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# Why Latinas swing left: Ideological self-identification in conservative Chile

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**WHY LATINAS SWING LEFT:**

**Ideological Self-Identification in Conservative Chile**

**BY**

**KRISTYN A. CALL**

**BA Political Science, University of New Hampshire, 2007**

**THESIS**

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\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the most important person in my life who has taught me how to achieve my dreams and go after my goals. Mark, thank-you for always standing by me, supporting me, and encouraging me in everything I do....

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this time to acknowledge all those who supported me in the writing of my thesis. First of all, I would like to acknowledge the constant support and love from my mom, stepfather, father, and sister. Second, I would like to extend my appreciation to Liz Kyriacou, for her help and patient understanding while undertaking this process. Third, I would like to acknowledge the love and support of my best friend Anne Haas. I would like to thank her for being there for me when I needed her the most. Fourth, I would like to thank my fiancé who had to put up with the constant stress, worry, and fluctuating moods that only a thesis could cause someone. And finally, I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to my faculty committee members especially my thesis advisor Mary Malone. Professor Malone, Lyon, and Andrews helped me believe in my ability as a writer in periods of self-doubt and procrastination. I would like to thank all three of you for your patience, encouragement, and time.

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **WHY LATINAS SWING LEFT:**

#### **Ideological Self-Identification in Conservative Chile**

by

**Kristyn A. Call**

**University of New Hampshire, May, 2009**

As recently as 2006, Latin American citizens have shifted to the left ideologically. This study begins by exploring the ideological orientation of women in socially conservative Chile. After analyzing existing literature on gender and ideology, this study goes on to suggest what has led Chilean women to ideologically self-identify to the left. Using a combination of case study analysis and Latin America Public Opinion Project analysis, this thesis proposes that specific social demographics, attitudes toward social issues, the economy, and government intervention are related to the ideological orientation of women. This study focused on multivariate ordinary least squares regression model analysis to evaluate the suggested hypotheses. Additionally, this thesis will address the implications an ideological shift to the left may have on Chilean society.

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Recently, Latin Americans have drifted slightly to the left of the ideological pendulum. This shift in ideological identification is unusual, as in the past Latin Americans have tended to position themselves to the right of the ideological spectrum compared to other global regions.<sup>1</sup> Recently, however, the region has witnessed a rise of left-wing presidents such as Chavez of Venezuela, Correa of Ecuador, Morales of Bolivia, and Bachelet in Chile. While this shift may be slight, in some cases, it is a drift with consequences. Seligson finds that a leftist ideological orientation in most Latin American countries is strongly correlated with an unfavorable view of democratic governance and less support for civil rights and civil liberties. As a result of the lack of confidence Latin American citizens have for democratic institutions, “populist” leaders have been given the go ahead to take control.<sup>2</sup> Seligson finds that the problem with populism is its association with a belief that democracy, and democratic institutions, are ineffective and inefficient expressions of the “people’s will.” Instead, populist leaders carry out their own will, crushing dissent and curbing people’s rights and civil liberties.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Seligson (2007) “The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America,” *Journal of Democracy* vol. 18 no.3 pg. 83.

<sup>2</sup> Seligson (2007).

<sup>3</sup> Seligson (2007).

Chile has proven to be an exception in this trend. Seligson found that a shift to the left in Chile corresponded to support for democracy, civil liberties, and democratic institutions. This finding is reaffirmed by politics at the national level, when in an unusual turn of events, centre -left candidate Michelle Bachelet became Chile's first woman president running on a platform for social change, also advocating close ties to the United States and free trade. Bachelet came out on top by "attracting" liberal voters who had leftist ideological preferences.<sup>4</sup>

A liberal ideological orientation in Chile is surprising in a country known for its deeply entrenched social conservatism. Historically, men and especially women in Chile have strongly identified with social conservatism. Seligson's research found that an adherence to social conservatism is no longer the norm in Chile. Social conservatism, once so entrenched within Chilean society, has been gradually replaced with a preference for liberal ideology. This study will examine such trends more closely, focusing on women's ideological orientation.

Historically, Chilean women have been typecast as staunch conservatives. Conservative parties have been the groups that have aimed to incorporate women into the political processes. Although Chilean women were not granted the right to vote until 1935, in 1917 the Conservative Party in Chile called for a law to be passed extending the right to vote to Chilean women.<sup>5</sup> Conservative parties sought to increase women's participation in politics because they believed that by doing so it would increase support for their causes. Indeed, the incorporation of women into politics strengthened traditional

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<sup>4</sup> Seligson (2007) "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy* vol. 18 no.3 pg. 83.

<sup>5</sup> Power, Margaret (1953) *Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 56.

gender roles, rather than challenging them. For example, conservative values were strongly emphasized by the conservative party, and when women lent their support to the conservative party they were in essence supporting the value of limited rights for women in the workplace and in the public sphere.

Salvador Allende became the first democratically elected Marxist president of Chile in 1970 running on a platform of nationalization and “radical” social reform. However, the three years of Allende’s rule were wrought with tension. Running under a socialist platform oriented for the workers of Chile, Allende faced increasing distrust and alienation from the middle class and from the United States. The middle class came to view Allende and his government as a threat to Chilean society leading to demonstrations from the Chilean populous.

Women featured prominently in the opposition to Allende. During the second presidential term of Allende, right-wing women’s groups marched against the government of Allende. Women took to the streets of Chile on December 1, 1971 ushering in the beginning of a “mass opposition movement.” Most fascinating in regards to the large scale women’s opposition movement was the ability of conservative leaders to “appeal” to women as both wives and mothers in the mobilization against Allende.<sup>6</sup> By linking women’s most prominent roles in society with the fight for democracy conservatives were able to bring about the downfall of Allende. The conservative party adopted the issues which were most important to women at the time; scarcity of food and defense of the country and advocated on the behalf of women. These were the issues that

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<sup>6</sup> Power, Margaret (1953) *Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 56.

struck at what it meant to be a woman in Chile at the time; a provider and a mother. Women were instrumental in the conservative led oppositional march coined the “March of Empty Pots and Pans.” Women came to the streets in opposition to Allende and the scarcity of food he was creating for Chilean families.

Conservatism continued to infiltrate Chilean society well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century as conservative values have long been emphasized and practiced in Chilean society. Conservative political elites prevented divorce from being legalized in Chile until 2004 and abortion has yet to be legalized. The widespread Catholic presence in Chile delayed the legalization of divorce until 2004. Homosexuality and euthanasia are also not recognized as acceptable or lawful practices in Chilean society.

Chilean women continued to be strong supporters of social conservatism well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Inglehart and Norris found utilizing survey data from the World Values Survey in 2002 that conservative values and a conservative ideology were widespread among Chilean women. Conservative values in Chile have historically been linked to an emphasis on familial ties, marriage, a high level of religiosity, and a belief that women should stay at home and have limited rights compared to men.<sup>7</sup>

The Chilean case raises several interesting questions which will form the basis of this study. Seligson found that starting in 2006 Chilean citizens were starting to self-identify to the left of the ideological spectrum. If Chileans, and more importantly Chilean women, identify to the left ideologically then it suggests social and ideological change is occurring in Chile. If this ideological change among women has indeed occurred, than support for conservative values may be replaced by support for liberal and democratic values as Seligson suggests. In the future, the practices of abortion, euthanasia, and

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<sup>7</sup> Oppenheim, Lois (1999) *Politics in Chile*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 266-267.



homosexuality may eventually be legalized and women may assume a greater role in the realm of politics and formal employment.

Overwhelming support for Bachelet in the 2006 presidential elections in Chile may provide further evidence of changes in ideology and values. It has been shown by Seligson that a leftist ideology in Chile is associated with support for democracy and support for civil liberties and rights. If Chileans and women have indeed shifted to the left, this is demonstrative of widespread support for democracy and the liberal values associated with this form of government. This research may lead the Chilean government to take its role as a reformer and a provider of basic services more seriously. Perhaps, by doing so, the ideological orientation of Chileans will further be affected translating into a favorable rating for democracy and democratic institutions.

This study asks two important questions which will form the basis for my research; are Chilean women joining the trend to the left, and if so why? As traditionally staunch conservatives, Chilean women's ideological orientation may not be so quick to change as in other Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia, where women have jumped on board the liberal bandwagon. If an ideological change has occurred among Chilean women – what demographics and attitudinal issues can account for it?

This research contributes to the understanding of ideology in Latin America and the causal mechanisms of women's ideological orientation. Other studies have investigated gender difference in partisanship, vote choice, and even ideology in the United States and Latin America. However, this research examines the demographic factors and attitudinal issues that determine the ideological orientation of Chilean women.

The foundation for this research is a similar study conducted by Norrander and Wilcox in the U.S. Norrander and Wilcox examined the demographic and attitudinal issues which accounted for the shift to the left among a segment of women. Recently, an ideological change in self-identification has occurred in Latin America, this research will discuss the extent of which this trend has affected Chilean women and the correlation between ideological orientation, demographics, and women's attitudes toward social issues and government intervention.

This thesis relies upon statistical analysis to interpret 2006 LAPOP survey data. The Latin America Public Opinion Project is an independent survey of the citizens of Latin America and their political values conducted by Vanderbilt University under the general guidance of director Mitchell Seligson.<sup>8</sup> This survey was conducted as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2006.<sup>9</sup> The 2006 survey of Chileans was designed by Vanderbilt University in conjunction with the Instituto de Ciencias Políticas of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.<sup>10</sup> The study consists of 1,517 completed surveys, 835 of which were completed by men, and 682 by women.<sup>11</sup> A national probability design was used and the margin of error for the sample was  $\pm 2.57$ .<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The Latin America Public Opinion Project ([www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop)). THE 2006 LATIN AMERICA PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY [dataset]. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University [producer and distributor].

<sup>9</sup> LAPOP 2006

<sup>10</sup> LAPOP 2006

<sup>11</sup> LAPOP 2006

<sup>12</sup> LAPOP 2006

<sup>13</sup> LAPOP 2006

<sup>14</sup> LAPOP 2006

<sup>15</sup> Seligson, Mitchell (2007) "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America," *The Democracy Barometers*, vol. 18 no. 4: 87-95.

<sup>16</sup> Seligson 2007

<sup>17</sup> Seligson 2007

Respondents were drawn from the voting age population, and a quota system based on sex and age was established to select respondents.<sup>13</sup> Funding for this study was supplied by the Instituto de Ciencias Políticas of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.<sup>14</sup>

Survey data are useful for understanding social demographics, women's attitudes toward government intervention programs, and women's attitudes toward social issues. These data enhance the external validity of the research. Survey design is useful in this study for making predictions about women's attitudes toward government intervention and social issues. Even though survey design is not without limitations, it is the most appropriate research design to be used in this study. This research will add to the existing literature of ideology and gender by looking at the influence women's attitudes toward social issues and government intervention have on the ideological orientation of Chilean women.

