

THE AMERICAN FAMINE AID CAMPAIGN:
RUSSIAN - AMERICAN RELATIONS
AT THE TURN OF THE
19TH CENTURY

BY

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
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
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Dean of the Graduate College

PREFACE

Russia and the United States will remain good friends until, each having made the circuit of half the globe in opposite directions, they shall meet and greet each other in the regions where civilization first began . . .

Secretary of State Seward to Cassius Clay
6 May 1861

There are two distinct schools of thought on exactly when the United State and Russia "met" and their previously friendly relationship began to deteriorate. The first, held by advocates of ideological causation, argues that this deterioration began when Americans, led by George Kennan, first became aware of large ideological discrepancies between the two nations in the 1870s and 1880s. The second theory argues that such antagonism did not begin until the early 1900s, as Russian and American economic interests began to clash in Asia. The thesis that follows illustrates that, rather than being in conflict, these two motivations, economic and ideological, came together forcefully at the turn of the nineteenth century.

This union of forces centers around a seemingly minor event in the wider flow of *fin-de-siecle* international relations: the American Relief Campaign during the Russian famine of 1892. Initially, this philanthropic movement

appears to be an interesting, albeit insignificant, episode in Russian-American relations that has been overshadowed by larger relief movements during the 1920s. However, continued exploration of American and Russian relations during the 1890s indicates that this movement played a much larger role.

The Famine Aid Campaign, begun as a scheme to increase American wheat exportation, was a pivotal point from which a change in American perceptions of Russians evolved. Prior to the famine, most Americans tended to view the Russian government uncritically, as a friend and ally; after the Aid Campaign this perception had changed, Americans increasingly viewed the Tsarist government as a tyranny, victimizing defenseless peasants. This change in perceptions ultimately evolved into a transformation of U.S. foreign policy.

This thesis explores the relationship between economics, ideology, and foreign policy during the late nineteenth century. It is an examination of the American relief effort in terms of both the economic and political factors from which the movement arose, and the changes that resulted from it. Viewed in this manner, the famine becomes, not simply an isolated case of crop failure, but a "sign post" for change. It marked the end of Russian hegemony in the European wheat market and the beginnings of the Russian struggle to industrialize. Similarly, the American relief program, in addition to illustrating the new kind of "business" thinking that was developing in America, marked the beginning of a shift in American-Russia relations.

I could not have completed this project without the guidance and assistance of many people. The staff and faculty of the History department at Oklahoma State, particularly my major advisor Dr. George F. Jewsbury and the other members of my committee, Dr. James L. Huston and Dr. Bryant "Tip" Ragan, have provided invaluable help and encouragement. I must also extend a special thanks to Steven Nielson, reference assistant at the Minnesota Historical Society. Without his help, I would have been unable to complete the bulk of my "long distance research". Much of the credit for the work that follows belongs to these people, while, of course, the blame for any shortcomings or discrepancies is entirely my own.

The completion of any academic degree is, to my mind, only 50 percent scholarly. The other half comes from the emotional (and financial) support of many people. My greatest debt is owed to my parents, Karl and Janice Ryden. Their lifetime involvement in academics pointed me, at a very early age, toward this graduate degree. I must also thank my fellow graduate students -- Clyde Ellis, Mark Tate, Wade Farmer, Steve Jones, and Sheri Raney, in particular -- for graduate school is nothing if not an exercise in sticking together. Finally, I wish to thank my husband, Capt. Jeffrey L. Hupy, whose limitless encouragement carried me through the day by day trials of this degree.

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CHAPTER I

AMERICA AND RUSSIA: THE FIRST CENTURY

On Christmas day 1891, the editor of the Northwestern Miller, a weekly business journal for wheat farmers and flour processors in Minneapolis, Minnesota, decided to forego his annual holiday message.¹ In its place, William Edgar ran a full front page editorial on American foreign policy towards Russia. This rather unusual editorial policy continued until early spring. In fact, if the Miller is to be believed, during those months the everyday affairs of wheat milling business came to a halt; starving Russian *mushiks*, Imperial *Ukases*, "famine bread", and the struggles of Count Leo Tolstoy replaced the more mundane affairs of the day.

Though such critical attention on Russia has been familiar to twentieth century Americans, it was not the norm a century ago. Prior to the late 1900s, relations between the United States and Russia were remarkably congenial, despite fundamental differences in their national ideologies. Illustrations of this situation abound. For instance, Andrew Jackson, champion of the common man, once referred to Russia (where, of course, the "common man" was held in hereditary bondage) as a "steadfast friend"². Somewhat similarly,

Zachary Taylor, after expressing sympathy with Hungarian insurgents during the Revolutions of 1848, announced that the United States would maintain "accustomed amiable relations"³ with Russia. Such statements were made because leaders of the two countries did not base their relations on moral or ethical concerns. Rather, both nations tended to ground their policies on questions of territorial expansion, or, even more commonly, the world "balance of power" equation.⁴

It was the "concert" of European powers that shaped relations between the United States and Russia for most of the nineteenth century. Russia's most constant rival was Great Britain, though the Tsarist government also occasionally had conflicts with France, Prussia, and Austria. Similarly, the United States found itself in conflict with Britain. Consequently, this situation thrust the two nations into a somewhat unexpected alliance. As William Appleman Williams writes, "the first one hundred years of relations [between the two nations] were very cordial," because, "Russia gave way every time her territorial expansion clashed with the United States in order to preserve their common front with Great Britain."⁵

This relationship began almost as soon as the new republic declared independence. Although the "ideals" of the American revolution came into direct conflict with the Russian imperial system, Tsarina Catherine took the stance that "an enemy of Britain is a friend of mine." Thus, Russia

(along with France and Spain) declared neutrality in 1780.⁶ This neutrality was later strengthened into formal diplomatic relations by the close ties between Thomas Jefferson and Tsar Alexander I, both of whom came to power in 1801.⁷

Russia's determination to maintain a friendship with the United States in the face of conflict with the British continued throughout the early nineteenth century. This friendship was particularly important to American expansion into the Northwest.⁸ Though there was much diplomatic posturing, Russia declined to make any serious issue of the two nations' competing claims to the area.⁹ By 1824 Russia had agreed to move the territorial border up to 54'40', while in 1832 the United States returned the gesture by awarding the Tsarist government with what was essentially "most favored nation trading status."¹⁰ These actions allowed the United States to squeeze England out of the disputed area entirely.¹¹

The bond between the two nations more continued to strengthen during their respective mid-century wars. During Russia's disastrous Crimean War, America maintained friendly relations and even concluded several neutral trade agreements.¹² More important from the American perspective was Russia's assurance of support for the Union during the American Civil War.¹³ Despite a supposed sympathy between serf owners and slave owners, Russia declined to join Britain and France in a plan to act jointly on the side of the

Confederacy. Moreover, Russian ships anchored in New York and San Francisco harbors, ostensibly to discourage Western European intervention.¹⁴

After the Civil War and the purchase of Alaska, however, this long time American-Russian friendship began to ebb. Many historians have cited this era as the emergence of ideological conflict between the two nations. Intellectually, they link this decline to the work of a man who has been called "the first American crusader for Russian freedom",¹⁵ George Kennan. In his early years, having worked in Russia for Western Union Telegraph Company, Kennan was a staunch supporter of the Imperial family. However, during a research trip to Siberia in 1885 for Century Magazine, Kennan experienced first-hand the horrors of the Imperial exile system. Upon returning to the United States, Kennan turned his experiences into his famous work, Siberia and the Exile System. More importantly, Kennan undertook a series of lectures touring all over the United States, expressing his indignation over Russian despotism and the persecution of political opposition. Many American intellectuals, including Mark Twain, Julia Ward Howe, and James Russel Lowell, became zealous advocats of Kennan's beliefs.¹⁶

Kennan and his followers were not, however, entirely successful. Though they had slowed the approval of the Extradition Treaty (designed to stop convicted Russian criminals from escaping to the United States, and helped in

providing publicity for oppressed Russian minorities) Kennan and other crusaders had not brought about any major changes in foreign policy. Except for a few, very diplomatically careful, statements of disapproval, the American government had maintained the status quo -- diplomacy and friendly economic competition.

The stern anti-Russian stance that the United States would take during the Russo-Japanese War¹⁷ indicates that some sort of major shift did take place in Russian-American relations around the turn of the century. This shift began in earnest with the Russian Famine Aid campaign of 1892. By examining the newspaper accounts of famine aid in its three, very different, centers -- Minneapolis, Davenport, and Philadelphia -- and then exploring the highly publicized reports and reactions of Americans and other Westerners who delivered that aid, one can observe the dynamics that moved Washington to change its policy toward Russia.

The American Famine Aid campaign and the public attention that it drew did not, in itself, change American policy. However it did provide a platform for those who wanted to alter that policy. Prior to the famine aid program, attempts by activists such as George Kennan to convince the American people of the corrupt nature of the Russian regime had been largely unsuccessful; most Americans, as well as Washington politicians, continued to view the Tsarist government as a valuable trading partner and trusted

ally from the Civil War. The American Famine Aid Campaign, with its broad appeal, became a vehicle through which those anti-Russian activists could appeal to their staunchest detractors, the business and industrial community. What began as a business generating scheme of a Mid-western newspaperman became a powerful precursor to a major change in American attitudes and eventually American foreign policy, one that William Edgar, the founder of the campaign, would not have approved of.

Endnotes

1. Midwestern Miller, 25 December 1891.
2. Nikolai Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakolev, Russia and the United States trans. Olga Adler Titelbaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 9.
3. Ibid.
4. William Appleman Williams, American Russian Relations: 1781-1947 (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1952) 3-4.
5. Williams, 4.
6. Sivachev and Yakolev, 2.
7. This friendship is well documented. For the American perspective see, W.A. Williams, and for the Soviet view, see Sivachev.
8. There is some debate among historians on this issue. Most American historians agree with William Appleman Williams that there was at least some real conflict between the United States and Russia over this issue. The Monroe Doctrine, they claim, was directed primarily at the Russians and so is proof of this conflict. Soviet historians, in contrast, contend that the United States knew of the poor status of Imperial control over its American holdings, consequently the Monroe Doctrine was aimed at the British, because the Americans knew that the Russians would leave the area eventually anyway. To try to solve such a debate is beyond the scope of this paper, however it logical to assume that regardless of whom the Americans meant to aim the Monroe doctrine, the Russians chose not to question it and so set the stage for British-American conflict.
9. Williams, 7.
10. Sivachev and Yakolev, 5-8.
11. Williams, 7.
12. Sivachev and Yakolev, 8.
13. Williams, 19.
14. Sivachev and Yakolev, 10.

15. Max M. Laserson, The American Impact on Russia -- Diplomatic and Ideological -- 1784-1917 (New York: MacMillan Co., 1950), 303-4.

16. Laserson, 311, and Williams, 25.

17. Williams, 23-47.

CHAPTER II

PRECONDITIONS FOR FAMINE

...we grown-up folk can understand how the famine has come upon the people ... it is impossible for us not to see why the people are suffering from hunger ... Is it possible that the people, in such circumstances in which they are born, ie. with taxes, this insufficiency of land, this neglected condition and this savagery, having to perform this immense amount of labor, the fruits of which we enjoy in the shape of comforts and amusements -- is it possible, I say, that these people can escape hunger?

Tolstoy on the famine of 1891

Russia divides very roughly into two agricultural regions with a line running approximately along the northern boundary of what is known as the "black-earth" region. The land north of this line is either ill-suited to large scale farming, or is too overpopulated to be self-supporting, while the land south of this border serves as the "breadbasket" for much of the country. This "black-earth" region runs north-east from Bessarabia, with its northern border passing through the extreme south of Volynia and north of Podlia, as well as through the provinces of Kiev, Chernigov, Orel, Tula, Riazan, Nizhny-Novgorod, Kazan and Ufa. Its southern edges pass

through the south of the provinces of Kherson and Taurida, Saratov, and through the middle of Samara.²

The black earth zone is continental. Its climate is relatively dry and subject to both hot and cold temperature extremes. Despite these seemingly inhospitable conditions, the area is extremely fertile. This is due to the region's remarkable soil; in the center of the black earth belt the soil is nearly 50 percent humus, with top soil forty inches deep. Thus, the region exists in an extremely delicate balance -- the soil is rich, but the humus breaks down quickly, and the climate can be extremely unpredictable. Consequently, the area has been subject to some of the worst droughts and crop failures in Russian history.³

Famine, such as occurred in the winter of 1891-92, is not however, caused exclusively by crop failure. In an ideally functioning market economy, crop failure causes food prices to rise in poor harvest areas, which in turn draws in products from regions of better harvests, but lower prices. Thus, for one season, consumers suffer from lower quantities, higher prices, and, in poor harvest areas, imported food products. The following season, the process repeats itself, with products again flowing to areas of highest prices. If the same region repeatedly suffers from poor harvest, farmers will either be forced to relocate or change their crops and/or their farming methods. Such a fluctuating equilibrium

is endemic to an agrarian based economy. In somewhat less economic terms, this is known as "his majesty the harvest." Though such fluctuations are difficult for farmers, and will almost always cause severe hardship in isolated cases, they do not generally result in the widespread starvation and epidemic that characterize a famine.

