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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING OTHERS:

THE IMPACT OF DISCRIMINATIVE FACILITY UPON SOCIAL

INFLUENCE

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

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By

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UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING OTHERS:
THE IMPACT OF DISCRIMINATIVE FACILITY UPON SOCIAL
INFLUENCE

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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I would like to thank my committee members for their support during my graduate training. Your contributions and recommendations to the current project were greatly appreciated. Specifically, Dr. Terri DeBacker I am grateful for your time, insightful contributions, and warm encouragement. I am better prepared in the college classroom because of your help during my entry semesters in the classroom. Additionally, thank you for enriching my knowledge on social competence in children by allowing an open access to your drawers and drawers of reading material. I appreciate your suggestions along the way as this project took shape.

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Abstract

The results of two studies provided support for the importance of being sensitive to situational nuances (i.e., discriminative facility), especially when interpreting others' negative behaviors. Study 1 empirically clarified the distinction between discriminative facility and a seemingly related construct, self-monitoring. Additionally, a new, more convenient measure of discriminative facility was constructed and validated. Study 2 established boundary conditions for the efficacy of discriminative facility. Consistent with past research (Chiu, Hong, Mischel, & Shoda, 1995), discriminative facility was associated with positive social interaction quality. However, this finding was limited to the interpretation of negative (but not positive) behaviors. In addition, individuals high in discriminative facility demonstrated greater flexibility of social influence strategy use than individuals low in discriminative facility.

Understanding and Managing Others:

The Impact of Discriminative Facility upon Social Influence

Overview

Over the years, investigators have considered the capacities believed integral to interpersonal insight under the rubric "social intelligence" (e.g., Burks, 1937; Chapin, 1939; Hunt, 1928; Jones & Day, 1997; McClatchy, 1929; Thorndike, 1920; Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995). Social intelligence is generally recognized as consisting of multiple components (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1989; O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1975). In 1920, E. L. Thorndike articulated the first definition of social intelligence as "the ability to understand and manage men and women, boys and girls – to act wisely in human relations" (p. 228). These two components, understanding others and managing others, have been explored by a number of investigators (e.g., Ford & Tisak, 1983; Hunt, 1928; Jones & Day, 1997; Keating, 1978; McClatchy, 1929; Riggio, Messamer, & Throckmorton, 1991; Stricker & Rock, 1990; Weinstein, 1969).

In addition, a large body of literature has examined social influence, or compliance (i.e., techniques for eliciting desired behavior from others, e.g., Cody, Canary, & Smith, 1994; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980; Falbo, 1977; Miller, Boster, Roloff, & Seibold, 1977; Rule, Bisanz, & Kohn, 1985). Arguably, effective social influence involves the understanding and management of others.

Therefore, the present dissertation attempted to integrate the social intelligence and social influence literatures. Two experiments investigated a recognized component

of social intelligence, discriminative facility (sensitivity to situational cues), and its impact on interpersonal compliance. The degree of overlap between a similar construct that also encompasses situational sensitivity, self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), was examined. Additionally, how individual differences in discriminative facility influenced relationship satisfaction and the selection of social influence techniques was investigated.

One Important Component of Social Intelligence: Discriminative Facility (DF)

Following Thorndike's introduction, several conceptualizations of social intelligence emerged that emphasized the importance of understanding the social situation. Situational knowledge is an integral part of social intelligence (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1985). The ability to interpret ambiguous social situations correctly is thought to be a component of social intelligence (Jones & Day, 1997). Presumably, individuals that are more knowledgeable of situational prescripts will be better able to understand and manage others.

Of central interest for the present dissertation, Chiu et al. (1995) regarded sensitivity to situational cues, which they termed discriminative facility, as representative of social intelligence. Discriminative facility was defined as "the individual's sensitivity to subtle cues about the psychological meaning of the situation" (Chiu et al., 1995, p. 49). Chiu et al. (1995) noted that researchers (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987, 1989; Mischel, 1973; Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1993) have linked discriminative facility to "adaptive social behavior." To best predict behavior, recognition of the interaction between situational factors and individual

factors is critical (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Wright & Mischel, 1987). Thus, Mischel

and his colleagues (Chiu et al., 1995; Mischel, 1973; Mischel & Shoda, 1998; Shoda,

Mischel, & Wright, 1989; Wright & Mischel, 1987, 1988) have suggested that

conditional encoding, the recognition of the relationship between certain if x

(situational components) then y (behavioral responses), is a measure of discriminative

facility and therefore a demonstrable component of social intelligence. Wright and

Mischel (1987) proposed that recognizing the covariation between certain behaviors

and situations should inform individuals' impressions of others.

Consequently, a modified version of Thorndike's definition would best

represent contemporary thinking about social intelligence. In other words, social

intelligence includes the recognition of the demands of the situation, understanding the

individuals in the situation, and an appraisal of how best to act in the situation.

Understanding and Managing Others

As the previous examples illustrate, recognition of situational intricacies is

essential to understanding individuals and their behavior. Chiu et al. (1995) presented

discriminative facility as encompassing sensitivity to informative, subtle nuances

present in social situations that have precipitated various events. Cantor and Kihlstrom

(1989) proposed that socially intelligent behavior includes recognizing situations that

maximize goal-attainment while minimizing costs (e.g., not meeting other goals,

social disapproval). It is assumed that individuals use information gleaned from

discriminative facility to form a more refined understanding of their social world.

As mentioned previously, to identify discriminative facility Chiu et al. (1995) focused on the tendency to encode conditionally (recognizing the relationship between situational factors and behavioral responses). As a measure of this ability, Chiu et al. (1995) provided participants with two passages of text that did not include any trait descriptions or conditional propositions. In both cases, participants were asked to read and subsequently summarize the passages. The number of stories where the participant provided situational or state explanations (e.g., "Brad was mean because he was running late") constituted conditional explanations (i.e., discriminative facility). Additionally, unconditional explanations (e.g., "Brad was mean because he is a jerk") were measured by counting the number of stories where participants listed global dispositional characterizations of the main character in the story.

Though passage coding is an established approach to measuring discriminative facility, it is clearly a time intensive procedure. This measure necessitates the reading of each participant's summaries and subsequently identifying conditional and unconditional explanations within each. Additionally, this requires the use of independent coders, which is costly in numerous ways (e.g., time and money). One of the first goals for the present dissertation was to identify or if necessary devise a more easily scored scale designed to tap discriminative facility.

An Examination of a Related Construct and the Implications for DF: Study 1

Self-monitoring: A related construct. Self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) has been characterized as the degree to which individuals alter their behavior based on features

within a situation. Snyder (1974) proposed that people vary in their tendency to modify

their behavior according to the social context. This construct has generated a

large body of research over the past few decades (e.g., Funder & Harris, 1986; Mill,

1984; Riggio & Friedman, 1982; Snyder, Berscheid, & Matwychuk, 1988; Snyder &

Tanke, 1976). Generally, individuals are categorized as high self-monitors or low self-

monitors. High self-monitors modify their behavior in response to elements of the

situation. Low self-monitors behave consistently with their attitudes regardless of the

situation. Initially, Snyder (1974) proposed a 25-item paper and pencil questionnaire

that was designed to tap this distinction. Since that time, the scale has been revised to

an 18-item instrument (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985).

Although the Self-Monitoring Scale is widely used, controversy over self-

monitoring as a multidimensional construct has emerged (e.g., Briggs & Cheek, 1988;

Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). Briggs, Cheek, and Buss

(1980) argued that the original Self-Monitoring Scale tapped three underlying

dimensions: acting, extraversion, and other-directedness. The revised 18-item Self-

Monitoring Scale was proposed to tap two major factors: public performing and other-

directedness. Public performing comprises acting and extraversion and is measured by

statements such as "I would probably make a good actor." Other-directedness involves

adjusting one's behavior in response to others and is measured by statements such as

"In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different

persons." Other-directedness most directly involves sensitivity to changes in the

situation.

Given the common thread of sensitivity to situational details, self-monitoring in general, and other-directedness in particular, appear similar to discriminative facility. However, the exact relationship between discriminative facility and self-monitoring (including the subscale: other-directedness) is unknown. Persons high in discriminative facility should be more aware of the influence of the social situation on others' behavior than those low in discriminative facility. Consequently, they would be expected to use this information when explaining others' behavior. However, unlike self-monitoring which has elicited a large body of research (e.g., Snyder, Berscheid, & Matwychuk, 1988; Snyder & Tanke, 1976), investigations of discriminative facility have been less numerous. Therefore, the extent to which these two constructs overlap remains an empirical question. Chiu et al. (1995) examined the relationship between self-monitoring and social interaction quality; however, they did not examine the relationship between self-monitoring and discriminative facility. Given that self-monitoring is a widely validated construct that can be tapped with an established scale, if the two constructs do not differ, using the existing Self-Monitoring Scale would be the preferred method of measuring discriminative facility. Study 1 was a replication and extension of Chiu et al. (1995), that examined the relationship between discriminative facility and self-monitoring in individuals' explanations of positive and negative behavior.

Specifically, study 1 examined the relationship between discriminative facility and self-monitoring. Discriminative facility encompasses the tendency to be sensitive to the relationship between situational cues and <u>other people's</u> behavior

(Chiu et al., 1995; Wright & Mischel, 1987). Self-monitoring involves being sensitive to situational cues and altering one's own behavior as a result (Snyder, 1974). Although seemingly related, the exact relationship between discriminative facility (DF+ and DF-) and self-monitoring was unknown. Therefore, the extent to which these constructs are related was of interest. As an extension of Chiu et al. (1995), potential for discriminative facility for positive behavior (i.e., dismissing positive behavior by attributing it to the situation, DF+) as well as negative behavior (i.e., excusing negative behavior by attributing it to the situation, DF-) was investigated.

Understanding Others' Positive and Negative Behavior and the Utility of DF: Study 2: Part A

Chiu et al. (1995) suggested that discriminative facility was associated with positive social interactions. However, they found support for this claim while investigating responses to negative behavior in negative situations (what will be referred to subsequently as DF-). Chiu et al. (1995) did not consider the consequences of discriminative facility in response to positive behavior (what will be referred to subsequently as DF+). Thus, the suggestion that discriminative facility (DF-/DF+) is always beneficial must be examined further.

The superiority of the analysis of events in terms of situational factors (DF) is clear when one considers many of the dispositional biases proposed within psychology, specifically the attribution literature. For example, the Fundamental Attribution Error (Heider, 1958; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977) occurs when

individuals neglect situational factors and rely upon dispositional explanations of an

individual's behavior. Similarly, the Actor-Observer Effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1972) is

defined as the tendency to recognize the influence of situational factors on oneself but

to neglect situational factors and adhere to trait attributions for others' behavior. Both

of these biases exemplify the tendency of perceivers to ignore situational constraints

inappropriately. Similarly, often victims are blamed for their fate due to the lack of

importance assigned to situational factors (Carli & Leonard, 1989; Summers &

Feldman, 1984). Thus, sensitivity to situational nuances (i.e., discriminative facility) is

important.

