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On *Convivencia*, Bridges and Boundaries: Belonging and exclusion in the narratives of Spain's Arab-Islamic past

K. Elaine McIlwraith
The University of Western Ontario

Supervisor
Farah, Randa
The University of Western Ontario

Graduate Program in Anthropology
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Abstract

References to the history of al-Andalus, the medieval Muslim territory of the Iberian Peninsula, in what is today the region of Andalusia (Spain) still have a palpable presence and relevance. This dissertation examines diverse accounts of the Arab-Islamic past, and the ways and contexts in which they are invoked. Based on a year and a half of fieldwork in Granada, Spain, I conducted interviews with ordinary Andalusians, academics and researchers (primarily historians), tour guides, historical novelists, high school history teachers, Spanish-born Muslim converts to Islam, Moroccans, and others involved in the contemporary production of this history. Moreover, I conducted participant observation at national and regional commemorations, celebrations and historical sites, areas where this ‘Moorish’ history, as it is commonly known, is a central feature. I argue that: (1) historical accounts of al-Andalus cannot be reduced to the two polarized versions (or “sides”) dominant in political discourse and in much academic debate – one that views the *Reconquista* as liberation and another that views it as a tragedy – rather, there is a broad and often neglected spectrum between these opposing versions; (2) Andalusia draws on the Arab-Islamic past to promote its tourist industry, and its economic, political and cultural relations with the Arab world. It is safe to suggest that Andalusia is pulled between a history that bridges Europe and the Arab world, and a contemporary European border that reminds us of contemporary geopolitical divisions and separations; (3) Andalusian history and historical sites are commodified to maintain revenue from the tourist industry. Yet, in the process, inhabitants of the Albayzin, the Moorish quarter, adopt similar tourist practices to learn about their own history and appropriate global heritage tourism discourse to contest governmental decisions that benefit tourists to the detriment of residents; (4) commemorations and celebrations in the city weave together a dominant narrative that reinforces the national narrative and its myth of origin; concurrently, these annual rituals provide spaces for alternative versions to circulate, including those that are opposed to the official versions. Importantly, the *Día de la Toma* (Day of the Capture) commemoration symbolizing national unity is the most publicly contested.

Keywords: Past and Present, Narrative, Popular memory, History, Nationalism, Hegemony, Ethnography, East/West divide, al-Andalus, Medieval history, Spain, Andalusia, Granada, Albayzín, Alhambra, UNESCO, World Heritage, Tourism, Commemorations

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When the seed of a dissertation topic is planted ten years before a student leaves to do fieldwork in an area of the world that already feels like home, it becomes difficult to thank everyone who picked up a watering can to help it develop. When I first left for Malaga, I knew little about what to expect. My time there – going to the Alcazaba to study (before entry fees were implemented) coupled with my ‘Hispanic-Arabic Literature’ class – both physically and intellectually impressed upon me an interest in the Arab-Islamic past. However, it is the human relationships that I made both in Malaga, and then back at the University of Guelph, that continue to bring me back to Andalusia time and time again. So, once again, the usual ‘suspects’ have to be included in these “*agradecimientos*”. My friends from Malaga have over the years have continued to give and give and for this, I am extraordinarily grateful. To Chiqui Ramos and Juan ‘Moli’ Molina, Jose Racero and family, Carolina Bermúdez and Sergio del Pino, Maite Rodríguez and Fernando Aguilar, the Pineda family, the Piazuolo family, and of course, Ana Roji and Rafa Casielles (and joining us officially later on, Ángela Magno): You have ‘raised’ me to be some strange form of ‘*andaluza*’, teaching me how speak and fend for myself. You have brought me into your homes, fed me time and time again. This time around, you continually showed interest in what I was doing in Granada, which of course, resulted in ‘outside of fieldwork’ discussions that I won’t soon forget. A ‘*El Club*’, *creo que ya es hora de otro viajecito a Benajárfes!*

The little bits and pieces of this interest that took the form of a paper here, a class there throughout my studies, however, would have remained as fragmented instances of intellectual pursuits if it weren’t for one friend, Lujaien Al-Rubaiey Majorel, and our conversations about Spain, the Middle East and the many similarities that reminded her of home. At times, the moments (and people) you least expect trigger critical junctures and steer you towards a path that until stumble across it, you didn’t know it was there.

I can’t say that it has been an easy journey to arrive at this point, but I am thankful to have many friends from Western that, at different times, tried to make the road more enjoyable. They made sure I was fed, had a place to stay and had a shoulder to lean on through the tough moments. Of the many food memories, some of my favorite were when Dana Bekri would show up on my doorstep with pots and pots of Algerian cous cous (to

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¹ (Arriaga & Olvera Ferrer, 2000)

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Chapter 1

1 Fragments of al-Andalus: The interweaving of the past (and its reconstructions) with the present in a political climate of amplified alterity

“To my guitar, O water, be a string. The conquerors arrived, and the old conquerors left, heading southward, repairing their days in the trashheap of change: I know who I was yesterday, but who will I be in a tomorrow under Columbus's Atlantic banners? Be a string, be a string to my guitar, O water! There is no *Misr*¹ in Egypt, no *Fez*² in Fez, and Syria draws away. There is no falcon in my people's banner, no river east of the palm groves besieged by the Mongols' fast horses. In which Andalusia do I end? Here or there? I will know I've perished and that here I've left the best part of me: my past. Nothing remains but my guitar.”

Excerpt from Mahmoud Darwish
Eleven Stars over Andalusia,
VII. *O water, be a string to my guitar*

The street lamps topped with tiny iron crowns cast a dim light illuminating very little as we turn the corner onto a pedestrian street that slowly inclines up in short, deep stairs. A group of neighbours and I were returning from a summer concert and, as we had been doing throughout the year, decided to find somewhere in the Albayzin³ to end the night with tapas. As we walked along a typical white wall-lined street, we came across one of the many vined plants that spill over the walls of a *carmen* – a walled-in plot of land with a house and gardens common in the Albayzin. In that moment, Jaime,⁴ a regular in the group, decided to stop and smell the flowers only to be disappointed that there wasn't a fragrant aroma. Turning to Nuria, an avid gardener of the group like him, he began to

¹ *Misr* is the Arabic word for Egypt but also for “urban life” (Darwish, 1994).

² *Fez* in Arabic also means “axe” (Darwish, 1994).

³ The name of the medieval Moorish quarter in Granada, Spain that continues to be a functional neighbourhood.

⁴ All names have been changed to maintain anonymity of the people involved in this work. For some interviewees and people mentioned, gender has also been changed, particularly in cases in which the person is more easily identifiable.

explain to her that yellow jasmine didn't have a smell like aromatic white jasmine. Although it didn't come up in this conversation, jasmine was originally imported by the Arabs to al-Andalus,⁵ the name given to the territory they conquered during the medieval period in Spain. However, Jaime quickly decided that the long mess of vines weren't jasmine. As Beatriz (another neighbor), Nuria and Jaime discussed the jasmine, Raquel, a visitor of Inés (also a neighbor) from Cadiz,⁶ intervened to seemingly change the topic completely: "If I were *mora*,⁷ I would have invaded this land too, just because it is so beautiful. If I were *mora*,⁸ I would have come like they did!" Beatriz sharply responded: "But they are already here!", referring to the many Moroccans who live in Granada. Jaime, without missing the cue, suggested that "they would appreciate Granada much more than we do", if they were still in power today. In one short quip, he expressed the view that Granada was worthy of Raquel's praise and that Granadans, including its officials, seemed to lack the desire to take care of the unique neighbourhood in which we lived. His comment was consistent with the previous conversation that we were having as we left the concert, and with the view shared by the group about the corruption and excessive spending of the present government that, in the view of many Spaniards, had led to the economic crisis in which the country found itself.

By no means were Raquel or Jaime expressing a desire to return to Spain's Muslim past and its almost eight centuries of Muslim rule in Andalusia,⁹ the

⁵ Note that in using the term al-Andalus, I make reference to the medieval territory of the Iberian Peninsula that was under Muslim rule, the borders of which were ever-shifting along with changes in political powers. It very specifically does not refer to the entire Peninsula during this period. I use this term synonymously with the term Muslim Spain, which was the more common term used in academia throughout the first three quarters of the 20th century, a point that Alejandro, a University of Granada (UGR) history professor, clarified for me (personal communication, July 26, 2012).

⁶ Cadiz is a province and city in western Andalusia with a significant Atlantic coastline.

⁷ *Moro* (masc.)/*mora* (fem.) can be translated as "Moor" in reference to the historical Moorish people but is also a common term used contemporarily to refer to Moroccans (and sometimes Arabs). It is most often used in derogatory terms but can also be used as a term of endearment (albeit without recognizing the power differential it holds).

⁸ All unknown terms in Spanish are included in the glossary.

⁹ In Spain, autonomous regions are larger geopolitical formations than provinces. The autonomous community of Andalusia consists of eight provinces, each of which has a capital city with the same name as the province. For example, the capital city of the province of Granada is the city of Granada and the city of Malaga is the capital of the province of Malaga, etc.

southernmost autonomous region in which both Cadiz and Granada are situated. Their comments may very well have expressed nostalgia for a time of splendour, the enjoyment of pleasure, and a time when trade generated wealth, in particular from the sale of Granadan silk. Moreover, Raquel and Jaime did not believe that those who follow the Islamic faith today have a superior learned capacity for treasuring, maintaining and



Figure 1.1: Detail of the Catholic Monarchs “giants” at the side of the Cathedral of Granada in the Festival of the *Tarasca*, celebrated the day before Corpus Christi in May or June (29 May, 2013; photos by author)

Figure 1.2: The giants of the last Muslim rulers and Catholic Monarchs stop for a rest near the statue of Queen Isabel and Christopher Columbus on the main street during the Festival of the *Tarasca* before Corpus Christi (10 June, 2012; photo by author)

Figure 1.3: Detail of the Boabdil and Moraima (his wife) “giants” in the festival of the *Tarasca*. The Muslim monarchs follow the Catholic Monarchs before the figure of the *Tarasca* (“old hag” on a dragon) (29 May, 2013; photos by author)

protecting their surroundings. However, it is not far-fetched to assume that they thought of the medieval Arabs and *Andalusies*¹⁰ – the inhabitants of Muslim Spain – as having lived during a period known for the appreciation for aesthetic and brilliant scientific advances.

¹⁰ Throughout the dissertation, I refer to contemporary inhabitants of the region of Andalusia as “Andalusians”. On the other hand, I refer to the inhabitants of Muslim Spain as “*Andalusi*” or “*Andalusies*”, a term used in Spanish (mainly in academic literature) that includes Muslim, Jewish and Christian inhabitants of the Muslim-ruled territory. When referring to inhabitants of a particular religion, I specify which religion (i.e. Muslim *Andalusies*). The term “Moor” as a reference to the inhabitants of al-Andalus should also include inhabitants of all three faiths. However, it is often erroneously used to make reference exclusively to the Muslim inhabitants of al-Andalus. This error in English may be influenced by the contemporary pejorative use of the same term in Spanish, “*moro*”, which is used to refer to Moroccans and other North Africans.

What becomes meaningful in the above-mentioned exchange among friends is the presence of a past that came to an end more than 500 years ago, yet still has relevance and a presence today in everyday life. These seemingly unrelated, unanticipated references to al-Andalus, however, are quite common, not only in Granada but all over Andalusia. They take the shape of comparisons, contrasts and explanations, becoming a way to think through contemporary behaviours, attitudes and practices. Moreover, images, references mentioned in everyday conversation, explorations and evocations of this history appear interspersed throughout Andalusian, and in particular Granadan



Figure 1.4: The wagon carrying the *simpecado* (or flag) from Granada during the Pilgrimage of *Rocío*, designed with Arab-Islamic architectural elements such as the horseshoe arch but crowned with the Catholic Monarchs' coat of arms and adorned with a statue of the Virgin Mary (20 May, 2012; photo by author)

Figure 1.5: A pilgrim taking part in the Pilgrimage of *Rocío* places the headpiece on one of the steers after attaching the yoke. The steers are wrapped in the colours of the Spanish flag. Three pomegranates, the symbol of Granada, also adorn the head cover. The same symbol was added to the coat of arms of the Catholic Monarchs after they took the city (20 May, 2012; photo by author)

Figure 1.6: Detail of the candle holders on Granada's wagon for *Rocío*, with a design reminiscent of a mosque cupola (20 May, 2012; photo by author)

Figure 1.7: Detail of the centre of the wagon, a replica of the well-known Patio of the Lions in the Alhambra (20 May, 2012; photo by author)

society, in celebrations and commemorations (Figures 1-3), in architecture, in academic inquiry and production, in clothing design, in religious and popular traditions (Figures 4-7) and in the tourist industry, gastronomy and smells (Figures 8-11), to name only a few

examples.¹¹ While this presence may not be overly expressed on a daily basis, it has broader implications in politics and social life in general. It has come to form one part of a regional identity, an element that is viewed by some in northern Spain as problematic, given the special connections with the Arab world it has come to promote.

1.1 Dissertation Question

This dissertation addresses the varying accounts of the Andalusian past as it articulates with particular presents. It draws on anthropological fieldwork to argue that the diverse and changing historical reconstructions are better understood within particular political and economic contexts, and that they are not easily reducible to the two dominant polarized narratives of al-Andalus – the first of which views Spain (and Europe) as always having been interconnected, and thus promotes this history and the historical connections between peoples that are now seen to be distinct; the second of which characterizes Spain and the Arab world (or West and East) as antithetical and the relations between them antagonistic, and thus draws on civilizational theories that view clashes necessary and inevitable. Furthermore, it posits that the debates around al-Andalus are closely entwined with questions surrounding Andalusia's regional identity, where on the one hand this identity affirms its Spanish and European belonging, on the other it draws on its Arab-Islamic history to enhance its regional interests and international relations – particularly economic transactions – with the Arab world. For ordinary Andalusians, questions surrounding the Arab-Islamic history have become equally meaningful. The local official commemoration most representative of the nation-state, the *Día de la Toma* (Day of the Capture), ends up being the most publicly contested. It is not surprising that the history of al-Andalus and Arab-Islamic heritage, especially the Alhambra (the castle of the last-standing Muslim rulers), is commodified, and the reproduction of this history in Andalusia is necessary for the perpetuation of revenue for the tourist industry. As such, this history and the ways in which it is narrated

¹¹ For further explanation of these examples and their corresponding photographs, see glossary entries: La *Tarasca* and *Rocío*.

today poses as a bridge that defies geopolitical divisions between Europe and the Arab-Islamic world, while paradoxically it also stands as the border that separates the two.

I examined the questions posed in the dissertation by focusing on three fieldwork sites: celebrations and commemorations; interviews and conversations with participants, mainly in Granada; and historical and archaeological tourism. Because my research is about the diverse and changing historical accounts of the Andalusian past, a short introductory historical overview, which is drawn from academic histories, helps to frame the discussions around the topic in the following pages.



Figure 1.8: Smells of al-Andalus-based tourism. Perfumes, candles and essences are displayed in a shop window on a street often filled with tourists (29 April, 2012; photo by author)

Figure 1.9: A main street leading into the Albayzin often filled with tourists who stop at the many teashops and souvenir vendors on the street (7 September, 2012; photo by author)

Figure 1.10: Dishes of al-Andalus. A pamphlet cover decorated with spices mapping a “gastronomy tour” that included restaurants that served “*Andalusi*” dishes during the Millennium of Granada¹²

Figure 1.11: Tastes of “al-Andalus”. Honey and nut-based pastries including baklava in a Moroccan bakery on a busy street frequented by tourists (7 September, 2012; photo by author)

¹² In 2013, the region celebrated the Millennium of (the Kingdom of) Granada. Although the city and *taifa* are argued to be founded in 1013 during the medieval period, the Nazarid Kingdom of Granada was established in 1238 and became a territorial demarcation that was not dismantled until 1833. Thus, the events organized in celebration of the Millennium in 2013, organized by numerous employees of the *Fundación El Legado Andalusi*, covered both the Muslim and Christian history of the Kingdom and the founding of the city.

1.2 Background: From al-Andalus to democratic Andalusia

The contemporary Iberian Peninsula is seemingly far removed from its medieval history. More than a Quincentenary has passed (1492) since the Catholic kingdoms in the northern part of the Peninsula pushed south, seizing land ruled by Arab-Muslim sultans, emirs and caliphs since 711 (see Appendix A for an outline of key dates). Eight centuries of Arab-Islamic rule and contact with the Catholics to the north left indelible marks on the landscape, the language and the inhabitants. Over the centuries after the expulsion of the Arab-Muslim presence, this history has undergone many reinterpretations and has acquired many layers. By the 18th century, Romantic period artists and writers arriving from the Middle East to Southern Spain who observed similarities between Spain and the Arab world adopted Orientalist views of the relatively forgotten Arab-Muslim period (Said, 1979). The parallel development of nationalism and historical narratives that bolstered the nation-state (Coakley, 2012; 2004; A.D. Smith, 1986; Giddens, 1985) over time brought into question the place of the Muslim past in Spanish history. As the 19th century came to a close, the loss of Spanish colonies overseas (1898) sparked a renewed need to re-examine national identity and the past that informed it.

Amongst Spanish professional historians and archaeologists, the principal debate hovered around whether the Muslim past formed a part of the nation's history or whether the history of al-Andalus and its inhabitants were not entirely part of Spanish history (Rubiera Mata & de Epalza, 2007). While the former became the more accepted view before the Civil War (1936-1939), the executions and exile of liberal intellectuals by the fascist dictatorship of Francisco Franco quickly silenced this version of history and returned the country to a narrative that viewed al-Andalus as an aberration and demonized its former Muslim inhabitants. With its close ties to the Catholic church, the regime regarded the Muslim troops that arrived in 711 as barbaric, uncivilized invaders that occupied part of the Peninsula for almost eight hundred years. These occupiers were then expelled by the Catholics through a process called the *Reconquista* (or Reconquest) that lasted equally as long as the Muslim presence and successfully returned Christian land to their rightful owners (García Sanjuán, 2018; 2012).

As the dictatorship came to a close with the death of Franco in 1975, the country once again faced a transition as the King, Juan Carlos I (chosen by Franco to lead the country after his death), took strides with both liberal and conservative politicians to shift the country into a secular parliamentary democracy. As with other significant transitions in the country's past, interest in al-Andalus and its inhabitants surged both in academia and among the general population. The newly established autonomous regions took control of heritage site maintenance, further developing regional narratives of their past that, at times, present opposition to the centralized, dominant version of history. The region of Andalusia, inheritor of almost three centuries of Muslim rule longer than the rest of the country, searched for its distinctiveness in this past (Rogozen-Soltar, 2017; 2010).

As a result, this *Andalusi* history has developed a sort of “contemporary afterlife” (Hirschkind, 2013; Tamm, 2013), continuing to persist in various ways in everyday life long after the period has passed. In private life, the period has become a reference point and a framework with which Andalusians can think through national and regional identity (Rogozen-Soltar, 2010), the boundaries of Europe (González Alcantud, 2017a; Hirschkind, 2013), and, increasingly, interactions with Arabs and Muslims in Spain. Academic research on this period ranges across many disciplines and has come to highlight many of its contributions to Spain and western civilization in general, and the relationship between medieval Christians, Muslims and Jews. In certain places, such as Granada, this history has become indispensable to the growing tourism industry. The concept of *convivencia* (or peaceful coexistence between religions, ethnicities or nations), a concept argued to be characteristic of the medieval Muslim territory, has become a part of global discourse as an ideal to strive for to enhance cooperation and peace. With more transnational human movement and interaction than ever before, consideration of the meaning of shared histories, nation-making, and historical “others” comes to the forefront as global processes and flows become ever present at the local level (Ferguson, 2006; Tsing, 2000; Gupta & Ferguson, 1991; Appadurai, 1990).

1.3 Theoretical framework and Literature review: The past in the present and vice versa

Berliner (2005) argues that the use of ‘memory’ to address the past, its dissemination and its effects, runs the risk of overextension, blurring the lines between memory as remembering, and the persistence of culture, where memory represents everything in society (p. 202). In this study, and at the risk of overextending, I use it in both ways, mainly how people remember experiences related to public and private reconstructions and knowledge of this period of history, and also its persistence as it manifests itself in celebrations, commemorations and rituals, with the distinction that I discuss the diverse ways these rituals are interpreted, and the meanings attached to them. While we should be mindful of the possibility of overextending or equating memory with culture, memory is present in the heritage industry, commemorations, literature, art and music (Erl, 2011, p. 1), a number of which I consider in this dissertation. Furthermore, directing our attention to the past-present relationship importantly allows us to consider “the political” together with these other dimensions of everyday life (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, p. 211).

1.3.1 History and memory

French historian Pierre Nora suggests that for many, memory has replaced the word ‘history’ (2011, p. 1). Nora’s statement highlights both sides of an old debate about the relationship between memory and history, which can be characterized as “history or/as memory” (Tamm, 2013, p. 463). In his observation, Nora (2011) recognizes the increasing characterization of ‘history as memory’ by other scholars that is part of the ‘memory boom’ of the 1990s (Erl, 2011; Connerton, 2006). In his earlier work, however, Nora (1989) argues for history or memory. Where he views history as an “intellectual and secular” reconstruction of the past that requires “analysis and criticism”, true memory, of which little is left, is found in the unconscious knowledge of the past, in “gestures and habits, in skills passed down by unspoken traditions, in the body’s inherent self-knowledge, in understudied reflexes and ingrained memories” (Nora, 1989, p. 13). In his view, memory is now always evolving, can be manipulated and appropriated or deformed without realizing, “susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived” (p. 8), selects facts that fit a group’s narrative and situates us in the present. Tamm (2013)

argues for a separation between history and memory as well (as do others such as Connerton, 1989 and Halbwachs, 1980), specifying that:

While the former [history] refers to a specific way of studying and representing the past that has evolved in Western culture over the last few centuries, the latter [memory] signifies the general relations of the past and present in a particular socio-cultural context. (p. 463)

In my dissertation, I follow this view of history and memory as distinct, recognizing that historical writings (or professional histories) are shaped through in-depth investigation and critical analysis but follow Johnson and Dawson (1982) by viewing the separation between history and popular memory as blurred. For these authors, academic history forms a part of the larger processes that shape memory (p. 207), providing facts and narratives from which popular memory can draw. They also argue for “cultural readings” of the historical accounts of professional historians (pp. 225-231). Empiricism in historical research masks both the ‘culture’ of the historian, where “belief in a model of neutral factual validation underestimates the practical influence of the researcher’s own values, theories and preoccupations.”, and the cultural processes that originally went into the production of “the sources” (p. 225). This implies that scholars too, as participants in society, are subject to what takes place around them.

1.3.2 Popular memory, History and politics

While popular memory can be described simply as the memory of ordinary people, this definition does not situate it outside the realm of history. Instead, it expands the concept of history writing to include other forms of historical production beyond professional and politicized histories (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, pp. 206-207). Popular memory, therefore, forms part of historiography. By blurring the lines between these distinctions, the study of popular memory can consider the contributions of the many groups that shape social history. Thus, it recognizes “a larger social process in which ‘we ourselves are shaped by the past’ but are also continually reworking the past which shapes us.” (p. 207). In this way, popular memory becomes concerned with two sets of dialectical relationships: the distinction between dominant and oppositional memory as well as public representations of the past and the more private versions. The latter of these two relations contrasts

official versions of history and the everyday production of the past. Private memory generally occurs without having a larger, public audience, appears in “everyday talk and in personal comparisons and narratives” (p. 210) and can often be found in the many ways memory is recorded and recalled privately, for example, “letters, diaries, photo albums, collections, etc.” (p. 210). It is not necessarily recorded and is frequently silenced, often denied a place in public constructions of the past. It may, however, be collective, shared outside of public institutions and spaces between a group (p. 207). In Spain, this point becomes most clear in regard to memory that was forcibly privatized during the Franco dictatorship. However, to study private popular memory in isolation becomes problematic. These private accounts often draw on dominant and/or oppositional narratives and discourses, which can be used to consider and reconsider memory (p. 211). They are thus inseparable from public constructions that may or may not be dominant in the public field. In other words, the study of popular memory necessarily requires consideration of public histories, and vice versa, to understand where these narratives have intersected or diverged and to fully grasp the forces that shape both public and popular memory (Glassberg, 1996, p. 13).

The second relationship critical to understanding popular memory is that between dominant and oppositional memory, and the struggle between these constructions that takes place in the public field. This field, referred to by Johnson and Dawson (1982) as “the public ‘theatre’ of history” (p. 207), is the public space in which many people present subordinated private memory, in an attempt to challenge dominant versions of the past and advance these narratives or extend them to a larger group. Narrative (previously referred to as myth) is central to the historical memory of groups (Gedi & Elam, 1996, p. 30) and, similarly, to identity. These dominant narratives can then be defined by three characteristics: (1) their “power and pervasiveness”, (2) their links to the dominant institutions, and (3) their role “in winning consent and building alliances in the processes of formal politics” (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, p. 207). They may, however, not be ‘dominant’, meaning those most widely held amongst the many groups that shape society, since the narratives of one (smaller) group may become more privileged than others in the contestation of memory. Nonetheless, some historical accounts do become

more prominent and generally accepted than others, as a result of processes of domination, silencing, marginalization, exclusion, and reconstruction.

The public distribution of institutionalized versions of the past is ultimately determined by the politics of history (Glassberg, 1996, p. 11). These versions that are made public are disseminated in the interest of particular groups. Yet, in the past, ideologies and professional histories tended to define history as “the study of the past”, completely unrelated to the political uses of history today (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, p. 211). Still, the pervasiveness of “the past”, its significance in political discourse, and the political repercussions in the present of how it is narrated, clearly compel questions beyond consideration of “the past” as completed.

Scholars have considered the purpose that public versions of history serve in a number of different ways. First, these narratives become the historical foundation that ties a group together, even when this group is seemingly disparate (Glassberg, 1996, p. 11). A shared history is a fundamental element in the imagining of nations and the “imagined community” that binds individuals together that may never meet yet often feel they are a part of a connected collective (Anderson, 1992). Secondly, scholars also analyze constructions and representations of history as “instruments in the political struggle for hegemony across various groups” (Glassberg, 1996, p. 12) (see Chapter Five). Johnson and Dawson (1982) add to these, outlining three methods that historians use to examine the “political relevance of history”. The first approach is to analyze the past-present relationship as positive or negative “lessons”, either as a warning or something to be commemorated. A second approach is the use of historical methods and perspectives to analyze political problems in the present:

We seek to examine **the conditions on which contemporary dilemmas rest**. In looking at the nature of the origins of current oppressions, we trace their genesis as far back as it is necessary to go. (p. 212, *my emphasis*)

In these authors’ attempt to tease out approaches relevant for a ‘left history’, they elaborate on a third approach since the first approach risks conservatism in relying on traditions and the second, the inclusion of a historical analysis that addresses distant pasts, is a given. The final approach, then, is to continuously be aware of

how the processes of “historical argument and definition” shape all political activity; how political projects reconstruct the past and imagine the future in some way; and how these processes stretch from the past into the future and impact more than just the present (p. 213). Finally, the versions of the past in political discourse and those that challenge them not only include ideas, hopes and objectives for the past, present and future but they also have a role in determining how different groups are politically defined in their connections or disconnections to each other both in terms of history (p. 11) or identity (Gillis, 1994, p. 3).

1.3.3 Collective memory and identity

Principal theories of memory in the early 20th century generally placed individual remembering at their centre, minimizing the importance of social structures (Erll, 2011). They neglected considerations of group cohesion and the role of memory within groups, from smaller local groups to larger nations and even beyond the national. French scholar Maurice Halbwachs, with a challenge to this constricted view of memory, shifted this view by arguing that even private memory is shaped by social interaction (Erll, 2011). Coining the term “collective memory”, the sociologist elaborated on the bank of knowledge, practices, symbols, institutions and the past that groups share and upon which individuals draw in acts of remembering. He posits that social contact and structures within society are necessary for “worlds of meaning” to be developed and transmitted over time (p. 16), although the author doesn’t really provide a clear definition of the concept (Gedi & Elam, 1996, p. 35). Furthermore, Halbwachs argues that collective memory of groups is only observed through individual memory (Erll, 2011, p. 16), yet simultaneously blurs the line between the individual and collective to such an extent that he avoids characterizing private memory in the form of individual representations altogether (Gedi & Elam, 1996, p. 36). Instead, he contends that individual differences are explained by the varied groups to which a person belongs that supply them with “collective memories” that diverge from others (Erll, 2011, p. 16).

Collective memory serves to establish and remind the group of its continuity and sameness, functioning as the source for the formulation of identity. Identity formation, which is constantly renegotiated depending on “complex class, gender and power

relations” (Gillis, 1994, p. 3), is therefore crucially shaped by remembering. Identity, like memory, delineates the relationship between different groups and the differential access to power these groups may have: for example, the power to define history, access to the public field, or at times, even access to material goods and services in society. Taking this discussion to the scale of nation-states, according to many authors national identities no longer regulate local and global relationships insofar as “particularistic and cosmopolitan” (p. 5) identities shaped by globalization and political relationships that cross national boundaries now challenge them. The search for a regional identity at the time of Spain’s transition to democracy (1978) as the autonomous communities took shape saw Andalusia turn towards its Arab-Islamic history. As a result, the regional identity of Andalusia is shaped by a history that crosses geopolitical boundaries, one that is seen at times as a threat to national identity (as discussed in Chapter Five).

1.3.4 Area literature: Spain, Andalusia, Granada

The main contributions to anthropological literature that this thesis makes are: a) the detailed ethnographic accounts, especially of annual rituals, and the linkage of this material to a discussion on the debates on the Andalusian past; b) an ethnography of how historical reconstructions of the past are disseminated in the tourist sector; c) the attempt to give an account of the ‘in-between’ histories between what is generally assumed to be an either/or historical approach to al-Andalus; and d) a contribution to the question of regional identities within Spain, and how differential history can be used as a mobilizing force in struggles for independence and/or autonomous rule, as it has been in the Catalan case. It shows that Andalusians constantly shift between a part of Andalusian identity shaped by its Muslim past and their position in Spain and Europe, the latter being stronger than their connection to the Arab world. Despite having its Arab-Islamic history to negotiate economic and political agreements with North Africa, or to mobilize for enhanced autonomy within Spain, so far there are no signs that it has or that it would mobilize for secession from Spain.

Much of the North American research done on al-Andalus has either focused on the medieval history of this period or on the historiography and archaeology of more recent pasts (i.e. the Romantic period, the Fascist period). This work is often undertaken

either in history departments – Near East, Middle East, Medieval or European history – or in Spanish departments – Modern Languages, Romance Studies. Thus, the majority of academic inquiry about Muslim Spain has taken place outside of Anthropology.

Moreover, in recent years, studies on Spanish “historical memory”¹³ both within Anthropology and in other disciplines have understandably focused on lived memory of the fascist dictatorship (1939-1975) or on the exhumations of mass graves from the Civil War (1936-1939) (Baer & Sznajder, 2015; Bevernage & Colaert, 2014; Ceasar, 2014).¹⁴ Other studies that consider the ways in which regional histories have taken shape and continue to challenge the national narrative have been done by historians (for example, Álvarez Junco, 2002; Boyd, 2002). These tend to focus solely on the competing narratives. However, some do discuss practices and events in-depth, but these generally discuss the narratives that local elites and governments presented and the actions they took in the past in their attempts to have their local festival designated as nationally important. Rarely do these studies include private accounts. Analysis of the historical and contemporary perceptions of *el moro* – the Moor or the North African – provides extensive research, not on the history of Muslim Spain specifically, but instead on how the image of *el moro* has been depicted (Velasco et al., 2011; López Gil et al., 2010; Martín Corrales, 2002). Given this considerable amount of research both within and outside of Spain, I attempt to primarily draw on Spanish (and where possible Andalusian and Granadan) historiographers, historians and anthropologists throughout the dissertation, while constantly keeping in mind that academics had the dual role of advisor (i.e. suggesting literature to read) and ‘informant’.

With respect to anthropological inquiry, much research that involves discussion of Muslim Spain centres on inter-ethnic relations and interaction of different groups in Granada (Rogozen-Soltar 2017; 2010; 2007; Rosón Lorente, 2008). These authors address both the history and concepts of *convivencia*, and how the latter is observed in

¹³ A term that is almost exclusively used to make reference to left-wing Republican memory of the Civil War and the fascist period.

¹⁴ The first exhumation of a Republican mass grave took place in 2000 and a Historical Memory Law recognizing the victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship only came into effect in 2007 (Ceasar, 2014).

everyday interactions. Similar considerations on *convivencia* in other cities in Spain, such as Almeria,¹⁵ and the North African enclaves, such as Ceuta, provide analysis of civil *convivencia*¹⁶ with little reference to this history (Taha, 2014; Erickson, 2011; Torres Colón, 2008). Those studies that have analyzed the contemporary narratives of this history have been limited to discussions on how the accounts intersect with these relations. Historical accounts outlined in terms of Muslim and non-Muslim narratives are valuable in that they establish where these accounts diverge to establish distinct identities. Additionally, the authors acknowledge the high degree of variation between historical narratives within these groups but don't account for this variation. Further understanding of how alternative constructions of history (including those of Muslims and non-Muslims) draw on one another, is neglected. Another contribution is related to the Spanish use of this history in the tourism industry for economic purposes, given the lack of ethnographic research done on historical tours and the narratives disseminated in Granada.

The most extensive body of anthropological research and analysis of the history of al-Andalus within contemporary Granadan society belongs to University of Granada anthropologist Jose Antonio Gonzalez Alcantud. His work on the social memory of the Alhambra (González Alcantud, 2011; González Alcantud & Akmir, 2008) and on memory and heritage (González Alcantud & Calatrava Escobar, 2012) are coupled with commentary on subjects such as the *Moros y Cristianos* (Moors and Christians) festivals (Garrido, 1998/1892) and the presence of this history in Granadan literature (Ganivet & Unamuno, 2011). Alcantud has approached the contemporary presence of al-Andalus in terms of both myth (González Alcantud, 2014) and narrative in Spanish historiography (González Alcantud, 2017). Additionally, the “myth” of al-Andalus has been addressed by Sandra Rojo Flores, who defines myth as a “narrative elaboration of a historical “objective” fact, but that remains abstract and malleable in its discursive environment”

¹⁵ Almeria is the province of Andalusia which has the highest population of Moroccan and African migrants, due to their employment through the temporary foreign worker programs at the many greenhouses in the region.

¹⁶ Civil *convivencia* refers to the act of living together in ways that doesn't cause conflict. It invokes the idea of “good neighbourliness”.

(2015, p. 13, *my translation*) and addresses this “myth” separately from professional histories.

Past anthropological research occasionally touches upon political discourse and its uses of al-Andalus but has yet to consider the entanglement between narratives of this history, politics, tourism and nationalism/regionalism. Thus, I follow other anthropologists that have analyzed historical narratives by considering the politics of memory such as Hodgkin & Radstone (2003) and Farah (1999) to include this entanglement in the research on the *Andalusi* past in the present.

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 The field site: Granada

Preliminary research consisted of a month and a half long period split between Andalusia, Morocco and London, England in the summer of 2010. Two extended periods of fieldwork in Granada formed the main portion of my fieldwork: a stay from September 2011 over one year and a shorter stay in early-to-mid 2013 for a total of 17 months. The first portion was dedicated to participant observation, interviews, tours and other research in the field. The shorter stay was dedicated mainly to library research and observing events planned for the Millennium of Granada which was celebrated throughout 2013, although interviews that I did in 2013 to clarify particular topics were key to expanding understanding of my research from the previous year.

This research was primarily based on fieldwork conducted in Granada, Spain. The city of Granada sits approximately 50 kms from the Mediterranean coast. It had a population of approximately 239,000 in 2012. The principal reasoning behind this location was the extensive physical presence and contemporary uses of the city’s medieval Muslim history. The city’s Moorish quarter, the Albayzin, is a significant, dynamic, functioning neighbourhood, yet forms half of a UNESCO World Heritage Site (WHS) and is popular with tourists. I chose to do significant portions of my fieldwork in

the Albayzin and the historic city centre. Unlike the rest of the city,¹⁷ the neighbourhood retains the Arab labyrinth-like street patterns with narrow, mostly pedestrian cobblestone streets.¹⁸ The majority of the architecture in the Albayzin is whitewashed with lime paint, capped with Mediterranean-style clay tiled roofs (Figure 1.12). A number of my inquiries also included the Moorish Castle, the Alhambra, which forms the other half of the WHS designation (Figure 1.13). The Albayzin and the Alhambra are located in the middle of




Figure 1.12: A view of the Albayzin from the Alhambra as the sun sets. The white bell tower at the top right is the Church of San Nicolás in the Mirador de San Nicolas discussed in Chapter Three. Although not visible, the Grand Mosque of Granada sits to the right of the church. Finished in 2003, it was the first mosque built since the expulsion of the Muslims in 1492. In the middle sits the Church of San Juan de Dios, the bell tower of which was the minaret of the mosque that once stood on the site (3 January, 2012; photo by author)

the city of Granada (north to south) on the eastern side. Both are situated on lower (foot)hills of what, to the east, expands into the Sierra Nevada mountains. The rest of the city extends out onto the *Vega* of Granada,¹⁹ an immense area that has been primarily cultivated agricultural land since, at the very least, the Medieval period. The geography and naming of the landscape are of particular importance since many names and terms from this period are still in use today.

¹⁷ Parts of the neighbourhood of the Jewish quarter, Realejo, and the historic centre also retains this design, although not to the same extent as the Albayzin.

¹⁸ For a socio-cultural spatial analysis of the neighbourhood see Rosón Lorente (2008).

¹⁹ The Vega is a relatively flat agricultural area west of the city.

Unlike other major capital cities²⁰ in the region, the city's tourism sector is primarily based on the medieval Muslim history. The economic aspect of the use of this history became especially important during my fieldwork as I undertook this work during the middle of the 2008-2016 economic crisis.²¹ Furthermore, industry in the city is relatively underdeveloped. Instead, the education and the medical sectors together with tourism form the economic profile of the city. This profile resulted in a high unemployment rate in the city. By the end of 2012, Granada had an unemployment rate 11% higher than the national average – the second highest in the region of Andalusia (López Pavón, 2013).²² As a result, slightly more than 10% of the people I interviewed were unemployed or in a precarious work situation.²³




Figure 1.13: A rare view of the Alhambra covered in snow (on “Andalusia Day” in 2013) as it sits on top of Sabika Hill, taken from the Albayzin. Shown are the *Alcazaba* (or fortress) on the right and the Nazarid palaces to its left. Further to the left of the palaces is the *Generalife* (or royal summer palaces and gardens). On the far left is the *Silla del Moro* or Castle of Santa Elena. The Sierra Nevada mountains frame the background (28 February, 2013; photo by author)

²⁰ The region does not officially have a capital city although the regional Parliament is located in Seville.

²¹ While this recession was coming to an end in many parts of the world by the end of my fieldwork, the Spanish press (and government) did not talk of an end to the recession until 2016-2017.

²² The national unemployment rate was 26.02% whereas by the end of the first year of my fieldwork, Andalusia's adult unemployment stood at 35.86%. Granada's was 37.32%, after Cadiz, a city (and province) in the western part of Andalusia (López Pavón, 2013).

²³ My interviewees had higher rate of employment than Granada's unemployment rate as a result of the groups that I interviewed, where a number of these groups (discussed in the next section) were characterized by their type of employment (e.g. teachers, tour guides, employees of relevant initiatives or companies).

When I first began my fieldwork, the research objective I first provided to people in Granada was to understand what impact the Muslim past has in the present and how it affects contemporary issues such as migration and the increasing presence of Islam in Spain. This short summary, however, seemingly invoked two responses: one of suspicion or apprehension (Marti 2017, p. 72), or a short statement insisting that it is of no consequence today. For this reason, I began to describe my research objectives as a study of how Granadans tell and use their history today, an objective to which a number of people still felt they had little to contribute but provoked less of an emotional reaction to my explanation and opened up the topic.

1.4.2 The anthropological tools

I used participant observation, particularly to understand the extent to which the Arab-Islamic history of al-Andalus arises in everyday contemporary life, the situations in which the use of this history arises, and references made to this history. I wanted to attempt to grasp the pervasiveness of historical narratives of al-Andalus in public and in private narratives. Regarding public narratives, I focused my attention on the political sphere, on institutions and on heritage sites in the city. In Spain, in general, there are innumerable festivals and public celebrations. In Granada alone, there are eight official processions and parades, not including Holy Week during which there are processions almost every day. To this number, the Festival of the Crosses²⁴ can be added as well as the many processions that take place unofficially. Thus, I participated in the preparations for two processions, one during Holy Week and one smaller procession of a saint. I also observed innumerable others: six directly related festivals in Granada, five of which I observed twice, and five small, town festivals outside of Granada in three different provinces. Academics in Granada quite often give very well attended public academic talks on their current research in a number of centres around the city. Therefore, I attended 13 academic talks and three different conferences, one on Orientalism, one on

²⁴ The *Día de las Cruces* (Festival of the Crosses) takes place every May 3rd, during which large crosses are erected and decorated in streets and plazas, the patios of houses, schools, and businesses (in shop windows). People visit the different locations at which each of the crosses is set up and socialize at those that have also set up a bar. The local authorities hold a competition in which the crosses are entered and judge the best crosses of the year.

historical fiction and one on journalism. Furthermore, I attended eight book releases and a film release with a panel talk that included academics. Seven of the book releases were for various types of book, from historical novels to poetry to children's books and one for a special edition academic journal. Television shows and mini-series about the medieval period, both on al-Andalus and on the Catholic kingdoms to the north, are common. Thus, I also watched two shows relating to the historical period, one on Queen Isabel's reign on national television, and another on traditions, practices and knowledge inherited from the past on regional television (that included six episodes on the Arab-Islamic past in particular). Two shows that reproduced typical contemporary characterizations of Arabs and Spanish Muslims were also significant, one about Moroccan migrants working in the agricultural industry, and another about Islamic 'terrorist' activity and ethnic relations between Muslims and Christians in Melilla.²⁵ Finally, to approach the touristic uses of this history, I attended a session at four Arab Baths and participated in 27 different historical tours of the Albayzin, Sacromonte,²⁶ Realejo, the Alhambra and the centre of Granada, which included two audio-guide tours. A number of these tours were not strictly dedicated to the Muslim past. However, each of them included narratives about this history. These popular accounts of the Arab-Islamic past provided alternative narratives that both diverged and converged with official narratives. Some guides used regional materials which they adapted, while others did personal research, drawing from many different sources, including collective memory.

The most in-depth information I collected on historical narratives, however, came from the 109 interviews conducted with 87 people. I organized the interviewees into various very loosely structured categories, although many of my interviewees could be included in a number of different groups. These divisions included geographic origin

²⁵ The second of these ended with an attempted attack on Granada.

²⁶ Sacromonte is a neighbourhood that is connected to the Albayzin, which from the time of medieval period until a major flood in 1963 housed the majority of the city's Roma (*gitano*) population. During the medieval period, it lay outside the city walls. One narrative often repeated was that its marginality sheltered numerous Muslim inhabitants when they were expelled by the Catholics. It is known for its cave houses (Rivera Heredia, 2014), a number of which house flamenco *zambras*, or caves in which nightly flamenco shows are held for tourists. Realejo is a neighbourhood on the opposite side of the Sabika Hill on which the Alhambra sits. It was known to be the Jewish neighbourhood of the city during the medieval period.

(residents of the Albayzin; from Granada (not the Albayzin); from Andalusia; from Spain (outside of Andalusia); Moroccan), membership to certain groups (Holy Week brotherhood; Arabic school classmate; etc.), profession (teachers; academics; employee of specific institutions) and religious beliefs (Catholic; Muslim; Muslim convert). The last category was only assigned if the interviewee indicated that they strongly identified with the group assigned. Given that many Spaniards identify as Catholic but are non-practicing, I decided to consider this as a group in order to clarify whether or not religion was a determining factor in shaping these interviewees' historical accounts.²⁷ More of my interviewees were male than female.²⁸ This imbalance was a result of three particular "groups" of interviewees that consisted of more men than women: academics, interviewees from the Albayzin, where the male neighbours I knew were less hesitant to share their knowledge, and those with Moroccan citizenship.²⁹ I did not, however, consider gender, generational or socio-economic status as separate categories since I did not observe fundamental differences in relation to how Andalusian history is constructed between these groups as will become evident throughout the following chapters.³⁰ In terms of generational differences, the historical constructions of many of my older research participants differed little from younger interviewees, apart from amount of knowledge. These similarities between generations are perhaps not surprising, given the anti-fascist history of challenging dominant narratives.

The interview total included four hand-written interviews (in which the interviewees asked not to be recorded) and four formal discussions (with academics during which I took fieldnotes). All others were recorded. These interviews were a

²⁷ As I demonstrate in Chapter Two, this was not always the case, which is an indication of the complexity of historical narratives and the factors that influence them.

²⁸ Overall, approximately 60% of these interviewees were men and 40% were women.

²⁹ The last group, Moroccan citizens, likely resulted from two things: researcher access to this group and difficulty finding willing interviewees. Many of the people I approached felt that Spaniards could provide more information than they could.

³⁰ Gender differences were observed in the representations of this history at official festivals, where the costumed participants of two festivals in particular are all male. This point is addressed in Chapter Four.

mixture of both open-ended and semi-structured interviews to further explore the historical narratives people living in Granada hold. After beginning my research, it became clear that everyday exchanges in which reconstructions of this past arise are often fragmented. They are acquired and shaped (and reshaped) throughout the lifespan of members of a society. Although these fragments are understood between these individuals, it became necessary to obtain longer narrated versions of the medieval history to compare these fragments with longer historical accounts. Therefore, the question that elicited some of the longest, most comprehensive responses was: If I had recently arrived in Spain and knew nothing about the medieval history of Spain,³¹ could you tell me what you know about the history of al-Andalus with as much detail as possible with the assumption that I know very little about the history? Leaving the question as open as possible and at times, making it hypothetical (Spradley, 1979, p. 85-88), I aimed to avoid imposing pre-determined time frames such as chronological time. These questions were coupled with a number of others, including what interviewees remembered about learning this history when they were younger or what their understanding and thoughts were on the various relevant festivals in the city. I also included basic background questions for all interviewees and recorded a few life histories of my interviewees to obtain a clearer understanding of their life experiences during the Francoist dictatorship. I conducted these interviews at locations determined by my interviewees: at homes, in cafés, the offices of my interviewees and at workshops, always in places where the interviewee felt the most comfortable.

In addition to the formal interviews, I had numerous informal chats with different people. A number of my research participants I saw on a weekly basis, whether at neighbourhood assemblies or at classes held at different centres in the neighbourhood and around the city. I also sporadically attended mosque gatherings and church services, both of which were always followed by a meal and time spent socializing.

³¹ The hypothetical framing was helpful when an interviewee expressed that they knew very little about the history or that they knew less about the history than I did (Spradley, 1979, p. 80).

Data analysis incorporated various methods of organization, searches and coding. I scanned all materials in paper form that I collected (apart from some books). All data was stored in file folders separated by either type, theme or related location.³² Fieldnotes were typed up, organized by book number and a table of contents made of all entries to make searching possible. The majority of interviews I used in the dissertation were transcribed in full. Transcribing entire interviews had two objectives. First, the narratives provided by many of the people with whom I spoke were extensive. By asking people for an overview of the history, it was possible to obtain a general narrative of the period. Other anecdotes, examples and narratives, however, were often interspersed throughout the interview and were related to various topics or questions raised. Second, in order to tease out themes, narratives and historical details that were most common and that overlapped, thorough transcriptions became necessary.

Finally, I used OCR recognition of text in Adobe Acrobat for material that was not yet searchable and the data management program NVivo to complete keyword searches to find specific terms or concepts, particularly in my fieldnotes and the transcribed interviews. Coding, however, was done separately, on printed copies of the interviews. Given that coding in a data management program can become time consuming and slight changes in labeling can become complicated, I chose to code themes by hand. For specific topics and themes discussed in the dissertation, I gathered all quotes relevant to the theme in a separate document, each labeled by person (using his or her pseudonym) and interview number.

1.4.3 The anthropologist and the research participants

Because the ethnographic data is derived from fundamentally relational practices in the field, the researcher's rapport with and acceptance by the people (i.e. her social role within the community) with whom she works determines: "how they perceive him [her].

³² Folders included fieldnotes, interviews and recordings; images, books and articles, pamphlets, documents (including government documents and laws); events, foundations; news articles, media (including relevant television series and podcasts); and data relevant to the Alhambra, Albayzin and history in schools. An Excel file was created which listed all tours taken, talks and concerts attended, festivals observed, readings provided by academics and all literature collected. This file was also used to keep track of the numbers of interviews done with each "group".

It also affects what they freely divulge to him [her] and what he [she] will be allowed to observe.” (Tsuda, 1998, p. 110). My own experiences in the field often began with an explanation of my academic background in Hispanic literature and linguistics and the ten years before my fieldwork in which I had regularly travelled back and forth between Canada and Spain. During my undergraduate degree, I had lived in Malaga (1.5 hours from Granada) for an academic year and still maintained many relationships there. I had also collected the control data for my master’s thesis on Spanish-English bilingualism in Malaga and thus had done previous academic research in Andalusia. For many of the people I knew and interviewed in Granada, this long-term commitment to the region in different capacities helped to establish and maintain rapport since my breaks from the field routinely became occasional weekend visits to Malaga, about which I could share with people in Granada. These escapes were not unlike a weekend that any of the people I knew in Granada might take themselves. This connection established my role as a committed researcher and enhanced my relationships with the people I met and who would later become research participants.

Many anthropologists work with groups of either the same ethnicity as their research participants or can be considered as “halfies” – or “people whose national or cultural identity is mixed by virtue of migration, overseas education, or parentage” (Abu-Lughod, 1991, p. 137). My own ethnicity, however, falls into neither of these categories. Despite this, for many of those who came to know my past experiences in Andalusia, I became more often accepted as a “partial insider” (Tsuda, 1998, p. 112) similar to those who shared a similar ethnicity with their research participants. My extensive experience in Andalusia and my years working closely with Hispanic professors and students³³ allowed me to pick up on mannerisms and expressions more closely associated with Spain. However, not all viewed me as such. In particular, for many of the academics I worked with, I was seen strictly as a North American academic. A number of these researchers had done research in the US or were well aware of differences in theoretical

³³ Colleagues and friends from Latin America often refer to me as Spanish, mainly due to picking up the Andalusian accent over many years.

approaches and academic interests between Spain and other countries. Moreover, in speaking with academics, if I was not mindful of my linguistic register in Spanish (i.e. speaking properly vs. speaking “street” Spanish), it was noted that there was “room for improvement”, indicating my place as a young non-native, Spanish-speaking academic.

My ethnicity by birth, however, did come into play with a number of groups that I was in contact with in different, surprising ways. With Spaniards living in the Albayzin who knew of my paternal Scottish background, they often associated me more with British inhabitants in the neighbourhood than perhaps with my Canadian upbringing. British historical literature on Spain is quite well-known, even by the general public as it has contributed to many stereotypes of Spain and its inhabitants in the past. For the Muslims that I worked with, my Scottish roots became a point of great interest and connection given that the *sheikh* who established the Muslim community in Granada was a Scottish convert from the same region as my own family. Moreover, my interest in Arabic and time having spent studying the language as well as my contact with Arabs from numerous Arab countries in Canada certainly facilitated the establishment of rapport with these groups, as well as others that had interest in disseminating this history in the public.

The negotiation of multiple identities that anthropologists undertake in the field (Tsuda, 1998), however, can cause disorientation amongst research participants. As a result, rapport between the interviewer and interviewee can fluctuate over time (Spradley, 1979, p. 79). Drawing on my own Protestant upbringing first helped to establish rapport with a number of research participants that identified as practicing Catholics. However, after much time spent discussing medieval history from this point of view and attending events connected to Holy Week celebrations to which my research participants invited me, my attempts to shift towards discussions about *Andalusi* (medieval) history were viewed with suspicion by some. Quite often, these research participants expressed the assumption that academic interest in the Catholic history and the Arab-Islamic history was mutually exclusive.

1.5 Significance of Research

The history of al-Andalus, in particular, the *convivencia* in Muslim Spain – or peaceful coexistence between Muslims, Christians and Jews – is often considered to be a unique history. After the expansion of the Islamic Empire, no other part of Europe experienced Muslim rule as long as Spain. Because the Empire once straddled Europe and the Arab world, which is now a geopolitical divide, the way in which it is narrated, used and what it comes to mean to the various groups who claim this history acquires particular importance. Not only do these narratives become relevant at a local and national level but also at the global level, especially in relation to Islamophobia, and the so-called U.S.-led ‘War-on-Terror’. The history of al-Andalus, and the ways in which it has been represented, written about, negated, erased or silenced provides a source to draw comparisons and parallels with other histories, including indigenous histories in the ‘New World’, but also in the ‘Old World’ such as with Palestinian history. In fact, the famous long poem (more like an Odyssey) about the 1492 expulsion of the Arabs from al-Andalus by the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish (excerpt at the beginning of this chapter), is heavily laden with metaphors about the tragic loss of Palestine in 1948. In addition, it is a significant case study to question when does a population become ‘original inhabitants’ or ‘autochthonous’. Another significant contribution of this dissertation is the political economy of tourism, with the examination of how historical and archaeological tourism not only serves as a means for economic gain but also becomes a space for contesting not only the official historical narrative but also contemporary tourism practices.

Anthropologically, this dissertation contributes to debates on history and memory, an area that can include anthropologists from the four fields, including archaeologists. However, over the past three decades, memory studies developed into a field that allows researchers to step outside the boundaries of their disciplines and share observations across fields of study (Erll, 2011; Climo & Cattell, 2002). Anthropological inquiries into memory tend to use the term in two ways, either to address lived experience of the past in the present (i.e. remembering) or in reference to the persistence of shared cultural traditions and practices in the present (Berliner, 2005, p. 201). My research addresses

both of these characterizations. Since people in Spain no longer have knowledge produced by first-hand experience of the medieval period, it informs the latter characterization of memory: “the past that we carry, how we are shaped by it and how this past is transmitted in the present [...] the transmission and persistence of cultural elements through the generations.” (pp. 200-201). In terms of the former characterization, the narratives presented are not remembering per se, but are historical reconstructions which also have elements of remembering. This analysis is also relevant for anthropological research on identity formation (mainly political identities), on the nationalism/regionalism juxtaposition, and for the anthropological study of contested pasts and the role such contestations play in defying the hegemonic narratives of those in power.

1.6 Questions addressed and Chapter outlines

In order to address these lines of inquiry, some of the questions I ask are: How have various versions of history developed throughout time, and how are they related to national and regional politics? How are the concepts of Invasion, *Reconquista* and *Convivencia* interpreted, and what do they tell us about how the Arab and Muslim ‘other’ is viewed past and present? Regarding the economic aspect of this history, how are tourism, heritage (sites) and history entangled? Has the historical narrative been commodified? If so, what effect does this commodification of history have on everyday life in Granada’s Moorish quarter? With commemorations and celebrations, I turn to the politics of memory to ask: how do these festivities support particular national narratives? How do three festivals rooted in histories of the same period compare? How are the festivities and the politicization of the past entwined? What controversies arise and what are the alternative narratives that are excluded from official narratives and that publicly challenge these versions? Finally, in terms of connections and/or ruptures, is the version of the past that is promoted by the region inseparable from the changing dynamics in regional and national politics? How do these regional historical narratives displayed in initiatives compare to those taught in schools? Do teachers’ constructions of the past parallel regional accounts or state accounts? How does a regional history that highlights

its difference by positing similarities to the Arab world remain connected to the state?
Can the history of al-Andalus be considered a hegemonic narrative?

In Chapter 2, I map out the trajectory of three historical phenomena: the Muslim invasion (711), the *Reconquista* (722-1492) and *convivencia*. These three are fundamental to historical debates on Muslim Spain in academic circles from the Romantic period until today and show where professional histories and popular narratives both coincide with and diverge from each other. They are central to or regularly appear in public, political and private versions of the past. The *Reconquista* (or ‘Reconquest’) is the term given to the process of expansion by the northern Catholic kingdoms into the south, eventually ending with the capture of the city of Granada. It invokes the idea that the land and its inhabitants were fully converted to Christianity before the Islamic invasion and thus that the conquest was a battle to return the land to its rightful owners. *Convivencia* is often loosely translated as ‘coexistence’ but generally implies harmonious coexistence between Muslims, Christians and Jews in which the three groups participate equally in shared social life. These concepts, and the way in which they are constructed, are often intended to steer the country in particular directions.

The history of al-Andalus forms a significant part of the tourism industry in Andalusia and stands at the centre of tourism in Granada. All over Europe, mass tourism has been markedly increasing in recent years, having significant effects on the very people inhabiting spaces that tourists visit (García-Hernández et al., 2017). Therefore, in Chapter 3, I consider the entanglement between tourism, heritage and history in the Moorish quarter of the Albayzin. This successful use of historical narratives and sites for economic purposes, which may be referred to as the commodification of history (MacDonald, 2002), has come to rely on symbolic capital out of which monopoly rents are garnered. Yet, Granadans (and Spanish tourists as well) take advantage of this method of socially producing history, using it to explore and adapt their own identity as participants in Granadan and Andalusian society.

In Chapter 4, I compare three festivals, all of which invoke medieval Spain in different ways, in order to consider what is included in and excluded from official

representations of the past. National celebrations and commemorations (or those that invoke a national version of the past) bolster official narratives, becoming a tool of those in power to further their political agendas. This nationalist discourse, however, is defined not only from above but also below. It is then necessary to not only consider official accounts, but also oppositional narratives that surround these festivals with controversy by challenging the dominant versions of the past.

When interest began to grow in the history of al-Andalus, Spain found itself at the edge of its entrance into a new political arrangement, its entrance into the European Economic Community in 1984. Along with this new membership, the country took on the role of being an economic and cultural bridge to Africa and Latin America. In the final chapter, I discuss how this bridge narrative and its dialectical opposition, narratives of disjuncture or rift, have taken shape. The region's turn toward the Arab world in search of these connections is seen as problematic to some at the national level, creating what I argue is a complex Janus-faced identity. The regional narrative of past *Andalusi* contributions to science, language and everyday life, however, is firmly anchored to the state unification narrative of the *Reconquista*, and therefore, reiterates the region's place in Europe.

Chapter 2

2 The Invasion, *Convivencia* and the *Reconquista*: Politics, debates and the public

Early on in my fieldwork one Sunday afternoon, I found myself desperately searching for shade. The arid, dusty fields behind the Hermitage of San Miguel provided little place to take refuge from the scorching sun. I pulled out my fieldnotes once a seat emptied at one of the three lines of packed tent-covered tables. The tents had been erected for people enjoying free *paella*¹ during the Albayzin's Neighbourhood Festival in Granada.