Famine is caused by some failure within this economic equilibrium; either food products can not come in from other areas, or farmers can not move to better producing areas or methods, or, because of other economic forces, individuals can not survive even one season of high prices. Such was the case in Russia in 1891 - 92. Because of failures in all of these areas, Russia's primarily agrarian economy broke down and large numbers of peasants in the black earth region were in danger of starving to death.

The most important factor in Russia's economic problems in the late nineteenth century was the unsuccessful emancipation of the serfs by Tsar Alexander II in 1861. Prior to that time, approximately 85 percent of Russians were held in permanent bondage by large land owners. Most historians agree that Alexander did not emancipate the serfs in order to develop an industrial economy, but rather to keep the serfs from liberating themselves through revolution.⁴ Consequently, the government chose an emancipation policy designed to keep the peasants on the land, while at the same time placating the nobility.

This policy was based on three principles. The first was that liberated peasants were to become small land holders. Secondly, the government was to pay the nobles for the land, and the peasants were to repay the government in the form of taxes. Finally, landlords were to receive no payments for liberating the person of the serf.⁵

Unfortunately, perhaps because these principles were designed to keep the peasants on the land, the results of the emancipation hampered rather than encouraged economic growth. In the first place, the peasants received much less land than they had customarily tilled. This was particularly true in the rich "black earth" regions.⁶ In some of these areas, land lords kept up to 40 percent of the cultivatable land,⁷ while in the less productive northern and western portions of the country peasants had "practically free run over former master's land."⁸

Not surprisingly, the quality of the allotments in the black earth region was as inadequate as the quantity. Because the lords maintained control over most of the pastures, forests, meadows, and water sources, peasant holdings frequently lacked basic essentials of subsistence farming.⁹ Shortage of pasture limited the keeping of livestock, and consequently limited the supply of manure needed to fertilize the fields. Additionally, lack of forested land meant an inadequate fuel supply. Writing at the turn of the century, historian Paul Miliukov estimated

that the average crop was 16.6 *poods*¹⁰ of grain per inhabitant, while approximately 20 *poods* were necessary to feed one individual. Similarly, the average yield of oats was 23.6 *poods* per horse, though at least 40 *poods* were required for adequate equine diet.¹¹ Peasants often had to lease land from their former masters -- in effect negating emancipation.

Finally, the redemption payments that the government assigned were far higher than the peasants could realistically pay. In many cases, in order to placate the nobles, the redistributed land was appraised at far higher than market value. Thus, as peasants were often leasing land as well as paying redemption, their financial obligations far exceeded their potential profit. For example, in the thirty-seven provinces of European Russia total payments due to the state from former privately owned serfs (as opposed to former state or imperially controlled serfs) amounted to 198.25 percent of the estimated net yield of their holdings.¹² It is not surprising that owing tax arrears to the state (67.7 percent of yearly payments as early as 1860¹³) became the norm in the south central portion of the country.

By encouraging peasants to leave the land for the cities or Siberia, and thus spurring industrial growth, this situation could conceivably have resulted in increased economic growth for Russia. However, this option was thwarted by the institution of the *mir*.¹⁴ The *mir*, or

village community, was responsible for the assessment and payment of all peasant tax obligations. Thus, all members of the *mir* (usually all the former serfs of a particular master) were jointly liable for the tax obligations of each. Moreover, the actual ownership of the land was vested in the *mir*, not in the individual or family. The ultimate result of this type of communal ownership was that until all redemptions were paid, former serfs and their descendants had to remain on the land and members of the *mir*.

Some of the overpopulation/underproduction problems that resulted from this might have been overcome by a transition to more labor intensive production methods. However, agricultural intensification on a Western pattern would have required much capital and a knowledge of improved agricultural methods. Both of these factors were largely non-existent in Russia during the later half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, as the *mir* periodically re-partitioned and redistributed land allotments, there was no real incentive for the Russian peasant to make such improvements on his holdings.¹⁵

Thus, by the late 1880s the Russian agrarian-based economy was weakening, particularly in its most productive black earth regions. The government's response was to shift its policies away from bolstering the agrarian economy, as it had in the past, to actively supporting and encouraging industrial growth. Ultimately, the effect of this decision

was not to bolster the economy, but rather to shatter it.

Initially, Finance Minister N.K. Bunge (1881-86) attempted to support both the floundering agricultural sector, as well as encourage industrial growth. By means of a more liberal taxation policy toward the peasantry (most importantly, he abolished the poll tax) and agricultural credit for peasants and landowners, Bunge sought to increase agricultural productivity. Additionally, he created a protective customs policy to encourage industrial development. Although his intentions were admirable, his policy resulted only in lowered revenue for the state and difficulty in balancing the budget. To meet the budget deficit, the country needed foreign borrowing and increased exports. However, export surpluses, achieved primarily by import cuts, were insufficient to balance Russia's external accounts, especially as grain prices were falling world wide at this time. Ultimately, interest on foreign loans consumed more than one third of the total budget, and the value of the paper ruble fell to historic lows.¹⁶

Following Bunge in the position of Finance Minister, I.A. Vyschnegradskii immediately began an attempt to solve the problems by reforming the existing monetary system. Vyschnegradskii strove, at all costs, to direct gold into the Tsarist treasury. Basically, he planned to do this through drastic measures to expand exports and keep down imports. One of the most important of these methods was differential

railway rates. By lowering the rail rates from inland regions to the Baltic ports he encouraged cash hungry peasants in traditionally non-exporting areas to export grain. At the same time, Vyshnegradskii refrained from new loans abroad, confining himself to the home market. Finally, he drastically increased indirect taxation.¹⁷

The flaw in Vyshnegradskii's policy seems to have been in his disregard for the vacillating nature of agriculture. As economist Olga Crisp puts it, Vyshnegradskii "based his policy on harnessing and not extending the existing forces."¹⁸ Thus, his success depended largely on the continued strength of those forces. Between 1887 and 1889, when American wheat exports fell while Russian exports reached an all time high, Vyshnegradskii's policies worked admirably. From 1887 - 91 the surplus on the balance of trade rose to an average of 311.2 million rubles, as opposed to the 68 million rouble surplus from 1882 -86.¹⁹

Unfortunately for the Russian peasantry, however, this situation did not continue. The winter of 1890 -91 was extremely long and unusually cold. In addition, there was very little snow, causing a disastrous combination of a short growing season and a virtual drought. Contemporary Russian estimates show the total grain harvest at 26 percent below normal, with the rye crop (the Russian staple) at 30 percent below the norm. The rich black earth regions was even worse -- in Voronezh, Kazan, and Tambov the harvest ranged from 65

to 75 percent below normal.²⁰

Had Vyshnegradskii not continued his extensive grain export drive, this poor harvest might not had such disastrous effects. However, with his now infamous statement "*Nedoedim no vyvezem*" -- roughly translated, "We must export, though we undereat" -- Vyshnegradskii continued his policy, and most of what little had been produced was exported. Essentially, subsistence farming peasants sold their grain during the fall in order to pay their taxes (the tax decrease by Bunge was more than made up for through indirect taxation on liquor, tea, sugar, etc),²¹ then they were forced to attempt to buy that grain back in the spring when they needed it to eat.²²

Further complicating the situation was the state of Russian railway system at the time. There were few lines existing in much of the famine region. Moreover, those lines that were in the black earth regions had been designed primarily to move goods to the frontiers and ports, not the other way. Thus, there would have to have been a complete revision of government controlled shipping schedules in order to get food where it was needed. Though by twentieth century standards this does not seem difficult, given the inept bureaucracy of the Russian Ministry of Transportation, it was a problem in 1891.²³

Consequently, even though there may have been sufficient supplies of grain within the country, the peasants had no money to buy it with, and the government had no way to get it

to them in any case. A Swedish philanthropist described entering a famine stricken village this way:

... a sense of desolation oppressed us as we drew near the village. No smoke was rising anywhere. Most of the *izbas* [huts] were roofless, having been stripped for fuel. No living creature was to be seen, except for two or three skin-covered skeletons of horses, picking a blade or two of old and rotten grass in front of a recently-dismantled *izba* ... all the help received from the authorities was consumed, most of the cattle had died, and for food they used a kind of bread made of dried and powdered grass, chaff, straw, and leaves from trees. Those who were not ill with fever were almost too weak to move or speak.²⁴

Endnotes

1. Leo Tolstoy, as recorded by Jonas Stadling, In the Land of Tolstoy: Experiences of Famine and Misrule in Russia trans. Will Reason (London: James Clarke and Co., 1897) 34.
2. George Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968) 16.
3. Ibid.
4. David McKenzie and Michael Curran, A History of Russia and the Soviet Union (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1987) 436.
5. Lazar Volin, "Land Reform in Modern Russia" in Agrarian Conditions in Modern European History eds. Bruce Mazlish and Charles K. Warner (New York: MacMillan, 1966) 13-114.
6. In the west where Polish land owners were *personae non grata*, peasants fared much better -- not surprisingly, these areas did not suffer much during the famine years.
7. Alexander Gershenkron, "Problems and Patterns of Russian Economic Development" in The Transformation of Russian Society ed. Cyril Black (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) 43, see also, Lazar Volin, 114.
8. Pavlovsky, 67.
9. P.I. Liashchenko. History of the National Economy of Russia to 1917 trans. L.M. Herman (New York: MacMillan Press, 1949) 439.
10. Russian Weights and Measures:
 - one *dessiatin* = 2.7 acres
 - one *verst* = 3,500 ft = 0.66 miles
 - one *pood* = 40 Russian lbs = 36 English lbs
 - one *funt* (Russian lb) = 0.9 English lbs
 source: Pavlovsky
11. Paul Miliukov. Russia and its Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906) 449.
12. Pavlovsky, 78-79.
13. Miliukov, 436.
14. The Imperial government wrote four separate versions of Statute of Peasants, each representing a separate region of the country. Only the statute for the 29 provinces of Great

Russia (plus Kherson, Taurida, Ekaterinoslav) included the concept of the mir. The other three regions had much milder forms of communal ownership. source: Pavlosky, 66-7.

15. Volin, 117.

16. Olga Crisp "Russian Financial Policy and the Gold Standard at the End of the Nineteenth Century" Economic History Review 6 No.2 (December 1953) 160.

17. Ibid, 162.

18. Ibid, 161-162.

19. Ibid; see also, Richard Robbins, Famine in Russia 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975) 7.

20. Robbins, 2.

21. Paul Miliukov estimated that the new excise and customs taxes were six times Bunge's earlier tax reductions. source: Milyoukov, Russia and Its Crisis, 444-45.

22. Geroid T. Robinson. Rural Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: MacMillan Co, 1932) 103.

Some comment must be made at this point regarding the opposing school of thought on this issue. James Y. Simms has argued that there is no real evidence of a crisis in Russian agriculture at this time. He argues the large arrears in taxation were not a sign of peasant inability to pay. Rather, they were indicative of peasants unwillingness to pay. Furthermore, according to Simms, the increasing governmental revenue from indirect taxation (on sugar, vodka, matches etc) was a sign of an improving economic situation -- his logic being that if peasants had money to spend on these items, they must have been doing better.

There are some fundamental flaws to Simms' thesis. The first is that he fails to adequately differentiate between different geographic groups; he treats the nation as a whole. On the few occasions that he does make differentiations, he admits that the northern urban worker was substantially better off than the southern agrarian peasant. Health of the northern economy does not assure health of the agrarian economy. Secondly, Simms makes no inquiries into the day to day functioning of the peasant farmer. How can he then assume vodka, sugar, matches, cotton, and kerosene to "luxury" items which, if the peasants were experiencing economic difficulty they could choose not to purchase? Does one assume that a homeless alcoholic is not experiencing a lack of money because he purchases alcohol? Finally, Simms does admit the existence of a famine in 1891-92, but he

refers to these years as the exceptions. The problem here is that all evidence points to poor crop year, but that **there should have been enough food, if the government had not encouraged exportation.** If, as Simms asserts, the governmental policy was not detrimental to the agricultural sector, what caused the famine? Simms and his followers simply do not supply the answer to these questions.

James Y. Simms, "The Crisis in Russian Agriculture at the End of the Nineteenth Century: A Different View," Slavic Review No. 3 September 1977.

23. Robbins, The Russian Famine. 77.

24. Stadling, In the Land of Tolstoy. 58.

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN REACTION: BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE

The initial reaction of the American legation in St. Petersburg to the growing famine was a clear case of maintaining the "status quo" in relations with Russia -- diplomacy and friendly economic competition. It would not be until non-federal government organizations forced the issue that the United States would begin, officially, to reconsider its position on this issue.

