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FRANCO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 1898-1907

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FRANCO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 1898-1907

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PREFACE

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine all aspects of the relations between France and the United States from the Spanish-American War until the second Hague Conference. During these years there was a general improvement in relations, with the greatest change taking place around the turn of the century. There were many reasons for this development: they include the efforts of important individuals, economic matters, cultural traditions, public opinion, imperial ambitions and historical circumstances. It is impossible to measure the exact relationship of these variables, but the most important consideration seems to revolve around the fact that neither nation presented any real threat to the vital interests or security of the other.

From my point of view, the material in this study is worthwhile for at least three reasons. In the first place, while there exists a vast literature on various phases of the history of Franco-American relations, at this time there is no substantial work devoted to the years between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. Secondly, the relationship of the two countries has been crucially important throughout the twentieth century, and it remains as significant today as ever

before in the past. Of course, knowledge of Franco-American relations of seventy years ago does not alone provide a basis for understanding the situation of today, but it does provide a perspective that is helpful. Thirdly, from a study of the bilateral relations of the two powers there is a great deal that can be learned about the international situation at a very important time. Although Franco-American relations did not constitute one of the major questions of international diplomacy, in many ways they influenced and reflected some important developments of the larger picture.

In the research for the dissertation I have used a wide variety of original sources. A glance at the bibliography will reveal that I have not been able to use the archives of the Quai d'Orsay. On several matters, especially the Moroccan crisis, the published volumes of the Documents diplomatiques français have been very helpful. For the subject of the reaction of the French Government to the Spanish-American War, Ernest R. May's Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power quotes a number of important documents from the French archives. Also I have made extensive use of Le Temps, a newspaper which almost always contained the government's position on foreign affairs.

Many librarians, archivists and others have helped me in different ways. I would like to express my appreciation especially to Dr. Russell Buhite, who initially stimulated my interest in American diplomatic history and who directed

the dissertation; to the history department of the University of Oklahoma, for providing a research grant; and to my wife, who supported me for a year so that I could devote my energies to research and writing.

FRANCO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 1898-1907

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the late nineteenth century there was a recognition in both France and the United States that the diplomatic relations between the two countries would be increasingly important in the years ahead. When in 1897 President William McKinley had to choose the first Ambassador to go to Paris, he was anxious to select a man with both talent and prestige. McKinley decided upon General Horace Porter, a former aide-de-camp to General Grant during the Civil War. Porter was a prominent railroad executive, and he was fluent in the use of the French language. In presenting Porter with his appointment, McKinley told him that the international situation was rapidly changing and that it would be necessary for the American Ambassador in France to demonstrate "tact, distinction and force of character."¹ But McKinley added: "I

¹Elsie Porter Meade and Henry Pearson, An American Soldier: Horace Porter, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1927), p. 170. This work by Porter's daughter is not especially scholarly, but it records many personal incidents, and it contains many unpublished diplomatic despatches.

doubt very much whether you will have much to do in Paris because our relations are very friendly and seem to be growing in quite fertile soil."² At about the same time the French Government also had to find a suitable diplomat to go to Washington as the first French Ambassador in the United States. In January, 1898, it was decided that M. Jules Cambon was the wisest choice. Cambon was a veteran diplomat, having served as the head of the French delegation in Morocco and as the Governor-General of Algeria. When he talked to the French Foreign Minister, M. Gabriel Hanotaux, about the assignment, Cambon expressed the desire to be nearer Paris, and he protested that he did not speak English. Hanotaux insisted that Cambon go to Washington, and he said: "Take M. Thiébaud with you; he speaks English perfectly."³

By 1898 Franco-American relations already had a long and varied history. Gabriel Hanotaux, who was a capable historian despite his busy public career, wrote that geographical circumstances had made it inevitable that the two nations would have a special importance for each other. Hanotaux's argument was that the busy harbors of Bordeaux, Nantes, Brest and Le Havre face the American continent and are America's shortest routes to the European mainland.⁴

²Recorded in the New York Herald, July 30, 1905.

³Quoted in Geneviève Tabouis, The Life of Jules Cambon, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), p. 82.

⁴Gabriel Hanotaux, La France vivante: en Amérique du Nord, (Paris: Librairie Hachette et cie, 1913), p. 139.

During the American Revolution, France had come to the aid of the thirteen colonies in the attempt to weaken Great Britain. Ever since, the memory of the alliance of 1778 has had great sentimental value in France and the United States. In both nations it has long been a cliché to say that France was the first ally of the United States, and this general idea has been restated time and time again at diplomatic receptions. Yet the relations between the two countries were far from friendly during much of the nineteenth century.⁵ There was a major diplomatic crisis when Napoleon III attempted to establish a French sphere of influence in Mexico at the time of the Civil War. The House of Representatives adopted a resolution against the venture in 1864, and Secretary of State William Seward warned France that the congressional action represented the sentiment of the entire American people.⁶ As a result of Napoleon's blunder, during the war of 1870-1871 the majority of Americans sympathized with Germany and believed that France was the aggressor.⁷

⁵This is the thesis in Henry Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830-1871, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959). Also see Clara Schieber, The Transformation of American Sentiment Toward Germany, 1870-1914, (Boston: Cornhill Pub. Co., 1923), p. viii.

⁶Count Egon Caesar Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico, trans. by Catherine Philips, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938), Vol. I, pp. 410-1.

⁷Schieber, Transformation, pp. 36-7.

Following the Franco-German War, many influential Frenchmen realized the future importance of the United States. For this reason they were anxious to do everything possible to improve their image in the country. This, of course, was the motivation for the presentation of the Statue of Liberty in 1884. This symbolic action probably was of little importance, but only five years later there was a dangerous controversy between Germany and the United States as a result of conflicting ambitions in the Samoan Islands. The American press suddenly became anti-German, and the American public began to look more favorably upon the French position in the world.⁸ By 1898 there had not been a complete diplomatic revolution, but American-French relations were much more amiable than they had been during the days of the Second Empire.

Any examination of world diplomacy at the turn of the century must emphasize European imperialism. The high point of the competition for territory and influence came during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century. Professor William Langer, who has studied the subject in some detail, concludes that during this score of years "it was taken for granted that the world was marked out by providence for exploitation by the European white man and that the principle of every man

⁸Ibid., p. 40.

for himself and the Devil take the hindmost was the natural law."⁹ France had a long tradition of imperialism, and her colonial empire was the second largest in the world. The United States was one of the last of the powers to enter the colonial race, but after the Spanish-American War, she too exerted a world influence and controlled a large empire. It is important to note that imperialism, in its diverse forms, was an integral part of the foreign policies of both France and the United States. More than perhaps anything else, this fact had a profound impact on the diplomatic relations of the two countries whenever they came in contact.

Just after World War I historian Louis Madelin wrote: "Our race is expansive."¹⁰ At the turn of the century this was a common assumption among Frenchmen, and with some reason.¹¹ After the Napoleonic wars France had been left without any external empire. But in the 1830's Louis-Philippe began the new French empire when he conquered Algeria. Under the leadership of Napoleon III France took possession of

⁹William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 797, 67, 787-8.

¹⁰Louis Madelin, L'expansion française de la Syrie au Rhin, (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1918), p. 5. A good summary of French colonialism is in Charles Seignobos, L'évolution de la 3^e République, 1875-1915, (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1921), pp. 326 ff.

¹¹President Charles de Gaulle, born in 1890, writes in his memoirs that "France cannot be France without greatness." Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de guerre: l'appel, 1940-1942, (Paris: Plon, 1954), pp. 1-2. Mémoires de guerre: le salut, 1944-1946, (Montreal: Le Cercle du Livre de France, 1960), pp. 750 ff.

Cochin China, and following the fiasco of the Franco-Prussian War, France was able to maintain control over her colonies. Books, especially Paul Leroy-Beaulieu's De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes and Paul Gaffarel's Les colonies françaises, were widely read and stimulated interest in colonization.¹² France's most dynamic expansion took place under the leadership of M. Jules Ferry, who was premier during the years 1880-1881 and 1883-1885. Ferry was willing to accept the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and he co-operated with Bismarck in order to secure France's territorial aggrandizement. Under his premiership the French occupied Tunis, entered Tonkin and Madagascar, and penetrated the regions of Niger and the Congo. Despite much opposition, the consolidation and enlargement of the French Empire continued until the first World War. In 1908 Archibald Cary Coolidge, a noted Harvard historian, observed that "France is a world power, with a territory and a population larger than those of the Union, a great army and navy, and extraordinary wealth, and, in spite of the assertions of hostile critics, her natural genius seems far from exhausted."¹³

The story of American imperialism was quite different from that of France. Before the Civil War the United States

¹²Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes, (Paris: Guillaumin et cie., 1874). Paul Gaffarel, Les colonies françaises, (Paris: G. Baillière, 1880).

¹³Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908), p. 195.

had been expansive, but territorial growth had been in the direction of the relatively unsettled areas of the western American continent. There had been great interest in Asian trade, but with few exceptions, there had been almost no interest in the establishment of colonies. In 1867 The United States purchased Alaska from Russia and took possession of the uninhabited Midway Islands. Secretary of State William Seward and a few other expansionists urged that the Hawaiian Islands should also be annexed, but Congress did not sympathize with the proposal.¹⁴ It was during the Samoan controversy of the late 1880's that the American Government first competed with the European powers for foreign colonies, and at the Berlin Conference of 1889 the United States accepted a tripartite protectorate of the islands. During the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895 the Department of State, with the approval of President Grover Cleveland, directly challenged European ambitions in South America, and Secretary of State Richard Olney warned the British Government that America's "infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers."¹⁵ The French Government understood perfectly

¹⁴See Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China, Japan and Korea in the 19th Century, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), pp. 416, 347-50, 454-59.

¹⁵Richard Olney to Thomas Bayard, July 20, 1895, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), p. 558. Henceforth this source is to be cited as FR.

that the American Republic was rapidly becoming a major force in world politics, and at the Quai d'Orsay there was little satisfaction with this new reality. But if French leaders were suspicious of American imperialism, they had few fears that it would be a dangerous threat to the vital interests of France.

America's phenomenal growth after the Civil War attracted a great deal of attention in France. Especially there was much interest in America's economic expansion. M. Emile Levasseur, a distinguished economist at the Collège de France in Paris, devoted a major part of his time to the study of this subject. In the 1890's Levasseur wrote L'agriculture aux Etats-Unis and L'ouvrier américain.¹⁶ Levasseur was impressed with what he saw. Although he believed that the United States had a comparative advantage over Europe because of her greater natural resources, he was also convinced that American ingenuity was partly responsible for the amazing economic expansion. He wrote: "The genius of enterprise, which manifests itself in the multiplicity of inventions, and in the daring with which the captains of industry undertake new ventures and capital supports them, is undeniable."¹⁷ Other French economists

¹⁶Emile Levasseur, L'agriculture aux Etats-Unis, (Paris: Secrétariat de la société d'économie sociale, 1894). L'ouvrier américain, (Paris: L. Larose, 1898).

¹⁷Quoted in S. N. D. North, "Levasseur's American Workingman," Political Science Quarterly, XIII (June, 1898), pp. 321-3.

were convinced that American economic competition posed a major threat to Europe. Paul de Rousiers warned in an article in La Revue de Paris that American commerce was "becoming more and more menacing for the economy of the old world."¹⁸ Similar fears were expressed in Paul Leroy-Beaulieu's Les Etats-Unis au XX^e siècle.¹⁹ Many Frenchmen hoped that France might be able to learn from the American experience. Auguste Carlier and Henri Gaullieur were two political scientists who argued that their countrymen should imitate some of the techniques of American industry and commerce.²⁰

The United States has always been a subject of fascination for French novelists and journalists, and this was especially true in the second half of the nineteenth century.²¹ M. Paul Bourget was a distinguished novelist who saturated his works with material relating to the United States, and

¹⁸Paul de Rousiers, "La marine marchande aux Etats-Unis," La Revue de Paris, VI (November 1, 1901), p. 146.

¹⁹Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Etats-Unis au XX^e siècle, (Paris: A. Colin, 1909).

²⁰Auguste Carlier, La République américaine: Etats-Unis, 4 vols., (Paris: Guillaumin et cie, 1890). Henri Gaullieur, Etudes américaines, (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et cie, 1891).

²¹For an annotated list of travel accounts see Frank Monaghan, French Travelers in the United States, 1765-1932, (New York: Antiquarian Press Ltd., 1961). The best study of the reception of American literature in France for the period is Cyrille Arnavon, Les lettres américaines devant la critique française, 1887-1917, (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1915).

his views were typical of many Frenchmen of his day. Bourget presented types in his novels, and in Une idylle tragique the American type was a self-made millionaire. In the work one Frenchman exclaimed: "The Americans and I can not understand each other. The excessive energy of those people fatigues me."²² In 1895 Bourget visited the United States for nine months, and he wrote of his impressions of the trip in Outre-Mer. Bourget was ambivalent in his attitude toward American culture. He admired the system of political democracy, and he wrote that in the United States he was able to "truly breathe the air of liberty at every minute."²³ But he was astonished by the concern for time and efficiency in the country, and he feared that the human spirit was crushed by so much material wealth. In his conclusion Bourget wrote that the dominant American traits were the following:

Her incoherence and her haste; the brutality of the streets in her large cities; the excess of modern life accompanied by a lack of equilibrium and taste; the artificial tension of her culture which gives America's women, like her flowers, the haste of the green house; her abundant energy which creates ferocious competition between business men; the corruption

²²Paul Bourget, Une idylle tragique, (Paris: Alphonse Lemerre, 1896), Vol. I, p. 283. An American woman is described as "an energetic and self-assured person who is accustomed from childhood to govern herself and who has no concern for social convention." Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²³Paul Bourget, Outre-Mer: notes sur l'Amérique, (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1895), Vol. II, pp. 320, 311.

of her police and her politicians; her absence of relaxation and time-consuming pleasures.²⁴

American novelist, Mark Twain, believed that Outre-Mer was a misrepresentation of American society. In his criticism of the book Twain wrote: "I wish M. Bourget had read more of our novels before he came. It is the only way to thoroughly understand a people. When I found I was coming to Paris, I read La Terre."²⁵

If the French tended to have a stereotyped conception of the United States, the same thing can be said for American ideas about France. In his excellent book, France and American Culture, Professor Howard M. Jones concludes that Americans had three images in regard to France in the mid-nineteenth century. First, in the popular mind, France was associated with the movements of Catholicism, deism and irreligion, and since America was predominantly Protestant, there was some prejudice and suspicion toward French religion. Secondly, French culture was associated with a high development in art, literature, philosophy and the theater. For this reason there was a certain prestige attached to French perfumes, wines and fashions, and the French language was more popular than any other foreign language. Thirdly, in the United States there was the widespread conviction that

²⁴Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 326, 315-6.

²⁵Mark Twain, "What Paul Bourget Thinks of Us," North American Review, CLX (January, 1895), p. 62.

French political institutions were unstable, and that the typical Frenchman was easily attracted to anarchy and revolutionary movements. In short, in the American self-image the typical American was stable, hard-working and honest in contrast to the Frenchman who spent his time dancing, drinking wine, accumulating mistresses and participating in revolutions.²⁶

In general, Jones's analysis of an earlier period seems to be an accurate description of American opinion at the turn of the century. The influential Harvard historian, Archibald Cary Coolidge, believed that there was a basic difference in the cultural patterns of France and the United States. Coolidge maintained that to the Frenchman, the word civilization implied accomplishments in art and literature, while to the American the term meant "efficient telephone service and improved plumbing."²⁷ Coolidge pointed out that "it is not an uncommon belief in the United States that France is politically and morally decadent." He did not agree with this judgment, and he wrote that it was based on "doubts as to the stability of the government, on the fact that the population is stationary, and still more on the impression of moral corruption modern French literature

²⁶Howard Mumford Jones, America and French Culture, 1750-1848, (Montréal: Louis Carrier & Co., 1928), pp. 562-72.

²⁷Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908), pp. 194-5.

serves to spread abroad."²⁸ When Hughes le Roux, a literary critic, was a visiting lecturer in the United States, he complained that "the American public has come to regard modern French novels as immoral productions of the worse kind."²⁹ Many Americans believed that arrogance was a typical French characteristic. Alice Porter, the daughter of the American Ambassador in Paris, noted that often the French were condescending to American visitors. She reported that it was not uncommon for Frenchmen to ask her: "Why should we travel? Everyone comes to Paris. If your country has beauty in it, why do you Americans risk your lives to cross the ocean each year."³⁰

Despite the large French colonial empire, many Americans were convinced that France was on the decline. Brooks Adams wrote in 1900 that "gangrene is devouring all the Latin races. The aggressive energy of France is, perhaps, dead."³¹ Theodore Roosevelt had a similar point of view in the late nineteenth century. In 1897 he wrote: "There seems to be some ground for believing that France is decadent. In France, as in the later Roman world, population is decreasing,

²⁸Ibid., p. 194.

²⁹The Nation, LXXXV (September 28, 1907), p. 273.

³⁰Meade and Pearson, Soldier, p. 189.

³¹Brooks Adams, America's Economic Supremacy, (New York: Harper & Brothers Pub., 1900), p. 70.

and there is gross sensuality and licentiousness. France is following Spain in her downward course."³² As Howard Jones argues, France's problems were often attributed to unstable political institutions. The Nation commented that "French cabinets are so chronically in unstable equilibrium that the wonder is, not that they fall, but that they survive."³³ In regard to anarchists and revolutionaries in France, an editorial in the Outlook remarked: "It seems incredible that France should produce such brutal agitators."³⁴ Robert McCormick, who followed Porter as Ambassador to France, wrote in a despatch: "With the admiration and affection that I with all Americans have for France, I cannot but recognize that in a material sense Germany is her superior. The German is the strong, virile, progressive people on the continent."³⁵

The most loyal supporters of France in the United States were those Americans whose ancestors had been French. At the turn of the century there were some ten million American citizens in this category. It is important to note that this was considerably less than the number of Americans whose

³²Roosevelt to Spring Rice, May 29, 1897, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, edited by Elting Morison and John Blum. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), Vol. I, p. 620.

³³The Nation, LXXXV (November 16, 1905), p. 393.

³⁴The Outlook, IX (October 22, 1898), p. 461.

³⁵McCormick to Root, December 15, 1905, Records of the Department of State, Despatches from the United States Ministers in France, Vol. 125. Henceforth this source will be cited as Despatches.

ancestors had come from either Germany or England, and in addition to this, French immigrants tended to assimilate into the dominant society more rapidly than did German immigrants. Statistics for broad ethnic backgrounds are only approximate, but information is more accurate concerning immigrants and their immediate children. This smaller grouping is the more significant. In 1900 there were some 214,000 American citizens who were from France or whose parents were from France. At the same time there were over five million citizens who were from Germany or their parents were from that country, and almost two million citizens had this association with Great Britain.³⁶ But it is also significant that in the late nineteenth century many French Canadians from the province of Quebec moved into New England in search of greater economic opportunities. It is estimated that in 1900 some 283,067 French Canadians were living in New England.³⁷ In General they lived in French-speaking communities and maintained a surviance of the French cultural tradition. Besides New England, the only other area in the United States to have a large concentration of French culture was southeastern Louisiana. Elsewhere those with

³⁶ U.S., Bureau of the Census with the Co-operation of the Social Science Research Council, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 65.

³⁷ Gilles Paquet, "L'émigration des Canadiens-Français vers la Nouvelle-Angleterre, 1870-1910: prises de vue quantitatives," Recherches Sociographiques, V (September, 1964), p. 328.

French backgrounds had become absorbed into the mainstream of American life.

Many Frenchmen were distressed about the large number of Americans of French origin who had lost all identification with the French tradition. Ambassador Cambon took a special interest in all efforts to try to change this situation. He believed that there should be a concerted effort of propaganda to attract Americans of French ancestry. He hoped that there would be a massive publicity of French cultural achievements. Cambon urged the French Government to help finance such a project, with the explanation that it could result in a positive advantage in international diplomacy.³⁸ Abbé Félix Klein, when visiting the United States, was upset when he found that few members of the second generation of French emigrants had any sentimental attachment for France. He found one couple, both of whose parents had come from France, and neither of the two had any knowledge of the French language or the place of origin of his parents.³⁹

The French language has long been a source of prestige for France. This was unmistakably true before the first World War, for until that time French was the recognized lingua franca of international diplomacy. It was assumed

³⁸Letters quoted in Tabouis, Cambon, pp. 114-5. The source is not made clear.

³⁹Félix Klein, L'Amérique de demain, (Paris: Plon, Nourrit et cie, 1910), p. 64.

that any diplomat would be able to communicate in the language. At the Second Hague Conference of 1907, for example, there were three hundred delegates from all over the world, and almost all of the delegates had a working knowledge of French.⁴⁰ Almost without exception, the American diplomats, who appear in the following pages, were able to use the language. In 1924 James Brown Scott, an important advisor to the Department of State, wrote Le Français: langue diplomatique moderne in which he maintained that French would continue to be the standard language of international diplomacy.⁴¹ This was an assumption early in the twentieth century. It is impossible to measure the extent to which the prestige of the language influenced the American conception of France, but certainly it is a factor which can not be completely ignored.

⁴⁰Observed in Paul d'Estournelles de Constant, America and Her Problems, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915), pp. 178-9.

⁴¹James Brown Scott, Le Français: langue diplomatique moderne: étude critique de conciliation internationale, introduction by Nicholas Murry Butler, (Paris: A. Pedone, 1924), This is not true since the second World War. At one diplomatic reception President de Gaulle was surprised that McGeorge Bundy was able to speak French fluently. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), pp. 350-1.

CHAPTER II

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR--I

The war between Spain and the United States caused the greatest tension in Franco-American relations since the intervention of Napoleon III in Mexico.¹ Throughout the conflict the overwhelming majority of Frenchmen favored the cause of Spain, but despite considerable popular support for intervention, the French Government maintained a policy of strict neutrality.² The swiftness of the American victory was the major factor which prevented more serious difficulties between France and the United States. At Paris there was some uneasiness at the appearance of America as a world power, but despite this, the French Government realistically

¹This point has been emphasized in Charles W. Porter, The Career of Théophile Delcassé, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936), p. 119. Elsie Porter Meade and Henry Pearson, An American Soldier and Diplomat, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1927), pp. 206-8, 219-20. Baron Pierre de Coubertin, "M. Delcassé: A Character Sketch," Fortnightly Review, Vol. LVII (January 1, 1902), p. 71.

²The neutrality of France is stressed in Garel Grunder and William Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), p. 15. Louis Le Fur, Etude sur la guerre hispano-Américaine de 1898 envisagée au point de vue du droit international public, (Paris: A. Pedone, 1899), pp. 235-6.

accepted the development as a fact of international politics.

At the end of the nineteenth century France supported the Spanish Empire because of considerations of culture, finances and colonial interests. The cultural similarities of the two countries were obvious. Both nations communicated in the Latin language, and both were predominately Roman Catholic. In the area of finance, it was estimated that between three and five billion French francs were invested in Spain in various forms, from which French investors received an average annual return of five per cent. At least one and one-half billion francs were invested in Spanish Government bonds, and an equal sum was in Spanish railroad securities.³ This meant that a significant number of Frenchmen with financial power had vested interests in the future of the Spanish Empire. Faced with the antagonism of both England and Germany, France hoped to have the diplomatic support of Spain in her bid for colonial expansion, especially in regard to Morocco.⁴ Because of the facts of geography, the Spanish nation, despite instability and weakness, was an important factor in Morocco's political and economic future.

³Porter to Sherman, August 19, 1897, Despatches, Vol. 114, no 74. Also see Meade and Pearson, Soldier, p. 120.

⁴This interpretation is emphasized in Robert Neale, Great Britain and United States Expansion, 1898-1900, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1966), p. 77; and Bertha Leaman, "The Influence of Domestic Policy on Foreign Affairs in France, 1898-1905," Journal of Modern History, XIV, (December, 1942), pp. 449-80.

Pressure in America for intervention on the side of the Cuban revolutionaries existed from the moment of the outbreak of hostilities in February, 1895. The following year the Spanish Foreign Secretary, fearful of the possibility of an American intervention, requested diplomatic support from the European powers. Gabriel Hanotaux, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, did not sympathize with the proposal at that time, despite the urging of several French officials. Hanotaux, however, did not want to appear to lead in the opposition to the Spanish request, and thus he encouraged Russia to help prevent any united European action. To the Russian Ambassador in Paris Hanotaux said that he was convinced that "it would be imprudent for Europe to engage in a Démarche that might set all America against her."⁵ The Spanish Government, finding a lack of European interest, decided to withdraw her request for aid. Hanotaux was pleased, and he is reported to have said, "enfin c'est un incident clos."⁶ But later that year an editorial in Le Temps, a paper which generally reflected the government viewpoint, suggested that the European powers should join in the attempt to oppose American imperialism.⁷

⁵Hanotaux to Réverseaux, July 24, 1896, Quoted in Ernest P. May, Imperial Democracy: the Emergence of America as a Great Power, (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, Inc., 1961), p. 204; and Orestes Ferrara, The Last Spanish War: Revelations in Diplomacy, (New York: Paisley Press, 1937), pp. 69-70.

⁶quoted in May, Democracy, p. 204.

⁷Le Temps, November 12, 1896.

In 1897 there was increased pressure on the American Government to help the Cubans dislodge the Spanish from the American hemisphere. The European powers looked uneasily at the activities of the New York Junta and the American "yellow press." As American intervention seemed more likely, Secretary Hanotaux became more receptive to the idea of a united European action in behalf of Spain. On the margin of a diplomatic despatch he wrote: "The United States at this time are making many enemies, it is something to be watched. We could perhaps render a considerable service to Spain."⁸ Hanotaux instructed the French Minister in Madrid to express interest to the European diplomats but not to make any commitment to Spain.⁹ In a memorandum Hanotaux indicated that he wanted to avoid "permanent commitment" but that he was "alert to the danger of seeing Spain, convinced that she has nothing to expect from us, knock at other doors."¹⁰ By this, the shrewd Secretary meant that if there was to be a diplomatic advantage from close association with Spain, he hoped that France would be the one to benefit. He realized that there was little hope for a joint European effort, for a few years earlier in relation to the

⁸Margin on a letter from Patenôtre to Hanotaux, May 23, 1897, quoted in May, Democracy, p. 205.

⁹Hanotaux to Réverseaux, October 26, 1897, quoted in May, Democracy, p. 205.

¹⁰Memorandum of October 28, 1897, quoted in May, Democracy, p. 205.

Near Eastern question he had recognized the impotency of the Concert of Europe.¹¹

A major part of Hanotaux's foreign policy was the continuation of a strong Franco-Russian Alliance, and therefore the actions of France were influenced by the views of the government of Nicholas II. Hanotaux requested the Ambassador in St. Petersburg to determine the attitude of the Imperial Government in regard to the Cuban question. Russia, it was learned, was opposed to even a mild diplomatic statement in Spain's behalf. In seeking greater power in the Far East, Russia cared little for the welfare of Spain, and she did not want to disturb her relations with the United States.¹² This information dampened Hanotaux's enthusiasm in the matter. When in December Spain formally asked if she could depend on France's participation in a joint démarche by the European powers, Hanotaux advised Spain not to encourage such a policy for it "could have only a purely Platonic character." He cautioned that such a move "might wound the pride and arouse the sensibilities of a Democracy so little accustomed to diplomatic forms and thus produce an effect contrary to the one hoped for."¹³ In this

¹¹Unsigned article by Hanotaux, "En Orient," La Revue de Paris, April 15, 1959, Vol. VI, pp. 449-461. Langer, Imperialism, pp. 162-4.

¹²Hanotaux to Montebello, October 21, 1897; Montebello to Hanotaux, November 11, 1897, quoted in May, Democracy, pp. 205-6, 210-1.

¹³Quoted in May, Democracy, p. 206. From the French archives, but the documentation is not clear.

mood the Foreign Secretary wrote in a memo: "I am preoccupied with the increased friction between Spain and the United States. Is there really nothing that can be done? The possibility of a war between the United States and Spain becomes probable and more and more dangerous."¹⁴

It should be emphasized that in urging support for Spain Hanotaux had in mind only a mild diplomatic statement combined perhaps with financial assistance.¹⁵ Never did he consider the possibility of a direct threat to the United States, and even less did he envision military assistance. Hanotaux hoped that a statement of support would add moral weight to the policy of Spain and cause the American Government to reconsider its position. He believed that there was a harmony of interests in Spanish and French colonial expansion, but the encouragement of the Spanish Empire was a very limited goal as far as he was concerned--a minor consideration in a large and intricate foreign policy. For such a limited goal the leader of the Quai d'Orsay was prepared to use only very limited means, and this was to remain the French policy throughout the Spanish-American conflict.

¹⁴Memorandum by Hanotaux, January 26, 1898, quoted in May, Democracy, p. 206.

¹⁵On December 15, 1897, Hanotaux told Castillo, the Spanish Minister, that "any true intervention must be financial; from this point of view it might be possible to come to the aid of Spain." France, Ministère des affaires étrangères, Documents diplomatiques français, 1897, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1918), Vol. XIV¹, p. 46, note 2. Henceforth this source shall be cited as DDF.

The American Government was concerned with the position of France in the Cuban question. This was especially true in January, 1897, when a British correspondent reported that France and Russia had promised to intervene in order to keep America from going to war.¹⁶ Secretary of State, John Sherman, instructed General Horace Porter to investigate the matter. Porter subsequently indicated that there was no reason to believe the British allegation. There was naturally much sympathy for Spain in France because of their "common Latin race," financial investments and similar colonial ambitions, but Porter was convinced that the French Government had "no disposition in her present temper to enter any formal protest against such action as the United States may be compelled to take to put a stop to the disastrous Cuban war."¹⁷

The German Kaiser, William II, was the first European leader seriously to consider giving aid to Spain. To the French Ambassador in Berlin he expressed the opinion that Europe should act to "put a halt to the aggression of the United States."¹⁸ When it came to action, however, the

¹⁶London Times, January 7, 1897.

¹⁷Porter to Sherman, July 13, 1897, Despatches, Vol. 114, no. 35. Also letter of August 19, 1897, no. 74.

¹⁸Statement to M. de Réverseaux on December 23, 1897, mentioned in DDF, XIV, p. 46, note 27. Also see Johannes Lepsius, ed., Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, (Berlin, 1925), Vol. XV, no. 4118. Henceforth this source shall be cited as GP.

Kaiser was much more cautious than he was in his emotional outbursts. Bülow notified the Ambassador in Vienna that Germany hoped to support the Spanish Monarchy, but at the same time she did not want to provoke an anti-German reaction in the United States. The German Government would therefore be willing to take a formal stand in behalf of Spain only if Austria, France, England and Russia would also do so.¹⁹ The Ambassador responded that he was convinced that the Austrian Government would be happy to join in opposing the "overseas covetousness" of the United States, but he could find no indications that France and Russia would consider such an action.²⁰ Seeing that there was little chance of any united effort, the Wilhelmstrasse decided not to push the project. Bulow notified the German Ambassador in Madrid that France must take the lead in any action because of her close political, commercial and geographical connections with Spain; Germany would be willing to support France's lead.²¹

In January, 1898, it was clear to all informed observers that there existed a major crisis in Spanish-American relations. In this tense situation Hanotaux had a long conversation with Leon Y. Castillo, the capable Spanish Ambassador to France. Castillo asked if the French

¹⁹Bulow to Elenburg, September 29, 1897, GP, XV, pp. 3-4.

²⁰Elenburg to Bulow, October 1, 1897, Ibid., pp. 4-5.

²¹Bulow to Radowitz, February 15, 1898, Ibid., pp. 7-8.

Government was prepared "to join with the other European powers in order to prevent an American intervention in the Cuban question, without military force but by diplomacy and counsel." But even in such a moderate request Hanotaux expressed the opinion that "the Republican Government would render Her Majesty a wise counsel in calling her attention to the difficulties in forming a common European policy." The only optimistic note in the conversation was Hanotaux's observation that President McKinley had consistently opposed American intervention in the Cuban question.²² Castillo reported to his government that Spain had "the support of public opinion and the stock exchange, but that the help we can expect from the French Government is very small because of France's own difficulties with her colonies . . . and the care she must exercise . . . in regard to the United States."²³

In Madrid the Austrian Minister, Count Dubsky, spoke to the Queen Regent of the possibility of a European Concert in behalf of Spain, and the Ambassadors of Germany and Italy appeared to sympathize with the idea. M. Patenotre, the French Ambassador, was convinced that none of the three powers were willing to go to this extreme, but that they were attempting to make it appear that inaction was due to the

²²Conversation of January 4, 1898, DDF, XIV, p. 46, note 1.

²³Quoted in Ferrara, Revelations, pp. 69-70, from the Spanish archives.

indifference of Russia and France. Patenôtre, as directed by Hanotaux, made it clear that France had no intention of using any force against the United States, but that she would only consider participation in a diplomatic statement. The Queen Regent and others in the Spanish Government had hopes for the Dubsky proposal, and Patenôtre complained, "it has become rather difficult to explain the impossibility of a European intervention."²⁴ Patenôtre was able to talk frankly with the Spanish Colonial Secretary, Sigismondo Moret, who was the leading spokesman in Spain in behalf of an accommodation with the United States. The two men agreed that the wisest course of action for Spain was to attempt conciliation through the proposed Spanish-American treaty of commerce.²⁵

Two incidents in February excited Americans and made war almost inevitable. First, the New York Journal published the private letter of Mr. Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister in the United States, which referred to McKinley as "weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd." A few days after this, on the evening of February 15, the battleship, the USS Maine, exploded in Havana harbor with a loss of 260

²⁴Patenôtre to Hanotaux, January 23, 1898, DDF, XIV, no. 27, pp. 46-8. Patenotre describes Dubsky as "an independent spirit in diplomacy," but it seems that Dubsky represented the views of Francis Joseph.

²⁵Patenôtre to Hanotaux, February 6, 1898, DDF, XIV, no. 43, pp. 74-6.

American lives. The French press reflected an awareness of the seriousness of the situation but expressed the hope that war might yet be avoided. The Journal des débats dismissed the de Lome letter as a minor incident of a private nature and blamed the Maine disaster on the Cuban revolutionaries.²⁶ In the Revue des Deux Mondes François Charmes charged that emotions were stirred in the United States because of "jingoism" and the "yellow press." He claimed that Captain Charles Sigsbee of the Maine had "attested and recognized immediately the accidental character which had befallen his ship."²⁷ Likewise, an editorial in Le Temps, a newspaper which generally reflected the views of the Quai d'Orsay, declared that "Cuba is a Royal morsel which tempts a people intoxicated with its own strength and convinced that the Monroe Doctrine is the Alpha and Omega of international law."²⁸

French diplomatists throughout the world discussed the prospects for a Spanish-American war. In London on March 16 the French Chargé d'Affaires, M. G. Geoffray, told the British Undersecretary of State: "We consider that a war between Spain and the United States would be a major calamity; with our colonies in the West Indies and in Guiana, we

²⁶Journal des débats, February 17, 1898, February 27, 1898.

²⁷François Charmes, "Chronique de la Quinzaine," Revue des deux Mondes, March 1, 1898, Vol. CXLVI, pp. 232-3.

²⁸Le Temps, February 27, 1898.

are not able to be disinterested in the question."²⁹ On that same day in Paris Secretary Hanotaux had a long conference with General Porter. Hanotaux said that France had a great deal of sympathy for Spain because of the "closeness of commercial relations." He expressed his conviction that Spain was attempting to "find a conclusion to the affair consistent with honor," but he stated that his government was determined to remain neutral in the matter. General Porter believed that President McKinley would be able to avoid war, despite the fact that "the independence of Cuba was a cause which inflamed all spirits in America." The next day the Spanish Ambassador, Castillo, told Hanotaux that above everything else Spain desired a peaceful settlement, even if it meant giving up Cuba. In achieving the end, Spain would perhaps seek the good offices of "some friendly power."³⁰

One of Hanotaux's major sources of information was the able French Ambassador in Washington, Jules Cambon. In report after report Cambon reported that the President did not want war but that he was pushed by Congress and the Jingoists. In regard to McKinley he asked, "Is there in Europe any statesman, who in daily contact with the passions

²⁹Geoffray to Hanotaux, March 16, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, pp. 148-9.

³⁰Hanotaux to Jules Cambon, March 18, 1898, Ibid., no. 94, p. 156.

of Parliament, would be able to keep a clear head for such a long time?" Cambon believed that the religious issue was an important matter in the pressure for war. Many Americans were convinced that "the Anglo-Saxons were God's chosen people," and there were the "temples of the narrow pastors, accustomed to mock the infallibility of the Pope."³¹ Cambon feared that England was taking advantage of the situation to improve her relations with America. To avoid war he suggested that France should use her influence to convince Spain to grant independence to Cuba. He was convinced that this was the only way that Spain could prevent an American intervention.³²

On March 25 Hanotaux told a French reporter that the Cuban problem "is not our business, but that of Spain and the United States." He tended to confirm the rumors that France and England would offer mediation, but he emphasized France's determination to maintain "the best and most cordial relations with both countries."³³ The next day in the Chamber of Deputies a Socialist member attacked Hanotaux's policy in the Cuban question. He declared: "France cannot remain

³¹Cambon to Hanotaux, April 8, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 142, pp. 214-5. Cambon to Hanotaux, March 8, 1898, Ibid., p. 126, note 1.

³²Cambon to Hanotaux, March 9, 1898, Ibid., no. 75, p. 129.

³³London Times, March 26, 1898. New York Herald, Paris Edition, March 25, 1898. A clipping of the latter in Despatches, Vol. 116.

indifferent to the Spanish-American conflict and the monstrous encroachment of the Anglo-Saxon race on the Latin race. It is the duty of France to approach the two nations with words of conciliation and peace." Hanotaux replied that France was determined to maintain friendly relations with both countries. With Spain there were "ancient and faithful relations, good neighborly feelings, affinities of race and interest," and the United States was "a powerful Republic, a sister of our own." It was therefore France's hope that there would be "an equitable solution of the matter, wherein right, honor and liberty may be satisfied." But Hanotaux emphasized the fact that his government would not intervene unless it were with the consent of both governments. He said that if asked France would be willing to offer "impartial advice in arriving at a peaceful solution" but that "beyond this it is impossible to go." Following the speech Hanotaux's policy was sustained by a vote of 289 to 101.³⁴

Americans were happy to have this public statement by the French Foreign Minister, especially as it had not been officially requested. An editorial in The Nation observed: "It is clear now, as it really has been all along to the discerning, that France will do nothing beyond expressing good wishes and sympathy."³⁵ General Porter expressed to

³⁴Washington Post, March 27, 1898. Le Temps, March 28, 1898. Summary of speech in DDF, Vol. XIV¹, p. 181, note 1. Porter to Sherman, March 31, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 115, no. 199.

³⁵The Nation, March 31, 1898, Vol. LVI, p. 235.

Hanotaux the appreciation of his government. Hanotaux assured him that "if the government of the United States judges it useful to seek our good offices to facilitate an arrangement or obtain counsel, we will gladly co-operate, but we will do nothing more."³⁶

Hanotaux's speech did not end efforts in Europe to find some way to come to the aid of Spain. The leading advocate of support was the dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The aged Francis Joseph, convinced that the Monarchs were duty bound to support each other, wrote Nicholas II a personal letter in which he requested that Russia should join with the powers in a common démarche.³⁷ The Austrian Minister in Paris told Hanotaux that Austria was prepared to take the initiative in either a military or a diplomatic intervention if she "could count on the adherence of all European powers."³⁸ In Madrid Count Dubsky continued to try to convince his colleagues that a joint action was practical. Several influential French diplomatists favored giving Spain limited diplomatic support. In London the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, inquired about the possibility of a joint

³⁶Hanotaux to the Ambassadors at Washington, Madrid, St. Petersburg, London and Vienna, March 31, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 112, p. 181.

³⁷Patenôtre to Hanotaux, March 30, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 108, p. 174.

³⁸Hanotaux to Patenotre, March 31, 1898, Ibid., no. 111, p. 180.

declaration which would "avoid anything which might arouse the susceptibilities of the United States" and which would be "based on grounds of humanity and on the common interests of the powers in averting a conflict which might have deplorable consequences."³⁹

In a last desperate effort Spain encouraged the powers to make any possible movement in her behalf, no matter how weak. On March 25 the Spanish Queen Regent appealed to the Russian Tzar, but because Russia had recently annexed Port Arthur, the appeal received no serious attention.⁴⁰ The following week Castillo informed Hanotaux that Spain hoped there would be some European démarche even if it were made without the unanimity of the powers. Hanotaux answered that France's policy remained the same as explained in his speech of March 26, but that he would be open to two suggestions: "to join in an action which would be unanimous and amicable to both Spain and the United States, and secondly, to accept any plan for mediation which might be requested by both nations." Spain, he cautioned, should not entirely reject any of the American demands, but she should "gain time by a conciliatory attitude in order to give McKinley the opportunity to resist the current of jingoism."⁴¹

³⁹Foreign Office to Pauncefote, March 28, 1898, Neale, Expansion, p. 14.

⁴⁰May, Democracy, p. 211.

⁴¹Conversations reported in Hanotaux to Patenôtre, March 31, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 111, p. 180; Hanotaux to Montebello, April 4, 1898, Ibid., no. 122, pp. 193-5.

In this early period, as later during the war, the French press was far less neutral than was the government policy. The Journal des débats declared that an American intervention would be "an act of international piracy" for there was "no principle of international law which permitted one country to interfere in the affairs of another under the pretext that civil war was being prolonged on the latter's territory."⁴² A later editorial in the same newspaper stated that the congressional pressure for war was "a monument of international bad faith."⁴³ President McKinley's statements of Christian idealism were interpreted as "a sophistry in a sentimental form which is so naturally assumed by Americans."⁴⁴ Charles Benoist in the Revue des deux mondes wrote that if war came, it would be the fault of the United States, who "invoked the name of 'humanity'" but failed "to act for conciliation and peace." Benoist feared that the hour had come when "M. Adam's prediction will be realized and the apple of Cuba, separated from the Spanish tree, will fall upon American ground." Unless the European powers intervene there "will be an invasion of the western hemisphere by Anglo-Saxon Americans."⁴⁵

⁴²Journal des débats, March 7, 1898.

⁴³Ibid., April 15, 1898.

⁴⁴Ibid., April 14, 1898.

⁴⁵Charles Benoist, "Chronique de la Quinzaine," Vol. CXLVI, April 15, 1898, Revue des deux mondes, pp. 956, 158.

Early in April Leo XIII took the leadership in the attempt to avoid war, for the Vatican was anxious that Catholic Spain not lose her colonial empire. As instructed by the Pope, the popular Archbishop of Minnesota, John Ireland, visited McKinley and expressed the Vatican's desire for peace. McKinley replied that he shared this desire for peace, but that he needed help if he were to withstand the increasing strength of the jingoists. Archbishop Ireland then went to see Jules Cambon and asked if support for peace might be provided by a united statement by the major European powers. Ireland suggested that Spain should be given immediate advice to make satisfaction for the Maine and to grant an armistice to the Cuban revolutionaries. Ambassador Cambon was pessimistic, for he feared that a simple diplomatic statement would have little effect on the American Congress. He nevertheless agreed to advise his government to follow the Archbishop's suggestion, and he immediately telegraphed the Quai d'Orsay that President McKinley would welcome a European statement favoring peace so long as it were not pro-Spanish. Cambon advised Hanotaux that there was a possibility that a collective European demarche might make a "sensitive impression" on the American public.⁴⁷

⁴⁶Details of Ireland's efforts are in Cambon to Hanotaux, April 4, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 124, pp. 196-7. The New York Times reported that "there is reason to believe that the Pope's influences are being exerted more directly and with greater effect at Madrid than at Washington." April 5, 1898.

⁴⁷Cambon to Hanotaux, April 3, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 121, p. 193.

Hanotaux was encouraged to learn that the American president would not oppose a friendly diplomatic statement. He immediately telegraphed the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg: "I desire to be informed as soon as possible the attitude of the Imperial Government concerning a possible intervention."⁴⁸ That same day the Russian Government replied that it would be willing to join in a public statement if it were unanimous.⁴⁹ Learning of this policy change in St. Petersburg, Hanotaux authorized Ambassador Cambon to join with the representatives of Russia, Germany, England, Italy, and Austria-Hungary in a joint statement "which would attempt to encourage in an amicable spirit the Federal Government to arrive at an entente with Spain." Hanotaux emphasized: "In any case be careful that any demarche be neutral and disinterested, and avoid any wording which might be interpreted to mean that we wish to take the side of Spain."⁵⁰

On April 6 the six representatives at Washington assembled at the British Embassy and jointly drafted an appeal to the American Government. Before delivering the note the British and French Ambassadors met with Assistant Secretary of State William Day to discuss the wording.

⁴⁸Hanotaux to de Montbello, April 4, 1898, Ibid., no. 122, pp. 193-4.

⁴⁹Hanotaux to Cambon, April 4, 1898, Ibid., no. 125, pp. 197-8.

⁵⁰Hanotaux to Cambon, April 4, 1898, Ibid., no. 125, pp. 197-8. Cambon to Hanotaux, April 5, 1898, Ibid., no. 129, pp. 202-3.

Cambon noted that as Day read the statement he mumbled, "good, very good."⁵¹ Day did make several suggestions for changes which were used.⁵² The final form of the appeal was entirely friendly in tone; it merely expressed the pious desire that the United States would use moderation and show concern for "humanity at large." The following day the six diplomats went to the White House to deliver their message. In a short statement President McKinley declared that he shared the desire for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban problem and that he recognized "the good will which motivates this amicable communication." But he added that the United States was determined to see a permanent end to the matter even if it required an American intervention. The delegation then visited Secretary of State Sherman, who also expressed appreciation for the démarche.⁵³

Ambassador Cambon was convinced that the common statement by the six powers had been wise "even if it probably would have little effect." A manifestation for peace had been made so that "no one could accuse Europe of indifference or division."⁵⁴ The British Ambassador was more optimistic,

⁵¹Cambon to Hanotaux, April 6, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 136, pp. 208-9.

⁵²Campbell, Understanding, p. 32.

⁵³Cambon to Hanotaux, April 6, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 136, pp. 208-9.

⁵⁴Cambon to Hanotaux, April 8, 1898, Ibid., no. 142, pp. 214-5.

and he expressed the hope to his government that the action would have a "moderating influence" on American policy.⁵⁵ The London Times, on the other hand, feared that "the action of the European Legations has, in fact contributed... to strengthen rather than weaken the war party of the United States and the hamper the President's policy of moderation and reserve."⁵⁶ In hindsight, it appears that the appeal had little of either a positive or negative result. The historian Ernest May notes: "Few historians of the period have even thought it worthwhile to mention the collective démarche in Washington. Despite its seeming consequences, this joint démarche represented Europe's one united response to the emergence of America as a power."⁵⁷

The Spanish Government on April 9 attempted to appease the United States by ordering a temporary suspension of military action in Cuba. Le Temps expressed the view that this action "removes from the Washington cabinet all the so-called humanitarian pretext for any indecent haste."⁵⁸ But the Spanish concession did not have much effect on American policy. Two days after it was made President McKinley recommended to Congress that he be authorized to

⁵⁵Campbell, Understanding, p. 32.

⁵⁶London Times, April 8, 1898.

⁵⁷May, Democracy, p. 181.

⁵⁸Le Temps, April 11, 1898.

use armed forces to the extent that would be necessary to obtain a pacification of Cuba. On the day of McKinley's speech the Spanish Ambassador in Paris suggested to Hanotaux that the European powers should join in making a second appeal in Washington. Hanotaux was opposed to this idea. He said that all of the powers except Austria-Hungary believed that a second démarche would be unwise. It was feared that "the effect would be to excite the passions of the American people, and perhaps to put an end to the struggle between the Congress and the President."⁵⁹

In Washington on April 14 the representatives of the six powers met again at the British Embassy to discuss the possibility of a second diplomatic statement. The British Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, had already prepared a second draft note which expressed the hope that the United States would give proper attention to the latest Spanish concession. The representatives with one exception did not have permission from their governments to make a second appeal, and any action would therefore require approval from the six capitals. The representatives decided to recommend that an appeal would have additional moral weight if made directly by the Foreign Ministers of the respective governments. Jules Cambon was given the task of writing a telegram which would attempt to encourage the six governments in this

⁵⁹Ferrera, Revelations, pp. 140, 148. From the Spanish archives.

direction. Cambon's text was much more critical of the American position than Pauncefote's note. Among other things Cambon stated:

The attitude of Congress, as well as the resolution that the House of Representatives approved yesterday by a large majority, leaves little hope for peace The memorandum by the Spanish Minister presented last Sunday appears to offer a base for a reasonable arrangement and eliminates all legitimate causes for war In these conditions, the representatives of the great powers in Washington estimate that their respective governments could well call the attention of the United States to the memorandum of the Spanish Minister and make it known that their approval would not be given to an armed intervention that appears to them to be entirely unjustified.⁶⁰

Austria-Hungary was the only nation enthusiastic to act upon the Cambon note. Emperor Francis Joseph would have been willing to appeal unilaterally to the United States, but the Foreign Minister, Count Goluchowski, convinced him that any unilateral action could not help Spain and might harm Austria. The French Government did not especially favor Cambon's suggestions, but it was willing to go along if the action would be unanimous. Le Temps declared that "any nation which would assume by itself the responsibility of sustaining Spain and making itself an enemy of the United States would injure in a most serious way its most essential interests."⁶¹ The British Government cautiously agreed to

⁶⁰Cambon to Hanotaux, April 14, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 153, pp. 226-7. Also see Campbell, Understanding, p. 34. Ferrera is correct when he writes that the note was "a joint action by the representatives." Revelations, p. 146.

