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THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: TOWARD A COMMON
FOREIGN POLICY, A COMMON DEVELOPMENT POLICY, AND EUROPEAN UNION

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PHILLIP ARTHUR TAYLOR

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THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: TOWARD A COMMON
FOREIGN POLICY, A COMMON DEVELOPMENT POLICY, AND EUROPEAN UNION

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THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
TOWARD A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY, A COMMON
DEVELOPMENT POLICY, AND EUROPEAN UNION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The European Community is the most highly developed and most important regional intergovernmental organization in existence. The Community (also referred to as the European Economic Community, European Common Market, EEC, or EC) is an economic and political union of nine European nations¹ that provides for an ever closer union of the member states for an unlimited period of time. Its permanent institutions not only apply and administer the treaties that constitute the legal foundation of the union, but also make and revise policy as the integration process continues.

The European Community is actually the combination of three communities that share the same institutions. The three communities are

¹The original six member states are Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and West Germany. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom became active members in 1973.

the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The ECSC was created by the Paris Treaty of April 18, 1951, and the EEC and Euratom by the Treaty of Rome of March 25, 1957. The stated purpose for the creation and maintenance of the three, which together constitute the European Community, is to put an end to national prejudice, discrimination, and armed conflict in Europe; to open up the economic frontiers that had previously divided Europe into small, protected markets; to harness the constructive energies of the European peoples; to make the Community a single economic area; to recover collectively some of the world influence the Western European nations had lost separately; to become a strong force for peace and a generous provider for the world's poorer nations; and to contribute to world stability and law and order.²

The European Community is, without question, an important world actor. Collectively, its member states have a population greater than either the United States or the Soviet Union, and a share of international trade and aid to developing nations which exceeds that of the United States. Although the Community is not a "superpower" politically or militarily, its economic strength in an emerging era of increasing global economic interdependence lends it potential importance as a foreign policy actor. Granted, regional governmental organizations are far from being ready to replace nation-states as prime actors in international relations. The Community's successes in its external relations

²The European Community Information Service (Washington, D.C.), The European Community: The Facts (February, 1974), p. 2.

do not as yet give cause to believe that bloc-à-bloc multinational relations will replace traditional bilateral interstate relations as the prime focus of foreign policy analysis. Such a development is, however embryonic, a significant one, and the Community offers the best example to date of a movement away from bilateral to multi-lateral foreign political and economic policy-making.

This work will focus on the Community's external relations. The general thesis of this dissertation is that in recent years, the Community has stagnated internally, but has progressed markedly in its external affairs. There are many plausible reasons for this development, but none of them offers satisfactory explanation if taken out of the context of the Community's past experience and present situation. The presentation of the theoretical statements and evidence to support the claim that the Community has stagnated internally while seemingly concentrating further integration in its external affairs will follow in later chapters. This chapter will first provide a brief history of the Community, an explanation of the structure of its institutions and decision-making procedures, and a summary of what is known of the present state of integration in the European Community.

The European Community: 1945-1969

The end of World War II and its resultant suffering and devastation reawakened the movement to unite the nations of Europe. If for no other reason, Europeans were determined to find a way to prevent another war on the continent and the effects brought on by unlimited

nationalism.³ The difficulties in post-war economic recovery exacerbated the problems imposed by narrow national boundaries, and the inability to compete with American trade in the world market enhanced the arguments for European union. The American Marshall Plan, which began in 1948, gave those who favored European union a first glimmer of hope.

One aim of the Marshall Plan was to promote economic integration. The organization created by the Marshall Plan, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), was to be a supranational body, but British reticence kept it from being what France and the Benelux countries hoped for and what the Americans had designed it to be. Moreover, the OEEC was limited in scope and suffered due to the unanimity rule. This meant that when decisions as to common action

³There are several good historical-normative accounts of early European integration movements. John Patrick Corbett, in Europe and the Social Order (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1959), assumes the perspective of a rationalist social philosopher, focusing on normative considerations and priorities he feels do and should underlie European unity, particularly what he calls the "principles of social order." Corbett sees rapid, extensive, accelerating and above all systematic change for Europe. A former President of the EEC Commission, Walter Hallstein, in United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962), expresses his views as to how economic integration can be turned to political ends, and outlines the necessity for a re-definition of U.S.-European economic, political, and military relationships. Altiero Spinelli's The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis an the European Community (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), is a description of the centers of European action and construction. Spinelli analyzes the extent and importance of European-level bureaucratic and interest group interactions, and argues that more active and systematic efforts should be made by the Commission to mobilize the support of political groups in the European Parliament, national political parties, and private European movements.

could be negotiated, they were almost always at the level of the lowest common denominator. The Hague Conference of May, 1948, sponsored by the International Committee of the Movement for European Union, ended in agreement only to support traditional forms of cooperation among European states. The conference did assist, however, in laying the groundwork for the Council of Europe which was formed in May, 1949. The European "federalists" and those who supported some immediate form of European unification were confronted by nation-state rivalries and those favoring a gradual approach to the question. It seemed as though these obstacles could only be overcome by a substantial shock to post-war Western Europe.

The shock came in May, 1950. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, formally proposed that Franco-German coal and steel production be combined under a common high authority in which participation would be offered to all other European countries. Schuman justified his plan in economic terms, but his primary motive was political. Schuman later admitted that the French proposal was "to end Franco-German hostility once and for all."⁴

The Schuman Plan was approved by the French Cabinet in hopes that by entrusting part of their sovereignty to a supranational authority, individual nations would lay the basis for an eventual political union in Europe. Negotiations between the nations responding to the Schuman Plan (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and

⁴F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1963 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 80.

Luxembourg) began in Paris on June 20, 1950, and culminated in the signing of the Joint Declaration on April 18, 1951. This formally initiated the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC High Authority began operations on August 10, 1952. The ESC Treaty provided for the abolition of customs duties and other restrictions in the movement of coal and steel between the member countries. It also contained a set of common rules meant to control cartels and to regulate mergers, measures to harmonize transport rates, and measures to control production and prices during economic crises.⁵

The drive toward further European unity suffered a setback when, in 1954, the proposed European Defense Community and creation of a European army were defeated in the French National Assembly.⁶ These proposals were replaced, in part, by the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) and the admission of West Germany into NATO in 1955. Although political and military integration plans were thwarted, economic integration success in the ECSC was sufficient for the foreign ministers of the Six meeting in Messina, Sicily, in June, 1955, to call for even further economic integration. The eventual outcomes were two new treaties that were signed in Rome in March, 1957, and entered into force on January 1, 1958. Known as the Treaty of Rome, the treaties added to the ECSC the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The three Communities each had

⁵For background, see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

⁶For detail, see Chapter V of this dissertation.

separate executive bodies (Commissions) but shared some common institutions: the European Court of Justice, the European Parliamentary Assembly (later called the European Parliament), and the Council of Ministers which made all important policy decisions for all three communities.

Euratom progressed little in the beginning. Differences between the member states as to the scope and direction of its research activities and serious budgetary difficulties hampered Euratom's development.⁷ Despite initial progress, the ECSC was overtaken by a serious coal crisis in 1958, competition from cheaper imported oil, and difficulties in the steel industry. Quite the contrary, the EEC was an immediate and unexpected success. In its first four years, tariffs on industrial goods were cut by 40 percent, significant progress toward a common external tariff was achieved, and the member states agreed on initial steps toward the free movement of workers and capital, and on rules for competition. Further, agreement was reached on financial and marketing arrangements for a common agricultural policy.⁸

Successful integration in the economic sectors brought on yet another attempt at political unity. The "Plan Fouchet" proposed foreign and defense policy coordination through a treaty for political union. The de Gaulle-initiated proposal was negotiated for two years, but

⁷See, Jaroslav G. Polach, Euratom: Its Background, Issues and Economic Implications (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1964).

⁸More on this period may be found in Michael Curtis's Western European Integration (New York: Harper and Row, 1969) and Roger Morgan's Western European Politics Since 1945: The Shaping of the European Community (London: B. T. Batsford, 1972).

collapsed in 1962 due to French refusal to include the British and Dutch insistence on it. This cleavage was exacerbated the following year by the French veto of British entry into the Community.

The Community experienced its greatest crisis in 1965. The Commission proposed that the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) should be made independent of the member states. At about the same time, it also recommended a substantial increase in the budgetary power of the European Parliament. The immediate break occurred in June when several of the member states (notably Italy) refused to commit themselves to a definite settlement on financing the CAP, an issue on which France was most adamant. But deeper issues lay behind the conflict. The major problem involved the willingness of the member states to introduce majority voting in the Council of Ministers during the third stage of transition provided in the Treaty of Rome (which began in 1959).⁹ In September, 1965, French President de Gaulle announced he would not accept majority voting, proposed changes to decrease the power of the Commission and ordered a boycott of Community institutions. When France walked out of the Council of Ministers, the Community came to a standstill.

The crisis was finally resolved by a compromise reached in Luxembourg in January, 1966. France agreed to resume active participation in the Community after the Six agreed to disagree concerning majority voting in the Council of Ministers. The "gentleman's agreement"

⁹ Roy Pryce, "Customs Union and Economic Union in the EEC," in John Calmann (editor), The Common Market (London: Anthony Bland, 1967), pp. 43-57.

in the Luxembourg Compromise had the effect of maintaining the unanimity rule and immediately increasing the power of the Council of Ministers and decreasing that of the Commission. The weighted voting system still remains a formal part of the Council of Ministers, but it is virtually never used. To date, each member state retains the right of veto in the Council. France did not win completely. In return for the Luxembourg compromise, France softened its demands concerning the CAP, getting from the other states only a program of work which promised progress toward completing the CAP.

Economic integration continued to progress despite further conflict between the member states (Britain's second attempt to enter the Community was again answered by a French veto in December, 1967). The customs Union was completed ahead of schedule, the decision to progressively introduce a value-added tax and a five year economic program were worked out, and some progress was made on the common transport policy.¹⁰

¹⁰ There are many studies of European economic integration. Most analyze European integration's impact on growth rates, productivity, investment patterns, and the transnational movement of economic factors. Leading examples include Ingo Walter's The European Common Market: Growth and Patterns of Trade and Production (New York: Praeger, 1967), Lawrence B. Krause's European Economic Integration and the United States (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1968), and A. Lamfalussey's The United Kingdom and the Six (Homewood, Ill.: R. B. Irving Co., 1963). There are those, however, that focus on the institutions and policy in regional economic integration. James W. Meade et. al., Case Studies in European Economic Union: The Mechanics of Integration (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), examines the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, Benelux and the ECSC, attempting to answer the question: "What economic arrangements must be made in an economic union in order to make it work affectively?" In The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott, 1965), Finn B. Jensen and Ingo Walter provide succinct summaries of policy and institutional problems, particularly on regional policy, social policy, competition, coordination of national taxation and counter-cyclical policies, and monetary integration. D. L. McLachlan and D. Swann provide a systematic and exhaustive account of competition policy

Further, on July 1, 1967, the merger of the commissions of the three Communities into one Commission was accomplished. In the external affairs of the Community, significant successes occurred also. The Community spoke with one voice in the Kennedy Round of GATT, which concluded successfully in 1967. The Six renegotiated the Yaoundé Convention with the African "associate states,"¹¹ and added a substantial number of trade agreements, notably with Morocco and Tunisia, in 1969.

In many ways, 1969 was a watershed for the Community. De Gaulle's resignation in April of that year finally paved the way for expansion and British membership. Moreover, the Hague Summit of the Heads of State and of Government of the Six in December, 1969, set new goals for political and economic union in the Community. Before discussing this further, it should be instructive to briefly consider the institutional and decision-making structure of the Community.

The Institutions

The Six major institutions of the European Community are the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the Economic and Social Committee (and Consultative Committee). In general, the Council of Ministers fulfills a legislative role, the Commission an

¹⁰ (the goals sought in the Treaties, the problems encountered, the common policies developed and their effects) in their Competition Policy in the European Community: The Rule in Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

¹¹ See Chapter VII of this dissertation.

executive role, the Court of Justice has the power of judicial review on the Treaties, and the Parliament, Economic and Social Committee, and Consultative Committee are advisory groups to the Council and Commission. The Committee of Permanent Representatives has the responsibility of preparing the deliberations of the Council. All institutions are located in Brussels, Belgium, except the Court of Justice which is located in Luxembourg, and the European Parliament which meets both in Luxembourg and in Strasbourg, France.¹² (See Figure 1.1)

The Commission

The Commission is the "guardian of the Treaties". It is responsible to see that treaty provisions and institutional decisions are properly implemented. It has the authority to investigate, issue an objective ruling, and notify the government concerned (subject to verification by the Court of Justice) of the required corrective action. As the executive arm of the Communities, the Commission is directly invested with specific powers by the Treaties. It also has been granted substantial additional powers by the Council to implement enactments based on the Treaties (these powers are referred to as "derived Community law"). The Commission's powers can be summarized as falling in three major areas. First: the Commission prepares implementing orders for treaty provisions or Council enactments. These fall into the following categories: regulations (which are binding in every respect and have the direct force

¹²General descriptions of the Communities' institutions may be found in A. H. Robertson, European Institutions: Co-operation: Integration: Unification (New York: Matthew Bender, 1973); and in Michael Palmer and John Lambert, Handbook of European Organizations (New York: Praeger, 1968).




Figure 1.1
The Community's Institutional Structure

of law in every member state), directives (which are binding on the member states but leave to the national authorities' discretion as to the mode and means), decisions (which are binding in every respect), recommendations (which are binding as to ends but not to means), and opinions (which are not binding). Second: the Commission applies the rules of the Treaties to particular cases (concerning both governments and private firms) and to the administration of Community funds. Generally, these rules involve such things as preventing cartel formations and market dominance, limiting state subsidizations, and discouraging discriminatory fiscal practices. The Commission manages several large funds, including the European Social Fund, the European Development Fund, the "Cheysson Fund," and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. Third: the Commission administers the safeguard clauses in the Treaties. These so-called "escape clauses" provide only the Commission the authority to grant waivers ("derogations") at the request of a member state when special problems or circumstances exist for them.

Structurally, the Commission consists of 13 members who are appointed by agreement of the member governments. By an official agreement, each member state has at least one of its nationals on the Commission, and the President of the Commission rotates between the member states. The Commissioners are required to act fully independently of both the national governments and the Council of Ministers. The Council cannot remove any Commissioner from office. This may be done only by the Parliament's passing a vote of censure, in which case the entire Commission must resign as a body.

The Commissioners have working for them a General Secretariat,

a Legal Department, a Statistical Office, 19 functionally specific Directorates-General, and a small number of specialized services. Their staffs total over 7,000 civil servants from the nine member states. The major importance of the Commission is that it is the initiator of Community policy and the exponent of Community interest. It is responsible to see that Community policy forms a single consistent whole.¹³ (See Figure 1.2)

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is the Community's main decision-making body. It is made up of representatives of the member states. As a rule, each government sends one minister although it may on occasion send more than one. Membership varies according to the subject matter under consideration. The member states' foreign ministers are considered the main representatives on the Council, but meetings are often composed of ministers of Agriculture, Transport, Finance, Industry, etc. The Council usually meets three or four times monthly. It has a permanent secretariat (staff of 1,200) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives to assist in the preparations for the meetings. The chairmanship of the Council rotates among the member states every six months. The present rotation began in the first half of 1973 with Belgium and follows this order: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom.

In theory, decision-making in the Council is by a weighted

¹³ See David Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the EEC (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970).




Figure 1.2
The Organizational Structure of the Commission

majority vote. The larger states, Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom, have ten votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands five each, Ireland and Denmark three each, and Luxembourg two. Of this total of 58 votes, 41 votes are required for passage. Should the vote concern anything that did not come first as a proposal from the Commission, those 41 or more votes must have been cast by at least six member states. In practice, almost all decisions are made by seeking unanimity, although the treaties require this in only a few instances (such as admission of a new member). The gentlemen's agreement of the Luxembourg Compromise is still in force. Rather than give up veto powers, the member states have preferred the practice of seeking unanimity on council decisions during marathon sessions. These sessions continue around the clock without interruption until consensus is reached by "splitting the difference" or, as is more usually the case, by "finding the lowest common denominator." All Council decisions on matters included in the Treaties must be based on a Commission proposal. Commission proposals can be amended by the Council, but this requires a unanimous vote.¹⁴

The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)

The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) consists of the nine member states' ambassadors to the Communities and the staffs of the ambassadors which are composed of experts in various fields of Community interest. These staffs are arranged in multi-national action groups and working committees. Basically, their role is to do the

¹⁴See, P.-H.J.M. Houben, Les Conseils des Ministres des Communautés Européennes (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1964).

groundwork for the Council meetings by reviewing all Commission proposals and reporting to the Council areas of agreement among the national viewpoints. As such, the COREPER provides a function similar to that of a Congressional Committee. Although the COREPER does not hold formal hearings, the Commission can and does provide them further information and support for Commission proposals. Given the great volume of Council business, COREPER recommendations carry great weight and influence. The COREPER has been an important institution since 1958. Its existence was not provided for in the Treaties (it did not even exist for the ECSC), but the Treaty of Assession in 1973 confirmed its existence and gave it a legal basis. (The COREPER will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V.)

The European Parliament

The major role of the European Parliament is as a consultative body and watchdog over the Commission, charged to insure it does not adhere to any one national position or lose sight of the "Community interest." The Parliament consists of 198 members appointed from and by the national legislatures (36 each from France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom; 14 each from Belgium and the Netherlands; 10 each from Ireland and Denmark, and six from Luxembourg). The Parliament is constituted to be truly Community in character, having European-level political party groups but no national groupings. The Parliament meets seven or eight times a year for a week at a time. Between sessions, its various functional committees meet in camera to discuss issues concerning the Community and obtain information from other Community institutions.¹⁵

¹⁵See, Murray Forsyth, The Parliament of the European Communities (London: Political and Economic Planning, 1964).

The Parliament has the right to put written and oral questions to Commissioners and the Council of Ministers. In 1973, a Question Time was introduced to increase the dialogue with the executive organs.

The Parliament has limited but gradually increasing budgetary powers. In 1970, the "free" part of the budget (money to maintain EC's institutions' functioning) was brought under "the final word of the Parliament." Although the funds involved are small by comparison to the total Community budget, they have great political significance. Control of operating funds is a matter to which all Community institutions are quite sensitive.¹⁶ The powers of the Parliament are likely to increase dramatically in and after 1978. In July, 1976, the European Council decided to hold the first direct elections to the European Parliament in May or June, 1978, and also to increase substantially the size of the Parliament. The new body will have 410 seats. The seat allocation will be as follows: 81 for each of the four largest members (Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom), 25 for the Netherlands, 24 for Belgium, 16 for Denmark, 15 for Ireland and 6 for Luxembourg. Having a directly elected European Parliament and the accompanying increase in political power substantially increases the chances of a much stronger role for the Parliament in the near future.¹⁷

The European Court of Justice

The Court of Justice consists of nine judges. They are appointed

¹⁶Emile Noel, "How the European Community's Institutions Work," Community Topics 39 (April, 1973), pp. 9-10.

¹⁷James Goldsborough, "EEC Reaches Accord on Europe Parliament," The International Herald Tribune, July 13, 1976, p. 1.

at the consent of the national governments for terms of six years. The nine judges are assisted by four advocates - general. The Court insures the observance of law and justice in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, and laws passed to implement the Treaties. The Court may give judgment on appeals brought by a member state, the Council, the Commission or any person or company affected by a Community decision. In that sense, the Court of Justice is the Community "Supreme Court." The Court's decisions are binding and final, and cannot be appealed in the national courts.¹⁸

The Economic and Social Committee

The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is a consultative body having no powers of decision or initiative, but it does influence decision-making in the Community. The Commission and the Council are required to consult the ESC on most major policy proposals. In addition, the ESC sends published opinions to the Commission, many parts of which are included in later Commission proposals sent to the Council. The Committee consists of 144 members selected from labor, business, agriculture, consumer, and family organizations. Seats are allocated by nation: Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, twenty-four each; twelve each from the Netherlands and Belgium; nine each from Denmark and Ireland, and six from Luxembourg. Most of the ESC's members are high officials in interest groups which have offices and staffs located in Brussels as well as throughout Europe.

¹⁸See, Gerhard Bebr, Judicial Control of the European Communities (New York: Praeger, 1962). Also, Stuart A. Scheingold, The Rule of Law in European Integration: The Path of the Schuman Plan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965).

The ESC is divided into three groups. Group I contains business organizations (such as the Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne (UNICE)). Group II is the labor unions' section; its largest member is the European Trade Union Confederation. Group III is made up of agricultural groups (e.g. the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations in the EEC (COPA)), professionals, consumer groups, and family groups.

The ESC functions only for the EEC and Euratom matters. A similar group, the "Consultative Committee", advises the Council and Commission on ECSC affairs. Constituted similarly to the ESC, the Consultative Committee has 81 members.

The "European Council"

In recent years, an unofficial institution has developed in the Community. Motivated by a concern to deal at the highest level with difficult political problems that had stalemated the Council of Ministers, the heads of state and of government of the member states began holding periodic summits to discuss Community issues and problems. This body, popularized as the "European Council", is an extremely important actor in the Community. So far as institutional structures are concerned, however, it may be little different than the Council of Ministers, attended by Prime Ministers rather than Foreign Ministers. Like the Council of Ministers, the European Council's chairman rotates between the member states every six months; the nation chairing the Council of Ministers also chairs the European Council. When the European Council meets (generally every four months), both the COREPER and the Council of Ministers serve to prepare the meeting. (The European Council will be discussed in more

detail later in Chapter IV.)

The Decision-Making Process

By virtue of the Treaties, the Commission can make regulations and decisions, and can submit resolutions to the Council, but these must be made collegiately. Majority voting is used in the Commission, and the minority always abides by the majority decision. The Commission draws up decisions and proposals in two stages. After consulting with political circles, (e.g. the European Parliament, top civil servants, and the Economic and Social Committee and various employers and workers groups), the appropriate Directorate-General prepares an opinion on its own, generally through a long, time-consuming series of meetings. When general policy guidelines (based on the prepared opinions) have been determined and approved by the Commissioners, the second procedure is initiated. The concerned Directorate-General holds meetings with groups of experts from the national governments and often informally confers with representatives of the COREPER. In addition, members of the Commission meet with representatives of interest groups and other Community institutions in committees, many of which have become institutionalized (e.g., the Short-Term Economic Policy Committee, the Budgetary Policy Committee, the Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee, the Nuclear Research Advisory Committee, the Committee on Vocational Training, the Committee on the Free Movement of Workers, and the Committee on Social Security for Migrant Workers). The results of these meetings are reported to the responsible Commissioner who, in turn, reports them to the entire Commission.

When the Commission sends either a memorandum of general scope

or a proposal on a particular point, the Council will first refer it to the COREPER. The COREPER can only recommend action to the Council; all decisions must be made by the Council of Ministers. On matters of relative less importance and when the COREPER and Commission are unanimously agreed, the Council will adopt the decision without debate. On more important matters or those having political implications, the Council will debate the issue. At such times members of the Commission attend the Council meetings (as a right) to defend their proposals. Consultation with other Community institutions i.e., the Parliament and ESC, generally takes place before the debate (but usually only if required by the Treaties). Decisions and regulations of the Council are binding, subject only to review by the European Court of Justice.¹⁹

A Return to Community History: 1969-1973

Two important events occurred in the Community in 1969. First, the election of George Pompidou as French President to succeed de Gaulle paved the way for British entry and enlargement of the Community. Second, the European Council meeting in the Hague in December, 1969, called for "completing, deepening, and enlarging the Community." It formally declared the Community's 12-year transition period to be at an end in December 31, 1969, and approved a plan to finance, by 1975, a Community budget totally from proceeds of the common external tariff and a small part of the proceeds of the value-added tax. The agreement also gave limited control of the Community budget to the European Parliament.

The Hague Summit also produced proposals for the creation of an

¹⁹Noel, pp. 11-12.

economic and monetary union and a renewed attempt at political union.²⁰ The economic and monetary union proposal prompted a report the following year by a committee chaired by Luxembourg Prime Minister Pierre Werner. The "Werner Report" set a target date of 1980 for a high degree of coordination of national economic policies, a harmonization of budgetary policies, a Community currency, a unified capital market, and Community intervention into regional policies.²¹ Also, in December, 1969, a marathon Council session produced agreement on financing a common agricultural policy.

Membership negotiations opened in 1970 to include the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway. Also in 1970, the common foreign trade policy became operational and political cooperation meetings began. The following year produced a common fisheries policy and the generalized system of preferences for 91 developing nations. The Assession Treaty enlarging the Community was signed in 1972, but the people of Norway rejected membership in a popular referendum and Norway declined membership. In 1973, Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom began actively participating in the Community, giving the Community the membership and character it has today.

The European Council (heads of state and of government of the nine member states of the European Community) issued in its final communiqué of the 1973 Paris Summit the resolve "...of transforming,

²⁰The latter is discussed in more detail in Chapter V.

²¹Glenda G. Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions: Cases In European Policy-Making (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 101-125.

before the end of the present decade and with the fullest respect for the treaties already signed, the whole complex of relations of member states into a European union..." and "...request{ed} the institutions of the Community to draw up a report on this subject before the end of 1975...". The reports, published by the Commission, European Parliament, Economic and Social Committee, European Court of Justice, and specially commissioned reports by Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans and the Dutch government (the "Spierenburg Report"), all strongly advocate European union. For example, all except the ECJ report make special mention of the need for the Community to formulate and implement a common foreign policy for and on behalf of the nine member states. The recent reports of the Community institutions indicate greater consensus, a stronger resolve by political leaders, and expectations for European union higher than ever before.

Yet, since the 1973 Paris Summit, European integration seems to be nearing a standstill. Despite the optimistic tone of the various reports on European union, the decision for direct elections to the European Parliament by 1978, and the communalistic rhetoric to come out of the European Council, attempts at reaching economic and monetary union have met an impasse (or, perhaps, nine separate impasses). The nine member states differ in their various market mechanisms, labor structures, and consumer mentalities to the extent that goal conflicts abound. The Community members cannot decide whether the European Community should concentrate on fighting inflation or fight unemployment by expanding economic growth. No concensus exists as to whether it is best to take steps to minimize energy costs or to safeguard energy sources. Strong

differences exist as to whether the currencies of the nine should be tied together or should be susceptible to manipulation by each government as a national economic control mechanism. Were the Nine able to reach agreement on the basic goals, they would still be far apart concerning the means to be employed to reach those goals. The probable accession of Greece, and later Spain and Portugal, should serve only to exacerbate these differences. Indeed, many of those most knowledgeable of Community affairs now argue that a step backward has been made in economic and monetary affairs.

This assessment is not a new one. Doubts concerning the possibility of economic and monetary union pre-date the Hague Summit, which gave birth to the Werner Report. The Economic and Social Committee of the European Community stated in a published opinion in 1969:

A correct assessment of the results already obtained calls for an appreciation of the enormous difficulties involved in merging the different national economies into a single union which leaves a way open to political union. There is no denying, however, that the Community has for some time past been faced with difficulties over and above those which the progress of integration itself would normally entail. The situation is uncertain, and progress towards economic union is marking time. There are many reasons for this regrettable state of affairs but the main one is that the Member States hold profoundly different views on essential political issues such as the enlargement of the Community, the powers of the European Parliament, the implementation of treaty rules on voting within the Council, the work to be done by EURATOM. There is evidence that these conflicting opinions may well herald a return to nationalism and paralysis for the Communities; because it looks as if, contrary to our long-cherished belief, economic integration does not necessarily lead to political union. On the contrary, if economic integration is to advance beyond the customs union, there must be a political will.²²

²²"Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee," February 26-27, 1969, pp. 7-8.

Later assessments also attest to the fact that little progress has been made in the Community's internal affairs. The European Parliament recently called the lack of progress toward a common transport policy "disappointing," the lack of political will to arrive at a common position on energy a sign of "weakness and impotence" of the Community and of renewed competition between the nation states. The Parliamentary report further charged that "the lack of progress toward economic and monetary union was largely attributable to the failure of the Council {of Ministers} to take decisions..".²³ The Parliamentarians' assessment of the state of integration in the economic and monetary affairs of the Community was negative:

Coordination of {the} economic policies of the Member States {is} inconsistent; {there are} now more restrictions in movements of capital than at {the} beginning of {the} '60's; only limited progress {has occurred} in EC structural policy and fiscal harmonization. {The} European Monetary Cooperation Fund plays {a} subsidiary role. Ireland, Italy, and {the} United Kingdom play no part in the EC's exchange-rate mechanism. Cooperation between the central banks of the Member States {is} satisfactory.²⁴

The unsuccessful attempt to achieve a passport union in the Community provides another example of the state of integration in the Community's internal affairs. Indeed, the original effort has now been reduced to an attempt to standardize the size, color, and format of the member states' passports. Even this effort is now bogged down due to disagreements as to which languages should be used, in what order they

²³"Report on European Union," The European Parliament Working Papers, Document 174/75, 7 July 1975, p. 5 ff.

²⁴Secretariat of the European Parliament, Europe Today: State of European Integration, April 15, 1976, para. 4.163.

should appear, and what color the external cover should be.²⁵

Speaking before the European Parliament on July 7, 1976, Max van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and then the new President of the Council of Ministers, provided his assessment of the state of European integration:

There was a time, not so long ago, when the European Communities included a motto in their flag, which ran: 'completion, enlargement and strengthening'. This was at the time of the summit conference at The Hague, when we reached agreement on the conclusion of the EEC's transitional stage, on the accession of new members and on the prospect of an economic and monetary union. All this happened at the end of the sixties and at the beginning of this decade.

Now, a few years later, one cannot but notice that the motto 'completion, enlargement and strengthening' has been replaced by the motto 'stagnation, decline and elusion.'

Stagnation: especially as regards the construction of the common market and its development into a real economic union, there has been a long period of virtually complete standstill. The Communities' institutions have been unable to produce any new, creative legislation; no new policy areas of any significance have been transposed from the national to the Community sphere. The Community apparatus is still operative but seems to be sterile and ineffectual. There is a lack of imagination and decision-making and I know only too well that this discouraging picture is, first and foremost, characteristic of that institution of the Communities referred to as the Council of Ministers. However, this stagnation and ineffectualness have also affected other bodies of the Community.

Decline: the blight of stagnation did not come by itself, as was to be expected, it was accompanied by an even greater blight, namely the decline, disintegration and impairment of the Community's patrimony. These signs of disintegration are produced day by day, and as the economic problems currently facing the Member States become more serious and more persistent, so will the danger of recession at Community level become even more acute than it already is. I am not only referring, or not even referring primarily, to the degeneration of the rules whereby the Community institutions should operate, or to the institutional interplay as provided for in the Treaties. No, I am especially referring to the signs of disintegration affecting the member States' economic and monetary policies. It is in this

²⁵Based on interviews with officials in the COREPER, June - July, 1976.

field that the dangers which are threatening the Communities should without any reservation be termed very serious. The realities which at one time were to have formed the basis for our European solidarity now seem to be the cause of differences, of our growing apart and the parting of our ways.²⁶

Stagnation in the Seventies: Barriers to Continued Integration

Attempts at further integration in the European Community have been frustrated by various conditions, personalities, external problems, but particularly by two broad categories, political barriers and economic barriers. Political barriers include differing foreign policies, different ideological and political party structures, nationalism and ethnonationalism, perceived relationships of the member states to the Community, and the issue of collective security. Economic barriers consist of different national economic problems, different economic philosophies, the questions concerning energy, and the persistence of simultaneously high unemployment and inflation.

Political Barriers

Foreign Policy Differences. West Germany and France represent the two extremes among the Community states. Germany has pursued a more cautious, conservative approach toward non-member states, and has been the staunchest ally of the United States. In contrast, France has pursued policies antagonistic to the United States (particularly concerning NATO, nuclear power, and weapons), and has been quick to take definitive stands on conflict in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The United Kingdom has modified but continued its independent aloofness from the Continent,

²⁶I received the text (an English translation) of the speech while visiting the Dutch Foreign Ministry in The Hague, July, 1976.

but it more closely resembles German conservatism than French unpredictability. The best example of EC political disharmony occurred immediately after the Arab Oil Boycott. The divergent reactions, all of which were nationalistic in character (and which nearly destroyed the Community), ranged from the almost immediate acquiescence of the French to the dogged refusal of the Dutch to alter their foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel. Concerning the developing countries, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom often openly favor their former colonies, while West Germany, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg have no inclination or reason for such favoritism.

Expansion. A related political problem concerns the anticipated expansion of the Community. Greece is now negotiating for EC membership and Spain and Portugal have expressed the desire to join by the 1980s. There is growing concern among Community leaders as to what effect the fragile political structures and poor economies of these states will have on European integration after the Community expands to twelve. The expansion would require massive capital transfer to the poorer states depleting the stronger states in order to achieve economic balance in the Community. The alternative would be to continue national economic policies widening the chasm between rich and poor in the EC. The "Nine" realize that admitting the three Mediterranean states is economically unsound. It will, at best, retard integration; at worst, it may cause the Community's undoing. Politically, however, the Community cannot turn down the requests for admittance as long as the applicants "fulfill the

conditions of democracy" as required in the Treaties of Rome.²⁷

Internal Political Pressures. Sizeable opposition to the Community still exists in some of the member states, particularly in Britain and Denmark. Anti-marketeter forces in those states draw politically on the failures of the Community to deliver the promises of the pro-marketeter forces. Political leaders in those states tend to be more conservative and less willing to risk new integrative programs. Additionally, Britain, France, and Belgium must contend with ethnonationalist movements within their borders. The British have the most serious troubles with open warfare in Ulster and Welsh and Scottish nationalists clamoring for local autonomy up to outright independence.²⁸ France contends with similar though smaller forces in the Brittany, Normandy, and Gascony regions of France. Belgium still must respond to a serious cleavage between the Flems and Walloons. Hugo Schiltz, leader of the Flemish Nationalist Volksunie Party argues that the only rational solution to govern Belgium is to create a federal state of two nations with Brussels as a separate neutral district.²⁹ What must be considered with all this is that many leaders of the member states now have tenuous holds on their governments, governing from the minority or holding

²⁷William Drozdiak, "EEC Sees Problems If Three Countries Admitted," The Washington Post (November 4, 1976), Section A, p. 5.

²⁸A 1976 poll in the Scottish Daily Record indicated nearly one-half of all Scots favored cutting ties with Britain completely and setting up an independent nation. The Washington Post (November 30, 1976), Section A, p. 11.

²⁹European Community 201 (May-June, 1977), p. 38.

insecure coalitions. Economic insecurity has eroded the political support for den Uyl of the Netherlands, Tindemans of Belgium, Britain's Callaghan, and France's Giscard d'Estaing. Schmidt's liberal coalition in Germany won by only eight seats in the last election in the face of growing conservative opposition. Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti heads a minority government. National leaders are not disposed to risk innovation toward more European integration when their own political survival is in question.

A related political problem has to do with relatively strong Communist Parties in France and Italy. These parties have major influences on the labor unions in those countries and an increasing influence in their governments. They now have the greatest power and support since the period immediately following World War II. The Italian Communist Party, led by Enrico Berlinguer, has a membership of 1.7 million, and received 34 percent of the vote in the 1976 parliamentary elections. The French Communist Party's George Marchais leads one-half million members who won 20 percent of the vote in the 1973 General Assembly elections and have, by all estimates, grown considerably stronger since that time. The gains of the Communists in the South of Europe compared to relative weakness in the North reflect the stronger class structures and absence of Democratic Socialist parties to buffer left from right in France and Italy. In addition, these states are still far behind their Community partners in overhauling tax structures and seive-like collection procedures that favor the rich and permit the amassing of huge fortunes.³⁰ The growing left in the South while Germany, Denmark,

³⁰The Washington Post (September 19, 1976), Section A, p. 1.

and the Benelux countries reassess their heavy expenditures on welfare programs and inch to the right creates another political barrier to further European integration.

Collective Security. There are quite different national perceptions among the member states concerning collective security. Germany, Denmark, and the Benelux countries are either happy with NATO as it is or would like to see even more United States involvement in NATO. France continues to opt for an alternative to dependency on the United States in NATO and for a more independent national defense. Ireland staunchly refuses military involvement preferring to remain neutral. Britain and Italy have cut back in troop strengths in response to their badly sagging economies. West Germany, with its 495,000 troops, is the only European NATO member not considering troop cuts. The different philosophical attitudes toward defense and considerations brought about by economic necessity pose a further political barrier to European integration.

Economic Barriers

Economic Problems. Economic recovery has been very slow in the European Community states. The general difficulty has been the phenomenon plaguing the entire developed world: simultaneous increases in unemployment and inflation. The major concern has been how to strengthen economic growth without kindling more inflation. Inflation has been serious in 1976 in all states except West Germany (3.9 percent). Inflation rates in France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Ireland were 9.7 percent, 14.7

percent, 18.4 percent, and 20 percent respectively.³¹ Unemployment has been equally high and rose in 1976 in Germany, France, Denmark and Belgium; 943,686 were unemployed in Germany, and 955,352 in France in September-October, 1976.³² Fluctuations in currency exchange presented further difficulties. In 1976, the Deutschmark rose 9 percent over the dollar, 21 percent over the French franc, and 38 percent over the pound and lira.³³ The plunge of the pound and lira make products from the United Kingdom and Italy such bargains, they now threaten to destroy the customs union. Further, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy have refused to participate in the EC's government currency float, making that economic central instrument nearly powerless. Finally, some Community economic policies, e.g., guaranteed farm prices which require the stronger states to underwrite the weaker (notably the United Kingdom and Italy) have caused considerable resentment on the part of the stronger members. For example, United Kingdom food imports from the EC get a 40 percent subsidy. The Germans are now asking why they should turn over decision-making to EC institutions staffed by those from countries who can't keep their own houses in order.³⁴ In general, these economic problems have exacerbated differences between the member states and have been barriers to further integration. They have helped to create an

³¹Martha Plummer, "Roy Jenkin's Task - Rebuild the EEC," The New York Times, (January 30, 1977), Section XII, p. 2.

³²The Washington Post (November 27, 1976), Section D, p. 9.

³³Michael Getler, "W. Germany: Edgy in Europe," The Washington Post, (October 30, 1976), Section A, p. 12.

³⁴Plummer, Section XII, p. 2.

environment of uncertainty in which political and economic leaders have assiduously avoided any decision-making involving economic risks.

Economic Philosophies. Many of the Nine differ significantly in their choice of strategies to solve their economic problems. For example, Denmark, Germany, and the Benelux countries have opted to emphasize fighting inflation, with remedies for high unemployment getting lesser consideration. On the other hand, France and Italy emphasize keeping employment as high as possible with less regard to inflation (and failing in both in 1976). Britain made a major decision to rely heavily on a predicted 20 million tons of North Sea oil, but suffered a setback when only 12 million tons could be counted in 1976. Other economic philosophies are now being seriously reexamined. For example, the Dutch economy has been declining steadily this decade. Yet the usual yardstick for economic decline had been a trade deficit -- and Holland has none (due mainly to its reserves of natural gas). A Dutch political advisor noted:

... we are clearly in decline. We are in the process of losing our competitiveness in industry, of pricing ourselves out of the market in shipbuilding, machine tools, metals and textiles. That means still more out of work and on welfare. The strong balance of payments simply means we still have a margin for more nonsense.³⁵

The "more nonsense" refers to the vast welfare system in the Netherlands. On any one day 18 percent of the work force (740,000) are sick, on sick leave, or disability leave. Added to the 240,000 jobless (6 percent), the unproductive percent of Holland's labor force amounts to 24 percent, twice what it was five years ago. For this reason and because Dutch

³⁵ Quoted from: Michael Getler, "Holland Gets the Feeling Something Is Wrong," The Washington Post (November 27, 1976), Section D, p. 9.

business capital investment has gone from 8 percent to 0 percent in the last ten years, there are signs of a more conservative shift away from welfare programs, similar to what has happened in West Germany and Sweden.

Energy. Given Europe's almost total reliance on external sources of energy, this policy sector is an extremely important economic factor. The member states take different positions on energy pricing and supply. For example, France and Belgium want to minimize oil prices, Denmark has preferred to secure guaranteed supplies with less attention to price. The Netherlands, with reserves in natural gas, and the United Kingdom with its North Sea oil have taken and continue to take more independent attitudes toward energy. Economically, however, the Nine are more sensitive (and more vulnerable) to OPEC than to each other's policy differences. For example, the OPEC decision in Doha, Qatar, on December 16, 1976, to raise oil prices had the effect of raising the price of gasoline in the United Kingdom by three cents per gallon. In addition, it effectively lowered France's projected growth rate from 4.5 percent to 3.9 percent for 1977 by increasing the rate of inflation by one-half percent. France, which imports 82 percent of its energy, was hit hardest, followed closely by the United Kingdom and Italy.³⁶

Summary. The economic and political barriers discussed above have contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty and caution in the Community. Member-state and Community decision-makers have been largely unable to make decisions to further integrate the Community internally for fear of the risks involved. Attempts at further integration in the

³⁶ Jim Hoagland, "Serious Consequences for Europe from Oil Price Increase," The Washington Post, (December 19, 1976), Section F, p. 1.

Community have not been totally frustrated, however. Despite (or, perhaps due to) the stagnation in the Community's agricultural, industrial, financial, transport, and social sectors, significant progress has been achieved in the external relations sectors of the Community. This work is intended to investigate this phenomenon and offer some explanation for its development.

CHAPTER II

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

In order to better understand the process of European integration, both historically and presently, it is important to discuss political integration theory. This discussion will provide a better understanding of the several attempts to explain the Community's progression and its probably future. It will also facilitate the presentation of my explanatory model concerning the Community's relative success in external affairs, while its internal affairs have stagnated. Finally, the research methodology of this dissertation will be described.

Theory

International regionalism has been a major area of concern in international relations for the past twenty years, and theories concerning the possibilities, stages, and dynamics of regional integration of nation states into larger units are numerous. Almost as numerous are the attempts to categorize various schools of thought. For example, Altiero Spinelli suggests three "designs" for European integration: the

Functionalists, the Confederalists, and the Federalists.¹ Steven Warnecke concentrates on the American "sources" in his discussion of three major academic theories:² those of Karl Deutsch³, of Ernst Haas⁴ and of Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold.⁵ Charles Pentland has suggested four schools: the "pluralists," the "functionalists,"

¹See Altiero Spinelli, The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 10-17. See also, David Calleo, Europe's Future: The Grand Alternatives (New York: Horizon Press, 1965).

²Steven Warnecke, "American Regional Integration Theories and the European Community," Integration 1 (1971), p. 9.

³In particular, Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966) and International Political Communities: An Anthology (New York: Doubleday, 1966).

⁴Haas' seminal work is The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). See also, Ernst Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," Journal of Common Market Studies V (June, 1967), pp. 315-343; "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 3-42.

⁵Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

the "neo-functionalists," and the "federalists."⁶ These are probably the most frequently suggested categories; I have chosen them as a means of organizing the following discussion of the utility and inadequacies of regional integration theory.

Pentland's four schools are not mutually exclusive or necessarily at odds with one another. Indeed, it is useful to view each of the four as having relatively more explanatory capabilities depending upon which aspect or stage of the integration process is the concern of the study. For example, the pluralists have more to offer to explain the beginning and initial stages of regional integration, but fail to address or address too briefly that which maintains and keeps the process going or to what end the process is intended.

The functionalists and neo-functionalists concern themselves little with the initial or final stages of regional integration, but concentrate instead on the dynamics of operating and expanding the process. Similarly, the federalists' concerns are of greatest utility as to final stages and end-products while offering little as to initiating

⁶Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (New York: The Free Press, 1973). Pentland's typology of the four major schools is based on the end product to which the integration process is expected to lead and on which major conditions are seen as bringing about the process of change. According to Pentland, the federalists and neo-functionalists believe the end-product of integration to be the state-model (respectively, a federal state and a supra-national government), and the pluralists and functionalists think that the community-model is the end-product. Both pairs are divided, however, in terms of the types of independent variables employed to explain the process of change. Federalists and pluralists focus on the direct processes or political variables, and functionalists and neo-functionalists concentrate on indirect processes, particularly the socio-economic variables.

the process and linking means-to-ends. Viewed this way, each school makes an essential contribution to understanding the entire process of regional integration and should be considered.

The Pluralists

The pluralist approach to integration sees a "community of states" engaged in a "continuous process of sensitive adjustment to each other's actions, supported usually (although not necessarily) by the socio-political behavior and attitudes of their populations."⁷ The approach centers on several variables important to the formation of the community of states: historical, cultural, economic, social, political, and diplomatic exchanges among those states.

Of the major integration theorists, Karl Deutsch best represents the pluralist approach. In his Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Deutsch puts forth several underlying definitions central to his approach:⁸

1. The Security community: A group of people which has become 'integrated'.
2. Integration: "The attainment within a territory of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and wide-spread enough to assure for a long time dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population."
3. Sense of community: "A belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change."

⁷ Ibid, p. 29.

⁸ Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 5-6.

4. Peaceful change: The resolution of social problems normally institutionalized by institutionalized procedures without resort to large scale physical force":
5. Amalgamation: "The formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit with some type of common government after amalgamation."