During the onset of the Russian famine, one of the most active areas of this "friendly competition" was in the export of cereal crops. Just as Vyshnegradski was instigating his export encouraging duties, the United States was also seeking to expand its own export of wheat. The target of both nations was, of course, the densely populated, but agriculturally limited Western Europe. American Secretary of Agriculture, J.M. Rusk, stated in his annual report (1891) that

in furthering the interest of our agricultural products abroad it ... [would be] especially desirable to propagate by every legitimate means a knowledge among the peoples [of Western Europe] of our resources and our own facilities for supplying their wants¹

Such a "profitable disposal" of excess grain would, according to Rusk, not only "maintain a balance of trade in our favor" but would also, "mean many millions paid to our farmers ... and have a sensible effect on prices at home".²

This "sensible effect" to which Rusk refers was critical to the domestic agenda. The new rules of commerce that had accompanied the post-civil war economy -- high production costs, low prices, and a lack of available currency -- had led to short credit and painfully high interest rates for farmers.³ As American farmers found more and more of their farms foreclosed and, in increasing numbers, joined the Populist bandwagon, Washington needed to find an outlet for their excess crops in order to maintain high prices. The fact that America's grain exporters were still smarting from Russia's 1889 boom crop, which had meant dull export markets, further complicated the situation.⁴

Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that the American legation in St. Petersburg kept a remarkably close watch on the state of Russian agriculture in general, and the state of Russian agricultural exports in particular. Of the utmost interest to the Americans was Vyshnegradskii's high protective tariff system. American reports indicated that the legation believed that the tariffs had improved the condition of both industry and agriculture. So much so, in fact, that the legation predicted that other tariffs would soon follow.⁵

By February 1891, the consular reports began to change, indicating that there had been a slight decline in both Russian imports and exports. Nevertheless, the State Department attributed this, as it had in years past, not to impending famine, but to low value of the ruble⁶ which Vyshnegradskii had been unable to control. In March, American reports confirmed this analysis; Consul-General Crawford reported that the grain market was now "firmer"⁷ and that there had been an unexpectedly large increase in exportation, presumably intended to bolster the value of the ruble. Crawford was of the opinion that "if demand continue[d] the stock ... [would] run out, [because] fresh [grain] arrivals were decreasing daily".⁸ The United States might, implied Crawford, be able to supply the difference. Despite this positive report (for the Americans), he was still clearly concerned about Russian competition in the export market. He stated that Russian exports "were probably going to enjoy a far better showing for [the] present year,"⁹ than they currently were.

Throughout the summer, the American legation continued to monitor on the Russian situation, needless to say, with an eye towards American economic interests. By October 1891, the Consular Report on Commerce and Manufactures reported that the number of districts suffering from a bad crop of winter grain had increased considerably, including the districts of Yekaterinoslav, Nizhnii-Novgorod, Viatka, Kazan,

Simbersk, Samara, Saratov, Donetz, and Kherson. Furthermore, the legation was of the opinion that summer grain would be "totally lost" in the eastern and southeastern black earth areas. Despite this grim picture, however, the Americans were still concerned about export competition: "the reports of the crops surpass by far the expectations entertained for weeks ... with exportation remaining an open question."¹⁰

Some twenty days later, 22 October 1891, the American legation finally officially acknowledged that there was, in fact, a "famine" situation. In a report to Washington, Charles Emory Smith, Ambassador to St. Petersburg, asserted that the existence of a famine was not so much in question as was the "extent of the calamity."¹¹ He estimated that some 13,728,000 people were in need of assistance, who would require, he calculated, some 1.7 to 1.9 billion pounds of rye. Still, the official attitude had not changed significantly; Smith ended his letter by stating that the Russian government was "contributing liberally" for the emergency and would have to purchase about twenty-five million dollars worth of grain.¹² The implication was that Smith meant for that grain to be purchased from the United States.

This relatively unconcerned attitude (from a humanitarian perspective) reflected the official U.S. government opinion as to the cause of the "difficulties". Both in Russia and at home, American government officials generally agreed that the

problem had been caused by poor "methods" on the part of the Russians and, appropriately, was being solved by them. According to Consular Report #137 ("Russian Farm Products"), the crops had been "ample to supply the needs of the people,"¹³ but the value of the ruble had encouraged rich landowners to sell their crop to foreigners. As the food situation worsened, the poor had to purchase that grain back at extremely high prices. The report went on to say that the grain elevators were "full to overflowing," but that most of that grain had been previously purchased by foreigners, thus there was much profit to be made.¹⁴

Evidently wishing to show that the Russian government was solving the situation, reports began to emphasise, not the export situation, but Russian governmental relief measures¹⁵. Late in October, Smith began a series of correspondence that outlined in detail the nature of Russian relief. Such aid, according to Smith, included special conferences of government representatives and *zemstvos* (local government presiding over the *mirs*), as well as local administrations to distribute food. Additionally, the Russian government was planning to arrange cheap transportation of foodstuffs, provide free pasture for live stock, and create employment opportunities in public works.¹⁶ Such measures, according to Smith, indicated "the spirit with which the Emperor and his government [would meet] ... the challenge."¹⁷

It is clear that Washington's initial response to the famine was in line with the traditional relationship between the two nations. In all correspondence, the American legation never failed to praise the Imperial government, even in cases where it was clear that Smith felt that the Russian officials were partially to blame for the situation. Had not pressure come from elsewhere, there is no reason to assume that this watchful, but hands-off and self-interested policy would ever have changed.¹⁸

Popular knowledge of the Russian famine in the United States spread rather quickly. Largely because of the American harvest that year. In the United States, 1891 had been a bountiful year. Not only was the harvest vastly superior to the Russian harvest, but it was quite a bit better than was normal for the United States. The report of the Department of Agriculture, in the fall of 1891, stated that the wheat harvest alone had been 50 percent higher than that of the previous year.¹⁹ Secretary of Agriculture Rusk call it "perhaps the largest yield ever recorded in this country."²⁰ Moreover, this unusually good crop was not accompanied by the low prices that had generally followed good harvests in the past.²¹ J.R. Sage, director of the Iowa weather and crop service, simply stated that

all in all the year of grace, 1891, gave farmers of Iowa the best all round crop season ever known since the soil was first turned by the plowshare of civilized men.²²

In an effort to showcase stories about the good harvest, editors of small town newspapers began to reprint stories from the New York and London Times about the Russian famine. This portrayal of starving peasants, combined with the prospects of an international grain shortage driving wheat prices to one dollar a bushel,²³ created an issue near to the hearts of the farmers. Stories that had been on the back pages of the larger newspapers soon became front page copy in the Mid-west.

Early in Fall 1891, William Crowell Edgar, editor-in-chief of the Northwestern Miller, Minneapolis, Minnesota, struck upon the idea that American millers and wheat farmers ought to share their good harvest by starting a campaign to feed the Russian poor.²⁴ According to Edgar, given the "broad minded liberality of the millers of America ... if a plan could be devised whereby the hungry peasant could be brought to the miller's door"²⁵ most of those in the flour industry would consent to send aid. In order to test this theory, Edgar approached some of the prominent millers in the Minneapolis area. In his own words, the response was "prompt and highly satisfactory."²⁶ Thus, on 4 December 1891, Edgar published the first article in the Northwestern Miller appealing publicly for aid.²⁷ By Christmas, the Russian Famine Aid Campaign dominated the paper.²⁸

Though Edgar was a relatively young man, just thirty-six years old at the time of the Russian famine, a brief look at

his background shows he was quite capable of taking on such a large enterprise. He was born in La Crosse, Wisconsin and later educated in St. Louis, where he began his newspaper career early, at age sixteen working with the Democrat Lithograph and Printing Company.²⁹ From there he returned to his hometown of LaCrosse, where the Northwestern Miller had been started in 1873. In 1882 Edgar was taken on staff as a business manager, and by 1883 he was both manager and editor.³⁰

As business manager for the Miller, Edgar had been responsible for a number of innovations, most of them concerning international business. In 1883, he orchestrated the first-ever flour mill advertisement (for Charles S. Pillsbury), while in 1885 Edgar followed with the first foreign flour advertisement (from Glasgow, Scotland). In early 1891 Edgar organized the "Miller's Excursion to Great Britain," a convention taking sixty American millers to visit London, Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in an effort to build closer relations between American and European millers.³¹ When the Russian famine issue came up, Edgar was in the midst of planning a similar excursion to South America.³²

This dedication to increasing international milling business is closely tied to Edgar's motivation for starting the American Famine Aid Program. Though his initial appeals for aid were, of course, in the name of Christian philanthropy, it is clear from the outset that Edgar saw

international business opportunities attached to the aid. On 11 December 1891, only seven days into the newspaper campaign Edgar cited

Good, sound business reason for aiding in this work. This will not be the last effort to help these people. Money will be raised in many quarters for the same object. The starving peasants can not eat money, they want bread. The nearest thing to it is flour. This is the only country in the world with exportable surplus, the money raised will be spent here!!³³

Similarly, in his memoirs Edgar wrote that "when contemplating the commercial aspects of the situation"³⁴ it was impossible not to see its possibilities. While there is no reason to suspect that Edgar was not a generous individual, there were obviously factors beyond philanthropy at work.

As the campaign began to pick up speed, Edgar continued to emphasize this "good business" aspect. On the eighteenth of December, as the first donations began to trickle in, Edgar noted in an editorial that the large mills had made generous contributions (Charles Pillsbury, still apparently the aggressive marketer, gave the first recorded donation).³⁵ To this Edgar wondered, "who said that corporations have no souls?"³⁶ By January 1891, the editorials had become even more adamant. Edgar pleaded with his readers to "ignore short haired women and long haired men"³⁷ because the famine relief committee did not have time "to waste with theorists or men with missions -- [famine relief] was a business men's

movement and it ... [would be] carried out in a business-like way."³⁸

This conflict with "theorists or men with missions" refers to growing conflict between advocates of famine relief and those individuals who had been long involved in George Kennan's campaign against Russian autocracy. Those in the Kennan camp felt that the aid would never reach peasants in need, but would be squandered by the Imperial Russian government. Edgar's editorials and pleas for aid to Russia left no doubt how he felt about such anti-Imperial sentiment. In one editorial he stated that Americans "can not question the good will of the Russian government."³⁹ On the issue of Russian treatment of the Jews, Edgar responded,

if the Russian Jews whom one sees heading this way at the Liverpool docks are a fair sample of what Russia has to put up with, we can only say that we do not blame her [Russia].⁴⁰

Furthermore, Edgar felt that the Russian Tsar was "doing what he could for their [peasant] relief" and was not, in any way responsible for the famine. One could "hardly expect", according to Edgar, the "fortunate, but equally poor, raisers of a crop to direct it to those with no money"⁴¹ Both the voracity of his arguments and the number of times Edgar addressed the questions of whether the peasants would ever receive the aid attest to a rapidly building conflict.

Evidently, Edgar's tactics were effective. By the close of the year, the Midwestern Miller had received offers of 1,534,590⁴² pounds of flour.⁴³ Furthermore, Governor Merriam

(Minnesota) had appointed a committee to oversee the aid drive, of which Edgar was, of course, the chairman. Governor John Thayer of Nebraska closely followed, issuing an appeal for donations of corn to be sent to the Minnesota movement.⁴⁴ Additionally, the two governors together made appointments to a committee that would actually go to Russia with the aid.⁴⁵ As yet, however, there was no clear indication that there were any plans as to how this aid was to be delivered and distributed.

The outcome of the aid campaign might have been different had William Edgar remained in complete control; however, this was not to be. Shortly after Edgar began his campaign, a paper of a decidedly different sort from the Northwestern Miller picked up the story. The Davenport Democrat, unlike the Miller did not cater to a business man's crowd. Rather, it was a community paper from a largely farming and agricultural town. As such, its editor, Benjamin F. Tillinghast, chose to drop much of Edgar's pro-business sentiment and concentrate on the more philanthropic aspects of the aid campaign. On the twenty-seventh of December, the Democrat ran a copy of Tolstoy's already much publicized appeal for international aid. Alongside this was an editorial stating that Iowans would be "backward in the matter of organized charity"⁴⁶ if they did not take up this appeal. This was followed the next day by an even stronger plea: "it is a duty no less than a pleasure for every

patriotic American"⁴⁷ to aid the starving peasants, Tillinghast wrote.

The response of the Iowa farmers was even more dramatic than that of the Minnesota businessmen. The town immediately formed a committee to administer the relief effort, and though the dollar amount of the donations was not quite as high as that of the Minnesota group, it was spread out much more evenly through the community. As Clara Barton of the Red Cross would later state, Iowa's "organization under proclamation of its Governor cover[ed] every county, town, and village, every newspaper, and periodical, all charitable societies and churches"⁴⁸. In addition to church drives, the surrounding county governments held competitions to see which would collect more corn. Clearly indicating the size of the Iowan movement, the Democrat listed every donation by name, including the penny donations of local school children.⁴⁹

The aid campaign did not stop in Iowa. The story rapidly hit the large industrial newspapers of the Northeast -- though, again, not without some subtle changes. In Iowa, the stories and public interest had centered primarily around the failed harvest, something easily understood and sympathetically viewed by mid-western farmers. In the more urban and sophisticated cities of the northeast, however, the headlines quickly veered away from this agricultural bent. The first front-page story in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin dealing with the Russian famine, for example,

concerned Russian peasants committing cannibalism in order to survive.⁵⁰ Such shocking tales rapidly led to editorials regarding the immoral nature of Russians, and, most commonly, the inadequacy of the Russian government. Here is where those opposing the views of William Edgar found a voice. One editorial stated that

Men, women and children [were] starving and [that] the situation [was] made worse by the ineptitude of the [Russian] government. The government that [held] the balance between war and peace in Europe [was] utterly incompetent. It's policy of silence and repression [were] well known. [Despite] its army of secret agents and it's repressive measures, occasional bits of news escape[d] regarding the corruption so highly ingrained in the Russian character.⁵¹

Such stories of official incompetence and peasant atrocities rapidly led to popular concern for European stability. Editorials appeared connecting nihilist plots against the Tsar with the famine, and citing warlike riots in the armories and stockyards.⁵²

William Edgar's response to this Eastern movement clearly shows how much the Famine Aid Campaign had changed as it traveled throughout the country. When an Eastern journal criticized the Minnesota movement for being too slow (it had suggested that to send cash would be more effective, but that the millers were insisting on sending flour and corn for their own business interests), Edgar responded:

We have been considerably amused at the inconsistent remarks about the famine and methods of relief suggested in a recent issue of a journal published in the east and devoted to Russian freedom ... He prints a great deal of saddening information ... as to the extent

and severity of the Russian famine ... [then] turns aside momentarily to abuse the Tsar... His notions on government are ... hazy, we imagine that Russia is a thousand times better off under the Tsar than she would be if ruled by such impractical theorists...³³

Thus, by the opening of the new year, 1892, the publicity of the Russian famine had caused the begrudged union of several very divergent groups: Minnesota Millers, Iowan farmers, and Anti-Imperial intellectuals. However, this union was shaky at best. Each group wanted the same thing -- to supply food to starving Russians -- but, they wanted to do it for very different reasons. These reasons began to conflict when the Russian aid moved from the private arena to the labyrinth of Washington ...

