

IMMIGRATION: THE SHAPING OF PARTISAN  
IDENTITY AND PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE

By

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IDENTITY AND PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE

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Abstract: Immigration as an issue is salient in U.S. politics, particularly regarding the 2016 presidential election. Building a wall on the southern border of the United States, expanding border patrol units, and deporting all unauthorized aliens are all salient immigration issues pervasive in the politics of today. The Latino population is often targeted as the population that these issues affect to the greatest extent, and thus, their vote hinges upon the issue. What impact does immigration as an issue have on Latino partisan identity, and in turn, vote choice? The author draws election data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study and conducts regression analysis to determine the issue of immigration's effect on partisan identity and vote choice. The results show that immigration directly affects both Latino partisan identity and presidential vote choice. The findings point to further research on issue salience and party identification.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. A REVIEW: LATINO POPULATION AND PARTISAN IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT .....	4
Assimilation .....	4
Group Identity and Partisan Identity.....	6
Issue Saliency, Framing, and Group Identity.....	8
The Latino Population and Vote Choice.....	12
III. THEORY .....	14
IV. METHODOLOGY .....	19
Dependent Variables.....	20
Independent Variables .....	23
Control Variables.....	24
Specifications of the Models.....	25
V. RESULTS .....	28
VI. CONCLUSION.....	41
REFERENCES .....	47
APPENDICES .....	55

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Immigration Descriptive Statistics.....	20
2. Partisan Identity Descriptive Statistics .....	21
3. Presidential Vote Descriptive Statistics.....	23
4. Hypotheses.....	28
5. Assimilation Hypothesis Results .....	28
6. Immigration Hypothesis Results.....	30
7. Vote Choice Hypothesis Results.....	33
8. Robustness Check for Vote Choice Hypothesis .....	35

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Theoretical Framework.....	27
2. SEM for 2008 PV .....	37
3. SEM for 2012 PV – 2012 Data.....	38
4. SEM for 2012 PV – 2014 Data.....	38
5. SEM for 2012 PV – 2016 Data.....	39
6. SEM for 2016 PV .....	39

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Building a wall on the southern border of the United States, expanding border patrol units to cover more ground, and deporting all unauthorized aliens from the United States are all salient immigration issues in the politics of today. These immigration issues matter to the general populace, in varying degrees, and may influence public opinion for elected officials and future votes in important elections. Politicians who focus on increasing border patrols along the southern border, or politicians who advocate for amnesty for illegal aliens within the U.S., may influence the population that find those immigration issues salient to vote for their candidacy for office. The literature on issue salience considers immigration an important issue to the Latino population (Barreto 2007). It is less clear, however, what impact issue salience has on partisan development for the Latino population, and whether issue importance affects the presidential vote choice of the population. What impact does immigration as an issue have on Latino partisan identity, and in turn, vote choice? The Latino population is the fastest growing population in the United States, and with that, it constitutes a growing electorate. The issues that are salient with the population, such as immigration, influence public opinion (Leal and Nuno et al. 2008). The impact of the Latino population is potentially vast in



any election; practical implications are clear. If the framing of salient issues can influence public opinion, issue importance can shape voting behavior.

In this paper, I develop a theoretical framework to explain Latino issue attitudes and their effect on partisan identity, and in turn, vote choice. Assimilation and group consciousness influence partisan identity through the development of issue opinions salient to the population, and I postulate that salient issues in turn affect presidential vote choice. Assimilation affects the issues that a population finds salient, establishes social commitment, and creates group consciousness (Branton 2007). Group consciousness, often based around race, self-identity, or in-group/out-group status, posits that individuals put stock into group membership, and that this knowledge of membership results in opinion and biases (Greene 1999, Greene 2004). These group opinions, derived from social context and assimilation patterns, exhibit generational effects. The generations of a populace are affected by the issues that are important at the time; the opinions important to a newly immigrated population are different from the following generations, and their opinions may change on those issues as time goes on. These opinions, shaped by the media of their time and the important issues that affected their lives, influence partisan alignment (Barreto 2007). Individuals who support issue positions that are concurrent with party positions are likely to identify with that party when it comes to partisan identification. I also posit that in turn, Latino partisan identity influences their presidential vote choice. The Latino population adopt issue stances from their environment, whether that is exposure to media, their education (public or private), a religion they subscribe to, or the community they grow up with. These issue stances shape how they identify in the political arena, as people align themselves with those that have similar views, in this instance, a political party or candidates. Through this identification to a party, the Latino population are that much more likely to vote for the candidate from that party. I posit that not only will their likelihood to vote for that candidate increase as their party affiliation is similar, the issues at hand influence this relationship as well.

I test my hypotheses on assimilation, immigration, partisan identity, and vote choice by drawing on three different iterations of data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, and ran logistic and ordinal logistic regressions, as well as structured equation models for a robustness check. Specifically, among the data, I isolated for the Latino population, and used a partisan identity measure, an immigration stance measure, presidential vote choice variables, and variables drawn from the literature meant to account for environmental effects. The findings provide support for the hypotheses; the duration of citizenship and generation status affect respondents' stance on immigration. The Latino respondents' stance on immigration directly affects their partisan identity, and their partisan identity significantly affects presidential vote choice. Direct and indirect effects of immigration on presidential vote choice are observed and point to the importance of issue attitudes in both partisan identity development and vote choice. The findings suggest immigration as an issue has a significant effect on partisan identity, and thus, influences vote choice.

The organization of the paper is as follows: in the next section, I outline different methods and processes of partisan identity development, the effects of assimilation and group identity on issue opinion, and partisan identity's influence on vote choice in the literature. Following the literature review, I establish my theoretical framework of partisan identity development and the importance of salient issues influencing partisan identity and vote choice, where I follow with a set of hypotheses. I then present a research design to test the hypotheses, followed by model specifications, and the results of the models. I conclude with a summary of the main findings, state the limitations of the research, implications of the findings, and future research on the topic.

## CHAPTER II

### A REVIEW: PARTISAN IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE LATINO POPULATION

The literature on partisan identity development is vast, and the literature on the Latino population specifically has an expansive collection of works analyzing issue salience, group consciousness, assimilation and vote choice. The concern of the following literature is to explicate the various theories on development of partisan identity; what the development entails, and ultimately how partisan identity affects vote choice within the Latino population. I split the literature into sections expanding on assimilation theory, in general and about the Latino population, group consciousness literature, and literature on issue salience and framing theory. Following the partisan development literature, I explicate the vote choice theory literature, laying out how partisan identity affects vote choice, and how this pertains to the Latino population.

#### *Assimilation*

The assimilation literature offers a first look at the development of partisan identity through the joining of communities, participating in activities, and merging of cultures, as well as the establishment of attitudes on issues of importance. An initial theory of assimilation stems from Gordon (1964), who connects partisan identity development to straight line assimilation, that is, the process of a population integrating into an existing society, community, with a set of ideas and norms. Gordon found that each successive generation after immigration acculturates to society through contextual mechanisms and the environment. Sears and Danbold et al. (2016) examine the function of years and higher socioeconomic status of successive generations of

immigrants on partisan identity and found that the inclusion of the population was dependent how long the immigrated family had been in society; more time in society meant that the people were more likely to adopt customs, practices, language and skills to increase socioeconomic status and thus, partisan identity. Segmented assimilation theorists claim that depending on how the immigrant is incorporated into society, they can be steered towards partisan identity (Lucas 2003, South and Crowder et al. 2005, Samson 2014, Stark and Bielawski et al. 2015). Specifically, Portes (1993) examines the incorporation of immigrants into society, and the contextual factors that speed or hinder the process through the process of segmented assimilation. Portes found that it is due to “modes of incorporation” that an immigrant assimilates; these modes may be societal or economic based, ranging from skin color and location to mobility and opportunity. Depending on the location, the community, and resources available, assimilation may happen relative to those attributes. Portes also found that while dependent on contextual factors, successive generations of a naturalized citizen have a greater chance of assimilating. Akresh (2016) presents a modified segmented assimilation hypothesis when it comes to health of a populace, and how their health changed as the immigrants assimilated into the populace. Akresh found that the level of health involved was reliant on the disadvantage level of their environment, the resources available, and the mobility for recent immigrants to change their social standing.

While not exclusively based in established theory, other scholars found that social context and participation in social events matter when it comes to assimilation, and that this can shape partisan identity specifically for the Latino community. Alvarez and Bedolla (2003), among others, find that societal factors and the process of inclusion positively affects Latino partisanship. Logan and Darrah et al. (2012) examine assimilation and they find that much like Portes (1993), low levels of political identity and inclusion are due to recent immigration, and that as the duration increases, successive generations exhibit greater participation and stronger partisan identity. Klofstad and Bishin (2013) also found that to assimilate and build a partisan

identity, prospective voters need to gain personal resources to have their social ties affect their political activity. Light and Togunde (2008) examine this trend in assimilation, where they produce a study of Mexican immigrants' assimilation patterns. These patterns illustrate that the merging of cultures, as well as learning the language and participating in local events and processes, influence the speed of assimilation and the development of partisan identity. Norrander and Manzano (2010) echo similar sentiments about Cuban Americans and their tendency to gravitate to communities where they know other immigrant families. While the duration within a culture helps assimilation, identification with a political party can compound assimilation and speed up the process, as immigrants become settled and involved in the local setting. Gordon-Larsen (2003) applied the segmented assimilation theory to the Latino population and argued that political party identification is an identity that the Latino immigrants would assimilate into. Dalton and Weldon (2007), building on Gordon-Larsen (2003), find that electoral experience and socialization shapes Latino partisan identity. Assimilation, however, is only one possible explanation for how the Latino population develops partisan identity, and quite possibly only a piece of the puzzle that is partisan identity development.

#### *Group Identity and Partisan Identity*

Social identity theory and the establishment of group consciousness is an alternative avenue of partisan identity development. Social identity theorists postulate that "individuals derive their self-concept from knowledge of their membership in a group, they place significance on group membership, with resulting perceptual and attitudinal biases" (Greene 1999). Greene (1999) applies social identity theory to partisanship and found that social identity theory provides a valuable alternative framework for viewing partisan identity. The applicability of Greene's study is that by viewing partisan identity through the lens of social identity theory, group consciousness and polarization of opinion for the "in-group" is established, and opinion towards the "out-group", or other party, is strengthened. Greene examined partisanship through the

traditional seven-point scale and found that most American citizens have social identifications with political parties that shape their political perceptions and partisan behavior. Greene (2004) backed up his findings with another application of social identity theory to party identification and used levels of partisan social identity to predict political party ratings for respondents. Greene found that partisan social identity significantly predicted political party ratings, the ideology of the respondents, and party activities. Social identity theory proved to be a valuable lens in which to view partisan identity and how partisan identity is derived for the population.

Social identity theory, while viewed as a possible lens in which to view partisan identity, is not without critics. Huddy (2001) examined group identity and political cohesion, and concluded that research on ethnic and national identities, at minimum, cannot fully explain identity formation, and that the salience of group membership is not the sole condition that leads to partisan identity. Huddy postulated that social identity theory has limited utility in political science, and that group membership alone does not tell the full story. Chen and Li (2009) found that when examining in-group identity and social preferences, in-group members showed significant preference for choices that benefited the in-group, while those not within the group chose to benefit others, more often. While these results are concurrent with social identity theory, Chen and Li also point to while this is based in sociology, the context of the group itself is important, and that at the very least, one component of partisan identity, is identification to a group.