### **Is there a Gender Gap in Chile?**

Ideological orientation has recently become the focal point of several studies of Latin American political behavior. Seligson examined the ideological orientation of Latin American citizens and the relationship of ideology to support for democracy and democratic institutions. Seligson argued that for an ideological shift to matter it must translate into voting behavior and party preferences.<sup>15</sup> Seligson analyzed survey data from the World Values Survey and the AmericasBarometer questionnaire asking respondents to self-position themselves on an ideological scale from 1 (extremely

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<sup>18</sup> Power, Margaret (1953) *Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 56.

conservative) to 10 (extremely liberal).<sup>16</sup> He concluded that in many socially conservative countries, including Chile, citizens had shifted to the left ideologically but the magnitude of the shift is small.<sup>17</sup> This regional shift to the left has put a spotlight on Chile a country known for its longstanding social conservatism.

Chilean women have historically been linked to conservative issues and parties. Chilean women's historic identification with the conservative party is evidence of women's conservatism in Chile.

Although Chilean women were not granted the right to vote until 1935, in 1917 the Conservative Party in Chile called for a law to be passed extending the right to vote to Chilean women.<sup>18</sup> This "sponsorship" of a voting law in Chile by the Right is but one example where conservative parties have advocated on the behalf of women in order to increase the "support for the Conservative party" while simultaneously "expanding the support" for traditional gender roles.<sup>19</sup>

Another piece of evidence for women's conservatism in Chile is Chilean women's prominent role in the overthrow of Allende. During the turbulent years of the Salvador Allende government, conservative women were instrumental in the eventual

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<sup>19</sup>Power 1953

<sup>20</sup>Power 1953

<sup>21</sup> Oppenheim, Lois (1999) *Politics in Chile*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 64-65.

<sup>22</sup> Oppenheim 1999

<sup>23</sup> Oppenheim 1999

<sup>24</sup> Oppenheim 1999

<sup>25</sup> Oppenheim 1999

<sup>26</sup>Power 1953

<sup>27</sup>Power 1953

<sup>28</sup>Power 1953

<sup>29</sup>Power 1953

overthrow of the Unidad Popular.<sup>20</sup> Ideological orientation has long been contentious in Chile, as ideological polarization ushered in the demise of democracy under Allende in 1973 and gave rise to the 17 year Pinochet dictatorship. Women featured prominently in these ideological battles, as women's protests for and against democracy were important in overthrowing Allende's Popular Unity government.

The most famous march led by right-wing women against the government of Allende was appropriately called the March of the Empty Pots and Pans. Well to do women took to the streets of Chile on December 1, 1971 ushering in the beginning of a "mass opposition movement."<sup>21</sup> These women were opposed to Allende's economic policy which was creating a scarcity of food by raising worker's salaries.<sup>22</sup> Interestingly enough, this large scale women's protest, constituted the first "mass mobilization" against the Unidad Popular.<sup>23</sup> Conservative women fed up with the burdensome economic crisis took charge in "catalyzing" political opposition to Allende.<sup>24</sup>

Scholars attribute the demise and "forcible dismantalization" of Allende to the work of oppositional women's groups.<sup>25</sup> The issues weighing heavily on women's support for conservatism during the 1970s were an inability to provide basic resources for their children due to a scarcity of food and public disorder/violence.<sup>26</sup> Most fascinating in regards to the large scale women's opposition movement was the ability of conservative leaders in the Christian Democratic Party and the National Party to "appeal" to women as

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<sup>30</sup> Power 1953

<sup>31</sup> Power 1953

both wives and mothers in the mobilization against Allende.<sup>27</sup> By linking women's most prominent roles in society with the fight for the overthrow of democracy, conservatives were able to bring about the downfall of Allende. Women became drawn to the principles and philosophy behind the Conservative Party.<sup>28</sup> The doctrine of the Church, which women looked to for spiritual guidance, was embodied in the message of conservatism.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, the parties of the Right promised to pursue policies that would benefit women and their families. Conservative leaders played upon the "rage and frustration" many women felt as a result of the food shortages and lack of security to mobilize women against Allende.<sup>30</sup> Women believed that stability and security could only be achieved when there was a complete military overthrow of Allende.<sup>31</sup>

Stern illuminates the reasons women identified with conservatism in a series of qualitative interviews with Chilean women conducted after the military dictator Pinochet came to power. After the demise of Allende, women became prominent supporters of Pinochet and his conservative party which successfully overthrew Allende. Even after Pinochet was accused of crimes and human rights abuses committed during his seventeen year rule, conservative women continued to support the Chilean military dictator.<sup>32</sup> Some women even denied that human rights abuses had occurred. Stern poignantly captures the perspective of Chilean women who supported the takeover of Chile by the military

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<sup>32</sup>Power 1953

<sup>33</sup> Stern, Steve (2004) *Remembering Pinochet's Chile*. Durham and London: Duke University Press: 6.

<sup>34</sup> Stern 2004

<sup>35</sup> Stern 2004

<sup>36</sup> Stern 2004

backed Pinochet. Many people including Doña Elena saw Pinochet as a “hero.”<sup>33</sup> For her and many like Elana the overthrow of Allende saved her family and “set Chile on the road to good health.”<sup>34</sup> In the mind of Doña Elena the cost of Pinochet was less than the cost to Chilean society if Allende had remained in power.<sup>35</sup> Doña Elena remembered the transition of power from President Frei to Allende as one of upheaval and violence. Property was seized and the government took over industries. For Doña Elena, President Allende was “too frivolous and irresponsible to control those on the Left who did advocate and organize violence.”<sup>36</sup> For many, Allende for many represented the turmoil and violence to conservative Chilean society. Stern notes that “the world of conservative middle-class and Catholic morality, as well as conservative arrangements of property fell apart in the 1960s and 1970s,” and for women like Doña Elena this happened because of Allende and his socialist ideals.<sup>37</sup>

Even well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, perhaps one of the most surprising consequences of democratization and modernization of Chilean society was the maintenance of “traditional, conservative, classist, and sexist” values.<sup>38</sup> Even as Chile experienced record economic growth, the underlying conservative values were still present.<sup>39</sup> Efforts to

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<sup>37</sup> Stern 2004

<sup>38</sup> Oppenheim, Lois (1999) *Politics in Chile*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 266-267.

<sup>39</sup> Oppenheim 1999

<sup>40</sup> Oppenheim 1999

<sup>41</sup> Power, Margaret (1953) *Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 261-263.

<sup>42</sup> Power 1953

<sup>43</sup> Power 1953

<sup>44</sup> Power 1953

<sup>45</sup> Power 1953

legalize divorce and liberalize abortion laws were met with great resistance from the legislature and the right-wing dominated media.<sup>40</sup> Machismo was also still “pervasive,” and gender barriers prevented many women from leaving their homes.<sup>41</sup>

On January 16, 2000 Richard Lagos was elected president of Chile after securing a majority of votes from Chilean men.<sup>42</sup> Chilean women voted for the candidate to the Right of the ideological spectrum, Joaquín Lavín for the same reasons that they supported the overthrow of Allende. Just as in the 1970s, the Right continued to appeal to women because Lavín “spoke directly to their primary concerns and promised that he would solve their most urgent problems.”<sup>43</sup> The issues which motivated women in their identification as conservatives were once again related to the family, security, and their roles as wives and mothers.<sup>44</sup> Lavín promised to create new jobs, improve schools, help the elderly, and crack down on the high crime rate which instilled fear in many Chilean women.<sup>45</sup> Women were drawn to his rhetoric of making it easier for women to work and have a family. Just as in 1970, the Right did a better job than the Left in creating a program centered around women and the issues important to them.<sup>46</sup> The Left, just as

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<sup>46</sup> Power 1953

<sup>47</sup> Power 1953

<sup>48</sup> The LAPOP name for this variable is CHI2. The exact wording of the political ideology question is, “Otra forma de situarse políticamente es utilizando los conceptos de conservador o liberal. En una escala de 1 a 10, dónde 1 significa que usted es totalmente “conservador” y 10 que usted es totalmente “liberal, ¿ en qué lugar situaría usted?” On the ideological scale where 1 is extremely conservative and 10 is extremely liberal where do you position yourself?. The exact wording of the gender question is “Género: (1)hombre (2)mujer.” Gender: (1) male (2) female. The variable in this study was recoded (0) male and (1) female



under Allende, “failed to” create a program that “dealt with the realities and aspirations of Chilean women.”<sup>47</sup>

How do Chilean women orient themselves ideologically today? Despite the long standing historical relationship between Chilean women and conservatism, Chileans are starting to self-identify to the left ideologically. Seligson finds that despite the magnitude of the ideological shift to the left being small it is nonetheless present among Chilean voters. Now we must determine if Chilean women are joining this trend or if they are continuing to follow the historical pull of social conservatism. In this research the ideological orientation of respondents refers to the degree to which Chileans self-position themselves on an ideological scale. Ideological orientation is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents to self-position themselves on an ideological scale ranging from (1) extremely conservative to (10) extremely liberal.<sup>48</sup> Gender refers to the sex of the respondent. Gender is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question recording respondent’s gender.

Figure 1 indicates that 22% of Chilean men self-position themselves as a 5 or somewhere in between an extremely liberal and extremely conservative ideological orientation. Likewise, 21.4% of Chilean women self-positioned themselves on the ideological scale at greater than 5, or liberal.

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<sup>49</sup> An Independent Samples t Test determined the significance of this result, indicating that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean ideological position of men and the mean ideological position of women at the .001 level.

**Figure 1: The Frequency of Chileans Self-Placement on the Ideological Scale**





Figure 2 indicates that overall, out of 791 male respondents, the average ideological position is 5.94. Out of 660 female respondents, the average ideological position is 5.21. There is a small but statistically significant difference between the two.<sup>49</sup> While women historically have been more conservative than men, by 2006 the differences between men and women were slight. Indeed, on average women were staunchly in the center of the ideological spectrum.

Figure 2



To understand the reasons for the ideological orientation of Chilean women, this paper is organized into six subsequent chapters. I begin chapter two by establishing a theoretical framework explaining the ideological shift to the left among Chilean women. The first part of this framework explores studies that address the impact demographic factors have on the ideological orientations of men and women. The second part explores studies that address the impact attitudinal variables have had and continue to have on the ideological orientations of men and women.