Deutsch further amplifies his central concept of the "security community":

A political community is not necessarily able to prevent war within the area it covers...Some political communities do, however, eliminate war and the expectation of war within their boundaries...A security-community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.⁹

The concept of the security-community largely centers on the linkage between transactions and conflict. According to the pluralists, this linkage process involves certain characteristics: First, some form of communication must be taking place. Normally these are positive interactions, although hostile or negative communications represent a type of communication system. Second, something of common interest must be present about which two parties can communicate. The mutual interest presumes both the physical capabilities to communicate (exchange messages, trade, etc.) and an identification of interests to allow meaningful communication to occur. Third, interacting nations are important to each other and, therefore, their basic relationship (as defined by the communication) is different from those with whom they do not interact. Fourth, high inter-nation interaction is unlikely to be

⁹Karl Deutsch et. al., "Political Community in the North Atlantic Area," in International Political Communities: An Anthology (Garden City, N. Y. Doubleday, 1966), pp. 1-2.

accompanied by high tension and conflict. In such cases, behavior tends to be institutionalized, and patterns of interaction develop. These patterns soon develop into standard procedures which in turn develop into formal (international) organizations.¹⁰ The process suggests that as communication between the units increases, the complexities inherent in such activities increase, causing the groups in the potential community to formalize their interaction to handle these complexities, which results in greater collaboration. This mutual cooperation facilitates the formation of formal institutions to further simplify the relationships or to make decisions jointly for the states now involved as one unit. Once that stage has been reached, it is argued, further integration becomes more likely. Michael Sullivan suggests that the most insightful proposition of the pluralists is that truly integrated communities may not necessarily be those declared integrated by formal agreement, that "...using concepts from communication theory, Deutsch contended that those nations that contain high and consistent levels of communication, and transactions with each other may be more integrated than those that have signed agreements."¹¹ Surely, the relationship that has evolved between Canada and the United States is the best example. In many ways, these two nations have more common economic, communications (mass media), cultural, ecological, and legal (e.g. relaxed restrictions at border crossings) policies than do the signatories of the Treaties of Rome.

¹⁰Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community: A Regional and Global Study (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), pp. 8-9.

¹¹Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 210.

The Functionalists and Neo-Functionalists

Those belonging to the functionalist school of political integration theory have drawn from the social theories of Spencer, the metaphorical organicism of Radcliff-Brown and Durkheim, and the "requisite analysis" or "structural-functionalism" of Parsons, Levy, Almond and Apter.¹² The notions that "form follows function" and that "structures exist to satisfy functional needs" were expressed very early by David Mitrany,¹³ and later by other international integration functionalists, i.e., Inis L. Claude, James P. Sewell, and P. G. Taylor.¹⁴ These theorists focus on the world international system. As for those who concerned themselves with regional integration and Europe in particular,

¹²See, H. Spencer, The Principles of Sociology, Vol. 1, (New York: Appleton, 1897), E. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1938); A. R. Radcliff-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956); T. Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951); M. J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952); G. A. Almond, "Introduction" in G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and D. E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

¹³David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1933).

¹⁴See, Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plow Shares (4th edition) (New York: Random House, 1971); James Patrick Sewell, Functionalism and World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); P. G. Taylor, "The Concept of Community and the European Integration Process," Journal of Common Market Studies 7 (1968), pp. 83-101; and P. G. Taylor, "The Functionalist Approach to the Problem of International Order: A Defense," Political Studies 16 (1968), pp. 393-410.

Altiero Spinelli describes them as follows:

There were the Functionalists who believed that first of all it is important to confide the administration of certain concrete public activities to a suitable European administration. This administration would receive its common directives from the national states which would have formulated them in appropriate treaties and in subsequent inter-governmental decisions. Within the framework of these directives the European administration would be separated from and independent of the various administrations.¹⁵

It is perhaps a bit simplistic but not inaccurate to say that the functionalists argue a sort of economic determinism. They do this by tying economics to the process of integration in such a way that political integration was an automatic result of economic integration. In theory, economic cooperation between states results in working relationships rather than political relationships, and these relationships can only be established through international organizations. The resultant transfer of functions to the international organizations leads to a transference of loyalty and support from the national to the supra-national entity which in time leads to the creation of a political community.

The "neo-functionalists" agree that the process of political integration results from economic integration (or its "functional equivalent"), but they do not see the process as automatic. Those of the neo-functionalist school (notably Ernst Haas, Philippe Schmitter,

¹⁵ Altiero Spinelli, The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 13. "European Functionalists" appear to have lost interest in the European Community and now direct their attention to the ECE. See, for example, A. J. R. Groom, "Functionalist Approach and East-West Cooperation in Europe," Journal of Common Market Studies 1 and 2 (1975), pp. 21-60.

and J. S. Nye¹⁶) assert that political variables cannot be extracted from the process and that, indeed, political actors, "technocrats", and bureaucrats often manipulate the process and give it a "political push" (or what Haas refers to as "cultivated spillover"). The central analytical concept for the neo-functionalists is spillover, a force caused by functional interdependence or inherent linkages of tasks that press political actors to define their common tasks and then to go on to other activities. Spillover is commonly thought of as a process in which integrative activity in one sector leads to integrative activity in other sectors or, as M. P. Sullivan notes, it occurs when "certain procedures and behaviors occurring in the communication process spill over into others: cooperative processes in the matter of trade, for example, may effect relations between the parties in the matter of extradition."¹⁷

Put simply, spillover is said to occur when integrative success in one policy sector spills over into other, related policy sectors, causing the member states to integrate their once separate activities in the new policy sectors. At the macro level, the best example of spillover was the creation of the EEC and Euratom out of the successes of the ECSC in the 1950s. Subsequent micro-examples are numerous.

¹⁶See Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) E. Haas and P. C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America" in International Political Communities: An Anthology (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 259-300, J. S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

¹⁷Sullivan, p. 212.

When tariff barriers were first reduced in the EEC, the profit margins and competitive positions of many European firms became more strongly affected by the different systems of taxation in the member states. This led to the adoption of a common system of calculating the value added tax. Similarly, the agricultural surpluses generated by the initial common pricing system pressed the member states toward a common structural policy in agriculture. An example of deliberative ("cultivated") spillover is the 1960 package deal which hastened internal tariff cuts in the EEC to satisfy those eager to advance the common market and, at the same time, lowered the external tariff to satisfy those concerned about a loss of foreign trade.¹⁸ The examples illustrate an important observation: spillover involves an increase in both the scope of authority and the level of authority for central institution decision-makers.

The neo-functionalists view European integration as an ad hoc, step-by-step process characterized by gradual, continuous movement toward regional integration. Ernst Haas sees political integration as the process whereby certain crucial elites, those in government, interest groups, and political parties, "are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." His central theoretical conclusion is that integration is favored by societal circumstances (e.g., an industrialized economy,

¹⁸J. S. Nye, "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model," in Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 200-202.

politically mobilized masses, and pluralist democracy) that favor or permit leaders of central institutions to propose or pursue collective policies that increase elite expectations and demands.¹⁹ Haas provides several criteria for judging whether community sentiment, which is the basis for political union, can be considered to flourish:

1. Interest groups and political parties at the national level endorse supranational action in preference to action by their national government, or if they are divided among themselves on this issue, only the case of national opposition to supranational action could be considered incompatible with community sentiment.
2. Interest groups and political parties organize beyond the national level in order to function more effectively as decision makers vis á vis the separate national governments or the central authority, and if they define their interests in terms larger than those of the separate national state from which they originate.
3. Interest groups and political parties in confronting each other at the supranational level succeed in evolving a body of doctrine common to all or a new nationalism i.e. supranationalism.
4. Interest groups and political parties in their efforts at supranational organization coalesce on the basis of a common ideology surpassing those prominent at the national level.
5. Interest groups, political parties and governments show evidence of accepting the rule of law and faithfully carrying out supranational court decisions, administrative directives and rules even when they oppose these, instead of obstructing or ignoring such decisions; further, when opposing federal policy they channel their objections through the legal avenues provided instead of threatening or practicing secession.
6. Governments negotiate with one another in good faith and generally reach agreement while not making themselves consistently and invariably the spokesmen of national interest groups; furthermore, community sentiment would seem to prevail if governments give way in negotiations when they find themselves in a minority instead of insisting on a formal or informal right of veto.²⁰

¹⁹Haas, p. 16.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 9-10.

Another prominent neo-functionalist, J. S. Nye, defines the significant aspects of political integration as institutional, policy, and attitudinal integration, and adds Deutsch's "security-community" as a fourth aspect. Nye's neo-functionalist model concentrates on seven process mechanisms: the functional linkage of tasks, rising transactions, deliberative linkages and coalition formation, regional group formation, elite socialization, the ideological identitive appeal, and the involvement of external actors. His basic hypothesis is that "most political decision-makers will opt for the status quo at any level so long as the process forces or popular pressures are not so strong as to make the choice unbearable for them."²¹ Nye's seven process mechanisms are meant to be indicators of continued, arrested, or reversed institutional, policy, attitudinal, and "security-community" regional integration. According to the model, the response of political decision-makers to these process mechanisms depends on the strength of the mechanisms and on certain integrative conditions: structural conditions (economic equality of units, elite value complimentarity, pluralism, capacity of the member states to adapt and respond) and perceptual conditions (perceived equity of distribution of benefits, perceived external cogency, low or exportable visible costs).²²

The Federalists

While the pluralists' emphasis on pre-integration forces and the beginnings of the process of integration makes the pluralist school of

²¹Nye, p. 97.

²²Ibid., pp. 55-107.

greater value in understanding that stage of the integration process and the functionalists' and neo-functionalists' views are helpful for understanding the dynamic maintenance of the process (how it keeps going), the federalists offer the most with regard to measurement of objectives and the end-product orientation of the process. Generally, the federalists stress political solutions, political institutions, and an acceptance of the nation-state as a political given that needs to be accommodated rather than abolished or circumvented in any scheme to reorganize world politics. As Charles Pentland notes, the federalists argue that "...since the classic mechanisms of international adjustment have proved impermanent or unreliable for maintaining peace and security, real institutional limitations must be placed on the autonomy of states -- however difficult this may be. While autonomous states can be influenced by diplomacy and communications, they can only be controlled if they give up some of their autonomous powers. Hence, in the federalist view, the need for a supranational state."²³

Those in the "federalist school", notably C. J. Friedrich,

²³Pentland, pp. 149-150.

W. H. Riker, Peter Hay, George Liska, and Amatai Etzioni,²⁴ take an approach to European integration most aptly described by Spinelli:

...there are the Federalists who asked that the political institutions of a democratic Europe be constructed first by taking certain powers of initiative, deliberation, decision and execution from the national executives, parliaments and judiciaries and confiding them to a European executive, parliament and judiciary. The institutions would derive their legitimacy from the consent of European citizens directly expressed through European elections and would exercise their powers directly on European citizens without interference from the member states in matters of federal competence.²⁵

(Table 2.1 contains a comparative summary of the above four schools.)

The Eclectics

There is no popular acceptance of an added typology, "the

²⁴See C. J. Friedrich's Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968); W. H. Riker's Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), and Peter Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organizations: Patterns for New Legal Structures (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1966). Although not explicitly federalist, George Liska's Europe Ascendant: The International Politics of Unification (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1964) and Amatai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965) employ a body of federalist assumptions. Liska sets out to analyze the means and forces forging Europe's unity by focusing on the concept of "Statecraft". His analysis of the shortcomings of functional strategies and his prescriptions for moving from functional to political phases makes the work federalist in character. In Political Unification, Etzioni attempts to construct a general theoretical framework based on Parson's structural-functional systems theory. He posits twenty-two propositions which he attempts to test (rather, illustrate) in case studies of the European Community and three other regional organizations. Although intended to be a functional analysis, Etzioni's use of the single-state analogy, his emphasis on the continuing role of the component units, and his insistence on the role of supranationality make his work equally federalist in character.

²⁵Spinelli, p. 11.

Table 2.1 - Comparative Summary of the Four Schools of International Integration.

	PLURALISM	FUNCTIONALISM	NEOFUNCTIONALISM	FEDERALISM
I. The End Product:				
Structure	Community of states	Administrative network responsive to community needs	Supranational decision-making system	Supranational state
Evidence	Probability of peaceful conflict resolution; communications (flows intensity).	Degree of 'fit' between structures & functions; need --satisfaction.	Locus of decisions (scope & level).	Distribution of power (formal & informal).
II. The Process: (levels of analysis)				
System	Self-sustaining growth of interdependence & informal structures	Technical self-determination; imperatives of functional needs & technological change	Political development; growth of central institutions through 'forward linkage'	Constitutional revolution: dramatic redistribution of power and authority
State	Increase of capacity for decision-making, information & responsiveness	Reluctant cooperation to solve technical & economic problems	Bargaining process where governments pursue interests among other groups	Bargaining resulting in Hobbesian contract among elites of states
Individual	Social learning through communications & interaction (elite & mass)	Habits of cooperation derived from satisfaction of utilitarian needs by new institutions	Effects of successful decision-making & conflict resolution on elite attitudes	Differentiation of loyalties according to level of government.
III. Major Variables Measured:				
	<u>PLURALISTS</u>	<u>FUNCTIONALISTS</u>	<u>NEOFUNCTIONALISTS</u>	<u>FEDERALISTS</u>
	(1) unbroken links of social communication (2) mobility of persons (3) multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions (4) interchange of group roles (5) mutual predictability of behavior (6) flow of goods, information, services, population and symbols between states	(1) international trade and trade agreements (2) technological change and cooperation between states (3) creation of international organizations (4) creation of interdependencies (5) social-welfare agreements between states (6) "technical self-determination"	(1) size of unit (2) rate of transaction (3) pluralism (of governments) (4) elite complementarity (5) governmental purposes (6) powers of union (7) decision-making style (8) rate of transaction (9) adaptability of governments (10) perception of governments (11) external pressures	(1) Power politics (division of, separation of, etc.) (2) political identification (3) process of decision-making (4) control over means of violence (5) national political elites (6) government/citizen relationship (7) equity of governmental members (8) "constitutionalism" (9) decentralization and diversity

SOURCE: Charles Pentland, Integration Theory and European Integration (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 190; and Gerhard Mally, The European Community in Perspective (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 25-39.

eclectic school." However, many international integration theorists agree that some utility exists in all the schools discussed previously. Indeed, as was mentioned above, J. S. Nye borrowed the "security-community" concept from Deutsch and the concern with elite socialization from the pluralist school, and the works of George Liska and Amatai Etzioni on international integration appear to combine functionalist and federalist perspectives.

Perhaps the best example of eclectic international integration theory is the work of Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold.²⁶ Like Nye, Lindberg and Scheingold attempted to refine the concepts advanced by Haas in light of the historical experience of the Community's first ten to fifteen years. Lindberg and Scheingold describe the Community as "an ambiguous pluralistic system" and, in an assessment of two decades of polity-building in the three European Communities that focuses on the development of the varieties of mass public and elite attitudinal and behavior supports, they discuss the role in integration of four different coalition-formation mechanisms: functional spillover, side-payments and logrolling, actor socialization, and feedback. The authors also suggest some specific models of change, e.g., forward linkage, output failure, equilibrium, and "spillback".²⁷ While strongly neo-functionalist in character, their eclecticism comes primarily from the liberal borrowing from Karl Deutsch.

²⁶ See, especially, Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity and Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

²⁷ Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity, pp. 34-139.

Another neo-functionalism who has demonstrated in his more recent work some borrowing from the pluralists and significant modification to the neo-functionalism model is Philippe Schmitter. Schmitter concluded in the late 1960s, from the experience in Europe and elsewhere, that "spillover" was much less automatic than he or other neo-functionalists had once supposed. Consequently, he extended the concept of spillover to include several "strategic options" available to actors in particular policy sectors (see also Figure 2.1):

1. Spillover: i.e., to increase both the scope and level of his commitment concomitantly
2. Spillaround: i.e., to increase only the scope while holding the level of authority constant
3. Buildup: i.e., to increase the decisional autonomy of capacity of joint institutions but deny them entrance into new issue areas
4. Retrench: i.e., to increase the level of joint deliberation but withdraw the institution(s) from certain areas
5. Muddle-about: i.e., to let the regional bureaucrats debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues but decrease their actual capacity to allocate values
6. Spillback: i.e., to retreat on both dimensions, possibly returning to the status quo ante
7. Encapsulate: i.e., to respond to crisis by marginal modification within the zone of indifference²⁸

Schmitter's concept of spillover does not differ from the explanation of spillover given previously. By spillaround, Schmitter means that regional decision-makers would be given authority by national leaders

²⁸Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration" in Lindberg and Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration, p. 242.




Figure 2.1
Schmitter's Alternative "Actor Strategies"

SOURCE: Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration" in Lindberg and Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 241.

to regulate additional aspects of a particular policy sector or an entirely new policy sector without an accompanying increase in autonomy or rule-making or rule-enforcement power. For example, the scope of Commission authority in external relations has increased due to the expansion of the Community and the increase from nineteen Yaoundé associate states to fifty-two ACP states. However, the level of authority granted the Commission did not significantly increase for the Lomé Convention relative to the Yaoundé agreements. (This is discussed in more detail in Chapter VII.)

The buildup concept is similar to spillover except that central institution decision-makers are given more autonomy or rule-making authority, but only in those areas over which they previously had any control. They are not given any additional competences. The European Parliament was given more control over the operating budget (of the Community's institutions) in 1970. Although Parliamentary control was increased, it was only over that small portion of the Community budget for which they previously had some input. The increase in the level of authority without the Council's permitting the Parliament any decision-making authority over the major portion of the EC budget is an example of buildup.

Schmitter's terms, "retrench", "muddle-about", and "spill-back", are all negative in character. Retrenchment brings an increase in decisional authority, but a decrease in the number or scope of policy areas. The increase in decisional authority may mean only an increase in the level of joint deliberation (e.g., from the Council of Ministers to the European Council); but this is accompanied by a withdrawal from

certain common areas (e.g., the British, French, and Italian withdrawal of their currencies from the Community's common currency float). "Muddle-about" refers to an increase in the scope of authority with a concomitant decrease in the level of authority given regional decision-makers. The Council of Ministers, for example, may permit an increase in competences for the Commission (allow the bureaucrats to debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues), but give them no power to act on those issues. Such is the present situation for industrial and energy policies in the Community. Directorate General III (Industrial and Technological Affairs) and Directorate General XVII (Energy) have been permitted to research and recommend new policy areas, but not a single mandate for action has come from the Council of Ministers since 1970. "Spill-back" is a term that denotes disintegration, a decrease both in the level and scope of decision-making authority given regional institutions. Historical examples of spill-back in the European Community include the national solutions to the 1958 coal crisis in the ECSC, the isolation of the French and West German agricultural market after the changes in currency values in 1969, and the immediate reaction of the Community member states to the Arab oil embargo.

Schmitter's final actor strategy, "encapsulation", centers on another of his terms, the "zone of indifference". Schmitter suggests that regional actors operate inside certain loosely defined limits within which their activities (or absence thereof) go uncontested. As long as regional bureaucrats operate within the zone of indifference and incur no new costs, they are tolerated. Encapsulation, then, is the response of regional actors to crises by marginally modifying their

actions without exceeding the zone of indifference. Encapsulation occurs when regional actors respond to crises by reasserting previous strategies. Perhaps the best examples are the decisions to negotiate the Lomé Convention and to begin the Eur-Arab Dialogue in response to the 1973 oil crisis. (The Eur-Arab Dialogue is discussed in detail in Chapter V.)

Schmitter also offered three interesting hypotheses concerning the process of integration. His "spill-over hypothesis" suggests that "the greater the policy scope and the higher the level of initial commitment to collective decision-making, the greater the propensity for task expansion." Second, the "politicization hypothesis" postulates that "faced with this culmination of commitments, national actors find themselves gradually embroiled in even more salient or controversial areas of policy-making {leading to} a shift in actor expectations and loyalty toward the new regional center." Third, his "externalization hypothesis" states that once agreement is reached...members will be forced to hammer out a collective external position."²⁹ Schmitter's expanded neo-functional model, particularly his "externalization hypothesis", "spillaround", and "encapsulation", provide the basis of this dissertation's theoretical framework. The theoretical model also includes a different use of the term, spillaround, the "path of least resistance" hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that given sufficient political support, some progress in integration will occur even when strong

²⁹Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration" International Organization 23 (Winter, 1969), pp. 161-166.

political and economic barriers to integration exist. Further, that progress will occur in policy sectors where those barriers are weakest. The political resolve to demonstrate progress of some sort will, then, follow the path of least resistance.

The Theoretical Model

As was noted in the latter part of Chapter I, progress toward European union in the context of the European Community appears to be nearing a standstill. The stagnation is most evident in the Community's internal affairs (e.g., the attempts to reach an economic and monetary union, a passport union, and improved cooperation in industry and agriculture). National government leaders, Community officials, and press and academic observers are united in that assessment.

Yet, significant progress toward integration has been made in the external relations of the Community during the past seven years, in moving the member states toward common policies in foreign relations (toward non-EEC nations) and in development aid programs for the less developed countries of Africa and Asia. The ensuing chapters of this dissertation will focus on the following:

Proposition I: Generally, the Community's internal policy sectors (economic, monetary, industrial, agricultural, transport, social, etc.) have been in a state of stagnation since 1970.

Proposition II: Support for continued integration in the European Community is strong and widespread. It exists beyond the several reports on European Union and statements by national and Community leaders.

Sub-proposition IIa: Support for further European integration will be stronger among citizens of the original six member states than among the Danes, Irish, and British.

Sub-proposition IIb: The relative amount of member-states' support for further integration is strongly associated with the

relative size of the member states: the smaller states will be seen as favoring further integration more than the larger states.

Sub-proposition IIc: Those working in or closely with Community institutions strongly support continued European integration. They favor further policy centralization, i.e., the goal of a federal state in which foreign political and economic decisions are made by Community central institutions.

Sub-proposition IIId: The general publics of the Community's member states and Community officials prefer certain strategies to reach the goal of European Union. They agree that further integration will not come automatically, but requires an occasional push from political leaders or a shock from the external world. They favor:

- (1) accelerating the process, pursuing economic and political union simultaneously,
- (2) combining foreign affairs ("high politics") and economic matters ("low politics") into the competence of the Community's institutions,
- (3) establishing a European Community defense function,
- (4) a mondialist, multilateralist approach to developing countries.

Proposition III: Since 1970, the external relations efforts of the European Community have been relatively more successful than have other policy sectors in the Community.

Proposition IV: Since 1970, the successes in the Community's external relations have had an integrative effect on the Community. This development can be explained, at least in part, by Schmitter's "Externalization Hypothesis" (that intergovernmental regional actors would find themselves compelled to adopt common policies toward non-participant third parties once intermember policies are decided and operationalized).

Proposition V: The continued successful integration in the Community's external affairs can be explained by "encapsulation" (responding to a crisis by marginal modifications within the zone of indifference) or "spillaround" (increasing the scope of authority (more coverage of issue areas) while holding the level of authority constant or within the zone of indifference).

Sub-proposition Va: Progress in integration in the Community's external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may be explained by "encapsulation".

Sub-proposition Vb: Progress in integration in the Community's external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may be explained by "spillaround".

Sub-proposition Vc: Progress in integration in the Community's external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may be explained by a different application of "spillaround": the "path of least resistance" hypothesis. (This will be presented in Chapter IX.)

In summary, this dissertation will attempt to demonstrate that, given the self-assessed state of stagnation in the European Community, there still exists in the European Community strong ideological commitment to move toward European Union; that progress toward this goal has been encapsulated, or has spilled around the internal Community sectors and is strong in the external sector; that the Community's decision-makers have opted for increased cooperation and formulation of joint policies vis-à-vis nonparticipant third parties; and, finally, that the collective assessment of a group of those most familiar with the Community's external relations substantiates the above.

Methodology

The data presented in this dissertation were collected from the following sources: primary source documents read or collected in Brussels; news sources (Agence Europe, Europolitique, The New York Times, The International Herald Tribune, and press and news releases of the Commission of the European Community); and from personal interviews in Brussels and The Hague during the period May-July, 1976. Averaging one hour and twenty minutes each, the interviews were conducted with more than seventy officials of the Commission, Economic and Social Committee, European Parliament, Council of Permanent Representatives, national

foreign offices, the U.S. Mission to the Community, UNICE, COPA, and the ETUC. Most of the personal elite interviews afforded me the opportunity to ask unstructured questions that were geared to the expertise of each respondent and designed to broaden or refine that which was suggested by non-interview data sources. For the most part, findings from the above sources are presented in Chapters III, V, and VII. In fifty of the elite interviews (discounting interviews with non-EC member citizens or those with whom I had insufficient time or access), I employed a structured questionnaire, the results of which provide the bases for Chapters IV, VI, and VIII.

The Interview Sample

Neither the interview sample size nor the selection technique were determined in advance. I set out to talk to as many elites knowledgeable of the Community's external affairs as was possible. Due to problems of time and access, I made no effort to achieve a scientifically random sample. As my research focus was the external relations of the Community, I sought out only those who were likely to have relatively more knowledge and expertise in that area. Consequently, no attempt is made to imply that my sample is representative of any larger population. The combined responses of the fifty respondents will be presented only as a substantial collection of expert opinion of bureaucrats of the nine member nations working for or directly connected to institutions of the European Community. As a matter of convention, I shall hereafter refer to the fifty respondents to my structured questionnaire as the "Eurocrats." I do not mean to suggest that they are all dedicated "Europeanists" committed to furthering European integration and employed by the Community's

central institutions (as suggested by Spinelli in his previously cited book). Indeed, many are national foreign ministry officials or employees of private interest groups. (See Table 2.2 for a profile of the respondents.) I define the term "Eurocrat" somewhat more broadly than do Lerner and Gorden who use "Eurocrats" to mean "the corps of top civil servants responsible for the functioning of the EC."³⁰

The initial interviews were arranged for me by the Commission's Office for University Information, Directorate General for Information (DG-X). The majority of my interviews were arranged through contacts and referrals from my initial respondents, through the Administrative Assistants to the Directors-General in the Commission's Directorate for External Relations (DG-I) and Directorate for Development (DG-VIII), and by direct contact. Although some of the interviews were conducted in both English and French, all of the structured questionnaires were conducted in English only. This was done in an attempt to avoid interviewer error. Due to the fact that the first part of the questionnaire allowed open-ended responses, the interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to 3 hours and 15 minutes. Most of the interviews occurred in the respondent's office. However, I conducted some, at the urging of some of the respondents, in such places as the Commission's "commons room" (a sort of combination bar and coffee house), while seated on the planters in the patios below the Berlaymont, in a local pub or coffee house, and, on one occasion, seated on a store-front ledge on the Rond-Point Schuman.

³⁰ Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of European Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), p. 263.

Table 2.2 Profile of the Respondents to the Structured Questionnaire,
by Nationality and Institution

	Commission			Economic & Social Committee	European Parlia- ment	COREPER ^d	Private Interest Groups	TOTAL
	DGI ^a	DGVIII ^b	DGX ^c					
Belgium	2			1	1	1	1	6
Netherlands			2	1	1	1		5
Luxembourg		1				1		2
Ireland	1	1				1		3
Denmark	1	1				1		3
Britain	2	3	4			1	1	11
Italy	1	2		1		1	1	6
Germany	1	4	2			1		8
France	2	2	1			1		6
TOTAL	10	14	9	3	2	9	3	50

^aDirectorate General I (External Relations)

^bDirectorate General VIII (Development)

^cDirectorate General X (Information) and the Secretariat-General

^dCouncil of Permanent Representatives

The Questionnaire

The structured questionnaire was in three parts. The first part included three general areas of questions, one dealing with development assistance, one with foreign policy, and the third with European Union in general. The technique employed in the first part was self-anchoring scaling. In each of the three major areas I asked the respondent to tell me what he or she saw as the best and worst possible states of European Union, foreign and development policy-making, and I took detailed notes of their responses. I then showed each a nine inch by twenty-four inch card on which I had drawn a ladder. The rungs of the ladder were numbered from "0" on the bottom to "10" at the top. I asked the respondent to assume that the bottom rung of the ladder ("0") represented the worst possible state as they had described it, and the top rung ("10") the best possible state, again as he or she had described it. I then asked each where on the ladder he or she would place the Community today, five years ago, and five years in the future. I recorded the ladder responses for each of the three question groups.³¹

³¹For seminal and exemplary uses of self-anchoring scaling, see F. P. Kilpatrick and Hadley Cantril, "Self-Anchoring Scaling: A Measure of Individuals' Unique Reality Worlds," Journal of Individual Psychology XVI (Nov., 1960), pp. 158-173; and Albert H. Cantril and Charles W. Roll, Jr., Hopes and Fears of the American People (New York: Universe Books, 1971). I used as a guide to constructing the questionnaire and wording the questions the following: John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, Wilham Buchanan, and Roy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1962); and F. P. Kilpatrick, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., and M. Kent Jennings, Source Book of a Study of Occupational Values and the Image of the Federal Service (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1964). The latter also contains an excellent section on the self-anchoring scaling technique on pp. 20-24.

(The entire questionnaire appears in Appendix A.)

Part II consisted of handing each respondent three sheets of paper, each of which contained an alphabetical list of the Community's member states. The first sheet asked the respondent to rank the states from one to nine as to the support each gives to a common development policy in the Community; the second asked for rankings on a common Community foreign policy; and the third asked for rankings on general efforts toward European Union. For part III of the structured questionnaire, I handed the respondent a twelve inch by twenty-four inch poster board on which I had drawn six large squares and an accompanying arrow indicating that the top square was for strong agreement, the bottom for strong disagreement, and the middle four for lesser degrees of agreement or disagreement. I then handed the respondent twenty cards which I had shuffled prior to each interview to insure random order. I asked the respondent to read each card and place it on the square where it belonged according to how much he or she agreed or disagreed with the statement on each card. When the respondent finished, I put the six piles of cards into separately numbered envelopes and recorded the responses after the interview. (The statements on the cards are shown in Appendix A.) I completed the interview by asking several demographic questions, such as age, nationality, education, prior experience, and reasons for coming to work in Brussels.

Data Analysis

The fifty interviews were coded and data analysis accomplished by constructing numerous bi-variate tables. Correlational analysis

employed simple statistical tools: the two-sample mean t-test for the self-anchoring scaling and Likert-scaling questions, and Spearman's Rho and Kendall's W for rank correlations on the nation states of part II of the structured questionnaire. Tests of significance were calculated. Independent variables will be reported in succeeding chapters only when significant differences ($P < .05$) are found.

Data Presentation

The next six chapters present the findings of this dissertation. Chapters III and IV examine the general questions of European Union, particularly questions of perceived goals, attitudes concerning several means to those goals, and assessments by the "Eurocrats" of existant support for and progress achieved toward European Union in the European Community. Chapters V and VII are meant to provide some background on two major aspects of the Community's external relations, foreign (political) policy and development assistance to developing countries. Like Chapter IV, Chapters VI and VIII contain the collective attitudes about and assessments by the Eurocrats of foreign policy and development policy respectively, again with attention to perceived goals, means to these goals, and the state of progress toward integration in those sectors. In Chapter IX, I return to the subject of integration theory in general, and the hypotheses suggested above.

CHAPTER III

THE REPORTS ON EUROPEAN UNION

At the Paris Summit Conference in October 1972, the European Council (Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Community), "having set themselves the major objective of transforming, before the end of the present decade and with the fullest respect for the Treaties already signed, the whole complex of the relations of the Member States into a 'European Union,'" requested the Community institutions to draw up a report on this subject by the end of 1975 for presentation at a later summit conference.¹ The aim of achieving European union by 1980 was later reaffirmed at the European Council Summit Conferences held in Copenhagen on December 14 and 15, 1973,² and in Paris on December 9 and 10, 1974.³ At the Paris meeting the European Council decided that an overall plan to achieve European

¹Point 16 of the Final Communiqué, Bulletin of the European Communities 10-1972, Part I, Chapter 1.

²Point 2 of the declaration released after the Summit, Bulletin of the European Communities 12-1973, point 1106.

³Point 13 of the Final Communiqué, Bulletin of the European Communities 12-1974, point 1104.

Union should be developed and charged the European Parliament, the Commission of the European Community, and the European Court of Justice to submit reports to them by the middle of 1975. Subsequently, the Economic and Social Committee of the Community and the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands prepared similar reports on their own initiatives. Mr. Leo Tindemans, the Belgian Prime Minister, was asked to prepare a summary report for the European Council (of which he is a member), and to submit his report by the end of 1975. His report was to have been based on the reports submitted by the Community's institutions, and his consultations with the member states governments and representative sectors of public opinion in the Community.⁴

The Tindemans Report

The Tindemans report is generally believed to be the most pragmatic of all the reports on European union. Tindemans prepared the report for and on behalf of the European Council and appears in the report to have been very conscious of the impact on and reaction of his primary audience. He states in the letter of transmittal of his report to the European Council: "...I deliberately refused to draw up a report claiming to be, at least in part, the Constitution for the future of European Union. Nor did I wish to describe what Europe ideally should be, while remaining personally convinced that Europe will only fulfill its destiny if it espouses federalism."⁵ Tindemans'

⁴Supplement 9/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, p. 5.

⁵His letter, dated December 29, 1975, is reprinted in Supplement 1/76, Bulletin of the European Communities, pp. 5-7.

report, then, is not a blueprint for some future government of Europe, but a series of proposals to gradually transform relations between the member states to broaden their present collective action. By taking a moderate approach to future European integration, Tindemans has been criticized both by those who see his proposals as too modest and by those who see them as too ambitious.⁶

Tindemans sees the "European idea" in the context of the European Community as having been weakened by an imbalance in the development of certain sectors of the Community, some in which the Community has far reaching powers and others where Community institutions are powerless. European union, according to Tindemans, means that Europeans ought to present a united front to the outside world. This, he says, requires a common economic and monetary policy, and common policies in agriculture, industry, energy and research. It requires institutions that respect the equality of the member states and that work for individual rights and equality and the solidarity of Europe's people. He argues that European union must be built gradually but that it must be done. Inaction would mean a divided and increasingly impotent Europe.

Tindemans' report includes substantial recommendations concerning Europe's role in the world. Tindemans argues that the

⁶At the time of this writing, both the European Council and the Council of Ministers are still in the process of studying and discussing Tindemans' report. The only concrete action that has been taken is the decision of the November, 1976, Summit of Heads of State and Government in The Hague to charge the foreign ministers and the Commission to produce annual reports of progress in achieving European union. See, European Community 199 (January-February, 1977), pp. 45-46.

Community's activities in its external relations must be, at once, economic, industrial, financial, commercial, and political. He further urges the Council of Ministers to end the "schizophrenic" distinction between "economic" and "political" matters, and that the European Council should become the locus of common foreign policy decision-making, taking over the present efforts to coordinate foreign policies. Tindemans proposes that the member states join in the search for a new world economic order by presenting united positions at multi-lateral international negotiations in which the member states are represented by Community delegates. Further, they should gradually transfer a substantial part of their development aid programs to the Community, and take common stands on all political problems arising in the Third World. In the area of relations with the United States, Tindemans suggests a more constructive dialogue, particularly concerning security and defense matters. In addition, he argues the need for a Community common defense policy, specifically the establishment of a European armaments agency for cooperation in manufacture and procurement of military hardware. Concerning the nations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Tindemans recommends that the Community member states have a common position on "détente". As all of these qualitative changes occur, they will require formalized legal obligations in amended or new Community treaties.

Concerning economic and monetary policies, Tindemans urges

that all member states should be helped to join the "snake"⁷ and that all capital barriers between those in the snake should be gradually abolished. As a more immediate step, those now outside the "snake" should be included in discussions of joint action on monetary, budgetary, and short-term economic policy. He argues that the European Monetary Cooperative Fund should be made stronger and automatic, and that moves toward developing a European currency should be encouraged. All economic and monetary problems must be handled from a total perspective and irreversibly. Tindemans makes a further suggestion in this area which he refers to as a "new approach": "...(1) those states which are able to progress have a duty to forge ahead, (2) those states which have reasons for not progressing which the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, acknowledges as valid do not do so, -- but will at the same time receive from the other states any aid and assistance that can be given them to enable them to catch the others up..."⁸

Social policy in the context of European union means, for Tindemans, a "citizens' Europe." Tindemans believes that individuals ought to have the right to appeal directly to the European Court of Justice. He argues that border controls should be abolished and a passport

⁷The "snake" is a currency fluctuation devise in which those participating member states agree to link the floating value of their currencies in a chain fashion to one another, while maintaining fixed ceiling and floor rates (hence, the analogy of a snake in a tunnel). See, Paul Kemezis, "Europe Slims the Money 'Snake'," European Community 165 (April, 1972), pp. 11-12, and Supplement 12/73, Bulletin of the European Communities, pp. 1-17.

⁸Supplement 1/76, Bulletin of the European Communities, p. 21.

union established between Community states. He generally favors improved transportation and communication, more student transfers, and the establishment of a "European Foundation" to promote human contact.

The Tindemans Report's last section contains his recommendations as to how his proposals should be put into effect. It is, in its entirety, a plea for strengthening five of the Community's institutions, the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the Court of Justice. For the Parliament, Tindemans lists as first the necessity for direct elections.⁹ He adds that the Parliament should be empowered to consider all matters, not only those within the scope of the Treaties, and recommends that the Parliament's resolutions should receive immediate consideration by the European Council. He also recommends an amendment to the Treaties to give the Parliament the legal right of initiative, and that it conduct an annual State of the Union debate. Concerning the European Council, Tindemans recommends its members make coherent general policy guidelines. In matters of Community competence, the European Council should do so with the Commission present; on other matters, it should appoint a subsidiary institution to execute its decisions and, when necessary, apply deadlines. The Council of Ministers ought to prepare the meetings of the European Council and itself be given more competence outside the Treaties by authority of the European Council. Tindemans recommends that basic reforms take place in the Council of Ministers: majority voting should be instituted as normal practice and the presidency of the Council should be extended from six months to one year. Tindemans says the Commission

⁹Direct elections are now anticipated in 1978.

should be given more mandates and should reassert its freedom. Its President should be appointed by the European Council (subject to Parliamentary confirmation), and he, in turn, should appoint the other Commissioners. Finally, the Court of Justice must be given the same powers it now has (interpretation of the law and ability to annul acts not in accordance with the Treaties) in any new sectors created as the Community moves closer to European Union. (See Table 3.1)

The Commission's Report

The Commission was the first to transmit a report on European Union to the European Council in accordance with point 16 of the final Communiqué of the Paris Summit. In their report, published in June 26, 1975, the Commissioners are less guarded in suggesting a structural goal for European Union than was Tindemans in his report. While strongly denying any desire to see the Union give birth to a centralized super-state, the Commission recommends a strengthening of the present institutions and the relationship between the member states and Community bodies. Essentially, their appeal is for constitutionalization, for clearly (and legally) defining exclusive and concurrent competences. The Commissioners argue that the means of transferring power from the member states to Community institutions should be determined by those institutions, leaving the timetable solely in the hands of the states. During the transition, the Community bodies would serve to promote harmonization of national legislation and coordination of nation policies as a means of bringing about convergence. This, the Commission states, is preferable to any purely intergovernmental approach which suffers from a lack of continuity

Table 3.1 - Summary of the Tindemans Report

<u>View of Europe</u>	- A "Citizen's Europe" (emphasis on individual social and legal rights).
<u>General Strategy</u>	- Build constantly, step-by-step integration made irreversible. A "two-speed" Europe. End distinction between "Politics" and "Economics" in decision-making.
<u>Common Internal Policy Areas Advocated (or mentioned)</u>	- Economic and Monetary Union, Agriculture, Industry, Energy and Research, Passport Union.
<u>Role in the World</u>	- Common position on detente; Coordinate common foreign policy in Council of Ministers; increase multilateralism in aid; establish European Arms Agency.
<u>Institutional and Decision-Making Structure</u>	- <u>European Council</u> : make general policy guidelines. <u>Parliament</u> : direct elections, widen scope, own legal initiative. <u>Council</u> : widen scope, integrate Commission, majority vote, President for 1 year. <u>Commission</u> : wider mandates, more accountability to Parliament. <u>Court</u> : same competences in each new added Community area.

and tends to be short-lived.

The Commission's report is quite explicit as to what ought to be the proper fields of competence of Community institutions. The report lists those competences mentioned in the Treaty in the fields of commercial policy, competition, agriculture, social, and regional policy where significant progress has been made, and those needing significant improvement: economic, industrial, energy, environment, and research policies. The authors of the report conclude that the immediate objective of European union should center on economic and monetary union. They argue that competence, powers, and means of action should be increased in: "(i) monetary policy; (ii) budgetary expenditure; (iii) budgetary revenue; (iv) improving economic structures so as to help reduce imbalances; (v) social affairs."¹⁰ The report provides various approaches to these areas, but, in general, the recommendations are to enable the authority already granted in the EEC Treaty rather than creating a new legal arrangement or amending the Treaties under Article 236. It does, however, contain a recommendation for a European tax to finance a larger, more independent "Union budget".

The authors of the Commission report do argue for the inclusion of foreign policy and defense in the competence of the European Union. The reasons cited for including foreign policy include increased weight and efficacy to be gained by collective action in international policy (the Lomé Convention¹¹ is cited as an example), the using of "multilateralism"

¹⁰Supplement 5/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, p. 15.

¹¹The Lomé Convention is discussed in Chapter VII of this dissertation.

in international negotiations, and the geographic position and commercial and economic power of Europe. Decrying the fact that political cooperation in the Community has been no more than a collective reaction to events, the Commissioners propose, as a final objective, common policies to be made in a single institutional framework "...in all areas where the Member States acting alone cannot have as effective a voice as would the Union acting as one, or where the absence of a common policy would make it impossible for the Union to pursue the objectives of its internal development or to contribute to international actions of interest to the Union."¹²

The Commissioners make three important proposals concerning the external relations of the Community. They suggest that the Community's institutions should prepare and implement joint positions and actions. Second, they argue that external Community competences must cover the same areas and be of the same nature as those the Community exercises internally.¹³ Finally, they recommend the development of a common defense policy as an adjunct to a common foreign policy. The basic argument in the report is that once European Union is established, common security (defense) will have to be an integral part of the Union. The Commissioners recommend interim actions such as joint strategic planning and the establishment of a

¹²Supplement 5/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, p. 23.

¹³The European Court of Justice set the precedent in this matter in its "AETR judgment" (Case 22/70: Recueil, p. 263). The Court ruled that each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy envisioned by the Treaty, lays down common rules, the member states no longer have the right to contract obligations with third countries which may be contrary to these rules. See Common Market Law Review 8 (July, 1971), pp. 392-401.

"European Arms Agency". They add that the alignment of defense policies would be desirable even if done outside the present Community structure.

The Commission report contains extensive discussions of several future institutional systems for the European Union. The Commissioners discuss in detail two possible models, a single institutional system to cover all functions, and totally separate structures, each functionally specific, connected to others only by a central coordinating body. The authors clearly show a preference for the former. They argue that any institutional system must include legislative, governmental, judicial, and constitutional amendment functions and that a separation of powers must be defined for these functional groups. As for setting up the institutional system, the Commissioners appear to prefer a qualitative leap (reform) forward (as happened, they argue, when the Treaties were adopted) to a step-by-step approach to enlarging institutional competences. Specifically, they call for direct suffrage to the European Parliament and a major reorganization of the executive organ of government. Again, demonstrating a propensity for proposing alternatives before hinting at a preference, the Commission report offers three structural models. The first posits a governmental organ consisting of ministers from the national governments devoted solely to European affairs, completely independent of a bicameral Parliament. The second model has, as a governmental organ, a collegiate body independent of the national governments, which would absorb the present Council of Ministers and Commission. It too would have a bicameral legislature, but the governmental organ would be in some way responsible to the Parliament, the primary decision-making body. The third model would be the same as the second with the addition of a third

body, the "Committee of Ministers" (representatives of the member governments). The Commissioners clearly prefer the second model. The first, they say, is no real improvement on the present situation, and the third involves a more ponderous institutional structure and the possibility that the "Committee of Ministers" might intervene too often, thus undermining any government action.

