A DESIGN FOR TEACHERS' BELIEFS-PRACTICE

CONGRUENCY IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS

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PREFACE

The reader is due an explanation about sexism problems related to this study. Most sensitive persons are aware of the problems of sexism in society. However, terms which take the place of the generic use of "man," mankind," and the pronoun "he" are awkward to use in a philosophical discourse of this nature. Terms are used in order not to unduly distort ideas. I hope the reader will understand the dilemma of the writer.

<div align="center">L. M. B.</div>

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

A perusal of educational literature demonstrates that among educators there is an ever-increasing tendency to favor unexamined practices, trends, and bandwagons in order to improve educational practice without due consideration of underlying theory/philosophy. There is ample evidence to suggest that classroom teachers seldom adopt a teaching model that is in accordance with their professed beliefs. Instead, they proceed with an eclectic approach composed of bits of data from diverse psychological and philosophical theories. The result is a confused practice where on a given day the teacher may be attempting to follow Skinner's (1971) and Chomsky's (1965) ideas simultaneously.

Because of this state of affairs, internalization of philosophy/ theory is a need for teachers. Only when teachers have reached a thorough understanding of the theoretical assumptions underlying their classroom behavior will it be possible for them to arrive at an adequate degree of congruence/consistency between what they profess and what they actually do. Shaw (1969) defines congruence as organic harmony between one's authentic self and one's lifework. Aspy and Roebuck (1977, p. 6) state that congruence means genuineness: "The degree to which an individual's words and actions accurately reflect her or his own feelings and attitudes."

Gay (1980, p. 121) states that ". . . theory can either guide practice or can be used as a perceptual screen through which practice is interpreted and ordered." Connelly and Elbas (1980, p. 115) point out the importance of theoretical knowledge as a resource for the shaping of ". . . his/her practical knowledge in an important way." The result should be clear, then, that educational practice without the support provided by a well-developed theory/philosophy of education proceeds at random, blindly. Education without purpose becomes mere activity to "get things done" with little consideration of means-ends compatibility.

Rationale for the Study

Today, more than ever before, educators are faced with the pressure of making sound educational decisions: Pressures range from those of parents to those of society at large. Every decision educators make has a philosophical or theory-based bias of which they are either consciously or unconsciously aware.

Confronted with the fact that numerous theories/philosophies of education exist, educators have made many assumptions about how learning occurs; they have adopted diverse positions about human nature and about the role of the school. Educators, representing various positions, seek ways to express their personal views about education in the classroom situation.

The educational scene has always been plagued by a diversity of bandwagons, pure rhetoric resulting from technological advances, or unsound theories adopted by groups of people in charge of educational decisions. These adaptations, according to Halpin (1969), are the result of rhetorical effort for convincing oneself or others about

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something.

Bandwagons are conscious efforts of a group of people to convince others and themselves of an idea which is intended to modify a social reality by acting upon it and controlling it. They are the expression of the feelings of people who explain reality only as a state of change without any consideration to the balance among stability and change in the social scene.

Because of the impinging pressures mentioned, teachers must become conscious of the following:

1. Teachers must be aware of the philosophical underpinnings of theories in education.

2. Through a sound philosophical examination of basic beliefs in education, teachers should then fashion educational practices congruent with beliefs.

Education today has become a competitive market. Survival in education corresponds not to the one who can convince one's self and others of the soundness of their beliefs and the practical possibility of the implementation of these ideas, but to one who can successfully make use of the convincing pleas to get the funds to support their ideas.

It is the belief of the writer that to this state of affairs educators must take a stand to reject change for the sake of change. Change, according to Halpin (1969), must be welcomed only when it is needed and when it is the sound belief that such intended change can alter in some positive way the present educational situation. Educators must recognize that change is a process and not an event or a series of events.

Halpin (1969, p. 9) distinguishes between "free change" and "planned change". Connelly and Elbas (1980) and Halpin (1969) support

the idea that educators need to introduce stability in a stage of flowing change. In this respect, Connelly and Elbas (1980, p. 104) state: "Our experience with bandwagons suggest more than a little caution in this regard. The orderings soon begin to falter as legitimate diversity asserts both its theoretical voice and its practical effect."

Language

Because of the crucial importance of recognizing that fads and bandwagons are easy ground for the use of rhetoric as a technique of persuasion, educators should be urged to hold strong examined beliefs as an antidote to persuasion via language communication. This view of the power of language as influencing practice in education (it could be said that in this case, educational beliefs are left unexamined) is supported by Soltis (1973), who points out that an educational system that happens to be complex develops a specialized vocabulary. Students of education are affected by this type of language and, more often than not, their actions will reflect the posed meaning these words possess. Sometimes, however, "conceptual confusions" emerge. It seems that language in education can be used in at least three influential ways:

1. As a way to "persuade" people lacking sound educational beliefs, it has the purpose of "convincing"; the element of understanding is not desirable. The less understandable the language the better. In this way, educational beliefs go unquestioned and are not exposed to the screen of analysis to achieve understanding and questioning.

2. Language can also function as a way to express ideas or theories. In this case, language is an instrument for

communication of understanding. The language conveys the message, and it is a necessary condition that the language be clear. The purpose is to explain theories and pursue understanding of them through the language. No intention of "indoctrinating" people is intended. Whorf (1956, p. 278) contends that ". . . language shapes behavior. The words men use to describe reality or themselves dictates what they do or do not do."

3. As expressed by Frymier (1972, p. 13), there is a language of ". . . conditional relationships and the language of 'relationships without conditions.' The first is a language of control. The second is a language of love and growth." In this capacity language serves to emancipate.

Thus, we find that educational words have power, the power to redirect the procedures and purposes of educators.

Congruent with the questioning and identification of educational beliefs is Halpin's (1969) contention:

> But if the word is only as good as the idea behind it, we as educators should ask ourselves more frequently than we do not just what does this or that educational word mean, to what assumptions, values, theories, procedures, and strategies for teaching do these words commit us (p. 11)?

Huebner (1964) talks about the dangers involved in the languaging activity. He refers to the language of the technical model in education as the prevailing focus in the last few years. Huebner, according to Macdonald (1977, p. 5), ". . . opens the possibilities of political, aesthetic and moral talk."

In the same vein, Foshay (1980) proclaims the importance of language and its linkage to practice. He states:

It is scarcely recognized that the way we talk and think has a controlling effect on our action. Behind our manifest language is a metaphor, which carries latent meaning to events. Behind our action is also theory about the domain of action. It is the substratum of meaning that leads to whatever style a curriculum worker creates as he or she speaks and writes (p. 82).

Foshay's (1980) contention provides us with a clear picture of how theory and practice, talk and action are underlying sequences in everyday events. This way of thinking can also be extended to curriculum/instructional endeavors.

Values and Beliefs

Teachers have the responsibility of dealing with raw material that happens to be human. This fact has prodded the concern of many educational thinkers. In dealing with human beings, teachers should be totally aware of the beliefs they profess and whether or not they can be matched effectively with educational practices. At the core of educational beliefs are values. Macdonald (1977) contends that every curricular decision is immersed in the value considerations of someone with a personal view of what the good life is. Ubbelohde (1977) believes that any curricular endeavor is aimed at the construction of a theory of values.

An awareness of the instructional art as a value-ladened enterprise is positioned by Combs (1972) when he contends that the particular role of teachers' beliefs is one of influencing the way educators view children and their learning. Combs continues that educators can approach the process of better understanding children and the causes of their behavior through beliefs clarification. He also contends that educational values and practices must be in harmony with the teacher's sense of the meaning of human dignity.

Rogers (1976), talking about desirable traits for teachers, encourages them to behave in a way that is a basic affirmation of the student's dignity, with respect for the individual as a real person capable of feeling curiosity. Also teachers must show at the center of their basic values a desire to approach teaching as a helping relationship, one that is respectful of the learner, judgment free. Educational beliefs and practices are the unique possession of every individual teacher according to Wolfson (1977) and Dobson and Dobson (1979).

The issue of values and beliefs in education pervades and shapes the entire school environment. Classroom teachers affect the course of their students' lives through their values. The values of the Board of Education and administrators are revealed through curriculum related decisions. However, teachers are the final implementors of decisions that are made in the upper ranks. Therefore, teachers must be conscious of what they profess and how they act in the classroom in a hopeful search for consistency among theory and practice in education. Indeed, those who declare to hold value free positions, according to Macdonald (1977), have an underlying set of educational beliefs which remain unrecognized or unidentified.

Dobson and Dobson (1980) contend that any real revolution in education will consider the person of the teacher as central in the classroom. It will be teachers who, through a unique, personal set of educational beliefs, will affect life in the classroom. As a result, the measure of teacher's effectiveness will be a measure of their "unique self". This reasoning make Dobson and Dobson (1980, p. 95) think of the teacher as ". . . a most important factor in the learning process."

For those advocating a deschooling of society, the existence of

operating values is also true (Macdonald, 1977). This point of view is
expressed also by Connelly and Elbas (1980, p. 116): "The teacher's
per-sonal orientation rests not only on intellectual belief but also on
perception, feeling, values, purposes, and commitment." There is no
such thing as a value-free position. Values operate in every decision
we make in life.

Purpose of the Study

Clearly, the data provided by practice (in other words, experience)
inevitably alter one's conceptions and, hence, the theoretical represen-
tations of reality that one constructs. Thus, theory is viewed as an
evolutionary phenomenon (Zais, 1976).

This study has two basic purposes: The primary purpose is the
development of a theoretical analysis (conceptualization) of the pre-
vailing philosophical camps of the educational experience:

1. Behaviorism - Essentialism

2. Cognitive Field Psychology - Experimentalism

3. Humanism - Existentialism

A systematic study of the aforementioned philosophical camps will help
secondary teachers to identify where they stand both in educational
beliefs and in practice.

The need for people in education to arrive at a comfortable degree
of harmony (congruence) between theory and practice is strongly favored
by Macdonald (1977) as noted in the following statement:

> What I am proposing is a challenge . . . to explicitly profess
> their basic grounding values of goodness that underlie the
> work they do. How do they answer the questions of the meaning
> of human existence; and what form of living together? What do
> they substitute for such concerns as persons and social

democracy? And if they agree with these, why is the connection between values and their activity (whether talk or work) so vague (p. 21).

The second purpose of the study is to develop a model that could help teachers to arrive at congruency among educational beliefs and practices. Through this model, special attention will be given to the major components of educational beliefs and practices in education as expressed by Dobson and Dobson (1979), as noted below:

1. The nature of man
2. Motivation and learning
3. Nature of social learning
4. How intellectual development proceeds
5. The nature of knowledge
6. The nature of society
7. Instruction
8. Curriculum
9. School organization
   .
   .
   .
11. Evaluation (p. 5).

The blending of the two main purposes will provide teachers with a cognitive framework for making theory and practice in secondary education more congruent, thus shifting the responsibility of one's teaching actions from externality to internality; from pawn to origin (Rotter, 1954, 1955, 1960, 1971; de Charms, 1968). The merit of this shift is based on the contention that externality, a perceived inability to affect one's fate meaningfully, is a source of immature and poor coping behavior contributing to ineffective teaching behavior (Bettleheim, 1943; Elkins, 1961; Lewis, 1961).

Factors Operating Against

Belief-Practice Congruency

If desirable educational belief-practice congruence is an agreement

of many authors and has been pointed out as the center of the educational process, why is it sometimes hindered or neglected? Combs (1972, p. 36) holds the following assumption regarding mythological views of teachers about how learning takes place affecting the learning process in a negative way: "The beliefs teachers hold about the nature of behavior are crucial for their behavior toward students." Apple (1974) and Eisner (1977) attribute such an attitude to a dominance of a behavioristic position across the years. Schools of education do not provide adequate instruments for the study of education as the complex intellectual activity that it is. Educators continue to be fascinated with a technological approach to education.

The field of curriculum has borrowed heavily on science, stressing the less humane part of the scientific enterprise. Eisner (1977) believes that at the center of this attitude are the following considerations: The scientific view goes beyond the establishing of subject matter priorities to influence curriculum organization and teacher behavior. Interest in control of behavior is derived from the scientific outlook. MacDonald (1977) and Lane (1974) think that at the roots of the problem is the fact that educational beliefs usually remain unexamined. Connelly and Elbas (1980) state:

> Whatever the teacher's position, his/her stance with respect to theory determines what kinds of theoretical knowledge he/she will draw upon and how he/she will use it in a particular situation. Thus, the teacher's theoretical orientation shapes his/her practical knowledge in an important way (p. 114).

Connelly and Elbas (1980) discuss the role of theory on teacher behavior, stressing that this relationship ranges from absolute denial of any theory base for classroom action to overt adherence to a particular view, passing through an intermediate position that claims the

difficulties of implementing a theory position. It is their contention
that maybe both, a position of absolute denial and a hopeless position
related to implementation of theory, are major drawbacks for the desir-
able congruency among beliefs and practice in education.

Basic Premises

The basic premises for this study are (1) There is an obvious rela-
tionship between a teacher's set of values or beliefs and his/her prac-
tical implementation of these ideas in the classroom. (2) Teachers need
to make a consistent effort in order to develop an ever-increasing har-
mony among beliefs and practices in education. (3) Whatever the set of
beliefs supported by educators, they should be in accordance with a high
respect for the dignity of the human condition. (4) Many sets of educa-
tional beliefs exist, but most of them center on considerations relative
to the nature of society, the purpose of the school, the ways learning
proceeds, and the philosophy of the good society.

Organization of the Study

Chapter I of this study provided background information to the
study. The purpose and need for the study were established. The format
for succeeding chapters is as follows: Chapter II treats the literature
associated with three philosophical camps. Chapter III relates each of
three philosophies to certain educational variables. Chapter IV pre-
sents the literature associated with three schools of psychology.
Chapter V relates each of the three schools of psychological thought to
selected educational variables. Chapter VI discusses the significance
of language in educational thought, while Chapter VII presents a model

for achieving educational beliefs-practice congruence. Finally, Chapter VIII presents a summary of the study, conclusions, and recommendations.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THREE MAJOR PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION

Existentialism

Existentialism as a philosophical doctrine evolved as an alternative for Man disintegrated to a "scientist" position which reduces the human condition to both an abstraction and to a depersonalized value-free entity (Fallico, 1970).

There are as many positions in Existentialism as representatives of the movement, but the major thrusts are represented by Kierkegaard, Sartre, Jaspers, Tillich, and more recently from the developments of a group of American psychologists: May, Maslow, Rogers, Combs and Kelly, among many influential others.

As opposed to many other philosophical movements, Existentialism is not a comforting philosophy for men. Instead it is an attempt to awaken Man. It leads Man to Existential desperation which grows out of self-awareness of his Existential loneliness and need to face death. Existential Man is encouraged to exercise his freedom to choose, in fact, the mark of Existential Man is his personal freedom, from which he has no possible escape.

The use of his freedom determines Man's authenticity, and the neglect to use his freedom leads Man to lose contact with his personal Self. Because Man is free, autonomous, he is faced with personal decisions which are no more than the exercising of this responsibility.

Every decision Existential Man makes is an attempt to reproduce Human Nature in himself. Another way to describe the Existentialist premise is that "Existence precedes Essence" and that "When Man chooses, he chooses for all Mankind". There is no recapitulation of human history, since every Man's existence is an attempt to define humankind.

Man is always in a process of being or becoming. Heidegger (1958, p. 31) has expressed this as the problem of "how one becomes what one is". Man has to make his own world out of these free choices and responsibilities. As Rogers (1951, p. 484) has expressed: "Reality is basically a private world of individual perceptions." Or, as Kneller (1958, p. 25) has expressed: "Existence is projection; it 'becomes'. With every passing moment it becomes more (or less) than it is. Existence and temporality are thus practically synonymous."

The preceding thesis is the basis of the Existentialist's refusal to accept absolute truth. Knowledge is reconstructed for every generation of Man, indeed more, for every individual Man. Knowledge grows out of the need for Man to find himself and it is only an instrument in his search for selfhood.

As Weiner (1950) has expressed:

It is not the quantity of information sent that is important for action, but rather the quantity of information which can penetrate into the communication and storage apparatus sufficiently to serve as a trigger for action (p. 237).

Knowledge and Man, who re-creates knowledge, share the same changing nature. This is another way to express the Existentialist's refusal to accept permanency. Man is always in the process of improving himself and his personal knowledge in order to attain meaning or selfhood.

Because Man is faced with individual choices and individual freedom, his choices become his values, which are an outgrowth of his

personal view of the world. This is the main reason why values cannot be taught. Values direct Man's own actions and are a source of internal control, but values, as Man himself, are always evolving, changing, becoming. There are no fixed values all Men can possess. Values are a source of contradiction for Existential Man because as Johnson (1975) has expressed there are two sources for values: one is <u>experience</u> itself, another is <u>societal influence</u>. For Sartre (1947), experienced values are the same as "being-for-itself" and Societal Influence is "being-in-itself." Although these value contradictions are recognized for Existentialism, O'Neill (1970, p. 235) expresses that personally held values have self-disciplining power. "There is no basic and irreconcilable conflict between self interest and the interest of others . . . real autonomy precludes license." Makarenko (1955, p. 209) has expressed the same view: "A logic of . . . discipline confirms that discipline places each individual personality in a position of greater security and freedom." All the marks of Existential Man, his freedom, responsibility, personal meaning, Existential loneliness and death, can be the source of his personal becoming, but also Man's refusal to accept his responsibility, his major existential task, is the source of self-estrangement, alienation, or as Fromm (1941, p. 180) has expressed, his escape from freedom: "Not to see possibility, not to find reason for existence, is to lose the authentic self and thus exist in bad faith." The word for alienation used by Rogers (1951, p. 510) is maladjustment which ". . . exists when the organism denies awareness of significant sensory and visceral experiences, which consequently are not symbolized and organized into the gestalt of the self-structure."

From Rogers' statement, we can infer that "synthesis" is another

mark of Existential Man. If he is not to live in self-betrayal, Man has
to be ONE fully functioning organism. Both his objectivity and his sub-
jectivity should become a blend that help him in the pains of Existen-
tial self-questioning, anger, disappointment, and Existential growth.

Experimentalism

Experimentalism within the context of American philosophical
thought can be attributed to three major philosophers: Charles Pierce,
William James, and John Dewey, but roots of the movement can be found in
the ideas of the Greek philosopher, Protagoras (481-411 B.C.).

It can be said that the three aforementioned philosophers agree on
the main tenets of the Experimentalist Movement, but differences of
interpretation can be found among them. Although an exhaustive descrip-
tion of the movement will not be attempted here, the main features of
the Experimentalist Movement in education will be considered.

A concept basic to all Experimentalism is that of Experience. This
concept has strong importance for them, because the base of all possible
knowledge is grounded on Experience. So experience comes first. Upon
having experienced a situation an idea emerges. Ideas are only
conceivable if they lead to an end, if they have purpose, a practical
counterpart. Ideas can have the purpose of generating Truth, which Man
uses as illusions in order to adapt easily to his environment in order
to achieve self-fulfillment. Only through the use of scientific verifi-
cation can ideas be validated and help Man to improve his human condi-
tion. This point is supported by Hook (1959, p. 333): "The function of
an idea is to enable an organism in a certain culture, at a certain his-
torical time, to solve problems." James (1958, p. 81), in the same vein,

expresses: ". . . ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just insofar as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience." James goes on to say it must seem "odd" to hear him express that an idea depends on its degree of practicality in order to be good. Our thoughts and ideas must refer directly to the world of reality in order to be valid. Since thoughts are possible sources of knowledge, they must be tested against experience. Dewey (1958) himself opposes dealing with intangibles, abstract ideas, the supernatural world, because they cannot stand scientific analysis. So he expresses:

> The serious matter is that philosophers have denied that common experience is capable of developing within itself methods which will secure direction for itself and will create inherent standards of judgment and value . . . to the waste of time and energy, to disillusionment of life that attends every deviation from concrete experience must be added the tragic failure to discover what intelligent search would reveal and mature among the things of ordinary experience (p. 331).

The preceding paragraph highlights the concept of intelligence. For the Experimentalist, intelligence makes possible wise reasoning, but as intelligence develops, freedom is a necessary condition, so the mind can wander freely (great thinking flourishes in a Democratic political system because of this reason). The blending of experience, intelligence, and freedom is advocated by the Experimentalist which leads them to think that every experience is a potential answer (may be a truth). After the individual identifies what the good conditions for the betterment of life are, he uses his powers of reasoning (intelligence). Under conditions of freedom, it follows that the solution to the problem will be found. As Dewey (1958, pp. 144-145) expresses: "The only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation and of judgment exercised in behalf of

purposes that are intrinsically worthwhile."

It is obvious now that all experience, for the Experimentalist,
emerges out of the interaction of Man with his particular environment.
Experiences are as diverse as the innumerable interactions of Man with
his surrounding. Life is a succession of experiences. Every experience
has the potential of truthfulness for Man. In this point rests the very
heart of the Experimentalist's thesis: experience means change, the
emerging of many possible truths for every individual man. As Dewey
(1958, p. 119) stresses: "Experience as trying involves change, but
change is a meaningless transition unless it is consciously connected
with the return wave of consequences which flow from it." This is
because the Experimentalist does not consider absolute truths, they
reject absolutes, also they refuse to contemplate dualistic positions.
As Dewey (1958) so expresses:

> The idea that mind and world of things and persons are two
> separated and independent realms - a theory which philosophi-
> cally is known as dualism - carries with it the conclusion
> that method and subject matter of instruction are separate
> affairs (p. 133).

It is their belief that dualism disintegrates experience which is con-
ceived as a unified whole.

Because of Dewey's belief in experimental change, no absolutes, and
no predetermined truths, life itself is a challenging experience. The
optimism so characteristic of Dewey (1981) leads him to believe that all
experience has an enjoyable aesthetic character:

> I see signs that appreciation is taken too narrowly - that
> its universal scope as a function of all normal experience is
> not sufficiently perceived . . . . We have the clue to two
> marked traits of appreciation. It involves a stirring of emo-
> tion and an immediate development of imagination . . . to be
> emotionally stirred is to care, to be concerned (pp. 27-28).

Essentialism

Essentialism as a philosophical movement applied to American education is a blending of both Idealism and Realism (Dobson and Dobson, 1979). It is based on the premise that reality is not a dual phenomenon. What constitutes reality for Idealism is a synthesis of opposites, both the Mind and the rest of the existing things. Reality for realism ". . . is universal, abstract, and permanent . . . reality is found by turning one's attention to the visible objects we encounter constantly" (Howick, 1971, p. 59).

Idealism

Idealism is first attributed to the philosopher, Plato, who thought of reality as permanent, universal, and dependent upon universal laws (348 B.C.). Hegel's (1770-1831) ideas contributed to the expansion of the movement. Hegel gave a high value to the powers of the Mind and also conceived a unified reality where the opposites, mind and nature, were concealed. His doctrine about Man supposed that every Man has the duty to recreate historically the marks of Human Nature.

Bishop Berkeley is credited as the Father of Modern Idealism (Dobson and Dobson, 1979). Butler (1958) represented with his writings the strength of Idealism in American philosophy.

For the Idealist Man and his accomplishments, infinite in potentiality are superior to all scientific expression. Man, for the Idealist, uses scientific knowledge to develop his Mind. The development of the Mind is the measure of the intents of Man for development of his potential, which is unlimited.

The Realist thinks that Man uses the parts (his knowledge) to form

the whole (his realization as a member of Mankind). Every part contributes to the accomplishment of the whole. The whole for that reason is bigger than its parts. Facts and evidence are already there, ready for Man to re-create them, to put them together in a unity.

The mission of Man on earth is the pursuit of Reality through the reconstruction of the parts of a whole. Man is the sum of all his experiences. The making of Man belongs to the temporal. Reality is reached when Man is close to the Ideal of Perfection but this, in fact, never happens. Man can never be absolutely realized because Man and his efforts and experiences belong to the temporal. Reality is a temporal, not changing entity. As Horne (1963, p. 222) so expresses: "The Absolute is, the finite becomes."

The question of freedom for Man is posed by the Idealist who thinks that Man reaches freedom when he measures up to what is expected from him for the realization of his potential, which is the same as his Mind.

Realism

Realism as a philosophical school of thought was initiated by Aristotle. The main postulate of Realism is that there is a separate objective reality different from the one that Man can know through conscious efforts. There exists a Cosmic Universe composed of small parts. These parts form the objects that Man knows through the reflections they emanate. What Man really knows are the reflections of the objects that belong to the world of objective reality. The Universe that Man inhabits is regulated by permanent laws. Man's search of these laws leads him to knowledge. The way Man should approach the search for laws and Universe is through scientific inquiry. Whitehead represents the Ameri-

can wing of Realism. For Whitehead (1958), human life is the process of giving meaning to the objects taken out of the world of nature. Knowing, for Whitehead, implies "self-enjoyment" of the experiences he has in his search for knowledge. He adds the notion of intention of Man's action. Man's intentions constitute the process by means of which he selects and prioritizes in the world of the Reality known to him.

CHAPTER III

BASIC EDUCATIONAL BELIEFS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP

TO THE THREE SELECTED PHILOSOPHIES

OF EDUCATION

Existentialism and the Nature of Man

One of the basic premises of Existentialilsm is its neglect of abso-
lutes, of fixed truth. From here, it is inferred that for Existential

thought, Man is a potential to be realized, in any direction he chooses.

This means that Man can freely choose to be either good or bad, but when

we attach the idea of responsibility to the concept of free choice, the

results are that Man's action and his desire to make responsible deci-

sions place him in a situation in which he naturally tends to be "good".

This view of Man is corroborated by Maslow (1962), who thinks that:

> We have, each one of us, an essential inner nature which is
> intrinsic, given, 'natural' and, usually, very resistant to
> change . . . this inner nature, as much as we know of it so
> far, is definitely not 'evil' but is either what we adults
> in our culture call 'good' or else it is neutral. The most
> accurate way to express this is to say it is 'prior to good
> and evil' (pp. 35-37).

That Man is a subject capable of free, responsible choices has

implications for education: Teachers should strive for developing chil-

dren's autonomous behavior from very early in life. The teacher should

act as the encouraging person who helps students to be self-dependent.

Perhaps the only thing teachers should attempt to teach is a sense of

self-reliance, the inner belief in childrens' capacities for learning

and growth in a positive direction. As O'Neill (1970) expresses:

> The basic function of the school is normative. It should act
> to encourage the maximum development of individual autonomy,
> or free choice. The fundamental problem confronted by the
> school is as Heidegger states . . . 'how one becomes what one
> is' (p. 232).

In Man's search for selfhood using his given freedom and responsibility,
he can only attempt to develop what is already innately present in him.
What Man has to do with this natural endowment is to proceed to unfold
it. Education is one of the agencies that can help Man in the develop-
ment of himself. This is expressed by Combs (1962, p. 62): "Educators
have been in the business of effecting changes in perception since
teaching was invented. No one knows better than they how to bring such
changes about."

Man experiences his world in a unique manner. Knowledge and experi-
ence are instruments that he uses to build his growing, ever-changing
perceptions of himself. This building of Man upon his personal mean-
ingful experiences is what constitutes his self-concept. The concept
Man has of himself is not static, it develops and changes as his experi-
encing of the world progresses. This natural tendency of Man to develop
a view of himself must be supported by the school, which should encour-
age and help through the building of a democratic environment, where the
student can explore freely.

Kelley (1962, p. 16) states: "For the development of a fully func-
tioning self, a person needs to have opportunity to live the life good
to live. This life, or his world, needs to be populated by people whom
he can view as facilitating."

Man's evolving self-concept grows out of the interaction with his
inner world and with the world around him. This means that Man builds

his own selfhood cooperatively with others, but the final choices of his

being are left to him alone. Kelley (1962) and Rogers (1962) suggested

that a good perception of oneself frees the individual to both be hims-

elf and feel empathy for his fellow-man so that the experiencing of one-

self and others is one solid entity.

When Man is able to function freely because his felt experiences

lead him to be one with himself, when the environment around him (home,

school and the wide society) are trustworthy, then Man's natural incli-

nation is to be constructive. He will freely socialize without need for

external controls upon his natural tendency toward good, he will be

responsible because he will only tend to choose his own good. Without

saying that Man is basically rational, his own tendency toward free

choice and responsibility will lead him to rational behavior.

But the opposite also holds true. When Man is neglected his right

to be himself, when he is prevented his right to choose freely, and

responsibility is taken away from him, or when his power of decision is

lessened or destroyed, maladjustment or alienation takes place.

O'Neill (1970) expresses this view:

Authoritarian control, regardless of how ostensibly 'effi-
cient' it may seem to be, undermines the basic human values
which should motivate the entire educational process and even
serves to subvert the basic goal of student self-determination
(p. 238).

Alienation and maladjustment are the result of subverting the Existen-

tialist premise that "Existence precedes Essence", because when we place

Man under one specific, fixed nature that he has to develop, we limit

him, we impose a role upon Man, we decide what Man should be, we decide

for him. Teachers cannot decide externally that Man should be neces-

sarily good, bad, both, or neither. When teachers allow students to

potentially be whatever they choose to be, they are consistent with
leaving Man to choose and build an essence of his own. After man exists
consciously and responsibly, he is then able to define his essence,
which is the same as developing or actualizing his potential, deciding
upon the individual project that his life is at a certain point in
time. Because his existence and essence are never totally made, Man is,
until the moment of his physical death, in the process of becoming what
he progressively decides to be. This is why the notion of time: past,
present, and future is so important to the Existential nature of Man.
Because a Man is the result of choosing every moment of his life, his
yesterday and his future are related to his present. His present
remains to be both what Man experienced in the past and his optimistic
projects for the future.

Existentialism and the Nature of Learning

Given the Existentialist postulates of Man as an agent able of free
decision-making, basically responsible for his choices which determine
his attitude toward life (as part of the process of self-actualization),
it follows that it is this process of Man becoming whatever be chooses
to be that determines Man's learning.

As Johnson (1975) states:

Man is asked to make himself what he is supposed to become,
to fulfill his destiny. In every act of moral self-
affirmation man contributes to the fulfillment of his des-
tiny, to the actualization of what he potentially is (p. 52).

Although it has been recognized that learning takes place in three
related domains, cognitive, affective, and psychomotor, the Existential-
ist emphasis is upon the development of the affective domain. But it
also holds true that the development of the affective does not lessen

the development of the two other domains. This view is expressed by Maslow (1962, p. 44) who, talking about the healthy personality, expresses that the three domains are closely related. Maslow goes on to warn us about the dangers of "purely abstract thinking and of analytic thinking," because certain types of reality, such as the aesthetic one, cannot be perceived through pure rationality. So he expresses: "Science and education, being too exclusively abstract, verbal and bookish, do not have enough place for raw, concrete aesthetic experience, especially the subjective happenings inside oneself" (p. 44).

The meaningful experiences people have in the three aforementioned domains constitute the way they experience the world, which is the same as their perceptions. As perceptions grow meaningfully to the individual, so the act of knowing or learning occurs. But we need more than mere confrontation with the world in order to know. For Combs (1962), two conditions seem necessary:

1. The individual's discovery of personal meaning, and

2. The satisfaction of need.

From his statement, we derive that in order for learning to take place, the curriculum content must respond both to the learner's interests and needs.