Endnotes

1. United States Department of Agriculture, Annual Report of the Secretary of Agriculture (Washington, DC: GPO, 1891), 22.
2. Ibid, 23.
3. Lawrence Goodwin, The Populist Movement: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) 3-5.
4. James E. Boyle, Chicago Wheat Prices for Eighty-One Years: Daily, Monthly and Yearly Fluctuations and Their Causes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1922) 17.
5. United States Department of State, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Consular Reports, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1893) no. 124, January 1891.
6. Consular Reports, No. 127, February 1891.
7. Consular Reports, No. 128, 18 March 1891.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Consular Reports, No. 133 October 1891.
11. United States Congress, House Executive Documents, 52nd Congress, 1st Session, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Correspondence (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1893), Mr. Smith to Mr. Wharton, 22 October, 1891.
12. Ibid.
13. Consular Reports No. 137, December 1891.
14. Ibid.
15. Interestingly, Richard Robbins, who has studied the Russian relief effort in detail, concluded that the size and scope of the government relief was quite impressive, but its effectiveness was abysmal.
16. Diplomatic Correspondence Mr. Smith to Mr. Blaine, 30 Oct 91.
17. Ibid, 8 December 1891.

18. Smith never did stop trying to show the Imperial government in a positive light. Despite personal correspondence that indicated Smith did blame the Russian government, in May 1892 he wrote an article for North American Review in which he attributed the famine to drought. Of course, this may have simply been attempts at staying in the good graces of the Russians. See Charles Emory Smith, "The Famine in Russia," North American Review CLIV (May 1892), 541-51.
19. Annual Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 14.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid, 17. (one assumes this is due to the lowered Russian export of grain)
22. Annual Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 600-601.
23. Davenport Democrat. 4 November 91.
24. This is according to Edgar's own memoirs. There is no other evidence to suggest that this was planned any early than December. Of course, there isn't any evidence refuting Edgar's claim to have been the first one that thought of sending aid to the Russians. See, William Edgar, The Russian Famine of 1891 and 1892: Some Particulars of the Relief Sent to the Destitute Peasants by the Millers of America in the Steamship Missouri (Minneapolis, MN: Millers and Manufacturers Insurance Co., 1893) 5.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Northwestern Miller, 25 December 1891.
29. Minnesota Historical Society Biographical Information -- William Edgar
30. Newspaper Biography (Paper unknown) from Edgar's Scrapbook. 16 February 1895, Minnesota Historical Society, Minneapolis, Minnesota
31. Minnesota Historical Society Biographical Information (interestingly, Edgar was also the first American Newspaper editor to employ a female assistant editor)
32. Midwestern Miller, n.d. (Edgar scrapbook clipping)
33. Northwestern Miller, 11 December 91.

34. Edgar, 5.
35. Ibid, 6.
36. Midwestern Miller, 18 December 1891.
37. Midwestern Miller, 2 January 1892.
38. Ibid.
39. Midwestern Miller, 11 December, 1892.
40. Midwestern Miller, 25 December 1891.
41. Ibid.
42. Midwestern Miller, 30 December 91.
43. Midwestern Miller, 30 December 1891.
44. Nebraska, Report of the Work in Nebraska for the Russian Famine Sufferers prepared by Luther P. Ludden, Commissioner (Lincoln, Nebraska: State Journal Co. Printers, 1892) 5.
45. Ibid.
46. Davenport Democrat, 27 December 1891.
47. Davenport Democrat, 28 December 1891.
48. Clara Barton, as quoted in the Davenport Democrat, 16 January 1892.
49. Davenport Democrat, December, 1891 - January, 1892.
50. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 19 December 1891.
51. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 23 December 91.
52. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 23,24 December, 91.
53. Edgar, 10. see also, Northwestern Miller, 3 January 91.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE AND ITS AFTERMATH

American Famine Relief became an issue for the American federal government through a rather circumspect route. Initially, William Edgar and his followers believed that the Russian government had agreed to organize and pay for the shipment of the American grain. On 11 December 1891, the Northwestern Miller reported that "they [Edgar and other aid organizers] were acting in concert with the Russian authorities" who had "agreed to pay freight on all shipments to New York," as well as provide transportation from New York to Russia and distribute the flour once it arrived there.¹ None of Edgar's correspondence indicate that he had ever had this contact with the Imperial government, though in his memoirs he claims to have corresponded with the Russian Charge d'affaires in Washington, Alexander Gregor. This may or may not have been true. However, it is quite clear that Charles Emory Smith, American Ambassador to St. Petersburg, knew nothing of the idea until he received a telegram from Governor Merriam of Minnesota.² It seems unlikely that a small town newspaperman would be making official correspondence with the Imperial government without Smith's

knowledge.

The situation became even further clouded just two days after Smith received the telegram from Governor Merriam. At this point, the New York Times published "what appeared to be an official statement"³ indicating that the American Secretary of the Navy had offered a ship to transport the donations. Despite the fact that no one ever substantiated it, newspapers around the country rapidly picked up the story. It became widely believed that the U.S. government was going to pick up the tab.

Thus, with the opening of 1892, the United States government was in an increasingly difficult predicament. With virtually no federal involvement, state and local organizations had compiled the largest foreign aid program to date, and had convinced the nation that the federal government was responsible for delivering that aid. Such an act would imply a sympathetic American foreign policy that simply did not exist. Something had to change.

Facing the possible embarrassment of having no official policy on the issue, President Benjamin Harrison hastily composed a message for Congress. It read as follows:

The famine prevailing in some of the provinces of Russia is so severe and widespread as to have attracted the sympathetic interest of a large number of our liberal and favored people. In some of the great grain-producing States of the West movements have already been organized to collect flour and meal for the relief of these perishing Russian families, and the response has been such as to justify the belief that a ship's cargo can very soon be delivered at the seaboard, through the generous

cooperation of the transportation lines. It is most appropriate that a people whose storehouses have been so lavishly filled with all the fruits of the earth ... should manifest their gratitude by large gifts ... The Secretary of the Navy has no steam vessel at his disposal that could be used for the transportation of these supplies, and I therefore recommend that he be authorized to charter a suitable vessel to receive that, if a sufficient amount should be offered and to send them under the charge of a naval officer ...⁴

Simultaneously (and assumably jointly planned), Senator Washburn (Rep., Minnesota,) introduced a joint resolution authorizing the Secretary of the Navy "to employ any ship or vessel ... for the purpose of transporting ... such contributions." Moreover, the resolution also authorized an unlimited appropriation of funds to cover the expenses of such an endeavor. Finally, William Edgar sent a telegram to Congress (read by Senator Washburn) listing seventeen states plus the District of Columbia as contributors, and stating that a steamship was greatly needed.⁵

The outcome of the vote that followed is not surprising, given both the suddenness with which the issue arose, as well as the barrage of governmental and private support that it seemed to be receiving. The resolution passed easily, with only nine dissenting votes (see Appendix A). So limited was the debate accompanying the bill, that the Senate only added a spending ceiling of \$100,000.⁶ Even this was somewhat innocuous, as Edgar had previously estimated that it would only cost about \$25,000.⁷

Such a complete reversal of government policy was not to come quite this easily, however. The "battle" occurred in the House of Representatives on the next day, the sixth of January, 1892. In the New York Times, the debate would be described as a "free for all town meeting," with a complete lack of leadership,⁸ while the Omaha Bee would call it "simply disgraceful partisan politics."⁹ Without any apparent organization, this seemingly harmless foreign aid bill would dredge up key issues in American policy toward Russia -- partisan animosities, the nature of the Imperial government, and human rights.

The volatile nature of the debate that occurred in the House the next day should not have been entirely unexpected. It was clear as soon as the Senate passed the resolution that all was not right in the House. After a messenger arrived, bearing the news that the Senate had passed S.R. 21 (as the Famine Aid Bill was now called), Representative Blount (Dem., Georgia) requested that the resolution be "laid on the table" so that House members could have time to examine it, while Representative Breckenridge (Dem., Kentucky) expressed the urgency of passing the resolution quickly. Shortly thereafter, Blount (evidently having examined it) asked for full House consideration of the resolution. Thus far, there had been no real indication that the House would respond any differently than the Senate. However, after the Speaker asked if there were any objections, Representative Kilgore

(Dem, Texas) responded (one imagines quite dryly), "Mr. Speaker, since Congress seems inclined to look after everybody's people but our own, I object to it."¹⁰ Thus, parliamentary procedure forced the Speaker to postpone the vote until the following day. The stage had been set.

Initially, proponents of the resolution attempted to prove that it was in line with traditional American foreign policy. Representative McCreary (Dem, Kentucky) used a petition from Gen. Cassius M. Clay, (who had formally served as Senator from Kentucky as well as represented the U.S. as minister to Russia for a number of years) to illustrate this viewpoint. Clay wrote that "the Russian autocratic dynasty and people ... [had] from the earliest times been on the most friendly terms with" the United States. Furthermore, Clay argued, Russia "saved the life of the Republic" when she supported the Union "against all Europe and Great Britain" during "our last war".¹¹ No longer was the aid seen as simple charitable, it had become duty.

Blount continued this line of reasoning by showing that aid of this kind not only was deserved, but had historic precedent. On two occasions, he argued, in 1847 and again in 1880, the Congress had provided ships to transport food to the Irish.¹² Not only had the Congress allowed the Department of the Navy to transport the food, but they had also declined to limit the appropriation. Thus, according to Blount, the resolution had precedent as well as merit.¹³

These viewpoints did not, however, go unattacked. In response to the question of historic precedent Kilgore countered that there had always been "demagogues to pander to the Irish vote,"¹⁴ thus it really did not apply. Furthermore, it was not a policy that ought to be adopted, as Kilgore put it,

in the State of Durango, in Mexico, thousands of people are dying of starvation. Every year, as the years go by, suffering will exist somewhere. Every year communities are stricken by flood, by epidemics, or by famine. And every year and every day Congress would be called upon to extend charity to suffering people in every quarter of the globe if we should countenance this policy by adopting this resolution.¹⁵

Finally, Kilgore cited the case of his own state several years before, which had suffered a "famine which covered thirty counties." When Texas came before Congress asking for \$10,000 to purchase seed grain, the response had been that "Government had not the authority to expend money for such purpose". Clearly, argued Kilgore, if the government could not "extend charity to our own people ... it certainly has not the authority to extend charity to Russians".¹⁶

This issue of authority rapidly led to the question of whether or not the Congress could appropriate money for such purposes, and which congressional committee had the authority to decide. Proponents of the resolution felt that it belonged in the Committee on Naval Affairs, as the Secretary of the Navy was the one to whom the responsibility of shipping the grain would belong. Those against the bill,

however, felt it more properly belonged in the Committee on Appropriations, or even better, the Committee on the Judiciary, as it was somewhat unclear whether paying for such aid was constitutional.

It is tempting to make much of this debate. It could easily be seen as a landmark argument over who makes foreign policy, and whether the Congress could control that policy by controlling the purse strings. However, this would probably be adding legitimacy to a debate that was somewhat less than a serious inquiry into constitutional law and parliamentary procedure. As Representative Raines (Rep., New York) put it, the debate rapidly degenerated into a question of benefit for "either for the Naval Committee or the Committee on Appropriations, and is not in the interest of retrenchment and reform."¹⁷ This is particularly true when one examines the membership of each committee, it is clear that each side was trying to get the resolution sent to a committee where they might control its destiny (see Appendix B).

