

THE POLITICAL EFFECT OF
MILITARY INTEGRATION ON NATO

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PREFACE

A study of the problems confronting the United States alliance systems is important because of the security value Americans have placed upon their allies. The security of the United States, to a large degree, is directly related to the dependence the Americans have placed upon their allies. Problems within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are of such a consequence that the effectiveness of the alliance is now in jeopardy; perhaps the alliance will lose its force because of the failure of the members to reconcile their differences. It is my belief that the United States, to insure the continuance of NATO, will have to adjust its policies to meet many of the problems that exist among alliance members.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1949 Western Europe was economically and militarily prostrate, but its potentiality for economic reconstruction and military development was readily apparent. Because the United States had emerged from the recent war with a strong economy and an unchallenged nuclear capability, Western Europe had to depend upon her for much economic and military assistance and support. This dependence elevated the United States to a dominant position in European affairs. Under the leadership of the United States, Western Europe and America joined in an alliance under the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949.

On the basis of this treaty the signatory nations, upon the urgings of the United States, worked toward the creation of a military deterrent¹ in the form of a tightly integrated multinational military establishment characterized by an efficient unity of command. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the embodiment of this design.

The United States has remained the principal force in the Organization, providing most of the top leadership and supplying a substantial amount of men and equipment. However, the United States has also been

¹Deterrent force can be defined as military forces, the purpose of which is to dissuade a government from committing a hostile act (in the eyes of the deterring states) by virtue of its fear of the consequences of military counteraction. Although a deterrent force's primary function is to deter, should it fail in that task, then its function becomes one of fighting.

one of the beneficiaries of NATO accomplishments since the alliance has constituted a vital deterrent to any aggression against one or all of its members, including the United States. Viewed by the United States, NATO, as structured in the early 1950s, continues to serve that role. It is for this reason that the United States government insists that the organization not be modified. President Johnson recently expressed the commitment in these words:

For nearly two decades this Alliance has assured the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. It has greatly reinforced stability throughout the world.

The Alliance, in our view, reflects two important propositions. The first is that if war should come to the Atlantic area we must fight together--and fight effectively. The second is that if we act together for the common interest during peace war will not come.²

While the United States continues to value the Organization, Western European members have grown restless with it. They are not as strongly influenced by the policies of the United States today as they were in 1949. For several reasons their attitudes toward the United States' leadership in NATO have changed. In the first place, postwar economic recovery has made Western Europe virtually independent of the United States, economically. This recovery has contributed to Western Europe's political independence. Next, the development of effective Soviet nuclear forces has cast a large shadow of doubt on the credibility of American retaliation in response to possible Soviet aggression in Western Europe. Further, the shift of Soviet policy from the postwar Stalinist challenge to a less tense policy of "peaceful coexistence" has caused Western Europeans to ponder whether NATO is as vital as it once was.

²Lyndon Johnson, "President Johnson's Reply to President de Gaulle (23 March)," NATO Letter, Vol. 14, No. 5 (May, 1966), p. 22.

Complaints concerning NATO's potentiality and possible lack of effectiveness have frequently been voiced. France, by its actions over a period of years, has expressed its dissatisfaction with it and recently took steps to remove itself from the integrated features of the alliance.

These events have confronted the United States with the reality that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is in severe difficulty. General Lauris Norstad, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, expressed the problem facing NATO and the United States in this manner: "But now we have clearly moved from disarray to dissension to crisis. Let me emphasize that this is a crisis."³ How did the alliance reach this "crisis" stage? What role did the United States play that such conditions within NATO should exist?

It is one of the assumptions of this study that the United States and the Soviet Union, because of their global interests, will continually be confronted with threats to their vital interests vis-a-vis each other to the point of necessitating the maintenance of an adequate deterrent force by both countries. It is further assumed that the United States would possess a more favorable deterrent factor if it could maintain a formal military alignment with its current European allies than without them.

On the basis of these assumptions it is the hypothesis of this study that United States policies have required a tight military integration of military forces within NATO, and that this integration has resulted in the breakdown of formal military coordination among its members. The

³General Lauris Norstad, USAF, Ret., "The Crisis in NATO", Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (May 25, 1966), p. 222.

United States during the formative years of NATO insisted upon the development of a tightly integrated military organization and, because of its predominance of power, assumed almost all the major command positions. The United States enjoyed nearly absolute decision-making authority within the entire alliance. Western European states initially, because of their dependency upon the United States, accepted these conditions. Subsequently, political leaders in Western Europe became suspicious of the structures of NATO because the concept of military integration violated their sensitivity over national sovereignty; because they were fearful that an alliance so structured would not meet their security needs; and finally because such an organization interfered with policies that they desired to pursue toward the Soviet Union and other nations. United States refusal to adjust to these changing conditions led to the recent withdrawal of the French from NATO; this withdrawal has resulted in a serious breakdown of the NATO deterrent. This study will give considerable attention to France's withdrawal from NATO in order to observe the impact of military integration on the alliance.

The methodology employed in preparing this study has been descriptive and explanatory. Documentary sources of the United States government have contributed to vital data. Periodicals, pertinent journals, and news reports have added to the factual data required. Public statements, as recorded in varied sources, of governmental leaders provided guidelines to the official policies proposed and adopted by the different member-states of NATO.

A review of the literature pertaining to the problems confronting NATO did not disclose any previous work that focused primarily upon the political impact of military integration on NATO. Numerous sources deal,

in somewhat superficial manner, with some of the disadvantages of military integration or with a specific aspect of military integration and its consequences. The best work found in this area because of its analytical insight in relating NATO integration to subsequent political problem was by Robert Osgood.⁴

Chapter II deals with the commitment of the United States to Western Europe following World War II. It also focuses upon the conditions existing in Europe during the immediate postwar years that were instrumental in the development of a tightly integrated military system in NATO.

Chapter III is concerned primarily with an analysis of the military organization that evolved within NATO. Data reveals that the United States was instrumental in the structuring of the alliance organization. The high degree of military integration that was achieved became inconsistent with traditional Western European concepts of sovereignty. The German case, while a special problem, illustrates this inconsistency vividly.

In Chapter IV the impact of the United States' directed military integration upon the actions of allied states is analyzed. France is of particular importance in this chapter because her withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO has resulted in a disruption of military coordination of the North Atlantic community. German response to the military organization of NATO is also considered.

Chapter V contains the conclusions drawn from the evidence presented.

⁴Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, 1962).

CHAPTER II

THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO WESTERN EUROPE

To view the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the proper perspective of 1967 it is essential to view the world, and most especially the Western European scene, of 1949. In that immediate postwar period, where was Europe going, what were her plans, and with what resources were those plans to be accomplished? What and how were the thoughts of her leaders to be transformed into realizable goals; to what degree could her aspirations be fulfilled or frustrated; who were her friends and who were her enemies? These were but a small fraction of the myriad of questions the world was asking of Europe and she was asking of herself in 1949.

The Europe of 1949 did not have to resort to the history books or to the vagueness of a grandfather's memory to recall the horrors of war. Bomb rubble instead of houses, an economy that could not provide the minimum subsistence for a major share of its citizenry, political instability that threatened to topple governments, rampant disease and malnutrition--this was Europe of the late forties. Yet, in this degenerate environment, there was generated an alliance that called for a massive effort of economic and military reconstruction. In a few years, though not without frustration for the United States, a remarkable recovery was achieved in Europe.

American Interest in Europe

One of the factors that contributed to the recovery of postwar Western Europe was the continuation of American wartime interests in Europe. The United States had come to realize that her security was dependent upon a stable and prosperous Western Europe. William C. Foster expressed this interest in such a manner: "The national security of the United States is closely linked to the stability and progress of Western Europe. Indeed, neither can be strong without the other."¹

There are at least three reasons why the United States is linked more closely to Europe than to any other area of the world. Economically Europe and the United States form a complimentary trading area. It is from Europe that the United States is able to trace its cultural roots-- language, religion, and the political philosophy of the United States had their origins in Europe. As evidenced by American participation on European battlefields twice this century, it is reasonable to deduce that American security is tied directly to the affairs of Europe.

The combination of the United States-European industrial areas creates a military potential without equal in the world. It is this capacity, actual and potential, that excites the interests of the United States. Since the war, all of the American aid and defense programs directed toward Western Europe have been oriented primarily to security interests. The United States has attempted by its leadership and assistance to draw the nations of Western Europe within its military camp. Had this failed, a secondary goal was to deny the Soviet Union the use of the

¹William C. Foster, Forward to NATO and the Future of Europe by Ben T. Moore (New York, 1958), p. vii.

resources of these countries to augment its position of power.

American participation in both World Wars in Europe gives evidence to the premise that its security does not stop at the ocean's edge. The United States has realized for many years that its security is interwoven with that of the Europeans. Should a hostile state dominate Europe, given its power potential and modern military technology, then the United States' security would be in question. The presence of hundreds of thousands of American military personnel stationed on European soil continuously since June 6, 1944 (D-Day) gives testimony to the fact that the United States' interests in Europe are far-reaching. American foreign policy has reflected a need in Western Europe for military cooperation. This need has been of a continuing nature to the present time. The present-day anti-air defense complex of the United States is predicated to a large extent upon European geography and cooperation;² a segment of the American early warning system used to warn against ballistic missile attacks is located in Great Britain.

Economically, culturally, and militarily the United States has an interest in Europe and its affairs. Further advances in technology possibly will bring America and Europe closer together; modern transportation and communication may make it possible for Americans to accentuate previous European contacts and interests.

Postwar Soviet-American Conflict

The United States, prior to World War II, was fearful of a powerful

²Robert S. McNamara "McNamara's Defense Statement", Survival, Vol. 8, No. 5 (May, 1966), p. 145.

and dominant Germany in Europe. Following the war, it became suspicious of the Soviet Union, whose military position, if unchallenged, might lead to Soviet domination of Europe. It had been hoped by United States leadership that postwar conflicts might be settled within the United Nation's structure. This approach to solving international problems required "Big Power" cooperation which President Roosevelt was confident could be realized. Ronald Steele has expressed this hope and confidence in this way:

Through the United Nations Roosevelt hoped to turn Wilson's thwarted vision of world order into a pragmatic design that would guarantee the peace.... With each of the powers (Russia, Britain, and China) attending to its own interests, the United States whose global claims overlapped them all and whose influence over Britain and China was unquestioned, would be the deciding force in the world balance, enforcing peace through a world law directed by the United Nations. It was the blueprint for the American Century.³

Others in positions of authority were not so optimistic about American-Soviet cooperation after the war. Some American officials were of the opinion that the national interests of the Soviet Union were of such an order that there would be inevitable conflict.⁴

The first issue to give difficulty to the concept of "enforcing peace through world law" was the Soviet Union's refusal to honor the

³Ronald Steele, The End of Alliance: American and the Future of Europe, (New York, 1964), pp. 22-23.

⁴With the retrospective wisdom of hindsight it is a simple matter to state unequivocally what the Soviet Union was or was not going to do, but some during World War II viewed a victorious Soviet Union with alarm. Quoting in a memorandum authored by W. C. Bullitt, first American ambassador to the Soviet Union, "Stalin is not a Duke of Norfolk but a Caucasian bandit whose only thought when he got something for nothing was that the other fellow was an ass, and that Stalin believed in the Communist creed which calls for conquest of the world for Communism." Quoted in Marshall Knappen, An Introduction to American Foreign Policy (New York, 1956), p. 245.

United Nations' request to remove Soviet troops from Iran in 1946. It had been agreed by the American, British, and Soviet leaders at Potsdam Conference "...that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Teheran, and that further stages of withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered...".⁵ When the Soviets failed to withdraw their troops within the specified time, the Iranians pleaded their cause before the United Nations. In attempting and failing to postpone discussion on Iran, the Soviet delegation walked out of the Security Council meeting.⁶ This first walkout of many to follow indicated that the Soviet Union would thwart other issues within the United Nations in similar fashion if it served its national interests.

Coupled with the veto, the walkout technique served notice that the United Nations was not going to be the exclusive arena in which the differences of nations were to be settled. If nations had intended to depend upon the aegis of the United Nations for their security, they were vividly shown in March 1946 that, even on relatively minor points, the Soviet Union had no intention of allowing an international organization to dictate national policy to it. Should definitive measures be required, little or no assistance could be expected from the United Nations in opposing the independent actions of its members. These Soviet actions served to prove to many that the United Nations in theory and practice

⁵Article XV, "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Potsdam Conference", August 1945. Source: "The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)", Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, Government Printing Office (Washington, 1960), p. 1460.

