yale Women's Crew protest, and the text of Roderick Jackson, who over thirty years later took his Title IX case to the Supreme Court provide fertile ground to explore

the meaning of the Yale Crew event in its historical location, and in the present moment.

Rhetorical spaces are “fictive, but not fanciful or fixed locations” according to Code (1995) and she explains that her “appeal to spatial metaphors is drawing on a late 20th century concern with location” (p. ix). Rhetorical spaces are not material locations with an address that one can always locate by following a set of directions, so they are fictive. But rhetorical spaces are not fanciful because they help to locate the particularities of real life situations, where knowledge/ subjectivity/power interact to create and frame what can be uttered, and where territorial imperatives are created and framed by unevenly distributed cognitive resources, positions of authority and expertise (Code, 1995). Rhetorical spaces are not fixed partly because, within this conceptual framework, subjectivities are not fixed, nor are relationships of power, authority, cognitive resources and expertise.

While an archive can be a fixed location, like the one at the library at Yale University, with an address and a building that houses documents, I am also concerned with the unofficial archives that “hold” cultural memory. For those whose authority, power and expertise are diminished in a particular *rhetorical space*, the artifacts of one’s utterances—textual or otherwise may also not be “taken up” by an archive. But the lack of official archival documentation of one’s experience does not make that experience go away.

The archive that holds the artifacts of the Yale Women’s Crew Protest is also a fictive location, neither fanciful nor fixed. But what, and where, is that

archive? In a lecture which was published as a book under the title *Archive fever*, Derrida (1995) attempts to explore the concept of the archive. He began the lecture with an etymology of the word:

Let us not begin at the beginning, nor even at the archive. But rather at the word “archive”—and with the archive of so familiar a word. *Arche*, we recall, names at once the *commencement* and the *commandment*. This name apparently coordinates two principles in one: the principle according to nature or history, there where things *commence*—physical, historical, or ontological principle but also the principle according to the law, *there* where men and gods *command*, *there* where authority, social order are exercised, in this place from which *order* is given—nomological principal.

There, we said, and in this place. How are we to think of there? And this taking place or this having a place in the arche?” (p. 1).

Derrida explains, through this etymology, that conceptually the archive is associated with both the beginning of something, a marking of a time and place—the commencement, but also as a location that is structured according to the exercise of authority and social order—the commandment. The concepts that Derrida digs out and brushes off from the history of the word itself resonate with Code’s definition of a rhetorical space. For Code (1995), the commandment comes in the form of the “territorial imperatives that structure and limit” and from the “spaces where knowledge and subjectivity are mutually constitutive, yet where cognitive resources and positions of authority and expertise are unevenly distributed” (p. ix). For Glenn (2004), the commandment comes in a historical definition of rhetoric that is aristocratic, agonistic and male.” These kinds of limits, these territorial imperatives and unevenly distributed resources are often associated with, but not limited to, gender. The discipline of using the archive to construct narratives of cultural memory is called history: *his* story. But Code’s

notion of the storied epistemology brings us back to a location; revisionary rhetoric brings back the previously silenced voices in the history of rhetoric (e.g., Dasler-Johnson 2001; Enoch, 2002; Jung, 2005). Code is working toward an epistemology that locates the knower and the known, helping to foster what she calls epistemic responsibility. The story is meant to reveal the process of how knowledge is produced, making the commencement transparent and specific. The oral history by Emily Clark (2002), and the film *A Hero for Daisy* (1999), both provide the kind of storied epistemology that locates the knower and the known.

In his Sage Publications book on archival methodology, *Archival strategies and techniques*, Michael Hill (1993) teaches the method and the issues of archival research to the student of research methodology. He explains that the archives are a process of sedimentation, a cumulative process of experiences, of previous decisions about what is worth knowing and what is worth keeping.

When researchers open a box of archival materials, the particular, concrete set of items in that box is the end product of an involved sedimentation process. The 'sediment' in archives results directly from people defining certain materials—and not others—as 'worth keeping' in archival situations. Conversely, it is from this accumulated sediment that researchers reconstruct and reinterpret our shared stock of knowledge in sociohistorical terms—and try to convince us that information about particular situations is 'worth knowing.' This is an endless iterative loop, since what is worth knowing helps us, as a society, decide what is worth keeping, and so on and on (p. 9).

Feminist philosophers and some theorists in curriculum studies and composition critique the assumption of objectivity in processes like these that result in the production of knowledge; that is to say, they are critical of their claim that they possess a view from nowhere, that they are dislocated in time, place, gender, and power. The archive itself is part of an epistemic process which ties

past to present, and experience to knowledge. Someone decides what to keep, where to keep it, and how to name it. What takes place in the process of creating and maintaining an archive—what Derrida (1995) calls “archivization” is a kind of editing process. Mary Mazzio produced the documentary film *A Hero for Daisy*, pulling together the sediments of the Yale Crew protest, providing both the commencement of an archive, and a commandment, through her own decision to make the film, by providing the funding and the research to make it possible.

Composition theorist Steven Mailloux (1999) explores the notion of editing archival documents, and its relationship to meaning in *Archivists with an attitude: Reading typos, reading archives*. He explains that

. . . If deciding on the make-up of a text is an unavoidable act within every reading, then can we not say that a kind of editing takes place—by omission or commission—in every textual interpretation? It has always been a mistake, I think, for textual scholar including those who cite the Matheissen typo reading, to argue merely that responsible editing is a necessary *preliminary* to sound criticism. Rather, it would be better to say that editing *is* criticism and history, both in the sense that editing is an extension of the same rhetorical activity of interpretation that results in published arguments establishing a text’s literary *and* historical meaning and in the sense that editing provides a model for understanding many of the most important aspects of all interpretation, the rhetorical establishment of textual meaning. I agree with the view—shared by such different editorial theorists as Tanselle, Herschel Parker, Jerome McGann and D.C. Greetham—that editing involves interpretation and not just some mechanical process of scientific reconstruction. It explicitly demonstrates several characteristics of the interpretive process: (1) its materiality; (2) its embeddedness in traditions of theory and practice; (3) its institutional and cultural locations and (4) its involvement in rhetorical politics constituted by arguments over ideologies, professional and other (pp. 585-586).⁷

Mailloux’s essay explores the acts of interpretation that occur in the archive, and in particular, the acts of interpretation that occur in a text in the

⁷*Archivists with an attitude* appeared as a special volume of *College English* devoted to the history of composition studies and the problems of defining a methodology for archival research in the field of Composition Studies. See *College English*, vol. 61, issue 5, 1999.

archive through the reading of typos. Mailloux further explains, and later in his essay draws on Derrida's *Archive fever* (1995) to support his thesis, that editing, which provides a model for all acts of interpretation, is not something that happens prior to criticism and interpretation; is it part of the process. Some of the work of the archivist functions as a form of editing as well; determining meaning, including making decisions about the worth of saving something, requires an act of interpretation. Mazzio's film (1999) certainly required editing, decisions about how to interpret information, juxtapose images, and what film sections to keep, and which to cut. The archive itself is a conceptual apparatus for producing knowledge, where the decisions made simultaneously create and interpret what counts as knowledge. Like Yale University's Archive, Mazzio's (1999) film *A Hero for Daisy* is another, different conceptual apparatus for producing knowledge. When the socio-historical terms for reconstructing and reinterpreting our stock of knowledge are happening in the archive, "there where men and gods command"(Derrida, 1995) those who have not been in positions of power may find their experiences leaving a negative space in the archive. In 1999, the film *A Hero for Daisy* was released, and with its release, the event found both a commencement as an official document to be archived, and a commandment, in the fact that the silence around this event and the lack of uptake for its importance was contested by the film's producer, Mary Mazzio, and by those who gave the film choral support, like the Sadkar Institute.⁸

⁸A teaching guide to accompany the film was written by Karen Zittleman, Professor David Sadkar and Phyllis Lerner through the Myra Sadkar Advocates organization. See <http://www.aherofordaisy.com/dates.html> for a partial description of the "uptake and choral support" the film has received.

The Digital Archive

When conceived as a rhetorical space whose location is neither fanciful nor fixed, the archive takes on a new conception. Derrida (1995) theorizes an archive that is not necessarily located as an architectural location, a geographic place or space. He alludes to the potential of modern technology such as the phone, the fax and e-mail to shift the location of the archive, not only geographically, but also temporarily; the “printing” of an event or a document or a letter, and the saving of it, takes place at the very moment of its conception. The moment one makes the decision to press the button save on the computer, the complex process of archiving is taking place. There is an immediacy to Derrida’s notion of the archive.

Other theorists have begun to explore the impact of the internet on the concepts of the scholarly archive. The term “archive” has a particular sense in computer science: it means the storage of digital materials i.e., archived documents. To “google” the term archive brings up thousands of hits that have little to do with an archive that might prove fruitful for social scientific historical research. But in researching Title IX and the Yale Women’s Crew Protest, the digital archive becomes invaluable. The internet makes possible “access” to archives which might take many years and many dollars to visit in person. Through the internet, the Yale University archives are immediately available through my computer, my keyboard and some exploration of search terms and links, as are the archives of the *New York Times*, the National Women’s Law Center and archives of television interviews as well.

Rune Daalgard (2001), author of the essay "Hypertext and the Scholarly Archive: Intertexts, Paratexts and Metatexts At Work," defines the web as a vast cultural archive, and hypertext as "the paradigmatic rhetorical structure" of this archive. Daalgard explains:

The web, properly speaking, is not one archive, but a distributed system of more or less connected collections of texts. It is one "cultural archive," in the sense that anything on the web in principle can be accessed from anywhere else on the web. Considered as a whole, this is a highly anarchistic network. . . (p. 4).

Digital archives perform a kind of intertextuality that goes beyond the level of the single text; here, in cyberspace, a dialog between archives is made possible through this "distributed system of more or less connected collections of texts." And while the promises of open access and seemingly limitless possibilities for intertextuality exist, the "anarchy" of the archive can pose problems. The situatedness of a text, its place in time and history, currently and in its past, are often opaque and may tacitly disturb or control the ways in which the dialogs between and the readings of texts take place.

Derrida (1995) touched on the power of technology in both producing and storing archival material in *Archive fever*. Much work has been done since Derrida presented *Archive fever*, however this work in the exploring the Web, its seemingly limitless archive and hypertext as a rhetorical structure is beyond the scope of this work.

Methods in the Archive

The methodology of archival research is, as Hill explains, “excavating the unknown, the unwritten, or the unrecognized in the history of the social sciences” and, he warns us that it “. . . requires reversing the conventional wisdom of social research. The inherent liminality of such a strategy makes it suspect to those who do not appreciate the playful element in scientific research (Turner, 1969; Degan & Hill, 1991a; Hull, 1993; Hill, 1993).

The Yale women themselves performed a sort of excavation of the unrecognized, and it is that very thing Hill describes about archival research, that inherent liminality and playfulness, that makes this event so “worth knowing about.” Undressing and addressing the institution that couldn’t or wouldn’t see them, citing the law on bare skin, inviting a *New York Times* reporter, these tactics used by the women’s rowing team members achieved that “not-going-away-ness” that Steedman (2001) explains is an important quality of archival dust. She writes:

This is what Dust is about; this is what Dust *is*: what it means and what it is. It is not about rubbish, nor about the discarded; it is not about a surplus, left over from something else: *it is not about Waste*. Indeed, Dust is the opposite thing to Waste or at least the opposite principal to Waste. It is about circularity, the impossibility of things disappearing, or going away, or being gone. Nothing can be destroyed (p. 164).

Steedman is writing about her own work in the archives, Derrida’s (1995) work *Archive fever* and Jules Michelet’s (1869) work in the French National Archives. She is critical of Derrida’s conception of the archive, and the postmodernist, uncertain view of what it holds:

Archive' is conflated to mean—if not quite Everything then at least all the ways and means of state power, Power itself, perhaps, rather than those quietly folded and filed documents that we think provide the mere and incomplete records of some of its inaugural moments (Steedman, 2001, p. 6).

However, in her readings of Michelet's work, she believes that he is writing about the presence of the uncanny in the archive, and the fact that the voiceless ghosts of the past were waiting to be discovered. His work, she writes, makes it very plain that

. . . he knew that the unconsidered dead were to be found in the Archives Nationales; so he knew that the material presence of their dust, the atomistic remains of the toils and tribulations, the growth and decay of the human body, was literally what might carry them, through this inhalation and his writing of History, into a new life (p. 164).

But what is it that compels Michelet or any other historian to usher the silent into speech. Steedman herself experiences an imperative in the archive as a result of being in the physical presence of the dust. She expresses that imperative this way

Now, having breathed in the Dust, knowing about it, in a way that was not really possible in a period of attention to its opposite, Waste, the implications of this imperishability—this not-going-awayness—of Dust for narrative, force themselves forward (p. 165).

And so, the archive is a rhetorical space where things both begin and end. It is a place where authority and social order serve as "the tacit, rarely spoken territorial imperatives that structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can be voiced within them with a reasonable expectation of uptake and choral support" (Code, 1995, p. ix). The archivist has to decide if something is worth keeping, and if so, how it will be kept, named and categorized, and who will have access to it. The uptake and choral support in the archive are required at many stages—

in determining what is worth keeping, what is worth knowing, and who will have access. That determination is made by a historically and socially situated *someone*, who can never be completely free of the structuring and limiting imperatives of her/his location. The rhetorical space of the archive call for what Lorraine Code might call epistemically responsible archival research: that is, listening between the lines, reading what is not there, and making less obvious connections between fragmented and disparately located particles of dust

In my own turn backward to explore this event, I both rely on the archivist and become one. I rely on the archivist for access to documents and artifacts of the Yale Women's Crew Event and the Title IX law, and I become an archivist as I pull the sediments of this event into a space set aside specifically to help me understand what it is about the event that is worth knowing, and what it means to my present moment as a literacy educator.

What methodologies help shine a light into the negative spaces of the archive where those voiceless, body-less, invisible specters silently, uncannily make themselves known? Answers to these questions can be explored through a reading of the rhetorical tactics of the Yale women in their 1976 protest.

Postructuralist theorists from across the disciplines suggest that it is a form of poesis that allows us to usher the half spoken into language or to hear the half-spoken. Code (1995) explains that

in locations where it matters who is speaking, and why, and where such mattering beard directly upon the possibility of knowledge claims, moral pronouncements, descriptions of "reality" achieving acknowledgement, going through...discourse becomes a form of poesis, a way of representing experience, reality, that remakes and alters it in the process (p. 2).

While Code does not follow this explanation by defining what she means by “discourse in the form of poesis,” she does later explain that these types of situations do not necessarily call for the speaker or the listener to improve in some way. Rather, she explains, “it is a matter of working out, collectively, how to produce and circulate new scripts, how to devise improvisational possibilities that can unsettle and disrupt story lines that are apparently seamless” (Code, 1995, p. 76). New scripts, new rhetorical spaces, improvisational archives are the means by which I disrupt some of the dominant story lines about literacy, language and learning and about knowledge, power, and access.

De Certeau (1995) suggests that bricolage is one of the methods that can prove useful for those who are not in power, and for whom uptake, or achieving acknowledgement is not going through. Bricolage is a means for problem solving or production that involves the playful use of materials that one has at hand. In contrast with the analytical approach of constructing an argument in a linear, sequential manner bricolage is a non-linear, intuitive method of trying and testing. The crossing of disciplinary boundaries, for example, represents a form of bricolage. Curriculum theorists draw on the work of poststructuralism, feminist theory, psychoanalytic theory, and performance theory, to name some, but not all of the various disciplines that have influenced the work in the field of currere, for example (Pinar, 2004). Code herself is crossing and merging disciplinary boundaries within Philosophy, linking analytic and continental approaches to philosophy, feminist theory and poststructuralism, epistemology and ethics.

Joe Kincheloe (2001) explains the need for a new method for research in the postmodern age where objectivity and universality are in question, and where social scientists and scholars are doing “research in the ruins” of the bounded disciplinarity which is emblematic of modernity:

Once understanding of the limits of objective science and its universal knowledge escaped from the genie’s bottle, there was no going back. Despite the best efforts to recover “what was lost” in the implosion of social science, too many researchers understand its socially constructed nature, its value laden products that operate under the flag of objectivity, its avoidance of contextual specificities that subvert the stability of its structures, and its fragmenting impulse that moves it to fold its methodologies and the knowledge they produce neatly into disciplinary drawers. My argument here is that we must operate in the ruins of the temple, in a postapocalyptic social, cultural, psychological, and educational science where certainty and stability have long departed for parts unknown (p. 681).

