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Corruption, Culture, Context & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict

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Corruption, Culture, Context & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of
Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict

by

Mark Thaller

A Dissertation presented to the
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences of Nova Southeastern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


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
This dissertation was submitted by Mark C. Thaller under the direction of the chair of the dissertation committee listed below. It was submitted to the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences and approved in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University.

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
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


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Abstract

Like an elephant, while it may be difficult to describe, corruption is generally not difficult to recognize when observed (Tanzi, 1998, p. 564). Many countries have been, or are currently typified by both lethal conflict and massive corruption. Historically, post-conflict development programs have imposed policies of zero corruption, yet they routinely fail. Initial research into “corruption” also identified significant ambiguities and self-contradiction with the definition of corruption, itself. This study used an Existential Phenomenological methodology with 8 participants from Iraq, Afghanistan, Uganda, South Sudan and Sudan to: 1) redefine and model corruption within a global construct, 2) examine the current doctrine mandating zero tolerance for corruption, and 3) examine the potential for tolerating moderate levels of corruption in favor of reduced lethal violence. Corrupt behavior is alleged by this research to include financial as well as non-financial mechanisms, and is motivated by Human, Institutional and Cultural Factors of Corruption. This research robustly redefines corruption, and develops new theories/models to better explain corrupt behavior. These include the *Corruption Hierarchy*, the *Corruption Pyramid* and the *Universal Corruption Model*. The research was inconclusive with respect to the tolerance of corruption mitigating lethal conflict, but confirmed strong support for policies of zero tolerance. In redefining corruption, many political, social and cultural norms currently exhibited by nation states, including the United States, are corrupt if/when properly classified. *I’m desperate about my country. You’ve got to be strong in my country. If you are weak, they will take you.* (Jeremy from Iraq)

Chapter One: Introduction

Statement of Problem

Protracted lethal conflict and unrest have occurred in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, Sudan, Uganda, and other countries around the world for decades (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2005, pp. 2-4). Regions of lethal conflict, extreme poverty, terrorism, genocide and illegal arms sales are also commonly associated with extraordinarily high levels of corruption (Vogl, 2012, pp. 107-127). Similarly, “corruption that often pervades war-torn environments—both in host nation institutions and those of international actors.” (United States Institute of Peace, 2009, p. 3-17). The United States and western foreign policy commonly insist upon zero corruption within post-conflict society, yet the collective success of these efforts has been poor (Roberts, 2011, p. 2535). Further compounding the situation, the foundational definition of corruption and its key drivers is ambiguous (Chun, 2009, p. 173; Harrison, 2007, p. 672).

Background

The world is constantly experiencing the effects of societal, governmental, economic, and cultural pressures where lethal conflict commonly occurs. These conflicts result in millions of casualties and fatalities, economic regression and cultural eradication. Associated periods of violence can be tumultuous and short-lived, while in other instances they can become protracted, continuing for months, years or decades. Associated with most or all of these conflicts are government regimes and cultural norms that are generally proclaimed as corrupt by the United States, European states, and western entities such as the United Nations, the World Bank, Transparency International and a host of other global entities and not-for-profit governmental organizations (NGO's)

where a direct relationship between *corruption* and war, misery, and/or any undesirable outcome has been asserted. According to Amundsen (1999), “Democratisation and liberalization has increased the level of corruption to unmanageable proportions in Russia and several other formerly communist countries, as well as a number of erstwhile one-party regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 29). As a result of these assertions, organizations as well as western and European society, as a whole, aggressively endorse and promote policies of minimized and/or zero corruption as a requisite for growth, development and reconstruction of post-conflict regions. Yet, “these indices [from Transparency International and others] are inadequate if the issue of causation between corrupt and social and political indicators is to be addressed” (Jain, 2011, p. 5).

Post-conflict development programs have a track record of routine failure. Roberts (2011) confirms this by stating, “Peacebuilding is considered failed by many, but those who preach such failure do not have an alternative” (p. 2535). Despite efforts from NGO’s and government officials denying the failure of their own programs as well as the inadequacy of their own capabilities, new ideas and methodologies are required. Jabareen (2013) asserts that the “current doctrine is suboptimum, and new approaches are warranted” (p. 107). The failure of these post-conflict development efforts raises questions about the validity of a zero-tolerance corruption mandate. Although controversial, we must also pragmatically realize that “each of the possible sources that can curtail corruption is also a possible source of corruption” (Amundsen, 1999, p. 29).

The effects of corruption are surprisingly complex. For example, the direct and indirect effects of corruption include “significant economic degradation, civil rights degradation, decreased government effectiveness, and an overall detriment to political

stability and legitimacy [Doig & Theobald, 2000; La Porta et al., 1998; Mauro, 1995; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Seligson 2002]” (as cited in Tavits, 2010, p. 1258). Corruption also “increases transaction costs, reduces investment incentives, and ultimately results in reduced economic growth” (Seligson, 2002, p. 408).

Current academic studies as well as government policies, by virtue of their collective absence of corruption tolerance, all mandate zero corruption within governance and structure for optimized reconstruction and oversight. For example, the United States Institute of Peace report, “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” is based upon various studies from the United Nations, Rand Institute, World Bank and other well recognized westernized and/or Eurocentric agencies. This document has been widely used as the overall governing doctrine for post-constructive activities promoting numerous activities and methodologies to limit corruption (2009). However, it is interesting to note that nowhere within this comprehensive document is corruption ever defined, despite being mentioned 32 times throughout the text. Instead, the definition of corruption is ironically assumed to be inviolate and clearly understood, which is dramatically not true.

Lederman (2011) states, “Corruption is commonly regarded as one of the most serious obstacles to social development” (as cited in Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 569). This is primarily because corruption has “grave social and human consequences such as sluggish economic growth, shoddy law enforcement, unequal provision of public services, and a distorted social morality” (Gong & Wang, 2013). Vogl (2012) goes on to place nearly all of the world’s woes upon the shoulders of corruption as the primary culprit and states, “Corruption is a political, social and economic issue of global

proportions. Today, as never before, it is a major cause of the global crises of poverty, human rights, justice, and security. It impacts us all” (p. 12). There are extremely few examples of successful campaigns against corruption. In most instances, “a reduction in corruption accompanies economic growth in open societies, where the cost of corruption begins to exceed the ability of those who benefit from it to purchase compliance from other politicians and bureaucrats” (Jain, 2011, p. 7).

International motives and involvement are not always altruistic, and are allegedly sometimes corrupt within some contexts. Fiske-Rusciano (2014) states, “If we are to strengthen global alliances for business, education, and peace-building purposes, we need to study and understand the meanings of each other’s behavior, and formally recognize the parallel hidden alliances that work not for the public good, but for a narrower, more immediate or more divisive intent” (p. 259). So, corruption potentially exists within the very programs that are intended to improve other cultures and entities, while mandating and superficially insisting upon zero tolerance. The irony is cruel, true, and prolifically commonplace.

Humanity lives within a global, intertwined society that thirsts for unambiguous syntax concerning intellectual property, financial investment, and civil rights. Corruption is similarly global and intertwined, to some degree, within each and every society. Yet, its definition is currently vague, ambiguous and often self-contradictory. Despite enormous attention and financial commitment being focused upon anti-corruption programs and objectives, any and all generalizations concerning corruption are alleged, by virtue of this dissertation, to be skewed, out of context and/or simply incorrect because of the nature of corruption being defined by westernized (e.g. the United States, Europe,

etc.) lenses, diction and paradigm. Specifically, what is defined as corruption by one party or culture is often acclaimed as noble and appropriate by another, while a third party might be ambivalent and without opinion: “Like the heads of Hydra’s dragon, corruption presents itself in many shapes . . . [and may] differ from one another in terms of both the source of power that is exploited and the impact they have on the economy and the society” (Jain, 2001, p. 3). In fact, a universally reconciled definition of corruption does not exist. How can such a critical metric as corruption be considered as inviolate for peacebuilding and conflict resolution if the term’s meaning is so drastically different within context and cultural perspective? Vogl, Lederman and others are superficially correct, but are unfortunately neither academically nor pragmatically accurate. What one person defines as corrupt has been, and continues to be, vastly different than what another person might attest within a different culture, society and/or geography.

Hence, current intentions may be admirable, but the syntax defining subsequent action vis-à-vis anti-corruption programs is ambiguous at best and undefined at its worst. Instead of accurately defining the problems, western society has superficially labeled the rest of the world as corrupt within its/our own context and definition of what is proper, ethically correct, and socially acceptable within its own westernized paradigm. Understanding corruption is challenging, and requires full understanding of its “idiosyncrasies” (Chun, 2009, p. 173). Harrison (2007) suggests, “There is a need to avoid using the stereotypical assumptions about what corruption is and how it operates. This means generating an understanding of how meanings of corruption vary, and how this variation is determined by the social characteristics” (p. 672).

Corruption is rarely addressed with caveats accounting for cultural bias. Instead, scholars and policy-makers focus upon corruption's superficial, financially centric definition (i.e., the personal financial gain at the expense of others) rather than upon contextual and/or cultural modification. Despite this ambiguity, most researchers overtly refer to the importance of rule of law, cultural empathy, cross-border empathy, and a plethora of principles that would otherwise infer that corruption was a focus of their research. This paradox is exceptionally perplexing when nearly all governments, NGO's, and peace-building agencies zealously promote zero corruption policies.

What is defined as unethical or immoral for some people is defined as acceptable by others. Historically, the United States is arguably guilty of countless atrocities, such as slavery, torture, child mistreatment, women mistreatment, labor law violations and a host of human rights violations. Each of these instances was ethically and morally justified within its respective cultural context. Yet, in each instance, these justifications directly contradicted the opposing parties' definitions of morality and civility. The world contains billions of people, with the vast majority having religious, customs, work ethic and cultures vastly different from the United States. Hence, one might ask, "How can the United States claim to have all the answers about corruption when this same country, in the not-so-recent past, has been guilty of so many atrocities?"

It is also interesting to note that people and governments rarely associate these mandates for minimized corruption with promises of minimal violence, unrest and/or lethality. To be sure, nearly everybody relates corruption to economic growth, foreign investment and long-term stability. However, to date, only limited research has focused on the effects of corruption upon shorter-term violent, ancillary fatalities or upon feelings

of physical security.

The source of these problems may stem from the ambiguous, self-contradictory definition currently assigned to corruption. This is akin to Kuhn's (2012) observation that "further development [of an existing paradigm] calls for . . . the development of an esoteric vocabulary" (p. 64). Nuclear physics is best understood using the language of nuclear physics, and civil rights is best understood using the language of civil rights. In each case scholars within each respective field agree upon definitions, syntax and meaning. Similarly, corruption should be best understood by using an appropriately defined syntax, verbiage and language. However, to date, no such agreement exists. As predicted by Kuhn, this ambiguity otherwise leads to confusion, failure and an inevitable challenge to the current paradigm. Specifically, Kuhn (2012) states that, "Discovery commences with the awareness of [an] anomaly [within the current paradigm] . . . that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern [the] normal science [of corruption theory]. It then continues . . . [and] closes only when the paradigm theory [concerning corruption] has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the expected" (p. 53). This dissertation directly challenges corruption theory, and by so doing, will hopefully help to create and/or shift the science of corruption study to a new, non-anomalous paradigm.

This situation can also be compared to the drivers and facets of war. Although significant research has been conducted on the relationship between war, fatalities and conflict, the vast majority of these studies focus upon quantitative issues and metrics. Past studies focusing on variables such as "political system" and "cultural distance" are rare (Gantzel, 1981, p. 39). The "usefulness [of existing/past research] for practical peace

policy seems negligible,” perhaps because past quantitative studies have fallen short “due to the fact that it is not based on a systematic frame of reference offering substantial categories for analysis” (Gantzel, 1981, p. 39). These same deficiencies are seen within the topic of corruption.

The focus of identified research to date does not factually or pragmatically support how and why lowest levels of corruption are currently mandated by the United States and Europe for highest levels of post-conflict stability. Instead, such focus is simply ignored in pursuit of supporting the current westernized paradigm, syntax and context of corruption. Said differently: though difficult to prove, this current attitude among NGO’s and academics might be based upon political motivations oriented towards preserving the status quo of the NGO’s and universities’ major sources of anti-corruption funding, namely, the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. Moyo (2009) states, “Donors, development agencies and policymakers have, by and large, chosen to ignore the blatant alarm signals . . . when it has become apparent that aid, under whatever guise, is not working.” (p. 27). Yet,

Aid has failed to deliver the promise of sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction . . . At every turn over the past five decades, policymakers have chosen to maintain the status quo and furnish Africa with more aid, . . . despite the fact that there are very compelling reasons to show that it perpetuates the cycle of poverty and derails sustainable economic growth (Moyo, 2009, p. 28).

A small portion of existing research has examined the positive, catalyst-based role of corruption with respect to economic, cultural and social transformation. These potential constructive benefits of corruption within the context of the current westernized

paradigm notwithstanding, formal research in this facet has neither disproven, nor rarely focused upon, what superficially appears to be self-contradictory, non-ethical, and, as a result, highly controversial; that is, the potentially positive role contextually tolerable corruption may play in regions of deadly conflict to reduce lethality and/or enhance feelings of safety from life threatening issues. This group of research, though nearly negligible, also supports a broader definition of corruption focused upon corruption providing an individual or entity positive utility, such utility above, beyond and/or in place of personal financial gain.

Purpose of Study

The primary purpose of this study was to resolve the current confusion and ambiguity associated with the definition of corruption, and by so doing, establish a new doctrine and foundation from which future research can be more effectively performed. This research was also intended to clarify if, when, and how various levels of corruption within leadership and governance directly and/or indirectly affect lethal violence and associated feelings of safety among the general populace within regions of violent conflict. A better understanding of the effects of corruption upon the affected community's impressions and behavior within regions of deadly conflict was desired, with such understanding intended to allow policy, programmatic interventions and international assistance to be tailored and optimized for minimal fatalities. This, in turn, would have significant positive effects upon all other peacebuilding processes.

This research intended to ensure that the current doctrine promoting zero corruption was not exacerbating conflict and deadly violence. Wallenstein & Sollenberg (1996) suggest that the general policy promoting zero-corruption is "potentially

accelerating intrastate conflict to interstate conflict [war]” (p. 357). Restated for emphasis, despite the best intentions of countries like the United States and others in having an anti-corruption policy, we might be making matters worse by insisting upon zero tolerance for corruption, or by continuing to impose such constraints when corruption is so poorly and ambiguously defined. As a result, this study intended to identify the potential benefits, if any, of short-term toleration of various forms of corruption, as well as the contextual, cultural and perspective-based nuances associated with defining corruption, such benefits defined as minimizing lethal violence and/or enhancing feelings of physical security from lethal violence.

It is critically important to note, from the onset, that this study precluded any and all arguments that might have supported the contortion, delay or manipulation of the democratic and/or electoral processes that are optimistically envisioned and desired. These democratic processes have long-term repercussions, and so were academically, professionally and personally considered to be inviolate.

Foundational Definitions

Corruption. There is neither a universally agreed definition of corruption, nor is there an easy way to alleviate confusion on this issue. The lack of consensus is, in fact, a core element of the basis for this dissertation. There are dozens of definitions; many are individually succinct, concise and purportedly clear within their respective context. The preponderance of these definitions is financially-centric. Yet, despite this commonality, these definitions often contradict each other. Further compounding the ambiguity, each definition is completely discredited when context, culture, and non-financial motivations are introduced.

Nonetheless, many researchers have intensely studied corruption. Despite the immensity of research, and despite a degree of academic self-denial, massive ambiguity persists. One candid researcher admits, “Like an elephant, while it [corruption] may be difficult to describe, corruption is generally not difficult to recognize when observed” (Tanzi, 1998, p. 564). Sometimes, the simplest approach is the best approach. The World Bank defines corruption as, “The abuse of public office for private gain” (Haller & Shore, 2005, p. 2). Jain (2011, p. 3) defines corruption as an “act in which public power is used for personal gains in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game (Jain, 2001, p. 73).” By comparison, this dissertation alleges that corruption is much more complex, and should be based upon contextual aspects of positive utility from any fiduciary situation, as opposed to the current parochial definitions involving only personal financial gain from those holding public office. Researching and universally defining corruption is the primary focus of this dissertation, and so the definitions provided above are admittedly superficial. Chapter Two will address this situation in detail.

Violence. Fiske-Rusciano (2014) defines violence as “any condition that takes away human rights; violence therefore includes such conditions as poverty, disenfranchisement, silencing, intimidation, and lack of access to education, healthcare, housing, food, water, respect, and physical security” (p. 261).

Lethal Violence. Violence that results in death.

Genocide. Genocide, as described by Michael Mann, is “murderous ethnic cleansing” (as cited in Shaw, 2007, p. 11). Genocide is treated as a special category with special definitions outlined by the United Nations, as originally authored by Raphael Lemkin. According to Lemkin and Article II of the United Nations Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC), genocide has two phases: (1) Destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group, and (2) Imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor (Campbell, 2013, p. 118).

Genocide is formally defined by Article II of the UNGC of 1948 as

Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic racial or religious group: (a) Killing members of group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions designed to destroy the group in whole or in part, (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Campbell, 2013, pp. x).

Although researchers' opinions vary, it is generally agreed that genocide requires intent as well as an action (Campbell, 2013). Genocidal intention mandates the "cultural destruction, but also destruction of biological patterns of the oppressed group" (Campbell, 2013, pp. x).

Terrorism. Terrorism has a wide number of definitions used within government and literature. All definitions center upon the following three common themes: "(1) the use of violence (2) an agenda concerning political objectives, and (3) the intention of sowing fear in a target population" (Merari, 2007, p. 14). In the vernacular, terrorism is defined as the willful activities that cause fear within a civilian populace through deadly violence. Because the nature and drivers of fear are each a function of culture and time, so too is the general working definition of terrorism. The British legal definition of terrorism is defined by Schmid & Jongman (2005) as "the use of violence for political

ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear” (as cited in Merari, 2007, p. 14).

By comparison, the United States defines terrorism as “the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individual or groups to modify their behavior or policies” (Merari, 2007, p. 14). Summarized in a contrarian fashion, “[Terrorism] just boils down to an idea of a just war that legitimates violent action since western tradition considers violence legitimate only when it is practiced by the state” (Chalian & Blin, 2007, p. 7).

Terrorism has also been defined by Laquer as “the substate application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change” (as cited in Crenshaw, 2012, p. 5). Although Laquer and the majority of academics limit the labeling of terrorism to only non-state actors, others have expanded its application to include state-sponsorship, claiming, “top down [state] terrorism has been far more prevalent through history” (Chalian & Blin, 2007, p. 6).

War. Oxford’s Dictionary defines war as “a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country” (2017). Yet, Merriam-Webster defines war as “a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations” (2017). The key issue to note here is that war, by Merriam’s definition, results in violence and death as a result of armed conflict activities between two or more different states or nations, as opposed to conflict with a group that is not officially representing a country or nation. Similarly, groups that represent countries or nations not

officially recognized by the United States as a legitimate country or nation would not be categorized as a party of war. We should also note that war, by Merriam's syntax, is a conflict between the armed forces and combat-trained personnel of respective states and does not target or involve civilians or non-combatants. The nuances excluding terrorists, non-state actors and noncombatant civilians are critical, since no such exclusion exists when using the Oxford definition. War is also described as "the most acute form of hostile interaction among political entities", but is actually a subset of conflict (Wilkenfeld & Brecher, 2012, p. 271). War is also defined as a "conflict involving at least one member of the interstate system on each of the [conflict], resulting in a total of 1000 or more battle deaths" (Wilkenfeld & Brecher, 2012, p. 272).

Research Questions

This dissertation answers the following three Research Questions.

Research question one. *How should corruption be properly, accurately and pragmatically defined?* Rusciano (2014) states that "one society's corrupt practices might be another society's standard" and that "corruption, in short, becomes a concept that, to quote Joseph Joubert, is 'like glasses [that] obscure everything they do not make clear'" (p. 27). Corruption, as currently defined, is often inadequate, as its definition makes it challenging to discern corruption from general incompetency, ignorance and/or naiveté. Hence, fully describing and understanding the contextual nature of corruption is paramount. If the definition and overall notion of corruption is, in fact, ambiguous, or just simply incorrect in some instances, then the concept posed by Research Question Two attains a modest degree of credibility. Research Question #1 also includes the academic need and desire to unify and reconcile existing corruption research within a foundational

concept, definition and model that bridges current gaps of paradigm, culture, syntax and context.

Research question two. *Is zero corruption required for maximizing feelings of safety during and/or post-conflict while concurrently minimizing associated lethal*

violence? Restated by a leading corruption scholar, and the essence of this dissertation,

“Can certain situations involve non-zero-sum games, where corruption benefits all (and hence loses the moral stigma attached to the term)” (Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 15)?

The statement is an interesting adjunct to corruption, whereby actions might be defined as corrupt only because they violate some law or regulation, but not because of harming any person or parties, and, concurrently, not because of providing utility or advantage to somebody in public office or public trust. Hence, what might be abhorrently defined as corrupt in the United States might be benevolently acceptable in another part of the world. An argument can be made that such forms of corruption have justifiable positive elements by extending the criteria of a just war: “In short, the question we are facing today is whether sensitivity to context and cultural traditions could be combined with the need for shared concepts” (Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 19).

Research question three. *Is there an optimum, positive level of tolerable corruption associated with maximizing feelings of safety from violent death and/or minimizing lethal violence?* This study uniquely focuses upon endorsed or tolerable corruption as a potential constructive driver within foreign policy, such behavior being nearly non-existent within published research. The vast majority of notable texts and research on the topic of war and peacebuilding fail to mention the (potential) importance of context upon corruption. Maslow and scores of subsequent studies support the

necessity for attaining feelings of at least adequate physical safety and security prior to the onset of nominal peacebuilding efforts (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011, pp. 13-14, 43-44, 47-48).

Peacebuilding also requires the inclusion of “people and cultural modalities in the setting. In addition, considerable attention must be given to discovering and building on the cultural resources for conflict resolution that exist within the context” (Lederach, 1997, p. 97). This dissertation differentiates between true, physical security and the notion of “feeling” secure. Without such assurances of security, and/or resolving near-term crises, various peacebuilding policies and programs are severely affected to the point of being negligible. Lederach (1997) suggests an integrated approach to peacebuilding and discourages “quick fixes to situations of protracted conflict” (p. 78). It is important to understand if and how corruption within governance and structure affects the severity of post conflict notions of insecurity and associated violent fatalities. Until such an understanding occurs, other post-conflict programs and policies cannot be optimized, as “Building sustainable peace in the absence of minimal levels of public security is next to impossible” (Donais, 2004, p. 943).

Pre-Research Impressions

This dissertation’s Proposal Defense, as well as the associated Institutional Review Board (IRB) submission, were based upon several qualitative suppositions. Some of these notions were supported by subsequent research and data analysis. However, some were also proven to be unfounded and/or inconclusive. The candid disclosure of these details and initial misconceptions are provided to confirm the objectivity and rigorous application of scientific methodology by the Principal Investigator, and by so

doing, hopefully enhance the credibility of this dissertation's admittedly controversial findings.

Pre-research impression one. *Corruption as currently defined is ambiguous, and does not properly account for culture or context.* My research and dissertation support this initial impression. New theories were developed, as well as a universal definition of corruption.

Pre-research impression two. *The pursuit and requirement for zero corruption within post-war environments in regions of extreme conflict is detrimentally affecting security and feelings of safety.* This dissertation fails to provide solid support for this assumption. The data gathered on this issue is generally inconclusive, and includes instances supporting as well as refuting this assumption.

Pre-research impression three. *If low or moderate (culturally acceptable) levels of corruption occur in pursuit of other far-reaching objectives, then feelings of lethal insecurity and associated violent fatalities will be minimized in regions of conflict and post-conflict.* This dissertation fails to provide solid support for this assumption. The data gathered on this issue is generally inconclusive, and includes instances supporting as well as refuting this assumption.

Supporting Theories

The potential for positive effects of corruption upon minimized lethal violence and enhancing feelings of security are currently unknown, with little to no past research on the topic. As a result, theories supporting such behavior are also nascent to non-existent. Nonetheless, some potential theories for consideration are outlined below. These theories were considered as phenomenological interviews were conducted, post-interview coding performed and trends identified. References to existing theories explaining corruption are also included. Unfortunately, existing theories must be heavily discounted since they are used to explain corruption as currently defined, and the current definitions of corruption are being challenged.

It is also critical to note that academia does not have a unified voice on what corruption is, nor why it occurs. One group refers to “actors being regarded as autonomous agents making (bounded) rational means-end calculations” while the other describes “corrupt behavior by cause[s] beyond individual control” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 41). There is enormous confusion surrounding the drivers of corruption. A variety of theories has been developed, but none are robustly and universally applicable. “Instead of synthesizing the theory groups, one could look for an alternative causal theory. By combining macro and micro factors and everything in between, it would be well suited as a theoretical model” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 42). The following theories are presented and discussed, after which my research tries to develop a single, unified universal theory.

Justwar theory. This theory provides a moral and policy basis justifying state sponsored lethal violence, armed conflict and war. Comerford (2001) discusses President Bush and his “crusade” against terrorism (p. 1). Similarly, “The Crusades found their

initial justification as offensive action aimed at protecting Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem, but quickly took on the characteristic of the jihad or Muslim holy war” (Comerford, 2001, p. 1). Although justifying the Crusades and/or recent U.S. military activities in Iraq may seem inappropriate, both are justified within the context of Justwar theory. Specifically, a war is deemed justified by Justwar theory if each of the following seven mandated characteristics is satisfied: “1) There must be a just cause, 2) War must be waged by a legitimate authority, 3) It must be formally declared, 4) Those waging it must have a right intention, 5) It must be the last resort, 6) There must be reasonable hope for success, and 7) It must be a due proportion between the benefits sought and the damage done” (Comerford, 2001, p. 3).

In a just war, most scholars and policymakers attest that “non-combatants must be guaranteed safety. The mandated conditions for a just war do not allow us to dismiss large-scale death of civilians as mere ‘collateral damage’” (Comerford, 2001, p. 3). However, there are also opposing positions where violence against noncombatants is permitted: “Aristotle, who coined its name, originated Justwar theory. The theory was then further refined by Saint Augustine, who tried to justify and explain when Christians might take part in war in good conscience” (Comerford, 2001, p. 3). Comerford (2001) comments that Saint Augustine felt “all wars remained sinful and could only be waged in a ‘mournful’ spirit. War involved resorting to a lesser evil only in the hope of preventing a greater evil and of restoring justice” (p. 2).

This theory has application to corruption since one of the tenants of a just war is that the conflict be based upon the right intention. Since states are governed by people, and because people as well as groups can be tempted and/or coerced into acting for

personal or collective benefit at the expense of their fiduciary responsibility, it appears very likely that many wars may have been un-just and waged as a result of corrupt leadership, corrupt governments and/or an ambiguous definition of what was, and what was not, corrupt. However, this situation is complicated by corruption's current definition being so ambiguous and allegedly context agnostic. Hence, an evaluation of the criteria for a just war is clearly warranted.

Prospect theory. Prospect Theory is based on changes in assets and how people react to risk and associated reward in the form of enhancing or detracting from these assets. By comparison, Expected Value (i.e. Rational Utility) Theory is based upon total assets and taking whatever actions might be necessary to maximize these assets. Until the introduction of Prospect Theory in 1979, Expected Value theory was generally agreed to govern the behavior of decision making under risk. It assumed that "all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory, and that most people actually do, most of the time" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 263).

Prospect Theory is based upon the notion that people are more sensitive to gains than losses. More specifically, people are risk averse to gains and risk seeking with respect to losses. This means that gains are undervalued and losses are overvalued, if an analogy to either Rational or Expected Utility Theory were to be overlaid (Levy, 2012, p. 194). In fact, 80% of all people tend to overvalue losses with respect to gains, all other issues being equal (Campbell, 2015). For example, "If I have something in hand, I am willing to take a risk to avoid losing it. However, if I don't already possess something I am not willing to take a risk to obtain it. People value things they already have more than what they do not have or want" (Campbell, 2015).

In Prospect Theory, emphasis is placed upon: 1) Guarantees, with respect to gains, even though logic dictates that some risk should be taken for statistically greater gains, and 2) Taking risks, with respect to losses, even though logic dictates that by taking risks, greater losses will be incurred than would have otherwise occurred by accepting the guaranteed loss. In Expected Value Theory, people “overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable; a phenomenon [called the] certainty effect” (Khaneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 265). By comparison, Prospect Theory claims, with supporting evidence, that people violate the Expected Value Theory principles and generally go with a non-guaranteed loss, even though they might lose a lot more by taking the risk. “In [situations] where winning is possible but not probably, most people choose the prospect that offers the larger gain” (Khaneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 265). Hence, they are risk seeking with respect to losses, where emphasis is being placed on retention or maintaining their position (or perceived position) whereby nothing is lost (Levy, 2012, pp. 193-196).

In Prospect Theory, renormalization occurs more quickly for gains than for losses. This leads to an “Instant Endowment Effect” when gains occur (levy, 2012, p. 197). However, when losses occur, an individual will rationalize the situation and frame their current situation about a past reference point. This behavioral theory is built upon “Reference Dependence.” Reference Dependence is the ability to make a particular decision is based upon a standard when making a decision (Levy, 2012, pp. 196-198). The individual will refer back to past decisions and results, and will take this data into account before making future and additional decisions. For example, after a series of losses, people will not adjust or renormalize easily to the new situation but, instead, will

frame around the old situation (or reference point). They perceive improvement of their now worsened situation to be any point less than where they used to be, or remember themselves being as unacceptable, and as a loss. Hence, they will engage in risk-seeking behavior, even though such behavior might be destructive (Levy, 2012, pp. 193-200).

Framing is the term describing the process about which an individual or party defines a reference. Framing above the status quo defines status quo as a loss. Declining relative power is typically framed as a loss, as the individual or entity reflects upon a time where they had more power (Levy, 2012, pp. 193-200). Hence, people will be risk seeking in this instance, since they are looking at the current situation (i.e. status quo) as a loss (Levy, 2012, p. 197). The past state of affairs and/or power is often the goal, which unfortunately leads to illogical and destructive behavior, since people are risk seeking with respect to losses. Incremental gains in power or civil rights will be avoided, as this will appear to be a gain, and people are risk averse with respect to gains. Instead, people or entities tend to go all-in, and will attempt to re-achieve a past state of affairs. Anything less is perceived as a loss, as people are risk seeking with respect to losses. By comparison, framing below the status quo defines the status quo as a gain (Levy, 2012, p. 197).

The implications of Prospect Theory to international relations and foreign policy are analogous to their application to individuals and states vis-à-vis corruption behavior. Specifically, states have a “greater tendency to defend/support status quo than expected-utility theory would predict” (Levy, 2012, p. 200). The costs of moving away from the status quo will be considered a loss, and the benefits of moving away from status quo considered a gain. The latter places over-consideration on the effects of the loss, and so people will be biased to support the status quo since we are risk adverse to gains. Hence,

the status quo is defended, even at the expense of war. When states experience a decline in relative power, they frame their reference points to a past situation above the current status quo, which allows them to perceive inaction as a guaranteed loss. This makes the alternative of war a better choice. This behavior is otherwise described as “risk seeking for losses” (Levy, 2012, p. 200). If both sides see themselves in the domain of losses, then each is more likely to engage in risk seeking behavior, which increases the chances of war (Campbell, 2015).

Incentive theory. The most common explanation of individual corruption from an economic perspective is Incentive Theory. Incentive theory is based upon “cost-benefit analysis of a particular individual . . . and factors such as wage incentives, job security and (job) promotion (e.g. whistle blowing) in curbing the motivation of public officials to engage in corruption” (Tavits, 2010, p. 1261). Tavits (2010) further finds that “empirical models demonstrate that both public officials as well as citizens are motivated by their perception of what is acceptable and commonplace. At the same time, the general views of government and other people as trustworthy and fair, remains inconsequential” (p. 1272). Incentive Theory shares several characteristics with Rationalist, Utilitarian or Expected Utility/Value theory. Incentive Theory has its origin with corruption defined from an individualistic perspective, while Expected Utility Theory is universally applied to both individuals as well as to groups and entities.

Rational-expected utility-value theory. This theory is most commonly known as Expected Value Theory, and is based upon a rationalist approach whereby an entity or individual, either consciously or subconsciously, estimates the collective probabilities for payoff and reward. A discount is not applied for ethical violations, emotional stress or

other intangibles. Similarly, a premium is not applied for comparable non-financial and/or non-specific rewards. This theory focuses on the overall value of the assets, while Prospect Theory focuses upon gains, or the change in assets (Levy, 2012, p. 194).

Expected Value Theory is very closely aligned with Incentive Theory. The primary difference is that Expected Value Theory can be applied to any person, group, entity, state or situation, while Incentive Theory is generally applicable to individuals. Expected Value Theory is also closely related to Prospect Theory. The key differences between these two theories involve Prospect Theory's premise that people and/or groups are, with an 80% majority, risk seeking for losses and risk adverse for gains (Campbell, 2015; Levy, 2012, p. 195). By comparison, Expected Value Theory mandates that neither premium nor discount be applied to the evaluation of risk and reward other than the variables already being measured as a metric for increasing utility.

Rationalized irrationality. This approach is a semi-formalized subset of Expected Value Theory, and is based upon rationally estimated gains versus losses while following the consensus of popular opinion, without accounting for effects of morality, long term reputation and other conditions. "If we had to name one reason why petty corruption is so difficult to tackle, it has to be that it makes sense for people to engage in than not" (Nagano, 2009). Although not an academic theory per se, Rationalized Irrationality theory is pragmatically correct, but does not provide causal basis. This theory contends that neither structure nor personal morality are the strongest drivers for, or against corrupt behavior. Instead, "individual opinion doesn't seem to matter much [either]. In theory, most people believe that corruption is wrong. But in practice, the incentive that motivates an individual's behavior in a corruption-prone situation is their

perception of what everyone else would do in a similar situation” (Nagano, 2009). It simply makes no sense to try to do the right thing at the expense of your own family, security, peer reputation, and, perhaps at the expense/peril of your own life. John Maynard Keynes in “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” makes an analogy between behavior and competition, and suggests that to win “one’s task was to choose the outcome which you think others will select, regardless of your personal opinion. ‘This means that attempts to act responsibly and achieve a cooperative solution cannot be sustained, because they leave you vulnerable to exploitation by others’” (as cited in Nagano, 2009).

Proponents of Rational Irrationality Theory point out the futility of a top-down approach being used to fight corruption. This is because the additional rules and regulations imposed by an external organization “in an effort to ensure that private and public interest are brought into line have doubtful applicability . . . [because it is this] very behavior . . . that has been made an integral part of the [game theory based] game” (Nagano, 2009).

Balance of power and power cycle theory. These theories are based upon the notion that no nation (or party) will escalate behavior against another party similarly capable of causing harm unless they perceive a mismatch between their own power, measured on an absolute basis, compared to their own power ranked against others, as measured on a relative basis. As states gain military, economic or resource advantages, the balance of power shifts. So, one state might choose to preempt the previous balance of power through war, while the other state, now declining in power, may want to continue enjoying the privileges and status it once had as the dominant state. The key

factor promoting war or deference is the degree of mismatch between a state's absolute power and its relative power, as compared to other states (Doran, 2012, pp. 332-338). Extensive quantitative analysis using multi-variable regression analyses were performed over the past 150 years, and arguably support a relationship between status and war. For example, the greatest propensity and strongest correlation between status mismatch and conflict occurs at the 15-year point (Wallace, 1971, p. 30).

Thousands of years ago, Plato criticized Thrasymachus for adopting the opinion that "internal to the state, only justice meant that the strong should rule" (Doran, 2012, p. 349). However, Doran (2012) points out,

Ironically, external to the state, in injustice that has precipitated the most massive wars is more egregious than that of Thrasymachus. It is the injustice of unearned privilege. The decreasingly powerful want to claim all of the perquisites, status, and influence that they had enjoyed when they were at the top of their power cycle. The increasing powerful [capable], because they foolishly postponed assuming responsibility [for leadership] until too late, or because the system refused to adjust for them . . . have been denied an appropriate role. This is a recipe for structural catastrophe (p. 349).

Although widely utilized by the United States, Russia and other nuclear capable countries as justification for the development of nuclear weapons, "despite studies by Kim and Ferris . . . a significant amount of evidence suggests that we should also have serious doubts about the traditional balance-of-power hypothesis that equality of power leads to peace" (Cashman, 1998, p. 253). This is likely because once the capability and

threat of offensive activity is created, retraction becomes problematic, and at great risk to the first party to agree to such arms reduction.

Complex systems theory. A Systems Theory approach can be used to describe and/or explain everything and anything. This being said, it is not always the most appropriate choice. Complex Systems Theory describes the interactions of the various inputs, resources and drivers of a particular system or problem, with such interactions resulting in a particular behavior. By understanding these drivers, inputs, resources and inter-relationships, the resulting behavior should be better understood. If proven valid, then the manipulation of these various nodes or modules within a complex system should also be capable of selectively modifying the outcome.

Complex Systems Theory is based upon Complexity Science, which is the “study of phenomena which emerge from a collection of interacting objects” (Johnson, 2009, p. 3). Essentially, complexity is defined as a “collection of objects competing for some kind of limited resource; food, space, energy, power, or wealth” (Johnson, 2009, p. 4). The “Holy Grail of Complexity Science is to understand predict and control such emergent phenomenon; in particular, potentially catastrophic crowd-like events such as . . . human conflicts” (Johnson, 2009, p. 5).

Corruption is a particularly complex phenomenon, and so it is well suited for description and modeling using Complex Systems Theory. South Sudan, in Sub-Saharan Africa, is well known for corruption, lethal violence and unrest. In stable regions, the role of institutions and governance are “distortions of the system”, but in regions like South Sudan, “corruption and patronage are the system. There may be bubbles of integrity, due

to the efforts of committed and influential individuals . . . but they are fragile and subordinate to the kleptocratic operation of the broader system” (De Waal, 2014, p. 348).

Kantian, utilitarian and virtue ethics theory. Three additional approaches (i.e. theories) can be used to describe and explain corruption. These include Kantian Theory, Utilitarian Theory and Virtue Ethics Theory (Chun, 2009, p. 173). Utilitarian and Kantian theories are both based upon a rationalist approach for general behavior, but have some slight differences. Kantian Theory is based upon abiding by specific, well defined moral principles for human behavior, leaving little room for interpretation or objectivity. By comparison, Utilitarian Theory has the same rational-based foundation as Kantianism, but overlays a “businesslike cost-benefit relationship” (Chun, 2009, p. 173). Virtue Ethics Theory is significantly different from the Kantian and Utilitarian approaches since it “captures the emotion and . . . concern for happiness of the self as well as of others. Virtue Ethics looks to motivate aspirational values and seeks to answer the question, ‘what kind of society should we be?’” (Chun, 2009, p. 173).

Specialized corruption theories. There has been enormous effort expended to describe the causes of corrupt behavior simply and universally. Although concrete, confirmed explanations do not exist, quite a bit of other common ground has, in fact been established. For example, “Research shows that a conglomerate of social, economic, political, organization and individuals causal factors are important to explain cases of public corruption (Huberts, 2002, p. 8)” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 43).

De Graaf (2007) provides an excellent review and summary of the six different categories currently typifying corruption theory. These theories are summarized by Tables 1 and 2, and include: 1) Public choice Theory, 2) Bad apple theories, 3)

Organizational culture theories; 4) Clashing moral values theories, 5) Ethos of public administration theories, and 6) Correlation theories (De Graaf, 2007, p. 46).

Public Choice theory is based upon “an individual making a (bounded) rational decision that leads to a predetermined outcome” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 46). Public Choice theory is further supported by Expected Utility Theory. Here, the corrupt individual is akin to an autonomous agent, and internally calculates and compares the benefits of performing the corruption against the penalties of being caught. It is important to note that this theory does not directly account for organizational, cultural, contextual and/or environmental effects. Hence, autonomous agents are “assumed to make more or less rational means-end calculations,” contrasting with other theories where “behavior is explained by causes beyond individual control” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 47).

Bad Apple theories place the causes for corrupt behavior upon the individual’s predisposition to act “with faulty moral character” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 47). This approach has numerous flaws and ambiguities, not because of what is stated, but because of the enormous spectrum of factors and issues left unstated: “In the past, there was a tendency to think of corruption as a temporary, exceptional ‘problem’ to be removed by ‘surgical’ treatment.... [but we now see] corruption as near universal and as forming a permanent concern” (Punch, 2000, p. 317).

