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The Basis of Angolan Nationalism

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THE BASIS OF ANGOLAN NATIONALISM

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate Faculty
Central Washington State College

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Education

by
Albert V. Vandenberg
December, 1968

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INTRODUCTION

Independence and freedom are magic words in Africa today, and they have been the primary objectives of nationalist leaders in colonial areas for more than a generation. To the African, whether he resides in Biafra, Angola, or Rhodesia, independence and freedom signify dignity, position in the world, and new opportunities for social development and economic growth.

For centuries Westerners have referred to Africa as the Dark Continent. This has not been a reference to Africans as black people, but, rather, a realization of the West that little was known about the African continent, its history or people, not to mention its great achievements and civilizations. Westerners had never heard of Zimbabwe or known the ancient glory of the kingdoms of Mali, Ghana, or Axum. Exploration and the slave trade and translations from Arab historians and geographers were responsible for the initial Western interest in the continent.

Africa, in spite of all we know about it, remains dark to the non-African world, and this is truly unfortunate at a time when the "eyes" of the world look to Africa for political support and economic resources.

Man's inhumanity to man seldom has been exhibited anywhere on Earth as on the Dark Continent. How long is it destined to remain dark to the eyes of the governments of the world?

Western colonial powers have had a tremendous opportunity to bridge the gap between the West and Africa, and, indeed, there have been great material achievements that benefited both the colonies and the colonial powers. However, the intellectual trust that should exist naturally between all human beings has been almost totally absent. Herein lies the crux of the problem existent now, as in the past, between Africa and the world.

Since World War II, thirty-eight African nations have gained their independence, at the expense of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. These nations emerged with representative governments. Of these thirty-eight nations, however, few have retained their representative democratic structure, most having become highly centralized and antagonistic to the Western democracies.

This centralized structure is of concern to the West, since the failure of Western colonial policies and the political breakdown that ensues may lead to another kind of colonialism. For these reasons then, more must be learned concerning the people and how they perceive their national destinies. Then, the West must aid in

their achievement. Only then can the West feel it understands its burden to the emerging nations.

Portugal has the largest empire remaining in Africa. Portugal's history there dates to the Columbian period, and its government boasts that a colonial philosophy different from the other colonial powers in Africa is at work. The Portuguese speak of a "civilizing mission," "cultural assimilation," and the "Lusitanization" of its colonies. The determination of Portugal to see its policies through and the determination of Angolan nationalists to exact independence and freedom from the Portuguese warrant an investigation of the current revolution and the basis of Angolan nationalism.

If the colonial powers in Africa had been cognizant of their responsibility to their dependencies, would their policies have been altered to avert upheaval and disaster? Would the French government have followed its traditional colonial policies and sacrificed thousands of lives in Algeria, only to lose it? Would Great Britain risk another Mau-Mau uprising for the sake of preserving British property holdings in Kenya, only to lose them? If these "enlightened" colonial policies had recognized the danger signals and taken positive action, perhaps the African block would be more

receptive to Western ideology and policy. Or, is there a larger problem? Are the colonies so indispensable to the welfare of the mother country, for example, Angola to Portugal, that the Portuguese government will fight to the end to retain its empire?

In this world of change, ideas and policies must be constantly evaluated to encompass the real; reactionary policies can only court disaster. An understanding of the past can provide insight into the present and offer guidelines for future action. An investigation of Angola has exposed great weaknesses in Portuguese colonial organization that must be altered. The naming of Premier Marcello Caetano to replace the ailing President Antonio Salazar may permit movement in this direction.

The preservation of Africa to permit Africans to develop their cultures and traditions and to develop pride in past achievements must be recognized by both East and West. Both the communist countries and the Western democracies look at Africa with a serious political myopia. Africa cannot be expected to develop as pro-West or pro-communist but must be permitted to develop as pro-African.

Africans were dispossessed socially, economically, politically, and mentally by colonialism. With the loss

of their homelands came enslavement, persecution, an inferior status, discrimination, and dependency, involving the loss of freedom and dignity. A neo-colonialism is not the answer to Africa's problems.

All peoples have a right to freedom and dignity. This must be restored to Africa and to the Angolan peoples if these nations are to assume responsible positions in the world community.

This paper examines the divergent rolls of both Portugal and Angola in this quest.

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA

A. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ANGOLA

Angola lies between $4^{\circ}22'S$ and $18^{\circ}03'S$ in latitude and between $24^{\circ}05'E.G.$ and $11^{\circ}41'E.G.$ in longitude on the southwest Atlantic coast of Africa. Its area of 481,351 square miles includes the enclave of Cabinda, located north of the Congo River and separated from Angola by a twenty-mile-wide corridor of land. Angola is bordered by the Democratic Republic of the Congo--Kinshasa--on the north; on the east by Zambia; and on the south by the Trust Territory of Southwest Africa. North of Cabinda lies the Congo Republic--Brazzaville (see Map 1). The name "Angola" is a Portuguese corruption of the word "ngola," meaning chief.

Angola is, in a geographical sense, a transitional country. In the north are equatorial forests and grasslands, and the marshes of the Congo with their luxuriant verdure and torpid heat; in the south, the semi-arid plains and harsh desert east of the Mossamedes littoral. The coast is fringed by a plain which in the north has a width of 150 miles or more but narrows until

it practically disappears near 17° south latitude. Behind this coastal plain, the land rises in steep escarpments to the plateau. This vast plateau covers most of the country. North from Lobito the climate is tropical. South of this city, the cold Benguela current influences the environment; temperatures are cooler with diurnal and annual changes less extreme.

In general, the plateau is adequately watered, averaging 59 inches of precipitation annually. The most productive area in this tableland region is the Bié Plateau, Angola's loftiest agricultural region and most important watershed. (See Map 2.)

B. DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF ANGOLA

In 1960, the last year of an official census, the population of Angola was 4,832,677, of which just under 200,000 were white.¹ Latest statistics, however, estimated that in 1965 the total population rose to 5,215,000, of which 210,000 were white or mestizo.²

¹"The Angolan War," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 12 (February-March, 1962), p. 69.

²"White Outposts in Southern Africa," Editorial Research Reports, Vol. II, No. 17 (November 2, 1966), p. 815.

Its inhabitants consist of numerous tribes with long histories of separateness in their cultural heritage and lines of authority. The great majority of the native peoples of Angola are of Bantu-Negro stock, and only a small minority are non-Bantu Negroes. In the south there are some Hottentots and Bushmen. In Angola the term Negro is generally used to designate the entire indigenous population of the country, while the term Bantu designates those peoples who have migrated over the centuries into the Congo Basin from an area between Lake Tschad and the Upper Nile. The most important tribes are the Kimbundu, who live in a rectangular area inland from Luanda and eastward, and the Ovimbundu, who occupy the Benguela Highland in central Angola (see Map 3). These two groups comprise more than one-half the total population, and it is difficult to envision effective political control of an independent Angola without the support of these two groups. The Kikongos, who live in the Portuguese Congo, are politically, culturally, and historically linked to the Bakongos of the Congo-Kinshasa.³

³Thomas Okuma, Angola in Ferment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 19.

The most important group south of the Kikongo tribe to reside in and around Luanda, the capital, and east to Malange are the Kimbundu peoples. Urban city life has affected greatly the outlook and aspirations of these people; they are more influenced by Western ideals than other tribal groups, speak fluent Portuguese, have many students in the "liceus," and are, therefore, more tied to the economy and the political ideals of the Portuguese than are other tribes.⁴ The Ovimbundu, who are located in the central plateau area east of the Kimbundu, are the largest group in Angola but are politically somewhat less vocal, probably because of their geographical isolation from the main current of political thought which centers itself in the populous areas. The Cuanhamas, who live in southern Angola, are semi-nomadic cattle raisers, and, because of their isolation from major population centers, have been somewhat insulated from the "tide" of nationalism that has influenced many Angolans. Independence, to the Cuanhamas, means a return to political freedom which predates the period of Portuguese authority over their political destinies. The Cuanhamas have not identified with other nationalist groups. In the northeast corner of the

⁴Okuma, op. cit., p. 19.

country are the Lunda people, considered one of the most "primitive" groups in Angola and only recently active participants in the struggle for independence from Portugal. Also less influenced by nationalism are the Nganguela, located in the southwest section of the country. In spite of the apparent differences in nationalistic fervor between these people, the tribal leadership appear quite knowledgeable about one another's political aspirations.

When the colonial powers divided the African continent at the end of the nineteenth century, many tribes were sub-divided by artificial political boundaries. In Angola this "geographic" separation of tribes created ethnographic regions not oriented to an Angolan state. Current tribal populations are, therefore, only a part of a larger tribal grouping (see Table I).

TABLE I⁵

Population of Ethnic Groups in Angola

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Population (Est. 1965)</u>
Kikongo	500,000
Kimbundu	1,100,000
Ovimbundu	1,500,000
Lunda-Chokwe	360,000
Nganguela	330,000
Nyaneka-Humbe	200,000
Ambo-Cuanhama	63,000
Herrero	25,000

⁵Ronald H. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 56-58.

The description of the major tribal groupings indicates the great diversity that exists within the country and points to the obvious fact that the political boundaries of Angola bear little relationship to the ethnographic or physical makeup of the country. Ethnic groups are many, and tribal boundaries are only loosely related to political boundaries. For example, the Kikongo people overlap territorial borders and populate large districts in the two Congo republics. The Cuanhama people of southern Angola are a part of the larger Ambo tribe of Southwest Africa.

The physical boundaries of Angola further complicate the "solidarity" of an Angolan state, since the physical limits of the country are often rivers or other features that enhance movement rather than provide a barrier to it. The Congo, Kwango, Kasai, Kwando, Cubango, and Cunene Rivers make up over 1000 miles of border between Angola and neighboring countries, and river routes have always been avenues of movement and communication, transmitting cultural ideas and enhancing the movement of peoples. The relative absence of physical barriers should now aid in linking the corners of Angola politically and economically. Inter-tribal warfare has ceased, and the common bond of nationalism is now possible.

Internal and external forces are bringing these tribal groups closer together; even though considerable differences separate them, the common link of cultural homogeneity exists to serve as a bonding agent for future political enlightenment.⁶

C. THE ECONOMY OF ANGOLA

The most important single aspect of Angola's economy is its tremendous potential. This lends some insight into Angola's present economic condition--a state of underdevelopment. In spite of this condition, the country has undergone tremendous economic change in the past few years--both in industrial and agricultural investment. The enormous economic potential rests with the under-exploited mineral resources and the underdevelopment of arable land. However, a rather primitive communications system and a general lack of cooperation between the white population and the Africans hinder the development of these resources.

Agriculture is the chief occupation in Angola, but methods of cultivation are mainly primitive.

⁶Jan M. Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 19.

The Angolan sub-soil is rich in natural resources, especially mineral deposits. The value of these resources is undetermined, since only in recent years have exploration and exploitation been undertaken. Limited financial resources and a reluctance to permit extensive foreign investment also retarded the development of Angola's sub-soil resources (until after 1961). The present development of mineral resources is politically motivated. With great amounts of foreign capital invested in Angola, the Portuguese government is banking on foreign political support to protect these financial interests, a modern-day example of "dollar diplomacy." Also, through economic development the Portuguese government is able to reduce the influence of revolutionary leaders who use the existent substandard economic system as evidence of Portuguese inability and corruption. Portugal, however, does not possess the financial resources to carry on a large-scale economic development without permitting huge foreign capital investment.

The 1961 revolt made it clear to President Salazar that economic policies in Angola were in need of revision. The economic plight of the Angolan citizen had to be eased if his allegiance was to be maintained, and Angola's

economic base had to be expanded to help pay for increased military expenditures if Portugal was to remain in Africa. Foreign capital investment provided a partial answer.

The Alfred Krupp Corporation of Germany and the Kawasaki Steel Corporation of Japan invested in the steel industry.⁷ The Belgian firm Petrangel⁸ and the American Gulf Oil Company explored and located large oil deposits.⁹ The development of basic industries attracted investment in the secondary industries. The General Motors Corporation, General Tire Company, Société Pechiney, Berliot Tractor Company, Petrofina Belge, Krupp, and Opel were among the investors in Angolan manufacturing industries.¹⁰ Significant investments in the coffee and diamond industries also increased production, thereby helping to ease Portugal's financial drain.

⁷"Colonial Struggle," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, Vol. VI, No. 4 (August-September, 1966), p. 342.

"Colonial Struggle," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, Vol. V. No. 6 (December, 1965-January, 1966), p. 306.

⁸"New Oil Strike?" Africa Report, Vol. XI, No. 7 (October, 1966), p. 42.

⁹"Oil Find in Cabinda," African Recorder, Vol. VI, No. 1 (January 1-14, 1967), p. 1528.

¹⁰"Portuguese Africa," American Opinion Review, Vol. VII, No. 7 (July-August, 1964), p. 8.

The above data are important to illustrate the dependence of Portugal on Angola if a favorable balance of trade and a balanced budget are to be maintained. The increased military expenditures necessitated by the revolution which began in 1961 have only increased Portuguese dependence on the Angolan economy.

The interdependence of the Portuguese and Angolan economies is evident, and the relationship of the two is inextricably wrapped up in the internal problems of Portugal. Portugal, in addition, is short of capital. Her industries in Angola as well as in Europe are owned and run by foreign industrial or investment firms. Most of the vital sectors of the economy are dominated by British, French, and Belgian capital with great increases in American and German investments in recent years. There has been, in general, a lack of educational opportunity in both Portugal and Angola. As a result the population does not possess the technical skills necessary to overcome foreign dominance. Angolans and Portuguese alike are thus placed in a position of subservience and must rely upon outside technical aid. In short, Portugal is not in a position to give economic aid to Angola without foreign intrusion.

The object of Portugal's economic policy seems clear--to influence large companies to invest heavily, to

derive increased revenue by sharing in the profits of these enterprises, and, in the event of an African uprising, count on these firms to mobilize public opinion on her behalf in their respective countries.

The economic future of Angola is one of promise. Hindering this development is the economic backwardness of Portugal, itself an economic colony.

D. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ANGOLAN HISTORY

Portugal's contemporary problems in Angola are linked to the great exploits of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a century after the Bantu migrated to the Congo Basin. From this early period, Portuguese history has been bound to Africa and to the great Lusitanian exploits of the past. Portuguese manifest destiny owes its conception to the ambitions of Prince Henry, "the Navigator." Prince Henry was motivated by a five-fold purpose: to explore the unknown African coastline south of Cape Bojador; to link Portugal commercially with any Christian nations discovered; to determine whether Mohammedan traders were influential in this unknown part of Africa; to seek Christian allies; and to win Christian converts.¹¹ (See Map 4.)

¹¹Chilcote, op. cit., p. 3.

More significant than his accomplishments were two ideas which, once in motion, caught the imagination of the Portuguese and became responsible for what is now termed the Portuguese "mind"--the economic integration of overseas enclaves with Portugal, and the conversion of the native population to Christianity.

The visit of Diogo Cão to the Congo River in 1484 marked the initial attempt of Portuguese explorers to carry out the "civilizing mission" of the mother country as envisioned by Prince Henry. On this voyage he carried gifts to the Kongo chieftain King Nzinga-a-Cuum and implored him to embrace the Christian faith. This early venture established a peaceful relationship between the Manicongo and Portugal; the Portuguese motivation was "to evangelize and in a sense nationalize, to seek alliance, not conquest."¹² From 1506-1512, strong ties were established between Kongo and Portugal.

Alfonso, who replaced Nzinga-a-Cuum upon his death in 1506, asked for and got priests, teachers, masons, and technicians to help with military matters; he also sent Kongolese to Portugal for their education,

¹²James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 11.

in return supplying gifts of slaves and copper.¹³ By 1510 the Portuguese had established themselves as superior to the Kongolese and racial harmony was, in general, absent. Alfonso requested that King Manuel send a representative to the Kongo with special jurisdiction over the Portuguese citizens to help reestablish equality between the races. In response, King Manuel issued a "regimento," which was the codification of a program of Christianization and Lusitanization. This document, unique for its time, was a blueprint for the acculturation of the native population.¹⁴

Ironically, then, the cultural assimilation of the population began at the request of Alfonso, an African, still the most revered political figure in Angolan history.

The regimento failed to achieve its purpose even though its implementation became the focal point of colonial policy. Its failure was due mainly to the undisciplined Portuguese colonials and government officials in carrying out the intent of the program.¹⁵ The kingdom

¹³Vansina, op. cit., p. 48.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Duffy, op. cit., p. 16.

of Alfonso, after 1522, declined in importance as Portuguese attention shifted to São Tomé, an island fast becoming prosperous as an entrepôt for the slave trade.

Angola's rise to prominence, though partially a natural consequence of Portuguese expansion below the equator, was stimulated by several conditions in the sixteenth century. São Tomé needed to tap a rich new area to keep pace with the demand for slaves, and the Guinea trade could not produce them in sufficient numbers. Attention focused southward toward Angola because the "ngola" wanted to please his European friends by opening the slave trade.¹⁶ As a result Portuguese occupation shifted to Angola and Benguela. A militant policy which charged Paulo Dias de Novais with conquering and colonizing Angola was adopted in 1575. Its prime purpose was to conquer and colonize the coastal and interior regions. Its ultimate objectives were the acquisition of land for European settlement, the expansion of the slave trade, and the discovery and control of mineral wealth, especially the silver mines believed to exist in the interior.¹⁷

The Angola chief had wanted contact with Portugal since 1519, probably because the slave trade would enrich

¹⁶Duffy, ibid., p. 137.

