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by

DON EDWARD BECK

Norman, Oklahoma

1966

THE RHETORIC OF CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: A STUDY IN CIVIL WAR CAUSATION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

LIST OF TABLES v

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION 1

Purposes of the Study
Approaches to the Study
Sources of Material
Plan of the Study

II. THE SOCIAL JUDGMENT-INVOLVEMENT APPROACH 30

The Cognitive Process of Perception-Judgment
Impact of Ego-Involvement
Impact of Social Judgment on Group Theory
Impact of Social Judgment on Rhetorical Theory

III. RHETORIC AND COMPROMISE: A THEORETICAL APPROACH . 67

Relationship between Conflict and Compromise
Relationship between Rhetoric and Compromise
Effect of Ego-Involvement

IV. BACKGROUND TO THE 1860 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION . . . 97

Historical Influences
Political Background
Social and Cultural Background
Rhetorical Background

V. ATTITUDES TOWARD SLAVERY IN 1860 151

Positions on Slavery
Assimilation and Contrast Effects

VI. BIPOLARIZATION IN 1860 193

The Nature of Bipolarization
The Causes of Bipolarization
The Effects of Bipolarization

VII. CONCLUSION 225

BIBLIOGRAPHY 231

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Mean Sizes of Latitudes of Acceptance, Rejection, and Noncommitment: Oklahoma, 1960 41

THE RHETORIC OF CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: A STUDY IN CIVIL WAR CAUSATION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Philosophers and statesmen across the Atlantic in 1860 and 1861 asked one another why twenty-five million intelligent Americans could not settle the condition of four million uneducated Africans without tearing one another's throats. Over one hundred years later Professor J. Jeffrey Auer, in his Preface to Anti-slavery and Disunion, 1858-1861, asked: "Why did the Americans, trained in the democratic tradition of free speech and compromise, ultimately fail to talk out their differences?"[1]

The rejection of compromise in the ante bellum struggle was reflected in the failure of the rhetoric of conciliation as a rational instrument in the "energizing of knowledge and the humanizing of truth."[2] The alternative was a bloody war resulting in over one million casualties and a total monetary cost well in excess of eight billion dollars.[3]

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[1] John Jeffrey Auer (ed.), Anti-slavery and Disunion, 1858-1861 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. x.

[2] This definition of rhetoric by Charles S. Baldwin is cited in Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 70.

[3] David M. Potter, "Why the Republicans Rejected both Compromise and Secession," in The Crisis of the Union, 1860-1861, ed. George Harmon Knoles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), p. 105, points out that the war cost the life of one soldier, either Rebel or

This dissertation will focus on the development of a theoretical approach to conflict and conflict resolution. An analytical model, reflecting current thought from several disciplines, will be applied in an historical analysis of the factors which brought on the American Civil War. This interaction of the theoretical with the historical is both deductive and inductive. This study performs a deductive function in that the basic principles of the eclectically-derived construct will be superimposed on the historical context. This dissertation follows an inductive pattern in that some of the insights gained from the historical data modify or replace the theoretical concepts.

The deductive and inductive views of conflict, rhetoric, and compromise result in a more sophisticated theoretical approach on one hand and more accurate historical judgment and interpretation on the other. An approach to conflict and conflict resolution which has been developed theoretically and tested historically should prove to be a useful paradigm in the examination of other controversies.

Purposes of the Study

The intent of this dissertation, therefore, is two-fold. First, this study develops a theoretical construct dealing with the interaction of rhetoric and compromise within a conflict. The main objective is to determine at what point a controversy becomes so rigid that it is no longer amenable to some form of peaceful settlement. This approach, which views compromise as a rhetorical activity, focuses on those factors

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Yank, for every six slaves who were freed and for every ten white Southerners who were held in the Union. This is not to say, however, that the parties in the conflict were aware, at the time, of the implications of their decision to resort to arms.

within the anatomy of a controversy which either make possible a settlement or deepen the confrontation into an "irrepressible conflict." The analytical model will be described in Chapters II and III.

Second, the theoretical construct will be applied, in the form of a case-study, to the pre-Civil War controversy in general and to the presidential campaign and election of 1860 in particular.

The ante bellum controversy, which has been described by Devoto as "the crux of our history,"[1] has been selected as a testing-ground for the theoretical approach. Three factors motivated this choice. First, many of the issues which caused the disruption of the Union are just an meaningful and important now as they were then. Although the contemporary attitudes do not activate the same degree of intensity as they did in 1860, they are still vital to many Americans of this century. The importance of the issues discussed in the sectional conflict has been underlined by Elkins in his study of the problem of slavery.

> It can hardly be doubted that the estrangement of North and South over slavery, and the consequences of it, offer us what is potentially the most distinguished subject in our history. That it might have ended otherwise is a shadowy possibility that will trouble our minds forever. That there may have been alternatives--that choices were at least conceivable--makes it a subject not quite foreordained and fatal, but tragic.[2]

Second, the student of the prologue to the war is able to observe the development and interaction of various shades of attitudes as the conflict emerges and intensifies. The critic, then, is in a position to study both the rise and fall of ideas and movements related to the sectional confrontation.

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[1] Bernard Devoto, "Slavery and the Civil War," Slavery as a Cause of the Civil War, ed. Edwin C. Rozwenc (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1949), p. 99.

[2] Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 194.

Third, the various forms of behavior stimulated by the attitudes of that generation can be examined by the modern critic because of the availability of research materials, both primary and secondary, dealing with that period in American history. For these reasons, then, the theoretical model will be applied to the general area of the causes of the American Civil War.

The campaign and election of 1860 will be the specific focus of this historical study; both of which were highly significant events along the path that led to war. First, the importance of the campaign was reflected in the nature of the issues discussed and the degree to which they captivated the thoughts and emotions of the voters. Smith claimed that the campaign "became a contest over principles in 1860, not one of personalities as it was in 1828, 1840, and 1856."[1] The extent of the nation's involvement in these issues was noted by Fite.

> The whole history of the country and its social, legal and governmental institutions, were searched for proof and refutation; contemporary society, manners, and customs were rigorously held up to view, analyzed, and judged. Rarely has the nation taken a broader view of itself.[2]

For the first time in the history of the slavery controversy the clearly-defined issue was placed before the voters in a national election. For decades the slavery issue had been temporarily resolved within the halls of deliberative bodies. In 1860 the question was put to the people for a verdict. Fish and Smith point out that

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[1] William Ernest Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), I, 503.

[2] Emerson David Fite, The Presidential Campaign of 1860 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), p. xi.

> it is doubtful that the American people, unless possibly in 1896, ever participated in a campaign more enlightening than that of 1860. It was a campaign built on six years of constant debate, preceded by another six during which points of view had been sharpened. If ever the people were prepared to speak it was in November, 1860.[1]

The nature of the issues and the degree of their penetration into the social structure of that period made the 1860 campaign a momentous event in the history of this nation. The editor of the Daily Missouri Democratic was correct when he predicted in July of that year that "we have entered upon a campaign that will be memorable in the annals of American politics."[2]

Second, the results of the 1860 presidential election intensified the cleavage between the North and the South. The role of Lincoln's election in the coming of the war has been described by several historical critics. Lipset argued that "the election of 1860 stands out decisively as the presidential election which most affected American life. Its controversies culminated in the Civil War."[3] Knox suggested that "the election of Abraham Lincoln in November of 1860 set into action the secession which the South for many years had threatened."[4] Fehrenbacher asserted that "whatever disagreement there may be about the underlying causes of the Civil War, it is clear that the conflict was precipitated in 1860-61 by a series of momentous decisions which began with the election of a Republican president."[1] Finally, Luthin, in his study of the first Lincoln victory, reached the conclusion that

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[1] Carl Russell Fish and William Ernest Smith, The American Civil War (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937), p. 26.

[2] Daily Missouri Democratic, July 30, 1860.

[3] Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), p. 345.

[4] Clinton Everett Knox, "The Possibilities of Compromise in the Senate Committee of Thirteen and the Responsibility of Failure," Journal of Negro History, XVII (October, 1932), 437.

> many of the students of the period are agreed that without Lincoln's victory in November, 1860, war between the sections would not have been precipitated in the following April, if indeed this greatest of American tragedies would have occurred at all.[2]

Both the campaign and the election, consequently, contributed to the intensification of the sectional conflict which led to the firing on Sumter. In this regard James, who described the 1860 campaign and election in Illinois, claimed that "the campaign and election of 1860 was one of the most crucial events in the history of the United States. It was the last contest of speech and editorial preceding the battle of blood and lead."[3] The application of the theoretical construct to the historical context of the ante bellum controversy will be developed in Chapters IV, V, and VI.

This study, then, proposes (1) to construct an analytical model dealing with the interaction of rhetoric and compromise within a conflict, and (2) to apply that construct in an analysis of the factors which culminated in the most costly war this nation has ever known.

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[1] Don E. Fehrenbacher, "The Republican Decision at Chicago," in Politics and the Crisis of 1860, ed. Norman A. Graebner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 32.

[2] Reinhard H. Luthin, The First Lincoln Campaign (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), p. vii.

[3] Harold Preston James, "Lincoln's Own State in the Election of 1860" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Illinois, 1943), p. viii.

Approaches to the Study

In applying the dictum of Kenneth Burke that the critic should use "all that is there to use" in the act of criticism,[1] this study will approach the investigation of conflict and compromise from the distinctive yet interdependent viewpoints of rhetoric, history, political science, and the behavioral sciences. The intent, here, will be to integrate these four fields of study in light of their interdisciplinary, interactive, and perceptive characteristics.

Interdisciplinary Approach

Some of the most productive types of critical research and writing are interdisciplinary in their approach. The general interrelationship of these four disciplines appears in the following six ratios.

History and the Behavioral Sciences

History and the behavioral sciences interact in two directions. First, the descriptions of human behavior which have arisen from quantitative research within the behavioral sciences serve to assist in the unraveling of the complex problems of historical interpretation. Nevins contends that

> history, over the long period since Hume and Voltaire, has become steadily more useful to people as it has broadened its scope, and gained an eclectic use of new tools. It has learned to take all possible profit from the other social studies--statistics, sociology, economics, psychology, geography--in presenting a complete and exact picture of the past.[2]

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[1] Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1941), p. 23.

[2] Allan Nevins, The Gateway to History (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1962), p. 31.

The same idea has been expressed by Sellers as he contends that "the infant discipline of social psychology" can furnish the historian with useful concepts.

> Historians of the Old South have a special reason for pressing their problems on their brethren in social psychology, while the social psychologists may find in historical data a challenging area for developing and testing hypotheses. Especially rewarding to both historians and social scientists would be a collaborative study of ante-bellum southern radicalism and its peculiar locus, South Carolina.[1]

Modern historians have not hesitated to view ante bellum behavior from the vantage point of the behavioral sciences. For example, Mary Scrugham's The Peaceable Americans of 1860-1861: A Study in Public Opinion has been described by Pressly as "the first important statement in the twentieth century by a historian reflecting the distinctive outlook which was to characterize the 'revisionist' approach."[2] In her study Scrugham employed "psychological explanations" of events and quoted heavily from such books as Human Nature in Politics by Graham Wallas, The Crowd by Gustave Le Bon, Social Psychology by William McDougall, and Educational Psychology by Edward Thorndike.

Information and insights derived from a study of present human behavior may, consequently, contribute to a study of past human behavior. The behavioral scientists, then, may assist the historian in recreating and understanding the past.

Second, the study of past human behavior may help explain the nature of present human behavior. Just as scientific research assists in the solution of historical complexities, historical research contributes to a better understanding of contemporary problems. Holsti and North suggest, in the context of "game theory," that the exploration of past wars and conflicts can materially aid the student of current and future events.[1] They base their claim on two factors. First, the historical critic has more data with which to work than the contemporary critic since more documents and papers are available. Second, the critic can, in the language of Holsti and North, "enjoy the advantages of an algebra book with the answers in the back. He can compare in minutest detail what statesmen have said with what they have actually done--and determine what perceptions have shaped their decisions."[2]

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[1] Charles Grier Sellers (ed.), The Southerner as American (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 68.

[2] Thomas J. Pressly, Americans Interpret Their Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 292.

The student of modern conflicts and controversies will profit from a careful examination of past conflicts and controversies as he is able to observe the kinds of choices that were made with their corresponding results.

The relationships between the historical and scientific studies of human behavior are, as a result, complementary and interdependent. The social psychologist "may find in historical data a challenging area for developing and testing hypotheses"; the historian may profit from the "other social studies" in presenting a "complete and exact picture of the past."

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[1] Ole R. Holsti and Robert C. North, "The History of Human Conflict," in The Nature of Human Conflict, ed. Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), pp. 155-71. For a description of "game theory" see Anatol Rapoport, "Game Theory and Human Conflict," in The Nature of Human Conflict, pp. 196-226.

[2] Holsti and North, pp. 155-56. Their own study focuses on the weeks just prior to the outbreak of war in 1914. They contend that "embedded in archival data lies something close to a prototype of crisis against which a contemporary crisis--or future crisis--can be measured."

History and Political Science

The integration of history and political science occurs on several dimensions. The historian is interested in the history of political movements; the political scientist is interested in the politics of historical movements. The historian studies past elections in order to understand the past. The political scientist studies past elections in order to understand the present and, hopefully, predict the future. This relationship has been stated succinctly by what Lane calls "Seeley's rhyme."

> History without political science has no fruit:
> Political science without history has no root.[1]

The sharing of data and interpretations by the historian and political scientist aids substantially the development of both disciplines as they seek to understand the nature of man as a political animal.

Political Science and the Behavioral Sciences

The relative merits of the traditional as opposed to the behavioral approach to the study of politics is a controversial subject within the discipline of political science. Saveth described the behavioral approach in the following statement.

> Emphasis upon the concept as a nuclear and interdisciplinary factor in social science analysis is suggestive of the behavioralist trend in social science, and, particularly, in political science. This theory stresses the role of certain hard core disciplines--psychology, sociology, and anthropology--in the explanation of political behavior. Transcending these disciplines are concepts such as voting behavior, decision-making, and those associated with psychology and psychoanalysis, which are used to explain past and current political behavior.[2]

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[1] Cited in Robert E. Lane, "Political Science and Psychology," in Psychology: A Study of a Science, ed. Sigmund Koch, Vol. VI of Investigation of Man as Socius: Their Place in Psychology and the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 587.

[2] Edward N. Saveth (ed.), American History and the Social

Kirkpatrick contends that the controversy between the two points of view is needless for they are not, as he says, "mutually exclusive."[1] Lasswell defended the importance of the behavioral view when he wrote:

> If archaeology, history, and anthropology have provided a corrected map of the past of organized politics, we must credit social psychology with helping to explain the mechanism whereby interacting individuals achieve both culture and individuality. It is unthinkable that any center of political science would cut itself off from these disciplines.[2]

An understanding of human behavior can assist the political scientist in exploring the complexities of political behavior. Since the scientific approach can add to our knowledge of the nature of human behavior, then the political scientist has much to learn from the behavioral scientist.

Rhetoric and the Behavioral Sciences

Rhetoric, defined as "the function of adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas,"[3] has always relied on the theories of human behavior which were accepted in each generation. Maccoby observed that

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Sciences (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 17. For the opposite point of view see James C. Charlesworth (ed.), The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1962).

[1] Evron M. Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach on Traditional Political Science," in Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, ed. Austin Ranney (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p. 27.

[2] Harold D. Lasswell, The Future of Political Science (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 226.

[3] Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope," in Philosophy, Rhetoric and Argumentation, ed. Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965) p. 47. In this sense "rhetoric" is not to be thought of as "mere verbiage" but has a much broader definition. See Hoyt Hudson, "The Field of Rhetoric," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. Raymond F. Howes (New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 3-15.

"for both [Plato and Aristotle] the approach to rhetoric was through psychology--to them the science of the mind."[1] Brockriede contended that the "essence of the Aristotelian study of rhetoric is not the system of finding the available means of persuasion; rather, it is the empirical description of rhetorical situations and the philosophical construction of an appropriate system of principles."[2] Bryant added that such an "empirical description of rhetorical situations" should be influenced by the behavioral sciences.

> It is a commonplace that of the studies recently come to new and promising maturity, psychology, especially social psychology, and cultural antropology have much to teach modern rhetoric and to correct and reinterpret in traditional rhetoric.[3]

In his discussion of the interaction between the traditional and experimental viewpoints of rhetoric, Thompson asserted that the "experimentalists are a potential source of material for a new rhetoric."[4] Both viewpoints, the traditional and the scientific, may contribute to the formation of a theory of rhetoric which reflects rhetorical situations in the twentieth century. Current research in the behavioral sciences, consequently, provides the empirical descriptions of human behavior necessary for the formulation of a contemporary theory of rhetoric.

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[1] Nathan Maccoby, "The New 'Scientific' Rhetoric," in The Science of Human Communication, ed. Wilbur Schramm (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1963), p. 42.

[2] Wayne E. Brockriede, "Toward a Contemporary Aristotelian Theory of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LII (February, 1966), 34.

[3] Bryant, p. 50.

[4] Wayne N. Thompson, "A Conservative View of a Progressive Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIX (February, 1963), 3. For a defense of the traditional view of rhetoric see Otis M. Walter, "On Views of Rhetoric, Whether Conservative or Progressive," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIX (December, 1963), 374.

Rhetoric and History

The alliance between rhetoric and history, which was firmly entrenched in Classical thought, is just as meaningful in the twentieth century. This alliance was described by Auer when he wrote the following paragraph in the Preface to Anti-slavery and Disunion, 1858-1861.

> Historical studies must, of necessity, investigate rhetoric, identify persuasive appeals, and examine the causative factors influencing men's minds, impelling them to act in one way or another. Historical events do not take place in a vacuum; a people's behavior develops from their reactions and adjustments to the forces playing upon them.[1]

Not only will an understanding of rhetorical theory and practice aid the historian, but an analysis of various historical movements will add to the knowledge of the rhetorician. Baird wrote:

> Nothing is more illuminating to the student of speeches than to trace, through the debates and orations of the 1850s and 1860s, the disintegration of discussion, the split in the Democratic Party, the secession, and the resort to war.[2]

The student of rhetoric views rhetorical transactions against the background and within the framework of historical processes; the historian views the various dimensions of rhetorical interaction as essential parts of the rise and fall of historical movements. Rhetoric and history, consequently, share a close interdependency.

Rhetoric and Political Science

Both rhetoric and political science are interested in the means of social influence. They jointly concern themselves with the characteristics of effective communication and persuasion within and between political organizations and movements. A student of rhetoric should explore the nature of political theory and practice in order to understand the rhetorical transaction; the political scientist should become familiar with the nature of rhetorical theory and practice in order to comprehend the full implications of the political transaction.

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[1] Auer, p. x.

[2] A. Craig Baird, American Public Addresses, 1740-1952 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), p. 6.

The fields of history, political science, rhetoric, and the behavioral sciences are, consequently, interrelated and interdependent. The student of human behavior both past and present should avail himself of the information and insights to be found in these related disciplines. This study is eclectic, then, in the sense that it follows the advice of Kenneth Burke in seeking to "use all that is there to use."

Interactive Approach

In addition to their interdisciplinary relationships, these four disciplines share an interactive nature. All four stress the interaction of elements within the situation or chronological period to be studied.

Interaction in History

The historian endeavors to view the interaction of ideas, individuals, and events within the historical drama. This concern for an interactive approach to the study of history is reflected in the nature of historical causation. Bestor contends that "the fundamental historical problem, in short, is not to measure the relative weight of various causal elements, but instead to discover the pattern of their interaction with one another."[1]

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[1] Arthur Bestor, "The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis," American Historical Review, XLIX (January, 1964), 330.

Strout observed that "the historian conventionally speaks of 'multiple causes' because he knows he has no monistic formula to explain the course of history and no single generalization to cover all the necessary and sufficient conditions for a civil war."[1] Silbey rejected what he calls the "single-factor explanations for human behavior" in favor of an approach which considers all the "political stimuli" operating upon an individual or groups at a given time.[2] Finally, Nevins suggested that

> since in nine instances out of ten, any important historical transaction should be treated as of multiple causation, its roots as numerous and far-ramifying as its consequences, the office of the historian is not to select one or two explanations, excluding or minimizing all others, but to ascertain all the factors and assign each its proportionate weight.[3]

This study of the influences which led to the American Civil War will be based on the concept of multiple causation.[4] The investigation of any war, for that matter, must consider the interaction of the various components within a historical situation. The role of the historian, then, is to attempt to balance the interacting causes instead of isolating a "single-factor explanation."

Interaction in the Behavioral Sciences

Considerable interest exists in the interactive approach to human behavior in the behavioral sciences, especially in social psychology. In rejecting the one-way view of traditional psychology or sociology, social psychologists focus on the interaction of the individual with his social situation. Sherif and Sherif wrote:

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[1] Cushing Strout, "Causality," in American History and Social Sciences, p. 510.

[2] Joel H. Silbey, "The Civil War Synthesis in American Political History," Civil War History, X (June, 1964), 140.

[3] Nevins, p. 247.

[4] For a list of the explanations which have been given to the cause of the Civil War see David Donald, "Excess of Democracy: The American Civil War and the Social Process," Centennial Review, V (Winter, 1961), 22.

> In short, we can achieve a balanced understanding of relationships among influences coming from individuals and from social environments if we avoid a stand that glorifies the individual and a stand that glorifies culture. By viewing experience and behavior as joint products of influences coming both from within him and from groups and the culture surrounding him, we can approach our study of social psychology prepared to note the interplay of both sets of influences in shaping any particular experience and behavior.[1]

The current trend in social psychology is to view human behavior within the context of the "interplay" of external and internal stimuli which influence an individual. The theoretical construct developed in this dissertation will rely, in large part, on the interactive nature of attitudes and group formation and modification.

Interaction in Rhetoric

Rhetoric is an interactive transaction. When Thonssen and Baird published their comprehensive treatment of rhetorical criticism in 1948, they expressed a need for "a set of principles which will bind the many concepts together."[2] One of the concepts they used to represent their view of the rhetorical process was "interaction." They observed that judicial criticism "reconstructs a speech situation carefully in the light of the interaction of speaker, audience, subject and occasion."[3]

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[1] Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1956), p. 8.

[2] Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), p. 465.

[3] Ibid., p. 18.

Marie Hochmuth [Nichols] proposed that the totality of rhetoric should be seen as an "organism." Rhetoric, she suggested, must be concerned with every aspect of the situation.

> If we do not press the analogy too far, we may compare the speech with a multi-celled organism, whose units consist of speaker, audience, place, purpose, time and form. In order to evaluate the speech, all these elements, verbal and nonverbal, must be examined.[1]

The parts of the organism cannot be studied individually but must be evaluated as a functioning unit with a matrix of relationships. The rhetorical transaction involves the interaction of multiple factors which, in combination, determine the final outcome of the rhetorical appeal.

Kenneth Burke uses the analogy of the drama in demonstrating the interactive nature of rhetoric. Just as a drama is created by the interaction of act, agent, agency, scene, and purpose, the rhetorical transaction is created by the interaction of speech, speaker, method, occasion, and intent.[2]

Thonssen, Baird, Nichols, and Burke have emphasized the relationship among the elements in a rhetorical situation and look for "the set of principles which will bind the many concepts together." Brockriede summarized the current view of rhetoric when he observed that "central to the rhetorical function is the notion of purposeful interaction between speaker and audience."[3]

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[1] Marie Hochmuth [Nichols], "The Criticism of Rhetoric," in A History and Criticism of American Public Address, Ed. Marie K. Hochmuth [Nichols] (New York: Longman's Green and Company, 1955), III, 9.

[2] See Virginia L. Holland, "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach to Speech Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (December, 1955), 352-58.

[3] Brockriede, 39.

Interaction in Political Science

A political scientist, in his study of individuals and groups within society, views political interaction on the ideational and interpersonal dimensions. A student of political theory is interested in the interaction of ideas and concepts in a dialectical sense. One need not accept the full implications of the Marxist-Hegelian form of dialectical materialism to interpret the ideational interaction of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis within the political dimension.

Furthermore, political scientists explore in depth the impact of interpersonal relations in the quest for political power and influence. The interaction of candidate with party is matched along side the interaction of candidate with voter. In short, the study of politics requires an analysis of the interaction of ideas and individuals as they confront each other within the political context.

The interdisciplinary fields of history, rhetoric, political science, and the behavioral sciences share a reliance on the process of interaction. The critic who works within or among these disciplines should examine the interplay of the basic and multiple factors which influence human behavior.

Perceptive Approach

The third approach to a study of conflict and conflict resolution employed in this dissertation is based on the notion of perception. The perceptive approach to human behavior suggests that ideas, events, and people are not perceived in the same way by any two individuals. Instead, each individual brings with him his own evaluative categories or "pictures in the head" which determine the way he will perceive a stimulus. Historians, political scientists, rhetoricians, and behavioral scientists all deal, in one form or another, with the phenomenon of perception.

Perception in History

The historian views an event, idea, or movement through the eyes of the participants involved. Jaffa claimed that the historian must first "see the past as it appeared in the past and not only in the light of the opinions of a later and different age."[1] In discussing the role of the student of history, Potter contends that

> the supreme task of the historian, and the one of most superlative difficulty, is to see the past through the imperfect eyes of those who lived it and not with his own omniscient twenty-twenty vision. I am not suggesting that any one of us can really do this, but only that it is what we must attempt.[2]

In other words, the historian must be cautious to avoid superimposing the values and mores of his own generation on a different generation. The student of history strives to "see the past as it appeared in the past" and endeavors to avoid the tendency to judge the past by the standards of the present.

Perception in Political Science

Walter Lippman, in his study of Public Opinion, described what he called the "triangular relationship between the scene of action, the human picture of that scene, and the human response to that picture working itself out upon the scene of action."[3] Lippman contended that man does not live in the real environment but, instead, exists in the "pseudo-environment" of his own perceptions.

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[1] Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1959), p. 28.

[2] Potter, pp. 92-3.

[3] Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 17.

A graphic example of the nature of perception in political science is in the area of voting behavior. Bone and Ranney use the term "cognitive map" to represent the picture carried in the mind of an individual which he utilizes in his assessment of political ideas and candidates.[1] Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee, in their classic studies of voting behavior, made two observations about political perception.[2] First, they distinguish between the "objective campaign" that is carried on in the "real" world and the "perceived campaign" that exists in the voter's mind. There are, then, two campaigns--one real and the other perceived. Second, these political scientists discuss the effect of perception on political judgment. They contend that perception in response to political campaigns operates to maximize agreement with one's own party and maximize the amount of disagreement with the opposition party.

The nature of perception within the political process, therefore, makes it essential that the political observer attempt to see the issues and candidates through the eyes of the participants within the political transaction.

Perception in Rhetoric

The rhetorician is interested in perception as a way of viewing the interaction between speaker and audience. First, the audience's perception of the source and message fundamentally shapes the reaction that will result. Auditors judge a communication on the basis of what they perceive; they perceive through the filter of their cognitive structures. The critic, then, should raise the question: "How did the audience perceive the speaker and his message?"

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[1] Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney, Politics and Voters (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 15.

[2] Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfeld and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 231.

Second, the speaker perceives the audience through his cognitive structure. The rhetorical choices he makes are based on the way he perceives his audience or audiences. His rhetorical failure may be caused by his distorted perceptions of the auditors. The rhetorical critic should attempt to discover how the speaker did perceive the audience in a particular rhetorical situation and how his perceptions influenced his performance.

The effective rhetorician, then, must be sensitive to the potential effects of perception and must endeavor to account for them in his study of the rhetorical transaction.

Perception in the Behavioral Sciences

The significance of perception to the behavioral sciences, especially social psychology, is too involved and complex to be discussed in this chapter. In contrast to both faculty psychology and behaviorism, perception rejects a straight stimulus-response linkage. Harley maintains, in his study of perception, that "perception does not copy anything. Perceived objects are not existent entities in the outside world that have the visual, tactual, thermal, and solidity characteristics which we experience in them."[1]

A detailed discussion of the nature of perception will appear in Chapter II of this dissertation. Perception-judgment, along with ego-involvement underpin the attitude and attitude change construct used in this study as the basis for the formulation of a theory of rhetoric and compromise.

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[1] S. Howard Bartley, Principles of Perception (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 22.

The effective analysis of human behavior requires that the theoretician, critic, and practitioner understand the nature and impact of perception on experience and behavior. The historian endeavors to see the past as it was seen; the political scientists hopes to explore the perceptions of the political world within individual and group "cognitive maps"; the rhetorician seeks to probe into the perceptions that speaker and audience have of each other; the social psychologist strives to determine how individuals are perceiving the diverse stimuli within their social situations.

This dissertation has approached an analysis of conflict and conflict resolution from the related disciplines of history, political science, rhetoric, and the behavioral sciences. These four viewpoints, which are indisciplinary in nature, share an interest in both interaction and perception. This study, in drawing from all four disciplines, hopes to weld the information and insights derived from these disciplines into a comprehensive statement of conflict and compromise.

Sources of Material

Because of the dualistic nature of this dissertation, two types of sources have been used. The theoretical model, developed in Chapters II and III, is based primarily on the scientific method of research. The historical application of the analytical model, found in Chapters VI, V, and VI, depends on the historical method of research.

Sources for the Theoretical Formulation

The material used in the construction of the analytical model of conflict and conflict resolution comes from several sources. First, most of the information used in the development of the construct comes from the work of behavioral scientists, especially in the areas of attitudes and groups. The adaptation of the scientific method of research to these areas has provided some useful findings for a theoretical statement of human behavior in conflict situations. Of special interest in this study have been a series of attitude experiments related to the social judgment-involvement approach.[1] This approach is based on experimentation which seeks to determine the influence of ego-involved attitudes on the social judgment of controversial issues.

Second, studies of voting behavior from the province of political science are used in this dissertation. The work of such political scientists as Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee has made an effective contribution to understanding political influence. The voting behavior studies, based primarily on extensive interviewing during and after political campaigns, corroborate the results produced in the social judgment studies.

Third, the theory of compromise developed in this study relies heavily on the creative insights of theorists like Kenneth Boulding who have worked in such areas as economics, labor relations, sociology, and international relations.

The theoretical formulation, consequently, has drawn from many fields and disciplines in order to develop a comprehensive view of conflict and compromise. No single discipline has developed a broad enough view of the interaction of the components within a controversy and it remains for the critic, in an interdisciplinary study, to integrate the separate points of view.

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[1] The best summary of social judgment experiments appears in Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965).

Sources for the Historical Application

Material for the historical phase of this dissertation falls into four categories: (1) primary sources represented by speeches, newspapers, private papers, and campaign documents, (2) biographical studies of the candidates and their contemporaries, (3) historical monographs dealing with the ante bellum controversy, and (4) general histories of that period.

The newspapers in 1860 present a highly partisan but useful account of the presidential campaign. These newspapers, described by Williams as the "truest mirror of the time," lined up behind the various candidates and turned their editorial fire on the opposing camps.[1] In addition to the regular newspapers published during the campaign, several special campaign editions were introduced. Among these publications were the Squatter Sovereign, the Freeport Wide Awake, and the Chicago Rail Splitter. Representative newspapers of each of the positions on the issue of slavery and of political parties were used in this study. The criteria for selection were based on the information found in Dumond's study of the secession crisis as seen through Southern editorials and

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[1] Wayne C. Williams, A Rail Splitter for President (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1951), p. viii. For a more thorough discussion of the role of the newspaper in the ante-bellum period see Chapter IV of this dissertation under the heading "Rhetorical Background."

Perkin's study of the same period through Northern editorials.[1] A complete list of the newspapers used in this dissertation will be included in the Bibliography.

The campaign speeches have been preserved in a number of places. The newspapers of that day were careful to print the texts of the major speeches. In addition, a number of the speeches were published in the form of political tracts which were circulated as campaign documents. Finally, some of the major speeches are included in the history books dealing with the prologue to the Civil War.

A limited amount of work has been done in private paper collections. Some private collections are now available on microfilm and were consulted in this study. In addition, several groups of letters and campaign documents were consulted while I was doing research in the Chicago Historical Society, the Illinois State Historical Society, and the New York Historical Society.

Biographies have been written of many of the leading political figures of that generation. Lincoln, of course, has been the subject of numerous biographical studies. Useful biographies are also available on Stephen A. Douglas, John C. Bell, William Garrison, Carl Schurz, William L. Yancey, and William Seward.

The historical literature, both published and unpublished, is full of essays and monographs discussing various aspects of the 1860 election. The list would be too long to cite in this chapter. In addition to the publications of the national historical organizations, many of the states have their own historical journals and proceedings which were valuable in this study.

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[1] See Dwight Lowell Dumond (ed.), Southern Editorials on Secession (New York: The Century Co., 1931), pp. vii-xxiii, and Howard Cecil Perkins (ed.), Northern Editorials on Secession (New York: Appleton-Century Company, 1942), I, 2-10.

As one might expect, a number of general histories deal with the prelude to the war. A rather complete list of these is found in Thomas J. Pressly's *Americans Interpret Their Civil War*. Pressly also places each of the interpretations with its own "school" thus providing the reader with an understanding of the premises behind each of the points of view. This becomes important when one realizes that the post-war historians are just as subject to assimilation and contrast effects as the pre-war politicians.

The campaign itself has also interested the historian. Emerson David Fite's *The Presidential Campaign of 1860* includes valuable texts of speeches, but it is not a critical study. Reinhard H. Luthin, in *The First Lincoln Campaign*, describes in detail the nomination and election of Lincoln. Ollinger Crenshaw, in *The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860*, discusses the campaign in the South. Melvin L. Hayes wrote for what he calls "John Q. and his good Wife" in *Mr. Lincoln Runs for President*. Wayne C. Williams examined the 1860 campaign through the journalism of that day in his *A Rail Splitter for President*. Norman A. Graebner edited a series of essays dealing with the political background to 1860 in a book entitled *Politics and the Crisis of 1860*. Finally, William B. Hesseltine recently edited the newspaper reports Murat Halstead made of the nominating conventions of 1860 in *Three Against Lincoln: Murat Halstead Reports the Caucusses of 1860*.

Research for this dissertation, consequently, has been varied and diverse. The materials used have ranged from highly abstract statements of conflict and compromise to the perceptions of a country newspaper editor as to the fate of the nation if Lincoln were elected in 1860. This kind of research has been necessary, however, in order to pursue an eclectric approach to a study of human behavior.

Plan of the Study

Chapter II

The intent of this chapter is to explain the basic assumptions and applications of the social judgment-involvement approach to attitude and attitude change. This behavioral science viewpoint, which is based on the concepts of perception-judgment and ego-involvement, attempts to explain the basic factors involved in social influence. This discussion of the social judgment approach will consider its effect on both group and rhetorical theory.

Chapter III

This chapter presents an interdisciplinary approach to a theory describing the interaction of rhetoric and compromise within a conflict. Although the construct is called an "approach" and not a "theory," it is based on the assumption that man should pursue the development of a general theory of conflict and conflict resolution. This chapter delineates the relationship between conflict and compromise; the interaction of rhetoric with compromise; and the influence of ego-involvement on both rhetoric and compromise. The thesis will be advanced that rhetoric is the necessary antecedent of compromise and that both are undermined in certain types of conflicts. Those characteristics of a conflict which undermine rhetoric and compromise are discussed in this chapter.

Chapter IV

The campaign of 1860 was conducted in an atmosphere that was highly explosive and unstable. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to recreate that atmosphere by describing the historical, political, social and cultural, and rhetorical factors which combined to form the background to the campaign and election. These influences contributed to the intensification of sectionalism and influenced the state of mind of the American of that generation.

Chapter V

The purpose of this chapter is to single out the slavery issue for more careful analysis. The slavery issue is seen against the framework of the anti-slavery, pro-slavery, and "neutral" sentiments which existed in 1860. Furthermore, this chapter traces the effect of the campaign as a form of sectional confrontation in amplifying the assimilation and contrast effects which were described in Chapter II. The participants in the campaign did not isolate the positions which were delineated at the beginning of this chapter but, instead, were subject to the effects of perceptions and ego-involvement.

Chapter VI

This chapter combines the material from Chapters IV and V in describing the extent and nature of bipolarization. The purpose of this chapter is to apply the analytical model directly to the ante bellum struggle by demonstrating that the split into sections and the decision to accept the alternative of war were the products of the nature of the conflict. In short, this chapter argues, as does the entire study, that by 1860 the conflict was no longer amenable to compromise because of the ideational, interpersonal, and structural effects of sectionalism in that particular period.

Chapter VII

This final chapter will restate both the theoretical instrument and the application of the instrument in the ante bellum study. The purpose, here, will be to demonstrate the similarities between the principles described in the model and the degree to which the pre-Civil War conflict coincided with those principles. Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the possibility of other kinds of research to improve the analytical model and seek other controversies in which to apply it.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL JUDGMENT-INVOLVEMENT APPROACH

This chapter intends to focus on one of the starting points for exploring attitude acquisition and change, namely, the social judgment-involvement approach. This approach, first presented by Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif in 1957, was delineated in some detail in 1961 by Sherif and Hovland and by Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall in 1965.[1]

This approach to a study of attitudes is in contrast to two other starting-points. First, Katz argues that attitudes perform major functions for the individual's personality.[2] The basic assumption of personality theory, then, is that both attitude formation and change must be understood in relation to the needs they serve. Second, the various balance-theory approaches consider imbalance reduction as the basic starting-point.[3] The social judgment-involvement approach, however, centers on perception-judgment and personal involvement in the issue as the key influences in the process of attitude formation and modification. For the purposes of this study the most significant features of this approach involve the cognitive process of perception-judgment; the effect of ego-involvement on perception-judgment; the effect of social judgment on group theory; and the effect of social judgment on rhetorical theory.

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[1] C. I. Hovland, O. J. Harvey and M. Sherif, "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LV (September, 1957), 244-52; M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961; and Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965).

[2] See Donald Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (Summer, 1960), 163-204.

[3] "Common to the concepts of balance, congruity, and dissonance is the notion that thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior tend to organize themselves in meaningful and sensible ways. It assumes that inconsistency is a noxious state setting up pressures to eliminate it or reduce it." Robert B. Zajonc, "The Concepts of Balance, Congruity, and Dissonance," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (Summer, 1960), 280.