Organization Culture theories mandate a “causal path from a certain culture . . . [whereby] a certain group culture leads to a certain mental state . . . and that mental state leads to corrupt behavior.” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 51). An individuals’ personal gains are no longer driven by individual desire for reward, nor are these actions predisposed by

Table 1

A. Corruption Theories

	Causal chain	Level of analysis of causes (independent variables)	Level of analysis of corruption (dependent variables)	The context	Most common research methods
1. Public choice theory	A 'free' official making a (bounded) rational decision that leads to a more or less predetermined outcome.	Individual	Micro and macro	Situational aspects mostly ignored; they cannot account for triggering causes. Starts from the moment the actor makes a calculation.	Mostly theoretical
2. Bad apple theories	A causal chain from bad character to corrupt acts.	Individual	Individual	Attention to individual background.	Theoretical
3. Organizational culture theories	A causal path from a certain culture – a certain group culture – leads to a mental state, which leads to corrupt behavior. Facilitating factors are described which, in some cases, strengthen a causal chain.	Organizational	Organizational	Organizational structure and culture; correlates to number of corruption cases. Situational aspects and contingencies mostly ignored.	Mostly theoretical

Note. part 1 (De Graaf, 2007, p. 45)

genetics. Instead, “If we scan these activities then it is plan that we are no longer dealing with individuals seeking solely personal gain, but with group behavior rooted in established arrangement and/or extreme practices that have to be located within the structure and culture” (Punch, 2000, p. 304). This does not mean that everybody within a certain culture or organization acts corruptly. Instead, this group of theories “describe certain conditions under which corruption occurs. It is a matter of describing ‘facilitating factors which . . . strengthen a causal chain’” (De Graaf, 2007, pp. 51-52). This group of theories implies that corruption is contagious, and infer that people associating with corrupt organizations run the risk of becoming corrupt themselves. They also suggest that corruption itself seems to be the cause of corruption, and that “not becoming corrupt in certain organizational cultures means betraying the group” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 52).

Clashing moral values theories are based upon the role of society and its culturally specific behavioral nuances. There is also difficulty differentiating between behavior in the private realm, and behavior while holding public office and/or working as a fiduciary. For example, “In the private sector, gift giving is pervasive and highly valued, and it seems natural to provide jobs and contracts to one’s friends and relations” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 91). Yet, this particular behavior would be defined as corrupt as well as potentially illegal in many part of the world, including the United States. Localized values and customs can also lead to corrupt behavior. For example, “Out of obligations to friends or family, officials take bribes. Thus, it is not so much selfish personal gain the corrupt official is after, but rather the agent feels a need to fulfill important personal (moral) duties, like ensuring loyalty to friends and family. As stated in Latin American countries . . . “for my friends everything, for my enemies nothing, and

for strangers the law” (De Graaf, 2007, pp. 53-54). Although many people agree that “patrimonial character is the root cause of corruption in the third world . . . Theobald (1999, p. 473) warns that ‘we are simply describing symptoms rather than identifying underlying causes’” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 55).

Table 2

B. Corruption Theories

4. Clashing moral values theories	The causal chain starts with certain values and norms of society, which directly influence the values and norms of individuals. These values and norms influence the behavior of individual officials, making them corrupt.	Societal	Societal	Situational aspects reduced to moral conflicts of individuals	Mostly theoretical; some case studies
5. The ethos of public administration theories	A causal path from societal pressure – often through the level of organizations on officials to perform and lack of attention to integrity issues – leads to a focus of the official on effectiveness, making him or her corrupt.	Societal and organizational	Societal and organizational	Situational aspects mostly ignored; no explanation of why some officials become corrupt and others do not.	Theoretical
6. Correlation ‘theories’	No causal model, only correlations.	All levels	All levels	Situational aspects and contingencies ignored; focus is on variables.	Surveys, expert-panels

Note. part 2 (De Graaf, 2007, p. 46)

The ethos of public administration theories posits that “officials’ performance has a causal path from societal pressure through the level of organizations. This, combined

with a lack of attention to integrity issues, leads to a focus of the official on ‘effectiveness,’ making him or her corrupt” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 56). This group of theories is very closely related to the third group on organizational cultures. There is also a greater-good mentality implied, whereby activities are justified as long as the objective is attained; that is, the ends justify the means. Empirical research within this particular group is nearly non-existent, “probably because the causal link . . . is so indirect that the claim, as true as it may be, is hard [or impossible] to support empirically” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 58).

The sixth category of existing corruption theories are collectively called Correlation theories. This group of theories “does not start from an implicit or explicit theoretical explanation model [as do the other groups], but from specific factors. Certain social, political, organizational or individual factors are highlighted. Then, it is often claimed that these factors are somehow ‘causes’ of corruption” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 59). These studies are often quantitatively based, with conclusions derived upon statistical analysis metrics. These types of correlation theories and analyses typify the current approaches from organizations like Transparency International, the World Bank and other agencies associated with post-conflict aid. As De Graaf (2007) points out, “In general, of course, we must be careful when concluding causality from correlations. [For example], the frequent correlation between ‘income’ and ‘corruption’. It seems that the lower the income of a country, the higher the occurrence of corruption” (p. 60). This type of conclusion has enormous contingencies, and if true, would lead us to conclude that monks and other religious orders taking an oath of poverty are likely to be corrupt. Again, this may be true, but to assume such a correlation from the onset is equally

ludicrous. These types of contingencies, combined with a definition of corruption that is ambiguous and argumentatively defined, typify the current academic landscape vis-à-vis corruption.

Pre-research new theories. Two of the three Research Questions focus upon the possibility of tolerable and/or non-zero levels of corruption mitigating lethal conflict. Finding conditional benefits within a characteristic so universally detestable and critical as corruption is controversial as well as challenging. This being said, a shift of perspective for the corruption paradigm similarly justifies a shift in applicable theory. The existing theories discussed earlier in this Chapter did not directly apply but were useful as supplementary thought-drivers as new theories were developed.

Three preliminary theories were developed pre-research, and are graphically shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3.




Figure 1. Preliminary Theory -- Effects of Corruption upon Post-Conflict Stability

FINANCIAL CORRUPTION AND POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION





Figure 2. Preliminary Theory -- Effects of Corruption upon Reconstruction Success

FINANCIAL CORRUPTION & STABILITY

(POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION....OR UNIVERSALLY?)



Mark Thaller
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Figure 3. Preliminary Theory -- Financial Corruption versus Conflict and Stability

These theories are rough and purposefully incomplete. Explanations and details developed are not provided, nor is such detail appropriate. Instead, these pre-research

theories served as a catalyst from which phenomenological interview questions were developed, posed and subsequently analyzed. These theories also played a crucial role in this dissertation's subsequent development of the *Corruption Pyramid*, *Corruption Hierarchy* and *Universal Corruption* theories, which are explained in greater detail in Chapter Five.

Justifying the Dissertation

This dissertation topic was developed, reviewed, and confirmed by my Dissertation Committee, as well as by the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board (IRB). I developed the topic using the guidelines provided by Dr. Elena Bastidas (2015) for the desired characteristics and associated research worthiness of Ph.D. research. These are further described by the following two sections. The IRB approval letter is included as Appendix F.

Required characteristics for research. Guidelines and respective justifications describing an acceptable dissertation topic are presented in each paragraph below. The research guideline is first quoted, after which evidence is provided supporting the guideline:

“The research must be justified by evidence of problem being significant to the professional field” (Bastidas, 2015). Protracted lethal conflict and unrest have continued in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, Sudan, Uganda and other countries around the world for decades. Perhaps not without coincidence, each of these countries has extraordinarily high levels of corruption. The United States and western foreign policy insist upon zero corruption within post-conflict society, yet the collective success of these efforts has been poor, thus this dissertation challenges the necessity for a zero-corruption mandate.

Compounding this issue, the foundational definition of corruption and its key drivers are ambiguous and often self-contradictory, and so robustly defining corruption as well as understanding the drivers and relationship (if any) between corruption and continued lethality and/or associated feelings of insecurity during and after conflict is highly desired.

“The research must be justified by statistics and documentable discrepancies that confirm the urgency of the problem” (Bastidas, 2015). Thousands of NGO’s as well as the United Nations, USAID and other countries’ relief agencies are continuously involved with providing relief to regions affected by violent fatalities and concurrently insist upon zero corruption within the targeted populations. Despite enormous effort and financial commitment expended, results range from suboptimum at best, to dismal failure at worst.

“The research must be grounded in the literature where the problem must be framed in such a fashion that existing research can be used as a foundation, or a target for contradiction” (Bastidas, 2015). Considerable research exists on corruption, war and violence. These findings will be used as a foundation for this dissertation. However, research justifying or refuting zero corruption as required for minimal post-conflict lethality and for maximized feelings of security is extremely limited. Additionally, the academic standards and definition associated with corruption are ambiguous, confusing and often self-contradictory.

“The research must be grounded in the literature whereby a theoretical or conceptual framework is used, if possible. Ideally, new findings must build upon past findings, except in situations of contradiction” (Bastidas, 2015). This dissertation used an

Existential-based, Phenomenological approach to confirm the relationships (if any) between corruption, violent fatalities and feelings of security However, since past research on this topic was lacking, there were no directly applicable theoretical models on which to base rationale or theory. Suggestions and hypotheses on the development of new theories and rationale were made using an approach that reconciled the self-contradictions inherent with the current definition of corruption and also used several existing, well accepted theories.

“The research must be original, and be needed to fill gaps in existing literature” (Bastidas, 2015). This topic did not appear to be covered very well by past research, nor by associated literature. In fact, there initially appeared to be a fair chance that this topic has never been studied, at all. Ever. Further exacerbating this issue, the current definition of corruption was confirmed as ambiguous, self-contradictory and neither applicable nor relevant within a global context. A new definition and model for corruption were needed.

“The research must have an associated necessity for a methodological, scholarly process being applied to study the problem” (Bastidas, 2015). The nature of this study and availability of data on violent fatalities initially pointed towards a quantitative or mixed methods approach. However, defining the corresponding metrics of corruption was found to be impossible due to corruption’s ambiguous definition and context-driven interpretation. Qualitative approaches, such as Grounded Theory and various types of Phenomenological methodologies are ideally suited to identify key drivers, metrics and to develop foundation theories where an existing paradigm is being challenged. These approaches also require access to unique, vetted individuals as interview Participants. Fortunately, the Principal Investigator has access to several subjects living/working in

regions of post conflict, such as Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Uganda and Afghanistan, and recruited Participants from this population. Hence, an Existential-Phenomenological methodology was considered the most appropriate, and was used.

“The research must ensure that bias and pre-ordained conclusion must be avoided” (Bastidas, 2015). Specific mid-stream checkpoints were established within and between interviews to ensure pre-ordained conclusions and bias were avoided. The interview questions were thoroughly vetted by the Dissertation Committee and by the Institutional Review Board (IRB). Subjects were identified from the Principal Investigator’s (PI) pre-existing network of friends and contacts, and also from these same individuals making further introductions (i.e. snowballing). Additionally, bias was further excluded through the PI’s generation of this topic, and through the rigorous application of the dissertation process. In other words, were significant bias to ever have existed, it seems unlikely that this topic would have ever been considered. This logic provided the investigator a small degree of confidence that objectivity would prevail over bias as research was performed.

“The research must ensure that systematic inquiry and processes are used, thereby permitting possibility for a variety of conclusion, despite initial inclinations and opinions” (Bastidas, 2015). Inquiry was systematic and iterative, while also based upon conflicts in various regions of the world personally experienced and well known by the PI, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Interviews and inquiry avoided using multiple subjects from the same family. Multiple layered coding was performed several times, each time using a different coding approach. The Qualitative Data Analysis software, MAXQDA, was used to assist and manage this coding,

evaluation and analysis process. The Dissertation Committee and the IRB provided appropriate oversight. All of these factors, combined with iterative theory development via an existential phenomenological perspective, ensured systematic inquiry with minimized predisposed opinions and bias.

Research worthiness. The following attributes of acceptable Ph.D. research are provided in the following paragraph. In each instance, a required trait is quoted, after which justifying support is provided.

“Will a known gap in the body of knowledge be filled” (Bastidas, 2015)? Yes. Past research and literature on this topic was very limited, and was actually non-existent for a good portion of the literature search. Additionally, the current definition of corruption was and is ambiguous, and potentially erroneous as a result of the definition’s apparent independence from culture and context.

“Will previous research be replicated and expanded by looking at a different category of participants, environment and/or constructs/variables” (Bastidas, 2015)? Yes, where possible. However, previous research on this exact topic did not effectively exist. Research on corruption, violent conflict and mortality was, instead, used as a foundation and subsequently further expanded upon using a phenomenological methodology. A variety of environments and variables were examined to resolve this ambiguity. Research on corruption, violent conflict, and mortality was used as a foundation.

“Will previous research be expanded by more thoroughly examining some identifiable aspect” (Bastidas, 2015)? Yes. Existing research on stability, durations of peace between conflicts, degree of mortality, etc. for many types of conflicts was examined. This research was extensive, but was lacking within the context of how

corruption affects (if at all) post conflict violence and associated feelings of security. Past research has also occurred on various types and magnitudes of corruption over time, and within various regions of the world. Indirect and direct effects of war and lethal and non-lethal violence have also been studied. This dissertation related corruption to post-conflict lethal violence and associated feelings of insecurity within the context of cultural tolerance, and by so doing, expanded upon existing research. This research also examined the repercussions of corruption within post-conflict environments. Furthermore, the research examined the unfortunate and counter intuitive possibility of how minimizing corruption, if promoted as current foreign and NGO policy dictates, may occur at the direct expense of increased lethality and/or at the direct expense of heightened feelings of insecurity. Perhaps most importantly, though, was the development of a more robust definition, syntax and paradigm vis-à-vis corruption that accounts for corruption's relationship(s) to/with context, culture and other non-absolutistic variations.

“Are there specific, identifiable, and documented problems with the currently available solutions” (Bastidas, 2015)? Yes. Violent, deadly conflicts continue to occur in the form of insurgency, terrorism, rioting, war and general unrest. Each of these occurrences has sporadic instances of superficial resolution. However, peace is either short-lived and/or incomplete, with violence and fatalities continuing after the formal declaration of peace, and despite (or because of) the insistence of zero corruption by external parties. The current definition of corruption is/was also ambiguous, and is not universally applicable due the current definition ignoring the effects of context and culture. Hence, by general observation and general public knowledge, the existing processes for minimizing conflict and post-conflict violent and non-violent fatalities had

enormous room for improvement. Similarly, the mandated requisite of zero corruption within post conflict programs was problematic as a result of corruption's current definition having such enormous ambiguity and self-contradiction. More importantly, and highly controversially, an argument was posited supporting the selective, short-term use and/or toleration of contextually acceptable corruption (e.g. utility-based corruption which include financial as well as non-financial benefits) in pursuit of minimizing and/or avoiding overall fatalities in the interest of enhancing feelings of physical security which, in turn, would enhance the effectiveness of other post-conflict resolution activities.

Structure of Dissertation

Chapter One, Introduction, included general background information on the dissertation topic such as the statement of problem, research question, pre-research impressions and governing theories. Chapter Two, Literature Review, outlines, as well as discusses, all of the relevant literature reviewed. Chapter Three, Methodology, discusses options as well as the decision process used for selecting an Existential-based, Phenomenological Analysis approach to performing the research. Chapter Four, Presentation and Analysis of Data, summarizes the coding process and analysis of the data gathered through phenomenological interviews. Chapter Five, Discussion, Findings & Conclusion, describes the respective emergent themes, associated development of theoretical models and research conclusions. Each chapter includes an introductory section as well as a chapter summary. References and Appendices are included at the end of the document.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Introduction

A comprehensive literature review was performed with an overall focus upon the identification of war, violence, lethality and corruption within a contextual perspective. It was also critically important to find or confirm instances where corruption and/or the absence of a zero-tolerance policy for corruption resulted in positive benefits, specifically with respect to lethal violence. Although not commonly stated or admitted by most people, “corruption . . . is present within all governments,” and so, not surprisingly, “It would be very difficult to obtain a visa to a developing country in order to study corruption” (Nye, 1967, p. 417). This paradoxical statement is essentially true, and is directly analogous to this dissertation’s hypotheses about corruption.

Of greatest importance to this research is properly defining the syntax of the topic. Specifically: *Corruption, Culture, Context & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict*. Hence, the focus of this literature study is upon: 1) Defining corruption, 2) Identifying individual drivers and motivations for corruption, 3) Understanding cultural, social and contextual drivers of corruption, 4) Examining the relationship between war and corruption, 5) Examining the relationship between terrorism and corruption, 6) Examining the relationship between genocide and corruption, and 7) The potential for corruption having beneficial aspects within either reducing fatalities and/or enhancing feelings of physical security. War, terrorism and genocide are discussed since all three activities include lethal violence, and corruption has been, and continues to be, theorized as directly related to violence.

Defining Corruption

The definitions of corruption are not nearly as concise as we might think. There are legal, informal, formal, and cultural-specific nuances, all resulting in drastically different interpretations and connotations of what the United States and Western society typically defines as corruption. Corruption is widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. This is not because of errors or incompetency, but instead is attributed to the multitude of definitions currently surrounding the topic. Harsch (1993) describes corruption having a “wide spectrum of practices, of varying forms and significance” (p. 33).

Mendilow and Peleg (2014), quoting Johan Goldberg, state that over the centuries, “Corruption thus joined the club of terms like ‘terrorism,’ or ‘fascism,’ that became banalities that disguise reality while impoverishing language and thought by obliterating distinction” (pp. 1-2). Corruption becomes a buzzword or sound bite that, at its uttering, conjures up images that may or may not be accurate. In fact, these images may not only be less than accurate, they may be so completely incorrect as to be absurd in the eyes of the contextual audience. The concept of corruption “in itself makes no sense because the distinction [at its base] does not arise” (Clapham, 1985, p. 50). Rephrased, corruption, as defined above, often becomes a catalyst for discussion and focus illustrating the non-western nature of non-western cultures. Although seemingly obvious, this latter observation is key, and therein potentially typifies one of the root causes for miscommunication and misinterpretation of the constitution of corruption: extreme ambiguity. One definition of corruption originated with James Madison, who stated that,

Corruption meant the overstepping for private gain of officially recognized boundaries of public office . . . and the assumption it rests on is that the scope of public office is delineated by clear boundaries, and that there are unambiguous rules of conduct that assure that office holders will adhere to them. Should such constraints lose their clarity, or become subject of controversy, the definition would become inappropriate (as cited in Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 3).

This is a very common definition that has permeated society throughout the world. Similarly, and in the vernacular, corruption is often defined as the actions of public officials in pursuit of private financial gain.

Corruption is most commonly defined by Nye (1967) as “behavior, which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (p. 419). Nye discusses corruption within the context of government, since this is where the vast majority of research and use of the syntax currently resides. It is important to note that Nye expands what is notionally defined as financial gains as a result of deviation from “formal duties of public role” to include status gains also. Nye’s definition, upon an out-of-context literal translation, leaves open the possibility that such positive utility can be applied to a non-individualized entity, such as a regime, country and/or state. In other words, Nye supports corruption as being the deviant behavior that results in any type of positive utility for the perpetrator, such utility being financial or non-financial, and such perpetrator being an individual, group, community or party.

An argument further supporting corrupt behavior extending to state as well as civil society is suggested by Harsch (1993), who claims that a “legalistic definition has its limitations. It assumes a differentiated society in which public office is considered separate from private interest. Yet, in much of the Third World, the actual distinctions between the state realm and ‘civil society’ are far from clear” (p. 34).

Mushtaq Khan (as cited in Amundsen, 1999, p. 2) defines corruption in a manner very similar to Nye, and states that corruption is “behavior that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power or status”. Nye’s definition was not intended to allow cultural adaptability in its application to other cultures and context. Nonetheless, it is “the most widely used in the English language literature” (Sun & Johnson, 2009, p. 2).

In Uganda, the Public Service Review and Re-Organization Commission defined corruption as “conduct or practice by a public official or private individual done in flagrant violation of existing rules and procedures for the realization of personal or group gains” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 188). This definition initially appears to be widely applicable, as it transcends financial issues as well as a government-centric focus. However, upon closer review, we note that this definition avoids cultural and contextual nuances, and instead establishes “rule and procedures” as the basis for normative comparison. Cultural and contextual nuances are hypothesized and supported by this dissertation as essential.

We must also keep in mind that corruption is not always performed and/or condoned by a person on behalf of his or her gain of utility. Instead, corruption can be

considered the collective actions or policies of groups, communities, political parties and other such collectives of individuals where the benefits of such corrupt practices benefit a group or common cause, rather than a singular individual. Of course, by its very nature and connotation, these benefits cannot occur without an associated and direct expense of some other individual, group or cause. Mendilow and Peleg (2014) supports this relationship between benefits, and expenses by stating, “The authoritative distribution of resources in society invariably results in winners and losers. Where and how are we to draw the line between policy and corruption” (2014, p. 4)?

Tanzi (1998) has performed considerable research on corruption, and defines it through the following commonsense phrase: “Like an elephant, while it [corruption] may be difficult to describe, corruption is generally not difficult to recognize when observed” (p. 564). Sometimes the simplest approach is the best approach. This may correctly describe the tactic by the World Bank, where it defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (Haller & Shore, 2005, p. 2).

A corrupt act can be defined as an action against the expected behavior of not only an office, but also contrary to established laws and rules. De Sardan defines corruption as “a form of secret social exchange through which those in power (political or administrative) take personal advantage, of one type or another, of the influence they exercise in virtue of their mandate or their function” (as cited in Amundsen, 1999, p. 2). This particular definition is very broad reaching, and unlike others, has broad application to both the public as well as private sectors if read out of context. However, the proper context in which De Sardan defined corruption intended to limit its application to public office: “In sum, almost every definition (or rather conceptualization) of corruption has a

principal focus on the state and politics (“the corrupted”) and a “demand side” perspective” (as cited in Amundsen, 1999, p. 2). Here, demand side refers to those in a position to be corrupted, while supply side would refer to those enticing officials to act corruptly as a result of payment, favors, and other incentives. Amundsen (1999) recognizes that there may be corruption within the private sector, and/or “without any state agency or state official being involved. However, most definitions of corruption will exclude this intra-societal corruption, and emphasizes corruption as a state-society relationship” (p. 3).

Most people use legal definitions and connotations to define corruption (Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 4). However, this definition avoids the application of context and culture when defining and evaluating corruption issues. Yet, since legal definitions are supposed to lack ambiguity, they also infer tolerance of types of corruption that are not defined by rules or by law, but are nevertheless perceived by society as immoral, unethical and/or improper. As a result, laws that do exist “may arise from corrupt processes and lack legitimacy and consistent meaning” (Johnston, 1997, p. 62).

In the vernacular, some have divided corruption into categories of a narrow or legalistic approach, and a public interest approach. These two [approaches] assume that existence of a public interest that rises above the law, despite the fact that it is not necessarily defined in clear terms or encoded in legal documents. Such a public interest serves not only to direct behavior but to validate or censure the performance of power holders and the law itself. Forms of behavior that are considered corrupt by universal schema may be judged

otherwise by the public at large, while the behavior of power holders that is popularly believed to sacrifice the public interest would be considered corrupt regardless of its legal definition (Mendilow, & Peleg, 2014, p. 6).

Some scholars have attempted to use other senses, such as color, to further define and refine the context of corruption. For example, Heidenhemier used a color-coding system to visualize corruption as it relates to mass public opinion, and to what is legally defined (Gong & Wang, 2013, pp. 571-572). Black indicates consensus between both definitions: gray is ambiguous and white signifies agreement by the public that an action that is legally defined as corrupt is not (Heidenheimer, Johnston, & Levine, 1970, pp. 149-164; Mendilow, & Peleg, 2014, p. 6).

Tavits aggregates the commonly agreed opinions and findings of academic experts such as Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) and Treisman (2000) by stating, “Corruption is usually understood as a ‘misuse of public office for private gain’” (2010, p. 1258).

As previously stated, the World Bank’s definition of corruption is “the abuse of public power for private benefit” (Haller & Shore, 2005, p. 2). By comparison, the definition provided by Transparency International, one of the world’s largest scholarly entities, focused entirely upon corruption is, “The misuse of entrusted power for private gains” (Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 2). Both of these are very similar in their intent, as both mandate that corruption be within the context of a governmental or publicly entrusted position, and that the result of such improper behavior be private gains or benefit. The choice of words here is critical, since many other definitions focus upon financial benefits. Here, the private benefits alluded to by Transparency International and

the World Bank's definition for corruption can clearly be non-financial, and might include such benefits as influence, prestige, favors, power and status. However, drawing this conclusion would be wrong and against the both entities' intentions, each being tightly focused upon financial wrongdoing and/or associated inappropriately obtained financial benefits.

Burke (2007) divided corruption into two categories. First, corruption can be interpreted as "undue influence: the use of political authority to extend social and economic power beyond the limits set by the constitutional principles for the authoritative distribution of resources and the resolution of societal conflicts" (p. 398). Burke's (2007) second form of corruption is the "use of social and economic power to gain political ends in breach of the basic principles by which political resources [including political power] are distributed. As wealth, is power" (p. 398).

Burke's concerns about political and state corruption are further confirmed by Doherty (1978), who alleges the "corruption of state theorists, such as Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Rousseau", and feels that "corruption was not a particular behavior, but a situation that grew out of permanent and extensive inequalities of wealth or political power [or both] that erode common moral commitments. The loss of the sense of civic duty and loyalty means that the primary attitude among citizens is wary competition to preserve what one possesses, and to gain more if possible" (p. 960).

Burke (2007) further defines corruption as "erosion", where such erosion is "a state of inflammation" that results from authoritative individuals, groups or institutions that exploit their power to increase the share prescribed to them at the expense of others" (p. 344). This particular definition deserves some comment, since here, Burke has opined

that corruption is not necessarily obtaining private gains as a result of abusing public trust or position. Rather, he specifically makes it clear that such private gains are *at the expense of others*. This is different than other, more absolute definitions of corruption, since Burke has purposefully used a relativistic approach. Said differently, if such private gains were to occur as a result of abusing the power of public office, and such gains were not previously available to anybody, then these actions would, under Burke's definition, not be defined as corrupt.

Burke's observation is further confirmed by Mendilow and Peleg (2014), who state that corruption involves a "shift in the manner in which resources are distributed, and hence is discerned by members of society that are not implicated in it first and foremost by the denial of resources. By definition, then, corruption involves winners, but all [other options and all other actions as well] involve losers" (p. 15). Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) provide a potential core definition of corruption as,

A distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere is a recognition that corrupt acts involve an exchange, in which one party offers inducements [frequently but not necessarily monetary] to a public official in return for special policy or administrative advantages, or 'political goods' . . . [and] the sense that such exchanges are improper, that, they violate established norms (pp. 34-35).

Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) also argue that corruption "refers to practices that are considered improper under Western norms" (p. 34). This is clearly an absolutism perspective.

Aggregated definitions of corruption abound. One such definition postured by Mendilow and Peleg (2014) suggests defining corruption as, "The use of public office to

undermine the norms delineating the boundaries separating social and economic power from political authority in order to advance individual, group or institutional benefits” (pp. 14-15). This is an interesting attempt to define corruption within a universal context. However, casual observation disproves the utility of this aggregate definition, since it avoids any type of cultural or socially embodied factors.

Corruption can also be defined through inference, as a result of specific intended consequences. For example, “According to its [The Supreme Court] verdict in *Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission*, the only permissible restrictions on free speech are those necessary to prevent ‘corruption or the appearance of corruption’” (Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 16). Since the definition of corruption is both ambiguous as well as controversial, by extension, the right to free speech in the United States might also be made ambiguous. This particular definition has an unintended consequence since this free speech, as granted by the United States Constitution, is considered so inviolate that likely infringement upon the Federal Election Commission appears to be expected. In other words, corruption, perhaps in the form of burning a flag, and/or non-violently expressing various opinions of hatred, might be condoned when, according to the court’s findings, such behavior might otherwise be prohibited. Making this particular legal finding even more challenging to interpret is the context and definition of corruption within the syntax.

The field of corruption, as well as the syntax, verbiage and idioms used to describe and communicate thoughts are themselves, suboptimum, since corruption is currently so perfectly ill defined, ambiguous, and contextual. Mendilow and Peleg (2014) make an argument that the “corruption of which governments are accused often cannot be understood by the tools that are offered by the definition of corruption current in the

literature,” and that corruption is, at its foundational core, “a conflict over the answers to the fundamental questions of what is meant by good government and what constitutes corruption” (p. 17).

In general, people and institutions often become what they are perceived to be. In the case of corruption-ridden regions of the world, the people and entities within these regions become corrupt if they perceive their own government and culture as similarly corrupt. Mendilow and Peleg (2014) states that “societies with high social perception of corruption have experienced a viscous cycle of social distrust, limited governmental functioning and consequently, pervasive corruption” (pp. 18-19).

Fiske-Rusciano (2014) discusses the importance of trust and how corruption is “characterized by the betrayal of such trust” (p. 258). Hence, corruption can be anything that betrays such trust, be it between people, communities, governments, ethnicities, or other demographic metrics. This broad definition of corruption is overly simplistic, and clearly ambiguous. Nonetheless, this simplistic approach may prove useful as research continues. Resolving current ambiguities and confusion requires thinking outside the box, and the trust-based definition offered by Fiske-Rusciano represents a unique, objective approach.

Corruption-based norms are “the misuse of public office for private gain” (Sandholtz & Gray, 2003, p. 765). Rusciano (2014) notes that “international norms infers interpretation driven by world opinion . . . but the role is unspecified, while ‘misuse’ and ‘private gain’ maintain their mystery” (p. 28). International Organizations and NGOs have created anticorruption regimes, policies, and practices, but these entities’

involvement within these efforts is generally dominated, as well as targeted, to the global elite. (Sandholtz & Gray, 2003, p. 774).

Warren (2006) notes “where an exclusive elite simply holds to different norms than the broader public, however odious, we would not usually say they are ‘corrupt’” (p. 804). Rusciano (2014) states, “If the public does not recognize norms supposedly disseminated by international institutions then they are not aware whether elite follow those norms; corruption implies a public evaluation of elite behavior that would not exist here” (p. 28). Ivanov (2007) maintains that “The emotive term ‘corruption’ has masked the gap between global and local discourse” and the effort to prescribe similar policies from Nigeria to Bulgaria ended in various how-to’s but little of what to fight” (p. 28). Current definitions for corruption are contradictory, ambiguous, and confusing. It is amazing that such a superficially mature topic, like corruption, can be so immature, undeveloped and in need of massive clarification.

Corruption and Contextual Considerations

Rusciano (2014) notes that the Business International (BI) measure of average country scores for corruption indicators, as well as the Transparency International Index of Corruption, have a critical and fundamental problem where the definitions upon which the surveys are based vary across cultures, and that the indexes are produced primarily by quantitative analysis of qualitative data. As a result, these purported absolute metrics depend upon the perceptions of western analysts, rather than upon the local citizens within the respective regions of study (p. 28). Rusciano (2014) attempts to define corruption by looking at the problem in reverse, and starts with trying to figure out what

people think about corruption; he then uses reverse engineering to determine what attributes are inherent within these localized and culturally specific perceptions.

Rusciano (2014) quotes John Locke: “Words, in their primary or immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of [they] who use them” (p. 28).

Societal norms often dictate what is defined as corruption and what is not. In the Middle East, “bestowing benefits on kin may confirm to social norms of loyalty to the family” and thus, are viewed as non-corrupt behavior, regardless of legalities that would define it otherwise (Gillespie & Okruhlik, 1988, p. 59). This is a common theme.

Mendilow (2014) further states that “A new approach is indeed required to escape the assumption that all regimes are based, or should be based, on rational legal authority; the proposition that the boundaries of public offices are unambiguous, or the premise that public opinion is more or less uniform” (p. 7). Social norms provide excuses for corruption, as currently defined, in various regions of the world. Many of these regions have regimes and laws that are themselves ambiguous and do not stand up to the rigors of time. As a result, they fail the standards of legal mandate. This observation could be further expanded to imply that neither law nor legal basis has anything to do, whatsoever, with corruption, and that the entire syntax is based upon abiding by social norms.

The existence of a democratic government has long been anecdotally related to the degree of corruption, or lack thereof. However, extensive quantitative analyses show that,

corruption has no affect upon economic growth in democracies, while non-democracies suffer significant economic harm from corruption. This might be because democracies and the rule-of-law as well as the electoral prevent the

existence of corruption from becoming as institutionalized as it has been seen to occur in non-democracies (Drury, Kriekhaus, & Lusztig, 2006, p. 121).

The issue of time is also critically imperative. The cultures and time sensitivities of the United States and the majority of western and euro-centric culture are based upon immediate gratification and fairly short time spans. By comparison, the timelines for relationships, programs and government action is much longer in Asia. This is particularly interesting, since a very strong relationship exists in Asia between corruption and institutional trust. Trust, regardless of context, be it interpersonal or institutional, requires time to develop, while “corruption is often considered as an absolute, and time independent” (Chang & Chu, 2006, p. 259).

Rocha, Brown, and Cloke (2011) states, “The concept of corruption is frequently represented as relating to social practices that violate established rules and norms” further discusses societal norms (p. 159). However, “corrupt practices are often only possible because they, in fact, draw on existing institutional mechanisms and cultural dispositions that grant them a certain social approval and legitimacy (Rocha, et al., 2011, p. 159).

Locke suggests that a “nation’s foundation is based upon a constitution made by the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions and moral, civil and social habitudes of the people” (as cited in Burke, 2007, p. 398). This makes every nation different from every other nation, which, by definition, makes the definition of corruption both different for every context and also non-constant, as people within different nations modify their respective positions on issues of moral, civil, and social habitudes. We need look no farther than our own country to find examples of widespread agreement on

corruption circa 2016 that, humorously and ironically, contradicts the same opinions of just 10, 20 or 50 years earlier.

It is important to note that “Corruption can be a way of life in certain countries, while it is a criminal activity in others” (Chun, 2009, p. 173). Nonetheless, Chun (2009) further states that “not all the corruption seems to have the same effect; certain types of corruption seem to have a less threatening effect than others” (p. 173). Fiske-Rusciano (2014) points out that “Rosen (2010) asked the people of the Middle East what they thought about corruption, and found that while the West thinks in terms of bribery and nepotism, in the Middle east corruption is ‘the failure to share any largess you have received with those with whom you have formed ties of dependence’” (p. 257). Clearly, as a result of context, foreign definitions of corruption can be superficially concise, yet ambiguous and contradictory when compared to alternative definitions (Brooks, 2010).

Cultural context endorsing corruption is contradicted by Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s firing of his own cousin, “which has loss-of-face implications for a family as a whole in Rwandan society” (Streeter & McNaught, 2008, p. 12). Despite challenges and controversy, Rwanda is a success story, perhaps as a direct result of its anti-corruption efforts and subsequent growth. Streeter and McNaught (2008) attribute Rwanda’s exceptional GDP growth of 6.4% from 1996-2006, despite losing nearly 10% of its population over the preceding 15 years to genocide, and claim, “Rwanda is heralded as a country where anti-corruption efforts, security and accountability are consistently at the forefront of the government’s attention” (p. 2). Transparency and openness is not necessarily endemic to African or any other cultures. Yet, in Rwanda, President Kagame created a Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) comprised of many members of the

American and international business community (Street & McNaught, 2008, p. 17). As a result, “Out the wreckage of the genocide, Rwanda is rapidly emerging as a model of post-conflict recovery and progress. Many people are calling the Rwanda success a ‘model for others to follow’ because of its ‘demonstrated commitment to cleaning up corruption’” (Streeter & McNaught, 2008, p. 20).

In the case of Sudan and the Janjaweed, the international audience is quick to claim corruption and culpability of the Khartoum government and President Bashir. Looking deeper, though, we need to remember that the military of Sudan is comprised of full time soldiers, as well as volunteers, called the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). The PDF “are volunteers who aid the armed forces but the Janjaweed are ‘gangs of armed bandits’ with which the government has no relations whatsoever” (Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 2005, p. 3). However, the PDF are allegedly assisting and cooperating with the Janjaweed. The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur stated, “When militias attack jointly with armed forces, it can be held that they act under the effective control of the Government,” and that “when militias are incorporated in the PDF and wear uniforms, they acquire, from the viewpoint of international law the status of organs of the Sudan. Their actions and their crimes could be legally attributed to the Government” (2005, p. 4).

Hence, in this particular case, the Government of Sudan has attempted to establish a legal separation, and non-culpability, rather than social acceptability. These efforts have not been received well by the international community, and so sanctions remain imposed on Sudan, as international bodies tend to agree with the Darfur Commission (2005) that “the large majority of attacks on villages conducted by the [Janjaweed] militia [in

conjunction and/or in collaboration with the PDF) have been undertaken with the acquiescence of State officials” (p. 5). The Commission further notes that the Government of Sudan may claim that their activities were part of a tactic of war against rebel groups and militants actively opposing the sovereignty of Sudan. This notwithstanding, the Commission (2005) emphasized that “if it is established that the Government used the militias as a ‘tactic of war’, even in instances where the Janjaweed may have acted without evidence of Government support, Government officials may incur criminal responsibility for joint criminal enterprise to engage in indiscriminate attacks against civilians and murder of civilians” (p. 5).

In the instance of Sudan, has corruption occurred within individuals, or within the government? Has an individual or individuals within the government benefited, in some fashion, by the alleged genocidal efforts against the people of Darfur? Similarly, has the government acted in a corrupt fashion by western and euro-centric standards in an effort to favor one group of people over another? Further complicating this argument is whether or not the Government of Sudan’s tactical efforts against insurgents, with or without the assistance of the Janjaweed, are justified through Justwar theory. Allegations of genocide have been frequently levied against President Bashir and the Sudan government by a variety of states and NGO’s. However, genocide requires clear “intent” (Campbell, 2015), and can intent be clearly established if the Janjaweed militias are, as claimed by the Sudanese government, operating to a substantial degree independent of the government? The answers to these questions are not easily found unless and/or until corruption can be properly defined and agreed upon by world actors.

Rusciano (2014) postulates that the core definition of corruption includes key elements, characterizes vis-à-vis world opinion from corruption's victims' perspectives, and that "prominent among these elements is the identification of corruption by its costs it incurs for its victims: the deliverable denial of goods and services to which they, [the victims] feel entitled" (p. 29). Rusciano (2014) further states that confusion occurs as a result of

the manner in which one measures world opinions. Hence, the opinions of nations are often represented by the specific distribution of opinions on an issue within a given nation, the leaders' 'official opinions' on the issue, or media content analyses, while the opinions of individuals are often represented by international poll results from individual countries combined into an aggregate' (p. 30).

This is the problem with surveys and quantitative methodologies when applied to qualitative topics such as corruption, transparency, and other types of contextual issues. In this case, "the combined survey cannot measure the variations introduced within the various nations; it assumes that models must approach world opinion as the opinions of individuals, [and] not the opinions of nations" (Rusciano, 2014, p. 30).

Page and Shapiro (1992) support using country-level aggregate public opinion when analyzing issues and effects upon foreign policy (p. 8). Specifically, "What matters for foreign policy makers and studies of public opinion and foreign policy is collective public opinion, rather than individual public opinion" (Page and Shapiro, 1992, pp.15-34). So, if public opinion is analogous to world opinion, what does "world opinion" mean? Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano (1990) define world opinion as having the following five components: 1) A moral component, a pragmatic component, 2) The power of the

world opinion, 3) The nation's image or reputation (in world opinion), 4) The world considered as a unit, and 5) The threat of international isolation,” and further postulate that “world opinion refers to the moral judgments of observers which actors must heed in the international arena, or risk isolation as a nation” (pp. 305-322).

Haller and Shore (2005) take the stance that “anthropologists sometimes become a part of the corrupt patterns of behavior, where such patterns are, perhaps, not seen as corruption onsite in the field, but could be seen as such in one's own society” (pp. 15-16). This is further shown by western society and, more notably, the United States' desire to control Iraq's oil, and may justify and once again rest upon “corruption-based patronage but aligned with US interests” (Le Billon, 2005, p. 685). Corruption in Iraq is well known, but the United States has been equally complicit. Le Billon (2005) exposes the United States' motives to be themselves corrupt to a degree, in pursuit of foreign relations goals that, in the opinion and judgment of the United States, supersede negative repercussions of corruption (p. 685).

Corruption is not always a proactive, preplanned activity. Dereliction of duty, to include lack of action and/or gross incompetency, could represent a form of corruption. The same conclusion can be extended to policies, legislation and system (as well as those who support such systems), and evokes Burke's (2007) notion that “behavior of public servants need not be illegal to be corrupt” (p. 398). In other words, corruption can potentially be defined not only by what we do, but also by what is purposefully or accidentally left undone.