Curiosity struck one of the older men in mid-conversation with his friends, prompting him to joke about the caricature I might draw of him. Laughing, I began to chat with him and explained the basic objective of my research to which Salvador,² a retired, former emigrant³ for most of his adult life, immediately reacted. "That's tough because it depends on who you ask. It all depends on their politics. You'll have to talk to as many people as you can and see where they overlap", he responded. Our brief exchange immediately became a topic about which everyone in his group had an opinion and effortlessly stimulated debate about history. One insisted that it wasn't North Africans that invaded Spain but Arabs from Saudi Arabia. The next asserted that the *moros* had nothing to do with the invasion, without defining who she meant by *moro*. By the third response, these accounts of the Arab-Islamic past became a relaxed argument about current immigration and coexistence. The debate was one I had heard for years, but Salvador's initial comments turned out to be more accurate than I realized at the time. It exemplified how the past, in this case the medieval Muslim period, invokes present politics. The conversation with Salvador and his friends was also indicative of how

¹ A typical rice dish seasoned with saffron, usually made with seafood.

² All names have been changed to maintain anonymity of the people involved in this work. For some interviewees and people mentioned, gender has also been changed, particularly in cases in which the person is more easily identifiable.

³ Salvador, a Spaniard, had lived in Latin America for most of his adult/working life and had returned home after retirement.

popular versions of history often draw on historical knowledge produced in academic circles.

Salvador's historical insight in the above encounter reveals a number of themes that many scholars have established about the reproduction of the past: first, that the reproduction of the past is shaped by contemporary contexts and vice versa, and that there are different and sometimes contradictory versions of the past (Tamm, 2013; Berliner, 2005; Glassberg, 1996; Samuel & Thompson, 1990; Johnson & Dawson, 1982); secondly, that politics and memory/history are entwined (Glassberg, 1996; Connerton, 1989; Johnson & Dawson, 1982); and thirdly, individual versions of the past may coincide or deviate from dominant versions (Connerton, 1989; Johnson & Dawson, 1982). Salvador was well aware that in order to fully comprehend contemporary versions, one had to take into account the country's fascist history, which added a complex layer to historical constructions of al-Andalus. He also knew that political discourses and particular versions of history are closely associated. Finally, individual versions of the past can, but do not always parallel official versions, since they can overlap or diverge from collective narratives. As Shapiro emphasizes:

...**making history becomes**, then, less the autonomous preserve of any one constituency or guild, and the historical narrative less a finished story, than **a dynamic project that encompasses both the production and reception of intersecting, overlapping, contradictory, and parallel accounts of the past.**⁴ (Shapiro, 1997, p. 2)

Popular narratives of the past, meaning versions that are produced by ordinary people, often draw on academic or professional histories, some of which mirror official state narratives and which play a critical role in forging national identity (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, p. 208).

⁴ All emphasis in bold are my own.

In this chapter, I take a look at three historical phenomena: two well-known processes (or events⁵) in the body of literature on al-Andalus,⁶ namely, the initial Muslim conquest and the *Reconquista*, and one concept, *convivencia*,⁷ which were the most commonly invoked and discussed by my interviewees. However, it is not only ordinary people or participants in my research that refer to these historical markers; these same concepts and events have been politicized since the 19th century and were instrumental in the national projects of both Liberals (who promoted modernization) and Traditionalists (conservatives). These historical phenomena continue to inform political debates today at both the official and popular levels. It is not my intention to provide an overview of all topics researched on al-Andalus by academics, but rather to trace the aforementioned historical concepts and events as they are represented by some historians and scholars and by ordinary people I met who are neither professional historians, nor political figures. By considering all three together, I address what form each narrative takes and how they are interrelated. Exploring these also helps to clarify how the various versions of history have shifted when the interpretation of these concepts and events have changed.

Finally, I look at convergences between academic and popular narratives of the Muslim past. I argue that the Arab-Islamic invasion in the 8th century (CE), *convivencia*, the *Reconquista* are the anchors that hold larger histories in place when they are debated amongst the general population in Granada. One concern that is quite common amongst academics is that the increase in academic interest in al-Andalus in the 1980s and 1990s created a “myth” of idyllic *convivencia* that has become overly pervasive in popular

⁵ Note that both the Arab invasion and the *Reconquista* can be considered not as events, but as processes. Both begin with battles (the former, the Battle of Guadalete and the latter, the Battle of Covadonga) that initiates a period of continued expansion over a specified period of time. Throughout this dissertation, I use the terms “invasion” and “*Reconquista*” to refer to these processes, but also to refer to the initial events (unless otherwise specified). However, with the *Reconquista*, while the Capture of Granada is also part of the process, I refer to the event specifically as the Capture (or *Toma*) of Granada.

⁶ According to some scholars, al-Andalus is the name given to both the Iberian Peninsula and the Muslim territory on the Peninsula during the medieval period (García Sanjuán, 2017). As is noted in the introduction, I use it strictly to refer to the latter throughout this dissertation.

⁷ These terms will be elaborated in the next section and throughout the chapter. However, to clarify, *convivencia* is generally defined as peaceful coexistence between Jews, Christians and Muslims and the *Reconquista* refers to the historical process of Catholic expansion into Muslim territory from the north to the south of the Iberian Peninsula over eight centuries.

memory (Rojo Flores, 2015). My fieldwork shows that the narratives surrounding these three fundamental markers in the history of al-Andalus are heterogeneous and often parallel and overlap with those of academics. Before I begin, however, clarification on the three debates to be addressed in this chapter is required.

2.1 A brief overview: Invasion, *Convivencia*, and “*Reconquista*”

The Arab-Islamic (also referred to as Moorish) invasion refers to the arrival of Muslim troops, which culminated in their victory at the Battle of Guadalete (711), and their expansion, which was halted at Poitiers (France) in 732. During my fieldwork, most debates about the initial invasion argued whether or not the invading troops responded to a call for help from one of the numerous Visigoth tribes in the Peninsula or whether they invaded for reasons of expansion. The discussions also explored whether they displaced the inhabitants of the Peninsula, how many troops crossed into the Peninsula from North Africa, and if the troops consisted of Arabs and/or Berbers. Additionally, to counter accounts that claimed it was an occupation, topics developed such as if and how much violence took place. *Convivencia*⁸ can be loosely defined as peaceful coexistence, a productive “living together” (Bahrami, 1998), interreligious interrelation and exchange (Martínez Montávez, 2008) between Muslims, Christians and Jews. This positive characteristic of the concept has become well known even outside of Spain and most often is used in this way. In Spanish, however, it can also be used to describe “living together” while being in conflict or a poor or problematic existence between different groups that live in close contact. This negative quality of coexistence is usually noted when the term is mentioned. Debates on *convivencia* that emerged during my fieldwork hinged on whether it existed or not (Díez Jorge, 2006), and, if the claim to *convivencia* during this period was considered as valid, they questioned the duration of the peaceful interactions between groups and the historical periods in which it was common practice. Lastly, the *Reconquista*, or “Reconquest”, refers to the process of Christian conquest

⁸ Note that negative *convivencia* can also exist in situations where the groups were at odds with one another (Domínguez Ortiz, 1997, p. 172).

beginning in 722 in which, over eight centuries, Christians fought for and claimed land that was believed to be previously Christian. This historical process concluded with the capture of Granada in 1492. Both previous academic research and many of my interviewees contend that the concept of “re”-conquest is laden with an ideological impulse.

2.2 Debating history: How reinterpretation of the past impels other questions

The historical debates regarding the invasion, *convivencia*, and the *Reconquista* arise within larger narratives of the past in academic, public and private circles. When a history is as far removed in time from the present as the period of Islamic Spain is from today, it is often taken for granted that shifts in the meaning and understanding of one historical concept brings into question others, making each part inextricably linked to the other concepts as well as other historical periods. In the case of the history of al-Andalus, debates on *convivencia* have challenged the “national-Catholic”⁹ narrative which privileges the *Reconquista*, a version of history that posits a “natural” and continual conflict and animosity between Christians and Muslims and between the “East/Orient” and “West/Occident”. Debates about the invasion and the length of time that Muslim Caliphs (rulers) governed in Spain brought questions regarding the autochthony of Muslim inhabitants. The idea that Muslims were autochthonous to Spain challenges the national-Catholic version which excludes this history from Spain’s ‘national’ narrative, and regards the Muslim *Andalusies*,¹⁰ even after eight centuries, as invaders. Even the inclusion of this past in Spanish history unsettles the narrative of a purely Christian Europe and of ideologies that place Islam outside of Europe. These changes in historical

⁹ I refer quite often to the term “national-Catholic” throughout the dissertation. This term, often used in Spanish historiography, refers to the close relationship between the state and the Catholic church (“nacionalcatolicismo”, 2018) and the church’s involvement in much of civil life during the fascist dictatorship. Therefore, the “national-Catholic narrative” makes reference to the dominant national narrative promoted by both the fascist regime and the Catholic church. This version of history glorifies the *Reconquista* and the unification of the Iberian Peninsula under Catholic rule. Therefore, the reference does not encompass all versions of the medieval history promoted by Catholics in Spain (since not all Catholics defend this version).

¹⁰ *Andalusí* denotes the inhabitants living in the territory that constituted Muslim Spain and avoids the use of religion as a method of identification.

narratives are prompted primarily by changing political contexts and theoretical paradigms in which facts become reinterpreted. In this context, the public dissemination of historical research may promote a shift in historical concepts and narratives of the past among the general population, and in turn may reshape collective memory and by implication identity (Erl, 2011; Glassberg, 1996).

When these shifts occur in moments of national transition, ruling elites may employ this memory in an attempt to shape and rally national consensus around their political projects. As Climo and Cattell note: “who is to be the master of memory and, with it, the master of meaning? For the masters of memory and meaning also control much else.” (2002, pp. 1-2). In Spain, the Arab-Islamic past has been a fundamental component in reinterpretations of Spanish collective identity during these times of transition (Hirschkind, 2013, pp. 228-229; Rogozen-Soltar, 2010, p. 93; Aidi, 2006, pp. 67-68). Moreover, the very foundation of Spanish identity is constructed upon the Catholic capture of Muslim Granada in 1492 (Álvarez Junco, 2002).

As many scholars of memory have long argued, there is an inextricable relationship between reproductions of the past and the forging of collective identity (Schwartz, 2009; Moreno Navarro, 1986; Assmann & Czaplicka, 1995; Halbwachs, 1980). Consequently, this shared identity is dynamic, always incomplete and contested (Hall, 1990, p. 234). Arabist Pedro Martínez Montávez emphasizes this point in rejecting a fixed, eternal, exclusive Spanish identity, which he argues is assumed “to be an idea based on the historical and deduced from it, but it is in fact an a-historic idea, and that manipulates, cuts off and selects historical material in the form which is convenient, without any scruples at all.” (Martínez Montávez, 2008, p. 3, *my translation*). A conceptualization of collective identity that views identity as unchanging fails to consider emerging political environments and historical data that challenge its imagined fixedness. During the Franco dictatorship, fascist ideology viewed a national collective identity as fixed, eternal and immutable. It was buttressed by an official historical narrative that

silenced¹¹ al-Andalus in the national narrative. This fixed identity is similar to that propounded by extreme right-wing conservatives, including supporters of the *Día de la Toma* (Day of the Capture) festivities addressed in Chapter Four. This attests to the role that a political environment can have in shaping historical narratives.

2.3 Moving beyond dominant narratives: The relationship between academic history, political discourse and popular memory

Looking at debates and arguments surrounding the invasion, *convivencia*, and the *Reconquista*, it becomes clear how inseparably intertwined historical narratives are with the political environment in which they are constructed. Throughout much of the 18th through 20th centuries, the history of al-Andalus was remodeled by political and elite expediencies and interests, which I elaborate on later in this chapter. During the Romantic period, dominant and alternative narratives of the Arab-Islamic past were closely tied to how the emerging nation-state, and the colonial Middle East, were imagined. Here, dominant narratives refer to those narratives that are the most prevalent in the public field. By alternative, I mean any other narratives that don't align with the dominant versions of history. Certainly, the later struggle over national identity in the late 19th and early 20th century was also shaped, first, by the loss of the majority of Spain's colonies by 1898, then by the Civil War (1936-1939), and later by the establishment of a fascist state (1939-1975), all of which produced a dominant narrative rooted in conservative ideology.

Following Johnson and Dawson (1982), the term popular memory refers to the memory of ordinary people. This knowledge of the past is shaped by two sets of relations, dominant and oppositional alternative memory, and public and private memory. I use these concepts "dominant" and "alternative" narratives to capture the competing

¹¹ Throughout this dissertation, when I speak about erasing or silencing this history, it is important to stress that although more liberal voices were silenced within the country (either by exile or by more violent means), the silencing in terms of the historical narrative took the form of minimizing the existence of the Muslim territory, excluding Muslim Spain from being considered part of Spanish history, and depicting al-Andalus as an aberration, demonizing its Muslim inhabitants as occupiers of the land for eight centuries.

nature of the different versions of the past, although these are better thought of as entwined, or as ‘two sides of the same coin’. These two take from one another, and at times, use the same histories. The term ‘dominant’ (often professional histories tied to state institutions) does not refer to the historical accuracy of one version over the other but “points to the power and pervasiveness of historical representations, their connections with dominant institutions and the part they play in winning consent and building alliances in the processes of formal politics.” (p. 207). While some narratives have more circulation and dominance in the public sphere, alternative and popular accounts form part of the larger arena where the past is produced. Other narratives have little impact on the “social production of memory”, being “marginalized or excluded or reworked” (p. 207). Also important to note is that alternative narratives are not necessarily subaltern, as in oppositional to dominant histories. Alternative historical narratives can be held by equally powerful groups within society whose narratives present a challenge to one another in the “public field”. Thus, consideration of both dominant and alternative narratives is crucial in order to show how these competing historical constructions of the political, the academic, and the popular are intertwined.

2.4 “Forgotten” historical knowledge: The impact of fascist state narratives of al-Andalus in Francoist Spain

Different versions of the history of al-Andalus have been filtered through half a millennium of contemplation and historiography since 1492, whose trajectory has been at times intimately linked to political ideologies and agendas of institutions as well as intellectual and artistic movements of their time. Orientalization of al-Andalus during the Romantic period and the critical layer of liberal¹² academic thought that first tied the development of historical narratives of Muslim Spain to nationalism become important for the comprehension of these narratives today (Manzano Moreno & Pérez Garzón, 2002). The later conservative turn to nationalism, which effectively created two competing identities known as “the two Spains”, is equally relevant (Álvarez Junco,

¹² The term “liberal” makes specific reference to Liberalism, a wide-spread political ideology in Spain in the 19th and 20th century.

2002). Liberal Spain invoked an identity that called for modernization, democratization of government and criticized Catholic Monarchs for the expulsion of Jews and for the Inquisition (p. 21). On the other hand, the conservative Spain promoted an identity that was formed around tradition, the *patria* (or fatherland), Catholicism and viewed the Muslim invasion as punishment for previous sins committed (p. 30). This framing of the history in terms of the nation-state and nationalism is one that is maintained from the 19th century through to the dictatorship (1939-1975).

The political projects linked to each of these competing constructions of the past, however, have had immensely different effects. After the Civil War (1936-1939), many left-wing and anti-fascist historians and academics were exiled; other intellectuals who remained in the country produced scholarship that justified fascist ideology and rule by trying to show parallels between the victorious Catholic Monarchs and Franco himself (Ribagorda Esteban, 2001). Formal history lessons about al-Andalus became reduced to a short paragraph of major military events that glorified the Catholic unification project and demonized the Muslim “occupiers”. This version of the past became the dominant and privileged historical version of al-Andalus. Moreover, it is the narrative that many of my older adult interviewees learned in school. As a result, in the narratives of my interviewees, the Arab-Islamic past is commonly reduced to a focus on the beginning and end of Muslim rule, that is, how they imagine the end of the Christian conquest – the seizure of Granada and the expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants from the Peninsula in 1492 – and, quite often, the initial arrival of the Arabic-speaking troops in 711. For many people, this period is condensed into (or reduced to) these two major military events. In an article on the different types of “forgetting”, Connerton (2008) suggests that forgetting can result from “repressive erasure” and/or “forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity”, both of which can consign the finer historical details to “oblivion”. These two types of forgetting were arguably at play in the fascist national project. Thus, this forgetting of fascist design, which attempted to silence the history of the Moors in Spain and characterize them as nothing more than invaders, is relevant to understanding contemporary historical reproductions. Since the transition to democracy in the late 1970s, the history of al-Andalus has come to form a part of regional

Andalusian identity (Moreno Navarro, 1986), creating space for not only inclusive dominant narratives of al-Andalus but also alternative ones.

2.5 Historiography of al-Andalus and its others

The Romantic period in Spain lagged behind that of the rest of Europe, beginning in the late 18th century and finding its apogee in the mid-to-late 19th century, but is generally credited with giving oxygen to Spanish interest in the history of al-Andalus. Studies on Arab topics within Spain began with artistic considerations on the Alhambra in 1780, yet the predominant impulse came from outside of Spain with the characterizations by other European and American thinkers who imagined Spain as non-European¹³ and exotic (Díaz-Andreu, 2002, p. 137-138). Washington Irving's work, *Tales of the Alhambra* (1829), translated around the world, found a forgotten and neglected palace, inhabited by Spanish Roma people (*gitanos*) and other occupants. Orientalist painters, photographers



Figure 2.1: Manuel Gómez-Moreno y González's "Exit of the Family of Boabdil from the Alhambra" (Gómez-Moreno González, 1880/2012, p. 5) depicts the expulsion of the sultan's family from their residence in Granada upon capture of the city in 1492. They first fled to Almeria and shortly after to Fez, Morocco.



Figure 2.2: Mariano Fortuny's "The Massacre of the Abencerrajes" (Fortuny, 1870) depicts the story of the assassination of a large part of the male members of the military *Abencerraje* family, which took place in the room later named the Hall of the *Abencerrajes* of the Alhambra. The reasons behind the assassination in legends usually involve romantic and/or political intrigue.

¹³ Alexandre Dumas (b.1802-d.1870) and Victor Hugo (b.1802-d.1885) are two French authors known for these characterizations. Popular belief in Andalusia attributes the phrase, "Africa begins in the Pyrenees", to Dumas, although this is questionable (Calderwood, 2014, f.n.19).

and writers followed, only flocking to Granada to study and depict Granadan landscapes and Arab-inspired architecture after returning from travels throughout the colonized Arab territories. Painters such as David Roberts (b.1796-d.1864; Scotland), Owen Jones (b.1806-d.1874; England), and Eugène Delacroix (b.1798-d.1863; France) brought fantasized depictions of the Arab-Islamic past to Spanish painters such as Spain's own artists Manuel Gómez-Moreno y González (b.1834-d.1918; Granada) (Figure 2.1) or Mariano Fortuny (b.1838-d.1874; Reus, Cataluña) (Figure 2.2).

At the same time, imaginings of European nation-states settled on the medieval period as the rational origin of the unique distinctions between each nation (A.D. Smith, 1991, p. 88). However, in Catholic Spain of the 18th century, an Arab-Islamic medieval past presented a conflict that had to be resolved (Díaz-Andreu, 2002, p. 135). The crux of this debate hinged on whether or not Muslim Spain was a part of Spanish national history or whether it was exterior to it; today, the latter is still a dominant narrative in some conservative circles. The Muslim invasion of the Peninsula had been viewed as a national tragedy or catastrophe and although the Arab-Islamic presence lasted almost 800 years it was considered an anomaly, and 'foreign' or external to what was regarded as "Spanish". Thus, a Spanish nation-state was conceived as beginning with the unification of the kingdoms by the Catholic Monarchs Isabel and Fernando and completed with the capture of Granada and the expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants that refused to convert. The historical account of this consolidation of power and unification within borders that are almost the same today is how the nation is imagined as immemorial. Despite this, we cannot speak of a Spanish state until the 18th century when "several different kingdoms, which had until then only owed allegiance to the same king, were unified under Castilian law." (Díaz-Andreu, 1995, p. 41).

The growth in Arab and Oriental studies established by José Antonio Conde (b.1765-d.1820) began to view the Arab past in a more positive light, "critiquing the Academy for clinging to the versions of the "old *Cronicones*"¹⁴ and dismissing "the

¹⁴ Brief historical narration presented in chronological order ("cronicón", 2017).

memoirs of the Arabs.” (López García, 2016, p. 108). Since the country didn’t have colonies in the Middle East, Arab Studies scholars turned to their own *Arab-Andalusi* past, which led to the creation of Orientalist schools in Spain and the production of Orientalist literature and scholarly work. Conde’s push for an area of study centered on Arab studies was at first rejected within the political environment of the late 18th century (Díaz-Andreu, 2002, p. 138). However, over time, Arabists brought into question the place of Arab-Islamic history within a Spanish past, the contribution of the *Andalusies* to culture, economy, scholarship, and other spheres, and eventually, the belonging of the Muslim inhabitants within the Peninsula. By this time, material evidence from the Arab-Islamic period was as much of interest to archaeologists as it was to others (Díaz-Andreu, 2002).

Paralleling this shift, the importance of the Catholic religion in liberal thought notably began to decrease and as a result, liberal academics distanced themselves and their research objectives from the limiting influence of the church (p. 138). Anticlericalism was an integral component of liberal ideology, which increased as the liberal national project to modernize the country developed (Álvarez Junco, 2002, p. 29). As Margarita Diaz-Andreu explains further: “This doesn’t mean that their researchers had necessarily renounced their religious ideas but that they prioritized historical studies over these ideas” (p. 138). Furthermore, distinct nationalisms within the nation-state began to take form in the late 19th century, with the Catalans and Basques stressing the lack of Arab archeological artifacts found in their regions. Andalusian pride towards its Arab-Islamic past became palpable (p. 142).

The Arab-Islamic past first became seen as an exceptionally brilliant period in history but was still the darkest of the nation’s past. By the late 19th century, it came to be considered part of national history by less conservative scholars. In archaeology, excavations in Madinat al-Zahra brought attention to the importance of Muslim Cordoba as a major medieval city and its role as the first urban cultural center expressing the

European renaissance (p. 144). By the turn of the 20th century, complete exclusion¹⁵ of the Arab-Islamic past, framed as an interruption of Iberian and then Spanish history, had shifted to the Europeanization and acceptance of al-Andalus as integral to Spanish national history in liberal circles (p. 138).

As argued earlier, the history of al-Andalus has often been reexamined during moments of crisis and transition in the country. Thus, the loss of the country's main colonies by 1898 sparked renewed anxieties surrounding national identity with this past at the centre of its historical revisionism. The first three decades of the 20th century brought up questions of the role of both positive and negative interaction between the Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the Peninsula in shaping Spain as a nation (López García, 2000, p. 5). Before Americo Castro (b.1885-d.1972) introduced his arguments on the origins of Spanish identity, the idea of historical *convivencia*, in terms of a coexistence that was conflictual had been argued in historical works. Prior to the Civil War (1936-1939), historian José Amador de los Ríos (b.1816-d.1878) framed his appeal¹⁶ for more interest in Arab studies in light of the need to further examine the relations between Muslims, Christians and Jews and the influence of the Jews and Arabs on “Spanish civilization” (*his term*):

In it [Spanish history], three communities appear that are gifted with different customs, governed by different laws and inspired by different religious principles. In it, **contrary elements are combined and assimilated; opposing interests collide and combat, and contradictory ideas clash without stopping; the most strong and powerful triumphantly remaining, the same controversies disappearing and again being reborn** [...] Our historical studies should, then, be directed towards examining with the utmost circumspection and impartiality these

¹⁵ Throughout this chapter, I discuss the “exclusion” of al-Andalus from the national version of history. To clarify, as with the terms “erasure” and “silencing” (see footnote 10), I do not mean to insinuate that this history was completely removed from Spanish history and simply not included in historical accounts, being told as if the Muslim period did not happen. Instead, I mean to show that al-Andalus was not considered a part of Spain, and thus that its history was external to Spanish history. Considered in this way, the Muslim inhabitants are viewed as outsiders that invaded the territory and were later successfully expelled after eight centuries.

¹⁶ Amador de los Ríos presented his claims in 1848 during his entry speech to the Royal Academy of History in a talk entitled *La influencia de los árabes en las artes y literatura española* [The influence of the Arabs in Spanish art and literature] (Amador de los Ríos, 1898).

three different groups because until this day, the written history is only an imperfect history of the Christian community, without having made all of the possible efforts to recognize and appreciate the influence that the Hebrews and Arabs had on the Spanish civilization. (Amador de los Ríos, 1898, *my translation, my emphasis*)

At this time, Arabs and Jews were not seen as being autochthonous, despite the fact that studies now show that much of the general population did not change at the time of the Arab-Berber invasion. These affiliations, “Arabs” and “Jews”, became associated with particular emergent nation-states that did not exist when they lived on the Peninsula and, therefore, were easily viewed as being external to Spain or outside of the boundaries of Spain as a nation.

Continuing in the nationalist intellectual traditions of his father, the painter Manuel Gómez-Moreno y González,¹⁷ the archaeologist Manuel Gómez-Moreno y Martínez (b.1870-d.1970) finished his doctoral thesis in 1911 insisting on the Muslim invasion as an occupation and as a national disaster (Díaz-Andreu, 2002, p. 145). Yet, by the 1930s, he had clarified his position, emphasizing that the contact between the Muslims and Christians enriched all of the communities in the Peninsula and should not be seen simply as an antagonistic dichotomy of victors and defeated. By the beginning of the Civil War (1936), Spanish intellectuals had clearly taken sides in this national historical debate. As a result of the war and subsequent establishment of the dictatorship, the exile of many of the more left-leaning academics excluded their alternative narratives of al-Andalus from the intellectual circles that forged official national history. Inside the country, the history of al-Andalus became external to the national narrative once again (García Sanjuan, 2012, p. 84). Instead, interest in the Visigothic past grew exponentially and research on the *Andalusi* past lost support (Díaz-Andreu, 2002, p. 148; 1995, p. 46). Consequently, the concept of *convivencia* began to provoke debate not inside the country within this academic environment but rather outside of Spain and the academic discussions permeated by fascist hegemony within the country.

¹⁷ The Granadan painter and archaeologist, Gómez-Moreno y González, was the author of the work in Figure 2.1, Exit of the Family of Boabdil from the Alhambra.

The global turn away from cultural nationalism at the end of the 1970s, which paralleled the transition out of the dictatorship and into democracy after Franco's death in 1975, saw a dramatic shift away from historical justifications for nationalism and, thus, a loss of support for the national-Catholic narratives of Spanish identity (Díaz-Andreu, 2002, p. 149). As Boyd emphasizes in her discussion on the site of the Battle of Covadonga,¹⁸ "governments since the Transition have studiously avoided the nationalist cultural projects associated with the previous regime." (2002, p. 58). Connection to nationalism was no longer required to generate interest in archaeological research. Responsibility for the care of monuments of interest (BIC or *Bien de Interés Cultural*) was transferred to the regional governments in Spain and, at the international level, concern for world heritage sites was led by UNESCO and the first World Heritage Sites were named in 1978, which I discuss further in Chapter Three. Spanish historians returned to debates that had been sparked before the dictatorship, debates which were now removed from their connections to nationalism made before the dictatorship by both liberal and conservative academics (see Díaz-Andreu, 2002, p. 150 for further discussion). Before the Civil War and their exile, prominent intellectuals such as José Ortega y Gasset had begun to question how "something that lasted eight centuries can be called a reconquest" (Ortega y Gasset, 1922/1983, p. 103, *my translation*). Therefore, with the movement away from nationalism, academics returned to debates on the nature of the *Reconquista* and those on the invasion in 711 gained ground. In this context, the formation of the autonomous regions engaged archaeologists and historians in new debates on regional identity that were embedded in an overall increase in research in all areas of the sciences, social sciences and humanities. Conservative narratives of the *Reconquista* and of the exclusion of the medieval Muslim inhabitants from national history became marginal and have been reconstructed in ways that distance them from fascist ideologies (García Sanjuan, 2012). This reduced influence of nationalism on historical research now presents the obstacle of identifying the varied forces involved in

¹⁸ Covadonga (Asturias) was the site in northern Spain that in 722, the troops of Don Pelayo first defeated the Arab invaders. In the national Catholic narrative, this event represents the beginning of the *Reconquista* and embodies the character of the nation and Spanish identity. Boyd (2002) thoroughly reviews the fragmented memory and multilayered imaginings of the meaning of the site during the construction of the shrine and into the dictatorship.

the forging of contemporary narratives of the past. Archeologist Margarita Díaz-Andreu, in her considerations of 21st century archaeology in Spain (2002, p. 149-152), has speculated as to whether or not personal national or regional affiliations of individual researchers are at play in academic circles.¹⁹

2.6 Past academic debates: Embedded in political histories

Debates about the invasion, *convivencia*, and the *Reconquista* have surfaced at different times throughout the past century. As mentioned earlier, Ortega y Gasset brought into question the *Reconquista* slightly before Primo de Rivera overthrew the government and established the first dictatorship (1923-1931). Debates about *convivencia* surfaced less than a decade after the second dictatorship, under Francisco Franco, was established (1939-1975). Challenges to historical narratives of the Muslim invasion appeared near the end of the second dictatorship. Each of these continue to be questioned by academics today, some having more weight than other more marginal versions of these historical events and concepts.

2.6.1 *Convivencia*: Three views on the essence of nationhood

The most prominent debate on Spanish national identity after the Civil War is generally considered to be that of the role of peaceful *convivencia* between Muslims, Christians and Jews. However, as a result of the exile of liberal intellectuals, three theories on *convivencia* emerged. Outside of the country, a predominant contentious exchange developed between Americo Castro (b.1885-d.1972) and Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz (b.1893-d.1984) while both were living in exile, Castro at Princeton and Sánchez-Albornoz in Buenos Aires. The third was forged inside the country, albeit removed from those of exiled liberal intellectuals. The rupture caused by the assassinations and exile of liberals and others once again brought a return of a national historical narrative that cast the history of Arab-Islamic rule in Spain as an aberration and deviation from Catholic Spanish history. Within the country, Maravall's work on the concept of Spain as a nation

¹⁹ Díaz-Andreu uses the example of the Spanish Association of Medieval Archaeology.

in the Christian and Muslim medieval territories clearly excludes al-Andalus from the concept of a Spanish nation (1981; see García Sanjuan, 2012, p. 84 for elaboration). The Arab-Islamic past was again conceived as a national catastrophe brought on by a foreign occupation and relations among the groups were regarded as being of no historical consequence. Few researchers within the country, save for Menéndez Pidal with his voluminous work *Historia de España* (1947),²⁰ bridged this fracture created by the exile with scientific rigor intact (Ribagorda Esteban, 2001, p. 379). Most academic research being done at this time within the country aimed to provide support for a national-Catholic identity that became the hegemonic depiction of events.

The exiled Castro, on the other hand, attributed Spain's unique identity to the coexistence, or *convivencia*, of the three major religions in al-Andalus – Muslims, Christians, and Jews – and the tolerance between them in his book *España en su historia. Cristianos, moros y judíos* (Castro, 1948),²¹ a pleasant, heartening vision within the political climate of the day both within Spain and internationally. Coexistence for Castro went beyond simply existing in proximity to other groups but was characterized as everyday interactions and exchanges between them. The author conceived the three religions as forming separate “lineages” (*casta*), today frequently referred to in both academic circles and popularly as the “*tres culturas*”.²² One example he gives is that of some Jews serving as godparents at Christian baptisms (p. 531). Similarly, some Christians held a similar role at Jewish circumcision rituals. Throughout the massive volume, however, Castro rarely goes as far as mentioning intermarriages between the groups. The few references he does make are to historical documents claiming the tainting of blood when noblemen married *moriscas*, Muslim women who had converted to Christianity (p. 54-55), and the mention of slave women marrying Muslim captors (p.

²⁰ [History of Spain]

²¹ [Spain in its history: Christians, Moors and Jews]

²² Translates as the “three cultures”.

50). Instead, Castro focuses on situations of interrelations between these groups – the Muslims, Christians and Jews:

My interest is directed towards those aspects of medieval life in which both civilizations [i.e. Muslim and Jewish] were combined, not only to follow the footprint of Islam in Christian Spain, but rather to arrive at an effective point of view in respect to the very composition of Iberian civilization. (Castro, 1948, p. 47)

His theory avoided the questions about the autochthony of the inhabitants that had plagued earlier debates (García Sanjuan, 2012, p. 85). Previous discussion on the synthesis of the distinct groups during the 19th century considered whether or not autochthonous characteristics were more prevalent than the foreign and often formed a part of the comparison between their civilizational or barbarous attributes. Within a nationalist version of history, authors such as Simonet,²³ affirmed “the prevalence of the autochthonous over the foreign” (p. 85). It was this conceptualization of *convivencia* as representative of the national essence that began a debate that that has arguably become the most important debate in Spanish historiography (Ribagorda Esteban, 2001, p. 382).

The opposing argument to Castro’s position, and last of the three on Spain’s national “essence” highlighted here, was led by the also exiled Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz. In *España, un enigma histórico* (1956),²⁴ Sanchez-Albornoz argues against *convivencia* as the defining element and instead plants national character firmly in two distinct narratives. First, discarding Castro’s concept of *convivencia*, he defends Muslim Spain and places the utmost importance on its contributions, going against the fascist national-Catholic *españolismo*,²⁵ but simultaneously anchors the national essence in the *Reconquista* (García Sanjuan, 2012). Moreover, he reverses the Muslim influence on the

²³ Simonet refers to well-known Malaga historian Francisco Javier Simonet, one of the leading orientalist Arabists on al-Andalus of the 19th century.

²⁴ [*Spain, a historical enigma*]

²⁵ *Españolismo* is the version of the past that makes Muslim Spain external to the nation’s history. The suffix *-ismo* in Spanish indicates a system, party or doctrine. Thus, *españolismo* refers to system or doctrine of Spanishness or a term defined in such a way that it can include or exclude that which is or is not considered within the realm of being Spanish.

Catholics by asserting that Spain is defined by elements of *lo español* (i.e. that which is Spanish) and thus that the Muslim inhabitants were not Arabized because of this “Spanish” influence. The historian avoids characterizing the Muslim invasion as a definitive rupture by framing al-Andalus as part of Spanish history and forming a continuity from the Greco-Roman/Visigothic past – including the Muslim history – through the Spanish nation-state to come (p. 85). By consolidating both the national-Catholic narrative and al-Andalus, or Muslim Spain as it was referred to before the 1970s, he was able to consider distinguished intellectuals in al-Andalus such as Ibn Hazm and Ibn al-Arabi as Spanish.

2.6.2 The “*Reconquista*”: A conquest of “lost” territory

Reconquista became another term debated in scholarly circles paralleling the nation’s movement toward democracy. According to historian Alejandro García Sanjuan, the term has been used since 1796, when the historical process was converted into “a definitive element of configuration of national identity.” (2013, p. 23, *my translation*). The idea of a Muslim occupation and conquest of the occupied lands, however, can be traced throughout many medieval texts, dating back to at least the 9th century (Manzano Moreno, 2000, p. 53). History books of Franco’s dictatorship later described it as a process of retaking rightfully Christian land. They recount that the majority of the inhabitants had originally converted to Catholicism before the arrival of Islam. In this historical version of the medieval past, the length of the *Reconquista* almost equals that of Muslim rule in al-Andalus, where the former began in 722 with Don Pelayo’s defeat of the Muslim troops at Covadonga. The Muslim invaders had occupied all but a small corner of the northern coast of the Peninsula and it was from here that the reconquest of the territory was launched. The final coup de grâce, the capture of Granada, was a result of eight centuries of conscious war effort to unify the territory on the part of generations of Catholic monarchs. For Spaniards that maintained the national-Catholic narrative, it was this rationale behind the term that legitimized the process as more than just a Christian “conquest” and proved the prefix – “re”conquest – as warranted. The final victory in Granada was viewed as a national liberation, akin to Franco’s liberation of Spain from Marxists and other liberal thinkers (García Sanjuan, 2016). Franco’s coup-

d'état and victory were characterized as a second *Reconquista* and as a Crusade (Basilio, 2002, p. 72). The Monarchs, Isabel and Fernando, became symbols of the state, representing both the Catholic triumph over the foreign Muslim “other” and the architects of *Hispanidad*, the legacy of shared commonalities and connection between Spain and the Americas. Thus, the *Reconquista* was central to fascist ideologies. In order to justify Franco’s rule, the national-Catholic narrative drew parallels between his rule and that of the Catholic Monarchs and their unification of the nation (p. 74). It ignored the varied medieval Christian political formations in order to emphasize a unified Christian nation, one whose ideological confrontation against Islam aligned with the fascist confrontation against its ‘godless’ enemies (Manzano Moreno, 2000, p. 53). It also ignored that at times the different kingdoms were enemies themselves and had often allied with Arab and Muslim *Andalusi* rulers against each other. Moreover, the narrative drew a continuity between the Visigoths, Isabel and Fernando through to Franco and stressed that his victory formed part of this progression. After the Civil War, these ties to this myth of origin became necessary to consolidate a fragmented nation made up of many heterogeneous groups (see Coakley, 2004 on myths found in nationalist history). Finally, the link drawn between fascist rule and the Catholic Monarchs reinforced the idea of a return to “cultural and religious purity” (Fuchs, 2009, p. 2), which Castro’s narrative of *convivencia* challenged by arguing for inter-group interaction. In the end, the national-Catholic ideology of the regime supported by this historical narrative became a tool of indoctrination of the values for which the Spanish right fought during the Civil War (García Sanjuan, 2013, p. 45).

2.6.3 The Arab invasion: An occupation that never happened

Perhaps the most polemical version of the initial entrance of the Muslims is Ignacio Olagüe’s essay, *Les Arabes n’ont jamais envahi l’Espagne* (1969).²⁶ The author originally published the essay while he was exiled in Paris, which was later turned into

²⁶ [The Arabs never invaded Spain], or the later Spanish title: *Los árabes no invadieron jamás España*

the book *La revolución islámica en Occidente* (1974).²⁷ Olagüe posits that the invasion of Spain by Arabs was a logical impossibility. His fellow academics had already brought into question whether or not, and to what extent, Spain had been Arabized but Olagüe went beyond this debate by describing how it was physically impossible for Arab troops to arrive to North Africa by 711 and conquer the Iberian Peninsula in a matter of five years. Olagüe expands his argument further with a descriptive theory on how Islam was contemplated among the Visigoths as an extension of Arianism. Over time, the rejection of the Christian tripartite nature of God, established at the Council of Nicaea in 325, drifted into Visigothic conversion to Islam without intervention from the Arabs. Despite the surge in interest in al-Andalus around the time of the Transition, both the essay and the book were immediately dismissed by Spanish academics because of problematic sources according to Eladio, one of my interviewees (CSIC²⁸ researcher. Interview, June 4, 2013). However, as I discuss below, this argument continues to be debated today. Therefore, in the following section, I discuss contemporary debates and considerations about *convivencia*, the *Reconquista* and the invasion.

2.7 Contemporary academic narratives of *convivencia*, the “*Reconquista*” and the Arab invasion

2.7.1 According to scholars: *Convivencia*

Castro’s position on *convivencia* has seemingly been defended more in intellectual circles outside of Spain than within, as is exemplified by North American academics such as Maria Rosa Menocal (2002). The Arab-Islamic past sparked renewed interest during the 1980s and came to be the focus of much academic research. To Eladio, one academic at the CSIC *Escuela de Estudios Árabes*²⁹ (School for Arab Studies) I spoke with, the

²⁷ [The Islamic revolution in the West]

²⁸ CSIC stands for *Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* or Superior Council of Scientific Research (i.e. the Spanish National Research Council). It is a public institution, and thus financed with public funds.

²⁹ Granada is home to two CSIC research centres. The first being the *Escuela de Estudios Árabes* (EEA). The research done at this centre generally focuses on demographics and society and social relations in al-Andalus.

historical period seemingly became the only important period of history, one in which there was perfect harmony between Jews, Christians, and Muslims:

And [it was like] we *had* [have] to be thankful to the Muslims for the magnificent part of culture, literature and sciences that we have had. When the Catholic Monarchs arrived, all of that was interrupted and it turns out that all we have is problems because we've lost that Muslim identity. (Eladio. CSIC researcher. Interview, June 4, 2013)³⁰

Eladio's critical tone in his statement lends not to an ungratefulness towards the contributions of the *Andalusies*, the inhabitants of al-Andalus, but instead to the fast-growing trend-like fascination with the Arab-Islamic past. He then went on to elaborate on how academics today have moved in the opposite direction, now characterizing the period more as a "barbarity".

Historians and Arabists in Spain today continue to debate the role of al-Andalus in Spanish identity (Arigita, 2009, p. 224) and argue against the idealization of *convivencia*. Beyond the rebuttal of Sanchez-Albornoz, *convivencia* (i.e. coexistence that promoted productive relations between Muslims, Christians and Jews) as a cornerstone to Spanish identity was promptly rejected on three fronts for reasons a number of academics explained to me in my interviews. First, in some narratives, the three religions did not form distinct groups (*castas* as defined by Castro) with separate everyday practices. Muslims, Jews, and Mozarabs³¹ alike that lived in al-Andalus wrote, spoke, and read Arabic and shared similar social practices, a way of being within a particular time and place now referred to as *andalusí* (Molina Martínez, 2006, p. 3), despite maintaining distinct liturgical traditions. Likewise, Mudejars³² and Jews in Christian Spain lived similarly to the majority. Mudejars in Christian territories or Mozarabs in Muslim territories were more likely to diverge from the way they lived everyday life because of

³⁰ All translations of research participant interviews are my own. As such, all errors in translation of both Spanish academic texts and of my interviewees (academics and non-academics) are mine.

³¹ Christians that lived in Muslim Spain.

³² Muslims that lived in Christian Spain.

the proximity of a majority Muslim or Christian territory respectively, while Jews as a minority adapted to the majority. Secondly, perhaps the strongest argument against an idealized narrative of continued peaceful *convivencia* lies in the longevity of the history of al-Andalus and different shifts in power. Different pacts and laws in the historical record establish that *convivencia* between the groups was not always peaceful and had to be regulated by agreements when disputes arose. The Emirate and Caliphate of Cordoba (756-1013) is perhaps the only period where a lasting peaceful *convivencia* could be argued to have existed and where Jews who had been persecuted under Christian rule were protected. Both Jews and Christians living under Muslim rule were considered *dhimmi* or “People of the Book”, protected but required to pay *jizyah*, a tax to maintain their religion. Later periods were marked by the rule of religiously zealous Berber tribes from North Africa, instability between warring *taifas* (small city states), and the Kingdom of Granada where Muslims expelled from conquered territories took refuge as the Catholic conquest pushed further south. Lastly, academics I spoke with emphasized that when the groups did exist in the same city, they were generally separated into ghettos as is physically represented in Granada with its Muslim neighbourhood, the Albayzín, and the Jewish neighbourhood, Realejo. Felix, a researcher at CSIC elaborated on this point:

I also don't... I mean, the myth of the three cultures, that which talks about *convivencia* and the three cultures occurred in a more exceptional way, more marginal way and more isolated way than what is thought. **Because the communities were separated within the city and lived in their own neighbourhoods. There were rules of exclusion.** I mean, it wasn't an easy *convivencia* at all. (Felix. CSIC researcher. Interview, June 19, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

Furthermore, they argue that close interaction mainly happened among elites, citing examples such as Samuel ibn Nagrela (b.993-d.1055). Ibn Nagrela was born to a prosperous Jewish family in Cordoba, built his own fortune in Malaga, and then rose to become a trusted vizier in the Ziri *taifa* of Granada. Therefore, within most academic circles since the transition to democracy, Castro's position on *convivencia* is considered to be disproved. Theories that side with Castro's reasoning are generally criticized as being “maurophilic”, that is, as idealizing the Moorish past and falling prey to romanticization and nostalgia, a point which I address in Chapter Five.

2.7.2 According to scholars: The “*Reconquista*”

Both the narrative of *Reconquista* – despite being discredited by scholars and historians – and a catastrophic invasion (which I address below) have been extremely resilient in conservative academic circles as well as conservative politics. The dissolution of the link between history and nationalism in the 1970s meant a conservative shift towards Sanchez-Albornoz’s argument that privileged the militaristic *Reconquista* over the interactions and connections of Muslim Spain. Moreover, it also disconnected this history from the concept of national liberation. From my interviews (and other authors cited), it would seem that this view is now reduced to a marginal group of intellectuals, as I argue above. Nonetheless, Maximo, a researcher at CSIC, disclosed that there are still many academics that follow Sanchez-Albornoz, including Arabist Serafin Fanjul (2000). It is a narrative that “today, continues to be current as a political and ideological phenomenon, not exempt from historiographical manifestations” (García Sanjuan, 2013, p. 23, *my translation*). Alejandro,³³ a historian from the University of Granada, elaborated on this point in our interview:

In history, there are always creations of this type that later are filled with content depending on the ideology. A generally historiographical ideology, a progressive historiography has rejected the concept of ‘*reconquista*’. The traditional and conservative historiography continues to cling to the concept of *Reconquista* because it goes well with its concept of... with its essentialist discourse of Spain, etc., etc. (Alejandro. History professor, University of Granada (UGR). Interview, July 26, 2012)

Conservative historians, including Fanjul and others, have gone as far as recently arguing at a conference supporting the platform #stopISISya (#stopISISnow) that the Caliphate of Cordoba did not produce an environment of *convivencia*, but one of apartheid (Manzaneque, 2015) and that tolerance in al-Andalus did not exist (C.M., 2015).

Academics such as Emilio Molina López or Pedro Martínez Montávez have argued against Fanjul and maintain that Muslim Spain, its contribution, and its *convivencia* and

³³ While the majority of academic interviewees did research on al-Andalus, their area of expertise did not necessarily centre on the invasion, the *Reconquista* or *convivencia*. Thus, I chose to maintain the anonymity of all academics when quoting them in my interviews.

the relationships between medieval Muslims and Christians, must be considered together with Christian Spain, all the while understanding that confrontations would have been inevitable. Sanchez-Albornoz's consolidation of the *Reconquista* with the inclusion of al-Andalus in Spanish history and recognition of the contributions of the Muslim inhabitants, however, was dissolved as conservative circles once again relegated al-Andalus to being external, a foreign occupation with little influence on what Spain is today (García Sanjuan, 2012, p. 94). As a result, a situation similar to that of 19th century historiography has been reproduced (p. 89). The principal debate is reduced to two arguments instead of the three that the fascist era and the exile of intellectuals produced – a privileging of the *Reconquista* and an exclusion of al-Andalus on the one hand, contra the inclusion of al-Andalus and continued academic research and debate on related subjects on the other.

The resilience of the term is strengthened by certain earmarks of the exclusionary narrative. First, the Catholic conquest is presented as a logical historical progression of history (García Sanjuan, 2012, p. 92). The inhabitants of the territory converted to Christianity first, and thus the Muslims occupying the land needed to be expelled and the land recuperated. The national connection becomes unnecessary to justify the gradual reappropriation of land. Second, the reasons given for the often-violent friction in al-Andalus is connected to a contemporary theory, Huntington's theory (1996) on the clash of civilizations, that naturalizes conflicts between Islam and Christianity (p. 92). This point coincides with conservative political discourse discussed in Chapter Five. Therefore, not only does the narrative attempt to make sense of past conflicts with Islam but also present-day encounters within a framework of "civilizational logic" (Arigita, 2009, p. 233). This version has in turn continued to provide a foundation for conservative political rhetoric that seeks to delineate Spanish history as European forged by a Christian past separating it from its Muslim "other". Finally, the idea of the *Reconquista* is reinforced by one unlikely source, academics who argue against the use of the term. Felix, a researcher I interviewed at CSIC's Laboratory of Archeology and Architecture of

the City (LAAC),³⁴ explained that the change in terminology has not been readily adopted among academics outside of Spain, and thus still has some weight (Felix. CSIC researcher. Interview, June 19, 2012). He also reasoned that even Spanish academics who argue that the term should not be used continue to use it out of custom and forgetfulness, although there is a general consensus within Spain that the process was a Catholic conquest that served religious expansionism rather than conflict over territory or resources, and that this previously hegemonic narrative served only the national-Catholic identity.

The narrative of *Reconquista* is contested by a number of scholars who argue against the national-Catholic narrative and call for historical reconstructions that are neither used to legitimize the nation nor are shaped by political discourse. Each of these observations has produced its own historical debates within Spanish historiography and appear in my interviews. The first argument is aligned with José Ortega y Gasset's abovementioned consideration that the invasion by Fernando and Isabel cannot be considered a reconquest after eight centuries. The duration of the Muslim period brings into question whether the *Andalusies* were autochthonous by the time they were expelled or converted. Secondly, whether autochthonous or not, a people that had inhabited the Peninsula for eight centuries simply did not deserve to be expelled from a territory that had become their home. Questions of autochthony also problematizes certain elements of the invasion and occupation. Onomastic research on the limited size³⁵ of the invading Arab armies, their ethnicities, their settlement and marriage patterns in the Peninsula as found in documents shows patterns of individual soldiers mixing with the inhabitants already living on the Peninsula (Máximo. CSIC researcher. Interview, November 25,

³⁴ The *Laboratorio de Arqueología y Arquitectura de la Ciudad* (LAAC or Archaeology and Architecture Laboratory of the City) is one of two CSIC research centres in the city of Granada. The other being the *Escuela de Estudios Árabes* (or the School of Arab Studies). Both are located in the Albaicín. The research done at the LAAC overwhelmingly focuses on archaeological sites in the region of Granada but the researchers from the Laboratory have undertaken projects in other parts of Spain as well as in Morocco.

³⁵ Taking Sanchez-Albornoz's estimates into consideration, Guichard estimates this number in the tens of thousands of Arabs. Texts, however, do not allow for a fair estimate of Berbers amongst these troops. I refer to this number as limited due to the lack of displacement and repopulation of large parts of the population and the Peninsula (Guichard, 2006, p. 33).

2011; Guichard, 2006, p. 12 & 33-34). Similar research on conversion to Islam by the inhabitants and the *ulema*³⁶ also brings into question a substitution of the population (Molina, 1994). The narrative of Don Rodrigo's appeal for military support from the Muslims to the south in exchange for territory to fight off the rival Visigoth tribe of Witiza has directed researchers towards the aforementioned pacts and agreements of protection between different parties. Pacts such as the Pact of Tudmir – a written agreement between Visigoth king Teodormiro, and the coordinating general of the Muslim armies, Musa ibn Nusayr, guaranteeing the freedom of religion and safety of the inhabitants (Guichard, 2006, p. 36) – have also provided historical data that challenges the characterization of the invasion as continuous violence inflicted by Muslim barbarians. Eladio, one CSIC researcher, noted:

[The son of Witiza] makes a pact [to facilitate] the entrance of the Muslims, and the Muslims help recuperate the throne. Or better said, [the tribe of Witiza] help the Muslims enter the Peninsula and in exchange [for their help, Witiza] concedes some territory, a series of privileges and in such a way that **the Muslim invasion has a military component but also a very important component of pacts.** (Eladio. CSIC researcher. Interview, June 4, 2013) (*my emphasis*)

Finally, the extent of the conversion to Christianity in the Peninsula before the Arab-Berber invasion has prompted further research. One version discusses the religious split between Arian and Christian Visigoth Kings and how the presence of Arianism, a monotheistic view on the nature of God, was significant when King Recaredo I became Christian before the 3rd Council of Toledo in 589 (Valdeón Baroque, 1999, p. 62-63). Another draws attention to the Jewish role in the initial arrival of the Muslims as Eladio also touched upon when elaborating on the rapidity of the invasion:

Simply because the Visigothic state is split and moreover, they [the Muslims] are going to count on the help of the Jews. So, the Jews are going to feel more identified with the Muslims. The Muslims are going to assure at the beginning you know... that all the members of the religion, I mean, members of... what they call “the people of the book”. [...] they are going

³⁶ *Ulema* is defined as: “Muslim scholars or men of authority in religion and law” (“ulema”, 2018).

to offer protection to the Jews. The Jews will collaborate in this conquest as well. (Eladio. CSIC researcher. Interview, June 4, 2013)

As Eladio observes, Jews persecuted under Christian rule were promised protection as *dhimmi* and thus facilitated the Muslim presence. These different narratives do not idealize al-Andalus. They instead view the Muslim inhabitants of al-Andalus as one more group – along with the Iberians, the Celts, Phoenicians, Romans, Visigoths, and others – who invaded, settled, and left its mark on Spain and especially Andalusia.

2.7.3 According to scholars: The Arab invasion

The arguments of Olagüe's book have gained strength amongst Arab Studies scholars since 2004 when the book was reedited (García Sanjuan, 2013, p. 23). This line of thinking was taken on by Arab Studies scholar Emilio González Ferrín in his massive work *General history of al-Andalus* (2006), arguing that what resulted from this religious split was a civil war between Trinitarian and Unitarian Visigoths, not an Islamic invasion. Furthermore, he completely rejects the narrative of the *Reconquista*. Similar to Olagüe's theory, González Ferrín's version of history is contested and labeled as a "negationism",³⁷ a denial of historical events that took place:

In a curious phenomenon of transference between completely unconnected ideologies, although perfectly explicable, **the negationist fraud is transmitted during the Transition to the historiographical discourse of Andalusian nationalism, that sees in the *Andalusi* civilization, the maximum historical culmination of the "Andalusian nation" [...]** Negationism takes pleasure today in presenting itself as a necessary questioning of myths [that are] promoted from [positions of] Power. (García Sanjuan, 2013, p. 24, *my translation, my emphasis*)


As mentioned above, Olagüe's theories have been adopted by some of the groups that promote Andalusian nationalism (Fierro, 2017, p. 178; García-Sanjuan, 2013), such as the now-dissolved *Andalucista* party (which I discuss in the following section).

Moreover, Spanish converts to Islam, including many that I interviewed, also tend to

³⁷ *Negacionismo* (negationism), defined in terms of history, is the "attitude that consists in the negation of recent and very serious historical facts that are generally accepted" ("negacionismo", 2017, *my translation*), although in the case of al-Andalus it becomes the negation of historical events from the medieval period, namely the Arab invasion.

favour this narrative (Fierro, 2017, p. 178; see Roson Lorente, 2008, pp. 91-94 for more on political Islam during the Transition in Andalusia). The following section addresses three ways in which the history of al-Andalus has appeared in political discourse since the Transition. In this context, *Convivencia*, as a commonly used term today, is often detached from its historical meaning, although the two – historical and non-historical – meanings at times overlap, as my research shows. Furthermore, *Andalucismo*, or Andalusian regional nationalism, is one example of how this history has been used to forge collective identity. Finally, the still-dominant national-Catholic narrative arises in conservative political discourse at strategic moments to publicly reinforce a particular view of the past.

2.8 History in politics: *Andalucismo* and the bylaws of *convivencia*

A very poignant recent example of how history and politics are entwined within conservative circles is found in a slew of politicians' tweets on the 525th anniversary of the Capture of Granada in January of 2017. Among others, Esperanza Aguirre, the spokesperson for the local *Partido Popular* (People's Party) in Madrid, tweeted: "525 years ago today, the Capture of Granada by the Catholic Monarchs. It's a glorious day for female Spaniards. With Islam we wouldn't be free. " ("Esperanza Aguirre, sobre la toma", 2017), accompanied by an image of the painting "The Surrender of Granada" by Francisco Pradilla (b.1848-d.1921) – a contemporary of Gómez-Moreno and Fortuny – which hangs in Madrid's Palace of the Senate. Her celebratory words referencing the final stage of the *Reconquista* illustrates how history can serve present-day politics. Additionally, she draws on the contemporary anti-Islamic atmosphere and stereotypes about Islam, not least the erroneous assumption that Islam and Muslims are inherently against women's rights. These comments do not just reference the past but make connections between and assumptions about the past and the present that are situated in and governed by contemporary political discourse of the conservative People's Party of which Aguirre forms a part. Memory by definition is about a *past-present relation*. It is because "the past' has this living active existence in the present that it matters so much politically." (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, p. 211). In her comment, Aguirre draws on a

persisting Orientalist perspective that views Islam and the Arab world as fixed and unchanging since its emergence in the 7th century. Her comment connecting the Muslims of the past to contemporary Muslims, although inflammatory, is not uncommon for conservative politicians. Despite this conservative narrative, a contrasting more critical approach, which emerged at the beginning of the transition to democracy as another trend among historians, also found its way into politics. This other trend did not regard the Muslims or Islam as the oppositional ‘other’ but as part of Spanish history.

On the regional level, the past was similarly instrumental in forging a regional collective identity in the newly created autonomous regions, and it is not surprising that Andalusia drew heavily on its ‘unique’ past. Initial proposals from the nationalist *Andalucista* Party – regional nationalism that is – presented the distinctive history of al-Andalus as justification for obtaining the special route to autonomy, one that would allow for a regional parliament and the power to create its own laws. Not only had the Muslim inhabitants lived almost 300 years longer in Andalusia than in the rest of Spain but the Kingdom of Granada as a territorial division existed until 1833. However, the argument found little support in other political circles, as Nicolás, a professor of Political History from the University of Granada, explained to me (personal communication, April 16, 2013). In the end, despite the interest at a regional level, the role of al-Andalus in shaping the bid for regional autonomy is clearly absent from the documents (Ruíz Robledo, 2003). Moreover, the historical arguments found little support from Andalusian labourers who formed a significant part of the population at the time (Núñez Seixas, 1993, p. 11). Still, claiming the history of al-Andalus as a base for regional identity took hold symbolically despite this lack of broad recognition on the part of politicians outside of the *Andalucista* Party. The Statue of Autonomy for Andalusia names Blas Infante (b.1885-d.1936), a liberal thinker who had been executed at the beginning of the Civil War, as the father of the region (Parlamento de Andalucía, 1981). It does not, however, make reference to his call for a historical connection to al-Andalus, which he considered to be the maximum example of Andalusian identity. As the founder of the *Andalucista* Party, Infante had called for autonomy before the war and laid out the region’s historical connections to al-Andalus in *Ideal andaluz* (1915). He gave suggestions for what later became adopted as the current green and white flag of Andalusia after the Transition and

coined the regional motto. The lyrics of the regional anthem are also his. As a political ideology, *Andalucismo* has no political weight today.³⁸ Its legacy, however, responded to the historical search for a distinctive identity for Andalusians, one that quite often appears in political discourse in nuanced ways.

The type of *convivencia* that politicians are most likely to make reference to is not historical *convivencia*. It was a call heard commonly in the public speeches made by politicians and the King after both the Barcelona attack (August of 2017) and during the violence perpetrated by the state during the referendum in Cataluña that led to the region's vote on and very brief declaration of independence in October of 2017. The prescriptive definition of *convivencia* does not directly refer to the historical concept but simply to any "action of coexisting" or "living in the company of others" ("*convivencia*", 2017, *my translation*) and is used commonly in everyday interactions. Many, if not all, cities in Spain have a bylaw on *convivencia* that outlines the local expectations for civil coexistence between neighbours (see also Taha, 2014 on the teaching of civil *convivencia* in the Spanish school system). This way of characterizing *convivencia* diverges from liberal multiculturalism in that it isn't specific to relations between Spaniards³⁹ and groups that differ culturally. The bylaw on civil *convivencia* in Granada contains only one article that specifically references Spanish-foreigner relations and limits the regulation to stating that the local government promotes collaboration with any foreign person who also promotes civil *convivencia* in the city (Ayuntamiento de Granada, 2009, Chapter 3, Article 19). The law maps out everything from the problematic watering of plants on balconies to the commercial occupation of public space without special permits. Once again, historical *convivencia* is not included in these documents as was the case with the proposal for regional autonomy. On both sides of the political debate, however, comments on and discussion about both historical *convivencia* and contemporary

³⁸ With such little support, the *Andalucista* Party was dissolved in mid-2015.