Ultimately, the Omaha Bee was most correct when it called the debate "disgraceful partisan politics."¹⁸ Rather than following the regional lines that one would expect (those states that donated aid vs those that did not), the argument rapidly turned a strictly partisan direction. Representative Boatner (Dem., Louisiana) did "not see how any Democrat could vote for it," as they had just spent the last twelve months "writing to their constituents that ... [they] could not

grant any relief to the agriculturists of our own community"¹⁹ On the Republican side, Raines pointedly asked, "who had discovered that the American Congress had no right to make appropriations from the United States Treasury?." ²⁰ To which a Democrat responded,

It is old and sound Democratic doctrine that Congress has no such power; but ... [the Republicans], in view of the precedents they have established, are entitled to a patent for disregarding constitutional limitations in this respect. ²¹

Had the debate not taken this partisan turn, its ultimate results would probably have been different. In the Senate the vote had been largely non-partisan, with a few seemingly symbolic "no" votes from the South (see Appendix A). The early debate in the House seemed to be following this pattern also, though a few southern Democrats such as Blount and Breckinridge appeared to be in favor of the the bill, most Southerners, like Kilgore of Texas were vehemently against it. Because of a skewed party distribution of the fifty-second Congress, however, a change to a partison vote would be a death-nell for Famine Aid; there were only eighty-eight Republicans to two-hundred and thirty-five Democrats.

Utimately, it was a legitimate question of foreign policy that swung the debate permanantly in a partisan direction. Representative Charles Boutelle (Rep., Maine) asked that if the aid "could not be transported by the Russian government" then how could the alleged famine "be very great? Or else that Government is very negligent in making proper provision

for its suffering poor."²² Thus, Boutelle addressed the fundamental question of whether there was a famine, and if there was, did the United States have an obligation, or even a right, to interfere?

Representative Pendleton (Dem., West Virginia) responded with what would become the Democratic answer to this fundamental question. He suggested that the Russian government had over \$150,000,000 in gold put away in European banks, and clearly did not need American aid.²³ Pendleton continued his indictment of the Russian government by stating that the aforementioned funds were being stockpiled for war; "Russia as she stands today is a menace to modern civilization."²⁴ Thus, though the statements were clearly false (had Russia had that much gold available, she would not have been suffering from currency problems), an elected U.S. government official was portraying the Russian government in an extremely negative light.

With this, Democratic sentiment began to swing against the resolution. The debate centered around striking the \$100,000 appropriation to charter a ship, thus forcing the Navy to transport the supplies on their own vessels, or decline to transfer it at all. On the verge of voting on this change, Representative Herbert (Dem., Alabama) insisted that it ought to be the Russian Navy that provided the ships to transport the aid; "that Government can ... charter tomorrow morning by telegraph every ship to be found in

American ports."²⁵ Herbert then began to question whether such a government could be trusted to distribute any aid that it received.²⁶

The debate then turned towards its final chapter -- Imperial treatment of Russian subjects. Responding to the question of whether the Russian government could be trusted to hand out the grain to those who needed it most, Representative Elijah Morse (Rep., Massachusetts) made a last ditch effort to save the bill. He introduced the subject of Russian anti-semitism, stating that "it was well know to the people of the United States", that

5,000,000 citizens of Russia, known as
Israelites or Jews are subjected by the Russian
Government at this time to the most cruel and
relentless persecution

This being the case, Morse suggested that there would be "no harm" in coupling American disapproval of anti-semitism with the foreign aid resolution. This was to be done by amending the resolution to insist that there be "no discrimination"²⁷ in the distribution of aid against Jews. In this way, the famine aid could be delivered, while also being used as a tool to express American disapproval of Russian anti-semitism.

This issue of Russian anti-semitism was not new to Capital Hill. As early as 1873, the revival of anti-semitic laws in Russia had led to conflict with Washington when a Jewish representative of Singer Sewing Machine Co. had been detained in St. Petersburg.²⁸ Over the next twenty years, disputes between the two nations on the whole issue of

discrimination had become increasingly bitter as nearly 250,000 oppressed Jews, Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and White Russians emigrated to the United States to escape persecution.²⁹ In October of 1890, the Secretary of State submitted a report to Congress concerning the enforcement of "proscriptive edicts against Jews".³⁰ Finally, on 9 December 1891, just as the famine aid campaign was heating up in Minnesota, President Harrison, in a message to Congress, expressed "serious concern for the harsh measures ... against the Hebrews."³¹

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that these actions were indicative of a nationwide concern for the welfare of the oppressed in Russia, or of a waning of the longtime friendship between the two countries. Rather, it was a result of the American economic situation. The initial incident involved, as previously mentioned, the mistreatment of the representative of a major American manufacturer. Moreover, the concern on the part of the President in his 1891 message was not for the oppressed people of Russia, but that the immigration was "likely to assume proportions which [would] make it difficult to find homes and employment for them [in the United States] and to seriously affect the labor market". Finally, that same message did not indicate, in any way, that this situation would put Russian-American relations in jeopardy. The message began "in a friendly spirit", and ended stating that the "historic friendship for ... [Russia]"

could not "fail to give the assurance that" that these observations were "of a sincere well-wisher."³²

The American Aid resolution became, then, another forum for those who did not share the administration's traditional view of Russian-American relations. Unfortunately for the proponents of famine aid, however, this seemed only to strengthen the partisan lines. Representative Chipman (Dem., Michigan) put the argument quite succinctly as he questioned whether Russia, "treating the Israelites and the Poles ... as she ... [does, was] entitled to the comity which prevail[ed] among civilized nations". Chipman later quelled any doubts as to whether he intended this remark to include all American dealings with the Imperial government by stating that refusing to send aid would be "one means of stimulating them [the peasants] to **rise and throw off the fetters which bind them.**"³³ Such a blatant encouragement of rebellion certainly could not be categorized as "in the spirit of friendship!"³⁴

Though much Democratic applause followed Chipman's oration, the entire body did not agree. Butler (Dem., Iowa) remained a supporter of the resolution, pointing out that the aid was private funds and should not be enmeshed in governmental relations. Furthermore, to include such an anti-discrimination clause would be, in his words, "a studied insult"³⁵ to the Russian government. Blount (Dem., Georgia) put the debate in somewhat clearer terms, stating that

perhaps Chipman should "go further and make even a declaration of war against any government that was not republican in form." Blount had no doubt that the amendment had been "calculated to disturb the good relations between [the United States] and the Russian Government."³⁶

Ultimately, despite Chipman's passionate oration, it appears that the Congress was not yet ready to deal directly with the touchy issue of ideological inconsistencies between the two nations. The anti-discrimination amendment was rejected.³⁷ In the end however, those who were against continuing the "status quo" in Russian-American relations won out. While a majority of representatives did not wish to connect their names to such a potentially inflammatory clause, they could achieve much the same effect by voting to strike all appropriations. This is precisely what happened. In a 165 to 72, largely partisan, vote,³⁸ many of those who had previously been in favor of the resolution (including Butler and Blount) voted to remove the \$100,000 appropriation (see Appendix A).³⁹ Further emasculating the bill, the House later voted to table it completely. Thus, Congress voted against legislation affecting Russian-American relations because that legislation went counter to American ideology, as well as economic concerns.

Though the congressional debate would ultimately change the nature of the American Famine Aid, it did not kill it. If anything, the public outcry that the vote caused added

zeal to an issue that had begun to lose some of its momentum. (articles on the Russian situation had begun to slip off the front pages). William Edgar ran a headline stating that while Congress argued, "mothers [were] killing their children that they may not see them tortured by hunger."⁴⁰ In Davenport, the Democrat urged Iowans not to "lose courage"⁴¹ in light of the Congressional vote. In Philadelphia, always the most political, articles appeared that questioned what the Tsar's reaction to it all would be.⁴²

Of the three cities, the motivation behind the Minneapolis movement changed the least. William Edgar simply used the Congressional vote as an opportunity to point out how superior his business organization was to the federal government. "We have", he wrote, "carried out ... [this] project without government aid", Its success, he felt, would be due entirely to "businessmen and business methods".⁴³ It is important to note, however, that even as Edgar pounded home the business importance of this venture, he was conscious of a change in attitudes brought about by the Congressional debate. After the sixth of January, Edgar did not print a single article extolling the virtues of the Tsarist government.

As in previous months, Edgar's intuition proved to be correct. In mid-February, a New York businessman, William James who owned the Atlantic Transportation Line, donated use of one of his ships (the steamer Missouri) to transport the

donated flour.⁴⁴ At the same time William Edgar contacted various rail lines and arranged to have the flour shipped to New York for free. Predictably, Edgar then listed the names of those lines that agreed and those that did not, suggesting that where possible millers only utilize those lines that aided the Famine Relief effort.⁴⁵

In Iowa, the effects of the Congressional debate were somewhat more pronounced. While the Davenport Democrat had previously limited its appeals for aid to Christian charity, after the sixth of January, the Democrat took on a decidedly political tone. On the thirteen of January, the Democrat included an article stating that Jewish families had been "reduced to beggary"⁴⁶ while Russian authorities looked on. Such a candid discussion of anti-semitism would have seemed out of place among previous articles stating that Orthodox Russians, like Protestant Iowans, were "members of the household of [Christian] faith".⁴⁷ The Democrat's new anti-Tsarist sentiments were quite clear by the seventeen of January, when the paper included excerpts of a Harpers article stating that

the people of the United States are not so ignorant as to hold the people of Russia responsible for all the acts of the autocratic government which there exists ... These peasant ... are victims of bad government ... it would be pitiful, indeed, if these poor peasants doubly cursed by famine and by dishonest rulers should be regarded as outlaws beyond the pale of humanity because of unworthy acts of their government which they are powerless to resist or restrain.⁴⁸

Moreover, at the same time as the Northwest Miller stopped running articles in praise of Imperial charity, the Davenport Democrat no longer mentioned that patriotic Americans "owed" the Russians because of actions during the Civil War.

In Philadelphia the front page copy had always been somewhat more inflammatory and political. The Congressional debates seemed, however, to take what had been simply a gory story and make a real issue of it. Once the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin began running detailed stories of the Congressional debate alongside reports of the Tsar stating that there was no famine,⁴⁹ as well as extended articles regarding Russian persecution of Jews⁵⁰, long time activists against Russian Imperialism abandoned their role as critics and became actively in the campaign. One such man was Jacob Schiff, a New York Banker and regular contributor to the journal Free Russia.⁵¹ Schiff began a campaign among New York Jews; donations came pouring in.

On 31 January 1892 the city of Philadelphia followed the lead of Midwestern cities and formed a Mayoral committee to oversee the aid.⁵² The response was so great that the city was able to raise donations as well as enough money to charter a ship, the Indiana, in less than a month. Much to the chagrin of William Edgar, Philadelphia's Indiana left for Russia on the twenty-sixth of February.

Finally, on the twelfth of March, the combined donations of Iowa⁵³ and Minnesota followed the Pennsylvania donations

across the Atlantic to Libau.⁵⁴ Not only had the largest foreign aid campaign to date been organized entirely by private means in just three months, but that aid had undergone a major transformation. What had begun as business generating venture to a long time allied country had become a mission to rescue persecuted peasants from a corrupt and incompetent government.

Endnotes

1. Midwestern Miller, 11 December 1891.
2. Diplomatic Correspondence, Mr. Smith to Mr. Blaine. 6 January 1892.
3. Ibid.
4. Congress, Senate, message from President Benjamin Harrison urging the passage of Senate Resolution 21, 52nd Congress, 1st sess., Congressional Record (6 January 1892) vol. 23, 110
5. Senator Washburn of Minnesota, Congressional Record, 110.
6. Ibid, 111.
7. Midwestern Miller, 7 January 1892.
8. New York Times, 7 January 1892.
9. Omaha Bee, 10 January 1892.
10. Congress, House, Representative Kilgore of Texas, 52nd Congress, 1st sess., Congressional Record (5 January 1892), vol. 23, 126.
11. Congress, House, a petition to Congress from Cassius Clay regarding famine relief and U.S. - Russian Relations as read by Representative McCreary of Kentucky, Congressional Record, 157.
12. Representative Blount of Georgia, Congressional Record. 158.
13. Ibid.
14. Representative Kilgore of Texas, Congressional Record. 158.
15. Ibid, 160.
16. Ibid.
17. Representative Raines of New York, Congressional Record. 161.
18. Omaha Bee, 10 January 1892.
19. Representative Boatner of Louisiana, Congressional Record. 161.

20. Representative Raines of New York, Congressional Record, 161.
21. Representative Oates of Alabama, Congressional Record, 161.
22. Representative Boutelle of Maine, Congressional Record, 161.
23. Representative Pendleton of West Virginia, Congressional Record, 163.
24. Ibid.
25. Representative Herbert of Alabama, Congressional Record, 166.
26. Ibid.
27. Representative Morse of Massachusetts, Congressional Record, 168.
28. William A. Williams. 26.
29. Laserson. 299; see also, Sivachev and Yakolev, 14.
30. United States Department of State, Message to Congress, from: (ed) Stanley S. Jados, Documents on Russian-American Relations: Washington to Eisenhower, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1965) 33.
31. President Benjamin Harrison in 3rd Annual Message to the Congress of the United States, Executive Mansion (9 Dec 1891), in Jados. 33.
32. Ibid.
33. Representative Chipman of Michigan, Congressional Record, 168.
34. President Benjamin Harris, in Jados, 33.
35. Representative Butler of Iowa, Congressional Record, 169.
36. Representative Blount of Georgia, Congressional Record, 170.
37. Congressional Record. 173.
38. Congressional Record. 176.