Corruption is often used to maintain the status quo, and is an alleged immoral tool used by those in power to achieve these objectives. For example, in Iraq “Saddam

Hussein resorted to corruption in order to prevent the development of civic groups that could oppose his regime” (Jain, 2011, p. 4). This leads some to see, and potentially conclude, that “some dictators have a benevolent side to them, [whereby] corruption is accompanied by sharing some of the wealth” (Jain, 2011, p. 4).

Rusciano (2014) observes that “it is important to realize that many social scientists do not equate illegality with corruption,” since, unless harm to public interest can be proven, it is exceedingly difficult to conclude that a corrupt act has occurred on basis of illegality, alone” (p. 248). Unfortunately, this latter element is, by far, the litmus test used by the majority of American citizens, politicians, and western society when conversationally defining corruption.

Tierney (2013) notes,

Iraqis frequently describe nepotism not as a civic problem, but as a moral duty. Whoever gets a leadership position is expected to move members of his family into available spots. The patriarch of one tribe south of Baghdad said, ‘I told my children not to participate in any outside groups or clubs . . . We don’t want distractions. We have a dynasty to preserve’ (n.p.).

This approach is further attested by Tierney (2013) with respect to Iraq, where “social priority is the family, clan and tribe, not the civic professional groups that are so common in America, the pillars of civil society that observers . . . have been crediting for the promotion of democracy” (n.p.).

Succinctly identifying corruption with other people, parties, or groups, from time to time, is a necessary requisite for western society where we seem to be socially compelled to find corruption. Fiske-Rusciano (2014) supports this by stating,

First, the ‘finding’ of the disturbing [bad] apples [of corruption] becomes necessary to assure that all is well during times of economic distress . . . when public confidence shows a deliberate demonizing of a sector of the economy or citizenry, and can turn into a useful scapegoating. Two consequences of this narrative are that there is a ‘silencing,’ a loss of rights, and a public betrayal, as we are told who to fear and mistrust at home and abroad. Authorities are not held accountable and there need not be any true problem solving; simply a distraction from what is actually going on. A fearful citizenry is easily manipulated and demand little, leaving an open door for the abuse of power (p. 250).

Corruption can, and does, permeate post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa as well as other parts of the world. Arowosegbe (2011) discusses the relevance of Claude Ake's political thought for state reconstruction in post-conflict Africa, and posits that a complete “transformation of the state is a central component of peacebuilding and post-conflict transition” (p. 651). Instead of attempting to rehabilitate or correct issues, a complete rebuilding of the state from ground up is recommended as a requisite for achieving a sustainable democratic reconstruction in post-conflict Africa (Arowosegbe, 2011).

State behavior, with respect to sharing and influencing other states’ cultures, has changed a lot over the past 50 years. Since the Cold War, “we have experienced each other and transmitted culture sometimes when and where there was little such transmission before, and have done it at a much faster speed and higher volume. This is not to say that we are homogenous . . . but rather that we must pay attention to culture

transmission, shared experiences, and contextualized memory” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 254).

Having a narrow, focused belief in the prevalence of corruption is corrupting on its own accord. This is, arguably, what has occurred, and continues to occur, in the United States, Europe, and western society. Westernized practices and efforts sometimes, arguably oftentimes, do more harm than good, and in many cases, achieve exactly the opposite of what was intended. Case in point is the United States’ involvement in Iraq, where, “worse than the waste and unfinished projects, is the culture of corruption that was established. Through kickbacks, money laundering, theft and bribery, the country’s development continues to be hindered as its resources are diverted and political patronage alliances assume unstable control” (Wood, 2013).

Corruption, and/or any type of behavior that is non-constructive can promote and accelerate continued and/or worsened negative behavior. Kahn (2003) refers to this as the *Logic of Reciprocity*. More specifically, this refers to how “individual[s] who lack faith in their peers can be expected to resist contributing to public goods, thereby inducing still others to withhold their cooperation as a means of retaliating. In this self-sustaining atmosphere of distrust, even strong [and costly] regulatory incentives are likely to be ineffective in promoting desirable behavior” (pp. 71-72). Post-crisis Turkey “associates corruption with historical and cultural specificities, and contradictory in terms of its counter-productive anti-corruption strategies” (Bedirhanoglu, 2007, p. 1239). Corruption fosters distrust and encourages public cynicism. As a result, in some parts of the world a cyclic and self-destructive feedback loop occurs. For example, in Mexico corruption is

considered “so entrenched by the country’s citizens that, for many, stopping corruption is neither attempted nor expected” (Morris, 1999, p. 623).

Nepotism, in many parts of the world, is not seen as corruption, but rather, it is a family responsibility. In fact, “you are expected to give jobs to your kin; to not do so is corrupt (Rosen, 2010)” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 257). As stated earlier in this chapter, “Rosen (2010) asked the people of the Middle East what they thought about corruption, and found that while the West thinks in terms of bribery and nepotism, in the Middle east corruption is ‘the failure to share any largess you have received with those with whom you have formed ties of dependence’” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 257).

The role of media and how journalists have the power to support or modify the truth with respect to a particular agenda can lead and/or enhance corruption that is already occurring. Fiske-Rusciano (2014) discusses how using the media and the purposeful betrayal of public trust “to incite riots through racist commentary or purposeful lies” (p. 258). This example of serious corruption occurs nearly daily within the United States’ media. Although these actions are not illegal, and although they cannot be officially punished, manipulation of and by the media is a form of corruption. The Polish media, like other media worldwide, exacerbate the confusion about proper behavior, corruption, and lack thereof:

The lack of clear definition of corruption reinforces confusion even further since corruption as a general term [in Poland] is used in connection with common crimes committed by public officials, the police and customs officers, traders of children. The lack of clarity concerning the definition of corruption is the cause of

many misunderstandings concerning corruption and its remedies (Fuszara, 1999, p. 281).

As a result, syntax and perspective are vitally important when discussing corruption, due to its extremely broad spectrum and ambiguity of its defined meaning.

Leaders, just like people, can change as a result of circumstance. Hoge (2013) writes about President Rousseff in Brazil, stating, “Some believe, however, that the new rules changed once they gained power. Their goal became to keep power and to have access to public funds for their own objectives, causing disillusionment among its (Brazil’s government) supporters” (as cited in Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 260).

“Hong Kong has become one of the most corruption-free societies in the world,” and has a corresponding very low tolerance for corruption (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 569). Research indicates “a more significant impact of informal institution than formal ones on corruption tolerance levels” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 569). Here again, we must note that the definition of corruption used for research and for associated conclusions is based upon westernized constructs. Hence, it is, perhaps, not without coincidence that Hong Kong is one of the most westernized countries/regions in Asia.

Government officials in corrupt countries grossly misuse and reduce the effectiveness of foreign aid development funds provided from donor countries. Although “aid policies [of the donor countries] do not differ as a function of the corruption level of the recipient country,” it is interesting to note that the “less corrupt donor states allocate more aid to less corrupt recipient states than to corrupt recipients, whereas corrupt donor states do not make such a clear distinction” (Schudel, 2008, p. 507). This behavior

provides empirical confirmation that corruption not only tolerates, but tacitly encourages corruption, regardless of the state's size, status, or stature.

War and Corruption

The purpose of war is “to capture disputed land or some other resource, but with war, lives are lost and production is sacrificed” (Becsi & Lahiri, 2006, p. 3). Hence, if enhanced production and prosperity for citizens are paramount, then war, itself, can be argued as a form of corruption against the state's citizens, since war compromises the economic success and status of the state. The concept and nuances of war are also important because of the significant financial, stature, and other incentives that are integral to a war economy.

The costs of warfare are significant and fall into two categories. The first cost of war is foregone production, as resources are diverted towards warfare (Becsi & Lahiri, 2006, p. 4). Collier (2007) further estimates this cost as “being roughly the equivalent of one year's GDP for the typical developing country engaged in civil war.” The second cost of war is death, disease, and displacement, where “the human cost has not been incorporated into modern analyses of conflict, though it can easily exceed the production costs” (Becsi & Lahiri, 2006, p. 4). Collier (2007) estimates that the “human cost of warfare” as being “roughly the equivalent of another one to two years of the initial GDP for the typical developing country engaged in civil war,” and that this cost “may even be higher because total war deaths are not always easily measured.”

Becsi and Lahiri (2006) find that “an increase in foreign aid to the warring countries may increase war efforts when arms protect lives in a significant way” (p. 3). This is counterintuitive, but has been proven to be true. Hence, the financial support of

another country involved with lethal conflict, and/or war actually hurts more than it helps. This flies in the face of common sense alternatives, since to do nothing may be ethically challenging. However, in many cases, non-assistance, from a financial perspective, is exactly what should have been promoted. Becsi and Lahiri (2006) find, “An increase in foreign aid to two symmetric warring countries will increase the employment of soldier and the imports of arms in both countries if the effect of arms on the protection of the lives of soldiers is very significant,” and that “An increase in foreign aid to warring countries increases their income and therefore their marginal disutility from loss of life increases” (p. 12). This reduces soldiers employed in warfare. On the other hand, Becsi and Lahiri (2006) suggest that “an increase in income [because of foreign aid by other means] and the resulting increase in the marginal disutility for death induces a country to import more military hardware, which can protect the lives of soldier,” and further assert that “foreign aid to the two warring countries can actually increase both the employment of soldiers and the imports of military hardware in the two warring countries” (p. 13).

Within the context of war, it is important to distinguish between the death of military forces and all others who are not part of the military fighting force. To do this, war mortality is divided into several categories. For example, Battle Deaths is defined as, “Civilians and soldiers killed in the course of combat,” and Total War Deaths is defined as, “Battle Deaths plus deaths from disease, starvation, riots, and crime. Battle Deaths are more easily measured than the latter, and can be grossly undermined in magnitude. For example, Total War deaths in the DRC from 1998-2001 were six times greater than Battle Deaths” (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005, pp. 145-166).

According to Henderson (2010), “Civil wars have become increasingly prevalent in their incidence, and increasingly deadly in their result” (pp. 248-256). Despite their frequency, the justification for violence is often based upon doing what is “right”, which is otherwise defined as *Justwar Theory*. Justwar Theory requires

that a nation at war respect proportionality both before it goes to war, *jus ad bellum*, and in the way it fights a war, *jus in bello*. To respect proportionality is to know or estimate on good evidence that the whole war, and the tactics used in the war, will not generate more evil and harm, and costs than they will generate good and help and benefits (Betz, 2005, p. 137).

For example, a view commonly expressed by many, albeit in hindsight, is that “on the proportionality standards for a justwar, this [Iraq] war is a miserable failure” (Betz, 2005, p. 137).

A Justwar Index (JWI) was developed to help researchers evaluate and determine the extent to which various conflicts could be rationalized or confirmed as “just” (Dorn, 2011, p. 242). The criteria for a Justwar are, “1) Declared by lawful authority, 2) Cause must be just, 3) War must be fought with the right intention, 4) War must be fought with the right means, 5) There must be a real probability of winning, and 6) War must have been undertaken as last resort when all other means for fighting the injustice have been attempted and failed” (Palter, 1964, p. 214).

Justwar Theory and the mandated prerequisites for justifying armed conflict can be described and defined by the “long-standing Justwar tradition; Just Cause, Right Intent, Net benefit, Legitimate Authority, Last Resort, Proportionality of Means and Right Conduct” (Dorn, 2011, p. 242). Lethal conflict, often in the form of war, is

frequently avoidable, and because such conflict commonly fails to achieve stated objectives, the motivations of its architects are questionable. Hence, if the conflict is orchestrated for the benefit of certain parties rather than for the benefit of the leaders' constituents, these actions might be classified as corruption.

To further expand upon the nuances of corruption and war, some facets of nuclear war are discussed herein. An analogy to nuclear war is used as the basis for the following "extermination" discussion. Palter (1964) discusses Ramsey's and Anscombe's claim that nuclear war can be morally justified as a resulting "Double Effect", whereby, "one is not morally responsible for unintended effects of an action which otherwise is not morally blameworthy, even when the unintended effects are foreseen" (p. 211). Anscombe's argument is based on the premise that self-defense is permissible and that society cannot exist without some degree of coercive power. Interestingly, it is the certainty of death from nuclear weapons that differentiates nuclear weapons from other types of weapons, such as biological weapons and/or obliteration bombing, despite both techniques resulting in massive fatalities of women, children, and non-combatants. However, the non-combatant immunity principle is not morally absolute if nuclear weapons and other massively deadly, non-nuclear options are available. Palter (1964) asserts, "Of the two alternative courses; preparation for nuclear war and unilateral disarmament; each establishes the 'absurdity' of the other . . . and yet morality transcends the stalemate', and justifies unilateral disarmament as the only rationale action and the only hope for the world" (p. 212).

In Afghanistan, there were recently two primary international missions using armed forces. One was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while the

other was Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Each had different mandates, histories, and approaches to the use of force. Dorn (2011) finds that the ISAF mission is considerably more “justified” than OEF, though still “ethically deficient” (p. 242). Regardless of the approach, evaluation of justwar criteria is exceptionally judgmental, subjective and by its very nature prone to error in hindsight. We need look no further than the first prerequisite of “just cause,” since what might be defined as just by one culture or nation might be viewed very differently by another. Nonetheless, this is currently our state-of-the art argument within the current paradigm of Justwar Theory.

War and violence are commonly used as tools for achieving political, strategic, and/or economic objectives “because the goal of reducing violent conflict is nearly universally acceptable, [and] these varieties of noninterventionism are rarely scrutinized” (Trosky, 2015, p. ix). Social psychological peace research (SPPR) is an area of study focused upon how various psychological factors affect efforts for peace and/or the proclivity of war, foreign policy, economic and sovereign border issues notwithstanding (Trosky, 2015, p. ix-x). Despite SPPR’s and other research institutions’ focus upon war and corruption, the interrelationships between these two topics are, at best, only weakly understood.

Corruption and war are further related to Power Theory, and can be discussed through the relationship between an individual’s or nation’s status and the corresponding effect of a mismatch between economic, military, and political status upon a nation’s propensity to respond and/or initiate conflict. From an individual’s perspective, many past studies have showed how a person’s position in social hierarchy, as well as their position from an external perspective, affects attitudes, often leading to frustration and/or

aggressiveness. Galtung and other scholars focused past research on “Rank Disequilibrium” (Wallace, 1971, p. 23), and suggested that an effect similar to that experienced by individuals exists with nations. Wallace (1971) further states, “Nations that rank high on such achieved status as economic and military capability, yet are denied a correspondingly high rank on ascribed ones such as recognition and prestige, appear to resent their lot” (p. 23). Extensive quantitative analysis using multi-variable regression analyses were performed over the past 150 years, and arguably support a relationship between status and war. For example, the greatest propensity and strongest correlation between status mismatch and conflict occurs at the 15-year point (Wallace, 1971, p. 30). Wallace (1971) goes on to say that “If we consider the 144-year period as a whole, the evidence would appear to confirm that status inconsistency has an extremely important, albeit long-range impact on the genesis of international war” (1971, p. 30).

Status and/or the desire to enhance status can be applied within the context of corruption from the basis of an individual as well as a state, where the status enhancement and corresponding positive utility that occurs from a just war that is effectively unjust is, or can be, the desired outcome and the basis for corrupt behavior.

Individual Motivations for Corruption

Individual level motivations for corruption are primarily based upon fear of punishment, though more recent literature, as stated by Tavits (2010, p. 1259) and based upon Levi and Stoker (2000), “has extended the basic deterrence model by treating compliance as a collective action problem.”

Why do people engage in corruption? Individual attitudes on what constitutes corruption are shaped by “people’s understanding of what corruption is, their assessment

of its impact on society, and their trust in the government as an effective enforcer of corruption prevention” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 583). In the case of Estonia, Tavits (2010) finds that “both public officials and citizens are more likely to engage in corruption when they do not define corruption as wrong, as when they perceive that corrupt behavior is widespread among their peers” (p. 1257). Is lack of trust of government and/or peers a necessary and/or required condition for corruption? Tavits (2010) finds “no support for the most common argument on corruption and compliance; that people are more likely to engage in corruption when they are distrustful of their fellow citizens or of government” (p. 1257).

Causes for corrupt behavior as well as associated “facilitating factors” were derived by Huberts (1998a, p. 35) and are described by Table 3, below (as cited in De Graaf, 2007, p. 68). Each of these causes was found to have an association and/or correlation with some type of corrupt behavior. Although very interesting, the causes are noticeably lacking with any type of interactivity and hierarchy. Furthermore, the causes of corruption are potentially worthless unless, and until, a unified definition for corruption can be identified.

The accumulation of wealth and the sustainment of ego and pride, for whatever reason, pragmatically describes a potential motivating force behind corrupt activity. For example, in Sudan in the 1970’s, the formerly established “mercantile class of traders and farmers was overtaken by a middle class that was parasitic on the state and used government contracting as a route to enrichment” (De Waal, 2014, p. 350). There was no such mechanism, nor any middle class to speak of in Southern Sudan. The same situation remained leading up to, and subsequent to, South Sudan declaring sovereignty 2011.

Table 3

*Causes of Corruption****Types of Causes of Corruption and Fraud***

<p>Individual and work</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. individual: character and private circumstances 2. work: type, colleagues, contacts <p>Organization</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. leadership 2. organization structure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - size, complexity - control, auditing - separation of responsibilities 3. organization culture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - goals/mission - values and norms - operational code 4. personal (policy) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - training and selection - rewarding <p>Environment</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. juridical/law 2. political-administrative 3. societal (e.g. criminality)

Note. (De Graaf, 2007, p. 68)

De Waal (2014) further reflects upon statements by Sudanese economists El-Wathig Kameir and Ibrahim Kursany: “. . . the elite in the South wanted to enrich themselves as quickly as possible as to be on a level with their colleagues in the North (Sudan). This is why they have resorted to corruption as the quickest way of acquiring money” (p. 350). Hence, it is not surprising to find South Sudan classified among the very most corrupt countries in the world, ranked just one notch above Sudan; both

countries received grades of “F”. (Abbas, Anderson, Dixon, Hurd & Raymond, 2015, pp. 1-2). To be fair, these rankings were compiled by Transparency International, an organization that focuses upon quantitative metrics that, frankly, are highly subjective and in direct contrast to many of the postulates developed by this dissertation. This being said, having lived and worked in Sudan and South Sudan for many years, I must concur that by any measure, Sudan and South Sudan are typified by corrupt behavior.

Tavits (2010) believes that the general public in non-communist countries is of the general opinion that corruption is widespread. At the same time, the causes of corruption, especially on the individual level, are not well understood. Tavits (2010) further claims, “Corruption is ultimately the direct result of decisions, choices and behavior at the level of the individual, but the growing research has largely focused on system-level and institutional explanations of corruption,” and also states, “One of the most common explanations in social science research on compliance and corruption; political and social trust; is not significantly related to an individual’s decision to engage in corruption exchange” (p. 1257). Instead, “the decision to engage in corrupt behavior corresponds with positive or neutral definitions of corruption and modeling/imitating similar behavior by others” (Tavits, 2010, pp. 1257-1258). This interpretation of corruption, and the underlying propensity for an individual’s, as well as an entity’s decision to engage in such corrupt behavior represents a core thesis of this dissertation.

Corruption is often seen within people that are otherwise upstanding, law-abiding citizens. Such behavior is explained through rationalization. This is very relevant to post-conflict scenarios, since “people may be encouraged to act in a corrupt fashion, in favor

of time, politics or other issue, with such activities rationalized” (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005, p. 9).

There are situations where non-corrupt individuals and entities that might normally be considered as non-corruptible behave corruptly. For example, Fluri (2009) suggests that the chaos and confusion within a war environment, combined with the lack of concise bookkeeping provides a significant temptation for “corrupt behavior among those who manage, assist, or financially profit from international aid and development economies” (p. 986). Fluri (2009) further discusses why and how NGO personnel in Kabul, Afghanistan, a group that might otherwise be superficially classified as non-corruptible, behaved in a corrupt manner by subliminally rationalizing their actions and behavior.

Tavits (2010) explains corrupt behavior by introducing “a cost-benefit calculation into an individual’s behavior. Namely, the higher the potential benefits of corrupt behavior, [such as when a person has been extorted to pay a bribe], and the lower the risk of getting caught, the more likely people will engage in corruption regardless of their socially learned predispositions” (p. 1258).

On an individual basis, risk orientation might be considered to play a role within corruption and/or corrupt actions. This is because it stands to reason, by virtue of Utility Theory and Rationale Behavior Theory, that corrupt actions will only be undertaken when the risk of failure is low, and/or when the corresponding payoff is high. However, research actually disproves risk orientation playing a significant role. Dolbear and Lave (1966) found that a “subject’s basic attitudes towards risk do not affect his behavior in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation . . . or if they do have an effect, they [the effects] are not

very large” (p. 514). Though the null hypothesis could not be rejected, the authors admitted to “failing to show significant evidence justifying the ability to make conclusive statements about risk and how it might affect [or not affect] decisions in [a] Prisoner’s Dilemma game” (Dolbear & Lave, 1966, p. 514). This is not to say that risk orientation does not affect an individual’s or entities propensity for corruption. Rather, this research illustrates that such propensity, if it exists, is not very great.

Scholz (1998) claims that “because compliance is equivalent to a cooperative solution to the collective action problem, the factors that help to sustain cooperation also promote compliance.” Tavits (2010) further suggests that “One such factor is trust. Both sides to a social interaction cooperate as long as the other is perceived to be trustworthy” (p. 1259). However, in large groups, regions and/or cultures, it is hard to determine whether the other party is trustworthy. Tavits (2010) finds that “Empirical research on compliance . . . [demonstrates that] the more individuals trust government and their fellow citizens, the more likely they will comply with laws, rules and standards” (p. 1259). Scholz (1998) supports such claims that “generalized trust, including trust in political institution, increases tax compliance more significantly than fear of punishment.”

Seligson (2002) claims a correlation between corruption and trust in some Latin American countries, but further states that “corruption leads to mistrust” (p. 1260). This, in turn, infers that an asymmetric balance (of trust versus non-corruption) being required for non-corruption. Furthermore, if and when the balance is disturbed, the destructive cycle feeds upon itself, with negative reinforcing feedback promoting increased destruction.

Social Learning and Cultural Motivations for Corruption

Tavits (2010) discusses Social Learning Theory, and gives credit to Akers (1998) who initially developed this theory

to explain deviant behavior . . . [and by so doing] offers an alternative explanation of individual motivation to engage in corrupt behavior. The basic mechanism of the social learning theory works as follows: Behavior is acquired and sustained 1) Through adopting definitions (evaluations of the behavior as good or bad) via differential association with one's peers (friends, family, colleagues and civic organizations, 2) Through imitating such behavior by peers, and 3) Through the positive reinforcement provided by past rewards for such behavior (p. 1260).

It should be noted that "Social behavior is also acquired and sustained through imitation or modeling of others' behavior (Akers et al., 1979). If people perceive that a behavior is widespread and that it is approved, then they are more likely to engage in it" (Tavits, 2010, pp. 1260-1261). Tavits (2010) further states, "A person is expected to engage in corrupt behavior if he or she does not define corruption as morally or situationally wrong, but rather as a justified and acceptable mode for exchange; and if he or she has been exposed to corrupt behavior or at least perceives that such a behavior is widespread and, thus, approved" (p. 1261).

The judicial system is counted upon by the notional rule of law to promote justice and stability, which certainly infers that corruption should be concurrently minimized. However, "the decline in ethical standards among the judiciary and the legal profession became one of the most debilitating aspects of corruption in Uganda, and one of the most difficult to reverse" (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 182). Furthermore, "as corruption

erodes confidence in political leaders and institutions, the government becomes less able to rely on the cooperation and support of the public, and it increasingly resorts to force and coercion. The resulting social unrest often leads to civil strife and a violent change of government that can subvert, or even reverse, decades of . . . progress” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 183).

Montinola and Jackman (2002) rightly maintain that “Government corruption is more pervasive in lower income countries than in others primarily because of the lack of adequate pay among/for government workers” (p. 147). Political competition affects the level of corruption, but in a nonlinear fashion. Specifically, Montinola and Jackman (2002) claims that “corruption is typically lower in dictatorships than in countries that have partial democracies. Past a threshold, democratic practices inhibit corruption. Government size does not affect corruption, but membership of the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) does” (p. 147).

The determinants of corruption, be they absolutely or relative, have been elusive. So too has been an explanation of why corruption levels are so different around the world. El-Bahnasawy (2008) suggests that corruption is “positively correlated to a country’s size, but negatively correlated to the strength of rule-of-law, per capita wealth and by the number of women holding seats in Parliament” (p. 7). Western stereotypes for corruption often associate corrupt behavior with incentives and greed associated with oil, diamonds, coal, and other natural resources. However, El-Bahnasawy (2008) finds no correlation between corruption and the abundance, or lack thereof, of a country’s natural resources (pp. 6-8).

Corruption is an integral feature of, and embedded within, the culture of all African countries. Within the African continent, corruption has been pervasive: “despite sanctions, its apparent irreversibility, the absence of correlation with regime types and its legitimacy to its supporters. Corruption is culturally and socially part of negotiation processes, hierarchy, and wealth distribution [in Africa]” (De Sardan, 1999, p. 25).

In Uganda, “while combatting corruption loomed large among the government’s preoccupations, and the president considered it a matter of highest priority, the Mission Report noted that corruption also loomed large in the consciousness of the people, but in a different way. The general public seem unconvinced that the leadership was serious about dealing with the problem,” with specific areas of concern involving “procurement, privatization, vote buying and the judicial system” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 199). The Mission Report was a compilation of efforts from the Economic Development Institute and Transparency International, who visited Uganda in 1994 to assess the situation and report to the Inspector General of the Government (ICG) (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 198).

In Uganda, the Mission Report determined that corruption in Uganda was influenced by: “1) Low levels of civil service pay, 2) High cost of political campaigning, 3) Lax enforcement of auditing, 4) Lack of prohibiting conflict-of-interest activities, 5) Inability to monitor assets and liabilities of key decision makers, 6) Manipulation of some types of aid flows, 7) Under-resourced judicial system, and 8) Constantly changing criteria for privatization programs” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 198). Overall, the Mission Report noted the Uganda anti-corruption “campaign might falter or even fail without the involvement of the general public and a determined effort to convict people

found guilty of corruption” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, pp. 201-202). This led to the follow-up recommendation of “Engaging the public: The public should be involved in helping to identify and root out corruption and building a public ethos rejecting corruption and the corrupt” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 202).

Tavits (2010) asserts that “Corruption as an illegal act involves both potential benefits and risks. Benefits can be defined as getting something as a result of a corrupt deal that one would otherwise not get, while risk can be defined as the probability of getting caught and being punished. Uncertainty of benefits and risks may increase the importance of social learning variables” (p. 1273). By comparison, and of greater interest is that “when benefits are unlikely and risks are high, people should be less likely to engage in corruption regardless of their socially learned predispositions (Tavits, 2010, p. 1273). Moreover, the

flip side to [the] argument [by Tavits] is that when benefits are certain and risks are low, [when there is a structural incentive to behave in a corrupt manner], then perceived acceptability and pervasiveness of corruption may be less important in making the decision to engage in corruption. For example, in order to receive a good or a service a bribe is needed or in situations where an official asks an individual to pay a bribe . . . where in such situations one can be almost certain that the benefit will follow when the bribe is paid (or at least be certain that no benefit will follow if the bribe is not paid) (Tavits, 2010, p. 1273).

Tavits (2010) argues that “willingness to engage in corrupt behavior is more likely when one does not define corruption as morally or situationally wrong. Furthermore, a willingness to engage in corruption is enhanced by modeling others” (p.

1275). This is an undesirable adjunct to the suggestion for tolerating corruption and/or defining corruption within a cultural context since, if others condone such behavior, additional parties will find such corruption increasingly acceptable.

Tavits (2010) further states that “when engagement in [a] corrupt exchange is voluntary, or even unsuspecting, then the extent to which a person trusts other people or government has no effect on his or her willingness to engage in corrupt activity. This does not invalidate the findings that when extorted, people may lose trust in their government (Seligson 2002); or when being skeptical about one’s government and the trustworthiness of other people, one also tends to perceive others (including government) to be more corrupt” (p. 1275).

In Nicaragua in 2011, “corrupt practices related to [recent] banking bankruptcies engaged in an extensive instrumentalization of formal state institutions in order to protect elite parochial interests and to achieve ‘accumulation by dispossession’ through appealing to the legitimating support granted by multilateral financial institutions” (Rocha, et al., 2011, p. 159). Many and most perspectives and researchers of corruption approach this type of situation from a legal perspective. But,

such perspectives focus exclusively on the state as the location of corruption, whereas clearly, in Nicaragua as elsewhere, corruption is a far more complicated phenomenon which crosses the artificial boundaries between private and public sectors. It also evolves and takes a myriad of different forms, which are intimately connected with the ongoing struggles for control of accumulation processes, suggesting a much more integral role for corruption within accumulation

strategies than often allowed for in both orthodox economic and Marxist literatures on capital accumulation (Rocha, et al., 2011, p. 159).

The academic community is generally divided on the causes of corruption and respective resolution tactics. In general, there are two schools of thought. One focuses upon “institutional dimension and emphasize the impact of formal anti-corruption institutions, law, and policy. Academic theorists such as Klitgaard (1988), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Johnston (2005) and Gong & Ma (2009), among others support this approach” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 570). Another group of scholars has focused upon a belief that a culture of corruption or anti-corruption, itself “persists and greatly shapes individuals’ behavior. Theorists such as Barr and Serra (2006), Fishman and Miguel (2006) are two of many supporting this postulate” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 570).

Gong and Wang find that in some developing countries, “corruption is taken as the rule rather than as the exception (Smith, 2007), and social norms of corruption can cross institutional boundaries (Larmount, 2009)” (2013, p. 570). The general public typically assumes a strong relationship between black markets, corruption and the degree to which a country is developed. The stereotype of lesser-developed countries having extensive black markets (e.g. shadow economies) and associated corruption is typical. Yet, “shadow economies are illegal, artificial economies supported by various types of corruption behavior that have become so institutionalized that they become expected as the pseudo-norm” (Dreher & Schneider, 2010, p. 215).

The existence of corruption does not necessarily mean that the general public is either aware and/or cares. Mocan (2008) and Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) note that “A number of empirical studies point to the low correlation between perceived and

actual corruption” (as cited in Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 572). Di Tella and Fanceschelli provided evidence in Argentina where the government distorted their reporting in exchange for promised government advertising revenue (as cited in Jain, 2011, p. 4). This is one of but countless examples of the government, itself playing an official role in what might and should be defined as corrupt behavior.

The correlation between ethics and corruption is yet another area of contradiction and paradox. For example, in some instances, a high degree of observed corruption may correspond to a high ethical standard, rather than alleged (and noted ambiguous) corruption, illegal and/or unacceptable behavior. Gong and Wang (2012) find that “contextual situations can largely determine the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts by shaping people’s perceptions. Manion (2004) finds that ‘Widespread corruption makes actors downplay the role of formal anti-corruption institutions’” (p. 571). Heidenheimer (1970) and his black-gray-white Corruption Typology attest that social tolerance of corruption is “a necessary, if not sufficient condition to define corruption” (as cited in Gong & Wang, 2013, pp. 571-572). Although Heidenheimer’s perspective and definition for corruption is interesting and academically accepted to a notional degree, the statement also contradicts this dissertation’s hypothesis. This is because Heidenheimer is suggesting that corruption, from an absolute context, is enhanced through local and regional toleration, and that such toleration should be tempered if corruption is to ever be completely eradicated. Heidenheimer’s observation further confirms the need for clarifying the current confusion and contradictions surrounding corruption’s definition, syntax, and applications.

If corruption involves government or organizations in any way, then changing

these entities might appear to be an option for controlling and/or eliminated corruption. Choi (2009) posits that any “attempt(s) to cause behavioral changes by restructuring formal institutions cannot be successful unless it is accompanied by perceptual changes of individuals” (as cited in Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 572). Corruption is often “narrowly defined as the use of public authority for private gain” and therefore government centric, the data gathered and/or provided by the government is itself questionable, and so must always be considered as a mitigating factor since the issue of corruption is so potentially embarrassing and destructive within the realm of government, politics, and state institutions (Wedeman, 2004, p. 895). However, “perceptions and propensities should not be confused with factual levels of corruption. People’s attitudes may not reveal the actual degree of corruption to which a society succumbs; they indicate corruption risks. Whether or not the general public has a strong inclination to accept or reject corruption sheds light on a society’s susceptibility to it” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 573).

Terrorism and Corruption

Terrorism is, itself, a very complex topic. This dissertation will not endeavor to explain, research, or probe the topic other than to justify its inclusion as a potential form, driver, or association with/of corruption. By so doing, the benefits and disadvantages will then be subsequently explored, all within the context of corruption.

Terrorism could arguably be classified as form of corruption. Although acts of terror are non-financially motivated, they also clearly violate law and provide a demented form of positive utility to one party, at the expense of others, in a fashion otherwise not obtainable by normal methods. However, an argument can also be made where such terrorist acts are akin to what the westernized context would define as war or armed

conflict. Actions defined as terror by one culture can be, and often are, defined as war or a justwar by another culture. Defining terrorism as corruption or simply an action against civilians intended to promote fear in pursuit of philosophical or political goals is problematic. The definition of corruption is ambiguous. By comparison, terrorism research is fairly clear, but is simply misunderstood by the general public. By its very nature and often misunderstood definition, we have to question terrorism's syntax as well as its underlying philosophies.

Terrorists do not abide by the stereotype created by western and euro-centric media as semi-suicidal, pseudo-insurgents. To the contrary, and taken to an extreme, terrorism is, itself, a tool of sophisticated governments to further their respective agenda. Hence, this tangentially infers that sophisticated states, themselves, condone terrorism. Trosky (2015) supports this allegation, and claims,

States regularly use fear of terrorist threats to gain support for domestic political agendas and promote geostrategic interests. Consecutive U.S. presidents have cited the theory of the just war to defend these policies and particular violations of national sovereignty. Those doubtful of whether existing threats justify violations of privacy and territorial integrity also use fear; of corruption, mission creep, and unintended consequences; claiming that such interventions are a cure worse than the disease, yet one about which domestic audiences are easily misled (p. ix).

There is also the issue of defining limited and discriminate terrorism to indiscriminate terrorism. Walzer and Steinhoff argue that terrorism is, indeed justified or excused by means of invoking 'supreme emergency' circumstances, and claim "that the *Principle of Noncombatant Immunity* can be justifiably overridden under extreme

circumstances” (as cited in Kaplan, 2011, p. 224). However, Kaplan (2011) further argues against such justification, and states that there is never a situation where “any harms inflicted upon those who have done nothing to forfeit their rights to life, bodily integrity, liberty, or property” justify indiscriminate terrorism (p. 221). Nonetheless, an academically defensible emergency justification for indiscriminate terrorism seems to open the door to a broader, nonemergency rationale for conceivably excusing or justifying indiscriminate terrorism.

The *Principle of Noncombatant Immunity* originated from the Geneva Protocol of 1977, Articles 51 and 52, which prohibit the targeting of “civilian objects” which are in no way “military objectives” (as cited in Kaplan, 2011, p. 236). “Like their rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity, the ‘innocent’ have *generally* done nothing by which to forfeit the right to property such that their homes, schools, houses of worship, and so on, can be legitimately be directly targeted when they serve no military purpose” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 236). Of course, this particular definition, like so many others developed by the United Nations and other international accords, is highly subjective to interpretation, such meaning typically assigned by westernized and non-localized perspectives. However, “to deliberately target the ‘innocent’ with any sort of political violence, regardless of how one conceives of ‘innocence’ or liability to attack, is a clear prima facie wrong. Whatever harms inflicted upon those who have done nothing to forfeit their rights to life, bodily integrity, liberty, or property are taken ex hypotheses to be unjustified” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 219). Furthermore, “once one begins to analyze the arguments from extremity used to excuse or justify indiscriminate terrorism, one discovers a broader rationale for conceivably excusing or justifying such acts and which does not require an emergency

per-se” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 219). Steinhoff (2007) suggests that “indiscriminate terrorism can be justified for the weak by means of a rule-utilitarian rationale” (pp. 134-135).

Kaplan (2011) further states, “The right of non-combatant immunity should not necessarily be held above the value of survival, whether construed as individual or communal survival” (p. 220).

Walzer’s (2004) claims justify terrorism in instances of “supreme emergency,” defined as, “those rare moments when the negative value we assign; that we can’t help assigning; to the disaster that looms before us devalues morality itself and leaves us free to do whatever is militarily necessary to avoid the disaster, so long as what we do doesn’t produce an even worse disaster” (p. 40). Kaplan (2011) claims, “Supreme emergencies are not faced by individuals, but by a collective community; whether political, cultural, ethnic, or religious” (p. 222). Hence, Walzer (2004) would never allow terrorism and/or exceeding notional moral limitations on an individual’s self-defense, even in most dire circumstances. However, in the case of a community, entity or state, such moral justification for terrorism is acceptable. This supports an argument that the positive utility garnered by terrorists or states promoting terrorism in instances where a supreme emergency fails to exist satisfies an expanded, utility-based definition of corruption.

The opposing argument is predicated upon a state being neither a community, nor a collective culture. Instead, a state is “nothing more than an instrument of the community, a particular structure for organizing collective action” (Walzer, 2004, p. 40). Hence, using this particular definition, a state can never really die, or be threatened with genocidal extinction, nor can a state justify its actions using Walzer’s principle of Supreme emergency; and so, a state is never justified in the use of terrorism (Kaplan,

2011, p. 222). As we can see through this brief dialogue, classifying some actions as corrupt, justified, morally acceptable, illegal, and/or appropriate are, in some cases, self-contradictory. This type of confusion is commonplace within the realm of corruption as currently defined and utilized:

“It is not sufficient that one’s way of life is being threatened (as was often asserted by the post-9.11 Bush administration) to declare a supreme emergency. The destruction of an entire people who may propagate this way of life into the future must be imminent” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 223).

“The principal of non-combatant immunity only ought to be temporarily overridden by those facing supreme emergency and, while this excuses any blame post factum, it does not make it completely right to target the innocent; only less wrong than allowing genocide” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 224). “In effect, Walzer’s criterion of supreme emergency is only satisfied by genocidal violence as opposed to massacres of equal proportion where there is communal identity at risk” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 224).

Hence, the defense of terrorism as a justified act of corruption hinges directly upon the act of terror being required as a result of a supreme emergency.

Existing research on the relationship between terrorism and corruption, per se, is non-existent. However, both corruption and terrorism are highly driven, dependent upon and/or influenced by syntax, culture, and context. To this point, Campbell (2015) identifies the following three problems defining terrorism. First, objectivity is difficult because of the pre-judgmental nature of the term “terrorism.” Guantanamo Bay detainees are caught in this issue, since labeling dehumanized the individuals. If dehumanization occurs, then there is no surprise when we hear about torture and other types of abuse.

Second, terrorism is not tied to any organization or ideology. There is also neither a common religion nor ethnicity. Third, is the generally naive notion that “just because I understand terrorism does not mean that terrorism can be stopped” (Campbell, 2015).

There are four primary forms of terrorism, identified as: 1) Domestic terrorism (happens within the state), 2) International terrorism (more than one country or state’s citizens or territory is involved), 3) Bargaining dependent terrorism, where perpetrators use anything of value to extort those in power to meet their demands, and 4) Bargaining Independent terrorism, when bargaining is not sought (Campbell, 2015). Acts are performed to perpetrate fear, such as bombings, mass killings, mass poisoning, and activities that might otherwise and externally be classified as genocide (Campbell, 2015). Bargaining of some sort is easily tied to the definitions of corruption, and also, as stated above, tied to various forms of terrorism; since bargaining by definition involves the maximizing of some form of utility on behalf of the terrorists, then it stands to reason that terrorism might, in fact, be a form of corruption if the bargaining is occurring outside of the normally accepted rules, regulations and laws whereby individual positive utility is obtained as a result of such bargaining.

Campbell (2015) further states that understanding and having awareness of approaches to intervention are different for each form of terrorism. Hence, it makes sense that fully understanding the importance and relationship of corruption within the terrorists’ paradigm is not a sufficient, but is certainly a necessary, condition to resolve terrorist situations. Additional, yet controversial, food for thought is that “terrorism may be an illegal form of warfare, but characterizing it as an immoral one is meaningless” because of the issues of context and perspective (Merari, 2007, p. 30). We also should

also ask ourselves if genocide is sometimes, or always, a form of terrorism? Perhaps genocide is a sufficient condition for terrorism, but it is not a necessary condition.

Genocide is more thoroughly discussed in subsequent sections.

