

THE PENNSYLVANIA CONGRESSIONAL
DELEGATION, 1789-1801:
A ROLL CALL ANALYSIS

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A ROLL CALL ANALYSIS

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PREFACE

This study concerns the development of political parties in Pennsylvania during the 1790's. Major emphasis is devoted to an analysis of roll call votes in Congress from 1789 to 1801. The Pennsylvania congressional elections and the behavior of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation are also examined extensively. An ideological "Court" versus "Country" dichotomy, with roots as far back as 1776, is applied to the opposing political parties within Pennsylvania. It is suggested that because of the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity within Pennsylvania, that the state developed political parties which foreshadowed the rise of modern party politics in the next century.

In conducting the research for this study, I have received much valuable assistance and have incurred many debts. I owe considerable gratitude to my major advisor, Dr. H. James Henderson, who has spent countless hours perusing my writing. His devotion to scholarship and detail made him an indispensable asset in the preparation and completion of this study. Also, I am indebted to the other members of my committee: Professors Leroy H. Fischer, Joseph A. Stout, Jr., J. Paul Bischoff, and Bertil L. Hanson, for their kind assistance. I owe a special debt of thanks to David L. Nofziger for the time and effort he expended in designing the computer program for use in the roll call analysis. I would also like to thank Edward Hollman for his support and assistance during the course of this project.

As researchers and historians are aware, the success of research often depends on the many librarians and institutions that make available the materials and manuscript collections necessary to complete our work. I wish to thank Terry Basford, Lorna Ruesink, Tim Balch, and Heather Lloyd of the Oklahoma State University Library for their valuable assistance in obtaining material through interlibrary loan from other institutions. I also wish to thank the following institutions and their kind and helpful staffs for making available to me the primary sources necessary to complete this study: The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, The American Philosophical Society, The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, The Library Company of Philadelphia, and The Library of Congress. I owe a personal debt of thanks to Roy Goodman and Frank Shulman for allowing me to reside with them while engaging in research work in Philadelphia and Washington, D.C.

The computer data and tabulations utilized in this dissertation were made available in part by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records, 1789-1860, were originally collected and prepared by Clifford Lord under the auspices of the Works Progress Administration. Neither the original source or collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here. I wish to thank Greenwood Press for permission to use the Pennsylvania congressional district maps in this study which were adapted from the book by Stanley B. Parsons, William W. Beach, and Dan Hermann, United States Congressional Districts, 1788-1841 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 21 and 59. I also want

to thank Dr. W. David Baird and the Department of History at Oklahoma State University for making available the computer time necessary to complete this study.

Finally, I wish to express my deep appreciation and love for my wife, Nancy, and two sons, Matthew and Christopher, for their support and understanding during the years devoted to this study. To them I owe the greatest debt.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APS--American Philosophical Society

Annals--Gales, Joseph and Seaton, W. W., eds. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, 1789-1824. 42 vols. Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1834-1856.

DHRC--Jensen, Merrill, ed. The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. Vol. 2. Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Pennsylvania. Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976.

FFE--Jensen, Merrill and Becker, Robert A., eds. The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections, 1788-1790. Vol. 1. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976.

HSP--Historical Society of Pennsylvania

LC--Library of Congress

LCP--Library Company of Philadelphia

PHMC--Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission

PMHB--Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography

WMQ--William and Mary Quarterly

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this dissertation to study the behavior of the members of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation and their relationship to their constituents during the 1790's in order to determine what role that state played in the development of the first American party system.¹ The development of parties, particularly in Pennsylvania but also on a limited scale on the national level, is traced from 1776 to 1801 when the transfer of political power from the Federalists to the Democratic-Republican party took place. Particular emphasis is placed upon a study of the Pennsylvania congressional elections and an analysis of roll call votes in the first six congresses from 1789 to 1801. While there have been several studies done which include some roll call analysis of the early congresses, they all tend to use only a subset of roll calls concerning a particular issue or a group of selected roll calls judged to be of particular importance.² In this study, however, I use all roll calls during each Congress in order to analyze each representative's position relative to all other congressmen on all voting issues. (See Appendix B for an explanation of the methodology used in this roll call analysis.) By using all possible roll calls which correlate with each other it is possible to determine the level of voting cohesion for almost all representatives in each Congress.

This in turn enables one to see if consistent and stable voting blocs, which is one strong indication of party, existed in the early congresses.

It should be noted at the outset that some political scientists and historians, particularly Ronald Formisano, have argued that the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans of the 1790's were not parties in the modern sense of that term.³ Formisano implies that the voting blocs in the early congresses were based more on sectional or boarding-house patterns than on party influence. He also maintains that the level of voting cohesion which did exist was not accompanied by a bona fide party organization or party following so as to merit the distinction of being labeled parties. Formisano claims that only with the advent of the second party system can truly "modern" parties be said to exist. While a discussion of Formisano's model and the tripartite approach to the concept of party--that is the "party in office", the "party in the electorate", and party organization--will be treated more fully in the conclusion, this study maintains that remarkable advances were made in Pennsylvania toward more egalitarian and mass participatory politics. Although there may not have been a "party system" comprehending the entire nation in the 1790's, the development of parties within Pennsylvania was certainly a preview of what the second American party system, or first "modern" one, was later to become.

There has also been widespread difference of opinion among historians as to when parties first emerged in the 1790's. Some scholars, including Charles Beard and Mary Ryan, have concluded that there is evidence of parties as early as the First Congress. In a critique of Ryan's article, H. James Henderson has maintained that

Ryan's evidence of two parties in the First Congress more closely resembled three sectional voting blocs, similar to those in the Continental Congress. Henderson suggested that it was not until the Third Congress that evidence of parties emerged. Several writers, including Joseph Charles, Rudolph Bell, and John Hoadley, have placed the emergence of parties in the Fourth Congress over the Jay Treaty controversy. Others, particularly Orin Libby and Manning Dauer, have held that parties did not arise until the administration of John Adams and the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts.⁴

If party development is seen as an ongoing process along a continuum the exact date of party emergence is very hard to establish. However, through the use of roll call analysis it is possible to determine the level of polarization and voting cohesion for any particular Congress. The evidence obtained from my analysis of roll calls in the first six congresses suggests that the First and Second Congresses were basically a continuation of the sectional factionalism that existed in the Continental Congress.⁵ The roll calls in these congresses failed to scale across all issues but only scaled by one particular issue or a series of related issues. Not until the Third Congress did strong evidence of party voting appear. A roll call analysis shows that for the first time a majority of issues scaled with each other. Of the 69 roll calls in the Third Congress, 50 scaled with each other. This emergence of polarization within Congress became stronger in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Congresses while at the same time sectionalism decreased. In fact, by the Sixth Congress roll call analysis shows that all congressmen had chosen to align with one party or the other. There was no middle ground as 90 percent of

the representatives voted for their party at least 80 percent of the time. Such high levels of party cohesion have seldom, if ever, been achieved.

This study also maintains that the traditional ideological division between "Court" and "Country" intensified many of the differences between not only the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans in the 1790's but also between the Constitutionalist and Republicans in Pennsylvania beginning in 1776.⁶ Several major works over the last 20 years, beginning with Caroline Robbins' The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, have "identified a strand of radical Whig-Dissenting thought that outlived the English Puritan experiment in republicanism and persisted down to the time of the American Revolution."⁷ Subsequently, Bernard Bailyn in his The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution and Gordon Wood in The Creation of the American Republic maintained that this radical English tradition was central to American political ideology from the American Revolution through the adoption of the Constitution. Lance Banning, in The Jeffersonian Persuasion, then connected the Republicans and Federalists of the 1790's to the philosophy of the traditional English Court-Country dichotomy.⁸

What characteristics did the terms "Court" and "Country" signify? In England the Court was the "collective designation of the monarch, his residence, council, officials, and courtiers."⁹ The Court party members were considered supporters of commerce, a funded national debt, a national bank, a standing army, and particularly of strong government. The Court party was generally supported by those who were considered bureaucrats, financiers, and commercialists. On the other hand, the Country party could be largely understood by their "opposition to the

exercise of power by government."¹⁰ As very ably stated by Daniel W. Howe,

The Country party was suspicious of a standing army and government involvement with the financial community (through a national debt and a central bank), which it perceived as forms of patronage that, like the use of 'influence' on members of Parliament, tended to corrupt the Commonwealth.¹¹

The supporters of the Country party tended to be agrarians who had a localist rather than a cosmopolitan outlook. As confirmed by Bernard Bailyn, the Country tradition was transferred across the Atlantic by the American rebels and was relied upon as an ideological underpinning for the American Revolution.¹²

In Pennsylvania the Court-Country dichotomy was intensified because of the state's ethno-religious diversity and the different cultural layers in the process of settlement. The Anglicans and paradoxically the Quakers, who had been dissenters in England, came to Pennsylvania early and because they were located near the center of power in Philadelphia became Court-oriented. Many of the later settlers who went into the interior, particularly the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, were naturally inclined toward the dissenting Country philosophy. Many characteristics of the men who became Pennsylvania Republicans and later Federalists were compatible with the Court philosophy. These men tended to be those who can be labeled as commercial and cosmopolitan and were also most likely to be wealthy Quakers, Anglicans, Episcopalian, or sectarians of English or German extraction who lived in eastern Pennsylvania. Likewise, the characteristics of those who became Constitutionalist and later Democratic-Republicans harmonized with the Country philosophy. Richard Ryerson has described the Constitutionalist as outsiders who were excluded from political

and economic power by the wealthy and aristocratic Quakers and Anglicans, most of whom became members of the Pennsylvania Republican party.¹³

In Pennsylvania the vast majority of the Republicans and Constitutionalists later became Federalists and Democratic-Republicans respectively, and they carried their Court and Country philosophies along with them as well. The Country-minded politicians were most likely agrarian and localist in outlook. And in Pennsylvania they tended to be Presbyterians, Lutherans, or Calvinists of Scotch-Irish or German descent who lived in western Pennsylvania and other agricultural areas.

In Pennsylvania (to a greater extent than in most other states) the Country ideology also attracted some urban people who felt threatened by the Federalist drive for political power. This Country-oriented urban element was composed largely of more recent settlers, particularly Irish immigrants, who became allied with the ethnic groups in the interior through the efforts of Constitutionalist and Democratic-Republican political organizers. This urban wing tended to be more democratic than the average Country-oriented follower. In fact, it was largely the urban based Democratic-Republicans in Philadelphia who through their political organization and broadening of popular participation in the political process helped Pennsylvania develop an internal opposition party in advance of other states. Another difference between Pennsylvania and most other states, particularly before the mid-1790's, was that Pennsylvania had influential leaders in both the Court and Country parties. In many states, especially in New England and the South, politics tended to be dominated by one party or the other.

It is also the contention of this study that Pennsylvania, because of its rapid movement toward a more popular and electorally-oriented style of politics, played an important role in the development of the first party system in the 1790's. Because of Pennsylvania's social and cultural diversity the state developed political parties in advance of other states, particularly those in New England and the South which were more homogeneous in nature. Parties began in Pennsylvania as early as 1776 with the formation of the Constitutionals and Republicans who attempted to promote or curb the dramatic changes in political and social policies during the revolutionary period. Because of this early political development the Pennsylvania delegation, as shown by the congressional elections and an analysis of roll calls, rapidly polarized into opposing parties after the beginning of the new Federal Congress. The two-party voting pattern initiated by the Pennsylvania delegation gradually evolved in other state delegations throughout the 1790's as they began to abandon their usual sectional voting patterns. The intensely controversial political issues of the 1790's, many of which had particular relevance for Pennsylvania, led to the development of parties in the state which prefigured the development of the more modern parties of the nineteenth century.

ENDNOTES

¹The term "first party system" is used here, and throughout this study, as it has historically been used by scholars to designate the period in the 1790's when the roots of our modern American parties were established during the intense political battles between the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans. Most historians and political scientists today would deny that these parties, particularly on the national level, ever evolved into an institutionalized party system as later ones have. See also footnote number three.

²Some examples of such studies are Orin G. Libby, "A Sketch of the Early Political Parties in the United States," Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota 2 (April 1912): 205-242 and "Political Factions in Washington's Administration," Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota 3 (July 1913): 293-318; Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953); Noble E. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789-1791 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957); Joseph Charles, The Origins of the American Party System (New York: Harper and Row, 1961); Rudolph M. Bell, Party and Faction in American Politics: The House of Representatives, 1789-1801 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973); Mary P. Ryan, "Party Formation in the United States Congress, 1789 to 1796: A Quantitative Analysis," WMQ, 3d ser., 28 (October 1971): 523-542; and H. James Henderson, "Quantitative Approaches to Party Formation in the U. S. Congress: A Comment," WMQ, 3d ser., 30 (April 1973): 307-324.

³See Ronald P. Formisano, "Deferential-Participant Politics: The Early Republic's Political Culture, 1789-1840," American Political Science Review 68 (June 1974): 473-487; and also his more recent article "Federalists and Republicans: Parties, Yes--System, No" in Paul Kleppner et al., The Evolution of American Electoral Systems (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981) in which he maintains that the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans can be labeled parties, although not in the modern sense, but that a party system did not exist.

⁴Charles A. Beard, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915); Ryan, "Party Formation"; Henderson, "Quantitative Approaches"; Charles, American Party System; Bell, Party and Faction; John F. Hoadley, "The Development of American Political Parties: A Spatial Analysis of Congressional Voting, 1789-1803" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1979); Libby, "Early Political Parties"; and Dauer, Adams Federalists.

⁵See H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974) and also his "Constitutionalists and Republicans in the Continental Congress, 1778-1786," Pennsylvania History 36 (April 1969): 119-144.

⁶For a fuller discussion of the Court versus Country argument see the insightful article by James H. Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution: Antifederalism and the Historians," WMQ, 3d ser., 38 (July 1981): 337-368.

⁷Daniel Walker Howe, "European Sources of Political Ideas in Jeffersonian American," Reviews in American History 10 (December 1982): 33.

⁸Ibid., pp. 33-34; Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development, and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978). See also J. G. A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975) in which he has traced the beginning of this political tradition back to Machiavelli and Renaissance Florence.

⁹Perez Zagorin, The Court and the Country: The Beginning of the English Revolution (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 38.

¹⁰Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution," p. 356.

¹¹Howe, "European Sources," p. 33.

¹²Ibid.; Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution," pp. 356-358; Bailyn, Ideological Origins. While the Court and Country classifications in England and America did not mean exactly the same thing, particularly since there was no "Court" or monarch in America, the ideological similarities were remarkable. The parallel between the Court-Country dichotomy in American and that in England is shown persuasively by John M. Murrin, "The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and American (1776-1816)," in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 368-453.

¹³Richard Ryerson, "Republican Theory and Partisan Reality in Revolutionary Pennsylvania: Toward a New View of the Constitutionalist Party," in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981), p. 99.

CHAPTER II

PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS FROM 1776 TO 1790

The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776

Profound political changes occurred in Pennsylvania in 1776. Over a period of only several months, the people of Pennsylvania ousted the old provincial government, proclaimed their independence from Great Britain, and framed a new democratic constitution. This internal revolution, which took place in the spring and summer of 1776, saw long established conservative political leaders replaced in power by new and more radical leaders. Prior to this 1776 change in political control, Pennsylvania politics had largely been dominated by English Quakers and Anglicans and their allies centered in Philadelphia. The conflict over the movement for independence from Great Britian in 1776 led to a challenge of this eastern aristocratic faction by a combination of western farmers and Philadelphia artisans made up largely of Scotch-Irish Presbyterians.¹

This more radical faction, which advocated independence, seemingly failed in its challenge when its conservative opponents won the elections of May 1, 1776 for the Pennsylvania Assembly.² The Continental Congress, however, breathed new life into the radical faction's movement for independence when on May 10, 1776 it passed a resolution calling for

. . . the respective assemblies and conventions of the United Colonies, where no government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs have been hitherto established, to adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and America in general.³

The resolution gave the radicals in Pennsylvania political justification to move toward the creation of a revolutionary government. On the evening of May 15, a meeting was held at the Philosophical Hall to debate the Congressional resolution. At the conclusion of the meeting the following day it was decided to call a convention "to protest against the present Assembly's doing any business in their House until the sense of the Province was taken in that Convention."⁴ Two days later the Committee of the City and Liberties (suburbs) of Philadelphia agreed to meet on Monday, May 20 "in order to take the sense of the people" concerning the resolution.⁵

Over 4,000 people assembled in the rain on May 20 in the State House Yard to discuss the fate of the provincial government. The radicals were particularly upset at the instructions of the Assembly to the Continental Congress delegates which prohibited them from separating from Great Britain. Led by the radical advocates of independence, several resolutions were passed which condemned the Assembly's instructions to the Pennsylvania delegates to the Continental Congress, claimed that the Assembly was not properly authorized, and called for a convention of the people of Pennsylvania for June 18 to carry the Congress' resolutions into effect. The Provincial Conference which met in Carpenter's Hall in Philadelphia from June 18-25 was made up largely of men who had previously been politically underrepresented. Unlike the earlier political assemblies in Pennsylvania which had been dominated by the Quakers and Anglicans of English and Welsh extraction,

the Provincial Conference which set the procedures for the election of a state constitutional convention was comprised largely of Scotch-Irish Presbyterians and Germans of various religious sects. Most of the other colonial assemblies, except perhaps for New York, maintained their stability and authority during the transition to independence. However, in Pennsylvania, the internal revolution was swift and complete with the Assembly, the Proprietorship, and the Crown being ousted almost simultaneously. This break with the past, along with the political rise of ethnocultural groups which had little previous influence, made the political changes in Pennsylvania the most radical of any of the American colonies during 1776.⁶

Besides laying plans for a convention, the Provincial Conference also assumed political control of the state in defiance of the legally chosen Assembly. Elections for the Constitutional Convention, set to open in Philadelphia on July 15, were called for July 8. Voting in the convention was to be by county, with each county and the city of Philadelphia to have eight representatives.⁷

The Constitutional Convention, which began its sessions in the West Room of the State House in Philadelphia, met in the hot summer days from July 15 to September 28. Similar to the preceding Provincial Conference, its membership was again dominated by political newcomers. Such well known Pennsylvanians as Robert Morris, James Wilson, and John Dickinson were not elected. Benjamin Franklin, chosen unanimously as President of the Constitutional Convention, was one of the few delegates with much political experience. And since Franklin was simultaneously a delegate to the Continental Congress, the time he contributed to the new Constitution was lessened. Scotch-Irish

Presbyterians and German church people were in the majority again at the expense of the previously dominant English and Welsh Quakers and Anglicans. It was evident that the conservative eastern political leadership was being replaced by Philadelphian and western radicals. The leaders of the Philadelphia delegates were David Rittenhouse, Timothy Matlock, and Dr. James Cannon. Rittenhouse was a scientist and astronomer from Philadelphia. Matlock was a Colonel in the Pennsylvania militia. Cannon, a native of Scotland, was a mathematics professor in the College of Philadelphia. Judge George Bryan, although not a member of the Convention, had considerable influence on the making of the Constitution because of his leadership of the Presbyterian faction.⁸

The Constitution that emerged from the Convention on September 28 differed substantially from the previous Pennsylvania provincial government and from other state constitutions adopted during the early years of the Revolution. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was the most democratic of all the state constitutions. The legislature was to be unicameral with the representatives to be elected annually in proportion to the taxable residents in each county and the city of Philadelphia. This provision helped to answer the demand of western counties for increased representation. Under the prior government the five western counties, which contained over 50 percent of the population by 1776, elected only ten representatives while the city of Philadelphia and the southeastern counties of Chester and Bucks elected 26. Electors for the unicameral assembly included any tax paying freeman over the age of 21 who had resided in the state for at least one year. A son of a freeholder who was over 21 but had not paid taxes could also vote.⁹

Although all state constitutions veered toward legislative supremacy, the Pennsylvania Constitution carried this tendency to an extreme. The executive branch consisted of a Supreme Executive Council made up of one member from each county and the city of Philadelphia elected on a rotating basis for three year terms. The Supreme Executive Council was to be presided over by a President, who was elected by a joint ballot of the Assembly and the Council. The main duties of the Council were to carry out the laws passed by the legislature and to make appointments. The Council was not given veto power over legislation passed by the Assembly.¹⁰

A highly unusual aspect of the Constitution was the establishment of a Council of Censors, which was to be comprised of two people from each county and the city of Philadelphia. The Censors were to be elected every seven years, with the first election to take place in October of 1783. The main task of the Council of Censors was to ensure that the Constitution was being carried out properly and to determine whether it should be amended. However, an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Council of Censors had to be obtained in order to call a convention to amend the Constitution. This provision made the Constitution very difficult to amend, especially in light of the political parties which developed in Pennsylvania following implementation of the Constitution.¹¹

The Constitutional Convention also drafted a Declaration of Rights which guaranteed such prevailing eighteenth century rights as trial by jury, free elections, the right of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and religious liberty.¹² The Pennsylvania radicals viewed the Declaration of Rights as a very important part of the Constitution. It was a failure of the Federal Constitution of 1787 to contain a

corresponding Bill of Rights which caused much opposition to its ratification in Pennsylvania.

