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# The Rise of American Extremism: An Exploratory Analysis of American Religious and Political Extremism from Presidents Jimmy Carter to Barack Obama: 1977-2016

Alwyn J. Melton

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The Rise of American Extremism: An Exploratory Analysis of American Religious and  
Political Extremism from Presidents Jimmy Carter to Barack Obama: 1977-2016

by

Alwyn J. Melton

A Dissertation Presented to the  
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences of Nova Southeastern University  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

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**Nova Southeastern University**  
**College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences**

This dissertation was submitted by Alwyn J. Melton under the direction of the chair of the dissertation committee listed below. It was submitted to the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences and approved in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University.

**Approved:**

**October 22, 2018**

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Date of Defense



\_\_\_\_\_  
Jason Campbell, Ph.D.  
Chair




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Gregory Vecchi, Ph.D.



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Neil Katz, Ph.D.

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Jason Campbell, Ph.D.  
Chair

## Dedication

I dedicate this paper to my grandmother, my mother and my family. There is an old adage that states “Behind every great man is a great woman” and my grandmother, Dorothy Jean Deleveaux and my mother, Phyllis A. Melton, were living testaments to the truth of this statement. From the time I was young man until the day she passed away, my grandmother stressed the importance of education and learning. She would always quip, “Learn all you can, whenever you can, regardless if the situation is positive or negative. Boy, don’t just live life! Learn life!” Although my grandmother had a second-grade formal education, she read the newspaper intently every day, stayed abreast of current events, and prided herself on learning. In times when I decided to quit, she would not hear of it and forced me to continue by encouraging me that I could do anything if I put my mind to it and its okay to “give out, but never give up.” In her 60s, she decided to enroll in school, attain her GED and went on to become a nursing assistant, graduating at the top of her class. Her resiliency inspired me to pursue advanced degrees. If my grandmother was the inspiration, my mother, was the consummate teacher. She laid the foundation. Because of my mother’s persistence and insistence, I excelled in reading, writing, and spelling. She would read to me just about every night. As I got older, she would make me read every day. Her dedication to my education is and will always be a testament to my academic and professional achievements. I also would like to dedicate this paper to my daughter Melissa and my wife Doris. I have always stressed to my daughter the importance of hard work and expressed to her that education and learning “levels the playing field” because the opportunity is available to those who diligently

pursue its benefits. My pursuit of a doctoral degree caused us to miss many weekends and quite a few family nights. Now that my journey is finally complete, I look forward to spending more time with my family, doing more in my community, and being more involved in my church. To my wife Doris, I say your support and confidence in me throughout this process helped me immensely. My father, who taught me the value and importance of critical thinking, was instrumental in my life. He taught me the value of character and integrity. More importantly, he taught me many life lessons, most important was never to seek validation in people or “things.” I can honestly say that my father’s guidance was equally instrumental in providing me the confidence to achieve anything I set my mind to by making every interaction a teachable moment.

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## List of Abbreviations

RCSI	random criminal shooting incident
TER	terrorist attack
THW	thwarted terrorist attack
left	left-wing
mil	militant
natl	nationalist
pol	political
rel	religious
right	right-wing

## Abstract

The purpose of this quantitative case study was to address the problem of domestic terrorism facing the United States. This concern led to a comprehensive examination of historical documents that focused on the temporal evolution of the problem beginning with the Carter administration and continuing through the Obama administration. The conceptual foundation centered on resolving the research question and validating three hypotheses directed at qualifying the escalation of domestic incidents of terrorism. This led to developing a behavioral model to assist law enforcement agencies in combating the issue of domestic terrorism. Bivariate and clustering statistical analysis validated the data while qualifying the demographics of the various typologies of U.S. domestic terrorists. The use of case study analysis, which drew on historical documents for evidence, considered the evolution of various groups, motivations, their ideologies, and goals. These variables were compared to successes and failures of relevant federal policies. The lack of understanding and oversight that led to an escalation of the number of incidents was also evaluated. Using ethical and scientific guidelines and protocols, the study's findings promote the need for future research and highlight the dangers of repeating the past. By developing a behavioral model, this study gives law enforcement a valuable tool for resolving domestic terrorism. Additional considerations relate to future policy implications and the course of future research.



## Chapter 1: Introduction

*“Surprise! When it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he’ll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of it. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion—which is usually too late (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical backgrounds to tip us off to the climax). Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck. The results of Pearl Harbor were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was the cumulative, wide-spread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government’s (or in an alliance’s) failure to anticipate effectively.”* -Thomas C. Schelling, Forward to

Pearl Harbor; Warning and Decision by Roberta Wohlstetter

*“There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by*

*infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him...It preys on unrest...*” - John F. Kennedy, Address to the Graduating Class, US Naval Academy, 6 June 1962

In 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano released a report titled, *Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment* (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The report warned that Lone Wolf terrorists, Right-Wing extremists, White supremacists, Sovereign Citizens and disgruntled military veterans were potential terrorist threats and their anger was possibly being fueled by the economic recession, unemployment, the inability to obtain credit, and the election of the first African-American president (DHS, 2009). The report sparked outrage among several Republicans in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.

Then House Minority Leader Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), sharply criticized the DHS Secretary saying that her Department was not focusing on the real threats the United States faces:

[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security owes the American people an explanation for why she has abandoned using the term ‘terrorist’ to describe those, such as al Qaeda, who are plotting overseas to kill innocent Americans, while her own Department is using the same term to describe American citizens who disagree with the direction Washington Democrats are taking our nation. Everyone agrees that the Department should be focused on protecting America, but using such broad-based generalizations about the American people is simply outrageous. (Mehta, 2011)

U.S. Congressman Bennie Thompson of Mississippi, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, said in a letter to Ms. Napolitano that he was “dumbfounded” that such a report would be issued and “This report appears to raise significant issues involving the privacy and civil liberties of many Americans - including war veterans” (Lake & Hudson, p.1, 2009). Napolitano, under intense criticism from both Democrats and Republicans issued the following statement in defense of the agency’s report:

Let me be very clear: we monitor the risks of violent extremism taking root here in the United States," Napolitano said in a written statement issued by her department. "We don't have the luxury of focusing our efforts on one group; we must protect the country from terrorism whether foreign or homegrown, and regardless of the ideology that motivates its violence..... We are on the lookout for criminal and terrorist activity but we do not -- nor will we ever -- monitor ideology or political beliefs," Napolitano said in the statement. "We take seriously our responsibility to protect the civil rights and liberties of the American people, including subjecting our activities to rigorous oversight from numerous internal and external sources. (O'Keefe, 2009)

Despite her statements explaining her position on the DHS report, the criticism was relentless. Republicans accused Napolitano of offending the American people especially those military veterans who served their nation. While some Republicans demanded an apology, others demanded that she be fired. The polarization of the issue became so contentious that Napolitano issued a statement apologizing to all military veterans. This was unfortunate because it deflected from the real issues and concerns of the report, which was ultimately to assist law enforcement in keeping all Americans safe.

Moreover, under President George W. Bush, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued a report entitled, *White Supremacist Recruitment of Military Personnel since 9/11* (7 July 2008). Ironically, this report went virtually unnoticed by right-wing conservatives because the strategy was to contest “all things Obama.” The political partisanship diluted the seriousness of the threat and unfortunately, based on historical evidence, when the anger manifests itself into violence, the innocent become the casualties of political gamesmanship. On January 08, 2011, anti-government extremist Jared Lee Loughner shot and injured 19 people including U.S. Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, and murdered another six people, including Chief U.S. District Court Judge John Roll (Orr, 2013).

This phenomenon of politicizing and ignoring domestic terror warnings is not a new phenomenon. According to Aaron Winter (2010), a senior lecturer in criminology and criminal justice, it can almost be expected. Winter wrote:

Throughout American history, both terrorism and extremism have been constructed, evoked or ignored strategically by the state, media and public at different points, in order to disown and demonize political movements whenever their ideologies and objectives become problematic or inconvenient – because they overlap with, and thus compromise, the legitimacy of the dominant ideology and democratic credentials of the state, because they conflict with the dominant ideology or hegemonic order, because they offend the general (voting) public, or because they expose the fallacies of national unity and bi-polar opposition in the face of foreign enemies or international conflicts, such as the war on terror (p. 156)

This scientific research study into U.S. domestic terrorism focuses on the temporal nature of domestic terrorism as a criminal phenomenon. In addition, it accounts for a wide variety of social influences and variables. Using an enhanced mixed-methodology, it connected past and current domestic terrorism events and offered depth and scope to the research. The research established its foundation on the potential causes associated with domestic terrorism and highlighted individual and organizational causes. What is presented is a research opportunity to draw on the past, prevent future attacks, and empower law enforcement with the tools to move beyond reactive ideologies and positions.

For purposes of clarity and the direction of this study, the link between international and domestic terrorism goals is acknowledged. However, what is essential is understanding that domestic terrorists are an internal threat to the United States; they operate from an agenda that does not include international funding, mandates, messages, or goals. Centralizing the problem as domestic, President Ronald Reagan, in his 1981 Inaugural Address stated that, “government is not the solution to our problems, it is the problem” (Stoken, 2004). To promote their ideology, domestic terror groups determined that our government and its leaders are evil by their own acknowledgment, thus allowing self-justified actions to support what they perceive as a positive end. As a result, the U.S. domestic terrorist is unique, having turned his or her back on society to pursue its destruction. Thus, they present a clear and present danger, requiring ongoing evaluation and study (Borucki, 2014).

## Statement of the Problem

The United States of America came into existence from acts of domestic terrorism that would later be hailed as acts of patriotism because Americans decided rebellion was the most effective action to free them from tyrannical leadership by the British. Citizens felt it necessary to engage in civil disobedience (e.g., the Boston Tea Party, the founding of the Sons of Liberty, and Massachusetts's social elite) to provoke a revolution that would dismantle the heavy-handed social construct of totalitarian rule. Although these actions seemed reasonable under the circumstances, in 18<sup>th</sup> century society, these groups and acts would be classified as terroristic.

As a nation that is predicated on free speech and democratic principles that call individuals to action if they believe their government is operating contrary to the will of the people, determining who is a terrorist or freedom fighter ultimately rests in the mind of the individual and society. While the birth of the United States provides a starting point, the focus of this research will be on the growth of American extremism between 1977 and 2015; that is beginning with the administration of former President Jimmy Carter and ending with the term of President Barack Obama.

In reviewing this period, my inquiry discovered a lack of current research focusing on domestic terrorism as a criminal phenomenon, which subsequently created gaps in the research that this study will attempt to fill by addressing emerging issues and problems. Timothy McVeigh and his bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (1995), the Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta (1996), and the shooting at Knoxville's Unitarian Universalist Church (2008) are examples that highlight sustained domestic terrorist assaults in the United States (Weiner, 2012).

In his research, terrorism expert Alberto Abadie (2006) notes that while international terrorist attacks has been the primary focus of the American media and its elected officials, statistically, domestic terrorism presented the greatest threat towards government facilities and public spaces. During the period 1998–2005, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism dataset recorded 26,445 fatalities, but only 6447 resulted from international terrorism, of which more than 3000 were due to the 9/11 attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 447).

A scientific assessment of these and other events will highlight the realities of the domestic terrorist beyond media sensationalism and address the true nature of these individuals. Currently, the domestic terrorist is identified as evil, destructive, and remains hidden within U.S. society. By responding to the misinformation about domestic terrorists, problems associated with identifying domestic terrorist groups are resolved, thereby elevating the awareness of both law enforcement and society through empirical study, and thereby assist in preventing future tragedies.

### **Purpose of the Study**

On October 12, 2001, while providing testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, terrorism experts Zoe Budinger and Jeffrey Smith provided the committee with this observation:

The attacks on 9/11 showed all of us that the Cold War “need to know” system for managing classified and sensitive information drove a culture of information security that resulted in countless stovepipes and secretive pockets of the nation’s most valuable information. It may have worked in the Cold War, but it was not adequate to keep America safe in a world of asymmetric threats. Many realized that protecting America in

this new threat environment would require the government to operate in an entirely new way (p. 1).

Domestic terrorism and its perpetrators remain in the consciousness of America, the distinction between various groups, their goals, and their methods of operation remain unclear. The purpose of the research is to assist law enforcement in destabilizing domestic terror cells by understanding their motivations for engaging in terroristic activity. In addition, this study will show that from 1977-2001 (pre-9/11), every president since Jimmy Carter failed to develop a comprehensive domestic counter-terrorism strategy. The only constant under each president during this period was their commitment to fighting international and transnational terrorism.

The recurrence of domestic terrorism events support the notion that this phenomenon is escalating, and there is a need for ongoing study to ensure current and relevant responses that minimize organizational growth and capacity to inflict damage on U.S. citizens. To achieve this goal, correlations were drawn between incidence of domestic terrorism and changes within the economy, political climate, and influences related to religious faith. Defining key variables that underlie this research study allows for developing models, which can assist law enforcement in their approaches to combating domestic terrorism. These models considered social, political, and environmental contexts that influence individuals and organizations, drawing the domestic terrorist out of the darkness and subjecting him or her to intensive scrutiny that could ultimately save the lives of citizens.



### **Importance of the Study**

The importance of studying past and contemporary domestic terrorist groups and their actions, is to aid in developing methods to thwart their attacks, which are presented as outcomes in the conclusion of this study. A mixed-method approach that uses case study analysis and bivariate correlations of quantitative data, makes this research unique, as previous researchers used a single methodology. With emerging technology reshaping society and education, the ability to conduct detailed analyses of statistical trends that consider key demographic variables provided hard data and evidence. This evidence, drawn from multiple sources and evaluated in dynamic scientific approaches, supported creating profiles, which could assist law enforcement. By creating a valid and reliable study, which promotes outcomes that can be generalized and replicated in future studies, this research can serve as a foundation and benchmark for further studies examining this social phenomenon to promote positive social change (Yin, 2012).

### **Definition of Terms**

***Anti-terrorism.*** According to Joint Publication 3-07.2 (2010), anti-terrorism is defined as defensive measures strategically used to minimize the vulnerability to the U.S. citizens, allies, and property from terrorist acts, to— including rapid containment by local, state, federal, military, and civilian forces.

***Counterterrorism.*** The FBI (1999) defined counter-terrorism as activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists, and their organizations and networks, in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.

***Domestic terrorism.*** According to the FBI (1999) and for the purposes of this paper, domestic terrorism is dangerous acts to human life that violate federal and/or state law and are designed to intimidate or coerce the U.S. civilian population; influence the state/federal policy of a U.S. government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the conduct of the government by engaging in guerilla tactics that involve mass destruction, assassination(s), or kidnapping(s).

***Homegrown Terrorist.*** The *Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007* defines homegrown terrorism as the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual, born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States, if its purpose is to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

***Patriot Act.*** Section 802 of the *U.S.A. PATRIOT Act* (Public Law No. 107-52) was expanded to include acts covering “domestic” (as opposed to “international” terrorism) post 9/11. The act allows for expanding the earlier definition of terrorism to include that any act dangerous to human life can be considered domestic terrorism.

***Propaganda.*** Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, that is used to promote or publicize a particular political cause or point-of-view. The use of social media outlets such as *YouTube* has become a popular tool by which domestic terrorists support their causes.

***Terrorism.*** Terrorism, as defined in the Code of Regulation (28 C.F.R., Section 0.85), is act driven by political violence that is designed to induce terror and psychological fear through violent victimization and destruction of non-combatant

targets. The purpose of terror is to send a message by exploiting the media in an effort to obtain maximum publicity coverage.

### **Characteristics of Domestic Terrorism**

As policy makers, law enforcement officials, and terrorism experts seek to identify specific internal characteristics and conditions that might make countries such as the United States more likely to experience domestic terrorism on its soil, The notable increase in empirical research on the causes associated with terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks is noted. The completion of these studies is essential to not only educate counter-terrorism policy makers, but the general public must also be informed as to emerging patterns that terrorists use in qualifying the use of violence as a domestic weapon (Abadie, 2014).

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush, politicians, world leaders, and terrorism experts immediately hypothesized that the motive for the attack was economic disparity. They argued the following point:

Why else would the attacks be directed toward New York City, the financial capital of the world, and the World Trade Center the symbolism of capitalism and international commerce unless economic depravity was the root cause?

In a speech given in Monterrey, Mexico, on March 22, 2002, President George W. Bush stated, “we fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (Bush, 2002). This was a provocative statement; given the time, right-wing extremist ideologues were searching for answers and more importantly, a scapegoat to justify their anger and overt bigotry. While the comments on the relationship between poverty and terrorism make sense intuitively, what can result are anger and grievances—leading to a sense of

hopelessness that some domestic terrorist organizations used for their benefit (Frey, 2004).

The empirical evidence from studies focusing on democracy and terrorism generally failed to validate the idea that promoting democracy was an antidote to terrorism. While numerous researchers concluded that democracies do not experience fewer domestic terrorist attacks or produce fewer terrorists, there are some studies showing that political participation is a way to reduce domestic terrorism. Though research in this area continues to find interconnections and divergences, with discussions in some empirical studies offering that recent democracies are at a higher risk of domestic terrorist activities than more established democracies such as the U.S., there is nonetheless a need to continue to seek unifying variables to assist all democratic, and even non-democratic, nations in preventing domestic terrorist attacks (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

Though democracy is not a complete remedy for terrorism, what appears to be central to reducing domestic terrorist threats is protecting and preserving human rights. Countries whose governments choose to abuse citizen rights can expect elevated attacks, leading to government responses, and thus creating a destructive cycle. To reduce human rights violations, which often occur in crackdowns against protesters who are affiliated with organizations that covertly support political violence, escalating confrontations that lead to violence should be avoided. This can defuse potentially explosive situations.

The U.S. created programs of torturing confirmed and suspected terrorists, after 9/11, and did not allow constitutional rights for foreign nationals who committed acts of terror on U.S. soil. These techniques likely diminished the government's ability to act as

a positive role model. By not protecting the human rights of even the worst offenders of domestic terror, the United States may have taken retribution, but when the offenses came to light, the government's standing as a beacon around which citizens could rally in denouncing terror was diminished (Frey, 2004).

Additional recurring findings in the literature relate to countries where ethnic and/or religious minorities occupy a lower status in society. Such groups are more likely to experience and engage in terrorism. This is most notable when the disenfranchised groups also experience significant economic discrimination and/or are excluded from political power and are unable to promote change in society. Exclusion and discrimination leads to grievances by these groups against the government, and makes them more likely to challenge the majority population, and the status quo.

In these scenarios, the lack of social integration routinely hinders government attempts to elicit cooperation from members of minority groups. Lack of cooperation and cohesion promotes the alienation of these groups, and leads to them identifying with domestic terrorist groups, thus generating the worst possible outcomes (Claude, 2007).

### **Potential Causes of Domestic Terrorism**

According to Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab (1970), right-wing extremism is the "politics of backlash" that evolves in response to economic and social changes, which will ultimately result in "the displacement of some population groups from former positions of dominance" (Martin et al., p. 3., 1970). Although empirical research supports this analysis, it must be noted that the potential causes of domestic terrorism can be attributed to numerous variables related to individual and/or organizational perceptions. These variables can lead individuals beyond rational thought and into overt and/or covert

dissent, validated by criminal acts of defiance, which can be connected to the following: religious ideology, government positions or actions which the individual views as contrary, racist, or affecting socio-economic status, and/or environmental conditions. These variables routinely occur together and create convergences that further dilute the reasons that may have caused an individual or organization to move in open defiance of the government and engage in criminal activity. When analyzing the causes of terrorism, law enforcement and policy makers must exercise academic caution and not use poverty as the primary metric in determining terrorists acts. Terrorism expert, Jeff Victoroff (2003) conducted an extensive study and found that many terrorists were not the stereotypical young and uneducated. In fact, his study uncovered that in the late 1990s, terrorists were a very diverse. Some were professionals, college students, married, and some were even older men well into their forties.

This study sought to understand the evolution of domestic terrorists, and the changes in their perceptions, positions, and ideologies regarding society. In addition, the study also considered the legitimacy of the primary perceptions of terrorists who are U.S. citizens through historical examination and by conducting psychological and sociological assessments of the individuals and their motivations (Schuck, 2011).

### **Encouraging Extremism**

When examining the alignment of the research variables historically, while accounting for external sources that motivate individuals or groups to engage in extremist action, as a researcher, you must first move beyond the simplistic narrative of extremists merely being disgruntled, xenophobic, racist, or politically partisan without justification. For example, in the book, *The Politics of Terrorism*, Brannan (2006) posited that right-

wing extremists who subscribe to a *seed-line* theology wholeheartedly believe that non-Whites deserve enslavement, expulsion, or even death if Whites are to stave off the “left-wing’s” socially manufactured plot to force them into the abyss of extinction. Their justification and absolution are rooted, according to their interpretation, in the Holy Bible, which, according the right-wing extremists is just as important or superior to the U.S. Constitution. But religion does not hold a monopoly on agitating extremism. The political divisive rhetoric espoused by politicians and media outlets since 2009, revitalized organizations promoting domestic terrorism. There is a typology that links right-wing extremists’ behavior to their underlying political ideology that provides the framework for these individuals or groups to engage in violence to shape their message. This approach reinvigorated various causes and ushered in a new and energetic breed of domestic terrorists. As such, it is essential that law enforcement have the necessary intelligence and counter-intelligence techniques and resources to respond to this threat. By describing the *how*, *what*, and *why* of participation, and considering the ongoing support and encouragement from domestic terrorist organizations, law enforcement agencies can qualitatively assess motivation and develop appropriate responses (Creswell, 2011; Yin, 2012).

### **Conclusion**

The study’s purpose, significance, and rationale for the study of domestic terrorism was established. The nature of this study requires an understanding of essential terms and concepts associated with domestic terrorism; these are defined in Chapter 2. A review of the typologies presented are central to developing profiles that can assist law

enforcement agencies in creating a significant deterrence aligned with validated outcomes.



## Chapter 2: What is Domestic Terrorism?

To create a foundation for this study, the operational definition of domestic terrorism concerns using violence against a civilian population or infrastructure of a nation often, but not always, by citizens of that nation and usually with the intent to intimidate, coerce, or influence national policy (Vohryzek-Bolden, Whamond, & Olson-Raymer, 2001). Definitions of domestic terrorism overlap; however, what is central to domestic terrorism is that the acts are violent and dangerous to human life, and are a violation of the criminal laws of a state and, for this study, the United States. The purpose of these acts is to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of the government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping (Reitan, 2010).

### **Defining Terrorism**

The definition of terrorism is given in Chapter 113B of the *United States Code*, entitled, "Terrorism". It stipulates that in order for any action to be characterized as a terrorist act, it must have specific characteristics. An act of terrorism must be inherently dangerous to human life, violate federal and/or state law and appear to be intended to: (a) intimidate the civilian population; (b) influence policies of the U.S. government by using intimidation and/or coercion and/or; (c) affect the conduct of government officials through the use of mass destruction, assassination, and/or kidnapping. A domestic terrorist attack by its nature must be directed at the state and, for the purpose of this research, occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.).

Key domestic terrorist definitions in law include 18 *U.S.C.* §2332b, which defines “federal crime of terrorism” as an offense that is designed to influence or affect the conduct of government organizations and officials through the use of intimidation or coercion, and/or retaliation against government conduct. This law is one of several statutes aimed at qualifying a general understanding of terrorism, which include §930(c). The latter identifies domestic terrorism as engaging in activities that relate to the killing or attempted killing of government officials during an attack on a federal facility with the use of a dangerous weapon. Also, §1114 addresses the killing or attempted killing of U.S. officers and employees by organizations determined by the government as being involved in domestic conspiratorial activities. As domestic terrorism has evolved, what is seen is the need for updated legislation, ongoing studies, and creating deterrents that will assist the nation in remaining current as to both understanding domestic terrorism and prosecuting it (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.; Smith, 1994).

### **Defining American Extremism**

A review of contemporary research on violent American extremism supports the premise that a series of theoretical frameworks evolved that seek to explain individual involvement in politically or religiously motivated violence—and correct the poor understanding of causal mechanisms. Building on situational action theory, in the current study the researcher proposed that an understanding of movements and causations beyond dominant risk factors is necessary and requires developing integrated models. In seeking explanations for politically and religiously motivated violence, the challenge facing researchers is the ability to distinguish direct mechanisms from other causes (Schils & Pauwels, 2016). Though models emerged that seek to understand the

motivation of the domestic terrorist by combining existing theories and mechanisms from different but complementary traditions, further insight is needed (Schils & Pauwels, 2016).

In earlier primary and secondary studies that considered the underlying causes of domestic terrorism, a central focus has been evaluating the influence of key direct mechanisms. These mechanisms incorporate a propensity towards violent extremism and exposure of potential recruits to violent extremist moral settings. However, what is also sought is the ability to explain—from a political perspective—foundational premises and variables that are used to support political and religious violence. Various theoretical models of domestic terrorism have been used to test structural equation modeling that estimates the strength and power base of domestic terror organizations. The main results from these studies indicate that violent extremist propensity, as well as exposure to violent extremist moral precepts and settings, were found to have direct effects on the likelihood of individuals engaging in domestic political and religious violence.

Such research highlight explicit and direct mechanisms thought to be connected to a series of exogenous factors, including perceptions which lead to a sense of injustice, and manifest as poor social integration. Feelings of perceived injustice and poor social integration converge with political and religious violence and are strengthened by a sense of alienation, belief in the failure of the judicial system, and a background of religious authoritarianism. As a result of the convergence of these social mechanisms in people throughout the country, organizers capitalized on these feelings in order to create extremist groups across America. Displaced and marginalized individuals who join these

groups believe that violent action can restore a balance of power, as well as restore perceived injustices (Kushner, 2003; Schils, & Pauwels, 2016; Simmons, 1999).

Domestic terrorism, because of the definitional impediments associated with its antecedent term, *terrorism*, scholars and terrorism experts, for the sake of contentious academic debate, simply defined domestic terrorism, in its most basic form, as a set of actions, beliefs, feelings, attitudes, and strategies of an individual or group who are far removed from the mainstream, or what is commonly considered ordinary. In conflict settings, those engaged in extremist activities show severe forms of conflict engagement. However, caution is urged when labeling particular activities, individuals, and groups as extremist. While acknowledging an idea or position that is commonly believed by society as being ordinary, these assessments become subjective when considering political and religious beliefs, concepts, and ideologies that are outside the norm.

As a result, discussions regarding extremism must consider that researchers will have different perspectives; some will consider various acts just and moral (“freedom fighting”). Others will see these same acts as unjust, immoral, and consistent with ideologies associated with anti-social “terrorism.” The point-of-view depends, of course, on an observer’s politics, moral scope, values, and the nature of his or her relationship with the member and his organization. Further, an individual’s sense of the morality of a given act must be considered and assessed within current and historical contexts of extremist acts, as well as support the shaping of an overall view on these individuals and their organizations (Wilcox, 2013).

One of the most important and relevant factors in determining the drive of extremists is their awareness and consolidation of power differences, which are both

essential when defining domestic terrorism/extremism. As social disparities increase and lead to conflict, the activities of the members of low-power groups are often viewed as more extreme than similar activities done by members of groups advocating the status quo. Political terrorist/extremist acts are more likely to be used by marginalized individuals and organizations that believe in a more radical form of engagement because traditional forms of protest are considered of little worth. It is worth noting, though, that high-power terrorist groups also commonly employ extreme activities to achieve their ends (Goble, 2015).

The separate ideologies of the extremist support actions that routinely employ violent means, although groups differ in their choices of and preferences for the use of and/or level of violence. Also, there can be a range of choices for targets of their violence: infrastructure, law enforcement, military personnel, and civilians (including children as primary targets). Although low-power groups are more likely to employ direct, episodic forms of domestic terrorist violence, higher-power groups are more likely to be associated with structural and/or institutionalized forms of terrorism, such as covert and overt torture. Although extremist individuals and their groups in the country are often viewed by the general population as being evil, their indoctrination and belief systems allow them to violate societal norms and break federal and state laws by their acts (Coleman & Bartoli, 2003).

### **Typologies of Domestic Terrorism**

Domestic terrorism has been the most common form of terrorism in the United States and until 9/11 became the deadliest. The FBI recorded 353 incidents or suspected incidents of terrorism in this country between 1980 and 2001; 264 of these incidents were

attributed to domestic terrorists (Lewis, 2004). Domestic terrorism cases nearly doubled from 1999 to 2003 according to the FBI (2003). Between 1999 and 2001 the FBI prevented 10 possible domestic terrorist incidents, including two potentially large-scale, high-casualty attacks by right-wing groups (Mueller, 2003).

A significant oversight by researchers has been accepting the premise that terrorists are a uniform class who lack diversity. As studies continue, terrorist groups are now seen as not all the same; their characteristics, means, and goals ultimately define their actions. Thus, continuing analysis of such groups is necessary and relevant to understand this unique social phenomenon. Terrorist groups develop goals and frame strategies, just as other groups do. In researching and understanding the war on domestic terrorism and individual groups, it is necessary to understand how their typologies, defined by their ideologies, are related to their behaviors.

Viewing domestic terrorism as a monolithic entity overlooks key points when describing the platforms and tactics used by various groups against the government and its citizens for a variety of reasons. These organizations believe violence is a reasonable response to what is seen as the government's incorrect policies, legislation, and choices. A review of past presidents, beginning with Jimmy Carter, demonstrates how short-sighted approaches to domestic terrorism exacerbated the problem, and led to increased levels of criminality and violence (Boxall, Rosevear, & Payne, 2015).

By examining the goals, strategies, and tactics of different groups, this study seeks to understand why domestic terrorists have various strategic logistical platforms and approaches, and how these variations should inform and augment federal and state policies. A typological analysis divides terrorist groups into four main categories: ethnic,

ideological, political, and religious. They are distinguished by the nature of their ideologies and identities. Key questions concern the aims of each group and a consideration of whether they are bound to the idea of a single nation or state and their laws, or whether they seek to affect changes throughout the United States and want changes to or dissolution of the federal government.

For domestic terrorists, important considerations include the race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, shared language, customs, and traditions. These help researchers define members of extremist groups. Central issues and beliefs are important when determining longevity—which is driven by continuously enrolling or reaching out to like-minded individuals. Terrorist groups routinely use similar methods and tactics to achieve their goals. However, the basic characteristics that define these organizations and their goals vary based on the desired outcomes. The result is a differentiation of strategic logic that dictates their commitment to the level of violence.

By qualifying the variables and tactics that affect the domestic terrorist's ability to act, along with his or her potential for survival, dictates the group's level of sophistication and the potential damage they can inflict on society in promoting their message. By identifying unifying variables that can develop predictive behavioral models based on the identified variables and expected outputs, law enforcement can create and promote counter-terrorism strategies to address threats to all levels of society from domestic terror groups (Rosenthal, 2006).

With terrorism routinely deployed as an attempt to wreak havoc, create fear among the population, draw attention to a particular cause, and affect change, what is important to note is that all groups that opt to use terrorist tactics do not all share the

same ends. Some domestic terrorist groups seek political autonomy, statehood, or are looking for greater political freedoms within the U.S., while others promote extreme ideas of anarchy and, consequently, also engage in criminal behaviors for profit. In addition, there are domestic terrorist organizations that use violence in hopes of bringing about what has emerged as the idea of the final clash of civilizations: cataclysmic destruction (Huntington, 1993).

Terrorism in the U.S. has become a frightening and all too-common experience. Extremist groups employ these tactics to force policy changes commensurate with their stated goals and objectives while simultaneously considering it their “patriotic duty” to liberate the masses from the tyranny of government by destabilizing it to a point of lawlessness. If law enforcement fails to categorize the domestic terrorist groups correctly, counter-terrorism strategies will be flawed. These flaws, in turn, could create situations that risk exaggerating domestic terrorist threats, create policies that are inconsistent, thereby alienating potential allies and strengthening the very groups the U.S. is seeking to undermine (Huntington, 1993).

On September 15, 2010, terrorism expert, Stephen Flynn, provided testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Homeland Security Committee on *The Evolving Nature of the Terrorism Threat: Nine Years after the 9/11 Attacks*. In his testimony, Flynn pointed out the seriousness of domestic terrorism in America stating that:

When terrorists are homegrown, it is the streets of Bridgeport, Denver, Minneapolis, and other big and small communities across America that become the frontlines. That translates into local cops on the beat and increasingly the



American public at large who must be better informed and empowered to deal with the terrorism threat.

Since 9/11, both current and past terrorism experts have sought to examine how ethnic, ideological, religious, and financial terrorist groups are ideologically different, while seeking methods of political and military deterrence. Acknowledging the differences among terrorist groups, and analyzing them, can lead to new methodologies that can generate appropriate policy which may reduce violence and save lives. One of the more current methods by which to assess extremist groups that opt for terror is using deconstruction.

The purpose of deconstruction and its associated analytical strategy is to understand and define terrorism by dividing groups according to their identities, focusing on the group's ideological imperatives, and subsequently creating viable group-specific strategies for use in counterterrorism (Hutchinson, 1972). These foundational concepts, first used by the Carter administration, supported law enforcement in promoting response strategies based on group typologies to provide law enforcement with the ability to respond to the ongoing threat of domestic terrorism (Hutchinson, 1972).

### **Religious Extremism**

A review of the literature on the threat of religious extremist groups to national stability demonstrates that their past actions influenced domestic and foreign policies. Why some such groups fail, while others flourish, can be understood by identifying common attributes, which informed and enhanced government policy, leading to current response strategies. Characterizing key variables within various extremist groups reveals


two major typologies: those based on religion and those driven by religious and political ideologies. According to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman (1999):

Religious and secular terrorists also have starkly different perceptions of themselves and their violent acts. Whereas secular terrorists regard violence as a way to instigate the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good, religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving at all but as “outsiders” seeking fundamental changes in the existing order. This sense of alienation further enables the religious terrorist to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than secular terrorists—and reinforces the tendency to embrace a far more open-ended category of “enemies” for attack.

The extremist groups that emerged from these religions generally share the following four common attributes: (a) the search for meaning, (b) sense of religious responsibility, (c) the quest for purity, and (d) inspirational leadership often using scripture as justification for violence. The success of groups that are highly effective can be attributed to these unifying attributes. In some instances, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic extremist groups that engaged in domestic violence not only achieved their goals, but also transformed themselves into political parties that operate within the boundaries of traditional society and follow the normal channels of protest.

Using comparative case studies, Zisk (1981) determined that Islamic groups present the greatest threat to society as domestic terrorists. Islamic extremist groups since the 1970s having bonded due to the common perceived threats of modernity and globalization. Domestic Islamic extremist groups routinely engaged in supporting

traditional Islamic identities within various communities, resulting in cultural clashes that are ongoing examples of extremist domestic violence. However, by the 1980s, according to the 1986 FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States Report, there was a significant shift in the domestic terror threat. An analysis of Figure 1 reveals that during the Reagan Era, specifically, from 1980-1986, Middle-Eastern (Islamic) and Right-Wing extremist groups only accounted for seven terrorism incidents each. In contrast, Anti-Castro terrorism groups accounted for twenty-one (21) incidents, Jewish terrorism groups accounted for twenty-four (24) incidents, Left-Wing terrorism groups accounted for thirty (30) incidents and Puerto Rican terrorist groups accounted for seventy-four (74) incidents.



*Figure 1. Analysis of U.S. Extremist Groups Terrorism Incidents 1980-1986. Note. FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States Report 1986*

According to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman (1986), since their failed mission to assassinate President Harry Truman on November 1, 1950, Puerto Rican extremists have consistently sought their independence from the United States by specifically targeting U.S. symbols of power and commerce which they understood to be tools of political repression and economic exploitation (p. 10).

It is unclear as to what specific variable(s) precipitated the significant increase in the number of terrorist incidents perpetrated by Puerto Rican extremists under the Reagan administration. Nevertheless, Puerto Rican extremists were considered a top priority when a 1980 police raid uncovered documents that revealed plans to kidnap several U.S. politicians and business leaders. More importantly, there was one name on that list peaked law enforcement's interests and that was the name of the newly elected president, Ronald Reagan (Hoffman, 1986). Between 1980-1985, federal and local law enforcement authorities came to a consensus that dismantling Puerto Rican extremists organizations such as Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña (FALN), which in English translates to Armed Forces of National Liberation, had to be their primary focus. In 1980, eleven FALN members were arrested in Illinois (Hoffman, 1986, p. 11). In 1983, FALN's bomb expert, William Morales and four other members were taken into custody and two (2) safe houses were raided in Chicago, Illinois (Hoffman, 1986). Law enforcement authorities uncovered a cache of weapons, bullets, explosives, disguises, bullet proof vests and significant subversive documentation (Hoffman, 1986). The seizure of this arsenal by law enforcement led to the decline of the organization (Hoffman, 1986). By 1985, authorities arrested seventeen (17) key members of both FALN and Macheteros (a Puerto Rican extremist group) which ultimately decimated both groups to the point

where they were no longer a threat to the United States or their interests (Hoffman, 1986).

Government domestic policies and response strategies would likely be more successful in uprooting and ending extremist groups if they had a better understanding of their organizational dynamics, and able to identify why some groups fail and others succeed. Behavioral models that integrate a proper balance of soft and hard power within domestic terror organizations are essential for success in developing strong law enforcement responses, which include de-radicalization and political inclusion, supported by civilian intelligence and law enforcement.

The most effective way to prevent domestic terrorism is to have an effective community policing policy embracing different groups within the community which can possibly assist in deterring people from joining terrorist organizations (Portland State University, 2013). McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak (2007) suggested when law enforcement personnel develop strong relationships with community members, they are more likely to gain knowledge of critical information. Information that can alert authorities to behaviors or actions that can metastasize into homegrown terrorism.

Extremist groups thrived during the past decades, drawing new recruits by their divisive rhetoric and condemning national political leaders who failed to resolve or respond to anxieties about the country's shifting demographics (Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], 2016). The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) determined that the number of hate-groups organized against religious and/or racial characteristics rose to 892 in 2015, from 784 the previous year. This 14% increase came after 3 years of decline in the number of extremist groups, which suggested a decrease in religious extremist

growth. However, a shift in demographic attributes, owing to White Americans' heightened fears over their shrinking majority during the Obama administration, let religious extremist factions capitalize on these fears and end the downward trend (McPhate, 2016).

The SPLC (2016) also identified 34 anti-Muslim groups having heightened anger in 2015 after the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California. Over the course of 2015, a year in which battles over same-sex marriages occurred, the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP), received reports on 24 hate-violence related homicides of LGBTQ and HIV-affected people in 2015, which was a 20% increase in the number of reports compared to 2014 (NCAVP, 2016).

As extremist religious groups used new laws and acceptance as a rallying cry to validate their criminal behavior and attacks on pro-LGBT groups and infrastructure, an increase in future religious violence is anticipated (Norwitz, 2011; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015).

### **Political Extremism**

When the American economy struggles, its woes emerges as a unifying theme among citizens who continually blame politicians and big government for its failures. For example, the right-wing extremist do not share political and social values with left-wing extremist, but each group points to, and fixates on, the same political and economic stories: bank insolvencies, currency devaluations, securities fraud, total-collapse scenarios (e.g., the mortgage crisis of 2008), the short-comings of the Federal Reserve, and the need to return to the gold standard (Stern, 2016).