The Cognitive Process of Perception-Judgment

This approach postulates that an individual's frame of reference or psychological structure determines how he perceives or judges a psychophysical or psychosocial stimulus at the moment of exposure.[1] The frame of reference determines how that person will categorize the stimulus, influences how he will assess the stimulus, and controls his response to the stimulus. Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall explain that

> the present approach to problems of attitude change starts with the fundamental process of evaluation, or social judgment, which underlies the way an individual sizes up a communication situation, whether he is fully aware of it or not. His appraisal of the communication and the communicator fundamentally shapes his response to them.[2]

Perception operates in at least three ways in establishing a response to a situation. First, it can magnify the observance of certain stimuli, giving them greater weight than they necessarily deserve. Second, perception can diminish the importance of other stimuli which are competing for attention. Finally, an individual may actually distort the real meaning of the various stimuli he is perceiving. These processes of exaggeration, minimization, and distortion occur at the moment an individual engages the particular stimuli involved.[1]

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[1] Both psychophysical and psychosocial judgments are included because the concept of social judgment is underpinned by psychophysical investigations of the time error and of the effects of anchor-points on perceptions of weights and lights, etc. For examples of psychophysical experiments see Harry Helson, "Adaptation-level as a Basis for a Quantitative Theory of Frames of Reference," Psychological Review, LV (November, 1948), 297-313, and Muzafer Sherif, Daniel Taub, and Carl I. Hovland, "Assimilation and Contrast Effects of Anchoring Stimuli on Judgments," Journal of Experimental Psychology, LV (February, 1958), 150-55.

[2] Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 13.

The Frame of Reference

The frame of reference, which plays a critical role in perception-judgment, is the product of the interaction of internal and external factors.[2] The internal factors include social attitudes which have become internalized, biogenic motives, and the states of the organism.[3] The external factors that merge with the internal influences include the point of view or stand represented in the stimulus material, the initiator of the point of view, the speaker or writer, the form of presentation, the medium through which it is presented, and the social context in which it is presented.[4]

Not all of these factors, however, have equal weight in determining a person's perception-judgment. Those factors which are more important to the individual at a given time are called "anchorages." Sherif and

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[1] See Ross Stagner, "Personality Dynamics and Social Conflict," The Journal of Social Issues, XVII, No. 3 (1961), 33.

[2] For a full discussion of the integration of the internal and external factors in the formation of the frame of reference and the impact of those factors on perception-judgment see Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), pp. 37-142.

[3] A list of biogenic motives would include hunger, thirst, rest, sex, temperature regulation, evacuation, and others. States of the organism include such conditions as emotionalism and exhaustion.

[4] Sherif and Sherif, p. 539.

and Sherif observed:

> All influences operating at a given time do not have equal effect in determining the behavioral outcome. Major reference points, which are called anchorages, weigh more heavily than others in shaping the final psychological product. Major reference points or anchorages may be in the external stimulus situation or on the side of internal influences, depending on the particular interrelationship among factors at the time.[1]

These anchorages, then, become the most important judgmental factors used by the individual in his assessment of a stimulus. An individual, in effect, compares the stimulus with the anchorage or anchorages which he views as pertinent. For example, weightlifters and watchmakers judge a ten-pound weight differently because they begin with different points of comparison or anchorages.

A situation may develop in which a stimulus calls forth two or more anchorages which represent conflicting goals. Anchorage "A" would call for a favorable assessment of the communication; anchorage "B" would insist that the communication be rejected. If the anchorages are of relatively equal weight the individual is subject to what the political scientists call "cross pressures."[2] An example of this kind of anchorage conflict occurred in the 1960 presidential election when the pro-Democratic but anti-Catholic voter was caught in a political "cross-pressure."

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[1] Ibid., p. 44.

[2] Paul F. Lazarfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet in The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. xxi-xxii, argue that "such predispositions to change are more typical for individuals in whom cross-pressures operate. In our complex society, individuals do not belong to one group, only. They have a variety of major social affiliations; their social class, their ethnic group, their religious group, the informal associations in which they participate. These various affiliations will make conflicting claims on some individuals: an upper-class Catholic, for example, may find that his religious affiliation pulls him in one direction, while his class position pulls him in the opposite direction. And when concrete situations such as an election campaign require him to make a definite decision, he must also decide which of his group loyalties should take priority."

External and internal factors, consequently, are integrated within the frame of reference. When one of the factors dominates in a given situation it is called an anchorage. These reference points are used in the process of judgment in that the stimulus to be judged is compared to the particular anchorage or anchorages which are activated.

Latitudes of Acceptance, Rejection, and Noncommitment

If a person has an attitude on a social issue, he will have diffused within his frame of reference a set of categorical responses that will be aroused when the attitude stimulus is perceived. The predetermined categories of response are acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment. In the social judgment language, a latitude of acceptance refers to the position on an issue that is most acceptable, plus other acceptable positions; a latitude of rejection involves the most objectionable position on the same issue, plus other objectionable positions; and a latitude of noncommitment represents those positions not categorized as either acceptable or objectionable in some degree. This concept of latitudes can best be explained by citing an example of the use of an experimental instrument in a social judgment study.

In 1957 the following continuum of nine statements was presented to subjects to determine their evaluative categories within their frames of reference on the repeal-of-prohibition controversy in the then "dry" State of Oklahoma.

(A) Since alcohol is the curse of mankind, the sale and use of alcohol, including light beer, should be completely abolished.
(B) Since alcohol is the main cause of corruption in public life, lawlessness, and immoral acts, its sale and use should be prohibited.
(C) Since it is hard to stop at a reasonable moderation point in the use of alcohol, it is safer to discourage its use.

(D) Alcohol should not be sold or used except as a remedy for snake bites, cramps, colds, fainting, and other aches and pains.
(E) The arguments in favor and against the sale and use of alcohol are nearly equal.
(F) The sale of alcohol should be so regulated that is available in limited quantities for special occasions.
(G) The sale and use of alcohol should be permitted with proper state controls, so that the revenue from taxation may be used for the betterment of schools, highways, and other state institutions.
(H) Since prohibition is a major cause of corruption in public life, lawlessness, immoral acts, and juvenile delinquency, the sale and use of alcohol should be legalized.
(I) It has become evident that man cannot get along without alcohol; therefore, there should be no restriction whatsoever on its sale and use.[1]

These statements on the prohibition issue were formulated by a process of content analysis and description of the actual arguments used in the campaign. This was done in order to correlate the attitude continuum as accurately as possible to the shades of attitudes which were reflected in the wet-dry controversy.

The latitude of acceptance of each individual was determined by requesting that individual to select the statement that best represented his own position, followed by the selection of other statements he could accept. He was then requested to indicate the statement that was most objectionable to him as well as any other statement or statements he must reject. These statements formed his latitude of rejection. The remaining statements, if any, comprised his latitude of noncommitment. These categories reflected that individual's attitude on the prohibition controversy at that time.

Two important observations should be made at this point. First, an individual's position on the issue is multi-dimensional instead of single dimensional. A person can accept or reject multiple positions instead of single positions only. Second, the subject is using the latitudes that he brought with him to the experiment. These latitudes, then, lie dormant within the frame of reference until activated by an attitude-arousing stimulus. The evaluative categories are then called forth in the act of judging a stimulus.

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[1] The prohibition experiment is reported in Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, pp. 244-52.

Assimilation and Contrast Effects

The frame of reference, consisting of anchorages and latitudes, influences an individual's perception of a communication in that it causes him to assimilate some messages while contrasting others on the same issue.

When a communication advocating a position between clearly defined extremes is given to subjects with varying positions on the issue, those whose stand corresponds most closely tend to judge the communication properly. Some people with positions slightly removed from that of the communication may judge it as being more like their position than it actually is. This is known as an "assimilation effect." On the other hand, if an individual perceives the communication to represent a position more remote from his own anchorage, he will displace the communicator's stand away from his own. This is called a "contrast effect."

In other words, if a stimulus representing a position on the social issue is either within or close to the accepted latitude, an individual tends to minimize the difference between it and his own preferred position or anchorage and is inclined to adopt it as his own. If a stand is perceived by a subject to be further away from his own position or anchorage, he will exaggerate the difference and displace it further away from his stand than it actually is.[1] For example, in the 1964 presidential campaign the radical right element was able to assimilate the candidacy of Barry M. Goldwater but displaced or contrasted Nelson Rockefeller and George Romney into the camp of the Americans for Democratic Action.

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[1] Social judgment may be related to the dissonance approach in that in the process of assimilation an individual reduces the distance between the stimulus and his own position. Furthermore, in the contrast effect the individual reduces dissonance by exaggerating the distance between positions.

Various studies of voting behavior have reported this same assimilation and contrast phenomenon. Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee, for example, in their extensive survey of voting patterns in elections from 1940 to 1952, observed that the voter, especially when he is involved in the campaign, tends to perceive his own candidate's position as his own. At the same time, however, he makes the opponent into more of an "enemy" than he actually represents.

> This tendency to "misperceive" issues in a favorable direction does not operate in a uniform fashion within the electorate. The degree of affect attached to the election, in the form of intensity upon one's vote intention, also influences perception. Those voters who feel strongly about their vote intention perceive political issues differently from those who do not feel so strongly about the matter. With remarkable consistency within each party, the intensely involved "pull" their own candidate and "push" the opponent more than the less involved.[1]

The "push" or contrast phase of this phenomenon has also been described by various political scientists. Abcarian and Stange, for example, point out that "right wing extremism expresses itself publicly in the form of telescoping--a process of compressing or coalescing levels and categories of political events and analyses which are ordinarily treated as distinct or unique."[2] Pournelle, in his study of the left-right political continuum, observed that "the man on the Left accuses the Conservatives of being akin of Reactionaries, and very nearly allied with Fascists; while the man on the Right links Liberals to Socialists, and Socialists to Communists."[1]

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[1] Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 223.

[2] Gilbert Abcarian and Sherman M. Stange, "Alienation and the Radical Right," Journal of Politics, XXVII (November, 1965), 782. In their study, Abcarian and Stange cite the example of Senator Thurmond's assertion that "communism" is fundamentally "socialism" in order to illustrate the "telescoping" process.

In summary, the frame of reference provides an individual with a wired-in set of evaluative categories with which he perceives a particular stimulus. The three reactive categories are acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment. If the communication is close to an individual's position, he will minimize the difference and assimilate it; if the communication is further away, he will exaggerate the difference and contrast it. As a result, the individual's placement of the stimulus within his frame of reference determines the kind of response he will make.

Impact of Ego-Involvement

This approach considers the degree of ego-involvement in the particular issue as a basic variable in determining both perception and propensity for attitude change. An ego-involved attitude is different from other attitudes primarily in intensity. The person who is highly committed to a position has a commensurate attitude which has become a critical factor in prescribing his relatedness to the world. Whenever his self-view becomes part of that attitude, he has become ego-involved.[2]

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[1] Jerry Eugene Pournelle, "The American Political Continuum: An Examination of the Validity of the Left-Right Model as an Instrument for Studying Contemporary American 'Isms'" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of Government, University of Washington, 1964), p. 12.

[2] Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 53-4, suggest that such attitudes may have been tested by experience; there is an authority or a source for the attitude which is valued; the attitude is anchored in valued group membership; the individual has a public stake in his attitude; the attitude serves some social function for the individual; the attitude

Such attitudes which are characterized by high intensity are not made and re-made daily. Nor can they be produced in brief instructions or transitory experiences in a laboratory. This is not to say, however, that there are only two kinds of attitudes--involved and non-involved. The attitude spectrum can represent as many shades of involvement as there are people. Ego-involvement, then, should be seen as dimensional rather than dichotomous. Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall contend that such attitudes constitute a person's

> self-picture, not snap judgments or transitory opinions on his part. To this extent, change in his attitudes is not a discrete event of shifting one single item in his psychological makeup. Changing his attitude means changing him as a person, changing a part of himself as he has come to know himself relative to his social world.[1]

Several useful synonyms for ego-involvement exist in the literature of the social and behavioral sciences. Lane and Sears, for example, use the concept of "intensity" as the term representing commitment.[2] Some of the voting behavior studies prefer the concept of "partisanship."[3] One of the most interesting delineations of the kinds of attitudes comes from the writings of Kenneth Boulding, an economic theorist.

> Thus we have, in effect, divided the value structure of a person's image into two parts: an inner core around which he integrates his personality and which holds him together and an outer shell which he holds or possesses but which does not constitute an essential part of the image of the person who does the holding or the possessing.

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serves some economic function for the individual; the attitude serves an intra-psychic function; and, the attitude rationalizes some role-strain in which he finds himself.

[1] Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 13.

[2] Lane and Sears, p. 10.

[3] Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee, p. 225.

> The core is rigid and not subject to small changes, though it may be subject to catastrophic reorganizations in conversion. The shell is not rigid and is amenable to the processes of modification under the stimulus of discussion and argument.[1]

Whether the terms "ego-involvement," "intensity," "partisan," or "core" are used, the meaning is the same. Certain kinds of attitudes, because they are integrated into the self-view or value structure of an individual, are much more rigid and firm than other attitudes which are more superficial and temporary since they are found in the "shell." A study of attitude and attitude change, consequently, must ask the qualitative question (How involved are the subjects in their attitudes?) as well as the quantitative question (How many people are for, against, or neutral?).

The effect of ego-involvement on assimilation and contrast effects may be seen in the following two ways. First, the degree of ego-involvement determines the number of rejected positions on the issue-scale which fall within the contrast range. Second, the degree of ego-involvement determines the number of different positions or categories perceived on a particular issue.

Effect of Ego-Involvement on Latitude Size

The extent to which an individual is personally committed on a particular issue will be mirrored in the relative sizes of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment. The more ego-involved individual will reject more positions on the continuum and will accept and be noncommitted on fewer positions.

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[1] Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), p. 312.

In the prohibition experiment, conducted by Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif in 1957, the data revealed that the 193 subjects who took an extreme position (A, B, G, H, or I) accepted a mean of 2.81 statements, rejected 4.71 statements, and failed to check 1.48 statements. On the other hand, those taking the intermediate positions (C, D, E, or F) accepted 3.05 positions, rejected 3.70 positions, and were neutral toward 2.24 statements.[1]

Similar results were found in a social judgment, based on a nine-point continuum, in the 1960 presidential election. This study was populated by 945 subjects in the Northwest and 571 respondents in the Southwest. Although the experiment had several features, of interest at this point is the relationship among acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment. Subjects from the Southwest revealed the following mean sizes of latitudes.

TABLE I

MEAN SIZES OF LATITUDES OF ACCEPTANCE, REJECTION, AND NONCOMMITMENT: OKLAHOMA, 1960*

Position	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Latitude of:									
Acceptance	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.5	2.6	3.1	3.0	2.9
Rejection	4.9	4.3	3.7	3.6	3.0	3.4	3.2	4.0	4.9
Noncommitment	1.3	1.7	2.2	2.3	3.5	3.0	2.7	2.0	1.2
n	42	137	77	75	48	44	22	48	14

*This chart is recorded in Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 53.

This chart demonstrates that those who identified the more extreme positions as their most favorable statement tended to reject more statements, accept fewer statements, and refuse to respond to fewer statements. Those, however, who identified one of the intermediate positions inclined to reject fewer positions while enlarging their latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment. This is not to say, however, that the most preferred statement selected by an individual reveals all the necessary information about his attitude. Nebergall points out that

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[1] Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, 248.

> it is possible, though, that people who would identify the same position or alternative as their own would judge differently regarding other possible stands. If they did, then the single position which they most preferred would not reveal their attitude fully.[1]

In short, the relative sizes of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment are necessary in obtaining a complete picture of a person's attitude. The individual variations among those who identify the same most-preferred position will be revealed in the latitude sizes.

These two studies provide support for the notion that, generally speaking, those taking the more extreme positions had larger latitudes of rejection, smaller latitudes of acceptance, with a diminishing latitude of noncommitment. This instrument assumes, of course, that an extreme position tends to reveal a more involved position. There is considerable statistical evidence for this assumption. Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall claim that

> there is considerable evidence in the literature that degree of personal involvement with the stand varies with the extremity of the stand, as mentioned earlier. Adherents of extreme positions are likely far beyond chance level to be intensely partisan. Therefore, it was reasonable to investigate latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment as a function of extremeness of most preferred positions on the issue.[2]

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[1] Roger E. Nebergall, "The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach to Attitude and Attitude Change" (unpublished paper, Department of Speech, University of Oklahoma, 1965).

[2] Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, pp. 26-7.

This same relationship is corroborated by Lane and Sears. Although they contend that, in theory, extremity and intensity are not the same, as a practical matter the two elements are closely related.

> Nevertheless, empirically it has been well established that on most issues there is a U-shaped curve, relating the two. The more extreme a person's position is--say, on desegregation, where immediate total integration is one extreme and total and absolute segregation is the other--the more intensely he is likely to feel about his positions.[1]

There are several possible explanations for this correlation between intensity and extremity. Allport and Hartman suggest that extremists are usually taking a more selective view of a situation and must devote energy (emotional intensity) to screen out opposing considerations.[2] Cantril contends that those who are on the defensive because of their extreme views must either develop a rigid position or else succumb to community pressures to moderate their views.[3] In short, for a person to reject the traditional moderation of the majority requires a stronger anchorage for support.

Although high ego-involvement is usually associated with the more extreme positions on a continuum, this does not preclude an individual from experiencing a "core" attitude in an intermediate position. In describing the "interesting case of middle-of-the-roaders," Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall make the following observation from the 1960 social judgment experiment.

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[1] Lane and Sears, p. 10.

[2] Cited in Lane and Sears, p. 105.

[3] H. Cantril, "The Intensity of an Attitude," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLI (January, 1946), 129-35.

> Thus, the middle-of-the roaders in the election study turn out to be some mildly Republican and Democratic sympathizers, some persons generally unconcerned and equally tolerant of either side, and other persons strongly committed to the middle position or, at least, strongly against both major parties.[1]

When a person is ego-involved in an intermediate position, however, he rejects a larger number of positions than his "neutral" counterpart. In short, his latitude of rejection is as large as that typical of a strong partisan of an extreme position.

The prohibition study in 1957 and the 1960 election experiment support the predicted correlation between extremity of the respondent's own anchorage and the sizes of the evaluative latitudes. The latitude of rejection within the frame of reference of the committed person tends to be larger; the latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment are smaller. As a result, the intermediate or neutral positions tend to be skewed toward the opposite-end position in order to enlarge the contrast range. In effect, then, the involved person sees the issue as "black" or "white" and has difficulty perceiving shades of "gray."

Effect of Ego-Involvement on Position Discrimination

Ego-involvement influences the number of positions perceived by a subject within the universe of discourse on a particular issue. Persons who are strongly committed to a stand on a controversial issue tend to use fewer categories and distribute their judgments differently than persons who are less concerned with the issue. In addition, the subject is unable to differentiate among the statements which he has lumped into the rejected-contrast range.

Instead of the nine-positional scale used in the prohibition and 1960 election studies, the experiments to be reviewed in this section utilize the "own-categories" approach. This differs from the other system in that the experimenter does not impose on the subject a scale of nine fixed positions which artifically structure his response. Instead, the experimenter gives the subject a number of statements representing various positions on the continuum and asks him to sort them into as many or as few categories as he finds necessary to reflect the positions of the statements. The value of this method lies in the ability to determine an individual's attitude without revealing the purpose of the experiment. He is not asked to reveal his personal attitude, but his point of view becomes apparent as he judges the statements by placing them into the number of stacks he deems necessary to reflect their positions.

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[1] Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 58.

In 1953 Sherif and Hovland predicted that individuals with strong personal involvement in an extreme stand on a controversial issue would (1) use fewer categories for judging relevant statements than less-involved subjects and (2) would place fewer statements in the extreme category most acceptable to them than in the opposite (objectionable) extreme.[1] The subjects in the experiment were told to sort 114 statements on the segregation issue into the number of piles that seemed to be required so that the stand expressed on the issue of the social position of Negroes would be different from the other pile or piles.

The data indicated that the more highly-involved subjects (Negroes) used fewer categories for judging relevant statements than less-involved subjects (average white subjects). Moreover, the highly-involved subjects placed a disproportionate number of items in the extreme category farthest removed from their most acceptable position. In fact, Negro subjects, on the average, found 65 of the 114 statements highly objectionable but only 27 acceptable in some degree. By comparison, average white subjects found 43 statements objectionable, on the average, and 38 statements acceptable. The subjects were not responding to whether or not the statements were acceptable or objectionable to them as individuals. They were to judge whether the statements were favorable or unfavorable to Negroes.

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[1] M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, "Judgmental Pehnomena and Scales of Attitude Measurement: Placement of Items with Individual Choice of Number Categories," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVIII (January, 1953), 135-41.

In 1961 Vaughn selected 60 statements on the Latin American controversy and asked four groups of subjects to place them in categories.[1] Included in the population of the study were (1) intensely anti-Latin residents of South Texas, (2) South Texas residents who were not overly anti-Latin, (3) unselected college students in South Texas, and (4) unselected college students in extreme northern Texas who were not involved directly in the social issue.

The results indicate that over 85 percent of the highly involved subjects used three or fewer categories; almost 92 percent of the uninvolved subjects used four or more categories. The number of categories used by involved subjects ranged from two to five; uninvolved subjects used two to eleven, with the median at five categories. Only 8 percent of the uninvolved subjects used three categories or less.

John Reich investigated the own-categories method in relation to the reapportionment issue in Oklahoma in 1963.[2] Using active members of the League of Women Voters who had dedicated a major effort for some time to reapportionment, and a comparable group of less-involved school teachers, Reich studied the categorization effect on 60 statements. Of these, 15 statements had been consistently judged in a pretest situation as favorable, 15 as unfavorable, and 30 had been rated with high variability. In categorizing these statements by the own-categories procedure, 74 percent of the highly involved women used four or fewer categories; only 26 percent of the teachers used such a small number. The teachers placed about the same number of statements in favorable and unfavorable categories; the women actively favoring reapportionment placed over half of these statements in unfavorable, rejected categories.

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[1] Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, pp. 118-22.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 122-25.

These experiments tend to verify the notion that a direct correlation exists between the importance an issue has to an individual and the number of categories he uses in judging statements along the continuum. Furthermore, the data indicate that a person who lumps rejected statements into a single category or categories fails to discriminate the shades of differences among the grouped statements. In short, ego-involved attitudes create the "either-for-me-or-against-me" syndrome since the committed person does not discriminate among the rejected positions.

Ego-involvement, consequently, plays an important role in the social judgment process. The highly-committed individual rejects more positions within the universe of discourse on a particular issue and has difficulty discriminating among the rejected positions. Conversely, the less-committed person rejects fewer positions and is better able to distinguish among positions.

Impact of Social Judgment on Group Theory

Although the social judgment approach is primarily designed to investigate individual attitudes, it is also directly related to the various aspects of group theory. Sherif and Sherif observe that

> a central portion of the individual's sense of personal identity, his ego-attitudes defining his status and role relations with others, his prestige concerns, the level of his future goals is derived from groups of which he is a part or aspires to be a part.[1]

Attitudes and reference groups are not separate and distinct fields of study but, instead, are interrelated and interdependent areas of human behavior. For this reason, this discussion of the social judgment approach will consider (1) the nature of a reference group, (2) the effect of ego-involvement on the intra-and intergroup relationships, and (3) the reduction of group conflicts.

Nature of Reference Groups

Reference group is a traditional subject of social psychology. Secord and Backman define it as "a group the individual takes as a frame of reference for self-evaluation and attitude formation."[2] Sherif and Sherif define reference groups as "those groups to which the individual relates himself as a part or to which he aspires to relate himself psychologically."[3] A person may belong to a "membership" group which may or may not influence him psychologically. Whenever a person's standards and aspirations are regulated by a social unit, whether he is an official member or not, that social unit has become a reference group. Furthermore, he may be a member of a particular group but psychologically refer himself to a different group to which he does not belong.

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[1] Sherif and Sherif, p. 630.

[2] Paul F. Secord and Carl W. Backman, Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 209.

[3] Sherif and Sherif, p. 175.

A reference group is formed whenever a number of individuals (1) interact, (2) over a period of time, (3) toward the fulfillment of certain common goals.[1] A reference group has two salient characteristics. First, a reference group possesses a structure which serves to determine the relationship among group members in terms of role, power, status, and intent.[2] These factors determine the more or less stabilized system of interdependent relationships among individuals according to their respective contributions to interaction toward a common goal or goals.

Second, a reference group performs a normative function in setting and enforcing standards of conduct and belief. These group norms regulate the behavior of individual members within the social unit. They become internalized attitudes which serve as anchorages on the individual's frame of reference. This superstructure of rules, standards, and values is concerned only with matters of importance to that particular reference group. Conformity, then, refers to a situation in which group members follow the tolerable ranges of behavior which have been established by the group itself; deviation refers to an individual course of action which is beyond the limits of acceptable behavior within the group.

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[1] Sherif and Sherif, p. 162.

[2] Role, in this context, refers to the reciprocal expectations that each group member has of all the other group members in terms of responsibilities to the social unit. Power, which is related to role, is defined as the influence that "A" has on "B" whenever "B" perceives that "A" is instrumental to "B's" goals. Status defines the influence that "A" has "B" when "B" perceives that "A" identifies with or shares "B's" goals or values. Finally, intent represents the way in which "A" influences "B" in so far as "B" perceives "A's" intention in relation to "B's" goals. These definitions were taken from a class lecture by Jack E. Douglas at the University of Oklahoma in the summer of 1965.

The structural and normative influence of reference groups on individual attitudes and behavior has been well documented in a number of experimental studies. The experiments of Newcomb with the Bennington College students, Lewin and his associates with discussion groups, and Sherif and others with Robbers Cave campers verify this assertion.[1] Furthermore, as Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall point out, "the most dramatic cases of attitude change, the most widespread and enduring, are those involving changes in reference groups with differing values."[2]

Single stands on specific issues are not unrelated characteristics of an individual's frame of reference but are directly related to group contexts. These group contexts, in the form of reference groups, superimpose a structural and normative pattern on the individual.

Effect of Ego-Involvement on Reference Groups

Since attitudes tend to be group-oriented, an ego-involved attitude would, in most cases, indicate an ego-involved group. Coser observed that

> in groups that appeal only to a peripheral part of their member's personality, or, to use Parsons' terminology, in groups in which

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[1] The Newcomb study of Bennington College is described in Sherif and Sherif, pp. 139-54; the Lewin experiments can be read in K. Lewin, "Group Decision and Social Change" in Readings in Social Psychology, ed. by T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (New York: Holt, 1947); and the Robbers Cave study has been described in considerable detail in M. Sherif, O. J. Harvey, B. J. White, W. R. Hood, and Carolyn Sherif, Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment (Norman: The University of Oklahoma, 1961).

[2] Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 214.

> relations are functionally specific and affectively neutral, conflicts are apt to be less sharp and violent than in groups wherein ties are diffuse and affective, engaging the total personality of their members.[1]

Groups, then, which engage "the total personality of their members" are different from those which are "affectively neutral." In most cases, when a group becomes firm in a position, it usually does so in competition with another group or groups.[2] This group commitment influences both intragroup rigidity and intergroup hostility.

Intragroup Rigidity

Whenever a group becomes highly involved in a particular norm, more pressure is put on individuals within the group to conform to that norm. Deviation is viewed as extremely dangerous and would, at least, result in careful surveillance of that member, if in not severe sanctions or expulsion. Two types of deviant behavior pose a threat to the cohesiveness of the group. First, a renegade, who leaves the group and even joins a rival organization, threatens to breakdown the boundary lines of the established group. In doing so, the renegade confirms the conviction of the rival group of the righteousness of its cause and, in most cases, will be more firm in his loyalty to the new group.[3]

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[1] Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. 68.

[2] Sherif and Sherif, p. 280.

[3] Coser, p. 70. This same point of view has been expressed by Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1951), p. 117, who declares that "it is doubtful whether the excommunicated priest, the expelled Communist and the renegade chauvinist can ever find peace of mind as autonomous individuals. They cannot stand on their own, but must embrace a new cause and attach themselves to a new group."

Second, the heretic presents a somewhat different problem to the group than does the apostate. The renegade deserts the group in order to go over to the "enemy"; the heretic, in upholding the group's central values and goals, presents even a more insidious danger. By proposing alternatives where the group wants no alternative to exist, the heretic continues to compete for the loyalty of the members of his former group. The renegade, then, will tend to fight the group; the heretic will attempt to proselytize it. As Robert Michels wrote, "the hatred of the party is directed, not in the first place against the opponents of its own view of the world order, but against the dreaded rivals in the political field, against those who are competing for the same end."[1]

Deviant behavior, then, personified in the renegade or the heretic, presents a serious problem in a reference group whenever an ego-involved attitude or group norm is concerned. The permanence of the group may well be determined by its success in withstanding attacks from within as well as from without.[2]

Intergroup Hostility

Whenever two or more groups come into contact and interact in one way or other, they develop some form of intergroup relations. If this interaction becomes unfriendly as each group becomes more ego-involved and rigid in its position, intergroup prejudice becomes a group norm in both organizations. The prejudice, if unchecked, may lead to friction, feelings of hostility and superiority, and distorting stereotypes. As the conflict becomes more intense, three related processes develop.

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[1] Cited in Coser, p. 70.

[2] Hoffer, p. 115, points out that "this enemy--the indispensable devil of every mass movement--is omnipresent. He plots both outside and inside the ranks of the faithful. It is his voice that speaks through the mouth of the dissenter, and the deviationists are his stooges. If anything goes wrong within the movement, it is his doing. It is the sacred duty of the true believer to be suspicious. He must be constantly on the lookout for saboteurs, spies and traitors."

First, the groups attempt to isolate themselves from the contamination of the other in order to protect their members from defilement. This isolation, according to Lipset, produces "a tendency to view politics and personal relationships in black-and-white terms, a desire for immediate action, an impatience with talk and discussion, a lack of interest in organizations which have a long-range perspective."[1] In short, the two groups, because of ideational and interpersonal conflicts, lose the ability to communicate objectively on almost any issue.

Second, the groups exaggerate the "evil" in the other and tend to discover a "conspiracy" within the adversary. The group members express "a readiness to follow leaders who offer a demonological interpretation of the evil forces (either religious or political) which are conspiring against them."[2] Osgood points out that partisan perceptions make

> Bogey Men of the opponents in every human conflict: if We are good, kind, fair and so on, then cognitive consistency requires that THEY (THE ENEMY) must be equally bad, cruel, unfair and so on through the opposites of all traits we attribute to ourselves. The Bogey Man conception both justifies aggressive behavior on our own part and nullifies any non-aggressive ploys by the opponent.[3]

Third, the ego-involved reference group is inclined to stereotype all members of the opposing group as "bad" and "untrustworthy"; all members of the in-group, however, are "good" and "trustworthy." This stereotyping effect has been observed by many social critics. Lippman, who used the word in 1932, wrote that "the pattern of stereotypes at the center of our codes largely determines what group of facts we shall see, and in which light we shall see them." In applying the concept of stereotyping to international conflict, Buchanan and Cantril argue that

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[1] Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), p. 121.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Charles E. Osgood, "An Analysis of the Cold War Mentality," The Journal of Social Issues, XVII, No. 3 (1961), 13.

> the danger of stereotypes is not so much that nations are hostile to other "peoples" because they have unfavorable stereotypes; it begins to appear that they have unfavorable stereotypes because they are hostile. The greater danger is that we will act irrationally on the basis of these simple, realistic, but entirely fanciful images.[2]

When an intergroup conflict becomes full-grown, consequently, there is a break down in communication as the groups isolate themselves; dangerous conspiracies are searched for and found in the opposing group; and all members of the out-group are stereotyped as "evil" but all members of the in-group are "good."

Reduction of Group Hostilities

Perhaps the most effective way of reducing or eliminating intergroup tension is through the implementation of a superordinate goal--a value that is meritous to both groups. There are two types of superordinate goals. First, the common enemy approach may bind together conflicting rivals. Boulding suggests that

> a strong enemy, however, is a great unifying force; in the face of a common threat and the overriding common purpose of victory or

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[1] Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 125.

[2] William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), p. 96.

> survival, the diverse ends and conflicting interests of the population fall into the background and are swallowed up into the single, measurable, overriding end of winning the conflict.[1]

Alexander adds that "the best safeguard against internal disruptive antagonisms seems to be the presence of an external enemy which gives the hostile impulses an external target."[2] Finally, Edwards insists that "hatred of a common enemy is the most powerful known agency for producing group unity."[3]

The common enemy approach, however, may not be the most reliable kind of superordinate goal. As one might expect, as soon as the enemy is defeated there would be a tendency to revive old antagonisms since the reason for unity has vanished. Even a cursory investigation of the history of military alliances verifies this notion.

The second and most effective means of intergroup tension reduction involves a program that leads to the constructive integration of the two groups through the completion of a number of cooperative projects. This technique, which was demonstrated in the classic Robbers Cave experiment, is superior to the common enemy approach in that the reason for unification is relatively permanent.[4] Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall summarized that particular field study by writing that "a series of superordinate goals and the cooperative efforts they required for attainment did result in changed attitudes on the part of members of both groups in varying degrees.[1]

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[1] Boulding, p. 162.

[2] Cited in Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947), p. 58.

[3] Cited in Williams, p. 58.

[4] For a discussion of the superiority of a constructive program of integration see Coser, pp. 140-46.

Groups and attitudes are two ways of looking at the same phenomenon, namely, the behavior of an individual within his social situation. The structural and normative influences of a reference group are reflected in both intra and intergroup relations. Under conditions of ego-involvement, intragroup rigidity and intergroup hostility appear. The application of a common enemy or constructive superordinate goal may be the most effective means of controlling the hostility of intergroup tensions.

Impact of Social Judgment on Rhetorical Theory

In discussing the failure of a movement to secure the fluoridation of municipal water supplies, Rosenfield suggested that the crucial question must not be "Why did the campaigns fail?" but, instead, "Why did the voters resist the campaign messages?"[2] The answer to Rosenfield's question may lie in a qualitative analysis of the way audiences perceive both the content and the sources of communication. The social judgment approach provides at least one method of viewing the effect that an individual's frame of reference has on his perception of and reaction to various communications.

The last part of this chapter will investigate the impact of social judgment, a behavioral science approach, on rhetorical theory.[3] First, the effect of ego-involvement on individual reactions to communications will be described. Second, the relationship between social judgment and rhetorical theory will be delineated.

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[1] Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, p. 217.

[2] Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "Rhetorical Criticism and an Aristotelian Notion of Process," Speech Monographs, XXXIII (March, 1966), 16.

[3] Nebergall contends, in the paper already cited, that the social judgment approach satisfies the two salient characteristics of rhetorical theory, namely, the (1) accurate description of the phenomenon to be studied, and (2) reliable predictions about future attitudes and future behaviors.

Individual Reactions to Communications

People are not blank sheets of paper on which the communicator makes some verbal etchings in the form of communication. Instead, the audience, whether singular or plural, brings to the rhetorical situation a set of evaluative categories which determine the kinds of perceptions and reactions that will result. Davidson supports the notion that

> the communicator's audience is not a passive recipient--it cannot be regarded as a lump of clay to be molded by the master propagandist. Rather, the audience is made up of individuals who demand something from the communications to which they are exposed, and who select those that are likely to be useful to them.[1]

The effect of ego-involvement on the frame of reference has already been described. The purpose, here, will be to relate the concept of ego-involvement directly to the perception of persuasive messages. The principles to be discussed at this point will reflect the dimensional nature of attitudes in that they are more or less present, depending on the intensity of the attitude under consideration. First, ego-involvement influences the perceptions of communications. Second, ego-involvement influences the number of positions which are perceived. Third, ego-involvement influences the assessment that will be made of the message.

Effect of Ego-Involvement on Perception

A study of the perception of communications involves an analysis of (1) what the individual perceives and (2) how he perceives it. First, the selective nature of perception was discussed earlier in this chapter. In summary of that discussion, however, it should be recalled that individuals are not capable of attending to every stimulus within their perception ranges but must focus on a limited number of stimuli at a given time. Stagner points out that

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[1] Cited in Raymond A. Bauer, "The Obstinate Audience: The Influence Process from the Viewpoint of Social Communication," *American Psychologist*, XIX (May, 1964), 319.

> The answer to this question is found in the principle of selective perception. The principle operates even in the simpler levels of perceiving objects; one learns to disregard confusing cues, e.g., when viewing through colored lenses, through inverted prisms, etc. To survive, man must learn to sift the information coming in, emphasize some items, and ignore others.[1]

In short, an individual is not capable of perceiving everything at a given moment but tends to select ideas which he favors but ignores ideas which he does not favor. Bone and Ranney, in relating this principle to political campaign communications, point out that

> The partisan viewers and readers, moreover, for the most part "tune in" only messages from the side they favor and "tune out" the opposition. Consequently, most political mass communications become pep talks to the faithful, not arguments to convert the heathen.[2]

Lazarfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet make the same observation concerning the perceptions of political campaigns on the part of voters.

> Despite the flood of propaganda and counterpropaganda available to the prospective voter, he is reached by very little of it. And, when we examine what does actually reach him, we find that he elects to expose himself to the propaganda with which he already agrees, and to seal himself off from the propaganda with which he might disagree.[3]

Second, an individual perceives communications in relation to his position on the issue. Information which confirms his cognitive structure will be assimilated; information which challenges his cognitive structure will be contrasted and avoided. Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee suggest that

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[1] Ross Stagner, "The Psychology of Human Conflict," in The Nature of Human Conflict, ed. Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 48.

[2] Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney, Politics and Voters (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 37.

[3] Lazarfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, p. xx.

> in the course of the campaign, then, strength of party support influences the perception of political issues. The more intensely one holds a vote position, the more likely he is to see the political environment as favorable to himself, as conforming to himself, as conforming to his own beliefs. He is less likely to perceive uncongenial and contradictory events or points of view and hence presumably less likely to revise his own original position. In this manner perception can play a major role in the spiraling effect of political reinforcement.[1]

An individual's position on the issue, consequently, determines how he will perceive a communication. Messages which reinforce his position will be accepted; messages which deny his position will be rejected. Hoffer insists that a persuasive message penetrates "only into minds already open, and rather than instill opinion it articulates and justifies opinions already present in the minds of the recipients."[2] The over-all effect of political perception, therefore, is to "increase the amount of political consensus within the parties and to increase the amount of political cleavage between parties--once again, homogeneity within and polarization between."[3]

Perception, in summary, influences both what a person perceives and how he perceives the stimulus he has selected. An individual, especially under high ego-involvement, selects that which is favorable to him and assimilates it; he rejects that which is unfavorable and tunes it out.

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[1] Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee, p. 223.

[2] Hoffer, p. 98.

[3] Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee, p. 232.

Effect of Ego-Involvement on Judgmental Categories

Several experiments, which were summarized in this chapter, demonstrate that a personally committed individual uses few categories in judging the positions within the universe of discourse on a social issue. He does, moreover, see the world as "black" or "white."