³⁹ Here and elsewhere I refer not to any Spanish citizen regardless of ethnicity, but instead, specifically to those Spaniards that consider (the majority of) their ancestors to be inhabitants of the Peninsula for an unknowable number of generations and that generally identify with dominant Spanish practices and customs. I will use this definition throughout the dissertation and will indicate if I use it differently. While the complexities and differences allowed within citizenship are not captured in this definition, I attempt to indicate this group in particular.

convivencia between non-Muslims and Muslims do surface. These political references and others that mention the Islamic and Catholic conquests almost always allude to the present.

2.9 *Convivencia*, the “*Reconquista*” and popular memory

The three intertwined narratives of invasion, *convivencia*, and the *Reconquista* have become extremely common amongst ordinary people. Even individuals who tend to know very little about *Andalusi* history tend to be aware of and often have a strong opinion about these three periods of history. The total exclusion of al-Andalus from what shapes the nation is more likely to form part of the narratives of extreme right-wing supporters, and as a result this view was fairly elusive in my fieldwork. The majority, if not all, of the people that agreed to be interviewed for my research considered al-Andalus a part of Spanish national history. With that said, I hesitate to argue that the reason for this is that the inclusive version of the past has become the hegemonic narrative at the national level. The political attempts to claim this history as representative of the region and the many initiatives supported by the regional government throughout the years have certainly lent support to the dissemination of the narrative. However, regional narratives continue to compete with national constructions of the past. Moreover, my research was carried out in a locality known around Spain for its connection to the history of al-Andalus and thus may not be characteristic of the whole region. One of my interviewees, Amparo, speaks to the exclusion and the effect that the local can have on these narratives by explaining:

I think that for a lot of people it is outside of the history. But it does form a part of the history. Man! Especially living in Granada, you have to realize that it forms a part of the history. Man, I understand that someone that lives in Logroño,⁴⁰ or, I don't know, in Soria, it's a little far for them but [for] us, it's a part of the history. Of course [it is]. (Amparo. Mid-50s, *Albaicinera*.⁴¹ Interview, August 8, 2012)

⁴⁰ Logroño is a city in northern Spain in the region of La Rioja. Soria is a city approximately 100kms south of Logroño in the region of Castilla y León.

⁴¹ A common reference to residents born to families from the Albayzín, the Moorish neighbourhood in Granada, and generally used to denominate someone residing in the neighbourhood.

Amparo refuses to detach her lived experience in the present from the past as represented by the historic buildings in the built environment. She considers the local within the frame of the nation, acknowledging that in the northern part of the country, the extent to which people identify with the history of al-Andalus may be much more limited.

Questions of autochthony were also common among both scholars and my non-academic interviewees. The belonging of the Muslim and *Morisco*⁴² inhabitants, the former's inclusion in Spanish history and the recognition of the injustice of the expulsions were often coupled together.⁴³ As Eladio, at the CSIC School of Arab Studies, explained:

The *Moriscos* shouldn't have been expelled but not because they didn't contribute anything in terms of organization [but] because they were people who, during many centuries, had lived here, because this was their land. [...] But that is the great social and personal injustice of someone who you remove from what has been their life, that of their grandparents, that of their great-grandparents, that of many generations and all of a sudden you tell them: Of course... I am going to send you to North Africa, with another people that speak your language, and they say: But that's not my land! (Eladio. CSIC researcher. Interview, June 4, 2013)

While Eladio frames the narrative historically, popular constructions of other people interviewed often associate the autochthony of the *Andalusi* inhabitants with Spanish national identity, insisting that they belonged and shouldn't have been expelled because they were "Spanish". This assertion is made despite that the Spanish nation-state did not exist during the medieval period. Furthermore, the narratives of some groups that invoke a fixed, static and exclusive national identity, at times weave together ideas and events from dominant and alternative narratives. Curiously, Oscar, an interviewee whose profile would suggest he supported right-wing ideals and exclusion of this history, stated:

⁴² *Moriscos* were Muslim inhabitants that converted to Christianity in the Christian kingdoms of the north. It also refers to the Muslim inhabitants that stayed after the expulsion by converting, who were expelled a century later.

⁴³ Where the Muslims were expelled in 1492 along with the Jews and the *Moriscos* from 1609-1613.

Nobody is conscious about where we are at. 500 years here already, but they were here for 800 so we still have to make it 300 years more in order to be here the same [amount of] time that they were here. **I mean, [they were] more Spanish than me, right? As of today, they are more Spanish than we are.** But it's sold as something exotic, that they came without... they invaded and they got to keep what was yours. (Óscar. Mid-30s, *cofrade*.⁴⁴ Interview, June 28, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

This inclusion of the Muslim inhabitants in the history and the insistence that their “Spanishness” surpasses that of the inhabitants of Christian Spain (i.e. from 1492 to today) by Oscar, a self-proclaimed conservative traditionalist who supports centre-left politics, is an example of the importance of individual interpretation in historical narratives that are used to conceptualize collective identity. Halbwachs’ (1992) considerations on collective memory posits that individual representations have little effect on social phenomena (in Gedi & Elam, 1996). Yet, as we see here, individual and collective stories are intertwined, without reducing individual agency and its influence on collective versions of the past.

Popular narratives surrounding *convivencia* parallel academic debates. The majority of my interviewees primarily made reference to historical *convivencia* given that much of the discussion during our interviews was centered around the history. In daily conversations, the main references made to *convivencia* was that of civil *convivencia*. However, in public discussion, the concept of *convivencia* becomes a term to consider and debate the past, present and future of Spanish society. An example of this past-present-future relation was the opening panel of the “Meeting of Social Communication and Journalism of the Mediterranean” held at Granada’s Science Centre (April 12, 2013) as part of the events organized in celebration of the Millennium of Granada.⁴⁵ The panel

⁴⁴ The term *cofrade* makes reference to membership in a *cofradía* or *hermandad* (meaning “brotherhood”). These brotherhoods each year participate in the Holy Week parades, carrying statues (called “images” in Granada) of the Virgin Mary and scenes from the life of Jesus of Nazareth through the streets. The distinct views on history that Oscar and Santiago, both *cofrades*, held, demonstrate the broad range of people that participate in these parades. Versions of the Muslim history held by the *cofrades* I interviewed varied greatly, demonstrating that religion is not always a determining factor in the historical narratives of al-Andalus that one carries, although it can be of influence.

⁴⁵ Organized as a part of the initiative “Millennium of Granada” held in 2013 to celebrate the millennium of the city. One version of the city’s history presents the founding of the city and Taifa of Granada in 1013 by the Zirí dynasty.

“Millennium of the Kingdom of Granada as a reference for contemporary society” debated the relevance of the term today, discussing the uniqueness and loss of *convivencia* in al-Andalus and how this idea should define intergroup relations in the present.⁴⁶

On the other hand, civil *convivencia* was almost always connected to discussion of immigration in my interviews. It was generally considered separately from its historical version but the two often shared elements, such as the requirement of harmonious relations, tolerance,⁴⁷ respect for the ‘other’ or a lack of xenophobia. Everyday discussions between my respondents were framed more often in terms of neighbourly *convivencia*. Complaints about *convivencia* are often framed in terms of the Bylaws of *Convivencia*, referencing the behaviour expected from everyone living in Granada. However, questions of migration and racism can complicate the situation. To give an example, it is prohibited for businesses to occupy public space in the street without a permit (Ayuntamiento de Granada, 2009, Chpt. 4, Article 20). Both the numerous restaurants with fixed illegal patios and the Moroccan shops that extend their merchandise displays into the street whenever open are in violation of this law, as both often severely limit sidewalks and plazas. Migrants and amateur artisans also often set up stands in the streets to sell their goods. These vendors, however, are generally not included in complaints about this behaviour. The grievances about this practice by restaurants and the Moroccan shops that I observed are equally common and equally reported to authorities;⁴⁸ however, those about the Moroccan shops can be complicated, at times intertwined with racism.

⁴⁶ The paragraph given in the information pamphlet for the Meeting was the following: “The celebration of the Millennium of the Kingdom of Granada assesses a form of understanding and *convivencia* that can change cultural evolution today as a fundamental base for the social and economic development of communities.” (ECSP, 2013)

⁴⁷ Tolerance, however, was defined quite differently between my interviewees.

⁴⁸ The response from the authorities in both the case of the restaurants and the Moroccan shops has been one of evasion, giving little response and not taking action.

Interviewees who had a positive view of historical *convivencia* observed that apart from being peaceful and pleasant, the groups nurtured or enriched each other culturally, they respected and tolerated each other. For Bilal, one interviewee of Lebanese-Spanish descent who has experienced various forms of racism in his daily life, “it might even have been better than today” (Bilal. Early 30s, waiter. Interview, September 3, 2012). This view of *convivencia* perhaps represents the idealized version from which many academics attempt to stay away. In contrast to Bilal’s characterization, UGR historian Alejandro draws attention to *convivencia*’s problematic positive connotations and opts to characterize the intergroup relations using a different term:

In the Kingdom of Granada (pause) *convivencia* existed from the same moment that the conquest began. So, the two creeds [*credos*] necessarily had to ‘live together’ [*convivir*], right? The Christians and Muslims. ***Convivencia, in any case... using the term convivencia could even be excessive because the convivencia was rather... almost coexistence. But convivencia probably carries an ameliorative meaning of harmony, of agreement.*** While coexistence, well, I mean here are some communities and they coexist close by each other. (Alejandro. History professor, UGR. Interview, July 26, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

Similar to Alejandro’s distinction, Santiago stressed the difference between *convivencia* and coexistence, a subtlety that academics from outside of Spain often disregard completely when speaking of Spanish *convivencia* due to a lack of an adequate translation that captures its full meaning:

There isn’t *convivencia* because it doesn’t exist. [...] Well, sure, *convivencia*, pfff... they lived together [*convivían*]. **They coexisted more than anything. What’s more is that like some people, I think people directly call it coexistence because *convivencia*...** to making life impossible for someone else, that’s what they did in the Muslim period. (Santiago, Late-30s, *cofrade*. Interview, February 29, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

Santiago insists that idyllic *convivencia* doesn’t exist and opts for the term coexistence to describe what he imagines as difficult relations during al-Andalus. Amparo is also explicit in saying that it simply didn’t exist, mentioning that: “they were always at war”. When I mentioned the “*tres culturas*”, she laughed and exclaimed: “That was an invention from three days ago!”, telling me that it was a contemporary political move and reminded me that in 1066, when the Zirids ruled Granada, they massacred thousands of

Jews. Others, like Oscar, observed there were always moments of peace between the moments of tension instead of dismissing the idea of *convivencia* altogether but also stressed that *convivencia* only existed among the elites (Óscar. Mid-30s, *cofrade*. Interview, June 28, 2012). Most curiously, the narratives of respondents that knew a lot about the history tended to incorporate various aspects in their interpretation of the past. Hector, for example, pointed out that in Cordoba, tribunals would be set up between the families of two communities involved in a dispute to decide a just sentence for the guilty party, a legal process that indicated *convivencia*. However, he also pointed out that an 800-year-long *convivencia* is a myth because both conflicts and pacts of peace are documented. However, Hector still sees *convivencia* as part of the legacy of al-Andalus:

The point is justice, dialogue, meeting, understanding, and agreement. That, as we say, is the [historical] memory that al-Andalus left us, right? Understand each other, dialogue, compromise, and make it possible. (Héctor. Mid-60s, Granadan. Interview, November 4, 2012)

It is this ideal that many of the foundations and initiatives that invoke the argument for *convivencia* aim to accomplish. *Convivencia* becomes an ideal that goes beyond coexistence. Felix, a CSIC researcher, addresses this ideal when discussing past and present religious conflicts such as the genocide in the Balkans and persecution of Christian Maronites in Syria before the civil war:

So in the best/ in any case, what can be said about the concept of the ‘three cultures’ and the concept of *convivencia* is that when it is used at times, the impression it also gives me is that **[people] want to use it as an act of good faith. Almost as a project of the future more than/ or also of the present, as a guide to action more than a real description of what happened.** So it creates this concept. It is projected backwards to the past based on some evidence that is there. (Felix. CSIC researcher. Interview, June 19, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

Felix emphasizes the role of the concept and what is often referred to as the “Myth of the *Tres Culturas*” (see Rojo Flores, 2015 for further anthropological discussion) in the relation of the past-present. Moreover, like Oscar, in this same discussion, Felix also emphasized that this *convivencia* was limited to the elites of society. Furthermore, similar to UGR historian Alejandro and CSIC Arabist Eladio, he characterized relations as “problematic”.

Similar to *convivencia*, many of my non-academic interviewees presented opposing versions of both the *Reconquista* and the Islamic conquest. Only a few of my respondents defended the *Reconquista*. The most common response was simply that it was a European project and that all of the inhabitants on the Peninsula according to the project had to become Christian, but that it was history and, therefore, we cannot judge the past. One of my neighbours, Marisol, suggested that all civilizations “have a fall and here, the civilization was already in decline. So, the Catholic Monarchs took advantage to finish them off and prove that it was their [land], because it [actually] belonged to the Muslims’.” (Marisol. Early 70s, *Albaicinera* from birth. Interview, September 4, 2012). Santiago insisted that the *Reconquista* was justified when I asked him what he thought of a similar comment made by a conservative researcher whom we had seen give a talk (Santiago, Late-30s, *cofrade*. Interview, February 29, 2012). His reasons for this justification was, first, that it was a recovery and reaffirmation of what was once Christian and, second, that the justification wasn’t really needed since the documents provided proof in his view. He was perhaps unaware of the debate surrounding the scarcity of the sources used in this national-Catholic justification. Arguing against the national-Catholic narrative, Alejandro elaborated on the reasons it could not be considered a *Reconquista*:

There had been a sort of retreat towards the north and later, a moment arrived that was very early on [when] that same group starts a process of... first the retreat and now the spreading out. And that same group begins to recuperate that which they had lost. And it’s not true. It’s not true. (pause) It’s not true because the majority of the population that stayed in Muslim Spain, in al-Andalus, were Christians that converted and now, what they were overcome by, we would say, was some Muslim powers that came from Syria, from Africa, from wherever. But the amount of people that came, they couldn’t have occupied Spain. They wanted to dominate Spain and the Visigoths, the majority of them, well, because they [the Arabs] gave them advantages, because they [the Visigoths] had their lands, because they [the Arabs] respected them wherever, they [the Visigoths] converted and they converted to [become] Muslims. So that retreat to then spread out again isn’t possible. (Alejandro. History professor, UGR. Interview, July 26, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

Felix also emphasized that it was not a “Reconquest” in saying that the term *Reconquista* “is a construction. What it was, a war of conquest that lasted centuries and it was, well,

just that, little by little, made a society disappear.” (Felix. CSIC researcher. Interview, June 19, 2012). Others, such as Bilal, thought that most people believe the term is no longer of significant use. Perhaps surprisingly, given the general acceptance of the argument against the *Reconquista* in academia, not many of the non-academics I interviewed indicated that it was conquest and not a “reconquest”, an argument that would reject the term that links the Christian conquest to nationalism. However, we are reminded of Felix’s comment mentioned above about the continued use of the term in academia out of habit.

The initial arrival of the Muslims is still perhaps the least contested of the three narratives. Olagüe’s theory is still relatively unknown to the general population. It is also still much more controversial. The national-Catholic version of the Muslim invasion is still very present and often tied to the idea of *Reconquista*. Having tea one afternoon, Elias told me how he thought it sad that the Muslim inhabitants were expelled because they were Granadan, yet it wasn’t right to judge the expulsion since the Muslims:

also arrived on the Peninsula and in a way, they also conquered territory that wasn’t theirs. Because this land didn’t belong to them. But at times, people forget that the Muslims landed at Tarifa and they built their empire. **They came from the north of Africa. [...] We forget that they occupied the land for eight centuries.** (Elias. Late 20s, Granadan Musician. Interview, February 19, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

His statement is another example of how popular narratives take from both dominant and alternative constructions of the past and how individuals might select a part of an alternative historical narrative while maintaining other parts of the national-Catholic version. He reiterates that the Muslims conquered and occupied the land, two elements of the conservative narrative. Another parallel to the more liberal academic version is Oscar’s questioning of the history and what they have been taught in school. He doubts that it was an extensively violent invasion, wondering why there were so few deaths and so much acceptance of the new elites in power. His doubt allowed for a shift in his own narrative, a reconsideration that is common to individual narratives as well as academic debates. Thus, debates of *convivencia*, the Christian conquest, and the Islamic conquest, as well as others such as the inclusion or exclusion of the *Andalusi* past from national

history, are equally present in popular memory. It is clear that *convivencia* is more often described idealistically in the public field as well as among the general population, but in Granada it is equally met with skeptical criticism. Despite academic criticism of popular narratives conveyed to me, not only do these debates parallel those of academics, I would contend that the popular and academic interlaced, and at times, took cues from each other to both shape and reflect shifting societal sentiments and political contexts.

2.10 Concluding thoughts

Both popular and academic narratives of al-Andalus cover far more topics and are far more complex than the three historical concepts that I chose to address in this chapter – *convivencia*, the “*Reconquista*” and the initial invasion, in actuality sharing many more commonalities beyond the realm of politicized aspects of the past. Yet, few concepts and events have been employed more readily in forging the imagined nation-state. They are consistently raised during times of transition to quell insecurities and are often intended to direct the country in different directions. In this chapter, I first outlined how Muslim Spain transitioned from being considered external to Spanish history to developing a narrative of two conflicting positions: one of inclusion and, by more conservative academics, one of exclusion. The interpretations of each of these three politicized historical phenomena that I consider play an integral part in the formation of the different versions of the past and whether or not the history is included or excluded. Individual constructions of the past are not limited to one position of this partitioned national narrative – and the parts that pertain to it – or the other. Instead, they can take from both, whether from dominant or alternative narratives, creating a heterogeneity of versions of the past. It is in this entanglement of diverse narratives that have been politicized that parallels are found between popular and academic narratives. Contestations of the version of history presented at the *Día de la Toma* (Day of the Capture) festival in Granada that I discuss in Chapter Four are often rooted in alternative narratives of *convivencia*, accounts that blur the lines between the past and present as well as historical and civil *convivencia*. They draw on a narrative of an erroneous *Reconquista* and privilege the autochthony of the inhabitants of al-Andalus. After the move away from a nationalist history in the 1970s, the day that this festival depicts – the day that signified the end to Muslim rule in

Europe and the end to the Christian conquest – came to be framed by a universal narrative, that of UNESCO World Heritage. Thus, in Chapter Three, I consider how local, national and international narratives of al-Andalus has everyday lived effects on the people residing in the historical Arab neighbourhood of the Albayzín in Granada. Commodification has surpassed nationalism in its effects on the production and interpretation of history, although their influence is not mutually exclusive. In Chapter Five, I address how considering commonalities formed during the *Andalusi* period can be used to create connections – and disconnections – between Spain and the Arab world. Alternative narratives of the autochthony of the historical inhabitants, of Islam as forming a part of European history, of the legacy of dialogue and *convivencia*, and questions of whether the past can inform the present and reduce tensions, have all come to be entangled in the economic, political and educational uses of history that lend to the building of bridges.

Chapter 3

3 “Spain, the most monumental country in the world”: Historical tourism and the selling of history

The incline of *Horno de Oro* (Oven of Gold) Street was not by far the steepest in the neighbourhood, but as we walked up the street, Maite,¹ our tour guide, promised that our route wouldn't be too hard of a climb. The ripple of relief could be heard amongst the 21 tourists who decided that going on a historical tour in 39°C heat that day was a wise choice. Maite paused at the top of the street to ask a question: Why are all the streets narrow, with all of the houses white from lime plaster, and organized in a labyrinth? The group waited for her to answer. She explained that it provided both security and protected privacy and intimacy. Invading troops would easily get lost, as some *albaicinos*,² a term for residents of the neighbourhood, still do today. Furthermore, the patios of Muslim houses provided a social space similar to, but more private than, our contemporary plazas. We continued to the left onto *San Juan de los Reyes* (St. John of the Monarchs) Street, sticking to the somewhat cooler shade of the buildings as mopeds sped by us. As we walked, Maite stressed that the street before Muslim rule was a Roman road. Then, she decided to stop at a place that seemed odd for a tourist. There weren't any heritage sites on this part of the street. Instead, she brought attention to the banners hanging from the balconies of numerous houses. Laminated papers with explanations and sheets and pillowcases painted with protests hung from doors and balconies (Figure 3.1). The show of indignation was a response to the recent pedestrianization of a main street that parallels *San Juan de los Reyes*, the *Carrera del Darro/Paseo de los Tristes*,³ a move that was more beneficial to tourists and hotels than it was to residents that live in the

¹ All names have been changed to maintain anonymity of the people involved in this work. For some interviewees and people mention, gender has also been changed, particularly in cases in which the person is more easily identifiable.

² A term for residents of the neighbourhood of the Albaicin.

³ Although the *Carrera del Darro & Paseo de los Tristes* form a single street, the end closest to the city is called the *Carrera del Darro*. The end closest to the valley is called *Paseo de los Tristes*. The entire street runs just below the cliff on which the Alhambra sits. Thus, the street provides picturesque views from different angles.

neighbourhood. They were grievances with which I was very familiar, but it surprised me how long a tour guide took to elaborate to tourists about how mass tourism was (and still is) affecting the neighbourhood and how the government had handled the situation. We continued on while she and I started talking about whom the change affected and in what ways. Arriving at our next stop, the focus shifted back to the historical sites, and Maite



Figure 3.1: Signs by residents on *San Juan de los Reyes* Street in protest of the city's decision to pedestrianize the *Carrera del Darro*, favouring tourists over resident access. (left) "Who does it benefit?" (right) "According to the City, Albaicin is for visiting, not for living" (27 August, 2012; photo by author)



Figure 3.2: Church of St. John of the Monarchs, built on top of Mosque of the Converts, still maintains the minaret of the original mosque (17 August, 2012; photo by author)

pointed out the 13th century Almohad minaret, one of the few remaining in the neighbourhood. It was once a part of the Mosque of the Converts (*Masjid al Tai'been*), now the Church of *San Juan de los Reyes* (Figure 3.2). The celebration of mass and the performing of conversions in the mosques until a church could be built, was a common Christian practice. The church was usually built on top of the ruined mosque after some time. This point is commonly known by many in Andalusia.⁴ Other tour guides, academics and teachers as well as many of my other interviewees told of the same

⁴ This practice is quite common knowledge amongst Granadans and is mentioned in many resources on this history, including in television shows about history such as *La respuesta está en la historia* (The answer is in the history), a show that ran on regional television while I was doing my fieldwork. The premise of the show was to answer questions about the customs, practices and often-used items in Andalusia by understanding the historical reasons for their existence. Six episodes were dedicated specifically to the history of al-Andalus (Carmona Morón & Domínguez, 2011). I discuss this show further in Chapter Five. It was a common practice of the Catholic conquerors to rebuild the church in "mudejar" style, which was a fusion between gothic, renaissance and *andalusi* architecture.

practice. It is also noted on many of the historical plaques placed outside of churches that were formerly mosques.⁵ This church, Maite said, was the first church ordered by the Catholic Monarchs (1520) after taking the city. Next stop, we moved onto a 14th century Muslim water cistern.

Major European historical centres in recent years have begun to feel the negative effects of mass tourism. Cities such as Barcelona and Venice have seen residents protesting against various forms of tourism (França, 2017; Giuffrida, 2017; Rodríguez, 2016; Castedo, 2014; Harvey, 2002). Anti-tourist graffiti with slogans such as “Tourist Go Home. Refugees Welcome”, “Your tourism kills my neighbourhood”, “Tourist You are the Terrorist” along with other more vulgar expressions of anger have appeared in Palma de Mallorca and Barcelona (Blanchar, 2017; Aguiló, 2016). Residents in the documentary *Bye Bye Barcelona* outline their plight against tourism and the devastating effect on the historical city centre (Chibás Fernández, 2014). The repercussions of the commodification of history and heritage sites has brought homogenizing development, eroding the unique character of the city (Harvey, 2002, p. 104). The neighbourhood of the Albaicin⁶ in Granada has seen similar effects, although it has not yet reached the same level of frustration from residents as in other cities, despite massive increases in tourists over the past five years. With this, the opportunities to capitalize on Granada’s history and heritage within a global climate that places value on both have also grown. Tourists’ attempts to know and understand the place they visit allows for a more open structure of historical tours such as Maite’s and allow guides to disseminate historical knowledge as well as to comment on contemporary issues. Equally, the juxtaposition of historical and contemporary Arab baths allow for tourists and Granadans alike to physically experience the blurred lines between the past and the present.

⁵ These plaques are placed outside of many of the historical sites throughout the city (see Figure 3.7 for example).

⁶ Two spellings of Albaicin exist in Spanish, both of which are commonly used. Duque Calvache (2010, p. 115) argues that *Albayzín* is generally used in reference to the Muslim past of the neighbourhood reinforcing exotic notions of the history. *Albaicín*, instead, makes reference to the Catholic working class neighbourhood as of recent. This point was confirmed by one of my interviewees. In this chapter, I have opted for the second version, Albaicin, due to the theme of the chapter, tourism and its contemporary effects on the neighbourhood. However, in the other chapters, when used, I have intentionally used Albayzin in reference to the historical.

With the influence of nationalism on history greatly reduced since the 1970s, a point I address in the last chapter, other factors come to affect its production and interpretation (Baram & Rowan, 2004, p. 3). Commodification of the past is expanding in an increasingly globalized era. These tours are but one example of this commodification, one in which the historical narrative along with heritage sites and the spaces between them are capitalized upon economically. Directing our attention toward this commodification does not preclude considerations of nationalism (or regionalism):

Increasing globalization is an undeniable fact of life in the twenty-first century, but it is premature to view this commercialization of the past as overtaking or rendering obsolete states' manipulation of the past for nationalist purposes. **Both phenomena exist and complement each other; neither is opposed to or replaces one another.** (Khol, 2004, p. 298, *my emphasis*)

Indeed, this commodification of history, by arranging, organizing, and making sites accessible for tourists (Baram & Rowan, 2004, p. 14), can come to be of financial benefit to the state or region as is the case with the Alhambra, the castle-fortress of the last Muslim dynasty in al-Andalus. The Alhambra together with the neighbourhood of the Albaicin form a UNESCO World Heritage site. The presence of the site in Granada (and its virtually exclusive control over the history of the last two centuries of al-Andalus) significantly increases the symbolic capital of the city, effectively allowing it to hold a monopoly over tourism in the city (and over other cities with a Moorish past) and, thus, over the capital that the 'heritage industry' produces. This control creates a market in which "monopoly rents" arise – where "monopoly rent" is simply surplus income gained from maintaining control over an item or plot of land that can be directly or indirectly traded and has unique, non-replicable qualities (Harvey, 2013, p. 90). Thus, in this chapter, I first consider how the entanglement of history, heritage, and tourism in the Albaicin, the still-inhabited part of this World Heritage site, takes shape. Questions I address are: has the historical narrative of the neighbourhood been commodified, and if so how? and how has this commodification affected resident life in the neighbourhood? Tourists and residents consistently come in contact with one another. In their daily lives, residents overhear and even periodically listen in on tours passing the spaces they inhabit.

At times, residents themselves become the tourist (and thus, consumers of history) in either paid or free tours. Gillis points out that:

both Americans and Europeans have become compulsive consumers of the past, shopping for that which best suits their sense of self at the moment, **constructing out of a bewildering variety of materials, times, and places the multiple identities that are demanded of them** in the post-national era. (Gillis, 1996, p. 17, *my emphasis*)

Thus, I also touch upon the role of historical tours and contemporary Arab baths in local and regional collective identity. Previous ethnographies on the neighbourhood of the Albaicin often mention tourism in passing and sometimes briefly mention contemporary changes in the Albaicin. Still, an ethnography of the commodification of the historical narrative in Granada has yet to be done, even with a massive surge of tourism in recent years. In this chapter, I present an ethnography of this World Heritage site by focusing on two forms of commodification, the historical narratives given on tours and visits to the Arab baths, in order to consider this entanglement.

3.1 Uniqueness and authenticity: How World Heritage and monopoly rent draw from a similar discourse

In Granada, the old Moorish neighbourhood of the Albaicin and the Alhambra have long been attractions to foreign travellers. Romantics of the 19th century, including artists, writers, and thinkers I mentioned in the previous chapter, brought international recognition in the West to the intricately sculpted plasterwork designs and mathematically calculated angles of the architecture of the Alhambra, the Muslim fortress, castle, and once fully functioning city that sits on top of the Sabika hill in Granada. To the southeast, the jagged, often snowcapped mountains of the Sierra Nevada frame the architectural site on the hill. Like much of the toponymy in the province of Granada, a number of the peaks watching over the city bear the Spanish rendering of Arab names and words. The most well-known of these is Mulhacén, named for Abu al-Hasan ‘Ali ben Saad, one of the last rulers of Granada. Known in Spanish as Muley Hacen, the ruler’s love affair with a Catholic captive and convert to Islam, Isabel de Solis

(or Zoraya), is blamed for the start of the civil war with his son, Muhammad XII or Boabdil and wife, Aixa⁷, that eventually lead to Granada's defeat by the Catholics. This peak is where Muley Hacen was laid to rest. To the north, the Albaicin sits on the *Cerro de San Miguel* (Hill of St. Michael) opposite to the Alhambra, providing a seemingly pristine white picturesque landscape for those who gaze over the castle walls. Numerous theories about the origins of the name of the neighbourhood are shared by Granadans, one of which argues that it stems from the Arabic *al-Bayyazin*, meaning the suburb of the falconers where *al-Baz* in Arabic means "the falcon". Another suggests that the term comes from the residents of Baeza (a city and a region north of the city of Granada in the province of Jaen) who are argued to have settled in the neighbourhood after the Christian capture of Baeza in 1227. The name *al-Bayyazin*, then, does not come from the Arabic word, *al Baz*, but from the city of origin of these refugees that settled in a particular part of the neighbourhood (Simonet, 1860, p. 42). A third explanation is given by Ibn-Jatib, who wrote that it meant "neighbourhood on a slope" ("Itinerarios didáctico-culturales", n.d.). Between the two hills, the Darro Valley and the chilling waters of the river with the same name cuts through the foothills outside the city until it arrives at the Plaza of Santa Ana, where it is covered over to continue its flow under the city streets. It is a scene that numerous Orientalist painters have depicted and those that came after still draw on the tradition (Figures 3.3 & 3.4).

Capitalizing on the Andalusí past, the tourism industry – the most lucrative in the city – has centered on the Alhambra for many years. The site is managed by the regional Andalusian government, the *Junta de Andalucía*. For many years, very little of the capital gained from tourist activity at the site benefited the city.⁸ The many complaints of my interviewees suggested that these funds end up in Seville where the regional government

⁷ Aixa was the wife of ruler Mulehacén and the mother of Boabdil, who rallied the military *Abencerraje* family in her fight against the ruler.

⁸ A change in government seems to have shifted this practice only recently. In late 2016, the new local PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party) government – elected after the acting conservative mayor José Torres Hurtado (of the People's Party) resigned amidst corruption charges – negotiated an agreement with the *Patronato* (run by the regional PSOE government) that granted a portion of ticket sales of the Alhambra to go toward the rehabilitation of the Albaicin (Marquéz, 2016).




Figure 3.3: An 18th century engraving of the *Carrera del Darro* with the Bridge of the Qadi (or Door of the Planks) downstream from the Church of St. Peter and St. Paul and the Alhambra above, generally attributed to Scottish Orientalist painter David Roberts (Roberts, 2018)



Figure 3.4: Photograph of the Bridge of the Qadi (right) and the Church of St. Peter and St. Paul (left) along the *Carrera del Darro* in the valley with the same name (28 February, 2013; photos by author)

is located. Documents published on the website of the *Patronato de la Alhambra* (or simply the “*Patronato*”, which is the “Heritage Trust of the Alhambra”) now suggest otherwise, asserting that the funds go directly to programs, maintenance and rehabilitation of the site (Patronato de la Alhambra y Generalife, 2017, p. 48). Thus, for many years, the *Patronato* held a monopoly over much of the tourism entering the city. Tourists would come to the city exclusively for the Alhambra and rarely visit the city below. Excess financial gains from the Alhambra rarely passed onto the city. Only since I have done my fieldwork has the *Patronato* made more effort to develop initiatives that overcome this centralization of activity in the Alhambra, including the *Dobla de Oro* (Gold Coin), a cultural itinerary that allows visitors to purchase entrance to six sites around the city for one price⁹.

The Alhambra together with the neighbourhood of the Albaicin therefore become “marks of distinction” that raise the collective symbolic capital of the city. As a result, various commodification processes develop as interested parties attempt to take

⁹ This move to capitalize on the heritage sites in the city as well has meant that a number of sites that offered free entry at the beginning of my fieldwork, such as the historic Arab bath, the Bañuelo, are now only accessible for a fee (see Section 3.6 in this chapter).

advantage of this monopoly. Shaw and Williams (2004) outline these processes, indicating three types: direct, indirect and part commodification (G. Shaw & Williams, 2004, pp. 26-27). Harvey (2013, 2002), on the other hand, discusses the first two of these in terms of monopoly rents, where he explains monopoly rent in the following manner:

All rent is based on the monopoly power of private owners of certain portions of the globe. **Monopoly rent arises because social actors can realize an enhanced income stream over an extended time by virtue of their exclusive control over some directly or indirectly tradable item** which is in some crucial respects unique and non-replicable (2002, p. 94, *my emphasis*)

The search for monopoly prices above the market value, therefore, produces monopoly rents in situations of private ownership, where rent “is simply a payment made to landlords for the right to use land and its appurtenances (the resources embedded within it, the buildings placed upon it).” (Harvey, 2006, p. 330). Direct commodification that gives rise to monopoly rent results when land or resources are traded upon directly (2002, p. 94). Here, the land or resource has an “exchange value” and can be sold to other buyers to be used by them. In Granada, the buying and selling of property (land) in the Albaicin can give rise to direct monopoly rents as I later discuss. Indirect commodification, on the other hand, occurs when resources, commodities or locations (e.g. a central location or proximity to a particular activity) are traded. In this case, a commodity or service can be offered at a price as a result of private ownership of or control over the land. Historical tours (a service) fall under this type of monopoly rent. In terms of Shaw and Williams’ (2004) third process, audio-guides can be considered part commodification since the tourist purchases the use of the audio-guide but then must decide the order of the sites visited. With part commodification, the tourist pays for the use of the item but avoids further charges by supplying the labour. Shaw and Williams also include non-commodified tourist experiences in their discussion of tourism production as a form of tourism in which services are provided by friends. Neighbourhood and academic tours provided for residents, which I discuss later, can be included in this category.

Despite the capitalist aim to create monopolies, their presence in a globalized market is contradictory (Harvey, 2002, p. 95). The market demands competition in order

to function and ceases to function without trade. Thus, practices of “hoarding, withholding, miserly behaviour” are problematic for the market as they encourage scarcity of a commodity. Yet “market processes crucially depend upon the individual monopoly of capitalists (of all sorts) over ownership of the means of production including finance and land” (p. 97). In the Albaicin, the intentional creation of scarcity occurs with privately owned land. Monopolies can emerge as a result of location, where monopoly prices arise from both the forced scarcity of property and the prestige of a property being in a World Heritage site. The Alhambra, however, is publicly owned. How then might monopoly rents be produced?

The commodification of all material artefacts and cultural practices, including that of heritage and history can, like any other marketable entity, produce monopoly rents if considered to be more unique or “authentic” than others. This narrative of particularity or speciality is indispensable to creating monopoly rents. Thus, the discourse surrounding certain heritage, especially that which accompanies World Heritage, is the very discourse that drives capitalist interest in these sites:

many [claims to uniqueness] rest on historical narratives, interpretations and meanings of collective memories, significations of cultural practices, and the like: there is always a strong social and discursive element at work in the construction of such claims (Harvey, 2002, p. 103)

The concept of heritage has been over extended, moving from being defined as “the finest, most elevated and most ancient creations of human genius” to representing anything “mundane” that represents collective identity (Nora, 2011, p. ix-x). For this reason, capitalists have been able to incorporate it into the tourism industry by stressing the uniqueness of a certain heritage, historical narrative or material artifact over another. The more symbolic capital (or “marks of distinction”) a city has, the more draw it has for tourists (Figure 3.5), and as a result has “significant drawing power upon the flows of capital more generally.” (Harvey, 2013, p. 103). Collective symbolic capital has become vital since past obstacles protecting local monopolies, such as lack of adequate transportation, or trade policies put in place to benefit the nation-state, have been drastically reduced with globalization. In the case of Granada, its unique history as the centre of the last-standing Muslim territory in Spain and the singularity of the Alhambra,

boasting unrivalled extensive architectural remains, is unequalled in other Spanish cities. Cities have come to depend on these “marks of distinction” in order to create monopolies that will draw in various economies. However, as Harvey highlights:

The struggle to accumulate marks of distinction and collective symbolic capital in a highly competitive world is on. But this entrains in its wake all of **the localized questions about whose collective memory, whose aesthetics, and who benefits.** (p. 105, *my emphasis*)

We, therefore, keep in mind that no matter which type of capital it is that draws tourists to Granada (or any other city for that matter), the consumption of history and heritage still resonates beyond the economic, as Maite demonstrated in her tour by emphasizing the lived effects of this global phenomenon.

3.2 Background: The increasing global valuing of heritage and the effects of massification of tourism in a World Heritage Site

The increased valuing of heritage taking place on a global scale brought about the UNESCO World Heritage Site list in the same year Spain became a democracy (1978). Soon after, the palatial city, geographically distributed on one ridge, and the old Moorish quarter, which creeps up the opposite hill, earned the denomination of UNESCO World Heritage Site in two parts, the Alhambra in 1984 and its extension to the Albaicin ten years later (UNESCO, 2017). Both spaces have seen dramatic changes since the country’s transition to democracy in 1978. The Alhambra until recently had a significant number of people living within the limits of the architectural site. Many of my interviewees lamented this point as does José Antonio González Alcantud (2011), a University of Granada anthropologist and researcher on social memory of the Alhambra. This population, along with gardeners who farmed the vegetable gardens for the Marquis of Mondejar, the official governor of the Alhambra from the time of the Catholic Monarchs, also abandoned the premises when the site became regional property. Lorenzo, one of my neighbours born in the Albaicin, recalled when his family gave up their positions:

When the Generalife¹⁰ became owned by the state, my father stayed there. Well, one of the conditions that the governors required of the Spanish government is that the workers that were there were allowed to continue working. So, my grandfather and father stayed, and my father stayed until he saw that he didn't make enough to support the family and he looked for other work. (Lorenzo. Late 60s, *Albaicinero* from birth. Interview, September 4, 2012)

He went on to explain how gardening in the Alhambra was an occupation passed from his grandfather to him and his brothers. With changes in the heritage trust policy, the Alhambra was effectively emptied of its population. This occurred after its management was passed on from the state to the *Patronato de la Alhambra* (Gonzalez Alcantud, 2011). The new policies were aimed at improving the site to better deal with mass tourism.

The Albaicin refers to both a district¹¹ and a neighbourhood in the district of the Albaicin in Granada. The area is under the jurisdiction of the local government. Since the transition to democracy, the demography of the neighbourhood has also changed. The first person that I chatted with upon my arrival, Macarena, a younger grandmother who was also born in the neighbourhood, explained to me how the Albaicin was a very poor, working class neighbourhood when she was growing up in the 1950s and 1960s. In her house alone, there were eight families living in eight rooms of one house with a shared patio and bathroom. Residents of the neighbourhood were often only able to purchase their houses room by room as the Spanish economy improved. At this time, Spain's fascist government boosted the economy by opening the country up to foreigners, promoting tourism and, with it, stereotyped images of Spanish popular culture (Crow 1985, p. 376).

¹⁰ The architectural complex of the Alhambra is divided into three main parts for tourists: the Nazarid palaces (the residence of the sultans), the Alcazar (the fortress) and the Generalife, which was the summer palace and vast gardens (both floral and subsistence). The Generalife, until it came under regional government control, was farmed and maintained by paid labourers. Today, each of these areas have a controlled entry, accessed by the scanning of a ticket. Of the three areas, the Nazarid palaces have a designated time for entry.

¹¹ It is one of eight districts in the city. The district of the Albaicin consists of four neighbourhoods: the Albaicin, Sacromonte, Haza Grande and El Fargue.




Figure 3.5: Many spaces on the board of the Granada version of Monopoly[®] – held up for the press during the game release in the Mirador de San Nicolas with the Alhambra as the backdrop – represent the city’s “marks of distinction”. These sites include various parts of the Alhambra, Moroccan tea shops, the Arab baths as the cheaper properties; the historic neighbourhoods of the Albaicin (Moorish), Realejo (Jewish) and Sacromonte (“Gypsy”) as the moderately priced properties; and two famous tourist lookouts (or *mirador*) as the two most expensive (6 November, 2014; photo by author)

Figure 3.6: Graffiti against speculation in plain sight of inter-city buses arriving to Granada stating: “The Albayzín is being sold. Reason: Junta [de Andalucía] and the City”, in reference to the regional and city governments) (17 April, 2012; photo by author)

The increase in tourism, along with the global turn towards the appreciation of heritage, brought various new groups to the neighbourhood. Macarena noted an increase in a more affluent middle-class which moved into the neighbourhood,¹² a process known as gentrification. It was neither this change in residents nor tourism at this time, however, that spurred the massive population reduction, but the exodus of the younger residents from the neighbourhood in search of work and the aging population that remained. Newer residents of the lower Albaicin, much of which provides stunning views of the Alhambra, were often drawn to the area for aesthetic reasons. When visiting the residents with whom I became acquainted in the lower Albaicin, it was common to end a visit with a quick trip up to the roof of their house to admire the view of the Alhambra from different points in the neighbourhood. The lower Albaicin also became popular with students, including foreign students during their Erasmus study year (Duque Calvache 2010, p.

¹² These affluent residents were mainly Spaniards. However, the neighbourhood has also attracted wealthy foreign residents, including, but not limited to, painters and writers.

179). Students are drawn to the lower rents in often poorly maintained houses and the proximity to the city centre (Rosón Lorente, 2008, p. 133). Quite indicative of attempts to capitalize on the particularity of the Albaicin were the responses of landlords of rental properties while helping a friend search for an apartment. Many landlords listed their properties as being situated in the Albaicin. As Harvey explains, “prestige and statues locations create all kinds of possibilities to realize monopoly rents from other factions of the bourgeoisie” (2006, p. 350). Yet, when contacted, these landlords clarified that the rental was not in fact located in the neighbourhood. Once they had used the reputation of distinction to establish contact, they were quick to warn us of the many dangers of living there to deter us from continuing our search for a rental in the neighbourhood.¹³ Thus, even those who do not own property¹⁴ in the Albaicin try to take advantage of the monopoly created by narratives of uniqueness and particularity. A significant number of *carmenes* (walled-in houses with varying sizes of private gardens) also house wealthier residents of both the upper and lower Albaicin. Most of the residential areas of the upper Albaicin, situated where the hill first levels off, lack a visible sightline to the Alhambra. The residents of the area are more likely to be “*albaicineros de toda la vida*” (“life-long *albaicineros*”, a common reference to residents born to families from the neighbourhood) although a growing number of Spanish Sufi converts to Islam also reside in the upper part of the neighbourhood. More recently, it is common to find North African and Sub-Saharan African¹⁵ migrants and younger people living alternative lifestyles, some of

¹³ My interviewees were quick to point out that petty crime and drug presence in the Albaicin did not significantly differ from other neighbourhoods in the city, although both are present. However, the past reputation of the Albaicin as being the marginalized, crime-filled neighbourhood it was rumoured to be still precedes it.

¹⁴ Rental properties may be privately owned by the landlords. However, it is common for rental advertisements to be posted by other renters looking to rent out a single room.

¹⁵ While I use the term Sub-Saharan African, at the same time, I recognize the problematic nature of the term (Mashanda, 2017; Butty, 2010). African migrants in Granada are primarily Moroccan (4,524) and Senegalese (1,102). Small populations of Algerians (136) and Nigerians (159) are also registered in the city (numbers taken from INE, 2012). It is also important to note that migrants who do not have state documentation often refrain from registering out of fear of deportation (Calavita, 2003), even though the registry is maintained for access to social services and education, not for identification and localization of residents (González-Enríquez, 2009).

whom are *okupas*¹⁶ (or squatters) in the neighbourhood. These people often sell their hand-made products to passers-by, taking advantage of the lenient enforcement of laws due to a strong informal economy (see González-Enríquez, 2010; Zapata-Barrero, 2008; Calavita, 2003; Huntoon, 1998). These economic exchanges depend largely on mass tourism brought to the city by the Alhambra. Although these vendors do not always reside in the neighbourhood, they set up their stands in the streets and plazas.

For the Albaicin, gentrification has also meant that the practice of property speculation – the buying or selling of property in the hope of deriving capital gains (“speculation”, 2017) – rose markedly (Figure 3.6). The frenetic pace of construction contributed to recurrent housing booms that catered to both the migration of rural populations to city centres, and the further increase of mass tourism in the country (Burriel, 2011). As Macarena explained in our first conversation, this process took two forms in the Albaicin: the purchasing of land either by wealthier residents or interested outside parties who then left the building to ruin, in order to either clear and sell the land at a higher price or the rebuilding of apartments or houses with a higher market value. Indeed, Duque Calvache (2010) reports similar findings in the neighbourhood. This practice, which includes withholding property and creating scarcity, aims to obtain excess rents (Harvey, 2002, p. 94). Furthermore, city bylaws often make rebuilding easier than undertaking minor restorations. These laws map out certain expectations of property maintenance, which can become difficult to maintain for less financially stable residents. With speculation, building violations often happen, commonly in attempts to capitalize on views of the Alhambra. During my fieldwork, a number of new turrets, built a story higher than permitted, appeared in the neighbourhood. Neighbours consistently protest if and when new constructions or upgrades to residences break the building regulations of the PEPRI.¹⁷ These improvements to the quality of residence allow landowners to

¹⁶ The term *okupa* comes from the verb *ocupar* or “to occupy” in English. The term is not limited to young Spaniards who either choose to live an alternative lifestyle or who lack of financial support, and thus find themselves in this situation, but to anyone in these precarious living conditions.

¹⁷ PEPRI stands for *Plan Especial de Protección y Reformación Interior del Albaicín* (translation: Special Interior Protection and Reformation Plan of the Albaicin). It is a plan that sets out special laws and guidelines for all buildings and spaces in designated parts of the neighbourhood.

“compete with each other for the rent they can command” (Harvey, 2006, p. 349) and later sell these properties at a monopoly price (i.e. above the market price) to gain surplus rent. Thus, speculation is one way by which builders, some landowners and corporations attempt to garner monopoly rents resulting from the location of properties within the heritage site.

The bulk of the fieldwork I did in Granada took place in the middle of the most recent economic recession, over one and a half years between 2011-2013 after the housing bubble burst in 2008 and the Spanish government requested significant bailouts (June 2012). This time frame became meaningful as tourism became one of the few dependable economies in the city. During the crisis, residents began to turn to online private residence rental sites or other virtual marketplaces catering to tourists. Later legislation was created requiring and charging for registration of short-term rental accommodations.¹⁸ As a result, over half of the properties listed on Air BnB, for example, are now considered ‘illegal’ (Nuñez, 2017).

Population migration out of the neighbourhood due to poor labour prospects, the speculation on the properties owned by residents, and the desire for better quality housing and living conditions, has reduced the population significantly since Macarena’s younger years (Barrera, 2016).¹⁹ The depopulation of the neighbourhood has yet to parallel the depopulation of the Alhambra but residents and tour guides alike consistently voice worries about the declining feeling of community within the neighbourhood (also mentioned by Rosón Lorente, 2008; Cabrera Medina & de Pablos, 2002). Similar to the *Patronato de la Alhambra*, the *Agencia Albaicín* is a local agency that was originally founded to administer the neighbourhood rehabilitation funds received from UNESCO in the years after the first designation in 1984. However, now that the funds are long spent,

¹⁸ In fact, around the same time this dissertation was submitted, so dire was the situation in the city of Palma de Mallorca that the city became the first in Spain to completely ban this type of “tourism” rental (Bohórquez, 2018).

¹⁹ The population at the beginning of the 1970s was 23,395 inhabitants. By 1987, it had drastically dropped to 11,810 people and by 2000, was 8,997 (Barrera, 2016). To put things into perspective, there are 6000 residences in the neighbourhood (Cabrera Medina & de Pablos, 2002, p. 76)

the agency has dedicated its efforts mainly towards tourism initiatives (Amparo. Early 50s, *Albaicinera*. Interview, July 11, 2012).

Finally, abandoned residences or those used as summer homes became living spaces of *okupas*. They joined the other constantly shifting population of *okupas* that have dug cave houses into the side of the upper, undeveloped part of the *Cerro de San Miguel* (Hill of St. Michael).²⁰ These undesired residents face repeated attempts of physical eviction by law enforcement. Community assemblies in which these occupants are the topic at hand are attended by both the occupants and property-owning residents, and at times explode into heated discussion. However, these evictions were not limited to *okupas*. As I was taking the bus to the Alhambra on at least three occasions, the bus turned the corner to leave the neighbourhood near the Arab *Puerta de Elvira* (Gate of Elvira) to come up against police officers dressed in ominous black riot gear preparing for early morning evictions – one of which ironically happened the day I was headed to a tour on Orientalism where it took 60 officers to evict one long-time resident (Cano, 2011). These forced removals of residents and *okupas* take on a different tone in light of a desire to maintain the image of a neighbourhood worthy of the World Heritage designation, where attention to aesthetics is closely related to tourists' search for authenticity (Halewood & Hannam, 2001, pp. 568).

3.3 “*Esto no es Patrimonio de la Humanidad*”: How a heritage designation demands a certain quality of convivencia

Reference to the World Heritage designation among community members is common in the Albaicin as well as in the historical tours. Despite this, it more often takes a form that I hadn't considered. The concept of World Heritage has become a measure of the quality of everyday living conditions in the neighbourhood. Askew (2010) counters arguments that present the UNESCO label as an “authorizing heritage discourse” (AHD) (see Figure

²⁰ Cave houses in the area are quite common. Sacromonte, a neighbourhood that borders the Albaicin, is famous for its cave houses that once housed Granada's marginalized *gitano* (Roma) population and is considered to be one of the birthplaces of flamenco music.

3.7), defined previously by Laurajane Smith (2006) as a Western elitist view of heritage that minimizes alternative and marginalized discourses. He points out that UNESCO's role within the communities of the heritage sites is limited. Esteban, a LAAC researcher, confirmed this point early in my research and further explained that UNESCO does not impose rules or interpretations in regard to restorations (personal communication, November 17, 2011). Askew argues instead that the power to define the discourse surrounding the sites lies with the governing national and subnational bodies (2010, pp. 21-22).



Figure 3.7: One of many information boards in Granada. Found at the beginning of a major tourist street, this board explains the UNESCO World Heritage list and how it confirms the “exceptional universal value” of the Albaicín (4 October, 2016; photo by author)

Figure 3.8: A sticker collected from one of the neighbourhood associations in the Albaicín, which translates as “The Albaicín is world heritage. Lend it a hand.”

Figure 3.9 & Figure 3.10: The move to pedestrianize the *Carrera del Darro* (left) included reversing traffic on *San Juan de los Reyes Street* (right). Many garages on the street were built on an angle to facilitate entry from east to west. With the change, numerous residents could no longer access their garage (17 August, 2012; photo by author)

Among residents, this discourse takes a different form. In conversation, residents of the Albaicín as well as tour guides do tend to mention the notions conveyed in the UNESCO criteria for selection (see Appendix B for the criteria in full) that were attributed to the Alhambra and the Albaicín – those being Criteria (i) that they “represent a unique artistic achievement, a masterpiece of the creative genius”; (iii) that they “bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a civilization which has disappeared”; and (iv) that they are “an outstanding example of a type of building or architectural ensemble

which illustrates a significant stage in history” (UNESCO, 1984, pp. 7-8). Rocio, a long-time tour guide in the city, for example, in explaining one theory about the origin of the name Albayzin, touches on the third criteria:

It was the neighbourhood of the falconers. A falcon is a type of bird that is the best bird of prey that is used in hawking. And of course, falconry is World Heritage. There is a very close relationship with the Arab world. Falconry²¹ is an art. [...] And it forms a part of what we have lost here in Granada. (Rocío. Mid-30s, tour guide. Interview, March 4, 2012)

Still, knowledge of the specifics of these criteria is rare among the general population. Therefore, this connection to the global, or AHD, is quite present in the telling of the *Andalusi* history. What I was not expecting was everyday questions and challenges to social conditions by residents and guides. They tend to evoke the concept of World Heritage to draw attention to certain practices of tourists, other residents and ‘*okupas*’ (indeed, anyone in the neighbourhood),²² violations of *convivencia* or expected civil behaviour noted in the previous chapter, violations of building codes, or even complaints directed at the city government’s decisions regarding the neighbourhood. The reference is usually rhetorical and is often used in community meetings about neighbourhood issues (see Figure 3.8 for an example paraphernalia invokes this connection between the WHS designation and civil *convivencia*). In late February, during a community assembly, Elisa explained to those of us in attendance that earlier in the week she had approached the local police in regard to a tourist’s motor home parked in the street for slightly longer than a fortnight. When the officers showed little initiative in addressing the problem, she asked them “How is this allowed in a neighbourhood that is a World Heritage Site?” (Elisa. Older *Albaicinera*. February 21, 2012). The term was also used in reference to noise complaints about squatters, disrespectful tourist behaviour, and traffic and security issues.

²¹ Falconry in Spain was not included on the list of “Intangible Cultural Heritage” by UNESCO until 2016.

²² One of these frowned-upon practices took shape in a massive campaign to convince all dog owners in the neighbourhood to pick up and discard pet feces. The campaign not only targeted residents but also those living alternative lifestyles who spend time in the neighbourhood.

Later that spring, the local government decided to pedestrianize the main street entering the neighbourhood, the *Carrera del Darro/Paseo de los Tristes*, as mentioned in Maite's tour at the beginning of this chapter (see Figures 3.9 and 3.10). The government decided to ban all vehicles save taxis carrying tourists to hotels in the neighbourhood, an electric minibus²³ that catered to tourists, and school buses servicing the state-funded Catholic school close to the end of the street. The city minibuses that provide access to the entire neighbourhood upon which many older residents depend were significantly rerouted, at times adding one to two hours onto a five-minute trip. Residents of the street with vehicles were banned from driving to their front door with groceries or heavy loads. Service vehicles to the many restaurants along the street were also banned. In a heated meeting with affected residents, one older resident with whom I wasn't familiar commented that he would like to know what stance UNESCO would take on the city government's decision since he knew that "World Heritage of UNESCO doesn't use the model of embittering the lives of the neighbourhood's residents" (Resident, March 6, 2012). The resident presented his criticism as if the UNESCO criteria included consideration of the inhabitants of the site. Rarely does ICOMOS, the reporting body of UNESCO, intervene in matters at a local level as Domingo, a UGR history professor, explained to me (personal communication, June 14, 2013). Yet, this resident invokes an imagined stipulation of UNESCO's discourse on living conditions within a World Heritage site.

Harvey's discussion on monopoly rent ends by addressing how its contradictions can lead to "'transgressive' cultural practices" that oppose globalization (2002, p. 108) and argues that oppositional movements – mainly referring to frustrated, exploited cultural producers – need to seek "to trade on values of authenticity, locality, history, culture, collective memories and tradition" (p. 109). In this way, these cultural producers can "open a space for political thought and action within which socialist alternatives can

²³ The electric minibus, a Diablin bus, has now been replaced with a longer mini-train with three cars. Instead of running on only one street like the Diablin, the train now has a route through the neighbourhood and consistently causes major traffic problems given that the neighbourhood only has two streets open to vehicular traffic that enter the neighbourhood and three that exit.

be both devised and pursued” (p. 109). While residents of the Albaicin, who are also affected by political action of local government officials looking to privilege the tourist over the resident in order to attract more tourism, may not trade on these values, they do tap into the collective symbolic capital of the neighbourhood in their contestations. They frequently challenge the distinction granted to the Albaicin in order to reinforce what they believe to be a livable neighbourhood in the face of mass tourism.

3.4 An overview of historical tours and their spaces in Granada

The spaces where tourists gather in large numbers in the Albaicin are largely distinct from those frequently used by residents of the neighbourhood, although certain spaces do coincide. Tourists generally collect in four main areas. When I first visited the Albaicin in 2001 as an undergraduate student, the only place in the neighbourhood that my group



Figure 3.11: Tourists watch the sunset over the Alhambra, take pictures of the castle and consult maps to decide what to visit next (centre) in Mirador de San Nicolas while street vendors sell hand-made jewelry (right) and paintings of the scene (left) (16 September, 2016; photo by the author)



Figure 3.12: Plaza Larga in the morning. Residents (left) and tourists (centre right) enjoy coffee and sit chatting in the plaza while a waiter of a café sets up an umbrella (centre left) and others visit the clothing market (right) and the fruit and vegetable stands (back) (8 September, 2012; photo by author)

visited was the Mirador de San Nicolás (Figure 3.11). Like many tourists, it is the only place in the Albaicin hurried visitors see on cursory stops in Granada. The lookout point, in the upper Albaicin, provides one of the best views of the entirety of the Alhambra from the neighbourhood open to the public. From the Mirador, down one short cobble-stoned

street and through a Berber arch likely built by the Zirids,²⁴ the *Arco de las Pesas* (Arch of the Weights) lies Plaza Larga (Figure 3.12). The plaza is the centre of resident life in the upper Albaicin. The morning sees residents gather at one or other of the two popular coffee shops in the plaza while lotto vendors weave in and out of the daily fruit and vegetable markets and the weekly clothing market. The individually owned home improvement store, flower/pet shop, stationary shop, grocery store, and newsstand, infuses some of the “community feeling” lost to the effects of tourism, back into the neighbourhood. However, these businesses have been under threat as multi-national companies attempt to move into the neighbourhood. In May of 2013, residents and business owners unanimously voted to stop the building of a well-known corporate-owned grocery store. Mid-afternoon and early evening sees other restaurants open for lunch and tapas. Organized events for the neighbourhood children at times take place in the square. Having become popular with tourists more recently, the plaza is perhaps the one space in the neighbourhood that tourists, residents, and Sunday visitors from the city below share. It has also become an almost required stop for tour guides where contemporary neighbourhood life is set against the city walls of the Ziri period (1010 - 1090). The other two sites popular with tourists are in the lower Albaicin. Three connected streets with their Moroccan souvenir shops, teashops, and restaurants are regularly overflowing with tourists and residents entering and leaving the neighbourhood (see Rogozen Soltar, 2010; 2007 for further discussion). Finally, the *Carrera del Darro/Paseo de los Tristes*, is a popular street for a scenic stroll, just below the Alhambra. The majority of the streets in the neighbourhood are only accessible to pedestrians; thus, points of interest and heritage sites are also only reached by walking. However, walking tours are not limited to these spaces where tourists congregate. Tour groups can be found along any number of streets, often blocking the path of residents and traffic, depending on the route chosen by the tour guide.