Kincheloe offers bricolage as a method for doing research in the ruins of rationality, in which the bricoleur “picks up the pieces of what’s left and pastes them together as best as he can.” This method could be described as interdisciplinary in the way that the bricoleur draws on a variety of disciplines, methods and approaches for research

Drawing on non-linguistic forms of interpretation and communication is another form of poesis, and a method for uncovering the unspoken. Forms of embodiment, gesture, and performance inform the methodologies used to read the negative spaces of the archive. Drawing on the work of Merleau Ponty, Madeline Grumet’s concept of “Bodyreading” is a relationship between text and subject that allows for reading text and self, which, as Grumet explains “is strung between the two poles of our actual situation, crowded as it is with our intentions,

assumptions, and positions, and the possibilities that the texts point to (Grumet, 1988).

The use of Intertextuality is a means by which to make present what is absent, which is what exploring the negative spaces of the archives is about. By employing multiple texts, it becomes possible to creating dialogs between them through the use of juxtaposition, repetition, and weaving of words, establishing resonance and “choral uptake,” a term Lorraine Code (1995) borrows from Patricinio Schweikart (1991) who used it in a presentation called “Knowledge, Gender, Education and Work.” The concept of multiple voices, or a chorus, appears in the work of other feminist theorists who highlight the importance of community and relational knowing (Noddings 1986; Grumet 1990).

I draw on a postmodern approach to understanding the archive, and to interpretation of the sediment from the archive. While Steedman (2001) might be critical of this postmodern, deconstructed view of the archive, and of this notion of the limitless “distributed system of more or less connected texts,” she is willing to poke fun at herself, and find value in this kind of work at the same time. She describes her own approach to the archive and historical research as “empirical doggedness,” quite in opposition to the postmodern approach. As she begins a parody of the “fever” in *Archive fever* by taking it literally and pathologizing it through her readings of Jacques Michelet, she writes:

There is always a pleasure as a reader in finding something that the writer did not know was there (or that he has hidden, deep in its crevices and cracks); and in this case, there is a particular pleasure in willfully asserting of a text so intimately connected by its authorship to the practice of deconstruction, that there *is* something there, *at all*, in the first place. Indeed, in one view, the practice of history in its modern mode is just one long exercise of the deep satisfaction of *finding things* (Steedman, 2001, p. 10).

I too share the deep satisfaction of finding things that are associated with history in its modern mode, but also with the deconstructionists pleasure of finding something in a text that the writer didn't know was there. My method in the archive is both looking for the actual dust particles of everyday life, the particles that serve as evidence toward the seduction of locating certainty, and reading the archive as a text for what is "hidden deep in its crevices and cracks" and negative space. I will move forward into the archive, like Sexton's rower, with the passage from *Dust: The archive and cultural memory* in which Steedman (2001) articulates how she found evidence in the deconstructed notion of Derrida's archive:

That laughter would be no criticism of Derrida (part of the point is to miss his), but rather an acknowledgement of what he showed in *Mal d'archive*: that is we find nothing, we will find nothing in a place; and then, that an absence is not nothing, but is rather the space left by what has gone; how the emptiness indicates how it was once filled and animated (p. 11).

Finding nothing, but finding nothing in a place is the beginning, Derrida's commencement. I have held a space in my memory, a space left by what is gone, and appeared to me for some time to have slipped from cultural memory. Mazzi's film reminded me of that space, and so I went looking for the particles and pieces left over from the event to pull them together, to save them, to

remember them, and to begin to think about what it all meant to me then, and means to me now.

Making an Archive

What was compelling for me about the film was that it named and affirmed some of my own experiences that were previously unspoken. The memories of being forced to sit and watch my brother play baseball when I was seven might have been the “commencement” of my own personal gender bias archive. For every coach or athlete who did speak out and use the court systems to contest his mistreatment and the mistreatment of female athletes, how many others were/are there whose complaints about gender discrimination never got uptake? How many athletes lost the opportunity to participate, and how many coaches lost their jobs for speaking out? Roderick Jackson, the high school girls’ basketball coach from Birmingham, Alabama who lost his job for being a Title IX “whistleblower” on behalf of his team becomes is one who becomes important in my analysis of the Yale Crew Event. The statement of Roderick Jackson (2004) who was the plaintiff in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education is available on the National Women’ Law Center web site and reads as follows:

Good afternoon. My name is Roderick Jackson, and I am a teacher and the Acting Head Coach of the girls’ basketball team at Ensley High School in Birmingham, Alabama. I am glad to be here to talk about my case.

From 1999 until May, 2001, I was the head coach of the girls’ basketball team at Ensley. We had a good team. They played good ball, they worked hard, and they won many games. In fact, six of my seven seniors who graduated in 2001 received college scholarships.

But my team didn’t have it easy, and the girls were treated worse than the boys in many ways. The girls were not allowed to use the new, regulation, gym used by the boys’ team; instead, the girls had to practice and play in the old gym with its wooden backboards, bent rims and no

heat. Although the boys' team was transported to away games by bus, the girls had to make their own arrangements to travel by car when their games were scheduled at different times from the boys' games. The girls also couldn't get to some of the amenities available to the boys, including the ice machine. On one occasion, for example, I was forced to break into the ice machine with a screw driver to put ice on an injured player.

Money was another major problem. The girls were routinely denied any share of the money donated to the school athletics program by the City of Birmingham—of the \$8,000 donated one year, for example, the girls never saw a dime. While the boys' team was allowed to keep the money from admissions and from concession sales during their games, the girls were not. To add insult to injury, the fact that teams had to pay for their own game officials meant that not being able to keep those funds caused very serious problems.

To me, this is just unfair. So I went through the chain of command—from the school Athletic Director, to the Principal, to the Athletics Director of the system, to the Director of High Schools in Birmingham, and to the Deputy Superintendent of Instruction, who is the second in command of the system—to try to level the playing field for my team. I was astounded that no one cared. Worse than that, they got angry and fired me from my coaching job.

Why I was fired is clear cut. I spoke up on an issue that no one was ready to deal with, an unpopular issue, and I got penalized for it. I not only lost the pleasure of coaching; I lost the extra income I earned and the higher retirement benefits I would have gotten based on that money. I was labeled a troublemaker and for two and one-half years was turned down for every coaching position I applied for at other schools. And the young ladies at Ensley lost the only person who was willing to speak up for them.

So I went to court to try to get my job back. I didn't have a lawyer at the time of the court of appeals argument, and the court ultimately dismissed my case, saying that in Title IX, Congress was silent on whether retaliation was specifically prohibited and that I couldn't sue. I'm not a lawyer, but that doesn't seem right to me. I never got a chance to present, and the court never got a chance to hear, the merits of my case: the facts on the inequities the girls suffered or the subsequent retaliation against me.

That's why I'm so pleased that the National Women's Law Center took up my case, and I hope that the Supreme Court will consider it.

Since last fall, I have been serving as Acting Head Coach for the Ensley basketball team. I was rehired in this capacity once there was a change in the school administration and once my case started getting some publicity in the local press. But I do not know whether I will be offered a permanent position as the Head Coach again, and many of the inequities about which I originally complained have not been corrected. For example, my girls' team is still forced to frequently practice in the old,

unheated gym because the team is not allowed access to the new gym until after the boys' team has finished its practices—which would mean having to stay at school until very late in the evening. And the girls are still not allowed to get the admissions money that's taken in during their games. There is more to be done before Ensley's sports program is fair.

I have a son and a daughter, and I want them both to be treated equally in their educational opportunities. I want the law that requires that, Title IX, to be enforced. And that is true for other civil rights laws too. I want to be able to do my part to ensure that my son and daughter, and the girls on my team, are treated fairly when they play sports. I hope that the Supreme Court will agree that I have the right to do that and that my school can't punish me for speaking up. Thank you. (June 10, 2004).

(See <http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm?id=1905§ion=newsroom> for the speech and other information regarding this case.)

The archives of the National Women's Law Center provided an interesting opportunity to juxtapose a Title IX statement from the very recent past with the 300-word testimonial statement read by the Yale Women's Crew in 1976, which I perform in the following chapter. By reading these two texts together, I pull the some of the fragments of Title IX history together, across a thirty year gap, and over the digital gap between the National Women's Law Center web site where Roderick Jackson's testimonial statement is publicly available and the *A Hero for Daisy* web site, where the 1976 Yale Women's Crew testimonial statement is publicly available.

The gendered/powered location of the archive determines what is worth knowing, preserving, remembering. Often, it is the dust particles of *his* story, not *hers*. In locations where females did not have access, like Yale University for over 150 years, territorial imperatives about gender and location, though they may be tacit and rarely spoken, reveal themselves in the archive through both artifacts, like the *Yale book of numbers* (Pierson, 1983; see <http://www.yale>.

edu/oir/pierson_original.htm for the original passage) which catalogued the Yale Man's body for over 100 years, and through the negative space where those voiceless, body-less, invisible specters silently, uncannily make themselves known.

For almost a century (1883 until the late 1960s or early 70s), students' height and weight was recorded, graphed and analyzed. The growth over time of height and weight of the Yale men was described in the *Yale book of numbers* (Pierson, 1983) with enthusiastic language like "spectacular shift" and "extraordinary leap." Much discussion of these statistics revolves around the percentage of each class who could be considered "six-footers." The discussion ends with language that hints at a sense of loss as the author describes the end of the record keeping, and the changes in the "student body."

. . . in the most recent years [after 1967] one seems to notice signs of a faint decline in height and weight, but the statistics and our table end before we can learn whether the new admission policies of the 1960's⁹ were changing the physical as well as the social constitution of the men now coming into Yale College. (Pierson, 1983, p. 117)

One thing that changed in the late 1960's was the admission of women in 1968. The student "body" was no longer all male. And in many of the Ivy League schools, which had traditionally held admission policies that favored Christian, white, upper middle class males from noteworthy families, the student body was no longer all white, all Christian or all upper-middle class. Even with the admission of women, though, the "rhetorical space" of Yale University held tacit "imperatives" left over from its mostly white, mostly Christian all male environment.

⁹ Presumably Pierson is referring to Yale University's admission of women in 1968.

The information available about Yale University and Title IX provide the contextual background that helps me understand the rhetorical spaces of the Yale Women's Crew. Much of the data that emerged is in the form of various narratives: Roderick Jackson's statement, the Yale Women's Crew speech, the newspaper articles documenting the event, and the first person interviews in the film. All of these become the data for the post-currere analysis. And so, I am rowing, I am rowing, looking backward, using landmarks to make my way, but there will be a door, and I will open it.

CHAPTER 4

TITLE IX WHISTLEBLOWERS AND RABBLE-ROUSERS

Title IX was passed as part of the federal government's civil rights legislation designed to eliminate discrimination in the United States. In pertinent part it states:

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance (20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 2000).

The Title IX amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act addresses Title VI of that act regarding “non-discrimination in federally assisted programs.” The first iterations of the bill, passed under President Lyndon Johnson, were designed to protect people from discrimination based on race, color or national origin. In addition to covering non-discrimination in federally assisted programs, the Civil Rights Act did a number of things to protect US citizens' rights and to discourage discrimination. The civil rights act comprised eleven sections dealing with amendments to the 1957 Voting Rights Act, public accommodation, desegregation of public facilities, desegregation of public education, establishment of a commission on civil rights, non-discrimination in federally funded programs, equal employment opportunity, registration and voting

statistics, intervention and procedure after removal in civil rights cases, and establishment of community relations service. While the section of the 1964 law dealing with employment specifically prohibit discrimination based on sex, the section dealing with non-discrimination in federally funded programs did not include gender in the language.

The 1964 version of the law read:

SEC. 601. No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
(20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).

Institutions receiving federal funds were subject to this law, and the ultimate penalty for failing to redress any wrongdoing in this category would ultimately result in loss of federal funds. From 1964 until 1972, non-discrimination laws did not protect US citizens at federally funded institutions from discrimination based on gender. It wasn't until 1972, under President Nixon, that the congress enacted Title IX of the education amendment including gender as a protected category.

I was twelve at the time that Title IX passed, and had long since accepted the fact that I would not be allowed to participate in many of the athletic opportunities that were afforded to my brother. But my sister was five years younger than I was, and she was able to realize the impact of Title IX in ways that I was not. I'll never forget finding out that she would be allowed to play Little League baseball. I had so desperately wanted to play myself, and for years went grudgingly to my brother's games where I sat seething on the hot tarpaper of the

dugout roof. I watched those games, but thanks to Title IX, five years later I was watching my sister play as well.

Interpreting Title IX

Although Title IX was not initially passed as a “sports law,” the application to athletics became a focus. The law covers discrimination based on sex in admission, programs and employment at institutions receiving federal funds. Title IX has been used to address issues of discrimination in areas including, but not limited to access to higher education, career training, employment, learning environment, sexual harassment, standardized testing and the treatment of pregnant and parenting students (National Coalition of Girls and Women in Education, 2002)

Not long after the law was passed, there were several attempts made to dilute the application of Title IX in athletics. The ability for access and protection against discrimination is important for males and females because participation in sports has positive benefits for both sexes. A 2004 Women’s Sports Foundation Report found “positive educational impacts of school sports were just as strong for girls as for boys including self-concept, educational aspirations in their senior year, school attendance, math and science enrollment, time spent on homework, and taking honors courses (p. 84). The first attempt at inclusion was the Tower Amendment which was proposed in 1974 to allow federally funded institutions to exempt “revenue-producing” sports from the calculations of opportunities and funding offered men and women. Revenue producing sports are defined as those sports which are able to bring in revenue, usually through ticket sales. Football

and men's' basketball have historically been the primary focus of this kind of language as they have the potential to fill stadium seats and sell television rights to their games. The revenue, it has been implied, means that "gate receipts" or money from the ticket sales for these sports would offset the higher expenses they usually incur. This would mean that football and basketball at the very least would be removed from the test for equity. Many schools field teams of over 100 football players and for basketball, although the teams are much smaller, the per-capita spending for athletes can be disproportionately high. In both "spots" for intercollegiate participation and dollars spent, this amendment would have protected institutions with revenue producing sports from having to pass a test for equity. The Tower Amendment, and several other subsequent bills that were proposed in the 1970s to soften the affects of Title IX were rejected. Most recently the Virginia federal district court, Equity in Athletics, Inc., v. Department of Education (2007, confirmed that Title IX extends its oversight to extracurricular programs.

The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) through the Equal Education Opportunities Commission (EEOC) published a set of guidelines entitled A Policy Interpretation: Title IX And Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 413 (Dec. 11, 1979) in 1979 to clarify the conditions for equity in athletics. Guidelines outline a three-prong test to determine if a federally funded institution was in compliance with Title IX. The original language has undergone clarification (Gender and Athletics Act, Public Law no 93-380, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) and Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Public Law 100-259, 20 U.S.C. §1687

(2000)) several times in the last thirty years, and in the 1996 clarification of the 1979 interpretation reads as follows:

The Title IX regulation provides that if an institution sponsors an athletic program it must provide equal athletic opportunities for members of both sexes. Among other factors, the regulation requires that an institution must effectively accommodate the athletic interests and abilities of students of both sexes to the extent necessary to provide equal athletic opportunity.

The 1979 Policy Interpretation provides that as part of this determination OCR will apply the following three prong accommodation test to assess whether an institution is providing nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for individuals of both sexes:

1. Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
2. Where members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interests and abilities of the members of that sex; or
3. Where members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a history and continuing practice of program expansion, as described above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. (44 *Fed. Reg.* at 71418).

The burden of proof for the first and third prongs is placed on the plaintiff with the institution required to meet the second prong (Cohen v. Brown University, 1993, pp. 901-902). In other words, the plaintiff bears the burden of meeting the prima facie case of prong one that proportionality has not been achieved by the school/college. The third prong essentially requires the plaintiff to rebut the assertions of the institution in prong two.

The institution is responsible for ensuring that athletic opportunities meet the requirement of proportionality; that is, the number of opportunities (or spots on a team) for males and females must reflect the proportion of male to female members of the entire institution. Where the proportionality test fails, meaning the institution does not provide the number of opportunities for males and females that reflects the proportion of male/female in the entire student body of a university, for example, then the university must show a “record of expansion” that would “be responsive to the development of interests and abilities” of the underrepresented sex.

Finally, if an institution does not meet the first and second requirements for Title IX compliance in athletics, they must demonstrate that the current opportunities for the underrepresented sex meet the demonstrated interests and abilities of that group. Until recently, this “three pronged test” was the teeth behind the law. If proportionality wasn’t met, and there was no record of expansion, the burden was on the institution to prove that interests and abilities were being adequately met. That final “prong” is where the law has more recently become vulnerable to softening.