39. It is possible that Representatives districts donating large amounts of aid voted to maintain appropriations regardless of party affiliation, but only states, not districts, are listed on donation records, so such tracking is not possible.
40. Northwestern Miller, n.d. (a clipping, but clearly post congressional debate).
41. Davenport Democrat, 7 January 1891.
42. It is interesting to note that newspaper reaction did not, as might have been expected, follow party lines. see, Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, pg 106-107, though Curti does not follow the paths of the "founding" newspapers, he does examine the reaction of a set of New York papers that did not cover the famine campaign prior to the congressional debate, and found them completely non-partisan on this issue.
43. Northwestern Miller. n.d.
44. Northwestern Miller. n.d.
45. Ibid.
46. Davenport Democrat. 13 January 1892.
47. Quoted from Sunday sermon in Davenport -- Davenport Democrat, 10 January 1892.
48. Harpers, as reprinted in Davenport Democrat, 17 January 1892.
49. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 12 January 1892.
50. Ibid, 14 January 1892
51. Cyrus Adler, Jacob Schiff: His Life and Letters (NY: Doubleday, 1928) 116.
52. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 1 February 1892.
53. Some of the Iowa donations actually went to Russia a few months later on the Red Cross ship, Leo.
54. Northwestern Miller, 17 March 1892.

CHAPTER V

THE DELIVERY OF AID. AND AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS

The impact of the American Famine Aid Campaign did not end once the Indiana and the Missouri (and later, the Red Cross ships, Conemaugh and Leo¹) left the United States. In fact, the campaign's greatest repercussions were yet to come. In order to determine that impact, one must explore two distinctive, yet related, issues: what happened to the aid once it reached the famine districts; and secondly, how that same information reached the average American (who was, after the congressional fiasco, actively following the story).

The Philadelphia Aid Society's ship, the Indiana, arrived in the harbor at Libau in late March. Unfortunately, however, there is no reliable way to track its cargo in Russia, as no records or diaries of those that accompanied the ship to Russia have survived. Clara Barton mentions the name of the ship in her book on the birth of the Red Cross,² so it is likely that at least some of that aid was delivered through Red Cross channels. Additionally, William Edgar's papers describe meeting a "Mr. Blankenburg who came with from Philadelphia with the Indiana and went as far as Samara."³ so

one can assume at least some of the cargo was delivered there.

The case for the Mid-western aid was quite different, however. William Edgar, ever the newspaperman, sent regular correspondence to be published in the Northwestern Miller, and eventually published his memoirs in book form.

Thus, we know that the Missouri arrived in Libau harbor on the sunny afternoon of 3 April 1892.⁴ From there the Russian government transferred the cargo onto thirty-two train cars, the first of which left for Saratov on the following day. According to Edgar, each of these cars was equipped with governmental orders instructing that the freight was to be "pushed to its destination ahead of everything else."⁵ The last trainload left for the interior on Thursday, 7 April 1892. Altogether, the cargo filled 241 cars and weighed 5,389,728 (English) pounds. It was shipped to thirteen different provinces. to Tambov, fifty-one cars; Samara, eleven; Simbirsk, ten; Penza, eight; Ufa, four; Niznii Novgorod, six; Tula, twenty-two; Voronej, thirteen; Orel, twelve; Saratov, seventy-eight. Perm, eight; Riazan, six; and, to Orenburg, twelve.⁶

Interestingly, Edgar claimed that the flour (and corn) ended up in the areas most affected by the famine. However, it appears that the American aid actually went to those areas which were accessible by train.⁷ In fact, by the time the American aid reached Russia, the Imperial government (as well

as private individuals) had already begun to supply aid to these more accessible areas.⁸ The regions most affected (those off the rail lines) probably did not receive any American aid at all.

Having seen the cargo on to the trains, William Edgar decided to "go personally on a tour through a portion of the famine districts to actually see something about the extent of the famine and the state of the relief work."⁹ The rest of the committee, meanwhile, returned by ship to the United States. Much like Edgar's statements that the flour went to the most needed areas, however, his assertion that he saw to the actual delivery of the flour was somewhat erroneous. His records show that he travelled to Moscow and from there to Bogoroditsk in Tula,¹⁰ where he observed famine relief activities in various villages. By his own later admission, however, he never got as far as the districts where American aid was sent.¹¹

It is possible, however, to make some reasonably accurate conclusions about how the aid was delivered. Edgar's records indicate that "Count Tolstoy ... received a certain number of cars."¹² While Edgar never observed any of Tolstoy's famine aid work, a Swede, by the name of Jonas Stadling, was actively involved in Tolstoy's work.¹³ Stadling's account of his experiences agrees with Edgar's, indicating that they were typical of most of the relief work.

According to Stadling, the principle means of relief was by "eating rooms." These were actually homes of (usually widowed) female peasants who exchanged their cooking services for free food.¹⁴ In these homes, two meals a day were served to the most needy. In the instances in which the villagers had a supply of flour, the kitchens served warm food only (Edgar's memoirs indicate that this was usually a thin soup)¹⁵, while in areas of complete destitution, both warm food¹⁶ and bread were served. Records of the number of meals eaten by an individual were then recorded on "bread tickets" with a square marked off for each day of the month. Additionally, famine aid workers set up separate houses serving complete meals for children.¹⁷

In the areas where the government had not yet approved the establishment of soup kitchens, the distribution of food appears to have been much more haphazard. According to all accounts, when the local nobility took care of the distribution of food (as was most common), the method consisted of calling the mir together once a month or so, and then having audiences with any peasant requesting aid. Ultimately, the noble determined who would receive what amount of food each month.¹⁸ Generally no help at all was given to those who possessed horses or cattle, or those able to work.¹⁹ A British journalist described the process in the following way.

Next morning, my host's house was fairly stormed by peasants. There were about two hundred of them collected in front of the

modest mansion. They were admitted in lots of about a half dozen, and my friend asked them what they wanted. It was always the same tale; they wanted food. Some wanted to be put on the list for relief; others came to complain that their names had been taken off.²⁰

Even William Edgar, ever the optimist about Russian aid, admitted that the nobles were seldom able to give the kind of aid needed.²¹

When determining the effect that any event has on American public opinion, the reporting of that event can often be more significant than what actually occurred. This is particularly true in the case of Russian Famine Aid. Many people were concerned with its delivery (having donated relatively large sums of money), but few people actually had the opportunity to see it for themselves. Thus, there was a great demand for information about "what really happened," particularly in light of the controversy over whether to send the aid or not.

Aside from newspaper accounts (which tended to stick to basic factual information -- such as dates of arrival of ships and the like), personal narratives and memoirs published in the months after the campaign seem to have been the most sought after sources of information. It was from these memoirs that most Americans developed their perceptions of Russia and the Russian famine. Three such manuscripts have survived: Jonas Stadling's In the Land of Tolstoi: Experiences of Famine and Misrule in Russia; Braley Hodgett's In the Track of the Russian Famine: The Personal Narrative of

a Journey Through the Famine Districts of Russia; and William Edgar's own. The Russian Famine of 1891-1892. Each of these pamphlets represents a different political view of Russia and the famine situation. Despite their radically different viewpoints, however, there are enough similarities between them to illustrate how they both represented, and helped to form, a changing view of Russia.

The very fact that Jonas Stadling's work, In the Land of Tolstoi, exists is representative of the high demand for information regarding the famine and the American aid effort. Stadling was a Swedish philanthropist who traveled to Russia during the famine to help Count Tolstoi with his charity work. By Stadling's own admission he did not intend to write a book about his experiences, much less market that book in the United States. However, William Reason, an American, in an effort to provide information about American Famine Aid sought out Stadling and translated his personal memoirs, converting them into a book format.²² It seems unlikely that Reason would have undertaken such a task had there not been a demand for it.

In addition to indicating the demand for information, Stadling's book represents clearly how the famine aid campaign was being used to market anti-Imperial sentiment. In his discussion of the "magnificent gifts from America."²³ the author made no attempt to veil his distaste for the Tsarist government, or for his belief that the only way to

solve the problem was to end that regime. According to the author, the Russian government scorned even attempts at relief from the nobility; when "it was no long possible to ignore" those people demanding that the peasants be aided, the government was suspicious of nobles giving aid "invariably sending detectives to spy on their proceedings."²⁴ The ending of the book was particularly ominous, implying that if something was not done, bloody revolution would result.²⁵

While the Stadling work could be disregarded as an isolated case of political propaganda (there being, of course, no way of knowing how much "liberty" Reason took in its translation), Edward Hodgetts' work, In the Track of the Russian Famine, attests to the fact that work on the Russian famine invariably became statements on the Tsarist government. Hodgetts was a Reuters' agent in Berlin. As he spoke fluent Russian (having lived there for twelve years as a child), Reuters assigned him to go to Russia to report on the famine. Specifically, Hodgetts was to determine if there really **was** a famine. In the Track of the Russian Famine is nothing more than the published version of his correspondence back to his home office.²⁶ What makes Hodgetts' work a somewhat more creditable example of Famine Aid taking on political overtones than Stadling's book, is that Hodgetts did not have any prior animosity toward the Russian government. In his own words, he accepted the mission "to

re-establish old acquaintances".²⁷ Furthermore, upon completing his mission, Hodgetts stated that he was "deeply grateful to the Russian official authorities" because he had "never once been interfered with or molested and [had] always experienced the greatest kindness", and felt "little sympathy and less faith in the political agitators of Russia".²⁸

Clearly, this was not a man writing revolutionary propoganda.

Nevertheless, Hodgetts' work left its readers with a decidedly negative view of the Tsarist government. According to Hodgetts, "the most frightful abuses"²⁹ had occurred in all of the Russian relief systems, including the Russian Red Cross. Of the Red Cross, he reported that, "millions and millions have fallen into the coffers of the central committee of the Red Cross", but where that money ended up "nobody knew."³⁰ Worse than the abuses of the Red Cross, according to Hodgetts, was the prevailing attitudes of the nobility.

should the patience of the peasant give out, the country gentleman will be the first to feel the effects of his wrath. In the majority of cases the latter fails to realize his danger and is assuming bullying airs and despotic ways now that the famine has again placed the peasants in his power. The foolishness of this attitude is obvious.³¹

Finally, Hodgetts attacked the one constant in all of the Famine Aid campaign -- the fact that Russia was a "Christian" nation. After meeting an Orthodox priest, Hodgetts wrote,

Here was a revelation! Before me stood the disciple of Christ, with long hair, pale face, cassock touching the ground looking like a sacred picture. Round him was a starving

people. And what was his dominant idea? The succour of the afflicted? The feeding of the hungry and clothing of the naked? Nothing of the kind. His one concern was the price of corn he contrived to hoard...³²

Ultimately, Hodgetts made it quite clear that he placed the blame for the situation directly on the head of the government. "While the peasant [was] gradually growing poorer," he wrote, "the state was growing more and more exacting in the collection of taxes."³³ For readers who still doubted Hodgetts sentiments, he later stated that his journey had "convinced ... [him] that it [was] the deliberate policy of the government to keep the peasant in a state of barbarism and poverty."³⁴ The ultimate result of all of this, he felt, was anyone's guess, but that he had been "much saddened" by his journey.³⁵

Perhaps the most convincing evidence for a change "in the air," was the book least critical of the Russian government, William Edgar's own narrative, The Russian Famine. Though Edgar remained pro-Tsarist until the end, his apologies, explanations, and rebuttals say more about prevailing attitudes than any of the anti-imperial works could. Initially, Edgar denied that he intended the book to be taken in any political way. "Upon the subject of Russian politics" which he claimed was "engaging the attention of the world and about which much discussion is prevailed ... [he had] nothing to say." Further illustrating the fervor of public interest in Russia, Edgar wrote that since his return, he had been

"asked one hundred times, 'and what of the Siberian exile system?'... 'or the condition of the Jews?'" Clearly, these "anxious inquiries"³⁶ show a dramatic shift from interest in the plight of starving farmers, or the state of the international milling business.

Ultimately, Edgar attempted to convince his readers that the Russians had distributed the aid fairly, and that the Tsarist government was not to blame for the situation. Despite that fact that he never travelled to see American aid actually delivered, he wrote that "there was absolutely no question"³⁷ that grain was fairly distributed. As to the Russian government's role in creating the famine, Edgar concluded that the famine was the result of "many causes, some beyond human prevention."³⁸ His constant and emphatic return to these two themes clearly indicates that he no longer felt that his was the majority opinion.

To determine how much works like these really affected public opinion, and, later, government policy, one needs to know how many people actually read them. This, of course, is virtually impossible to do with any certainty. However, one can make some educated guesses. In all three cases, for instance, the books were first produced in serial format for newspapers during the famine. They were, then, available during the height of interest in the famine, and through the media that had already been quite successful in maintaining interest in the subject. This is particularly true of

Hogetts' letters, because excerpts from them appeared in a wide range of newspapers.³⁹ Similarly, the fact that publishers suggested to the authors that they reprint their work as books also implies that there was a continued interest. Finally, in the case of Edgar's book, one can be fairly assured of a wide readership because his personal letters include several requests (some from acquaintances Edgar made in Russia) for "your little book I've heard so much about"⁴⁰ -- or some other variation of the same thing.