²⁴ Like many archaeological debates, the dating of the arch is challenged. On some tours, guides mentioned the arch could be Almoravid.

These tours (directed towards tourists from outside the city) often visit the three spaces mentioned above, but mainly focus on stops along the route. They include walking tours, hop-on/hop-off mini-train tours, segway, and e-bike tours, although the tours I focused on were walking tours. The mini-train was only introduced in the neighbourhood after I finished my field research and the segways and e-bikes appeared near the end of my first year in the city. Given the cost, I chose to focus on the walking tours of which there are many in the city. These tours take place in the morning, evening, and at night and tend to either focus on a particular area of the city or on a particular theme. Examples of “area” tours are those that focus on either the historical centre or the Albaicin. With the “themed” tours, themes can range from a unique feature of the city such as the water system, to the romantic or mysterious places in the city, to a designated period of history such as only visiting heritage sites from the Christian or Muslim periods, and even to places that appear in the works of famous writers, such as Washington Irving or the city’s own renowned poet, Federico Garcia Lorca. A limited number of companies also offer dramatized tours that include one or two paid actors that present a theatrical version of the history. During my research, most of the tours were paid tours with registered companies, each with varying degrees of presence in tourist spaces; for example, companies had more or fewer pamphlets and advertising in hotels, the local tourism office, tourism kiosks, contemporary Arab baths and so on. Only walking tours are offered in the Alhambra but many of these at the time of my research followed a theme-based structure as well. More recently, the curious phenomenon of “free tours” in many city centres around the world has also found a clientele base in Granada. These tours boast tour guides from the neighbourhoods visited and function through donations. The use of the concept “free”, however, not only applies to the cost of the tour, but also to the freedom that the guide has to create his/her own tour as well as alter it mid-tour depending on the desires of the group participating in the visit. Other tour options tourists have are tours that are mapped out in pamphlets that explain the history of sites on the route, as well as an audio-guide of the city or of the Alhambra, where tourists are unaccompanied by a tour guide, but follow routes suggested by the audio-guide.

Walking tours are not limited to providing a service to tourists. Living in the Albaicin, free tours – different from the “free (by donation) tours” in the city – given by

other more knowledgeable residents are offered to interested residents. These outings consist of routes and sites such as the Palace of Dar al-Horra, the summer palace of Boabdil's mother, Axia, located in the upper Albaicin. In addition, academics specializing in particular areas give tours of the Alhambra, architectural heritage and on different topics related to the neighbourhood at the request of various historical associations or interested parties. High school teachers also give tours of the Alhambra and the Albaicin to their students with a similar aim, providing the students with a connection between the history they are learning in class and the physical environment that surrounds them. Thus, historical tours become a practice in which both tourists and Granadans of all ages have an embodied experience of heritage sites and narratives of the history of al-Andalus. Moreover, they become a practice where the "authorized heritage discourse" of UNESCO and regional narratives combine with the agency of the guide, all of which go toward defining his or her own tour narrative.

3.5 "*Quién tiene un moro (en la huerta no tiene un moro), tiene un tesoro*": Narrating the Arab-Islamic history for tourists

Phrases such as the one in the title, which translates as: "He who has a Moor (in the [vegetable] garden doesn't [just] have a Moor), he has a treasure", often form one of many anecdotes given by tour guides. Because companies often leave the content of a tour up to a guide's discretion, the versions of the historical narrative presented in each tour differ to some extent. Despite this, city tour guides tend to have a particular goal in common when giving a tour: to evoke sentiment to encourage visitors to identify with heritage sites. Natalia, a seasoned tour guide, elaborated on this objective in her interview:

For me, on a historical level, it doesn't really matter that I show how the people were as a group, how they lived. My objective with what I do isn't for people to know how things were. That's part of it but the goal is to see how it could have influenced the past, [to consider this] now in order to conserve it, not to write knowledge (i.e. write history). Our perception isn't to want to saturate people with information, but instead generate feelings towards the heritage that we have. The simple and the complex. (Natalia. Mid-30s, tour guide. Interview, Dec. 12, 2011)

The heritage to which Natalia refers includes not only the material traces left by the *Andalusies* but also to the legacy left by these inhabitants, a legacy that is narrated by these guides to counteract the negative reception and rejection this history receives in the general public. Thus, guides such as Natalia attempt to generate these feelings toward the history (and the sites that represent it) by stressing the uniqueness of the sites. The narratives that distinguish Granada and its history from other cities increase collective symbolic capital which has “a significant drawing power upon the flows of capital more generally” (Harvey, 2002, p. 103). During the various tours I took with her, Natalia also stressed more than once that her goal was to teach Granadans about their own history and “who they really are”, attempting to challenge collective identity shaped by official national narratives. Moreover, her dual goal of conveying the importance and singularity of the sites, and imparting enough historical knowledge for tour participants to understand heritage sites, falls in line with guides’ attempts to provide an enjoyable outing.

Both in their tours and to myself while chatting, many guides mentioned the self-taught nature of their knowledge. Joaquin, an older guide educated at the end of the dictatorship, for example, explains:

So if you ask me... and I work in this [field] and I live off of explaining this... I had to study on my own. I can't tell the information that they told me. Everything I have done, I've done because of who I am, with the desire to actually understand the truth. In fact, when I was studying to work in this, I was surprised! Of all the things that I didn't know because nobody explained them to me. (Joaquin. Mid-50s, tour guide. Interview, June 18, 2012)

The information that Joaquin makes reference to is that of the fascist narrative of the Arab-Islamic history. He is aware that the version of history he had learned in school is filled with the national-Catholic ideology of the dictatorship and falls short of explaining Granada’s past. His knowledge of this history, like that of much of the population, had been limited by the dictatorship – as I have addressed in the previous chapter – and required individual exploration before sharing it with his clientele. Thus, the tours become a space where a particular version of history is superimposed on a physical heritage. The tour guides I worked with were all university educated. The guides often

drew on their education as most had studied disciplines such as history, art history, architecture, tourism, and many had also studied the language in which the tour is given. However, similar to Joaquin, all of the guides indicated that much of what they presented came from historical literature they had read on their own.

Generally, it is the guide, as an individual, or the company for which they work, that determines which physical spaces to visit. The narrative, however, depends on both the agency of the guide and the audience. A guide's version of the past does not change for a given audience yet certain interpretations of the past can be added or left out. Diego, another seasoned guide, made this clear during a tour he gave. The tour was in both Spanish and English due to the limited number of low-season tourists in February and only four people participated, two English speakers and two Spanish speakers. At one point, I curiously took note of discrepancies between the two versions. To the English speakers, Diego had explained the threat that the *Moriscos*, or converts to Christianity, posed after the Christian Monarchs took the city in 1492. He narrated how the Christians feared the *Moriscos* had converted under false pretenses and would eventually call contacts they had in Africa to help retake the city. With the Spanish couple, Diego focused on the role that the *Moriscos* held in the construction of new Christian architecture around the city. He emphasized the great loss the city suffered when the *Moriscos* were completely expelled in 1610. He reminded them of the phrase mentioned at the beginning of this section: "*Quién tiene un moro en la huerta no tiene un moro, tiene un tesoro*",²⁵ where Moor and treasure in Spanish rhyme. The saying makes reference to the narrative that all of the agricultural knowledge that the *andalusies* had developed, including the functioning of the hydraulic systems, was lost when the Muslims (1492) and, subsequently, the *Moriscos* (1609-1613), were expelled. When both groups were out of earshot, Diego explained to me his reasoning for the discrepancy. Throughout the tour, it had become clear from the Spanish couple's comments and questions that they still held quite strongly to a version of the narrative that demonized the Muslim *Andalusies* and glorified the Christian *Reconquista*, or reconquest, and the

²⁵ Translated as: "He who has a Moor in the [vegetable] garden doesn't [just] have a Moor, he has a treasure".

expulsion, a part of the national-Catholic narrative of the fascist period (see Chapter Two for considerations on narratives of the Christian conquest). This view clearly flowed into their perceptions of contemporary Muslims. The couple were agriculturalists but had emigrated and lived in Paris for many years, where they had developed a “capacity for intellectual pursuits” (Diego. Late 40s, tour guide. Historical tour, February 23, 2011) and were therefore open to learning. Diego explained further that: “they have an excellent level of understanding [of what I am talking about] but they don’t know the historical data.” and that he was trying to adapt the information he was providing them so that they wouldn’t feel too uncomfortable. Diego understood that as a guide, he had to maintain a balance between presenting the version of history he believed to be correct, thus challenging his clients to consider the history they learned in the past, and not injuring their historical sentiments. This fine line is the balance between the possibility of bringing in new clients through word of mouth or losing out on paying customers. Examples such as this allow us to consider “how much the current interest in local cultural innovation and the resurrection and invention of local traditions attaches to the desire to extract and appropriate such rents” (Harvey, 2002, p. 101). Diego’s reading of his clients, which is constantly negotiated throughout the tour, weighs on how he narrates the past. The balance becomes one especially important in the light of the economic recession. During my fieldwork, a number of the younger guides had turned to giving tours either because they formed a part of the 57% unemployment rate for youth under the age of 25 in Spain (Gómez, 2013), or because they were only able to find part-time work and needed supplemental income. Good rapport with clients brought more business.

To maintain this balance, guides tend to elaborate on less polemical topics. These include topics such as water, art and the aesthetics of the architecture, agricultural, gastronomy, language and gestures, scientific knowledge, legends and stories about the spaces, and the exotic. However, as Maite’s tour at the beginning of this chapter indicates, tours also become a space for social commentary regarding the past or the present (see comic in Figure 3.13). Two of the three debates discussed in the previous chapter, *Reconquista* and *convivencia*, do come up. In the same tour, Maite also explained that it is incorrect to use the term *Reconquista* because “it was Visigoth here. They weren’t Christian-Catholic after the Romans”, in reference to the theory of partial

conversion of the Visigoths to Christianity (Maite. Late 20s, tour guide. Historical tour, August 22, 2012). Visitors consistently question guides not only about social life and practices in Muslim Spain but also contemporary issues relating to Muslims and Islam (Laura. Early-30s, tour guide, personal communication, numerous occasions), even when the guide knows very little about the Arab world. In the next section, I will focus on Arab baths in particular in order to elaborate on one of the less polemical topics: water.



Figure 3.13: A comic from a neighbourhood newsletter slipped under the doors of residences in the Albaicin gives an example of the social commentary that might take place on a tour. It also invokes the concept of World Heritage in order to satirically disapprove of building practices in the neighbourhood. The dialogue reads: (1) Welcome to “Construction Tour”, follow me and we will enjoy the most characteristic scaffolding of the Albayzín.” (2) Behind you, on Santa Ana Street, along with the Tourism Office, you will find one of the oldest scaffolding structures in the Albayzín. It was constructed 9 years ago. (3) No, if the scaffolding becomes as famous as the Alhambra itself... the crowning glory (*lit.* the height) would be that they declare them ‘World Heritage’.”

Figure 3.14: The temperate room of the Bañuelo, historic Arab baths, where bathers would wash with buckets of water, socialize, and access services such as massages (10 October, 2011; photo by author)

3.6 *Los baños árabes*, Arab baths: A snapshot of the *andalusí* value of water

A popular stop on tour routes in the Albaicin is the *Baño de Nogal* (Hammam al Jawza or Bath of the Walnut Tree), commonly known as El Bañuelo. For guides, the inclusion of

the Bañuelo is not only relevant because of its construction in the 11th century²⁶ by Sultan Badis (Badis ben Habús, b.1038-d.1075), but also because it allows guides to elaborate on the importance of water in *Andalusi* society. Moreover, it provides a comprehensive glimpse of life in al-Andalus. Using both the interior and exterior spaces, guides can explain class structure, gender divisions, city infrastructure, hygiene, religious and social practices, and comment on the physical architecture and contemporary similarities between those in Andalusia and baths in the Arab world. Each guide contributes his or her own insight and understanding. In almost all of the tours, he/she would elaborate on how the baths of Granada drew from an extensive and ingenious hydraulic system that runs beneath the city. The various baths were connected to one of two water canals that steadily descend from the mountains and run into an underground system in the city: one beginning at the *Acequia de Aynadamar* in Alfacar, 11kms from the city, and the other, 6kms outside the city in Güejar Sierra (Appendix D). The twenty-six public water cisterns still visible around the neighbourhood were used until the 1960s – so unique is the system of cisterns that some historical tours are dedicated solely to explaining its importance throughout history (Appendix E). El Bañuelo was a public bath although wealthier residents often had baths with a similar structure in their homes. The baths provided a dual objective in Muslim society, corporal and religious cleansing, similar to the Roman belief of looking after both the mind and the body. The religious practice of ablutions was of utmost importance; Muslims wash the face, behind the ears, elbows and hands, and feet five times a day. One non-Muslim guide went through the gestures of the ablution using the water of a fountain. Because of daily ablutions, men would only have to visit the bath once or twice a week, usually in the mornings. The afternoons were reserved for the women but because women were more restricted, they visited the bath less frequently. The guides continue, especially emphasizing that the baths served a social function. They were a place where one could mingle with neighbours, relax, play chess, establish and build contacts, hold meetings, and even make business deals or political agreements. For women, it was a place to meet with friends and catch up on gossip.

²⁶ As we will see, this is challenged by some archaeologists later in the chapter.

Each of the guides explained both the physical structure of the baths and the bathing rituals. Similar to Roman thermal baths, El Bañuelo and others in the city consist of three bathing rooms: a cold room (*al-bayt al barid, frigidarium*), a temperate room (*al-bayt al-wastani, tempidarium*) (Figure 3.14), and a hot sauna-like room (*al-bayt al-sajun, caldarium*) along with a changing room (*al-bayt al-maslaj*). This connection to the Roman baths often leads to a variant of the comment that “the Moors didn’t invent anything” or that they simply “copied everything” that came before. In one tour, when guide Natalia noticed I made note of the line, she awkwardly attempted to clarify. She emphasized that she meant to refer to the borrowed Roman concept of the bath and reused Roman materials – columns and capitals in the temperate room, octagonal or star shaped openings in the ceilings that let light in, vapour out, and at the same time reduced the weight of the vaulted roofs. Beneath the hot room, bath employees constantly attended to a fire that heated both the hot room and the temperate room by warming spaces under the floor. The cold room was a space to bathe with cold water after using the sauna and relax after the bath. Bathers would use receptacles to draw water from a basin and pour it over their body, never fully submerging themselves in water. Services offered at the bath included massages, beauty and body treatments, haircuts and styling, body hair removal, and washing the backs of bathers. This last idea, making some of the tour participants squeamish, lead Diego to explain that physical “contact is different in the Arab world”. The information that guides share about the Arab baths and the hydraulic system, apart from their added commentary, aligns with the regional narrative provided both on an information board in the Bañuelo and in didactic itinerary resources the region has produced for secondary school students (Ruiz Ruiz & Barbosa García, 2000; 1999; Barbosa García & Ruiz Ruiz, 1996).

3.7 Contemporary “Arab baths”: A return to the aesthetics of the past

Down the stairs, past the sinks and towel deposit, I enter a dimly lit change room. Slow Arabic music fills the space with muted but audible sounds of an oud, a guitar, and darbukas. Together with the deep brown beautifully carved lockers and the vaulted roof with star and octagonal shaped openings, the mood is set. Entering the bath, I notice how

the Moroccan lamps with the different shaped openings allow the candle light to dance off the ceilings and walls with varying designs of typical Andalusian tiling that calls to mind the walls of the Alhambra. Perhaps out of place, more candlelight is provided by tall white candles in red plastic containers used during Catholic ceremonies in memory of loved ones. I skip the cold pool, knowing that the 16°C will take some easing into and head over to the other rooms, first, the shallow hot pool and then chest-deep temperate pool. As I float around, I begin to make mental fieldnotes, counting ceiling openings and memorizing shapes, while I wait for my massage. After all, there isn't a chess tournament or a poetry reading today. The aromatic jasmine oil I chose brings back memories of my time studying in Malaga, but I keep thinking, I should have paid extra for the massage with a name reminiscent of al-Andalus.²⁷ Instead, I finish my time with the sauna, a five second submersion in the freezing cold pool, and some time floating in the hot pool until the bath attendant firmly insists that the idea is to periodically change pools.

The Arab bath, such as the one I describe here, as a marketable concept has quite successfully returned to Andalusia in the past 20 years. These baths are frequented much more by tourists than by local residents, partially due to the relatively steep cost, especially during a financial crisis in which Granada was significantly affected. Differing from historical baths,²⁸ the three rooms have pools at various temperatures and include separate areas for massages and beauty treatments, relaxing, and in some, a steam room. Treatments include standard massages and more elaborate bathing experiences with essences such as jasmine, cinnamon, and orange, considered to be smells of the Arab world. More inventive massages use forceful jets, and chocolate or wine as massage "oil". Tea in silver (or pewter) Moroccan teapots is served in the rest areas.

Based on the historical concept of an Arab bath, these contemporary establishments range from spa-like to a place of relaxation more aligned with the narrative of historical Arab baths in Spain and contemporary baths throughout the Arab

²⁷ A more recent look at services offered shows that almost all of the treatments are named after historical figures of the *andalusí* past or after Arabic words.

²⁸ In the historical baths, services were usually offered in the temperate room.

world. In his interview, Matias, an employee at one of the baths in Granada, clarified that Arab baths in Spain are not thermal baths or spas focused on therapeutic treatments, but stay true to the social and relaxation aspect of the Arab bath and attempt to bring the “enjoyment of what a real Arab bath was like” (Matias. Early 30s, Arab bath employee. Interview, March 1, 2012). This bath in particular, however, seemed to be the only one in which the employee I interviewed stressed a certain degree of authenticity. It was this particular aspect of the bath that Matias emphasized in distinguishing his bath from the others. His stress on authenticity begs the question as to whether or not it is simply a marketing technique to take advantage of monopoly rent, since “authenticity is also often consciously invoked as an actual marketing strategy” (Halewood & Hannam, 2001, p. 567). However, his personal identification with and relatively extensive knowledge of the *Andalusi* past suggests the connection to the Arab world was more important than marketing. Employees of other baths I spoke with acknowledged their baths, which had the same pool-based design as the rest, were conceptualized more as a spa than a traditional Arab bath, despite the use of architectural styles that evoke *Andalusi* architecture.

In all four baths that I visited in both Granada and Madrid, very little socializing seemed to take place between bathers, unlike how historical baths are imagined. Various companies organize chess tournaments and, at times, invite musicians to encourage interaction. However, the focus on tourism and the limited regular use of the baths by locals who would already know each other seems to curb socializing. At some baths, this quietness is desired. Noelia, an employee of another bath, insisted that the silence of guests was necessary to “enter into a space where you forget everything.” and continues, “Sometimes it’s obtainable. The people lose the notion of time.” (Noelia. Mid-40s, Arab bath employee. Interview, May 7, 2012). She goes on to explain that the time at the bath should be to relax, to feel/sense (using the verb *sentir*, i.e. to perceive through the senses or emotions, which invokes both English words), elaborating on the different smells and essences used at her bath. Understandably, in a spa the goal is to disconnect; however, the idea of silence and the timeless Arab space brings to mind Said’s characterization of the Orientalization of the Arab world (Talreja, 1998; Said, 1979, p. 174). Despite this, employees at the various baths all consider the newer baths as connected to the *Andalusi*

history and to Arab baths in the contemporary Arab world. Moreover, as Matías added, their goal is to be associated with the concept of Arab baths throughout history, a history with traditions that “Northern Spain doesn’t have” as Leticia, an employee of a third bath I interviewed, argued, and of which they “should be proud” (Matías. Late 40s. Interview, January 11, 2012). Evidently their thoughts invoke the discourse of uniqueness, one that gives rise to monopoly rents.

This connection with Spain’s Arab past and its Orientalization played a significant role in the conceptualization and design of the first contemporary Arab baths. In our interview, Matias elaborated on the stories he heard about the developers:

The owners were strolling through the Alhambra, it’s a little romantic actually, and they thought: ‘What can we do, something romantic like this, that we can offer to tourists and Granadans? Not like the Alhambra because it’s a little untouchable [...] And they thought of an Arab bath. I mean, they saw the baths in the Alhambra and thought that they could bring them to the present day, make use of them, and teach the public what an old Arab bath was. (Matías. Early 30s. Interview, March 1, 2012)

He goes on to say that the owners had been to baths in the Arab world and that, to them, the baths seem to be “something romantic, something original, something that nobody had exploited here, and the truth is, it is a shame that they had disappeared from Granada.” While Matias’ earlier identification with the history brought into question his use of authenticity, it is clear that the owners understood the monopoly that the Alhambra has created in the city and recognized the Arab baths as a business concept upon which they could capitalize. Matias, on the other hand, laments the loss of what he sees as a common practice that was beneficial in the past. Easily classified as and voiced in terms of Western appropriation and exploitation of the baths, his nostalgic lament is expressed in terms of recuperation of the lost *Andalusi* past. He sees the baths as “applying what was the old world to our everyday life and routines but giving it a Western touch”. For the baths where Matias works, this Europeanized recuperation of the baths takes on a marketing objective that goes beyond tourism. The chess tournaments, together with a music competition and an Arab bath-themed story writing competition in past years, is an attempt to be associated with what Matias refers to as “cultural tourism”. The company encouraged participation in Spain and various countries in the Arab world by advertising

these not-for-profit competitions internationally. Matias explained that, although with tourism still in mind, their idea is to promote contemporary connections with the Arab world along the lines of a common past. In the final chapter, my discussion of these bridges and connections illustrates how Matias' narrative forms a part of a larger narrative – one that characterizes the city as space of dialogue and exchange – that emerged alongside developing economic relations between the European Union and the Arab world.

3.8 Learning history outside the classroom: Non-tour guide tours by academics and teachers

The commercialization of historical spaces, both those from the Muslim past and those from periods other than al-Andalus, and the historical narratives that go with them, draw increasingly sizable numbers of tourists to Granada each year. Still, the substantial presence of tourist-oriented historical tours has not yet completely excluded Granadans from learning about their own past. Access to the Alhambra is limited, unless residents choose to visit on similar terms and prices as tourists or solicit limited space on free tours on Sundays, a point of resentment among Granadans given that other cities such as Seville²⁹ allow residents free and unlimited entry to heritage sites. Yet considerable interest ensures that the free historical tours and talks given by academics of a number of disciplines are frequently packed with residents eager to learn about their city and their past (Figure 3.15). In fact, the four free tours I participated in given by academics and more knowledgeable residents of neighbourhood groups all reached the limited number of people allowed (between 30-50 people) and required two guides. Similar to tours for residents, high school teachers give their students tours of the Alhambra and the Albaicin, although visits were often contingent on a number of factors: age and “manageability” of the students, whether the students visited often, whether the teacher believed in field trips, and other factors. The last chapter of this dissertation discusses the historical

²⁹ Seville is also the official seat of the regional government and often viewed as the unofficial capital of Andalusia.

narratives of these teachers further; however, I mention these school tours here since they parallel the others in the city.

Academic tours differ from city tours in that they focus on the guide's area of expertise. One tour that offered to residents, for example, was a tour that complemented a talk given by an archeologist about Arab Baths the previous day. The tour visited two Arab baths, the Bañuelo, and the *Baños de las Mercedarias* (Arab Baths of the Mercedarians), an Arab bath closed to the general public that had been discovered during renovations inside a primary school. During the tour, our guide, LAAC archaeologist Julio Navarro, elaborated on working archaeological theories of architectural and infrastructure changes regarding the Bañuelo and its corresponding city scape. His presentation of new evidence challenged both the 11th century dating of the Bañuelo as well as the simplified narrative that most city guides share. He explained that in looking at the archeological analysis, it is more likely that the vestibule and the cold room of the Bañuelo were both spaces of acclimatization, allowing the bathers to rest and adapt to outside temperatures before leaving the bath. Thus, he discards the narrative of the cold room as a bathing space. By challenging the description given by non-academic tour guides, our guide's academic expertise speaks not only to the authenticity of the site, but also to the authenticity of the version of history given during the tour. This authenticity and its accompanying discourse of particularity aids in reinforcing what has been framed politically as part of the collective regional identity. Furthermore, the researchers' expertise also aids in strengthening the connection between regional identity and the universalist discourse of World Heritage.

It is unlikely that many of the local participants who take these tours know the specific UNESCO criteria that emphasize the uniqueness of the Albaicin and the Alhambra although they are very aware of the World Heritage distinction. Still, the discourse of uniqueness is inferred and reproduced. Participation in these tours provide residents with a deeper understanding of practices of the past beyond the simplified and often romanticized versions of some tour guides. Furthermore, they give residents first-hand experience of how the past is shaped by the present through archaeological research where they see the past “not as a given ‘thing’ which we must preserve, but as a force

constantly resonating in the present, producing new layers of sound and meaning.” (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, p. 241). Thus, the tours effectively allow residents to participate in changing narratives based on archeological research. Tours of the Alhambra can parallel this past-present experience. One tour for high school students I observed



Figure 3.15: Our guide, a researcher and expert on *Andalusi* architecture, walks closer to the Nazarid wall on a neighbourhood walking tour, The Walls of the Albayzín, to elaborate on the architectural elements and the construction of the wall (22 March, 2013; photo by author)

Figure 3.16: A mime dressed as an Arab warrior (and his dog) waits patiently to begin his act as a tourist places money before him at the *Arco de las Pesas* (Arch of the Weights) in Plaza Larga. Security cameras similar to those in the Alhambra were installed in early 2018 in order to control vandalism to the arch/doorway (25 March, 2013; photo by author)

echoed the importance of the archaeological research. As Jeronimo, an art history teacher, connected the information students were learning in class to the architecture and design of their surroundings, he also indicated to his students the extensive archaeological research at the Alhambra yet to be completed. He then stressed that this much-needed research is frequently affected by regional government bureaucracy and funding. Delayed archaeological work, however, is much less a problem for narrating the past in the present than competition between guides. When narrating the history in the Alhambra, teachers, city tour guides and even knowledgeable individuals face similar challenges.

3.9 The Alhambra as a space of dialogue, music, and overwhelming tourism

The Alhambra can be considered a space with many different facets: one of dialogue, intellectual exchange and memory (see González Alcantud, 2008); music – which has included the first festival of music, Cante Jondo (1922) and the continuing yearly Festival of Music & Dance (1952-current) (see González Alcantud, 2011); archaeology; history; art; architectural analysis; and, overwhelmingly, one of tourism. Often characterized as an “amusement park” by city residents that I interviewed, the historical site received more than 2.6 million visitors³⁰ in 2016, 300,000 more people than the site welcomed in 2012 (Patronato de la Alhambra y Generalife, 2016; 2012). Over the years, the monopoly of the Alhambra over this tourism resulted in somewhat of a disconnect between the tourist activity in the Alhambra and that of the city. Thus, more recent attempts by the city government to bridge this divide have meant an extension of tours from the Alhambra down to the city. Tour guides and operators from the Alhambra often end up visiting the same sites as city guides. Walking through the city, tour groups of sometimes 30-40 people with an identifying company sticker on their clothes and with headphones and receivers hanging around their necks are often seen gathered around significant historical spaces in the city, listening to the tour guides speaking into a microphone. These large groups, organized by tour operators, are often passengers from the massive cruise ships that dock in Malaga or bus tours of foreigner tourists with a stop at the Alhambra always in their itinerary. Individual visitors can also purchase visits to the Alhambra with a tour guide in which they gain access to spaces at the site normally closed to the general public. These guides, like those employed by the tour operators, have also come to include stops in the city.

The regional government’s strategies for controlling mass tourism in the Alhambra, however, have also limited the voices that contribute to the historical narratives of the monument. Official tours provided for tourists generally are given by a

³⁰ To put this in perspective, Granada’s population in 2016 was 234,758 (INE, 2016).

licensed tour guide. This license grants holders the right to conduct tours at any historical site in Andalusia. Licensing is granted by the *Junta de Andalucía* and is open to any guide who applies, provided that they have completed undergraduate studies in a related field and have general knowledge of two languages. Some of the official guides that give tours in the Alhambra, however, belong to a collective (or a cooperative, as these guides are freelance) to which many of the city guides do not belong, often because of the cost and competition involved (Rocío. Mid-30s, tour guide. Interview, March 4, 2012). One employee of the Alhambra, Guillermo, alluded to extreme competition amongst guides, with some being favoured over others by those in management positions (personal communication, July 5, 2012). Similarly, over the past few years, management at the site has come under scrutiny over contracts won through public bidding that possibly favoured some companies over others (Chirino, 2016; Agencia EFE, 2015).³¹

Because of this practice amongst guides, teachers I interviewed, including Jeronimo, frequently mentioned that they feel so rushed on tours with their students that they don't have time to explain the monument. Leonor, a teacher from a different school, echoed his frustration. When I asked if she took her students to the Alhambra, she explained that she did not because:

Lately the conditions under which one can visit the Alhambra are, well, very deceptive [and] misleading. I mean, they don't let me walk around with my students and stop and do what I would want. I've been with students explaining the Alhambra, talking about art history and the tour guides from the tour operators have called attention to me because I was taking up the room and it bothered them. I swear to you, it's no joke. I mean, I swear to you. Or for example, the very guides of the Alhambra. The last time I was at the Alhambra, I was giving an explanation about what the Albaicin was and all of that, ummm, and we were on top of the *Torre de la Vela* [Tower of the Candle]³² and they said to me: 'You've

³¹ This scrutiny is both legally and political motivated. Because the *Patronato* is controlled by the regional government in power, the Alhambra has been managed by the centre-left PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party) for many years. Many of the positions in the head committee of the *Patronato* are held by politicians of this party. Thus, the conservative party, *Partido Popular*, continuously objects to the "monopoly" that PSOE holds on management of the monument (Sánchez, 2016).

³² *Torre de la Vela* is the largest tower in the fortress complex and the same tower that houses the bell rung on the Day of the Capture (*Día de la Toma*) discussed in Chapter Four. From the tower, the entirety of the Albaicin can be seen.

been here for longer than a half hour. You have to leave because the next group is going to enter.’ And they threw us out. They literally threw us out. I mean, man, this was back when the Alhambra started to become what it is now, you have to request in advance, and they effectively send you away evicted from the spaces. You are more and more restricted [meaning: there are more and more limitations]. (Leonor. Late 40s, history teacher. Interview, May 31, 2012)

These controls do not only target teachers during school tours but also individuals, without regard to visitors’ credentials or the extent of their knowledge. In 2014, a Granadan journalist knowledgeable about Muslim Spain came close to being arrested while explaining the history to a group of friends visiting the Alhambra. As he was explaining, three guides alerted security and prohibited him from continuing insisting that any explanation was “the job of the [official] guides” (Granada, 2014). The journalist was then approached by officers of the national police corps who demanded each person in his group identify themselves and threatened the group with jail time if they didn’t comply. Because only licensed guides are permitted to give “tours”, any seemingly larger group with unaccredited individuals heard to be narrating the history or explaining elements of the site are suspiciously observed and warned if considered to be defying this rule as they are seen to be infringing upon the monopoly that the guides hold.

In order to protect and preserve the monument, security measures such as security cameras have been necessary – steps that have now also been implemented to protect the *Ziri Arco de las Pesas* (Arch of the Weights) (Figure 3.16) in the Albaicin from graffiti creators. Mass tourism does put the Alhambra at risk with the vast number of people accessing it on a daily basis. Therefore, control of the space is necessary in order to preserve the monument.³³ The extensive network of cameras at the Alhambra allow for any transgressive behaviour to be addressed quickly. However, these restraints placed on non-accredited individuals – whether city tour guides, teachers or the general population – together with the competition created amongst guides, simultaneously assures that some guides come to control the service provided at the site – and as a result, the historical

³³ This control of movement at the site has become so extensive that as of January of 2018, individual tickets are now required to list the holder’s name. Moreover, security personnel are permitted to ask visitors to present (national) identification at any time.

narrative presented – and that they are able to take advantage of monopoly rent that arises. Thus, both the heritage site and the historical narrative has become commodified. The earlier mentioned journalist, however, seemed to fully understand these complexities of power surrounding historical narratives. In the journalist’s complaint lodged with the *Patronato*, he gave evidence of the “alliance observed between guide[s], security guards and the national-regional police” (Granada, 2014).

3.10 Concluding thoughts

What makes a World Heritage site worthy of the designation can differ quite drastically from the definition at the site, far removed from the seeming reach of UNESCO. While collective symbolic capital has become increasingly vital to the economic vitality of cities, residents of the Albaicin in Granada in their daily lives define and redefine what this label should mean in a neighbourhood that continues to be the place of residence of a significant living population. It can vary from day to day and can be adapted to any situation in which civil *convivencia* of residents – the same concept discussed in the second chapter – is at stake. This World Heritage designation and the global recognition of the Alhambra and Albaicin together with global flows have produced an unexpected phenomenon, that of mass tourism. It is one that has had palpable effects on the neighbourhood. The economic reliance on tourism has gone hand in hand with the increasing dual commodification of the historical narrative and physical heritage sites. In Granada, the presence of the Alhambra puts this Muslim past at the centre of this commodification. The same discourse of World Heritage, that of uniqueness and particularity, are paralleled by the discourse that gives rise to monopoly rents. The larger monopoly of the Alhambra over tourism, with its history of al-Andalus and the last Muslim kingdom, the Kingdom of Granada, has given rise to monopoly rents that benefit some Granadans in particular. Certain Arab baths tap into the discourse of providing a unique service in Spain yet concurrently uses the discourse that characterizes Granada as point of connection between Spain and the Arab world discussed in the last chapter. Speculation on properties in the Albaicin allow for direct monopoly rents to be garnered on private property due to their location. Competition between tour guides in the Alhambra creates a monopoly over both the service provided and the historical narrative.

In the city, guides attempt to take advantage of the collective symbolic capital produced by the “marks of distinction” that the Alhambra and the Albaicín have created for the city (Harvey, 2002, p. 103). Their tours provide a range of narratives and have even benefited the younger generation most affected by the economic crisis. City guides share knowledge, both historical and contemporary, that challenges more conservative and sometimes historical narratives reminiscent of the fascist era. Historical sites and spaces around the city enable criticism of past and present injustices, but also enable residents to find spaces in which they can continue to shape a more nuanced understanding of their past. In the following chapter, I address the yearly festival, *Día de la Toma* (Day of the Capture). The commodification of history has come to impact its production and interpretation much more than nationalism has. Still, the connection between nationalism and certain narratives of al-Andalus continues to linger. This festival provides an example of nationalist historical narratives that continue to be present and are politicized on a day in which both tourists and Granadans participate.

Chapter 4

4 Three Fiestas: The entanglement of polemical pasts and the contemporary politicization of commemorations and celebrations

Walking up the middle of the street, I could see the mounted police horses shift restlessly on the spot as they waited for the parade participants to leave the Royal Chapel and return to the Plaza del Carmen. In the background, the sounds of the bell could be heard ringing randomly on top of the Alhambra's *Torre de la Vela* (Tower of the Candle) as it had done all day. The sounds, as I learned later, are reminiscent of past *Día de la Toma* commemorations (literally 'The Day of the Taking, Capture or Seizure') that used to include ceremonial rituals that took place in the Alhambra. Earlier in the morning while running down the hill of *San Miguel*, I had tried to figure out a pattern to the strikes but neither the number of rings nor the time between each ring seemed to have any logic. Only later did I learn the reason from one of my interviewees. It was a tradition celebrated annually to wish unattached women a partner and marriage: One ring, hope for a significant other, two, to get married, and three, to be happy (Guillermo, personal communication, n.d.; "La Torre de la Vega", 2016). One could understand why the people below were paying little attention to it. I found a place among the crowds and prepared for the return of the parade. The children of the family beside me seemed equally anxious for the festivities. To keep them occupied, their mother struck up a conversation and although her children were young, they already knew the story. When the mother asked if they knew "what happened to the *moros*¹ (or Moors) today?", Samuel,² the eldest son of no more than five years old, threw up his hand, as if in a

¹ *Moro* is translated as Moor in English but can hold a pejorative historical or contemporary weight depending on how it is used and to whom it is referring. According to my interviewees, the contemporary reference generally makes reference to North Africans, Moroccans in particular (although it can be extended to Arabs, depending on the speaker). The term can be used affectionately. However, its more common pejorative use is pervasive in everyday language. Many of my interviewees also explained that it makes reference specifically to economic migrants.

² All names have been changed to maintain anonymity of the people involved in this work. For some interviewees and people mentioned, gender has also been changed, particularly in cases in which the person is more easily identifiable.

classroom and exclaimed, “I know, I know! The *Reyes* threw them out!” (*Reyes* is in reference to the Catholic Monarchs Isabel and Fernando). He knew the day was significant not necessarily because it was the day that the Catholic Monarchs captured the city but because of the events that came after. This five-year-old’s version of the historical events following the *Toma de Granada* is not explicitly expressed in the rituals performed in the annual commemoration³ of this day. The expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants of the Peninsula is depicted neither in the ceremony nor rituals. Yet the boy’s comment made clear he had learned the connection between the rituals of the annual *Día de la Toma* (Day of the Capture) commemoration and the expulsion that followed.

Once the ceremony came to a close, my hope of finding someone who knew more about the items carried in the parade was dashed as the crowd quickly dispersed and the plaza in front of the City Hall returned to normal. I sat down on a bench with my notebook and, for a moment, watched the children racing around the plaza beat each other with balloon swords. Opening my notebook to summarize my observations, the voice of a stranger distracted me from my task. “Are you a *cronista*?”, Víctor, a smartly dressed elderly gentleman wearing a flat cap, asked. *Cronista* in Spanish can be translated as reporter, journalist, historian, or chronicler. My background in Spanish literature and the word’s similarity to English made me jump to the conclusion that he was asking if I was documenting history like the medieval chroniclers of Christian Spain. When I elaborated on my research, Víctor immediately took it as a cue to share his thoughts. He began by telling me that the history presented in the plaza during the *Día de la Toma* was falsified. The city, he explained, was never captured. It wasn’t the glorious victory that more conservative Spaniards promote. The last ruler, Boabdil⁴ or Muhammad XII, surrendered the city to the Catholic Monarchs to protect his place in

³ Note that I refer to this yearly observance as a commemoration given that this festivity is generally referred to as a *commemoración* in Spanish. However, by critics of the ceremony, it is referred to as a celebration. Conversely, I refer to the *Día de la Hispanidad* and *Moros y Cristianos* as celebrations although the former could either be considered a celebration or commemoration.

⁴ I choose to use the Spanish common names of historical figures in order to provide consistency between my own considerations and my interviewees’ references to these same figures. In academic disciplines such as History and Archaeology, it is now common practice to use the Arabic names (Díaz-Andreu 2002, p. 150).

court and guarantee certain living conditions for his subjects. The Catholics pitted him against his father and started a civil war between them during which the people of the city took sides. They forced him to hand over his children to gain his freedom. Víctor paused his historical account to express his reproach: “What kind of Catholics were they? If they killed, if they wanted to call the city “Christianapolis”, the city of the Christians, a new Jerusalem?” The Monarchs were issued a Papal Bull authorizing (and financing) the war on the Muslim Kingdom of Granada to take revenge on the Ottomans for taking Constantinople in 1452. By making reference to the Papal bulls granted to Spain, Víctor linked the historical events in the Iberian Peninsula to powers greater than the Catholic Monarchs that held influence far beyond their territory. He continued. The Muslims were not that different from the Christians and to say that they were would be a lie. There were even Christian Kings in Seville that dressed like the Muslims.⁵ The conservative version of history never recognizes what they had in common, Víctor insisted, and people never take care of their history, especially Granadans who don’t appreciate the history they have. After two years, they expelled the entire Muslim population even though they had promised to protect the converts to Christianity and the Muslims living in the city. At this point, Víctor claimed, as he did quite often throughout our chat, he no longer had the memory that he once had and that he would tell me more if his memory was better. He went on to tell me about great writers and fighters – Christian and Muslim, historical and contemporary figures – that he felt were more representative of the city and the country than those glorified in the national narrative. The more knowledge he shared, the more I thought: his memory seemed highly intact. His historical account was pointedly made up of snippets of history that I heard often throughout my fieldwork.

The complex version of an elderly man willing to challenge the national-Catholic narrative was as far as one could get from little Samuel and his exclamation about the “*moros*” thrown out by the “*Reyes*”. Víctor, who had been standing with very vocal critics of the commemoration, gave voice to the oppositional versions of the past presented in the plaza. Moreover, his insistence on sharing his account of the Capture

⁵ See Fuchs (2009) for analysis of these medieval Christian customs.

highlights the controversy surrounding public representations of this history in the present. Yet, in Granada, the *Día de la Toma* commemoration is the festivity that generates the most controversy and politicized public debate during the events held. Other celebrations such as *Moros y Cristianos* (Moors and Christians) and the *Día de la Hispanidad* (Columbus Day, translated as Day of “Spanishness” or “Hispanic-ness”), whose historical referents are also rooted in the medieval period, are subjected to different kinds of criticisms than the *Toma* ceremony. At first glance, these two celebrations have elements in common with the *Toma*. While *Moros y Cristianos* are popular festivals with local significance, the *Día de la Hispanidad* is celebrated nationally. The *Toma*, on the other hand, is a local festival with national significance but it observes the same moment in a city’s history as *Moros y Cristianos*, the city’s capture from the Muslim inhabitants. By considering commemorations and celebrations,⁶ we can examine how they are used to support particular national historical narratives, as Luzon suggests:

these commemorations reveal the political culture of those who organized them, their **desire to maintain a particular version of history** and **to affirm their own identity** while giving a meaning to the past that was still valid in the present. (Moreno Luzón, 2007, p. 70)

Thus, national celebrations and commemorations support official narratives that shape and reproduce a sense of national belonging. Although official narratives may shift with changing political contexts, the meanings ascribed to these commemorations are usually aligned with dominant accounts of the past. Johnson and Dawson speak of ‘dominant memory’ as that which has dominance in the public sphere and is tied to state institutions or to elite classes (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, p. 207). These constructions are produced in the midst of contestation of a society’s past. Popular memory might converge with and diverge from the dominant narrative given that dominant memory may not be agreed upon by all members of society. Thus, Víctor’s narrative is an example of how ordinary people often counter the official or dominant account of the past. Yet, these popular

⁶ To make clear the distinction between commemoration and celebration, I consider commemoration to be a solemn “ceremony or service in memory of a person or event” (“commemoration”, 2018). On the other hand, I consider celebration to be an observation of “a notable occasion with festivities” (“celebration”, 2018).

versions circulate in the more privatized domains and have less authority in the public sphere (p. 210).

Much research on historical nationalism, including the work of Moreno-Luzon and Alares Lopez, considers how the nation was defined by intellectual and political elites. However, historian Eric Hobsbawm reminds us that nationalist discourses are not only defined by these authorities but that nations are:

dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people. [...] Official ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what is in the minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters. (1990, p. 10-11)

In this chapter, I question what are the alternative narratives that are excluded from official representations of the past, and whether or how they oppose or provide alternatives to official historical accounts represented by the *Día de la Toma* ceremony. I also consider recent changes made by the centre-left PSOE (the Spanish Socialist Worker Party) government with the aim to reduce the expression of more oppositional alternative narratives during the civil ceremony. Moreover, I compare the three festivals mentioned earlier to consider why certain celebrations and commemorations in Granada with historical referents are more publicly contested than others with similar histories. Following Coakley (2004), Glassberg (1996), Hobsbawm (1990), Connerton (1989) and Johnson and Dawson of the Popular Memory Group (1982), I assume that history and politics are connected. The commemoration of the *Día de la Toma*, ordered by Fernando V (b.1542-d.1516), began long before the emergence of nations-states. Still, this commemoration along with the *Día de la Hispanidad* came to be associated with nationalism. Despite the removal of fascist symbols in the late 1970s, these two events, the *Toma* and *Día de la Hispanidad*, held by the local government⁷ are interpreted by some groups as specifically promoting elements of the national-Catholic narrative. Therefore, I look at how the festivities and the politicization of the past are entwined.

⁷ Note that while *Día de la Hispanidad* is a national holiday, the city government, however, is responsible for the festivities in Granada.

Authorities with the power to define public historical representations use commemorative sites of memory (Nora, 2001-2010; 1996-1998), along with narratives, and other national symbols and rituals (Moreno Luzón, 2007, p. 70; Coakley, 2004, p. 534). The power to determine which elements are both included and excluded from a celebration or commemoration can become an advantage in the political struggle over the past as “it is through the so-called ‘politics of the past’ that collective historical identities are articulated.” (Alares López, 2016, p. 708). I begin by outlining the rituals and material objects involved in the ceremony to consider the symbolism of the commemoration and the historical narrative attached to it. Often, it is the symbolism attached to these traditions, and their elements, that is opposed by critics, who recognize the reductive processes of selection that forge nationalist versions of the past.

4.1 A historical background: The “*Toma de Granada*”

The *Día de la Toma* ceremony is an annual commemoration of the rendition of the city of Granada in 1492, still celebrated 525 years⁸ after the *Toma de Granada* – where both the historical event and the commemoration are often referred to simply as the *Toma*.

Boabdil (a Spanish rendering of his Arabic name, Abu Abdallah⁹) had been embroiled in a bitter civil war and struggle for the sultanate against his father, Abu al-Hasan Ali ben Saad (Muley Hacen in Spanish). When Boabdil first took the sultanate from his father, his need to legitimize his position and strengthen his control over the territory lead to an incursion into Christian territory in which he was captured unwittingly as a prisoner of war in 1483. He was released only after he agreed to a pact with the Catholic Monarchs that would convert Granada into a vassal kingdom if he defeated his father (Vidal Castro 2000, p. 197).

⁸ As of 2017.

⁹ In Arabic, Abu Abdallah literally means “father of Abdulla”.

Once in power during his second reign, Boabdil refused to pay the tribute tax. This defiant act led to a decade long war in which the Catholics, camped at Santa Fe,¹⁰ laid siege to the city until the young sultan had little option but to surrender. In late November of 1491, Boabdil agreed to terms of surrender with little negotiation and signed a series of capitulations documenting the terms (Mármol Carvajal 1946, p. 146). These terms included specifics about the way in which the city would be surrendered, the freeing of both Muslim and Christian captives, amnesty for actions before the surrender, the respectful treatment of “Moors”¹¹ going forward, and “Moorish” customs to be respected (see Appendix F for the English translation of the agreement).¹² They outlined exemptions for Muslim inhabitants from taxes, tributes, and money owed, the guarantee of retention of property, animals, and belongings, and the different ways in which Muslims and Jews outside of the city could be included in the Capitulations. Three terms in particular regarding the definitive expulsions of the Muslim inhabitants stand out. These three inclusions mapped out conditions under which the return of Muslim inhabitants was possible. If the returnee agreed to the terms, the Capitulations allowed for the return (within a three-year period) of any Muslim *Andalusi* who had already left, the freedom of movement and return for Muslim *Andalusies* engaging in trade outside the Peninsula, and even more striking, the return of any Muslim *Andalusi* who attempted to settle in North Africa but who wished to return within the same three-year period (Capitulation 26-28 in Appendix F).

¹⁰ Santa Fe translates as “Holy Faith” and is a site that is now a city on the Vega or flatlands of Granada. The name is yet another example of how the Andalusian topography reflects this history.

¹¹ The document uses the term *moro*, which in English translates as Moor. The term *andalusí* – one that recognizes that the political power was held by Muslims but that not all inhabitants of al-Andalus were Muslim – is now quite commonly used in academic spheres in Spain.

¹² Throughout the Capitulations, the distinction is made between Muslims (*moros*) and Jews (*judíos*). For Jews to be subject to the Capitulations, they had to convert unlike the Muslims, who were supposed to be protected without conversion.

The city was then surrendered on the 2nd of January, 1492 when Boabdil handed the keys to the Alhambra over to the Catholic Monarchs near the Alcazar Genil,¹³ a recreational court palace built by Almohad governor Said Ishaq ben Yusuf in 1218 that still stands in the city's south end ("Sabes dónde entregó Boabdil", 2016). The *Día de la Toma* festivities mark the act of this exchange of political power between the Muslim Sultan and the Catholic Monarchs. Moreover, it was a popular ceremony celebrated by Granadans between 1493 and 1516, until Fernando officially ordered its continued commemoration in his last testament (Tobías. Late 50s, *Toma* supporter. Interview, June 11, 2013). The festival was conceived as a ritual memorializing the final victory of Isabel and Fernando and their eradication of Islam in mainland Europe. The capture was celebrated throughout Europe as the end of a crusade. In Spain, the Jews were expelled six months after the capture. The implementation of a more zealous religious vision by court advisor, Cardinal Cisneros, began to dissolve soon thereafter the conditions granted to the remaining Muslims that recognized them and respected their traditions. The later expulsion of the *Moriscos*¹⁴ (1609 -1613) – Muslim *Andalusies* that converted to Christianity – decisively put an end to any lingering traditions.

Before the surrender of Granada, Boabdil negotiated Capitulations that allowed for the protection without religious conversion to the inhabitants of the city, including the large number of refugees that had fled from other Muslim kingdoms that had been taken by the Catholics. This protection was honoured but in the end short-lived, with Cisneros' goal of complete conversion of the Muslim population (Echevarría Arsuaga, 2000, p. 386). Such was the persecution that it provoked repeated uprisings by the *Moriscos*¹⁵, first, in the neighbourhood of the Albayzin (1499-1502) and later, during the bloody

¹³ The restored building now houses the Francisco Ayala Foundation, an organization that aims to protect "the creative, intellectual and material legacy of Francisco Ayala (a 20th century Granada writer) and promote the study and diffusion of his work as the precursor to Spanish exiled Avant Garde prose, narrative, and essay." (Fundación Francisco Ayala, 2017, *my translation*)

¹⁴ The *Moriscos* of Andalusia were expelled on January 10, 1610 after the first expulsions in Valencia the year before (Domínguez Ortiz & Vincent, 1978, p. 186). They fled to many different areas in the Arab world, including Morocco, Algeria and Turkey.

¹⁵ Muslim converts to Christianity.

Rebellion of the Alpujarras¹⁶ (1568-1571) (pp. 387-388). By the early 16th century, *Mudejars*, Muslims living in Christian territory, who refused conversion had long been expelled. The *Moriscos* continued to face accusations of false conversion and persecution often resulting in judgment by the Inquisition. By 1609, the final, definitive expulsion order of the *Moriscos* from the Peninsula took effect and successive waves of expulsions throughout the Christian kingdoms exiled the last of the formerly Muslim inhabitants from their homeland. By 1614, anywhere between 300,000 and 1,000,000 *Moriscos*¹⁷ were expelled from the Peninsula (Echeverría Arsuaga 2000, p. 389).

4.2 *Día de la Toma*: An ethnographic account of a public commemoration

The rituals and the ceremony of the *Día de la Toma* take place in one of three spaces in the city: the political – the Plaza del Carmen in front of City Hall or *Ayuntamiento*; the community – on two streets leading from the City Hall, past the statue of Christopher Columbus and Queen Isabel¹⁸ and up to the iron gates leading into the plaza at the entrance to the Royal Chapel; and lastly the religious – inside the Chapel and the Cathedral of Granada. The events in the plaza and on the street are open to the public. A short mass, also open to the public, is held in the Cathedral and is followed by a ritual flag waving in the Royal Chapel. This display is a public ceremony, although it is only attended by clergy, politicians and the soldiers participating in the procession.¹⁹ The chapel holds the sepulchre of the Catholic Monarchs and is attached to both to the Cathedral and to the *Iglesia del Sagrario* (the Church of the Tabernacle). The latter is built on top of the Great Mosque of Granada (Cathedral construction: 1705-1759) (Barbosa García & Ruiz Ruiz, 2006). The participants in the public commemoration then

¹⁶ The Alpujarras is the area on the southern face of the Sierra Nevada mountains where many *Andalusies* from the city took refuge from the repression.

¹⁷ The first number is generally the most supported estimation by researchers (Echeverría Arsuaga, 2000).

¹⁸ The statue of the Catholic regent and the explorer, Christopher Columbus, depicts Columbus' request for financing of his famous voyage in 1492 on which he landed in the Caribbean instead of finding an alternate route to Asia.

¹⁹ Note that I use parade and procession interchangeably.

return to the street and proceed back to the plaza for the final part of the day's festivities. Rituals that hold national symbolism like those of the *Día de la Toma* are "formed round these occasions: festival pavilions, structures for the display of flags, temples for offerings, processions, bell-ringing, tableaux, gun-salutes, government delegations in honour of the festival, dinners, toasts and oratory." (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 6). To this we can add "anthems, parades, coinage, capital cities, oaths, folk costumes, museums of folklore, war memorials, ceremonies of remembrance for the national dead, passports, frontiers" (A.D. Smith, 1991, p. 77) and coats of arms (Hyttinen & Näre, 2017, p. 236). Many of these practices form a part of the *Día de la Toma*. Thus, in the following sections, I outline the rituals that take place in each of these spaces in order to later compare and contrast them with those of the *Día de la Hispanidad* (Columbus Day) and the *Moros y Cristianos* (Moors and the Christians) celebrations.

4.2.1 The plaza: A military preparation (with the volume of controversial noise turned down)

Waiting behind the crimson fabric-draped metal barriers that cordoned off the centre of the plaza, we heard them before we saw them. By this point, the crowds had grown to fill the empty spaces as we waited for the festivities to start during the *Toma* commemoration on the white January 2nd morning of 2012. A fanfare of music sounded on the aptly named *Reyes Católicos* Street (Catholic Monarchs Street) that leads past the plaza. The backdrop for the event was white, not because of threatening snow – rarely does it snow in the city – but because the white overcast sky echoed the greyish white marble of the plaza and the white and grey stone of the City Hall. The monotone palette of the surroundings made the military greens of the Army soldiers and, later, the colours of the parade participants, stand out even more. A selection of infantry entered the plaza, came to a stop at the bottom of the large cobblestone coat of arms of the city that adorns the middle of the plaza and, after the band had finished their fanfare, turned at attention to face City Hall (see Figure 4.1). The City Band had already gathered to the right of the entrance and all in attendance found ourselves waiting once again amidst a less than silent crowd. After some time, the City Band began to play, drawing the public's attention away from the noise in the plaza and directing it to the opening in the barriers



Figure 4.1: Soldiers stand at attention in the Plaza del Carmen while waiting for inspection by the Major General. Extreme right-wing flags have yet to be unfurled behind them (2 January, 2012; photo by author)



Figure 4.2: The first participants of the procession return to the Plaza del Carmen down *Reyes Católicos* Street past the watchful eye of the statue of Queen Isabel and Christopher Columbus (top right). In the middle, pages carry the three cushions (2 January, 2012; photo by author)

through which the soldiers had marched. The music welcomed Mayor José Torres Hurtado and a General of the Army as they entered the plaza, resulting in even more noise from the crowd. The General, who I was later informed was the Major General of MADOC,²⁰ saluted the soldiers and then did a ceremonial inspection of the group together with the mayor. After the two enter the arched doorway of City Hall, the four soldiers that would guard the *Pendón*, a replica of the 15th century flag carried at the historical *Toma de Granada* (Capture of Granada), and accompany it to the Royal Chapel and back, followed them across the plaza and into the building. The crowd was left to wait once again.

4.2.2 The procession: History parades through the streets

While we waited, I began to take note of various types of decorations that adorned the plaza and City Hall. The trees and small balconies were still adorned with Christmas decorations. From the main balcony, a large crimson and gold stitched tapestry hung with

²⁰ *Mando de Adiestramiento y Doctrina (del Ejército de Tierra)* roughly translates as Command of Training and Teaching of the Spanish Army, whose headquarters in Granada sits a few blocks from City Hall.

the coat of arms of the city surrounded by four pomegranates²¹ topped with regal crowns in each corner. The shoelace of the man beside me was decorated with a small red-gold-red ribbon, the same colours of the national flag. Amidst the noise of the crowd, the sound of a trumpet announced the procession. A stream of (what are assumed to be) period costume-dressed participants emerged from the door of the City Hall. The procession was led by a thick deep red banner with the coat of arms of the kingdom ruled by Queen Isabel, that of Castile and Leon – the former depicted by two castles and the latter by two rearing lions (Figure 4.2). An adult squire dressed in a thick brown velvet tunic, black cap, and a white collar, gloves, and leggings carried the banner leading the first section of the procession (see Appendix G for the order of procession, including colours of costumes and items carried). Two teenaged pages flanked the squire, one on either side, dressed in black and white. This first section was compromised of a line of ceremonial banner men on either side of the street, many of whom were also teenagers. Each row began with two flag bearers followed by vertical pendants alternating with studded, long-handled, wooden hatchets or decorated staffs topped with a pointed cross. At the very front of the right line was the only indication the *Andalusi* role in the events of 1492. Clutching a sheathed curved dagger with his right hand and a thick iron ring of keys with his left, a participant representing Boabdil walked solemnly behind the first line of pages (Figure 4.3). Dressed as an Arab, he wore a long white hooded *jellaba*, an equally long black hooded cape, and a golden domed helmet wrapped in red and gold fabric.

The lone figure of Boabdil in the procession as representative of all Muslim inhabitants visually personifies the absence of this population in the national-Catholic narrative of al-Andalus and of the city's capture as the culmination of the *Reconquista*.²² This absence likely stems from the almost non-existent public narrative of the Muslim

²¹ The translation for “pomegranate” in Spanish is *granada*. Although the origins of the name of the city are often debated, with differing narratives given as an explanation, the pomegranate fruit is a symbol of the city that appears in everything from flags and coats of arms to the designs in the cobble stone streets of the city. The pomegranate was added to the royal coat of arms after the Catholic Monarchs' victory in Granada.

²² See Chapter 2 for further discussion.

inhabitants during Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975) and parallels the lack of representation in the educational material of the time. Hugo, one of my more politically active interviewees later in the year, illustrated this clearly when he pulled out his schoolbooks from the 1950s and 1960s, including the *Enciclopedia*,²³ a book of three



Figure 4.3: “Boabdil” carries the keys of the Alhambra through the streets as the sole representative of the *Andalusi* population out of more than 100 costumed participants (2 January, 2012; photo by author)



Figure 4.4: A page boy carries the crown and sceptre of Queen Isabela on a pillow through the streets. He is followed by the sword of King Fernando (2 January, 2012; photo by author)



Figure 4.5: Men in colonial dress carry a wooden chest. A closer look shows the royal eagle (right) with the Catholic Monarchs’ coat of arms in the centre (2 January, 2012; photo by author)



Figure 4.6: A participant carries one of two frames, this one with coat of arms of the city. He is followed by the city flag and the *Pendón* trumpeters (2 January, 2012; photo by author)

volumes that was the only book used in schools at the time. During our conversation, he stressed the difference between the four pages about the Muslim inhabitants in the chapter “The Arabs in Spain” compared to the majority of the history section that focused on the Christian kingdoms. After showing me the book, Hugo emphasized the same point:

“The Muslims... [you see in the book that] they didn’t deny that they were here. But what they emphasized was that they were gone, and that they

²³ The *Enciclopedia Álvarez* included all subjects to be studied, including reading. All lessons were narrative passages that students had to memorize. Each of the three volumes of the *Enciclopedia* corresponded with the level of education of the student.

threw them out. That was what was important, that they arrived but that they were expelled.” (Hugo. Mid-70s, *Toma* critic, politically active retiree. Interview, August 31, 2012).