Political extremists in America, ranging from militias, the Black Bloc, to Sovereign Citizens (who style themselves as homegrown radicals united by political and economic ideology and not race), highlight the failures of politicians who have grown corrupt (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shapiro, 2005). By examining data convergences for various studies, core questions (such as how many extremists and/or groups are active in the United States) remain unanswered. Yet, their pervasive influence is undeniable, as seen in the 400+ U.S.-based websites that generate thousands of extremist posts each day (Mulloy, 2004). This level of traffic suggests that these groups are a clear and present danger to the government. Therefore, research must focus on the growth of political terrorist groups and their individual and group-unifying behavioral characteristics (Berger, 2012).

Political terrorists in the United States seek to manipulate every piece of so-called credible evidence that supports end-of-the-world scenarios driven by economic collapse which can be leveraged to spread other extreme ideologies (Applegate, 2016). As perceptions of the social, economic, and political milieu are filtered and shaped by this ideology, ultimately, what terrorists wholeheartedly believe is what will affect their decision to employ violence as a means to achieve their social and political goals (Crenshaw, 1988).

The exercise of militia training in the woods, hoarding gold and food, arming wives and children in anticipation of political insurrection, massive civil unrest or government collapse is extremist propaganda that is effective in the proliferation and justification of terrorist action as a means of survival. By appealing to one's fears, these pseudo-reality scenarios produce a two-fold effect. First, promoting these concepts can

lead to increased political awareness by potential followers. By choosing to believe the worst about humanity, the ranks of politically extreme organizations will grow and reinforce the commitment of those who are already members of what Eric Hoffer (1951) described as “true believers” (Brecher, Devenney, & Winter, 2010). Second, extremist anti-government websites offer the premise for their existence by suggesting that: *citizens should arm themselves, have the courage and determination to face this world, and challenge political mandates and laws* (Lombardi, Ragab, & Chin, 2014).

Despite the deep moral opprobrium that the word terrorism carries, certain national, sub-national, and extremist groups have often employed terrorist tactics when more conventional means of conflict resolution have been exhausted or ignored (Weeber, 2011). In fact, every violent extremist movement or group requires an ideology or belief system “to nourish, motivate, justify, and mobilize [its] use of terror violence” (Wilkerson, 1998, p. 205).

By promoting insurrection against existing political structures and laws, their hope is the fall of society, implosion of the collective order, and destruction of the rule of law. The *raison d’être* (justification) for political extremists is that government is intrusive, only benefits the aristocracy of society, and manufactures internal strife, civil unrest, repression, wars, and misery. Although this is the basic premise for their actions, not all political extremists subscribe to the concept that violence is the necessary means that produces desired results. Like a duplicitous anarchist, some political extremists have all but concluded that government is a great unnecessary evil, and that anarchy, in the literal sense of no government, need not mean anarchy in the popular sense of violence and disorder (Carter, 2010).



These differences and typologies are essential to understanding the ongoing changes of the U.S. political terrorist by law enforcement agencies (Jenkins, 2012).

### **National Extremism**

*“The up-tick in moderate-to-small scale attacks in the West since last summer by individual extremists reinforces our assessment that the most likely and immediate threat to the Homeland will come from Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) or individuals with loose affiliation to terrorist groups overseas.”* - Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen,

National Counterterrorism Center, February 12, 2015

The United States has faced significant challenges from national domestic terrorists since the 1970s. According to Dale L. Watson (2002), former Executive Assistant Director of Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division of the FBI, between 1980 and 2000, the FBI recorded 335 incidents or suspected incidents of terrorism. Of those, 247 were confirmed and attributed to acts of national domestic terrorists. As threats from national extremist movements have grown, the need to address this reality has become a priority. National terrorists continue to refine and expand their methods, the threat they pose will grow. In response, the FBI divided the national terrorist threat facing the United States into two general categories: national and international.

The FBI leads terrorism investigations at the federal level (Bjelopera, 2013). Their agents have been on the front lines for the past 40 years (Bjelopera, 2013). What emerged from their experience with domestic terror groups is a coordinated effort by them to undermine the federal government. Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within

the United States. In the case of national terrorism, precedents for criminal prosecution are set. Terrorist acts directed and coordinated by U.S. citizens, committed against persons or property with the intent to intimidate or coerce the government and/or civilian population, is a message cloaked in terror. These acts seek to further personal, organizational, political, and/or social objectives.

Through continued research, some national terrorist groups have been sponsored by, or received financial support from, international terrorist groups. However, the central objective of national terrorist groups is to promote internal change within the national government. In some cases, the objectives of international groups support this, and lead to collaborations (Wager, 2009). During the past decade, the United States witnessed dramatic changes in the nature of the national terrorist threat. In the 1990s, right-wing extremism surpassed left-wing extremist groups as being the greatest domestic terrorism threat. Right-wing politics had devolved from healthy Christian activism into contentious and ultra-politically conservative extremist groups who viewed political empowerment as a Constitutional right particularly when conservative politicians and media personalities become increasingly tolerable of far right-wing ideals that had been suppressed from the mainstream for decades. As national extremist groups grew during the past decade, special interest extremism emerged and reinvigorated this category of terrorists, characterized by groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), both considered by law enforcement agencies as serious national threats. In 2002, former FBI Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, James F. Jarboe reported that ALF and ELF were responsible for approximately 600 criminal acts in the United States since 1996, causing damages in excess of \$42 million. As these nationwide

organizations, which operate overtly and covertly, continue to seek and gain support by rationalizing their terrorist acts, the message will continue to be refined for public consumption and used as a recruitment tool.

### **Eco-Terrorism**

Eco-terrorism is a tactic used by radical environmentalists who believe that the approach of the mainstream environmental movement has been ineffective. Eco-terrorists argue that industrialization, urbanization, and corporate expansion, has violently infringed upon nature, and bringing about the destruction of the earth. As a result, violent retaliation is needed. Those who are part of left- or right-wing radical environmental reformists do more harm than good. Eco-terrorists advocate the intentional destruction of machinery they believe is detrimental to nature and includes bulldozers, cranes, trucks, and whaling vessels. Their activity has also included releasing animals from laboratories and zoos (Smith, 2014).

The basis of eco-terrorism can be traced to writing by Aldo Leopold and Edward Abbey, among the first to advocate for civil disobedience in the preservation of nature. Organizations such as ALF, who actively embrace the tactics of eco-terrorism, draw from the “Earth First” movement, and publicly call for direct and radical environmental actions. Between 1990 and 2000, attacks by ALF and ELF resulted in the emergence of an anomaly in the United States. In the post-9/11 era, the FBI has warned that the primary domestic threat to national security is not political or religious terrorism, but rather the environmental variety. By examining the variables that define eco-terrorists, further analysis finds a gap between the description of eco-terrorism and devising and enforcing

public policy. As a result, there is a need to advocate for research that supports a better understanding of this dangerous social phenomenon (Smith, Tunno, & Smith, 2002).

Synthesizing relevant findings suggests that the definition of eco-terrorism remains ambiguous. As a result, it is subject to numerous interpretations, which affect how public policy responds to eco-terrorism. Attacks coordinated by ALF and ELF have not been adequately deterred to-date. A majority of the attacks by these groups are most likely to occur in states which rank in the 80th percentile of per capita income, meaning that the attacks occur primarily on the West Coast. The significance of the relationships between the ELF and ALF attacks in conjunction with U.S. public policy demonstrates that these two facts (infusion of capital and location) are related. With researchers seeking a better understanding of what constitutes eco-terrorism, along with identifying radical elements within the environmental movement, this study provided a model for seeing the cycle of terrorist attacks and government responses in a fresh way. In developing and providing a framework of inquiry for understanding eco-terrorism, the expected result will be a reduction in this form of extremism, and deterrence due to sentencing of eco-terrorists (Smith, 2014; Smith et al., 2002).

By returning to an ideology that supports terrorist actions in conjunction with civil disobedience to be distinguished through definition and the assignment of penalty, the argument is presented where people will be more confident in their ability to engage in their rights of free speech and engage in political opposition. The loss of civil liberties, a direct result of the increases in eco-terrorism, suggests a correlation between these variables. Miller, Rivera, and Yelin (2008) argued the opportunity to prevent escalations at the domestic level.

The United Nations conducted a review of civil liberties assignments in developing their official policy against all forms of terrorism, including eco-terrorism. It should be an example to the United States and the rest of the world in the fight against international and domestic terrorism. What is called for is a balance and notes that, while domestic security is necessary, but should not come at the expense of civil liberties. The U.S. government is required to continue a course of due diligence while adjusting to ever-changing societal expectations and norms, but yet uphold Constitutional rights. It is clear that this is going to be a delicate balance indeed (Miller et al., 2008).

### **Anti-Abortion Extremism**

In 1973, the United States Supreme Court legalized abortion in the *Roe v. Wade*, (410 U.S. 113, 1973) decision. Since that decision, anti-abortion protesters have for the most part, peacefully protested against the decision or actively making the argument to their elected officials that *Roe v. Wade* (1973) must be overturned and the only way to accomplish that is nominate anti-abortion Supreme Court judges. In fact, in order to receive the endorsement of the powerful evangelical voting bloc, a candidate must be a pro-life hardline conservative. But discontentment quickly grew within the ranks of the pro-life movement and proselytizing, picketing and praying were rapidly being considered as ineffective by radical anti-abortionists who literally wanted sweeping policy change by any means necessary even if that meant intimidation or murder.

In 1985, Joe Scheidler, president of the Pro-Life Action League, wrote a book entitled *Closed: 99 Ways to Stop Abortion*. In his book, he advocated for pro-lifers to engage in disruptive activities such as blockades, preventing water from entering the clinic and clinic sit-ins (Jacobson & Royer, 2010). Like many *pro-lifers*, Scheidler did

not openly advocate violence, he did not openly oppose its usage. The Army of God (AOG) however, openly embraced terrorism and was one of the most prolific anti-abortion informal terrorists group in America in the 1980s and 1990s (Jacobson & Royer, 2010). According to the National Abortion Federation, AOG scripted a manual on how to target abortion clinics using bombs, arson, and butyric acid (Jacobson & Royer, 2010). Moreover, AOG would post a “Wanted List” on their website listing the names, pictures, addresses, license plate numbers and names of family members (Jacobson & Royer, 2010). The AOG was so effective in intimidating abortion clinic providers, that other pro-life organizations would adopt their tactics.

In Pensacola, Florida, Dr. David Gunn decided to perform abortions in the rural south because other doctors had refused to do so because of religious convictions or concerns for safety of themselves and their family. But Dr. Gunn was determined, and he wholeheartedly believed in a woman’s right to choose. So much so, that at one point in his career he gave up his own practice to travel to surrounding clinics to perform abortions (Rimer, 1993). Pro-life radicals were on a mission to put an end to what they deemed as a “sin against God.” Anti-abortionists employed every means of intimidation at their disposal. They posted “Wanted” posters with Dr. Gunn’s name, address, work schedule and telephone number (Salcedo, 1990). Those actions were followed by daily hate mail, frequent tails that followed him around from clinic to clinic, he received a consistent barrage of death threats, and he was greeted with anti-abortion protesters everywhere he went standing outside calling him a “murderer” and a “baby killer.” (Rimer, 1993). Doctor Gunn was not dismissive of these threats from pro-life radicals. For protection, he strategically placed three firearms in his car for his personal safety

(Rimer, 1993). He positioned one in his glove compartment, one under the driver's seat, and one in the trunk of his car (Rimer, 1993). Despite his precautions, on Wednesday, March 10, 1993, Doctor David Gunn arrived at his Pensacola, Florida office and was greeted by routine pro-life protesters, but before he could enter the clinic, thirty-one year old Michael Griffin yelled, "Don't kill any more babies!" and shot Doctor Gunn three times in the back with a .38 caliber revolver (Booth, 1993). When the police arrived, they identified the perpetrator as 31-year old pro-life protester, Michael Griffin.

The murder of Doctor David Gunn was met with disaffection and disillusionment from pro-life radicals. Joseph Foreman, the dogmatic pro-life ideologue and president of Milwaukee's Missionaries to the Pre-born, stated that Gunn was a "mass murderer. He was preparing to kill five to ten babies. I'm genuinely happy these lives are spared." (Robinson, 1993). This glorification of the murder of Doctor Gunn may have appalled non-violent anti-abortionist, but not to the point where they were willing to actively challenge pro-life radicals to supplant their pro-violence narrative. The unquestioned radical dogma at the end of the day was self-serving to non-violent pro-life protesters in that pro-life radical terrorism, although horrific, was silently embraced as both quixotic and salvific.

### **Left-Wing Terrorism**

The ideology of leftist groups, often referred to as Marxist-Leninist terrorism and/or revolutionary/terrorism is a form of domestic extremism designed to overthrow capitalist systems and replace them with socialist constructs. The concept of left-wing terrorism draws its roots from later 19th and early 20th century anarchist and Bolshevik forms of domestic terrorism and became pronounced during the Cold War. Modern left-

wing terrorist movements developed in the context of the political unrest of in Western Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Notable factions include the West German Red Army Faction and the Bader-Meinhof Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, the French Action Directe, and the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells. Asian groups included the Japanese Red Army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, although the latter organization later adopted nationalist terrorism. In Latin America, groups that became actively involved in terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s included the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, the Peruvian Shining Path, and the Colombian 19th of April Movement. This international movement challenges the ruling elite and the premises of democracy, along with traditional understandings of law and order (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Between 1973 and 1975, the Symbionese Liberation Army committed bank robberies, two murders, and other acts of domestic violence. One of the most infamous of these was the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, one of the grand-daughters of newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst. During the 1980s, left-wing terrorist actions grew to include groups such as the May 19th Communist Organization and, later in the decade, the smaller United Freedom Front, both engaging in covert/overt domestic, left-wing terror. However, in 1985, with the end of these groups, there was a reduction in the confirmed acts of left-wing terrorism reported in the U.S. Further, left-wing terrorism incidents dropped-off dramatically at the end of the Cold War in 1991, primarily due to loss of support for communism, and lack of money (Department of Homeland Security, 2008).

Left-wing extremism often has developed from working-class movements seeking in theory to eliminate, not preserve, class distinctions (Seger, 2001). In the 1980s



through the mid-1990s, domestic leftist terrorist groups and state-sponsored cells and continued their espionage activities and the planning of terrorist actions against the U.S. government which at times, paralyzed local law enforcement agencies who did not have the resources to combat extremism (Seger, 2001). Leftist extremists were so prolific that they were responsible for three-fourths of the officially designated acts of terrorism in America in the 1980s (Seger, 2001). To put this in perspective, of the 13,858 people who died between 1988 and 1998 in attacks committed by the 10 most active terrorist groups in the world, 74% were killed by leftist organizations (Seger, 2001).

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Despite their success in earlier decades, there are currently no equivalent groups fashioning themselves as left-wing extremists. Bands of protestors, who periodically engage in bouts of smashing windows or throwing rocks at police (for instance, the Occupy Wall Street protestors), have become the norm. Bombings, bank robberies, and

terrorist engagements with law enforcement have now become the province of extremist right-wing groups. Unlike earlier decades, there are only a few true left-wing extremist organizations still operating. This reduction, believed to be the end of left-wing extremism, was chronicled by Daryl Johnson (2012) in his book, *Right-Wing Resurgence: How a Domestic Terrorism Threat is Being Ignored*. However, in 2009, Johnson's research noted that cyber-attacks are now viewed as an attractive low-cost option for left-wing extremists. These types of attacks, in which engagement with economic targets is promoted in order to align with their non-violent agenda and no-harm doctrines, are seen as producing positive outcomes for these organizations. Prior to 9/11, there was a serious need for a counter-terrorism strategy that could effectively respond to the re-emergence of radical left-wing groups before they became pervasive in society. Considering the success the FBI has experienced in preventing potential domestic terror threats post 9/11, we now understand the importance of an effective counter-terrorism strategy in preventing left-wing radicalism from becoming a significant and ongoing domestic terror threat in the United States (Johnson, 2012).

### **Right-Wing Terrorism**

*"I personally regard them as more dangerous than the Klan groups from which they*

*emanated."* - Director William Webster, FBI, New York Times, April 4, 1985

Right-wing extremists are considered to be on the far-right end of the political spectrum and they are often called *right-wingers* or the *far-right* usually as a pejorative. According to data from the New America Foundation (2014), in the years since the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, right-wing extremists committed at least 19 different terrorist attacks in the United States, resulting in the deaths of at least 48 people.

Right-extremist are motivated by a deep sense of conviction that a revolution to overthrow a government is necessary in order to restore the White race to their “rightful” position of dominance and authority in America. Their views of an American past of self-sufficient, morally righteous, hard-working people is similar to that of the mainstream. The difference however, are the tenets of the right-wing ideology which is deeply rooted racial hatred and anti-government sentiment. Moreover, they are willing to exact violence on anyone they deem as a threat to advancing their cause. Their methods of effecting change include violence and intimidation which qualifies them to be labeled as domestic terrorists instead of patriots because they lack the affective or cognitive skills that would allow for constructive engagement.

*The Turner Diaries*, the infamous racist dystopian novel by neo-Nazi William Luther Pierce, inspired more than 200 murders since its publication in 1978, including, prior to 9/11, the single deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (Berger, 2016). In the book, the character of Earl Turner was crafted in a way to connect to the anger and fears of working-class White men became frustrated with government and their failure to prevent Jews, African-Americans, and other from “taking over” America. From their perspective, the White man was being systematically excluded from almost every facet of the American dream. The character of Earl Turner articulates a litany of missed opportunities by White men that precede the book’s apocalyptic events, explicitly stating that earlier action would have produced a better outcome (Berger, 2016):

We have allowed a diabolically clever, alien minority to put chains on our souls and our minds. These spiritual chains are a truer mark of slavery than the iron

chains which are yet to come. Why didn't we rebel 35 years ago, when they took our schools away from us and began converting them into racially mixed jungles? Why didn't we throw them all out of the country 50 years ago, instead of letting them use us as cannon fodder in their war to subjugate Europe? More to the point, why didn't we rise up three years ago, when they started taking our guns away? Why didn't we rise up in righteous fury and drag these arrogant aliens into the streets and cut their throats then? Why didn't we roast them over bonfires at every street-corner in America? Why didn't we make a final end to this obnoxious and eternally pushy clan, this pestilence from the sewers of the East, instead of meekly allowing ourselves to be disarmed? (Macdonald, 1978, p. 13)

Right-wing extremists perceived that the marginalization of White Americans began shortly after World War II, when the armed forces were first integrated, the United Nations established its general headquarters on U.S. soil, and anti-communism became the driving political force of the early Cold War (Gumbel, 2015).

Although the Klan's membership had dwindled from three million in 1925 to roughly 50,000 by 1964, the Klan was still a force to be reckoned with in the south (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011). By 1964, FBI investigations and congressional probes had dealt a significant blow to the Klan and their hegemonic ideology of White supremacy. FBI's COINTELPRO relentlessly targeted the Klan between 1965-1967, and the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee of the *Committee on Un-American Activities* conducted hearings into the *Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations In The United States*, most notably terrorism, and produced the report *The Present Day*

*Ku Klux Klan Movement* (Eighty-Ninth U.S. Congress, 1965). The fanaticism of White extremist was further crushed by the passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and government hearings into the Klan in 1965-1966, in the late 1970s as the farm crisis was starting to affect the population of rural America and stoke existing White anger and resentment at the federal government, Texas Klansman and Aryan Nations ambassador Louis Beam Jr. issued a call to arms, 'where ballots fail, bullets will prevail', introducing a period of radicalization and violence that would become known as the 'Fifth Era' (Ridgeway, 1990).

America's bruising experience in Vietnam radicalized the far right even further, breathing life into the Patriot movement, whose members referred dismissively to the American government as the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG), and believed that only a return to the values of the American Revolution could save the country from its corrupt leaders who were under the undue influence of Jews at home and abroad. (Gibson, 1994). By the 1980s the farm crisis reached its apex, plunging entire rural communities into penury as giant agribusinesses took over family small-holdings, the movement briefly achieved a Robin Hood-style romantic appeal as two notable right-wing extremists actively resisted what he perceived as government abuse and over-reach (Gumbel, 2015). Gordon Kahl was a North Dakota farmer who refused to pay his taxes and emerged as hero when he was killed for his extremist positions. Kahl likened the government to "Satan", and died in a shootout with federal law enforcement in Arkansas. Wayne Snell left his farm in Arkansas to join the efforts of three anti-government paramilitary groups; The Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. It was during

this period where the first abortive plan to blow up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (Gumbel, 2015).

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the American extreme right, made up of Ku Klux Klan paramilitaries, White separatists, neo-Nazis, Identity Christians and anti-government patriots such as Invisible Empire, White Patriot Party, White Aryan Resistance, National Alliance, Aryan Nations, Posse Comitatus and The Order, was implicated in numerous robberies, shootouts, murders and terrorist plots that grabbed the public and state's attention, such as the 1984 murder of Denver Disc Jockey Alan Berg by The Order (Winter, 2010).

By the 1990s, right-wing extremism surpassed left-wing terrorism as the most dangerous domestic terrorist threat in America (Watson, 2002). The most notable attacks perpetuated by right-wing domestic terrorists during this time was the infamous April 19, 1995 attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City by right-wing extremists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, killing 168 people, including 19 children in a day care and injuring 500 others (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2001). In January 1998, Christian Identity extremist Eric Rudolph was responsible for detonating a remote-controlled nail bomb in Birmingham, Alabama that instantly killed Robert Sanderson, an off-duty police officer and severely injured Nurse Emily Lyons (Stack, 2015). Prior to this incident, On July 27, 1996, a pipe bomb, filled with nails and screws, exploded in Atlanta's Centennial Park at the Olympic Games. The explosion killed one person and wounded 111 others (START, 2012).

In the summer of 1992, members of the Christian Identity and Patriot movements convened at the Rocky Mountain Rendezvous in Estes Park, Colorado (Southern Poverty

Law Center, 2000). The meeting was organized by Identity Minister Pete Peters in order to devise a strategic response to the government's "assault on Ruby Ridge in which they deemed as tyranny of the government (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2000). At the meeting, Beam introduced "Leaderless Resistance", a strategy based on the formation of autonomous terrorist cells to combat a better equipped and larger state law enforcement and military (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2000). This meeting is widely believed to have influenced the development of the Militia movement (Winter, 2010).

### **Militia and Paramilitary Groups**

The defining characteristic of many domestic terrorist groups, include militia extremists, is that they are all anti-government (Bjelopera, 2013). The characteristic that differentiates militia groups from others is that they routinely organize themselves into paramilitary groups that follow military-style rank. These groups seek to stockpile various kinds of illegal weapons and ammunition and seek fully automatic firearms. They attempt to illegally convert weapons from semi-automatic to fully automatic and try to purchase or manufacture improvised explosive devices. They engage in multiple types of training, some of which include wilderness, survival, or other paramilitary training. Their primary focus is to generally target the government itself, including law enforcement personnel, representatives of the courts, public officials, and government buildings. When members are arrested, they are routinely charged with various explosives, weapons, and/or conspiracy violations (Mulloy, 2004).

The Patriot movement reached its peak in the early-mid 1990s, as the end of the Cold War shuttered many defense industries, the country experienced a recession, and a resurgent militia movement that detested the militarization of federal law enforcement

agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the FBI (Gumbel, 2015).

On August 21, 1992, the FBI enraged White extremists when during a raid on Ruby Ridge, Idaho, FBI sniper Lon Horiuchi shot Vicki Weaver in the head (killing her instantly) as she hid behind their cabin door. Extremists considered it vindication when Agent William Degan was shot to death in a shootout that killed the Weaver's 14-year-old Sam Weaver during an exchange of gunfire (Churchill, 2009). The FBI went to serve a warrant on Randy Weaver after informant Kenneth Fadely advised the FBI that Weaver had provided him with two sawed-off shotguns with obtaining a 200-dollar government permit (Churchill, 2009). This transaction, and Weaver's refusal to turn "state's witness," gave the FBI a reason to raid the Weaver Household (Churchill, 2009). During the trial of Randy Weaver and family friend Kevin Harris, April 19, 1993, the government assault in Waco, Texas on David Koresh and the Branch Davidians sent the militia movement into a frenzy. Right-wing extremists viewed these assaults as grave injustices and an abuse of power perpetuated by a Zionist Occupation Government (Churchill, 2009). Jim Mckinzey, the co-founder of Missouri 51<sup>st</sup> Militia, described his move to action against para-military policing:

Ruby Ridge was a wakeup call for a lot of people in the country, including myself. Until Ruby Ridge came down the pike, I could care less about politics...This is the greatest country in the world, love it or leave it...And then, they're starting to shoot children, and shooting unarmed women in the head. Wait a minute now, I need to pay attention to what's going on here. Then, what, less



than a year later, these same people are now down in Texas, taking on women and children, and that is really what did it. (Churchill, 2009)

Militia extremists see themselves as protecting the U.S. Constitution, other U.S. laws, or their own liberties (FBI, 2011). Their actions are based on the belief that the Constitution grants citizens the ability and the right to wrest power from the federal government by force, if it is deemed that the federal government has become authoritarian or tyrannical. One of the primary ways this justification to overthrow the government manifest itself is by intense propaganda that the federal government wants to disarm the average citizen by violating their second amendment right “to keep and bear arms.” Militia extremists are often described as subscribing to various conspiracy theories regarding government; a central one concerns the New World Order. Their training and preparation is preparation for an inevitable invasion of the United States, coordinated by United Nations forces. Another fear held by militias is that the federal government will forcibly relocate citizens to camps controlled by the Federal Emergency Management Agency or force them to undergo vaccinations against their will (Bill, 2005).

An individual simply espousing anti-government rhetoric is not against the law. However, when the desire is to advance that rhetoric through violence, it becomes illegal. That is when the FBI and law enforcement agencies become involved. As the FBI, backed by the government, attempt to combat militia threats, its primary goal is to gather intelligence and analyze it in order to successfully identify the gaps in knowledge that may possibly lead to future terrorist attacks. By developing networks using confidential informants, tracking and identifying emerging tactics and trends, and proper use of

effective investigative techniques, militias planning domestic terror plots, can be stopped and prosecuted before they carry out their plots (Mulloy, 2008).

### **Lone Wolf Terrorism**

*“...the most likely scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more of a lone wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack.”* - President

Obama, CNN, August 16, 2011

Existing research on “lone wolf” terrorism often interprets it through the lens of psychoanalytic theory (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). Numerous defining characteristics, which can depict the lone wolf include: framing an ideology, a personal grievance, moral outrage, dependence on a virtual community, failure to affiliate with an extremist group, lack of occupational goals, radicalization fueled by changes in thinking and emotions, excitement of clandestine activities, contempt and disgust with various ideologies; failure to sexually bonding; and predatory violence sanctioned by moral (superego) authority figures (Phillips, 2011).

The greatest threat for law enforcement agencies, and what makes lone wolf terrorist so extremely dangerous, is their unpredictability. Although they are driven to destruction by extremist rhetoric and ideology, lone wolves are individuals radicalized without significant contact with others and their plots of destruction are without direction from a top down military styled chain of command. Lone wolf terrorists are free to act upon any scenario and are only limited by what they can conceive in their minds (Simon, 2013). This freedom to act independently has resulted in some of the most horrendous domestic terrorist attacks in American history.

There are three primary types of lone wolves: (a) the secular lone wolf is defined by the violent nature of attacks for political, ethno-nationalist, or separatist causes; (b) the religious lone wolf operates under an ideology that perpetrates terrorism in the name of Islam, Christianity, Judaism, or other belief systems; (c) the third type is the single-issue lone wolf, who perpetrates attacks for specific issue, such as abortion, animal rights, or the environment (Simon, 2013).

While secular, religious, and single-issue lone-wolf attacks have similar objectives and motivations, there is a fourth and fifth type of lone wolf terrorist that is rather distinctive. The criminal lone wolf is primarily motivated by the desire for money and personal gain, as opposed to other kinds of terrorists, many of whom may be motivated by political, social, religious, or ethnic-nationalist goals. The lack of an ideological objective is why most analysts do not consider lone-wolf criminals to be ‘terrorists’ in the traditional sense. However, there do exist cases where the criminal activity has so great an effect on society and government that it should be considered terrorism (Barnes, 2012).

The fifth kind of lone-wolf terrorist is termed the “idiosyncratic” lone wolf. This person is mainly motivated by personal demons or mental illness. This category of lone wolf terrorist is unique. Except for cults that commit terrorist acts, there are no idiosyncratic terrorist groups currently in operation. Although the idiosyncratic lone wolf may commit attacks in the name of some radical ideological belief, these causes are the result of irrational desires, and perpetrators are frequently driven to violence mainly by severe personality disorders or other psychological issues. One of the most classic examples of the idiosyncratic lone wolf terrorist is Theodore Kaczynski, who called for a

revolution against an increasingly industrial-technological society, and although he was a mathematical genius, it was later determined that Kaczynski was not only an ideologue, but he was psychologically diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic (Barnes, 2012).

Law enforcement strategies employed to deter homegrown terrorism has not been significantly useful, and most instances ineffective, against lone wolves. The greatest challenge is that the *modus operandi* of the lone wolf is so inconsistent that it is almost impossible to prevent because their actions are only detectable by authorities after the terrorist incident has been committed.

Technology has given the lone wolf terrorists significant tools for contacting other participants and accessing the Internet for planning. On the other hand, it can also cause problems in carrying out attacks. Lone wolves have become most vulnerable to discovery by law enforcement agencies when they surface online. Whether announcing to the world that they are ready, willing, and able to commit a desired terrorist act, or posting online manifestos (as some have done in the past), they can leave behind many Internet clues that can ultimately lead to their detection and demise. The chat rooms they visit, and the online searches they conduct can all become pitfalls leading to their arrest, and highlight a weakness for this kind of domestic terrorists (Reid Meloy, & Yakeley, 2014).

Because of the relatively recent emergence of the lone wolf threat and the politicization of domestic terrorism by non-jihadist, legal scholarship is deficient in fully addressing this specific type of terrorism. Like past presidential administrations dating back to president Jimmy Carter, previous legal scholarship addressing the more widely discussed phenomenon of homegrown terrorism focuses primarily on prosecutors' efforts to criminalize nascent expressions of criminal intent (Abrams, 2005).

## Sovereign Citizens

The ideology of the sovereign domestic terrorist originates from the Posse Comitatus movement, which was promoted by William P. Gale, a Christian identity minister. His theories led to the rise of the Christian Patriot Movement, which was followed by the Redemption Movement, and further challenged the authority of the federal government by making use of citizens as a form of collateral to be used against foreign debt. The 14th amendment to the Constitution, according to Gale and others, converts sovereign citizens into federal ones by using their agreeing to accept benefits directly from the federal government, and thereby become indebted to the government, creating a new problem. To free themselves from their oppressive government, they instead label themselves as a group that is “seeking the Truth”, and also challenges the authority of the government and, in some instances, do so by directly engaging in acts of domestic terrorism (Loreleil, 2014).

One of the central issues debated by and acted upon as Sovereigns, are the various laws concerning taxes where a variation of the argument that promotes civil disobedience is that the person is not directly subject to various laws because the person is considered “sovereign.” These challenges to the government have been repeatedly rejected by the courts especially, the tax courts (e.g., *Cheek v. United States*, 498 U.S. 192 (1991)). The basis of the argument was that the individual is not to be subject to federal income tax because they are an “individual sovereign citizen.” This reasoning, if ever validated, would make every individual a nation unto themselves, such that prosecution using common and statutory laws would be unlikely. The sovereigns, having been rejected by the government, have performed isolated and sporadic acts of domestic terrorism, and are

individuals that need to be monitored by the government in an effort to avoid escalation (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011).

### **Conclusion**

This chapter considered key domestic terror groups and described their ideological positions, their histories, and their fears. The various groups described offer insights that can aid in creating a comprehensive, predictive model of future group behavior and assist law enforcement. Chapter 3 offers an analysis of policies, determinants, and social and behavioral characteristics that promote an in-depth review of the domestic terrorist groups.

### Chapter 3: Literature Review

This review examined current scholarly articles and studies related to key themes identified in the study that are useful to incorporate in a prevention model. Based on the findings of Chapter 2, the factions described there will be reviewed through a temporal evaluation. Searching for common themes and variables defining a particular time period supporting the growth and evolution of a domestic terror group will provide insights and the opportunity to develop deterrent capabilities, such as predictive behavior models (Davidson & Hudson, 2012).

By developing each group, themes were interconnected and analyzed based on the literature offered by standard academic databases, including ERIC, Sage, and ProQuest, focusing on primary and peer-reviewed research articles and studies. Review of the various domestic organization typologies was developed in response to the problems law enforcement faces in responding to domestic terror groups. The researcher synthesized relevant research and provided recommendations at the conclusion of the study for stakeholders (Rosenau, 2013).

Boolean search terms used to achieve saturation include: U.S. domestic terrorism groups, governmental responses, evolution of domestic terror organizations, history of key terrorist groups in the United States, and the future of U.S. domestic terrorism. By understanding the past and the creation and growth of the important types of U.S. domestic terror groups, unifying variables can be identified, thus allowing for statistical analysis. Supported by research, the analysis can draw from key inputs and outputs to develop models that can provide U.S. law enforcement agencies the opportunity to identify trends, hot-spots, and emerging issues related to domestic terrorism. Building on

past research utilizing quantitative methodological approaches, the potential damage from these organizations can be minimized, and give law enforcement the upper-hand in preventing future attacks (Schmitt, 2010).

### **U.S. Public Policy on Terrorism from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan**

*“I’m a father and I’m a Christian; I’m a businessman and I’m a Christian; I’m a farmer and I’m a Christian; I’m a politician and I’m a Christian. The most important thing in my life beyond all else is Jesus Christ.”* - President Carter (Nielsen, p. 18, 1977)

#### **President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)**

In examining Jimmy Carter’s approach to terrorism or his overall approach to policy development, it is important to consider his devotion to his Christian faith. Reflecting on the tumultuous and politically charged sixties and seventies, some of Carter’s advisors felt that he should not be so straightforward regarding his faith for the fear that he would be viewed as a religious ideologue and alienate a new generation of voters. However, what was underestimated by Carter’s advisors was that even though Americans were not as indoctrinated or theologically dogmatic as their parents or grandparents, most Americans still expected that elected leaders, especially the President of the United States, be of the Christian faith. The uncomfortable or unnerving aspect to some extent was the time when elected officials, especially a President, gave the appearance that faith guided all their decisions on domestic and foreign policy. Although President Carter was aware of this concern, he was so deeply rooted in his religious convictions it was clear that his Christianity was inextricably connected to his personality. As a result, any attempts President Carter would have made to sever his decisions from his faith would often place him in an uncomfortable position.



In qualifying his moral turpitude, Carter's religious convictions were essential in developing policies on terrorism (Ariail & Heckler-Feltz, 1996). As Carter (1976) believed that his faith would make him a different type of President from his immediate predecessors, researchers determined that those who knew and worked with Jimmy Carter believed that his religious faith was the core of his existence. To the Secret Service, he was known as "The Deacon," and he would often forthrightly proclaim that his "religious faith has always been at the core of [his] existence" (Ariail & Heckler-Feltz, 1996, p. 28).

When President Jimmy Carter was elected as America's 39<sup>th</sup> president of the United States, combating domestic terrorism was not considered a top priority. By the time President Carter was elected, incidents of domestic extremism had drastically declined. Furthermore, Carter was intensely focused on dismantling the hierarchical *modus operandi* of the Nixon/Ford administrations and approaching acts of terrorism from a more humanitarian perspective where conflict negotiation, soft sanctions, coercion and compromise would be the alternative to military force. One of Carter's primary concerns from the outset was to set up his foreign policy machinery in a way that would avoid the extreme centralization of power that Kissinger, as special assistant for national security affairs, had acquired during Nixon's first term and that led him to replace for all practical purposes the secretary of state (George, George, & Stern, 1998). In an attempt to inhibit the special assistant from becoming the dominant actor in the system and a *de facto* "chief" of staff, Carter planned to rely on collegiality among his principal national security advisers which consisted of the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, a special assistant, and the vice president (George et al., 1998). Their mandate was to

achieve the necessary interaction and coordination required to engage those individuals or nations perceived as threat or potential threat to America's national interest (George et al., 1998).

While Carter accepted that occasionally it was necessary to use military force, he rejected the Clausewitzian notion that domestic and international conflict be solely resolved through military and law enforcement intervention. Carter rejected the imperialist dogma that differentiated between good wars and bad wars. To Carter, all wars were considered bad because it devalued the human condition. President Carter based on his religious beliefs, felt that it was imperative for any leader to find paths to peace and for him, it was not only a presidential priority, but it was in line with biblical precept found in Matthew 5:9, which states, "Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God."

Emerging from the Wilsonian southern traditions, Carter's approach to governing was far different than his predecessor's, and he was determined to challenge corruption as a political and religious necessity. Carter considered himself as a reformer and progressive, putting his faith in science and technology as well as religion, to advance the human condition, not only in America, but globally. He thought political leadership should support a common good, rather than satisfy a small constituency of elites and lobbyists whom he thought were only interested in defiling the ideals of democracy. Carter admitted that he never had the stomach for "politics as usual," whether in international or domestic affairs; he did not love politics (Gould, 2003). Vice President Walter Mondale affirmed this sentiment when reflected on Carter's predisposition about politics: "Carter thought politics was sinful. The worst thing you could say to Carter if

you wanted to do something was that it was politically the best thing to do” (Gould, 2003, p. 182). Like Woodrow Wilson, Carter intended to act with honesty, fairness, and candor, leading people by example, and asking them to reach for a higher moral plane (Ariail & Heckler-Feltz, 1996).

Although President Carter’s faith was a key component to how he governed, his technocratic style and his collegial model of governance, although Nobel, would prove ineffective in the times of crisis when presidents are expected to “take charge.”

According to Richard Neustadt (1990):

Modern presidents need to be activists, experienced politicians, and possess a passion for politics. “The Presidency is a place for men of politics,” in fact, “extraordinary politicians.” Presidents must be political and learn the art of political compromise; they must exercise “the power to persuade” and “the power to persuade is the power to bargain.” (pp. 151-53)

President Carter’s quest to “sanctify” and “sanitize” his administration and Washington, D.C. prevented him from developing the political acumen needed to advance his policies. The press was routinely harsh and critical of Carter’s frequent public displays of faith; church historian Martin Marty explained that President Carter knew no other way to govern (Berggren & Rae, 2006).

Although President Carter was a devout Christian, there were incidents where his closest advisors would witness a persona that was far different than the congenial statesman displayed in public. His Chief Campaign Speech Writer, Patrick Anderson (1994), recounted incidents where President Carter engaged in mild uses of profanity, was known to be vindictive at times and would occasionally drink scotch and water in

moderation. Carter was a complex duplicitous technocrat that proved challenging to work for. In his book, Anderson (1994) made this observation of what it was like working for President Carter:

Hiding behind his big smile and pieties about love and peanut farming was a far more interesting and complex man than the voters knew. He possessed not only intelligence and high moral purpose, but a mixture of pride and piety that could make him quite maddening to deal with. I found much to respect in the candidate and much to regret in the man.

Despite, his shortcomings, his staff was convinced that post-Watergate, Jimmy Carter was a righteous and descent man who sincerely had a mission to restore integrity and honesty to government.