However, the attribution and social cognition literatures suggest that

discriminative facility may be more of an asset when one is interpreting negative

behaviors (DF-) in comparison to positive behaviors (DF+). Chiu et al. (1995) posited

that discriminative facility would have positive interpersonal effects across situations

(interpreting both positive and negative behavior). Chiu's participants rated the quality

of several recent interactions on two dimensions: attainment of goal(s) and emotional

consequences for the relationship. Responses to the two questions for each interaction

were multiplied and then the products were averaged to form an index measuring

quality of social interaction. Discriminative facility (more specifically DF-) was

positively related to social interaction quality. Chiu et al. (1995) argued that

conditional encoding allowed individuals to avoid broad, unqualified generalizations.

Moreover, they suggested that this discriminating tendency, when applied to oneself,

might provide a self-preservation advantage such that it allows for the avoidance of

self-blame for negative events. However, as noted by Chiu et al. (1995), most of the

trait descriptions (unconditional encodings) in their participants' summaries were

negative due to the somewhat negative tone and the somewhat negative behavior

displayed in both stories. Arguably, the reliance on material of a negative nature could

affect subsequent results. Negative behavior is assigned a greater weight when forming

impressions (Fiske, 1980; Hamilton & Zanna, 1972; Ostrom & Davis, 1979).

Furthermore, we have a tendency to attend to negative information (e.g., automatic

vigilance, Pratto & John, 1991).

In cases of negative behaviors, the benefit of discriminative facility (DF-) to

personal relationships is apparent. Qualifying the circumstances for an individual's

negative behavior, or alternatively recognizing the impact of negative situational

factors upon behavior, is an advantage. For example, if we observe a colleague

perform poorly and reason that circumstances precluded her success, arguably we will

be better liked than if we conclude she is foolish. However, what if she had been

successful? Would it still be advantageous to explain the behavior conditionally? In

this circumstance, discriminative facility (DF+) would lead one to emphasize the

context for her success (e.g., luck) rather than her talent. Certainly, this could impede

positive interpersonal feelings. Consistent with this reasoning, Fincham and O'Leary

(1983) found dissatisfaction in marriage was associated with attributing positive

behavior to unstable causes. Furthermore, relationship satisfaction is related to giving

one's partner credit for positive events in the relationship (e.g., Jacobson, McDonald,

Follette, & Berley, 1985; Kelley, 1979; Thompson & Kelley, 1981).

Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the implications of discriminative facility in positive situations (DF+). Would the same positive interpersonal relationships manifest for individuals who conditionally encoded in positive situations? Taylor and Koivumaki (1976) found that individuals were more likely to view individuals with whom they were acquainted (e.g., spouse, friend) as responsible for positive actions and were less likely to attribute negative actions to those with whom they had a high degree of acquaintanceship. Discriminative facility may not always be the best choice for successful interpersonal relations. Certain behaviors (e.g., positive behaviors) may call for dispositional explanations.

Therefore, one purpose of study 2 was to examine whether discriminative facility (DF+/DF-) is always beneficial in relationships, or whether, in certain situations (when one is attempting to explain someone else's positive behaviors) it can actually be detrimental.

Managing People: Study 2 Part B

The second aspect of Thorndike's (1920) definition of social intelligence was the management of others. Within the social intelligence literature, Ford and Tisak (1983) equated social intelligence with behavioral performance. Orlik's (1978) review of the social intelligence literature included social influence as an aspect of social intelligence. However, the concept of social intelligence has not been the focus of much research within the social influence literature. Nonetheless, a variety of other factors such as situational constraints, goals, and individual differences have received attention in the social influence literature.

Researchers have developed a variety of taxonomies to characterize influence

tactics by identifying common strategies (e.g., Canary, Cody, & Marston, 1986;

Marwell & Schmitt, 1967; Rule & Bisanz, 1987; Rule, Bisanz, & Kohn, 1985). One

common method used to develop these taxonomies involves participants listing

common strategies that they use in different situations (Falbo, 1977). Another popular

approach entails providing the participant with a list of common techniques and asking

the participant to indicate the likelihood that they would use each of the techniques

(e.g., direct request, coercion) across a variety of situations (Canary, Cody, & Marston,

1986).

Factors such as goals and potential targets have been determined to impact

strategy selection (Cody, Canary, & Smith, 1994; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980; Miller,

Boster, Roloff, & Seibold, 1977). Cody and his colleagues have completed numerous

investigations aimed at categorizing common goal types (Canary, Cody, & Marston,

1986; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980; Cody, Woelfel, & Jordan, 1983). Cody, Canary, &

Smith (1987) (as cited in Canary, Cody, & Marston, 1986) identified fourteen different

goal types (e.g., initiate relationship, gain assistance-professor). For each of these, a

unique situation was presented with a designated goal. For example, one scenario was

depicted as giving advice to a friend. The situation was described as involving a close

friend that is doing poorly academically. The goal was to convince the friend to pay

more attention to class work and less attention to extracurricular activities. To examine

the impact of this situation upon strategy selection, Canary, Cody, and Marston (1986)

provided participants with a set of strategies. Next, participants were asked to rate the

likelihood that they would use each of the strategies to advise their friend. A similar

methodology was used in study 2 of the present dissertation.

Compared to situational factors, internal factors (i.e., individual differences)

have not received as much attention as potential mediators of strategy selection.

Individual difference variables have in general been considered as target (recipient of

persuasion) factors (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Eagly & Warren,

1976; Rhodes & Wood, 1992) rather than as source factors. Nonetheless, some factors

such as locus of control (Canary, Cody, & Marston, 1986), machiavellianism (Falbo,

1977), neuroticism (Buss, Gomes, Higgins, & Lauterbach, 1987), and self-monitoring

(Caldwell & Burger, 1997) have been found to influence strategy choice.

For example, Caldwell and Burger (1997) found high self-monitoring (i.e.,

using situational cues to direct one's behavior) was related to greater flexibility in

choice of influence strategies. These findings highlighted the impact of individual

differences upon strategy selection and repertoire breadth. Moreover, they suggested

that sensitivity to situational nuances (i.e., discriminative facility) may impact

interpersonal compliance. Similarly, it was hypothesized that utilizing discriminative

facility would affect an individual's appraisal of the situation, sensitize the individual

to situational cues that could suggest one influence strategy over another, and result in

the selection of more varied techniques of compliance in goal attainment.

Overview of the Studies: Study 1 replicated and extended Chiu et al. (1995), by

examining the relationship between discriminative facility and self-monitoring in

explaining positive and negative behavior.

Study 2 had two purposes. One purpose was to examine whether discriminative

facility was more beneficial in response to negative behavior than in response to

positive behavior. Discriminative facility was expected to be related to better quality

of social interactions when explaining negative behavior (DF-). However, for positive

behavior, discriminative facility (DF+) was expected to be related to poorer quality of

social interactions.

Another purpose of study 2 was to investigate the impact of discriminative

facility upon social influence strategy choice. As noted earlier, high self-monitoring

has been found to be related to breadth of strategy choice (Bell & Daly, 1984;

Caldwell & Burger, 1997). Given that both self-monitoring and discriminative facility

emphasize situational sensitivity, it was expected that discriminative facility

(DF+ and DF-) should also be positively related to strategy breadth.

Study 1

Study 1 examined the relationship between discriminative facility and self-

monitoring. Also, extending Chiu et al. (1995), the implications of discriminative

facility for positive behavior (i.e., dismissing positive behavior by attributing it to the

situation, High DF+) as well as negative behavior (i.e., excusing negative behavior by

attributing it to the situation, High DF-) were investigated. In order to examine these

issues, participants completed the Self-Monitoring Scale (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985)

and two measures of discriminative facility: Chiu's passage summary method and the

newly created discriminative facility Likert measure. The relationship between the three measures was examined.

Method

Participants

A total of 78 college students had complete data on all instruments of interest. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 46 years, with a median age of 19 years.

Materials

Self-monitoring. Participants completed the revised Self-Monitoring Scale (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985). This scale measures an individual's tendency to monitor or adjust behavior based on the social situation (see Appendix A). Eighteen items are presented in a true/false format. After reverse scoring several items, a composite is computed by summing across items. Higher scores reflect a higher self-monitoring tendency. Gangestad and Snyder (1985) reported an alpha = .70. In the present study, an average composite was calculated based on responses to the 18 items.

In addition, a subset of the 18 items has been reported to represent "other-directedness" (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980). These items focus on altering behavior in order to obtain goals that involve others. Because these items most closely overlap with discriminative facility, the correlation between discriminative facility and other-directedness might be larger than the correlation between discriminative facility and the overall self-monitoring score. The five items representing "other-directedness" are asterisked in Appendix A.

Discriminative facility. Participants were asked to read, summarize, and answer questions about four passages to measure discriminative facility (see Appendix B). Half of the passages were written to create a moderately positive impression of the main character. The remaining two passages were written to create a moderately negative impression of the main character. The characters were consistent when constructing passages (i.e., Scott or Brad) resulting in four possible outcomes (i.e., positive Brad, positive Scott, negative Brad, and negative Scott). The passages were written as descriptions of typical events within the life of Brad or Scott. Within each subset of passages (i.e., positive Brad and negative Brad), the gist of the passages was kept the same; however, various behaviors were altered to reflect the opposite impression (i.e., positive or negative). For example in the negative Brad passage, Brad hides a coffee cup that he breaks. In contrast, in the Brad positive passage, Brad secretly replaces the cup. The negative Brad passage appears below:

Brad completed his Masters in Business Administration and ranked in the top ten percent of his graduating class. He secured a position at Paxwell Incorporated (a large marketing firm). Brad wanted to advance into corporate management. Advancement in the company was very competitive. A couple of Brad's coworkers were also looking to advance in the company. Brad worked long hours at his job. On one occasion, Brad knocked his boss's coffee cup to the ground. He picked up the broken pieces and threw them in the dumpster. Brad noticed his boss looking for his cup, but said he did not know anything about it. Brad's boss often worked late. One day, Brad's boss asked him to join him for golf the next day. Although Brad did not care for golf, he told his boss that it was one of his favorite sports and that he was looking forward to playing. That evening, Brad purchased a set of golf clubs with a well-known brand and other pieces of equipment. Brad knew that office politics were important. Brad wondered what people thought of him in the office. Brad regularly sent birthday cards to his boss.

On occasion, he brought donuts for his boss and complimented his appearance. Once, a coworker was

on his way to give a presentation and noticed a stain on his shirt. He asked Brad to look at his shirt.

Brad told him that the stain was not noticeable. The next morning Brad was preparing for a meeting. A

coworker called and stated that he had car trouble. The coworker was 2 blocks from work and asked

for a ride. Brad told him that he could not help him. Brad suggested he try someone else. After working

for the firm for five years, Brad received a promotion.

The passages were written to convey the intended positive or negative

impression; however, there was a degree of ambiguity in each paragraph to allow for

attributing behaviors to either the person or situation. In order to increase this

ambiguity, trait descriptions were not included in the passages.

Discriminative facility: Passage coding. In the primary measure of

discriminative facility (as in Chiu et al., 1995), coders who were blind to the

participants' self-monitoring scores coded participants' passage summaries. One coder

was also blind to the experimental hypotheses. The scoring was based on the

framework of Chiu et al. (1995). The passage summaries were coded for conditional

explanations and unconditional explanations. Conditional explanations provide a state

or situational motive for behavior beyond a trait description. In general, conditional

explanations reflect high discriminative facility. Unconditional explanations rely on

personal attributions as motives for behavior and therefore reflect low discriminative

facility.