Another condition that favors learning is that of a positive attitude toward learning, which grows out of a positive attitude toward self. It is known that a positive expectation in our capacities for learning affects the quality and quantity of our meaningful experiences. A positive attitude toward future learning experiences is the result of our being successful in the past (Combs, 1962). The preceding statements focus on the development of a positive view of self, the getting

of meaning and the need for knowing in order for learning to take place. This view is corroborated by Combs (1962, p. 69): "Learning only occurs when something happens inside the learner and this is, for the most part, in his, not the teacher's control." It is, then, the idea of "meaning" which pervades the atmosphere of an Existential classroom environment. Learning is so viewed as the individual search for personal meaning. As meaning is so personal no teacher can teach, but rather helps in this journey through the world of meanings. Knowledge can be viewed as a means that helps in the student's search for personal meaning. This process can be helped but in no way forced by the teacher. Students can plan cooperatively with their teachers, but their learning experiences are personal.

<center>Existentialism and the Nature of Knowledge</center>

Because of their rejection of absolutes, of fixed truth, the Existentialist does not consider that an existing body of knowledge must be possessed by all persons in order to function adequately. It is the making of personal meanings out of information we need to possess that makes "knowing" relevant to the Existentialist. In fact, it is knowledge per se, which is neglected by the Existential thinker, it is instead meaningful knowledge that they strongly advocate. Because knowledge is important for the person to actualize his potential at its full capacity, Combs (1962) states:

> In the complex society in which we live one cannot be both adequate and stupid simultaneously. The truly adequate person must also be well informed. Indeed, the minimum level of what everyone needs to know just to exist continues to rise year by year as we become ever more specialized and dependent upon technical know-how. One need not know everything to be adequate but one must certainly have a field of perceptions,

rich and extensive enough to provide understanding of the
events in which he is enmeshed and available when he needs
them (p. 59).

The acquisition of knowledge must then be drawn from two spheres.
Both of them must appropriate the concept of "meaning" in order to be
validated as knowledge: ". . . knowledge of abstract, verbal terms,
which express concepts about the world, and knowledge of self and feel-
ings . . ." (Combs, 1962, p. 185).

That knowledge is an instrument that wisely used by Man helps him in
his personal redefinition seems to be involved in the following assump-
tions by Dobson and Dobson (1979).

1. Knowledge is a model created by the individual that makes
   sense out of encounters with external conditions in the
   environment.

2. The process associated with the development of new knowl-
   edge and new insights is greater in significance than sim-
   ply the act of receiving or transmitting knowledge.

3. Knowledge is personal.

4. Little or no information exists which is essential for
   everyone to acquire.

5. The quality of being is more important than the quality of
   knowing (p. 22).

The idea that "knowing" is an expression of our openness to experi-
ence is posed by Rogers (1962) in his analogy of Man working out his
experiences in the same way that a computer machine is fed. If we give
to it the necessary and right kind of information, we will get the
results we expect. As the process applies to Man, he stresses that
". . . the defects which in most of us make this process untrustworthy
are the inclusion of information which does not belong to this present
situation, or the exclusion of information which does . . ." (p. 27).
In the same vein, Maslow (1962, p. 44) when talking about the prevailing

preference for abstract knowledge rather than for a more ". . .

preverbal, metaphorical . . . and esthetic type of cognition" states:

> Even in science this is true, now that we know (a) that cre-
> ativity has its roots in the non-rational, (b) that language
> is and must always be inadequate to describe total reality,
> (c) that any abstract concept leaves out much of reality, and
> (d) that what we call knowledge (which is usually highly
> abstract an verbal and sharply defined) often serves to blind
> us to those portions of reality not covered by the abstraction
> (p. 44).

The Existentialist denies the assumption that every generation of

Man is a recapitulation of the marks and accomplishments of preceding

generations, including all the scientific knowledge generated until

then. Such neglect comes from the Existential assumption that every Man

in every new generation is made afresh, bringing with him only his

potential for being. This assumption seems to be implied by O'Neill

(1970) who states that for the Existentialist:

> Much, if not most, past knowledge is actually noncontributive
> and possibly even disfunctional with respect to the fulfill-
> ment of basic human freedom . . . much of what presently
> passes for 'education' is simply an attempt to obscure the
> real (existential) problems relating to the human condition
> behind a great deal of irrelevant or erroneous data about the
> past and present human situation (p. 236).

Affecting the nature of knowledge is the idea of change. Knowledge

is evolving, changing, and at the very core of Existential thought rests

the assumption that it is in the capacity of the self to make important

decisions in the absence of certainty that truly personal development

flourishes.

Apple (1974) believes the ways schools fail in fostering creativ-

ity, indeed in producing conforming behavior on the part of the student,

is due to

> . . . a fundamental ethic that all important modes of human
> action can be known in advance by educators and social
> scientists; that certainty in interaction among people is of

primary import, and, underlying all of these, that the primary
aspects of thought and sentiment of students should be brought
under institutionalized control (p. 120).

Existentialism and the Nature of Society

It would seem a paradox for those who recognize that Existentialism's major postulate is Man's freedom, that Existentialism also advocates responsibility in choices affecting both oneself and others. Fallico (1970) in dealing with this issue stresses:

> The paradox of Man is that he is freedom itself, even in his lack of being, and yet is not free to be his own freedom in the world. His freedom is gained with and against other alien freedoms who are other men, and who, under the miracle of love alone perhaps, may become as his own person. In this dialectical struggle in which his own being is at stake, he risks constantly compromising the very meaning of himself. Compromise is dangerous for the free self, and so is the refusal to compromise (p. 169).

The preceding thoughts concerning the freedom of the individual as both threatened and complemented by Man's relationship to his fellow-men seems to be solved by the fulfillment of Man by his identification with society. This is posed by Maslow (1962, p. 36) as belonging to the basic human need for affiliation, belonging, and love: "No psychological health is possible unless the 'inner nature' of the person is fundamentally accepted, loved and respected by others."

This view is complemented by Rogers' (1962) statement concerning the human need for affiliation:

> When we are able to free the individual from his defensiveness, so that he is open to the wide range of environmental and social demands, his reactions may be trusted to be positive, forward-looking and constructive. We do not need to ask who will socialize with him because one of his deepest needs is for affiliation and communication with others (p. 80).

The Existentialist's concept of responsibility is inherent in the relationship of the individual to his fellow-men because when one

chooses free and responsible alternatives affecting his own life,
responsible consideration for others emerges. This is because Man is
naturally a social being.

The aforementioned element of responsibility seems to be present in
Kelley (1962). He states:

> The life good to live depends on the quality of the people
> around the individual. His world needs to be populated by
> people whom he can view as facilitating . . . . The life good
> to live is a cooperative one. When the person is part of
> something, consulted and involved, then he becomes respon-
> sible . . . . The cooperative life . . . is not an easy life
> p. 16).

Kelley's view is complemented by Combs (1962, p. 55) who seems to
stress the importance of quality relationships from very early in life:
"One learns to identify with others, depending upon the nature of his
contacts with the important people in his life."

Johnson (1975) seems to pose the problem that Man as a consequence
of his relationship to society is confronted by two different positions
concerning his values; he is faced to his own evolved, guiding princi-
ples and those of the wider society, something which Sartre (1941),
expresses as "being-in-itself" instead of a "being-for-itself".

The Existentialist's ideals of freedom and responsibility seem to
be present when Man relates to other members of Mankind, because when he
chooses responsibility for the life that he wants to live, that choice
would not compromise the integrity of his own self, nor inflict harm
upon others. If Man chooses well, he chooses the well-being of his
fellow-men. Such Existential premises seem to be implied in what Dobson
and Dobson (1979) consider basic assumptions concerning the nature of
society:

1. Society has existence in Man's minds.

2. Society provides a system of universals.

3. The school's primary task is individual; an incidental task of the school is social .

4. The way to improve civilization is by improving the quality of individuals, not by improving institutions (p. 22).

It seems to follow that the Existentialist thinker can conceal the apparent conflict between himself and society by means of an attitude that conceals the two apparent opposites: his well-being and that of others through a unifying gestalt structure.

Existentialism and the Aim of Education

A key concept for the Existentialist is the view of education as a process of becoming, which make implicit Man's right to generate authentic Existential choices for his life. Education within the Existentialistic way of thought means helping the individual to be self-determinant from very early in his life. Because education is the individual project of Man, it cannot be imposed upon him. Thus, the task of the school should have its limits in the freedom of the individual. The most that schools can do to help the individual is help him to move toward the actualization of his innate potential. Maybe the concept of education as a project best defines the character of education. The individual is never finally educated because this would be against the Existentialistic premise of fluid change and lack of permanence in man's life. This seems to be the point made by Maslow (1962) when he states:

> We can no longer think of the person as 'fully determined' when this phrase implies 'determined only by forces external to the person'. The person, insofar as he is a real person, is his own main determinant. Every person is, in part, 'his own project' and makes himself (p. 36).

In order to initiate the process of becoming, it is requisite for

the individual to be in touch with his own self. An adequate view of

himself is basic for the unfolding process of the individual to start.

As Combs (1967) has expressed:

> Self-actualizing persons seem to be characterized by an essen-
> tially positive view of self. They see themselves as persons
> who are liked, wanted, acceptable, able; as persons of dignity
> and integrity, of worth and importance (p. 51).

The concept of "experiencing" the world as part of the process of

becoming seems to be present in Kelley (1967) who has expressed:

> The fully functioning person . . . sees himself as part of a
> world in movement - in process of becoming. This follows from
> the whole notion of self and the acceptance that they can feed
> off each other and hence can improve (p. 19).

The person in the process of becoming imposes discipline and organ-

ization within himself but still keeps the process as a moving, fluid

one. As Rogers (1962) has expressed:

> The individual moves toward more acceptantly being a process,
> a fluidity . . . such living in the moment then, means an
> absence of rigidity, of tight organization, of the imposition
> of structure on experience. It means instead a maximum of
> adaptability, a discovery of structure in experience, a flow-
> ing, changing organization of self and personality (p. 26).

The same notion of structuring self-discipline in a state of flow-

ing change seems to be supported by Makarenko (1955, p. 209): "A logic

of . . . discipline confirms that discipline places each individual per-

sonality in a position of greater security and freedom."

From the aforementioned considerations can be drawn that education

is for liberation of the innate potential of Man to be his own in a

climate of responsible actions governed by flowing self-structure, with-

in a state of ever-changing experiences and events.

Existentialism and the Nature of Curriculum

The curriculum of the school reflecting existential practices is

one characterized by its attention to the development of the student's self-concept, because it determines the richness of personal meanings the students acquire through their academic learning. It is already known that self-concept is learned. The school should attempt to promote curricular experiences that promote the development of a healthy self-concept. Kelley (1962, p. 9) confirms this view: "The self has to be achieved; it is not given . . . all that is given is the equipment and at least the minimal (mother and child) social environment."

The purposes of life, education among them, are made possible when the individual trusts his capacities for purposeful action. This seems to be implied by Combs (1962, p. 141) when he states: "The accurate, realistic assessment of self resulting from acceptance makes possible the use of self, as a dependable, trustworthy instrument for achieving one's purposes."

A second characteristic of the Existential curricular practices is that they foster and encourage an environment open to meaningful experiences. This makes Combs (1962) think that:

> An adequate person can launch himself without fear into the new, the untried and the unknown . . . truly adequate people possess perceptual fields maximally open to experience . . . their perceptual fields are capable of change and adjustment in such fashion as to make the fullest possible use of their experience (p. 141).

A third characteristic of a curriculum that applies Existential thought would be the fostering of feelings of belongingness. Children need to realize that their contributions are appreciated by significant others: their teachers and peers. When the need for affiliation is incorporated into the curriculum, the students feel that they are respected, their voices heard, and responsibility comes naturally for them. This view seems to be contemplated by Maslow (1962).

> No ideally good relationship to another human being, especi-
> ially a child, is possible without 'being-love'--especially
> it is necessary for teaching, along with the tauistic, trust-
> ing attitude it implies (p. 164).

Another important feature of the curriculum would be its concern

for dealing with accurate knowledge, in as many varieties as possible in

order to excite the natural curiosity of the students. Knowledge is

seen as an instrument that the individual uses in his self-actualization

process. The importance of knowledge is especially advocated by Combs

(1962) who states:

> Rich and extensive perceptual fields are a product of the
> kinds of opportunities an individual has been exposed to
> . . . . Mere exposure to an event is no guarantee that the
> event will be perceived by the individual or be available on
> later occasions . . . . An adequate person seems to have many
> more such personal meanings (p. 60).

Also, a main curricular concern is the inclusion of an interest

for helping the student to develop a set of consistent values and

beliefs. People should have values they are eager to stand for. This

view seems to be expressed by Combs (1962, p. 61): "The deeper, more

personally significant the perception, moreover, the more likely it is

to affect behavior."

The curriculum emphasis on personal meanings and focus on the

evolving character of experience seems to be stressed by Dobson and

Dobson (1979):

1. The curriculum must be considered dynamic and forever
    emerging. Curriculum planning requires a balance between
    input and output.

2. The curriculum should reflect as its source the children
    of that school.

3. The curriculum environment provides each student with
    multiple options to explore, i.e., touch, dream, read,
    count, taste, think, sense, feel, tell, and smell.

4. Curriculum structure exists largely in teacher's and student's minds, not on paper (p. 23).

In summary, the Existential curriculum is one that allows for:

1. Students' initiated learning.

2. Constructive support on the part of the teacher.

3. A built in emphasis on the individual's potential for learning and success.

4. Goals for learning grow out of the individual interests of the student.

5. Expression of creativeness that is the same as to say, individual freedom and responsibility.

6. Use of information as a tool for the actualization of the individual student's potential.

7. Use of evaluation as one instrument for growth and self-assessment. The evaluation process is shared by both student and teacher individually, as a group, and is wide enough to encompass all the significant meanings of the perceptual field of an individual.

8. Experiences so significant to the student as having the power to sustain motivational forces that grow within the individual.

Existentialism and Instructional Behavior

Instructional behaviors are the tools that the teacher in combination with the student uses to activate the content of learning, which in the Existential classroom exists as Dobson and Dobson (1979, p. 23) express, ". . . largely in the teacher's and student's minds, not on paper."

Existential instructional behavior is based on what Reidford and Weinberg (1972) called the principles of Humanistic Psychology:

1. Persons learn in a free environment.

2. The child learns by relating the world to his own experiences.

3. Persons learn cooperatively.

4. Persons learn from the inside out.

5. Persons learn in relation to their human qualities:

   -The student is unique

   -The student is a child (or adolescent)

   -The student is a feeling person

   -The student is part of the human experience

   -The child is a social being

For the actualization of these principles, Reidford and Weinberg (1972) go on to suggest "humanistic stratagies" in three areas:

1. Learning about the world;

2. Improving your capacity to experience;

3. Relating to others.

Reidford and Weinberg's suggestions emphasize the consistency that must exist between principles of learning and educational practices.

The Existential premises of self-actualization of one's own potential, meaning in life, and purposive behavior as the generators of Existential school practices seem to be posed by Dobson and Dobson (1979):

1. Children are naturally active; they set goals and enjoy striving.

2. Children receive many satisfactions from work, have pride in achievements, enjoy the process, and gain a sense of worthiness from contribution, pleasure in association.

3. Children aspire to independence, self-fulfillment, and are capable of assuming responsibility for their behavior and academic growth.

4. Children who understand and who are involved in what they are doing can create their own methods of accomplishing educational tasks.

5. Children seek to give meaning to their lives by identifying with certain basic groups.

6. Children naturally dislike routine tasks that are boring, and desire new experiences.

7. Children desire to be released, encouraged, and assisted (p. 23).

In summary, the instructional behavior within an Existential class-room is based on the Existential premises of individual's freedom, right to choice, commitment to duty and responsibility, and mainly student's initiated behavior.

Existentialism and the Nature of Evaluation

Since the main concern of the Existential teacher is with the development of selfhood of individual students, the existential development of the individual becomes the object of learning. Evaluation procedures focus on helping students assess the quality and amount of their learning experiences which can be defined as the choices the student makes and the degree of responsibility and commitment of the student toward those existential choices.

The existential element of choice is paramount to the existential educator when making evaluation decisions. Because choices are spon-taneously and responsibly made by the individual; assessment on the part of the teacher is an external element that cannot be forced upon stu-dents. This view is expressed by Dobson and Dobson (1979) when they state:

Evaluation is solicited by the learner and the norm is self-established. Evaluation data are available to the child upon his request and represent a shared experience as opposed

to being imposed from without. The child is furnished with
data and encourage to analyze and interpret them for
him/herself (p. 26).

When talking about the nature of existential choices Zais (1976)

contends that:

Because existential choices are intuitive, choices based on a
rational analysis of the situation will be discouraged in
favor of choices based on affect or feelings. Of course, as
the students makes his choices he is engaging in the process
of defining himself, i.e., determining his own nature as a
human being (p. 235).

Evaluation for the Existential teacher does not make use of group

norms. Cooperation instead of competition is encouraged.

Clark and Beatty (1967) see evaluation within this perspective as

inherent to the human condition. Meaningful construction is an

ever-increasing process of evaluation by means of which new meanings are

constructed upon already existing meaningful structures. They state:

It is the "nature" of man to relate and constantly to test and
judge the results of the relating. If we think of this
constant testing and judging as evaluation, then in an
abstract sense, evaluation is the process of making meaning
out of experience. It is an essential part of the learning
process; for no one could learn from his experience except by
utilizing the feedback from these experiences and converting
it into meaning for the future (p. 51).

At the very heart of the process of meaning construction through

evaluation schemes rests the assumption that motivational states help to

first, evaluate already existing meaning structures and second, to act

upon them if it is necessary. In an evaluation act engaged in by stu-

dents and teachers alike, Clark and Beatty go on to offer some guide-

lines for a comprehensive evaluation program:

There are judgments to be made independently by (a) the
individual student, concerning his Becoming; (b) the teacher,
concerning an individual relationship with each student; (c)
the teacher and students, concerning how to organize all the
relations which must be maintained in a class; and (d) all the
resource people--administrators, supervisors, coordinators,
counselors, researchers, lay boards, and citizens' committee--

concerning the facilities the teacher uses to help the student toward his becoming effective. At each level of evaluation the process of making judgments is much the same, but the questions asked and the data collected are of a different order.

. . . At the first level stands the individual learner. He is building his values from his perceptions of how things are related in the world . . . . At the second level of evaluation, the teachers must continue to seek insights about how the teacher role pertains to the perceived self and how relations with students are used for the teacher's own becoming . . . . At the third level of evaluation, among the teacher and members of the class, there must be continual development of shared values . . . . At the fourth level of evaluation, the major problem is to clarify values about what schools are for. It is generally recognized that we can answer questions about our programs only in terms of what we are trying to do (pp. 69-70).

It was seen here how within an Existential perspective evaluation drops its role of being equally applied to all the students of a school. It is rather an effort to particularize it, according to the unique meaning structures the individual student possesses at certain points in his life.

Experimentalism and the Nature of Man

Experimentalist philosophy has as its central belief regarding human nature, the concept of Man as a unified entity, where the objective and the subjective are fused to form an organic whole. As Childs (1970) expresses:

Experimentation has accepted without discount, the evolutionary account of Man's genesis. It has sought to define the implications of this bio-social view of human development for traditional beliefs about the nature and conduct of man. It has pioneered in the construction of a theory which has sought to eliminate the traditional dualisms of man and nature, of mind and body, of subject and object . . . (p. 110).

Its neglect of fixed absolutes and dogmas implies a negation of the concept of Man as either good or bad. Instead, he can be ". . .

potentially both good and bad or a blank state" (Dobson and Dobson, 1970, p. 5).

What better defines Man is his capacity for rational thinking. When Man uses his intelligence (developed by significant experiences), he generates ideas which both emerge from experience and are tested against experience.

The use of rational intelligence entitles Man to make ethically righteous decisions. Value conflict emerge for Man when he divorces himself from experience. Lawler (1980, p. 331) expresses this view: "Dewey embraces and radicalizes the democratic and egalitarian tenden-cies of the development of modern natural science as the progres-sive destruction of obsolete erroneous dogma."

The Experimentalist denial of irrational thought is supplanted by a perspective of Man as a being that elicits the natural and spontaneous as expressed through Man's purposeful search for empirical evidence. Central to the Experimentalist conception of Man is the idea that Man functions in a concealed form with the rest of society. In fact, Exper-imentalism does not separate Man from his social context. Man has his expression in society's experiential achievements. As Dewey (1958) expressed it:

> The problem of restoring integration and cooperation between
> man's belief about the world in which he lives and his
> beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his
> conduct is the deepest problem of modern life (p. 255).

Essentially, Experimentalism views Man as a scientific organism. Only through scientific experience can Man achieve the satisfaction inherent to life. So, Dewey (1958) expresses:

> The serious matter is that philosophers have denied that common
> experience is capable of developing within itself methods which

will secure direction for itself and will create inherent stan-
dards of judgment and value . . . to the waste of time and
energy, to dissillusionment of life that attends every devia-
tion from concrete experience must be added the tragic failure
to discover what intelligent search would reveal and mature
among the things or ordinary experience (p. 35).

The relationship of thought and experience is what generates

meanings, which are as diverse as experience,

. . . thinking and activity are organically related . . .
whenever thinking is more than ideal daydreaming, it is engaged
in the work of contructing possible lines of action . . . no
distinction of meaning, no matter how subtle, can ever be other
than a possible distinction of practice (Childs, 1970, p. 111).

The preceding conception of experience and its relationship to

meanings applies to Man in all spheres of his activity because he is a

wholistic entity by himself. Being a unified entity is not, for the

Experimentalist, a denial of Man's freedom because Man does not inherit

freedom, he gains freedom as he relates intelligently to his environ-

ment. The quality of his exprience is what determines Man's freedom.

Experimentalism's conception of Man does not contemplate matters of

"certainty" as Existential loneliness and death (Lawler, 1980, p. 336).

The aforementioned Experimentalism premises seem also to be considered

by Dobson and Dobson (1970):

1. Man's behavior is based on cognition, the act of knowing
   or thinking about a situation and not on the situation
   itself.

2. Personal cognitive structure is determined by experience
   with environment and the maturation of innate potential.

3. Man is best described in relative terms.

4. Human variability is seen as desirable in a democratic
   society which respects the dignity and worth of each indi-
   vidual.

5. Man is endowed with a creative urge for improvement.

6. Man is an active, goal-seeking organism.

7. Man is a social being.

8. Freedom for an individual means growth and the willing-
   ness to change when modifications are needed (p. 14).

Both the idea of intelligent pursuit of experience and social Man
using his intelligence and powers of reasoning determine Man's freedom.
Experienced as a force within himself, his scientific validation of
ideas against experience, seems to resume the marks of the Experimenta-
list Man.

Experimentalism and the Nature of Learning

Learning for the Experimentalist involves the whole child, his body
and mind need to be involved in experience in order for learning to take
place. A necessary condition for meaningful learning experiences is
that the child be free to experience, discover, and develop knowledge
as he experiments with his environment (Hourick, 1971).

The conditions for learning are previously arranged in the school
environment and it goes from the most simple concepts to the more
abstract generalizations (Strain, 1971).

Because the interaction of the child with his environment is what
determines learning, the Experimentalist emphasizes that meaningful
experiences be diverse and qualitatively rich in meaning for the child.
Learning takes place when the child poses a problem or difficulty. The
problem has to be related significantly to the meanings of the child.
Through interaction with the environment, the child derives some conse-
quences. It is the recognition of consequences by the child from his
experiences that determines learning. This view is expressed by Strain
(1971, p. 68) who states that for Experimentalists: "Children should
learn where to get information when it is needed and how to solve

problems, rather than be encouraged to memorize facts and obey outdated rules." Dobson and Dobson (1979) consider the learning conditions within the Experimentalist paradigm:

1. Expectations of learners should be based upon knowledge of their abilities which are determined by physiological and social development.

2. Learning that takes place in lifelike or functional situations will enhance retention, transfer and useability.

3. Experiencing too much frustation causes children's behavior to be less integrated, purposeful and rational.

4. When the learner sees results, has knowledge of his/her status and progress and/or achieves insight, understanding and personal meaning, then the learning process proceeds in the best manner.

5. The educative process begins with the learner identifying his/her concerns and interests.

6. Self-confidence is related to one's capacity for learning and for making important choices affecting one's learning (p. 14).

It highlights, then, the Experimentalists emphasis upon concrete experiences operating within a social environment as a necessary condition for learning to take place.

Experimentalism and the Nature of Knowledge

What seems to characterize most the nature of knowledge for the Experimentalist is its quality of change. Since knowledge grows out of the experiences of the individual, and experience is changing, evolving, then knowledge is in a permanent state of flow for the Experimentalist philosopher.

> Experimentalism recognizes that any empirical account of existence must accept change as real . . . it contends that it is not tradition and precedent, but the movement of experience responding to changing conditions and expanding bodies of knowledge which should contribute the ultimate criteria of both truth and value . . . (Childs, 1970, p. 111).

Child (1970, p. 111) goes on to emphasize that ". . . means of knowledge and control are supreme human interests."

When knowledge is relevant to Man through the empirical test of experience, it has the potential for becoming truth. Within this line of thought, Lawler (1980) expresses:

> Reflection clarifies and makes sense of conflicting natural impulses. As a result, it is the guide to the most complete and, hence, most fully natural satisfaction. Indeed, the human good is nothing more than the intelligent satisfaction of desire. The purpose of an idea is to enable an organism in a certain culture at a certain historical time, to solve problems . . . the rational conclusion is that 'an idea is true not if it tends to agree with anything, but if it enables you to achieve something: a purpose, an end, or a goal' (p. 333).

The potential usefulness of experience is emphasized by Childs (1970, p. 111): "The discovery of the 'operational' nature of ideas, conceptions, and, theories has contributed a logical tool which both the common man and the research specialist can and do employ to great advantage."

Dewey himself (1958, p. 137) refuses theories which are not based on empirical validation; "For any theory and set of practices is dogmatic which is not based upon critical examination of its own underlying principles."

Experience for Dewey (1958) must have an element of delight and pleasure for the learner,

> It is his business [the educator's] to arrange for the kind of experiences which while they do not repel the student, but rather engage his activities which are, nevertheless, more than immediately enjoyable since they promote having desirable future experiences (p. 138).

Experimentalism and the Nature of Society

Society and individuals are a single entity within the framework of

Experimentalist thought. Man is essentially a social being and he finds

his personal achievements through his interactions with the wide

society.

Childs (1970) stresses that:

The experimentalist was one of the first to grasp the intimate
connection between democracy and intellectual freedom . . . .
Hence it is only in a society which consciously aims at the
good of all, and in which all share in making the common pat-
terns of life, that intelligence can be liberated. This is
equivalent to saying that a democratic society is an essential
condition for the richest cultivation of the life of reason
(p. 111).

The preceding and following statements by Childs highlight the ideal

of democracy for a well-functioning society. The ideal of democracy is

so important to the Experimentalist tradition that ". . . the task

cannot be achieved by those who retreat from democracy and science, or

by those who shrink from the deeper implications of these modern

movements" (Childs, 1970, p. 113). The role of the school as a social-

izing agency is stressed by Dewey (1958):

As a society becomes more enlightened, it realizes that is is
responsible not to transmit and conserve the whole of its
existing achievements, but only such as make for a better
future society. The school is its chief agency for the accom-
plishments of this end (p. 97).

One experimentalist conception is that man strives for
survival and goes beyond that minimal aspiration to enjoy the
process of experiencing and testing his world. At this very
point lies the Experimentalist assumption that Man strive pur-
posively for power. This very process reconciliates man and
society in a unifying entity (Lawler, 1980; p. 329).

In identifying the social mileu as capable of giving direction to

the individual's life, Dewey (1958) stresses:

The very existence of the social medium in which an individual
lives, moves, and has his being in the standing effective
agency of directing his activity. . . . There is not, in fact,
any such thing as the direct influence of one human being on
another apart from the use of the physical environment as an
intermediary (p. 99).

Experimentalism and the Aims of Education

The purposes of the school for the Experimentalists are essentially utilitarian. Education is seen as the activation of the possibilities for Man's fulfillment of his potentialities through empirical confrontation of his ideas.

Dewey (1958) gives us an account of what schools are for:

> In what are called the new schools, the primary source of social control resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility . . . .
>
> The only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence. . . . Everything depends, so far as education is concerned, upon what is done with this added liberty . . . without its existence it is practically impossible for a teacher to gain knowledge of the individuals with whom he is concerned.
>
> For I am so confident of the potentialities of education when it is treated as intelligently directed development of the possibilities inherent in ordinary experience . . . [that] the only ground for anticipating failure in taking this path resides to my mind in the danger that experience and the experimental method will not be adequately conceived . . . (p. 142).

The purpose of elementary schools, identified early in history, could also be applied to further levels of education. Such tasks are:

1. Acquisition of certain cognitive skills through subjects such as English, mathematics, and science.

2. Acquisition of social skills and appropriate behavioral patterns.

3. Acquisitions of personal human relations skills in order to deal with basic human interactions.

4. Acquisition of necessary vocational skills.

5. Acquisition of a value system which is acceptable to the larger society.

It can be inferred then that the basic purpose of the school is to elicit, through an array of organized experiences, an environment that leads the individual to the conquest of life skills, drawn mainly from experienced subject matter, that will contribute to the enhancement of his life.

Experimentalism and the Nature of Curriculum

The curriculum of the Experimentalist school focuses on a special arrangement of circumstances that, according to Dewey (1958), tends:

> . . . to balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born, and to come into living contact with a broader environment.

> [To control] . . . them and . . . the influences by which they are controlled . . . a child may have to be snatched with roughness away from a fire so that he shall not be burned . . . the very existence of the social medium lives, moves, and has his being in the standing effective agency of directing his activity.

> . . . to acquire habits, or develop definite dispositions . . . a habit is formed of executive skill, of efficiency in doing. A habit means an ability to use natural conditions as means to ends.

> [To provide for an environment that considers] . . . that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end . . . the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming.

> . . . to insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure growth. The inclination to learn from life itself and to make the conditions of life such that all will learn in the process of living as the finest product of schooling.

> . . . reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience . . . the increment of meaning corresponds to the increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities in which we are engaged . . . .

. . . get ready or prepare in advance so as to secure bene-
ficial consequences and avert undesirable ones . . . .

[Extend] in space . . . the number of individuals who parti-
cipate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action
to that of others, and to consider the action of others to
give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the
breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national
territory which kept men from perceiving the full impact of
their activity . . . .

[Develop] . . . interest, concern mean that self and world are
engaged with each other in a developing situation . . . .

[Experience] . . . the necessity of an actual empirical situ-
ation as the initiating phase of thought.

. . . to furnish the environment which stimulates responses
and directs the learner's course . . . all that the education
can do is modify stimuli so that responses will as surely as
is possible result in the formation of desirable intellectual

and emotional dispositions. Obviously, studies of the subject
matter of the curriculum have intimately to do with this busi-
ness of supplying an environment.

[Translate] into concrete and detailed terms the meanings of
current social life which it is desirable to transmit . . . a
knowledge of the ideas which have been achieved in the past as
the outcome of activity . . . to provide the stimuli needed to
direct them [the students] so that they will amount to some-
thing . . . the teacher already knows the things which the
student is only learning.