The report contains several other recommendations concerning the institutional system, particularly the need for legislative initiative, strengthening judicial review, and the rights of individuals before the European Court of Justice. In general, the Commission's Report differs from the Tindemans Report in that its view of a future Europe is more ambitious, particularly concerning the means to that end. The Commissioners argue for moving toward union by "reactivating the building of Europe." This, for them, means an immediate institutional reform rather than the step-by-step pragmatism of Tindemans. (See Table 3.2)

The European Parliament's Report

The Report on European Union by the European Parliament is in the form of two resolutions, one adopted October 17, 1974, and the other July 10, 1975. In both, the Parliament argues that efforts to transform the present Community into a European Union should involve the strengthening and extending of Community powers (to include foreign policy and security). The Parliamentarians specifically call for a democratization of the Community's institutions. These institutions should include a Parliament having budgetary powers and powers of control, a single decision-making center independent of the national governments and responsible to

Table 3.2 - Summary of the Commission's Report

<u>View of Europe</u>	- "Reactivate the Building of Europe" (a qualitative leap forward).
<u>General Strategy</u>	- "Constitutionalization" (EC to States). Transfer power (states to EC): EC defines means, states set timetable.
<u>Common Internal Policy Areas Advocated (or mentioned)</u>	- Now under Treaty: Commercial, competition, agriculture, social, regional; need to add: economic, industrial, energy, environment, research, monetary, budgetary.
<u>Role in the World</u>	- Integrate foreign policy into EC institutions (single decision-making body for areas deemed necessary); Competences same in external as for internal areas; Establish European defense policy.
<u>Institutional and Decision-Making Structure</u>	- Single system to cover all functions. <u>Parliament:</u> direct elections, bicameral body, act as primary decision-maker. <u>Council:</u> to be eventually replaced by Commission and Parliament. <u>Commission:</u> collegiate body independent of member-states' governments. <u>Court:</u> strengthen judicial review and individual access to the ECJ.

the Parliament, a European Court of Justice, a European Court of Auditors, and, as a consultative body, an Economic and Social Committee.

The two resolutions by Parliament are also explicit as to what policy sectors should be included in the Union. The first mentioned and most emphasized is foreign policy followed by security policy, social and regional policy, educational policy, economic and monetary policy, budgetary policy, energy and raw materials policy, and scientific and technical research policies. The Parliament specifically recommends direct universal suffrage to the European Parliament, the submission by the Commission of an action program of positive steps toward union over the next ten years, and the substantial reinforcement of the Parliament's power by 1980. Further, they call for an end to allowing a lack of progress in one aspect of economic and monetary union to serve as a pretext to inaction in the other, an end to unanimity voting and closed meetings in the Council of Ministers, and an end to the distinction between Community procedures and intergovernmental procedures. Finally, the Parliament calls for incorporating in the Union a "Charter of the rights of the peoples of the European Community."¹⁴

The Report of the Court of Justice

In making its report on European Union, the European Court of Justice confined its suggestions solely to areas of its competence. Hence, its concerns are the requirements for a genuine rule of law, the requirements for effective legislation, and judicial requirements. As for the first, the court warns that European Union would lack any force if it is

¹⁴Supplement 9/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, pp. 9-13.

based on rules that impose neither obligations nor sanctions on the member states' relations with each other or with respect to individuals. Further, all such rules must apply with the same force to all parties to the Union. Protections of the rights of individuals must be considered, and individuals must have direct recourse both to their national courts and to the European Court of Justice.

Effective Community law depends on establishing an effective decision-making body. The Court further argues that the present slow process of lawmaking must be replaced by a system which provides clear and positive rules of law in a timely fashion that can be easily absorbed in the judicial system. Once effective decision-making machinery is designed, the next important area is legal cooperation, particularly the harmonization of national laws (as provided in Art. 100 et. seq. of the EEC Treaty).

Finally, the Court argues that the judicial system should be subject to a single Supreme Court, that a system of separate and competing courts should be avoided. Also, judicial procedures should be simplified even as new institutional arrangements having new competences become more complex. Finally, the Court recommends that the present relationship between the Community and national courts should apply to any new fields added to or modified for Community competences.¹⁵

The Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee

The contribution of the Economic and Social Committee, expressed in the form of an opinion to the Commission and Council of Ministers,

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 17-21.

states several broad objectives to be achieved by European Union. These objectives, which the Committee considers basic aims, are the establishment of a lasting peace between European states, the preservation of democratic freedoms, Europe's international mission, and economic recovery. The Committee insists, however, that these aims are subject to a prerequisite, that Europe become economically and politically independent relative to the rest of the world.

The Economic and Social Committee's view of Europe is one which goes far beyond the economic sphere. European Union must move toward a society which reflects "...the lofty ideals of the people of Europe, who want peace, freedom and security and who aspire to the abolition of frontiers, the achievement of a more natural human environment and way of life, enhanced human dignity, and greater fairness through the reduction of inequalities."¹⁶ The Committee concretely recommends the adoption of a charter setting out these objectives enumerating the rights of European citizens, and setting economic and social targets as steps to the achievement of European Union.

The opinion also contains specific recommendations concerning the institutional structure of the proposed Union. The Economic and Social Committee sees the need for significant changes spread out over a long period of time, during a transition period in which Community and member states powers exist side by side. Ultimately, however, the legislative function for the Union must be assigned to a European Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage. The executive function should be assigned

¹⁶Ibid., p. 26.

during the transition period to both the Council of Ministers and the Commission. The Council would have decision-making powers and would immediately adopt the principle of majority rule; the Commission would continue to have implementing powers. Eventually, the Commission would propose legislation to the Parliament and be responsible to it for the execution of Community laws and programs. The Economic and Social Committee would continue its consultative and advisory role, but consultation would be obligatory on all economic and social matters. The European Court of Justice would continue to function as it does now, but would be joined by the Court of Auditors.

The Committee recommends several action programs in its opinion. It lists steps which it feels must be taken to speed up the achievement of Economic and Monetary Union.¹⁷ The Committee also calls for the implementation of a Community employment policy directly financed by a Community budget, the setting up of a European Employment Office, the introduction of a European regional policy, the definition of a common energy policy, the establishment of an industrial policy, strengthening the Common Agricultural Policy, the development of a common policy on immigration, and the harmonization of working conditions and degrees, diplomas, and certificates.

Finally, the Economic and Social Committee addresses specific areas of the Community's external relations. Having mentioned the success of the Lomé Convention and the fact that the Commission has substantially

¹⁷See "Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee" (December 13, 1973) in Bulletin of the European Communities 12-1973, point 2463.

increased its own power through increasing its international contacts,¹⁸ the Committee recommends the "concertation" of member states' foreign policies, and institutional arrangements to coordinate trade, energy, and industrial policies both internal and external to the Community.¹⁹ (See Table 3.3)

The Spierenburg Report

Unlike the other reports, the Report by the Advisory Committee on European Union (called the Spierenburg Report after the President of that group)²⁰ is a result of a unilateral initiative of only one of the member states, the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The advisory Committee (consisting of prominent Dutch citizens) was commissioned to do the report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs pursuant to a Cabinet resolution (March 22, 1974). The mandate given the Spierenburg Committee specifically charged them to address what process (stages) should be followed, what should the end-product be, what organs should it have with what accompanying powers, what should be the role of the member states in the process and the final stage, and what external position should the union have?

The Report is in two parts. Part one contains general references to questions of the "desirable vs. the attainable" and policy content vs. policy procedures. It contains also a brief assessment of the move

¹⁸See Chapter VII of this dissertation for further elaboration of this point.

¹⁹Supplement 9/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, pp. 25-34.

²⁰The Spierenburg Report is distributed in mimeograph form by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Table 3.3 - Summaries of the Reports of the European Parliament,
European Court of Justice, and Economic and Social Committee

<u>View of Europe</u>	- The Democratization of EC Institutions. ^a Europe under the General Rule of Law. ^b A "Citizen's Europe". ^c
<u>General Strategy</u>	- More power to Parliament. ^{a&b} End distinction: politics/economics. ^b Adopt Economic and Social Rights Charter. ^c Long-term gradual change; ^c 10-yr. time table; ^a Harmonize national laws. ^b
<u>Common Internal Policy Areas Advocated (or mentioned)</u>	- Social and regional, educational, economic and monetary, budgetary, energy and raw materials; ^{a&b} European Employment Office, industrial, agricultural, immigration; ^c judicial.
<u>Role in the World</u>	- Common foreign and security policies; ^a concertation of foreign policies; ^c coordinate internal policies with external policies (trade, energy, industrial cooperation). ^c
<u>Institutional and Decision-Making Structure</u>	- <u>Parliament:</u> direct elections budgetary control, ^a sole decision-making powers. ^c <u>Council and Commission:</u> merge as single executive accountable to Parliament. ^{a&b} <u>ESC:</u> ^c obligatory consultative body. ^{a&c} <u>Court:</u> as is, but add Court of Auditors; ^{a&c} no other courts should be established. ^b

^aEuropean Parliament only

^bEuropean Court of Justice only

^cEconomic and Social Committee only

toward European unification during the past twenty-five years, including an itemization of the causes of stagnation,²¹ and a general discourse concerning unification in the future. Part two provides specific observations and recommendations organized as to policy areas (monetary union, social policy, environmental and national resources policy, energy policy, foreign policy, development cooperation, and defense policy) and the institutional structure and decision-making procedures.

Of the reports mentioned thus far, the Spierenburg Report is generally regarded as the most far-reaching, ambitious, and, by some, as the least practical or realistic. The Committee freely admits that it has "...sought a close link with current realities without, however, entirely basing the form and content to be assigned to the Union on what would be practical in the present circumstances."²² Moreover, the Committee argues that the European Union should be regarded as a future step in the process of European unification and that it need not represent a final state. Progress toward Union should be in a stable environment in which each exercise of new powers must be irreversible. It may continue along the existing patterns of integration, but revision of the existing treaties will prove unavoidable in the long term. As to policy areas, the Committee believes that the sine qua non of success for European Union

²¹The Spierenburg Report, points 2.2.1-2.2.5. Specifically mentioned are changes which have taken place in the structure of economic policy and social structure of the member states, the lack of political will (and the dependence on it) in the member states, the serious defects in the Community decision-making process, and the failure of the member states to lay the foundations for a common economic and monetary policy when, in the first ten years of the Community's existence, the economic situation was still "exceptionally favorable."

²²The Spierenburg Report, point 1.2.2.

is the formation of a monetary union. This might be followed by common positions in "complementary policy areas": social matters, environment, national resources, energy, and development aid and cooperation. With further unification, the Committee believes it "inconceivable" to have any Union without a common external policy, especially a foreign policy and an associated common defense policy. The Committee does not suggest a timetable to accomplish European Union. The Spierenburg Committee is careful to point out that all future developments depend on the creation of political consensus, for which no time limits can be set.

The Committee does make certain recommendations concerning the institutional and decision-making structures. They recommend that the present institutions remain, but that their powers and "democratic content" be strengthened. The Council should have competences in all areas, and should appoint special subgroups of government ministers to handle less politically controversial matters. Further, it should in all matters make decisions by majority rule (unanimity might be retained for the short-term only for admission of new members, amendment of the Treaties and foreign and defense policy matters). The Commission, in sharing executive responsibilities with the Council, should have a political role. Its exclusive right of initiative should be restored, it should have more power and competences in all functional areas, and the Commissioners should be made individually accountable to the European Parliament and the President of Commission appointed by that body. Finally, the European Parliament should be given a share in decision-making, i.e., the right to share with the Council of Ministers in legislation. The Parliament must also be further "democratized" through the institution of direct

Table 3.4 - Summary of the "Spierenburg Report"

<u>View of Europe</u>	- European Union as a stage toward still further European unification.
<u>General Strategy</u>	- Create stable environment in which integration progress is irreversible. Revise existing treaties. Begin with Monetary Union.
<u>Common Internal Policy Areas Advocated (or mentioned)</u>	- Monetary union (first), social, environmental, natural resources, energy.
<u>Role in the World</u>	- Common foreign policy made by EC central institutions after common defense policy established (common budget, etc). World-wide development program - harmonize national aid programs.
<u>Institutional and Decision-Making Structure</u>	<p>- <u>Parliament</u>: direct elections; share in decision-making with Council; have commission accountable to it.</p> <p><u>Council</u>: expand its scope, majority voting, appoint subgroups of Ministers (to handle details).</p> <p><u>Commission</u>: have political role, expand scope, have exclusive right of initiative.</p>

elections to that body by universal suffrage. (See Table 3.4)

Summary of the Reports

The reports on European Union discussed in this chapter are all similar in that all are arguments for increased integration to reach European Union. As such, an implicit assumption of each report is that European Union is both right and proper, and that continued European integration is, perhaps, a necessity. Although the contents of the reports differ in the recommended extent and speed of such integration, general positions regarding matters such as the policy areas that should be included in the Union, the appropriate decision-making and institutional structure, general strategy, the Community's role in the world, and the general view of what European Union should be are essentially similar (Table 3.5 provides a comparative summary of the reports).

In general, the reports contain recommendations for increasing the scope (legal competences) of the Community's institutions in many policy areas not included in the Treaty of Rome. Specific recommendations include the democratization of the Community's decision-making process (e.g., direct elections to the European Parliament and voting by majority rule in the Council of Ministers) and the cessation of the artificial distinction between "low politics" (matters given to Community competence by the Treaties) and "high politics" (the sole jurisdiction of the member states). As such, all the reports (except the one submitted by the European Court of Justice) include recommendations for some form of a Community foreign policy and a Community defense policy. The recommended means to achieve European Union range from the pragmatic, step-by-step gradualism of the Tindemans Report to the "qualitative leap forward"

	Tindeman's Report	The Commission's Report	Reports of the Parliament, ECJ, and Economic and Social Committee	The "Spiereburg Report"
View of Europe	A "Citizen's Europe" (emphasis on individual social and legal rights)	"Reactivate the Building of Europe" (a qualitative leap forward)	The Democratization of EC Institutions. ^a Europe under the General Rule of Law ^b A "Citizen's Europe" ^c	European Union as a stage toward still further European unification.
General Strategy	Build constantly, step-by-step integration made irreversible. A "two-speed" Europe. End distinction between "Politics" and "Economics" in decision-making	"Constitutionalization" (EC to States). Transfer power (states to EC): EC defines means, states set timetable.	More power to Parliament ^{a&b} End distinction: politics/economics ^b . Adopt Economic and Social Rights Charter ^c Long-term gradual change; ^c 10-yr. time table ^a Harmonize national laws. ^b	Create stable environment in which integration progress is irreversible. Revise existing treaties. Begin with Monetary Union.
Common Internal Policy Areas Advocated (or mentioned)	Economic and Monetary Union, Agriculture, Industry, Energy and Research, Passport Union.	Now under Treaty: Commercial, competition, agriculture, social, regional; need to add: economic, industrial, energy, environment, research, monetary, budgetary.	Social and regional, educational, economic and monetary, budgetary, energy and raw materials; ^{a&b} European Employment Office, industrial, agricultural, immigration; ^c judicial.	Monetary union (first), social, environmental, natural resources, energy.
Role in the World	Common position on detente; Coordinate common foreign policy in Council of Ministers; Increase multilateralism in aid; establish European Arms Agency.	Integrate foreign policy into EC institutions (single decision-making body for areas deemed necessary); Competences same in external as for internal areas; Establish European defense policy.	Common foreign and security policies; ^a concertation of foreign policies; ^c coordinate internal policies with external policies (trade, energy, industrial coop.) ^c	Common foreign policy made by EC central institutions after common defense policy established (common budget, etc). World-wide development program - harmonize national aid programs.
Institutional and Decision-making Structure	<u>European Council</u> : make general policy guidelines. <u>Parliament</u> : direct elections, widen scope, own legal initiative. <u>Council</u> : widen scope, integrate Commission, majority vote, Pres. for 1 year. <u>Commission</u> : wider mandates, more accountability to Parliament. <u>Court</u> : same competences in each new added Community area.	Single system to cover all functions. <u>Parliament</u> : direct elections, bi-cameral body, act as primary decision-maker. <u>Council</u> : to be eventually replaced by Commission and Parliament. <u>Commission</u> : collegiate body independent of member-states' governments. <u>Court</u> : strengthen judicial review and individual access to the ECJ.	<u>Parliament</u> : direct elections budgetary control, ^a sole decision-making powers. ^c <u>Council and Commission</u> : merge as single exec. accountable to Parliament. ^{a&b} <u>ESC</u> : ^c obligatory consultative body. ^{a&c} <u>Court</u> : as is, but add Court of Auditors; ^{a&c} no other courts should be established. ^b ^a European Parliament only ^b European Court of Justice only ^c Economic and Social Committee only	<u>Parliament</u> : direct elections share in decision-making with Council; have commission accountable to it. <u>Council</u> : expand its scope, majority voting, appoint sub-groups of Ministers (to handle details). <u>Commission</u> : have political role, expand scope, have exclusive right to initiative.

TABLE 3.5
Comparative Summary of the Reports on European Union

recommended by the Commission.

Taken with the Paris Communiqué, which first officially suggested the goal of European Union by 1980, the reports do represent a significant amount of ideological support for increased political and economic integration in Europe, at least on the part of the Community's institutions (the Tindemans' report was done for the European Council and the Council of Ministers). But the reports in themselves are not sufficient evidence that a widespread commitment exists in the Community to achieve European Union. Before one can argue strongly for the propositions suggested in Chapter II, that the move toward European integration has been externalized, concentrated in, encapsulated in, or has spilled-around to the Community's external relations sectors, it is necessary to examine the support rendered the European Union concept by the national governments, Community officials, and the general publics in the member states. This probes deeper than does consideration of the formal reports examined in this chapter and may assist in supporting the observation that the present state of stagnation in the Community's internal affairs (as was argued in Chapter I) is not merely the result of a lack of ideological commitment in the Community to demonstrate progress toward European Union.

Some Unanswered Questions

Such an examination will serve another important purpose. The reports on European Union leave several questions unanswered. What governmental form should the Union take: a unitary state, a federal or confederal arrangement, or a more loose association of the states? Is the underlying assumption in the reports that European integration is a right

and proper enterprise shared by the majority of elites and by the general publics in the Community? Of the strategies recommended in the reports, which are the ones preferred by those who will be called upon to implement them? Do these implementers see integration as an automatic phenomenon (as the functionalists have argued) or must it be contrived by political leaders (as per the neo-functionalists)? Is economic union a requisite for political union, political union for economic union, or is neither dependent on the other's having been established first? What is the general reaction to specific recommendations in the reports on European Union, such as Tindemans' suggestion for a two-tiered (or two-speed) Europe and the role the European Council should have in the Union (most of the reports make no mention of the European Council)? Further questions concern the assessments that can be made of the present state of progress toward European Union (as only the Spierenburg and Economic and Social Committee's reports attempted), as to perceived levels institutional support, national government support, and public opinion support. Finally, can one measure recent progress toward European Union relative to prospects for the immediate future? These questions and the general question as to commitment to progressing toward European Union will be addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE 'EUROCRATS': TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION

In order to answer the questions raised in the previous chapter, particularly those that attempt to get at more specific information concerning desired goals, means to those goals, and assessments of the present state of integration, I turn to my fifty informants, whom I call the "Eurocrats."¹ The collective insight of the Eurocrats is not intended to be a representative sample of elite attitudes in Brussels. It does constitute, however, a survey of a substantial number of people who are among the most knowledgeable concerning the Community. Moreover, many of them are in a position to directly influence decisions made in the Community, and one day some of the respondents will likely be at the

¹By Eurocrats, I mean the corps of high level bureaucrats in Brussels responsible for the functioning of the European Community. For further explanation, a profile of the fifty respondents, and details as to methodology, see Chapter II.

highest levels of Community policy-making.²

Personal Commitment to European Union

Taken by themselves, the reports on European Union indicate a very strong commitment to continued European integration. Before presenting the collective thinking of the Eurocrats, it should be helpful to measure in the most general way their attitudes as to whether efforts to achieve European Union are necessary and proper. It would also be instructive to point out any attitudinal differences which may exist between various categories of Eurocrats.³ Table 4.1 contains the responses of the Eurocrats to the general question of the correctness and necessity of European Union. A total of 80 percent agreed that European Union was a necessary and proper enterprise, and over half agreed strongly.

²There is sufficient justification for the study of bureaucratic attitudes. As Robert D. Putnam states: "Can there be any doubt who governs our complex modern societies? ... Bureaucrats, monopolizing as they do much of the available information about the shortcomings of existing policies, as well as much of the technical expertise necessary to design practical alternatives, have gained a prominent influence over the evolution of the agenda for decision." Robert D. Putnam, "The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Western Europe: A Preliminary Report," University of Michigan Institute of Public Policy Studies Discussion Paper No. 36, p. 1.

³As a convention, only those independent variables that showed a significant relationship (at .05 by t) will be reported throughout this chapter for all questions asked the Eurocrats.

Table 4.1 - "Working steadily and very hard toward the goal of European Union is the right thing to do. It is also something that must be done."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
27 (54%)	12 (24%)	1 (2%)	2 (4%)	4 (8%)	4 (8%)

Mean Response = 2.12 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

When the Eurocrats' responses were analyzed by nationality, some significant differences appeared (Table 4.2). The Danish respondents uniformly disagreed with the statement⁴ and the French were the most in favor of it. Similarly, those respondents who were from the three new member states (Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom) demonstrated (as a group) far less commitment to European Union than did those from the

⁴The Danish respondents were unanimous in their belief that any preoccupation with future integration, particularly if it involved any structural changes in the Community or attempts to increase the power of Community institutions relative to the member states, were ill-advised for the present. Rather, they argued, there is a more pressing need to fully apply the Treaties and solve present problems. One of them told me, "If it can be proven that increasing the power of the Commission will in any way reduce unemployment in my home country, I will then become a devout Europeanist." It should be further noted here that in almost all the statements put to the Eurocrats (included in this chapter), the Danes are the most negative. Rather than being a result of having chosen Danish respondents who were by nature negative individuals, the Danish respondents accurately reflect Danish attitudes in the Community. The "pro-marketeer" forces in Denmark barely won the referendum for Danish entry into the Community, and "anti-marketeer" political forces are still extremely strong in Denmark. Many "pro-marketeer" Danes feel they would have been much happier in some sort of Scandanavian Common Market, but the United Kingdom's entry into the Community combined with the fact that two-thirds of Denmark's trade is with the United Kingdom and West Germany, made Community membership an economic necessity if not something otherwise "devoutly to be wished." (From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976).

Table 4.2 - "Working steadily and very hard toward the goal of European Union is the right thing to do. It is also something that must be done."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	1.50
Netherlands	5	3.00
Luxembourg	2	1.50
Ireland	3	1.67
Denmark	3	5.33 ^a
United Kingdom	11	2.55
Italy	6	1.67
West Germany	8	1.63
France	6	1.17 ^b
Benelux Countries	13	2.08
France/Germany/Italy	20	1.50
New Three Countries	17	2.88 ^c
TOTAL	50	2.12

^aDiffers significantly with all other nations (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from the mean responses of the Dutch and British.

^cDiffers significantly from the mean responses of the French/German/Italian respondents.

original six member states. The difference suggests a correlation between length of membership in the Community (old members vs. new members) and commitment to European Union.

However, the respondents' ages, time in the Community, institution, or previous experience before working in the Community seemed to make no difference in their level of commitment to European Union. What does appear to have a definite association is the relationship of the respondent's answers as to the best possible states for European Union (See Table 4.4) and for foreign policy (see Table 6.1 in Chapter VI). As is indicated in Table 4.3, those who opted for a federal arrangement to a unitary state (designated here as the "federalists") and those who preferred foreign policy decision-making to be made totally by the Community's central institutions (the "centralists") were significantly more committed to European Union than were those who opted for less ambitious goals (the "non-federalists and "non-centralists") for European Union and Community foreign-policy-making.

Table 4.3 - "Working steadily and very hard toward the goal of European Union is the right thing to do. It is also something that must be done."

Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring Scaling Responses:	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
As to Government Structure: ^a		
"Federalists"	31	1.61
"Non-Federalists"	19	2.95
As to Foreign Policy Making: ^b		
"Centralists"	28 ^c	1.57
"Non-Centralists"	20 ^c	2.55

^aThe "Federalists" saw the federal (or unitary) model as the ideal state for European Union.

^bThe "Centralists" saw foreign policy making by the Community's central institutions as a goal for European Union.

^cTwo respondents indicated no preference in this area.

End Products

One important question about which the reports on European Union are usually very vague or totally silent concerns what the structural form of the European Union should be, especially the nature of the relationship of the central government to the member states. In their answers to the question designed to anchor the top of their self-anchoring scales on European Union, the Eurocrats provided the responses indicated in Table 4.4. It is worth mentioning that, although the

question was totally open-ended and the responses listed in the table are compacted categories of the fifty responses, all fifty respondents answered this question either wholly or in part as to government structure expressing what appeared to be definite preferences as to which governmental organization the European Union ought to have. It is also worth

Table 4.4 - The Best Possible State for European Union

<u>Ideal State</u>	<u>Number</u>
Unitary State of Europe	4
Between Unitary and Federal	1
Federal on a regional basis ^a	3
Federal ^b	23
Between Federal and Confederal ^c	6
Confederal	5
Supranational	5
Loose Union (as now exists)	3
Total	50

^aThose who mentioned this spoke of replacing the present member states with 50 regions in which, for example, Luxembourg would not change, but Great Britain would be divided into 11 regions, France into 12, Germany into 7, etc., and the Scandanavian countries, Switzerland, and other non-member states included. See, for example, the partially tongue-in-cheek article, C. J. Parkinson, "The Little (United) States of Europe," Profile (Autumn, 1974) (published by ITT, Brussels), pp. 49-51.

^bThese and the three categories above (total: 31 respondents) are referred to in this and later chapters as the "federalists".

^cThese and the three categories below (total: 19 respondents) are referred to in this and subsequent chapters as the "non-federalists".

noting that over half (31) of the respondents opted for a federal or unitary system for the Community, and that none thought the ideal state would be any state of integration less than what now exists.⁵

Table 4.5 contains the responses of the Eurocrats as to the worst possible state of European Union, compacted into the eight most often mentioned response categories. Although no general correlation

Table 4.5 - The Worst Possible State for European Union.

<u>Worst Anticipated Development</u>	<u>Number</u>
Too much federalism or centralization	6
"OECDization" (to become only an exclusive "club of nations" like the OECD)	4
Stagnation, no progress	9
Free-trade zone only	5
Slow dissolution (disintegration)	8
Re-nationalization (nine separate policies)	7
Split North/South or East/West	3
Break-up or collapse of the Community	8
Total	50

⁵This compared favorably with a much earlier study (1965) by Lerner and Gorden. They found that 93 percent of the Community's bureaucrats they interviews opted for "Etats-unis d'Europe" (after Jean Monnet's "United States of Europe") of which better than two out of three considered that to mean a federation. Only 5 percent chose "Europe des patries" (De Gaulle's vision of a Europe of many nations) as an option. See Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of European Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 264-265.

appears to exist between the responses in this and the previous table (Table 4.4), the three who preferred a loose association and three of the five who opted for a confederation as the best possible state for European Union saw as the worst possible outcome too much federalism or centralization (integration). (Those six are also those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement cited in Table 4.1.) The Eurocrats do not then represent a group unanimously committed to increased integration in Europe. The majority are, however, so committed (over half are federalists), and all have specific ideas as to what the future form of the Community ought to be.

In way of further proof, Table 4.6 lends evidence to support the observation that the majority of the Eurocrats favor something more than a loose confederation of the member states as the goal for European Union.

Table 4.6 - "The goal of European Union should be a loose association of the states in which the central institutions of the Community are slightly strengthened, but the national identity of each state and its right to act independently of the others are preserved."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
3 (6%)	6 (12%)	4 (8%)	3 (6%)	12 (24%)	22 (44%)

Mean Response = 4.62 (1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

Only 26 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement quoted in Table 4.6, and the mean response for all respondents indicates clear disagreement. Table 4.7 illustrates that it is again the three new

Table 4.7 - "The goal of European Union should be a loose association of the states in which the central institutions of the Community are slightly strengthened, but the national identity of each state and its right to act independently of the others are preserved."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	5.00
Netherlands	5	4.80
Luxembourg	2	5.50
Ireland	3	5.00
Denmark	3	1.33 ^a
United Kingdom	11	3.91 ^b
Italy	6	5.33
West Germany	8	5.25
France	6	5.00
Benelux Countries	13	5.00
France/Germany/Italy	20	5.20
New Three Countries	17	3.65 ^c
Original Six Countries	33	5.12
TOTAL	50	4.62

^aDiffers significantly from all other nations (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from responses of Italians and Germans.

^cDiffers significantly from Benelux, France/Germany/Italy, and Original Six responses.

member states, the British and much more so the Danes, who differ with the others as to support for a loose coalition only (in this case, the Irish did not concur with their fellow newer members). As one might expect, the "federalists" and "centralists" differed significantly from the "non-federalists" and "non-centralists" respectively in their greater disagreement with this proposition (see Table 4.8).

Table 4.8 - "The goal of European Union should be a loose association of the states in which the central institutions of the Community are slightly strengthened, but the national identity of each state and its right to act independently of the others are preserved."

Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring Scaling Responses:	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Responses</u>
As to Governmental Structure: ^a		
"Federalists"	31	5.29
"Non-Federalists"	19	3.53
As to Foreign Policy-Making: ^b		
"Centralists"	28 ^c	5.38
"Non-Centralists"	20 ^c	3.90

^aThe "federalists" saw the federal (or unitary) model as the ideal state for European Union.

^bThe "Centralists" saw foreign policy making by the Community's central institutions as a goal for European Union.

^cTwo respondents indicated no preference in this area.

When the Eurocrats were asked to agree or disagree with the proposition that the goal of European Union should be a federal arrangement, the result was nearly the opposite. Table 4.9 indicates that nearly three out of the four Eurocrats agreed with the federal goal, the mean response falling halfway between "agree" and "mildly agree."

Table 4.9 - "The goal of European Union should be a federal arrangement in which the Community's central institutions have more power than do the individual member governments."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
19 (38%)	11 (22%)	7 (14%)	5 (10%)	5 (10%)	3 (6%)

Mean Response = 2.50 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

When one looks at the responses to this statement by nationality (as in Table 4.10), the Danes are the most negative, but their responses differ significantly only from those of the Italians and Germans. The British as a group appear to be the most opposed to the federal idea, differing significantly from all other groups except the Danes. The responses of the Danes and British again account for the significant difference in the responses of the 'Three New countries' nationals when compared to those of the Original Six Member States.

As in previous questions, there exists a positive correlation between the responses to this statement and whether or not the respondents could be considered "Federalists" and "Centralists." Indeed, one would

Table 4.10 - "The goal of European Union should be a federal arrangement in which the Community's central institutions have more power than do the individual member governments."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	2.17
Netherlands	5	2.20
Luxembourg	2	1.00
Ireland	3	2.33
Denmark	3	4.00 ^a
United Kingdom	11	3.91 ^b
Italy	6	1.83
West Germany	8	1.50
France	6	2.33
Benelux Countries	13	2.00
France/Germany/Italy	20	1.85
New Three Countries	17	3.65 ^c
Original Six Countries	33	1.91
TOTAL	50	2.50

^aDiffers significantly from responses of Italians and Germans (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from all others except Danes.

^cDiffers significantly from responses of Benelux, France/Germany/Italy, and Original Six respondents.

expect the association between a statement advocating federalism and respondents considered federalists to be very high. (See Table 4.11)

Table 4.11 - "The goal of European Union should be a federal arrangement in which the Community's central institutions have more power than do the individual member governments."

Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring Scaling Responses:	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
As to Governmental Structure: ^a		
"Federalists"	31	1.77
"Non-Federalists"	19	3.68
As to Foreign Policy-Making: ^b		
"Centralists"	28 ^c	1.71
"Non-Centralists"	20 ^c	3.30

^aThe "federalists" saw the federal (or unitary) model as the ideal state for European Union.

^bThe "Centralists" saw foreign policy-making by the Community's central institutions as a goal for European Union.

^cTwo respondents indicated no preference in this area.

A Two-Speed Community?

Of all the strategies to achieve European Union recommended in the reports on European Union, none created as much reaction and controversy as did Tindemans' suggestion that those member states which had stronger economies continue progress toward integration while others

(particularly the British, Irish, and Italians) catch-up when they are able. The reaction of the Eurocrats seems to accurately reflect the general reaction in Brussels and the Community capitals that followed publication of Tindemans' report (see Table 4.12). The Eurocrats' mean response indicates disagreement with the suggestion. Indeed, three-fifths of the respondents strongly disagreed.

Table 4.12 - "The E.E.C. should be divided into a two-tiered community in which the stronger economies march quickly toward integration while the less strong ones proceed more slowly to catch up when they are able."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
2 (4%)	1 (2%)	3 (6%)	8 (16%)	5 (10%)	31 (62%)

Mean Response = 5.12 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

Not surprisingly, those who disagreed the more strongly were nationals of those countries which, because of economic difficulties, would presumably be left behind to catch-up. (The Irish, 6.00; the Italians, 5.67; and the British, 5.55). (See Table 4.13). Although no nationality group favored the proposal, the Danes and those of the Benelux countries were significantly less opposed to the idea.

Differences among the Eurocrats occurred also between age

Table 4.13 - "The E.E.C. should be divided into a two-tiered community in which the stronger economies march quickly toward integration while the less strong ones proceed more slowly to catch up when they are able."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	5.00
Netherlands	5	4.00
Luxembourg	2	4.00 ^a
Ireland	3	6.00
Denmark	3	3.67 ^b
United Kingdom	11	5.55 ^c
Italy	6	5.67
West Germany	8	5.25
France	6	5.33
Benelux Countries	13	4.46 ^d
France/Germany/Italy	20	5.40
New Three Countries	17	5.29
TOTAL	50	5.12

^aDiffers significantly from responses of Italians, British, and French (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from responses of Italians and British.

^cDiffers significantly from responses of Dutch, Luxembourgers, and Danes.

^dDiffers significantly from responses of the French/German/Italian responses.

groups and groups differentiated by experience (See Table 4.14). Those below thirty were unanimously opposed to the suggestion of a two-tiered Community while those over thirty also disagreed, but less strongly. There also appeared to be an association between experience and the response to this statement. Those having the least experience in the Community and those having had no prior national civil service experience

Table 4.14 - "The E.E.C. should be divided into a two-tiered Community in which the stronger economies march quickly toward integration while the less strong ones proceed more slowly to catch up when they are able."

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Below 30	6	6.0
30-39	24	5.0
40 and over	20	5.0
<u>Years Experience Working in the Community</u>		
1-6	32	5.31
7-12	6	5.33
13-18	12	4.50
<u>Respondent Had Prior National Civil Service Experience:</u>		
Yes	19	4.63
No	31	5.42

were more negative in their replies.⁶

What Role for the European Council?

The European Council (Heads of State and of Government) was created to provide summit level meetings held on a regular basis to permit the resolution of problems considered "too political," problems that had completely tied up the Council of Ministers. To some, this represented the recognition of a failure on the part of the Community's institutions and a vote for Gaullist-style intergovernmentalism for running Community affairs (hence, a sign of institutional disintegration). Others see the European Council as a move toward further European unification, a sign of the commitment by national leaders to solve the more difficult problems and get the Community moving again.

It is interesting that only one of the reports recommends a specific role for the European Council in an eventual European Union, and surely Tindemans, writing for that body and himself a member of it, might have been expected to include a role for the European Council. The Eurocrats appeared to side with Tindemans and those who see the European Council as a positive influence on the Community. That is, they disagreed with the proposition that the European Council is a sign of disintegration in the Community (see Table 4.15). By nationality,

⁶The differences in experience levels (in the Community) may reflect the fact that the British, Danish, and Irish respondents have less experience because their countries are relatively new to the Community. However, the possibility that nationality "contaminates" the experience-in-the-community variable is not supported by the highly negative responses of the Italians, Germans, and French, nor by the least negative response of the Danes.

Table 4.15 - "The creation of the European Council (summits of heads of state and of government) is a sign of the disintegration of the Community."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
6 (12%)	3 (6%)	7 (14%)	9 (18%)	9 (18%)	16 (32%)

Mean Response = 4.20 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

only the Danes, the Dutch, and the Irish agreed; the Luxembourgers and British were the most negative and the only ones to differ at significant levels. (See Table 4.16)

Table 4.16 - "The creation of the European Council (summits of heads of state and of government) is a sign of the disintegration of the Community."

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	4.17
Netherlands	5	3.00
Luxembourg	2	5.50 ^a
Ireland	3	3.00
Denmark	3	2.33 ^b
United Kingdom	11	5.45 ^c
Italy	6	3.83
West Germany	8	4.50
France	6	4.00
TOTAL	50	4.20

^aDiffers significantly from the Danish and Italian respondents (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from the Italian, German and British respondents.

^cDiffers significantly from all others except the Luxembourgers and Germans.

Significant differences in responses were observed between groups of respondents classified by the institution for which they worked (Table 4.17). As a group, those working in the Commission's DG VIII (Development) had a mean response which roughly equates to neither

agreement nor disagreement, and which significantly differed from the response of the group who most disagreed, those in the COREPER.

Table 4.17 - "The creation of the European Council (summits of heads of state and of government) is a sign of the disintegration of the Community."

<u>Institution(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Directorate General I	10	4.50
Directorate General VIII	14	3.50 ^a
Directorate General X/General Secretariat	9	4.78
Economic and Social Committee, European Parliament, and Private Interest Groups	8	3.63
Council of Permanent Representatives	9	4.89
Total	50	4.20

^aDiffers significantly from COREPER respondents (at .05 by t).

There also appears to be an association between age and response to this statement. Those 40 and older tended not to disagree while the other two age groups clearly did. (Table 4.18)

Table 4.18 - "The creation of the European Council (summits of heads of state and of government) is a sign of the disintegration of the Community."

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Below 30	6	4.67
30-39	24	4.75
40 and above	20	3.40 ^a

^aDiffers significantly from other two age groups (at .05 by t).

Perceptions of Support by Institutions

The reports on European Union are essentially reports made by institutions of the Community. The Spierenburg and Tindemans reports differ from the others in this regard, although the Tindemans Report was made for and by one of the members of the European Council and much of his report reflects the contents of the reports of the Commission, Parliament, and Court of Justice (which were first submitted to him). I asked the Eurocrats to assess the support given efforts to achieve European Union by their respective institutions for two important reasons: first, to attempt to measure different levels of support of the institutions as part of an assessment of the present state of integration and, second, as an important gauge of some of the institutions which produced reports on European Union.

Table 4.19 illustrates the total responses of the Eurocrats as to perceptions of institutional support for increased European integration.

The data indicate that two out of three respondents strongly agreed that their institution supported European Union and that only four respondents (8 percent) felt their institution did not support it.⁷

Table 4.19 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports increased European Union."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
34 (68%)	8 (16%)	4 (8%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	2 (4%)

Mean Response = 1.66 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

When, again, the Eurocrats' responses are separated by nationality (Table 4.20), little difference is evident. The West Germans were unanimous in their strong belief that their respective institutions supported European Union, the Danes exhibited a mean response that very nearly indicates neither agreement nor disagreement, and, as a group, those from the three new countries were less positive than were those of the original six states. It appears here that personal and/or country views distort perceptions of institutions. The alternative conclusion is that the respondents were, more so than in previous cases, simply giving their own unique viewpoints.

⁷Those who disagreed: mildly - 1 from COREPER; disagreed - 1 from a private interest group; strongly disagreed - 1 from COREPER and 1 from the Economic and Social Committee.

Table 4.20 - "The instution/organization for which I work supports increased European Union."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	1.83
Netherlands	5	1.80
Luxembourg	2	1.50
Ireland	3	1.00
Denmark	3	3.33 ^a
United Kingdom	11	2.09
Italy	6	1.17
West Germany	8	1.00 ^b
France	6	1.50
Benelux Countries	13	1.77
France/Germany/Italy	20	1.20
New Three Countries	17	2.12 ^c
Original Six Countries	33	1.42
TOTAL	50	1.66

^aDiffers significantly from Italian and German respondents (at .05 at t).

^bDiffers significantly from all others except Belgians and Irish.

^cDiffers significantly from France/Germany/Italy Group and Original Six respondents.

Considering the nature of the statement, the data presented in Table 4.21 are the most important. As one might expect, those in the Commission more strongly agreed than did those not in the Commission.

Table 4.21 - "The institution/organization for which I work support increased European Union."

<u>Institution(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Directorate General I	10	1.20
Directorate General VIII	14	1.36
Directorate General X/General Secretariat	9	1.44
<hr/>		
Total Commission	33	1.33 ^a
<hr/>		
Economic and Social Committee, European Parliament, and Private Interest Groups	8	2.50 ^b
Council of Permanent Representatives	9	2.11
<hr/>		
Total Outside the Commission	17	2.29
<hr/>		

^aDiffers significantly from responses of those outside the Commission (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from those in DG I and DG VIII.

Those in the Economic and Social Committee/European Parliament/Private Interest Groups were the least in agreement. This might have been anticipated, given the inclusion of the three respondents from private interest groups, were it not for the fact that the mean response for the three was only 2.67. The private interest group respondents did not by themselves account for the more negative mean response from that group. It is more interesting to note that the respondents from the COREPER were as positive as they were, given the fact that they were all national foreign office officials working for a group which many see as a brake on the Commission's centralization tendencies.⁸

The data in Table 4.22 appear to indicate a positive correlation between those who favor federalism and the perception of the respondents' institutions' support for European Union. It also indicates a significant difference between those opting for a world-wide development aid program and those preferring differing regional approaches. Those preferring the regional approach to development aid ("regionalists") were much less positive in their assessment of institutional support. It appears that those who favor more Community centralization see their respective institutions as more strongly in favor of European Union.

⁸See Chapter I and Chapter V, pp. 153-155.

Table 4.22 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports increased European Union."

<u>Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring Scaling Responses:</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
As to Government Structure: ^a		
"Federalists"	31	1.39
"Non-Federalists"	19	2.11
As to Scope of Community Development Aid: ^b		
"Mondialists"	24 ^c	1.54
"Regionalists"	9 ^c	2.56

^aThe "federalists" saw the federal model as the ideal state for European Union.

^bThe "mondialists" favor an overall world-wide approach to aiding developing nations over a region by region approach.

^c17 respondents had no preference in this area.

Public Opinion Support for European Union

When the Eurocrats were asked to assess the support given European Union by the people of their home countries, a greater span of opinion seemed evident. As is indicated in Table 4.23, the mean response indicates only mild agreement, and 17 Eurocrats (34 percent) felt that

the majority of their fellow nationals did not support European Union.⁹

Table 4.23 - "The majority of people in my country support European Union."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
19 (38%)	7 (14%)	7 (14%)	2 (4%)	7 (14%)	8 (16%)

Mean Response = 2.90 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

When the respondents are separated by nationality (Table 4.24), it is again the Danes, the British, and, as a group, those from the three new member states whose responses are the most negative and differ significantly from the responses of others.

⁹It is difficult to fully assess why in all cases the Eurocrats responded as they did to this statement. Many told me that they knew that public opinion polls in their own country indicated strong support for European Union, but argued that the knowledge level is so low among the general public as to make the opinion polls quite meaningless. One official told me: "The Dutch population is very favorable to European Union, but they wouldn't be at all were they to discover that there are as many communists in Italy as there are Dutch citizens or that European Union may mean losing some industries that are in type or style typically Dutch." He then responded by strongly disagreeing with the statement.

Table 4.24 - "The majority of people in my country support European Union."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	2.00
Netherlands	5	2.00
Luxembourg	2	2.00
Ireland	3	2.33
Denmark	3	4.33 ^a
United Kingdom	11	4.55 ^b
Italy	6	3.17
West Germany	8	1.75
France	6	2.67
Benelux Countries	13	2.00
France/Germany/Italy	20	2.45
New Three Countries	17	4.12 ^c
Original Six Countries	33	2.27
TOTAL	50	2.90

^aDiffers significantly from German responses (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from all others except Danes and Italians.

^cDiffers significantly from Benelux, Old Three, and Original Six respondents.

It is interesting to note that the Eurocrats' perceptions of public opinion support for European Union is quite accurate; that, indeed, the only two nations in which the majority of people do not support European Union are Denmark and the United Kingdom (See Tables 4.25 and 4.26).

The Support Rendered by the National Governments

A key consideration in any attempt to measure the likelihood of continued progress toward European Union is the role played by the national governments. Since nearly any definition of European Union includes some transfer of power from the member states to the central Community institutions, the support given the process by the member states is, perhaps, the most critical for the success of European Union. The Eurocrats were asked to assess support of the member states' governments (relative to each other).¹⁰ The results of the rankings of the member states are provided in Tables 4.27 through 4.31. (The columns indicate how various groups of respondents ranked the 9 member states; the mean response given for each member state accompanies the ordinal ranking in parentheses).

Table 4.27 illustrates how the respondents grouped by nationality ranked the member states' governments. Two observations can be made about the ten sets of rankings (including the "total" column) in Table 4.27. First, the correlation of the rankings is extremely high; no

¹⁰The methodology is explained in Chapter II.

Table 4.25 -- Public opinion in the member states: "Should the unification of Europe be speeded up, slowed down, or continued as at present?" (May, 1976)

Nation (Number)	Continued				Total
	Speeded Up	as at Present	Slowed Down	Don't Know	
Italy (923)	58%	16%	4%	22%	100%
Luxembourg (268)	55	20	9	16	100
Netherlands (904)	44	36	7	13	100
France (1241)	43	37	7	13	100
Belgium (963)	40	32	5	23	100
West Germany (1004)	39	34	10	17	100
Ireland (1007)	31	40	14	15	100
United Kingdom (1340)	23	42	24	11	100
Denmark (977)	13	33	32	22	100
Total Community	40%	33%	11%	16%	100%

SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre: Public Opinion in the European Community 5 (July, 1976), p. 27.

Table 4.26 -- Public opinion in the Member States: For or against European Political Union by 1980 (May, 1976).