Constitutionalists Versus Republicans, 1776-1787

Opposition to the Constitution of 1776 began even before the end of the Convention. Several conservative members of the Convention were wary of its' more radical aspects. It was obvious that a substantial number of men dissented from the new plan of government since 23 of the 95 delegates present at the signing on September 28 did not sign it. Most of the non-signers were members from eastern Pennsylvania. The Constitution of 1776 had brought about political changes in Pennsylvania but it did not bring about political harmony. Instead, the Constitution prompted a bitter political struggle which gave rise to two opposing political parties. The roots of this political struggle were to be found in the conflicting ideological perspectives of the opposing groups, with the Constitution of 1776 at the center of the conflict.¹³

Those who favored the Constitution of 1776 became known as the Constitutionalists. For most of the period from 1776 until 1787, the Constitutionalists controlled Pennsylvania politics, both on the state and national levels, and managed to keep the Constitution of 1776 from being overthrown. Some of the principal leaders of the Constitutionalists included the Philadelphians George Bryan, Timothy Matlock, and James Cannon who were mentioned previously. The western Constitutionalists were led by the agrarians William Findley and John Smilie both of whom were born in Ireland. The defenders of the Constitution claimed that because of the democratic features it was the best defense against aristocratic rule and the best safeguard for liberty.

The opponents of the Constitution of 1776 were first labeled Anti-Constitutionalists, but soon adopted the name Republicans from their organization in 1779 of the Republican Society in opposition to the Constitution of 1776.¹⁴ The Republicans were led by such wealthy and influential men as Robert Morris, James Wilson, Thomas Fitzsimons, John Bayard, George Clymer, and John Dickinson. The Republicans attacked the Constitution as impractical and unworkable. They ridiculed some of its features, particularly the unicameral legislature, the use of a Supreme Executive Council instead of a Governor, the demand that office-holders take an oath to support the government, and the unique idea of a Council of Censors. The Republicans also claimed that the Constitution could lead to loss of liberty through its invitation to tyranny by mob rule. Although the Republicans made some short term gains after 1776 both in the Pennsylvania legislature and in the Continental Congress, it was not until 1787, partly aided by the new Federal Constitution, that they were strong enough to successfully challenge the Constitution of 1776.

The divisions between the two contending parties over the Constitution, as well as other political and ideological issues, can be largely understood in terms of the Court versus Country dichotomy. The political conflict was not only an ethnic and religious one, but was also ideological. As will be discussed below, the opposing parties fought over such issues as test oaths, the College of Philadelphia, and economic policies. In each case the Republicans tended to take a stand which was more characteristic of the Court philosophy while the Constitutionalists more closely followed the Country ideology. The eastern Court-oriented Republicans were usually men who had a commercial

and nationalist outlook. The Country-oriented Constitutionalists were, on the other hand, led by farmers and men of localist outlook. The Republicans, behind the leadership of the financier Robert Morris, moved to establish a bank in order to strengthen the government and attract support from the eastern investors. The agrarians and artisans of the Constitutionalist party opposed the Bank of North America because as debtors they favored cheap money and feared domination by financial interests. Many of the Country Constitutionalists saw the Revolution not only as a struggle against the unjust supremacy of Britain, but also as a fight against the influence of the conservative Court aristocrats in Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania at least Carl Becker was right; the American Revolution was not only a conflict over home rule, but also over who should rule at home.

The Constitutionalists epitomized the basic theme of the Country philosophy, which was opposition to strong governmental power. In speaking against the power of the government to alter the Constitution without consent of the people, a Constitutionalist said that:

. . . they thereby should have made the legislature their own carvers, and in a convenient time had them as independent, nay indeed as absolute masters of the lives and fortunes of their constituents in Pennsylvania as they now are in Great Britain.¹⁵

The Republicans were critical of several aspects of the Pennsylvania Constitution which limited governmental power, particularly the absence of a veto power, the plural executive, insufficient appointive powers, and the dependent judiciary branch. The Republicans were especially critical of the unicameral legislature and called for the establishment of an upper house as a balance to the assembly. The Constitutionalists claimed that the Republicans were trying to establish an aristocratic

upper chamber in order to counter the assembly which was dominated by the middle and lower classes after the democratic changes of 1776.¹⁶

The movement to revise the Constitution of 1776 began shortly after the Constitutional Convention had ended. A public gathering, made up mostly of opponents of the Constitution, met at Philosophical Hall in Philadelphia on October 17 and planned a meeting in the State House Yard for October 21-22. Approximately 1,500 people attended this meeting on those two days. A majority of those present approved a set of resolutions which pointed out defects of the Constitution and chided the Constitutional Convention for assuming power that the people had not entrusted to them. Other resolutions asked that the first Assembly to be elected under the new Constitution on November 5 should be allowed to alter the Constitution and that the public should boycott the elections for the Supreme Executive Council until some constitutional revision was accomplished. The anti-Constitutionalists got off to a good start when all five of the Assembly delegates elected from the city, including Robert Morris and George Clymer, were opponents of the Constitution. Four of the six delegates from Philadelphia County, including John Dickinson, were also anti-Constitutionalists.¹⁷

Initially, the obstructionist tactics of the Republicans were partly successful because many elected opponents of the Constitution, including Robert Morris and John Dickinson, withdrew from the Assembly in an attempt to cripple the new government. This attempt was eventually a failure, however, because the Assembly, at the urging of its radical leaders, declared those seats vacant and ordered new elections. The new elections, both for the Assembly and for the Supreme Executive Council, were won by the Constitutionalists. Two

Constitutionalists, Geroge Bryan and Thomas Wharton, Jr., who had lost in the November 5th election were winners in the new Philadelphia elections. In March 1777, the Supreme Executive Council was put into operation with Constitutionalists in key positions. Wharton, who had been President of the Council of Safety, was elected President of the Supreme Executive Council and George Bryan was chosen Vice President. And Timothy Matlock, another ardent Constitutionalist, was appointed Secretary to the Supreme Executive Council.¹⁸

While the Republicans had clearly lost out in their first challenge, they continued to attack the Constitution at every opportunity. Because of the constant pressure for a second constitutional convention, the Constitutionalists agreed in June, 1777 to hold a referendum on the question in October of 1777. On their part the Republicans agreed to halt their criticism until the referendum results were reported to the Assembly. However, because of military reversals and the threatened invasion of Philadelphia, the Constitutionalist-led Assembly suspended the October referendum and adjourned to Lancaster. After this reversal the Republicans made another attempt against the Constitution in 1778-1779. They worked hard to elect enough delegates in the fall elections of 1778 to gain control of the Assembly. Jasper Yeates wrote to a fellow Republican that he had been "doing little for these ten days past but electioneering." He also reported that "every nerve will be strained to effect a change of Men and Measures."¹⁹ Even though the Republicans only elected about a third of the Assembly, there were enough moderates also elected that legislation was passed which called for an election in March, 1779 to determine if a new constitutional convention was to be held. In retaliation the Constitutionalists began

a newspaper and petition campaign against the referendum election. The Constitutionalist presented petitions to the Assembly which they claimed had 14,000 signatures opposing the referendum. Although the Republicans protested against this tactic it did little good as the Assembly, now convinced that the people were against it, rescinded the March referendum by a vote of 47 to 7. This demonstration of political power showed that the Constitutionalist were still firmly in control.²⁰

After this defeat the Republicans resigned themselves to waiting until the election for the Council of Censors in 1783 for another attempt on the Constitution. The Republicans gained steadily in the elections of 1780, 1781, and 1782. They won decisively in 1783 when they elected 38 assemblymen as opposed to 29 for the Constitutionalist. The Republicans also elected 14 members to the Council of Censors to the Constitutionalist 12. In the first meeting of the Council of Censors, several committees recommended drastic changes in the Constitution. The Council then adjourned until June 1, 1784. But when the Council reconvened, because of several resignations and replacements, the Republicans were no longer in a majority. Again the Republicans had been thwarted in their crusade against the Constitution. It was six more years before the Constitution was not simply revised but replaced. The Republicans finally terminated their campaign in 1790 when most Pennsylvanians agreed that a change was necessary.²¹

The Republicans opposed not only the Constitution, but also substantive matters that were important to the electorate. One of the more controversial issues concerned test oaths and loyalty to the state government. During the Revolutionary War years most of the population was divided in its support of the war effort between the loyalists and

patriots. Caught between these opposing groups were many of the Quakers and German sects who opposed military service and the taxes to support the military effort. In what became an ideological and political issue, the new state government attempted to punish loyalists and to exclude from public life those who did not financially or militarily support the American war effort. The radical Constitutionals, in order to accomplish their purpose, approved a series of test oaths for voters and officeholders between 1776 and 1779.²²

The Republicans claimed the the Constitutionals formulated the test oaths in order to disenfranchise their political opponents. The Republicans charged that the test oaths prevented them from attempting to revise the Constitution of 1776. They argued that while the Constitutionals theoretically held that the new government was based on the people, in reality representation was limited. The arguments of the Republicans were intended to gain support from those who were victims of the test oaths, particularly Quakers and members of the German sects who refused to take the test oaths. These groups and others who opposed the test oaths naturally supported the Republican cause. The Republicans exploited the exclusionist policies of the Constitutionals by maintaining that, unlike their opponents, their policies were based on pluralism and diversity. Opposition to the test oaths continued until all of them were repealed by 1787.²³

The self-righteous exclusionist policies of the Constitutionals weakened them politically. Their stubborn insistence on the test oaths alienated not only loyalists but pacifists, neutrals, and even sympathetic supporters who strongly disliked their imposition, particularly after the war was over. Richard Ryerson has shown that

this Country-oriented attitude of the Constitutionalist "drew upon a radical tradition that ran back to James Harrington and beyond and taught that the healthiest policy rested upon a virtuous, largely undifferentiated agrarian gentry and yeomanry."²⁴ They saw themselves as zealous defenders of the best interests of society. Consequently it was their duty to suppress all those who did not agree with their policies. However, the refusal of the Constitutionalist to accept the pluralistic nature of Pennsylvania society led to a continuing loss of voter support. The Republicans, despite their elitism, advocated a more open system that tolerated diversity during this period, and this enabled them to gain political strength in their move to replace the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.²⁵

Another controversial political, religious, and ideological issue which arose in 1779 between the two opposing parties concerned the College of Philadelphia. The issue began as a personal dispute between Dr. William Smith, the Anglican Provost of the College of Philadelphia, and Joseph Reed, a Presbyterian radical and at that time President of the Supreme Executive Council. Smith, besides being allied with the conservative Revolutionary political leaders, was associated with the loyalists and in 1777 he had been forced to give his word not to give aid to the enemy. Reed extended his attack against Smith's loyalty to include the Anglican dominated College of Philadelphia. The Constitutionalist, led by Reed, challenged the legality of the College's charter in light of the new Constitution. They also began looking into whether the trustees of the College had signed the test oaths. In November of 1779 the Assembly passed a law which replaced the College of Philadelphia with the new University of Pennsylvania. The board of

trustees of the new university was headed by Presbyterian Joseph Reed. The other major university officials were also Presbyterians and were closely allied with the Constitutionalist party including the Presbyterian minister Dr. John Ewing as Provost, David Rittenhouse as Vice Provost, and George Bryan as Treasurer.²⁶

Through roll call analysis of Assembly votes, Owen Ireland has shown that this political issue had obvious religious overtones. The issue was basically one between English Anglicans who backed the College and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians who opposed it. He also shows that the alignment on this issue in the Assembly correlates almost perfectly with the same ethnic-religious split over the test oaths and the Constitution of 1776. Led by George Bryan and Joseph Reed, the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians and the Reformed Germans were, by the end of 1779, strongly supportive of the test oaths, the Constitution, and the new University of Pennsylvania. On the other hand the English Anglicans, English Quakers, and German Lutherans and Sectarians were strongly opposed to the test oaths and the Constitution, and favored the College of Philadelphia. This statewide political and religious division was to continue through the 1780's and into the 1790's.²⁷

Another important issue that brought forth the Court and Country attitudes of the two parties concerned inflation and price controls. The Constitutionalist believed that prices should be regulated in the interest of community welfare and as a method of curbing those who would take advantage of the economic situation. They attacked the Republican merchants, especially Robert Morris and James Wilson, as monopolizers who were making large profits because of the war. Most of the merchants and many of the artisans who controlled the goods

protested the idea of price regulation as unjust and a violation of the laws of property. The Republicans saw the solution in national banking and financial reform rather than in local price control. It was largely because of the price control issue that many Philadelphia artisans, who had initially supported the Constitutionists, defected to the Republican party in the 1780's.²⁸

A dramatic incident that illustrates this antagonism was the attack on the house of James Wilson in 1779. The price of bread and other necessities, partly due to monopolizers, had risen to very high levels. The Supreme Executive Council said that the "heinously criminal" manipulation of prices, which was "ruinous to the industrious poor" must be stopped.²⁹ But despite orders from the Executive Council and action from the General Assembly, prices continued to rise. In May, a citizens' committee in Philadelphia was appointed to try to regulate prices, but it too had little effect. In early October a group of over 150 Philadelphia militiamen decided to take action. The group arrested four prominent men who they felt opposed price regulation and began to march throughout the city. James Wilson, fearing his own arrest, gathered a group of friends and fled to his house where they barricaded themselves in. As the crowd of people passed by Wilson's house and windows in the house opened, both words and shots were exchanged. Several people were killed and many more were wounded in the incident, which became known as the Fort Wilson Riot. Shortly after the riot 100 barrels of flour were distributed in Philadelphia, mostly to families of militiamen, and the Supreme Executive Council warned that those guilty of monopoly would not receive the protection of the government.³⁰

Many in Philadelphia, particularly the more affluent, feared a repetition of such mob violence. A threatened mutiny by soldiers over back pay in June of 1783 drove the Continental Congress out of Philadelphia. These incidents no doubt bothered the Philadelphia elite

. . . who yearned for a deferential, stable society. It reinforced their commitment to the ideal that electoral politics had to be safely lodged in the hands of respectable gentlemen who would not cater to the prattlings of the poor and their allies.³¹

The Republicans felt that the Constitution of 1776 and the widening of the franchise had helped lead to the loss of deference and an increase of independent political activity on the part of the lower classes. The Republicans therefore continued to work to destroy the Constitution and to recover political control in the hands of the affluent few.³²

Another major issue between the two opposing parties in Pennsylvania concerned the Bank of North America in Philadelphia. Established in 1781 by Robert Morris as part of his economic program shortly after he became Superintendent of Finance, Morris envisioned the bank as an aid to fiscal stability. However, the bank became involved in the partisan politics of Pennsylvania in the 1780's. After being authorized and chartered by Continental Congress, the Bank of North America also applied to Pennsylvania for a charter. There was some opposition against the bank in the Pennsylvania Assembly, and particularly against its president Thomas Willing who had cooperated with the British when they occupied Philadelphia. However, partly because of financial and military necessity, the Pennsylvania Assembly in April of 1782, then with a small Republican majority, voted along party lines to charter the bank by a vote of 27-24. Although opposition to the bank subsided

during its first few years of operation, once the war was over there was a move in Pennsylvania to revoke its charter.³³

The opposition to the bank was both politically and ideologically motivated. The bank's President, Thomas Willing, was a former business partner and ally of Robert Morris, and a leader of the Republican Society. The directors of the bank, including James Wilson, Thomas Fitzsimons, Samuel Meredith, and William Bingham were all prominent Republicans. Some Constitutionlists attacked the bank as an institutional embodiment of their Republican rivals. The most intense opposition to the bank came from the agricultural counties in western Pennsylvania. The western agrarians circulated petitions against the bank and forwarded them to the Assembly in March, 1785. They attacked the bank for its favoritism to the wealthy, its insensitivity to the long-term credit needs of farmers, its influence over the economy, and its high interest rates. In place of the Bank of North America the agrarians wanted to establish a state loan office and land banks with which to provide farmers with long-term credit. Behind the leadership of the Country-minded trio of William Findley, John Smilie, and Robert Whitehall, all from western Pennsylvania, the Constitutionlists moved to revoke the bank's charter. The Pennsylvania Assembly in September of 1785, by a vote of 42-12, passed a law which revoked the 1782 bank charter. The bank continued to function under its congressional charter while the Republicans worked to restore the state charter. When the Republicans were in control of the Assembly in 1787 they managed to recharter the bank although at the price of accepting stronger restrictions than in the original charter.³⁴

As the above struggle over the Bank of North America indicates, the state politics of Pennsylvania during this period were often closely associated with those on the national level in the Continental Congress. A study which analyzed the voting records of Continental Congress from 1778 to 1786 by H. James Henderson shows that the party affiliation of congressional delegates from Pennsylvania definitely influenced their voting patterns in the Continental Congress. When Pennsylvania delegations were composed of all Constitutionallists or all Republicans they were a very cohesive bloc. When the Pennsylvania delegation was split between the two parties they were much less cohesive. Furthermore, the Constitutionallists in the Continental Congress tended to side more with the New England delegations while the Republicans usually voted with the Southern states or with the other middle states. As Henderson indicates, these sudden voting shifts suggest that a well developed two party system existed in Pennsylvania even if one were not aware of the political conflict on the state level between the Constitutionallists and Republicans. And since the structure of partisan politics in the Continental Congress was basically one of sectional opposition between the North and South, Pennsylvania played an important and often politically powerful role as a swing state in national politics. And as we shall see later on, Pennsylvania briefly continued this pattern in the First Congress after the adoption of the Federal Constitution.³⁵

Pennsylvania Ratification of the Federal Constitution

The Pennsylvania Assembly, securely in the hands of the Republicans

after their victory in the elections of 1786, appointed a strong Republican and nationalist contingent to the Federal Constitutional Convention which met at the State House in Philadelphia from May to September, 1787. Those appointed were Robert Morris, James Wilson, George Clymer, Thomas Fitzsimons, Thomas Mifflin, Jared Ingersoll, Gouverneur Morris, and Benjamin Franklin. Franklin and Ingersoll, the only Pennsylvania delegates associated with the Constitutionals, played the part of moderate nationalists in the Federal Convention. The Pennsylvania delegation generally supported the Virginia Plan of James Madison and the concept of nationalism.³⁶

On Monday afternoon September 17, 1787 the Federal Constitutional Convention completed its task and sent the new document to Congress in New York. The Pennsylvania delegates went upstairs (for the Pennsylvania Assembly was meeting on the second floor of the State House while the Constitutional Convention met on the first floor) and informed the Assembly that they were ready to make their report concerning the proposed Federal Constitution. On Tuesday the proposed Constitution was read to the Assembly by Thomas Mifflin, the Speaker of the Assembly and also a Constitutional Convention delegate. No action was taken that day and the Assembly adjourned, although it was suggested that land should be ceded to the new Congress for the location of the federal capital in Philadelphia. The next day unofficial copies of the new Constitution appeared in several of the Philadelphia newspapers.³⁷

With the Pennsylvania Assembly scheduled to adjourn on September 29, the Republicans wanted to call a state convention before the end of the session to consider the new Federal Constitution. Although the Republicans felt they could maintain their political control, they

wanted to strike while they had a majority and before a new assembly would have to be elected. The Republicans orchestrated a petition campaign in support of the Federal Constitution. Within a few days, petitions with over 4,000 signatures poured into the Assembly. The Assembly took up the matter of calling a state ratifying convention on Friday, September 28. George Clymer made a motion for a resolution which called for a state ratifying convention to consider the Federal Constitution. The resolution specified the electoral procedures and set a date and a time for the convention to meet. Another resolution by Clymer proposed that the convention also be empowered to cede land to the new congress for a seat of government. These resolutions brought about several hours of debate in which many Constitutionalsists, led by the western Pennsylvanians William Findley and Robert Whitehill, argued against the calling of a ratifying convention until the people had more time to study it. However, upon the call of the roll, the Assembly voted 43-19 to approve the convention. Thirty-four Republicans were joined by nine Constitutionalsists in the vote. The Assembly then adjourned until later that afternoon at which time they would set a date and place for the convention and a date for election of delegates.³⁸

However, when the Assembly reconvened later that afternoon 19 of the Constitutionalsists were absent, thereby preventing a quorum. Most of the 19 absent members were from western Pennsylvania where feeling against the new Constitution was strongest. The sergeant at arms was sent to look for the missing assemblymen and found most of them at the boardinghouse of Major Alexander Boyd, a strong supporter of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. The absent legislators, led by Robert Whitehill and William Findley, refused to return to the Assembly.

Because of the lack of a quorum the Assembly was forced to adjourn until the next day. The Constitutionalist strategy to undermine the convening of the constitutional ratifying convention was apparently carried out with the knowledge and aid of John Smilie and James McLene, two Constitutionalist members of the Supreme Executive Council who were from western Pennsylvania, and by George Bryan, a judge on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and a leader of the Constitutionalist party.³⁹

When the assembly convened the next morning the 19 Constitutionlists were still not in attendance. The sergeant at arms, this time accompanied by a group of "volunteers", was again asked to find and return the missing members. Shortly two of the absentees, Jacob Miley and James McCalmont, were brought forcibly into the chamber. McCalmont protested this action and asked to be dismissed but his request was refused. When he tried to leave the chamber he was forced to return to his seat. When the roll was taken a quorum was present and the Assembly proceeded to discuss the resolutions introduced the previous day by George Clymer. The legislators then voted for November 6 as the date for the election of convention delegates. The convention itself was set to begin two weeks later on November 20. Pennsylvania had become the first state to call a ratifying convention for the new Federal Constitution. This was done, in fact, before the official notification of the proposed Constitution was received from the Continental Congress.⁴⁰ Nor did the forceful methods of the Republicans endear them to many Constitutionalist supporters. Although Pennsylvania was well on the road to ratification, the path would not be easy.