Campbell (2015) further suggests that attacks on terrorist groups by the encompassing state in form of structural violence help generate sympathy for terrorists by such inferences that, “We’re terrorists, but we’re really not bad people. We are victims of the State’s attacks (via structural violence on us).” This aids in recruitment, as being labeled as a terrorist becomes a badge of honor. Hence, what is abhorred and/or illegal in one society is morally acceptable and commendable within another. By this definition, terrorist activities are neither necessarily immoral nor unethical, though they are likely always illegal. Even this latter issue is non-absolute, since an individual or group could evoke terror by simply sharing proprietary information so sufficiently intimidating that fear and terror result. All of these nuances complicate succinctly labeling terrorism as corrupt or labeling corruption as a form of terrorism.

Wieviorka (1993) states that terrorism is an “antithesis of a social movement, and results when social actors are disconnected from the popular movement” (as cited in Crenshaw, 2012, p. 9). This is likely applicable within the context of a small number of terrorists representing a significant minority, and further restricted to non-state actors evoking fear through the death of innocent civilians. However, when the terrorists become a larger faction, such as thousands or tens of thousands, western society is reluctant to reclassify these actors as anything but terrorists. This continues with factions within Afghanistan, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia and elsewhere. This is not to say that the activities of these groups are ethical, right, wrong, or inappropriate. Rather,

the point here is to reinforce the ambiguity of *terrorism*, and the corresponding ambiguity of *corruption*.

Significant evidence exists that terrorists are neither insane, nor suicidal, nor crazy as inferred by the general public and media. Target choices as well as terrorists are rational (Crenshaw, 2012, p. 11), though repulsive to many, since “terrorism is the peacetime equivalent to war crimes” (Crenshaw, 2012, p. 5). Post (2007) claims that, “individual terrorists are psychologically normal...” (p. 15), and that “each of these terrorist groups was fighting for admission that, at the onset at least, expressed the goals of the people. The sociopolitical environment was accepting and supporting, with members winning praise for their service . . .” (Post, 2007, p. 12).

Terrorism may sometimes be classified as form of corruption. However, at other times it may, instead, be an expression of, or a result of, corruption. The key point is the importance of the critical roles played by the conversation’s audience and context. Hence, as a result of corruption being non-absolute, perhaps neither is terrorism. This argument further supports how important culture and context are when western society researches and imposes mandates upon another culture for non-corrupt behavior within a westernized paradigm. Campbell (2015) summarizes this by stating, “[Society is] wasting time on trying to stop terrorism. The underlying concept is much more important.” This same philosophy may be directly applied to corruption, too.

Genocide and Corruption

Genocide was defined earlier in this dissertation. A key aspect to properly classifying activities and incidents is that genocide must involve intent. Campbell (2013) discussed the four motivations for genocidal intent as: “1) Destruction of social

interconnectedness, 2) Identity reformation, 3) Resource reallocation, and 4) Consolidation of power throughout the community of genocidal perpetrators” (p. 102). Five foundational and purportedly morally justified claims for genocidal intent are listed below. These false, illogical and/or nonsensical claims of intent made by genocidal orchestrators include: “1) Extermination of targeted group is justified to strengthen the nation, 2) Extermination of targeted group is justified by biological supremacy of protected population, 3) Extermination of targeted group is justified because they threaten existence of protected population, 4) Extermination of targeted group is justified because of sociobiological incompatibility, or 5) Extermination of targeted group is justified because of their inherent parasitism” (Campbell, 2013, p. 144).

Genocide was/is often committed by former victims, such as former refugees, survivors, and internally displaced persons (Campbell, 2013, p. 106). Sometimes those targeted will attempt to shed their identity as an alleged and/or superficial victim by becoming a perpetrator (Campbell, 2013, p. 107). As a result, it certainly seems likely that justification and intention for genocidal activities might be subjective and/or biased as a result of past atrocities. Researchers need to keep in mind that, as outsiders, we cannot easily judge or truly understand another party’s feelings or motivations. We can undoubtedly judge other’s actions from our own context, but by definition, we are not able to judge actions from the point of view of another’s culture and context. This certainly does not alleviate guilt or responsibility from genocidal perpetrators. However, this idea, as well as additional research conducted as part of this dissertation, might start to explain the challenges researchers face with complex, multi-dimensional topics such as corruption, terrorism, and genocide.

Resource aggregation and power aggregation, on their own accord, do not completely explain the rationale behind genocide. This is because if the targeted population's lives are spared, and despite their property and power being taken, they continue to pose a threat because their existence "affords them the opportunity of attempting to reclaim what was original theirs" (Campbell, 2013, p. 110). Resource reallocation is not a suitable alternative to the death of the targeted group members for the same reason just discussed. Also, such sparing of death would not be called genocide, since the intent to destroy the human group would be absent. Hence, if the intent exists, and if genocide is therefore, intended, then the purposeful death and/or relocation of the targeted group are required (Campbell, 2013, p. 113).

Genocide is enormously contextual. Ethical reasons are the most important reasons for studying genocide, and scholars must "stand unequivocally on one side of the historical process. Yet, one group of people may be perceived as victims in one context, and perpetrators within another" (Shaw, 2007, p. 5). This makes research difficult, complex, and controversial. Thus, context with genocide is critically important, just as with terrorism, war; and corruption.

An individual's positive utility can clearly be defined as their sense of morality and ethnic purity. Right or wrong, this desire for enhanced positive utility can be achieved through modified actions, and these actions can take the form of genocide through the actions of an individual or through the actions of a state. The latter occurs as Intentional Embeddedness, defined as the "willful and specifically constructed attempt to introduce, hence embed, interpretative distinctions within a population" (Campbell, 2013, p. 130). Both individual as well as structural genocidal justification are shown via

Heinrich Himmler's infamous, sincere speech, though with a warped morality: "We had the moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy these people, who wanted to destroy us. But, we have not the right to enrich ourselves with so much as a fur, a watch, a mark, or anything else. We have exterminated bacterium because we don't want in the end to be infected" (as cited in Campbell, 2013, p. 134).

Positive Aspects of Corruption

The positive aspects of corruption are not prolifically addressed within the literature. However, there are a few succinct instances where such positive benefits have been posited: "Some researchers (and many practitioners) have argued that corruption may be a good thing because it can smooth rigid bureaucratic systems and help get things done. There is some truth to this, as excessive red tape . . . can make businesses [otherwise] unprofitable. Corruption . . . [can] enable private entrepreneurship and promote businesses (Amundsen, 1999, p. 19). Multiple examples are provided below.

"Several studies have found oil wealth to be a significant predictor of the onset of civil war," whereby "the mechanisms suggested to tie oil wealth to civil war work largely via policy failure in the allocation of revenue." (Fjelde, 2009, pp. 199-201). For example, in Nigeria, oil exploration has resulted in massive hardship, "while the elite benefit through rent seeking and corruption" (Ebiede, 2011, p. 143). This relationship between extraction resources and conflict is "not conclusive. "In fact, Watts (2008) cautioned that the resources determinism argument risks ascribing too much superficial importance to natural resources . . . [because the] attribution of the conflicts to oil resources alone leaves out critical issues of governance" (Ebiede, 2011, p. 145). Politicians often "engage

in primitive accumulation of wealth and use state funds to finance party politics and maintain their patrimonial ties to national ... leaders” (Ebiede, 2011, p. 145).

Nevertheless, political-corruption is not always associated with a higher risk of civil war. An exception might exist within oil-rich states, where political corruption can be used to mitigate violence by offering perks and special privileges. Governments of oil-rich states can use political corruption to buy support from key segments of society: “Countries such as Gabon, Libya and Saudi Arabia illustrate how oil-based rent-seeking can strengthen regimes by extending the clientelist networks, and thus placating restive groups” (Fjelde, 2009, p. 200).

The size and enormity of government budgets with respect to insurgents and other sources of violence effectively results in corruption instituted and supported by the government, thus overshadowing and overwhelming factors that would otherwise lead to civil war. Hence, though counterintuitive, increases in oil production and political corruption decrease the risk of conflict overall. Political corruption prolongs poverty as well as confirming alliances with a stake in the continuation of the corrupt regimes. These regimes, though corrupt as defined by western standards, might themselves “result in greater stability and decreased violence, albeit at the expense of wealth sharing and economic growth” (Fjelde, 2009, p. 199).

For example, in Cameroon, the “cross-cutting network of clientelism” has pacified a very complex political environment, but it is unsurprisingly accompanied by waste, mismanagement, and economic detriment (Fjeld, 2009, p. 203). Here, “the providers of patronage crowd out proponents of more accountable public policies.... [and so] political corruption might thus be considered a default option for inducing stability in

the weakly institutionalized” regions adjacent to oil rich countries (Fjelde, 2009, p. 204). Fjelde (2009) suggests, with significant quantitative analysis as well as qualitative substantiation, that “a strategic use of public resources for off-budget and selective accommodation of private interests might reduce the risk of violent challenges to state authority in oil-rich states” (p. 214).

There is rigorous, quantitative evidence confirming a negative relationship between resource rents and violence in less democratic countries (Arezki & Gylfason, 2013). The World Bank argues that one of the primary challenges of African economies “is the wide scope given to ‘rent seeking’ activities; namely, the search for financial gain or profit from non-production economic activities that are especially prevalent among these who depend on state privilege for access to credit, grants, licenses, contracts, and, often, monopoly markets” (as cited in Harsch, 1993, pp. 40-41). Restated for clarity, resource rents refer to the excess costs above and beyond production costs and normal margin associated with the extraction of natural resources. Directly contrasting world opinion, an evaluation of conflict from 1985-2007 in 29 African countries showed that “higher resource rents lead to more corruption . . . and to fewer internal conflicts. [These findings are likely] explained by the ability of the political elites in less democratic countries to more effectively quell the masses through redistribution or rents to the public” (Arezki & Gylfason, 2013, p. 552).

State building, while modifying the status quo through pragmatically supporting special circumstances and situations that might have otherwise been labeled as corrupt, is possible from an official anti-corruption viewpoint. One example illustrating such inconsistencies and contradictions between state building and anti-corruption is the

Performance-Based Governors' Fund (PBGF) in Afghanistan, where “some donors [countries] attempted to reduce corruption in local government by encouraging warlord governors to act and lead with integrity” (Marquette, 2011, p. 1871). Being realistic and direct in the short term was suggested, while concurrently having long-term indirect strategies that build integrity, rather than fighting corruption, per se. The emphasis with the PBGF was to promote the support of a new approach, rather than trying to promote the existing zero-tolerance corruption protocol. This behavior flies in the face of past behavior. The PBGF overlooked past behavior in favor of the future, rather than continually trying to prosecute and condemn those who have acted contrary to what the United States and its allies consider corrupt.

The impact of corruption upon growth, investment and the quality of government is superficially and anecdotally considered to always be detrimental or negative. However, extensive quantitative analyses using a data sample of 71 countries within the time period of 1970 to 1998 has shown otherwise. As would be expected, a negative effect is seen between corruption on both growth and investment. However, unlike previous studies, “corruption has a negative impact on growth independent from its impact on investment” (Méon & Sekkat, 2005, p. 69). These effects worsened when the quality of government worsened. This study supports anti-corruption behavior within its current status quo and paradigm. What is most relevant to this dissertation, and potentially alarming to those supporting the status quo vis-a-vis corruption, is that the effects of investment and economic growth, with respect to corruption, are independent. This defies past logic and opens the door for objectively examining the entire situation.

Hence, if a critical portion of past theory is proven wrong, then perhaps the entire theory, context and supporting foundation should be reconsidered.

Many countries have dictatorial democracies, dictatorships, or democracies where leadership appears to be benevolent, kind and caring to various causes. Instances of corrupt behavior are often associated with such benevolence, and “some dictators appear to have a benevolent side to them . . . by sharing the wealth” (Jain, 2011, p. 4). Although superficially attractive, it is more likely that such behavior is “merely a reflection of the high cost of purchasing the loyalty of the public and of those who help maintain the corrupt structure” (Jain, 2011, p. 4).

After a coup, “One of the most common, first, and generally correct charges to be alleged against the previous regime is one of corruption” (Nye, 1967, p. 417). The promotion of the status quo from western and Eurocentric society teaches us that corruption is evil, and that such behavior is destructive to growth, establishing/promoting democracy and enticing external investment. However, “Other scholars have adopted an opposite opinion and provide evidence about how, under some circumstances, corruption is good. Examples include the United States and Russian economic development, as well as the integration of millions of immigrants into the American economy in the 19th century” (Nye, 1967, p. 417). Within the first of these examples, the greater good benefited by corrupt government officials promoting economic development during nuclear disarmament in the face of likely alternative effects of nuclear material and/or weapons being sold to terrorists. In the latter example, “corrupt behavior from immigration officials in the 19th century allowed the United States to greatly benefit from the sharp minds and strong bodies arriving from Russia” (Nye, 1967, p. 417). As a result

of these and a multitude of similarly contrarian examples, it seems dangerously foolish to universally declare, without caveat or precondition, that corruption, as currently defined, is always destructive, undesired, and/or deleterious to violent fatalities and physical feelings of safety.

Corruption within four Latin American countries recently studied was shown to be beneficial for “political development, enabling citizens to overcome inefficient bureaucracies while increasing loyalty to the political system (Seligson, 2002, p. 408). Amundson (1999) adds, “In economic terms, corruption is not always bad. This is seen for instance in the level of economic growth and the level of direct foreign investment, in highly corrupt nations” (p. 19). However, this effect may be degrading over time, because while short term benefits with respect to inefficient bureaucracies may be occurring, “corruption erodes belief in the political system and reduces interpersonal trust” (Seligson, 2002, p. 408). The countering arguments of “loyalty to political system” and “eroding belief in the political system” are complex and are unanswered (Seligson, 2002, p. 408). The matter of time in this issue was also left ambiguous, since a timeline of two years is likely much different than two generations.

According to Graveline (2016), “Although corruption has clear moral and financial costs, scholars find that it can actually strengthen state cohesion by lessening the risk of coups and civil war in the short term through patronage based cabinet appointments.” Nepotism and asymmetric favoritism towards family members have long been associated with most definitions of corruption. Although typically shunned as inappropriate, many countries, such as the United States, have recently and overtly thwarted this restraint, appointing and/or hiring family members in earnest. It is unclear if

this behavior has any affect whatsoever upon violence in developed countries. However, in developing and/or conflict-ridden countries, such as those in Africa, Arriola (2009) notes that “cabinet expansion [through patronage] lowers the probability of a leader’s being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister . . . lowers a leader’s coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage increase in economic growth” (pp. 1339, 1357). This enhancement is accomplished by leaders using “state resources to facilitate intra-elite accommodation” (Arriola, 2009, p. 1340).

In other words, these leaders are effectively paying off their political competitors, whereby “Patrons offer resources to their clients in enhance for their loyalty, and clients support their patrons to access rewards that cannot be readily attained in a weak formal economy” (Arriola, 2009, p. 1344). There are enormously complex conditions associated with this particular observation. First, it is only applicable in countries where economies are weak, resources are plentiful, hardship is extreme, democracy is weak, and the threat of lethal conflict is both realistic and recent. Cabinet size within the 40 African countries studied also appears to have been a function of “GDP, regime type, ethnic fractionalization and total population” (Arriola, 2009, p. 1358). Although these conditions may appear unrealistic for the majority of the world, such a conclusion would be untrue. This is certainly true for nearly all of Africa. Figure 4 describes this relationship from 1970-2000 with data collected from 40 African countries, and infers that there is a point of diminishing returns where the appointment of an additional minister increases, rather than reduces, the likelihood of a coup (Arriola, 2009, p. 1357). So, we can conditionally conclude that from 1970 onward, “African leaders use the

cabinet as an instrument for managing their political environment”, and as a result, lower incidences of lethal violence (Arriola, 2009, p. 1349).




Figure 4. Ministerial Appointments and Probability of Coup. Note. (Arriola, 2009, p. 1348)

Levels of corruption are directly affected by the structure of government institutions and of the political processes. Weak governments with uncontrolled agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy cause distortion. This in turn costs the government more than would have resulted from taxation, the legal alternative to corruption. Hence, in some less developed countries, corruption is very high as well as costly to development . . . [and] corruption-based scandals can sometimes lead or affirm the general principles about how the country should be run (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993, p. 599).

One draconian, yet positive, aspect of corruption is that corruption becomes a tool used by anti-corruption forces, empowering achievement beyond what would have otherwise been possible (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993, p. 599).

Gaps in Literature and Research

The entire field of corruption is ambiguous as a result of lacking a universally accepted definition of corruption. Some organizations, such as the United Nations, World Bank and other entities of similar impressive stature, have made such universal claims, but these respective definitions have yet to corroborate or replicate each other. Copious data and research are available on corruption, war, terrorism and genocide. An equally large volume of work is available on deadly violence and feelings of security. However, thus far, succinct research exploring the potential beneficial effects of corruption upon lethality, violence, war, violent insurgency, genocide and/or terrorism is rare. In fact, because corruption's current definition is so often tied and restricted to financial remuneration, the vast majority of research also fails to fully address the negative effects of corruption upon the various topics associated with violent lethality. This substantial and critical gap in research is directly caused by a corresponding inadequate and universally nonacceptable definition for corruption.

Interestingly, the vast majority of research, context and syntax concerning corruption is currently based upon various corruption indexes. These corruption indices are prepared using quantitative metrics to describe qualitative behavior and context that often disregard cultural specificity. This renders the entirety of the data ambiguous and potentially useless. These corruption metrics currently drive entire works of research and policy, and although likely correct in some instances, the reader must somehow discern

that these specific instances avoid drawing incorrect conclusions from seemingly neat, concise and orderly data.

Gong and Wang (2012) claim that “scholars and researchers typically prefer to use first-hand data for corruption research, and depend upon surveys and interviews whenever possible” (p. 572). The basis for such behavior by scholars and researchers is that the “under-laying assumption is that perceptions represent . . . a good proxy for experiences” (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010, p. 1057). Corruption research tools such as the Corruption Perception Index, Global Corruption Barometer and Bribe Payers Index, all products of Transparency International, are relevant indications of corruption perception within corruption’s current ambiguous definition (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 572). Additional corruption research tools include the “Business International (BI) Index, the International Country Risk Guide (IRCG) index, the Global Competitiveness Report Index . . . [and] all of these indexes are . . . based on the personal judgements, perceptions and opinion of a number of observers, and not on statistical ‘hard data’” (Amundsen, 1999, p. 27).

These references above notwithstanding, and with greatest respect, this dissertation politely suggests that current academic opinion may not be entirely correct if, as is being suggested, the current definition of corruption is unclear and subject to significant interpretation as a result of culture and context. Despite the seemingly robust nature of these metrics, the basis of this dissertation and hypothesis unfortunately renders the vast majority of existing data potentially worthless, since the issues of culture and context have been inadvertently, yet purposefully, avoided in favor of a doctrine based upon absolute, firm, quantitative and financially-centric definition of corruption. This

dissertation asserts that such an attitude is problematic, and as a result is fatally flawed. Significant research is needed to explain, bridge and close these gaps within the plethora of existing corruption research.

Past research has utilized a number of focused research methods, ranging from quantitative to case study to phenomenological. These types of activities should continue, but closer coordination between researchers is needed, since “methodological triangulation (the use of several social science methods) is necessary to disclose the patterns and extent of corruption” (Amundsen, 1999, p. 27). The literature review also clearly reveals the potential for contextual relevancy of corruption within the arenas of war, terrorism and genocide. This being said, research on this specific topic and relationship is negligible.

Although inferences and glimmers of relevancy between corruption and positive benefits have been uncovered, past research does not provide significant, firm evidence of a positive correlation between lethality and/or insecurity with corruption, though it does point to several areas where such benefits might exist. In general, very limited research has been performed on culturally tolerable and/or potentially beneficial aspects of corruption. This makes it challenging to draw conclusions

It is also critical to note that there are no instances, whatsoever, of past research confirming the null attestation; that any degree of tolerance to corruption will not mitigate violence, at all. This lack of negative confirmation is, itself, cause for intellectual optimism, and helps justify the need for additional research.

Summary

Chapter Two has focused on the study of literature and past research associated with the definitions, drivers, and associated aspects of corruption. Chapter Three will discuss the methodological options available for performing this dissertation's research, the basis for selecting Existential-based Phenomenological Analysis as the preferred approach, and the tactics and processes associated with the execution of an existential-based phenomenological methodology.

Chapter Three: Methodology

Restatement of the Research Problem

Protracted lethal conflict and unrest have continued in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, Sudan, Uganda, and other countries around the world for decades. Perhaps not without coincidence, each of these countries has extraordinarily high levels of corruption. The United States' and western countries' foreign policies insist upon zero corruption within post-conflict society, yet the collective success of these efforts has been poor, thus this dissertation challenges the necessity for a zero-corruption mandate. Compounding this issue, the foundational definition of corruption and its key drivers are ambiguous and often self-contradictory, and so robustly defining corruption as well as understanding the drivers and relationship (if any) between corruption and continued lethality and/or associated feelings of insecurity during and after conflict is highly desired.

Restatement of the Research Questions

Research question one. How should corruption be properly, accurately, and pragmatically defined?

Research question two. Is zero corruption required for maximizing feelings of safety during and/or post-conflict while concurrently minimizing associated lethal violence?

Research question three. Is there an optimum, positive level of tolerable corruption associated with maximizing feelings of safety from violent death and/or minimizing lethal violence?

Methodology Options

Researching the potential benefits, if any, of corruption included the associated controversial facets of war, terrorism, and genocide. This was difficult because of the variability in defining basic terms and syntax as corruption, terrorism, genocide, and an ethically uniform sense of ethics. The situation was further compounded as a result of this research challenging the current paradigm defining corruption. Consequently, the research was required to identify and/or account for the potential for contextual bias within past data collection and research. Despite past research being carefully performed and presented, if the research used an incorrect and/or imprecise definition of corruption, then any and all data collected is automatically suspect as contaminated, skewed or categorically worthless on an absolute basis. As a result, each and every reference was carefully evaluated and vetted for applicability.

Research within the social sciences is divided into two general categories: Quantitative Analysis and Qualitative Analysis. “Quantitative research produces more precise (numerical) measures, but not necessarily more accurate ones,” while “Qualitative research tries to achieve accurate [conclusions]” but typically lack precision (Keohane, King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p. 151). One of the biggest problems with using quantitative research for this particular dissertation was the issue of endogeneity, whereby the results affect the chosen variables and the chosen variables themselves affect the results. “The values of the explanatory [independent] variables are a consequence, rather than a cause of our dependent variable” (Keohane et al., 1994, p. 185). “Endogeneity is not always a problem to be fixed, but is, instead, an integral part by which the world produces our observations” (Keohane et al., 1994, p. 199). The two

traditions of qualitative and quantitative research appear quite different. In fact, they “sometimes seem to be at war” (Keohane, King and Verba, 1994, p. 3). Given the non-concise nature of the major arguments, and since it is not even clear how to define corruption, some type of qualitative methodology was deemed necessary.

A qualitative approach to corruption research was chosen and was very appropriate because “first and foremost, as a participant-observer in a culture, one is obliged to make known one’s intentions, to protect anonymity of individuals and perhaps communities, to protect one’s informants from the possibility of any intrusion as a result of information gather, and to take measure to avoid distortion of the community studied” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 247). In support of an anthropological or ethnographic approach, Fiske-Rusciano (2014) notes, “The challenges and opportunities that globalization offers us mandates that we share more of these lived experiences, and integrate them into our worldwide marketplace of knowledge” (p. 251). Furthermore, “The significance of anthropological investigation into matters of corruption is not the claim to higher truth than the work of other specialists, but rather, to get closer to the events one is dealing with. This methodology allows a ‘reciprocal acquaintance between the observer and the observed: a form of mutual trust progressively develops, which makes possible an access to the everyday (Fassin, 2013)’” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 252).

Corruption has had an enormous amount of past research performed and data collected using a variety of numerical metrics. This situation would otherwise support the use of quantitative techniques. However, nearly all of this past data is highly suspect and potentially erroneous, not because of human error, but instead because the data,

questions, reflections, and conclusions may have been communicated and/or analyzed out-of-context. Hence, some type of qualitative methodology was preferred over quantitative options because qualitative theoretical sampling, as opposed to statistical sampling, “lets the research guide the data collection,” and because the “basis for [qualitative] sampling is concepts, and not people” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 157).

There are five major qualitative methodologies. These methodologies are: “Narrative Research, Phenomenology, Grounded Theory, Ethnography and Case Study” (Creswell, 2013, pp. 104-106). Narrative Research involves the recounting and telling of stories of individual experiences. It typically involves the experiences of a single individual and his/her past experiences within “lived and told stories” (Creswell, 2014, p. 70).

Phenomenology seeks to identify and describe the essence of a lived phenomenon. Polkinghorne (1989) suggests that phenomenological studies use “5-25 individuals who have all experienced the phenomenon” (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 81). Phenomenological methods will be described in detail later in this chapter. Although typified by several approaches, each are notionally referred to as a form Phenomenological Analysis.

Grounded Theory develops a foundational, and potentially new, explanation in the views of the 20 to 60 interviews conducted (Creswell, 2013, pp. 83-90). The intent of Grounded Theory is to “move beyond description and to generate or discover a ‘unified theoretical explanation’” (Creswell, 2013, p. 83; Corbin & Straus, 2008, p. 107).

Ethnography describes and interprets the “shared patterns” of culture from a group or community, which is generally comprised of more than the “20 or so” required

by Grounded Theory analysis (Creswell, 2013, p. 90). Ethnography is typified by extended, long term “participant observation” where the “researcher is immersed” into the subject culture (Creswell, 2013, p. 90). Ethnography is based upon the premise that “Human behavior and human interaction could best be studied in their proper and original natural environment” (Atkinson, Coffey, Delamont, Lofland & Lofland, 2001, p. 81). Ethnography is akin to the study of communities, as “For many people doing social research meant doing the study of a community” (Atkinson et al., 2001, p. 80). Hence, Ethnography takes place where human interaction occurs in full view, so that the researcher can see, experience and record such activity. Park (1925) states, “The city is not an artificial construction. It is involved in the vital processes of the people who compose it; it is a product of nature, and particularly of human nature” (as cited in Atkinson et al., 2001, p. 80). Past ethnographic efforts were too broad, attempting to cover too many areas of the targeted community. Today, such studies are more focused upon a particular area of the community (Atkinson et al. 2001, p. 88). For example, “Ethnographic approaches allow the researcher to occupy a place between the perspective of the observer and the observed” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 261).

Case Study provides an in-depth understanding of a single case, multiple cases or a case-within-a-case. A single case could be described as a single individual (Creswell, 2013, p. 97). This approach generally involves significant research and literature study rather than interviewing subjects. Case Study closely examines “real-life . . . bounded system[s]” using multiple sources of information, such as “observations, interviews, audiovisual, documents and reports” (Creswell, 2013, p. 97). The output of Case Study is a “Case Description and Case Themes” (Creswell, 2013, p. 97). Stake (1995) discusses

two types of case studies: “Intrinsic,” or unique; and “instrumental,” or applicable to a large problem or issue (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 98). Stake (1995) further claims that Case Studies result in the researcher making “conclusion or assertions” while Yin (2009) claims that they ‘identify patterns or explanations’” (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 99).

Phenomenological Methodologies

Qualitative methodologies can also be described through its four key phenomenological methodologies. These include Hermeneutical, Transcendental, Empirical, or Psychological, Grounded Theory, and Ethnography (Creswell, 2013, p. 79); some of these overlap with the preceding discussion. Phenomenological research describes the “common meaning for several individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or phenomenon,” and attempts to “reduce individual experiences with a phenomenon to a description of the universal essence” (Creswell, 2013, p. 76). Van Manen (1990) describes this as a “grasp of the very nature of the thing” (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 76). Phenomenology is a “philosophical approach to the study of experience” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 11). Husserl claimed that phenomenology “involves the careful examination of human experience” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 12). Husserl further developed a “Phenomenological Method” where he suggests that we, the researcher, “consider the consequences of our taken-for-granted ways of living in the familiar, everyday world of objects. We need to ‘bracket’, or put to one side, the taken-for-granted world in order to concentrate on our perception of that world” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 13).

The first two phenomenological methodologies are collectively referred to as Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). IPA is concerned with “the detailed examination of human lived experience” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 32) and is further defined

as “How people make sense of their major life experiences,” and the “exploring experience in its own terms” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 1). IPA identifies, studies, analyzes, and further interprets “what happens when the everyday flow of lived experience takes on a particular significance for people” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 1). IPA attempts to understand others’ relationships to the world, is “necessarily interpretative” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 21), and is typified by a fairly small sample size of subjects and by using semi-structured interviews. “IPA has a double hermeneutic”, according to Smith & Osborn (2003), whereby the researcher interprets what other people interpret, in a fashion: “the participant’s meaning-making is first-order, while the researcher’s sense-making is second-order” (Smith et al., 2009, pp. 35-36). IPA “focuses upon people’s experiences and/or understandings” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 46). This also includes the perceptions and views of participants, as well as researchers, assistants, and advisers. Hence, the combination of phenomenological and interpretive experiences occurs most readily when the data is gathered and analyzed in the context of existing experience and ancillary data from all sources, including, and particularly as a result of, the past experiences and reflections by/from the researcher.

Heuristics-based, Transcendental Phenomenology was developed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and is the original form of phenomenological research (Kafle, 2011, p. 185). It is sometimes referred to as Empirical or Psychological Phenomenological Methodology. It seeks “to determine what an experience means for the persons who had the experience and are able to provide a comprehensive description of it” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 13). Based upon work of Husserl, it is “focused less on the interpretations of the researcher, and more on a description of the experiences of

participants [being interviewed]” (Creswell, 2013, p. 80). Transcendental, Empirical and Psychological are the heuristic variations of phenomenological methodologies, and thus differ from hermeneutic thinking. In heuristics, the research focus is “exclusively and continually aimed at understanding human experience. Only the researcher’s experiences with the phenomenon are considered, [and] not how history, art, politics or other human enterprise account for and explain the meanings of the experience” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 16). Here, the “researcher’s experiences” refers to the interaction between the researcher and the participant with respect to the phenomenon being researched. Past, pre-conceived notions are discarded. According to Husserl, “the basic interest of this school of phenomenology is to discover and scribe ‘lived world’” (as cited in Kafle, 2011, p. 186).

Transcendental means “in which everything is perceived freshly, as if for the first time” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 34). Hence, heuristic researchers must avoid bringing their own past experiences and perceptions to bear, and instead “bracket out these views before proceeding with the experiences of others” (Creswell, 2013, p. 80) and “suspend personal opinion” (Kafle, 2011, p. 186). Of course, this is nearly impossible, but is required to ensure that bias is avoided.

Transcendental methodologies are oriented towards “lived experiences” (Creswell, 2013, p. 79) where “The research participants remain close to depictions of their experience telling their individual stories with increasing understand[ing] in sight” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 19). Van Manen (1990) describes this as when the “researcher mediates between different meanings of the meanings of the lived experiences” (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 80). In direct contrast to Hermeneutical Phenomenology, the heuristic-based Transcendental Phenomenological approach “focuses less on the

interpretations of the researcher and more on a description of the [lived] experiences of participants” (Creswell, 2013, p. 80). The life experiences of the heuristic researcher and the project’s participants, in conjunction with “his or her study of all of the depictions, portraits and personal knowledge of the experience, [means] the primary researcher develops a creative synthesis” to the problem being studied and avoids over-interpretation since: “The depiction is complete in itself. Interpretation not only adds nothing, but [detracts from the overall meaning] and essences of experience” by the researcher and the participants (Moustakas, 1994, p. 19).

A Transcendental methodological approach provides results in a textual description that is very rich and delves deeply into all aspects of the subject’s experience to include feelings, sounds, color, shapes, etc. (Moustakas, 1994, p. 34). Transcendental Phenomenological analysis requires the researcher to utilize “Imaginative Variation” to “grasp the structural essences of experience” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 35), while at the same time suspending personal opinions and subjectivity. The structural essence is then re-integrated back into the Reduction Phase and subsequently incorporated into the textual description, resulting in a “textual-structural synthesis of meanings and essences of the phenomenon or experiences being investigated” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 36). This approach is a “path to knowledge in the absolute sense, which means that it is also necessarily a path to self-knowledge, too,” as it “tries to eliminate everything that is a prejudgment and presupposition” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 40). It is typified by a “freshness, openness and a readiness to see in an unfettered way, not threatened by the customs, beliefs and prejudices of normal science, by the habits of the natural world, or by knowledge based on *unreflected* everyday experience” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 41). Transcendental

approaches assume that “if there is more than one reality that leaves doubt and lack of clarity”, then the claimed understanding of the phenomenon is questionable (Kafle, 2011, p. 186). This requires that the researcher “suspend personal prejudices . . . [while] attempting to reach to the core or essence through a state of pure consciousness” (Kafle, 2011, p. 186). In other words, personal opinion must be suspect, and this particular requirement is considered the primary motivation for Hermeneutical Phenomenology.

The Hermeneutic variation is defined as “the art of reading a text so that the intention and meaning behind appearances are fully understood” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 8). Hermeneutics is further and loosely defined as the “theory of interpretation” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 21). Van Manen (1990) describes hermeneutics as the “text” of life (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 79). This approach involves the “dynamic interplay among six research activities, which primarily focus upon the researcher writing a detailed text and description on the topic of interest and then analyzing this self-authored product in concert with his or her lived experiences, as refined and accentuated by the experiences conveyed from the analysis of interviews. The Hermeneutic Cycle is shown by Figure 5.

The interpretations of the researcher are emphasized, rather than experiences of the individuals being interviewed (Creswell, 2013, p. 80). These interpretations do not arrive immediately, but are iteratively obtained by reading, writing, interpreting, and then rewriting (Kafle, 2011, p. 195). The Hermeneutic variation for phenomenological




Figure 5. Hermeneutic Cycle. Note. (Kafle, 2011, p. 195)

research was developed because some members of the academic community rejected the Transcendental requirement of “suspending personal opinions” (Kafle, 2011, p. 186). Here, instead, a focus is placed upon the subjects’ subject experiences. The hermeneutical researcher is attempting to “unveil the world as experienced by the subject through their life world stories”, as told and recounted subjectively, from their own personal perspective (Kafle, 2011, p. 186).

Contrary to Creswell, Kafle (2011) considers IPA to be augmented with an additional phenomenological approach, that of Existential Phenomenology (p. 185). Existential Phenomenology is based upon the premise that “philosophy should not be conducted from a detached, objective, disinterested, disengaged standpoint” (Kafle, 2011, p. 188). Said differently, this variation still demands the essence and core understanding of a phenomenon, but the researcher must endeavor to do so in direct contradiction of the other two phenomenological variations. Heuristics and Hermeneutics both require that the individual be as detached and as objective as possible. By comparison, existential

phenomenology “stresses . . . the description of everyday experience as it is perceived by the consciousness of the individuals” (Kafle, 2011, p. 188). Warthal claims that this group of researchers are of the common opinion that “certain phenomenon only show themselves to one who is engaged with the world in the right kind of way” (Kafle, 2011, p. 188). Their reference to this approach rejects Husserl’s belief in “complete reduction,” and instead attempts to “re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with the world” by “stress[ing] . . . the description of everyday experience as it is perceived by the consciousness of the individuals” (Kafle, 2011, p. 188). An Existential Phenomenological approach insists upon the following requisites and constraints:

1. “Whereas Husserl saw the task of transcendental phenomenology to be that of describing the lived world from the viewpoint of a detached observer, the observer cannot separate himself from the world.
2. Shift of the notion of the *Lebenswelt* (lived-world) to the emphasis upon being-in-the-world expanded phenomenology in a way that allowed it to consider the totality of human relationships in the world in terms of the individual's concrete existence
3. ‘Being-in-the-world’ refers exclusively to human reality in contrast to nonhuman reality, and although the specific terminology has varied among existentialists, common to all is the insistence that human reality is situated in a concrete world-context. In short, man is only man as a result of his actions which are worked out in the world

4. This is not a concept that arises only in reflection. Even prior to reflection upon one's awareness of being-in-the-world there is already a pre-reflective grasp of the basic modalities which are his ways of being-in-the-world.
5. In pre-reflective experience, the subject and world are not distinct; they are rather the givens of concrete experience which can only be separated by a process of abstraction
6. Any reflection--whether theoretical or practical--already assumes man's pre-reflective experience of the world and his activity in the world” (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990, pp. 64-65).

The third phenomenological theory is Grounded Research Theory, or Grounded Theory, and it involves “unraveling the elements of experience. Its foundation is based upon close, rigorous, long term study of the phenomenon, and “from a study of these elements and their interrelationships, a theory is developed” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 4). Ethnography is the fourth and final phenomenological methodology, and requires “extensive fieldwork that allow for direct observations of the activities of the group being studied, communications and interactions with the people and opportunities for informal and formal interviews” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 1).

Selected Research Methodology

Case Study, Ethnography, and Grounded Theory methodologies were considered as options and quickly discarded in favor of the three phenomenological options.

Polkinghorne (1989) states that the objective of a IPA approach is to “come way from the phenomenology with the feeling, ‘I understand better what it is like for someone to

experience that” (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 82). This statement is simple, but is directly what I wanted to gain from the research.

IPA includes both heuristic-Transcendental as well as hermeneutic approaches. However, heuristic-Transcendental IPA requires suspending personal opinions. Although potentially desirable, this did not seem realistic, since I have extensive experience with corruption, lethal violence and have lived and worked in regions of extreme violence. Avoiding personal opinion and bias in this situation was also nonsensical, since my own personal perspective and experience should be used as a strength, if possible, and not as a detriment. Heuristic-Transcendental IPA was also based upon the concept of “discover[ing] reality”, and that by “suspending personal prejudices”, subsequent analysis would reveal the “core or essence” of the phenomenon. On that same note, Husserl based Transcendental IPA on the belief that a “single, essential and description presentation of a phenomenon” could be obtained (Kafle, 2011, p. 186). This was concerning, since it was not clear to me that corruption had a singular core description, nor was it clear that this description would be defined in the same manner by different individuals. Although Transcendental IPA is arguably the most popular form of phenomenology used in research today, it did not seem appropriate. This left Hermeneutical Phenomenology and Existential Phenomenology as viable approaches.

Hermeneutical IPA approaches clearly allowed subjective interpretation of data, with such data originating from subjects but eventually being the researcher’s own written text expressing reflections, thoughts, and feelings as a result of the research. This approach requires enormous amounts of writing and subsequent reflection upon the researcher’s own writing, feelings and interpretation of the subjects’ feelings and

expression. Although clearly valuable, this methodology also seemed to be more applicable to situations where the Participants may be more generically selected and not necessarily experienced with the exact phenomenon under investigation.

By comparison, Existential Phenomenology allowed the literal, direct and subjectively experienced stories of Participants to be analyzed within the context of each Participant's interpretation of what is, and what is not, corrupt from a "concrete perspective" of each individual's "lived world" (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990, p. 64). An Existential Phenomenological methodology pursued an understanding of issues, perspective and lived experiences through each subject's eyes and experience "as it is perceived by the consciousness of the individuals" (Kafle, 2011, p. 186). An Existential perspective of "being in the world" contrasts with Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology perspective of "lived world" where, "from the viewpoint of a detached observer, the observer cannot separate himself from the world" (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990, p. 64).

Existential Phenomenology also considers the pre-reflective influence of culture, context and environment to be of primary importance. This is particularly important, since my own background includes many years living and working within the corrupt-ridden societies of Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and Liberia. Rather than completely bracketing off these past experiences, Existential Phenomenology allows me to leverage and extend this background and pre-reflection as a component of what is otherwise unbiased analyses. Hence, for this particular research project, an Existential Phenomenological Analysis methodology was deemed ideal, and was chosen as the preferred approach.

This research methodology and approach also required the development of questions. These questions were carefully and iteratively developed to ensure open-ended responses without bias, and without pressure. In general, Moustakas (1994) suggests that two broad general questions are always asked for Phenomenological Analysis: 1) “What have you experienced in terms of the phenomenon, and 2) What contexts or situations have typically influenced or affected your experiences of the phenomenon” (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 83)? Moustakas’ advice was used to develop the interview questions, which have been included as Appendix B.