¹⁷Chilcote, op. cit., p. 66.

him and heighten his prestige. To tighten its hold over Angola, Portugal expanded its influence into the interior regions. Wars of "pacification" were fought with native tribes, and white Portuguese were encouraged to settle in Africa. The conquest of the interior began in 1575, and, in a series of wars lasting forty years, the Portuguese and the Angolans were able to control this region. The subsequent linking of Angola to Portugal by a treaty signed in 1656 ushered in the miseries of the slave trade which were to continue until the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The Portuguese were persistent in their efforts to convert the native population to Christianity and Western culture. After the advent of the slave trade into Angola; however, with slavery the main Portuguese pre-occupation, force became the principal method of persuasion.¹⁸ The ultimate goals of Portuguese occupation and settlement were to achieve cultural integration with the Angolan population, to relieve internal Portuguese problems of overpopulation and economic poverty, and to establish political superiority over a larger geographical area.¹⁹

¹⁸Chilcote, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 7-8.

The slave trade by its very nature destroyed any humanizing attempts by the Portuguese. Having solely a materialistic purpose, the slave trade constituted the greatest contradiction in Lusitanian policy. It denied equality of the races and implicitly implied that the Angolan was inferior, thus destroying any meaningful assimilation. As one missionary stated, "At the side of the missionary who carried salvation," Father Barroso lamented, "was the buyer of men who destroyed the ties linking father to son and mother to daughter."²⁰ For over two hundred years the inferior status of the native was perpetuated by the slave trade.

By official decree the slave trade was abolished in 1878, and, as would be expected, was met with a response demanding its continuance for "humanitarian" reasons.

. . . and should the measure be strictly enforced, the total annihilation and ruin of the thriving and rising cotton and sugarcane plantations, etc., will be the result

It is a pity that philanthropy should blindly put so sudden a stop to a custom that has existed from time immemorial, and of which the evils are, in a country like Angola, exceedingly slight. The effect of this measure will be to destroy its nascent industry, the

²⁰Quote of Father Barroso, Duffy, op. cit., p. 23.

only means for its progress and development, and will plunge a great part of its population into helpless misery for years to come. Let slavery be abolished by all means, but only in the most gradual manner, and in proportion to the industrial and moral advancement of the race.²¹

This statement again reiterates confidence in the idea of the acculturation of the native, even though it met failure in the Kongo and had been partially abandoned in Angola.

It was apparent by the last quarter of the nineteenth century that competition for the interior regions of Africa would become intense; with no internal frontiers all Africa inland from the coasts was considered to be, like America in the time of Columbus, without government and subject to the jurisdiction of whoever arrived first. The Portuguese government aspired to consolidate inland holdings by joining the colonies of Angola and Mozambique, creating a trans-African empire.

In response to the competition for African territory, Bismarck called a conference in Berlin in 1885 to submit the African problem to international regulation. This conference attempted to draft an international code to govern the way in which European powers wishing to

²¹Joachim J. Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo (London: Macmillan and Company, 1875), Vol. II, p. 41.

acquire African territory should proceed.²² The conference determined that a European power with holdings on the coast had prior rights in the "back" country. Occupation could not be on paper only, however, but had to consist of real occupation by administrators or troops, each power giving proper notice as to the territories it considered its own.

A wild scramble for "real occupation" quickly followed. The Portuguese annexed huge domains to Angola, with the intent of legitimizing its claim. Portugal was able to retain control over Angola partially because Germany, Great Britain, and France preferred to have this territory held by a minor power rather than by one of their significant rivals.²³

The period following 1900 provided Portugal with a second opportunity to revitalize its age-old colonial policy, since it was not until the period from 1900 to 1914 that the interior Angolan tribes were put under effective Portuguese administrative control. For the first time in Portuguese history, however, probably because of competition for territory with other powers,

²²Sybil Eyre Crowe, The Berlin West Africa Conference (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1942), p. 190.

²³Ibid., pp. 169-172.

the extension of Portuguese influence brought with it a total loss of native independence.

With the loss of independence and the absorption of control by Portuguese authorities, certain benefits accrued to the native population. Tribal slave trading was halted and the depopulation of tribes ended. The Portuguese government introduced legitimate commerce into the interior regions for the first time and established the initial rudiments of formalized education. With tribal peace assured, diseases were effectively combatted, and roads linked the interior to the coast.²⁴

When the Oliviera Salazar regime took over in the late twenties, the "civilizing mission" and economic exploitation continued to dominate colonial policy. For a time empires were fashionable, and Portuguese spokesmen during the thirties did not shrink from boasting that the colonies existed for the glory and profit of Portugal. After World War II, however, such policies ceased to be a source of respectability, but the economic objectives of Portuguese policy in Africa remained unchanged: cheap

²⁴W. E. Abraham, The Mind of Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 118.

labor, lucrative markets, and the exploitation of raw material resources.

Significant in the historical relationship between Angola and Portugal was the declaration in 1951 that Angola's status had been changed from a colony to that of an overseas territory, thus becoming an integral part of Portugal itself. This change in relationship brought no noticeable change to Angola, however. Following World War II Angolans were aware that the war had brought independence to many colonial areas.

African nationalism began to evolve in the Portuguese territories in the late 1940's and early 1950's; not until the early 1960's, however, did nationalism serve as the impetus for direct action and struggle for independence.²⁵

At what point in Angolan history did revolt against Portugal become inevitable? What was the last real opportunity President Salazar had to save a portion of the Lusitanian mission? It seems clear that the political disruption after World War II should have provided the impetus. The war had meant economic paralysis and political stagnation to the Portuguese colonies. After World War II, the British labour government advocated emancipation of the colonies and set the political machinery in motion. There was no sense of urgency in Portugal! In addition, World

²⁵Chilcote, op. cit., p. 49.

War II was a struggle against fascism and its anti-liberal, anti-parliamentarian, anti-democratic structure, which Salazar represented to much of the world. The war had germinated ideas against such a political structure and identified it as tyranny.

President Salazar did not heed the warnings. Instead, there was a reaffirmation of Portugal's colonial policy, essentially the same policy that dates to the age of Prince Henry. The vision of a Pan-Lusitanian community still inspires Portugal. Luso-Africans and Luso-Asians are to be joined together by a special bond: the loyalty born of miscegenation. This loyalty, it is claimed, is able to override all others. "One State, One Race, One Faith, and One Civilization"--these are the bonds that unite an empire. This has become, despite its agelessness, a part of the new mystique.

Speaking at the Colonial Governor's Conference in 1933, Salazar declared: 'I have in mind now the great old figures of Portuguese colonization. They pass back and forth in my memory, these men of yesterday and those of today, the soldiers and administrators of the public trust in Africa and the East. . . .'²⁶

²⁶K. Madhu Panikkar, Angola in Flames (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 4.

E. PORTUGUESE COLONIAL POLICY

Present colonial policy has its origins in the past, and has been justified on both moral and legal grounds. The outlines of colonial policy were clearly established during the period of expansion and colonization with the political objective being to control parts of Africa and other areas and to weld these areas into an empire based on friendly alliances. The economic objective was the dominance of international markets by controlling a network of key commercial centers. Another objective was the evangelization and Lusitanization of the uncivilized peoples and the instilling of European culture into the indigenous Africans' cultural values. The latter objective, the "civilizing mission," is of paramount importance to present Portuguese governmental philosophy.

This policy assumes, by the acculturation or assimilation of the indigenous population, the superiority of western culture, and, more specifically, Portuguese culture.

Portuguese attention is focused on native policy, which in theory favors assimilation of the African. Education is the vehicle by which integration is to be achieved.

According to Portuguese theoreticians like Joaquim de Silva Cunha, the policy of assimilation meant essentially that all inhabitants of the colonial territories, whether white or black and irrespective of their level of cultural development, must be regarded as equal in all respects and subject to the laws of the mother country. A policy of assimilation is founded on the idea that there are no essential differences between the races. In essence, all men are equal. . . .²⁷

A multiracial society based on Portuguese citizenship with its concomitant integrated structure is to be the result of the colonial policy.

Today, as in the past, the qualified African may attain, if he chooses, full Portuguese citizenship and attain the status of the civilized non-indigenous population. The standards are difficult and are stringently applied. Applicants must be at least eighteen years of age, be of good character, and possess those qualities necessary to exercise all the rights granted to the Portuguese citizen. He must speak Portuguese well and prove his ability to support himself and his family. Anyone who has evaded military service or has been declared a deserter is ineligible for assimilation.²⁸

²⁷Chilcote, op. cit., p. 16.

²⁸Duffy, op. cit., p. 295.

Thus, the end result of colonial policy is to assimilate all indigenous Africans into a harmonious multiracial society. This multiracial society is not the mere coexistence of different racial or ethnic groups, but is, rather, a society where all ethnic groups are closely integrated and knit together with a deep feeling of oneness.²⁹ "Full citizenship," as conceived by President Salazar, should be a "noble legal concept," and the granting of civil rights should correspond to a genuine and lasting evolution, or else the peoples run the risk of regression and a return to tribalism.

'A law recognizing citizenship takes minutes to draft and can be made right away,' he said. 'A citizen, that is a man fully and consciously integrated into a civilized political society, takes centuries to achieve.'³⁰

The question-mark concerning Portuguese colonial policy does not lie with the stated objectives or the legal codes themselves, but with the extent to which they hold meaning for the people to whom they are designed to give significance. Of the present population, approximately

²⁹Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Foreign Policy (Lisbon: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publication, 1965), p. 51.

³⁰New York Times, May 31, 1961, Interview with President Oliviera Salazar, Salazar Suggests Accord with U.S., by Benjamin Wells, Vol. CX, No. 37748, p. 12.

one per cent has achieved assimilated status, with the non-assimilated living under a different set of laws.

Up to the early fifties at least, many European observers felt that there was a real opportunity for Portugal to accelerate the development of a non-racial, integrated society in Africa. Some were impressed by the fact that in Angola education and economic standing in the community appeared not to follow racial patterns. It was suggested by some observers that that would have been the most propitious time to widen rights and opportunities for the indigenous population. Many people had hoped that steps would be taken in this direction. Some Africans feel, however, that there had never been any real racial equality or promise of racial equality. Authorities failed to widen rights. Assimilation progressed at an imperceptible rate, and hope in Portuguese policies waned. Angolans observed the independence of other African territories, and sovereignty for Angola was substituted for integration into Portuguese society.

The many facets of Portuguese colonial policy reflect a traditional belief. The Portuguese continue to profess faith in the dream of a Lusitanian community

and view Angola as the key to maintaining the empire. As if to support this faith, the Lisbon government has failed to prepare the Angolan population for independence.

CHAPTER II

THE BASIS OF ANGOLAN NATIONALISM

While the great tides of African destiny sweep forward, Portugal clings with forlorn but stubborn pride to the hopes and illusions of a bygone age. The memory that Portugal was the first of the European powers to explore the African coast and establish posts on African soil was recently brought to new life by the celebration of the fifth centenary of the death of Henry the Navigator, a celebration deliberately aimed to dramatize the country's world mission. It has been the dream of the Portuguese that they might be, not the last of the powers to leave Africa, but the only one which would fuse its African, Asian, and European peoples into a single national whole, perhaps even--wistfully--bringing multiracial Brazil back into the fold.³¹

A. CAUSES OF CONFLICT

The Portuguese government has adopted the position that, prior to the rebellion in 1961, Angola was a land of peace and tranquility. The rebellion was the work of outside instigation. President Salazar cited the small security forces in Angola at the time of the revolt as evidence that hitherto Angola had remained calm and unaffected by outside agitation.³² Information provided from sources other than the Portuguese government, including statements made before the Security Council and

³¹Okuma, op. cit., p. vii.

³²New York Times, May 31, 1961, p. 12.

General Assembly of the United Nations, indicate that for some years prior to the 1961 outbreak, there had been increasing unrest among local inhabitants. Open resistance and conflict originated with the accumulation of grievances in Angola and the impact of the movement toward total independence of many African territories, especially the Republic of the Congo-Kinshasa. Measures to restrict contact with the outside world, displays of force, and the repression of Angolans suspected of political activity could no longer forestall continuing disturbances and protests. Such measures, intensified after 1961, seem only to have increased tension and precipitated further conflict and guerrilla activity.

The grievances of the mass of the indigenous population of Angola were based principally upon the non-implementation of existing statutes and the fact that statutes and policy implied the inferiority of the Angolan peoples, especially the acculturation policy.

The policy of assimilation, proclaimed by the Salazar government as the most important aspect of its acculturation program, was not accompanied by a concerted effort to prepare the inhabitants for status as citizens. Only a small number of Angolans have acquired citizenship and assumed assimilated status. The vast majority were

not afforded educational opportunity and were often subject to discriminatory legislation. Even assimilado status had deteriorated somewhat since the mid-1950's, since there had been continuing pressure for an independent status for Angola rather than assimilation with Portugal. In addition, the vast majority of the indigenous population had no opportunity because of their tribal status to participate in the administrative affairs of the territory or have the right of franchise. There is no doubt that this lack of opportunity developed a feeling of being a stranger in one's own country. To acquire these privileges, the indigene had to adopt a way of life different from that of their heritage.

Angolans also complained of the denial of human rights and an abuse of authority by governmental officials. Political arrests, prolonged periods of imprisonment without trial, poor treatment of prisoners, and the disappearance of prisoners help to explain the gradual spread of nationalism throughout the countryside. Legal channels for the redress of grievances had not existed for the indigene.

As the indigene became enlightened through better communication and travel or mission education, they came to feel that they were the victims of exploitation by the

administrative system. They complained of the tax system, the compulsory crop quota systems, especially as regards cotton, the inadequate prices paid for crop production, and the inequitable wage scales. With the influx of Portuguese immigrants, the best arable land was developed for these settlers, at times dispossessing Angolans from their traditional tribal lands. Perhaps the most grievous complaint uttered by the indigenous Angolans was related to the system of contract labor. Called outright slavery by some and veiled frequently by reform and liberalized legislation, the labor system in effect in Angola was seldom viewed with enthusiasm regardless of liberalizing legislation. Labor laws governing the indigene isolated them from the mainstream of Angolan society. Village labor quotas, the contract labor system, the recruitment of laborers for plantations, all were studded with the use of force and the physical ill-treatment of the laborer.

In the political field, demands for self-government, self-determination, or independence had traditionally been regarded as subversive, and, in general, had been repressed. The Portuguese government had never been sympathetic toward any expression of Angolan nationalism, and no forum existed where discussion and/or negotiation with the authorities had been possible. The authorities

even denied the existence of a colonial problem or the validity of the right of autonomy or self-determination. All political movements favoring autonomy or self-determination had been forced into clandestine activity or exile with the subsequent result of revolutionary activity. With an increase in underground activity, repressive measures were taken, especially as neighboring African territories gained their independence.

Despite repressive measures, independence movements gathered strength as the leadership of the various opposition parties became more clearly evident. Numerous secret meetings were held throughout the country, especially in the larger urban centers and in the northern region where the Kikongo peoples were most in evidence. Anti-government literature was distributed through underground organizations. After the independence of the Republic of the Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville, Angolan revolutionary groups were able to operate more freely among the Angolan communities in these countries. Communication networks were established between Angolan groups in exile and members and/or sympathizers of the cause in Angola. Through this communication system, rebel plans were made and executed with representatives

in even the smallest villages being aware of the progress of revolutionary activity.³³

Portuguese officialdom, concerned over the political activity in Angola and the growing strength of revolutionary groups outside its borders, had increased its pressure against persons suspected of political activity or believed knowledgeable about clandestine rebel organizations. After the 1961 revolt, homes of anyone suspect were searched, and weapons were confiscated. During this period, as Africans were denied weapons, Portuguese settlers, especially on the frontier, were supplied with weaponry and trained in their use.

As repressive measures intensified during the 1950's and 1960's and the Portuguese government steadfastly rejected negotiations regarding self-determination or independence, three Angolan political groups resorted to guerrilla warfare as the only possible means of achieving their objectives. This question of outside influence and "agitators" linked up with these organizations looms important, especially from the Portuguese point of view.

³³Richard Mathews, "A Visit to the Rebels of Angola," Reporter, Vol. 25, No. 5 (September 28, 1961), p. 43. (Hereinafter referred to as "Rebels of Angola.")

Whatever the extent that agitators have been involved in the Angolan conflict or influence from other countries may have been in evidence, these would not alone be sufficient to explain the extent of revolutionary activity or the widespread appeal of the movement, unless there existed some genuine dissatisfaction and deeply-felt grievances.

The overseas policies of Portugal have been based upon the concepts of national unity and cultural identity and the creation of a "multi-racial" society. The success of this concept demanded the recognition of common interests in the economic and social fields, a degree of administrative and financial autonomy, and the acknowledgement of the obligation of the Portuguese to protect the indigenous inhabitants and their interests. All forces were to work progressively toward the integration of Angolans into Portuguese civilized society.³⁴ Basic to this ideology has been the concept of assimilation. According to this concept, any indigenous Angolan who wanted to be accepted as a member of the Portuguese community had to break away from tribal traditions and institutions in order to change

³⁴Nogueria, op. cit., p. 51.

his African personality and to integrate himself into the culture and custom of Portuguese society.

Within a theoretical framework, Portugal never practiced racial discrimination and never wanted to acknowledge any difference other than those determined by the levels of civilization. Civil and political rights were to be granted with a progression in education. Theoretically, persons on the various levels in the assimilation process were aware that equality existed at each level, and were apart from any racial discrimination. Becoming civilized, the indigena did not meet with a hostile or closed society, but with a "Lusitanization" that integrated him completely. Limitations to equality, then, did not lie in a racial barrier, but in the cultural and technical backwardness of the non-assimilated.³⁵

B. POLITICAL RIGHTS AND RACE RELATIONS

One main source of dissatisfaction leading to a breakdown of meaningful Portuguese-Angolan ties, and, consequently, to nationalistic activity, was the basic distinction in status between the indigene and the non-

³⁵S. de Miranda, "Education in Angola," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, Vol. I, Nos. 4 and 5 (June-July, 1961), p. 37.

indigene and the concomitant administrative practices. This basic distinction between European and non-European ways of life permeated all phases of society and became the basis of various discriminatory laws and practices. Under the Statute of 1954, for example, no political rights were granted to indigenous persons in respect to non-indigenous institutions. The Portuguese felt that non-indigenous institutions should be aspired to by the indigena and wanted the assimilado to feel the significance of his status. Thus, the policy of assimilation became unacceptable not only in theory but even more in practice, since it was based on a racist concept implying the incompetence of the African people and implying further that African cultural mores were of no value.³⁶ That many Angolans, once assimilated, reverted to the status of the indigene substantiates this point. The granting of citizenship was not irrevocable; according to the Statute of 1954, Article 64, "The citizenship conceded or recognized . . . can be revoked by decision of the judge of the respective circuit on the basis of evidence of competent

³⁶"Atlantic Report--Angola," Atlantic, Vol. 209, No. 3 (March, 1962), p. 26. (Hereinafter referred to as "Angola.")

administrative authority."³⁷ This statute was not applicable to citizens residing in Portugal.