Two coders independently scored the participants' summaries using a gist

criterion. In this coding scheme, propositions were identified in the negative stories

that indicated an "excuse making" response or a "blaming" response. For example, an

excuse making response would be "Brad was under pressure so he had to hide the cup." Whereas, a blaming response would be "Brad should be ashamed —he is dishonest." The excuse-making category (High DF-) represents discriminative facility whereas the blaming response (Low DF-) reflects an unconditional explanation (i.e., nondiscriminating response). The number of stories (0 or 1) where "Excusing" (i.e., High DF-) or "Blaming" (i.e., Low DF-) appeared for the negative passage was recorded. In the negative situations. participants that used "Excuse making" (i.e., High DF-) were given a "1" for the DF- factor and a "0" for the "Blaming" category. In contrast, participants that used "Blaming" (i.e., Low DF-) when explaining negative behavior were given a "1" for that category and a "0" for the "Excusing" category.

For the positive stories, propositions that praised the character (e.g., "Scott is nice") were coded as an unconditional explanation (Low DF+). Alternatively, when participants dismissed positive behavior (e.g., "Scott only helped to get ahead"), these statements were coded as conditional explanations (High DF+). The number of stories (0 or 1) where "Dismissing" (i.e., High DF+) or "Praising" (i.e., Low DF+) appeared for the positive passage was recorded. Participants that used "Dismissing" were given a "1" for the High DF+ factor and a "0" for the "Praising" category. In contrast, participants that used "Praising" when explaining positive behavior were given a "1" for that category and a "0" for the "Dismissing" category. [1]

Initially, a coding scheme was established with examples of the four categories (Excuse: High DF-; Blame: Low DF-; Dismiss: High DF+; Praise: Low DF+). The coders coded the first 5 packets together to establish a common understanding of the

criteria. The remaining packets were coded independently using the established coding scheme. Discrepancies were resolved by discussion.

Discriminative facility: Likert scale. The second measure designed to assess discriminative facility was an index comprised of several Likert items that asked participants to attribute responsibility for the character's behavior to something about the person or to situational factors. The items were derived to match each respective story. Thus, four instruments were designed (i.e., one for each passage). Participants responded to several questions about the main character (see Appendix C) that were answered on a 7-point Likert scale. For example, in reference to the negative Brad passage, participants rated "The main reason behind Brad lying to his boss was:" 1 (He is that kind of person) to 7 (Something about the situation). In contrast, after reading the positive Brad passage, participants rated "The main reason behind Brad buying his boss a replacement cup was:" 1 (He is that kind of person) to 7 (Something about the situation).

An index was formed for the positive (DF+) and negative (DF-) passages separately. A few items were reverse-scored and an average discriminative facility score was computed. For this measure, a higher number reflected a conditional explanation (i.e., considering the situation). In contrast, lower numbers indicated an unconditional description. Providing conditional explanations represents discriminative facility (High DF+ or High DF-), whereas unconditional explanations (Low DF+ or Low DF-) depict a nondiscriminating pattern.

Manipulation checks. Participants rated the main character of each story on a

number of dimensions (e.g., friendliness). The items were answered on a 3-point scale

(see Appendix D) with higher numbers reflecting a more positive impression.

Participants rated how "friendly," "likable," and "caring" the main character was with

1 (not at all), 2 (moderately), to 3 (extremely). Additionally, two items were included

that asked the participants to judge the main character's behavior on a 7-point scale.

The first item used 1 (Bad) to 7 (Good) as anchors for the judgment. The second item

had 1 (Negative) to 7 (Positive) as anchors.

Procedure

Initially, participants were tested in departmental mass testing sessions. They

completed several instruments including the Self-Monitoring Scale. During the

remainder of the semester, in smaller experimental sessions, participants completed

the remaining materials.

After arriving at the laboratory, participants were informed that the project was

examining the processing of information in social situations. Each participant received

a paper-clipped booklet containing the previously described materials. Each

participant was instructed to complete the materials in the order established by the

experimenter. After consenting, following Chiu et al. (1995), participants were

provided the following instructions: "In this part of the study, we will give you two

short stories to read. Then you will be asked to tell the stories again in your own

words. Later we will ask another participant to read your version of the stories and

answer some questions concerning <u>what kind of person</u> the characters described in the stories are."

The participants were asked to retell the stories in their own words and to use simple sentences. The participants were told that they might want to include their impression of the character. Additionally, they were told that the reader of their stories would not be asked about anything that happened in the stories.

Each participant received one passage about Brad and another about Scott; one of these passages depicted positive behavior, and the other depicted negative behavior. Presentation of the passages was counterbalanced across participants such that half of the subjects completed the positive excerpt first and the remaining subjects completed the negative excerpt first.

Participants read and summarized the first passage. In between passages, participants completed a demographic questionnaire as a filler task. Next, participants read and summarized the second passage with the same set of instructions.

Participants were instructed to wait until told to move forward to the next instrument. At this point, participants completed the discriminative facility Likert scale measure for each passage (see Appendix C) assessing participants' attributions concerning the causes of Brad and Scott's behavior. The scales were presented in the same order that the participants received their passages. Participants were informed that they could refer back to the passages if needed.

Next, participants recorded their impression of the main characters across

several dimensions (e.g., likability). Following this, participants were thanked for their

participation and debriefed.

Results

Manipulation Checks

In order to assess the manipulation of valence in the situations, the participants'

impressions of the characters were collapsed into two valence indices for the positive

and negative passages. One measure was calculated from the mean of the three items

that asked the participants about their specific impression of the characters themselves

(e.g., likability). The second measure was constructed from the mean of

the two items that examined their impressions of the character's behavior

(e.g., good/bad). To examine the internal consistency of the scales, Cronbach

coefficient alphas were computed for the two scales for each scenario (i.e., positive or

negative). For the positive likability items alpha = .87, whereas, alpha = .77 for the

negative likability items. For the two behavior scales alpha = .94 and alpha = .93 for

the positive and negative scenarios respectively.

Two separate repeated measures ANOVAs confirmed that the passages were

successful in creating the intended impression (i.e., positive or negative). In the first

analysis, participants' impressions of the character in the positive passage and of the

character in the negative passage were treated as levels of a within-subjects factor. A

significant difference was found in the impressions of the positive and negative

passages, $F(1, 77) = 83.08$, $p < .01$, with the character in the positive passage

($\underline{M}$ = 2.57, $\underline{SD}$ = .54; on a 3-point scale) eliciting a more positive impression than the character in the negative passage ($\underline{M}$ = 1.71, $\underline{SD}$ = .54; on a 3-point scale). Additionally, a significant difference was found in the rating of the main character's behavior, $\underline{F}$(1, 77) = 83.27, $\underline{p}$ < .01, with the positive passage's character receiving a more positive rating ($\underline{M}$ = 5.45, $\underline{SD}$ = 1.56; on a 7-point scale) than the character in the negative passage ($\underline{M}$ = 2.88, $\underline{SD}$ = 1.54; on a 7-point scale). Therefore, participants noticed the intended valence differences in the passages.

Discriminative Facility: Passage Coding

Inter-rater reliability estimates were calculated from the passage codings to determine the level of agreement between the coders. For each of the four coding categories (e.g., excuse), the proportion of agreement was computed. A high level of agreement was found across all categories. For the negative situation, participants could have clearly "excused" or "blamed," or not fit with either of those categories.[1] The coders agreed on 91% of the excuse cases and 92% of the blame cases. For the positive situation, participants could have clearly "praised" or "dismissed," or not listed any clear fit with those categories.[1] For the praise category, coders agreed 88% of the time. In cases of dismiss, coders agreed at a rate of 97%.

Discriminative Facility: Likert Scale

As described previously, the second discriminative facility measure was formed from several 7-point Likert items for the negative and the positive conditions respectively. To identify the best items for the final discriminative facility Likert scales, internal consistency coefficients were computed to determine which items

produced the best fit. From the original six items, four items were found to provide the best fit (i.e., highest alphas) for both the positive and negative conditions separately. The items are asterisked in Appendix C. Discriminative facility scores were calculated by averaging the four items. Therefore, each participant had a score that measured the tendency to recognize situational influences in a positive situation and a second average for the negative situation. The positive items produced alpha = .76, whereas, alpha = .78 for the negative items. Overall, the mean discriminative facility score for the positive passage was 3.24 ($\underline{SD}$ = 1.45) and 3.80 ($\underline{SD}$ = 1.46) for the negative passage. Thus, participants in general had a tendency to credit the person in the positive condition. In the negative condition, participants' scores were slightly higher toward the situation. Yet, the average was below the midpoint towards the dispositional endpoint. These findings were consistent with the coding results. However, to establish the scale as an adequate discriminative facility measure, a more in-depth comparison was needed.

Comparisons of Discriminative Facility

To assess the validity of the Likert discriminative facility approach, intercorrelations (Pearson's r) were computed between the two discriminative facility approaches. The coefficients appear in Table 1.

As expected when the scenarios were positive, the more participants praised the character in their passage summaries the less likely they were to weight situational factors in their ratings of the character's behavior, $\underline{r}(76)$ = -.43, $\underline{p}$ < .01. Also, when participants dismissed positive behavior in their passage summaries they were more

likely to weight the situation in their ratings $r(76) = .40$, $p < .01$. When the scenarios were negative, participants exhibited a similar pattern. Participants who blamed the character in their passage summaries were more likely to attribute responsibility to the character in their ratings of his behavior $r(76) = -.55$, $p < .01$. In addition, excusing negative behavior in the passage summaries corresponded to higher ratings of situational influences on the Likert items $r(76) = .53$, $p < .01$. These strong, consistent correlations suggest that the Likert scale is a reasonable measure of discriminative facility.

Self-Monitoring

The overall self-monitoring composite (average of the 18 items scored 0 or 1; higher score indicating high self-monitoring) for the group was .48 ($SD = .20$). To identify whether self-monitoring was a distinct construct from discriminative facility, intercorrelations were computed between self-monitoring, other-directedness, and the two measures of discriminative facility. The correlation coefficients are presented in Table 2 and Table 3.

As can be seen in these two tables, most of the correlations between self-monitoring and discriminative facility did not approach significance (and their absolute magnitude tended to be very small, $rs \leq .15$). It appears that discriminative facility and self-monitoring are constructs that tap different situational sensitivities. Interestingly, although non-significant, the strongest correlation for the self-monitoring composite was in a consistent direction. For example, blaming tended to be negatively related to self-monitoring, $r(71) = -.14$. Thus, low self-monitoring

(i.e., decreased situational sensitivity) was related to decreased situational sensitivity

as assessed by the coding method. However, overall, the low correlations suggest that

these two constructs are unrelated.

In order to examine the relationship between self-monitoring and general

discriminative facility (DF+ and DF- combined), an overall index of discriminative

facility was computed for the coding method, and another index was derived for the

Likert method. In the coding method, the index was calculated by combining the

categories for low discriminative facility (e.g., praise and blame) and high

discriminative facility (e.g., excuse and dismiss). The range was 0 (e.g., did not

use either praise or blame) to 2 (e.g., used both praise and blame) for each of these

new combined categories. An overall composite was calculated by subtracting the low

discriminative facility combination score from the high discriminative facility

combination score. The possible range for this difference score (the overall DF

measure) was -2 (low discriminative facility) to 2 (high discriminative facility).

