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# The transformative North Atlantic Treaty Organization: An alliance's out-of-area policy and journey to Afghanistan

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**THE TRANSFORMATIVE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION:  
*An Alliance's Out-of-Area Policy and Journey to Afghanistan***

**BY**

**LAURA KASH**

**BA, University of New Hampshire, 2007**

**THESIS**

**Submitted to the University of New Hampshire**

**in Partial Fulfillment of**

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
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
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
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## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my family, loved ones, and friends, for giving me the courage to think for myself and inspiring and driving me to new heights. Each of you has been with me every step of the way, through the good and bad times. Thank you for all the unconditional love, guidance, and support that you have always given me, helping me to succeed and instilling in me the confidence that I am capable of doing anything I put my mind to. Thank you for everything.

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## ABSTRACT

### THE TRANSFORMATIVE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION: AN ALLIANCE'S OUT-OF-AREA POLICY AND JOURNEY TO AFGAHNISTAN

Laura Kash

University of New Hampshire, May, 2009

NATO was formed in 1949 to safeguard and promote stability for its members throughout the North Atlantic. Since its formation its members have sought to uphold its mission and objectives while expanding its agenda and engaging in a broad range of activities. These activities have included engagements that lay outside the traditional European boundaries of the Alliance. Historically, the member nations were unable to carry out an out-of-area policy due to disagreements between interests, ideologies, and viewpoints. The end of the Cold War signaled a shift in member nations' attitudes and policy regarding out-of-area operations. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the Alliance engaged in several missions and participated in its first out-of-area mission in Afghanistan. Through a dialogical analysis of NATO's policy building upon rule-orientated constructivism, this thesis will explore NATO member nations' shift in out-of-area policy and understand why NATO became involved in Afghanistan in 2001.

## INTRODUCTION

After many years of misery and suffering through the Great Depression and World War II, prosperity was no longer a glimmer in the horizon for the citizens of the United States and Europe. The year of 1949 represented a time of hope, success, and change. The year was marked by a growth in car sales and television sets. It was also a year in which the People's Republic of China had established the first Asian Communist state under Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb. Amidst the trends and the rising tensions between the East and the West, the *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)* was established.

The Alliance was formed in order to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people” while trying to “promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”<sup>1</sup> According to NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, the formation of the Alliance was seen as a way to keep “the Russians out, the American in, and the Germans down.”<sup>2</sup> For the next sixty years, NATO's objectives would be sought after and achieved through both political and military means.

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<sup>1</sup> “The North Atlantic Treaty,” available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>; Internet, accessed 21 October 2008.

<sup>2</sup> “NATO in the 21st Century, Speech by the Secretary General to the Millennium Year Lord Mayor's Lecture,” available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000720a.htm>; Internet, accessed 16 February 2009.

From 1949 with the formation of NATO, until 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the member states of the Alliance<sup>3</sup> have continuously sought to uphold its mission and objectives. As the Cold War came to an end and the security threat against the member countries diminished, NATO sought new measures to uphold its mission within the global security environment.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has moved beyond its European boundaries and has carried out its missions and operations in a different way by expanding its agenda and engaging in a broader range of activities. Despite the shift occurring in the global security environment, NATO has remained a crucial element in preserving the safety and security of its member countries and their citizens. As NATO members continue to expand the role and agenda of the Alliance, their efforts are designed with one basic premise in mind – “to address proactively the security challenges which could, or already do, affect the safety or the interests of its members and their populations.”<sup>4</sup> As a result, NATO has carried out its mission and objectives in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Entering into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, NATO has continued to embark on its mission to preserve the safety and security of its members. In doing so, the member nations have sought to build a different relationship with the East, expand the membership of the Alliance, and increase the involvement and activities of the Organization beyond the traditional European boundaries. After the end of the Cold War, the members of NATO built a different relationship between the West and Russia. By building an organic,

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<sup>3</sup> NATO is an alliance made up of member states; thus NATO can be referred to as an Alliance. Throughout this thesis NATO may also be referred to as an Organization.

<sup>4</sup> NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

permanent relationship between Russia and the Alliance, the member nations have developed an effective and efficient way to solve security issues. These issues include crisis management and proliferation problem-solving. Additionally, the enlargement of its membership has allowed NATO to “preclude major conflicts in Europe, because the very prospect of NATO membership serves as an incentive for aspirants to get their own houses in order.”<sup>5</sup> However the most significant development within NATO is its continued involvement in selective missions and operations, particularly those reside out-of-area.<sup>6</sup>

From the time since the end of the Cold War, NATO and its members have dedicated a large amount of time in developing relationships and becoming involved in issues with the new democracies of central, eastern and southern Europe. These new partnerships have influenced NATO’s out-of-area policy and have influenced the Alliance’s involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo. These changes reflect a shift regarding the Alliance’s out-of-area policy. These adaptations have allowed the member nations to maintain the mission of NATO while combating threats through a combination of political, diplomatic, and military efforts.

Following the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, the United States began its fight against terrorism. In its war on terrorism, the United States called upon the help of several NATO member nations to invade and topple the al-Qaeda regime that resided in

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<sup>5</sup> NATO in the 21st Century.

<sup>6</sup> According to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6, the NATO area, the area which NATO would defend is “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” NATO is defined by these areas, thus any mission or operation which takes place outside of these regions is known as “out-of-area.” Furthermore, “out-of-area” is military term used in NATO’s military structure and forces, which means any mission or operations which takes place outside of the traditional European theater.

Afghanistan. NATO, upholding its mission and its resilient bonds of its member countries, responded by stating:

It underscores the urgency of intensifying the battle against terrorism, a battle that the NATO countries - indeed all civilized nations - must win. All Allies stand united in their determination to combat this scourge.

At this critical moment, the United States can rely on its 18 Allies in North America and Europe for assistance and support. NATO solidarity remains the essence of our Alliance. Our message to the people of the United States is that we are with you. Our message to those who perpetrated these unspeakable crimes is equally clear: you will not get away with it.<sup>7</sup>

NATO's involvement in Afghanistan proved to be a test of the Alliance's determination, principles, and military abilities. Afghanistan would be known as to be NATO's first out-of-area mission.

NATO's efforts in Afghanistan represent the Alliance's first mission beyond the traditional boundaries of Europe. Although NATO has historically participated in several missions, the operations in Afghanistan were special. NATO's involvement in Afghanistan was a historical turning point because it was the first effort undertaken by NATO which involved both military and political efforts outside of the European theater.

For over fifty years NATO and its members have sought to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilizations of their people and promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.<sup>8</sup> Throughout its existence, the member nations of the Alliance have changed and expanded the mission. As such, the Alliance has expanded its involvement from the central European theater to selective out-of-area operations. In 2001, NATO once again expanded its involvement by being a part of operations in Afghanistan. In its present day, NATO remains a cornerstone in the

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<sup>7</sup> "September 11th, 2001: Statement by the North Atlantic Council," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-122e.htm>; Internet, accessed 16 February 2009.

<sup>8</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty.



operations in Afghanistan. The member nations will continue to expand the role of the Alliance and be involved in selective out-of-area missions in order to uphold its mission of stability and safety.

Although NATO has been involved in various missions previously, why did it specifically become involved in Afghanistan? This thesis questions: why NATO become involved in Afghanistan. Specifically, are NATO member nations holding fast to collective security rules while gradually adhering to institutionalism or simply are the actions of the Alliance ad hoc? This analysis will critically analyze NATO member states attitudes and out-of-area policy. The analysis of NATO's out-of-area mission in Afghanistan will help to shed light on NATO's policy development and attitudes regarding out-of-area and explain what led to NATO involvement in Afghanistan in 2001.

## Overview of Thesis

The thesis consists of five chapters: Background, Toward an Analytical Framework, Methodology, Case-Study, and Conclusions. A brief overview of each of these chapters is as follows.

Chapter One, *Background*, will discuss relevant background information of this study. The chapter will briefly trace the development of the NATO and its mission since its establishment in 1949 to 2009. This discussion will lead to the question of the thesis: why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan, specifically was its due to the use of collective security rules and gradual adherence to institutionalism or ad hoc tendencies? The final section of the chapter will introduce the reader to the case study of NATO policy development which culminated in the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan. The purpose of this information is to provide a clear understanding to the reader for it is essential for the study at hand.

Chapter Two, *Toward an Analytical Framework*, is divided into two main sections. The first section will provide an overview of the literature and discuss related alternative theories. I will argue which theory is substantial and applicable to this thesis – constructivism. The section will then elaborate on the theory of constructivism. The second section, will discuss a critical piece of literature written on constructing post-Cold War collective security: Brian Frederking's *Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security*. Frederking's theory of rule-oriented constructivism will be the basis of this thesis. The section will conclude with an outline of the strengths and weakness of Frederking's work and then build upon these lessons learned and apply them throughout the thesis.

Chapter Three, *Methodology*, will provide the methodological framework for this study. The chapter will first identify the research question of the thesis, distinguish the hypotheses to be tested, define the unit and level of analysis and key variables. It will also outline the data and measurements of the variables. Finally, the chapter will intimately discuss the methodology of the study – dialogical analysis.

Chapter Four, *Case Study*, will comprise of the actual case study and present its finding. First the chapter will outline the purpose, mission, and structure of NATO. Next the chapter will provide a brief overview of NATO's policy regarding out-of-area. This will be dovetailed by a historical summary of Afghanistan and NATO's recent involvement in the Afghanistan 2001 invasion. The chapter will then interpret NATO's policy between 1996 and 2003. Using NATO's communiqués and dialogical analysis, the chapter will outline the necessary background needed in order to test the research at hand. Then the speech acts, found in the communiqués, will be identified and explained. These speech acts will then be analyzed according to both pragmatic and argument methodologies. This chapter will conclude with a presentation of the findings.

Finally, Chapter Five, *Conclusion*, summarizes the findings of the thesis, briefly highlight NATO and its policy development regarding out-of-area. The chapter finalizes with a few directions for future research.

## CHAPTER I

### BACKGROUND

For nearly sixty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a fundamental cornerstone in the global security environment. The Alliance was established based upon democratic values, individual freedoms, and the rule of law. As outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the Alliance's mission is to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples" and "seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area."<sup>9</sup> Each of these objectives would be achieved through political and military means.

This chapter will discuss relevant background information of this study. The chapter will briefly trace the development of NATO from 1949 to 2009. The chapter will then highlight the history of NATO's operation and missions. Building upon the historical developments of the Alliance, the chapter will briefly discuss NATO's new mission of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The chapter will end with a brief discussion on NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. The chapter will establish the question of this thesis: *why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan?* Specifically, are NATO member countries adhering to institutionalism or is it because of ad hoc tendencies?

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<sup>9</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty.

## The End of the Cold War

In 1989, the long standing divide – the Berlin Wall – between the hostile camps of the Eastern and Western Europe met its fate. This was a significant turn in the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the mission and objectives of NATO. The collapse of the Berlin Wall signaled the first of multiple dominoes to fall and finalized in the end of the Cold War. The security policy which had dominated Western policy since post-World War II had finally come to a closure. The fall of the Berlin Wall lead to a sudden shift in the balance of power. The materialization of a new world order signaled the beginning of a new chapter in the security of the transatlantic and the mission of NATO.

Since the end Cold War, the mission of NATO became refocused in manner that could have never been classified during the U.S.-Soviet dual. In essence the end of the Cold War removed the foremost threat to NATO and signaled the emergence new transnational threats. These new threats have jeopardized and challenged the peace and stability of NATO and its members. In this new environment, war was no longer considered the only threat which nations faced. Threats to the Alliance and its members would emerge outside of NATO's traditional mission area in the forms of terrorism, states who have access to weapons of mass destruction, civil wars, natural disasters, clashes over natural resources, and the "the impact of new technologies and reductions to national defense spending."<sup>10</sup> As a result, NATO member nations have responded to the global security environment by developing "new roles, new missions, and accepting new members."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, (1999) "NATO Burden Sharing: Past and Future," *Journal of Peace Research* 36:6:665.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

## NATO in the Post-Cold War Environment

The post-Cold War environment has inspired the emergence of a new integrated European-Atlantic global security environment. Within this new environment, NATO continued its central role of upholding its mission by establishing new methods for cooperation and promoting a shared understanding across the transatlantic region. As NATO continues to engage the global security environment, it will continuously be confronted with multiple challenges and threats. Albeit the challenges and threats, NATO will continue to strive to survive while transforming and adapting to reflect the changes of the global security environment.

In the post-Cold War environment, NATO's existence has been challenged and its objectives have altered. It was apparent from the end of the Cold War that the existing security structure of the Alliance could not be used effectively in a crisis management. Additionally, the security structures would not be capable of dealing with either "intra-state or regional conflicts, ethnic tensions, or aggressive separatism in the areas, which are most frequently outside of NATO's direct geographic reach."<sup>12</sup> The fundamental question arose whether the Alliance would be able to exist in this new global security environment and whether it could handle the nature of the security challenges while being able to effectively adapt and maintain to confront the threats and challenges.

In 1991, NATO Heads of State agreed on the need to transform<sup>13</sup> the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in the global security environment. The 1991 Strategic Concept helped to reaffirm the original principles of the Alliance as well

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<sup>12</sup> Manuka Metreveli, (2003) "Legal Aspects of NATO's Involvement in Out-of-Area Peace Support Operations," *NATO-EAPSC Research Fellowship* (Brussels, BE: North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

<sup>13</sup> Transform in this thesis will mean a marked change, as in composition, appearance, character, and condition.

as clarify NATO's role in the post-Cold War environment. The member nations agreed that in order to achieve its central purpose, the Strategy would center around four fundamental tasks:

1. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state; and
4. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.<sup>14</sup>

By fulfilling these fundamental security objectives, the member states were able to continue upholding security and seeking peaceful resolutions to disputes. However, within a decade this policy was in desperate need of transformation, renovation, and repairs.

From 1991 to 1999, NATO and its member states have been able to successfully maintain its objectives as outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 and the Strategic Concept of 1991 while adapting to the post-Cold War security environment. Over this

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<sup>14</sup> "The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b911108a.htm>; Internet, accessed 20 October 2008.

period of time NATO member nations made internal alterations and played an expansive role in supporting and maintaining objectives and missions. With the NATO members engaging new roles and activities it became necessary to refine the Alliance's vision and strategies for the future. In 1999, at the Washington Summit, the members of the Alliance adopted the Strategic Concept for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

In April 1999, NATO Heads of State approved the Alliance's new Strategic Concept. The new concept "emphasized that while collective security remains the core purpose of NATO, Alliance security interests could be affected by other risks of a wider nature and therefore must also take account of the global context."<sup>15</sup> These included "uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance" which could take the form of a "ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states" that could lead to "crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability."<sup>16</sup> More importantly the Strategic Concept formally adopted to support (on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures) "operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including by making available Alliance resources and expertise."<sup>17</sup> For the first time in NATO's history, the Alliance documented and endorsed missions and operations. Even though the member nations did not clearly define specification for area missions, the adoption of the Strategic Concept

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<sup>15</sup> "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>; Internet, accessed 20 October 2008.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.



solidified NATO's engagement in missions and opened the door for missions outside of the European scope.

### NATO's Missions and Operations

#### The Cold War

When NATO was first established in 1949, one of its fundamental roles was to deter any military aggressions. In this role, NATO's success was a reflection of the Alliance's lack of involvement in any military engagement. For much of the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, NATO remained vigilant and prepared. Thus, throughout the Cold War NATO relied upon a non-policy on missions who resided outside the boundaries of the European continent.

The fundamental reason NATO did not endorse or implement an out-of-area policy was based upon different interests perceived by each member nation beyond the North Atlantic area. For example, "the United States had global interests; some NATO members, including major ones as France and the United Kingdom, had regional interests; and other NATO members only had local interests."<sup>18</sup> Another reason was the different viewpoints regarding threat. "While NATO members recognized the constant, albeit varying, Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area; there was no such consensus on the Soviet threat to other parts of the world."<sup>19</sup> A third and final reason was the variation in ideologies. During the first half of the Cold War, various NATO members were in possession of colonies while other countries held a position of anti-colonialism.<sup>20</sup> In the

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<sup>18</sup> Frode Liland, (1999) *Keeping NATO Out of Trouble: NATO's Non-Policy on Out-of-Area Issues During the Cold War in A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years, Volume I*, (New York, NY: Palgrave), 173.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

later years of the Cold War, many of the NATO member countries found themselves engulfed by “American projection of power all over the world, in the name of containment of communism” and this was morally difficult for each country to grasp.<sup>21</sup> Despite the difference in interests, ideologies, and perceptions toward threat, the end of the Cold War led to a shift in area policy. This shift led member countries to reconsider the security borders of the Alliance and NATO’s role beyond Europe. The possibility of geographic widening of the Alliance, lead to alarm amongst members for it could jeopardize the cooperation of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty. Despite fears and anxieties, NATO member nations shifted attitudes and the Alliance’s out-of-area policy. This shift set the stage for NATO’s involvement in new missions and operations including several selective out-of-area operations.

### **Post-Cold War**

At the conclusion of the Cold War, the attitudes of the member states, NATO’s policies and procedures changed and began to reflect the current global security environment. In the post-Cold War environment, the member states committed the Alliance to missions and operations which resided beyond the traditional realm of Europe.

The development of NATO’s missions and operations after the Cold War can be classified into three stages. In the first stage, from 1990 to 1992, NATO’s “traditional reluctance to engage in out-of-area conflicts came under pressure, but remained largely unchanged.”<sup>22</sup> In 1991, the member nations realized that its forty year old threat and objectives had dissolved along with the Soviet Union. NATO and its members were

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<sup>21</sup> Frode (2009), 173.

<sup>22</sup> Metreveli (2003), 34.

faced with the choice to make dramatic changes. These changes resulted in the adoption of the Strategic Concept of 1991 and for the first time the member nations could envision playing in out-of-area roles. However, this Strategic Concept was soon outdated with the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia.

The second stage, from 1992 to 1995, was marked by NATO's involvement in the war in Bosnia. In July 1992, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), began monitoring operations in the Adriatic. These operations were undertaken in support of the UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713 and sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia outlined in UNSCR 757.<sup>23</sup> In October 1992, NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft began to observe the no-fly zone over Bosnia and were to report any movements under UNSCR 781.<sup>24</sup> Although these small actions by NATO were not cataclysmic, the success of the narrow mission led to further calls on NATO aircraft at later stages. In December 1992, NATO foreign ministers first stated that NATO was prepared to support operations acting under the authority of the UN Security Council.<sup>25</sup>

Initially, NATO's role was to help to support the UN's operations. However, throughout the operations NATO's role in the joint operations changed from launching a naval mission in the Adriatic Sea in 1992 to a large-scale air campaign against the Bosnia Serbs in 1995. These actions proved significant both in encouraging NATO authorities

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<sup>23</sup> "Chapter 5: The Alliance's Operation Role in Peacekeeping – The Process of Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb050102.htm>; Internet, accessed 25 October 2008.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

and in making it clear that NATO had vast superiority in air power and was fully committed to missions who threatened the peace and security of the member nations.

NATO's involvement in the war of Bosnia-Herzegovina marked a significant change in the relationship between NATO and the UN, as the Alliance transformed from peacekeepers to peace enforcers. From 1992 to 1995, NATO began to act independently and its operations changed from those of peacekeeping<sup>26</sup> to peace enforcement<sup>27</sup> as it intervened in the Bosnian war.

In the third stage, from 1995 to present day, NATO has fully embraced its new objectives to be involved in selective out-of-area missions. Over this period of time, NATO has been involved in three different types of missions. The first type of mission involves operations who reside within the Euro-Atlantic area, such as those in Albania in 1997. A second type of mission are composed of "able and willing," such as in the Kosovo military campaign. The third and final type of mission the Alliance is involved in is missions based upon assistance from the Partnership for Peace. Operations of this nature include those in Bosnia and Darfur. As NATO continues to expand and test its operational boundaries, its core mission has consistently been upheld since its founding in 1949.

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<sup>26</sup> The concept of peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned anywhere in the North Atlantic Treaty. It has evolved as a pragmatic solution over the life of NATO when it became apparent that the mission of the Alliance relating to upholding stability and security within the North Atlantic area could not be implemented as envisaged. The first operation, Operation Deliberate Force, was created in 1995 to "compel an end to Serb-led violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina." An overview of NATO missions and operations is provided by the listing of past and current operations posted on the website of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ([http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52060.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm)).

<sup>27</sup> "Note by the President of the Security Council, S/23500, 31 January 1992," available from <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20S23500.pdf>; Internet, accessed 05 May 2009.

Entering in the 21<sup>st</sup> century NATO's mission has remained consistent – maintaining peace and security – and operations have changed. However, the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> were a wakeup call for the member states of NATO. The attacks called for drastic steps to be taken by the member states in order to ensure the safety and stability of the Alliance. In response to the attacks, the member nations invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The adoption of Article 5 effectively signaled a new chapter in the history of NATO.

### NATO's New Mission

On September 11 2001, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C., ended in the deaths of hundreds and the injury of thousands. The impact of September 11<sup>th</sup> was felt immediately and directly. The attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> were a call for sweeping transformations to be made in the global security environment. The NATO member states took historical steps and made the extraordinary decision by unanimously agreeing to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which stated “an attack on one or more of them in Europe or North America as an attack against them all.”<sup>28</sup>

Within mere hours of the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, the Bush Administration announced a war on terrorism. The goals of the war were to bring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to justice and prevent the rise of other terrorist organizations. These goals would be accomplished by two means. First, the United States would place economic and military sanctions on any state perceived as harboring terrorists while increasing intelligence distribution and worldwide surveillance. Second, US-led military operations

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<sup>28</sup> “Chapter 1: What is NATO? – Terrorism and the Emergence of New Threats,” available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0106.htm>; Internet, accessed 25 October 2008.

would be launched in Afghanistan to overthrow the oppressive Taliban rule and oust al-Qaeda forces.

Within twenty-four hours after the attacks on New York and Washington D.C, the fight against terrorism was identified as a central tenet for NATO and its member nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. On 12 September 2001, the NATO member nations immediately pledged their loyalty and support of the war on terrorism. The first steps the member nations took were to invoke Article 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 and adopted measures, if needed, to fight against terrorism. In parallel with these dealings, the Alliance also agreed to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and to deploy elements of its AWACS force to support operations against terrorism.<sup>29</sup> These actions enabled the Alliance to better assist its member nations and their national authorities in the protection of their populations. These collective actions, operationalized in Article 5, clearly “demonstrated the member nations’ resolve and commitment to support and contribute to the U.S. led fight against terrorism.”<sup>30</sup>

NATO involvement in the fight against terrorism is a commitment of a wide-ranging, long-standing effort by the Alliance and its members. The mission would require a combination of political, economic, and diplomatic action and law enforcement measures, as well as military tactics. Consequently, the NATO member countries agreed on the need for a long-term, versatile approach which would include the “members of the

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<sup>29</sup> Chapter 1: What is NATO? – Terrorism and the Emergence of New Threats.

<sup>30</sup> Metreveli (2003), 56.

Alliance and as members of other international organizations.”<sup>31</sup> The first test of this long-term approach would be NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.

### **NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan**

In 2001, following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, the military of the United States with the help of several NATO member nations invaded and toppled the al-Qaeda regime. The invasion of Afghanistan would prove to be a test of will, ideologies, and military capabilities for NATO and its member nations. Indeed, Afghanistan created a venue for which NATO members would have to go beyond their European theater and combat the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The mission in Afghanistan can truly be called NATO’s first out-of-area mission.

The efforts undertaken by NATO in Afghanistan are the Alliance’s first mission beyond the boundaries of the European continent. The purpose of the Afghanistan mission was to stabilize and reconstruct the country. Even though NATO has participated in several stabilization and reconstruction missions, such as in Kosovo, the operations in Afghanistan were different. Different because there has never been a long standing centralized Afghanistan government, the presence of Taliban, the out-of-area scope and abrasive terrain, its historical context, and standing amongst the international community. The mission in Afghanistan has played an important role for NATO, its leadership, and will play a role in the Alliance’s future.

For approximately sixty years the mission of NATO has never deterred or wavered from its course as established in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 – to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples and seek to

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<sup>31</sup> Chapter 1: What is NATO? – Terrorism and the Emergence of New Threats.

promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.<sup>32</sup> Over this period of time, NATO has expanded its security umbrella far beyond the traditional European theater. In 2001, NATO became involved in its largest challenge to date – operations in Afghanistan. Today, NATO continues to be involved in Afghanistan operations and will continue to expand its role and be involved in various selective out-of-area missions. But taking a step back and looking at the larger picture, one questions why now and why Afghanistan? Indeed why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan?

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<sup>32</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty.



## CHAPTER II

### TOWARD AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Albert Einstein observed, “It is theory that decides what can be observed.”<sup>33</sup> This sentence explains that there are many theories that can explain a circumstance or a phenomenon. Thus a theory is what is observed by explaining what was responsible for the situation and conveys an understanding of what is seen. Based upon this explanation, there are multiple theories on security at different levels of analysis – the individual decision maker, the domestic determinant, the bureaucracy, and the international environment – which may explain the developments and occurrences in the global security environment, specifically NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. Recognizing that there are multiple scholars whose research explores security and its environment, this particular research will use the international level of analysis and analyze NATO policy regarding out-of-area to understand why the Alliance became involved in Afghanistan in 2001. Specifically, this thesis will apply Brian Frederking’s rule-oriented constructivist theory and dialogical analysis to analyze NATO’s out-of-area policy from 1996 to 2003.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will provide a summary of the related literature and related explanations. This section will establish that the school of constructivism provides the strongest foundation for this thesis and its analysis. The section will end with a discussion on constructivism, explicitly expanding

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<sup>33</sup> John S. Rigden, (2005) *Einstein 1905: The Standard of Greatness*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 75.

on the theory of this thesis – rule-orientated constructivism. The second section of the chapter will discuss Brian Frederking's *Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security*. The section will examine Frederking's argument, summarize its main points, and point out its major flaws. In particular, the section will critique Frederick's argument distilling the inconsistency in methodology, his lack of ability to clearly define global security, and use of secondary resources. The lessons learned from Frederking's research will be applied throughout the thesis.

## Literature Review

### Discussion of Security

The idea of security is a complex and highly contested concept which is profoundly weighed down with emotion and deeply held values. Security is defined as "state of being free from the threat of harm."<sup>34</sup> As such, there are both objective and subjective aspects in security. Most people would agree that security is a problem which occurs when someone – a person, group, organization, or state – threatens another's life or livelihood. For example think about a gunman in a dark alley way demanding your valuables or your life. Or more realistically, imagine the terror of a citizen in New York City on September 11 2001, witnessing firsthand the attack and destruction of the World Trade Center.

While few people would likely dispute that each of these examples are security threats, many would also seek to extend the meaning of security to other beliefs and interests. For example, they may apply the term to infectious diseases, the exponential growth of the human population, global warming, or to human rights. Thus where do we draw the line when studying security? What should be included or excluded? The study

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<sup>34</sup> Ridgen (2005), 5.

of security is a broad and contentious field, but for the purposes of this thesis, the study of security will be studied at the international level and narrowly defined as the survival of NATO and its member nations from threats and attacks.

The study of security is a complex and ever-growing and changing field. The field of security studies has a long and varied history. For the purposes of this thesis, the development of security will be discussed from the 1980s to present day.<sup>35</sup>

### Security Studies

The study of security has a long and varied history which can be predated to the Greeks and Romans. Based upon the expansive depth of the field, security studies in this thesis will primary focus on the period between the 1980s to present day.

The field of security studies has been attractive for many researchers and analysts over the decades. At the end of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s, the field began to see a dramatic resurgence. In addition to the dramatic increase of professional interest and a rise in publications regarding security related topics, “security studies became more rigorous, methodology sophisticated, and theoretically inclined.”<sup>36</sup> These patterns would result in a renaissance of security studies, which would last for the next three decades.

In the early 1980s, the focus of scholars and research in the studies of global security revolved around explaining why the Soviets and Americans thought differently about nuclear strategy. Scholars argued that differences in a nation’s security and defense policies stemmed from variations in macro-environmental variables. A pioneer, Jack Snyder (1977) argued that specific domestic elements develop aggressive strategic

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<sup>35</sup> The study of security predates the 1980s.

<sup>36</sup> Stephan M. Walt, (1991) “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35:2:211-239.

perspectives that serve particular political interests in order to achieve security. These interests are then manipulated by elites and used as a means of propaganda. This propaganda only served to obscure the true realities of the security found in the international community. Snyder points out that “statesmen and societies actively shape the lessons of the past in way they find convenient that it is to say that they are shaped by them.”<sup>37</sup> Thus, developments involving security are a result of historical experience linked with political culture. Similarly, Colin Gray (1981) and David R. Jones (1990) point out that “cultures comprise the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique historical experience.”<sup>38</sup> Thus security is not static. It changes gradually as society responds to challenges from within and without being based upon historical experience, culture and geography.

While Snyder, Gray, and Jones are considered some of the leading scholars in security studies, there are multiple shortcomings in each of their research. Since the analysis of security was relatively new during the 1980s, there were definitional problems which lead to unwieldy characteristics. By introducing problems dealing with patterns of behavior implied security led consistently to one type of behavior. When in reality it did anything but this. By not addressing these key elements created gaping holes in the field which in turn led researchers to take a different approach when regarding security studies.

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<sup>37</sup> Jack Snyder, (1977) *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 30.

<sup>38</sup> Colin Gray, (1981) “National Styles in Strategy: The American Example,” *International Security* 6:2:Fall.

In the mid-1980s a new wave within security studies emerged. Scholars at this time began to question the differences between what political leaders thought or said, as opposed to their deeper motivations. Scholars argued that security was used as a governmental tool in security decision-making models. Despite the new outlooks presented by the scholars of the late 1980s, each still had a problem with symbolic discourse; there was no analysis of what factors may be influencing the development of global security. Additionally, many scholars of the age relied upon secondary resources and these sources were uncertain if there were differences in policy-making. Once again, the field of security studies had many new ideas but all of whom were filled with gaps and uncertainties. The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s signaled new hope in the field with the rise of new outlooks and perspectives in security studies.

As the Cold War came to an end, the 1990s signaled a renewed interest in discerning motivations and related sources of behavior in the field of security. At this period of time, scholars and researchers were more rigorous in their studies and discriminating in their conceptualization and operationalization of variables. In this context, a majority of theorists and researchers took a realist approach and cases focused on structuralist-materialist notions. This approach proved that interests cannot explain a particular strategic choice, especially in making security policy. Noteworthy, Alastair Iain Johnston (1995) reasoned that the literature on security is both under and over-determined. Additionally, scholars have so far been unable to offer a convincing research design for isolating effects of security.<sup>39</sup> Johnston writes that security theory today does not reject rationality. Instead, a historically imposed inertia on choice makes strategy less responsive to specific contingencies. Johnston, like many scholars of this “new age”

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<sup>39</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, (1995) “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” *International Security* 19:Spring.

security, avoids determinism that was used by security scholars in the 1980s. In this sense, researchers and scholars no longer used behavior as their independent variable when establishing causal relationships. Rather, competitive theory testing was used, which pins alternative explanations against one another illustrating a new outlook for the field of security.

This new wave of studies within the field of security marked the 1990s and attributed to the ever-growing knowledge in the field of international relations. However, holes still remained. Three main shortcomings still continued to plague scholars – a lack of a definition of security; the flawed use of realism; and the use of organizational culture as the cause for the influence on security policy.

To date, the interpretation of security has become one of the largest challenges in the fields of security studies and international relations. Presently, the field of security studies rest on an ill defined and often debated netherworld. Despite the tensions within the field there are three alternative theories – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – used throughout security studies to help explain the global security environment and its developments.

### **Alternative Theories**

The alternative theories – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – each have strived to explain global security and its environment. Each of these theories differs significantly in their compositions and demeanors. The following section will briefly highlight each theory and will identify the theory which the thesis will be based upon.

## Realism

Realism, a traditional approach to security, is comprised of a variety of concepts and methods. It has remained a dominant theory within the field of security studies. Realism, associated with Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Morgenthau, as well as many others,<sup>40</sup> emphasizes that “the state is the principal actor in international affairs and there is no authority superior to these sovereign political units.”<sup>41</sup> This position asserts that analysis should focus on the behavior of individual states. Accordingly, states will act upon their own personal goals to maintain safety and achieve security. Thus, a state disregards the interdependence between states in order to achieve their personal interests.

Accordingly, realism presents itself in several tenets within security studies:

1. Nation-states are unitary and geographically based actors in an anarchic international environment who have no authority to regulate interactions between each state in the system;<sup>42</sup>
2. Sovereign states are the primary actors in the international environment;<sup>43</sup>
3. States, being the highest actor within the international system, are always in a constant state of competition with one another; and
4. States each act in rational manner that pursue their own self interest in order to maintain and secure their own security.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, (1999) “Theory, Images, and International relations: An Introduction” in *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond*, (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon), 5.

<sup>41</sup> Robert Gilpin, (2001) *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*, available from <http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s7093.html>; Internet, accessed 03 March 2008.

<sup>42</sup> Viotti and Kauppi (1999), 5.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

In summary, realists believe that all mankind and states are self-centered, aggressive, and competitive. Furthermore, realists believe that states are inherently aggressive and are consumed by the idea of security. Thus, aggression is present at all times and when this aggression builds up a security dilemma is created.<sup>45</sup> Within a security dilemma a state's objective is to increase its power; however it can create instability for itself, while another state is building up their security.

### Difficulties with the Realist Analysis

There are several cleavages within realism. These problems would call its relevance into question when specifically regarding this thesis. First, in the post-World War II period, realism emerged as the central structure for understanding international relations and security studies. However the rise of the Cold War gave birth to a "pessimistic view of human nature, and assumptions about the prevalence of the pursuit of power, underpinned more classical approaches to realism."<sup>46</sup> When the Cold War came to an end, the bipolar world, which realists argued was a triumphant and stable configuration, also ceased to exist. Secondly, it has been cited that the end of the Cold War was due to internal problems within the USSR not from a systemic failure, as realists would have contended. These governments then began to shift their behaviors toward "becoming Western-style political and economic systems and joined Western community

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<sup>44</sup> Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, (1999) "Realism: The State, Power, and the Balance of Power" in *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond*, (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon), 35.

<sup>45</sup> Allan Collins, (2007) *Contemporary Security Studies: Traditional Approaches*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 18-19.

<sup>46</sup> Karin M. Fierke, (2007) *Critical Approaches to Global security*, (Oxford, UK: Polity Publishing), 24.



institutions, turning to cooperation or at least band-wagging for their security.”<sup>47</sup> Many realists believed that the end of the Cold War would result in a multiplicity of power. Rather the United States rose to become the hegemony in the international community. Finally, these two patterns have risen to become larger than some realist may have anticipated. Although realists assert that they have time and history on their sides to rely upon, the post-Cold War global security environment displays characteristics – hegemony and levels of interdependence and cooperation – which are particularly difficult and at times tricky to explain from a realist point of view.

### Liberalism

Liberalism, a counter to realism, arose during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries during the age of Enlightenment.<sup>48</sup> The concept of liberalism did not begin to take root until after World War I when it was necessary to explain a states’ inability to find a counterbalance to war within international relations.

Liberalism, associated with Locke, Smith, Kant, and other French and German thinkers, argue for equality of opportunity and individual liberties. In this sense, liberalism holds that the individual is the main actor and as such there will be plurality in actions. Preferences will vary and be largely dependent on culture, government type, and economic organization. Thus there are various streams of thought concerning liberalism, but liberalism holds several general beliefs concerning security studies:

1. The individual is the primary actor in the international environment;<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Collins (2007), 24.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>49</sup> Carla A. Arena Ventura, Melissa Franchini Cavalcanti, and Verônica Angélica Freitas de Paula, (2006) “The System Approach to the Pluralist Theory of International Relations: A Case Study of the European Union,” *Systemic Practice and Action Research* 19:5:475–487.

2. State behavior is primarily determined by state preferences rather than their capabilities;<sup>50</sup>
3. State preferences will vary from state to state and are not limited;
4. State cooperation and interdependence exists allowing for absolute gains;<sup>51</sup> and
5. States are generally united by their support for freedom of thought and speech, governmental limitations, the rule of law, right to property, and transparency in government.<sup>52</sup>

Based upon these tenets, liberalism substantially discourages the use of force among states due to the associated risk with gains.<sup>53</sup> Liberals argue that the costs to use force are high and consequently using force to achieve security is unattractive. A state would rather cooperate and achieve a balance in security than use force. States rely upon a web of interdependencies to achieve their interests regarding security. As long as a high level of interdependence can be maintained there is a reason to hope for balance in security amongst countries and a diminished use of force and a potential security dilemma.<sup>54</sup>

#### Difficulties with the Liberalist Analysis

Liberalism stresses equality of opportunity and individual liberties; nevertheless there are serious problems with the liberal perspective when dealing with this particular

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<sup>50</sup> Collins (2007), 26.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>53</sup> Barry Buzan, (1984) "Economic Structure and Global Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," *International Organization* 38:4:597-624.

<sup>54</sup> Collins (2007), 27.

thesis. First, there are “recurring tensions in theory and practice over priorities.”<sup>55</sup> In other words, in order to achieve security and peace, it is important to cooperate with other governments and countries. However, where should a country’s priorities lay; in trying to build stable and successful relations with other countries or to protecting itself? This is one of the largest tensions evident – whether a state should place emphasis in self-determination or building relations and viable states. As Bush Jr. discovered, invading a state embedded with terrorist activities and then trying to create a stabilized state of fractioned minorities, raises alarm with those whom reside within the countries as well as states which are located within the region and around the world. The liberalist standpoint offers no remedy to resolve these internal and external conflicts in theory and does not provide any sound basis for governments to make pertinent resolutions.

A second problem with the liberalist theory can be found in the justification of using force. Specifically in two scenarios, (1) when governments disagree “about when force is justified or how to determine the will of the international community” and (2) when there is large strife and unhappiness in a certain scenario and the “willingness to see force used to deal with it but widespread reluctance to bear the costs.”<sup>56</sup> In both of these cases, liberalism is of little aid when trying to justify the use of force and those who should bear the burdens when becoming involved. The characteristics outlined above illustrate that it is easier said than done when trying to explain the global security environment from a liberalist perspective.

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<sup>55</sup> Collins (2007), 29.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 31.

### Preferred Alternative Theory: Constructivism

Since the Cold War, the perceptions surrounding the development of global security and related policies became refocused in a new manner. In this new environment, war was no longer considered the only threat which nations faced. Rather global security grew to include threats from transnational forces, failed states, spread of infectious and deadly diseases, terrorism, and cyberspace. Today global security has been redefined as the preservation of sovereignty and the protection against all physical threats, domestic and foreign, through global response and multinational cooperation.<sup>57</sup> Today, the global security environment has become complex in its nature as NATO and its member nations strive to survive and maintain themselves.

Today, global security is focused on problems which fall outside the realm of weapon defense systems. The global security environment and its associated threats and challenges have become all encompassing and have continually challenged the traditional assumptions – realism and liberalism – about the nature of international relations and global security. Accordingly, the fields of security studies and international affairs have employed several theories to explain the developments in global security. However after the end of the Cold War, some researchers saw that the realist model which focuses on state action, and the liberal model which advocates complex interdependence and cooperation, as inadequate and each needed to be modified to reflect the modern global security environment. One answer to the shortcomings of realism and liberalism was the constructivist approach.

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<sup>57</sup> Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr, (2003) *Seeking Security in an Insecure World*, (New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc), 5-7.

Fashioned in the 1990s, constructivism emerged as an alternative to realism and liberalism. Constructivism emerged as a new theory which could explain events like the end of the Cold War and the development of the global security environment. The rise of constructivism in the post-Cold War environment influenced the theoretical works of international relations especially concerning the subfield of security. Constructivism inspired a new wave of research with the promise of new avenues for future development.

### **Constructivism**

Constructivism, associated with Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore, Peter Katzenstein, Nicholas Onuf, as well as many others, asserts that the “existence of social structures – including norms, beliefs, and identities – constitute world politics.”<sup>58</sup> The theory of constructivism seeks to demonstrate that the state system is socially constructed. That is, the state is embedded in a larger society and in this society states agree to particular rules and institutions. Within the society, social arrangements are determined by “shared ideas rather than by material forces,” and “the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”<sup>59</sup> The social arrangements are constitutive and regulative. These so called “patterns of rules” tell us who we are and who others are, and what to do. Essentially, they tell us how the world works, and states and actors come to live and abide by these

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<sup>58</sup> Frederking, Brian. (2003) “Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security.” *American Political Science Review* 97:3:364.

<sup>59</sup> Alexander Wendt, (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press), 1.

arrangements. In a larger sense, these arrangements make up the complex and overlapping world of international relations.

Constructivism asserts that the state system is embedded in a larger more complex society. As cited above, particular social arrangements constitute the society. Many leading constructivists cite different factors that influence the social arrangements. For example, Wendt (1999) cites Mead's symbolic interactionism and Bhaskar's scientific realism.<sup>60</sup> While Onuf (1989) identifies Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, Giddens' structuralism, Habermas' theory of communicative action, and Searle's speech act theory.<sup>61</sup> Despite these differences, each scholar references the use of language. Many constructivists reference language in their studies because language is seen as a representative of the world which creates and makes action possible. In short, language is action itself and signals a "post-positivist turn in the social sciences."<sup>62</sup>

The use of language in constructivism is seen as a representative of the world. Language is a key factor which creates and makes actions possible, and essentially influences social arrangements. Accordingly, constructivists emphasize three common positions. Each of these positions is ontological in nature:

1. Social factors are the main influence of interaction between humans;
2. Social structures and identities of goal-oriented actors; and
3. Agents and structures construct each other; where rules make the agent and agents make the rules.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Frederking (2003), 364.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 364.

Based upon these tenets, constructivism can be called a social theory. The theory of constructivism “offers a synthesis between material, subjective, and inter-subjective dimensions of the world.”<sup>64</sup> In short, constructivism and its use of language can help explain social arrangements of the world and its developments.

In order to analyze and interpret the social world and its arrangements, constructivists have developed a variety of methods to analyze language. These methods include Crawford’s (2002) use of linguistic methods,<sup>65</sup> Hopf’s (2002) phenomenological approach,<sup>66</sup> Mattern’s (2001) analysis of narrative strategies,<sup>67</sup> the discursive practices of Doty (1993), conversation analysis,<sup>68</sup> event data,<sup>69</sup> and dialogical analysis. Each of these methodologies are unique in their understanding and execution, however each in some fashion or another to help emphasize that norms, rules, and institutions can help in understanding an environment where “people make society, and society makes people.”<sup>70</sup>

The diverse constructivisms and their methodologies each use ontology in order to depict the world. Constructivists describe a world which is made up various arrangements. These arrangements are constituted by types of rules. These types of rules

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<sup>64</sup> Emanuel Adler, (1997) “Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3:3:323.

<sup>65</sup> Neta C. Crawford, (2002) *Arguments and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).

<sup>66</sup> Ted Hopf, (2002) *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 & 1999*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

<sup>67</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, (1993) “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37:297-320.

<sup>68</sup> Anita Fetzer, (2000) “Negotiating Validity Claims in Political Interview,” *Text* 20:4:271-94.

<sup>69</sup> Gaven Duffy, (1994) “New Direction in Event Data Analysis,” *International Interactions* 20:1:1-167.

<sup>70</sup> Nicholas Onuf, (1998) “Constructivism: A User’s Manual” in Vendulka Kubalkova, *International Relations in a Constructed World*, (New York, NY and London, UK: M.E. Sharpe).

include beliefs, norms, and identities. “*Beliefs* are shared understandings of the world.”<sup>71</sup> Beliefs are social rules which make claims of truth about the world. “*Norms* are shared understanding of appropriate actions.”<sup>72</sup> Norm rules are social rules which make appropriateness claims about relationships. Finally, “*identities* tell agents who they are and who others are; they enable agents to make the actions of themselves another intelligible.”<sup>73</sup> The social rules of identity make sincerity claims about agents. Each type of constructivist argument emphasis one of these rules for they each help to guide and conduct while at the same time creating objects and agents.

The use of language has allowed constructivists to account for aspects within international relations which realists and liberalists have ignored completely. The use of ontology has allowed constructivists to tackle obstacles which other theorists have encountered and not been able to overcome in international relations and security studies. First, constructivists have “put in the center of attention the constitution of international agents.”<sup>74</sup> It is no longer assumed that “sovereign states and other international agents considered as given” and it appears that “national interests, state identities, social movements, and transnational networks appear in need of explanation.”<sup>75</sup> Second, since there is a central focus on the construction of norm, identities, and institutions. Constructivists are able to explain alterations that may occur in strategies. For example,

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<sup>71</sup> Frederking (2003), 365.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prügl, (2001) “Feminism and Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle Ground?” *International Studies Quarterly* 45:1:114

<sup>75</sup> Locher (2001), 114.



war and collective security are not tools “toward an end but constitute the enactment of diverse games and rules on which reasoning actors draw” when dealing with a particular security threat.<sup>76</sup> Finally, constructivists have developed a rich and diverse understanding in social arrangement and changes in the international realm. This has made the constructivist approach attractive to those who seek to explain the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the global security environment. It will prove to be a concrete and sound methodological approach when analyzing NATO’s out-of-area policy.

### **Rule-Orientated Constructivism**

The theory of rule-oriented constructivism is a theory which holds practices and social arrangements in terms of social rules. As discussed above and according to Frederking, social rules that are driven by beliefs, norms, and identities help to define social arrangements of a society.<sup>77</sup> Essentially, rules and norms are the linchpin in constructivist studies.

Constructivists believe rules are the reasons for actions. Rules are able to provide reason for action because they provide significance, establish criteria, and create conditions. Rule-orientated constructivists have two key tenets regarding rules. First, “rules give meaning to human action by communicating ‘shared understandings’ that shape and orient behavior.”<sup>78</sup> In this sense, social arrangements, which are constituted by a stable pattern of rules, make up the structure of world politics. Additionally, “rules also

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<sup>76</sup> Locher (2001), 114.

<sup>77</sup> Frederking (2003), 365

<sup>78</sup> Kurt Burch, (2000) “Changing the Rules: Reconceiving Change in the Westphalian System,” *International Studies Review* 2:2:186-87.

guide and regulate behavior.”<sup>79</sup> Thus, rules convey standards of how we should act. Rules make it possible for actors, such as states, to act: “They tell us how the world works; they tell us who we are and who others are; they tell us what we should do.”<sup>80</sup> Rules constitute the world at large.

The second rule establishes that rational actors use speech acts to construct social rules.<sup>81</sup> This rule-oriented constructivist claim is based upon the pre-existing speech act theory<sup>82</sup> and the notion of communicative rationality of Habermas.<sup>83</sup> According to the speech act theory, the effect of a speech is analyzed in relation to the speaker and listener’s behavior. Austin (1962) explains that acts of speech contain particular sentence types which have conventional relationship to certain types of speech acts. In this sense, a verbal statement defines an action. For example, saying “I swear to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth” in a court of law is a meaningful social act because it invokes social rules in the institution of the court. The “speech act theory argues that language is action; speech acts (promising, declaring, apologizing, etc.) are both plentiful and central to social life.”<sup>84</sup> In brief, the speech act theory is the backbone of the rule-orientated constructivist theory.