Coding, Sample Metrics and Data Gathering

Coding and data gathering. All types of phenomenology involve interviewing subjects, analyzing documents, and/or the review of all types of media. The review of collected data is defined as coding. Coding refers to analysis performed in a rigorous, formal fashion that allows an incremental and sequential understanding of the data, while hopefully avoiding inadvertent self-bias. It typically involves assigning a series of letters (or Codes) to categories to themes to theory (Saldana, 2009, p. 8). The data is then contrasted by using the previously assigned codes, lumping and splitting the data into logically oriented groups (Saldana, 2009, p. 19). Clark (2005) states that analytic memos include “sites of conversation with ourselves about our data” (as cited in Saldana, 2009, p. 32). These memos focus upon “what I am thinking as I analyze data will be presented as a memo,” and that “each memo . . . be labeled with a concept” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 163). Analytic memos can include: “1) Personal reflections, 2) Research questions, 3) Code choices and operational definitions, 4) Emergent patterns, categories,

themes and concepts, 5) Networks, 6) Emergent theories, 7) Ethical dilemmas, 8 Future steps, and 9) Final report” (Saldana, 2009, pp. 34-39).

Coding is typically performed in cycles, with the first cycle or pass through the data being of an overview nature. This is where general categories and observations are made. First Cycle coding categories include, but are not limited to: “attribute coding, in-vivo coding, hypothesis coding, values coding, and descriptive coding” (Saldana, 2009, p 46). Then, with key phrases, thoughts and observations already coded from first cycle activity, a second cycle of coding occurs. Second cycle coding is a much more advanced way of reorganizing and reanalyzing data from first cycle methods (Saldana, 2009, p. 149). Second cycle coding categories include, but are not limited to: “Axial Coding, Pattern Coding, and Focused Coding” (Saldana, 2009, p. 32). The primary goal of the second cycle coding is to develop categorical, thematic, conceptual or theoretical organization (Saldana, 2009, p. 149). For example, if there were 50 codes from first cycle coding, the result from second cycle coding might be three categories, with 25, 15 and 10 codes respectively (Saldana, 2009, p. 149). Coding stops when further data collection and sampling will not add anything new to the conceptualization, or at the point of “saturation” (Corbin & Straus, 2008, pp. 143, 263).

The following six steps, redacted from this dissertation’s IRB (see Appendix F), pragmatically describe the process of data gathering, coding and analyses. I used this process without incident for all coding and analysis.

Step 1: Read and re-read the original data. Take a break between successive readings. Take care to have an open mind, void of predisposed conclusions. For initial

readings, take particular care to avoid confusing the data and experiences of one Participant with another Participant.

Step 2: Make notes, comments, codes and categories for anything of interest.

Writing down thoughts, albeit personal and intuitive, through the data analysis process is invaluable. Scan or re-type all hand-written notes so that all data is in electronic format.

Step 3: Identify and develop emerging themes. This is where trends and patterns are hopefully identified. Reread transcripts (again) as necessary, and cross correlate with memos and notes written thus far.

Step 4: Connect and merge themes. Just as Step 3 looked for trends and relationships between various types of data, this step looks for trends and relationships between various trends and patterns.

Step 5: Repeat Steps 2-4 throughout, using different types of coding techniques in Step 2.

Step 6: Merge themes from different interviews and cases together. Develop and identify models and theories. Several preliminary models have already been developed as part of the Literature Study of the dissertation. These models may end up being confirmed as appropriate. However, take care to avoid forcing the data, trends and patterns to fit the model. Instead, be objective and take steps to create new models as the data and patterns dictate.

The qualitative analysis software MAXQDA was used to assist with all of the steps above. This specialized software allowed all codes, patterns, and trends to be linked within a single file. The software also provided several tools to visual display various

trends and relationships, greatly enhancing the analysis' depth, accuracy and time efficiency.

Sample size. Sample size for research using a phenomenology-based methodology must include at least two subjects, though a minimum of three to six subjects are recommended (Smith et al., 2009, p. 51). The sample sizes should be fairly homogeneous, if possible, but care must also be taken to avoid being deliberately non-homogenous in order to make a comparison (Smith et al., 2009, p. 50). A detailed examination of each case is then performed, with similarities and differences identified through coding. Phenomenology researchers need “access to rich and detailed personal accounts” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 40).

This dissertation and its associated IRB mandated that a sample size of six to ten Participants be obtained, and that all subjects abide by inclusion and exclusion criteria. Although challenging, eight Participants were successfully identified, recruited and interviewed.

Sample recruitment and selection. Over the past fifteen years, I have lived and worked extensively in regions of extreme conflict, including, not without coincidence, this dissertation's six targeted regions of study. These six regions included Sudan, Iraq, Uganda, Iraq, Liberia, South Sudan, and Afghanistan. Throughout this period, a fairly robust network of friends and professional contacts was developed. This network was used to solicit eight interview subjects, all self-identifying as being from one of the six targeted regions of study. The interviews were performed by Skype, in person or by telephone. Face-to-face interviews occurred in Gainesville, Virginia, in the vicinity of my home, or in a location within the Participant's respective country of self-identification.

Participants were recruited via my personal network, Gatekeepers and from friends of Gatekeepers. This latter technique is called snowballing. Gatekeepers were identified and recruited through existing personal friends and contacts from within my personal network through telephone, Skype, email or face-to-face activities. Snowballing was encouraged, but failed to successfully recruit any potential Participants until after the research had been substantially completed. As a result, these successful results of snowballing were never interviewed. In the end, all candidates were recruited directly by me through my own proprietary network.

A Recruitment Poster was developed, approved by the IRB, and was provided to participants by the PI and/or Gatekeepers at the time of initial contact. The Recruitment Poster is provided as Appendix C, and was either delivered personally, face-to-face, or by email. A sample email is included with this dissertation as Appendix D. Once a Participant was tentatively interested in participating in the study, a copy of the Consent Form was provided. An unsigned Consent Form is provided with this dissertation as Appendix E. The Recruiting Poster, Sample Email, and Consent Form were all reviewed and approved by the IRB on April 27, 2017. A copy of this IRB Approval letter is included with this dissertation as Appendix F.

Each interview lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. However, each interview pragmatically involved a modest degree of socializing and preparation prior to, and immediately after, the interview. Hence, each interview required two to three hours of expended time from me and from each Participant.

The Gatekeepers provided each prospective participant with a Consent Form at the time of recruitment, and/or once the individual tentatively agreed to be a Participant.

The Participants were always given the option of signing the Consent Form immediately, upon receipt. Regardless of when the Consent Form was signed, the Consent Form and its overall intentions was always discussed immediately prior to the interview. Questions, if any, were addressed. A signed copy of the Consent Form was always obtained prior to the onset of each interview. These Consent Forms, as well as associated personal identifying information for this dissertation's Participants, are currently stored under lock-and-key, with confidentiality provided and protected, as dictated by this dissertation's IRB.

Inclusion criteria. In accordance with the IRB, all Participants were required to have the following mandatory attributes. Note that this study was secular and gender agnostic.

1. Self-identify being from the region/country under study, such identification stemming from being born, raised (lived in the region for at least three years after age 14) and/or working extensively (at least five years) within regions of extreme violence. Relevant regions of extreme violence are limited to Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Uganda, Afghanistan and/or Liberia. Other regions will not be considered.
2. Have experienced the non-natural death of at least one close friend or family member through insurgency, civil war, genocide, dictatorial oppression and/or other form of lethal violence.
3. Be over the age of 18 at the time of the interview, which is also the time/date at which the Informed Consent Form will be signed.
4. Volunteer, and be willing to be interviewed about their experiences and feelings about violence and feelings of insecurity as they relate to corruption.

5. Be able to understand and speak English.

Exclusion criteria. In accordance with the IRB, all Participants were excluded who were:

1. Unable or unwilling to provide Informed Consent via the Consent Form.
2. Unable or unwilling to safely complete the interview process for any reason whatsoever.
3. Employed or involved with/by mass media (e.g. newspapers, internet blogs, etc.)
4. Solicited through any type of third party coercion, threat, financial reward or associated influence.
5. Unable or unwilling to express their feelings, thoughts, experiences and impressions.
6. Not self-identifying as being from a targeted region of extreme violence, such regions being Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Uganda, Afghanistan and/or Liberia.

Interview scheduling and approach. Interviews occurred either in person or via Skype and lasted between two to three hours each, overall. It was very important to ensure that the subjects were at ease, so about half of the interviews involved two or three phases. Breaking up the interview process made the entire experience less intimidating. The first phase of the interview focused primarily upon setting the stage for the subsequent phase and was not recorded. Social exchanges occurred, and a degree of trust was established. The next two phases collectively included questions requiring reflection and were recorded.

Each interview was scheduled by email, telephone or face-to-face communication. Alternatively, Gatekeepers were given the opportunity to schedule

interviews on behalf of the PI. Interviews were scheduled for an appropriate day, time and location mutually acceptable and suitable for the Participant and the PI. These times were typically in the morning, eastern standard time, as the majority of participants were located in Africa, the Middle East, or SW Asia. The locations of face-to-face interviews included, but were not limited to, private homes, coffee shops, hotel common rooms, libraries, and any mutually agreed upon public location that provided an acceptable degree of privacy.

The recorded portion of each interview lasted 60-90 minutes. All interviews were conducted in English. Interviews were semi-structured and utilized an interview protocol as outlined in IRB Section 7A, and included here as Appendices A and B. Interviews were recorded using a TASCAM DR-05 digital audio recorder. The Participant was always informed that the interview was being recorded and would be subsequently transcribed. Formal written consent obtained earlier using the Consent Form shown in Appendix E was verbally reaffirmed prior to beginning the interview. Written notes were taken during the interview and were treated with the same degree of confidentiality as other interview material. It was made clear that follow-up interviews, if needed, were voluntary and at the discretion of the Participant, and would range from 20-90 minutes. Follow-up interviews followed the same structure as the interview. Each Participant was asked to participate in only one interview session, with an option for voluntary follow-up interviews as needed. Follow-up interviews were used in several instances, with each follow-up interview occurring within an hour or so of the initial interview. Interviews were conducted in a variety of fashions, with prioritized options ranging from face-to-face, Skype or telephone. There was significant travel involved by the Principal

Researcher, with interviews occurring in Orlando, Florida, Kampala, Uganda and the PI's home in Gainesville, Virginia.

Demographic questions. Demographic information, if not already known, was collected during Phase 1. These questions are outlined below, and are also included with this dissertation as Appendix A:

- Sex?
- Race?
- Ethnicity (if applicable)
- Marital Status?
- Children?
- Country of Citizenship?
- Country of Self-Identification?
- Education?
- Current Occupation?
- Religious Persuasion?

Interview questions. The following questions listed below and included with this dissertation as Appendix B were posed, with the interaction recorded and subsequently transcribed. They are listed in order of chronological priority, but I sometimes modified this priority as the interview progressed. I was always ready to stop the interview immediately upon the request of the subject. However, this never occurred. Because of the logistics and challenges of setting up these interviews, multiple interviews with each subject were neither intended nor pragmatically desired. Hence, there were several

situations where small breaks were taken, with the interview recommencing immediately thereafter.

1. Introduction Question: First, I wanted to express my sincere gratitude for you helping me out with this research. I really appreciate it! Let's begin by introducing ourselves and describing the objectives of our time together today, and the associated objectives of this project. My name is Mark Thaller, and I am the Principal Investigator for this research focusing on Corruption and its effects upon Lethality and Feelings of Safety in Regions of Extreme Conflict. I am a U.S. citizen, and have spent a good part of my life serving careers on Wall Street, nuclear engineering, consulting and the U.S. Navy. However, over the past fifteen years I have lived and worked independently and often without government support in regions of extreme conflict, to include Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Liberia, Uganda and Afghanistan advising military and government leadership as well as advising commercial clients on entrepreneurial matters. This has compelled me to try to understand what, why and how such hardship, conflict and lethality is occurring in these regions, which is why I am now focusing my efforts through this PhD, to hopefully better understand what I saw, heard and felt. So, this is "me" in sixty seconds. Now, let's talk about you.
 - a. Shift to Demographic Questions. If possible, obtain answers to the Demographic Questions before the interview.
2. Can you tell me a little about how yourself, and where you spent your teenage years? And then?

3. Please tell me about a time where you experienced fear (of death or severe harm) for yourself, your family, your friends?
4. Please tell me a little bit about the home, town and country that you are remembering?
5. I understand that you lived through a period where many people died. Please tell me what you think about so many people in your family, town, region, and/or country being killed.
6. What does corruption mean to you? Why do you feel this way?
7. Please describe why you believe that your country, government, military acts (or ever acted) corruptly (or not)?
8. Tell me about a time that corruption that made you upset? Why do you think that this corruption occurred?
9. Tell me about other countries that you think are corrupt? Why do you think that they are acting the way they do?
10. Please tell me why you think that some countries are more corrupt than others, and why you feel this way.
11. Please tell me why you think that corruption in your country, your town, in the military and/or anywhere affected (or did not affect) your feelings of security or the number of people killed.
12. Have your feelings about corruption changed over your lifetime? Why do you think they have changed?
13. Please tell me about a time where you felt very safe? Why do you think this example came to mind?

14. Let's talk about the people in charge of the government, law enforcement, military, legal system and their degree of corruption? What comes to mind when you think of these people?
15. What has a person, group, or department in your country done, in your opinion, that has most reduced violent death, and/or most reduced related mortality and/or most enhanced your feelings of security? Why do you think that these efforts were so successful? Let's take some time to ponder this before answering.
16. What has a person, group or department done that has most increased violent death, and most reduced your feelings of security? Why do you think that these efforts were so unsuccessful? Let's take some time to ponder this before answering.
17. Probing will occur in each instance where the subject refers to death, violence, or fear with questions like:
 - a. What you were thinking and feeling when that occurred?
 - b. Why do you think that this (violence/death/mistreatment) may have occurred?
 - c. What do you think the other party was thinking and feeling when this occurred?

Transcriptions. The interviews were transcribed, verbatim, by native-English speakers into MS Word files by Vanan Online Services, doing business as (dba) Quick Transcription Service, a professional transcription service. A formal Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) was executed with Quick Transcription Service on April 18, 2017.

Time stamps were applied to all transcriptions every 30 seconds. All of the Participants have English as their second or third language. Most have moderate to heavy accents, too. As a result, the transcription service was challenged, but overall provided an excellent quality product. The eight Participants were interviewed and provided nearly 400 pages of transcribed data. These transcriptions, as well as approximately 50 pages of memoranda, rough notes, and other material were subsequently uploaded, coded and analyzed using the MAXQDA qualitative data analysis software.

The audio files, as well as the transcription files, are currently maintained on an external, password protected memory drive. Hard copy will not be maintained past the submission of this dissertation. In accordance with the requirements of the IRB, all interview records will be maintained for 36 months, after which these records will be destroyed, and a corresponding written attestation provided to Institutional Review Board's Center Representative at Nova Southeastern University at the address included with Appendix F.

Summary

Chapter Three discussed the methodological options available for performing this dissertation's research, the basis for selecting Existential Phenomenological Analysis as the preferred approach, and the tactics and processes associated with the execution of a phenomenological-based methodology. Chapter Four will discuss the data that was gathered, its analysis and the emergent themes.

Chapter Four: Presentation and Analysis of Data

Chapter Overview

A rigorous analysis of nearly 400 pages of memoranda, notes and verbatim interview transcriptions from this dissertation's eight Participants required hundreds of hours of iterative, multi-layered coding. This process revealed several general themes, with strong supporting data. However, the analysis failed to support an overall theme in a few areas, too. This section will summarize this process, but will steadfastly exclude personally identifying information, since the majority of the Participants still reside in their respective countries, and, as a result, the possibility of persecution and/or retaliation as a result of their candor and honesty is possible. All personal identification is also precluded as a result of the Consent Form that I provided and signed with each Participant prior to each interview, whereby I pledged to uphold all of the Participants' confidentiality and to safeguard the storage of all confidential documents.

Participant Demographic Profiles

Basic demographic data was gathered prior to, or in the course of, each interview, in accordance with the demographic questions outlined in Section 3 and included as Appendix A. Table 4 summarizes the demographic information obtained. It is important to note that the names used within this table are completely arbitrary in an effort to protect confidentiality, while also allowing easy reference to a Participant's thoughts, statements and/or feelings. Each of these aliases were randomly assigned from among the first names of my own children, nieces and nephews.

Table 4

Participants' Demographic Profiles

Alias	Sex, Marital Status	Race	Religion	Education, Profession	Citizenship	Country of Self- Identification
Josh	Male, Married	African Black	Christian	Post-graduate degrees, Military Officer	South Sudan	Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda
Kyle	Male Married	African Black	Christian	High School diploma, Driver & facilitator	Uganda	Uganda
Daniel	Male, Married	Arab	Muslim	College degree, Construction management	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
Nate	Male, Married	Kurdish	Muslim	High-school diploma, Entrepreneur	Iraq	Iraq (Kurdistan)
Matt	Male, Married	African Black	Christian	College degree, Entrepreneur	South Sudan	Sudan, South Sudan
David	Male, Married	African Black	Christian	College degree, Medical Prof.	South Sudan	Sudan, South Sudan
Bridget	Female, Married	African Black	Christian	Post-graduate degrees, Medical doctor	Uganda	Uganda
Jeremy	Male, Married	Arab	Muslim	Post-graduate degrees, Senior manager	Sudan	Sudan

The Participants for this study represent the feelings, impressions and reflections of Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq and Uganda. Half of the Participants self-identified with Sudan and/or South Sudan. However, with few exceptions, their impressions and comments aligned very closely with the remaining Participants. All of the participants were married, and all but one was male. The Participants' education level

varied from High School to several years of post-graduate education and associated degrees. All of the Participants were highly expressive, and, clearly, very intelligent. Religious persuasions were either Christian or Muslim.

It is important to note that other than the country of self-identification being mandated as one of the countries of interest referenced by this dissertation's IRB, none of the other demographic metrics were deemed relevant as inclusion or exclusion criteria. Hence, the demographic mix described herein and presented by Table 4 is completely random. This being said, there is significant satisfaction, post-dissertation, in having recruited and interviewed individuals having such a high degree of intelligence, verbal expression and candor.

Coding, Memo and Analysis Tactics

Each of the interviews was transcribed by Quick Transcription Services, a professional transcription services firm. An NDA was executed prior to any transcription occurring. Coding was performed using the assistance of a MAXQDA, a qualitative analysis software developed and distributed by VERBI GmbH, located in Berlin, Germany. MAXQDA allowed the transcription files to be uploaded directly, and maintained an ongoing aggregate of the original files as well as all coding annotations.

Memos were frequently written, summarizing midstream thoughts, personal reflections and continual findings. A memo was commonly written concurrent with, or immediately after, each interview. These memos sometimes utilized direct redactions and tables from MAXQDA. In other instances, the memos were written free-form, without structure, and were more akin to a journal or diary format. My observations and eventual

conclusions evolved over time, and the progression of these memos served as a catalyst for such evolution.

The eight Participants' transcriptions involved 13 separate MSWord files. These numbers are unequal because some of the interviews required two phases, and so there were two files for some of the Participants. A total of 485 minutes of interviews were transcribed, with an associated 346 pages of double spaced transcriptions coded. The coding was performed sequentially, one document at a time. However, as each subsequent document was read and coded, the coding structure and format within MAXQDA was modified and repeatedly updated. Each of the transcriptions was reviewed individually and in concert with the coding that had been ascribed. MAXQDA made this process fairly efficient, since the transcriptions, as well as coding to include remarks and memos, were maintained within a single MAXQDA data file.

First cycle coding was performed using categories of Initial, Attribute and In-Vivo coding (Saldana, 2009, pp. 55, 64). This was iteratively refined with hypothesis, values, and emotion coding superimposed (Saldana, 2009, pp. 123, 89, 86). Second cycle coding was performed using Focused, Pattern and Theoretical coding categories (Saldana, 2009, pp. 155, 152, 163). All of this was maintained within, and by, the MAXQDA software tool, allowing codes and references to be quickly added, modified, merged and/or deleted.

Visual maps and tables were also created by using MAXQDA. This allowed me to see overlapping codes and interrelationships, and by so doing, to determine general themes. Critical quotations were also identified and maintained within a separate,

artificial coding category. This greatly simplified the presentation of data, since I was confident that a good portion of these critical quotations would be needed and used.

Data Analysis and Codes

Over the course of analysis nearly 200 code categories were created, with nearly 2000 quotations initially referenced. These were continually merged, modified, vetted and refined to their final form, comprised of 68 coded categories and 885 verbatim coded references. Tables 5 and 6, both shown below, describe this dissertation's final Code System. Table 5 provides a clear snapshot of the overall Code Hierarchy, while Table 6 provides a matrix showing from which documents each of the various codes were extracted.

Table 5

Code System Hierarchy

Code System	Memo	#
Code System		885
New Critical Quotes		4
Critical Quotations, Overall 8-18-2017		79
Benefits of Corruption		0
Greater Good		4
Factors (Drivers) of Corruption		0
Human Factors		0
Moral (Religious & Ethical) Conviction		18
Pride		5
Selfish Betterment		23
Fatigue, Resignation, Despondency		15
Peer Pressure (including fear)		12
Temptation, Greed & Seduction		23
Job Security & Protection of Interests		6
Naivete; Lack of Perspective		15
Scarcity of Resources - Extreme Poverty		15
Family Responsibilities		11
Revenge		1
Rationalization - Greater good		3
Cultural Factors		0
Status Quo		12
Acceptance		0
Toleration of Corruption		18
Established Customs and Behavior		26
Cultural Conviction		18
Religious Influence		14
Tribal-Ethnic		9
Institutional Factors		0
Foreign Influence		11
School System & Education		9
Lack of Incentives		1
Gov't Imposed/Promotion Toleration		19
Gov't Promoted Corruption		18
Extraction Resources (oil, gold, etc.)		5
Criminal, Violent, Illegal Environment		8
Non-oversight		10
Willful Tolerance (via Police, etc.)		18
Systemic Inertia		25
Political Leadership		7
Public Trust		15
Ineffective Leadership and Policies		17
Rule-of-Law --- Corrupt judiciary		18
Lack of Repurcussions		12
Non-accountability		16
Military Influence		23
Fear-Safety-Violence-Death resulting from corruption		0
Violence to Protect Interests		9
Fear		30
Fear of Atrocities		7
Lethal Conflict		27
Violence (general and via police)		32
Reduced/enhanced Safety		16
Forms/Types of Corruption		0
Financial Remuneration		55
Non-confrontation		0
Acceptance of Situation		9
Maintain Status Quo		4
Tolerating Corruption		18
Discretionary Violence & Crimes		4
Willfully Non-performing Public Duty		2
Sexual Favors; Indentured Servitude		5
Power		17
Political Objective		14
Foreign Policy Objective		7
Military Objective		5
Unjust or Immoral Promotion of War or Violence		10
Reallocation of Gov't Resources		14
Amassing Non-financial Resources		7
Obligatory Reciprocal Gratitude		15
Tribal Gratitude		10
Family Gratitude		5

All of the codes were aligned with four key categories: Benefits of Corruption, Factors of Corruption, Fear-Violence-Safety-Death as a result of Corruption, and Forms/Types of Corruption. Each of these primary categories are further delineated by subcategories, which were collectively used to derive primary themes. Some of these subcategories have much more substantiating data than others. Although I used a qualitative methodology, observations supported by a plethora of data were more strongly weighted than isolated instances.

These overall categories were primarily developed in response to this dissertation's Research Questions. The subordinate categories were subsequently aligned to this dissertation's major themes and were iteratively developed by following the impressions, feelings, and verbiage of the Participants, as analyzed and interpreted through coding and thematic data analysis. Each primary category had, in some instances, more than a dozen subcategories. The most common and eventful subcategories were selected and constantly refined using graphical tools to further enhance the analysis process, resulting in either a non-conclusion or in what is presented herein as major themes.

Chapter Three discussed an Existential Phenomenological methodology to data collection and analyses. This approach required that care be taken to preserve each Participant's subjective interpretation and perspective as a "lived in the [concrete] world" experience (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990, p. 64). Coding and analysis was conducted with the realization and understanding that the subject's experiences were grounded in the concrete world, and that my own feelings and understanding were also an important part of the same world and society. "Central to the work of this figures was an emphasis on

the existing individual, and a call for a consideration of man in his concrete situation, including his culture, history, relations with others, and above all, the meaning of personal existence” (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990, p. 63). Existential Phenomenology considers the pre-reflective influence of culture, context and environment to be of primary importance, and so I outwardly, purposefully, and visibly engaged myself with the research, with each Participant, and within the issues of corruption in each respective country of interest. The Existential Phenomenological approach appears to have been well received by the Participants and allowed rapport and credibility to be quickly and significantly established. In hindsight, I cannot fathom the interviews with these eight Participants providing such detailed, rich data had I not outwardly shared and displayed shared experiences and empathy with their own perspectives.

A variety of graphical tools were provided by MAXQDA, and were repeatedly used throughout the various coding passes to visually show the degree of granularity, specificity, overlap, and commonality between each of the codes. These and other tools allowed an efficient review and confirmation of the actual quotation and associated context. Coding is not an exact science; thus, just as the presence of a relationship did not concretely prove anything, the corresponding lack of a relationship was similarly ambiguous. Hence, these MAXQDA graphical tools were iteratively, yet extensively used to tentatively support and/or disprove various mid-research assumptions and relationships.

Figures 6 and 8 are provided as examples of the dozens of scenarios that I created as part of the coding and data analysis process. These graphical tools and resulting diagrams were also highly interactive. Each of the hundreds of lines shown in these

figures, codes, and sub-codes are interactive, and link each of the coding categories to corresponding quotations with the respective Participant's associated file, showing the degree of interdependence. The importance, or degree of, inter-coding association is shown by the size of each linkage-line. These lines are all directly linked to each of the nearly 70 codes, and to the nearly 1000 final-coded segments from this study's eight Participants and an associated 13 documents and nearly 400 pages of verbatim-transcribed text.

The graphical images shown in Figures 6 and 8 each correspond to an electronic file of nearly 100 MB. The files are very large because of the linkage data described by the previous paragraph, rendering the images as nearly illegible when viewed in hard copy. The MAXQDA software and associated computer can easily zoom-in and view the images. However, this is not possible in printed form, and so each of these images has been magnified. The magnified images of Figure 6 and Figure 8 are shown below as Figures 7, 9 and 10.




Figure 6. A. Forms of Corruption -- Code Co-Occurrence Model




Figure 7. B. Forms of Corruption -- Code Co-Occurrence Model (Magnified)




Figure 8. A. Fear-Violence-Death-Safety --- Code Co-Occurrence Model




Figure 9. B. Fear-Violence-Death-Safety -- Code Co-Occurrence Model (Magnified)




Figure 10. C. Fear-Violence-Death-Safety -- Code Co-Occurrence Model (2x Magnified)

Emergent Themes and Supporting Data

The emergent themes within this dissertation were continually identified, developed and refined through many cycles of coding as described in Chapter Three. These themes were merged within the coding and sub-coding process, and are now presented in textual form within Tables 7-9. Some of these primary categories have a dozen or more subcategories. In these instances, the more numerically dominating subcategories were selected as representative, and, upon refinement, further designated as an Emerging Theme. This is not to say that the other categories listed are not important. Rather, in these instances, there was, instead, simply inadequate research to substantiate further designation.

The following sections present supporting data for each of the emergent themes and subcategories. Discussion is brief or absent, since the relationship between the category and associated quotations are generally self-evident.

Benefits of corruption. There was very little supporting evidence associated with corruption and its potential benefits. Instead, the vast majority of the data supported the contrary, or zero tolerance for corruption, with corruption being defined in whatever manner deemed appropriate by the Participant. It is also interesting to note that this scarcity of discussion and data occurred despite the Recruiting Poster and Consent Form each alluding to this study's focus upon the potential for positive benefits of corruption. Only the 8th, and last, Participant of the eight Participants interviewed provided any justification for corruption's potential to have positive benefits. This is not to say that the other Participants disagreed with the positions suggested by this last Participant. Instead, it was important to note that the potential tolerance of corruption having positive benefits

was never overtly queried. I felt it critically important to allow the Participant maximum freedom of expression, and so I took great care to avoid suggesting or inferring conclusions while carefully noting their responses, emotions, stories and inferred feelings. This was in line with an Existentialist form of Phenomenology, whereby I was aware of my own feelings and persuasion, while also respecting each Participant's right to have a different, very subjective point of view, and concurrently realizing that there may be more than one underlying theme.

Greater good. This theme is simple in its statement, but much more complicated in its meaning. The pursuit of greater good in this instance does not contradict, nor malign, morals, ethics, or civil rights in the long term. Instead, it is oriented to allow the passage of time and the toleration, to some degree, of corruption, during and after which institutions can be established. These institutions, of various types and forms, once established, can then be utilized to further reduce corruption to levels of non-tolerance. However, until such institutions are formed, mandates of non-tolerance, while noble, may delay and/or curb the establishment of these critically needed institutions. The importance and critical relevance for creating institutions, from one Participant's perspective, is supported by the following two quotations.

Yes, I believe that in less developed societies, where as I've mentioned before, we virtually don't have institutions, or we have very little institutions. [Hence] . . . there is a space for corruption to thrive, and in order to fill this space we need to support institutions. And, if these institutions are not willing to be present [or are not formed] because of this corruption, then we are actually defeating the objective of getting rid of corruption . . . So, I think that institutions should, or

parties should . . . try to be present where there is corruption, and participate in these communities in order to be able to improve the conditions of these communities, and therefore reduce corruption. However, if we want a prerequisite zero corruption, then it might as well mean that these institutions will no longer be able to help us within this community, and as a result I think we'll have more corruption. (Daniel from Sudan)

I think you do change your emotions of corruption. I think when you are younger you see things in black and white. You do not tolerate any form of corruption. You don't want to associate yourself with any person who has an iota of corruption in him. I think this changes with time when you are experience[d with] life, and you start to realize that there is a grey area in between. There are people who might not share your same values, but you have to accommodate their existence in order to be sure of the greater good. (Daniel from Sudan)

Zero tolerance for corruption. Feelings advocating zero tolerance for corruption were much more prevalent than tolerance of any kind. Data supporting this conclusion include, but is not limited to the following quotations.

I think whatever level [of corruption, that] . . . for me, I think that corruption is corruption, and it is an evil for the society. But I say 'no' [to corrupt behavior]. I didn't succumb to that. I didn't succumb to that. I think corruption is absolute. There's no way corruption can be accepted by another person. There is no corruption which is better than the other. I personally agree that there must be zero tolerance to corruption. I will say that. Zero tolerance to corruption. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

And those people who are not corrupted, it is not that they are afraid of the government. [Instead], they are afraid of their God and their religion, [as they think] that it [the bribe or extortion] is not my money. [They are afraid that] God sees this, and [so they decide] ‘I’m not going to be corrupted’. (David from Afghanistan)

Well, basically, nobody wants corruption, of course. Every[body] wants everything to be done in according to laws and regulations. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Factors of corruption. This primary category has three subcategories, each representing a potential emerging theme. These three emergent themes derived herein are designated as Factors of Corruption, and are specifically defined as Human, Institutional and Cultural Factors of Corruption. They collectively represent the three primary categories that cause, mitigate, and/or accelerate corrupt behavior. Within each of these three Corruption Factors’ categories are as many as a dozen specific factors. These Factors of Corruption are shown in Table 7, and were derived by summarizing the Participants’ most prevalent and/or relevant themes from Tables 5 and 6. These Corruption Factors can take the form of a catalyst, an enhancement, or a mitigating element. Examples of supporting data for each of these Factors and Sub-Factors of Corruption is provided within the following paragraphs.

Human factors of corruption. My research identified the following 13 Human Factors of Corruption, with examples provided for each. This is the first of three emerging themes that appear to affect an individual’s propensity for corrupt behavior.

Table 7

Factors of Corruption

Human Factors of Corruption	Institutional Factors of Corruption	Cultural Factors of Corruption
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selfish Betterment • Pride • Temptation, Greed and/or Seduction • Fear • Job Security & Protection of Interests • Scarcity of Resources and/or Extreme Poverty • Naiveté, and/or lack of perspective • Fatigue, Resignation, and/or despondency • Peer pressure • Family responsibilities • Moral (religious & cultural) conviction • Revenge • Rationalization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systemic Inertia • Foreign Influence • School System and Education • Lack of Incentives • Gov't-Imposed, Promoted, Tolerated • Political Leadership & Public Trust • Rule of law • Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Established Customs and Behavior • Religious Influence • Tribal/Ethnic

Selfish betterment. This Human Factor of Corruption included various objectives focused upon the individual, rather than upon a group, family, community or society. The following three quotations are provided as supporting corroboration.

Everybody will see that that's the way that you can be because everyone wanted a better life, wanted a better house, wanted a better work, and these services are not given by the government. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

So, everyone knows how to help themselves. They've got to grab everything.

(Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

Basically, when . . . [describing] people in my country, they think about their self. They don't say, 'Community.' They will say 'our self.' Everybody now is thinking about himself. (Jeremy from Iraq)

Pride. Actions performed as function of pride or ego were seen as drivers of corrupt behavior. An example of data supporting this conclusion is provided by the following quotation.

It's unfortunate, but [in] the culture [that] is being formed now, . . . it's more to your [image] . . . [to have] the most money you can make from any position or any place that you have responsibility over. So basically, it means that if you are in a position, and you can make whatever money extra than your regular monthly wages, then if you ignore it and if you don't make it, then you are silly. You should not be in that position, and you are being made of – made fun of by your own friends. Your close friends will laugh at you and say, 'How silly you are. You could have this much money and you ignored it.' So, that culture is being formed, and it is strong. It is strong right now, but it is getting worse, you know, in a negative way, [whereby] basically, that if you're in a position, you have to basically, you have to get money from outside sources, or from any other source other than your monthly wages. (David from Afghanistan)

Fear. Feelings of fear or insecurity can arise from others behaving corruptly. Similarly, fear can cause an individual to choose whether or not to engage in corrupt activities. Examples of data supporting this conclusion are provided by the following four quotations.

The fear of the Taliban would stop people [from acting corruptly]. Some of the people; the majority, I would say, they had religious beliefs that would stop them [from acting corruptly]. Then, the other part, the fear of the Taliban punishment [stopped them from acting corruptly]. (David from Afghanistan)

And when he saw how corrupted it was, he couldn't stay there. After three months, he quit. Now he's doing business, so he didn't want to be a part of that group. But, a lot of people want to be, and they are there, and if you want to be there acting clean; no, you would not fit there, so you will be forced to quit or, as my other distant family, you know, relative who was killed, you will end it up being, as they say, sleeping with the fish. (David from Afghanistan)

But, it's [corruption] an ugly thing. But, unfortunately, it's something which is growing and becoming very dangerous, as well, because if you tried to talk about it, . . . to show the high-profile [corruption topics] where billions of shillings [and] resources are being swindled, . . . you may end up in a mafia van. (Bridget from Uganda)

If you raise your voice [about corruption], you go to the streets you will be get arrested. Many people were arrested in the South Sudan. People were jailed, and eventually some of them were killed. So, what you do? You just keep silent, or you go and talk outside the country. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Temptation, greed and/or seduction. Corrupt behavior often occurs in an unplanned, non-methodical fashion as a result of human weakness and vulnerability to temptation, greed and seduction. Examples of data supporting this conclusion are provided by the following three quotations.

When they got their hands on the U.S. dollars, and being a part of a human being having greed, so they caught; they would cut a part of that money for themselves.

(David from Afghanistan)

The amount of money was so much, that they would be like, ‘You know, I can’t let this go.’ Nobody’s asking me. The government is not like [the] Taliban [and is not going] to punish me. I don’t go to jail for stealing the money; I don’t . . . [and I am not] being sued for stealing the money. And this is a big money, so should I let it go? Maybe not. And that’s what it is started. And then the other people seeing their bosses or their subordinates, you know, stealing and getting all that [money], and nobody’s asking them [about it], so they were motivated to do that, which is now . . . it is really terrible. Because, as I said, it’s very hard to find somebody in the government who is not corrupt. (David from Afghanistan)

So, he has to accept it [the money] and he, himself, will say ‘okay, since my commander is asking me to release this fund for his family or his personal benefits, I will take also something out of it. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Job security & protection of interests. Preserving employment was seen as a common driver of corrupt behavior. This following data supports this conclusion.

People are thankful to [have their jobs] . . . and so they end up bribing the authorities. It’s a lucrative business going on. Corruption. Therefore, survival becomes [a priority] for the people. Realize that, you know, violence comes in, because the [people will take steps to] protect their interest. (Bridget from Uganda)

The President also is fighting back, [in order] to keep his position. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

And, the moment somebody's corrupt, he or she will never want again to leave the position where he is. So, this is the connection where we have a very tragic situation. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Scarcity of resources and/or extreme poverty. Lack of alternatives amidst extreme poverty, with realistic risks of starvation and duress, were commonly expressed by Participants as significant reasons for corrupt behavior. Three examples of data supporting this conclusion are provided below.

They steal, because of they don't get their salary. I saw on the news [one] day, which makes me really sad, [that] a teacher . . . stole a can of milk for his kid. He got [put] in jail for three years. A teacher! The money we get is not enough to feed the people. (Jeremy from Iraq)

They, [the army soldiers] are corrupt, because probably poor of pay. They [are] poorly paid. They have squalid living conditions in their barracks where they live. [They are only] given the little money they get as salary, so somehow, they have to make ends meet. That's what we think [about why soldiers become corrupt]. (Bridget from Uganda)

Corruption is basically caused by poverty. People are very poor. A soldier in the army is being [paid] 700 pounds [per month]. 700 pounds, which is equivalent to 10 dollars; this is the salary for a month . . . [and as a result of payment delays from the government] it takes him three to four months to get \$10, so what he does is that he goes on, you know, [having corrupt behavior] and looting. They,

they do raiding also, they raid the houses and . . . there is a scarcity of resources, and you have a big population down there, so they need, all of them, they need these resources. So, everybody has to fight for [the resources]. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Naiveté, and/or lack of perspective. Complete ignorance, as well as a corresponding lack of Eurocentric perspective, was a very surprising, yet common theme expressed by the Participants. Examples of data supporting this conclusion are provided by the following 4 quotations.

Because, the Russian time, as I said, the people were kind of [respectful because] the religious belief was there. It would have stopped a lot of them [from corrupt behavior]. That was the first thing, and before the Taliban I'm talking about, all those governments. Plus, the people did not have that much money to offer [as bribes and corrupt behavior]. There was not much. There was just, you know, the people . . . [they] were happy with what they were making on their, daily life, and they [didn't] know that you can [become] corrupt. Basically, believe it or not, I know it's sounds stupid and silly, but they didn't know that [they could become corrupt]. (David from Afghanistan)

[There was] a recent upheaval and a change in the government in Sudan, so a lot of people were thrust into power that never had power before. Most of them are not highly educated, and do not have, actually, a professional [perspective] when it comes to enlightening the mind or experiences. These people, many of them experienced power that they've never had before, and not knowing how to handle that power, and not having anybody to learn from, it's not like they were watching

their father or their father's father. They succumbed to general human temptation [and became corrupt]. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Because none of those people constitute what was and is the army, the intellectual base of these people that might have fought against corruption was never brought to bear, and because of that, the army doesn't, in some ways, doesn't know any other way. All they know is what they've been doing since they were thrown into this situation with all of this money around them. And, the corruption that's existing now in the government of South Sudan and in the army or all the uniformed forces, part of it came from the bush. Because, when they were in the bush, all the army and the policing sector was divided to all, so evidently, they [the soldiers in the bush] had [their] own battalion. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

He [John Garang, former President of Southern Sudan] was a little bit [corrupt]. A little . . . but [only] because they [John Garang and his supporters] were in the bush, of course. They were in [the] bush, and you cannot change overnight. So, in the bush, they would have no laws. There was no regulation. It's . . . jungle law. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Fatigue, resignation, and/or despondency. Philosophical as well as physical exhaustion were expressed by many Participants as strong drivers of corrupt behavior. This conclusion is supported by the data gathered, to include the following four quotations.

People in my country they have zero trust with the government, zero trust with the police, zero trust with nobody. We had cases where the police or army they came

to houses. They kidnapped people; not just fake people, [but] real people. So, there is no trust. I don't know how you want me to go further, but we don't trust the government. We are tired. You know, every day we dream about this.

'Tomorrow's going to be better, tomorrow's going be better, tomorrow's going to be better.' But, it's not. Since 2013, up to now, every day we are dreaming something is going to be better, something is going to be better. (Jeremy from Iraq)

If you get the military to be corrupt, if you get the police to be corrupt, if you get the legal or the judicial system to be corrupt, then you are done as a country.

(Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

It's a part of the life, now. Any office you enter, you – you're expected to pay a little more to expedite your process, or even [to use] the normal process, you have to pay, the guy to me, to me to sign. Although he is being paid by the government to sign that paper for you, but no. If you want him to sign, then you have to pay him. (David from Afghanistan)

All the good people have gone. All the good people. All good people, I'm telling you. (Jeremy from Iraq)

Peer pressure. The strength of peer pressure has been, and will likely continue to always be, a compelling reason for corruption and other types of undesired behavior. This conclusion is strongly corroborated by the data gathered and exemplified through the following five quotations.