Chapter three will focus on demographic variables and their relation to the ideological orientation of Chilean women. Chapter four will examine women's attitudes toward the social policies of divorce, euthanasia, abortion, and homosexuality and their relationship to women's ideological preferences. Chapter five will focus on women's attitudes toward government issues and their relationship toward women's ideology. Using multivariate regression analysis, chapter six will analyze survey/attitudinal data in Chile related to social issues, social demographics, and government intervention. This analysis will show how changes in women's attitudes toward social policy and government intervention, has led to a slight ideological shift to the left among Chilean women. Chapter seven will explore the results of this analysis and offer a conclusion.

## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW

What factors account for Chilean women's liberal ideological orientation? According to Powers, the scarcity of food and personal security were the two pressing issues which factored into women's support for a conservative opposition movement against Allende.<sup>50</sup> The literature review that follows uses the literature conducted on women's ideological orientation in the US to identify additional factors that may explain Chilean women's ideological orientation, particularly potential structural and attitudinal variables.

This research relies on several theoretical approaches to explain the ideological orientation of Chilean women. A structural/ demographic approach examines the effect variables related to the structural characteristics of a population have on the ideological orientation of citizens. Commonly used demographic variables in social science research are age, race, educational attainment, and income level. An attitudinal approach in this research examines the effect a population or group's values, beliefs, and opinions of certain subjects have on the ideological preferences of citizens.

#### **Structural Approach**

The structuralism approach seeks to establish relationships between demographic variables and ideological orientation. Brooks and Manza explored differences between men and women in the US through a quantitative study of different structural theories. They use structural theories to explain gender differences in the voting behavior of both

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<sup>50</sup> Power, Margaret (1953) *Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 261-263.

men and women in U.S. presidential elections. Even though their dependent variable is distinct, their analysis still illuminates the potential importance of structural factors in explaining ideology. Their study relied upon data collected from the National Election Survey, which produces data on voting, public opinion, and political participation in the United States during the presidential election years of 1952 to 1992.<sup>51</sup>

The structural/demographic approach they utilized points to four key factors important in understanding the gender gap in voting. The first was an increase in women's autonomy. The logic behind this theory was that married women have a different voting behavior than divorced or single women who possess more autonomy and independence than their married counterparts.<sup>52</sup> In support of this theory, Carroll found evidence for the argument that the gender gap in the 1980 election can be attributed to the increasing number of unmarried women who remain independent from a husband.<sup>53</sup> This research has important implications for this study because the growing autonomy of women in Chile and the availability of divorce as an option for women to gain independence from their husbands may be prominent factors in the liberal orientation of Chilean women.

The second factor in this study was socialization. The logic behind this factor was that differences in the patterns of socialization for both men and women caused them to

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<sup>51</sup> Manza, Jeff, and Clem Brooks (1998) "The Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections: When? Why? Implications?" *The American Journal of Sociology* vol. 103:1239-1245

<sup>52</sup> Manza and Brooks 1998

<sup>53</sup> Carroll, Susan (1988) "Women's Autonomy and the Gender Gap: 1980 and 1982" *The Politics of the Gender Gap*, Sage: 236-257.

hold different political beliefs, core values, and behavior.<sup>54</sup> Some theorists such as Gilligan argued that childhood socialization was most important in determining the political values of men and women as adults.<sup>55</sup> In contrast, others, such as Sapiro argue that women's connection to their role as mothers has important implications in their political preferences and vote choice.<sup>56</sup> Women may view the Democratic Party more favorably because of the value the party places on providing for the general welfare of families. Their research has important implications for this study because it discusses how the values and beliefs of either political elites or parties can strongly influence voter choice. The same applies to the case of Chilean women throughout history whose ideological preferences were shaped by conservative elites who appealed to women's roles as mothers.

The third factor in this research was a rise in feminist consciousness. Brooks and Manza believed that women who were more likely to identify themselves with the women's movement were thus more likely to vote Democratic.<sup>57</sup> In agreement Conover found in a 1988 study that gender differences in voter choice among men and women is due to rising feminist identities among women.<sup>58</sup> Likewise, Cook in her article finds that

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<sup>54</sup> Manza, Jeff, and Clem Brooks (1998) "The Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections: When? Why? Implications?" *The American Journal of Sociology* vol.103:1239-1245

<sup>55</sup> Gilligan, Carol (1982) "In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

<sup>56</sup> Sapiro, Virginia (1983) "The Political Integration of Women" Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

<sup>57</sup> Manza and Brooks 1998

<sup>58</sup> Conover, Pamela (1988) "Feminists and the Gender Gap" *Journals of Politics* 50:985-1010.

<sup>59</sup> Cook, Elizabeth (1989) "Measuring Feminist Consciousness" *Women and Politics* 9:71-88.

feminists have traditionally been more supportive of Democratic candidates in the 1972, 1984, and 1988 elections.<sup>59</sup>

The fourth factor looked at an increase in women's employment. This theory predicted that women who were employed in the labor force would be more likely to vote Democratic.<sup>60</sup> However, the "political significance" of women's participation in the work force remains controversial.<sup>61</sup> Andersen and Cook argued that women's employment did not influence political values.<sup>62</sup> Likewise, Plutzer and Deitch found that other sociodemographic variables had a much greater effect on the gender gap.<sup>63</sup>

Brooks and Manza concluded that the gender gap in voting behavior was best explained by the increase in the number of women who were employed.<sup>64</sup> The increase in the number of women employed resulted in a shift among women toward support for Democratic presidential candidates. There was little to no statistical evidence indicating a relationship between women's autonomy and socialization processes with the emerging gender gap.<sup>65</sup> Likewise, the theory suggesting that women were more likely to vote Democratic as result of the support for the women's movement was not found to be

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<sup>60</sup> Manza, Jeff, and Clem Brooks (1998) "The Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections: When? Why? Implications?" *The American Journal of Sociology* vol.103:1250.

<sup>61</sup> Andersen, Kristi, and Elizabeth A. Cook (1985) "Women, Work, and Political Attitudes," *American Journal of Political Science* vol.29:606-25.

<sup>62</sup> Andersen and Cook 1985

<sup>63</sup> Plutzer, Eric (1988) "Work Life, Family Life, and Women's Support of Feminism," *American Sociological Review* 53: 640-49.

<sup>64</sup> Manza and Brooks 1998

<sup>65</sup> Manza and Brooks 1998

<sup>66</sup> Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) *Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press: 76.



significant. This research implies that the demographic variable of women's employment is a prominent reason for the gender gap in voting choice. Brooks and Manza were unable to rule out attitudinal changes in regards to women's participation in the labor force as being responsible for the emerging gender gap in vote choice. Brooks and Manza's finding are important to this research because it starts the examination of potential demographic factors that influence a gender gap, while also recognizing that attitudinal variables may be significant factors. This research, however, fails to provide knowledge regarding the demographic variables which predict the *ideological preferences* of women.

### **Structural/Demographic and Attitudinal Approach**

Like Brooks and Manza, Inglehart and Norris also focused on the importance of demographic/ structural variables in their study. However, Inglehart and Norris expanded upon previous gender gap studies in vote choice, issues, and partisanship in their 2002 study by examining the gender gap in ideology, and public opinion in various world regions.<sup>66</sup>

Inglehart and Norris argued that women who were once more likely to self-identify as conservative in post-industrial societies were now more likely to identify as liberal.<sup>67</sup> The theory utilized to explain this phenomenon was accurately coined gender realignment. Norris and Inglehart argued that in post-industrial societies a modern gender gap where women held more left leaning values than men had replaced the traditional gender gap. The cause of this gender realignment in the United States was thought to be

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<sup>67</sup> Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) *Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press: 76.

<sup>68</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003

an interaction between a shift in cultural values and new structural developments (the employment of women, educational advancement of women, and decrease in religiosity) that have “reshaped” political values.<sup>68</sup>

Essentially, what these social scientists argued was that changes in the lives of women in post-industrial societies had led to changes in ideological preferences. This research has important implications for this study because it discusses how a combination of structural and cultural changes may lead to changes in the ideological preferences of women.

Utilizing data from the World Values Survey during 1995-2002 Inglehart and Norris concluded that women hold more left-leaning values than men in regards to the appropriate role of the state versus the market, and government role in social protection and public ownership.<sup>69</sup> Women were more likely than men to hold left leaning values in the areas of support for an active role of government in social protection and public ownership of business, and in support for political issues.<sup>70</sup> They found that women were more liberal than men due to a more influential set of attitudinal variables. While Inglehart and Norris recognized that a rise in feminist consciousness, an increase in women’s autonomy, and women’s increasing participation in the labor force were

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<sup>69</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003

<sup>70</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003

<sup>71</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) “The Gender Gap in Ideology,” *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.

important factors in explaining the gender gap, it was the shift in cultural values that featured more prominently in women's changing ideological orientation. Inglehart and Norris' findings are important to this research because it highlights how influential women's attitudes toward the economy specifically in terms of government intervention are in determining the ideological preferences of women. Attitudinal factors are not only important determinants of the ideological orientation of women but also in explaining why women are more liberal than men.

Recently, and most applicable to this research, is a 2007 U.S. study conducted by Norrander and Wilcox which examined the presence of a gender gap in ideological self-identification in the U.S. In this research, Norrander and Wilcox examined the effect specific demographic variables and attitudinal variables had on the ideological gender gap. While existing studies such as the studies by Inglehart and Norris, and Brooks and Manza, account for the gender gap in partisanship, vote choice, and issues, "far less attention" has been paid to the impact social issues and attitudinal values have on gender differences in ideology.<sup>71</sup> A few scholars have confirmed the existence of an ideological gender gap but little exists in the way of an actual explanation for its existence.

Likewise, whereas Inglehart and Norris have noted the increasing liberal identification of American women as accounting for gender difference between men and women, few studies have tried to explain what accounts for this gender gap. Norrander and Wilcox, argue that ideological identification helps "organize" people's political

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<sup>72</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer

<sup>73</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>74</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

worlds.<sup>72</sup> For some, an ideological identity is the foundation from which people formulate their values and make political judgments.<sup>73</sup> And for others, an ideological orientation shapes their voting choice and political beliefs.<sup>74</sup> The election of Chilean president Bachelet may be indicative of changing ideological preferences resulting in changes in partisan preferences. Those studies that have examined ideological identification have suggested that women's conservative leaning in the past was due to their greater religious adherence.<sup>75</sup> Now, as women become more secular they have also become more liberal. This may be the case in Chile where examples of secularization such as the legalization of a divorce law are indicative of a weakening influence of the Catholic Church on the ideological orientation of Chilean women.