Because of this phenomenon, the ego-involved person attacks all positions which are not exactly his own. Communications from the opposing point of view are, of course, rejected. Communications from neutral or intermediate positions are grouped with the extreme opposition. Finally, communications from heretics or renegades are likewise grouped with the opposing positions and are rejected with equal vehemence and determination. Stagner described this "all-or-nothing" attitude in this statement:

> The patriot who feels that his nation is threatened will find it difficult to tolerate nations following a policy of nonalignment. The neutral country is an uncertain quantity; and under stress, we cannot tolerate this uncertainty. "if you are not for us, you must be against us." Thus the neutral is perceived as the enemy.[1]

A person who becomes extremely rigid in his position will view all other positions as a single group which he rejects. He is not sensitive to doctrinal differences or shades of belief. Everyone is either for or against him. Neutrality or even a moderate view of his own position is identified with the extreme position.

Effect of Ego-Involvement on the Assessment of a Communication

The degree to which an individual is committed to his position determines the standards of fair-unfair, truth-propaganda, and biased-unbiased that he will use in assessing a communication. The individual will "protect" his position and his psychological commitment to that position by judging subjectively the various communication to which he has been exposed. If he assimilates the communication it will be identified as fair, truthful, and unbiased. If he contrasts the communication it will be judged as unfair, propagandistic, and biased.

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[1] Stagner, "The Psychology of Human Conflict," p. 57.

In the 1957 prohibition study conducted by Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, the subjects were exposed to various communications one to three weeks after they took the initial attitude test.[1] The wet (repeal) communication was presented to extreme (dry) subjects and unselected subjects. The moderate communication was presented to wet, dry, and unselected subjects. Following the communication, the same nine-point questionnaire for determining the subjects' attitudes was completed a second time. In addition, the subjects were given a test to indicate their assessments of the truthfulness of the messages they had heard. The results of the experiment may be summarized in the following statements.

First, when the distance between subject's own stand and the position advocated in the communication is small, the communication is judged to be favorable, fair, and factual. A communication that reinforces personal anchorages is, of course, thought to be reliable.

Second, with increasing distance between the two positions, the favorable reaction is sharply reduced with the communication being perceived as propagandistic and unfair. A communication which challenges preconceived beliefs is viewed an unreliable.

The amount of ego-involvement, then, influences the intensity of the reaction to the communication. The highly involved individual perceives favorable communications to be more truthful than they actually are.

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[1] Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, 246-249.

Furthermore, he considers unfavorable communications to be more biased than they actually are.[1]

Ego-involvement, consequently, plays an important role in the social judgment process by influencing "why voters resist the campaign messages." In addition to a distortion of perception, ego-involvement reduces the number of perceived positions and establishes the kinds of adjectives which will be used in assessing the communications from those positions. The more ego-involved mis-perceive more statements than the less involved; they recognize fewer positions on the issue; they use stronger language in assessing the communications within the universe of discourse.

Relationship Between Social Judgment and Rhetorical Theory

The social judgment approach provides a realistic framework for a study of audience analysis. Since ego-involvement influences the frame of reference, the critic or practitioner should not only determine the attitude or attitudes represented in the audience but should also consider the personal involvement in those attitudes. The impact of social judgment on rhetorical theory and criticism can best be summarized by discussing the rhetorical alternatives in two situations--high and low ego-involvement.

Rhetorical Strategies Under High Ego-Involvement

Whenever an audience becomes rigid in the defense of its anchorages, little if any possibility exists that a rhetoric of change will be able to dislodge them from the entrenched attitudes. In fact, an opposite reaction might occur. Williams points out that "imparting information to the more militant of those prejudiced against the group will rarely produce an immediate change in attitudes and may intensify hostile reactions: a nonlogical prejudice may be transformed into consciously irrational hostility."[1] Sherif and Hovland point out that

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[1] For a comprehensive discussion of this judgmental distortion see Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, pp. 133-38.

> another possibility, which was evident in reactions to extreme communication on the political campaign, is that the highly involved individual may move still further away from a divergent communication. He retrenches, so to speak, by taking a stand more opposed to the communication than the one he initially upheld.[2]

Boulding contends that a communication may "serve only to harden and widen his core of values and so make agreement all the more difficult."[3] Rhetorical theory, as a result, which assumes that any attitude may be changed through persuasive discourse is not consistent with human behavior.

This is not to say, however, that rhetoric plays no role under conditions of high ego-involvement. A rhetoric of reinforcement could serve to (1) strengthen an anchorage which is already held, and (2) influence the anchorage an individual chooses as dominant when he is subject to anchorage "cross-pressure."

Furthermore, in certain kinds of situations a rhetoric of disengagement may have some effect, primarily on the more moderate advocates of a position. Whenever a speaker or writer recognize that his position is perceived by an audience as identical with an extreme position, he should disengage this position, in the mind of the audience, from the objectionable position. In the mayoralty election in New York City in 1965,

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[1] Williams, p. 64.

[2] Sherif and Hovland, p. 174.

[3] Boulding, p. 312.

Lindsay was able to disengage his candidacy, in the mind of the New York voter, from the ultraconservative image of the Republican party. The purpose, here, would be to break up the contrast effect which would influence an individual to the left of center from grouping all spokesmen and positions to the right of center as identical with the extreme right persuasion.

Ego-involved audiences, consequently, are insulated against a rhetoric of change but may be subject to a rhetoric of reinforcement and, possibly, a rhetoric of disengagement.

Rhetorical Strategies Under Low Ego-Involvement

When individuals are less involved in their anchorages they may be influenced by a number of rhetorical factors. Since they would characteristically have larger latitudes of acceptance and noncommitment, the persuader has a more flexible situation in which to work. Furthermore, since their frames of reference are not as structured, they will be subject to external stimuli. Sherif and Sherif contend, for example, that "the more unstructured, the more uncertain, the stimulus situation, the greater are the effects of social influences (personal suggestion, information, group demands, majority opinion, and the like) in psychological structuring."[1]

Among the external factors which may influence the frame of reference when relatively unstructured are (1) source credibility, (2) fear arousing appeals, (3) organization of the arguments, and (4) participation in persuasion through such devices as role-playing.[1]

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[1] Sherif and Sherif, p. 82.

To conclude, people who are personally committed to a stand are less susceptible to attitude change in the first place and less responsive to variations in communication in the second. Conversely, less committed and less involved persons are more susceptible to changing their stands as a result of communication and are more responsive to situational factors that may provide additional anchorages for their evaluations. The difference in behavior on the part of an involved and non-involved audience may, therefore, be explained by the effect of ego-involvement on perception, recognition of shades of belief, and evaluation of messages.

Audience analysis, consequently, by a rhetorician, should consider the effect of ego-involvement on the qualitative development of positions on social issues. This awareness can contribute to a better understanding of the role of rhetoric in social influence.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to (1) describe the social judgment-involvement approach to attitude and attitude change, and (2) discuss the effect of this approach on group theory and a contemporary theory of rhetoric. The two salient characteristics of the social judgment approach which have been delineated in this chapter include perception-judgment and personal involvement in the issue. The frame of reference, reflecting the integration of internal and external stimuli, influences the way individuals perceive messages and determines their behavioral reactions to those perceptions. Ego-involvement, in turn, influences the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment which determine the positions on a social issue that will be either assimilated or contrasted.

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[1] The best summary of current research in these four areas is found in Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953).

Second, this chapter has examined the effect of this approach on both group relations and rhetorical transactions. The influence of ego-involvement on group theory has been discussed in terms of intragroup rigidity and intergroup hostility. Finally, the last part of this chapter was concerned with the reactions made by individuals under both high and low involvement when exposed to communicative messages.

The next chapter will apply the social judgment approach, as it relates to group relations and rhetorical practices, to a broader study of the nature of conflict and compromise.

CHAPTER III

RHETORIC AND COMPROMISE: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

One of the basic characteristics of a democratic society is a reliance on compromise as a means of reducing conflict and engineering consent. The economist studies conflict and compromise among economic organizations--management and labor unions. Political science is interested in conflict resolution among branches of the government, states, and nations. Sociology studies the role of compromise and conciliation both within and among racial, religious, economic, and social groups in our society. Hallowell is probably not overstating the case when he claims that "compromise not only is a worthy, self-sufficient political ideal but, many insist, is the distinguishing and essential characteristic of democracy as a form of government."[1] Simmel corroborates this view by describing compromise as "one of mankind's greatest inventions."[2] Finally, this point has also been suggested by Charles Dollard, Carl I. Hovland, and Leonard S. Cottrell.

> Implicit in democratic theory and practice is the acceptance of the fact of conflicting interests and even the positive encouragement of the expression of divergent views, aims, and values. However, there is the equally important assumption that conflicts can be resolved or accommodated by nonviolent means and that intergroup hostilities can be kept below the point where the basic consensus

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[1] John H. Hallowell, "Compromise as a Political Ideal," Ethics, LIV (April, 1944), 157.

[2] Georg Simmel, Conflict, trans. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), p. 115.

> of the society is threatened. The survival of a democratic nation, therefore, depends on the invention of techniques for resolving its internal group conflicts in such a way that the welfare and interests of all elements of the community are given adequate consideration in the community.[1]

The purpose of this chapter is to delineate some of the basic concepts involved in a theory of rhetoric and compromise. This formulation of a general theory, based on insights from many sources and disciplines, can more accurately be called an "approach" since broad generalization about human behavior, especially in conflict situations, may be both impossible and misleading. The intent, then, will be to suggest various dimensional guide-lines which, at least, will be an initial attempt to provide a synthesis of the contributions from many disciplines.

The specific focus, here, will be to consider the role and function of rhetoric within the anatomy of a controversy. The first part of this chapter will discuss the relationship between conflict and compromise; the second will consider the interaction of rhetoric with compromise; the third will measure the effect of ego-involvement on both rhetoric and compromise.

Relationship Between Conflict and Compromise

Since the terms "conflict" and "compromise" are used rather liberally in this chapter they should be clearly defined. Conflict, from the point of view of Boulding, refers to "a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other."[2] The salient characteristics of this definition include (1) competition, (2) awareness, and (3) desire. Competition, in its basic meaning, is broader than conflict in that it exists when any potential position of two behavioral units is mutually exclusive. Athletic teams, political parties, and individuals may "compete" in the sense that they are in a situation in which their potential positions are mutually exclusive.[1] In conflict, however, there is a deepening of the competition in that the parties are "aware" that the incompatibility of behavior space does exist; both parties "wish" to occupy the contested space; and, each party would not hesitate to destroy the other in order to gain exclusive occupancy of the behavior space. Wright distinguishes between the two by writing:

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[1] Cited in Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947), p. vii.

[2] Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), p. 5.

> Conflict, defined as opposition among social entities directed against one another, is distinguished from competition defined as opposition among social entities independently striving for something of which the supply is inadequate to satisfy all. Competitors may not be aware of one another, while the parties to a conflict are.[2]

Conflict may be handled in two ways. First, a conflict may be prevented through some phase of avoidance. Avoidance occurs when (1) one party removes itself from the field on its own volition; (2) both parties withdraw from the field or competition; or (3) one party forcibly removes the other.[3] In all three cases the basic cause of the conflict, namely, joint competition for behavior space, has been eliminated.

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[1] Ibid., p. 4. See also Kurt Singer, "The Resolution of Conflict," Social Research, XVI (June, 1949), 230, and Jessie Bernard, "The Conceptualization of Intergroup Relations with Special Reference to Conflict," Social Forces, XXIX (March, 1951), 243-51.

[2] Quincy Wright, "The Nature of Conflict," Western Political Quarterly, IV (June, 1951), 197.

[3] Boulding, pp. 308-09.

The alternate method of managing a conflict is through what Boulding calls "procedural conflict conclusion."[1] This type of conflict reduction or elimination may take one or more of the following forms. First, the parties in a dispute are able to reconcile the conflict by changing their value systems in such a way so that they will have common preferences in their joint field, thus eliminating conflict. Whenever their values become identical, the satisfaction of one group also results in the satisfaction of the other group. Reconciliation has ended the conflict.

The second method of resolving the conflict is through compromise. Compromise is a means whereby each party is willing to settle for something less than the ideal position rather than continue the conflict. Although the parties have different optimum positions in the joint field, they would prefer, through bilateral negotiation, to accommodate the controversy.

Finally, conflict may be concluded through an award which has been given by an adjudicating agency or individual who has been brought into the dispute as a third party. This becomes possible when both parties have consented ahead of time to accept the verdict of the neutral person or agency instead of continuing or proliferating the conflict. The award method of conflict resolution may also apply in cases where sub-groups have agreed to accept the will of the majority.

For the purposes of this study, however, the term "compromise" will be broadened to include all the forms of procedural conflict conclusion--reconciliation, compromise, and award. A compromise may result, therefore, when the parties involved alter their goals in such a way so that there is harmony; when the parties, through negotiation, are able to sacrifice non-essential goals or values in order to preserve goals or values of higher priority; and, when the parties agree to accept the mediation of a third party or the decision of the majority in order to conclude the conflict.

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[1] Ibid., p. 309.

Both conflict and compromise are viewed in this study as "amoral" activities in that neither is inherently "good" or "bad." Conflict, on one hand, makes possible a free enterprise economy and, on the other, leads toward a disastrous war. Compromise provides a means whereby conflicting parties are able to discover a meaningful and constructive accommodation or, in other situations, it may lead to a "Munich." Hallowell recognized this difficulty when he wrote that "compromise can lead just as surely to individual degeneration and social decay as it can to individual growth and social progress."[1] He concluded by suggesting that "a compromise is not good in itself; it is good only if it leads to good results. But one can know if it will lead to good results only by subjecting the substance of the compromise to the test of some ideal goal one hopes to attain."[2]

Conflict, which grows out of intensified competition, may be resolved through avoidance and "procedural conflict conclusion." Both conflict and compromise are amoral and must be evaluated in terms of their goals and effects instead of their inherent characteristics.

Relationship Between Rhetoric and Compromise

Although there are many influences which contribute to the act of compromise, none is more important than rhetoric, defined previously as the "adjusting of ideas to people and people to ideas." McKeon delineated this relationship by suggesting that

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[1] Hallowell, 159.

[2] *Ibid.*, 163.

> the difficulty in planning and resolving conflicts lies, not in the multiplicity of elements to be considered or in the incompatibility of objectives to be realized, but in the initial establishment of the elements as those proper to the problem and in the translation of objectives acknowledge verbally into ends practicable in a course of action.[1]

To Bryson, the "rhetoric of conciliation" is identical with the "rhetoric of democracy" in that it rests upon the willingness to accept any other individual's cooperation, in practical tasks, without demanding that he share all our beliefs or that he depend on our ultimate sanctions. In summing up his notion of the "rhetoric of conciliation," Bryson wrote:

> Here is the creative paradox of a rhetoric of mediation; the search for the grounds of mediation; the search for the grounds of decision is an effort to bring into a converging force all the elements in all the differing opinions that can drive action forward. At the same time, the search uncovers the differences which cannot be managed and undertakes to let people live with them in peace and friendliness. There are no safe formulas by which real differences can be smoothed out. The hope of a rhetoric of conciliation is that these differences will prove to be less in number and importance, and less hindering to practical cooperation, when all avenues of agreement and difference have been quietly explored, vigorously debated, and fairly judged.[2]

Fisher continues this line of thought by suggesting:

> Compromise is a natural invitation to rhetoric. It is a situation in which rival factions are at odds with one another, in which an effort is made to reconcile or adjust these differences, and in reconciliation or adjustment depends on the discovery and persuasive presentation of proposals on which rival factions can reach a consensus.[3]

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[1] Richard McKeon, "Discussion and Resolution in Political Conflicts," Ethics, LIV (July, 1944), 237.

[2] Lyman Bryson, "The Rhetoric of Conciliation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (December, 1953), 443.

[3] Walter R. Fisher, "The Failure of Compromise in 1860-1861: A

Rhetoric or communication, however, are not utopian schemes that will lead to an agreeable compromise regardless of the nature of the issue or the involvement in that issue. In fact, rhetoric may have the opposite effect of blocking rather than clearing the path to an accommodation. Boulding develops this point of view by observing:

> The elimination of misunderstanding will not necessarily eliminate the conflict or produce complete reconciliation of values and images of the two parties. Indeed, there may be occasions when conciliation can actually exacerbate a conflict; each party may think, quite wrongly, that the other party agrees with him, and the clearing up of this misunderstanding may make the parties realize that their conflict is deeper than they thought.[1]

Rhetoric and compromise, then, interact in the conclusion of conflicts involving social issues. The nature of this interaction process can be explored by the examination of two concepts. First, the interaction between rhetoric and compromise is on both an ideological and an interpersonal level. Second, the interaction requires the availability of institutions and communicative channels.

Ideational and Interpersonal Interaction

The complementary nature of the ideological and interpersonal interaction within a rhetoric of compromise is firmly grounded in rhetorical theory. The point of view of a rhetorician has been expressed by Brockriede when he observed:

> If contemporary practice is essentially interactive, the theorist, accordingly, might appropriately be concerned along a _personal_ dimension with the images that speakers and audiences have of themselves and of one another, along an _ideational_ dimension with

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Rhetorical View" (unpublished paper, Department of Speech, University of Southern California, 1965), 4. _In press_ in _Speech Monographs_.

[1] Boulding, pp. 316-17.

> the strategies for material and formal identification, and with the conditions under which the reciprocal images and attitudes of speakers and audiences may change.[1]

Osgood, in his concept of "congruity," presents a similar view from within social psychology. Osgood argues that in effect message and source are inseparable in that the attitude of an individual toward one influences his attitude toward the other.[2] In a simple illustration, if a person is an avid supporter of Lyndon Johnson on the personal level he is apt to be a supporter of the "Great Society" on the ideational level. On the other hand, if an individual is strongly anti-Johnson he is likely to view any of Johnson's ideas with considerable suspicion.

Finally, the philosophical view of the interaction of these processes is provided by Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca. Johnstone writes that

> for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, most of the important techniques of rhetoric depend upon the fact that there is, in the mind of the audience, an interaction between the personality of the speaker and the propositions he asserts. If the speaker is trusted, his thesis will be received with less hesitation than otherwise, and if the thesis seems obviously true, the trustworthiness of the propounder will appear to be enhanced.[3]

The ideational (message) and interpersonal (source) variables are so interwoven into the rhetorical process that it is difficult if not impossible to pry them apart. They may be discussed separately, however, provided this separate treatment does not imply exclusive categories. This section will relate rhetoric and compromise from the ideational and interpersonal points of view.

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[1] Wayne E. Brockriede, "Toward a Contemporary Aristotelian Theory of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LII (February, 1966), 36.

[2] One of the best discussions of the principle of congruity as it relates to attitude change may be found in C. E. Osgood and P. H. Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," Psychological Review, LXII (January, 1955), 42-55.

[3] Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "A New Theory of Philosophical Argumentation," in Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Argumentation, ed. Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), p. 129.

Ideational Relationship

Rhetoric shares with compromise the necessity of working from ideational premises that are jointly held by the factions within a dispute. Compromise, from this orientation, is theoretically available when the participants in a controversy possess or perceive that they possess a common goal or value. In the language of the social judgment approach, their latitudes of acceptance or noncommitment overlap. From the viewpoint of Kenneth Boulding, their "boundaries of acceptability" overlap within the same behavioral space.[1]

The definition of compromise itself indicates such a reliance on shared values on the part of both parties. Lasswell finds that

> such a theory [of compromise] would emphasize the advantages of drawing attention to the values which are cherished in common, in the hope of avoiding too much concentration upon values which are mutually exclusive. When there are many such values held in common, success in the pursuit of any particular value is secondary to the preservation of the whole network of common interests and sentiments.[2]

The importance of accepted premises in order to turn a conflict into a possible compromise situation was echoed by Hallowell when he wrote that "if intelligent deliberation is to achieve a solution to conflicts, it must start from the same or similar premises and have as its goal the same or similar objects."[1] The same observation was made by Williams when he wrote:

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[1] Boulding, p. 17, points out that "a position in the field is acceptable to one of the parties if the party is willing to conclude a bargain or enter into some continuing relationship with the other party. The field can, therefore, be divided into an acceptable set and a non-acceptable set by a boundary of acceptability for each party. If the acceptable sets of the two parties do not overlap, that is, if there are no points common to both sets, no bargain can be struck."

[2] Harold D. Lasswell, "Compromise," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. Edwin R. A. Seligman (1931), 148.

> Mediation between groups in conflict is possible only when effective appeal can be made to a superior value-consensus which transcends group differences, e.g. the preservation of a larger community, common larger "interests," basic religious values, shared mores, etc.[2]

Fisher points out that "compromise is not meant to explore and to establish what is the good, the true, and the just as abstract conceptions, but to reach and implement decisions which reflect these values."[3] Broyles refers to conflicts which do remain within the context of common acceptance of basic ends or values as "communal" and argues that such conflicts are, indeed, amenable to settlement in one form or another. Conflicts, however, which occur in a context in which "the common acceptance of basic ends or values" does not exist, are called "noncommunal" and would be difficult if not impossible to settle peacefully.[4]

Whenever a common value, goal, or premise is not present within a controversy, one may be introduced into the confrontation in the form of a superordinate goal. In this sense a goal or "issue" is inserted into the conflict which makes it "communal" and, as a result, within the range of accommodation. Because both parties share the superordinate goal, compromise becomes theoretically possible as they seek to protect and perpetuate the accepted value.

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[1] Hallowell, 164.

[2] Williams, p. 75.

[3] Fisher, 4.

[4] J. Allen Broyles, "The John Birch Society: A Movement of Social Protest of the Radical Right," Journal of Social Issues, XIX (April, 1963), 59.

The importance of the presence or perceived presence of an accepted value or superordinate goal for a conflict to become amenable to compromise is also reflected in the servant of compromise--a rhetoric of conciliation. Bitzer contends, in his study of the enthymeme, that rhetoric must begin with premises held by both speaker and audience because persuasion cannot take place unless an audience views a conclusion as required by the premise it subscribes to.[1] Weaver echoes this reliance by rhetoric on shared premises by stating that

> it may not hurt to state that this [enthymeme] is the syllogism with one of the three propositions missing. Such a syllogism can be used only when the audience is willing to supply the missing proposition. The missing proposition will be "in their hearts," as it were; it will be their agreement upon some fundamental aspect of the issue being discussed. If it is there, the orator does not have to supply it; if it is not there, he may not be able to get it in any way--at least not as orator.[2]

Whenever a controversy, then, involves questions of value or truth instead of matters of expediency that reflect the accepted concepts of value and truth, the confrontation is dialectical instead of rhetorical. In this context dialectic means a process of rational analysis or speculative thought designed to discover the philosophical and moral truths involved in a particular controversy. In the Platonic sense, dialectic provides the method of discovering the "Truth"; rhetoric provides the method of presenting the "Truth."[1] "There is no true rhetoric without dialectic," Weaver concludes, "for dialectic provides that basis of high speculation about nature without which rhetoric in the narrower sense has nothing to work on."[2] Compromise, therefore, is a rhetorical activity which thrives on expediency in the search of practical proposals; it is not a dialectical activity which is employed in search of philosophical and moral truths.

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[1] Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLV (December, 1959), 405.

[2] Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), pp. 173-74.

Rhetoric and compromise, consequently, share an interest in the existence of common goals or values, however abstract, which can be appealed to in resolving practical and expedient issues. Rhetoric and compromise thrive on "communal" conflicts but are both negated in "non-communal" disputes. In this context Hallowell claims:

> If there is no agreement on fundamentals, there can be no discussion worthy of the name, no common policy, no compromise that is anything but the extraction of concessions by force, no assurance that human dignity will be respected.[3]

Interpersonal Relationship

The importance of interpersonal relations to both rhetoric and compromise does not need an extended apology in this study. The ability and willingness to compromise is, in part at least, based on the degree to which the parties involved respect the motives and intents of their counterparts. This is also true in those situations where a neutral or third party is brought into the controversy to negotiate a settlement. The workability of what Boulding has called the "award" system is predicated upon the amount of faith and confidence both parties have in the objectivity of the intermediate source or agency. Bernard contends that

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[1] See William M. Sattler, "Socratic Dialectic and Modern Group Discussion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXIX (April, 1943), 156; Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Nathaniel Carpenter's Place in the Controversy Between Dialectic and Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, I (September, 1934) 26-7; Maurice Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (April, 1955), 137; and Albert Duhamel, "The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression," Journal of the History of Ideas, X (June, 1949), 345.

[2] Weaver, p. 17.

[3] Hallowell, 164.

> mediation is a profoundly moral process; it cannot successfully take place unless both parties have faith in the integrity of the mediator. Both parties, furthermore, must inhabit the same moral universe, otherwise there will be no understanding. For success, both parties must want a solution.[1]

Suspicion, mistrust, personal bitterness, and like sentiments are the natural enemies of compromise. Simmel has described a situation in which a party would ordinarily give up the struggle because of a concession offered by the other faction but fails to do so "merely because it is offered by the opponent."[2] Furthermore, Broyles suggests that when a conflict is "initiated on and remains on a highly acrimonious tone," it will probably not be concluded peacefully.[3]

Inquiry into the relationship between the rhetor and respondent on the interpersonal level is as old as Aristotle. The Greek rhetorician, in his concept of ethos, codified the doctrine of ethical proof under the categories of wisdom, character, and good will.[4] The speaker who possessed, in the perceptions of the audience, these characteristics was more likely to persuade that audience than the speaker with less "ethos."

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[1] Jessie Bernard, "The Sociological Study of Conflict," in The Nature of Conflict, ed. Jessie Bernard, T. H. Pear, Raymond Aron, and Robert C. Angell (New York: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1957), p. 111.

[2] Simmel, p. 115.

[3] Broyles, 58-9.

[4] For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of ethos see William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, XIV (1949), 55-65.

In modern rhetorical theory the term ethos has been largely replaced by the concept of source credibility. Whether one chooses to identify the interpersonal relations between the speaker or communicator and the audience as ethos or source credibility, the meaning is the same. Both refer to an important dimension of the rhetorical transaction.

Both compromise and rhetoric share the basic factors of the ideational and interpersonal dimensions of their interaction. Compromise and rhetoric rely on values, premises, or goals jointly held by the participants; both are influenced by the interpersonal relations which exist among the parties to the conflict. These two dimensions, however, are interrelated and interdependent. Personal hostility can destroy ideational harmony; divergent ideologies can turn friends into enemies.

Structural Interaction

Rhetoric, operating on both the ideational and interpersonal levels, serves compromise in the discovery of possible grounds of agreement. This takes place through the basic structural components of compromise--institutions and channels of communication.

Institutions

An institution, in this context, refers to an organization or negotiating agency which serves as the focal point for the conciliation of a conflict. Among such institutions that perform this function are law-making bodies, boards of arbitration, national conventions, or confederations of parties, states, or nations.

The institution may be either permanent or temporary. Institutions which are engaged in a continual search for compromise, such as the United Nations, are always available for the purposes of conflict resolution. On the other hand, certain types of institutions may be created on a temporary or contingency basis. The settlement of the dispute will create a situation in which the institution is no longer needed, so it will be either disbanded or withdrawn from the field.

Whether the institution is permanent or temporary, however, it still serves a useful purpose in the resolution of disputes. Boulding underlines the importance of such organizations when he wrote that "when procedural conflict proves inadequate to deal with the intensity of the conflict in society or when there are no institutions for procedural conflict, violence is likely to result."[1] To substantiate this claim, Boulding cites the example of the First World War which, he argues

> might well have been scotched in the six weeks before its outbreak if communications had been better and if there had been a quite simple apparatus of mediation; it was, at least at that moment, a war that nobody really wanted, and that happened because of a dynamic process that bred misunderstandings and misinterpretations of intention.[2]

Channels of Communication

Rhetoric also serves compromise by acting through various channels of communication. Three such channels exist at some point in the development of a controversy. First, the two parties in the dispute may have access to each other. As the conflict deepens, however, the availability of such a communication channel is sharply reduced. Boulding observes that "messages between the parties have to pass through an intense emotional field in which they are likely to be distorted so that the image that each party has of the other's position may be quite false."[1] Furthermore, Stagner points out that "perceptual distortions and perceptual rigidities block communication between groups in conflict."[2]

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[1] Boulding, pp. 322-23.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

Second, the two parties may communicate through an intermediate or third party. Since the neutral party is, more or less, outside the emotional field which has been charged by the controversy, it is in a better position to transmit messages between the parties with more accuracy provided, of course, the intermediary is actually perceived to be neutral by both parties. The conciliator or mediator may perform three functions within the anatomy of a dispute. First, he may insure that the parties involved see all the trading opportunities which may, in intense rivalry, be missed because of inadequate communication of suspicious motives. Second, the adjudicating party may be able to introduce new variables into the dispute in order to avoid an impasse which may have resulted from the lack of the raw material of concessions and trade. Finally, the mediator may, from his relatively uninvolved vantage point, introduce a possible bargain which will be acceptable to both parties. The third party is not, moreover, totally without power since he may be able to influence public opinion in such a way to pressure one or both recalcitrants to reconsider a possible accommodation. In short, conflicts may result in meaningful compromises through the intervention of a neutral, intermediary agency into the dispute. Coser contends:

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 316

[2] Ross Stagner, "Personality Dynamics and Social Conflict," _Journal of Social Issues_, XVII, No. 3 (1961), 41.

> The mediator shows each party the claims and arguments of the other; they thus lose the tone of subjective passion. He helps to strip the conflict of its non-rational and aggressive overtones. Yet this will not in itself allow the parties to abandon their conflicting behavior since, even boiled down to the "facts of the case," the conflicting claims remain to be dealt with. The mediator's function is primarily to eliminate tension which merely seeks release so that realistic contentions can be dealt with without interference. In addition he may suggest various ways to conduct the conflict, pointing out the relative advantages and costs of each.

Third, in addition to intergroup and intermediate communication, the leaders within a particular reference group may have some flexibility in influencing, through rhetoric, the group norms. Hartley points out that attitude

> changes can be brought about (1) by creating new reference groups with which the individual can identify; (2) by charging the relative dominance of the reference groups on the individual; (3) through skillful leadership, changing the norm in some one particular of existing dominant reference groups; or (4) changing the individual's perception of the norm of his reference groups.[2]

There are so many variables involved in this process that a full discussion of intragroup communication and influence should be sought elsewhere.[3] That this channel of communication is available in certain kinds of controversies is, however, obvious. The relative value of intragroup rhetoric

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[1] Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. 59. See also Elmore Jackson, Meeting of Minds: A Way to Peace Through Mediation (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952).

[2] Eugene L. Hartley, "The Social Psychology of Opinion Formation," Public Opinion Quarterly, XIV (Winter, 1950), 674.

[3] See, for example, the chapter on "Leadership" in Paul F. Secord and Carl W. Backman, Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), pp. 252-72.

in resolving conflicts depends on the nature of the controversy and the degree of rigidity of the group norm. Even leaders may be branded as "renegades" or "heretics" if they openly challenge a cherished group norm.[1]

Compromise, then, is an effective means of conflict resolution when its necessary counterpart, rhetoric, is able to operate from accepted premises within an atmosphere of a relative amount of mutual trust and has, at its disposal, the necessary institutions and channels with which to "adjust ideas to people and people to ideas."

Effect of Ego-Involvement on Rhetoric and Compromise

The last part of this chapter will examine the effect that an intense conflict has on the effectiveness of the rhetoric of conciliation and, ultimately, the success of compromise. Ego-involvement, already defined in Chapter II, describes the kinds of attitudes which reflect man's self-image and world-view. These attitudes, which may be held by individuals or groups, become more intense when they are challenged by other individuals or groups. In short, conflict situations are natural breeding grounds for ego-involved attitudes.

The purpose of this discussion will be to measure the effect of ego-involvement on (1) the ideational, interpersonal, and structural aspects of rhetoric and compromise and (2) the anatomy of a controversy.

Effect of Ego-Involvement on the Dimensions of Rhetoric and Compromise

Whenever parties within a dispute become highly ego-involved in a controversy, they tend to erect ideological defenses of their positions; brand the opposing party as an "enemy"; and undermine the structures and channels of communication and negotiation. Edelman, in his study of politics and symbolism, describes this process in the following terms:

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[1] See Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), pp. 211-22.

> When, on the issues that arouse men emotionally, there is a bimodal value structuring, threat and insecurity are maximized. Those who hold the other value become the enemy. Under these circumstances condensation symbolism and mental rigidity become key factors in social interaction.[1]

Effect on the Ideational Dimension

Three factors influence the development of an ideological position, separate and distinct from that of the other disputant. First, ego-involved proponents of a position seek to justify their rigid stand by developing an abstract, philosophical defense of that point of view. As a result, the highly committed individual is able to justify his stand on the basis of "principle" instead of the pragmatic considerations of "interest." Conflicts on the abstract level, which transcend personal interests, are likely to be more radical and merciless than conflicts over immediate "selfish" issues. Summarizing Simmel, Coser says that

> the consciousness of speaking for a superindividual "right" or system of values reinforces each party's intransigence, mobilizing energies that would not be available for mere personal interests and goals. He [Simmel] bases this assertion on two arguments: (1) that

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[1] Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 175. Edelman further suggests that "a multimodal scattering of values is the opposite extreme. In this situation a very large part of the population is likely to see some merit in both sides of the argument: to be ambivalent and at the same time free to explore the possibilities of alternative courses of action. A minimal fraction of the population is frozen in a narrow class or other fixed grouping, and a major fraction is marginal and searching for a synthesis. Value structuring is therefore relatively slight. Rather than a fixed past and future, accepted with passion and carrying clear implications for present behavior, alternative possibilities can be recognized and pluralistic politics supported. The preconditions exist for cognitive planning, negotiation, and logrolling." Ibid., p. 176.

> individuals enter into a superindividual conflict as the representatives of groups or ideas; and (2) that they are imbued with a sense of respectability and self-righteousness since they are not acting for "selfish" reasons.[1]

Therefore, a struggle is intensified when it becomes depersonalized and becomes depersonalized when it is intensified. The process of abstraction to a higher ideological level can, consequently, transform an interest group into an ideological movement, thus increasing the degree of ego-involvement.

Second, the tendency toward abstraction also serves to magnify the points of difference between the hostile parties within a dispute. The "enemy" must be made to appear radically and significantly different from the in-group. As Boulding observed, "an ideology often increases its power because it runs into opposition, and two mutually opposed ideologies may reinforce each other, and each may even increase the power of the other by the modifications that it engenders."[2]

This mutual reinforcement may take several forms. First, a belligerent attitude on the part of one party will be met with a belligerant attitude on the part of the other party. Furthermore, even a series of concessions on the part of one faction may contribute to the increase in social distance between the conflicting units. Simmel argued that "every concession of the other side, which is only partial anyway, threatens the uniformity in the opposition of all members and hence the unity of their coherence on which a fighting minority must insist without compromise."[1] Therefore, in extreme conflict situations practically any action on the part of one group will facilitate the further entrenchment of the competitor in its divergent position. The exception, here, would be what would amount to a complete capitulation on the part of one of the parties as it removes itself from the behavioral field in a form of avoidance.

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[1] Coser, p. 112. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1951), p. 60, makes the same point in that "to ripen a person for self-sacrifice he must be stripped of his individual identity and distinctness. The most drastic way to achieve this end is by the complete assimilation of the individual into a collective body."

[2] Boulding, p. 280.

Third, the growth of an ideological position is part of a vicious cycle. The more a group becomes committed to its position the more the ideas it supports become integrated into the life of the group. As these concepts permeate the structure and life of the group it tends to become even more rigid. As a result, ideological positions which "infect" more areas of a group's activity are more ego-involving. Boulding described this cycle:

> The power of an ideology depends in large measure on its ability to organize a culture around it. An ideology is a view of the universe. It must give the individual a sense of the drama in which he is acting and the role that he has to play. It must be able to resolve doubts and bewilderments and to explain messages that apparently contradict it. It will be stronger and more persistent if the culture that it organizes contains structures, symbols, occasions, and agencies such as cathedrals, monuments, rituals, elections, churches, parties, and schools, that transmit and reinforce the ideology.[2]

Attitudes, on the ideological dimension, become more ego-involving because of the depersonalization of the stand, the "foil and counterfoil" interaction with the "enemy," and the adoption of the ideology as the sine quo non of the group's world-view.

The interaction of the bipolarized ideologies, in the Boulding system, can occur in three patterns. First, the two ideologies may merge, much in the manner of Hegel's dialectic, to form a synthesis or tertium quid. Second, the defense of an ideology may require the pattern of isolation or segregation.

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[1] Simmel, p. 97.

[2] Boulding, p. 280.

> Where an ideology is exposed to strong counterideologies in its environment, its adherents may resort to the defense of their ideology by withdrawing from the hostile environment into an insulated subculture where the ideology is continually reinforced by mutually supportive communications and where hostile communications from outside are simply cut off.[1]

The third pattern of interaction, according to Boulding, has already been mentioned in the chapter. This pattern, which usually takes place in the early days of the development of an ideology when it is fighting to differentiate itself sharply from the world around it, is called "mutually divergent modification."[2]

Whenever the bimodal value system is formed within a controversy and is reinforced by either the pattern of isolation or mutually divergent modification, the tendency is for both sides to develop the "either-for-me-or-against-me" syndrome. This process, which was introduced in Chapter II, occurs here on the doctrinal level. First, the doctrinaire individual fails to recognize differences among the positions on the other side of the continuum. As has been demonstrated in the contrast effect, all the positions on the other side are skewed toward the extreme and become identical with it, in the individual's perceptions. Second, the neutral position, because it occupies middle ground and refuses to declare for the extremist, is likewise grouped with the "enemy." Finally, the ego-involved individual views the ideological position of the heretic, even though it may be a mild version of his own, as being the same as the opposing extreme position.

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[1] Ibid., p. 284.

[2] Ibid., p. 285.

Ego-involvement, therefore, sabotages a "communal" conflict on the ideational dimension and destroys any existing values or premises which could conceivably connect the two factions. Both parties see the world in "black" or "white" and insist that neither neutrality or milder shades of their positions can exist. Thomas defined this kind of situation when he wrote: "When a controversy becomes a moral issue wherein opponents each see right and justice as altogether on their side, then there is no further hope of compromise."[1]

Effect on the Interpersonal Dimension

Since the ideological split requires the viewing of the opponent as the "enemy," strong emotional responses are likewise activated. As a result, deterioration occurs in the interpersonal as well as ideational aspects of the dispute. Just as the ego-involved individual has difficulty discriminating among doctrinal positions on the spectrum, he also questions the motives and integrity of those represented by the various shades of belief. People who hold the opposing point of view or even the neutral position are perceived as either knaves or fools. Furthermore, those supporting a position only slightly removed from the orthodox view are subject to the same description.