The Constitutionlists, soon to be named Antifederalists and later to become Democratic-Republicans almost to a man, began their partisan

newspaper campaign immediately. In a broadside dated September 29 and published on October 2 by Eleazer Oswald, publisher of the Independent Gazetteer, 16 of the 19 "absentee" assemblymen attacked the Republicans and the new Constitution. Also printed in Oswald's paper on October 3, a piece entitled An Address of the Subscribers, Members of the Late House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to Their Constituents, faulted the Republicans for their actions in forcing a premature convention and listed their reasons for opposing the proposed Federal Constitution. The Constitutionalist maintained that all eight of the Pennsylvania delegates to the Federal Constitutional Convention were from the Philadelphia area and did not represent the agrarian western parts of the state. Furthermore, they said that the Constitutionalist had been vastly underrepresented in the Pennsylvania delegation. Over the next several months a myriad of articles against the Constitution appeared in the Philadelphia and other state newspapers. A particularly long series of essays, most of which were published in the Independent Gazetteer, began in October, 1787 and ran until November 1788 under the pseudonym of "Centinel". Written by Samuel Bryan, the son of George Bryan, the essays among other things proposed the convening of a second convention to undo the mistakes of the first.⁴¹

There were also many articles in the newspapers by Republicans in support of the Federal Constitution. Under the pseudonym "American Citizen", Tench Coxe published three articles which appeared in the Independent Gazetteer. These articles, the first major defense of the Constitution published in the country, discussed and justified several sections of the Constitution. Another defense of the Federal Constitution in Pennsylvania was a speech, later published in the

Pennsylvania Herald, by James Wilson, a leading Republican who had been a member of the Constitutional Convention. The speech was given in the State House Yard at a meeting to nominate a slate of candidates for the next Pennsylvania Assembly. Wilson claimed that those people who opposed the Constitution did so only for selfish political reasons. He maintained that the lack of a bill of rights, an alarming omission in the minds of the Antifederalists, was of no great concern because the states would still protect those liberties through their own constitutions. And the federal government could not destroy those liberties because the states had not given that power to the federal government. Six Republican assemblymen, including Thomas Fitzsimons and George Clymer, responded in a newspaper article to the previous Address of the 16 "absentee" Constitutionals. They pointed out that both William Findley and Robert Whitehill had been on the committee that appointed the constitutional convention delegates. At that time, the Republicans claimed, they both felt that it would be easier and less inconvenient for all concerned if the delegates were from the Philadelphia area.⁴²

Most of these articles in the newspapers for or against the Federal Constitution were done in preparation for the Assembly election on October 9 and for the election of delegates to the constitutional ratifying convention on November 6. The Assembly election ended in a close decision between the two opposing parties with the Republicans gaining 34 seats and the Constitutionals 31. Even though this was a loss of several seats for the Republicans, they felt it was an important step toward victory in the elections to the ratifying convention. Republican John Montgomery's prediction that western Pennsylvania would be heavily Constitutionalist was right on target.

Only five of the 34 Republicans elected were from counties west of the Susquehanna River and three of those were from conservative York County just west of the river. The city of Philadelphia and the five southeastern counties of Bucks, Chester, Lancaster, Philadelphia, and Montgomery chose 27 Republicans and only three Constitutionals, all from Montgomery County, to the Assembly.⁴³

The election a few weeks later for the ratifying convention was along the same lines as the Assembly election, except that the Republicans did even better. They elected 46 delegates and the Constitutionals chose 23. Again, the results showed an obvious east-west split. In the city and county of Philadelphia the Republicans won all 10 delegates. It was obvious that the commercial center of Philadelphia was strongly in favor of the new constitution. In the five southeastern counties and city of Philadelphia the Republicans elected 29 delegates and the Constitutionals elected only one. Of the 46 Republicans chosen only 12 were from west of the Susquehanna River, and six of those were from York County. The Constitutionals elected only nine delegates from east of the Susquehanna River and five of those were from Berks County.⁴⁴

The election results almost assured that the Constitution would be ratified by Pennsylvania. It was a big boost for the Republican and Federalist cause, especially because it came so quickly after the Federal Constitutional Convention. Although the debate over the Constitution continued after the election, even most of the Constitutionals realized that their chances for slowing down the Republican and Federalist momentum were slim. Even the crowd in Philadelphia turned pro-Federalist. On the night of the election a

large group of Republican and Federalist supporters marched on the boarding house of Alexander Boyd, a well known Constitutionalist and Antifederalist. Boyd's rooming house was the place where the "absentee" Constitutionlists had gone in their attempt to keep from having a quorum during the vote to call a ratifying convention. Seven prominent western Pennsylvanian Constitutionlists, including William Findley and John Smilie, were residents of the boarding house. The mob attacked Boyd's house and the lodgers within. The crowd yelled abusive words, beat on the door, threw rocks through several windows, and threatened to hang the Antifederalists. The crowd dispersed after harassing the homes of other Antifederalist Constitutionlists including George Bryan, Dr. James Hutchinson, and John Nicholson. Following a heated debate on November 10 the Assembly gave the victims some satisfaction by condemning the riot and asked the Supreme Executive Council to apprehend the offenders. The Supreme Executive Council offered a reward of \$300 for apprehension and conviction of the rioters, but no one was ever arrested.⁴⁵

The Pennsylvania ratifying convention met from November 20 to December 15, 1787 in the State House in Philadelphia. A leading Republican and Federalist, the well known German Frederick A. Muhlenberg from Montgomery County, was chosen as President of the convention. It was obvious even to the Constitutionlists that the Constitution would be ratified. However, the Antifederal Constitutionlists, led by the western Pennsylvania trio of William Findley, John Smilie, and Robert Whitehill, argued vigorously against it. Their main objections against the Constitution were that the liberties of the people would be lessened because of the lack of a bill of rights and that the state

governments would lose their sovereignty. The Federalists, led by James Wilson, Thomas Hartley, and George Clymer, replied that because the people had not delegated any of their rights that a bill of rights was not necessary. Furthermore, all of their liberties which were now allowed them by their respective states would still be in force. And even if the states did lose some of their sovereignty, as the Federalists admitted, the Constitution would help the United States to become a stronger, stabler, and more prosperous nation since the central government would be much more effective than under the Articles of Confederation.⁴⁶

On December 12, 1787 the Federal Constitution was ratified in the Pennsylvania Convention by a vote of 46 to 23. Pennsylvania became the first large state and the second state after Delaware to ratify the Constitution. On the last two days of the convention, at the urging of the Republicans from Philadelphia and the surrounding counties, the delegates discussed a resolution to cede a ten mile square tract of land to Congress for the capital of the new government. This resolution, clearly of advantage to the state, and a reason for the popularity of the new Constitution in Philadelphia, was adopted along with an offer of the use of public buildings in Philadelphia until the permanent seat of government was established by Congress.⁴⁷

Twenty-one of the 23 Antifederal Constitutionalists who voted against ratification published "The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents" in the Pennsylvania Packet on December 18. This "Dissent" was later published in other newspapers throughout Pennsylvania and as a broadside of Eleazer Oswald. As an "official" statement of the

convention minority, the "Dissent" summarized the arguments which the Pennsylvania Antifederalists had used against the Constitution. It was not only a partisan political attack against the Republicans and Federalists, but also outlined the Constitution from the perspective of those who believed in state sovereignty and that the new government would take away some of the rights and liberties of the people.⁴⁸

The division over the Federal Constitution was similar to those earlier political battles between the Republicans and Constitutionalist over the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, the test oaths, the College of Philadelphia, and economic policies. The Republican leaders of the previous decade, such as James Wilson, Robert Morris, George Clymer, Thomas Fitzsimons, and Thomas Hartley, were also those who pushed for adoption of the Constitution. Likewise, it was the Constitutionalist leaders, such as George Bryan, William Findley, John Smilie, Robert Whitehill, and John Nicholson who led the opposition to the Constitution. Federalists drew support largely from English Anglicans and Quakers, and German Lutherans and Sectarians. On the other hand, the Antifederalists were composed largely of Scotch-Irish Presbyterians and Reformed Germans. Federalists also tended to be more involved with commerce, finance, and industry. The supporters of the Constitution-
alists and Antifederalists, especially the core leaders from western Pennsylvania, tended to be much more dependent on agriculture and political office for their livelihood. In fact, the Constitutionalist fear that the new Constitution would threaten the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 under which many of them held elective or appointive office was soon to become a reality.⁴⁹

The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790

Republicans drew new hope for overturning the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 from the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the beginning of the new federal government, and their increasing strength in the Assembly. Benjamin Rush and other Pennsylvania Federalists felt that the change of government on the national level would make it easier to achieve constitutional change on the state level. The Republicans pointed out several inconsistencies between the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions and argued that the Pennsylvania Constitution should be changed to reflect these differences. The changes most often mentioned were a bicameral legislature in place of the unicameral legislature and a single executive in place of the unwieldy Supreme Executive Council. Ignoring the constitutional provision regarding the Council of Censors and its authority to initiate action for a constitutional convention, the Republican controlled Assembly in March, 1789 voted to appeal directly to the people through a petition campaign throughout the state calling for a convention. Two Philadelphia newspapers, the Federal Gazette supporting the Federalists and the Independent Gazetteer for the Constitutionalist took opposing sides in the campaign. Despite opposition from the Constitutionalist controlled Supreme Executive Council and disappointing results from the petition campaign the Republicans adopted a report in September which held that a majority of the people wanted a convention. The Assembly then set the procedures for electing delegates in October for a convention to meet in November. As Thomas Hartley indicated in a letter to a fellow Republican, their hopes were now high that the upcoming convention would solve many of Pennsylvania's political problems.⁵⁰

The October elections for the Constitutional Convention were again dominated by the Republicans. The eastern counties of Pennsylvania and the city of Philadelphia again sent strong Republican delegations. The Republicans were led by James Wilson, Thomas Mifflin, William Lewis, and Thomas McKean. With few delegates from eastern Pennsylvania the Constitutionalist were led by the agrarian faction from western Pennsylvania. Their reliable leaders such as William Findley, John Smilie, Robert Whitehill, David Redick, and James McLene were again elected. Another western Pennsylvanian present who was to become more well known in later years was the 28 year old Swiss born Albert Gallatin from Fayette County. As it was his inaugural political involvement in Pennsylvania, he did not play a large part in the convention.⁵¹

The Constitutional Convention opened in Philadelphia on November 24, 1789. The popular revolutionary war officer and "fighting Quaker", Thomas Mifflin, was chosen as President of the convention. The Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention was less acrimonious than the Federal Constitutional Ratifying Convention had been. The Constitutionalist, realizing that the Constitution of 1776 would be changed whether they liked it or not, were willing to compromise with the moderate Republicans to keep some features of the 1776 Constitution intact, especially those concerning voting rights. The Constitutionalist, led by William Findley, and the moderate Republicans, led by James Wilson, agreed early in the convention that certain changes should be made in the Constitution of 1776. By large margins it was decided that the legislature should be bicameral and that there would be a single executive. It was also agreed that there would be some changes in the judiciary and in the Declaration of Rights. In spite of

an attack on the broad franchise of the 1776 Constitution by the conservative Republicans, Wilson and Findley agreed to maintain this important feature.⁵²

One issue that caused much controversy concerned the proposal by the conservative Republicans that the upper chamber of the legislature should be chosen by electors rather than directly by the people. This proposal, supported by William Lewis and his conservative allies, was defeated by the Constitutionalist and the more moderate Republicans. A similar alignment occurred on the issue over whether to weight representation in the upper house of the legislature toward counties that had higher taxable wealth. Again William Lewis, Samuel Sitgreaves, and others favored this method of representation. The majority, including moderate Republicans as well as Constitutionalist successfully opposed this attempt to give greater influence to men of property. Men such as George Clymer complained that the Pennsylvania Senate, unlike that of the national government, would now be at the mercy of the popular will rather than being controlled by stable men of property.⁵³

The Convention on February 26, 1790 proclaimed that the finished constitution should be submitted to the people. They then adjourned for five months in order to allow the people a chance to express their thoughts on the proposed constitution. The Convention reconvened in Philadelphia for its second session on August 9, 1790. The Republicans were confident that no major changes would be made in the proposed constitution. After a few minor changes the constitution was accepted by the delegates on September 2, 1790 by a vote of 61 to 1.⁵⁴

The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 was obviously a victory for the Republicans in their long battle for a more balanced government.

They had achieved their goals of a bicameral legislature, a single executive, and a judiciary appointed and maintained on good behavior. However, the compromises and general good feelings between the two opposing parties at the 1790 Constitutional Convention also showed that the Republicans, or at least the moderate faction of the party, had come to accept some of the ideology of the Constitutionalist, particularly popular sovereignty, equal rights, and a government representative of the people. The 1790 Constitution kept intact the important liberal voting provisions of the 1776 Constitution which allowed all free male taxpayers over the age of 21 who had been Pennsylvania residents for two years and their dependent sons over 21 to vote. The civil liberties guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights in 1776 were also reaffirmed. Despite attempts by the conservative Republicans to change it, representation in both houses of the legislature remained in proportion to the taxable residents in the voting districts. Reapportionment of representation in response to changes in population was also provided for.⁵⁵ Although the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 was in many respects a Republican victory and counter-revolution of sorts, it was by no means a return to the pre-1776 status quo.

The political compromises by both parties concerning the Constitution of 1790 indicated a movement toward an acceptance of genuine two party competition which would become even more institutionalized during the party battles in the next decade. It seemed that both parties were willing to contend for political control on the basis of mutually acceptable state and federal constitutions. The Republicans showed that they were willing to accommodate political opposition, particularly if their goal of a more balanced constitution was achieved.

On the other hand, the Constitutionalist realized that the road back to political dominance required the abandonment of their earlier insistence that they were the exclusive legitimate expression of the public interest. Furthermore, the acceptance by the Republicans of some of the basic ideas of the 1776 Constitution, particularly the concepts of popular sovereignty and equal political privileges, was an important step in the direction of more modern politics and a decline of deference.⁵⁶

The Pennsylvania Gubernatorial Election of 1790

Even before the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention adjourned, both Republicans and Constitutionalist began looking for appropriate candidates for the important new position of governor. The governor's term ran for three years with the provision that he could serve no more than nine out of 12 years. Both parties realized that once in power they could possibly hold the governorship for nine straight years. Senator William Maclay predicted to Benjamin Rush, accurately as it turned out, "Nine years is a long term and I think it two to one that the person who wins the first election, will hold it for that period."⁵⁷ Five of the most often mentioned candidates were Thomas Mifflin, Robert Morris, Frederick Muhlenberg, George Bryan, and Arthur St. Clair. Mifflin was the current President of the Supreme Executive Council and a very popular Revolutionary War hero. Though associated with the Republican party, Mifflin was well known and popular throughout the state. Robert Morris was a current United States Senator and a wealthy merchant who was also an influential leader of the more conservative faction of the Republican party in Philadelphia. Frederick Muhlenberg, a Republican, was a popular German politician currently in the United

States House of Representatives and Speaker of that body. George Bryan was a justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and a leader of the Constitutionalist party in Philadelphia. General Arthur St. Clair, a Republican and a Revolutionary War officer, was currently governor of the Northwest Territory. The result of the election for Governor, much like that of the just completed Constitutional Convention, was to end in the choice of a compromise candidate.

Although favoring Bryan, the Constitutionlists decided to throw their support to Mifflin who as a moderate Republican was much favored over the likes of the conservative Republican candidates Morris and St. Clair. Realizing that the Constitutionalist candidate probably would not win, they decided to get the best they could out of the situation. In a letter to Albert Gallatin asking for western Pennsylvania support, Samuel Bryan, the son of George Bryan, explained that since the party was not strong, particularly in eastern Pennsylvania, it was felt "that Mifflin would be the best bet we could carry."⁵⁸ Dr. James Hutchinson, a Constitutionalist and later a Democratic-Republican party organizer in Philadelphia, also threw his support to Mifflin. In a letter to Albert Gallatin in June of 1790, he wrote confidently of Mifflin's chances. Hutchinson expressed his satisfaction on hearing that the western counties of Fayette and Washington were favorably disposed toward Mifflin. He also wrote that he was certain that Mifflin would be opposed by the "aristocrats of this city."⁵⁹ The Constitutionlists, knowing that Mifflin was not a strong party man, were hoping that he might be persuaded to reward some of them after he received their support.

Many of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation, led by the conservative Representatives Thomas Fitzsimons and Robert Morris, opposed Mifflin as a candidate. They thought Mifflin, an unreliable party man, would be difficult to control, especially in the distribution of patronage. Speaking to Frederick Muhlenberg, Thomas Fitzsimons declared that "Mifflin must not be Governor," and that if he were, "they would be worse off than if no new Constitution had been made."⁶⁰ Consequently, at one of the weekly dinners of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation in New York, with James Wilson also present, Fitzsimons claimed that "it is expected of us that we should fix the Governor of Pennsylvania."⁶¹ At this same meeting, Morris, knowing that Muhlenberg also desired to be a candidate, intimated that their supporters should chose either himself or Muhlenberg. Shortly thereafter, in a letter to Benjamin Rush in Philadelphia, Fitzsimons urged Rush and his friends to work against Mifflin's candidacy.⁶² These political maneuvers by Morris and Fitzsimons indicate that the Federalists in the Pennsylvania delegation were attempting, through the use of legislative caucuses, to develop a "party in the legislature," which is one of the aspects of tripartite organization in developing modern parties.

However, the Republican congressional group did not decide on their candidate until September. Morris decided not to try for the governorship and Fitzsimons discouraged Muhlenberg by adeptly pointing out the importance and dignity of the Speaker's post. It was obvious to Senator Maclay that Fitzsimons was attempting to talk Muhlenberg out of running for governor. Muhlenberg then indicated that he would not run against the wishes of his friends.⁶³ In a broadside published on September 6, 1790 and signed by seven conservative Republicans the

congressional group announced their support for Arthur St. Clair. The signees of the campaign broadside were four current members of Congress, Thomas Fitzsimons, George Clymer, Robert Morris, and Frederick Muhlenberg, along with three of their allies, James Wilson, Benjamin Rush, and William Lewis. The contents of the broadside were also later published in the Pennsylvania Packet. The broadside, after congratulating the people of Pennsylvania on their new Constitution, maintained that it could only be carried out if Arthur St. Clair were elected Governor. After listing the many good qualities of their candidate, the signees stressed the point that

. . . he possesses the confidence of the President of the United States, and of course will not fail to use it for the important purpose of maintaining a constant harmony between the State of Pennsylvania and the Executive power of the National Government.⁶⁴

In many respects the first gubernatorial campaign in Pennsylvania was between a national Court-oriented candidate and a state Country-oriented candidate. The supporters of St. Clair, particularly those who signed the campaign broadside, tended to be nationalists and associated with the federal government and the policies of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton. While the broadside had emphasized St. Clair's influence with Washington, it also intimated that this would not be the case with Mifflin. The Republicans in Congress felt that with St. Clair they would have more influence and patronage than with Mifflin. This certainly turned out to be true as Mifflin gave many appointments to Constitutionlists as well as to Republicans. A case in point which gave the Republicans much frustration was Mifflin's appointment of Alexander Dallas to the important position of Secretary of the Commonwealth. Dallas later became very instrumental in helping to

organize the Democratic-Republican party in Pennsylvania, both on the state and national levels. Although both candidates had experience in the military and Continental Congress, Mifflin was heavily involved in Pennsylvania politics while St. Clair was not. Also, while Mifflin resided in and was very well known in Pennsylvania. St. Clair seldom actually lived in the state. Many of the supporters of Mifflin, particularly the Constitutionals, had a parochial and state oriented outlook. Though they were not all Antifederalists by any means (although many of the Constitutionals undoubtedly were) they were not so closely associated with the federal government as were the St. Clair enthusiasts. Letters written by two of his supporters show this very well. Thomas Fitzsimons wrote to St. Clair that those who backed him would "not spare pains to accomplish what they believe would prove highly advantageous to our country."⁶⁵ And Tench Coxe, writing to Benjamin Rush, maintained that St. Clair would bring Pennsylvania into closer alignment with the more patriotic aims of the federal government.⁶⁶ Such statements were sure to attract those who were partial to the Court ideology.