Although Jimmy Carter ascended to the president at a time when incidents of domestic terrorism were on the decline, his presidency was not immune and his decision-making in crisis situations would be tested in ways no one anticipated. Carter, like many of his predecessors, considered incidents of domestic terror as an annoyance better served by local authorities. This position became evident when on March 09, 1977, Hanafi Muslim extremists occupied B'nai B'rith headquarters, the Islamic Cultural Center, and city government buildings in Washington, DC, holding 134 people hostages (Naftali, 2006). By the time the sieges were over, a student reporter from Howard University had been shot to death and City Council member Marion Barry had been wounded in the chest (Naftali, 2006). At the time, under the existing procedures, the incident was managed by the District police (Naftali, 2006). It was the Police who called in the State department's Office for Combating Terrorism when it became clear that the ring leader of

the Hanafis, Hamaas Abdul Khaalis was interested in speaking with Arab representatives (Naftali, 2006). The Carter administration received regular updates regarding the incident, but they did not take the lead in resolving the crisis. Douglas Heck, the State's antiterrorism expert and chairman of the Working Group for Combating Terrorism, worked with Egyptian, Pakistani and Iranian ambassadors who were acting as mediators, in an attempt to resolve the situations without any more human casualties (Naftali, 2006).

On the evening of March 10, 1977, the Hanafi hostage incident, was resolved and all involved in the incident were sentenced to prison. The Carter administration undertook a low-level review of U.S. counterterrorism policy (Naftali, 2006). Initially, under the guidance of Jessica Tuchman, a National Security Council staffer, the process did not draw the full attention of the President's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski (Naftali, 2006). Brzezinski did not believe that domestic terrorism was a strategic issue," recalls William Odom who replaced Tuchman after she lost Brzezinski's support (Naftali, 2006). As a result, President Carter made no public statement regarding the Hanafi Hostage Crisis.

Jimmy Carter saw the terrorism problem tied to other international issues, and not only as threat in the United States (Smith & Thomas, 2001). In that context, Carter took a "trickle down" approach to domestic terrorism. That is, if he was effective at combating international terrorism, that would somehow curb or reduce the amount of domestic terrorism incidents. As a result, Carter was laser focused on dealing with terrorism on an international level. So much so that the 1980 Statute of Liberty Bombing received minimal attention from the Carter administration. He placed more emphasis on the

political character and “warlike” nature of terrorism, and less on its criminality (Smith & Thomas, 2001). What started out for Carter as political terrorism—a smorgasbord of sub-national, transnational groups, some with state sponsorship, willing to operate against U.S. and allied interests—ended as “microcosmic” warfare, a teapot war, that scalded the Carter Presidency in the end (Smith & Thomas, 2001). By 1980, the Iranian Hostage Crisis and international terrorism had consumed the Carter administration to the point where almost everything else was secondary, including the economy, the oil crisis, and how to deal with stagflation. Carter, true to his humanitarian world view and Judeo-Christian ethics worked tirelessly to create effective solutions to combat international terrorism through negotiations and sanctions. In May of 1980, the Carter Administration had developed an aggressive counter-terrorism program with elements that addressed the increased international terrorism threat (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Domestic terrorism was neither a concern to President Carter or the senior advisors of his administration. This was evident when Odom and Brzezinski made their positions known that the United States did not need an elaborate domestic counter-terrorism strategy (Naftali, 2006). As far as they were concerned, the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to U.S. interests and terrorism abroad was more significant than issues of domestic terrorism in the United States. Odom concluded that as a phenomenon [domestic] terrorism did not exist. "When it happens here [America], it is a crime." "When it happens abroad, it is war" (Naftali, 2006).

Jimmy Carter was frequently criticized for lacking compelling political vision and it is noted that he took on too many issues, lacked focus, and lacked priorities (Berggren & Rae, 2006).

By the end of the 1970s, state-sponsored terrorism became an unambiguous threat to U.S. interests, metaphorically devouring President Carter, which ultimately sealed his fate and re-election looked bleak if not impossible (Smith & Thomas, 2001). In December 1979, the U.S. Department of State began designating state sponsors of terrorism, designations that carry harsh penalties in trade and international relations with the United States (Smith & Thomas, 2001, p. 206). But these sanctions came a little too late. President Carter was already seen as weak when dealing with acts of terrorism on an international stage. Despite his efforts to shift the counter-terrorism paradigm from the United States might to a role of conflict resolution and mild coercion, Americans were disappointed with the Carter administration and they were looking for a President that would exude confidence, strength, and military might around the world. They wanted a leader that terrorists would fear and respect. In 1981, the American people elected former California Governor Ronald Reagan because he was the embodiment of toughness and confidence. The former actor who was known for his heroic portrayals in cowboy westerns was able to transfer that personification of “true grit” to the White House where he was expected to take a more aggressive approach in combating both international and domestic terrorism.

### **Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)**

When Ronald Reagan took office on January 20, 1981, he refocused U.S. counter-terrorism strategy from conflict negotiation and mediation to military action. Secretary of State Alexander Haig was emphatic when he announced that President Reagan’s approach to fighting terrorism would replace the Carter administration’s focus on advancing human rights throughout the world (Richelson & Evans, 2001). In his

inaugural speech, Reagan (1981) became the first president in U.S. history to mention the threat of international terrorism:

Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have. Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and prey upon their neighbors.

His speech was resilient and a warning to terrorist actors around the world that a new commander-in-chief was in the White House, and his name was Ronald Wilson Reagan. Reagan would be the first U.S. President to openly announce that he was waging war against global terrorism (Willis, 2003).

Like the Carter administration, the Reagan administration recognized the global threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, Reagan and his top security advisors viewed the Soviet Union far more critically and accused them of being a stealth sponsor of international terrorism and the Reagan administration was determined to disrupt and destroy all international terrorist networks that threatened U.S. interests. Throughout the presidential campaign, Reagan took every opportunity to characterize Carter as weak on issues of international terrorism particularly in his approach of dealing with the Soviet Union. While campaigning, Reagan would consistently inject the notion that America, in order to achieve world peace, we must do so by rebuilding its military and nuclear capabilities (Smith, Clymer, Silk, Lindsey, & Burt, 1980). The slogan, throughout the campaign was *Peace through Strength* and Reagan made it clear that the weakness of the Carter administration was the primary reason that “our allies are losing confidence in us



and our adversaries no longer respect us” (Smith et al., 1980). Once Reagan was elected in November of 1980, he was laser focused on a military arms build-up that rivaled the Soviet Union (Smith et al., 1980). He wasted no time in appointing long-time friend and World War II veteran Caspar Weinberger as his Secretary of Defense. Reagan wanted someone in the position who shared his views, zeal and disdain for the Soviet Union. In his book, *Fighting for Peace*, Weinberger (1990) confirmed Reagan’s assessment of his potential commitment to a position of parity with the Soviets when he wrote:

From then on I became almost totally immersed in defense and security issues, and would remain so with an intensity and single-mindedness that permitted thought about virtually nothing else, night and day, every day until the end of November 1987. (pp. 14-15)

Both Weinberger and Reagan were convinced that the Soviet Union, via instruments of terrorism, were on a mission to destabilize America’s system of democracy and freedom. Based on this premise, from 1981-1983, the Reagan administration, with dogged determination, developed strategies and policies that would counter, what they perceived as diabolical scheme by the Soviets to one day disrupt America’s system of democracy.

While the terrorism rhetoric-levels were high for incoming President Ronald Reagan, initially, the administration did not have in place the necessary strategic planning or the required counter-terrorism infrastructure to take decisive action that would yield positive results (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Reagan knew that he could ill-afford to authorize the execution of a military operation that would be a failure. The praxis of actual policy limped behind the fire-breathing rhetoric of the declared policy (Smith & Thomas, 2001, p. 238). Throughout his first term as president, Ronald Reagan skillfully

gave the appearance that he was the first commander-in-chief to develop a policy to combat international terrorism, when in actuality, he was only the first U.S. president to synthesize a terrorism protocol in 1986 with the issuance of National Security Decision Directive 207 (Rosenau, 2014). This directive resulted from the findings of the 1985 Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism, headed by then Vice-President George H.W. Bush, which highlighted the need for improved, centralized interagency coordination of the federal government's significant assets to respond to terrorist incidents (Rosenau, 2014). This directive was primarily focused on terrorist incidents abroad and was crafted to specifically to coordinate the national response and designate lead federal agencies to respond to and resolve terrorist incidents overseas and domestically (Rosenau, 2014). The U.S. State Department was renamed as the lead agency for developing international terrorism policy, procedures, and programs, while FBI remained the lead law enforcement agency for investigating and suppressing acts of domestic terrorism (Rosenau, 2014). However, like his predecessors, domestic terrorism never really became the primary focus of the Reagan administration. Incidents of international terrorism always took precedence even though every administration since the 1970s recognized the threat of domestic terrorism in the United States (Richelson & Evans, 2001). The only war American soil that Ronald Reagan would focus his attention and the nation's resources, was the *War on Drugs*. On October 02, 1982, President Reagan officially announced, in his weekly radio address, his administration's War on Drugs:

The mood toward drugs is changing in this country, and the momentum is with us.

We're making no excuses for drugs—hard, soft, or otherwise. Drugs are bad, and

we're going after them. As I've said before, we've taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag. And we're going to win the war on drugs.

In March 1983, President Reagan announced the formation of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to interdict the flow of narcotics into the United States (DEA, 1985). NNBIS was headed by then Vice President George Bush, and had an Executive Board made up of members from the State Department, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Transportation, Central Intelligence Agency, and White House Drug Abuse Policy Office (DEA, 1985).

Between 1980 and 1984, FBI anti-drug funding increased from \$8 million to \$95 million (Beckett, 1997). Department of Defense anti-drug allocations increased from \$33 million in 1981 to over \$1 billion in 1991 (Beckett, 1997). During that same period, DEA anti-drug spending ballooned from \$86 to over \$1 billion dollars, and FBI anti-drug allocations grew from \$38 to \$181 million (Beckett, 1997).

The Reagan administration was well aware of the disruption and destruction of domestic terrorists but determined early on in the development of their counter-terrorism policy that domestic terrorism did not rise to the level of receiving dedicated federal resources in combatting their subversive activities around the country. However, what the Reagan administration did not anticipate was that between 1981-1986, there would be a simultaneous resurgence of domestic terrorism from right-wing, left-wing, and para-military extremists. By 1981, there had been a resurgence of left-wing violence perpetrated by the May 19<sup>th</sup> Communist Organization (M19CO), Black Liberation Army (BLA), Jewish Extremist groups, Puerto Rican extremist groups, Anti-Castro/Cuban exile


extremists, and a few other ethno-nationalist terrorists re-energized their politically motivated violent campaigns (Rosenau, 2014).

On October 20, 1981, exactly 9 months into the Reagan administration, six men, comprised of members from BLA and M19CO, donned ski masks and robbed a Brink's armored truck in the Nanuet Mall in the upstate city of Nyack, New York. The guards were ambushed as they were loading the money into the truck (Castellucci, 1986). Brink's guard, Peter Paige, was killed immediately while his partner, Joe Trombino, was severely wounded (Rosenfeld, 2013). While both guards were incapacitated, the men grabbed the bags, hopped into a red Chevrolet van and headed for a vacant Corvette dealership where they had a U-Haul truck in waiting (Rosenfeld, 2013). Once they arrived to the dealership, they abandoned the Chevrolet van and transferred themselves and the \$1.6 million dollars to the U-Haul truck and headed for the New York State Thruway (Rosenfeld, 2013). A witness, who suspected something suspicious was afoot, contacted the police and gave a description of what she had seen. Police quickly set up roadblocks and stopped every U-Haul van in search of the suspects (Smith, Damphousse, & Roberts, 2006). Finally, on Exit 11, three Nyack police officers, with guns drawn, stopped Kathy Boudin and begin questioning her (Smith et al., 2006). Boudin feigned hysteria, and asked the police to "Put the guns down" because they were scaring her (Rosenfeld, 2013). Almost convinced that they had stopped the wrong U-Haul van, Sergeant Edward O'Grady decided to let her leave but Detective Arthur Keenen wanted to be sure and asked could he check the van (Rosenfeld, 2013). As the officers proceeded to inspect the van, six men emerged from the van and opened fire (Smith et al., 2006). Officer Waverly Brown and Sergeant O'Grady were both killed. Detective Keenen

managed to hide behind a tree and he was only slightly wounded (Rosenfeld, 2013). Kathy Boudin attempted to flee the scene but was captured by New York City Corrections Officer Michael Koch (Smith et al., 2006). A Honda, carrying a White male, White female and a Black male, crashed and its occupants were caught (Rosenfeld, 2013). The actual murderer, Chui Ferguson, fled into the woods but was later captured by the FBI and a Joint Terrorism Task Force (Rosenfeld, 2013). The Brinks robbery was a concern to federal investigators because it disproved law enforcement's previous theory that left-wing groups could not unite because of deep-rooted dogmatic ideology and diametrically opposed viewpoints. Nevertheless, the death of two officers and one security guard, domestic terrorist incidents on American soil were simply perceived as national media events regarding dissidents who engaged in sedition and criminal activity as a means to undermine U.S. democracy. As far as Reagan and his senior policy advisors were concerned, illegal drugs and crime were a greater threat to American society than comparatively low-level incidents of domestic terrorism that were undergirded by the Soviet Union as a tactic to destabilize democracy and advance communist ideals (Sterling, 1981).

Figure 2 demonstrates the frequencies of domestic terror attacks and their casualties over time from 1980-1986. In observing the figure, the height for the frequency of the attacks over this six (6) year period could be contributed to the disillusionment of left-wing extremist organizations who became frustrated with the slow-moving U.S. political process for substantive changes in human rights, peace treaties and trade agreements. Another reason could be attributed to American imperialism which is considered a tool for economic exploitation of less developed countries. In addition to

these possible explanations, there were several instances where left-wing extremist's traversed their native infighting to American soil which contributed to the steady increase of terrorist attacks from 1980-1982.




*Figure 2.* U.S. Domestic Terrorism Incidents and Casualties 1980-1986. *Note.* FBI Terrorist and Analytical Center (1986)

Despite the Reagan administration dismissive approach regarding instances of domestic terrorism, these attacks would only intensify. In January 1982, two Armenian immigrants murdered Turkish Consul General Kemal Arikan in Los Angeles. The group, Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, claimed responsibility for the killing, and one member was arrested (Bureau of Diplomatic Security, p. 263, 1985). The Justice Commandos demanded that the Turkish Government admit responsibility for “genocide,” specifically, the deaths of more than one million Armenians in Turkey in 1915 (Bureau of Diplomatic Security, p. 263, 1985). Initially, Reagan officials thought that local officials should be charged with providing security to foreign diplomats but local police chiefs

pushed back citing that they were already experiencing manpower and budget shortages (Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1985). On January 4, 1983, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Public Works and Transportation (1982) resolved the issue and passed Public Law 97-418. This act expanded the authority of the U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division, by allowing the agency to provide protective services to foreign diplomats as well as providing funds to the Department of State and local police agencies that assist with protection. This incident of domestic terrorism concerned the Reagan administration because they wanted to assure their allies that diplomats travelling to America would be kept safe while visiting the United States on diplomatic missions. Ironically, the issue was not viewed as an American problem.

As far as the Reagan administration was concerned, this was an issue that *spilled over* from Armenia to America and should be considered an anomaly. Furthermore, international incidents of terrorism were given far more media attention and the Reagan administration wanted to capitalize on American's fear by channeling these concerns into support for their aggressive counter-terrorism agenda. High profile incidents of Americans being kidnapped or killed by foreign terrorists demanded a response from a president who promised that under his administration, the United States will no longer appear weak and as a nation, we will command respect through military action. From 1980-1986, the Reagan administration was stretched and challenged by a tumultuous synchronized wave of unrestrained pandemonium both nationally and internationally. According to the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Threat Analysis Division report generated on December 31, 1985, international terrorist attacks were responsible for 86 American casualties, while the 1986 FBI report listed 57

casualties that resulted from domestic terrorism incidents and not all the casualties listed in the FBI report were American citizens.



*Figure 3.* Number of International Terrorist Incidents 1981-1985. *Note.* Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security 1985

Figure 3 demonstrates terrorist activities abroad against U.S. interest abroad to include U.S. businesses and citizens. From 1981 – 1985, there is a steady increase of attacks on U.S. facilities and interests with a significant increase between 1984 -1985. This increase of attacks against U.S. interests abroad could possibly be attributable to the frustration of radical Islamic fundamentalist who wanted to *purge* U.S. influence and presence from the Middle-East. Hezbollah waged war against the United States because members strongly believed that the CIA was responsible for the attempted murder of their leader, Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. Both Iran and Lebanon



sponsored terrorism against the United States and they were determined to force America to withdraw military forces from the Middle-East.

Reagan wasted no opportunity in portraying international terrorism attacks on American citizens and their interests as acts of defiance and a war on U.S. democratic principles. Every attack gave Reagan a platform to “*go public*” and emphatically denounce international terrorism while his top security advisors were simultaneously planning an aggressive military response.

Reagan and his administration were driven by their priorities and public opinion. Fifty-seven casualties on American soil paled in comparison to eighty-six (86) international terrorism incidents in size, scope, and media coverage. Although Reagan was not as astute as many of his senior policy advisors on issues of international affairs, he was a master tactician when it came to understanding how important the media was in shaping or reshaping the opinions of the American people. These seemingly well-choreographed press conferences allowed Reagan to portray America to the international community as being strong and confident, especially since these characteristics, many Americans felt, were severely diminished under the Carter administration. Reagan was well aware of this sentiment and his focus on international terrorism was unshakable. On July 8, 1985, while speaking at the Annual convention of the American Bar Association, Reagan named Iran, Libya, Cuba, North Korea and Nicaragua "a confederation of terrorist states." (Reagan, 1985). Reagan (2005) went on to issue a scathing indictment of state sponsored terrorism:

So, there we have it -- Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua -- continents away, tens of thousands of miles apart, but the same goals and objectives. I

submit to you that the growth in terrorism in recent years results from the increasing involvement of these states in terrorism in every region of the world. This is terrorism that is part of a pattern, the work of a confederation of terrorist states. Most of the terrorists who are kidnaping and murdering American citizens and attacking American installations are being trained, financed, and directly or indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments -- a new, international version of Murder, Incorporated. And all of these states are united by one simple criminal phenomenon -- their fanatical hatred of the United States, our people, our way of life, our international stature.

Reagan characterized state-sponsored terrorism of as "an act of war" to which the United States had the right to respond militarily (Naftali, n.d.). Not only did Reagan hold states accountable, he was adamant that individual terrorist or terrorist groups would be apprehended and brought to justice on American soil (Naftali, n.d.). Reagan (1985) was emphatic as he went on to say:

There can be no place on Earth left where it is safe for these monsters to rest, or train, or practice their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together, or unilaterally, if necessary, to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary - anywhere.

By 1985, domestic terrorism had declined. This decline had less to do with counter-terrorism measures at the federal level and more to do with aggressive investigations, prosecutions, and convictions by state governments. In addition, left-wing terrorist groups were unable to garner massive support for their outdated political agenda due to diametrically opposed ideologies, internal competition for control, the arrest and sentencing of charismatic leaders, the demands of being a fugitive and the prevalence of

multiple cognitive distortions weakened the sustainability of these groups. But the JDL, although they were less prolific than years past, and their membership in decline, they would commit a nefarious act of revenge that would reinforce the Reagan administration's polemic that all Muslims were complicit in acts of international terrorism.

On October 11, 1985, at approximately 9:00 am, a bomb exploded at the Santa Ana, California office of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), killing 41-year-old Palestinian activist, husband and father, Alex Odeh (Habib, 2016). Initially, the murder of Odeh was thought to be as the result of his public reverence of Yasser Arafat on television the day before his murder (Habib, 2016). But that theory soon dissipated as the investigation revealed that the plot was too elaborate to be completed in just one day (Habib, 2016). Furthermore, The Los Angeles Times reported on Oct. 12, 1985, the day after Odeh was killed, FBI spokesman John Hoos stated they had "no evidence linking Odeh's remarks to the bombing" (Habib, 2016). A more plausible theory, and one that was circulated throughout the Arab-Palestinian community, was that Alex Odeh was murdered by the JDL as retaliation for the October 7, 1985, murder of Jewish-American Leon Klinghoffer at the hands of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) while he was on the Italian cruise liner *Achille Lauro* (Hoffman, 1986). This incident prompted an immediate response from the Reagan administration and although this incident occurred in international waters, Reagan wanted the perpetrators extradited as a guarantee they would be tried for the murder of an American citizen. In fact, when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak secretly arranged for the hijackers to be smuggled out of the country, Israeli Intelligence notified American Intelligence who in turn relayed this

information to President Reagan (Heymann, 1990). Incensed, Reagan immediately approved for Navy fighter pilots to force the plane carrying the hijackers to land at a NATO airbase in Sicily with last minute approval from Italian Prime Minister Benedetto Craxi (Heymann, 1990). What Reagan and his team failed to mention was that there were also two transport planes carrying Delta Force troops with orders to arrest all the passengers on Egyptian plane and transport them to the United States to be tried for murder (Heymann, 1990). Italian officials blocked this move, which strained relations between the United States and Italy.

The Reagan administration was relentless in their pursuit of those responsible for the death of Leon Klinghoffer while the investigation of Alex Odeh, in comparison, seemingly moved at a pace of disinterest. Ronald Reagan exacerbated the Palestinian community's suspicions of indifference when he met Mrs. Marilyn Klinghoffer to offer his condolences for the loss of her husband but the same courtesy was not extended to Alex Odeh's widow, Norma Odeh (Palermo, 1985). Despite the sharp criticism from leaders in the Arab-Palestinian community, a spokesman for the Reagan administration said the President had no intentions of meeting with the Odeh family (Palermo, 1985). Ironically, the Department of Justice, in conjunction with the FBI, would finally take over the Alex Odeh murder investigation from local law enforcement because it had finally concluded that Odeh's death was the result of a domestic terror attack (Habib, 2016).

By the end of his second and final term, Reagan and his administration worked incessantly to restore the credibility and the image of the Great Communicator after the Iran-Contra Affair stained his reputation and the image. More importantly, Reagan knew that the closest he would come to serving a third term in office to further advance his

foreign policy agenda would be the election of his vice-president, George H. W. Bush. Consequently, the administration never allotted the time or the space required to aggressively combat domestic terrorism. Like the Carter administration, Reagan dismissed the notion that domestic terrorism was an existential or societal stability challenge and continued to stress the criminality of domestic terrorist activities and their behavior was nothing more than civil disobedience. Not surprisingly, this sentiment regarding domestic terrorism would carry over to the next administration when George H. W. Bush was eventually elected the as the 41<sup>st</sup> president of the United States. Bush was integral in the development of the Reagan counter-terrorism strategy and like his predecessor, Bush and his senior advisors would focus almost exclusively on combating international terrorism.

### **U.S. Terrorism Policy from George H. W. Bush to Bill Clinton**

#### **George H. W. Bush (1989-1993)**

George H. W. Bush was a permanent fixture in Washington politics since his 1966 win of a congressional seat to the House of Representatives after defeating challenger Frank Briscoe (then district attorney) for the 7<sup>th</sup> district of Texas (O'Reilly & Renfro, 2006). Bush quickly became a rising star in the Republican Party and was well known throughout the state of Texas as a staunch conservative. In 1970, President Richard Nixon convinced Bush to vacate his seat in the House of Representatives and make another run for the United States Senate. Unfortunately, this was a miscalculation by both Nixon and Bush. Former congressman Lloyd Bentsen proved to be a formidable opponent and defeated George H. W. Bush denying him a chance to serve in the U.S. Senate. Disappointed by his second loss in his bid for the U.S. Senate, Bush's political

career seemed uncertain until President Nixon tapped him to become Ambassador to the United Nations where served from 1971-1973 (Hess, 2001). Bush would continue to build his foreign policy credentials under President Gerald Ford when in 1974, he accepted Ford's invitation to become the Chief U.S. Liaison to China and 3 years later the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Hess, 2001).

On January 20, 1989, George Herbert Walker Bush ascended to the office of the presidency with more foreign policy experience, and arguably more government experience, than any of his predecessors (Knott, 2005). In constructing his administration, Bush wanted to surround himself with people that were more agreeable to his style of management. Bush was a reserved strategic thinker that did not operate on emotion or external pressures, more importantly, he did not want to be surrounded by a cabinet of "yes men." Therefore, Bush methodically forged an administration that placed a priority on a collegial exchange of ideas, relying on solid analysis and formal decision-making (Rothkopf, 2005). His senior, most trusted advisors included National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell (Knott, 2005). These picks were individuals that Bush had established a personal relationship at some point in his career while in Washington with a temperament mirrored his own. Bush however, made a notable departure in temperament and style with his selection of John Sununu. A graduate of the prestigious M.I.T. University and engineer by training, Sununu was very domineering and was known to block access to the president. Despite his proclivity to be openly ostentatious, Sununu was brilliant, capable, and he made the controversial decisions that made President Bush feel uncomfortable.

The “full court press” against international terrorism began under Ronald Reagan (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Bush, being the progenitor of the Reagan counterterrorism Task Force, was expected to approach terrorism with the same zeal as his predecessor. Bush however, despite the rhetorical statements against acts of terrorism, became content and preferred that the United States take a defensive or reactionary approach. To the chagrin of *Reaganites*, the Bush Administration’s decision to gradually deprioritize the threat of terrorism was viewed as disingenuous considering that he assured foreign policy conservatives continuity with the counter-terrorism policies of the Reagan administration once he was elected president. Bush’s NSC adviser, Brent Scowcroft, said terrorism never really came up on the White House radar screen during the Bush Administration except during the release of the hostages in Lebanon (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Overall, neither Bush nor Scowcroft viewed terrorism as a strategic threat. This position however would cause Bush’s image to suffer under hardline conservatives. Although Bush skillfully crafted his image during his presidential campaign as a forceful leader, his reversal of policy on terrorism had Reagan stalwarts resurrect images and conversations of a salient theme that haunted Bush throughout his career at the White House: President George H. W. Bush was still a deferential, indecisive, wimp (O’Reilly & Renfro, 2006).

The Bush administration’s low-key, non-engagement approach to counterterrorism was actually a strategy put forth by then Secretary of State, James Baker. Baker rationalized that if the administration was less visible and less vociferous, this would keep terrorists guessing and ultimately give the United States a tactical advantage both operationally and psychologically. Bush embraced this strategy because it was effective and it was more in line with his personality traits and management style. More

importantly, it freed him from the burden of acting like Ronald Reagan in order to appease a conservative base constantly judged his performance using their own self-created and highly subjective *Reagametrics*. Nevertheless, Bush approached foreign affairs with characteristic conservatism and pragmatism (Knott, 2005). His approach to any issue was methodical and he was comfortable in a collegial setting surrounded by likeminded senior staff members who would give him honest feedback in their critique of his policy and strategic plans to best accomplish the administrations overall goals. Bush was never a person to rush into new actions or policy changes because they were popular with voters or the Congress (Knott, 2005). When he acted, he did so with firm conviction and determination because Bush and his top advisors would analyze the situation from almost every angle. Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of any operation, Bush relished uncertainty and always wanted potential outcomes to be as accurate as humanly possible.

Although Bush was perceived as weak by many Reagan loyalists for reducing *tough talk* rhetoric and lessening threats of terrorism, he maintained and supported many of the policies of the Reagan administration. He retained the “no quid pro quo” policy when it came to negotiating with terrorists, continued emphasis on international cooperation, which allowed him to negotiate the release of the hostages during the Lebanon hostage crisis without the military force, ransom payments or an exchange of weapons (Smith & Thomas, 2001). While levels of international terrorism increased during the Gulf War, they quickly returned to much lower post-Cold War levels when Bush proved to terrorists that his low-key persona should not be mistaken for weakness or timidity (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Bush authorized so-called “snatch” military



operations where U.S. forces would covertly enter another country and capture notorious drug dealers and terrorist and bring them to America to stand trial (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Despite the international backlash from world leaders who felt disrespected that the U.S. did not seek their approval, these operations were popular with the American people and put drug dealers and terrorists on notice they could not out run the *long arm* of U.S. justice (Smith & Thomas, 2001).

As the Bush presidency was coming to the end of its first term, the success of Operation Desert Shield in thwarting Saddam Hussein's plan to annex Kuwait by force, was thought to be enough for Americans to elect Bush to a second term. Although the operation afforded Bush high favorability ratings, his re-election campaign was viewed as disorganized and off message (O'Reilly & Renfro, 2006). During the re-election campaign, Bush struck many Americans as a bumbling New England Yankee whose mangled syntax and unfamiliarity with checkout counter scanners invited derision (O'Reilly & Renfro, 2006). American voters perceived that President Bush was far too concerned with foreign policy and not nearly enough on domestic issues (Knott, 2005). Moreover, during his first-term, he alienated Reagan stalwarts by breaking his promise not to raise taxes, softening his position on international terrorism, and cutting military spending (Knott, 2005). Without their backing, hardline Reagan supporters calculated that Bush's defeat was inevitable and would guarantee him a spot in the pantheon of utterly forgettable presidents and the studious successor to the popular Ronald Reagan never evolved into the heir apparent conservatives voted for in 1988 (O'Reilly & Renfro, 2006). On Tuesday, November 3, 1992, Americans voted for change and elected William Jefferson Clinton as the 42<sup>nd</sup> President of the United States.

**Bill Clinton (1993-2001)**

*“Terrorism is at the top of the American agenda, and it should be at the top of the world’s agenda.”* - President Clinton, Address to the UN General Assembly, September

1998

On January 20, 1993, after President Clinton was sworn into office, it was explicitly clear that terrorism did not figure at all as an issue in the presidential campaign of 1992 and the foreign policy experts of the victorious Clinton team did not list terrorism as a priority for the incoming administration (Naftali, 2006). Clinton and his senior policy advisors reasoned that lowered terrorism statistics did not warrant maintaining the counter-terrorism infrastructure put in place by his predecessor (Smith & Thomas, 2001). But, what the Clinton administration did not take into account was without American leadership on issues of international terrorism, and a contingent strategy to combat potential incidents of domestic terrorism, the United States would lag behind if a reinvigorated terrorism campaign suddenly emerged. (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Critics of the Clinton administration’s new approach towards counter-terrorism felt that he had dumbed-down, deemphasized, defunded, and deconstructed counter-terrorism to a point where it left the U.S. in a vulnerable position (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Thirty-seven days into the Clinton administration, his critics would be vindicated in their excoriation of President Clinton’s policy position on terrorism.

On Friday, February 26, 1993, a massive truck bomb exploded in the parking garage of the World Trade Center’s (WTC) North Tower in New York City. This would be only the beginning. Like Ronald Reagan, the Clinton presidency would be confronted with a simultaneous rise of terrorism from various ideological and religious perspectives

both nationally and internationally. Most notably, on the domestic front, was pro-life domestic terrorists. President Clinton was the first pro-choice President since Jimmy Carter and within 1 month of his election anti-abortionist fires caused \$1.5 million dollars of damage to abortion clinics around the country (National Abortion Federation, 1993).

The terrorists involved in 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the 1995 Tokyo sarin-gas attack, the 1996 Oklahoma City Bombing, and the 1998 East Africa bombings were the unmistakable harbingers of a new more vastly more threatening form of terrorism which were designed to produce casualties on a massive scale (Simon & Benjamin, 2000). Prior to the World Trade Center bombing, The Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI and other law enforcement officials had been complacent about major international terrorist incidents in the U.S. (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations weakened America's first line of defense against international terrorism by cutting budgets, losing experts and refocusing national attention away from terrorism being a real threat to American security (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Despite the Clinton administration and DOJ's lack of terrorists' response readiness, the FBI investigation was relentless in finding the perpetrators who committed such a heinous act that killed six and injured more than 1000 people (9/11 Report, 2004). But like every president before him, Clinton viewed the bombing as a criminal act and not a security threat. A responding FBI agent was reported as saying that it was a miracle that the incident did not yield more fatalities (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). After the bombing, President Bill Clinton ordered his National Security Council to coordinate a response to the attack (9/11 Report, 2004). Federal, states, and local law enforcement agencies worked feverishly to find the culprits (9/11 Report, 2004).

The perpetrators of the WTC bombing turned out to be a group of New Jersey men who had been on the FBI's radar as suspected terrorists for at least 2 years (Parachini, 2000). The mastermind, Ramzi Yousef, was assumed to be a naturalized Pakistani citizen who entered the U.S. on September 1, 1992 (Dirgham, 1995). Although he possessed an Iraqi passport, he claimed to have been born in Kuwait (Dirgham, 1995). During the investigation, it was discovered that Yousef, attended a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, where he perfected his skills as an explosives expert (Parachini, 2000). After arriving in the United States, Yousef went to live in New Jersey with Musab Yasin, an Iraqi whose brother, Abdul Rahman Yasin, also arrived in New Jersey from Iraq shortly after Yousef (Parachini, 2000). Mohammad Salameh attended the Mosque of Sheikh Omar Abdul an extremist Sunni Muslim cleric who had moved to the United States from Egypt in 1990 (9/11 Report, 2004). In speeches and writings, the sightless Rahman, often called the "Blind Sheikh," preached the message of the Egyptian radical, Sayyid Qutb and quoted his seminal work *Milestones*, in which Qutb characterized the United States as the oppressor of Muslims worldwide and asserted that it was their [Muslims] religious duty to fight against God's enemies [America] (9/11 Report, 2004). Yousef was convinced that the *West* was evil and a threat to the Islamic way of life and it was now his duty to punish America for the perceived atrocities inflicted on Muslims.

After the bombing, Salameh made an unsophisticated, dull-witted attempt to divert investigator's attention by reporting the truck he rented to commit the terrorist act as stolen on March 3, 1993 (9/11 Report, 2004). What raised law enforcement's suspicion even further was the fact that Salameh called the Ryder truck rental company several times requesting, and sometimes demanding a refund of his 400-dollar rental deposit

(9/11 Report, 2004). On March 4, 1993, FBI SWAT moved in and arrested Salameh as he attempted to collect his deposit (9/11 Report, 2004). As the FBI Task Force connected the “dots,” and it led them to co-conspirators Ahmed Ajaj, Nidal Ayyad, a trained engineer who had acquired chemicals for the bomb, and Mahmoud Abouhalima, was the accomplice who helped mix the chemicals (9/11 Report, 2004). Another associate, Ibrahim Elgabrownny, while being served with an ATF search warrant attacked the serving agent but was immediately subdued and arrested (Stewart, 2015). While executing the search warrant, agents discovered Nicaraguan passports, driver’s licenses, and identification cards bearing the photos of his cousin, El Sayyid Nosair (Stewart, 2015). As the search continued and after further investigation, it was clear that agents did not have enough evidence to connect Elgabrownny to the bombing, however, there was enough evidence to prosecute him for passport and document fraud (Stewart, 2015). The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York office vigorously pursued these lesser charges and indicted Elgabrownny on assault and passport fraud charges (Stewart, 2015).

On May 24, 1994, during the sentencing of four of the convicted WTC bombers, Judge Kevin T. Duffy asserted that the perpetrators had incorporated sodium cyanide into the bomb with the intent to generate deadly hydrogen cyanide gas that would kill everyone in one of the towers. The Judge stated:

You had sodium cyanide around, and I’m sure it was in the bomb. Thank God the sodium cyanide burned instead of vaporizing. If the sodium cyanide had vaporized, it is clear what would have happened is the cyanide gas would have been sucked

into the north tower and everybody in the north tower would have been killed. That to my mind is exactly what was intended. (Duffy, 1994)

Although the FBI Joint Task Force made the arrest rather quickly, Ramazi Yousef, the mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, evaded capture (Stewart, 2015). FBI agents worked tirelessly and used all their resources to bring Yousef to justice. During the course of the investigation, the FBI discovered that Yousef was in the process of planning more attacks within the United States including the simultaneous bombing of a dozen U.S. international flights (Stewart, 2015). But with some 700 FBI agents worldwide, Yousef was captured in Pakistan in February 1995, returned to America, and convicted along with the truck driver, Eyad Ismoil (Stewart, 2015). Although the work performed by the FBI Joint Task Force and the U.S. Attorney's Office, the swiftness and the efficiency of the investigation created an impression that law enforcement was well-equipped to deal with this new form of "modern" terrorism (9/11 Report, 2004).

President Clinton created and reformulated the "new-terrorism" discourse, which he characterized as borderless and possessing the catastrophic threat of weapons of mass destruction. Clinton forced Americans to confront to the realization that homegrown terror was no longer a theoretical abstraction that would be "birthed" from a series of societal breakdowns. In fact, as President Clinton surmised, terrorism has proven that it could come from "within or beyond our borders" (Clinton, 1995a, p. 832) and the tentacles of terrorism no longer skirt the edges of American society while wreaking havoc abroad, and instead terrorist had "become an equal opportunity destroyers, with no respect for borders" (Clinton, 1996a, p. 1257). In other words, there was no longer a clear

boundary between domestic and international terrorism. Terrorists had shown that resilience paired with criminal ingenuity was difficult to counter and America would become increasingly susceptible to foreign attacks whether they be random or target specific. Moreover, Clinton's discourse on international terrorism highlighted the real threat of domestic terrorists' incidents and posited the theory that so-called rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were skillfully, and strategically aimed at the United States for the sole purpose of disrupting American democracy and instilling a fear that would give terrorists *de facto* political leverage. Rogue states, according to Clinton, were allies of terrorists, who hated the United States. In his remarks at a World Jewish Congress dinner, Clinton (1995b) stated, "Nations like Iran and Iraq and Libya aim to destabilize the region. They harbor terrorists within their border. They establish and support terrorist base camps in other lands; they hunger for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction" (p. 616).

Although President Clinton said all the right things after the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, there was a reluctance by the President and his administration to lobby Congress for more resources directed at combatting terrorism (9/11 Report, 2004). Like past presidents, Clinton's focus was on combatting white-collar crimes, gang violence, and the war on drugs (9/11 Report, 2004). On September 1, 1993, President Clinton chose Louis Freeh as the new Director of the FBI. Freeh immediately recognized that terrorism was considered to be the greatest threat America and he moved quickly to protect American interests by increasing the number of legal attaché offices abroad with a specific focus in the Middle-East and urged FBI agents to be proactive in terrorism plots (9/11 Report, 2004). In fact, in his efforts to procure more funding for counter-terrorism,

Freeh told Congress, "...merely solving this type of crime is not enough; it is equally important that the FBI thwart terrorism before such acts can be perpetrated" (9/11 Report, 2004, p. 76). In 2000, the FBI assigned 76% of its agents to criminal cases, roughly 21% to counterintelligence, and just 2% to 3% to counterterrorism (DOJ, 2003). Of the FBI's 12,730 convictions in 1998, more than half involved drugs, bank robberies, and bank fraud, whereas only 37 related to terrorism (Gulati, Rivkin, & Raffaelli, 2016, p. 13)

Freeh experienced significant "pushback" from the senior agency officials, Congress, and the Department of Justice even though he had managed to forge a relationship with the CIA to share intelligence regarding terrorists' activities. Moreover, Freeh created a Counterterrorism Division to work in conjunction with the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (9/11 Report, 2004). Despite his best efforts, Freeh was unable to convince Congress, the Department of Justice or President Clinton that counter-terrorism was significant enough to shift resources away from areas violent crime or drug enforcement (9/11 Report, 2004).

In 1996, President Clinton signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Simon and Benjamin, 2000). Under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), prisoners convicted by a state court must file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus within one year of "the date on which the judgment became final" unless one of three exceptions applies (Harvard Law Review, 2013, p. 319). In the case of certain impediments to filing, including unconstitutional state action, recognition of a new right by the Supreme Court, or recent discovery of facts crucial to the petition, the limitation obtains one year after removal of the impediment (Harvard Law Review, 2013). In terms of terrorism, it authorized the creation of a special tribunal that had the



inherent authority to expedite the deportation of foreign terrorist without disclosing classified information to the deportee or his legal counsel (Simon & Benjamin, 2000). In addition, the law made it illegal for anyone to render financial or material assistance to a designated terrorist or their organization and it mandated that investigators recover and test all taggants in an attempt to trace the origin of the explosive(s) used in terrorist attacks (Simon & Benjamin, 2000).