Both the book during the dictatorship and the almost non-existent representation in the contemporary procession echo young Samuel’s comment at the beginning of the chapter, that focused only on the Muslim inhabitants’ expulsion.

As the first participants came out of City Hall, Soledad, the woman beside me who had curiously asked me earlier what I was doing after seeing my notebook, nudged me and suggested I “pay attention to what was on the cushions”. The cushions to which she was referring were carried by two red and white clad pageboys walking between the banner men. The two crimson velvet cushions held the crown and sceptre of Queen Isabel (Figure 4.4) and the sword of King Fernando, normally housed in the museum attached to the Royal Chapel. They were followed by similarly dressed pageboys hugging three large books and two teenaged squires struggling down the street with a chest-height wooden coat of arms that depicted the Monarchs on their thrones. Despite my later attempts to identify the two tanned books that came before and after the coat of arms, they are still a mystery. One might assume that at least one represents the Capitulations, the agreement outlining the treatment and protection of Muslim *Andalusies* after the Capture, but my thoughts remained as speculation. Many of my interviewees rarely attended the *Toma* and those who did weren’t sure what they represented. This lack of knowledge coincides with the observations of Marisol, one of my interviewees, and of Victor at the beginning of this chapter, who both argued that much of the public that attends the commemoration “doesn’t know what the *Toma de Granada* is and what it means. They go to see the show (also translated as ‘performance’)” (Marisol. 70s, *Albaicinera*. Interview, September 4, 2012). The last book was a thick green book with the words “Ordinances of Granada, 1552” written in gold on the cover. As more procession participants entered the plaza, Soledad continued pointing out material objects of importance. She suggested I take a picture of “the chest that they carry and the objects in the frames”. The chest she was referring to was a large gold-embossed painted black chest with clawed feet carried by two men dressed in colonial style hats and red and gold long coats (Figure 4.5). I later observed the holes in the top that to me suggested it was a stand for the many ceremonial

banners and staffs carried by participants. Although Soledad stressed its importance, she never did explain its significance. I followed her suggestions nonetheless.

The group of people following the chest and its accompanying silver pitchers on plates all carried items relating to the city, not its historical capture. The first banner, similar to the lead banner of the procession, was an old, equally elaborate stitched coat of arms of the city. The frames (and their carriers) that Soledad had highlighted followed. At the time of her comment, my procession guide had also mentioned that one of the frames was the city's coat of arms (Figure 4.6). It was, in fact, an elaborate silver and gold coat of arms that gleamed from behind the glass of the frame. Its accompanying frame contained a royal document making reference to the framed coat of arms. These three, the banner and the two frames, were followed by a costumed-participant bearing the contemporary city flag, which also has the coat of arms in the middle.

The banners, flags, material objects, and regalia set the stage for the main attraction. Following Soledad's suggestions, I attempted to observe and document the more than 90 male costumed participants and the items they carried streaming out of the door until I felt another nudge in my side. My procession guide indicated the eight trumpeters and four drummers that had emerged from the City Hall and had formed two rows facing each other. The four soldiers that had followed the mayor and the Major General into City Hall then surrounded a female city councillor in a strategic square and escorted her and the *Pendón* on her shoulder into the plaza to a spot between the two rows of trumpeters. As the trumpets sounded announcing the presence of the flag, the press and public took advantage of the photo opportunity (Figure 4.7). Soledad suggested I follow suit, highlighting the many photographers taking pictures of the *Pendón*. Out of all of her suggestions, it was clear that this flag was of utmost importance. María Francés, the city councillor carrying the *Pendón*, stood dutifully amongst musicians, soldiers, and photographers while the city band played the national²⁴ and regional anthems, all of whom then moved into their place in the parade. As the procession participants moved

²⁴ The Spanish national anthem does not have lyrics. Therefore, although people in the crowd hum the tune, it is not sung.

towards the barrier opening toward the street, Soledad commented on the heavy weight of the pole and on how she felt for “the poor woman who had to bear its weight through the streets and then later wave it from the balcony”. Believing that it was the original flag, she explained that the Catholics carried the flag when they took the city and that it was over 500 years old. She followed by joking about her lack of knowledge and admitted that she didn’t know why it was called a *Pendón* (which translates more formally as a “military standard”, an uncommon word in Spanish for civilians). Once the pronouncement had been made, representatives of the city government took their place behind the *Pendón* and its military guards. Following two city guards in formal dress, the councillors, the mayor, and the military representatives then proceeded to the Royal Chapel with the procession.



Figure 4.7: Posing for the press, City councillor María Francés stands guarded as trumpeters and drummers in period costumes announce the presence of the *Pendón*, a replica of the 15th century flag carried by the Catholics at the *Toma de Granada* (2 January, 2012; photo by author)



Figure 4.8: City councillor María Francés waves the *Pendón* over the balcony of City Hall in the Plaza del Carmen after the third “Granada, qué?” call and response with (now former) Mayor Torres Hurtado, city guards and costumed participants at her side (2 January, 2012; screen shot of video by author)

The *Pendón* draws a symbolic line of continuation between the capture of the city – and thus, the political power of the Catholic Monarchs – and contemporary Spain with its political institutions. For supporters of the commemoration, it reinforces the significance of the past by symbolically connecting the local to the national in the present, and by stressing the city’s strategic and symbolic role in national unification. The flag, as a symbol of the Capture, and its continued public importance represent the

territorial, political, and religious unification of the nation, a merging of what Anderson defines as “an imagined political community – imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (2006, p. 6). The flag’s presence at the surrender of the keys represents the legitimization of the Catholic Monarchs’ political rule and the imposition of a religious doctrine to come. As the day and the festivities are only celebrated at a local level, it could be argued that the flag is no longer a national symbol. It never served as a “national” flag, representing Spain before nations were conceived and it has been replaced many times over, including in 1978 when the contemporary national flag was adopted. As Geisler argues, however, the past is “preserved for the nation in its symbols” (2005, p. xvi). Moreover, although this replica makes a local appearance only twice a year (during the *Día de la Hispanidad* and the *Día de la Toma*), the well-known painting, “The Surrender of Granada” (1882),²⁵ hangs in the Palace of the Senate in Madrid. The work shows a white flag with an early version of the Catholic monarchs’ coat of arms. However, the depiction of the presence of the large crest-adorned flag at the surrender is a constant visible reminder of the relation of the present to the past for the nation’s law makers.

As the procession slowly filtered into the street, Soledad elaborated on the role of the councillors at City Hall. These representatives were councillors that they had voted into office the year before, who adhered to one of the political parties including the conservative People’s Party, the centre-left SOE party (or PSOE), and the IU (*Izquierda Unida*, or the United Left party). She stressed that each was chosen to represent people with different opinions and fight for the people that support them. It seemed my guide, however, was unaware that the left-wing IU consistently opposes the ceremony and refuses to participate. The initial rituals of the ceremony came to a close with the military band and soldiers following the politicians out of the plaza, forming the tail end of the procession.

²⁵ The work by Francisco Pradilla y Ortiz (b.1848-d.1921) portrays the scene of the surrender of the keys of the city of Granada by Boabdil to the Catholic Monarchs in 1492. This same scene, as I will discuss later in the chapter, is now also acted out during the *Moros y Cristianos* portion of the *Día de la Toma* in Granada. It was this painting that PP spokesperson, Esperanza Aguirre, tweeted to celebrate the 525th anniversary of the *Toma* in 2017 (as discussed in Chapter Two).

At first glance, one could mistake the entire display with the *Día de la Hispanidad* (Columbus Day) – a national holiday held on October 12th each year when the country celebrates the Hispanic world or “Spanishness” – as the ceremony on this day is visually very similar. This resemblance of these two festivities reinforces the connection between the local and the national and reiterates the importance of the local festival in the national narrative. Moreover, it highlights the role that the city played in the growth of the empire and the eventual shaping of the formation of what Nuñez (2002, p. 239) calls a “supraterritorial” identity. It was a mission ordered by the Monarchs whose bones still form a part of both ceremonies.

4.2.3 The Royal Chapel: Exclusive rituals of the commemoration

Festivities such as the *Día de la Toma* commemoration become difficult to observe in full as a member of the public. Once I left Soledad, my attempt to take the back streets to avoid the crowds to the Cathedral became futile. A mix of the public from the plaza and tourists had blocked my route through the *Alcaiceria*, a reproduction of the city’s silk market of al-Andalus, to the public mass. I later learned, however, that numerous news outlets publish video clips and images of the rituals in the Royal Chapel each year after the commemoration for public viewing (Rodríguez, 2017; Ramón, 2016; Cano, 2012). Following the mass, local political and military dignitaries and clergy members participate in a ceremonial waving of the *Pendón* in the Chapel. Although I label the ceremony as “exclusive”, it seems a handful of public do manage to sneak through the doors behind the invited dignitaries after the mass but are only able to observe the ritual from behind the iron gate that divides the chapel nave from the transept. Thus, labeling it a “restricted access” ceremony may be more fitting.

The section of the chapel ritual shown by media outlets consists of a selected person of importance, often a city councillor, with the *Pendón* in hand, first kneeling to salute toward the altar of the chapel,²⁶ then turning 180 degrees to do the same towards the sepulchre of the Monarchs. The dignitary then turns 90 degrees, first to the

²⁶ When the selected person is male, he also removes his top hat while kneeling.

Archbishop of Granada and clergy in attendance to nod in recognition, and then continues to the other side to nod at the mayor and the Major General. Standing with them are two participants of either the clergy or a selected representative. One holds the pillow with Queen Isabel's crown. Another holds the sword of Fernando horizontally by the blade at attention. The sword is wrapped in the decorative thin, white material that accompanies it on the pillow. Thus, the flag, crown and sword serve to reinforce the historical connection between the political power of the rulers of the various kingdoms (which eventually became the state) with the religious power of the Catholic church. Once finished the salute, the flag holder raises the *Pendón* to wave the flag back and forth while the military band plays the first verse of the national anthem. The four city police guards in ceremonial dress that form a square around the act vertically hold up their swords at the level of their faces in salute. The whole sequence is repeated various times, completing the first few sequences facing the altar and the remaining waves facing the sepulchre.

The crown and sword are then blessed by a priest and are placed on a side-altar below images of the four monarchs buried in the chapel and four saints. The mayor and clergy proceed to the crypt below that houses the coffins of the Monarchs, one of their grandsons, and the crown princess and prince, Juana and her husband, Felipe, where they lay a wreath and floral offering and say another blessing. The press take advantage of the blessing to photograph the dignitaries together with the (remains of the) Monarchs. Thus, the ritual entwines the political history of the Monarchs with contemporary state military power, the Catholic church, and local politics. The association made between the past political-religious victors and the present political-religious representatives privileges the Catholic narrative of medieval Spain, one that underlies the characterization of an ostensibly secular Europe (Asad, 2003).

4.2.4 The plaza once again: The city responds

Finally, with the conclusion of the chapel ritual, the procession along with the *Pendón* made its way back past the statue of Queen Isabel and Columbus and back into the Plaza del Carmen. At this point in time, I had little knowledge of what had taken place in the Royal Chapel but had learned what to expect at the finale. Pushing my way through the

crowded square, I tried to find an open pocket amongst the group of right-wing *Democracia Nacional* (DN, or National Democracy) representatives at the back plaza. During the military parade, they had been one of the two groups making the most noise and I hoped to talk to them after the ceremony. Despite my plan, the trees, their raised flags, and the military formation blocked the view of the balcony, so my search continued until navigating through the now packed plaza and street became impossible. Eventually, I found a clear view, a spot in which a group of eight to ten seniors wearing formal black capes had also settled, ready to participate. Many of the seniors' cape lapels bore pins of silver and ruby pomegranates, a typical brooch found in jewelry stores around the city, or other pins in the form of uniquely Spanish items. My curiosity pushed me to ask about the capes. The woman closest to me responded. The Spanish cape (*la capa española*) was formal attire that they wore for important festivities. My questions about their thoughts on the *Toma* (both ceremony and historical event), however, were quickly quieted as two red and white costumed adult sceptre carriers and two city guards stepped out onto the centre tapestry-draped balcony of the City Hall. Shortly after the city councillor carrying the *Pendón*, the mayor, and the Major General, joined them. From where I was standing, the applause, cheers, and whistles of the markedly expanded crowd washed out the noise of any one group in particular. The city councillor, Maria Francés, with the flag in hand, then stepped forward. "GRANADA!" she exclaimed into the microphone. The shout of the leader of a collective call and response guaranteed a reaction from the crowd: "QUÉ?". Their answer was a simple "What?". The politician called again: "Granada!". The mass of people below responded. The interaction was repeated a third time and the councillor continued: "For the illustrious Catholic Monarchs, Don Fernando V of Aragon and Doña Isabel I of Castile. *Viva* (or "Long live") Spain! Long live the King! Viva Andalusia! Viva Granada!", as the crowd answered, "Viva!" after every "Long live" call. She then picked up the *Pendón* to wave it over the balcony, as one of the two bands played the first verse of the national anthem (Figure 4.8). The whole call and response was repeated three times and less than two minutes later the soldiers marched from the plaza, carving a path through the crowds, and the ceremony was over.

4.3 Festivities with history: *Día de la Hispanidad* and *Moros y Cristianos*

Ritual celebrations, processions, festivals, and other public official and popular displays of customs are quite common throughout Spain (Brisset Martín, 2001). Often, my fieldwork was informed not by people but by the sounds of the trumpets and drums of processions that echoed over the city and were heard at the top of the Hill of *San Miguel*. Usually, the music resulted in my racing out of the house, down the cobblestone hill, and following the notes through the streets. A number of these celebrations and commemorations in the city, and in the region, make reference to the same period of history as the *Toma de Granada* (Capture of Granada). One example, the *Día de la Hispanidad* (Day of “Hispanic-ness” or Columbus Day, which is also called *Día de la Fiesta Nacional*, or National Day), is celebrated – and commemorated²⁷ – nationally and internationally each year. Soon after the Catholic Monarchs took Granada, Queen Isabel granted Christopher Columbus’ request to set out in search of new trade routes to India. On the 12th of October in the same year, he landed in the Americas. By the beginning of the 20th century, left-leaning progressives and some conservatives²⁸ contested the concept of *Hispanidad*. The term was a traditionalist²⁹ concept that was specifically anti-liberal, which imagined the national historical destiny as one of “a community of Hispanic nations founded on the religious spirit of Spanish colonization” (Aguilar & Humblebæk, 2002, p. 137). As a result, it became readily adopted by “the ideologues of National Catholicism” (Boyd, 2002, p. 56).

In Madrid, the nation’s capital, the festivities consist of a military parade. In Granada, however, the order of the celebration, the costumes, and rituals are similar to the *Día de la Toma* (see Appendix G & Appendix H for comparison of the order). The

²⁷ Where it may be celebrated in Spain, it may be commemorated in some Latin American countries, where commemoration implies a somber event in memory of the destruction caused by the Spanish colonizers.

²⁸ Conservatives that rejected the concept of *Hispanidad* were those that agreed with the progressive views and aims of the Liberals to secularize the country despite their religious beliefs (Boyd, 2002).

²⁹ Traditionalism is a conservative ideology that supported the return to traditional values and identities, as opposed to the progressive, secular views of Liberals (Boyd, 2002).

material items that are carried are the same save the heavy wooden chest and the number of banners, ceremonial staffs, and hatchets. The costumed participants differ slightly as there is a group of usually young pages dressed in aquamarine blue capes and coats that alter the order slightly. Even the sole participant representing Boabdil takes part, stressing a symbolic connection between the historical *Toma* (capture) and the *Día de la Hispanidad*, or, the expulsion of the Muslim *Andalusies* and Columbus' explorations in the Americas. The main rituals that differ are the absence of the call and response, and the inclusion of a wreath at the foot of the statue of Queen Isabel and Columbus (Figure 4.9). While *Día de la Hispanidad* does not represent a *Toma* (a captured city from the *Andalusies*), it is historically connected to the same period and plays a highly significant role in the history of the Spanish Empire and an important symbolic role in national identity. Consequently, the two ceremonies invoke each other with their visual similarities and historical connectedness.



Figure 4.9: Blue-costumed pages wait for the mayor and the Major General for the laying of the wreath at the foot of the Queen Isabel and Columbus statue during the *Día de la Hispanidad* celebration. Behind them, the flags of former Latin American colonies are raised (12 October, 2016; photo by author)



Figure 4.10: A “Moor” shoots off a gun during the “Little War” in a *Moros y Cristianos* festival in Valencia. The Palestinian *kufiya* was used as part of the costumes both in the “War” and various “lines” during the “Moors” parade at this festival (18 July, 2012; photo by author)



Figure 4.11: A detail of a line of “Moors” from the “Muslim Scorpions” troupe, carrying decorative scimitar type swords with Arabic lettering. A number of the troupes had Arabic lettering on their costumes, swords and banners. However, unconnected lettering in Arabic loses its meaning (21 July, 2012; photo by author)

More recently established small-town festivals³⁰ that make reference to the history of al-Andalus have become common around Andalusia such as the *Fiesta del Monfi* in Cutar (Malaga), a medieval festival that celebrates the *Monfis*,³¹ or Muslim *Andalusies* that hid in the mountains³² after the expulsion. Still, the most prevalent festival referencing this history is that of *Moros y Cristianos* (Festival of the Moors and Christians). This festival is most common in the regions of Valencia and Murcia³³ and in the eastern part of the province of Granada,³⁴ although the celebration still takes place in a number of small towns around Andalusia, such as Benamahoma (Cadiz) in western Andalusia. *Moros y Cristianos*, like the *Día de la Toma*, is a festival organized around the date corresponding with capture of each town by the northern Christians. This day is often coupled with a celebration of the town's patron saint. The ceremonies and rituals held during *Moros y Cristianos*, however, differ extensively from the *Toma* celebration in Granada. Each town's festival differs in terms of the size, organization, and the number of days over which it takes place. Different events that can be included are the "Capture of the Castle", a theatricalization of the capture often acted out in a downsized wooden castle in the town square; the "Little War", a parade with "Moors" and "Christians" firing cannons and guns with gunpowder and firecrackers at each other simulating the fight over the town (Figure 4.10); a religious procession that includes carrying the patron saint through the street; and "the Retreat", which in the festival I observed was a children's costume parade. The main event of these festivities is the parade (or parades, depending

³⁰ This festival along numerous others have been created in the past 20 years, often serving both as a town festival and a method of attracting tourism. Examples of these are the *Fiesta de las Tres Culturas*, a festival celebrating *convivencia* as a characteristic of al-Andalus in Frigiliana (Malaga), *Jornadas de Cultura Islámica* (Meeting of Islamic Culture), a festival celebrating the Islamic past in Almonaster la Real (Huelva), and the *Fiesta de la Luna Mora* (Festival of the Moorish Moon), a celebration *Andalusi* music and traditions of Guaro (Malaga).

³¹ The term *منفي* (*manfi*) in Arabic means "exiled (person)" and was applied to "certain Moors or *Moriscos*", "highwaymen and criminals" (de Eguilaz y Yanguas, 1886, p. 457). Unlike inhabitants of small towns, these groups camped freely in the mountains and were accused of numerous armed incursions in the Albayzín, Granada and other towns after expulsion from cities across Andalusia (Muñoz y Gaviria, 1861).

³² The term is not limited to those that took refuge in the mountains of Malaga but was also used for those in Granada.

³³ These autonomous regions lie on the eastern and south-eastern part of the Iberian Peninsula.

³⁴ The denomination, Granada, is both the name of a province and a municipality within the autonomous region of Andalusia. This duplication of names is common throughout Spain.

on the size of the festival) of the Moors (Figure 4.11 & 4.12) and the Christians (Figure 4.13). The costumes are often extremely elaborate, much more than those of the *Toma* ceremony. The various lines in each troupe are often but not necessarily gendered. During interviews in Granada, I noted no differences between the historical narratives of men and women despite the overwhelming male representation in the *Día de la Toma* and *Hispanidad* parades.

Moros y Cristianos, is often described as having more of a festive atmosphere (Natalia. Mid-30s, tour guide. Interview, June 29, 2012). The *Día de la Toma*, a commemoration organized by the city government, is seen as much more of a formal, solemn event. This difference exists in spite of the two celebrating the same event, the capture of their respective cities. *Moros y Cristianos* is instead a popular festival organized by representatives of the many groups involved. The *Día de la Toma*, on the other hand, is a public commemoration organized by the city government. Thus, the rituals celebrate a similar event in each town's history yet the manner in which *Moros y Cristianos* is celebrated is drastically different from the *Día de la Toma*.



Figure 4.12: A “line” of male Moors from the “Black Egyptians” troupe during the “Moors” parade in a *Moros y Cristianos* festival (21 July, 2012; photo by author)



Figure 4.13: A “line” of women from the “Knights of King Fernando” troupe during the “Christians” in a *Moros y Cristianos* festival (20 July, 2012; photo by author)

Interestingly, however, the *Día de la Toma* in Granada used to include a now-eliminated version of *Moros y Cristianos* that for many years differed quite significantly from these festivals. The Granadan version disappeared at the beginning of fascist rule in 1940, leaving the military-religious-civil festival that exists today (González Alcantud,

2017b). Instead of the parades typical of *Moros y Cristianos*, this version consisted of a play, *El Triunfo del Ave María* (Carrasco Urgoiti, 1996, p. 366),³⁵ that over centuries of annual popular reproduction had been turned into a deteriorated version of the original (González Alcantud, 2017b, p. 191). It was this part of the day that anthropologist José Antonio Gonzalez Alcantud argues that once gave the *Día de la Toma* a similar festive atmosphere:

The lack of popular connection of the *Toma*, politicized to the extreme, lead it into the field of seriousness, opposite to the carnivalesque mood. This, the mood and the [popular] festival, is exactly what has protected the *moros y cristianos* of other places, and what has brought them to be a living cultural survival [i.e. something that has survived]. (2017b, p. 196, *my translation*)

Through the political ups and downs of the 19th century, the city's festivals came close to oblivion, only to be revived by the bourgeoisie at the end of the century. By this time, the play had become far removed from the original text, greatly modified by the input of the masses. The addition of profanities, live horses and other bourgeoisie-offending changes brought the call among intellectuals for a return to the original text and caused controversy surrounding the festivities.

4.4 Politicizing fiestas: Controversies of *Moros y Cristianos* and *Día de la Hispanidad*

Numerous parallels between these three festivities can be drawn to elaborate on the various forms of public uses of history and how the past-present connection takes shape. One of these similarities nevertheless is overlooked in the earlier ethnographic description of the *Día de la Toma*, that of the public contestation by critics of the event and the political debate between groups of different ideologies and political agendas that ensues in the plaza. Like the *Toma*, both the *Día de la Hispanidad* and *Moros y Cristianos* have seen controversy. In 2006, various celebrations of *Moros y Cristianos* in Valencia eliminated a dummy representing Muhammad. Before then, the dummy's head

³⁵ The play title translates as “The Triumph of Ave Maria”. Authorship of the play is contested. Some attribute it to 16th century playwright Lope de Vega, others to Ginés Pérez de Hita, others to local author Cubillo de Aragon. Many simply attribute it to a “genius of the Court” (González Alcantud, 2017b, p. 187).

was exploded with fireworks during the festivities. However, after the Danish cartoon controversy, the festival event organizers decided it was offensive to contemporary Muslim communities (see Zapata-Barrero & de Witte, 2010 or Rogozen-Soltar, 2007 for further explanation). The extent of criticism surrounding these festivals has mostly been self-criticism. One explanation for the limited disapproval of these festivals is that they are often small local celebrations and have little impact on people beyond the local level. Another is the lack of connections that are made between these festivals and the national-Catholic narrative. In turn, they generally avoid the presence of extreme right-wing supporters that ideologically connect to the history of each town. These towns (and cities) were of little importance³⁶ in the final unification of what was later imagined as the nation. Furthermore, as with the popular play once staged in Granada (González Alcantud, 2017b, p. 189), the festive atmosphere reduces any tension or othering, where participants of various troupes – both “Moors” and “Christians” – celebrate together in castle-shaped temporary structures set up with a bar belonging to each troupe. Moreover, in these celebrations, participants in the “Moors” troupes are known to be proud of being *moro* despite “losing” every year (Felix. CSIC researcher, personal communication, July 14, 2012). Thus, the historical narrative of expulsion has acquired a completely different meaning that has been removed from nationalist ideology. However, it is still overtly orientalized and presents an ahistorical version of events (Felix, personal communication, July 14, 2012), even though organizers and participants insist that the history depicted during the festival is rooted in well-researched historical fact.

Critiques of the *Día de la Hispanidad* in Granada take two forms. In 2011, Latin American migrants to Granada organized an annual *Fiesta de Hispanidad y Mestizaje* (Festival of “Hispanic-ness” and Miscegenation or Blending) as an alternative festival celebrated the same afternoon following the morning rituals (Barrera, 2011). It is a celebration of the diversity of traditions and customs of Latin America. The *Día de la Hispanidad* (National or Columbus Day), celebrated or commemorated in a variety of

³⁶ Whereas the main regions in which *Moros y Cristianos* is still celebrated, namely Valencia and Murcia, were conquered in the 13th century, the Kingdom of Granada lasted for 200 years longer.

ways throughout the Hispanic world, is often highly contested in Latin America due to its connection with the idea that Columbus “discovered” the Americas and with the subsequent oppression and colonialism at the hand of the Spanish. Thus, continuing in this tradition, the *Fiesta de Hispanidad y Mestizaje* serves to celebrate the day in a way that includes Latin American countries and tries to “avoid having the ceremony reduced solely to a floral offering to the Catholic Monarchs” (“Mezcla de culturas”, 2013). Although the festival raises this critique of the exclusion, *Hispanidad* is a symbolic conceptualization that emphasizes close ethnic connections and identity with the Hispanic world. The concept was written into the preamble of Organic Law 7/1985, giving special treatment to all ethnicities that have an ethnic affinity or identify with the country (Gobierno de España, 1985). Similar to Nuñez’ argument for “Galician-ness”,³⁷ it is used to maintain a “supraterritorial” imagined community (Núñez, 2002). At the same time, however, it serves as a reminder of the Golden Age of the Spanish empire and its expansion to the Americas. Still, this critique does not surface on the day of the *Día de la Hispanidad* during the festivities.

The second form of criticism of the *Día de la Hispanidad* lies in its association with the extreme right-wing ideology. According to Elisa, another politically active interviewee, the three days celebrated more than any other by extreme right-wing groups are the *Día de la Toma*, the *Día de la Hispanidad*, and the day of Franco’s death, the 20th of November, which is not a holiday (Elisa. 70s, *Albaicinera*. Interview, August 23, 2012). This criticism does not focus on historical symbolism or the concept of *Hispanidad* or “Spanishness” as a celebration of connectedness or as a part of Spanish national identity. Instead, it denounces the way extreme-right wing groups use the day to promote their xenophobic ideology and how they connect their version of history – a narrative that speaks of a glorified Spanish Empire and Spanish superiority – to the dictatorship and the xenophobia it also promoted. Despite this, a public display of the politicization such as the one seen in the plaza during the *Toma* commemoration does not

³⁷ Nuñez discusses the relation between Galicians in Spain and those that have migrated to Latin America for work. He characterizes the community imagined by the regional government that still connects these migrants to Galicia as a “supraterritorial” imagined community.

take place during the *Día de la Hispanidad*.³⁸ Most likely, this silence is a result of the “quasi-liberal” twist that the concept of *Hispanidad* was given in the 1960s, in which the fascist regime attempted to move away from the emphasis on conquest and “historical destiny” and highlighted a “shared cultural destiny” with its former colonies (Aguilar & Humblebæk, 2002, p. 137). During the transition to democracy, state discourse employed the term, but adapted it in an attempt to move away from “imperial connotations” and make the term more inclusive. The affinity that even the most critical of Spaniards often feel towards Latin America likely overrides this dissent. The day, like the *Día de la Toma*, is celebrated locally but has symbolic connotations on a national level and beyond. The criticism, however, is limited to the past-present connections made by the extreme right. Both festivals allow an interpretation of the past through the national-Catholic ideological lens, one that shapes which groups from the past are included (i.e. those that were colonized) and which are excluded (i.e. those seen as invaders) in the present.

4.5 The annual politicization of the *Toma*: Challenging the narrative of *Reconquista*

This politicization of the *Día de la Toma* has been a part of the commemoration for slightly more than twenty years (Lucas. 50s, *Toma* critic. Interview, June 10, 2013). Around the same time, much of southern Europe³⁹ saw a political shift to the right which in Italy produced marches against the newly-elected Silvio Berlusconi and his interpretations of Italian history (Carli, 2015).⁴⁰ In Spain, the conservative People’s Party representative, José María Aznar, was elected for the first time, upsetting the ruling left-wing government that had been in power since the country’s transition to democracy. In Granada, a similar upset took place the year before when the city elected its first

³⁸ During two *Hispanidad* ceremonies that I have attended, I personally have not come across any public criticism in Granada despite being informed that it happens.

³⁹ Apart from Portugal, Greece (in 1990), Italy (in 1994) and Spain (in 1996) elected back-to-back governments from centre-right parties between 1990 and 1996. In both Spain and Italy, these elections upset long standing left-leaning governments.

⁴⁰ Carli (2015) argues that left-wing protesters “felt more threatened by the attack on the values of the Resistance than by those on the welfare state or the system of mass communications.” (p. 255), where the Resistance refers to those involved in bringing the Second World War in Italy to a close and bringing the country out of fascism.

conservative mayor since the transition to democracy. This political environment becomes relevant when we consider that symbols like those used in the *Toma* ceremony (and even the ceremony itself):

preserve within the architectural structure of their historical reference not only the (permanent or temporarily) ‘victorious’ definition but also, just beneath the surface, the fossilized debates, discourses, and contestations that have crystallized around them over decades or, in some cases, centuries. (Geisler, 2005, p. xxxi)

It was in this political environment, as the conservatives returned to political power for the first time since the end of the dictatorship, that critics began to publicly voice their view that the values of democracy and those expressed by the Catholic Monarchs in their conquest (and therefore, the ceremony as well) were contradictory and irreconcilable.

The controversy surrounding the *Toma* festivities in the 1990s was not the first time the ceremony had been contested. At the beginning of the 20th century, when intellectuals in Granada attempted a reversion of the *Moros y Cristianos* play closer to the original text, the general population rejected it and demanded the continuation of the popular version (González Alcantud, 2017b, p. 194). The actors had to stage a second performance to allow for increased attendance. Additionally, during the Second Republic (1931-1936), the festivities were celebrated, yet included “another controversy more concerned with the problems of day to day political existence than with the past history, especially with what is known as ‘class struggles’.” (p. 195, *my translation*). Gonzalez Alcantud, however, notes that during these two periods, dispute about the incompatibility between the commemoration of these historical events and the democratic process was not observed (p. 195). Critics today argue that the values that these events represent – (religious) intolerance, ethnic cleansing and dispossession of land – are the antithesis of the democratic values for which the nation now should strive.

This present-day controversy diverges significantly from the *Día de la Hispanidad* or *Moros y Cristianos*. Like the former, the historical event celebrated on the 2nd of January forms an integral part of the national-Catholic historical narrative. Although it is a local commemoration, the military-religious-civil ceremony was

acclaimed nationally during the dictatorship after the elimination of its popular elements (González Alcantud, 2017b) – even appearing in a 1939 national *No-Do*⁴¹ news brief (Granada Antigua, 2012). Consequently, the commemoration is defended by far right-wing groups. Members of these groups come from outside of Granada to attend the day's rituals, travelling from all over Spain and other parts of Europe (Lucas. Late 50s, *Toma* critic. Interview, June 10, 2013 among others). At times, the friction between these and other groups in the plaza has become violent – most recently the year I attended the *Toma* (Cano, 2012) – to the point that the annual coverage of most leading news outlets focus on whether or not the commemoration took place “*sin incidentes*” (without incident) (“Granada celebra la Toma”, 2017; Martín-Arroyo, 2016; “Celebran el aniversario”, 2015; Mingorance, 2014; “Gritos y aplausos”, 2013; Cortés, 2011). Neither *Moros y Cristianos* nor *Día de la Hispanidad* produces this same level of public dissent that takes place each year in the plaza at the *Toma* commemoration. The range of criticism of the *Día de la Toma* is extensive (Figure 4.14).⁴² Public controversy is raised about the commemoration of the expulsion in the 15th and early 16th centuries, along with a historical denial of the rights of *Andalusies*, the historical memory (*Memoria Histórica*⁴³) denied by fascism, Islamophobia, and the fascist legacy of xenophobia. Critics call for recognition of the autochthony of these past inhabitants and of the *convivencia*⁴⁴ during this period.

The *Día de la Toma* has an alternative commemoration similar to the *Día de la Hispanidad*. It is, however, much more critical of the *Toma* and its rituals, and is held at

⁴¹ *No-Do*, a short form for News Broadcast y Documentaries, were newsreels produced by the fascist dictatorship of General Franco. The briefs often contained propaganda promoting the regime.

⁴² Figure 14 provides a demonstration that dissent is not limited to the plaza but is instead spray painted in various forms around the city.

⁴³ *Memoria Histórica* refers to the collective knowledge that was lost during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). The term usually refers to the collective memory of left-wing critics of the fascist regime, although it has been used to refer to right-wing collective memory (García Sanjuan, 2017). A Law of Historical Memory was enacted in 2007 that condemned the regime and its actions towards critics and began the process of public recognition of victims of the Civil War (Gobierno de España, 2007).

⁴⁴ See Chapter Two for previous discussion.

the same time as the public official event as an intentional boycott. The alternative commemoration is headed by a conglomerate of different associations and platforms within the city that have been fighting to ban or adjust parts of the official ceremony for 20 years. It has gained international support from writers such as Amin Maalouf, Jose Saramago, and Spanish authors Antonio Gala and Juan Goytisolo, representatives from UNESCO such as ex-director Federico Mayor Zaragoza, musicians, historians, and professors of Arab Studies (Lucas. 50s, *Toma* critic. Interview, June 10, 2013). The event, labeled the “Alternative *Toma*” by the press, gathers critics for poetry readings, musical interpretations including concerts of *Andalusi* music, and activities that pay homage to writers, poets, musicians, and other well-known figures who in the opinion of the organizers have embodied *convivencia* and tolerance.⁴⁵ Supporters of the platform also call for replacing the official holiday and ceremony with *Día de la Mariana* (or the Day of Mariana Pineda), arguing that both of the official city holidays, Corpus Christi and the *Día de la Toma*, have religious connotations. Mariana Pineda was part of the upper class who was seen as a traitor for supporting the First Spanish Republic. She was executed on the 26th of May 1831 for defending Republican⁴⁶ democratic values of liberty and equality (Lucas. 50s, *Toma* critic. Interview, June 10, 2013). The day was celebrated during the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1936) until the outset of the Civil War (1936-1939) but was not celebrated during the dictatorship. Critics have also successfully opposed applications for the commemoration to be listed as both UNESCO Intangible World Heritage and BIC (*Bien de Interés Cultural* or National Cultural Heritage) (R.I., 2012).

Similar to the *Día de la Hispanidad*, the criticism surrounding the *Día de la Toma* denounces the ideological connotations that the ceremony is believed to have, the same ones to which right-wing groups connect, and their use of this day to promote a narrative of Francoist Spain, a version of history that serves and encourages extreme right-wing

⁴⁵ Past figures include renowned local flamenco singer Enrique Morente, Granadan poet Federico García Lorca, and Canadian folk singer Leonard Cohen.

⁴⁶ *Republicano* in Spanish makes reference to left-wing Liberal supporters of the Republic.

ideological views. This point differs from the criticism of the *Día de la Hispanidad*. As I illustrated earlier, objection to the concept of *Hispanidad* and its historical narrative does not take centre stage in the politicization of its corresponding celebration. During the *Día de la Toma*, however, both the right-wing identification with what critics deem to be the remnants of the fascist historical narrative and the narrative as a fascist project are denounced.

Additionally, the symbolic connotations of the *Toma de Granada* (the historical Capture of Granada), that is the Capture as representative of the expulsions of the Muslim *Andalusies* and Granadan *Moriscos*, also becomes a central criticism. Comments made by Rocío, a tour guide, about the *Toma* commemoration illustrate this point:

Obviously what happens is that the problem is not that they celebrate the *Día de la Toma* but the religious connotations that it could have, and after that, the big fat symbol that signifies the expulsion of the Muslims from Europe. Of course, it's not that they celebrate a battle that I don't like but the religious and xenophobic connotations that it has come to have. (Rocío. Mid-30s, tour guide. Interview, March 4, 2012)

Rocío emphasizes that the Capture is not simply one more historical battle but was imbued with religious meaning that led to the expulsion of rightful inhabitants. Moreover, the narrative that reduces history to a battle between Muslims and Christians disregards the social and political intricacies of the projects of conquest and empire. As Rocío emphasizes, this simplification has taken on xenophobic connotations that then translates into a Christian “us” against a foreign Muslim “other”. Thus, the historical repression and intolerance associated with the Capture and the expulsion of the Muslims becomes highly condemned by critics along with any narrative that seems to glorify it.

Finally, these anti-*Toma* groups argue that neither the historical events, nor the ceremony, represent contemporary democratic values [as was observed by Gonzalez Alcantud (2017b)], and thus should not be celebrated. These critics emphasize that the xenophobic, religious, and political symbolism with which extreme right-wing groups connect are seen to be embodied in the rituals: in the presence of the military, which is known to promote a glorified narrative of *la madre patria* (the motherland) and its Catholic unifiers; in the rituals that entwine the Catholic church, politics, and historical

remembering; and in the *Pendón*, a material object at the centre of these rituals that creates a seemingly unbroken line from 1492 to contemporary Granada. Hugo touched upon this point when I asked him to clarify a comment he made to me earlier in the year:

Their (the Catholic Monarchs) idea [to conquer al-Andalus] is a value: the social, political, and religious unification, and everything. Is social, political, and religious unification a value today? No. Because fortunately today, although it's not the same everywhere, the value of diversity is more important than the value of difference. And therefore that of unification. [...] So what is it that they [the supporters of the *Toma*] want to celebrate? Imposition, uniqueness, the religious Catholic empire? Or do they want to value diversity, *convivencia*, and freedom, which are different values. And since the *Toma* presents certain values, and we support other values, well, it doesn't seem logical that they celebrate the *Día de la Toma* festivities. (Hugo. Mid-70s, *Toma* critic, politically active retiree. Interview, August 31, 2012)

The values that they promote instead, those of equality, *convivencia*, solidarity, and tolerance, are seen to be rational, modern and secular, and contrast with backward traditionalist values that were promoted during the dictatorship (Lucas. *Toma* critic. Interview, June 10, 2013).



Figure 4.14: Graffiti written on the back of a public building echoes slogans of critics of the *Día de la Toma*, declaring “2nd of January: Nothing to celebrate” (24 September, 2011; photo by author)



Figure 4.15: Watched by police, critics of the *Toma* commemoration hold up flags and blow whistles during the ceremonial inspection of the soldiers in the plaza (2 January, 2012; photo by author)

To conclude, and as the data I collected indicates, those contesting *Día de la Toma* expressed in ceremonies outside the plaza, are centered on four core ideas: (1)

criticism of the identification of right-wing groups with this history, (2) criticism of the version of history that was promoted during the dictatorship, which now serves right-wing ideology, (3) criticism of the events of 1492 and the symbolism that has come to be attached to them, and finally, (4) the commemoration of a historical event that, given its symbolic, religious, xenophobic, and political connotations, goes against what are defined as democratic values. All four of these criticisms are present in the plaza on the *Día de la Toma*. During the *Día de la Hispanidad*, dissenters rarely vocalize criticism of the destructive colonial project of Columbus in the Americas as mentioned above. Instead, Granadan critics limit their objections to the connections the extreme right-wing make between their ideology and Franco's dictatorship by way of the versions of history they share.

4.6 The plaza revisited: The volume of controversial noise turned up

The half hour that we had spent waiting for the ceremony to start wasn't time spent in eager expectation of the procession. Instead, much of the crowd listened agitatedly to supporters and critics of the ceremony hurl chants and insults at each other. The arrival of the military and its band riled the crowd in the plaza even more. It wasn't the undisturbed fanfare that it might have been in the years before the controversy began. The even louder whistles, horns, and boos from the critics overpowered the last notes of the band. In turn, supporters began to cheer as loud as they could in order to block the critical voices. The groups had been intentionally separated by the city police due to the possibility of violence – violence that came to fruition this particular year. This local nationally-significant festival engendered little unity between a number of the groups on this *Día de la Toma*. Instead, what became very clear was a “discursive community” and the “extended argument that a nation conducts with itself about the good internal to that tradition” that was taking place (Lentz, 2013, p. 233-234). According to Lentz (2013), these debates can be more common during national days than demonstrations of unity are, as she describes was the case with many of the 17 African nations that celebrated their independence in 2010 (p. 233-234).

In the plaza, flags distinguishing supporters and critics of the ceremony were unfurled, all of which belonged to different ideologies and political agendas. First, the white and green Andalusian flags with the red star in the middle, typical of left-wing Andalusian nationalist groups (Figure 4.15); the blue, red, white, and yellow flags of the members of the extreme right-wing group *Democracia Nacional* (National Democracy); the pre-constitutional flags of fascism and the Franco dictatorship; and finally, the horizontal stripes of purple, red, green, and white flag with the crest in the middle of supporters of the *Plataforma por Andalucía Oriental*, a left-wing group supporting the pre-constitutional division of Andalusia into separate eastern and western regions. These flags, the other official items carried in the parade, and the narratives that are formed around them, provide the observer insight into the “historical fault lines” in Spanish society (Geisler, 2005), fault lines which have come to be “crystallized” (p. xxxi) after almost thirty years of protests (López, 2018).

As the mayor (of the conservative People’s Party) and the Major General entered the plaza, the noise increased dramatically. Both ignored their critics and carried out their ritual duties. The supporters had little patience for the disruptions of the critics. Soledad, standing beside me, mentioned how she wished she could understand them and knew what they were supporting. Another attendee around us, hearing her comment responded with an air of self-assurance: “Communists. Right-wing. Extreme right-wing. And Nationalists.” Only later was I able to learn more about the public. In the news and in interviews, I learned that attending the commemoration were: people who “held those type of values [...] for unity, for the Empire, for the imposition of Catholicism as a doctrine that should have a political role” (Hugo. Mid-70s, *Toma* critic, politically active retiree. Interview, August 31, 2012); people, like Santiago, one of my more politically conservative interviewees, who normally would not attend but go to show support because they disagree with the critics and believe a 500-year-old ceremony should continue (Santiago. 30s, *Toma* supporter. Interview, February 29, 2012); a majority who “simply like rituals, the ritual of the commemoration, the liturgy, the event in itself, the paraphernalia, the musical bands, the police in formal dress, horses, the civil procession, the kids dressed in period costumes.” (Hugo. Mid-70s, *Toma* critic, politically active retiree. Interview, August 31, 2012); and finally, a number of minority groups. The small

pockets of minority groups that support the commemoration included: the right-wing *Falange* fascists that still support the dictatorship; the group right-wing *Democracia Nacional* (National Democracy); and members of the *Platforma por Andalucía Oriental* (Platform for Eastern Andalusia). Minority groups that support the abolition of the *Toma* commemoration included: representatives of the 15-M movement or the *Indignados*, mixed in with communists and regional separatists (Rico 2012). Unless participating amongst the group of critics, Muslims who in any way feel they are easily identifiable as Muslims generally do not participate. Marwa, an interviewee of Syrian-Granadan descent, once told me how she and her Algerian husband were stared-down and later threatened by extreme right-wing supporters the one time they tried to attend (Mid-30s, unemployed. Interview, September 2, 2012). This situation and the possibility of a violent confrontation seems to be a common fear among Muslims in the city, as is confirmed by anthropologist Mikaela Rogozen-Soltar (2017, p. 156).

Therefore, the plaza became a space in which alternative narratives challenge official representations of historical events of medieval Spain and the dominant official historical narrative of the fascist dictatorship. The dissenters heightened their criticism of the way the history is represented, and the rituals used to celebrate it (Figure 4.14). This contestation is especially significant in the context of growing polarization in Spain, and Europe in general, between a growing right-wing trend that is essentially anti-migrant and hostile to Muslims, and those seeking to preserve what they see as democratic European ideals. The conclusion of Hugo's comment above – that they, as critics, “support other values, well, it doesn't seem logical that they [the supporters] celebrate the *Día de la Toma* festivities.” (Hugo. Mid-70s, *Toma* critic, politically active retiree. Interview, August 31, 2012) – echoes the critical slogans shouted by the dissenters: “2nd of January: Nothing to celebrate” & “Genocide. You don't celebrate it.” Critics draw attention to this contradiction between democratic values and the historical event represented at the ceremony as noted above and contend that it is not worthy of celebration. Furthermore, critics see supporters of the *Toma* in the plaza as representative

of a dominant history promulgated by the current conservative government,⁴⁷ and respond by shouting the slogan: “Get out fascists!” (Úbeda, 2012). They challenge the national narrative, which privileges the history of the Christian kingdom of Castile and overlooks the 250-year simultaneous Muslim rule during the Nazarid Kingdom of Granada (1238-1492), by shouting the slogan: “Andalusia isn’t Castilla” (Úbeda, 2012). The Nazarids ruled longer in the southern part of the Peninsula than in the rest of Spain, which thus gives the region a history distinct from that of northern Spain. Finally, they present an inclusionary historical narrative of belonging that counters the xenophobic connotations that right-wing groups give the Capture. The slogan “They weren’t *moros*, they were Granadans” is a public declaration that they see the history of al-Andalus as integral to the history of Spain, and they refuse to see the Muslim inhabitants of al-Andalus as foreign or external to what is considered Spanish. By including this history and by considering the inhabitants to be Spaniards, the expulsion of the Muslims and *Moriscos* is seen as unjust and as a “genocide”,⁴⁸ as an earlier slogan suggests. As Carli (2015) observed in Italian marches against a right-leaning Berlusconi, references to the past in the plaza often serve as “metaphors for the present and current events” (p. 256). Thus, this version of the past also helps to create solidarity with contemporary Muslims by insisting that Granadans can be Muslim and that Muslims can once again become Granadan. To my knowledge, however, no official public discussion has taken place about what it means to continue commemorating a festival that observes a historical event so connected to the dispossession of two groups and the subjugation of another, even in a contemporary political environment that has seen an escalation in violent attacks carried out in the name of the Islamic faith.

⁴⁷ Two short years after I observed this festival, the conservative government passed a “gag law” disguised as a “Law of Civic Safety” (*Ley Orgánica de Seguridad Ciudadana*) that allows massive fines for racial profiling and random identity checks (of which even before the law was made, I observed as practice in the Albayzín with African migrants), peaceful civil disobedience, the production of images of police brutality during protests, protesting without a permit, stopping evictions, or congregating in groups, to list some of the details of this law.

⁴⁸ Critics use both the term “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” to describe the historical process of the Christian conquest. However, the common chant, “Ge-no-cidio, no se celebra”, specifically makes reference to the former rather than the latter.

Slogans in support of the *Toma* commemoration were not limited to a particular group but were instead called out by any supporter who felt the need to voice their disapproval of the critics. They hurled recession-themed insults directed at the representatives of the 15-M movement (also known as the Indignants⁴⁹) shouting “Lazy” or “15-*Mierdas* (shits)” as well as suggesting they go study or look for work (Úbeda 2012). Furthermore, a pamphlet handed out by *Democracia Nacional* after the ceremony sheds light on extreme right-wing views and narratives that intersect with other more conservative narratives. The pamphlet begins with what they consider as the historical roots of their national identity: “This motherland was not born of hybridity (miscegenation), nor of multiculturalism, instead our identity was settled by a political, cultural and religious unit” (Democracia Nacional, 2012). This narrative parallels the slogan which supporters shout, “Hey, Granadan *moros*. You aren’t Granadans!”, in response to the critics’ chant that insists that *Andalusies* weren’t “*moro*” but were Granadan. The right-wing narrative simultaneously excludes the Muslim inhabitants and the history of al-Andalus from their version of Spanish history and defines who is included. Moreover, they symbolically relegate any voice of dissent to a position external to their imagined concept of the nation. Supporters also yell insults like: “Chorizo.⁵⁰ Spain was founded after the Capture of Granada!”, which like the pamphlet, also reiterates their myth of origin by making reference to the historical event that, in their narrative, represents the beginning of the nation (see Coakley, 2004, p. 542-543 on myths of origin). Their slogans, such as “Christian Spain, not Muslim!” (Cano, 2012), invoke an exclusively Christian nation-state that corresponds to their historical narrative

⁴⁹ The Indignants movement, now more commonly referred to as 15-M, developed in 2011 after the Arab Spring and before the Occupy Movement (USA). In the midst of the economic crisis after the housing bubble had burst, the movement was formed by people “indignant” with the effects of capitalism and the influence of corporate interests in government. In response, they took to the streets on the 15th of May (15-*Mayo*) and occupied plazas all over Spain with the goal of fostering community outside of conventional economic, social, and political methods. Many of the participants were unemployed young people under the age of 25 years who were affected most by the recession (Seco, 2011). Ironically, the Occupy Wall Street movement is at times referred to as “*Toma* Wall Street” in Spanish.

⁵⁰ The most obvious translation of *chorizo* is “pork sausage” but it can also mean “thief, crook, scoundrel, shameless”. However, this double meaning would be clear to the Spanish public. One of the historical accounts of the conversion of Muslim inhabitants to Christianity that is shared tells of how *Moriscos*, or Christian converts, were forced to eat pork in order to prove that they had truly converted and had renounced Muslim practices of their past.

of the *Reconquista*⁵¹, religious unification and purity of blood. The pamphlet reflects their xenophobia, for example: “*Democracia Nacional* tells you: We defend the rights of our people. No to mass and illegal immigration, no to the teaching of Islam in schools. No to Moroccan expansionism.” (Democracia Nacional, 2012). More recently, more blatant expressions of their opinions found on their website expresses these views posted in what they call the “Manifesto of the 2nd of January”⁵²:

Our politicians whether from the right or the left encourage the division between Spaniards by not combating separatism. They encourage the arrival of “refugees” and immigrants as well as the islamicization of our land and they’ve gifted the possibility of acquiring Spanish nationality to close to three million Israelis of Sephardic Jewish origin with the clear intention of destroying the ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity of the nation of Spain. The hour has arrived to raise our heads and erect our swords as our fathers did. The hour of the latest crusade has arrived, a new Reconquest to recover our future. (Democracia Nacional, 2016, *my translation*)

The manifesto together with the slogan defines clearly, in xenophobic, Islamophobic, and anti-Semitic terms, who belongs and who remains outside in both their versions of history and their concept of the nation. Their slogan insisting: “This is history and you can’t erase it!” (Rico, 2012), evokes Connerton’s (2008) work on cultural memory, and the processes through which it is forgotten or erased. The right-wing chant, perhaps unintentionally, draws attention to the silencing of left-wing history, a practice that was prevalent during the fascist era. The “repressive erasure” by the government of the more progressive voices and ideological platforms – which included censure and the excising of alternative narratives associated with progressive or left-wing trends – inform contemporary national identity. When these supporters argue that “you can’t erase history”, they refer only to their version of history. These conservative defenders of the *Toma* disregard the fact that these alternative versions have been silenced in the past. Those raising the slogan stating that one cannot erase history also address calls to

⁵¹ See Chapter Two for previous discussion.

⁵² This manifesto recalls a publication with the same name compiled by *Granada Abierta*, the group that organizes the “Alternative *Toma*”. The *Granada Abierta* book, published at the same time as the group began protesting the commemoration, brings together poetry, artwork and essays by well-known supporters of the platform to give reasons why they believed the *Día de la Toma* should be transformed into the Day of Tolerance (Granada Abierta, 1996).

eliminate the ceremony, thus compounding time and space by considering the ceremony as “history”. Supporters often argue that the ceremony should continue to be celebrated and should not be judged through a contemporary lens with contemporary values (Elías. Mid-30s, *Toma* ambivalent.⁵³ Interview, February 19, 2012).

4.7 A new addition: *Moros y Cristianos* as a part of the *Toma*

Despite the efforts of the critics of the *Toma* commemoration, the controversy has had little long-term effect on the overall order and content of the ceremony or the rituals in the past 15 years. Until 2016, the city had a conservative People’s Party (PP) government for 13 years. When the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) was last in office, Mayor José Moratalla attempted to reduce the controversy during the ceremony and attended to the critics’ calls for change (Lucas. 50s, *Toma* critic. Interview, June 10, 2013). He reduced the presence of the military in the plaza and read a manifesto supporting *convivencia* and tolerance from the balcony of the City Hall along with the waving of the *Pendón*, but nothing else changed. The changes were enough to cause controversy in conservative circles resulting in pressure from the PP to reverse the changes. When PP Mayor Jose Torres Hurtado was elected into office – a position he held for the full 13 years of conservative government – all of the changes were withdrawn. PSOE was once again elected into office in 2016 and with it have come new attempts to tone down the controversy of the plaza. At the *Día de la Toma* in January of 2017, Mayor Paco Cuenca changed little of the rituals on the morning of the festival described in this chapter. The military presence was not reduced but the army soldiers were replaced with Spanish Legionnaires at the suggestion of the MADOC (Ramos, 2017). The Spanish Legion is a group of elite soldiers within the army who often take part in parades and processions.⁵⁴

⁵³ I refer to Elías as ambivalent in because he was neither for nor against the commemoration of the *Toma*. He did not attend the ceremony, but he also did not strongly contest the commemoration. He was in favour of continuing the rituals for those interested in attending.

⁵⁴ For example, the Legion is a favourite in the Holy Week processions in Malaga for their gun-twirling skills.

The more surprising addition to the day's events in 2017 was that of a *Moros y Cristianos* parade after the rituals and ceremony. Unlike the pre-Franco annual "Moors and Christians" theatrical comedy (González Alcantud, 2017b), this addition mirrors the *Moros y Cristianos* parades of the smaller towns that continue this celebration. In Granada, it begins in Plaza Nueva, a plaza close to the statue of the Queen and Columbus, and ends close to the Alcazar Genil, where Boabdil turned over the keys to the city. At the end of this parade, participants act out the surrender. Troupes from three towns in the Province of Granada, Cúllar, Zújar, and Benamaurel, participated in the parade in both 2017 and 2018. Their costumes similarly invoke extravagant orientalist elements; turbans, fez hats, niqabs, jellabas, hip scarfs (those used by belly dancers), harem pants and scimitars are often adorned with crescent moons and stars. In a region dependent on tourism, the *Moros y Cristianos* parades of all three towns have been awarded the provincial government's tourism prize ("La Toma de Granada", 2017) and thus play a double role of further depicting the historical event of the Capture, albeit in an orientalized fashion, and bringing in tourism.

Mayor Cuenca's reasoning behind their inclusion was the decision of the municipal government to use "all of the convenient and viable resources' so that the festive character of the *Día de la Toma* is recovered without 'outdated demonstrations' or 'extremisms'" ("La Toma de Granada", 2017). By making the *Día de la Toma* seem more like a popular festival, the mayor hoped to depoliticize the morning rituals. His hope draws on the idea that the festive atmosphere of *Moros y Cristianos* brings the city or town together. However, this understanding of the politicization in the plaza misses an important element, that of the difference in the assumptions and approaches to the past that divides critics and the supporters:

[Cuenca] remarked that the ceremony commemorates an event that is based on understanding and respect, which is the 'principal message that we want to launch from Granada.' For this reason, he urged those that want to overshadow the festival to 'read history' because the agreement signed in the Capitulations is a symptom of consent and consensus. (Mingorance, 2017, *my translation*)

Both in the press and by Granadans, the *Día de la Toma* is usually referred to as a commemoration in Spanish⁵⁵. The solemn atmosphere of the ceremony reflects this point. Yet the mayor's comments allude to the capture of the city as something to celebrate, not commemorate. Often, when a historical event is interpreted as both – for example, the interpretation of the Nakba for Palestinians compared to the interpretation of the Israeli Declaration of Independence – the political division between the two groups is considerable, and where one may be vastly overpowered by another. Farah (1999) introduces her doctoral dissertation with a focus on this distinction:

The half century mark in the unresolved Palestinian question has just been crossed and Hemingway's toll of the bell in 1998 awakens Israeli celebrations and Palestinian commemorations, inseparably wedded in a disturbing dissonant bond that continues to produce settlers and exiles, victimizers and victims. (p. 1-2)

By identifying the values of “understanding” and “respect” that Cuenca argues were inherent in the final blow of a conquest, he exalts them as values worthy of contemporary society yet ignores the unequal power relations between the Muslim and Christian ruling sovereigns. This omission allows him to condense “commemoration” and “celebration”, which jointly takes power away from contemporary narratives that are not dominant in the public sphere.

Furthermore, Cuenca attempts to appease both groups by incorporating elements of both sides of the debate. He uses the historical narrative of the supporters and couples it with the critics' contemporary demands for a city holiday that represents democratic values. Moreover, Cuenca's understanding of the Capitulations frames the Capture as an isolated historical event and pretends to separate it from the repercussions and events that followed. It attempts to remove the historical Capture and commemoration from the contemporary symbolism for which it is criticized. He, therefore, unwittingly aligns himself⁵⁶ with right-wing supporters and pro-*Toma* spectators that attend the ceremony

⁵⁵ See Footnote 5 for clarification of the distinction between commemoration and celebration.

⁵⁶ When serving as the opposition to conservative Mayor José Torres Hurtado, Cuenca voted against the continuation of this commemoration (López, 2018).

for the public spectacle of the rituals, and distances himself from the critics. Upon learning of the changes, the coordinator of *Granada Abierta* denounced them in a comment to the press:

Francisco Viguera has affirmed that if the municipal government of PSOE, ‘pretends to transmit a message of reconciliation by incorporating these parades, it ends up contradicting [itself by] waving of the *Pendón* of the conquest, the militarization of the festival and the homage paid to the Catholic Monarchs, with whom those nostalgic for Francoism identify. (“Granada Abierta dice”, 2017, *my translation*)

Viguera addresses this inconsistency of attempting to present a ceremony that is simultaneously interpreted as a commemoration and a celebration. Therefore, this ambiguous blend of the past and the present does little to avoid further dissent of the critics.

The festive atmosphere of *Moros y Cristianos* also does very little to address other differences between the views of supporters and critics. Ideological views that determine how groups interpret the past, and how they envision the nation and the symbols with which they identify, are unlikely to be affected by this change. However, the aim of reintroducing a popular festive aspect is, perhaps, an attempt to promote an atmosphere typical of *Moros y Cristianos* in which resentment between the “Moors” and the “Christians” doesn’t materialize. The atmosphere is one in which the “Moor” is not demonized in the way it is by extreme right-wing groups – who even recently have called for expulsion of Muslims on social media after the attack in Barcelona (“200 *musulmanes*”, 2017). This atmosphere is often argued to be typical of *Moros y Cristianos* festivals. However, it does not eschew the “celebration/commemoration” of a historical event that is coupled with an underlying history of victors and defeated, and in contemporary terms, a history of ethnic cleansing.