The campaign did not go well for St. Clair from the very beginning. Within a few weeks of the campaign opening broadside, the once confident Fitzsimons stated that "our opposition to Mifflin is futile in the extreme, a thousand circumstances combine to render it so."⁶⁷ Fitzsimons complained that Mifflin had associated himself "with the Constitutionals."⁶⁸ He realized that Mifflin would win in most areas of the state and agreed that "we must suffer the consequences."⁶⁹ Another of the Republican congressional group who backed the wrong horse saw that not only would Mifflin win but that those who supported St. Clair might

suffer when they came up for reelection. George Clymer noted this concern when he wrote to a friend that:

. . . Mifflin goes on swimmingly and I suspect that certain people who have opposed him in the letter of information as it is called will find in the election for Congress their prospects of ambition a little marred thereby.⁷⁰

Clymer, one of those "certain people," was already worried about holding his seat in the second congressional elections.

St. Clair realized that "individuals who composed the Constitutional party" were giving their support to Mifflin.⁷¹ In his letter to Fitzsimons on the day of the election St. Clair made a sound prediction when he wrote, "That party is not yet dissolved, and will probably revive under a different name indeed, but with the same views."⁷² It was not long before the rise of the Democratic-Republican party was to make this observation very accurate. St. Clair also informed Fitzsimons that William Findley was busy working for Mifflin in western Pennsylvania. He realized that with the Constitutionalists' support western Pennsylvania would vote strongly for Mifflin. However, he hoped that the decision in the eastern Pennsylvania counties would be more closely divided.⁷³

The election contest was not even close as Mifflin won by a landslide. He received over 90 percent of the votes with a statewide margin of 27,725 to only 2,802 for St. Clair. St. Clair did not carry a single county in the state.⁷⁴

Conclusion

As noted by Robert Brunhouse, the triumph of the Republican-Federalist interest at the end of the 1780's in Pennsylvania constituted a counter-revolution in some respects.⁷⁵ What happened, however, was both less and more than simple counter-revolution. Several important

aspects of the Constitution of 1776 were retained in the new constitution, most notably a liberal franchise, the abolition of special qualifications for office-holding and the decision to eliminate wealth as a basis for representation. The creation of a governor and a bicameral legislature thus provided greater executive energy and more balance in the political system without undermining its essentially responsive and democratic character. It is easy to exaggerate a counter-revolution of these proportions.

However, other important changes were occurring as well. After a decade of intensely ideological party conflict the Constitutionals, Pennsylvania's party of the Revolution, were changing their tactics in accord with altered perceptions of partisan politics. As exponents of the radical Country tradition, they had first assumed that all citizens could be united by the ideals of personal virtue and independence. When opposition immediately surfaced against their Constitution of 1776 in contradiction to these ideals their response was to exclude their opponents through test oaths and intimidation. In so doing they alienated many of their supporters. By the late 1780's they were forced to adjust to the heterogeneous character of the Pennsylvania electorate that they themselves had in great measure mobilized. This was another dimension of the counter-revolution of the period. After being excluded from power again the Constitutionals grudgingly accepted the new federal and state constitutions and proceeded to work within the system to regain the ascendancy they had lost. This accommodation by the Constitutionals to the realities of pluralistic politics did not mean that they abandoned all of their Country party values and assumptions. They continued to distrust and remained poised to oppose

programs of national consolidation in any form, for example. It was this ideological tendency that provided substantial continuity between the politics of the Revolutionary period and the 1790's.

Even though the Constitution of 1776 and the party upon which it was based met defeat in the late 1780's, some aspects of the Constitution were to continue and to have an effect on the development of parties in the 1790's. Contrary to the view espoused by Harry Tinkcom in his study on Pennsylvania in the 1790's, the new federal and state constitutions and the establishment of a new national government did not lead to a complete "realignment of affiliations and a reinterpretation of ideologies" in Pennsylvania.⁷⁶ Although the Country-oriented Constitutionalists were greatly outnumbered for several years by their opponents, they maintained their strong agrarian base in western Pennsylvania. The Constitutionalists gradually won back not only much of the urban support they had lost in the late 1780's but they attracted many of those who soon became disenchanted with the repressive Court policies of the dominant Federalist party. In Pennsylvania the nucleus, as well as most of the fringes, of the 1790 Federalists and Democratic-Republicans were very similar to those of the Republican and Constitutionalist parties of the previous period. The old Court versus Country conflicts did not rapidly disappear but were continued within the framework of the new federal government and its constitution. This time the battle was not to be over the validity of the constitution but over control of the government within the bounds of that constitution.

ENDNOTES

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¹⁵"One of the People," Pennsylvania Packet, 5 November 1776.

¹⁶Arnold, "Political Ideology," pp. 86-87.

¹⁷Marshall, Diary, pp. 97-99, 102; Pennsylvania Gazette, 23 October 1776; Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution, pp. 223-225; Pennsylvania Packet, 12 November 1776; Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942), p. 20.

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CHAPTER III

THE PENNSYLVANIA DELEGATION IN THE FIRST CONGRESS

The First Federal Elections in Pennsylvania

Much like the split in Pennsylvania over the Federal Constitution, the first federal elections in 1788 were an extension of the continuing party battles between the Republican and Constitutionalist parties. During the election campaign, as during the fight over ratification of the Federal Constitution, the parties were often labeled Federalist and Antifederalist rather than Republican and Constitutionalist. Most Republicans favored the Constitution and most Constitutionlists opposed it. Thus, most Republicans, who believed in the Court philosophy of a strong central government, soon became Federalists and most Constitutionlists, as followers of the Country tradition which feared governmental power, later became Democratic-Republicans. Even though the Republicans won the 1788 elections and solidified their hold on Pennsylvania politics on both the state and national level, the elections were significant in that there were two slates of candidates put up by the opposing parties.

Controversy over the Federal Constitution increased rather than declined after ratification. Besides the "Dissent of the Minority," discussed above, many of the Constitutionalist leaders started a petition campaign against the Constitution. Initiated by the Antifederalist John Nicholson, the comptroller general of Pennsylvania,

the petition urged that the Pennsylvania Assembly, censure the Pennsylvania delegates to the Federal Constitutional Convention for exceeding their authority, reject the ratification of the Constitution by the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, and instruct the Pennsylvania delegates in the Continental Congress not to approve the Constitution. The petition was printed in the Carlisle Gazette on January 30, 1788 and copies were sent to several counties to be printed in other Anti-federalist newspapers. In March several copies of the petition with over 6,000 signatures were sent to the Assembly. The Assembly, controlled by the Republicans, ignored the petitions.¹

The Antifederalists continued their opposition to the Constitution, especially in the counties of western Pennsylvania. But many of them soon realized that as more states ratified the Constitution they would have to accept it. They did, however, continue to argue for amendments to it. When on June 30 the Antifederalists of Cumberland County discovered that Virginia had become the tenth state to ratify the Constitution, they sent out a circular letter calling for a state convention in September to meet in Harrisburg to propose amendments and to nominate a slate of candidates for the First Congress. The Cumberland County Circular Letter of July 3, 1788 suggested that it would be "expedient to have proper persons put in nomination by the delegates in conference, being the most likely method of directing the views of the electors to the same object, and of obtaining the desired end."²

At county and township meetings during July and August throughout Pennsylvania, the Constitutionals chose delegates to attend the state convention at Harrisburg. Thirty-three delegates representing the city

of Philadelphia and 13 of the 19 counties met at Harrisburg from September 3-6. There were some differences of opinion about what policies to pursue. One group, of which Albert Gallatin from Fayette County was a member, wanted to establish an interstate organization of Antifederalists. A set of resolutions prepared by Gallatin called for continued opposition to the Federal Constitution. The resolutions requested that a national conference be held to revise and amend the Constitution. However, at the urging of Charles Pettit from Philadelphia, the delegates chose a more moderate course. Pettit argued that since the Constitution was favored by most Pennsylvanians and had been ratified in 11 states, it would be necessary to accept the Constitution and work within the new government in order to regain voter support. Following Pettit's advice the Harrisburg convention recommended that the people acquiesce in the organization of the new government. But the delegates also made a list of 12 proposed amendments to the Constitution. They requested the Pennsylvania Assembly to urge the new Congress to accept the proposed amendments. This acquiescence in the acceptance of the Constitution, with the hope of amendments, was an important step in the rebuilding of the Constitutionalist party.³

The Harrisburg Convention also nominated eight candidates to run for election to the First Congress under the new Constitution. Unlike the proposed amendments and the rest of the convention proceedings, the so called "Harrisburg ticket" was not formally reported to the public until the Pennsylvania Assembly decided on the election procedure in October, 1788. The Constitutionlists, suspecting that the Federalists would pass a general election law which would favor their party, wanted to nominate and seek private support for their candidates as early as




Figure 1. Counties and Major Cities of Pennsylvania

possible before the elections. The Constitutionalist circulated the Harrisburg ticket privately throughout the state until it was published in November. Among the eight candidates were five leaders of the Constitutionalist party. Charles Pettit and Blair McClenachan were chosen as candidates from the Philadelphia area. William Findley and William Montgomery were chosen to represent the western part of the state. The other Constitutionalist candidate was Robert Whitehill from central Pennsylvania. All five men had been involved in the political battles between the Constitutionalist and Republican parties.⁴

In what turned out to be a shrewd political move, the Constitutionalist chose three moderate Republicans to fill out the remaining positions on the Harrisburg ticket. Although nominal Republicans, the three were not strong Federalists. In fact, they were chosen partly because they were likely to support the move for amendments which the Constitutionalist advocated. All three of these Republicans later became Democratic-Republicans in the 1790's. One of the three Republicans was William Irvine, a popular Revolutionary War general from Cumberland County. Irvine was distrusted by the more conservative and nationalist faction of the Republican party led by Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimons, and their allies. Irvine was particularly attractive to the Constitutionalist because he had been one of the members of a committee of the Continental Congress which had accused Morris of corruption in the handling of finances during the Revolutionary War. The other two Republicans chosen by the Constitutionalist were the popular Germans, Daniel Hiester and Peter Muhlenberg. This ethnic strategy was effective as both were elected and subsequently opposed many of the Federalist policies in the First Congress.⁵

The Republicans, who controlled the Pennsylvania Assembly, were also making plans for the first federal elections. Discussion of whether to have statewide or district elections began as early as July. However, the Pennsylvania Assembly had to wait until the Continental Congress put the Constitution into operation on September 13, before election plans could be made. Guarding against the possibility that the Constitutionalists might win the state assembly elections in October, the Republicans were resolved to elect Pennsylvania's two United States Senators and provide for an election law before those elections took place. On October 4, 1788 the Pennsylvania Assembly passed an election law which regulated the selection of congressmen and presidential electors. The eight congressmen were to be chosen in statewide elections on November 26, 1788. By providing for at-large elections the Republicans were wisely exploiting the majority of voters in Pennsylvania who supported the Federal Constitution. The placement of all candidates on one statewide ticket would greatly increase their chances of electing an all Federalist slate to the First Congress. District elections might have led to several Antifederalists being chosen because of the strength of the Constitutionalists in western Pennsylvania.⁶

The Republican controlled Assembly also wisely chose the state's two Senators before adjourning. The two early Republican favorites were William Maclay and George Clymer. However, after Morris consented to being a candidate there was a move to put him in place of Maclay. At this juncture the Constitutionalists, who had little chance to elect one of their own, decided to support the moderate Irvine and the disgruntled Maclay. This support was probably more than just coincidental since Irvine later became a strong member of the

Democratic-Republican party and Maclay became a leading anti-administration critic during his two years in the Senate. Realizing that Morris could lose if only a few Republicans along with the Constitutionals, voted for Irvine and Maclay, the Republicans decided to support Morris and Maclay. The result of the balloting on September 30 was 66 votes for Maclay, 37 for Morris, and 31 for Irvine. Laying more groundwork for Irvine's eventual entry into the opposition, the Constitutionalist David Redick reminded Irvine that the Constitutionals had supported him and that if it had not been for his Republican "friends" he "would doubtless have been elected."⁷

The campaign for the election of the eight congressional delegates was exciting and bitter. Although the Republicans had learned of the results of the Harrisburg Convention and the Constitutionalist slate of congressional candidates, they did not finalize plans for their own nominations until after the election of Senators and just prior to passage of the election law. On October 1, 1788 a group of Republicans representing 11 counties and the city of Philadelphia convened in Philadelphia and planned a conference to meet in Lancaster on November 3 for the purpose of choosing candidates to the House of Representatives and for presidential electors. Throughout October the Pennsylvania Republicans met in their respective counties to appoint delegates to the Lancaster Conference. On November 3, 28 Republican representatives from Philadelphia and 18 counties met at Lancaster. All eight Republican candidates were Federalists. Half of the Lancaster ticket, including Thomas Fitzsimons, George Clymer, Thomas Hartley, and Frederick Muhlenberg, was associated with the influential Morris junto based in Philadelphia. The other four candidates chosen were

Henry Wynkoop, Thomas Scott, Stephen Chambers, and John Allison. All of these men, with the exception of Muhlenberg, remained loyal Federalists throughout the 1790's.⁸

Although the Republicans did much better in the congressional elections than the Constitutionalists, they would probably have won all eight seats had the Germans not altered the tickets of both parties. Many Germans, who made up approximately one third of the population of Pennsylvania, maintained they were underrepresented on both tickets, particularly the Republican one on which Frederick Muhlenberg was the only German politician named. In an anonymous broadside and in newspaper articles the Germans published revised tickets for both parties. Feeling that three Germans would be appropriate on each ticket, they removed Robert Whitehill from the Harrisburg ticket and replaced him with Frederick Muhlenberg. On the Federalist Lancaster ticket the Germans substituted Peter Muhlenberg and Daniel Hiester for Stephen Chambers and John Allison. Consequently, since they were on both tickets, all three Germans were elected to the First Congress.⁹

The Constitutionalists were evidently beginning to understand the importance of ethnic politics in a heterogeneous state like Pennsylvania. They openly bid for the German vote and accepted the revised tickets. The changes obviously favored the chances of the two Germans on their original slate. The initial choice of Peter Muhlenberg and Daniel Hiester had effectively balanced their ticket as the other candidates were mostly of Scotch-Irish background. The opponents of the Federalists were to effectively use ethnic politics throughout the 1790's in their building of the Democratic-Republican party in Pennsylvania. On the other hand, the Federalists ignored the revised

tickets and their attempt at ethnic support. Federalists generally believed that such overt catering to nationalities could lead to bitter jealousies between various ethnic groups.¹⁰

The outcome of the first federal elections in Pennsylvania can be considered a Republican and Federalist victory since six of the eight congressmen elected were from the Lancaster ticket. If Chambers and Allison had not been dropped by the German voters, the Republicans would probably have elected all eight of their candidates. The strategy of the Constitutionalists in supporting the Germans Peter Muhlenberg and Hiester was also successful. The movement of Hiester and Muhlenberg toward an eventual home in the Democratic-Republican party began in the First Congress when they opposed several Federalist policies of Washington's administration. The wooing of Irvine was likewise to lead to his entry into the opposing party. The voting results, except those for the three Germans which were largely based on nationality, followed previous party lines and divisions. The populous counties of eastern Pennsylvania voted overwhelmingly for the Republicans and the western counties voted strongly for the Constitutionalists. The voter turnout in western Pennsylvania where Antifederalist feeling was strongest was lower than usual. On the other hand, voter turnout was higher than normal in eastern Pennsylvania where Federalism was strongest. The six men from the original Lancaster ticket elected were: Thomas Fitzsimons, George Clymer, Thomas Hartley, Henry Wynkoop, Thomas Scott, and Frederick Muhlenberg. Only Peter Muhlenberg and Daniel Hiester were elected from the original Harrisburg slate.¹¹

The Location of the Capital

The fourth of March, 1789, the day set for the opening of the new Congress in New York City, was marked by the firing of cannons and the ringing of bells. However, only eight Senators and 13 Representatives were present for business at the reconstructed Old City Hall, renamed Federal Hall, at the corner of Wall and Broad Streets. It was not until April 1 that a quorum was present in the House and April 5 for the Senate. The first order of business for the House was the selection of a Speaker. The three candidates for the position were Frederick Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania, Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut, and Elias Boudinot of New Jersey. Muhlenberg won on the first ballot, and according to Henry Wynkoop, another Pennsylvania delegate, by a "very considerable" margin over Trumbull. The choice of Muhlenberg was probably due to two main factors. The first was sectionalism. Since the President was from the South and the Vice President was from New England, many politicians felt that New York and Pennsylvania, as the two leading middle states, should obtain the positions of Speaker and Chief Justice. This was, in fact, what happened as John Jay was named Chief Justice after Muhlenberg won the Speaker's chair. Secondly, Muhlenberg was a good choice because he was considered a moderate politician who could draw support from all sides. This too proved to be the case as Muhlenberg began as a moderate Federalist in the First Congress and ended up a moderate Democratic-Republican by the end of his term in the Fourth Congress. As Speaker, Muhlenberg seldom voted on any roll calls, and so is absent from all the voting scales in the First Congress.¹²

The sectionalism which dominated the Continental Congress was to continue in the First Congress. Most issues which greeted the newly elected Congress in 1789 were ones which had also been faced during the Confederation period by the Continental Congress. One of these continuing problems, and probably the most important question to be considered by the First Congress, was that concerning the permanent location of a residence for the government. This issue, which had both sectional and ideological overtones, was to be the most discussed and time-consuming item of the First Congress. Approximately one-third of the 109 roll calls in the First Congress were concerned with the residence question.¹³

It was also the most crucial of all issues facing the Pennsylvania congressional delegation, especially since several cities in Pennsylvania were mentioned as possible locations. The Pennsylvania delegation lobbied heavily during the First Congress to move the seat of government out of New York and to Philadelphia or some other site in Pennsylvania. During the first months the residence issue was extensively discussed and written about in private but it was not brought up for debate until August. Pennsylvania Senator Robert Morris, in a letter to a Pennsylvania friend, felt this was advantageous to Pennsylvania when he wrote that:

The Question of a removal of the seat of the Federal Government sleeps, but the Idea of fixing a place of permanent residence is a good deal agitated in private conversations amongst the members of the Two Houses, I observe that the more silent the Pennsylvania Delegation are on this Subject, the more anxious are members of other States and if left a good deal to themselves, the more strongly they point to a fixture in our state. The Southern People however pant after the Banks of Potomack but I hope our votes will finally decide.¹⁴

However, soon after Morris wrote his letter the sensitive issue was introduced into the House of Representatives, and by a Pennsylvanian. On August 27, 1789 Thomas Scott of western Pennsylvania moved that a permanent residence should be established "near the centre of wealth, population, and extent of territory" so as to be near the Atlantic Ocean but also with "due regard to the particular situation of the Western country."¹⁵

On the evening of September 2, Senator Rufus King of New York and Representative Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts visited Fitzsimons and Clymer at their lodgings at Anderson's boarding house on Pearl street. Most of the other members of the Pennsylvania delegation were also present. According to Senator Maclay, the northern visitors who opposed the Potomac site favored by the South, were willing to propose a permanent location in Pennsylvania if New York could maintain the temporary capital for a few years. The Pennsylvania delegation discussed the offer and the next morning Senator Morris, believing that the Falls of the Delaware would be the Pennsylvania site named, persuaded the rest of the delegation to go along with the northern bargain. When debate began later that day, Goodhue proposed the east bank of the Susquehanna River as the permanent location with New York to maintain the temporary capital for three more years. Over several days of debate, the Pennsylvanians, led by Hartley, Clymer, and Fitzsimons, supported the Goodhue motion. On September 7, the coalition of Pennsylvania, New York, and New England voted together on eight roll calls as the southern bloc attempted to lure away votes through various amendments. But the southern tactics were to no avail and Clymer, John Laurance of New York, and Fisher Ames of Massachusetts were appointed to bring in a bill to carry out the

proposed resolutions. In a letter to a constituent Hartley pointed out that the Pennsylvania members had stayed united through all the confusion. He also noted that Madison and "the Southern gentlemen" were very angry and called the Pennsylvanians "disingenuous" over their cooperation with the "Eastern men". The wary Hartley, hoping that the unstable situation would remain favorable to Pennsylvania, said: "We have just passed over three remarkable days. Such intrigue, such striking changes, I have never been witness to before."¹⁶

The committee residence bill was passed by the House on September 22 by a vote of 31 to 17 and sent to the Senate. However, before being passed the bill was amended to require Pennsylvania and Maryland to clear the Susquehanna River for navigation before any buildings would be erected at the site. The Philadelphians, particularly Morris, Clymer, and Fitzsimons, were against this because a navigable Susquehanna would mean more trade for Baltimore and less for Philadelphia. Consequently when the bill arrived in the Senate, Morris attempted to have the amendment removed from the bill. When that failed, Morris moved to substitute Germantown in place of the Susquehanna for the permanent site of the capital. This motion met with a nine to nine tie vote which was broken by Vice President John Adams in favor of Germantown. Maclay, who was so upset at Morris over the change, actually voted against the Germantown site. The amended bill now went back to the House where the southern bloc attempted to postpone consideration of the bill. Although this attempt failed, Madison did manage to add an amendment which provided that the laws of Pennsylvania would remain in effect in the capital land cession until Congress decided otherwise. Since Congress was about to adjourn, this delaying tactic was meant to send the bill back to the