⁶¹Le Temps, April 16, 1898.

support a second united statement, but Lord Balfour complained that the representatives in Washington "appear to wish to give the United States a lecture on international morality."⁶² It was the German Government which blocked all possibility for a second appeal. The Kaiser wrote in a marginal note: "I think it perfectly mistaken, pointless, and therefore harmful; we would badly damage our American relations."⁶³ Bulow informed Austria that Germany would not participate in any démarche, and Hanotaux immediately followed Germany's example.⁶⁴

Following the failure to obtain a second appeal, Francis Joseph thanked France for her support in the effort. He said that "only France has appeared as a sincere friend of Spain, and her support has succeeded in again joining the close relations between Austria and France."⁶⁵ But in fact France had not pushed the proposal to the extent which this statement would indicate. Perhaps the Austrian Emperor was referring to the fact that Ambassador Cambon had written an anti-American statement, but more likely the expression of gratitude was nothing more than a diplomatic formality

⁶²B.E.C. Dugdale, Balfour, Vol. 1, p. 192.

⁶³Bulow to William, April 16, 1898, GP, XV, no. 4140, no. 4141.

⁶⁴Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), Vol. II, p. 1305. May, Democracy, p. 219.

⁶⁵Réverseaux, Ambassador to Vienna, to Hanotaux, April 19, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 165, p. 239.

designed to improve Franco-Austrian relations. In any case, the démarche was not made because no European nation wanted to permanently damage its position with the United States. As the historian Robert Neale was written: "It was chiefly to the rivalries and ambitions of the European powers that America owed her freedom of action."⁶⁶

On April 19 the American Congress passed a joint resolution that Cuba was independent. The resolution demanded that Spain withdraw from the island and authorized the President to use all force necessary to see that this was done. The next day the President signed the resolution and sent the Spanish Government a formal ultimatum which allowed only three days to comply with the American demand. The Queen Regent was not willing to capitulate in this fashion, and on April 21 the Spanish Government recalled the Spanish Minister from Washington.⁶⁷ President McKinley answered by withdrawing the American Minister from Madrid. In addition he proclaimed a blockade around the northern coast of Cuba.⁶⁸ The American Congress on April 25 passed a decree that a state of war had existed since the time when Spain had severed her diplomatic relations with the United States.

⁶⁶Neale, Expansion, p. 213.

⁶⁷Woodford to Sherman, April 21, 1898, FR, 1898, p. 767.

⁶⁸Proclamation of April 22, 1898, in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1911), Vol. XIV, pp. 6472-3.

CHAPTER III

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR--II

Without the benefit of diplomatic representation in Washington, it was necessary for Spain to seek the good offices of a neutral third party which would protect Spanish subjects and interests in the United States. Ambassador Cambon on April 22 notified Secretary Sherman that the diplomatic machinery of both France and Austria-Hungary had been assigned this task at the request of Spain. Austria was given charge of the Spanish archives in Washington, and Cambon was to have the major diplomatic burden for the duration of the conflict. Supervision of the Spanish Consular Service was divided between France and Austria-Hungary according to geographical location.¹ The United States quickly gave "provisional acceptance" to the offer of the two countries to represent Spain. Sherman wrote Cambon that the arrangement would be used so long as it "contemplates only the friendly offices of yourself and your esteemed colleague."²

¹Cambon to Sherman, April 22, 1898, FR, 1898, p. 785.

²Sherman to Cambon, April 25, 1898, FR, 1898, pp. 786-7.

The selection of Jules Cambon as the key diplomatic representative was a happy choice, and a choice not made by accident. Cambon was recognized as one of the most able members of the French foreign service. He had many important friends in America, and he enjoyed good relations with the McKinley administration. Yet Cambon's sympathies were definitely on the side of Spain--as demonstrated by his note of April 14. It is interesting that he was against France's assuming Spanish diplomacy during the conflict. Especially he advised against a combined responsibility with Austria-Hungary because of the fact that the two nations had "marched hand in hand to uphold Emperor Maximilian."³ But after receiving official directions from Paris, Cambon exerted all of his capacities in behalf of the interests of Spain. Throughout the conflict he firmly upheld the Spanish position. The Department of State well understood that this was his job, and despite many differences, the relations between Cambon and American officials remained friendly. Elihu Root later referred to Cambon as the "ideal Ambassador" and the "sympathetic representative and defender of Spain."⁴

³Cambon to Hanotaux, May 6, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 179, p. 263.

⁴Elihu Root, Miscellaneous Addresses, edited by Robert Bacon and James Scott, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), pp. 145, 7. Delcasse later praised Cambon's work. Ministère des affaires étrangères, Documents diplomatiques: Négociations pour la paix entre l'Espagne et les Etats-Unis. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1898), August 13, 1898, no. 16.

There was never any doubt but that France would maintain an official position of neutrality during the conflict, and on April 27 an official proclamation of neutrality was issued. The declaration warned all French citizens to "refrain from all acts which, committed in violation of French or international law, could be considered as hostile to one of the parties or as contrary to a scrupulous neutrality." Frenchmen were forbidden to enroll in the armies of either belligerent; no ship of war was to be permitted to enter a French harbor for more than twenty-four hours except in the case of a forced delay; and no prizes of war were to be sold on French territory. Any person disobeying one of these restrictions would be acting contrary to the laws of France, and he would not be protected from punishment by the belligerent.⁵ This declaration was typical of the declarations of the other powers, and it was routine in nature. Only Germany, who did not have a custom of making declarations of neutrality, failed to issue a similar statement.

Early in May the Spanish Government desperately attempted to convince one of the European powers to offer mediation to help end the war. The French Ambassador in Russia, M. Montbello, was convinced by his Spanish colleague that the idea was practical, and he suggested to Hanotaux that France could at least give President McKinley a secret offer of

⁵Journal Officiel, April 27, 1898. Porter to Day, April 27, 1898, FR, 1898, pp. 862-3.

mediation. He believed that it might work because neither Spain or the United States had sufficient interests at stake to justify the expenses of a long war.⁶ Secretary Hanotaux was interested in the suggestion, but he believed that the idea was "premature." He did go so far as to request the French Ambassador in Madrid to find out if the Spanish Government might be willing to make more concessions.⁷ The Spanish Government had no new proposals to make, and Hanotaux quickly dropped the idea of mediation.⁸ But in the press there were rumors of a possible united European effort at mediation. An American correspondent in Paris investigated the rumors and reported that they were unfounded. He wrote: "The powers have determined not to intervene until after a decisive blow, and then only if asked by one of the belligerents."⁹

General Porter maintained very close relations with Hanotaux, and he never doubted the latter's determination to continue a policy of neutrality.¹⁰ In June Porter reported

⁶Montbello to Hanotaux, May 11, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 188, pp. 279-81.

⁷Hanotaux to Paten[^]otre, May 12, 1898, Ibid., no. 189, pp. 281-2.

⁸Ibid., p. 282, note 1.

⁹The Daily Chronicle, May 4, 1898, Clipping in Hay scrapbook.

¹⁰Both Porter and Hanotaux emphasized their personal friendship. See "Le Général Porter et l'affaire de Cuba," a letter by Hanotaux written on July 27, 1927, in Meade, Porter, pp. 202-3.

in a despatch: "Spain has made most urgent efforts to have the powers intervene in her behalf but in this part of Europe there is no such thing seriously contemplated, and she now seems to have abandoned all hope in that direction."¹¹ Porter expressed faith in Hanotaux's promise that "the policy of his country was definitely settled to observe a strict and impartial neutrality."¹² In late June the government of which Hanotaux was a member was forced to resign, and the direction of the Quai d'Orsay was turned over to Théophile Delcassé, a former disciple of Gambetta and an admirer of the American form of government. Shortly after the change in power, Porter had a frank discussion with Delcassé. According to Porter the new Foreign Minister "said very emphatically that it would be his purpose to observe the strictest and most impartial neutrality in the present war." In addition he expressed the hope that his relations with the American Ambassador would be "frank, intimate and cordial."¹³ Delcassé always acted in conformity with this stated purpose, and it is clear that the

¹¹Porter to Hitchcock, Ambassador to Russia, June 25, 1898, Porter Papers, Box 3.

¹²Porter to Day, June 29, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 284.

¹³Porter to Day, July 5, 1898, Ibid., no. 290. Day again asked Porter to investigate the reports of a possible offer at mediation. Day to Porter, July 14, 1898, Records of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions: France, pp. 69-70. Henceforth this source shall be cited as Instructions.

shift from Hanotaux to Delcassé did not have any significant effect on French policy in regard to the Spanish-American war.¹⁴

The financial closeness of France and Spain presented the most potentially dangerous situation in Franco-American relations. To finance the war it was necessary for Spain to rely on foreign loans, and the greater part of these loans came from France. In May Spain borrowed forty million francs from the Banque de Paris and was attempting to make another loan of 250 million francs.¹⁵ General Porter did all that he could to see that French leaders realized the American objection to such a loan, but American military success eliminated the problem. By July it was impossible for Spain to obtain a large loan in France. Happy with the development, Secretary Day wrote that this was one indication of the "ruined condition of Spain and of Spanish finances."¹⁶ The American Government never objected to the Spanish loans, for it was well recognized that the floating of such loans was not against the accepted principles of international law. They were made by French individuals and never by the French

¹⁴May, Democracy, p. 233.

¹⁵Porter to Day, May 24, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 257.

¹⁶Day to Porter, July 5, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, p. 61.

Government, even though it was believed that early in the war the government encouraged the loans.¹⁷

Although neutral, the French Government was somewhat anxious at the prospects of the United States becoming a colonial power. Always the government tried to use a limited amount of influence to discourage American imperialism, especially in regions near the French Empire. Neither the government nor the press was especially concerned about the annexation of Hawaii.¹⁸ But the Canary Islands were another matter. In May, Cambon informed the foreign office of rumors that the United States was considering the annexation of these islands. He pointed out that this move would "make vulnerable" the French possessions of North Africa and Senegal.¹⁹ The French Council of Ministers was sufficiently concerned about the matter to send a squadron of war ships to the Canaries "with the mission to observe the events."²⁰ In June the Washington Post suggested that the Canaries as well as the Balearic Islands should be made into American colonies, and Cambon informed Paris that this

¹⁷Elbert J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1908), pp. 215-6.

¹⁸Elizabeth Brett White, American Opinion of France: From Lafayette to Poincaré, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 225.

¹⁹Cambon to Hanotaux, May 6, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 179, p. 264.

²⁰Ibid., p. 298, note 3.

newspaper generally supported the point of view of the administration.²¹ In an interview with McKinley Cambon expressed the conviction that all Europe would be "uncomfortable" if the United States acquired the islands. Cambon feared that this conversation would have little affect on American policy, for Americans were "indifferent to considerations which dominate European relations."²² The French Government never made a formal statement about the possible American acquisition of the Canaries. If the United States had decided to act in this direction it seems certain that there would have been no effective opposition from France.

There was one basic reason for France's hesitancy to oppose directly the actions of the United States--the European colonial rivalry. In 1898 France's major problem was with England in the upper Nile and in Morocco. France was nervous at the appearance of a rapprochement in American-British relations, and some Frenchmen even went so far as to suggest that there could be an alliance between the two Anglo-Saxon nations. But the leaders in the Quai d'Orsay did not ever seriously believe that this development was possible.²³ The greatest difficulty between France and

²¹Washington Post, June 14, 1898. Cambon to Hanotaux, June 24, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 240, pp. 354-5.

²²Cambon to Delcassé, July 8, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 249, p. 373.

²³May, Democracy, p. 233.

England took place at the famous Fashoda crisis. From the time of Lord Kitchner's arrival at Fashoda in September until the retreat of General Marchand in November the two nations stood at the brink of war. In the year 1898 it was obviously not in the interests of France to antagonize the United States. The diplomatic official, Maurice Paléologue, feared that there might be a war between France and England, and for this reason he was anxious to have better relations with the American Government. In his diary he complained: "Hanotaux seems to me to be too outspoken in favor of the Spanish position."²⁴ The historian Christian Schefer makes a valid point when he writes that France wanted the friendship of the United States as insurance against Britain.²⁵

Because of the subjective nature of international law the rights and duties of neutral powers is an area which is troublesome in every war. This was true in the Spanish-American war, but the best historical work of the subject concludes that "in general the war was noteworthy for the small degree of friction with neutrals."²⁶ The close commercial relations between Spain and France made it almost inevitable that the latter would have some disagreements

²⁴Maurice Paléologue, Journal de l'affaire Dreyfus, 1894-1899, (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1955), p. 9.

²⁵Christian Schefer, D'une guerre à l'autre, (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1920), pp. 229-30.

²⁶Benton, Law, p. 218.

with the United States. But these differences were never of great magnitude. The main reason for this was the short duration of the conflict. If it had dragged on for a number of years there would certainly have been many more unpleasant difficulties in Franco-American diplomacy.

When war was declared, France, being a commercial nation, was anxious to learn of America's policy in regard to the neutral powers. This was especially true in light of the fact that the United States was one of the few powers which had never ratified the Declaration of Paris of 1856. On April 26 President McKinley issued a proclamation notifying the neutrals that the American Government would adhere to the Declaration of Paris during the conflict. McKinley's Proclamation obligated the United States to observe four important principles: 1) the neutral flag covers the enemy's goods except for articles of contraband; 2) neutral goods except for contraband, would not be subject to confiscation; 3) a blockade to be binding must be effective; and 4) the right of search would be exercised in conformity with the right of neutrals, and mail steamers would not be interfered with except "on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of contraband or blockade."²⁷ During the course of the war each of these four principles was to

²⁷Proclamation in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. XIV¹, pp. 6474-5. There are six articles in the proclamation.

be important in interpreting the neutrality difficulties between France and the United States.

The first Franco-American disagreement concerning neutral rights resulted from the capture of the French mail vessel, the Lafayette. This packet boat left La Corogne on April 23 on its regular route to Havana Harbor. Since the proclamation of the blockade of Northern Cuba had been announced by McKinley only the day before, the captain of the Lafayette had not had the opportunity to learn of the existence of the blockade. The owner of the ship, anticipating the difficulty, asked Ambassador Cambon to request a special leave of entrance. On May 2 Cambon explained the situation to Secretary of State Day, and the latter telegraphed orders to Admiral Sampson to allow the vessel to enter port. But for some unknown reason the orders did not reach their destination. On May 6 the Lafayette was captured as a prize of war and taken to Key West to be sold.²⁸ Ambassador Cambon was notified of the incident, and he immediately demanded to the Secretary of State that the vessel be released.²⁹ That same day orders were sent to Key West for the release. Because of this prompt release of the Lafayette the affair did not cause any great difficulty in

²⁸Cambon to Day, May 7, 1898, Records of the Department of State, Notes from the French Legation in the United States, Vol. 41. Henceforth this source shall be cited as Notes.

²⁹Cambon to Day, May 6, 1898, Ibid.,

Franco-American relations, but it did create some irritation in France. Cambon wrote to Secretary Day that the incident had been "unfortunate" and that "it could have been falsely interpreted by the French Government." He advised that in the event of a similar situation the French Embassy should be notified more promptly of American intentions.³⁰

Greater difficulties arose with the capture of the Olinde Rodrigues on July 23. This mail steamer was taken as a prize of war nine miles from San Juan, Puerto Rico, while on its regular route from Port-au-Prince to Le Havre, France. Cambon protested this seizure as "arbitrary" and in violation of the principles of McKinley's proclamation on neutral rights.³¹ But as it turned out the matter was quite complex. The Olinde Rodrigues left Le Havre on June 16 on its regular voyage, and eleven days later McKinley announced the blockade of San Juan, Puerto Rico. On July 4 the vessel failed somehow to meet the American blockade and entered the San Juan port. The next day, as the steamer left port, she was stopped by an American man of war. Because of the circumstances, the Olinde Rodrigues was not captured, but the American captain entered an official warning of the blockade on her log book. When, on July 23, the same vessel was headed in the direction of San Juan it was assumed that she

³⁰Cambon to Day, May 9, 1898, Ibid.,

³¹Cambon to Day, July 25, 1898, Ibid.

was attempting to run the blockade, and she was seized as a prize of war and taken to Charlestown, South Carolina. The legality of the capture was a matter to be decided by prize courts, which in America are the regular federal courts.

The fate of the Olinde Rodrigues was decided on the basis of two legal principles: the "effectiveness" of the blockade and the "intent to enter" of the blockade runner. The District Court in Charlestown first decided that the blockade of one warship was ineffective and therefore not binding. The intentions of the vessel were not considered in the decision. The Attorney General did not want this principle to become a precedent, and he appealed the case to the Supreme Court. The highest court reversed the decision on the basis that the blockade was "practically effective" in the circumstances. The court said in effect that the blockade had not been effective against a military fleet, but that it was sufficient to prohibit entrance of unarmed commercial vessels. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the position of the lower court that the vessel be restored to the owner on the basis that "intent to enter" on the part of the Olinde Rodrigues had not been proven. Because of the "suspicious circumstances" connected with the steamer's nearness to San Juan, the court decided that all expenses and losses resulting from the capture should be paid by the

French owner.³² Frenchmen were unhappy with American action in the matter. Cambon believed that the United States should pay an indemnity of \$10,000 to the owner because his daughter had become sick in Charlestown.³³ The French historian Le Fur accused the American Government of "obstinacy in an affair where all the presumptions were in favor of the seized vessel."³⁴ Probably Hanotaux had reference to the incident when he later wrote: "I saw the hour when, because of a matter without importance, we were almost pushed to a rupture; this was one of the worst moments of my ministerial career."³⁵

A third French mail steamer, the Manoubia, was captured eight miles north of Puerto Rico on July 25. The ship had orders to go to Sagua la Grande, a small Cuban port which was not within the area of the American blockade. On route the Manoubia was stopped and searched by an American man of war. The American commander did not possess a good

³²James B. Scott (ed.), Prize Cases Decided in the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1918, Vol. III, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 1863-1884. John B. Moore, "Maritime Law in the War with Spain," Political Science Quarterly, XV, (September, 1900), p. 420.

³³Cambon to Day, May 25, 1898, Notes, Vol. 42.

³⁴Louis Le Fur, Etude sur la guerre hispano-Américaine de 1898 envisagée au point de vue du droit international public, (Paris: A. Pedone, 1899), p. 200. This anti-American work is based on French and Spanish sources. For the other point of view see Benton, Law, p. 207.

³⁵Gabriel Hanotaux, La France vivante: en Amérique du nord, Paris: Librairie Hachette et cie, 1913), p. 146.

knowledge of the geography of the blockade, and finding that the steamer's destination was Cuba, he took it as a prize of war to Charlestown harbor. The Manoubia was not forced to appear before a prize court, but it was made to remain in quarantine for a period of six days. The basis for this action is not clear. Ambassador Cambon vigorously protested the matter to the Department of State. He wrote: "My government is beginning to be justly uneasy of American policy in regard to the unreasonable measures of severity such as those to which the Olinde Rodrigues and the Manoubia have been subjected."³⁶

It was no secret that French industries supplied a large percentage of the Spanish war armaments. The American and French governments disagreed concerning the duty of the neutral government in controlling the sale of such goods to a belligerent. The most dramatic of the differences was the case of the Carlos V, a Spanish man-of-war which was furnished gun-mounts by a Havre firm. The mounts were designed especially for the Carlos V while the vessel was in the port of Havre, and they were sold to Spain after the ship had left France. The United States protested that the action was practically the same as arming the vessel in a French port. Hanotaux responded that "the state of neutrality does not make it necessary to interfere with the commerce of its

³⁶Cambon to Day, August 2, 1898, Notes, Vol. 41.

citizens who remain entirely free to carry on, at their own risks and perils, all commercial operations." In a long memorandum he cited the precedent of British tradition as well as the statements of Thomas Jefferson.³⁷ The Department of State argued that there was a basic difference in ordinary contraband and articles of war measured for a specific man-of-war in a French harbor.³⁸ Hanotaux conceded this theoretical distinction, but he argued that in practice it was impossible for the Foreign Office to know if arms were being sent to a particular man-of-war or to the Spanish navy in general. He therefore refused to take any responsibility in the matter.³⁹ The United States continued to protest the French policy, and the two sides never reached an agreement on this subject, which was made academic in nature by the American military success.⁴⁰

A few French companies hoped to sell ships to Spain through the use of a third party. In May the American Consulate at Bordeaux obtained information that the transatlantic steamer, the Château Lafitte, had been sold to Spain in this way. General Porter protested the matter to Hanotaux

³⁷Hanotaux to Porter, April 26, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 115.

³⁸Porter to Hanotaux, April 28, 1898, Ibid.

³⁹Porter to Day, April 28, 1898, Ibid., no. 228.

⁴⁰Porter to Day, May 7, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 242. Day to Porter, May 29, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 33-4.

and asked that the steamer should not be allowed to leave the Bordeaux Port before there could be an investigation.⁴¹ Not long after this Hanotaux reported that his investigations revealed that the Château Lafitte had not been sold and was not for sale.⁴² It is not clear if this was a result of governmental pressure or if the Bordeaux consulate was badly informed. Hanotaux requested information on the policy of the Federal Government in such matters. Secretary Day replied that "the Department is inclined to treat each case upon its special circumstances rather than to attempt to anticipate the cases that may arise." As was customary in international law the United States did not hold the French Government responsible for the sale of contraband "in the ordinary course of commerce." But the sale of ships or arms were not to be included in this category, for the sale of these goods were interpreted as the same as "the setting on foot of an hostile expedition."⁴³ Later that summer the Department of State learned that in Le Havre a ship was being built to be given to the Spanish navy. Funds were donated by the Association of Spanish Patriots of Argentina. Day sent Porter the instructions: "You are to

⁴¹Porter to Hanotaux, May 10, 1898. Despatches, Vol. 116. Porter to Moore, May 11, 1898, Ibid.

⁴²Porter to Day, May 21, 1898, Ibid., no. 256.

⁴³Day to Porter, June 21, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 49-50.

keep in communication with our Consul at Le Havre, and to see that the ship does not pass into the hands of the Spanish Government during the continuation of the state of war."⁴⁴ But the co-operation of the Quai d'Orsay was not necessary in this instance. The ship was not finished in time to help Spain.

During the course of the war a number of Frenchmen accumulated financial grievances against the United States. The French citizen's only means of obtaining redress was through the American courts, and in most instances these legal suits were not successful. Several landowners in the West Indies suffered property damage caused by American military campaigns. Much of this damage resulted from "unauthorized action of individual soldiers acting, not in the performance of orders, but in violation of the military code," and the Federal Government assumed no responsibility in this category.⁴⁵ Undersea telegraph cables belonging to the Compagnie Francaise des Cables Telegraphiques were destroyed in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Manila. The House committee on war claims recommended that \$77,712 be paid to the French company, and both the President and Secretary of State recommended that Congress pass the

⁴⁴Day to Porter, July 19, 1898, Ibid., p. 72. Day to Porter, August 30, 1898, Ibid., p. 85.

⁴⁵Bacon to Jusserand, October 4, 1907, FR, 1907, pp. 396-7. Jusserand to Root, August 4, 1906, Notes, Vol. 46.

appropriation. The House was slow in the matter and the French Government expressed considerable irritation.⁴⁶ It was not until late in 1903 that the appropriation was finally passed.

French public opinion, as expressed in newspapers and magazines, was overwhelmingly in favor of the Spanish position during the war. The historian Louis M. Sears was the first to seriously study this topic, and he reported that "a search in the library of Congress on material bearing on the subject reveals not a single utterance by any Frenchman which could be viewed as genuinely friendly to the United States."⁴⁷ One American journalist, returning from Europe in the summer of 1898, wrote that to cross the English channel from England into France "was almost like going from one's own into the enemy's country." In France he found "bitter hostility" to the American position, but in England "everybody, classes and masses, rich and poor, are with the Americans."⁴⁸ Horace Porter on a number of occasions talked to Foreign Minister Hanotaux of the implications of this

⁴⁶Jusserand to Hay, February 19, 1903, March 12, 1903, March 12, 1903, Ibid., Vol. 44. Memorandum of the French Embassy, July 20, 1903, Ibid. Benton, Law, p. 211.

⁴⁷Louis M. Sears, "French Opinion of the Spanish-American War," Hispanic American Historical Review, VII (Feb., 1927), p. 25. Although some material was overlooked, this remains the best study of the subject. Because of the broader character of this chapter, I have not quoted as extensively as does Sears in his article.

⁴⁸New York Times, July 1, 1898.

state of things. Always Hanotaux claimed that anti-Americanism was a minority position which did "not represent the government nor the mass of the people," and he said that his government was "anxious to change the tone of what would seem to be the public sentiment."⁴⁴

French journalists were often intemperate in their denunciations of the United States. A popular political cartoon in France pictured the American Republic as a wolf and Spain as a defenseless lamb; a caption asked, "Will the might make right again?"⁵⁰ Paul Fauchille, an authority on international law, claimed that the United States had begun "a war of pure ambition." "Today it is Cuba that they claim," he warned, "Tomorrow it will be the rest of the Antilles, and then everything else of the continent that they do not possess."⁵¹ Most French journalists were content to criticize American policy, and very few went so far as to suggest that France should give military support to Spain. There were some writers who expressed understanding, if not approval, for the American position. Charles Benoist wrote L'Espagne, Cuba et les Etats-Unis while the war was still in progress,

⁴⁹Porter to Day, May 24, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116.

⁵⁰From La Silhouette, quoted in the Review of Reviews, July, 1898.

⁵¹Fauchille was the editor of Revue générale de droit international privé, quoted in Maurice de Beaumarchais, La doctrine de Monroe: l'évolution de la politique des Etats-Unis au XIX^e siècle, (Paris: Maison L. Larose et Forcel, 1898), p. 188.

and while clearly a supporter of Spain, he recognized that the United States had special interests in Cuba as a result of geographical propinquity.⁵² A writer for the Militaire also recognized the validity of the principle of le droit de voisinage. The writer noted that most Frenchmen considered Spain to be "a victim of aggression," but he believed that the history of the United States indicated that the nation did not wish to begin a program of colonial imperialism.⁵³

In the French press one constant theme was the possibility of an Anglo-American alliance as a result of the war. The Fashoda crisis naturally intensified this fear. François Charmes in an editorial in the Revue des Deux Mondes wrote: "The first success of the United States, or the Anglo-Saxon race, against Spain, or the Latin race, have produced an unhealthy intoxication in the British imagination, and Mr. Chamberlain entertains this sentiment more each day."⁵⁴ The anti-Semitic paper, the Libre Parole, stated that the Spanish-American war demonstrated that "the very basis of the Anglo-Saxon and Protestant mind was extreme hatred for the Latin race and Catholicism."⁵⁵ The moderate

⁵²Charles Benoist, L'Espagne, Cuba, et les Etats-Unis, (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1898), p. 123.

⁵³"La guerre actuelle," Militaire, May 4, 1898, clipping from the Hay scrapbook, book 45.

⁵⁴François Charmes, "Chronique de la quinzaine," Revue des Deux Mondes, CXLVII, (June 1, 1898), p. 718.

⁵⁵Libre Parole, April 22, 1898.

republican newspaper, le Journal des débats, was concerned about the possibility of a co-operation between England and America in the Far East.⁵⁶ This newspaper believed that rumors of a real Anglo-American alliance was nothing but speculation, but it feared that England's pro-American policy could not help but produce closer relations between the two countries.⁵⁷

The Royalist press interpreted the war as a conflict between Republicanism and Monarchy in general, and it was therefore especially bitter in denouncing the American position. The Figaro, the most respectable of the Royalist papers, charged that the United States was "urging a war against a weak nation for territorial aggrandizement under the pretense of humanitarian principles."⁵⁸ Consistently the Figaro reported that an American victory would be contrary to French colonial interests, for American expansionism would next be a threat to French colonies. One editorial warned: "The interests of Spain are not alone at stake. On the other side of the Atlantic a great power has arisen . . . she has the gold and the men. She has the fleet and the army There is a new peril: The American peril."⁵⁹

⁵⁶Journal des Débats, July 8, 1898, July 24, 1898.

⁵⁷Ibid., August 15, 1898, November 14, 1897.

⁵⁸Quoted in the New York Times, July 1, 1898, p. 9.

⁵⁹The Figaro, August 5, 1898.

Likewise the Soleil declared: "It is to the interests of Europe to uphold the rights of Spain. The question of Cuba involves not only the influence of Spain, but the influence of Europe in the Antilles and in all of America."⁶⁰ But the Figaro did not want the war to harm the American tourist business in France. It made a point to emphasize: "Americans may continue to visit Paris with perfect freedom; they will find that they are not in the slightest degree personally unpopular here."⁶¹

The Socialist press in France favored the cause of the Cuban revolutionaries, but it could find little good to say about either Spain or the United States.⁶² Before the war George Clemenceau advised Spain that it was in her interests to leave Cuba "instead of persevering in this insane struggle." He argued that "Spain will certainly fight heroically, but it requires only a glance at the resources of the two countries to understand that she will be fatally defeated."⁶³ The editor of La Revue socialiste, Paul Louis, interpreted the policies of Spain as "retrograd obstinance" and a continuation of the ideas of Philip II. Early in the struggle he believed that the United States would "contribute toward emancipating

⁶⁰the Soleil, August 14, 1898.

⁶¹quoted in the Nation, May 17, 1899, Vol. 66, p. 375.

⁶²London Times, April 25, 1898.

⁶³Dépêche (of Toulouse), September 28, 1897.

a people justly seeking independence."⁶⁴ After it was clear that America would annex some territory Louis became more critical of the American cause. He applied a Marxist interpretation to the appearance of American imperialism. The United States had gone to war to find needed markets which were created by the capitalistic system. Louis believed that this need would continue, and therefore he warned: "Who knows at what side the cabinet at Washington will direct its blows, what power it will attack, or what new territory it will attempt to seize."⁶⁵

One of the most interesting accounts of the war appeared in a series in La revue de Paris written by a mysterious Lieutenant X. This eye-witness observer left Saigon for Manila on May 1 on board a French vessel which had orders to observe and report the course of the fighting. Lieutenant X was extremely anti-American. He believed that the United States was hypocritical in claiming to go to war for the benefit of Cuba. On May 1, he predicted that America would annex the Philippines. If the Americans just wanted to liberate the Cubans, he asked, why were they attacking the Philippines?⁶⁶ Especially he feared that the United States and

⁶⁴Paul Louis, "A propos de la guerre Hispano-Américaine," La Revue Socialiste, May, 1898, quoted in Sears, "opinion," p. 29.

⁶⁵Louis, "La situation internationale," Ibid., Vol. XXVIII, Quoted in Ibid., p. 43.

⁶⁶Lieutenant X, "La guerre aux Philippines," La Revue de Paris, IV, (August 1, 1898), p. 521.

England were seeking co-operation in the Far East, and he wrote that eventually these two nations would divide the entire world between themselves.⁶⁷ While observing the Manila conflict he wrote the following words: "We are all convinced that the duty of Europe is to intervene; and we are all persuaded that Europe will not do so. Of what are diplomats made? They have no sense of action. To the Monroe doctrine we should respond with a European doctrine."⁶⁸

A number of ladies aid societies, religious groups and young peoples associations made donations to and expressed support for the Spanish cause. In April there was a large Paris rally of various French teenager associations which was called in order to find ways to help Spain. The organizations which were represented included the General Association of Students, the Colonial Union, the Catholic Circle of Students and the Young Royalists. The enthusiastic assembly formed a special committee which had "the function of organizing collections and circulating propaganda in behalf of Spain."⁶⁹ Likewise the Chambers of Commerce of several towns began collections to aid Spain."⁷⁰ The Cadets in the French Academy for the Marine Infantry passed a resolution

⁶⁷Ibid., August 15, 1898, pp. 882-3.

⁶⁸Ibid., August 1, 1898, p. 515.

⁶⁹Le Temps, April 29, 1898.

⁷⁰Ibid., April 25, 1898.

favoring Spain, and they sent it to Madrid. General Porter protested the action, for the cadets were considered as in the government service. Minister Hanotaux saw that those responsible for the resolution were "properly reprimanded." Porter reported to Washington that the incident had been "worthy of some attention" even if it "was not much more than a boyish prank."⁷¹

During the war there were a few expressions of French sympathy for the United States. The Havre branch of the Association of French Women held a ball in which they collected \$134.47 to be given to American wounded soldiers. The President of the association spoke of "the bonds of friendship which have so long united France with America."⁷² The French Society of the Red Cross, in contrast to several societies in South America, was impartial from the beginning of the conflict. The French society collected subscriptions for the wounded of both sides, and in July it donated twenty-five thousand francs to the American Red Cross "to be used for the relief of the suffering caused by war."⁷³ In the Paris Fourth of July banquet there were many Frenchmen and French officials present. The main speaker was the French

⁷¹Porter to Day, June 7, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 267.

⁷²Porter to Day, October 29, 1898, Ibid., no. 349.

⁷³Moore to Porter, July 11, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 67-8. Le Fur, Etude, pp. 175-6.

Minister of Commerce, M. Maruejouis, who declared in his speech: "Let me affirm to your compatriots that not a day, not an hour, not a minute has the harmony which reigns among us ever even run the risk of being broken."⁷⁴ In the Bastille day celebration in New York the French Consul-General delivered a speech, and he strongly denied that the war had caused any tensions between the two countries. Such reports, he explained, "have emanated from utterly irresponsible persons who desire to create a sensation." France has "always extended a hospitable welcome to visitors from the United States...and shall continue to do so."⁷⁵

Ambassador Cambon, like almost all Frenchmen, was clearly sympathetic to the Spanish position in the struggle. While always careful in his public statements to conceal all traces of anti-Americanism, in his reports to the Quai d'Orsay he complained that "imperialism has become the credo of the Republican Party."⁷⁶ Especially he was critical of Senator Lodge and those who wanted America to become a colonial power. As for McKinley, Cambon wrote: "He has become quite another man since the declaration of war. A worthy man but weak, now that war has been declared, he believes it to be just and

⁷⁴Porter to Day, July 5, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 289. report contains newspaper clippings.

⁷⁵New York Times, July 15, 1898, p. 7.

⁷⁶Cambon to Hanotaux, June 24, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV, no. 241, pp. 356-8.

carries on with all his heart to satisfy his conscience.⁷⁷ Cambon praised Bryan and Cleveland for their position of anti-imperialism, but he had little confidence that they would succeed.⁷⁸ In spite of this Cambon hoped that the war would not be too harmful to Franco-American relations. He was upset by the fact that three-hundred women in Washington had signed a petition to stop buying perfumes and other luxury items from France. He constantly worried that the American press "presents us as violently hostile to the United States," and for this reason he suggested to the Foreign Office that there should be more efforts to control the "violent outbursts in the French press."⁷⁹ But to the American Department of State Cambon always denied that the press in France was anti-American. On one occasion he wrote to Secretary Day: "We protest against the insinuations in the American press, for we do everything in our power to please the American Government."⁸⁰

General Porter likewise attempted to use his influence to smooth over hard feelings between Paris and Washington.

⁷⁷Quoted in Geneviève Tabouis, The Life of Jules Cambon, translated by C.F. Atkinson, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), p. 98. Generally this is not a very helpful work.

⁷⁸Cambon to Hanotaux, June 24, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 241, p. 358.

⁷⁹Cambon to Hanotaux, May 6, 1898, Ibid., no. 179, pp. 262-3.

⁸⁰Cambon to Day, May 16, 1898, Notes, Vol. 41.

He assured his government that the amount of anti-American sentiment in France was exaggerated and that it mostly came from the extreme right. "The anti-Republican press in France," he wrote, "criticizes its Republic nearly as much as it criticizes this Republic, and for some weeks it was annoying, but the Government behaved well throughout." Like Cambon he argued that "many papers have been with us heartily from the start, but their articles are never heard from at home."⁸¹ Early in the war Porter suggested that the American Embassy should employ a skillful French journalist to present the American side of the war in the French newspapers. "If you approve of this," he wrote, "and will place four or five thousand dollars at the disposal of the Embassy I will see that so much as may be necessary shall be used very cautiously and economically."⁸² Shortly thereafter Secretary Day sent him \$2,500 which was to be spent "to improve the friendly feeling in the press."⁸³ Porter only spent \$500 of the sum for propaganda, for American military success made such efforts largely unnecessary.⁸⁴

It was the American victories that more than anything

⁸¹Porter to Hanna, August 2, 1898, Porter papers, box 3.

⁸²Porter to Day, May 24, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116.

⁸³Day to Porter, June 10, 1898, Instructions, no. 237.

⁸⁴Porter to Hay, December 19, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 381.

else improved the position of the United States in the French press, for as Ernest May writes, "the fact of power was hard to deny."⁸⁵ After the victory at Manila Bay General Porter reported: "After the totally unexpected result, to people in Europe, at Manila, the general opinion began to change very perceptibly. Another victory will speak more eloquently than any newspaper articles."⁸⁶ Later he wrote: "The result is everywhere felt by us abroad, as hats are raised considerably higher to Americans and the power of our country and the great qualities of our people have been impressed upon other nations as never before."⁸⁷ The French press in the summer of 1898 indicates that Porter's analysis was correct. After the first two months of the war, when there was no doubt as to the outcome, one finds fewer and fewer outbursts against the United States. The conservative Royalist newspapers ceased to speak in behalf of Spain. The moderate Republican press began to advise Spain to face unpleasant realities and to sue for peace. Le Temps, for example, wrote that "peace must be made, and the longer it is deferred the more cruel will be the sacrifices which will be required."⁸⁸

⁸⁵Ernest May, Democracy, p. 239.

⁸⁶Porter to Day, May 24, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116.
Day to Porter, June 16, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 46-7.

⁸⁷Porter to Hay, September 6, 1898, quoted in Meade, Soldier, p. 220.

⁸⁸Le Temps, June 11, 1898. Also see Journal des Débats, July 8, 1898, July 24, 1898, July 31, 1898.

François Charmes in the Revue des Deux Mondes wrote that Spain had lost enough blood to maintain her honor and that to continue the war would serve no useful purpose.⁸⁹

The Nobel prize winning novelist, Anatole France, in his L'anneau d'améthyste, written in 1899, includes an interesting salon scene in which the subject of conversation is the Spanish-American war. In the scene everyone was entirely anti-American and pro-Spanish. One man asked a French general if he thought that the "bandit Americans" might win. The general answered that it would be very unlikely because of the superior experience of the Spanish navy. Hearing this a woman exclaimed: "Quel bonheur! Nos amis les Espagnols seront victorieux. Vive le roi!" Another man remarked that "the military success of our neighbors will be received with favor in France." A few hours later the general received a telegram which stated that Dewey had been completely victorious in Manila Bay. The people in the salon were shocked at the news, and the majority believed that it was false American propaganda.⁹⁰

⁸⁹François Charmes, "Chronique de la quinzaine," Revue des Deux Mondes, Vol. CXLVIII, July 15, 1898, pp. 495-6. Ibid., August 1, 1898, p. 734. The Outlook late in May wrote that French newspapers were "changing their tone." LIX, (May 28, 1898), p. 203.

⁹⁰Anatole France, L'anneau d'améthyste, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, n.d.), pp. 141-8. It should be noted that this is a work of satire directed against political and religious conservatism in Europe. It is obvious that Anatole France is antagonistic to Royalist Spain.

French prestige in the United States did temporarily suffer as a result of the pro-Spanish sentiment in France, but it would be false to say that the reaction created any general hostility towards France.⁹¹ Albert Shaw in the American Monthly Review of Reviews wrote that "we have no cause for serious complaint." Early in the conflict the French "were humbugged by their mercenary newspapers," but they were "rapidly seeing their mistake."⁹² The Outlook expressed the hope that "sooner or later the keen intelligence which is sometimes obscured but never wholly destroyed in France must discern the facts in the Cuban situation."⁹³ The Philadelphia Ledger regretted the expression of unfriendliness in France, but stated that despite this Americans continued to have "the warmest and most cordial feelings for France." This sympathy had been strengthened "by her adoption in 1871 of a Republican form of government so much like our own."⁹⁴ It should be observed that during the war one does not find a great deal written about France in American newspapers.

Anti-imperialists in America were especially tolerant

⁹¹White, Opinion, p. 224.

⁹²American Monthly Review of Reviews, XVII, (July 21, 1898), pp. 426-7.

⁹³The Outlook, May 28, 1898.

⁹⁴Philadelphia Ledger, April 28, 1898, quoted in White, Opinion, pp. 224-5.

of French opposition to the American position in the war. The Nation reported that French opposition was to be expected for three reasons. First, there were financial ties between France and Spain. Secondly, "they are of the same religion--and religion still counts with the bulk of Frenchmen--and rely on the same saints in time of difficulty and danger." Finally, both nations "attach great importance to manners, and the American indifference to manners has always enraged them both to equal degrees. This war has, unhappily, brought out this trait in our character with unusual prominence. There was probably never a war with so little attention to forms and preceded by so much billingsgate."⁹⁵ On another occasion The Nation declared: "From what we can learn, the general public has never shared in the newspaper feelings, or assumed feelings against America. French shopkeepers and artists remain as willing to see the color of American gold as ever, and say so."⁹⁶

The greatest hostility to France naturally came from the proponents of the "large policy" of colonial empire. Theodore Roosevelt, just after the war, wrote to a British friend congratulating him on the success of England during the Fashoda crisis. Roosevelt wrote: "I think that France was right not to fight you for you would have done her up

⁹⁵The Nation, LXVI (April 28, 1898), p. 315.

⁹⁶Ibid., May 19, 1898, p. 375.

to an absolute certainty; and I personally think the task would have been an easy one. The day of the Latin races is over." He complimented England's attitude during the Spanish-American war, and he expressed the conviction that "it saved us from a chance of very serious foreign complications." As a result "the English-speaking peoples are now closer together than for a century and a quarter." Roosevelt concluded that the two countries should maintain this unity for "their interests are really fundamentally the same, and they are more closely akin, not merely in blood, but in feeling and principle, than either is akin to any other."⁹⁷ British-American unity in the year 1898, of course, implied that the relations between France and the United States would not be very friendly.

After the first month of fighting the situation of Spain was hopeless. In this situation the French Government decided to make timid and unofficial peace overtures to the two belligerents. The first indication of French initiatives was a speech by President Felix Faure at St. Etienne on June 1. In this speech the President of the Republic departed from his custom of remaining silent on foreign affairs. Without being specific he declared: "We are resolved to carefully observe a strict neutrality, but we cannot help from hoping that circumstances will give the neutral states an

⁹⁷Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, November 25, 1898, Morison, II, no. 1091, p. 890.

opportunity to demonstrate their good will by working with both parties for the recovery of peace."⁹⁸

The early peace initiatives were largely the work of Foreign Minister Hanotaux.⁹⁹ A few days after President Faure's speech Hanotaux spoke to General Porter of his desire for peace. He said that the French Government was anxious that French creditors might lose as little as possible. Hanotaux expressed his conviction that Spain would "fight to the bitter end" unless she could be given reasonable terms for a settlement. If the United States would outline a moderate plan, France would use her influence to try to get Spain to accept it. Hanotaux suggested that the Spanish Government could probably be convinced to accept a settlement which included three principles: first a general election in Cuba to decide the island's fate; second, an American guarantee that Cuba would pay its debt to Spain; and third, the United States would agree to renounce all claims to the Philippines. Porter responded that he doubted that the last two proposals would be acceptable to Washington, but he agreed to forward the suggested plan to the Department of State. In his report Porter suggested that Hanotaux would be "the person whom Spain would trust rather than any

⁹⁸Porter to Day, June 3, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116.

⁹⁹One biographer falsely attributes Delcassé with beginning the initiative toward a peace settlement. Alberic Neton, Delcassé, (Paris: Avenue Hoche, 1952), p. 11.

other statesman in Europe to bring about negotiations for peace." He therefore wrote that French good offices might be useful "to sugar-coat the pill which Spain would be obliged to swallow."¹⁰⁰ Secretary of State Day instructed Porter to do or say nothing that might give the appearance that the United States was anxious for negotiations, but he also instructed the American Ambassador to avoid "repelling the friendly overtures of Mr. Hanotaux."¹⁰¹

The French Government hoped to encourage a peace settlement before the Spanish fleet in the West Indies was completely destroyed.¹⁰² Ambassador Cambon shared this view, and he encouraged Hanotaux to intervene more energetically. He wrote that if Spain waited any longer to make peace she would be "completely at the mercy of the United States."¹⁰³ On June 12 Hanotaux informed General Porter that he would have the French Ambassador in Madrid use his influence to encourage a spirit of compromise. This would be done "unofficially and in a friendly manner." Hanotaux further stated that he was convinced that Spain was "ready for making peace

¹⁰⁰Porter to Day, June 7, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116.

¹⁰¹Day to Porter, July 6, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 63-4.

¹⁰²Porter to Day, June 10, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 272.

¹⁰³Jules Cambon to Delcassé, July 8, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 242, pp. 272-3.

now, while she may still save something."¹⁰⁴ The next day he told Porter that Leon Y Castillo, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, had full power for negotiating a declaration of peace, and that he wanted to meet with Porter as soon as possible.¹⁰⁵ But Secretary of State Day instructed Porter that "under no circumstances" was he "to admit European interference in any form." He could receive and transmit Castillo's proposals, but he could not open formal negotiations. In addition Day cautioned: "Conversation in a quarter as to possible contingencies and terms of peace should be avoided because any utterances by you may be misunderstood."¹⁰⁶

Hanotaux's peace overtures failed because in June neither Spain nor the United States was willing to make the concessions which would have been necessary for a settlement. When Delcassé took charge of the Quai d'Orsay, he discontinued the efforts to get Porter and Castillo together. The new Foreign Minister told Porter that he "felt sure that any movement by a neutral power to interfere in any way in the matter would be misinterpreted and would produce only bad results." Delcassé did add that if he were asked by the

¹⁰⁴Porter to Day, June 13, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116.

¹⁰⁵Porter to Day, June 13, 1898, June 18, June 21, Ibid., no. 279.

¹⁰⁶Day to Porter, June 18, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, p. 55.

two governments to act as an intermediary "in his private and unofficial capacity," he would then be "most happy to put himself at their disposal and do his best to serve them."¹⁰⁷ The United States never took advantage of this offer. Castillo did make a few more efforts to meet with Porter, but the latter declined the overtures for he feared that a meeting "might have involved only unprofitable discussion."¹⁰⁸ Members of the French foreign service did make a few unofficial gestures to encourage peace. The influential French Ambassador in Denmark, Jean Jules Jusserand, expressed the fact that France desired peace to Henry White, the first secretary of the American Embassy at London. White responded that peace "could be on easy terms for Spain if she would sue for it." Jusserand assured him that France was entirely neutral and that "the reported alliance between France, Spain and Japan was all bosh."¹⁰⁹

After the failure of Castillo's peace overtures in Paris the Spanish Government decided to sue for peace directly

¹⁰⁷Porter to Day, July 21, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 302.

¹⁰⁸Porter to Day, July 21, 1898, Ibid., no number. In December Porter wrote: "Please do not publish any of the despatches concerning the Spanish Ambassador's unofficial overtures to me with regard to opening negotiations for the peace through this embassy." Porter to Hay, December 9, 1898, Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Memorandum of White, quoted in Alan Nevins, Henry White: Thirty Years in American Diplomacy, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930), pp. 137-8. Conversation also in Jean Jules Jusserand, What Me Befell; The Reminiscences of J. J. Jusserand, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933), pp. 166-7.

in Washington. The Spanish Minister of State, the Duke d'Almodovar del Rio, on July 22 wrote a letter to President McKinley asking "upon what basis might be established a political status in Cuba and might be terminated a strife which might continue without season."¹¹⁰ Ambassador Cambon was requested to present the peace message to the President.¹¹¹ When Cambon, on June 26, delivered the note, McKinley asked him for his opinions and observations. In response Cambon said only that he hoped that the United States would be "humane, Christian and generous." The President, according to Cambon, seemed very happy to receive the Spanish appeal.¹¹² Meanwhile in Paris General Porter told Hanotaux optimistically: "I am persuaded that now things will move fast."¹¹³

Three days later both the United States and Spain submitted a list of conditions which they considered necessary before there could be an armistice. The two governments agreed that Spain would give up control of Cuba and that there would be a reasonable indemnity. On the issue of the ownership of the territories, however, they were not in accord. Spain absolutely refused to give up her sovereignty

¹¹⁰Duc d'Almodoval del Rio to McKinley, July 22, 1898, FR, 1998, pp. 1819-20; DDF, Vol. XIV, pp. 400-2; Notes, Vol. 41.

¹¹¹Delcassé to Cambon, July 19, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV, no. 260, pp. 392-3.

¹¹²Cambon to Delcassé, July 27, 1898, Ibid., no. 266, pp. 402-3.

¹¹³Ibid., note 1, p. 403.

over any colony other than Cuba. The United States demanded ownership of Porto Rico, the other Spanish islands in the West Indies, plus one island of the Landrones. Also the American Government required that the future "disposition" of the Philippines should be left open and decided later at the peace conference.¹¹⁴ There was clearly an impasse. Meanwhile fighting continued, and it would require two more weeks of diplomatic haggling before an armistice could be agreed upon.

Officially Ambassador Cambon was nothing but an intermediary delivering the Spanish terms to the American President. He did, however, argue strongly in behalf of the position of Spain. He maintained that the cession of Cuba was "sufficient as an indemnity" and that no further territorial cession would be required. President McKinley replied that additional Spanish concessions would be necessary in order to satisfy the American public. In one particular McKinley was persuaded by Cambon to make a change in the wording of the American position. In the first American draft it was stated that a special commission would establish the "possession" of the Philippines. Cambon suggested that the word "disposition" would be more acceptable to the Spanish Government and would not prejudice future negotiations. This suggestion was followed. McKinley told Cambon that he was

¹¹⁴d'Almodovar to Delcassé, July 19, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 267, pp. 404-6.

personally sorry that Spain had not given in earlier so as to make it possible to offer less stringent terms. In his report of this meeting Cambon telegraphed Delcassé: "I regret that I have not been able to obtain greater concessions; I fear that henceforth the position of the White House will be unmoveable."¹¹⁵

Early in August the Spanish Minister of State asked Cambon for his opinion of the political situation in Washington. Cambon responded that he was convinced that McKinley was inflexible on the issues of Porto Rico and the Philippines. Cambon advised: "And since your Excellency gives me the honor of asking my personal opinion, I can only answer that it is my conviction that any hesitation on the part of Spain will aggravate the situation and make American demands more rigorous."¹¹⁶ Cambon's analysis of the situation turned out to be correct, and the interests of Spain would have been served if his advice had been requested earlier.