Ethnicity and race, which past research holds is not entirely responsible for group identification and opinion within social identity theory, can influence partisan identity, however. Huddy (2013) finds that social identities, such as race, ethnicity, religion or gender may generate “political cohesion” through a shared understanding and outlook of political norms. Plutzer and Zipp (1996) find that gender is also a significant predictor of partisan outlook and activity. Specifically, for the Latino population, the continued increase in active Latinos has helped

establish a grouping effect, where a collective minority has formed, with this minority viewing themselves as a group that could enact change, depending on the political attitude at the time (Wallace 2012). The creation of this collective political attitude is based on race, country of origin (Hispanic, in this case), and immigration status (Logan and Darrah et al. 2012, Sanchez 2006). The utilization of ethnicity, religion, gender, or race can have a significant effect on partisan identity but fails to fully explain political behavior.

### *Issue Salience, Framing, and Group Identity*

Politicians or political parties can utilize issues that are important to a populace through the process of framing, and a grouping effect may be noticed, particularly when the issue is salient, which may then influence partisan behavior. Issue salience, as defined in the literature, is the measure of importance placed on an issue by a population, particularly when it comes to voters (Wlezien 2005). While sharing similarities to social identity theory, group identity derived from issue salience offers a different viewpoint. Group identity derived from issue salience are based on the framing of issues for groups and issue salience. The framing of issues, in the context of this paper, is the shaping or construction of perceptions of issues by political actors. The corresponding literature examines issue salience as an issue granted importance by the population. The attention on a salient issue therefore would shape their evaluations and political leanings (Carey and Branton et al. 2014). Specific attention on an issue may shape partisan identity when it comes to impacting voting behavior; by appealing to the salient issues of a population, politicians may gain attention and favor of the populace (Edwards et al. 1995). According to RePass (1971), however, prior to his examination of issue importance, he found that partisan attitudes affect issue importance, and are not the sole causal mechanism of partisan identity or party choice itself. RePass found certain issues are important to partisan affiliation, particularly issues that are salient within a population.

While issue salience is an aspect of partisan development in general, there is agreement on specific issues that are salient to the Latino population. For example, the literature agrees that immigration has been a salient issue with the population (Leal and Nuño et al. 2008), along with race, identity, religion and language (Barreto 2007, Leal and Nuño et al. 2008, Logan and Darrah et al. 2012, Wallace 2012, Carey and Branton et al. 2014). Knoll et al. (2011) also make note of issue salience as being “derived from one’s value hierarchies”, with the Latino population and the issue of immigration. These value hierarchies are based on the culture that the individual grew up in, and those around the individual. Religion, race and income level also play a role in determining the value hierarchies of a population. While value hierarchies are not solely attributable to the Latino population, salient issues affect the development of the hierarchies, and hierarchies affect the development of group consciousness of the Latino population. The population reaffirms the development of these hierarchies when faced with other populations who have conflicting views. Self-grouping takes place within a population, and due to the contrary views having a consolidating effect for the population, issues become more salient. A competing group has an establishing effect for partisan identity and group consciousness, and thus reaffirming the salience of issues (Aroopala 2012).

Salient issues to the Latino population may also be political issues that affect political behavior. Leal (2008) conducted a study on the 2006 midterm elections and determined that immigration is a salient issue amongst the Latino population but not among the non-Latino population, as it was not as far reaching in impact to that segment of the population (Leal and Nuño et al. 2008). Carey and Branton (2014) made note of immigration protests contributing to increased salience of immigration issues for the Latino population, in response to H.R. 4437, which put immigration reform to the forefront of the political agenda. Wallace (2014) conducted a study of the representation of Latinos in Congress and made note of immigration as a highly salient issue within the populace, which could influence voter participation and issue importance.



Leal et al. (2005, 2008) found, amongst the issues of immigration and identity, that religion was also a salient issue among the Latino population during the 2004 presidential election and the 2006 midterm election.

Many scholars have examined ways in which political actors or media can enhance the issues that are salient with the population, influence the party choice, and affect the political behavior of the population. Framing offers the ability to affect how a population views an issue, how important that issue is, and what the opinion of an issue may be (Chong and Druckman 2007). Nelson and Oxley (1999), in a study of framings' impact on public opinion, find that framing may impact not only the issue opinion itself, but the importance granted to the issue, as well as belief in the content. Druckman (2001) examines the constraints of the types of frames used to influence opinion by elites and finds that credibility of the source of information and the context is a significant constraint to elite framing of public opinion. The saliency of the issues, and the sources that information is garnered from matter to a population when it is time to "accept" the frame. Slothuus (2008) finds similar results, in that there are "mediating" variables that affect framing effects and the evolution of public opinion; political knowledge, strength of values, and awareness of issues deter framing effects. In an examination of the framing of salient issues during a crisis, Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) find that alternative frames on gun frames, post-Littleton, Colorado shooting, influence opinion on handgun laws; the impact is contingent on the partisan identity of the participants of the study as well as the political knowledge of those participating. Salient issues may be framed in a manner to affect public opinion, but the knowledge and partisan identity are important variables. Dancey and Goren (2010) find, in an examination of NES data, that partisan identity affects issue attitudes, but issue attitudes also influence partisan identity. The salience of the issue at hand also matters; if the saliency of the issue decreases, the impact is not as significant. Saris and Sniderman (2004), in their reassessment of framing theory, find ample skepticism towards framing theory. The authors

find, contrary to a core assumption of framing theory, that the issue opinions of the targeted population are controversial, respondents are often resolute in their issue attitudes, and framing is not as impactful as previously researched. The type of issue, the partisan identity of the respondent, and the political knowledge affect the framing process, as well as the effectiveness of framing.

Aroopala (2012) explores the idea of framing, group identity and the perceptions of voter's ability to affect change as an ethnic group. The author found that by viewing the Latino population based on group identity, there was an increase in the rate of mobilization and the partisan behavior of the population. This is dependent on how strongly people identify with the framed issues and with others in the group. Racial ties influence group consciousness, partisan identity, and voting preferences. Different from value hierarchies, racial identity strongly encourages the forming of group ties to identity and participation (Masuoka 2008). In a study on voting patterns of the Latino population, Barreto (2007) found that ethnicity impacts voting behavior, with this impact being evident when there was the presence of a Latino electorate and an ethnically similar candidate, and the appeal to the population is based on an ethnic frame. The study also stated that ethnicity directly influenced voter preferences, as well as the issues that are important to the population. Fryberg et. al (2011) find, in a content analysis of newspapers covering the anti-immigration bill in Arizona (SB 1070), that political ideology influences framing of the Latino population when it comes to the issue of immigration. Framing the issue can shape public opinion; conservative outlets framed the discussion around threats, economic security and safety, while liberal outlets examined civil rights, equality issues and Democratic values. Knoll et. al (2011) find that framing labels affect opinion on the issue of immigration, but in different ways. The importance of the issue is a determining variable; Democratic and Republican respondents were more likely to pursue a conservative policy choice if immigration was a salient issue. The authors point to the limitation of the area of study, that is the Iowa

caucus, as well as the phrasing used in debate (Mexican vs. immigrant) and point to frames having an impact on a sub-group of the population. Ethnic cues influence the perception of immigration, specifically, compared to skill level or economic impact.

### *The Latino Population and Vote Choice*

Partisanship is an active force that changes how citizens behave in and perceive the political world and extends to vote choice (Gerber et. al 2010). Miller (1991), in an assessment of partisan identification and the causal relationship on vote choice, finds consistent support between the 1950-1980 of partisan identification affecting vote choice. However, partisan identification leading to vote choice is not the sole focus of the vote choice literature. Petrocik et al. (1996) examined issue ownership theory, in that political parties can use issue positions of a party to shape opinion on an issue through priming and framing of issues to appeal to the population. The authors found that party positions on issues had significant effects on voters. Instability of partisanship and vote choice led some authors to investigate other factors that influence vote choice. Issue positions, partisan identity, and candidate evaluations have all exhibited an effect on voting behavior (Whitely 1988). Some authors state that overemphasis on partisan identity led to a lack of focus on other factors that affect vote choice, such as issue positions (Meier 1975) and context of the election (Cowden and McDermott 2000). Partisan identity, issue positions of the parties, how the voters align themselves with the parties, and the context of the election influence the actual vote choice by the population.

Partisanship operates in a similar manner when it comes to vote choice for the Latino population, and contextual effects play a vital role in shaping vote choice. A popular component of a vote driving force is that of ethnicity. Stokes and Brown (2006) posit that racial self-identification and a group identity affect vote choice for the Latino population. Ethnic cues have also exhibited effect on voting behavior (McConnaughy et al. 2010), as well as ethnicity when it

comes to candidates that are running for office (Nuno 2007). Gender (Sanbonmatsu 2002) and religion have also exhibited significant effects on Latino vote choice (Lee and Pachon 2007). Group consciousness and identity created through “linked fate” and a set of issues that shape perceptions that are salient for the population affect voting behavior (Schildkraut 2005). Group influences and social contexts affect Latino vote preferences (Jackson 2011). The group identity of the population, the issues that are salient within that population, the gender of the candidates, the religion of those voting, and the contextual effects of society affect the Latino population and vote choice.

## CHAPTER III

### THEORY

What impact does immigration as an issue have on Latino partisan identity, and in turn, vote choice? To begin, acculturation consists of the changing of dominant language, adopting cultural practices, or participating in social processes. Acculturation and assimilation into the general populace affect what issues the target population regards as salient (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003, Branton 2007). How a population, like the Latino population, assimilates into society shapes their issue attitudes. The perception of in-group status, the development of identity based on race or social commitment, and the acceptance of the people by the population through assimilation influence what issues are important (Lucas 2003, Crowder et al. 2005). Straight line assimilation theorists posit that successive generations of immigrants acculturate through contextual factors and the environment around; surroundings shape their interests, and as successive generations grow, their interests change (Gordon 1964). Segmented assimilation theorists explicate that depending on the context in which immigrants are incorporated into society, partisan identity and opinion can be influenced (Samson 2014). As immigrant families grow into successive generations, viewpoints on salient interests of the initial generation evolve for the successive generation, and this effect continues (Sears and Danbold et al. 2016). Assuming immigration is a salient issue with the initial immigrant generation, the opinion would change as duration increases. I argue that as time passes since the immigration of the Latino respondents, it is more likely for issues salient to the population to evolve. The people will have more exposure to television, their parents, their teachers, other members of society, religion and

the media, and thus, a greater likelihood of influence on their opinions. Immigration is a salient issue to the population, as past literature has shown, and therefore Latino attitudes towards immigration would change as their environment shifts. Salient issues are relative to the context of which the respondents assimilated with and are affected by, and thus opinions will alter in importance as circumstances change. Immigration is important to the initial generation within the country, as it shapes their life, but may change in importance as a family no longer has to worry about entering a new country, or with U.S. laws, obtain citizenship. It may decrease in importance or opinion on the issue may change.