Nation (Number)	Totally Approve	Approve on the Whole	Disapprove on the Whole	Totally Disapprove	No Answer or Don't Know	Total
	Italy (923)	38 %	33 %	5 %	3 %	
Luxembourg (268)	36	35	6	1	22	100
Netherlands (904)	37	31	10	8	14	100
West Germany (1004)	23	41	9	5	22	100
France (1241)	21	37	12	8	22	100
Belgium (963)	29	26	5	5	35	100
Ireland (1007)	16	28	19	12	25	100
United Kingdom (1340)	10	24	21	29	16	100
Denmark (977)	8	16	19	33	24	100
Total Community	24%	33%	12%	11%	20%	100%

SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre: Public Opinion in the European Community 5 (July, 1976), pp. 34-37.

significant differences exist between any pair of rankings.¹¹ Second, the groups of respondents were very accurate in ranking their own countries, when each ranking is compared to the rank order given by all 50 Eurocrats. Only the French differed from the total ranking by more than one position in their ranking of their own country.

Table 4.28 provides the ordinal ranking of the member states as determined by the mean responses of nationality groupings. Again, the rank correlations between the three nationality groupings,¹² the original six and the new three,¹³ and the North States and South States¹⁴ are very high. Table 4.29 provides the rank orderings by institution. The rank correlations between the five institution groups (DG I, DG VIII, DGX/SG, ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups, and the COREPER)¹⁵ and between the rankings by those in the Commission and those outside the Commission¹⁶ are again very high. Similarly, the rankings resulting from the mean responses achieved using the variables indicated in

¹¹Kendall's $W = .88$ for the nine sets of ratings by nationality. The lowest Spearman's rho value for any ranking compared with the total rankings was for the French, $\rho = .85$. (All rank correlations reported in this Chapter have a P value $\leq .005$ by X^2 .)

¹²Kendall's $W = .956$.

¹³Spearman's $\rho = .90$.

¹⁴Spearman's $\rho = .95$.

¹⁵Kendall's $W = .866$.

¹⁶Spearman's $\rho = .925$.

Tables 4.30 and 4.31 are equally similar and highly correlated.¹⁷

Two general observations can be made about the relative support the member states have given and now give to European Union (Tables 4.27-4.31). First, the rankings appear to correlate with the size of the country - with the exception of Denmark, the smaller countries are rated highest and the larger lowest, particularly France and Britain who are almost always in a near tie for last place. Second, there appears to be a very high level of agreement among the Eurocrats as to the relative support given by each of the member states.

¹⁷Age: Kendall's W = .937; Community Experience: Kendall's W = .944; Private Sector Experience: Kendall's W = .940; Prior Civil Service; rho = .986; federalists/non-federalists: rho = .913; centralists/non-centralists: rho = .967; mondialists/regionalists: rho = .838; and multi-lateralists/bi-lateralists: rho = .933.

Table 4.27 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to European Union.

Nationality of Respondents	Belgians (n=6)	Dutch (n=5)	Luxembourgers (n=2)	Irish (n=3)	Danes (n=3)	Italians (n=6)	Germans (n=8)	British (n=11)	French (n=6)	Total (n=50)
Member States										
Belgium	<u>1 (2.42)</u>	1 (1.80)	1.5 (1.50)	4 (3.67)	2 (3.33)	1 (2.25)	1 (2.24)	3 (2.64)	3 (2.04)	2 (2.62)
Denmark	8 (7.17)	7 (6.60)	7 (7.50)	7 (6.67)	<u>7 (6.17)</u>	6 (6.00)	7 (7.13)	7 (6.91)	7 (7.00)	7 (6.70)
France	9 (8.00)	9 (8.10)	8 (8.00)	9 (9.00)	9 (7.00)	9 (8.33)	8 (7.31)	8 (7.91)	<u>6 (8.04)</u>	9 (7.64)
Ireland	4 (4.58)	4 (4.80)	4.5 (4.50)	<u>3 (3.33)</u>	5 (5.00)	4 (4.17)	6 (5.13)	4 (3.82)	5 (4.65)	4 (4.46)
Italy	6 (5.33)	5 (4.90)	4.5 (4.50)	6 (6.00)	7 (6.17)	<u>5 (4.33)</u>	5 (4.81)	5 (5.32)	8 (5.04)	6 (5.25)
Luxembourg	2.5 (2.92)	2 (2.00)	<u>1.5 (1.50)</u>	2 (3.00)	3 (3.67)	2 (2.42)	2 (2.56)	2 (2.36)	1 (2.35)	1 (2.60)
Netherlands	2.5 (2.92)	<u>3 (3.20)</u>	3 (4.00)	1 (1.00)	1 (3.00)	3 (3.50)	3 (2.81)	1 (2.88)	2 (3.19)	3 (2.82)
United Kingdom	7 (6.83)	8 (8.00)	9 (8.50)	8 (7.67)	7 (6.17)	8 (7.67)	9 (7.88)	<u>9 (8.00)</u>	9 (7.54)	8 (7.60)
West Germany	5 (4.67)	6 (5.60)	6 (5.00)	5 (4.67)	4 (4.50)	7 (6.33)	<u>4 (4.63)</u>	6 (5.68)	4 (5.08)	5 (5.20)

A nation's rating by its own nationals is underlined. Mean responses appear in parentheses.

Table 4.28 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to European Union.

Nationality Groups (of Respondents)	Benelux Countries (n=13)	France Germany Italy (n=20)	New Three (Ireland, Denmark, United Kingdom) (n=17)	Original Six (all but New Three) (n=33)	North (all but Italy & France) (n=38)	South (Italy and France) (n=12)	Total (n=50)
Belgium	1 (2.04)	2 (2.73)	3 (2.94)	1 (2.45)	1 (2.53)	2 (2.92)	2 (2.62)
Denmark	7 (7.00)	7 (6.48)	7 (6.74)	7 (6.68)	7 (6.91)	7 (6.04)	7 (6.70)
France	9 (8.04)	8 (7.13)	9 (7.94)	8 (7.48)	9 (7.84)	8 (7.00)	9 (7.64)
Ireland	4 (4.65)	4 (4.78)	4 (3.94)	4 (4.73)	4 (4.43)	4 (4.54)	4 (4.46)
Italy	5 (5.04)	5 (5.10)	6 (5.59)	5 (5.08)	6 (5.24)	5 (5.29)	6 (5.28)
Luxembourg	2 (2.35)	1 (2.68)	2 (2.71)	2 (2.55)	2 (2.55)	1 (2.75)	1 (2.60)
Netherlands	3 (3.19)	3 (3.18)	1 (2.12)	3 (3.18)	3 (2.63)	3 (3.42)	3 (2.82)
United Kingdom	8 (7.54)	9 (7.63)	8 (7.62)	9 (7.59)	8 (7.64)	9 (7.46)	8 (7.60)
West Germany	6 (5.08)	6 (5.20)	5 (5.29)	6 (5.15)	5 (5.08)	6 (5.58)	5 (5.20)

(mean responses appear in parentheses)

Table 4.29 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to European Union.

Institution of Respondents	Directorate General I (n=10)	Directorate General VIII (n=14)	Dir. Gen. X and Secretariat-General (n=9)	Total Commission (n=33)	Econ and Soc Comm, Parliament and Private Groups (n=8)	Council of Permanent Reps (COREPER) (n=9)	Total Outside Commission (n=17)
Belgium	1 (2.40)	3 (2.96)	2 (3.06)	2.5 (2.82)	1 (2.00)	2 (2.44)	2 (2.24)
Denmark	7 (7.00)	5 (5.29)	9 (7.72)	7 (6.47)	7 (6.38)	8 (7.83)	7 (7.15)
France	9 (7.80)	9 (7.79)	7 (6.44)	8 (7.42)	9 (8.63)	7 (7.55)	9 (8.06)
Ireland	4 (4.55)	4 (4.54)	6 (4.89)	4 (4.64)	3 (3.69)	5 (4.50)	4 (4.12)
Italy	6 (5.55)	6 (5.64)	4.5 (4.61)	5.5 (5.33)	5 (4.88)	6 (5.28)	6 (5.09)
Luxembourg	3 (2.50)	2 (2.68)	3 (3.39)	2.5 (2.82)	2 (2.38)	1 (2.00)	1 (2.18)
Netherlands	2 (2.45)	1 (2.61)	1 (2.39)	1 (2.50)	4 (3.88)	3 (3.06)	3 (3.44)
United Kingdom	8 (7.30)	8 (7.64)	8 (7.61)	9 (7.53)	8 (7.44)	9 (8.00)	8 (7.74)
West Germany	5 (5.35)	7 (5.79)	4.5 (4.61)	5.5 (5.33)	6 (5.63)	4 (4.33)	5 (4.94)

(Mean responses appear in parentheses)

Table 4.30 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to European Union.

Member States	<u>AGE</u>			<u>COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE</u>			<u>PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE</u>			<u>PRIOR CIVIL SERVICE</u>	
	<u>Below 30</u>	<u>30 - 39</u>	<u>40-Plus</u>	<u>1 - 6</u>	<u>7 - 12</u>	<u>13 - 18</u>	<u>Profession</u>	<u>Business</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
	(n=6)	(n=24)	(n=20)	(n=32)	(n=6)	(n=12)	(n=16)	(n=19)	(n=15)	(n=19)	(n=31)
Belgium	3 (3.00)	2 (2.63)	1.5 (2.50)	3 (2.63)	2 (2.50)	1 (2.67)	3 (2.66)	1 (2.50)	1.5 (2.73)	1 (2.50)	2 (2.69)
Denmark	7 (7.00)	7 (6.50)	7 (6.85)	7 (6.81)	7 (6.33)	7 (6.58)	7 (6.69)	7 (6.92)	7 (6.43)	9(7.45)	7 (6.24)
France	9 (8.25)	8 (7.38)	9 (7.78)	9 (7.89)	8 (7.17)	9 (7.21)	9 (8.13)	9 (7.66)	8 (7.10)	8(7.32)	9 (7.84)
Ireland	5.5 (4.67)	4 (4.69)	4 (4.13)	4 (4.39)	4 (4.50)	4.5 (4.63)	4 (4.13)	5 (4.71)	4 (4.60)	4(4.56)	4 (4.40)
Italy	4 (4.50)	6 (5.46)	5 (5.23)	5 (5.08)	5 (5.83)	6 (5.42)	6 (5.66)	4 (4.63)	6 (5.60)	6(5.36)	5 (5.18)
Luxembourg	2 (2.33)	3 (2.75)	1.5 (2.50)	.1 (2.41)	3 (3.17)	2 (2.83)	2 (2.41)	2 (2.66)	1.5 (2.73)	2(2.55)	1 (2.63)
Netherlands	1 (2.17)	1 (2.54)	3 (3.35)	2 (2.59)	1 (2.00)	3 (3.83)	1 (2.25)	3 (3.29)	3 (2.83)	3(2.82)	3 (2.82)
United Kingdom	8.5 (8.08)	9 (7.67)	8 (7.38)	8 (7.83)	9 (7.33)	8 (7.13)	8 (7.84)	8 (7.37)	9 (7.63)	7(7.29)	8 (7.79)
West Germany	5.5 (4.67)	5 (5.29)	6 (5.25)	6 (5.23)	6 (6.17)	4.5 (4.63)	5 (5.23)	6 (5.08)	5 (5.33)	5(5.16)	6 (5.23)

(Mean responses appear in parentheses)

Table 4.31 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to European Union.

Member States	Federalists (n=31)	Non-Federalists (n=19)	Foreign Policy Centralists (n=28) ^b	Foreign Policy Non-Cent. (n=20) ^b	Mondialists ^a (n=24) ^b	Regionalists ^a (n=9) ^b	Multi-lateralists ^a (n=22) ^b	Bi-lateralists ^a (n=9) ^b	Total (n=50)
Belgium	1 (2.47)	3 (2.87)	1.5 (2.27)	1.5 (3.13)	3 (2.75)	1.5 (2.22)	1.5 (2.57)	1.5 (2.61)	2 (2.62)
Denmark	7 (7.00)	7 (6.21)	7 (6.96)	7 (6.50)	7 (6.60)	9 (7.33)	7 (6.04)	8 (7.28)	7 (6.70)
France	8 (7.55)	9 (7.79)	9 (7.82)	8 (7.33)	9 (8.10)	7 (7.17)	9 (8.23)	7 (7.06)	9 (7.64)
Ireland	4 (4.69)	4 (4.08)	4 (4.48)	4 (4.48)	4 (4.38)	3 (3.83)	4 (4.16)	4 (4.33)	4 (4.46)
Italy	6 (5.15)	5 (5.42)	6 (5.43)	5 (4.80)	6 (4.94)	5 (5.06)	6 (5.27)	5 (4.39)	6 (5.25)
Luxembourg	2 (2.50)	1.5 (2.76)	1.5 (2.27)	1.5 (3.13)	1.5 (2.71)	1.5 (2.22)	1.5 (2.57)	1.5 (2.61)	1 (2.60)
Netherlands	3 (2.85)	1.5 (2.76)	3 (2.66)	3 (3.18)	1.5 (2.71)	4 (4.00)	3 (2.73)	3 (3.56)	3 (2.82)
United Kingdom	9 (7.60)	8 (7.61)	8 (7.75)	9 (7.38)	8 (7.75)	8 (7.28)	8 (7.61)	9 (7.72)	8 (7.60)
West Germany	5 (5.05)	6 (5.45)	5 (5.29)	6 (4.93)	5 (4.92)	6 (5.67)	5 (5.07)	6 (5.33)	5 (5.20)

^aRefers to handling of aid to developing countries.

^bNot all respondents indicated preferences in these areas.

(mean responses appear in parentheses)

European Union: Will It Come Automatically?

A basic difference between the functionalists and neo-functionalists is a disagreement concerning how integration occurs. In this case, it also involves a consideration of proper strategies to achieve European Union. As was pointed out in Chapter II, the neo-functionalists disagree with the functionalists' argument that integration occurs automatically; the neo-functionalists insist that spill-over must be "cultivated", that it is dependent on the political skill of political leaders and "technocrats".¹⁸

The reports on European Union address in various degrees the difficulties to be encountered in moving toward European Union and strategies as to how to proceed (for example, the Spierenburg Report argues the need to achieve first a monetary union; the Commission recommends permitting the EC institutions to determine the means of achieving the Union while allowing the member states to determine the timetable). The reports, therefore, appear to reflect more the neo-functionalist than the functionalist approach to achieving European Union. It is interesting to see if the Eurocrats have similar leanings.

A first test (albeit indirect) is one of the attitudes of the Eurocrats toward the central concept of the neo-functionalists, spill-over. The data in Table 4.32 indicate the majority of the Eurocrats (78 percent) agreed with the concept, at least as it is represented by the statement presented them. Table 4.33 indicates that the Belgians had a significantly more positive response, and Table 4.34 indicates

¹⁸ Again, see Chapter II of this dissertation.

those in the Economic and Social Committee, Parliament, and private interest groups to be the most in agreement. In no case did any group disagree with the statement.

Table 4.32 - "As the economies of the nine countries become more fully integrated, further political integration becomes inevitable."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
22 (44%)	11 (22%)	6 (12%)	3 (6%)	3 (6%)	5 (10%)
Mean Response = 2.38 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)					

Table 4.33 - "As the economies of the nine countries become more fully integrated, further political integration becomes inevitable."

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	1.17 ^a
Netherlands	5	2.60
Luxembourg	2	2.50
Ireland	3	1.67
Denmark	3	2.00
United Kingdom	11	2.82
Italy	6	2.83
West Germany	8	2.88
France	6	2.00
Total	50	2.83

^aDiffers significantly from Luxembourg, Italian, German, and British responses (at .05 by t).

Table 4.34 - "As the economies of the nine countries become more fully integrated, further political integration becomes inevitable."

<u>Institution(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Directorate General I	10	1.90
Directorate General VIII	14	2.43
Directorate General X/General Secretariat	9	3.11
Economic and Social Committee, European Parliament, and Private Interest Groups	8	1.38 ^a
Council of Permanent Representatives	9	3.00
Total	50	2.38

^aDiffers significantly from DG-X/SG and COREPER responses (at .05 by t).

There did appear to be an association between the responses to the statement and the respondents' ages. As indicated by Table 4.35, those under 30 years of age exhibited a mean response which shows the slightest disagreement with spillover, while other age groups were significantly different in their agreement with the statement.

Table 4.35 - "As the economics of the nine countries become more fully integrated, further political integration becomes inevitable."

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Below 30	6	3.67 ^a
30-39	24	2.13
40 and above	20	2.30

^aDiffers significantly from responses of 30-39 age group (at .05 by t).

Table 4.36 presents sufficient evidence to find that the Eurocrats reject the functionalist argument of automatic spillover in international integration. Ninety percent of the Eurocrats agreed with the statement in Table 4.36, with more than two-thirds of that number strongly agreeing.

Table 4.36 - "Increased European integration does not happen automatically or as a result of previous integration; it occurs through conscious effort and planning by individuals willing and able to make it happen."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
31 (62%)	9 (18%)	5 (10%)	3 (6%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)

Mean Response = 1.74 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

Table 4.37 - "Increased European integration does not happen automatically or as a result of previous integration; it occurs through conscious effort and planning by individuals willing and able to make it happen."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	1.17
Netherlands	5	1.80
Luxembourg	2	1.50
Ireland	3	1.53
Denmark	3	4.00 ^a
United Kingdom	11	2.18 ^b
Italy	6	1.33
West Germany	8	1.63
France	6	1.17
Benelux Countries	13	1.46
France/Germany/Italy	20	1.40
New Three Countries	17	2.35 ^c
Original Six Countries	33	1.42
TOTAL	50	1.74

^aDiffers significantly from all others except Dutch and Luxembourgers (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from Belgians and French.

^cDiffers significantly from Benelux, Old Three, and Original Six respondents.

Table 4.37 contains what should be, by now, a familiar pattern. The Danes continue to march to the beat of a different drummer, being the only respondents to disagree as a group. The British and New Three Countries' respondents again showed significantly different responses, and were slightly less in agreement than were other groups.

Age did not appear as an important variable, but working experience in the Community and prior experience in the private sector did provide differences in responses (Table 4.38). Those with the least experience were the least in agreement, but this is probably more a function of the Danes and British being among those with the fewest years experience in Community institutions. Those having had no prior experience before coming to work in or with the Community were significantly more in agreement than were those who had had prior business experience.

Which Comes First: Economic or Political Union?

The Tindemans and Spierenburg reports specifically advocate beginning in the economic and monetary policy sectors in moving toward European Union. The other reports, with their emphases on institutional and decision-making systems reform appear to favor a political focus in the continuing efforts to achieve European Union (although none specifically take that stand). The Eurocrats appeared not to have taken a definitive stand on this question. In response to a statement arguing that political union must first be achieved, 68 percent of the Eurocrats did not agree. The mean response was roughly equivalent to mild disagreement (See Table 4.39).

Table 4.38 - "Increased European integration does not happen automatically or as a result of previous integration; it occurs through conscious effort and planning by individuals willing and able to make it happen."

<u>Years Experience Working with or in the Community:</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
1-6 years	32	2.00 ^a
7-12 years	6	1.67
13-18 years	12	1.08
<u>Previous Experience in the Private Sector:</u>		
Professional	16	1.63
Business	19	2.21
No Prior Experience	15	1.27 ^b

^aDiffers significantly from responses of 13-18 year group (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from responses of Business experience group.

Table 4.39 - "Economic and monetary union is possible, but only after political union has been achieved."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
6 (12%)	5 (10%)	5 (10%)	10 (20%)	8 (16%)	16 (32%)
Mean Response = 4.14 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)					

When the responses are viewed as to nationality of the respondents, only the French agreed as a group, the Irish and Danes both demonstrated unanimous strong disagreement. (Table 4.40)

Table 4.40 - "Economic and monetary union is possible, but only after political union has been achieved."

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	4.00
Netherlands	5	4.20
Luxembourg	2	5.00
Ireland	3	6.00 ^a
Denmark	3	6.00 ^a
United Kingdom	11	3.73
Italy	6	3.67
West Germany	8	4.25
France	6	3.17
TOTAL	50	4.14

^aDiffers significantly from responses of Italians, Germans and French (at .05 by t).

The institutional group most unlikely to see political union as a prerequisite to economic and monetary union was the COREPER which, while none of the other groups had a mean response indicating agreement, was significantly more opposed to the statement (Table 4.41).

Table 4.41 - "Economic and monetary union is possible, but only after political union has been achieved."

<u>Institution(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Directorate General I	10	3.70
Directorate General VIII	14	4.07
Directorate General X/General Secretariat	9	3.78
Economic and Social Committee, European Parliament, and Private Interest Groups	8	3.75
Council of Permanent Representatives	9	5.44 ^a
Total	50	4.14

^aDiffers significantly from responses of all others (at .05 by t).

There appeared also to be an association between age and working experience in the Community and attitudes about the necessity for first achieving a political union. As indicated in Table 4.42, the younger respondents and those with the fewest number of years experience working in the Community were significantly more negative than were those older and having more experience respectively.¹⁹

¹⁹This finding supports in part a study done by Feld and Wildgen on national bureaucrats in the nine member states. Feld and Wildgen found age to be an important variable, that younger bureaucrats tended to prefer an emphasis on economic/monetary union while their older, more experienced colleagues tended toward being "political unionists". See Werner J. Feld and John K. Wildgen, "National Administrative Elites and European Integration Saboteurs at Work?", Journal of Commonmarket Studies XIII (March, 1975), pp. 244-265.

Table 4.42 - "Economic and monetary union is possible, but only after political union has been achieved."

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Below 30	6	5.17 ^a
30-39	24	4.13
40 and above	20	3.85
<u>Years experience working in or with the Community:</u>		
1-6 years	32	4.44 ^b
7-12 years	6	3.00
13-18 years	12	3.92

^aDiffers significantly from responses of 40-and-above age group (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from responses of 7-12 years group.

When the opposite statement was made (Table 4.43), the Eurocrats split, half agreeing and half disagreeing, with a mean response almost perfectly in the middle of the scale (neither agreement or disagreement).

Table 4.43 - "Political union is possible, but only after economic and monetary union has been achieved."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
6 (12%)	12 (24%)	7 (14%)	10 (20%)	5 (10%)	10 (20%)
Mean Response = 3.52 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)					

When the respondents were grouped by nationality, the British were the most positive, significantly differing with the more negative Italians and Dutch (Table 4.44).

Table 4.44 - "Political union is possible, but only after economic and monetary union has been achieved."

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	3.17
Netherlands	5	5.00
Luxembourg	2	3.00
Ireland	3	3.00
Denmark	3	3.67
United Kingdom	11	3.00 ^a
Italy	6	4.67 ^b
West Germany	8	3.00
France	6	3.50
TOTAL	50	3.52

^aDiffers significantly from responses of Dutch and Italians (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from responses of Belgians, Luxembourgers, Germans, and British.

By institutions, those in the Commission came very close to mild agreement as a group, while those in the ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups category were significantly more negative (Table 4.45).

Table 4.45 - "Political union is possible, but only after economic and monetary union has been achieved."

<u>Institution(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Directorate General I	10	3.50
Directorate General VIII	14	3.29
Directorate General X/General Secretariat	9	2.89
Economic and Social Committee, European Parliament, and Private Interest Groups	8	4.75 ^a
Council of Permanent Representatives	9	3.44
Total	50	3.52

^aDiffers significantly from responses of DG-I, DG-VIII, and DG-X/SG (at .05 by t).

Again, age was an important variable. Those below 30 agreed while those above 40 disagreed (Table 4.46).²⁰

Table 4.46 - "Political union is possible, but only after economic and monetary union has been achieved."

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Below 30	6	2.50 ^a
30-39	24	3.42
40 and above	20	3.95

^aDiffers significantly from responses of 40 and over age group.

²⁰Again, support for Feld and Wildgen's study. (See the previous footnote - #19.).

Toward European Union: An Evaluation

There does appear to be wide-spread attitudinal support for continued European integration in the Community. This assessment applies to national government leaders, bureaucratic elites, and the general public, but it is based on measurements of the direction, not the intensity of support for European Union. It is often mentioned by Community officials that further integration is dependent on political will, and there can be no political will until there is sufficient economic capability and social resolve.²¹ The collective assessment by the Eurocrats of efforts over the last five years to progress toward European Union (based on a scale from what for each is the worst to the best possible states) supports a conclusion of stagnation in the Community in this decade. As is indicated in Table 4.47, the mean values for the self-anchoring scaling responses of all 50 Eurocrats indicates almost no difference between ratings for 1971 and 1976.

Table 4.47 does demonstrate some degree of optimism for the next five years. The mean response of all Eurocrats for 1981 indicates a slight rise on the scale, demonstrating an expectation of progress. Many of the responses do vary significantly by nationality. On the 1971 ratings, the Dutch are significantly higher than the Luxembourgers,

²¹One Eurocrat explained that there is no urgency in political matters in the Community because there are no external threats perceived by, and there has developed a "softness of life" in, the general public. Another more senior official decried the fact that younger people coming out of European universities today did not know World War II and have been subjected to the "mollifying effect of détente." This, he argued, contributed to the lack of political will for further integration in the Community (from interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976).

Table 4.47 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for European Union Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

Year	Belgium	Netherlands	Luxembourg	Ireland	Denmark	United Kingdom	Italy	West Germany	France	Total
1971	3.60	5.60	3.00	4.00	7.00	3.45	4.83	3.86	5.17	4.38
1976	3.80	5.80	3.50	4.67	6.33	3.91	4.50	3.86	4.00	4.35
1981	5.60	6.40	4.00	6.33	6.33	4.82	5.67	5.00	5.83	5.48
(N)	6	5	2	3	3	11	6	8	6	50

Italians, and British; the Danes differ significantly with the Italians and British; and the British with the French. For the 1976 ratings, the Dutch were significantly higher than the Italians, and the British significantly lower than the Dutch and Danes. The 1981 ratings found the Luxembourgers significantly lower than the Belgians and French (at .05 by t).

Table 4.48 illustrates that two of the groupings of nations, the Benelux and New Three Countries, saw improvement during the last five years while the mean responses of the French/German/Italian group indicate a retreat of one-half step. Generally, the Benelux and New Three states (particularly the Danes and British) saw Community enlargement as having had a positive effect on Community integration, and the French/Germans/Italians believed the opposite occurred. The rankings

Table 4.48 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for European Union Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

Year	Benelux Countries	Germany/France/Italy	New Three Countries	Total
1971	4.33	4.59	4.18	4.38
1976	4.58	4.11	4.47	4.35
1981	5.67	5.47	5.35	5.48
(N)	(13)	(20)	(17)	(50)

were all quite close for the larger groupings, and exhibited no significant differences (at .05 by t).

The only other variable for which significant differences occurred was the institution of the respondents. (Table 4.49) Those in DGI, DGX/S-G, and the ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups indicated slight progress during both five year periods (past and future), while those in DG VIII and the COREPER felt a reversal had occurred during the last five years. On the ratings for 1971, the responses of the group from DGX/SG were significantly lower than were those from DG VIII and the ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups. For the ratings of the future (1981), the ESC/Parliament/Private Groups respondents were by far the most optimistic, rating the Community significantly higher than did the Commission's DG VIII and DGX/SG on their respective scales of expectation. Only those in DG VIII and the COREPER appeared to be pessimistic about the immediate future of efforts to achieve European Union.

Table 4.49 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for European Union Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

Year	DGI ^a	DG VIII ^b	DGX/SG ^c	Total Commis- sion	ESC-Parl- ^d Int. Groups	COREPER ^e	Total Outside Commission
1971	4.22	4.64	3.11	4.09	4.63	5.25	4.44
1976	4.44	4.14	3.67	4.09	4.89	4.88	4.88
1981	6.11	4.17	5.11	5.22	6.75	5.25	6.00
(N)	(10)	(14)	(9)	(33)	(8)	(9)	(17)

^aDirectorate General I (external relations) of the Commission

^bDirectorate General VIII (development) of the Commission

^cDirectorate General X (information) and Secretariat General (Commission)

^dEconomic and Social Committee, Parliament, and Private Interest Groups.

^eCouncil of Permanent Representatives to the Community.

Some Preliminary Conclusions

Although guarded in their expectations, the Eurocrats and the general public support the efforts to achieve European Union. The reports on European Union are not the only indication of attitudinal support or ideological commitment for European Union in the Community. The collective assessment of the Eurocrats concerning recent progress toward European Union is that none has occurred, and that prospects for the immediate future are not very optimistic (as based on personal scales of expectations). Yet, when all aspects (sectors) of the Community are

considered, progress is anticipated.

All of the Eurocrats were specific as to what goal they desired for the European Union, and the majority preferred a federal arrangement (or even greater governmental centralization). The vast majority felt that further integration toward that goal would not happen automatically, but must be contrived by political leaders. As such, they appear to opt for the neo-functional approach, and if the concept of "spillover" was supported, it was Haas' "cultivated spillover" which had their support. Again as a group, the Eurocrats disapproved of Tindemans' suggestion that a two-tiered or two-speed Community be instituted (to allow those states with the stronger economies to further integrate without having to wait for their weaker partners), but they seemed to support Tindemans' including the European Council in the European Union, by expressing the belief that the European Council had an integrative effect on the Community. An additional conclusion involving strategies is that the Eurocrats believed that neither political nor economic union was a necessary precondition for the other (although they disagreed more with the argument that economic union should occur first).

As was previously mentioned, the Eurocrats believed that European integration was stagnating. However, they exhibited a positive (and accurate) perception of public opinion and institutional support for the future. As for the member states' governments, the rankings of the states' support for integration (relative to each other) seemed to indicate that the smaller the state, the greater its support for European Union. Except for Denmark, which for reasons mentioned earlier

in this Chapter (footnote #4) does not fit the pattern, one might conclude that the smaller the state, the less it has to lose in surrendering sovereignty, and therefore, the more it would support European integration.

In short, the hypothesis that European integration in general has reached a standstill and that the standstill is not due to a lack of widespread attitudinal support or ideological commitment is supported by the elite interviews and public opinion polls. That progress has been made in the Community's external relations sectors, particularly in efforts to achieve common foreign and development policies, requires further evidence. The reports on European Union specifically address the external relations of the Community and those recommendations have been purposely omitted from consideration in this chapter. They will, however, be the foci of the next four chapters.

CHAPTER V

TOWARD A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY

Nearly all the reports on European Union contain recommendations to establish a common Community foreign policy. Actually, foreign policy formulation in the European Community is already quite advanced and unique among regional organizations. Through the Treaty of Rome, the Community's member states have given its institutions extensive external relations competences, including the formulation of common commercial policies, the negotiation and conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, exclusive authority over the common external tariff, and the negotiation of external agreements. In general, however, the nine member states have acted together in international affairs in such a haphazard manner that they have failed to exercise political influence commensurate with their collective economic strength.¹ This realization, in part, motivated the Heads of State and Government of the original six member states at the Hague Summit in December, 1969, to charge their respective Foreign Ministers to report on "the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification within the

¹See Kenneth J. Twitchett, Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market (London: Europa, 1976), Chapter I.

context of enlargement"² and on how the Community member states should move to increase political cooperation between them and find means to harmonize their views in the field of international politics. The mandate was not the first but the third such attempt at political cooperation and unification in Europe.

The first two attempts at achieving a political union within the European Community, the European Defense Community (EDC) and the French "Plan Fouchet", were unsuccessful, it is argued, because they were premature and too presumptuous. The EDC project of the early fifties would have linked the defense establishments of the six original member states and created a European army with a common military budget. The French National Assembly defeated the project in 1954, and its downfall also doomed the proposed European Political Community.

The Fouchet Plan of the early nineteen sixties, which provided for a political commission to develop common positions in foreign affairs, suffered the same fate. The commission was to be located in Paris, strictly separated from existing Community institutions, and based on a mandate having the member states' unanimous approval. The "Plan Fouchet" failed in 1962 due to disputes over theoretical approaches, the proposed location of the Commission, and political rivalries (particularly between the French and the Dutch).³

Following the collapse of the Fouchet Plan, those who still hoped for a political cooperation arrangement in the Community saw their

²Bulletin of the European Communities 3 (November, 1970), p. 9.

³Robert McGeehan, "A Foreign Policy for the Nine?", European Community 161 (December, 1972), pp. 10-11.

hopes dashed by the Community "crisis" of 1965-1966, which ended in the "Luxembourg Compromise" (the 1965 gentlemen's agreement to observe a unanimity rule in the Council of Ministers) and a significant increase in the power of the Council of Ministers over the other Community institutions. Later, encouraged by favorable economic conditions and indications of increasing integration in the Community's internal affairs, the subject of political cooperation among the states was reopened at the Hague Summit.

The declared intention of the 1969 Summit at The Hague was "to pave the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its tradition and its mission."⁴ The Heads of State and of Government instructed their foreign ministers to prepare a report on the best way of achieving political unification, particularly in respect to the anticipated enlargement of the Community. The Ministers later reported that they

felt that foreign policy concertation should be the object of the first political endeavors to demonstrate to all that Europe has a political vocation....Being concerned to achieve progress towards political unification, the Governments should decide to cooperate in the field of foreign policy. This cooperation has two objectives: (a) To ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly; (b) To increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes, and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable.⁵

When compared to earlier proposals, the Luxembourg Report (as the report of the Foreign Ministers was commonly called) was quite

⁴Bulletin of the European Communities 3 (November, 1970), p. 9.

⁵Ibid., pp. 10-11.

modest. It reflected Gaullist resistance to expanding the roles of the Commission and the European Parliament and insistence that political cooperation be conducted within a loose intergovernmental structure pursuing common policies distinct from and, perhaps, even opposed to those of the United States. The Dutch and Germans, who had resisted the French earlier on these matters, yielded in hopes of reducing French resistance to admitting the four applicant states.⁶ The modestly stated objectives of consultation, coordination, and (where possible or desirable) common action, reflected the disagreement among the Six as to what policy objectives and institutional frameworks were appropriate for cooperation in foreign policy. The result was an arrangement which "at its birth more closely resembled an unexpected bastard than a planned child welcomed into the family of European institutions."⁷

Structurally, this unexpected "illegitimate offspring" consists of the ministerial meeting (Council of Ministers), the Committee of the Heads of Political Departments (often referred to as the Davignon Committee), and the Group of European Correspondents. There later developed, in addition, several expert working groups and meetings among the nine member states' ambassadors in the capital of whatever country might be, at any given time, the subject of discussion. This group of ambassadors provides a sort of ancillary organ to insure on-the-spot coordination under the chairmanship of the ambassador of the country which is currently President of the Council of Ministers. The function and importance of

⁶David J. Allen and William Wallace, Die europäische politische Zusammenarbeit; (Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik, 1976), pp. 2-3.

⁷Ibid., p. 1.

the primary organs are essentially similar to the Community's institutional superstructure. The Ministers who meet for political cooperation are the same individuals in the Council of Ministers. The Committee of Political Directors roughly equates to the rank, importance, and task orientations of the Ambassadors to the Permanent Representations (COREPER), and the Group of European Correspondents (civil servants in the capitals of the nine Foreign Ministries whose function is to maintain contacts with the experts in the other eight Foreign Ministries and to follow through on the implementation of decisions) can be roughly compared to the Action Groups in the COREPER.⁸ (See Figure 5.1)

The decision-making process in the area of external relations is different for matters where competence is bestowed by the Treaty than it is for matters not mentioned by the Treaty but considered under the preview of political cooperation. For the former, the usual procedure is for the Commission to submit proposals to the Council of Ministers which it can accept, reject, or modify. In a very few cases, consultation with the European Parliament is required, or consultation with the Parliament or the Economic and Social Committee has become a pro forma practice, but advice from either body is in no way binding. The Council will normally refer the Commission's proposals to the COREPER for study and recommendation.⁹ In that way, the COREPER acts as a sort of filtering agent, and fulfills a role which many perceive as a conservative check

⁸Ranier Lau, "Political Cooperation" (unpublished paper delivered before the European Community Conference at Chatham House, England, March, 1976), p. 2.

⁹A more thorough explanation is provided in Chapter I.




Figure 5.1
The Structural Relationship of Political Cooperation
to Community Institutions

on an executive body (the Commission) inclined to extend its competences whenever possible.¹⁰ The staff of the COREPER is frequently consulted informally by the Commission before it submits a proposal to the Council. In order to handle the workload, the nine ambassadors and their staffs of the Permanent Representations (totalling over four hundred civil servants) have established numerous working groups, subcommittees, and ad hoc committees that parallel the functional structure of the Commission.¹¹ Altiero Spinelli, one of the Commissioners until his recent election to the Italian Parliament, characterized the COREPER as a body that:

...constitutes a sort of legislative chamber for the member countries and examines, amends and approves (or disapproves with relegation to the files) a large part of the proposals for rules of directives made by the Commission. It is an accepted constitutional custom that when an agreement is reached in COREPER, the Council ratifies it without further discussion. COREPER, for its part, passes to the Council only those points on which the Permanent Representatives have not wished to reach agreement, either because the points at issue are politically too important for the level of authority granted them, or because they have been unable to reach agreement due to too many incompatible differences in their mandates.¹²

¹⁰Based on interviews with COREPER officials in Brussels, June - July, 1976. One official of the British Permanent Representation put it this way: "The role of the Commission is to be European integration-oriented. The role of the missions is to pour cold water on Commission proposals that are too politically centralist." Most Commission functionaires repudiate the notion arguing that the Commission has too few personnel to fulfill its present responsibilities to want more competences. However, I overheard more than one conversation during my interviews in the Commission concerning how part of a Commission proposal to the Council might be worded to insure more Commission involvement and still get past the COREPER.

¹¹Werner J. Feld, "Problems of Foreign Policy Formulation in Interstate Association: The European Communities" (unpublished discussion paper, March, 1975), pp. 4-6.

¹²Altiero Spinelli, The European Adventure (London: Charles Knight and Co., 1972), pp. 32-33.

The decision-making structure for political cooperation is deliberately different from the institutional arrangements provided in the Treaty of Rome. First, as a procedure, political cooperation promises everything and nothing. The original mandate was very broad and intentionally vague. There is no commitment to agree, but only to consult on all important questions of foreign policy or on any question of their choice that the member states might propose.¹³ The major feature of political cooperation is that it has always been considered as a separate procedure, one which deals with matters of "high politics" (strictly political matters in the tradition of the Gaullist conception) as distinct from technical economic or "low politics" issues which fall within the legal framework of the Treaties. This insistence on the formalistic distinction between "high politics" (nation-state competence) and "low politics" (Community institution competence) reached a seemingly absurd level in November, 1973, when the Conference of Foreign Ministers met in the morning in Copenhagen to discuss political cooperation, then flew at mid-day to Brussels to meet as the Community's Council of Ministers. Not all the member governments accepted the political/economic, high/low politics distinctions at the beginning. Their administrators, however, were easily able to adjust to them. Political Directors, for example, were largely excluded from the relationship between Permanent Representatives in Brussels and Economic Directors and others who served to coordinate national policies and Community policies. Accustomed to the principle of multilateral negotiations in NATO, the political

¹³The "Luxembourg Report," Part II, iv (Bulletin of the European Communities 9 (1973), pp. 19-21.)

cooperation machinery offered them and their directorates a similar role at the Community level. The zeal with which many Foreign Ministries adapted to and pushed for the development of political cooperation might also be explained as a natural bureaucratic reaction. Since political cooperation focused on the central concerns of diplomacy and foreign policy formulation, the Foreign Ministry's control of the procedure was neither threatened by any other Ministry nor by any one powerful domestic constituency. Having lost some of their traditional role as gatekeeper between domestic and foreign policy-making to the internal Ministries on Community affairs, the creation of a Community functional area to be exclusively their domain was most welcome.¹⁴

A problem that has plagued the political cooperation efforts in the Community since its inception has been one of what the proper relationship should be between political cooperation and Community institutions. Of particular concern was the overlap of functional competences between the two arrangements.¹⁵ The overriding practical consideration is that an increasing number of topics have emerged (and continue to emerge) in which separation of the two areas is impossible and the

¹⁴Allen and Wallace, pp. 5-6. In my interviews in The Hague, I found that the Dutch had a Minister President's Cabinet Sub-committee on External Relations to coordinate all activities concerning the Community except one: political cooperation (the sole competence of the Foreign Ministry).

¹⁵McGeehan and Warnecke emphasized this point strongly in one of the first articles published on political cooperation in the Community. See Robert McGeehan and Steven Warnecke, "Europe's Foreign Policies: Economics, Politics, or Both?", Orbis, (Winter, 1974), pp. 1251-1279.

simultaneous coordination of the economic and political positions of the member states is indispensable. Examples of these areas are the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Eur-Arab Dialogue, the Community's Mediterranean Policy, relations with the United States, relations with COMECON, and many of the issues considered in the United Nations. The overlap is an especially important problem when one considers the relationship of political cooperation to the major Community institutions. Economic elements can be found within almost all political decisions and, in the European Community, these involve the Community's institutions in Brussels. For example, the political efforts to reach a common position on the war in Cyprus had an impact on the Community's association agreements with Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Also, when political discussions on the Middle East are in progress, the Community's preferential agreement with Israel is bound to be raised. In an incident which seriously embarrassed the political cooperation participants (particularly those who most strongly advocated keeping the Community institutions out of their deliberations), an expert working group spent months drafting a proposal on the Nine's political relations with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and presented its proposal at a committee meeting at which, for the first time, the Commission was represented. Much to the consternation of the experts, Mr. Wellenstein, the Commission Representative, had to point out that the report failed to mention that the Commission had had regular relations with ASEAN at a fairly high level for many years, and that any "political relations" could do little more than supplement the existent relationship as the main linkages between the two groups

were economic. The political cooperation experts had not included this in their report and had devoted a great deal of unnecessary time and work simply because the insistence on excluding Community institutions had made them ignorant of the EC-ASEAN linkages.¹⁶

Of the four major Community institutions with which political cooperation concerns overlap (the Council, COREPER, Parliament, and Commission), the role played by the Parliament is the simplest and least significant.¹⁷ In 1973, the second Davignon Report suggested that the Foreign Minister chairing the political cooperation machinery should make an annual report to the Parliament,¹⁸ and since 1975, members of the European Parliament are entitled to put written or oral questions concerning political cooperation, with the exception that questions concerning political cooperation cannot be asked during "question time" as such answers require the coordination and approval of all nine foreign ministries.¹⁹

Relations between the Political Cooperation Ministers and the Council of Ministers is a matter of form, as both bodies are composed of the same individuals. An important development is that the Ministers are changing their political cooperation and Council "hats" with increasing frequency and informality, often during the same meeting. Cross-

¹⁶Based on interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976.

¹⁷Direct elections and Parliamentary control of the budget in 1978 may change this significantly, however.

¹⁸"Second Report on European Political Cooperation on Foreign Policy," Part II, 10 (Bulletin of the European Communities 9 (1973), p. 17).

¹⁹Lau, p. 5.

continent treks, like the one from Copenhagen to Brussels in November, 1973, appear to be relegated to the past. There exists some difficulty in discerning the relationship between the Committee of the Heads of Political Departments (Davignon Committee) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) in Brussels. Here, again, problems arise with respect to competences in direct proportion to the extent a given topic under discussion involves both political and economic aspects. The resultant conflicts often amount to internal power struggles between a nation's Head of the Political Department and the Permanent Representative in Brussels. Both are of equally high rank and both continually contend for their minister's ear.²⁰ Professional jealousies, traditional hierarchies of national civil servants, and personality difficulties all combine to exacerbate difficulties in relations between the Political Director, the Ambassador to the Community, and their respective staffs.²¹ These considerations serve to increase appreciation for the significance of the Commission's importance for political cooperation; the Commission is represented on both committees, often by the same individuals.

The Commission's participation in the political cooperation

²⁰There are numerous examples. From several interviews in The Hague, I learned that the Dutch Permanent Representative had "more of the Minister's ear" by virtue of his extensive experience and forceful personality. The Irish appeared to have the opposite arrangement. An official of the Irish Permanent Representation told me that when Ireland had the Presidency of the Council and political cooperation, he got most of his information first from the British Permanent Representation, and later from Dublin.