The decision of an Angolan to assume assimilado status was awesome. In addition to the difficulties of relinquishing the status of an indigena and of fulfilling all the conditions required to become a citizen, he rejected his ancestral culture and adopted a European way of life. Thus, assimilation often had the effect of isolating the educated African from his own people. Africans were granted equal status with the Portuguese on the basis of equal education and other requirements. The legitimate aspirations of the Angolans to progress along lines more consistent with their own values and way of life were ignored. The recognition of elites based upon preparation for full status as a citizen also appeared to create a socially superior minority. After the 1961 revolt, the desire for assimilado status lessened considerably. This was due to the growing desire among many Africans, especially in the North, to retain their African identity and a general reluctance to become totally identified with a European culture.

³⁷Panikkar, op. cit., p. 38.

In addition, since the revolt the status of the assimilado has been lowered by the influx of Portuguese immigrants. Racial prejudice among this group was much more in evidence.

The extent that racism has existed in Angola is not without controversy; there is ample writing to support either contention. The writer's purpose and his personal philosophy have tended to influence his judgment in evaluating the situation or data. Camille Miropoix, writing in the tourist magazine, Travel, stated

It is a treat to see the happy African soldiers at the changing of the guard and their great pride at being Portuguese. There is no separation between the white and black races.³⁸

Conversely, K. Madhu Panikkar points out that the Portuguese "above all" want

. . . to be recognized as a white power. . . . This emphasis on colour--of the Portuguese being the white man--is also to be found in the USA and the Union of South Africa. It really underlines the Portuguese position. They are obsessed by colour; the struggle is seen in apocalyptic terms as one between blacks and whites, with the ever present danger that the black will emerge triumphant.³⁹

³⁸Camille Miropoix, "Unpublicized Angola," Travel, Vol. 107, No. 2 (February, 1956), p. 45.

³⁹Panikkar, op. cit., p. 35.

Panikkar further underscores his position by stating that

. . . the arming of white civilians and the formation of vigilantes who indiscriminately slaughtered all blacks clearly show that her object has never been to assimilate the African but to keep him as a helot, to be exterminated if he rose in revolt.⁴⁰

The Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University, conducted a symposium on Angola in 1962 and concluded that the Portuguese were a non-discriminating people on the issue of race, but discriminated by making class distinctions.⁴¹ By dividing the professions and income groups on a racial basis, it can be shown that the existing social economic barrier is enough to keep a tacit color bar in effect. In general, Portuguese and Africans co-exist professionally only in the lower quadrant, where competition is keener between the races. The "non-discriminating" aspect of official legislation can only be perceived if discrimination by class is recognized with its stultifying influence.

Social co-existence of the Portuguese and the African was a pleasant and convenient image to project, especially with eighty per cent of the Angolan population

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Antonio de Figueiredo, "The Case Against Portugal," Angola, A Symposium: Views of A Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 51.

scattered over the countryside away from an urban environment and Portuguese socio-economic influence.⁴² This partially answers why, four hundred years after the "civilizing mission" began, only one per cent of the population had been culturally assimilated.

In most western white-dominated multi-racial societies, political racism runs parallel and in proportion to the degree of prosperity of the colored groups. This is true in the case of Angola. Higher income and "upper-crust" social groups, not having had their socio-economic position challenged, saw no threat; the supreme test of socio-economic competition between the races never came, so restrictive legislation, such as exists in Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, was unnecessary.

In Luanda, blacks and whites work alongside one another on construction projects and mix in shops and cafes. In the slum areas on the outskirts, white families live in near destitution alongside black families with the same economic conditions. Discrimination is not in evidence at this lower societal level. Unofficial segregation

⁴²de Figueiredo, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

exists, however, in the way of job discrimination, i. e., any job requiring an education.⁴³ By law, no discrimination of any sort can exist and an African can occupy any post in business, the professions, or the administrative services where he is educationally qualified.⁴⁴ In many cases, qualified Africans working in schools, hospitals, or the social services where integration exists have whites working for them.

The Portuguese appear to have a tolerant racial attitude, but, given a set of circumstances, think in racial terms. The awareness of race goes deep and can come to the surface. This attitude permits blacks and whites to work on road gangs, mix in night clubs, have some black judges and mayors in the smaller municipalities, and control two-fifths of all administrative posts, mostly at the lower level.⁴⁵ But this tolerant attitude did not prevent the savage anti-black manhunt that followed

⁴³A. J. Meyers, "Color Bar," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. LI, No. 9 (August 28, 1961), p. 54.

⁴⁴Ronald Waring, "The Case for Portugal," Angola, A Symposium: Views of A Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 44.

⁴⁵"Angola Waits for It," Economist Newspaper, Ltd., Vol. CCIX, No. 6269 (October 19, 1963), p. 8. (Hereinafter referred to as "Angola Waits.")

the savage anti-white manhunt in 1961. Nor has racial "tolerance" added appreciably to intermarriage between the races. There has been in the past considerable cohabitation of races occasioned by necessity; i. e., the absence of white women. When the drug pentamidine removed the fear of sleeping sickness, women came to Angola in greater numbers, with the consequence that interracial marriages and cohabitation declined proportionately, although some Portuguese continued to have their "mulheres de necessidade."⁴⁶

With the vast majority of Angolans living in a rural-tribal environment, Portuguese administrators had enacted a separate set of laws regulating those Africans residing in a tribal state. These laws had served to keep intact tribal customs and preserve traditional mores and attitudes, but, on the other hand, kept these Africans as indigene and without a vestige of political, economic, intellectual, or social freedom. These restrictive laws not only denied the indigene freedom of speech and franchise--"luxuries" even the citizenry must forbear--but they could not travel, work, buy, sell, plant, harvest,

⁴⁶Clifford Parsons, "The Makings of a Revolt," Angola, A Symposium: Views of A Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 60.

meet in groups, or leave their villages without the specific permission of the chefe de posto, the local administrator.⁴⁷ Through these restrictive measures, Portugal has steadfastly refused to admit that African nationalism may eventually have to be accommodated. Either the African was to become a loyal Portuguese-speaking peasant or laborer, or he remained a tribal "native." It should be pointed out that these tribal laws were generally effective until foreign influence and ideas upset the social equilibrium. With outside influence permeating the stable tribal structure and upsetting it, especially after World War II, keeping the African population under strict control became more difficult.

Until early 1961, there was every indication to the outside world that Portuguese colonial policy, which had had the long-term aim of assimilation had successfully insulated Angola against the influences of African nationalism. After the independence of the Congo-Kinshasa, however, nationalistic ideas swept Angola. To counteract the revolutionary movements that followed, all Angolan natives became full Portuguese citizens after September 30,

⁴⁷Marvin Harris, "South of Lisbon See the Ten Million," Saturday Review, Vol. XLII, No. 30 (July 25, 1959), pp. 19-20.

1961, and the aboriginal status was officially abolished.⁴⁸ In African eyes, however, the Portuguese still appear the bosses, and the rulers, and they hardly correspond to the image this legal change was supposed to bring about. It would appear that this law and others adjusting other aspects of Angolan life came too late to make a significant difference.

C. EDUCATION AND THE INDIGENA

A great influence on the African indigene has been the quest for Western education. In a society that had placed its greatest emphasis on education, and had made it the key to all the society held as desirable and good, this quest was understandable. Education held the key to social status, human dignity, job opportunities, and economic wealth. Education was the key to the success of not only the African indigene but was also tied to the effectiveness of the Portuguese administrative system. The system required the training of local administrative officers, postal clerks, native police officers, telegraphers, etc., for the administration of the colonies. The government relied upon African interpreters who had

⁴⁸Waring, op. cit., p. 45.

to be able to write and speak the Portuguese language. And, more important, perhaps, to "Christianize," to "Westernize," and to "Lusitanize," or to "assimilate" the native population, the educational system had to impart a rudimentary knowledge of arithmetic, reading, speaking, and writing.

To achieve these objectives, the Portuguese government created two distinct educational systems--one for Africans and the other for the white and the assimilated. This distinction was the "natural consequence of the degrees of social and mental development."⁴⁹ Schools for African students were called rudimentary schools, since they provided the first introduction to civilization. The primary education system was provided for students possessing a stipulated level of mental and social development.

Under the Portuguese Constitution, the Catholic missions under the direction of a Portuguese See or Bishopric were especially protected and assisted by the government as educational and welfare institutions and as instruments of civilization. It was their exclusive responsibility to provide instruction especially designed for the indigene.

⁴⁹Okuma, op. cit., p. 41.

The Statute of 1954 laid down certain general principles to be applied regarding the education of indigenous persons. Article 6 of the Statute provided as follows:

The instruction especially intended for indigenous persons shall have as its general purpose the moral, civic, intellectual, and physical education prescribed by law and the imparting of work habits and work skill, as determined by the needs of both sexes and by social and regional economic conditions.

It further provided that

The instruction referred to in this article shall always be directed towards inculcating a knowledge of the Portuguese language, but the use of the vernacular language may be authorized as a means to that end.⁵⁰

Theoretically, the rudimentary schools did not constitute a system parallel to and distinct from the primary education system. The purpose of these schools was simply to provide an "adaptive" education; pupils proceeded from the rudimentary schools to the primary schools. The adaptive nature of the rudimentary schools made it pre-primary in character, since they preceded primary education. Therefore, there was no discrimination

⁵⁰"The Statute of 1954," Yearbook on Human Rights (New York: United Nations Publications, 1954), p. 236. (Hereinafter referred to as Yearbook.)

of a racial character. The criterion applied was a purely educational one; the pupils who attended the rudimentary schools could not, because of their level of education and inadequate knowledge of the Portuguese language, usefully attend primary schools.

The conditions on which a person of indigena status could attend the primary schools had been laid down in Article 6 of the Statute of 1954:

Those indigenous persons who have received 'adaptive' training or who demonstrate, in the manner prescribed by law, that they do not require such training, shall be assured of admission to public schools under the conditions applicable to other Portuguese nationals.⁵¹

Under the Constitution, primary education is compulsory and free to European and "assimilated" children; although, once qualified through adaptive education to enter primary schools, there are no compulsory education laws applicable to children attending rudimentary schools or those indigenous children who may have qualified for primary education.⁵² (See Tables II and III for a comparison of Portuguese educational standards.)

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²United Nations, General Assembly, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola," A/RES/4978, Sixteenth Session, New York (November 13, 1961).

TABLE II

ILLITERACY RATE*

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Per Cent of Illiteracy</u>
Austria	6,974	1-2
West Germany	68,500	1-2
Finland	4,241	1-3
France	43,264	3-4
Belgium	8,868	3-4
Spain	28,976	15-20
Greece	7,973	25-30
Port. and Colonies	21,159	70-75
(Metropolitan)	8,765	40-46
(Colonies)	12,394	90-95

*Source:

"Education Under Salazar," Portuguese and Colonial
Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February-March, 1964), p. 185.

TABLE III

YEARS OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION*

<u>Name of Country</u>	<u>Age Limit</u>	<u>Length of Course</u>
East Germany	6-18	11
France	6-16	10
England	5-15	9-10
West Germany	6-15	8-9
Italy	6-14	8
Austria	6-14	8
Belgium	6-14	8
Holland	7-15	8
Spain	6-12	6
Portugal	7-13	4
Greece	6-14	6
Iran		6
Egypt		6
Ghana		6
Morocco		5

*Source:

"Education Under Salazar," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February-March, 1964), p. 185.

Many native grievances were readily traceable to the inadequacies and basic inequities of the educational system. The system was not created to serve the indigenous population but to provide an adequate education for those qualifying as Portuguese citizens. First, in the interior regions of Angola there were few schools, even at the rudimentary level. Secondly, secondary education was not easily accessible to Africans due to fees which were exorbitant for most families. Third, to enter a government secondary school, a student had to be under fourteen years of age. Because most African children begin school at a later age than Portuguese or assimilado children, by the time the native child had completed the adaptive course the age limit became a serious hurdle. Children of assimilado parents could automatically attend secondary schools, while indigenous African children were compelled to comply with special requirements. The status of assimilation to which everyone was to aspire was needed to have access to adequate educational facilities, but education was required for assimilation! Thus, a vicious cycle seemed to be operating, making education more difficult for the indigenous African to achieve.

In addition, admittance to a secondary school required a birth certificate. If the birth had not been registered, a retroactive tax was levied against the pupil's parents. Also, students entering from private and missionary schools were required to take strict entrance examinations, not a requirement for Portuguese and assimilado students.

The obstacles placed in front of a native African student were at least partially responsible for the small number of African students attending secondary schools. Also, the rudimentary course taught in the mission schools was distinct from and inferior to the primary schooling afforded the white or assimilated Africans in the urban areas.⁵³

To help overcome the inadequacies of the mission schools and overcome much of the criticism heaped upon them, the Bishop of Angola, Francisco Esteves Diaz, inaugurated a program aimed at providing a more adequate rural education system. Much of the white population blamed the 1961 uprising on the alleged teaching of freedom and self-determination and sympathy for revolutionary groups within the mission schools. A special

⁵³"Kingdom of Silence," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 222, No. 1332 (May, 1961), p. 35.

target at this time were Protestant assimilados, many of whom were trained in mission schools.⁵⁴

As in most African colonial areas, education had created an educated elite. The elite group was not large, but actually enjoyed influence out of proportion to its numbers. This group was especially important in Angola since:

(1) the elite usually have sympathies and interests that go beyond the traditional tribal group; (2) they possess the skills to run a modern nation; (3) they are interested in building non-tribal organizations, such as political parties and cultural societies.⁵⁵

The creation of an educated elite has made Africans conscious of the inequalities of the Portuguese educational system. The fact that a separate system was created for native children is an irritant, and acted as a method of holding African children back from entering into secondary and higher education.

Revolutionary organizations relied heavily on the inadequate educational system for much of their propaganda against the Portuguese government. A statistical

⁵⁴"Civilizing Mission," Newsweek, Vol. LVII, No. 25 (June 19, 1961), pp. 45-46.

⁵⁵Okuma, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

comparison between black and white education showed clearly the gulf between races created through the school system and how the inequity would perpetuate itself. A ninety-seven per cent illiteracy rate among Africans existed. There was room to accommodate only five per cent of the indigenous children of school age (7-13) in mission schools prior to 1960.⁵⁶ Statistics like these did little to instill confidence in the African population, and it was not likely that they were to continue to look to Portugal for a solution to their problems.

The 1961 revolt was responsible for many educational reforms as a crash program was started to close the gap between the rural and primary schools. Five hundred new teachers were added to the rural program, and space was constructed to house 20,000 additional pupils in 1962, with the program doubling these statistics for 1963. In addition, Angola's first university was opened in Luanda in October, 1963, under the same program.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Homer A. Jack, Angola, Repression and Revolt in Portuguese Africa (New York: American Committee on Africa, 1960), p. 15.

⁵⁷"Angola Waits," op. cit., pp. 239-240.

D. LABOR AS A FACTOR OF UNREST

The labor situation in Angola has probably contributed more to developing a negative relationship between the African native and white Portuguese than any other single factor. This negative image is due, in part, to labor practices unchanged since the days of legalized slavery. Deprivation and a lack of human dignity have been the lot of the Angolan since the Portuguese first colonized the west African coast.

The Portuguese government was one of the last in Europe to officially end slavery in its colonies. By its abolition the status of the African was not suddenly changed, and his relationship to the Portuguese was not perceptibly affected. The legal terminology was altered, however, and slavery was transformed into a more "acceptable" labor system. Slavery became tutelage, forced labor, obligatory labor, contract labor.

As Angola became a prosperous colony and the demand for laborers increased, Portugal became more dependent upon it to maintain a favorable balance of trade and to provide raw material resources. Portugal's pre-capitalist mercantilist economic philosophy placed a greater demand on Angola through the years. The labor system, as it has

evolved from slavery, was calculated to contribute to Portugal its material and human resources in the most efficient economic way practicable.

Under the Constitution, indigenous persons were compelled to work, but only in specific instances. In this connection, Article 146 of the Constitution provided that:

The State may only compel the natives to work on public works of general interest to the community, on tasks the finished product of which will belong to them, in the execution of judicial sentences of a penal character or for the discharge of fiscal liabilities.⁵⁸

The use of compulsion in the recruitment of labor was prohibited for purposes other than those cited above. The Portuguese government specifically prohibited the recruitment of native labor for any firms working for their own profit. By law, indigenous persons were free to choose their own work, to work for themselves or for another, on their own land or on land allotted to them for this purpose.

The obligations of the employer toward the worker and the worker toward the employer were covered by the Native Labour Code of 1928. These obligations attempted to ensure the worker's adherence to the terms of his work

⁵⁸UN A/4978, op. cit., p. 27.

contract, provisions which pertained to the medical, social, and educational assistance to the worker and his family and his return to his place of residence. For example, the employer was to carry out scrupulously the terms of the contract; he could not require the performance of work beyond the strength of the worker; he could not prevent the worker from living with his own family if working away from home; he could not require the worker to buy goods from company stores and had to prohibit the sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages. The worker, on the other hand, was to obey the employer's orders provided they were in agreement with the Native Labour Code. He was to perform all work enthusiastically and to the best of his ability and he could not leave the place of employment without previous authorization of the employer. By the Native Labour Code, every indigenous male inhabitant over eighteen years of age was obliged to procure an individual work-book (caderneta indigena) to serve as an identity card and record of employment. This work-book contained a profuse amount of data, including personal and family information, identification marks, employment history, and the manner in which he performed his duties as a native worker.