Interpretations around interests and opportunity have been hotly contested. If there is no demonstrated interest, then should the institution be required to provide expanded opportunity? Advocates of Title IX and women’s athletics believe that the huge expansion in participation in sports by girls in women from Title IX’s passing in 1972 to the present day proves that interest follows opportunity. For example this past year, colleges and universities offer an

average of 8.45 women's teams per school, compared with an average of 2.5 teams offered in 1970. In 1970, 16,000 women participated in intercollegiate athletics, and the most recent statistics from 2006 show approximately 180,000 women are competing in intercollegiate athletics. This increase gives credence to the argument that "if you build it, they will come" (Carpenter & Acosta, 2006). (Statistics are taken from the *Women in intercollegiate sport: A longitudinal study twenty-nine year update [1977-2006]* which can be read in its entirety at: http://webpages.charter.net/womeninsport/AC_29YearStudy.pdf.) How can you be interested in something for which you have never previously imagined the possibility?

Once girls realized that they wouldn't have to fight so hard to be allowed to play, the interest in sports grew. Once female athletes were encouraged to continue to play their sports in college and were offered scholarships to attend, more and more young women could envision themselves as true athletes.

However there are opponents of the law (Flores, 2002; Gavora, 2002; Diegmuller, 1995), many of whom are male athletes in the "lesser sports" which have been cut in order to bring institutions into compliance for proportionality. Sports like men's gymnastics, swimming and wrestling have found themselves cut from varsity athletic programs in order to maintain the high numbers of athletes in football programs, and the high spending in sports like basketball, but still maintain proportionality.¹⁰ They have fought long and hard to soften the

¹⁰Many people believe that these athletes have indeed been treated unfairly, but are fighting the wrong enemy. It is not women athletes who are the problem; it is the inflated budgets and huge overhead for "big time" sports like football and basketball that are the problem. See the June 24, 2002 Washington Post ..Editorial by Sally Jenkins entitled "Title IX Opponents A Bunch of Sad Sacks" at <http://www.aherofordaisy.com/Sally%20Jenkins%20Article.htm>.

Title IX laws and even recently have proposed that congress amend Title IX to “take football out of the mix.” Congress did not act on that proposal, but on March 18, 2005, the Office for Civil Rights issued an additional clarification to the three-part test for part three. The clarification allows institutions to use an e-mail survey to determine interest of the student body in an institution that is not in compliance of Title IX. Concerns about the reliability of an interest survey sent out by e-mail abound, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association issued a resolution encouraging schools to avoid using this method to determine the level of interest in athletics at federally funded institutions for the purposes of Title IX compliance in athletics. (See the NCAA web site for the text of the resolution at: http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/media_and_events/press_room/2005/june/20050622_titleixanniv.html). However, the Office for Civil rights has issued a statement that this method of determining interests and abilities is sufficient.

Opponents of Title IX access the courts to redress their grievance about Title IX. For example in College Sports Council v. Department of Education (2005) brought suit challenging the effective accommodation three prong test. The case was dismissed finding that the plaintiff Council did not have standing to bring the suit. In Equity in Athletics, In. v. Department of Education (2007) sought preliminary injunction to forestall the elimination of some men’s and women’s NCAA Division I teams at James Madison University. The plaintiffs argued that gender-conscious capping or eliminating men’s teams violates the Constitution. The court held, “While the effect of the Title IX and the relevant regulation and policy interpretation is that institutions will sometimes consider

gender when decreasing their athletic offerings, this limited consideration of sex does not violate the Constitution. Congress has broad powers under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to remedy past discrimination (p. *13).

But colleges are not the only institutions receiving federal funds. High schools, where there is currently less vigilant oversight around Title IX discrimination, are not subject to NCAA rules and requirements. The National Coalition for Girls and Women in Education issued a report in May, 2007 entitled "Title IX Athletics Policies: Issues and Data for Educational Decision Makers." The data in this report shows that, although opportunities have increased dramatically in the years since the passing of Title IX and the Yale Women's Crew Protest, inequities still exist, and especially at the high school level. In fact, the gap in opportunities between boys and girls in high school has been increasing.

Over the last five years, the gap between male and female athletic participation in high school grew from 1.13 to 1.25 million opportunities. In other words, more athletics participation opportunities at the high school level were added for males at the high school level than for females despite the under-representation of females. Females comprise 49% of the high school populations but only receive 41% of athletic participation opportunities: 2,953,355 girls participating versus 4,206,549 boys (NCFGW, 2E006).

While there are many successes to celebrate as a result of enforcement of Title IX, there is still stereotyping about women and girls in sport that results in discriminatory practices in sports. The idea that a survey of interest would be an "objective" measure of interest is a territorial imperative that structures and limits the kinds of knowledge that can be produced about female interest in sport. The National Center for Girls and Women in Education (NCWGE, 2007) draws on

Cohen v. Brown University to explain. “As courts have recognized, surveys are likely merely to measure the discrimination that has limited and continues to limit sports opportunities for women and girls. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated in *Cohen v. Brown University*”:

Interests and abilities rarely develop in a vacuum; they evolve as a function of opportunity and experience . . . Women’s lower rate of participation in athletics reflects women’s historical lack of opportunities to participate in sports . . . Moreover the Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned gender-based discrimination based on archaic and overbroad generalizations about women. In addition, experts in the use of survey instruments have condemned the use of surveys of interest- which measure attitude—as a way to predict behavior. Even assuming that men will be more likely than women to profess an interest in sport, women’s lower levels of expressed interest—given their historic and current exclusion from a fair share of participation opportunities—cannot be used to predict their actual levels of participation when non-discriminatory opportunities are made available. To use the results of interest surveys as a justification for withholding opportunities would be an improper use of such methodology. (Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 174, as cited in NCWGE, 2007)

Let us return for a moment to the concepts introduced in the previous chapter.

Now, as we locate those concepts in the context of Title IX law, and the experiences and stories of women athletes and coaches, we have an opportunity to explore them further. The issues of “knowing other people well” that Lorraine Code describes resonate here. Remember that Code (1995), in calling for an epistemology that takes subjectivity into account, claims that “although the ideal objectivity of the universal knower is neither possible nor desirable, a realistic commitment to achieving empirical adequacy that engages in situated analysis of the subjectivities of both the knower and (where appropriate) the known is both desirable and possible” (p. 44). When injustice is rooted in the very nature of

language, “normal practical discourse and methods, like interest surveys, that rely on normal practical discourse are inadequate (Kastely, 1997).

The Office for Civil Rights is the institution that oversees Title IX compliance. One of the most difficult aspects of using the three-pronged approach for compliance is understanding and gathering evidence for the third part—determining interests and abilities of the members of the institution who are underrepresented in terms of opportunity. Those members, by definition as the underrepresented group, are the ones who find themselves voiceless.

An institution, or an underrepresented member of that institution, can gather evidence relevant to the proportionality of athletic opportunities. All one has to do is count—percentage of the population that is male and female, and percentage of athletic opportunities that are offered for male and female athletes.

Program expansion is also fairly simple to find evidence for, or against. It is this third aspect of the law, the “measurement” of interest and ability, and the implication that interest should precede opportunity that requires a different approach. When a group is already underrepresented, and historically has been underrepresented because discrimination and oppression, probing the interests and abilities of that group may be difficult. Simply asking, “Are you interested?” is not enough. Taking the subjectivities of the underrepresented group into account requires more than that. Perhaps the institution should be required to ask questions like: what prevents you from being interested in this, and what might change your level of interest? The method of using a survey to determine interest is inherently biased in that it assumes that the subjects of the survey are

untainted by previous biases and stereotypes. This method requires the victims of discrimination to “use the language of the criminal” (Kincaid, 1988) to express the problem.

If I were an African American living in the South during the Jim Crow laws and you asked me if I were interested in doing something for which I had been implicitly or explicitly forbidden and punished, isn't it possible that I may not express my interest, even if I were interested? So, my interest would have been tested by simply asking a question which begs many, many more questions to really understand the answers I am giving. What you really need from me is not a yes or no answer about my interests and my abilities. You need to know the history, the “stories” behind my answer, in order to be epistemically responsible. The e-mail survey is an instrument for gathering data, but it does not produce a “storied” conclusion about my desire, my interests and my abilities that will allow the institution to make decisions that are supported by both the letter and the spirit of the Title IX Law. If justice is truly the aim of the law, then “getting the story” on interest levels from an emailed interest survey is inadequate and irresponsible.

Title IX and Speaking Out for Compliance

One of the problems with Title IX compliance is that speaking out about discrimination can be dangerous. What happens if you claim discrimination and nobody hears you? In some cases, it is the coaches, employees of the institution, who have firsthand knowledge about the inequities their athletes are facing. What available means does an employee have to reveal non-compliance

of Title IX by their institution and still maintain job security? Many coaches keep their problems to themselves because they love their jobs; they need their jobs, they need the pay, and the health benefits and cannot afford to put their employment in jeopardy by blowing the whistle on their employer to reveal discrimination based on gender.

I suggest that the “whistle blowing” dilemma for coaches and athletes wishing to claim discrimination serve as an example of instances where injustice is rooted in language (Kastely, 1997) and where the “rhetorical space” puts limits on speech meant to pursue justice.

While the Yale women’s problems are located in a very specific time and place in history in a decade where civil rights for Americans were being reinterpreted, expanded and clarified, and where the women’s movement was gathering momentum, and where the legal constraints of the recently passed Title IX were being resisted at every level of society, from ball fields to congress to the courts, they have not gone away. Men and women who want to claim equal rights for women in sports are still “constrained” in ways that limit their speech and actions, silence them, and perpetuate an oppressive status quo.

In March of 2005, nearly thirty years after the Yale Women’s crew employed a unique set of rhetorical tactics to expose the discrimination at the Yale University Athletic Department, the United States Supreme Court ruled on behalf of a high school girls basketball coach, Roderick Jackson, who was fired for claiming discrimination under Title IX on behalf of his girls team (Jackson v. Birmingham Education (2003)). Until March 2005, other federal statutes included

“whistle blower” provisions, but Title IX did not. In other words, the people who are often in the best position to reveal Title IX violation on behalf of their girls’ or women’s’ programs were not protected under the law until a year ago, 30 years after the amendment was passed.

Rhetorical Girdles and a Woman’s Body

In the film *A Hero for Daisy* (1999) Mazzio relates the “Olympic Incident” involving Chris Ernst, the captain of the Yale women’s crew and a member of the first US Women’s Olympic Rowing Team. Rowing had always been an Olympic sport since the modern inception of the Olympics, but for men only. In the summer of 1976, at the Ile de Notre Dame in Montreal, women participated as Olympians in the sport of rowing for the first time. That team included two members of the same Yale Women’s Crew who had inscribed Title IX on their bodies in protest of discrimination. They were Chris Ernst and Annie Warner.

The “Olympic Incident” is the story of Chris’ response to the uniforms that were issued to the female members of the US Olympic Team. The two items of particular interest included as part of the opening ceremonies parade uniform were a red purse and a girdle. When Chris discovered that she had been issued a red purse and a girdle, she reacted with both horror and amusement. She dressed up in an outfit starting with her racing uniform underneath, and then she put the girdle and team-issue brassiere (there were no “sport bras” then) over it, red purse under her arm. She stood in the hallway in the athlete dorms at Olympic Village in front of the elevator to the humor, delight and, one would imagine, horror for some of those who encountered this emblem of the American

female Olympian. The film *A Hero for Daisy* documents this historical moment with an unforgettable image of the youthful Chris Ernst's humorous protest. How telling, how appropriate, that these unruly Yale women parading into the stadium to the deafening cheers of the adoring crowd should be wearing a girdle. Surely these fit, muscular athletes had no unruly bodily fat to be contained by this undergarment; it seems impossible to imagine that anyone could think a girdle necessary for these women. Somehow, the girdle stands for the cultural anxiety about women athletes, and for the desire to keep bound up all of the excess that these women's bodies represented.

Wendy Dasler Johnson (2001) writes about rhetoric and corsets in her essay "A Cultural Rhetoric of Women's Corsets." In it she explores both the limiting and productive possibilities for the ways that the corset informs bodily rhetoric. It can serve as a limiting force, producing a "girl entirely bound up by conventional expectations." For the Yale Women, the corset symbolizes the ways the Yale Women exceeded the conventional expectations for women, by both busting out of their corsets like Sojourner Truth did, when she bared her biceps to show that she was both strong and female. But they also wore their corsets in a display of mockery, as Chris did in the Olympics, over her chiseled muscular body and her red, white and blue Olympic racing uniform. The Yale women's rhetorical tactics exceeded the corsets limiting power, but also employed the corsets structuring power to juxtapose the conventional expectations for women's bodies at Yale University with the reality of "these

(women's) bodies" which were appearing before Joni Barnett. Dasler Johnson (2001) writes:

A thoughtful consideration of women's subjectivity in our day will include a long view on corsets. They suggest not only the plasticity and politics of cultural self-construction generally and the constructedness of gender "identity" in particular but also the lengths bourgeois culture went to—and goes to—the last two and a half centuries to shape a preferred feminine figure. For me, corsets foreground the ambiguity of disciplining discourses. They constrict but they also produce (pp. 203-33).

To cite Title IX in the way that the Yale Women did allowed them to exploit the limiting power of another corset as well, one for which a man named Roderick Jackson, in contrast, was able to harness and use productively nearly thirty years later. That is the corset of the U.S. Justice system and the court of law. The legal system requires that language, evidence and proof conform to very rigid codes and standards. The interpretive practice that occurs in the U.S. court system is subject to those same rigid codes and standards, for good reason. Jackson's story is one in which the corset of the law was, eventually, productive. Not only did Jackson win his case for himself, which made it all the way to the Supreme Court, he succeeded in getting a ruling that would protect future advocates of Title IX wishing to speak out against a discriminatory employer, and future athletes for whom speaking out for themselves might be impossible.

Jackson's story begins in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1998. A Health and Physical education teacher in the Birmingham School District for many years, Jackson became the head coach of the Ensley High girl's basketball team. When he began coaching he become increasingly aware of the inequity in

treatment between the girls team and the boys team. It was when he began to take his complaints “up the chain of command” in his school building, and then out to the district, that he found himself breaking some unspoken rules, and saying some tacitly forbidden things.

Roderick Jackson, although a man, experienced the rhetorical effects of the girdle in 2001 in much the same way the Yale Women did in 1976; they both found themselves in a rhetorical space where the “territorial imperatives” functioned like a girdle to silence them, and render them “trouble makers.” It may be interesting to note that in addition to the territorial imperatives around gender—a girls’ basketball team looking for equitable treatment by their public high school, the fact that the advocate for the girls was a black man in Birmingham, Alabama, may have played a role in the ways his speech was “structured and limited.” Can a woman, or a black man advocating for women athletes, get the kind of institutional uptake a white man might?

Roderick Jackson’s statement about his case, read before the Supreme Court and archived on the National Women’s Law Center Web site, echoes uncanny strains of the testimonial statement, read aloud by Chris Ernst in 1976 while her teammates stood baring their chests and backs covered in the words “Title IX.” Jackson (2001) explains his situation in the statement:

But my team didn’t have it easy, and the girls were treated worse than the boys in many ways. The girls were not allowed to use the new, regulation, gym used by the boys’ team; instead, the girls had to practice and play in the old gym with its wooden backboards, bent rims and no heat. Although the boys’ team was transported to away games by bus, the girls had to make their own arrangements to travel by car when their games were scheduled at different times from the boys’ games. The girls

also couldn't get to some of the amenities available to the boys, including the ice machine. On one occasion, for example, I was forced to break into the ice machine with a screw driver to put ice on an injured player.

He opens his speech by explaining who he is, and pointing out the achievements of his team. In other words, if success were a measure for equal treatment, there should have been no discrimination. His team was good. But they were not being treated fairly by Ensley High School. Almost thirty years earlier, the Yale statement went even further than to merely compare conditions to show the lack of equity; they claimed that Yale was exploiting them:

These are the bodies that Yale is exploiting. We have come here today to make clear how unprotected we are, to show graphically what we are being exposed to. These are normal human bodies. On a day like today the rain freezes on our skin. Then we sit on a bus for half an hour as the ice melts into our sweats to meet the sweat that has soaked our clothes underneath. We sit for half an hour chilled... half a dozen of us are sick now, and in two days we will begin training twice a day, subjecting ourselves to this twice a day.