⁶Although defying the immediate request of the United Nations withdrawn its troops from Iran, the Soviet Union did comply with the request some two months after the originally agreed upon date.

was not going to be the panacea of the international ills of member nations.

When the United States in 1946 proposed "...the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy",⁷ the world probably stood at the threshold of international control of nuclear technology. However, the Soviet Union refused to accept such controls because of its desire for independent nuclear development which would be fruitful in the near future.⁸ The Soviet Union had little, if anything, to gain by pooling its atomic resources and knowledge within an international agency controlled by the West.

This refusal on the part of the Soviets, however, did much to suggest that the Soviet Union was not willing at that time to submit to its wartime declaration to "...confer and cooperate...to bring a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the postwar period".⁹

A number of the Soviet actions following World War II were considered by American leaders to be in conflict with United States interests. The exercise of the veto, the "walkout" in the United Nations, and the refusal to accept international controls of nuclear technology generated

⁷Excerpt from a speech by Bernard Baruch before the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, New York, June 14, 1946. Quoted in Alexander Baltzly and A. William Salome, eds. Readings in Twentieth-Century European History, (New York, 1950), p. 593.

⁸Three months later the first Soviet atomic explosion was announced by President Truman on September 23, 1949.

⁹Article VII, Four-Power Declaration of General Security, signed in Moscow, November 1, 1943 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China.

feelings of frustration and apprehensiveness on the part of Americans and Western Europeans. Another source of apprehension, especially for Western Europe, was the Soviet disregard of the Yalta Agreement as interpreted by the West regarding free elections for the people "...liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the former Axis satellite states of Europe".¹⁰ Though each case is unique in itself, the countries of Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania have not had the elections the Western powers thought they had agreed to at Yalta because of the Soviet Union's interference.¹¹ Czechoslovakia was added to the list of countries in February 1948 when a Communist government was installed. The incorporation of the Eastern European countries into the Soviet sphere concerned the United States because this action was considered to pose a threat to the security of Western Europe.

The Soviet Union further aggravated Western fears by establishing the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947. During the height of American-Soviet wartime cooperation (May, 1943) a similar organization, the Comintern, was dissolved. The explanation offered by the Executive Committee of the Third International for its dissolution was that "...in the countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition the sacred duty of the widest masses of the people...consists in aiding by every means the military efforts of the governments of these countries aimed at the

¹⁰In the Yalta Agreements (February 4-11, 1945) signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, it was agreed that the liberated peoples of Europe were to be allowed "...to create democratic institutions of their own choice..." and to participate in "...free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people."

¹¹Walter Consuelo Langsam, The World Since 1919 (New York, 1954), pp. 662-63.

speediest defeat of the Hitlerite bloc."¹² At a meeting in Warsaw in 1947, attended by European Communist leaders, the Communist Information Bureau was organized along lines similar to the Comintern. In their first official proclamation, the Communist officials reinstated their earlier doctrines of 1919-1943 by stating that "...two opposite political lines have crystallized: on the one extreme the USSR and the democratic countries aim at whittling down imperialism...on the other side the United States of America and England aim at the strengthening of imperialism".¹³ In ideological terms the Communists drew a sharp distinction between the Soviet world and the West.

United States Involvement in Postwar Europe

At war's end the United States was financing a sorely-needed agency to assist Europe in postwar recovery and reconstruction. This agency, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), was devised to help the victorious allies by providing them with emergency welfare assistance and assisting in the re-establishment of their economies. As an emergency stopgap measure, it enjoyed a large degree of success. By 1947 the financial grants from the United States to UNRRA totaled \$2.7 billion.¹⁴

The United States also felt compelled to respond to the pressures applied by the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean area. Under this Soviet pressure, it was feared that Turkey might yield to demands for a Soviet

¹²Quoted in Langsam, op. cit., p. 597.

¹³Quoted in Baltzly and Salome, op. cit., p. 598.

¹⁴Knappen, op. cit., p. 386.

foothold in the Dardanelles. Greece also was subject to pressure. The Greek communists instigated an insurrection against the newly established Greek government and, using neighboring satellite states as bases for operations, the rebels enjoyed a moderate degree of military success. Greek appeals for an appointment of an impartial investigative body from the United Nations were met by a Soviet veto. Coupled with the inability of gaining any assistance from the United Nations, came an announcement from the British in February, 1947, that they could no longer continue to support or give aid to Greece or Turkey.

Speaking before a joint session of Congress, President Truman requested what was then considered an astronomical sum, 400 millions, "...to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures".¹⁵ These sums were to be used to assist Greece and Turkey. This speech marked a major change in American foreign policy as it recommended direct involvement in European affairs. The United Nations was relegated to a secondary position by the American people when Congress overwhelmingly approved President Truman's program, which came to be known as the "Truman Doctrine".

The need for American involvement in the European economic sphere did not stop in 1947; Western Europe was not able to rebuild with limited financial gifts and relatively small loans. The Americans had to become more deeply involved in the internal problems of the European nations if any measure of success was to be forthcoming. Within

¹⁵"Recommendations on Greece and Turkey", Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16 (March 23, 1947), p. 534.

knowledgeable circles,¹⁶ a European economic collapse was considered inevitable if much more American aid were not provided. Such a collapse would suggest the validity of communist propaganda that capitalism was dying; but of more serious consequences to the United States, an economic chaotic situation would be extremely fertile ground for European communist political parties to exploit or an invitation for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in Western Europe.

A major involvement was called for and proposals for such were made within Congress. To thwart Soviet influence and to assist Europe in a meaningful recovery program, President Truman requested \$17 billion dollars from Congress to aid Europe over a four-year period.¹⁷ Since these sums would require tax money from the majority of the Americans, the use of these dollars would have to be justified to the American public. The mood for explaining this massive American involvement had been set by Secretary of State Marshall in an address at Cambridge in June, 1947 when he stated: "Political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States".¹⁸ A few months later the President, in an address to Congress, pointed out the American interest and justification for European involvement when he said: "The next few

¹⁶During this period, the Administration (Democratic) and the leaders of Congress (notably Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg) became involved in an active instructional campaign to inform the American people of the seriousness of the Soviet threat.

¹⁷Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (Evanston, Illinois and Elmsford, New York, 1960), p. 228.

¹⁸"European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery", Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16 (June 15, 1947), p. 1160.

years can determine whether the free countries of Europe will be able to preserve their heritage of freedom.../Events/ might well compel us to modify our own economic system and to forego, for the sake of our own security, (emphasis mine), the enjoyment of many of our freedoms and privileges".¹⁹

Senator Vandenberg and other internationally-minded Congressmen supported this program which was known as the Marshall Plan. This plan, which initially provided for an all-European economic recovery program, became limited in scope with the refusal of Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union to participate. After the Czechoslovakian coup, both Czechoslovakia and Poland refused to be recipients of Marshall Plan assistance. Thus an economic plan became, in effect, a device for strengthening the political barriers that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. In time the Marshall Plan became the frame of reference for future American aid programs that developed into "military assistance" and "defense support" programs.

Within a month of the Czechoslovakian coup and with the active encouragement of the United States the Western Europeans reacted in a positive manner to past Soviet actions and possible future intentions.²⁰ In recognition of these Soviet actions and their own individual military weaknesses, five European nations--Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands--joined into an alliance that was intended to

¹⁹"A Program for United States Aid to European Recovery", Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 17 (December 18, 1947), p. 1234.

²⁰Crabb, op. cit., p. 239.

last for fifty years. Commonly referred to as the Brussels Treaty,²¹ it made provision for the establishment of a joint military organization, Uniforce, which was initially commanded by Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery. As shown by President Truman's comments regarding the Brussels Treaty, it was evident that the United States was in accord with Europe's desire to protect its security by military means:

This development [Brussels Treaty] deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them do so.²²

Too meager in resources and plagued with internal problems, this treaty was not enough to effectively oppose a Soviet menace, but it did express a clear understanding on the part of the states of Western Europe that their survival depended upon military cooperation with each other and with the United States. This alliance was the forerunner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

To effect the coalescence of Europeans, traditionally distrustful of one another, to mold the war-weary Americans to accept an entangling alliance with Europe, to force a radical change in American foreign policy, and to commit American military units to Europe in peace probably would have been an almost impossible task except for one occurrence--the Berlin blockade. The Berlin blockade, with its possible consequences of starving two million Germans, focused the world's attention upon the extremes that the Soviets were willing to use in order to achieve its aim.

²¹Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense signed in Brussels in March, 1948.

²²Quoted in M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (New York, 1959), p. 11.

"Mass democracies must be conditioned to support necessary but unpopular measures by a step-at-a-time process."²³ Many steps had already been taken by the Americans in assisting the Europeans--relief, loans, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. Now it was obvious to a great many Americans that more was required.

Goaded by the Soviet blockade of Berlin, prompted by the economic weakness of what remained of Europe and her inability to defend herself, the United States in 1948 began to throw her entire weight behind an effort to put Atlantic organization on a firm footing.²⁴

Soon the United States would "throw her entire weight" into military commitments that have lasted to the present time.

Less than three months after the Soviets imposed their blockade on Berlin, a proposal was adopted by the Senate to provide for the "...development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense...".²⁵ One year later, the Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As written by the Persian poet, Omar Khayyam:

The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
 Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor wit
 Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
 Nor all thy tears wash out a Word of it.²⁶

For the Americans, there was no turning back--the responsibility of leadership was theirs. The Americans were on their way to becoming one of

²³Knappen, op. cit., p. 346.

²⁴Frank Munk, Atlantic Dilemma: Partnership or Community (Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1964), pp. 8-9.

²⁵Part of the Vandenberg Resolution which was presented to the Senate by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg in June 1948. The Resolution passed by a vote of 64-6.

²⁶Omar Khayyam, Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, Edward Fitzgerald, tr. (New York, 1946), p. 32.

the two primary decision-makers of the world. Now, by design or default, the United States was to pursue actively a policy of "containment".²⁷

²⁷The term "containment" is primarily military in connotation and is used to describe operations for holding the enemy within a given area. It achieved its diplomatic respectability when an American career diplomat supplied the label for the Truman Doctrine by writing, "In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies". See George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951), p. 119.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY INTEGRATION WITHIN NATO

In planning any military activity, whether it is offensive or defensive, the systematic use of men, equipment, and strategy is of primary importance. Military commanders function on the premise that the greater the coordination of these vital elements in the combat situation, the greater the likelihood of military success. In developing a deterrent to a possible aggressor, those involved with the planning must be concerned with the prospects of success in battle should the deterrence fail. If battlefield success is unlikely, the deterrent value of military forces-in-being or potentially available is negligible.

The United States, in planning the development of a deterrent to possible Soviet aggression in Western Europe, was concerned with the creation of a tightly integrated and well-equipped military force in NATO comprised of men from the various allied countries, using standardized equipment, and functioning on the basis of a common strategy. Because of the preponderance of United States power on the immediate post-war European scene, the United States was able to control all three of the vital elements of the new multinational military force: to an overwhelming degree the United States commanded the men of NATO; it controlled the weapons of NATO; and it determined the vital strategy. Control of all three factors came through the process of military integration.

The Organization of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being primarily to meet the security needs of like-minded nations.¹ The impetus for the creation of such a traditional alliance was, in the words of Henry Kissinger:

(1) To provide an accretion of power.... The wider the alliance, the greater its power to resist aggression. (2) To leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. (3) To transform a tacit interest in mutual assistance into a formal obligation.²

The Treaty of 1949 did provide for an "accretion of power" on a wide base. Extending from the western shore of the Northern Hemisphere to the heart of continental Europe, the base included two of the three major industrial areas of the world. The Treaty document formalized an already existing "alignment of forces" between North America and Western Europe. The Treaty encompassed all of Kissinger's basic reasons for the creation of a traditional alliance. Treaty members formally stated a common interest in resisting the Soviet Union should a member's territorial integrity be impinged directly. As stated by Mrogothau:

Common interests are the rocks on which all alliances are built. Yet upon this rock all kinds of structures may be erected...there are good and bad alliances, some that work smoothly and are enthusiastically supported, others that are cumbersome and are grudgingly accepted as a lesser evil. While the existence of an alliance depends upon a community of interests, its quality is determined by the manner in which common interests are translated into concrete policies

¹The original signatories were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the United States. Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty in 1952, and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955.

²Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York, London, Toronto, 1965), p. 11.

and day-to-day measures.³

Since the signing of the Treaty nearly eighteen years ago a complex organization has evolved. The original "rock of the structure" was to be a defensive alliance "designed primarily to deter a military attack upon Western Europe and to provide mutual support to members in case an attack should occur either in Europe or North America".⁴ By definition, it could be surmised that the North Atlantic Treaty was similar in form and substance to many other alliances that preceded it in history. However, there were those who viewed this Treaty with much deeper significance; they had an almost mesmeric devotion to the principles of federation or supranationalism. Some viewed it as more than a "...defensive alliance, born of the need of the moment...it is also the core of a more profound historical reality: the share destiny of the West which, in essence and mission, forms a single civilization".⁵ Others with a more pragmatic bent towards supranationalistic organizations believed that, "...NATO possesses a potential for integration that could become the basis for a future community" and because of a "...common humanistic heritage"⁶ its member-states could develop common economic, political, and military policies to the point of submerging their national sovereignty. Today, some visualize that "...the members of NATO are moving

³Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice", Alliance Policy in Cold War, Arnold Wolfers, ed. (Baltimore, 1959), pp. 197-198.

⁴Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance (New York, London, 1964), p. 197.

⁵Prince Hubertus Zu Lowenstein and Volkmar von Zuhlsdorff, NATO and the Defense of the West, Edward Fitzgerald, tr. (New York, 1962), p. 3.

⁶Kurt Birrenbach, The Future of the Atlantic Community (New York, London, 1963), p. 3.

toward a closer union, a confederation, a commonwealth..."⁷ which could ultimately result in a United States of Europe. One source believed that this feeling of oneness has permeated NATO fighting forces by stating:

...these fighting forces from many countries now possess a common political will /that/ distinguishes NATO from most alliances of the past. NATO is more than a military alliance of expediency; it is united by a common outlook which reaches from the top echelons to the youngest recruit.⁸

A cursory review of the treaty articles might lead one to conclude that the signatories intended that the treaty go beyond the scope of other "traditional" military alliances. The preamble of the treaty mentions "liberty, rule of law, and well-being" before "collective defense, peace, and security". (See Appendix). One of the treaty provisions, Article 2, seems to have more than military implications with its concept of encouraging "...economic collaboration between any or all of them". Was it the intention of the original membership to develop something more than a military alliance? No so, according to Robertson, who gives little weight to these "airy generalities", because "...it has become fashionable to wrap up the military provisions of a treaty in expressions of good intentions of this sort".⁹

In recognition of the democratic parliaments of the member-states, the military clause¹⁰ contained a provision that, if "...an armed attack

⁷Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, op. cit., p. 4.

⁸Ibid., p. 76.

⁹A. H. Robertson, European Institutions, Co-operation: Integration: Unification (New York, 1959), p. 90. The author develops the point further by emphasizing NATO's unbalanced (political) membership prevents it from being considered a "community".

¹⁰Article 5, see Appendix.

occurs, each of them...will assist...by taking...such action as it deems necessary, including the use of force". Although military response from allies to a member under attack is not automatic, the Organization has so evolved that this aspect has become one of NATO's major problems. The other articles pertain to the scope of treaty limitations; i.e., geographical delination, recognition of United Nations responsibilities, future membership, ratification procedure, and time specifications.

The implementation of the treaty was provided for in Article 9 which authorized the establishment of a Council: (1) to consider matters concerning implementation; (2) to be so organized as to be able to meet promptly; (3) to set up subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; (4) to establish a defense committee. On the surface it is possible to visualize that "...NATO is a intergovernmental organization in the traditional style"¹¹ without much variance from most of the alliances of the past. Viewed only from the wording of the treaty articles this appears to be so except for the implementation procedures and results therefrom.

It will be observed that the North Atlantic Treaty is extremely laconic about the international machinery which was to be set up to give effect to its provisions.... Nothing is said about the many other committees, both military and civil, which were later found necessary, nor about an international staff or combined military forces under a joint command. All this was left for the future....¹²

It is at this point in the development of NATO that this study will focus as the genesis of the major problems confronting NATO today.

In September 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty members began to form the Organization. The main organs were created during the first four

¹¹Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., p. 25.

¹²Robertson, op. cit., p. 83.

meetings of a Council which, after nine months of negotiations, decided its own composition to be the Foreign Ministers of the member states who were to meet once annually except during a crisis or actual aggression.¹³ Within the Council, NATO is an inter-governmental organization. Council decisions concerning NATO are technically based on the rule of unanimity recognizing the concept of legal equality among states. However, real decision-making authority rests primarily with the four major states as is suggested by Cottrell and Dougherty:

Undoubtedly the four major allies (United States, Britain, France and West Germany) carry a great deal more political weight than, say, Iceland or Luxemburg. But, unlike the Charter of the United Nations...the NATO Treaty does not spell out any special powers (such as a veto) for the major members which are withheld from the lesser allies.¹⁴

For purposes of continuity the Council established Permanent Representatives who represent the Ministers in their absence. Remaining in close consultation with their respective Ministers, the Permanent Representatives possess virtually the same powers of decision as do their superiors. The Permanent Representatives of ambassadorial rank meet on a weekly basis to resolve matters of routine. Twice annually the Foreign Ministers (Secretary of State in the United States) meet to discuss the more pressing matters and to issue the more important communiqués. Once, in December 1957, the Council met at the level of the Heads of Government. It is claimed that the purpose of this latter meeting was to promote "alliance solidarity" as a reaction to the Soviet space success during the previous October that "...had temporarily cast a shadow of doubt over the

¹³Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 29.

technological superiority of the United States".¹⁵

Since the proceedings of the Council meetings are never publicly disseminated, it is possible only to speculate on the nature of the discussions by the various nations from the official communiques issued at the completion of the official sessions. The rationale for closed sessions of the Council is the belief that "...the intricate details of alliance negotiations and strategic planning cannot be argued under the full glare of publicity" and it is easier to achieve frank and free discussion in private sessions.¹⁶

Since all NATO organs--political, economic, or military--are subordinate to the Council, it is in the Council that major policy is "hammered out" for the entire structure. From the beginning, the Council has assumed a wide range of responsibilities. It:

(1) creates and maintains the military structure required for the integrated defense...; (2) formulates the basic strategy for the local defense of Europe against aggression; (3) establishes military force levels; (4) ensures the co-ordination of member's efforts...; (5) receives, debates and accepts the report on the Annual Review¹⁷...; (6) approves military organizational changes in Europe...; (7) approves major NATO appointments...; (8) decides on the admission of new members to NATO; (9) establishes and reviews the work of the political, cultural and economic committees...; (10) co-ordinates allied policy on major political questions...¹⁸

Since the Lisbon Conference of 1952, the Council has been in

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁷The Annual Review can be compared with the planning, discussion, and acceptance of the United States defense budget. See Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, op. cit., Chapter 13 for a detailed description of NATO's Annual Review procedures.

¹⁸Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

permanent session, usually meeting twice weekly, to discuss the current issues confronting NATO. Very little within the borders of member-states appears not to be within the Council's range of discussion. A great deal of discussion concerning the foreign policies of members seems to take place.¹⁹ However, approval by unanimity protects each member from Council action that might be prejudicial to its national interest.

Article 9 gave the Council authority to implement the treaty and to establish the necessary subsidiary bodies. The Council has created numerous bodies under this authority. There are thirteen standing committees and a considerable number of working groups under the direct auspices of the Council. Although the articles of the treaty specified only economic and military provisions, the Council has created such diverse committees as Science, Information and Cultural Relations, Food and Agricultural Planning, Medical, Coal and Steel Planning, Civil Aviation, and Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport. Further down the scale of command, within the NATO Secretariate, is the Committee for Pure and Applied Science, and the Committee for the Press. No doubt preparations for modern war can encompass a nation's total capability, but one can not help but wonder whether the planners of NATO envisaged such multiplicity of efforts and interests within the original alliance.

The Council should possess the bureaucratic capacity to analyze the "imponderable and subjective factors" referred to by Osgood:

...military strategy transcends to the traditional realm of the military specialist and exceeds the bounds of purely military logic...the nature of the threat and the resulting

¹⁹Ibid.

contingencies in which the use of force should be anticipated --are as much matters of political as military judgement. And even the planning of military responses and capabilities, although a highly technical operation, requires...a novel type of systematic analysis of imponderable and subjective factors.²⁰

Apparently, the numerous committees are considered necessary to assist the military planners in analyzing the many "factors" that comprise the determination of military strategy.

In compliance with Article 9 a high level Defense Committee was established. This committee was composed of the Defense Ministers of the member-states. It was its responsibility to recommend measures for the implementation of the articles pertaining to an armed attack. In less than two years time after its creation, because of a duplication of effort and responsibility with other NATO agencies, the Defense Committee merged with the Council.²¹

When the Defense Committee was formed, a Military Committee, consisting of the member-states' Chiefs of Staff,²² was created for the purpose of advising it on military matters. Since the Defense Committee was merged with the Council, the Military Committee has advised the Council directly on military questions. However, the Military Committee has not functioned effectively because of the national demands made upon each representative of the Military Committee, and because of the frustrating rule of unanimity within its decision-making process. Because of these conditions the Military Committee's functions are performed by a smaller

²⁰Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO The Entangling Alliance (Chicago and London, 1962), p. 7.

²¹Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, op. cit., p. 65.

²²Iceland, which has no military forces, is always represented by a civilian on the Military Committee.

body called the Standing Group.

The Standing Group is a direct manifestation of the power structure within NATO since it consists of the Military Committee's representative from the United States, Great Britain, and France. As the three most powerful members of NATO, this group enjoys a privileged position as the executive arm of the Military Committee. It is the Standing Group, in conjunction with the Military Committee, that exercises direct control over the major NATO commands; Supreme Allied Commander (SACLANT), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Channel Committee, and the Canadian-American Regional Planning Group. In the event of war it is the Standing Group that would function as the Supreme Command.²³

As in each of the member countries, the political authority has primacy over the military forces in NATO. The Council, composed of civilians, transmits its instructions and policy statements to the Military Committee, which in turn has its orders implemented by the Standing Group. The Standing Group is located in the Pentagon, which also houses the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff and the major military hierarchy of United States military forces.

In addition to directing the NATO military command organization, the Standing Group also co-ordinates defense planning within the geographical perimeter protected by NATO forces. The Standing Group is directly represented on the Council by a general officer who is assisted by a large staff. The existence of this direct representative results in the by-passing of the Military Committee. This officer furnishes to the Council technical military advice, and he has the authority to make

²³Ibid., pp. 322-23.

direct recommendation to the Council.²⁴ Such a chain-of-command arrangement has conferred upon the Standing Group an inordinate amount of authority not commensurate with its numerical representation. It is probable that the Standing Group, representing the more powerful members and having direct access to the supreme authority of NATO--the Council, is more able to affect the policies of their respective countries than the policies of those members who do not have representation on the Standing Group.

The Standing Group has specifically assigned duties that can, and often do, have far-reaching consequences. Supervising the Military Agency for Standardization allows considerable latitude to the three nations in the realm of recommendations for weapons, tools, and other implements of war to be used by NATO forces. The Standing Group also has supervisory control over the Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development, the Communications Agencies in Europe, and the NATO Defense College.²⁵

NATO was given no forces of its own in 1949, and there was no treaty obligation to provide forces in specific numbers or categories even in the event of emergency. No doubt the member-states had placed a great deal of reliance on the United States monopoly of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe, but all had an awareness that military forces would have to be forthcoming if Article 5 was to have any significance to the Soviet Union. But before effective military forces could be built, a

²⁴Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., pp. 34-5.

²⁵M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (New York, 1959), pp. 60-62.

determination had to be made concerning their numbers and functions.

The United States, by its actions and declarations, had convinced the Europeans that the American government and people would become militarily involved in Europe should aggression occur. What type of military involvement? To what extent would United States' forces be committed? After experiencing the vast amount of destruction and death during the previous liberation of Europe, it was of paramount concern to the Europeans that the strategy, and the forces allocated to support that strategy, be of such design that an invader could not possibly occupy their countries. A deter-and-liberate policy would not do; the policy must be deter-and-defend.