In addition to these entries, the caderneta indigena contained information relative to the payment of the native tax, vaccinations, or other treatment pertaining to infectious diseases, the lands owned by the holder or freely assigned to him, the cattle which he owned and their registered brand, and other information which would be helpful as identification or in establishing rights.

The Statute of 1954 iterated the official position of the government as it related to the value of work:

The State shall endeavor to teach the indigenous peoples that work is an indispensable element of progress, but the authorities may not impose labour except in the cases explicitly prescribed by law.⁵⁹

"Progress," in this sense, implied that work was a part of the civilizing process even though there was little evidence to prove that work was a civilizing agent.

There was, however, plenty of evidence that the native worker was degraded and exploited. Forcing the native to get a new perspective of his work role and obligation to work often led to the exploitation of the native population.⁶⁰

⁵⁹Yearbook, op. cit., p. 236.

⁶⁰Duffy, op. cit., p. 157.

The Portuguese government viewed work as a "moral obligation" for the indigenous native. This meant simply that every adult fourteen years of age or older was required to work, and the work had to be productive. Further, he had to support himself and his family and to contribute to the development of the territory, i. e., to be employed on public works. He had to work, in the absence of other employment, at least six months per year.

The fulfillment of these laws and regulations led to many abuses, especially in regard to the vast majority who were farmers. Africans had to show they were productive. The burden fell on every adult Angolan African, the majority of whom normally lived on the land, to prove to the local authorities that he was a productive element in the economy.

This system of contract and obligatory labor has been defended by some apologists as the only system by which the indigene could be civilized, while retaining the tribal character of the people.⁶¹ To the defenders of the labor system this is the secret of Portugal's success as a civilizing agent. Legally, contract and obligatory labor were based on the Native Labour Code, which stated

⁶¹Dr. Frederick P. Marjay, "Angola," Seccão Anuario Comercial de Portugal (Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand, S.A., 1961), p. 32.

that every African had to satisfy the administration that he had worked at least six months in the previous year, or was working at the time of inquiry. If the worker could not prove this, the administration had the duty to put him to work. According to the law, the African either had to work in his own fields or to take a job with any employer who had a position. Workers were requisitioned by employing firms through the Governor-General, requesting the fulfillment of the orders by local chefes de posto, who were then obliged to "recruit" the workers. The Portuguese Constitution and the Native Labour Code specifically forbid "all methods by which the State undertakes to supply Native workers to employers," and "all methods by which natives living in any territorial area whatsoever may be compelled to work for such employers under any pretext whatsoever."⁶² In fact, however, for the overwhelming mass of poor natives, there was nothing to look forward to but a lifetime of menial labor, much of it forced. Tens of thousands of Angolan natives were rounded up annually and assigned to public works projects at wages which varied from \$2 to \$5 per month (reported in 1961).⁶³

⁶²Basil Davidson, "Africa's Modern Slavery," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 212, No. 1250 (July, 1954), p. 57.

⁶³"The Next Explosion in Africa," Nation, Vol. 192, No. 1 (January 7, 1961), p. 3.

The contract labor system ran contrary to the traditional work patterns of native society which had existed for hundreds of years. Traditionally, women did all the work that sustained the family from season to season. Polygamy was common until recently as a partial solution to the task force needed to keep the family alive in a subsistence economy. Work in itself was considered neither ennobling nor desirable by the males, and, wherever possible, was left to the women. This societal system did not engender itself to the labor system of the white man or to his demands upon the black man to perform work according to westernized standards. Neither contract and obligatory labor nor the low wage scales would induce the native to abandon his tribal state or the traditional subsistence economy. To this extent, then, the forced labor system was an evolved form of slavery with the individual ownership of a slave being replaced by the collective ownership of the African population by the Portuguese government and the business community.⁶⁴ Henry Nevinson and James Duffy in their investigations could find little distinction between contract labor and slavery. In addition, Basil Davidson has reminded us that, contrary to the conviction of many Europeans, very little was "done

⁶⁴de Figueiredo, op. cit., p. 53.

for" Africans under colonial labor systems, as these systems were designed to bring cheap raw materials at low prices into Europe to satisfy the needs of the growing manufacturing industries.⁶⁵

It should be pointed out, however, that the Native Labour Code requiring six months' employment per year was an attempt to adjust the labor system to tribal life and customs. An International Labor Organization (I.L.O.) committee of three (Uruguay, Senegal, and Italy) visiting Angola in 1962 reported favorably about the Portuguese contract labor system in the area visited.⁶⁶ Dissatisfaction with the labor system has been widespread, however, and must be seen as one of the most important causes of unrest in the countryside.

Local chefes de posto were required to recruit laborers from those natives who had not satisfied the work requirement. For public works projects requiring large numbers of workers, laws were not strictly adhered to. Anyone in the village was eligible if the local quota for workers was high and workers scarce. For

⁶⁵Basil Davidson, "Guide to African History," African Studies (formerly Bantu Studies), Vol. 23, Nos. 3-4, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1964) p. 62.

⁶⁶Gene Farmer, "Dictator on the Defensive," Life, Vol. 52, No. 18 (May 4, 1962), p. 105.

special projects, such as building roads or laying railroad ties, any pretense at contract labor was, therefore, abandoned, and whole towns were conscripted, reportedly, even children under fourteen, including girls and pregnant women.⁶⁷ Not infrequently, whole towns would disappear into the wilderness as the chefe de posto would enter to conscript workers.

The same was true in the cotton industry. Cotton has been the traditional crop in the Catete, Muxima, and Bolange regions for many generations, with European farmers devoting a great deal of time to it in the past. From the earliest cultivation dates, the Portuguese government protected and enhanced the industry through the institution of export bounties and the guaranteed purchase of the cotton crop at a fixed price. Cotton cultivation made real progress under this program, and native Angolans participated at a faster growth rate than white or assimilated Angolans or immigrants. The Cassange region in Malange alone was responsible for more than fifty per cent of the total Angolan production, and Catete for more than twenty per cent. The cotton program was a source of many serious grievances, and, interestingly

⁶⁷Richard LeMaster, "I Saw the Horror of Angola," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 235, No. 19 (May 12, 1962), p. 53.

enough, the 1961 revolt against Portuguese rule had its first and most important impact in the cotton-growing regions of northern Angola.

In the cotton-growing areas where the governmental program was in effect, every adult indigena was required to grow a certain area in cotton. The cotton-raiser received no wages, but at the end of the season was paid according to the amount of cotton he had produced at prices fixed by the government. Because the indigenous inhabitants could not move away from the area without special approval, the indigene born in the cotton-growing area had no choice but to implement the program. The cotton program had certain aspects which paralleled forced cultivation. Africans believed they were at the mercy of the Portuguese governmental monopoly.

Cotton cultivation was not highly advanced, and the soil was rapidly depleted, leading to shifting cultivation. As quotas could not be met, the government assigned plots of land to the farmers for cultivation. Over the years, many farmers were tilling soil on plots as far as fifty miles from their residence. In many cases, farmers could not return home daily, and, in effect, became involuntary migrant laborers. The only other recourse open to them was to move to the new plot and

remain there until the soil was exhausted, thus requiring another move. More often than not, however, families were required to remain in the villages to cultivate the food crops and care for livestock on private plots of land, since growing crops other than cotton on assigned lands, or raising livestock, was prohibited and punishable.

Complaints were frequent. Many claimed that government cotton prices were fixed low, at a bare subsistence level, and that, at times, the fixed prices themselves were not paid. An investigation conducted by the United Nations through the I.L.O. (International Labour Organization) confirmed these complaints as justified noting price and wage inequities existed.⁶⁸ With the inequitable price structure and the other evils built into the system, the cotton program was the source of much tribal unrest. The injustices arising from the program led to uprisings in two cotton-growing areas in 1960 and 1961, Catete and Malange. The revolt was responsible for the repealing of the compulsory cotton cultivation laws in May, 1961, three months after the rebellion began. Also, Portuguese Overseas Minister Moreira announced that,

⁶⁸UN A/4978, op. cit., p. 30.

in October, 1962, the Native Labour Code was to be altered to abolish compulsory labor and punishment for absenteeism.⁶⁹

E. THE CHURCH AS A DISRUPTIVE FORCE

The missionary movement had been a part of Portuguese colonial policy since Prince Henry and Diogo Cão first made the "civilizing mission" an indispensable aspect of Portuguese thought. The task of Christianizing the African was entrusted to the Roman Catholic Church. Since that time it shared most of the successes and failures of Lusitanian policy. Catholic missionaries were eagerly sought by the Portuguese government to assume the responsibility of "civilizing" the Angolan natives by recasting him sociologically as a western European. Since the Roman Catholic Church was an integral part of the Portuguese culture, it was natural that this partnership enjoyed a preferential status in the colonies.

Protestant missionary groups, not enjoying a favored position, did not become a part of the colonial structure until 1885 when the Berlin Act of that year required all signatories at the conference to agree that:

⁶⁹"Labor Reforms Planned for Portuguese Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 7, No. 8 (August, 1962), p. 20.

They (i.e., all signatories) shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favor all religious, scientific, or charitable institutions, and undertakings . . . which aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessing of civilization. Christian missionaries . . . shall likewise be the objects of special attention. Freedom of conscience and religious toleration are expressly guaranteed to the natives, no less than to subjects and to foreigners.⁷⁰

While both Catholic and Protestant missionaries have had measurable success converting large portions of the population (over fifty per cent), there is a serious question regarding the extent and depth that this influence has had upon African life. There is, however, no doubt that Angola missionary activities led to the modification of the Angolan traditional society, through education, through the weakening of traditional authority, through the introduction of the ideal of equality, and through the creation of an African clergy.⁷¹

Neither the Catholic nor Protestant church in Angola took an official position on African nationalism or the revolt of 1961. Official ties of the Catholic Church to the Portuguese government negated chances that an official pronouncement regarding the rebellion would be made. Having no official governmental ties, Protestant

⁷⁰Crowe, op. cit., p. 190.

⁷¹Okuma, op. cit., p. 51.

missionary societies enjoyed greater latitude in the educational influence they had, especially regarding nationalism, and were freer to criticize.

The Catholic clergy had, by and large, felt control by Portuguese officialdom, and, indeed, most missionaries permitted other national cultures to permeate Angolan society and in this way to "teach" standards alien to the Portuguese stereotype. Most Protestant missionaries used the native language in mission schools, thus impeding the implantation of Portuguese language and customs.⁷² Legally, native languages could be used only to facilitate the teaching of the Portuguese language.

The 1961 revolt created problems for the Catholic and Protestant churches in Angola. Angolan clergymen, like Canon dos Neves, Vicar-General of the Archbishopric of Luanda, and the Chancellor of the Diocese, the Reverend Pinto de Andrade, openly sided with the rebel element and were arrested and imprisoned for their "political crimes." On April 15, 1961, the bishops of Angola met in Luanda, and, although they condemned the attacks made by the African Nationalists on villages, also pointed out that the just aspirations of the people

⁷²Okuma, op. cit., p. 53.

had to be taken into account by the Portuguese government if they wished to avoid discontent and trouble.⁷³ The "official" position of the Catholic bishops of Angola was read to all parishioners in May, 1961, in the form of a pastoral letter, a portion of which stated:

Disillusioned people fighting against privation are a prey to despair and more apt to be carried away by dangerous ideologies and promises which cannot be fulfilled. Poverty is a bad counselor and a threat to tranquillity and peace. The solution of certain problems can be found only through united and adequate legislation and the total and generous cooperation of individuals and organizations.⁷⁴

In June, 1961, the situation became so intolerable that Protestant and Catholic clergymen in the United States and Canada, prompted by missionaries in Angola, appealed to end the "wholesale bloodshed in the Portuguese colony," and "urged a joint consultation of Portuguese and Angolan leaders to end indiscriminate killings by seeking a reasonable solution to Angola's problems."⁷⁵ Similar requests for restraint and understanding came

⁷³"The Catholics and Salazar," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 1 (April/May, 1962), p. 79.

⁷⁴"Open Letter on Portugal," Commonweal, Vol. 74, No. 13 (June 23, 1961), p. 326.

⁷⁵"Angolan Massacres Continue," The Christian Century, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 3 (July 26, 1961), p. 894.

from the World Council of Churches, the Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies (located in London), the Baptist Missionary Society, and influential Catholic clergymen, like the Bishop of Oporto. These groups or individuals openly broke with Premier Salazar's policies in Angola.

The Portuguese government is aware of the potential threat to colonial rule from Catholic and Protestant churches and organizations. In response to this threat, the Governor-General of Angola ordered local administrative officials to attend all church services and meetings held in their juridical areas.⁷⁶

While no official judgment publicly condemned the churches' role as instruments in the civilizing process, there was a great amount of criticism against missionary societies for their role in training catequistas. According to the Portuguese government, the Gospel taught in the mission schools was unquestionably a factor in developing a spirit of self-determination among the Angolan people. The "failure" of missionaries to teach patriotism and loyalty to the Portuguese government and the "influence of outsiders" were to take the blame for the unrest in the Angolan countryside.

⁷⁶Okuma, op. cit., p. 57.

CHAPTER III

REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE REVOLUTION

While the other colonial powers were coming to terms with their colonies, each in its own way, with the rising African nationalism of the post-World War II period, Portugal preferred to deny that she had any problem in her territories, and thus made no serious attempt to deal with it. It was, of course, impossible that Angola could be insulated against the independence movements that have swept through Africa the last two decades.

Portuguese policy failed to recognize the legitimacy of any nationalist aspirations for self-determination and independence of Angola. The stated objective of Portuguese policy was to create an integrated multi-racial society in Angola as the only lasting solution to that territory's problems. President Salazar stated just prior to the February, 1961, revolt:

The familiar treatment of successive generations has forged and consolidated the unity that was foreseen at the outset. It is, therefore, no political or legal fiction but a social and historical fact translated in Constitutions, which raises very serious difficulties for those who intend to dedicate themselves now to the task of emancipating Portuguese Africa. They come too late, for the job has already been

done. That unity does not allow of transfers, cession, or abandonment. The juridical figures of the plebiscite, the referendum, auto-determination do not fit into its structure either.⁷⁷

And yet, the Angolan revolution is now in its eighth year. This revolution is the first genuine challenge to the Portuguese colonial system, and there appears to be every indication that the revolt will continue until the Angolan problem is ultimately resolved. To help determine the "immediate" cause of the insurrection, a United Nations investigation committee with Bolivia, Dahomey, Finland, The Federation of Malaya, and Sudan serving as members was named. Their report stated that the development of political aspirations among the Angolan peoples appeared to stem from the lack of an ability to express grievances, especially over the loss of their land to Portuguese farmers, to cotton cultivation, and to harsh labor conditions and policies.⁷⁸

Some expression had been permitted in the 1920's when the "Liga Africana" and the Regional Association of the Natives of Angola were formed. These groups were not

⁷⁷Portuguese Foreign Policy; "Portugal and the Anti-Colonialist Campaign," Oliveira Salazar, speech delivered before National Assembly, November 30, 1960, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin (1965), p. 13.

⁷⁸UN (A/4978), op. cit., p. 42.

permitted to act as a vehicle for criticism against conditions or policies. They were formed to forge a closer link between Portuguese officialdom and the Angolan native population. After World War II, many insurrectionist groups were formed in other African colonies. Angolan leaders renewed efforts to give expression to their grievances and political aspirations. Because Angolan nationalist activities were not permitted, this led to the formation of clandestine underground political organizations which extended their activities from inside Angola to those who had fled the territory and were residing in neighboring countries. It would appear that the only "benefit" to the Portuguese prohibition of political activity gained at this point was time--the world press would not become "Angola-minded" until 1961; until that time, silence in the countryside would be synonymous with peace and harmony.

Although between thirty-five and forty revolutionary groups organized in Angola since 1954, only three have garnered popular support in large numbers and are able to conduct guerrilla activity on a respectable scale. In 1954, the U.P.A. (Union of the Peoples of Angola) was founded in Leopoldville in the Republic of the Congo under the leadership of Holden Roberto. In 1956, the

M.P.L.A. (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) was organized inside Angola by Dr. Agostinho Neto and Mario de Andrade. In 1959, the M.P.L.A. was declared a subversive organization by the Portuguese government, and was, therefore, moved to Conakry, Guinea, and then to Leopoldville, Congo. In 1966, U.N.I.T.A. (National Union for the Independence of all of Angola) under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi was founded by a revolutionary wing of the U.P.A. which had grown dissatisfied with Holden Roberto's leadership. The U.P.A. passed out of existence in 1962 when G.R.A.E. (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile) emerged. G.R.A.E. represented a coalition of the FNLA (National Liberation Front in Angola) with the U.P.A., which had a multi-ethnic leadership and a popular following among P.D.A. (the Angolan Democratic Party). The P.D.A. represented the Bazombos, a sub-group, of the Bakongo tribe which is centered in northern Angola and in the two Congos. The Kikongos are also a sub-group of the larger Bakongo tribe. Both the U.P.A. and the P.D.A. had originally organized within the large emigré population that had fled to the Congo-Kinshasa.

The O.A.U. (Organization for African Unity) in August, 1963, met in Dakar where it was decided that Angola was to be given top priority because of the state

of war that existed with Portugal.⁷⁹ Top priority meant that whatever material aid possible would be made available to GRAE by the OAU's Liberation Committee. Holden Roberto, as president of GRAE, predicted a short war with victory for the revolutionaries. It soon became apparent, however, that Roberto was underestimating Portugal's tenacity and overestimating the aid forthcoming from the O.A.U. Recognition by the O.A.U. gave impetus to an increase in the organization's military, diplomatic, and educational areas plus that of refugee relief.⁸⁰ If GRAE's resources were not adequate to meet demands in these areas, there was a great psychological letdown among the group's membership.