Roderick describes his attempts to address the inequities in a reasonable manner, using normal channels, which he calls "the chain of command":

o me, this is just unfair. So I went through the chain of command – from the school Athletic Director, to the Principal, to the Athletics Director of the system, to the Director of High Schools in Birmingham, and to the Deputy Superintendent of Instruction, who is the second in command of the system—to try to level the playing field for my team. I was astounded that no one cared.

Despite the fact that his women were clearly being prevented from getting the same benefits the boys teams were getting, Roderick's complaints fell on deaf ears. It was as if he were invisible, and the things he was trying to say were in a language no one could hear. The rhetorical space he was in did not allow him to voice, with a reasonable expectation for uptake, the truth of the situation

for the girls on the Ensley High School basketball team: they were being discriminated against and no one would listen. The Yale women describe a similar situation:

No effective action has been taken and no matter what we hear, it doesn't make these bodies warmer, or dryer or less prone to sickness. We can't accept any excuses, nor can we trust to normal channels of complaint, since the need for lockers for the Women's Crew has existed since last spring.

The complaints the women made, using "normal channels of complaint" were met with either no response, or excuses, or both. Their concerns were not taken up by the athletic administration at Yale University. The Yale women were aware of the risk that this protest would result in retaliation. They were willing to accept whatever retaliation came their way, but they wanted to protect their coach, an employee of the institution. They ensured that he not be held responsible by explicitly absolving him in their statement:

We have taken this action absolutely without our coach's knowledge. He has done all he can to get us some relief, and none has come. He ordered the trailer when the plans for real facilities fell through, and he informed you four times of the need to get a variance to make it useable, but none was obtained. We fear retribution against him, but we are, as you can see, desperate.

Roderick Jackson *did* suffer retribution against him. He was the one who spoke out on behalf of his team. He was the employee of the institution against which he was making discrimination claims. Not only did he encounter an institution that didn't care about the claims he was making, he writes:

. . . Worse than that, they got angry and fired me from my coaching job...Why I was fired is clear-cut. I spoke up on an issue that no one was ready to deal with, an unpopular issue, and I got penalized for it. I not only lost the pleasure of coaching; I lost the extra income I earned and the higher retirement benefits I would have gotten based on that money. I was labeled a troublemaker and for two and one-half years was turned down for every coaching position I applied for at other schools. And the young ladies at Ensley lost the only person who was willing to speak up for them.

Jackson explained in an interview a Los Angeles radio station after the Supreme Court ruling came down in his favor, that he would have been fired from his teaching job as well if he didn't already have tenure. However, even though he was not fired from his teaching position, he was moved without explanation from the better job of teaching driver's education to a position teaching health to ninth graders where the class sizes were large and the students were typically unruly. His status as a teacher was being reduced, he was fired from his coaching position, and he felt the affects of having spoken into a public space where his words were not welcome. The reason for these punishments was not explicated, and the issues were not spoken of. But he knew why he was losing status as a teacher and the right to coach basketball. He had become labeled a troublemaker and a "rabble rouser" and he was feeling squeezed by an institution that wanted him to conform to their tacit expectations to look away from the discrimination his team was suffering.

The Yale women's speech is written in the present tense, and brings us, the readers into the moment of the protest. From the speech, we know they are concerned about what might happen to their coach, Nat Case, and are not sure what kind of retaliation this protest might spawn. Roderick Jackson's speech

takes place after he has been fired, gone to court, had his case dismissed in the lower courts and on the eve of a history-making decision by the Supreme Court to protect those who speak out against gender based discrimination in the same way those who speak out against racial or ethnic discrimination have been protected for decades. Both Roderick Jackson and the Yale Women were labeled troublemakers for what they said and did. Both Roderick Jackson and the Yale women used Title IX to loosen the girdle that constrained their ability to speak and claim the truth of their situations.

What is different about these two cases, however, is the way in which citation of Title IX was used. In other words, the girdle of speech around Title IX resulted in very different means for producing the truth for the Yale Women in 1976 than for Roderick Jackson in 2001. For Jackson, the time and means for moving through the court system was, though difficult, possible, and eventually productive.

For the Yale Women, suing Yale University for discrimination under Title IX would have been problematic on several counts. First, suing would have taken too much time. The year was 1976, and at least two of the women on the Yale Crew were vying for a spot on the first Women's Olympic Rowing Team. As Annie Warner explains in the film *A Hero for Daisy*, "We couldn't afford to get sick. We didn't have *time* to get sick! The Olympics were coming, and we had to train and be healthy now" (quoted In Mazzio, 1999). These women needed shelter immediately, and because they had been operating under the impression that shelter would be provided imminently, when it wasn't, they needed to act

quickly in order to remain healthy and maintain their training regimen and schedule for the summer Olympics.

Secondly, they feared suing would put their coach, Nat Case, in jeopardy. They feared retribution for him for any action they took; suing would put him in danger of losing his job and put them in danger of losing the coach they needed to guide their training for the intercollegiate racing season that would begin a month later in April, and for Annie Warner and Chris Ernst's long term goal of making the 1976 Women's Olympic Team.

Thirdly, the legal system's requirement of meeting certain standards of proof would be difficult for them. How does one make a case against the institution one belongs to without feeling immediate repercussions? Would they lose the right to compete? To use the Yale Athletic facilities? How would they get the institutional information they needed that would help to serve as proof of their discrimination? Could they come up with the support of their families—some of whom considered rowing too masculine a sport in the first place—to finance the court battle? Clearly the hurdles before were so burdensome that going to court was out of the question, at least in the short term.

So the Yale women used legal citation in a very unconventional manner. Instead of sending a legal letter putting Yale University on notice of their legal complaint, they burst out of the constraints of the system and cited the law on their own flesh. Unlike the Yale Women, Roderick Jackson worked within the corset of the legal system by filing the 2001 Roderick Jackson vs. Birmingham Board of Education complaint in 2001, representing himself because he could not

afford a lawyer. Jackson lost that case in the lower courts, and lost the appeal as well on the grounds that the courts saw no specific language in the Title IX Amendment that would protect those complaining of discrimination, thereby making legal the actions taken against Jackson by his school and the Birmingham Board of Education. But Jackson, for whom the sense of urgency was strong, but not limited by an upcoming Olympic try-out, continued his journey through the court system over a period of five years, from the lower courts, through the high courts until finally, with the help of the National Women's Law Center which provided professional legal representation, his case made it to the Supreme Court, where the lower court rulings were overturned, and Title IX received yet another interpretation. This time it was an interpretation that clarified and expanded the scope of this Amendment to include protection for those "whistle blowers" claiming discrimination on behalf of someone else. For Jackson, and for future Title IX whistle blowers, the corset of the law was, eventually, productive in allowing him to claim the truth of his female athlete's discrimination, and his right to make that claim without suffering retribution.

The history of the Yale Women's Crew protest, Roderick Jackson's experience and the thirty plus year history of Title IX are deeply entwined with my own history as a female athlete, and college and Olympic Rower and women's rowing coach at University of Pennsylvania, Harvard and the University of New Hampshire. All of these narratives intertwine, circle around and resonate in uncanny ways with each other. I experienced the humiliation of institutional denial and silencing—in Little League, whose doors were opened to me long after

I could take advantage of it, in high school and college athletics, where being an athlete meant being “a dyke” or a “he-woman” or, as we were referred to at the University of Pennsylvania, “a crack.” I experienced the power of Title IX as well. I advocated for equity at the University of Pennsylvania for women athletes, and eventually the University of Pennsylvania’s “men’s boathouse” underwent an expansion. In my senior year, the University of Pennsylvania opened its boathouse doors to the University of Pennsylvania Women’s Rowing Team for the first time in its 150-year history.

CHAPTER 5

A TEXT OF WEIRD ABUNDANCE

I begin the analysis of the Yale Women's Crew Protest by returning to the quotation from Craig Lambert's (1999) book on *Rowing, Mind over Water*:

In the shell we occupy a liminal area between sky and water, between carp and cormorant. The rower is both fish and bird—a flying fish, or else an aquatic condor with a staggering wingspan, skimming across the water's surface. Suspended between liquid and air, we inhabit a transitional zone that opens a window on mysteries hidden from those with solid ground beneath their feet. Sliding between dark and shadow, between sunlight and the obscure, is the region of discovery. Here the inchoate seeks form. Every area of creation has such a penumbra: venture capital, avant garde arts, courtship. In such crucibles, imagination creates the future (p. 15).

Lambert's poetic description of the space occupied by the rower as she skims across the water in her paper thin rowing shell expresses the magical experience of rowing: suspended between liquid and air, both a fish swimming and a bird flying, sliding between dark, hidden negative spaces and light, where the inchoate seeks form. Language is nearly insufficient to locate that place, though Lambert's description takes me there. And it is language, too, that occupies this liminal space. Language is the rowing shell, the boat we row where the inchoate seeks form and language can slide and rock unevenly as the rowing shell does at times.

The promise of language, and the promise of literacy is that it will move us from the inchoate to mutual understanding, from powerlessness, voicelessness,

and invisibility to recognition and acknowledgement. However, remember that Leigh Gilmore (2001) explained how the frame of jurisprudence in autobiography makes certain forms of language use perilous for the speaker, who can only contest by “not telling their story” (p. 43). Both Lisa Delpit (1996) and Carol Gilligan (1990) write about the dangerous assumption that language is neutral; language is imbued with power, they explain, and our particular locations and subjectivities, “the skin that we speak” structure and limit our access to that power. Delpit (1992) explains that for non-dominant groups like African American students who are forced to use the language of dominant groups, there is a risk of “bowing before the master.” Gilligan (1990), describing the struggles of adolescent girls to maintain their identity through puberty, explains that when the only language available to contest patriarchal oppression is “the language of the father,” adolescent girls are rendered silent and “go underground.” Cheryl Glenn (2004) identifies silence as a rhetorical tactic in response to language that functions as a girdle. The women of the Yale University Crew, struggling to overcome their oppression as women in the Yale Athletic Department, had to find a way to both use language and not use language in order to give their complaints a form that would be recognized by the university. By creating a text in this liminal space, between the concrete and the abstract, between fact and feeling, between the law and a specific context, between Yale as audience and the readers of the *New York Times* as audience, the Yale women discovered a future.

I return you now to the scene of the protest. Chris Ernst, Annie Warner, Eugenia Keisling and the other members of the Yale women's crew appear before Joni Barnett in the her office. The women stand in two lines, wearing Yale Crew sweats. A *New York Times* reporter enters the room and takes out a note pad. The silent women remove their tops and Joni Barnett stands up, speechless. Their chests and backs cite the law "Title IX" in grease marker, and Chris Ernst begins reading a 300-word statement that had been composed earlier on the bus between the boathouse in Derby, Connecticut, to the Yale University campus in New Haven.

These are the bodies Yale is exploiting. We have come here today to make clear how unprotected we are, to show graphically what we are being exposed to. These are normal human bodies. On a day like today the rain freezes on our skin. Then we sit on a bus for half an hour as the ice melts into our sweats to meet the sweat that has soaked our clothes underneath. We sit for half and hour chilled... half a dozen of us are sick now, and in two days we will begin training twice a day, subjecting ourselves to this twice everyday. No effective action has been taken and no matter what we hear, it doesn't make these bodies warmer, or dryer or less prone to sickness. We can't accept any excuses, nor can we trust to normal channels of complaint, since the need for lockers for the Women's Crew has existed since last spring. We are using you and your office because you are the symbol of Women's Athletics at Yale; we're using this method to express our urgency. We have taken this action absolutely without our coach's knowledge. He has done all he can to get us some relief, and none has come. He ordered the trailer when the plans for real facilities fell through, and he informed you four times of the need to get a variance to make it useable, but none was obtained. We fear retribution against him, but we are, as you can see, desperate. We are not just healthy young things in blue and white uniforms who perform feats of strength for Yale in the nice spring weather; we are not just statistics on your win column. We're human and being treated as less than such. There has been a lack of concern and competence on your part. Your only answer to us is the immediate provision of the use of the trailer, however inadequate that may be. (Speech made by Chris Ernst before the Yale Assistant Athletic Director, May, 1972)

Bricolage as Rhetorical Tactic

From the Yale Archives, the text of this speech is one of the few artifacts that document the important 1976 protest that as John Kerry (in Mazziio, 1999) says, had implications for female athletes around the nation. The event was a performance, of which only traces exist, traces that are dispersed and fragmented, particles of dust. Mary Mazziio's documentation of the event for her film *A Hero for Daisy* contributed to the collection and reintegration of many of these particles, including the fragments of memory of those who participated, those who were spectators and those who heard about it and felt its affects afterward. In my study of this event, I have uncovered other fragments and pulled them together alongside the fragments in the film for my analysis of this event. This is the method of bricolage.

Chris Ernst and her teammates used bricolage in their text as well. They drew on the available rhetorical tactics at hand to pull together a whole, creating a single text containing multiple modes, genres, audiences, a kind of multi-genre text (Allen 2001; Jung 2005; Romano 1992). It may have been that the power of the text is a result of the interaction of all of its elements, rather than from any one or several of the elements the women drew on to communicate their concerns. The use of a testimonial speech, of the females body, of legal citation, of the *New York Times*; perhaps no one of those elements would have had the same rhetorical effect as the combination of all of them. Whether the choices made by the women were conscious or unconscious, the resonance of this bricolage text is "weirdly abundant" (Salvio, 2007).

Subject/Object

In the first line, Chris Ernst reads, “These are the bodies that Yale is exploiting.” Remember that the members of the Yale Women’s Rowing Team have filed silently into the Athletic Director’s office, and have just removed their Yale Crew sweatshirts and there is a *New York Times* reporter present. This first line renders the members of the team standing before the athletic director into the objects of the sentence—these are the bodies—and the sentence begins with a bold declaration. Yale is exploiting these bodies. In the first sentence, the women are objects. But in the next sentence, they appear as the grammatical subject as Chris reads, “We have come here today to make clear how unprotected we are, to show graphically what we are exposed to.” The plural pronoun, a collective subject—we—puts the institution on notice that “these bodies” are both objects and subjects. They said they needed to make clear that they were unprotected because perhaps it had not yet been made clear to the institution, or because it was an abstract concern for them. They made their vulnerability clear to the institution—graphically—they said, to show to what they were exposed. They were, literally, exposed to the elements, which they showed graphically through the uncovering of their bodies. However, they were also exposed to objectification, which they were performing for the institution both by appearing as nude women, and by writing themselves into the text of this speech as objects: “these bodies.” They simultaneously exploited their own objectification by turning their objectified bodies into texts. They “wrote” their protest onto their own skin to show that they were exposed to discrimination

based on their gender, signified by the grease marks forming Title IX on their chests and backs. The mark "Title IX" held multiple meanings: as a symbol, or graphic mark, Title IX signified the legal power of those who are discriminated against, so the mark represented a certain kind of power available to vulnerable (naked) bodies. The single phrase written on their skin also served as a textual citation to another authoritative text, the law meant to protect them from gender discrimination within an institution receiving federal funds.

Citation

The use of the words *Title IX* by the Yale women is particularly interesting. The testimonial speech which Chris Ernst read aloud, and which Yale University preserved in its archives, never mentions the law. The speech is about "the bodies Yale is exploiting," in a tone that is clearly a demand because they say that no excuse is acceptable. "Your only answer to us is the immediate provision of the use of the trailer, however inadequate that may be." Like Sexton, in her poetry readings, using middle-class style to lodge a complaint against the plight of middle class women (Salvio, 2007) these women have used their own objectification to lodge their complaint against Yale for objectifying them. They never say they will sue Yale University for discrimination; they never suggest that they will test the reach of the Title IX amendment within the athletic department at Yale University by going to court. But the use of the citation on the nude chests and backs of the silent female rowers is deliberate. The women are claiming that the law does, or should, reach to these particular women athletes at Yale University. The law is cited, but rather than citing it in the text of the

speech, the women situated the law, literally, on the nude bodies of the women. One could read that move as a message: the context for interpretation of Title IX extends to objectified Yale women athletes, in this Yale Athletic Department office, in this very moment. The citation was a silent one; it was not referred to explicitly. And the bodies that bore the law were silent as well; they appeared as the objects of the testimonial speech. Both the law, and the women, though, represented power in their silence. By shifting that image out of the context of Yale University's Athletic Department and into a more public realm, the silent women and the Title IX law were infused with power.