Language is the primary catalyst to drive an action according to the speech act theory. In order to determine what kind of action will take place, I will use Onuf’s three

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<sup>79</sup> Burch (2000), 187.

<sup>80</sup> Frederking (2003), 365.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 366.

<sup>82</sup> John L. Austin, (1962) *How to Do Things with Words*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

<sup>83</sup> Jurgen Habermas, (1984) *Theory of Communicative Action*, (New York, NY: Beacon).

<sup>84</sup> Frederking (2003), 366.

types of speech acts – assertions, directives, and commitments. These different types of speech acts help to determine the social rules that have fashioned the particular speech act. When analyzing a speech act an assertion will “convey knowledge about the world.”<sup>85</sup> Examples of speech acts involving assertion rules are trade agreements and arms shipments. A directive conveys “what we must or should do and often include consequences for disregarding them.”<sup>86</sup> Examples of directive rules are use of force and trade sanctions. Finally, commitments are “promises to act in a particular way.”<sup>87</sup> Examples of speech acts invoking commitment rules are international trade and treaties.

The second rule-oriented claim also uses Habermas’s notion of communicative rationality which builds upon the speech act theory. Communicative rationality is a theory which tries to explain human rationality based upon outcomes of successful acts of speech. Habermas argues communication is “oriented to achieving, sustaining and reviewing consensus - and indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims.”<sup>88</sup> Habermas asserts that a “rational agent performs a speech act, convey validity claims, interpret and evaluate the claims of others, and act on the basis of mutually recognized validity claims.”<sup>89</sup> In this process, agents express and evaluate one another’s validity claims of speech acts which help to construct and reconstruct social rules and perhaps social arrangements. Frederking emphasizes that rule-oriented constructivists “rely on Habermas because only communicatively rational

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<sup>85</sup> Frederking (2003), 366.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 366.

<sup>88</sup> Habermas (1984), 17.

<sup>89</sup> Frederking (2003), 366.

actors can achieve the interpretive accomplishments ascribed to them by constructivist argument.”<sup>90</sup>

Rule-orientated constructivism is a theoretical framework that takes into account the structure in social analysis and provides the means to analyze the complex interrelationship between agents, speech acts, and social structures. Rule-orientated constructivists are able to explore what makes social action possible and meaningful.<sup>91</sup> Essentially, rule-orientated constructivism asserts that people use information from their own experience to create constructs in order to problem solve; this can help constructivists anticipate future events and to make sense of the world.

### **Rule-Orientated Constructivist Theory and the Global Security Environment**

The theory of constructivism seeks to demonstrate that the state system is socially constructed. That is, the state is embedded in a larger society where states agree to particular rules and institutions. This position can only assert the existence of the social arrangement and their so called “societal rules,” however it cannot tell us the content of these rules. Thus, constructivists need to demonstrate that their theoretical assertions about social rules correlate to the speech acts and are produced by real-world agents. As such the rule-oriented constructivist theory is a solution which demonstrates a relationship between theoretical applications and speech acts that can explain the global security environment.

As outlined above, a state system is constructed based upon a variety of social arrangements. These arrangements thus constitute the makeup of the world. For example, the global security environment is constituted by war, rivalries, collective

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<sup>90</sup> Frederking (2003), 366.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

security, and security communities. These social arrangements allow the global security environment to “go on;” although some arrangements may be more institutionalized or fluid than others. Concisely, what comprises a system depends on what logics are guiding particular social arrangement.

The ‘ideal typical rules’ in these societal arrangements can be found in Figure 1. Each social arrangement has six rules which make up and rule action(s) – (1) Identity; (2) Autonomy; (3) Security; (4) Deterrence; (5) Enforcement; and (6) The Use of Force. The following are the scope of each of these rules:

1. The identity rule establishes agent identities as enemies, rivals, citizens, or friends.<sup>92</sup>
2. The autonomy rule establishes the extent to which the autonomy of both state and non-state agents are either threatened by others or limited by mutual obligations.<sup>93</sup>
3. The security rule establishes the belief that security is acquired by either relative military capability or friendly political relationships.<sup>94</sup>
4. The deterrence rule establishes a dominant normative expectation either to recognize the autonomy of others or to follow the rules of the community.<sup>95</sup>
5. The enforcement rule establishes the ultimate method of resolving conflict.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Frederking (2003), 367-68.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

6. The use of force rule establishes the extent to which force is required to resolve conflict.<sup>97</sup>

There are variations of these rules which makeup the 'ideal' social arrangements of war, rivalry, collective security, and security communities.<sup>98</sup> Each of these rules constitutes and helps to explain the global security environment.

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<sup>97</sup> Frederking (2003), 367-68.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 368.

	<b>War</b>	<b>Rivalry</b>	<b>Collective Security</b>	<b>Security Community</b>
<b>Rule 1 – Identity</b>	We are enemies	We are rivals	We are fellow citizens	We are friends
<b>Rule 2 – Autonomy</b>	We do not recognize the autonomy of others	We recognize the autonomy of others	Autonomy is limited by obligations to follow and enforce the community's rules	Autonomy is limited by obligation to follow the community's rules
<b>Rule 3 – Security</b>	Survival is based on relative (Alliance) military capability	Security is based on relative (Alliance) military capability	Security is based on a multilateral commitment to use military capability	Security is based on political relationships
<b>Rule 4 – Deterrence</b>	You must surrender	Do attack me	Do not break the rules of our community	Do not break the rules of our community
<b>Rule 5 – Enforcement</b>	We will attack until you surrender	We will retaliate if you violate our sovereignty	We will retaliate if you break the rules of our community	We will resolve conflicts peacefully
<b>Rule 6 – Use of Force</b>	The use of force is always necessary to resolve conflicts	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is not acceptable

**Figure 1: The Global Security Environment Social Arrangements<sup>99</sup>**

It is important to point out that each of these rules is not intended to be exact replicas of reality of the global security environment. Rather they are a reflection of the rule-oriented constructivist theory. Each is applicable to the task at hand and each is able to provide a concrete application in order to conduct research. It is recognized that these rules may not cohere with future research and may need to be refined or even abandoned when regarding the global security environment.

<sup>99</sup> Frederking (2003), 368.

### Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security: Brian Frederking

Frederking (2003) argues that “September 11<sup>th</sup> did not fundamentally change world politics” rather “it exacerbated already existing tensions about the appropriate implementation of fledging collective security rules.”<sup>100</sup> For one terrorist event cannot mechanically change the development or rules of global security. Instead, Frederking uses dialogical analysis building upon rule-oriented constructivism and the collective security rules of the global security environment to explain that there exists a set of overlapping social arrangements. This helps to explain that “the dominant trend in the post-Cold War world is the gradual institutionalization of collective security rules.”<sup>101</sup> This interpretive method is capable to yielding both theoretical and practical insights to “posit four social arrangements constituting the security structure of world politics: war, rivalry, collective security, and security communities.”<sup>102</sup> Frederick uses the analysis of the debates over Kosovo and Iraq to show that each of these events is very similar in nature. However the involvement in each of these circumstances is due to gradual institutionalism in the development of the global security environment.

Frederking’s research reveals three conclusions. First, “it contributes to the constructivist research program by offering a tentative rule-orientated constructivist theory by asserting the existence of war, rivalry, collective security, and security community social arrangements.”<sup>103</sup> Frederking asserts that the rule-orientated constructivist theory moves beyond the traditional methodology of social theory in

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<sup>100</sup> Frederking (2003), 363.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.



international politics. Unlike Alexander Wendt who argues that the structure and tendencies of social systems will depend on which of these three roles – enemy, rival, and friend – will dominate world politics and global security;<sup>104</sup> Frederking argues that the global security environment is dominated by four sets of social arrangements which interact and overlap. Moving away from the original three roles, Frederking explains four sets are needed in order to understand the dominant security trends in the post-Cold War environment – “movement away from the Cold War rivalry” and the gradual institutionalization of collective security rules.”<sup>105</sup> Frederking builds upon the traditional assumptions of constructivism to explain development in the global security environment.

The second conclusion is in regard to dialogical analysis. Frederking’s research holds that dialogical analysis, a means for modeling language in a serious manner,<sup>106</sup> “models a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivist arguments.”<sup>107</sup> This particular methodology allows for pragmatic analysis, dialogical disputation analysis, and formal theorem proving. Pragmatic analysis “reveals proposition actors implicitly convey to and infer from one another.”<sup>108</sup> Dialogical disputation analysis “identifies additional tacit proposition that actors discursively convey

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<sup>104</sup> Wendt (1999), 259.

<sup>105</sup> Frederking (2003), 363.

<sup>106</sup> Gavan Duffy, Brian Frederking, and Seth A. Tucker, (1998) “Language Games: Dialogical Analysis of INF Negotiations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 42:2:271-272.

<sup>107</sup> Frederking (2003), 363.

<sup>108</sup> Duffy (1998), 272.

and summarize the flow of interaction.”<sup>109</sup> Finally, formal theorem-proving tests “hypotheses concerning the importance of particular propositions for interaction outcomes.”<sup>110</sup> In other words, dialogical analysis has the ability to help develop theoretical approaches into practical applications. It is a practical methodology which offers an approach to analyze social interaction of the global security environment.

The third and final conclusion of Frederking’s work involves its contribution to the “policy debates about U.S. foreign policy after September 11<sup>th</sup>.”<sup>111</sup> Frederking’s research suggests that “preemption policies are premised on a flawed assumption that the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> fundamentally changed the world politics.”<sup>112</sup> The research refutes that the war on terrorism represents a “more aggressive, unilateral, and even preemptive U.S. policies.”<sup>113</sup> Rather Frederking argues that the events of Kosovo and Iraq, and the war on terrorism are an embedded part of a larger, more complex world of global security. Each is a result of gradual institutionalism of collective security rules and the arrangements in the global security environment. In short, the three conclusions of Frederking’s work are consistent with the tasks of rule-oriented constructivism – “(1) assert the existence of social arrangements, (2) show how these rules make action intelligible, and (3) helps agents ‘go on’ in the world.”<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Duffy (1998), 272.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Frederking (2003), 376.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

In sum, Frederking argues that terrorist events cannot change the overall rules of global security and its environment. “Even U.S. foreign policy, although tremendously important, cannot unilaterally construct a war socially arrangement through declarations of a ‘war on terrorism’ or even by invading Iraq.”<sup>115</sup> In the modern global security environment there is an existence of constitutive social rules and “communicatively rational actors constructing these rules through the performance of speech acts.”<sup>116</sup> As such these rules are constantly in a state of flux as they are negotiated, mediated, and facilitated through varies agents and facilities. The analysis presented by Frederking suggests that the post-Cold War rules and global security environment will remain relatively stable while gradual institutionalism takes place. As in Kosovo, the global security environment remains strikingly similar even after intervention by the United States. In the case of Kosovo, the United States sought the approval and authorization of the United Nation Security Council prior to the intervention. It is clear that the international community is reliant upon historical examples and constancy rather than ad hoc methods, and collective security rules are preferred over unilateral measures.

### Weaknesses

Building upon the scholars of constructivism, Frederking’s work is insightful and strives to move beyond the current epistemological debates; nevertheless it has four critical faults. First, there are definitional problems which lead to unwieldy characteristics within Frederking’s research and analysis. Although Frederking introduces patterns of behavior inherent to the social arrangements – war, rivalry, collective security, and security communities – which constitute the security structures of

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<sup>115</sup> Frederking (2003), 376.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 363.

global security, he never provides a tangible definition of global security. Does global security involve “material circumstances and the psychological state produced by those circumstances?”<sup>117</sup> Is global security the “physical survival of nations and its people by protecting from attacks by states and non-states?”<sup>118</sup> Or is global security the “protection from transnational forces, such as the environment, weather, disease, and criminal activity – the physical survival and safety of the United States and its people by protecting from all physical threats?”<sup>119</sup> Or is global security “the preservation of sovereignty against external and internal threats” by an international defense organization and its member states?<sup>120</sup>

Presently in the field of security studies, the interpretation and definition of security has become one of the largest challenges in the field of international relations. Security concepts have continued to maintain their limitations and what does remain is largely oversimplified. Despite this, scholars, like Frederking, continue to drive on regardless of what critics argue. To some, the field of security studies exists in a comprehensible state. However, to others it is necessary to broaden the field of security studies in order (1) to narrow the definition of security and (2) to comprehend and study contemporary political debates.<sup>121</sup> By not addressing this key element in methodology, there is a lack of conceptualization and operationalization of the variables presented. In

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<sup>117</sup> Caldwell (2003), 5.

<sup>118</sup> Lionel Ingram, (2006) “A Useful Concept of National Interests,” available from [http://home.comcast.net/~lionel Ingram/National\\_Interests\\_rev2006.htm](http://home.comcast.net/~lionel Ingram/National_Interests_rev2006.htm); Internet, accessed 20 September 2008.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Caldwell (2003), 5-7.

<sup>121</sup> Johnston (2003), 19.

short, Frederking's work at best, acts as introductory survey to the development within global security environment and security studies.

Secondly, Frederking research is based upon NATO operations in Kosovo and Iraq; however the researcher fails to incorporate any resources dealing directly or affiliated with NATO. Although there are a wealth of statistical and research data available today pertaining to Kosovo and Iraq, data dealing directly with NATO and its involvement in Kosovo and Iraq may not be readily available or available only in limited allotments. Although finding resources no small task, all material must be relative to the research at hand.

Third, Frederking uses secondary resources as a primary basis for conducting his research. Although the use of secondary data has time and cost saving advantages, there are a number of disadvantages to using secondary data. First, the secondary information related to the research topic may either not be available or is only available in limited quantities. Second, the secondary information may be of a questionable nature pertaining to its authenticity, quality, and credibility. This can then lead to misleading interpretation of the facts or analysis. Third, the information may be in a different format or unit than what be desired by the researcher. Finally, secondary data may not be concurrent with what is sought after by the researcher. In short, Frederking's use of secondary sources leads to a lack of methodological consistency within his research.

Lastly, Frederking's three faults, as cited above, lead to inconsistencies in the theoretical framework of the analysis. This then compels this research to (1) define global security; (2) use primary resources to explain what has affected the shift in policy which lead NATO's involvement in Afghanistan; and (3) create a consistent theoretical

framework. This thesis and its research will examine and build upon these faults in order to develop a consistent analytical framework. This framework will act as a foundation when trying to develop an understanding of NATO's policy concerning out-of-area missions and path to Afghanistan.

### **A Way Forward**

Constructivism asserts that the "existence of social structures – including norms, beliefs, and identities – constitute world politics." The theory of constructivism helps paint the backdrop of the global security environments and developments within it. Bearing this concept in mind, this research recalls the original research question: *why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan?* Specifically, was it due to ad hoc tendencies or was it based upon adherence to collective security rules while gradually adapting institutional methods? It also recalls Brian Frederking's analysis of the global security environments of Kosovo and Iraq, which illuminates the global security environment is gradually institutionalizing towards collective security rules. According to Frederking, the post-Cold War rules and global security environment will remain relatively stable while gradual institutionalism takes place. However, how clear or certain is it that NATO is reliant upon historical examples and constancy rather than ad hoc methods? Or that collective security rules are preferred over unilateral measures? Thus, this research will apply Frederking's rule-oriented constructivist theory and dialogical methodology to determine what is affecting the development of NATO's out-of-area policy which may have contributed to NATO's involvement in Afghanistan.

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

#### Research Question

Nearly three decades ago, the United States and the former Soviet Union were at the end of a long ideological, political, and military battle which defined international relations, politics, and the global security environment for more than a generation. International relations and security studies, mirroring this struggle, primarily focused on the threat of nuclear war and defense which influenced the global security environment and related policies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples” and “seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area,”<sup>122</sup> sought to protect its member nations against nuclear warfare and stabilize the global security environment.

Today, the ideological battle between the United States and the Soviets has come to an end and new factors have arisen affecting the global security environment. In today’s global security environment, NATO member nations have continued to carry out the Alliance’s mission by way of an expanded agenda and selective participation in out-of-area missions. Taking NATO’s mission and history of operations into account, one has to ask: *why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan?* In today’s global security environment and the activities taking place in Afghanistan, it is important to ask if NATO

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<sup>122</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty.

member nations are holding fast to collective security rules while gradually adhering to institutionalism or simply is the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan based upon ad hoc methods in the post-Cold War global security environment?

### Hypotheses

To address the questions this thesis proposes, this thesis will test the following hypotheses:

HO: If NATO member nations adopt a neutral attitude toward out-of-area missions then NATO will not become involved in Afghanistan.

H1: If NATO member nations adopt an institutional attitude toward out-of-area missions then NATO would become involved in Afghanistan.

H2: If NATO member nations adopt an ad hoc attitude toward out-of-area missions then NATO would become involved in Afghanistan.

This study's hypotheses will test NATO member nations' attitude toward out-of-area missions. The thesis will determine if there is a particular attitude adopted by member nations regarding out-of-area missions. In this sense, attitude is defined as a manner, feeling, or disposition with regard to a person, circumstance, or thing which affects how particular actions are carried out. For example, if a state has a neutral attitude then they are "not aligned with or support any side or position in a particular circumstance."<sup>123</sup> As compared to a state who has an institutional attitude which is a "well-established and structured pattern of behavior or of relationships that is accepted as a fundamental part"<sup>124</sup> of a culture, institutional, or government when regarding a situation. On the other hand, if a state has an ad hoc attitude then they are impromptu in their manners and

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<sup>123</sup> "Neutral," available from <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/neutral?o=100074>; Internet, accessed 05 May 2009.

<sup>124</sup> "Institution," available from <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/institution>; Internet, accessed 05 May 2009.



usually rely upon a “temporary, provisional, or improvised” attitude to deal with a particular problem.<sup>125</sup> If a particular aforementioned attitude is adopted by the member state regarding out-of-area missions, the analysis will determine how this attitude affected NATO’s out-of-area policy and the Alliance’s involvement in Afghanistan. The hypotheses which will be tested will seek to answer the proposed research question of the thesis.

### Unit/Level of Analysis

This thesis will use the international level as the level of analysis and the international security organization, NATO, as the unit of analysis.<sup>126</sup> This level of analysis and unit were chosen in order to properly measure the impact of the hypotheses which have been generated. Additionally, the international level of analysis is best suited for this research design because much of the literature concerning post-Cold War global security is conducted at this level, including Brian Frederking’s research. Thus, there are considerable grounds for this thesis.

For the purposes of this thesis, the analysis of an international defense organization is conducted at the international level because other techniques have proved to be spurious and cannot accurately measure a system of states. The international level of analysis helps to examine the behavior of states in the international environment. It can be argued that the international environment “determines a state’s behavior (for) it

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<sup>125</sup> “Ad hoc,” available from <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ad%20hoc?o=100074>; Internet, accessed 05 May 2009.

<sup>126</sup> It is important to emphasize that NATO is comprised of member states. Each member state has its own ideologies, attitudes, objectives, and procedures. Each state and its unique characteristics are the backbone of the Alliance. In short, NATO, the unit level of analysis, will not be used as a proxy but is recognized as an Organization composed of member states that agree to and implement policy.

asserts that all state react similarly to the same objective external situation.”<sup>127</sup> Then changes in a “state’s domestic regime, its bureaucratic structure, and the personalities and the opinions of its leaders do not lead to changes of policies.”<sup>128</sup> Rather, changes in external conditions can alter a state’s behavior. In other words, the global security environment can cause changes in a state’s behavior. Finally, the international level will best serve this thesis because it allows for the identification of the characteristics of the complex process of the global security environment and will build an understanding of the shift in NATO’s out-of-policy and help explain why NATO became involved in Afghanistan.

### **Methodology**

Having analyzed the selected literature on which this thesis draws, briefly describing rule-orientated constructivism, drawing on NATO’s history and out-of-area policy, and keeping in mind the activities and circumstances in Afghanistan, a framework has been developed. Building upon the established framework, this thesis will conduct a crucial case study of NATO member nations’ out-of-area policy between 1996 and 2003. I will apply Brian Frederking’s rule-orientated constructivist theory to determine: (1) if there is evidence to support this research; (2) if rule-orientated constructivist theory is viable for this research; (3) if rule-orientated constructivist theory to explain the developments within NATO’s out-of-area policy; (4) if there was indeed was a shift in member nations’ attitude and out-of-area policy; and (5) what led NATO to become involved in Afghanistan in 2001.

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<sup>127</sup> Robert Jervis, (1976) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 18.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

For this research, a case study will be used because it is the most effective method of analysis. Rather than using large samples, which are difficult to define, quantify and follow protocol, a case study is in an in-depth analysis of a unit. In short, a crucial case study is a systemic way of conducting research. Thus, the unit of study in this thesis is NATO. It is important to note that NATO will not be used as a proxy but is recognized as an organization composed of member states that agree to and implement policy.

Within this crucial case study, it is important to ask: how does one quantify an international security organization, such as NATO and its member nations, or the development of out-of-area policy? In order to answer these particular and crucial questions, this research will use a qualitative analysis to account for policy developments towards out-of-area and engagement in mission and operations. By employing a qualitative analysis, I will use this quality of data to explain the shift in policy and explain what led NATO to become involved in Afghanistan in 2001.

For the purposes of this particular thesis, the qualitative method of dialogical analysis will be the primary methodology used. Dialogical analysis is a methodology which models “a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivist arguments.”<sup>129</sup> This particular method uses speech acts to study “the category of things that exist or may exist in some domain.”<sup>130</sup> The end result is a catalog of the types of things that are presumed to be in a domain of interest from the perspective of a person who uses particular language for the purpose of talking about a particular

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<sup>129</sup> Jervis (1976), 363.

<sup>130</sup> John F. Sowa, (2006) “A Dynamic Theory of Ontology,” in B. Bennett and C. Fellbaum, Eds., *Formal Ontology in Information Systems*, (Amsterdam, NL: IOS Press), 204-13. Also available from <http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/dynonto.htm>.

social arrangement.<sup>131</sup> For this thesis, the focus on ontology emphasizes a particular type of social rules – beliefs, norms, or identities<sup>132</sup> – which make up and influence social arrangements of the global security environment.

Beliefs, norms, and identities are the types of rules that constitute the social arrangements within in the global security environment. Each of these rules is in line with Habermas' notion of communicative reality and the fundamental validity claims – truth, appropriateness, and sincerity.<sup>133</sup> Beliefs are social rules which make claims of truth about the world.<sup>134</sup> Norm rules are social rules which make appropriateness claims about relationships.<sup>135</sup> Finally, the social rules of identity make sincerity claims about agents.<sup>136</sup> Each type of constructivist argument emphasis one of these rules. Dialogical analysis is then able to “illustrate constructivist arguments about the role of norms, beliefs, and identity.”<sup>137</sup> For it “posits the existence of social rules, communicatively with rational agents, and the arguments of validity claims.”<sup>138</sup>

The method of dialogical analysis is comprised of three components. These three components are pragmatic analysis, formal argument analysis, and formal theorem-proving. Pragmatic analysis is a method which “reveals propositions actors implicitly

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<sup>131</sup> Sowa (2006), 204-13.

<sup>132</sup> Frederking (2003), 364.

<sup>133</sup> Habermas, (1984).

<sup>134</sup> Frederking (2003), 365.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid,

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., 369.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

convey to and infer from one another.”<sup>139</sup> Formal argument analysis is an additional tacit proposition which identifies which “actors discursively convey and summarizes the flow of interaction.”<sup>140</sup> Finally, formal theorem-proving “test hypothesis concerning the importance of particular propositions for interactions.”<sup>141</sup> Each of these components helps to identify and defines the international level of analysis and support the unit of study.

The dialogical method is comprised of four steps. The four steps are identified as the following:

1. One specifies the background knowledge necessary to understand the interaction;<sup>142</sup>
2. One accumulates explicit speech acts that conveyed meaning during the interaction;<sup>143</sup>
3. One conducts a pragmatic analysis of the speech acts, deriving the implicitly conveyed propositions during the interaction;<sup>144</sup> and
4. One constructs a formal argument analysis from the inventory of pragmatic propositions to isolate consensual and disputed claims during the interaction.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Duffy (1998), 272.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Frederking (2003), 365.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 365.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

The method of dialogical analysis first begins with the researcher specifying the background knowledge that will be necessary to understand the dialogue which will be analyzed. Most importantly a set of rules which governs the interactions will be established. These set of rules should either be “politically noncontroversial facts or beliefs of the relevant party support by the archival evidence.”<sup>146</sup> The set of rules are the “theory which will be asserted by the analyst; dialogical analysis is the mythological tool to provide empirical evidence for the existence of these rules.”<sup>147</sup> The social arrangements – war, rivalry, collective security, and social arrangements – asserted in the previous chapter, will act as the set of rules and serve as the background knowledge needed in the dialogic analysis.

Next the researcher gathers speech acts which occurred during the time of interaction by cataloging the specific moves which deal directly and indirectly with the interaction. This may include any nonverbal actions which illustrate significance, such as force deployments and diplomatic acts.<sup>148</sup> In this step the speech acts are not selected on a random basis. Rather this step will be made up of a reconstruction of the speech acts from public sources. It is important to note that “no algorithmic coding rules exist to transform textual data into analyzable speech acts.”<sup>149</sup> It is possible that these kinds of rules are impossible to develop. In this sense the researcher gathers the speech acts which are most relevant with the same interpretive ability as other researchers have.

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<sup>146</sup> Duffy (1998), 272.

<sup>147</sup> Frederking (2003), 369.

<sup>148</sup> Duffy (1998), 272.

<sup>149</sup> Frederking (2003), 369.

The analyst then conducts a pragmatic analysis of the dialogue. Pragmatics is the field of linguistics where the meaning of the language relates “contents to context.”<sup>150</sup> Pragmatic analysis is concentrated on the aspects of meaning that “context-free, truth-conditional semantics” cannot summarize.<sup>151</sup> In this sense, speakers express more than nonsense; they make pragmatic statements which allow them to understand one another and correlate actions accordingly. A researcher is then able to construct a list of assertions, directives, and commitments conveyed by each person or party within a particular speech act.

Drawing upon this list of assertions, directives, and commitments, an analyst is able to carry out the final step by constructing a “formal argument analysis composed of moves conveyed explicitly or implicitly.”<sup>152</sup> This “isolates and formalizes the disputed propositions and thus disputed social rules generated in the pragmatic analysis.”<sup>153</sup> Within this context, speech acts are tested by illustrating if particular speech act logically follows the belief inventories.<sup>154</sup> This will help determine is a speech act is able to express an outcome for a particular party.<sup>155</sup> If the speech act follows the established beliefs then it is considered adequate and if the speech act does not follow its contents then it is inadequate. If this happens the researcher must return to its original information and reconsider if the speech act(s) are applicable to the particular research. The “analysis

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<sup>150</sup> Duffy (1998), 273.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Frederking (2003), 370.

<sup>154</sup> These were outlined earlier in the research.

<sup>155</sup> Duffy (1998), 273.

thereby yields a parsimonious account of practical inferences” consistent with the speech act.<sup>156</sup> The qualitative method of dialogical analysis is a viable technique that can account for the “changing construction of social rules both within and across social arrangements.”<sup>157</sup> Dialogical analysis will be used in this thesis in order to explain if there was a change in member nations’ attitudes and a shift in out-of-area policy which may have contribute to NATO’s participation in Afghanistan in 2001.

### **Data**

In this research, in order to examine NATO’s out-of-area policy, speech acts published by NATO’s North Atlantic Council will be collected from the online NATO database. They will be accessed through the NATO official Press site; the online, full-text archived database of Committee Reports and Committee Meeting summaries. This research will analyze communiqués found in NATO Committee Reports between 1996 and 2003. However, the key tenet for this study will be Brian Frederking’s “Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security,” a constructivist study published in *The American Political Science Review* in 2003. These sources of data will enrich the quality of the research, as well as cover a large continuum which reduces spuriousness and allows for triangulation to occur.

### **Key Variables**

**Dependent Variable:** NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan

**Independent Variables:** Attitude of member nations regarding out-of-area missions

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<sup>156</sup> Duffy (1998), 273.

<sup>157</sup> Frederking (2003), 370.



### **Operationalization: Key Variables**

The first step in measuring a hypothesis is to define the variables used – the dependent and independent variables. For the purposes of this thesis, the dependent variable is identified as “NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan” and the independent variable is identified as the “attitude of members nations regarding out-of-area missions.” These two variables throughout the thesis will be operationalized as the following.

“NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan” shall mean an international defense Alliance (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) engagement in the regional territory of Afghanistan.

“Attitude of member nations regarding out-of-area missions” shall mean a negative or positive point(s) of view and/or feeling(s) of members of an internal defense organization (NATO) toward 1.) internal and external threats and threats without borders (which include but are not limited to invasion, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism) at the international level and 2.) bodies of personnel sent to foreign territories that reside outside of the traditional boundaries of the European theater.

### **Measurement**

For this study, “NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan” will be measured, as best as possible, in terms of (1) missions and operations, including out-of-area, between 1996 through 2003 and (2) areas in which missions and operations were conducted in.

Measuring the “attitude of member nations regarding out-of-area missions” will be done by analyzing communiqués published by the North Atlantic Council between 1996 through 2003. Each of the communiqués, hereby known as speech acts, will be analyzed using dialogical analysis. Specifically, the “attitude of member nations

regarding out-of-area missions” in the speech acts will be measured by using pragmatic analysis, dialogical disputation analysis, and formal theorem-proving. This research will look for evidence in changes or shifts in NATO’s policy or treaty concerns, emotions or feelings regarding particular situations in the global security environment, or participation in treaties, missions, and operations. Thus, knowledge of NATO’s policies and treaties, partnerships with member countries and other nations, Alliance processes and procedures, and missions are vital in measuring this data.

In summary, after the end of the Cold War, ideologies and policies regarding the global security environment became refocused. The emergence of a new global security environment challenged the traditional assumptions of NATO. As such, NATO’s has continuously transformed and changed to meet the threats and challenges of the new security environment. NATO member countries have continuously broadened its agenda, began a process of enlargement, and time after time committed the Alliance to engage in missions outside the realm of the traditional European theater. In 2001, NATO became involved in Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism. This involvement raised the question of *why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan?* Exclusively, one has to ask: are the member states gradually adhering to collective security rules and institutionalism or simply was it an ad hoc reaction?

Security studies are a vast field and usually understood on the basis of theory or in limited application. Security studies are usually justified on the basis of political or academic benefit and each are usually challenged on the impracticality, out datedness, or irrelevancy. This thesis can provide a window of opportunity to learn and understand the

transformation of NATO member nations' attitudes; shift in the Alliance's policy regarding out-of-area missions; and the path which led to its involvement in Afghanistan.

## CHAPTER IV

### CASE STUDY

The past and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have become linked to its mission in Afghanistan. NATO, an Alliance that was created to safeguard and promote stability within the North Atlantic area,<sup>158</sup> was a player in the Afghanistan invasion and is an active participant in helping Afghanistan's new government against a resurgent Taliban. Afghanistan represents NATO's first mission which is outside of its traditional European theater, and the "largest operational deployment" in the history of the Alliance.<sup>159</sup> NATO's mission in Afghanistan has become the test of the member nations and the Alliance's ability to transform and survive. However, in order to ascertain the Alliance's future it is important to comprehend *why did NATO become in Afghanistan?*

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will summarize the purpose, mission and structure of NATO; outline NATO's policy toward out-of-area missions; briefly summarize the history of Afghanistan; and highlight NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. This section will provide the background information which is necessary to grasp the member nation's policy of out-of-area and understand the historical developments which led the Alliance to become involved in Afghanistan

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<sup>158</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty.

<sup>159</sup> Helle C. Dale, (2006) "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test Case for Future Missions," *Backgrounder* 1985:1-7. Also available from [http://www.heritage.org/research/europe/upload/bg\\_1985.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/research/europe/upload/bg_1985.pdf).

operations. The second section in the chapter will analyze the communiqués agreed upon by the members of NATO. This section will conclude with a summary of the findings.

### **The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a transatlantic link which unites both North America and Europe in a distinctive and timeless collective defense coalition. NATO's mission is to protect and defend the liberty and security of each of its member nations and their people by political and military measures. Since its birth, NATO has continued to provide a collective defense to its members and serve as an "essential pillar of peace and stability" in the transatlantic theater.<sup>160</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and its members have continued to pursue the Alliance's original mission while taking on new fundamental tasks. In response to the global security environment, the member nations have continued to broaden the scope and agenda of the Alliance, and continuously committed the Alliance to additional responsibilities. These new responsibilities include addressing instability within the Balkans, and confronting threats beyond the traditional European theater such as in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. In its present day, NATO continues to engage in a large array of activities and missions which have been designed to promote cooperation within the international community, build partnerships, and find proactive solutions to the security threats and challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **The Dynamics of the Alliance: Its Structure and How It Works**

The Alliance of NATO is a dynamic inter-governmental organization. The backbone of the Alliance is its membership. NATO is comprised of twenty-eight

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<sup>160</sup> NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

countries.<sup>161</sup> Each member country has its own policies, objectives, and procedures. Each nation works with one another along side of the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Council of Europe. NATO works in accordance with each of its member nations and other entities to help create a peaceful and secure environment in which countries preserve their sovereignty and independence, economies can flourish, and individuals will prosper. In order to function in a cooperative and productive manner, the member states rely upon the consensus decision-making process.

### **Consensus Decision-Making**

One of the key elements of NATO is its decision-making process. The decision-making process is based upon a foundation of consensus.<sup>162</sup> Consensus is usually sought when member nations must formulate policy on an important issue. In order to formulate policy and implement particular policy, “all member governments must be fully informed of each other’s overall policies and intentions and the underlying considerations which give rise to them.”<sup>163</sup> Consequently, extended consultations and discussions are required before an important decision can be made.<sup>164</sup> Reaching a consensus in the

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<sup>161</sup> “NATO’s member countries,” available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato\\_countries.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm); Internet, accessed 15 April 2009.

<sup>162</sup> The main objective of this process is the formation and publication of policy. These policy statements are published in the form of a communiqué.

<sup>163</sup> “Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making – Consensus Politics and Joint-Decision Making,” available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0702.htm>; Internet, accessed 04 March 2009.

<sup>164</sup> Consultation and discussions within NATO takes on many different forms. “At its most basic level it involves simply the exchange of information and opinions. At another level it covers the communication of actions or decisions which governments have already taken or may be about to take and which have a direct or indirect bearing on the interests of their allies. It may also involve providing advance warning of actions or decisions to be taken by governments in the future, in order to provide an opportunity for them to be endorsed or commented upon by others. It can encompass discussion with the aim of reaching a consensus on policies to be adopted or actions to be taken in parallel. And ultimately it is designed to enable member

decision-making process is a progression in which member states have multiple opportunities to provide and revise language in NATO's documents which reflect a nation's individual perspectives and objectives. Additionally, consensus amongst the member nations "represents the common determination of all the countries involved to implement them in full."<sup>165</sup> The end result of the decision-making process is the formal publication of NATO's policy in the form of a communiqué.<sup>166</sup> In short, the consensus decision-making process is a fundamental building block within the Alliance and results in the formulation and publication of policy statements.

Within the member nations and in other allied governments, there is varied support for decision-making by consensus. However there are critics who believe that the process needs to be altered or abandoned. Although the consensus decision-making process may be criticized as lengthy and cumbersome, it has two major distinctions and advantages. First, "the members of the Alliance safeguard the role of each country's individual experience and outlook while at the same time availing themselves of the machinery and procedures which allow them jointly to act rapidly and decisively if circumstances require them to do so."<sup>167</sup> Secondly, once a decision has been made the decision represents the determination of all the member nations and their commitment to

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countries to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements on collective decisions or on action by the Alliance as a whole." For more information refer to Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making – Consensus Politics and Joint-Decision Making in the *NATO Handbook*.

<sup>165</sup> Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making – Consensus Politics and Joint-Decision Making.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

the decision.<sup>168</sup> The consensus decision-making process is a fundamental cornerstone in the Alliance.

### **Principal Players in the Decision-Making Process**

NATO is an alliance composed of multiple countries. Each of these countries is the foundation upon which the Alliance rests and functions. Essentially, “the most important players in NATO are the member countries who form the organization.”<sup>169</sup> Each of these countries is represented at every committee level by a representative, as illustrated in Figure 2, at the political level. The Alliance is comprised of three principal committees – the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group – and their various subcommittees. The three political committees are each unique in their nature and each plays a vital role within NATO. The North Atlantic Council is the principal decision-making body. The Defense Planning Committee is the ultimate authority regarding the Alliance’s integrated military structure. The Nuclear Planning Group is involved in nuclear policy issues. Each group is discussed at greater length in the subsequent sections.


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<sup>168</sup> Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making – Consensus Politics and Joint-Decision Making.

<sup>169</sup> “Together for Security: An Introduction to NATO,” available from [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int); Internet, accessed 04 March 2009.



# NATO's Civil and Military Structure



## Principal NATO Committees




Figure 2: Principal Committees of NATO<sup>170</sup>

<sup>170</sup> "NATO's Civil and Military Structure and Principal NATO Committees," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm#>; Internet, accessed 05 March 2009.

### The North Atlantic Council (NAC)

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) was established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>171</sup> The NAC is considered the highest authority and is considered the fundamental decision-making body in NATO allowing it to have “effective political authority and powers of decision.”<sup>172</sup>

Normally, the Council consists of Permanent Representatives of all member countries. The NAC meets at least once a week under the chairmanship of the Secretary General. In order to assist in its work, the Council maintains numerous committees, each of whom are responsible for carrying out the tasks the Council orders or execute its decisions. Each committee, regardless if it is civil or military, is under the discretion of the Council. The type of decision and work the Council and the committees carry out allow the Council to maintain its public profile, while issuing “declarations and communiqués explaining the Alliance’s policies and decisions to the general public and to governments of countries which are not members of NATO.”<sup>173</sup>

### The Defense Planning Committee (DPC)

The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) is the highest authority within NATO in regards to the Alliance’s integrated military structure. The DPC offers assistance and guidance to NATO’s military authorities, and within its scope, has the same functions

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<sup>171</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty.

<sup>172</sup> “Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making – The Principal Policy and Decision Making Institutions of the Alliance, The North Atlantic Council,” available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070101.htm>; Internet, accessed 05 March 2009.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

and authority as the NAC on issues within its aptitude.<sup>174</sup> Essentially the DPC engages in matters pertaining to defense matters and subjects who are associated with collective security planning.

The DPC is composed of representatives of all member countries, with the exception of France. The DPC meets when necessary at the level of Ambassadors and twice a year at the level of the Ministers of Defense. It is chaired by the Secretary General of NATO.

#### The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) discusses specific policy issues which are related to or associated with nuclear forces. The NPG holds discussions which “cover a broad range of nuclear policy matters, including the safety, security and survivability of nuclear weapons, communications and information systems, deployment issues and wider questions of common concern such as nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation.”<sup>175</sup>

The Planning Group is comprised of the defense ministers of member countries who participate in NATO’s Defense Planning Committee. The defense ministers meet at regular intervals throughout the year. The NPG frequently reviews NATO’s nuclear policy and any decisions are taken jointly in order to modify or adapt new measures in

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<sup>174</sup> “Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making – The Principal Policy and Decision Making Institutions of the Alliance, The Defense Planning Committee,” available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070102.htm>; Internet, accessed 05 March 2009.

<sup>175</sup> “Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making – The Principal Policy and Decision Making Institutions of the Alliance, the Nuclear Planning Group,” available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070103.htm>; Internet, accessed 05 March 2009.

light of new developments and to update planning and consultation procedures relating to nuclear policy matters and subjects.<sup>176</sup>

In short, NATO is an environment which brings together countries that are willing to come together for a common cause and prepared to integrate their forces and engage in multinational activities during a particular period of time. The military and political structures of NATO provide for the advance planning which is required to enable member countries to secure themselves in the global security environment. It is indeed these structures and its process, that each member countries participates in, which contribute to NATO's policy shift concerning out-of-area, and contributed to the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan in 2001.

### **NATO's Missions and Operations**

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, NATO has continued to change while maintaining cohesion and unity of purpose within the Alliance. In reality, NATO and its member nations have not always been cohesive and unified, especially when dealing with missions and operations who reside outside the traditional European borders. The Alliance's inability to cope with out-of-area missions can be traced back to the foundation of NATO in 1949.

### **The Cold War**

The tensions revolving around out-of-area policy of NATO can be traced back to the establishment of the Alliance. When NATO was first established in 1949, one of its fundamental roles was to deter any military aggressions. However, the member nations of the Alliance were presented with the "difficulty of balancing their collective interest in

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<sup>176</sup> Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making – The Principal Policy and Decision Making Institutions of the Alliance, the Nuclear Planning Group.

North Atlantic security with their variously shared and perceived commitments in other parts of the world.”<sup>177</sup> In this context, the member nations were unable to find common grounds to participate in anything beyond the boundaries of Europe.<sup>178</sup> Throughout the Cold War, the member nations relied upon a non-policy on out-of-area missions.

Since the foundation of NATO, conflicts regarding out-of-area was based upon differences in perceived interests, ideologies, and viewpoints of the member nations. From 1945 until the mid-1960s, the decolonization worldwide shifted European desires and willingness to control economic boundaries.<sup>179</sup> The decolonization created a vacuum within the global security environment where NATO member countries found themselves overcome by “Americanism” and this was hard for many to swallow. Additionally, the realities of the Korean War affected member countries’ interests and perceptions of threat.<sup>180</sup> Since, that period of time, many member nations have felt that by having NATO forces involved in mission which resided outside the European boundaries would leave the Alliance vulnerable. While the United States felt that it was in the Alliance’s best interest to engage in efforts outside of the European scope.<sup>181</sup> The conflicting ideologies, perceptions, and interests remained a major stumbling block within the NATO when responding to out-of-area missions. The member states lacked a

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<sup>177</sup>Marc Bentinck, (1986) “NATO’s Out-of-Area Problem,” *Adelphi Paper* 211:Autumn:3.

<sup>178</sup> As outlined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

<sup>179</sup> “Milestones – 1945-1960,” available from <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NATO>; Internet, accessed 15 April 2009.

<sup>180</sup> “Germany’s accession to NATO: 50 years on,” available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_22005.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_22005.htm?selectedLocale=en); Internet, accessed 15 April 2009.

<sup>181</sup> “Enhancing security and extending stability through NATO enlargement,” available from [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2004\\_04/2009\\_03\\_D8B67F56A5CD4F44805365DB21B29108\\_enlargement\\_eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2004_04/2009_03_D8B67F56A5CD4F44805365DB21B29108_enlargement_eng.pdf); Internet, accessed 15 April 2009.

comprehensive consensus on how to deal with issues outside the geographical scope of the North Atlantic that threaten allied interests and defense. Thus throughout the Cold War, the Alliance continued to be hindered by its member states' ability to effectively deal with out-of-area issues. In short, throughout the Cold War the member nations 'practiced' a non-policy on missions who resided outside the realm of the European theater.

### **Post Cold-War**

Throughout the Cold War, NATO member nations met resistance on collective defense on out-of-area operations due to a lack of comprehensive consensus based upon disagreeing beliefs, viewpoints, and objectives. The end of the Cold War heralded a major shift in member nations' policy specifically regarding out-of-area. Many member nations began to pursue more global policies due to the realization that in the modern global security environment it is simply not possible to remain ambivalent about armed aggression and threats beyond the European borders.<sup>182</sup> But more importantly the member nations were able to build upon differences in ideologies, perceptions, and interests to engage in several selective missions throughout the 1990s and its first out-of-area mission in Afghanistan.<sup>183</sup>

### **The Afghanistan 2001 Invasion Case-Study at a Glance**

Initially, NATO was a creation of the Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, the global security environment has continued to become more complex. Therefore

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<sup>182</sup> Robert F. Turner, (1987) "International Law, the Use of Force, and Reciprocity: A Comment on Professor Higgins' Overview," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* 25:2:Summer:168.

<sup>183</sup> Despite NATO's apparent shift in policy to adequately deal with the global security environment, the Alliance experienced new problems resolving around mission. These problems included consultation, burden sharing, and leftover Cold-War tensions.

the Alliance has taken on new and fundamental tasks in order to remain effective in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The member nations have continued to refocus its efforts to “adapt to the reality of asymmetrical threats”<sup>184</sup> Furthermore, the member nations continue to adopt “a broader and more ambitious approach to security by further deepening and extending its partnerships, modernizing its forces and providing assistance in crisis areas that are new to the organization.”<sup>185</sup> In sum, NATO and its members continue to shift attitudes, update and adopt policy, and accelerate the Alliance’s transformation to deal with the global security environment. The following is a brief historical description of Afghanistan and summarizes with NATO’s involvement in the region.

### **A Brief History of Afghanistan**

Throughout its history, Afghanistan has confronted centuries of strife and turmoil. Only until recently has the country been able to rebuild from the seemingly endless warfare that has plagued the land since its conception. The history of Afghanistan is convoluted in conflict and social unrest but offers an intriguing and diverse tale. Because of Afghanistan’s location, between the historical trade routes of Asia and the Middle East, the country has consistently been invaded and conquered by foreign invaders and governments.<sup>186</sup> However, none of these foreign invaders successfully established and maintained a long withstanding rule of law. As history has illustrated, invasion and victory in Afghanistan will only be temporary at best, for success can be taken as easily as it was given.

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<sup>184</sup> Together for Security: An Introduction to NATO.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Shaista Wahad and Barry Younderman, (2007) *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, (New York, NY: Facts on File).

The history of Afghanistan has been a test to the global security environment and the international community at large. Approximately 50,000 years, Afghanistan's earliest settlers lived as hunters in caves until their numbers grew and moved to warmer plains and formed villages and began to domesticate animals.<sup>187</sup> The 6<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> century ushered in the age of invasion and conquest. The foreign rulers bequeathed to the region a rich and varied culture, and religious traditions which allowed Afghanistan to become a center of great cultural and economic heritage.<sup>188</sup> This was only to decline in the 16<sup>th</sup> century due to constant foreign invasion and the discovery of other trade routes. The country was finally unified in 1747 under Pashtun tribal leader Ahmad shah Durrani.<sup>189</sup> The country continued to be influenced by the presence of foreigners and was shaped largely by competition between the United Kingdom and Russia during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.

The region of Afghanistan relied upon an absolute monarchy, influenced by the British Empire, until 1922. Under the guidance of the elected president, Amanullah Khan, a state assembly and legislature were organized, and ministers were appointed to the cabinet.<sup>190</sup> From the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the end of the 1960s, the western ideals of Khan and his successor Zahir Shah continued to challenge the powerful religious leaders.

In the early 1970s the country was beset by serious economic problems. In 1973 the monarchy was overthrown by former Prime Minister Mohammad Sardar Daoud

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<sup>187</sup> Martin Ewans, (2002) *Afghanistan: A New History*, (London, UK: Routledge), 10.

<sup>188</sup> Ewans (2002), 10-19.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 292.



Kahan.<sup>191</sup> Soon thereafter Daoud declared Afghanistan a republic and appointed himself the first president and prime minister.<sup>192</sup> By the middle of the 1970s, President Daoud had decided to form closer ties with the West and the oil-rich nations of the Middle East while distancing the country from the Soviet Union. Gradually, the Soviet's presence was transitioned out of Afghan government and military positions. However, in 1978, a Soviet-backed coup by the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) ended in the overthrow and murder of President Daoud. In December 1979, the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan.

The presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan continued for the next decade. During which time the Soviet army conducted military operations against Afghan Mujahideen rebels who were backed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and CIA operatives.<sup>193</sup> While the UN Security Council met to consider the Soviet Union intervention, which resulted in the adoption of the first series of "Situation of Afghanistan" resolutions (resolution ES-6/2).<sup>194</sup> The resolutions "deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan, called for the withdrawal of foreign forces, asked states to contribute humanitarian assistance, and asked the Security-General to keep it informed of developments."<sup>195</sup>

Throughout the 1980s, the UN General Assembly and the international community continued to focus on Afghanistan by passing an additional series of

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<sup>191</sup> Ewans (2002), 126.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid, 127.

<sup>193</sup> Patricia Gossman, (2001) "Afghanistan in the Balance," *Middle Eastern Research Project* 221:9-12.

<sup>194</sup> "The Situation in Afghanistan," available from <http://www.un.org/ga/62/plenary/afghanistan/bkg.shtml>; Internet, accessed 20 September 2008.

<sup>195</sup> "Afghanistan and the United Nations," available from <http://www.unh.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml>; Internet, accessed 20 September 2008.

resolutions. The resolutions “called for an end to the conflict, withdrawal of foreign troops, UN assistance to find a political statement and international help for refugees and others affected by the conflict.”<sup>196</sup> As international opposition from the United Nations vocally increased daily, various approaches were made with the intentions of trying to end the conflict. However, “action by the United Nations Security Council was impossible because the Soviets were armed with veto, but the UN General Assembly regularly passed resolutions opposing the Soviet Occupation.”<sup>197</sup> Assistance from the international community – Germany, Great Britain, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia – was offered in order to help Pakistan deal with more than three million refugees fleeing from Afghanistan.

In June 1982, a breakthrough in the Afghan War occurred when “proximity” talks began between Pakistan and Afghanistan through the mediation of UN Secretary General’s special representative, Diego Cordovez. The negotiations were aimed at reversing a policy, which had enormous political, material, and human capital ramifications, while achieving withdraw of the Soviet forces.<sup>198</sup> “The format had essentially been agreed upon by 1985. Meanwhile the United States and the Soviet Union had committed themselves to guaranteeing the implementation of an agreement leading to a withdrawal.”<sup>199</sup> An agreement was reached which affirmed the sovereignty

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<sup>196</sup> Afghanistan and the United Nations.

<sup>197</sup> Peter R. Blood, Ed., (2001) “Communism, Rebellion, and Soviet Intervention,” *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: GPO for the Library of Congress). Also available from <http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/index.htm>.

<sup>198</sup> Gossman (2001), 13.

<sup>199</sup> Peter R. Blood, Ed., (2001) “The Geneva Accords, 1987-89,” *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: GPO for the Library of Congress). Also available from <http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/97.htm>.

of Afghanistan and its right to self-determination, freedom from foreign invasion, and the right of refugees to return in a safe return.<sup>200</sup> The core of the agreement was reached in “May 1988 that authorized the withdrawal of foreign troops according to a timetable that would remove all Soviet forces.”<sup>201</sup> The occupation of Russian forces ended in February 1989 under the conditions of the Geneva Accords implemented by the UN. Nevertheless the Soviets continued to back the Communist PDPA under Mohammed Najibullah until the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992.

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, civil war between the various factions arose. The number of citizens fleeing the country resulted in the worst refugee crisis the international community had ever encountered. In 1992, the fighting intensified, making aid more difficult and shattering hopes of the country finding resolution. At the request of the UN General Assembly, in December 1993 the Secretary-General established the United Nations Special Mission Afghanistan (UNSMA).<sup>202</sup> UNSMA was constituted to “canvass a broad spectrum of Afghan leaders and solicit their views on how the UN could best help with the national reconciliation and reconstruction.”<sup>203</sup> Meanwhile, the Taliban began to manifest their presence throughout the country.

In 1994, the Islamic Pahtun Taliban movement began in the southern providences of Afghanistan.<sup>204</sup> Over the next two years the movement began making rapid gains. Soon thereafter the Taliban “controlled approximately 95 percent of the country,

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<sup>200</sup> Blood (2001) “The Geneva Accords, 1987-89.”

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Afghanistan and the United Nations.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Gossman (2001), 14.

including the capital of Kabul, and all the largest urban areas, except Faizabad.”<sup>205</sup> After the seize of Kabul, the Taliban began to implement their own interpretation of the Islamic law and conduct. In a presidential statement by the president of the UN Security Council on 15 February 1996:

The Security Council expressed concern about intensified hostilities around the capital city of Kabul, which prevented deliveries of humanitarian aid. It was also deeply concerned that the continuing conflict provided fertile ground for terrorism, arms transfers and drug trafficking, which destabilized the whole region and beyond.<sup>206</sup>

As Taliban forces continued to establish their reign over the country, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1076.<sup>207</sup> The Resolution was a call for all Afghan parties to cease all hostilities and to begin open dialogues aimed at achieving national unity and reconciliation. It echoed earlier concerns “that the conflict provided fertile ground for terrorism and drug trafficking and called on the parties to halt such activities.”<sup>208</sup> Disregarding the resolutions passed by the UN and the condemnation by the international community, the Taliban continued to expand its rule of law throughout the country and conduct terrorist activities.

The rule of the Taliban and fighting between political and military fractions continued between 1997 and 2000.<sup>209</sup> The UN General Assembly, Security Council, and international community continued to condemn the actions of the Taliban. Finally, on 15

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<sup>205</sup> Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, (1986) “Afghanistan – Taliban Era,” *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army). Also available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/taliban.htm>.

<sup>206</sup> Afghanistan and the United Nations.

<sup>207</sup> “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1076 (1996),” available from [http://unama-afg.org/docs/\\_UN-Docs/\\_sc/\\_resolutions/sc1076.pdf](http://unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_sc/_resolutions/sc1076.pdf); Internet, accessed 20 September 2008.

<sup>208</sup> Afghanistan and the United Nations.

<sup>209</sup> Gossman (2001), 14.

October 1999, "citing the failure of the Taliban authorities to response to demands, the Council applied broad sanctions under the enforcement provisions of the UN Charter."<sup>210</sup> The sanctions included the freezing of all assets and funds owned or controlled by the Taliban.

### **NATO in Afghanistan**

By the end of the 1990s, the nation of Afghanistan had become notorious for its rule under the Taliban, production of opium, and terrorist training camps. The situation in Afghanistan continued unresolved until the end of 2001. Throughout this period the international community, including the UN and NATO, tried with varying levels of success to provide aid to the citizens of Afghanistan.<sup>211</sup> While condemnation by the international continued without any direct actions taken. This situation drastically changed after the attacks of September 11 2001

In 2001, immediately following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, large scale transformations were fashioned and implemented in the global security environment. Within mere hours of the attacks in New York and Washington D.C., the Bush Administration announced a war on terrorism. Initially the goals of the war were to bring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to justice and prevent the rise of terrorist organizations. In order to accomplish each of these goals, the approach to be carried out by the United States was twofold. First, economic and military sanctions were to be placed on any country which was allegedly harboring terrorists while implementing global surveillance and intelligence sharing. Secondly, US-led military operations would be launched in Afghanistan to oust the oppressive Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. Soon thereafter, NATO

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<sup>210</sup> Afghanistan and the United Nations.

<sup>211</sup> Gossman (2001), 15.

and its member countries issued statements which were the first step in its path to involvement in Afghanistan.

Immediately following the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, and the announcement of U.S.-led war on terrorism, NATO and its member states took historical steps by pledging their loyalty and support in the war on terrorism. For the first time in the history of the Alliance, NATO member nations made the extraordinary decision by unanimously agreeing to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Additionally, the Alliance also agreed to deploy its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and elements of its AWACS force.<sup>212</sup> The steps undertaken enabled the Alliance to better assist its member nations and their national authorities in the protection of their populations. The actions of the member states regarding Afghanistan created a venue in which NATO members would have to go beyond their European theater and combat the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The mission in Afghanistan was NATO's first out-of-area mission.

After the initial activities in Afghanistan by NATO and as the situation continued to unfold within the country, the international community met to discuss the situation at hand and determine a decisive course of action before engaging in military operations. On 12 November 2001, the "Six plus Two" group met in New York.<sup>213</sup> Under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, representatives from six countries neighboring Afghanistan, as well as the United States and the Russian Federation, agreed

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<sup>212</sup> Gossman (2001), 15.

<sup>213</sup> Kenneth Katzman, (2002) "Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns," (Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service), 7.

on “the need for a board based and freely chosen Afghan government.”<sup>214</sup> In a Joint Declaration, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the U.S. and Russia each pledged their support in trying to help the Afghan people find a political solution to the crisis within the country. Additionally each country agreed that “there should be the establishment in Afghanistan of a broad based multi-ethnic, politically balanced, freely chosen Afghan administration representative of their aspirations and at peace with its neighbors.”<sup>215</sup> At the end of the meeting it was concluded by many participants, including some NATO member nations, that the crisis in Afghanistan was critical and required immediate action.

Following the “Six plus Two” meeting, in December a further donor conference was held in Berlin. The focus of the Bonn Conference was to address the immediate and long-term needs of Afghanistan. Delegates from nations, international organizations, and the European Union attended the conference in hopes of addressing humanitarian and reconstruction support for Afghanistan.<sup>216</sup> The conference ended with the establishment of a new, interim government in Afghanistan, known as the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA).

After the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed the agreement, the Council passed Resolution 1386.<sup>217</sup> The Resolution “authorized the establishment of the

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<sup>214</sup> Afghanistan and the United Nations.

<sup>215</sup> “Six Plus Two Group Stresses Need for Broad-Based Afghan Government,” available from <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=2116&Cr=Afghan&Cr1=>; Internet, accessed 08 April 2009.

<sup>216</sup> Frank Clements and Ludwig W. Adamec, (2003) *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia*, (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO), 41.

<sup>217</sup> “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386,” available from [http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution\\_1386.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1386.pdf); Internet, accessed 20 September 2008.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help the Afghan Transitional Authority maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.”<sup>218</sup> Initially led by the United States, the ISAF was comprised of all NATO members as well as other partner states of the Alliance. Additionally, the Afghan National Army was also key members of the ISAF. The agreement of the ISAF paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, UNAMA, and ISAF.

As the mission of the ISAF continued, larger participation and assistance of NATO forces were requested at the behest of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai. In August 2003, NATO took over the command of ISAF.<sup>219</sup> In its new role, the UN Security Council Resolution 1776 called upon “NATO to disarm militias, reform the justice system, train a national police force and army, provide security for elections, and combat the narcotics industry.”<sup>220</sup> However, the Resolution failed to address how NATO<sup>221</sup> should carry out these tasks. It was left up to the member nations, in consultation with the Afghan government, to take the provisions outlined in the Resolution and make them tangible and quantifiable in order to carry out a realistic policy. However, political leaders and local commanders have had to face considerable challenges – national caveats, difficulty in persuading some member states to contribute forces,<sup>222</sup> counter

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<sup>218</sup> Afghanistan and the United Nations.

<sup>219</sup> “International Security Assistance Force Chronology,” available from <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/chronology/index.html>; Internet, accessed 20 September 2008.

<sup>220</sup> Paul Gallis and Vincent Morelli, (2008) “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,” (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Institute).

<sup>221</sup> NATO will be used not as a proxy but is recognized as an Organization composed of member states that agree to and implement policy.

<sup>222</sup> “NATO Commander Asks Member Nations to Drop Troop Limits,” *Mideast Stars and Stripes* 25 October 2006.



narcotics,<sup>223</sup> and failure of provincial reconstruction teams.<sup>224</sup> These challenges have influenced the implementation of the ISAF by member nations. Despite these challenges, over time NATO commanders implemented actions in Afghanistan to bring the country under NATO's operational responsibilities.<sup>225</sup> Today the ISAF is the primary operation within Afghanistan.

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<sup>223</sup> Testimony of Director Negroponte, (2007) "Annual Threat Assessment," available from [http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20070118\\_transcript.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20070118_transcript.pdf); Internet, accessed 06 April 2009.

House International Relations Committee (2005), "U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan," available from <http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/20058.pdf>; Internet, accessed 06 April 2009.

<sup>224</sup> Yuji Uesugi, (2007) "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan: A New Model for Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations," available from [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p178892\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p178892_index.html); Internet, accessed 06 April 2009.

"Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan - An Interagency Assessment," available from [http://pdf.dec.org/pdf\\_docs/Pnadg252.pdf](http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnadg252.pdf); Internet, accessed 06 April 2009.

<sup>225</sup> "NATO's Role in Afghanistan," available from <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html>; Internet, accessed 06 April 2009.




Figure 3: ISAF Troop Locations in Afghanistan<sup>226</sup>

Today, the two military efforts in Afghanistan continue with efforts to stabilize a potentially hostile country. The first operation, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),<sup>227</sup> was a U.S. led combat mission against the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorist groups, primarily conducted along the Pakistan border. The OEF operation was not a NATO mission, although it did involve nations whom are a part of the NATO. The second operation involved in Afghanistan was the ISAF,<sup>228</sup> who was established in order to stabilize the country by the international community. The ISAF includes troops from all twenty-eight states of NATO and has included troops from several non-NATO nations,

<sup>226</sup> NATO OTAN International Security Force, (2008) "ISAF Map and Logos: ISAF Troops in Numbers," available from [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf\\_placemat.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf); Internet, accessed 20 September 2008.

<sup>227</sup> Gallis (1998), 1.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

such as Azerbaijan, Austria, Jordan, New Zealand, and Sweden.<sup>229</sup> “By July 2008, ISAF had an estimated 52,700 troops from 40 countries, with NATO members providing the core of the force. The United States has approximately 14,800 troops in ISAF.”<sup>230</sup>

The efforts undertaken by NATO in Afghanistan are indeed the Alliance’s first mission beyond the boundaries of the European continent. The purpose of the Afghanistan mission was to stabilize and reconstruct the country. Even though NATO has participated in several stabilization and reconstruction missions, such as in Kosovo, the operations in Afghanistan were different. Different because there has never been a long standing centralized Afghanistan government, presence of Taliban, the mission’s out-of-area scope and abrasive terrain, and the country’s historical context and standing amongst the international community. Different because this was the first mission where NATO was involved in a military operation outside of the European theater.

The mission in Afghanistan has played an important role in NATO, in the future of the Organization, and for the leadership of its member nations. Most importantly, the mission illustrates the progression of the political and operational involvement of the Alliance since the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and a shift in NATO’s out-of-area policy. By why would NATO shift its policy and become involved in Afghanistan? Is it a result of ad hoc tendencies? Or, is something more typical of policy development and adherence to institutional methods in the globalized, post-Cold War environment? The following analysis will address these questions and analyze NATO’s out-of-area policy to understand what led NATO to become involved in Afghanistan.

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<sup>229</sup> NATO’s Role in Afghanistan.

<sup>230</sup> Gallis (1998), 1.

## Interpreting NATO in Afghanistan: A Dialogical Analysis

### Background Knowledge

The background knowledge which is required for this analysis includes the knowledge of the four global security arrangements and the history of NATO, its policy of out-of-area, and involvement in Afghanistan,<sup>231</sup> but more importantly, an understanding of the transition from the bilateral Cold War rivalry to the post-Cold War security environment of collective security arrangements and Alliances. The global security environment is made up of many international organizations, bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties, policies and resolutions, non-governmental organizations, and diffusion of norms and each of these components continue to grow and will continue to govern the global security and its environment. Within this context, NATO has continued uphold its mission, shifted its views concerning out-of-area, and has become involved in Afghanistan.

### Speech Acts

The speech acts in this analysis were gathered from communiqués published by NATO's North Atlantic Council between 1996 and 2003. The communiqués, policy statements, are a result of the consensus decision-making process. During this process representatives from the member states consult with one another. During the consultation process, member nations exchange views and information and discuss the language of the communiqué prior to reaching an agreement and taking any necessary action.<sup>232</sup> This process enables each country to voice their views and express any hesitations or worries.

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<sup>231</sup> Each of these concepts is discussed in greater detail in the previous sections of this Chapter.

<sup>232</sup> "NATO: The Consultation Process," available from [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B73F6E0F-59D6E441/natolive/topics\\_49187.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B73F6E0F-59D6E441/natolive/topics_49187.htm); Internet, accessed 08 April 2008.

The result of the consultation and consensus decision-making process are policy statements published in the form of a communiqué. This process ensures that each communiqué is consistent in its format and reporting methods. In short, each speech act of this analysis represents an official position of NATO member states. Each communiqué focuses on the issues of how the member states of NATO will respond and deal with the global security environment within the context of the appropriate security rules.<sup>233</sup>

The following are the speech acts used in this analysis:

1. Speech Act 1: Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1996)165 held at NATO HQ Brussels 10 Dec 1996.<sup>234</sup>
2. Speech Act 2: Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1997)155 held at NATO HQ Brussels 16 Dec 1997.<sup>235</sup>
3. Speech Act 3: Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1998)140 held at NATO HQ Brussels 8 Dec 1998.<sup>236</sup>
4. Speech Act 4: Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1999)166 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 1999.<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> To read each speech act in its entirety refer to the Appendices.

<sup>234</sup> North Atlantic Council, (1996) "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 10 Dec 1996," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-165e.htm>; Internet, accessed 08 March 2009.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., (1997) "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 16 Dec 1997," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-155e.htm>; Internet, accessed 08 March 2009.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., (1998) "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 8 Dec 1998," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p981208e.htm>; Internet, accessed 08 March 2009.

5. Speech Act 5: Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2000)124 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 2000.<sup>238</sup>
6. Speech Act 6: Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2001)158 held at NATO HQ Brussels 6 Dec 2001.<sup>239</sup>
7. Speech Act 7: Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2002)59 held at NATO HQ Brussels 14 May 2002.<sup>240</sup>
8. Speech Act 8: Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2003)152 held at NATO HQ Brussels 4 Dec 2003.<sup>241</sup>

### Content of the Speech Acts

In speech act 1 the member states assert that the Alliance is in a state of reform. The member states assert they will strive to define a new structure and dimension in a different world and with a Europe in search of a new identity. The member states are resolved to preserve its political and military strength which will ensure its ability to

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<sup>237</sup> North Atlantic Council, (1999) "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 15 Dec 1999," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-166e.htm>; Internet, accessed 08 March 2009.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., (2000) "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 15 Dec 2000," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-124e.htm>; Internet, accessed 08 March 2009.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid., (2001) "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 6 Dec 2001," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-158e.htm>; Internet, accessed 08 March 2009.

It is important to note that this particular communiqué was published in May rather than December. This particular communiqué was chosen because the North Atlantic Council only met once during 2002 rather than twice. The Council only met once during 2002 due to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in the previous year.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid., (2002) "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 14 May 2002," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-059e.htm>; Internet, accessed 08 March 2009.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., (2003) "Final Communiqué Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 4 Dec 2003," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-152e.htm>; Internet, accessed 08 March 2009.

carry out a multiple missions. NATO member states will continue to build upon its security by “maintaining its capability for collective security, admitting new members, expanding and strengthening cooperative relationships with all Partners” and “realizing the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance.”<sup>242</sup> The member states reconfirmed their mission statements and will continue to support all efforts to combat threats, like terrorism, which constitute serious challenges to harmony, security, and steadiness of NATO.

NATO member states assert in speech act 2 that the Alliance is in a period of transition. The member states have expanded its membership to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Additionally, the member nations have expressed a new will and capacity to adapt to a new Europe through continual engagement in the Partnership for Peace and the transatlantic coalition. As such, the member nations will continue to consider options for a future of military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will continue to condemn all acts of terrorism.<sup>243</sup> In doing so the member states of the Alliance will continue to pay particular attention to the Mediterranean since the security of Europe is directly tied to security and stability within the region. Thus securing peace over the long term will then require cooperative efforts but also using “arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature that affect Alliance security interests.”<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> Final Communiqué 10 Dec 1996.

<sup>243</sup> Final Communiqué 16 Dec 1997.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

In speech act 3 the member states continue to redefine the role of the Alliance in order to adapt, renew, and meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Internally, the member nations continue to strive to “maintain the Alliance’s military effectiveness for the full range of its missions building on its essential collective defense capabilities and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).”<sup>245</sup> Additionally, the member nations continuously work to update the Strategic Concept. Externally, NATO member states continue to enhance the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace. These partnerships continue to be a focal point for the Alliance, in order to build “new patterns of practical military and defense-related cooperation across a wide range of issues.”<sup>246</sup> These efforts have proved useful in the crisis in Kosovo as cooperation in the region progresses and the establishment of a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow. Finally, the members of the Alliance recognizes the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons are a means of serious concern; therefore member countries will work in conjunction with one another to urge all countries to fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The member states of NATO assert in speech act 4 that the Alliance has embarked on a new chapter. The member states note that the new chapter was marked by three major milestones. First, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became official members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in mid-March. Secondly, the member states committed the Alliance to its first air-strike campaign. The objectives of

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<sup>245</sup> Final Communiqué 8 Dec 1998.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid.



the campaign were twofold: (1) target Yugoslavian military targets to stop violence and genocide and (2) force Belgrade to withdraw its troops from Kosovo.<sup>247</sup> Finally, NATO celebrated its fiftieth anniversary since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Each of these events has propelled NATO and its member countries to reconsider their ideas, concepts, and theories towards the Alliance at present and in the future. In particular, the experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO member countries “must continue to adapt and improve its defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions.”<sup>248</sup> The member states recognize that this is an important step in the Alliance’s transformation especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The member states will continue to enhance their cooperation with other states, consider options for security building measures, and strive to preserve its strategic stability.

In speech act 5 NATO members asserted they will continue to pursue its current missions, including those endeavors in South-East Europe, while maintaining the Alliance’s partnerships and cooperative efforts to assure peace and stability. In order to do so, NATO members will continue to “promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, (and) a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons.”<sup>249</sup> Additionally, the member states will continue to review their progress in implementing the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The DCI will provide the “forces and

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<sup>247</sup> Final Communiqué 15 Dec 1999.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> Final Communiqué 15 Dec 2000.

capabilities the Alliance urgently requires to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century by ensuring the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions.”<sup>250</sup> In doing so, the Alliance and its members will be able to supply forces which are well, structured, interoperable, scalable, mobile, highly capable and readily deployable. Each of these initiative require the member nations to make “the most effective use of resources” and to find “innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common funding.”<sup>251</sup> Additionally, the member nations have made substantial progress on the development of the European Security and Defense Identity, Mediterranean Dialogue, Partnership for Peace, OSCE, reaction and response to NBC and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Alliance’s Open Door Policy, but important work remains to be done as the member countries continue to place high priority on strengthening relationships with all participants in the Euro-Atlantic community.

The member states of NATO stress in speech act 6 the effects of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. This act resulted in the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Amidst this tragedy, NATO member states have “taken stock of NATO’s broad agenda, and given further guidance on its implementation”<sup>252</sup> and issued statements regarding NATO’s response to terrorism and

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<sup>250</sup> Final Communiqué 15 Dec 2000.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> Final Communiqué 6 Dec 2001.

its contribution to the campaign against terrorism. The member states call into account their commitment to forge a new relationship with Russia; their continued efforts in enlarging the Alliance; and reiterated their commitment to peaceful, stable and democratic countries, particularly those in South-East Europe. NATO member states have demonstrated that the events of 11 September have challenged the Alliance and the global security environment “in a variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways.”<sup>253</sup> Thus the Alliance and its member states need to have the ability to ensure that each country and its forces have the best capabilities to meet the challenges and are able to work with one another in a seamless way. The members of NATO have demonstrated they have the ability to interact with one another based upon their ability to adapt and facilitate a “comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.”<sup>254</sup> In this context, NATO member countries will continue to actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in the particular field while pursuing proactive policies and missions which are flexible and enduring.

In speech act 7 the member states confirm that they have continuously engaged and upheld their core commitments “to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.”<sup>255</sup> The Alliance has continuously engaged in upholding the security of its member countries and in doing so it has changed by expanding its agenda and engaging in selective out-of-area missions, such as in South-East Europe. In order to survive,

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<sup>253</sup> Final Communiqué 6 Dec 2001.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid.

<sup>255</sup> Final Communiqué 14 May 2002.

NATO member nations have strived to transform the Organization. In doing so; the member nations have pledged to fight against terrorism and become engaged in operations in Afghanistan. The member nations' commitment and involvement in Afghanistan represents a new chapter in the Organization's history. In order to keep abreast in the static global security environment, the members of NATO vow to carry out the following:

- Field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives;
- Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance, including strategic lift and modern strike capabilities, so that NATO can more effectively respond collectively to any threat of aggression against a member state;
- Confirm the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area;
- Commit ourselves to continuing to work with the aspirants to help them make sufficient progress to be invited to begin accession negotiations, and undertaking internal preparations to ensure its readiness to accept new members;
- Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue; and
- Reconfirm commitments to a peaceful, stable, and democratic South-East Europe and operations in the Balkans.<sup>256</sup>

Each of these efforts confirm that NATO member nations will continue to work to transform the Alliance, as "new, more substantive relationship with Partners" are formed

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<sup>256</sup> Final Communiqué 14 May 2002.

and cooperation efforts are amplified when “responding to new security challenges, including terrorism.”<sup>257</sup>

Finally, NATO member nations in speech act 8 confirm the Alliance’s ongoing transformation in order to meet the needs of the 21<sup>st</sup> century global security environment, its threats, and challenges which impose on the security of member countries, their populations, territories, and forces. The member nations reaffirm the transformation of the Organization within the global security environment by welcoming seven new members to the Alliance; rejecting and condemning all acts of terrorism; confirming its leadership of ISAF; outlining the Alliance’s mission in the Balkans and South-East Europe; reconfirming its commitment to those partnerships made and continually enhancing cooperative efforts across the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean area; and supporting the aims of Proliferation Security Initiative and CFE Treaty.<sup>258</sup> Finally, the members of NATO demonstrate that their “commitment to multilateralism through effective action and shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; NATO’s fundamental security tasks including collective security; shared democratic values; and the United Nations Charter” has laid the path for the Alliance’s transformation and survival in the global security environment.<sup>259</sup>

#### Context of the Speech Acts

This thesis relies upon Frederking’s (2003) theory of rule-orientated constructivism to contextualize NATO’s communiqués within the global security environment. According to Frederking’s theory, actors perform speech acts that

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<sup>257</sup> Final Communiqué 14 May 2002.

<sup>258</sup> Final Communiqué 4 Dec 2003.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

construct, invoke, or contest the collective security rules.<sup>260</sup> For this study, in order for NATO member countries to interact within the global security environment and maintain the Alliance, the member countries have identified and adopted several rules. The member nations of the Alliance abide by the following rules:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens;
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use;
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships;
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully; and
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.

Each of these rules was designed to ensure stability and security for the Euro-Atlantic area, help the member countries effectively conduct out-of-area missions, and allow the existence and transformation of the Alliance within the context of the global security environment.

### Pragmatic Analysis

Pragmatic analysis refers to “a linguistic level that relates contents to context.”<sup>261</sup> In other words, pragmatic analysis is concerned with the way in which the meaning(s) or significance of a word(s) and/or phrase(s) are constructed within a particular context composed of interactions.<sup>262</sup> Central to pragmatics is the fact that we can mean much more than we say. In order to assess the meanings of a particular word or phrase involves the generation of propositions. The important point is that propositions, as inferences, are

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<sup>260</sup> Duffy (1998), 273.

<sup>262</sup> Stephen C. Levinson, (1983) *Pragmatics*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), Introduction.

based on a grammatical item or clausal structure phrase chosen, and fall directly within the realm of the speech act.

Pragmatic analysis helps to generate all propositions associated with a speech act. Each proposition concerns those aspects which convey truth, appropriateness, and sincerity claims. Therefore pragmatics reveals how each speech act illustrated claims of validity and how each uses or builds upon the global security arrangements and the social rules associated. During an interaction, either a speech or activity, a rational actor conveys multiple understood propositions, and each of these propositions is “consensual and/or irrelevant to the specific issue of how to implement collective security rules.”<sup>263</sup> Throughout the course of this thesis, in order to understand the context in which NATO member states are functioning in, the collective security rules identified above should be reference.

#### Assertions, Directives, and Commitments

The pragmatic analysis of the speech acts located within the communiqués from 1996 through 2003 illustrates each invoked the use of several collective security rules. Within the overall pattern, each speech act generated a distinctive set of assertions, directives, and commitments. The paragraphs below briefly summarize the distinctive and unique assertions, directives, and commitments from each speech act.

In speech act 1, NATO member states assert that the Alliance would uphold security and stability while taking a new shape. The new shape of the Alliance would reflect the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring vitality of the transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors. In order to do so, the member nations of the Alliance would have to commit to:

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<sup>263</sup> Frederking (2003), 371.

- Agreeing on a new structure command;
- Making arrangements for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI);
- Keeping the Alliance open for new membership;
- Strengthening cooperative relations with all Partners, especially those with Russia and the Ukraine;
- Enhancing Mediterranean dialogue; and
- Further enhancing political and defense efforts relating to conflict prevention, crisis management, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).<sup>264</sup>

Additionally, the member nations directed all members to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. The publication of this speech act confirmed that each member nation has a clear understanding of NATO's mission and the necessary steps needed to be taken in order to carry out the mission.

In speech act 2, the members of NATO asserted the Alliance has upheld its mission through the reinforcement of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based upon on Allied solidarity and cohesion. Additionally, the member nations have asserted they have been able to maintain a strong transatlantic link and form new cooperative partnerships with other Euro-Atlantic nations; began to build an ESDI within NATO, and remained effective and vigilant for a full range of missions. In order to do continue with these assertions, the member nations of the Alliance would have to commit to:

- Maintaining a strong transatlantic link while remaining open through the admission of new members;

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<sup>264</sup> Final Communiqué 10 Dec 1996.



- Upholding the cooperative partnerships with Euro-Atlantic nations, especially with Russia and the Ukraine;
- Continuing the comprehensive process of NATO enlargement;
- Building a ESDI within NATO;
- Strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation as well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights;
- Continuing to support the Alliance in the effectiveness which enable it for a full range of its missions;
- Endorsing and continue with measures for the proliferation of WMD; and
- Continuing to support all efforts to combat terrorism.<sup>265</sup>

NATO also directed its member nations and other partners to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. Each of these efforts illustrate NATO is in a period of transformation as it continues to broaden its agenda and engage in mission which are outside the traditional boundaries of Europe. Indeed, the Alliance and its member nations comprehend the urgency to transform in order to meet the security challenges of the global security environment.

In speech act 3, the member nations assert that the Alliance is able to adapt and renew in order to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup>. In order to do so, NATO members have committed the Alliance to carry out the following acts:

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<sup>265</sup> Final Communiqué 16 Dec 1997

- Developing a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process, operationalize our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards;
- Continuing with internal adaption;
- Improving the political, civil and military aspects of the Alliance;
- Preparing to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat;
- and
- Combating terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.<sup>266</sup>

To carry out each of these acts, NATO member states direct each of its members and other nation to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. In short, the purpose of this speech act is twofold; first to acknowledge NATO's fifty year establishment, and secondly, to illustrate that the Alliance members have to continuously redefine their role in order to adapt, renew, and have the ability to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This has allowed the Alliance and its member nations to take on new roles and operations while maintain a clear and stable mission.

In speech act 4, the members of NATO point out that the Organization has been able to secure and stabilize the global security environment while still being able to transform to meet security challenges. The member countries asserts they have been able to do so by maintaining stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military relations; implementing robust practical and political support provided by

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<sup>266</sup> Final Communiqué 8 Dec 1998.

Partner countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and transform policies; and establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of the Alliance. In order to continue to engage in each of these measures, the Alliance and its member nations will commit to:

- Further adapting the Alliance to the new security environment while continuously maintaining security and stability;
- Continuing to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate;
- Monitoring closely the situation in South-East Europe;
- Continuing efforts in Kosovo and other areas of involvement for the Alliance;
- Helping to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo;
- Contributing to effective conflict prevention;
- Reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar;
- Remaining open to new members and encouraging applicants;
- Continuing to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine;
- Maintaining efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons; and
- Reaffirming the determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.<sup>267</sup>

Each of these efforts are broad in their demeanors and efforts, thus the members direct the help of its partners and other nations to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO

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<sup>267</sup> Final Communiqué 15 Dec 1999.

treaties and policies; encourage the leaders in Kosovo to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society; urge Belgrade and the government of Montenegro to resolve their differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing measures; push Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict; and support the Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms. NATO member nations have changed the course of the Organization's history, as each country continues to improve its collaboration with other states, think about options for security actions and procedures, and strive to protect its strategic strength and security.

In speech act 5, NATO members demonstrate that the Alliance has been able to uphold and maintain stability and security. The members of NATO assert they have had the ability to do so by remaining strongly committed to the achievement of security, stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights for its member countries and in out-of-area missions, including South-East Europe and remain steadfast and adhere to policies and treaties. Additionally, the member nations continue to condemn violence and terrorism by vigorously pursuing out-of-area missions; continue to enable countries to work together to ensure their own security; further strengthening their military capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar; and maintain cooperative efforts to work with Russia and any situations which arise concerning the nation. To build upon these efforts NATO and its member countries will carry out the following commitments:

- Promoting long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, and regional cooperation;

- Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas;
- Providing sufficient resources to efficiently carry out policies, treaties, and out-of-area missions;
- Effectively using resources and finding innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities by taking advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common funding;
- To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and cooperation between member nations;
- Intensifying consultation in times of crisis;
- Continuing to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on their preparations for possible future membership; and
- Considering ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our cooperative relations with all partners.<sup>268</sup>

As such, the member states will continue to reach out and direct its members and other countries of the global security environment to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies and to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives. Additionally, NATO members will continue to call upon the representatives and leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies; urge Russia and

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<sup>268</sup> Final Communiqué 15 Dec 2000.

Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict; and encourage Ukraine to move forward on its current path of political and economic reform. NATO members will then be able to continue to pursue its current missions, including those endeavors in South-East Europe, while maintaining its partnerships and cooperative efforts in order to assure peace and stability.

In speech act 6, NATO member states assert that in order to maintain stability and security in a post September 11<sup>th</sup> environment for the Alliance, its member nations and their citizens, it is essential that confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Euro-Atlantic, are upheld. Furthermore, it is asserted that each member nation needs to uphold current policies and treaties; continue to condemn all use of violence and terrorism for either military or political means; engage in current and future out-of-area missions; and reaffirm the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately and effectively against threats. The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks will be forever remembered as a 'day of infamy' for all citizens around the world and in order to help prevent incidents of this level, the member countries commit to:

- Upholding its allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001;
- Exploring and developing new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action;
- Continuing the enlargement process;
- Developing a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans;

- Promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, and lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons;
- Continuing to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence;
- Further broadening and strengthening cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP);
- Ensuring that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly;
- Continuing to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; and
- Finding a swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia.<sup>269</sup>

To carry out each of these objectives, the member states direct the help of its members and the defense community to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community. Moreover, NATO member nations urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict; encourage the elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new functions in strict compliance and carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies; persuade the Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform process forward; and finally, encourage the Partners to seek a more active relationship with the Alliance. Based upon the static global security environment and the attacks of

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<sup>269</sup> Final Communiqué 6 Dec 2001

September 11<sup>th</sup>, the members of the Alliance will continue to adhere to its goals and rigorously pursue their commitments.

In speech act 7, NATO member states assert that the Alliance has continued to transform in order maintain stability and security while striving to survive within the global security environment. Consequentially, the member nations assertively have remained steadfast in order to promote peaceful, stable, and democratic nations, including those countries in South-East Europe while continuing to combat the threat of terrorism and preventing the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense. Also, member nations continue to maintain out-of-area missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives. The member states continue to work with Russia and the Ukraine to enhance cooperation in addition to ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response, effective crisis management is implemented, and upholding current policies and treaties. NATO member states have been able to do by directing its members and other nations in the global security environment to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community; encouraging Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our efforts to verify this claim as soon as possible; urging Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict; supporting Croatia in their quest to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans; persuading the Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard; and continuing to call on the local authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing policies and



treatments. Each of these assertions and directives will be build upon as the member states commit to:

- Acting on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state;
- Adapting to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area;
- Strengthening national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad;
- Working with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery;
- Developing new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance;
- Launching the next round of NATO enlargement;
- Remaining open to new members, and enhancing security in the Euro-Atlantic area;
- Building a new, more substantive relationship with Partners;
- Upgrading the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue;
- Promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons;

- Adapting the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts;
- Developing a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; and
- Continuing to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.<sup>270</sup>

Each assertion, directive, and commitment provides evidence that the member nations have shifted their out-of-area policy and transformed the Alliance within the context of the global security environment in order to survive and deal with its challenges. Indeed, the member countries of the Alliance have stayed true to their core commitments "to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state,"<sup>271</sup> while adopting an ever-broadening agenda and missions who are beyond the realm of the traditional European theater.

Finally, member nations in speech act 8 assert that NATO has continued to serve as a keystone in the collective defense of the Euro-Atlantic area. Additionally, the Alliance is an essential transatlantic forum for security in the current global security environment. The Alliance's member countries and partners have patiently and tirelessly worked towards the on-going transformation of the Organization to meet the 21<sup>st</sup> century threats and challenges. The members of NATO assert they have done so by continuing to expand the Alliance and encouraging new members to join; continuing to combat terrorism; ensuring peace, stability, and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans;

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<sup>270</sup> Final Communiqué 14 May 2002.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

continuing to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; continuing to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; carrying out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue developing relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhancing cooperation between the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis were met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management is implemented; maintaining out-of-area missions; and upholding current policies and treaties. In order for the Alliance to continue to transform in the global security environment, NATO member nations have committed to:

- Preserving peace through its operations;
- Spreading stability through its partnerships;
- Reinforcing the community of shared values through the most robust round of enlargement in our history;
- Using all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international Organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism;
- Assisting in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the international community;
- Developing a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional Authority;
- Supporting territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans and help those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures;

- Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU;
- Considering ways to further enhance relationships by generating a more ambitious and expanded framework;
- Building on the progress between NATO and Russia, and NATO and the Ukraine;
- Supporting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery;
- Encouraging multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment to the transatlantic link; and
- Implementing measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Organization.<sup>272</sup>

Furthermore, NATO member nations have directed its members to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community. The member states have also directed the defense community to encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards; encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries; encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership; encourage Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration; and urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level. The member nations' devotion to

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<sup>272</sup> Final Communiqué 4 Dec 2003.

its mission and its on-going transformation are part of a process to “enhance the security of Alliance member countries and the future stability and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole.”<sup>273</sup>

The analysis of each assertion, directive, and commitment derived from each speech act reveals that NATO member states have adhered to its commitments as outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty while transforming its out-of-area policy to effectively deal with the global security environment.

### Explicit Performatives and Implicit Contents

In the pragmatic analysis, each assertion, directive, and commitment are then expressed as an “explicit performative,”<sup>274</sup> grouping the category and subcategory of each speech act. Then each speech act is identified for implicit contents (reflexive intentions, implicatures, and presuppositions)<sup>275</sup> that can be inferred. In this sense, explicit or

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<sup>273</sup> NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, 23.

<sup>274</sup> The propositions add ‘hereby’ to each speech act to stress the fundamental point of speech act theory that language is action.

<sup>275</sup> A reflexive intention is the proposition which specify implicitly conveyed intentions. Reflexive intentions differ depending on the type of speech. Assertions follows P is the case and the intentions are S believes that P and S wants H to believe that P. Directives follow Do X and the intentions are S believes that his utterance, in virtue his authority over H, constitutes sufficient reason for H to do X and S wants H to do X because of X’s command. Commitments follow I will do Y and the intentions are S believes his utterance obligates him to do U on the condition that H indicates he wants S to do U; S wants Y on the condition that H indicate he wants S to do Y; and S wants H to believe (a) and (b).

A implicature is a proposition which comes from Grice’s cooperative principles, which includes the following maxim of conversation:

The maxim of these propositions come from Grice’s cooperative principle, which includes the following maxims of conversation:

- The maxim of quality: Do not say what you believe to be false, and do not say anything for which you lack adequate evidence.
- The maxim of quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange.
- The maxim of relevance: Make your contributions relevant.
- The maxim of manner: Avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief and be orderly.

A presupposition is an inference that needs to be true for a statement to be meaningful or have a truth value. Most suppositions have the characteristics of ‘constancy under negation.’ The classic example is as follows:

- The King of France is bald.

implicit contents of any utterance may cancel or even alter any of the beliefs of the member countries of the Alliance thereby affecting the collective security rules used. Because space is insufficient here to present the entire pragmatic analysis, there will only be brief list of implicit propositions of significance.<sup>276</sup> A listing of the propositions I analyzed and generated can be found in Table 1 and should be referenced throughout the analysis.

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- The King of France is not bald.
  - The King of France exists.

The first two statements help to suppose the third, even through the first two negate one another. This is consistent under negation. Most presuppositions in the pragmatic analysis have this property.

<sup>276</sup> For the pragmatic analysis in its entirety refer to the Appendices.

**Pragmatic Analysis of NATO in Afghanistan**

Speech Act

Speech Act 1

*Rules Invoked:* Identity, Security, and Enforcement

*Explicit Performative:*

- a. The member nations hereby assert that the Alliance will uphold the security and stability while taking a new shape, reflecting the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring vitality of the transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors.
- b. The member nations hereby encourage the member states and other nations to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO policies and treaties.

*Reflective Intentions:*

- a. Assertion:
  - a. The member nations believe that its must maintain security and stability while being able to evolve and survive in the current global security environment.
  - b. The member nations want the Alliance to uphold its mission by carry out cooperative measures through political and military means.
- b. Directive
  - 1. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
  - 2. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.

*Implicatures:* The intentions of the member nations are sincere and normative.

*Presuppositions:*

- a. If the member nations preserve their political and military strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its mission, then the Alliance will be able to stabilize and secure the whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security environment.
- b. If the member nations do not preserve their political and military strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its mission, then the Alliance will not be able to stabilize and secure in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security environment.

Speech Act 2

*Rules Invoked:* Identity, Security, Deterrence, and Enforcement

*Explicit Performative:*

- a. The member nations hereby commits the Alliance to do the following:
  - a. Continue with the comprehensive process of enlarging

	<p>NATO;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. Continue to remain open through the admission of new members into the Alliance;</li> <li>c. Create a strong, stable, and enduring partnership with Russia and the Ukraine;</li> <li>d. Continue efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina;</li> <li>e. Endorse and continue with measure for the proliferation of WMD; and</li> <li>f. Continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism.</li> </ul> <p><i>Reflective Intentions:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Commitment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The member nations believe that its utterance obligates the Alliance to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and the global security environment on the condition that the member countries continue with the comprehensive process of enlarging NATO; continue to remain open through the admission of new members into the Alliance; create a strong, stable, and enduring partnership with Russia and the Ukraine; continue efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina; endorse and continue with measure for the proliferation of WMD; and continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism.</li> <li>b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directive on the condition that the member countries will be able to promote peace and security amongst themselves.</li> <li>c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>Implicatures:</i> The intentions of the member nations are sincere and normative.</p>
Speech Act 3	<p><i>Rules Invoked:</i> Identity, Security, Deterrence, and Enforcement</p> <p><i>Explicit Performative:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance is able to adapt, renew, and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century through security and stability throughout the global security environment.</li> </ul> <p><i>Reflective Intentions:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Assertion: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The member nations believe the Alliance must be able to adapt, renew, and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century through security and stability throughout the global security environment.</li> <li>b. The member nations want the Alliance to believe it has the ability to adapt, renew, and has the ability to be ready to meet the security challenges in the global security environment while upholding security and stability.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



	<p><i>Implicatures:</i> The intentions of the member nations are sincere and normative.</p> <p><i>Presuppositions:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. If the member nations are able to adapt, renew, and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Alliance will be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.</li> <li>b. If the member nations are not able to adapt, renew, and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Alliance will not be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.</li> </ol>
Speech Act 4	<p><i>Rules Invoked:</i> Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force</p> <p><i>Explicit Performative:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance has been able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century by maintaining stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military relations; implementing robust practical and political support provided by Partner countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of the Alliance.</li> <li>b. The member nations hereby direct the following:       <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Leaders in Kosovo to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society;</li> <li>b. Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict; and</li> <li>c. Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms.</li> </ol> </li> <li>c. The member nations hereby commit to the following:       <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Monitor closely the situation in South-East Europe;</li> <li>b. Continue efforts in Kosovo and other areas of involvement of the Alliance;</li> <li>c. Help to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo; and</li> <li>d. Continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine.</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p><i>Reflective Intentions:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Assertion:       <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The member nations believe the Alliance has been able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.</li> <li>b. The member nations want the Alliance to believe it has adapted, renewed, and is ready in the global security</li> </ol> </li> </ol>

environment based upon the Alliance's ability to maintain stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military relations; implementing robust practical and political support provided by Partner countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of the Alliance.

b. Directive:

a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for leaders to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society.

i. The member nations want the leaders of Kosovo to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society because of NATO's command.

b. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict.

i. The member nations want Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict because of NATO's command.

c. The member nation believes in its utterance, virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms.

i. The member nations want the Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms because of NATO's command.

c. Commitment:

a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century on the condition that the member countries want to maintain stability and security; ensure the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintain civil-military relations; implement robust practical and political support provided by Partner countries; have the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and establish a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of the Alliance.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations would be able to maintain the ability to adapt, renew, and have the ability to be ready to meet the security challenges in the global security environment while upholding security and stability</li> <li>a. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).</li> </ul> <p><i>Implicatures:</i> The intentions of the member nations are sincere and normative.</p>
Speech Act 5	<p><i>Rules Invoked:</i> Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force</p> <p><i>Explicit Performative:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The member nations hereby commit to the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation;</li> <li>b. Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions;</li> <li>c. Providing sufficient resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently carry out policies, treaties, and out-of-area mission;</li> <li>d. Effectively use resources and find innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common funding.</li> <li>e. To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and cooperation between member nations, especially in regards to NATO and the EU;</li> <li>f. Intensify consultation in times of crisis;</li> <li>g. Continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on their preparations for possible future membership; and</li> <li>h. Consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our cooperative relations with all partners.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><i>Reflective Intentions:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Commitment:</li> </ul>

	<p>a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able to maintain and uphold its original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment on the condition that its member countries want to promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation; continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions; provide sufficient resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently carry out policies, treaties, and out-of-area mission; effectively use resources and find innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common funding; work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and cooperation between member nations, especially in regards to NATO and the EU; intensify consultation in times of crisis; continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on their preparations for possible future membership; and consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our cooperative relations with all partners.</p> <p>b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations will be able to maintain and uphold its original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment.</p> <p>c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).</p> <p><i>Implicatures:</i> The intentions of the member countries are sincere and normative.</p>
Speech Act 6	<p><i>Rules Invoked:</i> Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force</p> <p><i>Explicit Performative:</i></p> <p>a. The member nation hereby assert in order to uphold and maintain stability and security in a post 9-11 environment for the Alliance, its members nations and their citizens it is essential</p>

that confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Euro-Atlantics are upheld; continuing to uphold current policies and treaties; condemning all use of violence and terrorism for either military or political means; continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately and effectively against threats.