Many Ovimbundu tribesmen wanted to see the revolution spread from the Bakongo stronghold in the north, eastward and southward, to open revolutionary activities in this larger area. This Roberto would not do. He was accused of favoring the Bakongo peoples and of failing to expand the revolution. (One important reason for Roberto's reluctance was his friendship to Cyrille Adoula,

⁷⁹John Marcum, "Three Revolutions," Africa Report, Vol. 12, No. 8 (November, 1967), p. 10.

⁸⁰Ibid.

the president of the Congo-Kinshasa. Adoula feared that rebel activity in the south would cause the closing of the Benguela Railway, greatly needed to export Katangan copper.) Disappointed, a general mutiny occurred among Ovimbundu guerrillas, and GRAE's foreign minister, Jonas Savimbi, chief spokesman for the dissident group, withdrew from GRAE and traveled to Cairo. Thus, instead of a single revolutionary group, three distinct groups were actively seeking converts to their cause by the beginning of 1963.

In July, 1963, the OAU recommended that African states formally recognize the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) as the only Angolan revolutionary movement effectively fighting for independence. This pronouncement spurned the efforts of the MPLA and the embryonic "Savimbi-led" Ovimbundu element. By November, 1964, Roberto's GRAE had been recognized by twenty-nine African states.⁸¹ The only country to recognize the Angolan Government-in-Exile to date outside the African continent is Iraq.⁸²

⁸¹"Africa in the Soviet Press: Angola," The Mizan Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 11 (December, 1964), p. 22.

⁸²"Angola--Continued Guerrilla Activities in Northern and Eastern Areas," Keesing's Contemporary Archives (April 8-15, 1967), p. 21965.

Pursuant to the OAU's recommendation that member states should deal only with GRAE, the Adoula-led Congolese government in late 1963 closed the headquarters of the MPLA and forced Dr. Agostinho Neto, its leader, to move his offices across the river into the Congo-Brazzaville. Neto considered his movement sacrificed by the forces of "imperialism," acting through the intermediary of a Congolese government that had given the GRAE military training bases (Kinkuzu and Thysville) exclusive access to the Angolan border, "de jure" recognition, and support from the OAU.⁸³ Neto organized his small militia into what was referred to as the People's Liberation Army (EPLA) and launched raids on the enclave of Cabinda.

Many Angolan Bakongo tribes became interested in restoring the former Kongo Kingdom to unite eventually with the larger Bakongo tribesmen in the Congo-Kinshasa, of which they were a sizable sub-group. In April, 1965, five Bakongo secessionist movements banded together, thereby rejecting GRAE leadership. This group organized the Patriotic Front for the Independence of Kongo from Portugal (FPIDK) and attempted to negotiate with the Portuguese government for sovereignty to be granted to

⁸³Marcum, op. cit., p. 12.

the geographic region that was traditionally Bakongo. The Salazar government, of course, refused not only to accede to their demands but also refused even to recognize them as a legitimately organized group.

This low point of 1964-1965 for Roberto's GRAE gave Neto's MPLA an opportunity to regain much of the stature formerly enjoyed while based in Leopoldville. The principal problems of the MPLA were getting financial backing and obtaining supplies to keep the revolution alive and forceful. As Congo-Brazzaville was receiving communist aid, it appeared natural to the MPLA leadership to tap this material support, especially since it was commonly believed among the rebel groups that much of Portugal's aid came as a result of its N.A.T.O. membership.⁸⁴ Soviet aid and Cuban instructors--even a visit from Ché Guevara--gave the MPLA a renewed fervor. The MPLA had competition from a newly formed Liberation Front for the Freedom of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC); however, since MPLA's program envisioned independence for Angola and Cabinda as a single unit and not Cabinda as a separate nation, FLEC refused to cooperate with the MPLA. The latter, nevertheless, continued to concentrate its efforts on Cabinda.

⁸⁴"Nationalist Plans Massive Onslaught Against Portugal," African Recorder, Vol. III, No. 24 (November 19-December 2, 1964), p. 911.

As of late 1967, the political and military position of the MPLA was obscure. Politically, it is led by a predominantly Ovimbundu intelligentsia from the Luanda-Catete region, and is dedicated to the thesis that class, not racial conflict, should be the core of the Angolan revolution.⁸⁵ Its strongest appeal exists in the urbanized sectors of the Kimbundu-speaking community of over 1,000,000 persons in north-central Angola, but its military operations are quite fragmented.

In direct response to the great problems faced during 1964-1965, Holden Roberto announced that, if offered, he would accept Soviet and Red Chinese aid.⁸⁶ In a speech delivered in Leopoldville, Roberto stated,

Until now we have kept out of the cold war and within the framework of African politics, but we are now at a point where a radical change of policy is imperative for us to make headway in our struggle.⁸⁷

He had come to the conclusion that the Western countries were hypocritical since they continued to supply Portugal

⁸⁵Marcum, op. cit., p. 12.

⁸⁶"Portuguese Africa," op. cit., p. 8.

⁸⁷"Foreign Assistance for Revolution," African Recorder, Vol. III, No. 8 (April 9-22, 1964), p. 740.

with arms despite their declared belief in self-determination. In addition, Roberto stated,

There is always insufficient aid for a revolution such as ours; it is from the African countries that we have received aid so far. But our African brothers have their problems too. We will, therefore, appeal to anyone for aid--even to the devil himself.⁸⁸

The Soviet press watched the Angolan revolution closely in 1964-1965, and a great amount of propaganda against Roberto and in favor of Neto and Andrade was evidenced. Two Pravda articles written by the Soviet political writer, V. Midtsev, illustrated the official Soviet attitude. The analysis lamented that the MPLA and the UPA were actively competing with one another, thus, "seriously weakening their position and considerably damaging the struggle for independence." Midtsev further lamented that Roberto rejected the suggestion of the MPLA, "a progressive patriotic party," that a single front should be created. "The Americans would like to make Holden and his supporters 'their men.'" "It is also noteworthy that life is forcing Roberto Holden somewhat to re-examine his position." While "until recently he never turned for help to the socialist countries," in recent months his speeches had indicated criticism of

⁸⁸Ibid.

American policy and a desire for aid from the socialist countries. Midtsev continued:

The Soviet public does not approve of the negative attitude of Holden towards the unification of all the national forces of the Angolan people in a single anti-colonialist front and toward the question of cooperation with the MPLA. At the same time it evaluates positively the change in his attitude towards the socialist countries.⁸⁹

The GRAE organization weathered the 1964-1965 low point in its power and prestige, and Roberto chose to continue his independent path.

While the 1964-1965 period was a low point in GRAE power and effectiveness, and was, indeed, a fight for survival, it was for the MPLA the opportunity needed for a comeback and possibly a wresting of control from the GRAE. The MPLA continued its harassment of Portuguese positions in Cabinda; military operations against GRAE forces in northern Angola were begun, and a new third front was opened in the Angolan panhandle to challenge the Savimbi-led rebel forces there.

The strong force in eastern Angola was UNITA, which had been organized by Jonas Savimbi after his break with Roberto in 1964. UNITA was organized in

⁸⁹"Africa in the Soviet Press: Angola," The Mizan Newsletter, Vol. VI, No. 4 (April, 1964), p. 21.

Brazzaville primarily out of disenchanted or discontented members of the MPLA and GRAE movements. Three main groups joined Savimbi's UNITA: the AMANGOLA cadre of ex-GRAE militants (AMANGOLA (Friends of the Angolan Manifest)); central and southern Angolan students abroad who belonged to the National Union of Angolan Students (UNEA), and local leaders of the former Chokwe, Lwena, and Luchazi self-help associations.⁹⁰ Angolan refugees in Zambia also joined the UNITA organization. In March, 1967, Savimbi's effectiveness in eastern Angola was greatly restricted when his Zambian residence permit was not renewed. UNITA forces had temporarily cut the Benguela Railway link to Zambia, and the Portuguese government had demanded that Zambian officials control rebels using their territory as a haven or face closure of the railway. As in Katanga, the need to move copper over the railway demanded that action be taken against UNITA. Ultimately, Savimbi fled to Cairo and UNITA splintered into smaller, less-effective political groups.

The most significant aspect of the revolution has been the ability of GRAE-leader Holden Roberto to survive in the face of all obstacles and remain head of the most

⁹⁰Marcum, op. cit., p. 13.

vibrant military force of the revolution. One reason for Roberto's success rests with the ability of GRAE-UPA to occupy a prominent position in the minds of all Angolans desiring independence.⁹¹ The UPA was responsible for starting the insurrection and the Portuguese press, broadcasts, and public demonstrations accused the UPA of starting the war. Through the years, the UPA (now GRAE) has remained a household "word" in Angolan towns and villages.

Holden Roberto, president of the revolutionary Angolan Government-in-Exile, was born in the small Angolan town of Saõ Salvador in 1925. In 1927, his family moved to the Congo, and he has returned to Angola only four times since infancy--in 1932, 1940, 1951, and 1956. Roberto's first inclination to become a revolutionary and fight the Portuguese came during a visit to Angola in 1951 when he witnessed a chefe de posto beat and kick an old man. In the same year, Roberto, himself a Protestant, sought aid from Protestant organizations and the United Nations. In 1952, he joined the Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola (UPNA) and remained in membership until 1954 when he became convinced the organization, being interested in restoring the Kongo

⁹¹"Angola," op. cit., p. 28.

kingdom, was too narrowly oriented to be successful as a revolutionary movement. The UPNA, being made up of Kikongo tribesmen, a part of the larger Bakongo group, did not show an interest in joining with other ethnic groups in Angola and fighting a common battle--that of independence for all Angola. For this reason, Roberto founded the Union of the Peoples of Angola, as a party pledged to bind all the peoples of Angola into the common cause. In spite of his supra-nationalism, he has been accused of favoring the northern Kikongo peoples.

In September, 1958, Roberto boarded a ship at Pointe Noire and sailed to Douala, Cameroun. From there he walked and hitch-hiked to Accra, Ghana, where he attended the first All-African Peoples Conference in December.⁹² His proficiency in English, French, Portuguese, and some native languages enabled him to work as an interpreter at the conference. In 1959, he came to the United States as "José Gilmour," a member of the Guinean delegation to the United Nations.

Roberto, a Baptist, was educated at a Methodist mission and attributes his revolutionary spirit to his

⁹²John Marcum, "Angola Rebellion: Status Report," Africa Report, Vol. IX, No. 2 (February, 1964), p. 5. (Hereinafter referred to as Marcum, S.R.)

avowed faith in the efficacy of the Christian religion. Roberto became a rebel "because a Christian who remains silent before a crime becomes a participant in that crime."⁹³

At the outset, Roberto envisioned the role of the UPA as an organization conducting sabotage and creating general disobedience toward the Portuguese government by the Angolan populace, but maintains the insurrection only became bloody when the Portuguese ordered a series of "brutal" repressions.⁹⁴ This account, however, is very likely false, since many recountings of the first day of the insurrection are typical of the following:

The day began like almost all Angolan days in the north, the people rose at the first light of dawn, lit their breakfast fires, and warmed themselves against the chill of the early morning mist. Few (natives) went to work on the coffee plantations or hunted, but met--thousands of them--by plan at the edge of the towns in the valleys and (at the prescribed time) attacked. Local Portuguese chefes de posto, plantation foremen, merchants, and women and children were mutilated and hacked to death; an African way of showing contempt for the enemy. Thus began Angola's revolt for independence.⁹⁵

⁹³Farmer, op. cit., p. 105.

⁹⁴"Revolt in A Non-Colony," Time, Vol. LXXVII, No. 14 (March 31, 1961), p. 20.

⁹⁵Lloyd Garrison, "Now Angola: Study of A Rebel," New York Times Magazine (February 16, 1964), p. 13.

Roberto did, however, have instruction sheets passed out to rebel soldiers over his signature which required that each unit in the field was to select an individual to transmit information and to receive UPA commands. The person chosen was not to express personal views, but views of the whole population. There was to be no stealing by UPA soldiers and no Portuguese items seized were to be kept. Cooperation between the youth and the elders was to be urged.

All money the soldiers could lay their hands on was to be forwarded to UPA headquarters in Leopoldville, because "if we do not have money our work for independence cannot continue."⁹⁶

Richard Mathews, a journalist, traveled with the rebel troops for a period following the insurrection and observed that "the UPA members were treated with warmth and admiration" in the rebel-held Angolan villages and appeared to have "won real support in northern Angola."⁹⁷ In addition, he observed that the revolt appeared to be

⁹⁶"Rebels of Angola," op. cit., p. 43.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 41.

neither anti-white nor anti-European but was, rather, anti-Portuguese. The thing most hated was the forced labor system.⁹⁸

Roberto attempted to set up negotiations between his government-in-exile and the Lisbon government, but the possibilities for negotiated settlement were slim, especially since the official Portuguese position denied the existence of Angolans as people separate from the Portuguese. Roberto's conditions for settlement of the rebellion were forwarded to the United Nations in 1963. He demanded recognition of the right of self-determination, the withdrawal of Portuguese troops, the freeing of political prisoners, and general amnesty.⁹⁹

The GRAE leadership has abandoned hope that Western nations will force Portugal into a negotiated settlement through a severance of its NATO ties or through a blockade of arms and materials. It is this lack of action or commitment by the Western world that has caused Roberto to look Eastward to seek support for the revolution. The longer the war lasts and the longer the

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 43.

⁹⁹Marcum, S.R., op. cit., p. 7.

Western countries are dilatory in their avowed commitment to self-determination, the more will be undermined the basis for a friendly relationship with a future independent Angola.

CHAPTER IV

ANGOLA AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

There was genuine concern throughout the world early in 1961 that the Angolan insurrection would become a threat to world peace. Few people, even governments, are quite so concerned eight years later about the urgency of this war. Yet, because it is a war that has a large region resembling a military bastion, its effect on world peace should be ascertained. At a time in history when colonialism is not fashionable, and since Portugal is determined to continue a course contrary to historical trends, it is clear that one worldwide repercussion will be the loss of friends by Portugal. The newly emerged nations are quite vehement in their condemnation of Portugal's historical "mission," and, indeed, may become "action-minded" with respect to their own world "mission."

The recent histories of the Afro-Asian and communist bloc countries have oriented them against the Portuguese position. The so-called Western democracies, while perhaps not in tune with the Salazar thesis, superimpose this crisis on top of a much greater world problem--the Cold War.

By request of a large number of Afro-Asian states, the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly have investigated, insofar as Portuguese cooperation would permit, the situation in Angola, and have expressed anxiety over the conflict and its effect on international peace and security. During the debates in the General Assembly and the Security Council, a number of representatives stated that Portugal's policies and palliative measures had aroused strong sentiments in their countries, and that the continuance of the war was likely to have international repercussions; i. e., Portugal would likely suffer from blockades, embargoes, and a loss of friends.

The ability of the United Nations to deal directly with the Angolan revolt was somewhat restricted, since Portugal maintained that because Angola was an "overseas province" and, hence, an integral part of Portugal itself, the struggle was an internal one. The General Assembly, however, could not ignore the individuals and nations who testified that the rebellion was the consequence of genuine grievances of the indigenous population against the administration of the territory. These grievances included dissatisfaction with economic conditions, specifically the contract labor system, labor quotas, labor recruitment, and the physical ill-treatment of laborers. The impact of

African nationalism, especially on the Kikongo tribe; the rise of political groups, like the MPLA, which sought a redress of grievances; and the severe repression to which these groups had been subjected added to the dissatisfaction of the Angolan people.

The disturbances and conflicts have resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, the flight of roughly 300,000 refugees from the territory, and the creation, consequently, of a veritable atmosphere of conventional warfare. Because of the decadence of colonialism to most nations of the world today, especially Afro-Asian, the response was predictable and immediate. Resistance was organized. Financial resources and material support were pledged to the revolutionaries. It was this response by the African powers that posed a threat to world peace in the early 1960's. This was especially true if Angola were to be used as a pawn in the Cold War.

On June 1, 1961, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana called the Accra Conference, which was attended by over two hundred nationalists from throughout Africa. The purpose of the Conference, according to the published agenda, was to plan "a decisive assault on imperialism."¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰"Freedom Fighter's Conference in Accra," Africa Report, Vol. VII, No. 7 (July, 1962), p. 13.

Most of the meetings were secret, but the agenda indicated that discussion would be centered upon intensification of the struggle to gain independence for the Portuguese colonies, the vital role and need for concerted action and unity in the struggle, and the major problems confronting nationalist organizations and parties. At least partially as a result of this thinking, the Organization of African Unity became active in the Angolan rebellion. Angola was isolated as a target area to receive the OAU Liberation Committee's financial and material aid. Also, the Accra Conference chose to recognize one revolutionary party as the principal means of achieving self-determination, rather than attempting to support a multi-party system representing fragmented ideas and support. Hence, the OAU supported GRAE. Its multi-ethnic leadership and contact with the people at the village level made it the liberation party in the best position to achieve the goals of the OAU and the Accra Conference.

The second conference of independent African states was held in Addis Ababa in 1960, and in 1962 the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa was also held in the Ethiopian capital. The objectives of these conferences as they relate to the Angolan struggle were to unite the nationalist movements of these

areas and to promote closer association leading to federation from the Red Sea to the Cape.¹⁰¹ During the Addis Ababa Conference, Premier Khrushchev pledged his nation to the "full moral and material support" for the struggle of the peoples of Angola.¹⁰² This "pledge" helped confirm suspicious and unofficial reports that the Soviet Union was supplying arms for the revolution, shipping them first to Ghana, whence they found their way to the Congo-Kinshasa and into rebel hands. There seems to be little doubt that the MPLA was receiving Communist technical and material aid through Congo-Brazzaville.¹⁰³ This aid was allegedly routed from the Soviet Union and other communist bloc countries through Guinea and Algeria.

There is some truth to the Portuguese claim that the revolt was partly the work of foreign agents and agitators. Certainly Radio Conakry in communist-leaning Guinea beamed broadcasts into Angola and communist agents, according to this source, were operating from Congo-

¹⁰¹John Hatch, A History of Postwar Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 354.

¹⁰²"African Liberation," The Mizan Newsletter, Vol. VI, No. 5 (May, 1964), p. 60.