Unspoken: The Power of Silence

There were nineteen women in the room, but only one spoke. The rest of the women who were present were silent. What did their silent presence mean in this text? Cheryl Glenn (2004) writes about silence as a deliberate rhetorical move in her book, *Unspoken: A rhetoric of silence*. Glenn rereads silence through a feminist lens, explaining that silence is often taken to convey a lack of authority or power, and is often interpreted as passive agreement. When silence is read as an authoritative and intentional, it can be understood as a rhetorical tactic. Glenn (2004) writes:

The rhetorical tradition, long preoccupied with written and spoken rhetorics, has for too long ignored the rhetorical powers of silence. Though rhetorical handlist still mention *silence* and its generations (*aposiopesis*, *interpellatio*, *obticentia*, *praecisio* and *reinentia*), the contemporary rhetorical scene, for the most part, assumes silence to be simply an absence of text or voice (p. 2).

The nineteen topless women were not speaking nor reading from a text during the protest. While the unclothed body is often perceived as vulnerable, the

women were deliberately utilizing the voyeuristic objectification of their own bodies to get the attention of the athletic department officials. In a similar vein, their silence, which is often associated with vulnerability, created an absence of sound that demanded the listeners' attention. Glenn (2004) promotes silence as a rhetorical tactic:

When silence is our choice, we can use it purposefully and effectively... Employed as a tactical strategy or inhabited in deference to authority, silence resonates loudly along the corridors of purposeful language use, of rhetoric. Whether choice or im/position, silence can reveal positive or negative abilities, fulfilling or withholding traits, harmony or disharmony, success or failure. Just like speech, silence can deploy power; it can defer to power. It all depends (p. 15).

By standing there naked from the waist up and silent, simultaneously vulnerable and powerful, Chris Ernst's team members created a space which allowed them to be recognized, and which offered a means for them to get uptake from athletic department officials who had previously been slow or resistant to respond to their concerns. Just as they played with their own positions as simultaneously subject/object, their silence had the capacity to hold both their deference to power and their deployment of it. The silence of Ernst's nineteen team members drew even greater attention to her reading of the testimonial speech. Glenn (2004) explains that "the spoken and the unspoken reciprocate as they deliver often complementary rhetorical significance" (p. 7). The complementary rhetorical significance of 19 silent women and the testimonial speech, claiming "these are the bodies that Yale is exploiting," contributed to the choral uptake that these women eventually found.

Intertextuality

By inviting the *New York Times* Reporter, and by citing Title IX, another text, the women created a form of intertextuality that gave their protest another kind of power. Julie Jung (2005) explains that “the intertextual moment reaches back, filling in gaps with new and different versions that both work against and support the central text (31). She draws on Nancy Walker(1995) to help us see that intertextuality allows authors to use the juxtaposition of texts in ways to challenge the legitimacy of dominant “truths.” She cites Walker:

To the extent that narrative is referential to a prior narrative in its own construction, it calls attention to its own fictive and conditional character. Put another way, it becomes a narrative rather than the narrative, a construct to be set alongside other constructs. Thus this revisionary kind of narrative is closely allied to metafiction. Whereas metafiction calls attention to the conventions of creating fiction—its mechanisms of plot, character, voice—the narratives I am addressing accomplish a similar end by calling attention to the elements of another version of the story. (Walker, 1995, pp. 6-7 emphasis in original, as cited in Jung, 2005)

The presence of the *New York Times* reporter created a new audience for the lodging of the Yale Women rower's complaint. They pushed their text(s) through the walls of the institution from whom they were hoping for redress, out to the readers of the *New York Times*. The texts the women were making formed almost a set of nesting dolls: the speech, the spectacle of the nude women, the stunned Assistant Athletic Director, Title IX itself, the subsequent reports and photographs in the Yale Daily News, and The *New York Times* which themselves formed a single text. The interaction of the multiple texts with multiple audiences produced the response the Yale Women's Crew was looking for:

immediate action. The women got shelter and eventually they got a place in the Yale University boathouse. The citation of text, the citation of the women's speech and performance in another text, *The New York Times*, created momentum for this complaint that it might not otherwise have had in the form of a letter from the women's crew directly to Joni Barnett. The intertextuality employed in the Yale Women's Crew protest created new audiences and new authority for the claim that helped the complaint to get uptake.

Jessica Enoch, in *Resisting the script of Indian education: Zitkala Sa and the Carlisle Indian School*, (2002) explores another historical example of an autobiographical writer, Zitkala Sa, using another text, in this case *The Atlantic Monthly*, to shift the context of her story. In order to resist an institutional narrative that was attempting to overwrite her claims about how she experienced the off-reservation education of these schools, she had to extend the frame of jurisprudence from the institution where, no matter how well she demonstrated her mastery of the English language, she would always be a "savage," always rendered grotesque, and therefore, the unreliable "I" of the story. Enoch (2000) explains that by publishing her autobiographical writing in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Zitkala Sa:

. . . found an outlet that enabled her to enter into a public space not regulated by Carlisle's Man-on-the-band-stand and to speak out against the injustices she saw in Indian education. Her pedagogical resistance and rhetorical sovereignty address "the difficulty [. . . of speaking across realities that are culture bound" (Bird 68). She deals with this difficulty by enabling her readers to realize the material effects of imposing one culture's values, specifically their educational values, on another's. Through her essays, she exposes her readers to the world she

experienced as an Indian student and teacher and troubles dominant educational storylines, like Carlisle's, which dictated that white, culturally bound realities define what is good and right for Indian children (pp. 136-137).

While Zitkala Sa used a series of autobiographical essays to help her readers “realize the material effects of imposing one’s values” on another’s, the Yale women *performed* these material effects for the *New York Times* reporter and for the institution, simultaneously. By exposing themselves, they exposed their readers to the world they were experiencing as women athletes at Yale. By inscribing their bodies with “Title IX,” by undressing, by reading the testimonial statement, and by having that performance reported in the *New York Times*, the Yale women accomplished a similar troubling of Yale’s dominant educational storylines that dictated which athletic bodies would be admired and supported for their strength and power and which bodies would be rendered grotesque.

Over thirty years later, another text was added to this set of nesting doll texts. The film, *A Hero for Daisy* (Mazzio, 1999), is another more recent text that was produced as a result of this event. While the aim of the Yale women was to get shelter immediately, the perhaps unintended result of their text was a shift in the interpretation of Title IX. Once Yale had to address its institutional gender discrimination, other institutions began to self examine their practices and resource allocation. And, when Mazzio’s film was released decades later, these important and still relevant conversations were renewed. (See the web site <http://aherofordaisy.com/dates.html> for a list of the past and future screenings of the film and <http://title-ix.blogspot.com/> to read some of the current issues around Title IX law.) While the conventional wisdom portrays a rosy picture for women

athletes today, discrimination still exists. The film launched a consciousness raising for many who are involved in women's athletics. For example, Julie Greenleaf submitted a review of the film on the website, writing:

Your film inspired us [Connecticut College Rowing Team] to take a stand against the unfair treatment of our team by the college administration... I cannot thank you enough for making a film as empowering as "A Hero for Daisy." The story of Chris Ernst and your portrayal of it inspired 45 women to stand up for what we believe in. At dinner tonight, the captain of my team belted out, " Hey, we're heroes for Daisy!"

Although her submission is undated, this institutional discrimination to which Greenleaf refers was contested by these women sometime after the film was released in 1999; discrimination and voicelessness was experienced and contested 30 years ago by the Yale women, but this discrimination and voicelessness is still experienced today, and through the film, the event has become a powerful catalyst for change even in this century. The event, its reporting in the *New York Times* and its documentation in this film has had a "weird abundance" provoking courage, solidarity and uptake for women athletes across the country, and across the years. (For multiple examples of the weird abundance of this film see, "viewer reviews" at <http://www.aherofordaisy.com/reviews..htm>).

Graphic Representation or Non-linguistic Representation

What does it mean to show something "graphically." and how does that contribute to the meaning of the unusual text the women were performing? The word is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary this way: "As in a clear pictorial representation; in a vividly descriptive manner so as to convey all (esp. unpleasant or unwelcome) details; clearly, unequivocally." After letters and

petitions failed them, these women, who passed all of the conventional tests of literacy with flying colors, drew on the “clear, pictorial representation” to show that they were unprotected and to show what they were being exposed to, in a vividly descriptive manner so as to convey the unpleasant and unwelcome details of their “exposure.” There is another meaning to the word *graphically* in the OED; the second definition, the original meaning, is “in the manner of writing. Now, by means of written signs.” A rare and obsolete definition of the word in the middle seventeenth century for the word *graphically* is “by means of drawing or painting” and in the late eighteenth century the word meant “by the use of diagrams, linear figures, or symbolic curves; by the construction of diagrams or graphs” (citing the OED, p. 1132). The archeology of the word *graphically* reveals a meaning that includes “the use of symbolic curves,” which, given the use of the bare female breast, seems apropos. While Chris Ernst and the Yale Women may not have consciously chosen the word “graphically” in 1976 to mean “the symbolic use of curves,” the current meaning that drew them to a word that is “saturated with sense” (Vygotsky, 1996). These multiple meanings may have been more fully expressed visually and gesturally rather than verbally.

“Ain’t I a Woman”

In the third line of her speech, Chris Ernst’s reading returns to the bodies as object. “These are normal human bodies.” The women are claiming that they are normal human bodies. This word, too has definitions and connotations that are saturated with sense. To be normal is to be usual or typical and, mathematically, to be the mean, or average, the point on a continuum which falls

in the middle or the bulge on the bell curve. The claim to normalcy by the Yale Women may be in response to what they perceive is the institutional fear that this “sub category” of women, female athletes, are somehow deviant.

Annie Warner was another of the leaders of the team and of this protest, and, along with Chris, members of the first US Olympic Rowing team later in the summer of 1976. She articulates this in the film *Explaining* that they were “perceived somehow as debased and disgusting” (Mazzio, 1999). These women were aware that an unspoken perception about them was that they were deviant, exceeding the definitions of what Yale expected when they admitted women. “We are not just healthy young things in blue and white uniforms who perform feats of strength for Yale in the nice spring weather,” Chris Ernst reads. The women identified the attitude of the “healthy young things” playing in the “nice spring weather.” But they also included the fact that they were “performing feats of strength for Yale” something that might not be expected of healthy young (female) things.

Taking off their shirts could be read as an act of “proof” of the normalcy of their female bodies. And while “these bodies” were visibly athletic female bodies, Chris claimed their place within the conventions of normal, bringing to mind the 19th century advocate for social justice, Sojourner Truth. The baring of the chest and the claiming of one’s place within the norm describe the rhetorical moves of Sojourner Truth in her famous “Ain’t I a Woman” speech. The testimonial speech read by Chris Ernst echoes some of the anger, the demand for

recognition that can be heard in Sojourner Truth's famous abolitionist/feminist speech in these words:

That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages and lifted over ditches and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place! And ain't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed and planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could hear me! And ain't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man - when I could get it - and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman? I have borne thirteen children, and seen most all sold off to slavery, and when I cried out with my mother's grief, none but Jesus heard me! And ain't I a woman? (Halsall, 1997)

While Sojourner Truth didn't uncover her chest, the power of her speech came partly from the fact that a nearly six foot tall black woman stood before a group of white abolitionists to address the issue of black women's invisibility in the movement. She reportedly uncovered her arm to bare her muscle, which in 1851 might have been nearly as arresting as women taking off their shirts in 1976.

Repetition

The repetition of the phrase "normal bodies/human bodies" in the Yale Women's speech is reminiscent of the repetition of the phrase "ain't I a woman" in the famous Sojourner Truth address.¹¹ Whether the Yale Women consciously or unconsciously drew upon the rhetorical tactics of Truth, the "device" of repetition, and the use of the body to represent both normalcy and

¹¹There are questions about the validity of the speech as it was recorded by Francis Gage in 1863 regarding the phrase "ain't I am women." The repetition of this phrase may not have been part of the original speech. However, Francis Gage's version is the only written version of the speech, as Truth herself was non-literate. See Mabee, Carlton and Newhouse Susan M. Sojourner Truth: Slave, Prophet, Legend. New York: New York University Press, 1993.

difference simultaneously in the speech echo Truth's rhetorical tactics, and appear to contribute to the emancipatory power of the speech.

Repetition in the testimonial speech is just one example of the kind of repetition embedded within and resulting from this text. The fact that nineteen women appeared in two rows wearing their Yale Crew sweats meant that their membership in the institution was repeated nineteen times: Yale Women's Crew, Yale Women's Crew, Yale Women's Crew. . . And, when their tops were removed, Title IX appeared 38 times, on nineteen chests and 19 backs. Though it was never audible, and never uttered as part of the testimonial statement, the words Title IX had resonance in the room at that moment, and later in the headlines of the newspaper articles, photographs and many years later in the film documenting the event. Mazzi's representation of the speech is at first presented Ernst's lone voice reading the short phrase that appeared in the *New York Times* article in March 1976, then gradually multiple voices chime in, creating a chorus of readers, a multivocal performance of the lines, "These are the bodies that Yale is exploiting"

The Female Grotesque

In the archives, I came across the *Yale book of numbers* (Pierson, 1983), through which I learned that Yale University cataloged the height and weight of Yale students until the 1960s. The interest in the height and heft of the Yale student body was intriguing, as it implies an emphasis on both intellectual and physical power. Those attributes, particularly height and muscularity, are not typically considered female, or feminine attributes. The sport of rowing demands

physical power, and taller athletes tend to provide better leverage on the end of an oar. Rowing at Yale had been in existence for over 150 years, and “The Race,” a grueling annual three mile contest between Yale University and Harvard University signaled a struggle for power between the countries most elite and powerful men. Now, in 1976, a bunch of women were rowing, moving into a space that had historically been a proving ground for male power. These women challenged the concepts of femininity in ways that, perhaps, other female athletes did not.

In an interview with E. Clark (2002), 1976 Yale Women’s Rowing Team member Eugenia Keisling described her growing awareness of the particularly negative attitude toward the women rowers:

But I also remember some of my anger was directed towards the woman who was our representative in the athletic department, Joni Barnett, because I thought that she was much more concerned with whether we were drinking beer on road trips and how we looked in general, the aesthetics, then with how we performed. She liked the gymnastics team, the swim team, and the teams that looked cute and didn’t like the basketball team or the crew because we were not cute. We were big and strong and grubby. Some of us used bad language. So, that wasn’t a title IX issue but it was definitely a what is a woman athlete’s role issue and to me it was to be as big and strong as I could, not to be dainty and ladylike. There was a strong you should be ladylike message. And of course, ladies don’t argue that they need showers. (Interview with Eugenia Keisling, 2002).

The “you should be ladylike message” operates as one of the territorial imperatives in the rhetorical space of the Yale University Athletic Department in 1976, and the Yale women rowers clearly defied that stereotype. As Keisling explains, the message was “ladies don’t argue that they need showers.” So, these women who were big and strong and grubby, who used bad language and

who were arguing for showers, defied the territorial imperative for uptake: be ladylike. That imperative put them in a double bind: to be heard by the institution meant that you had to be ladylike, but to be ladylike meant that you couldn't argue that you need showers. Taking off their clothes proved that they were "normal women," but taking off their clothes in order to argue for showers pushed the institutional constraints on femininity. It was as though they were saying, through their actions, "If you give us no place to undress, we'll *do* it here for you, as we simultaneously *tell* you that we need a place to undress." It seems that in the repetition of their statement "these are normal human bodies" the women claiming that, although we may not be the ladies that you want us to be, we are normal, and we are here to argue for our showers. Like Sojourner Truth, the women were saying that, although they did not conform to the "dainty" version of women, they were, indeed women, and should be entitled to the same rights any "normal" woman would be.

I draw on Mary Russo's (concept of the female grotesque to explore the importance of this concept for the rhetorical tactics in this event. By drawing on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin's (1965, as cited in Russo, 1995) grotesque in the carnival, as well as Peter Stallybrass and Allon White's (1986, as cited in Russo, 1995) *The politics and poetics of transgression*, Russo explains that the grotesque figure becomes "a repository of (what is) unnatural, frivolous and irrational (p. 3). Russo explains that there are "two discursive formations which dominate contemporary discussions of the grotesque, organized around the theory of carnival on the one hand and the concept of the uncanny on the other."

These two “discursive formations” differ in their connotations. When organized around the theory of carnival, the grotesque is “understood as historical and locatable, that is, within a certain nexus of space and time, marked by dates, material events and exteriority.” When organized around the concept of the uncanny, the grotesque “moves inward towards an individualized, interiorized space of fantasy and introspection, and with the attendant risk of social inertia” which Russo explains “assumes a division or distance between the discursive fictions of the biological body and the Law.” Located in the realms of the body, the grotesque is understood by the ways it deviates from the classical body, symmetric and pure. The grotesque body exceeds norms, defies the boundaries of the sounds, smells, gestures, actions and locations determined by the “normal” body. This distance between the biological body and the law becomes an important and now reoccurring theme both to understand how the “frame of jurisprudence” (Gilmore, 2001) operates within the auto/biographical genre and in this analysis of the rhetorical tactics of the Yale Women’s crew. The Yale women both exceeded the frame of jurisprudence in their autobiographical text before the Yale Assistant Athletic Director, and also collapsed the distance between the biological body and the law by writing Title XI on their own bodies.