This kind of interpersonal hostility is heightened somewhat when the conspiracy or "devil" theory becomes the accepted doctrine of the group. History is full of examples of hatred and bigotry among organizations, nations, and races. Whereas all members of the out-group are viewed with suspicion, all members of the in-group are above reproach. Ego-involvement blinds individuals to both ideational differences and interpersonal objectivity.

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[1] Benjamin P. Thomas, Theodore Weld: Crusader for Freedom (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1950), p. 238. "We may find that people whom we decide are 'beyond the reach of reason' because they remain on the other side of the fence on an issue, are likely to charge us with unreasonableness, prejudice, and emotion. If either side is to get across to the other, the only alternative is for the parties to escape the tyranny and blinding influence of their

Effect on the Structural Dimension

When such firm positions develop within a dispute, the institutions, either permanent or temporary, become virtually useless as legislation is stymied, organizations are split, confederations are severed, and arbitration agencies are rejected by both parties as instruments of the "enemy." Any kind of negotiation with the opposing group through any media is viewed as evil "coexistence" or, at least, dangerous appeasement.

Furthermore, the channels of communication from the viewpoint of both the message and the source are blocked. Messages from the opposite party are categorically rejected; communications from the "neutral" source are displaced; individuals within the same reference group who indicate "heretical" tendencies are quickly censored.

Extreme ego-involvement, then, destroys the process of communication as it creates both ideational cleavages and interpersonal hostilities. The end result is the disruption in the influence of rhetoric, and consequently, the destruction of compromise.

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entrenched premises or stands and to examine the premises of the other side." Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, _Attitude and Attitude Change_ (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), pp. 2-3.

Effect of Ego-Involvement on the Anatomy of a Controversy

The effect of ego-involvement on the anatomy of a conflict can best be described as a qualitative and quantitative intensification of the polarized positions near the ends of both wings of the continuum. For the sake of clarity, the following diagram represents, in simplified fashion, the possible positions within a comprehensive controversy.

Extreme Moderate Conservative Neutral Conservative Moderate Extreme

These positions should not be viewed as exclusive compartments but, instead, are dimensional in that they move from one extreme position to another through numerous moderate stands as well as a neutral position. This spectrum corresponds in type to the "left-right" political continuum which represents the spatial relationships among political concepts with the extreme right-wing representing fascism and the extreme left representing communism.[1]

The intensification on a qualitative dimension occurs as the entire wing of the continuum moves toward a more rigid position on the particular issue. The extreme position will be even more extreme; the moderate and conservative positions will be less moderate and conservative. The same process is occuring simultaneously in the other wing so that the total effect of the intensification is a literal pulling apart of the two wings of the spectrum.

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[1] There is some disagreement as to the validity of the left-right political model for the structuring of attitudes. Jerry Eugene Pournelle, "The American Political Continuum: An Examination of the Validity of the Left-Right Model as an Instrument for Studying Contemporary American 'Isms,'" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, University of Washington, 1964), p. 149, points out that "the Left-Right Model of politics is not only inadequate for analysis of the American scene, but dangerous; that it leads to a blurring of theoretical distinctions between perspectives which must be seen as differing from each other."

The second type of intensification is quantitative in the sense that the point of assimilation or polarization which will ultimately capture the attention and commitment of most of the people on that side of the continuum will, in most cases, tend to locate itself between the extreme and moderate positions instead of between the moderate and conservative positions. Instead of the population being dispersed evenly along the spectrum, the individuals and groups will be skewed to a polarized position. This position will be somewhat ambiguous in that it speaks the language of extremism but advocates the policies of moderation. The condition described here is in reaction to a conflict situation instead of a competitive engagement. Whenever the confrontation falls into the competition classification, the assimilation point will tend to be closer to the middle of the wing of the continuum.[1] This kind of conflict, moreover, is described by Dahl as "severe disagreement: symmetrical" in that extremism dominates the controversy.[2]

In addition to the move toward the more extreme position by the moderates and conservatives, there is a corresponding shift to what

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[1] Burns discusses in some detail the importance of a political party being able to discover the "vital center" so that the party will include "conservatives who grumble that it is going too fast, activists who complain about its inertia, and moderate party leaders who seek to hold the two groups together and put the party in the right tactical position for engaging the enemy." See James MacGregor Burns, The Dead-Lock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, and Co., 1963), p. 66.

[2] Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 98.

appears to be a more moderate position by a segment of the more realistic extremists. Boulding described this process when he wrote:

> The conflict of ideologies is a dynamic process, and ideologies themselves constantly change through time. A very common pattern is for an ideology to emerge as the result of the rise of a charismatic leader. In its early years the ideology is intense and narrow in its appeal. It grows by separating out from the mass of the society a small subculture of dedicated people, who differentiate themselves very sharply from the mass culture and are frequently persecuted both by its official and its unofficial representatives. If the power of the ideology is sufficient, however, it may develop to the point where it becomes a dominant ideology in the society. As it approaches this point, the character of the ideology changes: it becomes less intense and of wider appeal, reflecting a movement toward a maximum of power.[1]

This is not to say, however, that all the extreme elements are able to make this adjustment in order to gain quantitative support. There is usually a die-hard band of radicals who view such popularization as a sell-out to the "enemy." These radicals, who are characteristically agitators and not politicians, lose control of the movement and are, in many cases rebuffed by it.[2]

The moderate and conservative supporters, then, move toward the more extreme position in a qualitative intensification; a portion of the extremist supporters moves toward the moderate position in a quantitative intensification. The moderates and conservatives make a doctrinal shift; the more radical element moves "toward a maximum of power." The qualitative and quantitative changes which occur within the anatomy of a dispute may be summarized in the following postulates.

First, most of the communication that is produced during the controversy is between the rigid, extremist positions. Radical agitators are inherently more vocal as they attack what they consider to be wrong with society. Conversely, the moderate and conservative positions are put on the defensive. Because of this, the language of the extremist is perceived as representative of the entire wing of the continuum--at least in the eyes of those on the other side. This reinforces the stereotyping effect in that conservative and moderate voices are not heard as well in the other group. Even if they were heard they would be subject to the contrast effect in that they will be grouped, especially by the radicals, with the extremist position.

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[1] Boulding, p. 282.

[2] Hoffer, p. 17, points out that "a movement is pioneered by men of words, materialized by fanatics and consolidated by men of action." The distinctions he makes among these three kinds of individuals and the role they play in a mass movement are very useful to a student of human behavior.

Second, opinion leaders, who are not necessarily extremists, use the language of extremism in order to identify the "enemy" as the entire opposite wing. Politicians, as they appeal for votes, feel the need to out-flank each other by taking a more extreme stance than their opponent in order to prove their superior patriotism. Once the support has been secured, however, it is sometimes difficult to retract. This problem has been discussed at length by J. David Singer in his study of international relations.

> The tragedy is, of course, that at about the time the political elites discover what they have set in motion, it is extremely costly to seek to slow or reverse it. They discover that their domestic pay-off structure is full of rewards for continuing to feed the hostility and the jingoism, and loaded with penalities if they hesitate to do so. Normally, the would-be peacemaker loses out (at the polls, in the smoke-filled rooms, or whatever the path to political power) to the sabre-rattler and the demagogue. As a consequence, the holder or seeker of domestic power finds himself seriously inhibited from "doing business with the enemy. Bargaining is seen as appeasement, quid pro quo concessions represent capitulation, and serious negotiation may be denounced as treason.[1]

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[1] J. David Singer, "The Political Science of Human Conflict," in The Nature of Human Conflict, ed. Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 146.

Third, the parties to a dispute may take a more extreme position for the purposes of improving their relative bargaining positions. Zinn asserts that

> two factors demand recognition by moderates who disdain "extreme" positions on the ground that compromise is necessary. One is the above-mentioned point that the early projection of an advanced position ensures a compromise on more favorable terms than would be the case where the timorous reformer compromises at the start (in which case the result is a compromise upon a compromise, since he will be forced to retreat even from his retreat after all the forces are calculated at the social weighing-in). The other is that there is a huge difference between the passive wisher-for-a-change who quietly adds up the factors and makes a decision as to which is the composition of all existing forces, and the active reformer who pushes so hard in the course of adding-up that the composite itself is changed.[1]

If the other side is motivated to the same kind of action, the end result may be a type of escalation which may not end until the two positions have become so distant and entrenched that peaceful conflict resolution is no longer feasible nor desired.

Fourth, the moderates and conservatives may appear to support the extremist position when they identify with the supporters of that position on other issues. For example, the moderate, as he resents the brutal attacks on the entire wing of the continuum from the opposite extreme, may, in defending the right of the radicals on his wing to believe and communicate their ideology, ultimately identify himself with that position. The two vocal extreme positions, as they interact, produce exactly what is required to strengthen and accelerate the extremity of the other.

Ego-involvement, therefore, creates a dynamic situation within a controversy that tends to produce a bimodal polarization closer to the extreme wings than occurs in less involved competitive confrontations. This qualitative and quantitative interaction process is accentuated by those factors which distort an objective analysis of the "real" issues involved in the controversy. Both ideational and interpersonal distortions create an atmosphere of confusion, hostility, misunderstanding, and alienation.

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[1] Howard Zinn, "The Tactics of Agitation," in Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin B. Duberman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 434.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to integrate the concepts discussed in Chapter II into a broader context of rhetoric and compromise. The impact of the social judgment approach on the interrelationship of rhetoric and compromise was delineated on the ideational, interpersonal, and structural levels. The forces which reject the rhetoric of change as an effective instrument of reconciliation also doom the fruits of rhetoric, namely, compromise. These processes of perception and ego-involvement are also instrumental in the polarization of a conflict so that it no longer is amenable to some form of accommodation.

The theory of rhetoric and compromise which was developed in this chapter will be applied, in the next three chapters, in the ante-bellum controversy between the North and the South. Chapter IV will seek to explain the historical, political, social and cultural, and rhetorical backgrounds to that controversy.

CHAPTER IV

BACKGROUND TO THE 1860 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

During the heated controversy over the Compromise of 1850, John C. Calhoun, the leading spokesman of Southern nationalism, made the following prediction:

> The Union is doomed to dissolution, there is no mistaking the signs. I am satisfied in my judgment that even if the questions which now agitate Congress were settled to the satisfaction and the concurrence of the Southern States, it would not avert, or materially delay, the catastrophe. . . . The mode by which it will be is not so clear; it may be brought about in the manner that none now forsee. But the probability is it will explode in a Presidential election.[1]

Ten years later, during the presidential election of 1860, the forces of extremism that yielded to compromise in the previous decade had reached their zenith. The campaign and election in 1860 served to articulate and crystalize the divisive attitudes which intensified the sectionalism between North and South.

In order to understand the role of the 1860 election in the broader setting of the eve of conflict, it becomes necessary to describe the atmosphere in which the campaign was enacted. This is important for at least two reasons. First, an event or movement is the product of many forces, influences, or pressures. This is what Hoffer had in mind when he wrote:

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[1] Cited in Gerald M. Capers, John C. Calhoun: Opportunist (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p. 252.

> No matter how vital we think the role of leadership in the rise of a mass movement, there is no doubt that the leader cannot create the conditions which make the rise of a movement possible. He cannot conjure a movement out of the void. There has to be an eagerness to follow and obey, and an intense dissatisfaction with things as they are, before movement and leader can make their appearance. When conditions are not ripe, the potential leader, no matter how gifted, and his holy causes, no matter how potent, remain without a following.[1]

Cantril has applied this concept in his study of such social movements as lynchings, Father Divine's organization, the Oxford Group, the Townsend Plan, and the Nazi Revolution.[2] In each case Cantril examines the movement in light of the background factors which interacted to give it life. Since events or movements are influenced by and, in turn, influence their unique situations, the critic or observer should consider these factors in his analysis.

Second, the critic of events or movements should apply a standard of judgment consistent with the alternatives known and available to the people involved in a particular unit of study. Nevins discusses this notion in relation to historical research and criticism.

> It remains to mention one special difficulty in using historical evidence in solving historical problems--the difficulty of evaluating events and figures of the far-distant past by the standards and atmosphere of their own time, not of ours. The essence of truth often depends upon giving the correct setting, material and especially moral, to an occurrence. Yet the nunc pro tunc fallacy crops up repeatedly in even the best writers. Though it is probably impossible ever to see events of a past age precisely as men living in that age regarded them, we can at least avoid the grosser errors of perspective.[3]

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[1] Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1951), p. 103.

[2] See Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963).

[3] Allan Nevins, The Gateway to History (New York: Anchor Books, 1962), p. 253.

Griffin has cautioned that the same nunc pro tunc fallacy should be avoided when a critic is interested in the "rhetoric of historical movements." He suggests that the

> critic must judge the discourse in terms of the theories of rhetoric and opinion indigenous to the times. This principle means that the critic will operate within the climate or theory of rhetoric and public opinion in which the speakers and writers he judges were reared, and in which they practiced; in other words, that he will measure practice in terms of the theories available, not to himself, but to the speakers and writers whom he judges.[1]

An analysis of the social milieu in which an event or movement was spawned is, consequently, necessary in order to understand the nature of the phenomena under investigation as well as to provide a rationale for criticism or assessment.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the historical, political, social and cultural, and rhetorical influences which permeated the campaign of 1860 and influenced its results. The next two chapters will isolate the slavery issue for a more thorough analysis. This chapter will focus, primarily, on other factors involved in the campaign which, of course, were not untouched by the slavery controversy. The purpose of this section, then, will be to describe the four influences which were interwoven into the fabric of mid-19th Century America and consider their effect on the campaign, candidates, and voters in the summer and fall of 1860.

Historical Influences in 1860

The campaign of 1860 was staged in the midst of increasing sectionalism that divided the nation in half and created a feeling of hostility and alienation between the two sections. By the time the voters flocked to the polls on November 7, 1860, the nation was well on the way to the formation of a separate North and South. This is not to say, however, that every citizen had already identified himself as either a "Rebel" or a "Yankee" by 1860. Not until the first blood was spilled in mortal combat did many force themselves to declare for the Union or the Confederacy. Even during the war occasional voices of protest were heard as many people, in both sections, refused to "rally around the flag."[1]

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[1] Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (April, 1952), 186-87.

The tendencies toward sectionalism by the time of the November election, however, were pronounced enough to justify the observation by Charles Mackey, erstwhile editor of the *Illustrated London News*, that

> between Massachusetts and South Carolina, between Vermont and Arkansas, between Connecticut and Alabama, there exists as great a difference in everything, except language and style of dress and architecture, as there does between Scotland and Portugal, England and Naples, Wales and the Ionian Islands.[2]

The Charleston *Mercury*, claiming to speak for the South, asserted that "the North and the South are two nations, made by their institutions, customs and habits of thought, as distinct as the English and French."[3] Rosenboom wrote, in his study of presidential elections, that "sectionalism triumphed in both North and South in 1860."[1] Catton and Catton were probably correct when they observed that

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[1] Dwight Lowell Dumond, *Antislavery Origins of the Civil War in the United States* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 2, points out that "resistance to centralization of power under President Lincoln by the followers of Clement L. Vallandigham was as bold and defiant as it was to the arbitrary acts of President Davis by the followers of William L. Yancey and Alexander H. Stephens."

[2] Cited in Henry Savage, Jr., *Seeds of Time: The Background of Southern Thinking* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), p. 49.

[3] Cited in Avery O. Craven, *Civil War in the Making, 1815-1860* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959), p. 102.

> the American experiment had apparently produced two distinct societies, the one free and the other slave, each with its own set of values and goals, standing now face to face in open antagonism bred of fear and suspicion, North and South at daggers drawn, war drums throbbing offstage, a house dividing, a nation rent in half.[2]

Finally, the importance of sectionalism to the causes of the Civil War was discussed in considerable detail by Owsley as he labels it the "fundamental cause."

> The cause of that state of mind which we may call war psychosis lay in the sectional character of the United States. In other words, the Civil War had one basic cause: sectionalism. There are two types of sectionalism: there is that egocentric, destructive sectionalism where conflict is always irrepressible; and there is that constructive sectionalism where good will prevails.[3]

This discussion of "destructive sectionalism" which was rampant in 1860 will consider (1) the characteristics of sectionalism and (2) the effect of sectionalism. The purpose, here, will be to discuss the divisive forces which had been building up over the years and to consider the extent to which they created, in the minds of Americans, a yawning chasm of separation between North and South.

Characteristics of Sectionalism

The structural and normative functions which regulate membership in a reference group have already been discussed in a theoretical context. These factors merge in the development of intragroup rigidity and intergroup hostility. The cleavage between the North and South in the ante-bellum period represents a prime example of the interaction of reference groups in conflict.

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[1] Eugene H. Rosenboom, A History of Presidential Elections (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 184.

[2] William Catton and Bruce Catton, Two Roads to Sumter (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 63.

[3] Frank L. Owsley, "The Fundamental Cause of the Civil War: Egocentric Sectionalism," Journal of Southern History, VII (February, 1941), 7.

Intragroup Rigidity in 1860

As both North and South became more entrenched in their sectionalism, the various degrees of heresy and renegadism were subject to more severe stricture. The pressures to conform to the group norm were much stronger in the South than the North. Calhoun made the observation, in the decade before the Civil War, that the North was an aggregate of individuals; the South was an aggregate of communities.[1] Each of these communities was a microcosm of the "Southern" point of view and strove to protect the rights of the South in general by enforcing the orthodoxy at home. Since the issues which created and proliferated sectionalism were more "ego-involving" in the South, the rules, written or unwritten, against deviant thought or behavior were more rigid. Nye, in his discussion of civil liberties in the controversy over slavery, claimed that

> there were in the South two threats to the security of slavery: the Southerner who entertained unsound opinions, and the Northerner (whether abolition agent or traveller) who was likely to spread antislavery doctrine. To silence the one and eject the other, if legal means were too slow or not justified by the case, the citizen-mob, backed by popular opinion, was the most effective instrument.[2]

Freedom of speech, thought, and action, particularly on the slavery question, rapidly disappeared in the South during the fifties. Criticism of the institution of slavery was prohibited. Any remark or action which was interpreted as inimical to the South was likewise dangerous. The literature of that period, especially in the North, was full of examples of individuals who were expelled from various communities in the South because of suspected subversion. Oliver Temple, in his _Notable Men of Tennessee_, wrote:

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[1] See Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Vintage Books, 1948), pp. 68-92.

[2] Russel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy, 1830-1860 (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1949), p. 141.

> No one dared any longer to suggest its 'slavery' removal or its amelioration. All, whether slaveholders or non-slaveholders, felt the crushing power and the omnipotence of this despotism of public opinion. The least suspicion of disloyalty to slavery, brought upon such person infamy and the curse of social outlawry.[1]

This persecution of deviants from the Southern norm was not only directed at traitors who, in many cases, were forced to move out of the South, but also at fellow Southerners who took a position only slightly removed from the orthodox view. Craven described these "heretics" in the following manner.

> There is no sadder story in all American history than that of the Southern conservatives in the final crisis. Under the circumstances, the advantage was all with the smaller group of determined, exasperated radicals who now talked loudly of Southern rights and Republican threats, and who were quietly, but not openly, planning secession. They hurled the charges of disloyalty, cowardice and weakness against all who would not join their ranks. They called them abolitionists and Northern sympathizers.[2]

Although such intragroup rigidity was more apparent below the Mason-Dixon line, it also existed in the North. Nevins, in his study of the pre-war controversy, supports this notion.

> The fanatic never sees his own inconsistencies. Though antislavery journals continually arraigned Southerners for their intolerance, no more dishonorable example of political lynching could be found than the removal of Judge Edward G. Loring in Massachusetts in 1858.[3]

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[1] Cited in Clement Eaton, _The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old South_ (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 275-76.

[2] Craven, _Civil War in the Making_, p. 59.

[3] Allan Nevins, _The Emergence of Lincoln_, II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 30.

In this particular case, the community persecuted the judge for his actions in enforcing the fugitive slave law in spite of the pressure and agitation stirred up by the antislavery factions. The condemnation of any form of deviant behavior, consequently, was not the product of either the North or the South but, in both sections, resulted from radicalism, extremism, or high ego-involvement.

As the sections became more rigid and committed in their positions, deviant behavior of any form was censored. The South, because of its involvement with slavery as a necessary part of its social structure, was more susceptible to such intolerance. The North, on the other hand, was more pluralistic and allowed greater flexibility of thought and action until the war forced a conformity of patriotism on all citizens.[1]

Intergroup Hostility in 1860

The effects of intergroup or intersectional hostility in the 1860 controversy were evident in the (1) breakdown in communication, (2) the discovery of conspiracies, and (3) the development of stereotypes.

Breakdown in Communication

"By the end of 1859," observed Catton and Catton, "the two sections had essentially lost the power to communicate."[2] Isely adds that "by the time of the crisis of 1860-1861, the north and the south had passed the point of understanding. They spoke to one another in a foreign tongue."[1] This disruption in communication between the sections was a product of both sectional isolation and communicative distortion.

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[1] Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 660, points out that "throughout the Civil War active disloyalty was effectively dealt with wherever it raised its head; but there was no general censorship of the press, no 'relocation' of suspects; and discussion of leaders and war aims remained open, unrestrained and often ill-informed, libelous, and nasty. Sentences of courts-martial were comparatively mild, and offenders were pardoned with the coming peace."

[2] Catton and Catton, p. 187.

Sectional Isolation.--Provincial isolation, fear of a minority status, and deep-rooted insecurities and tensions caused the South to disrupt channels of communication with the North. Mail was searched, freedom of thought and expression vanished, the Northern press was censored, and travelers from that section were viewed with increasing suspicion. The slightest provocation would place the Northerner in danger of tar and feathers or something worse. This led the Cincinnati Daily Commercial to complain that

> the recent proscriptive and despotic treatment to which many Northern citizens have been subject in the South, is one of the most serious and deplorable effects of the present political excitement. If not speedily arrested, it threatens to lead to the most disastrous consequences. It is impossible to maintain harmony and good feeling between the different sections of the country, where any considerable number of the people of one section are liable to continual outrage and persecution whenever they set foot in the other.[2]

In withdrawing itself from the North on all levels of interaction, the South was attempting to protect its civilization from the "contamination" of Northern influence. In short, the South was striving to enact what Boulding has called "avoidance" by seeking to withdraw from the field. The danger of any governmental organization controlling what people are allowed to think has been discussed in considerable detail by Dumond in his study of the origins of the Civil War.

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[1] Jeter Allen Isely, Horace Greeley and the Republican Party, 1853-1861 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 311.

[2] Cincinnati Daily Commercial, December 1, 1860.

> No democratic government can survive through a single generation unless there be free and unrestricted inquiry and discussion in the schoolroom, the press, and the public forums. That process makes it possible for people to live happily and harmoniously together, and the more difficult the problems of adjustment, the more essential it is. Paralyze it and passion, prejudice, and emotionalism prevail. Destroy the source of an elightened public opinion and religious fanaticism, class hatreds, or racial antipathies lead straight to inquisition or civil war. There cannot be said to have been an enlightened public opinion in either section on the questions at issue after Lincoln's election.[1]

Communicative Distortion.--Communications which did manage to penetrate the self-imposed Southern isolation were subject to distortion. There existed between the two sections a "gauze curtain," Nevins wrote, which was "more opaque on the Southern side than the Northern, distorting the vision of all who tried to peer through."[2] Rhodes reports that

> Dr. Lieber, who knew by long actual contact the people of both sections, wrote that "it sometimes has occurred to me that what Thucydides said of the Greeks at the time of the Peloponnesian War applies to us at present. 'The Greeks,' he said, 'did not understand each other any longer, though they spoke the same language; words received a different meaning in different parts.[3]

This communication failure between the two sections, from the point of view of the border states, was analyzed by the editor of the Lousville (Kentucky) Journal.

> We seriously believe that when the North and the South meet each other face to face and eye to eye; when they take their ideas of each other's sentiments and opinions from unprejudiced sources, and not through the perverted mediums of stump speeches, partisan

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[1] Dumond, p. 116.

[2] Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, II, 17.

[3] James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914), II, 489.

> distribes, buncombe resolutions, they will be prepared to fraternize most cordially, and kick parties, politicians, platforms and schemers into the pit of Tophet.[1]

By 1860, consequently, the communicative channels between the two sections were undermined by both isolation and distortion. As a result, the ideas prevalent in the South regarding what ideas were prevalent in the North and conversely, were neither realistic nor accurate.

Discovery of a Conspiracy

Both of the sections exaggerated the "evil" in the other and identified a "conspiracy" which proved the ruthlessness of the opponent. Tyler asserts that "when one adversary was personified as the 'Slave Power' and the other as 'Black Republicanism' the political machinery of the country broke down and war instead of a peaceful solution of the problem was the result."[2] Craven adds that

> the combined efforts of reformer and politician gradually created the notion of the "slave power" and of "Black Republicanism." Each of these creations was supposed to consist of a well-organized force and program. The one was determined to spread slavery throughout the land. The other was determined to wipe out the institution of slavery even at the cost of a race war. Both were fictitious. Yet partisans were able to bring all the fears and apprehensions, all the noble purposes and sentiments aroused by the antislavery and the proslavery crusades, to their side and to pour all the bitter distortions of that conflict upon their opponents.[3]

Both sections, then, were able to locate and amplify an evil "conspiracy" within the power structure of the other in order to solidify its own support.

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[1] Cited in Mary Scrugham, The Peaceable Americans of 1860-1861: A Study in Public Opinion (New York: Columbia University, 1921), p. 16.

[2] Alice Felt Tyler, Freedom's Ferment (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 547.

[3] Avery O. Craven, An Historian and the Civil War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 62.

The Slave Power.--The North blamed the "slave power" for all of its ills. Putting together all the evidence, the abolitionists came to the conclusion that there existed a secret agreement, a conspiracy among Southern slaveholders to foist slavery upon the nation, destroy civil liberty, extend slavery into the territories, reopen the slave trade, control the policies of the Federal government, and complete the formation of an aristocracy founded upon and fostered by a slave economy. "Slavery," declared Joshua Leavitt, the noted abolitionist, "has been the prime cause of all the financial tornadoes which have swept over our country. It is a bottomless gulf of extravagance and thriftlessness."[1] James Russell Lowell, in the Atlantic Monthly for October, 1860, wrote:

> The slave-holding interest has gone on step by step, forcing concessions after concessions, till it needs but little to secure it forever in the political supremacy of the country. Yield to its latest demand--let it mould the evil destiny of the territories--and the thing is done past recall. The next presidential election is to say yes or no. . . . We believe this election is a turning-point in our history. . . . In point of fact, we have only two parties in the field; those who favor the extension of slavery, and those who oppose it.[2]

The "positive good" thesis developed in the South in defense of slavery was used by the abolitionists to convince their Northern neighbors that the "slave power" was a threat to all Northerners. If slavery were a "positive good," in the South, a superior political, economic, and social system, it seemed to be reasonable to expect that the next step would be to attempt to impose it upon the nation at large for the nation's own good. Nye wrote that

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[1] Cited in Norman A. Graebner, "The Politicians and Slavery," in Politics and the Crisis of 1860, ed. Norman A. Graebner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 10.

[2] Cited in Rhodes, p. 486.

> the abolitionist contention that there existed a Slave Power conspiracy which threatened the continuation of liberty, was an important factor in enlisting support among certain Northern elements for the anti-slavery movement. The Slave Power threat helped widen the rift between North and South by making it more difficult than ever to be neutral toward or tolerant of slavery or its extension.[1]

Black Republicanism.--The South, on the other hand, accused the North of engaging in a conspiracy to (1) deprive the Southern states of their constitutional rights and (2) foment servile insurrections in the South through inflammatory literature and militant action.

First, the Southerner feared that the North was intent on destroying the political power of the South in order to undermine its institutions and way of life. With the growth in Northern voting power created by the addition of new free states, the South feared that it would be reduced to a minority status and be made easy prey of the militant abolitionists. Whitridge points out that

> Southerners came to believe that Northern manufacturers and capitalists had joined with the abolitionists to overthrow the constitutional rights of the slave states, tax the South for the benefit of the North, and reduce the white man to the level of the Negro.[2]

Second, the South lived in constant fear of servile uprisings, particularly after the Nat Turner massacre of 1831 and the John Brown raid in 1859.[3] The Southern press kept the people in near frenzy and hysteria by warning them of the danger of a possible slave war, spawned by the abolitionists. After the insurrectionary scare of 1856, the editor of the Jackson Daily Mississippian wrote:

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[1] Russel B. Nye, "The Slave Power Conspiracy: 1830-1860," in Slavery as a Cause of the Civil War, ed. Edwin C. Rozwenc (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1949), p. 35.

[2] Arnold Whitridge, No Compromise! (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1960), p. 10.

[3] In August of 1831 a religious fanatic slave named Nat Turner, long convinced that he was destined to free his fellow bondsmen, led a revolt in Southampton County in southeast Virginia. Fifty-seven men, women and children were slaughtered by the slaves. See Louis Filler, The Crusade Against Slavery (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 52.

> The conspiracies detected among slaves in Tennessee, Kentucky, South Carolina, and Texas show that the vile emissaries of abolition, working like moles under the ground, have been secretly breathing the poison of insubordination into their minds.[1]

During the 1860 campaign rumors of slave insurrections in Texas were spread throughout the South by the press.[2] The Southern mind, according to Elkins, "could conceive the enemy in any size it chose; specters were utterly free to range, thrive, and proliferate."[3]

By 1860 both the North and the South had successfully located the cause of all their internal problems in the opposite section of the country.[4] Both sections were able to close ranks as the common enemy was identified and made into a "Bogey Man." The North was obsessed with the "slave power" threat; the South accused the "Black Republicans" of conspiring to destroy Southern institutions and to foment slave uprisings.

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[1] Cited in Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 100.

[2] For a thorough discussion of the insurrection rumors during the 1860 election see Chapter V: "The Uses of Emotionalism" in Ollinger Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1945), pp. 89-111.

[3] Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 217.

[4] Graebner, "The Politicians and Slavery," p. 9, points out that "for antislavery politicians, therefore, victory would come when they had transferred, either by intent or by accident, the concept of slavery's confining influence from the Negroes of the South to the farmers, merchants, and industrialists of the North. This required, above all, the effective identification of all dangers to the country's welfare with an immoral institutions and with immoral concepts of society that, by the accident of geography, lay neatly segregated in one portion of the nation."

Development of Stereotypes

As the conflict between the two sections deepened, individual differences disappeared in the maze of blinding stereotypes. Owsley, for example, in his study of sectionalism and the Civil War observed that

> in time the average Northerner accepted in whole or in part the abolitionist picture of southern people: they became monsters and their children were not children but young monsters. Such a state of mind is fertile soil for war. The effect upon the minds of the southern people was far more profound, since they were recipients of this niagara of insults and threats. To them the northern people were a combination of mad fanatics and cold-blooded political adventurers.[1]

As sectional tensions increased there was a growing tendency among Northerners to transfer their hostility toward slavery to the South itself, thus merging two separate but related subjects. Garrison, in the Liberator, wrote of the Southerners in the following fashion.

> Their career from the cradle to the grave is but one of unbridled lust, of filthy amalgamation, of swaggering braggadocio, of haughty domination, of cowardly ruffianism, of matchless insolence, of infinite self-conceit . . . of more than savage cruelty . . . monsters whose arguments are . . . the bowie knife and revolver, tar and feathers, the lash, the bludgeon, the halter and the stake.[2]

During the actual campaign of 1860 the Freeport Wide Awake, a pro-Lincoln campaign newspaper, suggested that

> the political contest of to-day is being waged upon eternal principles. On the one had the venomous and slimy serpents of rum, riot, murder, lust, slavery, and all the political evils that usually follow in the train of depotism, are rampant, seeking to fasten their fangs into the quivering flesh of outraged humanity, justice and freedom, and demanding at the hands of the general government protection, or at least non-interference in the accomplishment of their hellish designs. On the other hand the Republican party stands upon the

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[1] Owsley, p. 17.

[2] Savage, p. 77.

> immutable foundation of truth, insisting that the energies of the general government shall be exercised in behalf of humanity and the extension of the moralities revealed by our Creator.[1]

The same reaction was prevalent in much of the South as Northerners were grouped into a single objectionable class. Dr. Thornwell, president of a Southern college and editor of the Southern Presbyterian Review, said:

> The parties in this conflict are not merely abolitionists and slaveholders--they are atheists, socialists, communists, red Republicans, Jacobins on the one side, and the friends of order and regulated freedom on the other. In one word, the world is a battle-ground, Christianity and Atheism the combatants, and the progress of humanity the stake.[2]

In addition, as Nichols points out, "never having seen a Yankee, many a southerner had no difficulty in picturing him as a nasal-toned, penny-grabbing, pious hypocrite whom it was easy to despise."[3]

Reactions, then, in both North and South were stereotyped and rationalized toward "principles." Northerners were all John Browns to the Southerners; slaveholders were all Simon Legrees to the Northerners.[4]

The factionalism between North and South is a graphic example of the kinds of intragroup rigidity and intergroup hostility which develop within and among groups in conflict. Each section placed requirements on the behavior of its members; both sections suffered from a lack of communication, the exaggeration of the "evil" in the opposing group, and the stereotyping of its members.

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[1] Freeport Wide Awake, October 6, 1860.

[2] Cited in Tyler, p. 520.

[3] Roy Franklin Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 46.

[4] Simon Legree was the cruel slaveholder in Uncle Tom's Cabin.

Effects of Sectionalism

The development of intense sectional strife during the ante-bellum controversy had momentous effects on the nation as a whole as well as the two sections. The growing cleavage between the North and South manifested itself in the divergent perceptions of issues and events. These events and issues, which were raised during the decade before the firing on Sumter, reinforced the division and hostility between the sections. Murray Edelman, in his study of politics and symbolism, wrote that

> this analysis suggests the corollary that the particular incidents in the news do not really matter so far as the creation of threat perceptions is concerned. No matter what incidents occur and which of these are reported, they will fit nicely as evidence to support people's preconceived hopes and fears.[1]

In short, everything that activated the sectional conscience was perceived through sectional eyes and, as a result, had different meanings on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. This impact of sectionalism on perceptions was evident in the diverse interpretations of issues and events.

Perceptions of Issues

Practically every political, economic, or religious issue that was raised during the fifties was subject to sectional interpretations and versions. The limited scope of this chapter will not allow a thorough discussion of all the issues that developed. There arose between the North and South questions of transportation, communication, trade, land, and foreign relations that drove the wedge deeper between the sections. In his summary of these issues, Luthin wrote:

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[1] Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 13.

> Had it not been for sectional contests over economic policies--Field's Atlantic cable, protective tariff, internal improvements, Pacific railroad, transcontinental telegraph, overland-mail routes, homestead, endowments for agricultural-mechanical colleges, and the proposed acquisition of Cuba and parts of Mexico--it may well be concluded that the sectionalism on which the Republican party rested would not have been so profound, and the emotional rantings of anti-slavery and pro-slavery extremists would not have been so intense.[1]

Because of this sectional interpretation of issues, according to Smith, "many measures supported by the North were defeated for sectional reasons when they appeared in Congress. The Homestead Bill suffered defeat because the South did not want to allow territory to be formed into free states."[2] The Southern reaction to the Homestead Bill, as an example of sectional bias, was described in an editorial appearing in the North Carolina Standard. The editor declared that should the Homestead Bill become law, the people of the free states

> would pour their thousands into the territories where the bitter hates made still more bitter, would rise [sic] State after State of Yankee growth, to take their places in the Senate--to vote us down upon every question affecting our vital interests, and finally to control the government absolutely and reduce us either to subjection or force us into the horrors of general civil war.[3]

Sectionalism both encouraged and allowed the biased interpretations of issues as each section read different meanings into the issue confrontations that plagued the 1850's.

Perceptions of Events

In addition to these divisive issues, a number of events, both dramatic incidents and inflammatory publications, electrified the atmosphere between the sections. In describing the role of dramatic incidents in social influence, Nevins concluded that

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[1] Reinhard H. Luthin, The First Lincoln Campaign (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), pp. 5-19.

[2] William Ernest Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics, I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), 456.

[3] Cited in Joseph Carlyle Sitterson, The Secession Movement in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939), pp. 109-10.

> words may excite mankind, but it is the violent act which raises emotions to fever heat. Newspaper polemics and party broadsides can never crystallize popular sentiment like a dramatic blow--the Boston massacre, the destruction of the Maine, and the sinking of the Lusitania.[1]

Five such events will be discussed briefly in this analysis: the publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin, "Bleeding Kansas," the Brooks-Summer Affair, Helper's The Impending Crisis, and John Brown's raid.

Uncle Tom's Cabin.--The publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin by Harriet Beecher Stowe in 1852 and the sequel in Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin in the following year, provided explosive material for the sectional confrontation.[2] Although many antislavery books and plays were produced during that decade, Uncle Tom's Cabin became the symbol of the mistreatment of slaves from the Northern point of view and abolitionists' lies and distortions from the Southern point of view. Tyler, for example, claimed that "it is probable that Uncle Tom's Cabin had more effect in shaping public opinion than had all the abolition tracts and societies together. In the South the book was anathema, and it was a penal offense to buy or sell it."[3] Channing, in his historical analysis of that period, wrote that

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[1] Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, II, 70.

[2] The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin was written to verify that the original book was based on authentic situations in the South. For a discussion of both publications see Reginald Valentine Holland, "The American Theatre as a form of Public Address," (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of Speech and Drama, Cornell University, 1951).

[3] Tyler, p. 513.

> *Uncle Tom's Cabin* did more than any other one thing to arouse the fears of Southerners and impel them to fight for independence. On the other hand, the Northern boys who read it in the fifties were among those who voted for Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and followed the flag of the Union from Bull Run to Appomattox.[1]

Bleeding Kansas.--The bitter struggle over the Lecompton Constitution in "bleeding Kansas" was the result of the Douglas-inspired Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 which abolished the Missouri Compromise line in favor of the doctrine of popular soveriegnty. The South was willing to try popular sovereignty in Kansas but became enraged when the proslavery Lecompton Constitution was defeated in the Senate, primarily because of the efforts of the "turn-coat" Douglas.[2] The North, on the other hand, viewed the removal of the Mason-Dixon line as the boundary of slavery as a sell-out to the "slave power." The confrontation over the proposed constitution, which became symbolic of the war in the territories, widened the gulf between the North and South. Until that time the only disunionists were Southern fire-eaters and abolitionists, who denied that Americans shared common values. But during the congressional debates over the Kansas debacle, even moderate Southerners and Northerners became involved.[3]

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[1] Cited in Lorenzo Dow Turner, "Anti-Slavery Sentiment in American Literature," *Journal of Negro History*, XIV (October, 1929), 444.