Senate where it would hopefully be tabled until the next session. On September 28, the Pennsylvania-Northern coalition voted 31 to 24 to accept the amendment in order to pass the bill. However, the southern strategy worked because when the bill returned to the Senate the New York Senators, Rufus King and Philip Schuyler, joined the South in tabling the bill until Congress reconvened.¹⁷

In the second session the residence question became entangled with the fight over assumption of state debts. The eventual result was a political bargain between Pennsylvania and Virginia which finally settled both the residence and assumption issues. Historians continue to argue over whether this Compromise of 1790 was actually ever consummated, although evidence seems to show that it was.¹⁸ Because the New Yorkers had reneged on their compromise in the first session, the Pennsylvania delegation looked south to Virginia for a new alliance. As early as February, most of the Pennsylvania members had concluded that in order to get out of New York that the Potomac would probably have to be the permanent site. Therefore, they decided to try to arrange for the best deal they could for Philadelphia as a temporary location. At a state delegation caucus held on April 19, the Philadelphia members urged the Pennsylvania delegation to make an alliance with the South, especially after they discovered that New York, Massachusetts, and South Carolina were planning to work together to keep the capital in New York.¹⁹

Morris on May 24 put forth a resolution in the Senate calling for the next session of Congress to be held in Philadelphia. However, the Senate voted 13 to 11 to postpone consideration. A few days later Fitzsimons brought the same question up in the House and it passed by a

vote of 38-22. The resolution passed by a comfortable margin because several New England delegates voted for it after Fitzsimons and Clymer told them that Pennsylvania would agree to any location other than New York. However, this House motion to adjourn to Philadelphia was again defeated in the Senate.²⁰

In a meeting on June 24 the Pennsylvania delegation agreed to accept the Virginia offer of the temporary capital in Philadelphia for 10 years with the permanent capital going to the Potomac. Maclay disagreed with his colleagues but agreed to vote for it because of his acceptance to abide by the vote of the majority for any site in Pennsylvania. After three days of debate the bill for the capital location bargain between Pennsylvania and Virginia passed the Senate on July 1 by a vote of 14-12. The bill went through several days of debate and numerous roll calls before it passed the House on July 9 by a vote of 32-29, with the New York and New England delegations voting against it.²¹

A look at Table I which shows the results of the roll calls concerning the location of the capital issue in the First Congress indicates the obvious sectional nature of the vote. It also shows that Pennsylvania, the only state which voted in a completely solid bloc, played the important role as the swing state on this issue. The Pennsylvania delegation is situated exactly in the middle between the southern and northern voting blocs. On the first 13 roll calls the Pennsylvania delegation voted with the northern bloc. All but one of these roll calls took place during the first session when Pennsylvania was trying to make a deal with the northern bloc in order to move the capital to Pennsylvania. The last 22 votes, all of which took place

TABLE I

SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON LOCATION OF THE CAPITAL IN THE FIRST CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																																							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3				
Cadwalader	NJ	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Vining	DE	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Coles	VA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+		
Lee	VA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Madison	VA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Moore	VA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Parker	VA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
White	VA	+	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Sumter	SC	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	
Mathews	GA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Contee	MD	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	
Griffin	VA	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	
Page	VA	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	
Jackson	GA	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	
Baldwin	GA	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Carroll	MD	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Gale	MD	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Brown	VA	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Stone	MD	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+
Sinnickson	NJ	0	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Ashe	NC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Steele	NC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Williamson	NC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	

TABLE I (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																																											
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3											
Clymer	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+										
Fitzsimons	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+										
Hartley	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+									
Hiester	PA	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+									
Muhlenberg, P.	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+									
Scott	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+								
Wynkoop	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+								
Gilman	NH	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+						
Bloodworth	NC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	-			
Tucker	SC	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	-				
Burke	SC	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+			
Goodhue	MA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	+	+	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	0	+	-	-	-	-					
Seney	MD	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Smith, W.	MD	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-				
Thacher	MA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Smith, W.L.	SC	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Leonard	MA	-	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	0	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Sherman	CN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Wadsworth	CN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Boudinot	NJ	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	0	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Schureman	NJ	+	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Partridge	MA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE I (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																																															
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3														
Gerry	MA	0	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-											
Trumbull	CN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+									
Hathorn	NY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+									
Laurance	NY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-								
Silvester	NY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-							
Foster	NH	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+							
Livermore	NH	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+						
Ames	MA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+					
Sedgwick	MA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	+	-	-	+			
Huntington	CN	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+			
Sturges	CN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+		
Grout	MA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Benson	NY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Floyd	NY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Van Rensselaer	NY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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- Roll Call #1--To establish the Capital on the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania--No is a positive vote--22 September 1789--Y=31 N=17
- Roll Call #2--To establish Wilmington, Delaware as the Capital--7 September 1789--Y=19 N=32
- Roll Call #3--To move the temporary Capital to Wilmington, Delaware rather than New York City--7 September 1789--Y=21 N=30
- Roll Call #4--To establish the Capital on the North bank of the Potomac River in the state of Maryland--7 September 1789--Y=21 N=29
- Roll Call #5--To move the temporary Capital to Philadelphia instead of New York--7 September 1789--Y=22 N=29

TABLE I (Continued)

Roll Call #6--	To establish the Capital on either the Potomac, Susquehanna, or Delaware Rivers--	
	7 September 1789--	Y=23 N=28
Roll Call #7--	Same as Roll Call #1 above--No is a positive vote--	7 September 1789--
		Y=28 N=21
Roll Call #8--	To adhere to a Senate bill to locate the Capital near Philadelphia--No is a positive vote--	28 September 1789--
		Y=31 N=24
Roll Call #9--	To postpone consideration of an amendment to the Capital location bill--	26 September 1789--
		Y=25 N=29
Roll Call #10--	To strike "East bank" and insert "banks on either side of the River Susquehanna in Pennsylvania" in the Capital location resolution--	7 September 1789--
		y=26 N=25
Roll Call #11--	To provide that Pennsylvania and Maryland must make the Susequehanna navigable if the Capital is to be located there--	7 September 1789--
		Y=24 N=25
Roll Call #12--	To change the site for the next session of Congress from Philadelphia to Baltimore--No is a positive vote--	11 June 1790--
		Y=31 N=28
Roll Call #13--	To include Maryland in the list of proposed sites for the Capital--	7 September 1789--
		Y=25 N=26
Roll Call #14--	To locate the temporary and permanent Capital at a site on the Delaware River--No is a positive vote--	31 May 1790--
		Y=29 N=30
Roll Call #15--	To change the date for moving the temporary seat of government to Philadelphia from December, 1790 to May, 1792--No is a positive vote--	9 July 1790--
		Y=28 N=32
Roll Call #16--	To consider the resolution to pick the permanent and temporary seats of government--	10 June 1790--
		Y=32 N=29
Roll Call #17--	To pass S. 12 which would establish a permanent Capital on the Potomac--	9 July 1790--
		Y=32 N=29
Roll Call #18--	Same as Roll Call #15 above--No is a positive vote--	9 July 1790--
		Y=28 N=33
Roll Call #19--	To commit the seat of government resolution to the Committee of the Whole--No is a positive vote--	10 June 1790--
		Y=28 N=33
Roll Call #20--	To strike the provision of S. 12 which would locate the Capital in Philadelphia from 1790 to 1800--No is a positive vote--	9 July 1790--
		Y=28 N=33
Roll Call #21--	To consider holding the next session of Congress in Philadelphia--	31 May 1790--
		Y=32 N=27
Roll Call #22--	To amend S. 12 by limiting the amount to be spent to erect buildings for the use of Congress--No is a positive vote--	9 July 1790--
		Y=28 N=33
Roll Call #23--	To amend S. 12 so as not to commit Congress to meet in any special place next session--No is a positive vote--	9 July 1790--
		Y=26 N=33

TABLE I (Continued)

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- Roll Call #24--To limit the amount spent for buildings for the Capital--No is a positive vote--
9 July 1790--Y=25 N=32
- Roll Call #25--To change the proposed Capital site from the Potomac to Baltimore--No is a positive
vote--9 July 1790--Y=26 N=34
- Roll Call #26--To amend S. 12 by striking the words "Purchase", or" referring to any proposed
site the government might select--No is a positive vote--9 July 1790--Y=26 N=35
- Roll Call #27--To change the proposed site from the Potomac to "Between the Potomac and Susque-
hanna"--No is a positive vote--9 July 1790--Y=25 N=36
- Roll Call #28--To hold the next session of Congress in New York City--No is a positive vote--
31 May 1790--Y=25 N=35
- Roll Call #29--To repeal the act establishing a temporary and permanent seat of government--No
is a positive vote--5 August 1790--Y=23 N=35
- Roll Call #30--To change the proposed site from the Potomac to the Delaware River--No is a
positive vote--9 July 1790--Y=22 N=30
- Roll Call #31--To change the proposed site from the Potomac to Germantown, Pennsylvania--No is
a positive vote--9 July 1790--Y=22 N=39
- Roll Call #32--To amend the resolution to provide to hold the next session in Philadelphia or
Baltimore--No is a positive vote--31 May 1790--Y=22 N=38
- Roll Call #33--To amend the resolution to provide that Congress will hold their next session
at Philadelphia--31 May 1790--Y=38 N=22
- Roll Call #34--To establish the permanent Capital on the Potomac and the temporary site at
Philadelphia--1 March 1791--Y=39 N=18
- Roll Call #35--To provide that all public officers be moved to the Potomac area prior to
1800 if the buildings are prepared--No is a positive vote--9 July 1790--
Y=13 N=48

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which generally favors locating the Capital on the Potomac River or at some favorable Southern site.

during the second session, show the Pennsylvania delegation solidly allied with Virginia and the southern bloc. This alliance led to the final result which saw the permanent capital go to the Potomac after a ten year hiatus in Philadelphia.

Why did the Pennsylvania delegation decide to make a bargain with Virginia and settle for the temporary residence in Philadelphia instead of trying for the permanent capital? Given the confusing and intricate nature of the issue, it was probably the best Pennsylvania could reasonably expect. If Morris had not been so intent on considering Germantown or Philadelphia in the first session, however, it is possible that Pennsylvania could have had the permanent capital on the Susquehanna. However, a letter of Henry Wynkoop fairly well sums up the situation for Pennsylvania:

Thus we have a prospect at length to put an end to this disagreeable business, and upon Terms tho' not altogether so advantageous to Pennsylvania as might have been wished, yet the best possible to be procured, and such as must be considered a great acquisition to the State, for the Financial arrangements once established there, it is improbable that their Removal to an Inland Situation will be convenient to Government.²²

Furthermore, because assumption of state debts was associated with the issue, it also had some influence on the final result. Because Morris, Fitzsimons, Clymer, and Wynkoop favored assumption, they pushed the Pennsylvania delegation to accept the deal with Virginia. Thus, the Philadelphia area congressmen got the temporary capital and their wish for assumption. Also, as indicated in the Wynkoop letter, the idea that once the capital was in Philadelphia for a period of 10 years that it would be difficult to move elsewhere was very prevalent. It was something which the Pennsylvanians hoped for and which the Virginians feared.

The Pennsylvania delegation, as indicated, voted as a solid bloc on all 35 of the roll calls concerning the residence issue. This is a prime example of what Morris hoped to achieve in getting the Pennsylvania delegation to act in a unified manner. While there were some internal disagreements about where in Pennsylvania the capital should be located, the delegation generally suppressed their differences in order to obtain the best result for their state. Both Maclay and Scott, from central and western Pennsylvania respectively, favored the Susquehanna site over Philadelphia. But even the highly independent Maclay had agreed during a Pennsylvania delegation caucus to vote for whichever site the majority decided upon. The absence of any Country-minded Constitutionalist in the Pennsylvania delegation, who generally abhorred the power and "corrupt" influence which the commercial and financial center of Philadelphia represented to them, also contributed to the cohesiveness of the voting. However, the unity of the Pennsylvania delegation was to decrease substantially during some of the roll calls concerning the Federalist financial plans of Alexander Hamilton.

Funding and Assumption

Alexander Hamilton's report on the public credit which the House had requested he prepare during the first session was another controversial and sectionally divisive issue in the First Congress. Hamilton's report, which was received in the House on January 14, 1790 called for funding of the national debt, for paying the principal and interest at full value, for no discrimination between original and current holders of debt certificates, and the assumption of the state debts.²³ Unlike the residence question, the Pennsylvania delegation was not united on

the issues of funding and assumption. The people of Pennsylvania were also divided over these issues. While most Pennsylvanians supported funding, they could not all agree on how it should be carried out. There was also deep division in Pennsylvania over discrimination and the assumption of state debts. This split in Pennsylvania over Hamilton's financial program occasionally cut across party lines. The Federalists usually supported Hamilton's program and the Constitutionals generally opposed it. However, one of the important consequences of the Federalist policies in Pennsylvania was the defection of several Federalists, particularly Benjamin Rush, George Logan, and William Maclay. Those Federalists who defected to the opposition because of these issues were those who believed in Country-oriented fiscal policies instead of the Court-minded fiscal policies of Morris and Hamilton. The Federalist policies were recognized and opposed by Country-minded politicians who argued that "banks, monopolies, and a funding system, were projects that had never been thought of" by those who had originated the American system.²⁴ Thus, the discontent in Pennsylvania over Hamilton's program prompted some political realignments which helped to strengthen and unite opposition to the Federalists.

On August 28, before Hamilton's report on public credit was announced, Thomas Fitzsimons presented a petition to the House from several Pennsylvania creditors seeking a revival of the public credit. This petition was signed not only by several leading Republicans but also by some Constitutionals. Of course, a definite factor in their positions was the fact that they all held large amounts of public securities. Their self interest can also be seen the following July when most of these same men protested against the final funding act because they felt the interest paid on the debt was too low. However,

there were some Pennsylvania Federalists who protested strongly against parts of Hamilton's program. Several of these Federalists, particularly Benjamin Rush, began their eventual transfer into the Democratic-Republican party over these issues. Rush, who had been a strong and influential supporter of the Constitution was particularly upset over the lack of discrimination and the assumption of state debts. In corresponding with James Madison, Rush pointed out that in Pennsylvania few Quakers or Germans owned certificates and that most widows and soldiers had sold theirs. He felt that the Pennsylvania delegates who did not support discrimination, particularly Fitzsimons and Clymer, had betrayed Pennsylvania. He told Madison that Fitzsimons had become "the midwife of a system every principle of which will be reprobated when established in our state." Rush also claimed that 99 out of 100 "Country Citizens" were against Hamilton's plan and hoped that the Pennsylvania congressmen supporting it would not be reelected.²⁵

However, it was leaders of the Constitutionalist party who led the protest against Hamilton's Court-oriented fiscal policies in Pennsylvania. They felt that funding and assumption would strengthen the federal government, something they strongly opposed. Opposition to Hamilton's plans was organized by John Nicholson, William Findley, James Hutchinson, and Alexander J. Dallas. William Maclay and George Logan, both former Federalists and future Democratic-Republicans, also combined with the Constitutionlists to fight against Hamilton's program. John Nicholson wrote to Madison pointing out that Pennsylvania had instituted his plan for discrimination on their state debt. Nicholson said that with very little difficulty it could be adapted to the federal debt as well. In an attempt to broaden support for this Pennsylvania proposal Nicholson sent a copy of his plan to Madison and had it printed for distribution.

Opposition to the Federalist plan for nondiscrimination was further organized by Dr. James Hutchinson and Alexander Dallas, future organizers of the Democratic-Republican party in Pennsylvania. They began a petition campaign in support of discrimination aimed particularly at those who had served in the army. Furthermore, Hutchinson, aided by Rush, attempted to arouse public opinion against those in the Pennsylvania delegation who supported Hamilton's plan. The Constitutionals, with support from Maclay, also put pressure on the legislature to instruct the Pennsylvania congressmen to vote against assumption. And a series of articles by "A Farmer" appeared in Pennsylvania newspapers which strongly attacked the funding system. Making an obvious plea to the agrarians, the writer maintained that under the funding system scheme farmers would be in more danger of being ruined than they had been by the British. These articles, written by George Logan, were reprinted in 1791 as Letters Addressed to the Yeomanry of the United States on Funding and Banking Systems. They are a good example of the conflict between Country and Court ideology which characterized the political battles between Federalists and Antifederalists.²⁶

The voting on funding and assumption in the First Congress by the Pennsylvania delegation was also divided. In the Senate Robert Morris, who had originated many of the Court-oriented fiscal policies during the Confederation period, was a strong supporter of both funding and assumption. But Maclay, elected as a Federalist, was opposed to most of Hamilton's fiscal plans, particularly those concerning discrimination and the assumption of state debts. In the House, as shown in Table II, the strongest Pennsylvania supporters of funding and assumption were the three Federalists Fitzsimons, Clymer, and Wynkoop. Frederick

TABLE II

SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON FUNDING AND ASSUMPTION IN THE FIRST CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Foster	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ames	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gerry	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Goodhue	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Grout	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Leonard	Massachusetts	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Partridge	Massachusetts	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sedgwick	Massachusetts	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+
Thacher	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Huger	South Carolina	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	0
Trumbull	Connecticut	-	+	0	+	+	+	-	+	+
Wadsworth	Connecticut	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+
Benson	New York	-	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, W.L.	South Carolina	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Sherman	Connecticut	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sturges	Connecticut	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Silvester	New York	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Boudinot	New Jersey	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Vining	Delaware	0	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+
Burke	South Carolina	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Huntington	Connecticut	-	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Laurance	New York	-	-	0	-	+	+	-	0	+
Clymer	Pennsylvania	0	-	-	-	+	+	0	+	+
Fitzsimons	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+
Wynkoop	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+
Cadwalader	New Jersey	-	-	0	0	+	+	+	+	+
Schureman	New Jersey	-	0	-	0	+	+	+	+	+
Sinnichson	New Jersey	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+
Carroll	Maryland	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+
Gale	Maryland	-	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	+
Lee	Virginia	-	0	-	-	+	+	-	+	+
White	Virginia	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+
Tucker	South Carolina	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Sumter	South Carolina	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+

TABLE II (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Gilman	New Hampshire	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-
Livermore	New Hampshire	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-
Floyd	New York	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+
Hathorn	New York	+	0	0	-	-	-	+	+	+
Van Rensselaer	New York	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-
Smith, W.	Maryland	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+
Griffin	Virginia	-	0	-	-	-	-	+	+	+
Sevier	North Carolina	0	-	0	0	-	-	0	+	-
Hartley	Pennsylvania	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	+	+
Hiester	Pennsylvania	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	+
Contee	Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Stone	Maryland	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	+	+
Moore	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Baldwin	Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Muhlenberg, P.	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Scott	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Seney	Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Madison	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Page	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Parker	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	+
Ashe	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Steele	North Carolina	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	+
Brown	Virginia	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Coles	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bloodworth	North Carolina	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-
Williamson	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jackson	Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mathews	Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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- Roll Call #1--To amend H.R. 63 by paying back interest on funded continental money--26 May 1790--Y=15 N=42
- Roll Call #2--To engross on the third reading the public debt bill--No is a positive vote--19 July 1790--Y=40 N=15
- Roll Call #3--To exclude consideration of assumption of state debts--No is a positive vote--26 April 1790--Y=32 N=18

TABLE II (Continued)

Roll Call	#4--To consider Hamilton's report on public credit--No is a positive vote--15 April 1790--Y=33 N=23
Roll Call	#5--To disagree on a Senate amendment which would provide for assuming the state debts--No is a positive vote--24 July 1790--Y=29 N=32
Roll Call	#6--To agree to a Senate amendment which would provide for assumption--26 July 1790--Y=34 N=28
Roll Call	#7--To fund continental money at the ratio of one hundred to one--26 May 1790--Y=31 N=25
Roll Call	#8--To provide that original holders of certificates shall have the exclusive right of subscribing for a six months period--No is a positive vote--26 July 1790--Y=15 N=45
Roll Call	#9--To eliminate a Senate amendment which would pay the states all claims even if not subscribed for within the time limit--No is a positive way--26 July 1790--Y=13 N=47

A positive response to each roll call indicates a vote in favor of the strongest support for assumption and funding.

Muhlenberg does not appear on the scale because as Speaker of the House he seldom voted. Near the other end of the scale are the remaining four members of the Pennsylvania delegation who supported only a couple of the votes on these issues. These four members include not only Daniel Hiester and Peter Muhlenberg, who were supported by the Constitutionalists, but also the Federalists Hartley and Scott. Scott, who owned few securities, was from western Pennsylvania where discrimination was favored and assumption was opposed. Hartley, a strong Federalist on most issues, supported the Federalist fiscal policies at first, but began voting against them due to the Pennsylvania opposition against them, particularly from his home county of York. It is significant that three of the four Pennsylvania delegates who supported funding and assumption were from the financial and commercial center of Philadelphia. Morris, Fitzsimons, and Clymer were all associated with the Philadelphia financiers, speculators, and merchants who strongly favored the Federalist Court-oriented fiscal policies. The four opponents were from agrarian areas which were more attuned to the Country ideology.