²¹Lau, p. 6.

machinery has been substantial since 1974, and particularly so because of the more open Council presidencies of, first, the Irish in January, 1975, and then of the Italians, Luxembourgers, and the Dutch. Commission representatives now take part in all meetings of the Heads of Political Departments, all ministerial meetings, meetings of the CSCE Follow-up Working Group, and all of the Eur-Arab Dialogue working groups. The Commission also takes part on an ad hoc basis in the Africa, Latin America, and Asia working groups, and are excluded from participating in only one, the Middle East Working Group (which discusses the purely political aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict). The major difference between the Commission's role in other Community bodies and in political cooperation is that in the Council and COREPER, the Commission has certain rights granted to it by the Treaties and, therefore, has nearly the status of a tenth delegation in the Council of Ministers. In the political cooperation bodies, however, the Commission has no more than a sort of observer status.²²

To date, the topics discussed in and by those engaged in the political cooperation machinery have been numerous and cover a variety of interests. By 1973, the topics included the Middle East, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Community's role in the less developed nations, the political institutions of the enlarged Community, preparation for the Paris and Copenhagen Summits, international terrorism, recognition of North Vietnam, relations with the United States, and an attempt to define a European identity. The most difficult topic proved to be the Middle East, where common positions

²²Ibid., pp. 7-9.

were not reached by the Nine due to differing philosophies concerning the OPEC oil boycott and Israeli pressure on the Germans concerning the Yom Kippur war.²³

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The most highly regarded area of political cooperation (and, therefore, the one most often mentioned by officials in the Community) is the CSCE. Political cooperation between the Nine was so successful during the negotiations which led to the Summit in Helsinki for two major reasons: all of the member countries saw potential gains in cooperating to maximize their influence over the shape and agenda of the conference; and, given the relative lack of policy differences between them, few costs were anticipated. Also, the division of the conference into "baskets" of issues neatly coincided with the distinction between Community and non-Community ("high politics") matters.²⁴ Work in the conference began in late 1971. A political cooperation working group made up of foreign ministry officials was formed to prepare the security, humanitarian, and cultural aspects of the CSCE. During the long series of preparatory sessions which began in November, 1972, and

²³McGeehan and Warnecke, pp. 1251-1279.

²⁴Allen and Wallace, p. 7. The member states had differences, even in "Basket II" which involved items within Community competence under the Treaty of Rome. However, they managed to find compromises through daily meetings of representatives of the nine governments and the Commission. Some reservations remained even after the conclusion of the Final Act, however. France had wanted stronger guarantees of reciprocity in East-West mutual exchanges and had earlier proposed amending CSCE document II/D/9 in CSCE document II/D/150. Some of the Nine were concerned about "awkward problems over the nomination of representatives" concerning business contracts

culminated with the Final Act, the practice of political cooperation was gradually extended into other multi-national organizations and conferences.²⁵ Perhaps the most singularly successful aspect was totally symbolic, but nonetheless most significant. Despite consistent objections by the Soviet Union, which had refused to recognize the Community, the European Community became a signatory to the CSCE Final Act when Mr. Aldo Moro signed both as Prime Minister of Italy and as President of the European Community's Council of Ministers. Despite

and facilities. Germany, France, and Italy took exception to East German and Hungarian positions which "diluted" industrial cooperation arrangements in the Final Act, and, in the area of cooperation in science and technology, Germany had reservations concerning specific bilateral arrangements involving industrial cooperation; Belgium, Germany, France, and Italy had expressed a particular point of view concerning discussions about the environment; and Italy, Ireland, and the Netherlands had proposed stronger measures in the promotion of tourism. (This information is taken from an unpublished, not as yet released analysis of the CSCE Final Act by the Davignon Committee: *Cooperation Politique Européenne, "Cooperation dans la Domaines de l'Economie, de la Science et de la Technique, et de l'Environnement: Analyse des Resolutions,"* GT(76)1, Luxembourg, March 9, 1976, Annexes, pp. 1-115.)

²⁵The Community has observer status in 26 U.N. institutions and special agencies, and maintains relationships with 14 non-U.N. international organizations (ranging from direct voting delegates for the Nine to the status of "auditeur") and 10 commodities councils. See, Commission des Communautés Europeennes, Direction Generale des Relations Exterieures, "Tableau synoptique des relations entre la Communauté et les Organisations internationelles", Note d'Information I/212/75 - F, June, 1975. Also see the interesting study of voting cohesion of the member states in the U.N. (based on 518 role call votes in the General Assembly from 1948 to 1973) by Leon Hurwitz reported in his "The European Economic Community in the "United Nations: The Voting Behaviour of Eight Countries, 1948-1973" , Journal of Common Market Studies XIII (March, 1975), pp. 224-243.

the limited aims of political cooperation in the CSCE (proposals, for the most part, were at the very general level rather than in the form of detailed, specific agreements), and the consequently limited possibilities for disagreement, the almost daily successes of political cooperation in the CSCE paved the way for the 1972 Luxembourg Report, the Copenhagen Report,²⁶ and the optimistic call for political union in the 1973 Paris Summit of the European Council.

The optimism ended late in 1973, however. Political cooperation in the Community effectively disintegrated after the OPEC oil embargo was begun. The shock of the embargo and the resultant "go-it-alone" strategies of the member states did, however, have a positive side. During 1974, the "boundaries" between Community institutions and political cooperation were lowered (primarily in discussions in the Council of Ministers), the Commission was accepted as a "tenth member" of the Community, and the Eur-Arab Dialogue, a direct result of the oil embargo, was begun.

The Eur-Arab Dialogue

Following the formal declarations of the Nine in Copenhagen on November 6, 1973, and the Arab Summit held soon after in Algiers (both of which professed an awareness of producer/consumer economic interdependence and a need for closer contacts and relations based on reciprocity), the Eur-Arab Dialogue was officially opened in Paris, on

²⁶The Copenhagen Report led to the Commission's involvement in Basket II of the CSCE, and took note of the fact that in 1973, the number of meetings of the Political Directors was nine, five more than had been initially proposed per annum.

July 31, 1974. The conference included thirty-one participants: the nine Community nations, the twenty Arab League states, and delegations both from the Community and the Arab League. It was the format of the negotiations that constituted its most unique feature; each side, the Europeans and the Arabs, had co-chairmen speaking on behalf of their respective member states. For the European Community, it was the President of the Commission and the President of the Council of Ministers (the latter rotates every six months among the member states). The designated co-chairmen for the Arab States were the President of the Arab League and the League's Secretary-General.²⁷ This arrangement has had two interesting effects on political cooperation in the Community. First, it significantly lessened the politics/economics dictomy which had been the basis for the separation of political cooperation from Community institutions. Although the discussion (so far as the Nine are concerned) is to concern only commerce, raw materials and energy, no one has ever doubted that the conference had political importance from the beginning. The Arabs have made no secret of their desire to include the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question on the Dialogue's

²⁷The Arab League has patterned much of its organization since the beginning of the Eur-Arab Dialogue using the European Community as a model. One Commission official told me that delegates from the Arab League had made several trips to the Commission in Brussels to study its operation and, on their last visit, took back with them a copy of the Commissions Directory to use as a guide in restructuring the League's executive organs (from an interview in Brussels, July, 1976).

agenda.²⁸ The Community, which has separate commercial agreements with Israel and with several of the Arab States, has indicated on numerous occasions that it opposed any such inclusion on the agenda. Many feel the talks may well be expanded to discussions of the consequences of the CSCE, coordination at the U.N., and the struggle against terrorism.²⁹ The second major effect of the Eur-Arab Dialogue's format is the official integration of the Commission into an area of prime concern for political cooperation. Supplying the co-chairman, the Commission is much more than a "tenth delegate" in the Dialogue; indeed, the Council of Ministers' attempts to confine the talks to commercial and economic matters gives the Commission the dominant role as the talks center on competences the Commission alone exercises under the Treaty of Rome.

Despite several pessimistic assessments made in the press and by many Community bureaucrats,³⁰ there are reasons to believe that, at a minimum, some positive results should come out of the Dialogue. The Arabs have some advantages they hope to gain from the Dialogue beyond

²⁸ At the first meeting of the General Commission in Luxembourg (May 18-21, 1976), Ambassador Abd El Aziz Saad El Chamlan, Chairman of the Arab side of the Dialogue, made two demands in his introductory speech: that the Europeans exert pressure on Israel to give up occupied territories, and that the Europeans recognize de jure and de facto the Palestine Liberation Organization. Europolitique 327 (May 22, 1976), "Relations Exterieurs", p. 5.

²⁹ Ranier Lau, "Le Dialogue Euro-Arabe et Sa Place Dans La Politique Mediterranéenne des Neuf," Revue du Marché Commun 193 (February, 1976), pp. 71-73.

³⁰ Europolitique 328 (March 27, 1976), "Featured Document", p. 1.

using it, as many have suggested, as a political forum. The oil reserves are finite (estimates vary between thirty and forty years), and the Arab States need modern development while they have the wealth to invest in it. Europe offers technology, trained labor, and long-term capital investment opportunities. On the European side, there is more of importance than the need to guarantee oil supplies and turn dependence into interdependence. One high official in the Economic and Social Committee summed it well: "We Europeans have two cards (up our sleeves) in this game with the Arabs. We have a traditional and historic relationship with the peoples of the Arab states and, given a choice of dealing with the Americans, the Russians, or the Europeans, which do you think the Arabs would prefer?"³¹

The Eur-Arab Dialogue is now in its operational stage. The joint body, the "General Commission", met in May, 1976 (six months after initial plans called for it to meet), and issued a two-part final communiqué which indicated a balanced approach to the discussions -- between the exchange of general declarations of a political nature and measures on practical cooperation and procedures. The following five points summarize the results of the meeting:

1. For the first time an exchange of declarations took place within the framework of the Eur-Arab Dialogue on the positions of the two parties on political issues.
2. In the economic field in general the common interest was recognized which each party to the Dialogue has in the other's economy being healthy and prosperous and the need to do everything possible to promote this objective.

³¹From an interview in Brussels, June, 1976.

3. In the field of practical cooperation not only were the priorities laid down at the Rome and Abu Dhabi meetings formalized but on a proposal from the European side the General Committee adopted a list comprising a number of initial concrete projects, such as a rural development project in the South Darfour region, the establishment of a polytechnic institute in an Arab country, etc. For these schemes, the preparatory work is in progress.
4. The tricky problem of financing was discussed and the two parties agreed to contribute in an appropriate manner to the projects adopted by common agreement. On this matter the European side to some extent gave ground since it had hitherto proceeded on the principle that the studies and schemes should be financed solely by the Arab side.
5. The General Committee formally established the Dialogue's working machinery: the Working Groups and the various Specialized Groups were set up, their timetables and the venues of their next meetings fixed.³²

The Eur-Arab Dialogue has weathered many "political storms".

The conclusion of the EEC/Israeli Agreement, the adoption of an "anti-Palestinian resolution" in the European Parliament, Arab reactions to holding the Second International Conference on Jews in the USSR, and the "Zionism vote" in the U.N.,³³ comprises but an incomplete list of the most highly reported incidents. The final communiqué of the General Commission revealed a note of optimism for the Eur-Arab Dialogue in particular, and political cooperation in general, as is indicated by the following:

On the whole this has been a good week for Eur-Arab relations. The tensions still exist, but, following the first meeting of the Eur-Arab Dialogue's general commission in Luxembourg May 18-21, they no longer seem insurmountable. Indeed, not only did the meeting avoid the political showdown many had feared, but it invested a dialogue which was stuck in the mud of its own making with a new dynamism.³⁴

³²Speech by Ranier Lau before a group of Arab students in Rome, July 12, 1976.

³³Europolitique 303 (February 21, 1976), "Institutions", p. 1.

³⁴Europolitique 327 (May 22, 1976), "Focus", p. 1.

A discussion of political cooperation which cites only the successes of the CSCE and the Eur-Arab Dialogue provides, certainly, an incomplete and inaccurate account. Political cooperation in the Community has had some definite failures, perhaps the greatest of which was the failure to negotiate a "new relationship" with the United States. In a more recent example, France announced on February 17, 1976, its unilateral recognition of the MPLA government in the People's Republic of Angola without having notified the other members of the Community. France acted even though the Nine had agreed the day before to recognize the Neto government collectively, but at a time yet to be determined.³⁵ Three months later, France again proved to be the "bête noire" in political cooperation. Without consulting its EC partners, France proposed sending its troops to Lebanon to attempt to end the civil war there after the Nine (through the political cooperation machinery) had agreed that there should be no European initiative in Lebanon beyond low-keyed diplomatic efforts. The reaction of the other eight member states was to insist on the complete disassociation of the French announcement from Community political cooperation.³⁶

External Influences

A more serious rift in the Community resulted from an extra-EC initiative. When President Ford called for a second "Rambouillet" to be held in Puerto Rico in late June, 1976, he invited only the large Community states (Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany) to meet with

³⁵Europolitique 302 (February 18, 1976), "Institutions", p. 4.

³⁶Europolitique 328 (May 27, 1976), "Institutions", p. 3.

the United States, Canada, and Japan.³⁷ After noting the negative reaction of the smaller five EC states to having been ignored, the United States indicated that it would invite a Community delegate if the Community so wished. The smaller states reacted sharply at not having been consulted by the larger four and drafted a proposal to have Gaston Thorn, the President of the Council of Ministers, attend, but France blocked the draft at the last minute because it objected to establishing a precedent for future summit meetings.³⁸ The reaction, in part, by the smaller states was expressed by Hermann Bohle (of Germany's Der Zeit):

EC manners deteriorate rapidly. The foreign ministers meeting, in which a last attempt is to be made to agree on the first European election before the chiefs of government meet in July, can of course be rescheduled for compelling reasons. But the fact that four partner states do not even consult the other five is far worse than the inconsiderateness of many lords of creation who stand their wives up. But our equal-rights ladies can at least defend themselves in this age of emancipation. The smaller EC states, however, feel passed over as weaklings even before the summit giants begin their palavers in Puerto Rico. The EC states, which urgently need a unification of equal peoples, can no longer take such liberties - this is already the second time. The EC, as a partnership between bigger and smaller countries, would break up and forfeit its fascination of East Europe and the Third World. The Germans, who for no good reason are in ill favor in Europe at this time, have just missed an opportunity. They could have insisted on Community participation by Council President Gaston Thorn.³⁹

This incident, like the breakdown of political cooperation as a result of the OPEC embargo, is indicative of the political cooperation's

³⁷ New York Times editorial reprinted in The International Herald Tribune, July 1, 1976, p. 4.

³⁸ David Haworth, "EEC Seeks Plan for Summit Roles," International Herald Tribune, June 28, 1976, p. 2.

³⁹ Herman Bohle, "Row in the EC," Luxembourger Wort, June 9, 1976, p. 1.

frail susceptibility to outside influences. Indeed, many Europeans blamed the United States for causing the split in the Community. They point out that in a May 25th (1976) Luncheon address, Secretary Kissinger had called for Europeans to build European unity stating, "We believe that it is imperative that Europe unify itself. We will encourage it, we will cooperate with it, and indeed we think the most meaningful cooperation between Europe and the United States will occur only after Europe has achieved political unity..."⁴⁰ They also point out that the United States had contributed nothing but harm to that end by inviting only four of the Community's member states and then, only as an after-thought, a Community representative.

Dissention Within: A European Directorate?

One further related development has cast a shadow on the future of political cooperation in the Community. Despite denials by Prime Minister Callaghan, President Giscard d'Estaing, and Chancellor Schmidt, something resembling a European Community "directorate" may be taking shape. The annual bilateral talks between France and Germany were conducted in Hamburg the first week in July, 1976, only a few days after the Declaration of London (an agreement on French-British yearly summits) was signed during Giscard's visit to Whitehall.⁴¹ What these events leave open to question is whether the institutionalization of Franco-

⁴⁰"Kissinger Calls on Europeans to Build European Unity," Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the European Communities, no. 25, May 28, 1976, p. 1.

⁴¹International Herald Tribune, June 24, 1976, p. 1.

British meetings at all levels, added to the same arrangement for France and Germany, will amount to a willful avoidance of Brussels by the "big three" enabling them first to coordinate policies that can then be implemented in and by the European Council. The possible development of a Bonn-Paris-London Axis would be a blow to Italy and the smaller states and to political cooperation among the Nine.⁴²

Positive Aspects: Toward Continued Integration

There are many indications that political cooperation is having an integrative effect in the Community. One such condition actually resulted from an initial breakdown in political cooperation. The French had always wanted a permanent political secretariat to be located in Paris, but others, particularly the Dutch, questioned the motives of the French and objected to the proposed location. The French, who were the most adamant at keeping political cooperation separate from the Community, would hear nothing of placing the secretariat in Brussels. (The Dutch had argued that after enlargement, Brussels would more nearly be the geographical center of the Community.) The compromise solution was for the member state holding the office of the Presidency of the Council to fulfill the function of secretariat for political cooperation, with the understanding that the other foreign ministries would offer staff assistance should the workload become too great (an important consideration for the smaller states). The work of this travelling secretariat has been confined to the purely technical matters of organizing for the

⁴²James Goldsborough, "Who's in Charge Here?", International Herald Tribune, July 1, 1976, p. 2.

meetings and recording the proceedings. Yet, the process suffers from a lack of continuity, since each time the Presidency changes hands the new incumbent must form its own political cooperation secretariat. A new development in this area occurred when Ireland took the Presidency in January, 1975. Lacking a sufficient number of multi-lingual secretaries, the Irish recruited four women from the Commission in Brussels to work in the foreign office in Dublin (Irish Foreign Minister Fitzgerald is said to have jokingly referred to the four secretaries as his "European Secretariat"). When the Italians took the Presidency in July, 1975, they took over en bloc the four multi-lingual secretaries, prompting many to see the move as the possible germ of an acceptable permanent (administrative) political secretariat. When Luxembourg assumed the Presidency in January, 1976, however, they had neither the need nor the resources to continue the arrangement, and the four women found jobs once again in Brussels.⁴³ The problem of the political secretariat has not as yet been resolved. During the CSCE, the necessity for daily meetings compensated for the lack of a secretariat,⁴⁴ but no other development has provided anything to fulfill that role, not even the Eur-Arab Dialogue. There appears to be no insistence on the part of any of the member states for an independent secretariat for political cooperation. But there also appears to be growing consensus that the "rotating secretariat" should be (and will eventually be) replaced by

⁴³Based on interviews in the Commission and COREPER in Brussels, June-July, 1976.

⁴⁴Allen and Wallace argue that the CSCE made a decisive contribution to the development and tone of political cooperation. See, Allen and Wallace, p. 7.

some sort of arrangement in Brussels, probably in a section of the Council of Ministers' General-Secretariat.⁴⁵

A structural arrangement exists among the Nine which is a direct result of political cooperation and which has had an integrative effect, at least between the nine foreign ministries. This key element is the COREU network, a telex system which links the nine capitals in a sort of "European hotline". The system was highly praised by the foreign ministry officials with whom I spoke in the COREPER and in the Foreign Ministries in Brussels and The Hague. Officials in the Commission, however, point to the fact that the system connects nine technically different machines (cooperation is all very well, but each ministry naturally prefers its own equipment), and that the machinery failed miserably when the attempt was made to transmit voluminous working papers containing tables of figures concerning the Eur-Arab Dialogue.⁴⁶ But this shortcoming may soon be corrected. A high official in the Dutch foreign ministry told me that one of the initiatives during the Dutch Presidency would be to encourage all to adopt telex transceivers (a system linking photocopying machines) which are now in use by the Danes.⁴⁷

There are continuing indications that the Eur-Arab Dialogue is having some integrative impact on the Community. The Dialogue not only

⁴⁵This opinion was shared by all nine of the COREPER officials with whom I talked, and all were relating what each believed to be their respective governments' official positions at that time.

⁴⁶R. Lau, "Political Cooperation," p. 3.

⁴⁷Based on interviews in The Hague, July 15, 1976.

has helped to narrow the gap between low and high politics (the Community and political cooperation), but, in addition, the commitment to an economic response in the Dialogue necessitated a similar lowering of boundaries between political and economic considerations in the national administrations.⁴⁸ The format of the Dialogue has enhanced the role of the Community institutions, particularly the Commission. As co-chairman of the Eur-Arab Dialogue, the Commission also co-chairs the preparatory and expert working groups for the Dialogue. For example, the European chairmen of the meetings of groups of experts provide the presiding chairman of the European Coordination Group, who changes every six months (in July, 1975, in Cairo it was Mr. E. Gallagher, Assistant Secretary in the Irish Foreign Ministry; in July, 1975, in Rome and in November, 1975, in Abu Dhabi it was Italian Ambassador H. E. M. C. Regard; and in Luxembourg in 1976, it was His Excellency Mr. J. Wagner), and, for the Commission, it was in all cases the Deputy Secretary-General of the Commission, Mr. Klaus Meyer. (The Arabs also rotated the representation of one co-chairman among representatives of the Arab League states; the representative of the League was, for all the meetings, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.)⁴⁹ The fact that the Council of Ministers' representative rotates affords one decided advantage to the Commission, that of continuity. Meyer has had longer (and, in this case, stronger) ties with participants on the Arab side, he has had more experience in the dialogue,

⁴⁸Allen and Wallace, p. 13.

⁴⁹R. Lau's speech in Rome, July, 1976.

and, because of his continuous presence and involvement, a long-range perspective throughout the discussions. Meyer once jokingly complained of the arrangement, pointing out that at every meeting of experts he had to introduce a new co-chairman to the Arab officials.⁵⁰

Perhaps the most solidly integrative aspect of political cooperation is that, while failing to achieve common positions and although "political cooperation has seldom led to anything more than the Community reacting to events,"⁵¹ political cooperation has instilled the "habit" of working together, at least among the nine Foreign Ministers. As Viscount Etienne Davignon, then Director-General of the Belgian Foreign Office and the man considered the "father of political cooperation" in the Community, stated in an interview in March, 1976, "Nowadays, the difficulties are recognized but joint action is not rejected out of hand. It is obvious that there will be difficulties and problems, but as I said at the outset, the changes resulting from working together mean that there are no longer any taboo subjects."⁵² This "habit" is sufficiently advanced that "non-EEC countries in international frameworks such as the U.N. and UNESCO are increasingly attentive to what position the nine will collectively take...our consultation has become a political phenomenon and is recognized as such externally...

⁵⁰Based on interviews in Brussels, July, 1976.

⁵¹Commission's Report on European Union, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/75, para. 65.

⁵²Europolitique 313 (March 27, 1976), "Featured Document", p. 5.

which is clear progress over what existed previously."⁵³

Many questions concerning political cooperation and efforts to achieve common foreign policy stances in the Community persist. Case study analyses fail to provide adequate clues as to the direction and intensity of political cooperation initiatives, and the general reports on European Union are vague or silent concerning the desired end-products (goals) of political cooperation, the preferred (or a priority listing of) strategies to achieve those ends, and assessments of the present state of integration in Community political cooperation/foreign policy. Of the very few attempts to address these points, nearly all are by news reporters rather than scholars, and virtually all such attempts are based on public opinion polls or speeches/interviews with government leaders. The next chapter, Chapter VI, will contain (as did Chapter IV for Chapter III) the collective insight of the fifty "Eurocrats". Moreover, the next chapter is their evaluation of the Community's institutions and member states both in terms of the present state of integration and the support each gives to moving toward a common foreign policy. Also included are surveys of the Eurocrat's opinions of positive and negative political cooperation/foreign policy end-products, of their perceptions concerning the choice of certain strategies designed to achieve positive end-products and expectations as to the future development of political cooperation in the Community. Again, as was argued in Chapter IV, the collective insight of the Eurocrats has an importance that goes beyond its use in evaluating the findings presented in this

⁵³Ibid., p. 2.

policy analysis chapter. It represents the thinking of many of those who are in a position to directly influence decisions made in the Community; some of these people will be at the highest levels of decision-making in the not-so-distant future.

CHAPTER VI

THE 'EUROCRATS': TOWARD A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY

The European Community is moving toward a time when the member states will "speak with one voice" in all its external relations. The statements, official reports, and case studies mentioned in Chapter V indicate that some progress has been made, particularly in narrowing the gap between "low and high politics" and in increasing routine cooperation among the nine foreign ministries. In attempting to assess the extent of this progress, there are certain questions for which the statements, official reports, and case studies fail to provide definitive answers. What, for example, is the desired goal for future foreign policy-making in the Community? Should the process continue to be one of inter-governmental or centralized decision-making? Will a common foreign policy depend on a common defense policy, or will it come only in reaction to some external threat or development? Is there sufficient support among the Community's institutions and among member states' governments and publics?

In order to attempt to answer these questions, and to assess

the current and immediate future state of integration in attempts to achieve a common Community foreign policy, we must again turn to the "Eurocrats",¹ the group of European Community officials who are among those most knowledgeable about the Community's external relations. It is their collective expert opinion which we shall explore.

Personal Commitment to a Community Foreign Policy

Before attempting to discern which goals and strategies are preferred by the Eurocrats to achieve "Europe's speaking with one voice", it should be instructive to discover whether or not the Eurocrats agree with the notion at all, and if any differences exist between groups based on nationality, institution, attitude toward the Community, or demographic variables.² As one of the more sensitive considerations involving a common Community foreign policy is the recognition that some

¹For an explanation of the Eurocrats, a profile of the fifty respondents, and details as to methodology, see Chapter II of this dissertation.

²As a convention, only those independent variables that showed a significant relationship (at .05 by t) will be reported throughout this chapter for all questions asked the Eurocrats.

significant loss of sovereignty of the member states must occur,³ I chose to include the important issue of sovereignty in a question designed to measure agreement at the most general level. Rather than attempt to measure degrees of support for yielding varying amounts of national sovereignty to the Community in the area of foreign affairs, I asked the Eurocrats whether they agreed or disagreed with a comment made recently by an Italian official.⁴ The statement and total response results are contained in Table 6.1.

³As H. R. Nord, Secretary-General of the European Parliament, put it: "You cannot have a Community without stepping on the toes of national sovereignty." Quoted from Daniel Yerkin, "Europe's Endless Crisis," European Community 194 (April-May, 1976), p. 11. Examples of the concern over the loss of sovereignty and its possible implications may be found in the great numbers of books and pamphlets which were meant to combat "anti-marketeer" efforts in Britain and Denmark to equate Community membership with a substantial loss of sovereignty and, hence, national self-determination. See, for example, Robert J. Lieber, British Politics and European Union: Parties, Elites, and Pressure Groups (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973); Uwe Kitzinger, Europe's Wider Horizons (London: The Federal Trust, 1975); and Commission of the EC (London Information Office), "Europe at a Glance" (particularly the section, "What the Community is not," pp. 1-4).

⁴The comment is quoted from Yerkin, p. 4.

Table 6.1 - "In Foreign Affairs, sovereignty is the ability to influence the external world; if Europeans want to establish a presence in foreign affairs, the way to do it is to unite."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
28 (58%)	12 (24%)	4 (8%)	1 (2%)	2 (4%)	3 (6%)
Mean Response = 1.92 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)					

When the Eurocrats' responses were analyzed as to the nationality of the respondents, some significant differences appeared (Table 6.2). The Belgians, all of whom strongly agreed, and the only negative group, the Dutch, had responses that differed significantly from certain other groups and from each other. Further differences were evident when the respondents were grouped as to work experience before coming to work in or with the Community, and as to the respondents' answers as to possible states for European Union (see Table 4.4 in Chapter IV) and for foreign policy (Table 6.4). As is indicated in Table 6.3, those having had prior business experience were less in agreement than those with professional or no prior working experience. Those who opted for a federal arrangement or a unitary state (designated here as the "federalists") and those who preferred foreign-policy making to be made totally by the

Community's central institutions were significantly more in favor of the statement than were those who opted for less ambitious goals (the "non-federalists" and "non-centralists") for European Union and Community foreign policy-making.

Table 6.2 - "In foreign affairs, sovereignty is the ability to influence the external world; if Europeans want to establish a presence in foreign affairs, the way to do it is to unite."

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	1.00 ^a
Netherlands	5	3.60 ^b
Luxembourg	2	1.00
Ireland	3	1.33
Denmark	3	3.00
United Kingdom	11	2.18
Italy	6	1.33
West Germany	8	2.00
France	6	1.50
TOTAL	50	1.92

^aDiffers significantly from responses of the Dutch, Danes, British, and French (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from responses of the Belgians, Italians, and French.

Table 6.3 - "In foreign affairs, sovereignty is the ability to influence the external world; if Europeans want to establish a presence in foreign affairs, the way to do it is to unite."

<u>Previous Experience in the Private Sector:</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Professional	16	1.50
Business	19	2.47 ^a
No Prior Experience	15	1.67
<u>Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring Scaling Responses:</u>		
As to Government Structure: ^b		
"Federalists"	31	1.58
"Non-Federalists"	19	2.47
As to Foreign Policy-Making: ^c		
"Centralists"	28 ^d	1.46
"Non-Centralists"	20 ^d	2.45

^aDiffered significantly from the responses of the other two groups (at .05 by t).

^bThe "federalists" saw the federal model as the ideal state for European Union.

^cThe "Centralists" saw foreign policy-making by the Community's central institutions as a goal for European Union.

^dTwo respondents had no preference in this area.

End-Products

There are numerous speeches, official pronouncements, and special reports that address the subject of a Community foreign policy. For example, the European Parliament has resolved that "foreign policy...must be strengthened. New procedures must be developed to enable the Community to speak with a single voice in international politics..."⁵ And the Commission has argued that there is a "need to ensure, when dealing with the outside world, that the common policies pursued inside the Union are effective makes it vital in this connection for a common foreign policy of the Union to be developed."⁶ Both official statements are indicative of a common problem: no specifics are mentioned as to where the process should lead. In other words, there appears to be a general inability or unwillingness to define goals. It is in part for this reason that the expert opinions of the Eurocrats were sought, as they are all officials who either worked directly with or had substantial knowledge of the Community's external relations. Their answers to the open-ended question, "What, in your opinion, would be the best possible state for a common foreign policy for the Community?", were quite varied. The responses fell into the categories indicated in Table 6.4. Note that more than half of the respondents advocated a common foreign policy to be made by the Community institutions. (Two qualified their answers to include the necessity for prior consultation with the member states, and three mentioned that a Community defense policy is a

⁵Supplement 9/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, p. 11.

⁶Supplement 5/75, Bulletin of the European Communities, para. 60, p. 22.

prerequisite.) Only two respondents felt that reaching common positions in the Community's central institutions was unwise and opted for keeping political cooperation outside the Community.

Table 6.4 - The Best Possible State for Community Foreign Policy-Making

<u>Ideal State</u>	<u>Number</u>
Common foreign policy made entirely by Community institutions	23
Policy made by central Community institutions but only after consulting each member state first	2
Policy made by central Community institutions but only after a common defense arrangement exists in the Community	3
Most foreign policy decisions made by Community institutions, but a few areas reserved to the member states	4
Coordinate/consult on all foreign policy matters	8
Coordinate one position only on vital issues or only when necessary	5
Coordinate common positions for international organizations only	1
No central decision-making - keep political cooperation machinery outside the Community	2
No preference	2
Total	50

The responses to the question, "What, for you, would be the worst development for foreign policy-making in the Community?" were also varied (Table 6.5) but half of the respondents indicated that the worst possible development for them would be no coordination or cooperation in

foreign policy matters, and an additional 30 percent felt that agreement on minor or relatively unimportant issues (but a failure of the Community to agree on major issues) would be the worst anticipated result. Two respondents saw bloc agreements without the ability to implement or enforce decisions as the worst possible outcome. It is significant that only one felt that foreign policy-making in the Community's central institutions would be the worst possible end-product.

Table 6.5 - The Worst Anticipated Development for Foreign Policy-Making in the Community.

<u>Worst Anticipated Development</u>	<u>Number</u>
No coordination or cooperation	25
States generally "go it alone" (political disintegration)	2
No common position on major issues	15
No progress (stagnation)	2
Putting limits on political cooperation (e.g., exclude Commission)	2
Failure to agree on common positions in international organizations	1
Acting as a bloc but with no result	2
Community central decision-making in foreign policy	1
Total	50

The Eurocrats were asked to assess the support given to efforts to achieve common foreign policies by the Community institutions, the general public in the home country of each respondent, and by governments of the member states. In their assessments of the support given by their own respective institutions (Table 6.6), 92 percent agreed (of which 64 percent strongly agreed) that their respective institutions support moving toward a common foreign policy in the Community. Only two mildly disagreed (both were in DG-X of the Commission), and two strongly disagreed (one in the Economic and Social Committee, the other an official of one of the private interest groups).

Table 6.6 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports moving toward a common foreign policy for the Community."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
32 (64%)	9 (18%)	5 (10%)	2 (4%)	0 (0%)	2 (4%)

Mean Response = 1.70 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

No significant differences were evident when the respondents were grouped by nationality (the mean responses ranged from 1.0 to 2.0), but significant differences did occur when the responses were analyzed as to the institution of the respondents (Table 6.7). The responses of those in the Commission were significantly different than those outside the Commission, and the strong agreement by all respondents in DG I differed significantly from the other four institutional groupings. In addition,

the positive mean response by those in DG VIII differed significantly from the ESC/Parliament/Private Interest Groups which had the least positive response.

Table 6.7 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports moving toward a common foreign policy for the Community."

Institution	Number	Mean Response
Directorate General I	10	1.00 ^a
Directorate General VIII	14	1.36 ^b
Directorate General X and the General Secretariat	9	2.00
Total Commission	33	1.42 ^c
Economic and Social Committee, European Parliament, and Private Groups	8	2.75
Council of Permanent Representatives	9	1.78
Total Outside Commission	17	2.24

^aDiffers significantly from the other four institutional groupings (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from the ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups responses.

^cDiffers significantly from the responses of those outside the Commission.

Generally, those who were younger or who had relatively less experience in the Community were more favorable in their assessments of their institution's support for a common foreign policy. The responses of those younger than 30 years of age were more positive and differed significantly from those who were 40 or older (Table 6.8).

Table 6.8 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports moving toward a common foreign policy for the Community."

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Below 30	6	1.00 ^a
30-39	24	1.88
40 and older	20	1.70

^aDiffers significantly from the responses of those 40 and older (at .05 by t).

When the responses to the same question were cross-tabulated with other variables, only one significant difference could be seen. Unaccountably, those who might be considered "mondialists" (favor a world-wide approach to the Community's development aid program) were more positive in their assessments of their respective institutions' support for a common foreign policy than were those who favor a regional approach to development assistance. (Table 6.9)

Table 6.9 - "The institution/organization for which I work supports moving toward a common foreign policy for the Community."

<u>Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring Scaling Responses:</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
As to Governmental Structure:		
"Federalists" ^a	31	1.65
"Non-Federalists"	19	1.79
As to Foreign Policy-Making:		
"Centralists" ^b	28 ^d	1.57
"Non-Centralists"	20 ^d	1.90
As to Scope of Community Development Aid: ^c		
"Mondialists"	24 ^e	1.46
"Regionalists"	9 ^e	2.56

^aThe "federalists" saw the federal model as the ideal state for European Union.

^bThe "centralists" saw foreign policy-making by the Community's central institutions as a goal for European Union.

^cThe "mondialists" favor an overall world-wide approach to aiding developing nations over a region by region approach.

^dTwo respondents had no preference in this area.

^e17 respondents had no preference in this area.

The perceptions of the Eurocrats concerning the extent of public opinion support in each respondent's home country (Table 6.10) was generally less favorable when compared to their own perceptions as to the support rendered by the institutions in which they worked (Table 6.6).

Table 6.10 - "The majority of people in my country favors Europe's speaking with one voice to increase Europe's influence in the world."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
12 (24%)	13 (26%)	8 (16%)	4 (8%)	7 (14%)	6 (12%)

Mean Response = 2.98 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

Differences in responses were especially marked between those who favored centralized foreign policy-making and those who did not (as from Table 6.4), and between those favoring "mondialism" and those advocating "regionalism" (for development aid), suggesting, perhaps, that both points of view colored the perceptions of each group of respondents as to how they saw public opinion in their own country (Table 6.11). It was, in both cases, more positive for the centralists, more negative for those favoring solutions short of centralized decision-making. When mean responses to the question of public opinion support in the respondents' home countries are analyzed by the nationality of the respondents, interesting differences are evident (Table 6.12). Table 6.12 suggests an association exists between nationality and perceptions of public opinion support for a common foreign policy for the Community. With the exception of the Irish, the respondents from the three new member states disagreed with the statement that the majority of their fellow countrymen favored Europe's speaking with one voice.

Table 6.11 - "The majority of the people in my country favors Europe's speaking with one voice to increase Europe's influence in the world."

<u>Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring Scaling Responses:</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
As to Governmental Structure:		
"Federalists" ^a	31	2.81
"Non-Federalists"	19	3.26
As to Foreign Policy-Making:		
"Centralists" ^b	28 ^d	2.50
"Non-Centralists"	20 ^d	3.50
As to Scope of Community Development Aid: ^c		
"Mondialists"	24 ^e	2.29
"Regionalists"	9	4.22

^aThe "federalists" saw the federal model as the ideal state for European Union.

^bThe "centralists" saw foreign policy-making by the Community's central institutions as a goal for European Union.

^cThe "mondialists" favor an overall world-wide approach to aiding developing nations over a region by region approach.

^dTwo respondents had no preference in this area.

^e17 respondents had no preference in this area.

Table 6.12 - "The majority of people in my country favor Europe's speaking with one voice to increase Europe's influence in the world."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	2.17
Netherlands	5	2.00
Luxembourg	2	2.00
Ireland	3	2.00
Denmark	3	5.00 ^a
United Kingdom	11	4.00 ^b
Italy	6	2.83
West Germany	8	2.75
France	6	3.00
Benelux Countries	13	2.08
France/Germany/Italy	20	2.85
New Three Countries	17	3.82 ^c
Original Six Countries	33	2.55
TOTAL	50	2.98

^aDiffers significantly from all other nationalities except the British (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from the responses of the Belgians, Dutch, and Irish.

^cDiffers significantly from the Benelux, France/Germany/Italy, and Original Six responses.

Perceptions of public opinion support in the Community's member states by the Eurocrats are more enlightening (at least as a function of its accuracy) when compared to actual results of public opinion polls in the member states. The results of the most recent poll, in which a question was asked concerning foreign policy in the European Community, are reflected in Table 6.13.

Table 6.13 - Public Opinion, May, 1976: "The Member Countries of the European Union {should} have a common foreign policy."

<u>Nation (Number)</u>	<u>Agree Totally</u>	<u>Agree on the Whole</u>	<u>Disagree on the Whole</u>	<u>Disagree Totally</u>	<u>No Reply</u>	<u>Total</u>
Belgium (963)	31%	26%	6%	5%	32%	100%
Denmark (977)	16	21	17	25	21	100
West Germany (1004)	33	41	10	4	12	100
France (1241)	28	36	9	9	18	100
Ireland (1007)	28	37	10	6	19	100
Italy (923)	33	33	10	4	20	100
Luxembourg (268)	45	34	3	3	15	100
Netherlands (904)	30	36	9	7	18	100
United Kingdom (1340)	19	37	14	12	18	100
Total Community	29%	36%	11%	7%	17%	100%

SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Baremetre: Public Opinion in the European Community 5 (July, 1976), p. A22.

The only country in which public opinion appears to be weighted against a common foreign policy for the Community is Denmark. Although a large number (26 percent) in Britain opposed the proposition, the majority of those polled were in favor (56 percent). The percent of those in Britain opposed was significantly higher than that in all other Community states except, of course, in Denmark; no other member state had more than 16 percent of the respondents opposed to the idea of a common Community foreign policy. When, however, a particular issue is mentioned, such as the formation of a common Community "front" to the United States or the Soviet Union, public opinion, even in Denmark, largely favors a common Community position, as is suggested by Table 6.14. The results indicate that the percent of those strongly favoring the statement was larger than of those less strongly in favor (which was not the case in the results shown in Table 6.13), and Danish public opinion indicated 48 percent believed that such a common position was important with only 23 percent thinking it of little or no importance.

In an attempt to get an assessment by the Eurocrats of support for a common foreign policy by the governments of the member states, the respondents were asked to rank the nine member states from first to last (they were not asked to indicate relative degrees of support nor if they felt any of the states did not support moving toward a common foreign policy in the Community). The results of these rankings, computed as to the nationality of the respondents, are reported in Table 6.15.

Table 6.14 - Public Opinion, May, 1975: The Importance of Achieving a Common Foreign Policy in Discussions with the United States and Russia

<u>Nation (Number)</u>	<u>Very Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Of Little Importance</u>	<u>Not at all Important</u>	<u>No Reply</u>	<u>Total</u>
Belgium (1507)	22%	24%	16%	10%	28%	100%
Denmark (1073)	20	28	11	12	29	100
West Germany (1039)	36	34	15	5	10	100
France (1000)	40	27	10	9	14	100
Ireland (1000)	15	36	17	11	21	100
Italy (1043)	38	25	17	9	11	100
Luxembourg (311)	26	20	17	9	28	100
Netherlands (1093)	28	26	13	10	23	100
United Kingdom (1328)	28	38	11	8	15	100
Total Community	34%	31%	13%	8%	14%	100%

SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre: Public Opinion in the European Community 3 (June-July, 1975), p. A15.

The data suggest three general observations. First, the ordinal rankings of the member states are significantly alike;⁷ only the Danes differed significantly in their rankings of the member states (e.g., they rank Germany first, France second, and have Ireland tied for last; the total

⁷Rank correlation by Kendall's "W" = .682 for the nine sets of ratings (all rank correlations reported in this chapter have a P value = .005).

Table 6.15 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve Common Foreign Policies in the Community.

Nationality of Respondents	Belgians (n=6)	Dutch (n=5)	Luxembourgers (n=2)	Irish (n=3)	Danes (n=3)	Italians (n=6)	Germans (n=8)	British (n=11)	French (n=6)	Total (n=50)
Belgium	<u>1 (2.50)</u>	1 (2.30)	2 (2.00)	3.5 (3.33)	4 (4.33)	1 (2.33)	2.5 (3.06)	3.5 (3.73)	1 (2.00)	1 (2.95)
Denmark	8 (7.17)	5 (4.50)	7 (7.00)	7 (7.00)	<u>8.5 (7.00)</u>	6 (6.08)	7 (5.88)	7 (6.50)	8 (6.25)	7 (6.28)
France	9 (7.67)	7 (6.70)	8 (8.00)	9 (9.00)	2 (3.67)	9 (8.08)	9 (8.00)	9 (7.50)	<u>7 (6.17)</u>	8 (7.31)
Ireland	4 (4.17)	4 (4.20)	3 (3.00)	<u>3.5 (3.33)</u>	8.5 (7.00)	4 (4.25)	6 (5.25)	3.5 (3.73)	4 (5.17)	4 (4.45)
Italy	6 (5.67)	6 (5.20)	4.5 (4.50)	6 (5.67)	6 (5.67)	<u>5 (4.42)</u>	5 (5.13)	6 (5.50)	6 (5.50)	6 (5.28)
Luxembourg	2 (2.67)	2 (3.00)	<u>1 (1.00)</u>	2 (2.67)	7 (6.00)	2 (2.67)	1 (2.88)	2 (3.14)	2 (2.67)	2 (2.97)
Netherlands	3 (3.75)	<u>3 (3.20)</u>	4.5 (4.50)	1 (1.00)	3 (4.00)	3 (3.67)	2.5 (3.06)	1 (2.68)	3 (3.92)	3 (3.24)
United Kingdom	7 (7.00)	9 (7.80)	9 (8.50)	8 (8.00)	5 (5.33)	8 (7.50)	8 (7.13)	<u>8 (7.18)</u>	9 (8.00)	9 (7.34)
West Germany	5 (4.25)	8 (7.10)	6 (6.50)	5 (5.00)	1 (2.00)	7 (6.17)	<u>4 (4.50)</u>	5 (4.95)	5 (5.33)	5 (5.09)

A nations rating by its own national is underlined. Mean responses appear in parentheses.

rankings by all fifty respondents for those states is, respectively, fifth, eighth, and fourth.)⁸ A second observation concerns the relative accuracy of each nationality group's self-rating. In no case were the ratings off by more than 1.5 when compared to the total rank order. Third, the rank order of the member states appears to be closely associated with the size of the member states. The smaller countries (with the exception of Denmark) were rated as those most in support of a common foreign policy. The larger states were ranked fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth.⁹

Rank correlations between rank orders of the member states analyzed by nationality groups (e.g., old six/new three, North/South)¹⁰, by institution of the respondents,¹¹ by age,¹² by prior experience,¹³ and by responses to the self-anchoring questions (indicating preferences

⁸There is no correlation between the rankings by the Danes and those by all the Eurocrats (Spearman's rho = -.038).

⁹As an example, one of the Belgian respondents invited me to visit the Belgian Parliament when foreign policy was to be debated. He assured me that Belgium has lost so much self-interest in this area, that at such times the chamber is nearly empty. Thus, the willingness to support a Community foreign policy.

¹⁰Benelux/Old Three/New Three: Kendall's "W" = .99; Original Six/New Three: Spearman's rho = .883; North/South: Spearman's rho = .825. (Table 6.16)

¹¹For the five institution groups: Kendall's "W" = .901; for the Commission/Outside the Commission: Spearman's rho = .917.

¹²Kendall's "W" = .931.

¹³Community Experience: Kendall's "W" = .954; Private Sector Experience: Kendall's "W" = .949; Prior Civil Service: Spearman's rho = .967.

either for centralization or decentralization in the Community)¹⁴ were also significantly similar (see Tables 6.16, 6.17, 6.18, and 6.19). Although the mean responses are in some cases extremely close (e.g., rankings between France and the United Kingdom), no matter what variables are employed to compare mean responses of the respondents, the Benelux countries are consistently ranked in the top three positions, France and the United Kingdom are, interchangeably, eighth and ninth.