For the Likert approach, discriminative facility scores for the positive and negative

passages were summed resulting in a possible score of 2 to 14, with 14 reflecting the

highest level of discriminative facility. The correlation between these two indices was

high, resulting in a significant $r(76) = .58$, $p = .0001$. However, the correlations

between the overall discriminative facility measures and self-monitoring were much

lower and nonsignificant. The correlation between the overall discriminative facility

coding measure and self-monitoring resulted in a nonsignificant $r(71) = .14$. The

correlation between the overall discriminative facility Likert scale measure and self-

monitoring resulted in a nonsignificant $r(71) = .04$.

Study 1 Discussion

Several interesting findings emerged from study 1. This study found that

discriminative facility could be assessed by the use of a Likert scale. This is not

surprising given that Chiu et al. (1995) used an instrument (e.g., monitoring-blunting;

Miller & Mangan, 1983) designed to tap situational sensitivity to hypothetical

situations as a measure of discriminative facility. However, this scale could not be

used in the present study because it focused only on negative situations. One strength

of the present study was that it extended the measurement of discriminative facility to

positive behavior. The positive and negative discriminative facility scales were both

found to have acceptable levels of reliability. Additionally, the scales were found to

share a significant portion of variance with the original passage coding measure of

discriminative facility. Given its ease of administration, the Likert approach seems to

be the preferred method to measure discriminative facility.

Additionally, although Chiu et al. (1995) also measured self-monitoring, they

did not attempt to identify its relationship to discriminative facility. Therefore, the

present study was an attempt to establish whether self-monitoring tapped

discriminative facility in positive and negative situations. Discriminative facility was

found to share little with self-monitoring. One possible explanation for this is that

situational details are important for both constructs but for different reasons. Thus, the

focus of high self-monitors involves adjusting one's own behavior because of self-

presentation goals (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974). In contrast,

discriminative facility goes beyond self-presentation and encompasses a broader

knowledge-seeking component (about the influences on other's behavior). Thus, both

constructs involve the recognition of situational details but the representations of the

information gleaned and the use of that information are different. Arguably,

discriminative facility results in a more differentiated interpretation of the situation

and the actors within the situation.

As noted earlier, DF- has been associated with more successful social

interactions (e.g., Chiu et al., 1995). The results for self-monitoring are somewhat

mixed within the social skills literature. Mill (1984) found that high self-monitors

were better at interpreting changes in vocal expression (e.g., voice intonation).

Additionally, Geizer, Rarick, and Soldow, (1977) found that self-monitoring was

related to detecting deception. However, Mill (1984) found that high self-monitors

were rated as poorer in portraying empathy convincingly in comparison to low self-

monitors. It seems clear that discriminative facility and self-monitoring are different

from one another.

Study 2

As noted earlier, the positive relationship between discriminative facility and

social interaction quality was found based on responses to negative behavior (DF-).

Therefore, in study 2, the relationship between discriminative facility and the quality

of social interactions was further examined. As an extension of Chiu et al. (1995), the

effects of discriminative facility in response to positive behavior (DF+) as well as

negative behavior (DF-) were investigated. Of interest was whether discriminative facility is more beneficial in response to negative behavior than in response to positive behavior. Discriminative facility (DF-) was expected to be related to better quality of social interactions when explaining negative behavior. However, for positive behavior, discriminative facility (DF+) was expected to be related to poorer quality of social interactions. Discriminative facility in positive situations would involve taking the situation into account when understanding positive behavior (i.e., dismissing the positive behavior). This failure to give credit to the individual was expected to be associated with lower social interaction quality.

The second part of study 2 examined the relationship between discriminative facility and social influence strategy choice. Given that individuals who rely on discriminative facility are more sensitive to situational details, they should alter their strategy choice across different situations significantly more than nondiscriminating individuals. Discriminative facility is believed to provide a differentiated understanding of the situation and goal(s). Subsequently, a broader range of tactics was expected to be endorsed by individuals who are high in discriminative facility (DF+ and DF-).

In the first of two sessions, in addition to completing the discriminative facility Likert measure of study 1, participants completed an index of social interaction quality measuring goal acquisition and interpersonal satisfaction (used by Chiu et al., 1995). In session 1, the consequence of discriminative facility (in terms of social interaction quality) for explaining both positive and negative behavior was examined.

In a second session, participants rated their use of several different social

influence strategies in 14 different situations. For those that rely on discriminative

facility as a mechanism of encoding, a wider range of strategy approach was expected.

Method

Participants

One hundred twenty-two participants completed both sessions of study 2. The

participants ranged in age from 18 years to 55 years with a median age of 21 years.

Materials

Quality of social interactions. The Quality of Social Interactions Survey

(Chiu et al., 1995) is a self-report instrument in which participants rate the quality of

four recent personal interactions on two dimensions: attainment of goal(s) and

emotional consequence(s) of the interaction for the relationship (see Appendix E). The

social situations include interactions with a professor, a parent, a close friend, and a

person they disliked. For example, participants are asked to recall the most recent

instance in which they interacted with a close friend alone and face-to-face for more

than 15 minutes. For goal attainment, participants are asked "Do you feel that you

attained your personal goal in the interaction?" Participants indicate the degree of their

success on a scale from 1 to 3: with 1 = "no," 2 = "to some extent," or 3 = "yes." For

emotional consequence, participants are asked to rate the quality of their relationship

after the interaction on a 1 to 3 scale: with 1 = "got worse," 2 = "remained the same,"

or 3 = "got better." Responses to the two questions for each social interaction are

multiplied. Next, the products are averaged across the four social situations to form an index measuring quality of social interaction.

Discriminative facility: Likert scale. The same four passages presented in study 1 were used to tap discriminative facility (see Appendix B). Two passages reflected a positive impression of the main character. The remaining two passages gave a negative impression.

The discriminative facility Likert indices derived in study 1 (see Appendix C) were used for the positive (DF+) and negative (DF-) passages separately. As stated earlier, higher numbers reflected greater discriminative facility (High DF+, High DF-). In contrast, lower numbers indicate a nondiscriminating explanation (Low DF+, Low DF-).

Goal Types and Strategy Selection

Goal type/situation. Fourteen common situations, each with a desired goal and complemented by an example (see Appendix F), served as the goal type instrument (Canary, Cody, & Marston, 1986). For example, in the situation entitled "Routine Activities-Friends," the general goal listed for this scenario is to have a routine night out with friends. This is followed by a specific example that the participant is asked to imagine: "You and your friends haven't gone out for a night on the town in some time and you want to persuade them into going with you this Friday evening." The remaining 13 situations included: trying to get out of a speeding ticket, advising a friend about their study habits, breaking off a dating relationship, persuading an acquaintance to help you with your homework, persuading your landlord to perform

maintenance, initiating a relationship, persuading a professor to let you into a class, persuading an acquaintance to talk to a friend about his/her drinking problem, persuading your father to relax, persuading your partner to meet your relatives, persuading your neighbor to keep the noise down, persuading a stranger to participate in a class project for you, and persuading your parents to send you money (see Appendix F). Participants are asked to imagine each situation separately and are provided with a list of eight persuasion tactics/strategies that they rate independently.

Strategies. The tactics include direct request, ingratiation, compromise, negative manipulation of feelings (e.g., sulking), rational arguments, coercive influence (e.g., threaten to punish), referent influence (e.g., appeal to the relationship), and avoidance. Each tactic with an accompanying description is provided below.

Direct request. "Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request."

Ingratiation. "I'd put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to persuade him/her. I'd get him/her in the right 'frame of mind' before asking."

Compromise. "I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work something out."

Negative manipulation of feelings. "I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I'd act sad, hurt, and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc."

Rational arguments. "I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to agree with my request."

Coercion. "I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along with my request."

Referent appeal. "I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking."

Avoidance. "I probably wouldn't do anything about persuading the person(s) in this situation. I'd drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around."

Respondents were asked to rate each strategy as described above in each situation on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). As in Canary, Cody, and Marston (1986), a description of each tactic was presented for each situation (see Appendix F).

Manipulation checks. As in experiment 1, to check the intended valence manipulation, participants rated the main character of each story (see Appendix D) on a number of dimensions (e.g., friendliness, likability, and caring).

Procedure

Session 1. Participants initially completed an informed consent form. In the first of two sessions, the experimenter provided each participant with a booklet that contained several instruments. The social interaction quality inventory was the first instrument completed. Next, participants followed the same Likert scale procedure used in study 1 to tap discriminative facility. Participants read one positive passage

and one negative passage about Brad and Scott. The passages were counterbalanced as before such that, half of the subjects completed the positive passage first and the remaining half completed the negative passage first. As before, participants completed the Likert item discriminative facility measure asking them to make attributions about Brad's and Scott's behavior. Similarly, the manipulation check items were included which asked the participants to rate the main character on a number of traits and to make a judgment about his behavior.

After completing all instruments including the manipulation checks, participants were thanked for their participation. Participants were informed that they would complete another task at a later date.

Session 2. In session two, after completing the informed consent, the same participants received a stapled packet that contained the 14 different goal-seeking situations (adapted from Canary, Cody, & Marston, 1986). Nine random orders of situations and strategies were used. Within each packet, the strategies were presented in the same order for each situation. Participants were informed that they would be rating their use of a given set of strategies across 14 scenarios. Participants were asked to imagine themselves in each of the situations and to rate each strategy independently. After participants completed the packet, they were thanked for their participation and debriefed.

Results

Manipulation Checks

As in study 1, the manipulation of valence in the passages was examined. The impression indices for the positive and negative passages were calculated using the same items described in study 1. As mentioned previously, the first valence measure tapped participants' impression of the characters themselves (e.g., likability). This measure was calculated from the mean of the three items that asked the participants about their specific impression of the characters themselves (e.g., likability). The second measure reflected judgments of the character's behavior and was constructed from the mean of the two items that examined their impressions of the character's behavior (e.g., good/bad).

Two separate repeated measures ANOVAs confirmed that the passages were successful in conveying the intended impression (i.e., positive or negative). In the first analysis, participants' impressions of the character in the positive passage and of the character in the negative passage were treated as levels of a within-subjects factor. A significant difference was found in the impression ratings, $F(1, 121) = 217.38$, $p < .001$, with the character in the positive situation ($M = 2.47$, $SD = .43$; on a 3-point scale) eliciting a more positive impression than the character in the negative situation ($M = 1.58$, $SD = .49$ on a 3 point-scale). In the second analysis, participants' judgments of the character's behavior in the positive passage and of the character in

the negative passage were treated as levels of a within-subjects factor. A significant

difference was found in the rating of the main character's behavior,

$F(1, 121) = 213.76$, $p < .001$, with the positive character's behavior ($M = 5.36$,

$SD = 1.35$; on a 7-point scale) receiving a more positive rating than the negative

character's behavior ($M = 2.63$, $SD = 1.28$; on a 7-point scale).

Discriminative Facility: Likert Scale

Discriminative facility was classified by using the same index validated in

study 1. Using the same four established items, discriminative facility scores for the

positive (DF+) and negative (DF-) behaviors were computed by averaging across the

items (see Appendix C).

As before, each participant had a score that measured the tendency to recognize

situational influences for positive behavior (DF+) and a second score for negative

behavior (DF-). Internal consistency tests for the positive items (DF+) produced

alpha = .82. Internal consistency (alpha) was .69 for the negative items (DF-).