[2] For the Southern reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its consequences see Roy Frank Nichols, "The Kansas-Nebraska Act: A Century of Historiography," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLII (September, 1956), 186-212, and George Fort Milton, *The Eve of Conflict: Stephen A. Douglas and the Needless War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934), pp. 258-314.

[3] George H. Mayer, *The Republican Party, 1854-1964* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 70.

Brooks-Sumner Affair.--The debate over Lecompton was further dramatized by the brutal attack by Preston S. Brooks, Congressman from South Carolina, on Charles Sumner, Massachusetts Senator, on the floor of the Senate, May 22, 1856. Two days before the attack Sumner had delivered his infamous and inflammatory speech on "The Crime Against Kansas" which included a fierce attack on Senator Butler of South Carolina, a relative of Brooks. In measuring public opinion in both sections following the attack, Craven discovered that

> a startling difference in approach to the assault by Southerners and Northerners was apparent at once. Most Southerners viewed it as a strictly personal affair between one individual who used insulting language and another individual who rightly resented such flagrant irresponsibility. Northerners, on the other hand, ignored the personal angle. Sumner had spoken for freedom. He was not the mere representative of a State, or party, or section. He labored for the elevation of our Government and of mankind . . . and the blow which struck him to the earth, throbbed in the temples of twenty-five millions of people.[1]

To Northerners, then, Southern approval of Brooks' attack stamped all Southerners as men of violence hardly different from the Missouri border ruffians whose sacking of Lawrence, Kansas, was revealed in the Eastern papers at almost the same time. His percha cane became the symbol of Southern intention to check free speech and to use force because it could not meet argument in order to "bully" the North into submission.

The Impending Crisis.--The general endorsement of Hinton Helper's The Impending Crisis by Northerners further intensified the crisis.[2] Although the book, written by a Southerner about the evils of slavery to the Southern economy and culture, was published in 1857, it did not have its maximum effect on sectionalism until the North used its endorsement as a criterion for the election of Speaker of the House of Representatives in the organization meeting in 1860.[1] Bailey contends that

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[1] Avery O. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), p. 395.

[2] Helper, a "poor white" from North Carolina, expressed with convincing statistics the wrong done the South's non-slave-holding whites by slavery. The book was largely ignored in the South until Horace Greeley, in

> *The Impending Crisis* alone did not produce the dispute. Its endorsement came at a convenient time to serve as the most dramatic symbol for the contest of sections. Yet coming to light after the Brown raid, no better instrument could have been found to increase sectional tensions.[2]

John Brown's Raid.--The greatest boon to the Southern fire-eaters, however, was not the economic argument of Helper, but the overt act of John Brown's raid. Fite, in his study of the 1860 campaign, wrote:

> the creation of sudden and intense excitement, which rendered deliberation and moderation well-nigh impossible, he [Brown] forced the political parties of the country to assume extreme positions and declare extreme principles before they were prepared to do so; and from these positions and principles, once assumed and declared, there could be no receding. The only change possible was progress into more advanced radicalism. John Brown must, therefore, bear the immediate responsibility for the extremes of the presidential campaign of 1860.[3]

The raid on Harper's Ferry, consequently, was effective in convincing the South that its varied economic groups had a common concern

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1858, undertook to publish it as a campaign document for the Republican party.

[1] In 1859, when the House of Representatives was engaged in choosing a Speaker, a Southern member introduced a resolution that no one who had endorsed Helper's book should be considered fit to be Speaker. This provoked a bitter debate since the leading Republican candidate for Speaker, John Sherman, had endorsed the book. See Ollinger Crenshaw, "The Speakership Contest of 1859-1860," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIX (December, 1942), 323-38.

[2] Hugh C. Bailey, "Hinton Rowan Helper and The Impending Crisis," *The Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XL (April, 1957), 145.

[3] Emerson David Fite, *The Presidential Campaign of 1860* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), p. 32.

in the stability of the slavery system. Morison argued that Brown

> played into the hands of extremists on both sides. Southern Unionists were silenced by secessionists saying, "There--you see? That's what the North wants to do to us!" Keenly the South watched for indications of Northern opinion. That almost every Northern newspaper, as well as Lincoln, Douglas, and Seward, condemned Brown they did not heed, so much as the admiration for a brave man that Northern opinion could not conceal. And the babble of shocked repudiation by politicians and public men was dimmed by one bell-like note from Emerson: "That new saint, than whom nothing purer or more brave was ever led by love of men into conflict and death. . . will make the gallows glorious like the cross.[1]

In the fifties, then, the two sections, North and South, moved steadily apart in sympathies and ideologies. One of the factors which further alienated and distorted the relationship between the people in the sections was the divergent perceptions of issues and events. Sitterson, in his analysis of secession in North Carolina, argued that "the enmity between the two sections was intensified by the course of events during the 1850's, and the people of the Southern states were coming to look with suspicion upon the North and everything that smacked of anti-slavery sentiment."[2]

The historical background to the 1860 presidential campaign and election can be represented in the single word--sectionalism. Sectionalism, which was a product of isolation and communicative failure, thrived on imaginary conspiracies and blinding stereotypes. "The tremendous impact of ten years of hammering and pounding upon one great social issue, that of slavery," Dunham concluded, "inevitably led to sectional misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and misinterpretation."[3]

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[1] Morison, p. 602.

[2] Sitterson, p. 119.

[3] Chester Forrester Dunham, The Attitude of the Northern Clergy Toward the South, 1860-1865 (Toledo, Ohio: The Gray Company, Publishers, 1942), p. 36.

Political Background in 1860

The influence of political theory and practice in the 1860 campaign and election was diverse and many-sided. Mayer, in his study of the history of the Republican party, was probably correct when he called the nineteenth century the "golden age of politics."[1] No other single election in that explosive century was more important and significant than the four-cornered contest between Lincoln, Douglas, John C. Bell, and John Breckinridge in 1860. This discussion of the political background to the election will consider (1) the splintering of the political parties, (2) the rise of the "common man," and (3) the use of political techniques.

Splintering of the Political Parties

Although political parties are not mentioned in the Constitution, they have become an integral part of American political life. Traditionally, the American party system has been characterized by the presence of two major parties which have been able, through skillful leadership, to absorb both diversity and intensity into their membership. On several occasions one of the two parties has suffered a split resulting in the formation of a third party. In 1860, however, four parties of relatively equal strength appeared on the political stage--all claiming to embody the true principles of Americanism. These four political parties were the Republicans, the Northern and Southern Democrats, and the Constitutional Union party.

The Republican Party

The origin and development of the Republican party has been discussed in a number of books and scholarly articles. Several observations, however, should be made in this limited investigation of the party of Lincoln. First, the party was composed of a curious agglomeration of political malcontents, abolitionists, Free Soilers, disgruntled Democrats, Whigs, German-Americans, and Know-Nothings when it nominated its first presidential candidate, John C. Fremont, in February of 1856. The single issue that made "political bed-fellows" of many groups who joined under the Republican banner was the question of the future of slavery, particularly in the territories. Kirway points out, for example, that "many Republicans opposed the spread of slavery for humane reasons. Others, equally opposed to the institution, were impelled by less worthy motives."[1] In short, the uniting and activating force of the Republican party in 1860 was its anti-slavery position.

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[1] Mayer, p. 3.

Second, the Republican party was a sectional organization in the sense that it drew its support almost exclusively from the Northern states.[2] Although there was some support for the party in the border states, the anti-slavery party was not even represented on the ballots of the Southern tier of states in the 1860 election.[3] This provided fuel for the

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[1] Albert D. Kirway, John J. Crittenden: The Struggle for the Union (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), p. 372.

[2] Avery O. Craven, Edmund Ruffin-Southerner: A Study in Secession (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1932), pp. 210-11, contends that "freed from the restraints that a Southern wing would have imposed, the Republicans had unconsciously become more and more antagonistic to the South in their efforts to control the North, offering an economic program which satisfied the more conservative and adopting an attitude on abstract questions which was satisfactory to the radical."

[3] Lincoln received no votes in Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas.

Southern "hotspurs" in the post-election crisis as they could claim, with considerable validity, that the national government, or at least the executive arm, was under the control of a sectional, anti-slavery, Northern political party.

Finally, although the party's main emphasis and reason for existence was its anti-slavery stance, its appeal to the voters, during the campaign, had a much broader base. First, the anti-slavery plank limited the party to opposing the futher spread of slavery in the territories; the platform did not call for the tampering with slavery where it already existed.[1] Second, using the Covode Report and other evidence, the Republican rhetoricians asserted that the Democratic party which had been in power for eight years was a corrupt, bickering organization with a record of quarrels, illegal bargains, and questionable "deals."[2] Third, they laid their greatest stress, in various parts of the North, on their economic program and, varying their tune to suit local and regional desires, they argued for a protective tariff, agricultural colleges, the homestead law, internal improvements, and the Pacific railroad.[3] Finally, they wooed the foreign-born element which possessed considerable voting power in the election by guaranteeing the "hyphenated Americans" that they would permit no unfriendly legislation.[1]

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[1] The anti-slavery plank read: "That the normal condition of all the Territory of the United States is that of freedom: . . . it becomes our duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; and we deny the authority of Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United States."

[2] See Luthin, pp. 176-76.

[3] Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860, p. 17, has argued that "the platform retreated from the radicalism of 1856, much to the chagrin of such an abolitionist-Republican as Joshua Giddings, but it was sufficiently inclusive to promise a protective tariff designed to satisfy Pennsylvania, Congressional restriction of slavery in the territories, a homestead law, and a Pacific railroad, with which to win various blocs of voters. One issue could be emphasized in one region, and another stressed elsewhere."

With Abraham Lincoln of Illinois and Hannibal Hamlin of Maine on the ballot, the Republican party, characterized by its sectional, anti-slavery platform, was able to win the election because of the superiority of voting strength in the Northern states.[2]

Northern and Southern Democrats

Until the Charleston convention of the summer of 1860, the Democratic party had been able to maintain, at least in theory, its national character and support. The Northern and Southern wings of the party reconciled their differences by adopting, especially in 1856, an ambiguous or "rotten" platform which would enable the politicians in both sections to maintain their local support.[3] By 1860, though, such a compromise was no longer feasible and the party split asunder over what Luthin called "personalities, policies, and patronage."[4]

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[1] The role of the "foreign" vote in the election has been debated ever since 1860. See, for example, Joseph Schafer, "Who Elected Lincoln?" American Historical Review, XLVII (1941), 51-63, and Robert P. Swierenga, "The Ethnic Voter and the First Lincoln Election," Civil War History, XI (March, 1965), 27-43.

[2] Although Lincoln carried only 39.8% of the popular vote, he won 169 electoral votes to a total of 134 for all of his opponents combined. In short, Lincoln won the election because of the strength of the Northern states in the electoral college system. See W. Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 1836-1892 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 84-85.

[3] For an interesting discussion of a "rotten plank" see Scrugham, pp. 42-44.

[4] Luthin, p. 17.

Split over Personalities

The leading personality in the Democratic party in early 1860 was Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois who was fresh from a triumph over Lincoln in 1858. Douglas, a Northern Democrat, had been able, until the Lecompton controversy and the Freeport Doctrine speech, to cultivate friendship and support in the South.[1] When the party convened in Charleston for the quadriennal nominating convention, the name of Douglas had become anathema in a large part of the South. So strong was the personal animus against Douglas that Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia placed the breakup of the party solely on the personality issue. The Southern bolters, he wrote in September, 1860, "ran not from a platform but from a man. The whole rupture originated in personal ambition, spite and hate."[2]

The increasing sectionalism had turned life-long political friends, within the Democratic party, into deadly enemies. Interpersonal harmony, which had maintained the party's unity while the Whigs were splitting, was victimized by the polarization behind sectional lines.

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[1] The Douglas position on the Lecompton controversy identified him with the free-soil elements against the South. In the famous "Freeport Doctrine" Douglas attempted to harmonize popular sovereignty with the Dred Scott decision. Many historians feel that the "Freeport" question posed by Lincoln caused the South to turn on Douglas. A revisionist point of view, however, has argued that by 1858 Douglas had already alienated the South and that the most significant effect of the debates with Lincoln was the loss, to Douglas, of any free-soil support. See, for example, Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850's (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), pp. 122-42.

[2] Cited in Robert W. Johannsen, "Comment on 'Why the Democratic Party Divided,'" in The Crisis of the Union: 1860-1861, ed. George Harmon Knoles (Baton Rouge: Louisana State University Press, 1965), p. 56.

Split over Policies

The destruction of the Democratic party was also the result of sectional interpretations of the meaning of popular sovereignty, a plank in the 1856 platform. Douglas and his Northern followers, because of the pressure from their supporters, contended that the people within the territories should decide the slave or free territory issue before the question of statehood was raised. On the other hand, the "Southerns" argued that the 1856 platform meant that the people in the territories should decide the fate of slavery only at the point of statehood. This distinction, which may or may not have been a meaningful one, served to justify the rejection, by the South, of Douglas and his doctrine. They had a "reason" to bolt. By convention time, moreover, the notion of a Congresionally guaranteed slave-code for all the territories had gained popular support.[1]

The motive and wisdom of the Southern Democrats in taking a rigid position behind a territorial slave-code has been seriously questioned for over one hundred years. Rosenboom insists that

> the blunders of Buchanan and the extremism of southern leaders had broken the party, but the immediate issue was a legal abstraction. Slavery could not exist in the remaining territories, and no court decision or Congressional code could give it life; but the South had evolved its formula, and compromise was impossible.[2]

Split over Patronage

Finally, the two wings of the party split over the issue of control of political patronage. In the time before the passage of the Civil Service Act, the president wielded a tremendous amount of political power, since all federal offices were subject to executive authority. Since the Kansas feud, Buchanan had used the patronage power against Douglas and his allies in an attempt to ride them out of the party.[1] The Charleston confrontation, consequently, became a struggle for control of the national party between the two sections. The section which was able to capture party control, nominate the candidates, and win the election, would have access to political patronage.

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[1] For a thorough delineation of the Southern insistence on a slave-code for the territories see Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860, pp. 26-58.

[2] Rosenboom, p. 175.

The Charleston convention, therefore, because of the differences over "personalities, policies, and patronage," was unable to agree upon a slate of candidates. The Southern fire-eaters used this as an opportunity to stage a dramatic walkout. The convention adjourned, after a week of nothing but deadlocks, because no candidate could obtain the necessary two-thirds vote, to be reconvened later that June in Baltimore. At the second convention the bolting state delegations were refused credentials; Douglas was nominated by the convention while the Southern state delegations nominated John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, the incumbent vice-president, on a slave-code platform.

In the campaign, the Northern Democrats, with Douglas as both leader and spokesman, appealed primarily to the voter in the North. Douglas, however, did tour the border and Southern States with his doctrine of popular sovereignty and appeal to unionism.[2] In the North, Douglas attacked the radicalism of the abolitionists; in the South, he attacked the radicalism of the fire-eaters. The "Little Giant" sought to hang the extremist label on both the Republicans and the Southern Democrats.[1]

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[1] See Philip G. Auchampaugh, "The Buchanan-Douglas Feud," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, XXV (April, 1932), 5-48.

[2] Popular sovereignty and unionism were the two themes that Douglas developed in his campaign speaking in both North and South. At Raleigh,

Although the Southern Democratic party had token support in the North, it appealed almost exclusively to the Southern voter by creating the image that the real issue in the campaign was a sectional one. A vote for any candidate other than Breckinridge was considered a vote for the abolitionists.[2]

The Constitutional Union Party

In May of 1860 a conservative anti-Democratic aggregation of Whigs and "Americans," mostly from the South, organized the Constitutional Union party.[3] All of those in attendance at the convention were certain

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North Carolina, for example, he defended popular sovereignty as an extension of the principle of local-self government which, he pointed out, was "an inherent right in North Carolina." In regard to the value of the Union, he asked: "Now when you tell me that you are going to divide the Union, I ask where you will run the line? Will you run it between the graves of your ancestors?" For the text of the Raleigh speech see Fite, pp. 289-90.

[1] Whereas Douglas admitted that neither Lincoln nor Breckinridge were radicals, he argued that the parties they represented were controlled by extremists. He rejected the extremists with a "plague on both your houses" attitude and remarked in speeches in both New York and North Carolina that "I wish to God we had Old Hickory now alive in order that he might hang Northern and Southern traitors on the same gallows." Cited in William E. Baringer, "The Republican Triumph," in Politics and the Crisis of 1860, p. 109.

[2] Many in the South were so ego-involved in their position that they developed the "all-or-nothing" attitude. Henry T. Shanks, The Secession Movement in Virginia, 1847-1861 (Richmond: Garrett and Massie, Publishers, 1934), p. 113, observes that "radicals, including Edmund Ruffin and John Tyler, Jr., even suggested that the 'South ought to secede if any candidate except Breckinridge were elected.'"

[3] Shanks, p. 102, points out that W. C. Rives of Virginia urged Crittenden to change the name of the party from "National Union Party," to the "Constitutional Union Party" because of Southern hostility to the word, "national."

that a new party, with a new name, without fanaticism or prescription, could unit patriotic and conservative men of all parties to check sectionalism and disloyalty to the Union. In calling for the new party, the Daily Chronicle and Sentinel wrote:

> But what shall be the basis of the new party? In the first place it must be truly a Union party, standing on middle ground between the extremists of each section, rebuking the fanaticism of the North and the ultraism of the South. Its great aim must be to preserve the Union of these states.[1]

The party nominated John C. Bell of Tennessee as the standard bearer with the distinguished Edward Everett of Massachusetts as his running mate. The platform ignored all public issues, including slavery, and made general statements concerning the value of the Union. Parks points out that

> the Constitutional Union appeal to reason and caution, although commendable, could not have been calculated to generate much enthusiasm. Paradoxically, its strong point was also its weak point. Its refusal to take a stand on the one exciting issue robbed its candidates of all chance of substantial support from the more aggressive politicians; few people become excited over a proposal to do nothing.[2]

Bell and Everett drew support mainly from the border states but were also able to challenge Breckinridge in the states of the Upper South. The party appeal, however, was primarily in these areas of the South where the slave system was not as firmly entrenched.[3] In social judgment language, slavery was not so important an "anchorage" as unionism.

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[1] Daily Chronicle and Sentinel (Augusta, Georgia), cited in Dwight Lowell Dumond (ed.), Southern Editorials on Secession (New York: The Century Company, 1931), p. 33.

[2] Joseph Howard Parks, John Bell of Tennessee (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), pp. 367-68.

[3] See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 346-52.

Two observations should be made concerning the unique four-party race for the presidency in 1860. In the first place, two elections instead of one were held. Douglas and Lincoln fought over the the North and Bell and Breckinridge competed in the South. Lipset observed:

> Although there were four candidates in the race, the contest in each region of the country was largely a two-party affair. In the southern states it was a contest between the secessionist Democrats supporting Breckinridge and the Old Whig Constitutional Unionists who advocated remaining in the Union. In the North it was the Democrat, Douglas, who opposed slavery but favored saving the Union by giving the southern states various guarantees for their "peculiar institution." The northern Whig-Republicans under Lincoln also hoped to save the Union but vigorously opposed the extension of slavery in the territories or new states and included a number of prominent abolitionists in their ranks. Thus the northern Whig-Republicans and southern Democrats represented the two extremes, while the northern Democrats and the southern Whig-Constitutional Unionists represented the groups in each section of the country who were seeking to compromise the cleavage.[1]

Second, the reorganization of the political parties occurred at a dangerous point in American history. Nichols asserts, for example, that "the triple conjunction of tensions in politics, business, and religion was gathering in all its force, making perilous this period of political reshuffling."[2]

The splintering of the political parties, consequently, was both the cause and the symptom of the growing sectionalism and agitation over slavery. The extent of bitterness between the two sections was measured in the destruction of the one remaining national organization that could speak to both sections--the Democratic party. That four political parties of relatively equal strength should enter the "hustings" was evidence of the divided state of the Union.

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[1] Ibid., p. 345.

[2] Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, p. 24.

Rise of the Common Man

The Western farmer, Eastern workingman, and middle class reformer had been able, by the time of the Lincoln election in 1860, to broaden the base of participation in the American democracy. The rise of the "common man" had witnessed such reforms as the direct election of presidential electors, the abolition of property qualifications for voting and office holding, and the substitution of the national nominating convention for the congressional caucus. "Thus, by 1860," as Stampp points out, "the 'common man' had gained increased opportunities to make his influence felt in government."[1]

All critics, however, have not viewed the emerging power of the common man as an advantage. Donald, for example, argued that "it can be safely maintained that universal democracy made it difficult to deal with issues requiring subtle understanding and delicate handling."[2] In describing what he called the "excess of democracy," Donald contended that the broadening of the base of democratic influence occurred at an unfortunate time since it placed within the hands of incompetent and unlearned citizens the power to determine the destiny of the nation. Since the slave issue had so inflamed and distorted the differences among individuals and between sections, the average "common man" would be unable to react in a rational fashion to the converging emotional pressures. Eaton reinforced this notion by writing that

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[1] Kenneth M. Stampp, "The Republican National Convention of 1860," in Anti-Slavery and Disunion, 1858-1861, ed. J. Jeffery Auer (New York: Harpers and Row, 1963), p. 194.

[2] David Donald, "Excess of Democracy: The American Civil War and the Social Process," The Centennial Review, V (Winter, 1961), 34.

> the rise of the common man as a political and social power intensified the atmosphere of intolerance. Such concurrence of the illiterate and of the educated classes of the South in a policy of repression indicates that factors other than illiteracy played a dominant role in closing the Southern mind on the slavery question.[1]

The 1860 campaign, then, occurred during a significant political and social period of transition in the American Democracy. More people were actively participating in the campaign in one way or another, and, in addition, the atmosphere was conducive to an outbreak of demagoguery and irrationality. In this regard, Catton and Catton point out that

> at the same, manhood suffrage and party politics did away with a recognized, quasi-patrician class of leaders and substituted a species of professional politicians whose interest in living up an immediate majority tended to obscure a national viewpoint and put constructive statesmanship at a discount. At the lowest level this meant demagoguery and appeals to prejudice, and even at the highest it encouraged saying what one's audience wanted to hear or risking defeat at the hands of a rival who never said anything else.[2]

Use of Political Techniques

The political methods used during the campaign to win support for the various candidates were adapted to the specific political conditions and practices of that day. In the first place, the campaign was more than just an opportunity for political persuasion but was an important social event as well. Catton and Catton wrote:

> A red-hot political campaign in this unjaded era was festival, circus, and bank holiday rolled into one. To a disordered society in the grip of change, the spread-eagle democracy of log-cabin campaigning and professional party organizations was vitally important. Politics was church and country club, intellectual stimulant, mass entertainment, and prime emotional outlet for this generation, and every facet of the American experiment--rough edges, partisan enthusiasm, ballyhoo, and all.[3]

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[1] Eaton, p. 29.

[2] Catton and Catton, p. 78.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

The air was literally filled with the campaign. Bands, torch-light parades, political rallies, pole-raisings, fiery speeches and editorials and extensive pamphleteering charged the campaign atmosphere. Mayer observed that

> the parades, picinics, and contests accompanying the campaign rally were America's equivalent of the religious celebrations and royal celebrations that existed in the European countries from which its people had come. For a few fleeting hours life took on a magical, operative quality for the spectators and principals alike. Boastful oratory, flamboyant gestures, and emotional battle cries gave the crowd a sense of participation in the great enterprises of the party.[1]

In the second place, since the political parties had not been able to organize at the local level, each candidate had his own marching clubs which would, in addition to making an appearance at local rallies, perform the perfunctory duties necessary in a political campaign. In describing the role of Lincoln's "Wide Awakes" in the 1860 campaign, Randall observed that

> they functioned as party clubs, ready at all times with mottoes, torches, special uniforms, and exploding fireworks to demonstrate for the Union, for Lincoln, for free homesteads, free labor, the Constitution, Plymouth Rock, Liberty throughout the world, American industry, river and harbor improvements, and the Republican party. Their music, pageantry, and army-like drill, being designed for spectacular show and sensational appeal, were unanswerable: it was theirs to shout, not argue, it was theirs also, at election time, to get out the vote.[2]

The other candidates also had their own versions of the "Wide Awakes." Douglas was represented at various political rallies by the "Little Giants" and "Little Dougs." In Brooklyn a Douglas group started the "Chloroformers," their sworn object being to "put the Wide Awakes to sleep."[1] Bell, on the other hand, had his "Bell Ringers," "Minute Men," and "Union Sentinels." Those fighting for Breckinridge and Lane worked under the banner of "National Democratic Volunteers."

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[1] Mayer, p. 8.

[2] J. G. Randall, Lincoln the President (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1945), I, 179-80.

The political techniques used in the 1860 campaign were adapted to the particular demands of political persuasion in that generation. The atmosphere was conducive for an unusual amount of "ballyhoo" since a political campaign occupied such an important place in mid-19th Century American culture. Furthermore, the marching clubs were organized in order to fill the vacuum between the party organization and the average voter.

The election of 1860 was conducted against a backdrop of intense emotionalism amidst a period of political transition and reorganization. Four political parties appealed with all their vigor and enthusiasm to the American voter who, because of the extension of democratic opportunities, was in a position to exert maximum influence on his own destiny. This expansion of the franchise enlarged the opportunity for political bossism and demagoguery as each candidate sought to out-flank the other. In describing the campaigns of that period, Nichols wrote:

> The campaigns of that critical decade focused public attention too sharply upon conflicting attitudes, exaggerated them to perilous proportions, and generated dangerous over-conflicts in the course of the political maneuvering. They aroused passion to such a pitch that only bloodletting, occasional or wholesale, could relieve the tension. Election campaigns thus became the catalytic agents which fatally hastened the processes that brought on secession and civil war.[2]

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[1] Luthin, p. 174.

[2] Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, p. 21.

Social and Cultural Background in 1860

Since a political or historic movement is part of its unique social situation or milieu, an analysis of the movement must include a discussion of the social and cultural influences which were dominant at that particular time. These factors, typically, are so interwoven into the movement that it is difficult to unravel and view them separately. This observation can certainly be made of the ante-bellum controversy over slavery. Nichols, in his study of the "pervasive attitudes" which permeated the pre-war culture, suggested that "Protestantism and romanticism fundamentally influenced emotion and action within the Republic. They stood in the way of realistic consideration of troublesome questions and issues."[1]

The two social and cultural influences, romanticism and religion, made it difficult for the Americans of that generation to discuss or decide critical issues with a reasonable amount of rationality. This part of the chapter, then, will discuss the effect that romanticism and religion had on both sections of the country as the crises between them became more acute.

Effect of the Romantic Movement

The first half of the 19th Century has been rightly called the "Romantic Age," for romanticism was an attitude common throughout western culture at that time. The American was like his counterpart in Europe in that he glorified in the melodramatic and utopian; advocated the glorious triumph of virtue and defeat or punishment of vice. His education was dominated by classic lore, rhetoric, logic, and moral philosophy. In his analysis of the Romantic movement within the American democracy, Minar wrote that

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

> the term romantic is, of course, a very loose one. In the present context, we mean it to refer to the reemphasis within the liberal tradition of the impulse of religion, or optimism, and of reform. It was a reassertion of faith in the individual, captured in the reinvigorated use of such terms as spirit, nature, destiny, and faith.[1]

The romantic spirit permeated both the North and South, but in doing so, was manifested in different ways. In the North, on one hand, romanticism manifested itself in a passion for making over society according to the dreams of perfectionists, Fourierites, feminists, abolitionists, and the transcendentalists. Romanticism "underlay transcendentalism and the agitation for immediate abolition of slavery," observed Eaton, "it was directed toward reform, toward establishing utopias."[2]

In the South, on the other hand, the Romantic movement looked to the past for its inspiration, to the dream of a Greek democracy based on slavery, to the feudal charm of Sir Walter Scott's novels. As Osterweis observed, the South was based on a tripod of slavery, the plantation system, and Southern romanticism.[3] In the language of Parrington, "the dream of a Greek civilization based on black slavery was discovered at the bottom of the cup of southern romanticism."[4]

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[1] David W. Minar, Ideas and Politics: The American Experience (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1964), p. 237.

[2] Clement Eaton, The Mind of the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 184.

[3] Rollin G. Osterweis, Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old South (New Haven: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927), p. 136.

[4] Vernon Louis Parrington, The Romantic Revolution in America, 1800-1860 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927), p. 136.

In addition to the backward-looking characteristics of Southern romanticism, the romantic spirit also made the average Southerner resentful of any outside criticism, especially from the abolitionists. Eaton suggests that

> the sensitiveness of Southerners to criticism was exaggerated by the existence of a well-developed vein of romanticism in their society. The vogue of romanticism was not peculiar to the Southern States of this period, but it attained a more luxuriant growth below the Potomac than elsewhere in America.[1]

The Romantic movement, consequently, flourished in both the North and the South. Such romantic concepts, however, could not supply the kinds of rational correctives which were necessary because of the emotional impulses of the time.

> The American mind often viewed its problems unrealistically. The people easily espoused causes and went forth on crusades instead of giving constructive thought to grave social questions. They were willing to accept simple explanations for complex social problems, easy "cures" for pervasive ills. Political behavior was much affected by this romanticism, for voters could be swept along by impassioned oratory playing upon fears and hates and could rush heedlessly into the chaos of civil war.[2]

Effect of Religion

Romanticism was closely related to the religious thought and practice of that day. Like romanticism, religion had a telling effect in the way in which the voters perceived political problems and controversies. Religion influenced the ante bellum conflict in at least two ways. First, the Protestantism of that day viewed the world as "black or white" in so far as moral judgments were concerned. The religionists had a keen sense of "sin" and "morality" and were quick to see a moral issue in practically every question--social, political, and religious. Van Deusen verified that

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[1] Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South, p. 47.

[2] Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, p. 37.

> moral judgments carried great weight one hundred years ago. Religious teachings made a deep impact during the 1850's: Northern pastors of evangelical churches thought they knew a sin when they saw one, and both preachers and congregations knew that slavery was sinful.[1]

On the other hand, the Southern form of religion came to the defense of slavery on moral grounds. Both sections, moreover, believed the same Bible, prayed to the same God, but violently disagreed as to the Christian view of slavery. This tendency toward moralizing every issue further intensified the sectional split. "As long as religious ties reinforce secular political alignments," Lipset noted, "the chances for compromise and democratic give-and-take are weak."[2] The reinforcement of the "secular" issue of slavery by "religious ties" is a prime case in point.

In the second place, religion influenced the culture of that period by sustaining a form of revivalism. Donald has commented that "religious revivalism reached a new peak in the 1850's. Hysterical fears and paranoid suspicions marked this shift of Americans to 'other-directedness.' Never was there a field so fertile before the propagandist, the agitator, the extremist."[3]

Because of this revivalism, the churches of the nation were unable to escape the political question of slavery. In the North, as Mayer has pointed out, local preachers took their cue from older evangelists like

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[1] Glyndon G. Van Deusen, "Why the Republican Party Came to Power," The Crisis of the Union: 1860-1861, p. 7.

[2] Lipset, p. 84.

[3] Donald, p. 35.

Lyman Beecher and Charles Grandison in exhorting "their flocks to fight slavery, intemperance, and other evils. In the best American traditions, the crusading churchmen represented their opinions as the will of God."[1] In the South, a counter movement developed in the churches as the ministers, stung to anger by attacks upon their institutions and slurs upon their moral integrity, made their pulpits into rostrums of defense.[2]

Romantic and religious concepts combined to add to the already explosive atmosphere prevailing during the 1860 election by infusing irrational and moralistic points of view into complex and difficult problems. Furthermore, those who clearly "saw the light" felt obligated, in using emotionalized revivalistic methods, to "convert" the doubtful by condemning the "heathen." Romanticism and relgion were, indeed, "pervasive attitudes" which prevented a thoughtful, rationalistic, and realistic approach to the settlement of vital questions.

Rhetorical Background in 1860

The success of any movement or campaign is, to a large degree, dependent on the effectiveness of the rhetoricians in the "adjusting of ideas to people and people to ideas." This is evident for at least two reasons. First, the rhetorician performs the role of a "gatekeeper" in that he is able to control what people know about the movement or candidate by letting through "some kinds of information but not others."[3] In short, the picture the population has of an idea or person is influenced by the "gatekeepers."

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[1] Mayer, pp. 6-7.

[2] Eaton, The Mind of the Old South, pp. 177-78.

[3] Charles A. McClelland, "Systems Theory and Human Conflict," in The Nature of Human Conflict, ed. Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 268.

Second, the rhetoricians are instrumental in gaining popular support for an idea or individual. Ideas become powerful and individuals become influential when they have been popularized. The rhetoricians, consequently, who are associated with a movement have the responsibility for filtering and popularizing the kinds of information which serve to develop the "image" of a movement of personality.

The background analysis of the 1860 campaign would be incomplete without a discussion of the rhetorical practice and methodology of that particular generation. This study will consider the rhetorical function of (1) newspapers, (2) campaign documents, and (3) public speaking.

Role of the Newspapers in 1860

The newspaper was a major source of communication and persuasion in 1860. Since communication was limited, except for speeches, to written form, the newspaper was a chief vehicle for news dissemination and coloration. By 1860, 372 dailies and 2,971 weeklies were in circulation. As public literacy was increased because of the development of state school systems, more of the voters were able to read newspapers than ever before in the history of the nation. The newspaper, as a result, occupied a strategic role in the 1860 campaign.

The importance of the press to the political parties was evident. Hayer observes that

> party leaders distrusted editors but regarded them as a necessary evil because the political machine subsisted on favorable publicity. Since association was inescapable, the rising politician preferred that the editor be his employee, and either bought a personal organ or induced his followers to do so if possible. Lesser politicians

who could not afford to own papers were obliged to pay editors for support. Congressman Elihu Washburne of Illinois regarded $50 per editor as the standard fee in the 1850's, although he had to put up $200 to secure satisfactory treatment from the Chicago Tribune.[1]

The editors of 1860, free from copyrighted influences and newspaper chains, and representing every political party and every economic and religious group, were representative of the thoughts of the general population. In small population centers their offices were the favored exchanges of "local intelligence," and almost invariably the editors themselves paired off to cross quills in provincial politics. Perkins reported that the newspapers "were certainly far better spokesmen of their times than are the editors of modern newspapers; and the conclusion seems warranted that they were the best spokesmen of their day."[2]

It is, of course, difficult to assess the extent to which the newspapers actually influenced the voter in 1860. Campbell suggested, in her study of the 1860 campaign and election in Tennessee, that

> the Memphis Appeal's campaign in behalf of Douglas, whom it had represented as being the only candidate who could unite all sections and so insure the preservation of the Union as it then existed, was responsible in a large measure for the support which he received in West Tennessee, particularly in the area around Memphis.[3]

The newspapers, then, performed a significant rhetoric function in the 1860 campaign by carrying the names of their favorite candidates on their masthead and by "beating the drums" for their man in the editorials and news stories.

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[1] Mayer, p. 20

[2] Howard Cecil Perkins (ed.), Northern Editorials on Secession (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942), I, 4-5.

[3] Mary Emily Robertson Campbell, The Attitude of Tennessee Toward the Union, 1847-1861 (Vantage Press, 1961), p. 134.

Role of Campaign Documents in 1860

In order to supplement the newspapers, the political parties published a number of different types of campaign documents. The most popular forms of documents were the pamphlets and campaign biographies.

Campaign pamphlets, published by the thousands by each party, usually included the text of speeches favoring their candidate or a series of quotations, usually taken out of context, of the opponent in order to reveal his "true position" on various issues. Nichols described the role of the campaign pamphlet,

> What the party lacked in newspaper power it must compensate for by pamphlets. The resident committee worked particularly hard at preparing such material for people still set great store by this reading matter. Voters in the country and the small villages prized the pamphlets received by mail as their special contact with the outside world.[1]

In addition, campaign biographies were mass produced in order to introduce the voter to the background and career of the candidates. In 1860, biographies of Lincoln were written by Bartlett, Washburne, and Howells. Brown estimated, in regard to Lincoln, that between one hundred and two hundred thousand copies of his biographies were distributed during the campaign.[2] Biographies of Douglas, which were written specifically for the campaign, were authored by Sheehan and Flint.[3]

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[1] Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, p. 55.

[2] William Burlie Brown, The People's Choice: The Presidential Image in the Campaign Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), p. 10

[3] For an analysis of the Douglas biographies see Martha Kester,

The newspapers and campaign documents, consequently, were utilized by the rhetoricians in appealing to the voters in behalf of their respective candidates. As the campaign saturated other areas of social life, it also filled the available reading material. Although it is difficult to assess the overall effect of any written propaganda in contemporary campaigns--much less campaigns that were staged over one hundred years ago, the fact remains that the politicians relied on these written forms of persuasion.

Role of Public Speaking in 1860

Campaign or public speaking was perhaps the most significant rhetorical method employed by the candidates and their supporters in 1860. The American form of government has always encouraged the development of political speaking as an essential aspect of the democratic system. This discussion will consider (1) the importance of public speaking in 1860, (2) the style of public speaking in 1860, and (3) the occasions for public speaking in 1860.

Importance of Public Speaking in 1860

On November 8, 1960, the day after the election, the New York Tribune observed that "while the circulation of speeches, campaign and pamphlet essays has not been remarkably large, the number of meetings and oral addresses in this canvass has been beyond precedent."[1] Because of the nature and setting of the campaign, a high premium was placed on

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"Stephen A. Douglas: A Bibliographical Study," (unpublished master's thesis, Department of Library Science, University of Illinois, 1953).

[1] Cited in Rhodes, p. 484.

public speaking as a means of voter influence. The New Orleans Bee, for example, advised the party leaders to "speak to the sovereigns face to face. Stump oratory is the mightiest political weapon that can be wielded."[1] That same newspaper, in describing the obligation of one of the political parties, suggested that

> the plain duty of the Constitutional Union Party is to rely chiefly on public speaking as a means of spreading useful and important information. Campaign circulars and documents are not without their usefulness, but a million of them will effect less than half a dozen able and well considered speeches . . . . every member of the party competent to deliver a well-timed and forcible speech should be pressed into service.[2]

Although this interest in public speaking was nation-wide, the South was especially fascinated by speaking from "the stump." W. G. Brown points out, in The Lower South in American History, that "it was the spoken word, not the printed page, that guided thought, aroused enthusiasm, made history. It is doubtful if there ever has been a society in which the orator counted for more than he did in the Cotton Kingdom."[3]

One of the reasons for the general popularity of public speaking in the South was related to that section's isolation. Southern isolation placed a premium on any means of breaking the boredom and satisfying the common craving for human association. Three such opportunities were available in that section--political rallies, court days, and church services. In all three the great delight was listening to speeches. For this reason, Nichols wrote that:

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[1] Cited in Jerry L. Traver, "Political Oratory and the New Orleans Campaign Clubs of 1860," Southern Speech Journal, XXVII (Summer, 1962), 325.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Cited in Robert T. Oliver, History of Public Speaking in America (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1965), p. 181.