¹⁰³Supra, p. 76.

Brazzaville across the border into Congo-Kinshasa, Cabinda, and Angola.¹⁰⁴

The relationship of Portugal with Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa is not yet clear. Portugal has had close ties with Rhodesia since the 1880's, but established firmer ties with the Republic of South Africa only recently. Each of these countries employs a policy of racial discrimination that isolates it from the remainder of the world. This relationship can be expected to become closer as pressure increases and common support is needed for survival. This position was reiterated by Mr. H. Das Neves, mayor of Laurencio Marques, Mozambique, at a luncheon in his honor in Pretoria, South Africa.¹⁰⁵

The Iberian Pact also binds Portugal to Spain, another of the remaining colonial powers in Africa. "If the going gets really tough, Franco may be counted on to give aid," wrote Ramon Serrano Suner, Foreign Minister and brother-in-law to Generallissimo Franco.

Spain would view the taking of Portuguese colonies as an act of war and it would be the duty of everyone to go and fight, against ten or a

¹⁰⁴"Portugal's Ancient Empire," Reporter, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (April 13, 1961), p. 22. (Hereinafter referred to as "Empire.")

¹⁰⁵"Long Friendship Binds South Africa and Portugal," South African Digest, Vol. XIV, No. 14 (March 31, 1967), p. 23.

thousand . . . a duty not only to the fatherland
but to the world.¹⁰⁶

However, since the Iberian Pact has been in effect since 1939 and Spain elected not to intervene when Portugal lost Goa on the Indian sub-continent, perhaps the pact lacks force and will not in the future push the world into crisis..

The United Nations has attempted to become a vital force in altering the course in Angola and bringing about a peaceful settlement there; but, due to an almost complete lack of Portuguese cooperation or recognition that the United Nations has a legitimate right to investigate the Angolan crisis, little has been gained. Numerous resolutions and documents have been introduced; some have been debated and voted upon. In much of the deliberation, the East-West struggle was the background issue at stake.

In April, 1961, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which the United States supported that claimed Portugal had not accorded Angolans adequate opportunities for social, economic, and political advancement. Reforms were called for, especially the granting of self-determination to the territory.¹⁰⁷ The United States voted in

¹⁰⁶"Empire," op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁰⁷United Nations, General Assembly, "Declaration Calling for the Introduction of Measures and Reforms in Angola," A/RES/1603 (XV), Fifteenth Session (April 20, 1961).

support of self-determination and published a bulletin supporting this decision against adverse Portuguese opinion.¹⁰⁸ United Nations Resolution A/RES/1808 called for a training program for territories under Portuguese administration and declared, over Portuguese protest, that Angola was a non-self-governing Territory, and hence, subject to UN jurisdiction. A/RES/1514 (XV) upheld the right of self-determination and independence and called for the cessation of "all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples."¹⁰⁹ The Assembly also recognized that the denial of the rights of peoples under colonial subjugation to self-determination constituted a threat to the well-being of humanity and to international peace. Resolution A/1542 attempted to force Portugal to comply with Resolution A/1514, but the Portuguese position remained unaltered--Angola was an integral part of Portugal; therefore, problems there were internal and of no concern to the United Nations.

The Assembly attempted to draw attention to the considered judgment of the General Assembly in Resolution

¹⁰⁸State Department Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1170, (November 27, 1961); unnumbered.

¹⁰⁹United Nations, General Assembly, "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," A/RES/1514 (XV), Fifteenth Session, December 14, 1960.

1514 (XV) that the process of liberation was irresistible. "It is too much to hope that the nationalist sentiments aroused in the Angolan population and the desire for change will subside, and that the 'status quo' can be re-established."¹¹⁰

The policy of the United States is somewhat obscured by political reality, our dedication to self-determination on the one hand, and our NATO alliance with our Western anti-communist neighbors on the other. Foreign observers not familiar with the American political system must view our pronouncements as somewhat inconsistent. For example, after the collapse of the summit conference in May, 1960, President Eisenhower visited President Salazar in Lisbon and stated that the United States and Portugal "have worked together without a single difference of opinion."¹¹¹ With a change of administration in 1960, Portugal noticed a change in our attitude toward the African states. Portugal believed that the United States was in a popularity contest, seeking votes at the United Nations. They were also seized by the suspicion that the Kennedy Administration was motivated by policies that

¹¹⁰UN A/4978, op. cit., p. 46.

¹¹¹"Kingdom of Silence," op. cit., p. 31.

would win for him the support of the Negro in the United States. In 1961, Vice-President Johnson made a 28,500-mile trip to explain the American cause to the world. He explained that

The United States must and will commit the full strength of its great capacity, the full moral force of our devotion to peace, the full energy and vitality of our people, to the cause of human freedom everywhere.¹¹²

An Angolan might reflect on democracy in the United States and wonder about the napalm bombs being supplied to Portugal by the United States through NATO and used in Angola. Perhaps the United States reasons that it cannot show the full moral force of its devotion to the cause of human freedom everywhere because of the politics of the Cold War. Africans will find this reasoning difficult to understand.

¹¹²"Deeds, Not Words," Nation, Vol. 192, No. 20 (May 20, 1961), p. 421.

CHAPTER V

THE PROSPECTS OF ANGOLAN NATIONALISM

Portugal is a proud nation, proud of having been the first country to penetrate Africa and open it to European trade and influence. Portugal also clings tenaciously to past glories, dating to the exploits and philosophies of Prince Henry. The Portuguese are quite aware that theirs is not only the oldest, but the last of the great empires of the "old" world.

The Portuguese were not the only colonial power to believe it had a "civilizing" mission and "white man's burden," but they are the only power that has attempted to transform their colonies into provinces totally integrated sociologically with the mother country. In addition, Portugal has neither promised independence to its colonies nor prepared them for it.

The government of President Salazar has made no promises to the indigenous populations, nor has he set in motion the machinery that will someday evolve into sovereignty for the colonies, because Portugal feels she cannot afford to. Portugal's economic dependence on its empire, and especially Angola, is literally a matter of life and death. With its empire, Portugal is a "nation" of twenty

million people with nearly a million square miles of area, a balanced budget, and a highly protected market for its exports. Without the empire, Portugal would be a country of barely over nine million people, with an area of thirty-five thousand square miles, a considerable annual trade deficit, and a depressed economy that inevitably would lower what is already the lowest standard of living in western Europe.

These factors, linked to the mystique of Prince Henry's "civilizing" mission, illustrate why the world can expect Portugal to cling to its policies with dogged determination. This is not to say, however, that these policies are not irrevocable. There are elements inside Portugal, repressed, that are in profound disagreement with the politics of their government. Ex-General Humberto Delgado and Henrique Galvao are exiled leaders who represent strong anti-government feelings. In 1958, the first election where candidates were permitted to oppose the official government slate, Delgado polled 236,528 votes while Americo Tomas, the government candidate, polled 758,998.¹¹³ In Angola where only 0.7% of

¹¹³Peter Fryer and Patricia M. Pinheiro, Oldest Ally (London: Dobson Books, Ltd., 1961), p. 188.

the population was eligible to vote, Delgado received 10,300 votes while Tomas received 22,300.¹¹⁴ The size of this protest vote is significant, especially since the election was controlled. The hijacking of the Santa Maria by Henrique Galvao was also a violent protest against the policies of the Portuguese government. With the overthrow of the government, the political policies inside Portugal could abruptly change. This change could be equally abrupt for the colonies.

The role of the Western democracies probably will not change--the primary interest in Angola's struggle will be as it affects NATO or the Cold War balance of power. The governments and parties of the West look upon the human and universal aspects of democratic principles from vantage points much too dehumanized to allow for a commitment to the rights of the suffering Angolan citizen. This position by default leaves a vacuum within which communist countries and groups can operate relatively free from competition.

The role of the United Nations will be relatively inflexible. Portugal is not to remain in Africa indefinitely. This inflexibility will not bring the world

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 178.

organization and Portugal together to resolve their differences unless one or the other alters appreciably its present position. This is unlikely! The official United Nations position has not changed since 1960, when General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) declared without dissent:

. . . that the subjugation of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the United Nations Charter, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation. Immediate steps are to be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.¹¹⁵

Some Portuguese are hopeful that their acculturation policy can continue long enough to bring about the "Brazilian solution." This "solution" would recognize independence for Angola; however, Angola would assume membership in an international Lusitanian cultural community.¹¹⁶ This "solution" would conflict with the fundamental aspects of Pan-African nationalism with which the principal rebel organizations identify.

¹¹⁵UN A/1514 (XV) (December 14, 1960).

¹¹⁶Victor C. Ferkiss, Africa's Search for Identity (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1966), p. 201.

The OAU's program demands an end to Portuguese domination in Angola and self-determination and independence for its people. Military operations are to cease, and all acts of repression against the Angolan people halted. The OAU also demands an "unconditional political amnesty" and free functioning political parties.¹¹⁷ Free elections and a peaceful transfer of power to the elected Angolan representatives is the ultimate goal of the OAU program.

The OAU asks all countries to halt assistance to Portugal which may be used to fight Angolan revolutionary organizations and hinder the just aspirations of the people.

Occasionally, the Portuguese press emphasizes educational and political reforms which are to ameliorate the wrongs of the system. For example, citizenship has now been granted to all Angolans. The crop quota system has been abolished. The educational system has been expanded to permit a more adequate education for all Angolan children. It should be clear, however, that rebel political processes have matured to a point where independence

¹¹⁷"The OAU's 'Operation Liberation,'" Africa Report, Vol. VIII, No. 8 (August, 1963), p. 16.

is the only permanent solution to the Portugal-Angola problem. Reforms can no longer bridge the gap between the opposing forces!

Independence for Angola is, therefore, inevitable. The major concern, then, is the status of the new leaders and the extent to which Angolans look to them for their leadership. The picture for Angola is not a happy one. The Portuguese government has not prepared the Angolan for independence, and the economic, political, and educational structure Angola will inherit when independence is won will not be staffed by people adequately trained to prevent a general condition of mayhem.

One might also address himself to the question of Angolan nationalism. Does it truly exist? The Kikongos envision a restoration of the Kongo Kingdom, unification with the Bakongos, and severance from Angola as an independent state. In the south, the Cuanhamas argue that independence will reinstate a political status pre-dating Portuguese intrusion. Most tribal groups in Angola did not actively support the efforts of GRAE-UPA, the MPLA, or UNITA, and tribal divisions will be a formidable obstacle to Angolan unification.¹¹⁸ GRAE made

¹¹⁸Dr. G. Wesley Johnson, Professor of African History, private interview held at Stanford University, August, 1967. (Hereinafter referred to as G. W. Johnson.)

the greatest inroads toward providing multi-tribal leadership; however, primary support came from the Kikongo and Kimbundu tribes. GRAE had difficulty overcoming the image of fighting to reunite the Bakongo nation. The MPLA competed with GRAE for support from the same ethnic area. UNITA attempted to expand its revolutionary support to the Lunda tribes but with very limited success. Therefore, whatever support that GRAE, MPLA, or UNITA received came from northern Angola. (See Map 5.) The effectiveness of each organization was greatly reduced because of their intense competition with one another. Tribes located in the central and southern regions of Angola never supported the revolt and the northern tribes were fragmented "to a point where unification after eight years of fighting a 'common' cause was impossible."¹¹⁹ If this fragmented nationalism constitutes a true assessment of the Angolan situation, the tribes can be expected to splinter after sovereignty is achieved.

Perhaps, with all factors weighed, Angola is not experiencing nationalism in the countryside, but is

¹¹⁹Mr. Leão Lorenzo, Special Adviser of the Portugal Mission to the United Nations, private interview held at the United Nations, New York, July, 1968.

"suffering" from elitism. The revolutionary leadership is made up of a Western-educated minority that may not have communicated effectively with the masses. Once independence is won, the masses may fragment and rise up against the elitist leadership.¹²⁰ The extent that elitism exists poses a danger to the success of the revolution. There is always this danger if leadership does not rise organically from the people. If the Angolan rebel leadership is elitist, it does not detract from their sincerity, dedication, or commitment, however. The sincerity of the elite is not a question; the wisdom of the creation of an elitist leadership is what must be placed in question.

The eventual control of the revolution may well slip from the hands of the elite and terminate with individuals not yet prominent in rebel leadership ranks. Because MPLA leader Mario de Andrade, as a communist sympathizer, has permitted numerous communists to infiltrate the ranks of that body, it may well become a communist frontal organization.¹²¹ If the MPLA were to become

¹²⁰G. W. Johnson


¹²¹Dr. Peter Duignan, Curator, African Section, Hoover Library, an interview held at Stanford University, August, 1967.

dominated by the Communist Party as Dr. Duignan suggests, it will not have meant that the revolution at its inception was communist or even leftist. If it should ever be, however, it will serve notice to the Western world of its long indifference and ignorance of this problem.


Portugal, too, must recognize that it must accede to the demands of its allies, the United States and Great Britain, that independence must be recognized as a right and be granted to the Angolan people.¹²² Portugal is clinging to an age, fading, that will soon be no more. By attempting to perpetuate this anachronistic machine, the world's oldest Western empire is heading toward oblivion.

¹²²Anthony Verrier, "Portugal on the Brink," New Statesman, Vol. LXIV, No. 1649 (October 19, 1962), p. 518.


MAP I - POLITICAL



MAP 2 - PHYSICAL




MAP 3 - ETHNOGRAPHY



MAP 4 - EXPLORATION



MAP 5 - AREAS OF GREATEST REBEL ACTIVITY



APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF PORTUGUESE TERMS

<u>Assimilado</u>	Literally, an assimilated person. Under the Statute of 1954 this term was used to designate an African who had obtained the status and rights of a full Portuguese citizen.
<u>Caderneta (indigena)</u>	Identity card issued to non-assimilated Africans. Commonly referred to as "work-book" or "native work-book."
<u>Chefe de posto</u>	Official in charge of a sub-area called a <u>posto</u> .
<u>Conto</u>	Portuguese unit of currency (1 conto = 1000 escudos).
<u>Contract Labor</u>	Africans recruited, under the supervision of local administrators, to work on private or public projects, often outside the region in which they normally reside, for a specified contracted time period, with the maximum time limit on contracts two years inside Angola and three years outside.
<u>Escudo</u>	Portuguese unit of currency. The parity of the Portuguese escudo in terms of United States dollars is Esc. 28.75 = \$US1.
<u>Indigena</u>	Under the Statute of 1954, it was used as a legal term designating an individual living in accordance with tribal ways, i. e., non-assimilated African. Also used in Portuguese in a more general sense to mean African or "native." Used in the report as an adjective to qualify the special <u>status</u> of indigenous inhabitants. (<u>Indigene</u> - plural form.)

Liceu

Secondary school.

Obligatory Labor

Africans compelled to work on public works of general and collective interest, the results of which will benefit them, to fulfill judicial sentences of a penal character, and to fulfill fiscal obligations. This means that Africans may be requisitioned to work on public projects whenever voluntary workers are not sufficient, or in disaster emergencies.

Voluntary Labor

Africans who contract directly with an employer and work in the area in which they normally reside. The contract may be for varying lengths of time and is not under the direct supervision of the provincial administrator.

APPENDIX II
EDUCATION STATISTICS*

	Government		Private		Total	
	1955	1958- 1959	1955	1958- 1959	1955	1958- 1959
<u>Number of schools</u>						
Primary	144	211	154	371	298	582
Secondary:						
Liceu	2	5	18	26	20	31
Technical prof.	5	10	5	5	10	15
Indigenous education:						
Adaptation courses	837	814	158	243	995	1,057
Elementary prof.	7	6	-	-	7	6
Teacher training	1	2	-	-	1	2
Other schools	-	13	-	-	-	13
Total	996	1,061	335	645	1,331	1,706
<u>Number of students</u>						
Primary	11,132	16,771	7,564	13,226	18,696	29,997
Secondary						
Liceu	1,510	3,006	1,610	2,355	3,120	5,361
Technical prof.	1,300	3,074	530	288	1,830	3,362
Indigenous education:						
Adaptaion courses	35,938	41,866	12,310	13,913	48,248	55,779
Elementary prof.	468	426	-	-	468	426
Teacher-training	161	297	-	-	161	297
Other schools	-	1,007	-	-	-	1,007
Total	50,509	66,447	22,014	29,762	72,523	96,229

*Source: Angola: Repartição de Estatística Geral, Anuário Estatístico, 1959 Luanda, 1960, p. 61.

ON THE EXISTENCE OF THREE SEPARATE AFRICAS

I think we can and must say that there is not a single Africa; there are several Africas. We have the Arabic Africa, in the North, with its specific problems, its own traditions, its peculiar culture: and it is not possible to discover there anything fundamental, common to the other Africas. Then we have Africa, to the South of Sahara: the political, sociological, and economic problems it faces are typical, which separates them completely from those found in other areas. Finally we have the multiracial and pluricultural Africa, and we can say with a certain amount of pride that in it is included, with its unique characteristics, Portuguese Africa. This theory of the three Africas does not mean a simple speculation, neither constitutes a theoretical interpretation with political aims. On the contrary: it is based on a reality that is becoming progressively more profound, it is the result of an experience that becomes clearer day by day. Though it may look paradoxal, the political ties created by XIX Century Europe were what gave a seeming unity to Africa; so when those were broken or transformed, the reality took again its rights, which are imposing themselves with growing force. This means it is artificial to try to impose on the whole of Africa the same political and economic solutions, to face its sociological evolution with the same standards, to defend a unity of action that does not correspond to a unity of values or interests. One thing is cooperation, which is always useful and must be established on large bases, and another thing is uniformity, that suffocates and kills regional values whose loss constitutes damage to Africa itself. If those who have some responsibility for African policy, or who have some means of influencing it, wanted to see and to accept the reality of the three Africas and to act accordingly, we are sure that many benefits would result from it to the continent and that the solution of many basic problems would be found more easily. As far as we are concerned, we have said and repeated, and we keep saying it and repeating that we are ready to cooperate within the principles of equality and mutual respect. And we also keep saying that from us Africa has nothing to fear, and only extreme demagoguery or obedience to interests of others can one think and say the opposite.