Integration of the Military Forces

Defense, not liberation, of Europe was agreed upon by the United States, primarily because of the psychological implications and secondarily because of military considerations:

It must be perfectly clear to the people of the United States that we cannot count on our friends in Western Europe to resist if our strategy in the event of war is to abandon these friends to the enemy with a promise of later liberation. That strategy would be costly, since it could produce nothing better than impotent and disillusioned allies in the event of war.... Western Europe must count on us if it is to survive, and we, in turn, must count on Western Europe if we are to endure.²⁶

Reflecting the newly-adopted strategy wants of its members, the NATO Defense Committee in 1949 produced its first integrated defense plan which called for the production and delivery of weapons and equipment. This

²⁶Harry Truman, "The U.S. Military Assistance Program", Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 20 (May 22, 1949), p. 645.

first war plan was "...predicated on the defense of all NATO members rather than withdrawal..."²⁷ and to this day, the strategy of defending Europe by NATO forces has remained unchanged. This plan was known as the "forward strategy", and it eventually justified the granting of NATO membership to the Federal Republic of Germany, and resulted in the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in the arsenals of NATO. The Soviet Union also gave recognition to the existence of a common NATO strategy confronting it as expressed by a Marshal of the Soviet Union:

In contrast to prewar years, when the strategy of the principal capitalist countries bore a distinctly national character, the postwar period has been characterized by a tendency toward uniformity in national military strategies and their combination into a single global military strategy, intended to assure the realization of American foreign policy aims...thermonuclear weapons...facilitated the consolidation of the imperialist forces under the leadership of the United States, and exerted considerable influence on the development of a unified imperialist military policy and strategy determined by American ruling circles.²⁸

Should Europe be compelled to fight under a single plan, it would also fight under a balanced force concept as proposed by the NATO Council. Europe, at NATO's birth, collectively might have mustered sufficient military forces to repel an invader, but no single nation in Europe could afford national forces that would be of adequate strength by itself to deter or defend against Soviet aggression. Consequently the Council urged the member governments to concentrate on the construction of balanced collective forces instead of each attempting to build balanced

²⁷Ball, op. cit., p. 40.

²⁸V. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, Herbert S. Dinerstein and others, tr. (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), pp. 151-52.

national forces.²⁹ This was the beginning of the integrated force system that eventually in various degrees plagued the cohesiveness of the alliance.

In addition to integrating strategies and forces, NATO also considered the feasibility of integrating the command structure. The Korean War pointed out the danger of war in Europe because of the insufficiency of military forces in Western Europe. Recognizing the danger, the Council determined that an integrated military force commanded by a single military commander would bolster the defenses of NATO.³⁰ In December 1950 General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander by the Council. Eisenhower was a logical selection as he had been the "...personal embodiment of the allied war effort, and his appointment translated an as yet abstract alliance into tangible reality".³¹ By degrees, the strategy, forces, and command structure of NATO were integrated; as time passed, the degree of integration became closer knit as the United States contribution to NATO increased.

The appointment of an American as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), was precedent-setting for NATO. Since the initial appointment, this top command post of NATO has always been held by an American: General Dwight D. Eisenhower (December 1950 - June 1952); General Matthew B. Ridgway (June 1952 - July, 1953); General Alfred M. Gruenther (July, 1953 - November, 1956); General Lauris Norstad (November 1956 - January

²⁹Ball, op. cit., p. 41.

³⁰Robertson, op. cit., p. 85.

³¹Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, op. cit., p. 75.

1963); General Lyman Lemnitzer (January, 1963--present).³²

Arriving in Paris a month after his appointment as SACEUR, Eisenhower began immediate preparations to build a military force. He appointed an American, General Gruenther, as his Chief of Staff and chose Marly, near Paris, as his headquarters--Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). It was from here that NATO was to be translated from paper proposals into a "tangible reality" that was to "...provide political and psychological reinforcement in the continuing political warfare of the cold war".³³ He and his staff started immediately "...to turn the armies of the allies into an allied army".³⁴

Some of his immediate problems are described as follows:

The forces at the disposal of SACEUR must be welded into an effective and integrated organization. This demands in turn an integrated logistics systems and an adequate level of stocks. Despite having assigned their troops to the allied commanders, there are few signs that the member countries are prepared to give the commanders a like authority over the means with which their troops must fight.³⁵

Of prime concern to General Eisenhower was not only how large a force was to be under his command, but from where and when would the where-withal to conduct military operations be forthcoming. Assigned United States forces on the day of his command appointment, he was faced with the pressing problem of providing the "means" with which his troops could fight, if the need should arise.

³²Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., p. 37.

³³Osgood, op. cit., p. 30.

³⁴Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, op. cit., p. 75.

³⁵T. W. Mulley, The Politics of Western Defense (New York, 1962), p. 224.

In NATO terminology, military facilities are called "infrastructure."³⁶ The first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, described infrastructure as "...installations which are set up at the request of NATO international Commanders for the maintenance and training of NATO international forces".³⁷ General Eisenhower received the authorization for the required facilities the following September when the Council determined that there was a "...need for sharing the burden of financing installations", and ever since 1951, members "...have financed infrastructure items jointly".³⁸ From the very beginning of NATO, starting with the approval of the first master defense plan by President Truman in January 1950, the United States has been the largest contributor of money and material.³⁹ The formula for sharing infrastructure costs has always been determined in a somewhat arbitrary manner as explained by the first Secretary-General:

They dumped the whole problem in my lap, so I called in three assistant secretaries-general, and each of us drew up our own list of what we thought the percentage of sharing should be, and then we averaged them out. I couldn't for the life of me possibly say on what basis I acted, except I tried to take into account all sorts of things like the ability to pay and whether the building would be going on in a country so that it would benefit from the construction and the money

³⁶"Infrastructure" is a word borrowed from French railroad terminology, where it is applied to all of the installations (as tunnels and embankments) required before a railroad can be completed. Within NATO the term has been broadened to include: bases, supplies of fuel, lines of communication, depots, and headquarters. See Roger Hilsman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context", NATO and American Security, Klaus Knorr, ed. (Princeton, 1959), p. 21.

³⁷ Quoted in Ball, op. cit., p. 85.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 40.

spent.⁴⁰

The "ability to pay" concept saddled the United States with the lion's share of the expenses.⁴¹ Until 1961 the United States paid almost three times the amount as the number two contributor, Germany, which was 36.98 and 13.72 percent respectively. Since 1961, the United States, still the major contributor, has paid about 30 percent and Germany, still number two, has paid approximately 20 percent. It is noted that the combined costs to United States, Germany, and Britain is over 60 percent, or almost two-thirds of the total contribution.⁴²

Possessing the largest submarine fleet in the world, and modern, well-equipped naval forces, the Soviet Navy posed almost as formidable a threat to NATO as did Soviet armies. After providing for and integrating their land forces, the NATO planners directed their efforts toward possible warfare on the sea. Less than one year after the creation of the land command (SHAPE) a NATO sea command was formed. The first Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) established his headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. The first commander was an American admiral and this command position has remained in American hands since.

SACLANT consists of fleet units from the maritime powers of NATO, giving the American commander authority over the naval forces of Britain, Canada, France, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Holland as well as the United States naval base at Keflavik, Iceland. He also wears another "hat" as the commander of the United States Atlantic Fleet. As

⁴⁰Quoted in Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960s (New York, 1960), pp. 113-14.

⁴¹Robertson, op. cit., p. 86.

⁴²Mulley, op. cit., p. 190.

with SACEUR, there is also a considerable degree of integration of strategy, command and infrastructure.

During the ten or twelve naval exercises which were held every year...SACLANT exercises direct and supreme command over this NATO force, just as he would in the event of war.... SACLANT's task is to draw up strategic plans, to urge the national authorities (through the Standing Group, NATO's 'general Staff') to maintain a high level of preparedness, and to set up a cadre organization which could exercise direct supreme command over the united NATO fleets in the event of war.⁴³

Unlike SACEUR, the commander of SACLANT does not have military units permanently assigned to his command except during training maneuvers and time of war. The degree of integration is less rigid for the NATO naval forces than the land forces, but similar forms of integration do exist at the highest echelons of command. Perhaps the rationale for more integration of the land forces than the sea forces is best expressed by

Moore:

The only way to have an effective ground force made up of several national contributions is to place it under a single command and give that command the powers necessary to enable it to fight effectively as a unit. The need for integration has not been so clear in the naval commands and the various allies have retained a greater degree of independent control over their naval forces. Confidence of its members in the fairness and military competence of SHAPE has also been an essential factor.⁴⁴

The responsibility of SACLANT encompasses the Atlantic Ocean from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer but excludes the waters adjacent to the British Isles. This responsibility entails the protection of the

⁴³Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, op. cit., p. 24.

⁴⁴Ben T. Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New York, 1958), p. 87.

"...lifelines of the free world in the Atlantic".⁴⁵ The surrounding waters of Britain that are not included in SACLANT's area of responsibility are defended by a separate NATO unit directly under the command of the Military Committee--the Channel Committee. The Channel Committee is a maritime command which consists of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff of Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. From its initial formation, its operational commander has always been a British admiral. The operational command, Allied Command Channel, has its headquarters in Portsmouth, England and is staffed largely by British personnel.⁴⁶

The remaining military command of NATO is the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group which has equal status to SACEUR, SACLANT, and the Channel Committee in the military command structure. Initially NATO established five Regional Planning Groups,⁴⁷ but with the subsequent development of SACEUR and its subordinate commands,⁴⁸ duplication and overlapping of lines of command and responsibility resulted. Thus all but one of the Planning Groups, the Canada-United States Planning Group, was abolished. This group has developed the tightest form of integration within NATO; it is here that the strategic plans for the joint land and air defense of the North American continent are formulated.⁴⁹

⁴⁵Ball, op. cit., p. 64.

⁴⁶Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., p. 35.

⁴⁷These were the Northern European Regional Planning Group, the Western European Regional Planning Group, the Southern European-Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group, the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group, and the Canadian-United States Regional Planning Group.

⁴⁸Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), and Allied Forces Mediterranean.

⁴⁹Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, op. cit., p. 77.

Meeting in Lisbon in February 1952, the Council reviewed the accomplishments up to that date. In less than three years NATO had been able to adopt a common strategy; integrated commands for land, sea, and air defense had been established; common infrastructure programs had been achieved; militarily, NATO members by 1952 had been able to present somewhat of a common, integrated approach to any threats to their security.

At this same conference the Council reorganized itself, which resulted in the creation of a Secretariat composed of a Secretary and an international staff. Appointed by the Council for an unspecified time period, it is the Secretary's responsibility to preside over the Council and to direct the International Secretariat.⁵⁰ The Secretariat comprises several hundred individuals of whom many are permanently employed. Those not permanently employed are on loan from their governments and after a few years tour with NATO, return to their own countries. The secretariat has become essential to the overall effectiveness of NATO. With such diverse interests as "...long term studies of the economic capacities of members, research having a direct bearing on defense, technical services connected with armament production, political liaison, and production planning"⁵¹ the civilian side of NATO has become as much integrated, perhaps more, than the military components. Its integrated character was recognized by General Ridgway, as SACEUR, when he stated:

The organization of the civilian bodies of NATO has been progressively strengthened during the past year as a result of the creation of the position of Secretary-General as a focal point of civilian leadership.... The North Atlantic Council, since the decision in early 1952 that it function

⁵⁰Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., p. 38.

⁵¹Ball, op. cit., p. 60.

in permanent sessions through the appointment of permanent representatives, has provided increasingly firm top-level direction to NATO, on a continuous basis.⁵²

Also at the NATO Council meeting of February 1952, Secretary of State Dean Acheson commented on the extent NATO had progressed:

In building up their military forces, our European allies had to start almost from scratch, but they have tackled the job with determination. Since 1949, our allies in Europe have doubled their military budgets. Every one of them has lengthened its period of military conscription. Military production in Europe has been expanded almost four times beyond the 1949 level. More than half a million men have already been added to their military forces on active duty.⁵³

In his introductory remarks the Secretary further stated that "...the Supreme Commander must be assured of the largest number of effective combat forces that can be developed this year". He established the basis for the future when he said, "The Allies wanted to lay the ground work for increases in 1953 and 1954".⁵⁴ While the Korean War was still in progress, there was no assurances that the Soviet Union had relaxed its pressures on Europe. Within such an environment of hostility and fear, the Council proposed a force build-up that eventually gave impetus to the tightest aspect of military integration within the alliance--military units from West Germany.

⁵²General Matthew B. Ridgway, "Second Anniversary of SHAPE as an Operational Headquarters", Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 28 (June 29, 1953), p. 902.

⁵³Dean Acheson, "NAC Meeting Strengthens Defense of North Atlantic Community", Department of State Bulletin, Vol 26 (March 10, 1952), p. 364.

⁵⁴Ibid.

Plans were made by the Council to train and equip 50 divisions⁵⁵ in 1952, 75 divisions in 1953, and to have available 96 divisions, reserve and regular, by 1954.⁵⁶ Discounting the myriad of problems except the primary one, availability of manpower, the task of raising some one million men was indeed a formidable one. In order to raise 96 divisions NATO would require a contribution of twelve divisions from West Germany.