Two general observations can be made about the relative support the member states' governments are seen to have given to efforts to achieve a common Community foreign policy (Tables 6.15 through 6.19). First, with the exception of Denmark, the rankings appear to correlate with the rank order by size of the country (from smallest to largest), as was true for the rankings of support for European Union in general (See Chapter IV). Second, except for the Danes, there appears to be a high level of agreement among the Eurocrats as to the relative support given by each of the member states.

¹⁴Federalists/non-federalists: Spearman's rho = .917; centralists/non-centralists: Spearman's rho = .979; mondialists/regionalists: Spearman's rho = .917; multilateralists/bilateralists: Spearman's rho = .993.

Table 6.16 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve Common Foreign Policies in the Community.

Nationality Groups (of Respondents)	Benelux Countries (n=13)	France Germany Italy (n=20)	New Three (Ireland, Denmark, United Kingdom) (n=17)	Old Six (all but New Three) (n=33)	North (all but Italy and France) (n=38)	South (Italy and France) (n=12)	Total (n=50)
Belgium	1.5 (2.54)	1 (2.53)	3 (3.76)	1 (2.53)	3 (3.19)	1 (2.17)	1 (2.95)
Denmark	7 (6.12)	7 (6.05)	7 (6.68)	7 (6.08)	7 (6.32)	7 (6.17)	7 (6.28)
France	8 (7.35)	8 (7.48)	9 (7.09)	8 (7.42)	9 (7.37)	8 (7.13)	8 (7.31)
Ireland	4 (4.00)	4 (4.93)	4 (4.24)	4 (4.56)	4 (4.37)	4 (4.71)	4 (4.45)
Italy	5 (5.31)	5 (5.03)	6 (5.56)	5 (5.14)	6 (5.38)	5 (4.96)	6 (5.28)
Luxembourg	1.5 (2.54)	2 (2.75)	2 (3.56)	2 (2.67)	1.5 (3.07)	2 (2.67)	2 (2.97)
Netherlands	3 (3.65)	3 (3.50)	1 (2.62)	3 (3.56)	1.5 (3.07)	3 (3.79)	3 (3.24)
United Kingdom	9 (7.54)	9 (7.50)	8 (7.00)	9 (7.52)	8 (7.21)	9 (7.75)	9 (7.34)
West Germany	6 (5.69)	6 (5.25)	5 (4.44)	6 (5.42)	5 (4.88)	6 (5.75)	5 (5.09)

(mean responses appear in parentheses)

Table 6.17 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve Common Foreign Policies in the Community.

Member States	Directorate General I (n=10)	Directorate General VIII (n=14)	Dir. Gen. X and Secretariat- General (n=9)	Total Commission (n=33)	Econ and Soc Comm, Parliament and Private Groups (n=8)	Council of Permanent Reps (COREPER) (n=9)	Total Outside Commission (n=17)
Belgium	1 (2.40)	3 (3.29)	2 (3.50)	2 (3.08)	1 (2.31)	2 (3.06)	2 (2.71)
Denmark	7 (7.00)	5 (5.25)	7.5 (6.61)	6 (6.15)	7 (6.38)	8 (6.67)	7 (6.53)
France	8 (7.25)	9 (7.43)	7.5 (6.61)	8 (7.15)	9 (7.88)	9 (7.39)	9 (7.62)
Ireland	4 (4.60)	4 (4.43)	6 (5.11)	4 (4.67)	4 (3.50)	4 (4.50)	4 (4.03)
Italy	6 (5.10)	7 (6.07)	4 (4.11)	6 (5.24)	5 (5.13)	6 (5.56)	6 (5.35)
Luxembourg	3 (3.40)	2 (2.93)	3 (3.61)	3 (3.26)	2 (2.69)	1 (2.17)	1 (2.41)
Netherlands	2 (2.85)	1 (2.79)	1 (3.17)	1 (2.91)	3 (3.31)	3 (4.39)	3 (3.88)
United Kingdom	9 (7.55)	8 (7.39)	9 (7.39)	9 (7.44)	8 (7.81)	7 (6.56)	8 (7.15)
West Germany	5 (4.75)	6 (5.29)	5 (4.89)	5 (5.02)	6 (5.81)	5 (4.72)	5 (5.24)

(Mean responses appear in parentheses)

Table 6.18 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve Common Foreign Policies in the Community.

Member States	AGE			COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE			PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE			PRIOR CIVIL SERVICE	
	<u>Below 30</u> (n=6)	<u>30 - 39</u> (n=24)	<u>40-Plus</u> (n=20)	<u>1 - 6</u> (n=32)	<u>7 - 12</u> (n=6)	<u>13 - 18</u> (n=12)	<u>Profession</u> (n=16)	<u>Business</u> (n=19)	<u>None</u> (n=15)	<u>Yes</u> (n=19)	<u>No</u> (n=31)
Belgium	3 (3.75)	1 (2.73)	2 (2.98)	3 (3.20)	2 (3.08)	1 (2.21)	1.5 (3.13)	2 (3.05)	1 (2.63)	1 (2.74)	2 (3.08)
Denmark	7 (6.33)	7 (6.54)	7 (5.95)	7 (6.48)	7 (5.92)	7 (5.92)	7 (6.56)	7 (6.03)	7 (6.30)	7 (6.47)	7 (6.17)
France	8.5 (8.25)	8 (6.98)	9 (7.43)	8.5 (7.25)	9 (7.50)	8 (7.38)	9 (7.41)	8 (7.05)	9 (7.53)	9 (7.11)	8 (7.44)
Ireland	6 (4.75)	4 (4.79)	4 (3.95)	4 (4.48)	4 (4.58)	4 (4.29)	5 (4.53)	4 (4.47)	4 (4.33)	4 (4.58)	4 (4.37)
Italy	4.5 (4.67)	6 (5.13)	6 (5.65)	6 (5.22)	5.5 (5.25)	6 (5.46)	6 (5.28)	6 (5.39)	5 (5.13)	6 (5.53)	6 (5.13)
Luxembourg	2 (2.33)	3 (3.38)	1 (2.68)	1 (3.03)	3 (3.25)	2 (2.67)	3 (3.44)	1 (2.61)	2 (2.93)	2 (2.89)	1 (3.02)
Netherlands	1 (1.83)	2 (3.35)	3 (3.53)	2 (3.06)	1 (2.67)	3 (4.00)	1.5 (3.13)	3 (3.26)	3 (3.33)	3 (3.29)	3 (3.21)
United Kingdom	8.5 (8.25)	9 (7.17)	8 (7.28)	8.5 (7.25)	8 (7.33)	9 (7.58)	8 (7.00)	9 (7.68)	8 (7.27)	8 (6.92)	9 (7.60)
West Germany	4.5 (4.67)	5 (4.94)	5 (5.40)	5 (5.02)	5.5 (5.25)	5 (5.21)	4 (4.34)	5 (5.37)	6 (5.53)	5 (5.37)	5 (4.92)

(Mean responses appear in parentheses)

Table 6.19 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve Common Foreign Policies in the Community.

Member States	Federalists (n=31)	Non-Federalists (n=19)	Foreign Policy Centralists (n=28) ^b	Foreign Policy Non-Cent. (n=20) ^b	Mondialists ^a (n=24) ^b	Region- ^a alists (n=9) ^b	Multilat- ^a eralists (n=22) ^b	Bilat- ^a eralists (n=9) ^b	Total (n=50)
Belgium	1 (2.63)	3 (3.47)	1 (2.84)	2 (3.10)	2 (3.10)	2 (2.61)	1 (2.93)	3 (3.22)	1 (2.95)
Denmark	7 (6.32)	7 (6.21)	7 (6.52)	7 (5.98)	7 (6.15)	6 (6.50)	7 (6.36)	7 (6.67)	7 (6.28)
France	8 (7.39)	9 (7.18)	9 (7.48)	8 (7.00)	9 (7.60)	8 (7.17)	9 (7.75)	9 (6.94)	8 (7.31)
Ireland	4 (4.50)	4 (4.37)	4 (4.41)	4 (4.50)	4 (4.54)	3 (3.50)	4 (4.32)	4 (4.28)	4 (4.45)
Italy	6 (5.32)	6 (5.21)	6 (5.34)	6 (5.23)	6 (5.35)	5 (5.00)	6 (5.30)	5 (4.67)	6 (5.28)
Luxembourg	2 (2.81)	2 (3.24)	2 (2.86)	1 (3.03)	1 (2.98)	1 (2.00)	2 (3.09)	1 (2.50)	2 (2.97)
Netherlands	3 (3.34)	1 (3.08)	3 (3.32)	3 (3.25)	3 (3.19)	4 (3.72)	3 (3.36)	2 (3.17)	3 (3.24)
United Kingdom	9 (7.45)	8 (7.16)	8 (7.11)	9 (7.65)	8 (7.21)	9 (7.89)	9 (6.95)	8 (8.06)	9 (7.34)
West Germany	5 (5.18)	5 (4.95)	5 (5.05)	5 (5.15)	5 (4.65)	7 (6.72)	5 (4.84)	6 (5.33)	5 (5.09)

^aRefers to handling of aid to developing countries.

^bNot all respondents indicated preferences in these areas.

(mean responses appear in parentheses)

Strategies

Strategies as to how the Community might best move systematically toward making common foreign policies are not daily topics of discussion in the Community. In those few instances when means-to-ends are discussed, prescriptions as to how to reach certain ends are intentionally vague. For example, the Tindemans Report on European Union, usually considered to be the most pragmatic and practical of all such reports, simply mentions that the ultimate authority lies with the European Council and that the existing political cooperation machinery must be improved in order to permit the Community to act rather than just react to the external world. The only hard recommendation Mr. Tindemans makes in this area is that the Community must first establish a common defense policy.¹⁵

Having asked the group of external affairs experts in the Community what they saw as the goals of political cooperation/foreign policy-making in the Community, I then put to them certain statements concerning techniques and prerequisites to those ends, and asked them to indicate various levels of agreement or disagreement with each statement. These "strategies" included giving the central institutions more power in this area, the suggestion to end the "schizophrenia" between high politics outside the Community and low politics or economic and trade matters inside the Community, the necessity for an external pressure or shock to make political cooperation happen, and the necessity for a common European defense organization as was suggested by Mr. Tindemans.

¹⁵See Chapter III.

More Foreign Policy-Making Power for the Central Institutions?

In general, the Eurocrats favored a common foreign policy for the Community. In answer to the question quoted in Table 6.20 below, a total of only 16 percent disagreed, and half of those told me they did so only because they disagreed with the assertion that it ought to be the Commission which makes foreign policy for the Nine.

Table 6.20 - "The European Community, particularly the Commission, should be given more power to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the nine member states."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
18 (36%)	15 (30%)	9 (18%)	4 (8%)	3 (6%)	1 (2%)

Mean Response = 2.24 (1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

When the responses were compared as to the nationality of the respondents, the most positive responses were the Irish and those in the Benelux countries; the less positive responses came from the larger states: in order, the French, British, and the Germans. The least positive, having a mean response indicating neither agreement nor disagreement, were the Danes (see Table 6.21). Mean responses to the same question by institution of the respondents found those in the Commission slightly more positive than those outside the Commission. The least positive were the foreign office officials in the COREPER (indicating slightly less than mild agreement). The COREPER responses differed significantly from those in

Table 6.21 - "The European Community, particularly the Commission, should be given more power to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the nine member states."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	1.83
Netherlands	5	1.80
Luxembourg	2	2.00
Ireland	3	1.67
Denmark	3	3.33 ^a
United Kingdom	11	2.45
Italy	6	1.83
West Germany	8	2.63
France	6	2.33
Benelux Countries	13	1.85
France/Germany/Italy	20	2.30
New Three Countries	17	2.47
Original Six Countries	33	2.12
TOTAL	50	2.24

^aDiffers significantly from the Belgian, Irish, and Italian respondents (at .05 by t).

the DG-I, DG-VIII, and the ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups (Table 6.22). As the nine respondents in the COREPER were all national and not Community civil servants, their more negative mean response was anticipated, particularly given the stipulation in the question that the Commission in particular should be given more power to make common foreign policies.

Table 6.22 - "The European Community, particularly the Commission, should be given more power to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the nine member states."

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Directorate General I	10	1.80
Directorate General VIII	14	2.00
Directorate General X and General Secretariat	9	2.67
Total Commission	33	2.12
Economic and Social Committee European Parliament, and Private Interest Groups	8	1.75
Council of Permanent Representatives	9	3.11 ^a
Total Outside Commission	17	2.47

^aDiffers significantly from DG I, DG VIII, and the ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups (at .05 by t).

"High" versus "Low" Politics in the Community

One of the most crucial concerns relative to the Community's institutional structure is the question of merging political cooperation into the Community institutions (a move which many argue will necessitate amending or renegotiating the Treaty of Rome). Table 6.23 contains the exact wording of the statement and the results for all respondents:

Table 6.23 - "A coordinated foreign policy for the Nine must take place in the context of the Community's external commercial and economic functions. Attempts at political cooperation through specifically constructed machinery outside the major Community institutions will be unsuccessful."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
12 (24%)	12 (24%)	5 (10%)	7 (14%)	7 (14%)	7 (14%)

Mean Response = 3.12 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree).

Although 28 (56 percent) of the Eurocrats favored the long-range goal of centralized foreign policy decision-making (see Table 6.4), and 42 (84 percent) agreed that the Community (and particularly the Commission) should be given more power in foreign policy-making (Table 6.20), only 29 (58 percent) agreed that political cooperation ought to be merged into the Community (less than was anticipated, particularly given the positive response in Table 6.20). Again, differences between the Eurocrats' responses when analyzed by nationality were quite marked, particularly

Table 6.24 - "A coordinated foreign policy for the Nine must take place in the context of the Community's external commercial and economic functions. Attempts at political cooperation through specially constructed machinery outside the major Community institutions will be unsuccessful."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	2.33 ^a
Netherlands	5	2.00 ^a
Luxembourg	2	2.50
Ireland	3	3.33
Denmark	3	2.67
United Kingdom	11	4.09
Italy	6	4.17
West Germany	8	3.13
France	6	2.33 ^a
Benelux Countries	13	2.23
France/Germany/Italy	20	3.20
New Three Countries	17	3.71 ^b
Original Six Countries	33	2.82
TOTAL	50	3.12

^aDiffers significantly from the Italians and British (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from the Benelux and Original Six respondents.

between the most positive (the Dutch, Belgians, and the French) and the most negative (the Italians and British). The responses of those from the three new member states were more negative than and differed significantly from those from the Benelux countries and those from the original six member states (Table 6.24). The relatively positive agreement to this statement by the six French respondents may appear to be contrary to what one might have expected, given the traditional French (Gaullist) insistence on keeping "high politics" separate from Community matters. Since 1973, however, it has been the Germans and the British who have been most enthusiastic about continuing the development of political cooperation (as an entity outside Community institutions) and the French who, reportedly, have been urging caution in that development.¹⁶

Significant differences were found in the responses to this statement when the respondents were grouped by the institution to which each belonged (Table 6.25). Respondents outside the Commission were slightly more in favor than were those in the Commission. Of particular interest, the COREPER had the second most positive response. Those who had prior civil service experience before coming to Brussels (which includes the nine COREPER officials who were still national civil servants) responded far more positively to the statement than did those who had no prior civil service experience. The more positive response by former national civil servants, particularly the foreign office officials in the COREPER, was unexpected. A possible explanation is that those in

¹⁶David J. Allen and William Wallace, Die europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit (Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik, 1976), p. 8.

Table 6.25 - "A coordinated foreign policy for the nine must take place in the context of the Community's external commercial and economic functions. Attempts at political cooperation through specially constructed machinery outside the major Community institutions will be unsuccessful."

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Directorate General I	10	2.10 ^a
Directorate General VIII	14	3.71
Directorate General X and General Secretariat	9	3.67
<hr/>		
Total Commission	33	3.21
<hr/>		
Economic and Social Committee, European Parliament, and Private Interest Groups	8	3.50
Council of Permanent Representatives	9	2.44 ^a
<hr/>		
Total Outside the Commission	17	2.94
<hr/>		
<u>Prior National Government Service</u>		
Yes	19	2.37 ^b
No	31	3.58

^aDiffers significantly from those in DG VIII and DGX/S-G (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from those having had no prior civil service experience.

DG-I (the external relations section of the Commission) and the COREPER believe that they, in particular, should have more input and involvement in political cooperation, and therefore favor its incorporation into the Community institutions.

A European Defense Policy?

A rather critical and often discussed foreign policy strategy is the need to enforce the common foreign policy with a common Community defense policy and/or organization.¹⁷ As was previously stated, the Tindemans Report specifically mentions a common defense policy (although Tindemans had little more in mind than a military hardware procurement agency for the Community) as a pre-condition to formulating common foreign policies. The statement put to the Eurocrats received responses that were the most varied, but the mean response for all the respondents indicated slight opposition (Table 6.26). When the responses are analyzed by nationality (Table 6.27), only the French and those from the Benelux countries agreed with the defense concept, and the response of those from the three new member states indicated decided disagreement with

¹⁷ See, for example, Sir Bernard Burrows and Christopher Irwin, The Security of Western Europe: Towards a Common Defense Policy (London: Charles Knight and Co., 1972) and Michael D. Butler, European Defense Problems in the 1970's: The Case for a New European Defense Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, February, 1971). The topic has been discussed more recently by the Defense Ministers of the ten-member Eurogroup of NATO (Norway, Greece, Turkey, and the EC member states minus Ireland and France). Due, in part, to the General Dynamics F-16 contract, it is a continuing item of discussion. Europolitique 332 (June 12, 1976), "Institutions", p. 1.

Table 6.26 - "There is a need to establish a new European Defense Organization in order to counter the fact that not all Community members belong to or participate in NATO, and other problems in NATO."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
8 (16%)	6 (12%)	9 (18%)	3 (6%)	8 (16%)	16 (32%)

Mean Response = 3.90 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

the idea. The responses of the Danes and of the Irish appear to be consistent with the positions of their respective governments. The Danes have strongly favored keeping NATO as it is, particularly keeping their costs at a minimum and the role of the United States in NATO exactly as is. A member of the Irish Permanent Representation told me that the Irish have no intention of joining NATO, and, within the context of political cooperation, that they refuse to take part in discussions concerning "defense"; he said they may, however, sit in on matters having to do with "security". The distinction may appear to be one of semantics, but it is, for the Irish, an important one.¹⁸

Significant differences in the responses exist between the Danes and the Belgians, the Italians, and the French. The mean response of those from the three new member states is significantly more negative than that of the Benelux respondents, the other three states of the original six and the original six member states. It is interesting to compare

¹⁸Based on interviews with officials in the COREPER, in Brussels, June, 1976.

Table 6.27 - "There is a need to establish a new European Defense Organization in order to counter the fact that not all Community members belong to or participate in NATO, and other problems in NATO."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	3.17
Netherlands	5	3.80
Luxembourg	2	3.00
Ireland	3	4.00
Denmark	3	6.00 ^a
United Kingdom	11	4.55
Italy	6	3.50
West Germany	8	4.13
France	6	2.83
Benelux Countries	13	3.38
France/Germany/Italy	20	3.55
New Three Countries	17	4.71 ^b
Original Six Countries	33	3.48
TOTAL	50	3.90

^aDiffers significantly from the responses of the Belgians, Italians, and French (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from the Benelux, Old Three, and Original Six member states' respondents.

the data in Table 6.27 to the public opinion responses contained in Table 6.28. While the Eurocrats did not seem to support the creation of a European Defense Organization to supplement or replace NATO, the majority of those who replied to the Community public opinion poll question concerning the importance of strengthening a common military defense (49% of the total) felt that it was important or very important.

Table 6.28 - Public Opinion, May, 1976: Relative Importance Attached to Strengthening Military Defense Against Possible Enemies.

<u>Nation (Number)</u>	<u>Very Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Of Little Importance</u>	<u>Not at all Important</u>	<u>No Reply</u>	<u>Total</u>
Belgium (963)	8%	18%	26%	38%	10%	100%
Denmark (977)	22	25	23	21	9	100
West Germany (1104)	15	29	28	20	9	100
France (1241)	15	35	28	17	5	100
Ireland (1007)	19	33	21	19	8	100
Italy (923)	9	27	30	23	11	100
Luxembourg (268)	11	25	20	27	17	100
Netherlands (904)	17	29	27	21	6	100
United Kingdom (1340)	32	38	15	10	5	100
Total Community	18%	31%	25%	19%	7%	100%

SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre: Public Opinion in the European Community 5 (July, 1976), p. A13.

Further, Belgian and Luxembourg respondents supported "Defense" while the majority in their country did not, the Irish, Danish, and British respondents did not support "Defense" while the majority in their respective home countries did. The Dutch and Italian respondents expressed "no opinion" while the majority of their countrymen disapproved of the common defense idea; the German respondents opposed it while the people in West Germany appeared evenly divided on the issue. Only the French Eurocrats and French general public agreed - both supported a European defense suggestion.

Significant differences in the responses were also found when the variables of age and previous experience were considered (Table 6.29).

Table 6.29 - "There is a need to establish a new European Defense Organization in order to counter the fact that not all Community members belong to or participate in NATO, and other problems in NATO."

<u>Age:</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Below 30	6	5.17 ^a
30-39	24	3.75
40 and older	20	3.70
<u>Previous Experience in the Private Sector:</u>		
Professional	16	3.38
Business	19	4.63 ^b
No Previous Experience	15	3.53

^aDiffers significantly from the responses of those 40 and older (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from those having had professional or no prior experience.

Those who were under thirty disagreed much more strongly than those who were forty and older, and those who had previous business experience were more opposed to establishing a European Defense Organization than were those having prior professional or no prior experience in the private sector before coming to work in the Community.

When cross-tabulated with preferences that had been indicated by the respondents in the self-anchoring scaling questions (centralization vs. decentralization), the "Federalists" and the "Centralists" agreed more with the statement than did the "non-federalists" and "non-centralists" (Table 6.30).

Table 6.30 - "There is a need to establish a new European Defense Organization in order to counter the fact that not all Community members belong to or participate in NATO, and other problems in NATO."

<u>Preferences Indicated in Self-Anchoring Scaling Responses:</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
<u>As to Governmental Structure:</u>		
"Federalists"	31	3.35 ^a
"Non-Federalists"	19	4.79
<u>As to Foreign Policy-Making:</u>		
"Centralists"	28	3.21 ^b
"Non-Centralists"	20	4.65

^aDiffers significantly from responses of "non-federalists" (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from responses of "non-centralists."

The Necessity of an External Threat?

There are those in the Community who argue that European integration will not progress substantially until some external event or actor threatens the member states sufficiently to force them to unite further. As a group, the Eurocrats came close to expressing no opinion on this matter (a mean response of 3.88), but more than half (56 percent) disagreed with the statement quoted in Table 6.31.

Table 6.31 - "European integration has nearly reached a standstill. It will take a shock, such as a worsening of relations with the U.S.S.R. or the unilateral removal of U.S. combat forces to reactivate it."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
5 (10%)	5 (10%)	12 (24%)	8 (16%)	9 (18%)	11 (22%)

Mean Response = 3.88 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

When the responses were broken down by nationality (Table 6.32), only the Irish, Germans, and French agreed, and those from the Benelux countries exhibited a mean response more negative and significantly different only from those from the France/Germany/Italy group. When all other variables were cross-tabulated with the Eurocrats' responses, no significant differences could be found. For all comparisons, the mean responses ranged between 3.50 (no opinion) to 4.50 (mild disagreement).

Table 6.32 - "European integration has nearly reached a standstill. It will take a shock, such as a worsening of relations with the U.S.S.R. or the unilateral removal of U.S. combat forces to reactivate it."

<u>Nation(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	4.67 ^a
Netherlands	5	4.80 ^a
Luxembourg	2	3.50
Ireland	3	3.00
Denmark	3	4.33
United Kingdom	11	4.09
Italy	6	4.50
West Germany	8	3.13
France	6	2.67
Benelux Countries	13	4.54 ^b
France/Germany/Italy	20	3.40
New Three Countries	17	3.94
Original Six Countries	33	3.85
TOTAL	50	3.88

^aDiffers significantly from the responses of the Irish and French (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from the France/Germany/Italy respondents.

The fairly wide spread of responses indicated in Table 6.31 accounts for the mean responses centering near the middle of the scale, but, more importantly, indicates general differences of opinion among the Eurocrats concerning the necessity for an external shock or pressure for continued integration to occur. It should be pointed out that in all cases the respondents were reacting to the second sentence of the statement; not one of the Eurocrats told me he or she disagreed with the premise, "European integration has nearly reached a standstill."

The Future for Political Cooperation/Foreign Policy
in the Community: An Evaluation

The efforts in the European Community to achieve greater political cooperation and to move toward the making of common foreign policies are experiencing severe "growing pains". But that, in itself, is its most positive feature; it is an area in which progress is being made. Many scholars who have studied this process conclude that the states will continue to insist on forming common policies based on the "lowest common denominator" between the member states, that the process remains an intergovernmental process subject at all times to the member states' governments' control. They tend to agree with British Prime Minister Callaghan that pragmatic "intergovernmentalism" offers the best model for the Community as it avoids any worry about legal structures or formal controls.¹⁹ Yet, the entire process is a dynamic one. It has managed at least to avoid what those closest to the process fear most, stagnation.

¹⁹Allen and Wallace, pp. 14-16.

As Viscount Davignon stated in March, 1976, "the most dangerous thing about the whole European cooperation exercise is stagnation because stagnation implies reversal. Therefore it is better to have continual and consistent progress even if it is not necessarily the speed one would wish for."²⁰

In response to the self-anchoring scaling questions concerning a Community foreign policy (as described in Chapter II), the Eurocrats, as a group, rated (from the worst possible state, "0", to the best, "10") the efforts to achieve a common foreign policy in the Community five years ago quite low (the mean response was 2.82), but indicated they felt some improvement had occurred in the last five years (up 1.56 to 4.39). Moreover, their responses indicated a relatively optimistic assessment for the future of this area in the Community. The mean response of all respondents was 6.10, higher by nearly two steps from the present rating (Table 6.33).

The responses did not differ significantly as to ratings of the Community five years ago. Responses by nationality of the respondents did differ significantly with the group giving the most positive present rating, the Danes (7.33), differing significantly from the Luxembourgers, the Irish, the Germans, the British, and the French. The mean response of the Dutch, the second most positive present rating, differed significantly from the mean response of the British. In their ratings of a Community foreign policy five years from now, significant differences occurred between the Belgians and the Irish, Germans, and British; between the Dutch and the Irish, Germans, British, and French; and between the

²⁰Europolitique 313 (March 27, 1976), "Featured Document", p. 3.

Table 6.33 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for Foreign Policy in the Community: Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

	Belgium	Netherlands	Luxembourg	Ireland	Denmark	United Kingdom	Italy	West Germany	France	Total
1971	2.83	2.60	2.50	2.67	3.67	2.45	3.50	2.63	3.00	2.82
1976	5.00	5.60	3.50	3.67	7.33	3.55	4.67	3.86	3.83	4.39
1981	7.17	7.20	5.50	5.33	8.00	5.55	6.66	4.86	5.60	6.10
(N)	6	5	2	3	3	11	6	8	6	50

Danes and the Luxembourgers, Irish, Germans, British and French.

Mean responses computed by grouping the respondents into groups of nations (Table 6.34) yielded essentially the same pattern as in Table 6.33:

Table 6.34 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for Foreign Policy in the Community: Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

Year	Benelux Countries	Germany/France/Italy	New Three Countries	Total
1971	2.69	3.00	2.71	2.82
1976	5.00	4.11	4.24	4.39
1981	6.92	5.67	5.94	6.10
(N)	(13)	(20)	(17)	(50)

The more positive ratings by those from the Benelux countries, in particular their mean responses for 1981, differed significantly from the 1981 ratings of the other three of the original six (France, Italy, and Germany), and from those of the three new countries (Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom).

When the self-anchoring scaling mean responses are compared to the institution of the respondents, greater differences appear (Table 6.35). Those outside the Commission gave the Community higher "marks" (on their respective scales of expectation) than did those in the Commission. Statistically different responses did not occur in the responses for 1976. However, for the 1971 ratings, significant differences occurred between DG X/Sec-Gen. and DG I, DG VIII, the COREPER, and the others outside the Commission. For the ratings of the future of Community foreign policy (1981), significant differences exist between the ESC/Parliament/Interest Groups and the three groups in the Commission: DG I, DG VIII, and the DG X/Sec-Gen. Differences on the 1981 ratings are also apparent between the larger groups, those in the Commission and those outside the Commission.

In summary, most of the Eurocrats favored efforts to move toward a common foreign policy in the Community; the majority agreed that foreign policy ("high politics") decision-making should be incorporated into the Community's central institutions and agreed as a group that the member states should give up sovereignty in the area of foreign affairs in order to make Community foreign policies effective. The Eurocrats disagreed with the notion that a negative influence by an outside actor is a necessary condition for Community cooperation, and, as a group,

Table 6.35 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for Foreign Policy in the Community: Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

Year	DG I ^a	DG VIII ^b	DG X ^c	Total Commission	ESC-Parl-I. Groups ^d	COREPER ^e	Total Outside Commission
1971	2.80	3.36	1.33	2.64	3.13	3.22	3.18
1976	4.60	4.50	3.44	4.24	4.63	4.75	4.69
1981	6.00	5.29	5.89	5.66	7.38	6.63	7.00
(N)	(10)	(14)	(9)	(33)	(8)	(9)	(17)

^aDirectorate General I (External Relations) of the Commission

^bDirectorate General VIII (Development) of the Commission

^cDirectorate General X (Information) and Secretariat General

^dEconomic and Social Committee, Parliament, and Interest Groups

^eCouncil of Permanent Representatives to the Community

exhibited slight disagreement with the contention that there is a need for a common defense organization in the Community. Again, as a group, the Eurocrats appear to believe that political cooperation in foreign policy matters has progressed since 1971, and will continue to improve in the next five years. There is no reason to doubt that the majority would agree with the recent comments of Viscount Davignon:

Above all I would stress that political cooperation should not be thought of as intrinsically inter-governmental in nature. Let me explain myself. It is just one example of cooperation which should be considered in the more general context of European unification. In this respect some progress has certainly been made, since it is now fully accepted that political affairs can be discussed

at Council meetings and there is no longer a question-mark hanging over the participation of the European Commission. This shows that one day all our political activities will have to come within the general framework of European Union. The aim is not to have inter-governmental cooperation as opposed to institutionalized cooperation at Community level. Political cooperation should not eclipse Community questions. On the contrary, it must form part of the overall force of Community action, be it economic, political, social, or ideological.²¹

²¹Europolitique 313 (March 27, 1976), "Featured Document". p. 6.

CHAPTER VII

TOWARD A COMMON DEVELOPMENT POLICY

The distinction between "high" and "low politics" discussed in Chapters V and VI suggests two levels of Community foreign relations, the statecraft of diplomacy and the economic relations of trade and other international commercial transactions. Indeed, for the European Community, the greater part of its external relations falls into this second category and is of immense importance. As Sir Christopher Soames, former Commissioner for External Relations, noted:

The European Community today has a gross national product that does not fall far short of that of the United States. Our population is greater, our production of many key manufactures is second to none. Our member states together transact 40 percent of the free world's trade. They hold 30-40 percent of the world's currency reserves. They are the source of over 40 percent of official development assistance to the third world; and they are by far the biggest single market for the exports of the developing world...Magnitudes of this order impose obligations: obligations of responsible behaviour and of imagination in our trading policies, obligations in our aid policies, obligations indeed in some of what look at first sight simply domestic policies (on agriculture, on textiles and such like) but which inevitably impinge on the economies of the rest of the world. Perhaps there were times in the past when our nation states individually, and ever a smaller Community, could afford to be sensitive above all to the economic boundaries. Today I think we all recognize that good citizenship of this planet involves an awareness of the implications of each of our actions on each other, imposes the added burden of thinking through their world-wide implications in this

increasingly interdependent global economic system, and demands mutual consideration for each other's vital needs.¹

The "trade and aid" side of the Community's foreign relations, in particular the move toward the creation of a common development policy, has evolved slowly over the past two decades, but has received tremendous impetus since the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and the successful negotiation of the Lomé Convention in 1975. It is this evolution, this move toward a common development policy as concerns the developing nations of the world that provides the focus of this chapter.

External Relations Provisions in the Treaty of Rome

Provisions in the Treaty of Rome concerning external relations aspects of the Community are relatively modest and small in number. When the Foreign Ministers of the original six member states met at Messina in 1957, they were determined to construct a secure, prosperous, and politically cohesive Europe; relations with other states was a topic limited to a common commercial policy and the creation of a common external tariff. Moreover, the consideration of a Community development policy was not even on their agenda. Nevertheless, the present foreign economic affairs of the Community are based of necessity on these few articles in the Treaty of Rome.

The first such article, Article 18, provides for the common external tariff designed to aid the development of international trade and the reduction of trade barriers on the basis of reciprocity. Articles 19

¹From a speech in Kuala Lumpur, September 19, 1974 (Quoted in, Uwe Kitzinger, Europe's Wider Horizons (London: The Federal Trust, 1975), pp. 8-9.

and 20 specified separate lists of duty items, with other provisions related in Articles 21-29, e.g., customs harmonization (Article 27).

Commercial matters external to the Community's member states are not again mentioned until Articles 111-116. These articles envision a common Community commercial policy as follows:

The undertaking of all tariff negotiations by the Commission on behalf of the Community, on the basis of a mandate and directives from the Council of Ministers, and in consultation with a special committee (known as the 111 Committee); this provision is applicable from the start of the transition period (Article 111);

- the conduct of commercial policy on uniform principles, notably for tariff changes, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the alignment of liberalization measures, export policy, and also measures for trade protection, including those against dumping and subsidies; as with tariff negotiations, the Commission negotiates on behalf of the Community on the basis of a mandate and directives from the Council (Article 115);
- cooperation by the member states should trade diversions threaten to hold up the carrying out of the common commercial policy, or if the latter causes economic difficulties in one or several member states (Article 115);
- joint action only, for all matters of particular interest for the Common Market, in international economic organizations (Article 116).²

The most pervasive provision of the Treaty of Rome as concerns the Community's external relations is Article 131. It is in and by this article that the original six member states agreed to associate with the Community the non-European countries, territories, and colonies with which they had special relations (particularly those of Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands). With Article 113, Article 131 is also the legal justification for most of the existing special commercial relations the Community maintains with non-EC member states (see Figure 7.1). The article suggests, as its motivation, aid for economic and social

²Derek Prag, "The Treaty of Rome," in John Calmann (editor), The Common Market: The Treaty of Rome Explained (London: Anthony Blond, Ltd., 1967), pp. 19-20.

ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS^a

Greece
 Turkey
 Malta
 Cyprus
 Morocco
 Tunisia
 ACP^c

TEXTILE AGREEMENTS^b

Bangladesh
 India (3)
 Sri Lanka
 Thailand
 Hong Kong
 Singapore
 Malaysia
 Pakistan

TRADE AGREEMENTS^bEurope:

Switzerland
 Sweden
 Austria
 Iceland
 Norway
 Finland
 Spain
 Portugal
 Yugoslavia^d

Handicraft Products Only:

India (2)
 Pakistan (2)
 Thailand (2)
 Indonesia
 Iran
 Philippines
 Sri Lanka (2)
 Bangladesh (2)
 Laos (2)

Middle East:

Egypt
 Lebanon
 Israel

NON-PREFERENTIAL TRADE - LATIN AMERICA

Argentina
 Uruguay
 Brazil
 Mexico

Commercial CooperationOnly:

India
 Sri Lanka

^aBy Article 238, Treaty of Rome

^bBy Article 113, Treaty of Rome

^cAfrican, Caribbean, and Pacific nations of the Lomé Convention

^dNon-preferential trade agreement

Figure 7.1

EEC Agreements with Non-Member Countries

SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities (DG-X), Information-External Relations, "EEC Agreements with Non-Member Countries" 115/76 (703/75-F(E)).

development in those countries and colonies with the expressed aim of establishing close relations between them and the Community as a whole. In matter of fact, France had insisted that special arrangements be made for her overseas countries and colonies as a condition to proceeding with the Treaty negotiations. Since there already existed free trade between these areas and France, they argued there could not be free trade between Germany and France without including the overseas territories in the trading area. But France was far more interested in harnessing some German money to help its already overextended economy in the development of its African territories than it was in extending the area of free trade.³ Article 131 later served as the basis for the two Yaoundé Conventions and other association agreements in East Africa (the Arusha Agreement) and with Nigeria. Its immediate effect was to necessitate an annexed implementing convention (Part IV) of the Treaty to set up the first European Development Fund (EDF) in 1958. The EDF's initial resources were \$581.25 million of which the "colonyless" Germans contributed \$200 million.

The Treaty of Rome contains some important structural external relations provisions. Article 228 specifies that any agreements envisioned under the Treaty between the Community and other states or international organizations are to be negotiated by the Commission and concluded by the Council of Ministers. Such agreements are binding on the member states. The Commission is made responsible for maintaining necessary contacts with the United Nations and with GATT (Article 229) and with the Council of Europe and the OECD (Articles 230, 231).

³Kitzinger, pp. 27-28.

Finally, the Treaty of Rome provides for negotiations with European states desiring membership in the Community (Article 237). The Community is also given competence to conclude, on behalf of its member states, association agreements with any other countries or groups of countries. Such agreements may include reciprocal rights and obligations and joint actions, and must be concluded by the Council of Ministers acting unanimously (Article 238).⁴

Lomé's Predecessors

The Convention which brought together the nine European Community states and the whole of independent Black Africa, the Caribbean, and three groups of islands in the Pacific at Lomé, Togo, on February 28, 1975, did not happen suddenly nor did it occur in a vacuum. The 18 months of negotiations to reach the treaty were but a small part of the evolution of Community/Third World cooperation which began in the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957. Using as a legal basis Article 113 and Part IV of the Treaty, the original six member states unified trade relations between 1958 and 1962 with a large part of Africa. At the same time, the Community began supplying development aid to these states through the first EDF. During the period 1960-1962, many of these African colonies became independent and therefore were in a position to discontinue the special relationship they had with the Community. Eighteen of these new states decided to remain associated economically with the Community and, on

⁴For the full text of Article 238 and others previously mentioned, see, Commission of the European Communities, The Treaties of the European Communities (Brussels: first English edition published in 1958).

July 20, 1963, signed the First Convention of Yaoundé.

The Yaoundé Convention featured several positive developments for the associated Francophone African states. It encouraged the formation of the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM), increased trade between them and the Community, and gained a slight increase in financial aid for the five year period, to 730 million units of account (U.A.).⁵ Trade relations were governed by a system of mutual preferences stressing reciprocity and, for the first time, joint institutions were set up to administer the arrangement.⁶ However, the appearance in the convention of equal partners negotiating an agreement providing equal benefit over which there would be equal control was highly illusionary. The first Yaoundé was certainly the strong confronting the weak on its own terms. As I. William Zartman notes:

While the Africans were asking for a continuation and strengthening of the Rome Treaty Association and its advantages, the evolving European position worked toward a loosening of protection for exports from the former French, Belgian, and Italian Africa in the European market and an opening of the flood gates of competition. This the Africans regarded with fear, since they felt that their economies had not yet been sufficiently prepared for the cold world of the open market, while the Europeans moved closer to a common feeling that the only way to learn to survive was by being thrown into the water - with varying kinds of life jackets - and not being paid to sit on the shore.⁷

⁵The unit of account is a form devised by the Commission as a "shopping basket" unit; its value is determined by reference to the value of a group of currencies. Before 1972, the U.A. equalled one dollar. In 1975, it was equal to \$1.24. For a complete explanation, see, Commission of the European Communities, Information: Economic and Finance 114/76, January, 1976.

⁶Charles Schiffman, "A Negotiation and a Convention," The Courier 31 (Special Issue - March, 1975), pp. 3-6.

⁷I. William Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confront the Strong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 40-41. Zartman provides an excellent account of the Yaoundé negotiations in pp. 24-76.

Yaoundé was criticized for other reasons. Some argued it was colonialism by another name while others felt it ought to have been extended to all developing countries. Many believed that it unfairly discriminated against the Community's competitors, while still others felt insufficient protection was given the associates against competing products from Asia and Latin America. Perhaps the most noticeable reaction occurred due to an unrelated development. Discouraged by de Gaulle's refusal to permit British entry into the Community, those who saw this French intransigence as "post-colonial" and oriented to "spheres of influence" which purposely omitted most developing nations (and particularly the British Commonwealth) began to talk of "mondialism", or a world-wide approach to trade and development. The result was the 1963 Declaration of Intent in which the Community declared itself willing to extend the Yaoundé or any similar arrangement to any countries having economic and production structures similar to the AASM. The Dutch, in particular, recommended three options for those outside the AASM: 1) participation in the convention negotiated with the Associates; 2) negotiation of a different but similar convention; or 3) negotiation of trade agreements.⁸

The reaction of the Commonwealth nations was guarded. Nigeria entered three years of laborious negotiations, but the Lagos Convention signed in July, 1966, was never brought into force. The first Arusha agreement with East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) expired without going into effect and the second Arusha Convention, negotiated in 1969,

⁸Kitzinger, p. 29.

did not go into effect until 1971. Its operation until 1975 is generally believed not to have been a success.⁹

The Second Yaoundé Convention was negotiated with the same Yaoundé I participants and signed in July, 1969. The second convention was essentially the same as the first with one substantial difference, the customs preferences problem. The GATT duty restrictions and the generalized tariff preferences the Community granted all developing nations' exports through the System of Generalized Preferences (GSP)¹⁰ eroded the advantages the AASM had under Yaoundé. Further, the flow of trade had not been substantially increased and the elimination of customs duties had not had the desired effect of stabilizing raw material prices. The AASM states did get concessions in Yaoundé II in aid to trade promotion and provisions for emergency aid. What they wanted most they did not receive. The EDF was raised only to 900 million units of account for the next five years (U.A. 5 million was added later when Mauritius became an associate.)¹¹

When, finally, the British were to be admitted into the Community, the Community member states realized that future "Yaoundés" would have to

⁹Zartman, pp. 77-115.

¹⁰The GSP is a system of customs franchise which favors manufactured and semi-finished goods from developing countries. The Community system, in operation since July 1, 1971, is non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory, and is based on preferential imports free of customs duty up to specified ceilings. Items such as agricultural products, basic industrial products and industrial raw materials are not included. (Commission of the EC, Information: External Relations 02/75).

¹¹Schiffmann, p. 4.

include the Commonwealth developing states as well. Consequently, Protocol 22 of the Treaty of Accession extended again the options provided in the 1963 Declaration of Intent, but only to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific members of the Commonwealth (areas where the French had colonies or former colonies), and not to the Asian members (the British did not wish to jeopardize their membership by demanding more for their Commonwealth). But the Commonwealth nations did not leap at the chance. Partially out of unfamiliarity with the nature of "association" and in response to the Third World criticism that "association" was neo-colonialistic, too dependent on Paris, and an obstacle to African unity,¹² the African states outside the AASM made no response for more than a year. After an African trade ministers' meeting in Abidjan in May, 1973, interest was expressed in "bloc-to-bloc" negotiation with the Community. This effectively provided the necessary foundation on which the Lomé Convention was to be built.

The Lomé Convention

While the meeting at Abidjan (and later reaffirmation at the OAU Summit at Addis Ababa) portended a change of attitude on one side, the real psychological impetus for the negotiations which led to Lomé came from the "Deniau Memorandum".¹³ This document suggested a flexibility on the part of the Community on the question of reciprocity, the

¹²M. K. Whiteman, "The Lomé Convention," World Survey 82 (October, 1975), p. 4.

¹³Named after Jean-Francois Deniau, the Community Development Commissioner.

"Stabex" concept (a scheme for stabilization of export earnings on certain commodities),¹⁴ and an indication of less rigid adherence to the three options of Protocol 22.¹⁵ The OAU states responded by taking to the first meeting in Brussels eight principles on which they based their side of the negotiations:

- (i) the principle of non-reciprocity in trade and tariff concessions given by the EEC:
- (ii) the extension on a non-discriminatory basis, towards third countries, of the provision on the right of establishment:
- (iii) the revision of the rules of origin must be formulated so as to facilitate the industrial integration of African countries, and in particular, they must grant the status of original products to all goods which have been produced in one or several of the African countries (whether or not they are members of African groupings) or which have been processed with mutually accepted criteria, whether or not they enjoy preferential relations with the EEC:
- (iv) a revision of the provisions for the movement of payments and capital to take account of the objective of monetary independents in African countries, and the need for monetary co-operation among African countries:
- (v) the disassociation of EEC financial and technical aid from any particular form of relationship with the EEC:
- (vi) free and assured access to EEC markets for all African products including processed and semi-processed agricultural products, whether or not they are subject to the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC:
- (vii) the guaranteeing to African countries of stable, equitable, and remunerative prices in EEC markets for their main products in order to allow them to increase their export earnings:
- (viii) any form of agreement made with the EEC should not in any manner adversely affect intra-African cooperation.¹⁶

¹⁴Stabex is a feature of the Lomé Convention designed to compensate ACP states for instability of export earnings for certain of their products. For an explanation of the aims, products covered, machinery, and financial arrangements in Stabex see, Commission of the European Communities, Information: Development and Cooperation 94/75 (202/X/75-E), pp. 1-23.