- b. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
  - a. Upholding it's allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001;
  - b. Explore and develop, in the coming months, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action;
  - c. To develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans;
  - d. Continue to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence;
  - e. Further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP);
  - f. Ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly; and
  - g. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.

*Reflective Intentions:*

- a. Assertion:
  - a. The member nations believe that the Alliance needs to be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
  - b. The member nations wants the Alliance to be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 environment by being confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Euro-Atlantics are upheld; continuing to uphold current policies and treaties; condemning all use of violence and terrorism for either military or political means; continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately and effectively against threats.
- b. Commitment:
  - a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able to be able to uphold and maintain

	<p>stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment on condition that the member nations indicate they would uphold its allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001; explore and develop, in the coming months, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action; continuing the enlargement process; develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; continue to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence; further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP); ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly; and continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.</p> <p>b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations will be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment.</p> <p>c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).</p> <p><i>Implicatures:</i> The intentions of the member nations are sincere and normative.</p> <p><i>Presuppositions:</i></p> <p>a. If the member nations are able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 environment, then the Alliance will be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.</p> <p>b. If the member nations are not able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 environment, then the Alliance will not be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.</p>
Speech Act 7	<p><i>Rules Invoked:</i> Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force</p> <p><i>Explicit Performative:</i></p> <p>a. The member nations hereby commit to the following:</p> <p>a. Act on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state;</p> <p>b. Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the</p>

Euro-Atlantic area;

- c. Strengthen national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad;
- d. Work with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery;
- e. Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance;
- f. Build a new, more substantive relationship with Partners;
- g. Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue;
- h. Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and
- i. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.

*Reflective Intentions:*

a. Commitment:

- a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment on the condition that the member nations to act on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state; adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area; strengthen national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad; work with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery; develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance; build a new, more substantive relationship with Partners; upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue; promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and continue to adapt the Alliance's

	<p>comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations will be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment</li> <li>c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).</li> </ul> <p><i>Implicatures:</i> The intentions of the member nations are sincere and normative.</p>
Speech Act 8	<p><i>Rules Invoked:</i> Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force</p> <p><i>Explicit Performative:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective security and the essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave direction on work still to be done thus the member nations need to continue expand the Alliance and encourage new members to join; continue to combat terrorism; ensure peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans; continue to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and treaties..</li> <li>a. The member nations hereby commit to the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Preserve peace through its operations; spread stability through its partnerships; and reinforce our community of shared values through the most robust round of enlargement in our history.</li> <li>b. Use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international Organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism;</li> <li>c. Assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the international community;</li> <li>d. Develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional Authority;

- e. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans and help those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures;
- f. Continue with the enlargement of NATO;
- g. Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU;
- h. Consider ways to further enhance relationships by generating a more ambitious and expanded framework;
- i. Build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and NATO and the Ukraine;
- j. Closely follow the development of events in Georgia and support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia;
- k. Support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery;
- l. Multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; and
- m. Implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Organization.

*Reflective Intentions:*

a. Assertion:

- a. The member nations believe the Alliance is the basis of collective security and the essential transatlantic forum for security and as such it needs to maintain security and stability for its member nations and Partners in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
- b. The member nations want the Alliance to maintain security and stability for member nations and Partners by taking stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave direction on work still to be done thus the member nations needs to continue expand the Alliance and encourage new members to join; continue to combat terrorism; ensure peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans; continue to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain

operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and treaties.

b. Directive:

a. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.

i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.

b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards;

i. The member nations want the Alliance to encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards because of NATO's command.

c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries;

ii. NATO wants its member nations to encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries because of NATO's command.

d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership.

iii. The member nations wants the Alliance to encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership because of NATO's command.

e. The member nation believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage the Ukraine to pursue all reforms

necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration.

iv. The member nations want the Alliance to encourage the Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration.

f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level.

i. The member nations want the Alliance to urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level.

c. Commitment:

a. The member nation believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment on the condition that the member nations strive to preserve peace through its operations; spread stability through its partnerships; and reinforce our community of shared values through the most robust round of enlargement in our history; use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international Organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism; assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the international community; develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional Authority; support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans and help those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures; continue with the enlargement of NATO; enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU; consider ways to further enhance relationships by generating a more ambitious and expanded framework; build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and NATO and the Ukraine; closely follow the development of events in Georgia and support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia; support farms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the

	<p>spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery; multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; and implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Organization.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations will be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment</li> <li>c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).</li> </ul> <p><i>Implications:</i> The intentions of the member nations are sincere and normative.</p>
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**Table 1: Pragmatic Analysis of NATO's Communiqués**

The pragmatic analysis for this thesis, which generated explicit performatives and implicit contents, revealed several patterns. The first pattern is connected to the use of collective security rules. In speech act 1, the member nations justify their speech act with the collective security rules of Identity (We are fellow citizens), Security (Security is based on multilateral commitment to use military capability; Security is based on political relationships), and Enforcement (We will resolve conflicts peacefully). In speech act 2, the member nations justify their speech acts by building upon the rules of speech 1 and adding the rule of Deterrence (Do not break the rules of our community). Finally, in the remaining speech acts (3 through 8), the member nations justify their speech acts with the collective security rules of Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force (The use of force is sometimes necessary).

NATO member states recognition and utilization of collective security rules allows the Alliance to engage and participate in the global security environment. The use of the rules illustrates a relationship between theoretical application and actions. Thus the member nations' adoption of the collective security rules constitutes the overlapping nature of the social arrangements of the security environment and provides a means to survive and interact. Each rule provides significance, established a basis for criteria, and creates the conditions which member nations have continued the Alliance's role in the global security environment while continuing to transform.

A further look into the pragmatics of the speech acts via the use of the explicit performatives, reflective intentions, and presuppositions brings to light the member states dedication to the original mission of the Alliance and highlights both the member nations and the Alliance ability to transform and adapt. In speech acts 1 and 2, the member

nations assert it is maintaining its original commitments and mission, but the Alliance is in a state of reform and transformation. By providing the basis for the collective security and preserving a balance in the Euro-Atlantic area throughout the 1990s, NATO member countries have continued to preserve its liberty and sovereignty. NATO member states are building upon the foundation it has created in order to fulfill its core functions, in addition to assuming new tasks. These measures include the enlargement process of the Alliance; creating a strong and stable partnership with Russia; continue engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and measures to effectively deal with violence and terrorism.

It is apparent in speech acts 3, 4, and 5, the NATO member nations have forged ahead to equip the Alliance for both security challenges and opportunities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It is evident that the Alliance needs to adapt, renew, and must be ready to deal with the modern global security environment as well as be able to guide its future political and military developments. Reaffirming the importance of the transatlantic link and of maintaining the military capabilities of the Alliance, the member nations commit to its broad approach to security and stability, specifically ESDI; conflict prevention and crisis management; partnership, cooperation and dialogue; enlargement; and arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The adoption of the new Strategic Concepts is the principal formal statement of the Alliance's objectives and the wide range of political and military means that constitutes the member nations' policy to achieve them. Indeed the conceptual context lays the groundwork for the member nations and the Alliance's gradual transformation internally and externally. In short, it allows the member nations to respond to the new challenges of the global security environment while continuing the process of adaption, gradual transformation, and institutionalism of

policies which enable the Organization to assume a large array of obligations and responsibilities.

Speech act 6 illustrates that since the establishment of NATO, the member countries have continually been effective in the deterrence and defense against the threat of war. The primary objective of the Alliance remains guaranteeing the security and territorial integrity of its member states and their citizens. Although the task of deterrence and collective security has remained unchanged, a different security situation has arisen since 1996. The development of a new global security environment has allowed the Alliance military forces to take on new roles in addition to fulfilling their primary purposes. For example, the Alliance forces have been increasingly involved in missions and operations, most notably in Kosovo and the Balkans. However, with the surfacing of new threats and in particular the impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO's military and political policies and activities have continued to expand and transformed. Speech act 6 depicts the transformation of the member nations in terms of developing the necessary capabilities to undertake its tasks and further adaptation alongside institutionalization of structures and procedures to reflect the needs of the global security environment.

Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, NATO and its member nations have continued to change by adapting and transforming the roles of its allied military forces and its defense posture and policies to reflect the global security environment. Speech act 7 asserts that the member states continue to act on their core commitment to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against NATO member states. The analysis revealed the member states' commitment to war on terrorism and their engagement in the out-of-area mission

in Afghanistan. This new commitment signals a historical step in NATO's history by becoming involved in a mission which is outside of the traditional boundaries of Europe. The members of the Alliance also are committed to strengthening national and collective policies; continuing to promote substantive relationships with member countries; and promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation. In sum, these commitments represent a milestone in NATO's transformation and further illustrate gradual institutionalism of NATO member countries' attitudes and policies within the global security environment.

Finally, speech act 8 asserts that the Alliance remains the basis of collective security in the global security environment and is an essential transatlantic forum for security and defense. The speech act illustrates that the structures and arrangements which have been built since 1996 have not only enabled member countries to benefit from the political, military and resource advantages of collective action and collective defense but allows the member states to remain flexible, mobile, and maintain composure of multi-nationality. Additionally the arrangements are based on a gradual institutionalization of an integrated structure; common funding and operational planning; multinational formation; an integrated air defense system (such as AWACS) balance of roles amongst the member states; common standards and procedures; and infrastructure, armament, and logistics cooperation.<sup>277</sup> The assertions, directives, and commitments of the member nations illustrate the gradual transformation and institutionalization of the Alliance in order to promote stability, peace, and security in the global security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In short, the net effect of each speech act illustrates that the member countries of the Alliance are gradually transforming themselves and

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<sup>277</sup> "Chapter 2: The Transformation of the Alliance – The Role of Allied Military Forces and the Transformation of the Alliance's Defense Posture," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0204.htm>; Internet, accessed 18 March 2009.



institutionalizing procedures, policies, and structures. This transformation has substantially affected NATO's agenda and shifted the Alliance's policy regarding out-of-area missions.

### Argument Analysis

The argument analysis formalizes "the alternating, context-constructing flow of argumentative dialogue."<sup>278</sup> This type of analysis is supposed to show the proponents of a thesis, which then forms categories or 'proviso' assertions, these may be countered by 'cautious' or 'proviso' denials of the assertions.<sup>279</sup> However, based upon the consensus decision-making process of NATO, the speech acts reveal no disputes which may have been generated by the pragmatic analysis. In this context, each speech act follows the beliefs and norms of the member nations of NATO. Each is a policy statement and a testament for shift in NATO's policy regarding out-of-area missions. Each speech act accounts for the collective security rules and arrangements in the development of the global security environment.

### Summary of Findings

This chapter has briefly outlined NATO, its structures, its major players and explored the history of Afghanistan and the member nations' policy toward out-of-area missions and operations. This information provided the background information needed to conduct the analysis. This analysis has proposed dialogical analysis as a method for analyzing NATO's out-of-area policy. This methodology combines the knowledge of historical background and the linguistic analysis of the speech acts to test hypotheses. By tackling the assertion, directive, and commitment discourses and the background

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<sup>278</sup> Duffy (1998), 276.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid.

assumptions (which make the speech acts understandable), dialogical analysis illustrates a deeper and more refined understandings of member nations' attitudes, policies and actions of the Alliance from 1996 to 2003. This allows for elaborate understandings of NATO's policy regarding out-of-area which played significant role in the Alliance's involvement in the Afghanistan 2001 operations.

The use of dialogical analysis was used in an analysis of eight speech acts obtained from the communiqués published by the North Atlantic Council. A surface reading of each speech act supports the contention that the member nations have progressively expanded the Alliance's missions and operations since 1996 while gradually institutionalizing its procedures, policies, and structures. However, a deeper contextual reading of each of the speech acts revealed (a) a chronological timeline of the member nations' policies and activities regarding missions and operations in the global security environment from 1996 to 2003, (b) the member states' recognition and utilization of collective security rules, and (c) the transformative<sup>280</sup> nature of the member states in conjunction with the Alliance within the global security environment.

The speech acts, spanning between 1996 through 2003, have revealed a detailed timeline of policies and activities the members nations have directed and committed to. Recall from the speech acts that there were several monumental events which the member states have engaged in between 1996 to 2003. Between 1996 and 1997, the member states launched the Mediterranean Dialogue; continued to enhance the Partnership for Peace Program alongside strengthening its "European pillar;" conducted air operations against Bosnian Serb forces; and deployed military forces in Bosnia and

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<sup>280</sup> Transformative nature throughout this thesis will mean to undergo a change in form, appearance, or character.

Herzegovina. Additionally, the members of NATO signed a special NATO-Russia agreement and NATO-Ukraine Charter while reinforcing their relationship with its partner countries. In parallel, in 1998 the Taliban regime came to power in Afghanistan. The 1999 was marked with the celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary; the signing of three new member countries; the adoption of a new Strategic Concept; NATO's air campaign to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; and the deployment of a NATO-led forces in Kosovo. The end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 were marked with the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and SALT II by Russia. Under the dark cloud of the large-scale terrorist attacks perpetrated against the U.S. in 2001, the member states invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history; the member nations continued with their institutionalize efforts within the Alliance; the member countries deployed forces to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and the Alliance members became involved in an international coalition against terrorism in Afghanistan. In 2002, the member nations formalized when and where it is necessary to fight terrorism; introduced major reforms to prepare the Alliance against major threats and challenges; and the member states worked with Russian representatives to create NATO-Russia Council whose aim was to strengthen relations between Russia and the member countries. The end of the analysis closes with the year of 2003. In 2003, the member nations streamlined its military command structure; NATO became the leader of the ISAF in Afghanistan; and the first NATO Response Force prototype was launched. The sequential events found in the speech acts illustrate the member nations' shift in policy regarding out-of-area.

In short, the Alliance is an environment which brings the member countries together for a common purpose. In order for the member countries to survive in the

global security environment, they along with the Alliance must change. As a result the members of NATO have transformed gradually by formalizing policies, procedures, and out-of-area activities. The transformative nature of the member countries has led NATO to become involved on a larger scale in the global security environment. The timeline of events reveals that the member countries change gradually as they respond to the challenges of the global security environment. It is indeed the transformation of member nations' policy of out-of-area which contributed to the Alliance's engagement in operations in Afghanistan in 2001.

NATO's active participation in the global security environment through transformation and adoption of policy, and involvement in selective out-of-area missions depicts an understanding and use of collective security rules by the member countries. The collective security rules adopted by the member nations help to merge the bridge between theoretical application and actions. The adherence of the collective security rules by the member nations have helped to lay the foundation for the Alliance's interaction within the global security environment and help to dictate its policies and actions. Each rule of the Alliance – Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force – allows the member states to understand the overlapping relationships that are present within the global security environment. Adherence to collective security rules and an understanding of the social arrangements in the global security environment has allowed the member nations to comprehend what logics are guiding the global security environment. This in return has allowed the member countries to understand and formulate policy accordingly. The collective security rules of the Alliance adopted by the member states are required in order stabilize and secure themselves within the global

security environment. Without a doubt, the collective security rules of the Alliance played a critical factor in NATO's policy shift in out-of-area, wherein the member countries commitment to efforts in Afghanistan.

The dialogical analysis of the speech acts has verified the member nations' transformative and institutional nature within the global security environment. Based upon the chronological timeline of NATO's policies and activities in relation to the global security environment from 1996 to 2003 and NATO's recognition and utilization of the collective security rules, the Alliance is gradually transforming and the member nations are institutionalizing its policies, procedures, and out-of-area missions. Each of these elements converged to lead NATO to become involved in Afghanistan. In sum, the analysis of NATO's communiqués illustrates that the institutional attitude of the member states towards out-of-area missions lead NATO to its involvement in Afghanistan.

The transformative and institutional nature of NATO member nations has allowed the Alliance to maintain its historical roots and continue to survive in the global security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Additionally, this analysis has confirmed Frederking's conclusion that 11 September was not a driving factor which led NATO involvement in Afghanistan. This analysis illustrates that attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> and its aftershocks are not a substantial driving force to cause an immediate rearrangement of the collective security rules or cause a complete overhaul of policy within the Alliance. Rather September 11<sup>th</sup> only exacerbated the already present tension evident in the global security environment. In accordance with the tenets of Frederking and this analysis, uncertain events and ad hoc attitudes do not dictate the attitude of member countries regarding the out-of-area policy. Nevertheless these events help to contribute to the member nations'

continual adherence to gradualism and institutionalization which help the countries to deal effectively with the out-of-area policy and at large with the threats and challenges of the global security environment.

Finally, the methodology of this thesis has revealed several factors and led to several conclusions. First, the use of dialogical analysis illustrates this methodology is a viable method used in the study of language. In this sense, dialogical analysis has the ability to help develop theoretical approaches into practical applications. The methodology of this thesis is an approach to analyze language, its affects, and influence on social interactions within global security environment.

Secondly, the use of this methodology has revealed strengths and weakness of the research. On one hand, the methodology has helped to further the understanding of NATO's consensus decision-making process; provided a definition of global security; allowed for the use of primary resources to explain what has affected the shift in policy; and created a consistent theoretical framework. On the other hand, the dialogical analysis of the NATO communiqués does not allow for formal argument analysis. Since, the analysis is unable to reveal any disputes which may be present within the speech acts, the entire picture of the communiqué cannot be seen and the actions throughout the consensus decision-making process are absent. The reader is led to believe that transformation of NATO is picturesque when regarding the member nations' attitudes and shift of out-of-area policy; however the consultation and the decision-making process are lengthy and difficult to navigate at times. In short, the reader is unable to fully comprehend the full meaning of the communiqués, the decision-making process, and fundamentally the transformation of NATO and its member nations.

Thirdly, the use of dialogical analysis has revealed a chronological timeline of the member nation's policies and activities regarding out-of-area missions from 1996 to 2003, the member countries' recognition and utilization of collective security rules, and the transformative and institutional nature of the member states in conjunction with the Alliance within the context of the global security environment. Each of these elements contributes to the rule-orientated constructivist theory by acknowledging the use of language by the member states. This use of language helps to establish a pattern of rules which helps the Alliance comprehend and recognize the existence of particular social arrangements. In return, NATO has been able to uphold its mission while adopting an institutional attitude toward out-of-area missions which led to its involvement in Afghanistan. In conclusion, dialogical analysis supports the theory of rule-orientated constructivism, helps to uphold the conclusions of this thesis and also contributes to the theory and conclusions made by Frederking.

The summary of findings presented in this analysis presents two conclusions. First, the findings establish dialogical analysis as a viable methodology, exposed the strengths and weaknesses of the research, and verified the theory of rule-orientated constructivism. Secondly, the findings help to develop an understanding of the member nations' shift in policy regarding out-of-area and helps to explain what may have contributed to NATO's involvement in Afghanistan. NATO's adherence to collective security rules established a particular ideology and a means to engage in specific actions within the global security environments. These actions in return provided a basis for the formation of social arrangements. These social arrangements allowed NATO to maintain security and stability while its member states broadened its agenda and shifted the

Alliance's out-of-area policy, which help lead the Alliance to become involved in Afghanistan operations in 2001. In short, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan was a result of NATO member nations' change in attitudes and ideologies, gradual development of policy and procedures, and transformation of out-of-area missions within the global security environment.



## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

In over half a century of existence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its member nations, and the global security environment have developed in ways in which the NATO's founding fathers would have never imagined. As the global security environment continues to change, and challenges arise, NATO member nations have continued to adapt and transform the Alliance at an ever increasing pace. Today, the member nations have to cope with a larger array of security threats and challenges than it has in the past.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization main mission is to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people” while trying to “promote stability and well being in the North Atlantic area.”<sup>281</sup> The organization of NATO created an environment which brought countries that were willing to come together for a common cause, prepared to integrate military forces, and willing to engage in multinational activities over a particular period of time. Within the Alliance, member states have worked in cooperation and through the consensus decision-making process to establish policy and procedures. The policy and procedures agreed upon by the members of NATO have been sought after and achieved through political and military means. Essentially, the military and political policy and structures of NATO have enabled

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<sup>281</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty.

member countries to secure themselves within the global security environment. As a result, the Alliance has been able to uphold its mission while the member nations continue to expand its agenda and engage in broader range of activities which includes selective out-of-area missions.

Since the inception of the Alliance, the member states of NATO have continued to change while maintaining an air of cohesion and unity amongst one another. Despite these picturesque conditions, the member nations have not always been unified; particularly when dealing with mission and operations which took place beyond the traditional borders of Europe. The tensions revolving around the member nations' inability to deal with out-of-area missions can be traced back to the foundation of the Alliance.

From 1949 till the end of the Cold War, NATO member countries had extreme difficulty in balancing collective interests with other shared and perceived commitments throughout the world. The members of NATO were unable to find common grounds due to conflicting ideologies, perceptions, and interests which would allow the Alliance to participate in activities beyond the borders of Europe. Thus throughout the Cold War, the Alliance continued to be hampered by its inability to deal with out-of-area issues. Eventually, the member countries relied upon a non-policy on out-of-area missions and operations.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO member countries continued to meet opposition on out-of-area missions, however the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled a major shift in member countries' attitudes and policy regarding out-of-area. At the end of the Cold War many member states began to pursue more global policies and practices. It is

clear that although tensions revolving around ideologies, perceptions, and interests concerning out-of-area had not been alleviated, the member states were able to work through these differences and shift its policy. The shift in policy has led to NATO's engagement in several missions throughout the 1990s and the Alliance's first out-of-area operation in Afghanistan in 2001.

### **Main Conclusions Drawn from the Thesis**

The study of this analysis has used dialogical analysis as a method for analyzing NATO's policy regarding out-of-area, in hopes of understanding why NATO became involved in Afghanistan. The analysis of eight communiqués through pragmatic and argumentative analysis reveals (1) a chronological timeline of the member nation's policies and activities regarding out-of-area missions in the global security environment from 1996 to 2003, (2) the member countries' recognition and utilization of collective security rules, and (3) the transformative and institutional nature of the member states in conjunction with the Alliance within the context of the global security environment.

First, the speech acts bring to light a timeline, extending between 1996 through 2003, of policies and activities the member nations have directed and committed. This timeline reveals the transformative and institutional nature of the Alliance and indicates a gradual shift in out-of-area policy by the member nations. The transformative and institutional nature of the member nations illustrates the acknowledgement of the changes and challenges within the global security environment and indicates the necessary steps – gradual shift in policy and adoption of institutional methods – the nations are willing to uphold its mission while adapting to ever-changing global security environment. In short, the timeline of policy and events unveils (1) that the member nations change

gradually as they respond to challenges in the global security environment; (2) an institutional attitude toward out-of-area missions has been adopted; and (3) gradual shift in out-of-area policy contributed to NATO's Afghanistan engagement.

Second, NATO's recognition and utilization of collective security rules allows the Alliance to be an active participant in the global security environment. Within this environment, the Alliance's actions are "determined by shared ideas rather than by material forces," and "identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared idea rather than by the given nature."<sup>282</sup> Thus member nations use collective security rules in order to interact within the global security environment at large. Each collective security rule adopted by the Alliance allows the member nations to comprehend the logic that is driving the global security environment. This has allowed NATO members to formulate policy accordingly and gradually apply institutional methods in order to create stability and security while enabling nations to have the ability to transform. In brief, the member nations' adoption and adherence of the collective security rules have (1) allowed the member countries to be active members in the global security environment; (2) help determine and dictate the shift in policy regarding out-of-area; and (3) provided an environment in which the member nations formulate policy and commitment to activities in a gradual and institutional manner.

Building upon the chronological timeline of NATO's policies and activities and NATO's recognition and utilization of the collective security rules, the speech acts verify the transformative and institutional nature of NATO member states within the confines of the global security environment. The transformation of the Alliance by the member countries, both internally and externally, is exhibited by the adoption of an institutional

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<sup>282</sup> Wendt (1999), 1.

attitude by the member nations, a shift in NATO's out-of-area policy, and gradual adherence to institutionalism within the Alliance. Each of the member nations are willing to work in cooperation with one another and each acknowledges the necessary capabilities – political and military measures – needed to sustain and survive within the global security environment. Evidentially, the Alliance is gradually transforming and the member nations are institutionalizing its policies, procedures, and operational engagements. Each of these elements coincided to lead NATO to become involved in Afghanistan. All told, the thesis upholds that if NATO member nations adopt an institutional attitude towards out-of-area missions then NATO will become involved in Afghanistan.

The findings presented above explain that there was a shift in NATO's out-of-area policy. The shift in the policy occurred based upon adherence to collective security rules and gradually adoption of institutional measures by the member nations of NATO. The shift in policy, adoption and use of collective security rules, and institutional attitude of the member countries were elements that contributed to NATO's involvement in the 2001 operations in Afghanistan.

In addition to using dialogical analysis as the primary method for analyzing NATO's policy regarding out-of-area, the methodology can be used in the analysis of Frederking's conclusions and be used to conduct a discussion regarding the theory of rule-orientated constructivism. As such, the use of dialogical analysis reveals (1) viability in regards to ontological analysis; (2) methodological strengths and weaknesses; and (3) contribution to the theory of rule-orientated constructivism.

First, the use of dialogical analysis in the analysis of eight communiqués establishes its viability as a tool when analyzing language. Dialogical analysis can be used as an interpretive approach by helping to explain action. It can do so by showing consistency between speech acts and patterns of rules for a specific social arrangement. In accordance with Frederking, dialogical analysis can be added to the toolkit of interpretive methods,<sup>283</sup> using it to study NATO member nations' attitudes and helping to explain the shift in out-of-area policy. In short, dialogical analysis is an approach to analyze social interaction.

Second, this particular methodology has exposed the strengths and weakness of within this research. Building upon the weaknesses of Frederking, the use of dialogical analysis has (1) provided a definition of global security; (2) allowed for the use of primary resources to explain what has affected the shift in policy; (3) created a consistent theoretical framework; and (4) developed an understanding regarding NATO's consensus decision-making process. Additionally, the use of dialogical analysis in this particular research does not lend itself to formal argument analysis. Unlike Frederking's research who uses formal argument analysis, this research does not divulge 'proviso' assertions which are to be countered by 'cautious' assertions. The lack of formal argument analysis results in the reader's inability to entirely grasp the NATO decision-making process. Rather than revealing the bumpy reality of the communiqué process and non-linear transformative nature of the Alliance, the illusion of a smooth transformative process is imprinted on the reader's mind. In conclusion, the dialogical analysis allows for strengths and weaknesses to surface which can then be used as lessons learned for future research.

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<sup>283</sup> Frederking (2003), 376.

Finally, the use of dialogical analysis contributes to the support the theory of rule-orientated constructivism. In the context of constructivism, the rule-orientated constructivist theory of constructivism within this thesis establishes that the global security environment is made up of overlapping social arrangements. These social arrangements are mainly influenced by language. The use of language makes action possible through the establishment of patterns of rules. These rules “tell us how the world works; they tell us who we are and who others are; they tell us what we should do.”<sup>284</sup> In short, dialogical analysis (1) supports the theory of rule-orientated constructivism; (2) establishes consistency with the tasks associated with the theory (assert the existence of social arrangements; show how these rules make action intelligible; and help agents “go on” in the world),<sup>285</sup> and (3) confirms the conclusions made by Frederking.

The summary of findings of this thesis makes two conclusions. First, it establishes that there was a shift in NATO’s out-of-area policy. The shift in the policy occurred based upon adherence to collective security rules and gradually adoption of institutional measures by the member nations of NATO. The shift in policy, adoption and use of collective security rules, and institutional attitude of the member countries were elements that contributed to NATO’s involvement in the 2001 operations in Afghanistan. Secondly, it establishes dialogical analysis as a viable methodology and verifies the theory of rule-orientated constructivism. In short, each of the conclusions drawn from the thesis have helped to explain why NATO become in involved in Afghanistan and will act as building blocks for future research.

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<sup>284</sup> Frederking (2003), 365.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid., 376.

### **Recommendations for Future Studies**

In light of this case study's finding, there are several possibilities for future studies. Future studies could measure the viability of rule-orientated constructivism and dialogical analysis. This can be carried out by applying this theory and methodology to a different case study. Additionally, future case studies could generate a new set of rules which constitute the global security environment. These rules then could be tested on the same case study or a different case study. Also, future studies could be conducted at the domestic level of analysis. The conclusions drawn from the domestic level could then be compared and contrasted to those results at the domestic level. Finally, future studies working at the international level, could conduct a cross analysis. A cross analysis could include the dialogical analysis of several resources. Each of these resources then could be compiled and compared in order to compose a complete picture and dispute or justify the findings of this thesis. Thus, future studies could apply several techniques to determine the viability as well as the accuracy of rule-orientated constructivism and the dialogical method.

### **Final Thoughts**

Analyzing NATO's policy regarding out-of-area operations has provided an opportunity learn about the institutional attitude of NATO members and the transformative nature of an Alliance. This thesis has briefly outlined NATO, its structures and its major players while exploring the history of the member nations' out-of-area policy. This thesis has used dialogical analysis to analyzing NATO's policy. The combination the historical background knowledge, and linguistic analysis, has revealed



that the institutional attitude of NATO member nations and the institutional policy and procedures in the Alliance's military and political structures have led to a gradual shift in out-of-area policy. This shift in policy contributed to NATO's involvement in its first out-of-area mission – Afghanistan in 2001. In conclusion, this thesis illustrates that the NATO has maintained its mission while transforming and adapting to the global security environment due to its member nations' adherence to collective security rules and gradual adoption of institutional measures. Additionally, the thesis has verified the use of dialogical analysis as a viable tool in ontological studies and provided evidence in support of rule-orientated constructivism. In the future, this thesis can serve as a basis for making sound policies and procedures while justifying selective out-of-area missions and operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and provide a base for research which involves rule-orientated constructivism and dialogical analysis.

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## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX A

Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1996) 165 held at NATO HQ Brussels 10 Dec 1996

### *Final Communiqué*

**Issued at the Ministerial Meeting  
of the North Atlantic Council**

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1. As we look ahead, the new NATO is taking shape, reflecting the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring vitality of the transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors. The broad vision of this new NATO and its role in the development of a new European security architecture was set out at the 1994 Brussels Summit and further defined at our last meeting in Berlin. The Alliance's adaptation and reform is well underway. We will take this process forward today.

The Alliance is resolved to preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its missions - as IFOR and its planned successor SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly show. We have issued a separate statement in this regard. The Alliance will continue to strengthen European security by maintaining its capability for collective defense, admitting new members, expanding and strengthening cooperative relationships with all Partners, including building a strong security partnership with Russia and a distinctive relationship with Ukraine, and realizing the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance.

The evolution of the Alliance takes place in the context of our aim to help build a truly cooperative European security structure. We welcome as a contribution the important decisions taken at the recent OSCE Summit in Lisbon and the decision by the States Parties to the CFE Treaty to begin negotiations in early 1997 with a view towards adapting the Treaty to the changing security environment in Europe.

2. Against this background, we have decided to recommend to our Heads of State and Government to convene a Summit meeting in Madrid on 8/9 July 1997 to set

the course for the Alliance as it moves towards the 21st century, consolidating Euro-Atlantic security. To achieve this aim, major decisions will have to be taken by the time of the Summit concerning NATO's internal adaptation, the opening of the Alliance and its ability to carry out all its new roles and missions. The agenda for our Summit will include:

- agreeing a new command structure, which enables all Allies to participate fully, and further advancing the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, in order to enhance the Alliance's ability to carry out the full range of its missions, while preserving the capability for collective defense, based on a strong transatlantic partnership;
  - finalizing, to the satisfaction of all Allies, all the necessary arrangements for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, which will allow for the preparation and conduct of WEU-led operations with the participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose;
  - inviting one or more of the countries which have expressed interest in joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations;
  - pledging that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further members and will remain ready to pursue consultations with nations seeking NATO membership, as it has done in the past;
  - strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including through an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership Council;
  - intensifying and consolidating relations with Russia beyond the Partnership for Peace by aiming at reaching an agreement at the earliest possible date on the development of a strong, stable and enduring security partnership;
  - further developing an enhanced relationship with Ukraine;
  - enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue;
  - further developing our ability to carry out new roles and missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis management; and
  - further enhancing our political and defense efforts against the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means.
3. We warmly welcome the decision of the Government of Spain, endorsed by the Spanish Parliament on 14 November 1996, to take the necessary steps to participate in the Alliance's new structure. Spain's participation will further strengthen the cohesion and military effectiveness of the Alliance, as it takes on new roles and missions, reinforce the transatlantic link and help develop ESDI within the Alliance.
4. Stability and security in the whole Euro-Atlantic area are our primary goal. We want to help build cooperative European security structures which extend to countries throughout the whole of Europe without excluding anyone or creating dividing lines. Recent decisions at the OSCE Summit meeting in Lisbon on European security cooperation and the decision to adapt the CFE Treaty to the new European security environment establish a cooperative foundation for our

common security. The Alliance, for its part, has developed a broad pattern of intensive cooperation with North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP Partner countries and with other international organizations and is thereby contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. With the same aim, we are now working towards opening the Alliance to new members; developing ever-closer and deeper cooperative ties with all Partner countries who so wish; building a strong, stable and enduring security partnership with Russia; strengthening our relationship with Ukraine; and enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue.

5. We reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention. New members, who will be full members of the Alliance in all respects, will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance's strategy. Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear posture and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and we do not foresee any future need to do so.
6. A number of countries have long-standing aspirations to become full members of our Alliance and have undertaken intensive and wide-ranging preparations and reforms with this aim in mind. We are now in a position to recommend to our Heads of State and Government to invite at next year's Summit meeting one or more countries which have participated in the intensified dialogue process, to start accession negotiations with the Alliance. Our goal is to welcome the new member(s) by the time of NATO's 50th anniversary in 1999. We pledge that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further members in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. We will remain ready to pursue consultations with nations seeking NATO membership, as we have done in the past.

We are satisfied with the intensified, individual dialogue which the Alliance has been conducting throughout this year with interested Partners. This dialogue has improved their understanding of specific and practical details of how the Alliance works. It has provided the Alliance in turn with a better understanding of where these countries stand in their internal development as well as in the resolution of any external issues with neighboring countries. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to prepare comprehensive recommendations for decisions to be taken by the Summit on which country or countries to invite to begin accession negotiations. The process should include:

- o an intensified dialogue with interested Partner countries including in a "16+1" format, as appropriate;
- o analysis, on the basis of further political guidance to be elaborated by the Council in Permanent Session, of the relevant factors associated with the admission of potential new members;
- o preparation of recommendations on the adaptation of Alliance structures

- o necessary to integrate new members into the Alliance;
  - o preparation of a plan for conducting the accession talks with one or more new members.
7. We look forward to tomorrow's meeting of the NACC, which will mark its fifth anniversary. The NACC has provided us over the years with a valued opportunity to consult regularly with our Partners on political and security issues. Through NACC and Partnership for Peace, we have achieved the development of common approaches to European security and brought the NACC countries closer together in a spirit of cooperation and a common commitment to European security. We are committed to ensuring that the NACC goals of enhancing transparency and confidence in security matters among member states remain central to future cooperation. In order to derive maximum benefit from our NACC meetings, we want to move towards further deepening our political dialogue and giving it more focus.
8. We are pleased with the dynamic development of Partnership for Peace and the role it plays in building European security cooperation. The Partnership for Peace will continue as a permanent element of the Alliances cooperative effort to contribute to the development of a more stable European security area and, with those Partners seeking to join NATO, will also facilitate their preparations to meet the responsibilities of membership in the Alliance. Substantial progress has been achieved in enhancing the scope and substance of our Partnership cooperation, in particular the growing range of exercises, the broadening and deepening of the Pfp Planning and Review Process, the intensification of work on civil-military relations, and civil emergency planning and disaster relief. In the current IFOR operation, in which 13 Partner countries are cooperating with Alliance armed forces, the Partnership for Peace has proved its value with regard both to political commitment to joint crisis management and to military interoperability.

We want to develop on the basis of transparency ever-closer and deeper cooperative ties open to all Partner countries by making the Partnership more operational; strengthening its political consultation element, taking full account of the respective activities of the OSCE and the relevant European institutions such as the WEU and the EU; and involving Partners more in operations planning and Partnership decision-making. To this end, the Alliance has set up a Senior Level Group to develop by the time of the Summit meeting a clearly strengthened and thus more attractive Partnership for Peace. We have received an interim report on the ongoing work and agree that work should begin without delay to implement its recommendations. These include:

- o enhancing the political dimension of the Partnership through increasing opportunities for political consultations;
- o expanding the agreed fields of military missions within Pfp to the full range of the Alliance's new missions, as appropriate, including Peace Support operations over and above previously agreed areas;
- o broadening the NATO/Pfp exercise program in accordance with the

- expanded scope of the Partnership;
- o enabling Partner countries to participate in the planning and execution of PfP activities (exercises and operations);
- o involving Partners more substantively and actively in PfP-related parts of the regular peacetime work of NATO's Military Authorities;
- o affording the appropriate opportunity to Partners who join future NATO-led PfP operations to contribute to the provision of political guidance for oversight over such operations, drawing on the experience gained in Operation Joint Endeavour;
- o examining, together with Partners, the possible modalities for the elaboration of a political-military framework for PfP operations, building on the current work of the Political-Military Steering Committee;
- o enhancing Partner participation in decision-making for PfP program issues;
- o increasing regional cooperation within the Partnership provided it remains open to all Partners and remains an integral part of the overall PfP;
- o expanding the Planning and Review Process; and
- o as soon as the Brussels Agreement on the Status of Missions and Representatives of Third States to NATO comes into force, offering Partners the opportunity to establish diplomatic missions with NATO.

We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to ensure implementation of these recommendations without delay and to continue the work on the enhancement of Partnership for Peace and also to review its common funding and resource implications, with a view to providing a further report by the SLG with recommendations for decisions at the time of the Spring Ministerial meeting.

9. With the rapid growth of our activities under both NACC and PfP, we have identified a need for greater coherence in our cooperation in a framework which will establish with Partners a more meaningful and productive cooperative and consultative process, building on the elements of NACC and PfP which we and our Partners deem most valuable. To this end, we have agreed to work with Partners on the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) as a single new cooperative mechanism, which would form a framework for enhanced efforts in both practical cooperation under PfP and an expanded political dimension of Partnership. We have accordingly tasked the Council in Permanent Session to draw up the modalities for such a council, in close coordination with Partners, by the time of our next meeting.
10. We affirm our support for the political and economic reform process in the Russian Federation. We welcome the landmark Presidential elections in Russia. We applaud the progress toward a lasting, peaceful settlement of the conflict in Chechnya.

A broad process of integration and cooperation is underway in Europe; Russia is

a part of it through its membership in the OSCE and the Council of Europe and its relationship with NATO as well as the European Union and the WEU. The pattern of consultations anchored by our regular "16+1" discussions, provide a firm foundation on which to build. We welcome Russia's participation in Partnership for Peace and encourage it to take full advantage of the opportunities which the Partnership offers.

We value the close and effective cooperation between Russia and NATO in IFOR. This cooperation demonstrates that NATO and Russia can collaborate effectively in the construction of cooperative security structures in Europe. We appreciate and welcome Russia's readiness to contribute to a follow-on operation to consolidate peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We look forward to continuing the experience of working closely together, which we believe will have a lasting, positive impact on our relationship.

Today, we reiterate our commitment to a strong, stable, and enduring security partnership between NATO and Russia. This partnership demonstrates that European security has entered a fundamentally new, more promising era. It constitutes an important element of the developing European cooperative security architecture to which Russia has an essential contribution to make. It will further enhance stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. By the time of the Summit, we aim to reach agreement with the Russian Federation on arrangements that can deepen and widen the scope of our current relationship and provide a framework for its future development. We want to ensure that NATO and Russia have a strong, flexible means to consult and cooperate as part of our evolving relationship. Agreement might be expressed in a document or could take the form of a Charter, which could encompass:

- o the shared principles that will form the basis of our relationship;
- o a broad set of areas of practical cooperation in particular in the political, military, economic, environmental, scientific, peacekeeping, armaments, non-proliferation, arms control and civil emergency planning fields;
- o mechanisms for regular and ad hoc consultations; and
- o mechanisms for military liaison and cooperation.

We therefore task the Council in Permanent Session to develop further guidance on these matters on the basis of which the Secretary General could explore with Russia the possibility of such agreement.

11. We continue to support Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation and a market economy. The maintenance of Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty is a crucial factor for stability and security in Europe.

Ukraine's development of a strong, enduring relationship with NATO is an important aspect of the emerging European security architecture. We greatly value the active participation of Ukraine in the Partnership for Peace and look



forward to next year's exercise near Lviv. We also value Ukraine's cooperation with European institutions such as the EU and the WEU. Ukraine has made an important contribution to IFOR and UNTAES, and we welcome its commitment to contribute to a follow-on operation to consolidate peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We welcome the continued development of our broad cooperation beyond PfP. We note with satisfaction the recent meeting between the Alliance and Ukraine on issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We welcome the progress made towards establishing a NATO information office in Kyiv, and look forward to its opening in the near future. We welcome Ukraine's active interest in further enhancing its relations with the Alliance. We are committed to the development in coming months, through high level and other consultations, of a distinctive and effective NATO-Ukraine relationship, which could be formalized, possibly by the time of the Summit, building on the document on enhanced NATO-Ukraine relations agreed in September 1995, and taking into account recent Ukrainian proposals.

12. We support the Middle East peace process, and urge all participants to remain firmly committed to it.

We reaffirm our conviction that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean, and that the Mediterranean dimension is consequently one of the various components of the European security architecture. In this regard, as part of the adaptation of the Alliance, we will work towards enhancing our relations with non-NATO Mediterranean countries through our dialogue.

The dialogue complements other international efforts, such as those undertaken by the Barcelona process, the OSCE and the WEU without creating any division of labor. We welcome the report of the Council in Permanent Session on the progress of and recommendations for future steps to develop the dialogue with Mediterranean countries through political dialogue and other activities agreed by the Alliance. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have reiterated their interest in the development of our relations. We have decided to enhance our Mediterranean dialogue in a progressive way and have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the implementation of the activities foreseen in the report as well as on the scope for further development.

13. We are carrying forward the process of the Alliance's internal adaptation, with the fundamental objectives of ensuring the Alliance's military effectiveness, maintaining the transatlantic link, and developing the ESDI within NATO. In keeping with the decisions taken by NATO Heads of State and Government at the 1994 Summit Meeting and by the Ministerial meetings in June this year in Berlin and Brussels and with a view to preparing for the Summit next year, our

primary focus has been on three closely linked issues: the development of a new command structure for the Alliance; the implementation of the CJTF concept; and the development of the ESDI within NATO.

14. We welcome the progress made in the development of the future command structure, noting that two structural alternatives have been selected by the Military Committee for future assessment and subsequent political consideration and agree the proposed way ahead. We urge the Council in Permanent Session and the Military Committee to complete the work as quickly as possible. Once approved, this new command structure will help ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness so that it is able, in the changing security environment facing Europe, to perform its traditional mission of collective defense and through flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles in changing circumstances and to provide for increased participation by Partner countries. It will constitute a renovated, single multinational command structure, reflecting the strategic situation in Europe and enabling all Allies to participate fully.
15. We welcome the progress made towards realizing the CJTF concept, on the basis of the Overall Politico-Military Framework approved by us last June. We direct the Council in Permanent Session and the NATO Military Authorities to pursue vigorously their work on this concept, bearing in mind its importance for future Alliance operations, including the possible involvement of nations outside the Alliance, as well as for the development of ESDI.
16. We are pleased with the progress made in developing the appropriate arrangements for ESDI within NATO, as decided at the Brussels Summit and at our meeting last June in Berlin. The newly created Policy Coordination Group has contributed significantly to this process.
17. We note in particular the steps taken towards implementing the concept of separable but not separate capabilities:
  - o the decisions of the Council in Permanent Session on political guidance concerning the elaboration of European command arrangements within NATO able to prepare and conduct WEU-led operations;
  - o the decisions of the Council in Permanent Session regarding the arrangements for identifying NATO capabilities and assets which might be made available to the WEU for a WEU-led operation;
  - o the progress to date on arrangements for the release, monitoring and return or recall of Alliance assets and capabilities;
  - o the decision of the Council in Permanent Session with respect to modalities of cooperation with the WEU;
  - o the progress on work regarding planning and conducting exercising for WEU-led operations, following receipt of illustrative profiles for WEU missions.
18. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session to submit to the Spring 1997 Ministerial meetings a report on the adaptation of Alliance structures and procedures related to the future command structure, on the implementation of the CJTF concept, and on further progress with recommendations for decisions in the development of ESDI within the Alliance.
19. We welcome the close and intensifying cooperation between NATO and the

WEU. At their meeting in Ostend on 19 November 1996, WEU Ministers agreed that it would be valuable for WEU to become actively involved in the Alliance's defense planning process and expressed their readiness to participate. Early agreement is now being sought in the WEU on the participation of all European Allies in WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and preparing for such operations. This would be a key contribution to the development of ESDI within the Alliance. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to develop the NATO-WEU relationship further in order to ensure effective cooperation in preparing for possible WEU-led operations.

20. We are pleased with the successful outcome of the OSCE Summit in Lisbon and, in particular, the adoption of a declaration on security as a result of work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st Century. The Lisbon Summit has created a security framework in which all European states can participate on an equal footing. The Security Model adopted in Lisbon is a comprehensive expression of the endeavor to strengthen security and stability. It complements the mutually reinforcing efforts of NATO and other European and transatlantic institutions and organizations. We attach great importance to the role of the OSCE as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as to the enhancement of its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. We believe the OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has an essential role to play in European peace and stability. We are committed to supporting its comprehensive approach to security. The principles and commitments on which the OSCE is built provide the standards for the development of a comprehensive and cooperative European security structure.

We commend the OSCE for its essential contribution to the implementation of civil aspects of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in supervising the preparation and conduct of the elections, in promoting and monitoring human rights and in overseeing the implementation of agreed confidence - and security - building measures and sub-regional arms control agreements. The OSCE thereby demonstrates its central role in contributing to regional stability and security.

We are pleased with the support given by IFOR to the OSCE in carrying out its tasks. The cooperation between OSCE and IFOR is a good example of our concept of mutually reinforcing organizations. The practical assistance given by NATO to the OSCE in helping to establish measures to verify the confidence-building and arms control agreements of the Dayton Accords testifies to a growing cooperation between NATO and the OSCE. We reiterate our readiness to further develop the cooperation between the two organizations.

The democratic and economic development, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states are essential factors for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We commend the OSCE for its mediation efforts in a

number of regional conflicts through its various missions, and recognize the valuable work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. We support the efforts of the Minsk Group to achieve a political settlement of the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

The OSCE acquis in the field of disarmament, arms control, and confidence- and security-building measures continues to contribute significantly to political and military stability. We consider the full implementation, the further development, and if necessary, the adaptation of these measures to be indispensable elements in our effort to further enhance the European security architecture. We welcome the recent adoption by the Forum for Security Cooperation of the Framework for Arms Control and its Future Agenda.