(Dr. Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference, held in Lisbon, June 2, 1964)

LEGISLATIVE DECREE No. 39666 ON THE STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PERSONS
OF PORTUGUESE NATIONALITY IN THE PROVINCES OF PORTUGUESE
GUINEA, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

of 20 May 1954¹

CHAPTER I.—INDIGENOUS PERSONS OF
PORTUGUESE NATIONALITY AND THEIR
STATUS

Art. 1. In accordance with the Political Constitution,² the organic law relating to the Portuguese overseas provinces³ and the present enactment, the indigenous inhabitants of the provinces of Portuguese Guinea, Angola and Mozambique shall enjoy a special status.

Sole paragraph. The status of an indigenous person of Portuguese nationality shall be personal and shall be reflected in whatever Portuguese territory the person possessing it may be in.

Art. 2. A person shall be considered to be an indigenous inhabitant of a province aforementioned if he is a member of the negro race or a descendant of a member of that race and was born, or habitually resides, in the province but does not as yet possess the level of education or the personal and social habits which are a condition for the unrestricted application of the public and private law pertaining to Portuguese citizens.

Sole paragraph. A person shall likewise be considered to be an indigenous inhabitant of the province if he was born of indigenous parents at a place outside the province to which his parents had temporarily removed.

Art. 3. Unless otherwise prescribed by law, indigenous persons shall be governed by the usages and customs pertaining to their respective societies.

(1) Toleration of indigenous usages and customs shall be subject to such limitations as are imposed by

¹ Text in *Diário do Governo*, Series I, No. 110, of 20 May 1954, received through the courtesy of the Portuguese Embassy, Washington, D.C. Translation by the United Nations Secretariat.

² See *Yearbook on Human Rights for 1951*, p. 301.

³ See *Yearbook on Human Rights for 1953*, pp. 327-329.

morality, the dictates of humanity and the higher interest of the free exercise of Portuguese sovereignty.

(2) In applying indigenous usages and customs, the authorities shall endeavour, whenever possible, to bring them into conformity with the fundamental principles of public and private Portuguese law, and shall encourage the progressive evolution of indigenous institutions in harmony with those principles.

(3) The extent to which indigenous usages and customs are to be applied shall be determined by the stage of development reached by the indigenous person concerned, his moral character and his occupational attainments and by whether he is estranged from, or still integrated in, tribal society.

Art. 4. The State shall endeavour by every means to improve, both materially and morally, the living conditions of the indigenous inhabitants, to develop their natural aptitudes and abilities, and, in general, to educate them by providing them with instruction and by transforming their primitive usages and customs, directing their activities into useful channels and actively integrating them into the community by giving them access to citizenship.

Art. 5. The State shall provide all assistance necessary for improving the health and increasing the life span of the indigenous peoples and for introducing new production techniques into the indigenous economy.

Art. 6. The instruction especially intended for indigenous persons shall have as its general purpose the moral, civic, intellectual and physical education prescribed by law and the imparting of work habits and work skills, as determined by the needs of both sexes and by social and regional economic conditions.

(1) The instruction referred to in this article shall always be directed towards inculcating a knowledge of the Portuguese language, but the use of the ver-

nacular languages may be authorized as a means to that end.

(2) Those indigenous persons who have received "adaptation" training or who demonstrate, in the manner prescribed by law, that they do not require such training, shall be assured of admission to public schools under the conditions applicable to other Portuguese nationals.

CHAPTER II.—LEGAL STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PERSONS

PART I

Art. 23. Indigenous persons shall not be granted political rights with respect to non-indigenous institutions.

Sole paragraph. Representatives of the indigenous inhabitants, chosen in the manner prescribed by law, shall sit in the legislative or government councils of each province.

Art. 24. Indigenous persons shall have the right of petition and complaint, which they may exercise at all administrative levels and in particular with regard to administrators of indigenous affairs and administrative inspectors.

Sole paragraph. It shall be a disciplinary offence for any overseas official to attempt any obstruction or reprisal with regard to the exercise by indigenous persons of the right conferred by this article.

PART II

Art. 25. In the absence of explicit legislative provisions concerning indigenous persons, the provisions of ordinary criminal law shall apply.

Sole paragraph. A judge, when assessing an offender's conduct and imposing penalty, shall in every instance take into consideration the influence exerted on the said offender and his actions by indigenous social conditions.

PART III

Sub-part I

Art. 30. Baptized indigenous persons may be married according to the provisions of canon law by a ministry of the Roman Catholic Church if they satisfy the requirements of the civil law.

Art. 31. The ownership of movable property shall be acknowledged and protected in accordance with the general provisions of law.

Sub-part II

Art. 32. The State shall endeavour to teach the indigenous peoples that work is an indispensable element of progress, but the authorities may not

impose labour except in the cases explicitly prescribed by law.

Art. 33. Indigenous persons may freely choose the work they wish to perform, whether for their own or for another's account, on their own land or on land allotted to them for this purpose.

Art. 34. The performance of work for non-indigenous persons shall be subject to freedom of contract and to the right to fair pay and assistance, and shall be supervised by the State through competent authorities.

Sub-part III

Art. 35. Indigenous persons living in a tribal organization shall be assured of the joint use and enjoyment, in the manner prescribed by customary law, of the land necessary for their settlement and for the growing of their crops and the grazing of their cattle.

Sole paragraph. Occupation of land as provided in this article does not confer individual rights of ownership and shall be governed, as between indigenous persons, by the relevant usages and customs.

Art. 36. No grants of land may be made to non-indigenous persons unless the position of the indigenous inhabitants established thereon have been protected as prescribed by law.

Art. 37. The State shall recognize and foster individual rights of indigenous persons over rural and urban properties.

Indigenous persons who have opted for ordinary law in the matter of immovable property may acquire rights of ownership and other rights *in rem* over immovable property through inheritance, legacy, gift or purchase.

An indigenous person who has not so opted may acquire rights over immovable property subject to the limitations imposed by the following articles.

Sole paragraph. Any contract for the purchase of immovable property in which the purchaser is an indigenous person, and any disposal by way of gift, sale or otherwise of immovable property belonging to an indigenous person, where such disposal is in favour of a non-indigenous person, shall be valid only if authorized by the local judge, who shall ascertain that the indigenous persons concerned have the necessary legal capacity and that their interests will not be injured.

CHAPTER III.—TERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PERSON AND ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP

Art. 56. A person may relinquish the status of indigenous person and acquire citizenship if he can

prove that he satisfies all the following requirements:

- (a) Is over eighteen years of age;
- (b) Speaks the Portuguese language correctly;
- (c) Is engaged in an occupation, trade or craft from which he derives sufficient income to support himself and the dependent members of his family, or else possesses adequate resources for that purpose;
- (d) Is of good conduct and has attained the level of education and acquired the habits which are a condition for the unrestricted application of the public and private law pertaining to Portuguese citizens;
- (e) Is not on record as having refused to perform military service or as having deserted.

(1) Evidence of compliance with the foregoing requirements shall be furnished in the form prescribed by law, but in the case of items (b), (c), and (d) a certificate from the administrator of the municipality or circumscription in which the indigenous person concerned has been resident for the past three years shall be sufficient.

As to evidence of good conduct, the certificate in

question must be supplemented by an extract from the register of criminal offences showing that the person concerned has never been sentenced to imprisonment and has not been sentenced to detention on more than two occasions.

(2) In case of refusal by an administrator to grant the relevant certificates, an appeal may be lodged with the authorities referred to in article 58 of this legislative decree, who shall render a final decision in the matter after ordering such investigation as they consider appropriate.

(3) For the purposes of granting citizenship, a notation of refusal to perform military service shall be deemed to be without effect if military service is subsequently performed.

Art. 57. An indigenous woman married to a person who acquires citizenship in pursuance of the preceding article and any legitimate or legitimated children under eighteen years of age living with the father at the date when citizenship was acquired may also acquire citizenship if they satisfy the requirements set out in items (b) and (d) of article 56.

...

DECREE No. 18:570, July 8, 1930, Portuguese Colonial Act,
Chapter II

Article 15: The State shall guarantee the protection and defense of the natives in the colonies, in accordance with the principles of humanity and sovereignty, the provisions of this Chapter and the international conventions at present in force or which may come into force. The colonial authorities shall prevent and penalize all abuses against the persons and possessions of natives in accordance with the law.

Article 16: The State shall establish public institutions and encourage the creation of private ones to support the rights of natives or render them assistance. The institutions in either case shall be Portuguese.

Article 17: The law shall guarantee to the natives, under the terms stated therein, ownership and possession of their lands and crops and this principle must be respected in all concessions granted by the State.

Article 18: The labour of natives in the service of the State or in that of administrative bodies shall be remunerated.

Article 19: The following shall be prohibited:
(1) All regulations according to which the State undertakes to furnish native labourers to any enterprises working for their own economic development. (2) All regulations according to which the natives existing in any territorial circumscription may be compelled to furnish labour to the said enterprises under any pretext whatever.

Article 20: The State may only compel natives to labour on public works of general benefit to the community, in occupations the results of which will be enjoyed by them, in execution of judicial decisions of a penal character or for the fulfillment of fiscal obligations.

Article 21: Regulations relating to the contracting of native labour shall be based on the liberty of the individual and on the right to a fair wage and assistance, the public authorities intervening only for purposes of supervision.

Article 22: Attention shall be paid in the colonies to the stage of evolution of the native populations, and there shall be special statutes for natives, which, under the authority of Portuguese public and private law, shall lay down juridical regulations for them in keeping with their individual, domestic, and social usages and customs, provided that these are not incompatible with morality and dictates of humanity.

Article 23: The State shall ensure to all its overseas territories liberty of conscience and the free exercise of the various religions, subject to the restrictions necessitated by the rights and interests of the sovereignty of Portugal and the maintenance of public order, and so long as they are in harmony with international treaties and conventions.

Article 24: Religious missions overseas, being instruments of civilization and national influence, and establishments for the training of personnel for service in them and in the Portuguese Padroado, shall possess a juridical character and shall be protected and assisted by the States as institutions of learning.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,
Having considered the situation in Angola,
Recalling its resolution 1603 (XV) of 20 April 1961
and the Security Council resolution of 9 June 1961,
Having examined the report of the Sub-Committee on
the situation in Angola appointed under resolution 1603 (XV),
Deploring the lack of co-operation and assistance by
Portugal in the full and effective discharge of the Sub-
Committee's task as called for in the aforementioned
resolutions,

Noting with deep regret Portugal's refusal to recog-
nize Angola as a Non-Self-Governing Territory and its failure
to take measures to implement General Assembly resolution 1514
(XV) of 14 December 1960 entitled "Declaration on the grant-
ing of independence to colonial countries and peoples",

Convinced that the continued refusal of Portugal to
recognize the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people
to self-determination and independence constitutes a
permanent source of international friction and threatens
international peace and security,

1. Expresses its appreciation of the work of the
Sub-Committee on the situation in Angola and commends to
the Portuguese Government, for urgent consideration and
effective implementation, the observations, findings and
conclusions set out in the Sub-Committee's report;

2. Solemnly reaffirms the inalienable right of the
Angolan people to self-determination and independence;

3. Deeply deprecates the repressive measures and
armed action against the people of Angola and the denial to
them of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and calls
upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from
repressive measures against the people of Angola;

4. Appeals to the Government of Portugal to release
immediately all Angolan political prisoners wherever they
may be held;

5. Urges the Government of Portugal to undertake,
without further delay, extensive political, economic and
social reforms and measures and in particular to set up
freely elected and representative political institutions with
a view to transfer of power to the people of Angola;

6. Decides to continue the Sub-Committee on the
situation in Angola appointed under resolution 1603 (XV):

(a) To continue the performance of its tasks;

(b) To study ways and means to secure the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council and to the General Assembly;

7. Requests Member States to use their influence to secure the compliance of Portugal with the present resolutions;

8. Requests all States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies to deny to Portugal any support and assistance which may be used by it for the suppression of the people of Angola;

9. Requests the Government of Portugal to submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session on the measures it has undertaken in the implementation of the present resolution;

10. Recommends to the Security Council, in the light of the Council's resolution of 9 June 1961 and of the present resolution, to keep the matter under constant review.

DECLARATION OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF
UNIÃO DAS POPULAÇÕES DE ANGOLA (UPA)

The Union of the Populations of Angola, conscious of its responsibility and the rights of the peoples of Angola, declares that it is devoted in its activities to the realization and acquisition of the immediate independence of the people, moreover to its acquisition by pacific and democratic means. It will spare itself no sacrifice. In consequence:

Peasants, Unemployed, Forced Laborers, your duty is clear. You are the most downtrodden. It is you who suffer most from colonial oppression. That is why you have the greatest interest in the re-establishment of the Angolan nation. For the past five centuries your ancestors, your parents and you, yourselves, have been condemned to exert all your efforts for the enrichment of only the Portuguese colonialists. You create the riches but you have not the right to profit from them. Your sweat is the grease of the colonist; your blood is sucked by the colonial vampire, and you are left to languish in misery and humiliation.

The Union of the Populations of Angola formally pledges to bring an end to this mortal sickness of the territory of Angola. It calls on you all to contribute to the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism in the national territory of Angola.

Women. The women of Ghana, Guinea, Cameroons, Togo, Congo, and Somaliland all participated in the heroic combat against colonialism. The hour is past when the women remained at their firesides and were mere spectators of events. Your husbands are not paid, your children are not fed or given schooling; they serve only as machines to permit the colonists to live an increasingly easy life at the cost of the misery of the peoples of Angola. You have the same rights as the men. The Union of the Populations of Angola is determined to establish a democratic regime which will, without distinction of sex, permit each individual to develop his personality and contribute to the development and productivity of the Angolan nation.

Most of the time now you are requisitioned and forced to work on forced labor projects. The pitiless colonialist beast requires of you the most inhuman and vile labor. The Union of the Populations of Angola considers that this scandal has lasted too long already, that the hour has struck

when you should have a respectable and dignified lot in life. Wherever you are: organize, prepare to take up and spread the orders of the Union of the Populations of Angola.

Erase fear and submission from your lives. You must prove to the occupying power that you are conscious of the justice of your cause.

Tribal Chiefs. Certainly your position is difficult. For a long time you have unknowingly served the colonialist interests and permitted the exploitation of the people. Although your mission as chiefs was to protect and serve the people of Angola. Certain members of your group have become instruments of colonialism. They have permitted the recruitment of forced laborers and have supported the policy of heavy taxation, and in a great portion of Angola their position has made them traitors.

The Union of the Populations of Angola is not ignorant of the terrible pressures you have suffered from colonialism, but it knows also that at this time, when a great movement is shaking Africa, you must not stand idly by. You must fully realize that the moment has come for you to make your choice between your country, your sons, your brothers on the one hand, and the colonists on the other. That is why we ask you to think carefully.

During the year 1960, all the African peoples are to unite their efforts for the eviction of colonialism from Africa. The African peoples and the people of Angola will be pitiless for the men who have not been able to choose the side of justice and truth. From today onward, the people are judging you. All that you do against the people will be held against you. This is no longer the time when a chief could be ordered by a European and blindly strike and punish his subjects at any moment and under any circumstances. The end of the arbitrary has come. You must understand.

Youth. You are the seeds of Angola, it is toward you that we all turn our hopes and our concerns. It is to you that we all look for new values, values which will bring Angola's voice to be heard immediately in the concert of nations.

You must develop your national conscience and your human conscience. You must erase from your soul all traces of inferiority complex. You must no longer permit yourselves to be beaten down; you must take in your hands the destiny of your land and of your people. And you must stand ready as the determined reserves to come to the aid of your elder brothers who are so enthusiastically setting in motion the battle for national liberation.

Portuguese Colonists. The Union of the Populations of Angola is not the enemy of the Portuguese, but it is against a system of spoliation which robs our land of all existence as a nation and which condemns 4,500,000 inhabitants to illiteracy, humiliation, and famine. The Union of the Populations of Angola is fighting with all its force against this system. It begs you not to stand in opposition to the advance of history.

Certain of your members have established colossal fortunes on the backs of the Angolans. They must be made to understand that the hour has come when they must make restitution to the Angolans for their land and their resources.

As for the others, the Union of the Populations of Angola tells them that they may remain in Angola in new found peace so that together we can work for the establishment of an Angolan Republic, democratic and socially just.

Portuguese People. You know, you are not ignorant of the lamentable state in which the people of Angola find themselves. Colonists who have come from Portugal, supported by the Army and a pitiless administration, have brought an unbelievable reign of terror to a population of 4,500,000 people.

The Union of the Populations of Angola calls upon all the democrats, workers, Christians, and men of good faith of Portugal to unite their efforts to work against this disgrace to the twentieth century, which dishonors and disgraces the name of Portugal.

Portuguese State. The regime that the Union of the Populations of Angola will establish in Angola will be democratic. It will be democratic because the power will be exercised by the people for the people. It will be socially just because it will be exercised directly and specifically by the most needy masses. The lands will be distributed to those who work them.

The Union of the Populations of Angola will abolish all the special privileges and exceptions established by your representatives. The women will also have the right of vote.

Privileges will be abolished, each person shall have an equal right to education. Unemployment will be declared a national emergency and every force will erase this situation.

Every man and every woman inhabitant in Angola, regardless of nationality, race, or religion, will have the same rights as individuals, and the same rights will be respected in relation to their belongings.

The emancipating movement of the colonial peoples is strongly developed. It has acquired extraordinary power in numbers and today is irresistible.

Men who refuse to recognize and take into consideration the prodigious wave of independence which is sweeping the world are unrealistic and irresponsible.

The people of Africa, from Algeria to the Cape, have come to their feet with the cry and the warning: "Africa for the Africans."

The Union of the Populations of Angola is certain that you will fulfill your responsibilities. As for ourselves, we have already undertaken our own, and any resistance to the movement is destined to be a total failure.