But, I can tell you about the other departments [in the Afghanistan Government] which are worse and which are bad. [This] is because the majority of them

[corrupt people] are there. I know. I knew. Actually, I knew a person, one of our distant relatives. He was a great guy. He was sort of religious in a good way. He did not accept any bribes. He did not accept any corruption from anybody. And he became a judge in one of the districts of Herat, [Afghanistan]. [After] working there a few months, [he saw that] all his colleagues were corrupted. They didn't like him. He didn't fit in their group. He didn't fit, and he was trying to be loud about it. You know; tell others; his friends not do it. So, he was starting to advise, [or to tell others not to act corruptly], but then, unfortunately, after three or four months of working there, he was killed. Somebody stopped by . . . [his house] and . . . he was killed. So, that makes it really hard for a person not who's not corrupted to work in those environments. (David from Afghanistan)

When you associate with the people who are corrupt; when you associate with the people who have this kind of negativity to the public and all that, you sometimes, if you're not careful, [or] if you are not principled, you [can] get yourself in this kind of [similarly corrupt] situation. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

So, he has to accept it, and he himself will say 'Okay. Since my commander is asking me to release these funds for his family or his personal benefits, I will take also something out of it.' And it becomes [acceptable] . . . or else, if he doesn't do it...he will be fired. He will be fire from his position. He will [have to be] transferred somewhere. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

It's unfortunate, but the culture [that] is being formed now . . . [compels you to earn as much] money you can make from any position or any place that you have responsibility over. If you are in a position and you can make whatever money

extra than your regular monthly wages, then if you ignore it and if you don't make it, then you are silly. You should not be in that position, and you are being made fun of by your own friends. And if you are satisfied with the monthly wage, then, as I said, you're being considered as a silly person and not being worthy of that position. (David from Afghanistan)

There are people who might not share your same values, but you have to accommodate their existence in order to be sure of the greater good. (Daniel from Sudan)

Family responsibilities. A sense of duty and responsibility for family transcends cultural and sovereign boundaries, compelling otherwise righteous people to commit corrupt acts. Examples of support for this finding include the following four quotations.

Most of our leaders were generals of the army, commanders and all, during their struggle. And most of them, they have never lived with their families. They have never taken their families to live in the camps. So, most of them have their families living in Kenya, in Nairobi, and in Kampala. And they started, you know, with the pressure of their families and all that. They have to use the resources that they get from their struggle in order to feed their families. So, when you get yourself in this kind of situation where your family [is put at risk] . . . because of economics and the difficulties of finances and all that, [then corrupt activities occur]. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

I've seen the military has been maintaining a control . . . and they have been shipping all the contracts to their relatives, to their friends, to their wives, to their children, to themselves. And, there was no way for any business contractor who

sits with a lot of money, personally, [to ever get the contract]. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

So, he has to accept it, and he, himself, will say, “Okay, since my commander is asking me to release this fund for his family or his personal benefits, I will take also something out of it. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

He’s got to bring all his relatives that belong to him, and he’s got to recruit a militia that protects him and his small circle. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

Moral (religious & cultural) conviction. Religious and cultural issues negate corrupt behavior, so the lack of these issues is often associated with corruption. Findings supporting this conclusion include the following five quotations.

Corruption, actually, is one thing I don’t like. Basically, I grew up within the values of my culture that does not encourage, actually, cheating others and a culture that promotes care to others. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

There is a difference between corruption being a fact of life, and corruption being a way of life, and there are so many countries where corruption is a fact of life. I wouldn’t rule out any country in the world where corruption is a fact of life, but the problem is when corruption becomes a way of life, and this is when it hinders the development; economic, political, and social development. (Daniel from Sudan)

Whenever we see anything wrong happening, and we keep quiet about it, we are giving way to corruption, [allowing it] to thrive and develop . . . horns, and tentacles, so that by the time you start saying, ‘No, no, this is too much. It has to stop,’ then you know that the beneficiaries, [or affected parties] of that kind of

corrupt act might actually come up in full force [and be subject to] maximum [detrimental] effects. (Bridget from Uganda)

Honestly, our religion tells us to not steal, to not lie. That's correct. To always to do the good stuff. But nowadays, the religion in my country is weak. You've got to be strong in my country. If you are weak, they will take you. (Jeremy from Iraq)

And those people who are not corrupted, it is not that they are afraid of the government. [Instead], they are afraid of their God and their religion, [as they think] that [the bribe or extortion] is not my money. [They are afraid that] that God sees this, and [so they] decide 'I'm not going to be corrupted.' (David from Afghanistan)

I think whatever level [of corruption, that] . . . for me, I think that corruption is corruption, and it is an evil for the society. But I say 'no' [to corrupt behavior]. I didn't succumb to that. I didn't succumb to that. I think corruption is absolute. There's no way corruption can be accepted by another person. There is no corruption which is better than the other. I personally agree that there must be zero tolerance to corruption. I will say that. Zero tolerance to corruption. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Revenge. Revenge as a basis for corruption is not likely very common, and may be an outlier. Data supporting this conclusion was available only one Participant. An example of this data is provided below.

One of our managers fired an employee, and that employee went to the security services and I think he probably bribed them . . . and they came and they actually

[acted] in revenge. They came to that manager, and he was detained for 35 days, and he came back in a very miserable state, and we were all worried about his safety. We were worried about our own safety. (Daniel from Sudan)

Rationalization. Justifying corrupt behavior in favor of a greater good or social benefit promotes such behavior by making it less egregious. This last Human Factor of Corruption has limited support, with data provided by only one Participant. However, the data is compelling, as shown by the following two quotations.

I think you do change your emotions of corruption. I think when you are younger you see things in black and white. You do not tolerate any form of corruption. You don't want to associate yourself with any person who has an iota of corruption in him. I think this changes with time when you are experienced [with] life, and you start to realize that there is a grey area in between. There are people who might not share your same values, but you have to accommodate their existence in order to be sure of the greater good. (Daniel from Sudan)

Yes, it's possible [that government leaders and officials might be taking the argument of greater good too far, and rationalizing their own behavior]. It is possible of course, but, then again, [with respect to Southern Sudan and South Sudan], we are talking about a situation where you do not have any institutions, or you have very [weak] institutions. There are people who will most definitely exploit that situation but, as these institutions grow, I think the, window shuts down. The window of exploitation. But, definitely people would always exploit this situation. (Daniel from Sudan)

Institutional factors of corruption. My research identified the following Institutional Factors of Corruption, with examples provided for each. This is the second of three emerging themes that appear to affect an individual's propensity for corrupt behavior.

Government-imposed/promoted/tolerated corruption. Although various government agencies and entities can be comprised of corrupt individuals, these same institutions can promote such corrupt behavior as a result of rules, regulations and structure, making it difficult for its personnel to avoid such behavior. Data supporting this finding includes the following three quotations.

People were still on the feeling of the previous, you know, because they were . . . the government was stronger, [the] Taliban had just gone, [and] so the government was a stronger, the government had more control, the people who had this fear, although the government didn't, you know, punish anybody. But, they had this fear of being punished. But then . . . they realized the government doesn't care, so then [corruption] raised up, and raised up. So, every day, it rises to a new level. Every day. And the government, yes, the government has few organizations and few departments [that are not corrupt]. Now it's a part of the life, now. (David from Afghanistan)

I would say that the government is corrupt in the sense that [it is] endorsing corruption, and does not hold the individuals in the government accountable to what they do. (Daniel from Sudan)

[It is] very disappointing when you find that the same institutions that are supposed to reflect the best practice are the same that have broken. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Political leadership & public trust. Political leadership and an associated level of public trust is directly related to the onset and proliferation of corrupt behavior. The following four quotations corroborate this finding.

They just torched those homes, and . . . this [is] a very, very sad thing. Usually, say, [they] made all of their family men . . . were pushed into their huts, and then [they] torched them, you know, and that kind of thing. So, it was not really something which hmm-hmm; it's still something which is not nice [to recall], and that probably explains why people in this type of region don't like the current government, because of what they experienced. And, [at] one point in time, we were at home, and then we just saw the people coming, running, from a nearby village. (Bridget from Uganda)

We had cases where the police or army they came to houses. They kidnapped people. Not just fake people. Real people. So, there is no trust. I don't know how you want me to go further, but we don't trust the government. We are tired.

(Jeremy from Iraq)

There was no government supervision to control that, because the government is a human organization. It's made of human beings. So, every person, they saw somebody they're underneath. Or, just some subordinates are having this big money . . . because they had a hand in that corruption, or that [they were] having

[a] piece of that money. They could not stop their subordinates because they were [now] a partner of that crime. (David from Afghanistan)

So, you cannot tolerate any of your colleagues stealing money, and then . . . still promote him, or still promote her. I think that this is a problem, because the bigger challenge; the biggest challenges that I notice in my country [are] that leaders [have] accepted to tolerate all individuals that have caused [corruption, or] that have actually [been themselves] corrupted in some way of another. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Rule of law. The importance of legal rules and regulations with associated oversight, enforcement, and accountability was found to be extremely important. The lack of strong rule of law allows corrupt behavior to occur more readily and to be rationalized and/or justified more easily, too. Data corroborating this finding is provided by the following five quotations.

Saddam Hussein was a bad guy, as everybody knows. He was bad in a lot of aspects, but he was good in . . . [a few ways]. Saddam Hussein was punishing the person who steals, admittedly. It doesn't matter [why he was stealing]. He'll kill him. He'll put him in jail forever, even if he steals \$10. Right now, there is no law. That's why everybody's acting by themselves. There is no law. You're by yourself. (Jeremy from Iraq)

Believe it or not, there is a government, but people go there to the Taliban. [They go to the Taliban] because it doesn't cost them as much. Because they don't have to pay the judge. Because they don't have to, you know, corrupt [or pay a bribe to] the judge for, you know, helping and supporting them. But they were the

highest paid. They were the highest paid people in the government. Judiciary people, the judges, were being paid so high. But, you know, they were still corrupted. No, it is the greed, it does not stop you. (David from Afghanistan)

The Supreme Court is absolutely doing nothing. The judicial system is corrupted because government brought everyone in. So, I don't . . . [think] . . . that we'll see any changes . . . happen anytime soon. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

There's no accountability, and you can do anything with impunity. A [military] commander can do anything with impunity. You can kill. You can rob somebody, and nobody answers for that. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

If the auditor comes and to do auditing on payrolls, the army will say 'well, where are you coming from,' and they will intimidate you with a gun, and all this, so eventually, of course, you will just leave. So, the army payrolls are not audited. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

I would say that the government is corrupt in the sense that [they are] endorsing corruption, and does not hold the individuals in the government accountable to what they do. (Daniel from Sudan)

Military. The presence, involvement, and influence of the military affects, as well as incites, corrupt behavior in many situations. Evidence supporting a finding of the military promoting and/or involving itself with corruption include the following six quotations.

Military leaders and government leaders came from towns like yours and growing up in a culture that actually does not endorse corruption at all. Regardless of how you define the definition, these people, many of them experienced power that

they've never had before, and not knowing how to handle that power and not having anybody to learn from. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

I was working in Mosul with the Army. There was more than forty-five, fifty thousand soldiers in that Mosul City; fully equipped. They got training from the U.S. Army. What happened, when the ISIS, they came, none of those soldiers they even shot a bullet. They; everybody ran away. There was a corruption from the top leader; Iraqi Government Leaders, then, to the top commanders. I know [several] people; soldier [who] work for, or [junior] officers who work for a big commander. They said, 'Our commander told us never shoot a bullet. Run away.'

(Jeremy from Iraq)

A [military] commander can do anything with impunity. You can kill. You can rob somebody, and nobody answers for that. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

The way the army is developed, it's developed in a structured manner that actually is not supposed to have gotten issues of corruption, and all that. It's made in such a way that it is a little bit difficult; [actually it's] supposed to be very, very difficult [to succumb to corruption] within the army structure and all that . . . because there's a kind of command and control, and there's chain of command and all those kinds of things. You can't do something without an order. You must get this. And you can hold people accountable. So, there's this system of accountability within these institutions [that] you are talking about. And, it's really very disappointing when you find that the same institutions that are supposed to

reflect the best practice are the same that have broken. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

I've seen the military has been maintaining a control . . . and they have been shipping all the contracts to their relatives, to their friends, to their wives, to their children, to themselves. And, there was no way for any business contractor who sits with a lot of money, personally, [to win any of this work]. They will award the contract to themselves, and they will deliver nothing, and they will walk away with the money. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

So, then, each general in the army is a certain ethnic group and underneath him are all his people. For instance, the Shilluk have their army. The Equatorians, they have their army. The Dinka have their army. They were [separate armies before] but [are] now becoming rebels. Now they're all rebels, so now officially all of these other armies are rebels. Officially, there is only one army and it happens to be the Salva Kiir army, which is the government of South Sudan army...and it happens to be all Dinka, and all these ethnic armies are fighting Salva Kiir because of his corruptions. The army is inflaming the situations throughout. It is only, it is because the army, sometimes they act on their own. Basically, the rules and regulations as I said are not, are not in force. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Systemic inertia. It is difficult to change the course of large ship, but quite easy to maneuver a small dingy. Corruption, once established, becomes part of culture, part of behavior, and part of institutional structure. Hence, it is extremely hard to modify corrupt behavior. Inertia is the propensity for any object at rest to remain at rest, and for any

object in motion to remain in motion. This physics principle is directly applicable to corrupt behavior. Hence, a region populated by people acting corruptly is resistant to behavioral change and is directly analogous to a systemic inertia. This finding is further supported by the following four quotations.

Now it's a part of the life now. Any office you enter, you're expected to pay a little more to expedite your process. Or, even [with] the normal process, you have to pay the guy [in order for me] to sign. Although, he is [already] being paid by the government to sign that paper for you . . . , but no; if you want him to sign, then you have to pay him. (David from Afghanistan)

The system is not good. We didn't build it well. But, it is the corruption, itself. It is the corruption, itself. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

For me, corruption always used to be like if you took a pen from the office which is not yours, but it belongs to the businesses [departments] that run the government. Corruption to me means no transparency. Corruption means, to me, control over every part of the earning with either the market share. Corruption means to me that the links they can evolve [within] a system that they [the corrupt people] can get rich. Corruption means to me a system [in which] the people within an elite family tried to benefit. The elites are the government the position of the elite. Corruption means to me the elites that develop a system that they can get rich themselves, with the government, or within a system, eventually. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

Corruption is also mostly due to a lack of institutions. And, institutions, they just don't come from the sky. Institutions are built through time, and any country that

is still in its beginning of state formation would, most probably, be lacking in institutions. And, this lack of institution is definitely one of the main reasons that you have corruption. (Daniel from Sudan)

Foreign influence. Foreign policy, aid, and assistance affect propensity for corrupt behavior to begin and to proliferate. This finding is supported by the following two quotations.

Foreign aid is a very fundamental concern to our countries, and particularly in South Sudan. There are a couple of issues that I wanted to bring for your just for you to have attention. One fact, is that while it is true that international community sends aid to countries like South Sudan, . . . amidst corruption and all those kinds of things . . . you can't stop actually sending aid to a country, which is said to be corrupt and all that, because you are actually exactly affecting the poor people and all that. Now, if we had used the money correctly; if you've used the money for the benefit of the people, over \$30 billion U S dollar within eight years would have tarmacked all other roads in South Sudan. We would have built schools in South Sudan. We would have not allowed all the children of these ministers and all to go and study outside the country. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Maybe western companies and countries, they start this issue in these countries for me. This is my personal; that's my personal opinion, because for me, it doesn't make sense. You have all these problems started . . . in all these countries; especially a few of those [countries]. They've been living good. As we know, there's a lot of countries, let's say United States Government and Europe and

multiple countries. They are in charge of the peace in the world, correct? Especially what they did in my country. They saved us, correct? Why they didn't do the same thing in Syria? Why all these million people they die. The land is vanished. It's a higher level of corruption. Corruption is occurring. Everything what's going on in the Middle East. It's about money. Basically, it's about oil. I will give you an example, which I don't understand honestly. You know, I live in Kirkuk. Kirkuk is "Land of oil" by the way. Oil is everywhere by the way. Even in my house, there is oil. I dig a well. I dig a well, and after ten feet, oil popped up. So, imaging how rich we are. How [come] my city's the poorest city comparing to the other cities? All these resources, but people living . . . poor. My dream was to find a job in Kirkuk City. I never got a job yet. Never; [because of] corruption. (Jeremy from Iraq)

School system and education. A relationship was found between corrupt behavior, education and the school system. This finding is supported by the following four quotations.

With the oil money that comes from the oil, [they] all use [this money] and they put in their account. They take their kids to best schools overseas (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan).

Even the building, you know; it's cold. It's freezing. The window is broken. When it's hot in the summer, we don't have a water to drink in the place. Broken tables. We don't have even an AC system to cool off the place. So, that's also part of the corruption. By the way, I didn't finish the school because of the corruption. (Jeremy from Iraq)

Most of them are not highly educated, and do not have actually a professional [perspective] when it comes to enlightening the mind or experiences; all that. Most actually do not have that. And they found . . . the easiest way to enrich yourself [is by corruption], because once you get into power, . . . you use your power in order to amass resources very freely, and all that; particularly in a country where there's no checks and balances. There's no accountability, and you can do anything with impunity. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Let's say you have a Chief Command of the Iraqi Army. If you go through his background, you find this guy is not educated. You will find most of the commanders; they are not educated. I have a couple friends. One of [them], he's a Major General. One of them, he's a Colonel. Both of them, they've never been in schools, and both of them they barely can write their names. (Jeremy from Iraq)

Lack of incentives. Providing aligned incentives has been a traditional motivational tool, and this relationship appears relevant for corruption, too. This finding is not well supported, and may be an outlier. Nonetheless, the following quotation is provided.

One of the most important tools of setting up proper institutions is actually to have the right incentives for people so that they will not misuse the power in their hand. (Daniel from Sudan)

Cultural factors of corruption. This is the third of three categories that emerged as a driver of corrupt behavior. My research identified the following Institutional Factors of Corruption. Examples are provided for each sub-factor.

Established customs and behavior. The actions of friends, family, officials, and community have a direct affect upon our individual behavior. A relationship between corrupt behavior, customs and local behavioral effects is supported by the following seven quotations.

Supposedly this culture [against corruption] has been within our [country]; these acts have been within our culture for years and years, and they used to do this with the thieves that the local village elders or the local war lords, if they were to arrest somebody who did some [corruption] . . . they would punish him like that. They would black his face, or her face; and then make him stand somewhere, so that people would see. And, that [the public humiliation of face blackened with tar] was basically the punishment. Usually, they put coal, like charcoal or oil, which is a symbol I am black faced, which means that yes, I did something wrong and now I'm black. Black facing is an expression in our language it means that somebody who was, or who is being punished for a guilt. (David from Afghanistan)

If a kid is corrupted, of course, eventually after 20, 30 years, he will be the master of corruption. It will lead to violence eventually. (Jeremy from Iraq)

Military leaders and government leaders came from towns like yours, and [these leaders were] growing up in a culture that actually does not endorse corruption at all, regardless of how you define the definition. These people, many of them, experienced power that they've never had before. And, [these leaders did] not know how to handle that power, and [did] not having anybody to learn from . . .

[And so this was] a [corrupt] culture that grew up with a country, right from independence. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

It [corruption] was something not tolerated in the society where I grew up from, because it was attached to a bad omen, which would follow you as well as your children. So, if anything bad happened to a family, they would say, 'Yeah. They got things which did not belong to them without permission, and they made other people for to suffer [and so this is their punishment]', or something like that.

(Bridget from Uganda)

It's difficult to build a culture [during] this big conflict, when these [people] think it's important to be corrupted . . . because there's no system with money [that will pay a normal salary]. Because, at the end of the day, the customer will be in chaos and . . . whoever is strong, [this person] will take the bigger cake. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

So, there was a [time when] we were living together, as a family, as peoples of one country. Yeah. So, there was no crisis [or war] when we were so little in 1970's or early 80's, you know. So, we were having a harmony among our self as the Dinka, the Nuers, the Shilluks, the Anuaks, even some Equatorians. People from Equatoria, Juba, Torit, Yambio, and Yei . . . they were also living in Malakal because they came . . . [to do] work [and to] do business. So, the city was really good. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

I think the only way that we can fight corruption is to be there . . . to be present, to try to find ways to deal with corrupt people in order to minimize their influence and try to propagate our own values. And I think with time, as societies develop

institutions, I that corruption would become, as I said before, a fact of life rather than a way of life. (Daniel from Sudan)

Religion. Culture has, is, and will forever be closely related to a region's religious practices. Evidence supporting religion's strong effects upon corrupt behavior is provided by the following four quotations.

The Islam religion in my country, every day, is getting weaker and weaker.

Because of this situation, we have the ISIS. Whenever somebody's praying, people, even nowadays, are scared to go to Mosque." (Jeremy from Iraq)

[The Taliban]; it's just political ideology. But, because they were insisting on being religious, they were really against corruption; against robberies, stealing and all that. So, if they would arrest somebody who was corrupted, they would not have mercy on that person. If the person had accepted a bribery, they would not have any mercy on the person. They would bring him to the stadium; to the, you know, to the field, . . . any place with a large amount of people [could gather and watch]. They would bring that person, and they would lash the person; 70 to 80 lashes per person, if they had known that this guy has accepted bribes. So, the fear would stop [corrupt behavior]. At that point, the fear of the Taliban would stop people. Some of the people; the majority, I would say, they [also] had the religious beliefs that would stop them. (David from Afghanistan)

The Taliban time was definitely less [corrupted] than the Russian time; and the corruption currently right now, is not even comparable. It's way more. (David from Afghanistan)

It [Iraq] is a religious country. “Honestly, our religion tells us to not steal, to not lie; that’s correct; to always do the good stuff. But, nowadays, the religion in my country is weak. So, religion; the Islam religion, in my country, every day is getting weaker. Weaker, [and] because of this situation, we have the ISIS. Whenever somebody’s praying, people, even nowadays, are scared to go to Mosque because they don’t want to become connected with the ISIS. Some people are scared to even raise a beard, because they think it’s a wrong thing. So, that’s what’s happening right now. (Jeremy from Iraq)

The [Muslim] religion says that, ‘If it’s not your money, it is illegal money; if you did not earn it the proper way.’” I know some people; I’m not saying a lot, but I know a few people who, because of their religious belief, they have turned down a lot of gifts and a lot of improper money or other stuff that they were offered.

(David from Afghanistan)

Tribal-ethnic. The tribal and ethnic background of people comprise a primary, if not *the* primary, component of their cultural composition. The effects of tribal and ethnic allegiance, or lack thereof, were identified as significantly related to corrupt behavior.

Data supporting this finding includes the following seven quotations.

Here in Uganda, we have many trades. I can be in Uganda, and if I’m in the office and the one giving jobs, I can look for someone who is [from same tribe as me]. If I look for the one [from the] Muganda [tribe], and [can] . . .give him a job. And, that’s why sometimes we have some powerful tribes as well referring [people to me]. If I’m Acholi [tribe, and if] I want a job, I have to go to find out the minute [it is announced from the] ministry. Like, we have an example from a tribe called

Bakuba. We [can] find . . . many [Bakuba people] in [the Minister's office] even if you have not papers [even if the job is not announced]. At least they can [give you a temporary job] somewhere, to do something, before they come to lift up their tribe. That's a very bad thing [hiring people from their tribe]. [Despite their efforts to try to lift up their tribe, overall, this corruption is] very bad. (Joshua from Uganda)

The government used that money to pay the Dinkas, or this [other] group in order to do their functions and all that. And, the Dinkas have become like an institution; an institution in the presidency that decides whatever they want to do in the country; whatever they want to do and don't. And, all these people have all their families outside the country. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

I'm told, you know, [that in the] Obote government, most of the people in the big offices and so on, were from his [Obote's tribal] region. That's probably not a part of this country. So, [others who were not of this tribe] felt that they were marginalized; [that] they were, you know, left out and so on and so forth. So, they ended up, you know, getting angry . . . because some [people] of this society felt they were, you know, they were left out from the government, . . . and so another corruption is [occurring to benefit of Obote's tribe], and probably that's what makes them [angry and willing] to go [to war] and, you know . . . [leave] their regular [military] outfits and start fighting the Obote government. (Bridget from Uganda)

He's got to bring all his relatives that belong to him, and he's got to recruit a militia that protects him and his small circle [of relatives from his tribe]. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

“So, why aren't these soldiers and these people prosecuted? Why does corruption continue? Why do you think it's allowed to continue?” [asked by Principal Investigator] Tribalism . . .because, basically, if you and I we came from the same ethnic group, and you committed a crime, or you went on embezzled public funds, I would protect you. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Back in, I believe 2007, the Minister of Finance in Southern Sudan . . . embezzled millions [of] dollars, and the government, the President, eventually decided to put him in jail. His very own ethnic clan in the army, they came in their armor and they went to the police stations and took him out from there [broke him out of jail]. The national army came and removed him from the jail and took him. He is a free man. He [the President] could not do anything; could not do anything. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

“Which one, which types of corruption do you think are most related to increase violence?” [asked by Principal Investigator]. Finance. Yeah. Finance, because with [support from Ministry of Finance], . . . a Dinka will buy guns with, with money . . .to kills other ethnic groups. And, they are using money; they give it to their Dinka's in other places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly what is happening now in South Sudan. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Fear – safety – lethal violence and corruption. This primary coding category intended to identify relationships between corruption and violence. More specifically,

there existed the possibility that some level of tolerable or endorsed corruption may have corresponded to reduced levels of violence and lethality. This primary coding category was further refined with five sub-categories, which are described below with supporting data from this study's Participants.

Individualized violence. Corruption is commonly related to individualized violence. This finding is supported by the following seven quotations.

When you get yourself in a pool of people who have [a] tendency . . . [for] corruption, [and then] if you want to be principled, you must be careful because [these actions] will even cost [you] your life. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

If a kid is corrupted, of course, eventually after 20, 30 years, he will be the master of corruption. It will lead to violence eventually. (Jeremy from Iraq)

But, at the end of the day, they'll be violence. At the end of the day, they'll be change of regime; by force or by whatever, because the people cannot [accept corruption]. The people will always resist this kind of behavior. So, I think the best is if you can, [try to discuss and find peaceful solutions]. If [these issues] can be sorted earlier, it's far better than condoning it, and then actually making it . . . institutional. [If you are not careful] you institutionalize the corruption itself within the country you see. Yeah, no. I think that's what I can [say]. That's what I see. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

So, he was starting to advise [tell others not to act corruptly], but then, unfortunately, after three or four months of working there, he was killed.

Somebody stopped by . . . [his house] and . . . he was killed. So, that makes it

really hard for a person not who's not corrupted to work in those environments. (David from Afghanistan)

So, at the end of it [corruption], all you find [is] that there's going to be; bound to be violence when these people go [to] protect their properties by force. You'll find people waiting, you know; wild. And lives get lost in the process. (Bridget from Uganda)

Violence is created for options, because if you only have stability, everyone would be accountable. When you don't have stability, everyone will do whatever they like. So, I believe always to have mental point; Violence is a man-made creation, [and is created] in order to make, [or] . . . in order to gain, [or] . . . to make money. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

[So, the people are fighting] over the scarce resources. [And, the scarce resources are made even more scarce] because of corruption. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Collective/organized violence. Corruption results in higher levels of violence from groups and/or organizations. Data corroborating this finding includes the following four quotations.

But, at the end of the day, they'll be violence. At the end of the day, they'll be change of regime; by force or by whatever, because the people cannot [accept corruption]. The people will always resist this kind of behavior. So, I think the best is if you can, [try to discuss and find peaceful solutions]. If [these issues] can be sorted earlier, it's far better than condoning it, and then actually making it . . . institutional. [If you are not careful] you institutionalize the corruption itself

within the country you see. Yeah, no. I think that's what I can [say]. That's what I see. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

So, now I [will] give [you an] example [of how corruption has orchestrated conflict]. The Dinka's are fighting against the Shilluk in Malakal. The Dinka's are fighting against the Murle in Boma. They are neighbor in Jonglei state. So, they're neighbors. They are fighting against each other. The Dinka's are also fighting the Equatorians in Torit. Also in Yei. So, where are they getting these resources? It is the government's leaders giving them the money to buy these resources [weapons and ammunition]. Favoritism [is the basis for the government assisting one tribe at the expense of others]. They're [corruption and violence] related because of [a couple of things]. First, it is finance [and the corruption from finance] that empowers them. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

The government, by itself, do[es] explosions for their self. They do; the government, by itself, they do explosions. Even they got caught by a camera. [They promote violence and conflict] just . . . for their interests. [Their own] personal interests. (Jeremy from Iraq)

This is where we're going to cause a loss of lives in our country. We're going to cause a lot of deaths to our country. And a corruption, actually, for me, is one of the reasons; one of the fundamental reasons why people will always go to [violent activities]. Because, if somebody takes power, and then he uses the power to amass resources, then another [person] or the rest of the people [are] resisting, [saying to themselves], 'no; we wanted also to be in that power so we can do that.' So, if you don't do that, and if you don't allow people to get in that power,

you automatically . . . [encourage that] people start all this fight. At least there will be conflict, definitely. There will be conflict. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Fear. Corruption results in fear, which is not necessarily the same thing as safety and feelings of safety. The relationship between corruption and fear is supported by the following six quotations.

The fear of the Taliban would stop people, and some of the people, the majority, I would say, they had the religious beliefs that they would stop them, and then the other part, the fear of the Taliban punishment, so that was the corruption. (David from Afghanistan)

But, it's [corruption] an ugly thing. But, unfortunately, it's something which is growing and becoming very dangerous, as well, because if you tried to talk about it, . . . to show the high-profile [corruption topics] where billions of shillings [and] resources are being swindled, . . . you may end up in a mafia van. (Bridget from Uganda)

If you raise your voice, you go to the streets you will be get arrested. Many people were arrested in the South Sudan. People were jailed, and eventually some of them were killed. So, what you do? You just keep silent, or you go and talk outside the country. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

You would have been in jail. Plus, if you had long hair, they would have been punished by the Taliban with a week to a month, or longer [of] jail time; and lashes, of course, and . . . the hair being cut. (David from Afghanistan)

We had a threat message left to our door with a couple rounds [from a gun]. It basically [said], ‘Leave the city or we will kill everybody.’ (Jeremy from Iraq)

So, . . . those days [were] so dangerous because those are the days where you see your father been beaten in front of you because they want money. They want riches from you. (Joshua from Uganda)

Reduced/enhanced safety. Corruption results in reduced physical safety as well as reduced feelings of safety. Data supporting this finding includes the following two quotations.

You see that we pay exorbitant fees. We have to do that, because otherwise our safety is at stake. (Daniel from Sudan)

Me [and many] of my colleagues . . . were deported from the region, from Kenya to South Sudan; immediately because of talking about corruption, and then talking about human rights violations and all that.” (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

I could not go to my home village for the last eight years basically. So, that’s because of the violence and the people who are there. Everybody has gun, so that would not be safe out there. (David from Afghanistan)

Manifestations of corrupt behavior. This primary coding category is summarized within Table 8 below, and clarifies the current ambiguities and self-contradictions associated with the definition of corruption.

This primary coding category was initially much larger and included two emergent themes: Corrupt Activities and Corrupt Objectives. Corrupt behavior describes the actions of an individual, thus defining corruption must be behavioral-oriented and individual-centric. Corrupt activities clearly lead to corrupt objectives, but so too do

Table 8

Primary Categories of Corrupt Behavior

- Financial remuneration.
- Power.
- Obligatory reciprocal gratitude.
- Non-confrontation.

countless other activities that are not listed here. In fact, nearly every legal and moral infraction conceivable could theoretically be tied to corruption. This thought process clarified this primary category and resulted in the omission of activity-based subcategories, which admittedly are better categorized as either criminal and/or unethical. This left only ten or so objective-based categories, which have been consolidated into four emergent themes. These are discussed within the following paragraphs, with supporting data provided from this study's Participants.

Financial remuneration. Financial reward, commonly in the form of bribery and extortion, are clearly the most common forms of corruption. However, financial reward can be provided in other forms, such as:

- Bribery
- Extortion
- Kickbacks
- Illegal land sale
- Illegal hiring practices
- Asymmetric law enforcement
- Judicial favoritism

This finding is supported by the following five quotations.

Just for example, if I'm a custom officer, I'm paid money by the government to do that job as a custom officer. But in the process of doing [my regular job], if I start asking favor from the people of an organization or whoever crosses [the] border or come[s] with goods and all that, and then I ask him [for] more money to give [to] me and use it for my personal [benefit, then] . . . that is where corruption is. So, because I'm charged with the responsibility [for my normal work] that I should . . . clear either [customs] papers and all that based on [an] agreement . . . with the government, . . . then I'm paid for that. [But]. . . if I ask for extra thing[s] and then extra favor[s], I think that's where corruption is [occurring]. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

So basically, it [corruption] means that if you are in a position [to make money through corruption], and you can make whatever money [more] than your regular monthly wages; then, if you ignore it and if you don't make [the extra money], . . . you are silly. (David from Afghanistan)

The money [is] taken by the leaders of the country and put in their personal accounts overseas. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Those [government] individuals are already corrupt. And, now they want to get more corrupt. They want to gain more wealth to enrich themselves with the remaining pot of whatever is still there. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

It's still boils for the same thing. For instance, a public officer decides to use his influence to swindle billions of shillings for his own benefit. (Bridget from Uganda)

You go to the [authorities] to report [corruption with your land ownership]. [Then, you] . . . find [that] . . . they have already took [a bribe] and they're connected [to the people taking your land]. So, you [took a] risk [to report this corruption]. You took your own case [to your lawyers]. [You do] not mind pay[ing] for the lawyers to work on your case. And, when you do have somebody to help, they pass by, see your lawyers, and then they pay them off. (Joshua from Uganda)

[There are] so many officials and soldiers on the way who try to exploit the situation, and [are] blackmailing you into paying them something in order for them to allow you to continue along the river to [deliver the humanitarian relief cargo to] your destination. (Daniel from Sudan)

Power. The pursuit and maintenance of power is a very common form of corruption, but is not commonly discussed within the existing paradigm. Here, power can be in the form of an elected position as well as employment. Government employment is not a necessary requisite, though this situation is clearly the most commonly seen. Power is demonstrated through corrupt behavior within the following six categories.

- Political objective
- Foreign policy objective
- Military objective
- Unjust or immoral promotion of war or violence
- Reallocation of gov't resources
- Amassing non-financial resources

This finding is supported by the following twelve quotations.

Now, if you have done this [become elected] without getting yourself into serious corruptions and all that, then you'll have the opportunity . . . [and] you can say, 'No, I think my term is over. I want . . . to spend time with [my] family. I want to be a free citizen.' So, they enjoy their life not being caged within [the government]. [The] problem is most of the leaders get themselves into [a position of corruption]. That is why they continue. They continue, and that's a big challenge you have. They continue to hang on for power. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

It [corruption] can involve . . . money. It can involve force, power. It can involve the social, . . . somebody with a high social level among the country to use as fame; to corrupt somebody because of [this person] having fame, power, . . . money, [and] all that. (David from Afghanistan)

There's no accountability, and you can do anything with impunity. A [military] commander can do anything with impunity. You can kill. You can rob somebody, and nobody answers for that. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Basically, they believe that they [the Dinka tribe] need be always in power. The President has to be always, a Dinka. [So], whatever happens, [the President] must be a Dinka and, and for him to do so he has to be empowered [by] grassroots [supporters] in various states to protect him. He is also training an army from his, his own area . . . to be his bodyguards and always keep him in power. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Corruption means to me that you attempt to gain advantage over somebody [or for something] else that is . . . not meant to be yours. (Daniel from Sudan)

The government, by itself, do[es] explosions for their self. They do; the government, by itself, they do explosions. Even they got caught by a camera. [They promote violence and conflict] just . . . for their interests. [Their own] personal interests. (Jeremy from Iraq)

I think the worst corruption is when you distort a government budget; when you take the whole budget of a government, which is supposed to serve the population, or the citizens. I think that's the worst one; the . . . ones [types of corruption] I mentioned; the others which are at the lower level [classification of corruption] . . . where you extract some . . . money from the citizens, and all that. But, I think for me, corruption is corruption. Whether it is small or big, it is still corruption. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

If you give funding to a government, you have a certain level of power, because you can . . . influence that government. It has always been the case most of the time. And, if you don't use that power well to influence the government or that leadership to stand on the principles that your country stands for, then I think . . . you really compromise a lot in reference to the lives of even the people of that country. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

I think, . . . violence . . . and corrupt [actions occur] for political positions and that kind of thing. We think, maybe, it is outside of . . .their [capabilities] and also their [personal desires]. So, probably, they're just following orders. (Bridget from Uganda)

The war has been; yeah, the war is a man-made creation. When you want to control resources, and when you don't want to be accountable, what do you do?

You create a problem, and this problem will give you a set of emergencies and give you a state of emergency [that] will give you control over all the government wealth. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

So, then, each general in the army is a certain ethnic group and underneath him are all his people. For instance, the Shilluk have the army. The Equatorians, they have their army. The Dinka have their army. They were [separate armies before] but [are] now becoming rebels. Now they're all rebels, so now officially all of these other armies are rebels. Officially, there is only one army and it happens to be the Salva Kiir army, which is the government of South Sudan army...and it happens to be all Dinka, and all these ethnic armies are fighting Salva Kiir because of his corruptions. The army is inflaming the situations throughout. It is only, it is because the army, sometimes they act on their own. basically, the rules and regulations as I said are not, are not in force. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

“Which one, which types of corruption do you think are most related to increase violence?” [asked by Principal Investigator] Finance. Yeah. Finance, because with [support from Ministry of Finance], . . . a Dinka will buy guns with, with money...to kills other ethnic groups. And, they are using money; they give it to their Dinka's in other places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly what is happening now in South Sudan.” (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

[Corruption is] Somebody using force or using his power. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Obligatory reciprocal gratitude. When significant favors are done for family, friends, and organizations, the expectation of some type of favor in return represents positive utility and is a form of corruption. The favor in exchange may be nothing more than gratitude and reverence. Obligatory reciprocal gratitude can take the form of either tribal/ethnic-based or family-based gratitude. This finding is supported by the following seven quotations.

So, once the President approves it, it then comes through the Parliament. And, [inside of] the parliament, of course, because of the tribal issue and other issues, there might be some people who are supporting this guy [this particular issue or budget item]. But, a lot of them don't. So, what this minister or the nominee do[es] is she goes . . . and pays him off with gifts, with promises, with all other corruption items [in order] to get the vote for becoming the minister. (David from Afghanistan)

What the government is doing . . . they acted corruptly against you, [so in retaliation] you used a friendship and acted corruptly against them. (Jeremy from Iraq)

You favor your own person [or tribe] that you know. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Here in Uganda, we have many tribes. I can be in Uganda, and if I'm in the office and the one giving jobs, I can look for someone who is [from same tribe as me]. If I look for the one [from the] Muganda [tribe], and [can] . . . give him a job. And, that's why sometimes we have some powerful tribes as well referring [people to me]. If I'm Acholi [tribe, and if] I want a job, I have to go to find out the minute

[it is announced from the] ministry. Like, we have an example from a tribe called Bakuba. We [can] find . . . many [Bakuba people] in [the Minister's office] even if you have not papers [even if the job is not announced]. At least they can [give you a temporary job] somewhere, to do something, before they come to lift up their tribe. That's a very bad thing [hiring people from their tribe]. [Despite efforts to try to lift up their tribe, overall, this is] very bad. (Joshua from Uganda)

So, why aren't these soldiers and these people prosecuted? Why does corruption continue? Why do you think it's allowed to continue? Tribalism . . . because, basically, if you and I we came from the same ethnic group, and you committed a crime, or you went on embezzled public funds, I would protect you. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Yeah, of course. That is also [corruption]. Yeah, that's also another aspect in terms of nepotism and all that, because if you appoint your own relative and all that, and [he is from the same] ethnic group and all that, and then [he] becomes corrupt; stealing money from the government and all that, and since he's from your place, usually they will not dismiss them. They will always incur [an obligatory debt to you as a family member]. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

It [corruption] could be nepotism. Well, employment . . . procedures are not followed. The laws of employment; the laws of public refugees are not followed to the letter, and a person who is in a government position will employ his own relatives . . . [such as] his wife. [It] might be his child; [It] might be his cousin in the office. So, for me is, this is a corruption. Favoritism. You favor your own

persons that you know. So, this will eventually lead to incompetency. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Non-confrontation. Avoiding confrontation, and thereby supporting the status quo, is part of everyday life. Nearly everybody avoids confrontation at some level and/or upon some issue. Corrupt behavior is no different. However, unlike other types of non-confrontation, such behavior in the context of corruption is itself a type of corruption.

