2016

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Racial profiling refers to the law enforcement practice of using only race or ethnicity as probable cause to search or arrest an individual. The public has found racial profiling to be unjustified in the context of common crime, but tends to support the practice in the context of terrorism. The current study uses an explicit judgment survey to examine the expression of prejudice and factors that influence stereotyping. The study found that participants aged 18 to 24, and those who identified with a political party, were the participants most likely to racially profile individuals with stereotypical Middle-Eastern features to be potential terrorists.

Keywords: stereotypes, terrorism, racial profiling, public opinion of racial profiling

Traditional criminal profiling began when law enforcement officers described an individual who had already committed a crime (Newman & Brown, 2009; Schildkraut, 2009). A profile, which was given to officers and the public to find a subject, included a physical description, behavioral classifications and social or criminal associations (Newman & Brown, 2009). In the 1980s and 1990s the traditional criminal profile was replaced with racial or ethnic profiling (Newman & Brown, 2009). The war on drugs, started by President Ronald Reagan, triggered police officers to tighten control over drug districts, which were unfortunately inhabited by more minority races than Caucasians (Newman & Brown, 2009; Schildkraut, 2009). By the end of the 1990s law enforcement was using the highly controversial method of racial profiling with race or ethnicity as the primary factor considered for stop and frisk decisions (Newman & Brown, 2009; Johnson et al., 2011; Jadallah & el-Koury, 2010). Distrust of the police began when results from numerous studies were released showing that law enforcement unfairly targeted African Americans and Hispanics in a phenomenon that became known as "driving while black" (Newman & Brown, 2009).

The conceptual framework for racial profiling developed during World War II with the negative treatment of Japanese and Japanese Americans by the United States government and citizens (Johnson et al., 2011). At that time the negative stereotypes held by Americans of an *other,* alien race were triggered after an event that was perceived as an attack on the in-group. Due to the level of violence in the attack, this *other* race became known as an enemy and was treated as such. Then when the wars on drugs and crime occurred in the 80s and 90s racial profiling became rampant in law enforcement and the general population (Newman & Brown, 2009; Johnson et al, 2011). Actions of ethnic or racial profiling can range from stopping an individual based solely on racial appearance to searching the person or property, placing the individual under arrest or removing the person from the community (i.e., deportation or confinement) (Schildkraut, 2009).

After the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th, 2001, national security was a major concern of the government and of US citizens (Hanley, 2012; Newman & Brown, 2009; Zakaria et al., 2002). The concept of "driving while black" changed to "flying while brown" and "walking while Arab" with tightened Transportation Security Administration restrictions in airports and threats perceived by the American people on their homeland by Arabs, Muslims and

Middle Eastern descendants (Newman & Brown, 2009; Jadallah & el-Koury, 2010 ; Zaromb, Butler, Agarwal & Roediger 2014). Although terrorism is not a new form of warfare unique to the 20ᵗʰ and 21ˢᵗ centuries, scholars still struggle to develop a precise definition that takes into consideration the requirements, purpose and agents who participate in terror tactics (Onwudiwe, 2005). The most basic definition that most scholars and experts agree on is that terrorism is the threat or use of violence on an audience with the intention of causing fear in a target group for political, religious or other ends. Eliciting fear in a population is a strong motivator for that group to listen to the perpetrator and can serve as a trigger for patriotism and an increase in prejudice against the *other* group (Oswald, 2005). However, terror acts are not easily restricted to a certain social group. The uncertainty of who the perpetrators are, and could be, heightens the fear felt by the population. Social bonds between in-group individuals are strengthened, and out-group derogation results from the combination of group cohesion and perceived threat (Oswald, 2005).