After receiving Cambon's viewpoint the Spanish Government agreed to all of the American conditions with the exception of the immediate evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico.

¹¹⁵Cambon to Delcassé, July 29, 1898, Ibid., no. 268, pp. 406-13.

¹¹⁶Cambon to the Minister of State in Madrid (through Delcassé), August 4, 1898, Ibid., no. 276, p. 427. Cambon wrote to Delcassé that earlier he could have asked for less severe terms, but because of the suffering of American troops from Yellow Fever it was "too late." The refusal of Madrid to come to terms would provoke an "explosion of furor." Cambon to Delcassé, August 6, 1898, Ibid., no. 280, pp. 232-3.

The Spanish constitution made it necessary for the Cortes to concur in such a move, and it would therefore take time.¹¹⁷ Delivering this message on August 10, Cambon found that McKinley and Day were disappointed with the news. The President said that he had expected "categorical acceptance" and could not agree to a delay resulting from reasons of Spain's internal politics. Cambon asked what Spain should be advised to do. McKinley suggested that Spain could agree to the formation of a special commission for negotiating the Spanish withdrawal of Porto Rico and Cuba, and secondly, Spain could authorize Cambon to sign a protocol for the meeting of plenipotentiaries to meet in Paris to negotiate a peace treaty.¹¹⁸ Cambon reported the details of the interview to Madrid, and on August 12 he received authorization to sign an armistice and the preliminary protocol.¹¹⁹ Later that same day the French Ambassador and the American Secretary of State met to sign the arrangements.¹²⁰ This ended the bulk of the French diplomatic effort in behalf of Spain.

The diplomacy of Cambon was skillful and effective. The basic factor in facilitating an armistice was the complete

¹¹⁷duc d'Almodovar to Day (through Delcassé), August 7, 1898, Ibid., no. 289, pp. 436-9.

¹¹⁸Cambon to the Duke of Almodovar (through Delcassé), August 10, 1898, Ibid., no. 284, pp. 444-5. Also see Tabouis, Cambon, p. 104.

¹¹⁹Cambon to Day, August 12, FR, 1898, pp. 825-6.

¹²⁰Text in Ibid., pp. 828-30.

hopelessness of the Spanish cause, but it seems that Cambon did make a contribution, however small, to the fact that the armistice was signed as quickly as it was. After the signing of the protocol, Secretary Day wrote Cambon that he had "been instrumental in contributing to this auspicious result." Day wrote that he recognized that France had been close to Spain because of "propinquity and intimate association," but he added that the United States was entirely satisfied with France's diplomatic position during the war.¹²¹ Shortly after the armistice the Spanish Government suggested that Spanish Consul of Canada be sent to Washington to take charge of the Spanish Embassy.¹²² The Department of State decided that because a state of war continued to exist it was better that Spanish-American relations "continue to be conducted through the very acceptable channel through which they have heretofore been made since the beginning of the war."¹²³ Later the Spanish Government suggested sending an "unofficial representative" to Washington, and the department responded that the earlier reply "answered by anticipation the present

¹²¹Day to Cambon, August 15, 1898, FR, 1898, pp. 827-8. On Cambon's roll in the negotiations see George Bonnet, Miracle de la France, 1870-1919, (Paris: Fayard, 1965), p. 96.

¹²²Cambon to Day, August 17, 1898, FR, 1898, p. 802.

¹²³Moore to Cambon, August 19, Ibid., p. 803.

communication."¹²⁴ This seemed to indicate that the Department of State was satisfied with Cambon's diplomacy.

The French Government was happy with the choice of Paris for the negotiations. General Porter had earlier suggested Paris would be an ideal site because the French "take a pride in the fact that the city has been the place where so many important conferences have been held."¹²⁵ He believed that another advantage was the fact that "Paris is the city in closest communication socially and financially with Madrid."¹²⁶ At first McKinley and Day had preferred Washington as a location for peace talks. Ambassador Cambon argued that it would facilitate the negotiations if the location were in a neutral country such as France. The Spanish Government strongly agreed with this point of view, and on August 1 Secretary Day agreed to Paris as a site.¹²⁷ This decision was received with a great deal of favor in France, and General Porter was of the opinion that it did much to

¹²⁴Day to Cambon, August 24, 1898, Ibid., pp. 806-7. But in October the French Embassy made an appeal in behalf of Spanish colonies, and the United States refused to discuss the matter with the reason that there were negotiations in Paris. Hay to Thiébaud, October 29, 1898, Ibid., p. 817.

¹²⁵Porter to Day, June 21, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 279.

¹²⁶Porter to Day, July 13, 1898, Ibid.

¹²⁷Cambon to Delcassé, August 1, 1898, DDF, Vol. XIV¹, no. 273, pp. 420-1.

improve Franco-American relations.¹²⁸ Several Englishmen, on the other hand, feared that the choice of Paris would give France even greater influence on Spanish foreign policy.¹²⁹

The proximity of the Philippines to French Indo-China made the French Government unhappy about the prospects of the Philippines becoming an American possession. General Porter reported that French officials worried that the American ownership of the islands would "further complicate the Eastern Question." He received unofficial information that the French Government would prefer to see the United States take possession of Cuba and let Spain retain the Philippines.¹³⁰ The French Government did not try to influence the Paris negotiations in the matter, for they realized that such action had no chance of success. In Washington Cambon and other French representatives did support the Spanish argument that the United States did not have the right to maintain political control over Manila before the final treaty terms were decided. The United States did not agree, and the French Government dropped the matter.¹³¹

¹²⁸Meade, Soldier, p. 129.

¹²⁹Sir Henry Wolff to Salisbury, August 14, 1898, BD, Vol. II, pp. 254-5.

¹³⁰Porter to Day, June 10, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 272.

¹³¹Embassy of France to the Department of State, September 11, 1898, FR, 1898, pp. 813-4. The Department of State to the French Embassy, September 16, 1898, Ibid., pp. 814-5. Thiébaud to Hay, October 4, 1898, Ibid., pp. 815-7. Hay to Thiébaud, October 29, 1898, Ibid., p. 817.

The French Government recognized that the alternative to American ownership of the islands was most likely ownership by Germany or England. For this reason the French Government believed that it could live with the terms of the Treaty of Paris.

Following the war the French press was very critical of American annexation of the Philippine Islands. The war against Aguinaldo and the Philippine insurrectionists was taken as proof of America's hypocrisy in earlier criticizing Spanish colonialism. Le Temps wrote: "What a scandal! They went to war under the pretext of liberating the Philippines and of giving an oppressed people the right to govern themselves. They have ended by a conquest of force and the imposing of an unwanted regime."¹³² A later editorial noted that McKinley did not have the authority of Congress for the military operations in the Philippines, and the article concluded that "this is the President's war made with the money and the soldiers of the United States."¹³³ In regard to the war in the Philippines the unknown lieutenant X wrote: "The Americans massacre the natives in the name of the dollar as the Spanish did in the name of the Saints. The liberty of the Philippines has survived exactly

¹³²Le Temps, January 11, 1898.

¹³³Ibid., August 5, 1905.

the amount of time which it was necessary for the Americans to substitute their tyranny for that of Spain."¹³⁴

In the few years following the Treaty of Paris there appeared a whole stream of French books on the new role of the United States as a major world power, and with few exceptions they were critical of the American Republic. In the first scholarly study of the diplomacy of the Spanish-American war Louis Le Fur emphasized that the United States had become a colonial power "in one blow" and "at the expense of Spain." He wrote that the Republic had "broken with the Monroe Doctrine and decided to play her part in the concert of the great powers." Le Fur feared that in the international situation this could create "new germs of discord and hate."¹³⁵ The diplomatic historian Achille Viallate observed that the war "was a definite mark of the passage of the United States from the rank of a purely American power to the rank of a world power." He wrote: "Because of their great number, their riches, their force of expansion, their fighting spirit, their national pride, the United States trouble the world and make us wonder if there will be the Americanization of the world."¹³⁶ Hector Petin believed that the United States had

¹³⁴Lieutenant X, "Guerre," La Revue de Paris, Vol. VI (November 15, 1899), pp. 393-4.

¹³⁵Le Fur, Etude, pp. 310-2, 314.

¹³⁶Achille Viallate, Essais d'histoire diplomatique américaine, (Paris: E. Guilmoto, 1905), p. 105.

seized the Philippines "without any regard for international law" and "without concern for the people of the Philippines."

He feared that the annexation of the Philippines and the Hawaiian islands indicated that the United States was extending the Monroe Doctrine to the entire Pacific.¹³⁷

Maurice de Beaumarchais repeated this theme, and he believed that the Spanish nation had "manifested a moderation and a dignity that made a singular contrast with the violent and outrageous American actions."¹³⁸

The well-known historian Henry Hauser was shocked at the "hypocrisy" of America's claiming to go to war to liberate Cuba and then using the war to become a colonial empire. He declared: "When they take a colony, it is with a brutality and a contempt for forms which surpass the most shameless European aggressions. An explosion, which was probably accidental, of one of their ships was sufficient reason for them to expunge Spain from the new world." He was disappointed that the United States had ceased to become a "pacifistic democracy," and he was convinced that "the most surprising event in the last years of the nineteenth century is the entry of the United States into the politics

¹³⁷Hector Pétin. Les Etats-Unis et la Doctrine de Monroe, (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1900), pp. 418, 423, 435-6.

¹³⁸Maurice de Beaumarchais, La doctrine de Monroe: l'évolution de la politique des Etats-Unis au xix^e siècle, (Paris: Ancienne Maison L. Larose et Forcel, 1898), p. 187.

of world imperialism."¹³⁹ Frantz Despagne, another serious historian, regretted that France had not been able to achieve "more just terms" for Spain. Nevertheless he had no doubts of the fact that France had "fulfilled to the utmost her pacifying role in helping terminate a war, which, if continued, would have menaced Europe by resulting in an even greater increase of American conquests."¹⁴⁰ An economist, Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, wrote that America was determined to dominate the Pacific. He believed that this would require strong coaling stations in the Philippines and a canal through Central America.¹⁴¹

French diplomatic leaders were unhappy with the outcome of the war. Ambassador Cambon feared that the new American predominance in South America was a major economic threat to French interests. In the same context he complained: "From a moral point of view, our intellectual influence and French culture in the American hemisphere are being brusquely eliminated by the United States."¹⁴² But French officials

¹³⁹Henry Hauser, L'impérialisme américain, (Paris: Pages libres, 1905), pp. 67, 86.

¹⁴⁰Frantz Despagne, La diplomatie de la troisième république et le droit des gens, (Paris: Librairie de la société de recueil sirez, 1904), pp. 795-6.

¹⁴¹Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les Etats-Unis: Puissance Coloniale," Revue des Deux Mondes, VII (January 1, 1902), pp. 110-2.

¹⁴²Cambon to Delcassé, May 29, 1900, DDF, Vol. XVI¹, no. 159, p. 252.

also breathed a sigh of relief when peace was restored. Before the Chamber of Deputies Delcassé declared: "Policy, race, commercial relations, mutual esteem and friendship, a thousand diverse and powerful reasons made us wish that this war which we viewed with regret, would come to an end."¹⁴³ Hanotaux later admitted that "the proximity of France to Spain created a feeling of friendship and good will toward the neighboring kingdom." He claimed that "there was nothing underneath, in the policy of France toward the United States; or rather, if there was anything underneath it was all sympathy and cordiality." Hanotaux concluded that for Franco-American relations the war was "a critical period, which was more important and more dangerous than one can imagine so long afterwards."¹⁴⁴

If France's diplomacy is to be seen in perspective it is necessary to compare it to that of Germany and England. France was not guilty of Germany's tactlessness which left a heritage of bitterness and suspicion in German-American relations. France committed no indiscretion to be compared to Vice Admiral von Diederichs' exploits at Manila or the

¹⁴³Journal officiel de la république française, Chambre, I (January 23, 1899, p. 146.

¹⁴⁴Gabriel Hanotaux, "Le Général Porter et l'affaire de Cuba," Letter of July 27, 1927, in Meade, Soldier, pp. 201-3.

German attempts to gain territory as a result of the war.¹⁴⁵ Great Britain, on the other hand, pursued a policy that made for better American relations. The colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, and other British statesmen encouraged the United States to annex the Philippines, and the British press was favorable to the American side in the conflict. Although historians disagree concerning the influence of the war on Anglo-American relations, it is clear that there was a new closeness between the new countries after 1898.¹⁴⁶ For France, the Spanish-American war did not have any extreme results in her American relations, and this is one reason that historians have not paid much attention to France's role during the conflict.

In summary, during the Spanish-American war there were difficulties in Franco-American relations, but these difficulties were never really serious. One standard historical

¹⁴⁵Langer, Imperialism, p. 519. Andrew Dickson White, Autobiography, (New York: Century, 1905), Vol. II, pp. 170-1. Two important articles emphasize that Germany did not want to anger the United States. Thomas Bailey, "Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," American Historical Review, VI (October, 1939), pp. 59-82. Lester Shippee, "Germany and the Spanish-American War," American Historical Review, XXX (July, 1925), pp. 754-7.

¹⁴⁶See Gelber, Friendship, pp. 30-2; Campbell, Understanding, pp. 44-55; Alfred Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1938), pp. 30-1. Robert Neale minimized the effects of the war on the relations between the governments of Britain and the United States, and supports the thesis that the British press was more pro-American than was the British Government. Neale, Expansion, pp. 205, 213.

work on the subject of the American conquest of the Philippines concludes that France was "bound by tradition and financial interests" to Spain, but that despite this "she was friendly to the United States."¹⁴⁷ This is perhaps an overstatement, but it is generally correct. The war did not leave any legacy of hard feelings, and the restoration of peace presented the opportunity for a new Franco-American rapprochement. The extent to which this opportunity was realized in the subsequent few years is the subject matter for the following chapters of this study.

¹⁴⁷Livezey and Grunder, Philippines, p. 15.

CHAPTER IV

THE MOVEMENT TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT

With the ending of the Spanish-American War there was an immediate improvement in relations between the United States and France, and this improvement continued almost unbroken until the first World War. Largely this was an accident of historical circumstances which resulted in a general harmony of interests. But in addition to this, there were efforts made by many groups and many individuals which were consciously directed toward this goal. For example, the two French Foreign Ministers, Gabriel Hanotaux and Théophile Delcassé, both realized the importance of the potential diplomatic support which might be obtained from the American Republic, and this consideration was an important aspect of the foreign policy of both men. In the preceding chapter it was seen that Hanotaux was anxious that the French Government remain neutral during the war, and after leaving the Quai d'Orsay, he continued to try to improve Franco-American relations. Delcassé was no less anxious to continue this diplomatic effort. His best biographer has demonstrated that Delcassé "saw in the ever

growing United States a useful addition to his system of ententes, and systematically set about wooing the new power."¹

During the first decade of the twentieth century American foreign policy was largely dominated by one man-- Theodore Roosevelt. For this reason, in the study of Franco-American relations, it is of primary importance to consider Roosevelt's conception of France. Before becoming President he generally expressed a general disdain for French culture. As a student at Harvard he wrote that his most difficult study was "that villainous French."² In several letters he wrote that the French were not progressive or capable of self-government, and for this reason he was convinced that "the day of the Latin races is almost over."³ Roosevelt was at one time concerned that the French Canadians were "swarming into New England with ominous rapidity."⁴ One of his major criticisms of Jefferson was that as President

¹Porter, Delcassé, pp. 154, 325. Porter adds that "after the 'happy mediation' of Delcassé which put an end to the Spanish-American War he was able to render Franco-American relations still more close and still more confident." p. 154. Probably Porter exaggerates the role of Delcassé in the improvement of relations.

²Carleton Putnam, Theodore Roosevelt: The Formative Years, 1855-1886, (New York: Charles Schreiber's Sons, 1958), p. 140.

³Roosevelt to Bryce, November 25, 1898, Morison, Roosevelt, II, p. 889. Roosevelt to Sternburg, October 11, 1901, Morison, Roosevelt, III, p. 173.

⁴Roosevelt to Francis Parkman, May 22, 1898, Morison, Roosevelt, I, pp. 282-3.

"Jefferson put the interests of France above the interests and honor of America."⁵ In 1898 Roosevelt wrote that France had been unfriendly toward the United States for more than a century, and he hoped that the American Government would not "submit" to French efforts to increase her colonial empire in South America.⁶ At the time of the Boxer Rebellion Roosevelt felt it easy to believe reports that the French soldiers had been "inefficient as well as inconceivably and wantonly cruel towards the Chinese."⁷

After becoming President, Roosevelt became much more favorable toward France. At the time of his European trip of 1910 he wrote of his admiration for French rulers:

It shows my own complacent Anglo-Saxon ignorance that I had hitherto rather looked down upon French public men, and have thought of them as people of marked levity. When I met them, I found that they had just as solid characters as English and American public men.⁸

While President, Roosevelt did not denounce French culture in his letters as he had earlier, and indeed, at times he

⁵Roosevelt to Francis Moore, February 9, 1898, Ibid., pp. 771-2.

⁶Roosevelt to Francis Moore, February 5, 1898, Ibid., pp. 768-9.

⁷Roosevelt to Sternburg, March 8, 1901, Morison, Roosevelt, III, pp. 5-6. Roosevelt to Sternburg, November 19, 1900, Morison, Roosevelt, II, p. 1428. Roosevelt to Gerald Kitson, May 4, 1901, Morison, Roosevelt, III, p. 70.

⁸Roosevelt to George Jevelyan, October 1, 1911, Morison, Roosevelt, VII, p. 380.

appeared to be somewhat pro-French.⁹ It should be pointed out that the letters of Roosevelt do not often reflect systematic conceptions about the nations of the world. Roosevelt wrote what was on his mind at the time, and he adapted his letter to the person to whom he was writing. Yet there is a noticable change in the general description of France that appears in Roosevelt's correspondence. This improvement resulted from a number of considerations. Primarily, it was because Roosevelt became convinced that the interests of France and the United States were complementary to each other. The increasing competition with Germany, Russia, and then Japan caused him to desire the diplomatic support of France. Also there is reason to believe that Roosevelt was influenced by two skillful French Ambassadors, Jules Cambon and Jean-Jules Jusserand. Roosevelt was a man who was influenced by personal relationships, and both men tried to use this to the advantage of France.

Jules Cambon was the French Ambassador for the first year and a half of Roosevelt's administration, and during this time Roosevelt and Cambon became very close friends. Always, Cambon expressed a profound admiration for the American President in his diplomatic reports, correspondence not intended for publicity. In one despatch he described

⁹Roosevelt to Delcassé, October 18, 1904, Morison, Roosevelt, V, p. 365. Roosevelt to Carnegie, August 6, 1906, Ibid., p. 345. Jusserand to Delcassé, October 18, 1904, DDF, Vol. V², no. 380, p. 475. Jusserand, Befell, pp. 275-6.

Roosevelt as "skillful in flattering opinion, simple, unselfish" and "anything but a vulgar personage." Yet Cambon also wrote that Roosevelt was an imperialist who "loves war, and thinks it necessary to humanity and to the greatness of the United States." It is significant that Cambon, who was suspicious of American ambitions, did not think that Roosevelt as President would be a real danger to French interests.¹⁰ Roosevelt and Cambon had a number of lengthy conversations. In 1902 Cambon was once pleased to report that Roosevelt had expressed his conviction that it was in the American interests to work for closer co-operation with France. Cambon was equally pleased that Roosevelt indicated fears of Germany's intentions.¹¹

Any study of Franco-American relations early in the twentieth century would have to take into account the influence of Jean-Jules Jusserand, who was Ambassador in Washington from 1902 to 1925.¹² Jusserand, was chosen to go to the United States following a successful career in Denmark,

¹⁰Tabouis, Cambon, pp. 107-8.

¹¹Cambon to Delcassé¹, January 15, 1902, DDF, Vol. 11², no. 32, p. 33.

¹²In 1936 a memorial stone of Jusserand was placed at Rock Creek Park. At the dedication Franklin D. Roosevelt declared: "We know his splendid career as the representative of our Sister Republic, the deep friendship between himself and Theodore Roosevelt, his wide knowledge and understanding of the American people." William Paris et al., Jean-Jules Jusserand: Ambassador of the French Republic to the United States of America, 1902-1925, (New York: Jusserand Memorial Committee, 1937), pp. 19-20.

and he was especially prepared to go to an English speaking country because of his knowledge of English history and literature. His works English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages (1899) and Shakespeare in France (1898) were recognized as major historical contributions. Roosevelt, who was an omnivorous reader, was delighted that Jusserand was to take charge of the French Embassy. Before their first meeting, Roosevelt is reported to have said: "I have bought the works of the French Ambassador, and I am ready to pass an examination on them."¹³ After the formal diplomatic introduction, the two men spoke of literature and politics. Roosevelt compared English medieval life with observations in Colorado, and Jusserand was impressed with the President's knowledge as well as his ability to speak French.¹⁴ The following day Roosevelt wrote to his son: "He is a nice little man, very dark and dapper, and is really a fine scholar. Having the diplomats presented to me is an awful bore as a rule. But this was a different matter; I kept him talking for an hour."¹⁵

Shortly after the formal presentation, Roosevelt invited Jusserand to join him in a walk in Rock Creek Park. In his memoirs Jusserand described this experience: "a run:

¹³Jusserand, Befell, p. 221.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 220-1.

¹⁵Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, February 8, 1902, Morison, Roosevelt, III, p. 422.

no stopping, no breathing time, no slacking of speed, but a continuous race, careless of mud, thornes, and the rest."¹⁶ Following the walk the two men went swimming in the nude in the Potomac River. In the water Roosevelt remarked to Jusserand that he had forgotten to remove his gloves, and the French Ambassador replied, "We might meet ladies."¹⁷ Jusserand's athletic ability impressed Roosevelt and contributed toward the development of an intimate friendship between the two men. One British Ambassador, disliked by Roosevelt, had made a bad impression on the American President when he had failed to keep up with Roosevelt's pace.¹⁸ Jusserand believed that his athletic ability was important in his personal relations with Roosevelt. In his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1922 Jusserand referred to his "boyhood days" of "swimming rivers and climbing rocks," and he declared that this early experience was "of service years later, when as Ambassador in far-off America, in order to keep company with the chief of state, President Roosevelt."¹⁹ Very often Roosevelt played

¹⁶Jusserand, Befell, pp. 330-2.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 335-6. Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 52. Also see: Nicholas Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: The Man As I Knew Him, (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1969), p. 40.

¹⁸Sir Percy Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand: A Biography, (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1926), p. 275.

¹⁹Jean-Jules Jusserand, "The School for Ambassadors," American Historical Review, XXVII (April, 1922), p. 436.

tennis and went horseback riding with Jusserand, to the extent that the French Ambassador was sometimes considered as a member of Roosevelt's tennis court cabinet.²⁰

Jusserand was sent to Washington to work in behalf of French interests, and he always believed that the major way to fulfill this task was to help give Roosevelt a better impression of France and French culture. In a lengthy despatch of 1904 Jusserand reported to Delcassé that the American President had a bad impression of the French character because he had read only the "skeptical, disrespectful, decadent and quarrelsome side" of French literature, and he boasted that he was taking advantage of his opportunities to educate the President. Jusserand wrote that at a dinner Roosevelt praised the brave Germanic warriors of the Nibelungenlied. Jusserand declared that courage was not only present in German medieval literature, but that it was just as prevalent in the Chanson de Roland. Roosevelt had never read the epic poem and he asked the Ambassador if he had a copy of the work. Jusserand was naturally happy to rush the work to Roosevelt, and the President was immediately impressed with the romantic atmosphere of chivalry which was so in keeping with his values.²¹ Jusserand wrote in What Me

²⁰Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, February 2, 1908, Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. VI, p. 922.

²¹Jusserand to Delcassé, March 9, 1904, DDF, Vol. IV², no. 340, pp. 446-7.

Befell that after this event the Chanson de Roland "enjoyed more popularity in Washington Society than it ever did before, or ever has since."²² It is interesting that when Roosevelt delivered his presidential address to the American Historical Association he made reference to the famous poem.²³

Jusserand was a very perceptive writer, and some of the best descriptions of Theodore Roosevelt are to be found in his diplomatic reports to the Quai d'Orsay. Jusserand, like Cambon, admired the ability and intelligence of Roosevelt. He accepted without question Roosevelt's account of how he had threatened the German Emperor during the Venezuelan crisis of 1902.²⁴ In a 1905 conversation, Roosevelt told Jusserand: "When I think of the future, I can foresee the possibility of war with Germany, England, Russia, and Japan, but I cannot anticipate one with France." Roosevelt is reported to have further stated: "What I love about France, is that with all her literature and her fine arts, when it is necessary to fight, she is always ready."²⁵ It is impossible to measure the extent to which Roosevelt's thinking was influenced by Jusserand, but it can be stated

²²Jusserand, Befell, p. 254.

²³Theodore Roosevelt, "History as Literature," American Historical Review, XVIII (April, 1913), p. 474.

²⁴Jusserand, Befell, pp. 237-8.

²⁵Jusserand to Delcassé, January 25, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI, no. 49, pp. 63-4.

that the influence was real. Secretary of State Root, another of Jusserand's personal friends, later wrote in regard to the French Ambassador: "No finer statesmanship, no more judicious diplomacy, no wiser sympathy has ever taken part in the great affairs of the world."²⁶

When considering the role of the diplomats on Franco-American relations, there should be some mention of those in charge of the American Embassy at Paris. The American Ambassadors of the period, Horace Porter, Robert McCormick and Henry White, were capable and conscientious.²⁷ Even more important for the orderly functioning of the Embassy was the work of Henry Vignaud, the first secretary at the Embassy for more than thirty years. Vignaud was born in New Orleans in the French quarter, and at a young age he was editor of La Renaissance Louisianaise, a literary review. At the outbreak of the Civil War he joined the Confederate Army and became a Captain. When New Orleans was captured he fled to Paris, France, where he worked as a journalist in the effort to enlist European aid for the Southern cause. After the war Vignaud quickly returned his allegiance to the Federal Government, and he represented the United States at

²⁶Paris, Jusserand, p. 29.

²⁷The only work on the subject is Beckles Wilson, America's Ambassadors to France, 1777-1927, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1928.) This is a poor work of little research or analysis. Roosevelt praised Porter in his letter to Maria Storer, October 4, 1901, Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. III, p. 159.

the settlement of the Alabama claims. In 1887 he was appointed secretary of the Paris Embassy. Ambassadors Porter and McCormick both indicated that they relied very heavily on the efforts of the first secretary.²⁸ Vignaud wrote many long perceptive dispatches to Washington, and on several occasions he served as chargé d'affaires. He was respected in Paris, and he had valuable contacts in the French Government. In 1905 he served as the Umpire of the arbitration of the French claims against Haiti.²⁹ In addition to his diplomatic career, Vignaud was an important historian who wrote several scholarly books on Columbus and Amerigo Vespucci.³⁰

The personal relationships of the diplomats did have some influence on Franco-American diplomatic relations, but of much greater significance was the nature of the European power struggle and the position of the United States in respect to that struggle. It has been often emphasized that during the period of this study a central theme of American

²⁸McCormick to Root, December 15, 1906, Despatches, Vol. 125. Meade and Pearson, Soldier, pp. 191-2.

²⁹Waldo Leland, "Henry Vignaud," Dictionary of American Biography edited by Dumas Malone, (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1936), Vol. X, pp. 268-9.

³⁰Histoire critique de la grande entreprise de Christophe Colomb. 2 vols. (Paris: H. Welter, 1911). Vignaud argued in this work that Columbus was not searching for the Orient but that he hoped to discover a new continent. The thesis has been rejected by Samuel Eliot Morison and most scholars of today.

foreign policy was the development of a closer co-operation with Great Britain. Secretary Hay in 1899 wrote that "the one indispensable feature of our foreign policy should be a friendly understanding with England."³¹ At the time that Hay wrote these words there was the possibility of a French intervention into the Boer War, and the year before there had almost been a Franco-British war as a result of the Fashoda crisis.³² Years later Foreign Minister Hanotaux wrote that the tensions between France and Britain had created difficulties between France and the United States. Hanotaux indicated that this situation had been of great concern to him in the late 1890's.³³ It was always understood at the Quai d'Orsay that there could not be a public alliance between the English speaking countries, but some officials did worry about the possibility of a possible secret entente.

The unexpected Entente Cordiale which was signed by Paul Cambon and Lord Lansdowne on April 8, 1904, created a diplomatic revolution which was to have a major influence on the entire international situation of the early twentieth century.³⁴ The formation of the entente naturally improved

³¹Hay to Henry White, September 24, 1898, Thayer, Hay, Vol. II, p. 221.

³²Langer, Expansion, pp. 670-2. Dennis, Adventures, p. 440.

³³Gabriel Hanotaux, La France vivante: en Amérique du Nord, (Paris: Librairie Hachette et cie, 1913), p. 49.

³⁴For the agreement see DDF, Vol. IV², no. 389, pp. 533-43.

the relations between France and the United States. Shortly after it was made public, there was a poll taken by the Literary Digest revealing that the majority of American press editors looked upon the agreement with favor.³⁵ In a private letter Secretary Root informed Henry White that the Department of State would attempt to encourage the continuation of the entente because "it is useful to us as well as agreeable."³⁶ At about this same time Roosevelt wrote the English King that there was a "constantly growing friendship and understanding between the English-speaking peoples," and he concluded that American interests were "identical" with those of Great Britain.³⁷ A conviction of oneness in American and British interests implied that there would be no basic contradiction between the interests of the United States and France.

It is also obvious that America's position in regard to Germany had a direct bearing on her French relations. It can generally be said that American-German relations gradually worsened after the Samoan controversy of 1885 until the outbreak of the first World War, and the American press reflected

³⁵Literary Digest, XXVIII (April 16, 1904), p. 634.

³⁶Root to White, November 28, 1905, quoted in Nevins, White, pp. 267-8.

³⁷Roosevelt to Edward VII, March 9, 1905, quoted in Sidney Lee, King Edward VII, (London: Macmillan & Co., 1925), Vol. II, P. 432; Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. IV, p. 1135.

this trend.³⁸ John Hay was probably the most anti-German of the American public leaders, and the German foreign office was unhappy in 1898 when Hay was appointed Secretary of State.³⁹ The German Ambassador, Speck von Sternburg, was a very capable diplomat, and he was an important figure who worked hard in the effort to improve German-American relations. Sternburg and Roosevelt were good friends before the latter became President, and Roosevelt had the American Ambassador in Berlin use his influence to have Sternburg sent to Washington.⁴⁰ When Sternburg was appointed Ambassador in 1903 Roosevelt assured Jusserand that the new German Ambassador would have no influence on American foreign policy. Jusserand, however, was concerned that Sternburg would be able to use his special friendship with the President to the detriment of French interests.⁴¹ The following year Jusserand complained: "All the means and special aptitudes that have ever been used by Ambassadors are being tried by Sternburg."⁴²

³⁸Clara Eve Schieber, The Transformation of American Sentiment toward Germany, 1870-1914. (New York: The Cornhill Publishing co., 1923), pp. 63, 151, 198-203.

³⁹Dennett, Hay, pp. 385-6.

⁴⁰Roosevelt to White, December 17, 1901, Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. III, p. 208.

⁴¹Margerie to Delcassé, January 18, 1903, DDF, Vol. III², no. 33, p. 43; January 12, 1903, no. 20, pp. 25-6.

⁴²Jusserand to Delcassé, March 9, 1904, Ibid., IV², no. 340, pp. 444-5.

Roosevelt's views of Germany and the German Kaiser, like his views on most subjects, were in a constant state of transition, and these views generally reflected his immediate reaction to events. German policy during the Spanish-American war angered Roosevelt, but the very next year he wrote that the Kaiser was "far and away the greatest crowned head of the present day."⁴³ In 1900 Roosevelt wrote of his "very strong hope that Germany, England and the United States will more and more be able to act together."⁴⁴ William II admired the militarism of Roosevelt, and the Kaiser often said, "That's my man."⁴⁵ In 1904, when the Venezuelan crisis was fresh on his memory, Roosevelt declared: "The only man I understand and who understands me is the Kaiser."⁴⁶ At this same time Ambassador Jusserand became very upset when he heard Roosevelt praise the courage and initiative of the German Kaiser.⁴⁷ Bülow was optimistic about Roosevelt's attitude to the extent that he suggested to the Emperor that there should be the effort for a defensive alliance between

⁴³Roosevelt to Sternburg, November 27, 1899, Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. II, pp. 1097-8.

⁴⁴Roosevelt to Sternburg, November 19, 1900, Ibid., p. 1428.

⁴⁵Bernhard von Bulow, Mémoires du Chancelier de Bulow, (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1930), Vol. I, p. 474.

⁴⁶Sternburg to Bülow, September 27, 1904, GP, Vol. XIX¹, no. 6266, p. 542.

⁴⁷Jusserand to Delcassé, March 9, 1904, DDF, Vol. IV², no. 340, p. 446.

the United States and Germany.⁴⁸ This optimism, however, disappeared at the time of the Moroccan crisis, and by 1906 it was clear that the thrust of American power was on the side of the Entente Cordiale.

The policies of France and the United States were generally complimentary in the two Hague Conferences. Both governments gave lip service to the two ideals of arms limitations and arbitration, but neither government was an enthusiastic supporter for an ambitious program. At the first Hague Conference of 1899 France sent as delegates Léon Bourgeois and Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, both of whom were well known leaders of the peace movement. The United States sent Andrew Dickson White, who shared their views, and Captain Alfred Mahan, the most outspoken militarist in the United States. The most important contribution of the conference was the creation of the Arbitration Tribunal. This project was largely due to the work of White and Bourgeois. The American delegation almost refused to sign the arbitration convention at the last moment because of Mahan's belief that it did not recognize American isolation from European conflict. The Americans finally signed with a qualifying statement that America had no obligation to "intrude, mingle or entangle" herself in European politics.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Bülow to William II, December 24, 1904, GP, XIX¹, no. 6274, pp. 547-9.

⁴⁹Andrew Dickson White, Autobiography, (New York: Century, 1905), pp. 338-41.

When Roosevelt became President he at first had little faith in the tribunal's future, but it is interesting that in 1902 Baron d'Estournelles helped to convince him to place an insignificant Mexican quarrel over Church property at the arbitration Tribunal for a decision.⁵⁰ This early settlement helped to establish the Hague Tribunal as a permanent instrument of international relations.

As Roosevelt assumed the position of power he became more a supporter of the peace movement. By 1906 he was supporting the calling of a second Hague Conference, although at the time he wrote his son that the American Navy was "an infinitely more potent factor for peace than all the peace societies."⁵¹ Roosevelt was worried about the military expansion of Germany, and he wrote in a letter that Germany "despised the Hague Conference and the whole Hague idea."⁵² Before the second conference met he expressed his conviction that "we can work hand in hand with France and England," and he always emphasized his conviction that these three nations of "free peoples" could not "disarm and leave the various

⁵⁰Bertha von Suttner, Memoirs, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), Vol. II, pp. 390-1.

⁵¹Roosevelt to Eliot Roosevelt, September 22, 1906, Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. V, p. 421.

⁵²Roosevelt to Straus, February 27, 1906, Ibid., Vol. V, p. 168.

military despotisms and military barbarisms armed."⁵³ At the second Hague Conference the question of a limitation of armaments was never even mentioned, and France was one of the nation's primarily responsible for keeping the question off of the agenda.⁵⁴ Before the conference, however, the French Government took the position that if the United States would support a positive program of arms limitations, the French delegate would not be instructed to oppose the American plan.⁵⁵ To France's pleasure Roosevelt did not choose to support such a plan, but rather he placed his support in behalf of improving the machinery of the Arbitration Tribunal.⁵⁶ The French Government did not fear that this program would be contrary to French interests.

If Roosevelt was not utopian in his hopes for the peace movement, he did support the formation of arbitration treaties between the United States and friendly nations. Following the Franco-British arbitration treaty of 1903

⁵³Roosevelt to Henry White, August 14, 1906, Morison Roosevelt, Vol. V, p. 359. Roosevelt to Andrew Carnegie, August 6, 1906, Ibid., p. 346.

⁵⁴Beale, Roosevelt, pp. 295, 300.

⁵⁵Paul Cambon to Pichon, January 19, 1907, DDF, Vol. X², no. 395, pp. 624-5. Pichon to Jusserand, January 14, 1907, Ibid., no. 392, pp. 619-20.

⁵⁶Root to Choate and Porter, May 31, 1905, James Scott, ed., Instructions of the American Delegates to the Hague Peace Conferences and their Official Reports, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916), pp. 79-80. Meade and Pearson, Soldier, pp. 311-32.

Baron d'Estournelles and the peace spokesmen of both the United States and France advocated that their two governments should follow the precedent of the treaty of 1903. Early in 1904 Hay and Jusserand had a long conversation about the possibility of arranging a similar arbitration treaty. Foreign Minister Delcassé outlined a provisional treaty which would provide for arbitration at the Hague Court all questions of legal differences or interpretations of treaties with the exception of matters of "the vital interests, the independence or the honor of the contracting parties." Delcassé further proposed that before a question would be submitted to the court the two nations would sign a "special agreement" defining the objects and the limits of the settlement.⁵⁷ A Franco-American treaty, almost identical to Delcassé's suggested one, was signed between Secretary Hay and Jusserand on November 1, 1904. At the time when the treaty was made public General Porter told reporters that Franco-American relations were so close that the treaty would probably have little effect except that it gave "definite treaty form to the long existing friendship of the two governments and peoples."⁵⁸

The Franco-American treaty of 1904 was only one of a series of almost identical arbitration treaties negotiated

⁵⁷Jusserand to Hay, February 26, 1904, Notes, Vol. 45.

⁵⁸New York Observer, November 3, 1904, clipping in the Porter papers, Box V.

by Roosevelt and Hay in November and December of that year. The Senate was unhappy with the treaties primarily because of its fear that the President was trying to usurp the legislative prerogatives. In February, 1905, the Senate voted to amend the agreements so as to make it necessary for the Senate to concur before any matter preceding its submission to the Hague Tribunal. Roosevelt was hopeful that he might make a compromise with the Senate. He told Jusserand: "The Senate will not give me all I want, but I shall snatch some part of it."⁵⁹ Roosevelt wrote one Senator that the amendment "converts the whole business into sham."⁶⁰ Roosevelt failed in his efforts at a compromise. He and Secretary Hay decided to drop the treaties entirely rather than accept the amendment which they believed made them valueless. Secretary Hay said of the matter: "A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull going into the arena; no one can say just how or when the final blow will fall, but one thing is certain, it will never leave the arena alive."⁶¹

Three years later Secretary of State Root persuaded Roosevelt that weak arbitration treaties were better than

⁵⁹Conversation of February 19, 1905, Jusserand, Befell, p. 261.

⁶⁰Roosevelt to John Spooner, January 6, 1905, Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. IV, no. 3420, p. 1092.

⁶¹William Roscoe Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1915), II, p. 263.

none at all, and Root negotiated new treaties that incorporated the Senate amendment. The first of the new series of treaties was made with France, signed between Root and Jusserand on February 10, 1908.⁶² With the French treaty as a pattern the Roosevelt Administration successfully concluded twenty-five such agreements with all the major powers of the world except Germany.⁶³ Later in 1911 President Taft negotiated arbitration treaties with Great Britain and France which went farther than the Roosevelt treaties in that they included all justiciable matters even national interests were involved. Roosevelt bitterly attacked the proposed treaties. He argued that such an arrangement was possible with England but that it was "academic" because of the "impossibility" of serious disagreement between the two English speaking countries.⁶⁴ Such a treaty with any other country was "not merely foolish but wicked."⁶⁵ Roosevelt encouraged the Senate to amend the treaties so as to exclude matters of national

⁶²Copy in FR, 1908, pp. 331-3.

⁶³For a discussion of the treaties see William S. Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), pp. 204-12. Philip Jessup, Elihu Root, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938), pp. 79-81.

⁶⁴Theodore Roosevelt, "The Arbitration Treaty with Great Britain," The Outlook, Vol. XCVIII (May 20, 1911), p. 97-8. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, August 22, 1911, Morison, no. 5508.

⁶⁵Roosevelt, "Arbitration: Pretence and Reality," The Outlook, XCIX (November 4, 1911), p. 566. "The Peace of Righteousness," September 11, 1911, Ibid., pp. 66-70.

interest, and this became the fate of Taft's ambitious treaties.⁶⁶ The implication of Roosevelt's position was that he feared a possible conflict of interest between France and the United States, but probably he did not seriously entertain such fears. Taft was convinced that Roosevelt was motivated primarily by his ambitions for the election of 1912, and in hindsight this seems to have been the situation.⁶⁷

The improvement of the European news coverage in the United States seems to have had an influence in American-French relations. Until 1902 the Associated Press had only one foreign agency which was in London, and this implied that the news was from a British perspective. In that year Ambassador Jules Cambon complained to the director of the Associated Press, Melville Stone, that all news relating to France had a British nuance. Stone replied that the telegraph service in France was generally inefficient and that it was faster to operate through London. He did agree to go to Paris to see about the possibilities of establishing a French office, and Cambon wired Delcassé that the matter should be treated with some urgency. In Paris Stone and Delcassé discussed the matter, and the latter agreed to

⁶⁶See George Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912, (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 278-9.

⁶⁷Sullivan, Times, Vol. V, p. 461.

co-operate with the Associated Press in providing a rapid telegraph service on government lines. After the change went into effect Stone noted in his memoirs: "We established an adequate bureau in Paris, and employed a large number of subordinate correspondents throughout the country, sometimes Frenchmen and sometimes Americans, and our service has proved highly satisfactory."⁶⁸ After this change in the Associated Press there were fewer complaints by Frenchmen that the United States did not have the French version of newspaper items.

Educators in the United States have always had a certain amount of influence on public opinion. In the latter part of the nineteenth century Germany was considered to be a type of intellectual Mecca, and many Americans went to Germany to do graduate work. France did not have the prestige in the American academic world. Some interested Frenchmen, hoping to change the situation, in 1874 organized the Société Américaine de France. The Franco-American Committee was organized in 1895 with the single purpose of providing opportunities for American students in France, and in 1909 the committee was reorganized on a larger scale under the

⁶⁸Melville E. Stone, "M.E.S.--His Book: A Tribute and a Souvenir of the Twenty-Five Years, 1893-1918, of the Service of Melville E. Stone as General Manager of the Associated Press, (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Pub., 1918), pp. 125-9.

leadership of Gabriel Hanotaux.⁶⁹ Harvard University took the leadership in improving relations between the academic works of France and the United States.⁷⁰ The Harvard historian, Charles H. Haskins, in 1897 declared that opportunities for American students of history were very good in France.⁷¹ In 1898 James H. Hyde provided a large fund which was to be used to bring prominent French professors to give conferences at Harvard. In 1904 Hyde financed a chair at the Sorbonne for a visiting professor of Harvard each year. For the first three years the chair was filled by Barrett Wendell, George Santayana and Archibald C. Coolidge.⁷² This experience resulted in Wendell's popular La France d'aujourd'hui and an unpublished manuscript by Coolidge, "France as a World Power."⁷³ By the beginning of World War I the bias among American college and university professors was almost five to four against Germany.⁷⁴

⁶⁹Sigmund Skard, American Studies in Europe: Their History and Present Organization, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), Vol. II, pp. 144-5.

⁷⁰Bernard Fay et al., Harvard and France, (Paris: Revue d'histoire moderne, 1936).

⁷¹"Opportunities for American Students of History at Paris", American Historical Review, Vol. III, (April, 1898), pp. 418-30.

⁷²Fay, Harvard, pp. 215, 231.

⁷³Barrett Wendell, La France d'aujourd'hui, (Paris: Nelson, 1909), Coolidge's manuscript is in the Coolidge collection at Harvard University Library.

⁷⁴Schieber, Opinion, p. 284.

In France one is astonished by the material published about the United States during the general period of this study, and this indicates that Frenchmen had a great deal of interest about the American Republic. After 1880 the study of American history and geography became popular in France, and many students studied in American universities.⁷⁵ In 1898 André Siegfried, who was to write much on the United States, visited the country for the first time.⁷⁶ The popular novelist, Paul Auguste Adam, visited the United States in 1904, and the following year he wrote Vues d'Amérique, ou la nouvelle jouvence, which was pro-American and widely read in France.⁷⁷ The economist, Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, presented a very attractive picture of the American economy in his Les Etats-Unis au XX^e siècle.⁷⁸ The famous pacifist, Paul d'Estournelles de Constant, was a great admirer of the United States as is seen in his America and Her Problems.⁷⁹ Gabriel Hanotaux was especially interested

⁷⁵Skard, Studies, pp. 146-7.

⁷⁶André Siegfried, Les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui, (Paris: Librairie Armand, 1929).

⁷⁷Paul Auguste Marie Adam, Vues d'Amérique, ou la nouvelle jouvence, (Paris: Ollendorff, 1905).

⁷⁸Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Etats-Unis au XX^e siècle. (Paris: A Colin, 1909).

⁷⁹Paul H. B. d'Estournelles de Constant, America and Her Problems, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915). The work was later translated into French.

in French relations with the United States. In 1913 Hanotaux wrote La France vivante en Amérique du Nord which began: "This volume is a book of action. Its object is concrete and precise: to develop the relations between France and America."⁸⁰

One important writer to popularize a good image of the United States in France was Andre Tardieu. Tardieu delivered the Hyde lectures at Harvard in 1908. These lectures were published the next year in France and the Alliances.⁸¹ After delivering the Harvard lectures Tardieu visited the United States for a month, and during this time he met many important political leaders including Lodge, Roosevelt and Root. These experiences were the basis for one of the most interesting of travel accounts of America! Notes sur les Etats-Unis. Tardieu's descriptive account was almost entirely pro-American. He reported that "Americans love France." "The United States," he wrote, "are a nation of tradition, and the American tradition has, at its roots, a French tradition."⁸² Tardieu reported that the majority of American leaders, including Roosevelt, were admirers of France

⁸⁰Gabriel Hanotaux, La France vivante en Amérique du Nord, (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1913), p. 1.

⁸¹André Tardieu, France and the Alliances, (Paris: F. Alcan, 1910).

⁸²André Tardieu, Notes sur les Etats-Unis: la société--la politique--la diplomatie, (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1908), pp. 87-8.

and the French culture.⁸³ He emphasized the great power of the United States and the benefit that this power could be to France.⁸⁴

Pierre de Coubertin was an important figure who was busy trying to further the Franco-American friendship. In 1893 he studied in the United States, and he was shocked to find that interest in French thought, literature and culture had declined. In order to improve the situation he began in 1900 a yearbook, La Chronique de France. The preface to the first edition frankly states that the purpose of the work would be to "conquer sympathies for France," and for this reason free copies were to be sent to the university libraries of Europe, America and Asia.⁸⁵ By 1902 Coubertin believed that there had been an improvement to the extent that he wrote an article entitled "La conquête des Etats-Unis." In the article he summarized the relations between the two countries, and he concluded that a rapprochement had been achieved to the extent that the two nations had a type of unsigned alliance. In bringing this change he noted a number of factors: the Hyde conferences at Harvard, improved trade relations, harmonious interests and a wise foreign

⁸³Ibid., pp. 123, 131, 103, 135.

⁸⁴Ibid., 367-8, 373-4.

⁸⁵"Avant-propos," La Chronique de France, Vol. I, 1900, pp. VI-X.

policy on the part of France.⁸⁶ In 1903 Coubertin established foundations for the study of French literature at Princeton, Tulane, Stanford and the University of California.⁸⁷

In an account of Franco-American cultural relations it is impossible to overlook Henry Adams. The ideas of Adams were profoundly influenced by French scientists and philosophers, and Adams was well acquainted with French literature from the Chanson de Roland through the nineteenth century.⁸⁸ During his lifetime he made some twenty-five trips to France, and in the last fifteen years before his death he had the practice of spending seven months of each year in Paris.⁸⁹ It is no wonder that the prose in his letters and in his books was saturated with French words and expressions. The monumental History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison was dependent on a thorough use of French original sources.⁹⁰ In 1905 he published the famous Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres, an interpretative work on France during the middle ages. Adams was not always

⁸⁶Ibid., "La conquête des Etats-Unis," 1902, pp. 107-13.

⁸⁷White, Opinion, p. 238.

⁸⁸This has been handled in detail in Max Baym, The French Education of Henry Adams, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 227-231.

⁸⁹Ernest Samuels, Henry Adams: The Major Phase, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1964), pp. 587-595.

⁹⁰Baym, Adams, p. 230.

uncritical of France, and he once wrote his friend, John Hay, that France was in a state of "moral collapse."⁹¹ But it is clear that Adams was a great admirer of the French cultural tradition, and it is probable that many readers in the early twentieth century gained a mystical attachment to that tradition from Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres.

Around the turn of the century there were a number of ceremonial occasions and dedications which were significant for what they reflected about Franco-American relations. In 1900 France erected a statue of the Marquis de Lafayette in Paris, and in order to recognize the occasion the American Government minted fifty thousand special Lafayette dollars.⁹² Two years later the French Government presented the United States with a statue of the Comte de Rochambeau. This statue was placed in Lafayette Square across from the White House. At the dedication ceremony Jules Cambon declared that France and the United States "blend in one common chord their national hymns and in celebrating their common glory they give the world an example of fidelity in friendship."⁹³

⁹¹Adams to John Hay, August 20, 1899, in Worthington Ford, (ed.) Letters of Henry Adams, 1892-1918, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 235.

⁹²Porter to Hay, March 10, 1900, Despatches, Vol. 118, no. 638.

⁹³De B. Randolph Keim. Rochambeau: A Commemoration of the Congress of the United States of America of the Services of the French Auxiliary Forces in the War of Independence. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), p. 92.

Henry Cabot Lodge also delivered an address on Rochambeau's importance during the Revolutionary War.⁹⁴ It is interesting to note that Cambon early suggested that the gift of a statue would be a wise gesture on the part of the French Government, and Cambon believed that he had been largely responsible for the statue of Rochambeau.⁹⁵ In 1903 France presented the United States with bronze casting of the bust of George Washington designed by David d'Angers. An earlier copy of the same work had been destroyed during the War of 1812.⁹⁶ In 1904 Secretary of State Hay was offered the award of the Grand Cross of the National Order of the Legion of Honor. In 1905 the Commissioner of Art of France offered Auguste Rodin's "le Penseur" to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York.⁹⁷

The anniversary of the bi-centenary of the birth of Benjamin Franklin attracted a great deal of attention in both France and the United States, and the event was naturally the time for the diplomats to speak of Franklin's work as a diplomatic representative in France. The American

⁹⁴Speech is in Henry Cabot Lodge, A Fighting Frigate and Other Essays and Addresses. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), pp. 291-304.