African Peoples. Our continent, which is in the shape of an interrogation point, has in its heart the destiny of all present day mankind. For so long in bondage, it is commencing to make its voice heard in the concert of nations. No African can remain indifferent to the existence of colonialism on our continent. Each one of us has a definite duty to perform: to liquidate the colonial regime, the colonialist spirit, the colonial ideal, and to establish democracy in Africa, to construct the United States of Africa on the foundation of the autonomy of democratic units which will compose it.

Taking into consideration the resolutions adopted at the Congresses of Bandung, Cairo, Accra, Tunis, and Conakry, and taking into account the watchwords of Liberty, Independence, and Action in Africa, the Union of the Populations of Angola is determined to join the African Anti-Colonialist Front and to join battle against Portuguese colonialism and continue the fight to total victory. It expects all the Independent African States to aid and support its movement unconditionally. It expects all men, all women, to give their full support for a free Africa as the common undertaking of the 200,000,000 souls who make up the population of this great continent.

International Opinion. The Union of the Populations of Angola pledges itself to spare no effort in bringing the occupying power which controls the human and economic interests of the Portuguese to a pacific solution.

Are not the people of Angola essentially a peace-loving people?

In spite of repression, torture, oppression, exploitation, humiliation, in spite of slavery, the Angolan people have always given proof of absolute pacifism, not out of moral weakness, but because of their firm belief that be-

tween men there is always the possibility of pacific solution to any problem. And today it is time for the Portuguese to respond to this call.

The Union of the Populations of Angola calls the world to be its witness.

The solidly entrenched camp of colonialism which is Angola today is a disgrace to all of humanity. It is the duty of every man worthy of the name to participate in the restoration of human dignity in Angola.

The Union of the Populations of Angola calls upon all international organizations and bodies, for them to bring pressure on Portugal so that the regime of exploitation and willful genocide in Angola shall cease, and that the territory shall recover its independence of ancient days.

MAJOR PROGRAM OF MOVIMENTO POPULAR DE
LIBERTAÇÃO DE ANGOLA (MPLA)

In this hour the concrete and immediate enemies of the Angolan people are the Portuguese colonialists and their agents, who will use all measures--violence, assassination, Machiavellism and subterfuge, military force, political and economic power, and cultural obscurantism--to maintain their sovereignty in Angola and to continue to oppress and exploit the Angolan people.

MPLA stands for the following program:

1. Immediate and Complete Independence: Liquidation in Angola by all available means of Portuguese colonial rule and all traces of colonialism and imperialism.

To fight in common with all the forces of Angolan patriots in a mass popular movement, in order that the Angolan people have the power to install in Angola a republican and democratic regime on the basis of total independence.

To abolish all the privileges which the colonial regime has conceded to the Portuguese nationals and to foreigners.

The sovereignty of the Angolan state must belong entirely and uniquely to the Angolan people without distinctions based on ethnic groups, class, age, political and religious beliefs.

The Angolan nation will have the sacred and inviolable right of self-determination whether in political, economic, diplomatic, military, and cultural planning or in any other sphere.

Revision of the Angolan position in all treaties, agreements, and alliances which Portugal contracted without the free consent of the Angolan people.

A popular voluntary union with the purpose of liquidating whatever tendency of imperialistic aggression and all the acts and works which prejudice the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Angola.

The establishment of peace in Angola, based on a program of social justice, and the recognition by other nations of the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Angola.

2. National Unity: To guarantee equality to all ethnic groups in Angola and to reinforce their unity and to help bring about friendship among them.

Absolute prohibition of all tendencies to divide the Angolan nation.

To create conditions in Angola so that the thousands

of Angolans who were forced to leave the country because of cruel treatment by the colonial regime would return to Angola.

Regions in which national minorities live in dense numbers and possess individual characters ought to become autonomous.

Each nationality or tribe will have the right to use and develop its own language--written and spoken--and to conserve or recreate its cultural heritage.

In the interest of the Angolan nation, economic and social solidarity must be instigated and developed as well as normal relations--in economic, social, and cultural planning--between all the autonomous regions and all the nationalities or tribes in Angola.

Freedom of movement for all Angolan citizens which does not encroach upon national boundaries.

3. African Unity: Complete solidarity with all African peoples who are fighting for complete independence and against colonialism and imperialism, and in particular with the peoples and political movements which are fighting against Portuguese colonialism.

To work for the unity of all the peoples of the continent of Africa on the basis of respect for liberty, dignity, and the right to develop their own political, economic, and social systems.

Unity of all African countries based on popular will and expressed through democratic and peaceful means.

Opposition of any move to annex or to pressure one country over another.

In the process of uniting one or more African nations, it resists political, economic, social conquests upon the culture of the working class and the boundaries of each country.

4. Democratic Regime: Republican, democratic, and secular government for Angola.

To guarantee freedom of speech, conscience, belief, press, assembly, associations, housing, correspondence, etc., for all the Angolan people.

All Angolan citizens--without distinction of nationality or tribe, of sex, social classification, cultural background, profession, wealth, religious belief, or philosophical convictions--will have the right to vote at the age of eighteen years and the right to be elected after twenty-one years of age.

Elections will be based on universal suffrage, equal, direct, and secret.

The Assembly of the Angolan nation will be the supreme legislative body of the State.

All members of the Assembly will have parliamentary immunity.

The Assembly will designate a coalition government which can effect a union among the various nationalities or tribes, social classes; and among the various political parties; and that the government will really express the will of the nation in favor of liberty and progress; and against political, economic, territorial, or cultural alienation to the advantage of foreigners.

The government of the republic of Angola will be the supreme body and will exercise the executive power of the State. It will receive its power from the Assembly and will be responsible to that body.

Each autonomous region will have the right to adopt methods particularly suited to its conditions, but not contradictory to the general welfare of Angola.

Africanization of all administrative machinery of the country.

Guarantees of protection in accord with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to all strangers who respect the laws in existence.

5. Economic Reconstruction and Plan of Production: Economic development through planning stages. Transformation of Angola into a country which is modern, prosperous, vigorous, and economically and industrially independent.

Agricultural development, with long-range planning, principally the abandoning of a one-crop system; increase in productivity and mechanization of agriculture.

Founding and progressive development of commercial and industrial enterprises, of consumers, wholesale, and producer's cooperatives. Progressive building of heavy and light industries; the latter for the production of consumer goods.

Exploration of the state of potential energy in the country.

Restoration and development of traditional African industries.

Abolition of economic privileges bestowed by the colonial regime upon Portuguese nationals and foreign commercial houses.

Development of communication and transport facilities.

Protection of industry and private enterprise.

Encouragement of industry and of private commerce which are useful to the progress and reinforcement of real independence of the Angolan people.

Development and vigorous activity of economic relations between cities and villages, with the idea of progressively improving rural conditions and the level of life of rural populations.

Effective implementation of a policy which considers, at the same time, the interests of employees and employers.

Establishment of a National Bank and currency.

Avoidance of inflation and creation of a stable currency.

Control by the State for the best interest of all of foreign trade of Angola. Revision of the unfair agreement of Angola with Portugal. Combat the balance deficit of the commerce of Angola. A balancing of the books--of receipts and expenditures.

Abolition of the fiscal system introduced by Portuguese colonialists and creation of a new fiscal system; just, rational, and simple.

Price control and prohibition of speculations.

6. Agrarian Reform: To introduce agrarian reform that will eliminate the existing injustices in relation to rural ownership; to liquidate private monopoly of special rural production which is contrary to the denationalization of the Angolan soil; to fulfill the principle: the land is for those who till the soil.

Nationalization of land belonging to the enemy of the nationalist movement after immediate and complete independence of Angola; of traitors and proven enemies of the independent and democratic Angolan state.

Definition of the limits of private rural property, having in mind the rural situation of each locality. After revision of title on lands, the purchasing by the State, for a just price, lands which are owned beyond the limits established by law.

Distribution of land to those who do not have it and to those who have insufficient acreage. The beneficiaries of land legally distributed will not have to pay to the expropriators and to the State.

Protection of the right of conquest by farmers in the popular battle for an independent Angola.

7. Just Social Politics and of Progress: The State ought to protect the rights of workers and farmers, and of all social strata who have actively defended the independence of Angola; autonomy and unity of the Angolan people and territorial integrity of the country.

Immediate abolition of the regime of forced labor.

Respect for the independence of syndicates and legal organizations of workers.

An eight-hour day and progressive application of new laws for the protection of workers. The State will fix a minimum wage scale and will guard the rigorous application of the principle, "equal salary for equal work," without discrimination of sex, age, and ethnic origin of workers.

Protection of churches, places and objects of worship of legal religious institutions.

In all planning--political, economic, social, and cultural--women will have the same rights as men. Women and men are equal before the law.

State assistance to maternity patients and to infants.

Application of social assistance to all Angolan citizens deprived of means and victims of disease, or in situations of forced unemployment, or of old age or infirmity.

Solution for unemployment. Work security for artisans, workers, functionaries, and for youths who complete their studies.

Assistance to all citizens who are disabled because of active participation in combat for the independence of Angola. Assistance to families whose members died for the liberation of the Angolan nation.

8. Development of Instruction, Culture, and Education: Prohibition of colonial and imperialistic culture and education. Reform of instruction in actual practice. Development of instruction, culture, and education in the service of liberty and of peaceful progress of the Angolan people.

To combat vigorously and rapidly illiteracy throughout the country. Public instruction will become the obligation of the State and will be under its direction.

To progressively establish compulsory and free primary education. To develop secondary technical-professional schools and to establish higher education.

Establishment of cultural relations with foreign countries. Formation and perfection of technical units necessary to the building up of the nation. To give impetus to the study of the sciences, technology, letters, and arts.

To institute in rural areas, efficient and adequate medical and sanitary aid for rural populations. Equal development on a national scale of medical and sanitary assistance.

Elimination of prostitution and alcoholism.

Stimulation and support of progressive youth activities. To support and protect, throughout the country, physical culture.

9. National Defense: Establishment of an army for national defense, with sufficient power, intimately linked with the people and commanded wholly by Angolan citizens.

To arm, equip, and unqualifiedly train an army. To install and unify new military and political instruction for the army. To establish democratic relations between officers and enlisted men. To consolidate discipline. Within the army to develop and create a national conscience, and to combat all regional tendencies.

Prohibition of foreign military bases on the national territory.

10. Independent and Peaceful Foreign Relations:
To establish and maintain diplomatic relations with all the countries of the world on the basis of the following principles: mutual respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity; nonaggression; noninterference in internal matters; equal and reciprocal advantages; peaceful coexistence.

Respect for the Charter of the United Nations.

Nonalignment to whatever military bloc.

Special relations with our good neighbors and collaboration with the surrounding nations of Angola.

Protection of Angolan residents in foreign countries.

POLITICAL GROUPS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

ABAKO Party

The party of the Bakongo and the X-Belguim Congo President, Joseph Kasavubu. Since the Bakongos live in Angola to the North as well as the Congo, the leaders of the Abako in Angola threaten to establish their own state if the Portuguese persist in utilizing the tribal divisions to obstruct the demand of independence of the Africans.

Alianca Zombo (ALIAZO)

A small tribal group around the village of Maquela do Zombo. Also known under the title Alinaca do Naturais of Maquela do Zombo and Alianca dos Originarios do Zombo. Under the leadership of Andre Massaki, the party maintained an independent position from the UPA and the MPLA until April, 1962, when, after having changed the name (Democratic Party of Angola [PDA], the party joined the UPA, which has established a provisional government in exile from Angola.

Alliance of the Young Angolans for Liberty

The Secretary-General, Eduardo Makumbi, in October, 1962, announced a conference (meeting) of the Young Angolans to pressure the UPA and the MPLA to unify for the "liberation of Angola."

Association of the Natives of the Enclave of Cabinda

Founded in 1958 with the purpose of separating Cabinda from Angola in order to unite it to the Congo.

Confederacao das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas (CONCP)

Under the leadership of the MPLA, the CONCP was formed by the delegates of the ten parties which met at Casablanca April 18-20, 1961. The President is Mario de Andrade. The CONCP was established as the committee to coordinate the Portuguese territories, overseeing those who were fighting for independence. The CONCP took the place of the FRAIN.

Corpos Voluntario Angolano de Assistencia dos Refugiados

Organized by the MPLA in June, 1961, in order to give medical aid to the refugees from Angola to the Congo.

Frente Africana Contra o Colonialismo Portugues (FACCP)

African Front against Portuguese Colonialism. Established in 1962, the FACCP was the UPA's response to the CONCP. The coalition includes the MLGV of Portuguese Guinea and the PDA of Angola.

Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA)

Formed in April, 1962, the FNLA is the provisional government and the coalition of the UPA and of the PDA or the ALIAZO. The leader of the UPA, Holden Roberto, was nominated Prime Minister of the provisional government, and Emmanuel Kounzika of the PDA was nominated Vice Prime Minister. In July, 1963, the Congolese Premier, Cyrille Adoula, recognized the FNLA as the government in exile.

Frente Revolucionaria Africana para a Independencia das Colonias Portuguesas (FRAIN)

The FRAIN replaced the coalition MAC of the MPLA and the PAIGC. It was formed in 1960 after the second "All African" meetings at Tunis and the headquarters were established at Conakry, Guinea. The FRAIN was a coalition of four movements: the MPLA, the PAIGC, Movement for National Independence of Angola, and the Anti-Colony Movement. The FRAIN was dissolved with the establishment of the CONCP in April, 1961.

Frente Unida Angolense (FUA)

Peaceful resistance Movement organized by Socrates Cascalos and Fernando Falcao. Composed of Whites, the majority born in Angola, it appears that the FUA is supported by at least two of the delegates of the National Assembly of Angola. In 1962, nine of the members of the FUA were deported and imprisoned at Lisbon.

Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGTA)

Trade Union syndicate that separated from the UPA in 1962 and joined the Angolan Front of National Liberation. The LGTA is under the leadership of Andre Cassinda, a syndicate leader from the South.

Liga Nacional Africana (LNA)

Like the ANANGOLA, the LNA required [demanded] several reforms. The LNA was a semi-legal organization "assimilated" whose activities were stopped when the leaders began to make appeal for the participation of the urban masses. It was a forerunner of the MPLA.

Moviment Anti-Colonista (MAC)

Nationalist movement which in 1960 joined the FRAIN and later was absorbed by the CONCP. The MAC was formed by the MPLA and the PAIGC of Portuguese Guinea. The aims were "the study of the needs of the Nationalist Organizations"; the unity of action among the movements of liberation of the Portuguese Colonies; the training of the members as reserves for the struggle inside their countries.

Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola (MDIA)

They advocated the collaboration with Portugal after the independence of Angola. It was a dissident faction which separated from the UPA in order to form the MDIA in January, 1961.

Movimento de Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC)

Founded in 1960 and bound to ethnic groups, it appears that the MLEC is under the leadership of descendants from African Families which were ennobled by the Portuguese King and Queen; their headquarters are at Leopoldville; the MLEC does not wish to dissolve into the Congo nor to associate with Angola.

Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA)

Under the leadership of Agostinho Neto and Mario de Andrade, the MPLA is one of the nationalist parties of much importance. Established in Leopoldville, it is the rival of the UPA. Andrade, Neto, are the African intellectuals associated with the movement. In 1956 those men formed the MPLA from several clandestine opposition groups. There are several differences between the MPLA and the UPA. At first, the mulatto leadership of the MPLA increases inter-racial cooperation between the Whites and Blacks, whereas the Black leadership of the UPA mistrusts the cooperation and fears that its position is being undermined by the mulattos' better

training. The UPA took a position favoring the Protestants, whereas the MPLA was on the Catholic side. The brother of Mario de Andrade is a Catholic priest who was imprisoned in Portugal. The interior Pan-African movement, the MPLA, took a position for the revolutionary countries: Ghana, Guinea, and the United Arab Republic. The UPA, on the other hand, was tied to the Reformist nations of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and many of the French-speaking African countries.

Movimento Separatista Angolana (MSA)

Founded in June, 1960, this revolutionary movement is under the leadership of Carlos Alberto Henriques.

Movimento Separatista Lusitano (MSL)

Like the MSA, this group was founded in June, 1960, by a white Angolese, Jose Antonio Cabral; the MSL maintains contact with the Portuguese exiles in Brazil.

Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO)

Founded in 1960 with the aim of restoring the old tribal monarchy, this group advocated a possible collaboration with Portugal after the independence of Angola. The NGWIZAKO is located at Leopoldville.

Nto-Bako Party (Partido Nto-Bako)

Protected by the Portuguese, this African party opposes the Nationalist Activity in Angola. This party assumes the position of spokesman for the Bakongos; its leader is Angelion Alberto.

Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA)

The first revolutionary party that sheltered a clandestine activity in Angola. In December, 1956, the leader of the PLUA, Viriato da Cruz, joined the Liberation of Angola Movement, and the Movement of National Liberation, forming the MPLA.

Partido Comunista Angolano

Founded in 1955, was accused by the Portuguese to have infiltrated the Nationalist, cultural, and religious centers at Luanda, Catete, and Malanje.

Partido Democratico de Angola (PDA)

Formerly the ALIAZO, this party joined the UPA in April, 1962, in order to form the provisional FNLA government in Angola. The PDA leader, Emmanuel Kounzika, was made vice-prime minister of the new government.

União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA)

Formed in 1954 with headquarters in Leopoldville, the UNTA joined the CONCP.

União Nacional dos Estudantes Angolano (UNEA)

Formed in 1962, the student movement supports the FNLA. It publishes the newspaper, Voz do Estudante Angolano.

União Social dos Maimbos de Luali

Apparently this group constitutes the Cabinda section of the ABAKO Party.

Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)

Under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral and located at Conadry, the PAIGC was founded in 1956. Member of the FRAIN, formed in 1960, the PAIGC later joined the CONCP. The PAIGC maintains friendly relations with the MPLA at Leopoldville. The original name of PAIGC is Libertacao.

Source: Africana Newsletter, Bulletin D'Informations Africana, Vol. 1, No. 3, Summer, 1963, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California. Editor, Redacteur, Peter Duignan.

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