¹⁵From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976.

¹⁶Quoted from Whiteman, p. 6.

The African (OAU) members were subsequently joined by six Caribbean and three Pacific nations, while the North African OAU members (Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Lybia, and Morocco) remained only as observers.¹⁷ The resulting group later came to be known as the ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) nations.¹⁸ (See Figure 7.2)

When the Community entered into formal negotiations with the ACP group in October and November, 1973, the member states pledged themselves to more than the creation of another external commercial agreement. Prior to this time, the Yaoundé Conventions represented the sum total of anything that might have been called a development policy. With the agreement to abandon reciprocity and to consider "Stabex", it was clear from the beginning that a Community development policy would be dramatically altered and enhanced. The negotiations proceeded quite slowly during the first six months. Several events took place in the environment of the negotiations that, in part, contributed to the initial

¹⁷North Africa falls under the Community's Mediterranean Policy. Those states had already decided to negotiate separate trade agreements with the Community. Indeed, the Mabgreb negotiations had already begun in 1972. For reference, see Avi Shlaim and G. N. Yannopoulos (editors), The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). See also an excellent analysis of the Mabgreb negotiations in Glenda G. Rosenthal, The Men Behind the Decisions: Cases in European Policy-Making (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975).

¹⁸The ACP states, particularly those in the Commonwealth disliked the terms "associate" or "association" thinking they suggested a children's table set up next to the grown-ups' table (the Europeans). The French and many of the Francophone African states wanted to keep the terms, suggesting that dropping them would render the relationship less close. The terms association and associates do not appear in the Convention; at all times the developing states are referred to as the "ACP" or "ACP states". (From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976).

slow pace. The OPEC boycott occurred at about the same time the negotiations began, and the problem of British opposition became acute when the Labor Party returned to power in Britain in March, 1974. Both events contributed to difficulties among those on the Community side, and the Arab oil embargo provided the ACP side with a unifying influence. According to Nigerian Ambassador Sarni, who chaired the ACP side during the entire 18 months of negotiations, the embargo indirectly cemented ACP solidarity by convincing them to shed the image of "beggar nations" seeking charity.¹⁹ The result was a far different relationship across the negotiating table than existed during the two Yaoundé negotiations.²⁰

The negotiations reached a watershed at the joint ministerial meeting in Kingston, Jamaica. It was here the Community formally dropped its insistence in reciprocity, and announced that the ACP states would have free access to EC markets without having to give corresponding commitments. There was also a Community promise to reexamine the different

¹⁹Whiteman, p. 9.

²⁰Other factors contributed to disunity on the Community side of the negotiations. Certain of the member states had strong reservations on certain issues or products. The French held out for reciprocity with half-hearted support from the Belgians, while the British and Germans vehemently opposed it. The British had reservations on bananas and sugar, the French and Germans on rum, the Danes on cut flowers, and the Italians on nearly all fruits and vegetables. The Germans were the biggest supporters of Stabex, but the most reluctant on the size of the EDF, or more particularly their rather disproportionate share of the EDF. The British wanted a larger EDF, the French were concerned about the Yaoundé group (Francophone Africa) getting less because of the expanded number of the ACP, and the Italians felt the EDF ought to go to the Italians. (From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976.)

questions of rules of origin and concessions on competitive agricultural products.²¹ The Kingston "breakthrough" also included the decision on exports earnings stabilization ("Stabex") and that industrialization should be given priority in the future cooperation. The ACP memorandum at the Kingston Conference served, for all practical purposes, as a draft for the Lomé Convention with two major exceptions - the sugar agreement and the size of the EDF.²²

Sugar was an issue that dominated the closing stages of the negotiations. Those negotiations were made especially difficult by the state of the world sugar market in the Fall, 1974, when prices were particularly high and supplies short. It was also a test of European good faith vs. third world "producer power": sugar from ACP states would be competing with Europe's own producers. The result was a victory for ACP "solidarity"; the Community agreed to buy 1.4 million tons of ACP sugar at the same price guaranteed European sugar beet producers.

²¹The concerns are outlined in: Commission of the European Communities, Information: Development and Cooperation 73/74 (633/X/74-E), pp. 6-11. The issue of reciprocity is a sore point for some Community officials. One Frenchman in the Commission's DG VIII (Development) told me that there is much the Community could and should ask of the developing countries other than tariff reductions. He argued that the Community should require predictability from the Third World states in the form of safeguards against overnight changes in health regulations, quotas, and customs duties. Further, he pointed out that after the Community dropped reciprocity and the United States and the Community haggled over further reductions in the GSP, Japanese businesses moved into the Ivory Coast and cornered many of the markets. (From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976.)

²²Schiffmann, p. 5.

The other last minute negotiation concerned the new amount of the EDF. The chairman of the Community side, Jean Sauvagnargues of France, indicated a willingness to go as high as U. A. 3 billion, but the ACP chairman, Babacar Ba of Senegal, demanded total aid of U. A. 8 billion. However, Babacar Ba announced just prior to the final marathon negotiating session that honor forbade undignified bargaining on the issue, and accepted the Community's figure.²³

The negotiations which led to the signing of the Lomé Convention on February 28, 1975, produced 350 joint documents in 183 EC/ACP negotiating sessions and 493 coordinating meetings of the ACP delegations. Moreover, the negotiations produced a convention which provides for very significant institutional arrangements, commercial cooperation, and financial, technical, and industrial cooperation.

Provisions of the Lomé Convention

The Lomé Convention is for five years, beginning after ratification and dated from March 1, 1975. The agreement is based on:

- Free access without reciprocity to the European market for goods exported from the ACP (the ACP agreed only not to discriminate between EC member states);
- A stabilization fund (Stabex) to compensate the ACP in the event of reductions in the receipts they derive from the export of their principle basic products (not all products are included - the only raw material involved is iron ore, and the total number of products involved is 29);
- Financial aid for the ACP, including U. A. 3 billion from the EDF and U. A. 390 million from the European Investment Bank (included as a major feature is the provision for increased participation by the ACP states in planning the aid, drawing up and appraising projects, preparing financial decisions, carrying out projects and appraising results);

²³Whiteman, p. 11-12.

- Industrial and technical cooperation, aimed at promoting a better international division of labor on lines advantageous to the ACP (including the development of infrastructure linked to industrialization, assistance in setting up industries (particularly for raw material processing), training schemes, technology, transfer plans, and trade promotion);
- Joint institutions to supervise the agreement involving a Council of Ministers made up of the EC Council of Ministers and Commission, and one member from each ACP state; a Committee of Ambassadors (to supervise other bodies and standing or ad hoc working groups), and an advisory assembly composed of European Parliamentarians and representatives appointed by the ACP states (as many ACP nations do not have Parliaments).²⁴

There are provisions in the Lomé Convention which have had and will continue to have an integrative impact on both the Community and the ACP. The Community has always encouraged regional integration preferring to negotiate "bloc-to-bloc" with other regional groupings. (The Eur-Arab Dialogue, discussed in Chapter V above, is an example). As was previously pointed out, the format of the negotiations and the resultant institutional arrangements for the Lomé Convention encourage the representation of the member states on either side by a central representative. The EC Commission has always advocated having a specific fund to encourage regional integration among developing countries. An example of a technique employed to encourage regional integration may be found in the technical and financial parts of the Convention. Article 7 provides for the creation of customs duties or free trade areas among the ACP states. To further encourage regionalization, the Convention makes the rules of origin cumulative; the Community treats the ACP states as a single customs area for purposes of origin. Therefore, cotton grown in one ACP state could be processed in another, and styled in a third without

²⁴The complete text of the Lomé Convention is reprinted in The Courier 31 (Special Issue - March, 1975).

calling into question the origin and tariff list of the product.²⁵ An integrative (centralizing) aspect operating in the Community is the provision that posts representatives of the Commission in each of the ACP states. It is the Commission, not the Council or the member states that has full-time emissaries in all fifty-two countries and control over the flow of information concerning the progress and maintenance of the convention.²⁶

Criticisms of the Lomé Convention

The most often heard criticism of the Lomé Convention concerns its scope, that it still grudgingly embodies a regionalist approach. Although much larger in scope than was Yaoundé, it is still predominantly a special arrangement between Europeans and their former African colonies. Other detractors argue that the most serious need, direct development aid, was not permitted to be a major point in the negotiations and that the total amount falls far short of what is needed.²⁷ The Stabex scheme has been criticized on various technical points, including the limited number of products covered and the relatively paltry fund (U. A. 375 million). Another criticism concerns the recipient of Stabex funds; money

²⁵Kitzinger, p. 34.

²⁶The terms of this arrangement are specified in Article 31, Protocol II of the Lomé Convention and in Commission of the European Communities, "Regulation of the Rules of Competition in the Awarding of Works and Supply Contracts Financed by the EDF" (Brussels, April, 1976) (VIII/242 (76)-E, VIII-E-4).

²⁷The point is well argued by Carol Cosgrove-Twitchett, "From Association to Partnership," in Kenneth J. Twitchett (editor), Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market (London: Europa, 1976), pp. 121-150.

paid from the fund goes directly to ACP governments and, as such, may be more a tax subsidy than any guarantee of helping farmers and producers.²⁸ Despite these valid concerns, the Lomé Convention does represent a decided break with the past, a move toward First-Third World equality in the face of "producer power" and the call for a "new economic order", a significant move on the part of the Community toward treating all developing states equally, and the emergence of a cohesive development policy in the Community.²⁹ Both the Community and the ACP leaders were justified in their self-congratulations. But the detractors were not long to find encouragement. The UNCTAD IV meeting in Nairobi appeared to reverse many of the psychological and political gains of the Lomé Convention in European/Third World relations.

UNCTAD IV

The Fourth Conference of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)³⁰ was, in many respects, a failure for the Community. First, it revealed how far apart many of the member states

²⁸From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976.

²⁹See, for examples, I. V. Gruhn, "The Lomé Convention: Inching towards Interdependence," International Organization 30 (Spring, 1976), pp. 241-262; and I. William Zartman, "Europe and Africa: Decolonialization or Dependency?", Foreign Affairs 54 (January, 1976), pp. 325-343.

³⁰UNCTAD was established as an organ of the United Nations General Assembly in December, 1964, by resolution 1995 (XIX). It is a world-wide forum having a membership of 152 states. Its aim is to evolve a coordinated set of policies, to be adopted by all governments, designed to accelerate the economic development of the developing countries. These policies concern external trade and payments as well as economic development.

were on certain issues and, therefore, how far the Community was from the common development policy envisioned (albeit embryonically) in the Convention of Lomé. The failure of the Community to "speak with one voice" during the conference in Nairobi, Kenya, in May, 1976, also indicated that the Community would have to admit that it could no longer participate in one conference as though other conferences in which it took part did not exist or were not significantly interrelated. The UNCTAD IV Conference seemed to have ended the sort of practice in which, for example, generalized preferences schemes are promised in GATT rounds while preferential arrangements are negotiated with ACP and other third world states.³¹

Preparations for UNCTAD IV began in earnest in the United Nations in 1975. The topics prepared for the agenda were commodities, manufactures and semi-manufactures, money and finance, transfer of technology, the least developed developing states, economic cooperation among developing countries, trade between nations having different economic and social systems, and shipping and insurance.³² Preparation in the Community

³¹In all of my interviews, I could find no indication that any effort was made in the Commission to link any of the concurrent negotiations together. Although this does not in itself prove that no such consultation or coordination took place, of one related observation I am quite certain. Those who I interviewed in DG I or DG VIII who had taken part in negotiating similar arrangements with different countries all told me that no effort was made to base new negotiations on the achievements or lessons learned in previous agreements, preferring instead to begin the new negotiations on a tabula rasa, often with a different negotiating team. It was as though the entire process could be characterized as "incremental ad hoc opportunism."

³²UNCTAD/CESI, Preparing for UNCTAD IV (New York: United Nations, 1975), TAD/INF/PUB/75-3, pp. 1-24.

did not begin until the middle of January, 1976 when it was learned that the Group of 77³³ were to meet in Manila from January 26 to February 6 to prepare a common position both for the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board meeting in March and for the general conference in May. The Dutch government was the first to act, sending an observer to the Manila meeting in order to aid the Community's preparation for UNCTAD IV.³⁴

The Commission finally sent to the Council its proposals for the Conference in February, 1976. These included an international "Stabex" scheme (for export earnings, not purchasing power as had been hoped by many Third World states),³⁵ the use of commodity agreements "where appropriate", and the application of accompanying trade measures. The communication specifically recommended rejection of the indexation of primary products proposed by the Group of 77 at Manila.³⁶ The ideas contained in the Communication were little more than a comparison of past positions with the positions of other groups of nations and ideas

³³The "Group of 77" is the name commonly used for meetings of the non-aligned members of the Third World. The group actually consists of about 110 members.

³⁴Europolitique 292 (January 14, 1976), "External Relations", p. 1.

³⁵Abd-El Rahman Khane, executive director of UNIDO, criticized the Lomé Stabex scheme as "not sufficient at all" during a February, 1976, press conference in Davos, stating that future arrangements must stabilize the purchasing power of developing states. Europolitique 299 (February 7, 1976) "External Relations", p. 3.

³⁶Commission of the European Communities, "Preparation for the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development." ((COM 176) 39 final: Brussels, February 4, 1976), pp. 1-23.

on coordinating UNCTAD IV with the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (henceforth referred to as CIEC or the "North/South Dialogue").³⁷

The meeting of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board in Geneva, March 8-19, served as a pre-negotiating session for UNCTAD IV. The session also served to point out the differences between the developed and developing states - no recommendations or resolutions emerged from the conference - and between members of the Community. For example, the Germans and British were most adamantly opposed to a binding code of ethics on multinational corporations and the transfer of technology; the Dutch were in favor of the integrated commodities approach advocated by the Group of 77, to the point of offering to contribute immediately to an international buffer stock.³⁸ The French still limited any decisions on aid funding to a long term review of both the CIEC and UNCTAD IV,³⁹ and the Germans maintained their insistence that there should be no aid

³⁷The CIEC has been meeting in Paris since May, 1975. It is attended by the developed states (major raw material consumers) and 19 Third World raw material producer states. The Conference is divided into four commissions dealing respectively with energy, raw materials, financial questions, and development strategy. By a decision at the Rome Summit in December, 1975, of the European Council, the nine Community states are represented in the CIEC by a single delegation. For background, see Jahangir Amuzegar, "The North/South Dialogue: From Conflict to Compromise," Foreign Affairs 54 (April, 1976), pp. 547-562.

³⁸Europolitique 312 (March 24, 1976), "External Relations", pp. 1-3.

³⁹Europolitique 295 (January 24, 1976), "External Relations", p. 3.

allocation without harmonization of aid programs.⁴⁰ The internal differences, differences with the Group of 77, and limited time remaining made it very clear that speaking with one voice at Nairobi would require continuous ad hoc consultation by the nine Community governments.

During the first eight days of April, 1976, the Council of Development Ministers of the Community met in Luxembourg in an attempt to resolve their differences before moving on to Nairobi. The meeting produced no results. For example, France still refused to support the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). However, some positive debate was held on the German memorandum. The Danes asked about the need to harmonize GNP shares devoted to aid. The French suggested concentrating aid coordination on the ACP and Mediterranean countries as an initial phase, while the British wanted a discussion of paid technical

⁴⁰The Germans submitted a memorandum to the Council in early April, 1976, the main points of which were:

- given the greater weight of Member States' development policy, as a result of EEC enlargement, an integrated development policy is required, implying greater coordination and harmonization;
- major efforts are needed to smooth the path to greater "Communitization" of development policy through progressive transfer of bilateral aid to Community responsibility (which, given the national prestige some countries derive from aid-giving, is not likely to be a welcome suggestion everywhere);
- in stage one, improved bases for national decision-making should be created by more exchange of information taking into account plans for existing EEC policy; this should make the interdependence of bilateral consideration clearer;
- in stage two, common planning of aid distribution by country and region;
- in stage three, progressive transfer to the Community of various instruments and resources.

Europolitique 315 (April 3, 1976), "External Relations", p. 3.

assistance to richer developing states. But the debate soured when France suggested spending the U. A. 20 million set aside for development assistance to non-associates entirely in Lebanon. The Dutch, British, and Belgians reacted heatedly to what they saw as another game of favoritism and an effort to abrogate 2 1/2 years of discussions on aid to non-associates. The meeting ended with an agreement only to disagree.⁴¹

UNCTAD IV began in Nairobi on May 6, 1976. The tone of the Conference was set immediately and was evident by the fact it took more than a week (or nearly half the allotted time) to reach agreement on the composition of the five specialized groups and who should chair them. Tensions between the Nine then arose due to a stalemate in the first commission which was charged with examining the problem of commodities. No longer wishing to wait for the developed states, the "Group of 77" announced plans to go it alone and create a common fund to finance buffer stocks for seventeen commodities.⁴² The fund was to have been financed by the OPEC nations (\$300 million), the Philippines (\$50 million) and India (\$25 million). The consternation among the industrialized nations at the prospect of an international market instrument set up outside their control was exacerbated by dissention within their ranks. The Netherlands and Denmark immediately expressed a willingness to contribute to such a common fund, while Germany (supported by Britain) continued to

⁴¹Europolitique 317 (April 10, 1976), "External Relations", p. 2.

⁴²The commodities are coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar, cotton, rubber, jute, sisal, copper, tin, wheat, rice, bananas, beef and veal, wool, bauxite, and iron ore.

reserve the right to decide on its own the timing of contributing to separate funds for commodities.⁴³

When the issue of indebtedness of the poorest countries joined in furthering the stalemate of the Conference, and the United States and Japan let it be known they would not oppose any compromise worked out among the EEC nine, the spotlight shifted to frantic efforts among the Community member states' delegates to find such a compromise. The most difficult obstacle remained the United Kingdom's and Germany's opposition to automatic market stabilization measures of world prices of commodities.⁴⁴ Faced with the prospect of seriously damaging the future of the North/South dialogue, the Germans softened their positions on commodities funds and debt financing. A two-day extension of the Conference permitted a qualified successful conclusion of UNCTAD IV on May 30th. Although some consensus was reached at the Conference concerning commodities, debt, transfer of technology, and institutional and monetary questions, the only major result was to pave the way for a large number of future international negotiations. The United States (whose proposal to set up an international resource bank was rejected) announced at the final meeting that it would not pledge itself to negotiate at any later date either agreements on certain products or on setting up the common

⁴³Europolitique 326 (May 19, 1976), "External Relations", p. 4.

⁴⁴Europolitique 328 (May 27, 1976), "External Relations", pp. 6-7.

fund.⁴⁵

The U.S. announcement was supported by the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. The Dutch led the Benelux and Scandinavian countries in their support of the common fund and a desire to assume obligations to help in the case of the indebtedness of the poorest nations. The French took a middle-ground position, stating only that they supported the final resolution of the Conference.⁴⁶

Community officials hailed UNCTAD IV as a "happy success"; but the press and the third world countries declared it a failure, and pointed to a lack of cohesion among the Community's member states.⁴⁷ The

⁴⁵It was generally believed among Community officials that the United States played a disruptive role at the Nairobi Conference. Many of the member states expressed fear that some (especially Germany and the U.K.) would be more interested in maintaining close ties with the U.S. than in compromising with the Group of 77. A persistent rumor in the Commission was that a member of the U.S. delegation broke into a private meeting of the Nine (designed to find a common EC position) and successfully pulled away the British delegate to sign a joint U.S./U.K. position. I could not substantiate the rumor, but its existence is significant in itself. (From interviews in the EC Commission, Brussels, June-July, 1976).

⁴⁶For the final resolution concerning an integrated program for commodities, and related declarations of the Netherlands (speaking for 16 countries of Group B including Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg), West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Columbia, and Australia, see, UNCTAD document TD/L. 131, 30 May, 1976. (5/898 e/76 (COMER 224)) Add. 1. France's position during the conference was pointed out in more than one of my interviews as an example of its voting "technique" on the Council since 1973. Tired of being labelled the Community's "bête noire", the French are careful to vote after the Danes, Germans, or British, whichever can be counted upon to cast a negative vote. (From interviews in the EC Commission, Brussels, June-July, 1976).

⁴⁷Europolitique 329 (June 2, 1976), "External Relations", pp. 4-5.

official Community assessment was based on the fact that UNCTAD IV did not directly hinder progress in the timetables and forms of the North/South Dialogue. Indeed, the situation was an example of recognized linkage between multinational negotiations. That any cohesion among the nine occurred at all was credited to a fear that an absolute failure in UNCTAD IV would jeopardize any chance of success in the North/South Dialogue (which continues at the time of this writing). It is, then, in the context of the North/South Dialogue that the formulation of any common Community policy on development will occur. The experience of UNCTAD IV demonstrates that the Lomé Convention was not sufficient to insure further progress. Further, the Community may have gambled unsuccessfully by sacrificing UNCTAD IV to save the CIEC. There was some indication that many third world states would have much preferred substantial progress in Nairobi, where each had a voice, to the Paris talks where they must depend on one of the 19 developing states representing them.⁴⁸

A Community Development Policy?

Before the Lomé Convention was signed and the UNCTAD IV Conference took place, the Commission of the European Community published a "philosophical statement" on development aid commonly referred to as the "Fresco".⁴⁹ This document, based on the theme, "To each according

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴⁹ Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8/74, (November, 1974), pp. 1-26. Prior to that, the Commission had published an extensive report arguing the need for a common development policy. See Commission of the European Communities, Memorandum of a Community Policy on Development Cooperation (Communication of the Commission to the Council of July 27, 1971 and February 2, 1972).

to his needs, by bringing all our means to bear", stresses the need for commodity stabilization, food production programs, and for stockpiling reserves. The "message" is that the diversity between developing states requires different approaches designed to respond to differing sets of needs and circumstances. The Commission was far more specific in a follow-on Communication to the Council in March, 1975.⁵⁰ These proposals were meant to complete an overall development policy by adding to those already included in the Lomé Convention. The proposals address rural development, food production, funds to encourage regional integration, and some modest allotments for emergency aid and technical assistance in trade promotion. The Commission recommended a total fund for all non-ACP developing states of U. A. 105 million for 1976, to be raised gradually to U. A. 210 million by 1980.

Despite the specificity of these proposals, it is the philosophical nature of the "Fresco" which both embodies what common Community development policy can be said to exist at present, and the very differences which were the bases for the disharmony between the member states and which now stand as barriers to any common policies. While the Community member states disagree as to what form of market stabilization should be constructed and for what products from which countries, more fundamental questions have not as yet been resolved. For example, given that an eventual common development policy is a proper Community goal, what form should that objective take? Should the goal be mondialism, regionalism, or a

⁵⁰Commission of the European Communities, "Community Financial and Technical Aid to Non-Associated Developing Countries 1976-1980" (COM(75) 95 final, Brussels, March 5, 1975), pp. 1-11.

form somewhere between the two? Do special arrangements in Africa or the Mediterranean discriminate against other third world nations? Should Community aid programs be entirely multilateral, coordinated or controlled by the Community's central institutions, or should national bilateral aid programs continue in addition to multilateral Community aid? As was done in previous chapters, the answers to these questions were sought in the collective wisdom of the Eurocrats. Their thinking on these fundamental concerns, plus their assessments of the present state of integration and the prognosis for a Community development policy are presented in Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER VIII

THE 'EUROCRATS': TOWARD A COMMON DEVELOPMENT POLICY

The European Community is moving toward the achievement of a common policy vis á vis the less developed countries of the world. The continuation of this progress depends now on the ability of the Community to prepare and negotiate a common position in the "North/South Dialogue". It is particularly important to the Community that in the "North/South Dialogue", the lack of unity and subsequent failure to achieve results in negotiations with the Third World experienced in UNCTAD IV not be repeated. That difficulty, added to the lack of any significant results in the North/South to date do not detract from the recent progress made toward a common development policy relative to the past. The Lomé Convention is sufficient evidence of that progress.

As I did in Chapters IV and VI above, I shall present in this chapter the collective attitudes and wisdom of the "Eurocrats",¹ a group

¹For an explanation of the term "Eurocrat", a profile of the fifty respondents, and details as to methodology, see Chapter II.

of European Community officials who are among those most knowledgeable regarding the Community's external relations. This chapter is, then, their collective expert opinions concerning the immediate and future state of integration in the area of development assistance outside the Community. Unlike previous chapters, however, the Eurocrats were not asked to specify or clarify different means and ends that had been left unclear by events and official statements. Indeed, the provisions of the Lomé Convention, the sources of contention between the member states, and the various recommendations now under consideration are relatively unambiguous and often expressed in technical clarity and hard Units of Account. If anything, the responses of the Eurocrats serve to underscore a real lack of consensus in the Community concerning efforts to move beyond the Lomé Convention. Nowhere is this more evident than in their expressions of preferences as to the goals for a Community development policy.

End-Products

The Eurocrats were asked to specify what for them would be the best possible goal for a common development policy. Their responses to the open-ended question, "What for you would be the best possible policy by the Community toward the developing countries of the world?", fell into the categories indicated in Table 8.1. Thirty-six percent specifically mentioned the Lomé Convention in some way. Although this constituted the largest group, the group was far from being a majority. The other responses indicated preferences for varying degrees of centralization (three specifically wanted no centralization of development policy) and

Table 8.1 - The Best Possible Community Development Policy

<u>Ideal State</u>	<u>Number</u>
The Lomé Convention (in spirit, theory, or principle)	18
More cooperation with Less Developed Countries	7
A common policy but on a "case-by-case" basis	6
A world-wide (mondialist) common policy	5
Increase aid to the poorest nations	3
Create a central Community development policy	3
Coordinate national bilateral programs (no central policy)	3
End ethnocentric development policies	2
Decrease aid, increase technical assistance and investment	2
Improve the General System of Preferences	1
Total	50

certain strategies: the mondialist approach, regionalist (or "case-by-case") approach, increasing or decreasing aid, etc. (The mondialist/regionalist and multilateralist/bilateralist controversies will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.) The responses in Table 8.1 indicate a willingness to state preferences on the part of the Eurocrats, but a general lack of consensus among them that fairly accurately reflects the situation in the Community as described in the previous chapter.

The responses to the question, "What for you would be the worst possible arrangement for the Community's relations with the developing

countries?", were indicative also of a lack of consensus. As indicated in Table 8.2, the responses ranged from the multilateralists' fear that only uncoordinated national bilateral programs would exist or that the Lomé would fail, to a state of no development programs at all.

Table 8.2 - The Worst Anticipated Community Development Policy

<u>Worst Anticipated State</u>	<u>Number</u>
No coordination, only national bilateral programs exist	17
A failure of the Lomé Convention	10
States favor former colonies and are too stingy with the poorest nations	6
Overall, inflexible policy without regard for special needs and circumstances (characterized by over-centralization)	5
"Beggar-Thy-Neighbor" Policy (competition between the Nine)	4
A "cold war" with the Third World/increasing the gap between rich and poor nations	2
Should the Community loose its development role in the world	2
No aid, just trade, or giving aid only	2
No aid programs at all	2
Total	50

The Current State of Integration

As there appears to be a lack of consensus about what the end-product of a common Community development policy should be, the same

situation exists as to whether such a common policy is an important endeavor. Public opinion in the Community member states indicates that only in Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, and Luxembourg do a majority feel that achieving a common development policy is important or very important. (These countries also had the lowest percents giving no reply; see Table 8.3 below). Indeed, the data for the total Community relate that 47 percent of the general publics believe a common development

Table 8.3 - The Importance of Achieving a Common Community Policy on Aid to Underdeveloped Countries Outside Europe.

<u>Nation (Number)</u>	<u>Very Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Of Little Importance</u>	<u>Not at all Important</u>	<u>No Reply</u>	<u>Total</u>
Belgium (1000)	14%	24%	23%	20%	19%	100%
Denmark (1023)	14	24	17	18	27	100
West Germany (1002)	14	33	29	14	10	100
France (1276)	20	31	24	16	9	100
Ireland (998)	18	42	22	10	8	100
Italy (1110)	22	30	22	17	9	100
Luxembourg (297)	17	44	22	6	11	100
Netherlands (1006)	15	28	25	15	17	100
United Kingdom (1438)	12	31	24	23	10	100
Total Community	16%	31%	25%	17%	11%	100%

SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre: Public Opinion in the European Community 4 (December, 1975), p. A22.

policy important or very important, while 42 percent see it of little or no importance. This may be explained, in part, when the relative intensity of the importance of problems dealt with by the Community is considered. Table 8.4 demonstrates that aid to developing states receives a low priority from the general populations in the member states relative to other Community concerns. Only in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom was a common development policy rated ninth rather than last.

The Eurocrats were asked to assess the support for a common development policy by the governments of the member states. Rather than an assessment of positive or negative support or of varying degrees of support, the Eurocrats were asked to rank the member states from first (1) to last (9) as to the support each gives and has given to efforts to achieve a common Community development policy. The results of these rankings, compiled as to the nationality of the respondents, are reported in Table 8.5. The data in the table suggests several observations. First, the ordinal rankings of the member states are significantly alike,² but they are not as similar as were the rankings based on support for European Union or a common foreign policy (see Table 4.27 in Chapter IV and Table 6.15 in Chapter VI). For example, Denmark is variously ranked from second to a tie for seventh, Germany's rankings range from first to 7.5, and Luxemburg from second to a tie for last. A second observation also requires a comparison with Tables 4.27 and 6.15. Except for the rankings of the Netherlands, which was clearly the first choice of eight

²Rank correlation by Kendall's $W = .553$ for the nine sets of rankings (all rank correlations reported in this chapter have a P value $< .005$).

Table 8.4 - Mean Scores on Intensity of the Importance Attached to Problems Dealt with by the European Community.

	Belgium	Denmark	West Germany	France	Ireland	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total (1)
1. Rising prices	2.63	2.46	2.58	2.63	2.78	2.57	2.33	2.38	2.70	2.61
2. Protection of nature	2.31	2.37	2.23	2.46	2.36	2.33	2.23	2.32	2.29	2.32
3. Protection of consumers	2.31	2.28	2.17	2.30	2.48	2.31	2.22	2.14	2.31	2.27
4. Policy on energy supplies	2.30	2.05	2.18	2.21	2.11	2.23	2.16	2.03	2.13	2.18
5. Social policy	2.15	1.79	1.91	2.25	2.33	2.11	2.10	1.97	1.99	2.06
6. Negotiations with the United States and Russia	1.91	1.68	2.00	2.05	1.61	2.04	2.09	1.81	2.04	2.01
7. Modernisation of agriculture	1.99	1.78	1.67	1.88	2.26	2.32	1.82	1.82	2.11	1.98
8. Differences between regions	1.83	1.80	1.74	1.98	2.14	2.19	2.00	1.61	1.78	1.90
9. European currency	1.70	1.12	1.48	1.80	1.78	1.84	2.11	1.48	1.28	1.59
10. Aid to underdeveloped countries	1.41	1.47	1.51	1.59	1.74	1.62	1.79	1.52	1.37	1.52
Mean	2.05	1.88	1.95	2.12	2.16	2.16	2.09	1.91	2.00	2.04

Scores calculated for each country by weighting the percentages of the answers by the coefficients 3, 2, 1, 0 following the intensity attached to the problem and by dividing the number obtained by the percentages of people having given an answer. Weighted, for the European Community, following the relative part of the population aged 15 years and over in each country. SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Euro-Barometre: Public Opinion in the European Community 4 (December, 1975), pp. A25.

Table 8.5 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve a Common Development Policy.

Nationality of Respondents	Belgians (n=6)	Dutch (n=5)	Luxembourgers (n=2)	Irish (n=3)	Danes (n=3)	Italians (n=6)	Germans (n=8)	British (n=11)	French (n=6)	Total (n=50)
Belgium	<u>2 (4.17)</u>	4 (4.50)	4.5 (5.00)	4.5 (4.33)	4 (4.83)	2 (4.00)	2 (4.50)	6 (5.91)	4 (4.58)	4 (4.75)
Denmark	4 (5.17)	5 (4.60)	3 (4.50)	3 (4.00)	<u>2 (2.33)</u>	7.5 (5.50)	3 (4.63)	2 (2.95)	6 (4.83)	2 (4.27)
France	5 (5.67)	6 (5.10)	9 (8.00)	9 (8.00)	5 (5.33)	9 (7.83)	9 (6.88)	9 (8.32)	<u>4 (4.58)</u>	9 (6.73)
Ireland	7.5 (5.92)	8 (6.20)	6.5 (5.50)	<u>2 (3.33)</u>	6 (6.00)	3 (4.83)	5.5 (4.88)	5 (5.27)	8.5 (6.58)	6 (5.42)
Italy	9 (6.08)	9 (7.30)	8 (6.50)	7.5 (7.33)	9 (7.67)	<u>5 (5.08)</u>	8 (6.31)	7 (6.73)	7 (5.75)	8 (6.41)
Luxembourg	3 (4.33)	7 (5.80)	<u>2 (3.50)</u>	4.5 (4.33)	7 (6.17)	6 (5.25)	7 (5.13)	8 (6.77)	8.5 (6.58)	7 (5.60)
Netherlands	1 (2.00)	<u>1 (3.20)</u>	1 (1.50)	1 (1.33)	1 (1.33)	1 (2.00)	1 (3.00)	1 (1.77)	2 (3.67)	1 (2.33)
United Kingdom	7.5 (5.92)	3 (4.40)	6.5 (5.50)	6 (5.00)	8 (6.67)	7.5 (5.50)	5.5 (4.88)	<u>3 (3.23)</u>	4 (4.58)	5 (4.77)
West Germany	6 (5.75)	2 (3.90)	4.5 (5.00)	7.5 (7.33)	3 (4.67)	4 (5.00)	<u>4 (4.81)</u>	4 (4.05)	1 (3.50)	3 (4.68)

A nation's rating by its own nationals is underlined. Mean responses appear in parentheses.

of the nine groups, the mean responses were often quite close tending to cluster between 4 and 7. This again is indicative of a lack of any consensus of opinion excepting that concerning the support by the Netherlands. Note that the total rankings place Denmark second and France last; the mean scores are respectively 4.27 and 6.73. A third observation concerns each nationality groupings' self-ratings. Most of the self-ratings were either first, second, or third, but no higher than fourth (the French and Germans) or fifth (the Italians). When compared to the overall ratings, these self-ratings are not very accurate. For example, the Luxembourgers, rated seventh by all others, rated their government second; the Irish rated their government second as compared to overall ranking of sixth; the Italians fifth against an overall ranking of eighth; and the French, whose nation ranked last overall, ranked their country fourth.

Rank correlations between rank orders of the member states analyzed by nationality groups (e.g., old six/new three, North/South),³ by institution of the respondents,⁴ by age,⁵ by prior experience,⁶ and by responses to the self-anchoring scaling questions (indicating preferences

³Benelux/Original Three/New Three: Kendall's W = .785; Original Six/New Three: Spearman's rho = .500; North/South: Spearman's rho = .600.

⁴For the five institution groups: Kendall's W = .653; for the Commission/Outside the Commission: Spearman's rho = .783.

⁵Kendall's W = .909.

⁶Community experience: Kendall's W = .788; Private Sector Experience: Kendall's W = .929.

either for centralization or decentralization in the Community)⁷ were all significantly similar (at .005 by X^2) within each of these groups (see Tables 8.6, 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9). These classifications appear to have made no difference as to responses with three important exceptions. The rank order given by those who had had prior national civil service experience significantly differed with the rank order of those who had no prior civil service experience (see Table 8.8).⁸ The same was true for the sets of rank orders based on foreign policy centralization and multilateralist vs. bilateralists.⁹

Generally, the rank orders exhibit the following characteristics:

1) the Dutch are most always listed as first, the French and Italians nearer the bottom (eighth and ninth); 2) unlike the rank orders for European Union and foreign policy, the order does not appear to be a function of the size of the countries. Luxembourg and Ireland are often listed among the last three states while Germany and the United Kingdom frequently appear in the top half of the member states. The rank orders, then, do not appear to indicate that the smaller the member state, the less intense are external interests and, therefore, the more willing the member is to integrate (i.e., give up sovereignty).

⁷Federalists/Non-Federalists: Spearman's rho = .850; Mondialists/Regionalists: Spearman's rho = .883.

⁸Prior Civil Service: Spearman's rho = .158.

⁹Centralists/Non-Centralists: Spearman's rho = .217; multi-lateralists/bilateralists: Spearman's rho = .533 (significance test found $P > .10$).

Table 8.6 -- Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve a Common Development Policy.

Nationality Groups (of Respondents)	Benelux Countries (n=13)	France Germany Italy (n=20)	New Three (Ireland, Denmark, United Kingdom) (n=17)	Original Six (all but New Three) (n=33)	North (all but Italy & France) (n=38)	South (Italy & France) (n=12)	Total (n=50)
Belgium	2 (4.42)	2 (4.38)	6 (5.44)	2 (4.39)	5 (4.89)	3 (4.29)	4 (4.75)
Denmark	4 (4.84)	4 (4.95)	2 (3.03)	4 (4.91)	2 (3.99)	5 (5.17)	2 (4.27)
France	7 (5.81)	9 (6.48)	9 (7.74)	9 (6.21)	9 (6.89)	9 (6.21)	9 (6.73)
Ireland	8 (5.96)	6 (5.38)	5 (5.06)	7 (5.61)	6 (5.33)	7 (5.71)	6 (5.42)
Italy	9 (6.62)	8 (5.78)	8 (7.00)	8 (6.11)	8 (6.72)	6 (5.42)	8 (6.41)
Luxembourg	3 (4.77)	7 (5.60)	7 (6.24)	6 (5.27)	7 (5.50)	8 (5.92)	7 (5.60)
Netherlands	1 (2.38)	1 (2.90)	1 (1.62)	1 (2.70)	1 (2.17)	1 (2.83)	1 (2.33)
United Kingdom	6 (5.27)	5 (4.98)	3 (4.15)	5 (5.09)	3 (4.68)	4 (5.04)	5 (4.77)
West Germany	5 (4.92)	3 (4.48)	4 (4.74)	3 (4.65)	4 (4.82)	2 (4.25)	3 (4.68)

(mean responses appear in parentheses)

Table 8.7 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve a Common Development Policy.

Institution of Respondents	Directorate General I (n=10)	Directorate General VIII (n=14)	Dir. Gen. X and Secretariat-General (n=9)	Total Commission (n=33)	Econ and Soc Committee Parliament & Private Groups (n=8)	Council of Permanent Reps (COREPER) (n=9)	Total Outside Commission (n=17)
Belgium	2 (4.15)	6 (4.89)	5 (5.33)	5 (4.79)	6 (5.38)	2 (4.06)	3 (4.68)
Denmark	5 (5.25)	2 (3.50)	4 (4.44)	2 (4.29)	2 (3.31)	5 (5.06)	2 (4.23)
France	7 (5.55)	9 (7.46)	7 (5.83)	8 (6.44)	9 (7.38)	9 (7.22)	9 (7.29)
Ireland	9 (6.00)	3 (4.64)	6 (5.78)	6 (5.36)	5 (5.13)	7 (5.89)	7 (5.53)
Italy	8 (5.90)	8 (7.11)	8 (6.28)	9 (6.52)	7 (5.94)	8 (6.44)	8 (6.21)
Luxembourg	6 (5.50)	7 (5.82)	9 (6.83)	7 (6.00)	4 (4.81)	4 (4.83)	4 (4.82)
Netherlands	1 (2.40)	1 (1.96)	2 (3.50)	1 (2.52)	1 (2.56)	1 (1.44)	1 (1.97)
United Kingdom	4 (5.15)	5 (4.79)	1 (3.17)	3 (4.45)	8 (6.13)	3 (4.72)	6 (5.83)
West Germany	3 (5.10)	4 (4.68)	3 (3.83)	4 (4.58)	3 (4.38)	6 (5.33)	5 (4.88)

(Mean responses appear in parentheses)

Table 8.8 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve a Common Development Policy.

Member States	AGE			COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE			PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE			PRIOR CIVIL SERVICE	
	<u>Below 30</u>	<u>30 - 39</u>	<u>40-Plus</u>	<u>1 - 6</u>	<u>7 - 12</u>	<u>13 - 18</u>	<u>Profession</u>	<u>Business</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
	(n=6)	(n=24)	(n=20)	(n=32)	(n=6)	(n=12)	(n=16)	(n=19)	(n=15)	(n=19)	(n=31)
Belgium	5 (5.17)	2 (4.40)	5 (5.05)	4 (4.63)	2 (4.25)	5 (5.33)	5 (4.91)	4 (4.76)	4 (4.57)	2 (3.67)	5 (5.35)
Denmark	2.5 (3.50)	3 (4.67)	2 (4.03)	2 (4.06)	4 (4.83)	3 (4.54)	4 (4.81)	2 (3.63)	2 (4.50)	4 (5.11)	2 (3.76)
France	9 (7.67)	9 (6.38)	9 (6.88)	9 (7.22)	5 (5.17)	9 (6.21)	9 (6.84)	8.5(6.50)	9 (6.90)	8.5 (6.68)	9 (6.76)
Ireland	6.5 (6.08)	6.5 (5.46)	6 (5.18)	6 (5.25)	6.5 (5.67)	7 (5.75)	6 (5.31)	6 (5.37)	7 (5.60)	5 (5.37)	6 (5.45)
Italy	8 (6.50)	8 (6.31)	8 (6.50)	8 (6.59)	9 (6.17)	8 (6.04)	8 (6.66)	8.5(6.50)	8 (6.03)	8.5 (6.68)	8 (6.24)
Luxembourg	6.5 (6.08)	6.5 (5.46)	7 (5.63)	7 (5.61)	6.5 (5.67)	6 (5.54)	7 (5.56)	7 (5.84)	6 (5.38)	3 (4.66)	7 (6.18)
Netherlands	1 (1.67)	1 (2.33)	1 (2.53)	1 (1.92)	1 (2.25)	1 (3.46)	1 (1.97)	1 (2.58)	1 (2.40)	1 (1.89)	1 (2.60)
United Kingdom	2.5 (3.50)	5 (5.02)	4 (4.85)	3 (4.63)	8 (5.92)	4 (4.58)	3 (4.50)	5 (5.18)	3 (4.53)	6 (5.39)	4 (4.39)
West Germany	4 (4.83)	4 (4.90)	3 (4.38)	5 (5.09)	3 (4.75)	2 (3.54)	2 (4.44)	3 (4.63)	5 (5.00)	7 (5.45)	3 (4.21)

(Mean responses appear in parentheses)

Table 8.9 - Ratings of the Community's Member States from First (1) to Last (9) as to the Support Each Gives and Has Given to Efforts to Achieve a Common Development Policy.

Member States	Federalists (n=31)	Non-Federalists (n=19)	Foreign Policy Centralists (n=28) ^b	Foreign Policy Non-Cent. (n=20) ^b	Mondialists ^a (n=24) ^b	Regionalists ^a (n=9) ^b	Multi-lateralists ^a (n=22) ^b	Bilateralists (n=9) ^b	Total (n=50)
Belgium	2 (4.42)	5 (5.29)	2 (4.50)	3 (3.95)	2 (4.46)	4 (4.83)	2 (4.43)	6 (5.39)	4 (4.75)
Denmark	3 (4.52)	2 (3.87)	3 (4.66)	9 (6.85)	3 (4.71)	2 (4.00)	3 (4.59)	4 (4.39)	2 (4.27)
France	9 (6.42)	7 (7.24)	9 (6.77)	6 (5.73)	9 (6.85)	9 (7.28)	9 (6.68)	9 (7.11)	9 (6.73)
Ireland	6 (5.44)	6 (5.39)	7 (5.20)	7 (6.13)	7 (5.46)	7 (5.78)	7 (5.59)	5 (4.94)	6 (5.42)
Italy	8 (6.18)	9 (6.79)	8 (6.50)	8 (6.28)	8 (6.48)	8 (6.00)	8 (6.59)	7 (5.72)	8 (6.41)
Luxembourg	7 (5.53)	8 (5.71)	5 (5.05)	1 (2.40)	6 (5.33)	5 (5.06)	4 (5.07)	8 (5.94)	7 (5.60)
Netherlands	1 (2.50)	1 (2.05)	1 (2.34)	5 (4.70)	1 (1.94)	1 (2.17)	1 (1.61)	1 (3.33)	1 (2.33)
United Kingdom	5 (5.02)	4 (4.37)	4 (4.80)	4 (4.00)	5 (4.90)	3 (4.72)	6 (5.23)	3 (4.17)	5 (4.77)
West Germany	4 (4.98)	3 (4.18)	6 (5.18)	2 (3.50)	4 (4.79)	6 (5.17)	5 (5.11)	2 (4.00)	3 (4.68)

^aRefers to handling of aid to developing countries.

^bNot all respondents indicated preferences in these areas.

(mean responses appear in parentheses)

Strategies

The most important fundamental questions concerning a common development policy for the Community concern strategy. Should development policy be centralized and all development assistance handled by the Community in a multilateral fashion only, or should the emphasis remain with national bilateral programs? Should Community aid programs be based on geographical regional arrangements or special economic relationships (as embodied in the Lomé Convention and the Community's Mediterranean Policy), or should a world-wide policy ("mondialism") be adopted which offers the same advantages and arrangements to all developing states? The responses to these questions by the Eurocrats are summarized in Table 8.10.