4.8 Concluding thoughts

Returning to Coakley (2004), a discussion of nationalist history without the discussion of all the apparatuses and traditions in place that are used to maintain dominant narratives, and how these are received and reinterpreted by ordinary people, will give little

information about how people respond to this history and, consequently, what form contestations of the past take. Commemorations and celebrations afford an additional tool to move beyond the ways in which intellectual debate and political rhetoric shapes historical memory of the nation discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation. Because national celebrations often divide as much as they unify, they allow for a “discursive community” to form in which the concept of the nation of some can be challenged by alternate imaginings, as Lentz (2013) concludes. The *Día de la Toma* provides an example that confirms and complements her observation. Even festivities that are not necessarily officially celebrated or commemorated at the national level can create these discursive openings for those vying to redefine both constructions of the past, as well as the present and future. It is in this discursive space that the *Toma* ceremony is polemical, a debate witnessed (but perhaps not understood) by all who attend. The controversy that brews in these struggles over the past during the display of the *Día de la Toma* in Granada doesn’t just involve critics and supporters, ambivalent attendees and participants. The spectacle draws in tourists as well, granting them another glimpse into the public field that “is crossed by competing constructions of the past, often at war with each other.” (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, p. 209), not unlike the one that Maite provided at the beginning of my last chapter.⁵⁷ Thus, each year the Plaza del Carmen becomes a canvas upon which different groups sketch for all in attendance not just two sides to a historical debate but a spectrum of debates, contestations and historical interpretations that reveal the relation between the past-present and that signal the future.

By considering three festivities, the *Día de la Toma*, the *Día de la Hispanidad*, and *Moros y Cristianos*, it becomes possible to examine how these diverse and alternative narratives entwine, converge, or diverge with the dominant version of the national past. Superimposed onto symbols with national significance, it is a narrative that both critics and supporters read and reread. While national symbols of fascism may have been removed from the first two ceremonies, the interpretation of the symbolism of the

⁵⁷ Guide Maite gave her tour participants a lengthy explanation about how residents were affected by governmental decisions that privileged tourist consumers of history and heritage over the residents in the old Moorish neighbourhood of the Albayzín.

material items and rituals in the *Toma* ceremony as fascist continues to linger. Even when the commemoration or celebration is a continuation of a pre-fascism, pre-nationalism era practice, these historical debates remain. They continue, however, reinterpreted and nested in the demands of the present. The present-day national narrative and its public representation at the *Toma* ceremony, still pressed upon by that of the fascist regime, unmask these political and social rifts embedded in the contestation of the past. The dissent by oppositional left-wing critics does not seem to be fundamentally effective due to the lack of strong left-wing political representation (who contest the festivities as well) at the ceremony. This raises questions as to the degree to which the once-exiled left has been able to successfully reshape official narratives and public representations of the past.

Historical memory of al-Andalus, then, is reshaped by continuous reinterpretation which hinges on the contemporary political environment. This memory is not only influenced by local, regional and national interests but also responds to international imaginings of the Spanish nation-state in the present. With its induction into the European Economic Community (1986), Spain came to be visualized as an economic bridge between Europe and the Arab world as well as Latin America. Therefore, in the following chapter, we turn to the ways in which this historical memory defies the right-wing national narrative promoted in the plaza and parallels that of the critics who argue for the connections that this historical memory creates between Spain and those who share this history.

Chapter 5

5 al-Andalus: A bridge or a rift between Europe and the Arab-Muslim world?

Looking up from a valley near Comares, a typical whitewashed town that sits perched on top of one of the many peaks in the Axarquía region¹ of Malaga, the words of one of my hosts, Catalina,² echoed in my mind about how protected the town was during al-Andalus. As small as it was, and still is, its strategic location would have made it difficult to conquer. It was understandable then, why, while visiting me in Granada a few weeks after I began my fieldwork, Catalina and her husband Mateo pointed out that the Tower of Comares at the Alhambra, one of the largest, most well protected towers which housed the throne room, was named after the town. Our conversation outside of Comares that day over a family lunch of sardines in vinegar, tomatoes in olive oil, *salmorejo*³ and barbequed skewers and chorizo had steered in the direction of my research. Catalina's eyes sparkled as she told me about the ancient skull she and Mateo had come across one day while walking in the mountains (which they now believed to be housed at the University of Malaga) and the medieval Qur'an that was found hidden, stuffed into the wall of a building of a town near their land. As their children and guests listened, Mateo told me that some of the olive trees in the area had been there since the time of the Moors and had to be at least 800 to 1,000 years old. The pre-emptive introduction to my fieldwork in Granada was a far cry from Hugo's characterization, almost a year later, of his childhood in Pinos Puente (Granada) when repression of the history of al-Andalus was prevalent. Even during the dictatorship, he explained, remnants of the Arab-Islamic

¹ The Axarquía borders the *comarca* (translation: region; refers to a collection of municipalities) of Alhama in the province of Granada, one of the ten *comarcas* in Granada. The larger territorial division is the autonomous community of Andalusia (also referred to as a region). Andalusia is split into eight provinces. Each province is divided into *comarcas*. The fall of the city of Alhama de Granada (the capital city of the region of Alhama) in 1482 marked the beginning of the 10-year long War of Granada, which eventually brought an end to the Muslim reign in the Peninsula.

² All names have been changed to maintain anonymity of the people involved in this work. For some interviewees and people mention, gender has also been changed, particularly in cases in which the person is more easily identifiable.

³ A cold tomato-based soup with garlic and topped with hardboiled egg and bacon, similar to but thicker than gazpacho.

past would be found in the fields near the now-protected archaeological site of Medina Elvira (Madinat Ilibira)⁴ outside Atarfe (Granada): “It’s true that someone ploughing found coins or things like that, but he had to hide even these items and keep them secret so that the *Guardia Civil*⁵ wouldn’t take away what he found and I mean, this [was spoken about] only in very small circles.” (Hugo. Mid-70s, retiree. Interview, August 31, 2012). The Arab-Islamic past was simply not spoken about publicly despite the material proof of this past in the everyday lives of Andalusians. The taboo contrasted significantly with Catalina and Mateo’s pride in the history of their small mountain hometowns. The reclaiming of the history of al-Andalus throughout more than thirty years of democracy contextualized the couple’s contemporary experiences, despite the fact that throughout their childhood, this past had reduced the Muslim inhabitants to invaders and long-term occupiers. These relics signified a real history, or as Lowenthal expressed it: “the relics we see need not to be historically true or accurate; they need only convince us that we are connected with something that really did happen in the past.” (1975, p. 11-12).

After lunch, I joined Mateo who headed out to water the crops he grew on the land. My first lesson was to learn how splicing a citrus tree can grow more than one fruit. Dates, figs, avocado, almonds, olives, mangos, grapes, eggplant – the agricultural production in the region has changed very little since the Moors, he explained, as he filled my hands with the many fruits that were ripe and told me to eat despite still being full. Along the trading routes of the Islamic Empire, the Muslim inhabitants had imported many of the products he grew. The whole day became peppered with mentions of

⁴ Madinat Ilibira (Elvira) sits between the two cities of Atarfe and Pinos Puente in the Province of Granada. At the site, once an important Roman settlement, Palaeolithic, Neolithic, Iberian and Roman artefacts have also been uncovered (Proyecto Medina Elvira, n.d.). It is the settlement from which King Zāwī ibn Zīrī moved the population of Elvira to the Albayzín in Granada to found the city in 1010 after the Umayyad caliphate divided into smaller taifas (warring kingdoms). This version of Granada’s history suggests that the move was necessary for the protection of the population since Madinat Ilibira lies on the *Vega* (or plains) outside of the city of Granada, while the Albayzín sits on top of the Hill of San Miguel with other higher strategic points in the foothills of Sierra Nevada surrounding it (Marina. Late-40s, *El Legado Andalusi* employee. Interview, May 21, 2013). The city’s founding by Ibn Ziri is contested by the argument that there was already a settlement in the area. The Alcazaba Qadima (old fortress) was built in 756 and archaeologists have found pre-Iberian, Iberian and Roman artefacts and walls in the vicinity (Barbosa García & Ruiz Ruiz, 1996, pp. 4 and 27).

⁵ The Guardia Civil are a national military police force that alongside the National Police carry out policing duties within the country. Its jurisdiction includes rural areas.

material remains of these inhabitants and highlights of their contributions to life in southern Spain today. These events, nonetheless, starkly contrasted with the events that unfolded on the same date exactly ten years earlier, when my fellow students from New York and I stood listening in the tiny office at the University of Malaga Language School to the reports about the attack on the World Trade Centre. The date of our lunch alone became a reminder of the contemporary political environment in which these narratives are shared, one in which historical narratives that appreciate the Arab-Muslim contributions to society coexist in an environment in which xenophobia towards Muslims is increasingly common.

Historical narratives are always diverse and often at odds with each other; in the case of Spain there are two that hover around oppositional poles.⁶ At one end of the pole are those who promote the idea that Spain and by proxy Europe have always been entwined with the Arab and Muslim world, and on the other, an Orientalist narrative that views West and East as mutually exclusive, and even antagonistic.⁷ The former was exemplified by the conversation with Mateo who discussed present agricultural practices and the modifications to the Mediterranean diet made by the *Andalusies* that form part of this shared inheritance. On the other hand, the latter (the Orientalist narrative) downplays these connections, giving prominence to the “Reconquista” – the Christian conquest of Muslim territory. Between these two poles, however, are other ways of accounting for the past often left out of research on Andalusia, which in general do not see these histories as either/or but as complex, shifting and layered: neither as an idealized *convivencia*, nor as separate or oppositional, but as a historical process that included coexistence but also struggle and conflicts.

⁶ Anidjar (2013) also argues that elaboration of this history falls around two poles. The two that he highlights, which are also observable, are a positive view on medieval Spain in which nostalgia for the period is expressed “along lines such as: ‘it would be good if it had lasted’” (p. 220), and a negative view in which Spaniards feel privileged and express their gratitude for their emancipation from such a dark period. The former can certainly (and often does) form a part of the first pole I observed. However, the negative view he argues for can be but is not necessarily a part of the Orientalist narrative.

⁷ Note that the first pole can but does not necessarily include the romanticized vision of the Arab world mentioned in earlier chapters. Romanticizing all that is related to the Arab world is another one of the many components of Said’s theory (1979). The second pole does not include this element of Orientalism.

In this chapter, I look at three spheres of Spanish society – economic, political and civil – to discuss historical accounts that bridge and divide histories and geographies. I first consider the connections imagined and realized between Spain and the Arab world as a part of European Union economic policy. I then discuss two competing political discourses, one that invokes the bridge narrative and the other the rift narrative. Additionally, in the political sphere, I draw on fieldwork involving the *Fundación El Legado Andalusi* (the Andalusi Legacy Foundation)⁸ to show how public historical narratives are influenced by present political and economic interests and are inseparable from the changing dynamic in regional and national politics. This Foundation is a publicly funded regional initiative that aims to promote appreciation for and disseminate the “Hispanic-Muslim civilization”, and in particular, its contributions, “its artistic manifestations, its monuments and [Andalusia’s] historic and social relations with the Arab and Moroccan world” (El Legado Andalusi, 2018). Following this, I consider another component of the political sphere by addressing historical accounts of al-Andalus taught in the education system. Because the Foundation’s Pavilion of al-Andalus and Science incorporates an educational element into their activities, I take a comparative approach between this cultural initiative and education in order to consider the extent that historical narratives of al-Andalus produced in “political society” lend to discourses of bridges and rifts. To address education, I turn to interviews I did with history teachers at three high schools in Granada to compare their historical accounts with the narratives presented at the Pavilion. Unlike the Pavilion contents, teachers include discussion about medieval violence, war and conflict. Battles are not narrated in detail, but emphasis is placed on the processes and clashes that brought Muslim al-Andalus to its end and united the Peninsula under Christian rule. I address this incorporation of violence vis-à-vis narratives of *convivencia* to ask, first, if historical accounts of those considered to be part of the state (meaning public organizations and teachers) support these bridges that promote coexistence, or if these narratives deepen the rifts between Spain and the Arab and Muslim world?; second, if these historical accounts of those representing “political

⁸ In Spanish, the *El Legado Andalusi* Foundation is referred to simply as *El Legado* (meaning: The Legacy) but to avoid confusion, I refer to it as simply the Foundation throughout this chapter.

society” parallel regional versions of history or do they coincide with the state?; and finally, if the regional narrative that celebrates the *Andalusi* history can be considered hegemonic within Andalusia or if it is merely a dominant account aspiring to be hegemonic?

In attempts to create economic, political and cultural bridges with the Arab world, I argue that these contrasting ways of imagining Spain’s and in particular, Andalusia’s relation to the Arab and Muslim world, have come to generate a Janus-faced identity for the region. When turned toward the state, the region of Andalusia is presented as different because of the extended length of its Arab-Islamic history (but still Spanish and European). To the state, despite its recognition of the Arab history of the entire Peninsula, overemphasis of this facet of Andalusia’s identity can become “worrisome”. Thus, this face has implications for regional and national politics especially following Catalunya’s referendum and demand for succession in 2017. After all, memory and history provide fertile ground for political contestation. The relationship between the autonomous regions and the Spanish state is fluid and changeable, and as a result divergent regional identities can and have become problematic for national unity and have afflicted Spain for a very long time.

To the Arab world, however, this double-sided identity sees Andalusia presented as Spanish (and essentially European). The region’s Muslim history is celebrated, and connections and similarities are highlighted. Yet, this opposing face takes into account other aspects of Andalusian identity (such as its popular displays of Catholicism), reinforcing difference between Andalusia and the Arab world. Although discussion of the *Reconquista* – the Christian “re”conquest of the lands in the south of the Peninsula – are muted in regional initiatives, this process is referred to by using the term *Reconquista* and is often taught by explaining the Catholic rationale of the time that lay behind the concept. While studies on difference and similarity used in the formation of imagined communities are many, this coming together, a creation of bridges of sorts or even the imagining of a grouping beyond ethnic or nationalist/regionalist identities, is still understudied. It is along these lines that I look at connections and disconnections in this chapter.

5.1 Situating narratives of al-Andalus, its contributions and its *convivencia* in political and civil society

Following Gramsci's theory of politics, the economic, political and civil spheres are relevant to understanding how power and hegemony operate in a society. Generally, the "state" can be defined as "political society", whereas "civil society" is considered to be the "social terrain on which rivalries and struggles of a cultural and ideological nature are played out and decided among social groups" (Hoare & Sperber, 2016, p. 56).

Throughout these struggles, social groups come to share particular understandings and notions about the world. The ruling classes within a state constantly strive to maintain power through various means. They use both coercive power, which includes the police, military and judicial system, as well as non-violent means, often referred to as 'hegemonic', which are used in the processes of mobilizing consent.

In other words, Gramsci wrote about hegemony as ideological control through 'consent', whereby a class within a state cannot sustain power unless it continuously mobilizes and solicits popular support. Therefore, hegemony is the set of beliefs, morality, values and attitudes that is diffused throughout society (all classes) and permeates everyday life in a way that supports the status quo and structures of power. It is diffused through socialization and is internalized by the population, becoming 'common sense' so that the morality and ideology of the ruling class appears as 'normal' or 'natural' (Crehan, 2011; Gramsci, 1971). Maintaining power through "leadership" is, in fact, the Ancient Greek definition of hegemony (K. Smith, 2010; Boccock, 1986). Civil society, therefore, is the terrain in which hegemonic discourse is forged. Roseberry (1994) further elaborates on 'hegemony' and suggests that we use the concept:

not to understand consent but to understand struggle; the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and movements used by subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate themselves to, or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself. (pp. 360-361, his emphasis)

Since the history of al-Andalus has been championed by the regional Andalusian government and narratives of al-Andalus are commonly heard throughout Andalusia, one may question whether the historical account is a dominant narrative that has become

hegemonic, that is, whether it has become normalized and internalized in civil society. However, what is relevant here is that Gramsci came to see the crucial importance of the cultural realm, recognizing the role of cultural and educational institutions in the exercise of hegemony (p. 29).

In his work, Gramsci makes a distinction between organizations that belong to political society and those that form a part of civil society. The former are tied to and funded by the state, and run by state agents. Organizations of civil society, on the other hand, are funded privately, “relatively long-lasting institutions” (Bocock, 1986, pp. 33-34), organized and managed by non-state actors, and do not participate in the economic processes that maintain the state. Thus, the *El Legado Andalusi* Foundation as a regionally funded institution could be considered as straddling the political sphere and civil society (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). Although the current director of the foundation is a (professional) politician, many of the employees at the Foundation and its Pavilion are not. Furthermore, during the first two decades of the Foundation’s existence, the director was not a politician. Still, these employees share this narrative of the region with visitors. Thus, in a manner of speaking, they became consenting agents to disseminate a particular narrative. According to Gramsci all members of society are “political beings” (1971, p. 265), although they may not be (professional) politicians. Therefore, we can consider politics to be “a moment of almost every human activity right down to the most quotidian aspects of life” (Hoare & Sperber, 2016, p. 54). As a cultural organization, the Foundation also participates in the struggle for hegemony. Generally, it is professional intellectuals that take a central role in this struggle. In fact, many of the books published by the Foundation are written by academics. Gramsci argues, however, that all members of society are considered to be intellectuals as well, since “all men” have intellectual capacity although “not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 9). As a result, both instructors at the Pavilion and high school teachers could be considered to be intellectuals, and as such hegemonic agents who can be involved in both political and civil aspects of society at the same time (Kurtz, 1996, p. 108-109).

Teachers, like the Foundation, can be considered part of both political and civil society. They are generally considered to be agents of the state, in that they also

disseminate historical narratives outlined in state curricula. In Spain, however, much of the educational materials are not drafted at the level of the state, but instead by regional actors. For this reason, I stress the necessity of taking into consideration regional historical constructions of this history as a hegemonic narrative within Andalusia instead of considering whether or not the national version is hegemonic compared to the regional version. The national and regional narratives do overlap, where both highlight the scientific and cultural contributions of the *Andalusies*, yet the regional construction of history is, at times, used to maintain regional powers of autonomy *vis-à-vis* the state.

If both the Foundation and education, however, are considered a part of political society, as I will argue for the purpose of analysis, we might consider which organizations form a part of civil society, following Gramsci's definition. Two relevant organizations (one association and one platform made up more than a dozen collectives and NGOs) in Granada fit this definition. As I will demonstrate, if hegemony is defined as mere domination, these two examples suggest that the struggle for hegemony in regard to the historical narrative of al-Andalus, its *convivencia* and the contributions of its inhabitants still continues and this regional account has not become hegemonic. Nonetheless, the framework of political and civil society is quite useful when considering the role these historical accounts play in society and in international relations.

5.2 Narratives of Andalusian identities: Emphasizing connections or marking difference

During the medieval period, the geopolitical boundaries that defined al-Andalus were not only significantly different from today but also continually shifted over time as the Christian kingdoms pushed south. Having formed a part of various Islamic Empires,⁹ the political, economic and sociocultural interactions and connections developed within borders that extended far beyond the physical boundaries of the Iberian Peninsula. Throughout these empires, merchants became linked by trade that extended from Asia to

⁹ At various times during its existence, al-Andalus formed a part of the Umayyad (661-750), Abbasid (750-929), Almohad (1086-1130) and Almoravid (1170-1212) Empires.

al-Andalus. Scholars travelled extensively to receive and transmit knowledge, carrying with them manuscripts, books, maps and knowledge of the languages in which they were written (Mouton, 2008, pp. 87-89). Many became ambassadors for their rulers, diplomatic representatives that fostered relations between different states (Espagnol, 2008, pp. 156-157). Historian, geographer, anthologist and poet Ibn Sa‘id al-Maghribi,¹⁰ for example, travelled from al-Andalus to North Africa, the Middle East and around the Indian Ocean islands taking extensive notes on the geographic coordinates of places that he visited (al-Hassani, 2006, p. 259). Upon arrival in Tunis, he served as an advisor to Emir al-Mustansir (Pellat, 2012). The connections made by these travellers have come to be imagined as a potential bridge that can bring groups together, groups that in the past formed part of an “us” (i.e. a whole) that are now seen as the “other” (i.e. a separate and, at times, antagonistic group).

This notion of Spain as a logical bridge between Europe and North Africa, or Spain with its Arab-Islamic history as being an ideal European connection to the Arab world, often accompanies the historical narratives which emphasize *convivencia* (see discussion in Rojo Flores, 2015; Calderwood, 2014; Rogozen-Soltar, 2010, pp. 88-89; Rosón Lorente, 2008, pp. 336-321; among others). Aidi (2003), for example, outlines how, in order to find belonging in the present, African and Latino American and Latino American Muslim converts and diaspora community identities have been nostalgically anchored in this period of Spanish history in which Islam both had a place in Europe and contributed to a Golden Age. Similarly, anthropologist Charles Hirschkind highlights how Muslim activists who championed this history as the foundation for regional identity now organize initiatives that have been “aimed at establishing connections to the Muslim world” (2013, p. 234). Among others, Arabist Elena Arigita (2017) argues that a European connection to this history can contribute to the conceptualization of Europe as having a multicultural legacy and to initiatives working towards greater inclusion of Islam in Europe. Each of these examples seem to promote the idea of *convivencia* and bridges between Europe and the Arab and Muslim world.

¹⁰ Abu ‘l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Mūsā b. Muḥ. b. ‘Abd al-Malik b. Sa‘īd (Granada, b.1213-1286) (Pellat, 2012)

In national political discourse, however, the disparity between the views of former Spanish presidents José Luis Zapatero of the PSOE¹¹ party and José María Aznar of the PP party has, in the past, clarified quite clearly two opposing narratives. One is presented as a bridge worthy of being strengthened and the other as a perpetual and insurmountable rift. On the same day that Zapatero presented his proposal for an “Alliance of Civilizations” (Zapatero, 2004) at the UN General Assembly, Aznar gave an address at Georgetown University titled “Seven theories of Today’s Terrorism” (“Aznar asegura”, 2014). Only six months after the March 11th Madrid train bombing, both speeches addressed terrorism and called for different means of confronting it. Zapatero insisted it was necessary to address it through non-military means (Agencias, 2004) and that this alliance should be built “between the Western and the Arab and Muslim worlds” (Zapatero, 2004, p. 6), with its main objective being to expand “political, cultural and educational relations” (Agencias, 2004). Aznar, on the other hand, reiterated that his struggle against armed Basque separatism provided him a deep understanding of how to be victorious against the common Islamic enemy of Spain and the United States. He added:

...the problem Spain has with Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism did not begin with the Iraq Crisis. In fact, it has nothing to do with government decisions. You must go back no less than 1,300 years, to the early 8th century, when a Spain recently invaded by the Moors refused to become just another piece in the Islamic world and began a long battle to recover its identity. This *Reconquista* process was very long, lasting some 800 years. However, it ended successfully. (Aidi, 2006; for full transcription see Aznar, 2004)

By considering Spain’s participation in the second Iraq War and the train bombing as forming a part of a particular version of an ongoing national (and global) history, Aznar sees these events as part of an eternal struggle between Europe (and the “West”) and its “natural” enemy, its Muslim/Arab “other”. Despite this, much of the general public understood that the Madrid bombing was retaliation for Aznar’s decision to participate in a baseless war in Iraq (Leonor. Late 40s, history teacher. Interview, May 31, 2012). The

¹¹ Zapatero represented the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), a centre-left party from 2004-2011 whereas Aznar represented the PP (People’s Party), a right wing party from 1996-2004.

attack occurred three days before a national election in which Aznar was in the lead. His loss in the election is consistently attributed by Spaniards to his reaction to the attack, and a rushed and reiterated yet unfounded accusation of ETA, the Basque group that in its fight for secession turned to armed struggle. Two years after these comments in his opening address of the conference, “Global Threats. Atlantic Structures”, he reiterated this animosity during the question period. He referred to Zapatero’s “Alliance of Civilizations” as “stupidity” and as “impossible” (“Aznar pretende”, 2006) and insisted that “we are living in a time of war.” and that “It’s them or us. The West did not attack Islam; it was they who attacked us.” (Shefferman, 2014). When asked about controversial comments made by the then Pope Benedict about Islam being an inherently violent religion, he added:

It is interesting to note that, while a lot of people in the world are asking the Pope to apologize for his speech, I have never heard a Muslim say sorry for having conquered Spain and occupying it for eight centuries. (Aznar, as cited in Shefferman, 2014, p. 192)

Aznar depicts the country as a victim of almost 800 years of Muslim occupation and aggression. While the name *España* or Spain (in Spanish) is derived from Hispania, the Roman name for the Iberian Peninsula, Aznar projects contemporary notions of Spain as a national entity onto the medieval past without acknowledging that the fact that neither “Spain” nor the kingdoms that eventually came to form the nation-state, existed at the time of the Arab-Islamic invasion. His comments were then followed by an expression of admiration for the Catholic regents, Fernando and Isabel. These varied political discourses, thus, become two distinct visions for the significance that the *Andalusi* past – and especially coexistence – has in the present.

The version of Spanish history that Aznar holds is seemingly antithetical to the amicable foreign relations with Arab and Islamic states that centre-left PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) has maintained. This apparent contradiction, however, parallels the political discourse of his party, PP (right-wing People’s Party), as well as those used in the foreign policy of the Franco dictatorship. The inclusion of Moroccan troops in the

1936 coup d'état,¹² for example, was framed as two groups that shared history, blood, and a destiny against “godless communists” (Aidi, 2006, pp. 72-73). Once in power, Franco’s narrative turned to demonize Arabs both within Spanish history and in foreign relations. Nonetheless, the fascist narrative of Spain’s enemy, the Muslim “other”, was again altered when in 1946 the UN imposed an economic boycott on the country. Franco had little choice but to turn to the Arab world in the face of economic hardship and adopt a policy that was rooted in a narrative of a shared past and fraternity, all the while internally promoting Spain’s ethnic purity. Thus, his foreign policy promoted an economic bridge based on historical connections yet simultaneously reinforced the historical rifts between Spaniards and their Muslim “other” within the country.

5.3 An EU-North African connection: Spain as an economic bridge

The geographical location of Spain – as it includes the southernmost point of mainland Europe, at Tarifa, and some of northernmost points of the global south with the autonomous enclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla in Africa – situate the country “at the crossroads of regular shipping routes that connect Europe with America, Africa, the Far East and south-east Asia.” (Castejón et al., 1995-1996, p. 10). It was this point that was used, upon consideration for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) (1986), to depict the country as an ideal intermediary between both North Africa and Latin America (Sotillo Lorenzo, 1989, p. 28) with major Spanish ports at the centre of economic exchange (Castejón et al. 1995-1996, p. 8). The EEC proposal highlighted domestic economic sectors that would contribute to the European economy including the two principal activities, agriculture and tourism, where the former was the dominant contributor to the Spanish economy until the 1960s, when it was surpassed by the latter. With Spain’s eventual entry into the EU, foreign economic relations with Latin America and the Arab world have taken many forms, including the more recent example of the

¹² See Chapter Three of Ceasar (2014) for discussion on contemporary historical memory of the bones of Moroccan mercenaries in Spain and de Madariaga (2015) for further reading. Despite Franco’s narratives of brotherhood during the Civil War, the remains of these soldiers become unworthy of memorialization in historical memory excavations.

construction of the high-speed AVE train from Mecca to Medina in Saudi Arabia by a consortium of 12 Spanish companies (Navas, 2017; Agencias EFE, 2014). In the years after entrance into the EEC, the European economic vision for the Mediterranean continued to develop, with the celebration of the Summit of Barcelona in 1995. The summit was organized to establish a “Euro-Mediterranean” region and focused on democratic political relations, economic cooperation including the possibility of a free trade zone, and increased cooperation between universities, businesses and professionals (Cembrero & Vidal-Folch, 1995).

The EEC bid had followed soon after the establishment of the autonomous regions (1981), around which the use of the Arab-Islamic past to define a distinctive regional Andalusian identity found a place in both regional and local politics (see Chapter Two for further discussion). Granadan politicians presented the city to the nation and the world as the ideal centre for European-Arab world relations, a city of dialogue capable of developing and maintaining international relations (discussed both in Rogozen-Soltar, 2010; Rosón Lorente, 2008). The mayor at the time, Antonio Jara Andreu, and city councillor José Miguel Castillo Higuera, both of PSOE, set in motion various initiatives to consolidate the city of Granada as the reference for the Arab-Islamic history and as representative of Andalusian identity (Rosón Lorente, 2008, p. 327). The first initiative, the founding of the *Universidad Euroárabe* (Euro-Arab University) was conceived as a space to develop, debate and research topics that spanned both Europe and the Arab world. However, due to obstacles to its development, it was eventually reduced to a foundation, now the *Fundación Euroárabe de Altos Estudios* (Euro-Arab Foundation of Higher Studies), that still provides a space in which presentations, art exhibitions, and conferences are held. One conference held during my time in Granada was “Orientalism: Art and Architecture between Granada and Venice” (2011). Additionally, the annual alternative celebration of the *Día de la Toma* (Day of the Capture of Granada) is also held in this space (see Chapter Four for further discussion). The objectives of this Foundation include “contributing to the training of experts and to research”, “contributing to the economic development of the Arab countries”, “boosting dialogue, exchange of experiences and ideas and collaboration between other intellectuals and creators”, and

“working to introduce in the society the idea of respect towards science and the values of tolerance, equality, objectivity, independence and rigor” among others (FUNDEA, 2011).

A second initiative was the presentation of a bid for Granada’s selection as the European Capital of Culture in 1992 (Rosón Lorente, 2008; Navarro, 1998). The distinction eventually went to the city of Madrid that year. To this day, it has never been granted to a southern Spanish city.¹³ Still, other initiatives were undertaken.

Development of architectural rehabilitation projects of heritage sites from the period of al-Andalus and the neighbourhood of the Albayzin were prioritized, later to be managed by the *Oficina de Rehabilitación del Albaicín* (Rehabilitation Office of the Albaicín, opened in 1998) (Moreh, 2016). However, as the 2008 recession brought the Spanish economy to a standstill, these projects slowed down and perhaps unbeknownst to the previous author, the office was first moved and updated in March of 2011, only to be closed in October of the same year (Gallastegui, 2011). Beyond local initiatives, the city was twinned with various Moroccan cities. These connections brought politicians and dignitaries, including the King of Morocco, on official visits from twinned cities to Granada (Rosón Lorente, 2008, p. 330), as is common, given that these public initiatives have often been directed towards a certain more educated class of Spanish society (Felipe. Mid-60s, history teacher. Interview, October 31, 2011). Thus, with entrance into the EEC, the city was reimagined as the European end of a bridge – an economic, political, cultural bridge for international relations with North Africa and the rest of the Arab world. This conceptualization has over time materialized into many initiatives that are set in a framework of shared historical roots, similarities, and Andalusian historical identity. One of these initiatives, the *Fundación El Legado Andalusí*, has received much criticism for its focus on tourism.

¹³ Three northern Spanish cities have received this distinction: Madrid (1992), Santiago de Compostela (2000), and San Sebastian (2016).

5.4 *El Legado Andalusí*: Tourism, international relations and regional identity

Public initiatives that are conceptualized by employing the *Andalusi* past have often been envisioned as a part of these economic partnerships. Certain cultural institutions that present this history, such as the *Fundación El Legado Andalusí* (the Andalusi Legacy Foundation), have been analyzed and critiqued in the past. Primarily, various scholars argue that this particular Foundation presents simplified, idealized, and at times, nostalgic narratives of al-Andalus, especially with respect to *convivencia* (Calderwood, 2014; Rogozen-Soltar, 2010). This critique of nostalgia in the “heritage industry” is common amongst scholars (see C. Shaw & Chase, 1989; Hewison, 1987; Lowenthal, 1985; Plumb, 1969). Furthermore, anthropologist José Antonio González Alcantud, in considering Spanish stereotypes of all that represents the Islamic past, has drawn attention to the lack of critique of the Foundation’s prioritization of tourism, the country’s most economically beneficial activity. He notes that:

Years later, once the project had rid itself of its cultural aspects, and despite the public support of eminent figures from Arab Literary Studies, **it became reduced to a frame strictly for tourism promotion, clearly observing that the underlying image [*trasunto*] of *El Legado Andalusí* essentially consists in maintaining a palace network between Morocco and Andalusia – perhaps it is necessary to say Spain – marked by the management of resources and economic flows above all.** To this end, it has continued to deepen the horizon of the *Andalusi* myth, meaning, of the imaginary analogies on one side and the other of the Andalusian Mediterranean. (González Alcantud, 2002, p. 194, *my translation, my emphasis*)

Alcantud’s comments point not only to the economic aspect of the Foundation, funded mainly by the *Junta de Andalucía* (the regional government) but also to its dual role, first, as an intermediary for international relations between Granada – and thus Spain – and the Moroccan government, and second, as a significant tourism initiative. In its infancy, the original initiative, inaugurated in 1995, stemmed from the idea of Granadan lawyer and games organizer Jeronimo Paez as an addition to the Alpine World Ski Championships in

1996.¹⁴ As Marina, an employee of *El Legado Andalusí*, explained, the initiative was one method to give the athletes and attendees of the games a sense of the historical importance of the city instead of simply being a place of accommodation for an event held in Sierra Nevada, the ski resort outside of the city. According to her, Paez:

didn't want the Worlds to end up being only that, to just be a sporting event, instead he wanted to give it a cultural part and Granada could be a city, it could be the perfect city to develop... **so that this idea of the legacy of the Andalusies has a base [sede or headquarters]**. (Marina. Late-40s, *El Legado Andalusí* employee. Interview, May 21, 2013) (*my emphasis*)

Once the Championships had concluded, the Foundation turned to focus on tourism initiatives with the goal of recovering the shared historical legacy between Spain and the Arab world (El Legado Andalusí, 2017; Paez, 2008).¹⁵ Marina's comment suggests that Paez' intentions entwined with those of the Granadan politicians who characterize the city as a prominent centre of Spanish-Moroccan connection and a historically rooted bridge between Spain and the Arab world.

As a tourism-focused foundation, *El Legado Andalusí* developed eight tourist routes¹⁶ throughout the regions of Andalusia, Murcia,¹⁷ and Portugal that connect and highlight towns historically relevant to each route that were unlikely to be visited otherwise. The routes mark the *Andalusi* past onto the landscape, providing both a

¹⁴ The Championships were originally planned to take place the same year as the Summit of Barcelona (see above) in 1995. However, the games were actually postponed for a year due to low temperatures and lack of snow the year before ("20 años del Mundial", 2016).

¹⁵ The same essay which is found on the introduction page of the website seems to also be included in a volume published about the Foundation, as it is cited in Calderwood (2014). Although the website does not attribute it to the former director, Jeronimo Paez, Calderwood's citation does.

¹⁶ These routes include the Route of the Caliphate (Cordoba-Granada), the Route of Washington Irving (Seville-Granada), the Route of the Nazarids (Navas de Tolosa-Jaen-Granada), the Route of the Almoravids and Almohads (Tarifa-Cadiz-Granada), the Route of the Alpujarras (Almeria-Granada), the Route of Ibn al-Khatib (Murcia-Granada), the Route of al-Idrisi (Malaga-Granada) and the Route of al-Mutamid (Lisbon-Granada). Other less-highlighted routes include the Route of Münzer (Almeria-Granada) in reference to the Renaissance thinker, Hieronymus Münzer, and the Route of Leo the African in reference to the main character of the book, *Leo Africanus*, penned by author Amin Maalouf (1986) (El Legado Andalusí, n.d.-b). The first route, in particular, is critiqued in Calderwood (2014).

¹⁷ The Route of Ibn al-Jatib connects Granada and Murcia and the Route of al-Mutamid connects Seville and Lisbon. The rest of the routes are limited to Andalusia.

possible present-day trip and a reminder of the enduring presence of the past in the present, where “history in the landscape often stands for duration of national ideas.” (Lowenthal, 1975, p. 13). In this case, it represents regional ideas of a national past that, as Leonor emphasized in our second meeting, has been claimed by Andalusia:

It’s as if the identification of *andaluz*¹⁸ with *andalusi*¹⁹ wasn’t only a phonetic similarity, right? As if it were a cultural invention and we are, like, appropriating the *Andalusi* past **and listen! The Aragonese²⁰ are also Andalusies, like it or not! It’s possible that they don’t like it because they have other ways of historical identification.** (Leonor. Late 40s, history teacher. Interview, May 24, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

The majority of these routes, however, are limited to Andalusia. Each point on the route is marked with an information board with a map of the route (Figure 5.1) and markers are also located along the highways and roads that the route follows. The Foundation also mapped out three “Cultural Itineraries” (El Legado Andalusi, n.d.-a). These extended routes stretch beyond national and regional borders. They include (1) the Almoravids and Almohads Route that connects Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Morocco, Algeria, and Spain and extends up into Catalunya in northern Spain, (2) the Umayyad Route that connects countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe, including the cities in the whole of the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula, and finally, (3) the Mudejar²¹ and Iberoamerican Baroque Route that connects Spain to Central and South American historically related mudejar spaces. A booklet describing the Umayyad Route elaborates on the objectives of the routes:

This route seeks to publicize the profound human, cultural, artistic and scientific relationship between East and West and the way in which the Greco-Roman legacy was passed on to Europe through al-Andalus. This

¹⁸ *Andaluz(a)* is the contemporary term in Spanish for someone from Andalusia.

¹⁹ *Andalusi* is the term indicating someone or something from al-Andalus, the ever-changing geographical area governed by Muslim rulers in the Medieval period. See glossary for more terms.

²⁰ Aragon is a region in the north of Spain and was the kingdom ruled by King Fernando II, husband of Queen Isabela.

²¹ *Mudejar* is a style of architecture that mixes the gothic styles of the Christians with Arab architectural styles that became common as the Catholic conquest pushed south. Mudejars, or Muslims that remained in the newly conquered Christian territory, were often hired as architects and designers of new constructions. The style was later transported to the Americas and can be found in architecture throughout Latin America and parts of the United States.

route was the path along which the Arabs came to the Iberian Peninsula and Europe, but it was also a channel for the transfer of knowledge and perfectly illustrates the close collaboration between East and West. Of these multiple contacts the most important things to have survived the wear and tear of history are common cultural and artistic backgrounds, a shared history and heritage. **This is the *raison d'être* of these routes, which seek to forge links and strengthen the relations between the different peoples they encompass, united by a common past.** (El Legado Andalusi, n.d.-c, *my emphasis*)

These objectives emphasize a shared history and similarities between two groups that, although connected, remain distinct in the present. Concepts of brotherhood or family – between Europeans or Spaniards and the Arab world – and the idea that this history is universally relevant, do permeate a number of the foundation's initiatives (Calderwood, 2014, pp. 38-39). It is a sentiment that is echoed by many Andalusians in everyday conversation. By reinforcing Spain – and Granada – as one end of this bridge that still separates these groups, these objectives align more closely with Zapatero's discourse of an "alliance of civilizations" where the different groups still maintain clear boundaries while recognizing their similarities and cooperating towards a common goal rather than being in conflict, and counters Huntington's "clash of civilization" theory (Huntington, 1996). The pamphlet also explains, firstly, that the route forms part of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for cross-border cooperation and, secondly, that different route-related initiatives will take place at the various locations on the route such as participation of local tour guides in promoting the routes. Thus, it becomes clear that the idea behind these routes, which celebrated their 20th anniversary in October of 2017 (Junta de Andalucía, 2017), parallel the discourse of Spain's EEC induction – Spain as a European connection to the Arab world – and the Summit of Barcelona's Euro-Mediterranean region.

Similarly, *El Legado Andalusi* has put on numerous exhibitions including photographic and art displays as well as artefacts (or their copies) and other historically related material items. The great majority of these exhibitions have been limited to Granada, Andalusia or Morocco while some of the major exhibitions such as "Ibn Khaldun: The Mediterranean in the 14th century, Rise and Fall of Empires" (see Serrano et al., 2006) have spanned various countries. The "Ibn Khaldun" exhibition, following the

life and travels of the historian, was inaugurated in the *Real Alcazar* in Seville and then travelled to Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and the United Nations Headquarters in New York. As my conversation continued with Marina, she elaborated on the “Ibn Khaldun” exhibition. It became clear that just as the cultural tourist routes had been conceived within this framework, so too are the exhibitions:

Or rather, we show [i.e. teach] this legacy and used the exhibition for a meeting of an alliance of civilizations, the ones that were at the UN Headquarters, in the meeting that Zapatero, the president of Turkey or Kofi Anan attended. I mean, it is utilized... it is a very practical resource, the history of al-Andalus is a very practical resource and it's real. **The history of al-Andalus allows us to establish... to decrease [*destensar*, literally to “de”-tense] tensions that can exist now.** (Marina. Late-40s, *El Legado Andalusi* employee. Interview, May 21, 2013) (*my emphasis*)

Marina's comments once again link the Foundation's projects to the political discourse of Granada as a city of dialogue, promoted by the previous local PSOE government, as well as an instance of the “alliance of civilizations” discourse of the former Spanish president at the United Nations.

Although her final point about decreasing tensions does not specifically make reference to the acts of violence in Europe, especially given that our interview took place before the Paris (2015) and other more recent attacks including Barcelona (2017), the connections she makes between the history that the exhibition presents and the “Alliance of civilizations” discourse address a belief that reinforcing collective historical commonalities reduces conflict. At first glance, this view may seem to neglect the role the history of al-Andalus had in the Spanish colonialist expansion in Morocco (Calderwood, 2014, pp. 40-41). In the late 19th century, Spain faced a transitional crisis having lost the majority of its colonies by 1898. Scrambling to maintain its colonial identity, Spanish “Africanists” called for Spanish colonial intervention in Morocco and the creation of a Spanish ruled cross-Mediterranean region (Tofiño-Quesada, 2003, p. 143-144). The Foundation's creator and former director, Jeronimo Paez (*El Legado Andalusi*, 2017), however, as well as numerous academics including González Alcantud (2017a), clearly recognize this colonial version of history and, instead, present the (non-

idealized) shared history of *convivencia* as a “good myth”. Alcantud even employs this idea to consider the contemporary use of this history through a post-colonial lens:

So, what does al Andalus contribute to this debate [on “epistemologies of the South and post-colonialism”? It contributes/ not only is it a historical question, I mean, that it [history] took this form. **It brings a myth that I have called a “good myth” to be considered and that it is an ethical myth, that allows us to address problems of our time, those such as cultural differences, systems of good government, the relation between faith and reason, etc., etc. They are very current problems.** (González Alcantud, 2017a, *my emphasis*)

Thus, rather than forgetting this legacy of historical justification for colonialist violence, Gonzalez Alcantud and Paez recognize the history as a tool to explore present-day human relations. As David Lowenthal argues, what makes the past so powerful is “hindsight” and “overview”, which: “enable us to comprehend past environments in ways that elude us when we deal with the shifting present.” (1975, p. 7). In fact, Johnson and Dawson outline this use of the past as one of the approaches that historians take to determine the relevance of history in politics (1982, p. 212, following Bill Schwarz in the same volume, pp. 80-81). This “nostalgic” view of the history of al-Andalus – selectively focusing on positive elements of what was lost – becomes an analytical tool for the present, and thus may inspire action. As anthropologist Charles Hirschkind observes, the link between the nation and the Muslim past has, for some groups and movements, been expressed as “ethical agency” (2013, p. 230), where it has become a “means to pose questions in the present about the conceptual and moral boundaries of Europe” (2013, p. 228). Still, these practices and historical narratives are often dismissed as “nostalgic”, usually by more conservative voices, in order to diminish the project of revising history. Nostalgia has become as “a topic of embarrassment and a term of abuse” in political discourse (Lowenthal, 1989, p. 20). This devaluing often takes the form of sweeping generalizations that can also be based on constructions of the past that are ideologically determined. Moreover, when using this skeptical critique, scholars tend to overlook deeper analysis of particular practices. Historical accounts of *convivencia* are a prime example. Positive interpretations frame the whole period of al-Andalus as exemplifying effortless, undisturbed coexistence. Attempts to counteract these are equally reductive, presenting *convivencia* as difficult, if not impossible. However, it is this dialectic – two

contrasting poles of the historical narrative – which provides the opportune opening for “sustained reflection on ‘pluralism, integration, and identity’” (Hirschkind, 2013, p. 217). Therefore, in presenting this history as part of a “good myth”, the exhibition on Ibn Khaldun,²² with his lived experience of crossing political borders²³ (Vigueras Molins, 2006; Hourani, 1991), represents much more than connections forged in a time past or possible contemporary alliances. For some, it becomes a tool in non-violently combating political conflict. Yet, as Atia and Davies warn, skepticism about nostalgia alongside the admiration for its “empowering agency” may be both a betrayal to history and to memory (Atia & Davies, 2010, p. 181; Spitzer, 1999, p. 91).

5.5 The Pavilion of al-Andalus and Science: An overview

Perhaps as a result of past labeling of the Foundation’s narrative as nostalgic, one long-term exhibition organized by *El Legado Andalusí* that has been largely left out of more recent critiques is the Al-Andalus and Science Pavilion at Granada’s Science Centre. By omitting consideration of the Pavilion, crucial details are overlooked that tell us how history is used and disseminated in society, especially in education. The Pavilion incorporated an educational component for visitors of all ages. In Gramsci’s view, the terms education and intellectual/educator go beyond the institution and the professional (i.e. professor or teacher). Therefore, the many practices in which different types of educators engage fall under the notion of education (Mayo, 2014, p. 387-388). Defined as such, the theorist therefore also views both everyday people and professionals (or those with particular expertise) as political individuals (Gramsci, 1971, p. 265). Furthermore, museums are always politically charged sites (Ang, 2017, p. 1), where arguably:

every aspect of museum work is – and always has been – political. [...] Museums have long been understood by museum studies researchers as sites of politics and culture, where themes of power, citizenship, and democracy

²² Walī al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Khaldūn (Tunis, b.1332-d.1406) (Talbi, 2012)

²³ Ibn Khaldun, a scholar and political advisor born in Tunis to a family that claimed to originate in Southern Arabia, lived for extended periods of time in Tunis, Granada, Seville, Ceuta, Cairo, and Algeria throughout his life (Hourani, 1991).

have played out in or been ignored by officially sanctioned spaces of representation. (Witcomb & Message, 2015, p. xxxvi)

Thus, this regional government-funded project, framed within a narrative promoting a cultural bridge (with economic implications), does not escape the political. The scholarly research presented in this public display of this Muslim history is often seen to have moved beyond the colonial gaze. The Pavilion, however, is still interwoven with elements of persisting Orientalism echoing Gonzalez Alcantud's "neo-orientalist" charge (2002). Consequently, the failure of the employees at the Pavilion to fully resolve this romanticized view of *Andalusi* history begins to expose the rifts that have yet to be overcome in the search for connections made with the Arab world.

Inaugurated in late 2008, the Pavilion housed²⁴ an exhibition and museum that presented an extensive overview of contributions of *Andalusies* and scholars from the Muslim world. Its contents brought to the public a reminder of how the Islamic Empire and the history of al-Andalus still affect life around the world today. Its scientific contents paralleled a travelling exhibition featured at the London Science Museum (London, England) in 2010²⁵ called "1001 Inventions: Muslim heritage in our world" (Figure 5.2) although the employees at the Pavilion I spoke to were unaware of similar exhibitions. On the other hand, Leonor, one history teacher who brought her students to the Pavilion each year, used both the 1001 Inventions astrolabe workshop materials and the introduction film,²⁶ "Library of Secrets", from the 1001 Inventions initiative in her class to complement the many other Spanish resources she had. Both the Pavilion and the British-based 1001 Inventions presented examples of scientific advances in all fields

²⁴ As I come to explain later, the Pavilion has since been closed. Arguably, the initiative still deserves consideration as it has impacted the historical education surrounding the history of al-Andalus of many Spanish students over the span of almost 10 years. Moreover, as we will see, the narrative presented shares some similarities with what is taught in schools in Andalusia.

²⁵ The exhibition at the London Science Museum was held from January to June 2010. I visited the exposition twice on a preliminary research trip in June of 2010. The 1001 Inventions exhibition has toured throughout the world, showing in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Mexico, Malaysia, and at the UN at various times (see <http://www.1001inventions.com>).

²⁶ The 1001 Inventions initiative has received a plethora of awards including a Cannes film award for "Best Education Film" for its "Library of Secrets" short film starring Ben Kingsley. The most recent short film, "1001 Inventions and the World of Ibn al-Haytham" was released in 2015 and ended up being Omar Sharif's final film.



Figure 5.1: One of the many markers that dot the Andalusian landscape, mapping various historical tour routes of *El Legado Andalusí* Foundation. This one in Montilla (Cordoba) is included in the “Route of the Caliphate” (29 October, 2014; photo by author)

Figure 5.2: The “Town” display at the 1001 Inventions exhibition in London (England). This particular section elaborated on “why East and West share so much architectural heritage”. A model of the Alhambra’s Lion Fountain sits at the beginning of the information boards (the white sphere with a blue centre) (16 June, 2010; photo by author)

Figure 5.3: The first of two rooms with interactive models, information booklets (in Spanish, Arabic and English), and material items of interest from the original exhibition “Al-Andalus and Science: A trip to scientific *Andalusí* knowledge” at the Al-Andalus and Science Pavilion at Granada’s Science Centre (14 September, 2016; photo by author)

made throughout the medieval period, for example, those of Ibn Firnas²⁷, Ibn al-Baytar²⁸, Abulcasis or al-Zahrawi²⁹ and Ibn al-Wafid.³⁰ Ibn Firnas, the first person to attempt flight, jumped from the minaret of the Mosque of Cordoba in the 9th century with a glider spread out by wooden braces and then again later from a hill with wings of silk and eagle feathers (FSTC, 2010). Ibn al-Baytar’s dictionary of over 3000 plants and their medical uses described new treatments through the field of botany (FSTC, 2010; *El Legado Andalusí*, 2010a; 2010c; 2010d). Al-Zahrawi was the first to describe and

²⁷ Abu ’l-Kāsim Abbās ibn Firnās (Ronda, d.887) (Lévi-Provençal, 2012)

²⁸ Abu Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad al-Dīn ibn al-Bayṭār al-Mālaḳī (Benalmadena (Malaga), d.1248) (Vernet, 2012)

²⁹ Abu ’l-Kāsim Ḳhalaf ibn al-‘Abbās al-Zahrāwī (Cordoba, d.1013) (Savage-Smith, 2012)

³⁰ Abū ’l-Mutarrif ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Kabīr ibn Yahyā ibn Wāfid ibn Muhammad al-Lakhmī (b.1007-d.1074) (Hopkins, 2012)

illustrate medical instruments in his 30-volume book, *al-Tasrif* (FSTC, 2010; El Legado Andalusi, 2010b). The book also described medical instruments, treatments, drug remedies and surgical techniques, using many of the same instruments used today such as drills, scalpels, knives, saws and scrapers. The Cordoban court physician set bones, replaced teeth, used plaster-casts and was the first person to use cat gut to close wounds. Both exhibitions also mention Ibn al-Wafid's "The Book of Simple Medicines" in passing. The information panel at the Pavilion where his work is included exemplifies the connectedness of and the transfer of knowledge in the Mediterranean basin at the time:

In the 10th century, **the *Material Medica* by Dioscorides reached Cordoba as a gift from the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitos to the Caliph Abd al-Rahman III.** Translated from the Greek into Arabic, the information it contained provided an important source for the works of al-Zahrawi (10th c.) from Cordoba, Ibn Wafid (11th c.) from Toledo, author of a "Book of Simple Medicines", Avenzoar (12th C.) from Seville, Averroes (12th c.) and Maimonides (12th c.) both from Cordoba, and, among others, the botanist from Malaga Ibn al-Baytar (13th c.), with his "Compendium of drugs and food" and his "Commentary" on Dioscorides, where he describes hundreds of medicines, with their names in Arabic, and in other languages (Latin and Berber among them). (El Legado Andalusi, 2010d, *my emphasis*)

Each of these works then went on to influence European and Arab scholars. Although 1001 Inventions continues to tour, the Pavilion came to a close in September of 2016 after the Foundation had financial and administrative problems as a result of a still unsettled budget deficit from the Millennium of Granada³¹ initiatives in 2013 (Márquez, 2016). With the closing of the Pavilion, the Foundation returned to focusing solely on its tourism initiatives.

The Pavilion covered approximately 4,500 m² and consisted of two floors. The lower floor contained an original condensed version of the contributions (Figure 5.3), an

³¹ In 2013, the region celebrated the Millennium of (the Kingdom of) Granada. The Kingdom of Granada, although the city and *taifa* were founded in 1013 during al-Andalus, was not dismantled until 1833. Thus, the events organized in celebration of the Millennium in 2013, organized by numerous employees of the *Fundación El Legado Andalusi*, covered both the Muslim and Christian history of the Kingdom and the founding of the city. Throughout the year, free street concerts, interactive historically related activities, art exhibitions (both fixed and travelling throughout Andalusia), academic talks on al-Andalus, conferences, gastronomic routes connecting restaurants that served *Andalusi* recipes, film series, sports events and children's activities were all organized. The initiative was also accompanied by a massive marketing campaign.

overview of the Arab world and its connection with al-Andalus, a bookstore with an expansive array of literature related to this history, overviews of the routes and cultural itineraries, a restoration lab, and a space used most often for children’s workshops. A section with an information display on each of the Arab countries in Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant was added soon after the opening.³² Each display and side



Figure 5.4: A reproduction of an astrolabe by *Andalusi* al-Sahli (1068, Toledo) in the “Astronomy” room (6 July, 2010; photo by author)



Figure 5.5: Scale model of a water-powered flourmill in the “Water Systems” room. With it, an explanation of Al-Jazari’s³³ contributions to the mechanics of hydraulic mills (6 July, 2010; photo by author)



Figure 5.6: Examples of the various projects from the workshops in which visiting children were able to participate at the Pavilion of Al Andalus and Science at Granada’s Science Centre before its closure in September 2016 (14 September, 2016; photo by author)

panels corresponding with their various countries presented a short description of the location and geography of the country and gave a historical background with important archaeological sites and historical buildings. They also contained a display with an artefact from the country highlighted. The upper floor held the Museum of al-Andalus and Science and included rooms focused on different fields of science and everyday life such as astronomy (Figure 5.4), water systems (Figure 5.5), physics, optics and

³² The room “Arab-Muslim Civilization” included three groupings of countries: the “Orient and Others” with Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Sudan; the “Maghreb” with Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya; and the “Arabian Peninsula” with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Yemen.

³³ Badī’ al-Zamān Abu ’l-’Izz Ismā’īl ibn al-Razzāz al-Djazarī (Iraq, b.1136? - d.1206?) (Hill, 2012)

chemistry, medicine and zoology, botany and pharmacology, mechanics and music and the arts. Each section included interactive multimedia screens and many held interactive exhibits such as a massive abacus and chessboard, a loom for textiles (in the “Other techniques and arts” section”), and a map of the Islamic Empire filled with water in the Mediterranean, Atlantic Ocean, and Black Sea with floatable boats (in the “Geography and Navigation” room). Many of the material objects displayed were meticulous reproductions.

5.6 The entanglement of tourism and teaching at the Pavilion of al-Andalus and Science

On a regular basis, the Pavilion welcomed families visiting the Science Centre as well as school groups of all ages through to university. Although it has continued to maintain a focus on tourism, the Foundation added educational tours of the Pavilion and various workshops geared toward different ages, as well as hosting classes of students from schools that were assigned group and individual projects based on its interactive contents. In one of my meetings with Leonor, a history teacher at a public school in Granada, she shared with me what drew the teachers of her school to organize an outing to the Pavilion. In an attempt to find commonalities between her bilingual history class and the bilingual science class at her school, she and another teacher stumbled upon the content at the Pavilion:

So, the science teacher and I, looking a little at the [Science Centre] catalogue, said: What’s this? And we went [to see the exhibition] and we were amazed because I remember telling him: Man [*Chiquillo*], **if what we have here is the interaction between the sciences, maths, and history that we have in the 2nd year curriculum³⁴ that we wanted, we have everything done!** We don’t have to complicate things. (Leonor. Late 40s, history teacher. Interview, May 24, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

³⁴ The history of al-Andalus is taught in the second year of ESO (*Educación Secundaria Obligatoria* or Obligatory Secondary Education) at the ages of 13-14 years old when the medieval period is taught. Depending on the focus the history teacher decides to take, it is also taught to some extent in the second year of High School (*Bachillerato*) at the ages of 17-18 years in an obligatory class about the general history of Spain.

Not only did the Pavilion incorporate different scientific disciplines, it also presented it in a historical framework from which students of all ages could learn. Leonor later added that her students were assigned projects to be done at the Pavilion learning everything from arithmetic progressions, trigonometry, computing systems to geography, hydraulics and writing.

The workshops were offered daily. Younger visitors glued mosaics on paper using shapes typical of *Andalusi* decorative arts (Figure 5.6) or glued a plate designed in the style of Granada's *Fajalauza* ceramics, complete with a pomegranate in the centre.³⁵ This type of ceramic is often attributed to the *Andalusies*. Older groups designed and painted plasterwork tiles typical of Nazarid decoration and built abacuses with styrofoam and wooden skewers. Adults learned about plants, essences and spices in al-Andalus and created aromatic sacks that smelled of a chosen fragrance. Other workshops included making astrolabes,³⁶ *taracea* (interlaced wood designs typical of Granada and Damascus), *alicatado* (a style of glossed tile typical in *Andalusi* as well as Andalusian architectural design) and clay oil lamps.

5.6.1 A guided visit at the Pavilion: The “annotated” tour

The introduction to each workshop complemented the information provided in the Pavilion contents and on the tour of the exhibition. The format and length of the tour depended on the age of the tour participants. I took the tour of the Pavilion with Razia, a friend of mixed Spanish-Arab descent. At first, Iker, our tour guide, couldn't decide where to begin. In a later interview, he finally resolved this indecision. In discussing what he called the “pro-Arab” stance of the Foundation, he reflected that had we done the interview first, he would have started our tour by highlighting a crucial rift:

³⁵ We recall that pomegranate in Spanish is *granada*. The pomegranate is the symbol of the city of Granada and is featured throughout the city in everything from cobblestone designs in the street to jewelry.

³⁶ Put simply, an astrolabe is a tool used in navigation that uses plates layered on top of one another that shift and align with stars to determine direction.

Here in this Pavilion [...] **the first thing that you find when you enter here is a rupture between the “Occident/West”³⁷ and the “Orient/East”**. There is a big poster there in the door that says, “From East to West” with huge letters. So, of course, it’s already marking a distinction, a distinction constructed because of a series of motives. (Iker. Mid-30s, tour guide at the Pavilion. Interview, September 1, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

This observation about the Pavilion, which was conceptualized as a space promoting the historical connections between Spain and the Arab world, immediately emphasizes the imagined rift across which these bridges and connections are built. On the tour, however, Iker decided that he first wanted to introduce the overall history on the first floor. He explained that he would not only elaborate on the history but that, because of my research topic, he also wanted to emphasize the parts that he always highlighted to the public. We began with the initial Arab-Berber invasion of the Peninsula. He drew attention to debates between historians about the speed of the invasion – sources suggest it took the Muslim troops a short four to five years to conquer the Peninsula, others say seven years³⁸ – and about whether or not Tariq Ibn Ziyad and his army crossed under their own volition or at the invitation of warring Visigoth factions locked in a civil war. However, Iker felt it was most important and easiest to explain this point at the information boards that sat between the large map of the Iberian Peninsula and the massive Arabic-script-covered gold coin on the wall superimposed over the horseshoe arches of Madinat Al-Zahra. Using the board titled “Al-Andalus, eight centuries of history”, he insisted that visitors needed to first understand how much time the presence of the *Andalusies* spanned and then realize that the Muslim inhabitants of al-Andalus lived on the Peninsula longer than any other group. A counter-argument to this narrative posits that the Romans as a “civilization” inhabited the Peninsula for 600 years. This way of life then continued for another 300 years under the Visigoths, Germanic tribes who allowed the inhabitants to maintain their Roman customs. Iker continued on to another board that included the political shifts. The simplified, idealized narrative of this history for which the

³⁷ In Spanish, the terms *occidente* and *oriente* translate to both “Occident” and “Orient” but also to “West” and “East”.