Military Integration and the German Problem

The official recognition of the need for German manpower in NATO may be dated from the 1952 conference, but the "...goals endorsed at Lisbon were the consummation of defense plans urged by the military since 1948".⁵⁷ The United States from the outset believed that West German military units were "...an essential condition of American commitments" and the American military advisors did not believe "...an effective defense of the continent"⁵⁸ was possible without the participation of the West Germans. The adoption of the "forward strategy" concept by NATO in September 1950 entailed the establishment of a defense line as far to the East as possible, preferably as far east as the Elbe River. Such defense-in-depth would benefit NATO militarily, but for maximum effectiveness it required participation by West German forces.⁵⁹

⁵⁵"Division" size varies from nation to nation and also with a country's national forces depending upon the primary function assigned to it but a 10,000 man average NATO division would bring the NATO armies to the planned goals.

⁵⁶Osgood, op. cit., p. 87.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Moore, op. cit., p. 37.

⁵⁹Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., p. 177.

As early as 1948, the British were giving tacit recognition to the possibility of rearming West Germany. In April 1948 the Military Governor of the British occupational zone, Lieutenant General Brian Robertson, stated to the Diet of North Rhine Westphalia that "...a turning point had been reached in policies toward Germany; Germany would return to the family of nations". The Governor further stated that "...the time has come to realize that the interest of all Europeans is converging. Our needs and your needs cannot be dealt with separately for we all form a part of Europe."⁶⁰

The British were not the only Europeans who desired the West to rearm and to integrate its military forces with the other forces of Europe. The following October the French Prime Minister, M. René Pleven secured a favorable vote from the French Assembly for his proposal "...of a European Army [West Germany included]...which would be a complete merger of men and equipment under a single European political and military authority".⁶¹ This particular proposal launched the European Defense Community (EDC) which included the "Pleven Plan".

The Pleven Plan reflected French recognition that West German manpower was essential to the defense of Europe, and the planned implementation of it was an acknowledgement of French fear of German rearmament. While the Germans were to be rearmed, military integration, according to Pleven, would prevent Germany from turning its forces once again against France. The Plan proposed a European army in which German

⁶⁰Konrad Adenauer, Konrad Adenauer Memiors 1945-53 (Chicago, 1965), pp. 108-09.

⁶¹Ball, op. cit., p. 28.

military integration with the forces of other countries would exist at all echelons of command above the brigade level.⁶² The level of integration proposed is described by Robert Schuman:⁶³

This Treaty sets up a defense community and stipulated that the six existing armies are to be replaced by one common army.... No element of the common army is at the disposal of any government acting alone; all six must approve its use. Command is integrated on the model of the Atlantic Army of which the European Army will be one of the chief land forces. But in the European Army integration is carried still further. Not only is the high command integrated, but the same is true of all units larger than a division, as well as of the services of supply and other auxiliary services, each will be composed of officers and men of different nationalities. There will be German soldiers but no German Army; German officers at every level but no German general staff; and the same will hold true for continental France and other signatory nations.⁶⁴

Schuman also said that "...we would have preferred to build up the economic and political foundations a little further first before starting on the military structure [in Germany]. But we have no choice in the matter; our tasks have been imposed upon us."⁶⁵ Very possibly the task of rearming Germany had been "imposed" upon France but the method was to be of French choosing. Integration of German military forces was the French choice, not primarily for military considerations but for

⁶²"Brigade" is generally considered to have about one-half the number of men as a division but its size also varies from nation to nation and also the function assigned to it. Roughly, 5,000 men could be the strength of an average NATO brigade.

⁶³French Foreign Minister who had proposed the "Schuman Plan" which envisage the entire production of the French and German coal and steel industries integrated with one another. His plan eventually led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community.

⁶⁴Robert Schuman, "France and Europe", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9 (April, 1953), p. 355.

⁶⁵Quoted in F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-63 (Stanford, 1965), p. 130.

political expediency. The Pleven Plan received serious consideration within French governmental agencies and was tentatively accepted by the other NATO allies as the basis of providing twelve German divisions. The adoption of the Pleven Plan would satisfy two demands: the Allies' insistence upon a German military contribution to European defense; and assurances that the complexities of military integration would not allow the proposed German forces to act without French approval.

For the United States it was the Korean War that gave momentum for the creation of an integrated German military force. The frustrations experienced by the United States in its unsuccessful attempts to defeat the military forces of North Korea also directed the Americans' attention to the inadequacies of Western European defense.⁶⁶ During this period President Truman demanded that Europe arm sixty divisions, of which ten should be from Germany.⁶⁷

Germany recognized that any resurgence of its military forces would have to manifest itself as some form of integration with the military forces of Europe. James Richardson summarized the attitudes of the states involved in integrating German military forces:

Before the North Korean attack the Schuman Plan had opened the way to equality for Germany; after the attack, with the United States pressing for German rearmament, equality could be expected as a natural concomitant of the new American policy... in the existing climate of opinion in Europe it was unthinkable that the Germans should propose rearmament. As early as 1948 there had been discussion in political circles in Germany as elsewhere, and Chancellor Adenauer was reported to have accepted the view current among the German military that thirty

⁶⁶Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, After 20 Years, Alternates to the Cold War in Europe (New York, 1965), p. 28.

⁶⁷Willis, op. cit., p. 131.

German divisions would be necessary.⁶⁸

Within a few years after suffering defeat in World War II, came the possibility for West Germany of ending an occupation that had been envisaged to last for years, perhaps generations. The probability of regaining its sovereignty, and the possibility of rejoining the "family of nations" was within grasp for the Germans. To achieve these concessions from the recent conquerors and present military occupiers of Germany, Chancellor Adenauer accepted a number of inequalities that are still with the German nation. Adenauer believed that "...rearmament might be the way to gaining full sovereignty for the Federal Republic. This made it rearmament the essential question of our political future."⁶⁹ Although the adoption of the Pleven Plan would leave Germany in a second class status within the military councils, Germany stood to gain much politically by making military units available to an integrated NATO.

In August 1954, when EDC was presented to the French Assembly, it failed to be ratified. While elements in France had "...sought to spin out negotiations of EDC as a delaying tactic, there was a surprising overall acceptance of supranationalizing even defense--the very essence of sovereignty."⁷⁰ This "overall acceptance" became readily apparent when EDC failed in the French Assembly; within days another proposal for German rearmament and integration with NATO military forces was circulated amongst the NATO capitals. Three months after the failure of EDC a

⁶⁸James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966), pp. 16-17.

⁶⁹Adenauer, op. cit., p. 270.

⁷⁰Timothy W. Stanley, NATO in Transition: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (New York, 1965), p. 45.

"looser structure" was planned that would revise the provisions of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 to include West Germany and Italy. This action ended the occupation regime and Germany became a sovereign member of the international community.⁷¹ Another modification of the Brussels Treaty was the relinquishment of some of its authority to NATO with the Brussels Treaty members' willingness to "...rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters".⁷²

At the same time the Brussels Treaty was revised the signatories also allowed Germany membership in NATO. The results of these negotiations, called the Paris Treaties, while allowing for the creation of German military units, also imposed severe restrictions on the manufacture of weapons for the German units. From the viewpoint of creating a supranational military force the protocols attached to the Paris Treaties had far-reaching consequences for NATO members. Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, renamed Western European Union after October 1954, prohibited Germany from manufacturing atomic, biological, or chemical weapons. Also guided missiles, warships, and strategic bombers were not permissible in the German arsenal. After the ratification of the Paris Treaties in May 1955, many traditional rights of sovereignty had been changed to adjust to the new organization: (1) determination of a nation's size of military forces, (2) control of types and stocks of armaments, (3) right of inspection on national territory and, (4) important decisions by majority vote.⁷³ Within these restrictions, in May

⁷¹Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., pp. 180-81.

⁷²Article 3, Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty. Source: Treaty Series, Vol. 210 (New York, 1955), p. 346.

⁷³Robertson, op. cit., pp. 132-37.

1955, the Federal Republic of Germany was accepted into NATO as a member-state.⁷⁴ As expressed by Richardson, the German case, though somewhat special, is a vivid example of the impact of European military integration upon a nation's sovereignty:

Germany has been the only member state willing to place the whole of its armed forces under NATO command...Germany... has held out the ideal of military integration as the goal appropriate to all NATO members. Further, by renouncing a national command structure or a General Staff and by encouraging logistic interdependence, especially with the United States forces, German policy has deliberately renounced options for independent military action...⁷⁵

Structurally the members of NATO have integrated their war plans, command positions, logistical systems, and, to more or less degree varying with each nation, their military forces. Since its inception, NATO has "...transformed itself from a traditional alliance, implying little more than a commitment to stand together, to an integrated coalition army."⁷⁶ From an initial treaty declaration of "...considering an armed attack against one as being an attack on all..." it has developed into an organization that could influence the destinies of a large share of the world's population without full regard to the separate states that are its members. Within such a political-military environment problems are inevitable.

⁷⁴Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, op. cit., p. 81.

⁷⁵Richardson, op. cit., p. 13.

⁷⁶Hilsman, op. cit., p. 18.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION

The position that the United States has occupied in NATO has been a direct reflection of its overall power vis-a-vis its NATO allies and the Soviet Union. As the only possessor of nuclear weapons and the economic capability to assist its postwar European allies in their reconstruction, the United States became the dominant member of the alliance. This domination of the alliance in its formative years by the Americans did not create too much concern on the part of the other allies because of more immediate problems, particularly of an economic nature, that were constantly before them. To some degree the domination of the Americans within the European security arrangements provided Western Europe with relatively inexpensive security costs. If the basic premise of the alliance is correct in regards to the concept that its primary purpose is one of deterrence, then the American strategic forces bore the major burden of deterrence, at little financial cost to the allies.

The needs of the Americans and Western Europeans were served by NATO during the first few years of its existence. For the United States, strategic bases close to the Soviet Union became available on a formal basis which increased American military capabilities; to the Western Europeans came the assurance that American nuclear forces would assist the NATO military forces should the alliance be activated for war. The Western Europeans also incurred risks inherent in placing NATO and

American weapons of war directed at the Soviet Union on their territory.

Had the United States been able to maintain an absolute monopoly of nuclear weapons, NATO in all probability would have continued to function as it was originally created with the Americans contributing the largest share of money and equipment, and dominating the command positions and the formulation of plans. However, the development of Soviet nuclear weapons capable of destroying targets in the United States forced a re-evaluation of NATO's usefulness by all of the allies. This issue has been considered with some degree of trepidation in the NATO countries; victory or defeat is no longer the question--national survival is now the issue. Modern weapons have precluded the possibility of recovery always prevalent in the past; now there exists a probability that a nation may never have the opportunity to rebuild in the aftermath of a nuclear war.

All the NATO allies are aware of these dangers and many have expressed doubts as to the practicality and feasibility of some of the integrated aspects of the alliance. The control of nuclear weapons, implementation of battle plans, stationing of military forces and the formulation of strategy are but examples of a host of problems that have hampered formal military coordination among NATO members. The recent, and not so recent, attitude of France exemplifies, to a degree, the attitudes of other allies. Regardless of reason, the French withdrawal from the integrated features of NATO can not but help to decrease the military effectiveness of the alliance which, without doubt, affects the overall deterrence factor. France however, is not alone in advocating change in NATO. During the discussions of the aborted multilateral force Germany favored the proposals in order to change its inferior status regarding the control of nuclear weapons. Insistence on change has brought about

dissension among members. With dissension has come a decrease and, in the case of France, a breakdown of formal military coordination among NATO members.

Internal Problems of NATO

The sources of dissension and the manner in which they manifest themselves are suggested by Claude:

NATO has become an organizational web expressing and reinforcing the political determination of the United States to align itself definitively with the free nations of Europe in resistance to Soviet expansionism. Joint military action of the members of NATO is not so much a promise of their treaty as a premise of their organization.¹

Immediately evident is the fact that the web has greatly favored the policies of one nation--the United States. At every level--civilian or military, policy or equipment, strategy or tactics--the United States has had the dominant role in NATO. Economic aid, equipment, commanders, military assistance programs, nuclear weapons possession have all had their share in making the United States the dominant, and domineering member of NATO. The United States wields an inordinate measure of influence within the entire NATO structure.