In 2000 there were 354 reported attacks on individuals of Middle Eastern descent and Muslims (Oswald, 2005). After the 9/11 terror attacks there was an explosion of hate crimes against Muslims and those categorized as Arab (Hollenbaugh, 2009). In the weeks after 9/11 a confirmed total of 27 individuals were banned from airlines purely because of their Arab race and there were 520 recorded, or reported, violent hate crimes on persons labeled by the perpetrators as Middle Eastern. By the end of 2001 there were 1,501 attacks reported - a substantial increase that could reasonably be attributed to the events of 9/11 (Oswald, 2005). Directly after 9/11, public opinion polls demonstrated a sharp increase in support for the use of racial profiling by law enforcement to prevent another terror attack

(Hanley, 2012; Jadallah & el-Koury, 2010; Jonson et al., 2011; Newman & Brown, 2009; Zakaria et al., 2002). The percentage of Americans who disapproved of the process had been around 60% before the attacks, and after 9/11 the approval rating was measured to be 80% (Jadallah & el-Koury, 2010). These percentages did not just reflect immediate reaction to the terror attacks of September 11th, but were relatively consistent over the next couple of years (Johnson et al., 2011). Even before 9/11 Americans began to equate Muslim with Arab (Suleiman, 1999). This can still be seen over a decade later. Both groups are viewed as alien and other, and the two categories have been used interchangeably to describe a new threat from the Middle Eastern region (Suleiman, 1999; Jenkins, Ruppel, Kizer, Yehl & Griffin, 2012).

As the nation's negative view of Arabs, Muslims and those of Middle Eastern descent worsened, the use of racial profiling by law enforcement in the context of terrorism became an issue. The traditional criminal profile morphed once again, only after 9/11 the profile created was for a suspected terrorist (Newman & Brown, 2009). Terrorist profiling is defined as the suspicion of a person being involved in a terrorist act because of physical characteristics and behavioral cues (Newman & Brown, 2009). The use of a profile that takes into account social connections and behavioral cues along with racial descriptions is considered acceptable; but an issue arises when an official uses race as the main reason for suspecting an individual of involvement in a terror plot. There is no evidence that suggests the use of racial profiling works in the context of crime, or in the context of terrorism (Hanley, 2012; Newman & Brown, 2009; Johnson et al., 2011; Schildkraut, 2009; Zakaria et al., 2002). Race is too broad of a category, and too dependent on social definitions, to be of much use in searching for criminal suspects (Zakaria et al., 2002). If

officials focus on the race of an individual when searching, it can become a distraction from the reality of the situation (Zakaria et al., 2002).

While the act of terrorism has been around for centuries, the majority of psychological research on the topic has occurred within the last twenty or thirty years (Newman & Brown, 2009; Johnson et al., 2011). There has been substantial research on the effects and uselessness of racial profiling in the context of common crime by law enforcement and whether the public finds the use of racial profiling by officers to be justified in either context (Jadallah & el-Koury, 2010 ; Johnson et al., 2011; Newman & Brown, 2009; Onwudiwe, 2005; Reitzel & Piquero, 2006; Sulieman, 1999; Zakaria et al., 2002; Zaromb et al., 2014).

What is currently lacking in psychological literature is research on the general public's use of these racial techniques outside of law enforcement. Here racial profiling is not in relation to protecting the borders where extreme caution is taken by officials who screen those coming into the country. It is purely racism or prejudice against an individual the public has labeled as Arab, or Middle Eastern or Muslim. This is the racial profiling that can be harmful to the country, resulting in hate crimes and alienation of innocent persons, and can lead to the national security and safety concerns that are stated as the reasons for profiling in the first place.

Race of the respondent is the most consistent predictor of attitude toward the use of racial profiling (Jonson et al., 2011). Whites are most likely to approve the process in preventing crime and terrorism (Jadallah & el-Koury, 2010; Johnson et al., 2011; Schildkraut, 2009). This is also seen in airport security situation studies where minority group members are significantly less likely to justify the use of racial profiling at airports (Gabbidon et al., 2009). Research has also shown that older adults are more likely than younger adults

to justify racial profiling by law enforcement in the name of national security, and more likely to express prejudicial views (Johnson et al., 2011; Reitzel & Piquero, 2006; Oswald, 2005; Schildkraut, 2009). Men are found to be more in support of racial profiling than women (Johnson et al., 2011; Schildkraut, 2009), and those who identify as conservatives are more likely than those who consider themselves liberals to justify the use of racial profiling in the context of terrorism (Johnson et al., 2011; Reitzel & Piquero, 2006; Schildkraut, 2009).