*Assimilation Hypothesis: The more recent the Latino respondent immigrated, the more likely the respondent is to support the Democratic position on the issue of immigration.*

Assimilation affects issue opinions; issue opinions and group identity affect partisan identity. The literature agrees that partisan identity is composed of salient issues and the amount that they correlate with the environment. Authors have found that salient issues such as race, income, education, religion, and immigration exhibit effects on the Latino population's partisan identity (Barreto 2007, Kelly et al. 2005, Leal et al. 2005, Leal et al. 2008, Mahler and Jesuit et al. 2014, Wallace 2014). Specifically, Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) and Dutwin et al. (2005) point to a hierarchy of values, such as ethnicity, family values, and views of concern for the populace that affect party identification. Partisan identity, for this study, is where the population falls in a partisan spectrum, spanning from Democrat to Republican. The Latino population historically has been more likely to identify as Democrat, with religion having a moderating influence on that trend, while income and education have mixed partisan effects (Light and Togunde 2008). The agreed upon salience of issues, such as immigration, as well as the agreement on contributing factors to the Latino group identity, like ethnicity and religion, would point to a relationship with partisan identity. Salient issues affect the development of value hierarchies, encourage grouping of

the populace, and shape the evaluation of partisan activities and the political leanings of the population (Carey and Branton et al. 2014). . Based on this literature, I argue that since the issue of immigration is salient with the Latino population, environmental context influence development of opinion on salient issues, and that salient issues affect the evaluation of partisan activities, Latino opinion on the issue of immigration should influence the partisan identity of the respondents. Latino respondents act in their interest by identifying the party that is closest in alignment to their position on salient issues and attempt to maximize their utility by aligning themselves with who they agree with. As an extension of Alvarez and Bedolla (2003), who find that policy issues influence preferences of a population, I posit the salient issue of immigration, derived from group identity and environmental effects, has a significant effect on partisan identification.

*Immigration Hypothesis: Respondent's stance on the issue of immigration have a significant effect on their partisan identification.*

In general, partisan identity influences vote choice (Miller 1991). I argue that this relationship is due to not only the alignment of partisan identity to vote choice, but also factoring in issue positions affecting partisan identity and vote preferences. For the Latino population, socialization, group consciousness and issue importance affect partisan identity. The partisan identity then influences their vote choice, based on their group identity, issue positions and the relation to the candidate positions. Issue positions (Meier 1975), candidate evaluations (Whitely 1988), ethnicity (Stokes and Brown 2006), gender (Sanbonmatsu 2002), and religion (Lee and Pachon 2007) affect vote choice, as they make up partisan identity, and may exert a direct effect as well. Assuming immigration is a salient issue, as the literature alludes to, and salient issues influence partisan identity, then those whom deem immigration important would vote based on the view of the candidate offering the position closest with their perceived interest in the issue (Jackson 2011). In this theory, partisan identity, driven by issue position and socialization,

influences vote choice. Latino respondents who identify as Democrat, who support the Democratic position on an issue, are more likely to vote the Democratic candidate in presidential elections. Populations who identify as Democrat will likely exhibit voting patterns in line with Democrat thinking, as Republican populations will likely exhibit voting patterns in line with Republican thinking.

*Vote Choice Hypothesis: Latino partisan identity has a significant relationship on vote choice.*

Existing theories are in place to answer how populations align themselves, and how these populations vote. The Running Tally theory, a rational choice framework of political behavior, describes partisan identification as “the running tally of retrospective evaluations of party promises and performance” (Fiorina 1981). The theory, developed by Fiorina and others, posits that party identification is composed of the differences in expected benefits individuals expect to gain from Democratic and Republican governments, alike, and that “rational” citizens would base their expected payoff for identification to a party and their vote based on the past behavior of the parties (Bartels 2002). The *American Voter* posits that electoral behavior is driven by party identification and candidate evaluations, and to a much lesser extent, issue preferences (Campbell 1960). A funnel model is the mechanism in which populations identify to a party, with parents serving as the main socialization variable, and that your identification to a party shapes attitudes on issues. Lewis and Beck (2008) recreate the *American Voter* model, but update it based on data in the early 2000s and find similar results to Campbell; issues matter little, and little focus is given to the context that populations grow within, and that partisan identity shapes issue attitudes. I believe my theoretical framework addresses the weaknesses in the above theories, while expanding the scope. I posit that for the Latino population in general, partisan identification is not simply a running tally of evaluations and a cost-benefit analysis of what the administration can provide the populace, but partisan identification is manufactured in how the population



assimilates into society, how the groups and organizations they encounter influence their views, and what issues are salient to them. Not only are issue attitudes influential in developing their partisan identity, their partisan identity and issue attitudes shape their presidential votes.

The theoretical framework described aims to explain how the issue positions are formulated within the Latino population, how such issue positions influence partisan identity, and if through partisan identity, exhibit effect on vote choice. I use immigration as the base issue to examine, as it is not only an important issue, it is a salient issue with the fastest growing population. Does immigration exhibit direct effects on partisan identity? Is the same effect noticed on presidential vote choice? The next section presents the research design, where I introduce the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, the variables used to test the hypotheses, and the specifications of the models.

## CHAPTER IV

### METHODOLOGY

To test the hypotheses, I plan to use multiple Harvard produced Cooperative Congressional Election Study data sets to pull out Latino respondents and their responses to test the issue of immigration on partisan identity and, in turn, vote choice. The CCES offers an expansive set of variables to assess the proposed hypotheses, as well as a large representative sample of the Latino population that other datasets do not offer. Specifically, I am using the 2014 data set, to target respondents participating in a midterm election and the 2012 and 2016 data sets to represent respondents participating in presidential elections.

The data sets will be excluding non-Latino respondents, to exclusively establish the Latino population and test their preferences. To achieve this end, I only included respondents who responded to the survey “race” question by answering Latino/Hispanic. The selection of the CCES over the ANES was due to the specificity of the immigration issues assessed in the 2012, 2014 and 2016 datasets, along with the fact that the CCES oversamples the Latino population, giving this paper a large sample to test. Previous work in the literature have used both the ANES and the CCES, but the CCES offers a better compilation of variables and sample size. Using the 2012, 2014, and 2016 CCES gives this work a large sample to examine partisan identity; 4,135 respondents for the 2012 data pool, 3,895 respondents for the 2014 pool, and 5,238 respondents for the 2016 pool identified as Hispanic and answered the immigration questions. Gimpel (2017), in his recent study on the rise of immigration rhetoric in American politics, used YouGov surveys

of 7000-8000 respondents for the 2016 election and compared them to the 2012 election. Gimpel focused on the 2016 election, and I believe that by examining the 2008, 2012, and the 2016 presidential elections, more insight can be gained.

### *Dependent Variables*

I used measures pertaining to the issue of immigration as the first dependent variable. Questions related to the partisan position on the issue of immigration were asked of the respondents in the 2012, 2014 and 2016 CCES surveys. Each survey asked multiple questions of the respondents, but I found only two consistent questions among all the surveys, and thus I will use the two questions that remained constant to test the hypothesis.<sup>1</sup> The CCES coded the questions in the survey as *1: Yes, 2: No*, where the respondent answered each question based on their preference. The questions are as follows:

1. *What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?*  
*Select all that apply. – Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years and not been convicted of any felony charges. 1: Yes, 2: No.*
2. *What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?*  
*Select all that apply. –Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border. 1: Yes, 2: No.*

Due to the nature of the questions, the partisan direction is not the same for each question. To avoid any confusion in analysis, I recoded each question, where *1: Democrat response, 2:*

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<sup>1</sup> The 2012, 2014 and 2016 CCES offer differing questions related to immigration; while two questions were used in the formal models in this work, the questions were run to first test for correlations, and also to test for reliability. The questions performed as expected; including questions that were available in all three data sets are still consistent with the other questions not represented in the model, and thus avoiding selection bias.

*Republican response* are the options for the respondent, where the respondent answer is recoded to reflect the new labels.<sup>2</sup>

#### INSERT TABLE 1

Partisan identity serves as the second dependent variable. Specifically, partisan identity is where the respondent falls on a partisan scale, ranging from Democrat to Republican, spanning a numerical range of one to seven. The CCES data sets measure partisan identity with multiple variables; a three-point party identification variable, a seven-point party identification variable, and a simple ideology question with five points. I used the seven-point identification variable as it provided the most variation for input, is available in all three datasets, and has been used in previous work (Jacobson, 2011, Jacobson 2012, Johnston 2016, Meier 1975). The goal is to provide the most variation of possible answers for the survey respondents. The question in the questionnaire asks the respondent:

*“Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?”*

*Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?”*

*Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democrat or Republican Party?”*

The CCES codes the variable as *1: Strong Democrat, 2: Not very strong Democrat, 3: Lean Democrat, 4: Independent, 5: Lean Republican, 6: Not very strong Republican, 7: Strong Republican, 8: Not sure, 98: Skipped, 99: Not Asked*. The partisan identity coding is consistent

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<sup>2</sup> To maintain consistency with the coding of the Immigration variables, I used ten other coders to re-code the variable. Nine of the ten coders coded in the same partisan direction, and thus I confirmed the consistency of their method with my method, to ensure reliability and avoid bias. The goal is for the exercise to mitigate any concerns of generalizations of the coding process. The Democrat and Republican positions on the two immigration questions are consistent with the party platforms of both parties (Democrats.org, Republicans.com). The Democrat response coincides with the DNC platform on immigration issues related to border patrol and granting citizenship to current illegal aliens within the country. The Republican response coincides with the RNC platform found on their organizational site referring to immigration concerns.

between the CCES data sets. The consistency for the variable was also an important reason to utilize it as the partisan identity measure, as well as the more specific nature of the measure compared to the five-point identifier measure. I recoded the variable to exclude those that were not sure, skipped the question, or those that the CCES did not ask.

## INSERT TABLE 2

The last dependent variable, vote choice, is multi-faceted. The vote choice measure consists of multiple vote choice variables representing the 2008 presidential election, the 2012 presidential election, and the 2016 presidential election. Drawn from the 2012 CCES, I recoded the 2008 presidential vote variable for 2008 as *0: Democrat, 1: Republican*. Three vote choice variables represent the 2012 presidential election; one 2012 variable stems from the 2012 CCES dataset, the second variable stems from the 2014 dataset, and the last is drawn from the 2016 dataset. The 2012 presidential vote variable indicates who the respondent voted for in the 2012 presidential election and the CCES coded as follows: *1: Barack Obama, 2: Mitt Romney, 3: Someone else, 4: Did not vote, 5: Don't recall, 8: Skipped, 9: Not Asked*. I recoded all three variables, across the three datasets, as *0: Democrat, 1: Republican*, to shadow the partisan identity dependent variable. The 2016 CCES dataset offers a 2016 presidential vote variable that indicates who the respondent voted for in the 2016 election. The CCES coded the variable as follows: *1: Donald Trump (Republican), 2: Hillary Clinton (Democrat), 3: Gary Johnson (Libertarian), 4: Jill Stein (Green), 5: Other, 6: I didn't vote in this election, 7: I'm not sure, 8: Evan McMullin (Independent), 98: Skipped, 99: Not Asked*. I recoded the variable as *0: Democrat, 1: Republican* to be in line with the other variables and to shadow the partisan direction of the partisan identification variable. The partisan direction is the desired result during analysis, and the variables do not include third parties in the analysis. The decision to code from 0 to 1, with Democrat to Republican, is in conjunction with the partisan identifier variable, where the smaller the number, the more aligned with the Democratic party the respondent considers

themselves. The inclusion of a 2012, 2014, and 2016 variable will give more depth to the vote choice variable, particularly regarding the Latino population over a longer span of time.