The positions of the Pennsylvania delegation on funding and assumption can also be discovered by their actions during the congressional debates on these issues. In the Senate Morris was one of the leading supporters of Hamilton's measures while Maclay was one of the leading opponents. In the House Fitzsimons not only supported the Federalist fiscal policies but he also proposed for debate the eight resolutions which contained the basic provisions of Hamilton's report. In debate over the Fitzsimons' resolutions, Scott spoke out against the large domestic debt which he felt should be scaled back. Scott's

motion to amend Fitzsimons' resolutions by re-examining the debt failed to pass. Fitzsimons and Hartley spoke in defense of the original resolutions.²⁷

The next couple of weeks were taken up with debate over discrimination after Madison's speech in favor of it on February 11, which Hartley said was in "the finest language I almost ever heard."²⁸ The only Pennsylvanian to speak in favor of discrimination in the debates was Scott. When the vote was taken on Madison's motion for discrimination on February 22, the vote was 36-13 against the motion. Senator Maclay, who visited the lower house to listen to the debates on discrimination, noted the Court orientation of Federalist policy:

Hamilton, at the head of the speculators, with all the courtiers, are on one side. These I call the party who are actuated by interest. The opposition are governed by principle, but I fear in this case interest will outweigh principle.²⁹

The debate over assumption was to be more intense and divisive than that over either funding or discrimination. It was also a much harder battle for the supporters of Hamilton's fiscal policies to win. In fact, several attempts to pass assumption were not successful and, as mentioned above, it was not until assumption became tied to the residence question that it finally passed. Both Fitzsimons and Clymer spoke early in the debate in defense of assumption. Taking a nationalist and Court-oriented outlook, they maintained that establishing fiscal power in the federal government at the expense of the states would not be detrimental. Maclay, who worked ardently against assumption in the Senate, tried to talk Clymer and Wynkoop into opposing assumption. Maclay realized that Morris and Fitzsimons would not switch but was

hopeful that Clymer and Wynkoop could be persuaded to change sides. He approached them several times about it but was unsuccessful.³⁰

While Maclay was attempting to push the Pennsylvania delegation against assumption, Fitzsimons was trying to gain support for it both within the delegation and at home in Pennsylvania. Fitzsimons wanted to unite the Pennsylvania delegation on these issues just as they were on the residence question. He felt that if they could hold a balance of power between the northern and southern blocs that it might work to their advantage. In writing to Tench Coxe, Fitzsimons maintained that Pennsylvania was for funding the debt and not adverse to assumption. He stated further that the Pennsylvania delegation was "trying to make some advantage of our situation."³¹ Fitzsimons left New York in March to return to Philadelphia in order to help prevent the Pennsylvania Assembly from instructing the Pennsylvania delegation to vote against assumption. Others also felt that Pennsylvania held a balance of power on the question. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, in a letter home concerning assumption wrote that:

The truth is we have not only to support our measures but we have also our party to keep in order. Without the delegation of Pennsylvania it is impossible to succeed. Mr. Fitzsimons and Mr. Clymer the only men in it are but unexpectedly called home and how soon they will return is uncertain.³²

Shortly after Fitzsimons and Clymer returned to Congress, the supporters of assumption decided to put it up for a vote. Fitzsimons was hoping that the large Pennsylvania delegation would make the difference in the vote. However, to Fitzsimons' dismay, assumption lost by a close count of 31-29. The only Pennsylvanians voting for it were Fitzsimons, Clymer, and Hartley. Wynkoop, who probably would have also voted for it, was not present. Senator Maclay, who was in the

House for the vote, exultantly described the reaction of Fitzsimons and Clymer. "Fitzsimons reddened like scarlet; his eyes were brimful. Clymer's color, always pale, now verged to a deadly white; his lips quivered, and his nether jaw shook with convulsive motions."³³ Fitzsimons' hope of Pennsylvania's strength as the "swing state" in the vote was lost since only three of their eight representatives voted for it. Fitzsimons now moved to separate the assumption issue from the funding bill. His motion to do so was accepted on April 26 by a vote of 32-18. And Clymer was appointed to a committee of five to bring in a bill for funding only. On June 2, 1790 the House passed the funding bill, without assumption attached, and sent it to the Senate.³⁴

After the funding bill reached the Senate it was recommended in committee that the bill be amended to include the assumption of state debts. In a discussion with other Senators concerning the report, Maclay realized that Hamilton now had enough votes to pass the resolution for assumption. After a few days of debate the Senate agreed to the resolution by a vote of 14-12. As expected Morris voted for it and Maclay against. The next day both the funding bill and the resolution on assumption were given to a committee of which Morris was a member. On July 16 the committee recommended that "the resolutions for assumption be added to the funding bill, and the whole made one system."³⁵ The recommendation was approved by a vote of 15-11, again with Morris voting for and Maclay against. Morris and Maclay were again on opposite sides when the combined funding and assumption bill was passed in the Senate on July 21 by a vote of 14-12.³⁶

Unlike the bitter struggle which had occurred earlier in the House over assumption, the Senate bill containing both funding and assumption

had little trouble once it was received there in July. The main reasons for the change in moods was the bargain made previously over the location of the capital and because the House had passed a bill to settle state accounts based on population, as determined by the first census. The House voted 32-29 not to remove assumption from the bill. On July 26 the combined funding and assumption bill was passed by a vote of 34-28.³⁷

As shown by Table II, the votes on funding and assumption were largely of a sectional nature. Except for the few South Carolinians, those favoring funding and assumption were mostly from the North. Furthermore, the table indicates that contrary to the hope of Fitzsimons and Morris, the Pennsylvania delegation did not hold the balance of power as they did on the residence question. The Federalists Fitzsimons, Clymer, and Wynkoop all favored assumption and were strongest in defending funding. Fitzsimons needed the votes of the Federalists Hartley and Scott to give Pennsylvania more power on this issue. But the general dislike of funding and assumption in many parts of Pennsylvania dissuaded Hartley and particularly Scott, who was from western Pennsylvania, from voting with the other Federalists. Almost certainly the pressure from constituents, which was no doubt heightened by the activities of the Constitutionals, had considerable effect on the Pennsylvania delegation. This was noticed earlier by Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts when he wrote:

Our great difficulty is with the delegation of Pennsylvania. They have no hesitation in declaring that they believe the assumption to be indispensable to the welfare of the country, but they seem to consider the measure as unpopular in that state and have not the firmness of spirit to give a decided preference to the welfare of the people over their own popularity.³⁸

Of course, a look at Table II shows why this was easy for Sedgwick to say. Every one of the Massachusetts delegation, including the Anti-federalists Gerry and Grout, voted consistently for funding and assumption. Massachusetts, unlike Pennsylvania, had a large debt and without assumption would be left with the responsibility of paying it off.

The Bank of the United States and the Excise Tax

The final session of the First Congress began in Philadelphia on December 6, 1790, the first session to be held in the temporary capital. The Congress convened in a brick building located just west of Independence Hall at Chestnut and Sixth Street. The new building, which was built as a courthouse for Philadelphia County, had enough room to accommodate both houses of Congress. There was even plenty of space for visitors and a large gallery which could hold about 300 people. In the House of Representatives the seats were placed in arched rows facing the Speaker's rostrum toward the west side of the building. The many arched windows allowed abundant sunlight to enter the chambers. A large glass chandelier added to the halls' attractiveness.

The movement of the national capital to Philadelphia was significant for Pennsylvania and for national politics. Philadelphia, which had great influence on Pennsylvania state politics, was also to influence politics on the national level. Philadelphia was not only the birthplace of the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Constitution but was also an economic, cultural, and social center. Between 1790 and 1800 it also became the most active political center in the United States. The adoption of new federal and state constitutions and a new

city charter had strengthened the Federalists in Philadelphia. On the state level, the Federalists, with the aid of Robert Morris and his allies, were to control Philadelphia and Pennsylvania politics until 1799. It was perhaps not just a coincidence that one year later the Federalists on the national level were also to meet defeat. The organization and growth of the Democratic-Republicans in Pennsylvania, and on the national level, were greatly enhanced by such Philadelphia organizers as James Hutchinson, Alexander Dallas, John Beckley, and Michael Leib. The Democratic-Republican political organization of the "lower classes" and immigrants in Philadelphia was to be very effective by the end of the 1790's. It was largely a national response by the Federalists to this state stimulus which brought about the Alien and Sedition Acts. The significance of the Philadelphia press was also important for both parties and the development of the first party system in the 1790's. The influence which Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania delegation had on Congress was no doubt substantial throughout the 1790's, in all likelihood helping to instill within Congress the movement toward bi-polarization in other state delegations.

Much of the third session of the First Congress was taken up by two other aspects of Hamilton's fiscal program, his proposals concerning the Bank of the United States and an excise tax. Both were of particular interest to the Pennsylvania delegation. Even before Hamilton had submitted his report on a national bank to Congress in December, 1790, he had sent his assistant, Tench Coxe, to ask Thomas Fitzsimons about his views on the matter. Fitzsimons also discussed it with his Philadelphia Federalist allies, Robert Morris and George Clymer. They were all strong supporters of a national bank as befitted their

Court-oriented philosophy. There were also several practical economic reasons for their support. Since the bank was to be located in Philadelphia it would enhance Philadelphia's standing as the main financial and commercial center in the United States. It would also aid the development of banking and manufacturing in the middle states area. Some Pennsylvanians also hoped that establishment of a national bank in Philadelphia would make it difficult for the capital to move to the Potomac in 1800. For these reasons the bank proposal was favored not only by the Philadelphia Federalists but by most of the Pennsylvania delegation, including the often dissenting Maclay. Those Pennsylvanians most likely to protest against the Bank of the United States were not even present in the delegation, since it contained no western agrarian Constitutionalists.⁴¹

The attitudes in Pennsylvania concerning the establishment of the Bank of the United States were more intricate than one might expect at first glance. Because the Constitutionalists had strongly opposed the establishment of the Bank of North America by Robert Morris in 1781, it could be concluded that they would just as strongly oppose the Bank of the United States in 1791. However, this was not necessarily the case. Many Constitutionalists, particularly western Country-oriented agrarians like William Findley, John Smilie, Robert Whitehill, and William Maclay, were very distrustful of banks. However, they were more distrustful of some banks than others. In fact, the hatred harbored by some Constitutionalists for the Bank of North America led them to support the Bank of the United States in hopes it would compete with their enemy bank. The Constitutionalists' dislike of the Bank of North American was due to the bitter political battles against the

Pennsylvania Republicans in the 1770's and 1780's. The Bank of North America was a Republican bank and had replaced the patriotic Bank of Pennsylvania which the Constitutionals supported in order to raise funds for the Revolutionary War. Furthermore, the President of the Bank of North America was Thomas Willing, whom the Constitutionals viewed as a loyalist traitor. Little did they know that Willing was also to become involved with the Bank of the United States with help from his partner Robert Morris. But the Constitutionals also disliked the Bank of North America because the wealthy Court-oriented men who controlled it used it to gain undue influence over the state government. The Country-oriented agrarian opponents also were upset at the high interest rates and short term loans which made it difficult to obtain loans on land.⁴²

In fact the Constitutionals were in the process of establishing their own state bank, the Bank of Pennsylvania, which they accomplished in 1793. The western agrarians supported it because it had rural features, particularly the availability of long-term mortgages on rural property. It was also supported by commercial and political elements in eastern Pennsylvania who had been shut out of any control over the Bank of North America. The Bank of Pennsylvania was also chartered in order to make the state more independent of the federal government for its revenue and credit. In other words, it was more important to the Constitutionals what type of bank was established and what type of person controlled it than the fact that it was a bank.⁴³

Other factors confused the bank issue in Pennsylvania. As mentioned previously, the bank issue and the capital issue were related. Many Pennsylvanians supported the bank with hopes that the temporary capital

in Philadelphia might become permanent. The first opposition to the Bank of the United States came from Federalist and Republican stockholders in the Bank of North America who feared the competition. Until the influential Robert Morris managed to get Thomas Willing and other Philadelphia bankers involved, the Bank of the United States was not fully supported in Philadelphia banking circles. Other Pennsylvanians doubted that the popular measure could be halted in any event. Thus, they felt they should make it as palatable as possible. This attitude was reflected by William Maclay who stated that, "It is totally in vain to oppose this bill. The only useful part I can act, is to try to make it of some benefit to the public, which reaps none from the existing banks."⁴⁴

The debate in the Senate over the bill establishing a national bank occurred between January 3 and January 20. Morris had been one of the five Senators appointed to the committee to draw up the bill. The bill was opposed by most of the southern Senators, partly because of their fears that a national bank in Philadelphia would make it more difficult to move the capital in 1800. Maclay reported that "the Potomac interest seem to regard it as a machine which, in the hands of the Philadelphians, might retard the removal of Congress."⁴⁵ The next day a motion was made to limit the incorporation of the bank from 20 to 10 years. This would make the bank bill expire in 1801, only one year after the capital would move to the Potomac site. However, this motion lost by a vote of 16-6, with only southern Senators in the minority. Both Morris and Maclay voted with the majority. The bill was then passed by the Senate and sent to the House.⁴⁶

The bank bill was introduced in the House on January 21 and debated extensively between February 1 and February 8. James Madison argued persuasively that the bill was unconstitutional. The southerners, showing an example of their Country ideology, claimed that the bank would only increase the number of "paper men" in Congress who would use the bank and its "paper system" to corrupt the government. Another fear was that the compromise of 1790 which promised the capital would go to the Potomac in 1800 would not be carried out. Shortly after the third session opened in December, Theodore Sedgwick noted that the Pennsylvania delegation did not "hesitate to declare that they never intended to aid in a removal from hence to the Potomac, and this declaration has awakened the jealousy of the southern members to a great degree."⁴⁷ The fears of the Virginians increased when it was discovered that the Pennsylvania House of Representatives had initiated an attempt to appropriate money to erect buildings for the government in Philadelphia. After Madison's efforts to have the bank bill amended in the Senate to a ten year incorporation failed, he threatened the Pennsylvanians with an attack on its constitutionality unless they cooperated to limit the bills' duration. But the Pennsylvania delegation refused, partly because they feared that in the rush by the Virginians to complete the permanent capital, that Philadelphia might not even get its full ten years as the temporary capital. Madison's argument against the bank changed no one's mind, and after several attempts to recommit the bill it passed the House by a vote of 39-20.⁴⁸

As indicated in Table III, all of the Pennsylvania delegation voted in favor of the bank bill on all four roll calls. As mentioned above, the advantages it would bring to Pennsylvania, and particularly

TABLE III
SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON THE BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIRST CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls			
		1	2	3	4
Foster	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+
Gilman	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+
Livermore	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+
Ames	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Gerry	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Goodhue	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Leonard	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Partridge	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Thacher	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Huntington	Connecticut	+	+	+	+
Sherman	Connecticut	+	+	+	+
Sturges	Connecticut	+	+	+	+
Trumbull	Connecticut	+	+	+	+
Wadsworth	Connecticut	+	+	+	+
Benson	New York	+	+	+	+
Floyd	New York	+	+	+	+
Hathorn	New York	+	+	+	+
Laurance	New York	+	+	+	+
Silvester	New York	+	+	+	+
Van Rensselaer	New York	+	+	+	+
Clymer	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Fitzsimons	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Hartley	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Hiester	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Muhlenberg, P.	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Scott	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Wynkoop	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Boudinot	New Jersey	+	+	+	+
Cadwalader	New Jersey	+	+	+	+
Schureman	New Jersey	+	+	+	+
Sinnichson	New Jersey	+	+	+	+
Vining	Delaware	+	+	0	+
Seney	Maryland	+	+	+	+
Sedgwick	Massachusetts	0	+	+	+
Bourn	Rhode Island	-	+	+	+
Smith, W.	Maryland	-	+	+	+
Sevier	North Carolina	0	-	+	+
Steele	North Carolina	+	-	+	+
Smith, W.L.	South Carolina	-	-	+	+

TABLE III (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls			
		1	2	3	4
Grout	Massachusetts	-	-	-	-
Carroll	Maryland	-	-	-	-
Contee	Maryland	-	-	-	-
Gale	Maryland	-	-	-	-
Stone	Maryland	-	-	-	-
Brown	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Giles	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Lee	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Madison	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Moore	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Parker	Virginia	-	+	-	-
White	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Ashe	North Carolina	-	0	-	-
Bloodworth	North Carolina	-	-	-	-
Williamson	North Carolina	-	-	-	-
Burke	South Carolina	-	-	-	-
Tucker	South Carolina	-	-	-	-
Baldwin	Georgia	-	-	-	-
Jackson	Georgia	-	-	-	-
Mathews	Georgia	-	-	-	-

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Roll Call #1--To recommit Senate bill 17, an act to incorporate the
Bank of the United States--No is a positive vote--
1 February 1791--Y=23 N=34

Roll Call #2--same as above--No is a positive vote--3 February 1791--
Y=21 N=38

Roll Call #3--To order the previous question on passage of Senate
bill 17--8 February 1791--Y=39 N=20

Roll Call #4--To pass Senate bill 17--8 February 1791--Y=39 N=20

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which
is favorable to the Bank of the United States.

Philadelphia, were the main reasons for their votes. The votes on this issue were the most sectional of any in the First Congress. Even most of the South Carolinians voted against the bill. The only northerner voting against the bank bill was the Antifederalist Jonathan Grout of Massachusetts. Like his southern Country allies on this issue, Grout feared the influence of "paper men" in the government.

The last aspect of Hamilton's fiscal program to be enacted in the First Congress was the excise bill. Although not leading to as much debate or as many close votes as did funding, assumption, and the national bank, it eventually led to a rebellion in Pennsylvania. In order to meet the costs of funding the national debt, particularly after the assumption of state debts, the government needed additional revenue besides that produced by the tarriff of 1789. It was felt that an excise tax would be less offensive than a stamp tax or a direct tax. The excise tax was to be levied on domestically manufactured liquor, including large and small producers. The large producers were concentrated in New England and New York. The smaller producers were numerous in the back country of Pennsylvania and the South. The larger producers could pass the tax off to their consumers. But the small whiskey distillers, largely Scotch-Irish frontiersmen, could not as easily pay the tax, particularly since it had to be paid in cash. Hamilton proposed a tax on liquor from nine to 30 cents a gallon and a tax of 60 cents per year per gallon of capacity on country stills.⁴⁹

The excise bill was of particular interest to Pennsylvania. An excise tax was not new to Pennsylvania since one, in various forms, had been in force since 1684. However, collection of these colonial and state taxes was a different matter, particularly west of the

Allegheny Mountains. The attitude toward excise tax collectors in the western counties of Pennsylvania was so negative that honest and respectable men to fill the positions were difficult to find. Tax collectors in western Pennsylvania had been threatened, bribed, and run out of the county. Western Pennsylvanians saw Hamilton's proposed federal excise tax as a means to pay off the assumption of state debts which they had strongly opposed. For many farmers in central and western Pennsylvania, it was difficult and expensive to transport their crops, so many of them converted their grain into whiskey and shipped it east, often by pack horse, to barter for staple goods. Thus, rather than cash, they used whiskey as their currency. This made it even harder to pay the tax. The western farmers also felt that a uniform tax would actually bear twice as heavily on them because whiskey was worth more on the east coast.⁵⁰

The House passed the excise tax bill on January 27 after several weeks of debate. In the Senate, which passed the bill on February 12, Maclay strongly opposed it while Morris supported it. The excise was quickly denounced by the Constitutionalists and they were even joined by others, such as George Logan, who had earlier supported the Federal Constitution. The only support for the excise in Pennsylvania came from the Federalist party, particularly the conservative Philadelphia junto led by Morris and Fitzsimons. The Country-oriented opponents of the excise saw it as a victory for the speculators and property holders who now were shifting the burden of taxation to the consumers in order to pay for assumption. It did nothing to help the image of the Federalists in power. To the contrary, and particularly in Pennsylvania, it was another issue which helped organize and unite the opposition

against the Court-oriented Federalists. Even the legislature of Pennsylvania was strongly against the national excise tax. The Pennsylvania House passed a series of resolutions which called the excise "subversive of peace, liberty and the rights of citizens."⁵¹ The resolutions, which were passed by a large margin, also instructed the Pennsylvania delegation in Congress to oppose the excise bill. The resolutions were defeated in the more conservative Pennsylvania Senate behind the leadership of the Federalist William Bingham. However, to show its disapproval, the Pennsylvania legislature later that year repealed all of the state excise taxes on liquor.⁵²

While the excise was vigorously protested in western Pennsylvania, it was also unpopular in Philadelphia and eastern Pennsylvania. The tax was especially disliked by the artisans and many Germans, who realized that it would make liquor more expensive. Opponents of the excise were quick to remind the people that it was a Federalist measure. Meetings of protest, one of which was chaired by George Logan, were held in Philadelphia and petitions were circulated against the excise bill. The petitions claimed that the excise tax was an infringement on the liberties of the people. The petitions described the excise as a "dangerous violation of our natural and inalienable rights" because Congress had no right to interfere with the use of distilled liquors. Many opponents, reflecting their Country ideology, argued that this governmental interference in their private lives was a threat to their rights to make a living. Several of these petitions were sent to members of the Pennsylvania delegation in order to put before Congress, where they were promptly tabled. There were meetings of protest and opposition in western Pennsylvania against the excise. The western

agrarians saw the excise as a discouragement to their agricultural livelihood. Using another typical Country argument against it, they claimed that the excise was an example, in the British tradition, of how the central government was attempting to undermine their liberties. They compared it to the action of monarchical nations rather than that of a republic. Maclay had warned the Senate during debate that in western Pennsylvania the act "could not be enforced by collectors or civil officers of any kind" and that only "military force could effect it." His prediction that "war and bloodshed are the most likely consequence of all this," was very near the mark, as the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 was a direct result of the excise tax of 1791.⁵³

Table IV reflects how the Pennsylvania congressional delegation split on the excise tax issue. The three conservative Federalists, Fitzsimons, Clymer, and Wynkoop voted consistently in favor of the excise tax. The only two Pennsylvanians not on the Federalist ticket in 1788, Daniel Hiestler and Peter Muhlenberg, are on the opposite end of the scale and voted solidly against the excise. The other two Federalists, Scott and Hartley are near the middle of the scale and voted inconsistently on the 10 roll calls. Although Hartley did vote against passage of the bill on January 27 (see roll call number six), Scott completely ducked it. Both were from areas where the excise was unpopular and they had difficult choices to make. It is notable, however, that Scott was not reelected to the Second Congress.