21. The CFE Treaty is a fundamental cornerstone of security and stability for all in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are committed to maintain and strengthen it. Consistent with our broader goal of enhancing political cooperation and military stability in a Europe without dividing lines, we welcome the decision of the 30 States Parties to the CFE Treaty on 1 December 1996 in Lisbon to launch negotiations to adapt the Treaty to the changing security environment in Europe. We look forward to beginning negotiations in the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna in January 1997 on the basis of the scope and parameters (Terms of Reference) document agreed in Lisbon.

Our common goal is to enhance security for all States Parties, irrespective of whether they belong to an alliance, and preserve their right to choose and change their security arrangements. Within the broader political context of enhanced security for all, this process should strengthen the cooperative pattern of relationships between States Parties, based on mutual confidence, transparency, stability and predictability. Committed, like the other States Parties, to adapting the Treaty by developing mechanisms which will enhance the Treaty's viability and effectiveness, we will pursue steps to review the Treaty's group structure, to adapt the Treaty system of limitations and to enhance its verification and information provisions. To that end, the members of the Alliance will develop and table proposals for the negotiations in Vienna.

We reaffirm our support for the CFE Flank Agreement, reached at this year's Review Conference in Vienna. We urge all States Parties who have not yet done so to approve this Agreement before the end of the extended provisional application period.

We will play our full part in the intensive continuing efforts directed at resolving outstanding implementation issues.

The members of the Alliance reaffirm the commitment made at Lisbon to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations as foreseen in the document in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed

forces - in particular, with respect to their levels of forces and deployments - in the Treaty's area of application. As decided in Lisbon, this commitment is without prejudice to the outcome of the negotiations, or to voluntary decisions by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to their legitimate security interests. We believe that the CFE Treaty must continue to play a key role in ensuring military stability into the 21st century, and are committed to adapting it expeditiously in order to take account of new security challenges.

22. We emphasize the importance of the START Treaties for international stability and security. We note with satisfaction the progress made by the United States and the Russian Federation in the implementation of START I. We urge the Russian Federation to follow the United States in ratifying the START II Treaty. We welcome the successful conclusion and signing by the great majority of UN members of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and we urge all other nations to sign this important international arms control agreement. We look forward to the early start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

We are pleased that the Chemical Weapons Convention will soon enter into force and we look forward to its early implementation. We welcome the fact that States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have at the Fourth Review Conference in Geneva in December 1996 again solemnly declared their recognition that effective verification could reinforce the Convention.

Recognizing the heightened concern of the international community of the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, we support the vigorous pursuit of an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and, as an important step to this end, support the early ratification of the revised Second Protocol of the Convention on Inhumane Weapons.

We urge the early ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies by those states which have not already ratified.

23. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means continues to be a matter of serious concern to us. Progress in expanding and intensifying NATO's political and defense efforts against proliferation, as directed by NATO Heads of State and Government in January 1994, is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the new security environment. These efforts also contribute to NATO's ability to conduct new roles and missions. We remain committed to preventing proliferation in the first place, or, if it occurs, to reversing it through diplomatic means. The Alliance is improving its capabilities to address the risks posed by proliferation. We welcome further consultations and cooperation with Partner countries to address the common security risks posed by proliferation. We note with satisfaction the report of the

Alliances Joint Committee on Proliferation on the activities of the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation and direct them to continue their vital efforts.

We attach particular importance to a solid preparation of the first preparatory committee of the strengthened review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), scheduled for April 1997. This process will significantly contribute to the further strengthening of the NPT, which is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation system.

24. We reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's common-funded program.

We note with appreciation the progress made in moving existing resources to the highest priority program, such as Partnership for Peace and the support of enhanced information activities in Moscow and Kyiv. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session to keep under review the allocation of resources in order to ensure their optimal use. We have also directed the Council in Permanent Session to identify the implications of adaptation for NATO's common-funded budgets and to make appropriate recommendations for dealing with these.

25. We continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism, which constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability.
26. The Spring 1997 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session will be held in Sintra, Portugal, on 29 Ma

## APPENDIX B

**Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1997) 155 held at NATO HQ Brussels 16 Dec 1997**

### *Final Communiqué*

**Issued at the Ministerial Meeting  
of the North Atlantic Council**

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1. Our Heads of State and Government, at their Summit in Madrid on 8th-9th July, took historic decisions to transform the Alliance. We welcome today the substantial progress made by the Alliance in putting into practice that far-reaching vision. In particular:
  - we will sign today Protocols of Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty;
  - we have endorsed politico-military guidance for the development of options for a future NATO-led military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate;
  - substantial progress has been achieved on the Long Term Study and an agreement has been reached on a new command structure as a whole, and in particular on the type, number and location of headquarters.

Furthermore:

- we will cooperate closely with the three invited countries through the coming months, building on the successful accession talks this year, and we will work for the timely ratification of the Protocols of Accession;
- we have completed the initial estimates of the resource implications for accession of the three invitees, and have confirmed that the costs will be manageable;
- we look forward to continuing in January 1998 intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions;

- we intend to realize the full potential of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which has opened new consultative and cooperative channels with Partners, and of the enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) through expanding the scope and range of Partnership activities;
  - we will pursue vigorously our consultations and cooperation with Russia under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, and look forward to the implementation of the 1998 work program;
  - we will carry forward our program of consultations and cooperation with Ukraine under the new NATO-Ukraine Charter, and will endorse later today with Ukraine a work plan for 1998;
  - we have carried out through our Mediterranean Cooperation Group a new round of individual dialogues with our six Mediterranean Dialogue Partners, and established a work program for cooperation;
  - we welcome the substantial progress in our internal adaptation and approve the progress made in the continued successful implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept;
  - we note with satisfaction that significant progress has been made on developing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance;
  - we will work constructively towards conclusion of the CFE Treaty Adaptation negotiations as expeditiously as possible, aimed at enhancing security and stability, and have introduced proposals to this end.
2. Our aim is to reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on Allied solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its missions.
  3. With this aim in view, NATO enlargement is part of a comprehensive process. It includes not only the decision of our Heads of State and Government to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO, but also the continued openness of the Alliance to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty; broad cooperation with Partners in the EAPC and the enhanced PfP; a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia; a distinctive Partnership with Ukraine; and an enhanced Mediterranean dialogue.
  4. We received a report by the Secretary General on the successful conclusion of the accession talks with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. We will sign later today the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on their accession and look forward to timely ratification of the Protocols of Accession by our respective countries in order to allow the three invited states to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty in time for the Alliance's 50th anniversary in April 1999. We are convinced that the accession of the invitees will contribute to the security and effectiveness of the Alliance. We are pleased by the thorough and detailed preparations undertaken by the three nations for the accession talks. We welcome the confirmation by the invited countries of their willingness to assume the rights and obligations of NATO membership and to meet the associated political



commitments. They have confirmed their intention to participate fully in NATO's military structure and collective defense planning and, for the purpose of taking part in the full range of Alliance missions, to commit the bulk of their armed forces to the Alliance. All three fully support the continued openness of the Alliance towards new members, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty as further elaborated in Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration.

We will progressively involve the invited countries, to the greatest extent possible and where appropriate, in Alliance activities, to prepare them to undertake the responsibilities and obligations of membership. In this regard, we welcome the proposal to develop a cooperation program with the invited countries, using Partnership for Peace tools and mechanisms, which is comprehensive and ensures transparency between multilateral and bilateral assistance program.

5. As reaffirmed by our Heads of State and Government at the Madrid Summit, admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance. We took note of a report on the resource implications of the accession of the three invited states, with particular emphasis on common-funded budgets. It provides an initial assessment of those costs which would be eligible for common funding, amounting to the equivalent of about 1.5 billion US dollars over a period of 10 years, of which 1.3 billion US dollars would be for the NATO Security Investment Program.

Overall, the analysis of the resource implications of the accession of the three new members has justified the confidence of our Heads of State and Government that, in the present and foreseeable security environment in Europe, Alliance costs associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided. The analysis also concludes that the available and planned military forces and the capabilities of the current Allies and the three invitees are sufficient to ensure fully the collective defense of all members of the enlarged Alliance in the present and foreseeable security environment. We note with satisfaction that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will also make valuable contributions to the Alliance's ability to perform the full range of its missions. The newly acceding countries will assume all rights and obligations of membership and are ready to shoulder the resulting burdens. They plan to increase significantly their defense spending and to contribute appropriately to the Alliance's common-funded budgets.

6. We remain committed to the ongoing process of enlargement in the terms set out in Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration, in which our Heads of State and Government clearly reaffirmed NATO's open door to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and we welcome the valuable efforts by countries which are aspiring members. To that end, we are maintaining our active cooperation with those nations that have expressed their interest in NATO membership as well as those who may seek membership in the future. We will

further encourage their active participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace. We will also continue our intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue on membership questions. In this context we have adopted modalities for the continuation of the intensified dialogues. These dialogues, which have already begun, will cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to any eventual decision. We will keep that process under continual review, looking forward to the review of the enlargement process which will take place at the meeting of our Heads of State and Government in 1999. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to report to us at our Spring Session on the intensified dialogues.

7. Decisions taken at the Madrid Summit and the Sintra Ministerials earlier this year created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as the overarching framework for expanding the political and security dimensions of our partnership and practical cooperation under the Partnership for Peace. We look forward to tomorrow's meeting with our EAPC counterparts. The EAPC will deepen and focus political and security-related consultations and cooperation, and increase transparency among its 44 member states. For our part, we will continue developing the EAPC as an action-oriented forum with practical, cooperative tasks on its agenda. To this end, we look forward to endorsing with our Partners the EAPC Action Plan for 1998-2000.
8. We are pleased with the progress of implementation of the EAPC Basic Document since its adoption in Sintra last May. We welcome the deepening consultations on political and security-related issues, including those in a limited format between the Alliance and open-ended groups of Partners to focus on functional matters or, on an ad hoc basis, on appropriate regional matters. We also note with satisfaction the growing number of cooperative activities under the auspices of the EAPC, which is based on the principles of inclusiveness and self-differentiation, including in the fields of defense economic issues, science, defense-related environmental issues, cooperation in peacekeeping, and civil emergency preparedness. We welcome the establishment by a growing number of Partners of diplomatic missions to NATO under the Brussels Agreement.
9. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build with Partners new patterns of practical cooperation across a wide range of security issues. We are pleased with the progress made since our Sintra meeting last May. We welcome the decisions to establish PfP Staff Elements at the strategic and regional levels of NATO's military command structure and note that Defense Ministers have mandated a report for May 1998 on the possibility of establishing them also at the sub-regional level. We also welcome proposals for the further development of the Planning and Review Process and the establishment of international military posts for Partners at the Partnership Coordination Cell. We note with satisfaction the identification of the first PfP projects to be supported under the NATO Security Investment Program and the start of work with Partners on the development of a political-military framework for NATO-led PfP

operations. We invite all Partner countries to take full advantage of the new possibilities to draw closer to the Alliance through the enhanced PfP.

We look forward to endorsing with our Partners at tomorrow's EAPC meeting the concept to establish a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit.

We task the Council in Permanent Session to increase further the effectiveness of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the enhanced Partnership for Peace, in cooperation with Partners, and to report to us at our next meeting.

10. The Partnership for Peace has shown its value in contributing to stability in Europe through the special assistance the Alliance is continuing to provide to Albania, in the context of PfP and drawing on the experience of the Italian-led Multinational Protection Force, in the rebuilding of its national armed forces following the crisis in that country in early 1997. We welcome the voluntary contributions of nations to Albania.
11. The signature in Paris last May of the NATO-Russia Founding Act marked the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. We are pleased that consultations in the Permanent Joint Council, created by the Founding Act, are developing into practical cooperation, on the basis of the 1997 work program which we adopted with Minister Primakov at the first PJC Ministerial meeting last September. Since then, NATO and Russia have made significant progress towards establishing the deeper relationship envisioned in the Founding Act. NATO and Russia have consulted together on many of the issues central to security in the Euro-Atlantic area, including the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ongoing implementation of the Peace Accords, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conduct of peacekeeping operations. We are encouraged by the progress made in the working groups on civil emergency planning, peacekeeping, and defense conversion. We welcome the commitment shown by Russia to the broad range of cooperative activities, including the development of an active Individual Partnership Program in the context of PfP and the appointment of a Russian military representative at NATO Headquarters. This will open a new chapter in NATO-Russia defense-related and military-to-military cooperation.

We therefore look forward tomorrow to our second meeting with the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council. At that meeting, we expect to adopt a substantive work program for 1998 that will further deepen our cooperation and strengthen mutual trust. We look forward in particular to enhancing NATO's information efforts in Russia, and we expect to open a NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow, as foreseen in the Founding Act, by 31st January 1998. The timely establishment of military liaison missions at various levels, as foreseen in the Founding Act, will usefully support its objectives. We encourage Russia to play an active role in the EAPC and the enhanced PfP.

The activities of the Permanent Joint Council will build upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency. In opening a new era in European security relations, we are fully committed to working together with Russia to realize the provisions and potential of the Founding Act.

12. The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, signed at the Madrid Summit by Allied Heads of State and Government and President Kuchma, underscores the Alliance's view that Ukraine has a key role to play in European security. We underline our firm belief that Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state are key factors for security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe and on the continent as a whole.

We are committed to launching a rich and varied program of consultation and practical cooperation with Ukraine. We welcome the substantial progress already made in this regard since the conclusion of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, on the basis of initial elements agreed by the NATO-Ukraine Commission on 10th October 1997. We look forward to the implementation of the NATO-Ukraine work plan for 1998, which we, together with Ukraine's Foreign Minister Udovenko, will endorse later today when the NATO-Ukraine Commission meets for the first time at Ministerial level. We also look forward on this occasion to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness between NATO and Ukraine. We will continue to support an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv.

We also welcome Ukraine's intention to play an active role within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the enhanced PfP. We are working with Ukraine on the development of a more focused Individual Partnership Program. We are pleased with the initial steps we have taken with Ukraine to implement this new partnership. We look forward to further progress in 1998 and beyond.

13. We continue to give great attention to the Mediterranean region since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO's Mediterranean dialogue has continued to develop progressively, and thus contributes to enhancing security and stability in the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean dialogue is an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. We welcome the progress made by the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, created at the Madrid Summit, which has the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, and the expansion of the dialogues with our Mediterranean Partners, including in a 16+1 format. We also welcome the establishment of an appropriately funded work program for cooperation activities, which will help in building confidence through cooperation on security-related issues, and we task the Council in Permanent Session to provide a progress report next year on its implementation.

14. We attach great importance to an early and successful completion of the process of the Alliance's internal adaptation, on the basis of decisions taken in Berlin and Brussels in 1996 and subsequently. The fundamental objectives of this adaptation are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness for the full range of its missions including collective defense and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance.

We received a comprehensive report describing the progress made since the Madrid Summit in the three main areas: the development of the Alliance's future command structure; the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept; and the building of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance.

Substantial progress has been achieved on the Long-Term Study and an agreement has been reached on a new command structure as a whole, and in particular on the type, number and location of headquarters. The structure will comprise two Strategic Commands (SC), one for the Atlantic and one for Europe. SC Atlantic will comprise three Regional Commands (RC), RC West (Norfolk), RC East (Northwood) and RC Southeast (Lisbon) as well as STRIKFLTLANT and SUBACLANT, both based at Norfolk. In SC Europe, two RCs are foreseen - RC North (Brunssum) and RC South (Naples). Two component commands (CC) - CC Air (Ramstein) and CC Nav (Northwood) - will report to RC North together with three Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRC) - JSRC Centre (Heidelberg), JSRC Northeast (Karup) and JSRC North (Stavanger). RC South will command two CCs - CC Air and CC Nav (both at Naples) - and four JSRCs - JSRC Southeast (Izmir), JSRC Southcentre (Larissa), JSRC South (Verona) and JSRC Southwest (Madrid). Taken together, this will represent a reduction from 65 headquarters at present to 20 in the proposed new command structure. The NATO Military Authorities have been tasked to develop a detailed plan, as proposed by the Military Committee, for the transition to the new command structure, for consideration and endorsement by Ministers next year.

Allies welcome Spain's announcement of its intention to join the Alliance's new military structure and thus to take part in the new command structure on which an agreement has been reached in the terms stated above. Spain's full participation will enhance its overall contribution to the security of the Alliance, help develop the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO and strengthen the transatlantic link.

Implementation of the CJTF concept will enhance the Alliance's ability to plan and conduct quickly and effectively a wide range of military operations employing multinational and multi-service forces capable of being generated and deployed at short notice. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the CJTF concept, noting that an initial trial has already successfully been conducted.

We note with satisfaction that work on building the ESDI within the Alliance is progressing in close cooperation with the WEU. Important work has been carried out on European command arrangements; on consultation and information-sharing; the development of mechanisms for the identification, release, monitoring and return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities made available for WEU-led operations; on the planning and conduct of WEU-led operations involving the use of such assets and capabilities; the modalities for the WEU's involvement in NATO defense planning; and military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions.

We welcome the steady strengthening of cooperative relations between NATO and the WEU, and the successful, ongoing consultation between our two organizations under the aegis of the NATO-WEU Joint Council. We will continue to develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning, preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities. In this context, we welcome the WEU's readiness to consult on and coordinate all ESDI-related work at the earliest possible stage, including through greater use of joint working groups and through the possibility of setting up ad hoc expert working groups on specific topics. In addition we welcome the decisions of the WEU Council of Ministers at Erfurt to improve the WEU's operational capability in relation to crisis management and peacekeeping operations (the Petersburg tasks). We also welcome the results of the WEU Ministerial Council in Erfurt that aim at enhanced forms of cooperation between WEU and NATO, supporting the process of translating the political directives formulated by the respective Ministerial Councils into practical links between both organizations leading in particular to arrangements for WEU-led operations making use of Alliance assets and capabilities.

We task the Council in Permanent Session to pursue further work, as required, on internal adaptation and to report to us at our next meeting.

15. The Alliance Strategic Concept adopted by our Heads of State and Government in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of the Alliance. As Foreign Ministers, we attach particular importance to the far-reaching, positive political developments which have occurred since 1991 in the security landscape in Europe and to new cooperative security structures which are being built throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. We therefore endorse the terms of reference agreed by the Council in Permanent Session for the examination, and updating as necessary, of the Alliance Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State and Government in Madrid. This work will confirm our commitment to the core function of Alliance collective defense and the indispensable transatlantic link. We look forward to receiving a progress report at our next meeting on the substantive work, which will begin early in 1998 for presentation to Heads of State and Government at their next Summit meeting in April 1999.
16. We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-

conflict rehabilitation as well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights. Examples of the important role the OSCE plays as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter are its tasks as a flexible coordinating framework for international assistance in Albania, the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the efforts of the Minsk Group, and the mission in Croatia which will acquire particular importance in 1998 after the termination of the UNTAES mandate. We are committed to supporting the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security and its work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, in accordance with the decisions of the 1996 Lisbon Summit, including consideration of developing a Charter on European Security. We welcome the initiative of the Chairman-in-Office to strengthen non-hierarchical cooperation between security institutions which accept and adhere to the principles and commitments contained in the relevant OSCE documents. In this regard, we recall the precepts set out in the Lisbon Document that security organizations as such are transparent and predictable in their actions, whose members individually and collectively adhere to OSCE principles and commitments, and whose membership is based on open and voluntary commitments. We look forward to a productive and successful OSCE Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen later this week.

17. NATO remains committed to the full and unconditional implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the establishment of that country as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state. We welcome the progress achieved in many areas, including the conduct of elections, the reduction of armaments and the reform and restructuring of police. In addition, many refugees have returned. However, much more could have been achieved had the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed their full share. Peace, and the institutions of civil society to uphold it, remain fragile.

Accordingly, we strongly endorse the conclusions of last week's Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) in Bonn that are intended to achieve further progress in consolidating the peace. We support the High Representative's intention to facilitate implementation of the Peace Agreement by using his authority fully to promote the resolution of difficulties through binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on the issues identified by the Peace Implementation Council. In this context, we also consider it important to achieve early progress on such basic matters as the building of common institutions, the creation of a common currency and common symbols, and the establishment of a uniform vehicle registration system. We confirm that our countries will continue to support those who support implementation of the Peace Agreement, and to oppose those who seek to obstruct the peace process.

NATO contributes to consolidating the peace by organizing and leading a Stabilization Force (SFOR) with the participation of all 16 Allies and 20 non-NATO countries, including Russia and 14 other Partners. At our meeting today, we reviewed the SFOR operation twelve months into its eighteen-month mission.

Following consultations last week with the non-NATO contributors, we confirmed that SFOR would continue at its present force levels, subject to prudent adjustments, until otherwise directed. This will allow SFOR to continue its firm and even-handed approach to implementing its mandate and supporting civil implementation. We extend our deep-felt appreciation to the men and women of SFOR for their essential contribution. We express deep sympathy to the families of those who have lost their lives and to those who have been injured in the cause of peace.

To succeed, the Peace Agreement must continue to be implemented in an environment of general security. The PIC recognized and supported the emerging consensus on the need for a military presence to continue beyond June 1998. It was the PIC's judgment that such a force should provide appropriate support to civil implementation while being readily available and effective enough to respond quickly to events on the ground in and across Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this in mind, we have endorsed politico-military guidance to the NATO Military Authorities for the development of options for a NATO-led military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate. NATO Military Authorities will provide these options to the Council in Permanent Session no later than mid-January 1998 to allow for the early selection of an option, following consultations with non-NATO contributors and a careful assessment of the likely security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina after SFOR's mandate expires in June 1998.

We welcome the continuing development of the confidence- and security-building measures under Article II of Annex IB of the Peace Agreement and the successful completion of declared reduction liabilities under Article IV of Annex IB. We congratulate the parties on the reduction of almost 6,600 pieces of armament. We underline the importance of starting the Article V process without delay to build on the achievements reached under Article II and IV. Steps in this context should not prejudice the integrity of existing arms control and CSBM agreements. A broad security dialogue would represent a significant element in establishing regional stability.

Securing the peace over the long term will also require further steps to promote confidence and cooperation among the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to encourage the development of democratic practices and central defense mechanisms such as the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM). NATO is organizing courses for military and civilian defense officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the NATO School to promote reconciliation among the formerly warring factions. We have also decided to launch an initial set of security cooperation activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina to include both Entities and all three ethnic groups. These activities, to be coordinated through the SCMM, will include additional courses, seminars and an assessment of how NATO can assist the SCMM in becoming fully effective.



While NATO will do its part to consolidate the peace, ultimately this responsibility rests with the democratically elected officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as with the other Parties to the Peace Agreement. We will continue to insist that the Parties to the Peace Agreement comply fully with their commitments, including the transfer of indicted war criminals to The Hague. The results of last month's elections in Republika Srpska show encouraging signs of emerging genuine multi-party politics, which are essential for a strong democracy. We look forward to the early establishment of a new government committed to implementing the Peace Agreement and thereby allowing the people in that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to benefit more fully from the peace.

We confirm that NATO's interest in stability extends beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina to the surrounding region. We share the concerns expressed at the PIC concerning the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo and other areas. We call upon those concerned to refrain from activities that might exacerbate existing difficulties and to strive for mutually acceptable solutions through responsible dialogue.

18. We share the commitment of all 30 States Parties to continued full implementation of the CFE Treaty, and its associated documents, including the Flank Agreement. We are determined that the adaptation of CFE will strengthen the Treaty's continued key role in the European security architecture and as a cornerstone of European stability and security.

The agreement reached in July 1997 on the Basic Elements of CFE Treaty Adaptation was an important step in the adaptation process. We note with appreciation the substantial progress achieved by the Alliance's High Level Task Force in elaborating the Alliance position on the operation of the future Treaty's system of limitations, appropriate flexibilities and consultative mechanisms, with the aim of enhancing security and stability in Europe. Introduction of Allies' illustrative Territorial Ceilings, together with their underlying rationale, in the Vienna negotiation is a further indication of the importance we attach to progress on CFE adaptation and our determination to work cooperatively with other Treaty Partners. We will work as expeditiously as possible towards the conclusion of the adaptation negotiation as foreseen in the timetable agreed in Lisbon on 1st December 1996. We call on other CFE States Parties to engage actively in the negotiations, including by putting forward proposed equipment ceilings under the adapted Treaty, considering reductions in their entitlements as NATO Allies have already done. We hope that these common efforts will enhance the climate of cooperation and confidence.

19. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery poses risks to the Alliance. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. We note the report of the Joint Committee on Proliferation regarding the activities of the Senior

Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation.

The Alliance shares with its Partners many of the risks arising from the proliferation of NBC weapons. We will therefore pursue a dialogue on this issue in the framework of EAPC and with Russia and Ukraine, with the aim of enhancing our cooperation in countering these risks.

20. We note with satisfaction that implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is proceeding well, and that the number of countries ratifying this important agreement continues to grow. We particularly welcome the CWC ratification by the Russian Federation in early November. We urge all states that have not yet signed and ratified the Convention to do so, and call upon those that have ratified to carry out fully their obligations under the Convention.

We continue to endorse efforts to negotiate an effective verification regime to strengthen the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

We support early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and an early start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

We continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty as soon as possible, so that negotiations on START III can begin. In this context, we welcome the agreements signed by Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov on 26th September 1997 to enhance the prospects for Russia's ratification of START II. We urge Russia to honor its commitments as stated by President Yeltsin in 1992 to substantially reduce its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile.

We attach great importance to the Treaty on Open Skies and urge the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine to take the necessary steps to permit its entry into force.

We welcome the signing in Ottawa on 3rd and 4th December, 1997 of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines and on their destruction. The impact of this agreement on NATO will be fully assessed in the months ahead. We will take the necessary action to ensure that national obligations under the Convention are compatible with our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. We welcome the efforts pursued in the Conference on Disarmament and in other fora on the issue of anti-personnel mines and urge the Conference to intensify its efforts to achieve progress on the issue.

21. We recognize the achievements of the NATO Science Program in fostering transatlantic exchanges and intra-Alliance cohesion. We welcome ongoing efforts to adjust the Program to NATO's new structures and tasks.

22. We strongly condemn all acts of terrorism. We will continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism, including using arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature that affect Alliance security interests. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.
  23. We accepted with pleasure an invitation from the United States to host the meeting of Allied Heads of State and Government in Washington in Spring 1999, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.
  24. The Spring 1998 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session will be held in Luxembourg, on 28th May 1998.
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## APPENDIX C

**Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1998) 140 held at NATO HQ Brussels 8 Dec 1998**

*Final Communiqué*

**Issued at the Ministerial Meeting  
of the North Atlantic Council**

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1. At our meeting today, we discussed preparations for the Alliance's next Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999. At this Summit, which will mark the 50th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, we will celebrate the historic achievements of NATO as a strong, united and successful Alliance and will welcome the three invited countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - as members of the Alliance. The Summit will also provide an opportunity to define the Alliance's role for the future, including ever closer relations with Partner countries. Accordingly, we recommend to our Heads of State and Government that at the Washington Summit they set out their shared vision of the Alliance in the years ahead - an Alliance adapted, renewed and ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st century

We reviewed the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the future of the NATO-led Stabilization Force, and consulted on the situation in and around Kosovo. On both these important subjects, we have issued separate statements. We have also issued a separate statement on "Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Restraint and Flexibility". We gave additional guidance to the Alliance's ongoing work in implementing the decisions of the Madrid Summit of July 1997 to shape the new NATO. We are pleased with the successful completion by all Allies of the ratification process for the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Washington Treaty. We welcome the progress made in preparations for membership by the invited countries, and encourage them and the NATO Military Authorities to accelerate their efforts towards completion of the relevant minimum military requirements of the Alliance. The membership of these countries will contribute to an overall strengthening of the Alliance and to enhancing security and stability

in Europe. We look forward to welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as our new Allies before the Washington Summit.

2. We reaffirm that the door remains open to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration. Taking into account a report on the intensified dialogue on membership questions, we reviewed this process, as mandated by our Heads of State and Government, in preparation for the comprehensive review which they will carry out at their meeting in Washington. We tasked the Council in Permanent Session to develop for the Washington Summit a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process, operationalize our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards.
3. We received a comprehensive report describing the progress made in our internal adaptation, to which we continue to attach great importance. The fundamental objectives of this adaptation are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness for the full range of its missions building on its essential collective defense capabilities and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. Implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept and preparations for implementation of the new command structure are well in hand. Our aim is to have the necessary preparations completed to enable the Council to take a single and irreversible decision on the activation requests of all headquarters of the new NATO command structure by the beginning of March 1999, and we tasked the Council in Permanent Session accordingly.

We reviewed the progress made in building the ESDI within NATO and welcome the close cooperation and consultation with the WEU in this regard. Regular meetings of the NATO and WEU Councils in Joint Session and of subordinate bodies, and arrangements for close consultation on the planning and conduct of WEU-led operations and exercises involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities, are important elements of the development of ESDI within the Alliance. Preparation within the Alliance for WEU-led operations making use of Alliance assets and capabilities is now well advanced. In this context, we welcome the results of the joint workshop on the NATO-WEU consultation process and look forward to a crisis management seminar in February 1999, leading up to a joint NATO-WEU crisis management exercise in 2000. We appreciate the steady strengthening of cooperative links between NATO and the WEU which was reaffirmed at the WEU Council of Ministers held in Rome on 16th-17th November. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to ensure that the key elements of the work on implementing the Berlin and Brussels decisions relating to ESDI are in place, as set out in the report on internal adaptation submitted to us, by the Washington Summit. Moreover, we direct the Council to make recommendations on how best to further enhance the effectiveness of ESDI

within the Alliance, including the contribution made by all European Allies, beyond the Washington Summit.

4. We reviewed the ongoing work on the examination, and updating as necessary, of the Alliance's Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State and Government at their Summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997. This work must ensure that the Strategic Concept is fully consistent with the Alliance's new security environment. It should reaffirm our commitment to collective defense and the transatlantic link; take account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; and present an Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance security and stability for countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century, including through dialogue, cooperation and partnership and, where appropriate, non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the possible participation of partners. We instructed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue this work vigorously so that the new text is available by the time of the Washington Summit.
5. We are pleased that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) are resulting in a stronger consultative forum and a more operational Partnership. This will improve the ability of Allies and Partners to contribute to security and stability through political consultations and practical cooperation. The EAPC has proven a valuable forum for consultations on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the crisis in Kosovo. We received a comprehensive progress report on implementation of the EAPC Basic Document and the enhanced Partnership for Peace.

We welcome the EAPC's substantial updated Action Plan for 1998 - 2000 which includes exploring new issues. In the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues, these would include arms control, political and defense efforts against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missiles, and arms trafficking, control of small arms transfers and means of encouraging de-mining.

We welcome as a positive development the inauguration last June of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which has already coordinated emergency aid for relief operations in Albania and Ukraine.

6. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build with Partners new patterns of practical military and defense-related cooperation across a wide range of issues.

We note with satisfaction the ongoing discussions with Partners on the development of a political-military framework for NATO-led PfP operations. This will enhance future cooperation by establishing a basis for Partner involvement in political consultations and decision-making, command arrangements and operational planning for NATO-led non-Article 5 operations. The political-military framework will be a key element in future cooperation and

will provide for an increased role of Partners in one of the Alliance's major new tasks. The intention is to finalize this work, in tandem with the Strategic Concept, by the Washington Summit.

We welcome the Concept for PfP Training Centers, which will advance the broad politico-military goals of Pfp's overall education and training efforts, particularly in supporting enhanced military cooperation and interoperability.

We are pleased that a substantial number of interested Partner countries are taking up the opportunity, provided under the expanded Planning and Review Process (PARP), to adopt initial Partnership goals in Spring 1999. This is an important effort towards closer Partner cooperation with Alliance structures and procedures, in particular by enhancing interoperability, a priority for the Alliance.

We welcome the increased attention given to multinational formations as a means to enhance military cooperation between Allies and Partners, as in IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We tasked the Council in Permanent Session to put together, with Partners, the initiatives above and other work now underway to form a coherent package of measures intended to reinforce Pfp's operational capabilities for the Washington Summit.

Partnership for Peace program can also play an important role in contributing to Alliance efforts in reinforcing regional stability, such as in the Balkans. In this context, the Alliance has promoted, with participation of Partners, a substantive program of assistance to Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

7. We are encouraged by the developing process of consultation and practical cooperation with Russia under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and remain committed to working together with Russia to achieve a strong, stable and enduring partnership, on the basis of the principles of common interest, reciprocity and transparency, as called for in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

The crisis in Kosovo has confirmed the value of the PJC as a consultative forum. The ongoing SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a valuable example of practical cooperation between NATO and Russia.

We are pleased that military-to-military cooperation is progressing well, and that agreement has been reached on the establishment of a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow by the end of this year.

We look forward to signing with Russia a Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Protection and to establishing as soon as possible a NATO Information Office in Moscow. We welcome the establishment of the NATO-

Russia Scientific and Technological Cooperation Committee, which recently held its inaugural meeting in Moscow; agreement on the establishment of an Information and Consultation Centre in Moscow on the retraining of retired military personnel; and Russian participation in the PfP exercise "Cooperative Assembly". We will continue to work closely with Russia to develop an updated and substantial Individual Partnership Program (IPP) to include a wide range of practical defense-related and military-to-military cooperative activities.

8. We reaffirm our view that Ukraine has a key role to play in European security. We attach importance to the development of strong and active practical cooperation and political consultations with Ukraine, under the aegis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter. We welcome the announcement by the President of Ukraine of a "State Program of Cooperation with NATO to the Year 2001" as a tangible signal of Ukraine's commitment to a productive relationship with NATO.

We intend to utilize as fully as possible the potential offered by Ukraine's active participation in enhanced PfP and the agreed NATO-Ukraine Work Plan for 1999. We also note with satisfaction the growing military cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. The newly established NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defense Reform is a unique partnership program.

We welcome the agreement to be signed tomorrow on the appointment of two NATO liaison officers to Kyiv to enhance mutual cooperation. We will continue to support an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv.

9. Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. We therefore give great attention to our Mediterranean Dialogue which is part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, contributes to building confidence with participating countries and mutually reinforces other international efforts towards this end. We look forward to the positive contribution that the newly designated Allied Contact Point Embassies will have in fostering the Dialogue. We are committed to further improving the political, civil and military aspects of our Dialogue. We encourage Partners in the Dialogue to take full advantage of all its possibilities, including in the military field. We are ready to consider possibilities to enhance cooperation with participating countries in preparation for the Washington Summit.
10. The establishment of the Kosovo Verification Missions has opened a new stage in cooperation between NATO and the OSCE. Through the close coordination with the OSCE over the last months in the planning and establishment of these missions, and our continuing cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have further demonstrated in practice our ability to work together in crisis situations.

We also welcome the strengthening of relations between NATO and the OSCE over the past year, in the spirit of the OSCE's Common Concept for the Development of Cooperation between Mutually Reinforcing Institutions. We



continue to support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on European Security, worthy of adoption at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. We welcome the outcome of the OSCE Oslo Ministerial of 2nd-3rd December 1998.

11. We continue to consider the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security. We are committed to a successful adaptation of the Treaty. We will play our full part in seeking to complete this by the time of the OSCE Istanbul Summit. To this end, we will support efforts aimed at the resolution of key outstanding issues and the start of drafting work in the first months of next year. To assist this process, the North Atlantic Council and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have today issued a separate statement entitled "Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Restraint and Flexibility." Pending Entry into Force of the Adapted Treaty, we regard continued strict implementation of the current Treaty and its associated documents as vital.
12. We welcome the communiqué of the five nuclear weapons states of 4th June this year affirming their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions of nuclear weapons stockpiles. We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty in due course. We support the early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
13. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance. We note the report of the Joint Committee on Proliferation regarding the activities of the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation. The Alliance and its members remain committed to preventing proliferation and to reversing it, should it occur, through diplomatic means. At the same time, we recognize that proliferation can pose a direct threat to the Alliance. Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on proliferation, we are prepared to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat. We therefore task the Council in Permanent Session to prepare for the Washington Summit proposals for an initiative to ensure that the Alliance has the political and military capabilities to address appropriately and effectively the challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery.
14. We underline the risk to international and regional stability posed by the spread of NBC weapons. In particular, we urge all countries to accede to and fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.
15. We are determined to achieve progress on a legally binding protocol including effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention. We re-emphasize the importance of universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

16. We call on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty without delay.
  17. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability which can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.
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## APPENDIX D

**Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1999) 166 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 1999**

*Final Communiqué*

**Issued at the Ministerial Meeting  
of the North Atlantic Council**

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1. At our meeting today, we recalled NATO's major achievements in 1999:
  - We set forth NATO's vision for the 21st century and approved an updated Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit, where we also celebrated the Alliance's 50th Anniversary;
  - We admitted as new members the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; and
  - We contributed decisively, in particular through the conduct of our air campaign and the subsequent deployment of KFOR, to the international community's objective of creating the basis for long-term peace and stability in Kosovo.

We reviewed progress in implementing the Washington Summit decisions and took steps to further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment. We reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to its fundamental security tasks, as set out in the Strategic Concept, and the importance of our individual and collective efforts to achieve our guiding objective of enhancing the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

2. Against the background of political developments in the Balkans, we reviewed the status of NATO's comprehensive approach and continuing commitment to the promotion of security, stability, peace and democracy, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region, including through the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the implementation of NATO's South-East Europe Initiative. Through the Council in Permanent Session and the NATO Military Authorities, we continue to monitor closely the situation across the region.

3. We pay tribute to the service-men and women of all nations who are serving in the Balkans for their professionalism and dedication to the cause of peace and stability. We express deep sympathy to the families of those who have lost their lives and to those who have been injured in the cause of peace.
4. The Kosovo air campaign, which demonstrated the cohesion and unity of the Alliance and its determination to act, reinforced the diplomatic efforts of the international community and achieved the key objectives of the NATO Allies and their Partners. The humanitarian catastrophe has ended; some 850,000 refugees have returned; a NATO-led international peace force (KFOR) has been successfully deployed; and the international community has assumed responsibility for the civil administration through the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
5. We are determined to play our part in meeting in full the aims of the international community as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. We remain committed to a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all peoples can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions.

We noted the progress made in restoring peace and stability since the deployment of KFOR in Kosovo in accordance with UNSCR 1244, in particular the reduction in violence and the re-establishment of civil institutions. We commend the work undertaken by UNMIK and are pleased with the excellent level of co-ordination and cooperation established between KFOR and UNMIK. Close civil-military relations are essential for the success of our common goals and of our peace-building efforts in the region. In this respect, we have invited the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Dr. Kouchner, to tomorrow's meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

6. While progress has been achieved, much remains to be done, in particular the continued protection of all ethnic groups and minorities. We condemn all acts of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter. We underline KFOR's determination to put an end to ethnically motivated violence and to act swiftly and decisively against all perpetrators, including through maintaining an effective military presence in Serb minority areas. We strongly commend KFOR's determination to combat arms trafficking, illegal possession of weapons, the development of parallel structures that threaten KFOR or UNMIK objectives or the rule of law, to monitor and provide security at the borders and boundaries of Kosovo and to work with UNMIK to avoid canonization.

The achievement of the de-militarization and the dissolution of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) under the supervision of KFOR was an important step in establishing an environment for post-conflict reconciliation. We welcome the establishment of a civilian, multi-ethnic Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) as another important step in the development of a civil society for the benefit of all communities. Close control of the KPC by UNMIK and KFOR is essential. We

underscore KFOR's determination to continue to provide day-to-day operational direction and tasking, under the overall authority of the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative.

KFOR will continue to co-operate closely with UNMIK, providing support to its efforts towards establishing a fully functioning administration and democratic institutions, promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights, and assuring the safe return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes. It will be vital that UNMIK is adequately funded and staffed to fulfill its mission, particularly in the area of local administration and civilian international police. We will continue to do our utmost to provide a secure environment and we will give appropriate support for the conduct of free and fair elections under the auspices of the OSCE, which are to be held next year. We will also continue to provide strong support for the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

7. We urge all community leaders in Kosovo, irrespective of their ethnic background, to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society founded on the rule of law, tolerance and respect for human rights. We call in particular on the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to renounce violence, to demonstrate its commitment to a tolerant, democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo, and to co-operate with UNMIK and KFOR against those who advocate and practice violence. In this context we welcome the creation by UNMIK of a Joint Interim Administrative Structure, and in particular the establishment of an Interim Administrative Council. We are encouraged by Kosovar Albanian agreement to participate in these structures, and underline the importance of early participation by representatives of all Kosovar peoples, including the Serb community. We expect all parties to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including by facilitating the conduct of its investigations. The continuing support of the international community will depend upon an adequate response to these requirements.
8. Our common efforts in Kosovo demonstrate the value of the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions, a concept long championed by the Alliance. In this respect, our individual bilateral efforts, the substantial role of the EU and that of other international bodies, are making a decisive contribution to the economic reconstruction of Kosovo. We also commend the UNHCR for organizing relief efforts and resettlement, the UN Mine Action Centre for its role in coordinating the removal of mines, and the OSCE for its institution-building, human rights work and training of Kosovo police. We also express our appreciation for the significant role played by the many non-governmental organizations.
9. We express our deep appreciation for the robust practical and political support provided by Partner countries of the region throughout the air campaign and thereafter. This support was and remains critical to success. In particular, we

reiterate our appreciation for the ongoing efforts of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in supporting KFOR.

We are grateful to NATO's Partners and other nations for the substantial contributions they are making to efforts to bring peace and stability to the Balkans, which are the practical expressions of these countries' commitment to our shared values.

10. The crisis in Kosovo demonstrated the resilience of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement. The Alliance remains committed to supporting a peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single democratic state composed of two multi-ethnic Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. We are encouraged by the continuing progress in the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement. We welcome the appointment of Ambassador Petritsch as High Representative, whose vigorous approach to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement we strongly support. We note in particular the progress made in:

- o the development of functioning civil institutions;
- o increases in the level of refugee returns, especially to areas in which returnees are in the minority;
- o civil reconstruction;
- o reduction in arms holdings; and
- o the development of the role of the Standing Committee on Military Matters.

We also welcome the progress made in the ongoing arms control and confidence building negotiations in the framework of the Dayton Agreement with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. We urge all parties to demonstrate fully their commitment to the Dayton process and their cooperation with the High Representative, as the basis for further progress in transferring administrative responsibility to local authorities.

11. SFOR has helped to secure a more stable and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result, it has been able to undertake significant restructuring. Early next year a smaller, more flexible force will be in place and will remain fully capable of carrying out its mandate. SFOR will continue to contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment and to give targeted and focused support to civilian implementation. In this respect, we fully endorse SFOR's close working relationship with the High Representative and other civil agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular SFOR's continuing strong support for the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in bringing indicted war criminals to justice.

12. Despite this encouraging progress, important challenges remain, such as:
  - o the return of displaced persons to minority areas;
  - o further reduction of both Entities' armed forces;
  - o further progress in humanitarian de-mining;

- improving the effectiveness of all common institutions, notably the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and cooperation between Entities;
- transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes;
- the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret services;
- judicial and police reform; and
- the establishment of a state border service.

Accordingly, we expect the Entities to work together fully in co-ordination with the Presidency, the Council of Ministers and on all other levels. We applaud the spirit of cooperation exhibited among the common institutions and between authorities of both Entities during preparations for hosting the Stability Pact Summit. We call upon the Presidency to implement in full the commitments made in the New York Declaration of 15 November, and to support the work of the Standing Committee on Military Matters. We also demand that all parties fully co-operate with the ICTY, in particular by surrendering inductees within their territory. Only on the basis of justice can a lasting peace be established. We emphasize the fundamental significance of implementing market oriented economic reforms.

Taken together, these steps will reinforce the efforts of the High Representative to make the leaders and authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina the "owners" of the process of peace implementation and open the way to the integration of their country into Euro-Atlantic institutions. As Co-chair of the Stability Pact Working Table on Security Issues, Bosnia and Herzegovina can play an important role in promoting stability in the region.

13. We remain concerned about continued tensions between Belgrade and the democratically elected government of Montenegro. We are therefore paying close attention to developments there. We call on both sides to resolve their differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing measures. We express our support for the objective of a peaceful and democratic FRY, which protects the rights of all minorities, including those in Vojvodina and Sandjak. This would open the way for the eventual return of the FRY to the Euro-Atlantic family of nations.
14. The forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia will be crucial for its future. We hope that the entire Croatian leadership will seize the chance to re-vitalize implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, and demonstrate their commitment to democratic elections and due constitutional process. There is an opportunity for the next Croatian government to move towards a closer relationship with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
15. Our goal remains the integration of all the countries of South-East Europe into the Euro-Atlantic Community. To this end, we are building on the Alliance's already extensive cooperation in the region as evidenced by NATO's leadership of the SFOR and KFOR operations. The South-East Europe Initiative, launched at our Washington Summit, is also working to achieve this goal, including through PfP

tools, the EAPC and the Consultative Forum, which all play valuable roles in our post-conflict efforts to win permanent peace in the region. Today we received a consolidated progress report on the South-East Europe Initiative and we note with satisfaction the range of activities already undertaken, by the countries in the region and by Allies, with the aim of harmonizing assistance program for the states of the region, as appropriate.

NATO's South-East Europe Initiative promotes regional security and cooperation; it supports and complements the objectives of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, adopted by Ministers in Cologne in June and endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Sarajevo Summit in July. NATO is participating fully in the work of the Regional Table and the Working Tables established to implement the Stability Pact. The Alliance will continue to contribute to the success of the Stability Pact by making available its wealth of experience and expertise in practical military and defense-related cooperation and by ensuring that our efforts complement and contribute to the goals of the Pact.

We welcome the constructive contribution of Partners and other nations of South-East Europe to the stabilization of that region. We applaud the engagement of Montenegro in the Stability Pact and look forward to the time when the FRY will be able to play its rightful part in this endeavor.

We direct the Council in Permanent session to pursue vigorously the various efforts under the South-East Europe Initiative and the Alliance's contribution to the objectives of the Stability Pact, and to report on progress by the time of our next meeting.

16. In its Strategic Concept, NATO has committed itself to contribute to effective conflict prevention. Our common efforts to build peace and security in Kosovo, to support a peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina and to enhance cooperation, including security cooperation, in South-Eastern Europe, are examples of such contributions by the Alliance, as are the recent initiatives to promote practical regional cooperation in the EAPC/PfP framework. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate.
17. Our experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO must continue to adapt and improve its defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions. Implementation of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), agreed in Washington, will ensure that NATO's forces can meet the challenges of mobility, deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability and interoperable and effective command, control and communications systems. The DCI will also promote greater interoperability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between Allied and Partner forces. The DCI is essential to strengthening European defense



capabilities and the European pillar of NATO, so that European Allies will be able to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO. It will also improve their capability to undertake EU-led operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We are encouraged by the useful initial results achieved to date in implementing the DCI and look forward to further essential improvements in Alliance defense capabilities. Though the implementation of DCI is first and foremost a national responsibility, the provision of adequate resources, including multinational, joint and common funding arrangements, will be a critical factor.