⁹⁵Cambon to Delcassé, May 21, 1902, DDF, Vol. II², no. 259, pp. 316-8. Geneviève Tabouis, The Life of Jules Cambon, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), p. 113.

⁹⁶Porter to Hay, October 27, 1903, Despatches, Vol. 123, no. 1254.

⁹⁷New York Times, June 15, 1905, p. 4.

Congress voted to give the French Republic a gold medallion to commemorate the occasion. At a Philadelphia ceremony Secretary Root spoke of the traditional "American sentiment for France."⁹⁸ In the celebration at Paris there were 4,000 people assembled in the Palace of the Trocadero. Albert Henry Smith, an editor of a collection of Franklin's writings, delivered the main address. Emile Loubet, Emile Bourgeois, Aristide Briand and other public leaders took the time to be present. The most notable event of the Paris celebration was the unveiling of a statue of Franklin made by John J. Boyle.⁹⁹

France was not the only nation to try to court the American Republic through gifts and ceremonial dedications. The German Emperor was also active in similar efforts. In 1902 William II tried to gain Roosevelt's sympathy by having Alice Roosevelt christen a large yacht and by sending his brother, Prince Henry, to visit the United States. The Kaiser was very hopeful that the visit of his brother would cause an enthusiastic reception, but except for the German community, it was not a success.¹⁰⁰ Ambassador Cambon

⁹⁸Jusserand, Befell, p. 328. Jusserand to Root, May 20, 1906, Notes, Vol. 46.

⁹⁹Le Temps, April 28, 1906.

¹⁰⁰Schieber, Sentiment, p. 247. Bülow believed that the voyage of Henry was a success. Bülow to Henry, January 30, 1902, GP, XVII, no. 5106, p. 243. Bulow, Memoirs, p. 662.

anxiously watched the American attitudes to the Prince's voyage. Cambon was pleased to note that the anti-German John Hay believed that the voyage was "nothing but noise without significance." Cambon was less pleased with Roosevelt's friendly attitude toward Henry. "That can not be translated into tangible accomplishments," reported Cambon to Paris, "but given the very personal character of the President, it is possible that the Prince has not completely wasted his time."¹⁰¹ Roosevelt did write in a letter that the Prince was "a thoroughly good fellow," but during the Venezuelan crisis later that year it became clear that the trip had made no mark on American foreign policy.¹⁰² Three years later Jusserand noted that the voyage was still remembered by Roosevelt, but that this was of no permanent benefit to Germany.¹⁰³

The International Exposition of 1900 occupied 277 acres in the heart of Paris and attracted fifty million visitors from April to November. Naturally the event received much interest in the United States. The American Congress

¹⁰¹Cambon to Delcassé, February 26, 1902, DDF, Vol. II², no. 104, pp. 123-5; May 21, 1902, Ibid., no. 259, pp. 316-18.

¹⁰²Roosevelt to Choate, March 3, 1902, quoted in Nelson Blake, "Ambassadors at the Court of Theodore Roosevelt", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLII (September, 1955), p. 185.

¹⁰³Jusserand to Delcassé, March 6, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 192, pp. 172-3.

in 1897 was one of the last of the governments to accept the invitation to participate in the exposition. In his annual message of that year President McKinley reported "an almost unprecedented interest in the proposed exposition," and he expressed his hope that the United States "would make a worthy exhibit of American genius and skill and their unrivaled achievement in every branch of industry."¹⁰⁴ Despite the late date for the American decision to participate, she was given as large an area for expositions as was any other nation. In 1898, during the Spanish-American War, M. Maruejols, the Minister of the Interior, declared in a speech that American participation in the event was "the guarantee of her perfect accord with France."¹⁰⁵ At the same time the Congress passed an appropriation of \$650,000 to be spent at Paris. In his second annual message McKinley declared that this was insufficient, and he asked that the amount be increased to one million dollars so that the United States "might not rest content with any secondary place."¹⁰⁶ The President attempted to use the influence of his office to encourage greater American participation, for he believed

¹⁰⁴The first annual message of December 6, 1897, in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1911), Vol. XIV, pp. 6267-8.

¹⁰⁵Porter to Day, July 5, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 289, dispatche contains a newspaper clipping.

¹⁰⁶Second message of December 5, 1898, in Compilation, Vol. XIV, p. 6330.

that the occasion would have a positive effect on American trade as well as Franco-American relations. Later the President reported that he had "visited and importuned" manufacturers to send exhibits and that in his appeals he had made "appeals to patriotism."¹⁰⁷

Several thousand Americans visited the Paris Exposition. Albert Shaw in a long article encouraged more to attend, and he maintained that "the present exposition, as a popular university, surpasses anything the world has ever seen before."¹⁰⁸ At Paris it appeared that the French had forgotten about the surge of anti-Americanism during the war two years earlier. Henry Steed, a British journalist, complained in his memoirs that the French at the exposition neglected England and Germany in the effort to draw nearer to her "Sister Republic."¹⁰⁹ On the fourth of July the American flag was displayed on the Eiffel Tower, carried by most of the boats on the Seine, and was displayed from many windows. In reference to this day Ambassador Porter

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 6427. Porter also urged that the exposition would help improve relations with France and encourage American commerce. Porter to Day, May 24, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116.

¹⁰⁸Albert Shaw, "Paris and the Exposition of 1900," American Monthly Review of Reviews, June, 1900, Vol. XXII, pp. 678-9. B.D. Woodward, "The Exposition of 1900," North American Review, March, 1900, Vol. CLXX, pp. 472-9.

¹⁰⁹Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922, (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1924), Vol. I, pp. 190-1.

observed that "all Paris seemed to display the feeling of good will toward the United States which has been steadily growing for at least two years."¹¹⁰ The United States had over seven thousand displays at the exposition--more than any other country except for France. Americans won over two thousand prizes, which was a good showing even if it was less than the number won by France, England, Germany, and Japan.

In 1903 the Exposition honoring the centenary of the Louisiana Purchase was naturally well publicized in France. In 1901 Delcassé told General Porter that France would accept an invitation for participation at the Exposition, but the Foreign Minister wanted assurances that there would be measures which would prevent a fire such as had occurred at the Chicago World's Fair.¹¹¹ The following year France formally accepted the invitation to participate.¹¹² Frenchmen did not travel as widely as Americans at the turn of the century, and for that reason there were few French visitors at the Louisiana Exposition. French dignitaries, however, had a conspicuous role in the various ceremonial occasions

¹¹⁰Quoted in Meade and Pearson, Porter, p. 237.

¹¹¹Porter to Hay, December 30, 1901, Despatches, Vol. CXX, no. 943.

¹¹²Porter to Hay, February 7, 1902, Ibid., no. 961.

of the event.¹¹³ Ambassador Jusserand believed that the Exposition was important to the extent that he includes several pages about the matter in his memoirs. He indicated that he was impressed by the friendliness that was manifested toward France.¹¹⁴ At the time of the Exhibition, New Orleans, the most French city in the United States, held a large fete to Commemorate the Louisiana Centenary. At this occasion Jusserand delivered a speech in French to a large crowd, and the speech was received with a great deal of enthusiasm.¹¹⁵

In 1904 General Porter was able to find the body of John Paul Jones after a search of six years and a cost of over \$35,000. When Porter arrived in France in 1897 he "felt a deep sense of humiliation" at the thought that the father of the American Navy "had for more than a century been lying in a distant foreign land, in a neglected and forgotten grave and that no serious attempt had ever been made to find his body."¹¹⁶ After two years Porter was able to find a copy of Jones' burial certificate which placed the burial spot in a deserted grave yard in North East Paris. It was already known that the body had been placed in a lead

¹¹³Robert A. Reid, The Greatest of Exhibitions Completely Illustrated, (St. Louis: Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co., 1904), pp. 65, 143, 145.

¹¹⁴Jusserand, Befell, pp. 230-5.

¹¹⁵Ibid., pp. 258-9.

¹¹⁶Porter to Hay, April 29, 1903, Porter Papers, box 4.

coffin. Porter's search was kept secret because of the tendency in France to regard digging in cemeteries as sacrilegious.¹¹⁷ When the coffin was finally discovered the body was identified beyond a reasonable doubt because it was well preserved and resembled the sculpture of Jean-Antoine Houdon. It should be noted that Porter's long search for the remains of the American hero took up the greater part of his time while he was Ambassador at Paris.¹¹⁸

Porter's efforts to locate the body of John Paul Jones were primarily motivated by patriotic sentiment, but Porter was also convinced that the discovery would encourage good feelings between France and the United States. After the discovery the French Government quickly agreed to allow the body to be reburied at the Annapolis Naval Academy. The French Government tried to exploit the occasion for a diplomatic advantage. At the transfer of the body there was a large, impressive ceremony which was jointly financed by the French Government and the American Embassy.¹¹⁹ Senator Lodge was in Paris at the time and he wrote of the event:

¹¹⁷Porter to Hay, October 20, 1903, Ibid., box 3.

¹¹⁸For a long discussion of the search and many photographs see Porter to Hay, May 19, 1905, Despatches, Vol. 124. Porter wrote of the matter in "The Recovery of the Body of John Paul Jones," Century Magazine, October, 1907.

¹¹⁹McCormick to Root, October 3, 1905, Despatches, Vol. 125, no. 51.

The ceremony was really splendid and imposing--performed with all the excellence and good taste of which the French are capable. They left nothing undone. The feeling shown to the United States from the Ministers to the vast crowds which lined the route was very striking. They feel that we have stood their friend in the Morocco business and the feeling is universal. "La conduite des Etats-Unis etait epatante" is what you hear again and again. Their gratitude to you and their confidence in you are equally marked and I received expressions of it from every one. The Prime Minister and all the Cabinet following the coffin of Jones on foot--a great compliment.¹²⁰

The body was taken to the United States by a squadron of American battleships, and the French Government provided a detachment of cruisers to accompany the American squadron.¹²¹ At Annapolis on March 23, 1906 there was a long memorial ceremony at which time there were speeches delivered by Jusserand, Roosevelt and Porter. This was one of those times in which it seemed natural to have many words about the closeness of France and the United States as well as about France's role in the American Revolution.¹²²

The famous Dreyfus Affair created much attention throughout the world, and the United States was no exception. Elizabeth White, in her interesting study of American opinion towards France, concluded that the American press was

¹²⁰Lodge to Roosevelt, July 8, 1905, Lodge, Letters, Vol. II, p. 164. New York Herald (European Edition), July 7, 1905, clipping in Despatches, Vol. 124.

¹²¹Jusserand to Root, April 1, 1906, Notes, Vol. 46.

¹²²Jusserand, Befell, pp. 285-7. John Paul Jones Commemoration at Annapolis, April 24, 1906, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), pp. 49-79.

"practically unanimous" in supporting the cause of Dreyfus.¹²³ A typical article in the Political Science Quarterly of 1898 condemned the system of the "secret trial" in France, and the author concluded that Dreyfus' condemnation had "no spark of fraternal sympathy in the heart of any genuine American."¹²⁴ The well-known humorist Finley Peter Dunne had his character "Mr. Dooley" exclaim in his Irish accent: "The Frrinch are a tumulche people . . . not steady ayether in their politics or their morals . . . it ain't been cap. Dhryfuss that's been on thrile, but the honor of the nation and honor of the arrmy."¹²⁵ Robert Ogden wrote in The Nation that France stood "disgraced before the world by this terrible denial of justice."¹²⁶ John T. Moore, Jr. believed that Americans should not be too self-righteous in the matter, for he believed that Americans should be thankful that they possessed the common law and did not have the pressure created by aggressive neighbors.¹²⁷ In a speech at Walton, New York, in 1899 Theodore Roosevelt declared:

¹²³White, Opinion, p. 252.

¹²⁴Frederick W. Whitredge, "Zola, Dreyfus, and the Republic," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XIII (June, 1898), p. 272.

¹²⁵Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley in Peace and in War, (Boston: Small, Maynard & Company, 1898), pp. 234-8.

¹²⁶The Nation, Vol. LXIX, p. 200.

¹²⁷"The Dreyfus and Zola Trials," Atlantic, Vol. LXXI, p. 585.

It was less Dreyfus on trial than those who tried him. We should draw lessons from the trial. It was due in part to the bitter religious prejudices of the French people. Those who have ever wavered from the doctrine of the separation of Church and State should ponder upon what has happened.¹²⁸

In 1906, after a bitter controversy of twelve years, Alfred Dreyfus was finally declared innocent by the Court of Cassation, the highest court of France. General Porter, who had always refused to discuss the matter publically, breathed a sigh of relief, for he had feared that there had been the possibility that the affair might have done real damage to Franco-American relations.¹²⁹ American public opinion was generally very happy with the outcome. Albert Shaw, for example, wrote that "it is not Dreyfus alone who has been vindicated before the eyes of mankind--it is France herself." He concluded that the acquittal demonstrated that "the French mind recognizes justice in the ideal and in the abstract, and however far short in practice French institutions have come from meeting the ideals, there is always the effort to bring life into harmony with truth and justice."¹³⁰ It is difficult to evaluate whether the Dreyfus Affair had any

¹²⁸ Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia, (New York: Roosevelt Memorial Association, 1941), p. 145.

¹²⁹ Meade and Pearson, Porter, pp. 225, 230.

¹³⁰ American Monthly Review of Reviews, XXXIV (August, 1906), p. 147.

real effect on relations between the United States and France. Probably Elizabeth White was correct when she wrote that it did not lead to "any active ill-will against France," but that "it made a very bad impression and led to a good deal of patronizing disparagement."¹³¹

At the turn of the century the Religious question was a burning issue in French public life, and the subject was a consideration which can not be overlooked in the study of Franco-American diplomatic relations. At the time conservative Catholics of France and of all Europe disliked the United States because of her separation of religious and public institutions and because the leading liberal voices of Catholicism were to be found in that country. In 1899 Leo XIII addressed the letter Testem Benevolentiae against liberal ideas which were "called by some Americanism."¹³² The French clergyman, Abbé Charles Maignen, associated Americanism with heresy, and he strongly denounced both in his Etudes sur l'Américanisme.¹³³ There were a few liberal

¹³¹White, Opinion, p. 256.

¹³²Edward Hales, The Catholic Church in the Modern World, (Garden City: Hanover House, 1958), p. 170. P. L. Pechenard "The End of 'Americanism' in France", North American Review, Vol. CLXX (March, 1900), pp. 420-432.

¹³³Charles Maignen, Etude sur l'Américanisme: le Père Hecker, est-il un saint? (Paris: V. Retaux, 1899). The Catholic paper La Verite on May 2, 1897 asked the question if the United States was a Christian nation. For several examples of Clerical opinion see May, Power, p. 184.

French Catholics who were more favorable toward the American experience. Abbé Félix Klein in L'Amérique de demain argued that the American separation of Church and State allowed for greater spirituality.¹³⁴ It should be emphasized that the government of the Third Republic was made up almost entirely of the anti-clerical party, and conservative Catholics in France generally denounced the French Government as vehemently as they did the American Government. Rome officially opposed the Third Republic until the ralliement of Leo XIII in 1892, and even after that date many French Catholics still did not accept the Republic. The fact that both the governments of France and the United States were denounced in conservative Catholic circles probably had little influence on the diplomatic relations between the two nations, but if there was any influence it was in the direction of more favorable relations.

The French Government in 1901 took away most of the power of the religious orders in the public schools, and four years later the Napoleonic Concordat was finally nullified--an action which meant the formal separation of Church

¹³⁴Félix Klein, L'Amérique de demain, (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie, 1910). Also see Viscount de Meaux, L'Eglise Catholique et la liberté aux Etats-Unis, (Paris: Plon, 1893). 2 vols.

and State.¹³⁵ Many American Catholics charged that the French Government was following a policy of religious persecution, but the mainstream of American opinion took the side of the government and looked upon the action as analogous to the American tradition of separation in Church and State.¹³⁶ Albert Shaw was of the conviction that the separation would make France a stronger nation as it would tend to help eliminate bigotry and intolerance.¹³⁷ Frank Vanderlip wrote that anti-Clericalism was justified in France because "the traditional attitude of the church and the clerical party has been reactionary and generally unfriendly to the Republic."¹³⁸ The Outlook argued that "any movement which will take the church out of political life, and conserve all its energies for its works, will bring untold blessings to it and to the world."¹³⁹ The New York Times,

¹³⁵Pius X condemned the action in the Encyclical of February 11, 1906. Frank M. Anderson, ed., The Constitutions and Other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of France, 1789-1907. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1908), pp. 670-6. It should be noted that this was a restatement of the Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX in 1864.

¹³⁶White, Opinion, p. 257. White has many examples of clerical opinion in the United States. This gives a false impression for in 1905 the United States was predominately Protestant.

¹³⁷American Monthly Review of Reviews, XXXIV (August, 1906), pp. 134-6. December, 1906, Ibid., p. 664.

¹³⁸"Political Problems of Europe as they Interest Americans," Scribner's Magazine, XXXVII (January, 1905), pp. 1-18.

¹³⁹The Outlook, LXXXV (January 12, 1907), p. 57.

while clearly on the side of the government, maintained a policy of neutrality in the matter, and the paper was content to express the hope that both sides would work for a compromise.¹⁴⁰ Barrett Wendell was of the opinion that there were extremists on both sides, and he wrote that until tolerance was learned "the question of religion in France must remain one of action and reaction."¹⁴¹ Andrew Carnegie wrote that the religious policy of the French Government would be a factor in the future in drawing that government and the American Government closer together.¹⁴² It is not clear if Carnegie was correct, but there is no doubt but that the majority of literate Americans smiled with favor when they read that clerical influence was being minimized in the Republic of France.

Diplomatic relations inherently are associated with cultural factors, ceremonial occasions and public opinion. Often, it is true, such considerations do not indicate much substance when it comes to the formation of foreign policy, and it would be a mistake to exaggerate their significance.

¹⁴⁰New York Times, June 27, 1905, p. 8.

¹⁴¹Wendell, France, p. 67.

¹⁴²Andrew Carnegie, "An Anglo-French-American Understanding," North American Review, Vol. CLXXXI, (September, 1905), p. 513.

Still, it is obvious that they are a small part of the entire story, and they must not be overlooked if there is to be a balanced perspective of Franco-American relations.

CHAPTER V

COLONIAL AND COMMERCIAL COMPETITION

Around the turn of the century there was a general improvement in the diplomatic relations between France and the United States. This is not to say there were no areas of conflict between the two powers. Even among national states with very friendly relations there are usually disagreements and conflicts of interests. In this state of Franco-American relations the main sources of friction were economic policies and imperial ambitions. Such was to be expected from two industrial and colonial nations. But it is important to notice that the conflict which developed was of a limited nature, especially when compared to the many diplomatic crises of the era before World War I.

The question of the tariff was a constant cause of irritation between American and French diplomats throughout the nineteenth century.¹ Conflict over the tariff question was intensified during the two decades before the first World

¹See Henry Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830-1871, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p. 88.

War.² The historian Sidney Fay has pointed out that commercial controversies are seldom, if ever, the cause for war.³ This is probably true, but the diplomatic correspondence used for this study reveals that the tariff was a source of major concern in Franco-American diplomacy. In fact, at least one third of the correspondence was directly or indirectly related to the subject of the tariff. This was a matter which generated much heated rhetoric. Even the most skilled and polite of diplomats--such as John Hay and Jules Jusserand--often lost their tempers and used rough language when discussing the matter.

For the sake of perspective, it should be emphasized that the United States had tariff controversies with other European nations, and especially with Germany.⁴ It should also be noted that America's trade with France was considerably less than her trade with either Germany or England. The major explanation for this development was the relative slowness of France's industrial development. France, then and now, based her economy primarily on agriculture and light industry. There was very little mass production such as was

²See Louis Sears, "John Sherman," The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. (New York: Pageant Book Companies, 1958), p. 17.

³Sidney Fay, The Origins of the World War, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1928), Vol. I, p. 46.

⁴Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1935), Vol. II, pp. 1274-1635.

to be found in Germany and England.⁵ A recent economic historian has written that "at the beginning of the twentieth century not only was France no longer the wealthiest nation in Europe; among Western nations it was among the least progressive economically."⁶ An older economist argued that since the middle of the nineteenth century the French economy had been in a state of "economic stagnation," and he believed that the reason was that the French "are essentially not a business people."⁷

In January, 1893, the French Parliament passed a tariff law which established the principle of the maximum and minimum rates. This tariff law remained in effect until 1910. With this system, goods were classified into 121 categories, and the French Foreign Minister had the power to make reciprocal agreements with other countries. The difference between the maximum and the minimum rates was between twenty and fifty per cent.⁸ By 1900 the Foreign Minister had made reciprocal arrangements with all of the European nations

⁵Herbert Feis, Europe the World's Banker, 1870-1914: An Account of European Foreign Investment and the Connection of World Finance with Diplomacy Before the War, (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 34.

⁶Rondo Cameron, France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800-1914, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1916), p. 502. The same point is made in J. H. Chapman, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914, (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1936), p. 258.

⁷Percy Ashley, Modern Tariff History: Germany, United States, France, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1920), pp. 357-8.

⁸Ibid., pp. 344-7.

except Portugal, and the United States was the only large commercial country which was required to pay the maximum tariff on almost all items.⁹ In this situation it was impossible for American products to compete in many areas of the French market. The fact that a single tariff system was applied throughout the entire French empire meant that the market was large and attractive. American exports to France had not dramatically declined since the tariff of 1893, but they had not increased to the extent of British and German exports. Whether true or not, many American businessmen were convinced that they would be able to significantly increase their exports to France if they could obtain the same tariff rates as their competitors. Largely for this reason the Republican platform of 1896 favored a tariff law which would allow for reciprocal tariff agreements.¹⁰

The high American tariff was the major reason that France required maximum rates on most American products. In 1897 the Congress of the United States passed the Dingley tariff, which had the highest rates until that time. The average dutiable rate was 51% or an increase of 10% over the

⁹Ibid., pp. 333-6.

¹⁰U.S., Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Documents Relating to Reciprocity Convention with France, December 8, 1902. Sen doc. 225, 56th cong., 1st sess., serial no. 3858, p. 64.

Wilson tariff.¹¹ As had been advocated in the Republican platform of 1896, the Dingley tariff incorporated the principle of reciprocity.¹² This provision was especially aimed at France, with the hope that it could be used as a bargaining measure to obtain better terms on the French market.¹³ It must be understood that the Dingley tariff allowed for two different kinds of reciprocal agreements. First, the President was given the power to make executive agreements which would lower the tariff on certain enumerated goods in return for similar treatment for American exports. In such an executive agreement, it was of course not necessary for the Senate to give its approval. The enumerated articles included brandies, champagne, wines, art works, stationary, and other common exports from France; it is obvious that the list was selected with France in mind. Secondly, the President was authorized to negotiate formal reciprocal treaties with any country. In a treaty the American tariff could be lowered as much as 20%, and it was to remain in effect for a

¹¹Charles Olcott, William McKinley, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1916), Vol. II, p. 367.

¹²The idea of reciprocity treaties was encouraged by the French tariff of 1892, but the idea had often been advocated in the United States after the Civil War. Secretaries of State Blaine and Frelinghuysen had both negotiated such treaties, but they had failed ratification in the Senate. The McKinley tariff of 1890 provided for reciprocal treaties.

¹³Frank Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, (New York: C. P. Putman's Sons, 1923), pp. 313-5.

period of five years. The difficulty was that--as in the case of any treaty--it was necessary to have the Senate's ratification before the reciprocal treaty would go into effect.¹⁴

In France the Dingley tariff caused dissatisfaction among manufacturers, and there was considerable pressure on the Government to enact reprisals against American goods. François Charmes in the Revue des Deux Mondes expressed a common sentiment when he wrote that "our tariff rates have the height of a simple parapet in comparison to the immense wall which the Americans have constructed with their energetic and rude hands."¹⁵ On March 22, 1898, the French Chamber of Deputies increased the rates on a number of key American products. Secretary of State Day wrote Ambassador Porter that the increases were "plainly unequal and unjust," and that there should be efforts to try to convince Foreign Minister Hanotaux to take "immediate action." Day expressed the belief that the French action was an indication "of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the French Government toward the commercial interests of the United States."¹⁶

¹⁴Edward Younger, John A. Kasson: Politics and Diplomacy From Lincoln to McKinley, (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1955), p. 368.

¹⁵François Charmes, "Chronique de la quinzaine," Revue des Deux Mondes, CL (November 15, 1898), pp. 700-1.

¹⁶William Day to Porter, May 16, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 15-17.

President McKinley hoped to improve Franco-American commercial relations by negotiating both a reciprocal executive agreement and a reciprocal treaty. To conduct the negotiations he chose John Kasson, a Republican leader of Iowa who was known as an expert on the subject of the tariff. In general Kasson had been a supporter of the protective tariff, but he believed that the principle of reciprocity was complementary to a policy of protection. He immediately began negotiations with Ambassador Cambon. It was not too difficult to agree on terms for an executive agreement, and such an arrangement was concluded on May 28, 1898. By the agreement the United States was granted the French minimum tariff on several items, and France was allowed a lower tariff rate on most of the enumerated articles of the Dingley tariff.¹⁷ The arrangement seemed to be satisfactory to both sides, and it was repeated with modifications in 1902 and 1908.¹⁸

More significant for American trade was the possibility for formal reciprocal treaties, and the policy of the McKinley Administration was to negotiate treaties with as many nations as possible. France was chosen as the country with which to make the first treaty. Primarily this was because of the French system of the dual tariff which made a treaty with

¹⁷Proclamation of May 30, 1898, Messages, Vol. XIV, pp. 6480-1; FR, 1898, pp. 292-4.

¹⁸In the summer there was a lively debate concerning the application of the agreement to French brandies. See FR, 1898, pp. 304-6.

France more clearly in the American interest than one with most other nations. Kasson believed that the French treaty would be a kind of "trial balloon" for the Senate; if the Senate failed to give its approval, there would then be little attempt for another attempt.¹⁹ In June Secretary Day instructed General Porter to speak to the French Foreign Minister about the possibility of negotiating a treaty.²⁰ Delcassé was quick to assure Porter that France would be willing to give most-favored-nation treatment to American exports in return for similar concessions.²¹ Kasson and Cambon were already trying to come to some kind of terms. In contrast to the earlier agreement, the conclusion of a treaty was slow, and the relations between the two men often became strained. Kasson wanted the two countries to give similar reductions in their respective rates. Cambon refused with the argument that the American rates were almost twice as large as the French rates. The American position was that France exported more industrialized goods into the United States than vice versa, and that French rates were no higher than the rates for any other country. Kasson

¹⁹Younger, Kasson, p. 374. Tarbell, Tariff, p. 255.

²⁰Day to Porter, June 22, 1898, Instructions, 24, pp. 53-4.

²¹Delcassé to Porter, July 22, 1898, Despatches, Vol. 116.

complained that France wanted "a total sacrifice by the United States" rather than a treaty based on true reciprocity.²²

Finally on July 24, 1898, Cambon and Kasson agreed on a reciprocal convention. Kasson later declared in a speech that "the negotiations were long, both sides were persistent and sometimes obstinate, but finally conciliation prevailed and the treaty was signed."²³ By the arrangement, the French minimum rates were to be granted to nineteen American products, of which the most important were canned meats, fruits, lumber, paving blocks, staves, hops and lard. The United States in return was to grant reductions of between five and twenty percent on some thirty items from France. Although France received concessions on all items authorized by the Dingley tariff except for champagnes and sparkling wines, the maximum reduction of twenty percent was used in only eight cases, and most of the reductions were less than ten percent. Even after the discount, French goods were to be charged by rates which were as high as those of the McKinley tariff.²⁴

²²Memorandums of two conversations between Cambon and Kasson, May 17, 1898, Instructions, 24, pp. 22-7; May 19, 1898, Ibid., pp. 27-31.

²³John Kasson, Reciprocity: The Benefits that will Accure to this Country by the Confirmation of the Treaties now pending in the United States Senate, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 31.

²⁴A copy of the treaty is in U.S. Senate, Reciprocity, pp. 2-7.

The French Government was pleased with the provisions of the reciprocity treaty. In the attempt to encourage the American Congress to ratify the treaty, the French Government in the summer of 1898 issued a decree which placed pork and lard products on the minimum list. Secretary Hanotaux told Porter that this was a "gesture" to demonstrate the French attitude toward the importance of trade with the United States.²⁵ The French Minister of Commerce, M. Maruejols, declared in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies that the Kasson treaty would "advance the cause of universal commerce and civilization."²⁶ French industrialists who exported goods to America quickly came to the support of the arrangement. The Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce, representing the wine makers of the area, urged the Chamber of Deputies that ratification would be a boon to the wine industry.²⁷ The American treaty was ratified by the French Parliament in July of 1899 without a great deal of opposition.²⁸

President McKinley hoped for ratification. He sent the treaty--along with six others--to the Senate "with a

²⁵Porter to Day, July 10, Despatches, Vol. 116, no. 273.

²⁶Porter to Day, Ibid., no. 287. This despatch includes a newspaper clipping.

²⁷Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce to the French Minister of Commerce, January 4, 1899, in Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 148-51.

²⁸Porter to Hay, April 3, 1900, Despatches, Vol. 118, nos. 601, 602.

view to receiving the advise and consent of the Senate to its ratification."²⁹ The New York Times urged that the treaty was in the American interest, and maintained that most of the opposition resulted from "the greed and stupidity of the antidiluvian protectionists."³⁰ Before being reported to the Senate, the proposed bill was considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The chairman of the Committee, Cushman Davis, supported the treaty, as did most of the other members. The first job of the Committee was to try to determine the viewpoint of American business leaders. Several hundred special interest groups throughout the country wrote letters and sent witnesses to argue for and against the proposal. The support and the opposition seemed to about even. But there were powerful industries that believed the treaty to be against their interests. These included the manufacturers of cotton knit goods, paper, electric fixtures, tiles, brushes and optical instruments.³¹ The opposition was better organized and more active than the groups who supported the Kasson treaty.

In January, 1900, Kasson appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee to argue in behalf of ratification. In his opening statement Kasson declared that the Dingley tariff

²⁹U.S. Senate, Reciprocity, p. 1.

³⁰New York Times, January 8, 1900, April 1, 1900.

³¹U.S. Senate, Reciprocity, letters for on pp. 110-32; those against on pp. 145-62.

had produced an effect of "exasperation throughout the commercial world and the governments as well."³² This had resulted in an European movement to increase the tariff rates on American products. Kasson stated that the situation was worse in France than anywhere else, for the maximum tariff made it impossible for America to successfully compete for that nations' market of forty million people. He further maintained that the proposed treaty would greatly improve the situation. The rates on American exports to France would be an average of thirty percent less, and this was twice as much as the American reduction by the agreement. After Kasson's speech there was a discussion. Senator Lodge mentioned that shoe manufacturers in Massachusetts were opposed to the treaty. Kasson responded that it was inevitable that some interest groups would not find the agreement to be in their advantage, but he argued that industrial leaders should consider the interests of America's economy as a whole. The treaty with France was reciprocal, and thus it was based on the principle of "to give and to take."³³ "We are to get into their market," concluded Kasson, "with all but the excepted articles at the lowest rate granted to any nation, and this is all the American producers ask for. The concession by the United States is limited to particular articles."³⁴

³²Ibid., p. 66.

³³Ibid., p. 80.

³⁴Ibid., p. 80.

The French treaty was reported favorably to the Senate by the Foreign Relations Committee in February, 1900. Immediately there was a concerted effort against ratification led by George Perkins of California and Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island.³⁵ There developed such strong opposition that the consideration of the Kasson treaty was never placed on the Senate calendar, but it was referred back to committee for amending. There it was pigeonholed, never again to be considered by the Senate body. Robert Porter of the New York Times took a Senate poll which indicated that the treaty would probably have been approved if it had ever been voted on, but this was never known for certain.³⁶ The Republican platform of 1900 again supported a policy of tariff reciprocity, but it was recommended that tariff rates should be lowered only on goods "we do not ourselves produce."³⁷ In his last speech at Buffalo, President McKinley spoke in favor of reciprocity as "the natural outgrowth of our wonderful industrial development."³⁸ Theodore Roosevelt stated in his inaugural address: "I ask the attention of the Senate

³⁵Congressional Record, March 2, 1900, Vol. 33, part 3, 56th cong., 1st sess., p. 2459.

³⁶New York Times, February 27, 1900. The Porter poll indicated that fifty Senators favored ratification, eleven opposed, and twenty-eight were uncommitted. Fifty-five positive votes were required for ratification.

³⁷Younger, Kasson, p. 376.

³⁸Dennett, Hay, p. 417.

to the reciprocity treaties laid before it by my predecessor."³⁹ He, however, did not fight for ratification, and this was of disappointment to Hay and Jusserand, both of whom had a greater desire for Franco-American reciprocity than did the President.⁴⁰ Even if Roosevelt had taken a more active interest in the matter, it is doubtful that the tariff could have passed the Senate. In 1904 John Osborne wrote that the reciprocity treaties had expired and were "of little interest to anyone but an historian."⁴¹

John Kasson was upset that his treaty had failed to pass the Senate, and he resigned in March, 1901. He gave as a reason that the impossibility of Senate action made his salary a waste of government money.⁴² The fact that he was eighty years of age certainly had an influence on his decision. Many historians have pointed out that the failure at ratification resulted in a higher tariff for American exports to France.⁴³ The effect was felt even several years later. In

³⁹FR, 1901, pp. XXII-XXIII. Before the speech Roosevelt asked Lodge's advise, and Lodge wrote him: "The more I think of it the better I like the paragraphs on reciprocity." October 17, 1901, Letters, Vol. I, p. 507.

⁴⁰Jusserand to Rouvier, June 28, 1905, DDF, XVI, p. 180. Dennett, Hay, p. 418.

⁴¹John Osborne, "Reciprocity and the American Tariff System," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XXIII (January, 1904), pp. 55-84.

⁴²Younger, Kasson, p. 377.

⁴³Ibid., p. 368. Taussig, Tariff, pp. 327-31. James Laughlin and Parker Willis, Reciprocity, (New York: The Baker and Taylor Co., 1903), p. 70.

1905 the French Government took away many of the rights of American companies in France, and the Embassy in Paris reported that support for the bill had been a result of the Senate's failure to ratify the Kasson tariff.⁴⁴ In 1907 Root complained to Jusserand that the French discrimination against American goods was unfair.⁴⁵ Ambassador Jusserand responded that "France never practiced discrimination of any kind against the United States." "It is certainly through no fault of France," he argued, "that the ratification of the treaty thus concluded was put off from year to year and finally given up, whereby the very situation with which the Federal Government finds fault was created."⁴⁶ Near this time Secretary Root wrote an article advocating that the United States should follow France's example of the minimum and maximum tariff rates. He maintained that this policy would "enable us to protect ourselves against those who use us badly."⁴⁷

⁴⁴Porter to Hay, December 14, 1904, Despatches, Vol. 124. McCormick to Root, September 21, 1905, Ibid., Vol. 125, no. 46.

⁴⁵Root to Jusserand, December 28, 1907, Department of State, France, (numerical file), Vol. 478. This volume is entirely concerned with economic matters.

⁴⁶Jusserand to Root, November 12, 1907, Ibid. Also see S.H.F. "Acute Tariff Difficulties with France," American Economist, XLIV (July 16, 1909), pp. 25, 36-7.

⁴⁷Elihu Root, "The Foreign Trade of the United States," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XXIX (April, 1907), pp. 446-70.

The French Government was not entirely anti-American in its tariff policy. In 1902 there was an attempt to form a European coalition against American trade. The action had no chance of success without the co-operation of France and Russia. Delcassé was happy to tell General Porter that Germany had made such a proposal. Delcassé claimed that the French Government had given "a prompt and emphatic refusal." He further told the American Ambassador that "the relations between his country and the United States were of the most friendly character, that the trade between them was increasing, and that there was every desire on the part of France to continue her harmonious intercourse with the American Republic."⁴⁸

Despite its overwhelming bulk, the greater part of the diplomatic correspondence dealing with the tariff was of a technical nature and was concerned with very minor questions. For example, there were hundreds of letters written on such questions as the type of oil used in preserving French sardines, the kinds of American nursery plants infected by San Jose Scale, the effectiveness of the measures taken to protect American cattle from Texas fever, whether labels on French products should be required to be printed in English, and the early enforcement of the Pure Food and Drug Act on

⁴⁸Porter to Hay, February 6, 1902, Despatches, Vol. 120, no. 960. To what extent this report was true is difficult to determine, but certainly Delcasse was not morally opposed to exaggeration in diplomatic rhetoric.

French products.⁴⁹ Despite the reams of material on such matters in the department of state Archives, it does not seem either sufficiently interesting or worthwhile to justify their consideration in any detail. There are, however, two points that might be emphasized in this connection. First, for the sake of perspective it should be understood that the diplomats spent a great deal of their time in dealing with trivia and routine. Secondly, although minor economic questions often caused irritation, they were not the source of real crises, and they did not seem to have a great deal of influence on the formation of basic foreign policy.

America's trade with France was an extremely small part of her foreign trade. In 1898 American exports totaled \$1,231,000,000. Exports to the United Kingdom were \$541,000,000; to Germany they were \$156,000,000; and to France they were only \$95,000,000. That same year total imports to the United States were \$616,000,000. Imports from the United Kingdom were \$109,000,000; from Germany they were \$70,000,000; and imports from France were \$53,000,000. In 1907 American exports abroad had increased to \$1,881,000,000.

⁴⁹See especially Hay to Porter, March 26, 1902, Instructions, Vol. 24. Adee to Porter, November 16, 1904, Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 37. Root to White, White Papers, box 18. Memorandum of the French Embassy, December 20, 1907, France, Vol. 478. Hay to Porter, March 26, 1902, Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 468-9. Francis Loomis to Porter, August 11, 1903, Ibid., p. 603. Jusserand to Root, April 11, 1904, April 21, 1904, Notes, Vol. 45. Root to Jusserand, April 22, Ibid. The Foreign Relations volumes devote many pages to such matters, but the Documents diplomatiques français do not.

To the United Kingdom the value was \$608,000,000; the value to Germany was \$257,000,000; and the value of exports to France was \$114,000,000. Imports to the United States in 1907 were worth \$1,434,000,000. Of this amount British imports totaled \$246,000,000; the total of German imports was \$162,000,000; and French imports to the United States reached the total value of \$128,000,000. For the years between 1898 and 1907 the total French exports to the United States were \$843,000,000, and during the same period the American exports to France were \$820,000,000.⁵⁰ The favorable balance of trade for France is more significant when it is remembered that since 1894 the United States has always had a favorable balance of merchandise trade.⁵¹

An interesting interpretative question is the extent to which there is a connection between foreign trade and the formation of foreign policy. It would certainly be a mistake to induce a broad theory of foreign relations from the study of Franco-American diplomatic relations for only a few years, but it is interesting that the commerce between the two countries from 1898 to 1907 seems to have had little influence on the basic policy orientation of either government. There

⁵⁰U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 550, 552.

⁵¹See Gilbert Fite and Jim Reese, An Economic History of the United States, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), pp. 463-6.

is no evidence that the Spanish-American War caused any serious damage to Franco-American trade, even during the year of 1898. More significant than this, for the ten years after the war America's trade with Germany was much greater than her trade with France. Yet during these years the direction of American power was increasingly used to support France at the expense of Germany.

At the turn of the century foreign investments were an established part of the economy of France. It is estimated that between one-half and one-third of the entire French capital savings was invested outside the country. Herbert Feis, in the best study of this subject, has emphasized that the investments were "guided and often controlled by the government" with political as well as economic goals in mind.⁵² It was in large part a result of the dual alliance that one-fourth of the French investment was in Russian securities. The economic advisers of the Quai d'Orsay did not believe that there was a large diplomatic advantage to be gained from investments in the United States. Still these investments totaled two million francs in 1900, and they had grown to six million francs by 1914.⁵³ At the beginning of the century the United States was moving in the direction of large

⁵²Feis, Banker, pp. 49-50. Harry D. White, The French International Accounts, 1880-1913, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), p. 267.

⁵³Feis, Banker, pp. 51-2, 57-9.

foreign investments. American insurance companies in France were becoming an important consideration.⁵⁴ It should be emphasized that American investments were small when compared to those of France, and until the first World War the United States was classified as a debtor nation.⁵⁵ In contrast to France, foreign policy did not have much influence in directing American investments. At least this was the case until the dollar diplomacy of the Taft Administration.

Much has been written about the economic value and the economic motivation of European colonialism. This is a very complex subject, but it is certain that in the case of French colonialism a basic part of the policy was to stimulate the home industry. It is also certain that the French policy was contrary to the American economic interests. It is interesting to note that Jules Ferry, the founder of the French Empire in the 1880's, stressed the value of the colonies as a market for French products. The law of January 11, 1892, extended the French protective tariff throughout the colonies, and thus gave French industry the same relative advantage in the entire empire that it enjoyed in mainland France. Eugène Etienne, the Secretary of State

⁵⁴Charles Lowb, Legal Status of American Corporations in France, (Paris: the Lecram Press, 1921), pp. 39-40.

⁵⁵Cleona Lewis, America's Stake in International Investments, (New York: The Brookings Institution, 1938), pp. 3, 96-7. This is the most detailed work on the subject. Also see Charles Hobson, The Export of Capital, (London: Constable and Company, 1914), p. 154.

for the Colonies, explained "that since France must incur the obligations involved in a colonial domain, it is just and proper that this domain should be reserved as a market for French products."⁵⁶

Madagascar is one example of the influence of French imperialism on American trade. This African island, which is larger than France, was made a French protectorate in 1895 and a French colony in 1896.⁵⁷ Before this development the majority of Madagascar's trade was with Britain and the United States, and both nations had treaties with Madagascar which granted most-favored-nation treatment. In 1896 the French Foreign Minister, in a matter of fact way, notified the Department of State that the American treaty had become "inconsistent with the new order of things." He explained that the French policy was to maintain a single tariff system throughout the French empire, and thus French colonies were not allowed to have bilateral commercial agreements.⁵⁸ This was obviously not good news to Secretary of State Richard Olney, but the United States was not prepared to challenge France's right to make colonies in Africa. Olney did refuse to recognize a change in Madagascar's tariff until the French

⁵⁶Stephen Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925, (London: P. S. King and Son, 1929), p. 44.

⁵⁷See David Brogan, The Development of Modern France, 1870-1939, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), pp. 243-6.

⁵⁸Bourgeois to Eusthis, April 16, 1896, FR, 1896, p. 123.

Government had gone through the normal legal channels to make it clear that the nation had become a "territory by conquest and absorption."⁵⁹ Shortly thereafter the French Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution to this effect, and the United States then recognized French sovereignty over Madagascar.⁶⁰

After Madagascar was made into a colony, French goods enjoyed a relative advantage over other foreign items in that market. In fact, by 1907 more than ninety percent of the colony's trade was with France and her empire.⁶¹ Certainly this was no major tragedy for the American economy, but there were special interests in the United States which were hurt as a result of the French colonial policy. In a report to the Department of State the Committee on American Interests in China concluded: "We certainly do not wish to have our experience of exclusion from Madagascar practiced in a greatly enlarged scale in the case of China."⁶² As far as possible the Department of State tried to give moderate support to American interests in Madagascar, but never did this ever take the form of direct opposition to France. In

⁵⁹Olney to Eusthis, May 2, 1896, Ibid., p. 125.

⁶⁰Hanotaux to Eusthis, June 3, 1896, Ibid., pp. 130-2.

⁶¹"Madagascar," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, Vol. 12, p. 275.

⁶²Quoted in Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 355.

1897 France asked the holders of concessions and deeds in the colony to register the property with the French Provincial Resident or face forfeiture. Secretary of State Sherman notified France that the Department of State would encourage Americans to comply with the orders, but that the department would not consider non-compliance as sufficient reason for a confiscation of property.⁶³

There was a similar Franco-American conflict of interests in the colony of Tunisia. In Tunisia the United States had treaties of 1797 and 1824 giving her most-favored-nation status. In 1881 the French Government forced the North African country into a treaty which took away most of Tunisia's sovereignty, but for several years there was no attempt to repudiate the special rights of American trade. Of course, American interests in the region were minor; trade between the United States and Tunisia amounted to only \$31,000 in 1896. In that year the French Government decided it was time to consolidate the empire under one colonial policy, and in accordance with this goal the French Ambassador notified the Department of State that the two American-Tunisian treaties would have to be abrogated.⁶⁴ Secretary of State Olney objected with the argument that to place Tunisia under

⁶³Sherman to Vignaud, August 12, 1897, Instructions, Vol. 33, no. 101.

⁶⁴Patenôtre to Olney, September 16, 1897, December 29, 1896, Notes, Vol. 41.

the French tariff would give an advantage to Germany, England and other nations that had the minimum rates. He requested that the United States should continue to have the benefit of the most-favored-nation clause in relation to countries other than France. As in the case of Madagascar, he did not challenge the right of the French to have a colony in Tunisia. But the French Government was not willing to make any exceptions in its attempt to have a single tariff system throughout the empire. The French Ambassador ignored the American argument that the change would be to the benefit of the European powers. He simply wrote that all other countries had agreed and that "the concurrence of the Federal Government in the same principle would seem all the more easy, since American interests are of very small importance in the Regency."⁶⁵

In October, 1897, the French Government unilaterally annulled the American-Tunisian treaties. The French Ambassador tersely wrote to Secretary Sherman: "I therefore have the honor to inform you that the Government of the Republic, both in its own name and in the name of His Highness the Bey of Tunis, denounces the treaties concluded in 1797 and 1824."⁶⁶ The American Government grudgingly accepted the

⁶⁵patenôtre to Olney, September 16, 1897, December 29, 1896, Notes, Vol. 41.

⁶⁶patenôtre to Sherman, October 19, 1897, Notes, Vol. 41.

development.⁶⁷ In the negotiations for the commercial treaty, John Kasson tried to get special tariff rates for Tunisia. The Ambassador immediately rejected this suggestion as contrary to the French colonial policy.⁶⁸ In the final draft Tunisia was as a part of the French empire, which at least was a clarification of American-Tunisian commerce.⁶⁹ With the defeat of the treaty in the Senate, the position of American rights in Tunisia was again in doubt. In addition to the tariff, there was also the question whether the United States would continue to have the right of extra-territoriality. It was not until 1904 that the United States and France signed a treaty defining the legal relationship between the United States and the Bey of Tunisia. By the arrangement the French tariff was applied to Tunisia, and American citizens were guaranteed the same rights in the colony which they had in France.⁷⁰

Elsewhere in the French empire there was little satisfaction for American commercial ambitions. The large market of Indo-China was almost eliminated from American penetration, at a time when it was commonly believed that the Far East

⁶⁷Hay to Porter, January 5, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 134-5.

⁶⁸Proposed treaty drafted by Kasson, March 8, 1898, Ibid., pp. 134-5. Memorandum of Cambon, May 2, 1898, Ibid., pp. 136-7.

⁶⁹Second draft of the treaty by Kasson, May 4, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, pp. 138-9.

⁷⁰For the treaty see FR, 1904, pp. 304-5.

offered great commercial opportunity.⁷¹ Certainly, American imperialism was equally detrimental to French trade. After 1898 France found fewer markets in the Philippines, Cuba and Porto Rico. France did not challenge the right to maintain a relative advantage within declared colonies, but in the case of Cuba, Ambassador Cambon in 1900 vigorously complained that the tariff rates had been increased on French products.⁷² Neither France nor the United States was liberal in regard to the tariff on imports from the other's colonies. In 1899 the United States refused to admit Algerian goods at the same rates as French products. The French Government maintained that Algeria was "an integral part" of France and not just a colony. Algeria was divided into departments like those of the mother country; she had representatives in the French Parliament; and she was united with the French customs.⁷³ In the commercial agreement of 1902 the United States gave special rates for Algerian imports in exchange for the minimum tariff on coffee from Porto Rico.⁷⁴ In 1907 France threatened to put Porto Rican coffee on the maximum list.

⁷¹In 1905 French exports into Indo-China were valued at 4,314,586 British pounds, and American exports were 126,425 pounds. "Indo-China," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edit., Vol. XIII. Roberts, Colonial Policy, pp. 494-5.

⁷²Cambon to Hay, May 31, 1900, Notes, Vol. 43.

⁷³Cambon to Hay, December 27, 1899, Notes, Vol. 42; May 10, 1900, Ibid., Vol. 43.

⁷⁴Agreement in FR, 1902, pp. 418-9.

Secretary Root responded that this would be "commercial warfare" and that "we shall not hesitate to use the weapons which are under our control in carrying out the warfare, much as we regret to do so."⁷⁵ But in the commercial agreement of 1908 the minimum tariff was continued on Porto Rican coffee in exchange for lower rates on French champagne and sparkling wines.⁷⁶

The policy of imperialism brought conflict in areas other than economic matters. Religious organizations in both France and the United States took advantage of colonialism to try to further their missionary ambitions. The governments of both countries had the formal policy of non-discrimination toward all religious groups, but in practice the French Government often became the supporter of Catholic rights and the United States of Protestant rights. In 1904 Senator Jonathan Dolliver of Iowa complained that American Mormon missionaries in the Society Islands had been hindered from their efforts by the French colonial administration. He charged that this was "a religious persecution under official order and sanction." The Department of State did not care to take firm action in such a matter, but Hay did instruct General Porter to use American good offices to get

⁷⁵Root to White, June 27, 1907, Instructions, Vol. 478.

⁷⁶Agreement in FR, 1908, pp. 329-30.