Norrander and Wilcox conceptualize ideological identity as an identity that both causes and is a consequence of specific issue positions. These social scientists make three concrete arguments while also acknowledging that the gender gap has reversed from the 1950s when men were more liberal than women. They argue that the liberal leanings of American women, and the conservative stance of American men, arise from differences in issue positions and policy preferences between men and women.<sup>76</sup> Specifically, Kauffman and Petrocik attribute the growing gender gap in ideological preferences to attitudes toward the role of government in the creation of social policy. This may be but

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<sup>75</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>76</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>77</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>78</sup> Kaufmann, K. M. (2002) "Culture Wars, Secular Realignment, and the Gender Gap in Party Identification," *Political Behavior*, 24, 283-307.

one set of attitudinal variables that have been influential in the slight shift to the centre left of Chilean women.

Second, Norrander and Wilcox argue that the gender gap in ideological self-identification is due to differences between men and women in the issues that shaped their ideological identities.<sup>77</sup> Instead of different views on the same issue accounting for the ideological gender gap, Norrander and Wilcox hypothesized that a different set of issues for men and women may be more important in determining what ideological identity they acquire. Previous studies by Gilens and Kaufmann have suggested that men and women differ in what issues they consider to be important and this strongly determines their partisan preferences.<sup>78</sup> Kauffman argued that for women gender-specific issues such as reproduction rights, gender equality, and equal rights were central to the partisanship choices of women, whereas for men social welfare issues were more important.<sup>79</sup> This argument has implications for this study because a certain set of social or economic issues may account for women's slight shift to the centre-left.

Third, Norrander and Wilcox hypothesized that a gender gap in ideological self-identification may be caused by a group of men changing their ideological self-identification while a similar group of women have not or vice versa.<sup>80</sup> The gender gap in ideological orientation among Chilean women may then be the result of a combination of demographic and attitudinal variables that have caused women to shift more centre-left

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<sup>79</sup> Kaufmann, K. M. (2002) "Culture Wars, Secular Realignment, and the Gender Gap in Party Identification," *Political Behavior*, 24, 283-307.

<sup>80</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.

<sup>81</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

than men. These arguments are applicable to the study of the ideological orientation of women in Chile because they stress the importance of attitudinal variables as important factors in the ideological preferences of women.

The data utilized in Norrander and Wilcox study was from the American National Election Study's ideological self-placement scale beginning with the 1972 survey through 2006.<sup>81</sup> The seven point ideological scale utilized in this study ranged from 1-7. The variable was coded 1 for an extreme liberal identification and 10 for an extreme conservative identification. First, Norrander and Wilcox looked at historical trends in gender differences in ideological orientation. They accomplished this by noting the average placement of men and women who identify themselves as liberals, moderates, and conservatives.<sup>82</sup> On average, both men and women had a mean ideological position above 4.0 indicating a slight conservative leaning. Similar to the measurement utilized by Inglehart and Norris, the gender gap was measured by subtracting women's mean ideological position from men's mean ideological position. A positive gap score indicated that women were more likely than men to self-identify as liberal. Between 1992 and 2004, the gender gap averaged .24 and was significant.<sup>83</sup> It is interesting to note that the gender gap did not emerge because women as a whole have become more liberal.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.

<sup>84</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

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<sup>86</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>87</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>88</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>89</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

After determining the means, they then analyzed the percentages of men and women who identified in each of the three ideological categories. In contrast to the study conducted by Inglehart and Norris, Norrander and Wilcox found that both men and women have become more conservative over time, but that a group of women defined by being college educated and unmarried have become more liberal. The surveys indicated that men on average have become much more conservative than women thereby accounting for the gender gap.<sup>85</sup> An analysis of the percentages of men and women who identify as liberals, conservatives, and moderates showed a somewhat conflicting trend. This analysis suggested that both men and women identified themselves as conservatives, but that women at the beginning of the time series were 8 percentage points less likely than men to self-identify as conservative.<sup>86</sup> Likewise, over time women were more likely to identify themselves as liberal while men were not. Taking the conflicting results into account, Norrander and Wilcox concluded that an examination of the average mean ideological position of men and women “masked” the “dual trajectory of women.”<sup>87</sup> Analyzing the percentages showed that a segment of women were more likely to identify themselves as liberal even as both men and women increasingly adopted conservative

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<sup>90</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) “The Gender Gap in Ideology,” *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.

<sup>91</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>92</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>93</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

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<sup>99</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>100</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>101</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

ideological self-placements. Thus, while men were increasingly becoming more conservative, women as a group were experiencing an “ideological divide.”<sup>88</sup> Explanations for gender differences in individual self-placements on the ideological scale were then measured examining a multitude of demographic and issue attitudinal variables, which are important to this study.<sup>89</sup> Norrander and Wilcox focused on the impact of “economic locations” such as income and union membership. They also looked at new “cultural cleavages” such as education, marital status, religiosity, and evangelical denominations on ideological self-identification while holding constant demographic variables such as race, age, and region.<sup>90</sup> To examine which groups of Americans were changing their ideology, they tested the relationship between demographic variables and the seven point ideological scale.<sup>91</sup> They found that employment and union membership had different effects for men versus women. Men who were employed were more likely to have conservative leanings while women who were employed were more likely to have liberal leanings.<sup>92</sup> Men who were members of a union were more likely to identify themselves as liberal.<sup>93</sup> Income had become a less significant predictor of men’s ideology and was not significant for women. Race was not a significant predictor of ideology for either men or women but religiosity (measured by asking respondents how frequently

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they attended church) was a significant predictor of a conservative identity for both sexes.<sup>94</sup>

Interestingly, some variables were found to be more important over time for either men or for women in predicting their ideological self-placement. For women education increasingly became a significant predictor of ideology.<sup>95</sup> Norrander and Wilcox found that college educated women were more likely to self-identify as liberal. Likewise, they concluded that as a result of the increase in the number of college educated women, women as a group had become slightly more liberal over time.<sup>96</sup> Married women and married men were more likely to be conservative than unmarried women and unmarried men.<sup>97</sup> These results indicated that marriage was a significant factor in explaining women's ideological position. For men, income and employment had decreased in significance over time and were no longer linked to men's ideological self-placement.<sup>98</sup> However, an increase in the number of women who held college degrees, and an increase in the number of unmarried women, resulted in both groups being more likely than other women to self-identify as liberal.<sup>99</sup> Thus, Norrander and Wilcox concluded that college educated and unmarried women were the segments of women responsible for producing gender differences between men and women in

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ideological self-identification.<sup>100</sup> Changes in the level of education and in the marital status of women had led to changes in women's self-identification.<sup>101</sup>

After determining which groups of men and women were responsible for the gender gap in ideological self-identification, Norrander and Wilcox then explored the potential reasons for changes in women's ideological self-identification. The focus of their study was on the political issues related to ideological orientation that may differ for men and for women. In their study, Norrander and Wilcox made reference to past research that has suggested social welfare issues are paramount for men in determining their vote choice and partisanship, while cultural issues such as support for feminism, religion, abortion rights, and gay and lesbian rights are more important determinants for women.<sup>102</sup> To test the relationship between ideological self-identification and these issues, Norrander and Wilcox utilized ANES surveys beginning in 1980. The five issues that they chose to analyze were social welfare (government guarantee of jobs), civil rights (aid to Blacks), the role of women in society, moral issues (abortion) and defense issues. To examine the relationship between religion and ideological self-identification they included a measure of evangelical religious doctrine.

Not surprisingly, given the "salience" of the issue, Norrander and Wilcox found that women's and men's attitudes on abortion were significant predictors of ideological self-identification.<sup>103</sup> Women and men who were pro-choice were more likely to identify

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<sup>102</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.

<sup>103</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>104</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>105</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>106</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

themselves as liberal whereas women and men who were pro-life were more likely to identify themselves as conservative.<sup>104</sup> Similarly, women's role in society was also a significant predictor of both men's and women's ideology. Past research indicating that women and men who followed traditional gender roles were more likely to be conservative supported these findings.<sup>105</sup> Norrander and Wilcox also found that over time attitudes on social welfare issues such as government provision of jobs was becoming a less significant predictor of ideological orientation overtime for both men and women.<sup>106</sup> However, it was still an influential factor in predicting men's ideological self-identification. Following Evangelical religious doctrine was a significant predictor of both men's and women's ideological self-identification. Men and women who followed religious doctrine were more likely to be conservative.

Norrander and Wilcox concluded that a gender gap between men and women was the result of a growing segment of women self-identifying as liberal even as both men and women were increasingly becoming more conservative.<sup>107</sup> Men's increasing conservatism over time was the result of the decreasing significance of income on ideological self-identification.<sup>108</sup> Over time both poor and wealthy men self-identified as conservative. Between income brackets there was no significant difference in ideological

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<sup>107</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>108</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>109</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>110</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>111</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>112</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

self-identification.<sup>109</sup> Norrander and Wilcox also determined that in the case of women, an increase in the number of college educated women and an increase in the number of women who were single had resulted in an increase in the number of women who self-identified as liberal.<sup>110</sup> Even though higher education levels and a single status had always predicted a more liberal self-identification among women, changes in both demographics had resulted in a larger number of liberal women.<sup>111</sup>

Norrander and Wilcox also concluded that religion remains a very important predictor of ideological identification, while attitudes toward abortion and women's role in society became significant predictors of ideological self-identification for both men and women overtime.<sup>112</sup> Therefore, attitudes on political issues were significantly related to both women's and men's ideological self-identification. This research has important implications for this study because it explores attitudinal and demographic factors that are significant predictors of the ideological orientation of women. This research provides a basis from which to determine whether Chilean women have followed a similar trajectory to women in the United States. A liberal orientation among Chilean women may be the result of similar demographic and attitudinal factors found to be significant in their study.

This research will begin by examining the influence of demographic factors and attitudinal factors on the liberal orientation of Chilean women. This research will argue that a combination of demographic and attitudinal factors have influenced the ideological orientation of Chilean women.

## CHAPTER III

### THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ON WOMEN'S IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

This chapter explores the relationship between the demographic variables of age, education, marital status, income, and religiosity and women's ideological orientation. When testing the significance of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, only women were selected for the analysis. In this research the ideological orientation of women refers to the degree to which Chilean women self-position themselves on an ideological scale. Ideological orientation is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents to self-position themselves on an ideological scale ranging from (1) extremely conservative to (10) extremely liberal.

#### Age

Norrander and Wilcox suggested in their study that older women in the United States were more likely than younger women to identify as conservative.<sup>113</sup> Inglehart and Norris attributed the gender realignment among women in the U.S. to the process of modernization and its effect on value and lifestyle change.<sup>114</sup> Specific to Chile, Seligson found that older Chileans are actually less likely to identify with leftist regimes than in other Latin American countries.<sup>115</sup> Leftist regimes in Chile are associated with liberal

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<sup>113</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.

<sup>114</sup> Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) *Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press: 88.