Non-confrontation as a form of corruption can be in the form of:

- Acceptance
- Maintenance of the status quo
- Toleration

This finding is supported by the following seven quotations.

But nowadays, people know that, you know, corruption is the order of the day.
(Bridget from Uganda)

The government of the Taliban was corrupted themselves. I mean, the corruption as [represented by] receiving weapons and guns from Pakistan government to fight the majority and the U.S. allied and the forces, of course, that was a corruption itself, because they were accepting it. (David from Afghanistan)

So, you cannot tolerate any of your colleagues stealing money, and then . . . still promote him, or still promote her. I think that this is a problem, because the bigger challenge; the biggest challenges that I notice in my country [are] that leaders [have] accepted to tolerate all individuals that have caused [corruption, or] that have actually [been themselves] corrupted in some way of another. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Whenever we see anything wrong happening, and we keep quiet about it, we are giving way to corruption. (Bridget from Uganda)

Well, basically, nobody wants corruptions of course. Every[body] wants everything to be done in according to laws and regulations. However, a junior officer, for instance, who is in charge of accounting, of accountings of money; if he is asked by his commander to release certain money, he cannot say 'no'. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

I would say that the government is corrupt in the sense that [they are] endorsing corruption, and does not hold the individuals in the government accountable to what they do. (Daniel from Sudan)

The Taliban exists in Helmut [Afghanistan] because the local people do not want to help the government to eliminate them. The local people do not want the Taliban to be eliminated because they can [be more helpful to the local people than the central government]. I'm talking about local people. (David from Afghanistan)

Application of Data to Research Questions

The following section provides responses to each of the Research Questions. Each Research Question is restated for clarity, and is then answered and defended with supporting evidence from this dissertation's eight Participants.

Research question one. *How should corruption be properly, accurately and pragmatically defined?* A new, broader, non-financially constrained definition of corruption is needed. The following data, supplemented by the data discussed in the previous sections supports this dissertation's claim and supposition that the current,

financial-based, personally benefitting definition for corruption is insufficient, incomplete, and in many instances misleading:

Corruption means . . . that you attempt to gain advantage over somebody else [or something else] that is not meant to be . . . yours. (Daniel from Sudan)

[Corruption means] . . . to take something that's not yours, that does not belong to you, through means that are improper. (Daniel from Sudan)

Corruption means something for something. You scratch my back; I scratch yours. (Bridget from Uganda)

And they are using money. They give it to their Dinka . . . [friends and allies] in other places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly what is happening now in South Sudan. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Corruption, at this point, is not money only. (David from Afghanistan)

Corruption is a very big word. Taking a bribe doesn't mean that [taking a bribe is] a corruption. It's a corruption sometimes. But, there are many ways of being corrupt. (Joshua from Uganda)

Whenever we see anything wrong happening, and we keep quiet about it, we are giving way to corruption, [allowing it] to thrive and develop . . . horns, and tentacles, so that by the time you start saying, 'No, no, this is too much. It has to stop,' then you know that the beneficiaries [affected parties] of that kind of corrupt act might actually come up in full force [and be subject to] maximum [detrimental] effects. (Bridget from Uganda)

The emergent themes described within the primary data category of Forms/Types of corruption provide the basis of a more robust, non-financially driven definition of

corrupt activities. Financial Remuneration appears to be critically important, and admittedly dominates the discussion. However, there are other non-financial elements that must also be explained, such as the desire for Power, the garnering of Obligatory Favors, and the Avoidance of Confrontation. This data was summarized in Tables 8 and 9.

Equally important to this question is an associated explanation describing the nature, drivers, and factors behind an individual's decision-making processes prior to acting corruptly. These primary factor-categories were identified as emergent themes and specifically defined as Human Factors, Institutional Factors and Cultural Factors of Corruption. This data was discussed in detail earlier, and is summarized by Table 7. Chapter Five will further discuss this Research Question, and by so doing, posit several overall models/theories, as well as an associated universal definition for corruption.

Research question two. *Is zero corruption required for maximizing feelings of safety during and/or post-conflict while concurrently minimizing associated lethal violence?* This dissertation has not identified significant evidence supporting the beneficial aspects of non-zero levels of corruption. Although limited data was gathered specifically supporting the toleration of corruption, the data was from a single Participant. In fact, the other seven Participants either inferred, or succinctly and adamantly supported, zero tolerance. The following data, all from a single Participant, is compelling in its sincerity and has potential merit as justification for future work:

I believe that in less developed societies where, as I've mentioned before, we virtually don't have institutions, or we have very little institutions, there is a space for corruption to thrive. And, in order to fill this space, we need to support

institutions. And, if these, institutions are not willing to be present because of this corruption, then we are actually defeating [working contrary to] the objective of getting rid of corruption. So, I think that institutions should [try], or parties should try to be present where there is corruption, and participate in these communities in order to be able to improve the conditions of these communities, and therefore reduce corruption. However, if we want a prerequisite zero corruption, then it might as well mean that these institutions will no longer be able to help us within this community, and as a result I think we'll have more corruption. (Daniel from Sudan)

I think when you are younger, you see things in black and white. You do not tolerate any form of corruption. You don't want to associate yourself with any person who has an iota [even a little bit] of corruption in him. I think this changes with time, when you are experience [in] life and you start to realize that there is a grey area in between. There are people who might not share your same values, but you have to accommodate their existence in order to be sure of the greater good. That doesn't mean that you endorse what they do. But, sometimes you just cannot achieve what you desire, even if it's the most-lofty of goals and objectives, unless you are cooperating with others. (Daniel from Sudan)

There is a difference between corruption being a fact of life, and corruption being a way of life, and there are so many countries where corruption is a fact of life. I wouldn't rule out any country in the world where corruption is a fact of life, but the problem is when corruption becomes a way of life, and this is when it hinders the development; economic, political, and social development. (Daniel from

Sudan)

The aforementioned collective stance for zero tolerance occurred despite the Participants being overtly reminded of this particular hypothesis, such reminders occurring within the Recruiting Poster and the Consent Form. Hence, the Participants' collective stance on this issue cannot be easily explained nor rationalized, other than by the obvious; that the Participants, in general, feel that a policy of zero tolerance is warranted and desired. The following data represents just a few of the many instances where Participants supported a stance of zero toleration for corruption:

I think corruption is absolute. There's no way corruption can be accepted by another person. I personally agree that there must be zero tolerance to corruption.

I will say that. Zero tolerance to corruption. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

If you get the military to be corrupt, [and then] if you get the police to be corrupt [and then] if you get the legal or the judicial system to be corrupt . . . then, you are done as a country. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

And those people who are not corrupted, it is not that they are afraid of the government. [Instead], they are afraid of their God and their religion, [as they think] that it [the bribe or extortion] is not my money. [They are afraid that] that God sees this, and [so they decide] 'I'm not going to be corrupted.' (David from Afghanistan)

Research question three. *Is there an optimum, positive level of tolerable corruption associated with maximizing feelings of safety from violent death and/or minimizing lethal violence?* This question is directly linked with Research Question Two, and since data supporting Research Question Two is limited, this particular question

cannot yet be definitively resolved. This is not to say that the answer to the above question is definitively “no”. In fact, the data gathered thus far is leaning towards support for zero corruption. However, such opinions for zero corruption were made external to the context of safety and violence. All this being said, we must also keep in mind that the data has also concurrently and strongly suggested a new, more robust definition for corruption. Examples supporting toleration for corruption having positive benefits include:

So, you actually could pay low ranking officers small amounts of money in order to facilitate business, and I think this is a great idea, not because I endorse corruption, but because I know that sometimes for the greater good, you have to be flexible (Daniel from Sudan)

So, we need to constantly negotiate these different understanding of values until we maybe feel that [the] time is right so that we can uphold these values in the same manner that we are holding [similar values] in other countries. But, until we reach that stage, we have to be flexible. Not very flexible, but we have to somehow understand the context in order for us to ensure that the maximum number of people are lifted out of poverty, and that we are able to save lives.

(Daniel from Sudan)

Although this dissertation does not fully demonstrate if/how tolerable levels of context-modified corruption might increase feelings of safety and/or reduce lethal violence, significant data was gathered, confirming the contrary. Specifically, this dissertation supports a direct correlation between corruption and feelings of insecurity, violence, lethal conflict. This may seem self-evident. However, unless and until the

definition of corruption is properly defined, any relationship between conflict and financially-driven definitions of corruption are both inappropriate as well as misleading.

Data supporting a direct relationship between corruption and lethal violence include:

Anyone who comes to try to disorganize the status quo will have to look for a way of silencing that kind of pattern. And what will that be? It will be violence. So, corruption [has] led to violence. (Bridget from Uganda)

People are fighting over the scarce resources, and the scarce resources are made even more scarce because of corruption. It is now high time for us to take a gun and fight these people who are taking our resources. You got my point? (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

[Corrupt activities and violence occur] . . . because the army sometimes [takes actions] on their own. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

When you get yourself in a pool of people who have [a] tendency [for] corruption, [and] if you want to be principled, you must be careful because [non-corrupt behavior] will even cost [you] your life.” (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

We had a threat message left to our door, [along] with a couple of rounds [from a gun]. It basically says, ‘Leave the city, or we will kill everybody.’ (Jeremy from Iraq)

If a kid is corrupted, of course, eventually after 20, 30 years, he will be the master of corruption. It will lead to violence eventually. (Jeremy from Iraq)

So, he was starting to advise [verbally express discontent on corrupt behavior].

But, then unfortunately, after three or four months of working there, he was killed. Somebody stopped by . . . [and] he was brought back to his house, [where]

he was killed. So, that makes it really hard for a person . . . who's not corrupted to work in those [corrupt] environments. (David from Afghanistan)

Conflict is created by corruption. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

Those [government] individuals are already corrupt, and now they want to get more corrupt. They want to gain more wealth to enrich themselves with the remaining pot of whatever [money] is still there. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

Wars are made by humans; by the government [in order] for them to defile their accountability, [and] for them to loot the money. Look at some money. Look at Iraq [and] the war over the oil. Someone else needs to make money out of it, so [that's] what's happening. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

Summary

Chapter Four discussed the detailed coding and data analysis performed using MAXQDA software. Several emergent themes were identified as drivers of corruption, and were subsequently defined as the Human, Institutional, and Cultural Factors of Corruption. These Factors of corruption, as well as subcategories, were further identified and substantiated with selected quotations from the Participants. This chapter also responded to each of this dissertation's three Research Questions, and by so doing, confirmed the inadequacy of corruption's current definition. Subsequent rigorous data analysis derived the basis for the four primary manifestations of corrupt behavior as: Financial Remuneration, Obligatory Gratitude, Non-Confrontation, and Power. Chapter Four also discussed the lack of significant evidence supporting the notion that tolerable and/or contextually acceptable levels of corruption might mitigate violence and/or

enhance feelings of safety. Although inconclusive, the data obtained on both sides of this issue should prove very useful if, and when, additional research is performed.

The Factors of Corruption, in concert with the clearly identified non-financially centric manifestations of corrupt behavior, provide the framework from which a more robust description and definition of corruption is developed in Chapter Five. Emergent themes will be reconciled utilizing existing theories from Galtung and Maslow, serving as the foundation for new corruption theories and models explaining financial and non-financial corrupt behavior within a culture-agnostic, global context. Chapter Five will conclude with a discussion of this dissertation's limitations, challenges and recommendations.

Chapter Five: Discussion, Findings and Conclusions

Dissertation Overview

This IPA-based study attempted to better understand corruption and corrupt behavior, and how such behavior might (or might not) be directly related to lethal violence and corresponding feelings of insecurity in regions of extreme conflict. Countries of interest were limited to Iraq, Afghanistan, Uganda, Sudan, and South Sudan. Past research within this particular area was nascent, and so the possibility existed that toleration of culturally and/or contextually acceptable levels of corruption might mitigate lethality and associated violence.

There also existed the possibility that current foreign policy insisting upon minimal or zero levels of corruption was inadvertently exacerbating violence and lethality. Hence, this research also intended to clarify if, when, and how various levels of corruption within leadership and governance directly and/or indirectly affected lethal violence and associated feelings of safety among the general populace within regions of violent conflict.

As initially envisioned, my research intended to provide insight to the potential positive benefits of corruption. However, upon performing a detailed study of literature and past research, I identified corruption as being ambiguously defined and often exclusively applied within a euro-centric context. Corruption's ambiguous definition, application, and discussion within existing research was confusing and often self-contradictory. As a result of corruption's vague definition, my dissertation proposal and the associated emphasis of my research was refined to include the development of a more

universally applicable definition and theory explaining what corruption is and why it occurs.

My dissertation proposal/topic, including chapters one through three, was presented to my Dissertation Committee for formal approval. Upon approval, this augmented dissertation proposal was subsequently presented to, and approved by, the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board (IRB). The IRB's formal approval is included here as Appendix F.

Restatement of the Research Problem

Protracted lethal conflict and unrest have continued in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, Sudan, Uganda, and other countries around the world for decades. Perhaps not without coincidence, each of these countries has extraordinarily high levels of corruption. The United States' and western countries' foreign policies insist upon zero corruption within post-conflict society, yet the collective success of these efforts has been poor, hence this dissertation challenges the necessity for a zero-corruption mandate. Compounding this issue, the foundational definition of corruption and its key drivers are ambiguous and often self-contradictory, and so robustly defining corruption, as well as understanding the drivers and relationship, if any, between corruption and continued lethality and/or associated feelings of insecurity during and after conflict, is highly desired.

Review of the Methodology

This research used an Existential-based Phenomenological methodology to interview eight individuals from five different regions of extreme conflict. Each interview was recorded, transcribed, reviewed, and rigorously analyzed through multiple sequences

of coding. MAXQDA software was used to closely examine, consolidate, identify, develop, and refine emergent themes from over nearly 2000 initially coded segments and nearly 400 pages of recorded transcriptions, memoranda, and notes. Graphical analysis of the inter relationships between various codes invaluablely assisted with this process.

Research Questions

My research provides some suggestions to reconcile corruption's current ambiguous definition, while also providing a universal model and theory explaining the nature, factors, and associated drivers of corruption from a global perspective. My research neither firmly supports, nor clearly dispels, the potential for moderate levels of tolerable corruption being beneficial. Each of these Research Questions are restated and discussed within the following sections.

Research question one. *How should corruption be properly, accurately, and pragmatically defined?* Chapter Four provided extensive data supporting the need for a more robust definition of corruption. Extensive data was obtained supporting the notion that corruption is motivated by issues, needs, and desires far exceeding current definitions focused upon financial remuneration. Granted, financial rewards are a dominant driver. But, so too are many others. These needs, desires, and issues were collectively defined as Corruption Factors, and include 13 Human Factors, eight Institutional Factors and three Cultural Factors of Corruption. Unlike the current definitions of corruption, not all of the factors identified herein involve finance or money, nor do all of these factors parochially limit corrupt behavior to only public service and/or government employees.

My research strongly suggests that corruption is widely pursued for reasons and motivations external to direct personal benefit as well as non-financial objectives.

Corrupt behavior is exhibited by individuals of all walks of life, and is neither required nor focused to limit itself to government employees or public servants, though such occupations admittedly dominate the topic. Although occupations can vary, corrupt behavior is differentiated from simple crime, extortion, and selfish behavior by some type of fiduciary expectation. This can be in the form of a public servant or elected official, but can also be in the form of general moral, community, and/or civil posture.

This dissertation also provided significant evidence of the manifestations of corrupt behavior and has established four primary categories of corrupt behavior, classified herein as: Financial Remuneration, Obligatory Gratitude, Non-Confrontation, and Power. These manifestations of corruption represent the complete universe of corrupt behavior; thus, any definition must encompass all of these variations. Again, by comparison, the current definitions of corruption are very finance-centric. Collectively, this dissertation suggests that we define corruption as:

Corrupt behavior is typified by an individual possessing responsibility or authoritative power, either formally or informally, pursuing personal positive utility at the expense or disadvantage of another party, and contrary to the fiduciary and moral expectations of this individual's constituents.

The proposed definition is simple in its underpinning, but admittedly complex in its explanation and verbiage. Understanding this concept requires concentration and reflection. However, once understood, these concepts are actually extremely simple and robustly applicable to any and all cultures, context, and situations while also transcending individual and non-individual constraints and occupations. "Corruption means . . . that

you attempt to gain advantage . . . to take something that's not yours . . . through means that are improper" (Daniel from Sudan).

It is also important to note that this definition encompasses the general principles and notions of the current financially and public-service centric definitions. Hence, this refinement of corruption and its syntax will not require enormous adjustment from a communications perspective. However, the philosophical, foreign policy, and political ramifications are potentially enormous, which is why this dissertation endeavored to identify such a solution.

For example, world leaders and any foreign involvement with post-conflict reconstruction and/or stability efforts also have an imputed level of responsibility. In South Sudan, "SPLA officer became oriented towards an apparently unending supply of international humanitarian aid, which could be stolen impunity. Looting food aid was elevated to military strategy in the 1990's, when the contending factions of the SPLA staged hunger camps to attract humanitarian relief, which was then stolen. Both NGOS and donors often connived in [these activities]" (De Waal, 2014, p. 351). In South Sudan, "the Army is prohibited from engaging in private enterprises . . . [yet allegedly] President Salva Kir is a major shareholder in the ABC construction company that provides most of the technical road construction work in Juba" (Abbas et al., 2015, p. 21).

These and countless other examples are blatant reminders that "Each of the possible sources that can curtail corruption is also a possible source of corruption" (Amundsen, 1999, p. 29). Hence, foreign government officials, NGO executives and others acting in a similar capacity are included within the universe of potentially culpable individuals. This means that these foreign leaders and officials, as they represent their

respective countries' actions, should not be benefiting from post-conflict stability efforts, such benefits being anything contrary to their imputed fiduciaries' (i.e. the foreign country receiving the aid) expectations. These observations directly confront and refute the vast majority of the current and often self-contradictory definitions of corruption, and directly challenges the motives, morality, and ethics of world leaders providing superficial aid to post-conflict countries while ensuring that such aid enriches or politically benefits targeted individuals, parties, or groups. Equally important, a country's lack of post-conflict assistance is also herein classified as corrupt, if such lack of involvement is contrary to world expectations and personally benefiting (i.e. politically advantageous) to foreign leaders, officials and/or NGO executives.

Research question two. *Is zero corruption required for maximizing feelings of safety during and/or post-conflict while concurrently minimizing associated lethal violence?* Despite my efforts with this dissertation, this question cannot yet be definitively answered. Chapter Four provided several examples supporting tolerable levels of corruption in favor of the greater good. However, each of these examples were provided by a single Participant. By comparison, a number of Participants provided data supporting a mandate for zero corruption and for zero tolerance. Reducing corruption in the long term, irrespective of its definition, is clearly critical.

Chapter Four provided significant data showing a direct relationship between corruption, lethal violence, and feelings of insecurity. This data confirmed existing literature and demonstrates a direct relationship between corruption and violence. From a long-term perspective, there is neither an argument nor a suggestion to modify a zero-tolerance objective. However, from a short-term perspective, an argument challenging a

zero-tolerance mandate seems possible, though tricky, and still incomplete. A mandate for zero corruption in the long term does not necessarily preclude the possibility that some small, tolerable level of corruption might actually be more beneficial than an absolute zero level of corruption in the short-term. Said differently, when confronted with massive corruption and associated lethal violence, a mandate for zero corruption is intended to reduce corruption from a very high level to the lowest level. Pragmatically, within a country or region of enormous corrupt behavior, any reduction whatsoever is beneficial. However, reducing corruption to zero is never likely to occur very quickly. So, perhaps reductions in corrupt behavior would occur more quickly if some level of short-term tolerance was allowed?

What is really being questioned is not the mandate of zero corruption in the long run, but rather, if tolerable corruption might be an acceptable compromise as a path towards long-term objectives of stability, safety, and accompanied zero corruption. Alleged benefits, if proven to be valid, would accelerate the establishment of institutions, such establishment thereby mitigating other types and forms of corruption. In other words, if we accept the premise that without institutions, stability and safety are impossible; and, if we also assume that institutions are difficult to build and that such success takes time; and, if we similarly assume that zero-tolerance mandates might interfere with the building of these institutions and, thereby delay their formation, then an argument can and should be made promoting some degree of tolerance for corruption in favor of building institutions as quickly as possible. Examples supporting moderation of zero-corruption mandates in favor of building institutions were provided by only one Participant, with several quotations included in Chapter Four.

The countering argument was voiced by all Participants except one, and is based upon general leadership principles associated with personally acting morally, ethically and setting a proper example for others to follow. On this accord, tolerance for any rule, law or custom violation dilutes the effectiveness and credibility of both the individual and the government as well as the associated rule, law, or custom being modified. For example, if child labor was allowed to occur only in areas of economic hardship, the credibility and morals associated with child labor regulations would be massively threatened. The following quotation illustrates the Participants' collective voice most succinctly.

I think that corruption is corruption, and it is an evil for the society. But I say 'no' [to corrupt behavior]. I didn't succumb to that. I didn't succumb to that. I think corruption is absolute. There's no way corruption can be accepted by another person. There is no corruption which is better than the other. I personally agree that there must be zero tolerance to corruption. I will say that. Zero tolerance to corruption. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

This topic is further discussed within Research Question Three, below. Although Research Question Two remains unanswered, future research is strongly recommended.

Research question three. *Is there an optimum positive level of tolerable corruption associated with maximizing feelings of safety from violent death and/or minimizing lethal violence?* Responding to this Research Question is unfortunately premature without having some type of closure for Research Question Two. Chapter Four provided data supporting the benefits of being flexible on corruption standards in order for institutional factors such as rule-of-law, infrastructure, and political leadership to

mature. Chapter Four also provided data whereby the pursuit of the greater good outweighed any short-term violations and harm of a lesser population. However, the countering argument is that pragmatism dilutes any position based upon ethics, morality, human rights, and civil liberty. For example, can we imagine a situation where slavery was only partially abolished, with slavery permitted in special circumstances? Or having a law that allows women to vote in some elections, but not others? Corruption may very much fall into this category of moral or ethical categorization, wherein any degree of tolerance significantly degrades associated credibility of the individual, statute, and organization. If so, then such toleration would not be recommended, since this degradation might further prolong the establishment of institutions.

What does seem applicable, regardless of tactics involving purposeful, selected areas of corruption toleration, is the effect of strong leadership. Despite some allowance for tolerable corruption among the masses, if leadership guides by example and demonstrates the highest ethical standards as well as an associated zero tolerance for his or her own corrupt behavior personally, then the behavior of individuals, groups, communities, governments, and countries may/might/should follow suit. The following quotation poignantly illustrates this leadership principle.

They don't teach us how to be good to people; how to . . . whenever you are in command, to do something . . . good to people. When you are in control; when you are a president or you are a commander somewhere, you should be fair with everybody. (Jeremy from Iraq)

Corruption, defined within the universal context, clearly allows cultural variations, and is always defined from the perspective of an individual's constituents.

However, despite a culturally diverse world, there are some standards of behavior that are, themselves, inviolate. Corruption may, in fact, be one of these particular standards, despite its definition have some variations across cultural boundaries. If so, then any tolerance whatsoever may mitigate and/or prevent long-term goals of stability. This particular topic and facet of my research remains both controversial as well as incomplete.

Universal Definition of/for Corruption

My research, as queried by Research Question One, intended to clarify the application and use of corruption beyond the current financial limitations imposed by political scientists, foreign policymakers, and the general public. I did not, and do not, intend upon changing the established structure of the English language and grammar. Instead, I aimed to clarify current contradictions and misunderstanding. In this context, we start with the Oxford Dictionary's definition for corruption:

Corruption: dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery: 'the journalist who wants to expose corruption in high places'
 Synonyms: dishonesty, unscrupulousness, double-dealing, fraud, fraudulence, misconduct, crime, criminality, wrongdoing, bribery, venality, extortion, profiteering, payola, graft, grift, crookedness, sleaze.

Antonyms: honesty (Oxford University Press, 2017).

Although widely misused in general syntax, the definition provided by Oxford Dictionaries clearly shows that corruption is neither a concise culture, nor a definitive legal characteristic. Tanzi (1998) may have captured this elusive issue by stating, "Like an elephant, while it [corruption] may be difficult to describe, corruption is generally not

difficult to recognize when observed” (p. 564). And, in the words of a Participant: "Corruption means . . . that you attempt to gain advantage . . . to take something that's not yours . . . through means that are improper" (Daniel from Sudan).

At its core, and from an academic perspective, it's critically important to understand that corruption is not a group behavior, but instead, is an individual behavior, action, propensity, desire and/or intention. Governments can act corruptly as a result of the combined behavior of government employees. A country can act corruptly as a result of the combined behavior of political leaders and their key advisors acting corruptly. However, the government, itself, is not corrupt. This does not mean that we cannot assign corruption metrics to various government entities, regions, or sovereignties as measures of their collective behavior, such behavior to include engagement as well as the lack thereof.

Manifestations of corrupt behavior. Table 8 presented the primary categories of corruption's manifestations among this dissertation's eight Participants. These categories are: Financial Remuneration, Obligatory Gratitude, Non-Confrontation, and Power. Each of these four primary areas also include several sub-factors, which are shown in Table 9. It is important to note that financial remuneration is clearly an important manifestation of corruption behavior. However, it is by far not unique. Other forms of corruption occur, in the aggregate, nearly as frequently.

These observations are based upon the interpretations, opinions, feelings, and thoughts of just eight Participants. This is a small data set, so their aggregated opinions may not be sufficient to provide exceptionally high credibility for what may be the best representation and/or description of corruption.

Table 9

Primary and Sub-Categories of Corrupt Behavior

Primary Categories (of Corrupt Behavior)	Subcategories (of Corrupt Behavior)
Financial Remuneration	Bribery Extortion Kickbacks Illegal land sale Illegal hiring practices Asymmetric law enforcement Judicial favoritism
Obligatory Gratitude	Tribal gratitude Family gratitude
Power	Political objective Foreign policy objective Military objective Unjust or immoral promotion of war or violence Reallocation of gov't resources Amassing non-financial resources
Non-Confrontation	Acceptance Status quo maintenance Toleration

However, and critically important, this dissertation's eight Participants do, in fact, provide exceptionally high consensus and credibility vis-à-vis the current definition of corruption being misleading, inaccurate, and self-contradictory. As a result of this research, I can now state with confidence that the current definition of corruption, as notionally limited to improper financial remuneration within only public servants and elected officials, is inadequate, insufficient, and by many measures, misleading.

Options include creating a new word to define corrupt behavior, and thereafter educating the entire world on the grammatically correct methods for speaking and writing this new word akin to "corruption"; or, redefining corruption to ensure that its general meaning corresponds with what is currently occurring in the real world. This dissertation

has attempted the latter, and suggests the compilation in Table 9 be considered as representative manifestations of corrupt behavior, as exhibited by an individual.

Reconciled definition of corruption. *Corrupt behavior is typified by an individual possessing responsibility or authoritative power, either formally or informally, pursuing personal positive utility at the expense or disadvantage of another party, and contrary to the fiduciary and moral expectations of this individual's constituents.*

The proposed definition reconciles all of the past inconsistencies and contradictions associated with corruption, while also incorporating the thoughts, feelings and notions conveyed by people living and working in regions of extreme conflict where lethal violence and feelings of insecurity are common. The key aspects of this universal definition are:

- 1) Corruption remains an individual behavior, and not a non-individual characteristic of groups, regions, countries, or societies. This is very important, as the various dictionaries would not necessarily need to drastically modify the formal definition of corruption. However, clarification over time is clearly desired, as well as inevitable.
- 2) Corruption is defined as anything that benefits an individual as a result or at the improper, immoral, and/or unfair expense of another individual.
- 3) Rule of law and regulations are important, but are not necessary to define corruption herein. Instead, a moral, ethical, religious, or other compass can be utilized.
- 4) An individual's benefit is utility driven, and thus, can be in the form of financial as well as non-financial rewards. Corrupt behavior manifests itself through:

Financial Remuneration, Obligatory Gratitude, Non-Confrontation, and Power.

Each of these can be expressed as positive utility, and thus fit within this universal definition. However, personal financial betterment is the most common form of corruption, so this remains squarely within the new definition's realm.

- 5) Corrupt behavior must be at the expense of a fiduciary, somebody for whom an individual was responsible, either formally or informally. This differentiates corrupt behavior from theft, extortion, and simple criminal acts. The individual may be a/an: elected official (e.g. president, mayor); political appointee (e.g. minister, police chief); government employee (e.g. government worker, policeman, military); social leader (e.g. priest, community leader); influential leader (e.g. former elected official, powerful businessman); or foreigner having influence over foreign policy, aid, and post-conflict reconstruction (e.g. foreign elected official, NGO executive, senior foreign government official).

For example, the nature of a country's involvement (or lack thereof) in various areas of conflict, as well as post-conflict reconstruction, can and should be closely examined. If a foreign political leader is benefitting (e.g. large contracts awarded to firms supporting this leader) by such involvement at the expense of his constituents' livelihood, lives, and well-being, then these leaders may fall within the definition of corrupt if their respective actions were purposefully manipulative. Equally important is the absence of such foreign involvement by foreign leaders because of a corresponding lack of personal positive utility.

One fact, is that while it is true that international community sends aid to countries like South Sudan, . . . amidst corruption and all those kinds of things . . .

you can't stop actually sending aid to a country, which is said to be corrupt and all that, because you are actually exactly affecting the poor people and all that. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

Theoretical Models and Framework

John Burton promoted problem solving as a conflict resolution technique, but also as an overall approach to more fundamental issues. Burton's approach, as influenced by Maslow Need's Theory, Systems Theory, and Burton's recognition of "the differences between needs and interests," "overcome[s] blockages to second-order learning, thereby becoming a central element . . . which moves beyond episodic conflict resolution" (Ramsbotham et al., 2001, p. 49). This Burtonian approach was utilized by this dissertation to further develop several new theories and models that reconcile the ambiguity and confusion associated with the world's current definition of corruption. This sets the stage for the reader and this dissertation to exercise objectivity and an open mind when reviewing this dissertation's suggested syntax, theory, and foundations for redefining corruption.

Corruption hierarchy model. Two existing theories dominated the incremental development of new corruption theories. These are Maslow's Hierarchy of Motivations/Needs (Maslow, 1943) and Galtung's "Violence/Conflict/Peacebuilding Triangle" (Galtung, 1969; Galtung, 1990; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011, pp. 11-13).

Maslow's Hierarchy is widely acclaimed, though it has been further modified since its initial development nearly 100 years ago. A graphical interpretation of Maslow's Hierarchy is described by Figure 11.




Figure 11. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. *Note.* (Dickson College, 2012)

Maslow's Hierarchy is based upon a "humanistic approach" to describe an individual's needs throughout an individual's lifetime (Maslow, 1943). Maslow claims that an individual's needs are hierarchically categorized within five categories. Over the years, scholars have added three additional categories. However, this dissertation will use Maslow's original five categories as the basis for new theory development. These five categories range from "physiological needs" and the desire to obtain the elements for survival, to, at the other extreme, the "need for achieving one's full potential; self-actualization" (Maslow, 1943; Dickson College, 2012).

Figure 11 also shows how Maslow's hierarchical categories are further refined into "Deficiency needs (D-Needs)" and "Being Needs (B-Needs)" (Dickson College, 2012). For most people, the Deficiency Needs must be satisfied before Being Needs can be addressed. Here, it is key to recognize that Maslow, as well as subsequent scholars, also acknowledge that some people may shift the order and/or priority of these needs as a result of personal, extenuating circumstances (Dickson College, 2012). For this dissertation, protracted lethal conflict, war, insurgency, and civil unrest are potential

examples of such extenuating circumstances that might justify modifying the priority dictated by Maslow's Hierarchy. The potential for reprioritizing notwithstanding, Maslow's hierarchy was steadfastly maintained without modification throughout the development of the Corruption Hierarchy. Subsequent research may likely prove this approach suboptimum, which is expected as a new theory is tested, probed, and incrementally improved.

The application of Maslow's Hierarchy is universal and robust, but is concurrently limited to individual behavior. This latter caveat is fortuitous since corruption, at its core essence, is an individual behavior. Hence, any and all new theories involving corruption must recognize this nuance, despite the world's current propensity for grammatical mis-use extending corruption's inference to non-living and non-individual entities. By maintaining this constraint, any new refinement of the definition for corruption stays within the current confines of corruption's current grammatical intent.

It is also important to note that corruption is currently defined with a degree of flexibility. Specifically, current definitions dictate that corruption is generally, but not specifically, defined within a financial context. Hence, an extension or refinement of the current grammatical definitions is not seen as grammatically significant. By comparison, the ramifications of such a refinement from other perspectives, such as foreign policy, foreign aid, diplomatic relations, and associated conflict resolution are, in fact, potentially enormous. These ramifications will be further discussed in the following sections.

Corruption manifests itself both financially as well as non-financially. Maslow's

Hierarchy supports both the past, as well as this dissertation's refined, definition for corrupt behavior. This is shown in Figure 12, below.




Figure 12. Maslow's Hierarchy and Corrupt Behavior

However, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, on its own, would fall short of describing and/or explaining corrupt behavior. Corrupt behavior, regardless of context or motivations, has been, and will continue to be, superficially defined as unacceptable behavior, and is never something that an individual would typically be proud of. It is on this note that corruption theory and Maslow's Hierarchy diverge since, by comparison, Maslow focused upon the positive and beneficial aspects of people. "Instead of focusing on psychopathology and what goes wrong with people, Maslow formulated a more positive account of human behavior which focused on what goes right. He was interested in human potential, and how we fulfill that potential" (McLeod, 2016, n.p.).

The B-Needs and D-Needs established by Maslow (1943) provided an appropriate framework from which to develop a Corruption Hierarchy of Human Factors.

Specifically, the 13 Human Factors of Corruption, as previously discussed and listed in Table 7 were overlaid and aligned with each of Maslow's B-Needs and D-Needs, which

were shown by Figure 11. Hence, each of these Human Factors of Corruption has some degree of correspondence with Maslow's Hierarchy, and so a new model and concept, the Corruption Hierarchy, is posited and depicted by Figure 13 below. Each category's position in the hierarchy is important. Like Maslow's Hierarchy, I suggest that corruption is motivated by needs, drivers, and issues with some degree of priority/precedence.




Figure 13. Corruption Hierarchy

Although my research provides strong support for establishing these 13 Human Factors and sub factors, I admittedly have no empirical data whatsoever confirming their hierarchical precedence. However, it stands to reason that if human behavior has a natural tendency to seek improvement to higher levels or classifications, as is described by Maslow, then corrupt behavior may follow in a lockstep fashion. For example, once an individual has satisfied Physiological and Safety Needs, Maslow would predict that needs associated with Love/Belonging would dominate behavior. Concurrently, if an individual was engaging in corruption to simply feed himself and his family, but later became so

sufficiently enriched that these needs were no longer relevant, then it stands to reason that the individual may ascribe to justifying corrupt behavior with the need and responsibility to enrich family and/or to satisfy needs of affection.

The corrupt behavioral relationships suggested herein stem from a commonsense perspective, but also because corruption is a human-centric behavior. Maslow's Hierarchy is similarly based upon human-centricity, and so it seems appropriate to base the Corruption Hierarchy, at least initially, with a hierarchy analogous to Maslow. Future research must be performed to confirm this general notion and to further probe specificities.

Although Maslow's Hierarchy provided academic inspiration for the development of the Corruption Hierarchy, there are significant differences between the two theories that are not yet resolved. First, Maslow's Hierarchy is Humanistic and is predicated upon the belief individuals will, through natural proclivity, try to progressively better themselves (Maslow, 1943). Maslow's (1943) foundational premise is described by the following:

It is quite true that man lives by bread alone — when there is no bread. But what happens to man's desires when there is plenty of bread and when his belly is chronically filled? At once other (and "higher") needs emerge and these, rather than physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still "higher") needs emerge and so on. This is what we mean by saying that the basic human needs are organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency. (p. 375)

By comparison, the Human Factors of Corruption are neither noble, nor necessarily hierarchical. It is not clear that people are naturally inclined to be corrupt or to act corruptly. This proclivity is an interesting theory, but has not been addressed by my research. Although a natural proclivity for acting corruptly may later be proven, at this point, all that is suggested is that these 13 Human Factors of Corruption appear to drive corrupt behavior.

The Corruption Hierarchy makes a small, yet significant assumption that corrupt behavior, though arguably immoral, can be internally justified through the pursuit of other, higher-reaching goals and objectives described by the Corruption Hierarchy, as aligned with Maslow's Hierarchy. The Corruption Hierarchy assumes a direct analogy with Maslow's Hierarchy because corruption is defined as individual, human behavior, and so, too, is the behavior described by Maslow's Hierarchy. Hence, there seemed to exist the possibility for a direct relationship defining corrupt behavior, and that this relationship might already exist within Maslow's Hierarchy.

Again, this is not to say that corruption occurs naturally, nor is it to say that some types of corruption are better, or less heinous than others, though each of these statements represent an outstanding topic for future research. Rather, I suggest that the Corruption Hierarchy is a notionally and directly correct next step explaining the nature of corruption, and that it may provide a platform from which additional research can be performed.

Corruption pyramid model. Corruption, like conflict, is dominated by human behavior, but it is also affected by its environment. Brainstorming and academic innovation cedes credit to Galtung's widely accepted Violence Triangle as a source of

inspiration. Galtung's Violence Triangle is graphically shown in Figure 14 below, and is widely acclaimed as a foundational theory for conflict and violence. Existing literature, as well as this dissertation, demonstrate a clear relationship between corruption, conflict, and violence. So, obtaining inspiration from Galtung was appropriate.




Figure 14. Galtung's Violence Triangle. *Note.* (Askapacifist.com, 2014)

Galtung asserted that peace is the absence of violence, and that violence is affected by the combined, interrelated effects of Structural Violence and Direct Violence (1969). Galtung (1969) further stated a relationship between Structural and Direct Violence as:

Violence with a clear subject-object relation is manifest because it is visible as action . . . Violence without this relation is structural, built into structure. Thus, when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of personal (e.g. Direct) violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence. Correspondingly, in a society where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when one person kills another (p. 171).

Galtung's theory was expanded in 1990 with the addition of Cultural Violence, which, "makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right; at least not wrong.

(For example) . . . ‘murder on behalf of the country as right, (but) on the behalf of oneself wrong’” (pp. 291-292). Cultural Violence affects the lenses through which Direct Violence is interpreted, while Structural Violence is an actual violent action built into the structure of government or macro-system. Galtung’s Violence/Conflict Triangle provides a fairly robust, two-dimensional representation for conflict and violence, both individually (i.e. Direct Conflict/Violence), as well as from non-individual entities such as structure and culture.

The Violence Triangle is viewed from the perspective of the resultant action upon society, group or individual. Galtung’s (1969) model also fails to explain why the violence occurred in the first place, and instead states a relationship between the Direct and Structural Violence and culture. By comparison, corruption is limited to an individual’s behavior, but such individual behavior is affected by other factors, including institutions as well as culture. Corrupt behavior is not necessarily punitive upon all other people, groups, or society. Instead, corrupt behavior, by the nature of its definition, is applicable only within the context of an individual’s constituents. These differences notwithstanding, Galtung’s Violence Triangle provided an appropriate foundation for brainstorming and subsequent corruption theory development. Some aspects of Galtung’s triangle are not directly useful, but will be modified to incorporate the nuances of corruption being individual-behavior centric.

Chapter Four identified and discussed the three primary drivers of corruption as: 1) Human Factors of Corruption, 2) Institutional Factors of Corruption, and 3) Cultural Factors of Corruption. The alignment and inter-related nature of these three categories are superficially analogous to Galtung’s (1969) Violence Triangle. However, unlike

Galtung's Violence Triangle, the manifestations of corruption are completely individualistic, but also affected by other environmental variables. Galtung's violence triangle refers to individual, structural and cultural forms of violence. Each of the indices of Galtung's Violence Triangle represent behavior or action. By comparison, the three primary Factors of Corruption are akin to drivers, catalysts and/or promoters of corruption.

A new concept, the Corruption Pyramid, is proposed as a three-dimensional model to more accurately model corruption and reconcile past contradictions, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies. The Corruption Pyramid model is shown in Figure 15, and explains the causes, drivers, and factors for corruption. The Corruption Pyramid ties directly to this dissertation's other new model, the Corruption Hierarchy, which is shown by Figure 13. The Corruption Pyramid has a triangular base with three vertices: Human Factors of Corruption, Institutional Factors of Corruption, and Cultural Factors of Corruption. The Corruption Pyramid reconciles the role that culture and institutions play with respect to affecting, mitigating, and/or amplifying individual corrupt behavior. Unlike the action-based perspectives associated with Galtung's Violence Triangles, the Corruption Pyramid focuses upon corruption occurring as a result of individual human behavior, with such behavior affected by culture and institutions as well as internal human psychology. Hence, the vertices of the pyramid's triangular base are annotated as Cultural Factors of Corruption, Institutional Factors of Corruption, and Human Factors of Corruption.