"equal privileges of worship and assemblage with those accorded to other denominations in the Society Islands."⁷⁷

France had a long history of involvement in the Eastern Question. In contrast, the United States, except for a few religious schools, had almost no interests in the Near East. In the latter part of the nineteenth century several American Protestant schools suffered damages during local revolutions against the Ottoman Empire. The United States demanded that the schools be given a suitable indemnity, but the Turkish Government was slow to make a settlement. Secretary Hay discussed the question with Jules Cambon in 1900. Hay asked if the European powers would oppose a forceful action by the United States. Cambon was evasive to Hay, but he advised Delcassé that France should encourage the Sultan to seek conciliation for "nothing would be so perilious for the future than to let the United States penetrate into the Mediterranean."⁷⁸ It appears that Delcassé shared Cambon's anxiety, and he instructed the French Ambassadors throughout Europe to use their influence to encourage the Sultan to pay the indemnity. Delcassé indicated that he wanted to keep the United States out of the Eastern Question.⁷⁹ The French

⁷⁷Hay to Porter, December 19, 1904, February 18, 1905, Instructions, Vol. 25, pp. 45-6, and p. 59.

⁷⁸Reference in DDF, Vol. XVI¹, p. 200, note 1.

⁷⁹Delcassé to Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Constantinople, and Berlin, April 22, 1900, Ibid., no. 122, p. 198.

Ambassador in Constantinople did not see any reason to fear an American penetration into the area, and he believed that a show of force was the only way the United States could collect the indemnity.⁸⁰ Twice President Roosevelt ordered the American fleet into Turkish waters in order to get Abdul Hamid to come to terms. Both movements were temporary without any effort to establish a permanent power base, and it appears that they did not create any concern at the Quai d'Orsay.⁸¹

In South America there was a greater potential for conflict between American and French goals. Americans remembered the attempt of Napoleon III to establish a sphere of influence in Mexico, and although France only had a few small colonies in that part of the world in 1898, she continued to regard several of the weaker South American Republics as potential colonies. In France the Monroe Doctrine was unpopular, and it was generally looked upon as an excuse for American imperialism. At the time of the Spanish-American War Maurice de Beaumarchais wrote that it gave "North Americans the illusion that it was in the interests of all Americans, while most often it serves the special interests of the

⁸⁰Constans to Delcassé, April 23, 1900, Ibid., no. 123., p. 199.

⁸¹Lewis Einstein, A Diplomat Looks Back, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 37-8. The French archives need to be checked to see the reaction at the Quai d'Orsay.

United States."⁸² By this time the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine had been greatly expanded since it had been declared seventy years earlier. In 1895 Secretary of State Richard Olney had been belligerent in warning Britain that the United States would protect Latin America from European intervention.⁸³ Theodore Roosevelt was one leader who had applauded this broad and vigorous interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. He wrote that "every true patriot, every man of statesmanlike habit, should look forward to the day when not a single European power will hold a foot of American soil."⁸⁴

In the late nineteenth century the United States did not have any major controversy with France because of the latter's policy in South America, but there were some areas of disagreement. One such area was Brazil. There was no clear settlement of the boundary line between Brazil and French Guiana. Gold was discovered in the disputed district in 1894, and the next year France sent troops into a part of the area. In London the influential Ambassador, Thomas

⁸²Maurice de Beaumarchais, La doctrine de Monroe: l'évolution de la politique des Etats-Unis au XIX^e siècle, (Paris: L. Larose et Forcel, 1898), p. 229.

⁸³Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895, FR, 1895-1896, pp. 560-2.

⁸⁴Theodore Roosevelt, "The Monroe Doctrine," American Ideals, (New York: C.P. Putnam's Sons, 1897), p. 252. Roosevelt wrote that the justification of the doctrine was "the needs of the nation and true interests of Western Civilization" and that if it "did not already exist it would be necessary to create it." p. 246.

Bayard, warned the French Ambassador that the United States had "serious interests in Latin America."⁸⁵ The French Government chose not to push the matter, and certainly the United States influenced that policy. France had a more significant controversy with Santo Domingo. In 1894 France sent a squadron into the Caribbean to force the Government of Santo Domingo into paying reparations to several French companies. The American Government was concerned enough to send one ship into the area with instructions to "watch carefully."⁸⁶ There was trouble again in 1899. In that year there were anti-French manifestations in Santo Domingo, and President Jimenez refused to pay the French debt. The French Government presented Jimenez with the ultimatum that force would be used unless there were an immediate payment accompanied with a public apology. Santo Domingo gave in to the demands. Shortly thereafter Delcassé wrote: "The incident is closed by the public apology of President Jimenez and by the payment of the indemnity which was due our nation. The delicate point of the affair was the United States."⁸⁷

France was naturally interested in the construction of a canal across the isthmus of Central America. After the failure of the French venture under Ferdinand de Lesseps, it

⁸⁵Quoted in LaFeber, Empire, p. 278.

⁸⁶FR, 1895, I, pp. 397-8. LaFeber, Empire, pp. 247-8.

⁸⁷Delcassé to Barrère, Ambassador to Rome, January 17, 1900, DDF, XVI¹, no. 50, p. 73.

was generally recognized that only the United States would have the interests and the means to complete a canal. The French had special rights in both Panama and Nicaragua, but because the project would benefit her world trade, France had no reason to oppose American efforts.⁸⁸ Delcassé hoped that Philippe Bunau-Varilla would be successful in selling the Panamanian rights in the United States, but he was never involved in the matter.⁸⁹ When there was the possibility of a revolution in Panama, Delcassé made it clear that France would not intervene in the affair except to protect French interests.⁹⁰ French leaders were not unhappy with the outcome of the revolution and the treaty between Hay and Bunau-Varilla, and France was the first nation to give diplomatic recognition to the new Panamanian Government.⁹¹ General Porter, in a despatch, noted that the majority of the French people were "much pleased with events."⁹² The Suez engineer, Gustave Sautereau, wrote a book which was very favorable

⁸⁸Cambon to Delcassé, February 18, 1900, DDF, XVI¹, p. 126. Frederick Murhard, Nouveau recueil général de traités, conventions et autres transactions remarquables, Continuation of the work of George von Martens, (Goettingue: Dieterick, 1863), Vol. XVI, 2nd part, p. 183.

⁸⁹Delcassé to Cambon, February 3, 1900, DDF, XVI¹, no. 68, p. 104.

⁹⁰Delcassé to Cambon, April 28, 1900, Ibid., no. 129, p. 207.

⁹¹Porter to Hay, November 19, 1903, Despatches, Vol. 123.

⁹²Porter to Hay, November 11, 1903, Ibid., p. 360.

toward America's projected construction of a canal.⁹³ The Quai d'Orsay had little sympathy for the fate of Columbia, and when that country was slow in paying for damages to foreign countries during the revolution, Delcassé suggested to the United States that they should take punitive action.⁹⁴ Secretary Root discouraged France from taking such action, but it was clear that Delcassé's suggestion was an indirect approval of the policy of the United States toward the Panamanian revolution.⁹⁵

For more than thirty years one of the major diplomatic problems of the American hemisphere was Venezuela's inability and refusal to pay her foreign debt. On several occasions this question became a consideration in Franco-American diplomatic relations. France, more than any other European country, had special interests in the affairs of the Venezuelan Republic. Out of a population of two and one-half million, more than 2,500 of Venezuela's citizens were French speaking. Even more important, two of the principle banks in the nation were entirely controlled by French capital, and a French company had a monopoly on the telegraph service in Venezuela.⁹⁶

⁹³Gustave Sauterouau, The Great Ocean Ways of the World: Suez, Nicaragua, Panama, (Paris: Privately Published, 1905), p. 6.

⁹⁴French Embassy to Root, September 1, 1905, Notes, Vol. 46.

⁹⁵Memorandum for Root, signed I.B.S., March 14, 1906, Ibid.

⁹⁶Pierre de Coubertin, "La conquête des Etats-Unis," La Chronique de France, (Auxerre: A. Lanier, 1902), pp. 121, 126.

The American Government was suspicious of possible French ambitions to expand her influence in the country. In 1881 Venezuela refused to pay her debt to French creditors, and the French Government threatened to send in troops and occupy several customs houses until the debt had been collected. The Department of State was concerned that this could lead to territorial aggrandizement, and Secretary James G. Blaine notified France that the United States would intervene if there were a threat to the Monroe Doctrine.⁹⁷ Eventually the conflict was settled through compromise, and a Franco-Venezuelan treaty of 1885 guaranteed that France would respect Venezuela's territorial integrity and would not intervene until all other means had been exhausted.⁹⁸

After the revolution of 1899 the Venezuelan Government was in the hands of Cipriano Castro, and this scoundrel repudiated the previous government's debt to France, Britain, Germany and Italy. Many Americans feared that the European powers might use this as an opportunity to gain a new foothold in South America. Roosevelt made reference to this fear in his annual message of 1901: "We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of

⁹⁷Blaine to Noyes, July 23, 1881, FR, 1881, pp. 1216-8.

⁹⁸Memorandum of January 13, 1903, FR, 1903, p. 410.

territory by any non-American power."⁹⁹ The French chargé d'affaires in Washington reported to the Quai d'Orsay that he feared the message indicated that Roosevelt intended to begin a policy of direct intervention in South America.¹⁰⁰ The next year the governments of Britain, Germany and Italy decided that patience would not work with Castro, and they joined in a concerted effort to force him to meet his international commitments. The three powers placed a blockade around Venezuela until February, 1903, when the two sides agreed to submit the conflict to the Hague Tribunal for arbitration. Thirteen years later Roosevelt wrote to his friend, William Thayer, that Germany had agreed to arbitrate the matter only after he had threatened the Kaiser with force. There is no evidence that the incident took place in exactly the way Roosevelt described it, and most historians believe it was one of his several romantic exaggerations.¹⁰¹

France had large claims against Venezuela in 1902, but

⁹⁹Annual Message of December 3, 1901, Ibid., 1901, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.

¹⁰⁰Margerie to Delcassé, December 29, 1901, DDF, I², no. 575, pp. 680-1.

¹⁰¹See Thayer, Hay, Vol. II, pp. 412-5. This story is accepted in James Ford Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 428. Beale, Roosevelt, pp. 395-413. The account is rejected in Howard Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 136. John Bassett Moore, "John Hay," Political Science Quarterly, XXXII (1917), pp. 119-21. Herbert Bowen, "Roosevelt and Venequela," North American Review, CCX (September, 1919), p. 416.

she did not participate in the joint effort of that year despite the urging of England and Germany that she should do so. This policy was predicated on two considerations. First, in February of that year the French Government had negotiated an arbitration treaty with Venezuela by which the extent of the French debt was to be decided by an umpire selected by Roosevelt. The treaty further guaranteed that France would have primacy in any payments Venezuela would make to her foreign creditors.¹⁰² In the second place, France did not join the united démarche because of her concern for the policy of the United States. The French Embassy in Washington went out of its way to indicate that France's abstinence was a demonstration of the "friendly character" of her foreign policy.¹⁰³ Ambassador Sternburg informed his government that he had learned from a "reliable source" that in the Venezuelan affair "France was marching hand in hand with Washington." He advised the Foreign Office to follow a course of moderation to avoid a "permanent coalition" of the two governments.¹⁰⁴ Roosevelt did indicate to the French chargé d'affaires that after the arbitration it might

¹⁰²The terms are in Jackson H. Ralston and W. T. S. Doyle, Report of the French-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission Under the Protocol of 1902, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906).

¹⁰³Memorandum of January 13, 1903, FR, 1902, p. 410.

¹⁰⁴Sternburg to the Foreign Office, January 31, 1903, GP, XVII, no. 51444, p. 285.

be possible for either France or Mexico to take charge of Venezuela's customs until the foreign debt was paid.¹⁰⁵ Two years after the incident Ambassador Jusserand was convinced that the French policy had resulted in closer relations with the United States.¹⁰⁶ Two contemporary political writers, René Pinon and Pierre de Coubertin, shared Jusserand's viewpoint.¹⁰⁷

President Roosevelt chose Frank Plumley of Vermont as the umpire of the Franco-Venezuelan arbitration. The French Government initially claimed that the debt was over eight million dollars, but in the final settlement of 1903 the amount was lowered to \$668,000. If France was willing to compromise on the amount, she expected the recognition of her right to priority in the collection of the claims against Venezuela. During the united blockade France had reminded the powers of this provision of the Franco-Venezuelan treaty, and the powers had agreed to respect the treaty.¹⁰⁸ The French chargé in Washington had also talked to Herbert Bowen,

¹⁰⁵Margerie to Delcassé, January 18, 1903, DDF, III², no. 30, p. 47.

¹⁰⁶Jusserand to Delcassé, March 9, 1903, DDF, Ibid., no. 127, p. 161. Margerie to Delcassé, January 28, 1903, Ibid., no. 46, pp. 62-3.

¹⁰⁷Rene Pinon, "Le conflit franco-vénézuélien," Revue des Deux Mondes, XXXII (March 15, 1906), pp. 433-4. Coubertin, "Etats-Unis," pp. 130-1.

¹⁰⁸Memorandum of December 18, 1902, Notes, Vol. 44. Memorandum of January 13, 1903, Ibid.

the American Minister in Venezuela, about the French claims. Bowen had assured him that the United States would remember and defend the principle of primacy for the French claims.¹⁰⁹ But at the Hague Tribunal later that year, the treaty between France and Venezuela was ignored. Priority of payment was granted to the three powers who had used force. French creditors, completely unrepresented at the Hague, believed that the decision was unfair. They were especially angry that the United States had failed to give diplomatic support to the power that had not participated in the blockade.¹¹⁰ In the event of further trouble with Venezuela, the French Government was not likely to discount the possible use of coercion.

Things had not improved in the Santo Domingo since the crisis between that unstable country and France by 1899. Santo Domingo had a debt of \$32,000,000, of which the greater part was owed to European creditors. With a default on the obligation in 1904, France, Italy and Germany began to threaten the use of force. It was in this situation that Roosevelt pronounced his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his state of the Union message he declared that the preservation of the doctrine might force the United States "in flagrant cases of such wrong doing or importance, to the exercise of

¹⁰⁹Margerie to Delcassé, January 28, 1903, DDF, III², no. 46, pp. 61-2.

¹¹⁰Pinon, "conflit," p. 434. Jules Basdevant, "Le conflit franco-vénézuélien," Revue Générale de Droit International Public, XIII, 509 et seq.

an international police power."¹¹¹ In France the announcement of the "Roosevelt corollary" created some concern. Le Temps, which normally reflected the viewpoint of the Quai d'Orsay, indicated that the Monroe Doctrine had "assumed an offensive character." This newspaper feared that the policy could lead to an alliance with England.¹¹² One author in the Revue Générale de Droit International Public denounced the principle of the message as a "hypocritical formula which will serve the exclusive and selfish interests of the United States."¹¹³ The historian Achille Viallate was less passionate, and he was convinced that it was necessary for Frenchmen to accept the advent of American imperialism as a fact of the international situation.¹¹⁴

Early in 1905 President Roosevelt negotiated a controversial treaty with Santo Domingo which placed the customs of the country entirely under American control. The agreement provided that 45 percent of the revenues would go to the Government of Santo Domingo and the remainder would be used to pay the foreign debt. With this arrangement there was not the slightest possibility that France or any other

¹¹¹Message of December 6, 1904, FR, 1904, p. Xli.

¹¹²Quoted in the Literary Digest, XXX (January 21, 1905), p. 104.

¹¹³Julien La Ferrière, "L'impérialisme aux Etats-Unis et la doctrine de Monroe," Revue Générale de Droit International Public, XII, p. 263.

¹¹⁴Revue Politique et Littéraire, IV, pp. 393-98.

power would intervene in Santo Domingo. If France was not prepared to oppose the application of the Roosevelt corollary, this did not mean that she was completely happy with the situation. When Roosevelt justified his policy in his annual message of 1905,¹¹⁵ an editorial in Le Temps declared: "We are already well acquainted with the doctrine of the 'big stick.' This doctrine is now enlarged and exaggerated to extraordinary proportions."¹¹⁶ It is not entirely a coincidence that in 1905 there appeared three French books on the subject of the Monroe Doctrine: Joseph Ribet's Des transformations de la doctrine de Monroe, Daniel Antokoletz's La doctrine de Monroe et l'Amérique and Horace de Barral Montferrat's De Monroe à Roosevelt, 1823-1905.¹¹⁷ All three works assumed that American foreign policy in South America was a form of imperialism contrary to the interests of the South American Republics. Also the three works did not see any reason to suspect that Europe had ambitions for territory in that part of the world.

Meanwhile the conflict between France and Venezuela

¹¹⁵FR, 1905, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

¹¹⁶Quoted in Literary Digest, XXXI (December 30, 1905), p. 995.

¹¹⁷Joseph Ribet, Des transformations de la doctrine de Monroe, (Auxerre: Impr. A. Lanier, 1905). Daniel Antokletz, La doctrine de Monroe et l'Amérique, (Paris: E. Larose, 1905). These two works were theses for the Sorbonne under Louis Renault. Horace Dominique de Barral Montferrat, De Monroe à Roosevelt, 1823-1905, (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie., 1905).

had become more critical. In September, 1905, President Castro withdrew the permit of La compagnie française des câbles télégraphiques, the company which had a monopoly in the Venezuelan interior. This was done with the excuse that the company had co-operated with the revolutionaries in the fiasco of 1903, but it was clear to most observers that this was an attempt to nationalize the telegraph system.¹¹⁸ In October the new Ambassador in Paris, Robert McCormick, noted that "the continued arbitrary action of President Castro has aroused considerable irritation."¹¹⁹ The Minister at Caracas, William Russell, reported later that month that five French warships were ready for action "in case of not arriving at a perfect understanding promptly."¹²⁰ At the Quai d'Orsay it was well remembered that two years earlier Germany, Britain and Italy had achieved positive results only after they had used aggressive methods. It was also well remembered that during the blockade President Roosevelt had told M. Margerie, the French charge, that it was not the American policy to let the Venezuelan Government use the Monroe Doctrine to escape her financial obligations.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ See Venezuela, Proceso Franco-Venezolano, 1905-1906, (Caracas: Imprenta Nacional, 1907), p. xliv.

¹¹⁹ McCormick to Root, October 5, 1905, Despatches, Vol. 125, no. 49.

¹²⁰ Quoted in Jessup, Root, p. 495.

¹²¹ Margerie to Delcassé, January 18, 1903, DDF, III², no. 33, pp. 44-5.

President Roosevelt feared that France was ready to break diplomatic relations with Venezuela. At this point he was convinced that the crisis was the fault of the Venezuelan Government. In a letter to Hay he referred to President Castro as "an unspeakably villainous little monkey." "I should like to send an expedition against him," wrote Roosevelt, "but this at present would be inadvisable in such a mundane world as ours, alike from the standpoint of internal and international politics."¹²² By the time that Elihu Root had been appointed Secretary of State, the crisis was worse. In his message to congress in December, 1905, Roosevelt made it clear that the United States looked with disfavor upon even a temporary occupation of territory by a European power, but he repeated the promise that the Monroe Doctrine would never be "used by any nation of this continent as a shield to protect it from the consequences of its own misdeeds against other nations."¹²³ A few days after the message Root wrote Minister Russell that "nothing but the efforts of this government have for a considerable time prevented the use of force by France." Root further stated that he was fearful

¹²²Roosevelt to Hay, April 2, 1905, Roosevelt Papers, series 4B.

¹²³FR, 1905, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

that the United States would not be able to "maintain the peaceful status quo much longer."¹²⁴

On December 15 Roosevelt, Root and Jusserand met at the White House to discuss the crisis. The conversation was frank and candid. Jusserand made it clear that if the talks with Venezuela failed, the French Government would "have to employ more telling measures than the mere sending of naval vessels to Venezuelan waters." France would "probably be obliged to occupy temporarily one point or another, and seize perhaps some customs house; having recourse, in a word, to means which, while having chances of being felt, would avoid bloodshed." President Roosevelt responded that he understood "the necessities of such a situation." He assured Jusserand that the Monroe Doctrine "could certainly not be used by Southern Republics to shield them from the consequences of their own torts, and that France ought to feel no uneasiness in this particular case." Roosevelt explained that the United States would be satisfied so long as France would give assurances that she had no goals for a permanent occupation of territory and that the occupation of any customs house "would be of as limited duration as possible."

¹²⁴Root to Russell, December 11, 1905, Quoted in Jessup, Root, p. 495. In his interpretation Jessup writes: "Without doubt the fiery Theodore Roosevelt would have been quite ready to assume a more aggressive attitude toward the Latin American Republics if Root had not held the check rein." p. 497. Jessup does not have documentation to completely support this interpretation.

Jusserand told Roosevelt that, while he did not define French foreign policy, he did feel sure that these two conditions would be entirely satisfactory to the Quai d'Orsay.¹²⁵

Early in 1906 the French chargé d'affaires in Caracas went on board a French ship for several hours, and the Venezuelan Government refused him permission to re-enter the mainland. France severed her diplomatic relations with the Government of Castro. Ambassador Jusserand notified the Department of State of the situation, and he emphasized that the French Government had decided on this course only after it had "exhausted all other means." In addition, Jusserand requested that the American Minister in Caracas might be instructed to take charge of the French archives and French interests in Venezuela so long as the state of non-recognition might continue.¹²⁶ Root agreed, and the same day he telegraphed Russell to assume the responsibility.¹²⁷ Like France, Venezuela was anxious to know about the viewpoint in

¹²⁵This conversation is described in detail in two unsigned memorandums of December 15, 1905, Notes, Vol. 46. Philip Jessup writes that these memorandums were written by Root with the aid of Jusserand, but he does not give any basis for this explanation. Jessup, Root, pp. 495-6.

¹²⁶Jusserand to Root, January 9, 1906, Notes, Vol. 46. Rouvier did not ask the Venezuelan chargé d'affaires to leave Paris until January 18. Rouvier then declared: "By its prolongment and by progressively assuming a more aggressive character the attitude of the Government of President Castro has become incompatable with the maintainance of diplomatic relations between the two states." Venezuela, Proceso, p. lxxvi.

¹²⁷Root to Russell, January 9, 1906, FR, 1906, p. 1432.

Washington, and the Venezuelan Foreign Minister asked Russell to inform him "without delay" if the United States "in these circumstances will maintain and defend the Monroe Doctrine."¹²⁸ About two weeks later Root simply answered that "the Government of the United States is not aware that any circumstances exist which require action by the United States in order to maintain and defend the Monroe Doctrine."¹²⁹ Le Temps did notice that Roosevelt sent the American cruiser, the USS Denver, in the proximity of the Venezuelan waters to observe the situation.¹³⁰

The French Government made a lot of threats, but it neither established a blockade or occupied any customs houses. Without recourse to the archives at the Quai d'Orsay the best source for insight into the policy of the French Government is Le Temps. Several editorials in mid-January, probably written by André Tardieu, considered the various options which were open to France. It was impossible for the government to back down, explained the writer, for the entire trans-Atlantic cable system was at stake. The writer ruled out a military occupation, because he explained: "The delicate point is that France does not want to anger the American

¹²⁸Russell to Root, January 9, 1906, quoted in Jessup, Root, p. 496.

¹²⁹Root to Russell, January 30, 1906, Ibid., p. 497.

¹³⁰Le Temps, January 22, 1906.

public on the subject of the Monroe Doctrine."¹³¹ But Le Temps was persuaded that a blockade and a naval demonstration would not be considered unacceptable by the Roosevelt Administration.¹³² The newspaper noted that there had been no opposition to the French policy at Washington, but it also remarked that one would have "to conjecture to what point this attitude of approval would extend to the future."¹³³ One editorial expressed the idea that no power would object to the use of coercion for each power would believe that it was in the common interest to teach Castro a lesson.¹³⁴

The analysis of American public opinion in Le Temps was probably correct, for during the controversy the American press was almost unanimous in taking a pro-French position.¹³⁵ The Outlook stated in an editorial that "Castro has ignored his duty in this respect, and has pushed the friendly feeling which France had for his country to their limit and beyond what patience and forbearance require."¹³⁶ Albert Shaw, long a bitter critic of Castro, wrote in the

¹³¹Le Temps, January 22, 1906, January 31, 1906.

¹³²Ibid., January 24, 1906.

¹³³Ibid., January 20, 1906.

¹³⁴Ibid., January 26, 1906.

¹³⁵White, Opinion, p. 217.

¹³⁶The Outlook, LXXXII (January 20, 1906), p. 104; Ibid., (January 27, 1906), p. 145.

American Monthly Review of Reviews: "The eminently calm and fair attitude of the French Foreign Office has prevented any possible opposition to even the sternest of measures against President Castro."¹³⁷ In Harper's Weekly the influential George Harvey expressed confidence that the French Government would not violate either the letter or the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Harvey noted that Castro's "temper ran away with him, and led him to commit an act which no self-respecting government like that of France could be expected to overlook."¹³⁸

The Venezuelan Government--weak, poor and without any hope of outside help--had no choice but to submit to the French demands. In February Castro agreed to pay the French claims, stop harassing the French cable company and recognize a French Minister in Caracas. Without these concessions, there is no doubt but that France would have used force. Still it must be understood that the controversy occurred at the same time as the Moroccan crisis, and for this reason France was in a conciliatory mood. The Franco-Venezuelan controversy was so brief that it did not have a significant influence on relations between France and the United States. Most works on American diplomatic history have very little to say about the incident, if they mention it at all.¹³⁹

¹³⁷American Monthly Review of Reviews, XXXIII (March, 1906), pp. 266-7.

¹³⁸Harper's Weekly, L (February 10, 1906), p. 182.

¹³⁹A major exception is Jessup, Root, pp. 495-7.

The following year at the Second Hague Conference the United States took the leadership in the adoption of a resolution concerning the use of coercion to collect foreign debts. General Horace Porter introduced the resolution, which was a modification of a memorandum given the United States in 1902 by Mr. Luis M. Drago, the then Foreign Minister of the Argentine Republic. The final resolution which was adopted committed the powers "not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts," but this principle was not to apply to cases where the debtor state refused arbitration or refused to abide by the award of the arbitrator.¹⁴⁰ The French Government did not oppose the passage of the so-called Drago Doctrine at the Hague, but certainly it would have if there had not been provision for the use of force as a last resort. As the resolution was worded, there was never any concern that it was meant to refer to the recent actions of France. By the time of this Hague Conference the French Government had given up any hope of territorial aggrandizement in South America. France wanted to maintain her special interests in South America, but she had come to the conclusion that this could best be done by working with and not against the United States.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰For the resolution see Bemis, Diplomatic History, p. 525.

¹⁴¹This interpretation is emphasized in J. Fred Rippy, Latin America in World Politics, (James Sprunt Historical Studies, XIX, 1927), pp. 130-1.

As France was continuing to build a large empire in Africa, the United States had almost no interests on the continent. With one exception Americans had no objection to French colonialism in this region of the world; the one exception was the Republic of Liberia. The modern nation of Liberia had its beginning in 1822 when the American Colonization Society sent a group of free Negroes to the area. The Republic of Liberia was organized in 1847, based on the model of the American constitution, and the United States recognized the Republic in 1862. The Government in Monrovia-- named after President Monroe-- made a courageous effort for economic progress and political stability, but it was overwhelmed by many difficult problems. The major problem was that the local tribes for the most part did not feel any sense of loyalty toward the central government. By the end of the nineteenth century the Liberian Government had effective control only in the coast towns and in the settlements along the St. Paul and St. John Rivers. A related problem was that Liberia's colonial neighbors, France and Britain, used this instability as an excuse to expand the boundaries of their colonies at the expense of the defenseless Republic.

Beginning in the 1880's Britain and France began to eat away at the outer edges of Liberia. In 1883 the British authorities at the colony of Sierra Leone sent in troops to occupy portions of territory which had long been claimed by the Liberian Government. The following year the French

Foreign Minister announced that the boundary lines between Liberia and Ivory Coast were uncertain, and he called for an investigation. The French survey claimed that France should have sovereignty over the area between the Cavally River and the San Pedro River, an area sixty miles wide and one hundred miles long. The French authorities made agreements with the local tribes, and then they, following the British precedent, sent in occupation troops. In 1892 Secretary of State James Blaine notified the French Government that the United States would strongly protest any action which forced Liberia to cede long claimed territory.¹⁴² This seems to have little effect, for in December of that year Liberia had no choice but to sign a treaty which recognized the French claims.¹⁴³ The United States did not consider any action against France, but the following year President Grover Cleveland said in his annual message that the United States felt "earnest concern lest territorial impairment in Liberia should take place without her unconstrained consent."¹⁴⁴

In 1897 the British Ambassador in Washington gave Secretary of State Richard Olney a memorandum which reported

¹⁴²Blaine to Thomas Jefferson Coolidge, June 4, 1892, FR, 1892, p. 167.

¹⁴³Treaty in FR, 1893, pp. 297-8.

¹⁴⁴Speech of December 4, 1893, in Ibid., p. vii; Messages, Vol. XIII, p. 5870.

that France was making plans for an encroachment of Liberian territory. Olney was interested and instructed the American Minister in Monrovia: "In the light of the enclosed memorandum, which you are to regard as wholly confidential, ascertain and immediately report all that you can, showing the present view of the Liberian Government upon the matter."¹⁴⁵ Just after the change in the executive branch of the American Government, the new Secretary of State, John Sherman, instructed General Porter to find out all that he could about the matter.¹⁴⁶ John Hay in 1898 again called Porter's attention to the charges of French aggression. "Our position in reference to the citizens of Liberia," he wrote, "is such that we could not be justified in regarding with indifference any attempt to oppress them or deprive them of their independence." He suggested to Porter that he should tell Delcassé that the United States was concerned but that she would "take it for granted that their (British) apprehension are not well founded."¹⁴⁷ After a conversation with Delcassé, Ambassador Porter reported that he had received an "assuring response." Hay was pleased, and he instructed the Paris Embassy to "continue to watch the matter with care."¹⁴⁸ The

¹⁴⁵Olney to William Heard, February 23, 1897, Instructions, Liberia, Vol. 2, no. 37.

¹⁴⁶Sherman to Porter, May 20, 1897, quoted in Dennis, Adventures, p. 438.

¹⁴⁷Hay to Porter, June 28, 1898, Instructions, Vol. 24, p. 199.

¹⁴⁸Adee to Vignaud, August 23, 1898, Ibid., p. 218.

next year Hay wrote Porter that he should again emphasize to Delcasse that the American people would be opposed to "any action by any European Government that might threaten the integrity or independence of Liberia."¹⁴⁹

The Liberian Government was so worried about French territorial ambitions in 1900 that it expressed the desire for the United States Navy to construct a coaling station on the Liberian coast. At the request of McKinley, this possibility was investigated by the Navy Department. The Secretary of Navy concluded that the region was not practical for a coaling station, and that such a project would require an "expenditure of a sum of money so large that the Navy Department does not feel justified in bringing the matter to the attention of Congress."¹⁵⁰ After learning of this, the Liberian Minister in Washington suggested that the United States should at least assign a military attache at her Legation in Monrovia. Secretary Hay did not like the idea, for he believed that only a very strong military force would have any influence on the policies of the European powers. He wrote to the American Minister in Monrovia: "It appears inexpedient to detail an officer of the army for duty as military attache of the Legation."¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹Hay to Porter, June 28, 1899, Instructions, Vol. 24, p. 640.

¹⁵⁰Hay to Ernest Lyon, November 3, 1903, Instructions, Liberia, Vol. 2, no. 12.

¹⁵¹Hay to Lyon, November 13, 1903, Ibid., no. 13.

In 1904 France formally charged that there was no effective police control in the northern part of Liberia next to French Guinea. The French Government obliged Liberia to agree to the appointment of a Franco-Liberian Commission to investigate the amount of political stability in that general area. Hoping for some outside aid, the Liberian Government asked the United States to send an investigator to join the commission. The Department of State was suspicious of the French intentions, but at this moment it did not want to challenge France directly. The acting Secretary of State, Francis Loomis, wrote to the American Minister in Monrovia: "I have to say that this government does not see how it could send an uninvited representative along with the commission, and would hardly like to ask the French Government to let us do so."¹⁵² The following year Alvey Adee, then the acting Secretary of State, requested McCormick to talk to the Liberian Minister in Paris about the situation. "If fitting opportunity offers," added Adee, "you may also express in the proper quarter our solicitude that all differences may be amicably adjusted with appropriate regard to the historical rights of Liberia."¹⁵³

While the Franco-Liberian commission was still in the process of investigations, Ambassador Sternburg gave the

¹⁵²Loomis to Lyon, January 28, 1904, Ibid., Vol. 2, no. 21.

¹⁵³Adee to McCormick, July 17, 1905, Instructions, Vol. 25, p. 106.

Department of State a note charging that Great Britain and France were conspiring to make Liberia into a joint protectorate. According to the note France was to be given special commercial privileges in Liberia, and Britain would take charge of the Liberian customs. The very next day after Root received the German note, he wrote to Ambassador McCormick in Paris to "ascertain and report as fully as possible how far this project is being seriously entertained." Root made it clear that he doubted the truthfulness of the German charges. He noted that the French Government well understood the special relationship between Liberia and the United States, and he did not believe France would attempt such a policy without saying anything to the American Government.¹⁵⁴ In Paris McCormick found that some individuals in the Government had suggested that France make Liberia into a protectorate, but in his report to Root he concluded: "After having carefully investigated the matter, I am unable to report that no such negotiations have taken place and that no such protectorate is contemplated by France." McCormick did find, however, that the Government was determined to make additional boundary changes to the benefit of French West Africa.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴Root to McCormick, November 8, 1905, Instructions, Vol. 25, p. 147. Root to Lyon, November 9, 1905, Instructions, Liberia, Vol. 2, no. 65.

¹⁵⁵McCormick to Root, November 24, 1905, Despatches, Vol. 125, no. 61.

It is difficult to determine the goals of France in regard to Liberia, but it is certain that by 1905 she was convinced that she had special interests in the Republic. When an English rubber company established a branch office in Liberia the French expansionist paper L'Europe Coloniale expressed concern that this was a challenge to French commerce.¹⁵⁶ Up until this time there had been almost no American investments in the country. In 1906 an American rubber corporation investigated the possibility of obtaining a concession to obtain natural rubber. In Monrovia the French Ambassador objected to the plan, claiming that the treaty of 1902 stipulated that "no concession granted by the Liberian Government can be valid without the consent and concurrence of the French Government."¹⁵⁷ The Department of State did not reject the validity of the treaty, but it chose to disagree with the French interpretation of that document. Mr. Robert Bacon, the department's expert on treaties, declared that according to the agreement the approval of the French Government was not required except when "a concession should impair the independence of Liberia or should alienate any part of its territory."¹⁵⁸ The matter did not lead to any further

¹⁵⁶Charles Martel, "Libérie," L'Europe Coloniale, December 27, 1905.

¹⁵⁷Lyon to Root, December 30, 1905, Despatches, Liberia, no. 144; January 1, 1906, no. 147.

¹⁵⁸Robert Bacon to Lyon, February 6, 1906, Instructions, Liberia, Vol. 2, no. 60.

disagreement between the United States and France, for the American company did not follow through on its attempt to get a concession. It was not until after World War I that American business interests--led by the Firestone Corporation--became important to the small African nation.¹⁵⁹

In 1907 the French Government coerced Liberia into accepting another Franco-Liberian treaty. By this treaty Liberia ceded some 2,000 square miles of land to the colony of French Guinea. When the President of Liberia went to Paris to sign the treaty, he talked to Ambassador Henry White about the dissatisfaction of his Government toward the terms of the new arrangement. White, following his instructions, answered that the American Government sympathized with Liberia's situation, but that it was not prepared to interfere in the affair in any way.¹⁶⁰ Few Americans knew what was taking place at Paris. The press in the United States was almost completely silent about the treaty. President Roosevelt did not discuss the matter to any length in his correspondence. In one contemporary letter he did mention the "fearful deterioration" of the nation, and he added

¹⁵⁹See R. Earle Anderson, Liberia: America's African Friend. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1952), pp. 126-42.

¹⁶⁰White to Root, September 27, 1907, Despatches, Vol. 226, no. 3532.

that "the condition of Liberia today is something with which I am obliged practically to deal as President."¹⁶¹

Not long after the formation of the Franco-Liberian treaty Roosevelt appointed a commission to go to the Liberian Republic to investigate the situation there and to make recommendations for the American policy of the future. In the Congress there was considerable opposition to the funding of the commission, but eventually an appropriation bill was passed for \$39,000.¹⁶² In its final report the commission recommended that the United States should make Liberia into a quasi-protectorate, following the precedent of Roosevelt's policy in the Caribbean. Specifically, the commission suggested that the United States should provide diplomatic support for any future boundary disputes with Liberia, that she should control Liberia's customs until the foreign debt had been paid, that she should construct a coaling station near Monrovia, and that she should assist in improving the police forces, schools and hospitals of Liberia.¹⁶³ According to the report these measures were necessary because of the

¹⁶¹Roosevelt to Ray Stannard Baker, June 3, 1908, Morison, Letters, Vol. VI, p. 1048.

¹⁶²Congressional Record, Vol. XLIII, part 2, pp. 1077 ff.

¹⁶³U.S. Senate, Affairs in Liberia: Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting a Letter of the State Submitting a Report of the commission which visited Liberia in Pursuance of the Provisions of the Defunct Act of March 4, 1909, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 32-6. All of these ideas were suggested to the Commission by the Liberian Government.

likelihood of future territorial aggression by Britain and France. "In pursuit of their policy of building up a great West African Empire," the report declared, "the French have been a thorn in the side of Liberia. They have been consistent and persistent in their efforts to increase their boundaries."¹⁶⁴

The Roosevelt Administration did not think it wise to establish an American protectorate in Africa, but it did favor several of the recommendations of the commission. Secretary Root, just before leaving office, wrote: "Our nation rests upon the highest obligations to assist them, so far as they need assistance, toward the maintenance of a free, orderly and prosperous civil society."¹⁶⁵ Congress did not see fit to implement many of the recommendations, and the report died the death of so many similar studies in American history. In 1910 France again forced Liberia to sign a treaty which increased the size of French West Africa and reduced Liberia to its present land area. As earlier, the United States did not react with any vigorous anti-French policy. But it should be emphasized that this was an age of imperialism so far as the European powers were concerned, and West Africa was a major area for colonial competition. Even if the outside edges of her boundary were carved away,

¹⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 14-5.

¹⁶⁵Root to Roosevelt, January 18, 1909, quoted in Ibid., p. 31.

Liberia did manage to remain independent, and she and Ethiopia were the only two independent nations in Africa by 1910.

Liberia was tempting to France, England and Germany, but they recognized the historical and sentimental attachment of the United States to the Republic. It seems certain that this was the only reason that there was no partition of Liberia.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶See Roland P. Falkner, chairman of the commission, "The United States and Liberia," American Journal of International Law, IV (1910), pp. 529-45.

CHAPTER VI

THE FAR EAST

The Far East was of central concern to the foreign policies of both France and the United States throughout the nineteenth century.¹ The two countries had been commercial rivalries, each seeking trade opportunities, and for this reason their contact in this part of the world had generally been unfriendly.² For example, during the undeclared Franco-Chinese War of 1884, the American Secretary of State offered mediation to end the conflict. The offer was politely refused, but the incident was considered as somewhat of an impertinence at the Quai d'Orsay.³ The United States was unhappy with the fact that France was building a large colony in Indo-China, but despite this, the American Government, as Tyler Dennett observed, "never murmured a protest" against French imperialism in South East Asia.⁴ In a previous chapter it is

¹Langer, Imperialism, pp. 167, 677.

²Dennett, Americans, p. 637.

³Jules Ferry to Sala, Chargé in Washington, August 29, 1884, DDF, Vol. VI, no. 382, pp. 387-8.

⁴Dennett, Americans, p. 649.

noted that France was initially unhappy with the situation when the United States became her colonial neighbor in the Philippines after the war of 1898. Shortly thereafter, however, the greater fear of Germany and Japan made it necessary for France to come to terms with American imperialism. René Pinon, an important political writer, expressed a rather common conviction in 1904 when he wrote in the Revue des Deux Mondes that American power in Asia was necessary "for the equilibrium and the security of European possessions and interests." Pinon's conclusion was that he "sincerely" hoped for "the success of the Americans in this grand work of civilization."⁵

In the nineteenth century the American government had attempted to gain Asian markets for American commerce through use of the principle of equality of commercial treatment for all of the industrialized powers. This had been the American policy since the early 1840's when Secretary of State Daniel Webster instructed Caleb Cushing to work for "entry of the American ships . . . on terms as favorable as those which are enjoyed by British merchants."⁶ Until the Spanish-American war the United States tried to obtain markets in Asia without establishing colonies or spheres of influence as had most of

⁵René Pinon, "L'oeuvre des Américains aux Philippines," Revue des Deux Mondes, XXIV (November 15, 1904), p. 411.

⁶Claude M. Fuess, The Life of Caleb Cushing, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1951), Vol. I, pp. 418-20.

the European powers. All historical data seems to indicate that this policy was little motivated by idealistic considerations, and almost all historians agree with Tyler Bennett's generalization that "the tap-root of American policy has been not philanthropy but the demand for the most-favored-nation treatment."⁷ A large number of Americans believed that Asian markets offered great wealth and opportunity to the nations that would be able to take advantage of the situation.⁸

President McKinley echoed this belief in his annual message of 1898. He spoke of "our constantly expanding direct trade with the farther Orient," and he stated that "it will be our aim to subserve our large interests in that quarter by all means appropriate to the constant policy of our government."⁹

France attempted to gain commercial access to Asia by way of a large colonial empire. France's goals in the nineteenth century were generally limited to the area of Southeastern Asia. Since the time of Jules Ferry the major motivation for colonization of Indo-China had been the belief that Indo-China could be used as a back door to the large commercial markets of Southern China. It was a common

⁷Bennett, Americans, PP. v, 680.

⁸See Paul Varg, "The Myth of the China Market, 1890-1914," American Historical Review, LXXIII (February, 1968), pp. 742-58. Alfred Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1938), p. 152.

⁹Message of Dec. 5, 1898, FR, 1898, p. xxii.

conception that the province of Yunan had almost unlimited trade opportunities.¹⁰ It was not until the German lease of Kiachow in 1895 that France began to seek to extend her authority into the Chinese empire. After this date France, working with her ally, Russia, was one of the leading powers creating spheres of influence in China.¹¹ By 1898 France had accumulated preferential treatment in the three provinces of Yunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung, a coaling station in the bay of Kwangchow for ninety-nine years, a concession for Railroads into Lunnan, and some participation in the Chinese Eastern Railroad in Manchuria.¹² It appeared at this time that France was following a policy directly opposed to the continuation of the open door and the territorial integrity of China.

In the United States it was generally believed that the partition of China was at hand. From the experience of colonization in other areas it was feared that this development would be in conflict with American interests. In the North American Review Charles Conant wrote in 1898 that

¹⁰Warren B. Walsh, "The Yunan Myth," Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. II, May, 1943, pp. 272-86. Jules Ferry, Le Tonkin et la Mere-patrie, (Paris, V. Havard, 1890), pp. 80-96.

¹¹Langer, Imperialism, p. 395.

¹²"Kwangchow Bay" Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edit., Vol. 15-16, p. 957. Stephen Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925, (London: P. S. King, 1929), p. 431. Auguste Gérard, Ma Mission en Chine, 1894-7, (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1918), pp. 196-9. Henri Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1902), Vol. III, pp. 370-2.

"Russia, Germany and France have seized stations and large tracts of territory in China with a view to enforcing their restrictive policy of shutting up the markets to their own people." He therefore concluded that "the United States cannot afford to adhere to a policy of isolation while other nations are reaching out for the command of these new markets."¹³ Another writer in the same journal reported that unless the United States intervened China would soon be "carved up like sirloin of beef, as if there were no vitality in her."¹⁴ Great Britain also wanted to see the preservation of the status quo in China. She feared that Germany, France and Russia would create large spheres of influence which would be harmful to British dominance of the Asian markets. The London Times warned in 1898: "There need be no doubt that France will have her share, and a large one, in what still remains to be taken before the Chinese Empire becomes a corpse."¹⁵ In March of that year the British Government made overtures to the American Government that the two nations should join together in the support of the open door in China.¹⁶

¹³Charles A. Conant, "The Economics of Imperialism," North American Review, CLXVII (September, 1898), pp. 338, 340.

¹⁴Archibald R. Colquhoun, "The Far Eastern Crisis," North American Review, CLXVII (November, 1898), p. 23.

¹⁵London Times, March 11, p. 5. The charges were answered in Le Temps of that same day.

¹⁶Campbell, Friendship, pp. 19-20.

By 1898 France was somewhat disillusioned about the possibility of commercial benefit in Southeastern Asia. The important economist Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu demonstrated that the provinces of Yunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung were three of the poorest regions in China.¹⁷ With the exposure of the "Yunan myth" France's policy suddenly changed, and she became opposed to a further partition of China.¹⁸ On March 19 Hanotaux told a correspondent that France did not have any desire to join in any scheme for the disintegration of China. France could not handle any larger area in Asia than Indo China. "God grant," he said, "that we may not be witnessing the death of China." The policy of France was "to try to prop up the Celestial Empire, the ruin of which would cause so much conflict."¹⁹ In a conversation with the British Ambassador in Paris Hanotaux claimed that France's policy, like England's, was "based on the conservation principles and the maintenance as long as possible of the integrity of the Chinese Empire." A general program of "dismemberment rivalry" would "very probably create a war between the European powers. Hanotaux disliked "the principles of spheres of influence in China," but he said that "France

¹⁷Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, La rénovation de l'Asie, (Paris: A. Colin, 1901), pp. 436-56, 439.

¹⁸Robert, Policy, pp. 431-2. Walsh, "Myth," pp. 285-6.

¹⁹New York Herald, Paris edition, March 25, 1898
Washington Post, March 21, 1898, p. 1.

must sustain her claims to consideration in the provinces contiguous to Tongking." France wanted railway privileges to be "equally balanced," and "the participation of the French in the occupation of the administrative ports not absolutely ignored."²⁰

It was in this background that Secretary of State Hay and his Asian advisor William W. Rockhill decided to try to get the powers to agree to support the principle of equality of trading opportunities in the Chinese empire. The famous "open door" circular, written by Rockhill, was sent to Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Italy and Japan on various dates from September 6 to November 21, 1899. The basic idea of the document was the request that the powers would maintain the most-favored-nation doctrine in the leased territory and spheres of influence of China. The note did not call for support for the territorial integrity of China. In a department memorandum Rockhill wrote that spheres of influence "have now been recognized by Great Britain, as well as by France, Germany and Russia, and they must be accepted as existing facts."²¹ It should be noted that the United States did not even consider any suggestion that commercial equality should be applied in the European colonies of Asia. France's policy in Indo China was considered as a matter entirely in

²⁰ Monson to Marquess of Salisbury, March 20, 1898, BD, Vol. 1, no. 33, p. 22.

²¹ Quoted in Dennis, Adventures, pp. 208-10.

the hands of France. American trade in Indo China had declined greatly since that area had become a French colony. Hay and Rockhill wanted to help prevent a similar development in the Chinese mainland, but they had no hopes of turning back the clock.

France was the last of the major powers to be asked to subscribe to the open door note. This was because of two factors. First, Hay noted that he had "some apprehension" that France might oppose the declaration and thereby make its acceptance more difficult. Secondly, General Porter was on vacation, and because of the close relation between Porter and Delcassé, Hay believed that it would be best not to act until the Ambassador returned to Paris. The chargé d'affaires, Mr. Henry Vignaud, was instructed merely to "take appropriate occasion to discretely sound the French government as to its views on the general subject."²² When Porter returned he spoke to Delcassé about the matter. Delcassé said that France intended to support commercial equality in China, and he emphasized that "there is apprehension felt by all diplomats in Europe regarding the possibility of serious complications in China which may some day make it a storm center involving many of the great powers."²³ After receiving this encouragement Hay telegraphed

²²Hay to Vignaud, September 6, 1899, Instructions, 24, p. 222. FR, no. 664, p. 128.

²³Porter to Hay, November 10, 1899, Despatches, Vol. 118, no. 559 Delcassé to Thiéban, Charge in Washington, November 14, 1899, DDF, Vol. XV, no. 301, pp. 521-2.

Porter to "informally submit" the proposal to Delcassé' and to "ask whether France will join."²⁴ On November 24 Delcassé' gave a discourse in the Chamber of Deputies in which he warned of the grave economic conditions that would result from a partition of China. He affirmed that France would therefore support "the maintenance of a China open to the free struggle of the capital of the entire world."²⁵

Despite French encouragement General Porter did not immediately present the open door circular to Delcassé'. In December Porter reported that he had received information that France was about to propose to the powers that they agree to a French statement of the open door for China. Secretary Hay did not want France to receive the credit for the demarche. He instructed Porter to ask for France's formal support of the open door. Porter would be able to argue that the principle should be considered in its "present form" because it had already been accepted by Britain and Germany.²⁶ It was not until December 13, that Porter formally asked Delcassé' to support Rockhill's note. Delcassé' was not surprised by the move, but before giving his formal approval he asked the French Ambassadors in London and Berlin to find out the policy of those two governments. The two diplomats

²⁴Hay to Porter, November 21, 1899, FR, 1899, p. 128.

²⁵Journal Officiel, November 25, 1899.

²⁶Hay to Porter, December 12, 1899, Instructions, 24, pp. 244-5.

reported that Germany and Britain would unenthusiastically agree to the open door if the other powers would do likewise.²⁷ Delcassé wrote the Chargé d'affaires in Washington that the French policy was to support equality of trade opportunities in all of China, but he added one reservation to Rockhill's note: "I would ignore the meaning of the term 'spheres of influence' employed in the American note, for we have never been notified of the creation or definition of such spheres."²⁸

On December 16 Delcassé sent General Porter France's formal response to the first open door note. If the other nations were willing to co-operate in their "leased territories" France would reciprocate in her leased areas and grant "equal treatment for the citizens and subjects of all nations, in matters which concern the tariff, navigation and railroad rates." France approved the policy on the condition that the other powers would also agree. Delcassé did not include any mention of spheres of influence in his response.²⁹ He orally explained to Porter that the term should be avoided because its use implied special rights. As usual Porter was

²⁷Paul Cambon to Delcassé, December 14, 1899, DDF, Vol. XVI¹, p. 46, note 2. Noailles to Delcassé, December 15, 1899, Ibid., p. 46.