<sup>115</sup> Seligson, Mitchell (2007) "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy* vol. 18 no.3:81.

values, so it is not surprising that older traditional Chileans are more supportive of conservative regimes and conservative values. In Chile, older women who had protested under Allende, might be more conservative than those who had not grown up under the tumultuous Allende years.


In this study age refers to the age in years of women. Age is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking women what their age in years is.<sup>116</sup> I hypothesize that as the age of women increases, ideology will become more conservative. The null hypothesis in this study is that there is no relationship between the age of Chilean women and their ideological orientation.

Overall, the average age of women respondents in the LAPOP survey was 44 years of age. To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the age of women and their ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between women's age and ideological orientation. Figure 3 suggests that at the bivariate level there is a relationship between women's age and ideological orientation and this relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as the age of women increases, they become less liberal.

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<sup>116</sup> The LAPOP name for this variable is Q2. The exact wording of the age question is "¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?" What age in years are you?

**Figure 3: The Effect of Age on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women**



A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates the relationship between age and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. The Pearson's correlation coefficient ( $r = -.218$ ) indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship at the .001 level between the age of Chilean women and their ideological orientation. As the age of Chilean women increases, they become less liberal. The null hypothesis can therefore be rejected. In support of Seligson's finding, this analysis finds that younger women in Chile are more likely to self-identify as liberal and espouse civil liberties and liberal values. Older women in Chile are more likely to espouse conservative traditional values.

## Marital Status

The research by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that in the United States married women were more likely than non-married women to self-identify as conservative.<sup>117</sup> Inglehart and Norris also found that married women were more likely to self-identify as conservative.<sup>118</sup> Married women have different interests and lifestyles than their non-married counterparts, and these differences are reflected in self-perception.<sup>119</sup> In this study marital status of women refers to the civil status of women. Marital status is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents whether they are single, married, widowed, divorced, civil union, or separated.<sup>120</sup> Marital status is coded (1) single, (2) married, (3) civil union, (4) divorced, (5) separated, and (6) widowed.<sup>121</sup>

The second hypothesis in this study predicts that there is a statistically significant difference in the mean ideological orientation between married women and women who are single or in a partnership. Married women will be less likely than single women to be liberal. Overall, in the LAPOP survey the majority or 55% of Chilean women respondents were married and 45% were not.<sup>121</sup> To test the null hypothesis that there is

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<sup>117</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.

<sup>118</sup> Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) *Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press: 86.

<sup>119</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003


<sup>120</sup> For my analysis I recoded the variable Q11 into a different variable. I renamed that variable marital and recoded the data. Women respondents who were married or widowed were recoded 1 for married. Women who were single, divorced, in a civil union, or separated were coded 0, for non-married.

<sup>121</sup> LAPOP 2006



no statistically significant difference in the mean ideological orientation between married women and single women, an Independent Samples t Test will be conducted. Figure 4 suggests there is a relationship between women's marital status and ideological orientation, married women are significantly less likely than single women to be liberal.

**Figure 4: The Effect of Marital Status on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women**



Those women who are married had ideological scores closer to the conservative end of the spectrum. The difference between the mean ideological position for married women and the mean ideological position for single women is .73. An Independent Samples t Test will determine the significance of this result. The Independent Samples t

Test shows that there is a significant difference between the ideological position of single women and the ideological position of married women at the .001 level. The significance statistic of .000 is much less than .001. Therefore, there is a statistically significant difference between the mean ideological position of single women and married women and the null hypothesis can therefore be rejected. Single women are significantly more likely than married women to be liberal.

### **Religion**

The research by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that in the United States religious women and men were more likely than non-religious women and men to identify as conservative.<sup>122</sup> Inglehart and Norris also found that religious belief was associated with traditional values and identification with a conservative ideology.<sup>123</sup> Historically in Chile the Catholic religion has permeated all aspects of life in Chile. The strong opposition to the legalization of divorce by the Catholic Church has featured prominently in delaying reform of existing social laws in Chilean society. In this research religion refers to the religious denomination of respondents. Religion is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking women what their religious denomination is. Respondents are given the choice of selecting (1) Catholic, (2) Christian, (3) Other than Christian, (5) Evangelical, (6) Jewish, and (4) nothing.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.


<sup>123</sup> Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) *Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press: 76.

<sup>124</sup> The LAPOP name for this variable is Q3. The exact wording of the religion question is "¿Cuál es su religión?" What religion do you identify with? For my analysis Q3 was recoded into a different variable named religion where respondent who do not belong to any religion were coded 0 and respondents who do belong to a religion were coded 1.

<sup>125</sup> LAPOP 2006 dataset.

The third hypothesis in this study predicts that there will be a statistically significant difference in the mean ideological orientation of women who adhere to a religious denomination and those who do not. Women who belong to a religion will be less liberal than women who do not. Overall, the majority of Chilean women respondents in the LAPOP survey, or 70% are Catholic.<sup>125</sup> To test the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference in the mean ideological orientation of women who belong to a religious denomination and those who do not, this research will utilize an Independent Samples t Test between religion and women's ideological orientation. Figure 5 suggests there is a relationship between women's religious denomination and ideological orientation and this relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, women who identify with a religious denomination will be less liberal.

**Figure 5: The Effect of Religion on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women**



Women not belonging to a religion had ideological scores closer to the liberal end of the spectrum. The difference between the mean ideological position for women who belong in a religious denomination and the mean ideological position for women who do not is .86. The Independent Samples t Test shows that there is a significant difference between the ideological position of women who belong to a religious denomination and the ideological position of women who do not ( $p < .05$ ). Therefore, there is a statistically significant difference between the mean ideological position of women who do and do

not belong to a religious denomination and the null hypothesis can therefore be rejected. Women who do not belong to a religious denomination are significantly more likely than women who do belong to a religious denomination to be liberal. In support of Norrander and Wilcox finding, this analysis finds that Catholic women and Evangelical women are more likely to self-identify as conservative, while women who do not belong to a religious denomination are more likely to be liberal.<sup>126</sup>

### Income

The research by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that in the United States income was not a significant predictor of women's ideological orientation over time.<sup>127</sup> In contrast, Inglehart and Norris found that while past research pointed to socioeconomic status being an insignificant predictor of gender differences in voting between men and women, middle class women were more likely than other income groups to self-identify as conservative.<sup>128</sup>

In this research income refers to the range of income a family makes. Income is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents their family

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<sup>126</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.

<sup>127</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>128</sup> Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) *Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press: 91.

<sup>129</sup> The LAPOP name for this variable is Q10. The exact wording of the income range question is "¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?"


<sup>130</sup> LAPOP dataset Chile 2006.

income range.<sup>129</sup> Income is coded (1) less than 40.000 pesos to (10) more than 980.000 pesos.<sup>130</sup> For comparison there are 13 pesos for every U.S. dollar.

The fourth hypothesis in this study predicts that as the income level of women increases they will be less liberal. Overall, the majority of Chilean women respondents in the LAPOP survey, or 26% fall into a lower middle income bracket of 109 to 190 pesos. To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the income level of women and their ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between income level and ideological orientation.

The Pearson's  $r$  coefficient of .045 was not significant, indicating that there is not a significant relationship between income level and women's ideological orientation. Figure 6 further confirmed this trend. The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected.

**Figure 6: The Effect of Income on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women**



Interviewer response effects such as social desirability may be why no significant correlation was found between income level and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. The lack of a relationship may also be due to other factors being more influential than income in explaining Chilean women’s liberal orientation. Income may not factor in to women’s decision to become ideologically liberal.

## **Educational Attainment**

The research conducted by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that education level was a significant predictor of the ideological orientation of women in the U.S.<sup>131</sup> Women with a college education were more likely than less educated women and men to self-identify as liberal.<sup>132</sup> Inglehart and Norris also found that the entry of women into higher education had a significant effect on their political values and priorities.<sup>133</sup> Numerous public opinion studies have indicated education is “consistently linked” with more liberal attitudes.<sup>134</sup> In this research the level of educational attainment of women refers to the highest level of education obtained by women. Level of educational attainment is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents what their highest level of educational attainment is by grade. Respondent’s Education level is arranged as an ordinal scale by primary school (grades 1-8), secondary school (grades 9-12), university level (grades 13-17), higher non- university/technical level (11-13), and no education.<sup>135</sup> The fifth hypothesis in this study predicts that as the number of years spent in school increases, women will be more liberal. Overall, the average number of school years for Chilean women was 10<sup>th</sup> grade, or second year of high school. The highest

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<sup>131</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) “The Gender Gap in Ideology,” *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer

<sup>132</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>133</sup> Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) *Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press: 91.

<sup>134</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003


<sup>135</sup> The LAPOP name for this variable is Ed. The exact wording of the educational level question is “Ahora para terminar le voy hacer algunas preuntas para fines estadísticos...¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. Aprobó?” What is the highest level of education attained?



number of school years achieved by the majority of women was 12<sup>th</sup> grade, or completion of high school.

To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the number of school years and women's ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between school year and women's ideological orientation. Figure 7 suggests there is a relationship between school year and women's ideological orientation and this relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as the number of years spent in school increases, women are more liberal.

**Figure 7: The Effect of Education on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women**



A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's  $r$  coefficient of .114 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .01 level between school years and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. As the number of years spent in school increases, Chilean women are more liberal.

This study will shift to a focus of attitudinal variables and their relationship to the ideological orientation of Chilean women. Women's attitudes toward the social issues of divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality, and abortion will be explored as potential factors in the liberal orientation of Chilean women.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE EFFECT OF WOMEN'S ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL ISSUES ON IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

It has already been established which demographic variables have a significant effect or relationship on the ideological orientation of Chilean women at the bivariate level. In this chapter the relationship between women's attitudes toward social issues and women's ideological orientation will be explored.

Attitudes toward abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and homosexuality have a strong correlation in the explanation of ideology in the United States. Norrander and Wilcox found that women's attitudes towards abortion were significantly related to their liberal orientation. Attitudes and beliefs regarding social issues reinforce who women are likely to vote for and what ideological orientation they are likely to choose. While it may be the case that ideology informs opinions in these issue areas, Norrander and Wilcox found that the majority of Americans ideological identities are the product of their beliefs and attitudes. When people think in ideological terms, their beliefs on social issues in particular form the basis for their ideological tendencies.<sup>136</sup> While this study is unable to establish causality, a limit of OLS analysis, there is evidence for why attitudes toward social issues result in the adoption of a specific ideological identification. Norrander and Wilcox examine theoretical considerations on gender and ideology by looking at how women's stances on social issues impact their ideological identities over time. They find evidence for their theory in Conover and Feldman's research. Conover and Feldman

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<sup>136</sup> Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," *Journal of Political Behavior*, Springer.

argued that people adopted ideological positions based on their stance on certain issues.<sup>137</sup> Norrander and Wilcox also examine the behavior of political elites as evidence for why ideological positions are a consequence of attitudes toward social issues. Political elites define the issues that are associated with a liberal and conservative ideology.<sup>138</sup> For example, Norrander and Wilcox argue that “elite positions connecting pro-life attitudes to the conservative label” help Americans link their own attitudes to a particular ideological tendency.<sup>139</sup> Likewise, when political elites use the terms conservative and liberal, people become more familiar with the terminology and start to identify with one or the other ideological orientation.<sup>140</sup> Political elites “define” what it means to be conservative or liberal by referring to “positions on concrete policy issues.” So while an ideological identification as conservative or liberal may cause people to have certain attitudes on issues, research indicates that ideological orientation may also be a consequence of issue positions.