INSERT TABLE 3

### *Independent Variables*

I used three main independent variables to test the proposed hypothesis. The first independent variable, *Assimilation*, indicates the generation status of the respondent, was used to test the Assimilation Hypothesis, and the effect of the generation status of the respondent on their stance on the issue of immigration. Citizenship norms have influenced differences in opinion on salient issues of society (Esses et al. 2001), as well as the rights of a citizen and the responsibilities that go along with citizenship (Coffe and Bolzendahl 2011, Mahler 2014). Past authors have noted generation effects as shaping of opinion and behavior, particularly for the Latino population (e.g. Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). A Latino respondent who is a first-generation citizen may have different opinions on issues than a Latino respondent who is an immigrant non-citizen, or a second or third generation citizen. I recoded *Assimilation* as *1: Immigrant Non-citizen, 2: Immigrant Citizen, 3: First Generation, 4: Second Generation, 5: Third Generation*. I also used *Assimilation* as a control variable for the Immigration Hypothesis and the Vote Choice Hypothesis to account for possible generation effects in the models.

Issues of immigration and partisan identity are the remaining independent variables. Already previously introduced, I used immigration as an independent variable to test the Immigration Hypothesis and the effect the issue of immigration has on partisan identity. I used *Immigration Q1* and *Immigration Q2* as the immigration measures. The coding remained the same between models. Partisan identity is the main independent variable to test the Vote Choice hypothesis, which assesses the impact partisan identity has on presidential vote choice. I also included partisan identity as the mediating variable in the structured equation models, as the

hypothesis postulates that immigration affects vote choice both directly and indirectly through partisan identity. The coding remained consistent between models for all variables.

### *Control Variables*

The models will also include a list of control variables to provide context during analysis. While the models could run the control variables as independent variables, I maintain they do not hold as much importance to the research question at hand and the hypotheses but do provide valuable context. The partisan identity of this population and the issues that affect their partisan identity vary, and by controlling for various aspects of partisan identity, the model can account for more tenants of the development of salient opinion, partisan identity, and vote choice.

The first control variable, titled *Family Income*, indicates what range of income the respondent claims to earn yearly. This measure aims to control for the respondent income level to establish context and appeal to the voting participation effect of income established in the literature. Particularly, some authors note that an increased income leads to a higher likelihood of identifying as a Republican (Bowler and Segura 2011) and income may have an effect on understanding partisan identity (Lucas 2003, Samson 2013). Drawn from the 2012, 2014 and 2016 data sets, I used this variable during analysis to represent the income level of the respondent, and how that may affect their partisan identity and vote choice.

The second control variable, titled *Education*, indicates the education level of the respondent. I used this variable to control for education's impact on partisan identity and vote choice, as education influences partisan identity development (Aroopala 2012). The CCES originally coded the variable as follows: 1: *No HS*, 2: *High School Graduate*, 3: *Some college*, 4: *2-year*, 5: *4-year*, 6: *Post-grad*, 8: *Skipped*, 9: *Not Asked*. I recoded *Education* into a dichotomous indicator of the respondent holding a degree, with the variable being code as 0: *No*

*Degree, 1: Degree.* This variable is consistent among the data sets and was utilized in the analysis to represent the effect having a college degree may have on partisan identity and vote choice.

The third control variable, titled *Religious Importance*, indicates the importance of religion for the respondent. The CCES coded the variable as follows *1: Very important, 2: Somewhat important, 3: Not too important, 4: Not at all important.* This variable is consistent among the data sets and is meant to control for the importance of religion for the Latino respondents when it comes to partisan identity and vote choice. Religion has a moderating effect on Latino partisan identity, specifically when it comes to the Cuban population and the natural conservative lean, and thus I included a Cuban Descent to account for this effect. Due to the lack of availability of the variable, I was only able to use the Cuban Descent variable for the 2016 models, and I included the analysis in the Appendix.

The fourth control variable, titled *Gender*, indicates the gender of the respondent. Multiple authors have examined the impact gender has on partisan identity development (Huddy 2013), vote choice (Plutzer and Zipp 1996), and views on representation (Htun 2004). The variable is coded as *1: Male, 2: Female.* I used *Political Knowledge* as the last control variable. The intent is to control for political knowledge when it comes to vote choice, as Carsey and Layman (2006) found that political knowledge may influence how people vote; more political knowledge points to people voting based on salient issues, while less knowledge points to people voting based on their partisan identity. The variable was created by computing knowledge questions asked of the respondents concerning political parties in control of the House and the Senate in Congress; the responses were computed to represent respondents who answered both questions correctly (2), a single question correctly (1), or did not answer either of the questions correctly (0).

#### *Specifications of the Models*



I analyzed the issue of immigration's effect on the partisan identity of the Latino population, partisan identity's effect on vote choice, and the mediation analysis between the immigration as an issue, partisan identity, and the presidential vote in five steps. Specifically, I ran four different sets of models to account for each election year data set, of which there were three. The first model type, an ordinal logistic regression, was ran to test the Assimilation Hypothesis. The dependent variables were the immigration questions asked of respondents, and the independent variable was the assimilation measure. I included control measures for religious importance, education level of the respondent, family income, and gender. I used the same specifications for all three Latino respondent pools. The second model type, an ordinal logistic regression, was ran to test the Immigration Hypothesis. In the ordinal logistic regression, the dependent variable was partisan identity, and the independent variables consist of measures that gauge the respondents' responses to immigration questions one and two. For controls, I included family income of the respondent, religious importance of the respondent, the education level of the respondent, their citizenship and generation status, and for the 2016 analysis, a Cuban descent control (Jackson, 2011). I ran the ordinal logistic regression for all three data pools, all with the same variables, related to election year, aside from the Cuban control, which is 2016 specific.

The third model type, a logistic regression, was ran to test the Vote Choice Hypothesis. The dependent variable, vote choice, operationalized by president vote variables, was ran with the partisan identity variable as the independent variable. Multiple presidential vote variables required the model to be ran individually for each variable; once for the 2008 presidential vote, three times for the 2012 presidential vote (three different variables), and once for the 2016 presidential election, for a total of five models. I used the same controls from the Immigration Hypothesis, along with the Cuban Descent control for the 2016 data set. The goal of the model was to discern the partisan identification effect on presidential vote choice; another model was necessary to discern the issue of immigration's potential effect on vote choice (Stokes-Brown,

2006). The fourth model type, another logistic regression, was ran with presidential vote choice as the dependent variable, partisan identity as the independent variable, and the same control variables as used previously. However, the model includes the immigration independent variables to discern the difference in effect of the model with and without the immigration measures. While this comparison is rudimentary, it was an introductory look at the effect of the issue of immigration on vote choice.

INSERT FIGURE 1

To more accurately gauge the effect of the issue of immigration on presidential vote choice, I conducted mediation analysis as a robustness check and to fully flesh out the indirect and direct effects the issue of immigration has on vote choice, through partisan identity and directly. To assess the mediation effects, I employed a Structured Equation Model. Presidential vote choice was the dependent variable for the SEM, with partisan identity representing the mediating variable and the immigration measures serving as the independent variables. I implemented the controls from the previous models for the structured equation model, to simulate continuity and account for contextual effects. Figure 1 illustrates the framework for the model.

## CHAPTER V

### RESULTS

INSERT TABLE 4

INSERT TABLE 5

The Assimilation Hypothesis posited that the more recent the respondent immigrated, the more likely they are to side with the Democrat position on the issue of immigration. To test this, I ran ordinal logistic regressions, with *Immigration Q1* and *Immigration Q2* as the dependent variables. Table 5 reports the result for Models 1-6. The results for Models 1 and 2 draws from the 2012 respondent data. For Model 1, the independent variable, *assimilation*, has a significant coefficient of .185 towards *Immigration Q1*. With all other factors held constant, the predicted probability of an immigrant non-citizen adopting the Democratic position on the first immigration question is .77, .73 for an immigrant citizen, .69 for a first-generation respondent, .65 for a second-generation, and .61 for a third-generation respondent. The results show that the longer the respondent has been a citizen, the more likely the respondent is to support the Republican position on the issue of immigration. The predicted probability for a respondent to adopt the Republican position on the first immigration question illustrates an inverse relationship; third-generation respondents are .39 likely to adopt the Republican position, second-generation respondents .35 and first-generation respondents .31. A clear relationship between longevity within the United States and issue stance on immigration is evident from Model 1. Model 2, as the second test of the Assimilation Hypothesis, used *Immigration Q2* as the dependent variable,

and the *citizen/generation* variable responded with a significant .171 coefficient. The predicted probabilities mirror the pattern in Model 1, with a decrease in probability of Democratic responses as the respondents' longevity increases within the U.S., and a reciprocal pattern for the Republican responses increasing as longevity within the U.S. increases.

Models 3 and 4, drawn from the 2014 respondent pool, also test the Assimilation Hypothesis. For Model 3, with *Immigration Q1* as the dependent variable, *assimilation* has a significant coefficient of .215, with  $p < .01$ . With all other factors held constant, the predicted probability of an immigrant non-citizen respondent adopting the Democratic position on the issue of immigration is .79, while a recently immigrated citizen has a .75 probability, followed by .70 for a first-generation respondent, .66 for a second-generation respondent, and .61 for a third-generation respondent. Alternatively, a third-generation respondent has a .39 of adopting the Republican position, a second-generation respondent with a .34 probability, a first-generation respondent with a .30 probability, followed by a decrease for recent immigrant citizens to .25, and a .21 probability for immigrant non-citizens. Model 3 illustrates the longer a Latino respondent has been a citizen within the U.S., the more likely the respondent is to vote according to the Republican position. Model 4, with *Immigration Q2* as the dependent variable, has a significant and positive coefficient of .143, with  $p < .01$  for *assimilation*. With all other factors held constant, the predicted probability of an immigrant non-citizen respondent adopting the Democratic position on immigration is .69, an immigrant citizen has a probability of .66, with a first-generation respondent having a .62 probability, followed by .59 for a second-generation and .55 for a third-generation respondent. Alternatively, the pattern is much like the others, with the longevity of citizenship affecting the probability of agreeing with the Republican position on the issue of immigration. Third-generation respondents show a .44 probability of agree with the Republican position, while slowly decreasing as respondents become more recently emigrated.

For the 2014 respondents, the duration of citizenship affects the likelihood of support for the Republican position.