In the first term of the Clinton administration counterterrorism initiatives were directly focused on providing local law enforcement agencies resources to protect Americans from external threats of violent extremists, building coalitions abroad in order to disrupt terrorism networks and more importantly, improve airport security both on the ground and in flight (Roberts, 2010). In President Clinton's second term, his administration had become increasingly aggressive towards international terrorists. In 1996, terrorists attacked the Khobar Towers and killed Nineteen United States Air Force personnel and wounded 372 (Riedel, 2015). On August 7, 1998, terrorist bombs exploded in front of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. As a result of this attack, 291 people were killed and nearly 5,000 injured (Corsun, 1998). Among the dead were 12 Americans and 32 Foreign Service Nationals employed by the U.S. Embassy (Corsun, 1998). On October 12, 2000, near Aden, Yemen, suicide terrorists used a small boat filled with explosives, pulled alongside of the USS Cole and detonated their explosives. The explosion ripped a hole in the side of the USS Cole approximately 40 feet in diameter and killed 17 U.S. Navy personnel and injured 40 others (FBI, 2000). The Clinton administration was being heavily criticized for not being forceful enough against terrorists who continued to take the lives of American soldiers,

diplomats, and personnel. The Clinton administration was accused of using the “failed” counter-terrorism policies of diplomacy and economic sanctions employed by the Jimmy Carter administration. As the Clinton presidency was coming to an end, President Clinton could ill afford to appear weak on terrorism if his vice-president, Al Gore was to succeed him in the Oval Office. The administration pivoted in their approach towards terrorism and became more aggressive in tone and willingness to use military force as a first option in combating terrorism. With a laser focus on international terrorist abroad and radical jihadists in the United States, the Clinton administration “shrugged” off anti-abortion terrorists as radical criminal fanatics best dealt with by local law enforcement. The actions of Timothy McVeigh, although concerning and horrific, was considered an anomaly of hatred that would quickly dissipate and there was no quantitative justification to dedicate resources combatting non-jihadist homegrown terrorism.

### **U.S. Terrorism Policy from George W. Bush to Barack Obama**

#### **George W. Bush (2000-2009)**

In his examination of the impact of religion on George W. Bush, Fineman contended:

[T]his president—this presidency—is the most resolutely ‘faith-based’ in modern times, an enterprise founded, supported and guided by trust in the temporal and spiritual power of God...But the Bush administration is dedicated to the idea that there is an answer to societal problems here and to terrorism abroad; give everyone, everywhere, the freedom to find God, too. (Fineman et al., 2003).

The scholarly literature on President W. Bush is equally limited in reviewing his politics and religion, noting there is a similar reluctance to examine Bush’s faith and its

impact on his political decision making. His campaign biography, published in 2000, as well as later works on the Bush administration refer to his faith, but do not explore its relevance or effect on his conduct in office. In five works on the Bush presidency, there are only two chapters on religion. One chapter is a brief discussion of his use of religious rhetoric, preference for moral certainties, and belief in universal values (Pfiffner, 2004). The other chapter explores Bush's political relationship with the religious right (Berggren & Rae, 2006). This lack of material gives rise to questions regarding the Bush presidency and the role faith had with domestic policies addressing terrorism.

President Bush transformed the White House into a place of faith drawing on his evangelical faith, and his cabinet members' choices reflected his strong religious background. His devotional habits during his administration, noting that he "opened every cabinet meeting with prayer and insisted on a high moral tone," promoted the idea and strength of religious connections to the creation of public policy while in the White House (Mansfield, 2003). The Bush White House was noted as being driven by a morality that supported a non-smoking, tea-totting, non-cussing affair, promoting a higher set of standards by the nation's leaders. George W. Bush's former speechwriter David Frum (an Orthodox Jew) gave an interview in 2003, in which he explained that if researchers wanted to understand the Bush White House, "you must understand its predominant creed and culture of modern Evangelicalism" (Frum, 2003, p. 3).

In many ways, George W. Bush management style was that of a Fortune 500 CEO. He was decisive in most of his actions and was very impatient when it came to bureaucratic "red tape" which he often deemed as unnecessary (Pfiffner & Davidson, 2003). This was in stark contrast to his father George H. W. Bush and his predecessor

Bill Clinton, who, as career politicians and government stalwarts, deemed it imperative to analyze every issue thoroughly and ensure that all angles had been examined and the appropriate response prepared depending on the outcome (Pfiffner & Davidson, 2003). President G. W. Bush, however, saw it as a strength to act decisively and intuitively. In his words, “I just think it’s instinctive. I’m not a textbook player. I’m a gut player” (Woodard, 2002). President Bush took his role in the Oval Office seriously and if a decision had to be made, he felt obligated as president “to force decisions, and to make sure it’s in everybody’s mind where we’re headed” (Woodard, 2002).

Confronted with a continuing rise of terrorism at home and abroad, both Clinton administrations were forced to place greater emphasis on terrorism, and as a result, between 1996 and 2000, the administration nearly doubled annual counter-terrorism expenditures (Dobbs, 2000). That emphasis did not continue when the George W. Bush administration assumed office in January 2001. During the 2000 American presidential election campaign, George W. Bush gave one foreign policy address. Not unexpectedly, domestic priorities prevailed at his Administration’s outset: education reform, the environment, private school vouchers, faith-based initiatives, energy sources and production, creation of prescription drug benefits, tax relief, an economic stimulus package, health care, values, ethics, and propounding a philosophy of “compassion in government.” (Stein, 2002, p. 52). During the first 8 months of 2001, the Bush administration took very little action regarding counter-terrorism, despite the warnings provided to him by the Clinton administration (Gellman, 2002). Bush’s national security team met formally nearly 100 times before the 9/11 attacks, but terrorism was the topic during only two of those meetings (Bridis, 2002).

When George W. Bush ran for president, it was clear that if he won, the United States military would no longer assume the role as the “world police.” Although President Bush believed that America should have a strategic military presence around the world, he was opposed to the substantial commitment the Clinton administration invested in long-term nation-building and humanitarian missions. Instead, the Bush administration placed emphasis on limited, but tactical global uses of military force and envisaged more of a support role in the areas of multilateral partnerships and nation building (Dobbins, Poole, Long, & Runkle, 2008). Domestic issues which contained foreign policy components--such as illegal drugs, trade questions, terrorism prevention, immigration concerns, energy matters, and currency stability-- also had some priority, but only if they affected the lives and immediate economic or physical well-being of Americans (Stein, 2002). In terms of foreign policy, the Bush administration had primarily focused its attention on China and Russia while simultaneously determining whether or not to entangle themselves in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Leffler, 2011). President Bush, along with his senior advisors did not consider the threat of global terrorism or the rising influence of radical Islam in America (Leffler, 2011). Richard Clarke, the chief counter-terrorism expert on the National Security Council along with CIA Director George Tenet, did their very best to convince in-coming President Bush, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, that Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden were a credible threats and that the issues regarding radical Islamic terrorism should be treated with a sense of urgency (Leffler, 2011).

The Bush administration was not completely dismissive of the warnings regarding counter-terrorism, but it became increasingly clear their agenda superseded any concerns of the previous administration. The Bush National Security Team was more concerned with devising a strategy on how to deal with "rogue" states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea with a specific focus on the best course of action to contain Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in Baghdad (Leffler, 2011). In the end, President Bush would take no definitive action on the counterintelligence provided to him by CIA Director Tenet or Terrorism expert Richard Clark. For the first 10 months of his administration, President Bush focused on fulfilling his campaign promises by executing his domestic agenda.

On September 4, 2001, Robert Mueller was sworn in as the sixth director of the FBI. However, with just seven days on the job, Mueller would be propelled into overseeing the largest criminal investigation in American history. Bush's domestic agenda was completely derailed as the president was faced with one of the worst domestic terror incidents since Oklahoma City in 1995.

At 8:46 a.m. on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a nation transformed (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). A hijacked commercial airliner traveling at hundreds of miles per hour and carrying some 10,000 gallons of jet fuel plowed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). At 9:03 a.m., a second airliner hit the South Tower and Fire and smoke billowed upward while Steel, glass, ash, and bodies fell below (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). In less than 90 minutes, the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, where approximately 50,000 people were employed, collapsed (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). The uncertainty of what was happening terrified the

Americans nationwide. As state and federal law enforcement officials attempted to determine what was happening in New York City, at 9:37 a.m., a third airliner crashed into the western front side of the Pentagon (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). At 10:03 a.m., a fourth airliner had targeted the White House but heroic passengers, who had been informed by friends and relatives via cell phone that America was possibly under terrorist attack, overtook the hijackers forcing the plane to crash in a field in Southern Pennsylvania (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004).

During the 9/11 attacks, President Bush had been visiting Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida when his Chief of Staff, Andrew Card entered the room, walked directly towards the president, and whispered in his ear that the World Trade Center had been struck by a commercial airliner (Warshaw, 2003). President Bush paused as if he were processing the information that had just been told to him. Shortly after, the Secret Service quickly escorted President Bush out of the school and rushed him back to Air Force One (Warshaw, 2003). While in the air, President Bush contacted National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice via secure communication and instructed her to begin to coordinate a response (Warshaw, 2003).

In a 2012 interview, then FBI director recounted his meeting with President Bush to discuss the United States' plan of action. According to Mueller, the conversation went something like this:

Mr. President, we have command centers that have been set up at each of the sites and we've started to identify the persons responsible for the attacks by their seat number. The president stops me and says "Bob, that's all well and good, and that's what I expect

the FBI to do. The FBI has done it throughout its existence. But my question to you today is, 'What are you doing to prevent the next terrorist attack? (Gulati, et al., 2016, p. 15)

After experiencing the worst terror attack on American soil, it had become clear to President Bush and his senior advisors that he had to do an *about-face* on his agenda to focus primarily on domestic issues (Brooks, 2012). The attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center had forced President Bush into the role of a *wartime president* instead of the reformer he spoke of on the campaign trail. Condoleeza Rice began to coordinate a *War Cabinet* as soon after she received the phone call from Air Force One (Warshaw, 2003). The cabinet consisted of senior level officials and they all were given specific assignments (Warshaw, 2003). CIA Director Tenet was charged with finding the source of the terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was charged with raising the military alert to Def-Con 3 to protect against further attacks, while Secretary of State Colin Powell, was charged with gathering information and support from President Vladimir Putin of Russia (Warshaw, 2003). The response to the 9/11 attacks, was a "*global war on terror*" (Leffler, 2011).

By 3:30 p.m. on September 11<sup>th</sup>, only hours after the first attack, Air Force One had landed at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska where Bush talked by conference call to the key players of the newly formed *War Cabinet* (Warshaw, 2003). Intelligence agencies from around the world began providing credible information as to who may have been responsible for the 9/11 attacks which allowed Tenet to surmise with certainty that the global terrorism group known as Al-Qaeda had were responsible for the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks (Warshaw, 2003). The Bush administration began to prioritize terrorists' threats and catapulted Saddam Hussein to the top of their list. In addition, Al-Qaeda, who was



said to be responsible for the attacks, the Taliban and regimes that harbored and succored terrorists were immediately classified as *enemies of the United States* that had to be brought to justice (Leffler, 2011). On September 12<sup>th</sup>, President Bush made the following public statement, “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war” (Barnes, 2001, p. 1869). Bush was determined to send the message and the war on terror was strategically crafted to send a strong message to terrorists’ networks around the world that America would spare no expense or resource in eliminating terrorism networks who threatened the United States or their interests. Military and intelligence officials were ordered to extract actionable intelligence, detain for as long as necessary, rendition known terrorists, and, in a few cases, torture terrorist suspects who refuse to willingly cooperate (Leffler, 2011).

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the abortive attack (possibly aimed at the White House or Camp David) that resulted in the crash of a jetliner in Pennsylvania had resulted in a new and extraordinary emphasis by the Bush administration on combating terrorism (Richelson & Evans, 2001). President Bush was emotionally impacted that more than 2,600 people died at the World Trade Center; 125 died at the Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes and the death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). For this reason, during the last 10 days of President Bush’s first term, key administration officials, particularly President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, repeatedly emphasized that their long-term objective is the destruction of terrorism networks a goal to be achieved by the death

or apprehension of terrorists, the destruction of their infrastructure and support base, and retaliation against states that aid or harbor terrorists (Richelson & Evans, 2001).

The 9/11 attacks forced a massive overhaul of the FBI. In 2002, while testifying before Congress, then FBI Director, Robert Mueller stated, “Starting immediately after the planes hit, when over half of our 11,500 agents suddenly found themselves working terrorism matters, it became clear that our mission and our priorities had to change.” Just a few years prior, former FBI Director Louis Freeh sought to implement changes that would have strengthened the agencies capabilities in preventing domestic terrorists attacks but this proposed shift in policy and mission was met with both internal and external resistance because terrorism was still classified and an overseas problem and the FBI’s core mission was “fighting crime” (Freeh, 2002). That all changed post 9/11. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there became a consensus among policy makers, politicians, and veteran FBI agents that the agency needed to change its core mission if there was any chance of preventing a catastrophe of this magnitude from ever happening again on American soil.

In the beginning of 2003, Muller and his top management team conducted a reassessment of their reorganization efforts and concluded their efforts were only adequate enough in the short term in preventing domestic threats of terrorism (Gulati, et al., 2016). In order address future threats to national security, Mueller and his team realized they needed to construct a model of prevention that synthesized both intelligence and law enforcement, an approach Mueller later coined as the “building foundations for intelligence” (Gulati, et al., 2016).

Although Mueller and his team made significant progress in their reorganization of the Bureau's counter-terrorism strategy, it was deemed not sufficient enough for protecting the nation's national security. Rather than the FBI thwarting domestic terror plots from internal intelligence gathering, there was too much reliance on external tips (Gulati, et al., 2016). This concerned Mueller and his team because the goal was to create a counter-terrorism response model that was proactive and gave them the ability to systematically analyze domestic terror threats based on internal data collection. To address this weakness, Mueller and his team established a new organizational unit at headquarters known as the Directorate of Intelligence (Gulati, et al., 2016). Although attitudes were changing in regards to the FBI's new role in matters of national security, they had not changed at a pace to Mueller's satisfaction. Furthermore, in order for the organizational culture to shift from the rigid mindset of prosecution and law enforcement, he thought it was imperative to hire a senior executive outside of the FBI who had an extensive background in intelligence gathering (Gulati, et al., 2016). This director would be spared the bureaucratic chain of command and report directly to Mueller. His selection of an National Security Agency (NSA) executive, although initially controversial, would later prove to be a good strategy. From the onset, the new director changed the hiring selection process. Whereas many of the pre-9/11 analysts were promoted into their roles from clerical positions, many of the new analysts had graduate degrees or military intelligence backgrounds (Gulati, et al., 2016, p. 20). Between fiscal years 2001 and 2006, the number of analysts in the FBI more than doubled, from 1,023 to 2,161 (Gulati, et al., 2016, p. 20). This new team of intelligence professionals were tasked for just one mission: integrate and disseminate valuable intelligence information (Gulati et al., 2016).

In 2007, Mueller enacted another one of his priority initiatives called the Strategic Execution Team (SET) and their function was to build the FBI's intelligence capabilities and integrate intelligence into FBI operations (Gulati et al., 2016, p. 24). The SET team focused on standardizing and upgrading the Field Intelligence Group's (FIG) best practices and codified models (Gulati et al., 2016). Once that task was complete, they placed them in a 61-page report, and rolled out a training program for all field personnel in 2008 which emphasized integrating national security and law enforcement at lower levels of the organization for effective, efficiency and continuity purposes (Gulati et al., 2016).

Under the Bush administration, in accordance with Muller's massive organizational restructuring of the FBI, substantial progress was made. Although not perfect, the territorial informational gridlock shifted from a "need-to-know" culture, to a "need-to-collaborate" environment, with information flowing more freely between state, local, and federal governments. In 2006, then FBI Director Robert Mueller, speaking before Before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, reported on the benefits of a collaborative, unified, national intelligence work force:

The National Security Branch structure took effect on September 12, 2005, in response to a directive from the President to the Attorney General. The NSB consists of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division (CTD), the Counterintelligence Division (CD), the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and the new Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Directorate. Combining our national security workforce and mission under one leadership umbrella enhances our contribution to the national intelligence effort and provides us

with the opportunity to leverage resources from our U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) partners, as well as our federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners.

The success of multi-agency collaboration was evident as the FBI began to dismantle terrorist networks at home and abroad. For example, Operation Blackbear, initiated in 2001, was responsible for the arrest and conviction of three people found to be funneling resources to terrorist organizations (Mueller, 2006). In January 2006, a sixty-five count indictment of eleven individuals associated with ELF and ALF was handed down on charges including arson and destruction of an energy facility on behalf of both ELF and ALF movements.

Between 2009-2010, the FBI and law enforcement in general, had some of the most successful multi-agency investigations in United States history (Dyson, 2012). Collaboration and information sharing allowed law enforcement to “connect the dots” and prevent numerous terrorist attacks (Dyson, 2012). One of the most significant changes in helping law enforcement capture and thwart incidents of domestic terrorism post 9/11, was the creation of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). JTTFs are locally based, multi-agency teams comprised of law enforcement investigators, investigators, intelligence analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists who are experienced in investigating acts of terrorism (Bjelopera, 2013). Prior to 9/11, FBI and DOJ had only twenty-nine JTTFs in operation. Post 9/11, Seventy-one more JTTFs were created along with 4,400 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents (Bjelopera, 2013). The FBI, Homeland Security and DOJ now consider the JTTFs the nation’s front line on terrorism since they are the “first responders” to acts of terrorism by investigating acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens, including those

employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas (Barker & Fowler, 2008).

Although JTTF investigations are highly tactical, they are equally determined. JTTFs expend a massive amount of resources in combating terror threats by developing human sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots (Bjelopera, 2013)

President Bush's style of political leadership exhibited a confidence and moral certainty that helped the nation deal with the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon (Pfiffner, 2003). Bush's moral certainty reflected his deeply held religious beliefs which were evident in his public and private life (Pfiffner, 2003). He was convinced that the United States was now duty bound to eviscerate "evil" anywhere in the world with seeking approval or support from other nations (Pfiffner, 2003). The positive side of President Bush's moralistic and Manichaeian view of the world is the moral clarity it brought to U.S. policy (Brookhiser, 2003). In spite of the sharp criticism he received during his presidency, overall, conservatives were satisfied that Bush's certainty and conviction enhanced his leadership during the war on terrorism.

### **Barack H. Obama (2009-2016)**

*"And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that, "Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you." - President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address,*

January 20, 2009

On January 20, 2009, America elected Barack H. Obama, its first African-American president. In the United States, at least to some, his election was indicative that America had become the utopian post racial society envisioned by Dr. Martin Luther

King Jr. World leaders saw this as an opportune moment for U.S. policy to shift from being hawkish in its war on Terror to becoming more deliberate in terms of who is considered terrorist. President Obama was viewed as a leader who would prefer conflict negotiation over the use of military force. For the most part, that was indicative of his style. However, like his predecessor, he knew that in order for America and its allies to feel safe, terror networks like Al-Qaeda, and ISIL must be destroyed or incapacitated and Osama bin Laden had to be eliminated.

When President Obama took office, his administration inherited a multiplicity of challenges not seen since Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter in 1981. President Bush was leaving the White House with a 34% job approval rating (Gallup, 2009). On the global stage, his ratings were equally abysmal. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2008), 19 of the 24 nations polled, including several strong U.S. allies, expressed little confidence in Bush as he neared the end of his presidency (Pew, 2008). The war in Afghanistan, the Invasion of Iraq, the misleading of America and its allies on the stockpile Weapons of Mass destruction, the recession, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib prison, and the infamous waterboarding scandal made President Bush, Vice-President Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld extremely unpopular. So much so, that in 2012, the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission found President Bush, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld guilty of war crimes in absentia for the illegal invasion of Iraq (Foreign Policy, 2012). Not only would President Obama be charged with restoring America's credibility abroad, but after a polarizing campaign, Obama had to reassure Americans that he would focus more on domestic issues, specifically, jobs, the economy, and the war on terror.

President Obama, like his predecessor George W. Bush, was in agreement that terrorism must be eradicated. However, he was opposed to the Bush strategy which he deemed as a hindrance in fighting global terrorism because of its maverick styled unilateral approach. Although Obama and G. W. Bush had sometimes diametrically opposed strategic military strategies, President Obama could not ignore that the situation in Iraq was stabilizing while Afghanistan was declining (Jenkins & Godges, 2011). For this reason, over the objections of his senior advisers, and to the dismay of many of his supporters, President Obama chose to replicate President Bush's second-term strategy for Iraq, sending an additional 45,000 American troops to Afghanistan, further increasing economic assistance (Jenkins & Godges, 2011). Obama, in many ways, was Reaganesque in his approach towards counter-terrorism in that it was much more focused with expected outcomes. Like Bush however, he was in full agreement that America should avoid international entanglements unless they proved to be absolutely vital America's national interests. Moreover, Obama believed that America should not be the lone voice in the world denouncing terrorism embraced the tenet that the international community should also have an integral role in fighting terrorism. President Obama had made it clear that the days of unilateral intervention was ending and transformational diplomacy was part of the new strategy.

The election of Barack Obama should have been a symbol of progress and pride for the United States of America. President George W. Bush could be heard telling an attendee at the 2009 Obama inauguration, "This is a great day for our nation." However, a segment of American society saw the elevation of an African-American to highest elected office in America, as a threat to their existence and the beginning of the end of the



White majority. In 2016, D’Vera Cohn at the Pew Research Center released a report that, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, for the first time in history, minorities babies (50.2%) under the age of 1-year old were slightly more than half of the babies born in 2011 (Cohn, 2016). Also in 2016, Time Magazine journalist Josh Sanburn reported on a study conducted by the University of New Hampshire that found natural decreases in the White population across 17 states in 2014, including Florida, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, which together comprise 38% of the U.S. population (Sanburn, 2016). Between 2015 and 2016, there were several demographers reporting that by the year 2060, Whites would no longer be the majority population in America. Although the resentment of President Obama was in large part rooted in racism, the Obama administration, like their predecessors, were short-sighted in that they assumed the *avalanche of White hatred* directed towards President Obama could be explained away as simply deep-seeded racism. The lack of inquiry to determine substantive or alternative reasons for this animus alienates this segment of the population, which in turn metastasizes into radical and violent extremist behavior. The theory put forth by Robin DiAngelo (2011) gives a plausible explanation beyond racial hatred that caused Whites to react negatively towards the election of Barack Obama. In her theory, DiAngelo postulated:

White people in North America live in a social environment that protects and insulates them from race-based stress. This insulated environment of racial protection builds White expectations for racial comfort while at the same time lowering the ability to tolerate racial stress, leading to what I refer to as White Fragility. White Fragility is a state in which even a minimum amount of racial

stress becomes intolerable, triggering a range of defensive moves. These moves include the outward display of emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt, and behaviors such as argumentation, silence, and leaving the stress-inducing situation. These behaviors, in turn, function to reinstate White racial equilibrium. (p. 54)

The return to this *White racial equilibrium* after the election of President Obama was often carried out in pseudo-quasi-judicial tribunals that lacked any real authority and only served as a means to unite like-minded dogmatic anti-government radical extremist. In 2009, a group in Georgia that called themselves *The American Grand Jury*, issued their own indictment of President Obama by concluding that he committed fraud and treason by falsely claiming he was a citizen of the United States when in fact, he was born in Kenya (Potok, 2009). In 2011, billionaire real estate developer Donald Trump spearheaded what was known as the *Birther Movement* which questioned the veracity of President Obama's national origin and demanded that the president release his birth certificate to the public. Republicans in leadership positions began to openly normalize racially divisive and demeaning rhetoric. Tennessee RNC chairman Chip Saltsman sent out a CD of "Barack the Magic Negro" as a Christmas present (Sinderbrand, 2008). Rather than rebuking her colleague, Young Republican vice-chairman Audra Shay found amusement in a post on her Facebook page sent to her by a colleague that read "Obama bin Laden is the new terrorist....Muslim is on their side...need to take this country back from all of these mad coons..... and illegals." Shay responded, 8 minutes later, "You tell em Eric! lol" (Avlon, 2009). This type dehumanizing and racially demeaning rhetoric advanced a new concept of "othering" the first African-American president of the United

States by intentionally undermining the prevailing legitimacy of the Oval Office. Ultra-conservatives rejected the notion that criticism of President Obama was disrespectful and they were content with their modes of critique intentionally being a ubiquitous commodification of White supremacy. After decades of promoting the values of hard-work, ethics, morality, and merit-based equality, the radical fringe of the Republican Party rejected the homogeneous and monolithic and replaced it with racism, nativism, and White male patriotism. This obscene level of hate in conjunction with its corollary of intensified partisanship, glamorized right-wing extremism during the Obama administration in pursuit of political, materialistic or individualistic gains. Although President Obama was a strong advocate of American exceptionalism, human rights, education, clean energy, winding down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and re-establishing American standing and leadership in the world, domestic extremism, he was deeply distrusted by ultra-conservatives.

Since September 11, 2001, the threat of violence inspired by radical right-wing ideologies has been largely overshadowed by the “*war on terror*” and the extraordinary effort expended by both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations to thwart attacks by jihadists inspired by al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other militant Islamist groups (Mueller & Stewart, 2011). In October 2015, at an event hosted by the Program on Extremism, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Carlin announced the creation of the post of Domestic Terrorism Counsel to coordinate cases arising from right-wing extremism, an acknowledgment that extremists weaned on radical homegrown, right-wing ideologies have killed more people in the U.S. since 9/11 than jihadis (Bruer, 2015). In fact, U.S. domestic terrorism groups outnumber

international groups seven-to-one and are a far larger threat to America than radical Islamist (McGarrell et al., 2007). A study conducted under the Obama administration described far-right extremists are predominately White males, late 20s and early 30s, who believe they have a patriotic duty to advocate for the elimination of all immigration policies and the systemic marginalization of minorities currently in America. Because of their views toward minorities, they are more likely than other domestic terrorists to attack in groups (55.5%), to target complete strangers (48.4%), and to use weapons (52.4%) (Gruenewald, 2011). Right-wing extremist pursue the agendas of their groups in various ways. Some limit themselves to lobbying and political activism, while others resort to acts of violence such as murder and domestic terrorism (Garland & Simi, 2011).

The Obama administration translated its democratic liberal worldview into a counterterrorism policy that limits the prerogatives and work methods of American security and intelligence agencies (Ganor, 2014). The stark difference between the Obama and G.W. Bush administrations was that “the war on terror” was an abstract enemy under Bush. President Obama however, was focused in his approach and put faces and names together and compiled a list of who exactly the enemy was and why they were a threat to the security of the United States (Ganor, 2014). President Obama and his national Security team surmised that when the definition of the threat is too broad, it may undermine the efficacy of the counterterrorism strategy and make it more difficult to identify to devise an effective strategy (Ganor, 2014).

In August 2011, the Obama Administration announced its counter-radicalization strategy which was devised to address the forces or conditions that influence people living in the United States to become so radicalized and extreme in their views they

ultimately feel compelled to engage in acts of domestic terrorism. This is the first such strategy for the federal government, which is called combating violent extremism (CVE) and is just another tool in assisting law enforcement in identifying root causes of terrorism (Bjelopera, 2014)

### **Conclusion**

Non-jihadist incidents of domestic terrorism have never been a top federal counter-terrorism priority for any incoming president. In the media, the Obama administration considered the importance of focusing on non-jihadist domestic terrorism until December 14, 2012, when a lone gunman Adam Lanza entered Sandy Hook Elementary and murdered 20 children and six teachers. However, the FBI's focus never waned on domestic terrorism because of the reorganization efforts that occurred under the Bush administration. Nevertheless, incidents such as Sandy Hook feature prominently among the concerns of law enforcement officers because of the dramatic increase in domestic incidents of terror, active shooters, and lone wolf radical extremist that ambush and murder police officers (Bjelopera, 2013). In 2011, former Los Angeles Deputy Police Chief Michael P. Downing included "Black separatists, White supremacist, sovereign citizen extremists, and animal rights terrorists" among his chief counterterrorism concerns (Gertz, 2011).

A frequent point made in the current literature on the U.S.-led war on domestic and international terror is that the war and its public discourse is a continuation from the George W. Bush administration. Researchers explored the political discourse of terrorism and counterterrorism during the Clinton, G. W. Bush, and Obama administrations. However, what is lacking are the challenges of maintaining an ongoing narrative and

including diverse perspectives. By examining presidential discourse on terrorism, contemporary research articles continue to demonstrate continuities in counterterrorism approaches from Reagan to Obama. This study suggests that, based on Reagan's initial "war on terrorism", Clinton articulated thoughts of "catastrophic terrorism" and a "new terrorism" both at home and abroad, which became a cornerstone for thinking about the issue over the past two decades. Clinton's counterterrorism discourse provided an important rhetorical foundation for Bush and Obama on how to respond to domestic terrorist attacks such as the Oklahoma City bombing. Far from being a radical break, Bush's war on terror at home and overseas represents a continuation of established counter-terrorist understandings and practices (Tsui, 2015).

Rhetoric involving catastrophic terrorism involved giving the nation details of particular incidents to shock them and allow for quick passage of policies that were designed to respond to these threats. Some of the broader outcomes, and political consequences of Clinton's terrorism discourse (such as anti-terrorism initiatives and a law enforcement and military approach) was designed to address public fears and promote funding for significant responses (Bourdieu, 1987).

Fairclough's (2001) critical discourse analysis (CDA) used a three-dimensional model as the central framework by which to examine U.S. terrorism statements and counter-terrorism initiatives implemented from Clinton to Obama. Fairclough's approach was distinguished by a concept of discourse that considers language commonly used in social practices. This discourse is understood as language used when speaking of terrorism in such a way that speaking generates ideas and concepts from a perspective that garners public support (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Through the process of

discursive practice, as exercised by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, a type of communication was created, consumed, and reproduced in response to society's fears about domestic terrorism. These Presidents sought to control the message and level of fear (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).

In the Fairclough CDA study, material from more than 200 official texts including all of Clinton's domestic terrorism and counter-terrorism-related speeches, interviews, and radio addresses published in the *Federal Register* and the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* were analyzed. Furthermore, in order to explore the continuities of U.S. counterterrorism policy, Reagan's "war on terrorism" material, as well as Bush's 'war on terror' discourse –which transitioned into the "war on domestic terrorism" –were evaluated (Clinton, 1995b).

This study of U.S. domestic terrorism discourse not only contributed to our understanding of the way speaking and writing about terrorism was constructed in the past, but also to our current understanding of how U.S. domestic counter-terrorism is framed. The dominant theme in the literature was that the discourse for the current U.S.-led war on domestic terror largely originated from the George W. Bush administration. Before 9/11, there had been a long history of labeling U.S. domestic terrorist threats and enemies as "terrorism" and "terrorists." However, the meaning of these words changed several times, depending on the social and political contexts of various Presidents. The discursive change in U.S. counter-terrorism is due, in part, to shifts in the political and social order, and also the way in which the world was understood (Clinton, 1996c).

During the Clinton era, the United States and its allies suffered a number of significant domestic terrorist attacks, including the World Trade Center bombing in 1993,

and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995. These incidents were the primary focus of the Clinton administration's domestic terrorism and counter-terrorism discourse, and led to solidifying the rhetoric for administrations that followed. In contrast to Reagan's terrorism discourse and its focus on state-sponsored terrorism, the Clinton administration developed and constructed its terrorism discourse by identifying and emphasizing the characteristics of catastrophic terrorism, or new terrorism. Its characteristics were based on the terrorists' targets, the methods they adopted, and the weapons used.

Reviewing the syntax and key discourse phrases utilized by the Clinton administration, the word "boundlessness" stood out as the most significant feature of "new terrorism," in which terrorists emerged "within or beyond our borders" (Clinton, 1995c). As terrorists changed, and they were perceived as "becoming an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders" (Clinton, 1996a), emphasis was on the lack of clear boundaries between external and internal terrorism, where terrorists could strike a foreign ally or on U.S. soil (Chin-Kuei Tsui, 2012).

John Deutch (1997), former director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Clinton, echoed the President's use of boundlessness when he suggested that terrorism was like the plague of the Middle Ages, frightening both leaders and citizens. It is a social disease that is spreading and its cure is unknown. Portraying terrorism as a "disease" was a repetition of a word used by previous Presidents, and not a new rhetorical expression. In order to intensify the significance of the domestic terrorist threat, Reagan and his administration adopted a similar theme, depicting terrorism as a cancer, with politicians actively seeking a cure. Reagan, and later Clinton would say that the plague of terrorism would spread like a cancer, challenging civilized societies, and sowing fear and



chaos (Leeman, 1991). These outcomes would occur if society, through its leaders, permitted terrorism to succeed anywhere. Thus, by employing a medical metaphor, terrorism was interpreted as a disease that could strike anywhere in society (Leeman, 1991).

Post 9/11, the concept of a new style of terrorism became a prominent concept and theme in the G. W. Bush administration's war on terror discourse. President Bush and his top officials adopted the same rhetorical strategy established by the Clinton administration to construct their narrative on terrorism discourse which became a primary weapon in responding to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. General Colin Powell, Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Bush, routinely referred to "the scourge of terrorism" (Jackson, 2005) while justifying U.S.-led global and domestic responses to terrorism. This type of rhetoric graphically described the characteristics of terrorism and promoted the theme that the terrorist threat required aggressive counter-actions and measures. Fairclough (2001) pointed out the significance of the fact that "different metaphors imply different ways of dealing with things" (p. 100). When responding to terrorism, the rhetoric interpreted these acts as a dangerous disease and an extreme social threat to all human beings. Those who did them had to be eliminated and cut out of society, like the cancer to which their acts had been likened (Jackson, 2005).

Oklahoma City was a "wake up call" for terrorism experts in 1995, as well as law enforcement officers. It was unnerving that weapons of mass destruction were now available to ordinary citizens who had grievances against United States could easily engage in acts of domestic terrorism. It was suggested that domestic terrorists would likely try to obtain chemical and biological weapons to attack civilian targets since they

were easy to acquire and had a significant lethality (Deutch, 1997; Laqueur, 1996). The Oklahoma incident was also thought to mark a turning point in the history of domestic terrorism: for the first time, a non-state terrorist individual had used chemical weapon to attack civilian non-combatants (RAND, 1999).

Before this tragedy, terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction had only been part of theoretical scenarios. However, the bombing came to symbolize the threat of such weapons domestically. They were no longer a theoretical possibility, but a reality (RAND, 1999).

The 1995 bombing and other domestic terrorist attacks in the 1990s were examples of White extremist terrorism. What was even more alarming for the Clinton administration was that the two main suspects were both American nationals. Their motivations for carrying out the act was that they disagreed with policies on gun control, and they were strong supporters of the militia movement (Linenthal, 2001). After reviewing the Oklahoma City bombing, the administration decided to amend its anti-terrorism legislation, which had initially concentrated on fighting international terrorism. Now the administration addressed the immediate threat of “home-grown” terrorism (Linenthal, 2001).

Oklahoma City appeared to display characteristics of modern terrorism: its unbounded nature and the means adopted by the terrorists identified them as a clear and present danger to national security. In Clinton’s public rhetoric, the President emphasized a new approach for responding to the transformation of ‘homegrown’ domestic terrorism. By developing the discursive construction of a borderless threat, this ideology would later provide a foundation for Bush’s “war on terror” and pave the way for the various security

acts following 9/11. With the concept of “new terrorism,” Clinton asserted that the United States had become vulnerable to terrorism both from without and *within* our borders.

Other concerns materialized during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies concerning domestic “cyber-terrorism,” a new tactic. The threat was first articulated in Clinton’s terrorism discourse, and later used by the Bush administration after 9/11. Clinton’s cyber-terrorism narrative closely echoed the concepts that supported the idea of the new terrorism being boundless. The convenience of technology, and the opportunities provided by emerging technologies supported terrorists’ breaching the traditional barriers of private and government facilities to achieve large scale social disruptions.

Reviews by data experts showed a dramatic worldwide increase in the number of people possessing the skills to carry out cyber-attacks, escalating from a few thousand in the early 1980s to over 17 million in 1996. Another projection that came to fruition was that the number would reach 19 million by 2001 (*Critical Foundations*, 1997). The Clinton administration faced the reality that cyber-terrorism was not just a possibility; it was now a fact of life that the government was required to counter.

A close study of Clinton and Bush’s terrorism discourse reveals that their counter-terrorism policy was a core issue for the government. Each administration faced domestic attacks, and the terrorism issue was frequently mentioned by each President. It emerged as an ongoing topic stressed by many senior officials. The Clinton administration also declared on several occasions that terrorism was one of the most significant and dangerous threats to the United States in the post-Cold War period. In Clinton’s 1995 remarks at the Air Force Academy, he said that “fighting terrorism is a big part of our

national security today, and it will be well into the 21st century” (Clinton, 1995d). Each President (Clinton, Bush, and Obama) had heightened American’s fears by promoting the fact that terrorism destroys innocent lives.

Each of these Presidents developed specific interpretations of terrorism that gave their perceptions and features of new terrorism, and various scenarios of potential terrorist attacks. It is noteworthy that they are generally based on similar ideologies and concepts. The response of each President was to build on Reagan’s foundation of the “war on terrorism.” Clinton expanded this discourse, and later added the threats posed by “homegrown” terrorists. Obama has also stressed the dangers of catastrophic terrorism that involve rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber-terrorism. He has used legislation such as the *PATRIOT Act* and bureaucracies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Clinton’s discourse provided rhetorical context for the George W. Bush administration to be able to respond to the tragedy of September 11<sup>th</sup>. Obama promoted the idea of freedom, resulting in continuity of U.S. counter-terrorism policies that removed domestic terrorism as a worst case, unlikely scenario and made these acts plausible (Christopher, 1996).

### **Evolution of U.S. Anti-terrorism Policy**

Soon after Louis Freeh was appointed FBI director, he wasted no time in developing a strategy to combat domestic terror threats. In 1998, Director Freeh submitted a comprehensive strategic plan (FY 1998-2003) designed to address both domestic and internationally terrorism absent the previous hierarchal structure that one threat was more significant than the other. FBI Deputy Director, Robert Bryant had been working on this plan for more than a year and the top strategic priority of this plan was

National and Economic Security (Freeh, 1999). The first two goals under this priority were the identification, prevention, and defeat of intelligence operations and the prevention, disruption, and defeat of terrorist operations before they occur (Freeh, 1999). In arriving at the priorities and goals of this plan, Director Freeh and Deputy Director Bryant realized the U.S. faced an increasingly dangerous threat and were making efforts to reshape the FBI to confront domestic terrorism (Freeh, 1999).

In March of 2000, Assistant Director Dale Watson initiated an internal counter terrorism planning process entitled MAXCAP 05 (Center for Strategic Management, 2002). This 5-year plan was based on the premise that although the FBI would never be able to stop all acts of domestic and international terrorism directed towards the United States and its interests abroad, it could however, create a formidable infrastructure so if attacked, the FBI would be positioned to adequately respond (Center for Strategic Management, 2002). Consequently, MAXCAP 05 was designed to measure the readiness of each Special Agent's assigned field office and their capacity to adequately respond to viable terrorist threats (Center for Strategic Management, 2002).