Participants were classified into discriminative (High DF+, High DF-) and

nondiscriminative (Low DF+, Low DF-) participants based on their responses to the

Likert items. Because the scales ranged from 1 to 7, an average above 4 indicated a

discriminative pattern. That is, the participant was placing more weight on external

factors when explaining the character's behavior. Using this strategy, a person's

behavior is conditionally represented (i.e., discriminative facility). In contrast, an

average below 4 reflected an unconditional explanation (i.e., nondiscriminating

explanation). Thus, the individual was given more responsibility or credit in terms of

the positive passage. From these divisions, two discriminative facility factors (DF+, DF-) were created with two levels each (high, low). Thus, discriminative facility was categorized as high or low based on the negative (DF-) and positive (DF+) situations separately.

To examine the benefits of discriminative facility in both positive and negative situations, a two-way nonorthogonal ANOVA (Appelbaum & Cramer, 1974; O'Brien, 1976) was conducted for social interaction quality. The tendency to rely on discriminative facility in positive situations (DF+) and the tendency to rely on discriminative facility in negative situations (DF-) served as factors. Each factor had two levels indicating "high" or "low."[2] A significant main effect was found between levels of discriminative facility in negative situations, $F(1, 101) = 4.52$, $p < .05$. As expected, high discriminating individuals (DF-) reported higher social interaction quality scores, $M = 5.83$ ($SE = .19$), than low discriminative (DF-) participants, $M = 5.32$ ($SE = .15$). No other significant effects were found. Thus, discriminating in positive situations appeared to have no effect upon social interaction quality.

To test the prediction that discriminative facility is related to a broader strategy base, a 2 (DF-: High/Low) X 2 (DF+: High/Low) X 14 (Scenarios) X 8 (Strategies) repeated measures ANOVA was performed. The main effect for scenario was significant $F(13, 1222) = 35.82$, $p < .001$. In addition, some strategies in general were more popular, producing a significant strategy main effect, $F(7, 658) = 241.01$, $p < .001$. However, strategy was found to vary across scenarios, such that the scenario by strategy interaction was significant, $F(91, 8554) = 24.62$, $p < .001$. Finally, as

predicted, DF- was found to systematically impact strategy choice across various

scenarios producing a significant DF- by strategy by scenario interaction,

$F(91, 8554) = 1.26$, $p < .05$. However, there were no significant main effects or

interactions with DF+.

Given that discriminative individuals take the situation into account, they were

expected to exhibit greater flexibility (i.e., variability) in strategy use across situations.

Because, DF- was consistently found to have a systematic influence, the remaining

analyses pertain to this encoding approach. Table 4 presents the mean likelihood of

strategy use across each of the situations for the two levels of DF-. It is important to

note that a lower number indicates higher likelihood of use.

To tease apart the effects embedded within the three-way interaction, a

2 (DF-: High/Low) X 8 (Strategy) repeated measures ANOVA was performed for each

of the 14 scenarios.

Strategy Preferences

The strategy main effect was significant in all 14 analyses, all

$Fs(7, 735$ to $742) \geq 58.68$, $ps < .001$. However, this effect was not of central interest.

Nonetheless, comparisons were made between strategies to identify the more popular

strategies in general. Given the large number of comparisons possible for the 8

strategies (i.e., 28 pair-wise comparisons) within each of the 14 scenarios, alpha was

adjusted to .00013. Table 5 presents the average ratings for each strategy within each

of the 14 scenarios.

Overall, across situations, rationalization, with one exception (relational initiation/trying to get a date) was the preferred strategy. Ingratiation (exception: third party/trying to get a friend to stop drinking), and compromise (exceptions: assistance stranger/getting participation from strangers in a class project and third party/trying to get a friend to stop drinking) were also popular with the few noted exceptions. On the other hand, coercion was the least preferred strategy with one exception (obligation/getting the landlord to perform maintenance). Other infrequently used appeals across situations tended to be negative manipulation (exceptions: annoyance/getting neighbor to turn down stereo and bureaucracy/getting out of a ticket) and avoidance (exception: bureaucracy/getting out of a ticket and relational initiation/trying to get a date). Given that the strategy main effect and subsequent comparisons were not of central interest, they are not discussed in detail. To examine all significant comparisons, refer to Table 5.

Effects of Discriminative Facility (DF-)

It was anticipated that for individuals who are high in discriminative facility, a broader range of strategies would be selected. Relying on discriminative facility encompasses sensitivity to situational differences; thus, this was expected to evoke varied strategic solutions for the given goal by discriminative individuals. Consistent with this prediction, there were significant main effects for discriminative facility (indicating more varied strategy use for high DF- participants) for the following scenarios: Advice friend, obligation, relational escalation, and third party. All $Fs(1, 105$ to $106) \geq 4.17$, $ps < .05$. High discriminating participants were more

likely to endorse a broader range of strategies ($\underline{M}$ = 3.85, $\underline{SD}$ = .64) in comparison to

low discriminating participants ($\underline{M}$ = 4.20, $\underline{SD}$ = .81) when attempting to convince a

friend to focus on their studies. Similarly, high discriminating participants were

willing to use a wider range of strategies ($\underline{M}$ = 3.58, $\underline{SD}$ = .74) to persuade the landlord

to fix the plumbing problem in comparison to low discriminators ($\underline{M}$ = 3.97,

$\underline{SD}$ = .91). When trying to persuade their partner to meet their relatives, high

discriminating individuals again endorsed a more flexible strategy base ($\underline{M}$ = 3.29,

$\underline{SD}$ = .72) in comparison to low discriminators ($\underline{M}$ = 3.58, $\underline{SD}$ = .70). Finally, to

convince a friend to discuss the possibility of another friend's drinking problem, high

discriminators again endorsed a broader range of tactics ($\underline{M}$ = 3.61, $\underline{SD}$ = .80) when

compared to low discriminators ($\underline{M}$ = 3.93, $\underline{SD}$ = .83).

<u>Discriminative Facility (DF-) by Strategy Interactions</u>

Given that individuals who rely on discriminative facility are more sensitive to

situational details, they should alter their strategy choice across different situations

significantly more than nondiscriminating individuals. Consistent with the prediction,

there were significant discriminative facility by strategy interactions in two scenarios.

A significant strategy by discriminative facility interaction, $\underline{F}(7, 742)$ = 2.70, $\underline{p}$ < .01,

was found when participants considered how to contend with an annoying neighbor. In

order to identify meaningful cell mean differences without inflating type I error

drastically, at least a .5 difference between means was considered necessary for future

comparisons. Three strategies met this criterion: direct request, coercion, and

compromise. Using the Games-Howell procedure (Toothaker, 1993), comparisons

were made between levels of discriminative facility. Alpha was adjusted to the .01

level. High discriminating participants were more likely to endorse using direct request

(M = 3.58, SD = 2.05) than low discriminating persons (M = 4.65, SD =1.95) when

confronted with an annoying situation, $t(93)$ = 2.73, p < .01. Differences in using

coercion and compromise were found to be nonsignificant. However, interestingly,

high discriminating individuals endorsed the "more assertive" approaches. That is,

they rated direct request (M = 3.58, SD = 2.05) and coercion (M = 4.80, SD = 2.29) as

more likely, whereas, low discriminators rated compromise (M = 2.00, SD = 1.59) as

more likely.

Additionally, a significant strategy by discriminative facility interaction,

$F(7, 742)$ = 2.84, p < .01, was found when participants considered convincing their

friends to go out for a good time (routine activity friend scenario). As before, in order

to identify meaningful cell mean differences without inflating type I error drastically,

at least a .5 difference between means was considered necessary for future

comparisons. The three strategies that met this criterion: direct request, negative

manipulation, and avoidance, were compared between levels of discriminative facility.

All comparisons were made at the .01 (alpha) level using the Games-Howell procedure

(Toothaker, 1993). None of the comparisons were significant; however, the trend of

the means indicated that high discriminating participants were more likely to endorse

each of the strategies more than low discriminating individuals.

Given that the previously described DF- main effect for strategy preference

may be the result of strongly endorsing a select few strategies or mildly endorsing

several strategies, an additional analysis was conducted to further explore strategic

flexibility between high and low discriminative (DF-) individuals. Because of the

greater social cognitive flexibility of high DF- individuals, it is reasonable to predict

that they would at least be willing to consider, and perhaps would prefer, more

strategies than low DF- individuals within each scenario. The specific strategies were

not of interest. Based upon these considerations, a count of the number of strategies

endorsed was performed within each of the 14 scenarios. Initially the cut-off was set to

a rating of 4 or less from the 1 to 7 scales, reflecting a <u>willingness to at least consider</u>

more techniques. A 2 (DF-: High/Low) X 14 (Scenario) repeated measures ANOVA

was performed on the total counts for each scenario. The interaction between scenario

and discriminative facility (DF-) was nonsignificant, $F(13, 1339) = 1.42$, $p = .14$.

However, a significant main effect was found for scenario,

$F(13, 1339) = 24.89$, $p < .001$. Not surprisingly, this suggests that some scenarios were

likely to evoke a broader range of tactic consideration in comparison to others. The

current focus was not to study situations; however, post-hoc comparisons ($p \leq .0005$)

indicated that the scenarios clearly separated into two clusters with $Ms \leq 4.17$

(bureaucracy, $M = 3.51$; relational de-escalation, $M = 3.92$; relational initiation,

$M = 4.10$; assistance stranger, $M = 4.16$; and gain-assistance professor, $M = 4.17$) and

$Ms \geq 4.82$ (third party, $M = 4.82$; obligation, $M = 4.85$; advice parent, $M = 4.85$;

annoyance, $M = 4.88$; assistance parent, $M = 4.92$; routine activities friends, $M = 4.96$;

and relational escalation, $M = 5.26$). Two scenarios that overlapped with both of these

clusters were advice friend ($M = 4.49$) and assistance acquaintance ($M = 4.52$).

In general, the pattern of means indicated that in those situations where there was less familiarity and less relationship closeness (i.e., bureaucracy, relational de-escalation, relational initiation, assistance stranger, and gain-assistance professor) there was also less breadth of strategy endorsement. In contrast, for those situations where there was a high degree of familiarity and a well-established relationship (i.e., obligation, third party, annoyance, advice parent, assistance parent, routine activity friends, and relational escalation) there was a corresponding increase in strategic flexibility. Possibly, individuals felt less constrained in situations with individuals that were more familiar.

As support for the flexibility hypothesis, a significant main effect was found for DF-, $F(1, 103) = 5.06$, $p < .05$. As predicted, high discriminators were willing to consider using a broader range of tactics ($M = 4.75$, $SD = .74$) when compared to low discriminators ($M = 4.37$, $SD = .92$). The absence of a DF- by scenario interaction clearly indicates that the flexibility displayed by high DF- individuals is not limited to particular situations.