Models 5 and 6, based on the 2016 respondent pool, were the last models to assess the Assimilation Hypothesis using ordinal logistic regression. As in Models 1 and 3, Model 5 used *Immigration Q1* as the dependent variable, and found a positive significant coefficient of .113, with  $p < .01$  for *assimilation*. With all other factors held constant, the predicted probability of an immigrant non-citizen respondent agreeing with the Democrat position on the issue of immigration is .76, .73 for recently an emigrated citizen, .71 for first-generation respondents, .69 for second-generation respondents, and .66 for third-generation respondents. The trend is consistent with the past models, and the trend for those that agree with the Republican position continues as well, with third-generation respondents agreeing with the Republican position .34 of the time, while second-generation respondents falling to .31, first generation falling to .29. Model 6, with *Immigration Q2* as the dependent variable, exhibits the same patterns as the previous models; the coefficient for *assimilation* is positive and significant, at .153, with  $p < .01$ . The predicted probability trends illustrate the same relationship as the other models; the more recently immigrated for the respondent, the more likely the respondent is to agree with the Democratic position. Models 5 and 6 illustrate continuing support for the conclusion that as Latino respondents' duration of citizenship increases, the likelihood of support for the Republican position on the issue of immigration increases. The control variables, drawn from the literature, report as expected; religious importance, family income, and gender are significant at  $p < .01$ , and education is significant at  $p < .05$ . The results in Models 1-6 show strong support for the Assimilation Hypothesis and posit that the duration of citizenship of a Latino respondent has a significant effect on their issue stance on immigration, with a significant decline in propensity to support the Democrat position as duration increases.

INSERT TABLE 6

Table 6 reports the results of Models 7 through 9, which assessed The Immigration Hypothesis, which posits the issue of immigration has a significant effect on the partisan identity of the Latino population. The ordinal logistic regression results for Model 7, which drew from the 2012 respondent pool, show that *Immigration Q1* has a coefficient of .885 and is significant at  $p > .01$ . The results also show that *Immigration Q2* has a coefficient of .641 and is significant at  $p > .01$ . With all the other factors held constant, the predicted probability of a respondent, who answered both immigration questions with the Democratic response, of being a strong Democrat is .38, with the probability of being a strong Democrat decreasing to .20 and .24 for answering one of the two questions in the Democratic fashion, and .12 probability to identify as a strong Democrat while not answering either question with the Democratic position. The disparity in probability decreases as the partisan identity trends towards independent, with .24 probability for those that answer both questions in Democratic fashion identifying as a not very strong Democrat, and .11 for identifying as a someone who leans Democrat. This trend then scales back up, but for the Republican side; the probability of respondents who answer both questions with the Republican response are likely to identify as a lean Republican .11, a not very strong Republican .14, and a strong Republican .20 of the time. For Model 7, the results illustrate that Latino respondent who support the Democratic issue positions on the issue of immigration are more likely to identify as a Democrat, and those that support the Republican issue positions are more likely to identify as Republican. Latino respondents who support only one of the Democrat or Republican positions show diminished results. While overall skewed towards identifying as Democrat, the issue position on immigration does affect partisan identification.

Model 8, drawing from the 2014 respondent pool, has a significant coefficient for *Immigration Q1* of .746, with  $p < .01$ , while *Immigration Q2* has a significant coefficient of .658, with  $p < .01$ . With all other factors held constant, the predicted probabilities, as in Model 7, show the same trend. The predicted probability of a respondent who answered both immigration

questions with the Democratic response of being a strong Democrat is .35, while the probability of being a strong Democrat decreasing to .20 and .21 for answering one of the two questions in the Democratic fashion, and .12 probability to identify as a strong Democrat while not answering either question Democratically. The disparity of probability decreases as the partisan identity trends towards independent. The pattern then reverses; if the respondent supports the Republican position on both questions, the likelihood of a respondent identifying as a Republican increase. Model 8 illustrates the issue stances on immigration by Latino respondents exhibit significant effects on their partisan identity, and that supporting Democratic stances on immigration lead to Latino respondents being more likely to identify as Democrat, and Republican stances leading to Latino respondents being more likely to identify as Republican, though with a slightly lower probability than identifying as a Democrat.

Model 9, which draws from the 2016 respondent pool, has a significant coefficient for Immigration Q1 of .717, with a  $p < .01$ , while Immigration Q2 has a significant coefficient of .878, with  $p < .01$ . The control variables, aside from education, are all significant. With all other factors held constant, the predicted probabilities elucidate the same pattern as models 7 and 8, finding that respondents who answered both questions with the Democratic position have a .38 probability to identify as strong Democrat, while those that answered one question with the Democrat position have a .23 and .20 probability of identifying as a strong Democrat, and .11 for those that answer both questions with the Republican position identifying as strong Democrat. The probability to identify as a Democrat decreases as the identity moves towards independent, and then trends towards Republican as the respondents answered the questions based on the Republican position. Models 7-9 support the Immigration Hypothesis and point to the issue of immigration affecting partisan identity. Specifically, the Latino respondents that chose to support both immigration questions either with the Democrat or Republican position exhibited significant probability of identifying as some variant of either Democrat or Republican. Respondents who

only supported one of the positions, either Democrat or Republican, exhibited mixed probabilities; while still more likely to identify as a Democrat than Republican in general, a reduced effect was exhibited of the issue of immigration on partisan identity. The control variables performed unevenly, with education, family income and assimilation showing uneven significance, while political knowledge and religious importance were consistently significant at the  $p < .01$  and  $p < .05$  levels.

#### INSERT TABLE 7

Table 7 reports the results for Models 10 through 14, which assessed the Vote Choice Hypothesis with logistic regression. The results for Models 10 and 11 illustrate the effects partisan identity, along with control variables, have on the 2008 president vote and the 2012 presidential vote. Model 10, assessing the effect on the 2008 Presidential Vote with respondents drawn from the 2012 pool, with a significant coefficient of 1.145 for partisan identity, shows a predicted probability of .94 of those that identify as strong Republicans voting for the Republican candidate in the 2008 election, .84 if identified as a not very strong Republican, .62 if the respondent identified as a lean Republican, .34 as an independent, .14 as a lean Democrat, .05 as a not so strong Democrat, and .02 as a strong Democrat. The likelihood of a Latino respondent voting for the Republican candidate in the 2008 presidential election is more likely if the respondent identifies as a Republican and decreases quickly if the respondent identifies as an Independent or Democrat. Model 11, which assesses the effect on the 2012 presidential vote with respondents from the 2012 pool, has a significant coefficient of 1.216 for partisan identity. The predicted probability for a Republican vote exhibits the same pattern as Model 10; strong Republicans have a .96 probability of voting Republican, not very strong Republicans with an .87 probability, lean Republicans with a .67 probability, .38 for independents, .15 for lean Democrats, .05 for not very strong Democrats, and .02 for strong Democrats. Consistent with Model 10, Model 11 illustrates a trend of partisan identity having a clear relationship with presidential vote



choice; the likelihood of a Latino respondent voting for the Republican candidate decreases if the respondent identifies as an Independent or Democrat.

Model 12, which assesses the effect of partisan identity on the 2012 presidential vote from the 2014 respondent pool, had a significant coefficient of 1.053 for partisan identity, and with all other factors held constant, showed a predicted probability much like the past models; strong Republicans have a .93 probability of voting for the Republican candidate, not very strong Republicans have an .82 probability, lean Republican with a .61 probability, independents with a .35 probability, lean Democrats with a .16 probability, not very strong Democrats with a .06 probability, and strong Democrats with a .03 probability. Model 12 illustrates the trend from past models; the likelihood for Latino respondents to vote for the Republican candidate in the 2012 presidential election decreases as the respondents as Independents or Democrats. Drawn from the 2016 respondent pool, Models 13 and 14 assess the impact of partisan identity on the 2012 Presidential Vote and 2016 Presidential vote, respectively. Both models have significant coefficients of 1.023 and .989. With all other factors held constant, a strong Republican has an .90 probability of voting for a Republican in the 2012 presidential vote, .76 probability for the not very strong Republicans, .53 probability for the respondents that lean Republican, .29 for the independents, .13 for respondents that lean Democrat, .05 for not very strong Democrats, and .02 for strong Democrats. For the 2016 presidential vote, a strong Republican had a .93 probability of voting for the Republican candidate, .84 for a not very strong Republican, .66 for those that lean Republican, .42 for independents, .21 for those that lean Democrat, .09 for not very strong Democrats, and .04 for strong Democrats. Models 13 and 14 strengthen the previous model's findings; the likelihood of Latino respondents voting for the Republican candidate is substantial while the respondents identify as Republican but decreases as the respondents identify as Independent or Democrat.

The results for Models 10 through 14 provide support for the Vote Choice Hypothesis; partisan identity has a strong relationship with vote choice. Five different instances of vote choice, drawn from three respondent pools, all point to a very strong effect. The control variables, included for all models, reported results consistent with past findings. Respondents that identify as Republican have a significantly higher probability of voting for the Republican candidate vote president than they would for voting for the Democratic candidate. Respondents who identify as Independent or Democrat offer low to very low probabilities of voting for the Republican candidate. Models 10-14 strictly assessed the impact of partisan identity on vote choice, without accounting for specific issues. What happens to this effect when the issue of immigration is involved?

INSERT TABLE 8

Table 8 illustrates the modified models, with Models 15-19 replicating Models 10-14, while including *Immigration Q1* and *Immigration Q2* to assess the difference in effect from the issue of immigration on the vote choices variables. With all other factors held constant, the stance of the respondents on immigration influence the predicted probabilities for respondents who identify as Republican or Democrat, of any degree. Model 15, which assesses the 2008 Presidential vote with the 2012 respondent pool, has a range of .89 to .96 for strong Republicans voting for the Republican candidate, depending on their support of each position on the issue of immigration. Recall, this probability for Model 10, which did not include immigration, had a predicted probability of .94. Not very strong Republican ranges from .74 to .89, while it was .84 in Model 10. Lean Republicans range from .49 to .73, compared to .62 in Model 10. Independents ranged from .24 to .48, with .34 in Model 10. Lean Democrat ranged from .09 - .23, not very strong Democrat ranged from .03 to .09, and strong Democrat ranged from .01 to .03, with Model 10 having the probabilities at .14, .05, and .02, respectively. Model 15 illustrates significant

variance for Latino respondents and the effect their stances on the issue of immigration have on their likelihood of voting for a Republican or Democratic candidate.

Model 16-19, which assessed the 2012 and 2016 presidential votes, show similar trends as Model 15. Model 16 shows ranges of probabilities of the 2012 Latino respondent pool voting for the Republican candidate in the 2012 presidential election, while including the respondents' stance on the issue of immigration; .89 - .98 for strong Republican, .72 to .91 for not very strong Republican, .45 to .85 for lean Republican, .21 to .64 for independents, .07 to .36 for lean Democrats, .03 to .15 for not very strong Democrats, and .01 to .05 for strong Democrats. Model 17 shows ranges of probabilities of the 2014 Latino respondent pool voting for the Republican candidate in the 2012 presidential election, while considering their stance on immigration; .82 to .96 for strong Republicans, .63 to .92 for not very strong Republicans, .38 to .81 for lean Republicans, .19 to .61 for independents, .08 to .36 for lean Democrats, .03 to .17 for not very strong Democrats, and .01 to .07 for strong Democrats. Model 18 shows ranges of probabilities of the 2016 Latino respondent pool voting for the Republican candidate in the 2012 presidential election, while considering their stance on immigration; .78 to .95 for strong Republicans, .57 to .88 for not very strong Republicans, .34 to .73 for lean Republicans, .16 to .51 for independents, .07 to .29 for lean Democrats, .03 to .13 for not very strong Democrats, and .01 to .06 for strong Democrats. Model 19 shows ranges of probabilities of the 2016 Latino respondent pool voting for the Republican candidate in the 2016 presidential election, while considering their stance on immigration; .80 to .98 for strong Republicans, .62 to .95 for not very strong Republicans, .40 to .87 for lean Republicans, .21 to .73 for independents, .10 to .53 for lean Democrats, .04 to .31 for not very strong Democrats, and .02 to .15 for strong Democrats.