. . . mark off three typical stages in the growth of subject
matter in the experience of the learner. In its first state,
knowledge exists as the content of intelligent ability--power
to do. This kind of subject matter, or known material, is
expressed in familiarity or acquaintance with things. Then
this material gradually is surcharged and deepened through
communicated knowledge or information. Finally, it is
enlarged and worked over into rationally or logically orga-
nized material . . . (p. 97-98).

The view of the Experimental curriculum as a set of organized cir-

cumstances forged to develop skills and knowledge the individual can

apply to daily events of life is posed by Dobson and Dobson (1970).

They identify characteristics of the curriculum of the Experimentalist

school in the following terms:

1. Top priority is placed on skills and knowledge necessary for all people to meet the basic demands of life.

2. Content earns its place in the curriculum by its contribution to the achievement of educational objectives.

3. The curriculum sequence in certain subject matter areas is based on a spiral structure which permits the learner to conceptualize by moving from limited perceptivity to universal perceptivity.

4. The scope of the curriculum is broad enough to include a wide variety of unifying and pupil-specialty learning experiences.

5. Though the curriculum has some degree of systematic structure, it is flexible enough to capitalize on emergent learning situations.

6. Provisions are made for the interdisciplinary nature of education.

7. In order to maintain balance in the curriculum, subject matter priorities are determined on the basis of societal and personal needs.

8. There is a system of articulation among units within a school, among schools, within school systems, and among states (Dobson and Dobson, 1970, pp. 16-17).

In summary, the curriculum within the Experimental school stresses development of students so they can do things within a controlled environment. The arrangement of environmental circumstances leads to pre-planned experiences, which will help the individual to experience life in an enhancing matter.

Experimentalism and Instructional Behavior

From the postulates of the Experimentalist approach to learning, according to Dobson and Dobson (1979), flows the instructional behavior associated with this particular school of thought:

1. The teacher functions as a resource person to individuals and groups rather than as a taskmaster.

2. Subgrouping for instructional purposes is recommended.

3. Learning activities are appropriately phased. The teacher decides when it is time to summarize or to pull loose ends together before moving on to another aspect of that which is to be learned.

4. The study period is well-organized with children knowing what is expected of them.

5. Educational listening, viewing, and reading opportunities present themselves in a vast array of radio and television programs, films, film strips, pictures, books, and magazines.

6. Learning activities are provided on the basis of individual needs.

7. Children are assisted in progressing through the curricuculum sequence at their own rate of development (p. 16).

It follows then that the instructional behavior of the teacher is that of leading students through predetermined paths with a maximum of gain in the experiential enlightening of the individual in his process of reconstructing experience.

Experimentalism and the Nature of Evaluation

The key emphasis of the Experimentalist teacher is upon experience. Experience is the interaction of the individual student with his environment. Since experience is personal to each individual student, evaluation procedures do not encourage the measurement of students against group standards. Dobson and Dobson (1979) describe evaluation from the Experimentalist tradition in the following manner:

> . . . evaluation programs have three dimensions: (1) quantitive measurements, (2) the teacher's judgments, and (3) the child's feeling. The third dimension considers children's attitudes and feeling toward themselves and their academic work . . . . In reporting and evaluating the teacher describes what the child is doing. Such basic, analytic description is more meaningful than any grade symbol. Since the school's goal is to develop the total child, evaluation reflects that effort. The ability to recall facts is valuable, but only as it provides a point of reference from which higher levels of cognition may proceed (p.   ).

This view of the full range of experiences of the whole child as the focus of evaluation within Experimentalism seems to be supported by Clark and Beatty (1967) who express:

> The world known to each person is unique since he is the only one who has evaluated experience in just his way. Much of what happens to one person is much like what happens to other people, but each person uniquely develops the meaning of what happens, because each is his own evaluator. The world of each self is, then, rather like the world of other selves who have had similar experiences. The similarities and differences depend on how the individual evaluaties the experiences, not alone on the experiences . . . . Through observing more of the total content of a child's actions, a teacher can evaluate the meaning of these actions more accurately and then make a more appropriate response. It is the teacher's response to the child which determines what the teacher helps the child learn. A child learns the relationship between his act and the consequences which follow. By being able to change these consequences, through responding differently, the teacher has the power to influence learning (pp. 52, 60).

In summary, for the Experimentalist oriented teacher the object of evaluation is the multitude of experiences the child brings to the learning situation at a given moment. Although evaluation posses a quantitative dimension it is mainly concerned with the experiences that comprise the cognitive-field of the student by the moment evaluation is taken place. Consideration of cognitive fields and cognitive structures demand evaluation of the whole child, not fragments of him.

<p align="center">Essentialism and the Nature of Man</p>

For Essentialist philosophy, Man is a predetermined organism rendered to the knowledge of truth for his adequate realization as a full human being. It postulates the self-reliant individual who through the culture of his mind and self is able to contribute to the maintenance of society. He is supposed to be free in the exercise of his search for the means that contribute to the perpetuation of the culture.

Man's task is the accomplishment of his mission to preserve the cultural traditions that have evolved during the centuries. He has the duty to cultivate his mind; that is what gives Man the sense of purpose that other living species do not possess.

Essentialism and the Nature of Learning

Within an Essentialism frame of philosophical thought, learning is a process by means of which the individual exercises his mind, imposing discipline. The more trained the mind, the more successful the role of the individual in the perpetuation of society, and the construction of a free self. In this respect, Howick (1971) asserts that for Essentialists:

> The pupil is important in the learning process, subordinated only by his lack of knowing and living. He is to be intelligently submissive, meanwhile searching for knowledge and understanding in order to qualify for his rightful place in society. Success in life requires him to overcome his own lack of interest, and to develop virtues of self-control, self-dependency, and self-discipline. He must understand the value of proper authority and adult direction in achieving goals (p. 51).

Basically, the purpose of learning for the Essentialist philosopher and teacher is the training of the faculties of the mind to its maximum potential.

Essentialism and the Nature of Knowledge

For Essentialists, knowledge is a given absolute, a fixed reality, a product of the efforts of the culture at given points in history. For the good of the individual, knowledge must be grasped according to their capacities. Knowledge is the legacy of centuries of Man's effort and deserves to be respected and sometimes worshipped by Men. According

to Strain (1971):

> Social habits condition formally all progress of rational
> development. If supported by the institutions of state and
> church, such habits gain strength and are more easily
> preserved.

> The school is an institution that is created to teach the
> social habits and customs that preserve the gains of civiliza-
> tion. Written laws and records are also rational achievements
> that must be preserved. Writing is the great preserver of
> truth and accomplishment, hence, the written word must be
> accorded a certain sanctity . . . . The school must teach the
> mastery of grammar, reading, figuring, spelling, and written
> translations from foreign languages. The basic tool is the
> written textbooks (p. 127).

In sum, knowledge is basically universal. The training of the mind

to grasp it reflects the Darwinian "survival of the fittest" and the

classification between elites and followers.

Essentialism and the Nature of Society

Howick (1971) expresses that:

The relationship of the essentialist school to society has
never been well-developed by the proponents of this position.
Clearly, the essentialists are democratic in practice and
attitude both in the classroom and in the community at large.
However, the task of the American school here would seem to be
that of conserving and reinforcing those personal and social
virtues which time has proven to be essential for the contin-
uance of an organized society. Further search and evaluation
will reveal added essentials which the schools in turn should
teach to the young and thus make for social progress. The
improvement of society must necessarily be gradual, never
brought about by massive government welfare programs which
only suppress human virtues such as self-dependence and self-
sufficiency, and result in a loss of selfhood and
individualism (p. 52).

Zais (1976, p. 139) states within the Realist tradition the follow-

ing, which perhaps it could be applied to the Essentialist movement:

"The good life . . . can be achieved only by discovering the laws of

nature and utilizing this knowledge in the decision-making process; in

short, by conforming to the natural order."

It can be summarized, then, that for the Essentialist philosopher and teacher, society is superordinate to man, since society is made upon the accumulated cultural knowledge available to every individual Man. Man's relationship with society is determined according to how well he is capable of preserving the tradition of all Men involved through history in the making of culture.

Essentialism and the Aim of Education

Within a philosophical Essentialistic framework, education is equated with the transmission of the "essentials" of the culture to be apprehended by everybody, according to their capabilities. The most important aim of education is to transmit the cultural legacies that have accumulated through centuries of Man's scientific pursuits. Education should be concerned with providing students with the knowledge, scientific knowledge, necessary for the optimal functioning of the individual in society. The uttermost consideration for Essentialist education is its concern for the maintenance and survival of society. Preservation of society as a legacy of the wise Men, that have contributed to its existence, is the most important of an Essentialist's aim of education. Although Essentialism is concerned with the development of the self of the individual, it is because a fully functioning self is a prerequisite for the individual's functioning in society.

Essentialist educator reacts heavily toward tender-minded approaches to the education of the indiviudal. They equate education with rigorous training of the intellectual capacities of the individual, through subject matter that reflects the scientific discoveries of all times.

Essentialism and the Nature of Curriculum

The curriculum of the school guided by Essentialist philosophy would be devoted to the presentation of the knowledge that school authorities consider should be mastered by all students according to their talents.

This view is expressed by Howick (1971) who asserts that:

> The curriculum of essentialism would include the time tested subjects which have already proven their value to the democratic community. Contrary to some interpreters the student would study his environment, the laws of nature, and science as contributors to personal happiness and noble living. Less important areas, not regarded as 'essential' should be added only when there is assurance that the established subjects will not be affected adversely (p. 52).

As has been asserted before, Essentialism is greatly influenced by an Idealist philosophy. This influence is still dominant and Zais (1976) sees some present trends in schools which are the legacy of the Idealist philosophy. He identifies such influences as:

> . . . the disposition of most contemporary American communities to view the subjects of the curriculum in terms of hierarchy, with the 'idea' subjects (like history and English) considered much more important than the 'practical' subjects (like bookkeeping and auto mechanics). Indeed, the 'college prep' idea subjects generally continue to be regarded as important for the elite class of leaders who will go on to college, while the 'practical' or 'vocational' subjects are deemed 'good enough' for working-class youth . . . .

> The curriculum must be administered in such a way that students 'respond' to one another and the teacher is on communitarian terms. A school, then, is not just a library, classroom, or books; it is an espirit that binds students and teacher together as a 'community of scholars . . ., only a specially endowed class of people is capable of communion with the supernatural realm. It is this select group, equipped by training to acquire knowledge, . . . that is charged with making the decisions for all' (p. 134).

There is also a Realist philosophical element in Essentialism. This includes school practices that are prevalent today. Zais (1976) identifies them:

> When students study science, they acquire certain knowledge of
> what is, knowledge that has been incontroversely established
> as true. . . . Thus, such subjects as arithmetic, algebra,
> trigonometry, and calculus are highly regarded . . . as the
> basic tool subjects, and often constitute prerequisites for
> the study of the physical sciences. . . . Only those indi-
> viduals endowed by nature with superior intelligence who are
> highly trained in the sciences and the techniques of scien-
> tific discovery are suited to making the right decisions for
> society (p. 140).

Zais (1976) goes on to say that the focus on skills and predeter-
mined subject matter and subjects necessarily for the adequate function-
ing of the individual in society is a legacy of the Realist tradition.

It has been shown that Essentialism takes from Idealism and Realism
those elements that justify the existence of "essentials" of knowledge
to be mastered by everyone, according to his individual capacities.

Essentialism and Instructional Behavior

All education within an Essentialist philosophical framework is
directed and centered on the authority of the teacher, who as a know-
ledgeable adult knows better what is good for children. This is also
positioned by Howick (1971, p. 51) who asserts that for the Essentialist
philosophy: "The proven essentials of a proper education for youth in a
changing society include a knowledge of great leaders and events which
have made a difference in the course of history." Given the eclectic
character of education based on Essentialist premises, the instructional
behaviors of the teacher for Howick (1971),

> . . . fall in an area midway between the rigid procedure of
> assignment, memorization, and recitation of old-fashioned
> traditionalism and the directionless freedom of modern pro-
> gressivism. The teacher, mainly by lecture and guided
> discussion, sees that pupil add to his store of true knowledge,
> and the pupil's task is to apply himself as diligently as he
> will to this understanding . . . Assigning specific areas
> for study is very often necessary and some learning may be

obtained only by purposeful memorization. But superior to ordinary rote-learning is a profound understanding of the ideas involved, a kind of 'conceptualization' (p. 52).

It follows, then, that for the teacher interested in Essentialistic school practices, the methods of teaching will vary according to the subjects involved. Concrete subjects probably will require a more rote-memory learning, and for those more abstract, it would be necessary to use more experienced-based methods.

<center>Essentialism and the Nature of Evaluation</center>

Knowledge has the character of fixed truth and is to be transmitted to all students alike. The purpose of evalution is to verify that the required knowledge has been acquired equally and efficiently by all students and the procedures of retrieval of such knowledge revolved around strict assignments, and use of memorization. Part of the evaluation job of the teacher according to Howick (1971, p. 51) is: "Keeping good records [is] part of his professional task. He seeks to motivate his students to learn by his own example and to control them by the intelligent use of rewards and penalties."

Usually specific behavioral objectives are identified, specified treatments are applied, and behavioral outcomes are measured and scaled in an objective manner. Value neutrality is encouraged as far as the assessment procedure is concerned. Clearly the approach is of a technological nature.

Brubacher (1939) expresses when talking about the Essentialist philosophical tradition:

> . . . the investigator contents himself only with what he sees in the way of overt behavior. The idea that the psyche of the child has a supernature, a soul, finds no place in his account. Pretty much the same comment is in order for the

neurological and physiological approaches to educational
psychology. There is often a materialism and mechanism
inherent here which is thoroughly naturalistic (p. 334).

It can be inferred then, that the overriding goal of Essential

evaluation is the retrieval, in an accurate and complete form, of the

essentials of the culture transmitted by competent adult teachers

through formal instruction. Evaluation corresponds to the objectives

the teacher has set for the lesson or course and can be assessed through

observation of students' behaviors. Behavioral objectives set the

expectations in terms of learning necessary for the students.

CHAPTER IV

REVIEW OF THREE MAJOR SCHOOLS

OF PSYCHOLOGY IN EDUCATION

Behaviorism

Behaviorism is a psychological movement, an outgrowth of the Twentieth Century, in response to the mentalist theories prevalent until that epoch. It is based on ". . . earlier scientific realism or contemporary logical empiricism . . ." (Bigge and Hunt, 1980, p. 280). The relationship of behaviorism to the aforementioned philosophical trends is thoroughly explained by Morris and Hunt and the following discussion is based on their ideas.

Scientific realism postulates a reality accessible to men's knowledge through sensory experience. Reality exists "out there," independently of individuals' perception of that reality. The physical world of reality obeys physical unalterable laws, mechanical in nature. It opposes all relation to mental operations or events out of the controllable world of experience.

Physics is the field of inquiry that best depicts the relationships among events pertaining to the physical world: cause and effect paradigms that explains relationships in the world of nature. This is the reason why scientific realism places physics, chemistry, and mathematics at the top of the list of knowledge that is verifiable and quantifiable and, on the overall susceptible to scientific inquiry. *Logical*

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Empiricism, on the other hand, also thinks in terms of cause and effect relationships. It considers human beings as mechanical operating entities, capable of learning in a way that is basically understood as a process of recording experiences and events in the memory storage. The environment is thus responsible for all of human learning. All learning comes from the environment in a passive deterministic way, in which the individual is more a reactor than an agent.

The main representatives of the movement are John B. Watson (1878-1958) and Edward Thorndike (1874-1944). But there exists differences between them, though they both remain within the parameters of broadest behaviorist definitions.

Thorndike's theory was designed as connectionism because he assumed the existence of events pertaining both to the physical and mental realms. Because he saw human behavior as an expression of connections existing between physical and mental dimensions, he designated his psychology of learning under the name of associationism, or S-R bond between a stimulus and a response connection. It involved the linking of a response with a given stimulus. Such process occurs through what Thorndike terms as a trial and error process, which implies, first selecting and then connecting. Zais (1976) states that for Thorndike "trial and error" learning

> . . . begins when a motive of some sort - e.g., a need,
> problem, goal, or discomfort - disturbs the equilibrium of the
> organism. The organism then makes a variety of responses to
> the new situation in hopes of meeting its need, solving its
> problem, reaching its goal, etc. Unsuccessful, superfluous and
> other wrong forms of activity are abandoned progressively
> until finally, the response or responses by which the goal is
> achieved gradually is integrated and established . . . . The
> association between the established response and the
> motivating stimulus (i.e., the S-R bond) is what Thorndike
> conventionally refers to an connection (p. 261).

For Thorndike, trial and error learning leads to what Zais (1976, p. 262) designates as "selecting and connecting" in the nervous system and had nothing to do with the animals insight or to "get the idea".

Thorndike refused to recognize purpose in human behavior and rather believed that all human behavior is an expression of successfully established connections that generate from the trial and error process. Thorndike's associationism is better expressed through his well-known Laws of Learning: (1) The Law of Readiness, (2) Law of Exercise or Repetition, and (3) The Law of Effect.

1. The Law of Readiness expresses that an organism ready to elicit a given response is satisfyed when it can do so; whereas, the opposite leads to an annoying behavior.

2. The Law of Exercise expresses that exercise leads to the strengthening of behaviors and lack of exercise to their extinction.

3. The Law of Effect expresses that a response is strengthened only if the situation that happens as a result of the organism's response is pleasurable. An annoying situation would lead to the weakening or further extinction of the given response.

In commenting about Thorndikes' laws, Bigge and Hunt (1980) state that they:

> . . . are closely related and may operate together . . .
> the laws appear to be exceedingly mechanical. Furthermore,
> they seem to leave no room for any sort of thought, or
> insight, and they do not appear to require the assumption of
> any kind of purposiveness of man or lower animals (p. 274).

A later modification upon th law of effect emphasized the belief that rewards, or satisfying situations as opposed to punishment or those

of an annoying type, strengthen the possibility of occurrence of a desired response.

John Watson, another leading Behaviorist conducted research that emphasized more strongly than Thorndike, the neglect for all mind-body dualism; he thought that psychology, if it was going to ever have a respectable status, would have to be based on physics and chemistry (Bigge and Hunt, 1980).

The emphasis of Watson's work was more than his predecessor only in those aspects of behavior that are amenable to observation and rigorous measurement.

The behaviorists' marked emphases upon observable, overt behavior, neglect of mind-body dualism and reduction of all bodily states to mechanist connections, that make of the human body a machine-like organism, is better expressed by Bigge and Hunt (1980). They assert that:

> Behaviorists have defined a live organism as a self-maintaining mechanism. They have assumed that the essence of a human machine is a system of receptors (sense organs), conductors (neurons) switching organs (brains and spinal cord), and effectors (muscles) attached to levers (bones)--plus, of course, fueling and controlling organs such as the stomach and glands. When an organism is defined in such mechanistic terms, mentalistic concepts can be entirely eliminated (p. 275).

The emphasis of the earlier behaviorists have been carried even further by a group of psychologists that are known today under the denomination of neobehaviorists. Although the basis tenets of behaviorism postulated by Thorndike and Watson, are retained, some variations can be identified. Those leading neobehaviorists of significant impact are Robert Glasser, Robert M. Gagne, and Burrhus F. Skinner, among others.

The characteristics that better define the neobehaviorist movement,

mostly based on S-R conditioning are pointed out by Bigge and Hunt

(1980) as follows:

> Contemporary S-R conditioning theorists continue to assume
> that life can be explained in essentially mechanistic terms,
> but they do not place nearly as much emphasis upon the opera-
> tion of the brain and nervous system as did their
> predecessors.
>
> Neobehaviorists differ from the original behaviorist in
> . . . their experimentation, they have tended to focus atten-
> tion more upon response modification than stimulus substitu-
> tion . . . . Another interesting feature of neobehaviorism is
> its attempt to explain behavior that appears to be purposive.
> The apparent purposiveness of organisms has always bothered
> psychologists who are behavioristically oriented. Because
> they have felt that is it difficult to recognize purposiveness
> without slipping into a mind-body dualism and its accompanying
> mysticism . . . neobehaviorists have tended to develop mechan-
> ical explanations for apparent purposiveness. So apparent
> purposiveness either is regarded as a product of a pattern of
> stimulation in which certain stimuli are more potent than the
> rest and thus lead an organism in one way rather than another,
> or it is interpreted as 'drive reduction' . . . . Thus neo-
> behaviorists continue to be careful to explain apparent pur-
> posiveness in a way that does not require the assumption of
> conscious behavior or intelligent experience (pp. 275-276).

Among the leading neobehaviorists, the one that has had the major

impact is B. F. Skinner, who is best recognized for his emphasis on

operant conditioning over respondent conditioning. Respondent condi-

tioning refers to behaviors triggered by an identified stimuli. Operant

conditioning is explained by virtue of the term "operant":

> . . . 'refers to behavior that operates' in the environment to
> produce certain effects. Operants are said to be emitted by
> the organism because they are not called forth or associated
> with any particular stimuli . . . (Zais, 1976, p. 269).

Operant learning singles out the specific operant of behavior (as

opposed to a stimulus) and then establishes the different rates of

response for that operant. A high increase in the rate of response is

equated with further strengthening of the desired behavior, because now

there exists more chances that the response will be emitted again,

successfully. Reinforcement is the key concept for the strengthening of a response, and has nothing to do with the presentation of a stimulus, because posterior reinforcement is what will determine the desired repetition of the behavior in posterior occasions. Reinforcers are of two types for Skinner: Positive reinforcement and negative reinforcement.

"A positive reinforcer is a stimulus whose presence strengthens a behavior" (Bigge and Hunt, p. 290). A negative reinforcer is defined as the act of withdrawing of a stimulus, which makes possible the operant response. Negative reinforcement should not be confused with punishment which ". . . involves either the presentation of a negative reinforcer or the removal of a positive one" (Zais, 1976, p. 271). Skinner, himself is not an advocate of punishment as a method for the weakening of undesirable behavior; rather he considers punishment as inadequate for this purpose. Possibly the neglect of punishment for Skinner is due to the temporality of the effects of punishment and the not already determined side effects they possess for the individual subjected to punishment.

Operant conditioning for Skinner is the basis of all learning, and in fact he thinks of teaching as ". . . the arrangement of contingencies of reinforcement which expedite learning" (Bigge and Hunt, p. 333).

For Skinner, the best way to accomplish the stamping of operant conditioners is through Programmed Instruction which utilizes a program as the paradigm of operant conditioning. When Programmed Instruction is used as a teaching device three procedures are basic according to Zais (1976),

1. identification (in behavioral terms, of course) of the operants to be conditioned,

2. meticulous sequencing of curriculum elements from simple
   to complex in order to facilitate shaping, and

3. the identification of reinforcers required to strengthen
   and maintain the desired operants (p. 276).

Much of the teaching that goes on today is based, one way or the
other, on some of the principles of Skinner's system and the forecast
for the future is that his influence will continue because of his strong
emphasis upon the construction of a technology-based engineering of
learning.

It would be useful, at this point, to remember that neither
Skinner's system nor Thorndike's and Watson's theories comprise all of
Behaviorism nor do their principles account for an overall definition of
behaviorism.

For an all-encompassing account of the major benchmarks of Behav-
iorist Theory, the following description of Behaviorist tenets by Leahy
(1980) gives an accurate view for singling out the implications of the
movement for education:

> The simplest assumption of behaviorism is physical monism, the
> denial of all forms of mind-body dualism. Behaviorists are
> materialists, denying the existence of a Cartesian mental
> substance . . . . Observable conditions are related to observ-
> able behavior, and no reference to mind is made. Psychology
> is the science of behavior, not mind . . . behavior is largely
> learned, a problem of an organism's environment rather than
> that of its genetic make-up . . . ., what is learned is some
> association between a behavior and a stimulus situation that
> comes to control it, including reward and punishment as
> aspects of the environment . . . the best strategy for psy-
> chology to adopt is some form of atomism. That is, any
> behavior may be viewed as a set of simple responses under the
> control of specifiable stimuli. Simple responses may be com-
> pounded into extrememly complex configurations, but ultimately
> complex behavior may be analyzed down to its component parts,
> . . . . Behaviorists also assume a stong continuity in the
> way in which behavior is learned and maintained in all animal
> species . . . they assume phylogenetic continuity . . . . One
> should study simple responses in simple organisms in order to
> understand the basic processes of learning and behavior con-
> trol. Principles established at this level may then be

extended indefinitely to more complex behavior into more complex organisms, including humans . . . , behaviorism adheres to the description of science proposed by positivism. Behaviorists study observable behavior and the observable environmental events associated with behavior. They minimize or eliminate reference to the unobservable, and when unobservable entities must be introduced, they are defined by reference to observable behavior or environmental events (pp. 321-324).

Accounting for all the aforementioned, behaviorists postulates it is now understandable why their interest in accuracy, precision, control of events, absence of subjective judgment, uncertainty, and reference to non-empirical situations prevails.

Behaviorism is within these parameters equated with the creation of an Empirical Science for the control of behavior within the classroom and beyond, to the wide society. Such is the situation that Skinner postulates in his Walden II: no more than a new Utopia, where the behavior of all individuals is shaped by technology to accomplish the overall well-being of society. In a similar way Becker (1967) one of Skinner's detractors, also depicts Walden II:

A vision of the future in which man is controlled by science, made happy by Technique, rendered well-adjusted by the manipulation of others. Emerson's vision? Only the hubris of science could take Thoreau's Walden and dare to appropriate a word with such noble connotations, for such a vile vision. The moral implications of a science of behavior for the manipulation of human beings is a rather questionable strategy, but it seems to be that for the engineers of behavior of the future, education should be devoided of all moral connotation, in order to bring human behavior under the full, unquestionable control of Technology (pp. 223-224).

Cognitive-Field Psychology

Cognitive-Field Psychology is one of the branches of the classical Gestalt Theory. It is based on Positive Relativist philosophy, which does not consider another particular reality different to the

psychological reality of each individual, which is constructed especially by each person according to the experiences that grow from the interchange with his particular environmental reality. As Bigge and Hunt (1980, p. 283) assert: "For a positivist relativistic, reality is psychological and thereby different from any objective existence; it is what people gain through their five-plus senses."

Other marks of the relativist position are its contention that all things acquire meaning within their particular contexts and in relationship with other significant elements; hence, the relativist stance of relativism of all truth. What exists for them is the knowledge generated by men and that is subject to temporality, since it can always be substituted for more meaningful knowledge. At this point lies one of the major relativist premises: their belief in the necessity of change. Because situations change, no truth is permanent, although they accept the temporal character of some events, which they consider as temporal certainties, but in the sense of something to which is professed a deep belief or commitment. There does not exist any reference to truth as pertaining to the divine realms. Temporal knowledge is validated within the relativist tradition through the scientific method, but in a different sense; for example, to that used by behaviorist scientific pursuits for relativists means using scientific knowledge that has any relationship to each individual's structures of meaning (Bigge and Hunt, 1980).

Classical Gestalt theory appeared originally in Germany with the psychologists Wertheimer (1880-1943), Kohler (1887-1967), Koffka (1886-1940) and Lewin (1890-1947). Some late representatives of the movement belong to the American version of Gestalt and they are, among others: Bayles, Snygg, and Bruner. They modified in a certain way the

original ideas of the founders and departed from Wertheimer who believed that man was a purposive, active being, and followed Lewin's thesis that man besides being active was mainly an interactive being in constant, purposeful interaction with his whole environment: both physical and psychological.

"Gestalt" is a German word the founders of the movement used to convey an idea of "pattern" or "configuration." The idea of learning conveyed by the movement was that learning occurs in wholes, insomuch as reality is perceived in that way. Of course, wholes or structural realities have parts, but in whatever event the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. First, the whole is perceived, then its constituent parts are analyzed. In fact this idea was orignally conceived by Wertheimer who also created *the laws of learning* central to Gestalt theory and, thus, explaining how perception occurs. These laws originally were designated as Pragnanz (regularity and simplicity) and are expressed through: (1) Similarity, (2) Proximity, (3) Closure, and (4) Good Continuation.

Pragnanz means pregnancy and connotes the idea of regularity and simplicity and refers to the tendency of the individuals to impose structure upon their fields of perception.

1. The <u>Law</u> of <u>Similarity</u> conveys the idea that within a Gestaltic perception all elements contributing to the existence of that global perception look similar leading to a noncontradictory perception of reality.

2. The <u>Law</u> of <u>Proximity</u> expresses the idea that Gestaltist representations possess elements that are closer together, both in space and in time.

3. The <u>Law</u> <u>of</u> <u>Closure</u> conveys the Gestalt idea that close areas or situations contribute more easily to the formation of perceptual wholes of Gestalts.

4. The <u>Law</u> <u>of</u> <u>Good</u> <u>Continuation</u> expresses the idea of incomplete Getalts helping to build patterns that resemble the first incomplete Gestalt.

What the Gestalt's laws seem to imply is that the perception of a structural, Gestaltic reality is explained through patterns that are closer together. These similar patterns possess an idea of closed spaces and are perceived as continuation of non-closed spaces.

One important concept within the field of Gestalt cognitive-psychology is that of insight. It explains the nature of learning within a Gestaltist framework, and it refers to ". . . a process of restructuring integrated wholes . . ." (Zais, 1976, p. 281). The process of generating INSIGHTS is constant, and perceptions are modified when new elements enter the perceptual field of the individual. According to Morris and Hunt (1980):

> INSIGHTS occur when an individual, in pursuing his (or her) purposes, sees new ways of utilizing elements of his environment, including his own bodily structure. The noun LEARNING denotes the new insights or meanings that are acquired . . . (p. 292).

When trying to discover the course that insights take within individuals in order to predict their behavior, they use the term behavior in a different sense than Behaviorists do, but their process in contrast is inferential, since behavior is used as a clue to deduce the psychological states of the individual, and it always involves the interaction of the individual with his environment, as opposed to the Behaviorist stance of Man as a passive reactor, subjected to all kinds

of environmental influences. Within cognitive-field psychology the
individual reflects upon his experiences in order to rationalize them.
That which does not penetrate the perceptual field of the individual
cannot be accounted for as true experience, insomuch as it does not
contribute to the individual's restructuring of reality. This is a
result of a new datum which has infringed upon those experiences he had
before.

One of the main contributions made to Gestalt cognitive-field
theory within the American tradition are those of Kurt Lewin. In fact,
Lewin, as was said before, changed the previous Gestalt emphasis of the
individual as an active being for one that considers the individual
basically interactive. The idea of purposeful being is common to both
perspectives of Man.

Those concepts that Lewin introduced to cognitive-field theory and
that caused a major impact upon the Gestalt theory of learning are
(Zais, 1976):

1. The Life Space

2. Learning as change in Cognitive Structure

3. Learning as change in valence and values.

1. The Life Space: It refers to:

> . . . the total field of forces within which the
> individual operates. In addition to certain internal
> forces such as the basic physiological drives for food,
> water, sex, etc., the life space includes the external
> environment with which the individual transacts: the
> people he meets, the objects he manipulates, the
> geographical space in which he maneuvers, and so on . . .
> it is not these elements as objective physical factors
> that constitute the life space. Rather, it is these
> elements as perceived by the individual that define it
> (Zais, 1976, pp. 284-285).