Membership on the Council allows the United States the opportunity to confront the decision-makers of the other fourteen members behind closed doors. Considering that all the other member-states were initially recipients of American economic aid and military assistance, it is not surprising that Washington insisted upon, and undoubtedly successfully a large share of the time, conformity to its concept of defense

¹Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York, 1956), p. 277.

for Western Europe. When the Mutual Defense Assistance Program of fiscal year 1952 was presented for discussion, President Truman explained that the "...bulk of these funds [\$4 billions] was to be used to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area."² Congress insisted upon conditions and restrictions before such a sum would be appropriated for the security of the North Atlantic area. From the initial appropriations for NATO there were strings attached to American monies. Conditions imposed upon aid recipients were specified as follows:

Nations receiving aid would be expected to devote a relatively large percentage of their national budget to military expenditure. In order to achieve an economy of effort, self-defense must be organized on a collective, integrated basis.³

Kurt Birrenbach describes NATO's most pressing problem:

Neither a strategy adjusted to military-technological evolution nor the reinforcement of nuclear and conventional forces can remove the uncertainties that beset the Western alliance. Among these uncertainties, the most harrowing is the unanswered question of the control of the use of nuclear weapons. It is the settlement of this issue that will largely determine the political fortunes of NATO.⁴

Many difficulties beset the alliance since its inception, but invariably most of the problems, if not resolved by time, were adjusted by military needs, political expediency, or some form of accommodation effected for the purpose of harmony or cohesion. However, one problem has been exacerbated with the passage of time--decision-making concerning the strategy and tactics to be employed in the use of nuclear weapons. Recently

²Robert H. Connery and Paul T. David, "The Mutual Defense Assistance Program", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June, 1951), p. 327.

³Ibid., p. 328.

⁴Kurt Birrenbach, The Future of the Atlantic Community, Toward European-American Partnership (New York, London, 1963), pp. 10-11.

testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, General Norstad explained the problem of nuclear control that has confronted, and is confronting, NATO:

Over the years, it has been said many times that the crux of this great problem of nuclear power and its military application springs from questions concerning who has the authority and how that authority is, or should be exercised. Most Europeans...feel that they should have a voice in the political process by which decisions will be taken governing the rise of weapons of this type--an influence, an appropriate measure of control.⁵

At NATO's beginning this problem was an academic one as only one nation possessed atomic weapons, but after the Soviet Union produced similar weapons and means of delivering them to Western European and American targets, the problem became very real and intense.

Regardless of geographical, strategical, or military considerations, there is not a single national leader in the world who would volunteer his country to be used as a nuclear battlefield if there were any alternative except surrender, and without doubt, many, perhaps most, would accept that condition in lieu of a nuclear war. Criticism could always be expected from some quarter no matter what strategy the planners presented as a counter to Soviet potential ventures. Since the United States initially possessed the only nuclear force--the Air Force's Strategic Air Command--and, it remained free of any NATO control, it was natural and logical that criticism, in or out of NATO, directed at the use of this force would be lodged against the United States. While weapons do influence strategy, it is still men who must formulate it.

⁵General Lauris Norstad, USAF, Ret., "The Crisis in NATO", Hearing Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (May 25, 1966), p. 222.

Determining the doctrine for the deployment of nuclear weapons was relatively simple some eighteen years ago but, since that time, the Soviet Union has emerged with equal weapons of destruction; also Great Britain and France have developed nuclear capabilities. The determination of nuclear strategy in NATO has become more complicated as a result. At the outset, unanimity on strategic doctrine was difficult to achieve among the military planners of NATO.⁶ The destructiveness of nuclear weapons made the issue of strategy much more complex and frightful because the planners were constantly confronted with the urgent problem of national survival.⁷ Coupled with the problem of nuclear weapons has been the nature of the European to be wary of alliances, which compounded the difficulty of developing strategy. Henry Kissinger wrote:

Too many of them have seen alliances disintegrate not to be concerned over the impact of the unprecedented stress of nuclear war on obligations incurred many years before under completely different circumstances.⁸

Kissinger also pointed out that the United States was very active in the immediate postwar years in assisting the development of non-military European institutions such as the Schuman Plan and the Common Market; however, in military matters the United States did not encourage a "...real European sense of responsibility." The consequences were that NATO strategy, nuclear and otherwise, were based on "more or less

⁶James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966), p. 3.

⁷Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959). See Chapter 5, "The Advent of Nuclear Weapons" for an excellent comparison of the potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons as opposed to the conventional weapons deployed during World War II.

⁸Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York, 1965), p. 94.

unilateral American conceptions."⁹

Until the introduction of the Radford Plan¹⁰ in 1957, the keystone of Western strategy with respect to Western Europe was reliance on United States strategic bombing capability.¹¹ This bombing capability was the Strategic Air Command, which could only be activated by the President of the United States. Such a command arrangement left the security of Western Europe in the hands of the United States. This arrangement assumed that European and American vital interests would always coincide in the event of Soviet aggression. Thus, NATO nuclear strategy was not only determined by NATO planners, who were mostly American, but the ultimate decision to use nuclear weapons was exclusively American.

After the initial introduction of nuclear weapons in NATO in 1954,¹² there was a great deal of fear among the Europeans that the United States would reduce its forces in Europe.¹³ Another source of friction with the advent of nuclear weapons in the NATO inventory was that their actual utilization remained unknown to non-American commanders.

⁹Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 94-5.

¹⁰A proposal endorsed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford predicated on the proposition that conventional war was no longer a possibility with the Soviet Union; hence, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons on a large scale into the NATO arsenals which would enable subsequent reductions in American military forces.

¹¹George H. Rathjens, Jr., "NATO Strategy: Total War", NATO and American Security, Klaus Knorr, ed. (Princeton, New Jersey, 1959), p. 66.

¹²The 85 ton, 280 mm. atomic cannon arrived in Europe in October 1953 and rockets and missiles (Honest John, Corporal, Matador, and Regulus) armed with atomic warheads arrived the following spring and summer. See Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO, The Entangling Alliance (Chicago and Toronto, 1962), p. 107.

¹³Ibid., p. 108.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946¹⁴ specifically forbade the sharing of any atomic information with the European allies; this legislation created an absurd situation: Marshal Alphonse Juin, a French citizen, who also was Commander of Allied Forces Central Europe,¹⁵ was not permitted to know the type and quantity of atomic weapons at his disposal.¹⁶ In time the MacMahon Act was changed to permit "...information about nuclear weapons to be disclosed to an allied country which had already made substantial progress in the development of such weapons." The only nation in 1958 to have made "substantial progress" was Britain; the change was purpose-ly written to dampen nuclear proliferation but its consequences merely antagonized France.¹⁷ To this day France has not received any assistance from the United States in the development of its nuclear weapons.

This aspect of secrecy concerning the dissemination of American nuclear knowledge has been a constant source of frustration and bitterness for the French. Discussing a manufacturing plant that produces plutonium for French atomic bombs, a spokesman¹⁸ for the French atomic program explained:

¹⁴Commonly referred to as the MacMahon Act after its sponsor, Senator MacMahon.

¹⁵Allied Forces Central Europe is a subordinate command of SHAPE and most probably would engage the enemy first and would endure the most massive attacks as its areas border East Germany.

¹⁶Osgood, op. cit., p. 106.

¹⁷F. W. Mulley, The Politics of Western Defense (New York, 1962), p. 81.

¹⁸Mr. Bertrand Goldschmidt, officer-in-charge of foreign relations for the French Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique.

We naturally considered asking help from our American and British friends when we embarked on this programme.... The initial reaction of the British was favourable, and then we were quickly told that this was not possible because it was against the spirit of the Quebec agreement, in which Americans and Britons and Canadians have agreed never to help another country in the military field without the consensus of the two others.¹⁹

Not only in the development of atomic bombs have the French been forced to act independently of the other NATO allies, but also they have been forced into expensive duplication efforts in the construction of nuclear submarines. To the French, all of this secrecy, especially since Britain has been able to share American atomic secrets and save tremendous costs in the creation of their independent nuclear forces, has "...served as an additional grievance against the special Anglo-American partnership."²⁰ The French subscribe to the theory that he who controls the nuclear weapons shall also determine the strategy in their use.²¹ It was apparent to the Western Europeans that the control of nuclear weapons was essential to the exercise of leadership in the alliance. Raymond Aron describes the importance that France placed on nuclear weapons:

Either France was to have along with the Americans and the English, a major voice, a special responsibility, and an exceptional role in leading the West, or it would withdraw from NATO, remove its troops from the common organization, and take over responsibility for the essential part of its own defense by creating its own atomic force...²²

After French atomic forces were technically assured of becoming a reality

¹⁹Quoted in Roy Batterby, "French Eyes on the Future", Survival, Vol. 7, No. 6 (September, 1965), p. 222.

²⁰Osgood, op. cit., p. 218.

²¹Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice. Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1961), p. 111.

²²Robert Aron, An Explanation of de Gaulle, Marianne Sinclair, tr. (New York, 1966), p. 158.

in 1958, de Gaulle became more amenable to cooperating with the NATO allies. Speaking before the future military officers of France at the École de Guerre, he stated:

It goes without saying that our defense, the mobilization of our means, the way in which the conduct of war is conceived --all this must be combined for us with what exists in other countries. Our strategy must be joined with the strategy of others. On the battlefields, there is every probability that we would find ourselves side by side with our allies.²³

De Gaulle has continually stressed that the "...Atlantic Alliance is absolutely necessary", that the actions of the allies should be in concert, and if war should come, all "...should combine their efforts". However, he has resisted the dominance of the United States over nuclear strategy, and has insisted that the security of France requires French nuclear weapons, asserting that France must "...retain her will, her countenance and her army".²⁴

The Problem of Further Integration

The United States and to a certain extent Great Britain have taken over the task of developing, preparing, and using primarily offensive strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons, because these countries have the greatest military economic, and technical potential...

The American imperialists, who have all the strategic weapons at their disposal, exert political and military pressure on their allies to force them to pursue policies advantageous to the United States.²⁵

Though the above passage is cloaked with propagandistic terminology,

²³Charles de Gaulle in a speech made November 3, 1959, quoted in Roy C. Macridis, De Gaulle Implacable Ally (New York, 1966), p. 134.

²⁴Charles de Gualle in a speech made November 23, 1961, quoted in *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.

²⁵V. D. Soklovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, Herbert S. Dinerstein and others, tr. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963), p. 168.

there are elements of truth within it. For purposes of this study an examination of one of the policies that was to be "advantageous to the United States is presented--the multilateral force.

The Allies differ in their interpretation of the most basic issue--the use of weapons. Henry Kissinger explained that the fundamental differences among them are "philosophical", and he outlined these differences as they pertain to the French and American concept of NATO:

Washington urges a structure which makes separate action physically impossible by assigning each partner a portion of the over-all task. Paris insists that a consensus is meaningful only if each partner has a real choice.... In its /Washington/ view, influence is proportionate to a nation's contribution to a common effort, somewhat like share-owning in a stock company.²⁶

On the basis of share-owning it is not difficult for the United States to expect to control the "company" as its shares coupled with two other major partners, Great Britain and Germany, represent an overwhelmingly majority of interests. What, though, are the results when the majority stockholders desire to pursue a particular course of action that is contrary to the wishes of the minority? Very possibly ten or fifteen years ago the majority--United States definition of majority--would have carried the issue but not so today.

In 1960 the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Norstad, proposed that NATO should become the fourth nuclear power in order to give the alliance control of the nuclear components now held in exclusive United States custody.²⁷ In anticipation of problems in the creation of

²⁶Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, op. cit., p. 46.

²⁷Timothy W. Stanley, NATO in Transition: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (New York, Washington, London, 1965), p. 199.

a multilateral atomic authority, General Norstad was very cautious in his assessment of the requirements of such a force that he stated:

...for the alliance to have continuing life and meaning, it needs increasing authority; it needs power of some form. If politically feasible, action to pass to the alliance greater control over atomic weapons and to subject their use more directly to the collective will could be a great and dramatic new step.²⁸

The members were not able to find a common basis for agreement on the proposal because of the lack of consensus concerning how to place "fifteen fingers on the trigger". The proposal did not progress beyond the discussion stage.²⁹ The failure of this proposal was indicative of the results of future plans that attempted to serve conflicting nuclear interests among the members of NATO.

To some extent the most serious proposal for creating a multilateral atomic authority within NATO was an outgrowth of British failures to perfect nuclear capabilities comparable to the defenses of the Soviet Union. Possessing fission weapons in 1952 and thermonuclear ones in 1957, the British depended upon their V-bombers (Vulcan, Victor, and Valiant) to deliver their nuclear weapons. Soviet technological advances in anti-aircraft defenses decreased measurably the proposed effectiveness of the British bombing force. To counter modern Soviet defenses the British attempted to develop the Blue Streak³⁰ which, after enormous expenditures,

²⁸Quoted in Mulley, op. cit., p. 95.

²⁹Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance (New York, London, 1964), p. 105.