According to the results of Models 15-19, the respondents' stance on the issue of immigration significantly affects the likelihood of Latino respondents voting for the Republican candidate (or the Democratic candidate). Significant variance is introduced into the results by

including the immigration variables into the models, and illustrate that partisan identity, while exhibiting significant effects on vote choice, can also be affected by salient issues, and in turn, vote choice. These results beg the question: is there a more direct way to test and isolate for effects from the issue of immigration on vote choice? In the previous models, the only information gleaned was the variance in the probability of a respondent voting for the Republican candidate and lacking specific effect data. To assess the effect, I ran structured equation models to more accurately assess the direct effect of the issue of immigration has on vote choice, and the indirect effect, through partisan identity, immigration has on vote choice.

INSERT FIGURE 2

Figures 2-6 display the results for the structured equation models ran to test for the direct and indirect effects the issues of immigration have on presidential vote choice from 2008-2016. Figure 2 reports the results for Model 20, while drawing from the 2012 respondent pool, and positing a direct effect of the issue of immigration on the 2008 presidential vote, and not just indirect effect through partisan identity. The first immigration question, Immigration Q1, has a direct effect on the 2008 presidential vote, as the coefficient is .034 and significant at  $p < .05$ . Immigration Q1 has a much stronger direct effect on partisan identity with a coefficient of 1.172, which is significant at  $p > .01$ . The second immigration question, Immigration Q2, has a direct effect on Presidential vote with a coefficient of .073 with significance at  $p > .01$ , while the direct effect on partisan identity is much greater with a coefficient of .832, and significance at  $p > .01$ . For Immigration Q1, the indirect effect on the 2008 president vote is significant, with a coefficient of .176, while Immigration Q2 shows a significant indirect effect with a .125 coefficient. The total determined effect on the 2008 presidential vote by Immigration Q1 is .209, which is significant, while the effect of Immigration Q2 on the 2008 president vote had a significant total effect of .197. Figure 2 shows that the Immigration Q1 and Q2 have a significant effect on partisan identity, and that through partisan identity, have a significant effect on

presidential vote choice for the 2008 election. Immigration Q1 and Q2 also exhibit significant direct effects on vote choice, however slightly smaller than the indirect effect. The issue of immigration has a significant total effect on the 2008 presidential vote.

#### INSERT FIGURE 3

Figure 3 reports the results for Model 21, and specifically the effect of the issue of immigration on the 2012 presidential vote for the respondents drawn from the 2012 pool. Immigration Q1 and Q2 have significant direct effects on partisan identity, with a coefficient of 1.289 and .789, respectively. A direct effect on the 2012 presidential vote is also apparent, with Immigration Q1 having a significant direct effect, with a coefficient of .122, while Immigration Q2 has a significant direct effect of .054. The indirect effect Immigration Q1 and Q2 have on the 2012 presidential vote is .191 and .117, respectively, with a total effect on 2012 Presidential vote choice of .313 for Immigration Q1, and .171 for Immigration Q2. The results point to a significant total effect, and that the issue of immigration had a significant direct effect on the 2012 presidential vote, though the effect is less than the direct effect on partisan identity.

#### INSERT FIGURE 4

Figure 4 reports the results for Model 22, which examined the effect of the issue of immigration on the 2012 presidential vote, drawn from the 2014 respondent pool. Immigration Q1 and Q2 have significant direct effects on partisan identity, with coefficients of 1.008 and .879, respectively. Direct effects on the 2012 presidential vote are also apparent; Immigration Q1 has a .126 direct effect on the 2012 presidential vote, while Immigration Q2 has a .065 direct effect. Indirect effects are also clear; Immigration questions one and two have significant coefficients of .141 and .123, respectively, on the 2012 presidential vote. The total effects by the immigration questions on the 2012 vote amount to .267 and .188, for immigration one and immigration two,

and provide support for the mediation analysis. Effect is visible through partisan identity, while direct effects on the vote are also apparent.

INSERT FIGURE 5

Figure 5 reports the results for Model 23, which assessed the impact of immigration issues on the 2012 presidential vote, drawn from the 2016 respondent pool. Immigration questions one and two have significant direct effect coefficients of .927 and 1.118 on partisan identity, respectively. Direct effects on the 2012 presidential vote are also apparent, with significant coefficients of .089 and .096. The first immigration question exhibits a significant indirect effect with a .123 coefficient for the 2012 presidential vote, while immigration question two has a significant .148 coefficient for the vote. The total effects of the immigration questions on the 2012 presidential vote were .212 and .244, respectively, and point to not only mediated effects through partisan identity, but also direct effects on the vote itself.

INSERT FIGURE 6

Figure 6 reports the result for Model 24, which assessed the impact of immigration issues on the 2016 presidential vote, drawn from the 2016 respondent pool. Immigration questions one and two have significant direct effect coefficients of 1.008 and 1.243 on partisan identity, respectively. Direct effects on the 2016 presidential vote are visible, with significant coefficients of .158 and .118. The immigration questions also impacted the presidential vote, but through partisan identity. The immigration questions had significant indirect effect coefficients of .134 and .165, respectively. The total effects for both questions illustrate not only mediated effects on the presidential vote, but also direct effect. The total effects for the first immigration question is .292, while the second immigration question has a total effect of .283. Granted, the effect of the issue of immigration on partisan identity is much larger than the effect of the issue of immigration on vote choice, the effect is still present.

In running the analysis, the goal was to test the three hypotheses highlighted in the paper, and to illustrate the effect that immigration as an issue has on partisan identity, and in turn, vote choice. The results point to assimilation and environmental effects, such as education, religion, income and income, affecting the respondents' viewpoint on immigration as an issue. Immigration as an issue has a significant effect on partisan identity, and partisan identity significantly influences vote choice. More nuanced, the results show that the issue of immigration has both an indirect effect on the presidential vote through partisan identity, and a direct effect on the presidential vote. Issue attitudes not only shape partisan identity, but also affect vote choice for the Latino population. The issue of immigration explicitly affects partisan identity and presidential vote choice. This has theoretical implications with the current research and points to future research on issue stances and their place in the relationship of partisan identity and vote choice. This work also provides an alternative Funnel Model, previously posited by the *America Voter*, and explicates that attitudes are shaped by the surroundings of individuals, and these attitudes, if salient, affect how the Latino population politically identifies, and that their partisan identification is “funneled” from their patterns of assimilation and socialization to partisan identification, and after, to vote choice.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

What impact does immigration as an issue have on Latino partisan identity, and in turn, vote choice? Salient issues, such as immigration, affect partisan identity, and in turn, affect vote choice according to the partisan direction of the Latino respondents. Partisan identity development, in general and regarding the Latino population, is reliant on group consciousness and importance applied to issues for the population. Vote choice, while partly driven by partisan identity, is also dependent on issues salient to the population and corresponding policy attitudes of parties on those issues. It is common for the Latino population to vote Democrat, with a caveat in place for the Cuban population penchant for voting Republican (Comas-Diaz 2001). With a fast-growing population, and with that a growing electorate, the importance of knowing what affects vote choice is imperative, and if the literature is correct about salient issue attitudes affecting vote choice, knowing how these issues affect vote choice is paramount.

The first major finding of this research is that the longer the duration the Latino respondent has been in the United States, the more likely the respondent is to support the Republican position on the issue of immigration. Illustrated another way, the shorter duration the Latino respondent has been in the United States, the more likely the respondent is to support the Democratic position on the issue of immigration. This finding is consistent with multiple works, where duration affects position attitudes (Dalton and Weldon 2007, Klofstad and Bishin 2013). This finding provides context for the proposition that recent immigrants need to accumulate



resources, immerse in culture, and gather experience within society to establish a partisan identity; as the duration of citizenship increases, the respondent is more likely to support the Republican position, and income remained a consistent significant variable (Akresh 2016, Portes 1993). The respondents were more likely to support the Democratic stance on immigration, but this effect diminished over time. The longer the duration of citizenship for a respondent, the more established within society they become, and the less connected the issue of immigration is. This finding posits that immigration as an issue evolves, just like partisan identity, as duration increases, and that this evolution leads to a greater probability of a Republican lean for Latino respondents.

The second major finding is that the issue of immigration is significantly correlated with partisan identity. The relationship between the Democratic and Republican issue stances on immigration compared to the partisan identity spectrum from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican supports previous literature, with issues stances correlating with party identification; people align themselves towards the political party that represent issue attitudes that coincide with issues that are salient with the population. Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) explicate that policy issue preferences influence partisan preferences and voter behavior; the findings support and extend this hypothesis; issue stances on immigration showed significant effect on Latino partisan identity, and not just vote choice. While accounting for contextual factors that also have been shown to influence partisan identity, such as gender (Sanbonmatsu 2013), income (Mahler 2014), education (Light and Togunde 2008), and religion (Huddy 2013), immigration issue stances still exhibited significant relationships, and may serve as indicators for partisan identity. Policy issue stances, according to this research, affect partisan identity.

The third major finding is that partisan identity significantly affects the Latino presidential vote. Intuitively, the finding is simple and often assumed, but the literature is very adamant that partisan identity is unstable when it comes to the relationship of partisan identity on

vote choice (Whitely 1988) and is more relative to contextual factors such as socialization and issues than partisan identity. In the models ran, I included control variables meant to account for such contextual factors, and the partisan identity and vote choice relationship is still significant. The finding may provide an alternative to the past “instability” of partisan identity, but another explanation could be that increased polarization has led to more obstinate partisan identity and political affiliation with political parties. The populace may be entrenched in their views, and thus their partisanship may not be as malleable as some have thought. I believe a better working knowledge is needed of the issues that influence partisan identity to sway any fringe voters if polarization is, in fact, increasing to a level where partisan identity is no longer unstable. This finding may also illustrate that Latino partisanship and the effect on vote choice is specifically different than past research on Anglo American partisanship, and that the development of Latino partisanship is inherently different (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003).

The final major finding is that issue stance on immigration exhibits a significant direct effect on presidential vote choice, and immigration is not affecting vote choice just through partisan identity. Some authors posit that the party that one chooses to identify with affects issue positions (Carsey and Layman 2006), while others posit that issue attitudes affect partisan identity (Alvarez and Bedolla). This finding supports the idea that a causal relationship between partisan identity and issue attitudes is present, and that a salient issue, such as immigration, can both influence partisan identity and vote choice. I believe this finding leads to a need to examine other factors that may influence this relationship. Carsey and Layman (2006) find that political knowledge has shown some effect when it comes to how people vote; those that were more knowledgeable voted based on issue attitudes, while those that were not as knowledgeable voted based on partisan identity. I controlled for political knowledge in the vote choice models, but I believe there could be valid concerns with the variable, as it may not fully measure comprehensive political knowledge, and represents an interesting path of future research. If

immigration as an issue is so salient that the effect is noticeable, this leads to more questions: is this relative to the issue importance of the election? I believe this finding furthers the discussion on salient issues and their relationship with partisan identity, and the implications of this effect increases the importance of the relationship with vote choice. Salient issue attitudes significantly influence partisan identity, at least for the Latino population drawn from this research, and are not merely a product of the party they identify with.