An individual's life space is made out of his purposes, goal, and

barriers that impede the realization of those goals, and the mechanisms that he uses to cope with barriers that block the accomplishment of his goals. When the individual sees the barriers that impede the realization of his goals as a challenge to his ability for coping, he experiences motivation, thus is internally triggered into action to solve the conflicting situation.

According to Zais (1976) Lewin identifies three elements in an individual's life space:

1. goals sought,

2. threats to be avoided, and

3. barriers that restrict movement.

The aforementioned Lewin elements of a life space support the previously mentioned forces impinging upon the individual's life space.

2. Learning as a Change in Cognitive Structure:
reports that for Lewin there are three aspects involved in such change. They are:

1. Differentiation of unstructured areas (p. 287).

2. Restructuration, psychological directions, and meaning p. 288).

3. Time perspective, psychological reality and irreality (p. 288).

Differentiation of structured areas is explained by a process or means of which the individual notice that what before was an undifferentiated whole, now starts to differentiate into its consitutive parts.

Restructuration, *psychological directions, and meaning*, that for Zais (p. 288) ". . . is the equivalent of classical Gestalt insight." Time perspective, psychological reality and irreality is seen according to Zais as occurring when (p. 288) ". . . the behavior of the individual

does not depend entirely on the present situation, but is significantly influenced by his views of his own past and future, and his hopes and wishes with regard to this time perspective."

3. Learning as Change in Valences and Values. Zais (1976, p. 288) expresses that it ". . . refers to learning in what is commonly called the affective domain. Although it is related to cognitive structures, it is essentially concerned with likes and dislikes."

Valence assumes two forms: positive and negative, and within a Cognitive-field perspective it is the valences and not the behaviors that schools should attempt to change. When an event possesses a positive valence for an individual he will tend to make it part of his cognitive structure. When positive valences impinge upon the cognitive structure of an individual, he experiences himself as in need of something that he still does not possess, but that has meaning for him. He will, then, strive to incorporate that event into his personal cognitive structure as when pursuing a goal.

Humanistic Psychology

A Twentieth Century psychology designated by its developers as Humanist or Third Force, is the effort of a group of psychologists who reacted strongly against the two prevailing psychological movements prevalent to that epoch: Psychoanalysis, the psychology of Sigmund Freud and the Behaviorist movement started by John Watson and continued by Thorndike and Skinner, among others.

It was the publication of "Motivation and Personality" by Abraham Maslow in 1954 that started the Movement. He has had many followers, among them: Carl Rogers, Fritz Perl, William Glasser, Charlotte Buhler,

Earl Kelly, and Arthur W. Combs. With another emphasis, Erich Fromm and the Brasilian educational writer Paulo Freire, can be counted as part of the Movement. Some of the earlier pioneers of the Movement are Carl Jung, Alfred Adle,r and Gordon Allport.

Abraham Maslow (1908-1970), the unquestionable foremost influential leader of the Movement, started as a follower of the ideas of Freud and was heavily involved with psychoanalytical practices. Later, and as an answer to both Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism, which emphasized the "evil" in the Nature of Man, Maslow devoted his life to construct a theory of behavior based on the "goodness" and infinite capabilities of Man for the realization of his potential.

In an attempt to demonstrate that Man is naturally good he conducted an early research study among the Northern Blackfoot Indian in Alberta, Canada. The result of this study appeared to confirm his original assumption about the Nature of Man. He found that Man is naturally inclined to peace, to good and that patterns of aggressive behavior are a result of cultural influence. Among these Indians, he reported, cruelty, aggression and physical punishment of children were forbidden. He thought that the influence of earlier psychological movements emphasizing the ill, the insane in Man, besides the influential action of some religions, advocating the idea of sin and guilt has settled the vision for a hopeless vision of humankind. At this point in his work he thought of devising a theory of human motivation, emphasizing neither the evil nor the average, notions held by the Freudians and Behaviorists respectively. He thought that the best indicators of the strengths of human potential could not be found either in the "evil approach," or in the "average approach"; instead he thought it was an imperative to look

at the very best of mankind, in order to realize how much Man is capable of in terms of the development of his potential. He thought that self-actualizing people provide the key for this theory. His main complaint of studies emphasizing the "average" is that they tend to create a person who "adjusts" to society, not one who explores his limits; his criticism extended bitterly to those who experimented with animals attempting to generalize their finding to the occurrences of human behavior. His main objection to this practice was that animals and humans are similar at a very low level; hence, the approach suffered from narrowness. Also, he complained against theories not interested in the causes of behavior, instead in the hopeless vision of Man as being trapped by instincts or as a passive reactor to his environment. From the viewpoint of both Psycho-analytic and Behaviorist theory, he complained, Man would never be able to ask questions about the meaning and joys of life.

Maslow (1972) thought that a blend of Psychoanalysis and Behavior-ism could provide the explanations of Man's behavior, both the intrin-sic and extrinsic aspects that motivate human behavior.

A major criticism toward the Behavioral scientists was their pro-claimed "value-free" approach to the study of human behavior. According to Maslow, a theory that claims to be "value-free" forgets about the moral implications of behavior: the differentiation of right from wrong, sane from insane; also its exclusion of consideration for human feelings such as joy, ecstacy, happiness, love, beauty. Such an approach was evidently incomplete to Maslow, because scientists in their attempt to be objective fraction the human experience into compartments. Maslow believed in a Gestalt approach to learning that maintains the whole being larger than the sums of its constituent parts.

Based on the assumption that the best definition of Mankind is the self-actualized person, one who has found himself and has developed his potential at it's maximum, Maslow began a research study using what he considered self-actualized persons; geniuses, heroes, saints and some of his most remarkable professors and friends.

He found that only a fraction of one percent were included among these top individuals. Also, most of them had reached self-actualization late in life, approximately age sixty.

Some of the characteristics of the self-actualized persons emerged from Maslow's (1962; 1972) work:

1. The self-actualized person is less fearful, neither excessively optimistic not too pessimistic.

2. Self-actualizing people are committed to some kind of fulfilling activity. They enjoy their activity so much that boundaries among work and play are nonexistent for them.

3. Creativity is expressed in these persons by a release of their energy. They do not have a consistent fear of making mistakes as most people do. Maslow believes that creativity is not the privilege of just a few. But it is true that only self-actualized people can stand the hard work that creative expression involves.

4. The self-actualized person possesses a well-integrated personality, where human ideals as beauty, trust and good-ness are harmoniously integrated.

5. The self-actualized person is both selfish and unselfish according to Maslow. His explanation for this is that

when the person seeks his development, his road to self-actualization, he is also benefitting society. The goodness of the individual is the good of society.

6. Self-actualized people have an inner world of themselves. This fact helps the individual to find pride and compensation in his behavior, just the opposite of the externally-oriented individual who needs the continual appraisal and praise of society for reassurrance. They can be both individualistic and sociable at the same time.

7. Self-actualized people have a psychological world that is ruled by freedom. They do not pay high consideration to conventional forms of behavior, since they are self-sufficient enough to set standards of behavior for themselves.

8. Self-actualized people are responsible, they enjoy striving because they want to be held responsible for what they do and care about. This is for Maslow a logical relationship.

9. Self-actualized people, although being accepting of all people, tend to relate to other people who share their motivation toward fulfillment of their potential.

10. The kind of love inspired by self-actualized persons is of a kind of emotional empathic understanding.

11. The self-actualized person can be critical of others, but in an empathic, understanding, positive way.

12. Self-actualizing individuals dare to take risks and compromise, because they are not afraid of the mysterious

implicit in the notion of future.

13. Self-actualized people are calmer when facing a problem

because they can detach themselves from it.

14. Self-actualized people have a great love and respect for

children, but paradoxically they can frustrate their

children because of their high level of expectation.

In the process toward personal growth, human beings must necessarily strive for satisfying some needs inherent to the human condition. Maslow's identified needs common to the whole of mankind are expressed by Bigge and Hunt (1980):

> . . . inborn, genetically determined needs and potentials, and
> that such a group of qualitative traits cannot be quantified
> in the sense of their existing in certain amounts . . .
> however, . . . the effects of society and culture on each
> individual shape these innate qualities, sometimes giving them
> what seemed like quantitative characteristics, such as so much
> need for physiological demands, and so much need for safety.
> However, society and culture cannot qualitatively change
> inborn possibilities (p. 77).

Maslow's hierarchy of needs includes both psychological and physiological needs, and it is termed a hierarchy, because only after a given need is fully satisfied, can the individual strive to fulfill increasingly higher needs in the hierarchy.

At the very basic level, Man has to satisfy needs for food, shelter, sex, sleep, and oxygen. It would be unthinkable for an individual to strive for self-actualization when the basic needs for food or shelter remain unsatisfied.

After these basic needs in the hierarchy have been fulfilled, Man reaches out for safety; expressed in consistency, regularity of change and freedom. Next, Man strives for a sense of belongingness and love, or order to fulfill his need for assurance, security, feelings of

worthwhileness and love. Love is such a basic, inherent need that its absence as dramatically found in children who have been deprived of this feeling leads to illness and death.

Esteem's needs are categorized into:

1. Self-esteem, the basic respect and acceptance of oneself.

2. Respect from ohters, or the need for basic acceptance, attention and appreciation.

After the preceeding needs have been fairly well fulfilled, the individual can strive for growth, or the need to become what the person thinks he can become. As a condition for growth, remains curiosity, expressed by the desire to learn, to know.

Higher in the hierarchy are the human needs for aesthetic fulfillment, as related in the individual to the formation of a well-rounded image of himself, and expressed for the need for the enjoyment of beauty. Later, in his research Maslow found some other needs that he considered as belonging to the psychological dimensions of the hierarchy. They are reported by Goble (1970):

1. Wholeness

2. Perfection

3. Completion

4. Justice

5. Aliveness

6. Richness

7. Simplicity

8. Beauty

9. Goodness

10. Uniqueness

11. Effortlessness

12. Playfulness

13. Truth; honesty, reality

14. Self-sufficiency

Maslow found that the human needs are cross-cultural, hence, the self-actualized person can be found anywhere in the world. The need for actualization of his potential is found in every person as a genetically inherent trait characteristic of the human species. Obstacles blocking the self-actualization process can be traced back to two basic tendencies in human nature, one that leads to growth and another that threatens growth in the form of regression. Maslow (1972) designated this psychological phenomenon also with the name of "The Jonah Complex" or the fear of one's own greatness of the "evasion of one's destiny" or the

> . . . running away from one's own best talents . . . . We enjoy and even thrill to the godlike possibilities we see in ourselves in such peak moments. And yet we simultaneously shiver with weakness, awe, and fear before these very same possibilities (p. 34).

One main experience in the process of growing is Man's experience of what Maslow designated as peak experiences. These are unusual moments of ecstasy, of a sense of fulfillment, of transcendence. When Maslow (1972) referred to the transiense of "peak experiences" and the continuous setbacks that the individual experiences when moving toward self-actualization he attributed such occurrences to six factors:

1. Drives toward growth are not strong enough and are generally shortlived.

2. Society's emphasis on negative forces for the motivation of the individual.

3. Needs of safety and security block the way for the individual to experience the mysterious in life.

4. Society does not reward adequately the demonstration of human feelings such as gentleness and kindness.

5. Lack of flexibility in experiencing unusual situation, fear of the unknown, and appetite for certainty.

6. Lack of truth in the human potential for becoming.

Underlying his theory is Maslow's approach to educaiton as a process within which the individual exercises his freedom at maximum strength but at the same time recognizes the self-imposed limits in order to guarantee other's individual freedom. There is not such a thing, for him, as freedom without self-imposed discipline. Education for him is a value-ladened process, since it is teacher's and parent's moral commitment to mankind survival to instill in children the appreciation for self-confidence and value people live up to and would dare to die for.

Love for children does not mean, for Maslow, taking the responsibility out of their hands, it should lead parents to foster and encourage authenticity and creativity.

Teachers and parents alike must provide for vivid, real experiences. All classroom activity should be related to real life experiences as the best preparation possible for a child in order to face life as an adult later on: The outside world must be shown as it is, with its strengths, weaknesses, good and bad.

The indisoluble nexus between theory and practice must be fully understood by the child if he is going to develop a non-fragmented vision of the world.

The educational process should be so well designed that it facilitates and encourages the search for personal meaning, truth, definition of self-identity, and help the individual to feel at ease in society, whatever the physical environment.

The work of Carl Rogers, in therapy, possesses implication beyond this sphere and extends to education and other "helping professions". He assumes the same goodness in Man and his natural disposition toward the actualization of his potential, that is characteristic of the work of Maslow. According to Rogers (1962):

> A major observation is that the individual moves toward being open to his experience . . . . The individual defends himself against any threat of alteration in the concept of self by not perceiving those meanings in his experience which contradict his present self-picture . . . . A second major trend which I have observed is that the individual moves toward more acceptantly being a process, a fluidity, a changing. He lives in a more existential fashion, living fully in each moment. . . . Still another characteristic of the person who is living the process of health appears to be an increasing trust in his organism as a means of arriving at satisfying behavior in each existential situation (pp. 23, 25).

In the same way that Maslow identifies six major set backs to the process of self-actualization, Rogers (1962) identifies two factors operating against the process of the person trusting his own potential for becoming. He states: "The defects which in most of us make this process untrustworthy are the inclusion of information which does not belong to this present situation, or the exclusion of information which does" (p. 27).

The process of becoming is for Rogers one in which the individual trust his perception of reality, as the only reliable and available datum through which the individual validates his experience, the individual experiences himself as a unified, harmonious identity. By trusting his potentialities the individual is more prone to make significant

contributions that reveal his innate creativity. Rogers (1962) implies
the goodness of the basic potential of the individual when he states:

> When we are able to free the individual from defensiveness, so
> that is open to the wide range of his own needs, as well as to
> the wide range of environmental and social demands, his
> reactions may be trusted to be positive, forward moving,
> constructive. We do not need to ask who will socialize him,
> for one of his own deepest needs is for affiliation and
> communication with others. When he is fully himself, he
> cannot help but be realistically socialized (p. 30).

Aggression will only be relegated to those situations in which
there is no better solution, so Man will tend to recognize peaceful
agreement as a better way to deal with difficult situations.

For Rogers, becoming is a continuous process that has at its center
a broad goal established for the individual, as his ideal for behavior.
The characteristic feature of such an individual is sensitiveness to the
full range of his experiences and those of others. Such a person is
also present oriented, following the Gestalt tradition, taking from the
past whatever he can learn and forseeing goals for the future, but
always taking into account that he is living in the present. Awareness
is then a necessary element for the individual to perceive reality at
its fullest. As Rogers (1962) expresses:

> Such a person lives a life which involves a wider range, a
> greater richness, than the constricted living in which most
> of us find ourselves . . . live more intimately with their
> feelings of pain, but also more vividly with their feelings of
> ecstasy . . . anger is more clearly felt, but so also is love,
> . . . so is courage; and the reason they can thus live fully
> in a wider range is that they have this underlying confidence
> in themselves as trustworthy instruments for encountering life
> (p. 32).

CHAPTER V

BASIC EDUCATIONAL BELIEFS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP

TO THREE SELECTED SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOLOGY

IN EDUCATION

Behaviorism and the Nature of Man

Within the Behaviorist paradigm, as within any other school of psy-
chology, lies some considerations relative to the intrinsic nature of
human beings. The Behavioristic tradition views Man as a neutral being
whose behavior is determined by environmental forces. But, aside from
this Behaviorist claim for <u>neutrality</u>, there exists an element that
seems to determine that Man needs to be controlled. Since Man is a non-
purposive human he is in desperate need for external sources of control;
otherwise, he will not be of use either to himself or to society. This
Behavioristic emphasis of control over Man's behavior is a result of be-
lieving that if Man is not effectively controlled, he will tend toward
evil. This belief seems to be implied in Skinner's (1971, p. 107)
assertion: "The intentional design of a culture and the control of
human behavior it implies are essential if the human species is to con-
tinue to develop."

The basic neutrality of human beings as seen by Behaviorists lies
mainly in the aforementioned feature of non-purposiveness. Man is con-
sidered to be a self-contained physical entity better described in terms
of his overt behavior. The physical endowment of Man is for the

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Behaviorist a wonder of perfection, and if only the behavior of each Man could be rendered predictable, the Skinner's Utopia, Walden II, would be more of a reality for humans than a dream.

What seems to bother the Behaviorists most about accepting Man's natural drive toward purposeful behavior is that recognizing purpose in human beings is one and the same as recognizing the dualism of mind-body that Behaviorism so strongly opposes. The Behaviorists' neglect of mind lies in the fact that whatever happens with the mind is both non-observable and non-measurable and, hence, not susceptible to detailed control. This point is supported by Bigge and Hunt (1980):

> The apparent purposiveness of organisms has always bothered psychologists who are behavioristically oriented because they have felt that it is difficult to recognize purposiveness without slipping into a mind-body dualism and its accompanying mysticism . . ., neobehaviorists have tended to develop mechanical explanations for apparent purposiveness. So, apparent purposiveness is regarded as a product of a pattern of stimulation in which certain stimuli are more potent than the rest and thus lead an organism in one way rather than another, or it is interpreted as 'drive reduction', that is, as a relieving reaction to the stimulation induced by organic drives such as hunger or sex (p. 276).

It seems that for the Behaviorists, Man defines himself through his capacity for behaving according to what is expected from him. Without inflicting any damage to his environment, Man's controlled behavior is the response to a perfect society in which Man so controlled, reacts by acting toward the conservation and improvement of his environment.

It is Man's shaping that defines behavior that is expected of him. Bigge and Hunt (1980, p. 287) assert, when talking about Behaviorism: "A child or youth is something to be molded in the proper fashion."

Behaviorists also believe Man is not inherently motivated toward any type of action. They recognize certain minimal human urges or drives, but no reference is made of the fact that Man is motivated to

certain types of behaviors. They rather believe that what passes for human motivation is the individual conditioned and reinforced in such a manner that leads him to choose a certain way of behaving. It is not basic human drives toward good or bad that make Man choose a preferential type of behavior, it is rather the reinforcing effect of the environment through reward and punishment that guarantees the strengthening or weakening of certain behaviors. Man, then, is in need of large amounts of guidance, to help him choose the appropriate types of behavior that will enhance himself and his fellow-man. This is better accomplished through conditioning, reinforcing, and whenever necessary, behavior modification. Only this technique will guarantee the survival of the culture that Man has created; to do otherwise is to invite its destruction.

Behaviorism and the Nature of Learning

Before attempting to define Behavioristic learning, it would be useful at this point to remember what was emphasized in the previous chapter: early Behaviorists differed among themselves, and Neobehaviorists also differ with early Behaviorists as well as among themselves.

For Edward L. Thorndike, learning was a process of linking physical and mental events, this linking or connectionism was to be established between a stimulus and its related response. This linking was through a process of randomly selecting the appropriate responses and discarding those undesirable. This process was entirely mechanical and should not be understood as purposeful. It will be remembered that learning for Thorndike obeys specific laws that define the S-R connection: Laws of Readiness, Exercise and Repetition, explained in detail in the preceding chapter.

For John B. Watson, following Pavlov's experiments, learning was a process of stimuli substitution. Watson refused some of Thorndike's ideas, especially those concerning the dualism operating of learning through mind-body connections. Watson chose to focus only upon those aspects of human learning susceptible to measurement and observation. Learning within the Neobehaviorist tradition is the arrangement of contingencies of reinforcement that promote shaping of behaviors in previously defined directions. This view is supported by Bigge and Hunt (1980), who, talking about Nonbehaviorists' conception of learning, express:

> Learning primarily is a process within which both verbal and nonverbal behaviors are changed. Such behaviors are inculcated by adults telling, showing, directing, guiding, arranging, manipulating, rewarding, punishing, and, at times, coercing the activities of children and youth . . ., teaching is a matter of adults setting behavioristic environmental conditions - stimuli - to make sure that the students accomplish those goals (pp. 287-288).

If shaping of behavior is the overall goal of Behavioristic learning, it follows that learning is accounted for, only if change in the desired behavior occurs. When no change is registered, the teacher following a Behaviorist tradition contends that no learning has occurred, and then proceeds to arrange the next contingencies of reinforcement, expressed through diagnostic and prescription. The overall goal is the attainment of teacher pre-selected behaviors to be shaped into the students uniformly, but at different rates. Success is to be experienced by all the students, but seldom do students participate in the establishing of goals or objectives.

Thinking processes undoubtedly account for most learning, but

. . . .

> Thinking is . . . a function or result of a set of antecedents or preceding conditions . . . or natural laws governing the

relationship of observable stimuli and responses are identi-
fied and established, internal processes likewise can be
described in terms of stimulus-response sequence that conform
to the same laws (Bigge and Hunt, 1980, p. 307).

Within the Neobehaviorist tradition, Skinner claims that operant

learning, that elicited for the consequences of a stimuli, is the proper

way to go about arranging contingencies for successful teaching. His

system, which uses programmed instruction as the method that expedites

learning, builds on the belief that success will be experienced by the

learner when he proceeds orderly through a sequence of steps. These

steps increase in difficulty, and are tailored to each student in an

attempt to quarantee success. The purpose is to avoid the annoyance of

failure upon the student. In this system, the correct responses the

student makes are rewarded through letting him progress through the

sequence toward higher levels of knowledge. Skinner thinks that success

is rewarding in itself and, if teachers build success into their daily

teaching, the expected behavior will occur on the part of the students

involved. Leahey (1980) supports this view:

Although Skinner sometimes speaks of the fluidity of behavior
and adopts methods that do not break it up into artificial
traits, he accepts atomism. The experimental analysis of
behavior tries, to break down any complex behavior into simple
units, each of which may be studied or taught separately
(p. 322).

It should be clear by now that learning within the broadest Behav-

iorist tradition involves the fixing of responses that are desirable and

the weakening of undesirable behaviors. Learning is explained through

the arrangement of reinforcing and conditioning contingencies that re-

duce all human manifestations to behaviors that can be observed and

measured.

Behaviorism and the Nature of Knowledge

Within a Behavioristic framework the value of Man created knowledge

varies in value. The value of the accumulated cultural legacy must be

evaluated in terms of its objectivity and contribution to the well-being

of the wider society. Such knowledge is also susceptible to empirical

observation and measurement. All contributions that belong to the realm

of the subjective and are not amenable to quantification are rendered

ineffective and lacking value. As Bigge and Hunt (1980), infer:

> . . . there is a kind of hierarchy of the sciences, some being
> much more objective and reliable than others. They place at
> the top of the hierarchy physics and chemistry, aided by
> mathematics . . ., so education should be based upon the pure
> sciences of biology and psychology. To a consistent logical
> empiricist, nothing should be asserted to be read or meaning-
> ful unless through observation, it can be subjected to objec-
> tive study, using only publicly verifiable data. If anything
> exists, it exists in some amount; if it exists in some amount,
> it can be measured (p. 280).

Skinner (1971) himself evidences his profound respect and belief in

the physical sciences and exhorts construction of a paradigm of science

of behavior to help people of all ages to feel at home in his environ-

ment. So he asserts:

> We can follow the path taken by physics and biology by turning
> directly to the relation between behavior and the environment
> and neglecting supposed states of mind. Physics did not
> advance by looking more closely at the jubilance of a falling
> body, or biology by looking at the nature of vital spirits,
> and we do not need to try to discover what personalities,
> states of mind, feelings, traits of character, plans, pur-
> poses, intentions, or the other prerequisits of autonomous man
> really are in order to get on with a scientific analysis of
> behavior (p. 12).

It follows, then, that for Behaviorists, knowledge is not for dis-

cussion and relativistic interpretations; it is for acceptance, in the

same way that a mathematical formula is accepted if it proves to be

valid, without any argument revolving around it.

Behaviorism and the Nature of Society

Within the parameters of Behavioristic thinking, society is the environment that surrounds each individual. It is postulated that it is the environment which is the determinant of Man's behavior and that behavior can be manipulated to the degree that the environment is manipulated, too.

If Man makes a conscious effort to modify his environment, his behavior, in turn, will change. Environments can be created that enhance Man's well-being and happiness.

Skinner (1976) poses the problem that made possible Walden II. It was the question:

> How were people to be induced to use new forms of energy, to eat grain rather than meat, and to limit the size of their families; and how were atomic stockpiles to be kept out of the hands of desperate leaders? . . . Behavior could be changed by changing its consequences - that was operant conditioning - but it could be changed because other kinds of consequences would then follow. Psychotic and retarded persons would lead better lives, time and energy of teachers and students would be saved, homes would be pleasanter social environments, people would work more effectively while enjoying what they were doing, and so on (p. 8).

Skinner's Walden II is a claim for small communities, where life can be carefully controlled and contingencies of reinforcement can more easily take place. Work will be available to all citizens, people will behave more friendly and will be more prone to respect community rules and practices. As a consequence competition for status will diminish, law enforcement will be less necessary since people will stick more to their codes of behavior. Child-rearing practices would be modified, which would help to control the incidence of crime. Attention will be given to the artistic expression of Man, which is as necessary as the serious work in which he engages. Leisure time will be more wisely used

and will contribute to needed changes in behavior.

Since much emphasis is put on the control of behavior, the government would limit its range of operation, because its bigness is a result of the bigness of Man's living arrangements. All of this utopian expectation would happen without changing the socioeconomic system significantly. The change would not operate at the level of big apparatuses and agencies, but rather at the level of every involved citizen of the utopian community.

Behaviorism and the Aims of Education

It has been previously mentioned that the Behaviorist understands the multiple uses of technology, not only for the betterment of the physical environment of Man, but also for his contribution to the building of a science of behavior that will undertake the education of all the citizenry. Besides the construction of a science of behavior, technology will provide devices to help speed up learning in such a way that waste of time and energy of teachers and students will be eliminated. They will have more time to spend on carefully planned leisure activities which will contribute to shaping the life of individuals in more constructive ways.

Education is equated with the shaping of behavior in predetermined ways enhancing individual and social purposes, with the stronger emphasis on effective social operation. This point seems to be supported by Skinner (1976):

> What we need is a technology of behavior. We could solve our
> problems quickly enough if we could adjust the growth of the
> world's population as precisely as we adjust the course of a
> spaceship, or improve agriculture and industry with some of
> the confidence with which we accelerate high-energy particles,
> or move toward a peaceful world with something like the steady

progress with which physics has approved absolute zero (even through both remain presumably out of reach). But a behavioral technology comparable in power and precision to physical and biological technology is lacking, and those who do not find the very possibility ridiculous are more likely to be frightened by it than reassured. That is how far we are from 'understanding human issues' in the sense in which physics and biology understand their fields, and how far we are from preventing the catastrophe toward which the world seems to be inexorably moving (p. 3).

Education for Behaviorists, in the future, will have to rely more on the arranging of contingencies of reinforcement in and out of the school environment in order to accomplish the mark of educated men: the building of a perfect society as mirrored by Skinner's Walden II.

Behaviorism and the Nature of Curriculum

The curriculum of the school dominated by Behavioristic practices focuses heavily on the idea that knowledge exists separately from the reality of men, that there are specific bodies of knowledge that enhance human behavior more than others. Such is the case of physics, chemistry, mathematics, etc. Such a predetermined cultural body is to be set and arranged for effective learning by teachers whose tasks become the arrangement of appropriate contingencies of reinforcement and conditioning. The emphasis on predetermined content of curriculum construction is supported by Bigge and Hunt (1980) who contend that:

> . . . teaching practices advocated by behaviorist psychologists are closely in tune with the logical empiricist-realistic outlook. Such psychologists tend to recommend that subject matter be selected by qualified adults prior to the teaching act, that it reflects facts and skills useful in contemporary society, and that it be inculcated into students. There is an implicit assumption that, if a given item of subject matter impinges upon a student, there will be a definite and predictable effect. Only secondary, if any, mention is made of such concepts as student goals or problem solving (p. 282).

Both early Behaviorists and Neobehaviorists advocate practices

according to a mechanist, predetermined conception of learning.

Thorndike (1949), within the Associationist tradition, emphasized the breaking down of subject matter into its component parts, following a sequence from simple to complex units of behavior. This was to take into consideration student's readiness to pass through the learning sequence by means of adequate presentation of stimuli, recording of responses, assurance of adequate S-R connections and the presenting of adequate rewards when successful learning had occurred.

Within the Skinnerian tradition, the major emphasis is on the identification of appropriate operants that will be reinforced in order to warrant a successful response in future contingencies. He recommends a curriculum tailored to the specific rates of learning and needs of individual students. This is determined by competent adults: teachers. Individualized instruction is advocated by Skinner because he thinks a group situation does not allow for individual rates of learning. The solution is Individually Prescribed Instruction, which allows students to pass through the curriculum successfully without experiencing the punishment implicit in failure. Teaching machines, and all kinds of mechanical devices, are favored by Skinner in order to make instruction as individualized as possible (Zais, 1976).

Behaviorism and Instructional Behavior

Student behavior is mainly determined by the teacher whose main role is to provide for the reinforcement and conditioning contingencies. The teacher role is one of predetermining the classroom environment in such a way that operants of the right kind are immediately available, are easily recognized, and all classroom activity leads toward the

accomplishment of previously determined patterns of behaviors or grade expectations. What teachers deal with is overt, observable behavior that is susceptible to measurement for diagnostic and prescriptive purposes. In the same way, subject matter determination is the responsibility of the teacher and not the students'. Very seldom do students have any voice in determining future goals for learning. This view is supported by Bigge and Hunt (1980).

> A behaviorist theory of motivation has important implications for education. According to this viewpoint, children do not have to 'want' to learn history in order to learn it. They do have to be persuaded to study it, repeat the verbal responses that we associate with a knowledge of history. Anyone can learn anything of which he or she is capable if he will only allow himself to be put through the pattern of activity necessary for conditioning to take place. Thus, behaviorists do not talk much about such things as 'psychological involvement' or 'helping students see the point of learning' (pp. 297-298).

Instead, they engage students in behavior and assume that behavior with appropriate conditioning automatically produces learning. Teachers carefully plan which learnings (responses) they want students to develop.

The fact that Behaviorists emphasize behavioral change as a proof that learning has taken place is the reason that so many school practices: methods of teaching and evaluation emphasize only those aspects of behavior amenable to observation and measurement. Behaviors to be implanted in the students are determined by the teacher. The behaviors are produced through mechanical manipulation of the environment. The success of contingencies of reinforcement is determined by the degree of reinforcement they produce.

It can be summarized that the instructional behavior for which teachers are accountable is of controlling and carefully setting the

environment, so that expected behaviors are reinforced. No affective elements are present in the teaching strategies of a Behavioristically-oriented teacher: his overall role is to change behaviors, not to promote nurturing of feelings.

Behaviorism and the Nature of Evaluation

The objective of student assessment is to verify the degree to which behavior has changed as a result of learning. Since overt behavior can be assessed through tests, they constitute the paradigm of evaluation practices. This view is expressed by Bigge and Hunt (1980) who express:

> Teachers, or other school authorities, decide which specific behaviors they want students to display. They then stimulate the students in such a way as to evoke the desired behaviors. The success of the process is judged by how dependably the behavior can be invoked in the future (usually on tests) (p. 300).

Evaluation is seen as empirical testing of the learnings that have been manipulated through the arrangements of contingencies of reinforcement and conditioning. This view is also shared by Zais (1976 who asserts that the framework of the technical model of education would

> . . . include a hierarchical, highly organized statement of outcomes framed in behavioral terms . . . . The motivation and behavior change of learners would be extrinsically managed, and the teachers would function in the role of skilled technicians (p. 316).