> the South specialized in oratory--political, court and pulpit. Its politicians, lawyers, and ministers became past masters in the art of pouring out emotional rhetoric. The average southerner would stand for hours in the heat to hear the impassioned flow of speech. The result was sharp rivalry among candidates for command over crowd emotions.[1]

Political oratory in 1860, therefore, was an effective instrument in the hands of politicians who campaigned in the generation of an "excess of democracy." If a candidate was not adept from "the stump" himself, he would gather around himself a number of supporters who were able to take the message to the people.

Style of Public Speaking in 1860

Public speaking in general in that century has been aptly described by Weaver as "the spaciousness of the old rhetoric."[2] Weaver argues that the rhetoricians of that day used general, vague, or "spread-eagle" terms and phrases in order to remind people of what they already thought instead of making them think. Nichols adds that this high-flown, florid, and fancy form of oratory was influenced by the cultural factors. "It was an age of romantic empiricism," he claimed, "so beefed up by hyperbolic rhetoric that it is difficult to discover exactly what some of these extravagant speakers were thinking."[3]

This notion of a "romantic rhetoric" was especially predominant in the South. Lieutenant Francis Hall, an Englishman who travelled throughout the South during the ante bellum period, classified the various brands of Southern orators as the "political spouters" descanting upon liberty, the rights of man, and the freedom of the seas; the "Fourth of July orators;" the "orators of the Human race;" and the "tobacco-spitting stump orators."[1] In describing the effectiveness of Yancey, a Southern fire-eater, Eaton suggested that

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[1] Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, p. 46.

[2] Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), pp. 164-85.

[3] Nichols, "Why the Democratic Party Divided," p. 42.

> The passionate addiction of Southern people to florid and emotional oratory was one of the social conditions that gave Yancey the opportunity to become something more than an ordinary politician. An examination of Yancey's style of oratory and its effect upon Southern audiences, therefore, affords a clue to a significant facet of the Southern mind of the eve of the Civil War. To a great extent Yancey employed the technique of the camp meeting in moving the masses. A deeply religious man himself, he allied the cause of obtaining justice within the Union or the alternative of secession with great moral forces and with the ineluctable dictates of honor. Much of his success as an oratory also depended on the fact that both he and his audiences were strongly affected by the Romantic movement.[2]

This is not to say, however, that all public speaking in 1860 was of the "spread-eagle" variety. In fact, a number of speakers of that generation exhibited some of the basic characteristics of the Attic style of oratory. Perkins points out that "Southerners tended toward the grand style, Westerners toward the plain style."[3] Mayer observed that Lincoln's

> chief asset as a speaker was a simplicity and clarity that contrasted sharply with the turgid oratorical style esteemed at the time, a style ornamented by pompous platitudes and quotations from the classics. There was an austere eloquence in his incisive sentences which enabled him to hold his listeners' attention.[4]

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[1] Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South, pp. 50-51.

[2] Eaton, The Mind of the Old South, pp. 209-10.

[3] Lindsey S. Perkins, "The Democratic Conventions of 1860," Antislavery and Disunion, p. 187.

[4] Mayer, p. 55

In the same sense, Hofstadter contends that Wendell Phillips' manner of speaking was "informal and direct in contrast to the pompous pedestal oratory that was so common."[1] Finally, Braden took exception with the stereotyped view of Southern oratory by insisting that the Southern literary historians, in their attempt to "keep alive Southern regionalism," tended to select certain kinds of speakers and speaking styles from the ante bellum period and label them as representative of the entire section.[2]

In spite of these exceptions, it can be said that the speaking of the day was more "spacious," florid, and ornate than one would expect to hear in the second century after the Civil War. In practically every case, however, the Romantic movement influenced, in one way or another, the kind of campaign speaking that appealed to the voter.

Occasions for Public Speaking in 1860

One of the most popular rhetorical occasions for the display of oratorical ability was the campaign tour. The Daily Missouri Democratic remarked in September of 1860 that

> among the most noticeable features of our quadrennial Presidential Canvass, both in a philosophical and a humorous light, are the oratorical pilgrimages made throughout the length and breadth of our happy country by the most distinguished advocates of the respective candidates, and the consequent immense outdoor mass meetings of the people, who thus drunk [sic] in, as by inspiration, the most profound or most erraneous [sic] political principles from the lips of the most illustrious statesmen, or the most nortorious [sic] demagogues, as the case may be.[3]

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[1] Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Vintage Books, 1948), p. 142.

[2] Waldo W. Braden, "The Emergence of the Concept of Southern Oratory," Southern Speech Journal, XXVI (Spring, 1961), 183.

[3] Daily Missouri Democratic, September 19, 1860.

Speakers in the campaign tours of 1860 were both numerous and distinguished. Lincoln, for example, was represented by such well-known politicians as Samuel Chase, Carl Schurz, William Seward, Edward Bates, and Charles Sumner. Lacking party organization and financial support, Stephen A. Douglas took to the hustings himself and, in doing so, broke the established tradition which restricted presidential nominees to "front porch" campaigning. This caused the *St. Louis Democrat*, a Lincoln paper, to report that

> Mr. Douglas, under one pretext or another, is vagabondizing all over New England and New York, and availing himself of every halt at a railraod depot to make a stump speech, in which he vilifies the Republican party almost as much as the party which is headed by Breckinridge. Since the day of his nomination, Mr. Lincoln has never left Springfield, nor spoken, nor written a work for the public, with the exception of his brief note of acceptance.[1]

Douglas conducted four "oratorical pilgrimages;" two in the North and two in the South.[2] His decision to take to the hustings was prompted by many factors. One of these factors has been described by Milton, one of Douglas' most recent biographers.

> For Douglas to be in town, even if for a few hours only, was a campaign tonic. His cheery smile, his reminiscence, his hand-shake, his arm thrown about the shoulder, could in themselves upset the Opposition's best laid plans. Then too he always made a sturdy, convincing, sledge-hammer speech, concluding his remarks with deep and resonant words about the Constitution, the Union, the

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[1] *St. Louis Democrat*, November 1, 1860. On the other hand, Lincoln has been criticized for his refusal to speak during the campaign. Kirway, p. 385, writes that "in the ominous public silence that Lincoln maintained from his nomination until his inaugural, he revealed somewhat his failure to understand the temper of the southern people. He apparently thought that the average southerner could distinguish between Lincoln's own philosophy on the slavery question and that of abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison."

[2] For a discussion of the Douglas tours see Lionel Crocker, "The Campaign of Stephen A. Douglas in the South," *Antislavery and Disunion*, pp. 262-78.

> Democratic party as a national institution and the fundamental right of self-government.[1]

The campaign tour, as a series of rhetorical situations, forced a degree of flexibility on the rhetoricians since they had to adjust both their message and their method to different kinds of audiences. Mayer wrote that

> most campaigners took as much care with their speeches as their personal contacts, especially if they reached higher political office. Seasoned orators were prepared to address groups of ten or ten thousand on a moment's notice. Normally, they had only one speech but constructed it in such a way that sections could be added or deleted as circumstances required.[2]

The emphasis on campaign speaking in that generation led Whitridge to describe the mid-point in the 19th Century as "the golden age of oratory."[3] Public speaking was especially important in the 1860 election because of the lack of other effective means of communication and persuasion. This speaking, in reflecting the spirit of romanticism, tended to be both "spacious" and ornate. The voters flocked to hear the political orators as they would come through the town on one of their tours or pilgrimages. "Stump speaking," then, was a significant rhetorical device in the elections of that period in general and the first Lincoln presidential election in particular.

The campaign of 1860 provides an interesting example of the role of rhetoric in social influence. The newspapers, campaign publications, and public speakers contributed to the dissemination of "images" and information to the voters. In describing the effect of the campaign on the voters, Fish and Smith concluded that "if ever the people were prepared to speak it was in November, 1860."[1]

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[1] Milton, p. 185.

[2] Mayer, p. 10.

[3] Whitridge, p. 47.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to delineate the impact of the historical, political, social and cultural, and rhetorical background factors on the campaign, candidates, and voters in 1860. Two conclusions seem justified. First, these influences contributed to the intensification of sectionalism. Sectional interpretations of issues and events, a breakdown in the political party structure, and a romantic-inspired culture and rhetoric, all contributed to the real or "perceived" differences between the sections. Randall and Donald, in this context, have suggested that

> two factors in the fifties tended toward the placing of undue stress upon controversy and strife: (1) economic sectionalism, and (2) the intensification of the slavery issue by the singling out of one narrow aspect--slavery expansion in the territories--till it became a process of exaggeration and over-simplification, the equivalent of "Southern rights" when viewed by one set of leaders, while by another group the checking of such expansion was represented as synonymous with democracy and freedom.[2]

Second, these same background factors influenced the state of mind of the Americans of that generation. Sectional friction, emotionalism, and irrationality were instrumental in making it difficult for the people involved in the ante bellum dispute to sit down and "reason together." Randall, in his study of Lincoln, reached the conclusion that

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[1] Carl Russell Fish and William Ernest Smith, The American Civil War (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1937), p. 26.

[2] J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1961), p. 79.

> Except for saner elements which seemed inadequately vocal, the campaign was waged in an emotional atmosphere of abnormal intensity. It was unreality made real--a conflict made inevitable by repeatedly and vociferously declaring it so. Social psychology of the time partook of the pathological.[1]

The excitement of the campaign, energized by various romantic concepts and religious precepts, created such a super-charged atmosphere that it became much easier to take sides and condemn all enemies instead of negotiate.

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[1] Randall, Lincoln the President, 190.

CHAPTER V

ATTITUDES TOWARD SLAVERY IN 1860

The preceding chapter described the background of the 1860 election in terms of the intensification of sectionalism and the presence of irrationality which was influenced by romanticism and religion. This chapter will focus on the various attitudes toward the question of slavery which were prevalent in 1860. The slave issue was of critical importance in the campaign of 1860. Catton and Catton wrote that "the record seems to indicate that the nation was all engrossed by the slavery question--that it talked slavery, thought slavery, lived slavery, and barely existed on any other plane. Surely nothing else mattered."[1] "The campaign of 1860," observed Craven, "would, regardless of what else might be involved, turn on the issue of the security of slavery in or out of the Union: its equal treatment with any other kind of property."[2] During the campaign the Honorable J. O. Broadhead wrote a letter to the president of the Republican Club of Jefferson City, Missouri, in which he adjured: "We cannot avoid the issue if we would; all parties discuss the question whether they profess to ignore it or not, and they all test the soundness of their candidates by their soundness on this question."[1]

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[1] William Catton and Bruce Catton, Two Roads to Sumter (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), pp. 61-2.

[2] Avery O. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), p. 313.

Because of the importance of the issue of human servitude in the campaign, then, this chapter will (1) delineate the various shades of opinion that existed on the question of slavery and (2) discuss the effect of the assimilation and contrast processes on the perceptions of these opinions.

Positions on Slavery in 1860

The attitudes toward slavery in 1860 can best be investigated by grouping them into three categories--anti-slavery, pro-slavery, and neutral. Two observations should be made in light of this grouping. First, although certain attitudes were dominant in a particular section of the country they were not exclusive to that section. Second, the shades of attitude which will be discussed were not discrete categories. Instead, they should be viewed as dimensional in that a given individual may have selected a position anywhere on the slavery continuum.

Anti-slavery Attitudes in 1860

The various shades of belief represented in an important issue within a historical movement tend to be obscured by time. One example of such distortion has occurred with regard to the anti-slavery movement. Smiley observed:

> In the years which followed the Civil War, men who contemplated its origins often considered the anti-slavery crusade and its effects upon the tragic event. But as the years passed, many forgot that there had been various shades of opinion among the opponents of

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[1] This letter was cited in the Daily Missouri Democratic, October 6, 1860.

of slavery, and put all agitators into the same category.[1]

These "shades of opinion" among anti-slavery segments may be viewed in several ways. Aptheker divides the movement in terms relative to the action that each segment was willing to take in order to abolish slavery.[2] Hart sees a geographical division including New England, the Middle states, and Western segments as the significant parts.[3] Dumond makes the division in the attitudes a product of chronological developments.[4] This study, however, will accept the notion, as has Potter, that the most effective method of interpretation involves an analysis of the priorities which were assigned to the issues.

> But in the realities of the historical past principles frequently come into conflict with other principles, and those who make decisions have to choose which principle shall take precedence. When principles thus conflict, as they frequently do, it is meaningless to show merely that a person or a group favors a given principle; the operative question is what priority they give to it.[5]

This analysis, consequently, will consider the salient anchorages or priorities which were used by the opponents of slavery. These anchorages were moral, moral and political, and social and economic.

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[1] David L. Smiley, "Cassius M. Clay and John G. Fee: A Study in Southern Anti Slavery Thought," Journal of Negro History, LVII (July, 1957), 201.

[2] See Herbert Aptheker, "Militant Abolitionism," Journal of Negro History, XXVI (October, 1941), 438.

[3] Albert Bushnell Hart, Slavery and Abolitionism: 1831-1841 (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1906), pp. 196-97.

[4] Dwight Lowell Dumond, Antislavery Origins of the Civil War in the United States (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1939), p. 5.

[5] David M. Potter, "Why the Republicans Rejected both Compromise and Secession," in The Crisis of the Union, 1860-1861, ed. George Harmon Knoles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), p. 90.

The Moral Attitude Toward Slavery

Those anti-slavery elements which were the most radical in their attacks on the South were characterized by a keen moral sensitivity to the inhumanity of slavery and a rejection of any form of political compromise.

The Inhumanity of Slavery

The most significant feature of what has been called the abolitionist movement was its view of slavery as an immoral institution both in theory and in practice.[1] Abolitionism, which in this context refers primarily to the radical agitators of the Garrison stripe, was motivated by French humanitarianism, English abolitionism, and American romanticism and religion. Hofstadter, in his study of the abolitionist movement, claims that it was "based upon a moral frenzy, not an economic discontent."[2] Elkins suggested that

> for them, the question was all moral; it must be contemplated in terms untouched by expediency, untarnished by society's organic compromises, uncorrupted even by society itself. It was a problem of conscience which by mid-century would fasten itself in one form or another, and in varying degrees, upon men's feelings everywhere.[3]

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[1] Betty Fladeland, "Who were the Abolitionists," Journal of Negro History, XLIX (April, 1964), 115, describes the difficulty in categorizing abolitionism: "The sheer number of Abolitionists, the thousands of unacknowledged and unsung, the myriad of personalities, and the vast diversity of exigencies which mounded each individual's decision to join the movement makes it impossible to label or categorize them. In my composite I find room for fanatics, reckless incendiaries, lawbreakers, militant suffragettes, exaggerators, philantropists, political and social eccentrics, political conservatives, visionaries, idealists ahead of their time, dedicated humanitarians, psychopaths, religious bigots, sincere Christians, atheists, political opportunists, and defenders of basic American liberties."

[2] Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Vintage Books, 1948), p. 145.

[3] Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 28.

The moral argument of abolitionists was based on the view of the Negro which held that all the races were equal. Abolitionism fostered the notion that a slave was a human who deserved all the rights of humanity. If, therefore, the slave were human in the fullest sense of the term, then the Negro was an equal--politically, religiously, and socially--to the Caucasian. Twersky suggested that

> it is only among the Abolitionists of the Weld-Tappan and Garrison caliber that we find the formulation and practice of a doctrine of complete equality with the hopeful and confident assertion that Negro and white would in the near future live in close and complete harmony with each other.[1]

The attack on the concept of racial inequality by the abolitionists centered on two fronts. First, an attempt was made to demonstrate, from the Bible, from science, from history, and from observed facts, the essential equality of the races. Second, the abolitionists sought to prove that the unfavorable environmental conditions of slavery and segregation, rather than natural inferiority, had caused the vices and disabilities of the American Negro.

Whenever a Negro, either slave or free, was perceived as "human" and slavery attacked as "immoral," abolitionist thought led toward the insistence of immediate freedom for all slaves and the acceptance of Negroes into the mainstream of American society.

The Rejection of Compromise

The abolitionists, who called for immediate abolition of slavery regardless of the social and economic consequences, rejected any form of political compromise. This rejection of political compromise was reflected in three areas of abolitionist thought and practice. First, the abolitionists developed an "all-or-nothing" attitude toward the elimination of slavery. This point was made by Parrington when he suggested, in describing Garrison, that "there were no shades in his thinking but only black and white, righteousness and sin. Expedience was not in his vocabulary. He was as narrow as he was intense."[1] In short, the radical opponent of slavery viewed anyone who was not totally with him as, *ipso facto*, his deadly enemy.

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[1] Atarah S. Twersky, "The Attitude of the Ante-Bellum North Toward the Negro," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Radcliffe College, 1958), p. 246.

Second, the radical abolitionists were agitators; they were not politicians. In referring to Garrison, Williams asserted that "he illustrated anew the fault of the radicals who will have a whole loaf or no loaf at all; who are utterly impractical in that most practical and compromising of all activities--political campaigns by political parties."[2] Elkins adds to this description of the abolitionists:

> Almost without exception, they had no ties with the sources of wealth; there were no lawyers or jurists among them; none of them ever sat in a government post; none was a member of Congress; they took next to no part in politics at all; indeed, as Emerson remarked, "they do not even like to vote."[3]

Finally, when it became apparent that the nation would not heed their demand for complete and immediate abolition, the agitators adopted an anti-union stance. Korngold suggested that to the abolitionists

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[1] Vernon Louis Parrington, *The Romantic Revolution in America, 1800-1860* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927), p. 357.

[2] Wayne C. Williams, *A Rail Splitter for President* (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1951), p. 160.

[3] Elkins, pp. 147-48.

> dissolution of the Union would accomplish two things: it would eliminate the danger of slavery expansion into Northern territory and its baneful influence on Northern institutions; it would end the complicity of the North in the maintenance of slavery.[1]

The attitude of the radical abolitionists to the political process of compromise has been summarized by Gara.

> To the Garrisonians, politics required the compromise of basic principles. Garrison was virtually a Christian anarchist who advocated seceding, if necessary, from a government which condoned slavery. Furthermore, the Garrisonians did not believe it possible to deal with a moral problem by using political means. Commenting on the very light Free Soil party vote in the 1852 national election, Samuel May, Jr. said that "the Anti-Slavery men of this country must cease to rely upon human devices and deep-laid schemes," and "trust solely to the moral power inherent in their causes. Party organization, drill and machinery are worthless. God's truth is to be their shield, their helmet, their whole armour."[2]

The abolitionist view of slavery, consequently, was overshadowed by an obsession with the moral implications of the slavery system to the point that any deviation from their rigid position could not be tolerated. In accepting the equality of the Negro slave, the abolitionists insisted on immediate freedom and rejected any form of political compromise.

Moral and Political Opposition to Slavery

The second degree of anti-slavery thought agreed with the abolitionists that slavery was a moral evil. The two points of view differed in that the moderates were willing to work within the limitations of political reality in order to achieve the ultimate extinction of slavery.

First, the moderates accepted, in large part, the picture of slavery that the abolitionists had skillfully portrayed. Catton and Catton, in describing the core of anti-slavery thought in the North, reported that

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[1] Ralph Kornbold, Two Friends of Man (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), p. 211.

[2] Larry Gara, "Who Was an Abolitionist?" in the Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin B. Duberman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 37.

> at the heart of the general attitude was a principle that Lincoln had been enunciating almost without let up since 1854, one which summed up everything that millions in the North really felt about slavery, however vague, and one which, as far as it went, both abolitionists and Nortern conservatives could honestly endorse; slavery was a moral wrong that should not be permitted to expand.[1]

Three representative examples of moderate abolitionist persuasion were Abraham Lincoln, William Ellery Channing, and Charles Sumner. Though certainly not a radical abolitionist, Lincoln found the institution of slavery deeply repugnant and rejected it on moral and traditional grounds. Fehrenbacher wrote that "there were also Republicans like Lincoln, a humane man but not really a humanitarian, who viewed the subject on a more theoretical level, opposing slavery as a moral wrong and as a violation of the principles on which the nation had been founded."[2] Lincoln, however, was unwilling to go as far as the abolitionists in declaring that the Negro was equal to the white in all respects. In a debate with Douglas in 1858, Lincoln argued against the notion that

> because I do not want a black woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for either, I can just leave her alone. In some respects she certainly is not my equal; but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her own hands without asking leave of any one else, she is my equal, and the equal of all others.[3]

The second example of moderate abolitionist conviction was William

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[1] Catton and Catton, p. 227.

[2] Don E. Fehrenbacher, "Comment on 'Why the Republican Party Came to Power,'" in The Crisis of the Union, p. 22.

[3] Cited in Paul M. Angle, Created Equal? The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. xxi.

Ellery Channing, a leading transcendentalist and Unitarian minister. In distinguishing between Garrison and Channing, Minar made the following comparison.

> Channing's position, while it shared much with Garrison's, gave greater empahsis to the religious aspects and abstract ideals of abolitionism and less to their historical and nationalistic roots. His arguments were those of the enlightened humanitarian. Channing's basic claim was that a slave is a man and must be treated as man and not as property.[1]

The last example of moderate abolitionist persuasion was represented by such politicians as Charles Sumner who, unlike the radicals, were able to serve in Congress with some degree of flexibility. Hart suggested that as time went on

> the anti-slavery and abolition movements in the north came closer together and sometimes joined forces, partly through the appearance of political abolitionists like Salmon P. Chase and Charles Sumner, who built up a little anti-slavery party and secured the support of thousands of men who were never conscious abolitionists.[2]

Lincoln, Channing, and Sumner, then, were typical of the moderates who accepted the immoral view of slavery but were not as intense and single-minded as the radical abolitionists who, because of their moral frenzy, were unrealistic in their solutions to the problem of slavery.

The abolitionists, consequently, viewed slavery as primarily a moral problem and refused to compromise; the moderates accepted the moral indictment of the abolitionists but tempered it somewhat by advocating the extinction of slavery through political means. The priority given by the moderates to these political means had three manifestations. First, the moderates reached the conclusion that the "slave-power" was a political organization that should be met with comparable political force, not just moral suasion or condemnation. Graebner reported that

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[1] David W. Minar, Ideas and Politics: The American Experience (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1964), p. 254.

[2] Hart, p. 175.

> ultimately the successful exploitation of antislavery sentiment in American politics emanated from the conviction that slavery represented a political power that could be checked only through the creation of a countering political force. The movement, in short, took its strength from the notion that a slave power was reaching beyond the confines of the South through its influence over the Federal Government.[1]

As far as the Republican leaders were concerned, they could expect to gain a political victory over the "slave-power" and, as a result, set slavery on the road to extinction. The Republican party, then, was the institution that would rally both anti-slavery and anti-Southern sentiment into a single political force.

Second, the moderates insisted that the gradual abolition of slavery should take place within the context of social harmony and cohesion. Minar has discussed, in considerable detail, the effect of this anchorage on moderate thought.

> The differences between abolitionists like Garrison and abolitionists like Channing on these matters reflects an age-old problem in political thought. It is a problem of priorities among values. The question is whether one must sacrifice social stability, to most men a value of high priority, if the sacrifice is necessary to achieve or preserve freedom, also a value of high priority. This was, perhaps, the most important question of political philosophy raised by the entire Civil War controversy. It occurred for Lincoln; it occurred for the statesmen of the South.[2]

The moderates, therefore, balanced their anti-slavery attitude with a concern for social stability. Williams, for example, quoted Lincoln as remarking that "much as I hate slavery, I would consent to the extension of it rather than to see the Union dissolved, just as I would consent to any great evil, to avoid a greater one."[1]

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[1] Norman A. Graebner, "The Politicians and Slavery," in Politics and the Crisis of 1860, ed. Norman A. Graebner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 8

[2] Minar, p. 256.

Finally, these two manifestations of the political anchorage were joined in the formation of a policy of nonextensionism as opposed to the radical appeal to immediate abolition of all slaves. The Republican leaders sought first to attack the slave system by opposing, by political force, its extension into the territories. There was no intent, in this proposal at least, to attack slavery where it already existed in the South. Duberman, in his study of the North in the ante bellum period, observed:

> The formula of nonextension did seem, for a time, the perfect device for balancing these multiple needs. Nonextension would put slavery in the course of ultimate extinction without producing excessive dislocation; since slavery would not be attacked directly, nor its existence immediately threatened, the South would not be unduly fearful for her property rights, the Union would not be needlessly jeopardized, and a mass of free Negroes would not be precipitously thrust upon an unprepared public. Nonextention, in short, seemed a panacea, a formula which promised in time to do everything while for the present risking nothing.[2]

The moderates, then, agreed with the abolitionists in their moral indictment; they rejected the solution proposed by the radicals. The radicals were in favor of a moral attack; the moderates favored a political attack. The radicals endorsed immediatism; the moderates supported gradualism through a policy of nonextensionism in the territories.

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[1] Cited in T. Harry Williams, "Abraham Lincoln: Principle and Pragmatism in Politics," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XL (June, 1953), 104.

[2] Martin Duberman, "The Northern Response to Slavery," in The Antislavery Vanguard, p. 402.

Social and Economic Opposition to Slavery

The third anti-slavery segment included those in both sections of the country who viewed slavery as amoral but opposed its spread on social and economic grounds. "Complementing the moral antislavery arguments of those like Garrison and Channing," suggested Minar, "were near-utilitarian arguments directed at the economic and sociological effects of the slavery institution."[1] This basis for anti-slavery thought was found primarily in the West and in certain parts of the South.

Many in the West, who were also Negrophobes, feared the expansion of slavery into the territories because of the threat it would represent to the free labor system. They argued that if the "slave-power" were able to foster slavery as a competitive economic system, their jobs would be undermined. Hofstadter wrote:

> Most of the white people of the Northwest, moreover, were in fact not only not abolitionists, but actually--and here is the core of the matter--Negrophobes. They feared and detested the very thought of living side by side with large numbers of Negroes in their own states, to say nothing of competing with them in labor.[2]

Williams argued the same point when he wrote that

> people in the West might have varying feelings about the morality of slavery, some being much agitated on the question and others very little, but they were united on one conviction: they did not want to meet the competition of slave labor in the national domain. And so the South lost the West to the Northeast--by insisting on the acceptance of a system utterly unadapted to the needs of the West.[3]

Furthermore, there were a number of "hyphenated Americans," settled primarily in the West, who feared that if the South truly felt that slavery was

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[1] Minar, p. 256.

[2] Hofstadter, p. 112.

[3] T. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern Politics (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961), p. 13.

a "positive good" certain underpriviledged groups might, sooner or later, find themselves in chains. Whenever the rhetoricians of political abolitionism approached these segments, the moral issue was subordinated to economic and social factors. Lafton observed that

> the abolitionists were well aware of the appeal which could be made to the artisans, mechanics, and laborers. Such an appeal would, in a measure, remove the anti-slavery movement from the realm of moral reform to one of economic reform by proferring help to enable the workers to better their own lot.[1]

This difficulty in appealing to both the radical abolitionist persuasion as well as the "near-utilitarian" position was discussed by Hofstadter.

> Merely to insist that slavery was an evil would sound like abolitionism and offend the Negrophobes. Yet pitching their opposition to slavery extension on too low a moral level might lose the valued support of humanitarians. Both could understand that if freedom should be broken down they might themselves have to compete with the labor of slaves in the then free states--or might even be reduced to bondage along with the blacks![2]

In the South the only significant attack on slavery was on economic and social grounds. Stampp, in a rather lengthy statement, summarized this opposition to slavery .

> In contrast with the basically moral issue raised by Northern abolitionists, whether professional reformers or politicians, the Southern antislavery argument was primarily an appeal to economic expediency. Here there was no call for immediate abolition on moral grounds; indeed there was but slight interest in the future of the Negro. It was the effect of slavery upon the whites that most concerned the Southern dissidents. They attributed the Southern small farmer's comparative lack of progress to the institution of slavery. Conspicuous in the indictment of slavery by the Southern dissenters was the charge that it was a wasteful labor system which ruined the land by encouraging careless and unscientific agricultural methods.[3]

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[1] Williston H. Lafton, "Abolition and Labor," Journal of Negro History, XXXIII (July, 1948), 249.

[2] Hofstadter, p. 112.

[3] Kenneth M. Stampp, "The Southern Refutation of the Proslavery Argument," North Carolina Historical Review, XXI (January, 1944), 36

This kind of slavery attack, as one might expect, never did capture the imagination of the Southern population. Two of the dissenters, however, received a considerable hearing in the North. First, the role of Hinton R. Helper in the ante bellum struggle has already been mentioned in this study. His opposition to slavery, articulated in The Impending Crisis, was primarily an amoral approach based on the influence of slavery on the nonslaveholding South. Helper compared the social and economic conditions of the South with those of the North and concluded that the North, in these areas, was far superior to the South.[1]

Perhaps the leading proponent of this opposition to slavery in the South was Cassius M. Clay of Kentucky. Clay, who was an advocate of free white labor and of an industrial economy, admitted that slavery "is not a matter of conscience with me. I press it not upon the consciences of others."[2] Nye, in addition, pointed out that Clay was by no means an abolitionist in the sense feared and hated in the South, and his attack on slavery was "not based upon these social, moral, and religious opinions to which Southern feelings were most sensitive. He was no friend of the Negro, and by no stretch of the imagination could he be construed as favoring racial equality or amalgamation."[3]

The voices of Helper and Clay were raised in the South in opposition to slavery because they were concerned with the social and economic effects of human servitude on Southern society. Along with conservative groups in the West, they viewed the extinction of slavery from the anchorage of "interest" instead of "principle." Their refusal to see a moral issue in slavery was due, in part, to their Negrophobe sentiment.

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[1] See Hugh C. Bailey, "Hinton Rowan Helper and The Impending Crisis," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XL (April, 1957), 133-45.

[2] Cited in Smiley, 204.

[3] Russel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy, 1830-1860 (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1949), p. 13.

There were, in 1860, various shades of anti-slavery opposition--moral, moral and political, and social and economic. These viewpoints differed primarily in the kind of anchorage or value that was utlized in the assessment of the slave system. Furthermore, in line with the social judgment hypothesis discussed in Chapter II, they also differed in the degree of ego-involvement that each approach activated. If there is a relationship between intensity and extremity it would necessarily follow that the abolitionists, because of their moral rigidity, were more ego-involved in their position in the moderates; the moderates, because of their acceptance of the moral indictment of slavery, were more committed to their position than the conservatives who based their opposition to slavery on utilitarian arguments.

Pro-slavery Attitudes in 1860

Two weeks after the 1860 presidential election, The Review, publised in Charlottesville, Virginia, observed:

> Now we have followed a breadth of country of two thousand miles, and the sentiment of the Slavery question shades off with the precision and regularity of the law of temperature. Give the latitude, and you can give the figure at which the negrometer stands. An opinion on Slavery is not an intelligent judgment; it is a prejudice. The bears in the North are white; the men are anti-slavery.--The bears in the South are black; the men are for the Slave Trade. There are also brown bears in Russia, and intermediate opinions of the Slavery question in Virginia and Kentucky.[1]

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[1] The Review (Charlottesville, Virginia), November 23, 1860, cited in Southern Editorials on Secession, Ed. Dwight Lowell Dumond (New York: The Century Company, 1931), pp. 261-62.

Just as the anti-slavery positions represented different priorities, the pro-slavery positions were also represented by diversity instead of unanimity. The development of pro-slavery thought is difficult to discuss in detail within the limited scope of this dissertation. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to (1) discuss the development of the "positive good" theory, and (2) delineate the degrees of commitment which existed in the nation to that theory.

Development of the "Positive Good" Theory

By the outbreak of the Civil War, there had accumulated a substantial body of pro-slavery thought in the United States which is both interesting and significant to a contemporary student of conflict and compromise. This discussion will consider the origin of the theory as well as its salient characteristics.

Origin of the "Positive Good" Theory

Pro-slavery thought did not develop in a significant way until the slavery controversy itself had nearly reached maturity. As Minar pointed out, "from the early 1800's and to some extent before, there had been real doubt in the South as well as in the North about the economic and social viability of the slave institution."[1] A number of factors caused a progression, as Jenkins observed, "from the apologist of the early period to the propagandist of slavery, from an attitude of passivity to one of militancy, from toleration to glorification of the institution."[2]

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[1] Minar, p. 260.

[2] William Sumner Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 106.

Scarborough, in her study of slavery opposition in Georgia before 1860, listed five such factors which closed the mind of the South on the slavery question.[1] First, the rapid growth of the cotton industry, precipitated by the invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney, resulted in a significant increase in the demand for slave labor to harvest the cotton crops. Second, the Nat Turner insurrection in 1831 forced the South to consider the potential harm of slavery agitation or abolition and moved to make slavery a permanent part of Southern society. Third, the debates in the Virginia legislature of 1831-32 and the subsequent vote crystalized and solidified support for slavery in Virginia which, in turn, set the stage for the rest of the South Fourth, the agitation of the new abolition movement in the North under the leadership of radicals such as Garrison forced the South to close ranks behind the doctrine of the superiority of the slave system.[2] Finally, the growing opposition to the colonization plan, which many Southerners had been active in promoting, eliminated for all practical purposes an alternative to a strong pro-slavery position. These five factors, then, combined to provide the necessary impulse for the formation of a rigorous defense of slavery.

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[1] Ruth Scarborough, The Opposition to Slavery in Georgia Prior to 1860 (Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers, 1933), p. 185.

[2] Rudolph Von Abele, Alexander H. Stephens (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), pp. 155-56, points out that "the entire fabric of Southern social and economic life was threaded by the Negro, both as Negro and as slave; and it was inconceivable that those most nearly affected by his presence should, under such relentless and bitter onslaughts as were coming from freesoilers and abolitionists, do anything but what they were doing--uniting in self-defense. A chain reaction had been set in motion whose end was an explosion."

Nature of the "Positive Good" Theory

The Southern defense of slavery, which took shape largely in the 1850's, was popularized by a number of Southern apologists.[1] In the writings of these apologists the "positive good" thesis was developed around four themes. First, slave labor was essential to the development and continued prosperity of the Southern economy. The loss of slave labor would substantially undermine the financial structure of the South. Second, the Negro was by nature an inferior being and was destined to a subordinate position for his own good as well as for the good of society. Third, slavery had lifted a savage people from barbarism to Christian civilization. This claim justified the argument that slavery was both Biblical as well as civil. Finally, the white race had not degenerated as a consequence but, on the contrary, had developed a unique and high degree of culture, similar to that of Classical Athens.

In summary, the entire Southern way of life was searched for evidence of the superiority of the slavery system. Economists, religionists, political theorists, scientists, and sociologists all agreed that slavery was a "positive good" and a necessary part of Southern civilization.

Degrees of Commitment to Slavery

Three degrees of pro-slavery thought existed in the nation during the prelude to the war. These lines of argument--radical, moderate, and conservative--were similar in structure to anti-slavery persuasions on the other wing of the continuum.

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[1] Perhaps the leading publicists of the pro-slavery cause was George Fitzhugh, author of two leading and influential works, Sociology for the South (1854) and Cannibals All (1856). See Harvey Wish, George

Radical Defense of Slavery

The Southern counterparts to the Northern abolitionists were the "fire-eaters" or "hot spurs." Like the abolitionists, these radical agitators were effective in both melodrama and publicity but were incapable, either because of their personalities or ideologies, of working for compromise or consensus. These Southern radicals, such as James H. Hammond, Robert Barnwell Rhett, and William L. Yancey, were characterized by their moral commitment to the "positive good" theory, their insistence on regionalism, and their refusal to compromise.

First, the Southern radical was a firm advocate of the superiority of the slavery system over the free labor society of the North. The radicals differed from other pro-slavery elements in that they openly advocated the revival of the slave trade. Whitridge reported that

> Rhett, Yancey and Ruffin were all at one movement in favor of reopening the trade on the grounds that the South could never be the homogeneous slave society it called itself until every white man in the South had a stake in the institution. Revival of the trade would increase the supply of slaves, lower the price, and thus put slave-owning within the reach of everybody.[1]

In this regard the radicals were at least consistent for if slavery were a "positive good" for both the Negro and the owner, then the slave system should logically be expanded. The radicals, then, supported in full the statement by Albert Brown: "For myself, I regard slavery as a great moral, social, political, and religious blessing--a blessing to the slave and a blessing to the Master."[2]

Fitzhugh: Propagandist of the Old South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1934).

[1] Arnold Whitridge, No Compromise! (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1960), p. 58.

[2] Cited in James Byrne Ranck, Albert Gallatin Brown: Radical Southern Nationalist (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937), p. 65.

Second, the fire-eaters were in the first ranks of those insisting that the South declare its rights by seceding from the Union. These radicals had already reached the conclusion that the protection of the slave system would require a legal separation from the Northern states. They were disunionists, then, in that they held that the Constitution was a "compact," thus entitling a state or a combination of states to withdraw from the Union. They differed from the more moderate voices in the South in that they were advocating immediate secession through whatever means they had at their disposal.

Third, like the abolitionist, the fire-eaters opposed all forms of compromise. In describing the role of Yancey in the controversy, Whitridge suggested that "he stood foursquare before the world as the enemy of all compromise. He too could have said that he would not equivocate, that he would not retreat a single inch, and that he would be heard."[1] Schultz observed, in his study of South Carolina politics, that

> the fire-eater envinced a few of the qualities commonly attributed to the office-seeker politician. Doctrinaire and uncompromising, he showed neither the desire nor the ability to dissimulate or to reconcile conflicting interests or points of view. Matters of constitutional principle or personal honor were not to be compromised, and always sensitive to violations of either, he found himself in frequent controversies. The fire-eater found Congress an uncomfortable place.[2]

The Southern radicals, consequently, were characterized by (1) their acceptance of the superiority of slavery, (2) their insistence on immediate secession, and (3) their refusal to be party to any form of compromise.

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[1] Whitridge, pp. 45-6.

[2] Harold S. Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism in South Carolina, 1852-1860 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1950), p. 16.

Moderate Defense of Slavery

The Southern moderates had been able, until the secession conventions of 1861, to control the radicals by claiming that the extremists had not analyzed the sectional controversy properly. Such Southern leaders as Jefferson Davis, Alexander Stephens, and John C. Breckinridge likewise accepted the premise that slavery was a "positive-good" and should be continued in the South and allowed to expand into the territories. They did not, however, generally advocate the renewal of the foreign slave trade and may, in moments of secret reflection, have foreseen the day when slavery would no longer be a part of Southern society.