Russo (1995) extends the work of Bakhtin by interrogating the role of gender in this concept of the grotesque. To illuminate the concept of the grotesque, Bakhtin draws upon some terracotta figurines, which Russo quotes him as describing this way:

This is a typical and very strongly expressed grotesque. It is ambivalent. It is pregnant death, a death that gives birth. There is nothing completed, nothing calm and stable in the bodies of the old hags. They combine senile, decaying, and deformed flesh with the flesh of new life, conceived but as yet unformed . . . Moreover the old hags are laughing. (Bakhtin, as cited in Russo, 1995)

She suggests that Bakhtin misses an aspect of the social construction of the carnival by failing to consider gender. She claims that “for the feminist reader, this image of the pregnant hag is more than ambivalent. It is loaded with all the connotations of fear and loathing around the biological processes of reproduction and of aging. . . His notions of the Female Grotesque remains in all directions repressed and undeveloped.” Russo (1995) explains how in the history of carnival and its theory, the category of the female grotesque can be used to “affirmatively destabilize idealizations of female beauty, or to realign the mechanism of desire.”

The Half-Spoken: Women Athletes and Sexuality

The female grotesque functions as the uncanny in this text as well. While the testimonial speech claims that these women are “normal,” OED definitions of normal also uncover meanings that are half-spoken in the text of the Yale protest, and remain half spoken in the film that documents the event, *A Hero for Daisy*; an early twentieth century definition of normal is to be heterosexual. Female athletes are stereotyped as “unfeminine” and very often, both in 1976 and currently, that stereotype extends to sexuality. Female athletes are referred to as dykes, and oarswomen were no exception. To this day, female Olympians are subjected to “gender identification” test. During the athlete processing at the Olympics in 1988, where my photo was taken and my Olympic ID was produced,

enabling me to access the facilities at Olympic Village and the Rowing Venue in Seoul, Korea, I was asked to go to a lab where people in white coats with rubber gloves took a sample of my DNA by scraping my cheek with a tongue depressor. Like every other woman competing at the Olympics, I submitted to this test of my female chromosomes and wore on my Olympic badge a large F as proof that I passed my test: the modern, Olympic version of “ain’t I a woman.”

What goes unmarked in the event, and in the later film, is the heterosexuality and homosexuality of the athletes in that event. “These are normal human bodies.” In the early 20th century, that statement could have meant “these are heterosexual human bodies.” The truth of that statement isn’t relevant to my discussion; however, homosexuality and gay rights in the 1970’s was still a marginalized aspect of civil rights, and to be both an unconventional female athlete *and* out as a gay woman was, and may have marked a speaker as exceeding the norm, making it impossible to get uptake from most audiences in most rhetorical spaces. Chris Ernst has been “out” as a gay woman for decades, however in the film portraying her as a hero for Mazzio’s daughter Daisy, her homosexuality goes unmarked.

To use and repeat the word “normal” may have allowed the women to assuage, if even only implicitly, the deepest institutional fears and prejudices about female athletes being gay. While the word does not clearly define them all as heterosexual, which some of them were not, and does not constitute a lie, it has a historical connotation that “allows” for the women to be taken as “normal”

in the heterosexual sense of the word, which in that rhetorical space may have been a necessary condition for being taken seriously.

Normal Channels of Complaint

One of the things that makes this approach by the Yale Women so striking is the fact that, for Sojourner Truth, a non-literate black woman, there may not have been other vehicles for her to make her point. It would have been unlikely that she could have written and published. She could not have found a rhetorical space that was necessarily open to a black woman speaker in 1851, so she had to subvert the normal codes and take her place at the podium.

The Yale Women were literate and there were many options open to them. They could write letters, publish editorials in the school papers and sign petitions. However, in March of 1976, they *deliberately* chose this unconventional method to get the attention of the Yale Athletic Department. They explain that, despite earlier pleas for attention to their need for shelter, and despite their earlier claims that it was discriminatory to deny them access to a building owned by Yale University for use by Yale students just because they were women, they were not getting uptake. “No effective action has been taken and no matter what we hear, it doesn’t make these bodies warmer, or dryer or less prone to sickness. We can’t accept any excuses, nor can we trust to normal channels of complaint.”

Here I return to De Certeau’s (1995) concept of the difference between strategies and tactics, to understand the choice to make this rhetorical move in their protest. The women appear to have discovered that, although they had

been admitted to Yale University proper, and should therefore have assumed that they were “members,” they were, in fact, provisional members and not really truly located in the institution proper. De Certeau (1995) explains that the use of strategies is effective for those who are in power and recognized as members of the inscribed space of the institution, so it is logical that the women initially expected that “normal channels of complaint,” institutionally sanctioned strategies, would be effective for them. But, their exile from some of the buildings within the Yale Athletic Department, and the lack of recognition of their concerns by the institution signaled that there were not truly equal members within this institution, and so they explain in their speech that they turned to a “method” that deviated from normal channels of complaint.

They explain, “We are using you and your office because you are the symbol of Women’s Athletics at Yale; we are using this method to express our urgency.” These two lines demonstrate the intentionality and purposefulness of the rhetorical tactics used by the women. This set of rhetorical moves and devices are intentional and planned, however unconventional and impulsive they might, at first glance, seem. They explain that they are using Joni Barnett, the Assistant Athletic Director responsible for women’s sports, and her office, because she is the symbol of, or she and her office represent, Yale University’s Women’s Athletic Department. This is the institution that the members of the Yale Women’s Crew feel has shown a “lack of concern.” They are addressing Joni Barnett as a symbol of the institution that is ignoring them

But, as a symbol, Joni Barnett and her office also “represent” women’s athletics at Yale in another sense; she and her office are meant to stand for the women athlete’s needs and concerns and voice them to the higher level administration. By addressing (and undressing for) Joni Barnett in her office, the women are calling attention to their unrepresented needs and their unrepresented claim that “we’re human and being treated as less than such” and to what they consider “a lack of concern and competence

While in the past years, the woman had not been granted access to the Yale University Boathouse at the river in Derby, they had been provided with a trailer which they had used for shelter there. It wasn’t that the women just woke up one day and got angry. They had been given a trailer out of which to row in previous years, and they had been satisfied enough that there was no strong impetus to contest their alienation from the boathouse. It was the fact that the trailer that had been acquired for their use was unusable because of a problem with permits and electricity. Keisling explains:

Well, it happened extremely suddenly. We’d been doing indoor training all winter and we hadn’t thought about the problems with facilities at the boathouse because we assumed that had been taken care of. It had been taken care of the previous year. It should have been taken care of for us the next year. We weren’t thinking about it. We knew that the trailer would be there. In fact, the trailer was there, a bigger and better trailer than the previous year. It just wasn’t hooked up. So, when we started rowing in late February or perhaps the beginning of March, we were surprised that there was no shower facility there for us and for several days, we just put up with it, maybe a week, I don’t recall. (Keisling, in Clark, 2000, p. 22)

The “method” that the woman chose was planned somewhat spontaneously, on a bus on the way home from a rowing practice. Keisling describes how the planning of the method took shape.

It wasn't a long plot. We didn't gradually begin to develop the idea. We just complained and moaned about it. And then one day on the bus, out of nowhere came the idea. I remember the conversation because Chris Ernst, and Anne Warner, and I were the three people most involved in the conversation and I remember, as you possibly remember from the film, the first thought was we'll throw Joni Barnett in the river because then she'll see how cold we are. Then, we said no that's not very practical. Let's make a statement by going to her office after practice with buckets of water and use her office as a shower. We thought well that's not very practical because she won't be in her office after practice. So, we thought well we'll go and take off our clothes in her office anyway before practice. But, it evolved very quickly. I mean, this all happened while we were sitting on the bus while the men were showering.¹² So, it couldn't have been ten minutes, probably less, for us to come up with the concept and Anne and Chris took my clipboard and started writing the statement on it. So, this was not a long planned mutiny. It was a spontaneous decision. And it was half political protest and half high spirits. We were extremely cold and miserable and it's a sign of the high morale of the team that instead of responding to that by going into a sulk, we came up with something that was funny. I mean, it wasn't funny, I'll talk about that later. On the bus, it was funny. It was hey we'll throw her in the river and then let's go to her office and fill it full of water. It was a high spirited kind of thing. I think it was a lot less political than the film says. I think it was much more we're going to show them that they can't beat us down and freeze us to death (p. 12).

The verbal planning, the clipboard, the writing all demonstrate a certain conventional use tools and processes for writing, but the method was planned in an unlikely setting, by multiple authors producing an intentional, tactical approach to show Yale University "that they can't beat us down and freeze us to death."

¹²The Yale rowers all rode the same bus back and forth between campus to the rowing facility in Derby which is roughly 30 minutes from campus. The men showered after practice, but because the women had no facility and no shelter where they could stay warm, they waited on the bus in their wet and sweaty clothing while the men showered and changed. This experience is similar to my own experience at the University of Pennsylvania in 1978-1981. The U Penn women's team was not allowed into the boathouse which was 3 miles from campus. There was no heated facility and no plumbing in the boathouse where we kept our three rowing shells, so, wet and sweaty, we waited on the bus every day after practice for the men to finish showering and changing before we could all go back to campus to the dining hall for dinner. The men arrived fresh and showered, while the women appeared in the dining hall sweaty and bedraggled, cold and dirty for dinner.

Collaboration and Teamwork

Keisling explains what it was like to be a part of this process. She explains that it wasn't a democracy and not every member of the team was fully aware of what was about to happen.

Chris was the team captain. We had four people training for the Olympic trials, Chris and Anne, Lynn Baker, and myself. Chris and Anne were the two most likely to make it and they did. Then, Chris was a senior and Anne was a junior. So, they were the leaders. I was probably the most visible sophomore on the team and I was, you know one of the Olympic candidates and I was the one with the clipboard. [Laughs] So, the three of us were the most, Julie [Yodeen] was involved I think. She was Chris' housemate. I would guess that half the team didn't know what the statement said before the event. I'm not sure about that. I don't have the sense that there was ever a meeting or we ever planned it. It was Chris yelling ok everybody be at the locker room at such and such a time. And there were probably people on the bus who didn't quite know what we were going to do exactly but they went along with it because that was the great thing about the team. I think there was only one person who didn't participate. There was one person who thought it wouldn't be good for her chance at getting a Rhodes Scholarship. [Sighs] Well... [Pause] (p. 23).

Not all of the members of the team knew what was going on, and one refused to participate for fear of putting her Rhodes Scholarship in jeopardy. There was identified risk to participating, since one woman chose not to take it. However, the rest of the team agreed to participate without full knowledge of what was about to happen. Keisling describes this as "the great thing about the team." This trust, this willingness to work together to speak out against an institution that they felt was "beating them down" might be described as solidarity.

The Yale women's crew drew on a bricolage of rhetorical tactics to resist their own exile from the Yale boathouse; their invisibility to the Yale Athletic Department; and their places as women in the only very recently coeducational Yale University. While their mastery of conventional literacy and Standard

English provided them access to this prestigious institution, it was their ability to draw on language use and forms that were not and are not conventional forms that allowed them to get uptake.

CHAPTER 6

RECOVERING THE HISTORY OF THE TITLE IX PROTEST IN FILM

We went upstairs. I still remember it was completely silent.... At the time we had no idea what the impact would be... What I think the really remarkable thing is that the protest had a ripple effect that went out... now... for decades! (Warner in Mazzio, 1999)

The film *A Hero for Daisy* opens by juxtaposing film clips from the 1986 World Championships in Nottingham England and an interview with Carrie Beth (CB) Sands, Chris Ernst's rowing partner at the World Rowing Championships that year, reminiscing on her memories of Chris Ernst. The viewer watches Chris Ernst and C. B. Sands race to a gold medal at the 1986 World Championships and hears Sands describing Chris, who was constantly challenging assumptions about how women should act. And she explains that Chris isn't afraid to speak up. "There was the incident at Yale and the incident at the Olympics--wherever Chris goes there's bound to be an incident."

Documentary Film and a Feminist View

It is the "incident at Yale," the 1976 Yale Women's Crew protest, that is the primary focus of the film. Mazzio takes up the story of the 1976 Yale Women's Crew protest against gender discrimination by the Yale Athletic Department in her first attempt at documentary film. The feminist documentary is charged with the task of disrupting the traditionally objectifying gaze of the camera and the master narratives of traditional films about women, which has

been described by a number of feminist film theorists, but in particular Laura Mulvey (1975, 1989). Daniel Chandler paraphrases her psychoanalytic analysis of spectatorship and the male gaze.

In the darkness of the cinema auditorium it is notable that one may look without being seen either by those on screen by other members of the audience. Mulvey argues that various features of cinema viewing conditions facilitate for the viewer both the voyeuristic process of *objectification* of female characters and also the narcissistic process of *identification* with an 'ideal ego' seen on the screen. She declares that in patriarchal society 'pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female' (Mulvey 1992, 27 as cited in Chandler, 2007; <http://www.aber.ac/media/documents/gse/gaze09.html>).

The feminist documentarian seeks to disrupt the cinematic conditions which facilitate the voyeuristic process of objectification of female characters in much the same way that the members of the Yale Women's Crew used specific rhetorical tactics to disrupt the voyeuristic process of objectification of female athletes at Yale University. For example, they used their naked chests to communicate the very message that the institution did not want to hear: Under the Title IX law, the university was obligated to provide equal access to resources for female athletes. In other words, they used their own objectification to their advantage. In this sense, they capitalized on the voyeuristic process of objectification to exceed the limits of language that the institution used to confine what was perceived as their excessive and grotesque bodies.

In this chapter, I offer a reading of the tactics used by Mary Mazzio in the making of *A Hero for Daisy* in order to identify the ways that this filmmaker articulates a fragmented narrative of an important historical event which has too often been left unspoken in our discussions about the struggles that females and

others encounter as they navigate the educational landscape both in and out of conventional institutional settings. Patricia Zimmerman (2000) writes about the role of documentary film in her book *States of emergency*, explaining that the globalization of economies results in what she calls “the corporate underwriting of culture” which she says has a devastating effect on the democratic public sphere.

She believes that:

We urgently need a new world image order. We need to think differently about independent documentary. Independent documentary is in danger of losing its oppositional edge to disturb the universe as all of its supports and infrastructures deteriorate. Shedding its older forms of argument and its allegiances to maintaining nation-states, documentary has the potential to shift the new world image order into more democratic spaces (p. xv).

Zimmerman (2000) sees independent documentary film as a means by which master narratives can be disturbed. Zimmerman’s concerns for disrupting older forms of argument and its allegiances resonate with the concerns of Code (2005), Kastely (1997), Jung (2005), Pinar and Grumet (1976), Salvio (2007) and other theorist in philosophy, compositions and curriculum studies. Lorraine Code (1995) explains that when speakers are not getting uptake for legitimate claims because of power differences, “it is a matter of working out, collectively, how to produce and circulate new scripts, how to devise improvisational possibilities that can unsettle and disrupt story lines that are apparently seamless” (p. 78). Zimmerman is claiming that independent documentary film can offer those improvisational possibilities.

The Female Hero

Mazzio (1999) embraced the task of disrupting seamless story lines in her project to create a hero for her daughter, Daisy. In order to take up this work, Mazzio had to use narrative structures and film devices that would create new stories about women. She was creating a film that would and here I paraphrase Zimmerman (2000), displace the, fantasy construction of the U.S. nation-state as conflict free, essential, homogenous, universal, and beyond reproach . . . to make space for histories to replace history, for pluralized visual and aural languages to evict a common language into the realm of nonfunctional mythology” (p. 7). In this case, the documentary film disrupts the fantasy construction of the nation-state’s educational institutions as conflict free, essential, homogenous, universal and beyond reproach. The pluralized visual and aural languages about the Yale students in Mazzio’s film disrupt the narratives about the Yale student body as the white, Christian, male “six-footer” (Pierson, 1983). And, as Mazzio suggests through the title of the film, this documentary disrupts narratives about “the heroine” in film and in culture. Mazzio’s hero for Daisy is a different kind of heroine. She is a woman without a man, a physically strong and competent woman, a woman pursuing an education from one of the oldest and formerly all-male institutions in America: these are not the familiar narratives of the woman who gets the man, like Maria in *The Sound of Music*, or of the ugly duckling who is transformed into the beauty, like Liza in *My Fair Lady* or, of the woman who relies on manipulation and trickery to achieve her goal, like Scarlett O’Hara in *Gone with the Wind*.