The social norm of a group is another predictor of expressed prejudice (Crandall, Eshleman & O'Brien, 2002). If a group is against those who fit the stereotype of Arab, then discrimination and racial profiling will be seen more often. Individuals with lower levels of education, those located in the Southern region (versus Northern region) of the United States and Western and Internationally-located respondents all show a greater prevalence of prejudice in the context of terrorism (Oswald, 2005). The vast majority of Americans find racial profiling in the context of terrorism to be more useful and more justifiable than its use by police in the general context of crime (Jadallah & el-Khoury, 2010; Johnson et al., 2011; Newman & Brown, 2009; Schildkraut, 2009; Suleiman, 1999).

The aim of the present study was to further advance our understanding of the factors that contribute to an individual's use of racial profiling in the context of terrorism. An explicit judgment survey was used to assess individuals' perceptions of those of Middle Eastern descent. In addition, age and political affiliation were examined as contributing factors to individuals' use of racial profiling in the context of terrorism. Based on the current literature in the fields of psychology, political science, sociology, criminology and criminal justice, it was hypothesized that racial profiling of stereotypical Middle-Eastern individuals as potential terrorists would be more common in

older as compared to younger adults, and more common in those who identify themselves as having conservative views as compared to those who identify themselves as having liberal views.

Methods

Participants

A total of 270 individuals participated in the present study. Volunteers were recruited from university classrooms (195 participants aged 18-24 years) and from community groups (25 participants aged 25-44; 20 participants aged 45-64; 30 participants aged 65 or older).

In the student sample there were 68 men and 127 women. Based on their responses to a demographic questionnaire, 81.1% of the student participants were Caucasian, 7.7% were Black or African American, 4.6% were Hispanic, 3.6% were Native American or Indigenous/ Aboriginal, 1.5% were Asian or Pacific Islander and 1% identified as Arab or Middle Eastern. Of the students included in the sample, 23.5% identified as Republican, 26% identified as Democrat, 17.3% identified as Independent, 31.1% identified with no political party, and a small percentage (2%) selected an "other" category.

The community sample included 26 men and 48 women. Based on self-report data, the community sample was 90% Caucasians, 5.3% Black or African Americans and 2.7% Hispanics. Of the community participants, 42.5% identified as Republican, 26% identified as Democrat, 12.3% identified as Independent, 16.4% identified as having no political affiliation, and a small portion (2.7%) identified as belonging to an "other" party.

Procedure

After responding to demographic questions, participants were given a six-page booklet. Each of the six pages included six black-and-white headshots. For each group of six pictures, participants were asked to select the individual they believed to most likely be the terrorist in the group.

All 36 of the pictures in the booklet were photographs of known terrorists. Based on physical characteristics, 14 were classified as Caucasian, 12 as Middle-Eastern, 7 as Asian, and 3 as Hispanic. All 36 were men. The identities of the terrorists were verified and the profile pictures were obtained from the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists listing online and a search of names gathered from www.start.umd.edu/gtd and www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html, which included members of the Japanese Red Army and the Irish Republican Army. Pictures were cropped or enlarged for consistency of presentation; no other alterations were made.

Results and Discussion

Profiling Score

The number of times a participant identified an individual with stereotypical Middle-Eastern physical characteristics as the likely terrorist was compared to the number of times a participant chose a Caucasian. The difference between those two numbers was considered the participant's "profiling score". Table 1 displays the profiling score means and standard deviations for each age group.

A single-sample t test was used to compare the sample profiling scores to a population value of zero. It should be noted that to use zero as the comparison value is to take a conservative approach, given that there were more Caucasian pictures included in the questionnaire and chance responding would have resulted in a negative profiling score rather than zero.