³⁸ This invasion, when contrasted with 770 years of Christian conquest that it took to cover the same amount of territory, surprises many who learn about this history.

Foundation is criticized is assumed to overlook the various changes in power, societal organization and divisions of the territory. However, he emphasized that he always elaborated on these points for students.

As we moved to the second-floor, he asserted that history belongs to all human beings – a view that draws on a narrative of brotherhood – but more importantly, for him, this history was of particular importance to Spaniards because of its duration. Iker’s opening statements bring to mind Gonzalez Alcantud’s thoughts on the history of al-Andalus as an interpretive tool for the present. Moreover, the link made between the national and the global echoes de Cesari’s observation on museums that:

Scholars and museum professionals alike tend to reproduce imagined topographies of scale as nestled hierarchies of bounded spaces [...] that conceive of social phenomena as taking place at stacked, neatly separated levels. Yet different scales are not only interconnected but also mutually constituted. Memories and memory projects do not simply straddle multiple scales, scale making is often one of their aims. (2017, p. 31)

Iker’s comments demonstrate that history both makes and shapes different scales and boundaries. However, he asserts a hierarchy in which the significance of this history for Spanish visitors to the Pavilion are relevant to the global but are anchored in the nation-state. They exemplify how “supra- and transnational memory works through national and regional sites and actors of memory.” (2017, p. 18). As a result, museums and the narratives they present become defined by the national context (Ang, 2016, p. 4).

The tour continued, and Iker brought us to a large model of a sailing vessel. Joking that it was the Formula 1 mode of transportation of the time, he elaborated on the changes that the Arabs made to boats of that time. Slight changes in the styles of sail and the addition of the first rudder allowed for individual steering and increased capacity. Rowing oars, slaves, and any space needed to house and maintain them could be removed from the Roman design, freeing up space for the transportation of more goods. We continued on to learn about astrolabes, physics, mechanics, and optics, and then on to water systems, when suddenly he stopped us: “This is the part that I like the most. What do you hear?” The constant trickle of water became more obvious than the muffled sounds of the Pavilion’s Arabic music and the noise in the first-floor foyer of the Science

Centre. He explained that he wanted the visitors to understand how essential water was to the Arabs when they arrived on the Peninsula. Coming from North Africa where water was scarce, the land was almost an earthly paradise to them. The importance of water was of course linked to the importance of the garden for the *Andalusies*. So, what is a garden useful for? “Nothing!”, he told us that this was the typical response of students, but that it always struck him as curious that the most vital profession during al-Andalus was the gardener. Yet, the gardener was much more than a gardener: someone who cultivated the land would know about medicine and cooking as well. They would know the plants, their properties, their benefits, and know the Mediterranean diet on top of knowing the medicinal value of the plants they grew. Nonetheless, Iker stressed that it wasn’t the idyllic medieval period that is imagined based on novels of chivalry and knights, but it was a hard period of scarcity for many people. We then moved on to talk about types of surgeries done during al-Andalus and laughed again as Iker jokingly insisted that al-Ghafiqi,³⁹ whose research was a precursor to modern ophthalmology, was the inventor of glasses – where the translation for glasses in Spanish is *gafas*.⁴⁰

Moving to the giant abacus, Iker began to elaborate on the difficulties he had experienced teaching the history promoted by *El Legado Andalusi*. The introduction he usually gave to students (the same one he had given to us) at times warranted warnings from teachers to “be careful” about stressing the length of the period and mischievously suggesting that if the land belonged to a particular group, it would belong to the longest inhabitants. Other visitors, including young students, arrived confident with their already established narrative. The examples that stuck with him more than any were the students who, when he asked: “What is al-Andalus?” responded: “Well, [it was] when the *moros* were here and they conquered us, but then we kicked them out. We expelled them because it was our land.” Iker understood that it was influenced by a fascist/right-wing discourse but was always shocked that it was a narrative that a young child would offer.

³⁹ Muhammad ibn Ḳassūm ibn Aslam al- Ghāfiḳī (Cordoba, lived in the 12th century) (Sarnelli, 2012)

⁴⁰ The invention of glasses is attributed to Alessandro Spina, a Pisan monk who lived in the 14th century (Rosen, 1956, p. 13-14).

He asked Razia and I how we would have responded, especially with a child's mother at their side, and then stressed that he tried always to hide his exasperation and explain that the history was much more complicated. Comments like these as well as warnings from teachers about the 'danger' in the way Iker presented his introduction are an example of what anthropologist Javier Rosón Lorente, in his discussion about the history presented by *El Legado Andalusi*, observed was a "confrontation of memory against memory" (2008, p. 184).

After our discussion, we returned to the abacus and Iker unsuccessfully attempted to teach us how to calculate large numbers. He followed this discussion on numbers turning to a large chess board nearby. As Iker spoke about the significance of the chess pieces, I noticed a small information board with some rules and a picture of Nassim, the Pavilion's mascot, playing chess (Figure 5.7).⁴¹ The board, entitled "Did you know that Yusuf III of Granada saved his life thanks to a game of chess?", gave a history of the Arabic names of the pieces (with their names in both English and Spanish) as well as explaining *Andalusi* variants of the game. I later noticed a similar but starkly contrasted board close to the music section (Figure 5.8). The second board provided information on the Foundation's routes and featured Nassim on a flying carpet dressed similar to Aladdin. Both the English and Spanish explanation states: "Would you like to travel on a flying carpet? It's been for a long time since our magic carpet has been flying over Andalusia, come and meet our paths, festivals, customs and secrets. Will you join us?" In an early critique of the Foundation's initiatives before the Pavilion was opened, Gonzalez Alcantud labeled it as a "neorientalist project" (2002). The image of a flying carpet intertwined with historical facts, scientific inventions and references to the Arab world continues to connect the history of al-Andalus to a romanticized and Orientalized version of the country's Arab-Islamic past. However, by Orientalising the other, it simultaneously

⁴¹ Nassim was featured throughout the Pavilion, mainly as a guide on touch screens in each section that included interactive games, puzzles, and questions to be answered with new material learned. The face of the character was based on the lions from the Patio of the Lions in the palaces of the Alhambra. A similar figure, named Cecilio, was featured in the original exhibition at the Ski Championships. The name Cecilio evokes one of the city's patron saints, St. Cecilio, who is the protagonist in another complex narrative that defends the city's Christian history. The faces of the two characters are slightly different, just as the face of each lion in the fountain is different, leading one to question the relation between the two.

Orientalizes the Andalusian “self.” The inclusion of this past in Spanish history adds to the many groups that have settled on the Peninsula and contributed to the shape of what Andalusia and its people have become today. Still, it is not uncommon to hear this identification of the self as the “other” in every day conversation. Marina, an employee in an administrative role at *El Legado Andalusi*, conveys this tendency in her description of the objectives of the foundation:

Secondly, [another motive for making this history public] is also something like... **I mean, knowledge of those that we now consider the other, the Arab, I mean al-Andalus, formed a part of an Islamic empire that was totally different from the current situation of the Peninsula, of our history, and so, it tries to bring this space closer and demonstrate that actually, during a period of history we shared a space, we shared an administrative, political space and that we are a part [of this], that it forms a part of us, of our history. So, it tries, among other things, to break barriers, to see life in al-Andalus, or to see a part of our history, a part of us, that is now the other, the image of the other.** So, on the one hand, the objective is to understand our past, and on the other hand it is a rapprochement between people (i.e. nations). (Marina. Mid-40s, employee in the administration of *El Legado Andalusi*. Interview, May 21, 2013) (*my emphasis*)

This complexity of a “self” divided by historical events, however, has a definite boundary, as Marina made clear at the end of our interview: “I mean, yeah... you don’t have to exaggerate it because now, we’re different. We are different. It’s clear that we are different. You can’t tell me I am like Morocco.” (Marina. Mid-40s, employee in the administration of *El Legado Andalusi*. Interview, May 21, 2013). Therefore, this practice of viewing the historical “self” as orientalized (i.e. characterized by “oriental” traits) yet distinct from the contemporary Muslim “other” is also present in the modern Arab baths, as discussed in depth Chapter Three. It was also used in Spain’s colonization of Morocco (Tofiño-Quesada, 2003, p. 143).

Although these images were limited throughout the Pavilion, children learning about their Muslim past on a school trip would likely not understand the full weight of this obvious expression of Orientalism. Learning that this Arab-Islamic past formed a part of their history as Andalusians, Orientalized images such as the flying carpet become unconsciously associated with this past. While the Pavilion seemingly challenges the

national and European historical narrative that privilege the Christian past, these examples serve to undermine this connection to the Arab world. They situate Andalusia firmly within a Europe bounded by imagined borders:

this spatial imaginary – the ways in which Europe is imagined as a diverse but fundamentally united cultural space – is racialized in a subtle way. It is troubling how often well-intended, critical curators who strive for inclusivity seem unable to overcome civilizational narratives imbued with colonial amnesia and Orientalist assumptions, and the idea that European culture is essentially Christian and made by white Europeans. (de Cesari, 2017, p. 31)

Although the Foundation’s employees acknowledge fascist and colonial uses of this history, the museum does not become fully removed from the colonial past. As a result, by connecting the exoticized historical self to the contemporary Andalusian self, they also reinforce the contemporary Orientalization of the Arab world.



Figure 5.7: An information board featuring Nassim with a short historical background teaching about chess beside a board at which visitors could sit down and play (6 June, 2010; photo by author)

Figure 5.8: A similar information board featuring Nassim with a “neorientalist” twist mentioning the *Legado Andalusi* tourist routes at the Pavilion of Al Andalus and Science in Granada’s Science Centre (15 September, 2016; photo by author)

Figure 5.9: One of the few display items relating to war: a print with Boabdil’s helmets, a dagger and sheath (far left & right), a knife (centre), sword and rapier (bottom). Another display included a spear head, incendiary projectiles and an information board about gun powder (6 June, 2010; photo by author)

Putting away the chess pieces, Iker moved on to the topic of language and language contact. His discussion of the evolution of Latin to Spanish touched upon the

difference between Castilian (*castellano*) and Spanish (*español*) – a complex history where, on one hand, the use of *castellano* (which is still used in the Constitution) implies the dominance of Queen Isabel’s Kingdom of Castile (or Castilla), and on the other hand, *español* implies a state identity rejected by non-state peoples (e.g. Indigenous peoples of Latin America), and thus is still contested in regions with periphery nationalisms such as Catalunya.⁴² With the extension of Castile’s power, the language was also modified and transformed. The Christian conquest⁴³ – or *Reconquista* in the view of many in Spain – brought changes in vocabulary. The four thousand words of Arabic in Spanish indicated to Iker an important detail. The contact that was necessary to have such an extensive lexical borrowing was indicative of relations between the “Christians” and the “Arabs”. With Arabic vocabulary in all areas of daily life, from food to trade to war to many other areas, Iker understood that the relation between the two groups had to have been extensive. Still, this contact came to an end with the “*Reconquista*”. While elaborating on these relations, his first mention of *Reconquista* was enough to require an interjection: “It’s a term I don’t like to use... because I don’t think it was a ‘reconquest’”. This was a conquest, a proper invasion. A “reconquest” would have meant that the Christians from the north once owned this land but they hadn’t. They took land, they conquered it and they occupied it. Iker insisted, however, it was a topic too controversial to say in his tours. His thoughts on the *Reconquista* echo those of Felix, a researcher from LAAC (the CSIC Archaeology and Architecture Laboratory of the City), who explained that among Spanish academics, the process of Christian territorial expansion is now seen as a conquest despite the continued use of the term *Reconquista* or reconquest (see Chapter 2). However, while academics continue to use it out of custom, Iker seemed to use it out of fear that ‘Conquest’ might elicit negative reactions.

⁴² Iker also added that the term Spanish (*español*) is contentious in some Latin American countries such as Venezuela, where the use of the term implies the colonial domination of Spain in Latin America.

⁴³ The process of Christian conquest that saw consecutive Catholic Monarchs push south, taking territory over eight centuries. The term given to this process in the national Catholic narrative, *Reconquista* (or “Reconquest”), assumes that the majority of the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula were Christian before the Muslims arrived, and thus that the Catholic northerners were retaking land that belonged to their ancestors. The debate surrounding the *Reconquista* addresses this argument, as discussed in Chapter Two.

After discussing the workshops and the summarized version of the museum on the first floor, our tour ended in the room on “Arab-Muslim Civilization”, with Iker elaborating on the information provided and a discussion about the contemporary Arab world. He pointed out the limited amount of information provided about each country, wishing there was more. By this time, our tour had become more of a friendly chat. Iker observed that displays were missing information about the reality of the Arab world, especially two aspects of the everyday Arab life: the reality of war and poverty. Iker suggested that the display for each country showed only pictures of monuments and historical sites. Yet, upon reading each board, the historical conquests, conflicts and wars all figured into the information in one way or another, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁴⁴ However, as was the case with the rest of the Pavilion’s contents, conflict and violence are only mentioned in passing when absolutely necessary (Marina. Late-40s, *El Legado Andalusi* employee. Interview, May 21, 2013). Iker’s comment highlighted an aspect of the Pavilion that, in fact, was welcomed by many teachers that took advantage of its educational activities:

Above all, what does it focus on the most? **On the part of culture, structures, scientific contributions, agricultural contributions but it doesn’t stop for very long on war, or on a battle. I mean that’s what they try to teach, the nice part of the history of al-Andalus.** This nice part is the other side of the coin from the part of continuous wars [...] They give special importance to this other facet. The aspect of *convivencia* between Christians and Muslims and they don’t stop to explain the wars. (Adrián. Late 30s, history teacher. Interview, March 30, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

While Iker drew attention to contemporary violence that he believed was missing from the historical overviews, he overlooked the historical violence that had been minimized in the whole of the exhibition. His comments became an unintentional reminder that even those labeled “maurophilic” (from *morofilia*) can consider violence as an integral part of Arab society – where maurophilia is a term used to describe in varying degrees those who narrate the history of al-Andalus in a positive and/or idealized manner often but not

⁴⁴ At the time of our tour, the Arab Spring in most countries had come to an end and the various resulting civil wars had begun but were not included on the boards.

exclusively by those who share the opposing national-Catholic narrative. Upon hearing Iker's comment, Razia indignantly interrupted him to address the unsettling contradictions in his observation. She brought his attention to the differences between countries in the Middle East and highlighted his overarching assumption that all Arab countries similarly experienced violence by touching on the lack of knowledge many people have about the history of and life in the Middle East.

Iker's final thoughts on violence, however problematic, bring up the "silences" in the narrative presented at the Pavilion.⁴⁵ Although some aspects of violence are included (Figure 5.9), it becomes meaningful to consider that:

What is significant to examine is the relationship between the saying and not saying, who says and who silences and of course, why some memories linger in the sphere of silence and at other times emerge as an articulated account. (Farah, 1999)

Given its many younger visitors, the Pavilion may have been an inappropriate space to provide extensive information on complex geopolitical conflicts. Thus, in an attempt to draw the focus away from the violence of the medieval period, the historical accounts that the Pavilion presents – as part of a cultural institution located in political society – lend more to the notion of forming a bridge with the Arab world. However, the Pavilion's contents left room for certain rifts. As a result, the "neoorientalization" of this history still goes unconsidered and unchallenged.

5.7 Histories that threaten unity: Internal rifts of regional nationalism

The presentation of this historical narrative as one that supports a regional identity also deepens rifts within the country, where periphery nationalisms in Spain had very serious consequences in late 2017 with Catalunya's unilateral attempt to declare independence.

⁴⁵ This particular silence, however, was broken with an exhibition at the Pavilion after it was closed in September of 2016. The foundation hosted an exhibition of photographs taken in a Gazan women's prison by Spanish-Palestinian photojournalist, Maysun (Zugasti, 2016). Although the theme of the exhibition didn't address violence directly, her previous work has focused on conflict zones and refugee camps around the world.

These histories that often diverge from the national narrative appear as threats to national unity:

Today, unfortunately, **local contents are prioritized in the autonomous education systems that impede students from achieving a balanced vision of different topics.** Although not the only example, the case of Catalunya which, in these moments of reclaiming sovereignty, causes the biggest worry in Spanish society **since it stresses an interpretation of the history of Spain that virtually eliminates all elements in common, essential for understanding the formation of the nation and its processes of consolidation.** A vision that makes Catalunya and the rest of Spain airtight compartments where they should be communicative vessels. **The same can be said about the Basque Country and, in another respect, about Andalusia, this last community where revisionism of the Muslim period is starting to become worrisome.** (Gobierno de España, 2012, *my translation, my emphasis*)

Although *El Legado Andalusi* isn't specifically named in this commentary in this National Press Bulletin, the regional narrative that the Foundation presents as a tourist initiative – which highlights the history of al-Andalus with the aim of building bridges with the Arab world – is viewed by some as problematic outside of Andalusia. With the addition of an educational component at the Pavilion, this narrative is taught to younger generations, but is regarded by many, especially in Madrid, as “worrisome” to include as part of an educational program, mainly due to the effect it might have in provoking separatist sentiments, perhaps similar to those that incited the events that took place in Catalunya in October of 2017. Students overwhelmingly supported the referendum held by the *Generalitat* of Catalunya (the regional government) (Mouzo Quintáins, 2017). Of 42% of the region's population that voted, 90% voted for independence from Spain (Baquero, 2017).⁴⁶ During the voting, the Spanish central government deployed thousands of extra police officers and civil guards, who during the referendum injured anywhere between 430 and 900 voters (“Cuántos heridos”, 2017). Catalunya became an example of state violence inflicted against citizens fighting for self-determination, where

⁴⁶ According to Baquero (2017), the population of the autonomous region was 5,343,358. From this, 2,262,424 people voted and 90% of these votes were in favour of independence.

the regional narrative provides a foundation for nationalist separatism.⁴⁷ The state resorted to coercive control, which is viewed at the national level as legitimate violence (see Ron, 1997), as the national hegemonic narrative has little support in the region.

Akhil Gupta reminds us that:

The containment that nationalist narratives seek to impose on their constituent elements – actors, actions, histories, and, most pertinent to this article, spaces – are predictably, but with varying degrees of success, resisted by those so confined. However, to the extent that it is successful in incorporating the recognition of difference, nationalism serves to negate in advance, to anticipate and thereby to diffuse, reshape, and contain particular forms of resistance. (1992, p. 72)

In reaction to the referendum, the violence during the voting, and the response of the central Spanish government (and monarchy) in the days following the event, the president of the *Generalitat*, Carles Puigdemont, briefly declared independence only to immediately suspend the declaration in favour of dialogue with the Spanish government.⁴⁸

In the case of Andalusia, however, neither similar events nor sentiments have developed. The historical narratives of al-Andalus that highlight a distinct regional identity are not adopted by any major political party and have never presented a real political threat. Although the Pavilion is funded by the regional government, its educational initiatives focused more on teaching children “values such as respect, team work and equality... valuing the legacy left by the period of al-Andalus” (Casero Béjar, 2015) rather than on instrumentalizing this historical narrative to promote “disunity”. Even within initiatives that present the history of al-Andalus as a possible bridge between

⁴⁷ Unlike Catalunya, Andalusia does not have a regional language that differs from the nation-state, given that the written *aljamía* – an Arabized version of Spanish written in Arabic script – along with any unique spoken language was extinguished after the expulsion.

⁴⁸ After demanding Puigdemont clarify his declaration, president Mariano Rajoy enacted Article 155 of the Constitution effectively allowing the national government to take control of the autonomous regional government of Catalunya and its institutions. On October 27th, the *Parlament* of Catalunya voted to pass a law declaring independence and Puigdemont unilaterally announced the independence of Catalunya. Rajoy responded by dismissing Puigdemont and dissolving the acting *Parlament*. Puigdemont along with four ministers then pre-emptively fled in exile to Belgium to avoid arrest. Eight other ministers were detained, sparking massive civilian protests throughout the region.

Spain and the Arab world, ruptures can surface. Alternative narratives that challenge how the nation-state has been imagined can bring about internal rifts. However, Orientalist tropes that have Orientalized the Andalusian “self” reinforce the East/West dichotomy and the Orientalization of the contemporary Arab-Muslim “other”. Furthermore, while muting the violence of the medieval world in order to center on scientific contributions allows for a seemingly idealized narrative, it is a historical account against which a perceived violent contemporary Arab world is contrasted.

5.8 Facing the Arab world, facing the state: A spectrum of narratives in the teaching of al-Andalus

In research on education and nationalism, the ways in which teachers impart the knowledge and narratives that they carry are addressed to a significantly lesser extent than curricula or textbook content (Osler, 2015; Mayo, 2014; Keyman & Kanci, 2011; Montgomery, 2006; Crawford, 1995, for example). Schools provide considerable insight into how the state (or in this case, the region) is constantly reproduced through its institutions. While they incorporate elements of coercion,⁴⁹ schools also present elements of consent. Groups within the population come to support the learning of regional discourses taught at these sites. “State” agents – professors, teachers and other intellectuals – teach dominant ideologies to students, mobilizing discourse of a particular group and aiding in this ruling group’s struggle for hegemony. Nevertheless, hegemony cannot be equated to dominant ideology since it is a process (Kurtz, 1996, p. 107; Brow, 1990, p. 3; Laclau & Mouffe, 1982, p. 100), and thus “what hegemony constructs, then, is not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination.” (Roseberry, 1994, pp. 360-361). Teachers may hold opposing views and narratives from one another, yet they disseminate historical narratives within the frame set out by the curriculum. Therefore, by participating in the reproduction of a particular version of

⁴⁹ Staff dismissals (Mayo, 2014, p. 388), laws of compulsory attendance, and detention and expulsion for undesired behaviour, are but three examples of state coercion.

history, they form an important part of “the cultural process” that shapes the region and the nation (Gramsci, 1971, p. 41; as discussed in Kurtz, 1996, p. 110).

By adhering to the curriculum, teachers in Granada presented content in class that substantially paralleled the narrative and the historical data presented at the Pavilion. Contributions of the Muslim inhabitants to science and the many other areas of everyday *Andalusi* life are highlighted. Students study less about major events and more about the “cultural” history: “we study a little about [*Andalusi*] society, the economy, the reality in the cities, some ideas about art. [Teachers] do a little reflection on social structures [and] city planning.” (Cristobal. Early 50s, history teacher. Interview, February 2, 2012). The scientifically and culturally more developed Muslim kingdoms are often contrasted with the Christian kingdoms of the north. Lamenting the loss of the Muslim population and their contributions almost always accompanies these narratives, as does stressing the injustice of the expulsion. Still, teachers tend not to dwell on either of these points. Connections are made by comparing similar practices shared by both Andalusia and North Africa, including the layout and whitewashing of traditional Andalusian houses, the urban planning of small towns, architectural features such as latticework-covered windows (i.e. *celosias*) and hygienic practices (Leonor. Late 40s, history teacher. Interview, May 17, 2012).

Despite the internalization of this dominant regional narrative, the teachers I interviewed presented one of the broadest ranges of historical accounts of al-Andalus during my time in Granada. By law, high school history teachers have academic freedom (Gobierno de España, 1978) that allow them to present these historical accounts from their own point of view based on their own ideology “whether that be positivist Marxism or otherwise” (Jerónimo. Early 60s, history teacher. Interview, October 27, 2011). This practice, therefore, allows for the possibility of interpretation. As a result, teachers’ narratives can fall along a spectrum, ranging from national to regional accounts or they can present an alternative narrative that is distinct from or even challenges both. When comparing those that contrast with the state and the region, the picture becomes more complex. When Leonor’s students became upset at the realization that Gothic Christian architecture was built on top of *Andalusi* sites, such as churches that were built over

mosques, she presented an alternative narrative of continuity that goes against both regional and national accounts:

I say to them: Yeah, you all have more Christian [in you] than [Muslim]... I say... **Deep down [you know] the Muslim population didn't leave. They converted to Christianity again, but they didn't leave.** I mean, the part that is the base of the population is continuous, or it has a continuity.
(Leonor. Late 40s, history teacher. Interview, May 17, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

Leonor's version highlights a change in political power and the ruling elites over time but stresses continuity of the general population and their customs and traditions. Although this narrative may seem to deviate from the regional and national account that Muslims were expelled, hers allows for a more complex understanding of the history, which suggests that some were expelled but not all. One historical interpretation that supports this continuity suggests that some of the boats of expelled Muslims circled back to a different port and the passengers made a life on a different part of the Peninsula. Furthermore, her account of the expulsion conveys to her students that their ancestors formed a part of the Arab world.

The way in which each teacher narrates the differences and violence vis-à-vis *convivencia* in the history of al-Andalus gives an indication as to how they perceive their relationship to the Arab world or with the Spanish nation-state. The violence to which I refer implies the conflict during the medieval period, including battles, wars, skirmishes, attacks, raids, and so on. This violence accompanied both the Arab invasion and the Christian conquest that slowly pushed south, but also includes violence between Muslim groups (or Christian groups) in conflict with each other. Today the invading Muslim troops are no longer characterized as barbaric, nor did they replace the general population (Adrián. Late 30s, history teacher. Interview, March 30, 2012). Humanizing the Arab-Muslim conquerors helps to present a more sympathetic narrative, one that avoids "showing touches or hints of racism" or focusing on "saying that we threw out the *moros* because the *moros* were bad and they were the enemy" (Adrián. Interview, March 30, 2012). However, the process that cemented Spain as primarily a Christian unified state remains relatively unchallenged. The Christian conquest is still taught as a "reconquest", a term that strictly limits teachers' variations on history. Some teachers, such as Adrian,

framed the invasion as an occupation and the *Reconquista* as the return of the land, a process of which Spaniards are proud. However, those that deviate from this account can do little other than direct the focus away from the violence by reiterating the collaboration between Muslims and Christians or by stressing the “ahistorical” ideology – namely national-Catholic ideology – that propelled the process:

The Christians considered it an invasion, [and **believed**] **that the Muslims had invaded the territory** and they wanted to expel those invaders because they didn't know the history [...] In the north, the Christians **thought that all of the Muslims that existed** on the Iberian Peninsula **were the invaders** (Cristobal. Early 50s, history teacher. Interview, February 2, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

Here, Cristobal frames the Christian conquering push south not as based on historical fact but on the Christian belief that the Muslims displaced all of the autochthonous inhabitants when they invaded. For him, this belief was misguided, since Cristobal stressed that many of the inhabitants remained and converted to Islam and, therefore, were not invaders. Furthermore, all of the teachers I interviewed rejected the idealized notion of perpetual *convivencia*, characterizing the regionally promoted narrative of the “three cultures” – Muslim, Christian and Jews – as a “historical error”, “myth”, or, as some suggested, a “lie”. As they expanded on this, their accounts fell along a spectrum: between being considered to be isolated events or being seen as overwhelmingly non-existent. They explained the frequency of *convivencia* in one of three ways: that the moments of peaceful *convivencia* were few and far between when they did exist, that they were interspersed among the extensive violence simply as moments of rest between conflicts to regroup, or that they only existed during the Caliphate of Cordoba. Moreover, all of the teachers mentioned the violence between and among these groups, although they attempt to minimize discussion about the battles and conflicts⁵⁰ and focus on the bridges resulting from and contributions made by the *Andalusies*. Therefore, by

⁵⁰ Leonor, for example, emphasized that her discussion about the *Reconquista* isn't framed by the many battles that took place but instead follows the expansion of the Christians geographically. The second year ESO (Obligatory Secondary Education) curriculum couples the subjects of history and geography together. Therefore, time is split between the two subjects in the classes in which medieval history is taught (Leonor. Late 40s, history teacher. Interview, May 17, 2012)

incorporating the violence as part of the history that determined the territory's political future and downplaying *convivencia*, the teachers' representations, which give example of the education component of political society, may remind students of their connections to the Arab world, but ultimately they align with the state narrative where difference was cemented by violence.

5.9 Beyond political society: Private organizations and their role in determining hegemony

Throughout his work, Gramsci makes the distinction between private organizations and associations located in civil society and those pertaining to political society. These cultural groupings through which social relations take place include a number of different groups:

A major component of civil society so defined would be religious institutions and organizations, apart from entirely state-funded and state-controlled religious organizations. The major means of communication which are not under state censorship, or political control, might also be seen as part of civil society [...] Many other organizations are formed outside of state bureaucracies and are funded by voluntary contributions [...] These include: women's organizations from Women's institutes to the more recent Women's Movement; youth groups; sports clubs; groups concerned with the natural environment; and many arts and entertainment organizations which are not state-funded nor directly controlled by the state. (Bobcock, 1986, p. 34)

By arguing that the *El Legado Andalusí* Foundation and education are components of political society, little can be said then about hegemony. In order to consider narratives of al-Andalus and its role in supporting economic, political and cultural bridges, the comparison of two organizations in Granada present a more convincing argument. First, *Granada Histórica* is a cultural association that was founded in 1985. Its objective is the:

guardianship of the cultural heritage of Granada in the most extensive sense possible – personal (or moveable) property, property (non-moveable), iconographic, material heritage – in short, everything related to what is considered to be 'heritage guardianship'. Understanding 'guardianship' from a scientific point of view. (Tobías. Late 50s, *Granada Histórica* member. Interview, June 11, 2013)

The association boasts approximately 1,400 members (in 2012) and is funded privately and voluntarily. Therefore, it is not state-funded nor receives public money for its activities in the way that organizations in political society do. Members of the association publish books, provide free tours for city residents and organize collective action for or against decisions made by the government and public administration, including presenting the proposal to make the *Día de la Toma* (Day of the Capture) festival a BIC (*Bien de Interés Cultural* or National Cultural Heritage).

The platform *Granada Abierta*, on the other hand, is a interreligious platform of 15 (or so) collectives and NGOs – including the Association of Pro Human Rights, a mosque in the city called the Mosque of Peace, different Christian groups, the Syndicate of Journalists of Andalusia, the Gypsy Association *Anaquerando* and the Democracy and Law Association – that began as the group that organized the collective action (discussed in Chapter Four) to end the *Día de la Toma* festival. The members of this platform organize both the “alternative *Toma*” and the celebrations for the *Day of Mariana Pineda*, as discussed in Chapter Four.

Because *Granada Histórica* has the aim to protect and take responsibility for all types of heritage in the city, the Muslim history is not viewed as being more important than others. However, Tobias, a member of the association, insisted that if he were to indicate one period of history as being more important, it would be the Roman history. He, like some of the teachers, considered *convivencia* in al-Andalus to be non-existent and believed that the Muslim period didn’t contribute anything to Spanish society. Moreover, he views the interest in the Muslim history as resulting from an “islamicization” of the history of Andalusia, begun after the country’s transition to democracy, that “was produced in a politically guided way, to create a link, a bond of connection between different provinces in the Andalusian territory.” (Tobías. Late 50s, *Granada Histórica* member. Interview, June 11, 2013).

As I explain in the previous chapters, this version of history clashes with the different versions that privilege the contributions and *convivencia* of the

Andalusies. The narratives that the members of *Granada Abierta* hold give example to the latter. The presence of both of these organizations in civil society, then, strongly support the argument that the ruling groups in Andalusian political society that advance a regional historical narrative that promotes the Arab-Islamic history still struggle to define historical account as a hegemonic narrative, meaning a historical account that is diffused throughout all groups within society and serves to maintain the regional power structures. Thus, we can characterize this bridge narrative as a dominant narrative, but not a hegemonic one if we take private organizations to be the only determining factor. One part of this narrative, however, does fit this description. Members of both of these organizations recognize the importance of the Muslim past and are proud of the history of al-Andalus.

5.10 Past and present dis/connections: A recognition of commonalities while reinforcing difference

Initiatives related to the history of al-Andalus permeate everyday life in Andalusia. Concerts expose audiences to fusion of *Andalusi* and flamenco music (Figure 5.10). Flamenco itself has strains of Arabic melismas. Many Granadan⁵¹ artists consistently integrate ideas related to al-Andalus into their music, for example using *convivencia*, incorporating the idea of Spain or Andalusia as a mixture or melting pot of different historical groups [*crisol de culturas*], or adapting the writings of *Andalusi* poetesses to set them to flamenco styles and rhythms. Furthermore, it isn't unusual to find television shows related to history such as *La respuesta está en la Historia* (The answer is in the History) (2011-2012), a series in which a group of twenty-something age friends investigate the history of customs, everyday items and all that surrounds them in the form of questions (Figure 5.11). Questions like “Why are Andalusians famous for being tolerant?” (Episode 8), “What is the origin of the cheerful/lively character of Andalusians?” (Episode 10), “Does Moorish blood flow through our veins?” (Episode

⁵¹ The Albayzín is considered to be one of the birthplaces of flamenco along with Triana (Seville), Jerez de la Frontera (Cadiz) and San Fernando (Cadiz). The city guides I spoke with often explained in their tours how during the persecution and expulsions in the city, many of the *Andalusies* that were expelled hid “*extra-muro*” (outside of the city walls) with the marginalized *gitanos* (Spanish Romani peoples) where they mixed Arab and Roma music.

13),⁵² “What is the origin of the word ‘*hola*’ (hello)?” (Episode 10)⁵³ or “*ojalá*” (Episode 8), “Why are the windows of Andalusian houses covered in *celosias* (lattice)?” (Episode 9)⁵⁴ and “What is the origin of *albondigas* (meatballs)?” (Episode 11)⁵⁵ pack each



Figure 5.10: At a free concert, group “Ziryab Caló” performs a fusion of flamenco and *Andalusi* music for the audience in the Beiro district of Granada. The group played to a packed room, most of whom were seniors (over 65 years).

The concert was a part of the “Millennium of Granada” celebrations organized by the *El Legado Andalusi* Foundation (11 May, 2013; photo by author)



Figure 5.11: Screen shot of Canal Sur (Andalusian regional TV) show “The Answer is in the History”, where the main characters Rafa and María run into Tariq, the “Berber chief” who initially invaded the Peninsula in 711. Tariq explains the Arabic root of the word Gibraltar, the religion of Islam, and the Arabic root of the word *ojalá* (meaning: “I hope”) – from *insh‘allah* (meaning: “God willing”) – to the young researchers (Canal Sur, 2012)

episode while historical figures appear out of nowhere to help the group locate in history each part of who they are as Andalusians (Carmona Morón & Domínguez, 2011). The

⁵² The show presents a study of DNA of 1,140 Spaniards in the *American Journal of Human Genetics*, in research done between the University of Leicester (England) and the Universidad Pompeu Fabra (Cataluña). The narrator of the show explains that 1 in 5 Spaniards have “North African” DNA and 1 in 10 have “Jewish” DNA. Thus, 1 in 3 have either one or the other (most likely: Adams et al., 2008). The narrator, however, does not elaborate on how “Jewish” DNA is determined nor explains the markers that are contained in “North African” DNA.

⁵³ According to the show, *Hola* comes from *wa-allah* (meaning “[be/go] with God”, in Arabic). However, it more likely comes from *ya-allah*, or “Oh God!”, a supplication that one uses when asking something of God since *wa-allah*, or “by God”, is a phrase to swear something is true.

⁵⁴ Lattice coverings allowed light and air to flow into the houses while maintaining the privacy of the occupants. Moreover, it allowed occupants to look out onto the street without being observed from the street.

⁵⁵ From the Arabic word *al bünduqa* or ball, meatballs were formed out of leftover meat from other plates and spices. The word was also used for other spherical objects like the hazelnut or musket balls.

show consisted of 30 episodes in total, on which distinguished historians Jose Manuel Cuenca Toribio and Fernando Wulff served as advisors. Six of the 27 regular season episodes were dedicated to al-Andalus (see Appendix I for the questions). With the tag line “Andalusians we know who we are... if we know who we were” and the regional anthem as the introductory music, the show gave Andalusians historical context for their lives. Moreover, this show significantly contrasted a popular show on national television that began the following year about the life and reign of Queen Isabela, the Monarch that credited with unifying the Spanish nation.

While this history is given prominence in these initiatives, many of my interviewees were sure to remind me that it is important not to exaggerate this part of what it means to be Andalusian. Leonor, a history teacher, elaborated on this double-sided identity as follows:

It's normal, of course, independently of us having a common historical past as we have with Islam, Andalusia and North Africa undoubtedly... we are sentenced [*condenado*⁵⁶] to understand each other because we are the border. Well, better to understand each other well than understand each other poorly. If you can create bridges of brotherhood even better. But those bridges of brotherhood in my opinion are perhaps sometimes overvalued, yeah. **I personally feel, as an Andalusian, more European than I do North African. But that is a strictly personal opinion. Now there are people who feel more at home in North Africa, right?** But I feel extremely European. (Leonor. Late 40s, history teacher. Interview, May 24, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

This division between those Andalusians who identify more with North Africa or more with Europe and their reasons for feeling closer to one or the other has its roots in a multilayered identity that depending on the circumstances of the situation at hand calls on different aspects of their identity. Moreover, it highlights the role of subjectivity in the struggle for hegemony. Gramsci himself acknowledged that hegemony is pervasive even in the personal lives of members of society (K. Smith, 2010, p. 47). Herein lies an obstacle to considering only organizations in political and civil society in the discussion of hegemony. Addressing only forms of collective action (and resistance), such as those

⁵⁶ Also meaning condemned or destined, not necessarily including negative connotations.

generated from within organizations, and defining hegemony as Roseberry does (i.e. defining consent through the lens of domination), may overlook the complexity of historical narratives and the extent to which they have won approval in civil society:

The point here is to see what we can learn about capitalist hegemony, by shifting the lens slightly from an emphasis on the politics of collective action to that of the personal. Subjectivity as an object of analysis can be related to broader issues of social formation through a theory of hegemony which does not consider hegemony as mere domination, but explores the multiple influences on human thought and action, as Gramsci suggested. That is, human beings are made at the intersection of various social relations which include family, location, religion, work and culture. In more recent times this can be expanded to include relations along axes such as sexuality, gender, ethnicity, race, age and subcultures, or specific culture interests or identifications. (p. 47)

By using the historical accounts held by those involved in different organizations in civil society to determine their hegemonic extension throughout the region, the analysis not only fails to clarify which parts or components of different accounts of the past have come to support and maintain the power of the ruling classes, but also fails to take into consideration of the combination of multiple factors that might inspire individual action.

Many Andalusians who value these connections with the Arab world also insist upon the difference between Andalusians and Arabs, Moroccans or Muslims. They also frequently stress the difference between these groups in the past and the present as well as between identifying with a group or being in solidarity with that group. While chatting with Roman,⁵⁷ a history professor at the University of Granada, he first explained that: “there isn’t any inconvenience in recognizing that the people who lived in Andalusia then were just as Andalusian as we are today”, that the fact that the Muslims lived on the Peninsula for longer than the Christians “is a right that we recognize (for them) in the present from a historical point of view in the same way that we recognize that it wasn’t legitimate for them to be expelled”, and that “economically [the expulsion] was a disaster because the system of cultivation, irrigation, craftsmanship that existed collapsed and

⁵⁷ Names of academics discussing topics outside of their areas of expertise have been changed.

they had to start building from zero.” (Román. History professor. Interview, April 29, 2013). However, he delineated the difference between recognizing the influence and contributions of the Arabs, and cultural identification today, as he said:

Well, so this came from a civilization that was here before, that we are now enjoying and with the inhabitants today, 500 years later, there isn't any inconvenience in feeling in solidarity. **But of course, it's one thing to be in solidarity and it's another to identify with the culture, the way of being, the forms of living that they had here 500 years ago.** History is like that. [...] Or rather, the value of that civilization is recognized and what they left as a legacy that we use now for our own benefit. **But of course, that doesn't mean that we identify with what Islam is today above all else.** (Román. History professor. Interview, April 29, 2013) (*my emphasis*)

Although not always a determining factor, it is worth mentioning that both Roman and Leonor had family members who had moved to Granada from the north – where Leonor had grandparents from the north and Roman's family migrated a few centuries earlier, and thus felt more connected to the north, and to Europe. This recognition of historical connection and solidarity with the plight of Andalusia's medieval Muslims certainly buttresses a bridge narrative. However, the distance between identity and solidarity, and the past and the present, leaves space rooted in difference in which rifts can develop. Here, identity means identification with a “homogeneous collective group” (Gilroy, 2005, p. 63-68). Andalusian collective identity also includes a connection to the “catholic-ness” of Spain, or Christianity of Europe. Islam, therefore, is still imagined outside of what it means to be Andalusian. Solidarity, on the other hand, allows for understanding and connection, yet marks the distinction between being Andalusian (and thus European) and being North African.

An important factor in the feeling of identification voiced by some of my interviewees was that of violence. Terrorism hit Barcelona at the end of August 2017; only six days after the first threat made by ISIS in Spanish was published online⁵⁸ calling for revenge for Muslims killed in the Spanish Inquisition and for a return to what al-Andalus was in the past. While my research was done before the Paris attacks in 2015,

⁵⁸ The group has published numerous videos in Arabic since its founding regarding Spain and al-Andalus.

the link made between Islam and violence seemed to be a tacit topic that lay under the surface of a number of my conversations. From a fellow Arabic student's confirmation of past al Qaeda threats of violence against the Albayzin and the Alhambra, to uneasy questions of undercover law enforcement in the neighbourhood, to high school students' prejudices about Muslims being *machista*⁵⁹ while learning about al-Andalus in history class, the references linking violence and Islam surfaced at pointed moments. Few people in my interviews mentioned the 2004 Madrid attack if I did not bring it up; history teacher, Montse, addressed the silence around the topic:

Philosophers, geographers, doctors, the best doctors, development, cultural refinement, we've always been, well, confirmed [or validated] that part of our history which is a very important contribution. That perception changed. **It changed a lot in terms of precaution towards Muslims above all.** Do you understand what I'm saying? It changed as a result of the topic of the Twin Towers and all that. **Above all, it changed a whole lot because it's [11-M or the 2004 Madrid train bombing]** something about which very little has been investigated. We talk very little [about it], the topic of 11-M was taken very badly [*muy mal digerido*; lit. very badly digested] by us, you know? (Montse. Mid-50s, history teacher. Interview, April 25, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

Drawing on a multilayered collective identity, these contemporary experiences and reminders of violence become one of the more easily accessible differences that can be used to reinforce a disconnection between Andalusians and their Muslim "other". Although those with whom I conversed did distinguish between the Medieval and present-day Muslims and between terrorists using Islamic slogans and non-violent Muslims, terror attacks in Spain and other European countries have a dual impact, in that it generates an often-unspoken view that all Muslims are violent and it discourages highlighting the bridges and connections with their Arab past. However, not everyone mutes their views. After the Barcelona attacks occurred, for example, when a small group of right-wing supporters set off smoke flares and protested in front of the main Mosque in the Albayzin, they were quickly condemned. The next day there was a large

⁵⁹ A term that invokes sexism, male chauvinism and inherent violence. It is also an attitude that has been the centre of many very visible campaigns in Spain against domestic violence.

demonstration in support of the city's Muslim community that filled the same open space beside the Mosque. However, highlighting what is, at times, assumed to be an inherent characteristic of Islam, gives fodder to a discourse of alterity that has perceivable repercussions.

This past-present linking of solidarity with historical *Andalusi* Muslims yet “precaution” towards present-day Islam can create a problematic obstacle in using this past to ameliorate contemporary tensions, as Marina emphasized in our discussion about the Ibn Khaldun exhibit at the UN. For Andalusians who do in fact identify with the Muslim *Andalusies*, or with Islam, such as converts to Islam, they quite often observe this rift that is generated by contemporary violence in the name of Islam; in private conversation, they speak more freely about it:

Moreover, when people talk about Islam here, ... it's a very curious trick [*truco*⁶⁰]... **I mean, Muslims are [seen as] terrorists, murderers, etc. A lost cause.** Or in these islands of a brilliant, glorious, tolerant past, well, I don't know, it's useful for tourism. Or rather, what has been cut out is what I told you. **Meaning the attempt to see that the people that created this civilization were a people that had a form of living, of understanding, etc., and there are people who continue to have this form of understanding.** ... in other words, that there is a continuity, right? (Zainab. Late 50s, Spanish-born Muslim convert. Interview, May 23, 2012) (*my emphasis*)

The people to whom she refers are the Muslims living in Andalusia today, who Zainab sees as continuing a way of life similar to the *Andalusies*, people who understand “beauty”, “harmony”, “architecture”, “geometry”, “mathematics”, and “pleasure”. Her idea of the continuity of ways of being, however, echoes but slightly differs from Leonor's earlier comment to her students when insisting that the inhabitants of the Peninsula didn't leave. While Zainab insisted that there wasn't a continuity of inhabitants, having been judged by the Inquisition and brutally expelled, Leonor argued that they converted to Christianity and many of them remained. A narrative of continuity, we remember, plays a role in informing the identity of many groups.

⁶⁰ “Trick” in the sense that it is a scheme to achieve something or that has a certain effect.

For all Andalusians, the contributions and different aspects of *Andalusi* life are still relevant to contemporary life, and the diverging historical narratives that give an account of them help to define the connections and disconnections that forge a multilayered identity. Commonalities often inspire either solidarity or identification with both past and present Muslims and the Arab world. Solidarity towards both past and present Muslims may allow for bridges. However, it concurrently leaves room for the emphasis of difference. By underlining these distinctions, rifts are reinforced that aid in maintaining the division between the contemporary “other” and those who form a part of the “us”.

5.11 Concluding thoughts

When Marisa showed up at the family home of a friend in northern Morocco, the scene wasn't much different from when her brother would bring friends home from university: a friend bringing a foreigner home to meet the family for the first time and to learn about his/her country and customs. Upon arrival, she was thrown back in time to her childhood to when she watched her mother in the very same situation twenty years earlier. She was offered the very same pastries and sweets. *Pestiños*,⁶¹ *roscos*,⁶² *perrunas*.⁶³ She didn't know how many centuries old her mother's traditions were, but what she did know was that the recipes – save for differences between families – were of the same origin and had similar ingredients. Similar occasions produced the same hospitable offerings of the same food. It was hard to doubt the shared history despite their differences.

The purpose of this chapter, above all else, was to address much neglected historical narratives that lie along the spectrum between two poles: one that promotes Spain as interconnected with the Arab world, such as the one Marisa felt connected to in Morocco or that Mateo recognized in his lands in the mountains of Malaga, and one

⁶¹ *Pestiños* are a fried pastry covered in honey and sprinkled with sugar usually in the distinctive shape of a flat square with the two opposite corners joined together to form a small, hollow roll.

⁶² *Roscos* are a doughnut shaped pastry with a hole in the centre, dusted with sugar.

⁶³ *Perrunas* are a dry sweet similar to a cookie sometimes topped with almonds.

oppositional to this that turns Andalusia away from its Mediterranean-crossing Arab-Islamic ancestors to stress difference between contemporary Andalusians as Europeans and Arabs and Muslims. These two poles are often marked clearly in political discourse and have been unabashedly promoted on an international scale. As these imaginings contending for the role of defining the *Andalusi* past in the present (and future), they play into regional and national politics, providing solid terrain on which to flesh out and mobilize consent around particular accounts of the past (Gramsci, 1971, p. 57). However, as this chapter shows, the past is not fixed by two polar opposites but that varying and changing accounts of the past exist, which in turn are entangled with economic objectives as well as with the political, the social and the everyday lives of people. They are taught by “intellectuals” at the Pavilion of al-Andalus and Science, and in schools among other venues. This range of historical accounts all contribute to the forging of how Andalusians imagine their past and allows for more complex consideration of connections and disconnections. However, taking into consideration only those organizations which form a part of civil society, it becomes difficult to clarify the extent to which these narratives permeate Andalusian society in ways that suggest they uphold structures of power.

Andalusia’s regional narrative of al-Andalus has focused on *convivencia* between the three Abrahamic religions, and points to the vast contributions made by the inhabitants of the Arab and Muslim world of which Andalusia, and much of the Iberian Peninsula, once formed a part. However, narrating Andalusia’s past as different to the nation’s can cause rifts between the region and the state, although it has not caused the political repercussions that Catalunya has recently witnessed. Yet within this wide range of accounts that are more complex than the simplified ideal constructs, there is a persistent theme which tends to highlight the differences despite the similarities, whereby al-Andalus on a larger scale acquires a Janus-faced identity. This identity is characterized by one face turned to Europe and another towards the Arab-Muslim world, where many ordinary people identify with both in various ways (or, at the very least, acknowledge the similarities). However, at the regional level, the discourses of identity and the past criss-cross in diverse ways that transgress the neatness of national cartographies, moving between many pasts and presents, and drawing boundaries that include and exclude territories that don’t align completely with state boundaries.

Chapter 6

6 Conclusions

In this dissertation, I show how the Arab-Islamic past continues to have a presence in everyday life in Andalusia today, and how the history of al-Andalus is variously constructed by academics and ordinary people, in historical tourist sites, in national, regional and local commemorations and celebrations, in education, in museums and through various regional initiatives. This history is especially relevant considering the rise of Islamophobia, regularly fueled by inflammatory political rhetoric. While political discourses establish hard and fast boundaries between “us” and “them”, I attempt to address the “in-between” narratives that fall between these polarized political and historical versions of history. One of these versions demonizes Arabs and Muslims as Europe’s ‘Other’ who temporarily interrupted a historical trajectory in Spain that essentially belonged to a European and Christian civilization. The polar opposite of this narrative tends to romanticize the Arabs as exotic and the period as one of ‘tolerance’. However, my research indicates that the changing constructions of the past are much more complex, pulling from dominant and alternative historical narratives, and thus fall within a broad spectrum and do not always align with these poles.

In this context, I show in Chapter Two how popular narratives and academic debates are interlaced and varied. Accordingly, I argued that they take cues from one another depending on shifting social and political contexts. The three historical phenomena of which I map out the historical trajectories – *convivencia*, the Arab-Berber invasion and the *Reconquista* (the Christian 7½ century-long battle for the Peninsula) – were the most well-known and debated parts of the history of al-Andalus in my interviews. Popular considerations of the *Reconquista*, for example, tended to characterize it as a historical construct, one that shaped a part of the national-Catholic narrative, and the expulsions as unjust. Although many people, both academics and ordinary Granadans, expressed these two points, academics continued to use the term while recognizing the ideological implications, even though one line of thinking in academic circles argues for its elimination. Many of my non-academic interviewees also addressed the problems with

using the term but instead of reverting to the term *Reconquista*, they tended to insist on using the term “conquest” slightly more than academics.

Convivencia, on the other hand, tended to parallel academic debate. Historical *convivencia* was idealized neither by my academic nor the majority of my non-academic interviewees and was met with skepticism by most. The idealization of the concept was present but usually shared by those research participants who knew very little about the history. However, many of them believed that *convivencia* of the Muslim period was an invention, but that if and when it existed, it only happened amongst elites. Common narratives of *convivencia* among the people I interviewed referred to Jews, Christians or Muslim who had a high standing in the courts of either the Christians in the north or Muslims in the south. For those interviewed that did believe *convivencia* existed, most of these interviewees characterized it as going beyond coexistence, although generally not enduring. In this vein, the term *convivencia* generally carries a positive connotation and implies that groups nurtured or enriched each other culturally. Today, however, the term *convivencia* is most often used to describe what I refer to as civil *convivencia*, or practices of good neighbourliness regulated by city bylaws, and is extremely common both in everyday conversation and in political discourse. Nevertheless, both historical and civil *convivencia* shared similar characteristics: harmonious relations, tolerance, respect for the other and lack of xenophobia, where civil *convivencia* even shapes how Granadans define what the designation of World Heritage Site means and how it applies to their standard of living. Thus, *convivencia*, instead of an accurate historical representation, becomes a term to think through, discuss and debate the past, present and future of (civil) *convivencia*, including, but not limited to, general coexistence or migration. Still, the variety of ways in which people interpret the Invasion, *convivencia* and *Reconquista* becomes integral to the formation of their version of the history of al-Andalus. What is interesting about the historical accounts of al-Andalus is that more than any other concepts or events, *convivencia* and *Reconquista* (where the latter implies also the initial invasion) seem to be the principal anchors in forging the nation-state and, not surprisingly, form part of the most polemical historical debates. They are often raised in times of transition in the process of reworking national identity.

Chapter Three addresses historical tourism, especially in Granada. I argued that historical tours are one site where these debates are clearly manifested and that they also reveal the extent to which economic factors are entangled with heritage or historical reproduction. I elaborated on the effects of the commodification of historical and archaeological tourism on the inhabitants of the Albaicin, a designated World Heritage Site. Over time, commodification has come to have a greater impact on the production of social memory and historical accounts than nationalism. Speculation in the neighbourhood of the Albaicin and competition over tour groups in the Alhambra both generate monopoly rents, as the number of city tours and online short-term rentals have increased at an exponential rate in the past five years. Nonetheless, these tours came to provide much needed employment for some during an economic recession that saw many Spaniards evicted from their homes. The Albaicin and the Alhambra both continuously accommodate the growing phenomena of mass tourism. In the process of managing this tourism, local government decisions to benefit tourists at times disadvantage inhabitants in the neighbourhood. Still, residents have not only become “consumers of their own past” (Gillis, 1994, p.17) by also participating in tours, but appropriate the heritage discourse in order to contest government decisions that disrupt everyday life in the neighbourhood.

In Chapter Four, commemorations and celebrations with national significance that are held locally are equally relevant to national projects and the way that this history is represented in Granada. I consider three festivals that invoke the history of al-Andalus but that have varying significance on the national level. The *Día de la Hispanidad* (Day of “Hispanic-ness”, in the US, Columbus Day) is a national holiday. The *Día de la Toma* (Day of the Capture) is celebrated locally but has national significance, and *Moros y Cristianos* (Moors and Christians), a festival based on the celebrating of the capture of the town, is held in smaller towns but has had little connection to the national. The comparison of these three festivals provides key information as to how the nation is constructed and how dominant representations and narratives are interwoven with alternative accounts of the past. However, the first two of these festivals are still pressed upon by fascism, where the material symbols and rituals of the ceremonies are interpreted by critics as representing the national-Catholic version of history promoted by the fascist

regime. Although the *Día de la Toma* was commemorated before the dictatorship, for example, debates over this festival continue. This commemoration is representative of the unification of the nation, since Granada was the final city captured and served as the residence to the Catholic Monarchs until their deaths. The main square in which the civic ceremony is held becomes a physical manifestation of the “public field” (Johnson & Dawson, 1982, p. 207) each year in which contemporary contestation of the nation is raised, unmasking political and social rifts and creating openings for reconstructions of the past, present debates and future aspirations that represent different social and political trends.

In Chapter Five, I outline two opposite versions of the history of al-Andalus prominent in political and academic discourse, one which views Spain and the Arab world as always having been interconnected but that romanticizes and idealizes this entanglement, and the other which posits Spain (and thus Europe) and the Arab world as eternally at odds with one another, which Orientalizes this relationship, viewing the two as mutually exclusive and incompatible. The chapter shows how the regional narrative of al-Andalus has positioned Andalusia as either a bridge or a rift between (1) the region and the Spanish nation-state and (2) Spain (and Europe) and the Arab world. The various versions of the Arab-Islamic history that I addressed are those presented in “political society” (or in public initiatives and the education system) and those presented in “civil society” (in two organizations that maintain competing narratives). The historical constructions in political society promote the legacy of extensive contributions to society by the Arabs during the period, which allow Andalusians to search for and understand similarities they share with North Africa. Furthermore, this way of telling history ties into the contemporary economic goals of the European Union and Spanish nation-state for increased exchange with the Arab world. In the process, this emphasis on similarities between Andalusia and the Arab world has looked to create a supraterritorial ‘imagined community’. However, these connections to the Arab world are seen as a threat to national unity by some. Because this version of history is intended to define the region as “historically different”, it has become one argument in mobilizing for greater autonomy within the country, similar to, although nowhere near the extent of, Catalunya. In fact, the struggle over the definition of the historical narrative between private organizations

(located in civil society) suggests this version of history has yet to become hegemonic. Individual narratives, however, might suggest otherwise. Moreover, I show that despite seemingly aligning with the first pole, educational narratives also do little to challenge the unifying narrative of the *Reconquista*, and thus serve to strengthen Andalusia's connection to the nation-state. Since the Arab-Islamic history shapes only one part of Andalusian identity, the history both blurs and reinforces the geopolitical borders of Europe.

The interviews with ordinary people and academics, the representations of this history in commemorations and celebrations, and the histories produced at tourist sites show that: a) historical constructions of al-Andalus in Andalusia and the political and economic environment in which they are produced are closely connected, as a result of the economic reliance on tourism in the region and the prominence of two polarized political and academic discourses; b) these opposing discourses allow for a broad spectrum of historical accounts that fall between the two, some of which incorporate elements of these polarized narratives and others of which fall outside of or even challenge them; c) the regional identity that has developed within the current political and economic environment shows the uneasy, shifting relationship between Europe and the Arab world, but because the Arab-Islamic legacy has become a defining element, it has produced a Janus-faced identity. This identity, on the one hand, promotes Spanish-Arab relations, and on the other strengthens Spain's position as European; as a result d) the official narrative of the capture of Granada, the most representative process of the nation-state as emergent from the *Reconquista*, becomes the most contested, where these contestations are an expression of the version of history that views Spain and the Arab world as entwined; and e) the historical reconstructions of al-Andalus represented in the tourist industry play an integral role in sustaining this political environment.

While this field research was extensive, further questions have emerged but which could not be addressed due to time and space constraints. A comparison between Granada and other cities that use this history as the centre of their tourist industries would be beneficial. Cities like Cordoba or Toledo in Spain also promote the history of al-Andalus, but from preliminary observations it seems that these cities focus more on the “three

cultures” narrative than Granada, meaning they privilege the Muslim, Christian and Jewish medieval presence equally. While Granada has only recently begun to bring attention to its Jewish history in the neighbourhood of Realejo with the Centre of Sephardic Memory, which has been open since at least 2014, Toledo and Cordoba have promoted this history much more. Given the already vast possibilities for research on this topic in Granada, it was necessary to limit most of this research (apart from the *Moros y Cristianos* festivals) to this city. While anthropologist Jose Antonio Gonzalez Alcantud of the University of Granada has conducted research on the social memory of the Alhambra (2011), a full ethnography including both *Alahambreños*, meaning people whose families have lived and worked in the Alhambra for generations, guides, tourists, guards (who share narratives with tourists as well) and employees including gardeners and security guards, has yet to be done. Finally, further research on the historical narratives of al-Andalus of both Arabs in Spain and in the Arab world to understand how these accounts converge and diverge from Spanish narratives is also necessary, especially given the lingering presence of the Orientalization of al-Andalus in Spain and the nostalgia in historical narratives of al-Andalus in the Arab world.