To examine whether high DF- participants actually preferred to use more strategies, rather than were just willing to consider more strategies, a more stringent criterion was applied to the strategy counts. A count of the number of strategies with a rating of 3 or less from the 1 to 7 scales was performed. Again a 2 (DF-: High/Low) X 14 (Scenario) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the total counts of strategies preferred for each scenario. Although the means were in the predicted direction with the high DF- endorsing more ($M = 3.91$, $SD = .83$) than the low DF-

($\underline{M}$ = 3.66, $\underline{SD}$ = .96) participants; neither the main effect for DF-, $\underline{F}(1, 103)$ = 1.94,

$\underline{p}$ = .17, nor the interaction, $\underline{F}(13, 1339)$ = 1.09, $\underline{p}$ = .36 was significant. A scenario

main effect was found to be significant, $\underline{F}(13, 1339)$ = 23.25, $\underline{p}$ < .001. However, the

general trend of increased strategic flexibility in closer relationships was similar to that

found in the preceding analyses; therefore, this effect is not discussed further.

Although high DF- participants indicated a broader consideration of techniques

across situations, they did not indicate a strong preference to use a broader range of

tactics when compared to low DF- individuals. The open-mindedness of high DF-

individuals is evident; however, what high DF- individuals would actually do in

practice is less clear. The current studies were not designed to tease apart the

implications of strategy consideration versus strategy preference; however, future

research could explore this issue.

<center>Study 2 Discussion</center>

These results provide additional support for the role of discriminative facility

as a facet of social intelligence. However, the positive relationship between

discriminative facility and social interaction quality was found to be limited to

negative behaviors (DF-). That is, in response to negative behavior it would be socially

smart to recognize the impact of the situation when making attributions about a

person's behavior. Further, blaming a person in a negative situation was related to

poorer social interaction quality. Interestingly, these results somewhat limit the benefit

of discriminative facility. Thus, previous conclusions of Chiu et al. (1995) where

discriminative facility was reported as being generally beneficial for social interactions

should be modified to pertain to only interpretations of negative behavior (DF-). The

failure to use discriminative facility for positive behaviors (i.e., giving credit to a

person for a good deed rather than attributing it to the situation) was not related to

higher social interaction quality as predicted. However, the more extreme hypothesis

(that DF+ would actually harm relationships) was not supported.

Another interesting feature associated with discriminative facility is strategic

flexibility. Not surprisingly, individuals high in discriminative facility (DF-) reported a

broader base of persuasion tactics in many situations. However, it is not the case that

high discriminators (DF-) simply relied on any particular strategy across situations.

They appear to be sensitive to certain features of the situation that prompt an

endorsement of a broader array of tactics in some situations while not in others. For

example, when advising a friend, asking their landlord to fix their plumbing, asking

their partner to meet their family, or trying to discourage a friend's drinking a wide

variety of tactics were considered. However, when confronted with an annoying

neighbor, they elected to rely on direct request more than nondiscriminators. These

results provide evidence for the role of discriminative facility as an aspect of social

intelligence that impacts social influence. Discriminantly encoding information is

associated with discriminantly responding in various situations.

General Conclusion

The results of these studies provided support for the importance of being

sensitive to situational nuances (i.e., discriminative facility), especially when

interpreting others' negative behavior (DF-). This unique component of social

intelligence is important to the understanding of others and was found to contribute to the managing of others. Study 1 examined the distinction between two constructs reported to encompass situational sensitivity (i.e., self-monitoring and discriminative facility). They were found to tap unique aspects of situational awareness. Additionally, a more readily scored Likert approach was successful in measuring discriminative facility in both positive and negative situations, compared to the burdensome summarization and coding approach used by Chiu et al. (1995).

Study 2 replicated previous findings (e.g., Chiu et al., 1995; Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1989) and established boundary conditions for discriminative facility. Previously, Chiu et al. (1995) had argued for the general benefits of discriminative facility. In particular, relying on discriminative facility was found to be associated with higher social interaction quality. However, their research was limited to negative situations (DF-). It is understandable that in the cases of negative behaviors, recognizing the context (i.e., giving an actor the benefit of the doubt) instead of blaming individuals would have positive interpersonal consequences. Indeed in the present study, being sensitive to the context was found to contribute to positive interpersonal relations. However, this finding was found to be limited to negative behaviors (DF-). The <u>failure</u> to use discriminative facility for positive behaviors (i.e., giving credit to a person for a good deed rather than attributing it to the situation) was not related to higher social interaction quality as suspected.

The robust finding that discriminating in moderately negative situations (DF-) leads to positive social consequences is consistent with previous research that has

highlighted the impact of negative information (Fiske, 1980; Hamilton & Zanna, 1972; Ostrom & Davis, 1979). Negative information and extreme information have been proposed as eliciting more attention than moderate information and positive information (Fiske, 1980). The goal of the present studies was to create moderately positive and moderately negative situations so that variability in discriminative facility (DF- and DF+) could be assessed. Moderately negative behavior may be sufficient to elicit DF- social consequences. Future research could examine the consequence of discriminative facility in response to more extreme positive behavior (DF+). It is possible that the suspected negative repercussions of discriminating in response to extremely positive behavior (i.e., dismissing positive behavior by emphasizing the situation) would surface.

The potential significance of discriminative facility in positive situations (DF+) is suggested by the close relationship literature (Fincham & Bradbury, 1989; Jacobson, McDonald, Follette, & Berley, 1985). Jacobson, McDonald, Follette, and Berley, (1985) found that when nondistressed couples made attributions of their partner's behavior in positive situations, they credited their partner (i.e., did not rely on discriminative facility). Still, their results were consistent with the present study when they examined distressed couples. In this circumstance, Jacobson, McDonald, Follette, and Berley, (1985) found distressed couples made internal attributions (i.e., did not rely on discriminative facility) for their partner's negative behavior. Hence, the lack of discriminative facility with respect to negative behavior was associated with poorer social interaction quality.

In study 2, individuals high in discriminative facility (DF-) reported a broader

repertoire of social influence strategies. As mentioned, high self-monitoring has also

been linked to a broader array of persuasion tactics (Bell & Daly, 1984;

Caldwell & Burger, 1997). Although self-monitoring and discriminative facility were

found to differ from each other in study 1, arguably they both encompass different

aspects of sensitivity to differences in situations. Therefore, it was reasonable to

expect that sensitivity to situational variations allows for flexibility in approach.

Jones and Day (1997) found that adolescents rated as socially competent displayed

greater social-cognitive flexibility (i.e., the capacity to apply social knowledge to

novel situations). Shoda et al. (1993) found that socially competent children

discriminantly responded across situations. Conger, Conger, and Cowan (1991) found

that socially incompetent males that had reported difficulties in heterosocial

interactions evidenced less variability in their social judgments. Conger et al. (1991)

posited that this might have reflected an inability to discriminate among social

information when compared to socially competent individuals. Therefore, the capacity

to discriminate flexibly among social stimuli and to be sensitive to situational changes

(i.e., discriminative facility) can facilitate success in life tasks (Cantor & Harlow,

1994). Social intelligence allows individuals to reach their goals and promote positive

feelings (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1989). Indiscriminant responding, that is failing to

recognize situational constraints, impedes social goal attainment

(Cantor & Harlow, 1994). This is consistent with the findings of the two previous

studies. Individuals who relied on discriminative facility (DF-) reported greater

success in social interactions. Additionally, they were found to be sensitive to differences within various situations, which resulted in a broader array of strategy selection.

In general, it is a common assumption that socially intelligent individuals have a prosocial orientation and rely on positive social influence tactics to reach their goals (e.g., Ford, 1982; Rubin & Rose-Krasnor, 1992). However, it is interesting to note that in the present data, although there was a tendency to use more positive techniques, high DF- individuals were at least as willing to consider negative techniques (i.e., negative manipulation and coercion) as low DF- individuals. Thus, part of social intelligence might include a willingness to consider which tactics are most effective, even if that includes less positive techniques when warranted by the situation. As defined by Thorndike (1920), social intelligence includes understanding others and successfully managing others. Consequently, socially intelligent individuals probably try to maximize both of these objectives when possible. However, occasionally they may not be able to meet both of these objectives simultaneously and may have to focus on goal attainment. Ultimately, this differentiated social-cognitive representation and varied repertoire of strategies allows those that rely on discriminative facility (DF-) greater flexibility in social situations. Clearly, discriminative facility (DF-) has a variety of benefits in terms of social interaction quality and social influence; however, the presence or absence of discriminative facility in positive situations (DF+) does not appear to have as great of an impact.

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Footnotes

[1]In some instances, participants did not clearly employ one strategy in their

summaries. In these instances, the passages were coded as "none."

[2]Because the levels (high and low) of DF- and DF+ were created based on the

scale mid-point cut-off criteria, individuals that scored at the mid-point of DF- or DF+

were excluded from the initial analyses. When all factors were included in the model,

96 participants were analyzed by a nonorthogonal ANOVA (Appelbaum & Cramer,

1974; O'Brien, 1976). After removing the nonsignificant interaction term and

nonsignificant DF+ from the model, 103 participants ($\underline{N}$ = 42 High DF-; $\underline{N}$ = 61 Low

DF-) were analyzed for the DF- main effect alone. Note that participants who scored at

the mid-point for DF+ (and therefore were excluded from the previous analyses) were

included in the DF- analysis.

Table 1

Correlations Between Discriminative Facility Coding and the Likert Discriminative

Facility Measure

	Passage Coding Categories			
	Praise	Dismiss	Blame	Excuse
Likert Scales				
Positive Situation	-.43**	.40**	-.19	.01
Negative Situation	.02	.11	-.55**	.53**

N = 78; *p < .05; **p < .01

Note. Higher scores for the Likert scales represent situational explanations. Higher

scores for the passage coding categories indicate use of that particular attribution.

Table 2

Correlations Between Self-Monitoring and Discriminative Facility Coding

	Passage Coding Categories			
	Praise	Dismiss	Blame	Excuse
Self-monitoring	-.13	.07	-.14	.01
Other-directed	-.23	.15	-.05	-.04

N = 73; None of the rs were statistically significant at p < .05.

Note. The scales for other-directedness and self-monitoring were scored such that higher values indicate tendencies toward being other-directed or a high self-monitor, respectively. Higher scores for the passage coding categories indicate use of that particular attribution.

Table 3

Correlations Between Self-Monitoring and the Likert Discriminative Facility Measure

	Likert Scales	
	Positive Situation	Negative Situation
Self-monitoring	.09	-.03
Other-directed	.17	-.03

$\underline{N}$ = 73; None of the rs were statistically significant at p < .05.

Note. The scales for other-directedness and self-monitoring were scored such that higher values indicate tendencies toward being other-directed or a high self-monitor, respectively. Higher scores for the Likert scales represent situational explanations.