In the spring of 2001, data compiled from MAXCAP 05 program revealed that field offices were not adequately staffed with key personnel needed to gather intelligence such as surveillance teams, translators, Intel analysts, and access to investigative databases. In short, almost every Special Agent field office reported they were undermanned and unable to address the terrorism threats or actions of terror (Center for Strategic Management, 2002). Watson and his team used this information for drafting the FBI budget and requesting additional funds from Congress to support their

counterterrorism programs. In September 2001, prior to 9/11, the FBI's request for funding was denied (Johnston & Risen, 2002).

The continued rise of confirmed and suspected terrorist incidents have once again drawn attention to U.S. policies and their implementation. The threats posed by terrorism are multi-dimensional, covering a wide range of possibilities: the domestic-international dimension; individuals, small groups, large groups, and governments as the perpetrators and/or initiators of terrorist activities; poorly organized and well-organized with widespread natures and purposes; and single-event-focused and campaign-focused in scope. The responses to these threats required multiple, multi-dimensional perspectives, and approaches. As dangers continue to emerge, an ongoing need is to gather strong, and reliable intelligence (Livingstone & Arnold, 1986).

U.S. policies varied widely over time based on how the impact of attacks were viewed. Repercussions include the nature of the incident, the scope of incident, its aims, geographical concerns, and political concerns. The FBI's debacle in investigating the bombing at Atlanta's Olympic Village in 1996 highlighted the need for revised domestic terrorism policies. Two key questions were asked following that incident, which showed the failures of existing policies. First, given the need for intelligence, why do we not have sufficient 'good' intelligence to prevent or prepare for such incidents? Second, if the United States lacks sufficient information that can lead to policies that increase deterrence capabilities, why has no significant action been taken (Fukuyama & McFaul, 2007).

These key questions go to the heart of the domestic terrorist issue. The need to support preventative measures, and develop a foundation for understanding issues related

to gathering and using good intelligence in the fight against domestic terrorist policy are crucial. While the focus remains on ‘difficulties’ and ‘issues,’ the research emphasizes instances in which good intelligence has paid off. Arnold and Livingstone (1984) noted that gathering of good intelligence is the best first line of defense.

As U.S. domestic terrorism policies benefitted from information utilizing selected, identifiable dimensions and contexts, what has emerged are organizations within the government, particularly inside the intelligence community, which supported strong responses. As information is distilled into intelligence through data collection, analysis, and dissemination, what has emerged is a counter-terrorism capability (Crenshaw, 2010). While research has not previously focused on ‘anti-terrorist policing,’ Crenshaw’s observations provide insight into how the U.S. has streamlined its bureaucracy to respond to imminent domestic terror threats. Key factors in creating a domestic terrorist response included availability, currency, credibility, and various other factors which can be viewed as creating and affecting a ‘rate of exchange’ for information shared among various potential end-users.

Carter, Clinton, Bush, and Obama faced hard decisions concerning pre-emptive strikes or formulating a response to an already delivered action, what is noted throughout the research is whether or not they had good intelligence. This process of getting and exchanging material is commonly referred to as the ‘politics of information’ which routinely affect decision making, and selecting options, based on whether or not available information is used (Progressive Policy Institute, 2003).

The escalation of attacks typically receives intense media attention and focus, particularly when these events occur on U.S. soil by radicalized citizens. As society seeks

to understand these inhumane acts that defy logic, the challenge for the government has been to create current and relevant policies. To date, the focus has been on highlighting specific sociopolitical and religious situations that may be of significance and consequence, thereby promoting a religious overlay (Lacquer, 1987).

As U.S. counterintelligence operatives probe religious sects and various other disenfranchised extremist groups, great effort has been made to gather good intelligence, by embedding informants in groups that may use terror as a means to an end. In coordinating these covert activities, what has been noted is coordination. Participation by multiple organizations, including the Department of State, Department of Defense, DHS, and the FBI, make logistical coordination problematic. As these agencies work against the clock, seeking to penetrate terrorist cells, what has evolved from the Carter administration forward is their ability to organize effectively and share intelligence.

The success of these organizations is based on their ability to assimilate information, analyze content, and evaluate human activities in the realm of collecting information for analysis, disseminating such information, and, in some instances, taking action. The formation of the DHS, which now coordinates all government responses to terrorism threats, has ended the lack of sharing of information between agencies. The sharing of information, particularly when agents penetrated organizations under cover has become an essential technique and highlights the difficulty, time, and cost associated with placing an agent in a group such as the Klu Klux Klan or the AOG (Arnold & Livingstone, 1984). By working together, all agencies receive not only good intelligence, but credit for their roles in thwarting a planned domestic attack.



With the evolution of policies mandating the exchange of information, and requiring agencies to develop the ability to identify the relevance of collected material, not only internally, but also from other members of the law enforcement community, an increase in cooperation is readily apparent. Further, sharing information between nations related to domestic terror threats has become standard (Thompson, 2003). This highlights a form of cooperation with other governments in which national interests are transcended and policies and protocols are established between them (Thompson, 2003).

While policies on domestic terrorism required adoption by lead federal agencies such as the FBI, the DOJ, and DHS, jurisdiction remains a challenge. DHS has attempted to resolve many of these issues and internal disputes over control of particular investigations, promoting the exchange of communication between local, state, and federal levels of government. Large security corporations or groups that are also involved with terrorist threats, such as Blackwater Worldwide, need to be brought into this flow of information as well. The major challenge for the U.S. government is how much intelligence to share with private organizations where such sharing may not be in the best interest of the American people. As the balancing act continues between who is in charge of various activities, who to share information with, and how much information to share, increasing the authority of the DHS offers the ability to provide intensive oversight and ensure full cooperation at every level by all parties (Turner & Lovell, 1998).

Prior to 9/11, there were substantive failures in the realm of domestic security that plagued the most prominent federal intelligence and investigative agencies in the world. Even with the oversight of congressional subcommittees, some critics and the general public have wondered if there ever anything intelligent about U.S. intelligence

gathering and domestic terrorism responses. Post 9/11, there was a mandate from President Bush that called for multiple investigative probes to uncover “strategic” shortcomings, but more importantly, enact policies that would correct all major deficiencies. Agency boundaries tied to jurisdiction routinely creates secondary problems when dealing with situations that are amorphous or fluid. With overlap between agencies needed, the older concept of a ‘lead agency’ may be implemented by some agency leaders, and create confusion among operatives and reduce their effectiveness. The dissolution of inter- and intra-agency jurisdictional wars involving investigative and intelligence organizations has been, and will likely remain a reality, into the future. These rivalries, which are slowly being diminished by the DHS, come to the fore when Congress annually increases funding related to counter-terrorism (Turner & Lovell, 1998).

An additional policy issue surrounding domestic terrorism in U.S. investigative and intelligence organizations is that while these agencies continue to become streamlined, the statutes by which they operate are bureaucratic. Policy developments traditionally followed bureaucratic politics and what has been sought by Presidents and Congress. Over the years, what emerged as necessary in policy formation are ways of approaching domestic terrorism via investigative and intelligence organizations that build collaboration and cooperation. This is a switch to a combined method in dealing with terrorist incidents and potential acts of domestic terrorism (Goldsmith, 2008).

As domestic terrorism continues to change, there will be a need for policies that integrate emerging technologies and take into account multi-dimensional approaches and investigations of potential threats. With an increasing number of terrorist events,

expenditures on new technology will always be justified if there are also increases in statistical information. Technology will help streamline jurisdictional issues, increase the flow of information, promote policy revisions, and highlight immediate threats (Bodansky, 1993).

Domestic policy has failed at times to appreciate the dynamics of other cultures and their willingness to respond to global terrorist events, which ultimately affected the U.S. (Bozeman, 1985). With a relatively rapid turnover of Presidents, the overarching purposes achieved through a steady developing of particular national terrorism policies over the course of one or two terms. However, researchers emphasize the fact that mid-level and senior levels bureaucrats generally outlast Presidents and the directors and supervisors they appoint. These bureaucrats do not always interpret the directives of Presidents or Directors the same way as their authors and presents the problem of policies and mandates being shelved in hopes the next President or Director will change direction following an election (Neustadt, 1960).

When assessing the competence of those who generate U.S. policy, Sloan (1986) noted there are no guarantees that those involved (e.g., politicians, directors, or even federal agents) have knowledge of domestic terrorism. Failures in policy and lack of security enforcement have almost been predictable, with agents lacking prerequisite training and/or education. Superior performance can conflict with administrative oversight and progress can be impeded despite strong rhetorical commitments from leaders to be proactive about terrorist attacks on the U.S. Concerns remain regarding those who develop counter-measures where, in some cases, individuals acted with impunity and disregard for lives (Sloan, 1986).

In complex and difficult scenarios for which policy has not been previously established, protocols are being developed to meet immediate needs and challenge organizational interests. With these organizations frequently operating in closed environments, concerns and challenges regarding who is socially and psychologically appropriate to write coherent and responsible policies that combat domestic terrorism (Baritz, 1985; Schlesinger, 1996).

### **Economic Determinants of Domestic Terrorism**

This section considers the relationship between economic development and domestic terrorism. When a traditional economy is replaced by a more contemporary one, the change may lead to protests and various forms of social unrest, making the society more prone to terrorist behaviors. However, the lasting effects of such modernization should be correlated with reducing domestic terrorism. In order to test this hypothesis and find better support for the theory, the latest Global Terrorism Database (GTD) datasets were utilized. The data show that states at intermediate levels of economic development are more prone to domestic terrorist activity and attacks, as compared to poorer or wealthier nations. Terrorist attacks would seem to be more likely in states that are not reducing poverty or providing a proper economic safety net that can cushion the effects of rapid economic development on a given region. Further, results indicate that countries which are more democratic and older are less likely to have incidents of domestic terrorism when compared to less democratic states (Boehmer & Daube, 2013).

The next question is: What is the statistical relationship between a nation's economic development and its rates of terrorist activity? Past studies were contradictory concerning the development of terrorism. This is not surprising, given the multiple

explanations and differences between the kinds of domestic terrorism. Furthermore, most of the studies on this matter model the effects of terrorism development as a linear relationship. Instead, the relationship between terrorism and development could be curvilinear, with different states at various stages of progress. Data shows that modeling development as a curvilinear relationship can help explain how seemingly contradictory findings from theoretical models created expectations that resulted in different explanations for the frequency of terror attacks across different levels of development.

Testing the new theory using the GTD dataset found support for the theory. However, the literature on terrorism provided contradictory evidence that shows a direct link between low income, poverty, or lack of state assistance, and increased rates of terrorism. Studies that analyze this subject at the level of individuals only infrequently found a correlation between poverty and terrorism, or that poverty is one of the key demographic criteria in becoming a terrorist today (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Sageman, 2004). Berrebi (2007) showed that it is more likely that individuals with higher incomes had higher rates of joining terrorist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Kavanagh (2011) demonstrated an interaction between education and poverty, and later participation in terrorist groups.

Mousseau (2011) surveyed individuals in 14 different Islamic states and concluded that rates of urban poverty predicted support for terrorist organizations in those regions. Recent studies on the issue found that states with more wealth have a much higher likelihood of becoming targets of terrorism (Bloomberg & Hess, 2008; Bloomberg & Rosendorf, 2009), perhaps due to the fact these states are more attractive targets to terrorist groups (Ross, 1993; Sandler, 1995).

Piazza (2011) found economic discrimination (real or imagined) against minority groups to be an important cause of domestic terrorism cases, especially when economic help is not readily available for those who need it. Piazza noted that states that had either income disparity or a higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, can be positively linked to terrorist activity in those nations. Some studies found no strong link between a state's level of development, rates of poverty, and terrorist activity. Yet other studies determined that poor states did not fare as well as middle or high-income states regarding increased levels of terrorist activity and attacks (Abadie, 2006; Dreher & Gassebner, 2008; Krueger & Laitin, 2007; Piazza, 2006).

In contrast, Derin-Güre (2009) found that as a state develops, it become less inclined to produce terrorist groups or organizations, and experiences decreased levels of domestic terrorist activity as it is decreasingly targeted by global terrorist groups. Differences in income have, in varying degrees, been linked to terrorism (Lai, 2007; Piazza, 2011); increasing income does appear to lower terrorism rates when nations fund social welfare programs. Alternatively, increasing economic development led to greater economic opportunity due to globalization (Bravo & Dias, 2006; Burgoon, 2006; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010; Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004). Given that research on economic development and terrorist activity has produced mixed results, researchers investigated the possibility of a curvilinear impact on terrorism. Both Daube (2011) and Enders and Hoover (2012) showed that middle-income states are more susceptible to domestic terrorist incidents compared to states with higher or lower income levels.

In contrast to earlier studies on this issue, the present study sought to determine whether high levels of national economic development had an effect on reducing levels

of domestic terror attacks and, if so, whether the relationship is non-linear or one in which the highest and lowest income states have reduced rates of domestic terrorism incidents as compared to states with mid-level economic and social development. Furthermore, given that the degree of democracy (or democratic process) coincides with economic development, it is important to delineate the effects of democracy on economic development. Once the curvilinear effects of democracy and development are modeled in this study, the concept was considered that highly democratic states are less likely to have incidents of domestic terrorist attacks when compared to those that are less democratic. Therefore, the study also examined the relationship between a state's economic development, and the amount of domestic terror attacks using the GTD (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2012).

### **Political Determinants of Domestic Terrorism**

Ross (1993) found that economic development does create numerous economic and social changes (Kuznets, 1955; Olson, 1963; Rostow, 1960), which disturb traditional patterns and can create conditions that give rise to domestic terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981). Factors such as economic discrimination against a background of economic instability may also affect the conditions needed for the growth of terrorism. The literature shows the many links exist between economic discrimination, deprivation, and insecurity that further motivate religious, ethnic, minority, and class grievances. These situations further increase the threat of terrorist incidents.

The present study borrowed from Mousseau's (2002) theory which, as noted above, suggested that acts of terrorism are related to a shift away from a traditional client-based economy to a more market-based one. This mix alters societies and could generate

political grievances. Some states do possess attributes of both systems. Mousseau found that this situation could compound a population's grievances against its government, and lead to terrorism. This change in an economy does appear to be related to the Kuznets curve, which shows the difference between development and income inequality. In this study, however, the assumption is that income inequality is not necessarily the single cause of terrorist activity, especially when deteriorating economic conditions may worsen any existing political conflicts, as was often shown in Piazza's studies.

The argument is not that working-class individuals are more inclined to become terrorists, but rather that the economic conditions that may give rise to terrorism are increased when a state attains a mid-level of development. As socioeconomic differences and other issues (e.g., rising unemployment rates begin to surface), economies based on social hierarchies that include gift-giving and reciprocity often accumulate a surplus of influence by obtaining obligations from others that are often related to patronage systems. These economies are inward-looking, and the societies in which they operate have rigid social and political norms. In contrast, market economies that rely primarily on contracts and enforce equality among economic actors challenge these traditions, especially when accompanied by urbanization. Insider groups from these social hierarchies may then finally act in the political realm (Piazza, 2006).

Political and religious extremists who use violence against their government and individuals in their society frequently disrupt client-based economies when faced with the possibility of privation or other economic insecurity. However, higher levels of state wealth do provide for economic safety nets that potentially minimize the threat of terrorist activities. Thus, economic unrest is reduced as the public good is promoted and



thereby co-opting those who might otherwise have resorted to violence (Burgoon, 2006; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010).

Some of these same economic issues exist for high and mid-level income states. However, the former can afford to act by social spending when such problems arise. Higher levels of wealth frequently provide richer states with more efficient means to prevent civil unrest and successfully counter terrorist activity, even as development increases the number of potential targets. Nevertheless, more developed states will still experience some level of terrorist activity, perhaps due to post-industrial issues such as environmentalism, abortion, animal rights, or other issues that can be used to incite violence. In this study, the expectation is that the number of terrorist-related incidents caused by post-industrial issues will be less than those of states that are in the midst of transition. Post-industrial states should have fewer economic issues that promote grievances, and those that do occur will be a less serious threat to the population. Given the amount of terrorism in states that have mid-level development, modeling this relationship should give a more linear result as increasing development could promote domestic terrorism until the pace of transition slows (Meierrieks, 2010).

Meierrieks (2010) gathered data between 1970 and 2000 from 144 nations were examined using a cross-sectional time series dataset. The unit of analysis in the study was the state-year. The GTD was used to create a count variable of domestic terror attacks occurring each year. To effectively record the curvilinear effects of development and democracy, the study included non-linear and squared terms, respectively. The development terms in these models show a statistically significant difference (i.e., expected levels of terror incidents in a state have a non-linear effect on development).

The lowest income states in the study showed relatively low levels of terrorist incidents. The number, though, could increase if these nations attain more wealth. Again, above mid-levels of wealth, the risk of terrorist attacks and related incidents is reduced, probably due to higher spending on entitlements and reduced cultural tensions characteristic of development. It is also possible that these states are more effective in gathering intelligence on terrorism, and successfully stopping terrorists' efforts (Li, 2005).

The effect of democracy on terror incidents is important because it was expected that the relative transparency of democratic states made them appealing targets for terrorist attacks. However, this was not likely the case for those proven to be durable (Li, 2005). Democracy was a unique and vital control variable in this equation because many of its effects on domestic terrorism were in wealthy states that were also very democratic.

Meirrieks' (2010) statistical model included democracy as a term by squaring the primary variable, in hopes of gaining a better estimation of a potentially parabolic relationship, particularly because the squared term is revealed to be negative and statistically significant. This is very significant because it demonstrates—in contrast to previous literature—that it is not the effects of democracy per se, but rather the stability and success of a government that defines stability. Overall, then, the literature suggested that higher levels of democracy do seem to add increased safety that reduced the rates of domestic terrorist attacks. These newer findings are in line with Abadie (2006), who concluded that the effect of political freedom on terrorism can be modeled as an inverted parabola. These separate conclusions empirically demonstrated that economic

development does indeed have a curvilinear relationship with domestic terroristic activities in countries in the midst of socioeconomic change.

Currently, individuals living in states with different levels of development will have dissimilar types of grievances against their nations. These can appear to be related to changes in socioeconomic relationships, and where citizens live and work within their countries. Transitioning to a more mixed economy can result in a (temporarily) more dangerous environment that can likely be changed by further development and an increase in national wealth, which would permit social welfare spending.

Meirriek (2010) also showed the various effects that democracy and regime durability have, and how they functioned together. By modeling the development process of states, and their relationship to democracy generally, it is evident that highly democratic nations are less likely to have incidents of domestic terrorism compared to others. Very democratic states are generally more stable due to the safety valves of the electoral process and civil liberties. At the same time, increased amounts of financial benefits from such governments reduce unrest. Democracies with higher economic standing internationally have the ability to properly function and disseminate such benefits. As such, there were lower incidents of resentment by the poor against the rich.

However, these results should not be directly interpreted deterministically or teleologically, because states that attain higher levels of wealth can fall back into poverty. The post-2008 financial shocks to global economic markets led to new economic contractions and debt crises even in the most affluent states. If these states reduce their safety nets, there would likely be a noticeable increase in income gaps, despite the fact

that development is ongoing. Another implication of this study is that there should also be an increase in the rate of domestic terrorism in wealthy states.

### **Religious Determinants of Domestic Terrorism**

When analyzing terroristic behavior, a vital question that remains unanswered concerns what determines the life or death of the terrorist groups that engage in domestic attacks? To expand this question: how do these terrorist organizations' ideology, base location, peak size, or tactics influence their longevity? Are economic, political, religious, and geographic considerations in the terrorists' home country essential to their survival? Why do some terrorist groups last for decades, while others wither away within the first year of operation? Addressing these questions is crucial to combating terrorism. Possible answers can be found by applying survival analysis to the 367 different terrorist organizations that conducted operations, at some point, from 1970 to 2007. To date, most studies on the subject of terrorist groups' survival rates used case comparisons that are clearly identified by some factors (e.g., achieved political goals, military defeat, theology, and reduced popular support) associated with a few groups' demise (Cronin, 2006; 2009). Case studies continue to offer additional evidence that, by their nature, cannot be directly applied to terrorist groups in general. Case comparisons do not seem to capture the main trends of statistical survival analyses that are able to be applied to an increasingly larger number of terrorist organizations, though they have unique and diverse ideologies. Nonetheless, these analyses can be used to identify core determinants and other information regarding terrorist group survival rates (Cronin, 2006).

The GTD has provided large amounts of data on terrorist group tactics and ideology, for almost 40 years. This data is used in combination with RAND's data (Jones

& Libicki, 2008), which focuses on groups' characteristics (e.g., base of operations, peak size, religious order, and mandates) from the vantage of how these aspects influence groups' duration. A proper knowledge of these determinants can better inform policy makers on how and when to allocate government resources for counterterrorism, so that survival rates are greatly reduced. Having a greater understanding of the tactics which help sustain terrorist groups assists counterterrorism efforts to allocate resources against various kinds of terrorist attacks (Jones & Libicki, 2008).

Prominent among these factors in longevity is religion. Yet, in an otherwise data-rich study conducted by Jones and Libicki (2008), beliefs were mentioned only in passing. In a later study on the same subject, Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer (2010) used only global terrorist attacks as their distinctive when considering survival rates, despite the fact that the majority of terrorist groups engage in both global and domestic terrorism. In fact, most groups rely heavily on domestic attacks to provide income to fund other activities. Blomberg et al. included political, socioeconomic, and other factors from specific countries. The analysis in the present study incorporated these different aspects from the groups' home countries, consistent with results from Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010). That is, these groups' survival relies on various conditions such as when and where they seek refuge when training.

Cronin (2009) examined the dynamics of 457 different terrorist groups identified in the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) event database. Cronin's study centered on displaying the groups' overall life span, and their achieved goals, instead of conducting a more traditional survival rate analysis. In the study, correlated data on the groups' ages and engagement in negotiations were evaluated;

however, the study's results did not show negotiations with their home governments as having an influence on survival rates. Evaluating data on only the oldest organizations, introduced bias in the selection process. Furthermore, Cronin did not evaluate potential relationships between a group's size, ideology, location, or base-country characteristics and longevity (Cronin, 2009).

### **Racial Determinants of Domestic Terrorism**

In the days following the September 11th attacks, the United States Congress passed the *U.S.A. PATRIOT Act*, which was an omnibus bill containing multiple changes to federal criminal procedure, laws applying to foreign intelligence surveillance, wiretaps and other methods of intercepting electronic communications, laws related to the gathering of documentary evidence, DNA collection, and immigration laws. More importantly, the *PATRIOT Act* allows federal investigative agencies less restrictions when obtaining permission for wiretaps on multiple electronic devices and secure electronic and documentary evidence from multiple sources, such as Internet service providers, telephones and cell phones, and cable companies. It also removes restraints that had been in place regarding sharing information among federal agencies. The increased latitude given to law enforcement activities under the Act, combined with the relaxed standards and requirements for information sharing, created a concern for preserving civil liberties, and our nation's approach to immigration and the path to citizenship (Rapoport, 2004).

Section 412 of the Act gives the Attorney General (AG) of the United States the power to hold illegal aliens certified to be a threat to national security for up to 7 days without bringing charges against them. This standard for detention of individuals is based

on the reasonable suspicion standard from the Supreme Court, better known as a “Terry Stop.” The certification by the AG must set forth why there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the person being detained would be likely to commit acts of sabotage, espionage, and terror, try to overthrow the government, or engage in acts that could result in endangering national security.

After the 7 days end, the individual may be released, although detention could continue in the event that the illegal alien is formally charged with a crime or other violation of visa conditions under federal criminal law. If circumstances prohibit repatriation due to a problem during the immigration process, detention may continue as long as deemed necessary by the AG, with re-certification every 6 months. Under the *PATRIOT Act*, the prospect exists that an individual held in violation of proper conditions of entry into the United States, but unable to be deported to their home country, could be possibly held indefinitely without formal charges being filed (Enders, Sandler, & Gaibullov, 2011).

In his 1989 dissent in *Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’* (489 U.S. 602), Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that “history teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.” In 2002, Chief Deputy Attorney General for the State of California Peter Siggins reported that surveys conducted by civil liberties organizations found that 66% of Whites and 71% of African Americans favored profiling ethnic minorities, particularly those considered to be Muslims (Siggins, 2002).

Post 9/11 saw a dramatic increase in hate crimes against Muslim Americans. According to the FBI’s Hate Crime Statistics Report (2015), aggravated or simple


assaults against Muslims in 2000 was only 12 incidents. In 2001, post 9/11, anti-Muslim aggravated or simple assaults increased to 93 incidents. FY 2002-2004, there is a significant decline in the number of anti-Muslim assaults with a peak in 2006 and with considerable decrease in 2007-2008. Beginning in 2009, anti-Muslim aggravated assault incidents began to increase and it was unclear as to whether or not there was a direct correlation between anti-Muslim sentiments and current events. There were several theories that lacked scholarly inquiry into the root causes as to why anti-Muslim assaults increased. One of the most populist theories was the election of President Barack Obama. The theorem purported that the plethora of unsubstantiated reports by right-wing extremists alleging that President Obama was a “secret Muslim” heightened fears and agitated anti-Muslim sentiments. Moreover, the Birther conspiracy claiming that President Obama was not born in America, but actually born in Kenya, only served to increase tensions and validate the montage conspiracy theories that Sharia law would soon usurp the U.S. Constitution. This anti-Islamic polemic from the right-wing continued from 2009-2015 and did not differentiate between so-called moderate Muslims and radical Islamic fundamentalists. Islam was being framed as a “violent” religion and anyone of the Muslim faith were de facto supporters of Muslim terrorist. Furthermore, anti-Muslim sentiment was seemingly justified by right-wing extremists due to several well publicized and high-profile incidents committed by Muslim extremists on American soil. In 2009, U.S. Major Nidal Hasan murdered 13 people and wounded 30 others in a shooting rampage inspired by his radical Islamic views (McFadden, 2009). In 2013, the Boston Marathon bombers, who killed three people and injured more than 100, admitted to the FBI they were motivated by their extremist Islamic beliefs. In 2015, there were



several high-profile attacks that seemed to re-galvanize anti-Muslim animosity back to pre-9/11 levels. In Garland, Texas, at the Curtis Culwell Center, Muslim radical extremists Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi Nathan Hunsinger exacted violence on attendees and organizers for what they deemed as mocking and disrespecting the Prophet Muhammad at a Muhammad Art Exhibition and Contest (Siron, 2015). The second was the shooting in San Bernardino, California where, Syed Rizwan Farook killed 14 people and injured 22 others at a Christmas party. Americans also feared that with the closing of Guantanamo Bay, former “terrorists” could possibly be relocated to the United States and wreak havoc in their city or state. Although these fears may have been exaggerated, there is substantial evidence of an inverse relationship between anti-Islamic hates crimes and how Muslims are portrayed by right-wing media outlets.

Figure 4 demonstrates the attacks on Muslim Americans from 2001 and ending in 2015. In observing the frequency distribution, the attacks on Muslim Americans was at its peak soon after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Saudi Islamic extremists. But attacks on Muslim Americans from 2002 – 2015 has been consistent, but sporadic. From 2002 – 2005, attacks on Muslim Americans dropped significantly from the number of attacks reported in 2001. In 2006, attacks on Muslim Americans increased considerably only to recede back to the low levels reported from 2002 – 2005. In 2009, the attacks on Muslim Americans increased, and would remain consistently high from 2009 – 2015. This could very well be attributed the election of President Barack Obama, whom many right-wing conservatives and extremists accused him of being a “secret Muslim.” Although this hypothesis seems plausible, there is other evidence that suggest that high-profile attacks against other Americans in the name of

ISIL or Al-Qaeda directly contributes to anti-Muslim sentiment which traverses from hateful rhetoric and devolves into violence.



*Figure 4. Anti-Muslim Assaults. Note. FBI Hate Crime Statistics, 2015*

Muslim Americans were not the only group to see an increase in hate crimes perpetuated against them because of their identity. Hate-motivated crimes against Sikhs also increased. Because their customary dress code is similar to that of Muslim-Americans, Sikhs are often attacked due to mistaken identity. In 2012, Wade Michael Page, a self-proclaimed Neo-Nazi, entered a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin and opened fire, killing six people and seriously wounding three others. Page, after shooting a police Lieutenant Lt. Brian Murphy in the throat, committed suicide after he was shot in the stomach by a responding police officer. Law enforcement later discovered that Page was a member of the White supremacist group called the Northern Hammerskins (Elias, 2012). After the shooting, FBI and local law enforcement officials concluded that there

was strong evidence to suggest that Page mistakenly assumed that his targets were Muslims and he was entering a temple and not a Mosque.

According to the Sikh Coalition (2014), The terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to an exponential increase in hate crimes, employment discrimination, law enforcement profiling, and school bullying against Sikhs in the United States. Since the FBI does not record hate crimes against Sikhs, Hindus, or others that Americans often mistake for Muslims, the hate crimes recorded will under-represent the actual number of hate crimes directed at Sikhs or other groups that identify with the Islamic faith.

According to research conducted by Florida State University professors Patrick Mason and Andrew Matella (2014), racial profiling of Muslim Americans or suspected Muslim Americans went into overdrive post 9/11. In their research, they reported that:

On November 9, 2001, the DOJ mailed interview requests to 5,000 Arab and Muslim males, 18 - 33 years of age, who arrived in America after January 2000 on student, work, or tourist visas. These were nominally voluntary interviews... The same month the US Department of State slowed the visa process for males ages 16 - 45 from Arab and Muslim countries. Further, the INS engaged in mass arrests of students who had violated the terms of their visas; all of these students were from Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen (pp.4-5).

During Spring 2004, the FBI, under intense political pressure from elected officials in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, again decided to round up Arabs and Muslims for “voluntary” interviews (Mason & Matella, 2014). On May 28, 2004, it was revealed that the Justice Department had targeted 5,000 Muslims

and Arabs for questioning, questioning based on religion and ethnicity, and not on individualized criminal suspicion (Arab America, 2014). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) vehemently opposed these measures promised that litigation would be forthcoming. The actions taken by the FBI were considered to so blatantly discriminatory that some local police chiefs worked hard to refute this racial profiling, going as far as resisting cooperation with federal law enforcement efforts on the grounds that the entire investigation appeared to violate departmental policies at state and local levels (Rapoport, 2004).

In California, Governor Davis and Attorney General Lockyer were concerned about possible terrorists congregating in the state. They authorized programs in September 2001 that supported racial profiling, using reports from and investigative powers of the Highway Patrol and the Office of Emergency Services, an organization that was later central in developing the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center. The Center, one of the first in the nation, was created to process thousands of anonymous tips and leads on suspicious activity following 9/11. The challenge for this organization has been separating fictitious reports from potential threats. Threats that are deemed credible or present a clear and present danger are forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement agency for follow-up. In January and February of 2016, 1,615 incidents identifying potential suspects were reported to the Center. Out of the 228 credible reports, 33 individuals remained as subjects of ongoing investigations. The Center, which contacts an average of almost 60 law enforcement agencies per week, and monitors dozens of anti-terrorist investigations, remains a tool that has yet to be validated through empirical testing and review (Shughart, 2006).

While the Office of Emergency Services Center continues to receive significant information every day from reports on and tracking of those with an apparent Middle-Eastern background, concerns emerged as to what is considered suspicious or dangerous activities. It is imperative that law enforcement agencies and officials extract relevant and reliable information from reports received by the Center, knowing that the outstanding challenge is to flag only behaviors and other indicators that indicate patterns related to domestic terrorism (STATA, 2009).

To accept that profiling Middle-Easterners is enough to warrant disparate treatment, Americans would need to accept that most Middle-Easterners have a proclivity for terrorism—a thought contrary to the Constitution. The horrific nature of the crimes committed on 9/11 by this group of foreign nationals from Saudi Arabia motivated officials to specifically investigate all foreign nationals from Middle Eastern countries, often disregarding other criteria normally a part of such investigations, and has resulted in social media backlash, civil rights protests, and confusion as to the scope and mandate of some federal and state investigations.

### **Systemic Determinants of Domestic Terrorism**

The total numbers of domestic terrorist attacks fluctuate annually. While the numbers of events may vary, their deadliness, destructiveness, and potential for catastrophic outcomes increased dramatically in recent years. Even states that are relatively free of terrorism can no longer afford to be complacent. With evidence of domestic terrorism spilling over from one state to another (Enders et al., 2011), the potential for disastrous consequences from even a single event must be kept in mind (Wilkinson, 2001).

As domestic terrorism is conducted in the pursuit of alternate outcomes, what has emerged is that many revolutionary terrorists are most interested in simply raising society's consciousness or demonstrating the fragility of the current state of society. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the goal for some domestic terrorists is bringing about a utopia that they believe will come from destroying all government and its authority. Between these extremes are terrorists who seek optimal economic systems that can follow the destruction of current institutions. Other groups seek societies that are better served by altering the current relationships with nature and promoting the reinvigoration of the planet. At the less ambitious end of the scale of domestic terror, there are those that desire autonomy or a section of the nation for themselves. Criminologists and other researchers found that terrorists and their causes are diverse and require a broad scope of investigation to find commonalities and unifying elements (Laqueur, 2003; Sambanis, 2008).

As terrorism is difficult to define and research, Silke (2004a) observed that academic researchers almost always choose to discuss differing definitions of terrorism because there has not been one that has been broadly accepted. For those who choose to study terrorism, what routinely occurs is dividing it into two categories (domestic and international), based primarily on the national origin(s) of the perpetrators, the choice of victims, and the selection of targets. For domestic terrorism, perpetrator and victim nationalities routinely match, with the violence seeking to resolve issues within a nation, directed by a group or an individual from that state (Young & Dugan, 2010).

### **Social Determinants of Domestic Terrorism**

Most debate on domestic terrorism had focused on policies related to prevention. There was a widespread view that poverty was a feature that creates terrorism and that view dominated much of the discourse (Kahn & Weiner, 2002) and ran concurrently with theoretical and empirical studies that addressed the economics associated with conflict. In particular, the results of a study conducted by Alberto Alesina, Ozler Sule, Roubini, Nouriel and Phillip Swagel (1996) suggested that poor economic conditions are likely to increase the probability of domestic terror, and drive citizens to challenge the government and use violence as a means to be heard. The fact that domestic terrorism is perceived as a manifestation of political conflict suggests that poverty and adverse economic conditions play important roles in explaining and understanding acts of domestic terrorism (De la Calle & Ignacio, 2011).

Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) suggested that aggressive national anti-terrorism policies were attributable to increases in domestic terror. This highlights the role that access to information and reporting play in fashioning policy. For example, the DOJ, DHS, FBI, and the U.S. State Department data are reluctant to publish material that runs counter to their initiatives or agendas. Instead, they seek to galvanize the public behind defeating these groups and ignore their messages. There is a single direction to the messages reaching the public. In 2003, for instance, the MIPT Knowledge Base (2004) reported 1,536 events of domestic terrorism but only 240 events of international terrorism, maintaining the focus on domestic terrorists. What is interesting in these trends is their impact on present and future actions and policies on domestic terrorism (MIPT, 2004; Piazza, 2004).

### **Extremist Social Movements and the Internet**

The need to study extremist social movements and their presence on Social Media has become vital. Since social media and other emerging digital technology has become a necessity, society routinely considers change as inevitable. As world-systems analysts predict the decline of the U.S. as the world's leading nation in the coming decades, extremist social movements have the potential to reshape the world (Walter, Hoover, & Sandler, 2014).

Research conducted by Wallerstein (1999) suggested that while researchers cannot predict what will happen in the future with any certainty, what is currently being promoted are egalitarian and utopian world societies. In trying to create a better world, societies must be willing to invest moral energy to achieve this while also challenging ones that would stand against brotherhood, equality, and religious freedoms (Piazza, 2006).

Following a similar course of research, Chase-Dunn and Boswell (2002) predicted a rise in extremist movements spurred by a global economy that would enable societies to move beyond borders and seek equitable solutions for all humanity. As this team promoted the emergence of a global democracy that would likely begin in the United States and move outward. This equality would also extend to assigning economic, political and cultural rights, and disregard the influence of the majority in favor of the individual. This search of a pure and true form of global democracy will ultimately unite factions opposed to the effort. While legislation is already uniting this form of global utilitarianism, which continues to gain popularity among the disgruntled, increased



domestic terrorist attacks on the United States, in an effort to disseminate the goals and message of social extremist movements can be expected (Frey, 2004).

In a two-pronged attack, leaders of extremist social organizations have been very successful in using the Internet and social media to publicize their complaints and goals. They seek to win the hearts and minds of those who may not be willing to engage in civil disobedience but want to understand and take part in the struggle. These digital outlets provide information about these “e-movements” and new forms of “e-protests” and “e-activisms” (Earl & Schussman, 2003) and highlight the Web as a tool for extremist groups.

Domestic and international networks are key resources in overcoming difficulties in leadership and decision making (Castells, 2000). The downside for social extremist groups that utilize the Internet as their primary means of communication between leaders and members is that government agencies also have a window into their modus operandi. Law enforcement therefore has the opportunity to identify immediate and future threats presented by these groups (Lichbach, 2003).

### **Conclusion**

The dynamic research conducted on the characteristics of domestic terrorists provides insights that will assist in establishing the comprehensive models used in this study and assessing the variables involved, which will be qualified by creating themes. Using poverty, ethnicity, religious ideologies, along with secondary variables, unifying connections were explored in Chapter 4, and used a qualitative document evaluation approach that followed scientific methodology and protocols.

## Chapter 4: Methodology

As this researcher sought to develop models that could be used by law enforcement to predict domestic terrorists' future activity, case studies with quantitative analysis was the optimal methodology. By assessing past domestic terrorist events conducted by various militia groups, political extremists, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionists, and left- and right-wing terrorist groups, the researcher anticipated successfully predict behavior. The researcher tested the hypotheses, based on variables from the study, with bivariate and regression analysis (Yin, 2009). The evolution of domestic terror and their supporting organizations were defined within the research.

A comprehensive quantitative study, rooted in a traditional scientific approach afforded the ability to correlate domestic terror incidents and changes in the economy, political climate, and beliefs. The search for causation was tied to their message and ultimately led to action, suggesting the approach used, which uncovered commonalities, and provided justification for producing the predictive models. Given the scope of domestic terrorist operations in the United States, this researcher sought reliability and validity by integrating quantitative and case study approaches (Creswell, 2011).

Formulating political hypotheses related to domestic terrorism is based on principles offered by Fearon (1991), who put forth a set of defined propositions to explain a group of facts or phenomena, or a fundamental component or aspect of a research study. This In this study, the researcher addressed multiple hypotheses in an effort to provide a full explanation of the social phenomenon under study.

To develop the various hypotheses for this study, it was essential to avoid preconceived assumptions and account for researcher bias, ensuring the validity of the

examination. In addressing this concern, the hypotheses were not developed until after completing a thorough review of the research, avoiding scenarios where relevant research was discounted for a pre-conceived conclusion (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).

### **Hypotheses 1**

**H1: The frequency of attacks by domestic terrorists from 1980-2016, has a direct correlation to the policies and positions of the President of the United States.**

The researcher used the political hypotheses, which were validated by empirical data collected in the literature presented in Chapter 3, to develop the models. They call attention to the significance of presidential administrations and their domestic policies from 1977 onward. One political hypothesis suggests that certain Presidents and their domestic policies resulted in increased domestic terrorist activities. Marschall (2002) provided a directional political hypotheses and stated that the nature of relationships can include positive or negative (inverse) and high or low levels of influence. An increase or decrease in domestic terrorism can be attributed to presidential influence.