18. The development of an effective ESDI will strengthen the Alliance, through which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives wherever possible. We are committed to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. Building on existing arrangements between NATO and the WEU as agreed in Berlin, and reaffirmed at our Washington Summit, we support the development within NATO of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. These developments will also result in a stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship.
19. We have set in train work on the development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance as set out in the Washington Summit Communiqué and the Strategic Concept. In this context, we have initiated discussions in the Alliance to address means to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU; participation of non-EU European Allies; as well as practical arrangements for assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities and for ready EU access to NATO collective assets and capabilities on a case-by-case basis and by consensus as set out at Washington.
20. Alliance work will proceed on the Washington Summit agenda, on an ongoing basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. In this regard, we note the results of the European Council meeting in Helsinki on the strengthening of the common European policy on security and defense and on the development of modalities for EU/NATO relations, which represent a major contribution to the process of reinforcing our Alliance and its European pillar. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that this process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army. In this regard:
  - a. We note the European Union's decision to set a common European headline goal and to develop collective capability goals to improve European military capabilities. The contribution of the non-EU European Allies to this process is and will be important. We applaud the determination of all European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defense capabilities. The EU's headline and capability goals and the objectives arising from NATO's DCI will be mutually

reinforcing, using - subject to the necessary decisions - existing defense planning procedures including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process of the PFP, noting that in addition EU Ministers will develop a method of consultation and a regular review of progress made.

- b. We reiterate our readiness to define and adopt, in accordance with our decisions taken in Washington, the necessary arrangements for European Union ready access to separable but not separate NATO collective assets and capabilities, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance, respecting the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure.
- c. We note the decision of the EU to set up, in future, appropriate structures to ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with European NATO members which are not members of the EU on issues related to European security and defense policy and crisis management. In this respect, we underline, as we did at the Washington Summit, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies, for the necessary involvement of non-EU European Allies in these structures.

We note that the non-EU European NATO members will participate, if they so wish, in the event of an operation involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities, and that they will be invited, upon decision by the EU, to take part in other EU-led operations. We see these EU decisions as important steps to achieve the goals envisaged by our Heads of State and Government at the Washington Summit. Participation of non-EU European Allies will enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military operations and will contribute directly to the effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of NATO.

- d. We recognize the European Union's decision to establish permanent political and military structures and interim bodies, and its commitment to develop, under the Portuguese Presidency, modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU. We note that this, as with all the tasks entrusted to the Portuguese Presidency, is to be carried forward as a matter of priority. We reciprocate the EU's intention to develop appropriate modalities for a close and confident relationship between the two organizations. We welcome as a first step the informal contacts between the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.
21. We welcome the participation in our discussions of Dr. Javier Solana. As Secretary General of the Western European Union, his presence symbolizes the close relationship that has developed between NATO and the WEU. The Alliance continues to work with the WEU to complete and implement arrangements to facilitate cooperation between the two organizations in the event of a WEU-led military operation using NATO assets and capabilities. We look forward to

exercising these arrangements in a crisis management exercise between NATO and the WEU scheduled for February 2000.

22. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to proceed with its work as set out at the Washington Summit, taking into account the developments described above, and report to us at our next meeting.
23. The Alliance reaffirms its commitment to remain open to new members. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. The three new members will not be the last.

At the Washington Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to reinforce NATO's commitment to the openness of the Alliance. We have received today a report on the implementation of the MAP to date. We are pleased that the MAP process has made an effective start and met with a positive response of the nine aspiring countries. Aspirants have submitted annual national program which enable the Alliance to provide them with direct advice, feedback and assistance on their preparations for possible future membership.

24. We encourage all aspirants to set themselves realistic, prioritized goals and timelines and to allocate the necessary resources to them. We stand ready to assist the aspirants in their efforts to meet the goals they have set. To this end, we will develop with them Planning Targets in the defense/military field and tailored PfP Individual Partnership Program. Meetings of the Council will take place next Spring with each aspirant to examine progress made. We will keep the enlargement process, including implementation of the MAP, under continual review. We expect the annual consolidated progress report on activities under the MAP at our next Ministerial.
25. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council remains the key forum for regular consultation on security and defense related issues between the Alliance and its Partners. We welcome the expansion of activities within the EAPC/PfP framework to promote practical cooperation, including regional cooperation notably in South-East Europe, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Enhanced cooperation in support of, inter alia, peacekeeping, global humanitarian mine action and addressing the challenges of small arms and light weapons underline the role of the EAPC as a vital and dynamic institution in enhancing security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
26. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the Washington Summit decision to further enhance the Partnership for Peace and make it more operational. We welcome the approval of the first Ministerial Guidance of the

PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the development of Partnership goals as a substantial step forward in bringing the force planning processes of Partners closer to those of Allies. We also welcome the progress that has been made in involving Partners as troop contributing nations in consultations, planning, conduct and political oversight of the present operations in the Balkans, in accordance with the Political-Military Framework (PMF) for NATO-led PfP operations. We endorse the Operational Capabilities Concept which will reinforce PfP's operational capabilities and improve the capability and interoperability of Partner forces, as well as enhance the Alliance's overall ability to put together tailored force packages to mount and sustain future NATO-led PfP operations along the lines of SFOR and KFOR. The Concept will continue to evolve. We appreciate the substantial progress achieved so far on the Training and Education Enhancement Program. We look forward to a report by the Council in Permanent Session on progress made on these important initiatives at our Spring 2000 meeting.

27. We welcome the recent signing by Ireland of the PfP Framework Document and we look forward to close cooperation with Ireland in the PfP and EAPC.
28. We continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with Russia. Our aim remains to establish a strong, stable and enduring partnership within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
29. We note the progress made in recent consultations in the PJC framework on issues relating to the operation in Kosovo. We note with satisfaction the valuable experience of practical cooperation between NATO and Russian forces both in SFOR and KFOR.
30. We encourage Russia to resume cooperation on the broad range of issues foreseen in the Founding Act and to engage actively in the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace. At the same time, we emphasize that the further development of our cooperation depends on Russia's respect for international norms and obligations.
31. We are deeply concerned about the conflict in Chechnya, continuing reports of civilian casualties there and the plight of displaced persons. We condemn, in particular, Russian threats against unarmed civilians, such as those in Grozny. We acknowledge the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and to protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness. We condemn terrorism in all its manifestations but believe that Russia's pursuit of a purely military solution to the conflict is undermining its legitimate objectives. The continuing disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population is incompatible with the commitments Russia has undertaken within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. In this context, we also recall the principles enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. We therefore urge Russia to exercise the fullest restraint, to refrain from the use of force against civilians and protect their human rights, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, and to co-operate fully with

international relief agencies and to ensure security for their operations. Bearing in mind the importance of regional stability and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighboring states, we are deeply concerned about the impact of the crisis of the entire Caucasus region and stress the need to avoid steps that would further undermine regional security.

We urge Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict. To this end, it is essential that the Russian government and Chechen representatives take meaningful steps toward a renewed dialogue. We also urge the Chechen authorities to condemn terrorism and to take action against it. We expect Russia to respect the commitments made in Istanbul and to make good use of today's visit by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to the region in order to facilitate a political process to end the conflict.

32. We welcome the progressive development of the NATO-Ukraine distinctive partnership in accordance with the Charter signed in Madrid in 1997. We are pleased that this partnership is providing a framework for cooperative initiatives such as the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, which is actively engaged with Ukrainian media, universities and think-tanks. We also note that a NATO Liaison Office has been operational in Kyiv since April, and is providing a valuable contribution to facilitating Ukraine's full participation in the Partnership for Peace program and more generally, to enhancing cooperation between NATO and Ukrainian authorities.
33. We continue to support the efforts of the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform and remain prepared to provide advice, as appropriate, to assist Ukraine with the transformation of its defense establishment. In the economic area, we welcome the initiation of a program for the retraining of retired military officers. Cooperation is also developing in the fields of civil emergency planning, air-traffic management, armaments-related partnership activities, defense research and technology, and science. We reiterate our view that a speedy ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement by Ukraine will further the goals of our cooperation.
34. We encourage Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms, and reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's efforts to this end. In this context, we welcome Ukraine's commitment to exploit the full potential of the NATO-Ukraine Charter and express our appreciation for Ukraine's concrete contribution to peace and stability in the Balkans, in particular through its participation in KFOR. We look forward to today's meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Foreign Ministers' session.
35. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the progress achieved in strengthening the Mediterranean Dialogue as agreed at the Washington Summit. The last round of political consultations with the six

Mediterranean Dialogue countries held in October and November, offered an opportunity for sharing views on the implementation and future development of the Dialogue, including the Work Program for 2000. We recognize the interest of our Mediterranean partners in developing the Dialogue, including through a strengthened cooperation in areas where NATO can bring added value.

36. We acknowledge the role played by the recently-designated Contact Point Embassies and we encourage the Mediterranean Cooperation Group to continue its efforts to progressively develop the Dialogue. Visits by NATO representatives have improved the prospects for closer contacts and cooperation. We welcome and encourage Allied nations and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to organize events such as the Rome Conference in 1997 and the Valencia Conference in 1999, as positive steps to strengthen mutual regional understanding. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the political and practical cooperation in the Dialogue agreed in Washington.
37. We welcome the adoption of the OSCE Istanbul Charter on European Security, in particular the emphasis in the Charter on closer cooperation among international organizations. We also welcome the adoption of the Platform for Cooperative Security. The adoption of the Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence and Security Building Measures constitutes an important step towards increased transparency in military matters among OSCE participating states. We look forward to further intensifying cooperation between NATO and OSCE, notably in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.
38. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play an important role in the achievement of NATO's security objectives.
39. The Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on 19 November, will ensure the continuing viability of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and stability. The Allies made comprehensive proposals which served as an important basis for the negotiations, in particular for the introduction of a system of nationally based equipment limits and improvements to the Treaty provisions concerning stability, transparency and predictability. The Adapted Treaty will enhance security throughout Europe, not least as it introduces a more constraining structure of National and Territorial Ceilings, while permitting sufficient deployment flexibility for routine training purposes and effective crisis management, thereby ensuring NATO's ability to fulfill its responsibilities. We are pleased that the Adapted Treaty will permit accession by new States Parties and strengthen Treaty requirements concerning host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces.
40. We welcome the important political commitments contained in the CFE Final Act, in particular the bilateral agreements reached by Russia and Georgia, and Russia and Moldova, on withdrawal of Russian Forces. But it is essential that the

CFE Treaty remains effective and credible. NATO countries are concerned about continued Russian non-compliance with the Treaty's Article V («flank») limits. We note Russia's commitment to comply with all the Treaty's provisions and limitations. We also note Russia's assurances that its exceeding of CFE limits will be of a temporary nature. NATO Allies expect Russia to honor its pledge to comply with CFE limits as soon as possible and, in the meantime, to provide maximum transparency regarding its forces and weapons deployed in the North Caucasus, in accordance with the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document. Entry into Force of the Adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's limitations. It is on this basis that we will work towards bringing the Adapted Treaty into force. Pending the completion of this process, the continued implementation of the existing Treaty and its associated documents remains crucial.

41. The Alliance attaches importance to preserving strategic stability. In this respect, we call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions on nuclear weapons stockpiles. We underscore the importance of achieving a successful conclusion to the upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Spring 2000. In this context, we reiterate our full support of all efforts towards universal adherence, full implementation and further strengthening the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We reaffirm our commitment to efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons.

We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty as soon as possible. We call for the early start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

42. The prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery remains our primary aim. We remain committed to preventing proliferation and reversing it where it has occurred through diplomatic means. We recognize that proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery, which pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory and forces, can continue to occur despite our preventive efforts and can pose a direct military threat to those populations, territories and forces.

We continue to attach the utmost importance to full implementation and rigorous verification of international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. We note with satisfaction that the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is proceeding well and welcome the progress made in the negotiations in Geneva on a legally binding Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by ensuring effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency. We urge that additional efforts be made to complete the remaining

work as soon as possible before the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC in 2001.

43. We welcome the progress made by the Alliance in implementing the Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction. NATO's new WMD Centre, which we expect to be operational in early 2000, will provide an effective additional means to address both the political and defense challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, and will promote more active and regular intra-Alliance consultations and cooperation on this important issue. Significant progress has been made in setting in place an enhanced WMD intelligence database and information repository, which will aim at improving the quality and increasing the quantity of intelligence and information sharing among Allies to support efforts by NATO members to address proliferation issues. We support deepening consultations with Russia in these areas within the Permanent Joint Council, as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners in the EAPC, as well as with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.
44. At the Washington Summit, our leaders committed the Alliance to consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament, in the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons. We have decided to set in train this process and have instructed the Council in Permanent Session to task the Senior Political Committee, reinforced by political and defense experts as appropriate, to review Alliance policy options in support of confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, and arms control and disarmament, so that a comprehensive and integrated approach to the accomplishment of the remit agreed at the Washington Summit is ensured. The responsible NATO bodies will contribute to this review. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session to submit a report to Ministers for their consideration in December 2000. We believe that this process will reinforce the Allies' contribution in advancing confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament.
45. In order to enhance the effectiveness of Civil-Military Cooperation, confirmed in the Strategic Concept as essential to the Alliance's operational capability, a fundamental review of civil emergency planning in NATO is nearing completion. We welcome the progress made. A close working relationship between the civil and military communities will contribute to a more effective use of Allied and Partner civilian resources in Alliance activities such as peace support operations. We look forward to the completion of this review at an early date. We will continue and consolidate the excellent cooperation with Partners in this field, including through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre, which played an important role in contributing to the relief of the humanitarian crisis in and around Kosovo, and in supporting Allied national authorities following recent natural disasters.
46. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our



international commitments and national legislation. The terrorist threat against deployed NATO forces and NATO installations requires the consideration and development of appropriate measures for their continued protection taking full account of host nation responsibilities.

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47. At the Washington Summit our leaders took the steps to ensure that our Alliance will remain the bedrock of our collective defense, and continue to play a key role in the development of a secure and stable peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, as we enter the 21st century, we can state with confidence that NATO is ready to face the challenges of the future.

## APPENDIX E

Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2000) 124 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 2000

*Final Communiqué*

**Issued at the Ministerial Meeting  
of the North Atlantic Council**

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1. At our meeting, we took stock of the progress made in NATO's ongoing efforts to bring lasting peace and stability to South-East Europe, and gave guidance for further implementation of the Washington Summit decisions.
2. We reaffirm NATO's strong commitment to the achievement of security, stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights in South-East Europe and will continue to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. We welcome the progress achieved in our relations with Croatia and the significant changes which have taken place in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). These encouraging changes offer new prospects of lasting stability in the region and further progress towards regional integration. They also bring closer the day when all countries in the region take their place in the Euro-Atlantic structures.
3. We pay tribute to the men and women of all nations serving in SFOR and KFOR for their professionalism and dedication to the cause of peace and stability. We express our deep sympathy to the families of those who have lost their lives or been injured in the course of their mission. We are grateful to NATO's Partners and other nations for the substantial contributions they are making to this effort. We reiterate our appreciation for the ongoing efforts of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in supporting KFOR.
4. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries in the region. We emphasize our determination to promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
5. We welcome the results of the Summit meeting between the European Union and the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process held in Zagreb on 24

November 2000. This meeting was an important step on the way towards reconciliation, increased regional cooperation and long-term stabilization. We also welcome in this regard the informal Summit of the South-East Europe Cooperation Process organized in Skopje on 25 October with the participation of all South-East Europe countries, which was also the first meeting attended at summit level by the new FRY democratic authorities.

6. We welcome the democratic changes that have taken place in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after September's parliamentary and presidential elections. We warmly welcome the admission of the FRY to the United Nations, the OSCE and other international fora. We also welcome the FRY's admission to the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, as well as the normalization of its diplomatic relationships with Allies. We support the democratic aspirations of the people of the FRY and the efforts of President Kostunica to lead his country towards the development of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and full international participation. We look forward to the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Serbia and hope that they will consolidate the democratic process.
7. The democratic changes in the FRY will pave the way for increased stability across the region and offer new opportunities for regional cooperation. We welcome the FRY's willingness to improve its relations with its neighbors, and to co-operate towards the full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. We note the FRY's more cooperative stance towards the ICTY and look forward to further steps in this direction. We welcome the lessening of tension between Serbia and Montenegro and the ongoing discussions on their future constitutional relationship within the FRY.
8. Recent acts of violence by insurgent elements in the Presevo Valley and the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) adjacent to the internal boundary between Kosovo and Serbia, are of concern to NATO and KFOR. We commend the efforts of KFOR to prohibit support from Kosovo for these elements. We condemn the violence caused by extremists and call on the perpetrators to cease their illegal activity forthwith. Any extremist activity and the possibility of an escalation of violence present a continuing threat to stability in the region, especially for neighboring countries. We note the commitment by the present FRY authorities to abide by the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA), and to use the Joint Implementation Commission to address this sensitive area, and recognize their current policy of restraint. We express our strong support for the steps taken by COMKFOR to increase control and enhance security, and welcome the recent positive correspondence between President Kostunica and the Secretary General.
9. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of UNSCR 1244. We are determined to continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions. We express our strong support for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Special Representative of

the Secretary General (SRSG), and commend the excellent cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK in implementing UNSCR 1244. We thank Dr. Bernard Kouchner for his efforts as SRSG, and welcome the appointment of Mr. Hans Hækkerup, the Minister of Defense of Denmark, to take up the position in January.

10. The municipal elections in late October were a milestone for democratic development in Kosovo. We applaud the conduct of these elections and the close cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK in supporting the OSCE's leading role in the process. These elections provide an important foundation for the further development of provisional, democratic self-governing institutions, in accordance with UNSCR 1244.
11. We fully support the efforts of the SRSG to establish local democratic, self-governing institutions in Kosovo. We call upon the new representatives on the Kosovo municipal councils to carry out their duties responsibly, in close cooperation with the international community. We encourage all the people of Kosovo to participate fully in this process.
12. The protection and security of all the people of Kosovo remain a priority. KFOR will continue to play a key role in ensuring public security in Kosovo and to carry out its duties in a robust and even-handed manner. In this connection, we strongly commend KFOR's continued efforts regarding the seizure and destruction of illegal arms. We note that substantial progress has been made in reducing violence in Kosovo. Violence from any quarter, whether ethnically, politically or criminally motivated, is unacceptable. In particular, we condemn the recent bombing of the FRY liaison office in Pristina and the politically motivated assassination of Mr. Xhemajl Mustafa, Mr. Ibrahim Rugova's adviser. We remain concerned about the high level of organized crime which is a continuing threat to the people of Kosovo and neighboring countries. We call upon all Kosovo inhabitants to support the significant efforts being made by KFOR and UNMIK to strengthen the rule of law. We welcome the increase in numbers of UNMIK police, who are now deployed throughout the province, and stress the importance of maintaining a high level of support to UNMIK in this area. We also commend the efforts of the OSCE in training and establishing the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). We support the efforts of the international community to establish a functioning judicial system in Kosovo, but acknowledge that much work remains to be done in this respect.
13. The release of all Kosovar Albanians detained in Serbia without proper grounds is a matter of urgency, as is accurate accounting for all missing persons, including in Kosovo. We are pleased to note that UNMIK and the FRY have initiated constructive talks to help resolve these issues. In this respect, we welcome especially the release of human rights campaigner Flora Brovina as a step in the right direction. We also underscore the right of all displaced persons and refugees, including Kosovo Serb and other ethnic minorities, to return to their homes, under secure and safe conditions. We call upon all communities in Kosovo to work towards this goal in cooperation with KFOR and UNMIK.
14. We note the progress that has been made in establishing the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), and the reduced number of non-compliance cases. We are aware

that improvements are still needed, especially with regard to full compliance, and will support efforts to ensure that the KPC has the means and proper tasking to fulfill its designated civilian role. KFOR will continue to exercise close supervision over the KPC.

15. We welcome the decision of our Defense Ministers to maintain KFOR's overall force levels at present and that the Council in Permanent Session should conduct a further review of KFOR's role and missions.
16. We remain firmly committed to the full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the objectives of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) as set out in its Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels in May 2000, and its determination to integrate Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, multi-ethnic, democratic state into Euro-Atlantic structures. Following the recent elections, we hope to see the incoming executive and legislative authorities, at state as well as entity level, in place and functioning effectively as soon as possible. We will continue to work closely, in particular through SFOR, with the High Representative and with other organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
17. Five years after the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement and despite the sustained efforts and resources of the international community, it is clear to us that greater and more rapid progress needs to be made in Bosnia and Herzegovina towards a self-sustaining, multi-ethnic democracy. The responsibility for achieving this lies with the leaders of communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who have too often been unwilling to look beyond their ethnic allegiances.
18. We welcome the successful conduct of the general elections in November under the supervision of the OSCE. We are encouraged by the increased support for moderate parties, while the continuing appeal of hard-line nationalist parties remains a cause for concern. We call on the newly elected leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to commit themselves to the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, taking on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process. In particular, we encourage them to redouble their efforts to improve the functioning of state level institutions.
19. We welcome the progress made so far in increased levels of refugee returns, civil reconstruction, reductions in Entity military manpower and defense expenditures, the inauguration of the State Border Service and the continued compliance with the establishment of the Brcko district and its demilitarization. Nonetheless, important challenges remain. In particular, further progress must be achieved in market reform, economic re-construction and the creation of a self-sustaining economy and a single economic space; the adjudication of property claims enabling the return of refugees and displaced persons especially to areas in which their ethnic groups are in the minority; improving the effectiveness of all state level institutions and cooperation between Entities; transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes; the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret services; judicial and police reform; and the full functioning of the

State Border Service. We support the High Representative in his use of the authority accorded to him to advance this agenda.

20. We urge the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the objectives of Annex I B of the Dayton Peace Agreement concerning confidence-building and security measures. We encourage the Presidency to give priority, through the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM), to the relevant military issues addressed by the Peace Implementation Council in May 2000. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs armed forces with a unified command and control capable of joint deployment and joint action under international and regional security organizations. We welcome the additional 15% reduction in Entity military manpower and defense expenditures which will be accomplished by the end of this year and call for rapid progress in further reducing and restructuring the Entities' armed forces, pursuant to development and implementation of a common defense policy. We support SFOR's efforts in this regard and its efforts to strengthen the SCMM. We reaffirm our commitment to further contribute to enhancing stability and confidence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to strengthen cooperation between the Entities' armed forces. We call upon the countries neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, in particular those countries which are signatories of this Agreement.
21. We endorse SFOR's continuing close working relationship with the civilian agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We reaffirm that SFOR will continue to support the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, while stressing that the Entities continue to carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for war crimes.
22. We welcome the conclusions of our Defense Ministers who reviewed SFOR's force levels and structure and concluded that they should be maintained for the present. They directed our Permanent Representatives to provide advice on a medium-term strategy, including a full range of options for the future size and structure of SFOR, for consideration at their next meeting. We note, inter alia, the need to fully resource the Multinational Specialized Units to agreed levels.
23. We received the Consolidated Progress Report on the Implementation of the Alliance's South-East Europe Initiative (SEEI). We noted with satisfaction the achievements to date of the SEEI, launched at the Washington Summit, which supports and encourages regional cooperation and helps individual countries in their efforts to draw closer to Euro-Atlantic institutions. NATO's efforts are aimed at enabling the countries of the region to work together to ensure their own security and thus support and complement the objectives of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. We welcome the progress achieved by the countries of the region in implementing the specific activities in the framework of NATO's SEEI, including the South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP) and the Regional Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges (SEECAP). Through such initiatives, the SEEI has also been making a significant contribution to the Stability Pact, particularly to its Working Table on security issues.

24. We applaud the cooperation between the Alliance, the World Bank, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, facilitated through the Stability Pact, to retrain and reintegrate former military officers into the civilian economy. The Alliance is ready to assist in drawing up a similar program for Albania. We look forward to contributing to the Stability Pact effort to develop a South-East Europe regional civil-military emergency response capability through its Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Initiative.
25. We look forward to a further progress report from the Council in Permanent Session on implementation of the SEEI and its contribution to the Stability Pact at our next regular meeting in Spring 2001.
26. We reviewed progress achieved to date in implementing the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), and endorse the statement by our Defense Ministers on this subject. DCI will provide the forces and capabilities the Alliance urgently requires to meet the security challenges of the 21st century by ensuring the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions. DCI's purpose is to facilitate the Alliance's movement towards forces that are more interoperable, more mobile, readily deployable and highly capable. Furthering the objectives of DCI continues to require sustained commitment - both at NATO and in capitals. We believe that we have reached an important stage in implementing the DCI. We remain committed to providing sufficient resources to ensure its implementation. We are also committed to making the most effective use of resources and to finding innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common funding. Ultimately, however, the implementation of DCI will depend on the adequacy of national defense budgets. We endorse the decision of our Defense Ministers to extend until 2002 the mandate of the High Level Steering Group, which is charged with overseeing the implementation of the DCI, in order to maintain the necessary high level engagement by nations in the initiative.
27. The DCI will also promote greater interoperability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between Allied and Partner forces. The efforts of the Alliance and Allied nations to implement DCI and the efforts of the EU to enhance European capabilities are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, implementation of DCI will also strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and improve the capability of European Allies to undertake EU-led operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. Because Partners have an important part to play in future NATO-led operations, we welcome their current engagement in elements of the DCI.
28. We took stock of the progress made to date on the development of the European Security and Defense Identity in accordance with the decisions taken at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings. We reaffirmed our determination to reinforce NATO's European pillar and remain committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. We share the goal endorsed by EU Member States at the Nice European Council for a genuine strategic partnership in crisis management between NATO and the EU. The Alliance will

remain the foundation for the collective defense of its members and continue actively to play its important role in crisis management as set out in the Strategic Concept. The partnership between NATO and the EU and the development of a capable and effective ESDI, in accordance with the principles set out at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, will strengthen the Alliance through which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives wherever possible.

29. We welcome the intensification of the dialogue between the Alliance and the European Union since our last meeting in Florence. In this context, we look forward to the working dinner between Foreign Ministers of NATO and the European Union later today, which is an important step towards establishing a close, confident and mutually beneficial relationship between the two organizations. We have made progress in the NATO-EU ad hoc working groups which have met to discuss security issues, permanent arrangements for consultation and cooperation, modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and capability goals - taking into account all relevant matters, including those related to participation. Together with the two meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the EU interim Political and Security Committee in September and November, they have enhanced the understanding of the two organizations and their members on how they might most effectively cooperate in the future. We look forward to their future work as well as to future meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee with a view to developing all the elements of the envisaged NATO-EU relations. We also welcome the establishment of an interim security agreement between the two organizations and note NATO's readiness to conclude a permanent security agreement with the European Union as a matter of priority.
30. The European Allies are committed to further strengthening their military capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. This will enhance their ability to contribute both to the Alliance's missions and to EU-led operations for Petersburg tasks where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that this process does not imply the creation of a European army and that the commitment of national resources for EU-led operations will be based on sovereign decisions. We welcome the efforts made in the EU towards meeting its Headline Goal by 2003 as set out at the Helsinki European Council, thus contributing to the improvement and strengthening of European military capabilities. Alliance experts, on the basis of a Council decision, have contributed military and technical advice to the work of EU experts on a catalogue of forces and capabilities for the EU Headline Goal. We note the EU's acknowledgement of the value of this input. NATO stands ready to provide, subject to the necessary decisions, further expert advice upon request by the EU. We welcome the pledges made at the recent EU Capabilities Commitment Conference, noting the EU's appreciation of the significant additional contributions offered by non-EU European Allies to the pool of forces available for EU-led operations. Such contributions, as expressed on 21 November 2000 at the meeting between the EU and the non-EU European Allies, are important and will enhance the range of capabilities potentially available to the EU. We note the



EU's recognition of the need for further capability improvements. The Alliance's Defense Capabilities Initiative is also supporting the enhancement of European capabilities. The objectives arising from NATO's DCI and the EU's Headline Goal are mutually reinforcing.

31. We note and welcome the proposals made by the European Council at Nice for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and cooperation between NATO and the EU. We agree that consultations and cooperation will be developed between the two organizations on questions of common interest relating to security, defense and crisis management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured.

We look forward to the early establishment of such mutually satisfactory arrangements based on the principles enunciated in Washington and at subsequent Ministerial meetings, which will be taken into account in the framework agreement establishing these arrangements. These arrangements are key to a close, confident and transparent relationship between the two organizations as foreseen at the Washington Summit.

We welcome the intention of the European Union that this dialogue should be pursued through a regular pattern of meetings at Ministerial, North Atlantic Council/Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and expert level as well as through contacts with Secretariats to ensure consultation, cooperation and transparency. We endorse the view of the EU that in the emergency phase of a crisis contacts and meetings will be stepped up. In the view of the Alliance, meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee outside times of crisis should be held not less than three times, and Ministerial meetings once, per EU Presidency; either organization may request additional meetings as necessary.

We welcome the Nice provisions on invitations for the NATO Secretary General, Chairman of the Military Committee and DSACEUR, in accordance with his terms of reference, to EU meetings. For our part, on the basis of reciprocity, we will invite the EU Presidency and Secretary General/High Representative to NATO meetings. The Chairman of the EU Military Committee or his representative will similarly be invited to meetings of the NATO Military Committee.

The Alliance agrees that these proposals constitute the basis for the permanent NATO/EU agreement. We stand ready to work to finalize this agreement without delay.

32. We underline, as we did at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies to the issue of participation. We note the provisions agreed by the European Council at Nice for dialogue, consultation and cooperation with non-EU European Allies on issues related to security and defense policy and crisis management and as well as the

modalities for participation in EU-led military operations. We welcome the commitment to intensify consultation in times of crisis, which will also enable non-EU European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security interests might be involved. It is particularly important in this context that non-EU European Allies can request meetings with the European Union and submit proposals for agenda items.

Allies look forward to the broad and effective practical implementation of these arrangements, in particular for consultation and cooperation with the EU Political and Security Committee and EU Military Committee and, as appropriate, with the EU military staff, so as to ensure that the Allies concerned derive maximum benefit from them and to enable the Allies concerned to contribute effectively. In this context, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, we stress the importance we attach to respecting the security interests of all Allies and the obligations which they have to each other as Allies.

We also welcome the EU's decision at Nice on initial proposals to develop dialogue, cooperation and consultation with Canada, including a commitment to intensify consultation in times of crisis, particularly when the EU is considering an operation using NATO assets and capabilities.

33. Taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU, work on ESDI is continuing within the Alliance as directed at the Washington Summit and agreed at subsequent Ministerial meetings. It has proceeded on the principle that nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed - the participation issue is also relevant in this context. On this basis, and consistent with the decisions taken at Washington and subsequent Ministerial meetings, work has progressed on the various aspects of the Washington agenda. Subject to this, we intend to put in place arrangements for: assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; the identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; and the further adaptation of the Alliance's defense planning system, taking account of relevant activities in and proposals from the European Union. Allies will be consulted on the EU's proposed use of assets and capabilities, prior to the decision to release these assets and capabilities, and kept informed during the operation.
34. Important work remains to be done which we will pursue intensively. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue work on the implementation of the ESDI decisions on the basis of the agenda above, and to report to us at our next meeting.
35. We note the decisions taken at the Ministerial meeting of the WEU held in Marseille in November, particular that WEU/NATO routine consultations mechanisms will be suspended, except for those that still need to be applied

during the transition period, in particular for the joint exercise study next year, JES 2001, to which we look forward. We appreciate the WEU's important contribution to the development of the European security and defense architecture. We have valued the close cooperation between NATO and the WEU and pay tribute to the work of the WEU and NATO staffs in support of it.

36. Recalling the decisions taken at the Washington Summit, we reaffirm the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Washington Treaty will be excluded from consideration regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on its own merits.
37. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process underlines NATO's commitment to its Open Door policy by assisting the nine aspiring countries in their own efforts to prepare for possible future membership. We welcome the streamlining of this process, which we have undertaken in consultation with aspirants, to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. In the second annual cycle of the MAP we continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on their preparations for possible future membership. We noted a report on the implementation of the second annual cycle to date. We welcome the aspirants' continuing strong commitment to reform, including to defense reform and the modernization of their armed forces as expressed by their Defense Ministers, and encourage them to build on the progress achieved so far. The aspirants should continue to pursue vigorously the challenging goals they have set themselves, ensuring that clear priorities are established and sufficient resources allocated to them.
38. We look forward to receiving a Consolidated Progress Report on the results of the second annual cycle of the MAP at our next meeting, as part of our ongoing review of the enlargement process, including the implementation of the Membership Action Plan. Heads of State and Government will review this process at the next Summit to be held no later than 2002.
39. We continue to place high priority on the strengthening of our partnership with all members of the Euro-Atlantic community through the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace. We believe that Partnership is pivotal to the role of the Alliance in promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and contributes to the enhancement of the Alliance's capabilities in crisis management. We welcome the activities within the EAPC/PfP framework to enhance transparency, confidence and cooperation among all members of the Euro-Atlantic Community and we remain firmly committed to the continued development of the EAPC as a key forum for political consultation and practical cooperation on Euro-Atlantic security issues.
40. We note with satisfaction the many EAPC/PfP activities to promote practical regional cooperation in South-East Europe, as well as in the Caucasus and Central

Asia. We value the role of the Regional Ad Hoc Working Groups on South-East Europe and the Caucasus in promoting and supporting regional cooperation. We welcome continued efforts in the EAPC/PfP framework to support broader efforts underway to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in support of global humanitarian mine action and the promotion of International Humanitarian Law, among other EAPC priority areas. In particular, we welcome the recent establishment of a PfP Trust Fund on Anti-Personnel Landmine Stockpile Destruction and look forward to periodic reports on its activities. We support steps to strengthen the EAPC/PfP cooperation in promoting conflict prevention and crisis management, which will complement the work of other relevant institutions. We also support initiatives for further developing cooperation on information and outreach opportunities and welcome Partners' continuing interest in cooperation in civil emergency preparedness.

41. We noted reports on the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership, and the implementation of the Operational Capabilities Concept. We value highly the continuing progress in making the Partnership for Peace more operational and look forward to reviewing progress on these initiatives at our next meeting. We look forward to exploring with our Partners how we can help support their efforts to reorganize and restructure their defense establishments and armed forces, and will continue to make full use of the existing clearing house mechanisms to help Partners ensure optimum use of scarce resources in these reform efforts. We remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations. Within this Framework, we attach great importance to enhancing Partners' roles in the political guidance and oversight, planning, and command arrangements for NATO-led crisis response operations. We look forward to receiving at our next meeting a report by the Council in Permanent Session on progress achieved in implementing the Political-Military Framework.
42. We remain committed to building a strong, stable and enduring partnership with the Russian Federation in accordance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, on the basis of the principles of transparency and reciprocity. We welcome the progress made in resuming consultations and cooperation on a broad range of issues in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC).
43. We attach great importance to the continued dialogue and cooperation in the framework of the PJC on issues relating to the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, building on the valuable experience of practical cooperation with Russian forces in both SFOR and KFOR.
44. We value our ongoing consultations and cooperation with Russia in the framework of the PJC on such issues as strategy, defense policy and military doctrines, infrastructure development program, nuclear weapons, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, theatre missile defense, air defense, and other disarmament and arms control issues, including CFE and Open Skies, scientific and environmental issues, civil emergency preparedness, and the retraining of discharged military personnel. In particular, we look forward to implementing the program of cooperation between NATO and Russia on search and rescue at sea agreed by PJC Defense Ministers

on 5 December 2000 and to the early signature of a Memorandum of Understanding with Russia on environmental protection. We welcome the progressive resumption of Russian participation in the EAPC and would welcome active Russian participation in PfP.

45. We welcome the exchange of letters on the establishment of a NATO Information Office in Moscow and look forward to developing NATO's information activities in Russia. We attach great importance to the further development of military-to-military cooperation and are pursuing our negotiations with Russia with a view to opening a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow in the near future, as called for in the Founding Act.
46. In connection with the situation in North Caucasus, we reaffirm that a mutually satisfactory, just and durable solution to the conflict in Chechnya is urgent and essential and that the parties must take steps to begin a dialogue that can lead to a settlement. While acknowledging the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and its right and responsibility to protect all its citizens against criminality and terrorism which we condemn in all its forms, we urge Russia to respect its international obligations as a member of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, as well as the relevant principles enshrined in the Founding Act. We call on the Chechen side to co-operate in good faith in seeking a solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it.
47. We urge the Russian government to expedite the OSCE Assistance Group's return to Chechnya under its existing mandate. We deplore the continued loss of life and material damage inflicted upon the civilian population; this calls for prompt and independent investigation of violations of human rights and breaches of international law. We recall the importance we attach to the efforts of humanitarian assistance organizations to relieve the suffering of the displaced and call on Russia to support them fully.
48. We value our relationship with an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine and Ukraine's contribution to ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe and the continent as a whole. We are satisfied with the successful implementation of cooperative and consultative activities under the NATO-Ukraine Work Plan, which has contributed to a steady deepening of the distinctive partnership. We are determined to build on these achievements in 2001 and to ensure further implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Charter.
49. We are pleased with Ukraine's enhanced participation in PfP, both in its military and non-military aspects. We will continue to support the implementation of Ukraine's defense reform and welcome the enhanced role and new initiatives of the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform. We encourage Ukraine to pursue these efforts, and in that regard we welcome the approval of Ukraine's state program for the reform of the armed forces, and the recent Presidential Decree on its implementation. We reiterate our appreciation for Ukraine's continuing contribution to KFOR, which is an expression of Ukraine's commitment to our joint effort to build peace and stability in the region. Our cooperation in KFOR also contributes to improving interoperability between Ukraine's forces and those of the Allies. We welcome the ratification by the Verkhovna Rada of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

50. We continue to attach particular importance to the NATO Liaison Office, which plays a key role in enhancing Ukraine's participation in PfP. We also value the important role of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, as a means to increase public awareness of our distinctive partnership and to consolidate it.
51. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is an essential part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the progress achieved so far with respect to the implementation of decisions on enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue taken at the Washington Summit, and look forward to cooperation in the field of search and rescue, maritime safety, medical evacuation and humanitarian relief. We reaffirm the progressive nature of the Dialogue, and will continue to consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our cooperative relations with all the Mediterranean partners in accordance with the Washington Summit decisions, in areas where NATO can bring an added value and where partners have expressed interest. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the political and practical cooperation in the Dialogue. We hope that the Mediterranean Dialogue conference originally planned to take place in November will be rescheduled as soon as possible.
52. Although the Alliance is not involved in the Middle East Peace Process, we strongly support it and urge all participants to remain firmly committed to it.
53. We applaud the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. We welcome the significant role played by the OSCE in the Euro-Atlantic area, notably in South-East Europe. We encourage the speedy implementation of the commitments undertaken and the initiatives launched at the Istanbul Summit for strengthening the OSCE's operational capability, thus improving its crisis management capacity. We recall NATO's support for the Platform for Cooperative Security, in which the OSCE declared its intention to work with other institutions. We welcome the substantial progress made in the implementation of the Platform, particularly the enhanced contacts and cooperation between NATO and the OSCE on matters of common interest.
54. We welcome the work of the OSCE in assisting in the implementation of the Dayton/Paris Peace Accords and its contribution to the creation of a framework for peace and stability in South Eastern Europe. We call upon the States participating in the negotiations on regional stability under the Accords to make use of the fresh impetus generated by the participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the OSCE, with the aim of concluding their work by the agreed deadline. NATO stands ready to support the implementation of such an agreement within the framework of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe.
55. Recalling the Alliance's longstanding commitment to the goals of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, we welcome the comprehensive report on options for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament called for by our Heads of State and Government in Washington. We task the Council in Permanent Session to pursue vigorously implementation of the recommendations contained in this

report, including with Russia through the PJC. A public report has been released as a NATO document.

56. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the CFE Treaty we recognize the vital contribution the Treaty makes to the stability and security of Europe. The overall implementation of the Treaty since its entry into force in 1992 has brought positive results including significantly reduced holdings of Treaty-limited equipment, enhanced transparency and predictability. However, there continue to be both substantive and technical concerns with specific aspects of CFE implementation, which must be addressed. As we approach the next CFE review conference in 2001, we will seek intensified efforts to resolve these issues. Pending the completion of the process of ratifying the Adapted Treaty, the full and continued implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents remains crucial.
57. Early entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, which was signed last year by Heads of State and Government at the Istanbul OSCE Summit, will ensure CFE's continuing viability as a cornerstone of European security and stability. We are committed to that end and are pleased that the Adapted Treaty will permit accession by new States Parties. However, as we have made clear ever since Istanbul, we believe ratification by our governments can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels of armaments and equipment and consistent with the commitments contained in the CFE Final Act. In this regard we welcome President Putin's recent reaffirmation of Russia's intention to fulfill all CFE Treaty obligations and commitments. We expect concrete results consistent with that assurance. We remain particularly concerned about the continued high levels of Russian Treaty-limited equipment in relation to the Treaty's Article V ("Flank") limits. We continue to attach special importance to early and complete fulfillment of Russia's assurances of 1 November 1999, that its current equipment levels in the North Caucasus are of a temporary nature and will be reduced to CFE limits as soon as possible, in conditions of maximum transparency and in a manner consistent with agreed counting rules and procedures.
58. We look for no less timely and effective fulfillment of the CFE Final Act commitments requiring the reduction and withdrawal of Russian military forces from Georgia and Moldova in accordance with the timelines agreed at Istanbul. We welcome progress thus far in Georgia, but note the importance of full Russian withdrawal of excess Treaty-limited equipment by the end of this year, and of actual closure of designated Russian military bases by the middle of next year. However, there has been little tangible progress in implementation of the unconditional commitment to complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of Moldova. To meet the deadlines set at Istanbul, the pace of withdrawal should be accelerated. We applaud and support the efforts of individual Allies and OSCE Partners to facilitate these activities through financial and other assistance.
59. We continue to attach great importance to the ratification of the Open Skies Treaty and call on Russia and Belarus to ratify the Treaty to allow it to enter into force as soon as possible. Joint trial observation flights conducted by Signatories,

including Russia, have demonstrated the potential of the Open Skies Treaty for enhancing security and confidence.

60. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance as it poses risks to international and regional security and can pose a direct military threat to Allies' populations, territory and forces. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is unchanged: to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. In this context we continue to place great importance on non-proliferation regimes, international arms control and disarmament, and export control regimes as means to prevent proliferation.
61. Our response to the NBC threat should be consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security. We reaffirm that the Alliance's defense posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery. We note continued work in NATO inter alia on Theatre Missile Defense for point and area defense, in particular on the feasibility study on a possible system for the defense of deployed NATO forces. We will continue consultations in the Alliance on TMD issues.
62. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Alliance nations have dramatically reduced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and reaffirm their commitment to work for the further reduction of nuclear weapons globally. We confirm our full support and commitment to the implementation of the conclusions of the NPT Review Conference which agreed on the importance of universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to disarmament, safeguards and peaceful nuclear cooperation.
63. Last May we welcomed Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. We continue to attach greatest importance to an early entry into force of that Treaty and of an early conclusion of a START III agreement, while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons. Given the need to reduce the uncertainties surrounding substrategic nuclear weapons in Russia, we believe that a reaffirmation - and perhaps codification - of the 1991/92 Presidential Initiatives might be a first, but not exhaustive, step in this direction. We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and, in the meanwhile, urge all states to refrain from any acts which would defeat its object and purpose. Similarly, we remain committed to the immediate commencement, in the Conference on Disarmament, of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in accordance with the Mandate of the Special Coordinator.
64. We continue to emphasize the importance of universal accession and adherence to, as well as full compliance with, the Chemical Weapons Convention. We continue to regard as a matter of priority the conclusion of negotiations on appropriate measures, including possible verification measures and proposals to



strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), to be included as appropriate in a legally binding instrument. We reiterate our commitment to efforts to achieve such an instrument as soon as possible before the 5th Review Conference of the BTWC in 2001. We remain strongly committed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as an important element in our efforts to counter the proliferation of means for delivering weapons of mass destruction. During the past year, the MTCR partners have focused increasingly on new ideas for addressing the ongoing global missile threat and responses to face the challenge posed by indigenous missile program and exports. We will encourage countries that are not part of the MTCR to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives. We support ongoing efforts to achieve a code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation on the basis of these ideas.

65. We have continued consultations on the United States consideration of a limited National Missile Defense system. We took note of President Clinton's decision not to take steps now to begin deployment of such a system. As the President noted, the view of NATO Allies was a critical consideration in that decision. NATO will continue its consultations on this issue.
66. We are pleased that the implementation of the WMD Initiative is proceeding well and that the newly established WMD Centre is already contributing to improve co-ordination of all WMD-related activities at NATO Headquarters, including the strengthening of our commitments to arms control and non-proliferation.
67. The Alliance is currently engaged in very productive consultations with Russia under the Permanent Joint Council on proliferation-related matters, and we are continuing to prepare for discussions with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission, with Partners under the EAPC/PfP framework and with Mediterranean Dialogue countries.
68. We deplore the recent terrorist attacks against nationals of several NATO countries and deeply regret the tragic loss of life. Terrorism constitutes a threat to internal and international security, to peaceful relations between States and to their territorial integrity, to the development and functioning of democratic institutions throughout the world and to the enjoyment of human rights and civil liberties. We strongly condemn this scourge in all its manifestations, and reiterate our strong determination to combat it in full compliance with all our international commitments and national legislation.
69. The Alliance has completed the review of the role of civil emergency planning in NATO and agreed the political direction for the future. It is currently translating that direction into structures and procedures. The direction identified five roles for civil emergency planning, taking into account the results of the Washington Summit, particularly the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, experience in Bosnia and Kosovo and the advice of the NATO Military Authorities. These are: civil support for Alliance military operations under Article 5; civil support for non-Article 5 crisis response operations; support to national authorities in civil emergencies, including disaster response; support for national authorities in the protection of populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction; and cooperation with Partners. We recognize the important part played by the Euro-

Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre as a means of coordinating EAPC countries' humanitarian assistance in times of disaster, bearing in mind the leading role of the United Nations. Especially with a view to ensuring the effective conduct of non-Article 5 crisis response operations, NATO civil emergency planning will need increasingly to be coordinated with the work of the United Nations, which has the primary responsibility for humanitarian relief, and with other international organizations. Partners will be actively involved in this work and will have a valuable contribution to make to its success.

70. We endorse the welcome of our Defense Ministers for the continuing work and progress made to improve the resource management of the Alliance's military common funded budgets.
  71. A separate review with the objective of securing greater transparency and efficiency is also required for the NATO Civil Budget. We task the Council in Permanent Session to make recommendations for further consideration at our next meeting.
  72. We decided to hold the next NATO Summit in Prague and tasked the Council in Permanent Session to identify an appropriate date.
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## APPENDIX F

Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2001) 158 held at NATO HQ Brussels 6 Dec 2001

### *Final Communiqué*

**Issued at the Ministerial Meeting  
of the North Atlantic Council**

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1. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the Alliance. We deplore the loss of life which affected so many NATO members and partner countries. Today, we have issued a separate statement addressing NATO's response to terrorism and contribution to the campaign against this scourge. Against this background, we have taken stock of NATO's broad agenda, and given further guidance on its implementation in the run-up to the meeting of our Heads of State and Government in Prague next November.
2. Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship with Russia, enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest. We reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We have decided to give new impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating, with Russia, a new NATO-Russia Council, to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20. To that end, we have tasked the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding Act, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action. We intend that such cooperative mechanisms will be in place for, or prior to, our next meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002. NATO's fundamental objectives remain as set out in the Washington Treaty, under which provisions NATO will maintain its prerogative of independent decision and action at 19 on all issues consistent with its obligations and responsibilities.
3. We are pleased that Russia stands with us in the struggle against terrorism, and believe this will contribute significantly to our common goal of a strong, stable and enduring NATO-Russia partnership. We are intensifying our cooperation in

this and other areas, including non-proliferation, export control and arms control matters, arms transparency and confidence building measures, missile defense, search and rescue at sea, and military-to-military cooperation, which represents a major step towards a qualitatively new relationship. We support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her right to protect all citizens against terrorism and criminality. We welcome the initial steps Russia has taken towards establishing a political dialogue over the conflict in Chechnya. We urge Russia to build on these steps to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful resolution to the conflict and to respect and protect the human and legal rights of the population. We call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take actions against it.