The Body Image

As one takes up a closer reading of the film it becomes apparent that the rhetorical tactics used by the women during their protest are used by Mazzio in the making of this feminist documentary, for example the subject/object dialectic, using Ernst, and the other members of the 1976 Yale Women's crew as subject and object. In certain parts of the film, other people are talking about Ernst, the rowing icon. Then Mazzio shifts to first person, represented by the narrative accounts of Chris Ernst, Annie Warner and Eugenia Keisling. Mazzio highlight the grotesque body here in the film as well. While others discuss Chris' unusually muscular body, the fact that she was drug tested and gender tested in international competition, the fact that she is "one buff chick," the viewer is confronted with images of Ernst, muscles bulging out of her shirt and shorts, veins engorged with blood popping off of her biceps and forearms. I return you now to the Carnivale, and Russo's challenge to Bahktin's interpretation of the female grotesque as a representation of death and decay. Her contention is that in the history of carnival and its theory, the category of the female grotesque can be used to "affirmatively destabilize idealizations of female beauty, or to realign the mechanism of desire" (Russo, 1995). Here, Mazzio draws on the female grotesque to affirmatively destabilize idealizations of the female hero. The Chris Ernst we see offered in the film as a hero for Daisy upsets traditional notions of female heroine.

The female body is used by Mazzio to evoke the original event, and the uncanny repetition of the issues it was addressing. Mazzio duplicates the

disrobing of the female body in her film, and duplicates the event itself in a way that might be confusing to the viewer. As Ernst narrates, “And then we took off our shirts . . .” Mazzio uses black and white film clips of several nude, muscular women with Title IX written on their backs, who walk away from the camera one at a time, through a tiled doorway of what is obviously the entry to a large shower room and then disappearing into a cloud of white light. Are these film clips of the actual event or a representation of it? For the viewer, this remains unclear. Mazzio did indeed recreate and represent the event in a way that brings the absent past into the present for the viewer. The duplication creates a kind of weirdness, in the magical sense.

At least one of the figures who appear nude in the film with Title IX inscribed on her back is an original member of the 1976 Yale Women’s Crew. For team member Eugenia Keisling, this re-enactment of the act of disrobing for the film is a personal repetition of the original event. She explains:

The film has given me considerably more fame than I ever had before. It’s amazing what happens when you take off your clothes the second time. I mean, the official party line is that Yale is now proud of this because Yale was in the forefront of these changes. (Clark, 2001. p. 31)

The black and white film and her duplication of Title IX inscribed on the nude female body replicates on film the original event which was not captured in moving images. While Mazzio never claims this is original film of the event, having Keisling or others who were participants in 1976 replicate their disrobing and inscription of the law on their bodies is a means by which the original moment is uncovered from the negative spaces of the archive and saved for others to study and experience. Mazzio’s re-enactments go beyond “playing out”

the event with actors; she uses rowers who participated in the original event side by side with rowers who stood on the shoulders of these Yale women to compete in the present moment. Mazzio's use of duplication of images, of the event, and of the people in the event allows a connection to be made from past to present and brings what was absent into our presence.

Multivocal Narratives

In my estimation, Mazzio elegantly represents the "plural" autobiographical narrative of the testimonial speech. A "plural" autobiography contests the demands of the traditional autobiography: the demand for a reliable "I," and for a single subject who stands for others (Gilmore, 2001). In the "plural autobiography," also referred to as the (auto)biography or the auto(bio)graphy, the reliable "I" is called into question, and the single subject who stands for others is challenged through the intertwining of multiple voices, narratives and subjects. Mazzio herself uses at least two devices to accomplish this in the film. For example, when several key players in the original event, Annie Warner, Chris Ernst and Eugenia Keisling are interviewed, these women narrate the history of the event, describing the context for the protest, the planning of the event and the event itself. Rather than privileging any one of the narrators, Mazzio has strung their voices together to create a multivocal narrative of the event. In composition studies, Julie Jung (2005) theorizes on the power of multivocality in creating a revisionary rhetoric. She explains that multivocal discourse draws on the fragments of links and silences to demand listeners to attend to gaps in meaning and unarticulated meaning.

The challenge for the revisionary rhetors is to produce a heteroglossic discourse that both listens well as it makes itself heard. Working in tandem, the textual features of metadiscursivity and intertextuality enable writers to meet this challenge by creating texts that contain gaps, which, when filled in by others, make room for fuller and deeper listening (p. 33).

Mazzio's use of multiple narratives produces these spaces for fuller and deeper listening. Oftentimes, Mazzio composes a single sentence from the three narratives given by the participants, with ellipses and pauses that create gaps in the narrative. Ernst may begin to describe something, Warner continues, then at a pause in her narrative, Mazzio shifts to Keisling to finish the sentence.

Ernst begins "Well, while we were not warm and happy and pink on the bus, we had plenty of time to talk about what we needed to do to get . . . the attention of the university and let them know that we really wanted them . . . to take . . . seriously and. . ."

Warner picks up, "We needed people to realize that we . . . were . . . there! And we were doing something really important and we were doing it right then! Not when the institution got around to it.

Keisling continues, "Now, the first plan actually was to drag Joni Barnett to the boathouse, throw her in the river and drive her back to New Haven soaking wet so that she would know what it felt like. Then we thought no, we'll take buckets of water and sponges and soap and shower in her office."

Ernst returns, "But we decided that would be destructive, so we wouldn't do that. There wouldn't be any buckets of water. But, ah, we decided that what we would do is go to the woman's office who was, I forget what her title was but

she was the gatekeeper for women's athletics, and uh, we would get a *New York Times* stringer to come and report that we had you know, made this protest."

Warner explains, "Once the idea cropped up, and I think it was Chris' and I said, "I dare ya, we were locked in."

Mazzio's method of pulling the interviews together to form one narrative from three creates a multi-vocal historical text, and a plural autobiographical narrative, a narrative which pushes the limits of the individual autobiography by using the narrative of several. Thus Mazzio invites the speakers to be personal and plural simultaneously.

The three women tell the story of the event that day. Mazzio pieces together their three separate "talking head" interviews as they recount the day, their thoughts and feelings, and the reactions of Joni Barnett. Then Ernst explains, "And, uh, then we took off our sweats." The talking head interview flashed like a camera bulb, with a musical crescendo, and the image switches to black and white, bare skin, a back with Title XI written on it, then another, and another until we have seen seven bodies, seven backs and seven repetitions of Title IX.

Mazzio creates layered multivocality through her performative depiction of Ernst's reading of the testimonial speech. Back to the talking head interviews, Keisling explains, "We stood at attention while Chris Ernst read our statement. . . ." Warner picks up, ". . . about 'These are the bodies. . ..'" The camera switches to a visual of the text itself, words sliding across the screen, as the speech is read by Chris Ernst. "These are the bodies Yale is exploiting. On a day like today, the

ice freezes on this skin. Then we sit for a half hour while the ice melts and soaks through to meet the sweat that is soaking us from the inside.”

Ernst’s voice is replaced by another voice, a voice which sounds very much like the voice of Francine Chew¹³ who reads “These are the bodies Yale is exploiting” The image shifts to a photo from the Yale Daily News of Joni Barnett facing a throng of topless women with their backs to the camera and then several other voices join into a choral reading, “. . . on a day like today the ice freezes on the skin. We sit for a half hour as the ice melts and soaks through to meet the sweat that is soaking us from the inside” The voices fade, the camera shows the silent faces of first Warner, then Keisling, then Chris, who hands what appears to be a text of the speech back to an invisible, unidentified interviewer who sits outside the frame of the lens.

The performative reading of the testimonial speech creates a sort of poetic “round,” voices encircling each other, phrases from the text encircling each other. For me, the sound of the familiar voices reading, Chris Ernst’s and Mary Mazzio’s encircle memories we share of competing in college and elite level rowing, of the inequities we faced and faced off against together. The “dust” of this event comes back and circulates here in the film, in this performance of the speech by one original member of the 1976 Yale Women’s Crew, by the film maker who is herself a rower from the 1980s and early 90s pulling the event from the negative space of the archive, and from a current member of Yale University’s women’s crew who says that she, an African American, is attending Yale in the class of

¹³ Chew is the African American undergraduate member of the Yale Women’s crew who explained earlier in the film, “The impact of the event? Me” in a statement laden with implications about race and gender.

2000 and rowing for the team because of the impact of the Yale protest in 1976. The voices, phrases and narratives of these women wind around each other, resonating with meanings about discrimination, protest, the use of voice, and the uncanny power of repetition.

I was thrilled to learn of Mazzio's film. As Francine Chew explains in the film, the story of the Yale protest is "definitely a story that every new rower hears and learns and her name is one we all know." While I was not present at the Yale protest, and had not yet found the sport of rowing in 1976, the narratives surrounding the event are part of my own autobiographical experience. I too heard the story of that event, and eventually came to know Christ Ernst personally after rowing on several U.S. National Teams with her. She was, and is, a remarkably charismatic woman who leads by example as a fearless, strong, intelligent woman. I also rowed with the filmmaker, Mary Mazzio, who is few years younger than I. I heard her being interviewed on National Public Radio's *Only a Game* just after the film was released. To hear her describing the event on a national program about sport awakened the dormant memories of that powerful protest and the sense of agency it gave so many of us. In the 1990s, I had become increasingly frustrated with the narratives of the success of Title IX, and the lack of discussion about current issues of discrimination in sport. To know that Mary Mazzio had created a film that was getting national attention about discrimination against female athletes was a relief; it affirmed for me the fact that I was not alone in wanting the conversation to continue.

Several years earlier, while I was working as the Varsity Women's Rowing Coach at the University of New Hampshire, I had served as the advisor for two young women who wanted to do an independent study about feminism and sport. One of the women told me that she thought it was such a travesty that no one today knows anything about the women whose shoulders they are standing on. She felt that women athletes today are where they are in athletics because of the women who came before them and few of them realize that. So, while many rowers received the story about Chris Ernst, most young women athletes remain completely unaware of what it was like trying to get a chance to play in the years before and the decade after Title IX was passed. When I learned that the film was going to be playing at the Museum of Art in Boston, I was anxious to go see it. It wasn't just that I wanted to see the film for myself; I wanted to be in the room to hear the discussion about it afterward. What would people say about discrimination in sport now? And how would seeing this film resonate with my own experiences as an athlete then and now? I participated in several group viewings of the film, in public forums and private settings and listened with interest as people discussed the impact of Title IX, past and current discrimination against women and girls in sport, the film's portrayal of a hero, and the reasons for the success of the protest.

During the opening credits, from the driver seat of her plumbing van Chris explains " I have a New Years resolution: no more trouble making, unless its absolutely necessary." While she's stopped at a light, the car behind her honks, and the camera shows her giving the middle finger to the driver behind her

through the rear view mirror. However staged, we can see from this contradiction between what Ernst says and what she does, that she is not done trouble making.

The Talking Head

Feminist filmmaking often draws on the interview, reviving and rehabilitating the spoken word to “pound out a space for women’s voices and refuse the position of victim (Zimmerman, 2000). What follows the credits is a series of “talking head” interviews, descriptions of Ernst which are juxtaposed with shots of her rowing in a single shell on the Charles River in Boston.

Zimmerman explains that there is criticism of this traditional approach, although;

according to Julie Lesage, a large strand of feminist filmmaking from the 1970’s relied quite heavily on women discussing their experiences, either in talking-head interview films or in cinema verite films chronicling women’s groups. Despite critical attacks on these formats for relying on realist conventions beholden to patriarchal representational models, Lesage defends these works by arguing that they provided a more subversive realism, one that moves from the domestic, interior zones of women’s lives into more public political realms that critique and disrupt patriarchy. (Zimmerman, 2000, p. 62)

In the film, most of these interviews serve to frame this “hero for Daisy” as a fiercely loyal, outspoken person to be feared and respected. She isn’t afraid to stand up for what she believes in, even if it means confrontation. Mazzio builds a certain kind of woman through her talking head interviews. Most of these interviews take place in and around a boathouse, situated firmly in the rowing environment. These interviews construct a Chris Ernst who is capable, tough, fair. Ernst’s mother is interviewed on a couch with an oil painting serving as the backdrop, and the backdrop of that talking head interview, together with the

language and speaking style of her mother, Jeannette Ernst, Chris' upper middle class background becomes evident, highlighting the fact that although Ernst came from privilege, it did not make her immune from discrimination.

There are three “talking head” interviews that stand out as different, and position the speakers differently. There are the interviews with Dave Vogel, who was the coach of the Yale Lightweight Men's Crew at the time of the protest in 1976, and who was working in the Yale University development office at the time of the interview. There are the interviews with Carm Coza, who was the football coach at Yale University from 1965-1996. And, finally, Mazziio chose to interview then Massachusetts Senator John Kerry, who is himself a Yale University alumnus. All three of these people are interviewed in institutional spaces with trophy cases behind them. They wear suits or more formal office wear, and they hold positions that are bureaucratic. Vogel is an important interview for helping the viewer to understand the climate of Yale University in 1976, which he said “had been an all male institution for over 200 years” and “wasn't going to divest itself of that overnight” (Vogel, in Mazziio, 1999). Carm Coza represents the male establishment in sport. He admits his own resentment and reluctance to seeing women enter the athletic arena as a result of Title IX and the Yale protest:

It forced all athletics in the right direction, where there now is equality for men and women, same thing with the coaches. And, also in facilities, so it really turned out to be a good thing.... Had it not happened, we wouldn't have come along as rapidly as we did in women's athletics... When Title IX was enacted in the mid 70's, a lot us resented it because we felt we were forced to do things that the women really hadn't earned yet. But now, that they've earned the respect of certainly of all the administrators and all

the players and coaches, it probably was one of the best things that was brought to the athletic world... Yes, now I think Yale is proud of Chris, but not at the time. They regarded her as a rabble rouser, maybe a problem child. (Coza, in Mazzio, 1999)

Vogel and Coza's interviews provide first person accounts of the climate at the Yale University athletic department in 1976, and of the response to the event when it happened. While many of the other interviews are very positive and affirming, these two people inform the viewer about those who, in 1976, did not necessarily admire Chris Ernst, her teammates and women athletes in general.

It is the Kerry interview that seems to fall into the trap of "bowing before the master" (Delpit, 1992). Kerry's interviews do not provide first person accounts of the event, nor do they act as a foil to the affirming narratives about Ernst. As an alumnus and member of the U.S. Senate, Kerry represents one of the "thousand male leaders" that Yale University meant to provide the nation (Case in Mazzio, 1999). His interviews in the film explain the national and historical significance of the event. For example, at one point he explains:

It's like Rosa Parks, refusing to be told she had to move and stayed seated, I mean that's the importance, and this time it wasn't Parks, it was Chris Ernst... and she extended it to the rest of the crew, and they extended it to the rest of the country. What Chris Ernst did is nothing short of spectacular. (Kerry in Mazzio, 1999)

Kerry is drawing an analogy between Chris Ernst and a major figure in the narratives of the Civil Rights Movement, Rosa Parks. His privileged position as one of Yale's thousand male leaders gives him the power and authority to make Chris into a civil rights icon.

I want to return you now to the notion of the archive where historians do their work, and to Derrida's (1995) etymology.

. . . *Arche*, we recall, names at once the *commencement* and the *commandment*. This name apparently coordinates two principles in one: the principle according to nature or history, there where things *commence*—physical, historical, or ontological principle—but also the principle according to the law, *there* where men and gods *command*, *there* where authority, social order are exercised, in this place from which *order* is given—nomological principal (p. 1).

The film is part of the making of an archive about the Yale Women's Crew Protest, both a commencement, since it retrieves the event from the negative spaces of the archive, and as a commandment. Mazziio draws on John Kerry for the command, for the authority to put Chris Ernst and the members of the 1976 Yale Women's Crew into the social order of the Civil Rights movement. While Mazziio draws successfully on many tactics to upset patriarchal narratives about women in her film, the use of John Kerry to affirm the importance of the event is, in many ways, a capitulation to patriarchy and the paternal voice in the making of history. Kerry, a government official, a white Christian male, is endowed with the authority to determine where Ernst fits into history, and whether this event is worth knowing about.