²⁸Delcassé to Thiébaud, December 14, 1899, Ibid., no. 27, pp. 46-7.

²⁹Delcassé to Porter, December 16, 1899, DDF, Vol., 118¹, no. 29, p. 48; FR, pp. 128-9.

convinced that France's policy was in conformity with American interests. He reported to Washington that France "is evidently in favor of the open door and equal treatment, in the broadest sense throughout China."³⁰

Russia was the power which was most hesitant to agree to the open door for China. In Washington the Russian Ambassador suggested to the French Ambassador that their two countries should jointly oppose the project.³¹ But to Russia's dismay France at the turn of the century feared that a partition of China would be contrary to her interests.³² Russia did not want to face the powers alone, and in February, 1900, Count Mouravieff informed Washington that Russia would agree to any action which was acceptable to France. Secretary Hay decided to give the "widest significance" to this reply.³³ Hay therefore notified each of the powers that the open door doctrine had been accepted. To Porter he instructed:

You will please inform the Government of France that the condition originally attached to the acceptance, that all other powers concerned should likewise accept the proposals of the United States, having been complied with, this government will therefore

³⁰Porter to Hay, Dec. 16, 1899, Despatches, Vol. 118, no. 567.

³¹Thiébaud to Delcassé, Dec. 20, 1899, DDF, Vol. XVI¹, no. 32, pp. 51-2.

³²Langer, Imperialism, p. 687.

³³Demmett, Hay, pp. 292-3.

consider the assent give it to France as final and definitive."³⁴

It is generally pointed out by historians that none of the powers had actually given definite support to the open door. In the case of France, however, it is clear that the Quai d'Orsay was not under any false impression concerning the policies of the other powers. The French Government was happy, believing that the American move would help prevent friction and advance French trade. In hind-sight it seems that the Department of State's suspicions of France in 1899 and 1900 were unjustified. The department did not fully understand that France by then had decided that further aggrandizement into the Chinese mainland would not give advantages commensurate with the cost and dangers involved in such a project.

The acceptance of the open door doctrine was of little encouragement to China, and in the summer of 1900 Chinese nationalists rose in revolt in the famous Boxer rebellion. Early in the crisis Delcassé instructed the French Minister in China to maintain close relations with the other powers. Delcassé believed that "in the circumstances an affirmation of solidarity of the grand powers is the best guarantee of each nation's interest."³⁵ At first Secretary of State Hay

³⁴Hay to Porter, March 20, 1900, Instructions, Vol. 24, p. 275.

³⁵Delcassé to Pichon, June 5, 1900, DDF, XVI¹, no. 163, p. 256.

told Jules Cambon that the United States would not co-operate with the powers but was only interested in the protection of American interests.³⁶ Shortly thereafter it became apparent that the revolt was more serious than had been initially thought, and the American government reversed its independent attitude. Hay then told Cambon that "if a military action were to become necessary the American forces would join with the European forces and would be placed under the same commander."³⁷ The United States eventually sent 5,000 soldiers to combine in the united effort of the powers to maintain their position in China.

The French generally favored a stronger reaction to the Boxer revolt than did the United States. Le Temps declared: "The yellow world must learn, at their expense, that one does not insult impunitely the rest of the world. No nation will allow it and least of all France."³⁸ Delcassé's early reaction was that the situation did not justify a declaration of a "regular state of war," but this became French policy only after American encouragement.³⁹ In August the Chinese Viceroy of Shanghai notified the European powers

³⁶Cambon to Delcassé, June 8, 1900, DDF, XVI¹, no. 166, p. 257.

³⁷Cambon to Delcassé, June 9, 1900, Ibid., no. 170, p. 261.

³⁸Le Temps, August 13, 1900.

³⁹Delcassé to Cambon, June 22, 1900, Notes, Vol. 43.

that there would be a general uprising if harm were done to the Emperor or Empress at Peking. At first Delcasse' interpreted this as an ultimatum, and he did not want to back down to a threat.⁴⁰ The American Department of State, on the other hand, interpreted the matter as a desire for an assurance that the European power would show no "disrespect to the imperial personages." The American position was that "it seemed better to endeavor to confine our quarrel to the disaffected Chinese of the North and not to consolidate the whole 400 millions of all China against us."⁴¹ American moderation was a factor in influencing the powers to give the desired assurance. Typical of the American policy was the decision not to participate in the capture of the Taku forts, but yet American ships assisted in the bombardment of the forts.⁴² In France there was some irritation at America's hesitation to follow the French lead. Always Le Temps was very critical of McKinley's "mysterious and changeable" policy. The newspaper explained McKinley's actions as motivated primarily by the election of 1900.⁴³ One editorial in Le Temps bitterly charged that the United States was not co-operating with the other powers. The writer feared

⁴⁰Cambon to Adee, August 19, 1900, Ibid.

⁴¹Memorandum of Conversation with the French Charge' d'affaires touching Chinese Matters, August 20, 1900, Ibid.

⁴²Le Temps, November 25, 1900.

⁴³Le Temps, August 5, 1900.

that this could only "increase the illusions of China and deminish the force of the concert." He expressed the hope that the sister Republic might learn of her error and gain "a more sound and just conception of her duty and power."⁴⁴

The Boxer rebellion reopened the question of a possible scramble for concession in China. Hoping to ward off any such occurrence Secretary Hay on July 3 issued the second open door circular. In addition to the principles of the first circular this note asked that the powers should "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity." The governments of France, Britain and Germany responded favorably to this demarche, and in the case of France the Government was pleased with the American action. By then French officials had decided that the open door might be a means to stimulate French trade without a great deal of cost or responsibility. Delcasse' announced this policy in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies. He declared that France would continue to be the "mistress of Indo-China" but would not be able to take charge of a larger area in Asia. For this reason France "has no interest in provoking or seeing the break-up of China." "I can affirm," he stated, "that France has no wish for war with China, but she cannot evade the duty of protecting her citizens and of obtaining for her merchants

⁴⁴Le Temps, November 25, 1900.

the guarantees obtained by others."⁴⁵ Secretary Hay was pleased to learn of France's opposition to a colonization of China.

The Boxer rebellion was soon quelled, and in September Delcassé took the initiative in supporting negotiations between China and the powers. Delcassé proposed that the powers should present a common front to demand reparations against China. He suggested that the minimum demands should include six points: 1. punishment of the rebels; 2. permanent interdiction of arms into China; 3. equal indemnities for wounded parties; 4. a permanent guard for the Peking legation; 5. a dismantling of the Taku fortifications; and 6. an occupation of the route between Peking and Tientsin. This plan was immediately supported by Russia.⁴⁶ The United States tentatively agreed with the principle of a common front, but added a number of reservations to the French note which generally made the proposals less stringent.⁴⁷ Delcassé was apparently satisfied with the American position, and he interpreted it as an acceptance of the basic principle of

⁴⁵The Paris Herald, July 4, 1900, FR, 1900, p. 313, (translation).

⁴⁶Delcassé to the French Representatives in London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Washington and Tokio, September 30, 1900, DDF, Vol. XVI¹, no. 321, p. 454. Thiébaud to Hay, October 4, 1900, Notes, Vol. 43. FR, 1901, Appendix, pp. 26-7.

⁴⁷Thiébaud to Delcassé, October 9, 1900, DDF, Vol. XVI¹, no. 332, p. 470. Hay to Thiébaud, October 10, 1900, FR, 1901, Appendix, pp. 27-8.

his suggestion for negotiations. Delcassé telegraphed Washington that the details of the French suggestion could be later discussed. The important thing, he wrote, was to demonstrate that the powers "are animated by the same spirit, that they are decided to respect the integrity of China and the independence of its government, but that they are none the less resolved to obtain the satisfaction to which they have a right."⁴⁸ Shortly thereafter Hay again suggested that the powers collectively support the open door and the territorial entity of China.⁴⁹ Delcassé quickly endorsed the doctrines and wrote: "I do not see any reason not to proclaim support for this policy one more time so long as it does not retard the opening of the negotiations."⁵⁰

The powers presented a joint note for negotiations on December 24, and the representatives of the powers met with China early the following year. From the beginning the negotiations were complicated by the existances of European alliances and the conflicting ambitions of those

⁴⁸Delcassé to Thiébaud, October 14, 1900, DDF, 16, no. 336, pp. 474-5. Thiébaud to Hay, October 17, 1900, FR, 1901, pp. 29-30. Thiébaud wrote that Hay was in "absolute sympathy" with the French plan and that McKinley was anxious for the matter to be finished. Thiébaud to Delcassé, October 18, 1900, DDF, Vol. XVI¹, p. 476, note 2.

⁴⁹Hay to Thiébaud, October 19, 1900, FR, 1901, appendix, p. 30. Thiébaud to Delcassé, October 23, 1900. DDF, Vol. XVI¹, no. 346, pp. 484-5.

⁵⁰Delcassé to Thiébaud, October 25, 1900, DDF, Vol. XVI¹, no. 350, p. 490. Thiébaud to Hay, October 26, 1900, Notes, Vol. 43.

power blocs.⁵¹ In his correspondence the American plenipotentiary, William W. Rockhill, referred to the situation as a "miserable muddle."⁵² American and French policies were occasionally in conflict during the treaty negotiations. France indirectly supported Russia's attempt to gain special rights in Manchuria through private negotiations with China.⁵³ The United States opposed the Russian actions and even sent Russia a note expressing dislike for private negotiations.⁵⁴ On the issue of territorial advantage France's policy was generally consistent. She continued to support Hay's open door doctrine, but at the same time she stood ready to join in a partitive scheme if desired by the other powers. Delcassé secretly instructed the Ambassador in St. Petersburg that France "sought no territorial annexation in China," but yet he observed that "if others make conquests France will not rest with empty hands."⁵⁵

At the Peking Conference the major difference between France and the United States was on the size of the indemnity.

⁵¹Langer remarked: "The governments worked together in the heat of the crisis, but there was no real heart for a European concert." Imperialism, p. 704.

⁵²Rockhill to Hay, April 18, 1901, Hay papers, Box 13 also Varg, "Myth", p. 48.

⁵³DDF, Vol. I², pp. 177-80, 80-2.

⁵⁴Dennis, Adventures, p. 243. John Kelly, A Forgotten Conference: The Negotiations at Peking, 1900-1901, (Paris: Librairie Minard, 1963), p. 131.

⁵⁵Delcassé to Montebello, February 19, 1901, DDF. Vol. I², no. 88, p. 107.

Secretary Hay and William Rockhill always urged moderation with the philosophy that it was not wise "to exercise from China an indemnity larger than that which she is able to pay."⁵⁶ The United States wanted the sum to be \$200,000,000 while France hoped that the amount would be \$333,000,000. Le Temps expressed irritation that the United States did not support the French demand. Hay and McKinley were referred to as unrealistic and without a knowledge of the situation in China.⁵⁷ The French delegate at the negotiations believed that Rockhill was hypocritical on the issue, and that his real intention was to improve Chinese-American relations by appearing to be generous.⁵⁸ In the final protocol the amount was only slightly less than the French demand. Rockhill believed that it was unreasonably high for the amount of damage and more than China would be capable of paying.⁵⁹ In the later history of the indemnity France continued to be less generous than the United States. In 1907 the United States refunded ten million dollars to the Chinese government and another six million in 1921. In 1921

⁵⁶Thiebaut to Delcassé, November 21, 1900, DDF, Vol. XVI¹, no. 385, pp. 536-7. Rockhill to Hay, May 7, 1901; May 20, 1901; May 22, 1901, FR, 1901, Appendix on China, pp. 155, 169, 171-2.

⁵⁷Le Temps, November 18, 1900, December 5, 1900.

⁵⁸Beau to Delcassé, July 1, 1901, DDF, Vol. I², no. 310, p. 366. This report includes a long character sketch of Rockhill. Beau wrote that Rockhill was capable, but that his poor French caused a good deal of "hesitation" in his speech.

⁵⁹Varg, Rockhill, p. 45.

the French government did make some refunds, but almost all of the money was given to French banks doing business in China.⁶⁰

In January, 1902, Japan and Great Britain signed a defensive alliance which supported the open door in China and the independence of Korea. This treaty was naturally looked upon with disfavor by Russia and France. In Washington Jules Cambon reported that "the United States is entirely favorable to the convention and sees in it a guarantee for the general peace." Yet he noted that there was no danger of Washington joining the treaty because of the fact that "it does not conform to the tradition of this country to enter into particular alliances."⁶¹ In February the United States protested to both China and Russia for the lack of commercial equality in Manchuria. The protest was released to the press. Cambon remarked to the Quai d'Orsay that the publication of this statement "was an indirect and skillful way to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese treaty without signing in behalf of the United States."⁶² The

⁶⁰Teichman, China, pp. 70, 110-1. In 1902 the United States would have agreed to let China pay the debt in silver, but France insisted that there be no departures from the treaty. de Margerie to Hay, July 26, 1902, Notes, Vol. XLIV.

⁶¹Cambon to Delcassé, February 14, 1902, DDF, Vol. II², no. 90, p. 103.

⁶²Cambon to Delcassé, February 25, 1902, DDF, Vol. II², no. 105, p. 122. Cambon noted that the Evening Star, which had very close relations with the Department, had indicated that Hay's protest was an indirect approval of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Russian Ambassador complained to Hay that his government feared American support for the recent Far Eastern Alliance. Hay denied that this was the policy of the McKinley administration, and he claimed that the American protest had not been meant for publication and had probably been stolen from the department bureau.⁶³

France and Russia responded to the Anglo-Japanese convention by issuing a joint declaration. The two allies stated that they shared the desire for commercial equality in China and Korea, and they further declared that in the event of aggression against either of the two they would "reserve the right to consult in order to search means to safeguard those rights."⁶⁴ The French Government was naturally concerned about Washington's response to the Franco-Russian declaration. When Cambon presented the démarche to Secretary Hay he received Hay's assurance that the American Government accepted the statement as being in harmony with American interests. Cambon was satisfied with the response. He reported to the Quai d'Orsay that the sympathies of both Hay and Roosevelt were on the side of Japan and England, but he expressed his conviction that the United States would

⁶³Cambon to Delcassé, March 3, 1902, DDF, Vol. II², no. 118, pp. 138-40. Vagts, Deutschland, II, p. 1178.

⁶⁴Texte de la déclaration franco-russe, May 20, 1902, DDF, Vol. II², no. 145, pp. 177-8.

remain independent of this alliance.⁶⁵ Cambon's report turned out to be a good perception of the policy of the Roosevelt Administration. Always the American gravitation was in the direction of the Japanese-British convention, but never was there the slightest danger that the United States would depart from the tradition of isolation from foreign alliances. When George Kennan suggested to Roosevelt that the American Government should join the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Roosevelt wrote him: "Mind you, I personally agree with you." But Roosevelt added that this was "talking academically" because of the "absolute impossibility" of getting the approval of such an action from the Senate.⁶⁶

Both the United States and France were deeply involved in the background of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The two countries were always sympathetic to opposite sides, but there was never the slightest possibility that either Government would enter the conflict. France had large vested interests in the Russian position. In addition to the France-Russian alliance, France was committed by the fact that nearly a fourth of the French foreign investments were in Russia.⁶⁷ Before the war, Delcassé had hoped for a strong

⁶⁵Cambon to Delcassé, March 20, 1902, DDF, Vol. II², no. 146, p. 178; March 24, 1902, Ibid., no. 163, p. 196; March 26, 1902, Ibid., no. 169, pp. 207-9.

⁶⁶Roosevelt to Kennan, May 6, 1905, Morison, Vol. IX, pp. 1169-70.

⁶⁷Tardieu, Alliances, p. 28.

Russia to aid France in the European power struggle, and for this reason he told Maurice Paléologue in January of 1904 that his greatest fear was that Russia and Japan would drift into war.⁶⁸ About this time Delcassé suggested to Germany that if Japan couldn't be persuaded by England to preserve peace, the powers would have to intervene to make Japan listen to reason. This scheme met with little favor in Germany because of the fear that it would antagonize the United States.⁶⁹

It is well recognized that even before the war began most Americans were anti-Russian.⁷⁰ This was primarily because of the conviction that Russia was trying to restrict American trade in Manchuria. In 1903 Roosevelt was irritated to the extent that he wrote Hay: "If only we were sure neither France nor Germany would join in, I would not in the least mind going to extremes with Russia."⁷¹ Roosevelt believed that Russia had a reactionary and undemocratic form of government, but he was convinced that Japan had Free institutions and "lofty ideas" which were "formed after the

⁶⁸Maurice Paléologue, Un grand tournant de la politique mondiale, 1704-1906, Paris: Plon, 1934., pp. 278-9.

⁶⁹Holstein to Bulow, January 17, 1904, Holstein Papers, IV, p. 278.

⁷⁰René Pinon, "La guerre russo-japonaise," Revue des Deux Mondes, XXI (May 1, 1904), pp. 211-2.

⁷¹Roosevelt to Hay, July 29, 1903, Morison, Roosevelt, III, no. 2739, p. 523.

American pattern."⁷² After Japan attacked the Russian fleet in Port Arthur on February 8, 1904, Roosevelt expressed contempt for Russia because she had left her fleet unprotected.⁷³ The Russian Ambassador in Washington worried that Roosevelt might form a type of Rough Riders unit to aid Japan.⁷⁴ The American Press generally supported Japan's position. Paul Reinsch wrote in the North American Review that "Japan is fighting our battle."⁷⁵ The popular writer, George Kennan, declared that Russia had little hope of victory because Japan's Government was "based on popular education, popular representation, individual freedom, enlightened patriotism, order, system, and efficiency."⁷⁶ More important than public opinion was the fact that Japan floated large loans in New York in order to pay for the

⁷²Stermburg to Bulow, Feb. 6, 1904, GP, XIX¹, no. 5978, p. 100. Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt Jr., Feb. 10, 1904, Morison, Roosevelt, IV, p. 742.

⁷³Jusserand to Delcassé, February 16, 1904, DDF, Vol. IV², no. 282, p. 366. January 25, 1905, Ibid., no. 49, pp. 63-4.

⁷⁴Jusserand to Delcassé, February 11, 1904, DDF, Vol. IV², no. 259, p. 341, Edward Zabriskie, American Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics, 1895-1914. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946), p. 105.

⁷⁵Paul Reinsch, "Japan and Asiatic Leadership," North American Review, CLXXX (January, 1905), p. 56.

⁷⁶George Kennan, "Russian Views of Kuropatkin and His Army," The Outlook, LXXIX (February, 1905), p. 431. Also see Review of Reviews, V (January, 1905), pp. 88-90.

war.⁷⁷ Also the war resulted in an improvement of trade between Japan and the United States.⁷⁸

In December, 1904, Roosevelt wrote to his English friend, Spring Rice: "If it were not for the attitude of England and the United States I think that Germany and France would probably have already intervened on Russia's side."⁷⁹ The following year he wrote this same friend; "As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and France in the most polite and discrete fashion that in the event of a combination against Japan . . . I would promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf."⁸⁰ There is in fact no evidence that this threat was ever delivered.⁸¹ Roosevelt's admirers such as Tyler Dennett accept Roosevelt's account as true, but the majority of historians believe that the story was an uncritical exaggeration.⁸² In the case of France there was never

⁷⁷Gotaro Ogawa, Expenditures of the Russo-Japanese War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), pp. 37, 51, 65-8. Zabriskie, Rivalry, p. 109. Vagts, Deutschland, II, p. 1209. Dennett, Roosevelt, pp. 497-8.

⁷⁸Ogawa, Expenditures, pp. 201-2.

⁷⁹Roosevelt to Spring Rice, December 27, 1904, Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. IV, p. 1087.

⁸⁰Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905. Ibid., p. 1284.

⁸¹Alfred Vagts searched the German and American archives, Vagts, Deutschland, II, pp. 1178-9.

⁸²Dennett, Roosevelt, pp. 11-12, 92. The story is characteristically rejected in Mowry, Era, p. 184, Bemis, Diplomatic History, p. 492, note.

any reason for serious doubt that the government would follow a policy of neutrality. The French Government officially declared its neutrality only one week after the war began, and France never did do anything that was in basic violation with her neutral policy.⁸³ Also against Roosevelt's interpretation is the fact that late in 1904 he let it be known that he hoped Russia would remain in the Far East to counter-balance the growing Japanese power.⁸⁴

The American Government early recognized that war would create a threat for the continuation of China's independence as well as the open door policy. The week before the Port Arthur attack Hay asked General Porter to consult with Delcassé' about the possibility of "concurrently using good offices with Russia and Japan to induce them to respect the neutrality of China and in all practical ways her administrative entity."⁸⁵ Delcassé' agreed to support the American suggestion, but he believed that Manchuria should be considered an exception.⁸⁶ Japan early accepted the principle of China's neutrality with the proviso that Russia would also do so. Hay therefore asked Porter to

⁸³ Journal Officiel, February 16, 1904. Also see Amos Hershey, The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906), pp. 189-90.

⁸⁴ Jusserand to Delcassé', October 18, 1904, DDF, Vol. V², no. 380, pp. 456-7. Stermburg to Bülow, March 21, 1904, GP, XIX¹, no. 5992.

⁸⁵ Hay to Porter, January 8, 1904, FR, p. 301.

⁸⁶ Porter to Hay, February 13, 1904, FR, 1904, p. 302.

appeal to Delcassé to use French influence to help convince Russia to accept the proposal. Hay wrote: "Prompt action by France, as Russia's nearest friend, seems to be most desirable."⁸⁷ Delcassé did not give an outright refusal, but he did not see any urgency in the situation.⁸⁸ The question was dropped until early in 1905.

In January, 1905, the Roosevelt Administration renewed the efforts to gain support for the open door in China. Roosevelt and Jusserand had a long discussion of the subject just before a White House diplomatic reception. Roosevelt spoke with such enthusiasm that he forgot about the time and the reception began late. The President expressed his fears that some power or powers might take advantage of the situation for the aggrandizement of territorial control. Jusserand assured him that France wanted to see the continuation of the status quo. In reporting the conversation to the Quai d'Orsay Jusserand asked Delcassé if this was indeed the policy of the French Government in the matter.⁸⁹ Delcassé approved of Jusserand's statement to Roosevelt.⁹⁰ Jusserand immediately notified Roosevelt of Delcassé's official position,

⁸⁷Hay to Porter, February 12, 1904, Instructions, 24, p. 657.

⁸⁸Porter to Hay, November 17, 1904, Despatches, Vol. 124.

⁸⁹Jusserand to Delcassé, January 15, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 29, pp. 37-8.

⁹⁰Delcassé to Jusserand, January 16, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 33, p. 43.

and Jusserand reported that Roosevelt was "grateful" to have French assurances.⁹¹

Secretary Hay instructed General Porter to seek to get the formal support of France for the "broad policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the open door in the orient whereby quality of commercial opportunity and access shall be enjoyed by all nations."⁹² Porter spoke to Delcassé about the matter and received the assurance that "France desires no concession of territory in China."⁹³ The conservative paper Le Figaro on February 14 included an article by Pierre de Coubertin which recommended the partition of China by the European powers.⁹⁴ Two days after the article appeared Roosevelt wrote in a letter that "there certainly do seem to be suspicious indications as to the possible action of France."⁹⁵ Roosevelt discussed the article with Jusserand and on February 18, Jusserand denied that the views of M. Courbertin represented the views of the Quai d'Orsay. He reminded Roosevelt that France had always before supported

⁹¹Jusserand to Delcassé, January 18, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 36, p. 47.

⁹²Hay to Porter, Despatches, January 14, 1905, Vol. 124.

⁹³Porter to Delcassé, January 16, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 34, p. 43.

⁹⁴Porter to Hay, January 18, 1905, Despatches, Vol. 124. Le Figaro, February 14, 1905.

⁹⁵Roosevelt to Tower, February 16, 1905, Morison, Roosevelt, Vol. IV, no. 3467, p. 1121.

the continuation of the integrity of China.⁹⁶ Delcasse' assured Jusserand that France's official policy was "absolutely opposed" to the views expressed in the Figaro article.⁹⁷

Roosevelt was anxious to see peace established in the Far East because he believed it would bring stability to the area. Especially he did not want Russia's influence in Asia to be entirely eliminated. In 1904 Roosevelt attempted to send some peace feelers to Russia through the French Government, and Delcasse' gave limited support to those efforts.⁹⁸ Early in 1905 Roosevelt renewed his efforts. In a series of conversations with Ambassador Jusserand he expressed his conviction that it was in the interests of Russia to settle at once, before she would be forced to accept even worse terms. He suggested that peace could probably be accepted if Russia would be willing to accept Japanese influence in Korea, Japanese ownership of Port Arthur, and Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. Roosevelt would be willing to use his influence to try to restrain the ambitions of Japan if France would do the same in regard

⁹⁶Jusserand to Delcasse', February 18, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 102, p. 140.

⁹⁷Delcasse' to Jusserand, February 18, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 103, p. 141.

⁹⁸Delcasse' to the Ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg, June 21, 1904, DDF, Vol. V², no. 237, p. 278.

to Russia.⁹⁹ In March Roosevelt talked to both the ambassador of Russia and the minister of Japan of the possibility of peace, and both told him that their governments intended to continue the war rather than give in.¹⁰⁰ There were rumors by a few American journalists that France was unfavorable at the possibility of peace. Roosevelt told Jusserand that he did not place any importance on this "gossip." Jusserand assured him that the stories were false.¹⁰¹ Roosevelt had real hopes for French aid. He wrote Hay: "I wish the Japs and Russians could settle it between themselves, and I should be delighted to have anyone except myself give them a job to settle it. If France will do it, it will serve the purpose just as well."¹⁰²

Throughout 1905 the Governments of France and the United States both believed it was in their national interests to see the end to the Russo-Japanese war.¹⁰³ In April

⁹⁹Jusserand to Delcassé, January 15, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 29, p. 38; February 11, 1905, Ibid., no. 90, pp. 109-10; February 21, 1905, Ibid., no. 111, p. 152; March 15, 1905, Ibid., no. 151, pp. 196-7.

¹⁰⁰Jusserand to Delcassé, April 1, 1905, Ibid., no. 218, p. 276; Roosevelt to Hay, April 2, 1905, Bishop, Roosevelt, p. 379.

¹⁰¹Jusserand to Delcassé, April 1, 1905, Ibid., no. 218, p. 277.

¹⁰²Roosevelt to Hay, March 30, 1905, Roosevelt papers, series 4B.

¹⁰³Tyler Dennett comments: "The French and the American governments became, in a sense, rivals for the position of peacemakers." Dennett, Roosevelt, p. 172.

Delcassé tried to convince the Japanese Minister in Paris that there could be peace if only Japan would cease to demand a territorial cession and an indemnity. The Japanese Government indicated no interest in Delcassé's suggestion.¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile Roosevelt continued to encourage Jusserand that France should try to persuade Russia to come to terms. Always Roosevelt tried to emphasize his fears that Russia would be destroyed if she continued the war.¹⁰⁵ Late in May at the battle of Tsushima the Japanese were completely victorious, and it was more clear than ever that Russia's cause was hopeless. Shortly thereafter the Japanese Government formally asked Roosevelt to invite the two belligerents to meet for negotiations.¹⁰⁶ The immediate problem was to convince the Russian Tsar to accept Roosevelt's good offers. The German Kaiser on June 3 advised the Tsar that he should negotiate.¹⁰⁷ Delcassé's policy was slower and more cautious. He asked the French Ambassador if such advice would be well received in Russia. The Ambassador reported that many influential

¹⁰⁴ Baron Komura to Takahira, quoted in Dennett, Ibid., pp. 176-7, 174-5.

¹⁰⁵ Jusserand to Delcassé, May 15, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 433, p. 509; May 16, 1905, no. 435, p. 511; May 30, 1905, no. 471, p. 564.

¹⁰⁶ Dennett, Roosevelt, pp. 215-6.

¹⁰⁷ William II to Nicholas II, June 3, 1905, GP, XIX², no. 6193, pp. 419-22. Bülow to Sternburg, June 3, 1905, Ibid., no. 6312, p. 606.

people in Russia wanted peace, and he believed that American mediation might prove successful.¹⁰⁸

Faced with the ministerial crisis of June, the French Government was not as careful as Germany to indicate support for Roosevelt's peace moves. On June 6 Roosevelt asked Jusserand to find out the intentions of Delcassé in regard to the war, and he again asked for the support of France in counseling Russia to accept the good offices of the United States.¹⁰⁹ It was at this very time that Delcassé was forced to resign because of his militant Morocco policy. Maurice Rouvier, the new acting foreign Minister, notified Jusserand that he could tell Roosevelt that he had "our complete concurrence in regard to his efforts to re-establish the peace."¹¹⁰ Roosevelt prepared telegrams to send to both Russia and Japan to express the American desire for peace. Before sending the messages Roosevelt consulted with Jusserand, and Jusserand made several suggestions in working which would not do damage to the Russian susceptibilities. Roosevelt made use of those suggestions.¹¹¹ Jusserand had confidence in Roosevelt and

¹⁰⁸ Boutiron to Delcassé, June 3, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 486, pp. 579-80.

¹⁰⁹ Jusserand to Delcassé, June 6, 1905, DDF, Vol. VI², no. 502, pp. 595-6.

¹¹⁰ Rouvier to Jusserand, June 9, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII², no. 19, p. 17.

¹¹¹ Jusserand to Rouvier, June 8, 1905, Ibid., no. 13, p. 12. Jusserand in this dispatch asked for more information about French policy in regard to the war.

urged the Quai d'Orsay to cooperate with the American efforts. All French diplomats did not share in this viewpoint. The French Ambassador in Tokyo was apprehensive about an American bias in the negotiations. He believed that "it is fortunate that St. Petersburg keeps her guard against the Americans and English who are too openly anti-Russian and pro-Japanese."¹¹²

In Washington Jusserand attempted to encourage both the Russian and the Japanese representatives to find an acceptable compromise. He complained to the Foreign Office that if he were kept better informed about the details of French foreign policy he could use the information to a good advantage.¹¹³ Rouvier advised Jusserand to be extremely careful in his actions and statements. He warned: "An intervention which is too direct might retard the negotiations, and also our desire for good relations with our ally Russia make it necessary for us to be very cautious."¹¹⁴ But Roosevelt was more pleased with Jusserand's efforts, and Jusserand was happy to report that the President had expressed to him his "sincere thanks."¹¹⁵ Roosevelt

¹¹²Hamand to Rouvier, June 11, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII², no. 35, p. 34.

¹¹³Jusserand to Rouvier, June 10, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII², no. 27, pp. 27-8.

¹¹⁴Rouvier to Jusserand, June 10, 1905, Ibid., no. 30, p. 30.

¹¹⁵Jusserand to Rouvier, June 15, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII², no. 63, p. 71.

consulted with Jusserand almost every day in June, and he placed a great deal of confidence in the advice of the French Ambassador. Roosevelt wrote: "My relations with Jusserand are such that I can always go to him freely, tell him what I have been asked to do, and then say that I will either do it or not."¹¹⁶

Russia eventually agreed to peace negotiations, and on August 10 the negotiations formally opened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. At this crucial moment Roosevelt especially hoped to have France's support. He wrote Jusserand asking that France use her influence to persuade Russia to make small territorial concessions and to pay a small indemnity. Roosevelt promised to attempt to "get the Japanese to be moderate about the money."¹¹⁷ Even after receiving this telegram Rouvier wrote to the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg to tell the Russian Government that "France hopes for peace and is ready to undertake any diplomatic action which the Russian Government might judge useful in achieving this goal."¹¹⁸ The next day after receiving Roosevelt's appeal, Rouvier forwarded the appeal to St. Petersburg and instructed the French Ambassador to show it to the Russian

¹¹⁶Roosevelt to Reid, August 3, 1905, Morison, Roosevelt, IV, p. 1298.

¹¹⁷Roosevelt to Jusserand, August 21, 1905, Morison, Roosevelt, IV, p. 1308.

¹¹⁸Rouvier to Bompert, August 21, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII², no. 364, p. 435.

Foreign Minister in strict confidence.¹¹⁹ After less than two weeks of negotiations it seemed that the two powers could not reach a compromise, and the Tsar told the French Ambassador that he would refuse an indemnity even if this meant a continuation of war.¹²⁰ Rouvier instructed the minister to continue to speak in behalf of a negotiated peace and to emphasize to the Tsar that "it was in his interests not to offend the active sympathies of the President of the United States."¹²¹

Just before the signing of the peace treaty Roosevelt again appealed to France for support. In his diary, Maurice Paléologue, an influential official in the Quai d'Orsay, wrote of the fate of this last appeal. Paléologue recorded: "Rouvier, lost in admiration of such bold and artful frankness, gave me immediate instructions to draft a telegram exhorting Nicholas II to take Roosevelt's advice." Paléologue drafted the note but discouraged Rouvier from sending it. He reminded Rouvier of one of Delcassé's earlier maxims: "Sooner or later, the Russians will have to submit to humiliating peace; but they would never forgive us for having encouraged

¹¹⁹DDF, Vol. VII², p. 445, note 1; M. Desports de la Fosse, charge d'affaires in Washington to Rouvier, August 22, 1905, Ibid., no. 370, pp. 443-5.

¹²⁰Rouvier to Bompert, August 23, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII², no. 373, p. 449.

¹²¹Rouvier to Bompert, August 24, 1905, Ibid., no. 374, pp. 450-1; August 24, 1905, Ibid., no. 376, pp. 452-3.

them to do so." Rouvier reconsidered and decided to tear up the note. At the incident he philosophized: "Before long European finances will be completely dominated by the Americans, and they'll control diplomacy through finance."¹²² Rouvier on August 29 wrote the Ambassador in Russia that he should continue to encourage a peace settlement, but Rouvier did not make any reference to an indemnity or a territorial concession.¹²³ Later that day the Quai d'Orsay was pleased to learn of the peace treaty. Rouvier immediately sent "eloquent telegrams" of congratulations to the governments of Russia, France and the United States.¹²⁴

In his Autobiography Roosevelt wrote that he had asked France to help him in achieving peace but that France had not been co-operative.¹²⁵ In a contemporary letter he wrote that Delcassé "really wished to prevent peace between Japan and Russia, or at least its coming through American efforts."¹²⁶ In several letters Roosevelt indicated that the German Kaiser was the only European leader to support his peace efforts.¹²⁷

¹²²Paléologue, Tournant, pp. 277-9.

¹²³Rouvier to Bompert, August 29, DDF, Vol. VII², no. 390, pp. 480-1.

¹²⁴Paléologue, Tournant, p. 279.

¹²⁵Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 586.

¹²⁶Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905, Morison, Roosevelt, V, p. 63.

¹²⁷Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Morison, Roosevelt, V, p. 251.

But it is clear that France did actually support those efforts. Always the French Government was convinced that it was in her interests to see a restoration of peace in the Far East. Of course France did not want to harm the Franco-Russian alliance by wounding Russian pride or by urging Russia to pay an indemnity. For this reason the French Government kept its diplomatic activity relatively secret.¹²⁸ There is no evidence that Roosevelt really became angry at French policy in the matter. Roosevelt at times did become mildly irritated that he did not receive more overt support from France, but this did not have any real affect on Franco-American relations.

In France Roosevelt's success was received with a great deal of favor, especially by peace groups. The Paris Peace Committee, for example, in its annual meeting of 1906 expressed its gratitude to the "peacemaking President of the Great American Republic." The committee invited Roosevelt to visit France in order to "bring liberty to Europe" in the same way in which "Lafayette had carried liberty to the new world."¹²⁹ The city council of St-Gervais agreed unanimously

¹²⁸ Rouvier to Jusserand, June 10, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII², p. 30. Germany of course warned the United States that France hoped to gain an advantage as a result of the war. Tower to Roosevelt, July 13, 1905, in Dennett, Roosevelt, pp. 233-5.

¹²⁹ Resolution of February 22, 1906, in Despatches, Vol. 125.

to send congratulations to Roosevelt.¹³⁰ The French Parliamentary Group of International Arbitration and Conciliation sent him a first edition of Sully's memoirs with an appropriate note of praise.¹³¹

Not long after the Portsmouth treaty the relations between the United States and Japan became so bad that the two countries almost reached the breaking point. Earlier René Pinon speculated that with Russia removed there would be a likelihood of a great geographical rivalry in Japanese-American relations.¹³² At the same time Franco-Japanese relations sharply improved so that these two countries in May, 1907, signed a mutual defensive agreement. There was some speculation that this agreement would worsen relations between France and the United States. André Tardieu, writing several years later, denied that this was the case. Tardieu interpreted the Franco-Japanese agreement as one of a "series of understanding" which included the Franco-Russian alliance and the Entente Cordiale. The policy of France, he wrote, was to see that "the balance of power in the Pacific remains what it is today." Because of this he concluded that "the relations of France with the United States cannot, under present circumstances, suffer anything from our policy in

¹³⁰Sent September 5, 1905, Despatches, Vol. 125.

¹³¹Morison, Roosevelt, V, p. 103, note 1.

¹³²René Pinon, "La guerre russo-japonaise," Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1904, Vol. XXI, pp. 211-2.

Asia. This policy favors the elements of stability, and the American efforts should tend to multiply them."¹³³

On May 28, M. Stephen Pichon, the Foreign Minister, asked if the United States would like to have French good offices in the effort to improve Japanese-American diplomatic relations.¹³⁴ The Roosevelt Administration immediately responded that the French offer was greatly appreciated but that it would have to be refused.¹³⁵ This minor diplomatic incident would have had absolutely no importance except for the fact that it reached the American press. The Washington Post feared that the publicity would do harm to American-Japanese relations, and the paper therefore reproached the French démarche. "One has the impression here," one article declared, "that France has not acted from disinterested motives in making this unexpected and unwanted offer."¹³⁶ Roosevelt became greatly irritated about the matter. He wrote Jusserand that neither he nor Secretary of State Root had given the French note to the press, and he concluded therefore that the source of information had to be the Quai d'Orsay. In his report to the Foreign Ministry Jusserand

¹³³Tardieu, Alliances, pp. 234, 291.

¹³⁴Pichon to Jusserand, May 28, 1907, DDF, Vol. X², p. 46, note 1.

¹³⁵Jusserand to Pichon, June 3, 1907, DDF, Vol. X², p. 46, note 1.

¹³⁶Washington Post, June 7, 1907.

assumed that Roosevelt's accusation was correct, and he complained that this grave indiscretion could have a lasting harm on Franco-American relations.¹³⁷ M. Pichon denied that the American press had learned of the matter in Paris, and the true source of information was never known.¹³⁸ As it turned out the incident did not seem to add to the crisis in the relations between Japan and the United States.¹³⁹

Throughout the period the United States and France participated in the struggle for power and influence in the Far East. As normal in international relations, the policy of each government was determined by its own conception of what was in its national interest. France's policy was generally one of territorial expansion and consolidation of her Asian empire, while the policy of the United States, except for the Philippines, was one of commercial expansion. These goals did not present any basic clash because both nations primarily wanted stability.¹⁴⁰ For this reason the two powers were able to co-operate in supporting the integrity

¹³⁷Jusserand to Pichon, June 14, 1907, DDF, Vol. X², no. 27, pp. 45-8.

¹³⁸Ibid., note 1, p. 47.

¹³⁹The next year M. Pichon told White that the Root-Takahira agreement "brought about a feeling of security in that direction which had not existed for a long time." Henry White to Root, January 8, 1909, Root Papers, box 15.

¹⁴⁰This was emphasized in Coolidge, Power, p. 191; and Rene Wallier, Le vingtieme siecle politique, 1901, pp. 27-8.

of China and in seeking an end to the Russo-Japanese war. America's policy was more influenced by idealistic considerations, but this fact did not have any real implications for Franco-American relations. The two powers were suspicious of one another, but neither had any real fears that the other was a threat to its vital interests. Ambassador Jusserand reported a conversation with Roosevelt in which the President expressed his desire to maintain France as a neighbor in the Far East. Jusserand noted in his report of the conversation: "The actual situation makes it in our interests to maintain the domination of America in the Philippines, because without the United States, this colony would surely be prey to a rival who would be dangerous for us."¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹Jusserand to Rouvier, June 11, 1905, DDF, Vol. VII², no. 41, pp. 45-7.

CHAPTER VII

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS--I

In the years between 1898 and 1907 Franco-American relations were more crucially important during the Moroccan crisis than in any other single event. President Roosevelt intervened more directly into this conflict than any American President had intervened in a European rivalry since the War of 1812. Throughout the controversy the Roosevelt Administration was one-sided in favor of the French position, but this policy was based on Roosevelt's conception of the American national interest. He was convinced that it was in the American interest to encourage a peaceful solution, and secondary to this, he hoped to influence a settlement that would be conducive to the growth of American trade in North Africa. Although American policy was not the most significant factor of the crisis, it has often been underestimated by European historians. André Tardieu was entirely correct when he wrote: "A power of the rank and strength of the United States could not take part in such a conflict without its action making itself almost immediately felt."¹

¹André Tardieu, La France et les alliances, (Paris: F. Alcan, 1910), p. 292.

At the turn of the century Morocco was a typical underdeveloped nation in which the vast majority of the people lived in poverty and ignorance. This situation was complicated by the large groups of nomadic tribes often at war with one another. Also, superstition and extreme religious asceticism did not encourage progressive social change and industrialization. The government, isolated in the small villegge of Fez, had a reputation for both corruption and inefficiency. Nominal leadership was vested in a hereditary Sultan, but effective power was traditionally in the hands of the Grand Vizier. Abdu-l-Aziz, who became Sultan in 1894 at the age of thirteen, was especially weak and unable to control his ministers.² By the year 1900 the country had fallen into almost total anarchy, and independence was maintained only because it was guaranteed by the world powers in the International Madrid Conference of 1880. The guarantee for autonomy was based on the right of the most favored nation clause for the fourteen nations represented at the Conference.³

The Roosevelt Administration first had experience with the Moroccan situation in the well-known Perdicaris-Raisuli

²For a lively popular description see Barbara Tuchman, "Perdicaris Alive or Raisuli Dead," American Heritage, (August, 1959), Vol. X, pp. 18-21, 98-101. Francis Charmes, "Chronique de la Quinzaine," Revue des deux Mondes, Vol. XXI, (June 15, 1904), pp. 755-958.

³For the treaty see FR, 1880, pp. 914-20.

affair. Ion Perdicaris was a wealthy American who lived in a country villa just three miles outside of Tangier. On May 18, 1904, he and his British stepson were kidnapped by one of the last of the Barbary Pirates, a scoundrel by the name of Sherif Mulai Ahmed ibn-Muhammed er Raisuli. This event was a part of a struggle between Raisuli and the Fez Government. In kidnapping a foreigner, Raisuli hoped to dramatize the Sultan's lack of authority and at the same time to gain local prestige and a large ransom.

American diplomacy in the matter was swift and noisy. On May 19, Samuel J. Gummere, the United States Consul-General of Tangier, telegraphed to the State Department: "Situation serious. Request man-of-war to enforce demands."⁴ Roosevelt immediately ordered to Tangier the entire South Atlantic Squadron, four warships which were about to coal in the Canaries. Gummere, attempting to determine the best course of action, conferred daily with the British and French Ministers, Arthur Nicolson and Paul Saint-René Taillandier. The three diplomats advised the Government of Morocco to give in to the demands of Raisuli if possible. At the same time the French Minister, who had earlier experienced similar situations, sent two members of a powerful Moslem Holy family to find Raisuli and attempt to mediate Perdicaris' release.⁵ The two emissaries found that Raisuli

⁴Gummere to Hay, May 19, 1904, FR, 1904, p. 496.

⁵Porter to Hay, May 30, 1904, FR, 1904, pp. 307-8.

was not in a conciliatory mood. In return for the release he demanded a number of extreme conditions including a ransom of \$70,000 and his own appointment as governor in two Moroccan provinces. He threatened to put Perdicaris to death if these demands were not met. The Moroccan Foreign Minister, Mohammed Torres, made it all too clear that the conditions were unnegotiable to the Fez Government.

The Quai d'Orsay was anxious to help find a satisfactory solution to the Perdicaris crisis. Delcassé had as one of his major goals to bring Morocco quietly into the French sphere of influence in North Africa. He was thus unhappy with the international publicity created by the kidnapping. This incident was only about a month after Delcassé had concluded the Entente Cordiale, an agreement with England which promised diplomatic support for the special interests of France in Morocco and secretly envisaged the eventual partition of the country between France and Spain.⁶ Delcassé was no doubt delighted when the United States requested the good offices of France in the mediation between Raisuli and the Fez Government.⁷ This was a subtle indication that the American Government did not look with disfavor upon the Entente Cordiale.

⁶For the agreement see DDF, IV², no. 389, pp. 533-4. Fay, War, I, p. 164.

⁷Hay to Porter, May 28, 1904, FR, 1904, p. 307.

When the Republican National Convention met in June of that year, President Roosevelt, always an astute politician, recognized that the Perdicaris affair could be used to a political advantage. He believed that a firm patriotic expression of American dignity in the world could create enthusiasm in an otherwise dead convention. In collaboration with Secretary Hay he wrote an ultimatum to the Moroccan Government: "This Government wants Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." When party leader Joe Cannon read the telegram to the convention it aroused a roar of approval and excitement. Cannon did not read the part of the message which gave the instructions: "But do not land marines or seize customs without department's specific instructions."⁸ It was years later that the historian Tyler Dennett revealed for the first time that Roosevelt and Hay had learned earlier that Perdicaris had renounced his American citizenship during the Civil War.⁹

While the Chicago Convention was in progress the Sherifian Government, with the aid of France, was able to come to terms with Raisuli. Morocco was forced to pay a large ransom and to give certain political rights to the Riffian bandits. Also, Morocco paid \$4,000 to the United

⁸Hay to Gummere, June 22, 1904, FR, 1904, p. 503.

⁹Hay, p. 402. Still Roosevelt was entirely non-political on June 15 when he wrote Hay that the United States should "demand the death of those who harm him if he is harmed." Quoted in Tuchman, "Perdicaris," p. 99.

States for expenses incurred during the kidnapping, American diplomatists believed that France had assisted in finding a satisfactory conclusion in the affair. It seems that Hay expressed his true conviction when he instructed General Porter: "Please make known to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the President's deep appreciation of the kindly and efficient cooperation of the French Government in the Perdicaris case."¹⁰ When Gummere expressed thanks to the French Minister in Tangier, he took the opportunity to suggest that France should take some action in behalf of the security of foreigners.¹¹ There is no evidence that Gummere had instructions to express this request, but in so doing the American Consul-General gave indirect recognition of French authority in Morocco.

Largely as a result of the Perdicaris episode the American Government decided to strengthen its position in Morocco. Early in 1905 Congress, encouraged by Roosevelt, indicated interest in changing the Tangier Consulate into a legation. It was believed that this change would encourage commerce and add to American prestige in the Moslem world.

¹⁰Hay to Porter, June 25, 1904, Instructions, Vol. XXIV, p. 9. Roosevelt personally thanked Jusserand for French help. Delcassé to Ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg, June 21, 1904, DDF, V², no. 237, p. 278.

¹¹Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 2, 1904, Livre Jaune: Affaires de Maroc, 1901-1905, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1906), p. 174.

From the beginning the French Government was hostile to this proposal. Delcassé' believed that such a move would encourage other powers to increase their interests in Morocco and make it more difficult to increase French authority. He therefore instructed Jusserand to try to convince Roosevelt that a Consulate was satisfactory for the supervision of a trade of only two and one-half million francs.¹² The very day, however, that Delcassé' sent this telegram the American Congress voted to create a legation.¹³ Jusserand did not believe it wise to express French dissatisfaction with the change. Rather he suggested to Hay that it was important to choose a "moderate and reasonable" Minister, and he also said that his Government hoped that the appointee would be instructed to keep in close contact with the French Legation. Hay gave his assurances that this was in conformity with the policy of the American Government.¹⁴

French interests in North Africa had a long history. The seizure of Algeria in 1830 created the problem of maintaining protection along the unstable Moroccan border, and this was France's principle concern for Morocco throughout

¹²Delcassé' to Jusserand, March 5, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 125, pp. 170-1. Taillandier wrote Delcassé' condemning the proposal, in even stronger terms and no doubt this influenced Delcassé'. Ibid., no. 108, pp. 145-7.

¹³Jusserand to Delcassé', March 5, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 126, p. 171.

¹⁴Jusserand to Delcassé', March 7, 1905, Ibid., no. 131, p. 176.

the nineteenth century. At the Madrid Conference France did not claim any special interests in the country other than those interests given to all of the represented powers. Toward the end of the century France became dissatisfied with the status of Morocco, and especially Delcassé¹⁵ hoped to consolidate all of North Africa into the French sphere of influence. After the humiliation of the Fashoda fiasco Delcassé¹⁵ achieved a small amount of compensation in annexing the Tuat Oasis in Eastern Morocco. In 1904 Delcassé¹⁵ informed the Fez Government that France hoped to establish closer relations between the two nations in order to develop the Moroccan economy and to prevent aggression by a foreign power.¹⁵ Delcassé¹⁵ hoped that his policy of "peaceful penetration" would not alarm Germany and England. In the Chamber of Deputies he declared that the problem was to "establish the preponderance of France in Morocco, thereby to augment her power in the Mediterranean, not by alienating, but rather by conciliating the powers whose position in the Mediterranean brings them to our attention."¹⁶ From the British standpoint this was achieved when Delcassé¹⁵ concluded the Entente Cordiale.

Early in 1905 the German Government decided that it

¹⁵Delcassé¹⁵ to Taillandier, May 9, 1904, DDF, V², no. 111, p. 125.

¹⁶Speech of Nov. 10, 1904, quoted in Porter, Delcassé, p. 163.

was time to act if she were to prevent an aggrandizement of French influence. Kaiser William II, Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, and especially the mysterious adviser behind the scenes, Friedrich von Holstein, each believed that a strong bluff was all that would be necessary to convince France to depart from Delcassé's policy of expansionism. It was assumed that England would not be willing to join in a continental war in defense of French colonialism. The German leaders hoped to weaken the Entente Cordiale, an agreement which in Germany created a great fear of encirclement. Germany had nothing to fear from the Franco-Russian Alliance for Russia's disastrous war in the Far East eliminated any possibility of her coming to the aid of France. Following a large French loan to Morocco, Saint-René Taillandier was sent to Fez in January, 1905, to supervise a proposed reform of the Moroccan police force. France claimed that this would benefit all the powers by adding security to Moroccan trade; Moroccan independence would not be violated, and thus the reform was in keeping with the provisions of the Madrid Conference.¹⁷ Germany, however, was not satisfied. She claimed that unilateral French supervision of reform was inconsistent with the principle of the open door. Bülow demanded that such a policy change necessitated the calling of another international conference.