The Famine Aid Campaign and its wide publicity also affected Congressional attitudes regarding Russia; as with the general population, the controversy over aid to the Russians opened up the larger issue of U.S.-Russian relations. In the seven months following the initial introduction of the bill, there were debates on the nature of American relations to Russian on six different occasions.⁴¹ This is particularly significant when compared to the almost total absence of the issue prior to this time (with the notable exception of George Kennan's efforts to halt the extradition treaty and Benjamin Harrison's rather milk-toast condemnation of Russian anti-semitism).

There can be little doubt that, at least initially, this swell in anti-Russian legislation was directly related to the introduction of the famine aid bill. Shortly after Senator Washburn introduced the original appeal for federal aid to the Famine Campaign, Representative Blanchard of Louisiana

introduced legislation designed to strengthen U.S. condemnation of Russian treatment of Jews.⁴² It is certainly no coincidence that Mr. Blanchard (along with Mr. Kilgore) were the leaders of the House movement to stall immediate voting of the Famine Aid Bill, thus opening the issue up for debate the following day.

This pattern continued for the first half of 1892. Most of the major figures against the Famine Aid bill introduced, or supported, legislation designed to criticize the friendly relations between the United States and Russia. In each case the bills became increasingly severe, beginning with one to criticize Russian treatment of American Jewish citizens visiting Russia and ending with a joint resolution "directing the severance of diplomatic relations" between the two countries.⁴³ Though this last bill died in committee, the Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended that the others be accepted. Perhaps even more indicative of an impending change, the platforms of both major parties expressed sympathy for persecuted Russians in the summer of 1892.⁴⁴ The acceptance of these mild condemnations thereby set the stage for the more dramatic diplomatic changes that would come later in the decade.

Thus, the aftermath of the Russian Famine Aid Campaign was twofold. At the Congressional level, lawmakers in favor of a change in the nature of the relations between the U.S. and Russia saw this as an opportunity to promote their own

legislation. (In nearly every case, proponents of these new bills made mention of the Famine Aid Bill)⁴⁵ At the popular level, the public's new interest in all things Russian became a conduit for anti-Imperial ideas that had previously remained in strictly academic, or politically revolutionary, circles.

Endnotes

1. Clara Barton, The Red Cross, 176
2. Ibid.
3. Edgar, 40.
4. Ibid, 28.
5. Ibid, 29.
6. Ibid, 31.
7. Ibid, 31.
8. Richard Robbins, 82.
9. Edgar, 33.
10. Ibid, 45.
11. Ibid, 50.
12. Ibid, 31.
13. Jonas Stadling and Will Reason, prologue.
14. E.E. Braley Hodgetts, In the Track of the Russian Famine: The Personal Narrative of a Journey Through the Famine Districts of Russia (London: James Clarke and Co., 1892) 71.
15. Edgar, 50-51.
16. Stadling, 47.
17. Ibid, 46.
18. Ibid, 56.
19. Ibid, 44.
20. Hodgetts, 66-7.
21. Edgar, see the last four chapters of The Russian Famine for examples of this sort.
22. Stadling, prologue.

23. Ibid, 160.
24. Ibid, 92.
25. Ibid.
26. Hodgetts, preface.
27. Ibid, 1.
28. Ibid, 6.
29. Ibid, 31
30. Ibid, 41-2.
31. Ibid. 53.
32. Ibid. 118.
33. Ibid, 182.
34. Ibid, 198.
35. Ibid, 235.
36. Ibid, 4.
37. Ibid, 32.
38. Ibid. 64.
39. See, Times (London). New York Times, and Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, for instance.
40. Pierre Botkin to William Edgar, 28 March 1893, transcript in the hand of Pierre Botkin, Manuscript Collection. Minnesota Historical Society, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
41. Congressional Record, 5 January 1892 - 21 July 1892.
42. Congressional Record (5 January 1892), 129.
43. Congressional Record (10 June 1892) 5228.
44. William T. Page, Platforms of the Two Great Political Parties (Washington: 1928), 83-9.
45. see. Congressional Record, (10 June 1892), 6533 for example.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

During its first century, the United States based its relations with Russia upon a mutually beneficial alliance. As long as the two countries shared the same nemesis -- most often, Great Britain -- there was no reason to alter this arrangement. Thus, from Russia's neutrality during America's Revolutionary war, through the United States' tacit support of Russia during the Crimean War and Russian support of the North during the Civil War, the vast ideological differences between the two nations did not really enter into their diplomatic and strategic relations.

Around the 1880s however, some subtle shifts began to occur. Though the governments of the two nations continued as partners in a "diplomatic waltz," economic and ideological factors began to intervene. On the economic end, the increasingly bad financial situation in Russia had led to severe discriminatory laws. This had, in turn, driven large numbers of non-Russian ethnic groups to flee to the United States. This immigration rapidly began to threaten working class Americans who, as has traditionally been true in periods of immigration, feared for their own jobs and way of life. On the ideological side, George Kennan had begun his

campaign against the Tsarist Siberian exile system. Though Kennan's beliefs were by no means held nation-wide, isolated pockets of anti-Tsarist, pro-revolutionary sentiment began to spring up in the United States.

This was the environment from which the Russian Famine Aid Campaign sprung. In Russia, the economic problems created by the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 combined with severe weather conditions to create one of the worst famines in Russian history. The United States, conversely, experienced one of its best crop years ever. The official American reaction to the Russian famine ran along traditional lines. The American government adopted a position of benign self-interest: the Russian's were solving the problem, but in the meantime much money could be made in the agricultural sector by using American wheat to fill the gap left by the Russians. That such action might also aid the increasingly vocal agricultural sector was not lost on Washington.

The economic implications of the situation were not lost on the American private sector, either. As newspapers around the country used the Russian famine to showcase the bountiful American harvest, William Edgar, editor of the Northwestern Miller began to contemplate the famine's commercial aspects. By sending American grain to starving Russian peasants, American millers might, reasoned Edgar, advertise American wheat and deplete some of their own overflowing elevators at the same time. This idea became an "overnight success" as

the movement to "feed the starving" rapidly spread across the country.

As the movement widened, so also did the motivation behind it. In the farming communities of the heartland, famine aid became an expression of Christian charity and of the "unity of farmers worldwide." In the Northeast, stories on the famine, were used to illustrate the degenerate nature of the Tsarist regime. By this rather round-about route, anti-Tsarist activists began, much to the chagrin of William Edgar, to take notice of the campaign.

With the opening of 1892, the famine aid campaign moved into the government sector. After rumors that the U.S. Navy was going to transport the aid began to circulate, President Benjamin Harrison requested the Congress allocate funds enabling the Navy to charter a suitable vessel. With only a few symbolic, largely Southern, votes against it, the resolution resoundingly passed through the Senate.

The circumstances surrounding famine aid changed dramatically when Joint Resolution 21 reached the House of Representatives. Initially, sentiment seemed to follow the Senate's lead -- bi-partisan support for paying to send the aid in light of the United States long standing friendship with Russia. However, as debate over the aid began to heat up, discontent with Russia, and with agricultural aid in general, that had been "simmering" for two decades began to surface. How, asked one Democratic Representative, could the

United States afford to send aid to starving Russians when it was unable to give financial support to its own farmers? Furthermore, there was the issue of Russian discrimination and anti-semitism. Though one representative felt that famine aid should be sent bearing a message of American disapproval, the vast majority seemed to agree with Representative Chipman (Dem., Michigan) that such behavior by the Russians meant that they were not "entitled to the comity which prevail[ed] among civilized nations".¹

With this, the foundation of support for the bill disintegrated. Most of the Democrats, and all of the "populists" voted to strike all appropriations, thus effectively killing federal support of famine aid. It is interesting to note, and indicative of the real discontent with the Russians, that the vote did not follow geographic lines. Many representatives from regions sending aid actually voted to strike appropriations. In fact, the only group of Democrats voting consistently to keep appropriations were those of Irish birth, or Irish descent. Given the prominent place that aid to the Irish had taken during the debates, this is not particularly surprising. Clearly, there were ideological differences (or at least partisan differences, if one does not want to claim ideological differences between the parties) and economic discontent directing the future of this particular aspect of U.S.-Russian relations.

The issues that surfaced during the Congressional debates forever changed the nature of the famine aid campaign. Though the organizers and contributors were certainly not going to abandon all of their efforts, they no longer cited long time relations with Russia as reason for the aid. In fact, the opposite was generally the case; Americans must save Russian peasants from despotic rule. At this point, William Edgar's business motivations had been long since forgotten, and the much of the impetus for the aid came from the Northeast, led by contributors to anti-Tsarist publications such as Free Russia.

This union between anti-Tsarist sentiment and American Famine aid continued well past the delivery of that aid. Nearly everything published for the next three years that described the aid made negative references to the Tsar, or the Imperial government. Even William Edgar's glowing descriptions of the Tsaravitch were strewn with explanations, or apologies for these indictments. Congress also seemed to experience a "sea change"; the House, which had been largely devoid of interest in international affairs.² became, for the next year, a forum for anti-Tsarist legislation.

Ultimately, when American and Russian interests began to conflict in Asia later in the decade, ideological conflicts between the two nations were ready and waiting to be used as a justification of American action in a purely economic clash. As William Appleman Williams puts it, England and

Russia both "waged a public struggle for the allegiance of the United States through the summer of 1899." This study has shown, however, that Williams was not entirely correct when he claimed that this struggle "acquaint[ed] the public with various arguments"³ against the Tsarist government. In fact, examination of the Famine Aid Campaign has shown that the public had already been "acquainted" with these argument some seven years earlier, in the winter 1892. It was the inertia of the federal government that kept official U.S. policy toward Russia from changing, not public opinion. The American Famine Aid Campaign, and the economic and ideological forces it joined, had already acted as an effective vehicle for changing that opinion.

Endnotes

1. Representative Chipman of Michigan, Congressional Record, 168.
2. George Calloway, History of the House of Representatives (NY: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1961) 194-8.
3. Williams, 35.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY AND
WORKS CITED

Despite the attention given to it by turn of the century press, very little scholarly work has been done regarding the Russian famine of 1891-92. So little, in fact, that upon reviewing the literature, one finds it the topic of only a few journal articles, a paragraph or two in the general surveys, and only one book length work, Richard Robbins' Famine in Russia: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis. Yet, as Robbins asserts in his introduction, historians generally consider the famine to be a "turning point in Russian history" which helped to bring an end to "the period of reaction which followed the assassination of Alexander II" and marked the onset of "a new era of dissent." Though the famine can not, of course be viewed as the causal factor for all the changes that occurred during this volatile pre-revolutionary period, Robbins successfully uses it to illustrate the defective functioning of Russian governmental institutions in the late nineteenth century.

In addition to its role in changing political dynamics within Russia, the famine can be viewed from an international perspective. In this particular area, there is even less literature. One piece is a ten page article on the American relief effort written in the shadow of the cold war in 1955.

As with much of the scholarly work on U.S.-Russian relations written at this time, the author of the article, George Queen, treats the American aid simply as a precursor to the cold war, not as result of the unique economic and political circumstances of the 1890s. The second work is of somewhat more use, though it is only one chapter in Merle Curti's book, American Philanthropy Abroad. This chapter contains much useful factual information on the American aid campaign and is less obviously biased than Queen's article. Unfortunately, the chapter is concerned, as the title of the book suggests, only with how the famine aid campaign fits into the larger scope of American charitable actions. Curti makes no attempt to place the event in the flow of American relations with, and perceptions of, Russia.

There is, of course, a much wider range of sources available on the general subject of U.S.-Russian relations. Of all these sources, however, there is not much that pertains to the late nineteenth century. Except for isolated works on the purchase of Alaska, most authors have emphasized the early twentieth century and the Soviet period, providing only a chapter or two to cover the entire nineteenth century. The classic of this genre is William Appleman Williams', American Russian Relations, 1781-1947. While Williams' title suggests that he covers the period in question, he devotes only thirty-seven pages to the pre-1900 era, while post-1900 gets the next two hundred and forty-five! It is not

surprising, then, that the years 1891-93 get little attention. Balancing Williams' work is its Soviet counterpart, Russia and the United States by Nikolai Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakolev. Aside from quibbling with Williams on a few minor points regarding the Monroe doctrine, Sivachev and Yakolev's book is much like Williams'. It gives "short shrift" to the late nineteenth century, saying only, like Williams, that change occurred because of unspecified "economic factors." One of the best works representing the opposing school of thought is Max Laserson's The American Impact on Russia: Diplomatic and Ideological. Not only does Laserson outline the ideological impact that American thinkers had on Russian revolutionary thought, but he also puts a great deal of weight on George Kennan's impact on American diplomacy toward Russia. Unfortunately, though Laserson calls Kennan "the first American crusader for Russian freedom," Laserson does not emphasize the late nineteenth century.