### **Hypothesis 2**

**H2: Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism will increase as political and religious rhetoric becomes increasingly partisan.**

The systemic hypothesis challenges the nature of society. Our social system and its relation to domestic terrorism supports a correlation between perceived injustice and radical extremism. Seeking internal consistency for this hypothesis was a significant challenge. Reviewing the delivery of social services, education, employment opportunities, democratic principles, court challenges, and increased crime rates, the data lend credence to certain elements within society that capitalize and exploit on a segment

of the population's belief that the only way the "White race" will survive in the United States is the systematic expulsion of all non-Whites, forced repatriation, and a return to White nativism. On the evening of June 17, 2015, self-proclaimed White extremist Dylann Roof walked in to the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in downtown Charleston, South Carolina, and murdered nine African-American parishioners during their weekly Bible study. In his manifesto, Roof cited his contempt for the American flag and the perceived apathy regarding the felonious deaths of White people: "I hate the sight of the American flag. Modern American patriotism is an absolute joke," "People pretending like they have something to be proud of while White people are being murdered daily in the streets" (New York Times, 2016).

Some terrorism experts and law enforcement officials would classify Dylann Roof as an anomaly or an outlier. However, terrorism experts have uncovered data to the contrary. Whether it be a foiled white supremacist act of domestic terrorism or an actual attack on ethnic minorities, the consensus among the experts is that Roof is emblematic of under-educated, ultra-right-wing, white male, who presumes that their economic and social situation would be different if minorities were either exterminated or expelled from the United States. When elected leaders irresponsibly make public statements sympathetic to the devastating actions of right-wing domestic terrorists, it only does three things: empowers their cause, motivate copycats, and it martyrs the perpetrator.

Domestic terrorist organizations capitalized on citizens who are disaffected by a government they feel has excluded them from life, liberty justice, freedom of speech, and the right to bear arms. The demonization of the government is the ideal platform to allow individuals from the same ideological perspective to unite in their opposition to the

government by openly defying the rule of law. Terrorist groups are skillful at promoting their message to those disenfranchised persons who see themselves as victims of societal amalgamation. As membership increases, so does funding. The research has shown a direct correlation between the financial resources of a terrorist organization and the likelihood of attacks increasing. For example, a group of bank robbers calling themselves the Aryan Republican Army pulled off 22 heists in 1994 and 1995 and had ambitions to use the money to start a revolution (Gumbel, 2015).

Review of historical data supporting the systemic hypothesis highlights key periods in U.S. history over the past 40 years when the system faltered and domestic terrorist recruitment increased. These indicators are now being used to develop similar studies and produce predictive models that allow for proactive measures by law enforcement (Palazzolo & Roberts, 2010).

With this hypothesis, the researcher sought valid relationships between variables, expressed as explicitly as possible, and supported by the literature. What emerged as significant was that the system cannot meet the requirements and expectations of every U.S. citizen. Trying to minimize the number of those who are dissatisfied with the system and considering taking violent action, what is suggested is to promote interventions using law enforcement and/or social services to deal with frustrations early on. The results should be fewer people signing up for and participating in domestic terrorist organizations (King et al., 1994).

### **Hypothesis 3**

**H3: Identify politics, race, and Nativism will become increasingly radicalized and divisive.**

The social hypothesis and its testing for this study followed a process in which individuals made judgments about what other people do, think, or say. The literature review showed an important deficiency: the percentage of extroverts in focus groups were not effectively analyzed. As a result, none of the personality variables were useful for the type of hypothesis testing strategy researchers believe is essential to understanding domestic terrorists (Newman, 2008).

To rectify deficiencies in forming a social hypothesis, the researcher used Lalonde's (2002) social identity-intergroup differentiation theory. Lalonde stated that individuals have stronger in-group identifications and will perceive greater differences between their in-group and a relevant out-group. As domestic terrorist leaders and key subordinates are likely to be extroverts, their writings were analyzed from that perspective and a deeper understanding of terrorist relationships emerged. The social hypothesis in this study suggested that the greater the strength of in-group relationships, the stronger the terrorist organization is or will become (Lalonde, 2002). The evaluation considered the strength of in-group and out-group identifications, and the relevance of dimensions associated with social comparisons.

### **Case Study Selection**

The study design addressed the research questions by focusing on the problems law enforcement faces when assessing changes in domestic terrorism from 1977 through 2015. Case studies typically focus on small groups or individuals within a group and document the groups' or individuals' experience in a specific setting in order to understand the social phenomenon under study. In order to consider domestic terrorism, the researcher assessed key variables, perceptions, and goals of domestic terror groups by

studying documents related to them. Assigning numeric values to social indicators when increased domestic terrorism occurred gave a temporal dimension and included instances of escalation. These steps informed the researcher's construction of a detailed narrative. From this narrative, models were developed that validated the hypotheses by drawing on the key variables that addressed the research questions (Yin, 2012).

The purpose of case studies is to give researchers the ability to effectively evaluate and filter information. A challenge in this study was developing a design that correctly assigned relevance and value to data. The purpose of this quantitative case study was to find relevant connections after examining historical documents and assessing key incidents in presidential administrations from Carter to Obama. With this approach, the researcher constructed a narrative and the models. These models were a comprehensive system for monitoring and forecasting changes in the dispersion and character of homegrown terrorism. The researcher used this empirical inquiry to examine the phenomenon with a reliable and valid data collection process. This case study focused exclusively on reviewing existing historical data and sought to identify patterns that converged with the research hypotheses and operant variables (Ellet, 2007).

The rationale for using a case study approach was that it is effective for identifying changes within domestic terror groups in the United States. The quantitative design assisted with identifying asocial variables and areas of development and growth. The premise is consistent with Yin's (2009) criteria that the case be of general public interest and that the social and educational issues have importance for the community.

As researchers continue to understand domestic terrorism and promote its academic study, a quantitative study using an exploratory research design was

appropriate for this study. The premise behind each case study was to develop a strategic inquiry that examined common links. The six-domestic terrorist categories examined through the lens of historical documents resulted in a comprehensive and contemporary view of these organizations and their goals. The use of a case study design was consistent with previous researchers who studied small groups (Horvat, 2013). The strength of the case study research process lies in its series of steps designed to provide careful analysis of individual cases (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). A design that includes multiple perspectives from different references, and the opportunity to promote new strategies such as the proactive models, will serve as effective tools for law enforcement (Creswell, 2011).

### **Dependent Variables**

Domestic terrorism continues to remain a challenge for American society. Thus, examining the dependent variables in relation to organizations was essential for this study. As research on social phenomenon evolved, Goodwin (2003) highlighted current studies relying on connectivity metrics which support empirical modeling. The use of structural measures highlighted connectivity measures. This was particularly relevant given that connectivity was treated as an independent variable. By reviewing dependent variables that supported connections between the six types of terror groups studied, interconnections and connectivity were found when identifying the causes that underlie domestic terror (Goodwin, 2003).

The traditional mathematical and statistical modeling the researcher used in the study highlighted the variables and informed the model at the conclusion of this study. The dependent variables represented the output or outcome whose variation were studied



and the models and tests explained the interactions between them. In this study, increases and decreases in domestic terrorism were analyzed to understand how the independent variables increased a terrorist organization's success, and was related to the number and outcomes of their attacks (Nyström, Wikström, Blomqvist, Kautsky, & Isaeus, 2013).

This research relied on dynamic data mining tools that drew on multivariate statistics. The dependent variable was the target variable; the independent variable was assigned as a regular variable. When identifying variables through a review of historical documents, the dependent variables were the events studied (i.e., the terrorist acts) and allocating expected changes when the independent variable was altered. The application of known values for the target variable was identified by data analysis, allowing for identification of target variables to be used in these learning algorithms (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). The algorithms derived their validity from a review of the ebb and flow of domestic terrorism. Basing these changes on the effects of the independent variables supported the models and the validity of their content and predictions (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009).

### **Independent Variables**

A review of the historical documents permitted assessing empirical data. Changes within society provided a foundational base for the study. The temporal guidelines were driven by changes in residents. Independent variables included economics, politics, religion, race, social variables, demographics, and the predominance of social media in contemporary society (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). These variables were assessed in relation to the formation, actions, and success of individual terrorist groups defined by pre-qualified categories, with an emphasis on the number of incidents. The number of

incidents was a measure for the domestic terrorist organization's success and was correlated with these key social variables (Brett, 2004).

In traditional scientific, quantitative case study analysis, the value of the dependent variable is manipulated by the effects and changes produced by the independent variables. While the independent variable is the operant variable that a researcher controls, manipulation was limited by societal changes across various time periods. To this extent, evaluation centered on convergences of the independent variables with the dependent variable of time and domestic terrorist action. Fluctuations in economics, social structure, race relations, and emerging technology such as the Internet, discovered relationships that could not have existed in the past. By accounting for the importance of time in this study, and the changes occurring among the independent variables within the research, the conclusions supporting the predictive behavior models drew on validated methodological approaches (Hastings, 1998).

As law enforcement seeks to better understand domestic terrorism, this study provides for a means to effectively evaluate the independent variables. What was emphasized in the conclusions is the challenge of the convergences of independent and dependent variables in qualifying and validating the influence of each on the final results. Though there were multiple independent variables, and the researcher could not directly manipulate the evaluated exchanges. However, the study's validity and the outcomes assigned to the statistical models were supported (Kusurkar, Ten Cate, van Asperen, & Croiset, 2011).

### **Control Variable**

The control variable, which is designated as the constant within a scientific study and the element that remains unchanged during the investigation, was the continued threat of domestic terrorism facing the United States. The control variable plays an important role in influencing experimental results and is tested relative to the relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Cheng & Thaga, 2006).

Following the example set by Aradillas-Lopez, Honoré, and Powell (2007), investigating difference estimation with non-parametric control variables—essential in developing the study—requires acknowledging that any system existing in a natural state may have many variables that are interdependent, with each affecting the other. By using an experiment, the relationship between independent and dependent variables is tested. Also, what is essential is identifying whether any additional independent variable can serve as a control variable. With a statistical analysis of the interplay between the independent and dependent variables (and the effects on the control variable), what is presented in the conclusions is the ability for law enforcement to utilize these exchanges and proactivity respond to domestic terrorism.

### **Conclusion**

Dependent and independent variables allowed the various hypotheses to be tested, provided direction for this study, and offered a methodology that ensures confident and reliable results. Using a quantitative case study approach supported a comprehensive evaluation of retrieved historical documents, in which social, system, and political variables operated as dependent variables and gave a detailed picture of the historical development of domestic terrorism that ran concurrent with changes in society.

In Chapter 5, the independent variables were examined using terrorist typologies: militia, lone wolf, political extremists, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionists, and left- and right-wing extremists. Convergence among these variables validated the hypotheses.

## Chapter 5: Case Study Analysis

Using a quantitative case study design that explored typologies of domestic terrorism allowed the researcher to conduct a comprehensive evaluation that addressed the study's research questions and problem. As this researcher drew upon empirical data from historical documents, an accurate depiction of the motivations, social influences, and organization of different types of domestic terror groups was possible (Creswell, 2011).

The case study method draws out relevant connections from primary, peer reviewed journal articles, governmental databases, and data collected by law enforcement. Incorporating this material supported the narrative. This form of empirical inquiry examined past and present phenomena by the data collected (Ellet, 2007).

### **Militia and Paramilitary Groups Case Study**

The public activities that dominate the militia agenda include public and private meetings, rallies, and paramilitary training. Of those, rallies and paramilitary training emerged as potential concerns for law enforcement authorities. However, due to the small number of rallies and marches, they fail to generate the kind of opposition that would identify them as a danger. Conducting paramilitary training activities in some instances may violate state law, depending on the state in which the activity takes place. However, nationwide legislation prohibiting paramilitary training has not occurred, although there were attempts to create and enforce laws prohibiting militia training (Crawford, Gardiner, & Mozzochi, 1994).

Concerning the group dynamics of militias, researchers identified two behaviors that caused concerns. The first is the propensity of militias to engage in confrontations

with local or federal authorities using their paramilitary training. The second type of dangerous behavior is their collecting and/or manufacturing illegal weapons and explosives, with the intent to use them against specific domestic targets. These activities stem from the movement's core ideology of using firearms to *resist* the government. Driven by their desire to *protect* citizens, and feeling themselves to be victims of the government, they justify their illegal and criminal actions (Abanes, 1996).

The media sensationalized militia confrontations with the government. Events included mobilizations, in which individuals claiming to be victimized by the government contact militia groups, as in the incident at Ruby Ridge. Typically, such confrontations result from individuals refusing to vacate property that has been foreclosed or seized, or from instances involving people who have warrants against them but refuse to give themselves up. When a militia organization identifies a victim, members mobilize support through communication channels such as ham radio or the Internet. A successful mobilization results when members assemble at a designated location, often armed and prepared for confrontation between the perceived victim and law enforcement agents, hoping to force authorities to back down and submit to the will of the militias (Pitcavage, 2001).

Contemporary militia movements are the latest in a series of paramilitary movements evolving from right-wing ideologies that emerged during the 20th century (Bennett, 1995). The original Ku Klux Klan militia and their derivatives began in the 1920s. In the 1930s, the world experienced a sudden rise in fascism. Groups such as the

Silver Shirt Legion and the Christian Front Units appeared and were organized into paramilitary units. The threat they posed was considered real (Warren, 1996).

The start of the Cold War ushered in new waves of paramilitary groups, causing the government and law enforcement to fear that some combination of Communist agents and fifth-column subversives would take place. Counter-militia groups such as the Minutemen and California Rangers saw it as their duty to arm themselves and defeat domestic communist threats facing the United States. These types of militias routinely formed sporadically during this period, driven by issues that addressed concerns ranging from White Supremacy to surviving the next world war. The Cold War also spawned militia groups, including the Christian Patriot Defense League, the Texas Emergency Reserve, the Covenant, and the Sword. The importance of religion is significant in the history of militias (Cobb, 1996).

As domestic militias seek to validate their purposes and causes, what is central to the majority of the organizations is challenging the federal government as legitimate. One of the more successful militias in the Northwest, the Posse, emerged in 1970 to advocate that a truer form of government would be led by county sheriffs whose primary goal was to mitigate intrusions by the feds. By challenging the authority of the federal government and asserting that it was not a legitimate government, their ideology quickly gained support from the far right and created the image of militias as true freedom fighters.

Militias interpreted each failure of the federal government as a crime against the people, and treaties such as the *North American Free Trade Agreement* as limiting individual opportunity and freedom. Also, the assaults on Ruby Ridge (ID), Waco (TX) against the Branch Davidians, and gun control legislation such the *Brady Handgun*

*Protection Act* (1993), provided the groups with pretexts for their criminal actions. Social media and the Internet fueled their rise in the 1990s and gave individuals who would otherwise have no access to militia groups a means to communicate with recruiters and leaders. The militias used the federal assaults noted above to increase organizational strength and succeeded in funneling the anger of some citizens into action (Eaton, 1995).

As authorities face the challenge of responding to militias who covet illegal weapons and explosives, and engage in conspiracies to obtain and use them, the need to understand domestic militias is required. Militias now seek support internationally, conduct fundraising for weapons and explosives, and seek information about potential targets. A legitimate threat is that a U.S.-based group could receive directives from overseas.

The continued goal is to challenge the authority of the American government (Intelligence Report Summaries, 1999). Despite the potential for danger in every militia confrontation, many authorities are more concerned with the desire of many militia members for illegal weapons, and their engaging in conspiracies to obtain or use them. Such occasions bring the militia movement closest to fitting more traditional definitions of terrorism (Larizza, 1996).

With many contemporary research studies on terrorism using 9/11 as a baseline for tracking increases and decreases in activities, Forensten (2015) highlighted the fact that Americans, and not foreigners, committed 80% of terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11. In the 15 years since the attacks, not one domestic terrorist attack was committed by a foreign terrorist organization, including the most recent mass shooting in Orlando Florida by Omar Mateen, who was an American citizen. In addition, militia



groups who cultivated homegrown terrorists perpetrated 26 deadly domestic terrorist attacks in the post-9/11 era (Forensten, 2015).

One of the key points argued in several research articles is that mainstream media has been effective in depicting militia groups as a consortium of racists, anarchists, and lunatics, all waiting for an opportunity to overthrow the U.S. government. New groups, such as the Arkansas Defense Force, emerged and promote a compelling and reasonable platform, and operate from the Bill of Rights, the writings of Thomas Jefferson, and Greek and Romans legislators. They believe that every citizen should be a soldier. What is often referenced is the famous Thomas Jefferson quote from a letter he wrote to William S. Smith, a diplomatic official in London, on November 13, 1787, commenting on Shays' Rebellion, "the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time, with the blood of patriots and tyrants... [and] the Constitution asserts that all power is inherent in the people; requiring them to take action" (Jefferson, 1787).

To support these beliefs, militias are united in the belief that they should be armed at all times, entitled to freedom of person, freedom of religion, freedom of property, and freedom of press. Any government challenges to these freedoms demands an immediate response, and violent (and illegal) actions are accepted as a means to an end (Pitcavage, 1997b; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2016).

### **Lone Wolf Case Study**

Researchers who monitor lone wolf terrorists in contemporary society see a continuous revision of their modus operandi. Uniformed police are now primary targets, they note. Lone wolves enjoyed the easing of gun control laws from the 1990s, which

likely increased the number of mass shootings that have used their preferred method of firearms, high-velocity weapons (Reid Meloy & Yakeley, 2014).

Forensic psychologists sought to develop a standard profile of the lone wolf. However, a profile has not yet been developed, but it is widely believed that most domestic terrorists are unemployed, single, White males with criminal records. Also, social and psychological characteristics indicate that they are similar to members of other terrorist groups in that they are older, lack education, and are more susceptible to mental illness. As lone wolves go through personal radicalization, leading up to their involvement in terrorist activities, what is significant at the outset is their combination of personal and political grievances.

Though the individual seeks solitude, what is unique is their desire to elicit sympathy for their cause, subsequently validating their terrorist action. The Internet has enabled this process. Given that an enabler now supports the lone wolf, intent is developed. The final commonality is a triggering event that overcomes the final hurdle for action. Once radicalization is complete, what occurs—and is likely unnoticed by the lone wolves themselves—is the creation of their own terrorist signature.

Investigators are now becoming aware of the radicalization process of lone wolves and what to search for regarding their enablers and the significant triggering events that would likely lead to action. With this enhanced understanding of lone wolf profiles, there is a need to understand their intentions. Despite being isolated from society, they seek recognition through manifestos, e-mails messages, and videotaped proclamations. In the case of lone wolf Ted Kaczynski (the 'Unabomber'), his capture was the result of his desire to be acknowledged when the media published his manifesto,

which ultimately led to his capture. This desire to be acknowledged is a key weakness of the lone wolf, but ultimately it is a benefit to law enforcement in understanding the frame of mind of the lone wolf terrorist (Reid Meloy & Yakeley, 2014).

Lone wolf profiles support the concept of what the FBI termed *violent true believers* (Meloy, Jr., 2011) and suggested that these individuals have, in most cases, experienced developmental growth issues in their late adolescent stages. As young adults, they present an immaturity due to a psychological issue originating from the pre-frontal cortex. As a result of this pathology, there impulsivity, psychological grandiosity, self-identification vulnerability, and biologically-based drives peak during this key growth period and support self-imposed isolation, leading to a downward trajectory. This trajectory has been established and follows a path of seeking to be enabled, finding a triggering event, and committing the act itself.

Erikson (1950) argued that this process could be interpreted as a complex internal negotiation related to whether the self is a terrorist or a soldier. As reality and fiction compete within the mind of the lone wolf, those who are incapable of integrating into society experience a deepening frustration that builds upon itself and the future terrorist eventually takes action in defense of their own cause. This delusional interplay makes the lone wolf particularly dangerous, as they are not beholden to group mandates, and possess a freedom to engage in any activity that presents itself as an opportunity. Every citizen is a potential target. The Internet has only enhanced the fantasy and made finding enablers easier. Also, there is always the opportunity to view triggering events online that may lead to lone wolf terrorist action (Alderdice, 2005; Alderdice, 2007; Bargh & McKenna, 2009).

When evaluating the mental status, professional success, and social status of lone wolves, it is understood that some of these individuals have histories of unfulfilled personal goals, leading to cases of extreme narcissism. In what has been identified as *in-betweeners*, they are caught between the confusion of late adolescence and the necessity to move through identity integration and enter adulthood. They also embody an absence of anticipated pride and joy, and lack the ability to meet their objectives and personal destiny. Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013) noted that this type of terrorist is particularly vulnerable to adult role models who convey a belief in and requirement to submit to authority. This point is relevant for law enforcement officers pursuing lone wolves as they mature and draw upon previous experiences in which they may have felt minimized and treated as less than others (Fonagy & Target, 1996).

A review of cases involving lone wolf terrorist activity between 1940 and 2000 highlighted 171 attacks resulting in 98 fatalities and 305 injuries. Statistics indicated that 60% of lone wolves committed a single attack and 40% committed multiple attacks. Examples of serial terrorism include racist serial killer Joseph Paul Franklin, believed to be responsible for an estimated 23 attacks over 4 years; Muharem Kurbegovic, the “Alphabet Bomber,” who committed 10 attacks in 2 years; and Kaczynski, who committed 16 bombings during 17 years.

A Department of Justice Report (2015), noted that between 2001 and 2013, 45 lone wolves committed 45 attacks, resulting in the deaths of 55 people and injuring 126. These domestic attacks involved using bombs, airplanes, biological weapons, construction equipment, and knives. The report highlights their heightened ability to attack their targets, despite their lack of education and isolation. Using multiple attackers

was noticeable before 9/11; afterward, the reality of the lone wolf rose to prominence. This fear was supported by media sensationalism surrounding lone wolf mass murderers, including Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 and injured 30 in the Fort Hood shooting (2009); Jared Laughner, who killed six and wounded 13 in the Tucson shooting (2011); and Wade Page, who killed six and wounded four in the shooting at the Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin (2012). By highlighting these examples, the data indicates a continued rise in lone wolf terrorism, enabled by technology and particularly social media (Hamm & Spaag, 2015).

As lone wolf terrorists focused their attention on uniformed police and military officers, the results have been 12 law enforcement officers dead or wounded in the 60 years preceding 9/11. This figure doubled in the first 13 years after 9/11: the number of government officials killed or wounded by lone wolves rose to 24. It was clear that this form of domestic terrorism presented an immediate danger to the United States. Because these attacks happened between 2009 and 2013 and coincide with Obama's presidency, it was clear that political dissent was a likely the main motivation behind the attacks.

Prior to the Obama administration, Black Power movements, the Israeli-Palestinian controversy, and abortion pro-life radicals, were key reasons why lone wolf terrorists directed their anger towards law enforcement. In the post-9/11 era, researchers confirmed that attacks on local, state, and federal law enforcement officers were motivated by three factors: anti-government sentiment, White supremacy, and anger over the election of the first African American President. As a result, lone wolf terrorist emerged from their ranks and displayed their dissatisfaction by engaging in acts of

domestic terror and the result has been a steady rise in these types of attacks (Sageman, 2008).

The lens through which society views the violent true believer, such as the lone wolf, is often rooted in psychoanalytic theory, which emphasizes attachments, object relations, mental structure (especially superego identifications), and internal defenses. Empirical case studies also focused on social dynamics, including the significance of social, religious, and political forces at work in terrorism. The lone wolf used his isolation from mainstream society to validate his actions. They have come to the point where violence toward organizations and others is considered the only way to receive validation and praise.

While the motivation for extreme violent action varies, clinical and forensic psychologists and psychiatrists believe that lone wolves likely have both conscious and unconscious characteristics that support their action. The mental instability that this produces in lone wolves who create their own reality, championing imaginary causes like a contemporary Don Quixote, ultimately justifies the violence in their mind. Their lack of connection to reality and mental instability make them inherently dangerous (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Smith, 1994).

### **Political Extremist Case Study**

Political extremists are overtly defined by their strong disapproval of an ideology, and they are generally contrasted with moderates or centrists on the political spectrum. In their research on the conditions supporting political extremism, Bartoli and Coleman (2009) highlighted the importance of power differences within the context of extremism. When conflict arises, low-power groups are routinely viewed as more extreme than other

groups engaged in similar activities, but still fundamentally believe in and support our system of government. In the political arena, marginalized groups and people who believe that normal modes of conflict resolution are either biased or blocked and give unfair outcomes, routinely utilize extremist acts. However, some argued that dominant political groups also employ extreme measures. For example, many argued that Janet Reno, who sanctioned the attack on the Branch Davidians, is a prime example of a political extremist who caused the death of innocent civilians. This type of extremism routinely uses violent means to ensure submission of marginalized groups. However, political extremists can promote change through non-violent means. Therefore, the spectrum of political extremism consists of many groups having a variety of characteristics (Coleman & Bartoli, 2005).

Political platform and positions are routinely aligned when considering the utilization of violent actions, where the level of violence, targets, differentiating between military personnel, civilians, and children, defines the level of extremism. The evidence of political power structures, and the use of extreme violence, is more consistent with lower power groups routinely resorting to episodic attacks and forms of violence such as suicide bombings. In contrast, dominant political extremist power groups rely on structural, institutionalized violence such as covert uses of torture, or allowing the police force to engage in brutality as a sanctioned code of conduct (Wilcox, 1987).

Political extremist groups and individuals are routinely demonized by society through the media because their extremist ideologies are almost always associated with violent behavior or violent rhetoric, which are precursors to violence. What is often overlooked by the media and law enforcement is the rationale for the extremist behavior.

As a result, all members that subscribe to an extremist political ideology are *framed* or depicted as radicals who only advocate violence to further their political agenda when in fact there are internal power struggles between individual members with regards to what course of action will best advance their cause and not all of them include acts of violence. The development of opposing internal factions in political extremist groups is not anomalous. Ideological demagoguery is a quintessential trait that often emerges in political extremist's groups often with the purpose of unifying those members who advocate a *violence only* mentality and expelling or converting those who are open to the idea of employing non-violent strategies. The key for political extremist groups is to present a united front because conflict or ambivalence can undermine the very foundation of the group. The unity of political extremists and their willingness to use violence is its greatest threat, and arguably its greatest asset in an effort to be heard and respected for the purposes of government policy modification or actions. When assessing the core problems facing extremist political factions in contemporary society as they seek consensus, it is evident that the very consensus they seek undermines their ability to evolve and grow out of a fixed, closed mindset. The inability for the political extremist to move beyond extremist attitudes and approaches suggests an inability and imperviousness to change, with the challenge being that by mainstreaming and moving towards the middle, the political extremist loses their most valuable asset. In what is clearly a catch-22, where political extremism requires participants of the group to take action on certain political issues, what is a determining and defining factor is the level and severity of the action (Wintrobe, 2006).



Studies of political extremes in convergence with politics indicate that the former draws heavily on political philosophy, with establishment of what constitutes the middle or political center, and addressing how these variables shift together over time, and create cultural contexts. The development of extremist politics, leading to terrorism, highlights the ongoing need to study and analyze individual and group behaviors, attributes, strategies, preoccupations, and internal/external supporters. In considering the different Presidents, approaches, and the creation of political sub-groups, which morphed into extremism, what is compelling is how liberal democracies such as the United States responded to these extremist politics and actions. This does not preclude the government, or the need to examine the role of the media and electorate in comprehending and understanding the strengths and weaknesses of democracies and extremists. As past research uncovered, the study of extremism reveals and supports assumptions concerning mainstream politics and ethics, highlighting their potential vulnerability to causes related to extreme dissent (Eatwell, 2006; Fleming, 2014).

Social media promoted the idea of political extremists being on the lunatic fringe, where simply being labeled a political extremist suggests that the actions of any opponent offered either directly or implicitly will be rejected out of hand, and is routinely promoted through the use of censorship, segregation, and persecution. With past research failing to conduct evaluations through assessments into violent political extremism, it was believed that an integrated theoretical framework that offers an explanation for an individual's involvement in politically motivated violence, was lacking, resulting in research that offered a poor understanding of causal mechanisms. Examples of political extremist groups include the following: Black September; Aryan Nation; Mexican Mafia; Bloods

and Crips Gang; WACO/Branch Davidian Compound; Black Guerilla Family; Original Knights of the KKK; Weather Underground (Weathermen); American Nazi Party; and the Aryan Brotherhood. The challenge for society has been understanding and acknowledging these extremist group's political positions, as doing so in some instances requires openly embracing racism and committing political suicide. As religion, ethnicity, and political ideology, these groups have been attributed with sustained, political domestic terrorist activities and attacks. The course of action, offered by Eatwell (2006), is to continue examining the relationships between perceived injustice and poor social integration, and political/religious violence, which is further mediated by perceived alienation. By drawing groups together, extremes can be avoided, perceived political procedural injustices can be resolved, ethnic discord can be minimized, and religious authoritarianism that supports continuous political discourse, in an effort to avoid marginalization and the escalation towards violence, can be resolved (Schils & Pauwels, 2016).

A unique argument for the existence of political extremists and their use of terror is that it continues to challenge the power of the government and avoid what conspiracy theorists argue is a continued evolution towards a New World Order. With governments routinely succumbing to tyranny, corruption, strife, and supporting the status quo, some argue that extremism offers a check to that possibility, with organizations seeking to generalize the entire population under one form of government. For example, the United Nations is seen as such an organization as it has already marginalized and has control over many third world countries. While many nations succumbed, the United States remains out of the grasp of the United Nations, with conspiracy theorist and political

extremist George Eaton's *Patriot Report* continuing to chronicle the descent of the last great Western power. Despite being anti-Semitic, and calling for an internal revolution by White patriots, his writings and literature express more fear toward the dissolution of a free government and press, challenging independent Christian patriots to fight. This example highlights the fact that the United States will likely continue to face some form of political extremism that relies on domestic terrorism, where the members, driven by fear and the right leader, will succumb and commit violent acts in support of their political group's greater good (Eaton, 1993).

### **Eco-Terrorism Case Study**

The behavioral characteristics of eco-terrorists are seen in those willing to engage in acts of violence to support of environmental or ecological causes that could result in destroying or damaging property and harming others. Other aspects within the eco-terrorist profile highlight the fact that radical environmentalism is also characterized by the belief that human society is ultimately responsible for degrading and depleting the environment. With society failing to act and leaving the destruction unchecked, the result could be the catastrophic end of the United States and the world's ecosystems (Leader & Probst, 2003).

In the FBI's National Crime Information Center Report (2014), eco-terrorism was defined as "the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against people or property, by an environmentally oriented sub-national group, for environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature" (NCIC, 2014, p. 1). Between 2003 and 2008, domestic eco-terrorists were credited with over

\$200 million in property damage, prompting many states to strengthen their laws and set stronger deterrents on place against these types of crimes (NCIC, 2014).

Disaffected environmentalists, in 1980, formed a radical group called Earth First and engaged in a series of protests and civil disobedience events (Jarboe, 2002). In 1992, the ELF was founded in Brighton, England, by radical Earth First members who began to view protests and acts of civil disobedience a waste of time and ultimately ineffective (Jarboe, 2002).

Despite the interconnections between philosophies that support eco-terrorism, this research identified that these organizations support a diverse set of goals and philosophies. Examples of radical ecology/eco-terrorist organizations include: Greenpeace, Animal Liberation Front (ALF), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, People for the Earth First, the Hardesty Avengers, and the Coalition to Save the Preserves. Each has been labeled an eco-terrorist group and been formally charged with acts of domestic terrorism by the FBI. The diversity of these groups is evident; some focus on the protection of animals, others the environment, and others seek to find a compromise between people and the environment and use of extremist or terrorist tactics to advance their message. Their consciousness and belief in the righteousness of their cause and organizational mandate makes these organizations a real domestic terrorist threat. In many instances, the end justifies the means, even if human casualties are collateral damage (Lepper, 2005).

Radical environmentalists can be recognized by their diagnoses and prescriptions regarding the impending environmental crisis (Taylor, n.d.). Their diagnoses generally

involve a critique of the dominant streams of occidental religion and philosophy, which are said to desacralize nature and promote oppressive attitudes toward it and people (Taylor, n.d.). Prescriptions generally include overturning anthropocentric and hierarchical attitudes (Taylor, n.d.).

After reviewing the research, what is essential for the continued success of eco-terrorism and continuing to add new recruits to their cause, is its ability to validate participant actions. Many eco-terrorist organizations subscribe to the idea of biocentrism, which is the belief that all human beings are ordinary members of the biological community and by extension, all living things should be assigned basic rights and afforded protection under humanitarian laws. Some of the more radical agendas of eco-terrorists include concepts from *deep ecology*, such as the goal to return the United States environment to its original, pristine state by ending the effects of industrialization (Eagan, 1996).

Since 1977, when disaffected members of the ecological preservation group Greenpeace formed the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and attacked commercial fishing operations by cutting drift nets, acts of eco-terrorism occurred around the globe (Jarboe, 2002). In recent years, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) became one of the most active extremist elements in the United States (Jarboe, 2002). The ALF was classified by the FBI as a terrorist group, whose purpose is to bring about social and political change through the use intimidation, extremist tactics, and terrorist activities. ALF eco-terrorists engaged in a steadily growing campaign of illegal activity against fur companies, mink farms, restaurants, and animal research laboratories (Jarboe, 2002). According to Fur Commission and the National Association for Biomedical Research

(NABR), from 1992-2002, ALF was responsible for approximately \$45 million dollars in damages (Jarboe, 2002).

On March 18, 2002, Pennsylvania State Police discovered heavy equipment used to clear trees at a construction site in Erie, Pennsylvania, spray painted with the statements “ELF, in the protection of mother earth,” and “Stop Deforestation” (FBI Terrorism Report, 2002-2005). On March 24, 2002, police responded to the same construction site, where a large hydraulic crane had been set on fire, causing approximately \$500,000 in damage (FBI, 2002-2005). It was later reported that ELF sent a facsimile to authorities’ claiming responsibility for the arson and vandalism (FBI, 2002-2005). ELF also claimed responsibility for an August 11, 2002 arson on the U.S. Forestry Scientific Laboratory in Warren, Pennsylvania (FBI, 2002-2005).

In late 2005 and early 2006, the FBI dismantled a network that, according to DOJ, committed violent acts in the name of both the ALF and the ELF (Bjelopera, 2013). They called themselves “The Family” and it was reported that they were directly responsible for at least 25 criminal incidents totaling approximately \$48 million in damages beginning in the late 1990s through early 2000s (Bjelopera, 2013). In 1998, The Family was responsible for an arson attack at the Colorado Vail Ski Resort that destroyed radio towers, ski lift towers, restaurants, and the ski patrol office, which resulted in excess of \$24 million in losses (FBI, 2008).

The threat of ecological terrorism has become a major concern of environmental discourse during the past three decades and ominously shifted focus in the process (Buell, 2009). This neologism has been brandished as a negative epithet from the conservative *right*, who are collectively pro-industrialist and have strategically used *as lighting*”

rhetoric to stigmatize all environmentalists and animal rights activists as eco-terrorist. (Buell, 2009). Those on the left often seek an imbalanced compromise which often creates a callous unilateral negotiation framework designed to allow business leadership to set the terms of their *environmental friendliness and compliance* instead of being relegated to a democratic scrutiny that holds them accountable for animal abuse, dumping illegal waste, deforestation, oil spills, safety violations, and carbon emissions. When eco-activists challenge this type of corporate self-aggrandizement, their dissent is then classified by those on the left as being unreasonable and protest is regarded as intimidation. Liberal democrats Martin Lewis (1992) and Luc Ferry (1995), posited this analysis regarding eco-terrorists:

...these movements are atavistic, primitivist, and Luddite; offer no realistic way to live in the modern world; and are anti-democratic, refusing to abide by decisions arrived at through democratic processes. Others argue that these movements are counterproductive to building sustainable societies because they do not value and support science, which is a critical foundation for environment related public policies, but is already assailed by religious conservatives and hardly needs its credibility further eroded in the public mind by radical greens.

When offensive and demeaning statements like this are made, the eco-terrorism discourse evolves as a predominantly rhetorical weapon not only against radicals but sometimes even mainstream reformist initiatives (Buell, 2009). In response, radical extremists, in their resentment of being classified as atavistic ideological bullies or radical terrorists, begin ratcheting up the level of violence and extremism deemed appropriate to advance their cause. (Amster, 2006; Burns, 2001; McGregor, 2010).

### **Anti-Abortion Case Study**

Pro-life and Pro-choice ideologues continue to vigorously debate the issue, *whether or not life begins at conception*. The *Roe v. Wade* decision allowed women the choice of having an abortion. Since this decision, pro-life advocates have insisted that elected officials balance a woman's right to choose against the state's legitimate interests in regulating abortions, to include protecting a women's health as well as the unborn baby. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision, using the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, set the stage for battles between the U.S. government and anti-abortion groups. Now that abortions were sanctioned, anti-abortion violence and terrorist activities began to be part of the social landscape. Violent and non-violent crimes used in the years since the decision included kidnapping, assault, stalking, attempted murder, murder, arson, the threat of bombs, and actual use of bombs on abortion facilities. Jacobson and Royer (2011) and Nice (1988) explored the aftermath of *Roe v. Wade* by examining the impact of violence on clinics and its effects on abortion services. They noted that there are more documented incidents of anti-abortion terror in the U.S. than Australia, Canada, and New Zealand combined. Their research highlighted anti-abortion violence, a single-issue form of terrorism, and found that anti-abortion violence in was considered to be a form of sub-revolutionary terrorism.

The DOJ (1988) identified anti-abortion extremists as a current domestic terror threat. This decision was precipitated by the murder of Dr. Barnett Slepian, who had created the National Task Force on Violence against Health Care Providers, which resulted in prosecuting a number of anti-abortion attacks. The killing of a high-profile figure brought attention to the issue; the media attention the anti-abortion forces were



after was achieved. This attention also assisted in apprehending James Kopp, a major anti-abortion extremist who was ultimately convicted of Slepian's death.

The FBI, now aware of the emerging threat of anti-abortion terrorism, began to develop inter-agency task forces to aggressively pursue relevant groups, with the goal of ending the violence against abortion providers. The challenge for the judicial system and law enforcement remains significant: the media, in some instances, portrayed Kopp as a crusader who led people who agreed that this was a just cause and felt the need to become involved join anti-abortion groups. As a result, many of the attacks against abortion providers in the United States are conducted by individuals who accept the correctness of the cause. In some cases, new participants were not affiliated with a particular organization. However, over time and through indoctrination, the idea—indeed, the necessity of—engaging in overt criminal acts became a reality. Extremists felt justified planting a bomb in an abortion clinic or killing an abortion provider (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Wilson & Lynxwiler, 1988).

Synthesizing research conducted between 1973 and 2003, U.S. abortion providers were the targets of over 300 acts of extreme violence. Statistical analyses of attacks on abortions providers were subjected to meta-analysis in an effort to understand anti-abortion violence and its effect on providers' decisions to offer abortions. Considerations included women's decisions end their pregnancy and their location (Jones & Kooistra, 2011; Nice, 1988). The effects of anti-abortion extremism and their activities were highlighted in 1993, a year that saw heightened anti-abortion activities. At that time, 50% of U.S. clinics reported being targets of violence and harassment (Feminist Majority, 2006).

The threat of violence extended from providers and support staffs to patients. To stem the escalating tide of anti-abortion domestic terrorism, Clinton signed the *Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act* (FACE) in 1994. The Act created federal statutes covering cases where individuals were prevented access to abortion facilities. Women entering health care facilities had to negotiate picket lines, protestors, threats, and insults. The legislation gave women the right to receive an abortion with free and unencumbered access to the facilities. The picketers, often considered domestic terrorists, now had to operate within the law and allow patients the necessary space to enter facilities. The judiciary could now prosecute offenders who violated FACE (Cozzarelli & Major, 1994; Doan, 2007).