The following set of hypotheses proposes that as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, and divorce increase, women will be more liberal. The null for these hypotheses is that there is no relationship between social issues and the political orientation of women. The analysis below explains these hypotheses.

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<sup>137</sup> Conover and Feldman (1981). The Origins and Meanings of Liberal/ Conservative Self-Identifications. *American Journal of Political Science*, 25, 617-645.

<sup>138</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>139</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>140</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

## **Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Social Issues**

Merike Blofield conducted some of the most influential research in examining Chilean public opinion and attitudes towards abortion and divorce. She conducted extensive field research in Chile for six months, interviewing key political actors and both conservative and liberal legislators.<sup>141</sup> Blofield concluded that the politics that surround the issue of abortion remain highly conservative, despite the growing number of illegal abortions.<sup>142</sup> Within Chile the practice of abortion is not much different from countries like the United States, but despite the occurrence it is still illegal. Likewise, conservative senators “dominate the discourse” on moral issues “equating therapeutic abortion with homicide, and divorce with the dissolution of national unity, poverty, increased delinquency, and drug addiction.”<sup>143</sup> Socialist leaders up to this point in time have been “timid” in confronting conservatives on moral issues.<sup>144</sup> However, Blofield finds that reform of social policies is linked with strong support for legalization of divorce and abortion and support for leftist parties and a liberal ideology.

A 2002 survey of public opinion in Chile revealed that public support for the legalization of divorce was at 85%. This strong public consent for the legalization of divorce resulted in the passage of a conservative divorce law in 2004. In contrast to the passage of the divorce law, the entrenched right-wing agenda has so far prevented there from being a public discourse about the legalization of abortion.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Blofield, Merike (2006) *The Politics of 'Moral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in Catholic Chile since 1990*. New York: Routledge, ix.

<sup>142</sup> Blofield 2006

<sup>143</sup> Blofield 2006

<sup>144</sup> Blofield 2006

<sup>145</sup> Blofield 2006

<sup>146</sup> Blofield 2006

<sup>147</sup> Blofield 2006

After analyzing the behavior of Chileans reflected in survey data, Blofield concluded that Chilean behavior “deviates” significantly from being conservative on divorce.<sup>142</sup> She finds that a majority of support existed for the legalization of divorce both before, and after Chile became a democracy.<sup>146</sup> Table 1 below shows how since the 1980s there has been an increase in public support for the legalization of divorce, with over 80% of the Chilean population believing divorce should be legalized.<sup>147</sup>

**Table 1: Percentage of Respondents Who Support Legal Divorce in Chile**

| Year                | 1987 | 1992 | 1996 | 2002 |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Favor Legal Divorce | 67%  | 67%  | 80%  | 80%  |

- Sources: Blofield, Merike (2006) *The Politics of 'Moral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in Catholic Chile since 1990*. New York: Routledge.

Blofield also finds that despite abortion remaining illegal, numerous women continue to “resort” to having abortions in dangerous conditions.<sup>148</sup> Every year over 94 abortions per capita are performed and death from abortion is the leading cause of “maternal mortality” in Chile.<sup>149</sup> Table 2 shows the percentage of public support for the legalization of abortion in specific circumstances. Over 65% of Chileans agree abortion

<sup>148</sup> Blofield 2006

<sup>149</sup> Blofield 2006

<sup>150</sup> Blofield 2006

should be legalized in cases where the mother's life is at risk, and 58% believe abortion should be legalized in cases of rape.<sup>150</sup>

**Table 2: Support for Abortion in Chile**

| When...                        | 1990  | 1996  | 1997  | 2002  |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| The mother's life is in danger | 75.3% | 58.7% | 75.6% | 65.6% |
| Rape is involved               | ----  | 47.7% | 56.8% | 58.3% |
| Fetus is deformed              | 40.8% | 32.6% | 35.7% | 56.3% |
| Does not want more children    | 13.9% | 10.7% | 7.4%  | 21.3% |

Sources: Blofield, Merike (2006) *The Politics of 'Moral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in Catholic Chile since 1990*. New York: Routledge.

- No data

In this research, attitudes toward social issues refer to how justifiable women view the social behaviors of divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. This study will operationalize attitudes toward social issues using the justifiability scale from the 2006 LAPOP dataset for how justifiable women view abortion, euthanasia, divorce, and homosexuality. The justifiability scale asks respondents to rank how justifiable they view

social behaviors to be on a scale from 1- 10 where 1 is coded for never justifiable and 10 is coded for always justifiable.<sup>151</sup>

### **The Justifiability of Abortion**

The first attitudinal hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion increase, women will be more liberal. The research conducted by Blofield suggested that a liberal ideology or support for leftist parties in Chile was associated with social support for the legalization of abortion.

I argue that women who regard abortion as a justifiable social behavior have shifted to the left ideologically. Despite the large amount of public support for abortion legalization as indicated by Blofield, the lack of public discourse about abortion reform has resulted in a smaller number of women who view abortion as a justifiable social behavior. This may be the result of abortion remaining an illegal practice in Chile.

Table 3 shows the percentage of Chilean women who view abortion as being a never justifiable, justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. As of 2006, the majority of Chilean women respondents view abortion as being a never justifiable social behavior, and only 12.7% of women view abortion as always justifiable social behavior. These findings indicate two possible conclusions. One indication might be that the entrenched right-wing agenda has waged a successful campaign in linking abortion with crime and bad social behavior. This is then reflected in the opinions of respondents.

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<sup>151</sup> The LAPOP name for this variable is CHI14A-CHI14G. The exact wording of the social issue question is "ahora, utilizando también una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta que punto cree que las siguientes situaciones son justificables. En este caso, 1 indica que usted cree que la situación nunca se justifica y 10 indica que usted cree que la situación siempre se justifica. Entonces, ¿Cuán justificable piensa que es?" On the justifiability scale from 1-10 where 1 is never justifiable and 10 is always justifiable, how justifiable do you view the following social behaviors?




Another indication may be that Chilean women are torn on the issue of abortion, either because it is still illegal and considered to be a private matter in Chilean society, preventing women from publically declaring it to be justifiable, or because the Catholic Church continues to influence people's religious beliefs.

**Table 3: Percent of Women Who View Abortion as a Justifiable Behavior**

|                    |       |
|--------------------|-------|
| Never Justifiable  | 75.5% |
| Justifiable        | 12.7% |
| Always Justifiable | 12.7% |

To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward abortion and the political orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of abortion and women's ideological orientation. Figure 8 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view abortion to be and their political orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion increase, women are more liberal.

**Figure 8: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Abortion on their Ideological Orientation**



A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's  $r$  coefficient of .205 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level between the justifiability of abortion and the political orientation of Chilean women and this is in the same direction as predicted by the research hypothesis. As positive attitudes toward the justifiability of abortion have increased, Chilean women are more liberal. It could be the case that an ideological identification influences one's attitudes and beliefs toward social behaviors like abortion. However, while causality cannot be determined

with OLS analysis, Norrander and Wilcox found that ideological identities are shaped by stances on social issues.

### **The Justifiability of Homosexuality**


The second hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of homosexuality increase, women will be more liberal. Table 4 shows the percentage of Chilean women who view homosexuality as being a never justifiable, justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. The majority of women respondents view homosexuality as being a never justifiable social behavior, and only 24.6% of women view homosexuality as always justifiable social behavior. These findings indicate that attitudes towards homosexuality like abortion are still very much conservative.

**Table 4: Percent of Women Who View Homosexuality as a Justifiable Behavior**

|                    |       |
|--------------------|-------|
| Never Justifiable  | 50.9% |
| Justifiable        | 24.5% |
| Always Justifiable | 24.6% |

To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward homosexuality and the political orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of homosexuality and ideological self-identification. Figure 9 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view homosexuality to be and their political orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes toward the justifiability of homosexuality have increased, women are more liberal.

**Figure 9: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Homosexuality on their Ideological Orientation**



A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's  $r$  coefficient of .240 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level between the justifiability of homosexuality and the political ideology of Chilean women. As positive attitudes towards the justifiability of homosexuality have increased, women are more liberal.

### **The Justifiability of Euthanasia**

The third hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of euthanasia increase, women will be more liberal. Table 5 shows the


percentage of Chilean women who view euthanasia as being a never justifiable, justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. The majority of Chilean women respondents view euthanasia as being a never justifiable social behavior, and only 30.7% of women view euthanasia as always justifiable social behavior. These findings indicate similar conclusions as the findings about abortion and homosexuality.

**Table 5: Percent of Women Who View Euthanasia as a Justifiable Behavior**

|                    |       |
|--------------------|-------|
| Never Justifiable  | 54.2% |
| Justifiable        | 15.1% |
| Always Justifiable | 30.7% |

To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes towards euthanasia and the political orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of euthanasia and ideological orientation. Figure 10 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view euthanasia and their political orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of euthanasia have increased, women are more liberal.

**Figure 10: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Euthanasia on their Ideological Orientation**



A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's  $r$  coefficient of .194 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level between the justifiability of euthanasia and the political orientation of Chilean women. As positive attitudes towards the justifiability of euthanasia have increased, women are more liberal.

### **Justifiability of Divorce**

The fourth hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of divorce increase, women will be more liberal. The research conducted by

Blofield suggested that a liberal ideology or support for leftist parties is associated with strong support for the legalization of divorce. I argue that changing attitudes towards divorce resulted in an ideological shift to the left among Chilean women which in turn created a strong public support for the legalization of divorce. Table 6 shows the percentage of Chilean women who view divorce as being a never justifiable, justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. The majority of Chilean women respondents view divorce as always justifiable social behavior, and 18.2% of women view divorce as a justifiable social behavior.