Implications of the findings are not only conceptual regarding the relationship of salient issues, partisan identity and vote choice, but also methodological in how we test these areas. Implications of this work could simply be to encourage investigation into different types of elections, different year sets, other segments of the population, and the issues that populations deem important. The findings are explicitly different than what was found in the *American Voter* (Campbell 1960), and thus provide, at the very least, another viewpoint in partisan identification development and vote choice. Immigration may be extremely salient for the newly emigrated Latino respondents; would immigration be as salient with another population, or with different year sets, and would immigration be as formative in partisan identity and influential with presidential vote choice? This line of thinking could also apply to other issues as well, especially cross cutting issues such as abortion or gun control. If these issues are deemed salient, how do these issues affect partisan identity, and in turn, vote choice? The use of a structured equation model to examine issue attitude effects on partisan identity and vote choice offers an alternative analysis of issue effects on voting, and in this vein future research is available. The results, initially, may be granular in just examining coefficients of a structured equation model, but the presence of issue significance belies spillover and importance of an issue, and this impacts theory. The literature on elections and issue importance is not vast when it comes to structured equation models and the utility of testing for issue effects on vote choice, and I believe SEMs offer a significant advantage in determining direct effect or mediation effect through another variable.

The limitations that I faced while conducting the research and analysis were mainly due to data availability. In the models ran, the lack of availability of Cuban descent information for all the data pools provides skepticism for the religious control variable, and the inclusion of a Cuban descent variable may have altered results; most results may have shifted slightly towards the Republican position, due to the natural lean of the Cuban population (Comas-Diaz 2001). I was only able to include a Cuban descent variable with the 2016 data pool, and I included the findings in the Appendix. I encountered additional issues with the postulation of the generation of the Latino respondents, and the recoding of the assimilation variable, included in the analysis, leaves room for future research to use a more refined measurement of generation of respondent.<sup>3</sup> The political knowledge control, as noted in the research design, is not as comprehensive or sophisticated as desired; Future research into issue position effects and political knowledge would ideally offer more sophisticated measures of political knowledge.

Future research can address issues of this topic that were outside of the scope of my work. Explorations into cross cutting issues that are salient with a population, how they affect partisan identity, and in turn, vote choice, would be valuable. Through structured equation modeling, future research could also identify salient issues' direct and indirect effects on vote choice. Salient issues and their impact are imperative in understanding how to appeal to a population and offer significant policy implications for political actors. Needed is more investigation into the relationship of the issue of immigration and partisan identity and their effect on vote choice; when is opinion formation occurring? The formation of issue attitudes and when they are created is essential in understanding if an issue attitude influences partisan identity, or if partisan identity shapes those issue attitudes, even if issue attitudes do affect partisan identity development as well, as I showed in this analysis. Noise within this topic exists, and future research may dig deeper. With these limitations in mind, there are still significant research

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<sup>3</sup> Recoding information can be found in the Appendix.

avenues to explore in the future. With the use of structured equation models to test direct and indirect effects and the finding that salient issues such as immigration significantly affect Latino partisan identity and vote choice, these avenues of research should only be broader and easier to navigate, and I believe the findings enhance these abilities to conduct future works.

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## APPENDICES

The 2012 survey was conducted by 48 teams, with a total of 54,535 respondents, of which 4135 identified themselves as Hispanic or Latino. Each research group purchased a 1,000-person national sample survey, which was conducted by YouGov. Each survey consisted of 120 questions, where half of these questions went to the CCES. The interviews for the 2012 survey were conducted in two waves. The pre-election wave was conducted during October 2012, while the post-election wave was conducted the two weeks following election day (November 2012). Each research group had 60 questions go to the CCES, and the dataset itself consists of the questions common to all the team surveys and has a sample size consistent to the size of all team modules combined.

The 2014 survey was conducted by 48 teams, which led to 56,200 respondents, of which 3895 identified themselves as Hispanic or Latino. Each research group purchased a 1,000 (some groups purchased more) national sample survey, and conducted a survey in October and November of 2014, by YouGov/Polimetrix. Each survey consisted of 120 questions, where half of these questions went to the CCES. The interviews for the 2014 survey were taken in two different waves: the pre-election survey took place in October 2014, while the post-election wave was conducted two weeks follow election day in November. Each research group had 60 questions go to the CCES, and the dataset itself consists of the questions common to all the team surveys and has a sample size consistent to the size of all team modules combined.

The 2016 CCES dataset was produced by 60 different teams, with a total of 64,600

respondents, of which 15,685 identified themselves as Hispanic or Latino. Each research group purchased a 1,000-person national sample survey, which was conducted by YouGov. For each survey, out of a total of 120 questions, half of the questionnaire was devoted to the CCES, and the dataset represents the most common questions asked by each research team, matching the total sample size. All cases were selected through YouGov, who constructed random matched samples. The interviews occurred in two waves, with the pre-election wave occurring from September 28 to November 7, and the post-election waves occurring November 9 to December 14.

The only coding information that was not specifically laid out in the methods section of the work is the political knowledge control variable. The questions asked of the respondents were as follows:

*“Which party has a majority of seats in the House of Representatives?”*

*1: Republicans, 2: Democrats, 3: Neither, 4: Not Sure, 8: Skipped, 0: Not Asked*

*“Which party has a majority of seats in the Senate?”*

*1: Republicans, 2: Democrats, 3: Neither, 4: Not Sure, 8: Skipped, 0: Not Asked*

For respondents who answered both questions correct, they were coded as *2: Most knowledge*, respondents who answered one question correct were coded as *1: Some knowledge*, and respondents who answer neither question correct were coded as *0: Limited knowledge*.


The following tables are the models ran for the 2016 data pool with the Cuban Descent control variable included, as the variable was only available for the 2016 pool. Following the 2016 Data Pool Cuban Descent models, Predicted Probability figures for all the models are included for reference.

Table 1. Immigration Question Summary Statistics		
Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Immigration Question 1 - 2012 Pool	N: 4,135	
<i>Democrat</i>	2,789	67%
<i>Republican</i>	1,346	33%
Immigration Question 2 - 2012 Pool	N: 4,135	
<i>Democrat</i>	2,612	63%
<i>Republican</i>	1,523	37%
Immigration Question 1 - 2014 Pool	N: 3895	
<i>Democrat</i>	2,670	69%
<i>Republican</i>	1,225	31%
Immigration Question 2 - 2014 Pool	N: 3895	
<i>Democrat</i>	2,370	61%
<i>Republican</i>	1,525	39%
Immigration Question 1 - 2016 Pool	N: 5,238	
<i>Democrat</i>	3,661	70%
<i>Republican</i>	1,577	30%
Immigration Question 2 - 2016 Pool	N: 5,238	
<i>Democrat</i>	3,453	66%
<i>Republican</i>	1,785	34%
<i>Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study</i>		

Table 2. Latino Partisan Identity Summary Statistics			
Partisan Identity	2012 Pool	2014 Pool	2016 Pool
Strong Democrat	1,133	931	1,444
Not very strong Democrat	831	818	1,093
Lean Democrat	433	400	504
Independent	498	598	841
Lean Republican	255	209	273
Not very strong Republican	294	294	412
Strong Republican	379	302	428
<i>N: 3,823 (2012); 3,552 (2014); 4,995 (2016); Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study</i>			



Table 3. Latino Vote Choice Summary Statistics		
Variables	Frequency	Percentage
2008 Presidential Vote - 2012 Respondents		
<i>Democrat</i>	1,770	70.24%
<i>Republican</i>	750	29.76%
2012 Presidential Vote - 2012 Respondents		
<i>Democrat</i>	1,266	70.06%
<i>Republican</i>	541	29.94%
2012 Presidential Vote - 2014 Respondents		
<i>Democrat</i>	1,587	71.71%
<i>Republican</i>	626	28.29%
2012 Presidential Vote - 2016 Respondents		
<i>Democrat</i>	2,335	74.22%
<i>Republican</i>	811	25.78%
2016 Presidential Vote - 2016 Respondents		
<i>Democrat</i>	1,827	69.13%
<i>Republican</i>	816	30.87%
<i>Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study</i>		



**Table 4. Hypotheses Overview**

Assimilation Hypothesis	The more recent the Latino respondent emigrated, the more likely they are to adopt the Democrat position on the issue of immigration
Immigration Hypothesis	The issue of immigration has a significant effect on the partisan identity of the Latino respondents
Vote Choice Hypothesis	Latino partisan identity has a significant effect on presidential vote choice
Mediation Hypothesis	The issue of immigration has a significant direct effect on presidential vote choice, while also having a significant indirect effect on vote choice, through partisan identity

Table 5. Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for Citizenship on Immigration Issues

Variables	Model 1 (ImmQ1)	Model 2 (ImmQ2)	Model 3 (ImmQ1)	Model 4 (ImmQ2)	Model 5 (ImmQ1)	Model 6 (ImmQ2)
Assimilation	.185 (.028)***	.171 (.028)***	.215 (.029)***	.143 (.028)***	.113 (.025)***	.153 (.025)***
Religious Importance	-.095 (.033)***	-.172 (.033)***	-.124 (.033)***	-.242 (.032)***	-.2 (.029)***	-.266 (.028)***
Education	.141 (.069)**	.180 (.067)***	.016 (.07)	.215 (.067)***	.01 (.061)	.207 (.06)***
Family Income	.003 (.001)***	.003 (.001)**	.002 (.001)	0 (.001)	.001 (.001)	0 (.001)
Gender	-.235 (.068)***	-.396 (.066)***	-.225 (.07)***	-.386 (.067)***	-.380 (.062)***	-.461 (.06)***
N	4,106	4,106	3,878	3,878	5,205	5,205
LR Chi2	73.22	107.18	76.92	114.62	98.03	177.29
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
Log likelihood	-2553.6873	-2651.4306	-2378.8103	-2539.455	-3132.6474	-3251.4482

Source: 2012 CCES (Models 1 and 2), 2014 CCES (Models 3 and 4), 2016 CCES (Models 5 and 6); (p < .10 \*, p < .05 \*\*, p < .01 \*\*\*); Model 1 DV: Immigration Question 1, coded as Democrat 1, Conservative 2; Model 2 DV: Immigration Question 2, coded as Democrat 1, Conservative 2; Assimilation as 0: Immigrant Non-Citizen, 1: Immigrant Citizen, 2: 1st Generation, 3: 2nd Generation, 4: 3rd Generation; Religious Importance as 1: Very important, 2: Somewhat important, 3: Not too important, 4: Not at all important; Education as 1: Degree, 0: No degree; Family Income as 1: Less than 10k, 2: 10k-19,999, 3: 20k-29,999, 4: 30k-39,999, 5: 40k-49,999, 6: 50k-59,999, 7: 60k-69,999, 8: 70k-79,999, 9: 80k-99,999, 10: 100k-119,999, 11: 120k-149,999, 12: 150k-199,999, 13: 200k-249,999, 14: 250k-349,999, 15: 350k-499,999; Gender as 1: male, 2: female;