¹⁷The proposed reform is explained by Delcassé in a letter to the French Ambassadors, June 7, 1905, DDF, VII², no. 1, p. 1.

Delcassé, secure in the Entente Cordiale, was determined not to back down to German demands. He offered to engage in bilateral negotiations with Germany but refused to consent to a conference. Theodore Roosevelt did not believe that a conference was necessary. As a result of the Venezuelan controversy of 1902 he had a greater fear of German imperialism than of French imperialism. Roosevelt believed that French colonialism in North Africa was another example of Europeans taking Western Civilization to a backward people. Because American interests in Morocco were not great, the political future of that small country was not of great concern to him. He was, however, concerned about the anxiety and fears of William II. To Ambassador Jusserand he reported that he had received information that the "present great preoccupation of the German Emperor is the Franco-British rapprochement which he believes is directed against him."¹⁸

The German Government had hopes that Roosevelt could be persuaded to support the idea of a conference. The United States was a logical choice because in 1905 all of the other major powers were allied to either France or Germany. Bülow had earlier written William that Roosevelt was "a great admirer of Your Majesty" and because of this the two countries

¹⁸Jusserand to Delcassé, Feb. 11, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 90, p. 110.

could march "hand in hand."¹⁹ The German strategy was to argue that Germany was supporting the principle of the open door in Morocco, just as the United States had done in the Far East. On February 25 Bülow instructed Ambassador Sternburg to warn the President that France and Spain were a "political unity" which was trying to partition Morocco between the two and to prohibit her markets from the rest of the world. The Governments of Germany and the United States should together support the Sultan in his struggle to maintain independence and the open door.²⁰ When Sternburg made this appeal, Roosevelt answered that American interests did not justify such a policy on the part of his Government. He did express his confidence in the "peaceful intentions" of Germany, and he promised to instruct the American Minister in Tangier to maintain "close contact" with his German colleague.²¹ In keeping with this promise Secretary Hay instructed Gummere to work with Germany "so far as you can do so without causing friction with France."²²

¹⁹"Bülow to William, August 31, 1904, GP, XIXII, no. 6264, p. 536. William added an annotation: "Very flattering to me."

²⁰"Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 25, 1905, GP, XX, no. 6558, pp. 256-8.

²¹Sternburg to Bülow, March 7, 1905, Ibid., no. 6559, pp. 258-9. Roosevelt's account is in his letter to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p. 468, Morison, V, p. 231.

²²Quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, p. 310.

The real beginning date for the Moroccan crisis was March 31, 1905. On this day Kaiser William II landed in Tangier and delivered a spectacular speech. It is now recognized that the speech was made at the insistence of Bülow and Holstein. The Kaiser himself was reluctant to go to Tangier, and in fact, he tried to use the roughness of the sea as an excuse for not landing. Once in Tangier, however, he gave the appearance of purpose and confidence. Before the Sultan and an enthusiastic Muslim audience he declared: "It is to the Sultan in his position of an independent Sovereign that I am paying my visit today. I hope that under the Sovereignty of the Sultan a free Morocco will remain open to the peaceful rivalry of all nations on the basis of absolute equality."²³ This was a clear threat that Germany would not stand aside while France made Morocco into a French dependency.

The day after the Tangier speech President Roosevelt and Ambassador Jusserand had one of their usual friendly chats. Roosevelt voiced the opinion that he did not believe the Emperor "at bottom" wanted war but that "it was possible to fear that his acts and words might cause one."²⁴ Both

²³Quoted in Stuart, French Foreign Policy, pp. 167-8. In regard to the Kaiser's position on the open door Gummere is reported to have said, "This is just exactly what we also want." Quoted in Dennis, Adventures, p. 488.

²⁴Jusserand to Delcassé, April 1, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 218, p. 277.

men agreed that the American reaction to the Tangier speech was unfavorable to Germany. Roosevelt remarked that the dominant sentiment in the Navy department was "sharply Anti-German." After the conversation Jusserand reported to his Foreign Office that "in the present situation the Federal Government intends to remain outside all political developments which might result from European rivalries concerning Morocco."²⁵ The conversation had been somewhat hurried for Roosevelt was busy making last-minute preparation for his hunting trip to the Colorado Mountains, a location far away from the governmental cares of Washington.

A week later, while Roosevelt was in Colorado and Hay was sick in Europe, Sternburg delivered a second appeal to William Howard Taft, who was left in charge of American diplomacy. This message, written by Bülow, argued that Germany "is obligated to think of her national dignity" for "as soon as France discovers that Germany will meekly submit to her bullying, we are sure that she will become more aggressive." In backing the open door in Morocco, the German Government was working not only for her own interests but "for those of all the commercial nations of the world." The note insisted that there must be a conference of the concerned powers to determine the fate of Morocco. The

²⁵Jusserand to Delcassé, April 3, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 227, pp. 289-90. Both this and the previous report are concerned with the same interview.

United States, as a participant of the Madrid Conference, should use her influence on France in support of such a conference.²⁶ Secretary of War Taft was noncommittal, saying only that he would forward the message to the President.²⁷ The German press that day expressed the hope for German-American co-operation in the Moroccan dispute because of the assumption that "American commerce and navigation would be equally menaced if the Mediterranean trade were to be exclusively under the control of France and England."²⁸

Secretary Taft, like Roosevelt, had a great deal of confidence in Jusserand. On April 7 the two men had a long conversation concerning the German demand for a conference. Jusserand argued that the German fears were entirely unnecessary because France, as a result of the Madrid Conference, was already committed by treaty to the principle of equality of trade in Morocco. His hope was that the United States "would abstain from all action that could indicate suspicion and thus make the French task more difficult." Taft responded that although the power to define policy was exclusively in the hands of the President, he did believe it was safe to say that "the United States has only a weak interest in the

²⁶Bülow to Sternburg, April 3, 1905, GP, XIX², no. 6302, pp. 593-5. Roosevelt to Reid, Ap. 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p. 668.

²⁷Sternburg to Bülow, April 6, 1905, GP, XIX², no. 6304, p. 579.

²⁸Reported by M. Bihourd, French Ambassador in Berlin, to Delcasse, DDF, VI², no. 239, pp. 303-4.

question of the open door in Morocco and does not consider it to be of equal importance to the same question in the Far East.²⁹ In a later conversation Taft went even farther in encouraging Jusserand that the United States did not intend to depart from the "tradition of isolation from European rivalries." "I am convinced," declared Taft, "that I do not go too far in saying that if there is an invitation for us to attend a Conference on Morocco, we will refuse to attend."³⁰

The German Government on April 13 formally appealed to Roosevelt for the third time. This appeal charged that France will "continue her aggressive policy in Morocco, aimed at all non-French interests, if she feels sure that England will stand by her and eventually show herself ready to back her up by force of arms."³¹ Meanwhile Delcassé' had managed to gain the diplomatic support of both England and Spain in a combined opposition to a new conference. "In these conditions," wrote Delcassé' to Jusserand, "it is very unlikely that Germany will get very far." He instructed Jusserand to maintain his "effective opposition" to the

²⁹Jusserand to Delcassé', April 7, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 246, p. 310. Delcassé' instructed Jusserand to say that France intended to maintain the open door in Morocco. Delcassé' to Jusserand, Ibid., April 7, 1905, no. 251, p. 314.

³⁰Jusserand to Delcassé', April 14, 1905, Ibid., no. 229, pp. 363-4.

³¹Sternburg to Bülow, April 15, 1905, GP, XX², note 3, p. 341, Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p. 469.

German project. Jusserand was to continue to assure Taft that the United States was to be given complete commercial equality in Morocco, and he was to argue that the background of the Madrid Conference had no analogy to the contemporary situation.³²

Roosevelt's policy was clear at this early stage in the dispute. He well knew that Delcassé¹ hoped to turn Morocco into a French protectorate, but this did not upset him. He was persuaded that American interests in North Africa were very small, especially when compared to his hopes for the Far East. Roosevelt did not want to offend either England, France or Germany, but more important, he believed that there was the constant possibility of a European war--a contingency which could not help but be destructive to American interests. He therefore hoped to encourage conciliation and to remain flexible on the question of the fate of Morocco. Roosevelt was sufficiently concerned to take out time from his bear hunt to write several letters. To Sternburg he wrote: "Dear Speck . . . I dislike taking a position in any matter unless I fully intend to back it up, and our interests in Morocco are not sufficiently great to make me feel justified in engaging our Government in the matter."³³ In a longer letter to Taft he wrote:

³²Delcassé¹ to Jusserand, April 13, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 285, pp. 350-1.

³³Roosevelt to Sternburg, April 20, 1905, Morison, V, pp. 234-5. Bishop, I, pp. 471-3.

Dear Will: I think you are keeping the lid on in great shape! The Kaiser's pipe-dream this week takes the form of Morocco. I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interests in Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and Germany in the matter.

At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other Fortunately, you and I play the diplomatic game exactly alike, and I should advise your being absolutely frank with both Speck and the British people.³⁴

Following these instructions, Taft spoke to the British Ambassador in the attempt to obtain the British position. Taft expressed the concern of Roosevelt for the maintenance of peace even if he "does not care a cent about Morocco."³⁵ The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Henry Lansdowne, did not have much confidence in Roosevelt's ability to conduct serious diplomacy. He instructed Ambassador Durand to firmly refuse the offer of the good offices of the United States and to insist that the goals of France were "conciliatory and moderate." There was no need for a conference unless Germany was determined to take advantage of what was at most a diplomatic oversight in order to make mischief or to disturb the status quo by demanding cession of a Moorish Port." Lansdowne

³⁴Roosevelt to Taft, April 20, 1905, Morison, V, pp. 232-3. Bishop, I, pp. 471-3.

³⁵Durand to Lansdowne, April 26, 1905, BD, III, no. 82, pp. 67-8.

emphasized that the British Ambassador was "to say nothing which could be interpreted as an invitation to the President to act as mediator between us and Germany."³⁶ It is interesting that on April 25 and again on May 13 the Kaiser wrote Roosevelt that England could be easily persuaded to cease her opposition to an international conference if he "would give her a hint to do so."³⁷

On May 11 when Roosevelt returned from the Colorado Mountains he found that both Sternburg and Jusserand were deeply concerned that war was possible.³⁸ Roosevelt kept in daily contact with both Ambassadors, and especially with Jusserand, in an attempt to help find some solution to the crisis. Jusserand was always a strong partisan of the French position. He assured the President that none of the interested parties expressed any desire for a conference. In talking to Jusserand Roosevelt almost always took the side of France just as Taft had done. On June 4 he announced that he decided that so long as France opposed the calling of a conference the American Government would not accept any invitation to participate in one. Roosevelt asked that this informal promise be kept out of the French Yellow Book.

³⁶Lansdowne to Durand, April 27, 1905, BD, III, no. 83, p. 68.

³⁷Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p. 469.

³⁸Roosevelt's version in his letter to Reid, Ibid., p. 469.

"I have not been invited to a Conference," he explained, "and I would not want to give the impression of saying no in advance just to be disagreeable to Germany."³⁹

Delcassé['] was extremely happy to receive Roosevelt's commitment to refuse to attend any conference not acceptable to France. Although Jusserand emphasized that this information was confidential, Delcassé['] immediately sent the news to the French Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London and St. Petersburg.⁴⁰ The very next day Paul Cambon was able to use the information in his diplomacy with the London Foreign Office. On that day the Sultan of Morocco appealed to the powers to support a Moroccan Conference. This appeal was more difficult to ignore than the German appeal, and Lord Lansdowne asked the advice of the French Ambassador. Cambon showed Lansdowne the secret message containing Roosevelt's promise, and he suggested to Lansdowne that he advise the Sultan that it was in Morocco's interests to place her confidence in France and Britain. Lansdowne agreed with this course of action. He said that the news from Washington would be of aid in opposing a conference.⁴¹

³⁹Jusserand to Delcassé['], June 4, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 492, pp. 586-7. The only evidence for the statement is the report of Jusserand. Jusserand is generally dependable in his reports, and the story agrees with the facts.

⁴⁰Ibid., note 2, p. 587.

⁴¹Paul Cambon to Delcassé['], June 5, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 497, p. 592.

At this stage in the crisis several British journalists, who were not familiar with Roosevelt's promise to Jusserand, wrote that Roosevelt was pro-German and under the influence of the Kaiser. This was the kind of story that upset Roosevelt. To his English friend, Spring Rice, he vehemently denied that there was any basis to this interpretation. He explained that his policy was to treat all nations with "peacefulness and righteousness." It was "ridiculous" that he could be influenced by a man of such "violent and often wholly irrational zigzags." Roosevelt concluded: "If the Kaiser ever causes trouble it will be from jumpiness and not because of long-thought-out and deliberate purpose."⁴² To Jusserand he indicated that he would be uneasy if the Kaiser were to have power in Morocco. "No Maritime power, and least of all the United States," said Roosevelt, "can look with indifference upon the threat of a German establishment at the entrance of the Mediterranean with the power to obstruct the straits of Gibraltar."⁴³ Senator Lodge mentioned to Henry Adams that some Englishmen believed that Roosevelt was "under the Kaiser's spell." Adams replied: "For Heaven's sake, let them think so. The President's

⁴²Roosevelt to Spring Rice, May 31, 1905, quoted in Dennet, Adventures, pp. 89-91.

⁴³Jusserand to Delcassé, May 21, 1905, DDF, VI², no. 435, p. 512.

influence with the Kaiser is one of the strongest weapons we have in a really perilous condition."⁴⁴

In early June an impasse had been reached between France and Germany, and it seemed that neither side was willing to budge. Then unexpectedly Premier Maurice Rouvier decided that Delcassé's uncompromising policy was leading France to war. On June 6 Rouvier and Delcassé debated their differences in the presence of the Council of Ministers and Emile Loubet, the President of the Republic. Delcassé based his case on two points: First, Germany was bluffing, and second, in the case of war England would come to France's defense. Rouvier claimed to have information that Germany was willing to go to war, and he denied that that was any clear evidence of England's willingness to join in a continental war.⁴⁵ The French army, still shaken by the Dryfus affair, was unprepared to fight the superior Prussian forces. After a discussion which lasted about thirty minutes the ministers unanimously supported Rouvier, and Delcassé was left with

⁴⁴Lodge to Roosevelt, July 25, 1905, Lodge, Letters, II, pp. 170-1.

⁴⁵The truth is not clear. Cambon had reported that Lansdowne had made definite offers of aid, but Lansdowne denied this. Cambon to Delcassé, May 29, 1905, DDF, VI, no. 465, p. 558. Lansdowne to Bertie, May 31, 1905, BD, II, p. 77. The question is discussed in Fay, Origins, I. pp. 195-9, and Keith Eubank, Paul Cambon: Master Diplomat, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), pp. 207-8. The policy of Rouvier is defended in such nationalist French historians as Tardieu, Alliances, pp. 212-4, and Jacques Bainville, La troisième république, 1870-1935, (Paris, Arthème Fayard, 1935), p. 529.

no choice but to give his resignation. Thus Delcassé's ministry, which is the longest in the history of the Third Republic, came to an abrupt end.⁴⁶ German leaders were very happy when they learned of this development. Bülow wrote that the most critical period of the Moroccan crisis had ended.⁴⁷ Holstein recorded in his diary: "Our cleverest and most dangerous enemy has fallen."⁴⁸ William congratulated the French Ambassador for the departure of the man who "was leading France to a catastrophe."⁴⁹

American opinion generally looked upon the fall of Delcassé as a hopeful sign for the prospects of peace. The Nation criticized Delcassé as a "visionary of a new European balance" and charged that his "mind was not upon a diplomatic settlement of the dispute, but upon humiliating Germany."⁵⁰ Roosevelt also expressed the opinion that Delcassé was not sufficiently conciliatory.⁵¹ Delcassé's fall, however, did not immediately mean that France was ready to adapt a policy of appeasement. Rouvier, taking charge of

⁴⁶A detailed eye-witness account is given by Joseph Chaumie, the Minister of Justice, in DDF, VI², annex, pp. 601-4.

⁴⁷Bülow to Tattenback, June 7, 1905, GP, XX², p. 418.

⁴⁸Holstein Papers, Vol. IV, June 16, 1905, p. 342.

⁴⁹Bihourd to Rouvier, June 12, 1905, DDF², VI, no. 44, p. 52.

⁵⁰The Nation, July 20, 1905, Vol. 81, p. 47.

⁵¹Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905, Morison, Vol. V, no. 3710, p. 63.

the Quai d'Orsay for an interim period, informed the French Foreign Service that "the Government of the Republic is invariably attached to a loyal and firm policy."⁵² Earlier he had told a German representative that popular opinion would prevent France from appearing to back down to a German threat.⁵³ Britain notified the French Government that she remained convinced that a Conference was "wholly unworthy of support, most ill-advised and contrary to the interests of Morocco."⁵⁴

On June 7 Roosevelt invited Ambassador Jusserand to meet with him to discuss the significance of Rouvier's taking charge of French diplomacy. At the meeting Jusserand said that he had not received any specific instructions from Rouvier, but he was convinced that the French Government would not cease its opposition to a Moroccan Conference. Roosevelt repeated his determination to support the French position, adding that the French interpretation of the most favored nation clause was "entirely just." He asked that he be immediately informed if the Quai d'Orsay were to change its policy. "I would not," he emphasized, "want to reject the idea of a conference and then find that we were opposed

⁵²DDF, VII, no. 1, page 1, note 1.

⁵³Mr. Miquel's memorandum of a conversation with Rouvier, May 30, 1905, GP, XX², pp. 393-8.

⁵⁴Lord Lansdowne to Paul Cambon, June 8, 1905, DDF, VII², no. 503, pp. 599-600.

to Germany only as a result of my personal opinion."⁵⁵ The next day Roosevelt informed Sternburg that the United States would refuse to participate in any Moroccan Conference because public opinion was opposed to involvement in European conflicts.⁵⁶ Only two days after the fall of Delcassé it appeared that Germany was faced with the combined opposition of France, Britain and the United States.

Jean Jules Jusserand took pride in the fact that he was an experienced and skillful diplomatist. It constantly offended him that the Foreign Office did not regularly supply him with the details of foreign policy. In every other despatch in his correspondence with both Delcassé and Rouvier he complained that a lack of information made his job more difficult. A week after Rouvier was in charge of the Quai d'Orsay Jusserand sent him a long letter explaining why it was necessary that the American Ambassador be kept well-informed. France could obtain "a great utility" by the fact that President Roosevelt was determined to play a major role in world affairs. Although France had the confidence of the President, "we risk the lose of this confidence which I cultivate with the greatest of care." "The world is

⁵⁵ Jusserand to Rouvier, June 8, 1905, no. 8, pp. 7-8, no. 14, p. 13. These are two reports of the same conversation. Rouvier the next day informed Jusserand that France would remain opposed to a conference. June 9, 1905, DDF, VII², no. 20, p. 17.

⁵⁶ Sternburg to Bülow, June 8, 1905, Dugdale, Vol. III, p. 230; GP, XX, no. 6696, p. 421.

shrinking," concluded Jusserand, "all nations are now neighbors, and especially this is true for the American Republic whose power grows greater each day."⁵⁷

Although Jusserand was somewhat vain at times, he was correct in claiming that he had the confidence of Roosevelt. In matters of French diplomacy Roosevelt relied on his personal contact with Jusserand, and he almost completely ignored the Ambassador in Paris. Robert S. McCormick was actually a very capable diplomatist, and he was sensitive to the fact that he was seldom contacted in regard to serious matters. "In the absence of such information," he once complained to Root, "I have refrained from discussing the Moroccan question, even in a general way, lest I might say something not in keeping with the interest and policy of our own Government."⁵⁸ During the Moroccan crisis Roosevelt also did not often consult with the anti-German John Hay, but in the first half of 1905 Roosevelt worked largely as his own Secretary of State. After Hay's death on July 1 Roosevelt placed much more confidence in the successor Elihu Root.⁵⁹ To Sternburg

⁵⁷Jusserand to Rouvier, June 11, 1905, DDF, VII², no. 41, pp. 45-7.

⁵⁸McCormick to Root, Oct. 5, 1905, Despatches, Vol. 125, no. 49. Also Oct. 4, no. 55. Jusserand mentioned that Roosevelt had little faith in McCormick. Jusserand to Rouvier, June 25, 1905, DDF, VII², no. 124, p. 135.

⁵⁹According to Root's biographer "there was nothing for Root to do but to carry on with the details and to exercise his usual restraining influence on Roosevelt. Jessup, Root, II, p. 56. Beale writes: "Much of the detail Root handled. At the critical points, however, Roosevelt made the decisions and did the negotiations. Beale, Roosevelt, p. 320.

Roosevelt wrote: "Root's political views and mine are in complete accord; I beg you to give Root your fullest confidence and to speak with him as if you were talking to me."⁶⁰

On June 11 Sternburg gave Roosevelt a memorandum which claimed that England had offered France an offensive and defensive alliance. Also the memorandum charged that France had offered to give Germany a zone of influence in Morocco in exchange for the abandonment of a conference settlement. The German Government had refused this proposal only because of her desire for all nations to have the advantage of the open door in Morocco. "If you could give a hint now in London and Paris," the note concluded, "your influence could prevent England from joining a Franco-German war started by the aggressive policy of France in Morocco."⁶¹ After a long conversation with Sternburg Roosevelt rather suddenly reversed his earlier policy in the matter, and he promised to advise the French Government in favor of accepting the Sultan's invitation for an International Moroccan Conference.⁶² It appears that Roosevelt did not completely reject the German

⁶⁰Sternburg to Bülow, November 3, 1905, GP, XXI¹, p. 9.

⁶¹Bishop, Vol. I, pp. 476, Morison, Vol. V, pp. 235-7. There is no documentary evidence that Britain had actually offered an offensive and defensive alliance, and Britain learned of the charge only through Roosevelt, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 342-3.

⁶²Roosevelt to Sternburg, April 20, 1905, Morison, V, pp. 234-5. Bishop, I. pp. 471-3.

charges, but this does not seem to be the basic reason for his change of policy. He later wrote that the decision was based on three points: first, "it really did look like there might be a war," and this would be "a real calamity for civilization;" second, since there was already a war in the Far East "a new conflict might result in what would literally be a world-conflagration;" and third, a war should be prevented "for the sake of France."⁶³ Secretary Hay disagreed with Roosevelt's change of policy, and he argued that the United States should continue to support France in her opposition to a conference.⁶⁴

President Roosevelt, in accordance with his promise to Sternburg, began to suggest to Jusserand that the conference idea should be considered by France. On June 14 he told Jusserand that the acceptance of a conference was not a greater evil than the granting of a sphere of influence to Germany. A Moroccan Conference did not have to indicate anything serious, for it was possible to design the agenda in accordance with French goals. Perhaps there was "only one chance in three that William really had the intentions which he manifested, but this chance that his menace might be serious meant that the stakes were so high that it was

⁶³Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Morison, V, p. 237, Bishop, I, p. 477.

⁶⁴Sternburg to Bülow, June 17, 1905, Dugdale, III, p. 231.

necessary to act with prudence." Still Roosevelt concluded that this was only an observation and that the United States would continue to support the French decision one way or another. Jusserand left the White House at 11 P.M., and he was met by five reporters who learned nothing.⁶⁵ In subsequent conversations with Jusserand Roosevelt repeated the same basic idea. "It would cause me anguish," he declared, "if France were to suffer a misfortune."⁶⁶ To save the peace it was necessary to placate the "incommensurable vanity" of the Emperor. There were "honorable concessions which one can make to avoid a conflict, and in this case I would not hesitate."⁶⁷ In contrast to the President, Secretary Hay calmly told Jusserand that he did not believe Germany would be willing to go to war for the sake of Morocco.⁶⁸

It was at this general time that France became more open to the possibility of a Moroccan Conference. On June 14

⁶⁵ Jusserand to Rouvier, June 15, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 62, pp. 688-70. Rouvier denied that France had offered Germany a zone of influence in exchange for a conference. Rouvier to Jusserand, June 15, 1905, Ibid., no. 66, p. 72.

⁶⁶ Jusserand to Rouvier, June 22, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 101, p. 105.

⁶⁷ Jusserand to Rouvier, June 19, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 85, p. 90. A copy of this despatch is in the Roosevelt collection, Series I. Roosevelt's account of the conversation is in his letter to Reid, Bishop, I, p. 478.

⁶⁸ Jusserand to Rouvier, June 22, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 101, p. 105.

Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador, spoke to Rouvier of the idea of prior Franco-German discussions in the event that a Conference were called. Rouvier indicated that he would have to give the proposal reflection, but significantly he did not indicate any opposition to the German Ambassador's suggestion.⁶⁹ Shortly thereafter the Council of Ministers agreed unanimously that "it was necessary to do all that was compatible with honor to avoid war" because Frenchmen "would not understand why there was a war over Morocco and not over Alsace and Lorraine." One Minister suggested that France could "gain time" by agreeing to go to a Conference and then postponing it indefinitely.⁷⁰ On June 21 Rouvier gave the German Ambassador a note which stated that France was ready to "seriously consider" participating in a Conference provided that there would be an earlier "exchange of views" to determine the exact agenda. Rouvier continued to argue that a "direct accord" between Germany and France would be the simplest and fastest procedure to settle the matter.⁷¹

Rouvier instructed Jusserand to tell Roosevelt that the American advice had influenced France's decision to

⁶⁹Department Note written by Mr. George Louis, June 14, 1905, Ibid., no. 54, p. 60.

⁷⁰Memorandum of the meeting by Mr. Chaumie, Ibid., note 4, pp. 61-2.

⁷¹Rouvier to Radolin, June 21, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 93, pp. 97-100.

accept a conference. "Tell him," cabled Rouvier, "that his council has an exceptional authority, not only because of his high office, but also because of his character, his spirit of justice and his clear understanding of France's highest interests."⁷² It is not clear, however, if this message represented the conviction of Rouvier, or if, on the other hand, it was diplomatic flattery designed to gain Roosevelt's sympathy. It is certain that Rouvier began to reconsider his position on the conference before Roosevelt began to urge Jusserand that a conference would be one way to let the Kaiser "save face." But Rouvier did not make the final decision to give in until after Roosevelt's encouragement. Certainly Roosevelt's viewpoint was one of several influential factors, for it was impossible for France to ignore the thinking of the leader of one of the major powers of the world. Howard K. Beale, however, overstates the matter when he writes: "The French attitude, apparently influenced by the Presidential suggestion, became immediately conciliatory."⁷³

The German Government, despite Prince Radolin's suggestion, did not find that the proposal for a detailed agenda was satisfactory. Bülow argued that the extent of

⁷²Rouvier to Jusserand, June 23, 1905, *Ibid.*, no. 112, pp. 117-9. These words are even more flattering in French.

⁷³Beale, Roosevelt, p. 316.

the necessary reforms should be decided by the Conference after it met.⁷⁴ Roosevelt and Jusserand discussed the possible means which might be employed to encourage Germany to agree to a pre-conference agenda. Roosevelt suggested that one helpful action was "to flatter the excessive vanity of the Emperor." Then the two men together composed a telegram with this purpose in mind, and Roosevelt sent it as if he alone had written it.⁷⁵ The message said of the Kaiser that "he stands as the leader among the Sovereigns of to-day who have their faces set toward the future, and it is not only of the utmost importance for his own people, but of the utmost importance for all mankind that his power and leadership for good should be unimpaired." In obtaining from France the concession of a conference the Emperor "has won a great triumph; he has obtained what his opponents in England and France said he never would obtain, and what I myself did not believe he could obtain." The message concluded with an encouragement: "The result is a striking tribute to him personally no less than to his nation, and I earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept it as the triumph it is."⁷⁶

⁷⁴Bulow to Radolin, June 25, 1905, GP, XX², no. 6742, p. 479.

⁷⁵Jusserand to Rouvier, June 25, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 124, pp. 134-5.

⁷⁶Roosevelt to Sternburg, June 25, 1905, Bishop, I, pp. 483-5, Morison, V, pp. 339-40. Sternburg to Bulow, June 27, 1905, GP, XX², no. 6742, pp. 479-80.

Shortly thereafter Roosevelt decided that a further French concession was necessary. In the presence of Jusserand he drew up a proposed formula for a solution: "The two Governments will agree to go to the conference without a preliminary program and discuss all questions concerning Morocco, except when either is honor bound by a previous agreement with another power."⁷⁷ Jusserand said that this seemed to be a workable solution if Germany would go along, but he added that he would have to consult with his Government before making any commitment. Rouvier immediately wrote that the proposed solution was not acceptable because it "would no doubt be interpreted in a different sense by France and Germany."⁷⁸ Germany just as rapidly agreed to Roosevelt's plan, as indeed it was very similar to the earlier German expression. In the German response, written by Sternburg, there appeared the words: "The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case during the coming conference differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be the most fair and the most practical."⁷⁹

⁷⁷Jusserand to Rouvier, June 27, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 137, pp. 156-7. Sternburg to Bulow, June 27, 1905, GP, XX², no. 6743, p. 480. Roosevelt's summary in Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p. 485.

⁷⁸Rouvier to Jusserand, June 28, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 149, p. 173.

⁷⁹Sternburg to Roosevelt, June 28, 1905, Morison, V, pp. 240-1, GP, XX, part 2, no. 6744, pp. 481-2.

Actually the Emperor had not been this definite for Bülow had instructed Sternburg to tell Roosevelt that he (Bülow) would "urge the Kaiser to accept the suggestions of Roosevelt."⁸⁰

The moderate policy of France prevailed, and on July 10 both she and Germany announced that they had come to an agreement which was substantially the plan outlined by Roosevelt.⁸¹ It is possible that the alleged promise of William that he would follow Roosevelt's lead might have had some influence in encouraging the French Government to agree to an agenda. It is true that Roosevelt, as almost always, informed Jusserand of the latest German message. Jusserand obtained this information just before the meeting of the Council of Ministers when it was decided to come to terms with Germany.⁸² Just after the Franco-German agreement Jusserand wrote Roosevelt that "the agreement arrived at is in substance the one we had considered and the acceptance of which you did so very much to secure." The crisis,

⁸⁰Bülow to Sternburg, June 27, 1905, quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, p. 325.

⁸¹The agreement gave a "recognition of the situation created for France in Morocco by the contiguity of a vast extent of Algeria and the Shereefian Empire and by the special relations resulting therefore between the two adjacent countries." In McCormick to Adee, July 12, 1905, Despatches, Vol. 124, no. 22.

⁸²Beale is rather definite that the alleged promise was of importance in influencing the Council to compromise, but Beale does not have documentary evidence that this is true. Beale, Roosevelt, p. 318.

he added, had been grave for "there was a point where more yielding would have been impossible; everybody in France felt it, and people braced up silently in view of possible great events."⁸³ Roosevelt himself believed that he had played a major role in the pre-conference negotiations. "This is a dead secret," he wrote to Lodge, "not a word of it has got out into the papers; but I became the intermediary between Germany when they seemed to have gotten into an impasse."⁸⁴

Before the conference met there remained several disagreements between France and Germany, and Roosevelt helped mediate two minor difficulties. The German Government objected to the French selection of Mr. Paul Revoil as a delegate. Berlin charged to Roosevelt that Revoil had earlier been removed from office by Premier Combes because Combes feared his warlike policy. Roosevelt immediately notified Jusserand that he had received an alarm "from our friend, whom I need not name."⁸⁵ Jusserand answered: "I am afraid that our fiery friend acts once more upon perfectly false information." Revoil "has been, from the first, in favor of an understanding with Germany concerning Morocco,"

⁸³Jusserand to Roosevelt, July 11, 1905, Bishop, I, p. 488. Morison, V, p. 242.

⁸⁴Roosevelt to Lodge, July 11, 1905, Morison, Roosevelt, IV, no. 1272, p. 3595. Lodge, Letters, Vol. II, pp. 166-7.

⁸⁵Roosevelt to Jusserand, July 25, 1905, DDF, VII, p. 1287.

and he was chosen because "he knows the question well and is very conciliatory."⁸⁶ Roosevelt gave this information to Sternburg, and the German Government ceased to oppose the French appointment. A second area of controversy was the location for the conference. The Kaiser preferred Tangier, and France argued in favor of a town in Spain or Switzerland. Jusserand wrote to Roosevelt that Tangier "would be a very bad choice, being a hot bed of intrigue, with each legation having its clientele."⁸⁷ Roosevelt argued this position to Germany. Finally it was agreed that the conference would take place in Algeciras, Spain, an obscure village on the northern shore of the Bay of Gibraltar.

France was naturally anxious to have the assurance of the diplomatic support of the United States at the Algeciras Conference. Rouvier instructed Jusserand to attempt to obtain from Secretary Root the assurance that the American delegate would "follow the lead of his French colleague."⁸⁸ Jusserand, however, believed that it was wiser to use the indirect approach. "We have a better chance," he answered Rouvier, "to obtain the President's support if we indicate

⁸⁶Jusserand to Roosevelt, July 26, 1905, Notes, Vol. 46.

⁸⁷Jusserand to Roosevelt, July 28, 1905, Ibid.

⁸⁸Rouvier to Jusserand, July 10, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 217, p. 260, note 1.

simply that we appreciate his good will rather than if we ask for a formal promise of support."⁸⁹ Rouvier agreed to let Jusserand act as he felt best, and Jusserand continued in his attempt to influence the President through a subtle appeal to his prejudices and sentiments. Always he emphasized to Roosevelt that "France was a proud nation and would fight if pushed too far." Jusserand explained to Rouvier: "This is the way to maintain the respect which Roosevelt has for our nation." Whenever possible he repeated one of Roosevelt's favorite clichés: "Justice first and then peace based on justice."⁹⁰

While choosing an American delegate for Algeciras it was clear that the Roosevelt Administration did not intend to be entirely unbiased in the Moroccan conflict. Lodge sent Roosevelt some advice in the matter. "The local dispute in Morocco," he wrote, "is a matter of indifference to us, but it is of very great importance to us to give France all the help that we can." For the appointment he suggested Joseph Choate and discounted General Porter only because "his friendship for France is well known." Whoever was the delegate "must keep on the best terms with the German delegate, and yet when it comes to action support France to the extent

⁸⁹Jusserand to Rouvier, July 13, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 217, p. 260.

⁹⁰Jusserand to Rouvier, July 28, 1905, Ibid., no. 155, pp. 178-9.

of his power."⁹¹ Roosevelt was in agreement with Lodge's suggestions, and he asked Choate to represent the United States at Algeciras. "Many delicate matters will come up," he wrote Choate, "for while I want to stand by France I want at the same time to strive to keep on fairly good terms with Germany."⁹² But Choate refused the appointment, for he preferred to devote his time to the preparation of the Hague Conference of the next year.

As a second choice Roosevelt selected his friend Henry White, a veteran diplomat who was serving as Ambassador to Rome. To White he wrote: "My sympathies have at bottom been with France and I suppose will continue so. Still I want to keep an even keel."⁹³ Secretary Root also wanted the American delegate to favor the French position. "We regard," he instructed White, "as a favorable condition for the peace of the world, and therefore, the best interest of the United States, the continued entente cordiale between France and England, and we do not wish to contribute towards

⁹¹Lodge to Roosevelt, August 14, 1905, Lodge, Letters, II, p. 172. Bunau-Varilla later claimed to have persuaded Lodge that war was inevitable unless the United States supported France. There is no evidence whether the story is true or false. Beale, Roosevelt, p. 318.

⁹²Roosevelt to Choate, August 16, 1905, Morison, IV, p. 1302.

⁹³Roosevelt to White, August 23, 1905, Morison, IV, no. 3640, p. 1313.

any entanglement between these two countries."⁹⁴ These instructions were in accord with the views of White, who was pro-British as a result of his long service in London. The French Government was therefore delighted with his selection. Jusserand went so far as to report that the decision for White was made "uniquely in the thought of being agreeable to us."⁹⁵ As White's assistant Roosevelt selected the Moroccan Minister Samuel Gummere. Premier Rouvier was convinced that "the selection of Mr. Gummere will be useful because of his close friendship with Mr. Nicolson."⁹⁶

Early in 1906 many French leaders were disappointed that the United States was not more outspoken in behalf of the position of France. André Tardieu in Le Temps complained that the Americans were "absolutely independent" in policy and that they believed themselves to have "superior rights of those of any other European power."⁹⁷ Rouvier indicated to Jusserand that he had received information that the United States' delegate was to vote for the internationalization of the Moroccan police force, a situation which would take away

⁹⁴Root to White, November 28, 1905, Root Mms.

⁹⁵Jusserand to Rouvier, December 3, 1905, DDF, VIII, p. 249, note 4.

⁹⁶Rouvier to the French Ambassadors, Dec. 2, 1905, DDF, VIII, no. 183, p. 249.

⁹⁷Le Temps, January 5, 1906.

from effective French control.⁹⁸ Secretary of State Root informed Jusserand that this story was "completely false." The American delegate would be instructed to support any arrangement consistent with the open door, the special rights of France in Morocco and for the other powers only those rights necessary for ordinary commerce. At the same time he would be told to show a preference for the positions supported by the Anglo-French entente. Root added that this last point would be easy for White because this was his "natural disposition."⁹⁹

Several French newspapers expressed confidence that the United States would support France in the conference. Ambassador Jusserand was fearful that this sort of publicity would have an adverse effect on American policy. "It is absolutely necessary," he lectured Rouvier, "that we be very circumspect in all that we say concerning the probable role of the United States at Algeciras." To "mix in European difficulties" was contrary to the American tradition, and the public would be upset if it believed that the Roosevelt Administration was departing from a policy of isolationism. By appointing Henry White the President "has given us a very

⁹⁸Rouvier to Jusserand, January 9, 1906, DDF, VIII, no. 367, p. 488.

⁹⁹Jusserand to Rouvier, January 12, 1906, DDF, VIII, no. 394, pp. 519-20. Sir Nicolson and other British leaders expressed the concern that the United States was not firmly behind France and England. Paul Cambon did not share these fears. Cambon to Rouvier, January 6, 1906, DDF, VIII, no. 342, p. 459.

special gesture of his good will and friendship." Jusserand concluded his despatch with a plea for silence: "If we let the public or the diplomatic world believe that we count on a marked action by the United States in our favor, we will render in advance such an action impossible."¹⁰⁰

With or without publicity there were a number of influential people in the United States who believed that involvement in the Algeciras Conference was contrary to the isolationist tradition. Senator Bacon of Georgia charged in the Senate that Roosevelt was departing from "the time honored principle" that "we will in no manner intermeddle with those things which concern the international politics of Europe, but that we will confine ourselves to our own affairs." This conference, unlike the earlier one in Madrid, was not called for reasons of trade but because of a colonial conflict between France and Germany. Bacon also argued that the President should seek the advice of the Senate in all stages of the treaty making process and that the Senate "should not be limited to saying yes or no." Senator Spooner of Wisconsin and Senator Lodge took the side of the President in what turned out to be a rather lively debate. The latter argued that the United States was not getting involved in a Franco-German dispute and that it was in the American interest

¹⁰⁰ Jusserand to Rouvier, January 10, 1906, DDF, VIII, no. 380, pp. 501-2.

to support the open door in Morocco.¹⁰¹ On January 20 Ambassador Jusserand referred to this isolationist spirit when he spoke to the Daughters of the American Revolution in Boston at the commemoration of the second centennial of the birth of Benjamin Franklin. "This great man," he declared, "is one who would have approved of the participation of the United States at the Algeciras Conference because from 1783 he supported the sending of a Minister to Morocco."¹⁰²

Peace advocates throughout the world hoped that the Moroccan crisis might be settled through arbitration at the Hague. This sentiment was especially strong in Britain and in the United States. Both the French and the German Governments were opposed to such a solution. The French Government believed that a judicial precedent was "the most dangerous possible suggestion."¹⁰³ President Roosevelt understood enough about European Realpolitik to know that a Hague settlement was not possible in the situation. Despite all discouragement Carl Schurz and Andrew Carnegie continued to

¹⁰¹Congressional Record, February 6, 1906, Vol. 40, part 3, pp. 2125-2148. On January 6 Bacon had introduced a resolution for the President to make available to the Senate the diplomatic correspondence relating to the conference. Lodge said that the matter was secret, and there were two executive sessions of three hours each. Ibid., Vol. 40, part 1, pp. 851-2, pp. 946-8. Bacon's resolution was passed the next year.

¹⁰²Le Temps, January 20, 1906.

¹⁰³Paul Cambon to Rouvier, June 22, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 108, pp. 111-3.

express hope for arbitration. Roosevelt was amused at this conception of European politics. He wrote to a friend that "Schurz's advice is absolutely worthless, for he does not know anything about existing facts, and in addition his judgment is wretchedly poor."¹⁰⁴

American Jews hoped to take advantage of the Algeciras Conference in order to protest alleged conditions of anti-Semitism in Morocco. Mr. Jacob Schiff, an influential New York banker, sent Root a letter protesting the fact that there was discrimination against Moroccan Jews. The idea appealed to Roosevelt from both a political and a moral standpoint, and he instructed White to look into the matter. Lewis Einstein, the American secretary at Algeciras, went to Tangier to investigate the charges, and he found that the Jews of Morocco feared that a charge of anti-Semitism, if made public, would worsen rather than improve the situation.¹⁰⁵ The French Government was firmly opposed to the introduction of the Jewish question into the conference program, for it was believed that such a complication would create additional opportunities for Germany to cause trouble. When Jusserand expressed this French position to Secretary Root, the latter is reported to have answered, "You have

¹⁰⁴Roosevelt to Oscar Straus, February 27, 1906, Morison, V, no. 3835, p. 168.

¹⁰⁵Lewis Einstein, A Diplomat Looks Back, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 10. White to Root, January 30, 1906, FR, 1906, II, pp. 1471-6.

no reason for anxiety."¹⁰⁶ The Jewish issue, in accordance with French desires, was never again brought up by the American government. The various diplomatists at Algeciras praised the American President for his humanitarian idealism, and Einstein observed that "the mischief which Mr. Schiff's excellent intention might have led to was safely buried with flowers."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶Jusserand to Rouvier, January 12, 1906, DDF, VIII, no. 396, p. 520. A department annotation added that it "was interests of all to avoid complicating the work of the conference." Note 1, p. 520.

¹⁰⁷Einstein, Diplomat, p. 11.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS--II

The International Moroccan Conference formally began on January 16, 1906, in the Hotel de Ville of Algeciras. At the first meeting the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, was unanimously elected as the President of the Conference. It was agreed that the topics for discussion would be the restoration of order, the organization of the police force, the creation of revenue for public expenses and the improvement of Moroccan ports. The French delegate diplomatically proposed that all reform should be based on the triple principles of the sovereignty of the Sultan, the integrity of Morocco and the open door in foreign trade. This was a brilliant tactic of propaganda which caused some embarrassment to the German delegates.¹ The Algeciras diplomats well understood that the most important fact at the conference was the existence of various European agreements and alliances. The represented powers were grouped into three blocks: first, there was Germany and Austria-Hungary; second, there was Britain, France, Spain and Russia;

¹Ibid., p. 20.

and third, the more or less neutral group including the United States, Italy and the six smaller nations. The Government of Morocco had almost no role in arriving at the final settlement at Algeciras.

From the beginning of the conference Henry White, as expected, kept in close contact with the French and British delegates. On January 23 he spoke to Revoil of "his good will and sympathy which the cause and attitude of France, in these circumstances, inspired in him." Revoil, realizing the potential influence of the United States, recorded in his journal: "I took care to greatly praise the President and to tell him how much we appreciated his attitude."² A few days later White said he was in complete agreement with the French position and that he hoped to see "an arrangement in which France was not sacrificed."³ The daily journal of Revoil reveals that throughout the conference the American and French delegates had a similar friendly conversation almost every evening.

The most difficult issue at Algeciras was the organization and control of the police force at the Moroccan ports. The French position was that the police should be supervised by France with the aid of Spain. Roosevelt favored this kind of settlement because he was convinced that "the interests of

²Paul Revoil, Journal tenu pendant la conference d'Algeciras, DDF, IX², p. 872.

³Ibid., January 28, 1906, p. 877.

France and Spain in Morocco were greater than those of the other powers."⁴ As everyone expected Germany rejected this idea, and the Wilhelmstrasse announced that it was necessary for the police to be controlled either by an international body, by the Sultan of Morocco or by a small power such as Switzerland. In Washington Jusserand argued in favor of the French proposal in a conversation with Root. "With our knowledge of the Arabs and because of our experience with Moslem colonies," he said, "we are the only European power who can offer Morocco an arrangement perfectly efficient and yet independent." Root was in sympathy with the French plan, but he said that the American Government was not ready to completely reject all German suggestions. He said that the American delegate would be instructed to oppose the idea for supervision by an international body but to be open to the other two German proposals.⁵ At this stage of the negotiations the Roosevelt Administration did not want to become deeply involved in the crisis. Roosevelt wrote to his friend Ambassador Meyer: "I do not know that I can do anything if the circumstances become strained at Algeciras, and of course I want to keep out of it if I possibly can."⁶

⁴Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Morison, V, p. 242, Bishop, I, p. 489.

⁵Jusserand to Rouvier, January 24, 1906, DDF, IX¹, no. 41, p. 70. In this letter Jusserand, as so often, complains of his lack of knowledge of French instructions at Algeciras.

⁶Roosevelt to Meyer, February 1, 1906, Morison, V, no. 3806, p. 145.

Henry White was a more outspoken partisan of the French position than was either Roosevelt or Root. To the German delegate White argued that Germany should be willing to give in on the control of the police because the French had agreed to the principle of the open door.⁷ "I believe," he states, "that France can not go beyond that because public opinion makes further French compromise impossible." In reporting the conversation to Revoil, White concluded, "I do not think that I have served you so badly."⁸ Jusserand reported to the Quai d'Orsay that Roosevelt and Root actually shared these views of White, but he cautioned: "In theory they are quasi indifferent to the question and absolutely impartial, and we must not do anything to take away this appearance."⁹ Roosevelt assured Jusserand that if there was an opportunity he would communicate directly with the German Emperor, and he urged that it was essential that the Emperor not suspect that his actions were French inspired.¹⁰ Likewise White cautioned the French delegate at Algeciras

⁷Radowitz to Bülow, GP, XXI¹, February 5, 1906, no. 6984, p. 141.

⁸Revoil to Rouvier, February 6, 1906, DDF, IX¹, no. 128, pp. 185-7. Also the Journal of Revoil, Ibid., February 4, p. 887; February 7, p. 889.

⁹Jusserand to Rouvier, February 10, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 151, p. 211.

¹⁰Jusserand to Rouvier, February 11, 1906, Ibid., no. 162, p. 227.

that it was in the interests of France to speak of the role of Roosevelt as little as possible.¹¹

The French Government recognized that Washington was suspicious of possible German ambitions for colonies in South America. Many diplomatists in the Quai d'Orsay believed that these suspicions could be used to the French advantage. Premier Rouvier therefore instructed Jusserand to warn Roosevelt that the Kaiser hoped to acquire special rights in the port of Mogador because he hoped to use the port as a coaling station which would make it possible to turn Brazil into a German colony.¹² On several occasions Jusserand quietly passed on this information to Roosevelt and Root. Later in a conversation Secretary Root pointed to a world globe and expressed the observation that Mogador would be an excellent stepping stone between Germany and Brazil. Jusserand reported that Root had spoken as if this had been his own idea, and he boasted that it was actually the result of a skillful use of psychology.¹³

Early in February the situation appeared more critical than at any time since before the conference had been agreed upon. The Berlin leaders were unwilling to compromise further.

¹¹Revoil to Rouvier, February 15, 1906, Ibid., no. 196, p. 277.

¹²Rouvier to Jusserand, March 2, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 331, p. 447.

¹³Jusserand to Bourgeois, April 2, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 598, pp. 780-1.

The French public was almost unanimously in favor of a firm policy.¹⁴ In London the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, told the German Ambassador that "if France were to be attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising out of the agreement which our predecessors had recently concluded with the French Government, public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favor of France."¹⁵ Several in Algeciras, including Sir Nicolson, believed that the conference had become useless and should be adjourned. On February 6 White notified Root that France would see the conference fail before she would yield any further.¹⁶ A few days later he telegraphed: "satisfied conference is likely to fail unless Germany can be got to accept French position in principle."¹⁷

Fearing that a deadlock might well lead to war, Roosevelt decided to once again intervene in the crisis. He asked White to determine the greatest concessions which France would be willing to accept. After talking to Revoil and others, White outlined a plan which he believed France could be persuaded to accept.¹⁸ Secretary Root and Roosevelt made

¹⁴Carroll, Public Opinion, p. 230.

¹⁵Metternich to Bulow, February 8, 1906, GP, XXI¹, p. 49.

¹⁶White to Root, February 6, 1906, White Mms.

¹⁷White to Root, February 11, 1906, Ibid.