Their most striking disagreement with the radicals was on the question of the protection of the slavery system. The radicals argued that slavery could be protected only in a Southern Confederacy; the moderates insisted that slavery could be protected in the Union. The radicals clamored for immediate secession; the moderates were willing to wait until there was overt hostility from the North. The radicals rejected all compromise proposals; the moderates were willing, at least on some issues, to negotiate with the spokesmen of conservatism from the other wing. By the 1860 election, however, even the moderates had taken a firm, uncompromising position behind the Congressional guarantee of a slave-code for the territories.

Conservative Defense of Slavery

Although there were numerous Americans who held the mild form of a pro-slavery attitude, they are difficult to identify in the confusion of the conflict. This segment, however, was characterized, regardless of where it was found, by a support of slavery on economic and social grounds and, in addition, a strong unionist feeling.

In the South the conservative attitude was represented by such unionists as John C. Bell and John Crittenden who, in this particular study, will be classified as "neutralists." In the campaign they chose to ignore the slavery issue totally in their platform in favor of an abstract defense of the Union. This in itself may be significant. Perhaps they were aware of the potential effect of a limited, utilitarian defense of slavery when others in the South were viewing it as a "positive good." They chose, in the campaign, to rely entirely on the appeal to peace and unionism and neglected the slavery issue.

In the North this defense of slavery was expressed by many financiers who feared the effect of slavery abolition or Southern secession on the nation's economy. Among these were a number of New York City bankers who viewed with considerable alarm the growing hostility on the question of slavery.[1] To them slavery was a necessity in order to maintain Southern society; it was not a "positive good" in the same sense that the South defined it. Furthermore, they were strong unionists and feared, with some validity, the effect of secession on the North in general and on their own bank accounts in particular.

The editor of The Review, consequently, was probably accurate in his assessment of the "sentiment of the Slavery question" in light of the "shades of precision" which existed in 1860. The defense of slavery was based on different anchorages which, in turn, determined the degree of ego-involvement that each position represented. Just as the anti-slavery attitudes were different in the amount of personal commitment they required, the pro-slavery commitments were likewise dimensional in that the radical position, based on both "principle" and "interest," was highly rigid; the conservative position was based primarily on "interest"; the moderate position was somewhere in between. Concurrent with the slavery attitudes were different views of the Union. The radicals rejected the value of the Union and asked for secession; the moderates were sympathetic with the estimate of the radicals but were not willing to act; the conservatives were generally pro-Union in sympathy until the dual anchorages of slavery and unionism caught them in a "cross-pressure."

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[1] See Philip S. Foner, Business and Slavery (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1941).

Intermediate Attitudes Toward Slavery

In between the anti-slavery and pro-slavery points of view in 1860 were the "neutralists" or intermediate groups which sought to appeal to the American voters who were repelled by the arguments on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. Sectionalism was so intense by 1860, however, that each section had its own version of "neutrality." Stephen A. Douglas and popular sovereignty were supported primarily in the North; John C. Bell and the Constitutional Unionists represented the Southern brand of neutrality.

Stephen A. Douglas and Popular Sovereignty

To an audience in Raleigh, North Carolina, on August 30, 1860, Douglas explained popular sovereignty in the following terms.

> It is the simple right of every people to make their own laws, and establish their own constitutions according to their own interests, without any interference of any person outside their own borders. That is all it is. Is not that a sound principle?[1]

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[1] Cited in Emerson David Fite, The Presidential Campaign of 1860

The "sound principle" of popular sovereignty was based on the assumption that the people in each of the territories should exercise "popular sovereignty" in deciding the question of slavery for themselves. In denying that Congress should have the authority either to prevent or allow slavery in the territories, Douglas claimed that conditions within the territories, such as soil and climate, should determine the future of slavery in that area.

This view of slavery, on the part of Douglas and his supporters, required a profession of an amoral attitude toward slavery itself. The very logic of popular sovereignty demanded that its supporters be neutral. The Senator was heavily criticized for his often quoted statement: "I don't care whether slavery is voted up or down." In this regard, Jaffa observed:

> Douglas was not blind to the moral implications of the slavery question. If he was constrained to profess indifference as to whether it was voted up or down, this was a logical implication of his commitment to popular sovereignty, according to which slavery ought to be dealt with at the local level. What his policy of "don't care" really meant was that he believed he ought not to express an official opinion on a subject which he did not believe ought to come within the scope of his official responsibility.[1]

The "official" position of Douglas, therefore, was that slavery was an amoral question. His role as a politician seeking to head a national party alliance required such a stance. The "private" position of Douglas, however, was best represented by his statement that he personally regarded slavery as "a curse beyond computation to both white and black." In short, Douglas dealt with slavery as a political issue

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(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), p. 284.

[1] Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959), p. 44.

which should be a question of political policy. Although Douglas did not necessarily believe that slavery was amoral, he thought that its morality was politically irrelevant. In describing what appeared to be the difference between Lincoln and Douglas, Kirway wrote that "the one real difference between them on slavery was philosophical. Lincoln thought slavery was a moral evil. Douglas thought it amoral; to him it was only a political issue, to be decided by legislation and by judicial decision."[1]

Popular sovereignty represented an attempt on the part of Douglas to discover a workable, pragmatic "formula" that might bridge the gap between the sections by removing the slavery question from the national forum. In this regard, Catton and Catton have written:

> In a sense, popular sovereignty occupied a precarious middle position in the shifting spectrum of national attitudes toward slavery. It represented the latest attempt, however misguided and poorly thought out, to find a workable compromise amid the clash of pro-and anti-slavery viewpoints. Its one drawback, given the hardening sectional attitudes of the eighteen-fifties, was that it could not possibly work. Popular sovereignty resembled a ten-foot plank laid across a chasm ten feet wide: it would just bridge the gap, but no one dared walk on it.[2]

This discussion of the political position would not be complete without mentioning that the appeal to unionism was uppermost in its philosophy. All during the campaign Douglas appealed to the voter in behalf of the perpetuation of the Union. In this regard, he clothed himself in the fabric of Henry Clay and, in the deepening crisis, was the leading spokesman for the Union. This was especially true in his ill-fated tour of the deep South after the results of the October state elections verified his fear that Lincoln could not be defeated.[1]

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[1] Albert D. Kirway, John J. Crittenden: The Struggle for the Union (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), p. 337.

[2] Catton and Catton, p. 133.

John C. Bell and the Constitutional Unionists

The Southern version of "neutralism" was represented by the platform and candidates of the Constitutional Union party which was composed largely of Southern Whigs, Southern Know-Nothings, and a number of Southern conservatives who were not willing to support the Yancey-backed Southern Democratic party. Rosenboom has reported that

> the conservatives of the upper South then turned their attention to an independent Union-saving movement, and the result was the Baltimore Constitutional Union convention. This convention was a gathering of graybeards, men of the faith of Clay and Webster, assembled to attempt the impossible task of pouring oil on the troubled waters.[2]

The party that was formed, according to John J. Crittenden, stood

> in that middle-ground and temperate region, where all who are opposed to both Democrats and Republicans might freely and properly meet . . . . From that position they might defend the country against the madness of those parties, their sectionalism, secession, and disunion tendencies.[3]

As the name implies, the Constitutional Unionists were interested in providing a rallying point for all Americans who joined with them in granting to the Union the highest priority. In short, these men possessed an overriding love of the Union, a conscious and lasting sense of identity with the interests of the nation. As the sectional conflict intensified, their primary concern was always that the Union be perpetuated. The solution to any problem, even that of slavery, must be found within the national framework, never outside it in secession. Because of this anchorage priority, Catton and Catton observed that to the Constitutional Unionists "the Union was more important than state rights, or slavery, or anything else."[1]

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[1] In describing the final campaign tour of Douglas, Nevins wrote: "Douglas' greatest single service to his country was this gallant effort to recall the South, as Lincoln's election became certain, to its duty in the Union; this bold attempt to warn Southerners that any secession would mean Northern coercion and war. In that late summer of 1860 he loomed up as incomparably the bravest, wisest, and most candid statesman in the land." See Allan Nevins, "Stephen A. Douglas: His Weaknesses and His Greatness," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, XLIII (December, 1949), 407.

[2] Eugene H. Rosenboom, A History of the Presidential Elections (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), pl 176.

[3] Cited in Kirway, p. 349.

Since the Constitutional Unionists viewed slavery from the unionist anchorage, they refused to take a firm position on the slavery question and wrote a platform that was ambiguous with regard to human servitude. This ambiguity made possible a wide latitude of interpretations. This, according to Craven, gave them a distinct advantage over the Douglas form of neutrality.

> The broad sweeping character of their platform made it possible for them to adjust their appeal to the peculiar and differing local interests and attitudes. Where the Democrats were forced to accept and defend the general unpopular squatter-sovereignty doctrine, some Whigs in Maryland could follow Henry Winter Davis in a near affiliation with the Republicans; and some in Kentucky could play with the idea of backing Edward Bates on a conservative national program, while their fellows in Mississippi and Alabama could agree with Breckinridge Democrats on almost everything but disunion.[2]

The ambiguous view of slavery, consequently, was the result of an intense brand of unionism which sought to smother the sectional conflict by refusing to become involved in the slavery agitation, on either side.

The Douglas and Bell types of neutrality were not only different in that they were based in opposite sections of the country. They were also different in the degree of commitment that they called forth. Douglas was a doctrinaire neutral in his reliance on popular sovereignty as the only hope of the Union. On the other hand, the nebulous and somewhat confusing position of the Constitutional Unionists was neither rigid nor restrictive for it rested on the premise of unionism that, theoretically, the advocate of any slavery attitude could accept.

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[1] Catton and Catton, p. 20.

[2] Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, p. 343.

The controversy over slavery in 1860 was characterized by four kinds of approaches to the problem. The radicals, represented by the abolitionists and fire-eaters, stood firmly on moral principles and refused to contemplate any kind of compromise. The moderates in both sections, who rejected both extremism and rigidity, were able to popularize their views of slavery in their respective sections. The conservatives, who based their perceptions of slavery on economic and social grounds, stood for an amoral view of slavery and insisted that the Union be preserved. The "neutralists," represented by Douglas and Bell, also saw slavery as amoral and were more unionist in sympathy than even the conservatives. These differing points of view can best be understood in terms of the anchorage priorities that were utilized in their development and defense.

Assimilation and Contrast Effects in 1860

The effect of a political campaign on the voters was summarized in Chapter II. The point was made in that theoretical context that campaigns tend to "increase the amount of political consensus within the parties--once again, homogeneity within and polarization between."[1]

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[1] Ross Stagner, "The Psychology of Human Conflict," in The Nature of Human Conflict, ed. Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 48.

This same phenomena was apparent in the 1860 presidential election as the political interaction among parties and voters increased the degree of assimilation around political candidates and intensified the contrast between political positions.

The social judgment approach would predict that the voter in the campaign would not distinguish among the various shades of attitudes which existed but would, under the effects of ego-involvement, tend to misperceive the ideological and interpersonal differences. This part of the chapter, then, will consider (1) assimilation effects in 1860, and (2) contrast effects in 1860.

Assimilation Effects in 1860

The voters in 1860 clustered around the four major candidates in the campaign--Lincoln, Douglas, Bell and Breckinridge. The assimilation phenomenon in the campaign, however, can best be understood by examining (1) anti-slavery assimilation, (2) pro-slavery assimilation, and (3) unionist assimilation.

Anti-slavery Assimilation

With the exception of the radical abolitionists who refused to support the nominee of the Republican party, those voters who selected an anti-slavery stance as a major anchorage were able to rally around the candidacy of Abraham Lincoln. The nomination of Lincoln by the Republicans, instead of Seward, Bates or Chase, was because, according to Fehrenbacher, he was "neither on the left wing nor the right, but very close to dead center."[1] As one Lincoln backer put it:

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[1] Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850's (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 147.

> The Republican party has a head and a tail to it and a middle. I name William Seward as the head and Bates as the tail--I say that if the convention selects the head, the tail will drop off; and if the tail, the head will drop off.[1]

The Republican party, at least in appearance, selected a standard bearer who stood midway between the radical and conservative wings of the party. All sides in the party were able to rally to him in the campaign, each hoping eventually to control him. In short, each faction within the party regarded Lincoln as "their man" and identified with him and his platform. He was radical enough for most of the radicals; he was conservative enough for the conservatives. Furthermore, his moderation also made it likely that he would obtain votes from outside the Republican ranks, a prime consideration in the North.

The Lincoln platform was limited to the prohibition of slavery in the territories. This satisfied most of the radicals who were persuaded that such a platform was the only feasible proposal since there was no basis for an attack on slavery in the slave states. In addition, this also satisfied the conservatives who disliked the Negro and did not want to compete with slave labor in the territories. Consequently, nonextensionism became "official" Republican doctrine in 1860.

The results of the election indicate that although a few of the extreme abolitionists supported Gerrit Smith, most of the anti-slavery voters lined up with Lincoln, thus insuring his election.[2] The Republican ticket polled all but 26,388 of their 1,865,543 votes in the free states. This vote reflected the profile of Lincoln's support--anti-slavery and pro-Northern.

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[1] Cited in George H. Mayer, The Republican Party, 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 65-66.

[2] As the vote tally indicates Lincoln won the election because he carried the Northern bloc of states which had a majority in the electoral college. His total electoral count of 169 out of a possible 313 would have guaranteed him victory even if the other three candidates had withdrawn in favor of a single opponent. For a good analysis of the vote see

Pro-slavery Assimilation

Those supporting the pro-slavery anchorage, which was of higher priority than unionism, flocked to John C. Breckinridge and the Southern Democrats. Just as Lincoln was more moderate than the abolitionists, Breckinridge was more moderate than the fire-eaters. This is the point that Crenshaw made when he wrote that Breckinridge "was the candidate of the element in the Democratic party associated with secession, he personally was a moderate, and vigorously defended himself against charges of inconsistency and disunion."[1] Breckinridge and Lincoln were similar in the respect, as Shaw suggested, that "all parties had sought candidates who would appear to be somewhat less sectional than their platforms, or their main voting strength."[2]

Because of his moderation, Breckinridge was able to pull votes from those of kindred spirits who could not bring themselves to support a fire-eater. On the other hand, the native of Kentucky was "safe" on the Negro question and was openly supported by the radicals. In fact, as

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Gerald M. Capers, Stephen A. Douglas: Defender of the Union (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), p. 208.

[1] Ollinger Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1945), pp. 24-5.

[2] Albert Shaw, Abraham Lincoln: The Year of His Election (New York: The Review of Reviews Corporation, 1930), p. 96.

Crenshaw reveals, the Breckinridge press "bestirred itself to prove their candidate a slaveholder."[1] Breckinridge, as a result, presented a broad enough image to gain the support of many elements in the South.

On the issue of slavery, the Southern Democratic position and platform became firm in a demand for a slave-code for the territories. This platform, which has been discussed earlier, became, in 1860, the "first line of defense for Southern civilization itself."[2]

The voting in 1860 revealed that the bulk of Breckinridge support was in the lower South where slavery was more firmly entrenched in the minds of the people and in the structure of society.[3]

Unionist Assimilation

During the 1860 campaign the Douglas and Bell parties, though maintaining their separate identities, were able to engineer a partial fusion on the common ground of a peacful preservation of the Union with the national government under national control. The Richmond Whig reported:

> But between the Douglas and Bell parties there is no such insuperable barrier. True, they differ--differ widely on many important questions; but these are administrative questions, which are entirely subordinate to the greater question of the premanency of the Union."[4]

Both parties were publicly amoral on the question of slavery.

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[1] Crenshaw, p. 26.

[2] Robert W. Johannsen, "Why the Democratic Party Divided," in The Crisis of the Union, p. 55.

[3] For an analysis, state by state, of the vote in the South in 1860 see Crenshaw, p. 298.

[4] The Richmond Whig, July 24, 1860.

Douglas wanted to evade the question and keep it out of the halls of Congress by placing it within the jurisdiction of the individual territories. The Constitutional Unionists wished to evade the question and did so by refusing to discuss it. Both parties considered it madness to rave about imaginary territory when slavery could hardly occupy the territory it already had.[1] Their joint acceptance of the priority of the unionism anchorage was reflected in the creation of fusion tickets in several states as well as the implementation of dialogues during the campaign.

The actual results of the popular vote in 1860 indicate that a plurality of the voters favored the Douglas and Bell approach. Over two-fifths of the electorate selected one of the unionist positions; one-fifth supported Breckinridge; less than two-fifths supported Lincoln.[2]

Assimilation occurred in 1860 as the anti-slavery elements supported Lincoln; the pro-slavery voters, primarily in the deep South, rallied behind Breckinridge; the voters from both sections and the border regions with stronger unionist feelings than slavery sentiments selected one of the two unionist candidates--Douglas or Bell. As a result, the voting in the campaign did not reflect the true nature of the attitude toward slavery in the sense that the supporters of Douglas and Bell were not expressing their slavery attitude in their vote but were indicating that unionism was, to them, of higher priority. When the unionism issue was stripped away in 1861, the slavery sentiment became dominant and influenced the move toward and reaction to secession.

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[1] Whitridge, p. 60, reports that "on the eve of Lincoln's inauguration there were only forty-six slaves in all the Territories of the United States--two in Kansas, fifteen in Nebraska, and twenty-nine in Utah, but for political purposes men talked about the extension of slavery into the Territories as if it were a real issue."

[2] Mary Scrugham, The Peaceable Americans of 1860-1861: A Study in Public Opinion (New York: Columbia University, 1921), p. 23, pointed out that "it is very important to note that this plurality voted neither for the anti-slavery candidate nor for the pro-slavery candidate. It registered itself neutral between Lincoln on the northern side and Breckinridge on the southern side.

Contrast Effects in 1860

Not only did the campaign serve to "break down the barriers protecting one type of sentiment on slavery from another," but it also exaggerated the differences among the candidates and their platforms.[1] Homogeneity within the parties and heterogeneity between the parties were both intensified by the campaign. The contrast effects, which make the positions appear to be further apart than they actually are, were evident between the abolitionists and Republicans, the sectional parties, and the sectional and intermediate parties.

Contrast Between the Abolitionists and Republicans

Although a number of the abolitionists supported the candidacy of Lincoln, the most radical agitators accused the Republicans of selling-out to the "slave-power," The Radical Abolitionists convention in Syracuse, New York, on Wednesday, August 29, 1860, issued the following proclamation:

> Resolved, That for Abolitionists to vote for a candidate like Abraham Lincoln who stands ready to execute the accursed Fugitive Slave Law, to suppress insurrections among the slaves, to add new slave states, and to support the ostracism, socially and politically, of the black man of the North, is to give the lie to their professions, to expose their hypocrisy to the world, and to do what they can to put far off

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[1] Elkins, p. 199.

the day of the slave's deliverance.[1]

Furthermore, during the campaign a document entitled "Address of the Free Constitutionalists to the People of the United States" was published. In representing the view of the extreme abolitionists, the publication claimed:

> Of all these factions, the Republican is the most thoroughly senseless, baseless, aimless, inconsistent, and insincere. It has no constitutional principles to stand upon, and it lives up to no moral ones. It aims at nothing for freedom, and is sure to accomplish it. The other factions have at least the merits of frankness and consistency. They are openly on the side of slavery, and make no hypocritical grimaces at supporting it. The Republicans, on the other hand, are double-faced, double-tongued, hypocritical, and inconsistent to the last degree.[2]

The intense radicals, therefore, developed an "all-or-nothing" point of view. Since Lincoln and the Republicans offered something short of a frontal attack on slavery in the South, they were displaced to practically a pro-slavery position. The radicals exaggerated the ideational distance between themselves and the anti-slavery moderates and conservatives.

Contrast Between the Sectional Parties

The Republicans and Southern Democrats exaggerated the distance between themselves. Thus, it became easy to identify the opposite party as under the control of the most radical elements within the party.

First, the highly ego-involved Southerner was unable to distinguish among the anti-slavery elements. As Tyler reported, "to the Southerner every antislavery man was a Garrison abolitionist. Oversimplification of the nature of the opposition led to a complete and categorical denial of the right to question the Southern position."[1] In describing the North, the Daily Journal observed: "The mass of the population are abolitionists--none of your half-way men calling themselves Republicans or Free Soilers, but plain Garrisonian abolitionists."[2] Scrugham noted, in her study of public opinion in the 1860 election, that

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[1] Cited in Arthur C. Cole, "Lincoln's Election an Immediate Menace to Slavery in the States?" American Historical Review, XXXVI (July, 1931), 754.

[2] This political tract appeared under the title "Address of the Free Constitutionalists to the People of the United States, 1860" and was published by Thayer and Eldrige, of Boston, in September, 1860. It may be found in the New York State Historical Library in New York City.

> a tendency existed in the South to make no discrimination between the anti-slavery policies advocated by Garrison, Brown, Seward and Lincoln, respectively. To many a southerner these northerners were all abolitionists of the same hue. Southern newspapers and politicians used the words "abolitionist" and "Republican" as synonyms.[3]

Because of this contrast effect, the advocates of the pro-slavery position perceived Lincoln as an abolitionist of the same stripe as Garrison and Brown. "Lincoln is exactly of the same type as the traitor who was hung at Charleston," reported the New York Herald, "an abolitionist of the reddest dye, liable to be led to extreme lengths by other men."[4] The New Orleans Crescent described Lincoln as "a thorough radical Abolitionist, without exception or qualification."[5] Nevins wrote that "'Abolitionist,' 'Black Republican,' 'nigger-lover,' and 'slavestealer' were terms which, loaded with bitter feeling, were applied with little discrimination to all Northerners."[1] At the same time the radical abolitionists were accusing Lincoln of pro-Southern tendencies, the involved Southerners were accusing him of abolitionist sympathies.

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[1] Alice Felt Tyler, Freedom's Ferment (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 486.

[2] Daily Journal (Wilmington, North Carolina), August 23, 1860.

[3] Scrugham, p. 14.

[4] New York Herald, May 23, 1860.

[5] Cited in David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 42.

Second, the involved proponent of slavery abolition had difficulty distinguishing among the various shades of pro-slavery thought. Just as the opponents of slavery were stereotyped by the Southerner, the anti-slavery defenders grouped all Southerners in the same fashion. The Daily Missouri Democrat, for example, claimed that "every vote for Breckinridge is an individual indorsement [sic] of Yanceyism."[2] The Illinois and Michigan men, in addition, were "denouncing Jeff Davis as a fire-eating fanatic."[3] The Northern opponent of slavery found it convenient to view all slaveholders as men of evil and wicked passions who were also hot-headed defenders of slavery. In addition, practically all Southerners were perceived to be slaveholders.

Both sectional parties, the Republicans and Southern Democrats, exaggerated the extremity of the other and had difficulty discriminating among the shades of sentiment on the question of slavery which existed in the opposite section.

Contrast Between the Sectional and Intermediate Parties

The positions represented by the sectional and intermediate parties were also misperceived by both groups. First, the intermediate parties exaggerated the radicalism of the sectional parties. Second, the sectional parties displaced the true positions of the intermediate parties.

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[1] Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), II, 157.

[2] Daily Missouri Democrat, November 6, 1860.

[3] Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, II, 205.

Intermediate Views of the Sectional Parties

Since the intermediate rhetoricians were in competition with the sectional parties for the vote of the conservatives in both sections, the Douglas and Bell supporters amplified the extremism of the Republicans and Southern Democrats. In the North Douglas said more about the Southern radicals; in the South Bell's spokesmen lashed out against the abolitionists. Both parties, however, did not hesitate to attack the sectional parties by branding them both with the stigma of radicalism.[1]

Sectional Views of the Intermediate Parties

The observation was made in Chapter II that under conditions of high ego-involvement the parties engaged in a controversy tend to view neutrality as an alliance with the "enemy." The disappearance, in the perceptions of the sectional supporters, of the intermediate positions is an interesting event in the history of the ante bellum struggle. The two intermediate candidates, Stephen A. Douglas and John C. Bell, both fell victim to the cross-stereotyping effect which is typical of extremism and intensity.

Sectional View of Douglas.--Because Douglas advocated an amoral, middle-ground, unionist platform in the campaign, he was contrasted by both the Republicans and Southern Democrats. As Crenshaw concluded, the quest by Douglas "for the Presidency was closely related to the final sectional cleavage, and it was his fate, as a middle-of-the-road statesman to fall between the fires of the extremists."[1]

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[1] While the Douglas and Bell rhetoricians were not as ready to label either Lincoln or Breckinridge as extremists they did attempt to fix on them the extremist brand by arguing that both candidates were mere puppets for the radical elements in both sectional parties. The election of either one would mean extremist control of the White House.

The opponent of slavery perceived Douglas and his brand of neutrality to be as bad as the fire-eaters. To the Illinois State Journal the contest in the North was primarily one between Lincoln and Douglas, between "conservative Republicanism . . . and fire-eating, slavery extending Democracy."[2] Carl Schurz, radical spokesman for Lincoln, claimed that "the point that separates Mr. Douglas and Mr. Breckinridge is but a mere quibble, a mere matter of etiquette. In nearly all practical measures of policy Mr. Douglas is regularly to be found on the side of the extreme South."[3]

On the other hand, the supporters of slavery saw in Douglas certain dangerous abolitionist designs. The Athens Southern Watchman objurgated that Senator Douglas was "ten thousand times more dangerous than John Brown."[4] The Breckinridge organization in Williamsburg, Virginia, adopted the following resolution: "Resolved, that we know no difference between Stephen A. Douglas and Lincoln, and can only see in either an enemy to our state and our liberty, and our firesides."[5] After the campaign was over, Herschel V. Johnson, a friend of Douglas, observed:

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[1] Crenshaw, p. 23.

[2] Cited in William E. Baringer, "The Republican Triumph," in Politics and the Crisis of 1860, p. 102.

[3] Cited in Fite, p. 257.

[4] Cited in Horace Montgomery, Cracker Parties (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), p. 237.

[5] Cited in the Richmond Whig, August 4, 1860.

> They [the extremists] in the South have succeeded in making them [the Southern people] believe that, what they call "squatter sovereignty," is as bad as abolitionism, and that your election will, therefore, be as fatal as that of Lincoln.[1]

Douglas and popular sovereignty, consequently, were caught between the extremism of that period which denied the existence of a middle position. As Randall reported, the hope that Douglas had of bridging "the widening gap between North and South was crushed under the weight of sectional agitation. It was his unhappy destiny that in the South he was distrusted as pro-Northern, while in Northern Republican circles he was denounced as pro-Southern."[2]

Sectional View of Bell.--John C. Bell, who also attempted to occupy middle-ground between the sections by campaigning in behalf of peace and unionism, was subject to sectional displacement. First, the Daily Missouri Democratic, a Lincoln newspaper, editorialized that "we think it will be found, on examination, that he [Bell] is a decided pro-slavery man--that his opinions on the slavery question are identical with those professed by the Breckinridge Democracy."[3] Second, the Charleston Mercury claimed that "the union-savers in the South are especially the most efficient allies of the Black Republican party."[4]

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[1] Herschel V. Johnson, "From the Autobiography of Herschel V. Johnson," American Historical Review, XXX (January, 1925), 321.

[2] J. G. Randall, Lincoln the President (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1945), I, 202.

[3] Daily Missouri Democratic, August 18, 1860.

[4] Charleston Mercury, August 4, 1860.

The *Maury Press*, a Bell organ published in Columbia, Missouri, said that while the "rabid Democracy of the South are denouncing John Bell as an abolitionist, the Republicans at the North are denouncing him as a pro-slavery advocate."[1]

The middle positions perceived the radicals within the sectional parties to be in control of those parties. Each section perceived the neutralists to be allied with the opposite party. The sectional parties were branded with an extremist image; the middle positions vanished in the view of the ego-involved sectionalists.

The campaign served to intensify the contrasting effect as the newspapers, speeches, and campaign documents exaggerated the differences among positions. Instead of the rhetoric of the campaign providing a basis for a meaningful consensus among the parties, it produced the crystallization of positions to a greater degree than existed before the campaign. The campaign of 1860, consequently, played a significant role in promoting the assimilation and contrast effects.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the question of slavery from two view points. First, it delineated the various shades of slavery sentiments that existed before the sectional confrontation through argument and action, distorted these positions in the eyes of the voters. The second part of this chapter suggested that the participant in the campaign, because of the assimilation and contrast effects, would misperceive the other positions in direct relation to the amount of ego-involvement his own position activated. The campaign, then, instead of promoting the settlement of the conflict, actually made it more intense and rigid.

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[1] Cited in Mary Emily Robertson Campbell, *The Attitude of Tennesseeans Toward the Union, 1847-1861* (New York: Vantage Press, 1961), p. 128.

Chapters IV and V have discussed the background to the 1860 election in general and the slavery issue in particular. Chapter VI will seek to make a direct application of the theory of rhetoric and compromise advanced in Chapter III to the context of the ante bellum conflict as described in the last two chapters.

CHAPTER VI

BIPOLARIZATION IN 1860

In Chapter III of this study the point was made that high ego-involvement within the anatomy of a conflict tends to characterize that conflict, in Dahl's language, "severe disagreement; symmetrical."[1] The conflict is "symmetrical" in that the power centers have developed near the end of the continuum with a relatively few number of people supporting the intermediate positions. Under such conditions, as was demonstrated in Chapter III, the usefulness of a rhetoric of conciliation and the possibility of a meaningful compromise are both seriously questioned.

The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that by 1860 the controversy between the sections, especially over the issue of slavery, reached the state of "severe disagreement: symmetrical." The plan, here, will be to (1) discuss the nature of bipolarization in 1860, (2) describe the specific causes of the bipolarization, and (3) delineate the effect of bipolarization on rhetoric and compromise.

The Nature of Bipolarization in 1860

James MacGregor Burns, in his study of the history of political movements, argued that for the democratic process to work effectively the national parties must locate their "vital centers" somewhere between the "conservatives who grumble that it is going too fast, and activists who complain about its inertia."[1] In the prelude to the Civil War, Burns contended, the national parties were unable to center on moderate positions.

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[1] Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 198.

> Parties failed in the 1850's because power drained into the hands of immoderates. Presidents failed because they could not build a vital center as the basis for their influence. The crucial step, politically, toward the Civil War was not simply the splitting of parties; it was the centering of power in the wings of the parties that saw the crisis of the 1850's as pretexts for more extremism rather than as warnings of the holocaust to come.[2]

This confrontation between the immoderate "vital centers" created a qualitative and quantitative bipolarization which left the nation ill-equipped to deal with what Burns called "hot issues and deep cleavages." First, the conflict resulted in a qualitative shift that in the two wings of the sectional continuum moved apart, thus eliminating the influence of intermediate groups. Catton and Catton observed that the conflict "finally developed that even the Northern moderates and the Southern moderates had drifted into positions too far apart to be bridged."[3] Dumond, in discussing the effect of thirty years of intense intellectual ferment over the questions of slavery and unionism, concluded that

> majority opinion in each of the two sections had tended to crystallize on opposite sides of these questions. Great principles of human rights and human relationships such as were involved in those questions

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[1] Dwight Lowell Dumond, Antislavery Origins of the Civil War in the United States (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1939), p. 3.

[2] Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 189.

> cannot be compromised, though men may be prevailed upon to forego a test of armed strength for a time in hope that they will triumph in the ordinary course of events.[1]

The two wings of the continuum, consequently, drifted into positions too far apart to be bridged. As the radicals became more radical, the moderates and conservatives, in both sections, became less moderate and conservative.

Second, the conflict forced a quantitative shift in both sections of the country as moral fervor became, to a degree, politically expedient. In short, the moderate and conservative elements were able to assimilate more of the radical view of the conflict while certain segments within the radical classifications adopted the moderate and conservative views of political action. In the North, as Elkins observed, "the democratization of antislavery had become complete."[2] As the spirit of abolitionism took the form of a political movement, it gained enough numerical support to make it politically effective. The center of popular support, consequently, moved to a position between the radical and moderate sentiments.

Because in the South there was general agreement that slavery was a "positive good," the quantitative shift there occurred on the issue of what should be done to preserve it. For years the radicals had appealed to the Southern population with the claim that the only reliable method of slavery protection was that of secession. By the time the guns had turned on Sumter, however, this radical view had become popularized to the point that the attitude of a majority of Southerners closely approximated the radical position on the continuum.

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[1] Dwight Lowell Dumond, Antislavery Origins of the Civil War in the United States (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1939), p. 3.

[2] Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 189.

In both sections, then, the political partook of the moral in a qualitative intensifications; the moral partook of the political in a quantitative intensification. Although the issues were slightly different, the effect was the same as the "vital centers" settled in the wings. In the North abolitionism had been democratized; in the South regionalism had been popularized. This bipolarization of the issues that aroused sectional conflict was manifested on three dimensions--ideational, interpersonal, and structural.

Bipolarization on the Ideational Dimension

Three processes augmented the development of divergent ideologies by the majorities on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. First, both sections erected moral and abstract defenses of their doctrines. Although the specific issue in the campaign was that of slavery expansion in the territories, it was a mere symbol of the larger conflict over the future of slavery in the nation. In this sense the question of the introduction of slavery into the West was, in itself, a meaningless abstraction. Potter, in describing the influence of slavery expansion into the territories, wrote:

> But thus reduced to an abstraction, devoid of tangible significance, it retained such emotional potency as a symbol that it remained the point of focus of all the political, economic, and social antagonisms of the two sections. The history of the slavery contest was a record of paroxysms arising from territorial rivalry, and of lulls following upon territorial compromise.[1]

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[1] David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 65.

Second, the ideological positions became firm because of the desire on the part of both sections to formulate positions as far removed from the opposing section as possible. This sectional disengagement was spearheaded by the rhetoricians who tended to line up on opposite sides of an issue without very much regard for the merits of their stand. "The sharpest spokesmen of North and South, more and more inclining to stand at polar opposites on all questions touching slavery in the thirty years before the Civil War," Elkins reported, "had at least a feature of style in common: each expressed himself with a simple moral severity."[1] Hence, the conflict in the ante bellum period is a graphic example of "mutually divergent modification" since both sections strove to disassociate themselves from the other.

Third, these abstract and symbolic ideologies had, by 1860, permeated the total fabric of the economic, social, religious, and political thought of the conflicting sections. Craven reported:

> Neither the South nor the North could yield its position because slavery had come to symbolize values in each of their social-economic structures for which men fight and die but which they do not give up or compromise. These values had been emphasized and reinforced by two decades of emotional strife, name-calling, and self-justification. Right and wrong, justice and injustice were in conflict.[2]

Consequently, sectional viewpoints became more rigid when they were identified with "core" values; the more the sectional attitudes were identified with "core" values, the more rigid they became.

These three processes contributed to the development of ideational positions on the explosive issues of slavery and unionism. The sectional interpretations of the nature of a slave and the meaning of the Union were "mutually divergent."

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[1] Elkins, p. 36.

[2] Avery O. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), p. 397.

Divergent Definitions of Slavery

The North and South did not agree on the definition of a slave. The Northern view, infused with notions of humanitarisnism and romanticism, defined a slave as "human." The South, in striking contrast, defined a slave as "property" and claimed that slaves should be subject to the same regulations governing all forms of private property. As Hart observed, "the two sides were not dealing with the same thing. The starting-point in the north was the individual, his inborn God-given right to make the best of himself, no matter what his race or color."[1] The Southern view, based on the concept of society, vested rights, and constitutional guarantees, saw slavery in a different light. Jefferson Davis, in a speech as early as 1848, displayed the hard core of Southern opinion when he remarked that slavery "is a common law right to property in the service of man."[2]

These contradictory definitions of slavery led to a stalemate on the question of slavery expansion into the territories. Jaffa and Johannsen described this phenomenon in their study of the Lincoln and Douglas speeches in the state elections of 1859.

> If a Negro can be regarded as nothing more than chattel, then there can hardly be any justification for depriving an owner of this species

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[1] Albert Bushnell Hart, Slavery and Abolition: 1831-1841 (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1906), pp. 310-11.

[2] Cited in Catton and Catton, p. 61.

> of property simply because he has migrated to a federal Territory. But if a Negro is a man, and hence susceptible of the human rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, then it must be at least as wrong to countenace his enslavement as to countenance another man's expropriation. There really was no logical middle ground between the two positions. The vote of the people of a Territory could not decide it.[1]

Nevins reached the same conclusion when he argued that

> two rival assumptions had divided South and North--one, the assumption that slavery was right and wholesome; the other that it was wrong and deleterious. Slavery might persist indefinitely within the fifteen slave States, but as to its restriction, and as to the faith that it was in the path of ultimate extinction, the nation had come at last to an unavoidable determination.[2]

The North and South, therefore, occupied contradictory positions on slavery in that they could not agree on the fundamental and essential question of the inherent nature of a slave. To the North a slave was a "man"; to the South a slave was a "chattel."

Divergent Definitions of Unionism

The attitude toward unionism was reflected, in both sections, in the attitude toward the Constitution. The North, in holding that the Constitution was a "contract" which could be violated by individual states, found secession intolerable. Stampp wrote that

> though many may have favored compromise and hoped to avoid war, the masses of Republicans and Democrats shared the belief that the Union was perpetual. That was the most profoundly important conviction of nearly every Northerner during the crisis.[3]

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[1] Henry V. Jaffa and Robert W. Johannsen, In the Name of the People (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1959), p. 50.

[2] Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), II, 317.

[3] Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-61 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 33. See also Joseph T. Durkin, "The Thought that Caused a War: The Compact Theory in the North," Maryland Historical Magazine, LVI (March, 1961), 1-14.

The South, in viewing the Constitution as a "compact," insisted that any state or combination of states could, by independent action, withdraw from the Union. Stampp wrote that

> by 1860 southern dialecticians had perfected the compact theory which entitled each sovereign state to separate from the rest of the states at its own discretion. The states were older than the Union; in ratifying the Constitution none had surrendered its sovereignty; each retained the right to resume its original independent position. Secession was an orderly legal process.[1]

The Union was not the same thing to Northerners and Southerners. The South, under the influence of Calhoun's brand of state sovereignty metaphysics, viewed the Constitution as an optional confederation. To the North the Constitution was a "contract"; to the South the Constitution was a "compact." To the North the Union was perpetual; to the South the Union was temporary.

Not only did the sections bipolarize the definitions of slavery and unionism, but they also injected the moral component which made their divergent positions even more firm. The moral factor, according to Filler, "had altered the shape of ordinary political argument: it had turned common differences into antagonism."[2] Current explained the implications of the infusion of moral principles into the confrontation when he claimed that "between the North and the South there was a moral gulf, too broad to be bridged by compromise."[3]

The interaction between the two sections, then, served to amplify if not create two divergent ideational positions on the salient issues of slavery and unionism. The moral factors, introduced by the apologists in both sections, further calcified the ideological positions. Bancroft, in his study of compromise in 1860-61, wrote:

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[1] Ibid., p. 32.