In contrast to the Constitutionals' argument, the Federalists, led by William Bingham, contended that the state had no right to interfere in the actions of the national Congress. The Federalists would not support any action which went against the authority of the

TABLE IV
SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON EXCISE TAXES IN THE FIRST CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Foster	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ames	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gerry	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	0
Goodhue	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Leonard	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Partridge	Massachusetts	+	+	0	+	-	+	+	0	+	+
Thacher	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Huntington	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Sherman	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sturges	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Trumbull	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Benson	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Laurance	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Clymer	Pennsylvania	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Fitzsimons	Pennsylvania	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Wynkoop	Pennsylvania	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cadwalader	New Jersey	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Schureman	New Jersey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sinnickson	New Jersey	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, W.L.	South Carolina	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Sedgwick	Massachusetts	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Wadsworth	Connecticut	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sevier	North Carolina	-	+	0	+	+	0	-	+	-	-
Boudinot	New Jersey	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Gilman	New Hampshire	-	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bourn	Rhode Island	-	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Vining	Delaware	-	-	-	+	0	+	+	+	+	+
Gale	Maryland	0	+	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	0
Silvester	New York	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+
Carroll	Maryland	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	0	0
Smith, W.	Maryland	-	-	+	-	+	-	0	+	+	+
Griffin	Virginia	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+
Lee	Virginia	-	-	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Madison	Virginia	0	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+

TABLE IV (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Livermore	New Hampshire	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+
Grout	Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	0	+	+	-	+	+
Floyd	New York	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+
Scott	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	+	-	0	+	+	-	-
White	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+
Hartley	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	0
Giles	Virginia	-	-	0	-	+	-	-	+	-	+
Hathorn	New York	-	-	+	0	-	-	-	-	+	0
Van Rensselaer	New York	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
Stone	Maryland	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	+	-
Seney	Maryland	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+
Ashe	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Hiester	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Muhlenberg, P.	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Brown	Virginia	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-
Moore	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
Parker	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bloodworth	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Steele	North Carolina	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Williamson	North Carolina	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	+	-	-
Burke	South Carolina	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tucker	South Carolina	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baldwin	Georgia	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-
Jackson	Georgia	-	-	+	-	0	-	-	-	-	-
Mathews	Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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- Roll Call #1--To amend H.R. 110 by changing the whiskey tax duties from 5 to 7%--No is a positive vote--19 February 1791--Y=34 N=20
- Roll Call #2--To disagree to a Senate amendment to H.R. 110 which would allow compensation to revenue officers until altered by law rather than for two years only--No is a positive vote--22 February 1791--Y=36 N=24
- Roll Call #3--To repeal excise taxes on whiskey and to lay others in their place--No is a positive vote--11 June 1790--Y=26 N=31

TABLE IV (Continued)

Roll Call #4--	To agree to a Senate amendment to H.R. 110 that allow- ance from the whiskey tax shall not exceed \$45,000 annually--25 February 1791--Y=30 N=29
Roll Call #5--	To strengthen H.R. 110 by providing for stricter enforcement of whiskey tax provisions--18 February 1791--Y=35 N=21
Roll Call #6--	To pass H.R. 110, the Revenue Bill--27 January 1791-- &=35 N=21
Roll Call #7--	To order engrossment of H.R. 110--25 January 1791-- Y=35 N=20
Roll Call #8--	To amend H.R. 110 to prohibit revenue collectors from intimidating electors in federal elections--No is a positive vote--21 January 1791--Y=21 N=37
Roll Call #9--	To provide that the taxes in H.R. 110 should be in effect only until the end of the next session of Congress--No is a positive vote--24 January 1791-- Y=19 N=36
Roll Call #10--	To amend H.R. 110 by proposing to eliminate the taxes on whiskey--No is a positive vote--17 January 1791-- Y=16 N=36

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which is favorable to the use of excise taxes.

national government. The Pennsylvania Federalists, even in light of the heavy opposition throughout the state, were willing to disregard their constituents wishes in order to support the policies of a Federalist administration. The Federalist attitude can also be seen in a letter home by a New England Federalist who wrote concerning the Country-oriented opposition in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania to the excise issue:

There is a party in this, and most of the States South, that still continue the cry of Liberty; and try all in their power to hold up the idea of danger to the people from the federal government . . . I cannot help looking upon this cry to spring either from ignorance, or a design, not so favourable to the people, ultimately; as the authors of it wish to make their constituents believe.⁵⁴

And, without doubt, the Constitutionalists used the excise tax issue to help rebuild their party from its minority status, particularly in Philadelphia. The Federalists may have misjudged the long range political effects of the excise tax issue in Pennsylvania. Many citizens, some as newcomers in the political process, were beginning to organize against the financial measures of the Federalists. The opposition to the excise tax and the resulting political consequences were probably stronger in Pennsylvania than other states for two basic reasons. The first is that the excise tax probably had more negative economic effect on Pennsylvania than on any other state. In fact, when the Federalists increased excise taxes in 1794 it led to the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania. Secondly, the Constitutionalist party not only opposed it on Country ideological grounds, as outlined above, but also used it as a popular vehicle to increase their party image in comparison to that of the Federalists. However, the excise tax was only one issue. Unfortunately for the Federalists,

there were too many issues in the 1790's that caused Pennsylvanians to fear for the security of their liberties. The result was the transformation in Pennsylvania of the Constitutionalist/Antifederalist party into the better organized Democratic-Republican party and its spread throughout the states.

Constitutional Amendments and Governmental Authority

The Pennsylvania congressional elections of 1788, as discussed above, were largely a continuation of the political battle over the Constitution and the need for amendments to it. The Constitutionals at the Harrisburg Convention had not only chosen delegates to run for Congress but had adopted resolutions which called for 12 amendments to the Constitution. Many of these amendments called for substantive changes in the Federal Constitution. Some of the changes advocated by the Antifederalists were that Congress only have powers which were expressly granted to it by the states, that Congress could not pass direct taxes, that Congress should not ratify any treaty which infringed on the rights of states, and that the individual states should retain all power over their own militia.

The Pennsylvania Federalists, led by James Wilson, claimed that no amendments were necessary since the liberties of the people were already protected by the Constitution. Others argued that amendments, if needed, should only be suggested after the Constitution had been in effect for awhile. Since six of eight Federalist candidates in the congressional election were victorious, the Pennsylvania Antifederalists had little hope that any of their substantive amendments would be adopted. When the issue of constitutional amendments came before

Congress, these six nationalist representatives supported the Federalist strategy of "throwing a tub to a whale," that is, offering only a few weak amendments on procedural rather than structural issues. Neither Hiester nor Peter Muhlenberg, who were elected with Constitutionalist support and later became Democratic-Republicans, pushed for structural amendments, although they were sympathetic with many of the Constitutionalist policies. In the Senate, Morris supported the Federalist strategy and was reluctant to even consider the procedural amendments. The nominal Federalist Maclay continued his usual anti-administration tendencies and favored stronger amendments. However, he was absent from illness during most of the debates and voting on the amendments.

The Federalist strategy of James Madison was to push through only procedural amendments in order to soothe the fears of many Anti-federalists. While still protecting the Constitution, the amendments would hopefully "extinguish opposition to the system, or at least break the face of it, by detaching the deluded opponents from their designing leaders."⁵⁵ Of course, little did Madison know that by the end of the 1790's he and Thomas Jefferson would be leading many of these "deluded opponents" and "designing leaders" in opposition to the Federalist government he was then serving. It should be noted that it was Madison who changed positions more than the "deluded opponents." This is particularly true in Pennsylvania where the Constitutionlists from 1776 until the 1790's, when they became the Democratic-Republicans, were more ideologically consistent than Madison. It must be kept in mind that Madison joined them, they did not join him. Unfortunately for the Pennsylvania Constitutionlists, they had no one to lead or fight for stronger constitutional amendments in Congress except for the ill Senator Maclay.

Madison attempted to begin the debate on the amendment issue in May of 1789, but because of other issues, it was postponed until June 8. On that morning, the worried Clymer wrote to Richard Peters, the Federalist Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, that "Madison is this morning to make an essay towards amendments, but whether he means merely a tub to the whale or whether he might attempt to lop off essentials, I do not know."⁵⁶ Later after hearing Madison's nine recommended amendment proposals, Clymer wrote with satisfaction that "Madison has proved a tub on a number of 'amendments'."⁵⁷ The proposals which Madison submitted were basically those that were later adopted. They were not the substantive changes that the Anti-federalists had asked for, but were procedural in nature. Most dealt with such freedoms as those concerning speech, press, assembly, religion, bearing arms, and judicial rights. There were several attempts to strengthen or postpone the amendments as written by those opposing the Federalist strategy.⁵⁸ However, a look at Table V will show that all these attempts were unsuccessful.

Richard Peters, whom Clymer had written to earlier about the amendments, questioned Madison about his strategy. Peters maintained that the Antifederalists were not strong enough to pass any amendments and that Madison need not compromise with them. After pointing out that the Antifederalists could not do it on their own, Peters, rephrasing what Clymer had written to him earlier, wrote "nor should any throw out Tubs but those who were afraid of the Whale."⁵⁹ Peters saw no advantage of passing any amendments just to please the opposition. Of course, this Court-oriented attitude, which many other Federalists also held and continued to display in the 1790's,

TABLE V
SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
IN THE FIRST CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls				
		1	2	3	4	5
Foster	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+
Gilman	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+
Ames	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+
Goodhue	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+
Sedgwick	Massachusetts	+	+	+	0	+
Sherman	Connecticut	+	+	-	+	+
Sturges	Connecticut	+	+	-	0	+
Trumbull	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+
Wadsworth	Connecticut	+	+	+	0	+
Benson	New York	+	+	+	+	+
Laurance	New York	+	+	+	0	+
Clymer	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+	+
Fitzsimons	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+	+
Hartley	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+	+
Muhlenberg, P.	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+	+
Scott	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+	+
Wynkoop	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+	0
Boudinot	New Jersey	+	+	+	+	0
Cadwalader	New Jersey	+	+	+	+	+
Schureman	New Jersey	+	+	+	+	+
Sinnickson	New Jersey	+	+	+	+	+
Vining	Delaware	+	+	+	+	+
Carroll	Maryland	+	+	+	+	+
Gale	Maryland	+	+	0	+	+
Smith, W.	Maryland	+	+	+	+	+
Brown	Virginia	+	+	+	+	+
Lee	Virginia	+	+	+	+	+
Madison	Virginia	+	+	+	+	+
Silvester	New York	-	+	+	+	+
Hiester	Pennsylvania	-	+	+	0	+
Seney	Maryland	-	+	+	+	+
Moore	Virginia	-	+	+	+	+
Partridge	Massachusetts	-	-	+	+	+
Thacher	Massachusetts	-	-	+	+	+
Smith, W.L.	South Carolina	-	-	+	+	+
Stone	Maryland	-	-	-	+	+
Griffin	Virginia	-	0	-	+	0
Jackson	Georgia	-	-	0	+	+

TABLE V (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls				
		1	2	3	4	5
Gerry	Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	+
Page	Virginia	-	-	-	-	+
Parker	Virginia	-	-	-	-	+
Mathews	Georgia	-	0	0	-	+
Livermore	New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-
Grout	Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	-
Floyd	New York	-	-	-	-	-
Hathorn	New York	-	-	-	-	-
Van Rensselaer	New York	-	-	-	-	-
Coles	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-
Burke	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-
Sumter	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-
Tucker	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-

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- Roll Call #1--To amend the Constitution to prohibit Congress from interfering in the times, places, or manner of holding elections--No is a positive vote--21 August 1789--
Y=23 N=28
- Roll Call #2--To insert the word "expressly" before delegated in what was later to become the tenth amendment--No is a positive vote--21 August 1789--Y=17 N=32
- Roll Call #3--To consider all proposed amendments to the Constitution--No is a positive vote--18 August 1789--Y=16 N=34
- Roll Call #4--To agree to a Senate amendment which would alter the eighth article concerning a speedy and public trial by jury--24 September 1789--Y=37 N=14
- Roll Call #5--To amend the Constitution by prohibiting Congress from imposing direct taxes--No is a positive vote--22 August 1789--Y=39 N=9

A positive response to each roll call indicates a vote which generally favors fewer and weaker amendments and for a stronger federal government.

helped assure that the opposition would organize against them. Soon, in both Pennsylvania and on the national level, it was going to take much more than a tub to pacify the anti-administration whale. Other Pennsylvania Federalists questioned why those who had advocated stronger amendments were not satisfied with the proposed amendments. Thomas Hartley wrote to Jasper Yeates wondering why the opposition had to have amendments forced on them rather than gladly accepting them. And Frederick Muhlenberg found it odd that those who had previously advocated amendments were putting up obstacles to them or delaying action on the issue.⁶⁰

The proposed amendments were introduced into the Senate on August 25. It was moved and seconded that the amendments be postponed until the next session. Senator Morris, who was against the idea of any amendments, strongly supported the motion and spoke against the need for amendments. However, this motion failed to pass. The debate in the Senate on the amendments lasted only from September 2 through September 9. Since Senator Maclay, who usually kept a good record of the debates, was ill during this time, there are few accounts concerning the Senate debate. The Senate Federalists were even more reluctant than those in the House to consider amendments. Morris, who declined the advice, wrote to Peters that "our friends Clymer and Fitzsimons . . . advised that the Senate should adopt the whole of them by the Lump as containing neither good or Harm being perfectly innocent."⁶¹ However, the Senate eliminated several of the 17 amendments which the House had agreed upon. After a conference committee between the two branches, the House accepted most of the changes in the 12 remaining amendments. The House on the 24th and the Senate on

the 25th of September adopted the amendments. They were then sent on to the states for their ratification.⁶²

The roll calls concerning constitutional amendments, as shown in Table V, indicate that they were not a sectional issue. Although some states tended to vote as a bloc, there was not a North-South split in the voting. The Pennsylvania delegation almost to a man supported fewer and weaker amendments. It seems that the Pennsylvanians had accepted the Constitution as the framework for future political conflicts.

Like the division over constitutional amendments, the split concerning presidential power and national authority was an ideological one. As shown in Table VI, most states had congressional members voting on both sides of the scale rather than in blocs as on most issues. Those who opposed strong presidential authority tended to be Antifederalists or men who agreed with the Country-oriented ideology that it was dangerous to place too much power in the executive branch. This tendency was illustrated well in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 which substituted the Supreme Executive Council for the Governor. Hiester and Peter Muhlenberg, as indicated on Table VI, were the only representatives from Pennsylvania who voted on more roll calls against presidential power than for it. It is significant that the Constitutionalists had supported them, although nominal Republicans, in the hope they would support some of their ideas, particularly the move for stronger amendments. As seen above, Hiester and Peter Muhlenberg gave the Constitutionalists little support on the votes concerning constitutional amendments. However, on the roll calls dealing with presidential authority, they gave substantial support to the

TABLE VI

SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE FIRST CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Foster	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+	-	0	0	+
Gilman	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Partridge	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	0	-	-	-	+
Thacher	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	0	-	+	-
Trumbull	Connecticut	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Wadsworth	Connecticut	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+
Benson	New York	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Laurance	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, W.	Maryland	+	+	0	0	+	+	-	+	+
Ames	Massachusetts	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Goodhue	Massachusetts	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Leonard	Massachusetts	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	0
Sedgwick	Massachusetts	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	+
Wynkoop	Pennsylvania	-	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	+
Cadwalader	New Jersey	-	+	0	+	+	+	+	-	+
Schureman	New Jersey	-	+	0	+	+	-	+	0	0
Sherman	Connecticut	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+
Silvester	New York	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Clymer	Pennsylvania	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Fitzsimons	Pennsylvania	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sinnickson	New Jersey	-	0	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
Vining	Delaware	0	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	0
Gale	Maryland	0	-	+	+	+	+	0	0	0
Baldwin	Georgia	-	-	+	0	+	-	0	+	+
Scott	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hartley	Pennsylvania	0	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	0
Carroll	Maryland	+	0	0	-	+	0	+	+	+
Lee	Virginia	+	0	-	-	+	+	+	+	+
Floyd	New York	-	-	-	-	-	+	0	0	-
Muhlenberg, P.	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+
Boudinot	New Jersey	-	+	0	-	-	+	+	0	+
Contee	Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	0
Seney	Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+
Brown	Virginia	0	-	0	-	-	0	+	+	+
Griffin	Virginia	0	-	-	0	-	+	+	+	+
Madison	Virginia	+	-	-	-	-	0	+	+	+

TABLE VI (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Hiester	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+
Moore	Virginia	-	0	-	-	-	-	+	+	+
Burke	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+
Stone	Maryland	+	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	+
Jackson	Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0
Gerry	Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	+
Huntington	Connecticut	0	-	0	0	0	-	-	-	+
Hathorn	New York	0	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	+
Van Rensselaer	New York	-	+	0	-	0	-	-	-	+
Coles	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	0
Page	Virginia	0	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0
Parker	Virginia	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	+
White	Virginia	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Sumter	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Smith, W.L.	South Carolina	0	+	0	0	-	+	-	-	+
Mathews	Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	+
Livermore	New Hampshire	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grout	Massachusetts	0	+	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
Tucker	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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- Roll Call #1--To agree to a Senate amendment to H.R. 27 which would empower the President to call out the militia generally --28 September 1789--Y=16 N=25
- Roll Call #2--To disagree to a Senate amendment to H.R. 74 which would allow the postmaster, under the direction of the President, to establish postroads--22 July 1790--No is a positive vote--Y=35 N=20
- Roll Call #3--To amend S. 4 so as to provide that court writs be issued in the name of the U.S. and not in the name of the President--No is a positive vote--24 September 1789--Y=25 N=18
- Roll Call #4--To adhere to the above amendment--No is a positive vote--25 September 1789--Y=28 N=22
- Roll Call #5--To recede from the above amendment--28 September 1789--Y=26 N=25
- Roll Call #6--To amend a Senate resolution authorizing the President to carry into effect actions relative to establishing a U.S. mint--3 March 1791--Y=25 N=21

TABLE VI (Continued)

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- Roll Call #7--To pass H.R. 8 which would establish a Department of Foreign Affairs with implied removal power by the President--24 June 1789--Y-29 N=22
- Roll Call #8--To amend H.R. 8 which would establish a Department of Foreign Affairs by allowing the President to remove appointees without Senate approval--22 June 1789--Y=30 N=18
- Roll Call #9--To consider H.R. 102 which would establish a uniform militia--No is a positive vote--29 December 1789--Y=8 N=43

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which generally favors the use of presidential power and governmental authority.

Constitutionalist ideology. It is also significant that they both later became Democratic-Republicans. In the Senate Maclay also opposed the move toward strong presidential authority. Morris, of course, strongly backed the Federalist strategy of strengthening the position of the president.

For the Federalists, the move toward a powerful executive was one of their aims in trying to secure a stronger central government. After Congress convened, the Federalists realized that they could use the popularity and prestige of George Washington to help their cause. Washington realized that the presidency was made stronger because he was the first to hold that office. Washington also initiated legislation and used his staff to help influence members of Congress to support certain bills or policies. The Federalists also felt that, unlike the Confederation government, a strong executive would help regain the support and respect of the people. And everyone, of course, realized that George Washington was the person who could accomplish that. Those who opposed this nationalist idea, mostly Antifederalists, feared a strong executive. To many of them it was too much of a reminder of the monarchy they had recently gotten rid of.⁶³

The debate over titles during the first session of Congress did not help allay the fears of the Antifederalists. Several members of the Senate, including John Adams as Vice President and presiding officer, favored imposing titles for the President and other important government officials. While some were serious in their efforts, others ridiculed many of the titles mentioned and thought up alternatives of their own. Maclay, who thought it was all "silly business," mentioned that since Henry Wynkoop was the tallest man in the House of

Representatives that he was entitled "Your Highness of the Lower House" and as tallest in the Senate, Maclay was called "Your Highness of the Senate."⁶⁴ It was during this debate over titles that Congress considered the bills creating the executive branch departments. And while the agitation over titles soon flickered out, the debate concerning presidential authority continued, not only in the First Congress but throughout the 1790's.