¹⁸White to Root, February 16, 1906, White papers. White's proposal did not include the open door as a definite point.

some modifications, and then they communicated the proposal to William II. This American plan, as it was later called, envisioned five points. First, the Sultan was to have the "organization and maintenance" of the Moroccan police forces. Second, money for the police was to be obtained from an international bank which would have a "small preference" for French shares. Third, French and Spanish officers would have the duties of "instruction, discipline, pay and assistance" for the police forces in the eight principle ports. Fourth, the Government of Italy would have the right of "inspection and verification" to assure that France and Spain did not abuse their mandate. Finally, there would be "full assurances" that there would be equality of trading rights for all of the powers. Root argued in a personal letter to the Kaiser that this plan had been "carefully framed" so as to make "concessions from the French position as easy as possible." The letter concluded with the admonition that Roosevelt "thinks it is fair, and earnestly hopes that it may receive the Emperor's approval."¹⁹

The German Kaiser promptly rejected the idea of only French and Spanish officers. He wrote Root that "this would place the police forces entirely into their hands, and the police organization would be tantamount to a France-Spanish

¹⁹Root to William, February 19, 1906, Bishop, I, pp. 489-91, Morison, V, p. 243. Root's letter actually combined points three and four.

double mandate and mean a monopoly of these two countries." He indicated that Germany would agree only to an arrangement which included officers selected from all the powers.²⁰ Roosevelt and Root were upset by this response. Root told Sternburg that if this "American proposition" was modified to comply with the Emperor's demands, it would have no possible chance of acceptance by France.²¹ In a private letter Roosevelt complained that William had promised earlier to follow his advice in such a situation, but added Roosevelt: "I never expected the Kaiser to keep this one, and he has not."²²

The French Government was also not in complete accord with the American plan. Still Rouvier early expressed the hope that Roosevelt's latest actions would have a positive result.²³ The Quai d'Orsay at this time was primarily opposed to an Italian inspection of the settlement. Rouvier instructed Jusserand to express thanks to the President for his efforts without expressing approval for the American

²⁰ Bülow to Sternburg, February 21, 1906, GP, XXI¹, no. 7020, p. 183. Sternburg to Roosevelt, February 22, 1906, Bishop, I, pp. 491-3, Morison, V, p. 244.

²¹ Sternburg to Bülow, GP, XXI¹, March 2, 1906, no. 7038, p. 213.

²² Roosevelt to Reid, March 1, 1906, Morison, V, no. 3837, p. 169.

²³ Rouvier to Revoil, February 21, 1906, DDF, IX¹, no. 247, p. 342.

plan.²⁴ Shortly thereafter the French Ambassador mentioned to Roosevelt that he had "serious doubts" that his government would be willing to accept an Italian inspection. Roosevelt characteristically stated: "Don't tell me that your government does not want the plan. I don't want to hear that." Jusserand, seeing that it was useless to insist, replied: "Since you ask, I'll be quiet."²⁵

Even without the agreement of France, Roosevelt decided to push the Kaiser to accept his proposal. "I cannot bring myself to feel," he wrote directly to William, "that I ought to ask France to make further concessions than the arrangement suggested." Roosevelt argued that if Germany accepted the American plan the burden of proof would then be placed on France. The American plan was in conformity with the principle of equality of trade, the German reason for the conference in the first place. American opinion would be unfavorable to Germany "if the conference should fail because of Germany's insisting upon pressing France beyond the measure of concession described in this proposed arrangement." In addition to these arguments, Roosevelt made it a point to remind the Emperor that in June of the preceding year he had promised to follow the suggestions of the American President

²⁴Rouvier to Jusserand, February 26, 1906, DDF, IX¹, no. 361, pp. 377-8.

²⁵Jusserand to Rouvier, March 5, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 361, pp. 484-5.

in the case of a difficulty.²⁶ The tone of this message was much firmer than the earlier one sent by Root. Jusserand was satisfied and wrote to Paris that the note was "as strong as possible."²⁷

While Roosevelt was making his appeal to William others in Algeciras were also searching for a workable compromise. On March 8 Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, offered a plan which envisioned French officers in four ports, Spanish officers in three ports and one port with either Dutch or Swiss officers. As in the American plan the foreign officers were to be inspected by an Italian observation force. Several historians have exaggerated the difference between the American and the Austrian plan, and it should be noted that the only differences were one port and a separation rather than a combination type of organization. The heated controversy concerning these minor matters brings to mind Bertrand Russell's characterization of the Moroccan dispute as a "childish absurdity,"²⁸ but it seems that Germany supported the Austrian plan with the belief that a separation of the ports would make it more difficult for France to dominate the

²⁶Roosevelt to William, March 7, 1906, Bishop, I, pp. 493-5, Morison, V, pp. 245-6.

²⁷Jusserand to Rouvier, March 9, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 404, p. 536.

²⁸Bertrand Russell, Atlantic Monthly, March, 1917, p. 371.

weaker power of Spain. Germany's support for the Austrian plan meant that the Wilhelmstrasse had ceased to hope for a sphere of influence in Morocco. There is the slight possibility, but without any evidence, that Roosevelt's appeal of March 7 might have influenced the appearance of the Austrian plan.

The Kaiser's alleged promise to Roosevelt caused some embarrassment within the German Government. Bülow violently criticized Sternburg for making the promise much more definite than it had been meant to be, but it was nevertheless recognized that a promise, even if a mistake, had been delivered to the President.²⁹ In an effort to smooth over the difficulty William politely wrote to Roosevelt: "I can only assure you, Mr. President that I am gladly willing to take your advice as a basis of an understanding." He then argued that the basic principles were the same in the plans of Austria and the United States. "I have therefore caused my representatives at Algeciras to be instructed to consent in principle to the proposition of Austria-Hungary."³⁰ Roosevelt, however, was not impressed. To Sternburg he denounced the Austrian plan as "absurd because it favors

²⁹Bülow to Sternburg, March 12, 1906, quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, p. 326.

³⁰Bülow to Sternburg, March 12, 1906, GP, XXI¹, no. 7093, pp. 276-8. William to Roosevelt, March 13, Bishop, I, pp. 495-7, Morison, V, pp. 246-7.

the very idea the conference has been trying to eliminate, namely partition into spheres of influence."³¹ Both Roosevelt and Root expressed a similar point of view to Jusserand.³² It is important to note that the opposition to spheres of influence was entirely an American idea. The French opposed the Austrian plan because of the limitations on French control but not because of opposition to a division of Moroccan ports.

Because of Roosevelt's complete frankness to Jusserand, the French Foreign Service was kept informed concerning confidential matters of American diplomacy. On occasion this created embarrassment. In March it was learned that at Algeciras there had been some leakage of the Kaiser's alleged promise to Roosevelt. Both Roosevelt and Jusserand feared that if this news reached the ears of William II it would "wound his pride" and thus retard the negotiations.³³ As it turned out this was a false alarm. Révoil had been informed of the promise by the Quai d'Orsay, and he reported that with the exception of the British delegate he had kept the information strictly secret.³⁴ It appeared impossible

³¹Sternburg to Bülow, March 14, 1906, GP, XXI¹, no. 7102, pp. 285-7.

³²Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 15, DDF, IX², no. 433, p. 567.

³³Jusserand to Rouvier, March 9, 1906, Ibid., no. 403, p. 535.

³⁴ Révoil to Rouvier, March 10, 1906, DDF, IX², note 2, p. 535.

for the German delegates to learn of Roosevelt's close connections with France. This incident gave Jusserand the opportunity to lecture Rouvier to be more careful with confidential information.³⁵

At the high point of the crisis the Rouvier Government was challenged in the Chamber of Deputies and received a vote of non-confidence. The point at issue was Rouvier's application of the act of 1905 which separated Church and State. After resigning, Rouvier said that he did not regret leaving the Premiership for "it relieved him of a burden which had begun to weigh heavily." He expressed the hope that his successor would be able to find a solution to the Moroccan question.³⁶ On March 13 a new ministry was formed under Mr. Jean Sarrien with the philosopher Léon Bourgeois as Foreign Secretary. Roosevelt asked Jusserand if the fall of the Rouvier Government would have any impact on French policy at the Algeciras Conference. Jusserand replied that "it would not make the least modification" because Rouvier's Moroccan policy was approved by all France.³⁷

³⁵Jusserand to Rouvier, March 12, Ibid., no. 433, p. 567.

³⁶London Times, March 8, 1906.

³⁷Jusserand to Rouvier, March 9, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 404, p. 536. Rouvier notified the foreign service that the Government's fall had nothing to do with foreign affairs, and French foreign policy would remain unchanged. Circular Memorandum of Rouvier, March 8, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 388, p. 519.

Shortly after the change in the French Government, the United States increased its efforts to get Germany to give up support for the Austrian plan. In a second personal letter to the German Emperor Root argued that the division of ports implied a creation of spheres of influences which presented the opportunity of "a potential partition" of Morocco. The Austrian plan was therefore wrong in principle and destructive of the declared purpose of both Germany and the United States." The American Government would be willing to agree to any solution acceptable to the majority, but added Root: "If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption of any such arrangement."³⁸ Root's message seemed to have the desired effect, and two days later Bülow notified Washington that Germany would be willing to accept any proposal which "would contain this mixed system and an inspector general." Bülow concluded that "the immediate removal of misunderstanding is far more important to Germany than the whole Morocco affair."³⁹

It is not clear whether Germany ceased to oppose the

³⁸Root to William, March 17, 1906, Morison, V, pp. 447-8; Bishop, I, pp. 497-9. Sternburg to Bülow, March 18, 1906, GP, XXI¹, pp. 300-4, no. 7112-3. Jusserand wrote that this was an "admirable" message, "firm and favorable to French interests." Jusserand to Bülow, March 19, DDF, IX², pp. 637-8.

³⁹Sternburg to Roosevelt, March 19, 1906, Bishop, I, pp. 499-500. Morison, V, p. 248, Bülow to Radowitz, March 17, GP, XXI¹, no. 7110, pp. 298-9.

American plan because of Root's arguments or because of the desire for closer relations with the United States. Roosevelt gave his own explanation: "I had previously informed Speck, in a verbal conversation, that if the Emperor persisted in rejecting our proposals and a break up ensued, I should feel obliged to publish the entire correspondence."⁴⁰ There is in fact no evidence that this threat was delivered, and the most likely explanation is that it is one of several exaggerations of Roosevelt in later telling of his actions.⁴¹ Sternburg did not report such a threat, but he did complain that "the French Ambassador has a strong hold on the President and influential leaders." Also he reported to the Wilhelmstrasse that American opinion was generally opposed to the German position at Algeciras.⁴² More significant than this, however, is the fact that Germany did not make a great concession when she agreed to cease her opposition to the American plan. The more significant German concession was the acceptance of the Austrian plan, and this change took place well before the alleged threat of Roosevelt.

⁴⁰Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p. 500, Morison, V, p. 249.

⁴¹Roosevelt's admirers such as Thayer, Beale and Einstein accept the story at face value. Cf. Beale, Roosevelt, pp. 229-30; Einstein, Diplomat, p. 22. Thayer also recorded that Roosevelt told Germany that to declare war against France would be a "crime against humanity." Dennis could find no evidence that this statement had been made. Dennis, Adventures, p. 495.

⁴²Quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, pp. 328-9.

Most American diplomats, including Henry White, believed that Germany's acceptance of the American plan meant that the Moroccan dispute had ended, Sternburg found the President in "very high spirits." Roosevelt said: "Inform his Majesty the Emperor of my heartiest congratulations on this epoch-making success at Algeciras."⁴³ Likewise to Jusserand Roosevelt cautioned that France must "abstain from a noisy celebration of victory."⁴⁴ Jusserand was satisfied with the American plan, and it seems that he had given Roosevelt the impression that the French Government would go along with it.⁴⁵ The truth, however, was that Jusserand was the only important French diplomatist to favor the proposal.⁴⁶ The Quai d'Orsay was opposed to the American idea of combined Franco-Spanish officers in all of the ports. Secretary Bourgeois believed that this arrangement would create future difficulties between France and Spain, and he, for obvious reasons, had no sympathy with the American opposition to spheres of influence. Bourgeois therefore instructed Jusserand to attempt to get Roosevelt to stop his support for the

⁴³Sternburg to the Foreign Office, March 21, 1906, Dugdale, III, p. 248.

⁴⁴Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 21, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 512, p. 670.

⁴⁵Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 12, 1906, Ibid., no. 513, p. 611.

⁴⁶Revoil made a strong attack against the American plan. Revoil to Bourgeois, March 21, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 502, pp. 659-60.

American plan. He claimed that at the exact time that Roosevelt had made his latest appeal to the Kaiser the governments of France and Germany had almost decided on a compromise which both could accept. The latest move of Roosevelt had therefore "thrown complications into the negotiations."⁴⁷

France's problem was to reject the American position without wounding the pride of Roosevelt. Jusserand did not look forward to telling the President of the position of his government. On March 23 Jusserand and Roosevelt met accidentally while both men were taking morning walks. The first words of Roosevelt were: "Well, is there any news about Algeciras?" Jusserand answered that the Quai d'Orsay had found it impossible to accept the system of mixed police officers in all of the ports. Roosevelt was visibly unhappy, and he complained that France should have earlier notified him of this objection.⁴⁸ Later that day Jusserand met with Roosevelt and Root in the White House to discuss the misunderstanding. Jusserand, as instructed by Secretary Bourgeois, emphasized that the French Government was grateful to Roosevelt

⁴⁷ Bourgeois to Jusserand, March 22, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 516, pp. 675-6. Bourgeois repeated his story that France and Germany were ready to come to terms just when Roosevelt intervened. Bourgeois to Jusserand, March 24, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 538, pp. 701-2.

⁴⁸ Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 23, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 257, p. 689. A member of the Foreign Office added an annotation to the side of Roosevelt's complaint: "How could we, if we did not know the proposition in advance." p. 683, note 3.

for his attempts to find a peaceful settlement. "Expressions of gratitude are always a pleasure," responded Roosevelt, "but I would have been more pleased if I had succeeded." Root said that the principle point of the American policy was that the police should be controlled by France and Spain; the details of this principle were not important. Roosevelt agreed but added that it would be impossible for him to ask Germany to make further concessions.⁴⁹ After this conversation the United States did not again intervene in the Moroccan dispute.

The Franco-American misunderstanding created a certain amount of irritation between Jusserand and Bourgeois. Jusserand was angry that he had not been notified in advance with the details of the French Moroccan policy. In a lengthy despatch to Bourgeois he quoted Roosevelt as having stated with some bitterness: "Your people have been less frank with me than I have been with you."⁵⁰ Jusserand complained: "I go and try to erase the memory, but unfortunately the President has a good memory." He argued that the Foreign Office should have kept him better informed of French policy because with Roosevelt "one can never anticipate the hour

⁴⁹Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 23, Ibid., no. 529, p. 691.

⁵⁰A member of the French diplomatic service added the annotation: "But no, the President had left us ignorant of the fact that he planned to make a proposition on the question of partition." DDF, IX², note 3, p. 700. Jusserand quoted this statement of Roosevelt in several reports, and he agreed with the criticism.

when he can be useful." When Roosevelt sees an opportunity "he does not waste time with preliminaries, but he acts as best he can according to whatever information he happens to possess." Jusserand concluded his rebuke by emphasizing that Roosevelt had shown his good will to France in spite of the large German vote in the United States.⁵¹ In reply to this message Bourgeois cabled: "If the President insists on the point you can remind him that he did not depend on us in producing the misunderstanding." Still he was in complete agreement with Jusserand that "it is necessary that Mr. Roosevelt should have the impression that we have complete confidence in his intentions as well as in his ability."⁵²

Several circumstances were responsible for the misunderstanding concerning the separation of Moroccan ports. At first the point had not come up because the American plan did not specify the details of the organization of the French and Spanish police officers. The Rouvier Government had objected to the American proposal only because of the policy of the Italian inspector, and Roosevelt was quick to agree to support a program with an inspector from another country. He said that he had chosen Italy only because of its location

⁵¹Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 25, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 553, pp. 723-5.

⁵²Bourgeois to Jusserand, March 24, Ibid., no. 538, pp. 701-2.

in the Mediterranean.⁵³ When Germany announced its support for the Austrian proposal, the United States immediately attacked the plan on the basis of the idea that the principle of the open door was not compatible with spheres of influence. Encouraged by the French Ambassador, Roosevelt did not believe that he was acting contrary to French interests, even though he well knew that France was not against French spheres of influence. Roosevelt did not have any way of knowing that at the very time of his diplomatic efforts the governments of France and Germany were on the verge of a settlement. In addition, Bourgeois, despite his later Nobel Peace Prize, was a firmer advocate of French imperialism than had been Rouvier, and this leadership change in the Quai d'Orsay took place at the most crucial point in Roosevelt's efforts.

At Algeciras the French Government began to advocate a modified form of the Austrian plan. Bourgeois suggested as "a last concession" that there be French police officers at Rabat, Mazagan, Safi and Mogador, Spanish officers at Tetuan and Larache, and a combination of Franco-Spanish officers at Tangier and Casablanca.⁵⁴ Henry White supported

⁵³Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 18, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 471, p. 621.

⁵⁴Bourgeois to Révoil, March 21, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 507, pp. 664-5. Bourgeois to Cambon, March 22, 1906, Ibid., no. 514, pp. 672-3. Paul Cambon had earlier advised this plan. Cambon to Bourgeois, March 15, 1906, Ibid., no. 449, pp. 585-6.

the French in this proposal. He complained to Révoil that his government had asked him to support the American plan, and he expressed the hope that the Roosevelt Administration would drop the project.⁵⁵ On March 23 Tardieu published an article in Le Temps which indicated that Roosevelt had proposed a combination of French and Spanish police officers in all of the Moroccan ports. Jusserand was angry that this information had become public because Roosevelt had asked that his diplomatic activities remain secret from the American public. "This indiscretion," complained Jusserand to Bourgeois, "will make it more difficult to obtain the future co-operation of Roosevelt."⁵⁶

After the United States ceased to oppose the creation of spheres of influence the powers were able to come to an agreement. The final Algeciras treaty was based on a division of ports along the lines of the French plan--French officers in four ports, Spanish officers in two ports and a Franco-Spanish combination of officers in two ports. There was to be a Swiss inspector general to see that the agreement was respected.⁵⁷ In a final vote only Germany, Austria-Hungary and Morocco voted against the arrangement. The United States,

⁵⁵ Révoil's Journal, March 22, 1906, DDF, IX², p. 951.

⁵⁶ Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 23, 1906, Ibid., no. 528, p. 690.

despite her earlier opposition to the separation of ports, voted with the majority. The treaty recognized that France and Spain had special rights in Morocco, and for this reason it is generally interpreted as a French victory. Germany, however, had obtained a guarantee for the continuation of the open door and Moroccan independence, the stated reasons for the calling of the conference. Also the fact that there had been a conference at all was a type of diplomatic triumph for Germany.

After the conference everyone politely complimented Roosevelt for his part in the arrival of a peaceful solution. Bourgeois said that the French Government recognized "the signal aid rendered by the President in arriving at a just solution of the differences between France and Germany with reference to Morocco--ni vainquer ni vaincu."⁵⁸ In a long letter White wrote to Roosevelt that the treaty "with the exception of a Swiss instead of an Italian inspector, was exactly the proposal you made." White further claimed that America's influence had helped France resist the Austrian plan and that "the French owe the whole eight ports on which they have laid such particular stress to your good offices."⁵⁹

⁵⁷For the treaty see "General Act of the Algeciras International Conference," Ibid., no. 631, pp. 823-53.

⁵⁸McCormick to Root, April 6, 1906, Despatches, Vol. 125.

⁵⁹Quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, p. 332. Beale uncritically accepts this letter as a valid interpretation of Roosevelt's role at Algeciras.

White's analysis, however, is lacking in several areas. The Algeciras treaty had more in common with the Austrian plan than with the American plan. From France's point of view the difference between the final arrangement and the Austrian plan was that France was given the joint supervision of the police of two more ports than in the formula of Austria, and White's statement that France owed eight ports to Roosevelt is simply not true.

The ratification of the Algeciras treaty brought American isolationism to the surface. There was enough opposition in the Senate to make it doubtful that the treaty would go into effect. President Roosevelt supported the agreement in the name of American trade. In his sixth annual message he declared that it "confers upon us equal commercial rights with all European countries and does not entail upon us a single obligation of any kind, and I earnestly hope it will be speedily ratified." A failure at ratification would mean that the United States would lose her commercial position in Morocco "at a time when we are everywhere seeking new markets and outlets for trade."⁶⁰ Roosevelt wrote one isolationist Senator a personal letter explaining that the treaty "gives us the open door, and we explicitly disdain in the treaty any responsibility for interfering in any shape or way to keep order; that is the treaty simply gives us the open door

⁶⁰Messages and Papers, Vol. XV, p. 7063.

and does not impose any obligations whatever upon us."⁶¹ Likewise Secretary Root wrote the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Algeciras convention "merely modifies and extends the provisions of the treaty of 1880 in accordance with the requirements of the present day." Root claimed that "we have carefully avoided any entanglement in European affairs."⁶² The New York Times and Senator Lodge were also influential supporters of the Algeciras treaty. The Senate, after much debate, gave its approval to the arrangement on December 3, 1906.

There are a number of interpretative questions inherent in a study of American-French diplomacy during the Moroccan crisis. Was America's role in the matter significant? To what extent did the Roosevelt Administration support the French position in the dispute? Was Roosevelt's policy motivated by a concern for France or by a determination to support a certain concept of the national interest of the United States? Was the French government skillful in its diplomacy with America? Finally, and especially important for this study, did the Moroccan crisis have a permanent effect on Franco-American relations? These questions, of course, are difficult, interrelated and complex.

⁶¹Roosevelt to Senator Eugene Hale, June 27, 1906, Morison, V, no. 3960, p. 318.

⁶²Root to Senator Cullom, June 25, 1906, quoted in Jussup, Root, Vol. II, pp. 59-60.

Theodore Roosevelt was not a man to underestimate his own significance. He seemed to have no doubt but that his diplomatic efforts were a deciding factor throughout the Moroccan crisis. Roosevelt did not want future generations to be ignorant of his part in the controversy. For this reason he sent his friend Whitelaw Reid a famous "confidential letter, which included his more important correspondence relating to the Moroccan crisis. In this letter, which is a major primary source, he explained how he influenced France and Germany to agree to a peaceful compromise.⁶³ "In this Algeciras matter," he wrote in another letter to Reid, "You will notice that while I was suave and pleasant with the Emperor, yet when it was necessary at the end I stood him on his head with great decision."⁶⁴ According to Roosevelt's own interpretation he persuaded both France and Germany to accept a conference and was largely responsible for the final terms of the agreement.

The fact that Roosevelt was often "adolescent" should not be allowed to obscure the fact that he was the legitimate

⁶³Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Morison, V, pp. 230-51; Bishop, I, pp. 469-505. All secondary works heavily rely on this important document. It is important to note that although the interpretations of Roosevelt are to be taken with caution, there is no evidence that Roosevelt tampered with the correspondence.

⁶⁴Roosevelt to Reid, June 27, 1906, Morison, V, no. 3961, p. 319.

leader of one of the major world powers in his day.⁶⁵ The diplomatic correspondence of France, Germany and Britain reveals that Roosevelt was taken seriously by the European powers. The powers recognized the economic and military strength of the United States, and for this reason they were anxious to improve their relations with Roosevelt. Each of the powers believed that Roosevelt could have an influence on the diplomacy of the other powers. As it turned out Holstein and Bülow overestimated Roosevelt's ability to influence British policy.⁶⁶ Likewise France at times was disappointed to find that Roosevelt was limited in his ability to persuade the Kaiser to compromise.⁶⁷ During the conference Henry White noted that "any opinion we expressed (which I did privately very often) was listened to with serious attention and often adopted."⁶⁸ Sir Edward Grey, who was not an admirer of Roosevelt, later wrote in his autobiography: "Roosevelt believed, and from what he told me had reason to believe, that the part he took

⁶⁵The adolescent character of Roosevelt is emphasized in Pringle, Roosevelt, p. 273.

⁶⁶Bülow to the Kaiser, April 4, 1905, Bülow's Letters, pp. 121-3. Holstein to Bülow, January, 1906, Holstein Papers, IV, no. 919, p. 379.

⁶⁷France relied more on Roosevelt than on Nicolas II in the attempt to influence the Kaiser. The French Ambassador in St. Petersburg once tried to enlist the aid of Nicolas and minimized Roosevelt's importance. Bompard to Rouvier, February, 12, 1906, DDF, IX¹, no. 292, p. 403.

⁶⁸Twenty-Five Years, Vol. I, pp. 121-2.

influenced a peaceful solution. This is of interest and should be recognized."⁶⁹

In evaluating the significance of the United States in the crisis it is necessary to make a clear distinction between several events. There seems to be little doubt but that Roosevelt had an important influence on the decision of the French Government to accept a conference.⁷⁰ Still it must be recognized that Rouvier from the beginning was more conciliatory than had been Delcassé. Roosevelt's compromise concerning the program of the conference was also significant. During the time of the conference, however, the role of the United States appears to be less significant than during the year of 1905. Roosevelt did manage to embarrass the Kaiser because of the alleged promise, but it appears equally clear that William did not suddenly become conciliatory because of a threat by Roosevelt. The American opposition to spheres of influence did not impress the powers, and spheres of influence were clearly a part of the final treaty. It is significant that neither Roosevelt nor his admirers say anything about French opposition to the American plan

⁶⁹White to Roosevelt, quoted in Nevins, White, p. 281.

⁷⁰André Tardieu, La conférence d'Algésiras, (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908), p. 5, note 2.

after it was agreed to by Germany.⁷¹ They imply that the American proposal was incorporated into the final treaty, and it has been demonstrated earlier in this study that the Algeciras agreement had little in common with the American plan. When the entire Algeciras conference is considered, it seems clear that Einstein overstates the matter in writing: "Much of the merit of saving Europe from vast disaster was due to the diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt."⁷²

Almost all historians have recognized that the preponderance of American support was on the side of France.⁷³ There is no doubt but that the American press of 1905 and 1906 was pre-French and anti-German.⁷⁴ The Nation, for example, described the policy of Rouvier as "an admirable example of straight-forward, considerate, and enlightened diplomacy."⁷⁵ The governments of Britain and France well

⁷¹In Roosevelt's account the controversy is over when Roosevelt receives Germany's agreement to the American plan on March 19. Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, pp. 499-501, Morison, V, pp. 248-250. Howard K. Beale follows this interpretation and says not a word of French opposition to the American plan even though he used the Diplomatiques Francais, Beale, Roosevelt, pp. 327-32.

⁷²Einstein, Diplomat, p. 8.

⁷³The historian Harbaugh interprets this as a result of pro-British sentiment. William Harbaugh, The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt, (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 276.

⁷⁴White, Opinion, pp. 261-2. Schieber, Sentiment, pp. 198-203. Jusserand to Rouvier, June 28, 1905, DDF, VII², no. 155, p. 180.

⁷⁵The Nation, 1906.

recognized that the United States was not entirely neutral during the Moroccan dispute. "It was felt all through the Algeciras Conference," wrote Sir Grey, "that American influence was not being used against France and us."⁷⁶ It is possible, however, to overemphasize the extent to which the Roosevelt Administration supported France. The support was never unlimited or unconditional, and it was always stronger in rhetoric than in actual diplomatic action.

When there is an examination of the men in power in the United States, it is interesting to note the great sympathy in behalf of France as opposed to Germany. Secretary of State Hay was violently anti-German, and he did not try to hide the fact that he hoped for a strengthened Anglo-French entente.⁷⁷ Ambassador Sternburg reported to his government that he hoped that sickness "may induce Mr. Hay to think about retiring."⁷⁸ Secretary Root was less emotionally committed than Hay, but his prejudices were also on the side of France. Root believed that France had legitimate interests in Morocco "which ought to be specially safeguarded," although he did not want the United States "to

⁷⁶Grey to Roosevelt, December 2, 1906, quoted in George Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin co., 1937), p. 142.

⁷⁷Nevins, White, pp. 267-8. Gelber, Friendship, p. 255. Jusserand to Rouvier, June 25, 1905, DDF, VII^c, no. 124, pp. 134-5.

⁷⁸Sternburg to Bülow, June 17, 1905, Dugdale, Documents, III, p. 232.

become the advocate of these special claims."⁷⁹ At the conference itself Henry White was a supporter of the French view.⁸⁰ His assistant Lewis Einstein was also very critical of the Wilhelmstrasse.⁸¹ Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, although at times hostile to France, was a partisan of the French cause at Algeciras. "I am very anxious that we should do all we can to draw France toward us," Lodge wrote during the crisis, "for France ought to be with us and England-- in our zone and our combination. It is the sound arrangement economically and politically. It would be an evil day for us if Germany were to crush France."⁸²

In American politics, of course, final authority to define foreign policy is in the hands of the President. It is clear that on the whole Roosevelt's sympathies were pro-French. In his letter to Reid he wrote: "With Speck I was on close terms; with Jusserand, who is one of the best men I have ever met, and whose country was in the right on this issue, I was on even closer terms."⁸³ Ambassador Jusserand never doubted but that Roosevelt wished to support

⁷⁹Quoted in Beale, Roosevelt, p. 320.

⁸⁰Nicolson to Grey, March 3, 1906, BD, III, no. 251, pp. 231-2.

⁸¹Einstein, Diplomat, pp. 17-18.

⁸²Lodge to Roosevelt, July 2, 1905, Lodge, Letters, II, p. 162.

⁸³Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p. 478, Morison, V, p. 236.

the French position, and the evidence indicates that Roosevelt was, as he always said, frank when he spoke to the French Ambassador. "The President," reported Jusserand, "has refused all the advances of William to do or say anything that would put him on the side of Germany in the Moroccan question, but, on the contrary, it is our case that he wants to defend."⁸⁴ Roosevelt was always distrustful of the German Emperor. This was largely because of Roosevelt's memories of Germany's actions in the Spanish-American War and the Venezuelan dispute. But also this was increased because of the Kaiser's personality and nonpredictable actions. "Nothing could persuade me," wrote Roosevelt, "to follow the lead of or enter into close alliance with a man who is so jumpy, so little capable of continuity of action, and therefore, so little capable of being loyal to his friends or steadfastly hostile to an enemy."⁸⁵

In the particular of the opposition to the creation of spheres of influence in Morocco the American government did not support the French position. This American move toward the end of the conference was resented by both French and British diplomatists. Sir Edward Grey described the

⁸⁴Jusserand to Rouvier, June 28, 1905, DDF, VII, no. 155, p. 180. The Roosevelt collection contains copies of this and several other of Jusserand's letters to the French foreign office.

⁸⁵Roosevelt to Lodge, May 15, 1905, Lodge, Letters, Vol. II, p. 123.

American plan as "an unworkable proposal which introduces an unfortunate complication," and he expressed the hope that Roosevelt would stop his intervention because "there were already too many peacemakers at work."⁸⁶ Roosevelt opposed spheres of influence because he believed that this policy was in the interest of American commerce, but when he learned that his action was contrary to French policy, he swiftly ceased to push the matter. Jusserand believed that if Roosevelt had known the French policy he would have acted in conformity with that policy.⁸⁷ Roosevelt had no great fears of French colonialism, and he was not against Morocco becoming a protectorate of France. Several writers have suggested that Roosevelt was ignorant of French goals in North Africa, but there is no reason to think that Roosevelt did not understand the broad outlines of French imperialism.⁸⁸ These broad outlines were obvious from a general observation of French expansion. In a later analysis Roosevelt explained that Germany "was supporting the Sultan of Morocco in his

⁸⁶Grey to Sir E. Goschen, March 21, 1906, BD, III, no. 371, p. 315. Grey to Sir de Bunsen, March 21, 1906, Ibid., no. 372, p. 316.

⁸⁷Jusserand to Bourgeois, April 4, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 609, pp. 794-5.

⁸⁸Of course Roosevelt did not know of the secret aspects of the Entente Cordiale, but I do not agree with Tansill that he would have changed his policy if he had obtained this information. Tansill, War, p. 12. Nevins, White, p. 278. Einstein did remark that White was "very much in the dark" concerning the secret negotiations. Einstein, Diplomat, p. 9.

resistance to French aggression." The conference "was faced with the delicate task of reconciling French claims to paramountcy with the German demand for the open door."⁸⁹

The major goal of Roosevelt was to prevent a war which would upset the balance of power in the Far East and perhaps involve the United States.⁹⁰ The fact that there was such a war just eight years later seems to suggest that war was in the realm of the possible. Those who criticize the intervention of Roosevelt do so on the basis that his intervention was not in the national interest. According to the historian Samuel Flagg Bemis: "It was risky business, and the United States had nothing to gain from it. That Roosevelt prevented a European war is to be doubted; the crisis had passed when Delcassé resigned in June, 1905."⁹¹ Bemis' analysis is faulty in two major areas. First, if war was possible, America had much to gain from the encouragement of a peaceful settlement. Secondly, the crisis continued after Delcassé's fall, and in early 1906 the situation was almost as serious as it had been before the calling of a conference. John Blum is undoubtedly correct when he writes that Roosevelt wanted

⁸⁹E. Alexander Powell, Yonder Lies Adventure, (New York: the Macmillan Co.), pp. 315-6.

⁹⁰This is well recognized. Cf. Osgood, Interest, p. 69, Gelber, Friendship, p. 196.

⁹¹Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, (New York: Host, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 585.

a peaceful settlement of the Moroccan problem because "in the peaceful settlement of the status quo of Europe, he realized, the United States had a large concern."⁹²

Roosevelt always believed that war was entirely possible in 1905 and 1906. During the crisis he wrote: "The trouble is that with Russia out of the way as she now is, Germany firmly believes that she can whip both France and England."⁹³ After the conference Roosevelt wrote: "It really did look like there might be a war and I felt honor bound to prevent war if I could."⁹⁴ Henry White and most of Roosevelt's advisers also believed that there was a true possibility for war.⁹⁵ Today most historians in hindsight minimize the likelihood of a war as a result of the Moroccan dispute.⁹⁶ Yet this dispute was the first real hint of a

⁹²Blum, Conservative, p. 133. Also see Pringle, Roosevelt, pp. 266-7; Lawrence E. Gelfand in his preface to Einstein, Diplomat, p. XVII.

⁹³Roosevelt to Reid, March 1, 1906, Royal Cortissoz, The Life of Whitelaw Reid, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), Vol. II, pp. 329-30.

⁹⁴Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Bishop, I, p. 477, Morison, V, p. 235.

⁹⁵Cf. Beale, Roosevelt, p. 307. Einstein, Diplomat, p. 20. From Paris McCormick reported that Rouvier would "act with the caution of a financier, while making no political sacrifices of a humiliating character to France." McCormick to Root, October 5, 1905, Despatches, Vol. 125, no. 49.

⁹⁶Taylor, Struggle, p. 441. Norman Rich writes: "At no stage of the Moroccan affair was a military solution ever advocated or seriously contemplated by the German leaders primarily responsible for Germany's Moroccan policy," Rich, Holstein, p. 745.

European war since 1871, and wars have been known to begin even when the possibilities were remote. Moreover, several influential Germans, including Holstein and Schlieffen, were in favor of a preventive war against France.⁹⁷ If the Emperor did not want war, neither was he willing for Germany to suffer humiliation.⁹⁸ German policy during this period was erratic and lacked "the unity and purpose of the Bismark system,"⁹⁹ and the greatest threat to European peace was Germany's almost paranoiac fear of encirclement.¹⁰⁰ In short, it seems that the situation was sufficiently dangerous to justify a limited intervention on the part of the American Government.

The French Secretary at Algeciras, Robert de Billy, presented an interesting economic interpretation of American participation in the crisis. "The Algeciras Conference," according to de Billy, "has given the United States the occasion to show once again her care to support European peace." The policy of Roosevelt had been "to maintain

⁹⁷Craig, Politics, pp. 257, 283-5. Holstein was forced to resign on April 4, 1906, as a result of his extreme Moroccan policy.

⁹⁸Bulow, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 211.

⁹⁹Ramond Sontag, "German Foreign Policy, 1904-6," American Historical Review, (XXXIII, January, 1928), pp. 278-9. Rich, Holstein, p. 744.

¹⁰⁰William later said: "The encirclement continues quietly its unalterable progress." Miquel to Bulow, October 9, 1907, GP, XXV, pp. 47-8.

American neutrality, but at the same time to let it be known that a rupture in the European status quo would be profoundly regretted by the American people." De Billy believed that German economic power was a rival to the United States, while "France does not present a threat to any of American interests." It was for this reason that Roosevelt and White had "searched to find ways to harmonize the special interests of France with the general interests of the other powers." According to de Billy's interpretation, the United States wanted peace and stability in the international order because this would encourage foreign trade and enhance American wealth.¹⁰¹ Likewise André Tardieu was convinced that Roosevelt had attempted "to maintain the European balance of power, while opposing any attempt at one-sided domination."¹⁰² Roosevelt was pro-French in the dispute "because he thought that the balance of power, which was necessary for world peace, was not menaced by France but rather by Germany."¹⁰³

In placing the weight of American support on the side of France the Roosevelt Administration was careful not to antagonize Germany. This caution was the principle reason

¹⁰¹Report of Robert de Billy, May 1, 1906, DDF, IX², pp. 988-900.

¹⁰²Tardieu, Alliances, p. 293. It should be noted that Tardieu himself feared that Germany threatened to upset the balance of power, and he assumed that Roosevelt shared his fear.

¹⁰³Tardieu, Algesiras, pp. 461-2.

that Roosevelt waited so long before deciding to intervene in the dispute. Roosevelt always tried to say the proper thing about Germany in his public statements and in his German correspondence. "My earnest wish," he wrote to Sternburg, "is that we use as much as possible the four years which stand before me in office to improve the relations between our countries. I believe in the German people."¹⁰⁴ The German Government realized that the United States generally supported the French position in the controversy, and at times German leaders were irritated by this fact. Holstein once wrote Bülow that Germany should cease to communicate with Washington because "a thorough understanding of the problem is lacking there."¹⁰⁵ Bülow answered: "You are right about Washington. Only I don't want to disturb our relations there."¹⁰⁶ Despite this, after the conference was over the American Government had largely succeeded in its attempt not to worsen German-American relations. In the Reichstag Bülow declared: "We have reason to be grateful to America for its attitude at the Conference of Algiers. America took, by reason of its less important

¹⁰⁴Sternburg to the Foreign Office, March 21, 1905, GP, XIX, no. 6295, p. 583.

¹⁰⁵Holstein to Bülow, March 25, 1906, Holstein Papers, Vol. IV, no. 945, pp. 402-3.

¹⁰⁶Bülow to Holstein, March 25, 1906, Ibid., no. 403, p. 946.

interests an attitude of reserve, It maintained its neutral position throughout."¹⁰⁷

During the Moroccan crisis French diplomacy toward the United States was at times rather clumsy. This was primarily because there were other more pressing matters for France to consider, but the Quai d'Orsay should have been more careful with confidential information obtained from Roosevelt. The greatest Franco-American difficulty resulted from Roosevelt's opposition to a creation of Moroccan spheres of influence. This misunderstanding was due in part to the failure of the French Foreign Office to pay enough attention to Washington. French diplomacy, however, was certainly as skillful as that of England and Germany. Sternburg's misrepresentation of the Kaiser's promise to follow Roosevelt's lead was a very undiplomatic move. The British Government made the mistake of sending to Washington an Ambassador who was always disliked by Roosevelt. "If Durand had been worth anything," wrote Roosevelt, "England might have helped me a little . . . but he . . . is simply entirely incompetent for a work of delicacy and importance."¹⁰⁸ Those close to the White House noticed that after speaking with Durand the President was always in a "bad disposition."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷Speech of November 14, 1906, Bülow, Memoirs, II, pp. 223-4. Scott, Root, p. 208.

¹⁰⁸Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Morison, V, p. 251.

¹⁰⁹Jusserand to Bourgeois, March 23, 1906, DDF, IX², no. 528, p. 690; March 24, 1906, Ibid., no. 537, pp. 699-701. Sternburg to Bulow, May 13, 1905, GP, XX², no. 6852.

Diplomacy is always a work which involves personal relations, and this was especially true in the case of Theodore Roosevelt, a man who looked upon nations as if they were enlarged individuals. A very important feature of Franco-American relations during the crisis was the personal friendship of President Roosevelt and Jean Jules Jusserand. Following the conference Roosevelt wrote Jusserand that he would have not intervened in the crisis "if I had not possessed entire confidence alike in your unfailing soundness of judgment and in your high integrity of personal conduct."¹¹⁰ In contrast to his correspondence with William, Roosevelt seems to have always expressed his true convictions in his communications with Jusserand. To Reid Roosevelt wrote: "Jusserand was a man of such excellent judgment, so sound and cool headed, and of so high a standard of personal and professional honor that I could trust him completely."¹¹¹ Although hypothetical questions are not in the realm of history, it seems probable that America's policy at Algeciras would have been less pro-French without the efforts of the skillful French Ambassador.

As a result of the Moroccan controversy France, Britain and Russia were drawn closer together, and the next year the

¹¹⁰Roosevelt to Jusserand, April 25, 1906, Morison, V, no. 3898, pp. 220-1, Bishop, I, p. 504.

¹¹¹Roosevelt to Reid, April 28, 1906, Morison, V, p. 235; Bishop, I, p. 481.

three powers concluded the Triple Entente. In addition, the crisis had the effect of pushing the United States closer to this power block and farther away from the Triple Alliance.¹¹²

Senator Lodge expressed a common American sentiment when he wrote: "You know how I have always believed France was our natural ally The Kaiser has done more in a month to drive her toward us than twenty years of effort."¹¹³

It is clear the Franco-American relations were closer as a result of the Moroccan crisis, but it is a mistake to exaggerate the extent to which this is true. Roosevelt had not been an uncritical supporter of all French goals. Especially the misunderstanding about spheres of influence caused Roosevelt to lose his enthusiasm for the French cause. After this incident he complained of "a certain furtiveness and lack of frankness in the French handling of their case." To Henry White he wrote: "Until the conference met I felt that France was behaving better than Germany, but toward the end it seemed to me that neither one was straightforward."¹¹⁴ Despite this, two years after the conference Roosevelt wrote to Jusserand: "As for the Moorish business,

¹¹²Cf. Pringle, Roosevelt, p. 273. Charles Tansill, America Goes to War, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1938), p. 13. Schieber, Sentiment, pp. 198-201.

¹¹³Lodge to Roosevelt, July 8, 1905, Lodge, Letters, Vol. II, p. 164.

¹¹⁴Roosevelt to White, April 30, 1906, Morison, V, p. 252.

I wish to Heaven, not in your interest, but in the interest of all civilized mankind, that France could take all Morocco under its exclusive charge."¹¹⁵ The motivation for this statement was not love for French imperialism, but Roosevelt realized that the Algeciras Conference had failed to eliminate the Moroccan issue as a potential source of European conflict.

¹¹⁵Roosevelt to Jusserand, August 3, 1908, Morison, VI, p. 1148. Jusserand to Pichon, November 28, 1906, DDF, X, no. 317, pp. 500-1.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The years between 1898 and 1907 are extremely important in the study of international diplomacy. This was a time of rapid colonial expansion, which was accompanied by the formation of new military alliances and the strengthening of older ones. Also, during these years the United States made her appearance as a major military force in the world. Before the 1880's the United States had never been considered an important power in the international community, but by the end of the Spanish-American War there was a widespread recognition of the new reality.¹ In 1906 Archibald Coolidge, in The United States as a World Power, argued that the American Republic would never again be able to return to a policy of isolation from the world's problems.² Only two years later the future French Prime Minister, André Tardieu, wrote that the United States "has a policy of world importance whether she wishes it or not."³

¹See May, Democracy, pp. 4-5.

²Coolidge, World Power, pp. 15, 373.

³Tardieu, Notes, p. 267.

America's rather sudden entrance into the international arena was received with ambivalence in France. Certainly, during the Spanish-American War the French people were hostile to the American policy, and the annexation of the Philippines was looked upon as the worst type of hypocrisy. Some hostility continued after the war. In 1905 Henry Hauser wrote that "one hears nothing spoken of in the press, at meetings, in Parliament, except the American peril."⁴ But during the war there was never any possibility of a French intervention, and following the conflict, the French Government--planning on continued expansion and not entirely forgetting about revanche--did what it could to obtain the diplomatic support of the American Government. Both Gabriel Hanotaux and Théophile Delcassé considered the establishment of better American relations as a major goal. The United States, somewhat isolated by two oceans, did not have any real fears about a direct threat from another power, and for this reason there was not any anxiety about France's policy toward America. Certainly many Americans, including James Hyde, Henry White and Horace Porter, strongly desired close Franco-American relations, but their motivation was not based on any belief that France's support was really useful.

The United States did not challenge or oppose French imperialism except in the cases of Liberia and South America.

⁴Henri Hauser, L'imperialisme américain, (Paris: Pages Libres, 1905), p. 108. See also Vagts, Deutschland, Vol. I, pp. 345, 353-6, 365-7.

In regard to Liberia, the motivation was sentimental. The American commitment to the small African nation was always limited. If France had decided to annex the country, it is not likely that the American Government would have used force to oppose the action. The American public, during these years, was never excited about Liberia's plight. In Washington there was little desire to increase American interests in Africa, and there was no serious consideration for the establishment of a African sphere of influence in that small country. In the case of South America, the United States was more determined. By the turn of the century the Monroe Doctrine was a kind of American creed, and there was the widespread conviction that South America was not open to further colonization. This was well recognized in Paris, and although the Monroe Doctrine was very unpopular, the French Government was very careful to respect the principles of the doctrine during the conflict with Venezuela. Of course, the American Government never challenged France's claim for the small colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana. This was a subject which was never discussed in diplomatic correspondence.

Both the United States and France had important interests in the Far East, and both nations had great expectations for financial returns from involvement in that region of the world. Although France and the United States were colonial neighbors after 1898, the diplomatic relations of the two

countries were seldom involved directly in the struggle for Asian influence. France was happy with America's open door doctrine, for she believed that this was an opportunity to capture a part of China's market without the expense of colonialism. In general, the French favored a firmer policy toward China than did the United States. During the Boxer rebellion, France was convinced that any sign of weakness would encourage later revolts against European imperialism. There were no serious conflicts of interest between France and the United States in Asia, and the French Government sympathized with Roosevelt's efforts to negotiate the Russo-Japanese War before Japan could upset the balance of power. The Taft Administration's policy of dollar diplomacy was a modification of the earlier American policy in Asia, and it was very unpopular in France.⁵ Only with a great deal of reluctance did the French Government agree to participate in the united loans to China.⁶ With the Chinese Revolution, the United States was one of the first of the powers to recognize the new Republic. The French Government was much slower in granting recognition, despite American suggestions that she should do so.⁷

⁵See C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), pp. 295-6.

⁶White to Knox, June 18, 1909, Despatches, Vol. 1445, no. 5315-322. Bacon to Knox, January 19, 1910, Despatches, Vol. 447, no. 5315-683.

⁷Myron T. Herrick to Knox, July 25, 1912, Despatches, Vol. 893, no. 00-1396.

During the Roosevelt Administration it was recognized that Franco-American relations had recovered from the unfriendly situation of the Spanish-American War. In the 1901 edition of the yearbook, Vingtième Siècle Politique, René Wallier, the editor, wrote that an unofficial entente had been formed between France and the United States.⁸ In 1905 Andrew Carnegie wrote an article, "An Anglo-French-American Understanding," in which he maintained that "no other three nations are so entirely complementary in aims and destiny."⁹ Archibald Coolidge in The United States as a World Power argued that Franco-American relations had never been better. "So far as we can judge," he concluded, "there is no reason why they should not continue to be excellent."¹⁰ The more recent historian, Charles Callan Tansill, believed that "the cordial relations which President Roosevelt established with France and England continued until the outbreak of the World War, and there is little doubt of their influence in preparing the American mind for intervention against Germany in 1917."¹¹ Probably this statement implies too much, but

⁸Le Vingtième Siècle Politique, edited by René Wallier, (Paris: Bibliotheque-Charpentier, 1901), pp. 27-8.

⁹Andrew Carnegie, "An Anglo-French-American Understanding," North American Review, CLXXXI (September, 1905), p. 517.

¹⁰Coolidge, World Power, pp. 188-9.

¹¹Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1938), pp. 13-31.

it is clear that by the time Roosevelt left the White House, the American position was somewhat pro-French.

The Moroccan conflict was the major diplomatic crisis during the years between 1898 and 1907, and this conflict was the most important single event which involved Franco-American relations during the years. At the high point of the crisis, Maurice Paléologue, recorded his thoughts in his daily journal:

"Something new and unexpected has happened--something which seems to indicate important developments in world politics. For the first time in her history the United States is intervening in a European affair. Until now it has maintained an isolation from the problems of the old world as a national dogma."¹²

The American policy was pro-French at the Algeciras Conference, but the diplomatic support for France was definitely limited. Roosevelt angered the French Government when he proposed a settlement which would not have divided Morocco into spheres of influence. Roosevelt was primarily concerned with the avoidance of a war, and secondary to this he hoped to stimulate American trade in North Africa, so long as this could be done without great risk or cost.

America's brief involvement in European problems did not continue long after the Algeciras Conference. After the crisis had passed, President Roosevelt was primarily occupied by the conflict with Japan. Relations with France and Europe

¹²Maurice Paléologue, Un grand tournant de la politique mondiale, 1904-1905, (Paris: Plon, 1934), June 16, 1905, pp. 224-5.

took a secondary position. Americans were of course concerned about the possibility of a European War. Ambassador Henry White closely observed and reported developments during the Bosnian crisis of 1909, but he did not participate in the affair in any way.¹³ This isolation from European conflicts really continued until the beginning of World War I. At the second Moroccan crisis of 1911, the American Government avoided a repetition of the intervention of six years earlier.¹⁴ Secretary of State Philander Knox informed Ambassador Jusserand that the United States would not participate in a conference, but would agree to any settlement "provided that our commercial and other advantages secured to us under our existing treaties are preserved."¹⁵

During the years between 1898 and 1907, there were a large number of factors which influenced Franco-American relations. Cultural and economic considerations were important. Public opinion always had a subtle influence, and the impact of individual diplomats should not be minimized. More than anything else, however, both France and the United States formulated their foreign policies around broad conceptions of national interest. Increasingly there was a

¹³See Nevins, White, p. 283. Nevins quotes from White's despatches at great length, even though the reports of the crisis have little relation to White's diplomacy.

¹⁴Adee to Bacon, October 9, 1911, Instructions, Vol. 285, no. 611.8131/29.

¹⁵Knox to Bacon, December 16, 1911, Instructions, Vol. 285, no. 881.00/475.

compatibility of interests between the two countries. Despite minor conflicts, the government of neither power seriously considered the possibility that the policies of the other government would offer a real challenge to its vital interests and security. Each government realized that there was always the possibility of such a challenge from another power. This is the reason why Franco-American relations were friendly early in the twentieth century, and this also explains why, despite some disagreements, good relations have continued until the present day.

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