Significant profiling was found in both the student sample (t (194) = 6.525, p < .001, 95% CI: [1.064, 1.987]) and in the community

sample as a whole (t (74) = 2.272, p = .026, 95% CI: [.099, 1.502]). Participants in each group were more likely to identify those with a Middle-Eastern appearance as terrorists. Unexpectedly, the profiling scores of the students and the youngest community group were twice as high as the profiling scores of the two oldest community groups. This finding is inconsistent with previous research, which has shown older adults to be more likely than younger adults to justify racial profiling. The relatively low profiling scores of older adults may be explained, partially, by the fact that the older adults were more likely to have recognized one of the Caucasian terrorists, Timothy McVeigh.

Timothy McVeigh

Timothy McVeigh was a white male in his early-twenties from Lockport, a city in western New York only 20 miles from the primary data collection site for the present study. On April 19th, 1995 McVeigh, along with accomplice Terry Nichols, planted a bomb in a truck parked in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The bomb blast resulted in over 165 deaths and buildings in a 16-block radius surrounding the Federal Building were destroyed or damaged. Both McVeigh and Nichols were arrested and convicted. McVeigh was sentenced to death and died in 2001; Nichols was sentenced to life in prison. The Oklahoma City bombing to this day is the largest domestic-based terror attack recorded in the United States. Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were 2 of the 36 terrorists included in the study.

A forward logistic regression was conducted to determine which independent variables (age, gender, if participants watched the news, and if any faces presented in the survey were familiar to the participant) were predictors of identifying Timothy McVeigh as a likely terrorist. Regression results indicated the overall model fit of two predictors (age and a familiar face was seen in the survey) were statistically reliable (X^2 (5) = 52.390, p < .001, 95% CI: [.075, .625]). The model correctly classified about 86% of the cases analyzed. *Wald* statistics indicated that age of the participant, and if a participant indicated a familiar face was seen, were significantly predictive of identifying Timothy McVeigh as a terrorist.

A comparison of the frequencies demonstrated that the predictive factor of age group for the choice of Timothy McVeigh was strong. Of the overall population sampled, a total of 17.7% of participants chose Timothy McVeigh. The percentage was lowest for the students aged 18-24 years (10.9%); higher for the community members aged 25-44 years (28.6%); even higher for the community members aged 45-64 years (38.9%); and highest for the community members aged 65 years and older (42.3%).

Despite the fact that more pictures of Caucasians were included than pictures of Middle Easterners, and one of the Caucasians was recognized by some to be a known terrorist, each of the age groups demonstrated racial profiling. That the experiment yielded these results in 2015, fourteen years after the incidents in 2001 on September 11th, is an indication of the strength and endurance of stereotypes. The violence and devastation to the United States of the terror attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York City, the Pentagon and the tragic heroism of Flight 93 had such a significant impact that most Americans remember where they were, what they were doing and what happened afterward to this day. If the media's stories were tracked, the mainstream news outlets would mile-mark the year and remembrance ceremonies around the country on 9/11 every year. Families of the victims would be seen and memories rehashed the whole day, always connecting the terror attacks to Al-Qaeda in the Middle-East, and

to the perpetrators who infiltrated our country to learn and then attacked innocent civilians from within our borders. These sentiments and honors to the victims and their families are certainly justified. Yet, the complete and unrelenting anger and discrimination of a very vaguely defined 'race' or ethnicity is not justifiable. The present study demonstrated a prejudice against Middle-Eastern individuals, and that prejudice was seen across age groups. While younger adults may report a disapproval of racial profiling in the context of common crime and to a lesser extent in the context of terrorism, they did rely on a stereotype when identifying a terrorist.