The analogy Kerry draws between Rosa Parks and Chris Ernst is in some ways troubling and brings to mind the comment of one of the audience members during the discussion after the film viewing at the Museum of Art in Boston very recently after the film was released. He said something to the effect of, "Is anyone else bothered by the fact that this film glorifies one group of privileged people fighting with another group over their entitlement to something most other people will never have?" Ernst and the other women at Yale were living a very different experience from Rosa Parks. Remember the interview with Jeannette

Ernst, Chris' mother, and the pictures of her childhood. In the interview, her mother tells us that when Chris was getting ready to go to college her tells us that, "Chrissy had signed up for Smith, and Mount Holyoke and Yale. I think her competitive spirit said I'll go to a male school and show them." Jeanette Ernst's use of the verb "sign up" instead of "apply" implies a sense of entitlement. Chris Ernst's choices for college were three exclusive private schools, and her mother's statement assumes Ernst had facile access to all three; money was not a concern, nor was acceptance. Ernst's experience was a far cry from the experience of the African American seamstress in 1955 whose body was being controlled by the Jim Crow Laws. The opening sequences of the film paint a picture of an upperclass Chris Ernst through Jeanette Ernst's narratives. She speaks of Ernst's childhood in the 1960s and early '70s as a middle class white girl and evokes much more privilege than oppression, especially in comparison to Rosa Parks' childhood. Parks grew up on a farm in Alabama with her mother and grandparents, was schooled in a one room school house until she was sent to Montgomery to finish her schooling and was unable to graduate because she had to take care of dependent family members.

Kerry "commands" Ernst into a category of civil rights icon with Rosa Parks, because he speaks from power and authority. To put these two women into a single category negates the suffering and oppression of Rosa Parks. She refused to move to the back of the bus, but the consequences for her refusal to submit to oppression and racial discrimination were potentially much greater than they were for Chris Ernst and her teammates. They realized that their actions

might have consequences, particularly against their coach, and they were carefully to absolve him of complicity in their speech:

We have taken this action absolutely without our coach's knowledge. He has done all he can to get us some relief, and none has come. He ordered the trailer when the plans for real facilities fell through, and he informed you four times of the need to get a variance to make it useable, but none was obtained. We fear retribution against him, but we are, as you can see, desperate.

They express fear of retribution against their coach, but not against themselves. The retribution for protest at Yale University might have been expulsion, perhaps even arrest. The consequences for some of these young women who came from conservative, upper-middle class families might have been more severe in their homes than at Yale University. But do they compare to the kind of retribution black protestors in the South were facing in the late 1950s and 60s? Rosa Parks' refusal to move to the back of the bus was considerably more treacherous and carried the potential for retribution that included violence and even death.

While the analogy Kerry makes between these two very different women seems overblown, it should not diminish the importance of the Yale protest and the power of the gender discrimination in sport that was, and continues to be, present for many women. And although Mazzio's use of Kerry appears as a capitulation to patriarchal power in the making of history, it also raises important questions. Can a woman, or women, "command" history? How would Ernst's place in the civil rights movement be understood if Kerry's interviews had not been used in the film?

Breathing Sounds and Multiple Interpretations

Many of the transitions in the film are images of the rowing landscape, the Charles River, the Harvard Boathouse in winter, birds flying overhead, accompanied by music. The musical interludes in the film are often overlaid with the sound of breathing, which for me and many rowers is a familiar one; it is the sound we hear when we are exerting ourselves, pushing the limits of our physical bodies. For middle-aged female rowers the breathing sounds may awaken the memories that lie in our bodies of practicing and competing in an environment that was hostile to women athletes, of the humiliation of that comes with being called names and being ridiculed for our participation in athletics. The sound of breathing in this film also awakens the thrill that many of us discovered through sport of being located in our bodies, a thrill that provided an avenue for us to live in and to learn to accept the very bodies that marked us in the 1960s and 1970s as inferior, weak and incapable. We remember the way our female bodies denied us access to athletic teams, to jobs, and to other kinds of opportunities taken for granted by men. But for others, the breathing sound may not elicit ghosts. Breath is life, it is the present moment, it is what potentially brings about awareness of self and other. That device and others which leave room for multiple interpretations may have implications for those in curriculum and composition studies.

Perhaps among the most important lessons that educators can take from the members of the 1976 Yale Women's rowing team is that it is not enough to have access to power or cultural capital. The issues and concerns that go

unrecognized, demand the capacity to provoke choral uptake. In this exploration of several events in the history of education that have gone unrecognized, I have discovered the important role that history plays for bringing together a chorus of voices, past and present, to establish uptake when none is available. The case of the Yale Women's Crew Protest and the case of Roderick Jackson both haunt and inspire me as I move forward.

CHAPTER 7

JOURNEY OF THE BREATH:

FROM THE PRIVATE TO THE PUBLIC AND BACK AGAIN

If we go beyond what we once thought was our perimeter, then all limits are open to question. We row toward an ever-expanding horizon. (Lambert, 1999, *Mind over Water*)

The final section of this dissertation examines what I estimate to be the central critiques of the field of curriculum theory and the current literature in curriculum theory that responds to those critiques, specifically the work of scholars experimenting with the autobiographical method, termed “post-currere” (Salvio, 2007; Whitlock, 2006; Casemore, 2005; Packard, 2004; Sellers, 2003). My express intention is to situate my dissertation within this body of scholarship and to discuss the implications post-currere has for reflecting on life histories in the context of education and curriculum studies.

The initial project that situated currere in the context of curriculum theory, *Toward a poor curriculum* (Pinar & Grumet, 1976) focused on autobiographical work and the place that personal reflection plays in the subjects of schooling. William Pinar’s earlier “Working from Within” (Pinar, 1972) laid the groundwork for this concern with subject matter, and *the subject*. Pinar drew on the words of the abstract expressionist painter Jackson Pollock in his essay to suggest that teachers and students might draw on their personal imagination and insights to understand their learning: “Like some modern painters, my students and I have

come to feel we rarely need to refer to subject matter outside ourselves. We work from a different source. We work from within” (Pinar, 1972, p. 33). What Pinar was beginning to articulate a growing concern on the part of a group of curriculum scholars, later referred to as the reconceptualists, about the lack of a method for attending to the subjectivities of students in curriculum studies. What came out of that concern was a growing body of scholars (e.g., Grumet 1978, Miller 1988, Edgerton 1991) who drew on the autobiographical as means by which to keep a focus on the individual in the field of curriculum studies. Pinar (1974) explained that “It is not that the public work—curriculum, instructions, objectives—become unimportant; it is that to further comprehend their roles in the educational process we must take our eyes off them for a time, and begin a lengthy, systematic search for our inner experience” (Pinar, 1974, p. 3). Scholars in the field of curriculum studies were searching for a method to study the inner experience of curriculum. It was Pinar and Grumet’s (1976) *Toward a poor curriculum* that identified the method of understanding curriculum as an autobiographical text, and this is the method they called *currere*.

Currere and autobiographical methods for understanding curriculum emerged and flourished into the 1980’s¹⁴ and beyond. However, in the mid 1980s, two strands of critiques against the method of *currere* began to be articulated. Critical theorist lodged concerns about the method claiming that *currere* was a-political and failed to recognize the ways in which curriculum

¹⁴ See Chapter 10, *Understanding Curriculum as Autobiographical Text*, in *Understanding Curriculum*, by Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman for a more complete discussion of the various directions this body of work took, including the use of autobiography to study classroom practice and the concepts of voice, community, gender and place in curriculum studies. Also see Robert Graham’s (1992) *Reading and writing the self: Autobiography in education and the curriculum* for a discussion the forms of research that emerged from this concern with autobiography and the subject in curriculum studies.

implicitly reproduces inequitable social structures. Pinar's suggestion that we take our eyes off of the public work was problematic for these critical theorists and other scholars concerned with the social aspects of curriculum studies. For example, in his discussion of *currere*, curriculum scholar and historian Peter Hlebowitsh (1992) articulated his own concerns and the concerns in the field about this Pinar's (1974) call for "a lengthy systematic search of our inner experience":

Such a perspective on curriculum is interesting, but in terms of the idealized civic mission of the school, which Dewey was committed to fulfilling, the premium placed on the self-encounter appears to come at the expense of the collective-encounter so obviously valued by Dewey (p.76).

To point to the problems of the method, curriculum scholars concerned with the social and political used terms like a-social and a-political and solipsistic. These kinds of criticisms continued into the 1990s arguing that the reconceptualists have created a bifurcation between theory and practice in curriculum studies (Wraga, 1999).

Around the same time, another strand of criticism was surfacing. As poststructuralist began to emerge as a central discourse in curriculum studies, critiques of *currere* from these scholars brought another set of terms like "subjectivities" and "grand narratives," for example, that framed some of the postructuralist critiques of *currere*. Postructuralist and postmodern notions about the limits of language, underlying assumptions about the multiple versions of reality and skepticism about the notion of truth called into the question the modernist notions of autobiography that informed Pinar and Grumet's (1976) early notions of *currere*. These modernist notions of subjectivity functioned to

define the ways early *currere* was taking subjectivity into account in curriculum studies and subjected *currere* to another kind of criticism from poststructuralist theorists in curriculum studies. Assumptions about the lack of transparency of language, multiple versions of reality, and the problematized notion of a fixed, unified subject problematized the project of autobiography and *currere* in curriculum studies (Doll, 1988, 1989; Kincheloe, 1993; Lather, 1991). Taking these two strands of criticism into account, and answering claims that the method of *currere* was a-political, a-social and solipsistic, the method of *currere* and its uses and conception of autobiography—(auto)biography, evolved in a number of ways, for which specific examples follow.. Scholars who have been involved in this evolution of the method are said to be using “post-*currere*.”

What is Post-*currere*?

While *currere* was a method intended to create a dialogic relationship between specificity and generality, personal and social as a response to the paradigm that viewed the curriculum as an object, it was this use of the autobiographical and personal as data, or the unit of analysis, that subjected the method to the critiques of solipsism and undue attention to the personal. As a response to those critiques, scholars began to reconceptualize *currere* in ways that recognized the problem of a unified subject and of a single, totalizing narrative of reality. The “post-*currere*” approaches employ methods of representation that shift the original focus of *currere* in ways that recognize the problem of the unified subject and grand unifying narratives, while continuing the early work of *currere* which was to take subjectivity into account in curriculum

studies. In this approach to *currere*, the unit of analysis is not autobiographical narratives, or the personal; the focus of these studies might be an historical event, or an historical figure, a body of literature, or a place. But while the data is not personal, the study draws upon a personal resonance with the data and coordinates the personal with the social and the political, also answering the critiques of *currere* as a-political or a-social.

Post-*currere* makes use of methods associated with *currere* that draw on the interdisciplinarity and particularity of the original method without grounding the research in one's own particular experience. That is to say, post-*currere* uses a kind of "critical subjectivity" (Reason & Rowan, 1981, cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 1998) to examine a pedagogical, biographical, historical, theoretical, social, phenomena or event.

Critical subjectivity means that we do not suppress our primary subjective experience, that we accept that our knowing is from a perspective; it also means that we are aware of that perspective and of its bias and we articulate it in our communications. Critical subjectivity involves a self-reflexive attention to the ground on which one is standing. . . (pp. 267-268).

Thus, critical subjectivity is derived from the autobiographical frame used within an interdisciplinary approach, as a means by which to both attend to one's own psychic investments in the research, and the way one's own past influences the analysis while at the same time grounding the research in a "unit of analysis" that both resonates personally and also into social and political spheres. To illuminate this approach, I offer some examples from recent scholarship.

One example of post-*currere* to which I have referred previously in this study is Salvio's (2007) (auto)biographical study of the teaching life of poet Anne

Sexton (Salvio, 2007). While *Anne Sexton: Teacher of weird abundance* is a biographical work that focuses on Sexton's life as a teacher, Salvio explores pedagogy by focusing both on Anne Sexton and also on how Anne Sexton's performative approach to teaching resonate with and disturb her own. Salvio explains that the book does not serve as a biography of Sexton, "rather, it performs a method of writing auto/biographically in which Sexton functions as an interlocutor, indirectly illuminating the gender, sexual, and cultural struggles that influence our conscious and unconscious interests, our scholarship, and our teaching" (Salvio, 2007, p. 3). Salvio performs for the reader a form of post-*currere*, which is (auto)biographical, but not personal. Salvio concludes this reflective and reflexive work on pedagogy, her own and Anne Sexton's, by explaining that "Sexton's work shows us the importance of revision, not only as a textual art, but as a life skill. It is also the series of paradoxical lessons of writing personally, but not about ourselves, that is Sexton's inimitable pedagogical legacy" (p. 122).

In a post-*currere* work that focuses on place, Brian Casemore (2008) explains that his scholarship "explores the southern place autobiographically, historically and theoretically to illuminate the subjective and social dimension of place and to promote progressive conversations in the region" (p. v). This inquiry project, *The language and politics of place: Autobiographical curriculum inquiry in the American south*, focuses on a social phenomenon through the trope of the white male southerner in his relationship to the land. Casemore interweaves autobiographical reflection into his theoretical exploration by writing

“autobiographical interludes.” Each autobiographical interlude performs a narrative exploration, located in the personal that resonates outward to the social/political, and is followed by a chapter which situates that personal exploration into a larger theoretical context. Each set of paired chapters moves from the particular to the social/political, always attending to the dialogic relationship between the particular and the universal. Casemore elegantly illuminates the way his own past influences his analysis of the larger socio-political context, while at the same time grounding the research in a unit of analysis, the language and literature of the American South, which both resonates personally for him and also into social and political spheres.

To study phenomena in nursing education that she calls “being-with,” Mary Packard (2004), draws on the method of *currence*. Her exploration begins with experiences of “being-with” begin with personal relationships, move outward to the context of the classroom in the student nurse–teacher context, and then to the context of nurse-patient relationships. While her concerns are about the personal in patient care, and her research draws upon her personal experiences and understandings, Packard is not being personal about herself.

In fact, in each of these three examples, the scholars perform the personal, but by “going beyond the perimeter” of the personal and coordinating the personal into an ever expanding set of cultural contexts of social and political concerns, the limits and accusations of solipsism that plagued early forms of *currence* are addressed, one might say settled. It is this relationship of the particular with a larger context and this location of the personal experience in a

larger historical, political, or social context which shifts the original conception of *currere* and identifies these writers and other contemporary scholars of *currere* as *post-currere*.

Situating My Research in the Field of Post-Currere

In ways akin to the approach scholars of *post-currere* have extended the focus beyond the autobiographical and the personal, my dissertation offers a study of an event that held and holds for me enormous significance in terms of what it means to be literate, to be privileged, to be a woman, and to be a female athlete. While curriculum theory in general is the "interdisciplinary study of educational experience" (Pinar, 2004, p. 2) I am bringing an interdisciplinary perspective specifically to studying what it meant and what it means to be literate given particular socio/political situations, and I am grounding that study in the 1976 Yale Women's Crew protest. I use a modified version of *currere* to illuminate the explicit and implicit literacy practices embodied in the incident at Yale and I use that incident to reveal the limitations and possibilities of extant approaches to literacy education.

The modified version of *currere* I employ allows me to analyze my own perspectives on, and assumptions about, literacy by thinking back through the rowing incident at Yale in the context of Title IX and through a study of my experiences rowing as I move forward into the possibilities for literacy education. I use a *currere* sensitive to the need to address social and political contexts to read that incident such that it illuminates the social and legal constraints placed

on female athletes at the time and how these constraints impacted the capacity women had to get 'choral uptake' from persons who held the power to undermine their work as athletes. Although I am sensitive to my own psychic investments in this scholarship, and although I pay attention to the way my own past influences my analysis, I do not ground the research in my own autobiography but rather in an event that resonates in my life but extends outward into the larger social and political spheres.

Conclusion

This dissertation offers the field of curriculum studies an example of a contemporary application of currere. Focusing on an important but ignored event, the protest by the Yale women's rowing team in 1976, the dissertation contributes to an understanding of the ways social identity (gender, sexuality, race and class), literacy practices (our use and understanding of what it means to be literate and the power and politics of literacy) and our own psychic and social location influence each other and cannot be parsed out without a profound loss of understanding. The dissertation also exemplifies an approach to educational research that takes into account the desires and history of the scholar, while at the same time challenging the assumption that power is inextricably tied to being literate. The field of curriculum studies is "committed to studying educational experience as it is encoded in the school curriculum," (Pinar, 2004, p. 20) and this dissertation "decodes" the educational experiences of the female rowers at Yale, as these experiences were encoded in the practices of the athletic

department, the institutional assumptions about literacy and power at Yale University, and the way the women rowers resisted those practices and assumptions. Furthermore, it reveals how the assumptions about literacy and the approaches to literacy education remain today encoded in the school curriculum.

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