These findings indicate that there is widespread belief among Chilean women that divorce is a justifiable social behavior. Despite the domination of the public discourse on moral issues by conservative leaders, the election of leftwing presidential candidate Lagos in 2000 was crucial in passing a comprehensive divorce law in 2004.<sup>152</sup> High levels of social support for reform of moral issues, and a larger government role in providing basic services to Chileans may have contributed to a shift in the ideological orientation of Chileans.<sup>153</sup>

**Table 6: Percent of Women Who View Divorce as a Justifiable Behavior**

|                    |       |
|--------------------|-------|
| Never Justifiable  | 29.1% |
| Justifiable        | 18.2% |
| Always Justifiable | 52.8% |


To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward divorce and the ideological orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a

<sup>152</sup> Blofield, Merike H. (2006) *The Politics of 'Moral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in Catholic Chile since 1990*. New York: Routledge, 16.

<sup>153</sup> Blofield 2006

Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of divorce and ideological orientation. Figure 11 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view divorce and their ideological orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of divorce have increased, Chilean women are more liberal.

**Figure 11: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Divorce on their Ideological Orientation**



A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's  $r$  coefficient of .186 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level between the justifiability of divorce and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. As



positive attitudes towards the justifiability of divorce have increased, women are more liberal.

## CHAPTER V

### THE ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, AND WOMEN'S IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Thus far, women's attitudes toward social issues have had a profound effect on women's ideological orientation in Chile and in explaining women's growing liberalism. In this chapter the relationship between women's attitudes towards government intervention, the economy, and women's ideological orientation will be explored.

Inglehart and Norris began some of the more influential work examining the relationship between government intervention in the economy and the gender gap in voting.<sup>154</sup> They conducted an analysis of survey questionnaires from the World Values Survey in the United States.<sup>155</sup> Respondents were asked on a scale from 1-10 where they would place themselves when asked questions about government intervention. The first question asked respondents whether they believed the government should take on more responsibility to ensure everyone is provided for. Respondents were also asked whether private ownership of business and industry should be increased. For both questions, (1) indicated that respondents believed government ownership of business should increase, and a (10) indicated that respondents believed private ownership of business should increase.<sup>156</sup>

After analyzing the findings, Inglehart and Norris concluded that women in the United States often "displayed relatively strong support" for government spending on the

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<sup>154</sup> Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) *Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press: 81.

<sup>155</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003

<sup>156</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003

welfare state and public services.<sup>157</sup> Women were also more likely to support leftist parties when these parties had been traditional proponents of a strong social safety net for public services.<sup>158</sup> Inglehart and Norris also concluded that women's favorable view on an active role for the state may have been due to women being the primary beneficiaries of government services such as pensions.<sup>159</sup>

### **The Present Economic Situation in Chile**

The question of government intervention in the economy has been of paramount importance in Chile. Historically, economic issues are what really mattered. This was the main reason women joined conservatives to oust Allende, and Chilean society has disagreed most strongly over the role of the state in the economy. Once Pinochet overthrew Allende, Chile adopted a strong neo-liberal model, and the first democratic governments assuaged conservative fears by promising not to touch the neoliberal models. These models led to high economic growth but also high income inequality. As of 2007, Chile has experienced numerous structural reforms including the strengthening of social protection and a plan to reform the pension system.<sup>160</sup> When Bachelet was sworn in as Chile's first female president she vowed to continue to work toward bolstering Chile's economic prosperity and eliminating the high level of income inequality.<sup>161</sup> Since being sworn into office in January 2006, Bachelet has maintained the

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<sup>157</sup> Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) *Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press: 92.

<sup>158</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003

<sup>159</sup> Inglehart and Norris 2003

<sup>160</sup> Reel, Monte "Bachelet Sworn in as Chile's President." *Washington Post Foreign Service*, March 12, 2006, [Washingtonpost.com](http://Washingtonpost.com)

<sup>161</sup> Chant, Sylvia, and Nkiki Craske (2003) *Gender in Latin America*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers.

<sup>162</sup> Chant and Craske 2003

<sup>163</sup> Chant and Craske 2003

free market policies that have been in place in Chile for decades.<sup>162</sup> She has also worked to increase social spending in the areas of health care and education.<sup>163</sup> I argue below that women's attitudes towards government intervention in the economy are important and influential factors in explaining why Chilean women are more liberal.

In this research, attitudes toward government intervention and the economy refers to whether or not women agree with the following statements: the health care system should remain the same, there should be an increase in taxes, and the income of people should be equal. This study will operationalize attitudes toward government intervention in the economy using a scale from the 2006 LAPOP dataset for whether or not women agree with the above statements.<sup>164</sup> The scale asks respondents to rank how much they agree with the above statements on a scale from 1-10 where 1 is coded for do not agree and 10 is coded for do agree.

### **Income Equality**

The fifth hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes toward income equality increase, the liberal orientation of Chilean women will also increase. To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward income equality and women's ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between attitudes toward income equality and ideological orientation. Table 7 shows the

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<sup>164</sup> The LAPOP name for this variable is CHI13A-CHI13C. The exact wording used in the government intervention question is, "Ahora me gustaría conocer su opinión acerca de algunos asuntos más específicos. ¿Cómo ubicaría su propia posición en la siguiente escala dónde 1 indica que usted se encuentra completamente en desacuerdo con la afirmación y 10 que usted se encuentra completamente de acuerdo con la afirmación?" On a scale from 1-10 where 1 indicates that you do not agree with following statements and 10 indicates you do agree where do you place yourself?

income disparities that have existed in Chile since 1970. In 1995, the richest quintile received 61% of consumed income, while the poorest quintile received only 3.5%. Income disparity remains a severe problem under the Bachelet administration and attitudes towards income equality may be reflected in Chilean women's ideological orientation.

**Table 7: Income Distribution in Chile (Percentage Share of Income)**


| Year | Highest percentage | Lowest percentage |
|------|--------------------|-------------------|
| 1970 | 51.4               | 4.4               |
| 1980 | -                  | -                 |
| 1995 | 61.0               | 3.5               |

Sources: CEPAL, World Bank, and Chant, Sylvia, and Nkiki Craske (2003) *Gender in Latin America*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 51.

- No data

Figure 12 suggests there is a relationship between income equality and women's ideological orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis; women who agree that incomes should be more equal will be more liberal ( $r=.105$ ,  $p<.01$ ). Essentially, income quality means that people want incomes to be more equal, and for the disparities between incomes to disappear.

**Figure 12: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Income Equality on their Ideological Orientation**




**Health Care**

The sixth hypothesis in this study predicts that women who agree that the health care system should remain the same will be more liberal. To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between women's attitudes towards health care and their ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between health care and ideological orientation. A Pearson's correlation test shows that there is not a significant relationship between women's agreement with health care remaining the

same and women's ideological orientation ( $p=.254$ ). Figure 13 further illustrates this trend.

**Figure 13: The Effect of Women's Attitudes toward Health Care on their Ideological Orientation**



Women who agree that the health care system should remain the same are more liberal. The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected. Interviewer response effects such as social desirability may be why no significant correlation was found between women's attitudes towards health care and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. There is more consensus in Chile today regarding the economic model in place and this may have affected how influential women's attitudes toward government intervention is


on women's ideological tendencies. The lack of a relationship may also be due to other factors being more influential than women's attitudes towards health care in explaining Chilean women's liberal orientation.

### **Raise Taxes**

The seventh hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards taxes being raised to fund social programs increase, Chilean women will be more liberal. To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward raising taxes to fund social programs and women's ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between raising taxes and ideological orientation. A Pearson's correlation test shows that there is not a significant relationship between women's agreement with the need to raise taxes to fund social programs and women's ideological identification ( $p=.258$ ). Figure 14 further confirms this trend.



**Figure 14: The Effect of Women's Attitudes toward Raising Taxes on their Ideological Orientation**



As positive attitudes toward raising taxes to fund social programs have increased, women did not become more liberal. The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected. Interviewer response effects such as social desirability may be why no significant correlation was found between women's attitudes towards raising taxes to fund social programs and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. The lack of a relationship may also be due to other factors being more influential than women's attitudes towards raising taxes to fund social programs in explaining Chilean women's liberal orientation. Also, there is consensus today in Chile regarding the economic model. Perhaps this is

**why attitudes towards government intervention in the economy are less influential in predicting women's ideological behavior.**

## CHAPTER VI

### PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Multivariate regression analysis will predict which of the significant variable(s) best explain Chilean women's liberal orientation. Multivariate analysis is necessary to test the hypotheses concerning structural and attitudinal factors together, modeling the variables simultaneously. It is also imperative to hold some variables constant while determining the significance of others, i.e., holding structural factors constant while assessing impact of attitudinal ones, and vice versa. Table 8 depicts how much influence age, school years, religion, marital status, women's attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion, divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality, and income equality have on women's liberal orientation. The trimmed model includes only the significant variables.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> Class notes Fall semester 2007 "Multiple Regression"

**Table 8: OLS Regression of Chilean Women's Ideological Orientation**

| <b>Independent Variables</b>           | <b>Original Model</b>     | <b>Trimmed Model</b>       |
|--|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>Constant</b>                        | <b>5.555***</b><br>(.683) | <b>4.881***</b><br>(.362)  |
| <b>Marital Status</b>                  | <b>-.674**</b><br>(.241)  | <b>-.966***</b><br>(-.203) |
| <b>School Year</b>                     | <b>-.012</b><br>(.029)    | -----                      |
| <b>Age</b>                             | <b>-.014</b><br>(.008)    | -----                      |
| <b>Religion</b>                        | <b>-.270</b><br>(.278)    | -----                      |
| <b>Justifiability of Abortion</b>      | <b>.090*</b><br>(.041)    | <b>.115**</b><br>(.039)    |
| <b>Justifiability of Homosexuality</b> | <b>.095**</b><br>(.036)   | <b>.129***</b><br>(.033)   |
| <b>Justifiability of Euthanasia</b>    | <b>.042</b><br>(.034)     | -----                      |
| <b>Justifiability of Divorce</b>       | <b>.028</b><br>(.033)     | -----                      |
| <b>Income Equality</b>                 | <b>.087*</b><br>(.038)    | <b>.089*</b><br>(.038)     |
| <b>Adjusted R Squared</b>              | <b>.110</b><br>(2.551)    | <b>.103</b><br>(2.563)     |
| <b>N</b>                               | <b>651</b>                | <b>655</b>                 |

An F test indicated that these models were significant at the .001 level. Coefficients are unstandardized, with standard errors in parentheses. \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

In the analysis of the original model age, school years, religion, attitudes towards divorce, and attitudes toward euthanasia were not significant predictors of the ideological orientation of Chilean women. These variables had no effect on the ideological orientation of Chilean women and were dropped in the Trimmed Model.