[2] Louis Filler, The Crusade Against Slavery, 1830-1860 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 260.

[3] Richard N. Current, The Lincoln Nobody Knows (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958), p. 98.

> It was therefore not so much profound as logical thinking that brought Lincoln to the conclusion, in 1858, that the country must become all slave or all free. This the great majority of each sections had now come to see: but only the extremists upon each side, who in their reasoning ran ahead like scouts before an army, saw the meaning of the coming conflict; namely, that the two ideas were diametrically opposed; that the moral conviction and personal interest of each side were greater than their existing love for the letter or the spirit of the Constitution.[1]

Bipolarization on the Interpersonal Dimension

As the conflict between the sections intensified, interpersonal hatred and hostility became commonplace. In January of 1860 The Liberator, a publication of one of the most rabid abolitionist factions, printed the following article from the Demopolis (Alabama) Gazette: "The North hates the South. The South hates the North. They are at this time bitter enemies. Can they continue as members of the same Confederacy?"[2] "We are enemies as much as if we were hostile States," declared Alfred Iverson of Georgia, "I believe that the northern people hate the South worse than even the English people hated France; and I can tell my brethren over there that there is no love lost upon the part of the South."[3]

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[1] Frederic Bancroft, "Efforts at Compromise, 1860-61," Political Science Quarterly, VI (September, 1891), 422.

[2] Cited in The Liberator, January 6, 1860.

[3] Cited in Avery O. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), p. 395.

This intersectional hostility, moreover, was not just between the Northerners and Southerners. Even those within the border states who sought to find some common ground between the sections were subject to the same kind of verbal abuse. Since "neutrality" within an intense conflict is rejected in the same category as the "enemy," the proponents of moderation are usually subject to the same recriminations as the supporters of the opposing extreme positions. Because of this, the representatives of the middle positions on both slavery and unionism, such as Douglas, Bell, Everett, and Crittenden, were viciously attacked in both sections.[1]

Bipolarization on the Structural Dimension

The two structural factors necessary for both rhetoric and compromise are institutions of negotiation and channels of communication. The role of these structural components has been discussed in Chapter III. The ideational and interpersonal cleavage between the sections was reflected in the destruction of both intersectional institutions and channels of communication.

Destruction of Intersectional Institutions

As the North and South pulled further apart, the institutions which had bridged the nation were rent asunder. In addition, the absence of other types of national organizations hastened the move toward "legal" secession.

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[1] This is the point that was made in Chapter V. Under conditions of high ego-involvement the middle or "neutral" positions are not perceived as such but are skewed by both wings to an identical grouping with the extremists in the opposite wing. Since an ego-involved partisan has a larger latitude of rejection, he tends to view all positions which are not exactly his own as the same as the position furthest removed from his own.

First, existing organizations, such as churches and political parties, that formerly enjoyed cooperation from both sections, fell victim to intense sectionalism. The national churches, which had been able to influence their individual congregations in all states of the Union, split into Northern and Southern wings.[1] As Shanks pointed out, though, the

> divisions in the churches did not prove that the Northern and Southern people were separate nationalities in 1860, but they did show the growing animosities of the two people. The intense feeling stirred between those churches, especially the branches of the Methodist church, was carried over into the political contests.[2]

In addition, sectional opinions and interests destroyed the national political party as an instrument of power and harmony. The Whigs were unable to survive their participation in the Compromise of 1850.[3] The split in the Democratic party was even more dramatic. As Mayer observed, "the Democratic party had survived the schism in the Protestant churches and the other nation-wide organizations in the 1840's. Its disruption, therefore, foreshadowed the collapse of effective communication between the North and South."[4]

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[1] Elkins, pp. 184-85, wrote: The Methodists split in 1844 and the Baptist in 1845. The Presbyterians did not divide along completely sectional lines until 1861, but the schism of 1837 was due, at least in part, to growing tensions over the slavery issue. That is not to say, of course, that the Northern and Southern church organizations thereby became impotent; it was rather that they no longer retained the kind of institutional commitments that transcended sectional interests and that might mediate in any way between the respective Northern and Southern moral positions on slavery."

[2] Henry T. Shanks, The Secession Movement in Virginia, 1847-1861 (Richmond: Garrett and Massie, Publishers, 1934), p. 82.

[3] For a discussion of the death of the Whigs see Burns, pp. 58-61.

[4] George H. Mayer, The Republican Party, 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 70.

The division of the Democratic party in the summer of 1860 into Northern and Southern wings deprived the nation of the one remaining tie which held men of different localities and differing interests together for larger national purposes. For the sake of party and the rewards of party victory men were willing to yield even a part of their convictions. The Democrats in Charleston, however, found that the convention system, the institution invented to engineer compromises, could no longer function since neither faction involved would advance concessions on either principles or candidates. The result, in the language of Nichols, was that

> the Democrats destroyed the instrument of accomodation that they had used effectively for thirty years rather than exhaust is possibilities, and in so doing they precipitated the catastrophe which was to follow. Their invention was smashed because a large faction, mainly from the South, found it no longer useful. The party must try something else to serve their purposes.[1]

As a result, the pre-war national organizations were sabotaged by sectional feuds and divisions. Neither religious nor political organizations were able to operate simultaneously in both sections.

Second, the friction between the sections became intensified before the nation was able to develop or strengthen other types of national institutions and organizations. This made it less difficult for the South to secede in 1861 since there were both fewer and weaker national ties to break. Elkins, in his study of the institution of slavery, points out the potential value of such institutions.

> There were no national universities to focus intellectual activity, no intellectual matrix within which the most pressing problems of the day would have to be debated on national grounds and on their merits.

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[1] Roy F. Nichols, "Why the Democratic Party Divided," in *The Crisis of the Union, 1860-1861*, ed. George Harmon Knoles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), p. 50.

> There was no national focus of social and financial power (the only possible American equivalent to a ruling class): no national vested business interest such as a national bank (the nearest approach to such a thing had been smashed during the Jackson administration): no established mercantile axis powerful enough to resist a sectional movement: no seaboard social axis reaching from Boston to Charleston, whose vested loyalities might have gone deeper than local ones. There was no national bar which would, with its vested interest in standards, be forced to meet the legal complications of slavery in a national way. Indeed, there were not even sectional (to say nothing of national) abolition societies--no organization which carried anything resembling power, or which lasted long enough to accomplish anything against slavery. Those that existed were contemptible in their importance.[1]

The growing sectional crisis witnessed the destruction of meaningful and effective national organizations which would have provided a method of communicating feelings and intents from one section to the other. Furthermore, the path to sucession was cleared somewhat by the weakness or absence of other types of national organizations which would bind the sections together.

Destruction of Intersectional Channels of Communication.

The breakdown in intersectional communication has already been discussed in Chapter IV. Because of the ideational differences and interpersonal hostilities, a spokesman in one section was not likely to receive a fair hearing in the other section. This is not to say that the North refused to allow a Southerner to speak within its states. Even a radical such as Yancey was permitted to campaign for Breckinridge in the North.[2] The thesis, here, is that the ego-involved partisan would find it difficult if not impossible to assess objectively the message of the "enemy."

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[1] Elkins, pp. 201-02.

[2] See Merwyn A. Hayes, "William L. Yancey Presents the Southern Case to the North: 1860." *Southern Speech Journal*, XXIX (Spring, 1964), 194-208.

Furthermore, the intermediate spokesmen were unable to "interpret" the "true" motives of one section for the benefit of the other. Even a "neutralist" could not convince the partisans that they had a distorted perception of the goals and intentions of the alien spokesmen. The middle-men would be open to the same charge of bias, prejudice, and propaganda that was hurled against the opposing rhetoricians.

In 1860, consequently, extreme sectionalism had all but eliminated the remaining institutions so that they could no longer speak to both sections. In addition, the channels of communication were virtually closed by the intensification of the conflict.

The bipolarization in "the wings of the parties," therefore, was reflected within the ideational, interpersonal, and structural dimensions. The conflict had matured to the point that the two sections were presenting exclusive definitions of slavery and unionism; interpersonal belligerency became the norm in both sections; the structures of communication, both institutions and channels, fell victim to the disruptive influences of the sectional confrontation.

The Causes of Bipolarization in 1860

The qualitative and quantitative intensification of the conflict was the product of many influences. This discussion will consider (1) the specific impact of the campaign and election of 1860 on bipolarization, and (2) the general effect of the influences within the anatomy of a conflict that encourage bipolarization.

The Campaign and Election of 1860

The campaign and election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 were significant factors in the polarization of Northern, pro-unionists, and anti-slavery sentiment on one hand and Southern, anti-unionist, and pro-slavery thought on the other. The presidential campaign and election influenced the bipolarization process in two ways. First, the campaign, with its characteristic charges and counter-charges, reinforced attitudes as it exaggerated differences among the factions and minimized differences within the factions. The campaign was one of a long series of confrontations which, through action and argument, accelerated the sectional crisis.

Second, the victory of Lincoln at the polls further reinforced the bipolarization phenomenon. In the North Lincoln's victory was welcomed as irrefutable confirmation of the righteousness of the anti-slavery, anti-Southern Cause. The first national victory of the Republican party infused that organization with the intoxication of triumph. Some of this spirit, in spite of the fact that the party rode to victory with less than forty-percent of the popular vote, was reflected in Lincoln's rigidity during the Crittenden compromise vote.[1]

In the South, meanwhile, the ascendancy of the sectional Republican party to national power was met with suspicion and despair.[2] The radicals, who had been threatening secession since as early as 1852, were gaining influence. Although the South still had control of the Senate and the Supreme Court, the threat or perceived threat of the Republican-controlled executive branch provided the agitators with the necessary opportunity, in the language of Yancey, "to strike the Southern heart." Furthermore, the failure of Lincoln to reassure the South during the critical period between his election and inauguration made the Southern conservatives helpless in their struggle with the radicals.[1]

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[1] Many historians argue that the basic cause of the failure of the Crittenden compromise was the firm position taken by Lincoln against the compromise proposals which would allow the extension of slavery south of latitude 36° 30'. This point was made by Allan Nevins to this writer in March, 1966, in a private conversation, in Dallas, Texas.

[2] Avery O. Craven, "Why the Southern States Seceded," in The Crisis of the Union, 1860-1861, p. 63, quoted the Reverend Benjamin M. Palmer as telling his people that the "Black Republican victory of November was incontrovertible proof of a diseased and dangerous public opinion all over the North, and a certain forerunner of further and more atrocious aggression."

The campaign and election of 1860, consequently, were among those momentous events which paved the way to secession. The effects of the campaign arguments and the results of the election combined to assist the bipolarization of nation issues that, in turn, set the North and South on a collision course.

Factors Within the Anatomy of a Conflict

The approach to a theory of rhetoric and compromise, formulated in Chapter III, suggested that four processes are instrumental in deepening competition into conflict.[2] All four factors, which serve to bipolarize a conflict, were present in the ante bellum struggle.

To begin with, communication between the radical rhetoricians in the controvery had at least two effects. First, extremism in one section produced extremism in the other section. Jaffa noted that "the extremes have a common interest against the mean. Calhoun's political goal in 1850, the consolidation of southern nationalism, depended upon the enemy in the North, abolitionism."[1] The St. Paul Pioneer and Democrat was probably correct when it predicted that "the natural impulses of the Southern mind will be to meet Northern radicalism with the radicalism of its own section."[2] The interaction between the extremes, therefore, forced them both to take even more advanced positions in the conflict.

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[1] The role of Lincoln during the campaign has been questioned by several historians. Since he failed to reassure the conservatives in the South of the true nature of his attitude toward slavery, the radicals in the South were successful in persuading the conservatives that Lincoln was as much an abolitionist as Garrison. In short, the argument suggests that Lincoln should have employed the strategy of disengagement during the campaign and after.

[2] See Chapter III, pp. 91-96, for a discussion of these processes.

The second effect of the highly vocal extremists was felt on the perceptions of the moderates and conservatives. In 1860, the extremists were perceived as representative of each of the sections by the population of the opposite section. Both North and South judged the opposing section by the excesses of the extremists of that section. Crenshaw, in his study of the Southern states in the 1860 election, made this observation:

> The student who has examined the mass of partisan mis-representation which emanated from the principal actors in the drama of 1860, cannot but reflect upon its vicious effects upon the welfare of the nation. The more rabid in each section avidly sought out for quotation extremists' expressions from the other section, where it would do the most damage--or partisan good. Southerners quoted the Liberator, the New York Tribune, and the Chicago Democratic as authentic spolesmen of the entire North, while the ululations of the Charleston Mercury or the Memphis Avalance were reproduced to strengthen the stereo-type of Southern society which was being presented to the Northern public. Calm voices were heard during the contest, but too often they were drowned in the furor. The gross misrepresentation bewildered when it did not mislead the voter of 1860.[3]

Whenever the moderates and conservatives became convinced that the radical statements in the opposing section were representative of that section's attitudes, they were more susceptible to the arguments of their own radicals. Thus, in 1860, the average Southerner perceived the abolitionist to be the spokesmen for the entire North; the average Northerner perceived the fire-eaters to be the spokesmen for the entire South.

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[1] Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959), p. 50.

[2] Cited in Daily Missouri Democrat, October 31, 1860.

[3] Ollinger Crenshaw, The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1945), p. 306.

Second, moderates in both sections used the languages of the extremists in appealing to the extreme vote. The effect of such an attempt at assimilation in one section by the opinion leaders was to further convince the proponents in the other section that moderation was a false front to disguise radical intent.

In the North the more moderate anti-slavery spokesmen used the language of the radical abolitionists. Cavanagh reported, in her study of anti-slavery motivation in the Northwest, that

> it is not difficult to find that the phraseology of the fervent abolitionist was easily transferred to the vocabulary of the anti-slavery extensionist. The abolitionists' picture of the institution of slavery, his impressions of the South as a section and of the slaveholder as a person were the very pictures which the Westerner adopted in this struggle for political control of the territories.[1]

The radical language of Lincoln, a Westerner, had a damaging effect on his image in the South. It became easy for Dixie to attach the abolitionist label to Lincoln in spite of the fact that Lincoln was a moderate on the slavery question. Catton and Catton wrote that

> Lincoln's talk of conspirators and a house divided against itself had been a response to one of the oldest dilemmas of politics--that of the leader who plans to use the moderate approach when in office but resorts to immoderate language during the campaign in the interests of getting elected.[2]

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[1] Helen M. Cavanagh, "Antislavery Sentiment and Politics in the Northwest, 1844-1860," (unpublished Ph.D. disseration, Department of History, University of Chicago, 1938), p. 46.

[2] Catton and Catton, pp. 143-44.

The same stereotyping effect occurred in the South as the politicians attempted to out-flank each other by using radical language in order to demonstrate the superior conformity to Southern norms. Nichols reported that

> in the frequent elections which agitated the South, faction capitalized southern fears. Each rival sought to show that the danger was great, that his opponents were incompetent to meet it, and that he alone could preserve, protect, and defend the Southland.[1]

The kind of language used by an opinion leader, whether it represents his real position or not, is selected by his enemies as representative of his "true" stance on an issue. Although the opinion leader may also use the language of the conservatives, this language will be screened out and not perceived by the enemies who wish to brand him with a radical image. On the other hand, the radical enemies who wish to make the opinion leader appear to be reactionary, will be able to perceive only his conservative language as the authentic representation of his "true" position. The Northern moderates, in the perceptions of the South, were identified with the radicals. The Southern moderates, in the perceptions of the North, were as extreme as the Southern radicals. In addition, the radical abolitionists in the North perceived Lincoln, one of their own moderates, to be more of a reactionary than he actually was because of the language he used in appealing to the conservative vote. The Southern radicals perceived Bell and the other Constitutional Unionists as "allies of the Black Republicans" because of their attempt to appeal to conservatives in both sections of the country.

Third, the parties in a controversy may feel the need to take a more radical position in order to improve their competitive bargaining positions. This will have the effect of increasing the distance between the parties in a qualitative sense. Zinn argued that "the abolitionists took an advanced position so that even if pushed back by compromise, substantial progress would result."[1] Many viewed the Southern threats of secession in 1860 as a form of political blackmail in order to exact concessions out of the North. As Potter remarked, "whether or not Southerners distinguished between the threat of secession as a campaign device and the actual use of secession as a minority safeguard, they invoked it again in 1860, perhaps more freely than ever before."[2] That the South was bluffing both in the threat of secession and secession itself has been argued by many critics, both then and now. Historians who defend this interpretation contend that most of the people in the South did not want war; they just wanted to improve their bargaining position and felt that secession was the only way to achieve the goal.[3]

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[1] Roy Franklin Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 45.

Finally, the moderates and conservatives in both sections were perceived to have supported the radicals in their respective sections because they identified with the extremists on non-sectional issues. Dillon, in his study of the legacy of the American abolitionists in the pre-war period, wrote:

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[1] Howard Zinn, "The Tactics of Agitation," in Antislavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin B. Duberman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 434.

[2] Potter, p. 3.

[3] For a discussion of the historiography of Southern secession see Ralph A. Wooster, "The Secession of the Lower South: An Examination of Changing Interpretations," Civil War History, VII (June, 1961), 117-27.

> The large accession to antislavery society membership after 1835 did not, in fact, result solely from a disposition to aid and elevate the Negro. As Catherine Beecher observed at the time, a great many men either declared or implied that in joining the abolitionists "they were influenced, not by their arguments, but because the violence of opposers had identified that cause with the question of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and civil liberty."[1]

The same defense of non-sectional issues was apparent in the South since, as Nye mentioned, "the moderate Southerners might dislike the absurdities emanating from the 'positive good' school, and at the same time concede the slaveholders's right to protect and retain his property, his economic system, and his distinctive civilization, for it was his civilization, too."[2]

Although the non-radicals disagreed with the radicals on the questions of slavery and unionism, they were perceived by the opposing section to have agreed with the radicals on these issues because of their agreement with the radicals on other issues. In 1860, consequently, many of the moderates and conservatives either identified with or were perceived to have identified with the extremists on crucial sectional issues because of their alliance on other issues.

Bipolarization in 1860, therefore, was increased by the interaction of such processes as sectional stereotyping, immoderate language, improvement of bargaining positions, and identification with non-sectional issues. These factors, in combination with the ideological positions in the conflict, served to push the "vital centers" of the section into more radical positions.

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[1] Merton L. Dillon, "The Failure of the American Abolitionists," The Journal of Southern History, XXV (May, 1959), 173.

[2] Russel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy, 1830-1860 (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1949), p. 251.

The Effects of Bipolarization in 1860

Since the fortunes of rhetoric and compromise are linked together, the breakdown in one would be a sign of the disruption of the other. The failure of compromise in the crisis of 1860-61 suggests that rhetoric, the necessary servant of compromise, was also underminded. This is not to say, however, that all rhetoric was ineffective. Two types of rhetoric were in deadly conflict. The rhetoric of reinforcement, represented by the abolitionists and political abolitionists in the North and the fire-eaters and nationalists in the South, was most successful in bipolarizing the conflict. The rhetoric of conciliation that sought to maintain the Union by pleading for sectional peace was, indeed, sabotaged. Both rhetoric and ultimately compromise, then, fell victim to the sectional confrontation. This discussion of the disruption of rhetoric and compromise in 1860 will consider the effect of bipolarization on the ideational and interpersonal dimensions as well as on the structures of negotiation and agreement.

Effect on the Ideational Dimension

The political leaders and positions involved in the pre-war controversy did not share the premises necessary for both conciliatory rhetoric and compromise to function. Neither the sectional nor the neutral positions could sacrifice enough ground to provide the basis for a compromise on the issues of slavery and unionism. Furthermore, no other superordinate goals existed which could bind the sections together.

Absence of Acceptable Values

Rhetoric of conciliation and compromise, which thrive on overlapping values or premises, were ineffective in 1860 because the sections did not share the same values on the two important issues of slavery and unionism. In addition, the neutrals could not provide the necessary premises when approaching either one of the sections.

First, the Northern view which held that a slave was "human" was countered by the Southern defense of slavery on the grounds that a slave was "chattel property." The two sections were not able to engage rhetorically in negotiation over the question of slavery in the territories because they failed to settle the dialectical question of the nature of a slave. The North argued that since a slave was human, slavery should be prohibited in the territories. The South contended that since a slave was property, a slave, as was true with any personal property, should be allowed in the territories. Douglas and Bell, who did not declare on the question of the nature of a slave, were unable, in either section, to supply the necessary premises. The Leavenworth Daily Times put it this way. "Lincoln's position advances Liberty and checks Slavery. Breckinridge's position advances Slavery and checks Liberty. There is no intermediate principle, no intervening power can harmonize the two."[1] The Daily Journal (Wilmington, North Carolina) printed the Southern version of the dichotomy. "There is no half-way house between this principle and the reverse. He who is not in favor of the right must belong properly to the wrong. There are no half-breeds between truth and error."[2] Since the sectional values of "Liberty" and "Slavery" were contradictory, and since there could be no "half-breeds" in the dispute, it would necessarily follow that no two opposing groups could share the same value or premise on slavery. The confrontation was dialectical; it was not rhetorical.

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[1] The Leavenworth Daily Times, August 7, 1860.

[2] The Daily Journal (Wilmington, North Carolina), August 11, 1860.

The other ideational confrontation dealt with the meaning of unionism. The immediate question of nullification or secession could not be settled until the nature of the Constitution could be agreed upon in both sections. The contractual view of the North conflicted directly with the compactual view of the South. If the Northern argument were put into syllogistic form, it would include the following premises.

> A contract is a permanent, binding agreement among parties.
> The United States Constitution is a contract.
> Therefore, the United States Constitution is a permanent, binding agreement.

If these premises were accepted then it would necessarily follow that nullification or secession were both illegal and could not be tolerated by the other parties who signed the contract. The Southern form of the syllogism would read:

> A compact is a temporary, non-binding agreement among parties.
> The United States Constitution is a compact.
> Therefore, the United States Constitution is a temporary, non-binding agreement.

If these premises were accepted, then it would follow that nullification or secession were legal since the nature of the agreement would allow a withdrawal from the compact at any time. The specific issues of nullification, Southern rights, Southern nationalism, and secession turned on the nature of the Constitutional agreement, whether "contract" or "compact." Because of this, the Northern rhetoricians could not provide the necessary premises to the Southern audience; the Southern rhetoricians could not provide the essential premises to the Northern audience.

The confrontations between the sections over the values placed on slavery and unionism, consequently, became dialectical activities which were employed in search of philosophical or moral truths; they were not rhetorical activities which thrive on expediency in search of practical proposals.

These competitive values were made even more rigid as both sections sanctified and deified their positions. The injection of the moral issue into the dispute, characteristic of the romanticism and evangelical religion of that day, further removed the conflict from the possibility of peaceful settlement. Thomas makes this point in his study of Theodore Weld, one of the abolitionists.

> As long as slavery could be dealt with as a constitutional, an economic, or a political issue, there was always room for give and take. But as the North was won to the abolition view of slavery as a sin, its resolve became more stubborn and more grim; for with sin one must not compromise. On the other hand, as more and more persons in the South were willing to believe that slavery and the Southern way of life were a positive good for all concerned, and that those who would disturb these things were evil bigots, then the South likewise became inflexible. With no further possibility of compromise, war came.[1]

The ideational conflict became more intense, then, as it was shot full of moral components. As Craven argued, the sectional leaders had "lifted the issues to the abstract level of right versus wrong and had thereby created a situation with which the democratic process of toleration and compromise could not deal. Only force would answer."[2]

The development of divergent values related to slavery and unionism and the moralizing of the defense of those values by both sections led to a situation in which conciliatory rhetoric was inoperative. Since a rhetoric of conciliation failed because of a lack of mutually acceptable premises on slavery and unionism, compromise, which also must share premises or values, likewise fell victim to the conflict.

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[1] Benjamin P. Thomas, Theodore Weld: Crusader for Freedom (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1950), p. 238.

[2] Avery O. Craven, An Historian and the Civil War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 204.

Absence of Acceptable Goals

The relationship among rhetoric, compromise, and superordinate goals has been summarized in Chapter II and III. Even though parties in a dispute may possess different values or doctrines which are significant to a particular controversy, other premises, such as superordinate goals, may be relied upon by the rhetoricians seeking an accommodation. Two such superordinate goals were present in 1860 but, because of the intense and bitter sectionalism, were not powerful enough to be used as the basis of negotiation. These two premises were expansionism and a common enemy.

Expansionism

Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois sought to discover a working formula for the reconciliation of the alienated sections through the doctrine of popular sovereignty. This doctrine, which would provide a method of deciding the status of future territories and states, would encourage, Douglas hoped, the development of the territories. In short, Douglas wished, through expansion, to submerge factionalism in the melting pot of the Union. The revisionist interpretation of the role of Douglas in the ante bellum struggle emphasizes this concept in supplying Douglas' motivation in passing the controversial Kansas-Nebraska Act.[1] Jaffa argued that

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[1] Thomas J. Pressly, Americans Interpret Their Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 298-99, reported that "while Hodder, Ray and Beveridge were not in complete agreement in their interpretations of Douglas and his actions, they were all agreed that the evidence did not support Rhodes' severe criticism of Douglas's motives in sponsoring the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854; the origins

> Douglas believed that the organization of a new territory would rapidly result in new free states, would lead to an overwhelming preponderance of freedom over slavery in the Union and an absorption in the constructive task of filling and building up the vast continental domain, a task which would so engage the energies of the nation as to leave the subject of slavery neglected and largely forgotten.[1]

If this were the intent of Douglas, then his actions with regard to the Kansas-Nebraska issue and popular sovereignty represented an imaginative program for the reduction of intersectional strife.

Common Enemy

A. E. Campbell, in his study of the effect of isolation on Civil War Causation, argued that the North and South were able to concentrate on their differences because neither were endangered by a foreign enemy.

> The fact of American isolation is as indisputable as that of American democracy. Since the War of 1812, two political generations before the Civil War, there had been no threat to the security of the United States. Even the War of 1812, though fought against a major European power and in the context of a great European struggle, was undertaken by Americans with curiously little calculation of what the international consequences of victory or defeat might be. That suggests that isolation had already made its mark on American thinking.[2]

Since the nation was not threatened directly by any foreign power, little if any reason existed to fear international hostilities. With the absence of a common enemy, the sections were free to debate and fight

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of this act they found not in the presidential ambitions of Douglas but in conditions prevailing in the Western states and territories in the 1850's."

[1] Jaffa, p. 48.

[2] A. E. Campbell, "An Excess of Isolation: Isolation and the American Civil War " Journal of Southern History, XXIX (May, 1963), 169

over their differences.

In 1861 William H. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State and probably the leading Republican in the nation until the nomination of Lincoln at Chicago, attempted to exploit the "common enemy" method of conflict resolution. Seward proposed measures aimed at provoking war with several European powers. These measures, which were directed primarily against Great Britain, were designed, according to Jaffa, as a method of arousing "national feelings as a means to ending the secession crisis."[1] One can only speculate what the results might have been if a foreign country had inaugurated some kind of overt hostility against the United States during this period.

The gap between the North and South, consequently, had become so broad that the two sections did not share either values or goals. The sections had become hopelessly divided in their perceptions of the nature of slavery and unionism. Expansionism or a common enemy were incapable of providing a major point of agreement to be used by middle-men in the engineering of a compromise. The ideational atmosphere was ripe for conflict; it was not conducive to compromise. Since both conciliatory rhetoric and compromise operate from agreed upon premises, and since the mutual values or goals did not exist in the prelude to the war, that conflict was not amenable to a peaceful settlement.

Effect on the Interpersonal Dimension

The notion that rhetoric and compromise also interact on the interpersonal level is defended in Chapter III. Mutual trust and confidence between the parties to a dispute or between those same parties and a third party which has been brought in for mediation purposes, are necessary ingredients for successful negotiation.

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[1] Jaffa, p. 82.

In the ante-bellum conflict, however, the ideational disputes were so intense that personal hostility and bitterness were spawned by the confrontation. For example, Hostettler, in his study of the Brownlow-Pryne debate, held in Philadelphia in September of 1858, concluded that

> the extremism of their expression could serve only to inflame sectional feeling further. Theirs was not the language of persuasion; it was the language of belligerency, designed to impress the faithful and to antagonize the enemy. It reflected the intensity of feeling, both South and North.[1]

The same feeling of hostility that characterized the two debaters in 1858 also existed among the national leaders as they faced each other in Congress during the months between Lincoln's election and the firing on Sumter. Most of the time was spent in bitter and personal attacks and diatribes against sectional enemies. One could hardly expect that effective bargaining could take place in an atmosphere such as that which prevailed during the secession crisis. While attacking personalities, the rhetoricians could not discuss issues.

Effect on the Structural Dimension

Not only did bipolarization effect the ideas and personal relations within the controversy, but it also destroyed the apparatus and channels of communication and negotiation. First, as has already been suggested in this chapter, the organizations and institutions which had served to provide the necessary machinery for negotiation and sectional accommodation had been neutralized. Neither religious nor political organizations could claim national status and representation with any degree of validity. Even the United States Senate, which had long been the organization for the arbitration of sectional differences, was virtually helpless in the conflict.

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[1] Gordon F. Hostettler, "The Brownlow-Pryne Debate, September, 1858," in Antislavery and Disunion, 1858-1861, ed. J. Jeffery Auer (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 26.

Second, the channels of communication and mediation were eliminated in the perceptions of the highly ego-involved partisans. As one might expect, the spokesmen from one section were not capable of persuading the other section to compromise. Even the most brilliant writer or speaker in the North could not persuade the Southern slaveholder to release his slaves or the Southern fire-eater to remain in the Union. Conversely, the most adept rhetorician in the South would have had considerable difficulty convincing the abolitionists of the merits of slavery or the Northern unionist of the advantages of secession.[1]

Furthermore, the spokesmen of the middle positions were unable to approach both of the sections with the same compromise proposal. Henry Clay and the other moderate leaders had been able, in 1850, to overcome extremism in both sections by marshalling enough support to pass the compromise measures. By 1860, however, Clay was dead and the other moderate voices were not able to prevent the polarization that was encouraged by radical elements in both North and South. "The North and South had now passed the point at which moderate utterances could have an emollient influence," reported Nevins, "if they pleased one side they seemed provocative to the other."[1] Burns, in describing the 1860 election, suggested that "the moderate candidates had been ground to death between the two sectional ones; the compromisers had given way to extremists. The center had been devitalized."[2] Gerald M. Capers, a recent biographer of Stephen A. Douglas, concluded that the

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[1] Haynes, p. 208, pointed out that "Yancey's speaking in the North in the fall of 1860 undoubtedly altered very few votes in November." Carl Schurz, radical spokesman for Lincoln, admitted that "my speech at St. Louis, while gaining some votes for Lincoln, did not produce any visible effect upon the 'slave-holders of America.'" See Carl Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz* (New York: The McClure Company, 1917), II, 204. In reaction to the Brownlow-Pryne debate, the *New York Times*, September 13, 1858, wrote that it was of the opinion that "the discussion . . . is not likely to influence public opinion . . . the question of the right and wrong of slavery is already settled." See Hostettler, pp. 27-8.

> crisis of 1860, in contrast to that of a decade earlier, ended in failure not because of the lack of a moderate leader with a plan, but because the majority in both sections which previously had supported compromise now rejected it. What made Douglas fail was what brought on the war. No one man, however great a leader, could have prevailed against the passions of 1861.[3]

The moderates, then, lacked the ability to mediate the dispute. The sections could not communicate directly with each other; the sections could not communicate through a third party; the third party could not communicate with both sections at the same time. Mediation failed in the crisis of 1860-1861.

The fierce struggle between the sections, reflected on both the ideational and interpersonal levels, was also manifested in the undermining of the structures of communication and negotiation. The spokesmen of both sectionalism and moderation lacked the ideas, spirit, and machinery necessary for a meaningful settlement.

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[1] Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, 107.

[2] Burns, p. 65.

[3] Gerald M. Capers, Stephen A. Douglas: Defender of the Union (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1959), p. 225.

Conclusion

The failure of the rhetoricians to mediate the sectional dispute marked the breakdown in the factors necessary for compromise. The ideational gap between the sections could not be bridged; the interpersonal bitterness stood in the way of any significant negotiation; the lack of effective structures of communication and mediation transferred the settlement to the battlefield.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Over one hundred years after the firing on Sumter plunged this nation into the most costly war in its history, critics are still attempting to unravel the causes of the sectional war. The basic questions raised by the Civil War, however, are not peculiar to that particular controversy in that particular century. Any time a controversy becomes intensified certain factors and influences develop which are common, in varying degrees, to all types of conflict situations.

This study has sought to isolate some the variables within the anatomy of a conflict as they are represented in a contemporary theoretical construct and the ante bellum historical context. The purpose of this concluding chapter is (1) to briefly summarize this study of conflict, rhetoric, and compromise and (2) to suggest areas future research.

Summary of this Dissertation

This study has been divided into two parts. The first part, represented by Chapters II and III, endeavored to devise an interdisciplinary approach to a theory of the rhetoric of conflict and compromise. In integrating the fields of history, political science, rhetoric, and the behavioral sciences, this disseration has attempted to provide an eclectic basis for an examination of human behavior under conflict conditions.

This approach to a study of human interaction has been influenced significantly by the social judgment-involvement approach to attitude and attitude change, a scientifically-derived construct from the behavioral sciences. This paradigm, based on the concepts of perception-judgment and ego-involvement, has been applied in the context of intra- and intergroup relations and in the development of a contemporary theory of rhetoric. Social judgment affects the study of group relations by considering the impact of ego-involvement on intragroup rigidity and intergroup hostility. Social judgment influences a contemporary theory of rhetoric by defining the kinds of reactions audiences will make to communications under the conditions of high ego-involvement.

The investigation into the nature of social conflict that is found in this disseration has centered on three basic relationships.

First, the relationship between conflict and compromise, based in part on the writings of Kenneth Boulding, has been delineated. Conflict, defined as a situation in which the parties involved compete for the same behavioral space and, in doing so, attack the competitor, is amenable to compromise only if the parties possess or perceive that they possess shared values or goals. Furthermore, the mere existence of jointly-held premises does not guarantee that compromise will result. The parties engaged in the conflict must utilize the means of discovering areas of agreement before an accomodation may be reached.

Second, Chapters II and III discuss the relationship between high ego-involvement and human conflict. Whenever the participants in a conflict become extremely ego-involved in their positions, they tend to adopt an "all-or-nothing" syndrome and, as a result, are insulated against compromise proposals. This process becomes even more intensified if the protagonists sanctify and deify their positions on moral grounds. As the parties pull further and further apart, the conflict becomes bipolarized as the power centers occupy the wings and deny the existence of middle-ground or the influence of middle-men. The opposing points of view disengage theselves as far from their "enemy" as possible. This disengagement will be reflected in the development of dichotomous ideational positions, the intensification of interpersonal hostilities, and the disruption of the structures and channels of negotiation and communication.

Third, the rhetoric of conciliation and compromise are interrelated in that they both operate from shared premises; interact on an interpersonal as well as ideational dimension; and function through both structures of mediation and avenues of communication. The success or failure of compromise will be reflected, consequently, in the success or failure of rhetoric as a process in the settlement of disputes. Under high ego-involvement, however, a rhetoric of attitude reinforcement may be quite successful in either intensifying or prolonging the dispute.

The purpose of this analytical model, based on these three relationships, is to locate the point at which a confrontation becomes an "irrepressible conflict" and is no longer amenable to a peaceful settlement. Whenever the parties in a controversy no longer share salient values or goals; view each other through an atmosphere of hatred and hostility; and lack the necessary apparatus of mediation, that conflict cannot be served effectively by the rhetoric of conciliation nor can it be resolved through compromise. This seems to show, as Carl Becker has said, that

> government by discussion works best when there is nothing of profound importance to discuss, and when there is plenty of time to discuss it. The party system works best when the rival programs involve the superficial aspects rather than the fundamental structure of the social system, and majority rule works best when the minority can meet defeat at the polls in good temper because they need not regard the decision as either a permanent or a fatal surrender of their vital interests.[1]

The second part of this study, found in Chapters IV, V, and VI, superimposes this theoretical construct on the 1860 ante bellum controversy as the Americans of that generation did, indeed, "fail to talk out their differences." Chapter IV concentrated on the unique background of the 1860 presidential election by considering the historical, political, social and cultural, and rhetorical factors which permeated that atmosphere. These background factors influenced the development of a spirit of sectionalism in viewing problems and a spirit of irrationality in attempting to solve these problems.

By 1860 the two sections, North and South, had formulated and popularized divergent ideational positions on the questions of slavery and unionism. To the North a slave was "human"; the Union was a "contract." To the South a slave was "property"; the Union was a "compact." Since these ideologies were mutually exclusive, a middle-ground did not exist in their perceptions. Furthermore, the conflict was characterized by intense sectional animosity which turned former friends into deadly enemies. Not only were they unable to communicate directly with one another, but they also were unable to communicate to each other through a third party. Finally, the existing organizations of mediation and channels of communication were sabotaged by the ideational and interpersonal sectionalism. In short, the conflict had been captivated by extremist elements who lacked not only the means and method of a peacful settlement but also lacked a desire to compromise.

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[1] Cited in Kenneth M. Stampp (ed.), *The Causes of the Civil War* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 156.

Areas for Future Research

The dualistic nature of this disseratation is also reflected in the recommendations for future research. First, more research needs to be done in the formation of a contemporary theory of conflict and conflict resolution. In order to accomplish this objective the theorist must be able to draw upon the cogent material from many disciplines. This point has been made by McNeil when he wrote:

> That social science cannot "pull itself together" to meet the challenge of the nuclear age is distressing, but disciplinary narrowness has had an even more important facet. Teaching, training, and orientation to the close quarters of a single discipline has acted to prevent the appearance of new approaches to global problems, since one must break the bonds of past experience even to think in other than familiar patterns.[1]

The ability to "think in other patterns," consequently, is necessary if a theory of human behavior in conflict situations is ever to be developed. New insights from the integrated disciplines need to be considered and, if possible, tested within authentic situations. As the repercussions from human conflicts become more and more severe, the fate of the world may very well hand on the ability of responsible parties to understand the nature of conflict and its resolution.

Second, the approach to conflict and compromise, found in this study, may be applicable to other kinds of historical contexts. For example, one might profit from some of these insights in the exploration of such controversies as the role of British propaganda in the prelude to World War I, the conflict over the League of Nations, or, in more modern times, the confrontations over race, religion, economics, and politics. In short, this analytical model in whole or in part may provide the critic with at least one way of viewing any dispute, contemporary or historical.

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[1] Elton B. McNeil, The Nature of Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 194.

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