Although the respondents opted for different alternatives or combinations of alternatives, those who stated a preference for either mondialism or regionalism,¹⁰ or multilateralism or

¹⁰ Those who opted for mondialism believed that any Community development policy should treat all developing countries of the world equally, i.e., provide all the same advantages and opportunity to secure development aid. Those who chose regionalism felt that developing states could and should be treated differently based on need, geography, history, and the like. As such, they favored the associate/non-associate distinction or the maintenance of special arrangements with the ACP and Mediterranean nations. It must be pointed out, however, that many who stated they were "regionalists" said they were not opposed to the mondialist idea, but were merely taking into account the limited Community development aid funds (one reason, for example, why the Asia Commonwealth states were not included in the Lomé and given similar advantages). Other reasons exist. As one Italian official put it, "Italy is for mondialism except when it comes to the Mediterranean due to the large number of competitive agricultural products." (From interviews in Brussels, June-July, 1976).

Table 8.10 - Preferences as to Development Strategies

<u>Ideal State</u>	<u>Number</u>
Mondialist/Multilateralists	7
Regionalist/Multilateralists	7
Mondialist/Bilateralists	3
Regionalist/Bilateralists	5
Mondialists	4
Regionalists	5
Multilateralists	3
Bilateralists	6
No Preferences	10
<hr/>	
Total	50
<hr/>	
Total Mondialists	14
Total Regionalists	17
Total Multilateralists	17
Total Bilateralists	14

bilateralism,¹¹ were nearly evenly divided. Another important observation is that 20 percent of the respondents stated no preference for any of the

¹¹Those who opted for a multilateral approach to development programs believed that all developing aid given by the Community member states should be given through Community channels and that all national bilateral aid programs should be ended. Those advocating the bilateral approach did not suggest an end to multilateral aid programs, but insisted that national bilateral aid programs should be equal or superior to multilateral efforts in the Community.

four strategies. Again, no clear consensus exists among the Eurocrats. When these responses are analyzed by nationality of the respondents, no clearer pattern emerges (Table 8.11). Those indicating preferences in the Benelux and New Three Countries appeared slightly more in favor of mondialism and the Germans, French, and Italians more inclined to regionalism. Given the historical and present positions of the Dutch, British, German, and French governments, the "Eurocrats" responses are what one might have expected. The same is not true for the multilateral/bilateral responses. Eighty percent of the respondents indicating a preference from the Benelux countries opted for multilateralism as one would have anticipated given their national government's positions, but the existence of a majority of multilateralists in the France/Germany/Italy group and of bilateralists from the three new countries was not anticipated. France has persisted in protecting its bilateral aid programs, and Germany has long been concerned by what it sees as its disproportionate share of Community development aid financing. The larger number of British bilateralists may be a reflection of pique over exclusion of a large portion of the Commonwealth from associate status, but that does not account for the bilateralist position of two Irish Eurocrats who are included in the New Three totals.

When the responses are analyzed by the institution of the respondents, no significant differences are evident (Table 8.12). Again, the lack of consensus can be seen in the nearly equal distribution of mondialists/regionalists and multilateralists/bilateralists both in the Commission and outside the Commission. Similarly, where variables such as age and experience are considered, no patterns emerge in the responses

Table 8.11 - Preferences as to Development Strategies

<u>Respondent's Nationality</u>	<u>Mondialist</u>	<u>Regionalist</u>	<u>No Preference</u>	<u>Multilateralist</u>	<u>Bilateralist</u>	<u>No Preference</u>
Belgium	1	2	3	0	1	5
Netherlands	1	2	2	2	0	3
Luxembourg	2	0	0	2	0	0
Ireland	1	1	1	0	2	1
Denmark	1	0	2	1	1	1
United Kingdom	3	3	5	4	5	2
West Germany	1	3	4	2	2	4
Italy	3	2	1	3	1	2
France	1	4	1	3	2	1
Benelux Countires	4	4	5	4	1	8
Germany/Italy/France	5	9	6	8	5	7
New Three Countries	5	4	8	5	8	4
Original Six Countries	9	13	11	12	6	15
Total	14	17	19	17	14	19

Table 8.12 - Preferences as to Development Strategies

<u>Institution(s)</u>	<u>Mondialist</u>	<u>Regionalist</u>	<u>No Preference</u>	<u>Multilateralist</u>	<u>Bilateralist</u>	<u>No Preference</u>
Directorate General I	4	3	3	2	3	5
Directorate General VIII	6	5	3	7	4	3
Directorate General X/ Secretariat General	0	1	8	1	4	4
Total Commission	10	9	14	10	11	12
Economic & Social Committee, European Parliament, & Interest Groups	3	1	4	2	1	5
Council of Permanent Representatives	1	2	6	2	3	4
Total Outside Commission	4	3	10	4	4	9

and only occasional differences occur (Table 8.13). For example, a large majority of those younger than 30 years of age and those having had prior business experience before coming to Brussels favored a regionalist approach to developing countries; those having had prior national civil service experience favored a multilateral approach, and the majority of those who had no prior civil service experience favored a bilateral approach. Again, Tables 8.10 - 8.13 serve to demonstrate that the alternative strategies are clear enough, but at least from the Eurocrats no consensus emerges.

Table 8.13 - Preferences as to Development Strategies

<u>Age</u>	<u>Mondialist</u>	<u>Regionalist</u>	<u>No Preference</u>	<u>Multilateralist</u>	<u>Bilateralist</u>	<u>No Preference</u>
Below 30	1	4	1	1	2	3
30 - 39	8	6	10	9	8	7
40 and older	5	7	8	4	5	11
<u>Experience Working in the Community:</u>						
1 - 6 years	10	9	13	10	11	11
7 - 12 years	1	2	3	2	1	3
13 - 18 years	3	5	4	4	2	6
<u>Experience before coming to work in or with the Community:</u>						
Professional	6	4	6	5	4	7
Business	2	5	12	5	4	10
No Prior Experience	6	7	2	6	6	3
<u>Previous Civil Service Experience</u>						
Previous Civil Service Experience	6	6	7	8	3	8
No Previous Civil Service Experience	8	11	12	9	12	10

Are Present Policies Discriminatory?

The Eurocrats were asked if they felt that the present policies (as contained in the Lomé Convention and various other agreements in the Mediterranean, Asia, and Latin America) discriminated against non-ACP developing states. The statement and the responses are depicted in Table 8.14.

Table 8.14 - "The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, and assistance to developing nations) favor the former colonies of the EC member states in such a way as to discriminate against the developing nations outside the ACP."

<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Agree</u>	<u>Mildly Disagree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
5 (10%)	8 (15%)	11 (22%)	4 (8%)	12 (24%)	10 (20%)

Mean Response = 3.80 (where 1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)

The fact that a total of nearly half the respondents agreed while just over half disagreed (and a mean response indicating something between no opinion and mild disagreement) again demonstrates that a variety of opinions exist among the Eurocrats. By nationality, the British, Luxembourgers, Irish, and French were the only groups to agree and to hold opinions which differed significantly with those who most disagreed, the Belgians and Danes (Table 8.15). Viewed by institution of the respondents, only those in DG VIII (the development experts) clearly agreed. The DG VIII respondents differed significantly from those who

Table 8.15 - "The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, and assistance to developing nations) favor the former colonies of the EC member states in such a way as to discriminate against the developing nations outside the ACP."

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Belgium	6	4.83 ^a
Netherlands	5	3.80
Luxembourg	2	3.00
Ireland	3	3.30
Denmark	3	5.67 ^b
United Kingdom	11	2.91
West Germany	8	4.25
Italy	6	3.83
France	6	3.33
TOTAL	50	3.80

^aDiffers significantly from the British and French respondents (at .05 by t).

^bDiffers significantly from the Irish, Italian, British, and French respondents.

most disagreed, the DG X/SG and COREPER respondents (Table 8.16).

Finally, those having had prior professional experience and those who had prior national civil service experience differed from the more negative respondents who had prior business and no prior civil service experience respectively (Table 8.17).

Table 8.16 - "The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, and assistance to developing nations) favor the former colonies of the EC member states in such a way as to discriminate against the developing nations outside the ACP."

<u>Institution(s)</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Directorate General I	10	4.20
Directorate General VIII	14	3.07 ^a
Directorate General X/General Secretariat	9	4.44
Economic and Social Committee, European Parliament, and Interest Groups	8	3.25
Council of Permanent Representatives	9	4.33
Total	50	3.80

^aDiffers significantly from the DG X/SG and COREPER respondents (at .05 by t).

The responses to the statement in Tables 8.14-8.17 add credence to the conclusion previously stated, that no consensus exists among the Eurocrats concerning development policy. Further, these differences of opinion fairly accurately reflect differences between the member states, particularly between the Dutch, Germans, British, and French (see Chapter VII).

Table 8.17 - "The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, and assistance to developing nations) favor the former colonies of the EC member states in such a way as to discriminate against the developing nations outside the ACP."

<u>Previous Experience in the Private Sector:</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Mean Response</u>
Professional	16	3.31 ^a
Business	19	4.42
No Prior Experience	15	3.53
<u>Previous National Government or Civil Service Experience:</u>		
Yes	19	4.42
No	31	3.42

^aDiffers significantly from responses of Business group. (at .05 by t).

The Future for a Common Community Development Policy: An Evaluation

Relative to the first fifteen years of the Community's existence, the move toward a common development policy has been substantial. Like political cooperation in the Community, it is an area still troubled with bumps and jolts but one in which significant progress is being made. The success of the Lomé Convention and the fact that the structural arrangement at the North/South Dialogue means the Community now not only wishes but must speak with one voice, far outweigh the failure at Nairobi and a present wide diversity of opinions concerning the proper goals and

means to those ends among Community officials and government leaders. The assessments by the Eurocrats of the past five years and their expectations for the next five years support this conclusion.

In response to the self-anchoring scaling questions concerning a common Community development policy, the Eurocrats, as a group, rated (from the worst possible state, "0", to the best possible state, "10") the efforts to achieve a common development policy in the Community relatively low for the year 1971 (the mean response was 3.8) but indicated that significant progress had occurred during the period 1971-1976. Their mean response for the present state of integration in this area was 5.96, over two steps above the 1971 rating. The expected rating for 1981 was 6.94, only one more step in the ladder, but a higher rating than had been given European Union in general for 1981 (the mean response was 5.48) and for foreign policy in 1981 (6.10) (Table 8.18).

When the responses were analyzed as to the nationality of the respondents, several differences were evident. The French were significantly more positive in their assessment of the Community's development policy for 1971 than were the Dutch, Irish, Germans, and British. (One should remember that the British and Irish were not part of the Community in 1971 and that the Dutch and Germans advocated mondialism against French regionalism.) For the ratings of the present (1976), the very positive response of the Danes differed significantly with those of the Irish, Italians, British and French. Concerning the ratings for 1981, the Dutch respondents differed significantly in their more positive expectations from the Italians and British, the Danes also differed significantly from the Italians and British, and the Italians, in their collective

Table 8.18 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for a Common Development Policy, Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

	Belgium	Netherlands	Luxembourg	Ireland	Denmark	United Kingdom	Italy	West Germany	France	Total
1971	4.40	3.20	3.00	3.00	4.00	2.64	4.17	3.38	5.33	3.80
1976	5.80	6.80	4.50	5.33	8.00	5.36	5.83	6.38	5.83	5.96
1981	7.20	7.60	6.50	7.33	8.00	6.30	5.67	7.29	7.50	6.94
(N)	6	5	2	3	3	11	6	8	6	50

assessment that things would get worse in the future, differed significantly from the Germans and French as well.

Generally, those who rated the Community lowest in the area of development policy five years ago, and highest for 1976, were those who were not in the Community five years ago, the British, the Irish, and Danish respondents. The responses of the New Three Countries group are different significantly from the responses of those from the group: France/Italy/Germany (for ratings of 1971 only). The New Three responses seem to suggest the belief among the Irish, British, and Danes that Community expansion had a positive effect on the development of a common Community development policy. The respondents from the Benelux Countries appeared to be the most optimistic concerning the Community's development policies for the next five years (Table 8.19).

Table 8.19 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for a Common Development Policy Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

Year	Benelux Countries	Germany/France/Italy	New Three Countries	Total
1971	3.67	4.20	2.94	3.80
1976	6.00	6.05	5.82	5.96
1981	7.25	6.84	6.81	6.94
(N)	(13)	(20)	(17)	(50)

Differences between groups of respondents based on age, experience, etc. were not marked. Some slight differences could be seen, however, when the Eurocrats were grouped as to the institution in which they worked (Table 8.20). The ratings for 1971 of those in DG I (External Relations) were significantly higher than those in DG X/Secretariat-General. Also, the expectations for the next five years of those in DG VIII are significantly higher than were those in the COREPER. This finding is not surprising. Directorate General VIII is the development branch of the Commission, and the COREPER is made up primarily of national foreign ministry civil servants.

Table 8.20 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Responses for a Common Development Policy Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

Year	DGI ^a	DG VIII ^b	DGX/SG ^c	Total Commission	ESC-Parl- ^d Int. Groups	COREPER	Total Outside Commission
1971	4.11	3.79	2.67	3.56	3.88	3.67	3.76
1976	5.89	6.36	5.56	6.00	6.13	5.67	5.88
1981	7.11	7.29	7.00	7.17	6.86	6.13	6.47
(N)	(10)	(14)	(9)	(33)	(8)	(9)	(17)

^aDirectorate General I (external relations) of the Commission

^bDirectorate General VIII (development) of the Commission

^cDirectorate General X (information) and Secretariat General (Commission)

^dEconomic and Social Committee, Parliament, and Interest Groups

^eCouncil of Permanent Representatives to the Community

Summary

No real consensus exists in the Community today as to what the goal or goals of the Community's development policy should be or how that policy should be constructed. Whether one looks at official Community documents, the official positions of the governments of the member states, or the assessments and attitudes of Community bureaucrats, the sides appear equally divided between those wanting a centralized completely multilateral common policy and those preferring a more

decentralized form favoring national bilateral programs. Equally divided are those advocating mondialism and those who prefer regionalism. Differences exist as to the reasons for those preferences within each "camp". There does appear to be a consensus that significant progress has been made toward the achievement of a common development policy in the Community, and that progress will continue at least for the next five years. The Commission's assessment is a correct one:

At a time when it is in everyone's interest that the gap between the industrialized countries and the Third World should be progressively narrowed, it is particularly significant that development cooperation has become one of the linchpins in the building of Europe and one of the fields in which Community action has been most tangibly successful.¹²

¹²Commission of the European Communities, "The European Community and the Developing Countries", European Documentation (1975/1), p. 17.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The general theme of this entire work is that an ideological commitment to further European integration exists sufficient to stimulate continued integration in the European Community. However, in the 1970's, the Community has stagnated internally while efforts at continued integration and collective action have been relatively successful in the Community's external political and economic relations. In order to support and explain this paradox, we must return to the theoretical model introduced in Chapter II.

Proposition I: Generally, the Community's internal policy sectors (economic, monetary, industrial, agricultural, transport, social, etc.) have been in a state of stagnation since 1970.

The first proposition is taken as a "given". The stagnation in the internal policy sectors can be demonstrated empirically, but this project was not undertaken in this work for a number of reasons. First, this general observation evokes much concern but little controversy in the Community. Indeed, there is consensus among both Community proponents and detractors that such a stalemate exists. Second, the many assessments

by Community and national political leaders, bureaucrats, and Community institutions reflect this consensus. The attitudes and barriers cited in Chapter I are but a few examples supporting Proposition I. Third, the perceptions of the "Eurocrats" further support this observation. Their mean responses as to progress toward European Union in 1971 and 1976 were almost identical (See Table 4.47 and Table 9.3).

Proposition II: Support for continued integration in the European Community is strong and widespread. It exists beyond the several reports on European Union and statements by national and Community leaders.

The reports on European Union (discussed in Chapter III) reflect strong support for continued integration (centralization) in the European Community. Strong institutional support was also indicated in responses by the Eurocrats. Ninety-two percent believed that their respective institutions supported both efforts to achieve European Union and a common Community foreign policy (see Tables 4.19 and 6.6). As a group, the Eurocrats themselves indicated strong support for continued European integration. Eighty percent of the Eurocrats felt that working toward the goal of European Union was necessary and proper (Table 4.1). In addition, eighty-four percent believed that the Community's central institutions should be given more power to make foreign policy decisions for the member states (Table 6.20). Besides the strong support demonstrated by Community institutions and bureaucrats, public opinion in the member states further substantiates Proposition II. Although just 57 percent support further integration, the percent of those opposed is a much smaller 22 percent (Table 4.26).

Sub-proposition IIa: Support for further European integration will be stronger among citizens of the original six member states than among the Danes, Irish, and British.

Public opinion polls in the Community clearly support sub-proposition IIa. Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark ranked seventh, eighth, and ninth respectively in support of political union by 1980. Indeed, they were the only states in which public opinion support was less than 50 percent. (Table 4.26: Ireland, 44 percent; United Kingdom, 34 percent; Denmark, 24 percent; total Community: 57 percent approved). On the question of a common foreign policy, Ireland ranked much higher in percent of those approving, but again the United Kingdom (56 percent) and Denmark (37 percent) were eighth and ninth, and low when compared to the percent of those approving for the total Community (65 percent) (See Table 6.13). The support indicated by the Eurocrats reflects the same pattern. In response to the question of whether it was right and necessary to work toward European Union, those from the Benelux countries had a mean response of 2.08 (indicating agreement), those from Germany/France/Italy a mean response of 1.5 (indicating strong agreement), while those from the three new member states had a mean response of 2.88 (only mild agreement) (Table 4.2). In response to the question of giving more foreign relations competence to the Community's central institutions, again the three new states' respondents' mean response was the least positive (2.47) compared to the Benelux respondents (1.88) and France/Germany/Italy respondents (2.30) (Table 6.21).

Sub-proposition IIb: The relative amount of member-state support for further integration is strongly associated with the relative size of the member states: the smaller states will be seen as favoring further integration more than the larger states.

Rank correlations of the member states by size (population) and by rankings by the Eurocrats as to support for European Union, a common foreign policy, and a common development policy (toward the Third World) are indicated in Table 9.1:

Table 9.1 - Rankings of the Member States by Size (Population) and Perceived Support for Further Integration.

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Rank by Size^a</u>	<u>European Union^b</u>	<u>Rank as to Support for:</u>	
			<u>Foreign Policy^c</u>	<u>Common Development Policy^d</u>
Luxembourg	1	1	2	7
Ireland	2	4	4	6
Denmark	3	7	7	2
Belgium	4	2	1	4
Netherlands	5	3	3	1
France	6	9	8	9
Italy	7	6	6	8
United Kingdom	8	8	9	5
West Germany	9	5	5	3

^aSmallest to largest by population

^bFrom Table 4.27

^cFrom Table 6.15

^dFrom Table 8.5

Rank correlations indicate a positive association between size by population and ranking as to support for European Union and a common foreign policy.¹ No such association exists, however, between rank by size and rank by support for a common development policy.² There is, however, a positive association between rank by percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in external trade and rank by support for a common development policy (See Table 9.2).³

Table 9.2 - Rankings of the Member States by Percent of GDP in External Trade and Perceived Support for a Common Community Development Policy.

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Rank by Percent of GDP in External Trade</u>	<u>Rank by Support for a Common Development Policy</u>
Belgium	1	4
Netherlands	2	1
Ireland	3	6
Denmark	4	2
West Germany	5	3
United Kingdom	6	5
Italy	7	8
France	8	9
Luxembourg	9	7

¹Rank Correlations by Spearman's rho = .550 and .530 respectively.

²Rank Correlation by Spearman's rho = -.03.

³Rank Correlation by Spearman's rho = .717.

The positive association between rankings by size (small to large) and rankings by support for European Union and a common foreign policy supports sub-proposition IIb. The best explanation is that the smaller nations have less to lose in giving up sovereignty to the total Community and, perhaps, see substantial gains in doing so (i.e., increased voice in European and world affairs). Therefore, they are seen as having rendered relatively more support for Community integration. The rankings by support for a common development policy do not support the sub-proposition until those rankings are compared to rankings by percent of GDP in external trade. This rank correlation is more positive than the previous two.

Sub-proposition IIc: Those working in or closely with Community institutions strongly support continued European integration. They favor further policy centralization, i.e., the goal of a federal state in which foreign political and economic decisions are made by Community central institutions.

As was previously indicated, 80 percent of the Eurocrats felt that moving toward European Union was both right and necessary. The Eurocrats also indicated definitive preferences for goals of the integration process. Seventy-four percent favored a federal state as the eventual goal for European Union (Table 4.9), and fifty-six percent felt that the Commission should be given more power to make foreign policy decisions for and on behalf of the member states (Table 6.4).

Sub-proposition IIId: The general publics of the Community's member states and Community officials prefer certain strategies to reach the goal of European Union. They agree that further integration will not come automatically, but requires an occasional push from political leaders or a shock from the external world. They favor:

- (1) accelerating the process, pursuing economic and political union simultaneously,

- (2) combining foreign affairs ("high politics") and economic matters ("low politics") into the competence of the Community's institutions,
- (3) establishing a European Community defense function,
- (4) a mondialist, multilateralist approach to developing countries.

The Eurocrats demonstrated a positive attitude toward moving forward toward European Union. As has been previously reported, 80 percent agreed and the large majority of those (54 percent of the total respondents) strongly agreed (Table 4.1). Public opinion polls indicate a similar pattern. Indeed, the largest group of respondents to the question, "Should the unification of Europe be speeded up, slowed down, or continued at present?", opted for speeding up the Community (40 percent in favor; see Table 4.24).

Concerning the question of whether economic union or political union should precede or provide a necessary prerequisite for the other, the Eurocrats showed no collective preferences, indicating that both economic and political union ought to be pursued simultaneously (Tables 4.39 and 4.43). In a related dichotomous issue, the Eurocrats favored ending the "high politics/low politics" schizophrenia in the Community. Fifty-eight percent of the Eurocrats believed that political cooperation must be merged into the central institutions of the Community.

Despite incorporation of proposals for a Community defense function in nearly all the reports on European Union, there was little support among the Eurocrats or general publics for its establishment. Fifty-four percent of the Eurocrats felt there is no need to establish any defense organization outside NATO. Public opinion in the Community

does not indicate great concern about defense. Less than one-half (49 percent) of the samples of the general publics in the Community responded that they felt strengthening military defense was important or very important. (Tables 6.26 and 6.28) The strategy option mentioned in sub-proposition IIId concerning aid to developing countries was also not supported. In what appeared to be a lack of consensus among the Eurocrats, fewer than half of those indicating a preference opted for a mondialistic (world-wide) approach to developing countries, and just over half favored strict multilateralism over a mixture of Community and member-state bilateral aid programs. The large member expressing no preferences and the nearly even divisions (14-17 and 17-14 respectively) make findings concerning these strategies inconclusive.

An important theoretical question concerns whether the integration process "spills over" from one policy sector to another and, if so, whether that process is automatic or must be caused to occur. The Eurocrats appear to have supported the neo-functionalists' concept of "cultivated spillover". They agreed overwhelmingly (90 percent) that the process is not automatic, but requires conscious effort and planning by individuals willing and able to make it happen (Table 4.36). The Eurocrats did agree, then, that continued integration does require an occasional "political push", but they did not agree on the necessity for an external shock to dislodge the process from its present stagnated state. While agreeing that European integration had nearly reached a standstill, 56 percent of the Eurocrats felt that an external shock to the Community was not necessary to reactive the integration process (Table 6.31).

Proposition III: Since 1970, the external relations efforts of the European Community have been relatively more successful than have other policy sectors in the Community.

Proposition III is central to the argument of this entire work. In Chapters V and VII, an effort was made through mini-case studies and examples of structure-and-process changes to demonstrate successful events and impacts of the Community's external relations. In addition to the increased annual trade, larger numbers of trade and preferential agreements, and increased participation as member states qua Community in international organizations, the Community has scored some substantial achievements. The Lomé Convention, participation in the CSCE, and on-going efforts in the Eur-Arab Dialogue and the Conference on International Economic Cooperation are, perhaps, the best examples. Whether those accomplishments are relatively more successful than internal Community matters and, if so, whether the trend can be expected to continue is a difficult question indeed. The best answer to such a question comes from those most informed about the Community, the "Eurocrats". Their collective (mean) responses to the self-anchoring scaling questions put to them offer comparative measurements on scales of their perceptions and expectations from what was for each the worst to the best possible states. Those responses are indicated in Table 9.3.

Table 9.3 - Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Values for European Union, Foreign and Development Policies Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

<u>Year</u>	<u>European Union^a</u>	<u>Foreign Policy^b</u>	<u>Development Policy^c</u>
1971	4.38	2.82	3.80
1976	4.35	4.39	5.96
1981	5.48	6.10	6.94

^aFrom Table 4.47

^bFrom Table 6.33

^cFrom Table 8.18.

The responses indicate that perceptions of efforts to achieve European Union (all Community policy sectors included) have been stagnated over the past five years (indeed, the mean for 1976 fell by .03), and that only a slight increase is expected (hoped for) during the next five years. In contrast, efforts to achieve common foreign and development policies were placed relatively low in 1971 and have risen significantly in the period 1971-1976, surpassing the relative mean response for the total Community (European Union). Further, the expectations of the Eurocrats suggest linear progressions exceeding the expectations for European Union (or when all Community policy sectors are considered together). The comparisons are graphically illustrated in Figure 9.1:




Figure 9.1

Self-Anchoring Scaling (Mean) Values for European Union, Foreign Policy, and Development Policy, Now, Five Years Ago, and Five Years in the Future.

The perceptions and expectation of the Eurocrats, as reflected in their collective responses to the self-anchoring scaling questions, clearly support proposition III. Those who are among the most knowledgeable of the European Community assess significant improvement in the Community's external relations sectors, but stagnation when all policy sectors are considered together.

Proposition IV: Since 1970, the successes in the Community's external relations have had an integrative effect on the Community. This development can be explained, at least in part, by Schmitter's "Externalization Hypothesis".

Philippe Schmitter hypothesized that intergovernmental regional actors would find themselves compelled to adopt common policies toward nonparticipant third parties once intermember policies are decided and operationalized. He further suggested that such actors will increasingly seek common external positions, and increasingly rely on central institutions to find those common positions.⁴ That all or even the majority of the Community's external relations are results of compulsive negotiations of common positions by the member states would most certainly be difficult to substantiate. There are, though, instances in which the externalization hypothesis is most plausible. Although the Community nearly broke apart when the OPEC embargo and price hike occurred late in 1973, the best examples of "externalization" are the Community's long-term reactions to the Arab oil boycott.

There is a general consensus that the Community member states were motivated by the OPEC price hikes and Arab oil embargo to initiate the Eur-Arab Dialogue and to participate in the North-South Dialogue. It may be argued that they were compelled to do so by the sudden realization of their dependence on and vulnerability to energy and raw material producers. It may also be argued that such considerations motivated, at least in part, the negotiations which led to the Lomé Convention and in ongoing negotiations of the International Energy Agency of OECD. What is perhaps most interesting (and most supportive of Schmitter's Externalization

⁴Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration," International Organization 23 (Winter, 1969), pp. 161-166.

Hypothesis) is that the Community member states decided to negotiate "with one voice" in all four forums. Further, they insured such an outcome through structural arrangements. In these cases and in several others, the member states do not take part in the direct negotiations with non-member countries but are represented by the Commission (as in the GATT and IEA) or by the Commission and Council of Ministers serving as Co-Chairmen or co-delegates (as in the Eur-Arab Dialogue and CIEC).⁵ The structural arrangement requires the Community to negotiate based on a common position which, in turn, demands a two-level negotiating process. The Community member states may find themselves having to hammer out common positions daily at the Community level in reaction to events occurring at the negotiating level with non-member states.

A second important observation pertaining to externalization is the development of linkages between multilateral negotiations in which the Community is involved. Some doubt exists as to how much attention the Community (particularly the Commission) gave to similar types of negotiations conducted with different countries during the same or different time frames. As was pointed out in Chapter VII, there appeared to be little or no institutional effort to acquaint Commission negotiators with the results of previous similar negotiations or with related events in other international forums. This may account, if only in a small way, for the frustration of the 19 African Yaoundé associates and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states at seeing their trade advantages

⁵ France does not belong to the IEA and the United Kingdom for some time had not wanted to participate in the CIEC due to its oil interests in the North Sea. Both had or now have their interests represented in these forums through the Community delegations.

eroded by Community agreements in GATT negotiations (which offered generalized tariff preferences to all developing states and consequently lessened the comparative advantage of associate and ACP exports). This phenomenon seemed to have been reversed dramatically in the Spring of 1976. The Community member states made a decision to de-emphasize their involvement in the fourth general meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV), preferring instead to concentrate on the North-South Dialogue. When it appeared that a failure to reach any agreement at Nairobi in UNCTAD IV might jeopardize the North-South Dialogue, the Community member states (particularly Germany) scrambled for some (albeit symbolic) gesture of accommodation with the Third/Fourth Worlds. An important further observation is that the member states each represented themselves at UNCTAD IV, but are represented by the Community at the North-South Dialogue. The linkage between the two multilateral negotiators is unmistakable. Regardless of motivations, the apparent preference for the forum in which structural arrangements require a common voice supports the externalization hypothesis.

There are other examples of external relations events furthering integration among the member states and having an integrative impact on the Community. While essentially an intergovernmental exercise, the political cooperation (Davignon Committee) machinery has further integrated the foreign ministries of the member states. The activities of the Group of Foreign Correspondents and the COREU network (described in Chapter VI) are examples. The gradual incorporation of Commission observers into all but one of the political cooperation working groups and the expected establishment of a secretariat for political cooperation in the Council

of Ministers' General-Secretariat should enhance that integration. A further example may be found in the Lomé Convention and its predecessors. The Community had always encouraged regional group formation among Third World countries, preferring to negotiate bloc-à-bloc. The Community was directly responsible for the creation of the AASM among the Yaoundé associates, and indirectly responsible for the creation of the ACP states group. The Commission still disperses funds designed to encourage regional organization formation and maintenance for developing countries. The effect has been occasionally dramatic and unexpected. ACP solidarity during the Lomé negotiations forced the Community member states to find common Community decisions they might not otherwise have attempted.

The conclusion relative to Proposition IV is that the Community's external relations do exhibit some integrative influence on the total Community. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the Eur-Arab Dialogue, where the distinction between those things political (high politics) and those things economic (low politics) is being gradually eliminated. Should the trend continue, it may lead to the incorporation of political cooperation into the Community's institutional structure. It is worth pointing out that this Community merger of politics and economics has caused similar mergers within the individual member states. The data are insufficient, however, to prove or disprove the externalization hypothesis. They appear to support the hypothesis to such an extent that the conclusion here differs notably from that reached by Werner J. Feld. Feld concluded that Community coordination in the UN and other multilateral bodies would not enhance the cohesion of the

Community or produce any measurable pro-integrative effects.⁶ While the data presented above do not prove the externalization hypothesis, it does not lead to the same negative conclusion.

Proposition V: The continued successful integration in the Community's external affairs can be explained by "encapsulation" or "spillaround".

Philippe Schmitter's strategic options for actors involved in regional integration were presented and discussed in Chapter II. Of those options, "encapsulation" (responding to a crisis by marginal modifications within the zone of indifference) and "spillaround" (increasing the scope of authority (more coverage of issue areas) while holding the level of authority constant or within the zone of indifference)⁷ are the most useful to explain the continued success in the Community's external relations. A slightly different conceptualization of spillaround will also be presented below.

Sub-proposition Va: Progress in integration in the Community's external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may be explained by "encapsulation".

Schmitter argues that encapsulation is the most likely strategic option to be chosen by regional actors. Schmitter notes:

In their search among alternatives national actors will tend to arrive at that institutional solution (in terms of scope and level) which will meet minimal common objectives despite prevailing tensions and will subsequently seek to seal the regional organization off as much as possible from its environment thereby adopting a self-maintaining set of institutional norms. This "hypothesis of natural entropy"

⁶Werner J. Feld, The European Community in World Affairs (Port Washington, N.Y.: Alfred Publishing Co., 1976), p. 316.

⁷Philippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration" in Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (editors), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 242.

suggests that all integration processes will tend toward a state of rest or stagnation -- unless disturbed by exceptional (i.e., unpredictable) or exogenous conditions not present in the original convergence or in the institutions themselves. Expressed in terms of strategies, the highest probability is that in any decisional cycle the actors will opt for encapsulation rather than spillover, spill-around, buildup, or spill-back.⁸

In light of what has happened in the Community during this decade, and given the data presented in the previous eight chapters, encapsulation is quite plausible. One can argue that national leaders in the Community did meet minimal common objectives in conceiving an institutional arrangement for political cooperation related to but not part of the Community structures. Further, this course of action was preferable to amending or renegotiating the Treaties, particularly given the uncertainty caused by the enlargement negotiations and subsequent international economic conditions. The "hypothesis of natural entropy" -- that the integration process would tend toward a state of rest or stagnation -- would have "predicted" the present state of integration in the Community's internal policy sectors. The success in external relations can also be explained. The oil embargo and subsequent ripple effects on Europe's political and economic health would certainly qualify as a disturbing exceptional and exogenous condition to which Community decision-makers responded with marginal modifications within the zone of indifference. The "marginal modifications" included the Lomé Convention (larger in scope but not a radical departure from the Yaoundé agreements), the Eur-Arab Dialogue, and the North-South Dialogue (see Chapter VII). The zone of indifference was not violated as the costs involved in most of these agreements are

⁸Ibid., p. 243.

exportable or are postponed. For example, Italy is marginally compensated in the CAP for ACP agricultural exports to the Community, Britain (as importer) and France (as a major producer) for the Sugar Protocol of the Lomé Convention. Thus, unemployment that may be caused by any jobs that are "exported" through industrial cooperation concessions or tariff preferences without reciprocity will not impact for several years making those concessions politically possible now. The concept of "encapsulation" as a hypothesis is not proven by these events, nor does it completely explain or account for internal stagnation/external progress in European integration. What it does is provide some basis on which at least a partial explanation is possible.

Sub-proposition Vb: Progress in integration in the Community's external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may be explained by "spillaround".

In his use of the strategic option, "spillaround", Schmitter introduces an actor integration strategy in which decision-makers increase the scope of authority (to include more coverage of issue areas) without increasing the level of authority to the Community's central institutions. Schmitter's "spillaround" is applicable to the phenomenon suggested in Sub-proposition Vb. The scope of Commission authority in external relations has increased due to the expansion of the Community, the increase from 19 Yaoundé associates to 52 ACP states, the substantial increase in trade and aid agreements with non-member states and accompanying increase in mandates from the Council of Ministers. At the same time, the Commission's (and, for that matter, Council of Ministers') level of authority (operational autonomy) has not been increased. Spillaround does not apply to the internal policy sectors of the Community.

In general, neither the level nor the scope of Community institutional autonomy has increased. The term "spillaround" has greater utility, however, when used in a slightly different manner than that suggested by Schmitter.

Sub-proposition Vc: Progress in integration in the Community's external relations (relative to Community-wide stagnation) may be explained by a different application of "spillaround": the "path of least resistance" hypothesis.

It has been established that 1) the Community is stagnated internally, 2) the stagnation is not due to a lack of ideological commitment to European integration, and 3) integrative progress has been substantially more successful in the Community's external relations. These observations support the "path of least resistance" hypothesis, which is graphically illustrated in Figure 9.2. An ideological commitment to further unite Europe presupposes a goal to which some progress ought to be made over a given period of time (e.g., the Werner Report anticipated economic and monetary union by 1980; the 1972 Paris Communiqué called for reports as to how to achieve European Union by 1980). Failure to progress (stagnation) is very often assessed as retrenchment; Community political leaders have tended to read (at least publicly) stalemate as failure. Once the attempt to find policies to further integrate the Community reach the policy decision stage (i.e., the agenda of the Council of Ministers), numerous barriers to the will to integrate block the ideological commitment to further integration in each policy sector. These barriers are summarized below from the discussion in Chapter I:

(1) Political Barriers:

- a. Different attitudes exist among the member states vis-à-vis various non-member states (e.g., the Middle East nations, the United States, former colonies).




Figure 9.2
The "Path of Least Resistance" Hypothesis

- b. Different internal political pressures exist (e.g., Anti-Marketeeer forces in Denmark, Scottish nationalism in Britain, large Communist Parties in France and Italy).
- c. There are different national perceptions as to the equality of the member states (i.e., large vs. small states).
- d. There are different national perceptions as to the question of collective security (e.g., Ireland advocates neutrality, France wants an alternative to dependency on the United States in NATO, Germany and Denmark would welcome more U.S. involvement).
- e. National and Community-level interest groups exert political pressures on ideological and economic questions.

(2) Economic Barriers:

- a. The member states have different economic problems: growth rates, strength of currencies, unemployment, and inflation rates vary greatly.
- b. The states have different economic philosophies (e.g., France and Italy concentrate on keeping employment high, Germany and Denmark are more concerned with controlling inflation).
- c. There are differences as to energy (e.g., France and Belgium want to minimize prices, Denmark has sought to guarantee supplies of energy with less attention to price, Britain's attitude changes as it develops North Sea oil).
- d. The member states differ in their various market mechanisms, labor structures, and consumer mentalities.
- e. There is an element of uncertainty caused by the state of the world economy, particularly due to the Third World's demand for a New International Economic Order (see Chapter VII and the discussion of UNCTAD IV).
- f. All the member states have been experiencing economic recession characterized by relatively high unemployment and inflation since 1972.

These political and economic barriers have been of sufficient strength in all but one major policy sector to block further progress (integration) in those sectors. The one exception has been in the area of external relations. This is not to say that no such barriers exist in external relations; indeed, many have been substantial. However, the

barriers have been relatively the weakest of all those in the Community's policy sectors. The drive toward continued integration in the Community, powered by the ideological commitment to European Union, has "spilled-around" those policy sectors in which the political and economic barriers were strongest and has followed the "path of least resistance", in this case, the policy sectors having to do with external relations. Progress past the weaker "barriers" is often assisted by certain "facilitators":

- a. Costs (such as loosing jobs) can be exported at present and postponed to the future.
- b. External agreements can be argued as means to improve domestic economies through increased trade.
- c. Assisting developing countries is supported on grounds of historical relationships, ideological or humanitarian concern, etc.
- d. Collective security is a convincing argument in many of the states.

The "path of least resistance" hypothesis simply predicts that given sufficient political support, some integrative progress will occur even when strong political and economic barriers exist. Further, that progress will occur in policy areas where the barriers are weakest and the facilitators strongest. The political resolve to show progress of some sort will, then, follow the path of least resistance. Positive results then provide positive feedback both to that policy sector and to the ideological commitment to integrate further. It is strongly contended here that the Community experience in the 1970s supports the "path of least resistance" hypothesis.

Implications for Future Research

At the time of this writing, the Eur-Arab Dialogue, the North-South Dialogue, and the Tokyo Round of GATT were still in progress. Institutionalized annual summits between the heads of government of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom were less than a year old (so far as Britain's inclusion is concerned), West Germany had only recently become a member of the United Nations, and the decision for direct elections to the European Parliament was about mid-way between its making and its implementation. Many of the events upon which this dissertation is based are ongoing, and their culmination will most certainly alter some of the attitudes reported and conclusions made in this work. The prospects for future research in this area are enormously promising and important. What the Community does relative to the less developed states qua Community and individual nations is of great importance to those states and to the United States, Canada, and Japan. Its efforts at political cooperation in the European capitals and international forums such as the United Nations deserve scholarly investigation. This is particularly important the more interdependent international actors become, and the more important multilateral and bloc-à-bloc relations become relative to traditional nation-state-centered foreign policy-making. It is probable that political cooperation and the Lomé Convention are more than interesting intergovernmental experiments. The fact that the Stabex Scheme of the Lomé Convention was a major basis for negotiation by the Third World states at UNCTAD IV, and that the Arab League has liberally borrowed much from the Community's political cooperation "model" would indicate a far more important assessment is due the Community's

external relations structures.

The applicability of the Community's experience in the 1970s and, hence, the application of the "externalization" and "path of least resistance" hypotheses to other regional intergovernmental organizations is problematic, but should not be dismissed out of hand. The European Community is the most advanced regional intergovernmental organization, an assessment which implies that other groupings may experience the same difficulties as they reach the same level of development. There are substantial differences between the European Community and, for example, the Andean Common Market (ANCOM) and the Associated South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose members are less developed states. However, their prospects for internal stagnation and simultaneous development in common external relations are in no way diminished due to their members' less-developed status. Indeed, some regional intergovernmental organizations exist primarily for external relations benefits anticipated from negotiating "with one voice" in international negotiations (especially the OAU, Arab League, and ACP Group). The future should provide fertile ground on which to test the wider applicability of the Community's experience in the 1970s.

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APPENDIX A

THE STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE

Part I: Self-Anchoring Scaling

1. There exists now a great deal of interest in European Union. What in your opinion would be the best possible state of European Union? What would be the worst possible state? On a scale of "0" to "10", where would you place the Community today? Five years ago? Five years from now?

2. In the same fashion, what, in your opinion, is the best possible state for a common foreign policy for the Community? What would be the worst in your opinion? Again on a scale of "0" to "10", where would you place the Community today? Five years ago? Five years from now?

3. What do you believe would be the best possible policy by the Community toward the developing countries of the world? What in your opinion would be the worst possible development in this area? On a scale of "0" to "10", where would you place the Community today? Five years ago? Five years from now?

Part II: Ranking the Member States

1. Please rank the Community member states according to the support each gives and has given to efforts to reach a Community development policy on a world scale which is not limited to present "associate agreements". Indicate the country you believe most supports this by "1", the next by "2", and so on.

2. Please rank the Community member states according to the support each gives and has given to efforts to permit the Community's central institutions to make foreign policy decisions for and on behalf of the member states. Indicate the country you believe most supports this by "1", the next by "2", and so on.

3. Please rank the Community's member states according to the support each gives and has given to increasing the power of Community institutions in all areas to speak for the member states. Indicate the country you believe most supports this by "1", the next by "2", and so on.

Part III: Likert-type Scaling

Here are some statements that various people have made concerning European Union and related subjects. Would you please read each card and place it on the agree-disagree scale where it belongs according to how much you agree or disagree with each statement.

(The cards contained the following statements:)

The institution/organization for which I work supports increased European Union.

The E.E.C. should be divided into a two-tiered Community in which the stronger economies march quickly toward integration while the less strong ones proceed more slowly to catch up when they are able.

The European Community, particularly the Commission, should be given more power to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the nine member states.

The goal of European Union should be a loose association of the states in which the central institutions of the Community are slightly strengthened, but the national identity of each state and its right to act independently of the others are preserved.

There is a need to establish a new European defense organization in order to counter the fact that not all Community members belong to or participate in NATO and other problems in NATO.

The best way to get the nine members of the Community to agree on a position today is for the United States to oppose it.

European integration has nearly reached a standstill. It will take a shock, such as a worsening of relations with the USSR or the unilateral removal of US combat forces to reactivate it.

Economic and monetary union is possible, but only after political union has been achieved.

Political union is possible, but only after economic and monetary union has been achieved.

The goal of European Union should be a federal arrangement in which the Community's central institutions have more power than do the individual member governments.

Increased European integration does not happen automatically or as a result of previous integration; it occurs through conscious effort and planning by individuals willing and able to make it happen.

The development policies of the Community (trade, aid, and assistance to developing nations) favor the former colonies of the EC member states in such a way as to discriminate against the developing nations outside the ACP.

The institution/organization for which I work supports moving toward a common foreign policy for the Community.

A coordinated foreign policy for the Nine must take place in the context of the Community's external commercial and economic functions. Attempts at political cooperation through specially constructed machinery outside the major Community institutions will be unsuccessful.

The creation of the European Council (summits of heads of state and of government) is a sign of the disintegration of the Community.

The majority of the people in my country favor Europe's "speaking with one voice" to increase Europe's influence in the world.

The majority of people in my country support European Union.

Working steadily and very hard toward the goal of European Union is the right thing to do. It is also something that must be done.

As the economies of the nine countries become more fully integrated, further political integration becomes inevitable.

In foreign affairs, sovereignty is the ability to influence the external world; if Europeans want to establish a presence in foreign affairs, the way to do it is to unite.

Part IV: Demographic Information

1. What is your:

age?

nationality?

level of education?

previous experience before coming to work in or with
the Community?

APPENDIX B

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AASM	Associated African States and Madagascar
ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific States
ANCOM	Andean Common Market
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
Benelux	Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy of the EC
CIEC	Conference on International Economic Cooperation
Comecon	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
COPA	Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations
COREPER	Council of Permanent Representatives
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DG	Directorate-General
EC	European Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice of the EC
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
ESC	Economic and Social Committee of the EEC
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences (of the EC)
IEA	International Energy Agency (OECD)

IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OUA	Organization for African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
UA	Unit of Account
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNICE	Union of Industries in the European Community
WEU	Western European Union