The emphasis on accomplishment of previous expectations of performance is termed by Dobson and Dobson (1979) as "predetermined standards." This concept is demonstrated by the following evaluation practices:

1. . . . excluding and including persons in the formal school program.

2. . . . expecting each child to measure up to a given level
    of performance.

3. . . . being applied indiscriminately to all children
    in a grade or school.

4. National norms being applied to all communities within a
    state.

5. Predetermined standards serving to solidify curriculum
    structure and learning experiences.

6. Placing a child in a learning environment that he/she is
    best suited for, based on someones assessment of his/her
    maturity, abilities, attainment, and overall general nature.

7. Children being ranked in terms of the success of other
    children.

8. Insisting that knowledge of facts should and must be
    measured (p. 12).

It follows that for the Behaviorist, learning can only be assessed

in terms of quantitative measures. This discards all those manifesta-

tions that do not belong to the realm of observable behaviors. With this

purpose in mind, sets of grade standards are considered sacred and stu-

dents are pushed into competition in order to excel into the system. All

learning experiences, activities and evaluation must be in accordance

with the demonstration of observable, overt behaviors. Knowledge eval-

uated through quantitative measures is more important than qualitative

experiences of students.

Cognitive-Field Psychology and the Nature of Man

Within the Cognitive-Field psychological tradition, Man is natur-

ally a neutral being, with no identified tendencies toward good or evil.

Man is a being in the making through purposive interaction both with

physical and psychological environments. The physical environment

becomes one with the psychological environment, since Man's process of

making himself is essentially of a psychological nature.

Cognitive-Field psychology changed its perception of Man, from an active to an interactive agent. The first consideration belongs to Wertheimer (1959) and the second is the legacy of Lewin (1936) to Gestalt psychology. This view of Man as a purposeful being for Cognitive-Field psychologists is explained by Bigge and Hunt (1980):

> Only by his living in a human world and having a biological organism of a unique type does a biological human being emerge as a psychological person or self. The form that the development of selfhood takes depends upon the learning that results from the purposive interaction of the person and his psychological environment . . . . It is because cognitive-field psychology is goal centered that its theorists inveigh against the use of such mechanistic terms as reflex arc, connectionism, conditioning, associationism, and reinforcement in dealing with learners. Within cognitive-field psychology, purposive, is virtually a synonym for intelligent; it signifies an intentionality that need not be conscious (p. 360).

The purposive character of human beings is what makes them pursue goals in interaction with their environment. All of the goals and present situations existing for an individual at a given moment constitute his life space, and his cognitive structure is made of all significant events that comprise his experience that is <u>changing</u> as the events in an individual's life change.

Man, for Cognitive-Field psychologists, is always in a process of building new cognitive structures based on his present life space at a given moment in time. The process is perpetual, never ending, and the cognitive structures grow in richness as significant, meaningful experiences penetrate the life space of the individual.

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Cognitive-Field Psychology and the

Nature of Learning

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Bigge and Hunt (1980, p. 293) assert that ". . . the key word of

Gestalt-Field psychologists in describing learning is insight. They regard learning as a process of developing new insight or changing old ones."

Insights seem to respond to that sudden moment in which the individual gets a feeling of "understanding" a situation that was not so clear before. It is a process of the individual interacting with his present life space in a purposeful attempt of trying to make sense out of perceived changing, evolving realities. Experience evolving of insights is always personal, since no two individuals pass through the same experiences during their lives. Bigge and Hunt (1980) assert that insights development within the individual is a very personal matter. Insights can be communicated to other individuals, as information is presented or exchanged, but never can an insight be forced into another person for his assimilation. No matter how worthy somebody else's insight may be, they are only true insights to himself and not to others, unless they possess a high degree of meaning for the person who experiences somebody else's insights.

Cognitive-Field oriented psychologists tend to see motivation as a key element in all learning. Bigge and Hunt (1980) talk about the individual acting at any given moment within a field of psychological forces. It seems that this is related with the concept of life space. It could be said that the psychological field is the same as the life space, and the "forces" the continuous restructuring of the individual's life space through meaningful experiences that grow out of his exchange with his personal environment.

Bigge and Hunt (1980) when talking of motivation as a necessary ingredient in Gestalt learning assert that:

A Gestalt-field psychologist regards motivation as a product
of disequilibrium with a life space. A life space includes
goals and often barriers to the achievement of these goals. A
goal may be either positive or negative - something one wants
to avoid. When a barrier, that is, any obstacle to the direct
and immediate achievement of a goal, appears, a person feels
tension. He (or she) tries to relieve tension either by sur-
mounting or circumventing the barrier. The tendency to
release tension by proceeding toward a goal, including the
overcoming of whatever barriers are in the way, is motivation
(p. 298).

For psychologists of a Cognitive-Field orientation, learning is

more than a change in overt behavior, it is continuous change in the

life space of an individual through his lifetime. For learning to

occur, the individual has to realize in what significant way his newly

gained experience affects his general outlook of life.

Central to the learning process for psychologists of a Cognitive-

Field orientation is the belief that thinking is a necessary process to

the building of insights, this is in opposition to psychologists of a

Behaviorist orientation. For them, thinking belongs to the realms of

the non-observable and non-measurable and, hence, does not deserve their

consideration as a necessary condition for learning to take place.

Bigge and Hunt (1980) explains how learning takes place within a

Cognitive-Field framework of thought:

A human being is born a very complex biological organism in a
social environment. Throughout his (or her) waking hours, as
a baby, later as a child, and then as a youth, he learns by
trying various acts and seeing what happens. Thus, through
his purposive living in a human environment, an individual
develops as a person or self (p. 360).

It follows, then, that for psychologists and school personnel

oriented to a Cognitive-Field approach to education, learning is a per-

ennial, permanent process of building cognitive structures through mean-

ing construction, all within an individual's life space. It is an

active, goal-oriented process that defines the essence of Man as an

essentially purposive, intelligent entity.

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Cognitive-Field Psychology and the

Nature of Knowledge

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Knowledge for the Cognitive-Field oriented psychologist and teacher is not a fixed truth that everybody must reach in order to function adequately.

The Relativist notion of truth means that knowledge never reaches the status of a sacred body. All truth is temporal and is subject to change and modification. The Cognitive-Field movement considers that certain knowledge reaches the temporal state of truth, but there is no fixed, permanent truth.

Bigge and Hunt (1980) contend when talking about the Relativist concept of truth for the Cognitive-Field people:

> A central idea of relativism is that a thing derives its qualities from its relationship to other things . . . the way we perceive any object or event is colored by the total situation . . . . Relativistic philosophy does little more than explore and develop the numerous ramifications and implications of this basic idea. Relativists question the notion that human beings are able to find and use final absolute truth. Consequently, they have little interest in 'eternal verities'. Nevertheless, they are deeply concerned with truths, relativistically defined (p. 283).

Truth within a Cognitive-Field framework is concerned more with individual truths that persons create as they gain significant personal insights. This grows out of an exchange with the environmental and psychological forces that impinge upon an individual life space. Bigge and Hunt (1980) later assert that:

> Relativistics assume that no scientific law is 'sacred', any law may change, and indeed, over the course of time most will . . . . Positive relativists do not mean that truth has no objective standard and that it always varies from person to person, group to group, and time to time. In fact, they

recognize that, fortuntely, many truths have been so ade-
quately tested that we may safely treat them as if they were
certainties. However, their definition of certainty 'is some-
thing in which to have tremendous faith' (p. 284)

It follows then that for Cognitive-Field oriented psychologists and

teachers, truth is in a permanent state of change, and is evolving in

the same way that human experience is evolving.

<p style="text-align:center">Cognitive-Field Theory and the</p>

<p style="text-align:center">Nature of Society</p>

For Cognitive-Field oriented educators society is equated with the

surrounding environment of every individual Man. Because each person

possesses a field of experiences that is eminently personal, each person

possesses a particular environmental reality that is in no way exact to

another's reality.

Man as an active being, that makes personal experience insightful

through his exchange with society, acts upon his environment in a pur-

poseful, intelligent way. From that social reality Man takes whatever

is of personal significance to him, and in the process, feels free to

modify his environment whenever he considers it necessary. Social real-

ity is not a fixed entity or truth given to Man for acceptance. He will

question that reality as often as necessary and will take from that

reality that which enhances the richness of his personal life space.

Reality is not imposed, nor is it created for some Men for the accept-

ance of the rest of humankind. It is something all Men construct as

they attempt to gain personal, meaningful insights into active exchange

with social institutions. The environment or society for the individual

becomes, because of his intelligent active exchange with it, a psycho-

logical field of forces. As Bigge and Hunt (1980) define it:

> A psychological field consists of the simultaneous concurrent interrelationships of a person and his (or her) psychological environment in any one situation . . . all psychological activity of a person, at a given juncture of time, is a function of a totality of coexisting factors that are mutually interdependent . . . . It includes a psychological past, present, and future, also a certain concrete or imaginative level of psychological reality - all interpreted as simultaneous aspects of a concurrent situation (p. 346).

It can be said that the environment or societal arrangement does not pose any threat to the individual's life space, as far as he is engaged in active exchange, where neither the individual nor society try to impose themselves as the most important consideration. Both society as a whole and the individual can interact successfully within a Cognitive-Field perspective.

Cognitive-Field Psychology and the
Aims of Education

Based on the notions that a psychological field of forces and a life space are not abstractions that can be externally imposed by competent adults, and departing from the idea that all significant knowledge is acquired through insight. It is not surprising that for Cognitive-Field oriented educational practitioners, education is a process in which the individual is permanently engaged in construction of new meaningful cognitive structures that define the individual's life space at any given point in time.

The aims of education are expressed through individuals purposefully engaged in the never-ending process of their making. The role of the school and, specifically of teachers, is to guide without imposing pressure upon individual students in the building of meaningful life spaces. As Bigge and Hunt (1980) express:

> Such teachers are deeply concerned with the problem of per-
> sonal involvement, that is, in helping students see a need to
> learn. Hence, the personal goals of students always are
> observed. Often they try to help them rethink their goals and
> discard those that are trivial and whimsical. Much of the
> time the teaching-learning situation is so that students will
> adopt goals quite new to them. They are convinced that,
> unless a child or youth realizes a need to learn something,
> the child or youth either will not learn it at all or will
> learn it only in a transitory and functionally useless way
> (p. 299).

These tasks assigned to education depart from most current prac-

tices in education where students are rendered helpless to the commands

of knowledgeable adults, i.e., teachers, who think, as possessors of

eternal truth, their mission to be deciding for students what they

should decide for themselves. These are two different conceptions of

the basic nature of Man; one thinks of Man as helpless, a passive

reactor to his environment. The second one, the Cognitive-Field perspec-

tive, recognizes will, strength, and purposiveness intelligence in human

beings. Such natural endowment leads Man to decide for himself the

course that his education should take.

Cognitive-Field Psychology and the
Nature of Curriculum

As inferred from the aims of education for Cognitive-Field oriented

educators, the purpose of any teaching attempt is to help students form

those significant wholes necessary for the building of progressively

meaningful cognitive structures. It is a matter of helping students to

gain meaning in more effective ways, compatible with their present life

spaces at any given point in the teaching-learning experience. This

point seems to be shared by Zais (1976) when he expresses:

> Since 'understanding' is a central goal, the curriculum will
> be designed to help learners see significant relationships and

organize their experiences into functional and effective pat-
terns. To accomplish this, instruction will necessarily begin
with the familiar, and great care will be taken to ensure that
content and learning activities are organized into meaningful
patterns. Essential generalizations will be emphasized, while
supporting details and data will receive subordinate status
(p. 283).

Zais goes on to suggest that within a Cognitive-Field perspective

the teacher will relate the content within a given subject matter, and

relationships will transcend to other subject matter bodies to give the

effect of an integrated whole that reflect the unified character of all

experience. The way of going about that, is for him, the assignment of

projects that will give a unified perspective about the interrelatedness

of all knowledge. Those projects resemble the previously described fea-

tures of a Gestaltic structure as proposed by Lewis (1942): proximity,

closure, and good continuation.

Zais (1976) differentiates among Cognitive-Field psychology those

psychologists that follow Lewin's tradition. For them, special atten-

tion should be given to an understanding of the student's life spaces,

in special ". . . the relationships prevailing among selves, motive,

environment and behavior" (p. 290). Since knowledge individuals learn

is necessary for a thorough understanding of their life spaces, small

classes are recommended in order to favor one-to-one relationships among

students and teachers. Within this perspective, Zais thinks both teach-

ers' and students' goals make up the curriculum. This is in consonance

with the Gestaltic idea that learning only occurs when the material to

be learned by the students possesses a positive valence, that is to say,

is meaningful to every individual student's experience. The key to such

learning is that it is compatible to the life spaces of the students

when learning is taking place.

Cognitive-Field Psychology and

Instructional Behavior

Basically, the instructional behavior adopted by the teacher

adhering to Cognitive-Field psychology is dictated by his belief in the

capacity of the students to select their own goals for learning through

interaction with significant subject matter content. It is based on

basic respect for the psychological space of the students concerned.

Learning is not equated with change in observable behavior, so

teachers are not overly concerned with tests as instruments of evalua-

tion. Rather, the emphasis is put on the quality of the experiences the

student encounters and will adopt as part of his life space.

The important fact about experience is that it in some ways alters

the previous perceptions of the students and makes them realize the

consequences involved in the fact of having a new experience. As Zais

(1976) emphasizes:

> Considering the Gestalt emphasis on perception and the under-
> standing of relationships, it is not difficult to see how
> Gestalt learning theory gives rise to curriculum designs that
> reorganize the formal disciplinary structure of knowledge into
> Gestalts corresponding to the categories of meaning encoun-
> tered in experience (p. 238).

Teachers' and students' behaviors will be in accordance with the

Gestalt principles of learning by structured Gestalts, psychological

life space, and individual meaningful experiences.

Cognitive-Field Psychology and the

Nature of Evaluation

Within the parameters of Cognitive-Field Psychology, the object of

most considerations are the concepts of both life spaces and the

insights that occur as the result of the meaningful exchange of the individual with his environment. The development of the individual is unique since no two individuals share the same experiences. Because experiences are individual, they are not assessed in terms of group achievement or national norms. Dobson and Dobson (1979) express their view of evaluation according to the Cognitive-Field Psychology paradigm below:

> . . . reflects a belief that any evaluation system in which pupils are ranked in terms of the success of other children will create more unwholesome competition than will a system in which success of others is not necessarily related to one's own. Evaluation must determine: (1) if enough preliminary knowledge is available for the child to proceed, (2) if the child is able to grow effectively and to produce in the environment, (3) if the child has the opportunity for higher order learning, and (4) the most important, if the child's concept of self gives any indication that the first three criteria are being met (p. 19).

The belief expressed by Dobson and Dobson (1979) about evaluation which is based on comparisons of other student achievements, as being undesirable, is also shared by Bigge and Hunt (1980) when talking about ways of reducing the threat in learning:

> When students regard their convictions to be under fire, they feel a threat to their egos. The intensity of the threat depends on its source, its power, and the valuation placed on the ideas that are in jeopardy. Unless threat can be largely eliminated, students are not likely to entertain evidence contrary to present convictions or, when facts warrant, to change their minds. Several techniques are available for keeping a sense of threat to a minimum. A teacher should always treat student opinions with respect. This does not necessarily mean that a teacher expresses approval; but he (or she) avoids ridicule, sarcasm, or any expressions that might be so interpreted by students. Furthermore, he does not cast aspersions on the intelligence or motives of students who render serious opinions . . . . When a teacher wishes to challenge an opinion expressed by a student, he (or she) should do it in such a way that conflict is internalized. That is, the students is made to feel the conflict within his (or her) own personality. If he sees the conflict merely as a contest between him and someone else, he may not feel a problem, or at least not the problem which the learning situation demands (p. 510).

It seems, then, that for the Cognitive-Field oriented teacher evaluation is concerned at first with not being defensive, since it is not the student's ego under question; it is, rather, a questioning of ideas based on the support the student can give to them.

Again, evaluation within this paradigm is not overly concerned with grades as an expression of achievement. Rather, it emphasizes the meaningfulness of knowledge, appropriate exchange of the individual with his environment, availability of opportunities that enhance growth, and above all, it encourages students' self-evalutions based on self-diagnosis to the degree of appropriateness of the meaning structures possessed.

Humanistic Psychology and the Nature of Man

Humanistic psychology views Man as a naturally good organism, with a natural endowment that leads him in the direction of the actualization of his potential. As Man seeks to actualize himself through responsible choice, then his innate inclination is toward good, because very seldom would Man choose voluntarily his own destruction.

That Man is basically a good, non-aggressive organism is supported by Rogers (1962):

> I have little sympathy with the rather prevalent concept that
> man is basically irrational, and that his impulses, if not
> controlled, would lead to destruction of others and self.
> Man's behavior is exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and
> ordered complexity toward the goals his organism is endeav-
> oring to achieve (p. 83).

One significant determinant of Man's goodness is his inborn capacity for choosing the course of behavior that most enhance his development as a fully responsible human being. If Man, given the appropriate environmental circumstances, is given the opportunity to exercise his

freedom to choose whatever he decides to become, he will invariably

choose his own good and, hence, the good of society. This view is

expressed by Maslow (1962):

> In the normal development of the normal child, it is now known
> that most of the time, if he is given a really free choice, he
> will choose what is good for his growth. This he does because
> it tastes good, feels good, gives pleasure or delight. This
> implies that he 'knows' better than anyone else what is good
> for him (p. 83). Capacities clamor to be used, and cease
> their clamor only when they are well used. Not only is it fun
> to use our capacities, but it is also necessary. This force
> is one main aspect of the 'will to health', the urge to grow,
> the pressure to self-actualization, the quest for one's
> identity. It is this that makes psychotherapy, education, and
> self-improvement possible in principle The inner core, or
> self, grows into adulthood only partly by (objective or
> subjective) discovery, uncovering and acceptance of what is
> 'there' beforehand. Partly, it is also a creation of the
> person himself (p. 83).

That becoming a human being to his maximum potential requires the

exercise of free choice, by the individual, as well as a supportive

environment, is again supported by Maslow (1962):

> Every person is, in part, 'his own project', and makes him-
> self. Growth forward . . . requires courage and strength in
> the individual, as well as protection, permission and encour-
> agement from the environment, especially for the child
> (p. 98).

One important condition for the process of becoming a person is

pointed out by Rogers (1962):

> The individual moves toward more acceptantly being a process,
> a fluidity, a changing. Self and personality emerges from
> experience. If they are open to experience, doing what 'feels
> right' proves to be a competent and trustworthy guide to be-
> havior which is truly satisfying. He is unified within him-
> self from the surface level to the level of depth. He is
> becoming 'all of one piece' (p. 99).

Maslow (1962) has defined the becoming of Man in terms of the

satisfaction of human needs, both of high and low level, physiological

and psychological, referred to in the previous chapter. The fulfillment

of these basic needs determines different qualitative degrees in the

process of self-actualization. So he expresses:

> Coordinate with his 'acceptance' of the self, of fate, of
> one's call, is the conclusion that the main path to health and
> self-fulfillment for the masses is via basic need gratifica-
> tion rather than via frustration. This contrasts with the
> suppressive regime, the mistrust, the control, the policing
> that is necessarily implied by basic evil in the human depths
> (p. 118).

One of the inborn conditions basic to the potential of Man is his
capacity for creative search, for invention and discovery that fulfills
his need for the expression of himself, such attribute is Man's creativ-
ity. Through creative striving Man actualizes his potential for human-
ity. As Rogers (1962) expresses:

> A fully functioning person is a creative person. With his
> sensitive openness to his world, and his trust of his own
> ability to form new relationships with his environment, he is
> the type of person from whom creative living emerge (p. 141).

Such a person is sensitively open to all of his environment, sensi-
tive to other individuals with whom he is in relationship, and sensitive
perhaps most of all to the feelings, reactions, and emergent meanings
which he discovers in himself.

It has been widely recognized that for creativity to emerge, the
individual has to have a consistent, positive view of himself. Some psy-
chologists refer to this as the individual's self-concept, and it is pro-
gressively formed through the exchange of the individual with society.
It is made of the impression the person causes in others which is fed
back to him. The individual possessing an adequate image of himself is
one that for Combs (1962) risks to take chances because:

> One does not have to be afraid of what is new and different.
> A sturdy ship can venture farther from port. Just so, an ade-
> quate person can launch imself without fear into the new, the
> untried and the unknown. A positive view of self permits the
> individual to be creative, original and spontaneous. What is
> more, he can afford to be generous, to give of himself freely
> or to become personally involved in events . . . . Truly

adequate people possess perceptual fields maximally open to experience. That is to say, their perceptual fields are capable of change and adjustment in such fashion as to make fullest possible use of their experience (p. 141).

In the process of Man becoming, and as he builds an adequate image of himself, he proceeds to set standards that rule his behavior. This standard of behavior assumes the form of beliefs and values. These constitute the models upon which the individual molds his behavior. It is inconceivable to think of purposive Man without a deep commitment to his most cherished ideals. This belief is of the agreement of Kelley (1962) who expresses:

> The fully functioning person develops and holds human values . . . the better the life, the better the values. He knows no other way except in keeping with his values. The fully functioning person sees the value of mistakes--has little need to be always right (p. 198).

The power of values as directions for behavior is also stressed by Maslow (1962):

> We need a validated, usable system of human values that we can believe in and devote ourselves to (be willing to die for) because they are true rather than because we are exhorted to 'believe and have faith'. It is necessary, in order for children to grow well, that adults have enough trust in them and in the natural processes of growth . . . to let them grow and help them in a Taoistic rather than an authoritarian way (p. 198).

The becoming individual is also one that is more integrated, more consistent, less disperse, and predictable. All these conditions emerge from the building of a self-image the individual approves, because this is consistent with valued principles for action. As Maslow (1962) asserts:

> We have, each one of us, an essential nature which is intrinsic, given, 'natural' and, usually, very resistant to change . . . . Every person is, in part, 'his own project' and makes himself. In them (self-actualizing people), the affective and the motor are less separated from each other. Their spontaneous reactions are as capable, efficient, and right as if they

have been thought out in advance. At the level of self-
actualizing, many dichotomees become resolved, opposites are
seen to be united and the whole dichotomous way of thinking is
recognized to be immature (p. 213).

Parallel to the concept of Man's inborn freedom is the self-

determined nature of Man, as opposed to being determined by others'

will. Man is essentially a self-reliant entity. This view is supported

by Maslow (1962):

> We can no longer think of the person as 'fully determined'
> when this phrase implies 'determined only by forces external
> to the person.' The person, insofar as he is a real person,
> is his own main determinant. Every person is, in part, 'his
> own project' and makes himself (p. 234).

In sum, the view of Man held by Humanistic psychologists is one that

sets Man free to become whatever he may become. It is the view of Man as

the only self-reliant living creature, capable of determining his be-

coming in whatever direction is most enhancing of the human condition.

Eventually, Man will try to resign from his freedom that places him in

Existential loneliness, but he will tend to regain his will for freedom

along the way.

Humanistic Psychology and the Nature of Learning

Provided the individual is experiencing appropriate circumstances

for the development of an adequate view of self, the progressive emerg-

ence of adequate perceptual fields will follow. It is a Gestalt concept

that Combs (1962) states as follows:

> All behavior is a product of the perceptual field of the
> behavior at the moment of action. That is to say, how any
> person behaves will be a direct outgrowth of the perceptions
> existing for him at any moment. To change behavior in this
> frame of reference requires that we understand the nature of
> the individual's perceptual fields . . . . The deeper, more
> personally significant the perception, moreover, the more
> likely it is to affect behavior (p. 65).

For perception to be authentic, it is necessary that the individual approach cognition in a confident, assured integrated way. As Maslow (1962, p. 65) expresses: "To the extent that perception is desireless and fearless, to that extent is more veridical, in the sense of perceiving the true, or essential or intrinsic whole nature of the object . . . ."

Pointing out the nature of perception, Combs (1962) believes that two additional factors account for the richness of an individual's perceptual field. He states:

> One of the most revealing facts about perception is that it is selective. We do not see everything in our surroundings. There are thousands of coincidences in the situation in which we find ourselves at any point of time. To perceive them all would cause pandemonium. We therefore choose that which the self feeds upon. The additional element which appears to determine perceptive intake is purpose. There is ample evidence now to show that all living tissue is purposive and, of course, in Man this purpose is partly, but only partly, on the conscious level; our psychological selves are particular as to what they feed on. What they take in has to suit their purposes, and fit into their past experiences (p. 65).

It should be stressed that the concept of self is basic to an understanding of how learning occurs. Such a perception of self must be positive, accurate, and optimistic in order for learning to take place. In this respect, Kelley (1962, p. 118) asserts: "The growing self must feel that it is involved, that it is really part of what is going on, that in some degree it is helping shape its own destiny, together with the destiny of all."

From the analytical postulates of Humanistic psychology, it follows that a conception of learning involves the possession of an adequate view of self, or self-concept, and the possession of knowledge that enhances the need for personal meaning. Only after these conditions are simultaneously met can learning take place. Since learning is meaning

construction, learning should be geared to the building of increasing significant structures of meaning.

Humanistic Psychology and the Nature of Knowledge

Within the framework of Humanistic psychology, the possession of adequately rich perceptual fields determines the meaningfulness of knowledge. Whatever enters and affects a perceptual field possesses the character of significant knowledge. Only knowledge that in some manner contributes to the richness and the development of the condition of being can be accounted as such. Otherwise, it is information that is not seen in any way affecting the course of the individual's life. This view is supported by Combs (1962):

> The truly adequate person must be well informed. One must certainly have a field of perceptions, rich and extensive enough to provide understanding of the events in which he is enmeshed and available when he needs them. Rich and extensive perceptual fields are a product of the kinds of opportunities an individual has been exposed to . . . . Mere exposure to an event is no guarantee that the event will be perceived by the individual or be available on later occasions. An adequate person seems to have many more such personal meanings. More than confrontation with events is necessary to insure inclusion of perceptions in the field and their availability on later occasions. This availability seems dependent upon at least two factors:
>
> > (a) the individual's discovery of personal meaning, and
> > (b) the satisfaction of need (p. 181).

Maslow (1962) seems to support the Gestalt view that for an organism prepared to function in a certain way, to do so is satisfying and the reverse is annoying. This is in accordance with the idea that knowledge should be used constructively for the individual in order for him to derive an experience that is enhancing to his human condition. He states:

To make growth and self-actualization possible, it is necessary to understand that capacities, organs and organ systems press to function and express themselves and to be used and exercised, and that such use is satisfying, and disuse irritating . . ., capacitities are also needs . . . . What we call 'knowledge' (which is usually highly abstract and verbal and sharply defined) often serves to blind us to those portions of reality not covered by the abstraction. That is, it makes us more able to see some things, but less able to see other things. Science and education being too exclusively abstract, verbal and bookish, do not have enough place for raw, concrete, esthetic experience, especially of the subjective happenings inside oneself (p. 181).

Possessing knowledge is, again, more than the mere accumulation of factual data for later retrieval. According to Rogers (1962):

The hypothetical person who is fully open to his experience would have access to all of the available data in the situation, on which to base his behavior; the social demand, his own complex and possibly conflicting needs, his memories of similar situations, his perception of the uniqueness of this situation, etc. All of the available data would be used, and it would be presented in accurate rather than distorted form (p. 181).

It follows from the previous considerations that knowledge is relative to the use the individual makes of it, and it is dependent upon its particular meaning for the individual. There is no absolute knowledge that the individual has to possess in order to perform adequately. There is no fixed truth that the individual has to possess in order to be considered knowledgeable. Knowledge is contingent upon the use the person makes of it.

Humanistic Psychology and the Nature of Society

Within the context of Humanistic-Perceptual psychology, society is in an interacting role with the individual, society is not a determinant force for the submission of the individual, it is supposed to be a helping, constructive force. The individual constructs personal meanings through the interaction of his personal self with the whole of society.

As Kelley (1962) expresses:

All that is given is the equipment and at least the minimal
(mother and child) social environment. Since the self is
achieved through social contact, it has to be understood in
terms of others. 'Self and other' is not a duality because
they go so together that separation is quite impossible
(p. 83).

Although society does not render the individual passive with its

influence, the influence upon the individual is significant, until a

point that makes Maslow (1972) think of the existence of good and bad

societies, in the sense that some of them, enhance the development of

the individual and others inhibit his becoming. So he expresses: "The

'better' culture gratifies all basic human needs and permits self-

actualization" (p. 99).

Maslow (1971) goes on to assert that:

There is a kind of feedback between the good Society and the
good Person. They need each other, they are SINE QUANON to
each other. I wave aside the problem of which comes first.
It is quite clear that they develop simultaneously and in tan-
dem. It would in any case be impossible to achieve either one
without the other. By good Society I mean ultimately one
species, one world . . . . It is now clear that with the
goodness of the person held constant, it is possible to make
social arrangements that will force these people to either
evil behavior or into good behavior . . . . To some extent
the goodness or badness of a person depends upon the social
institutions and arrangements in which he finds himself
(pp. 18-19.

The relationship of Man with society is a naturally complementing,

cooperative one. Society is so to speak the mirror in which, according

to Combs (1962):

The feeling of oneness with one's fellows produces in the
truly adequate person a high degree of responsible, trust-
worthy behavior.

The truly adequate personality has the capacity for identifi-
cation with his fellows. The feeling of identification seems
to produce a deep sensitivity to the feelings and attitudes of
others.

One learns to identify with others, depending upon the nature of his contacts with the important people in his life (p. 164).

As Men fulfill themselves in cooperation with others, the adequate attitude for them is not to be hostile with one another; instead, it is to have a cooperative, emphatic attitude toward other members of Mankind with whom they share their human condition. An emphatic identification with society means concern for human species, it is a trustworthy, cooperative attitude that values cooperation above the selfish pursuit of one's individuality. As Kelley (1962) expresses:

> Man is a social being in relationship to others. The fully functioning person thinks well of others and therefore sees his stake in others. The life good to live depends on the quality of the people around the individual. His world needs to be populated by people whom he can view as facilitating. The life good to live is a cooperative one. When the person is part of something (consulted and involved), then he becomes responsible (p. 164).

It follows, then, that Society, for the Humanistic psychology tradition, is in a constant cooperative relationship with the individual.

Humanistic Psychology and the Aim of Education

The purpose of education within the Humanistic tradition is to facilitate students in the unfoldment of the inborn capabilities they bring with them at birth. It is a process of self-actualization of their individual potential, a process that can be helped but not forced or imposed from the outside. Maslow (1962) refers to this process of becoming in the following terms:

> This force (dynamic force of the inner nature) is one main aspect of the 'will to health', the urge to grow, the pressure to self-actualization, the quest for one's identity . . . . The process of growth is the process of becoming a person (p. 234).