The situation regarding literature on Russian agriculture is much the same as that of U.S.-Russian relations. Ample material is available on the successes and, more often, the failures of Soviet agricultural policy; similarly, there has been plenty of debate on serfdom in Tsarist Russia. However, relatively few historians, or economists, have attempted any analysis of the interim period -- after emancipation, but prior to the 1905 revolution. By far the most common

interpretation of the period has a western "anti-government" bias. These authors contend that the difficulties experienced by Russian agriculture, specifically the famine of 1891-92 and subsequent peasant farm failures, were a direct result of Ivan Vyshnegradskii and Sergei Witte's tax policies. These finance ministers, the authors assert, were raising capital in order to promote industrialization, at the expense of the peasant farmer. The classic of this genre is Geroid T. Robinson's Rural Russia Under the Old Regime. In addition to being extremely well researched, Robinson's book presents a detailed history of the daily life of the average Russian peasant from the last days of serfdom to the eve of the 1917 revolution. Covering a smaller time period, Alexander Gerschenkron's "Agrarian Policies and Industrial development," Cambridge Economic History, is a more modern and concise version of a similar argument. His larger work, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, builds upon this idea of government fault, and concludes that in "backward" countries, such as pre-revolutionary Russia, governments tend to use intervention in lieu of more "natural" growth methods. Somewhat more lenient in his judgement of Tsarist policy, Theodore Von Laue, in Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia and High Cost of the Witte System, lauds Witte's accomplishments while decrying his final results. Von Laue sees Witte's policy as the "boldest since Peter the Great" and a "remarkable

success" in developing Russia's economic infrastructure, but concludes that by instituting industrialization, Witte destroyed Russia's ability to grow independently. Though all of these works provide critical background material, none make any attempt to see Russian agricultural and financial difficulties within the wider scope of international relations.

Thus, one is forced to rely almost entirely on primary sources for an inquiry into this area. As with any subject in international relations, government documents are a critical source. Unfortunately, on the Russian side, all the important documents are held in Soviet archives, and are unavailable in the United States. The researcher with limited time (and funds) is not at a complete loss, however. Richard Robbins has made an extensive study of these archives, thus information from these critical sources is available in at least a secondary format.

Luckily, United States government documents regarding the Russian famine and American famine aid are much more readily available. The annual reports of the Secretary of Agriculture provide extensive information regarding U.S. agriculture, and the state of agricultural exportation, while consular reports supply similar information on Russian exportation. On the diplomatic, rather than economic, end, diplomatic correspondence and House executive documents on foreign relations illustrate the gradual change in foreign

policy going on at this time. Finally, the Congressional Record provides a detailed account of the House and Senate debates, as well as committee reports. In terms of the actual aid campaigns, several state governments, most notably Nebraska, produced end of the year reports.

There is also a plethora of "private" sources on famine aid. Most important, of course, are the various newspaper campaigns. In addition to newspapers available in microfilm, William Edgar kept a scrapbook of newspaper articles from around the world that mentioned the aid campaign; this scrapbook has been preserved by the Minnesota Historical Society. Aside from the scrapbook, the MHS has a fairly extensive collection of Edgar's personal correspondence, though most of it is, unfortunately, post 1895. The Iowa Historical Society has a similar collection from the movement in that state, though much of it consists of letters that accompanied donations, which contain little useful information.

Because of the large public demand for information after the food donations left for Russia, there is a fairly wide range of published material on the subject from the years 1892-95. In addition to a multitude of magazine articles, several manuscripts describing famine relief have survived: William Edgar's The Russian Famine, Braley Hodgetts' In the Track of the Russian Famine, and Jonas Stadling's In the Land

of Tolstoi. Chapter five of this thesis has been based largely upon this material.

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APPENDIX A

CONGRESSIONAL ROLLCALL VOTES RELATED
TO FMAINE AID

Senate Vote on Resolution 21

Nay

Bate-TN-D
Berry-AR-D
Chilton-TX-D
Coke-TX-D
Harris-TN-D
Jones-AR-D
Kyle-SD-I
Pugh-AL-D
Vest-MO-D

Yea

Allen-WA-R
Allison-IA-R
Barbour-VA-D
Blodgett-NJ-D
Brice-OH-D
Butler-SC-D
Call-FL-D
Casey-ND-R
Chandler-NH-R
Daniel-VA-D
Dawes-MA-R
Dubois-IN-R
Faulkner-WV-D
Felton-CA-R
Frye-ME-R
Gallinger-NH-R
Gibson-LA-D
Gorman-MD-D
Hale-ME-R
Hawley-CT-R
Hiscock-NY-R
Hoar-MA-R
Kenna-WV-D
McMillan-MI-R
Manderson-NE-R
Mitchell-OR-R

Morgan-AL-D
Morrill-VT-R
Peffer-KS-FA
Pettigrew-SD-R
Platt-CT-R
Quay-PA-R
Sawyer-WI-R
Shoup-ID-R
Stanford-CA-R
Stewart-NV-R
Teller-CO-R
Vilas-WI-D
Washburn-MN-R
White-LA-D

Total Senate Breakdown: thirty-nine Democrats, forty-seven
Republicans, one Independent, one
Farmer's Alliance

Breakdown on Resolution 21:

Nay: eight Democrats, zero Republicans, and one
independent

Yea: thirteen Democrats, twenty-six Republicans, and
one Farmer's Alliance

House Vote to Strike Appropriations

Nay

Amerman-PA-D	Henderson-IL-R	Scull-PA-R
Atkinson-PA-R	Hermann-OR-R	Seerley-IA-D
Bingham-PA-R	Hitt-IL-R	Shonk-PA-R
Boutelle-ME-R	Hooker-NY-R	Smith-IL-R
Bowers-CA-R	Hopkins-IL-R	Stahlnecker-NY-D
Breckinrdge-KY-D	Huff-PA-R	Stephenson-MI-R
Broderick-KS-R	Hull-IA-R	Stewart-PA-R
Brosius-PA-R	Johnson-IN-D	Stone-PA-R
Buchanan-NY-R	Jolley-SD-R	Stone-PA-R
Caldwell-OH-R	Lind-MN-D	Storer-OH-R
Campbell-NY-D	Lodge-MA-R	Taylor-IL-R
Clancy-NY-D*	Magner-NY-D*	Townsend-CO-R
Clark-WY-R	McGann-IL-D*	Wadsworthp-NY-R
Collidge-MA-D	McKenna-CA-R	Walker-MA-R
Cummings-NY-D*	Milliken-ME-R	Waugh-IN-R
Curtis-NY-R	Morse-MA-R	White-IA-D**
Dalzell-PA-R	O'Donnell-MI-R	Wilson-WA-R
Doan-OH-R	O'Neill-PA-R	
Dunphy-NY-D*	Owens-OH-D	
Enochs-OH-R	Patton-IN-D	
Fitch-NY-R	Perkins-IA-R	
Flick-IA-R	Pickler-SD-R	
Griswold-PA-R	Powers-SD-R	
Grout-PA-R	Quackenbush-NY-R	
Grout-VT-R	Rains-NY-R	
Harmer-PA-R		
Haugen-WI-R		

* Either born in Ireland, or of Irish Catholic descent

** Born in Prussia

Yeas

Abbot-TX-D	Cox-TN-D	Lane-IL-D
Alderson-WV-D	Crawford-NC-D	Lapham-RI-D
Alexander-NC-D	Crosby-MA-D	Lester-GA-D
Andrew-MA-D	Culberson-NX-D	Lewis-MS-D
Arnold-MO-D	Davis-KA-P	Little-NY-D
Babbit-WI-D	DeArmand-MA-D	Livingston-GA-D
Bailey-TX-D	DeForest-CN-D	Long-TX-D
Baker-KS-P	Dickerson-KY-D	Mallory-FL-D
Bankhead-AL-D	Dixon-MT-D	Mansur-MO-D
Barwig-WI-D	Dockery-MO-D	Martin-IN-D
Beeman-MS-D	Dungan-OH-D	McClellan-IN-D
Beltzhoover-PA-D	Elliot-SC-D	McCreary-MD-D
Bentley-NY-D	English-NJ-D	McKaig-MD-D
Blanchard-LA-D	Enloe-TN-D	McKeighan-NE-I
Blount-GA-D	Epes-VA-D	McMillin-TN-D
Boatner-LA-D	Everett-GA-D	Meredith
Bowman-IA-D	Fellows-NY-D	Miller-WI-D
Branch-NC-D	Forney-AL-D	Mitchell-WI-D
Browley-SC-D	Gantz-OH-D	Moore-TX-D
Breckinrdge-AR-D	Geary-CA-D	Moses-GA-D
Bretz-IN-D	Geissenhmr-NJ-D	Newberry-IL-D
Brookshire-IN-D	Gillespie-PA-D	Oates-AL-D
Brunner-PA-D	Goodnight-KY-D	O'Ferrall-VA-D
Bryan-NE-D	Grady-NC-D	O'Neil-KS-P
Buchanan-VA-D	Greenleaf-NY-D	Outhwaite-OH-D
Busey-IL-D	Hall-MN-D	Page-RI-D
Bushnell-WI-D	Hallowell-PA-D	Patterson-TN-D
Butler-IO-D	Halvorsen-MN-FA	Paynter-KY-D
Bynum-IN-D	Hamilton-IO-D	Pearson-OH-D
Cable-IL-D	Hare-OH-D	Peel-AR-D
Cadmus-NY-D	Harries-MN-D	Pendleton-WV-D
Caminetti-CA-D	Haynes-OH-D	Pierce-TN-D
Caruth-KY-D	Heard-MO-D	Richardson-TN-D
Catchings-MS-D	Hempill-SC-D	Rockwell-NY-D
Cate-AR-D	Henderson-NC-D	Rusk-MD-D
Causey-DE-D	Herbert-AL-D	Sayers-IL-D
Chapin-NY-D	Hoar-MA-D	Shell-SC-D
Chipman-MI-D	Holmann-IN-D	Shivley-IN-D
Clarke-AL-D	Houk-OH-D	Simpson-KS-P
Clover-KA-FA	Johnstone-SC-D	Snodgrass-TN-D
Cobb-AL-D	Jones-VA-D	Snow-IL-D
Cobb-MO-D	Kem-NE-I	Sperry-CT-D
Compton-MD-D	Kendall-Ky-D	Springer-IL-D
Cooper-IN-D	Kilgore-TX-D	Stevens-MA-D
Covert-NY-D	Kribbs-PA-D	Steward-IL-D
Cox-NY-D	Lane-IL-D	Stewart-TX-D

Stone-KY-D
 Stump-MD-D
 Tillman-SC-D
 Tracey-NY-D
 Turner-GA-D
 Van Horn-NY-D
 Warner-NY-D
 Washington-TN-D
 Watson-GA-D
 Weadock-MI-D
 Wheeler-MI-D
 Wike-IL-D
 Wilcox-CT-D
 Williams-NC-D
 Williams-MA-D
 Williams-IL-D
 Wilson-KY-R
 Wilson-WV-D
 Winn-GA-D
 Wolverton-PA-D
 Youmans-MI-D

Total House Breakdown: two-hundred and thirty-five
 Democrats, eighty-eight
 Republicans, four Populists, two
 Farmer's Alliance, two Independents

Breakdown of Appropriations Vote:

 Nay: sixteen Democrats, fifty-five
 Republicans

 Yea: one hundred and fifty-five
 Democrats, one Republican, four
 Populists, one Independent

65 percent of all Democrats voted yes (90 percent of those who voted this issue), while only 6 percent voted no (9 percent of those who voted on this issue). Conversely, 62 percent of all Republicans voted no (98 percent of those who voted on this issue), while only 1 percent of all Republicans voted yes (2 percent of those who voted on this issue). All the Populists, and half the Independents (all who voted on this issue) voted yes.

APPENDIX B

COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE

52ND CONGRESS

Committee on Appropriations

Holman, Indiana,D	O'Neil, Massachusetts,D
Forney, Alabama,D	Livingston, Georgia, D
Sayers, Texas,D	Henderson, Iowa,R
Breckinridge, Kentucky,D	Cogswell, Massachusetts,R
Dockery, Missouri,D	Bingham, Pennsylvania,R
Mutchler, Pennsylvania,D	Dingey, Maine,R
Breckinridge, Arkansas,D	Grout, Vermont,R
Compton, Maryland,D	

Committee on the Judiciary

Culberson, Texas,D	Layton, Ohio,D
Oates, Alabama,D	Wolverton, Pennsylvania,D
Bynum, Indiana,D	Taylor, Ohio,R
Stockdale, Mississippi,D	Buchanan, New Jersey,R
Goodnight, Kentucky,D	Ray, New York,R
Boatner, Louisiana,D	Powers, Vermont,R
Buchanan, Virginia,D	Broderick, Kansas,R
Chapin, New York,D	

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Blount, Georgia,D	Rayner, Maryland,D
McCreary, Kentucky,D	Geary, California,D
Hooker, Mississippi,D	Hitt, Illinois,R
Chipman, Michigan,D	Harmer, Pennsylvania,R
Fitch, New York,D	O'Donnell, Michigan,R
Andrew, Massachusetts,D	Sanford, New York,R
Cable, Illinois,D	

Committee on Naval Affairs

Herbert, Alabama,D	McAleer, Pennsylvania,D
Elliott, South Carolina,D	Page, Maryland,D
Cummings, New York,D	Boutelle, Maine,R
Geissenhainer, New Jersey,D	Lodge, Massachusetts,R
Daniell, New Hampshire,D	Dolliver, Iowa,R
Meyer, Louisiana,D	Wadsworth,New York,R
Lawson, Virginia,D	

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