4. At their Prague Summit in November next year, our Heads of State and Government will launch the next round of NATO enlargement. We encourage the nine aspirant countries to continue focused efforts to prepare for possible future membership, making full use of the opportunities offered through our Membership Action Plan (MAP). We look forward to receiving a Consolidated Progress Report on activities under the MAP in 2001-2002 at our meeting next Spring. We will continue the MAP process beyond the current cycle. While aspirants continue their preparations, NATO is undertaking its own internal preparations for the admission of new members. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the issues that need to be examined in order to prepare comprehensive recommendations for decisions by our Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit.
5. We reaffirm our commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe, and our determination to oppose all violence, whether ethnically, politically or criminally motivated. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in South-East Europe. Working together with our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other international institutions, we will continue to promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). All persons indicted for war crimes by the ICTY must be brought to justice in The Hague.
6. Later this month, our Defense colleagues will review the status of NATO's operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalization and an enhanced regional approach, recognizing the need for continued close consultation with other international organizations involved. Our overall efforts have the ultimate aim of providing the foundation for self-sustaining peace and democracy in the region that no longer require the presence of international military forces.
7. Over the past year, the Alliance has played a particularly active role in promoting stability and security in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in close cooperation with the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In this context, we commend the neighboring states, especially Albania, for their constructive approach. We welcome the

voluntary disarmament and disbanding of the so-called NLA, the Parliament's adoption of changes to the country's constitution, and the amnesty declared by President Trajkovski. We reaffirm our condemnation of the use of violence for political ends. We urge all parties involved to implement the Framework Agreement in full, and to continue to cooperate with the international community. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Alliance stands ready to continue to contribute to security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors for a further three-month period, as part of its contribution to peace and stability in the country.

8. We remain firmly committed to the full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and call on all political leaders in this country to continue to renounce separatism and violence, to support democratic institutions and to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. We strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we reiterate that the Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end.
9. We welcome the Kosovo-wide elections of 17 November, in which all communities participated in significant numbers, as an important step towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo, where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions. We encourage the newly elected leaders to exercise their new functions in strict compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and the constitutional framework for provisional self-government and in full cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR. We also call on them to establish effective cooperation with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
10. We welcome Belgrade's constructive support for the participation of the Kosovo Serb community in the recent Kosovo elections. We note with satisfaction the continuing progress towards reconciliation between the parties in Southern Serbia and will continue to pay close attention to the situation in that region. We welcome the steady improvement of our relations with the FRY and look forward to their further development. We reiterate our support for a democratic Montenegro within a democratic FRY.
11. In celebrating the tenth anniversary of NATO's policy of Partnership and Cooperation, we recognize the crucial contribution NATO's Partner countries are making to the Alliance's efforts to foster peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. We value, in particular, their contributions to our peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. We also appreciate the solidarity and support which our Partners, and in particular those in Central Asia and the Caucasus, have demonstrated in the international campaign against terrorism. We want to further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). We encourage all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the Alliance. We also

want to broaden and strengthen cooperation with our Mediterranean partners, and invite them to intensify their dialogue with us on security matters of common concern.

12. We continue to attach great importance to further developing and enhancing the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership. In this context, we encourage Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform process forward and stand ready to assist it in this regard. We also wish to emphasize the importance of meeting our joint commitments and fulfilling our shared responsibilities in the Balkans.
13. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a close, transparent and coherent NATO-EU relationship. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the achievement of peace and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation brings considerable benefits. The events of 11 September have underlined the importance of enhanced cooperation between the two organizations on questions of common interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings. We remain determined to make progress on all the various aspects of our relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies. We note the commitment of the EU to finalize the modalities for consultation with Canada and for its participation in EU-led operations.
14. Events on and since 11 September show that our security is challenged in a variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways. Through our Defense Capabilities Initiative, we want to ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly. Enhancing European capabilities is central to this process.
15. We reaffirm that the Alliance must have the capability to defend appropriately and effectively against the threats that the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery can pose. Our response should be consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security. We will continue to work together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts. In this context, the Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords. We will continue to actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in this field and pursue further arms reductions, transparency and confidence-building. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and will work towards a successful outcome of the upcoming review. We also support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the end of 2002. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament along with

deterrence and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these new threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defense could play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the United States on this issue. In this regard, we welcome continued work at NATO on theatre missile defense.

16. Recalling the results of the second CFE Review Conference, Allies welcome Russia's planned reductions of its excess equipment in the North Caucasus to agreed levels, which must be transparent and verifiable, and progress in the reduction and withdrawal of Russian equipment from Moldova. We call for swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia. Allies can envisage ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty only in the context of full compliance by all States Parties with agreed Treaty limits and consistent with the commitments in the CFE Final Act. We look forward to the entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty on 1 January 2002.
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## APPENDIX G

Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2002) 59 held at NATO HQ Brussels 14 May 2002<sup>286</sup>

### *Final Communiqué*

#### **Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council**

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1. Since 11 September, NATO has acted on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Our countries are contributing, as individual Allies, to the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. The Alliance and its members are playing their full part in the current campaign against terror, confirming NATO's key role in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security, including in the face of new threats. The Alliance, which embodies the transatlantic link that binds North America and Europe in a unique defense and security partnership, must, and will continue to adapt itself, to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area. We will intensify our consultations on this process of adaptation, looking to the meeting of our Heads of State and Government in Prague in November to mark a decisive step forward in achieving this objective.
2. In preparation for the Prague Summit, we have today given guidance on the development of vital new capabilities, on the process of NATO enlargement, on the creation of a new security relationship with Russia, as well as on the development of our relationships with Ukraine and all other Partners. We have also re-affirmed NATO's commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe, and to the development of close and effective relations between NATO and the European Union.
3. We reiterate our determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as necessary. There is no justification whatsoever for terrorist actions. In keeping with our obligations under the Washington Treaty we will continue to strengthen our national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad.

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<sup>286</sup> In 2002 only one Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held rather than two annually meetings held by the Council. The meeting for 2002 was held in May.



We recognized this challenge in the Strategic Concept adopted at the 1999 Washington Summit, where we made clear that any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and where we singled out terrorism as a risk to the security interests of the Alliance. Meeting this challenge is fundamental to our security. Actions taken to meet this challenge will be in accordance with our decisions and in full compliance with all our commitments under international law and relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and national legislation.

4. Our countries are also working together to deal with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery. Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense. The Alliance is working on proposals to develop critical defenses against biological and chemical weapons. We also attach importance to reinforcing the role of the NATO WMD Centre within the International Staff. We will also enhance our ability, through working on all possible options, to provide support, when requested, to national authorities for the protection of civilian populations against the effects of any terrorist attack, and are cooperating with our Partners in this field, taking into account the various proposals and initiatives put forward. We are exploring the scope for enhancing cooperation with the European Union in this field. Together with our Defense colleagues, we are developing a package of proposals to be in place for the Prague Summit, to strengthen these capacities.
5. To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives. This will require the development of new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance, including strategic lift and modern strike capabilities, so that NATO can more effectively respond collectively to any threat of aggression against a member state. We look forward to decisions by Defense Ministers on specific recommendations for the development of new capabilities, for approval by Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit.
6. At their Prague Summit in November this year, our Heads of State and Government will launch the next round of NATO enlargement. This will confirm the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We received today a Consolidated Progress Report on the results of the third cycle of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). We congratulate all aspirants on the significant progress they have made thus far towards achieving their objectives in the MAP. Heads of State and Government will expect invitees to have demonstrated a commitment to the basic principles and values set out in the Washington Treaty, the capability to contribute to collective defense and the Alliance's full range of missions, a firm commitment to contribute to stability and security, especially in regions of crisis and conflict, and to be willing and able to assume the responsibilities of membership. We encourage all aspirants to intensify their efforts in the coming months and to continue them not only up to Prague but also in the years ahead.

7. We commit ourselves to continuing to work with the aspirants to help them make sufficient progress to be invited to begin accession negotiations at Prague. The 2002-2003 cycle of the MAP, which we launched today to conclude in Spring 2003, will include all the present participants, and be tailored to their individual requirements. We look forward to submission of individual Annual National Programs in the Autumn. After Prague, the MAP will continue to serve both aspirants and those countries invited to begin accession talks with the Alliance.
8. As at Madrid, our goal is that all invitees should accede on a common date before the next Summit. After Prague, we will expect invited countries to continue to participate in the MAP. The accession process will take into account work conducted under the MAP, and the MAP will be used to help the integration of invitees into Alliance structures. During accession talks and on the basis of an invitee's Annual National Program, the NATO Expert Team, on the basis of political guidance to be elaborated, will discuss with individual invitees specific issues and reforms upon which further progress will be expected before and after accession in order to enhance their contribution to the Alliance. These will be drawn from existing MAP objectives, Partnership Goals and other issues identified by Allies and those associated with military integration identified by the NATO Military Authorities. A timetable for the completion of these reforms should be established, including for those that are unlikely to be realized until after accession. This timetable should be reflected within a revised Annual National Program. We look forward to the commitments that invitees will make as part of this process. We look forward to signing the individual accession protocols not later than our meeting in Spring of 2003. Invitees will participate in subsequent MAP cycles until the ratification process has been completed.
9. We commend Croatia on the progress it has made in its reform efforts, making full use of the options offered by Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Intensified Dialogue. We expect Croatia to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans. We welcome Croatia's participation in the MAP and invite Croatia to present its first Annual National Program in the Autumn and look forward to reviewing Croatia's progress at our meeting next Spring.
10. NATO is undertaking internal preparations to ensure its readiness to accept new members. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a comprehensive report on the relevant factors associated with decisions on enlargement for consideration by Heads of State and Government in Prague. This work will be conducted in keeping with political guidance provided by the Council and will not create any preconditions or decisions on new members.
11. We welcome the decisive and substantial deepening of the NATO-Russia relationship, which marks an historic step towards the Alliance's long-standing goal of building a secure, cooperative and democratic Euro-Atlantic area. We look forward to the approval this afternoon by the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council of the document on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, where NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest, while preserving NATO's prerogative to act independently. The document will be adopted and signed at the inaugural session of the Council, to be

held at a Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government in Rome on 28 May. We are confident that the creation of the Council will lend new impetus and substance to our partnership with Russia, and make a substantial contribution to our common goal of a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. A NATO-Russia Council meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government in Prague would offer an opportunity to take stock of our new relationship.

12. We support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her responsibility to protect all her citizens against terrorism and criminality. We urge Russia to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful resolution to the conflict in Chechnya, and to respect and protect the human and legal rights of the population. We call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it.
13. We note Ukraine's strong determination to pursue full Euro-Atlantic integration. We continue to encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard. In that context, we have decided to give new impetus and substance to our partnership with Ukraine. To that end, we have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to develop new mechanisms and modalities that build on the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership and bring our relationship to a qualitatively new level. We expect to deepen and expand our relationship, including through intensified consultations and cooperation on political, economic and defense issues. In this context, Allies look forward to a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, at the level of Heads of State and Government, at the Prague Summit.
14. Since 11 September, the important contribution made by NATO's Partnerships to Euro-Atlantic security has been confirmed and reinforced. We look forward to a new, more substantive relationship with Partners, which intensifies our cooperation in responding to new security challenges, including terrorism. In light of the changing security environment, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are adapting to remain valuable and effective. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to continue reviewing our Partnerships, with a view to presenting our Heads of State and Government at Prague with concrete proposals for further developing the EAPC and PfP to better serve Allies and Partners in addressing the challenges of the 21st century. We look forward to the meeting of the EAPC at the level of Heads of State and Government in Prague.
15. We have decided to upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue, including by consulting with Mediterranean partners on security matters of common concern, including terrorism-related issues, as appropriate. These efforts will aim to bring our Mediterranean partners even closer to NATO, and give fresh impetus to the Dialogue by the Prague Summit.
16. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a close, transparent and coherent NATO-EU relationship. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the achievement of peace and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation brings considerable benefits. The events of 11 September have underlined the

importance of enhanced cooperation between the two organizations on questions of common interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings. We remain determined to make progress on all the various aspects of our relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies. We welcome recent progress towards finalizing EU modalities for consultation with Canada and for its participation in EU-led operations.

17. We reiterate our commitment to a peaceful, stable, and democratic South-East Europe, and reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the region. The continued presence of NATO-led forces demonstrates and embodies our determination to oppose all violence whether ethnically, politically or criminally motivated, and to strengthen peace, tolerance, the rule of law and democratic institutions in the region. Working together with our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other international institutions, we will continue to promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons. We remain actively engaged in the field of border security and smuggling interdiction operations and reaffirm the importance of a wider regional approach to these issues.
18. In light of the progress achieved towards a lasting and self-sustaining peace, we have reviewed the status of NATO's operations in the Balkans. Our Defense colleagues will review the implementation of force restructuring which takes into account a more regional approach and aims at rationalizing NATO's military presence, as civilian authorities increasingly take up their responsibilities. Full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) remains a priority. All persons indicted for war crimes by the ICTY must be brought to justice in The Hague.
19. We remain determined to further support efforts towards security and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO continues to contribute to security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors through the presence of Task Force Fox. We are encouraged by progress in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and emphasize that the passing of remaining legislation related to the Agreement and the holding of free and fair general elections in September will together constitute important steps towards peace and stability.
20. We remain committed to a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in full accordance with the principles of the General Framework Agreement, and call on the local authorities in the country to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. We strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we reiterate that the

Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end. We look forward to the general elections this Autumn as an important step towards a single, multi-ethnic, and democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21. We look forward to further developing the Alliance's relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and expect swift implementation of the agreement that has been reached between Serbia and Montenegro in redefining their relationship. We welcome the FRY's interest in joining PfP and look forward to working with the FRY leadership in achieving the progress necessary to enable participation in PfP. Full and continued cooperation with ICTY, democratic reform and control of the military, as well as full and transparent implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, are essential to a deeper relationship with the Alliance.
22. With regard to Kosovo, we reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, and welcome the establishment of provisional institutions of self-government which include representatives of all communities. We call on the provisional institutions and community leaders to assume their responsibilities and fully cooperate with UNMIK, KFOR and the international community to promote a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo. We look forward to the local elections in Kosovo this Autumn as another important step towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo, where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions.
23. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. We will continue to work together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts. Our efforts to that end should be consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords. We will continue to actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in this field and pursue further arms reductions, transparency and confidence and security building measures. In that context, we welcome the U.S.-Russian agreement to sign a treaty to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and welcome the full discussion of issues at the Preparatory Conference for the 2005 Review Conference in April 2002. We also support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the end of 2002. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, along with deterrence and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these new threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defense

could play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the United States on this issue. In this regard, we welcome continued work at NATO on theatre missile defense.

24. Concerning the CFE Treaty, we welcome the Russian Federation's December declaration that it is now within agreed levels of armament and equipment. We encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our efforts to verify this claim as soon as possible. However, we can envisage ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty only in the context of full compliance by all States Parties with agreed Treaty limits and consistent with the commitments contained in the CFE Final Act. We urge a swift resolution of outstanding issues relating to Istanbul commitments, including on Georgia and Moldova. Recognizing the contributions of the CFE Treaty to European security and stability, we recall that the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty would permit accession by non-CFE States. We welcome the entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty on 1 January 2002.
  25. We express our deep appreciation to the Government of Iceland for hosting this meeting.
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## APPENDIX H

Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2003) 152 held at NATO HQ Brussels 4 Dec 2003

### *Final Communiqué*

**Issued at the Ministerial Meeting  
of the North Atlantic Council**

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1. As we meet today, NATO is acting to preserve peace through its operations; spreading stability through its partnerships; and reinforcing our community of shared values through the most robust round of enlargement in our history. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective defense and the essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave direction on work still to be done, as we look ahead to our Summit in Istanbul next June.
2. We look forward to welcoming seven new members of the Alliance by the time of the Istanbul Summit, which will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are pleased to be joined today by our colleagues from these countries, who associate themselves with this Communiqué. The formal accession of the new members into the Alliance will take place as soon as the ratification process is complete. We welcome the significant contribution the Invitees are already making to our security and the progress they have made in their reform efforts, and we encourage them to continue on this path.
3. We categorically reject and condemn terrorism in all its forms. We express our sympathy to all the victims of terrorism and unwavering solidarity to Allies that have been targeted by it. NATO is determined to use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international organizations and with its Partners to fight this scourge. We welcome the progress on implementing the package of measures approved at the Prague Summit to improve NATO's capacity to respond to terrorism, and the recent establishment of the Permanent Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit. NATO's Operation Active Endeavour continues to make a significant contribution in the Mediterranean to the fight against terrorism, in cooperation with the International Maritime Organization; it has helped to

maintain security through maritime anti-terrorism surveillance and boarding operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the escort of designated Allied ships through the Straits of Gibraltar.

4. In Afghanistan, the Alliance now leads the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under its UN mandate. This operation demonstrates our readiness to deploy forces wherever the Alliance decides, to ensure our common security. Our aim is to assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the international community, including by assisting the Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security and stability and in the electoral process according to the Bonn Process. We decided on the progressive expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions, including through temporary deployments for specific tasks and limited in size and duration, provided all military conditions, and requirements for the Kabul mission, are met. We will continue to address the scope of such specific tasks. We welcome the German deployment of a pilot Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), under ISAF, in Kunduz. Expecting that the establishment of additional PRTs will follow, we consider that ISAF could move to assume military command of such PRTs where consistent with military requirements and capabilities. Achievement of these objectives will be subject to consultations with and contributions from PRT framework nations and the provision of the required assets, including for Kabul International Airport. We will review NATO's contribution to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan on a regular basis. It is necessary to ensure close co-ordination and cooperation between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom, and also with the Afghan National Army. Our forces will also have to work closely with the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan and other international organizations on the ground, including the European Union.
5. We task the Council in Permanent Session to develop for the Istanbul Summit a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional Authority. We welcome the appointment of Mr. Hikmet Çetin of Turkey to the position of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.
6. The Alliance continues to support Poland in its leadership of a multi-national division in Iraq. The North Atlantic Council will review NATO's contribution to the stabilization efforts on a regular basis. We welcome the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1511 on Iraq and are committed to its full implementation in order to restore conditions of stability and security in the country, and return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of Iraq. In that regard, we welcome the Agreement on Political Process signed in Baghdad on 15 November 2003. Peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq remain a high priority.
7. The security environment in the strategically important region of the Balkans is stable but remains fragile. We reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans. We want to see enduring stability and peace in the region.



8. Our missions in the Balkans continue to evolve. The improved security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina will allow for further reduction of SFOR by next Spring. Over the coming months, Allies will assess options for the future size and structure of SFOR, to include possible termination of SFOR by the end of 2004, transition possibly to a new EU mission within the framework of the Berlin+ arrangements and to a new NATO HQ Sarajevo. We task the Council in Permanent Session and the NATO Military Authorities to consult with their EU counterparts on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with agreed texts and procedures and within the framework of Berlin+. We will consult, as appropriate, with all other parties concerned, including the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9. In Kosovo, KFOR's presence remains essential. We welcome the proposal of the Contact Group to establish a date for review of Kosovo's progress in meeting internationally endorsed standards. Further advancement towards a process to determine Kosovo's future status, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, will depend on the outcome of this comprehensive review. We encourage all parties to work constructively to meet the agreed standards, and to support the efforts of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Harri Holkeri. Direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on practical issues of mutual concern remains a key benchmark and an indispensable element of the international community's policy of Standards before Status; we encourage Belgrade and Pristina to pursue their dialogue in good faith.
10. We are committed to help the countries of the Balkans integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures. We encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries. We expect them to assume ownership of, and implement, pressing reforms. They must comply fully with their international obligations, including full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in particular bringing to justice all those who are indicted by the Tribunal, notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, as well as Ante Gotovina, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1503.
11. We call on the Government and all political actors in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue to work toward full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. NATO's support to the European Union's Operation Concordia successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the Berlin+ arrangements. NATO has conducted its preliminary lessons learned process and we will conduct a lessons learned process with the EU.
12. We encourage Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership. We want them to succeed and will continue to support their reform efforts through the MAP process. We reaffirm that the current round of enlargement will not be the last and that NATO's door remains open.
13. We recognize the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro in their efforts to join Partnership for Peace (PfP), welcome substantive progress on defense reform, and will continue to assist both countries in meeting established NATO conditions for PfP membership. We look forward to welcoming them into PfP once they have met the conditions set forth by the

Alliance, including full cooperation with the ICTY, in particular to detain and turn over persons indicted for war crimes to the Tribunal. We urge both countries to envisage the Istanbul Summit as a realistic target by which they could meet the outstanding conditions. We will assess the two countries' progress on their possible accession to PfP in advance of the Istanbul Summit.

14. We task the Council in Permanent Session to review and develop NATO's Balkans strategy, encompassing political aspects as well as operations, in time for the Istanbul Summit.
15. NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests, and we remain strongly committed to enhancing our cooperation. Since our last meeting, NATO-EU cooperation has made concrete progress and is developing in a constructive manner. We agreed a concerted approach for the Western Balkans. We look forward to further substantive cooperation with the EU, including through the Berlin+ arrangements. A joint NATO-EU crisis management exercise was successfully held in November. NATO-EU consultations and cooperation on questions of common interest relating to security, defense and crisis management, such as the fight against terrorism, mutually reinforcing capabilities, and civil-emergency planning, were stepped up and will continue to be developed. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to consider how to reinforce, by the time of the Istanbul Summit, the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU as agreed between our two organizations, including through effective consultations with the EU, respecting the autonomy of the two organizations, and in a spirit of transparency. NATO and the EU could also co-sponsor a seminar on terrorism.
16. NATO's Partnerships, which contribute greatly to security and stability across the Euro-Atlantic area, are of increasing value and importance. During the ten years of its existence, Partnership for Peace has been an increasingly effective instrument for cooperation in such areas as peace support operations and the fight against terrorism. The Istanbul Summit should build on progress made at Prague to re-focus PfP to reflect its post-enlargement dimensions and the Alliance's focus on new threats. We have therefore tasked the Council in Permanent Session to develop proposals to further tailor Partnership to tackle key thematic issues and individual Partners' needs and capabilities, to promote defense reform which encourages military transformation and interoperability, and to enhance regional cooperation and mutual support. In this context the Council will examine whether and how selected Partnership activities might be opened, on a case by case basis, to other countries which might express an interest in such involvement. These new measures should allow for more focused and deeper practical cooperation. We agree to promote a special focus on the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia.
17. Security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We look for additional progress beyond that achieved since the Prague Summit in upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to consider ways to further enhance this relationship by generating, in consultation with all Mediterranean Dialogue partners, by the time of the Istanbul Summit, options to develop a more ambitious and expanded

framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue. This initiative will genuinely improve cooperation in a number of fields, including on defense reform and interoperability, including through PfP-like instruments, and open more Partnership activities to the Mediterranean Dialogue partners on a case by case basis. Our efforts will complement and mutually reinforce other Mediterranean initiatives, including those of the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

18. The NATO-Russia Council, in which NATO member states and Russia work together as equal partners in areas of common interest, continues to make valuable contributions to security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Our political dialogue has developed on key security issues, including Afghanistan and the Balkans. Our practical cooperation has reached a new level, including in military-to-military projects; and, through our focus on improving interoperability, we have also laid the groundwork for future military cooperation, including potentially in joint peacekeeping operations. We welcome progress made on nuclear confidence building measures, and on the safe management of nuclear and radiological material. We look forward to approval of an ambitious Work Program for 2004. We are committed to building on this progress, and to further enhancing the NATO-Russia relationship.
19. We remain committed to stronger NATO-Ukraine relations under the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership and welcome progress made over the past year in the implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and Ukraine's 2003 Annual Target Plan. We look forward to concrete implementation of the Annual Target Plan in 2004, including the conduct of free and fair Presidential elections, improvements to media freedom, strengthening arms export controls, and progress on and funding for the Defense Review. We encourage Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration, and we will keep under active review all possible options to support Ukraine in these efforts.
20. We are closely following the development of events in Georgia. We call on the Georgian authorities to hold free and fair elections, planned for January next year. We support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. The Alliance remains committed to developing Partnership with Georgia through using the full range of Partnership instruments.
21. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. We stress the importance of abiding by, fully implementing and strengthening existing international arms control and disarmament accords and multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes. Early admission of all invitees into all appropriate existing non-proliferation regimes could play a positive role in that regard. In particular, we underline our commitment to reinforcing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the pre-eminent non-proliferation and disarmament mechanism, and ensuring the full compliance with it by all states party to the

Treaty. We will also strengthen our common efforts to safeguard nuclear and radiological material.

22. The Alliance supports the aims of the Proliferation Security Initiative to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the United Nations Security Council.
23. We remain committed to the protection of civilian populations. We welcome the progress made in the implementation of the Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan for the Improvement of Civil Preparedness against possible Terrorist Attacks against Civilian Populations with Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents. We look forward to its full implementation in order to reinforce national preparedness and reaction to civil emergencies.
24. As we have consistently stated, we remain committed to the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security, and reaffirm our attachment to the early entry into force of the Adapted Treaty. We recall that fulfillment of the remaining Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova will create the conditions for Allies and other States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. We welcome the approach of those non-CFE countries, which have stated their intention to request accession to the Adapted CFE Treaty upon its entry into force. Their accession would provide an important additional contribution to European security and stability.
25. We urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia as set out in their Istanbul Joint Statement of 17 November 1999 and, to this end, call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level. We note the progress that was made on withdrawal of Russian military forces from Moldova during the first half of 2003. We regret that this progress was not sustained and that the 31 December 2003 extended deadline, agreed in the framework of the OSCE, will not be met. It is essential that efforts be intensified to complete the withdrawal in early 2004. We will continue, via the OSCE, to assist in this process.
26. Based on the enduring principles enshrined in the Washington Treaty, NATO today is demonstrating our commitment to multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; NATO's fundamental security tasks including collective defense; our shared democratic values; and the United Nations Charter. As we prepare for the Istanbul Summit, we invite the Council in Permanent Session to intensify consultations on the challenges and threats facing the Alliance, and how best to respond to them.
27. We continue to attach high priority to the implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the NATO Headquarters organization, including through modern management and financial systems, sound and transparent management of the new Headquarters project, and improvements to gender balance and diversity in the Alliance's International Staff.
28. We wish to thank Lord Robertson of Port Ellen warmly for his leadership role in guiding NATO's transformation. We are confident that the new Secretary

General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, will continue to carry forward NATO's evolution, and build on the Alliance's record of success, and we pledge our full support to him.

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## APPENDIX I

### DISCUSSION OF INFERENCES IN THE PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS

Speech Acts	<p>The speech acts are categorized as the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assertions: express a belief and the intention that another/others also hold that belief;</li> <li>• Commitment: express an intention to perform some act in the future;</li> <li>• Directive: express the intention that another/others act in a particular way.</li> </ul>
Explicit Performative	<p>These propositions add 'hereby' to the speech act to stress the fundamental point of speech act theory that language is action.</p>
Reflexive Intentions	<p>The propositions specify implicitly conveyed intentions. Reflexive intentions differ depending on the type of speech act. The reflexive intentions in the pragmatic analysis follow the following form:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assertion: P is the case. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Reflective Intentions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ S believes that P.</li> <li>▪ S wants H to believe that P.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>• Directive: Do X. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Reflective Intentions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ S believes that his utterance, in virtue his authority over H, constitutes sufficient reason for H to do X.</li> <li>▪ S wants H to do X because of S's command.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>• Commitment: I will do Y. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Reflective Intentions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ S believes his utterance obligates him to do Y on condition that H indicates he wants S to do Y.</li> <li>▪ S wants Y on the condition that H indicates he wants S to do Y.</li> <li>▪ S wants H to believe (1) and (2).</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Implicatures	<p>These propositions come from Grice's cooperative principle, which includes the following maxims of conversation:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The maxim of quality: Do not say what you believe to be false, and do not say anything for which you lack adequate evidence.</li> <li>• The maxim of quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange.</li> <li>• The maxim of relevance: Make your contributions relevant.</li> <li>• The maxim of manner: Avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief and be orderly.</li> </ul> <p>Researchers and analyst infer implicature by assuming that speakers follow these maxims.</p>
Presuppositions	<p>The presuppositions are inferences that need to be true for a statement to be meaningful or have a truth value. Most suppositions have the characteristics of ‘constancy under negation.’ The classic example is as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The King of France is bald.</li> <li>• The King of France is not bald.</li> <li>• The King of France exists.</li> </ul> <p>The first two statements help to suppose the third, even through the first two negate one another. This is consistent under negation. Most presuppositions in the pragmatic analysis have this property.</p>

## APPENDIX J

### DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 1

<b>Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 1</b>
<b>Statement:</b> Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1996) 165 held at NATO HQ Brussels 10 Dec 1996
<b>Speech Act:</b> Assertion, Commitment, and Directive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. The member nations hereby assert to:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its missions.</li><li>b. Help build a truly cooperative European security structure.</li><li>c. Open the Alliance and its ability to carry out all its new roles and mission;</li><li>d. Remains steadfast in its primary goal of providing stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.</li></ul></li><li>a. Strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including through an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership Council.</li><li>b. A broad process of integration and cooperation is underway in Europe; Russia is a part of it through its membership in the OSCE and the Council of Europe and its relationship with NATO as well as the European Union and the WEU.</li><li>c. Reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliances strategy of war prevention.</li><li>d. Develop on the basis of transparency ever-closer and deeper cooperative ties open to all Partner countries by making the Partnership more operational; strengthening its political consultation element, taking full account of the respective activities of the OSCE and the relevant European institutions such as the WEU and the EU; and involving Partners more in operations planning and Partnership decision-making.</li><li>e. Value the close and effective cooperation between Russia and NATO in IFOR.</li><li>f. Continue to support Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation and a market economy.</li><li>g. Support the Middle East peace process, and urge all participants to remain firmly committed to it.</li><li>h. The CFE Treaty is a fundamental cornerstone of security and stability for all in the Euro-Atlantic area</li><li>i. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their</li></ul>



- delivery means continues to be a matter of serious concern to us.
- j. Reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's common-funded programs.
- b. The member nations hereby direct to:
- a. Urge all participants of the Middle East Peace process to remain firmly committed to it.
  - b. Urge the Russian Federation to follow the United States in ratifying the START II Treaty.
  - c. Urge all States Parties who have not yet done so to approve this CFE Flank Agreement before the end of the extended provisional application period.
  - d. Urge the early ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies by those states which have not already ratified.
  - e. Urge all other nations to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- c. The member nations hereby commit to:
- a. Develop a new command structure;
  - b. Finalize all necessary arrangements for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO;
  - c. Invite one or more of the countries which have expressed interest in joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations;
  - k. Work with Partners on the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) as a single new cooperative mechanism;
  - l. Further develop an enhanced relationship with Russia and the Ukraine by aiming at reaching an agreement at the earliest possible date on the development of a strong, stable and enduring security partnership;
  - d. Enhancing the Mediterranean dialogue;
  - e. Further developing the ability to carry out new roles and missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis management;
  - m. Further enhance our political and defense efforts against the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means;
  - n. Ensuring that the NACC goals of enhancing transparency and confidence in security matters among member states remain central to future cooperation.
  - o. Enhance the political dimension of the Partnership through increasing opportunities for political consultations.
  - p. Expand the agreed fields of military missions within the PfP to the full range of the Alliance's new mission.
  - q. Broaden the NATO/PfP exercise program in accordance with the expanded scope of the Partnership.
  - r. Enable Partner countries to participate in the planning and execution of PfP activities.
  - s. Involve Partners more substantively and actively in PfP-related parts of the regular peacetime work of NATO's Military Authorities.
  - t. Examine, together with Partners, the possible modalities for the elaboration of a political-military framework for PfP operations.
  - u. Increase regional cooperation within the Partnership provided it remains open to all Partners and remains an integral part of the overall PfP.

- v. Develop a charter between NATO and Russia, which would encompass the shared principles that will form the basis of our relationship; a broad set of areas of practical cooperation; mechanisms for regular and ad hoc consultations; and mechanisms for military liaison and cooperation.
- w. The development of a distinctive and effective NATO-Ukraine relationship, which could be formalized, possibly by the time of the Summit, building on the document on enhanced NATO-Ukraine relations agreed in September 1995, and taking into account recent Ukrainian proposals.
- x. Keep under review the allocation of resources in order to ensure their optimal use.
- y. Identify the implications of adaptation for NATO's common-funded budgets and to make appropriate recommendations for dealing with these.
- z. Improve its capabilities to address the risks posed by proliferation and strengthen the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), scheduled for April 1997.

**Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, and Enforcement**

**Explicit Performative:**

- a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance will uphold the security and stability of its member countries while taking a new shape, reflecting the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring vitality of the transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors.
- a. The member nations hereby encourage the members of the Alliance to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
- b. The member nations hereby commits the Alliance to do the following:
  - a. Agree on a new command structure;
  - b. Finalize all necessary arrangements for the ESDI within NATO;
  - c. Invite one or more of the countries which have expressed interest in joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations;
  - d. Pledge that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further members and will remain ready to pursue consultations with nations seeking NATO membership, as it has done in the past;
  - e. Strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including through an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership Council;
  - f. Intensifying and consolidating relations with Russia beyond the Partnership for Peace;
  - g. Further develop an enhanced relationship with Ukraine;
  - h. Enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue;
  - i. Further develop our ability to carry out new roles and missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis management; and
  - j. Further enhancing our political and defense efforts against the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means.

**Reflective Intentions:**

- c. Assertion:

- a. The member nations believe that its must maintain security and stability while being able to maintain in the current global security environment.
  - b. The member nations want the Alliance to uphold its mission by carry out cooperative means through political and military measures.
- d. Directive
- 3. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
  - 4. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
- e. Commitment:
- a. The member nations believe that its utterance obligates the Alliance to secure and stabilize the global security environment on the condition that the member nations indicate they will agree to a new structure command; make arrangements for the ESDI; keep the Alliance open for new membership; strengthen cooperative relations with all Partners , especially those with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance Mediterranean dialogue; and further enhance political and defense efforts relating to conflict prevention, crisis management, and WMDs.
  - b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member countries will be able to secure and stabilize the Euro-Atlantic area and protect their citizens.
  - c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).

**Impicatures:**

- a. Assertion:
  - a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to the Alliance.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
  - c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political

relationships.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations; assertion informs its members conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- a. Directive:
- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral

- alliance commitment.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries and other countries
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries and other countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- b. Commitment:
  - a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the member countries that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its

member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.

- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.

**Presuppositions:**

- a. If the member nations preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its missions, then the Alliance will be able to stabilize and secure in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security environment.
- b. If member nations do not preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its missions, then the Alliance will not be able to stabilize and secure in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security environment.

## APPENDIX K

### DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 2

<b>Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 2</b>
<b>Statement:</b> Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1997) 155 held at NATO HQ Brussels 16 Dec 1997
<b>Speech Act:</b> Assertion, Commitment, and Directive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. The member nations assert to:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Have taken historical steps to transform the Alliance.</li><li>b. Have endorsed politico-military guidance for the development of options for a future NATO-led military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate.</li><li>c. Have completed the initial estimates of the resource implications for accession of the three invitees, and have confirmed that the costs will be manageable.</li><li>d. Have made significant progress has been made on developing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.</li><li>e. NATO enlargement is part of a comprehensive process.</li><li>f. Welcome the confirmation by the invited countries of their willingness to assume the rights and obligations of NATO membership and to meet the associated political commitments.</li><li>g. Admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance.</li><li>h. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build with Partners new patterns of practical cooperation across a wide range of security issues.</li><li>i. The Partnership for Peace has shown its value in contributing to stability in Europe through the special assistance the Alliance is continuing to provide to Albania, in the context of PfP and drawing on the experience of the Italian-led Multinational Protection Force, in the rebuilding of its national armed forces following the crisis in that country in early 1997.</li><li>j. The signature in Paris last May of the NATO-Russia Founding Act marked the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia.</li><li>k. That the Ukraine has a key role to play in European security; and that Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state are key factors for security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe and on the continent as a whole.</li></ul></li></ul>

- l. Believes the security of the Mediterranean region and the whole of Europe are closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean.
  - m. Implementation of the CJTF concept will enhance the Alliance's ability to plan and conduct quickly and effectively a wide range of military operations employing multinational and multi-service forces capable of being generated and deployed at short notice.
  - n. The Alliance Strategic Concept adopted by our Heads of State and Government in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of the Alliance.
  - o. To succeed, the Peace Agreement must continue to be implemented in an environment of general security.
  - p. A broad security dialogue would represent a significant element in establishing regional stability.
  - q. NATO's interest in stability extends beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina to the surrounding region.
  - r. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery pose risks to the Alliance.
  - s. We strongly condemn all acts of terrorism.
- b. The member nations direct to:
    - a. Urge all states that have not yet signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention to do so, and call upon those that have ratified to carry out fully their obligations under the Convention.
    - b. Urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty as soon as possible, so that negotiations on START III can begin.
    - c. Urge Russia to honor its commitments as stated by President Yeltsin in 1992 to substantially reduce its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile.
    - d. Urge the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine to take the necessary steps to permit its entry into force.
  - c. The member nations commit to:
    - a. Cooperate closely with the three invited countries through the coming months, building on the successful accession talks this year, and we will work for the timely ratification of the Protocols of Accession
    - b. Realize the full potential of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).
    - c. Pursue vigorously our consultations and cooperation with Russia under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.
    - d. Carry forward our program of consultations and cooperation with Ukraine under the new NATO-Ukraine Charter.
    - e. Carry out through our Mediterranean Cooperation Group a new round of individual dialogues with our six Mediterranean Dialogue Partners, and established a work program for cooperation.
    - f. Reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on Allied solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness



- for the full range of its missions.
- g. Continue our intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue on membership questions/
  - h. Endorse the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit.
  - i. Increase further the effectiveness of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the enhanced Partnership for Peace, in cooperation with Partners.
  - j. Enhancing NATO's information efforts in Russia, and we expect to open a NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow and encourage Russia to play an active role in the EAPC and the enhanced PfP.
  - k. Launching a rich and varied program of consultation and practical cooperation with Ukraine and work with the Ukraine to develop a more focused Individual Partnership Program.
  - l. Attach great importance to an early and successful completion of the process of the Alliance's internal adaptation.
  - m. Develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning, preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.
  - n. Endorse the terms of reference agreed by the Council in Permanent Session for the examination, and updating as necessary, of the Alliance Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State and Government in Madrid.
  - o. Strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation as well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights.
  - p. To the full and unconditional implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the establishment of that country as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state.
  - q. Endorsed politico-military guidance to the NATO Military Authorities for the development of options for a NATO-led military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate.
  - r. Organizing courses for military and civilian defense officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the NATO School to promote reconciliation among the formerly warring factions.
  - s. Launch an initial set of security cooperation activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina to include both Entities and all three ethnic groups.
  - t. Endorse efforts to negotiate an effective verification regime to strengthen the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
  - u. Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and an early start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
  - v. Continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism, including using arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature that affect Alliance security interests. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible

to prevent and suppress this scourge.

**Rules Invoked:** Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement

**Explicit Performative:**

- The member nations hereby assert the Alliance will uphold its mission through the reinforcement of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based upon on Allied solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its missions.
- b. The member nations hereby encourage its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
- The member nations hereby commit the Alliance to do the following:
  - a. Continue with the comprehensive process of enlarging NATO;
  - b. Continue to remain open through the admission of new members into the Alliance;
  - c. Provide broad cooperation with Partners in the EAPC and the enhanced PfP;
  - d. Create a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia and a distinctive Partnership with Ukraine;
  - e. Continue to enhanced Mediterranean dialogue;
  - f. Strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation as well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights;
  - w. Continue efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina by endorsing politico-military guidance to the NATO Military Authorities for the development of options for a NATO-led military presence; launch an initial set of security cooperation activities to include both Entities and all three ethnic groups;
  - g. Endorse and continue with measures for the proliferation of WMD; and
  - h. Continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism.

**Reflective Intentions:**

- a. Assertion:
  - a. The member nations believe that it must uphold its mission through the reinforcement of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area while being able to evolve and maintain the Alliance in the global security environment.
  - b. The member nations want the Alliance upholds its mission by carry out cooperative means through political and military measures.
- b. Directive
  - 5. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
  - 6. The member nations want is members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
- c. Commitment:

- a. The member nation believes that its utterance obligates the Alliance to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and the global security environment on the condition that the member countries, as reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its missions.
- b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directive on the condition that the member countries will be able to promote peace and security amongst themselves.
- c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).

**Implicatures:**

c. Assertion:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to the Alliance.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved

- peacefully.
- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- b. Directive:
  - a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries and other countries
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
  - c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.

- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries and other countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- d. Commitment:
- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the member countries that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
  - c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its

- member countries it is establishing political relationships.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.

**Presuppositions:**

- a. If the member nations are able to maintain an Allied solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its missions, then the Alliance will be able to promote peace and stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and throughout the global security environment.
- b. If the member nations are not able to maintain an Allied solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its missions, then the Alliance will not be able to promote peace and stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and throughout the global security environment.

## APPENDIX L

### DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 3

#### **Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 3**

**Statement:** Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1998) 140 held at NATO HQ Brussels 8 Dec 1998

#### **Speech Act:** Assertion, Commitment and Directive

- a. The member nations hereby assert to:
  - a. Celebrate the historic achievements of NATO as a strong, united and successful Alliance.
  - b. We are pleased with the successful completion by all Allies of the ratification process for the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Washington Treaty.
  - c. The membership of these countries will contribute to an overall strengthening of the Alliance and to enhancing security and stability in Europe.
  - d. Reaffirm that the door remains open to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration.
  - e. We are pleased that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) are resulting in a stronger consultative forum and a more operational Partnership.
  - f. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build with Partners new patterns of practical military and defense-related cooperation across a wide range of issues.
  - g. Political-military framework will be a key element in future cooperation and will provide for an increased role of Partners in one of the Alliance's major new tasks.
  - h. Partnership for Peace programs can also play an important role in contributing to Alliance efforts in reinforcing regional stability, such as in the Balkans.
  - i. Encouraged by the developing process of consultation and practical cooperation with Russia under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and remain committed to working together with Russia to achieve a strong, stable and enduring partnership, on the basis of the principles of common interest, reciprocity and transparency, as called for in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
  - j. The crisis in Kosovo has confirmed the value of the PJC as a consultative

- forum.
- k. The Ukraine has a key role to play in European security.
  - l. Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean.
  - m. We therefore give great attention to our Mediterranean Dialogue which is part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, contributes to building confidence with participating countries and mutually reinforces other international efforts towards this end.
  - n. The establishment of the Kosovo Verification Missions has opened a new stage in cooperation between NATO and the OSCE.
  - o. CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security.
  - p. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery continue to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance.
  - q. We recognize that proliferation can pose a direct threat to the Alliance.
  - r. We underline the risk to international and regional stability posed by the spread of NBC weapons.
  - s. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability which can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism.
- b. The member nations hereby direct to:
- a. Call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay.
  - b. Call upon all countries to accede to and implement the START II Treaty in due course.
  - c. We urge all countries to accede to and fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.
  - d. We call on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty without delay.
- c. The member nations hereby commit to:
- a. Recommend to our Heads of State and Government that at the Washington Summit they set out their shared vision of the Alliance in the years ahead - an Alliance adapted, renewed and ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.
  - b. Develop for the Washington Summit a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process, operationalize our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards.
  - c. Continue with internal adaption to be able to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness for the full range of its missions building on its essential collective defense capabilities and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.
  - d. Make recommendations on how best to further enhance the effectiveness of ESDI within the Alliance, including the contribution made by all European Allies, beyond the Washington Summit.
  - e. Ensure that the Strategic Concept is fully consistent with the Alliance's



new security environment.

- f. Reaffirm our commitment to collective defense and the transatlantic link; take account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; and present an Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance security and stability for countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century, including through dialogue, cooperation and partnership and, where appropriate, non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the possible participation of partners. We instructed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue this work vigorously so that the new text is available by the time of the Washington Summit.
- g. Enhance future cooperation by establishing a basis for Partner involvement in political consultations and decision-making, command arrangements and operational planning for NATO-led non-Article 5 operations
- h. Increased attention given to multinational formations as a means to enhance military cooperation between Allies and Partners, as in IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- i. Establish the NATO-Russia Scientific and Technological Cooperation Committee.
- j. Continue to work closely with Russia to develop an updated and substantial Individual Partnership Program (IPP) to include a wide range of practical defense-related and military-to-military cooperative activities.
- k. Utilize as fully as possible the potential offered by Ukraine's active participation in enhanced PfP and the agreed NATO-Ukraine Work Plan for 1999.
- l. Support an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv.
- m. Further improve the political, civil and military aspects of our Dialogue.
- n. Support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on European Security.
- o. A successful adaption of the CFE Treaty.
- p. Prevent proliferation and to reversing it, should it occur, through diplomatic means.
- q. Prepare to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat.
- r. Achieve progress on a legally binding protocol including effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
- s. Combat terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.

**Rules Invoked:** Identity, Security, Deterrence, and Enforcement

**Explicit Performative:**

- a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance is able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century through security and

stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.

- b. The member nations hereby encourage its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
- c. The member nations hereby commit the Alliance to do the following:
  - a. Develop a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process, operationalize our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards;
  - b. Continue with internal adaption;
  - c. Improve the political, civil and military aspects of the Alliance;
  - d. Prepare to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat; and
  - e. Combat terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.

**Reflective Intentions:**

- a. Assertion
  - a. The member nations believes that its must be able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century while maintaining security and stability for its members nations and throughout the global security environment.
  - b. The member nations want the Alliance to believe that it has the ability to adapt, renew, and has the ability to be ready to meet the security challenges in the global security environment while upholding security and stability.
- b. Directive
  - a. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
  - b. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
- c. Commitment
  - a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to maintaining security and stability on the condition that it can develop a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process; operationalize our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards; continue with internal adaption; improve the political, civil and military aspects of the Alliance; prepare to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat; and combat terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.
  - b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member countries will be able to adapt, renew, and has the ability to be ready to meet the security challenges in the global security environment while upholding security and stability.
  - c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).

**Implicatures:**

e. Assertion:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to the Alliance.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force

is relevant to its member countries.

- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.

c. Directive:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.

- ii. Quantity: NATO directive informs the member countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens.

- iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members and other countries in the global security environment.

- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive to its members and other countries in the global security environment.

- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.

- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.

- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries and other countries

- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.

- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.

- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing political relationships.

- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries and other countries.

- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.

- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.

- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member

- countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.

f. Commitment:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the member countries that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment

to its member countries.

- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.

**Presuppositions:**

- a. If the member nations are able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.
- b. If the member nations are not able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.

## APPENDIX M

### DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 4

<b>Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 4</b>
<b>Statement:</b> Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (1999) 166 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 1999
<b>Speech Act:</b> Assertion, Commitment, and Directive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. The member nations hereby assert:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. We set forth NATO's vision for the 21st century and approved an updated Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit, where we also celebrated the Alliance's 50th Anniversary.</li><li>b. We admitted as new members the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.</li><li>c. We contributed decisively, in particular through the conduct of our air campaign and the subsequent deployment of KFOR, to the international community's objective of creating the basis for long-term peace and stability in Kosovo.</li><li>d. The Kosovo air campaign, which demonstrated the cohesion and unity of the Alliance and its determination to act, reinforced the diplomatic efforts of the international community and achieved the key objectives of the NATO Allies and their Partners.</li><li>e. We are determined to play our part in meeting in full the aims of the international community as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1244.</li><li>f. Close civil-military relations are essential for the success of our common goals and of our peace-building efforts in the region.</li><li>g. The achievement of the de-militarization and the dissolution of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) under the supervision of KFOR was an important step in establishing an environment for post-conflict reconciliation.</li><li>h. Our individual bilateral efforts, the substantial role of the EU and that of other international bodies, are making a decisive contribution to the economic reconstruction of Kosovo.</li><li>i. We express our deep appreciation for the robust practical and political support provided by Partner countries of the region throughout the air campaign and thereafter. This support was and remains critical to success.</li><li>j. The Alliance remains committed to supporting a peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single democratic state composed of two</li></ul></li></ul>

multi-ethnic Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.

- k. SFOR has helped to secure a more stable and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- l. The important challenges remain, such as:
  - i. the return of displaced persons to minority areas;
  - ii. further reduction of both Entities' armed forces;
  - iii. further progress in humanitarian de-mining;
  - iv. improving the effectiveness of all common institutions, notably the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and cooperation between Entities;
  - v. transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes;
  - vi. the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret services;
  - vii. judicial and police reform; and
  - viii. the establishment of a state border service.
- m. We remain concerned about continued tensions between Belgrade and the democratically elected government of Montenegro.
- n. The forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia will be crucial for its future.
- o. Our experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO must continue to adapt and improve its defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions.
- p. The DCI is essential to strengthening European defense capabilities and the European pillar of NATO, so that European Allies will be able to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO.
- q. The development of an effective ESDI will strengthen the Alliance, through which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives wherever possible.
- r. Our readiness to define and adopt, in accordance with our decisions taken in Washington, the necessary arrangements for European Union ready access to separable but not separate NATO collective assets and capabilities, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance, respecting the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure.
- s. The importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies, for the necessary involvement of non-EU European Allies in these structures.
- t. Participation of non-EU European Allies will enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military operations and will contribute directly to the effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of NATO.
- u. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council remains the key forum for regular consultation on security and defense related issues between the Alliance and its Partners.
- v. Our aim remains to establish a strong, stable and enduring partnership within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
- w. We are deeply concerned about the conflict in Chechnya, continuing



reports of civilian casualties there and the plight of displaced persons. We condemn, in particular, Russian threats against unarmed civilians, such as those in Grozny.

- x. Acknowledging the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and to protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness.
  - y. We condemn terrorism in all its manifestations but believe that Russia's pursuit of a purely military solution to the conflict is undermining its legitimate objectives.
  - z. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.
  - aa. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play an important role in the achievement of NATO's security objectives.
  - bb. The Adapted CFE Treaty will enhance security throughout Europe, not least as it introduces a more constraining structure of National and Territorial Ceilings, while permitting sufficient deployment flexibility for routine training purposes and effective crisis management, thereby ensuring NATO's ability to fulfill its responsibilities.
  - cc. NATO countries are concerned about continued Russian non-compliance with the Treaty's Article V («flank») limits.
  - dd. The Alliance attaches importance to preserving strategic stability.
  - ee. The prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery remains our primary aim.
  - ff. Recognize that proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery, which pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory and forces, can continue to occur despite our preventive efforts and can pose a direct military threat to those populations, territories and forces.
  - gg. In order to enhance the effectiveness of Civil-Military Cooperation, confirmed in the Strategic Concept as essential to the Alliance's operational capability, a fundamental review of civil emergency planning in NATO is nearing completion.
  - hh. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States.
  - ii. The terrorist threat against deployed NATO forces and NATO installations requires the consideration and development of appropriate measures for their continued protection taking full account of host nation responsibilities.
- b. The member nations hereby direct to:
- a. Urge all community leaders in Kosovo, irrespective of their ethnic background, to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society founded on the rule of law, tolerance and respect for human rights.
  - b. Urge all parties to demonstrate fully their commitment to the Dayton

process and their cooperation with the High Representative, as the basis for further progress in transferring administrative responsibility to local authorities.

- c. Call upon the Presidency to implement in full the commitments made in the New York Declaration of 15 November, and to support the work of the Standing Committee on Military Matters.
  - d. Demand that all parties fully co-operate with the ICTY, in particular by surrendering inductees within their territory.
  - e. Call on Belgrade and the government of Montenegro to resolve their differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing measures.
  - f. We encourage all aspirants to set themselves realistic, prioritized goals and timelines and to allocate the necessary resources to them.
  - g. We encourage Russia to resume cooperation on the broad range of issues foreseen in the Founding Act and to engage actively in the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace.
  - h. Urge Russia to exercise the fullest restraint, to refrain from the use of force against civilians and protect their human rights, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, and to co-operate fully with international relief agencies and to ensure security for their operations.
  - i. We urge Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict.
  - j. We encourage Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms, and reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's efforts to this end.
  - k. Call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay.
  - l. Call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible.
- c.. The member nations hereby commit to:
- a. Take steps to further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment.
  - b. Further its fundamental security tasks, as set out in the Strategic Concept, and the importance of our individual and collective efforts to achieve our guiding objective of enhancing the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.
  - c. Review the status of NATO's comprehensive approach and continuing commitment to the promotion of security, stability, peace and democracy, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region, including through the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the implementation of NATO's South-East Europe Initiative.
  - d. Monitor closely the situation in South-East Europe.
  - e. Helping to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all peoples can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions.
  - f. Continue to do our utmost to provide a secure environment and we will give appropriate support for the conduct of free and fair elections under

the auspices of the OSCE.

- g. Our goal of integrating all the countries of South-East Europe into the Euro-Atlantic Community.
- h. Building on the Alliance's already extensive cooperation in the region as evidenced by NATO's leadership of the SFOR and KFOR operations.
- i. Continue to contribute to the success of the Stability Pact by making available its wealth of experience and expertise in practical military and defense-related cooperation and by ensuring that our efforts complement and contribute to the goals of the Pact.
- j. Contribute to effective conflict prevention.
- k. Continue to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate.
- l. Ensure that NATO's forces can meet the challenges of mobility, deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability and interoperable and effective command, control and communications systems.
- m. Reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar.
- n. Take into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU.
- o. Reaffirms its commitment to remain open to new members.
- p. Further enhance Partnership for Peace and make it more operational.
- q. Endorse the Operational Capabilities Concept which will reinforce PfP's operational capabilities and improve the capability and interoperability of Partner forces, as well as enhance the Alliance's overall ability to put together tailored force packages to mount and sustain future NATO-led PfP operations along the lines of SFOR and KFOR.
- r. Continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with Russia.
- s. Support the efforts of the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform and remain prepared to provide advice, as appropriate, to assist Ukraine with the transformation of its defense establishment. In the economic area, we welcome the initiation of a program for the retraining of retired military officers.
- t. Efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons.
- u. An early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- v. Remain committed to preventing proliferation and reversing it where it has occurred through diplomatic means.
- w. Support deepening consultations with Russia in these areas within the Permanent Joint Council, as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners in the EAPC, as well as with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.
- x. Consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament, in the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons.
- y. Condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in

accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.

**Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force**

**Explicit Performative:**

- d. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance has been able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century by maintaining stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military relations; implementing robust practical and political support provided by Partner countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of the Alliance.
- e. The member nations hereby direct the following:
  - a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies;
  - b. Leaders in Kosovo to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society;
  - c. Belgrade and the government of Montenegro to resolve their differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing measures;
  - d. Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict; and
  - e. Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms.
- f. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
  - a. Further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment while still maintaining security and stability;
  - b. Continue to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate
  - c. Monitor closely the situation in South-East Europe;
  - d. Continue efforts in Kosovo and other areas of involvement of the Alliance;
  - e. Help to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo;
  - f. Contribute to effective conflict prevention;
  - g. Reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar;
  - h. To remain open to new members.
  - i. Continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine;
  - j. Efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons; and
  - k. Reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.

**Reflective Intentions:**

- d. Assertion:
  - a. The member nations believe the Alliance has been able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
  - b. The member nations want its members to believe it has adapted, renewed, and is ready in the global security environment based upon the

Alliance's ability to maintain stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military relations; implementing robust practical and political support provided by Partner countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of the Alliance.

e. Directive:

- a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
  - i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
- b. The member nation believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for leaders to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society.
  - i. The member nations want the leaders of Kosovo to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society because of NATO's command.
- c. The member nations believe in its utterance, virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for both parties to resolve their differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing measures.
  - i. The member nations want the parties of Belgrade and Montegro to resolve their differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing measures because of NATO's command.
- d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict.
  - i. The member nations want Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict because of NATO's command.
- l. The member nations believe in its utterance, virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms.
  - i. The member nations want the Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms because of NATO's command.

f. Commitment:

- a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century on the condition that the member countries want to maintain stability and security; ensure the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintain civil-

military relations; implement robust practical and political support provided by Partner countries; have the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and establish a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of the Alliance.

- b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations would be able to maintain the ability to adapt, renew, and have the ability to be ready to meet the security challenges in the global security environment while upholding security and stability
- c. NATO wants the member nations to believe (a) and (b).

**Impicatures:**

g. Assertion:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs the members that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to the Alliance.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs its members it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs its members it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs its members

- conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.

d. Directive:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries and other countries
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing political

- relationships.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries and other countries.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- h. Commitment:
  - a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the member countries that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
  - c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing political relationships.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security



- through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
  - e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will use force if necessary.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries will use force if necessary.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.

**Presuppositions:**

- c. If the member nations have the ability to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, then the Alliance will be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.
- a. If the member nations do not possess the ability to able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.

## APPENDIX N

### DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 5

<b>Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 5</b>
<b>Statement:</b> Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2000) 124 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 2000
<b>Speech Act:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. The member nations hereby assert:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Reaffirm NATO's strong commitment to the achievement of security, stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights in South-East Europe and will continue to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo.</li><li>b. Reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries in the region.</li><li>c. Welcoming the democratic changes that have taken place in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after September's parliamentary and presidential elections.</li><li>d. The democratic changes in the FRY will pave the way for increased stability across the region and offer new opportunities for regional cooperation.</li><li>e. Recent acts of violence by insurgent elements in the Presevo Valley and the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) adjacent to the internal boundary between Kosovo and Serbia, are of concern to NATO and KFOR.</li><li>f. Condemn the violence caused by extremists and call on the perpetrators to cease their illegal activity forthwith. Any extremist activity and the possibility of an escalation of violence present a continuing threat to stability in the region, especially for neighboring countries.</li><li>g. Reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of UNSCR 1244.</li><li>h. The municipal elections in late October were a milestone for democratic development in Kosovo.</li><li>i. The protection and security of all the people of Kosovo remain a priority.</li><li>j. Violence from any quarter, whether ethnically, politically or criminally motivated, is unacceptable.</li><li>k. Concerned about the high level of organized crime which is a continuing threat to the people of Kosovo and neighboring countries.</li><li>l. Greater and more rapid progress needs to be made in Bosnia and Herzegovina towards a self-sustaining, multi-ethnic democracy.</li></ul></li></ul>

- m. Those important challenges remain. In particular, further progress must be achieved in market reform, economic re-construction and the creation of a self-sustaining economy and a single economic space; the adjudication of property claims enabling the return of refugees and displaced persons especially to areas in which their ethnic groups are in the minority; improving the effectiveness of all state level institutions and cooperation between Entities; transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes; the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret services; judicial and police reform; and the full functioning of the State Border Service. We support the High Representative in his use of the authority accorded to him to advance this agenda.
- n. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs armed forces with a unified command and control capable of joint deployment and joint action under international and regional security organizations.
- o. NATO's efforts are aimed at enabling the countries of the region to work together to ensure their own security and thus support and complement the objectives of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe.
- p. DCI will provide the forces and capabilities the Alliance urgently requires to meet the security challenges of the 21st century by ensuring the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions.
- q. The implementation of DCI will depend on the adequacy of national defense budgets.
- r. The DCI will also promote greater interoperability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between Allied and Partner forces.
- s. Reaffirmed our determination to reinforce NATO's European pillar and remain committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership.
- t. Alliance will remain the foundation for the collective defense of its members and continue actively to play its important role in crisis management as set out in the Strategic Concept.
- u. The European Allies are committed to further strengthening their military capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. This will enhance their ability to contribute both to the Alliance's missions and to EU-led operations for Petersberg tasks where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.
- v. The Alliance agrees that these proposals constitute the basis for the permanent NATO/EU agreement.
- w. Reaffirm the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members.
- x. We believe that Partnership is pivotal to the role of the Alliance in promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and contributes to the enhancement of the Alliance's capabilities in crisis management.
- y. We value highly the continuing progress in making the Partnership for Peace more operational and look forward to reviewing progress on these initiatives at our next meeting.
- z. We value our ongoing consultations and cooperation with Russia in the

framework of the PJC on such issues as strategy, defense policy and military doctrines, infrastructure development programs, nuclear weapons, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, theatre missile defense, air defense, and other disarmament and arms control issues, including CFE and Open Skies, scientific and environmental issues, civil emergency preparedness, and the retraining of discharged military personnel.

- aa. Great importance to the further development of military-to-military cooperation and are pursuing our negotiations with Russia with a view to opening a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow in the near future, as called for in the Founding Act.
- bb. Reaffirm that a mutually satisfactory, just and durable solution to the conflict in Chechnya is urgent and essential and that the parties must take steps to begin a dialogue that can lead to a settlement.
- cc. Acknowledging the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and its right and responsibility to protect all its citizens against criminality and terrorism which we condemn in all its forms.
- dd. We deplore the continued loss of life and material damage inflicted upon the civilian population; this calls for prompt and independent investigation of violations of human rights and breaches of international law.
- ee. We recall the importance we attach to the efforts of humanitarian assistance organizations to relieve the suffering of the displaced and call on Russia to support them fully.
- ff. We value our relationship with an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine and Ukraine's contribution to ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe and the continent as a whole.
- gg. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is an essential part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.
- hh. Reaffirm the progressive nature of the Dialogue.
- ii. Early entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty will ensure CFE's continuing viability as a cornerstone of European security and stability.
- jj. Believe ratification by our governments can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels of armaments and equipment and consistent with the commitments contained in the CFE Final Act.
- kk. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery continue to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance as it poses risks to international and regional security and can pose a direct military threat to Allies' populations, territory and forces.
- ll. We continue to place great importance on non-proliferation regimes, international arms control and disarmament, and export control regimes as means to prevent proliferation.
- mm. We reaffirm that the Alliance's defense posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery.

- nn. We continue to emphasize the importance of universal accession and adherence to, as well as full compliance with, the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  - oo. We deplore the recent terrorist attacks against nationals of several NATO countries and deeply regret the tragic loss of life.
  - pp. Terrorism constitutes a threat to internal and international security, to peaceful relations between States and to their territorial integrity, to the development and functioning of democratic institutions throughout the world and to the enjoyment of human rights and civil liberties.
  - qq. We strongly condemn this scourge in all its manifestations, and reiterate our strong determination to combat it in full compliance with all our international commitments and national legislation.
- b. The member nations hereby direct to:
- a. Call upon the new representatives on the Kosovo municipal councils to carry out their duties responsibly, in close cooperation with the international community.
  - b. Call upon all Kosovo inhabitants to support the significant efforts being made by KFOR and UNMIK to strengthen the rule of law.
  - c. Call upon all communities in Kosovo to work towards this goal in cooperation with KFOR and UNMIK.
  - d. Call on the newly elected leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to commit themselves to the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, taking on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process. In particular, we encourage them to redouble their efforts to improve the functioning of state level institutions.
  - e. Urge the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the objectives of Annex I B of the Dayton Peace Agreement concerning confidence-building and security measures.
  - f. Urge Russia to respect its international obligations as a member of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, as well as the relevant principles enshrined in the Founding Act.
  - g. Call on the Chechen side to co-operate in good faith in seeking a solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it.
  - h. We urge the Russian government to expedite the OSCE Assistance Group's return to Chechnya under its existing mandate.
  - i. Encourage Ukraine to pursue these efforts, and in that regard we welcome the approval of Ukraine's state program for the reform of the armed forces, and the recent Presidential Decree on its implementation.
  - j. Although the Alliance is not involved in the Middle East Peace Process, we strongly support it and urge all participants to remain firmly committed to it.
  - k. We call upon the States participating in the negotiations on regional stability under the Accords to make use of the fresh impetus generated by the participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the OSCE, with the aim of concluding their work by the agreed deadline.
  - l. Call on Russia and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty to allow it to

- enter into force as soon as possible.
- m. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
  - n. We welcomed Russian ratification of the START II Treaty.
  - o. We will encourage countries that are not part of the MTCR to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives.
- c. The member nations hereby commit to:
- a. Promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
  - b. Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo where its entire people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions.
  - c. Support the efforts of the SRSG to establish local democratic, self-governing institutions in Kosovo.
  - d. Support the efforts of the international community to establish a functioning judicial system in Kosovo, but acknowledge that much work remains to be done in this respect.
  - e. The full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  - f. Continue to work closely, in particular through SFOR, with the High Representative and with other organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
  - g. Endorse SFOR's continuing close working relationship with the civilian agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  - h. Assist in drawing up a similar program for Albania.
  - i. Contributing to the Stability Pact effort to develop a South-East Europe regional civil-military emergency response capability through its Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Initiative.
  - j. Providing sufficient resources to ensure its implementation.
  - k. Making the most effective use of resources and to finding innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common funding.
  - l. To provide, subject to the necessary decisions, further expert advice upon request by the EU.
  - m. To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency,

- consultation and cooperation between NATO and the EU.
- n. Develop cooperation and consultations between NATO and the EU on questions of common interest relating to security, defense and crisis management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured.
  - o. Intensify consultation in times of crisis, which will also enable non-EU European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security interests might be involved.
  - p. Continue to work on the ESDI within the Alliance as directed at the Washington Summit and agreed at subsequent Ministerial meetings.
  - q. To put in place arrangements for: assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; the identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; and the further adaptation of the Alliance's defense planning system, taking account of relevant activities in and proposals from the European Union. Allies will be consulted on the EU's proposed use of assets and capabilities, prior to the decision to release these assets and capabilities, and kept informed during the operation.
  - r. Continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on their preparations for possible future membership.
  - s. Continue to place high priority on the strengthening of our partnership with all members of the Euro-Atlantic community through the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace.
  - t. Continue to develop the EAPC as a key forum for political consultation and practical cooperation on Euro-Atlantic security issues.
  - u. Continue efforts in the EAPC/PfP framework to support broader efforts underway to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in support of global humanitarian mine action and the promotion of International Humanitarian Law, among other EAPC priority areas.
  - v. Further develop cooperation on information and outreach opportunities and welcome Partners' continuing interest in cooperation in civil emergency preparedness.
  - w. To the full implementation of the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations.
  - x. Building a strong, stable and enduring partnership with the Russian Federation in accordance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, on the basis of the principles of transparency and reciprocity.
  - y. Continue dialogue and cooperation in the framework of the PJC on issues relating to the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, building on the valuable experience of practical cooperation with Russian forces in both SFOR and KFOR.
  - z. Implementing the program of cooperation between NATO and Russia on

search and rescue at sea agreed by PJC Defense Ministers on 5 December 2000 and to the early signature of a Memorandum of Understanding with Russia on environmental protection.

- aa. Support the implementation of Ukraine's defense reform and welcome the enhanced role and new initiatives of the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform.
- bb. Consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our cooperative relations with all the Mediterranean partners in accordance with the Washington Summit decisions, in areas where NATO can bring an added value and where partners have expressed interest.
- cc. Support the implementation of such an agreement within the framework of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe.
- dd. Pursue vigorously implementation of the recommendations contained in the CFE Treaty, including with Russia through the PJC.
- ee. Continued work in NATO inter alia on Theatre Missile Defense for point and area defense, in particular on the feasibility study on a possible system for the defense of deployed NATO forces.
- ff. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as an important element in our efforts to counter the proliferation of means for delivering weapons of mass destruction.

**Rules Invoked:** Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force

**Explicit Performative:**

- b. The member nations hereby assert to uphold and maintain stability and security for the Alliance, its members nations and their citizens by remaining strongly committed to the achievement of security, stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights for its member countries and in out-of-area mission, including South-East Europe; remain steadfast and adhere to policies and treaties; continue to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo; condemn all acts of violence and terrorism; enable the countries of the region to work together to ensure their own security; further strengthening their military capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar; continue cooperative efforts to work with Russia and any situations which arise concerning the nation; and finally continue to condemn all acts of terrorism and violence.
- c. The member nations hereby direct the following:
  - a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies;
  - b. Encourage non-member countries to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives.
  - c. Representatives and leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies;
  - d. Urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict; and
  - e. Encourage Ukraine to move forward on its current path of political and economic reform.



d. The member nations hereby commit to the following:

- d. Promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation;
- e. Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions;
- f. Providing sufficient resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently carry out policies, treaties, and out-of-area mission;
- g. Effectively use resources and find innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common funding.
- h. To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and cooperation between member nations, especially in regards to NATO and the EU;
- i. Intensify consultation in times of crisis;
- j. Continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on their preparations for possible future membership; and
- k. Consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our cooperative relations with all partners.

**Reflective Intentions:**

b. Assertion:

- a. The member nations believe the Alliance has been able to maintain and uphold its original mission; as such the Alliance needs to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
- b. The member nations want the Alliance to be able to maintain and uphold its original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment based upon the Alliance's ability to remain strongly committed to the achievement of security, stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights for its member countries and in out-of-area mission, including South-East Europe; remain steadfast and adhere to policies and treaties; continue to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo; condemn all acts of violence and terrorism; enable the countries of the region to work together to ensure their own security; further strengthening their military capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar; continue cooperative efforts to work with Russia and any situations which arise concerning the nation; and finally continue to condemn all acts of terrorism and violence.

c. Directive:

- a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over

the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.

- i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
  - b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage non-member countries to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives.
    - i. The member nations want to encourage non-member countries to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives because of NATO's command.
  - c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the representatives and leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies.
    - i. The member nations want the representatives and leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
  - d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict.
    - i. The member nations want to urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict because of NATO's command.
  - f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Ukraine to move forward on its current path of political and economic reform.
    - i. The member nations want the Ukraine to move forward on its current path of political and economic reform because of NATO's command.
- d. Commitment:
1. The member nations believes its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able to maintain and uphold its original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment on the condition that its member countries want to promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation; continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including

through participation in democratic institutions; provide sufficient resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently carry out policies, treaties, and out-of-area mission; effectively use resources and find innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common funding; work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and cooperation between member nations, especially in regards to NATO and the EU; intensify consultation in times of crisis; continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on their preparations for possible future membership; and consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our cooperative relations with all partners.

- m. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations will be able to maintain and uphold its original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment .
- n. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).

**Implicatures:**

i. Assertion:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs the members that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to the Alliance.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs its members it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs its members it is establishing political relationships.

- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
  - d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations' are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
  - e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force if necessary.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members will use force if necessary.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- e. Directive:
  - a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries and other countries
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion

to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.

c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.

i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.

ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing political relationships.

iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries and other countries.

iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.

d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.

i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.

ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.

iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.

v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.

j. Commitment:

a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.

i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.

ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the member countries that they are fellow citizens.

iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its member countries.

iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.

i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.

ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.

iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.

iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its

commitment to its member countries.

- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations' are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.

**Presuppositions:**

- a. If the member nations are able to maintain and uphold its original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.
- b. If the member nations are not able to maintain and uphold its original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.

## APPENDIX O

### DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 6

<b>Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 6</b>
<b>Statement:</b> Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2001) 158 held at NATO HQ Brussels 6 Dec 2001
<b>Speech Act:</b> Assertion, Commitment, and Directive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. The member nations hereby assert:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the Alliance.</li><li>b. We deplore the loss of life which affected so many NATO members and partner countries.</li><li>c. To reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.</li><li>d. We support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her right to protect all citizens against terrorism and criminality.</li><li>e. The Alliance has played a particularly active role in promoting stability and security in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in close cooperation with the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).</li><li>f. We reaffirm our condemnation of the use of violence for political ends.</li><li>g. We recognize the crucial contribution NATO's Partner countries are making to the Alliance's efforts to foster peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.</li><li>h. The events of 11 September have underlined the importance of enhanced cooperation between the two organizations on questions of common interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings.</li><li>i. Events on and since 11 September show that our security is challenged in a variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways.</li></ul></li></ul>

- j. We reaffirm that the Alliance must have the capability to defend appropriately and effectively against the threats that the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery can pose.
  - k. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives.
  - l. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament along with deterrence and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these new threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defense could play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the United States on this issue.
- b. The member nations hereby direct to:
- a. Urge Russia to build on the steps towards establishing a political dialogue with Chechnya and find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful resolution to the conflict and to respect and protect the human and legal rights of the population.
  - b. Call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take actions against it.
  - c. Urge all parties involved in promoting stability and security in close cooperation EU and OSCE to implement the Framework Agreement in full, and to continue to cooperate with the international community.
  - d. We encourage the newly elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new functions in strict compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and the constitutional framework for provisional self-government and in full cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR. We also call on them to establish effective cooperation with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
  - e. Encourage all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the Alliance.
  - f. Encourage Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform process forward and stand ready to assist it in this regard.
- c. The member nations hereby commit to:
- a. Upholding its allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001.
  - b. Taken stock of NATO's broad agenda, and given further guidance on its implementation.
  - c. Forge a new relationship with Russia, enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest.
  - d. Explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding Act, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action.
  - e. Intensifying our cooperation in the common goals of a strong, stable and enduring partnerships and other areas, including non-proliferation, export control and arms control matters, arms transparency and confidence building measures, missile defense, search and rescue at sea, and military-to-military cooperation, which represents a major step towards a



- qualitatively new relationship.
- f. Continuing the enlargement process of the Alliance and will encourage the nine aspirant countries to continue focused efforts to prepare for possible future membership, making full use of the opportunities offered through our Membership Action Plan (MAP).
  - g. A peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe, and our determination to oppose all violence, whether ethnically, politically or criminally motivated.
  - h. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in South-East Europe.
  - i. Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
  - j. NATO's operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalization and an enhanced regional approach, recognizing the need for continued close consultation with other international organizations involved.
  - k. The territorial integrity of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
  - l. Stand ready to continue to contribute to security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors for a further three-month period, as part of its contribution to peace and stability in the country.
  - m. The full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and call on all political leaders in this country to continue to renounce separatism and violence, to support democratic institutions and to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement.
  - n. Strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we reiterate that the Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end.
  - o. Further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP).
  - p. Broaden and strengthen cooperation with our Mediterranean partners, and invite them to intensify their dialogue with us on security matters of common concern.
  - q. Achieving a close, transparent and coherent NATO-EU relationship.
  - r. Make progress on all the various aspects of our relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies.
  - s. Ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly.
  - t. Continue to work together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.

- u. Contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and will work towards a successful outcome of the upcoming review.
- v. Support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the end of 2002.
- w. Swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia.

**Rules Invoked:** Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force

**Explicit Performative:**

- c. The member nations hereby assert in order to uphold and maintain stability and security in a post 9-11 environment for the Alliance, its members nations and their citizens it is essential that confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Euro-Atlantics are upheld; continuing to uphold current policies and treaties; condemning all use of violence and terrorism for either military or political means; continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately and effectively against threats.
- d. The member nations hereby direct the following:
  - a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community;
  - b. Urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict
  - c. Encourage the elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new functions in strict compliance and carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies;
  - d. Encourage all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the Alliance; and
  - e. Encourage Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform process forward.
- e. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
  - h. Upholding it's allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001;
  - i. Continue to uphold existing relationships and forge new relationships Russia;
  - j. Explore and develop, in the coming months, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action;
  - k. Continuing the enlargement process;
  - l. To develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans;
  - m. Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, and lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons;
  - n. NATO's operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalization and

an enhanced regional approach, recognizing the need for continued close consultation with other international organizations involved.

- o. Continue to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence;
- p. Further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP);
- q. Ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly;
- r. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; and
- s. Find a swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia.

**Reflective Intentions:**

c. Assertion:

- a. The member nations believe that the Alliance needs to be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
- b. The member nations want the Alliance to be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 environment by being confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Euro-Atlantic are upheld; continuing to uphold current policies and treaties; condemning all use of violence and terrorism for either military or political means; continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately and effectively against threats.

d. Directive:

- a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
  - i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
- b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict.
  - i. The member nations want to urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict because of NATO's command.
- c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new functions in strict compliance and carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies.
  - i. The member nations want the elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new functions in strict compliance and carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with

the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies because of NATO's command.

- f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for all Partners to seek a more active relationship with the Alliance.
  - i. NATO wants all Partners to seek a more active relationship with the Alliance because of NATO's command.
- g. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance; constitutes sufficient reason for the Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform process forward.
  - i. The member nations want the Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform process forward because of NATO's command.

e. Commitment:

- a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able to be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment on condition that the member nations indicate they would uphold its allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001; continue to uphold existing relationships and forge new relationships Russia; explore and develop, in the coming months, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action; continuing the enlargement process; develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, and lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons; continue to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence; further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP); ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly; continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; and find a swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia.
- b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations will be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
- c. The member nations wants the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).

**Impicatures:**

k. Assertion:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the

- same race – human.
- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to the Alliance.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.

f. Directive:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries and other countries
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries and other countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion

to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.

I. Commitment:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the member countries that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will use force if necessary.

- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries will use force if necessary.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is relevant to its member countries.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.

**Presuppositions:**

- a. If the member nations are able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.
- b. If the member nations are not able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.



## APPENDIX P

### DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 7

#### Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 7

**Statement:** Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2002) 59 held at NATO HQ Brussels 14 May 2002

**Speech Act:** Assertive, Commitment, and Directive

- a. The member nations hereby assert:
  - a. Re-affirmed NATO's commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe, and to the development of close and effective relations between NATO and the European Union.
  - b. Reiterate our determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as necessary.
  - c. Meeting this challenge is fundamental to our security.
  - d. Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense.
  - e. To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.
  - f. The accession process will take into account work conducted under the MAP, and the MAP will be used to help the integration of invitees into Alliance structures.
  - g. We commend Croatia on the progress it has made in its reform efforts, making full use of the options offered by Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Intensified Dialogue.
  - h. We welcome the decisive and substantial deepening of the NATO-Russia relationship, which marks an historic step towards the Alliance's long-standing goal of building a secure, cooperative and democratic Euro-Atlantic area.
  - i. We note Ukraine's strong determination to pursue full Euro-Atlantic integration.
  - j. Since 11 September, the important contribution made by NATO's Partnerships to Euro-Atlantic security has been confirmed and reinforced.
  - k. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the achievement of peace and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation brings considerable benefits.
  - l. The events of 11 September have underlined the importance of enhanced

cooperation between the two organizations on questions of common interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured.

- m. The continued presence of NATO-led forces demonstrates and embodies our determination to oppose all violence whether ethnically, politically or criminally motivated, and to strengthen peace, tolerance, the rule of law and democratic institutions in the region.
  - n. We reiterate that the Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end.
  - o. Reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, and welcome the establishment of provisional institutions of self-government which include representatives of all communities.
  - p. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, along with deterrence and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these new threats and challenges.
  - q. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords.
  - r. Recognizing the contributions of the CFE Treaty to European security and stability, we recall that the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty would permit accession by non-CFE States.
- b. The member nations hereby direct:
- a. Croatia to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans.
  - b. Urge Russia to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful resolution to the conflict in Chechnya, and to respect and protect the human and legal rights of the population.
  - c. Call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it.
  - d. Encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard.
  - e. Call on the local authorities in the country to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement.
  - f. Call on the provisional institutions and community leaders to assume their responsibilities and fully cooperate with UNMIK, KFOR and the international community to promote a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo.
  - g. Encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our efforts to verify this claim as soon as possible.
- c. The member nations hereby commit to:
- a. Act on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

- b. To the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan.
- c. The Alliance and its members are playing their full part in the current campaign against terror, confirming NATO's key role in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security, including in the face of new threats.
- d. Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area.
- e. Strengthen our national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad.
- f. Working together with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery.
- g. Enhance our ability, through working on all possible options, to provide support, when requested, to national authorities for the protection of civilian populations against the effects of any terrorist attack, and are cooperating with our Partners in this field, taking into account the various proposals and initiatives put forward.
- h. Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance, including strategic lift and modern strike capabilities, so that NATO can more effectively respond collectively to any threat of aggression against a member state.
- i. Launch the next round of NATO enlargement.
- j. Remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
- k. Collective defense and the Alliance's full range of missions, a firm commitment to contribute to stability and security, especially in regions of crisis and conflict, and to be willing and able to assume the responsibilities of membership.
- l. Continuing to work with the aspirants to help them make sufficient progress to be invited to begin accession negotiations at Prague.
- m. Support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her responsibility to protect all her citizens against terrorism and criminality.
- n. Develop new mechanisms and modalities that build on the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership and bring our relationship to a qualitatively new level. We expect to deepen and expand our relationship, including through intensified consultations and cooperation on political, economic and defense issues.
- o. A new, more substantive relationship with Partners, which intensifies our cooperation in responding to new security challenges, including terrorism.
- p. In light of the changing security environment, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are adapting to remain valuable and effective.
- q. Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue, including by consulting with Mediterranean partners on security matters of common concern, including terrorism-related issues, as appropriate.

- r. Achieving a close, transparent and coherent NATO-EU relationship.
- s. To make progress on all the various aspects of our relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies.
- t. A peaceful, stable, and democratic South-East Europe, and reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the region.
- u. Working together with our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other international institutions, we will continue to promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons.
- v. We remain actively engaged in the field of border security and smuggling interdiction operations and reaffirm the importance of a wider regional approach to these issues.
- w. Further support efforts towards security and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
- x. Security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors through the presence of Task Force Fox.
- y. A self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in full accordance with the principles of the General Framework Agreement.
- z. Endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring to trial persons indicted for war crimes.
- aa. Further developing the Alliance's relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and expect swift implementation of the agreement that has been reached between Serbia and Montenegro in redefining their relationship.
- bb. Full and continued cooperation with ICTY, democratic reform and control of the military, as well as full and transparent implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, are essential to a deeper relationship with the Alliance.
- cc. Support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives.
- dd. Adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.
- ee. Actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and pursue further arms reductions, transparency and confidence and security building measures.
- ff. Contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and welcome the full discussion of issues at the Preparatory Conference for the 2005 Review Conference in April 2002.
- gg. Support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the end of 2002.

hh. Work at NATO on theatre missile defense.

**Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force**

**Explicit Performative:**

- b. The member nations hereby assert in order to maintain stability and security for the Alliance, its member nations, and their citizens, the Alliance must commit to promote peaceful, stable, and democratic nations, including those countries in South-East Europe; continue to combat the threat of terrorism; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and treaties.
- c. The member nations hereby direct the following:
  - a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community;
  - b. Encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our efforts to verify this claim as soon as possible.
  - c. Urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict;
  - d. Encourage Croatia to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans.
  - e. Encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard; and
  - f. Call on the local authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing policies and treatments.
- d. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
  - a. Act on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state;
  - b. Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area;
  - c. Strengthen national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad;
  - d. Work with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery;
  - e. Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance;
  - f. Launch the next round of NATO enlargement;
  - g. Remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area;
  - h. Build a new, more substantive relationship with Partners;
  - i. Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean

Dialogue;

- j. Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons;
- k. Adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts;
- l. To develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; and
- m. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.

**Reflective Intentions:**

a. Assertion:

- a. The member nations believe that the Alliance needs to be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of-area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
- b. The member nations wants the Alliance to maintain stability and security for its member nations and in out-of-area missions by commit to promote peaceful, stable, and democratic nations, including those countries in South-East Europe; continue to combat the threat of terrorism; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and treaties.

b. Directive:

- a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
  - i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
- b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO.
  - i. The member nations want its members to encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO because of NATO's command.
- c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict.

- i. The member nations want its members to urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict because of NATO's command.
  - d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Croatia to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans.
    - i. The member nations want its members to encourage Croatia to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans because of NATO's command.
  - e. The member-nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard.
    - i. The member nations want its members encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard because of NATO's command.
  - f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to call on the local authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing policies and treatments.
    - i. The member nations want its members to call on the local authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing policies and treatments because of NATO's command.
- c. Commitment:
  - a. The member nations believes its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment on the condition that the member nations to act on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state; Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area; strengthen national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad; work with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery; develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance; launch the next round of NATO enlargement; remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area; build a new, more substantive relationship with Partners; upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue; promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons; adapt the

Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; and continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.

- b. The member nations want the Alliance nations to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations will be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment

- b. NATO wants its member nations to believe (a) and (b).

**Implicatures:**

m. Assertion:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to the Alliance.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.



- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
  - e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force if necessary.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members will use force if necessary.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- g. Directive:
  - a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries and other countries
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
  - c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member

- countries and other countries it is establishing political relationships.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries and other countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
- n. Commitment:
- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the member countries that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
  - c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing political relationships.

- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.

**Presuppositions:**

- a. If the member nations are able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.
- b. If the member nations are not able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.

## APPENDIX Q

### DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 8

#### Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 8

**Statement:** Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (2003) 152 held at NATO HQ Brussels 4 Dec 2003

#### **Speech Act:** Assertive, Commitment, and Directive

b. The member nations hereby assert:

- a. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective defense and the essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave direction on work still to be done.
- b. We look forward to welcoming seven new members of the Alliance by the time of the Istanbul Summit, which will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area.
- c. In Afghanistan, the Alliance now leads the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under its UN mandate.
- d. Peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq remain a high priority.
- e. The security environment in the strategically important region of the Balkans is stable but remains fragile.
- f. We want to see enduring stability and peace in the Balkans.
- g. Our missions in the Balkans continue to evolve.
- h. The improved security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina will allow for further reduction of SFOR by next Spring.
- i. In Kosovo, KFOR's presence remains essential.
- j. Direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on practical issues of mutual concern remains a key benchmark and an indispensable element of the international community's policy of Standards before Status.
- k. We recognize the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro in their efforts to join Partnership for Peace (PfP), welcome substantive progress on defense reform.
- l. NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests.
- m. NATO-EU cooperation has made concrete progress and is developing in a constructive manner.
- n. NATO's Partnerships, which contribute greatly to security and stability across the Euro-Atlantic area, are of increasing value and importance.
- o. Partnership for Peace has been an increasingly effective instrument for

- cooperation in such areas as peace support operations and the fight against terrorism.
- p. Security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.
  - q. This initiative will genuinely improve cooperation in a number of fields, including on defense reform and interoperability, including through PfP-like instruments, and open more Partnership activities to the Mediterranean Dialogue partners on a case by case basis.
  - r. The NATO-Russia Council, in which NATO member states and Russia work together as equal partners in areas of common interest, continues to make valuable contributions to security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Our political dialogue has developed on key security issues, including Afghanistan and the Balkans. Our practical cooperation has reached a new level, including in military-to-military projects; and, through our focus on improving interoperability, we have also laid the groundwork for future military cooperation, including potentially in joint peacekeeping operations.
  - s. We stress the importance of abiding by, fully implementing and strengthening existing international arms control and disarmament accords and multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes.
  - t. It is essential that efforts be intensified to complete the withdrawal in early 2004.
- c. The member nations hereby direct to:
- a. We encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards, and to support the efforts of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Harri Holkeri.
  - b. We encourage Belgrade and Pristina to pursue their dialogue in good faith.
  - c. We encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries.
  - d. We expect them to assume ownership of, and implement, pressing reforms and they must comply fully with their international obligations.
  - e. We call on the Government and all political actors in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue to work toward full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement.
  - f. We encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership.
  - g. We encourage Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration, and we will keep under active review all possible options to support Ukraine in these efforts.
  - h. We call on the Georgian authorities to hold free and fair elections, planned for January next year.
  - i. We urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level.
- d. The member nations hereby commit to:
- a. Preserve peace through its operations; spreading stability through its

- partnerships; and reinforcing our community of shared values through the most robust round of enlargement in our history.
- b. Categorically reject and condemn terrorism in all its forms.
  - c. Use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism.
  - d. This operation demonstrates our readiness to deploy forces wherever the Alliance decides, to ensure our common security.
  - e. Our aim is to assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the international community, including by assisting the Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security and stability and in the electoral process according to the Bonn Process.
  - f. Develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional Authority.
  - g. Support Poland in its leadership of a multi-national division in Iraq.
  - h. Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1511 on Iraq and are committed to its full implementation in order to restore conditions of stability and security in the country, and return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of Iraq.
  - i. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans.
  - j. Consult with their EU counterparts on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with agreed texts and procedures and within the framework of Berlin.
  - k. Further advancement towards a process to determine Kosovo's future status, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
  - l. Committed to help the countries of the Balkans integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures.
  - m. The current round of enlargement will not be the last and that NATO's door remains open.
  - n. Continue to assist both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in meeting established NATO conditions for PfP membership.
  - o. Review and develop NATO's Balkans strategy, encompassing political aspects as well as operations.
  - p. Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU.
  - q. Examine whether and how selected Partnership activities might be opened, on a case by case basis, to other countries which might express an interest in such involvement.
  - r. Consider ways to further enhance this relationship by generating, in consultation with all Mediterranean Dialogue partners options to develop a more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue.
  - s. Build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and to further enhancing the NATO-Russia relationship.
  - t. Create stronger NATO-Ukraine relations under the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership.
  - u. Closely following the development of events in Georgia.

- v. Support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.
- w. Develop Partnership with Georgia through using the full range of Partnership instruments.
- x. Support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.
- y. Reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the pre-eminent non-proliferation and disarmament mechanism, and ensuring the full compliance with it by all states party to the Treaty.
- z. Strengthen our common efforts to safeguard nuclear and radiological material.
- aa. Support the aims of the Proliferation Security Initiative to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the United Nations Security Council.
- bb. The protection of civilian populations.
- cc. The CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security, and reaffirm our attachment to the early entry into force of the Adapted Treaty.
- dd. Multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; NATO's fundamental security tasks including collective defense; our shared democratic values; and the United Nations Charter.
- ee. Implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the NATO Headquarters organization, including through modern management and financial systems, sound and transparent management of the new Headquarters project, and improvements to gender balance and diversity in the Alliance's International Staff.

**Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force**

**Explicit Performative:**

- b. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective defense and the essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave direction on work still to be done thus the member nations needs to continue expand the Alliance and encourage new members to join; continue to combat terrorism; ensure peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans; continue to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and effective

crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and treaties.

e. The member nations hereby direct the following:

- n. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community;
- o. Encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards;
- a. Encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries;
- b. Encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership.
- c. Encourage Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration; and
- d. Urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level.

f. The member nations hereby commit to the following:

- a. Preserve peace through its operations; spread stability through its partnerships; and reinforce our community of shared values through the most robust round of enlargement in our history.
- b. Use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism;
- c. Assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the international community;
- d. Develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional Authority;
- e. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans and help those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures;
- f. Continue with the enlargement of NATO;
- g. Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU;
- h. Consider ways to further enhance relationships by generating a more ambitious and expanded framework;
- i. Build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and NATO and the Ukraine;
- j. Closely follow the development of events in Georgia and support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia;
- k. Support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery;
- l. Multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; and
- m. Implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of



the organization.

**Reflective Intentions:**

d. Assertion:

- a. The member nations believe the Alliance is the basis of collective defense and the essential transatlantic forum for security and as such it needs to maintain security and stability for its member nations and Partners in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
- b. The member nations want the Alliance to maintain security and stability for its member nations and Partners by taking stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave direction on work still to be done thus the member nations needs to continue expand the Alliance and encourage new members to join; continue to combat terrorism; ensure peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans; continue to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and treaties.

e. Directive:

- g. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
  - i. The member nations wants its member to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
- h. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards;
  - i. The member nations want its members to encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards because of NATO's command.
- i. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries;
  - ii. The member nations want its members to encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries because of NATO's command.
- j. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the

reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership.

- iii. The member nations want its members to encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership because of NATO's command.
- k. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage the Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration.
  - iv. The member nations wants its members to encourage the Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration.
- l. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over the Alliance constitutes sufficient reason to urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level.
  - i. The member nations wants its members to urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level.
- f. Commitment:
  - d. The member nations believes its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of-area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment on the condition that the member nations strive to preserve peace through its operations; spread stability through its partnerships; and reinforce our community of shared values through the most robust round of enlargement in our history; use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism; assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the international community; develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional Authority; support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans and help those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures; continue with the enlargement of NATO; enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU; consider ways to further enhance relationships by generating a more ambitious and expanded framework; build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and NATO and the Ukraine; closely follow the development of events in Georgia and support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia; support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery; multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; and implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization.

- e. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the condition that the member nations will be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security environment
- f. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).

**Impicatures:**

o. Assertion:

- a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
  - i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs the members that they are fellow citizens.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to the Alliance.
- b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs its members it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs its members it is establishing political relationships.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations’ assertion informs its members conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.

- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries.
- h. Directive:
  - a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive to its members and other countries in the global security environment.
  - b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries and other countries
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.
  - c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.
    - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
    - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries it is establishing political relationships.
    - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries and other countries.
    - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion

to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.

d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global security environment.

p. Commitment:

a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the same race – human.
- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the member countries that they are fellow citizens.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant to its member countries.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral commitment to use.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing security through multilateral alliance commitment.
- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security through political relationships.
- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries it is establishing political relationships.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.

- i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved

peacefully.

- ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
- iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.
- e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
  - i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its member countries will use force if necessary.
  - iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is relevant to its member countries.
  - iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its commitment to its member countries.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.

(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative..

**Presuppositions:**

- c. If the member nations are able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-missions, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.
- a. If the member nations are not able to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-missions, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.