Table 4

Mean Likelihood of Using Strategies in Each of the Scenarios

by Levels of Discriminative Facility (DF-)

Scenario	DF	Ration	Ingrat	Strategy Direct	-Man	Coer	Avoid	Ref	Comp
Relational	Low	2.23	3.81	5.50	5.76	6.73	5.23	3.34	3.32
De-escalat	High	1.89	3.87	5.11	5.76	6.78	5.11	2.56	3.51
Advice	Low	1.63	3.87	5.02	4.94	6.52	5.52	3.10	3.03
Friend	High	1.78	3.04	4.51	4.16	6.24	5.18	2.91	2.98
Advice	Low	1.37	2.59	4.63	5.21	6.65	5.68	2.38	2.43
Parent	High	1.64	2.64	4.22	4.78	6.42	5.11	2.29	2.51
Assistance	Low	1.21	2.52	4.75	5.71	6.95	5.49	5.05	2.41
Professor	High	1.31	2.51	4.53	4.82	6.71	5.60	4.80	2.51
Annoyance	Low	1.71	3.51	4.65	4.71	5.46	5.63	3.81	2.00
	High	1.64	3.98	3.58	4.36	4.80	5.71	3.80	2.56
Bureaucracy	Low	2.90	2.92	6.02	5.06	6.92	3.68	5.43	4.17
	High	2.91	2.93	5.75	4.86	6.86	4.39	5.73	4.23
Assistance	Low	1.14	1.90	5.03	4.75	6.79	5.56	2.67	1.79
Parent	High	1.44	2.04	4.33	4.44	6.69	5.40	2.33	1.62
Routine Act	Low	1.75	2.83	4.06	5.35	6.76	5.67	2.40	2.19
Friend	High	2.07	2.67	3.36	4.44	6.40	4.98	2.76	2.49
Obligation	Low	1.37	3.27	3.51	4.76	5.06	6.29	4.59	2.94
	High	1.44	3.00	2.73	3.76	4.18	6.27	4.04	3.20
Relational	Low	1.48	1.92	4.37	4.86	6.44	5.70	1.73	2.11
Escalation	High	1.53	1.96	4.11	3.73	5.84	5.67	1.60	1.89
Assistance	Low	1.29	2.22	4.60	6.06	6.86	5.32	4.67	2.89
Stranger	High	1.51	1.98	3.67	5.76	6.76	5.22	4.93	3.09
Assistance	Low	1.97	2.26	4.61	5.85	6.87	4.71	3.69	2.44
Acquaint	High	1.76	2.36	4.09	5.58	6.73	5.00	3.69	2.38
Third Party	Low	1.32	3.45	4.74	4.47	6.39	6.11	2.55	2.44
	High	1.49	3.04	3.93	3.69	6.02	6.02	2.27	2.38
Relational	Low	3.98	2.21	4.57	6.49	6.94	3.60	3.87	4.08
Initiation	High	4.18	2.07	3.96	6.13	6.87	3.78	3.31	3.47

Note. In order, the strategies are rationalization, ingratiation, direct request, negative

manipulation, coercion, avoidance, referent appeal, and compromise.

A lower number indicates higher likelihood of use.

Table 5

Strategy Comparisons within Each Scenario

Scenario	Ration	Ingrat	Strategy Direct	-Man	Coer	Avoid	Ref	Comp
Relational De-escalat	2.08_a	3.83_b	5.34_c	5.76_c	6.75_d	5.18_c	3.01_b	3.40_b
Advice Friend	1.69_a	3.52_b	4.80_c	4.61_c	6.40_d	5.37_c	3.02_b	3.01_b
Advice Parent	1.48_a	2.61_b	4.46_c	5.03_c	6.56_d	5.44_c	2.34_b	2.46_b
Assistance Professor	1.25_a	2.52_b	4.66_c	5.34_c	6.85_d	5.54_c	4.94_c	2.45_b
Annoyance	1.69_a	3.70_b	4.20_b	4.56_{bc}	5.19_{cd}	5.67_d	3.81_b	2.23_a
Bureaucracy	2.91_a	2.93_a	5.91_c	4.98_{bc}	6.90_d	3.97_{ab}	5.55_c	4.20_b
Assistance Parent	1.27_a	1.96_{bc}	4.74_d	4.62_d	6.75_e	5.49_d	2.53_c	1.72_{ab}
Routine Act Friend	1.88_a	2.76_b	3.77_c	4.97_d	6.61_e	5.38_d	2.55_b	2.31_{ab}
Obligation	1.40_a	3.16_b	3.19_b	4.34_c	4.69_c	6.28_d	4.36_c	3.05_b
Relational Escalation	1.50_a	1.94_{ab}	4.26_c	4.39_c	6.19_d	5.69_d	1.68_{ab}	2.02_b
Assistance Stranger	1.38_a	2.12_b	4.21_d	5.94_f	6.81_g	5.28_{ef}	4.78_{de}	2.97_c
Assistance Acquaint	1.88_a	2.30_a	4.39_{bc}	5.74_d	6.81_e	4.83_{cd}	3.69_b	2.41_a
Third Party	1.39_a	3.28_{cd}	4.40_e	4.14_{de}	6.23_f	6.07_f	2.43_b	2.41_{bc}
Relational Initiation	4.06_b	2.15_a	4.31_b	6.34_c	6.91_d	3.68_b	3.64_b	3.82_b

Note. The strategies are rationalization, ingratiation, direct request, negative

manipulation, coercion, avoidance, referent appeal, and compromise.

Lower numbers reflect a higher likelihood of use. Means within a row that do not

share the same subscript are significantly different at $p < .00013$.

Appendix A

NAME:_____

ID#_____

The statements below concern your personal reactions to a number of different situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement carefully before answering. If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, circle A. If a statement is FALSE or NOT USUALLY TRUE as applied to you, circle B.

MOSTLY TRUE = A   MOSTLY FALSE = B

	T (A)	F (B)	
1.	A	B	I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
2.	A	B	At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
3.	A	B	I can only argue for ideas for which I already believe.
4.	A	B	I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.
5.	A	B	I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. *
6.	A	B	I would probably make a good actor.
7.	A	B	In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
8.	A	B	In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different people. *
9.	A	B	I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
10.	A	B	I'm not always the person I appear to be. *
11.	A	B	I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.
12.	A	B	I have considered being an entertainer.
13.	A	B	I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
14.	A	B	I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.

PLEASE TURN OVER

	T (A)	F (B)	
15.	**A**	**B**	At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
16.	**A**	**B**	I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should. *
17.	**A**	**B**	I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
18.	**A**	**B**	I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. *

Appendix B

<u>Negative Situations</u>

BRAD

Brad completed his Masters in Business Administration and ranked in the top ten percent

of his graduating class. He secured a position at Paxwell Incorporated (a large marketing

firm). Brad wanted to advance into corporate management. Advancement in the company

was very competitive. A couple of Brad's coworkers were also looking to advance in the

company. Brad worked long hours at his job. On one occasion, Brad knocked his boss's

coffee cup to the ground. He picked up the broken pieces and threw them in the dumpster.

Brad noticed his boss looking for his cup, but said he did not know anything about it.

Brad's boss often worked late. One day, Brad's boss asked him to join him for golf the

next day. Although Brad did not care for golf, he told his boss that it was one of his

favorite sports and that he was looking forward to playing. That evening, Brad purchased

a set of golf clubs with a well-known brand and other pieces of equipment. Brad knew

that office politics were important. Brad wondered what people thought of him in the

office. Brad regularly sent birthday cards to his boss. On occasion, he brought donuts for

his boss and complimented his appearance. Once, a coworker was on his way to give a

presentation and noticed a stain on his shirt. He asked Brad to look at his shirt. Brad told

him that the stain was not noticeable. The next morning Brad was preparing for a

meeting. A coworker called and stated that he had car trouble. The coworker was 2 blocks

from work and asked for a ride. Brad told him that he could not help him. Brad suggested

he try someone else. After working for the firm for five years, Brad received a promotion.

Negative Situations

SCOTT

Scott was working to complete his undergraduate degree in computer science. He hoped to work in the Internet software industry as a programmer. Many of Scott's computer programming classes involved writing programs that were difficult. Scott enrolled in a COBOL class for the summer semester. Scott's COBOL instructor did not allow students to work together on the assignments. Scott worked many late hours on his homework. He would often arrive early to class. He sat in the front of the room. Scott wanted to make an "A" in the class. One day, the instructor informed the class that the next assignment would take 1 week to complete. Scott worked for two days on the program. He read several COBOL programming books. He was unable to reach a solution. One afternoon, Scott asked a fellow student if he had completed the assignment. The student said that he had finished the program. Scott asked for a copy of his program. Scott turned in a copy of the program a few days later. A week later, Scott took the student to lunch. One day, Scott was working in the computer lab on another assignment, and the computer crashed. He tried to reboot the computer. A message stating that his disk had corrupted the computer with a virus appeared on the screen. Scott quickly left the lab. The lab assistant worked for two hours correcting the situation. The hard drive was cleaned and the computer booted up properly. Later, Scott was able to retrieve the work he had completed earlier. The assignments and examinations continued to be very difficult. Scott worked very hard on the assignments. Scott performed well in the course. Scott continued to take classes and completed his undergraduate degree.

Positive Situations

BRAD

Brad completed his Masters in Business Administration and ranked in the top ten percent

of his graduating class. He secured a position at Paxwell Incorporated (a large marketing

firm). Brad wanted to advance into corporate management. Advancement in the company

was very competitive. A couple of Brad's coworkers were also looking to advance in the

company. Brad worked long hours at his job. On one occasion, Brad knocked his boss's

coffee cup to the ground. He picked up the broken pieces and threw them in the dumpster.

He brought a new identical cup to work the next day. Brad's boss often worked late. One

day, Brad's boss asked him to join him for golf the next day. Brad told his boss that it was

one of his favorite sports and that he was looking forward to playing. That evening, Brad

purchased a set of golf clubs with a well-known brand and other pieces of equipment.

Brad knew that office politics were important. Brad wondered what people thought of

him in the office. Brad regularly sent birthday cards to his coworkers. On occasion, he

brought donuts for his boss and complimented his appearance. Once, a coworker was on

his way to give a presentation and noticed a stain on his shirt. He asked Brad to look at

his shirt. Brad told him that the stain was not noticeable. The next morning Brad was

preparing for a meeting. A coworker called and stated that he had car trouble. The

coworker was 2 blocks from work and asked for a ride. Brad told him that he could give

him a lift. Brad left a few minutes later and gave him a ride. After working for the firm

for five years, Brad received a promotion.

Positive Situations

SCOTT

Scott was working to complete his undergraduate degree in computer science. He hoped

to work in the Internet software industry as a programmer. Many of Scott's computer

programming classes involved writing programs that were difficult. Scott enrolled in a

COBOL class for the summer semester. Scott's COBOL instructor did not allow students

to work together on the assignments. Scott worked many late hours on his homework.

He would often arrive early to class. He sat in the front of the room. Scott wanted to make

an "A" in the class. One day, the instructor informed the class that the next assignment

would take 1 week to complete. Scott worked for two weeks on the program. He read

several COBOL programming books. He was unable to reach a solution. One afternoon,

Scott asked a fellow student if he had completed the assignment. The student said that he

had finished the program. Scott asked him for a few hints. Scott finished the program a

few days later. A week later, Scott took the student to lunch. One day, Scott was working

in the computer lab on another assignment, and the computer crashed. He tried to reboot

the computer. A message stating that his disk had corrupted the computer with a virus

appeared on the screen. He alerted the lab assistant of the problem and the message. They

worked together for two hours correcting the situation. The hard drive was cleaned and

the computer booted up properly. Scott was able to retrieve the work he had completed

earlier. The assignments and examinations continued to be very difficult. Scott worked

very hard on the assignments. Scott performed well in the course. Scott continued to take

classes and completed his undergraduate degree.

Appendix C

Brad Negative Items

*1. The main reason behind Brad lying to his boss was

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

*2. The main reason behind Brad not giving a ride to his coworker was

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

3. The main reason behind Brad being nice to people was

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

*4. Do you think that Brad would have informed someone other than his boss that he broke their coffee cup?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

never

always

*5. Do you think that Brad would give a person a ride if he were not at work?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

never

always

6. Brad's behavior is

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

Highly consistent
(free of situational
influence)

Variable depending
on the situation

*Items used in the discriminative facility Likert scale.