The aim of education for the Humanistic psychologist or educator is to provide the kind of experiences, environment, and general school arrangements that facilitates and fosters growth. This is in no way an artificial manipulation of the environment with the predetermined purpose of producing a certain kind of individual. It is instead the providing of circumstances that will help to emerge as many personalities, diverse in nature, as possible. The goal is not the pursuit of a standard type of Man, it is the generation of human diversity. This view is supported by Rogers (1962) who asserts:

> The self and the personality emerge from experience, rather than experience being translated to fit a preconceived self-structure. It means that one becomes a participant in and observer of the ongoing process of organismic experience, rather than being in control of it. The individual moves toward more acceptantly being a process, a fluidity, a changing. It lives in a more existential fashion. Such living in the moment, then, means an absence of rigidity, of light organization, of the imposition of structure on experience. It means instead a maximum of adaptability, a discovery of structure in experience, a flowing, changing organization of self and personality (p. 234).

The pursuit of self-actualization within a Humanistic framework of thinking is the same as its educational goal. It involves helping the individual to move toward more personal acceptance of his self and others, facilitates the enrichment of perceptual fields, widens capabilities for experiencing, increases knowledge both in a quantitative and qualitative form. That is knowledge based on personal meanings, deep involvement, and faithfulness to values and beliefs and a human concern for the realization of Mankind.

Humanistic Psychology and the
Nature of Curriculum

The curriculum advocated by Humanistic psychology is one that

reflects students' rights to choose what is important for them to learn.
It is consonant with the student's dignity, since no manipulation of the
environment is involved, no accounts of observable behaviors are recorded
for evaluation purposes. The curriculum of the Humanistic school exists
in students' minds and does not need to be written on paper since it is
everflowing, changing for every particular student involved in the
learning process (Dobson and Dobson, 1979). This curriculum is more in-
terested in fostering the becoming of human beings than it is interested
in other purposes such as training and preparation for adequate func-
tioning in society.

Zais (1976) offers a description of what the curriculum that fosters
the human development of students is interested in:

> The general aim of the curriculum is to develop individuals
> along lines consonant with our ideal of the authentic human
> being. But since our authentic human being is a responsibil-
> ity free, self-reliant person living in a community of
> self-reliant men, we may alternately phrase our major aim as
> 'self-knowledge for every student.' Goals, therefore, will
> include (among others) enabling students (1) to become aware
> of the interior bases for their encapsulation, (2) to become
> conscious of the enculturating effect of society, (3) to
> assess the relationship of themselves to their environment in
> self-and social-critical terms, and (4) to develop an openness
> to experience . . . . Content selection and organization . . .
> will generally depend on two criteria: (1) effectiveness in
> fostering present awareness of self in society and (2) growth
> toward the increasing exercise of responsible freedom . . . .
> Child-rearing practices, family relationships, human psycho-
> logical needs, and other content from psychology, physiology,
> anthropology, etc., will provide students with a history of
> their own personal encapsulation . . . . The important thing
> is its self-and social-critical character (pp. 239-240).

Overall, the curriculum that evolves out of the postulates of
Humanistic psychology is interested in the unfolding of the inborn poten-
tialities the individual brings with him, his human potential for
becoming a fully integrated human being. It is more concerned with
preparing for the condition of being than for the condition of having

(Fromm, 1955). It is respectful of the human condition of students since it does not impose content nor manipulate the school environment in order to foster learning. It is deeply concerned with fostering self-knowledge by each individual involved, the development of adequate views of self or self-concept, the formation of progressively adequate perceptual fields as an ongoing continual part of the learning process and it is more interested in understandings than in retrieval of facts through evaluation instruments and devices.

Humanistic Psychology and Instructional Behavior

The classroom behavior of the teacher, according to the basic premises of Humanistic psychology, is expressed through the helping of students to construct rich perceptual fields as a precondition for the progressive forming of adequate structures of personal meanings. The teacher does not "teach" in the traditional role. He believes extensively in the inborn capacities of the students that require only help, adequate non-directive guidance in the process of learning, that it is the same as unfolding of the basic equipment that he brings with him at birth. The instructional process within this parameter will be in need of individualization, but in a sense that departs from the conception of individualized learning proposed by Behaviorists. For the latter, the educational goals are pre-established, the teacher is the owner of the knowledge to be deposited into the students' reservoir of knowledge.

A wide variety of physical resources and appropriateness of the environment will be of paramount importance. Zais (1976) identifies dialogue as the exemplar vehicle of communication that teachers and students alike will use to foster their understandings of each other and of the

learning involved. He expresses:

> Perhaps the most promising learning activity . . . is what
> Pritzkau calls the dialogue. He defines this activity as:
>
>> . . . conversation between two or more persons in
>> which each transcends his solitude and accepts his
>> aloneness and that of the other person's, thereby
>> seeking a form of transaction which maintains the
>> maximum freedom of each (Pritzkau, 1970, p. 10).

The Humanist educator pursues a kind of instructional behavior that
will have expression in the pursuit of the synoptic view of man . . .
moving toward awareness, responsible freedom, self-reliance, community,
authenticity--in short, a more human existence.

Such a synoptic view of Man requires an instructional behavior that
looks upon Man as a never finished being, one always personally involved
in the process of the making of self, a process that only finishes with
his physical death.

Humanism and the Nature of Evaluation

The major emphasis of Humanistic Psychology is permitting the
unfolding of the inborn potential of the students on an individual
basis. The evaluation procedures are not concerned with measurement
based on comparison, but rather focus on performance of the individual.
That is, they are more concerned with the process of learning than with
the demonstration of learning based on group or average expectations.
This view is supported by Zais (1979) who express the non-closed char-
acter of a Humanist psychology perspective:

> Outcomes would tend to be stated in humanistic rather than
> behavioral terms, and the behavioral psychology of the
> training paradigm would be supplanted by the 'self' or
> 'existential' psychology of Abrham Maslow or Carl Rogers . . .
> rather than specifying the psychological principles which
> would govern teacher's manipulation of learners, and between
> teachers and learners. . . . The 'motivation' and behavior

change of learners would be intrinsically stimulated, and
teachers would function in the role of 'sensitive' and
'responsive' whole human beings (p. 318).

A view of the process of evaluation for the Humanist perspective is
expressed by Dobson and Dobson (1979):

1. Errors are necessarily a part of the learning process;
    they are to be expected and even desired, for they contain
    information essential for further learning.

2. Those qualities of a person's learning which can be carfeully
    measured are not necessarily the most important.

3. Objective measures of performance may have a negative
    effect upon learning.

4. Learning can be assessed intuitively by observing a child
    working or playing (p. 26).

Dobson and Dobson go on to say that

Evaluation is solicited by the learner and the norm is self-
established. Evaluation data is available to the child upon

his request and represents a shared experience as opposed to
being imposed from without. The child is furnished with data
and encouraged to analyze and interpret them for him/herself
(p. 26).

It follows then, that for Humanistic Psychology oriented teachers the

emphasis is upon the process of learning rather than upon its outcomes.

It is more concerned with watching the process of the unfoldment of stu-

dent's capabilities in an active spectator role. This takes place with-

out imposing undue constraints upon students' capabilities.

The learning equation is viewed as consisting of two halves;

information and personal meaning. How a student feels about what they

have learned is equally as important as what they have learned.

CHAPTER VI

EDUCATIONAL RHETORIC

The Meaning of Educational Talk

Language is an expression of a person's beliefs. The language forms used to express thoughts in education convey intentions. Rhetorical expressions are used either intentionally or unintentionally to convey the structure of meanings. Practices, more often than not, are a reflection of a person's intentions, and in most cases are expressed through the language they use. Since language directs action, it is necessary to identify how language can be used to convey particular interests.

The work of Habermas (1971) who focuses on what he calls human interests is an interesting perspective to focus one's analysis of the uses of language in education. For Habermas, all knowledge is an expression of Man's interests. Three main interests explain why Man generates knowledge: (1) interest in technical control, (2) interest in mutual understanding, and (3) interest in emancipation. It should be stressed that Habermas' thesis concerns Man's interest and its relationship in the generation of knowledge. The three human interests identified by Habermas are used as a point of departure for explaining how language communication can be used by man to express his interest which results in the production of knowledge. The nexus of human interest will be used to explain Man's use of knowledge in conveying these interests.

The first interest identified by Habermas, interest in technical control, is expressed according to McCarthy (1978) as an outgrowth of a

> . . . behavioral system of instrumental action [which] . . . arose, contingently, in the natural evolution of the human species . . . it is grounded, contingently, in the action-oriented, bodily organization of man . . . this system of action binds with transcendental knowledge necessity, our knowledge of nature to the interest in possible technical control over natural processes (p. 63).

It seems that for Habermas, Man has a need for controlling the events in his surrounding environment. Because of Man's interest in controlling events that affect his life, a form of knowledge has emerged where ". . . the world appears objectively as a universe of facts whose lawlike connections can be grasped descriptively" (McCarthy, 1978, p. 57).

The technical interest in control possesses the following characteristics:

1. It is _instrumental_, by the fact that Man's actions are purpose-oriented. Whatever we believe must have a practical application counterpart.

2. It tends toward the development of a _synthesis_, which is no more than facts proved through empirical testing then rendered as accepted hypothesis for the explanation of reality.

Man's interest in technical control is expressed by Habermas using Pierce's pragmatists forms of inquiry: deduction, induction, and abduction. Reality is explained as a set or as organized predictable events that do not contradict such reality, but instead try to confirm it. The three previously mentioned instances of scientific method have an interest in the settlement of previously agreed truth, certainty of Man in his relation with nature and the development of a body of fixed truth that explains rather than contradicts Man's explanation of reality.

Within this framework of thought, Man's beliefs must be proven effective
in practice. If they are not, he has to proceed to a restructuring of
his beliefs in such a way that the newly generated beliefs do not con-
tradict practice. Beliefs, then, should be tested through pragmatic
action. If they do not pass the test of empirical verification, they
must be rendered ineffective as a guide for action or purposive behav-
ior. Whatever action is considered ineffective is eliminated, thus the
criterion is effective practice. It discards, as undesirable, any ele-
ment of uncertainty, since interest is for prediction. Reality is sub-
ject to empirical measurement and evaluation. Knowledge that passes the
test of empirical truth is settled, related to other already verified
knowledge and then assembled into a structure that expands with the
addition of more empirically verified truth. The connection between all
interrelated truth is kept as simple as possible, so they constitute a
reduction of reality to its more essential and unproblematic features.
The purpose is to make reality easily explainable, controlled, and later
feasible to predictability. Knowledge is, then, more increasingly used
for prediction and explanation of events. So, interest in technical
control makes necessary the production of knowledge that is technically
applicable. It is oriented toward the potential of science for predic-
tion of events following lawlike connections.

How the human interest in technical control, as identified by
Habermas, constitutes a powerful source for the generation of knowledge,
can be transferred to the present educational situation. It seems that
we are presently dominated by a need for Man to control his environment
in the most predictable and scientific manner. Today's educational
practices focusing mostly around the behavioral objectives movement, the

systems management approach, and concerns for educational accountability practices are an expression of the predominance of the technical interest in control. Because of the fact that the scientific enterprise uses a framework of technical control in dealing with Man's realities, the preponderance of educators' interest in technical control is explained.

If a close observation of the characteristics of the previously mentioned predominant approaches to education is maintained, a common parallel can be drawn between human interest in control and prevailing educational practices. Apple (1979) when talking about the prevailing educational practices that concentrate upon an interest in technical knowledge states:

1. An interest in commonsensical approaches to education that excel for their interests in consensus agreement, absence of conflict, and uncertainty. No ground is let for the undetermined the unexpected. The educational outcomes are predetermined in advance. Each student can proceed at different rates within the system, using diverse paths, but the outcomes of learning are already settled. The student has little access to the decision-making process. Everything is given to him for acceptance. The educational intentions are supposedly "good" and, in fact, the logic of this framework of thought is intended to give truth (knowledge) to students who have not possessed the privilege of acquiring a previously agreed upon knowledge that is worthwhile.

2. Systems management, the behavioral objectives movement, and the educational accountability movement rest on an unquestionable quest for prediction of behavior, everything within the

technical perspective in education is reduced to the means-ends
dilemma. Whatever practice leads to the pre-selected outcomes
of instruction is validated through the test of efficacy and
efficiency. When the elements of certainty, control, and pre-
diction are made prevalent in education, the problem of mani-
pulating a variable that is humane is faced, i.e., the student.
Hence, the moral and ethical questions are left out of context.
There is no interest in dealing with ethical matters since
they belong to the realm of the noncontrolled, verified,
and tested. The affective aspects of education are voided of
consideration, since the prevailing interest is with objectiv-
ity and measurable variables. Ethical matters, then, are
rendered not valid since they are not subjected to scientific
verification. Gintis (1976) brings Illich's position, which
seems to confirm Apple's views about the manipulative effects
of nonethical considerations in the technical perspectives to
education:

> . . . the educational system takes its place alongside
> other service bureaucracies, selling a manipulative,
> prepackaged knowledge product, rendering their
> services addictive, and monopolizing all alternatives
> to self-initiated education on the part of individuals
> and small consenting groups . . . (p. 210).

Manipulative practices, characteristic of a technical perspective
leads to passivity on the part of the manipulated individual. Every step
is calculated and planned so that it leaves out the right of individuals
to reorganize their experiences. This view, then, sets aside the
ethical consideration of how human beings operate in the context of real
life situations. If someone with authority possesses the legal right to
make decisions, then individuals are deprived of moral and ethical

choices. Technical decisions substitute for moral choices. Gintis

(1976) seems to share this assumption when he expresses:

> It seems also true that they do not reward, but instead
> penalize, creative, self-initiated, cognitively flexible
> behavior. By inhibiting the full development of individual
> capacities for meaningful individual activity, schools
> produce Illich's contended outcomes: the individual as
> passive receptor replaces the individual as active agent
> . . . (p. 26).

The very fact, that educational practices based on technical control

are manipulative, tends to be in one direction: from the figure of

authority who possesses knowledge to the individuals who do not own that

knowledge. This type of relationship lacks the basic element of "reci-

procity" that Goulet (1976) states as:

> Necessary for esteem, an idea which has come of age. A reci-
> procity is the sole basis for non-manipulative relationships
> . . . . Structural paternalism in relationships impeded genuine
> growth for both partners. What ought to underlie relationships
> is what Lebret calls 'active respect' for others. Passive
> respect means simply not interfering with the other's growth,
> whereas active respect enjoins positive action to foster the
> fulfillment of others on their own terms (p. 46).

The previously mentioned commonsense assumptions characteristic of the

prevailing educational practices are an attempt on the part of educators

for seeking the respect and validation that comes from adhering to prac-

tices concerned with control. But the fact is that both educational

theorists and practitioners take a "scientistic" stand instead of a

"scientific" one. They operate on the basis of what Apple calls the

reconstructed logic of science as opposed to a "logic" use of science,

being the first activities scientists engage in and the second the

interpretation given by non-scientific people about the real purposes of

science. This difference between scientists and pseudo-scientific

assumptions seriously affects the interpretations of the educators

engaged in pseudo-scientific practices that are the same as second

interpretations of what constitute first hand scientific knowledge.

It turns out, that for Apple (1979), the interest in control and pseudo-scientific approaches to education is responsible for at least the following problems:

1. It has contributed to one-sided perspective of the world by virtue of which pluralistic stances, conflict and uncertainty are left out of contest.

2. The pervading interest is to separate value from fact. Within the scientists' perspective to education, a "value-free" position is given preponderance over a "value-laden" approach posed by critical theory.

3. An utilization perspective in education has focused upon "ameliorative" approaches based mostly in technical-engineering solutions, rather than an interest on questioning the very institutions of society, among them, the school.

4. A pragmatic position favors a betterment upon accepted truth rather than their questioning, although such taken for granted truth might, as in fact happens, contradicts the current situation in education.

5. Very little attention is paid to the role language plays in the settlement of beliefs, maintaining of institutions, and the like, usually forgetting that man is the creator of language forms, thought structures, patterns of meanings, and in consequence, he is indebted to the periodic revision and questioning of his beliefs in order to clarify, analyze, keeping or even changing his beliefs if necessary. Historical evolution takes place when Man is able to look at his products, whether

it be institutions or mores, and affect them through change

whenever necessary.

6. . . . a fundamental ethic that all important modes of
    action can be known in advance by educators and social
    human scientists; that certainty in interaction among
    people is of primary import; and, underlying all of these,
    that the primary aspects of thought and sentiment of
    students should be brought under institutionalized control
    (p. 120).

7. Educators . . . have taken an outmoded positivist stance that

    disavows significant critical self-reflection and have given it

    the name and prestige of the scientific method.

8. Because of our lack of reflectiveness we have perceived our

    dominant style of scientific rationality as being interest

    free, when this may not be the case, thereby contributing to an

    already strongly manipulative ethos of schooling.

9. Educators may find it necessary to seek out forms of
    rationality that are less restrictive than those on which
    they have already drawn so heavily in the past if they are
    in fact to design more humane educational environments
    (p. 121).

10. A fundamental difficulty rests on the models and
    language systems that are applied in designing educative
    environments and engaging in a large portion of
    educational research. These language systems, have
    certain constitutive features that cause their users to
    approach problems in specific and identifiable
    ways. The modes of discourse that curriculum workers and
    other schoolmen employ often seem to be manipulative and
    deterministic. In the dominance of a vulgar behaviorism,
    for instance, in much of our thinking about life in
    classrooms, they are aimed at bringing student action into
    line with previously sedimented patterns of behavior
    extant in a collectivity (p. 121).

If, as was stated earlier in this chapter language structures are

linked to our intentions, which evolve from thought processes, and

through language we make clear thought patterns, there is then an

obvious relationship among what we think, what we say, and what we do.

Whorf (1956) believes the language we use to express our thoughts, shapes our behavior. Our actions are an expression of the ways we use to explain reality to ourselves. From this follows that if we use Habermas's interests as ideal explanations of reality belonging to the realms of thought processes then, the very language we use to make explicit these processes assume the form of the prevailing interest. If we are concerned with the control of reality and its explanation as a sequence of lawlike processes, then it follows that our language will reflect our intentions of interest in control. This view is shared by Frymier (1972) who states:

> Beliefs and assumptions, which are made by men and held by men, are a part of our environment, too. We are imprisoned by the assumption which we hold . . . as long as people hold to . . . "pathogenic premises" - the reductionist view of man, the separateness of men, of man from nature, the economic image of man, the belief that the future of the planet ought to be left to autonomoun nation-states - we immobilize ourselves. Everything can be explained away as a function of the fact that everything lies outside of our own sphere of control. It is a fatalistic, pessimistic set of notions . . . (p. 8).

In the oppopsite direction is Habermas' third human interest: that one of emancipation from unwanted dogmatism, where reason plays an important part, it corresponds to the definition of Enlightenment given by Kant and brought about by McCarthy (1978):

> Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's ability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self incurred is this tutelage when its causes lies not in lack of reason but in the lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another . . . (p. 11).

When societal pressures impinge upon a weak ego, control mechanisms assume the forms of "institutionalized repression in the form of power and ideology" (p. 91). As a result of social pressures, communication is affected. The individual, then, is interested in breaking with this

state of affairs, if the interest of enlightenment or uses of the powers

of critical reasoning emerges. The action is of self-reflection over

the ways these previously mentioned social mechanisms operate. The

bringing of these insights into the level of consiousness is important

because analytic elements are in operation. Critical reflection and its

relationship to liberation is a critical point of Habermas' thesis.

Self-reflection and consciousness knowledge is worth having, if it helps

to build responsibility and autonomy. More valid overall, critical

reflection, because it operates at the level of consciousness serves to

dispel societal dogmas. This view is expressed by McCarthy (1978) when

he asserts that:

> In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes
> to coincide with the interest in autonomy and responsibility.
> For the pursuit of reflection knows itself as a moment of
> emancipation. Reason is at the same time subject to the
> interest in reason. We can say that it obeys an emancipatory
> cognitive interest, which aims at the pursuit of reflection
> . ... the implication is that the emancipatory interest aims
> not simply at the pursuit of knowledge and reflection as such
> but as a practical change of established conditions, a parti-
> sanship guided by a critical insight into specific structures
> of power and ideology (p. 95).

Critical insights and conscious exploration of reality make possi-

ble the change of societal conditions that are already settled and

accepted for many without questioning. Critical activity based on

knowledge leads to emancipation through the questioning of established

societal rules and principles.

Apple (1970) seems to support Habermas' thesis for a critical

stance. He would involve an attitude in which accepted truths, conven-

tional societal rules, and absolutes in education are seen as obstacles

in education and submit to a serious appraisal the ways in which we do

certain things in education and learn how to question what is accepted

as unquestionable practices. He states that:

> There is nothing very odd about the fact that we usually do
> not focus on the basic sets of assumptions which we use.
> First, they are normally known only tacitly, remain
> unspoken, and are very difficult to formulate explicitly.
> Second, these basic rules are so much a part of us that they
> do not have to be expressed. By the very fact that they are
> *shared* assumptions, the product of specific groups of
> people, and are commonly accepted by most educators. . . .
> However, if we are to be true to the demands of rigorous
> analysis, it is a critical inquiry into just such things as
> the routine grounds of our day to day experience that is
> demanded. . . means must be found to illuminate the concrete
> ways in which the curriculum field supports the widespread
> interests in technical control of human activity, in ration-
> alizing, manipulating personal style and political diversity
> (p. 126).

Within the line of critical theory Paulo Friere (1970) working

within a third world perspective to education which can be applied in

its more general perspective to a worldly approach to education, sees

man's process of looking for a place in the world as both objective and

subjective. It does not include a pure mechanical perspective, neither

a pure subjective one. It is a blending of the two that allows man to

have a unified vision of his reality. For Freire (1970) "orientation in

the world" is a basic point since it explains Man's purposive striving.

"Orientation in the world . . . places the question of the purposes of

action at the level of critical perception of reality" (p. 326).

Man, different from animals, through the process of "orientation in

the world" adapts to this world and in the process humanizes it, all

within both an historical and valuative perspective. The process by

which man accomplishes his "orientation in the world" becomes

the realization of his own project.

Man's project, his becoming, is a process to which he adds purpo-

sive action which he calls "objectives." The blending of the two:

objectives and process provide Man's "orientation in the world."

He contends that:

> The action of men without objectives, whether the objectives
> are right or wrong, mythical or demythologized, naive or
> critical, is not praxis, though it may be orientation in the
> world. And not being praxis, it is action ignorant both of
> its aim: The interrelation of the awareness of aim and of
> process is the basis for planning action, which implies
> methods, objectives, and value options (Freire, 1970, p. 326).

Freire's (1970) critical approach to education, although implies an

abstract philosophical-sociological analysis, is strongly grounded in

his practice of teaching Brasilian peasants in the process of acquisi-

tion of literacy, which for him is a highly value-laden process. He

strongly expresses:

> Teaching adults to read and write must be seen, analyzed, and
> understood in this way. The critical analyst will discover in
> the methods and texts used by educators and students practical
> value actions which betray a philosophy of man, well or poorly
> outlined, coherent or incoherent. Only someone with a
> mechanistic mentality. . . could reduce adult literacy learning
> to a purely technical action. Such a naive approach would be
> incapable of perceiving that technique itself as an instrument
> of men in their orientation in the world is not neutral
> (p. 326).

In his explanation of the critical forces at work within the liter-

acy processes he directed, Freire uses the comparison of two primers

used to teach reading and writing: a poor one and a good one. The

teacher who uses the good primer based its election on the meanings con-

veyed by the words and uses these words for discussions with his stu-

dents along with sentences, and paragraphs. In the poor primer the

words are choosen for the teacher. What takes place is what Freire

(1970) refers to as a feeding act. The teacher feeds into a passive

learner who takes without questioning what the teacher chooses to give

him:

> Insofar as the primer is the mediating object between the
> teacher and students, and the students are to be filled with

words the teachers have chosen, one can easily detect a first
important dimension of the image of man which here begins to
emerge. It is the profile of a man whose consciousness is
"spatialized," and must be "filled" or fed in order to know
(p. 327).

By means of a process of "feeding receptacles", the teacher assumes

the idea of Man as a passive being, the object of the learning process,

and not its activation. Such a perspective renders the learning act

alienating since it is detached of the socio-cultural reality of the

learners involved.

How the content of the primer leads to alienation is better

expressed in the following passage:

Peter did not know how to read. Peter was ashamed. One day,
Peter went to school and registered for a night course.
Peter's teacher was very good. Peter knows how to read now.
Look at Peter's face [These lessons are generally illustrated.]
Peter is smiling. He is a happy man. He already has a good
job. Everyone ought to follow his example (Freire, 1981,
p. 328).

This passage is a most typical example of how through language manipu-

lation alienation is fed into students' minds. The utilitarian concept

of education, where learning is not good per se, but as an instrument

for the obtention of a job, serves to alienate the student, since it

confuses the true reasons by which men should become knowledgeable.

Since a close relationship exists between thought and language, we

are bounded to express what has been taught to us, in consequence,

meanings as expressed in such alienating primers, tend to mislead the

student's perceptions of reality at very early stages in the learning

process. The confounding and misleading role language plays in the

primers analyzed by Freire (1970) shows more eloquently in the analysis

of the content of a second primer:

It is about May 1st, the Labor Day Holiday, on which workers
commemorate their struggles. It does not say how or where

these are commemorated, or what the nature of the historical
conflict was. The main theme of the second lesson is
holidays. It says that 'on these days people ought to go to
the beach to swim and sunbathe . . . .' Therefore, if May 1st,
is a holiday, and if on holidays people go to the beach, the
conclusion is that the workers should go swimming on Labor Day
instead of meeting with their unions in the public squares to
discuss their problems.

> Analysis of these texts reveals, then, a simplistic
> vision of men, of their world, of the relationship between the
> two and of the literacy process which unfolds in that world
> (p. 329).

The passages of the mentioned primers are deterministic because a

view of Man is tacit when he is detached from his reality for purposes

of teaching: Such a perspective is degrading of the human condition of

the learners since it implies their lack of capabilities for meaningful

learning. Also, this perspective assumes that the learners have in

their minds empty spaces to be filled with knowledge.

An additional element appears as a result of the analysis of such a

type of meaningless learning designed for the "marginal" student.

Teaching within parameters that legitimate the self-fulfilling prophecy

is eminent in socioeconomic considerations, where the power structure

built into social institutions to degrade the poor makes him poorer and

more powerless. Marginability as a social phenomenon, created for those

holding the power to discriminate, is seen by Freire (1970) in the fol-

lowing terms:

> . . . illiterates have to be recognized as being 'outside of,'
> 'marginal to' something, since it is impossible to be
> marginal to nothing. But being 'outside of' or 'marginal to'
> necessarily implies a movement of the one said to be marginal
> from the center, where he was, to the periphery. This move-
> ment, which is an action, presupposes in turn not only an
> agent but also his reasons. Admitting the existence of
> men 'outside of' or 'marginal to' structural reality, it seems
> legitimate to ask: Who is the author of this movcement from
> the center of the structure to its margin? Do so called
> marginal men, among them the illiterates, make the decision
> to move out to the pheriphery of society? If so, marginality

is an option with all that it involves: hunger, sickness, pain, mental deficiencies, living death, crime, promiscuity, despair, the impossibility of being . . . . If then, marginality is not by choice, marginal man has been expelled from and kept outside of the social system and is therefore the object of violence.

In fact, however, the social structure as a whole does not 'expel' nor is marginal man a 'being outside of.' He is on the contrary, 'being inside of,' within the social structure, and in a dependent relationship to those whom we call falsely autonomous beings, inauthentic beings-for-themselves (p. 330).

Here, intensely expressed by Freire, is something which is at the very center of dehumanized schooling structures, i.e., the diagnostic treatment approach using mostly manipulating language communication to convey the meaning of "illness", where the real problem is one of conditioned relationships, where the oppressive intention is simulated under the name of "treatment" for all educational diseases. The thought, that the language process of manipulative conditioned relationships presupposes, as Frymier (1972) believes, is that someone owns the power (knowledge) to be exerted upon others who lack it. By virtue of such simplistic outlook, men are alienated from their right to be heard. Alienation cannot be overcome by any other means other than by those reflecting a critical transformation of the very social institution (in our case, school) and dehumanizing structures. Schools as sacred depositaries of knowledge are accomplished when educators attempt to solidify the raw material in the learning process; the student, proceeding to treat him as a separate entity. When this happens, the educator detaches himself from the act of teaching with the pretext of striving for objectivity for diagnostic and prescriptive purposes. This also implies that an individual who considers himself as depository of truth imposes agreed upon truth upon others considered less knowledgeable (the

students). This form is considered by Apple (1979, p. 134) as a process implying ". . . the notion of power of one group to 'impose' these social constructs on others." From this process emerges the labeling that so frequently goes on in schools. The labeling process, according to Apple, besides taking the attention out of the institutional problems, also leaves unexamined the economic and cultural problems that are causing the maladies that schools attempt to solve through the labeling, diagnostic, and prescription circle. Labeling, when misused carries the power of language to cause what is designed as the "self-fulfilling prophecy": the labels are permanently attached to the students, because once a quality judgment is associated with a particular child, the qualification will last forever. When the label used is of the type that suggests deviance, the effect is devastating upon the integrity of the child. Labeling has moral implications; it carries the danger of lacking moral qualities, in that it makes the labeled student fit into accepted categories of normalcy, which can be detrimental to the students' self-concepts. Furthermore, it has the effect of being generalized to all situations into which the student as an individual is placed. As a consequence of labeling, the knowledge distributed to differently labeled students differs both in quantity and in quality. As Apple (1979) expresses, the categorization of knowledge, according to its "value" is often decided outside of the school parameters, and it reflects what knowledge is worth possessing, the differences between work and play. A critical posture to the problem would involve the discovering of the ideological relationships existing between the process of labeling and the economic and social conditions within which the labeling process takes place. A critical stance would question (1) the

fact that labeling canalizes childrens' expectancies in and out of the school boundaries and (2) the myth that labeling is helping, a meaning conveyed by the language of "scientific" solutions expressed in the formula diagnosis-prescription.

When the diagnosis-prescription approach is used, the intention behind the idea is to make those deviant individuals return to normalcy, which is the same as to say back to a pre-emptied, deterministic idea of the normal personality.

Critical theory would dispel the myth that "pseudo-scientific" mechanisms of control are morally and ethically appropriate. The manipulative language of control would be unmasked, its homogenizing intentions uncovered, the focus will change from individual to institutions when the intention in identifying maladjustments is the intention. As a final consequence, educational research will change its control orientation for more apassionate human commitments to the solution of human problems with human solutions, not educational engineering formulas (Apple, 1979).

The belief expressed through this chapter has been to provide an unmistakable linkage between our thought patterns and our language communication, which in turn, guide beliefs and practices in education. Control theories, critical theory, and hermeneutic theory convey through specific and differential language patterns, different structures of meanings.

Fromm (1968) seems to follow along the lines of Habermas and Apple's positions regarding the uses of Critical Theory. He elaborates essentially on the mental processes that make individual awareness an essential condition for critical insights. Let contemplate Fromm's

explanations concerning the circumstances that make possible man's awareness.

> Our conscious thought is that type of thinking linked with language, which follows the social categories of thought imprinted in our thinking from early childhood. Our consciousness essentially is the awareness of such phenomena which the social filter composed of language, logic, and taboos permits us to become aware of. Those phenomenon which cannot pass the social filter blocks its entry. This is the reason why consciousness is determined by the structure of society . . . . Inasmuch as man has to work within a given society, his need for survival tends to make him accept the social conceptualizations and hence to repress that which he would be aware of had his consciousness been imprinted with different schemata (p. 73).