Variable	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Immigration Question One	.885 (.068)***	.746 (.068)***	.717 (.058)***
Immigration Question Two	.641 (.065)***	.658 (.064)***	.878 (.057)***
Family Income	.003 (.001)***	.000 (.001)	.003 (.001)***
Religious Importance	-.213 (.028)***	-.187 (.028)***	-.137 (.024)***
Education	.080 (.059)***	-.167 (.060)***	.030 (.051)
Gender	-.304 (.059)***	-.277 (.061)***	-.196 (.052)***
Assimilation	-.020 (.025)	-.047 (.025)*	.035 (.021)*
N	3796	3538	4964
LR Chi2	517.24	388.75	611.76
Prob > chi2	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.04	0.03	0.03
Log Likelihood	-6622.661	-6235.811	-8620.886


Source = 2012 CCES (Model 7), 2014 CCES (Model 8), 2016 CCES (Model 9). DV: Partisan Identity as 1: Strong Democrat, 2: Not as strong Democrat, 3: lean Democrat, 4: Independent, 5: lean Republican, 6: Not as strong Republican, 7: Strong Republican; (p < .01\*\*\*, p < .05\*\*, p < .10\*)



Variables	Model 10 (PresVote2008)	Model 11 (PresVote2012)	Model 12 (PresVote2012)	Model 13 (PresVote2012)	Model 14 (PresVote2016)
Partisan Identity	1.145 (.045)***	1.216 (.057)***	1.053 (.044)***	1.023 (.036)***	.989 (.037)***
Family Income	.004 (.003)	.014 (.004)***	.011 (.003)***	.006 (.003)**	.003 (.003)
Religious Importance	-.248 (.076)***	-.375 (.095)***	-.250 (.071)***	-.258 (.058)***	-.280 (.058)***
Education	-.009 (.149)	-.253 (.189)	-.144 (.150)	.061 (.126)	-.057 (.129)
Assimilation	.092 (.067)	-.057 (.084)	.045 (.067)	.161 (.057)***	.109 (.056)**
Gender	.38 (.153)**	-.199 (.189)	.168 (.154)	-.285 (.127)**	-.597 (.131)***
Political Knowledge	.35 (.088)***	.350 (.110)***	.386 (.091)***	.253 (.076)***	.041 (.076)
Constant	-6.086 (.473)***	-4.515 (.544)***	-5.181 (.457)***	-4.980 (.383)***	-3.198 (.361)***
N	2,406	1,725	2,150	3,099	2,594
LR Chi2	1657.65	1277.17	1314.79	1776.04	1522.81
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.57	0.61	0.51	0.50	0.48
Log likelihood	-635.96864	-415.57918	-628.62318	-886.06108	-841.21477



Source: Models 10 and 11 (2012 CCES), Model 12 (2014 CCES), Models 13-14 (2016 CCES); (p < .10 \*, p < .05 \*\*, p < .01 \*\*\*); The dependent variable for Model 10 (President Vote Choice for 2008), Model 11 (President Vote Choice 2012), Model 12 (President Vote Choice 2012), Model 13 (President Vote Choice 2012), and Model 14 (President Vote Choice 2016); Political Knowledge is coded as 0: Limited knowledge, 1: Some knowledge, 2: Knowledgeable;



Variables	Model 15 (PresVote2008)	Model 16 (PresVote2012)	Model 17 (PresVote2012)	Model 18 (PresVote2012)	Model 19 (PresVote2016)
Partisan Identity	1.100 (.046)***	1.149 (.058)***	1.006 (.045)***	.956 (.037)***	.911 (.038)***
Immigration Question One	.293 (.158)*	1.307 (.202)***	1.221 (.159)***	.780 (.131)***	1.337 (.139)***
Immigration Question Two	.778 (.155)***	.612 (.198)***	.694 (.158)***	.887 (.130)***	1.008 (.136)***
Family Income	.003 (.003)	.013 (.004)***	.009 (.003)***	.005 (.003)**	.001 (.003)
Religious Importance	-.226 (.078)***	-.416 (.102)***	-.252 (.076)***	-.223 (.061)***	-.231 (.062)***
Education	-.051 (.151)	-.298 (.197)	-.088 (.156)	.051 (.131)	-.045 (.137)
Assimilation	.056 (.068)	-.119 (.088)	-.012 (.070)	.120 (.059)**	.060 (.060)
Gender	.45 (.156)***	-.14 (.198)	.294 (.161)*	-.155 (.132)	-.441 (.139)***
Political Knowledge	.319 (.089)***	.323 (.116)**	.316 (.094)***	.176 (.078)**	-.011 (.080)
Constant	-7.420 (.544)***	-6.741 (.654)***	-7.706 (.571)***	-7.145 (.464)***	-6.335 (.468)***
N	2,406	1,725	2,150	3,099	2,594
LR Chi2	1693.31	1345.74	1412.74	1876.15	1702.51
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.58	0.64	0.55	0.53	0.53
Log likelihood	-618.13751	-381.29622	-579.64729	-836.00626	-751.36579

Source: Models 15 and 16 (2012 CCES), Model 17 (2014 CCES), Models 18 and 19 (2016 CCES); (\* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01); The dependent variable for Model 15 (PresVote2008), Model 16-18 (PresVote2012), Model 19 (PresVote2016); Political Knowledge is coded as 0: Limited knowledge, 1: Some knowledge, 2: Knowledgeable;












### 2014 Immigration Hypothesis: Predicted Probability of Partisan Identification







## 2016 Immigration Hypothesis: Predicted Probability of Partisan Identification




Vote Choice Hypothesis: Predicted Probability for Partisan Identity to Vote Choice, with Immigration Stance Effects




Vote Choice Hypothesis: Predicted Probability for Partisan Identity to Vote Choice, with Immigration Stance Effects



Vote Choice Hypothesis: Predicted Probability for Partisan Identity to Vote Choice, with Immigration Stance Effects



Vote Choice Hypothesis: Predicted Probability for Partisan Identity to Vote Choice, with Immigration Stance Effects



Appendix Table 1. Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for Citizenship on Immigration Issue - With Cuban Descent Control		
Variables	Model 1 (ImmQ1)	Model 2 (ImmQ2)
Assimilation	.124 (.026)***	.174 (.025)***
Religious Importance	-.205 (.029)***	-.275 (.028)***
Education	.090 (.062)	.190 (.060)***
Family Income	.001 (.001)	-.0003 (.001)
Gender	-.376 (.062)***	-.456 (.060)***
Cuban Descent	.312 (.123)**	.598 (.119)***
N	5,205	5,205
LR Chi2	104.56	202.03
Prob > chi2	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.016	0.03
Log likelihood	-3,129	-3,239
<p><i>Source: ; Model 1 DV: Immigration Question 1, coded as Democrat 1, Conservative 2; Model 2 DV: Immigration Question 2, coded as Democrat 1, Conservative 2; Citizenship/Generation as 0: Immigrant Non-Citizen, 1: Immigrant Citizen, 2: 1st Generation, 3: 2nd Generation, 4: 3rd Generation; Religious Importance as 1: Very important, 2: Somewhat important, 3: Not too important, 4: Not at all important; Education as 1: Degree, 0: No degree; Family Income as 1: Less than 10k, 2: 10k-19,999, 3: 20k-29,999, 4: 30k-39,999, 5: 40k-49,999, 6: 50k-59,999, 7: 60k-69,999, 8: 70k-79,999, 9: 80k-99,999, 10: 100k-119,999, 11: 120k-149,999, 12: 150k-199,999, 13: 200k-249,999, 14: 250k-349,999, 15: 350k-499,999; Gender as 1: male, 2: female; 2016 CCES; (<math>p &lt; .10</math> *, <math>p &lt; .05</math> **, <math>p &lt; .01</math> ***);</i></p>		

Appendix Table 2. Effects of Immigration on Partisan Identity	
Variable	2016 w/ Cuban Descent
Immigration Question One	.708 (.058)***
Immigration Question Two	.860 (.057)***
Family Income	.003 (.001)***
Religious Importance	-.149 (.024)***
Education	.008 (.051)
Gender	-.193 (.052)***
Assimilation	.057 (.021)***
Cuban Descent	.749 (.106)***
N	4964.000
LR Chi2	660.880
Prob > chi2	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.037
Log Likelihood	-8596.328
<p><i>Source = 2012 CCES (Model 7), 2014 CCES (Model 8), 2016 CCES (Model 9).            DV: Partisan Identity as 1: Strong Democrat, 2: Not as strong Democrat, 3: lean Democrat, 4: Independent, 5: lean Republican, 6: Not as strong Republican, 7: Strong Republican; (p &lt; .01***, p &lt; .05**, p &lt; .10*)</i></p>	

Appendix Table 3. Logistic Regression Results for Presidential Vote Choice

Variables	President Vote 2012	President Vote 2016
Partisan Identity	1.016 (.036)***	.985 (.037)***
Family Income	.006 (.003)**	.002 (.003)
Religious Importance	-.266 (.058)***	-.284 (.058)***
Education	.046 (.127)	-.067 (.129)
Assimilation	.190 (.059)***	.125 (.058)**
Gender	-.287 (.128)**	-.596 (.131)***
Political Knowledge	.246 (.076)***	.035 (.076)
Cuban Descent	.432 (.226)*	.307 (.243)
Constant	-5.053 (.386)***	-3.245 (.363)***
N	3,099	2,594
LR Chi2	1779.68	1524.4
Prob > chi2	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.50	0.4756
Log likelihood	-884.23867	-840.42006

*Source: 2016 CCES; (p < .10 \*, p < .05 \*\*, p < .01 \*\*\*); The dependent variable for Model 10 (President Vote Choice for 2008), Model 11 (President Vote Choice 2012), Model 12 (President Vote Choice 2012), Model 13 (President Vote Choice 2012), and Model 14 (President Vote Choice 2016); Political Knowledge is coded as 0: Limited knowledge, 1: Some knowledge, 2: Knowledgeable;*

Appendix Table 4. Logistic Regression Results for Presidential Vote Choice with Immigration Questions

Variables	President Vote 2012	President Vote 2016
Partisan Identity	.950 (.037)***	.907 (.038)***
Immigration Question One	.782 (.132)***	1.331 (.139)***
Immigration Question Two	.890 (.130)***	1.015 (.136)***
Family Income	.005 (.003)*	.001 (.003)
Religious Importance	-.230 (.061)***	-.236 (.062)***
Education	.037 (.131)	-.052 (.137)
Assimilation	.146 (.061)**	.076 (.061)
Gender	-.157 (.132)	-.441 (.139)***
Political Knowledge	.168 (.078)**	-.017 (.080)
Cuban Descent	.391 (.233)*	.295 (.259)
Constant	-7.202	-6.379 (.471)***
N	3,099	2,594
LR Chi2	1878.95	1703.8
Prob > chi2	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.53	0.53
Log likelihood	-834.60397	-750.71868

Source: 2016 CCES; ( $p < .10$  \*,  $p < .05$  \*\*,  $p < .01$  \*\*\*); The dependent variable for Model 10 (President Vote Choice for 2008), Model 11 (President Vote Choice 2012), Model 12 (President Vote Choice 2012), Model 13 (President Vote Choice 2012), and Model 14 (President Vote Choice 2016); Political Knowledge is coded as 0: Limited knowledge, 1: Some knowledge, 2: Knowledgeable;

VITA

Blake Whitney

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: IMMIGRATION: THE SHAPING OF PARTISAN IDENTITY AND  
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