Corruption Pyramid




Figure 15. Corruption Pyramid

The Corruption Pyramid theory has four foundational assumptions. These include:

- 1) All aspects of what we currently define as corruption are within the causal control of the acting party. Corruption is assumed to be behavioral and thereby assigned to an individual's specific behavior. By comparison, Galtung's (1990) definitions for Cultural Violence and Structural Violence are aligned to non-human and non-behavior attributes of the structural and/or cultural environment that, for whatever reason, are causing violence/conflict. (pp. 291-292). Corruption can be conversationally applied to an entity, unit, community, group, and/or nation only as a result of the aggregated behavior or individuals.
- 2) Corruption, as posited within this dissertation, is defined as: *Corrupt behavior is typified by an individual possessing responsibility or authoritative power, either formally or informally, pursuing personal positive utility at the expense or disadvantage of another party, and contrary to the fiduciary and moral expectations of this individual's constituents.*

- 3) Corrupt behavior is manifested within four primary categories: Financial Remuneration, Power, Obligatory Gratitude, and Non-confrontation.
 - 4) Corrupt behavior is motivated by three inter-related groups of drivers, or Factors of Corruption. These include 13 Human Factors of Corruption, 8 Institutional Factors of Corruption and 3 Cultural Factors of Corruption. Each of these Factors affects the other two Factors, culminating with the exhibition of corrupt behavior.
- The Corruption Pyramid was inspired by Galtung's Violence, Conflict, and Peacebuilding triangles. Galtung's triangles describe the relationships of Conflict, Violence, and Peacebuilding through the interaction of metrics identified at each of the triangle's three points (Galtung, 1969; Galtung, 1990). By comparison, the Corruption Pyramid, as proposed herein, depicts the overall interaction of the three Corruption Factors more graphically succinct than does a triangle. Specifically, a triangle fails to account for how all three types of corruption interact with, and affect, each other. The triangle is two-dimensional, and each of Galtung's triangular model's three metrics can be singularly evaluated as a separate type of violence or conflict. The Corruption Pyramid, by comparison, takes the magnitude of each of the Corruption Factor's three metrics and uses this individual magnitude as the slant height for each respective vertex. The overall tendency and/or propensity for corrupt behavior, manifested as either Financial Remuneration, Power, Obligatory Gratitude, Power and Non-Confrontation is then represented by the pyramid's height. The pyramid provides a three-dimensional metric, with all three variables affecting each other.

Although Galtung's two-dimensional foundation was extremely useful for brainstorming, the pyramidal concept is considered more appropriate for describing

corruption. This is primarily because corruption is defined to occur only within, and by, an individual. By comparison, violence/conflict can occur in a variety of independent ways. Specifically, Direct Violence is related to Structural Violence, but each can occur independent of each other. This is not the case for corruption. All three Corruption Factors are inter-related, but corruption only occurs by an individual as a result of the combined effects of these three primary categories of behavior drivers.

A new model was needed that blended the inter relationships of the three primary drivers (i.e. Factors) of corruption. The Corruption Pyramid satisfies this requirement, as the individual magnitude of each of these three Corruption Factors, when combined, describes an individual's propensity to act corruptly, which is graphically depicted by the overall height of the Corruption Pyramid.

Universal corruption theory. The aggregations of the key points, revelations and suggested made within this dissertation form a Universal Corruption Theory. These key points are summarized below.

- 1) Corrupt behavior occurs as a result of the interaction between three primary behavior drivers, defined as the Human, Institutional, and Cultural Factors of Corruption. These factors affect each other as enhancers, mitigations, catalysts, and obstacles for corrupt behavior. See Table 7.
- 2) Corruption, restricted to individual human behavior, is motivated by the 13 Human Factors of Corruption. See Table 7.
- 3) The Human Factors of Corruption can be aligned with Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, from which all human behavior is motivated. This is described by the Corruption Hierarchy in Figure 13.

- 4) The hierarchy of corrupt behavior is inextricably linked to the Basic Human needs' categories, as notionally described and defined by Maslow. See Figure 12.
- 5) The effective, or overall propensity for corrupt behavior is described by the height of a triangular prism or pyramid having a triangular base defined by the Human, Institutional and Cultural Factors of Corruption. See Figure 15.
- 6) Corruption is defined as an individual behavior and is primarily manifested through four categories of behavior: Financial Remuneration, Power, Obligatory Gratitude, and Non-Confrontation. See Tables 8 and 9.
- 7) Corruption is universally defined as: *Corrupt behavior is typified by an individual possessing responsibility or authoritative power, either formally or informally, pursuing personal positive utility at the expense or disadvantage of another party, and contrary to the fiduciary and moral expectations of this individual's constituents.*

I suggest that a Universal Corruption Model be considered as the coordinated and inter-related connection between the Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, the Corruption Hierarchy, the Corruption Pyramid, the Manifestations of Corruption, and the Universal Definition of Corruption. The Universal Corruption Model is shown by Figure 16 below. This universal relationship explains how and why corruption occurs, and reconciles past contradictions and inconsistencies in the nature and manifestation of corrupt behavior.




Figure 16. Universal Corruption Model

War, Genocide, Terrorism and Corruption

To this point, genocide and war all appear to be special, or limited forms of corruption because of the individual positive utility associated with the attempted extinction of, or lethal violence extended to, a race, people or culture, as well as when these actions occur as a result of somebody otherwise responsible for these individual's well-being and welfare choosing not to do so.

Genocidal behavior might, in some cases, be represented as a form of corruption. Specifically, an individual responsible for the well-being of others, but instead choosing to intentionally commit genocidal acts because of personal desires and satisfaction, contrary to the responsibilities associated with this person's position or job, satisfies the universal definition of corruption. Financial reward may or may not be involved. The universal definition does not differentiate, as long as the basic tenets are satisfied.

Classifying genocide as a form of corruption is supported by:

The government used that money to pay the Dinkas, or this [other] group in order to do their functions and all that. And the Dinkas have become like an institution; an institution in the presidency that decides whatever they wanted to do in the country; whatever they wanted to do and don't. And, all these people have all their families outside the country. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)

“Which one, which types of corruption do you think are most related to increase violence?” [asked by Principal Investigator] Finance. Yeah. Finance, because with [support from Ministry of Finance], . . . a Dinka will buy guns with, with money...to kills other ethnic groups. And, they are using money; they give it to

their Dinka's in other places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly what is happening now in South Sudan. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

War can be similarly argued as a form of corruption and includes instances where the objectives are to gain territory, resources, and/or assets to satisfy the desire for personal, individual positive utility of the political or elected leadership responsible for authorizing or engaging in such conflict. So, war, state-sponsored terrorism, and other forms of violence are themselves expressions of positive utility for those people, groups, and entities that support such actions, where these individuals are acting contrary to the objectives associated with their position of authority. This is potentially occurring in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Sudan today. Classifying war as a conditional form of corruption is supported by:

The war has been; yeah, the war is a man-made creation. When you want to control resources and when you don't want to be accountable, what do you do? You create a problem and this problem will give you a set of emergencies and give you a state of emergency will give you control over all the government wealth. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)

So, then, each general in the army is a certain ethnic group and underneath him are all his people. For instance, the Shilluk have the army. The Equatorians, they have their army. The Dinka have their army. They were [separate armies before] but [are] now becoming rebels. Now they're all rebels, so now officially all of these other armies are rebels. Officially, there is only one army and it happens to be the Salva Kiir army, which is the government of South Sudan army...and it happens to be all Dinka, and all these ethnic armies are fighting Salva Kiir

because of his corruptions. The army is inflaming the situations throughout. It is only, it is because the army, sometimes they act on their own. Basically, the rules and regulations as I said are not, are not in force. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

The President, himself; Salva Kiir Mayardit; is the one leading the war against other ethnic groups. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)

Defining Terrorist activities as corrupt on the basis of utility-driven motivations seems impossible. Further complicating this issue is identifying utility-based corruption within the mind of a terrorist, since terrorism, by definition, is associated with violence purposefully designed to evoke fear. Also, by definition, terrorists do not, and cannot, represent a sovereign state or country. They represent individual groups that, by their very nature, condone and endorse activities intended to promote a particular anti-government and/or political argument. Hence, terrorism categorized as corruption would need to involve a terrorist acting less violently or with sporadic degrees of compassion. This is not realistic.

Alternatively, the terrorist could be acting contrary to the desires of his/her group, such contrary actions resulting in his or her own personal, positive utility. Although an interesting intellectual discussion, it stands to reason that the only application of corruption to terrorism and individuals committing terror would be among those terrorists that happen to be insane. Terrorists are, in fact very sane (Post, 2007, p. 15; Crenshaw, 2012, p. 11), so this particular argument is not really likely to ever be relevant. Hence, an application of corruption to terrorism is deemed inappropriate.

Challenges and Limitations

Past research on this dissertation's topic was very limited. In fact, at the onset of this dissertation, and throughout a good portion of the literature review, relevant past research was negligible, at best. Instead, the vast majority of past research focused on the benefits of low corruption with respect to societal benefits, failing to focus upon lethality, feelings of security and/or the possibility of corruption have positive benefits. Past research rarely focused on or addressed corruption's potential for optimizing feelings of safety and minimizing lethal violence. Instead, nearly the entirety of past research excluded the effects of context and, instead, assumed that low corruption was desired as a de facto mandate. This made the literature study very difficult.

Existing research utilized financially-centric, and often self-contradicting, definitions for corruption. The lack of a robust, concise, and universally applicable definition for corruption effectively blocked research refinements since the syntax, findings, and data were often impossible to understand without superimposing context ex-post. Further exacerbating the issue was that context was often unknown and/or not documented. Put another way, imagine trying to study mathematics when the subject and nomenclature associated with mathematics is not clearly defined. The syntax and terminology associated with an ill-defined topic such as corruption is easily interpreted out of context. This resulted in nearly all past research being suspect. It also made a controversial, yet initially straightforward, research project extremely challenging. I had to take two steps backward in order to hopefully take three steps forward.

This study was not initially intended to develop a new model for corruption. Instead, the preliminary focus was on identifying and subsequently quantifying some

tolerable degree of corruption that would, from a greater good mentality, reduce lethality and enhance stability in regions of extreme conflict. The dissertation's literature study and preliminary research exposed the inconsistencies with corruption's syntax, application, and interpretation. Additional research could not be effectively performed without first reconciling this key deficiency. So, the focus of my research was modified, and hopefully takes a significant step toward reconciling these inconsistencies. As a result of these sequential, rather than parallel, objectives, the general orientation of the interviews and analysis could clearly have been performed more precisely had the issue of redefining corruption not been a necessary prerequisite.

Phenomenological methodologies are time consuming, and so the number of Participants is typically limited. Nonetheless, a more comprehensive study with 20 or more Participants would have provided a much stronger basis on which to draw conclusions.

Although significant justification for tolerating moderate levels of corruption was not found, one Participant was both vocal, as well as eloquent, in his support of such behavior. This did not, and does not, allow confirmation of such a position. However, it does provide some moderate impetus for revisiting this issue, perhaps with an expanded group of Participants.

The interviews involved eight individuals from Afghanistan, Uganda, South Sudan, Iraq, and Sudan. The mix of subjects between two countries was initially unknown and difficult to control, since the desired inclusion characteristics were very challenging. Ideally, all of the subjects should have self-identified from a single country. Although this mix of five countries provided diversity, it unfortunately also introduced

country, culture, regionalism, and other additional variables, which in turn, created additional elements of uncertainty. Diversity and variety is generally desired, but is normally accompanied by much larger sets of data. Future phenomenologically-based interviews should consider restricting Participants as being from a single country or region.

Performing interviews face-to-face is always preferred. However, security concerns mandated that the majority of the interviews be performed via Skype. This issue is somewhat problematic, since the key focus of this research was to explore the effects of corruption upon lethal violence . . . in regions of extreme conflict. So, it was not coincidental nor surprising that the ideal phenomenological subjects were those living within a harsh, conflict ridden environment. A suboptimal option existed involving subjects who may not have self-identified as being from regions of lethal conflict, but instead may have recently lived and/or worked within such lethal, conflict-ridden environments. This option was discarded, since it elevated the likelihood of perceptions and opinions being skewed. I was acutely aware of the challenges associated with Skype interviews, thus I took great care to ensure that connectivity was enhanced and that both audio and video quality was adequate, giving me the best possible chance of establishing rapport and having a good interview.

Context and the nuances of interpretation are essential. Research is flawed from the onset unless or until objectivity can be imposed, and unless or until unbiased analysis is executed. The phenomenological subjects and associated questions were carefully chosen so that the analysis of the subjects' responses accurately discerned the nuances of corruption within each individual's perspective to the greatest extent possible. This being

said, any and all qualitative interpretation is, by definition, somewhat subjective. Future studies should consider using quantitative methodologies as soon as metrics and variables are sufficiently well defined and concise. This was not possible for here, and so a qualitative methodology was effectively mandated.

The Corruption Factors identified by this research were initially assumed to have equal magnitude and impact. This assumption was later modified to instead align the various Human Factors of Corruption with Maslow's Hierarchy, as explained by Human Needs Theory. Aligning the human-centric drivers of corruption with the corresponding needs within people that motivate our behavior makes sense. This explanation may support the empirical behavior described by the Corruption Hierarchy; however, rigorous research is needed, since the nature of this dissertation did not provide the depth and specificity needed to properly address corrupt behavior being potentially hierarchical.

The primary nomenclature assigned for the Corruption Factors as well as the Manifestations of Corruption are fairly strong. Still, there are likely better ways to combine and/or describe the associated sub-factors and sub-manifestations. Although existing nomenclature assigned for each of these models is directionally correct, the models and theories can benefit by simplifying and/or aggregating categories.

Implications and Recommendations

The Corruption Factors and the associated Corruption Pyramid are, if even partially oriented in the direction of truth, potentially enormous in their academic domestic and foreign policy implications. The current definitions of corruption are financially centric and often self-contradictory. This research provided the basis for a refined and more robust definition of corruption that transcends financial activities and

includes a number of non-financial manifestations of corrupt behavior. As a result of this expanded definition of corruption, the execution of these programs is, itself, ironically now alleged and categorized as corrupt by design. Specifically, the pursuit of power and tribal favoritism is defined as corrupt within the context of this dissertation. Yet, the United States and other world leaders today would fail to classify such behavior as corrupt. They should consider doing so. Stability programs should keep this expanded definition of corruption in mind when mandating such zero-tolerance requirements. The implication for failing to do so is likely continued failure with post-conflict stability and reconstruction programs. This failure is not necessarily because of corruption, nor would correcting inconsistencies with corruption result in success, per se. Adopting and understanding corruption and its drivers might, instead, mitigate the failure of programs while enhancing the success of others.

Although my research was focused upon regions of extreme conflict, the resulting Universal Corruption Model also has common application in areas of relative stability. For example, in the United States and Europe, we can clearly see how many civic, community, and elected officials are acting corruptly (i.e. using the new definition of corruption), oftentimes in the course of their daily business. It can easily be argued that the United States Government is currently acting extremely corruptly, with Congress and others continually putting other motives ahead of their constituents, and in each case benefiting by positive utility, as exhibited by one of the four forms of corruption noted herein. Alleged corruption notwithstanding, their actions will necessarily lead to violence. In fact, a case is easily made that such violence is already occurring, with alarming levels of internal conflict, strife and civil discord. Considering and using an

expanded definition of corruption as an inadvertent driver of such behavior is directly applicable, and should strongly be considered by the general media in an attempt to curb such undesired behavior by our elected officials.

It is also important to note that the activities currently performed and/or condoned by the United States and other nations as acceptable with respect to foreign policy can, in many instances, be classified as corrupt within the context of this dissertation, its suggested Universal Corruption Model, and by the associated proposed definition for corruption. This realization can, could, and should result in world leaders behaving less corruptly. This alleged corrupt behavior by the United States' elected leadership includes a wide spectrum of examples and situations over the past 200 years. For example, we rarely discuss, nor have we publicly accepted responsibility for, past atrocities and potential genocidal activities in South Sudan, Rwanda, Serbia, Syria, Palestine, and other areas where our official policy and attitude often refuses to acknowledge the existence of a problem, and/or defers corrective action to the United Nations and their policy of non-intervention. Rather than point out the gross failings and inadequacies of this organization, we have chosen to avoid confrontation in favor of preserving personal political capital. Although money may not have changed hands, any and all United States officials avoiding such declarations of the United Nations' shortcomings and need for massive reorganization can be claimed as potentially corrupt.

Zero tolerance for corruption is currently a common objective within foreign aid and stability programs, so the implications of zero tolerance mandates negatively affecting stability and lethal violence would be enormous, if proven, supported, or conditionally suggested. I failed to derive relevant data supporting this postulate. This is

neither good, nor bad, per se. I have no personal desire to condone tolerable levels of corruption. Instead, I was just looking for ideas and methods that might help resolve conflict.

A theoretical argument can be made supporting the pursuit of “greater good” and tolerating short-term levels of corruption that allows institutions to be more efficiently established, with the presence of such institutions dramatically reducing lethal violence. The countering argument is that effective leadership requires setting a proper example, and so any public tolerance for corruption dilutes societal values and ironically delays, rather than accelerates, the establishments of institutions and culture, thereby jeopardizing long-term objectives of zero tolerance. Future research should consider focusing on these issues. I think that this particular concept is still potentially relevant, but only within a much narrower application. Specifically, I believe formal and informal leadership must adopt an attitude and public stance supporting zero corruption. NGO’s and aid organizations providing oversight must exercise some leniency when corruption inevitably occurs, but this leniency must include public declarations and specificity. In other words, the leniency cannot be hidden. Keeping everybody informed of how programs are doing with respect to corruption will lead to much greater success, since instances of failure will be immediately publicized; such publicity will allow the local constituents to pressure government and leadership to act properly.

Instances of corruption should be handled on a case by case basis, but the decisions for tolerance should be made by the organization providing funding. This would exclude NGO’s and foreign aid organizations, as these organizations never provide financial support. Instead, they provide massive amounts of funding for their own

personnel to travel, live, and work within areas of post-conflict and austerity while distributing food, medical aid and other programming services are provided. These organizations, which include the United Nations, never provide direct monetary aid to the targeted countries. Hence, they should be removed from the entire equation of corruption monitoring and tolerance. To be frank, based upon extensive personal experience, these aid organizations are often more oriented with the problem than with a solution. Their expatriots are often paid hundreds of thousands of dollars per year in exchange for living within the target country. These individuals are not incentivized to rock the boat, cause trouble and/or point out problems. Again, individuals that have claimed to be above reproach are, by virtue of this dissertation, now claimed as potentially corrupt.

Toleration should never, ever be exercised by leadership within a post-conflict society, since any public acceptance of corruption will degrade credibility and lead to distrust with the general public. This thesis needs to be further developed and proven, and I am hopeful that future research will consider doing so.

As a new Ph.D., I am clearly inexperienced with the nuances and mannerisms of more sophisticated and seasoned academics. I have not previously published any articles. Similarly, I have never worked for an NGO or government agency promoting anti-corruption policies and programs. Instead, I have lived and worked in each of the five regions studied and have experienced the corrupt behavior, lethal violence, and feelings of insecurity myself on numerous occasions. I have not been beholden or captive to any government's, military's or NGO's vision. Instead, I was living and working in these areas on my own accord, on my own budget, and because of my own motivations. While living and working in these regions of extreme conflict, I have personally seen employees

and leadership of the U.S. Army, United Nations, USAID, and numerous NGOs act corruptly. To be fair, I have also seen acts of heroism, extreme compassion and unbelievable humility. At the core, I believe that people are good, but that some people act badly as a result of poor leadership.

Past and current research would not need to be discarded. However, nearly all past research would need to be refined in the interest of clarifying past ambiguities and establishing a common perspective. This is done in this dissertation's design. I took great care to avoid any model or definition that grossly contradicted past definitions, syntax and/or perspectives. The new corruption models were intended to be inclusive and to incorporate past understanding while also clarifying existing contradictions. Said differently, nearly all past models, theories, and statements concerning corruption are applicable and relevant, but only in certain situations, and only within a limited context. By comparison, the Universal Corruption Model suggested by this dissertation incorporates context and culture, while clarifying past ambiguities.

Although my research focused upon corruption and lethal violence, the existential phenomenological process utilized herein may also have application to other sectors typified by syntax stagnation, status-quo maintenance, or long-term policy ineffectiveness.

Next Steps

Developing a theory from the inside out is always most strongly desired, and so, perhaps, this could have been done from the onset. On the other hand, this was deemed impossible without a more robust definition of corruption. The models and observations developed in this dissertation represent the impressions of eight individuals and thus have

a good chance of being directionally correct. Similarly, so too does the definition of corruption developed and suggested herein.

Next steps should be oriented to: 1) further confirm my results and the proposed definition of corruption; 2) more robustly generalize the Factors of Corruption and the interactivity effects within the Corruption Pyramid; and 3) confirm or dispel the proposed hierarchy of corrupt behavior suggested by the Corruption Hierarchy.

My research involved perspectives from eight participants but did not focus upon corruption, or lack thereof, being exhibited by these particular individuals. It is interesting, but not surprising, to note that “There are not many studies on actual, individual corruption cases” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 39). Also, “Many current studies lack contingency,” and instead look at the situation from a parochial, black and white perspective (De Graaf, 2007, p. 76). By comparison, a more holistic approach is described by Bourieu’s Theory of Action, which is based upon “social divisions [structure] and mental schemata [structures]” being inextricably linked, whereby “we should “focus on the categories of perception, appreciate and lived experience of corrupt officials” (De Graaf, 2007, pp. 70-72). The implications of lived experience imply a phenomenological methodology. Hence, Case Study, with significant interviews and interactions of an individual allegedly acting corruptly within regions of lethal violence, is strongly recommended for future research.

Quantitative approaches are likely to be discarded in favor of other qualitative methodologies for the indefinite future. Studying corruption is like studying love; applying quantitative metrics may, by their very nature, destroy any and all appreciation of the underlying concepts. That being said, Mixed Methods approaches can be

eventually used to more concisely confirm the magnitude of the effects and interrelationships of the Corruption Factors identified, but only after a quorum of researchers has agreed upon the syntax and definition of corruption.

Final Thoughts

Corruption has plagued the stabilization of conflict in many parts of the world. Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars in aid, and the millions of lives lost, many communities, societies, regions, and countries are experiencing protracted conflict, egregious lethal violence, and extensive corruption. To be fair, not all regions have the same levels of corruption. However, the regions of extreme and protracted conflict all have significant, massive amounts of corruption occurring in concert with lethal violence. As Jain (2011) rightly points out, “Although corruption may make one transaction easier, it gives rise to a demand for more corruption; almost like adding sand to machine [that for whatever reason helps the machine work better in the short term, but in the long term] will require more grease” (p. 5). Corruption incites violence, and violence, in turn, allows corruption to remain unchecked, since the formation of institutions is continually delayed. Foreign policy and assistance programs all identify and include zero-corruption as a long-term objective. This is good; yet, the very nature and definition of corruption has been universally misunderstood, misapplied, erroneously categorized and/or incorrectly discussed by academics, program managers, senior statesmen, and world leaders. This is bad, and has resulted in billions of dollars, as well as countless lives, needlessly wasted. Furthermore, the very people, agencies, and countries supporting zero corruption are, themselves, corrupt to a great extent.

Corruption is an evil to society. It represents the worst of ourselves. Yet, it will always be among us, as we are human, and corruption is nothing more than a manifestation of our own human frailty. An isolated, non-coordinated, one-directional mandate and objective of zero tolerance has been required, but has not worked.

This dissertation alleges that world leaders and their organizations have all acted corruptly from time to time. Specifically, world leaders often mandate zero tolerance to corruption, but then act corruptly themselves. This includes the United States, too. Although short-term tolerance has been suggested, a better approach seems to involve maintaining a zero-tolerance mandate while accompanying this objective with similar behavior from our leaders. Nobody is perfect, and we all have an inherent degree of corrupt tendencies. However, it is also true that in many cases, we are acting far from our full potential: “For the leaders of societies who engage in corruption, the temptation to succumb to corruption far exceeds any moral constraints or compassion for those who may suffer as a result. Constraints on their behavior may have to come from the outside” (Jain, 2011, p. 8). Hence, the United States and other developed countries should emphatically insist that standards of behavior be upheld by other world leaders, and we must also provide such an example for others to follow, too. Failure for us to do so should be accompanied by our democratic processes replacing these leaders. Our common voice and lack of tolerance for corruption can, and should, prevail.

This paper and my research takes a small step in better defining corruption, its drivers, and its academic foundations. I hope that this research serves as a catalyst for others. By better understanding corruption we can also better understand ourselves, too,

and by so doing, reduce lethal conflict and feelings of insecurity in regions of extreme conflict around the world.

Tribute, with Reflective Quotations

This dissertation has clarified some issues while inadvertently further confusing others. Irrespective of the reader's personal opinion, the following represent the most introspective observations and statements of this research project's amazing group of eight Participants and provide the basis for focused reflection:

Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda. If you get the military to be corrupt, (and then) if you get the police to be corrupt (and then) if you get the legal or the judicial system to be corrupt . . . then, you are done as a country. The end of corruption always is violence.

Jeremy from Iraq. You can build your own future. I build a lot of stuff by myself, without school. And, from my early life, corruption was everywhere. So, I was desperate about my country. I'm desperate about my country. You've got to be strong in my country. If you are weak, they will take you.

Joshua from Uganda. Corruption is a very big word. [There are] many types of corruption.

David from Afghanistan. The amount of money was so much, that they would be like, 'You know, I can't let this go.' Nobody's asking me. The government is not like [the] Taliban [and is not going] to punish me. I don't go to jail for stealing the money; I don't . . . [and I am not] being sued for stealing the money. And this is a big money, so should I let it go? Maybe not.

Matt from Sudan and South Sudan. You hear about instability in the area in South Sudan. [But], it was not because of a problem; it was created by the government for them to mainly move [illegally take advantage of exchange rates and, thereby, make] money. So, basically war is a man-made war . . . for them to make more money.

Simon from Sudan and South Sudan. And they [government] are using money [obtained through corruption]. They give it to their Dinka . . . [friends and allies] in other places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly what is happening now in South Sudan.

Bridget from Uganda. Whenever we see anything wrong happening and we keep quiet about it, we are giving way to corruption; [allowing it] to thrive, and develop . . . horns, and tentacles . . . and This is how we are going to make corruption [even stronger, allowing it] to develop horns and teeth. And tomorrow, when anyone talks about it, people will be killed.

Daniel from Sudan. I think the middle class are the . . . vanguards of values. The more you have middle class in a society, the more, I think, good values are upheld, and when you take any measures which reduces the middle class, I think you eventually end up with more corruption; and I think [this is] what happened to Sudan in the past years. I can understand some of the justifications for having sanctions, but at the same time, I'm saying that these sanctions have resulted in the reduction of the middle class. [Our population, overall, is constituted by] . . . poorer people now, because there's an out flux of people from Sudan to the outside. Therefore, we have a shrinkage of the middle class, and this has resulted, as I said, . . . [in] more corruption.

“[Society is] wasting time on trying to stop terrorism [and, perhaps, corruption too]?”

The underlying concept is much more important” (Campbell, 2015).

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Appendix A: Demographic Questions

1. Sex?
2. Race?
3. Ethnicity (if applicable)
4. Marital Status?
5. Children?
6. Country of Citizenship?
7. Country of Self-Identification?
8. Education?
9. Current Occupation?
10. Religious Persuasion?

Appendix B: Interview Questions

1. First, I wanted to express my sincere gratitude for you helping me out with this research. I really appreciate it! Let's begin by introducing ourselves and describing the objectives of our time together today, and the associated objectives of this project. My name is Mark Thaller, and I am the Principal Investigator for this research focusing on Corruption and its effects upon Lethality and Feelings of Safety in Regions of Extreme Conflict. I am a U.S. citizen, and have spent a good part of my life serving careers on Wall Street, nuclear engineering, consulting and the U.S. Navy. However, over the past fifteen years I have lived and worked independently and often without government support in regions of extreme conflict, to include Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Liberia, Uganda and Afghanistan. This latter experience has compelled me to try to understand what, why and how such hardship, conflict and lethality is occurring, which is why I am now focusing my efforts through this PhD, to hopefully better understand what I saw, heard and felt. So, this is "me" in sixty seconds.
 - a. Shift to Demographic Questions. If possible, obtain answers to the Demographic Questions before the interview.
2. Can you tell me a little about how yourself, and where you spent your teenage years? And then?
3. Please tell me about a time where you experienced fear (of death or severe harm) for yourself, your family, your friends?
4. Please tell me a little bit about the home, town and country that you are remembering?

5. I understand that you lived through a period where many people died. Please tell me what you think about so many people in your family, town, region, and/or country being killed.
6. What does corruption mean to you?
7. Please describe why you believe that your country, government, military acts (or ever acted) corruptly (or not)?
8. Tell me about a time that corruption that made you upset? Why do you think that this corruption occurred?
9. Tell me about other countries that you think are corrupt? Why do you think that they are acting the way they do?
10. Please tell me why you think that some countries are more corrupt than others, and why you feel this way.
11. Please tell me why you think that corruption in your country, your town, in the military and/or anywhere affected (or did not affect) your feelings of security or the number of people killed.
12. Have your feelings about corruption changed over your lifetime? Why do you think they have changed?
13. Please tell me about a time where you felt very safe? Why do you think this example came to mind?
14. Let's talk about the people in charge of the government, law enforcement, military, legal system and their degree of corruption? What comes to mind when you think of these people?

15. What has a person, group, or department in your country done, in your opinion, that has most reduced violent death, and/or most reduced related mortality and/or most enhanced your feelings of security? Why do you think that these efforts were so successful? Let's take some time to ponder this before answering.
16. What has a person, group or department done that has most increased violent death, and most reduced your feelings of security? Why do you think that these efforts were so unsuccessful? Let's take some time to ponder this before answering.
17. Probing will occur in each instance where the subject refers to death, violence, or fear with questions like:
 - a. What you were thinking and feeling when that occurred?
 - b. Why do you think that this (violence/death/mistreatment) may have occurred?
 - c. What do you think the other party was thinking and feeling when this occurred?

Appendix C: Recruiting Poster



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Principal investigator

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You are invited to participate in a PhD research:

Corruption, Context, Culture & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict

Requirements:

- **Be 18 years old, or older**
- **Have experienced corruption, and have opinions about corruption**
- **Have lived, worked and/or been raised in a region of extreme, deadly conflict, such as Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia or Uganda.**
 - **Experienced violent death of at least one friend or family member**
 - **Lived in region of violence for at least 3 years after age 14**
 - **Worked in region of violence for at least 5 years**

The purpose of this study is to:

1. Examine if, when and how various levels of corruption within leadership and governance directly and/or indirectly affect lethal violence and associated feelings of security among the general populace within regions of extreme violent conflict, and to
2. Examine contextual, cultural and perspective-based nuances associated with robustly defining corruption within a global construct.

The goals of this study are to:

1. Identify, outline and describe drivers, indicators and factors of corruption as they relate to feelings of insecurity and fear of death by lethal violence within regions of extreme violence.
2. Clarify the definition and syntax of “corruption” within a more robust, global application. Theories and explanations will be developed and postured, if possible, and as necessary.
3. Examine and analyze the possibility that the insistence of zero corruption (within

the current paradigm of corruption) may be inadvertently exacerbating and/or accelerating the resumption of lethal violence and feelings of insecurity within regions of extreme violence.

4. Add to the body of knowledge on corruption, with practical applications to international conflict and post-conflict situations, to include war, terrorism and genocide.

Where will interviews take place?

Interviews will take place at a mutually agreed upon location, such as the interviewee's home, a local hotel, coffee shop and/or any other location of the subject's choosing, either in person (face-to-face), or via video conferencing (e.g. Skype, etc.).

What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study?

You will verbally respond to a series of 10 to 20 questions posed by Mr. Thaller. These questions will be associated with your opinions, experiences and impressions about corruption, violence, fatalities and feelings of insecurity. The interview should not take longer than 90 minutes. You may terminate the interview and withdraw from the study at any time.

What language will be used for this study?

All questions will be posed in English. Responses will also be in English.

Is there any audio or video recording?

There will not be any video recording. However, this research project will include audio recording of the interview.

Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything?

There are no costs to you. Payments will not be made for participating in this study.

How will you keep my information private?

The transcripts of the tapes will not have any information that could be linked to you. All records of the interview will be maintained under lock and key, and held in strictest confidence.

I am interested. What do I do now?

Please let the person who provided you this Recruitment Flyer know that you are interested. He/she will advise you on next steps, which will include gathering some very basic information, such as your name, age, email address (if available), telephone number and Skype address (if available).

Appendix D: Recruiting Email

Subject: Research on Corruption and Lethal Violence; Participants needed for Interviewing

Date: xxxxxxxx

From: Mark Thaller <mark.thaller@gmail.com>

Dear (insert potential participant's name):

I am performing research on corruption, and am hoping that you may be available to assist me by being interviewed. Please take a look at the Recruitment Poster below. It is also attached to this email in its complete format. Thanks very much for your help, and for thinking of other people who may also be available to help.

Best Wishes,

Mark Thaller
Principal investigator
8736 Lords View Loop
Gainesville, VA 20155
+001-202-577-6062 (cell)
mt976@nova.edu

Appendix E: Consent Form



NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences

Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled:

Corruption, Context, Culture & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict

Funding Source: None.

IRB protocol #: 2017-298

Principal investigator

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Jc2017@nova.edu

For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact:

Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB)
Nova Southeastern University
+001-954-262-5369 or Toll Free at +001-866-499-0790
Email: IRB@nsu.nova.edu

Site Information

Interviews will take place at a mutually agreed upon location, such as the interviewee's home, a local hotel, coffee shop and/or private office, or any other location of the subject's choosing, either in person (face-to-face) or via video conference using SKYPE or other similar software.

What is the purpose of this Consent Form?

You are invited to participate in a research study. This Consent Form provides you with general information about the study, and about how your privacy will be safeguarded.

What are the purpose and goals of this study?

The purpose of this study is to:

3. Examine if, when and how various levels of corruption within leadership and governance directly and/or indirectly affect lethal violence and associated feelings

of security among the general populace within regions of extreme violent conflict, and to

4. Examine contextual, cultural and perspective-based nuances associated with robustly defining corruption within a global construct.

The goals of this study are to:

5. Identify, outline and describe drivers, indicators and factors of corruption as they relate to feelings of insecurity and fear of death by lethal violence within regions of extreme violence.
6. Clarify the definition and syntax of “corruption” within a more robust, global application. Theories and explanations will be developed and postured, if possible, and as necessary.
7. Examine and analyze the possibility that the insistence of zero corruption (within the current paradigm of corruption) may be inadvertently exacerbating and/or accelerating the resumption of lethal violence and feelings of insecurity within regions of extreme violence.
8. Add to the body of knowledge on corruption, with practical applications to international conflict and post-conflict situations, to include war, terrorism and genocide.

Why are you asking me?

We are inviting you to participate because you have lived within a region of extreme violence. There will be between 6 and 10 participants in this research study.

What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study?

You will verbally respond to a series of 10 to 20 questions posed by Mr. Thaller. These questions will be associated with your opinions, experiences and impressions about corruption, violence, fatalities and feelings of insecurity. The interview should take no longer than 90 minutes. However, you may terminate the interview and withdraw from the study at any time.

What language will be used for this study?

All questions will be posed in English. Your responses will be provided in English.

Is there any audio or video recording?

There will not be any video recording. However, this research project will include audio recording of the interview. This audio recording will be available to be heard by the researcher, Mr. Mark Thaller, personnel from the IRB, the dissertation chair, Dr. Jason Campbell and personnel from a professional transcription service constrained by non-disclosure agreements. The audio recording will be transcribed by a professional transcription service, with confidentiality maintained as a result of non-disclosure agreements between Mr. Thaller and the professional service. The recording, if in analog format, will be re-recorded in electronic format with the analog copy immediately destroyed. All rough notes will also be converted to electronic format, and stored in an identically secure fashion. The electronic files will be kept securely in Mr. Thaller’s home office in a locked cabinet. The electronic recording as well as all written notes (in

electronic format) will be kept for 36 months from the end of the study. The files containing the recorded interview as well as all rough notes and data corresponding to your interview will be destroyed after that time by destroying the external electronic storage device upon which the data is stored. The professional transcription service will destroy all files and records immediately upon delivery of the transcription. Because your voice will be potentially identifiable by anyone who hears the recording, your confidentiality for things you say on the recording cannot be guaranteed, although Mr. Thaller will make best efforts to limit access to the recorded interview and data as described in this paragraph.

What are the dangers to me?

Risks to you are minimal to moderate. These risks range from being no greater than other risks you experience every day, but could be as great as psychological distress, extreme sadness, anger and/or other emotions as a result of recalling unpleasant incidents. This psychological distress can also take the form of being embarrassed by your responses should your identity and the results of this interview become inadvertently exposed. Being recorded means that confidentiality cannot be promised. If you have questions about the research, your research rights, or if you experience an injury because of the research please contact Mr. Thaller at +001-202-577-6062. You may also contact the IRB at the numbers indicated above with questions about your research rights.

Should psychological distress occur, the interview will be temporarily halted, or permanently terminated, with recommended counseling and assistance from mental health professionals.

Are there any benefits to me for taking part in this research study?

There are no benefits to you for participating.

Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything?

There are no costs to you. Payment will not be made for participating in this study.

How will you keep my information private?

The interview questions will not ask you for any information that could be linked to you. The transcripts of the tapes will not have any information that could be linked to you. As mentioned, the audio recording files will be destroyed 36 months after the study ends. All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless law requires disclosure. The IRB, regulatory agencies, or Dr. Campbell (Chairman of this research committee) may review research records.

What if I do not want to participate or I want to leave the study?

You have the right to leave this study at any time, and can refuse to participate at any time. If you do decide to leave or you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty. However, if you choose to withdraw, any and all information collected about you **before** the date you leave the study will be kept in the research records for 36 months from the conclusion of the study and may be used as a part of the research.

Other Considerations:

If the researchers learn anything that might change your mind about being involved, you will be immediately informed, with details provided. It is very important that your decision be voluntary, and that your decision is made with full knowledge of all aspects of this study.

Voluntary Consent by Participant:

By signing below, you indicate that

- This study has been explained to you
- You have read this document or it has been read to you
- Your questions about this research study have been answered
- You have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions in the future or contact them in the event of a research-related injury
- You have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel questions about your study rights
- You are entitled to and have been given a copy of this form after you have read and signed it
- You voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled: *Corruption, Context, Culture & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict*

Participant's Signature: _____ Date: _____

Participant's Name: _____ Date: _____

Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: _____ Date: _____

Appendix F: IRB Approval Letter



NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Institutional Review Board

MEMORANDUM

To: **Mark Thaller**

From: **Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D., Center Representative, Institutional Review Board**

Date: **April 27, 2017**

Re: **IRB #: 2017-298; Title, “Corruption, Context, Culture & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict”**

I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level. Based on the information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB review under **45 CFR 46.101(b) (Exempt Category 2)**. You may proceed with your study as described to the IRB. As principal investigator, you must adhere to the following requirements:

1. 1) **CONSENT:** If recruitment procedures include consent forms, they must be obtained in such a manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the process affords subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers from those directly involved in the research, and have sufficient time to consider their participation after they have been provided this information. The subjects must be given a copy of the signed consent document, and a copy must be placed in a secure file separate from de-identified participant information. Record of informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from the conclusion of the study.
2. 2) **ADVERSE EVENTS/UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS:** The principal investigator is required to notify the IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D., respectively) of any adverse reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as a result of this study. Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury, depression as a result of participation in the study, life-threatening situation, death, or loss of confidentiality/anonymity of subject. Approval may be withdrawn if the problem is serious.

3. 3) AMENDMENTS: Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to implementation. Please be advised that changes in a study may require further review depending on the nature of the change. Please contact me with any questions regarding amendments or changes to your study.

The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human subjects prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46) revised June 18, 1991.

Cc: Jason Campbell, Ph.D. Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D.

3301 College Avenue • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314-7796 (954) 262-0000 • 800-672-7223, ext. 5369 • Email: irb@nova.edu • Web site: www.nova.edu/irb