While anti-abortion extremists were ultimately unsuccessful in obstructing the market for abortion services, it is clear that this type of activity does impose a cost. Because anti-abortion forces effectively reduced demand for abortion services and instilled fear in some women, it could be argued that the movement has experienced some level of success. Recent studies indicated that despite the prevalence of anti-abortion extremism, what remains notable are the effects on the decisions of pregnant women and abortion providers. Henshaw and Finer (2003) concluded that one of the primary reasons for recent declines in abortion providers is clinic violence, particularly the murder of abortionists. However, this claim however lacks validity. While FACE reduced anti-abortion violence for a decade, this lull in extreme violence does not mean the threat to providers has disappeared. Studies done after 2000 show that increased anti-abortion acts perpetuated the cloud of violence surrounding this issue (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Jones & Kooistra, 2011).

The predominant anti-abortion terrorist groups in the United States include Americans United for Life, Anglican Priests for Life/Order of Holy Innocents, Anglicans for Life, Anti-Choice Project, and the largest and most significant organization, the AOG (described in Chapter 2). These organizations and their leadership work, often underground, on planning activities while maintaining a more peaceful public image that seeks new members and funding, as well as continues to challenge the legality of abortion, the DOJ, and the DHS. The AOG, charged with numerous acts of violence including kidnapping and murder, is unique in that they rarely communicate and essentially operate as independent cells. The violent factions of the organizations cannot be found at rallies and marches; instead, they are buried deep within the organization and require sophisticated intelligence-gathering systems to bring them to justice (Blank, Christine, & London, 1996).

The AOG, whose mandate explicitly advocates violence as a means to end abortion, is a prime example of extremism. Other anti-abortion groups seek to promote their message while avoiding direct confrontation, if possible. The AOG, which first came to public attention in 1982, is a prime example of an informal domestic network of anti-abortion extremists. While many anti-abortion groups publish and distribute literature, the AOG is unique in that it produces a manual, offering direction on how individuals should engage in abortion clinic violence. The content is chilling, providing detailed methods for carrying out butyric acid attacks, bomb making, committing arson, and other tactics (Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004).

Anti-abortion extremists, labeled terrorists by the federal government, gained traction after *Roe v. Wade*, has grown from individuals acting alone, to nationwide

networks such as the AOG. The frequency of anti-abortion attacks has grown apace; there has been a considerable increase in such activity. Violence fluctuated, but peaked in 1984, 1992, and 1998. Recent data that reflects the success of the Obama administration in responding to anti-abortion attacks indicates that this type of domestic violence may be increasing, as noted in a NAF report (2009). It suggested that anti-abortion activity was at its highest level in the past decade. The need for due diligence and sophisticated intelligence gathering is needed to support current laws and mitigate the damage inflicted on those legally seeking an abortion, as well as those providing the means and facilities. It also points to the need for successful deterrence to end violence by extremist anti-abortion groups (Eisinger, 2004).

### **Left-Wing Extremism Case Study**

As a militant form of Marxist-Leninist ideology came to the United States and was blended with ideologies expounded by groups such as the Weather Underground, the Black Panthers, and various student groups that emerged on university campuses in the 1970s such as the Students for a Democratic Society, left-wing extremism developed a strong ideological and political base. This base was founded on the use of terrorism, with examples such as the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), discussed in Chapter 2. Media coverage of the SLA and their apparent persuading of Patty Hearst to their political agenda (she appeared to be actively involved in one of the bank robberies), led to increased public awareness of this brand of extremism. The formation of M19CO and various smaller organizations such as the United Freedom Front followed (Jamieson, 1990).

Research conducted by Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks (2009) showed that left-wing terrorism in the United States was ideologically motivated. The central argument that motivates them to action is that the revolutionary goal is non-negotiable. As a result, the rigidity of their demands may explain their lack of support and success compared to nationalist groups such as paramilitary and right-wing extremist organizations (Arena & Arrigo, 2006).

Left-wing movements are routinely fueled by injustices related to socioeconomic conditions, and it is not surprising that communism pervades these organizations political agendas, including their use of terror. Many American left-wing terror groups follow the examples of successful groups such as ETA (in the Basque region of Spain), the Provisional Irish Republican Army, and the Irish National Liberation Army (both in Northern Ireland). The use of violence was incorporated into communist and socialist ideologies and is reflected in their policies. Many of these policies came from Marxist revolutionaries, such as Che Guevara, who supported using violence and terror to achieve equity for entire marginalized groups during the 1970s (Jamieson, 1990).

Despite the early success of left-wing terrorism both abroad and in the United States during the 1970s, its success as a political ideology led to its marginalization. Criminal acts associated with these organizations dropped considerably in the 1980s and 1990s. However, with the re-emergence of the New Black Panthers in the early 2000s, this form of political protest and unrest in the United States again created incidents of domestic terrorism. While many researchers considered the left-wing movement as having reached its zenith decades ago, its re-emergence in new forms and new

organizations suggested a need for law enforcement to study and track them, hoping to avoid a repeat of their earlier successes (Department of Homeland Security, 2008).

### **Conclusion**

By examining the political dimensions of the various domestic terror groups, focusing on militias, lone wolves, political extremists, anti-abortionists, and left-wingers, commonalities were determined, allowing for behavioral characteristics to emerge, thus supporting the creation of typologies and the development of profiles. Drawing from key historical documents in plotting the trajectories of the various political factions, the detailed nature of this case study allows for critical and statistical analysis, utilizing clustering and bivariate methodologies to search out convergences and divergences. In Chapter 6, demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics will be identified, enhancing the outcomes of the case study. The presentation of the findings will assist in the development of the predictive behavioral models, aimed at assisting law enforcement in preventing future domestic terrorist activities and incidents.

## Chapter 6: Findings

The findings based on this case study identified key variables in assessing the following six groups: militias, political extremists, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionist, and left-wing terrorists. The correlation between these typologies would support risk assessment through by developing models that focused on demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics. These characteristics were utilized in bivariate and cluster analyses designed to assist law enforcement in both understanding and pursuing these groups. The goal was to create a probabilistic terrorism model which drew from historical patterns and used intelligence analysis, descriptions of terrorist plans, behavioral patterns, attack coordination, funding, and planning, to prevent attacks in the future (Samuels, 2006).

### **Bivariate Correlations**

Bivariate correlation is a measure of the relationship between two variables. This measure seeks to evaluate the strength of the relationship between the variables within the absolute values ranging from 1 to 0. A stronger relationship validates the correlation. Assessing the variables listed in the graphs and assigned pre-determined numbers, a positive relationship in the escalation of terrorism beginning with Carter and concluding with Obama was confirmed. The process of assigning values was drawn from the literature. The case study design highlighted the key variables. As law enforcement agents may need to conduct these correlations in the future, it is suggested that a primary and secondary review of the assignment of values to the variables being studied be conducted in relation to domestic terror, with a goal of maximizing the validity and success of the outputs, which will then support the development of predictive behavioral

models. Currently, while there are some profiling and predictive behavioral models for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, there is also a lack of consistency regarding their use. Adding bivariate correlation may enhance the success of such models (Samuels, 2006).

### **Bivariate Correlations Significant Findings**

The bivariate analysis gave outcomes of over .80 regarding the demographic variables. Many of the domestic terror groups operate nationally, and cultivate overt and covert faces for their organizations. While many of these groups are in rural areas, technology has allowed universal access and led to new recruits. The case study allowed for subjective assignment of numbers, with oversight. The outcomes of the bivariate analysis supported valid and reliable forecast for a continued increase in domestic attacks. Social, demographic, and behavioral bivariate analysis of the variables all produced scores over .50. This implies that domestic terrorism has become part of the fabric of society, and that law enforcement needs to remain vigilant. By examining these basic research variables, connections to the case studies will not only assist in promoting the creation of behavioral response models but also educate law enforcement officials and politicians on key motivating factors identify the most significant factors (Yin, 2009).

The strength of the bivariate correlations has been evaluated in this study by SPSS. By using bivariate correlation tests such as the one from this study, the relationship between two variables is reviewed as linear. If one variable increases, the other may also increase; if one variable increases, the other variable decreases. The uniformity of outputs produced using SPSS analysis confirmed the escalation of domestic terrorist incidents, driven by the identified variables (Field, 2006).



When two dependent variables in correlation with the independent variables listed in Tables 1-3 were examined, the strength of their connections was confirmed by highlighting the traits and characteristics that can be used by law enforcement in understanding terrorists while developing counter-measures based on their social, behavioral, and demographic traits. The most significant connections were behavioral traits identified through case analysis. They reflected a strong bivariate correlation (.85) to the dependent variable, consistent with the number of attacks. In addition, social media, having opened avenues to new ways to communicate and exchange plans and ideas, draws a moderate correlation where covert actions need a level of secrecy. As a result, a reduction in the correlations to social engagements and interactions among the various groups was observed.

### **Case Details and Demographic Characteristics**

A review of the demographic characteristics of the populations in this study focused on key variables that could be used in the bivariate and clustering process to assist law enforcement in developing a demographic profile. The demographic variables included income, educational attainment, employment status, and location. The distributions of values within a demographic variable correlated to trends over time. This study was concerned with the escalation of terrorist activities by reviewing and assessing demographic characteristics. The following tables detail the six primary categories evaluating the key variables used to develop the domestic terrorist profiling model. The variables emerged as significant in the literature, validating their significance for this research (Schuman & Scott, 1989).

Researchers and scholars used demographic trends to explain various social phenomena, including election outcomes, stock market results, and land acquisitions. Their usefulness is validated. Methodologists and researchers note that bivariate analysis is not final, but instead, a helpful means that routinely explained two-thirds of the variance of a social phenomenon. In this study, the researcher added cluster analysis to support the bivariate assessments (Foote, 1996; Klauke, 2000).

Table 1

*The Nature of Extremism*

<b>Extremist Group</b>	<b>Social Variables</b>	<b>Key Demographics</b>
Militias	Poor	Uneducated
Political Extremists	Politics	Older (25-40)
Eco-terrorists	Environmental	Younger
Anti-abortionists	Nationwide Movement	Binding Theology Principles
Left-wing extremists	Politics	Uneducated
Right-wing extremists	Politics	Educated

**Case Details and Social Characteristics**

The identification of social characteristics for this study, promoted the analysis of attitudes, orientations, and/or behaviors which take the interests and intentions of these groups into account. The behavioral models were constructed to retain consistency and reliability, and relied on concepts that included social constructivism, social psychology, social anarchism, and capitalism, where the identified variables created a sense of practicality and realism. While the identification of social variables is routinely used in politics, where its meaning often depends on the context of the group or organization using it (for example, left-wing and right-wing characteristics), emphasis was placed on identifying general social attributes and variables. Table 2 includes the key variables used for bivariate and clustering analysis (Dolwick, 2009; Latour, 2005).

Table 2

*Extremist Organizations*

<b>Extremist Group</b>	<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Political Principles</b>
Militias	Anti-government	Pro-1 <sup>st</sup> Amendment
Political Extremists	Anti-government	Violent Change
Eco-terrorists	Group Actions	Civil Disobedience
Anti-abortionists	Aggressive	Binding Religious Principles
Left-wing extremists	Radical	Promote Group Consensus
Right-wing extremists	Radical	Continually Challenge the Government

**Case Details and Behavioral Characteristics**

One of the primary purposes of Victoroff 's (2005) study was to understand and profile terrorists by focusing their on actions or reactions in response to external or internal stimuli. By identifying key behavioral traits that emerged in this case study review of domestic terrorists, law enforcement could better understand these behaviors and underlying motivations, a valuable resource can be developed in the fight against extremist groups. During this study, the researcher conducted bivariate and clustering assessments of behavioral traits. The focus was activities that could be observed, measured, and recorded that would consequently allow for learning essential social components, which are shown in Table 3. In preparing for the analysis, which drew on two behavioral points of view and considered overt and covert social behaviors. Langbine (2010) reiterated Lewin's formula  $B = f(P \times E)$ , where  $B$  = Behavior,  $f$  = Function,  $P$  = Person,  $E$  = Environment. This heuristic supported the validity of the variables identified in Table 3. The inclusion of this in-depth analysis, despite producing generalized variables within the report, supported a case analysis, which included assessing behaviors

that are increasingly recognized by researchers as a critical means of describing internal driving forces supported by counter-terrorism responses (Langbine, 2010).

Table 3

*Extremist Group Characteristics*

<b>Extremist Group</b>	<b>Extremist Nature</b>	<b>Political Position</b>
Militias	Group Dynamic	Promote Sovereignty
Political Extremists	Overt	Challenge Political Structures
Eco-terrorists	Overt/Covert	Prefer Non-Violence
Anti-abortionists	Pro-Life	Overt Use of Violence
Left-wing extremists	Aggressive	Utopian/Equality
Right-wing extremists	Radical	Isolationists

**Results of Cluster Analysis**

The cluster analysis showed there has been an acceleration in the number of domestic terrorist acts, with concurrent results highlighting increased severity of the attacks. The analysis, beginning with Carter's term through Obama's, highlighted that with increasing legislation and policies, the outcome nonetheless supported an increase in domestic attacks. This technique relies on the use of exploratory data mining that is itself a commonly used for statistical data analysis. The correlation with the bivariate analysis supported confident and reliable outcomes and assessments.

This study focused on developing a predictive behavioral model for assisting law enforcement authorities; the clustering analysis assisted pattern recognition, image analysis, information retrieval, and data compression. As a result, the ability to separate, differentiate, and then validate the variables in this study (driven by a temporal oversight), became a reality for having a domestic terrorist response model (Creswell, 2011; Yin, 2009; 2012).

The researcher used a clustering method called Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise. This method is an advancement in this type of analysis

technique, and uses well-defined cluster models that are referenced as density-reachability (Rahmah, 2016). The approach is similar to linkage-based clustering, where the clustering is based on connecting points within certain distance thresholds and only connecting those that satisfy a density criterion that is identified by the original variant (defined as a minimum number of other objects within the radius). Defining presidential terms and the number of incidents allowed an accurate assessment. Using this clustering methodology confirms the escalation of domestic terrorist attacks. It is anticipated that the ongoing development of predictive behavioral models will continue to employ clustering techniques to highlight and confirm domestic terror patterns (Willis, LaTourrette, Kelly, Hickey, & Neill, 2007).

### **Conclusion**

The convergence of outcomes produced by the individual case studies of the various organizations, and the identification and emergence of the key variables within each of the groups, allowed for bivariate analysis coinciding with the clustering analysis and provided some key insights into the historical evolution of the domestic terrorist organizations. In confirming the central research question, which supports an escalation of domestic terrorism, moving forward from the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the outputs also provide a key understanding of primary social, behavioral, and demographic characteristics. Chapter 7 includes a review of the study's findings, with the continued discussion focusing on how elected leaders are promoting the problems associated with domestic terrorism, and how a lack of policy and enforcement has aided in the expansion of this social problem.

## Chapter 7: Discussion and Analysis

This chapter includes analysis of a series of typologies of domestic terrorists, explores issues related to the increase of incidents, and considers the impact of a number of administrations and their policies (or their absence) impacted attacks. By correlating relevant definitions, literature, and statistical analyses, an enhanced understanding of this significant social issue emerges.

### **A Typology of Domestic Terrorism**

The diversity of domestic terrorist groups operating in the United States has been extensively explored in case studies. When examining the goals of militias, lone-wolves, sovereigns, anti-abortion groups, eco-terrorists, and left- and right-wing political extremists, the factor that makes each of them a significant social phenomenon is that they used (and in some cases, continue to use) violence as a means to advance a radical agenda. If researchers and criminologists explore domestic terrorism as a monolithic entity, important aspects of their evolution and continued growth may be missed. These oversights contributed to the escalation of criminal violence displayed by these various groups (Boxall et al., 2015).

The various typologies defining domestic terrorism can be divided into four categories: ethnic, ideological, political, and religious. In the case of ethnic extremists such as the KKK, their racial purity ideology is a central consideration. The Army of God has a religious stance against abortion. Green Peace operates from an ideological platform that seeks to save the earth from humanity. The Black Panthers promoted their political struggle to achieve equality in the United States. Many right- and left-wing groups sought to expand before the end of the Cold War by confronting the American

power structure and attempting to change it to their vision for the country. Leftist ideologues demanded the government correct social injustices and abuses of power, and right-wing groups sought to curb what they saw as intruding into their lives.

In this study, the researcher highlighted variables that define particular groups. What emerged is that they all use radical and extreme approaches to solving their concerns. Whatever social, demographic, or ethnic differences distinguish them from one another, the overall unifying factor is their acceptance of violence to achieve their goals. This makes each typology a danger to the nation (Huntington, 1993).

### **Counterterrorism Strategies In The 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

According to the infamous Chinese general, military strategist, philosopher, and writer, you must always have a strategy when confronting or being confronted by an enemy. In his legendary military treatise, *Art of War* (1963), Sun Tzu writes:

If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is temperamental, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected (p. 80).

In 2002, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released by the Bush Administration, made a statement that was not only timely, but prophetic:

Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-

called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. (p. 15).

Since 9/11, domestic counterterrorism expenditures have increased significantly. According to a study conducted by researchers John Mueller and Mark Stewart (2014): Domestic counterterrorism expenditures per year were about \$25 billion in 2010 dollars before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These increased by about \$75 billion in the subsequent decade or so. Spending on homeland security by the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, and 26 other such federal agencies was \$50 billion more in 2010 dollars than in 2001, adjusting for inflation. ....Overall intelligence operations were \$80 billion in 2010. A core function is “protecting against the threat of international terrorism in the United States,” and we conservatively estimate increased intelligence expenditures since 9/11 devoted to domestic homeland security to be \$15 billion in 2010 (p. 238)

A key way to fight the threat of homegrown terrorists is to develop an understanding of how radicalization works and formulate ways to prevent radicalization from morphing into terrorist plotting (Bjelopera, 2014). Counterterrorism investigators must strategically develop a lesson plan on how to learn everything there is to know about about the targeted person or group. Ultimately, an effective counterterrorism investigator must learn to think like a terrorist (Silke, 2003). More specifically, you must think like the terrorist in the subgroup you are investigating. Although psychopathological profiles are helpful, they should not be referred to as the primary instrument



for drafting a counterterrorism plan. When developing a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, the goal is to create a plan that demands a clear understanding of the motivations and causes of terrorism. Terrorists, even those with the same ethnic or religious background, should not be considered a homogeneous group considering their motivations and beliefs are oftentimes very different.

Once the investigator develops the ability to think like a terrorist, he or she can now begin prepare a plan to assess the degree of the threat and develop proactive security measures to manage the threat (Silke, 2003). Counterterrorism operations are extremely expensive, particularly those that specific members in a group or an individual terrorist. According to Mueller and Stewart (2011), the United States spent roughly \$1 trillion dollars in the pursuit and capture of Osama bin Laden from 2001 through 2011. Government resources are finite. That being the case, counterterrorism operations must be well planned and very strategic. This quantification allows intelligence teams to answer some very crucial questions before embarking on a counterterrorism mission. For example, Are they an immediate threat? How many key members or leaders have been captured or killed? If key members or leaders of this group are captured or killed, what members or other groups are likely to retaliate against the U.S. and their allies?

Campbell (2005) argued that the challenge of overcoming terrorism is the ability out-think and out-maneuver the terrorists. His strategies include:

- (1) the ability to formulate complex relational models, (2) an awareness and recognition of the critical level variables, (3) an understanding of their influence and interrelation, (4) a determination of the controllable and non-controllable aspects of each variable, (5) the implicational value of

such factors as applied to potential terrorist scenarios, and (6) an assessment of the potential consequences of shifts in each variable's valuation to the overall model. (p.2)

Almost all significant terrorist attacks are motivated by an agenda for political or policy change. To affect this change, extremists are willing to engage in devastating terrorist acts. Furthermore, when developing a counterterrorism strategy, the IQ and the financial resources of the perpetrator must be considered. Osama bin Laden vilified and framed in public as the epitome of evil, a terrorist, and a homicidal psychopath. The danger in this labeling is that it is assumed that the terrorist is dull-witted and angry. This is a misnomer. Terrorists, especially those who are well organized, could never sustain success in combating the FBI, CIA, NSA, and military intelligence if they did not possess a high degree of rationality and intelligence (Woo, 2004).

### **Terrorist Network Deconstruction Model**

The FBI has enjoyed much success post 9/11 in thwarting terrorists' plots. Although they have proven strategies to combat and prevent terrorist acts, their approach towards domestic terrorism will have to be modified in order to adjust to a political climate that has become increasingly anti-FBI. Since its inception, the agency has always endured some form of criticism. However, in 2016, the public vitriol towards the top law enforcement agency by elected officials was unprecedented. Both Republican and Democrat leaders sharply criticized the investigative efforts of the FBI and even accused the agency of being partisan. More concerning is the willingness of elected officials to openly support extremist behavior and ideology, knowing, it is an affront to civility and the behavior is criminal. Moving forward, the FBI will have to come up with new clandestine and creative

approaches when investigating radicalized persons or groups that politicians openly support. Elected officials that openly criticize the FBI and the intelligence community in favor of extremist behavior, will embolden these dissident groups to engage in terroristic behavior with impunity, while creating a culture of timidity in the ranks of counterterrorism authorities. When this happens, we become less safe as a nation.

When constructing a counterterrorism strategy, the focus of the policy should be one of deterrence and mitigation because realistically, the U.S. government does not have unlimited resources which is what it take in order eliminate acts of terrorism. Moreover, domestic terrorism has existed in America for more than one-hundred years and despite the best efforts of every U.S. president within that time, none of them have been successful in eradicating terrorism.

These components and recommendations below are not new concepts, but some of them have different approaches which should at least be considered when drafting a comprehensive or tailor-made counterterrorism strategy.

### **Intelligence Gathering/Analysis**

Over the years, law enforcement officials have discovered that terrorist are extremely disciplined. This can be attributable to their military styled training and the fact that some members are actually military veterans. Their political cause is the most important thing in their lives (Dyson, 2012, p. 61). Terrorists learn from the mistakes of other terrorists and realize that the only way to avoid being captured or killed, is to keep a low profile and follow the protocols anonymity. A person who has such dedication will go out of his way to follow security procedures, even if it limits his ability to function (Dyson, 2012, p. 61). He would rather travel ten or even twenty miles away to a remote

area to mail a letter rather than risk being followed or captured on surveillance (Dyson, 2012). When investigators consider how vigilant and disciplined terrorists are in avoiding detection, they now understand the importance of intelligence gathering.

The value of law enforcement officers reading and carefully studying clandestine “how to-function” documents is akin to a football coach having the opposing team’s playbook (Dyson, 2012, p. 62). For this reason, counterterrorism analysts and officers must invest time in reading extremist manuals, manifestos, or writings in general. Without question, this is one of the most important task in thwarting terrorist activities. Just as we view the act of terrorism as an act of war, collecting good intelligence should be considered the task that disrupts terrorist activities.

The collection of raw intelligence is a very good strategy, however, if it cannot be converted into actionable intelligence, it then becomes useless. It is not uncommon for counterterrorism analysts to sift through thousands of documents, recorded conversations, phone records, surveillance videos and social media pages before determining whether or not the information discovered is worth expending valuable resources.

### **Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #1: Intelligence Gathering/Analysis.**

Gathering intelligence presents opportunities for counterterrorism agents to disrupt domestic terror networks. Investigators should be aware that many groups, particularly domestic entities in the United States, have documents that instruct their members with respect to operations (Dyson, 2012, p. 58). The FBI, in conjunction with cooperating law enforcement agencies, should consider raids as an opportunity to disrupt terror networks by taking subtle actions. For example, if a counterterrorism raid uncovers terrorist training manuals, maps, security manuals, etc., after the information is analyzed, media

outlets should also receive materials created by the FBI's counterterrorism team that discredits the leaders, the organization, and their purpose. As a strategy, the information will be compiled by the counterterrorism team and the objective is to make the material appear as though it was created by the leadership for select members with the intent to deceive the rank-and-file membership and their supporters.

Terrorists are known for their commitment to using psychological warfare to their advantage. If they are to be neutralized to the point of ineffectiveness, counterterrorism teams must out-think them at every turn. By doing so, frustration is inevitable and the likelihood of dissent and distrust becomes highly probable. Internal power struggles and internal strife creates organizational instability which benefits law enforcement in that crucial mistake will be made or members become counterterrorism assets.

### **Covert Operations**

Covert operations is one of the oldest forms of intelligence gathering. Although it has been effective, it has also been deadly. Undercover operatives that were exposed were either tortured, murdered, or imprisoned for their betrayal. Although covert operatives are useful in the fight against terrorism, it is very risky and extremely dangerous. Many domestic terrorism networks provide members and followers with security manuals that teach them how to detect informants and the tactics used by the police to penetrate the network (Dyson, 2012). Moreover, renditions, enhanced interrogations techniques and torture are frowned upon by leaders of the United States even if they yield results.

**Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #2: Covert Operations.** As stipulated earlier, comprehensive counterterrorism strategy is crucial in disrupting activities of a

terrorist network. Disaggregating a terrorist network into its component parts can illuminate how terrorists in different functional roles calculate costs and benefits (Kroenig, & Pavel, 2012). For example, a person who sympathizes with an extremist movement, but refuses to jeopardize his or her own life setting off explosives, is more likely to offer financial or other types of support to the network (Kroenig & Pavel, 2012).

The new role of the agent provocateur is to create an environment of distrust since it is necessary to disaggregate the terrorist network. In conducting case analysis of radical extremist and terrorist organizations, although they possess different styles and ideologies, there is one common denominator that unifies them all: they are all distrustful of the government and they are extremely paranoid when it comes to informant infiltration. This paranoia gives the covert operative an advantage to disrupt operations by creating internal distrust and infighting. Depending on the mission, the covert operative may never be required to join the extremist group or terrorist network to disrupt the entire organization. For example, militia groups, like many other extremist groups, although divided by ideology, they are extremely skeptical. Once the counterterrorism team has gathered enough actionable intelligence and the agent provocateur is competently knowledgeable about the targeted terror network, he or she can discreetly begin their campaign of “sowing” seeds of discord. The agent provocateur could arrange for billboards to be strategically placed throughout the city and create notices that go out to members of the community advising them to report “suspicious activity” because it has been “brought to the attention” of law enforcement that international terrorism networks are posing as militia groups in order to fund terrorist operations abroad and in the United States. Considering the likelihood that the agent provocateur will draw the most suspicion, the

counterterrorism team would stage the arrest of the covert operative, charge him or her with the crime, thus making the propaganda real in the minds of the residents. As a result of the highly publicized arrest, it should be enough to “sow the seeds” of distrust. Residents and supporters who were normally quiet, may now decide to assist law enforcement because infiltration by a foreign enemy would be deemed as completely unacceptable.

### **Social Media Disruption**

Because so much of the radicalization process occurs within the marketplace of ideas, counterterrorism efforts must involve activity in the same realm (Bjelopera, 2014). We have often seen, through the media, how active shooters and domestic terrorists use social media to espouse their ideas and recruit like-minded individuals. They inspire radicals to engage in acts of domestic terrorism. YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter have all been used at one point or another to promote and inspire terrorist action. The strategy of monitoring radicalized social media pages, in my view, is insufficient.

**Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #3: Social Media Disruption.** The counterterrorism strategy of monitoring extremist social media sites is very limiting and only provides law enforcement with valuable information after the fact. Counterterrorism teams must take a new approach: create their own social media platforms. Although monitoring other social media sites can be an effective investigative tool, the intelligence community should create their social media outlets equivalent to Stormfront, Ayan Nations.org, Council of Conservative Citizens, or Gab. This allows the cyber counter-intelligence team to monitor extremists for hate speech that encourages violence, death threats, inflammatory rhetoric that advocates targeting federal buildings and elected

officials. More importantly, they can collect the IP addresses of those users who are considered potential threats in order to pinpoint an address or location. The challenge here would be to establish sufficient internal controls that prevent abuse. In addition, Considering the potential legal implications and political backlash, plausible deniability must be factored into this strategy.

### **The Capone Approach**

To counter violent domestic terror plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” (Bjelopera, 2014). The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations, unrelated misdemeanor or felony bench warrants. The purpose of this strategy is to apprehend the suspect while law enforcement either gathers more evidence to file more serious charges or disrupt a potential acts of violence. As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants Bjelopera, 2014, p. 19). The Al Capone approach works well when you do not have time to secure a warrant and apprehending the subject has become an issue of national security and public safety. While these techniques may be effective in stymieing rapidly developing terrorist plots, their use has fostered concern within U.S. Muslim communities as well as civil rights organizations who are concerned that this approach is a license to target racial and ethnic minorities for racial profiling (Bjelopera, 2014).

**Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #4: The Capone Approach.** Law enforcement officers, particularly FBI agents, should make every effort to avoid direct



confrontation with terror suspects until its time to make an arrest(s). When we look back on the 1995 Bombing in Oklahoma City or 1992, Ruby Ridge, we recognized that these two incidents were the catalyst for the militia movement and other anti-government movements to grow their membership by using these incidents as recruiting tools. Today, any confrontation with the FBI, or any federal law enforcement agency has the potential of giving the perpetrator status among both followers and sympathizers.

The Al Capone approach should never be used (or give the appearance) to intimidate or harass a suspect for the purposes of disruption. It should however, continue being used to prevent a suspect from fleeing the country or thwarting terrorist plot.

When utilizing the Al Capone approach, counterterrorism experts should maintain a list of each of these suspects along with a systematic approach of following up with these individuals to keep track of their movement once they have been released. If they have been deported, its equally important to know their whereabouts. It is critical to making sure they have not “slipped through the cracks” and returned to engaging in acts of domestic terrorism.

### **Limitations of the Study**

Limitations in this study included the fact that the study was circumscribed by previously published documents and research. That is, there are likely items relevant to the study that the researcher did not find. The quantitative analysis was limited by prior findings and the data derived from this study. While the researcher explored primary and secondary sources, interviewing professionals from various fields could have offered insight and increased the overall depth of the research (Ellet, 2007). However, reflecting on the subjective nature of domestic terrorism, and seeking a foundation on which to

understand it, what was possibly lost by not having assessments beyond the available resources was compensated for by extensive data mining (Creswell, 2011; Yin, 2009).

### **Increase in Homegrown Terrorism**

As the literature review was collated with case studies and led to examining a number of post-9/11 incidents, the researcher discovered that of 74 cases chosen for analysis, approximately 85% of these terrorist plots were either carried out or attempted by U.S. citizens or permanent residents. These homegrown terrorists, once law-abiding citizens, permanent residents, or visa card holders, were usually radicalized within the United States (Congressional Research Service, 2009). The overall numbers presented in the data clustering, shown in Appendices A-F, reflect an almost 152% increase from 1977-2016, where there was significant and phenomenal spikes in homegrown terrorism activity. Earlier data, beginning with President Jimmy Carter, shows gradual increases, with occasional inactivity followed by some periodic spikes. However, data collected after 9/11 clearly indicated that the threat of homegrown terrorism increased drastically and would continue to rise based on deeply entrenched radical and religious beliefs (Rohlinger & Earl, 2012).

### **Elected Leaders Contribute to the Problem**

With the correlation of the case studies and the statistical analysis during the terms of the six Presidents within the time frame, the researcher highlighted policies and practices that escalated the problems associated with domestic terrorism. These policies and practices began with Carter and his evangelical approach to issues, particularly his proclivity to engage in multi-lateral peace agreements, to Reagan's original war on terror (which almost exclusively focused on global terrorism), and back again to the different

evangelically-inspired policies promoted first by President George H. W. Bush and later by his son, George W. Bush. When President Clinton took office, he had the daunting task of addressing David Koresh and his Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas at a time when anti-government sentiment was still at its a peak. The incident at Ruby Ridge under the George W. Bush administration was an effective recruiting tool and was responsible for the influx of new recruits to the sovereign citizen and militia movements (Simmons, 1999).

When President George W. Bush presented a challenge to *Roe v. Wade*, by telling Americans to “reflect on the sanctity of life,” a second wave (the first being in his father’s term) of pro-choice radicalism began to emerge but nothing equivalent to the pro-life extremism witnessed in the 1990s. The threat level was extremely low to almost non-existent, but post 9/11, after his perpetual *War on Terror* began, radical Islamic terrorist incidents sharply increased. According to New American’s International Security experts (2016), there were 107 incidents of domestic terrorism post 9/11 from December 2001 through December 2008. If the *War on Drugs* was considered a referendum on the civil liberties of urban minorities; the *War on Terror* was equally considered an assault on this Islamic faith. As a result, anti-Islamic sentiments as well as radical Islamic extremism devolved into a chasm of intolerance.

When President Barack Obama assumed control of the Oval Office, radical right-wing groups re-emerged in conjunction with political extremists and hate groups that considered the election of an African-American president as clear indication that Whites had somehow lost control of America and they needed to collectively “Take Back Their Country.” On its praxis, the conceptualization of “taking back” is a grim reminder that

recapturing outdated American ideals and customs that marginalized women and minorities begins at the existential level but evolves into sinister strategy to marginalize and dehumanize selective groups of people based on race and gender in an attempt to undergird the premise superiority, specifically, White male domination. The domestic extremist, despite the odds, is determined to influence society from the lens of anachronistic ideals and norms. Radical Republicans sided with right-wing extremists in berating President Obama with impunity and attempting to humiliate him on the world stage by forcing him to show his birth certificate as justification of his authenticity to serve as President of the United States. The entire process was demeaning and was considered equivalent to slaves in the 1860s proving their freedom by providing slave owners or traders their *free papers*. More destructive to American democracy was that mainstream conservatives gave subtle (sometimes overt) signals that under the Obama administration, radical, extremist behavior would now be welcomed as long as the vitriol was directed towards President Obama. Instead of the congratulating the historic victory, radical conservatives were committed to making President Obama's ascension to the highest political office in America feel as though his decision was an act of self-imposed marginality.

President Obama and his incoming administration recognized immediately that he was in precarious position. On one end of the political spectrum, President Obama was faced with an insouciant democratic party still vexed that Hillary Rodham Clinton was not the party nominee. On the other end of the political spectrum was an insolent Republican Party that vowed to make him a "one term president" and refused to work with the newly elected Commander-and-Chief even if it would be beneficial to the

American people (Hulse & Nagourney, 2010). This public display of resistance from conservative elected officials in the highest levels of government created a climate for political and religious extremism to flourish. The animus projected towards President Obama created such rigid lines of demarcation and distance between Democratic and Republican ideals that radical conservatives viewed any acts of utilitarianism as liberal appeasement. This Republican strategy was myopic in scope in that conservatives either did not consider or concern themselves with the residual effects of their extremism.

During the Obama administration, from 2009-2016 (including foiled plots), there were 291 incidents of terrorism (New American, 2016). Moreover, when President Obama was succeeded in office by Real Estate Developer and reality television personality, Donald J. Trump in 2017, Democrats in Congress have seized the opportunity to exact revenge on the Republican controlled Congress by mimicking their *blueprint of obstruction* superimposed on President Obama's legislative agenda for the last eight years. Although this *one-upmanship* revolves on the axis of power and respect, the chronic polarization between the two major parties will only further divide America along the lines of political and moral ideology. As a result, partisan propaganda will only intensify and be directly responsible for an increase in domestic terrorism as substantive issues such as employment, national debt, the economy, education and healthcare erode into obscurity.

When President Obama settled into his new role as commander-and-chief, there was a miscalculation of his counterterrorism strategy that fueled anger in America and abroad. During the campaign, candidate Obama pledged to end the *War on Terror* and commit fewer military resources to Afghanistan and abroad. Liberal ideologues considered this approach refreshing while conservatives criticized the move as being

weak at a time when America needs to show its strength. Both critics and supporters were taken aback when President Obama implemented his aggressive counterterrorism strategy (Becker & Shanemay, 2012). President Obama and his security team crafted a “Kill List” a process where the team decided on which terrorists should be killed or captured based on their threat level towards the United States or their allies. Moreover, the Obama administration waged a relentless drone strike campaign in Pakistan and Yemen because counter-intelligence revealed that these countries were safe havens for suspected terrorists (Savage, 2012).

Based on the data analyzed for this study, there is a clear connection between politicians and their policies, and increased incidents of domestic terrorism. The level of terrorism appears to coincide with the ability of the various typologies to develop connections and create enough fear take action. This is noted in a DOJ (2009) report that outlined potential threats for violence in reaction to Obama’s election. However, discounting the variables supported by this study will put U.S. citizens in greater danger (Samuels, 2006).

### **Lack of Policy and Enforcement directed at Homegrown Terrorism**

As the threat of homegrown terrorism expanded from 1977 to 2001 (pre-9/11), an aspect that has remained a concern for the law enforcement officials are policies that fail to send a clear message of zero tolerance and are backed by retributive deterrence. Several trials, such as McVeigh’s and Kaczynski’s, received sensationalized media coverage. For the most part, society and its politicians avoided tackling the issue of domestic terrorism pre-9/11. As a result, federal, state, and local domestic terror laws

were primarily inadequate which allowed the terrorists organizations to become more unified, more organized, more defiant and unfortunately, more deadly.

The events on 9/11 serves as a constant reminder of the dangers of complacency. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh, in his testimony to the Joint Inquiry Committee, highlighted that the government was not efficiently organized to confront terrorism and terrorism was not the clear priority because the threat it posed was under-appreciated (Freeh, 2002). Post 9/11, the FBI has revamped its entire organization and domestic terror threats are now given equal priority to international terrorist threats. However, considering international terrorism has a “head start” in the areas of strategy and policy development, there must be a continual effort to formulate comprehensive and detailed policies for responding to domestic threats of terrorism. Although DHS took on some of the responsibility of responding to internal threats, there continues to be ongoing concerns about their ability to actively reduce incidents of domestic terrorism without continued collaboration with the CIA, FBI and other intelligence agencies. (Oliver & Steinberg, 2006).

### **Conclusion**

Analyzing the policies and ideological positions of former U.S. Presidents from the perspective of domestic terrorism, there is clear evidence that responses to domestic terror threats were usually reactive instead of proactive from 1977-2001 (pre-9/11). It can be argued that this approach led to somewhat of a quiet evolution and expansion of domestic terror groups that resulted in them being substantial threats to public spaces. When elected, every U.S. President has an agenda for the nation, and the world, during their time in office. What can be correlated to the study’s outcomes are specific periods

of increase in domestic terror threats. As future Presidents responding to domestic terror threats, what is necessary is a balanced and thorough approach that provides retribution while avoiding escalation. Weak policy positions regarding domestic terrorism are as equally irresponsible as aggressive and intrusive ones that the average American would consider infringing on the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Lastly, using predictive behavior models and continuing to use a case study approach to study the problem can provide a foundation for solid and thoughtful policy decisions in the future.



## Chapter 8: Conclusion

In this final chapter, the researcher considers the contribution of this research and revisits using a scientific approach to the issue. The researcher also presents findings that could develop ‘learning algorithms’ to be used in a model by which law enforcement could anticipate incidents. Such a model could be supported by the clustering data in Appendices A-F and by reviewing all domestic terrorist incidents through the seven presidential terms (the primary independent variable in this study). Final conclusions offer insight into the policy implications of developing a domestic terrorist behavioral model while acknowledging the study’s potential use.

### **Contribution of Research**

The researcher designed this quantitative case study to bridge the gap between current knowledge and the three hypotheses of this study on the frequency of domestic terror. In a detailed historical analysis spanning seven Presidents and 40 years of politics and policies, the findings from this study can assist future researchers in correctly identifying domestic terror typologies, their key characteristics, and societal variables, which sometimes led to increased attacks. Following established protocols, law enforcement officials can use the conclusions from this study to inform responses to domestic terror events by utilizing the predictive model schemas that are validated through empirical data (Yin, 2012).