Brad Positive Items

*1. The main reason behind Brad buying his boss a replacement coffee cup was

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

2. The main reason behind Brad giving a ride to his coworker was

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

*3. The main reason behind Brad being nice to people was

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

4. Do you think that Brad would have informed someone other than his boss that he broke their coffee cup?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

never

always

*5. Do you think that Brad would give a person a ride if he were not at work?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

never

always

*6. Brad's behavior is

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

Highly consistent
(free of situational
influence)

Variable depending
on the situation

*Items used in the discriminative facility Likert scale.

Scott Negative Items

*1. The main reason behind Scott cheating on the homework was

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

*2. The main reason behind Scott leaving the lab without telling the lab assistant of the problem was

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

3. The main reason behind Scott working hard

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

*4.Do you think that Scott would cheat in other classes?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

never

always

*5. Do you think that Scott would help someone if asked?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

never

always

6. Scott's behavior is

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Highly consistent
(free of situational
influence)

Variable depending
on the situation

*Items used in the discriminative facility Likert scale.

Scott Positive Items

*1. The main reason behind Scott helping the lab assistant with the computer problem was

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

2. The main reason behind Scott asking for help

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

*3. The main reason behind Scott working hard was

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

He is that kind
of person

something about
the situation

4. Do you think that Scott would work hard in other classes?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

never

always

*5. Do you think that Scott would help someone if asked?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

never

always

*6. Scott's behavior is

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Highly consistent
(free of situational
influence)

Variable depending
on the situation

*Items used in the discriminative facility Likert scale.

Appendix D
Impression Ratings

Use the following scale to respond to items below.

1	2	3
not at all	**moderately**	**extremely**

1. How friendly does **Brad** appear to you?
2. How likable does **Brad** appear to you?
3. Do you believe **Brad** cared about others?
4. Do you believe **Brad** worked hard?

Place an "x" in the box that represents your judgment about **BRAD**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
BAD						GOOD

Place an "x" in the box that represents your judgment about **BRAD**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
NEGATIVE						POSITIVE

1. How friendly does **Scott** appear to you?
2. How likable does **Scott** appear to you?
3. Do you believe **Scott** cared about others?
4. Do you believe **Scott** worked hard?

Place an "x" in the box that represents your judgment about **SCOTT**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
BAD						GOOD

Place an "x" in the box that represents your judgment about **SCOTT**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
NEGATIVE						POSITIVE

Appendix E
Quality of Social Interactions

1. Please take a moment and recall the most recent instance in which you interacted with **your professor** alone and face-to-face for more than 15 minutes.

	"no"	"to some extent"	"yes"
Do you feel that you attained your personal goal in the interaction?	1	2	3

After the interaction, rate the quality of your relationship.	"got worse"	"remained the same"	"got better"
	1	2	3

2. Please take a moment and recall the most recent instance in which you interacted with **your parent** alone and face-to-face for more than 15 minutes.

	"no"	"to some extent"	"yes"
Do you feel that you attained your personal goal in the interaction?	1	2	3

After the interaction, rate the quality of your relationship.	"got worse"	"remained the same"	"got better"
	1	2	3

3. Please take a moment and recall the most recent instance in which you interacted with **a close friend** alone and face-to-face for more than 15 minutes.

	"no"	"to some extent"	"yes"
Do you feel that you attained your personal goal in the interaction?	1	2	3

After the interaction, rate the quality of your relationship.	"got worse"	"remained the same"	"got better"
	1	2	3

4. Please take a moment and recall the most recent instance in which you interacted with **a person you dislike** alone and face-to-face for more than 15 minutes.

	"no"	"to some extent"	"yes"
Do you feel that you attained your personal goal in the interaction?	1	2	3

After the interaction, rate the quality of your relationship.	"got worse"	"remained the same"	"got better"
	1	2	3

Appendix F

Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Routine Activities-Friends

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to have a routine night out with your friends.*

Example: You and your friends haven't gone out for a night on the town in some time and you want to persuade them into going with you this Friday evening.

	Strongly agree					Strongly disagree
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

_____ I'd put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to persuade him/her. I'd get him/her in the right 'frame of mind' before asking. (*Positive Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work something out. (*Compromise*)

_____ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I'd act sad, hurt, and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. (*Negative Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to agree with my request. (*Rationality*)

_____ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along with my request. (*Coercion*)

_____ I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (*Referent Appeal*)

_____ I probably wouldn't do anything about persuading the person(s) in this situation. I'd drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around. (*Avoidance*).

Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Bureaucracy

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to persuade a person in authority or in a bureaucracy to do something.*

Example: On a recent trip back to school from vacation, you are going "about" 60 mph when you are stopped by a police officer for speeding. You want to persuade the officer not to give you a ticket.

<div align="center">

Strongly   Strongly
agree   disagree
1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

_____ I'd put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to persuade him/her. I'd get him/her in the right 'frame of mind' before asking. (*Positive Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work something out. (*Compromise*)

_____ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I'd act sad, hurt, and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. (*Negative Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to agree with my request. (*Rationality*)

_____ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along with my request. (*Coercion*)

_____ I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (*Referent Appeal*)

_____ I probably wouldn't do anything about persuading the person(s) in this situation. I'd drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around. (*Avoidance*).

Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Advice Giving-Friend

Please imagine the following situation: You are giving advice to someone about whom you care.

Example: A close friend of yours at college has been spending a good deal of time on his/her nonacademic activities and has neglected his/her grades. You want to persuade him/her to study more and generally speaking, to set some career goals.

Strongly agree					Strongly disagree	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

_____ I'd put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to persuade him/her. I'd get him/her in the right 'frame of mind' before asking. (*Positive Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work something out. (*Compromise*)

_____ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I'd act sad, hurt, and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. (*Negative Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to agree with my request. (*Rationality*)

_____ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along with my request. (*Coercion*)

_____ I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (*Referent Appeal*)

_____ I probably wouldn't do anything about persuading the person(s) in this situation. I'd drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around. (*Avoidance*).

Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Relational De-escalation

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to break off a dating relationship with a person that you have dated for a few months.*

Example: While you first liked the dating a particular person, you now realize that the two of you really do not have a lot in common. You want to persuade him/her that you only want to be friends, nothing more.

<center>

Strongly   Strongly

agree   disagree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

</center>

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

_____ I'd put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to persuade him/her. I'd get him/her in the right 'frame of mind' before asking. (*Positive Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work something out. (*Compromise*)

_____ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I'd act sad, hurt, and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. (*Negative Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to agree with my request. (*Rationality*)

_____ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along with my request. (*Coercion*)

_____ I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (*Referent Appeal*)

_____ I probably wouldn't do anything about persuading the person(s) in this situation. I'd drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around. (*Avoidance*).

Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Assistance-Acquaintance

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to persuade an acquaintance to help you do something.*

Example: You find that the math homework you need to have for class each period absorbs a good deal of your time—time that you really do not have since you started working three days a week. You want to persuade someone you know in class to help you with the homework.

<div align="center">

Strongly   Strongly

agree   disagree

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

_____ I'd put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to persuade him/her. I'd get him/her in the right 'frame of mind' before asking. (*Positive Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work something out. (*Compromise*)

_____ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I'd act sad, hurt, and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. (*Negative Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to agree with my request. (*Rationality*)

_____ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along with my request. (*Coercion*)

_____ I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (*Referent Appeal*)

_____ I probably wouldn't do anything about persuading the person(s) in this situation. I'd drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around. (*Avoidance*).

Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Obligation

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to persuade a person to fulfill his/her obligation to you.*

Example: You have lived in your apartment complex for some months. One Saturday evening you wake up late and find the kitchen plumbing dripping very badly. You want to persuade the landlord to fix the plumbing promptly.

<div align="center">

Strongly   Strongly
agree   disagree
1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

_____ I'd put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to persuade him/her. I'd get him/her in the right 'frame of mind' before asking. (*Positive Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work something out. (*Compromise*)

_____ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I'd act sad, hurt, and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. (*Negative Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to agree with my request. (*Rationality*)

_____ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along with my request. (*Coercion*)

_____ I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (*Referent Appeal*)

_____ I probably wouldn't do anything about persuading the person(s) in this situation. I'd drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around. (*Avoidance*).

Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Relational Initiations

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to initiate a relationship with a person of the opposite sex or to increase the intimacy in a relationship.*

Example: There is a person of the opposite sex in your Mass Communication class whom you would like to know better. You run into him/her after class and start a conversation. You want to persuade him/her to get together again and get to know each other.

Strongly agree					Strongly disagree	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

_____ I'd put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to persuade him/her. I'd get him/her in the right 'frame of mind' before asking. (*Positive Manipulation of Feelings*)

_____ I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work something out. (*Compromise*)

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_____ I probably wouldn't do anything about persuading the person(s) in this situation. I'd drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around. (*Avoidance*).

Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Gain Assistance-Professor

Please imagine the following situation: *You want a professor to do you a special favor.*

Example: You find that one of the classes you desperately need to enroll in has been closed out. You want to persuade the professor into letting you enroll in this class.

<div align="center">

Strongly   Strongly
agree   disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

</div>

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

_____ I'd put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to persuade him/her. I'd get him/her in the right 'frame of mind' before asking. (*Positive Manipulation of Feelings*)

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_____ I probably wouldn't do anything about persuading the person(s) in this situation. I'd drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around. (*Avoidance*).

Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Third Person

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to persuade an acquaintance to help a third party.*

Example: You believe that a friend of yours is drinking (alcoholic beverages) too much and you also believe that the drinking problem has become quite apparent to many people over the last several weeks. You want to persuade this person's closest friend to talk about the problem with him/her that he/she might stop drinking.

Strongly					Strongly	
agree					disagree	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Advice Giving-Parents

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to give advice to your parents about some long-term goal of theirs.*

Example: On a visit home recently you see that your father looks tired and overworked. You want to persuade him to take off from work and find something relaxing to do.

Strongly agree						Strongly disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Relational Escalation

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to include someone special to you into your social world by including him/her in activities with your friends and family.*

Example: You have dated your boyfriend/girlfriend for some time and the two of you really get along well. You want to persuade him/her into coming home for the weekend to meet your relatives.

<div align="center">

Strongly   Strongly
agree   disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

</div>

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Annoyances

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to persuade someone from engaging in an annoying habit.*

Example: Your neighbor frequently has friends over small parties. Usually, about 10:30 or 11:00 at night someone will turn on the stereo, and it will get louder as the guests get louder. You want to persuade your neighbor to keep the noise down when it gets late.

Strongly   Strongly
agree   disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Assistance/Stranger

Please imagine the following situation: *You want a stranger to do a special favor for you.*

Example: For a social science class that you are taking, you (and your group members) need to have a group of students participate in your experiment. The project counts as a large percentage of your grade. You want to persuade a group of people in the cafeteria to participate in your project.

<div align="center">

Strongly   Strongly
agree   disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

</div>

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use each of the following strategies for the given situation.

Assistance/Permission-Parents

Please imagine the following situation: *You want to gain permission from your parents to do something.*

Example: You want to persuade your parents to send (or loan) you more money for college.

<div align="center">

Strongly   Strongly

agree   disagree

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

_____ Without going into details, I'd simply ask, 'Can you do it?' I wouldn't feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (*Direct Request*)

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