Glossary

al-Andalus: a political denomination for the medieval Muslim territory in the Iberian Peninsula in which the boundaries and ruling entities over the eight centuries of Muslim rule constantly shifted, reaching up to Poitiers, France by 732 and being reduced to the Kingdom of Granada in the south by the 12th century; while I use it in the latter sense throughout this dissertation, it also can refer to the medieval Arabic name of the geographic territory known as the Iberian Peninsula according to some historians (García Sanjuan, 2017)

albaiciner/a: a resident living in the neighbourhood of the Albaicín

alfarje/lacería: lattice work patterns found on the tiled walls of the Palaces of the Alhambra as well as in the vaulted wooden ceilings throughout the architectural structures of the Alhambra

Alhambra (al-Hamra): the primary fortress and residence of the Nazarid dynasty of Granada (1232-1492); one of the most visited tourist sites in contemporary Spain. It is comprised of three main sections: the Nazarid Palaces, the Alcazaba (or fortress) and the Generalife (or the gardens and summer residence of the royal family)

andalusí(es): inhabitants of al-Andalus, most often Muslims. However, the term can be used to refer to inhabitants of any religion, including Jews and Christians living in the Muslim-ruled territory

BIC (Bien de Interés Cultural): or Property of Cultural Interest; the denomination given to nominated and successfully registered heritage sites; BICs are protected and managed by the autonomous region in which the heritage site is located

convivencia: most often translated as “coexistence”, yet the meaning extends further to include a productive “living together” (Bahrami, 1998), participating in harmonious everyday interactions, inter-religious inter-relation and exchange (Martínez Montávez, 2008); more specifically, the term refers to peaceful coexistence between Jews, Christians and Muslims during the medieval period; a term quite often used to refer to civil *convivencia* (or “good neighbourliness”) in contemporary Spanish life without alluding to its historical use in describing relations in al-Andalus; can also be described as either positively or negatively, as peaceful *convivencia* or poor *convivencia*

CSIC (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas): or simply Consejo (translation: the Spanish National Research Council); a national body of researchers spread across all scientific disciplines that is outside of the university system but often works in conjunction with various universities. In Granada, CSIC has two research centres: the *Escuela de Estudios Árabes* (EEAA) and the *Laboratorio de Arqueología y Arquitectura de la Ciudad* (LAAC)

Desahucio: a term given to both individuals and families that are forcefully evicted due to foreclosure on their homes and the act of eviction by the police; it is a term that has gone hand in hand with the most recent economic recession as *desahucios* became common in Spain and took place frequently during this fieldwork

Día de la Toma (festival): or “Day of the Capture”; the annual festival commemorating the surrender of Granada by the last ruler Muhammad XII (or Boabdil) to the Catholic Monarchs Isabel I of Castile and Fernando II of Aragón in 1492. The festival is held in Granada every 2nd of January and is comprised of three parts: military, religious and civil

Día de la Hispanidad (festival): or “Day of Hispanic-ness”; the day and festival held annually on 12th of October, the day that Columbus first landed in the Americas. The festival was first celebrated during Franco’s dictatorship. Depending on the region, celebrations may differ. In Granada, it is comprised of a celebration that is visually similar to the *Día de la Toma*; considered to be Spain’s National Day, it is now meant to be a term that imagines a “supraterritorial” community (Nuñez, 2002), and thus invokes inclusivity of and affinity with Latin America and other former colonies (Aguilar & Humblebæk, 2002)

EEAA (Escuela de Estudios Árabes) (CSIC): or the School of Arab Studies, which forms a part of the National Research Council (CSIC). There are two centres, one in Granada and the other in Madrid. The centre in Granada is located the *morisco* Casa del Chapiz (the House of Chapiz) and focuses mainly on the demographics and social aspects of al-Andalus (Máximo, CSIC researcher, personal communication, Nov. 25, 2011). The centre in Madrid, located in the main CSIC building, mainly focuses on religious and cultural aspects of al-Andalus

españolismo: refers to system or doctrine of Spanishness; a term defined in such a way that it can include or exclude that which is or is not considered within the realm of being Spanish; a conservative-Catholic version of nationalism (García-Sanjuán, 2012, p. 71)

Hispanidad: or “Hispanic-ness”; a concept made popular through the national-Catholic historical narrative that originally emphasized “ideas of “historical destiny” and “*Volksgeist*” (Aguilar and Humblebæk, 2002, p. 137), later to be redefined in the democratic period as an inclusive term that represents the connection between Spaniards and those nations (or former colonies) in which Spanish is spoken or has had influence (e.g. Latin America, Phillipines, etc.) in order to move away from its “imperial connotations” (*ibid*)

Historical Memory (memoria histórica): a term that in Spain, generally refers to the memory of historical trauma caused by the Civil War and the almost forty-year dictatorship. It is most commonly used in reference to the recovery of victims of the fascist state buried in mass graves around the country. The Law of Historical Memory came into effect in 2007, finally recognizing the victims, condemning

Franco's regime and providing other rights and recognitions to the victims and families that have suffered

IU or Izquierda Unida: the United Left party, a coalition party of numerous smaller groups and parties including the PCE (Spanish Communist Party)

Junta de Andalucía: the regional government of the autonomous region of Andalusia

LAAC (Laboratorio de Arqueología y Arquitectura de la Ciudad) (CSIC): or the Archaeology and Architecture Laboratory of the City, which forms a part of the National Research Council (CSIC). It is located in Granada, although ongoing research projects extend beyond the city and include research on rehabilitation, virtual reconstruction, and work at archaeological sites in both Spain and Morocco

lo español: or “that which is Spanish”; a neutral pronoun that makes reference to all things associated with the pronoun. So, “*lo moro*” refers to anything that is related to the term *moro*, “Moor” or “Moorish”

monfi(s): the term منفي (*manfi*) in Arabic means “exiled (person)” and was applied to “certain Moors or *Moriscos*”, “highwaymen and criminals” (de Eguilaz y Yanguas, 1886, p. 457). Unlike inhabitants of small towns, these groups camped freely in the mountains and were accused of numerous armed incursions in the Albayzín, Granada and other towns after expulsion from cities across Andalusia (Muñoz y Gaviria, 1861).

morisco(s): Muslim converts to Christianity

moro(s): Moor; Moorish; originally stemming from armies comprised of a mixture of Arabs and Berbers that initially invaded the Iberian Peninsula in 711AD; an older term denoting the inhabitants of al-Andalus, replaced more recently by *andalusí*; a derogatory term used currently to refer mainly to Moroccan migrants and at times, Arabs as well

Moros y Cristianos (festival): a festival common throughout the region of Valencia and the Eastern part of the region of Granada; town plays and parades depicting the expulsion of the Moors from the city or town in which the festival takes place. These festivals are often held on the day of (or days surrounding) the city or town's patron saint (usually the same day as the historical capture) and are based on the narrative of its capture from the Muslim inhabitants by the Christians

mocárabe(s)/muqarna(s): an ornamental architectural detail made of plaster and is often described as geometrical designs patterned similar to honeycomb or stalactites; a design is common in the architectural design of the Nazarid Palaces of the Alhambra

mudéjar(es): (a) the style of architecture that developed after the Catholic conquest in which the most characteristic element was “the union between the Christian

gothic and renaissance styles and the constructive and decorative techniques of the Muslim tradition” (Ruiz Ruiz & Barbosa García, 1999, p. 37); (b) can also refer to Muslims that remained in Christian territory once it was conquered and who lived under Christian rule. These Muslim *Andalusies* were often (although not always) artisans hired as architects to design and build in the Arab architectural style, such as the design of the Royal Alcazar of Seville (construction: mid-14th century)

nazarí(es): the second and final ruling Muslim *Andalusi* dynasty (1232-1492) of the Kingdom of Granada; the family of its last ruler, Muhammad XII (or Boabdil) of Granada

okupa: squatter in abandoned residences, opens spaces, and in Granada, cave houses on the San Miguel hill; from the verb *ocupar* or to occupy; not to be confused with families who at this time were similarly evicted from their own home because of the many foreclosures in the country due to the economic recession referred to as *desahucios*

PEPRI (Plan Especial de Protección y Reformación Interior del Albaicín): or Special Interior Protection and Reformation Plan of the Albaicín – the comprehensive local regulations that determine the protection and rehabilitation of architecture and public spaces within the neighbourhood of the Albaicín, which is different from the regulations that govern BIC heritage buildings and sites

Podemos/Podemos Unido: the left-wing party (which translates as “We can” or “United we can”) that was founded in 2014

PP (Partido Popular): the right-wing conservative People’s Party

PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español): the centre-left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party

Reconquista: the process of the Christian conquest of Muslim-ruled al-Andalus over eight centuries (722-1492). The term “*re-conquista*” or reconquest, with the prefix “re-” invokes a national Catholic narrative, a version of medieval Spanish history that views the Iberian Peninsula and its inhabitants as being Christian before the invasion of the Arab-Berber tribes in 711, and thus views the Christian conquest as a justified “taking back” of the land from the Muslim inhabitants of al-Andalus

Rocío: Rocio is an annual pilgrimage in which many Andalusians participate that begins in the city of origin of the *romero* (pilgrim) or *rociero* (someone who undertakes the Rocio pilgrimage) and ends in the western province of Huelva in the town of Almonte. Along the pilgrimage, steers pull a wagon that houses a flag, called *simpecado*, a miniature statue of the Virgin Mary, and a staff topped with a reference to the Virgin Mary. The wagon is pulled across the region with the pilgrims, some of whom go on horseback, others in tractor/truck-pulled covered wagons (with amenities, similar to camping trailers). The music composed for

Rocio is particular to this popular pilgrimage, played on an upright flute and on guitar and differs significantly from the somber processions of Holy Week

taifa: smaller break-away “party” or “faction” states from the Caliphate of Cordoba, formed by warring groups as the Caliphate dissolved. Ten taifas were formed: Cordoba, Sevilla, Malaga, Granada, Valencia, Zaragoza, Toledo, Huelva, Badajoz and Albarracin

la Tarasca: refers to both female figure representing an “old hag” (lit. translation) and the event in which it is paraded through the streets. In Granada, the female figure is a mannequin on top of a dragon which is carried through the streets, and is preceded by “giants” or large-headed dummies on stilts representing the Catholic Monarchs, Isabel and Fernando, and the sultan Boabdil and his wife, Moraima (seen in Figures 1.1-1.3). The *Tarasca* is followed by *cabezudos*, large headed carnival figures, that engage with the crowd by clowning around and hitting people (both adults and children) over the head with balloons. It is a common figure throughout Spain, some parts of Latin America and southern France (where it originated in the town of Tarascon) (Gilmore, 2008) and has an accompanying myth that varies from place to place. This parade takes place annually the day before Corpus Christi, a religious procession ordered by the Catholic Monarchs to be celebrated shortly after 1492, which was combined with a popular Muslim festival in the city

Toma de Granada: Capture of Granada (lit.), the historical capture that took place on the evening of January 1st and January 2nd, 1492 (also see *Día de la Toma*)

UGR: University of Granada

Vega (de Granada): the *Vega* is the plains (or farmland) surrounding the city of Granada that supplies the area with crops and products produced from livestock farming

yasería: plasterwork; referring to the decorative carved plaster work that covers the walls of the palaces and many of the interior of the towers of the Alhambra; typical of Muslim and Arabic architecture

zirí(es): the Muslim *Andalusi* dynasty that founded the city of Granada and is argued to have been the first to establish the city in its current location, building the *Alcazaba Qadima* (the old fortress) where the neighbourhood of the Albayzín now sits

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Appendices

Appendix A: General timeline of historical periods (for reference)

AL-ANDALUS			
Historical Event	Key Arabs/ <i>Andalusies</i>	Year/ Location	Key Catholics
Islamic Invasion	Tariq	711 CE Guadalete	Don Rodrigo (Roderic) – loss
Battle of Covadonga (beginning of <i>Reconquista</i>)	Munuza	722 Covadonga	Don Pelayo – victory
Islamic Expansion stopped	(Abderrahman ibn Abdullah) Al Gafiqi	732 Poitiers (France)	Charles Martel
Cordoba's golden age			
Emirate of Cordoba (established)	Abd al-Rahman I	756-912 Cordoba	
Caliphate of Cordoba (established)	Abd al-Rahman III (reign: 912-961)	929-1010 Cordoba	
Caliphate of Cordoba (dissolved)		1010 Cordoba	
1 st Taifa Kingdoms		1013-1086	
Seville's golden age			
	e.g. Al-Mu'tamid (1068-1091)	1013-1248 Seville	
		1085 Toledo (capitulated)	Alfonso VI of Leon & Castile
Almoravid (invasion & rule)		1086-1130	

GRANADA		
Historical Event	Key Arabs/ <i>Andalusies</i>	Year
Medina Elvira → Medina Garnata (Albayzn)	King Zawi ben Ziri (founder of the Taifa)	1010
Taifa of Granada	Ziri dynasty	1013-1090
<i>Architecture (Taifa of Granada)</i>	Alcazaba Qadima	
	Alcazaba of the Alhambra	
	Puerta Elvira (<i>Bab-Ilvira</i>)	
	Puerta Monaita (<i>Bab-al-Umaydar</i>)	
	El Bañuelo	

GRANADA (cont'd)		
Historical Event	Key Arabs/ <i>Andalusies</i>	Year
	Berber tribes	1090-1212
<i>Architecture</i> (Berber)	Arco de las Pesas (<i>Bab-al-Ziyad</i>)	
	<i>Bib-Alfajjarin</i> (now disappeared) Torres Bermejas	
Sultan of Granada, Guadix, Baza & Jaen (declared)	Al-Hamar "The Red"	1232
Vassalage to Cordoba		1234
Vassalage to Fernando III		1236

AL-ANDALUS (cont'd)			
Historical Event	Key Arabs/ <i>Andalusies</i>	Year/ Location	Key Catholics
2 nd Taifa Kingdoms		1144-1170	
		1162 Toledo (conquered)	Fernando II of Leon
Almohads (invasion & rule)		1146/7-1212	
3 rd Taifa Kingdoms		1212-1232	
Battle at Navas de Tolosa	Muhammad an-Nasir	1212	Alfonso VIII of Castile
		Navas de Tolosa	Pedro II of Aragon Sancho VII of Navarra
		1225 Jaen (capitulated)	Fernando III "The Saint"
		1236 Cordoba (capitulated)	Fernando III "The Saint"
		1238 Valencia	Fernando III "The Saint"

GRANADA (cont'd)		
Historical Event	Key Arabs/ <i>Andalusies</i>	Year
Kingdom of Granada	Malaga joins Kingdom of Granada	1238
<i>Architecture (Nazariid)</i>	"Suburbs" of Albayzin	
	Palacial City of the Alhambra	
<i>Pact/Treatise of Jaen</i>		1246
	Puerta de San Lorenzo	
	Puerta de Fajalauza	
	House of Chapiz (now houses CSIC EEA)	
	House of Zafra	
<i>Architecture (Nazariid)</i>	Dar al-Horra (Palace)	
	<i>Marristan</i> (Hospital)	

Note: Dates are approximate and stages often overlapped, where a group might still maintain power in one part of the Peninsula but had lost power in another geographical area and thus, the subsequent stage had begun in that part.

AL-ANDALUS (cont'd)			
Historical Event	Key Arabs/ <i>Andalusies</i>	Year/ Location	Key Catholics
Granada's golden age			
Kingdom of Granada	Nasariid dynasty	1238-1492	
		1243 Murcia (capitulated)	Alfonso X (as Prince Alfonso)
		1248 Seville (capitulated)	Fernando III "The Saint
		1262 Cadiz (capitulated)	Alfonso X "The Wise"
Battle of Salado	Abu al-Hassan Ali & the Benimerines	1340 Arroyo del Salado (Tarifa)	Alfonso XI Alfonso IV
		1466 Antequera (capitulated)	Enrique IV
		1487 Malaga (capitulated)	Fernando V & Isabel I "The Catholic Monarchs"
	Muhammad XII (Boabdil)	1492 Granada (capitulated)	Fernando V & Isabel I "The Catholic Monarchs"

Since 1492	
Inside Spain	
Dates	Historical Event
1492-1833	Kingdom of Granada (Castilian jurisdiction)
1568-1571	Rebellion of the Alpujarras
1609-1613	Expulsion of the Moriscos
1610, Jan. 10	Expulsion of the Moriscos from Andalusia
1800s	Literary Romantic period
1808-1814	Napoleonic Invasion & War of Independence
1812	First constitution
1822-1823	Liberal-Traditionalist Conflict
1827	Catalan Pesant Insurrection
1833-1840	1st Carlist War
1846-1849	Catalan Carlist Insurrections
1850-1870	Romantic period in Spain
1870s	Post-romanticism
1873	Republican Cantonalist Revolt
1873-1876	2nd Carlist War
1873-1874	1st Republic
1923-1931	Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera
1931-1936	2nd Republic
1936-1939	Spanish Civil War
1939-1975	Dictatorship of Francisco Franco
1978	Transition to Democracy
1982	Failed Coup d'Etat
1984	Alhambra World Heritage Designation
1985	EU Membership
1994	Albayzin World Heritage Designation
2007	Historical Memory Law 2007
2008-2017	Economic recession
Outside Spain	
Dates	Historical Event
1859	Moroccan War
1898	Loss of last colonies in Latin America & the Philippines
1975	Western Sahara, control of last Spanish colony relinquished

Sources: Granada: From interviewees, academic talks and other fieldwork.
 Crow, J. (1985). Spain: The root and the flower. Berkeley: University of California Press.
 Lowney, C. (2005). A Vanished World: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Medieval Spain. New York: Oxford University Press.

Appendix B: World Heritage List criteria for selection

Note: The Alhambra and Albaicin of Granada were included on the list due to the fulfillment of criteria (i), (iii), and (iv).

From section:

I. Establishment of the World Heritage List (UNESCO, 1984, p. 7-8)

C. Criteria for the inclusion of cultural properties in the World Heritage List

20. The criteria for the inclusion of cultural properties in the World Heritage List should always be seen in relation to one another and should be considered in the context of the definition set out in Article 1 of the Convention which is reproduced below:

"monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from -the point of view of history, art or science;

groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;

sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and of man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of view."

21. A monument, group of buildings or *site* - as defined above - which *is* nominated for inclusion in the World Heritage List will be considered to be of outstanding universal value for the purposes of the Convention when the *Committee* finds that it meets one or more of the following criteria and the test of authenticity. Each property nominated should therefore:

a) (i) represent a unique artistic achievement, a masterpiece of the creative genius; or

(ii) have exerted great influence, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture, monumental arts or town-planning and landscaping; or

(iii) bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a civilization which has disappeared; or

(iv) be an outstanding example of a type of building or architectural ensemble which illustrates a significant stage in history; or

(v) be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement which is representative of a culture and which has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change; or

(vi) be directly or tangibly associated with events or with ideas or beliefs of outstanding universal significance (the Committee considers that this criterion should justify inclusion in the List only in exceptional circumstances or in conjunction with other criteria)

and

b) meet the test of authenticity in design, materials, workmanship or setting (the Committee stressed that reconstruction is only acceptable if it is carried out on the basis of complete and detailed documentation on the original and to no extent on conjecture).

22. Nominations of immovable property which are likely to become movable will not be considered.

Appendix C: Seco de Lucena's Map of Arab Granada


From: *Plano árabe de Granada* (Seco de Lucena, 2002)
Also featured in the regional government's *Itinerarios didácticos por el Albayzín* (translation: *Teaching Itineraries for the Albayzín*) for secondary school students (Ruiz Ruiz & Barbosa García, 1999)



Appendix D: Map of the route of the water cisterns in the neighbourhood of the Albayzin

From: *Descubre el agua* (translation: *Discover the Water*) (Ruiz Ruiz & Barbosa García, 2000), a didactic book for secondary school students provided by the regional government, the *Junta de Andalucía*

Note: On the legend, *Morisco* houses, water cisterns, and public baths




Appendix E: Location of water cisterns in the neighbourhood of the Albayzín

From: *Descubre el agua* (translation: *Discover the Water*) (Ruiz Ruiz & Barbosa García, 2000), a didactic book for secondary school students provided by the regional government, the *Junta de Andalucía*

Note: On the legend, *aljibe* translates as water cistern

ALBAYZÍN: ALJIBES Y BAÑUELO.



- | | | |
|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. A. de S. Cristóbal | 7. Aljibe de Bibalbonud | 13. A. de S. Nicolás |
| 2. A. de Colorado | 8. A. de las Tomasas | 14. A. de la Gitana |
| 3. Aljibe de San Bartolomé | 9. A. de Cuesta Tomasas | 15. A. del Rey |
| 4. A. de Paso | 10. A. de Trillo | 16. Aljibe S. Miguel Bajo |
| 5. A. de Polo | 11. Aljibe Pl. Cruz Verde | 17. Aljibe de S. José |
| 6. A. de la P ^{ta} del Salvador | 12. Aljibe del Gato | 18. Bañuelo |

Appendix F: The Capitulations of Granada (1491) (English version)

As translated and summarized in *Islamic Spain 1250 to 1500* (Harvey 1990, p. 315-321).

Note: [F] represents a full translation, [S] represents a summary.

The Capitulations of Granada

"*Firstly* that the Moorish king and his *alcaldes* and lawyers, judges, *mufītīs*, ministers, learned men, military leaders, good men, and all the common folk of the city of Granada and of its Albaicín and other suburbs will in love, peace, goodwill, and with all truthfulness in their dealings and their actions yield and surrender to their highnesses, or to a person by them appointed, within forty days from this date, the fortress of the Alhambra and the Alhizan with all towers, gates to the city and the Albaicín and to suburbs connecting directly with the open country, so that they may occupy them in their name with their own troops, at their own free will, on condition that orders be issued to the justices that they should not permit the Christians to climb onto the wall between the Alcazaba and the Albaicín from where the houses of the Moors may be seen; and if anybody should climb up there, he should be punished immediately and sternly." [F]

2. The second clause related to the arrangements for the actual surrender: it should be carried out within forty days "freely and spontaneously," and in order to ensure against trouble, one day before the actual handover, Yūsuf b. Kumāsha (Aben Comixa) and fifty other hostages from important families should give themselves up (once the city, etc., was surrendered, they were to be released). [F]

3. Isabella, Ferdinand, and Prince John (their son) would after the surrender accept all Granadans, from King Abi Abdilehi (Boabdil) down, "great and small, men and women," as their vassals and natural subjects. In return the monarchs guaranteed to let them remain in their "houses, estates and hereditaments now and for all time and for ever, nor would they allow any harm to be done to them without due legal process and without cause, nor would they have their estates and property nor any part thereof taken from them, rather would they be honored and respected by - all their vassals." [S]

4. To avoid creating an uproar (*escándalo*), those who came to take over the Alhambra would enter by two named gates or from the side facing the country. [S]

5. The same day that Boabdil surrendered the fortresses, the king and queen would return to him his son and all the other hostages and their families, unless they had turned Christian. [S]

6. "Their highnesses and their successors will ever afterwards [*para siempre jamás*] allow King Abi Abdilehi and his *alcaldes*, judges, *mufītīs*, *alguaciles*, military leaders, and good men, and all the common people, great or small, to live in their own religion, and not permit that their mosques be taken from them, nor their minarets nor their muezzins, nor will they interfere with the pious foundations or endowments which they have for such purposes, nor will they disturb the uses and customs which they observe." [F]

7. "The Moors shall be judged in their laws and law suits according to the code of the *sharī 'a* which it is their custom to respect, under the jurisdiction of their judges and *qādīs*." [F]
8. "Neither now nor at any future time will their arms or their horses be taken from them, with the exception of cannons, both large and small, which they will within a short space of time hand over to whomsoever their highnesses appoint for that purpose." [F]
9. "Those Moors, both great and small, men and women, whether from Granada or from the Alpujarra and all other places, who may wish to go to live in Barbary or to such other places as they see fit, may sell their property, whether it be real estate or goods and chattels, in any manner and to whomsoever they like, and their highnesses will at no time take them away, or take them from those who may have bought them." [S]
10. Those who wished to leave with their families and all their possessions of any kind whatsoever, except firearms, might do so. Those wishing to cross immediately might make use of the ten large ships provided for the purpose for the next seventy days from the port of their choice to "those ports of Barbary where Christian merchants normally trade." After this, and for three years, ships would be made available free at fifty days' notice. [S]
11. After the end of the three years, they should be free to go, but would have to pay one ducat a head and also the cost of the passage. [S]
12. If those going to Barbary were not able to sell their real estate in Granada (etc.) they could leave it in the hands of a trustee who would be entirely free to remit to Barbary any proceeds. [S]
13. "Neither their highnesses nor the Prince John their son nor those who may follow after them for all time will give instructions that those Moors who are their vassals shall be obliged to wear distinctive marks like those worn by the Jews." [F]
14. Neither Boabdil nor any other Moor of Granada would have to pay taxes on their houses, etc., for three years, they would simply have to pay a tax of one-tenth in August and in autumn and one-tenth on cattle in their possession in April and May "as the Christians are accustomed to pay." [S]
15. All Christian captives were to be handed over at the moment of surrender, with no entitlement for ransom or compensation, although if the Granadan owner of the captive had taken him to North Africa and already sold him before the Capitulations came into force, he would not have to hand him back. [S]
16. Boabdil and his principal officers, etc., were exempt from having their transport animals requisitioned for any form of service (apart from work willingly undertaken for payment). [S]
17. No Christians might enter mosques where the Muslims perform their prayer without permission of the *alfaquíes*: anyone entering otherwise was to be punished. [S]

18. Their highnesses would not permit the Jews to have power or command over the Moors, or to be collectors of any tax. [S]
19. King Boabdil and all his dignitaries, and all the common people of Granada, etc., would be well treated by their highnesses and their ministers, "and that what they have to say will be listened to, and their customs and rites will be preserved, and all *alcaldes [sic]* and *alfaquíes* will be allowed to collect their incomes and enjoy their preeminences and their liberties such as by custom they enjoy, and it is only right that they should continue to enjoy." [S]
20. "Their highnesses order that the Moors should not against their will have boarders forced upon them, nor have their linen, or their poultry or their animals or supplies of any sort taken from them." [F]
21. "Law suits which arise between Moors will be judged by their law *sharī'a*, which they call of the *sunna*, and by their *qādīs* and judges, as they customarily have, but if the suit should arise between a Christian and a Moor, then it will be judged by a Christian judge and a Moorish *qādī*, in order that neither side may have any grounds for complaint against the sentence." [F]
22. No Moor may be tried for another. [S]
23. A general pardon would be accorded to Moors found in the prison of Hamet Abi Ali "his vassal," and neither they nor the villages of Captil would be prosecuted for any Christians they had killed, nor would any harm be done to them, nor would they have to restore stolen goods. [S]
24. Any Moorish captives in Christian hands who succeeded in fleeing to Granada or other places included in these Capitulations would become free, and their owners were barred from attempts to recover them making use of the law. Not included under this clause were Canary Islanders, and negroes from "the islands" (Cape Verde?). [S]
25. "That the Moors will not be obliged to give or pay more tribute to their highnesses than they used to give to the Moorish kings." [F]
26. Any Granadan Moors in North Africa could, if they wished, be included in the terms of the Capitulations; they had three years to return if they wished to do so. (If they had had Christian slaves and sold them, they would not be obliged to return them or the money so obtained.) [S]
27. If any Moor were to go to North Africa and then find he did not like the way of life, he could return and have all the benefits of the Capitulations, so long as he returned within three years. [S]
28. Any Moors accepting the Capitulations who wished to cross to North Africa for purposes of trade would be freely permitted to do so; also to any places in Castile or Andalusia, with no tolls to pay other than those commonly paid by Christians. [S]

29. Nobody would be permitted to abuse by word or by deed any Christian man or woman who before the date of the Capitulations had turned Moor, and if any Moor had taken a renegade for his wife, she would not be forced to become a Christian against her will, but might be questioned in the presence of Christians and Moors, and be allowed to follow her own will; the same was to be understood of children born of a Christian mother and a Moor. [S]

30. "No Moor will be forced to become Christian against his or her will, and if for reasons of love an unmarried girl or a married woman or a widow should wish to become Christian, she will not be received [into the church] until she has been questioned. And if she has taken away from her parents' house clothing or jewels, these will be restored to the rightful owner, and guilty persons will be dealt with by the law." [F]

31. Neither the King Abi Abdilehi nor any of the Muslims included in the Capitulations might be called to account for any cattle, property, etc., taken during the war, whether from Christians or from Muslims who were Mudejars or who were not Mudejars. If any persons recognized objects as theirs, they were not entitled to ask for them back and indeed could be punished if they did. [S]

32. If any Moor had wounded or insulted any Christian man or woman held in captivity, no legal proceedings could be instituted against him ever. [S]

33. After the initial three-year tax holiday the Muslims would not have heavier taxes imposed on them than was just, bearing in mind value and quality. [S]

34. "The judges, *alcaldes*, and governors which their highnesses appoint in the city and region of Granada will be persons such as will honor the Moors and treat them kindly [*amorosamente*], and continue to respect these Capitulations. And if anyone should do anything which he ought not to do, their highnesses will have him moved from his post and punished." [F]

35. Neither Boabdil nor anybody else would be called to account for things done before the city surrendered. [S]

36. "No *alcaide*, squire, or servant of the King al-Zagal may hold any office or command at any time over the Moors of Granada." [F]

37. As a favor to King Abi Abdilehi and the inhabitants both men and women of Granada, the Albaicín, and other suburbs [no mention of the Alpujarras here], they would give orders for the release of all Moorish prisoners, whether male or female, without any payment at all: those in Andalusia within five months, those in Castile, eight. Within two days of the handover by the Moors of any Christian captives in Granada, their highnesses would have two hundred Moorish men and women released. "And in addition we will place at liberty Aben Adrami, who is held by Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba, and Hozmin [‘Uthmān] who is held by the count of Tendilla, and Ben Reduan, held by the count of Cabra, and Aben Mueden and the *alfaquí* Hademi’s son, all of them leading residents of Granada, also the five *escuderos* who were taken when Brahem Abencerrax [Ibrahīim Ibn Sarrāj] was defeated, if their whereabouts can be discovered." [S]

38. The Moors of the Alpujarras who had accepted vassalage would surrender all their Christian captives within two weeks for no payment. [S]

39. "Their highnesses will order that the customs of the Moors relating to inheritances will be respected, and in such matters the judges will be their own *qādīs*." [F]

40. "All Moors other than those included in this agreement who desire to enter their highnesses' service within thirty days may do so and enjoy all the benefits of it, other than the three-year period of tax exemption." [F]

41. "The pious endowments [*habices*] and the emoluments of the mosques, and the alms and other things customarily given to colleges [*madrasas*] and schools where children are taught will be the responsibility of the *alfaquíes*, to distribute them as they see fit, and their highnesses and their ministers will not interfere in this nor any aspect of it, nor will they give orders with regard to their confiscation or sequestration at any time ever in the future." [F]

42. North African ships in Granadan ports would, so long as they carried no Christian captives, be free to leave, and while in port were free from vexation and requisition of property, but they must submit to inspection on departure. [S]

43. Muslims would not be conscripted for military service against their will, and if their highnesses wished to recruit cavalry [no mention of infantry] for service in Andalusia, they would be paid from the day they left home until the date of return. [S]

44. No changes would be made in regulations affecting water courses and irrigation channels, and anybody throwing any unclean thing in a channel would be prosecuted. [S]


45. If any Moorish captive had arranged for someone else to stand as proxy for him in captivity and had then absconded, neither of them would have to pay a ransom. [S]

46. Nobody as a result of the change of sovereignty would be allowed to escape from contractual debt obligations. [S]


47. Christian slaughterhouses would be separated from Muslim ones. [S]


48. "The Jews native to Granada, Albaicín, and other suburbs, and of the Alpujarras and all other places contained in these Capitulations, will benefit from them, on condition that those who do not become Christians cross to North Africa within three years counting from December 8 of this year." [F]

"And their highnesses will give orders for the totality of the contents of these Capitulations to be observed from the day when the fortresses of Granada are surrendered onwards. To which effect they have commanded that their royal charter and deed should be signed with their names and sealed with their seal and witnessed by Hernando de Zafra their secretary, and have so done, dated in the *vega* of Granada on this 28th day of the month of November of the year of our salvation 1491." [F]



Appendix H: Order of Procession– *Día de la Hispanidad 2011*





Appendix I: Questions from *La Respuesta está en la Historia* (Canal Sur TV) series

La Respuesta está en la Historia (translated: The Answer is in the History) (Canal Sur TV, 2011), a show about the history, customs and traditions of al-Andalus

Note: Although not all of these customs can be attributed to the Andalusies, all of the answers are related to Andalusian history. For questions whose answers were related to Arabic words, the Spanish, Arabic and English translations given along with an in-depth explanation are included here (all questions are my translations)

Episode 8

1. What is the origin of the name of our land: Andalusia?
(Arab.) Tarif (from Tarifa) = (Span.) Tariq
(Eng.) Gibraltar = (Arab.) Yabaltariq (meaning: the mountain of Tariq)
2. Why did the Muslims want to conquer this land?
3. What is the origin of Islam? Islam = (Arab.) Al-Islam = (Eng.) to submit to God
4. Why do Andalusians say “ojalá”? (Span.) ojalá = (Arab.) Insh Alá (lit. if Allah wills it) = (Eng.) I hope...
5. Why is there so much Arab influence in Andalusia?
6. Why are the streets of the Andalusian historical city centres so narrow?
7. Who brought the wheelbarrow to Andalusia?
8. Why do many of our Andalusian streets have the name of trades/professions?
9. Why are Andalusians famous for being tolerant?
10. Since when have we known about contagious diseases?
11. What is the origin of the cataract operation?
12. What was the cleanest group of people in the Middle Ages?
13. Why was Cordoba so important in the history of the territory of Andalusia?
14. What was the origin of the word “*esclavo*”? (Span.) esclavo = (Arab.) esclavo = (Eng.) slave
15. Why is the flag of Andalusia green and white?
16. Why are the floors of our Andalusian houses decorated with rugs?
17. What influence does Andalusi cooking have on Andalusian gastronomy?
18. Why are meal courses served in a particular order at the table?
19. Why do we use so many spices in Andalusian cooking?
20. What is the origin of relaxing baths?
21. Since when do we use aromatic soaps?
22. What is the origin of beauty salons?
23. What is the origin of the expression “*no hay tu tía*” (meaning: ‘there is no cure/fix’, lit. ‘there is no your aunt’)?
24. Why do we use shirts (or bedshirts)? (Span.) camisa = (Arab.) qamis
25. Why is it called the Guadalquivir River? (Span.) Guadalquivir = (Arab.) Wad al kibir = (Eng.) Río Grande (meaning: Big River)
26. Why is Andalusia the only zone with Viking heritage?
27. Why do we believe that the Vikings had horns on their helmets?

Episode 9

1. Why is the Mosque of Cordoba one of the largest in the world?
2. Why did the “Middle Ages” (or the Dark Ages) not exist in Andalusia?
3. How could Andalusia come to be converted into the most cultured territory of its time with all the wars and battles?
4. What is the origin of paper?
5. What is the origin of the fountain pen?
6. What is the origin of the expression “*orientarse*” (to navigate; lit. to orient oneself)?
7. (Span.) La paz sea contigo = (Arab.) aslalamalikum = (Eng.) Peace be with you
8. Why are the windows of Andalusian houses covered in latticework?
9. Why do we whitewash the houses in Andalusia?
10. What is the origin of municipal police? (Arab.) al-shurta
11. Why do we use the expression “*ser un cafre*” (to be a savage/uncouth)? (Span.) *cafre* = (Arab.) *kafir* = (Eng.) incredulous; unbelieving
12. Why is Medina Azahara one of the most important monuments in Andalusia?
13. Why did the Caliphate of Cordoba end?
14. Why are the houses in Andalusia crowned with *azoteas*? (Span.) *azotea* = (Arab.) *assu áy a* = flat rooftop terrace (lit. plain; flatland)
15. What is the origin of typical Andalusian houses?
16. What is the origin of wells and cisterns in the houses of Andalusia? (Span.) *arriate* = (Arab.) *arriadh* (lit. the gardens) = (Eng.) space for flowers
17. Where did the word “*albañil*” come from? (Span.) *albañil* = (Arab.) *al-banní* = (Eng.) the constructor/builder
18. Why are *azulejos* so present in Andalusian houses? (Span.) *azulejo* = (Arab.) *az-zulaij* (lit. polished stone) = (Eng.) polished tiles
19. Why do Muslims consider the left hand impure?
20. What is the worst punishment for a Muslim?
21. What is the origin of sugar?
22. What is the origin of our refreshments?
23. Why can we enjoy rice today?
24. What is the origin of *ajoblanco* (a typical Andalusian cold white rice soup with garlic)?
25. (Span.) *algodón* = (Arab.) *al-qutun* = (Eng.) cotton
26. Why are there so many Arabic words in the Spanish language?
27. Why do we have pillows? (Span.) *almohada* = (Arab.) *al-mukhádda* (lit. “the cheek”)
28. Where does the word “*jarra*” come from? (Span.) *jarra* = (Arab.) *djarrah* = (Eng.) pitcher (or vessel/receptacle)
29. Has black always been the colour of mourning in Andalusia?

Episode 10

1. What are the roots of the Andalusian *copla* (folk/popular song)?
2. Since when do suburbs exist? (Span.) *arrabal* = (Arab.) *rabád*
3. What is the origin of the word “*hola*” (hello)? (Span.) *hola* = (Arab.) *wa-llah* (lit. for Allah, meaning: [Be/go] with God)

4. What is the origin of the expression “*de balde*” (to be free of charge)? (Span.) *de balde* = (Arab.) *batil* (lit. without value) = (Eng.) free
5. Why do customs (i.e. economic control of borders) exist? (Span.) *aduana* = (Arab.) *ad-diwana* (lit. house of collections) = (Eng.) customs
6. Why is the Port of Malaga one of the most important in the Mediterranean?
7. What is the origin of Almeria (the southern costal Spanish city)? (Span.) Almeria (lit. *la atalaya*) = (Arab.) *al-Mariyyāt* = (Eng.) the watchtower/vantage point
8. Why are the Alcazabas (castles) of Malaga and Almeria famous? (Span.) *alcazaba* (lit. *la ciudadela*) = (Arab.) *qasaba* = (Eng.) citadel
9. What is an alcazar? (Span.) *alcázar* (lit. *castillo*) = (Arab.) *al qasr* = (Eng.) castle
10. What is the origin of the expression “*ser una jeta*” (to be someone who is shameless, lit. to be a snout)? (Span.) *jeta* (meaning: *hocico*) = (Arab.) *jatm* = (Eng.) snout
11. What is the origin of the word “*mamarracho*”? (Span.) *mamarracho* (meaning: *bufón*) = (Arab.) *muharrayj* = (Eng.) jester/fool
12. What is the origin of “*mequetrefe*”? (Span.) *mequetrefe* (meaning: *orgullosa o petulante*) = (Arab.) *mugatraf* = (Eng.) prideful/conceited
13. What came before the GPS?
14. Why are boats steered by a rudder?
15. Why do we call a headache “*jaqueca*”? (Span.) *jaqueca* (lit. *mitad*) = (Arab.) *saquiqa* = (Eng.) half (in reference to a headache only affecting half of the brain)
16. What came before chewing gum?
17. Why do we wear vests? (Span.) *chaleco* = (Arab.) *yalika* (lit: dress coat and tails of prisoners) = (Eng.) vest
18. What is the origin of the *quejío* flamenco (a melisma typical in flamenco music)?
19. Why do we say *olé*? (Span.) *olé* = (Arab.) *Allah* = (Eng.) an expression of admiration or exclamation of excellence
20. What is the origin of decorative trimming? (Span.) *cenefa* = (Arab.) *sanifa* = (Eng.) trim/edging
21. What is the origin of the word “*talega*”? (Span.) *talega* = (Arab.) *ta’liqa* (lit. thing that hangs) = (Eng.) sack
22. Why is there a shade of red called *escarlata*? (Span.) *escarlata* = (Arab.) *escarlata* = (Eng.) scarlet (meaning: silk fabric with threads of gold)
23. What is the origin of the typical *aguadores* (water vendors) in Andalusia?
24. What is the origin of the Spanish guitar? (Span.) *guitarra* (from *quitara*) = (Arab.) *citara* (from Greek) = (Eng.) guitar
25. Has our land always produced great artists?
26. What is the origin of the cheerful/lively character of Andalusians?
27. What is the origin of the name Triana (a neighbourhood in Seville famous for being one of the birthplaces of flamenco)? (Span.) Triana = (Arab.) *Atrayana* = (Eng.) lit. “further beyond the river” (in reference to its location in Seville)
28. What brought the end to the Taifa kingdoms?

Episode 11

1. Why do we have so many water reservoirs in Andalusia? (Span.) *alberca* = (Arab.) *al birka* (lit. deposit of water) = (Eng.) water reservoir
2. Why do we use bathrooms?

3. What is the origin of the word “*chisme*”? (Span.) *chisme* = (Arab.) *yism* (lit. part of something broken) = (Eng.) thing/junk
4. Where does the word “*zurrapa*” come from? (Span.) *zurrapa* (meaning: granos de café) = (Arab.) *sûrâb* (lit. standing mud) = (Eng.) coffee grinds
5. What is the origin of falconry in Andalusia?
6. Why are there dovecotes/pigeon lofts in many Andalusian houses?
7. Where does the custom of washing our hands before meals come from?
8. How did noodles come to be a part of our cooking? (Span.) *fideo* = (Arab.) *fidear* (lit. to grow) = (Eng.) noodle
9. What is the origin of meatballs? (Span.) *albondiga* = (Arab.) *al bûnduqa* (lit. the ball) = (Eng.) meatball
10. Why do we wash our patios down with water?
11. Why are there so many jasmine trees in Andalusia?
12. What is the origin of mulberry trees in Andalusia? (silk worms feed off of mulberry trees)
13. Where does the custom of eating *leche cuajada* (curdled milk) come from?
14. Where does the banana come from?
15. What is the origin of syrups (medicine)? (Span.) *jarabe* = (Arab.) *sharab* = (Eng.) syrup
16. What is the origin of Andalusian filigree (finely elaborated precious metals)?
17. Why are children taller today?
18. Why do we use clay recipient (with two openings) in Andalusia?
19. Why do we use clay utensils in the kitchen?
20. What products are never lacking in our pantry?
21. Why do we have the custom of going to the market in Andalusia? (Span.) *zoco* = (Arab.) *zuq* = (Eng.) market
22. Why do we drink camomile infusions?
23. What is the origin of leather craftsmanship?
24. What is the origin of the perfumes that we use in Andalusia?
25. Since when do perfumes contain alcohol? (Span.) *alcohol* = (Arab.) *al-khol* (lit. vaporous spirit) = (Eng.) alcohol
26. What is the origin of sorbet? (Span.) *sorbete* = (Arab.) *sarap* (lit. drink) = (Eng.) sorbet
27. Why is the silk of al-Andalus so famous?

Episode 12

1. Why is the Giralda one of the most famous monuments in the world?
2. Why is the Giralda called “Giralda”?
3. What is the origin of stewardesses? (Span.) *azafata* = (Arab.) *as-safât* (lit. basket) = (Eng.) [flight] attendant
4. Why is Navas de Tolosa one of the most emblematic places in Andalusia and Spain?
5. Why do we call Muslim peoples *moro*? (Spain) *moro* = (Arab.) *maurus* (meaning: dark skinned) = (Eng.) Moor
6. Why do we have so many castles in our land?
7. Since when has the name Andalusia existed?
8. Why is the famous *Torre de Oro* (in Seville) called the Tower of Gold?

9. What is the origin of honeymoons?
10. (Span.) chulo = (Arab.) shûl (lit. agile/flexible and handy/prepared) = (Eng.) arrogant
11. (Span.) gili (de gilipollas) = (Arab.) yahil (meaning: uncultured) = (Eng.) a shortform of the word for idiotic/foolish/asshole
12. Why do the names of some towns in Andalusia end in “*de la Frontera*” (of the border)?
13. What is the origin of our neighbour Portugal?
14. What is the origin of gunpowder?
15. Why in Andalusia do we eat *torrijas* (French toast)? (Span.) torrija = (Arab.) zalabiyya
16. Why do we eat hard boiled or soft-boiled eggs in Andalusia?
17. What is the origin of cinnamon?
18. Why do we put alhucema (lavender) in the brazier to perfume the surroundings?
19. What is the origin of the bathrobe? (Span.) albornoz = (Arab.) al-burnus (lit. hood)
20. Why are *churros* so popular in Andalusia?
21. What is the origin of coffee? (Span.) café = (Arab.) al-qahwa (lit. invigorating)
22. What is the origin of the profession of translator?
23. Why do we speak Castilian Spanish in Andalusia?
24. Why do many Andalusians *sesear* or *cecear*? *sesear* – to pronounce *c*, *s* or *z* as /s/; *cecear* – to pronounce the *c* or *z* (and in some places *s*) as *th* or /θ/
25. Why are there neighbourhoods that are called *juderías* (Jewish Quarters) in many cities?
26. Why are there so many shrines in Andalusia?
27. Why do so many Andalusians walk the Camino de Santiago (St. James Way)?
28. Why is it said that the bells of the Cathedral of St. James (Santiago de Compostela in Galicia) were Muslim?

Episode 13

1. Why are there so many orange trees in Andalusia?
2. Who can we thank for our wonderful Mediterranean diet?
3. Why are there so many waterwheels in Andalusia? (Span.) noria = (Arab.) al-naura (lit. she that cries) = (Eng.) waterwheel
4. Why do irrigated crops exist in Andalusia? (Span.) acequia = (Arab.) sāquiya (lit. watering) = (Eng.) irrigation channels
5. What is the origin of many of the pastries in Andalusia?
6. What is the origin of *turrón* (nougat)?
7. What is the origin of *alfajores* (a pastry made out of almonds)?
8. Why is the Alhambra named what it is named? (Arab.) Al-hanra (lit. the red)
9. (Span.) Albaicín (lit. neighbourhood of the slopes/hills)
10. When did we start using the word “*jamacuco*”? (Span.) [nos va a dar un] *jamacuco* = (Arab.) *zamacuco* (meaning: dizziness that drunkenness produces) = (Eng.) [we’re going to] faint
11. Why is plasterwork used in the houses of Andalusia?
12. What is the origin of (artistic) wooden ceilings?

13. What is the origin of the expression “*ser un cazurro*” (someone who speaks very little, is always around but acts with suspicion and astuteness for his own benefit)? (Span.) *cazurro* = (Arab.) *qadur* (lit. unsociable) = (Eng.) slow witted
14. Why are the numbers we use today the way they are?
15. Since when did the number zero exist?
16. Why do we say that someone is an *alcahuete*? (Span.) *alcahuete* = (Arab.) *al-qawwad* (meaning: someone that eases romantic (usually illicit) encounters for others) = (Eng.) busybody, gossip
17. What is the origin of pharmacies?
18. Why are the Catholic Monarchs buried in Granada?
19. What happened to the rest of the Andalusies?
20. What is the origin of many Andalusian last names?
21. Who are the *moriscos*?
22. Why do we say *fulano* and *mengano*? (Span.) *fulano* = (Arab.) *fulan* (lit. that guy) = (Eng.) whatshisname or (Span.) *mengano* = (Arab.) *man kan* (lit. whomever) = (Eng.) so-and-so
23. Why do we say “*no hay moros en la costa*” (lit. there aren’t Moors on the coast; meaning: there isn’t any danger in sight)?
24. Why do we celebrate the festival of Corpus (Christi)?
25. Is there Moorish blood running through our veins?
26. Why is Spain the country that it is?
27. What is the event that ended the Middle Ages?

Appendix J: Letter of Consent 2011-2012

Investigadora del estudio: Elaine McIlwraith
 (“*e-mail address*”, “*telephone number*”)

Directora: Dr. Randa Farah
 (“*e-mail address*”, “*telephone number*”)

Soy una estudiante doctoral en The University of Western Ontario (Canadá) y le invito a que participe en un estudio sobre la memoria y las narrativas históricas. La intención de esta carta es proporcionarle la información necesaria para que usted decida su participación en este estudio. El propósito de este proyecto es adquirir un mejor conocimiento de cómo la gente se acuerda, relata y emplea el pasado en la vida corriente, en particular de qué han aprendido y se acuerdan los españoles sobre la época de Al Ándalus. La información que estoy recogiendo es para mi tesis doctoral. Para participar en esta investigación, se tiene que ser español y ha vivido en Andalucía toda su vida.

Si usted consiente en participar, le pediré que pase usted tiempo conmigo hablando de lo que se acuerda de la historia de Al Ándalus, qué significa esta historia para su identidad como un/a español/a y como un/a andaluz/a y sus pensamientos sobre varios aspectos y vestigios de este periodo de la historia. Es posible que le pida también compartir la historia de tu vida y sus recuerdos de ciertos eventos de su pasado. También podríamos pasar tiempo visitando a ciertos monumentos como la Alhambra. Finalmente me gustaría saber sus pensamientos sobre ciertos temas corrientes como la inmigración. Si se siente cómodo, sus respuestas serán grabadas junto con apuntes escritos por mi, la investigadora del estudio, para asegurar claridad y exactitud. Se puede pedir que apague yo la grabadora en cualquier momento durante la entrevista. Las entrevistas tienen una duración entre una hasta tres horas dependiendo de la cantidad de información quiere compartir. Se las llevará a cabo en un sitio escogido por usted en que esté cómodo.

La participación es completamente voluntaria y no hay compensación por su participación. Además, usted puede negarse a participar, a responder cualquier pregunta o incluso renunciar a participar en la investigación en cualquier etapa de ella. No obstante, si usted decide renunciar la información proporcionada puede ser utilizada por mi o, en su defecto, puede solicitar que ésta sea completamente eliminada. Los participantes en este estudio no corren riesgos de ningún tipo, ni de salud mental ni de seguridad física.

No se sacará provecho de la participación en este estudio. Si le interesa, le proporcionaré un resumen de los resultados. Por favor, deje su nombre y dirección conmigo.

El archivo de sus respuestas serán debidamente guardados y asegurados en un armario en un sitio seguro, posteriormente los datos serán completamente eliminados (después de un tiempo apropiado si no son necesarios por estudios futuros). La única

persona que tendrá acceso a la información seré yo, la investigadora del proyecto (Elaine McIlwraith).

Los resultados de dicho estudio serán discutidos en la tesis doctoral o en publicaciones posteriores. En ningún caso aparecerá su nombre o dato alguno que revele su identidad. Toda la información que usted da será completamente confidencial. Su confidencialidad será mantenida durante el proceso completo de la investigación. No se renuncia ningunos derechos legales con la firma de este formulario.

Si usted tiene cualquier pregunta sobre el estudio, me puede contactar a mí, Elaine McIlwraith (“*e-mail address*” o al “*telephone number*”) o a mi directora de tesis, Randa Farah (“*e-mail address*” o al “*telephone number*”). Si tiene alguna pregunta o duda sobre sus derechos como participante puede contactar a la Oficina de Ética de la Investigación en The University of Western Ontario: “*telephone number*” o “*e-mail address*”.

Formulario de permiso

He leído la Carta de información y acepto participar voluntariamente en este estudio. Se ha respondido a todas mis preguntas.

Fecha: _____

Firma del participante del estudio:

Nombre del participante (escrito en letra de molde):

Firma de la persona que obtiene el permiso:

Nombre de la persona que obtiene el permiso (escrito en letra de molde):

Appendix K: Letter of Consent 2013

Investigadora del estudio: Elaine McIlwraith
(“*e-mail address*”, “*telephone number*”)

Asesora: Dr. Randa Farah
(“*e-mail address*”, “*telephone number*”)

Soy una estudiante doctoral en The University of Western Ontario (Canadá) y le invito a que participe en un estudio sobre la memoria y las narrativas históricas. La intención de esta carta es proporcionarle la información necesaria para que usted decida su participación en este estudio. El propósito de este proyecto es adquirir un mejor conocimiento de cómo la gente se acuerda, relata y emplea el pasado en la vida corriente, en particular de qué han aprendido y se acuerdan los españoles sobre la época de Al Ándalus. La información que estoy recogiendo es para mi tesis doctoral. Para participar en esta investigación, se tiene que ser español y ha vivido en Andalucía toda su vida.

Si usted consiente en participar, le pediré que pase usted tiempo conmigo hablando de lo que se acuerda de la historia de Al Ándalus, qué significa esta historia para su identidad como un/a español/a y como un/a andaluz/a y sus pensamientos sobre varios aspectos y vestigios de este periodo de la historia. Es posible que le pida también compartir la historia de tu vida y sus recuerdos de ciertos eventos de su pasado. También podríamos pasar tiempo visitando a ciertos monumentos como la Alhambra. Finalmente me gustaría saber sus pensamientos sobre ciertos temas corrientes como la inmigración. Si se siente cómodo, sus respuestas serán grabadas junto con apuntes escritos por mi, la investigadora del estudio, para asegurar claridad y exactitud. Se puede pedir que apague yo la grabadora en cualquier momento durante la entrevista. Las entrevistas tienen una duración entre una hasta tres horas dependiendo de la cantidad de información quiere compartir. Se las llevará a cabo en un sitio escogido por usted en que esté cómodo.

La participación es completamente voluntaria y no hay compensación por su participación. Además, usted puede negarse a participar, a responder cualquier pregunta o incluso renunciar a participar en la investigación en cualquier etapa de ella. No obstante, si usted decide renunciar la información proporcionada puede ser utilizada por mi o, en su defecto, puede solicitar que ésta sea completamente eliminada. Los participantes en este estudio no corren riesgos de ningún tipo, ni de salud mental ni de seguridad física.

No se sacará provecho de la participación en este estudio. Si le interesa, le proporcionaré un resumen de los resultados. Por favor, deje su nombre y dirección conmigo.

El archivo de sus respuestas serán debidamente guardados y asegurados en un armario en un sitio seguro, posteriormente los datos serán completamente eliminados (después de un tiempo apropiado si no son necesarios por estudios futuros). La única

persona que tendrá acceso a la información seré yo, la investigadora del proyecto (Elaine McIlwraith).

Los resultados de dicho estudio serán discutidos en la tesis doctoral o en publicaciones posteriores. En ningún caso aparecerá su nombre o dato alguno que revele su identidad. Toda la información que usted da será completamente confidencial. Su confidencialidad será mantenida durante el proceso completo de la investigación. No se renuncia ningunos derechos legales con la firma de este formulario.

Si usted tiene cualquier pregunta sobre el estudio, me puede contactar a mí, Elaine McIlwraith (“*e-mail address*” o al “*telephone number*”) o a mi directora de tesis, Randa Farah (“*e-mail address*” o al “*telephone number*”). Si tiene alguna pregunta o duda sobre sus derechos como participante puede contactar a la Oficina de Ética de la Investigación en The University of Western Ontario: “*telephone number*” o “*e-mail address*”.

Formulario de permiso

He leído la Carta de información y acepto participar voluntariamente en este estudio. Se ha respondido a todas mis preguntas.

Fecha: _____


Firma del participante del estudio: _____

Nombre del participante (escrito en mayúsculas): _____

Firma de la persona que obtiene el permiso: _____

Nombre de la persona que obtiene el permiso (escrito en mayúsculas):

Appendix L: Letter of Ethics Approval 2011-2012



Use of Human Participants - Ethics Approval Notice

Principal Investigator: Dr. Randa Farah
Review Number: 18257S
Review Level: Full Board
Approved Local Adult Participants: 0
Approved Local Minor Participants: 0
Protocol Title: "Restoring" Historical Memory: Challenging national identity through changes to regional narratives
Department & Institution: Anthropology, University of Western Ontario
Sponsor: Ontario Graduate Scholarship

Ethics Approval Date: July 29, 2011

Expiry Date: September 30, 2012

Documents Reviewed & Approved & Documents Received for Information:

Document Name	Comments	Version Date
UWO Protocol		
Letter of Information & Consent	Spanish	
Letter of Information & Consent	English Translation	

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above named research study on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information. If you require an updated approval notice prior to that time you must request it using the UWO Updated Approval Request Form.

Members of the NMREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussions related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

The Chair of the NMREB is Dr. Riley Hinson. The UWO NMREB is registered with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB 00000941.

Signature

Ethics Officer to Contact for Further Information

Grace Kelly	Janice Sutherland
-------------	-------------------

This is an official document. Please retain the original in your files.

The University of Western Ontario
Office of Research Ethics

• London, Ontario • CANADA

PH:

• F:

• www.uwo.ca/research/ethics

Appendix M: Letter of Ethics Approval 2013



**Western
Research**

Research Ethics

Use of Human Participants - Ethics Approval Notice

Principal Investigator: Dr. Randa Farah
 File Number: 100976
 Review Level: Delegated
 Approved Local Adult Participants: 0
 Approved Local Minor Participants: 0
 Protocol Title: "Restoring" Historical Memory: Challenging national identity through changes to regional narratives
 18257S
 Department & Institution: Social Science/Anthropology, Western University
 Sponsor: Ontario Graduate Scholarship

Ethics Approval Date: February 07, 2013 Expiry Date: June 30, 2013

Documents Reviewed & Approved & Documents Received for Information:

Document Name	Comments	Version Date
Revised Letter of Information & Consent	Changes made to Letter of Consent (only include correction of spelling and changes in the Spanish translation to include more commonly used terms in Spain)	
Revised Study End Date	Investigator would like to extend this ethics approval to include the dates February 1, 2013 (returning to the field this day) to June 30th, 2013. Please note, no research has been done since the original end date of the initial approval (i.e. from September 2012 to January 2013)	

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above referenced revision(s) or amendment(s) on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information.

Members of the NMREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussions related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

The Chair of the NMREB is Dr. Riley Hinson. The NMREB is registered with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB 00000941.

Signature

Ethics Officer to Contact for Further Information

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Grace Kelly	<input type="checkbox"/> Janice Sutherland
---	--

This is an official document. Please retain the original in your files.

Curriculum Vitae

Name: K. Elaine McIlwraith

Post-secondary Education and Degrees: University of Guelph
Department of Modern Languages (Spanish Studies)
Guelph, Ontario, Canada
1998-2003 B.A.

The University of Western Ontario
Department of Modern Languages (Hispanic Linguistics)
London, Ontario, Canada
2005-2007 M.A.

The University of Western Ontario
Department of Anthropology (Sociocultural)
London, Ontario, Canada
2009-2018 Ph.D.

Honours and Awards: Regna Darnell Graduate Award
2013

Ontario Graduate Scholarship (OGS)
Doctoral Fellowship
2011-2012

Related Work Experience: Graduate Research Assistantship: “The Sahara Project”
The University of Western Ontario
2011

Teaching Assistant: Cultures of the Middle East
The University of Western Ontario
2012, 2010, 2009

Teaching Assistant: Nature in the City
The University of Western Ontario
2010

Field Research: Andalusia (Spain)
2013 (6 months)

Andalusia (Spain)
2011-2012 (one year)

Andalusia (Spain), Morocco & London (England)
2010 (5 weeks)

Service:

Reviewer, The University of Western Ontario Journal of
Anthropology
UWOJA: 2016, TOTEM: 2011-2015

Western Anthropology Graduate Society Executive Committee
2011-2012, 2010-2011