In Fromm's view that our thoughts are made conscious when they are filtered through the screen of language besides the other two; it supports the view that language can serve the purpose of expressing social formed structures of thought. This is why language can be used as an instrument of manipulation for those whose thought structures corresponds to a technical, "scientistic" persuasion, as an instrument for mutual understanding (in the case of Hermeneutic Theory) and as an instrument for liberation or emancipation (in Critical Theory). Fromm's (1968) insights in the area of awareness provide us with valuable hints of how a critical perspective to human concerns (education, among them) can be accomplished:

1. Increasing Man's awareness is "opening one's eyes and seeing what is in front of one" (p. 66).

2. Awareness serves the purpose of dispelling myths that block consciousness.

> . . . the social contradictions and irrationalities which throughout most of man's history forced upon him a 'false-consciouness' in order to justify domination and submission repectively--dissapear or at least are reduced to such a degree that the apology for the existential order does not paralyze man's capacity for critical thought (p. 67).

. . . awareness of existing reality and of alternatives
for its improvement helps to change reality, and every
improvement in reality helps the clarification of thought
(p. 67).

The connection between man's awareness provided for his power
for critical reasoning with feelings and emotions. . . he
[man] has also a heart and a body which need to be tied emo-
tionally to the world. . . But what he needs most in order to
retain his sanity is some tie to which he feels securely
related. The one who has no such tie is, by definition,
insane, incapable of any emotional connection with his fellow
man (p. 68).

Freire (1981) provides us with his perspective of how Man's aware-

ness led to emancipation through educational means:

All educational practice implies a theoretical stance on the
educator's part. This stance in turn implies--sometimes more,
sometimes less explicitly--an interpretation of man and the
world. It could not be otherwise: The process of men's
orientation in the world involves not just the association of
sense images, as for animals. It involves above all,
thought-language; that is, the act of knowing through his
praxis, by which man transforms reality (p. 325).

Apple (1979) offers us his interpretation of how critical theory

goes about accomplishing its function. An analysis of his perspective

also provides us with the means for using critical theory in the anal-

yses of educational problems:

Within the context of critical analysis a problem is seen as
generated for correlational causes: reasons for its
existence, historical development of the problem, etc. In
this perspective contradiction and conflict is very likely to
arouse. The element of fluid change as permanent is involved
and all possible causes and relationships are examined.
Questioning of accepted institutionalized truths is the norm
rather than the exception (p. 132).

Critical science helps the individual to focus on existing reality

in a dialectical way, a means by which Man looks at his institutional

products, criticizes them in his own way of criticizing and in this dia-

lectical way improve his perceptions of the circumstances created by

himself and improve it in the process. The cycle is repeated and never

ends, since Man keeps himself in perpetual critique and reconstructive dialogue with his social productions.

Fromm's contention that those thoughts that are not filtered through the screen of language do not penetrate the level of consciousness is also shared by Apple (1979) who sees the process of gaining increasing awareness in a world bound by social traditions as:

> . . . a difficult task, at best. It requires a painful process of radically examining our current positions and asking pointed questions about the relationship that exist between these positions and the social structure from which they arise. It also necessitates a serious and in-depth search for alternatives to these almost unconscious senses we employ and an ability to cope with an ambigious situation for which answers can now be only dimly seen and will not be easy to come by . . . it usually takes a crisis of some sort to bring this basic rules to a level of consciousness. This is rather important for it should be clear that a crisis has arisen in education, one which raises significant questions about the very base on which schoolmen operate . . . (p. 128).

In summary, a movement or dialogue with our fellow teachers, simultaneous with an act of reflection about our ways of behaving and a questioning of the very act of questioning, seems to be necessary steps in the process of critical-conscious awakening.

CHAPTER VII

A DESIGN FOR EDUCATIONAL BELIEFS/PRACTICE

CONGRUENCE

In this chapter an attempt will be made to help teachers discover
ways of making educational choices more sound, based on an analysis of:

1. The factors operating against congruence.

2. The process of bringing current knowledge in education
    and teacher's philosophic postures in education to a level
    of conscious awareness.

3. An action orientation that is simultaneous to the process
    of critical awareness awakening elicited through
    Existential dialogue.

Factors Operating Against Congruence

It has been pointed out through preceding chapters that in the pro-
cess of striving for educational beliefs/practice congruence a multitude
of factors operate to make the process both slow and difficult. But,
whatever these factors are, the notion will be introduced in this chap-
ter is that they operate as part of a process in which teachers' per-
ceptions of educational reality are distorted either by a <u>lack of</u>
<u>conscious analysis</u> or by an absence of meaningful knowledge of educa-
tional theory/philosophy. It will be shown how these possible occur-
rences are intertwined.

Lack of conscious awareness operates as part of a process identified by Fromm (1955) as alienation or,

> . . . a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one might say, estranged from himself. He does not experience himself as the center of the world, as the creator of his own acts--but his acts and their consequences have become his masters, whom he obeys, or whom he may even worship. The alienated person is out of touch with himself as he is out of touch with any other person. He like others, is experienced as things are experienced, with the senses and with common sense, but at the same time without being related to oneself and to the world outside productively (p. 111).

The same process which can be characterized mainly by a loss of touch with reality concerning oneself and others is designated by Zais (1976, p. 219) as encapsulation, a general condition in which the individual believes that he has an accurate perception of reality when in fact, because of various limitations, he has only a partial and distorted image of what is really "out there . . . ."

It will be contended that this process of self-estrangement as absence of conscious awareness has its roots in a series of conditions inherent in the very nature of Man, who is an Existential being capable of directing his potential through freedom in any direction he chooses: toward good or toward evil, but with a recognized tendency toward goodness, inherent in his own willingness for striving. In this process Man defines his own essence.

It is contended that the most powerful source of alienation for Man from his reality is of a sociological nature. This idea seems to be supported by Freire (1981) who states:

> The process of men's orientation in the world involves not just the association of sense images, as for animals. It involves, above all, thought-language; that is, the possibility of the act of knowing through his praxis, by which *man transforms reality* (emphasis mine) (p. 325).

Other sources of the phenomenon of separation of Man from his reality, "encapsulation," as named by Zais (1976, pp. 219-220), are ". . . the physiology and internal psychology of man" being first explained as a limitation by means of which ". . . man views the world through a set of physiologial sensory 'goggles' that he believes convey an accurate image of 'what is', but which in fact presents him with a highly edited and uniquely human point of view."

The limitations based on the internal psychology of Man are expressed by Zais (1976) as

> Men are limited in their ability to learn and think . . . the ability fo conceptualize abstract ideas and relationships is another area of man's psychological limitations . . . emotional and UNCONSCIOUS processes frequently divest man of his capacity for rational thought . . . (p. 220).

The identified major source of Man's alienation from his personal and social reality stems from his exchange with society, something that is the major paradox in Man's life: he must struggle to be himself and relate to his world and still keep his freedom and responsibility.

Fromm (1955) supports the idea that Twentieth Century society with its technological and automatized character has presented to Man a reality in which he has become the servant of the machinery, represented by social institutions of which school is one. Man's products enslave him because the bigness and abstraction prevalent in Man's products (his institutions) make him feel powerless to control what originally was the product of his most creative thinking. Today's world is pervaded by an interest in quantitification: the more, the better. As a consequence of such immeasurable reality Man is thrown out of his place of creator having in the process to make abstract his reality in a frustrated attempt to grasp it. Man-made technological society rests basically on

a desperate <u>need</u> <u>for</u> <u>control</u> <u>of</u> <u>events</u>. This was identified in the pre-
ceding chapter as Haberma's theory of control.

Control over natural events has degenerated into an effort of Man
to control all realms of life, besides the natural one. Man's created
need for control of socioeconomic processes leans toward the need for
smooth operation of Man-created institutions. This process of control-
ling events, the need for prediction toward the goal of smoothness of
operation pervades all institutions, schools included. Fromm (1955)
states:

> . . . life is being denied; need to control and creativeness,
> curiosity and independent thought are baulked, and the
> result, the inevitable result is flight or fight . . . apathy
> or destructiveness, psychic regression (p. 114).

Since Man's material creation is too big to be controlled by him,
by every involved Man, he has developed anonymous sources of control, by
means of which no one Man experiences a sense of true responsibility for
his actions. Man creates authorities external to him to blame if the
Man-made production is faulty in its operation.

In this world Man experiences himself and others as part of the
whole machinery that runs Man's social products, institutions, self, and
others become little pieces of the social apparatus, "things," abstract
entities, where each part plays a role. Success is felt when no faulty
behavior of the "thing" that Man is, is detected.

In this process, Man becomes the servant of his own inventions
which earlier were "successful attempts to overcome nature." It seems
logical to suppose that since Man's function is so limited, his expecta-
tions are embodied in a sense of experiencing duty toward his creation.
This means that Man thinks his duty is synonymous to the exercising of
control, no pleasure is derived for Man in this process, and his only

incentive is the external reward that comes from knowing that the social apparatus is still operating at its peak, independently of Man, for good or for bad. No ethical or moral questions are asked by him since he has the inner feeling of performing a duty. In this inhumane, mechanistic process, Man is void of experiencing pleasure. Boredom occasionally arouses, but the anonymous, covert authority exerted over him very soon annihilates all discontent, and he is externally rewarded with a sense of "duty," "proper citizenship," "good worker," and the like.

Man's worth is measured in terms of this usefulness and cooperation with the socioeconomic forces that are his very creation. He draws his pride from the accomplishment of the part that he has to play in order for the social machinery to keep running as smoothly as possible. At this point Man stops experiencing himself in order to "feel" the experience of his creation. This behavior is rewarded through the recognition of the extent to which Man is able to fit and adapt to the social order. His behavior is so controlled that it tends to replicate in every other Man. Within this parameter Man fulfills artifically the need for belonging which is inherent in the human condition (Maslow, 1962). Within this context Man makes every effort to improve his production. Change, a quality that needs to be experienced by him in the natural process of growing is replaced for subsequent improvements upon his creation. Change is artificially introduced, meaning the improvement of his material creation, and it tends to be con-fused by change as a necessary condition for his very existence to be guaranteed. Then, Change is seen as natural and the person is eager to supplant one detrimental way of operation for another without any questioning being involved. The way he proceeds is based on plain common sense. So the

senses, not his reason, govern his acts.

This view is shared by Arendt (1967) who expresses that such lack of humaneness in truly human affairs is

> . . . a function of the impersonality of bureaucracy, of the giving and taking of orders, of the smooth functioning of organization, of the unquestioned daily duty of basically decent men, who ask only to be rewarded by praise for a job well done (p. 145).

Within the framework of his material creation, and the school is no exception; Man is left without freedom, since he is compelled to strive for conformity to the social institution.

Sometimes in this process, the person experiences short-lived periods of awareness, but experiencing himself as unable to truly act upon his creation, he proceeds to hopelessly conform and consciously avoid all questioning of his actions, because he cannot see how ways can be devised to break the dehumanizing cycle.

Helpless Man experiences the need for others to take steps to solve his dilemma, since he does not see any possible solution to it. In this way, perpetuation of his alienation is accomplished.

In this process, Man gives up the occasional search for answers to his dilemmas and proceeds to accommodate to the demands of the social system.

Man is compelled toward more work and more improvements in the name of change and he almost never bothers to question if it makes any sense at all what is keeping him so busy. What he really does is to use work as a means to overcome the emptiness created by his own arrangments.

In this way, work (a one time expression of Man's creative and reasoning powers) becomes alienated from himself and this very alienation at the level of his socioeconomic reality is transferred to all other

realms of his activity, blocking possibilities for reasoning by questioning the meaningfulness of his daily activity.

This view is accurately expressed by Freire (1981) when he expresses:

> . . . prevented from having a 'structural perception' of the facts involving them, they do not know that they cannot exercise the right to participate consciously in the socio-historical transformation of their society, because their work does not belong to them (p. 332).

What the previous considerations mean, when applied to the educational scene is that teachers should become aware that the troubles they face when striving for theory/practice or beliefs/practice congruency (terms used here are interchangeable) respond to an already described and all-pervading phenomenon of alienation. The following considerations seem to bring more clarity to this dilemma:

1. Teachers experiment, yet feel their mission as directed by forces strange to them. Sometimes, it is not recognized that these forces come from the very functioning of the socioeconomic system. Experiencing these forces as themselves, they are unable to really decide what in their views should be happening in the classroom. They hopelessly give their responsibility to others: the "experts," technicians," whom they believe are invested with the knowledge to determine right from wrong in the classroom.

2. Teachers immersed in a specific socioeconomic reality sometimes become unaware that this reality is not "given," that it can and in fact is, susceptible to critical analysis. Teachers are unaware that reality

is made out of all Men's contributions and, hence, that they can alter that reality, whenever necessary.

3. Teachers become unaware that the idea of freedom is inherent in the human condition. The exercise of freedom by teachers means feeling free to act responsibly upon the classroom reality in whatever ways they consider enhancing to the human condition of their students.

4. Teachers could become aware that their mission is to enable themselves and students to make and re-make reality through both critical reflection and action, that their mission is better accomplished through the act of enabling students to build a better society by reflection and action upon an already existing reality.

5. Teachers need to realize that both themselves and their students face the conflict of fulfilling social expectations and self-aspirations, but that although this conflict is never fully resolved, it is better approached when they think that their actions for building a better society could be harmonized, that is, if they have a clear perception of what a good society and a good life are, they will make the conflict of self-fulfillment versus social needs almost nonexistent.

6. Despite the bigness of the social institutions, the need for quantification, the abstraction of power, society's need for control, and the like, teachers can make a substantial contribution if they oppose such alienating forces, through a meaningful attempt in the classroom,

directed toward minimizing such dehumanizing forces. A
humanized education directed toward the reconciliation of
Man and society could be the best way to go about making
schooling a more meaningful process.

7. Teachers need to begin to realize that permanence and
change are not necessarily opposites. They could work,
similarly in the process of harmonizing, establishing a
balance between both permanence and change. They should
not be afraid any more of conflict, disorder, chaos,
transiency or temporality, critical awareness, question-
ing, revolt, as opposed to smoothness of operation,
order, prediction, permanence and stability, passive
accepting of orders, and prescriptions.

8. Bigness of society has an impact upon teachers, which
often leads to the misconception that they cannot alter
in positive ways situations that demand radical
changes. They need to realize that by becoming more
aware of their role as agents of change, situations
can be altered for the better.

9. Every action of teachers, although limitations will be
met, should lead to the exercise of their freedom and
those of their students.

10. Teachers should realize that both their practices
and their beliefs are based on the values they
possess, and that there is no such thing as value-free
education, as there is no "value-free" process involving
human beings.

11. The most rewarding feelings in teaching come, not from the recognition from others, but from the inner realization that personal beliefs and practices enhance the human condition of self and learners simultaneously.

12. Teachers should become aware that their role and the role of their students is at its worst, expressed in adjusting and fitting as ideals of behavior and at its best in differentiation, true belonging, and disagreement whenever necessary.

13. Teachers would gain much if they realized that institutions can be changed instead of improved. That change wihin one or more institutions should lead to change in the whole socioeconomic system. That what sometimes passes for malfunctioning of institutions is more than that: the injustice of prevailing social conditions and arrangements.

14. It would be a thought-provoking exercise for teachers to engage in the questioning of the intentions of much of what today passes for "prescriptions" designed to "help" students.

15. Teachers and students' actions need to be imbued in respect for the human condition, through actions that reject all forms of manipulation in the name of the well-being of individuals. Education in all it manifestations need to be moved by love for our fellow-men, for the belief in the inborn potentialities of persons to become whatever they choose to become, for the belief that all

individuals can learn to the best of their potentials when the conditions of the environment allow this to happen.

16. Teachers and students as equally able partners have the human obligation of asking themselves more frequently than they do, the basic questions that define the very essence of education; education for whom, for what, for what purpose, by means of what? Is education contributing to the development of full humaneness, or is it reduced to a "non-sense" all-pervading training?

17. Teachers and students together should engage more frequently in questioning concerning the social environment of their schools, if what is going on at school has any human purpose or meaning, or if it is some form of blind, unquestioned busy activity. Does what is happening in the classroom make sense? If the answer is <u>no</u>, the rational step is to proceed to make sense out of what is being done and have the courage needed to make the changes necessary.

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The Process of Bringing Current Knowledge in

Education and Teachers' Philosophic

Postures in Education to a Level

of Conscious Awareness

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Necessary to the pursuit of beliefs/practice congruence is the process of bringing the scientific knowledge embodied in educational theory to a level of conscious awareness, a process that involves an

analysis of current educational theories and their relationship to cur-
rent educational practices. That this requires an effort of looking
with critical eyes to the socioeconomic forces and event that have made
certain types of positions prevail over others at certain periods of
history. This process will help teachers to recognize that what they do
in the classroom has repercussions on the lives of their students. That
their actions should not be devoid of critical insight into a thoroughly
necessary questioning of education; most of these questions centering on
the why we do things the way we do.

As Zais (1976) asserts:

Now, possessing scientific knowledge about the operation of
encapsulating forces, man is in a position, as he has never
before been, to break out of his unawareness and, by
actualizing human potential for self- and social-criticism,
expand his flexibility of response (freedom) to a magnitude
never before possible (p. 235).

Zais (1976) goes on to say that as a result of Man acting
responsibly upon reality, a complete structure of meanings begins to
emerge. Individual teachers acting upon their knowledge of educational
theory are capable of engaging in a process of clarifying meanings, and
through the process of examining and reexamining what educational theory
has to say, arrive at a tentative structure of personal meanings con-
cerning educational theory and practice. Through an ever-increasing
mode of reflective awareness, assumptions can be refined so as to begin
a process of building a structure of meanings. That the process of
reflective analysis over their set of beliefs and their practices in the
classroom is not an easy matter is pointed out by Zais (1976, p. 237)
who contends that "It is not very difficult to intellectualize about
one's openness to experience and willingness to examine all beliefs, but
it is quite another matter to engage actively in the process . . . ."

According to Zais (1976), for some Existentialist thinkers Man is faced with the dilemma that threatens his very freedom, that is, the self-fulfillment of his own potential, the construction of personal meanings and sharing that Men have with the rest of humankind: his responsibility toward the self-fulfillment of the rest of Mankind's expectation. In the solution of this dilemma Man can risk compromising his very existence and threaten the building of his own essence. Probably, it is at this point when educators face the question: Education for what, for whom? For students' own self-fulfillment or for the fulfillment of society's aspirations?

It seems as Zais (1976) contends that the posed dilemma or "paradox" is impossible to achieve:

> . . . authentic man, completely self-reliant in a fully integrated community - is impossible to achieve. But without ideals life is absurd. Without them man has nothing but his finite transitory self. . . . finite man is faced with many paradoxes, e.g., the simultaneous needs for independence and dependence, change and permanence, striving and repose, reason and sentiment, and, of course, . . . individual diversity and social unity. The question is not 'How can these be resolved?' for they are unresolvable. Rather, the question is, 'How can they be dealt with in a humanly satisfactory and meaningful way?' (p. 236).

Bringing significant knowledge in education to a level of conscious awareness would require a previous act: that of identifying in a rather tentative manner those dominant focuses of educational beliefs and practices, grounded in theoretical knowledge. It was indicated in Chapter I, and later explained in more detail in Chapters II through V, that beliefs and practices in education revolve around three main philosophical schools of thought: Existentialism, Experimentalism, and Essentialism, with their respective counterparts represented in three psychological movements: Humanism, Cognitivism, and Behaviorism.

Each of the psychological and philosophical camps deal with basi-
cally the following components of educational beliefs and practices in
education:

1. The nature of Man.

2. The nature of learning.

3. The nature of knowledge.

4. The nature of society.

5. The nature of curriculum.

6. The aim of education

7. The nature of instructional behavior.

8. The nature of evaluation.

For purposes of clarity, a summary is presented relative to theory
and practice for each of the three camps:

1. Existentialism-Humanism.

2. Experimentalism-Cognitive.

3. Essentialism-Behaviorism.

Being an Existential-Humanistic educator means basic agreement with
the following premises:

1. Man is a potential to be realized in any direction he
    chooses.

2. Man is a subject able of free, responsible choices.

3. Man experiences his world in a unique manner: knowledge
    and experience are instruments that he uses to build his
    growing, ever-changing perceptions of himself.

4. Man's evolving self-concept grows out of the interaction
    with his inner world and with the world around him.

5. When the environment around him (home, school, and society

at large) are trustworthy, Man's natural inclination is to
be constructive. He will socialize without major problems
involved and without need for external coercion. He will
act responsibly because of his tendency to choose his own
good.

6. When Man acts for himself, he defines his essence in the
   process.

7. Essence and Existence are never totally made, beacause
   Man is forever engaged in the process of becoming.

8. Meaning is an inherent condition to Man's learning, which
   is the same as his becoming.

9. Since "meanings" construction are a personal matter, no
   teacher can teach, but rather help in this journey
   through the world of meanings.

10. The Existentialist teacher does not consider that an
    existing body of knowledge must be possessed by all
    persons in order to function adequately.

11. The Existential teacher denies the assumption that every
    generation of Man is a recapitulation of the marks and
    accomplishments of preceding generations, including all
    the scientific knowledge generated until then. Every Man
    in every new generation is made afresh, bringing with him
    only his potential for being.

12. Since knowledge is forever evolving and subjected to
    change, it is in the capacity of the self to make
    important decisions in the absence of certainty. Under
    this condition personal development takes place.

13. The Existential concept of responsibility is inherent to the relationship of the individual to his fellow-men, because when they choose freely and responsible alternatives, affecting their lives, responsible consideration toward others emerges. This is because Man is naturally a social being.

14. The Existential teachers can overcome the apparent conflict between himself and society by means of an attitude that conceals the two apparently opposites: his well-being, and that of his fellow-men, through a unifying gestaltic structure.

15. Education within the Existentialist way of thinking means helping the individual to be self-determinant. Because education is the individual project of Man, it cannot be imposed upon him. The task of the school should have its limits in the freedom of the individual. The person is never finally educated, since this would contradict the Existential premise of fluid change and lack of permanence in Man's life.

16. An adequate view of self is basic for the unfolding process of the individual's intrinsic potentialities.

17. The person in the process of becoming imposes discipline and organization within himself, but still keeps the process moving.

18. Education is the liberation of the innate potential of the individual learners to be whatever they choose to be, in a climate of responsible actions governed by flowing self-structure, within a state of ever-changing

experiences and events.

19. The curriculum of the school dominated by Existential practices is one characterized by its attention to the development of the students' self-concepts, because it determines the richness of personal meanings the students acquire through their academic learning.

20. Curricular practices within the Existential school foster and encourage an environment open to meaningful experiences.

21. The curriculum of these schools applies Existential thought, through the fostering of feelings of belongingness.

22. The Existential school is concerned with dealing with knowledge in as many varieties as possible, in order to elicit the natural curiosity of the students. Knowledge is seen as an instrument that the individual uses in his self-actualization process.

23. The Existential curriculum is interested in helping students to develop a set of consistent values and beliefs.

24. The instructional behavior within an Existential classroom is based upon the Existential premise of the individual's freedom, right to choose, commitment to duty and responsibility and, mainly, student's initiated behavior.

A different set of assumptions would be held by an experimentalist-cognitive teacher. These beliefs and practices would center around the following premises:

1. Man has the capacity for rational thinking. He uses his intelligence (developed by significant experiences) to generates ideas which emerge from experience and are tested against experience.

2. Man is a purposeful being functioning harmoniously with society. Experimentalism does not separate Man from his social context. Man has his expression in society's experiential achievements.

3. Man is a scientific organism. Only through scientific experience can Man achieve the satisfaction inherent to life.

4. For the Experimentalist educator, Man as a unified entity does not neglect Man's freedom: he makes his freedom possible through an intelligent, purposeful relationship to his environment. The quality and quantity of his experiences is what determine Man's freedom.

5. The nature of knowledge within the Experimentalist classroom is its quality of change.

6. When knowledge is relevant to Man through the empirical test of experience, it has the potential for becoming truth.

7. For the Experimentalist teacher, society and the individual are a single entity. Man is essentially a social being and finds his personal achievement through interaction with society.

8. The society, in which an individual performs his best in

interchange with society, is one in which democracy is the prevalent political system.

9. The Experimentalist teacher thinks that Man strives for survival and goes beyond that minimal aspiration, to enjoy the process of experiencing and testing his world. At this point lies the Experimentalist assumption that Man strives purposively for power.

10. The purpose of the school for the Experimentalist teacher is essentially utilitarian. Education is seen as the activation of the possibilities for Man's fulfillment through empirical confrontation of his ideas.

11. Within the school, each child must be given an opportunity to contribute to the well-being of society, which in return makes the individual act responsibly.

12. Edcucation should strive for the development of purposeful intelligence geared toward the wise use of the possibilities Man has, because of his access to experience.

13. The overall function of the school for the Experimentalist teacher is to elicit, through an array of organized experiences, an environment that leads the individual to the conquest of life skills, accessible, mainly through experience, under the form of subject matter. Such intelligent manipulation of experience will provide for the individual a life of enhancement and purpose.

The beliefs and practices of a teacher committed to Essentialist-Behavioristic practices depart in a great measure from those held by

both Existentialist and Experimentalist teachers. These practices can
be summarized in the following premises:

1. Man is inherently evil and is in desperate need for
    external guidance from those who qualify to direct
    his learning.

2. The negative features inherent in Man's endowment
    require strong sources of authority that will mold his
    behavior in desired directions.

3. Because of his inherent limitation, Man is not a free
    entity. His behavior is the determinant of his essence,
    therefore, Man's behavior should be carefully
    controlled.

4. Man defines himself only in close interchange with his
    environment.

5. The Essentialist teacher is mainly interested in dealing
    with students' behavior, since they claim it is the only
    feature of Man that is amenable to observation and
    measurement.

6. Students learn appropriate ways of behavior, and almost
    all learning is reduced to trial and error. Those
    behaviors that are positive must be rewarded by the
    teacher in order to warrant their future occurrence.

7. Learning occurs at the level of students' minds, hence,
    the need for an education corresponds to a training
    of the mental faculties.

8. Because of students' need for control and assistance,
    better learning occurs when it is programmed, dosified,

and controlled, to be given to the student for his unquestioned acceptance.

9. The main function of the school for the Essentialist teacher is that of assisting the students in their entrance to the adult world of maturity and work.

10. The Essentialist teacher recognizes that his students are endowed with different degrees of responsiveness to his environment, different degrees of adaptation to the environment, which is the same as saying, degrees of intelligence which can be precisely asserted through measuring devices.

11. There is a well-organized and developed body of knowledge that should be mastered through the school years as a necessary prerequisite for the individual's optimal functioning within society. Knowlege is also worth "possessing" because it exercises discipline of the mental faculties of the students.

12. The overall function of the Essentialist teacher is one of transmitting knowledge that serves the purpose of maintaining the structure of society. It brings cohesion and uniformity, and also helps students to adjust to a society given to them for their acceptance, not their questioning.

13. The Essentialist teacher sees his role as different from that of the student. He sees himself as the active participant in the process of determining what is good for his students, and the role of the latter as one of obeying

and passively accepting the truth that the teacher reveals for them in the form of knowledge. The teacher sees his role as one of prescribing formulas for the attainment of students' proper behavior.

14. The curriculum structure by the Behaviorist teacher is one narrowly conceived, carefully arranged, based on the products of the culture and having as its major purpose the training of students within rigid patterns of discipline geared more to the well-being of the society than to the fulfillment of the individual students.

15. The Essentialist teacher praises his students' abilities, degree of adjustment, and submission to norms and standards of achievement and behavior.

16. Evaluation techniques serve the purpose of sorting out students through the academic ladder, where survival of the fittest is expressed by achievement of high standards. Those students falling behind previously set minimum requirements are seen as in need of treatment or remedial work, so the task of the school is basically prescriptive and ameliorative.

17. An Essentialist teacher, believing that students possess different degrees of intelligence, will arrange the curriculum and all classroom contingencies upon his belief that some students are better suited than others to pass through the academic experience with different degrees of success and failure. What is a matter of most evaluation is students' behavior as expressed by the quality of

academic performance or output and their overall adjust-

ment to the school environment.

The preceding focuses of educational beliefs/practices are proposed only as tentative contents amenable to a dialogical process. This dialogical mode of operation is similar to the one proposed by Freire (1981) and will be considered within this context as a necessary must in the search for adequate structures of meanings operating at the level of beliefs/practice clarification. Dialogue here, as for Freire (1981), operates at two levels or contexts: theoretical and practical. The theoretical context is for Freire the classroom experience, the give and take of learning, ". . . it is the context of authentic dialogue between learners and educators as equally knowing subjects . . . the second is the real concrete context of facts, the social reality in which men exist" (p. 333).

In a dialogical process, for Friere, "common sense" perception of reality and the person's very questioning of reality, are subject to critical analysis. In this process, reality is "detached" for purposes of analysis. Freire (1981) explains how this process occurs:

> When this representation is projected as a slide, the learners effect an operation basic to the act of knowing: they gain distance from the knowable object. This experience of distance is undergone as well by the educators, so that educators and learners together can reflect critically on the knowable object which mediates between them (p. 333).

This process is called by Freire decodification of reality, which was already codified before the analysis.

A similar view of dialogue as a process of denouncing of encapsulating forces operating upon the individual is brought about by Pritakau (1970). For him, dialogue seems to be:

> Conversation between two or more persons in which each tran-
> scends his solitude and accepts his aloneness and that of the
> other person, thereby seeking a form of transaction which
> maintains the maximum freedom of each . . . there exists an
> attitude of (trust of the mind) in seeking meanings . . . a
> condition of 'openness to experience'. This means that the
> individual has opened himself to receive messages from others
> as well as all types of media, with no priority necessarily
> placed upon one over another . . . . Finally, in dialogue
> every effort is directed by individuals to liberate each other
> in the quest for meanings and to approach an integrity with
> surrounding phenomena (pp. 11-12).

Zais (1976) gives his own view of a DIALOGICAL PROCESS:

> Obviously, the dialogue is akin in form to what we usually
> refer to as 'discussion'. Also obvious, however, is that what
> ordinarily passes for discussion in classrooms is totally
> inadequate to the demands of educating the self-reliant
> student. At its best, discussion is exchange of views, debate,
> or clarification. At its worst, it is merely role playing.
> In any case, it is rarely self-critical (p. 241).

It follows then, that true dialogue is achieved only with the purpose of
clarifying one's own ideas, searching for more complete structures of
meaning.

The process of search for educational beliefs/practice congruence
is seen within this context as conscious knowledge of educational
theory, a critical analysis of past and present trends in education,
which is simultaneous to a critical analysis of educational practices in
order to determine if our awareness of theory and practice have meaning
for us. This process will lead to a conscious awareness of the theoret-
ical basis of education and an analysis of our practices in order to
align them.

The search for congruence is considered here as an active process
on the part of individual teachers involved in the process. It involves
active participation upon reflection of both personal knowledge of edu-
cational theory and educational practices. This process somehow paral-
lels in a deep sense the process Freire (1981, p. 331) uses to teach

illiterates to read and write, in his words, ". . . a human act implying reflection and action."