This researcher identified reliable outcomes that promote the continued examination of domestic terrorism. With the constant changes in society and its norms, what is offered by this research is insight into the effects of policies and their successful (or unsuccessful) implementation. Yin (2009) highlighted the need for studies to build on

each other and produce similar outcomes. This researcher expects that future social scientists could benefit from this wide-ranging assessment.

### **Policy Implications**

The essential policy implication for future U.S. Presidents from this study is the need for diligence in developing coherent policies and strategies that respond to domestic terrorists. By identifying key variables within certain organizations and their goals, it may be possible to reduce threats and, as a result, save lives. As leaders of the United States consider their options when reviewing predictive behavioral models, past trends, and develop policies that promote inclusion rather than isolation and social fragmentation, these may serve to reduce incidents. While hoping for positive results from the policies developed, the President, Congress, and state and local officials also need to develop significant, retaliatory deterrents.

To date, the United States has had domestic terrorist policies that have not been effectively shared with the terrorists or the public. To create a coherent message to domestic terror groups, the government must be willing to engage parties in a broader dialogue while also prosecuting offenders to the fullest extent. It is possible that dynamic changes may then occur within even the most radicalized groups and typologies who simply want their message to be heard and acknowledged by the government (Rohlinger & Earl, 2012).

### **Ethics and Reflexivity**

While conducting this research study, ethical mandates of the American Psychological Association and Nova Southeastern University were followed to limit researcher bias. The goal was to produce a study that would have validity as well as

sound reflection, and a circular logical relationship which produces reliable and confident causes that is correctly related to outcomes. Having peer review when assigning quantitative values to the data used to develop a model supported by generated variable tables, helped produce confident and reliable outcomes (Yin, 2012).

### **Future Research Concepts**

It is expected that with the increased threat of domestic terrorism, future studies will expand their scope and include additional social, ethnic, demographic, and political variables in their assessment. With numerous federal agencies awarding grants for long-term research projects, future research designed to explore the long-term effects of policies on a variety of extremist groups would be essential in furthering this area of study. These studies could also heighten the awareness of those in elected office, and even those who previously believed that the only way to promote their agenda is to engage in the attention-grabbing acts of violence.

As these studies continue, one factor that would remain constant is the opportunity and ability to protect the public from those who would use them as a means to an end. Advances in behavioral studies could produce superior behavioral models than those used presently to address domestic terrorist behavior. By including social perspectives, the researcher hopes that the realization emerges that by using violence, the intended message is lost; as a consequence, violent behavior undermines the entire cause (NIH, 2009).

### **Contribution of Research**

This research study and its contribution to the academic community is aimed at assessing and examining a social phenomenon by developing a behavioral model. The

focus of the research was to offer researchers and society a unique and comprehensive look at the social phenomenon of domestic terrorism. While the variables presented in this study are subject to change and were given numerical values subject to interpretation, the aspect that is offered this study is the ability to look at the past and avoid making the same mistakes again. The opportunity for policy makers and law enforcement to learn and grow, and possibly save lives, makes this study a potentially valuable contribution.

### **Findings**

The findings from the tool developed for law enforcement authorities to use in responding to acts of domestic terrorism are highlighted in Tables 4-6, with the variables being aligned with quantitative assignments in Tables 7-9. The historical data, obtained through DOJ databases, allowed alignment of the social, ethnic, and demographic variables with the appropriate Presidents: Table 4 for Jimmy Carter, Table 5 for Bill Clinton, and Table 6 for George Bush. A potential challenge during the research phase was for law enforcement and the policy makers to understand the social dynamics of these organizations while accounting for norms which, in this instance, were developed under various Presidents. The aspect that is significant in the bivariate analysis is the continuous increase in domestic terrorist violence, according to the designated variables. As policymakers and other officials use these predictive models, the key is oversight. However, by including professional criminologists in the design and quantitative assessments, bias would be limited, and reliability would increase. The expected result is a more accurate understanding of domestic terrorists, which would then support appropriate levels of funding, training, and articulating the appropriate message to terrorists operating openly in communities across the United States (Hoffman, 1988).

Table 4

*Two-Tailed Pearson Correlations 1*

		Correlations	
		VAR00002	VAR00003
<b>VAR00002</b>	<i>r</i>	1	-.739
	<i>p</i>		.094
	<i>N</i>	6	6
<b>VAR00003</b>	<i>r</i>	-.739	1
	<i>p</i>	.094	
	<i>N</i>	6	6

Table 5

*Two-Tailed Pearson Correlations 2*

		Correlations	
		VAR00002	VAR00003
<b>VAR00002</b>	<i>r</i>	1	.059
	<i>p</i>		.912
	<i>N</i>	6	6
<b>VAR00003</b>	<i>r</i>	.059	1
	<i>p</i>	.912	
	<i>N</i>	6	6

Table 6

*Two-Tailed Pearson Correlation 3*

		Correlations	
		VAR00002	VAR00003
<b>VAR00002</b>	<i>r</i>	1	.000
	<i>p</i>		1.000
	<i>N</i>	6	6
<b>VAR00003</b>	<i>r</i>	.000	1
	<i>p</i>	1.000	
	<i>N</i>	6	6

Table 7

*Quantitative Review 1*

<b>Extremist Group</b>	<b>Quantitative Assignments</b>	
	<b>Attempted Attacks</b>	<b>Actualized Attacks</b>
Militia	7	8
Political Extremists	6	8
Eco-terrorists	9	7
Anti-abortion	8	7
Left-Wing	7	7
Right-Wing	7	8

Table 8

*Quantitative Review 2*

<b>Extremist Group</b>	<b>Quantitative Assignments</b>	
	<b>Attempted Attacks</b>	<b>Actualized Attacks</b>
Militia	8	8
Political Extremists	7	8
Eco-terrorists	8	8
Anti-abortion	9	9
Left-Wing	9	7
Right-Wing	7	8

Table 9

*Quantitative Review 3*

<b>Extremist Group</b>	<b>Quantitative Assignments</b>	
	<b>Attempted Attacks</b>	<b>Actualized Attacks</b>
Militia	7	9
Political Extremists	8	8
Eco-terrorists	9	9
Anti-abortion	8	7
Left-Wing	8	7
Right-Wing	7	8

**Conclusion**

The following totals represent the clustering of numbers: Carter—14 domestic terrorist incidents; Reagan—55 incidents; George H. W. Bush—29 incidents; Bill

Clinton—34 incidents; George W. Bush—60 incidents; and Obama, completing his final term as of 2016—48 incidents. It is evident from the data, literature review, case studies, and statistical analyses that domestic terrorism is not only a clear danger to American safety and security, but also a threat to the stability of its democracy.

In the future, tools and resources to support law enforcement agencies that consider social variables will become necessary. Future studies are recommended in an effort to fill the gap observed during the research phase of this study.

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## Appendix A: Incidents during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)

Date	Location	Killed	Inj.	TER	Description
03/22/77	Denver, Colorado	1	0	TER	bombing attributed to Chicano activist
04/23/77	Washington,	1	0	TER	bomb explodes in locker at airport
08/03/77	New York City, New York	1	7	TER- natl	FALN bombs two office buildings;
05/28/78	Evanston, Illinois	0	1	TER- pol	mail bomb slightly injures campus police officer at Northwestern University
01/01/79	Wilmington, North Carolina	0	0	THW	extortion attempt threatening release of uranium dioxide
05/03/79	Chicago, Illinois	0	5	TER- natl	FALN bombing at Shubert Theatre
05/09/79	Evanston, Illinois	0	1	TER- pol	bomb slightly injures student at Northwestern University
11/03/79	Greensboro, North Carolina	5	11	TER- right	shooting attack at protest
11/15/79	Chicago, Illinois	0	12	TER- pol	bomb ignites on American Airlines flight which lands safely; 12 passengers suffer from smoke inhalation
12/01/79	Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico	2	10	TER- natl	Macheteros members ambush Navy bus in Puerto Rico, killing 2 sailors and injuring 10
05/29/80	Fort Wayne, Indiana	0	1	TER- right	Vernon Jordan Jr., civil rights leader, shot and injured
06/19/80	Chicago, Illinois	0	1	TER- pol	mail bomb injures president of United Airlines
04/22/80	Bethesda, Maryland	1	0	TER- pol	Ali Akbar Tabataba'i, former senior officer in Iranian Shah's SAVAK, shot at home by Daoud Salahuddin, a radical Black Muslim under instructions from Iran
01/12/81	Muniz ANGB, Puerto Rico	0	0	TER- natl	Macheteros terrorists bomb 9 Air National Guard jets, causing \$40 million in damage

**Total Incidents: 14.** Total dead: 11; Total injured: 49

## Appendix B: Incidents during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)

Date	Location	Killed	Inj.	TER	Description
03/17/81	Mobile, Alabama	1	0	TER-right	United Klans of America murders Black teenager
03/30/81	Washington, DC	0	4	TER	President Ronald Reagan and 3 others injured in attempted assassination by Hinkley
04/16/81	New York City, New York	1	0	TER-natl	bomb explodes in JFK airport terminal
04/21/81	Tulsa, Oklahoma	1	0	RCSI	fatal self-inflicted radiation dose using stolen source
10/20/81	New York City, New York	3	0	TER-left	Weather Underground member Kathy Boudin captured after killing 3
12/21/81	Warren County, New Jersey	1	0	TER-left	UFF members murder New Jersey State Police officer
01/21/82	Los Angeles, California	1	0	TER-natl	Kemal Arikan, Turkish Consul-General, assassinated by Armenian terrorists
05/04/82	Somerville, Massachusetts	1	0	TER-natl	Orhan Gunduz, honorary Turkish Consul in Boston, assassinated by Armenian terrorists
05/05/82	Nashville, Tennessee	0	1	TER-pol	mail bomb injures secretary at Vanderbilt University
05/16/82	San Juan, Puerto Rico	1	3	TER-natl	shooting attack on navy sailors
04/02/82	Berkeley, California	0	1	TER-pol	mail bomb injures professor at University of California
09/25/82	Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania	13	0	RCSI	shooting attack
12/31/82	New York City, New York	0	3	TER-natl	two bombings in Manhattan and Brooklyn by FALN
04/15/83	Los Angeles, California	1	0	TER-natl	bomb in car kills Armenian Victor Galustian
08/17/83	Detroit, Michigan	3	0	TER-pol	Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam secretary killed by members of Fuqra, a Black Islamic sect; 2 members killed setting fire in AMI temple
11/07/83	Washington, DC	0	0	TER	bombing at U.S. Capitol building; later linked to Revolutionary Armed Task Force
12/01/83	Seattle, Washington	0	0	THW	authorities prevent attempt by pro-Khomeini students to set fire to theater where 500 anti-Khomeini Iranians were attending a singing performance
12/31/83	New York City, New York	0	1	TER-natl	FALN bombings at federal and city buildings; 1 policeman injured



Date	Location	Killed	Inj.	TER	Description
04/01/84	New York	0	0	THW	two Canadians arrested in NY attempting to purchase large amounts of pathogenic bacteria (tetanus and botulinal toxin) from a Rockville, MD, firm
04/18/84	San Ysidro, California	22	19	RCSI	shooting attack at McDonalds restaurant
04/18/84	Denver, Colorado	1	0	TER-right	Alan Berg killed by White supremacists
08/29/84	The Dalles, Oregon	0	2	TER-rel	followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh use water to infect two officials with salmonella; both sickened, one hospitalized
09/09/84	The Dalles, Oregon	0	751	TER-rel	salmonella poisoning in restaurants by followers of Bhadwan Shree Rajneesh
12/07/84	Whidbey Island, Washington	1	0	TER-right	Robert Matthews, leader of The Order, a right-wing group, killed in raid by federal agents
12/25/84	Pensacola, Florida	0	0	TER-right	three abortion clinics bombed
03/01/85	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	letter writer threatens to contaminate New York City's water reservoirs with plutonium unless charges against Bernhard Goetz are dropped; testing was announced to have detected femtocurie levels of plutonium in the water on 26 July
03/13/85	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	11	0	RCSI	police assault on headquarters of radical Black group Move starts fire
03/15/85	Berkeley, California	0	1	TER-pol	mail bomb injures student at University of California
08/15/85	Paterson, New Jersey	0	1	TER	Tscherim Soobzokov, alleged Nazi war criminal, injured by bombing possibly linked to JDL; died 6 Sep
11/10/85	Santa Ana, California	1	0	TER	Alex Odah, officer of American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, killed by bombing possibly linked to JDL
11/15/85	Ann Arbor, Michigan	0	2	TER-pol	bombing injures two
12/11/85	Sacramento, California	1	0	TER-pol	Unabomber bomb kills Hugh Scrutton, a computer store owner, with bomb in paper bag behind store
04/16/86	Cokeville, Wyoming	2	79	TER-right	two Aryan Nation members take 150 students and teachers hostage at an elementary school; bomb accidentally explodes, killing one terrorist and injuring many children; second terrorist commits suicide

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
04/05/86	Chicago, Illinois	0	0	THW	members of Libyan-linked street gang El Rukn arrested attempting to obtain SAM to attack an aircraft at O'Hare IAP
04/20/86	Edmond, Oklahoma	15	6	RCSI	shooting attack by postal employee at post office
09/05/86	New York City, New York	0	30	TER	tear gas bomb set off 5 minutes before end of Russian dance troupe performance at New York City's Metropolitan Opera House by Jewish extremists
09/29/86	Coeur d'Alene, Idaho	0	0	TER-right	four bombs explode in Coeur d'Alene, at department store, restaurant, federal building, and armed forces recruiting station, set by Bruder Scheigen Strike Force II
10/28/86	Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico	0	1	TER-natl	Macheteros bombings at military facilities
12/01/86	Arizona	0	0	THW	6 members of Arizona Patriots indicted for planned bombings of the Phoenix ADL regional office, a Phoenix synagogue, the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, and the Ogden Utah IRS facility
12/14/86	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	Dennis Malvasi sets bomb in Planned Parenthood building in Manhattan, leaving rental agent handcuffed nearby; bomb fizzles
12/31/86	San Juan, Puerto Rico	97	140	RCSI	three employees set fire in Dupont Plaza Hotel; most fatalities were in the hotel casino; the employees were in a labor dispute with the hotel's management
02/20/87	Salt Lake City, Utah	0	1	TER-pol	bombing injures computer store owner
03/01/87	Atlantic City, New Jersey	0	0	THW	apparent Islamic terrorist plot to bomb Atlantic City casinos called off due to alerted authorities
10/23/87	Vermont	0	0	THW	Lebanese national and two others, all members of Syrian Socialist National Party, arrested attempting to enter Vermont from Canada with bomb components
11/29/87	Livermore, California	0	0	THW	bomb exploded in parking lot of Sandia National Laboratories
04/12/88	New Jersey	0	0	THW	Yu Kikumura, member of Japanese Red Army, arrested in New Jersey with bombs to be detonated in Manhattan 3 days later
11/10/88	Norwalk, Connecticut	0	0	THW	animal rights activist arrested leaving pipe bomb at U.S. Surgical Corporation

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
01/17/89	Stockton, California	6	30	RCSI	shooting attack on children in playground of elementary school; gunman then fatally shot himself
03/10/89	San Diego, California	0	0	TER-pol	pipe-bomb exploded in van of Sharon Lee Rogers, wife of U.S.S. Vincennes captain, planted by pro-Iranian terrorists
03/13/89	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	0	0	THW	US FDA inspectors in Philadelphia discover two grapes laced with minimal amounts of cyanide in shipment from Chile following warning telephoned to U.S. embassy in Santiago
03/18/89	Indianapolis, Indiana	0	1	RCSI	child maimed by bomb in toothpaste tube in K-Mart store; apparent teenage perpetrator commits suicide 20 April
03/19/89	Atlantic Ocean, Puerto Rico	47	0	RCSI	explosion in gun turret of battleship U.S.S. Iowa off Puerto Rico kills 47; Navy cites some evidence of sabotage
08/21/89	Atlanta, Georgia	0	15	TER-right	gas canister in parcel explodes at NAACP regional office
12/21/89	Mountain Brook, Alabama	1	1	TER	Judge Robert Vance killed by mail bomb, wife injured
12/18/89	Savannah, Georgia	1	0	TER-right	Black civil rights lawyer Robert Robinson killed by mail bomb

**Total Incidents: 55.** Total dead: 233; Total injured: 1092

## Appendix C: Incidents during the Presidency of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993)

Date	Location	Killed	Inj.	TER	Description
03/10/89	San Diego, California	0	0	TER-mil	pipe-bomb exploded in van of Sharon Lee Rogers, wife of U.S.S. Vincennes captain, planted by pro-Iranian terrorists
03/13/89	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	0	0	THW	US FDA inspectors in Philadelphia discover two grapes laced with minimal amounts of cyanide in shipment from Chile following warning telephoned to U.S. embassy in Santiago
03/18/89	Indianapolis, Indiana	0	1	RCSI	child maimed by bomb in toothpaste tube in K-Mart store; apparent teenage perpetrator commits suicide 20 April
03/19/89	Atlantic Ocean, Puerto Rico	47	0	RCSI	explosion in gun turret of battleship U.S.S. Iowa off Puerto Rico kills 47; Navy cites some evidence of sabotage
08/21/89	Atlanta, Georgia	0	15	TER-right	gas canister in parcel explodes at NAACP regional office
12/21/89	Mountain Brook, Alabama	1	1	TER	Judge Robert Vance killed by mail bomb, wife injured
12/18/89	Savannah, Georgia	1	0	TER-right	Black civil rights lawyer Robert Robinson killed by mail bomb
01/30/90	Tucson, Arizona	1	0	TER-pol	Rashad Khalifa assassinated
03/25/90	New York City, New York	87	0	RCSI	arson fire in social club
04/24/90	Oakland, California	0	2	TER-left	two Earth First members injured in explosion while transporting bomb in car
06/18/90	Jacksonville, Florida	10	4	RCSI	shooting attack at GMAC office
11/05/90	New York City, New York	1	1	TER-pol	Rabbi Meir Kahane assassinated by Al-Sayyid Abdulazziz Nossair
02/25/91	Brooklyn, New York	1	0	TER-pol	Mustafa Shalabi killed in Brooklyn by Islamic group members
10/16/91	Killeen, Texas	24	20	RCSI	shooting attack at Luby's restaurant
03/01/92	Minnesota	0	0	THW	Minnesota Patriots Council plots to assassinate law enforcement officials using ricin
03/26/92	Franklin Lakes, New Jersey	1	0	TER-pol	Parivash Rafizadeh, wife of former senior officer in Iranian Shah's SAVAK, shot near her home
04/19/92	Ruby Ridge, Idaho	2	0	RCSI	federal marshals in shootout with White supremacist Randy Weaver in Idaho kill his wife and son

Date	Location	Killed	Inj.	TER	Description
04/27/92	Los Angeles, California	58	4000	RCSI	Black riots following not guilty verdict in trial of four policemen for beating Black offender
05/01/92	Olivehurst, California	4	10	RCSI	shooting attack at high school
01/25/93	Langley, Virginia	2	3	TER-pol	Mir Amail Kans, an Afghan Islamist, shot several CIA employees in cars in front of CIA headquarters
02/26/93	New York City, New York	6	1040	TER-pol	truck bombing in garage of World Trade Center
02/28/93	Waco, Texas	86	25	RCSI	Branch Davidian cult members kill 4 ATF agents, injure 16, when agents raided their compound in Waco, TX; 10 cult members killed; compound was sieged until 19 Apr when another raid was attempted and the compound burned down
03/10/93	Pensacola, Florida	1	0	TER-right	abortionist David Gunn shot and killed by abortion opponent
06/22/93	Tiburon, California	0	1	TER-pol	bomb injures scientist from University of California
06/24/93	New Haven, Connecticut	0	1	TER-pol	bomb injures professor at Yale University
06/24/93	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and others arrested for role in World Trade Center bombing, thwarting plans to bomb United Nation Headquarters, the Lincoln Tunnel, the Holland Tunnel, the George Washington Bridge, and FBI offices in New York City
04/01/93	Los Angeles, California	0	0	THW	FBI arrests skinheads planning to machine gun worshippers at First African Methodist Episcopal Church in Los Angeles in hopes of starting a race war
08/18/93	Wichita, Kansas	0	1	TER-right	abortionist George Tiller shot and injured at an abortion clinic
12/14/93	Garden City, New York	6	19	TER-left	Colin Ferguson shot and killed 6, injured 17 on Long Island train, professing hatred of Whites

**Total number of incidents: 29.** Total dead: 339; Total injured: 5134

## Appendix D: Incidents during the Presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2001)

Date	Location	Killed	Inj.	TER	Description
03/01/94	New York City, New York	1	3	TER-pol	gunman fires at van of Orthodox Jewish students at the Brooklyn Bridge
04/26/94	Colorado Springs, Colorado	1	1	RCSI	mail bomb kills man and injures his wife
06/20/94	Fairchild AFB, Washington	4	22	RCSI	shooting attack at base hospital
04/29/94	Pensacola, Florida	2	1	TER-right	abortion opponent shot and killed abortionist and his bodyguard and injured abortionist's wife
09/12/94	Washington, DC	1	0	TER	Frank Corder flew Cessna from MD into White House, striking tree near President's bedroom, killing himself and causing damage to White House
10/29/94	Washington, DC	0	0	THW	lone gunman with semi-automatic weapon fires shots at White House from sidewalk in front on Pennsylvania Avenue
12/10/94	North Caldwell, New Jersey	1	0	TER-pol	Unabomber mail bomb kills New York advertising executive Thomas Mosser
12/30/94	Brookline, Massachusetts	2	5	TER-right	gunman kills 2 abortion clinic workers in MA, then drives to Norfolk, VA, and fires on clinic before arrest
04/19/95	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	169	675	TER-right	Timothy McVeigh and co-conspirator Terry Nichols set off a truck bomb explosion in front of Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, causing a partial collapse killing 168 people and injuring hundreds
04/24/95	Sacramento, California	1	0	TER-pol	Unabomber mail bomb kills Gilbert Murray, president of California Forestry Assn., at office
05/01/95	Washington, DC	0	2	THW	Man, with unloaded gun scales White House fence; jumper and Secret Service agent shot and injured by another guard
09/12/95	Essex, Maryland	5	0	RCSI	Car bombing at shopping mall, apparent murder plot
10/10/95	Hyder, Arizona	1	100	RCSI	Amtrak train derailed near Hyder, AZ, by sabotage to tracks with nearby note claiming responsibility by Sons of Gestapo, later attributed to railroad employee
12/23/95	Arkansas	1	0	THW	Thomas Lewis Lavy arrested in Arkansas for possession of ricin, a

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
02/27/96	Houston, Texas	0	1	RCSI	biotoxin; Lavy commits suicide the next day
06/01/96	New York	0	0	THW	Radioactive source theft Several individuals arrested in plot to kill Republican officials; seized weapons included radioactive materials
06/01/96	New York	0	0	THW	Several individuals arrested in New York planning to kill Republican officials; seized weapons included radioactive materials
04/27/96	Atlanta, Georgia	2	110	TER-right	Pipe bomb explodes in park at night concert at Summer Olympic Games; 1 killed, 1 died at nearby location of attack
01/02/97	multiple	0	0	TER	Letter bombs received at Egyptian newspaper offices in Washington, DC, New York City, and a prison in Leavenworth Kansas; similar device exploded at Egyptian Newspaper office in London, UK, injuring 2 guards
02/22/97	Atlanta, Georgia	0	4	TER-right	Bomb explodes in Atlanta, GA, nightclub frequented by homosexuals; 4 injured
02/24/97	New York City, New York	2	6	TER-pol	Lone Palestinian gunman fired on tourists on observation deck of Empire State Building; Danish national was killed and other tourists injured before gunman killed himself
03/26/97	Rancho Sante Fe, California	39	0	RCSI	Discovery of mass suicide by 39 members of Heaven's Gate cult, tied by cult members to Comet Hale-Bopp
04/31/97	New York City, New York	0	2	THW	Would-be Palestinian suicide bombers are arrested at their apartment while planning to bomb New York subways
01/29/98	Birmingham, Alabama	1	1	TER-right	Bombing at abortion clinic kills one guard and injures a nurse; Eric Rudolph suspected in case
03/24/98	Jonesboro, Arkansas	5	11	RCSI	Shooting attack at middle school by two students; 4 students and 1 teacher killed, 9 students and 2 adults injured
04/21/98	Springfield, Oregon	4	25	RCSI	Shooting attacks at residence and high school
04/24/98	Washington, DC	2	2	TER	Gunman enters U.S. Capitol building and kills two guards; one tourist and gunman are injured

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
10/19/98	Vail, Colorado	0	0	TER-left	Arson attacks by the Earth Liberation Front at Vail ski resort cause \$12 million in damages
10/23/98	Amherst, New York	1	0	TER-right	Abortionist shot and killed at his home
04/20/99	Littleton, Colorado	15	27	RCSI	mass shooting at Columbine High School by two students; 12 students and 1 teacher killed, 23 wounded; both gunmen (Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold) committed suicide
08/10/99	Los Angeles, California	1	5	TER-right	shooting attack at Jewish daycare by White supremacist
09/15/99	Fort Worth, Texas	8	8	RCSI	shooting attack at church service
10/31/99	Atlantic Ocean, Massachusetts	217	0	TER-pol	intentional crash of Egypt Air flight off Nantucket Island by copilot
12/14/99	Port Angeles, Washington	0	0	THW	terrorist arrested crossing from Canada with material to bomb Los Angeles International Airport
<b>Total number of incidents: 34. Total dead: 486; Total injured: 1011</b>					



## Appendix E: Incidents during the Presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009)

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
02/07/01	Washington, DC	0	1	THW	gunman fires on the White House from outside the perimeter fence; gunman is shot and injured by a guard
09/11/01	New York City, New York	2759	8700	TER-pol	crashing of two hijacked planes into World Trade Center towers, causing fires and collapse
09/11/01	Alexandria, Virginia	189	200	TER-pol	crashing of hijacked plane into Pentagon
09/11/01	Somerset County, Pennsylvania	45	0	TER-pol	crashing of hijacked plane into rural area of Pennsylvania, following attempt by passengers to regain control of aircraft
09/18/01	West Palm Beach, Florida	1	10	TER	anthrax-laced letters mailed to West Palm Beach, Florida, USA, and New York City, New York
10/09/01	Washington, DC	4	7	TER	anthrax-laced letters mailed to Washington, DC
12/22/01	Atlantic Ocean, Florida	0	1	THW	British citizen prevented from igniting shoe bomb on flight from Paris to Miami
05/08/02	Chicago, Illinois	0	0	THW	US citizen arrested for seeking to use dirty bomb in US
04/22/02	Los Angeles, California	2	4	TER-pol	Egyptian gunman kills two Israelis, injures four at the El Al ticket counter at the Los Angeles International Airport
05/08/02	Clinton, Maryland	0	1	TER-mil	owner of Italian restaurant shot in robbery by Beltway snipers
09/10/02	Lackawanna, New York	0	0	THW	6 U.S. citizens arrested for terrorist connections
09/21/02	Montgomery, Alabama	1	1	TER-mil	liquor store employees shot in robbery by Beltway snipers
10/02/02	Glenmont, Maryland	1	0	TER-mil	1 killed at grocery store by Beltway snipers
10/03/02	Aspen Hill, Maryland	5	0	TER-mil	5 killed in separate shootings by Beltway snipers
10/04/02	Spotsylvania County, Virginia	1	0	TER-mil	1 killed at shopping mall by Beltway snipers
10/07/02	Bowie, Maryland	0	1	TER-mil	1 child injured at a middle school by Beltway snipers
10/09/02	Manassas, Virginia	1	0	TER-mil	1 killed at gas station by Beltway snipers
10/11/02	Fredericksburg, Virginia	1	0	TER-mil	1 killed at gas station by Beltway snipers
10/14/02	Falls Church, Virginia	1	0	TER-mil	1 killed at shopping mall by Beltway snipers
10/19/02	Ashland, Virginia	1	0	TER-mil	1 killed at restaurant by Beltway snipers

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
10/22/02	Aspen Hill, Maryland	1	0	TER-mil	1 bus driver killed by Beltway snipers
03/19/03	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	US citizen arrested for planning to sabotage Brooklyn Bridge
06/01/03	Alexandria, Virginia	0	0	THW	11 arrested for planning attacks on U.S. servicemen
04/08/03	Meridian, Mississippi	7	8	RCSI	shooting attack at factory
11/28/03	Columbus, Ohio	0	0	THW	arrest of terrorist plotting to bomb shopping mall in Columbus
08/01/04	Albany, New York	0	0	THW	2 arrested plotting assassination of Pakistani diplomat
08/01/04	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	2 arrested planning to bomb Penn Station during Republican National Convention
08/03/04	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	terror cell leader arrested in London for planning attacks on financial centers in the US
03/21/05	Red Lake, Minnesota	10	7	RCSI	shooting at Red Lake Indian Reservation school
08/01/05	Los Angeles, California	0	0	THW	4 arrested plotting attacks on Los Angeles targets
11/29/05	Santa Cruz, California	0	4	TER-left	4 injured, including several children, by incendiary attacks by suspected animal rights activists
12/05/05	Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania	0	0	THW	1 arrested plotting attacks on refineries in Wyoming and New Jersey and on the transcontinental pipeline
12/29/05	Toledo, Ohio	0	0	THW	3 arrested plotting attacks on U.S. military abroad and on domestic targets
03/05/06	Chapel Hill, North Carolina	0	9	TER-pol	man drives vehicle into pedestrians at the University of North Carolina
04/07/06	Atlanta, Georgia	0	0	THW	2 arrested plotting attacks on U.S. Capitol and World Bank headquarters
06/22/06	Chicago, Illinois	0	0	THW	7 arrested planning to bomb the Sears Tower
04/01/06	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	1 arrested planning to bomb train tunnels
04/28/06	Seattle, Washington	1	5	TER-pol	gunman fires on women at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle
09/27/06	Bailey, Colorado	2	5	RCSI	hostage taking and shooting attack at high school
10/02/06	Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania	6	5	CRI	hostage taking and shooting attack at Amish schoolhouse
12/01/06	Chicago, Illinois	0	0	THW	1 arrested plotting grenade attack on Chicago area shopping mall

Date	Location	Killed	Inj.	TER	Description
04/16/07	Blacksburg, Virginia	33	17	RCSI	shooting attack at Virginia Polytechnic Institute
05/09/07	Cherry Hill, New Jersey	0	0	THW	6 arrested plotting armed attack on Fort Dix
06/03/07	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	4 arrested in Trinidad plotting to bomb fuel pipelines near JFK airport
08/01/07	Clinton, Michigan	0	1	RCSI	radioactive source theft
02/24/08	Los Angeles, California	0	1	TER-left	animal rights activists attempt home invasion of biomedical researcher, injuring the researcher's husband
06/12/08	Columbus, Ohio	0	0	THW	1 arrested plotting attacks on U.S. and European targets
04/27/08	Knoxville, Tennessee	2	7	TER	gunman fires on congregation at a church
03/10/09	Alabama	11	6	RCSI	multiple shootings at residences and businesses in Samson and Geneva, AL
04/03/09	Binghamton, New York	14	4	RCSI	shooting attack at immigrant center
04/20/09	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	4 arrested plotting bombing attacks on New York Jewish centers and attacks against Air National Guard aircraft
05/31/09	Wichita, Kansas	1	0	TER-right	1 doctor killed (George Tiller) in shooting attack at Reformation Lutheran Church
06/01/09	Little Rock, Arkansas	1	1	TER-pol	1 Army private killed (William Long), second injured in shooting attack at Army Navy Career Center
06/10/09	Washington, DC	1	1	TER-right	1 guard killed (Stephen Johns) in shooting attack at the Holocaust Museum
09/11/09	Owosso, Michigan	2	0	TER-left	abortion protester shot and killed outside a school; the gunman also killed an area businessman
09/23/09	Springfield, Illinois	0	0	THW	US citizen arrested plotting to detonate car bomb at the federal building in Springfield, IL
09/24/09	Dallas, Texas	0	0	THW	terrorist arrested planning to bomb Dallas Fountain Place
10/24/09	Sudbury, Massachusetts	0	0	THW	1 arrested plotting attacks on shopping malls and assassinations of two politicians
11/05/09	Foot Hood, Texas	13	44	TER-pol	shooting attack at Soldier Readiness Center at Foot Hood
12/25/09	Michigan	0	3	TER-pol	Yemeni terrorist attempts to detonate bomb on flight from Amsterdam to Detroit; bomb only ignites, and passengers and crew subdue the terrorist

**Total number of incidents: 60.** Total dead: 3117; Total injured: 9054

## Appendix F: Incidents during the Presidency of Barack Obama (2009-2016)

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
03/18/10	Austin, Texas	2	13	TER	suicide crash of small plane into federal office building
04/04/10	Alexandria, Virginia	1	2	TER	shooting at gate outside Pentagon; gunman killed
05/01/10	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	failed car bombing in Times Square by Pakistani terrorists
06/12/10	Anchorage, Alaska	0	0	THW	2 arrested plotting mail bomb assassinations
09/01/10	Silver Spring, Maryland	1	0	TER	3 hostages held by gunman at Discovery Communications headquarters; gunman killed by police
09/17/10	Washington, DC	0	1	THW	attempted shooting at Capitol Hill; gunman shot and injured by guards
10/10/10	Washington, DC	0	0	THW	Pakistani-American arrested plotting bombing attack on Washington subway
11/04/10	Portland, Oregon	0	0	THW	1 arrested plotting bombing at Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland
12/07/10	Maryland	0	0	THW	1 arrested plotting bombing of military recruiting center
01/08/11	Tucson, Arizona	6	13	TER	Jared L. Loughnershooting attack at political event at a supermarket; U.S. District Judge John Roll and five others were killed; U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords and 12 others wounded
03/07/11	Lubbock, Texas	0	0	THW	1 arrested plotting bombings of domestic targets
05/10/11	New York City, New York	0	0	THW	2 arrested plotting attacks on a Manhattan synagogue
06/08/11	Seattle, Washington	0	0	THW	2 arrested plotting attack on Seattle military recruiting station
04/27/11	Killeen, Texas	0	0	THW	thwarted attempt to attack restaurant near Fort Hood with bombing and shooting attack; Naser Abdo arrested
09/06/11	Carson City, Nevada	5	7	RCSI	shooting attack at restaurant, killing 4 (2 died immediately, 2 died later of injuries) and injuring 7 others; casualties included 3 Nevada National Guard soldiers killed and 2 injured; gunman also died of self-inflicted wounds
04/20/12	Aurora, Colorado	12	58	RCSI	shooting attack at movie theater; suspect was arrested afterwards; suspect had booby-trapped his nearby apartment with explosives which were successfully disarmed by police

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
08/05/12	Oak Creek, Wisconsin	7	4	TER-right	6 killed, 4 injured in shooting attack at a Sikh temple shortly before worship service on Sunday morning; one of those injured was a police officer, another was president of the temple; the gunman was shot and killed at the scene by police
08/14/12	LaPlace, Louisiana	2	4	TER	2 police officers killed, 1 injured while investigating attack that injured another officer; 7 arrested, 2 of whom were injured in the shootout; several of those arrested had ties to the sovereign citizen movement
08/15/12	Washington, DC	0	1	TER-left	1 guard shot and injured while subduing gunman at Family Research Council offices
12/14/12	Newtown, Connecticut	28	3	RCSI	shooting attack at elementary school kills 20 children and 6 adults; shooter killed himself and had killed his mother earlier that day
03/15/13	Boston, Massachusetts	3	264	TER-pol	two bombings at Boston Marathon kill 3 (including 1 child) and injure 183 (including 8 children)
04/17/13	Washington, DC	0	0	THW	two letters testing positive for ricin mailed to Mississippi Senator Roger Wicker and President Obama are found at mail screening facilities; a third letter to an official in Mississippi was awaiting testing; an individual in Mississippi is arrested and charged in the case
04/19/13	Watertown, Massachusetts	2	2	TER-pol	1 police officer killed, one injured during manhunt for the Boston Marathon bombers; one terrorist killed and one injured and captured
05/12/13	New Orleans, Louisiana	0	19	RCSI	two gunmen fired on crowds at Mother's Day parade; 19 injured, including 2 children
09/16/13	Washington, DC	13	3	RCSI	shooting attack at Washington Navy Yard
11/01/13	Los Angeles, CA	1	7	TER	shooting attack at Los Angeles International Airport; 1 TSA officer killed, 2 TSA officers and several civilians injured
04/01/14	Fort Hood, Texas	4	16	RCSI	shooting attack on Fort Hood; 3 killed, 16 injured; in addition, the gunman killed himself
04/13/14	Overland Park, Kansas	3	0	TER-right	shooting attack at a Jewish community center and Jewish retirement home; 3 killed, including one teenager

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
04/27/14	Skyway, Washington	1	0	TER-pol	shooting attack killed 1
06/01/14	Seattle, Washington	2	0	TER-pol	shooting attack near night club killed 2
06/08/14	Las Vegas, Nevada	5	0	TER-right	shooting attack at restaurant and store; 3 killed, including 2 police officers; both shooters killed themselves
06/25/14	East Orange, New Jersey	1	0	TER-pol	shooting attack killed 1 teenager
09/12/14	Blooming Grove, Pennsylvania	1	1	TER-right	shooting attack on police officers; shooter evaded a manhunt in nearby woods until 30 Oct
09/25/14	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	1	2	TER-pol	knife attack at food processing plant killed 1, injured 1; attacker was shot and injured
10/23/14	New York City, New York	1	3	TER-pol	axe attack on police officers injured 2, one severely; police shot and killed the attacker and injured one bystander
11/28/14	Austin, Texas	1	0	TER	shots fired at Mexican consulate, US courthouse, and police station during early morning hours; failed attempt at arson at consulate; attacker was shot at by police
12/20/14	New York City, New York	3	0	TER	shooting attack killed two police officers, gunman shot and killed himself
05/03/15	Garland, Texas	2	1	TER-pol	attempted shooting attack at event involving art critical of Islam, one guard shot and injured
06/17/15	Charleston, South Carolina	9	1	TER-right	gunman killed 9 in attack at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church on a Bible study group; South Carolina state congressman among those killed; 1 injured
04/16/15	Chattanooga, Tennessee	6	2	TER-pol	gunman killed 4 Marines and injures 1 Navy sailor (who died 18 Jul of injuries), 1 police officer, and 1 Marine, at two locations; gunman was shot and killed by police
11/04/15	Merced, California	1	4	TER-pol	student stabbed two students and two staff at the University of California; attacker was shot and killed by police
11/27/15	Colorado Springs, Colorado	3	9	TER-right	gunman killed two civilians and one police officer outside a Planned Parenthood clinic, also injuring 4 civilians and 5 police officers
12/03/15	San Bernardino, California	16	23	TER-pol	two attackers killed 14 and injured 21 at a county employee meeting and Christmas party;
01/01/16	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	0	2	TER-pol	gunman shot and injured a police officer; attacker was shot and injured

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Inj.</b>	<b>TER</b>	<b>Description</b>
02/11/16	Columbus, Ohio	1	4	TER-pol	attacker injured 4 in machete attack at a restaurant
06/12/16	Orlando, Florida	50	53	TER-pol	shooting attack at nightclub
04/07/16	Bristol, Tennessee	1	3	TER-left	shooting attack killed one civilian, injured one police officer and three civilians
04/07/16	Dallas, Texas	5	9	TER-left	sniper attack killed 5 police officers, injured 8 police officers and two civilians at protest rally
<b>Total number of incidents: 48. Total dead: 200; Total injured: 534</b>					