³⁰Blue Streak was a British intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that was to be armed with a nuclear warhead. Designed with a "soft"--above ground--launching pad it would not withstand the pressures encountered by an enemy's near-miss nuclear attack.

was cancelled for fear it would become obsolescent before, or immediately after, it became operational. Great Britain turned to the American Skybolt³¹ as a substitute for its defunct Blue Streak project. After investing some 25 million dollars to assist American development of the Skybolt, the United States cancelled the project. Consequently, the British had nuclear weapons but no effective delivery system.³²

At a meeting in Nassau in December 1962, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was responsive to President Kennedy's offer of Polaris³³ missiles for British submarines. The Prime Minister also accepted the principle of "indivisibility of strategic defense", which committed the nuclear force of Britain to NATO control. The Nassau Agreement provided the framework for future discussions concerning multilateral control of nuclear weapons in NATO; it was also the initial attempt to fulfill "... the American quest for the integration of all the nuclear forces of the Alliance"³⁴ which were to include the British Bomber Command, British Polaris missiles, and some but not all, of the American Polaris weapons.

For the proposed atomic force to become a reality it would require

³¹Skybolt was a United States air-to-surface missile consisting of a two-stage, solid propellant plant. It was designed to be air-launched from strategic bombers at a distance estimated at one thousand miles from the enemy target. With its hypersonic speed, mobility, and range it could have increased the effectiveness of British V-bombers immeasurably.

³²Stanley, op. cit., pp. 164-67.

³³Polaris -- United States surface-to-surface (sub-surface if launched by submarine) two-stage, solid propellant ballistic missile directed by an inertial guidance system that is capable of putting it "on target" at a distance of approximately 1500 miles. Since the Nassau Agreement the range of the Polaris has been extended to 3,000 miles.

³⁴Kissinger, op. cit., p. 82.

the nuclear forces of France to be included. The United States attempted to effect this by offering France the opportunity to buy Polaris missiles on the same terms that had been offered to the British. This, of course, would entail the same controls. France, however, refused the offer. De Gaulle's view of the proposal was one of suspicion and distrust. Pragmatically he expressed the French position as follows:

France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau agreement. As it was conceived, undoubtedly no one will be surprised that we cannot subscribe to it. It truly would not be useful for us to buy Polaris missiles when we have neither the submarines to launch them nor the thermonuclear warheads to arm them.³⁵

He amplified his remarks to include his personal feelings in regards to the concept:

...this multilateral force necessarily entails a web of liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself, and on the outside a ring of obligations such that, if an integral part were suddenly snatched from it, there would be a strong risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.³⁶

Not to be dissuaded by French reluctance, the United States proposed a multilateral submarine fleet manned by NATO forces; in time the proposal was modified to be a fleet of twenty-five surface vessels that would be armed with Polaris missiles. The feasibility of such a "mix-master" force was debated in every NATO capital, the United States included. Militarily the idea, had it materialized, would have added

³⁵ Charles de Gaulle at a press conference on January 14, 1963, Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle May 19, 1958--January 31, 1964 (New York, 1964), p. 219. Hereafter cited as Major Addresses.

³⁶ Ibid.

hundreds of missiles mounted on a mobile launching platform which, without doubt, would have compounded Soviet defensive measures; but the concept never went beyond the state of military planning because of the following reason:

...it can be said that the problem of sharing the control of nuclear weapons is an extremely complex one, and raises political and military issues of the most subtle nature. For the most part, political considerations rather than purely military ones will determine whether or not a European deterrent force will come into being and what its character will be if it does.³⁷

After French refusal to participate in any NATO multilateral nuclear force, it was apparent that no further military integration within NATO was to be accomplished. Perhaps President de Gaulle sounded the death knell to present, and future, attempts of military integration when he stated:

...the concept of a war or even of a battle in which France would no longer be herself and would no longer be acting in her own behalf, with a part to play all her own, and in accordance with what she wants--such a concept cannot be accepted... this system of integration has had its day.³⁸

Dissension Within NATO

France wants to retrieve the command of its own forces, decide its own defenses, and determine its own military strategy independently of NATO. However, French leaders profess that they are willing to commit France to concerted efforts in defense of the North Atlantic region, but not within a highly integrated military structure.

³⁷Cottrell and Dougherty, op. cit., p. 107.

³⁸Charles de Gaulle in a speech made November 3, 1959, quoted in Macrides, op. cit., pp. 134-34.

For the United States, "independent" military forces are not compatible with the purposes of the alliance. It is ironical that a major share of the current dissension between the United States and France rests upon differences over this issue. Since the appointment of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in 1950, French forces have been expected to serve under the American commander, but not the reverse--American units will not take orders from French commanders apart from NATO. The following French demand fell on deaf ears:

...to recover the full exercise of its sovereignty on French territory, in other words, no longer to accept the presence of foreign units, installations or bases in France falling in any respect under the control of authorities other than the French authorities.³⁹

To prevent American military forces from coming under the control of French authorities, 30,000 American military personnel are currently leaving France; this movement of men and installations is estimated to cost more than one billion dollars.⁴⁰ Why, at this time, has France placed the Alliance in a position of spending an extra billion dollars; why has France refused to integrate its military forces with its NATO allies? What changes have occurred to make one ally adopt such divergent policies? Perhaps Ronald Steele is correct in his observations of French feelings:

The integrated military alliance we built was the guarantee of their security; but at the same time it was the final mark of their fall from world power. The small armies they assembled were but token forces by which they could display their allegiances to an alliance whose only meaning rested on America's

³⁹"French Aide-Mémoire to the Fourteen Other NATO Members (March 10)", NATO Letter, Vol. 14, No. 5 (May, 1966), p. 24.

⁴⁰"NATO Without France--de Gaulle Forces U.S. to Showdown in Europe", U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 60, No. 13 (March 21, 1966), p. 44.

promise to protect them. Nations which but a decade before had been the arbiters of the World and the rulers of half of mankind found themselves totally dependent on the United States for their survival. Rarely have the mighty fallen so far in so short a time; and, having fallen, rarely do the once-mighty look benignly upon their successors.⁴¹

The recent French reaction to NATO has been publicly blamed on de Gaulle. In answer to a question posed by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the United States Ambassador to France spoke of French policy in the following manner:

In regard to the question that you asked me as to how this French attitude toward NATO developed, I think we can say without any question at all that it represents the ideas of General de Gaulle. His views particularly on foreign policy are dominant in the French Government.... You can go back as far as 1957, I think, where he has termed himself against the integration of NATO. One of his particular planks, you might say, in his platform when he returned to power in 1958, was that the Government of the Fourth Republic permitted France to be 'taken over' as it were by the United States.⁴²

It cannot be said that President de Gaulle's actions with respect to the demand that all foreign troops stationed on French soil be placed under French Command by March 1967 came unexpectedly.⁴³ France had for years been requesting changes within NATO that would better reflect its leadership's interpretation of French interests. General Norstad commented on this point:

⁴¹Ronald Steele, The End of Alliance: America and the Future (New York, 1964), p. 29.

⁴²Charles E. Bohlen, United States Ambassador to France for the past three years, "The Crisis in NATO", op. cit., pp. 3-4.

⁴³In his letter of March 7, 1966 to President Johnson, de Gaulle states, "France intends to...terminate her participation in the 'integrated' commands, and no longer to place forces at the disposal of NATO". See Ibid., pp. 59-60.

We tend to think of this threat as being recent and French. By withdrawing his forces from NATO and evicting our forces from France, General de Gaulle is rapidly assuming, in the public mind, responsibility for most of the ills from which the Alliance suffers. That General de Gaulle has added mightily to the problems within the Alliance needs no reaffirmation, no repetition; but to assign to him all responsibility may be a serious and dangerous oversimplification. In fact, doubts and questions, threats and attacks, have not been limited to the last few months; they have been going on for some years now.⁴⁴

Distrust of American intentions have been more pronounced since the development of Soviet hydrogen weapons in 1953 and a subsequent delivery system as dramatized by Sputnik in 1957, however this distrust of the French President dates back further than the advent of Soviet nuclear weapons. Fighting the major share of World War II from exile, General de Gaulle had first-hand experience in the ways and means of liberating his homeland. The seeds of distrust could have been implanted by his wartime experiences with his allies, Great Britain and the United States. Giving as reasons why he distrusts these two countries, Aron states:

...it is because he /de Gaulle/ realized, in his dealings with the English, that they, too, have one permanent trait: they are Machiavellis, cloaked in courtesy and decked out with friendliness, and he is sure that the inner feelings and the outer behavior of the English will never alter...

In the case of the United States, there is no Machiavellianism. Perhaps American policy could rather be called too unsubtle and too naive.⁴⁵

Regardless of the exact time of the implantation of the seeds of distrust there has been continuity in his feelings. In the fall of 1948, six months before the creation of NATO, General de Gaulle criticized the military arrangements of the Brussels Treaty of which the United States was

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 222.

⁴⁵Aron, op. cit., pp. 146, 151.

not a member but was still more than an observer.⁴⁶ It was his conviction that both Great Britain and the United States would be "...content to conduct the defense of Europe behind the Continent or behind the Pyrennes".⁴⁷ There is the possibility, perhaps probability, that this was the battle plan as determined by the Anglo-American planning staffs of that time; French thinking could not be responsive to the idea of the next battlefield being France. To some degree this apprehension pervades French military outlook to the present time.

It is mutual interest that the entire alliance is based upon but for the allies, France included, a question concerning the mutuality of interest has arisen since the Soviet Union has achieved parity in nuclear weapons with the United States. France, and the other allies to a lesser extent, fear that the United States would not respond with massive nuclear retaliatory forces against Soviet actions directed only at Western Europe because of the possible destruction of American targets by Soviet forces. Distrust is also prevalent in the opposite circumstances --should the United States engage in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, contrary to Western European wishes, there is an excellent possibility that the NATO allies would also become unwilling participants in a war of annihilation. Both issues, to fight or not to fight, become a matter of trust for the allies, but the United States, as the possessor of the majority of weapons, does not have to place the same degree of trust in its allies. Osgood states the allies' position in this matter as a "...simple principle that there should be no annihilation without

⁴⁶M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (New York, 1959), p. 11

⁴⁷The New York Times, October 2, 1948, pp. 1, 3.

representation".⁴⁸

It is the French, more than the other allies, who have vocalized their opposition to NATO nuclear strategy and its formulation. The French contend, and rightly so, that the disproportionate number of Americans in the top military command positions have resulted in the major decisions being made by the United States. Examining the composition of Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE), one may easily conclude that "...it is largely what the public thinks it is: an American general staff". The French officers within NATO also charge that the "...paucity of information made available to the representatives" of France and other NATO members contributes to the American monopoly of decisions, nuclear and otherwise.⁴⁹ The French also contend that since two-thirds of the representatives of the Standing Group are but "...a continuation of the wartime Anglo-American partnership", France has never attained equality with either of the other members.⁵⁰

Not only do the organizational aspects of NATO cause dissension but the problem of command and control is of concern to the allies, especially France. These problems of command and control of strategy and weapons have manifested themselves over the years in actions contrary to the purposes of NATO. In support of the concept of "forward strategy" NATO planners envisaged in 1957 that low-yield atomic weapons delivered by tactical aircraft and American strategic bombers would be required to

⁴⁸Osgood, op. cit., p. 59.

⁴⁹Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France Troubled Ally, de Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects (New York, 1960), p. 282.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 280.

defend Europe. France, among others, made bases available on its territory for this purpose⁵¹ but in time withdrew the use of its bases from all American aircraft carrying atomic or nuclear weapons. Similar French response was accorded the American offer to place Polaris missiles on French soil because the United States would not relinquish control of the warheads or the delivery means.⁵²

In accepting the responsibility "...for the unity, integrity, and independence of France", President de Gaulle referred to French forces in NATO as the "means for action" to put down the Nationalist rebellion in Algeria in 1958.⁵³ The bulk of French forces in NATO had been withdrawn to fight in Algeria⁵⁴ and were never returned to NATO, even though NATO requested that they be returned. In 1959 the French fleet units were withdrawn from NATO naval units in the Mediterranean; the same type withdrawal occurred in 1963 from the Atlantic fleet units of NATO. The six French divisions assigned to SACEUR were decreased by sixty-six percent. American tactical air squadrons were re-deployed to Great Britain and Germany because of French refusal to permit nuclear weapons to be stored on French soil. The French air defense system, in part, has been removed from the integrated air defense of the NATO countries throughout Western Europe.⁵⁵

These listed French that were considered to be detrimental to the

⁵¹Ben T. Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New York, 1958), p. 7.

⁵²Osgood, op. cit., p. 223.

⁵³Major Addresses, p. 7.

⁵⁴Moore, op. cit., p. 7.