The R<sup>2</sup> value is interpreted as the percentage of variance explained by the dependent variable. The Trimmed Model indicates that the Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> value is .103 with a standard error estimate of 2.563. In the Trimmed Model the Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> indicates that about 10% of the variance in women's ideological orientation is explained by marital

status, and attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion, homosexuality, and income equality. Although the overall model is significantly statistic, it fails to predict 90% of the variance in women's ideological orientation.

The ANOVA examines the significance of the model as a whole.<sup>166</sup> The F test indicates whether all the variables when tested together significantly predict women's ideological orientation.<sup>167</sup> The F test also indicates whether the variance explained by the line is greater than the unexplained variance.<sup>168</sup> The ANOVA shows that the F statistic of 19.842 is significant at the .001 level.<sup>169</sup>

Married women (or value coded as one) were (.966) less liberal than non-married women. This finding is consistent with prior research that suggests married women are more likely to self-identify as conservative than non-married women. This finding is also consistent with the findings in the second hypothesis. Women who are married are .966 less liberal than non-married women.

The t value for the justifiability of abortion is 2.957 and is significant at the .01 level. As women are more willing to justify abortion, they are more liberal. For every one unit increase in the justifiability of abortion women are more liberal. While it is impossible to determine causality when using survey data, the findings are strengthened by prior research suggesting attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion and other social issues are important indicators of women's ideological orientation.

The t value for the justifiability of homosexuality is 3.912 and is significant at the .001 level. As women are more willing to justify homosexuality, they are more liberal.

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<sup>166</sup> Class notes. Fall Semester 2007. "Multiple Regression." Professor Mary F. Malone

<sup>167</sup> Class Notes 2007

<sup>168</sup> Class Notes 2007

<sup>169</sup> Class Notes 2007

For every one unit increase in the justifiability of abortion women are more liberal. Chilean women's attitudes towards the justifiability of homosexuality are a significant predictor of their ideological orientation.

The t value for women's attitudes towards income equality is 2.341 and is significant at the .05 level. As women come to agree that incomes should be more equal, they are more liberal. For every one unit increase in women agreeing that incomes should be more equal women are more liberal. Chilean women's attitudes towards the justifiability of homosexuality are a significant predictor of their ideological orientation.

The multivariate results show that the other independent variables were insignificant predictors of the ideological orientation of Chilean women. However, in order to say that they are theoretically important, this study addresses multicollinearity. It may be that the independent variables are so strongly correlated with one another that the impact they have on the ideological orientation of Chilean women is weakened. The results from the Pearson r correlation matrix found in Table 9 and 10 lead me to believe that there is a presence of multicollinearity in this study. For example, it may be that marital status is a predictor of ideology, but its effects are compromised by its high correlation with whether or not a person belongs to a religious denomination.

**Table 9: Multicollinearity**

| Variables              |                 | Marriage | Religion | Income | Age     | School  |
|------------------------|-----------------|----------|----------|--------|---------|---------|
| <b>Marriage</b>        | Pearson r       | 1        | .131**   | -.008  | .532**  | -.145** |
|                        | Sig. (2-tailed) |          | .001     | .840   | .000    | .000    |
| <b>Religion</b>        | Pearson r       | .131**   | 1        | -.081* | .114**  | -.128** |
|                        | Sig. (2-tailed) | .001     |          | .034   | .003    | .001    |
| <b>Income</b>          | Pearson r       | -.008    | -.081*   | 1      | -.026   | -.008   |
|                        | Sig. (2-tailed) | .840     | .034     |        | .493    | .832    |
| <b>Age</b>             | Pearson r       | .532**   | .114**   | -.026  | 1       | -.418** |
|                        | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000     | .003     | .493   |         | .000    |
| <b>Years of school</b> | Pearson r       | -.145**  | -.128**  | -.008  | -.418** | 1       |
|                        | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000     | .001     | .832   | .000    |         |

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

| Variables                                |                 | How justifiable is abortion? | How justifiable is homosexuality? | How justifiable is euthanasia? | How justifiable is divorce? |
|--|-----------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>How justifiable is abortion?</b>      | Pearson r       | 1                            | .380**                            | .419**                         | .331**                      |
|  | Sig. (2-tailed) |                              | .000                              | .000                           | .000                        |
| <b>How justifiable is homosexuality?</b> | Pearson r       | .380**                       | 1                                 | .414**                         | .411**                      |
|  | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000                         |                                   | .000                           | .000                        |
| <b>How justifiable is euthanasia?</b>    | Pearson r       | .419**                       | .414**                            | 1                              | .428**                      |
|  | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000                         | .000                              |                                | .000                        |
| <b>How justifiable is divorce?</b>       | Pearson r       | .331**                       | .411**                            | .428**                         | 1                           |
|  | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000                         | .000                              | .000                           |                             |

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

## CHAPTER VII

### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study has examined Chilean women's ideological orientation, as well as the relationship between social demographics, attitudes towards social issues, and attitudes toward government intervention in the economy. This analysis indicated that Chilean women should not be pigeon-holed as staunch conservatives. Women's ideological orientation in Chile is not radically different from that of men, according to the 2006 survey data. This study has also identified several factors that explain Chilean women's ideological orientation today.

This research shows that social demographics have a small but significant affect on the ideological identification of Chilean women. Similar to Norrander and Wilcox findings in the U.S., married women in Chile are less likely to be liberal than their unmarried counterparts. Norrander and Wilcox find that the effect of marriage on the ideological identity of women has strengthened over time.<sup>170</sup> A push for the legalization of divorce by Chilean political elites in 2004, and an increase in the number of single women, has led to an adoption of liberal social attitudes which has translated into a more liberal identity. Single women are also less likely to espouse the same conservative familial values that have penetrated Chilean society than their married counterparts.

Income was not a significant predictor of whether women were conservative or liberal in Chile. This is interesting because Norrander and Wilcox found that the influence of income on the ideological identities of women in the U.S. has declined over time because there is less of an "ideological difference" between women of different

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<sup>170</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007



income groups in the United States.<sup>171</sup> In Chile, because women have limited access to formal employment opportunities, income disparities between women may be less common. This may explain why income was not a significant predictor of women's ideological identities.

Women's attitudes towards abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and homosexuality were found to be significant predictors of Chilean women's liberal ideological orientation. This is not surprising given the contentious nature of divorce reform and the debate over the legalization of abortion. These results also infer that stances on issues feature prominently in whether or not someone adopts a liberal or conservative identity.

Interestingly, a statistically significant relationship was found between women's attitudes towards income equality and their ideological orientation. This indicates that women's attitudes towards government intervention and the economy may be a slight factor in the liberal orientation of Chilean women. Women who viewed income equality favorably were more liberal. This finding may be due to the large income disparities that exist between Chilean women and men. Chilean women are less likely than men to have access to formal employment opportunities. As a consequence, women may be more likely to view income equality as a favorable reform program.

For the most part, women's stances on economic issues were unrelated to the formation of their ideological identities. These findings are important because they coincide with trends in the U.S. Norrander and Wilcox find that the role of government in providing jobs and economic security "are becoming less important" in the formation of

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<sup>171</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

“ideological identities” in the U.S.<sup>172</sup> Also, while stances on economic issues are becoming less important for men and women in the U.S. over time, they remain “one of the stronger influences” on men’s attitudes.<sup>173</sup>

Chilean women’s stance on the issue of abortion featured more prominently in the ideological divisions between liberals and conservatives in Chile and in the U.S. Norrander and Wilcox found that a conservative identity in the United States was being formed by attitudes on social issues. Those in opposition to abortion and those who advocated limited rights for women were more likely to be conservative.<sup>174</sup> This is interesting because attitudes on women’s rights may be undergoing a dramatic change in Chile, leading Chileans to adopt a more liberal identity.

Historically in Chile, ideological divisions over the economic model have led to the destruction of democracy and democratic institutions. What this research shows is that there is now consensus between conservatives and liberals on the type of economic model found in Chile and less consensus on social issues. What really divides conservative and liberal Chileans today are the social issues. This bodes well for democratic stability because a lack of consensus over economic issues has been a driving reason for Chile’s turbulent relationship with democracy.

This research adds to the existing body of literature about gender and ideology in Latin America. Several findings indicate why Chilean women have shifted to the left and now self-identify as liberal. While it does not examine every potential explanation of why Chilean women have shifted to the left ideologically, it does address social

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<sup>172</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>173</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

<sup>174</sup> Norrander and Wilcox 2007

demographics, women's attitudes toward government intervention, and women's attitudes toward social issues.

This research also has great implications for Chilean women and their participation in the political process. Presently, Chilean women have become bigger players in politics than ever before. This may be because a more liberal ideological identifications leads to changes in values regarding women's roles in society and politics. Overwhelming support for Bachelet in Chile's presidential election implies not only that ideological change ushers in democratic stability, but also that ideological change has allowed women to become prominent actors in the Chilean political system. This study shows that ideological change and identification in Chile really matters. As a doctor, single mother, and a woman, socialist president Bachelet exemplifies what it means to be a liberal woman in Chile today. More Chilean women may take a cue from Bachelet and become incredible political actors in the Chilean government and civil society. When women secure their role in the Chilean political system, the likelihood that there will be reform of existing social laws governing social behaviors increases.

This research may encourage future scholars to conduct similar studies examining the relationship between women's attitudes towards economic issues, democracy, and the ideological orientation of Chilean women, and Latin American women in general. Additionally, the findings of this study may applicable in an examination of the ideological orientation of women in other areas of the world such as in the Middle East where women are known to be socially conservative. While Chile is a unique case, this research may also lead to future research on the effects of demographics, attitudes toward social issues, and attitudes towards government intervention on partisanship, vote choice,

**and the ideological orientation of men and women in other socially conservative Latin American countries.**

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## **APPENDIX**

## University of New Hampshire

Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research  
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05-Aug-2008

Call, Kristyn  
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**IRB #: 4355**

**Study:** North-South, Liberal-Conservative: Why Latinas Lean Right

**Approval Date:** 04-Aug-2008


The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) has reviewed and approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 46, Subsection 101(b). Approval is granted to conduct your study as described in your protocol.

Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as outlined in the attached document, *Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies Involving Human Subjects*. (This document is also available at <http://www.unh.edu/osr/compliance/irb.html>.) Please read this document carefully before commencing your work involving human subjects.

Upon completion of your study, please complete the enclosed Exempt Study Final Report form and return it to this office along with a report of your findings.

If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to contact me at 603-862-2003 or [Julie.simpson@unh.edu](mailto:Julie.simpson@unh.edu). Please refer to the IRB # above in all correspondence related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your research.

For the IRB,

  
Julie F. Simpson  
Manager

cc: File  
Malone, Mary