Political Affiliation

Unexpectedly, there was no significant difference (t (94) = .824, p = .412, 95% CI: [-.755, 1.826]) between the profiling scores of students who identified as Democrats (N = 51, M = 1.726, SD = 3.418) and those who identified as Republicans (N = 45, M = 2.261, SD = 2.932). For many people, the Democrats in the United States represent the fight against discrimination of any kind, but especially within racial relations. It is this common understanding that makes the results found intriguing. One plausible explanation is that the topic of terrorism is highly controversial and complex because of the high level of fear associated with the acts recognized as terror attacks. The sense of being "American" and national singularity against an enemy *other* may trump any race ideologies in the context of terrorism. The violence of the attack may also have a strong influence on an individual's prejudicial expressions.

An independent-samples t test compared the mean profiling scores of the students who identified with a political party (Republican or Democrat; N = 96) to those who identified with no specific political ideology (Independent or no political affiliation; N =

95). The independent-samples t test found a significant difference between the means of the two groups (t (189) = 2.201, p = .029, 95% CI: [-1.933, -.106]). The mean of the political affiliation group (M = 2.019, SD = 3.156) was significantly higher than the mean of the group that had no political affiliations (M = 1.00, SD = 3.329).

An independent t test was also used to compare the mean profiling scores of the community group members (aged 25 and older) who identified with a political party (M = .280, SD = 3.003) and those who did not identify with a political organization (M = 1.809, SD = 3.076). A marginally significant difference was found in the same direction as was found in the student sample. Community participants who did not identify as Democrats or Republicans were less likely to use profiling than those who did (t (69) = 1.945, p = .056, 95% CI: [-3.099, .039]).

The finding that those who identified as Independents or as having no political affiliation had lower profiling scores may indicate that profiling in the context of terrorism is lessened in those with weaker political-social connections because they do not hold the social definitions associated with a particular political ideology. In the United States social groups are partially defined by the political party or political ideas held by the group members. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume we are more likely to converse about deeper issues and socialize over longer periods of time with individuals who share our political and social beliefs. Previous research has shown conversations amongst peer groups have a strong impact on the details remembered and the formations of a common frame of reference against which new information is viewed. Thus, those with similar perceptions of the world may reinforce historical representations of an *other* race or ethnicity and continue prejudice as a result. By having such drastic views within our political sphere, if one

belongs to a specific party than he or she is in increased and constant contact with individuals who share a similar worldview and segregated from those who have a different point-of-view. We tend to share more in a conversation when we agree with those in the discussion, while remaining silent on topics when we find ourselves in disagreement. It can be seen that those participants who identified as belonging to no political party had lower profiling scores. This same grouping of individuals has no significant political force alienating them from others due to a constructed social group.

Conclusions

The present study demonstrated racial profiling of Middle Eastern individuals in the context of terrorism. Profiling was more likely to occur in the younger age groups than in the older age groups, and it was more likely to occur in individuals affiliated with a major political party than those who did not claim party affiliation. That prejudice exists in modern America is a fact that is clearly understood when discussing white and black color lines and the context of common crime. However, because of the nature of terrorism and the fear it produces in the target population, prejudice in this context receive less attention. The use of racial profiling in the context of terrorism can be just as harmful as it is in any other context. Hundreds are targeted based solely on their race or ethnicity. Not only are the persons experiencing discrimination in their lives hurt by the use of the practice, the individuals condoning or participating in the use of such prejudice are as well. The continued, unfiltered use of cognitive frameworks based on negative historical representations of Middle-Eastern individuals can perpetuate violence and those joining terror groups. Negative stigma and biased media accounts of past and recent events can also contribute to a cycle that is counterproductive to combating terrorism.

It is recommended that future research focus on racial profiling in the context of terrorism. If the goal is to reduce or eliminate profiling in that context, it will be important to gain a better understanding of the prejudices held against the Middle East and the land's people. By determining how those prejudices are formed and maintained, it may be possible to develop methods to reduce the prejudice that underlies racial profiling.

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Appendix

Table 1
Profiling Scores

Age Group	Sample Size	Mean	Standard Deviation
18 – 24 years	195	1.526	3.273
25 – 44 years	25	1.200	3.559
45 – 64 years	20	.600	3.362
65 and older	30	.600	2.372