The process of increasing awareness and acting upon newly discovered structures of meanings, seems to be supported by Freire (1981), when he states that:

> It is not possible to recognize all this apart from praxis, that is, apart from reflection and action, and that to attempt it would be pure idealism. But it is also true that action upon an object must be critically analyzed in order to understand both the object itself and the understanding one has of it. The act of knowing involves a dialectical movement which goes from action to reflection and from reflection upon action to a new action. For the learner to know that he did not know before, he must engage in an authentic process of abstraction by means of which he can reflect on the action - whole , or more generally, on forms of orientation in the world. In this process of abstraction, situations representative of how the learner orients himself in the world are proposed to him as the objects of his critique (p. 332).

The process of Man acting upon his reality through a process of critical awareness involves for Man the creating of ideal forms of reality.

Man should strive through the exercise of his new capacity for creating meaning to build a reality that follows an ideal tentative model that emerges as a consequence of his critical search for meaning. This process that emphasizes the creation of ideals upon which actions are measured is supported by Zais (1976) when he expresses:

> . . . only ideals are adequate as criteria to judge men's very best capabilities. Without an ideal against which to measure individual and social conduct, we can never hope to rise above the convenient and expedient. But our answer must also be a general one, because the ideal question . . . must be left open ended (p. 236).

This view also seems to be shared by Freire (1981)who adds the idea that ideals, as based on personal meaning construction, belong both to the subjective and objective realms, because what is often categorized

as objective is permeated by our own perception of what reality is. And it could be added that reality as such is personal to every individual, since each person through meaning construction builds a reality of his own or a realistic ideal, whatever the case. So he contends:

> We recognize the indisputable unity between subjectivity and objectivity in the act of knowing. Reality is never just the simply, the objective datum, the concrete fact, but is also men's perception of it. Once again, this is not a subjectivistic or idealistic affirmation, as it might seem. On the contrary, subjectivism and idealism come into play when the subjective-objective unity is broken (p. 332).

Again, the ideal view of reality Man should strive for connotes a continuous process of meaning creation, because the ideal within this way of thinking is never met, since Man re-creates meanings, based on meaning structures he has been building in the process.

Critical consciousness becomes the true exercise of Man's freedom, but paradoxically and because of the previously described conditions of encapsulation, Men are afraid of making use of their gained freedom through the gradual process of conscious awakening.

The one who experiences their freedom and are still alienated, can be afraid of freedom, because in Freire's (1970, p. 19) words: "Critical consciousness, they say, is anarchic. Others add that critical consciousness may lead to disorder. Some, however, confess: Why deny it? I was afraid of freedom."

The submersion of critical awareness, the neglect of the exercise of freedom, is strengthened because of the comfort of Man used in receiving orders or prescriptions that alienate or prevent him from engaging both in reflective thinking and purposeful action.

> Every prescription represents the imposition of one man's choice upon another, transforming the consciousness. Freedom, true man's vocation is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an

ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea which becomes
myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest
for human completion (Freire, 1981, p. 31).

The exercise of freedom leads Man to his progressive becoming. The
ultimate expression of Man's freedom is his ever refined need for criti-
cal thinking, because of increasing awareness. In this process, Man,
according to Freire, is involved in a dual but simultaneous process
expressed in his critical reflection upon his surroundings, followed by
a parallel drive toward meaningful action, to execute the outgrowth of
his process of acting critically. Critical action and simultaneous pur-
posive action upon his reality, are two necessary conditions involved in
Man's exercise of freedom. In Freire's (1970) own words:

> In dialectic thought, world and action are ultimately interde-
> pendent. But action is human only when it is not merely an
> occupation but also a preoccupation, that is, when it is not
> dichotomized from reflection (p. 38).

When these reflections are applied to the process of educational
beliefs/practice analysis, they would lead to the identification of a
given personal position, but, what would happen if the teacher came up
to the realization that he is striving for harmony in an Essentialist
position, as opposed to an Existential one, and he becomes aware in the
process that students are being manipulated? Should he allow himself to
exercise his freedom to act accordingly?

Or should he strive to change his beliefs in behalf of his stu-
dents? It would be advisable to think that teachers' exercise of
freedom and responsibility would lead them to reconsider their beliefs
in the behalf of the greatest vocation of Man: to be fully human, by
means of not allowing himself to impose limits on other individuals'
exercise of freedom.

Examination of teachers' beliefs in education would lead toward a

straightforward position in value matters, because if their practices

are incongruent with their beliefs, they would be engendering mistrust

toward themselves.

As Freire (1981) strongly emphasizes:

Those who authentically commit themselves to the people must
re-examine themselves constantly. This conversion is so radi-
cal as not to allow of ambiguous behavior . . . . The man who
proclaims devotion to the cause of liberation yet is unable to
enter into *communion* with the people, whom he continues to
regard as totally ignorant, is grievously self-deceived (p.
47).

Could it be otherwise, if their actions contradict their values, or

vice versa; if what they preach is different from what they practice?

Values and behavior must be aligned if trust in people self is pursued.

A humanizing attitude toward teachers as subjects in the process of

beliefs/practices clarification would not lead to an array of circum-

stances of given subject-matter, or pre-determined content to be taught.

Instead it would focalize on the belief that teachers as active partici-

pants in a dialogical situation will use dialogue, not in the manner

methods are usually conceived, a sequence of step-by-step guidelines.

Instead, the process is a new conception of method which does not impose

strict guidelines to be followed. The unique condition that would be

required in this exercise in dialogue is an openness to experience, dia-

logue conceived in a dual movement: dialogue among fellow teachers upon

their main concerns in education, determined by the way they affect stu-

dents and teachers alike. This would be followed by a moment of dia-

logue with themselves where their value positions and their current

practices are questioned, and a later questioning of their own process

of questioning. This will be in agreement with Freire's (1981, p. 49)

belief in ". . . a humanizing pedagogy (where) method ceases to be an

instrument by which the teacher . . . can manipulate the students . . . because it expresses the consciousness of the students themselves."

If dialogue as an instrument of communication is advocated, teachers will have to devoid it of the traditional "method" connotation, because it rather pursues understanding, not manipulation of the students involved.

The view of dialogue in the humanistic "method" to be used in a pedagogical situation is presented by Vieira Pinto mentioned by Freire (1981):

> The method is, in fact, the external form of consciousness manifest in acts, which takes on the fundamental property of consciousness - its intentionality. The essence of consciousness is being with the world, and this behavior is permanent and unavoidable. Accordingly, consciousness is in essence a way towards something apart from itself, outside itself, which surrounds it and which it apprehends by means of its ideational capacity. Consciousness is thus by definition a method, in the most general sense of the word (p. 56).

It could be said, then, that the awakening of consciousness through dialogue becomes the method. An educational experience that places dialogue at its center starts the dialogical process according to Freire (1981), the very moment the teacher thinks about what would be of interest to his students and himself to discuss, when they meet in the pedagogical experience. It is a questioning process about possible "thematic universes" expressing the relationship of the persons involved in dialogue with the world (Freire, 1981, p. 86).

Students as human beings involved in a dialogical situation about Man products, in Freire's (1981), words: the 'world' and upon reflection and simultaneous actions, proceed to act upon that world in a purposive manner. The purpose of dialogical action within this context is the creation of meaningful knowledge by the students involved in a

process of questioning. How these processes take place is better expressed by Freire (1981, p. 59): "Knowledge emerges only through invention and reinvention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry men pursue in the world, with the world and with others." As it applies to the dialogical action, "invention" and "reinvention" implies creating and re-creating of meaning, but not in isolation, instead in communion with fellow men.

In order for teachers to act upon their sets of beliefs and current practices, they need to see that both of them constitute moments of the same process, that what stands between the values immersed in beliefs and practices is reality, which for the dialogical, Existential teacher (and following Freire) is not a fixed entity out there, something given. Teachers need to feel free in order to act upon their reality, introducing change in a gradual process, which is contingent to Man's becoming. To act differently is to throw man out of his place in the world, which would then become strange to him, it would mean to separate Man from his particular circumstances. To neglect Man's involvement with his personal circumstance is no different from creating for Man his own alienation, the estrangement from his reality which then, he believes cannot be modified. As Freire (1981, p. 62) expresses: "Reality is really a process, undergoing constant transformation."

Then it could be affirmed that reality can and should be changed whenever necessary. Only Men are the creators of the abstraction that is called reality. The changes that they introduce in it correspond to the action form of a humanizing learning process. In this process the educator is not the possessor of the truth given to the students for acceptance, but instead according to Freire (1981):

. . . his efforts must coincide with those of the students to engage in critical thinking and the quest for mutual humanization. His efforts must be imbued with a profound trust in men and their creative power. To achieve this, he must be a partner of the students in his relationship with them (p. 62).

It seems that for Freire (1981) the world of "reality" mediating both students and teachers engaged in a simultaneous process becomes something susceptible of being known through what he calls "acts of cognition" which he defines as something opposed to:

. . . transferrals of information. It is a learning situation in which the object (far from being the end of the cognitive act) intermediates the cognitive actors - teacher on the one hand and students on the other . . . through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges; teacher student with student-teachers, the teacher is no longer the one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach (p. 67).

Each dialogical situation serves the purpose of clarifying teachers' thought with one another, because in this process they no longer learn in isolation, but rather in a world context with their fellow-men. This is a process involving not only the cognition of a given situation, but it is also a process of reconsidering their own ways of approaching the situation under study. As Freire (1981) expresses:

Students as they are increasingly posed with problems relating to themselves in the world and with the world will feel increasingly challenged and obliged to respond to that challenge. Because they apprehend the challenge as interrelated to other problems within a total context, not as theoretical questions, the resulting comprehension tends to be increasingly critical and thus constantly less alienated. Their response to the challenge evokes new challenges, followed by new understandings; and gradually the students come to regard themselves as committed (p. 68).

It is appropriate at this point to assert that consciousness that takes place through dialogue with and within the world, is a simultaneous process by means of which neither world nor consciousness precede

each other. As he contends:

> That which has existed objectively but had not been perceived
> in its deeper implications (if indeed it was perceived at
> all) begins to 'stand out' assuming the character of a problem
> and therefore of challenge. Thus, men begin to single out
> elements from their 'background awarenesses' and to reflect
> upon them. These elements are now objects of men's
> considerations, and as such, objects of their action and
> cognition (p. 70).

And later he asserts that:

> Although the dialectic relations of men with the world exist
> independently of how these relations are perceived (or whether
> or not they are perceived at all) it is also true that the
> form of action men adopt is to a large extent a function of
> how they perceive themselves in the world.

> Hence, the teacher-student and the student-teacher reflect
> simultaneously on themselves and the world without dichoto-
> mizing this reflection from action, and they establish an
> authentic form of thought and action (p. 71).

When teachers and students reflect on their becoming through the

building of new structures of meanings they become aware that they are

building themselves in the process. They come to recognize the never

ending process of becoming, what Freire (1981) calls the becoming of man

who

> . . . as unfinished, incomplete beings in and with likewise
> unfinished reality . . . know themselves to be unfinished,
> they are aware of their incompletion. In this incompletion
> and this awareness lies the very roots of education as an
> exclusively human manifestation. The unfinished character of
> Men and the transformational character of reality necessitate
> that education be an ongoing activity. Education is thus con-
> stantly remade in the praxis. In order to be, it must become.
> Its 'duration' (in the Bergsonian meaning of the word) is
> found in the interplay of the opposites permanence and change
> (p. 72).

It does not come as a surprise, then, that the process of making

beliefs and practices in education congruent is one and the same as

becoming as teachers and human beings. This can only operate at its

best when it embarks all those interested in working cooperatively

toward maximization of their potential for becoming. Freire (1981)

expresses this view when he asserts that:

> The pursuit of full humanity, however, cannot be carried out
> in isolation or individualism, but only in fellowship and
> solidarity . . . Attempting to be more human, individualisti-
> cally, leads to having more, egotistically: a form of dehum-
> anization. Not that it is not fundamental to have in order to
> be human. (p. 73).

This humanitarian process of communication, according to Freire

(1970):

> . . . enable teachers and students to become subjects of the
> educational process by overcoming authoritarianism and an
> alienating intellectualism; it also enables men to overcome
> their false perception of reality (p. 74).

In the dialogical process of searching for beliefs/practice con-

gruence, teachers become aware of the limitations hindering harmony, and

from subsequent elaboration of meanings they expose their new gained

critical understanding which in Friere's (1981) thesis corresponds to a

dual process of denunciation and annunciation. As he expresses:

> Our pedagogy cannot do without a vision of Man and of the
> world. It formulates a scientific humanist conception which
> find its expression in a dialogical praxis in which the teach-
> ers and learners together, in the act of analyzing a dehuman-
> izing reality, denounce it while announcing its transformation
> in the name of the liberation of man . . . . Dennunciation of
> a dehumanizing situation today increasingly demands precise
> scientific understanding of that situation. Likewise, the
> annunciation of its transformation increasingly requires a
> theory of transforming action. However, neither act by itself
> implies the transformation of the denounced reality or the
> establishment of that which is announced. Rather, as a moment
> in an historical process, the announced reality is already
> present in the act of denunciation and annunciation (p. 338).

Denunciation and annunciation are both hope and action. Hope is

the belief in our inner capabilities for becoming whatever one decides

to become guided by value considerations.

Action is the very actualization of our hopes, it is our intent to

direct the course of our lives through the use of our human freedom.

Action is also critically based purposive action, it is striving in the

process of becoming (p. 338).

As Freire (1981) accurately expresses:

> Dialogue cannot be carried on in a climate of hopeless-
> ness. If the dialoguers expect nothing to come of their
> efforts, their encounter will be empty and sterile, bureau-
> cratic and tedious (p. 80).

When talking about the "hope" element of those involved in

dialogical education, Freire (1981) states that:

> In its desire to create an ideal model of the 'good man',
> a naively conceived humanism often overlooks the concrete
> existential present situation of real men. Authentic
> humanism, in Pierre Furter's words, 'consist in permitting the
> emergence of the awareness of our full humanity, as a
> condition and as an obligation, as a situation and as a
> project (p. 82).

Many difficulties will be met in the process of making value posi-

tions congruent with practices, because it supposes the exercise of per-

sonal freedom to make sound choices. It can be added that the process

can be sometimes frustrating but also very rewarding as teachers make

sense out of their beliefs and practices. As teachers bring beliefs and

practices together through thought and action, to a level of critical

awareness, contradictions arise, but it is natural for this to happen.

Every new conflict posed by teachers becomes a new problem that deserves

to be treated with praxis. The obstacles met are not impediments to

action, but "limit situations" or as Vieira Pinto mentioned by Freire

(1981), names them: "limit-acts," that Freire describes as:

> . . . those directed at negating and overcoming, rather than
> passively accpeting, the given . . . . As reality is
> transformed and these situations are superseded, new ones will
> appear, which in turn will evoke new limit-acts (pp. 89-90).

"Limit Situations" as described above can give origin to new

meaningful structures of meanings, since the limitations are felt for

the participants involved in critical dialogue. An overcoming of limit

situations results in the posing of new problems by those involved and

corresponds to what Freire (1981) calls the "investigation of thematics"

which

> . . . involves the investigation of the people's
> thinking - which occurs only in and among men together seeking
> out reality. I cannot think FOR OTHERS, nor can OTHERS,
> think FOR ME. Even if the people's thinking is . . . naive,
> it is only as they rethink their assumptions in action that
> they can change. Producing and acting upon their own
> ideas - not consuming those of others - must constitute that
> process (Freire, 1981, p. 100).

It becomes clear, then, that through Existential dialogue teachers

overcome limiting situations that result in lack of harmony between

what they preach and whay they actually do. The process of dialogical

search for new meanings needs to be experienced by the teachers involved

in the process, in addition to an individual questioning of personal

limiting situations. It needs to be a process in which teachers open

themselves to experience.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study was designed for two basic purposes. The primary purpose was the development of a theoretical analysis (conceptualization) of the prevailing philosophical and psychological camps of the educational experience:

1. Essentialism - Behaviorism

2. Experimentalism - Cognitism

3. Existentialism - Humanism

The second purpose of the study was to develop a model that would facilitate teachers in arriving at a desirable degree of congruence between educational beliefs and practices. Presumably, blending of the two main purposes will provide teachers with a cognitive framework for making theory and practice in education more congruent. The intention was to encourage teachers to exercise their freedom and responsibility through the practice of a dialogical approach which places responsibility for their educational beliefs and practices upon them as opposed to external uncontrollable forces out of their reach.

A review of related literature seemed to reveal some specific data in relation to the problem of lack of harmony between beliefs and practice in education:

1. There exists among educators an increasing tendency to favor unexamined practices, new trends, and bandwagons to improve

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educational practices without due consideration of the underlying theory/philosophy.

2. Very seldom in the classroom do educators adopt a teaching model that is in accordance with their professed beliefs. Instead, they proceed to assemble an eclectic approved mode of bits of data from diverse psychological and philosophical theories. The result is confused practice, because the teacher does not identify and adhere to any psychological or philosophical educational set of view.

3. There is a need for teachers to deeply study and analyze educational theory in order to make their practices and beliefs more congruent.

4. Congruence is favored by Aspy and Roebuck (1977) because it implies genuineness: the degree to which an individual's words and actions accurately reflect her or his own feelings and attitudes.

5. Internalization of educational theory as a path to congruency among educational beliefs and practices in education is useful for Gay (1980, p. 21), because ". . . theory can either guide practice or can be used as a perceptual screen through which practice is interpreted and ordered."

6. Educational practice without the support provided by a well-developed theory/philosophy of education proceeds at random. Education without purpose becomes mere activity without the due consideration of means-end compatibility (Connelly and Elbas, 1980).

7. The language forms used to express thoughts in education

convey intentions. The practices, more often than not, are a reflection of a person's intentions and, in most cases, expressed through the language they use. Language is an expression of a person's beliefs.

Based on the identified need for harmony between teacher's beliefs and their practice, an investigation of the roots of the problem seemed to have merit. The Existential-dialogical model proposed was an attempt to show that in the process of striving for educational belief/practice congruence these are factors operating that inhibit and distort teacher's perceptions of educational reality. These factors are a lack of conscious analysis or an absence of meaningful knowledge of educational theory.

Lack of conscious awareness is a process of self-estrangement that has its roots in a series of conditions inherent in the very nature of Man. As an Existential being man is capable of directing his potential through freedom in any direction he chooses: toward good or toward evil, but with a recognized tendency toward goodness, inherent in his own willingness for striving.

Lack of conscious awareness operates as part of a process identified by Fromm (1955) as alienation or

> . . . a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one might say, estranged from himself. He does not experience himself as the center of the world, as the creator of his own acts--but his acts and their consequences have become their masters, whom he obeys, or whom he may even worship. He, like the others, is experienced as things are experienced, with the senses and with common sense, but at the same time, without being related to oneself and to the world outside productivity (p. 111).

It was contended that the most powerful source of alienation for Man from his reality is of a sociological nature. Fromm (1955)

identified that the major source of Man's alienation from his personal and social reality stems from his exchange with society, something that is the major paradox in Man's life: he must struggle to be himself and relate to his world and still keep his freedom and responsibility.

Fromm further believes Man's worth is measured in terms of his usefulness and cooperation with the socioeconomic forces that are his very creation. He draws his pride from the accomplishment of the part that he has to play in order for the social machinery to keep running as smoothly as possible. His behavior is rewarded through the recognition of the extent to which he is able to fit and adapt to the social order.

Within the framework of his material creation, and the school is no exception, Man is left with no freedom since he is compelled to strive for conformity to the social apparatus. Sometimes in this process Fromm (1955) states the person experiences short-lived periods of awareness, but experiencing himself as unable to truly act upon his creation, he proceeds to hopelessly conform and consciously avoid all questioning of his actions, because he cannot see how ways can be devised to break the dehumanizing circle.

Man is compelled toward more work and more improvements in the name of change, and he almost never bothers to question if it makes any sense at all what is keeping him so busy. What he really does is to use work as a means to overcome the emptiness created by his own arrangements.

Work, one time an expression of Man's creative and reasoning powers, becomes alienated from himself and this very alienation at the level of his socioeconomic reality is transferred to all other realms of his activity, blocking in the process all possibilities of reasoning by questioning the meaningfulness of his daily activity.

Aside from a first step of identifying forces that hinders or neglects for teachers a satisfactory degree of educational beliefs-practices congruence, the proposed model considered as a second important step, the process of bringing current knowledge in education and teacher's personal position in education to a level of conscious awareness. This process was said to require an effort of looking with critical eyes to the socioeconomic forces and events that have made certain types of positions prevail over others at certain periods in history. This process helps teachers to recognize that what they do in the classroom has repercussions on the lives of their students, that their actions should not be devoid of critical insight centering upon the way we do things the way we do. Bringing significant knowledge in education to a level of conscious awareness requires a *previous act*: that of identifying in a rather tentative manner those *dominant focus* of educational beliefs and practices, both of which are grounded in theoretical knowledge. Educational beliefs and practices revolve around three main philosophical schools of thought: Existentialism, Experimentalism, and Essentialism, with their respective counterparts represented in three psychological movements: Humanistic, Cognitive-Field, and Behavorism.

Each of the psychological and philosophical camps deal with basically the following components of educational beliefs and practices:

-- The Nature of Man

-- The Nature of Learning

-- The Nature of Knowledge

-- The nature of Society

-- The Aims of Education

-- The Nature of Curriculum

-- The Nature of Instructional Behavior

-- The Nature of Evaluation

An Action Orientation to the Process of Critical

Awareness Awakening Through

Existential Dialogue

Ascribing to either Existentialism-Humanism, Experimentalist-Cognitivism, or Essentialism-Behavorism involves taking different philosopohical and psychological postures about the major identified components of educational beliefs. Man and his relationship to society, the role of knowledge, the purpose of the school, and the educational environment are seen quite differently when teachers adhere to any one of the three major identified philosophical-psychological positions.

The third major thrust of the proposed model was an action orientation that operates simultaneously with the process of critical awareness awakening, elicited through Existential diaglogue The preceding focuses of educational beliefs/practices were proposed only as tentative contents amenable to a dialogical process that closely followed Freire's (1981) *dialogical method* used by him to help Brasilian peasants to become literate. Dialogue was seen as a necessary must in the search for adequate structures of meaning operating at the level of beliefs/practice clarification. Dialogue, within the model operated as for Freire at two levels or contexts: theoretical and practical. The theoretical context is, for Freire, the classroom experience, the give and take of learning ". . . it is the context of authentic dialogue between learners and educators as equally knowing subjects . . . the second is the real concrete context of facts, the social reality in which men exist" (p. 333).

In a dialogical process, for Freire (1981), "commonsense" percep-
tion of reality and the person's very questioning of reality are subject
to critical analysis. In this process, reality is "detached" for
purposes of analysis.

True dialogue is achieved only when the purpose is to clarify one's
own ideas, a search for a more complete structure of meaning. The pro-
cess of search for educational beliefs/practice congruence was seen
within this framework as conscious knowledge of educational theory. A
critical analysis of past and present trends in education, is engaged in
for the purpose of placing the teachers' personal educational practices
in perspective. This action serves to determine if teachers' awareness
of theory and practice have meaning for them. This process leads to
conscious awareness of the theoretical bases of education and an anal-
ysis of teachers' practices. The projected outcome is belief-practice
alignment. The search for congruence was considered within this context
as an active process on the part of the individual teachers involved.
It implies *active participation* upon reflection of both personal knowl-
edge of educational theory and educational practices. This process is
supported by Freire (1981) who expresses:

> The act of knowing involves a dialectical movement which goes
> from action to reflection and from reflection upon action to a
> new action. For the learner to know that he did not before,
> he must engage in an authentic process of abstraction by
> means of which he can reflect on the action-whole, or, more
> generally, on forms or orientation in the world. In this
> process of abstraction, situations representative of how the
> learner orients himself in the world are proposed to him as
> the objects of his critique (p. 332).

This process of Man acting upon his reality through a process of crit-
ical awareness involves the creating of ideals form of reality. Man
should strive through the exercise of his new capacity for creating

meaning to build a reality that follows an ideal tentative model that emerges as a consequence of his critical search for meaning.

Critical consciousness becomes the true exercise of Man's freedom but paradoxically, and because of the identified conditions of encapsulation, Men are afraid of making use of their gained freedom through the gradual process of conscious awakening. The exercise of freedom leads Man to his progressive becoming. The ultimate expression of Man's freedom is his ever-refined need for critical thinking, because of his increasing awareness. In this process, Man, according to Freire (1981), is involved in a dual, but simultaneous process expressed in his critical reflection upon his surrounding, followed by a parallel drive toward meaningful action, to execute the outgrowth of his process of acting critically. Critical action and simultaneous purposive action upon his reality are two necessary conditions involved in Man's exercise of freedom.

When these reflections are applied to the process of educational-beliefs analysis, it leads to the identification of a clear-cut personal position. If teachers attempt to be consistent with their personal position there should not be a neglect of the human condition of themselves or their students. Teacher's examination of beliefs in education should lead to a straightforward position in value matters, because if their practices are incongruent with their beliefs, they will be engendering mistrust toward themselves.

A humanizing attitude toward teachers as subjects, in the process of educational beliefs/practice clarification, would not lead to an array of circumstances of given subject matter, predetermined content to be taught; instead, it would focalize on the belief that teachers as

active participants in a dialogical situation will use dialogue but not in the manner methods are usually conceived as a sequence of step-by-step guidelines. The unique condition required in this exercise in dialogue is an openness to experience, dialogue among fellow teachers about their main concerns in education, determined by the way they affect students and teachers alike. This would be followed by a moment of dialogue with themselves, by means of which their value positions and their current practice are questioned, and a later questioning of their own process of questioning.

The awakening of consciousness through dialogue becomes the method. An educational experience that places dialogue at its center starts the dialogical process, the very moment the teacher thinks about what would be of interest to the students and himself to discuss, when they meet in a pedagogical situation (Freire, 1970).

Teachers as human beings involved in a dialogical situation about Man produces in Freire's (1970, p. 59) word: the "world", and upon reflection and simultaneous action, proceed to act upon that world in a purposive manner. The purpose of dialogical-action within this context is the creation of meaningful knowledge by the teachers involved in the process of questioning.

In order for teachers to act upon their beliefs and current practices, they need to see that both of them constitute moments of the same process that what stands between the values immersed in beliefs and practices is reality, which for the dialogical, Existential teacher (following Freire), is not a fixed entity out there, something given. Teachers need to feel free in order to act upon their reality. Introducing change in a gradual process, is contingent to Man's becoming,

for to act differently is to throw Man out of his place in the world, which would then, become strange to him, it would mean to separate Man from his particular circumstances. Each dialogical situation serves the purpose of clarifying teachers thoughts with one another, because in this process, they no longer learn in isolation, but rather in a world context with their fellow-men.

The dialogical model proposed was first used by Freire in his Brasilian literacy process. Within the context of this study, it has been demonstrated how this model can facilitate teachers in the search for beliefs-practice congruence. In the process teachers become aware of limitations hindering harmony, and from subsequent elaboration of meanings, they expose their new gained critical understanding.

Conclusions

1. Educational beliefs/practices congruence is advocated on the basis that congruence is one and the same as genuineness, the degree to which an individual's words and actions accurately reflect her or his own feelings and attitudes (Aspy and Roebuck, 1977).

2. When teachers' words and actions do not contradict each other, they engender trust in themselves and in their actions.

3. Language structures are linked to the person's intentions, which evolve from thought processes, and through language the person makes clear his thought patterns. There is, then, an obvious relationship between what teachers think, say, and do. Their actions are an expression of the way they explain reality.

4. Every decision educators make has a philosophical or theoretical basis of which they are either consciously or unconsciously aware, such decisions are grounded in their assumptions of how learning recurs, their beliefs about human nature and about the role of the school.

5. At the very heart of the dilemma of educational beliefs/ practice congruence lies the problem of a lack of conscious awareness and analysis of educational theory and current practices in education. Lack of conscious awareness and analysis of educational theory and practice was *identified* as part of a social process of alienation by means of which the individual detaches himself of his actions and consequences. It was contended that alienation is essentially a social problem.

6. The resolution to the theory/ practice dilemma should operate as two levels:

   a. Bringing current knowledge in education and teacher's personal positions in education to a level of conscious awareness.

   b. Through an action-reflection orientation that operates simultaneously with the process of critical awareness awakening. This is elicited through existential dialogue.

7. When reflection and action are involved in this process, teachers are more prone to both value and act in a way that is respectful and enhancing of the human condition.

Recommendations

1. Teachers need to become aware that their mission is to enable themselves and their students to make and remake reality through both critical reflection and action, that this mission is better accomplished through the act of enabling students to build a better society by reflection and action upon an already existing reality.

2. Teachers should come to realize that both their practices and their beliefs are grounded in the values they profess, and that there is not such a thing as value-free education, as there is no such process involving human beings that is "value-free".

3. Teachers need to realize that their natural human freedom should be accompanied by a strong sense of commitment and responsibility toward their activities. That responsibility means assuming inner control and never the blaming of external occurrences unless it is accompanied by a strong commitment to affect the world of reality with their individual actions.

4. Teachers and students, as equally able partners in the educational experience, have the human obligation of asking themselves more frequently than they often do the basic questions that define the very essence of education: education for whom, for what purpose, is education contributing to the development of full humanness, or is it reduced to a "non-sense" all pervading-training?

5. Teachers need to begin to realize that permanence and

change are not necessarily opposites. They could work sim-
ilarly in the process of harmonizing, establishing a
balance between permanence and change. They should not be
afraid to substitute conflict, chaos, transiency or tempor-
ality, critical awareness, and questioning for smoothness
of operation, order, prediction permanence and stability,
and passive acceptance of orders.

6. Despite the overwhelming impact that bigness in society
   causes upon teachers, leading to the misconception that
   they cannot alter in positive ways situtations that demand
   far more radical changes, they need to realize that if
   they become more aware of their role as agents of change,
   situations can be changed for the better.

7. Despite the bigness of the social institutions, the need
   for quantification, the abstraction of power, society's
   needs for control, and the like, teachers can make a sub-
   stantial contribution if they oppose such alienating
   forces through meaningful attempts in the classroom,
   directed toward minimizing such dehumanizing forces. A
   humanized education directed toward the reconciliation of
   Man and society could be the best way to go about making
   schooling a more meaningful process.

Recommendations for Further Research

From the salient focuses of this work: the interplay of the
variables associated with the notion of congruence and the major focuses
of educational beliefs/practice and construction of a dialogical model

for the purpose of developing teachers' conscious awareness and reflection and commitment to action upon their values and current practices; some major concerns that can be developed for futher research are:

1. To test the feasibility of the dialogical model proposed upon the conceptual framework that links philosophical/ psychological positions in education with the major variables associated with the notion of congruence. The settings for such study could be both preservice and inservice teacher education.

2. Additional research relative to the limiting factors inherent in the human condition that inhibit awareness are proposed by Zais (1976, p. 220): ". . . the ability to conceptualize abstract ideas and relationships" and "emotional and unconscious processes frequently divest man of his capacity for rational thought," since they depart considerably from the sociological connotations that were attributed in this work to teacher's lack of conscious awareness and reflective action.

3. Additional research will be needed to establish the potential application of the conceptual framework developed in this work to some aspects of the educational experience: school climate, academic achievement, and so.

The major concern that this study intends to bring attention to is a conscious effort on the part of teachers for identifying the factors limiting beliefs/practices congruence.

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