⁵⁵Claude Witze, "NATO--New Deal or Fast Shuffle", Air Force and Space Digest, Vol. 49, No. 4 (April, 1966), p. 14.

effectiveness of military coordination were explained somewhat by President de Gaulle:

The defense of France must be French. That is a necessity which has not always been too well understood in recent years. I know this. It is absolutely essential that it become recognized once more. With a country like France, if war should come, then that war must be her war. Its effort must be her effort.⁵⁶

But in justifying his actions in the creation of an independent nuclear force, contrary to NATO's desires, the French President was more Machiavellian inclined when he said:

Who can say that in the future, the political background having changed completely--that is something that has already happened on earth--the two powers having the nuclear monopoly will not agree to divide the world?.... And who can even say that the two rivals, after I know not what political and social upheaval, will not unite?⁵⁷

There is little doubt that the French do not trust the American response to the security needs of France since it is the function of every political leader to prepare and protect his country against all dangers, no matter how remote.

In the same letter to President Johnson in which the French President stated his intentions to "...no longer place forces at the disposal of NATO" he was also adamant in ensuring that the alliance survive but in a different form. President de Gaulle spoke of the "...solidarity of defense" created by NATO, and that France should remain a "...party to the treaty signed at Washington".⁵⁸ Of particular note is the French willingness to remain a member of the Treaty but not the Organization.

⁵⁶Quoted in Macridis, op. cit., p. 133.

⁵⁷The New York Times, November 11, 1959, p. 10.

⁵⁸"The Crisis in NATO", op. cit., p. 59.

The French are merely abrogating the Organization that has plagued them for years, an organization that has afforded them ceremonial distinction but at a sacrifice of political flexibility and military independence. He not only intends to adhere to the treaty provisions but he also has no intention of completely divorcing his military forces from the other integrated forces of NATO. In a note to all the NATO members President de Gaulle stated that "...it would be advisable, after the termination of French participation, to establish liaison missions" with the various military commands of NATO; he went on to say that these missions would be helpful in planning the use of French forces during "...the time of war in joint military operations."⁵⁹

However, the French are emphatic in their views regarding the integrated aspects of NATO. In a recent speech Premier Pompidou referred to the problem that military integration might involve France in "...a war that would not be ours" for reasons "...alien to the interests of France". He further referred to the present state of military integration as being "...the daughter of the cold war and helps to perpetuate it".⁶⁰ Removal of army divisions, fleet units, and aircraft squadrons, and the refusal to participate in military training exercises, and the request that all military foreigners leave France, requires one to conclude that France's position in NATO is not one of complete and full membership. These recent French actions are a culmination of a series of efforts over a period of years to change the integrated character of the alliance.

⁵⁹"Second French Aide-Memoire to the Other NATO Members (March 29)", NATO Letter, Vol. 14, No. 5 (May, 1966), p. 24.

⁶⁰Georges Pompidou, Full Texts of the Statements on Foreign Policy By Premier Georges Pompidou Before the French National Assembly on April 13 and April 20, 1960, No. 243A and 245A, (April, 1966), p. 5.

There have been major adjustments in both NATO policies and structure in the past, but none of such magnitude as presently proposed. Osgood summarized the problem in the following manner:

...the economic and political resurgence of Western Europe now challenge the very foundation of effective collaboration, the basic political and military assumptions upon which the alliance was constructed. At the same time, these portentous developments raise fundamental questions about the utility and the vitality of such a tightly knit regional alliance...⁶¹

Assuming that the Soviet threat has not diminished, and this study does make that assumption, it becomes imperative for all NATO members to seek and find a new basis for cooperation. There must be recognition by all members that the viability of the alliance depends upon "...sustaining allied cohesion...to meet the requirements of deterrence and defense".⁶²

Exactly what are the requirements of deterrence and defense? It is on this question that NATO is floundering. Military requirements are predicated upon many variable factors, but eventually they become limited by two fundamentals--the threat, apparent or potential, and a nation's capabilities. Obviously both of these fundamentals are in a constant state of flux, and it is with this backdrop that President de Gaulle has steered NATO into shallow, but not necessarily dangerous, waters. His recent actions have forced the helmsman--the United States --and the oarsmen of NATO to be more aware of changes in the international currents and the not-so-hidden reefs that exist should the present course of NATO not be altered.

The reaction of France has been public and clear. Other nations of

⁶¹Osgood, op. cit., p. 3.

⁶²Ibid., p. 23.

NATO have expressed concern more subtly, or with less public attention. A Soviet military writer has given assurances that other nations will follow the lead of France:

Today it is France that attacks the U.S. positions. But it will not be long before West Germany, seeking as it does to seize leadership in Western Europe, appropriates the key posts in the major bodies and intercepts the initiative in determining the policies and military strategy of the bloc, also pitches into attack.⁶³

That Germany does seek leadership is undeniable. Evidence points to the desire of the Germans to "intercept the initiative" and become a more dominant spokesman in NATO affairs. It is probably true that Germany also is restless with the United States' dominance of the integrated aspects of NATO. However, Hans Morgenthau has written that Germany would be more powerful within the alliance without France because of its military strength:

The German Army is today the backbone of the ground forces of NATO. In view of the defection of France and the military weakness of the other European allies, NATO tends to become the organizational structure for what is in substance an American-German alliance.⁶⁴

Coupled with the idea that Germany is the strongest member of NATO potentially, except for the United States, is the fact that Germany is the only country in the world not allowed to have an independent nuclear force. These forces have not failed to make their mark on German leadership. Fritz Erler, the floor leader in the Bundestag, recently reflected this problem when he expressed the feelings of many Germans about

⁶³N. Andreyev, "NATO's Role in Europe", Survival, Vol. 8 (May, 1966), p. 155.

⁶⁴Hans J. Morgenthau, "Germany Gives Rise to Vast Uncertainties", The New York Times Magazine (September 8, 1963), p. 21.

nuclear weapons that "...it would be impossible to exclude forever one country alone without creating feelings of frustration that would lead to violent nationalism".⁶⁵ He also stated a problem causing concern in Germany that was troublesome to France: "For years I have urged that the European partners in NATO be given a share in planning, in deciding on common strategy, in preparing future weapons developments and similar matters...".⁶⁶

The same problems of planning, weapons, and strategy that drove France from the alliance are also of concern to political leaders in Germany. German politics may also be reflecting this problem. In recent elections in Bavaria and Hesse, the National Democratic Party, an extreme nationalist group, made significant gains. This party is against NATO, anti-American, and willing to pursue a strictly nationalist foreign policy.⁶⁷ Probably these foreign policy aims were significant to German voters. While most European members realistically accept subordination to American leadership, they are sensitive that their opinions be respected in the planning chambers of NATO. They would like to have a voice in the formulation of strategy, particularly nuclear strategy.⁶⁸

Franz Josef Strauss stated in April, 1966 that the problem of NATO re-organization was "pressing" because serious consideration had never

⁶⁵Fritz Erler, "The Alliance and the Future of Germany", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43 (April, 1965), p. 442.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Roscoe Drummond, "Contagious Nationalism", The Christian Science Monitor (December 5, 1966), p. 18.

⁶⁸Theo Sommer, "For an Atlantic Future", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43 (October, 1964), p. 117.

been given to updating the structure. Since the Americans were "...absolutely satisfied with the existing situation" and the Europeans would not act, there was little likelihood of change. He expressed the opinion that the lead set by France will undoubtedly call for reorganization of the NATO framework. In the same interview, Mr. Strauss recommended a change in composition and function of the Standing Group to better reflect German interests.⁶⁹

All of the American allies in NATO have experienced problems caused by the integrated features of the alliance. By virtue of being the strongest member, the United States has created and perpetuated many of these problems in NATO. France warned the members of the alliance, by word and action, that changes in the integrated features of NATO must be made. Not receiving the desired response, France initiated actions to bring about change. Germany, confronted with similar frustrations, might pursue a like course which could result in a further weakening of the deterrence factor of the alliance and the defense posture of the United States.

⁶⁹"Time to Start U.S. Pullback in Europe?" U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 60 (April 18, 1966), p. 70.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

World War II involved the United States in global affairs to the extent that it was impossible to withdraw into isolation upon the termination of hostilities. Great hope was placed in the United Nations and cooperation among the major powers for the solution of major conflicts of interests among states. However, it was not long after the war before relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union reached a point where wartime cooperation could not continue and the United Nations could not live up to expectations. The United States and the Soviet Union began to construct alliances against each other and to compete for the support of the so-called uncommitted world.

In Europe the United States became concerned with the position of power established by the Soviet Union as a result of World War II, and feared that the security of Western Europe was threatened. The United States throughout the twentieth century looked upon Europe as being important to its own security. Twice Germany was fought to prevent it from dominating the continent; now it was feared that the Soviet Union might attempt the same thing. The power potential of Western Europe added to that of the Soviet Union would constitute, in the view of the United States, a serious security problem. Western European leaderships had a mutual interest in resisting any Soviet expansionist effort, therefore, they willingly allied with the United States in NATO to develop a

military deterrent to discourage any aggression. These same leaders were also dependent upon the United States for economic assistance to reconstruct their war torn economies.

This dependence--economic and military--gave the United States an inordinate amount of power in European affairs, which was exercised to the point of eventually frustrating many of the European states. The United States insisted that Western Europe unify militarily, economically, and politically. Not only would such developments contribute to deterrence of the Soviet Union, but they would constitute a means by which Germany could be prevented from becoming a future menace.

This study has been concerned primarily with United States military policy in Europe and the impact of the policy on the relations between the United States and its Western European allies. The United States insisted, on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, that a highly integrated military structure be created. In the early 1950s the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, combining the military capabilities of the signatories came into existence. Because of its power, the United States not only was able to realize its objective of a highly integrated military force, but as well able to dominate the command structure and the strategy-formulation process.

In time the American allies became less dependent upon the economic assistance provided by the United States. The Western Europeans rebuilt their cities, industries, and trade relations. Economic prosperity produced more than material goods for the Western Europeans; economic well-being encouraged them to become more independent vis-a-vis the United States.

Technological development of weapons by the Soviet Union is also

responsible for European re-evaluation of relationships with the United States. The successful demonstration of the ballistic missile capability of the Soviet Union late in 1957 impressed the European states that the United States was vulnerable to Soviet nuclear missiles. This development brought into sharp focus the question of reliability of the United States in the event of a conflict in security interests between the Western European allies and the United States. NATO possessed nuclear weapons, but these weapons were under the control of the United States. If the United States should decide to counter Soviet action by military means, there is nothing that its allies could do but follow. Similarly, should the American allies believe that a nuclear response was required and the United States differed in view, there would be little that they could do to effect this response. It is conceivable that under these conditions their security might be jeopardized. Even though nuclear weapons might not be involved, the United States, because of its dominance of the command structure of NATO, could direct the NATO forces in such a way that the European partners' interests might not be fully served.

The French, who provide the major example of resistance to NATO in this study, have indicated by their policies and actions that they are unwilling to risk their security under conditions imposed by the NATO integrated military system. France, as a result, has embarked upon the development of a security system independent of the NATO system. The French leadership has insisted that the West European states must provide for their own security and not rely completely upon the United States. With respect to the current international environment in which a relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and Western Europe

seems to be taking place, the French leadership has concluded that the present NATO structure is too inflexible to exploit this condition in the French interest.

While France has rejected the tightly integrated military structure that has evolved since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, it has not renounced the treaty provisions requiring member nations to come to the assistance of each other if an aggression is committed. France insists, however, that each nation must be free to decide for itself what action it will take. The integrated structure violates that freedom of choice provided for in Article 5 of the Treaty.¹

There are indications that other nations in the alliance structure have been frustrated with the integrated military system as well. While the official policies of Germany have continually supported the NATO military system, there are indications that some political leaderships are responding to the same problems that led to the withdrawal of France.

It is the conclusion of this study that American policies requiring a tightly structured alliance system, with the United States dominating the command structure and the strategy-formulation process, have resulted in the breakdown of formal military coordination among the members of NATO. Assuming that the United States values formal military coordination as a major part of its security system, policies will have to be

¹The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

devised to meet the objections of the European partners. France is the only state to have withdrawn from the structured military system to date, but the likelihood of others doing so under present conditions of world politics is possible.

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TEXT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

PREAMBLE. The parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2. The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3. In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4. The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5. The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the

United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6. For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties.

ARTICLE 7. This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8. Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.

ARTICLE 9. The parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10. The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11. This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12. After the treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13. After the treaty has been in force for twenty years, any party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14. This treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

VITA

Allen Carl Neimeyer

Thesis: THE POLITICAL EFFECT OF MILITARY INTEGRATION ON NATO.

Major Field: Political Science

BIOGRAPHICAL:

Personal Data: Born in Fargo, North Dakota, July 22, 1926, the son of Alfred and Cora Neimeyer.

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