Pennsylvanians may have been particularly sensitive to the seemingly trivial matter of titles. Maclay remarked in his journal that "we have really more republican plainness and sincere openness of behavior in Pennsylvania than in any place I have ever been."⁶⁵ And perhaps Maclay was right. A look at his journal clearly reflects the Court versus Country conflict within Congress. Maclay viewed the Federalists as "courtiers" with monarchical tendencies as compared to administration opponents who were more independent and republican. And Benjamin Rush, a fast-fading Federalist and future Democratic-Republican, wrote to the title-hungry John Adams that:

The citizens of Pennsylvania are truly republicans and will not readily concur in a government which has begun so soon to ape the corruption of the British Court, conveyed to it through the impure channel of the city of New York . . . There is more known, said, and felt upon this subject than is proper to be communicated or than will be believed while Congress is perfumed with British incense in New York.⁶⁶

During the debate over the establishment of the executive departments and the judiciary there was more concern over the issue of governmental authority. The Court-minded Federalists wanted a strong national government. The Country-minded opposition was concerned that the Federalists were giving powers to the executive branch at the expense of the legislative branch. During the fight over the power of

presidential removal, some Federalists were disturbed by the tone of the debate. In the House, Speaker Muhlenberg reported that he saw an "antifederal Monster disrupting the harmony of the House."⁶⁷ Despite Muhlenberg's fear, the Antifederalists had little success in stopping the Federalists from giving the President the power of removal. A few days later the House amended the Department of Foreign Affairs bill to allow the President to remove appointees without Senate approval. The bill passed two days later by a vote of 29-22. In the Senate the vote on the removal issue ended in a tie vote which was broken by Vice President Adams in favor of presidential removal. Morris voted in favor of removal by the President and Maclay against it. So, as usual their votes cancelled each other out. And in the Senate, Maclay, unlike Muhlenberg in the House, feared an administration party rather than an Antifederalist one. In discussing the removal issue he maintained that, "It seems as if a court party was forming; indeed I believe it was formed long ago."⁶⁸

The voting in the House concerning whose name was to appear on judicial writs was much closer than that on presidential removal. In fact, it took three roll calls before the issue was settled. Those who favored a strong executive argued that court writs should be issued in the name of the President. On the other hand, those favoring a weak executive argued that the writs should be issued in the name of the United States. In the first two votes on this issue the House refused to agree to issue writs in the name of the President. A few days later a compromise put forth by those in the Senate who favored a strong executive was considered. It called for issuing the writs in the name of the Chief Justice rather than by the United States.

Several representatives changed their vote, including Hartley and Scott from Pennsylvania, and the result was a 24-24 tie. Fitzsimons, Clymer and Wynkoop had favored the strong executive position all along. Only Hiester and Peter Muhlenberg, the developing Democratic-Republicans, from Pennsylvania refused to go along with the vote. That left the decision up to the Pennsylvanian Frederick Muhlenberg, who as Speaker had not yet voted during the first session. Muhlenberg broke the tie in favor of the Federalist position for a stronger executive.⁶⁹

The Federalist movement to strengthen executive powers greatly upset those Country-minded thinkers who feared the power of the executive and saw it as a movement toward a monarchical government. The fear received added credence during the First Congress when coupled with the attempts to secure titles and to achieve high salaries for government officials. The "courtly" Presidential levees of George Washington were also disturbing to many. The Country opponents of this tendency, among whom Maclay was a leading figure, distrusted these undemocratic overtones of the government. They did not want the government to degenerate into an aristocracy or monarchy. From the Pennsylvania delegation only Maclay, Hiester, and Peter Muhlenberg, all future Democratic-Republicans, were to vote against most attempts to strengthen executive and national powers. In criticizing the Federalist position on the question of the President's removal power Maclay said:

It is easy to see what the court opinion will be with respect to this point. Indeed, I entertain no doubt but that many people are aiming with all their force to establish a splendid court with all the pomp of majesty.⁷⁰

Over issues in the First Congress, particularly Hamilton's fiscal programs, helped to fuel the split between Court and Country congressmen. Pennsylvania was to lose its leading Country congressional

representative as Maclay's term was up in 1791. However, the Pennsylvania congressional elections of 1791 were to see the arrival of two Constitutionals in William Findley and Andrew Gregg. And the western agrarian Findley soon took over Maclay's role as Pennsylvania's Country spokesman.

Conclusion

In spite of the fact that the Pennsylvania delegation in the First Congress was predominantly Federalist and contained no Constitutionals, there were internal splits over several ideological issues which continued the Court versus Country dichotomy which had its roots in the revolutionary period. While Pennsylvania, behind the influence of Morris and Fitzsimons, did act as a "swing state" between the northern and southern blocs on some occasions in the First Congress, it did not vote as a unit on most issues. The opposition in the Pennsylvania delegation to Federalist Court policies was led by Senator William Maclay and the Constitutionalist supported Representatives Daniel Hiester and Peter Muhlenberg, all of whom soon became Democratic-Republicans. The internal division within the Pennsylvania delegation was unusual since most other state delegations tended to vote as a unit on most issues. This was generally due to the sectional voting pattern which had been carried over from the Continental Congress. The partisanship which Pennsylvania initiated was gradually to spread to other state delegations throughout the next several congresses in the 1790's.

The reason for Pennsylvania's quick development of partisan voting behavior in the First Congress was the state's previous experience with

political parties within the state. Because many of the political struggles in the First Congress were a continuation of those from an earlier period, the opposing sides again became aligned against each other. The ideological polarization in the Pennsylvania delegation would be even more prevalent in the Second Congress with the election of two men who were in the Country-oriented Constitutionalist party.

ENDNOTES

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³Draft Resolution, 3 September 1788, Gallatin Papers, NYHS; Jensen and Becker, FFE, 1: 249-252-253, 255-264; Pennsylvania Packet, 15 September 1788; Manuscript, n.d., 1788, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

⁴Federal Gazette, 7 November 1788; Jensen and Becker, FFE, 1: 232, 331-335.

⁵Jensen and Becker, FFE, 1: 232, 418-419; Journals of the Continental Congress, 34: 554-570; Independent Gazetteer, 22 November 1788.

⁶Pennsylvania Gazette, 16 July 1788; Jensen and Becker, FFE, 1: 231-232, 246, 273-274, 299-302.

⁷Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, p. 216; James McLene to William Irvine, 12 September 1788, Ephraim Blaine to William Irvine, 2 October 1788, David Redick to William Irvine, 2 October 1788, Irvine Papers, HSP.

⁸Jensen and Becker, FFE, 1: 297, 313-319, 323-324; Pennsylvania Packet, 8 November 1788.

⁹Pennsylvania Packet, 19, 25 November 1788; Jensen and Becker, FFE, 1: 233, 339-340, 362-363.

¹⁰Kenneth W. Keller, "Diversity and Democracy: Ethnic Politics in Southeastern Pennsylvania, 1788-1799" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1971), pp. 77-85.

¹¹Steven R. Boyd, The Politics of Opposition: Antifederalists and the Acceptance of the Constitution (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1979), p. 144; Pennsylvania Packet, 19, 20 December 1788; Pennsylvania Gazette, 24 December 1788; Jensen and Becker, FFE, 1: 377-379.

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¹³For a fuller discussion of the residence question during the Confederation period see: Joseph L. Davis, Sectionalism in American Politics, 1774-1787 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), pp. 59-75; Lawrence D. Cress, "Whither Columbia? Congressional Residence and the Politics of the New Nation, 1776-1787," WMQ, 3d ser., 32 (October 1975): 581-600; and Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 339-343.

¹⁴Robert Morris to Richard Peters, 9 August 1789, Peters Papers, HSP.

¹⁵Annals, 1st Cong., 1st sess., p. 816.

¹⁶Perry M. Goldman and James S. Young, eds., The United States Congressional Directories, 1789-1840 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 15; Maclay, Journal, pp. 146-148; Annals, 1st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 867-920; Thomas Hartley to Jasper Yeates, 6 September 1789, Yeates Papers, HSP.

¹⁷Annals, 1st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 929, 946, 955-962; Maclay, Journal, pp. 158-165, 168-169; Robert Morris to Richard Peters, 13 September 1789, Peters Papers, HSP.

¹⁸For the various viewpoints on the Compromise of 1790 see: Jacob E. Cooke, "The Compromise of 1790," WMQ, 3rd ser., 27 (October 1970): 523-545; Kenneth R. Bowling, with a rebuttal by Jacob Cooke, "Dinner at Jefferson's: A Note on Jacob E. Cooke's The Compromise of 1790," WMQ, 3rd ser., 28 (October 1971): 629-648; Kenneth R. Bowling, "The Bank Bill, The Capital City, and President Washington," Capital Studies 1 (Spring 1972): 59-71; Norman K. Risjord, "The Compromise of 1790: New Evidence on the Dinner Table Bargain," WMQ, 3d ser., 33 (April 1976): 309-314.

¹⁹Maclay, Journal, pp. 190-191; Thomas Fitzsimons to Tench Coxe, 13 April 1790, Coxe Papers, HSP.

²⁰Maclay, Journal, pp. 272-275, 277-278, 285, 293; Annals, 1st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1678-1682, 1693.

²¹Maclay, Journal, pp. 305-307, 312-314; Annals, 1st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1715, 1737.

²²Henry Wynkoop to Reading Beatty, 2 July 1790, PMHB 38 (1914): pp. 200-201.

²³Annals, 1st Cong., 2d sess., p. 1902, Appendix, pp. 2041-2082.

²⁴Mercy Warren, History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution, 3 vols. (Boston: Manning and Loring, 1805), 3: 362; Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution," p. 361.

²⁵ Annals, 1st Cong., 1 sess., pp. 822-825; Pennsylvania Packet, 9 July 1790; Federal Gazette, 12 July 1790; American State Papers: Finance, 1: 76; Benjamin Rush to James Madison, 10 April, 25 March, 1790, Madison Papers, LC; Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," p. 260.

²⁶ George Logan, Letters Addressed to the Yeomanry of the United States on Funding and Banking Systems (Philadelphia: Oswald, 1791); Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," pp. 242-243, 260; Pennsylvania Gazette, 27 January, 3 February 1790; John Nicholson to James Madison, 17 February 1790, Madison Papers, LC; Federal Gazette, 16 February 1790; Daniel Hiester to James Hutchinson, 30 March 1790, Hutchinson Papers, APS; Benjamin Rush to James Madison, 10 April 1790, Madison Papers, LC.

²⁷ Annals, 1st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1177-1179, 1188-1189, 1198-1210, 1224.

²⁸ Thomas Hartley to Jasper Yeates, 14 February 1790, Yeates Papers, HSP.

²⁹ Annals, 1st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1318-1325, 1344; E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 299; Maclay, Journal, p. 197.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 202, 223-224, 227-228; Annals, 1st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1363-1364, 1368-1369, 1425, 1448-1449.

³¹ Thomas Fitzsimons to Tench Coxe, 28 February 1790, Tench Coxe Papers, HSP.

³² Maclay, Journal, p. 220; Theodore Sedgwick to Mrs. Sedgwick, 22 March 1790, as quoted in Joseph Charles, The Origin of the American Party System (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 17.

³³ Annals, 1st Cong., 2d sess., p. 1577; Maclay, Journal, pp. 236-237.

³⁴ Annals, 1st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1598-1599, 1685.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 1025, 1040, 1043, 1047; Maclay, Journal, pp. 322, 324-327.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 337-340; Annals, 1st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1049-1050, 1054-1055.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 1753-1755; Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 322.

³⁸ Theodore Sedgwick to Mrs. Sedgwick, 13 April 1790, as quoted in Charles, American Party System, p. 17.

³⁹ Winfred E. A. Bernhard, Fisher Ames: Federalist and Statesman, 1758-1808 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), p. 163.

⁴⁰For further accounts of Philadelphia and its importance in the 1790's see: Richard G. Miller, Philadelphia--The Federalist City: A Study of Urban Politics, 1789-1801 (Fort Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1976); and Roland Baumann, "The Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia: The Origins, 1776-1797" (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1970).

⁴¹Jacob E. Cooke, Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), p. 171.

⁴²Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 148-149; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 401-402; Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," pp. 37-39.

⁴³Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, pp. 325-326.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 299-300; Maclay, Journal, p. 364.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 373; Annals, 1st Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1782, 1784-1791; Bowling, "The Bank Bill," pp. 61-62.

⁴⁶Annals, 1st Cong., 3d sess., p. 1791.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 1924, 1940-2012; Bowling, "The Bank Bill," pp. 59-71; Theodore Sedgwick to Mrs. Sedgwick, 26 December 1790, as quoted in Bowling, "The Bank Bill," p. 60.

⁴⁸Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1979), p. 200; Bowling, "The Bank Bill," p. 63; Annals, 1st Cong., 3d sess., p. 2012; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, pp. 197-198.

⁴⁹McDonald, Alexander Hamilton, pp. 150, 196.

⁵⁰Leland D. Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, The Study of a Frontier Uprising (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1939), pp. 56, 69-71; Walters, Gallatin, p. 45; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 92.

⁵¹Annals, 1st Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1890-1934; Maclay, Journal, pp. 381-390; Gazette of the United States, 5 February 1791.

⁵²Ibid., Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 91; Miller, Federalist City, p. 41.

⁵³Ibid., p. 40; General Advertiser, 15 January 1791; Maclay, Journal, pp. 387-388; Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 4: 21; Annals, 1st Cong., 3d sess., p. 1928; Petition from the merchants and traders to the Pennsylvania Senate against the Excise Tax, 11 April 1791, Manuscript Collection, LC; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, pp. 147-148.

⁵⁴George Thatcher to Benjamin Chadbourne, 30 January 1791, as quoted in Bowling, "Politics," pp. 241-242; Miller, Federalist City, p. 41.

⁵⁵James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 29 March 1789, Madison Papers, LC.

⁵⁶George Clymer to Richard Peters, 17-18 June 1789, Peters Papers, HSP.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Annals, 1st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 440-468, 685-691, 730-809; Bowling, "Politics," p. 132.

⁵⁹Richard Peters to James Madison, 5 July 1789, Madison Papers, LC.

⁶⁰Thomas Hartley to Jasper Yeates, 16 August 1789, Yeates Papers, HSP; Frederick Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush, 18 August 1789, Miscellaneous Papers, HSP.

⁶¹Annals, 1st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 73-74, 76-79; Maclay, Journal, p. 134; Robert Morris to Richard Peters, 24 August 1789, Peters Papers, HSP.

⁶²Annals, 1st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 85-86, 90; 2d sess., pp. 948-949; Bowling, "Politics," p. 146.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 81-82.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 85; Maclay, Journal, pp. 1-13, 18-38, 50-51.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 5.

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 9-12, 106-114, 119-120; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, pp. 119-120; Benjamin Rush to John Adams, 4 June 1789, Butterfield, Rush Letters, 1: 513-514.

⁶⁷Frederick A. Muhlenberg to Richard Peters, 18 June 1789, Peters Papers, HSP.

⁶⁸Maclay, Journal, pp. 114, 116; Annals, 1st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 602-603, 614; Bowling, "Politics," pp. 95-96.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 111-112; Annals, 1st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 949, 951, 962.

⁷⁰Maclay, Journal, p. 82; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, pp. 121-125.

CHAPTER IV

THE PENNSYLVANIA DELEGATION IN THE SECOND CONGRESS

The Pennsylvania Congressional Elections of 1791

In the fall of 1790 when most states were holding their elections for the Second Congress, Pennsylvania was still busily implementing its new state constitution and electing new state officials. The Constitutional Convention in Pennsylvania had finished its work on September 2, 1790. The next day the Pennsylvania Assembly under the old Constitution of 1776 dissolved itself. However, they had made no plans for the elections to the Second Congress which was scheduled to begin in October, 1791. Consequently the congressional elections were postponed until the newly elected legislature could authorize a special off-year election.¹

When the first legislature under the new Pennsylvania Constitution convened in December, 1790 one of its earliest duties was to enact an election law. Since the Second Congress was scheduled to begin in October, 1791 the law had to be passed and the elections held before that time. When the issue was introduced in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, the Constitutionals William Findley and Blair McClenachan argued that it should be debated in the committee of the whole before it was sent to a committee. The Constitutionals, led by Findley, contended that district elections rather than a general

at-large election should be provided for. In January, the House voted by a one vote margin of 32-31 to appoint a committee to bring in a bill providing for district elections. All but seven of the votes of the majority came from western Pennsylvania. The opposition, on the other hand, received 21 of their 31 votes from the four southeastern counties of Bucks, Philadelphia, Lancaster, and York, and from the city of Philadelphia which wanted to take advantage of their heavily populated areas as they had in 1788. Following the close vote, the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House, William Bingham, appointed a committee to draft a bill which was passed by the House on February 1, 1791, by a vote of 33-28.²

The split over the election bill in the Pennsylvania Senate was similar to that in the House with a vote of nine to eight in favor of the district election bill. Besides the city of Philadelphia, the eight minority votes represented the southeastern counties of Philadelphia, Bucks, Lancaster, York, Chester, and Delaware. The election law, which was approved on March 16, divided Pennsylvania into eight congressional districts. However, the law also provided that delegates could run in any district they wished. Rather than provide for a costly separate election, the act set the congressional elections for the second Tuesday of October, the same day as the regular state elections.³

The Pennsylvania congressional campaigns of 1791 were less partisan and less exciting than the at-large elections of 1788 and 1792. In the at-large elections the opposing parties attempted to establish some statewide organization. That the Federalists were successful in 1788 was shown by their election of six of the eight

candidates on the Lancaster ticket. Correspondence committees were also formed to aid each party's candidates. There were numerous broadsides and newspaper articles published throughout the state. In the congressional elections of 1791 this statewide organization was less necessary. In several districts the outcomes were known beforehand because of the dominance of one party or the other. It was understood by all that the Federalists would dominate in eastern Pennsylvania, especially in the Philadelphia area, while the Constitutionals would do well in the western counties. But as party politics heated up later throughout the 1790's, this was not always to be the case. There were some of the usual county meetings and publication of newspaper articles concerning candidates, but in general the election was less well covered than other congressional elections in the 1790's.⁴

The first congressional district comprised the city of Philadelphia and the County of Delaware. This area was strongly Federalist and was controlled by Senator Robert Morris' junto. The incumbent Thomas Fitzsimons, a close ally of Morris, was the Federalist candidate. Morris had great political influence in the Philadelphia area, both on the national and state level. The district election law of 1791 deprived the Morris group of much of its power to affect elections outside the Philadelphia area. While gaining political strength throughout the 1780's, Morris' junto became predominant after the ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1787 and the establishment of a new state constitution in 1790. Two of Morris' closest associates were Congressmen Thomas Fitzsimons and James Wilson, an associate judge on the United States Supreme Court. As leaders of the Federalists in Pennsylvania they strongly backed the policies of George Washington




Figure 2. Pennsylvania Congressional Districts for 1791 Elections

and Alexander Hamilton. Most of their support came from the well organized and articulate commercial and professional classes.⁵

In the First Congress Morris had influenced the voting of the Pennsylvania delegation which usually voted for Federalist policies, except for the errant Daniel Hiester and Peter Muhlenberg. In the Senate, Morris lost control of the independent-minded Maclay early in the Congress. Morris made sure, however, that Maclay was not reelected for another term after his short term ended in 1791. The Morris group had also tried to elect the conservative General St. Clair as governor in 1790. However, the victory of the popular Thomas Mifflin was to cause Morris and the Federalists problems throughout the 1790's. Although a nominal Federalist, Mifflin was sympathetic with the Constitutionals as his appointment of Alexander Dallas as Secretary of the Commonwealth indicated.⁶ Indeed, Dallas was an organizer of the Constitutionals in the Philadelphia area. Dallas found an able partner in Dr. James Hutchinson, a well known physician and chemistry professor at the University of Pennsylvania and a member of the American Philosophical Society. The stout and good natured doctor was very popular and respected throughout Philadelphia. Charles Biddle described him as being "fat enough to act the character of Falstaff without stuffing."⁷ Hutchinson, particularly after the death of Judge George Bryan in 1791, became a leading activist in organizing the artisans, mechanics, and immigrants into an effective voting force. Although just beginning in 1791, this scheme to organize politically the lower classes against the Federalists was to have important consequences later in the 1790's. Hutchinson took good advantage of Pennsylvania's suffrage law which allowed all freemen over the age of 21 to vote.⁸

However, because Dallas and Hutchinson had just begun their plans, they were no match for Morris and the Federalists in the first congressional district in the election of 1791. They attacked Fitzsimons for his support of Alexander Hamilton's fiscal policies. But because the Philadelphia economy was in good shape and most of the people favored Hamilton's measures, the attack had little effect. In fact, the Constitutionals had trouble finding anyone to run against Fitzsimons and five others for state legislative positions to be filled at the same election. There was very little active campaigning against them since the opposition realized it had little support. At this moment the Federalists were the beneficiaries of the decision to return the federal capital and to locate the new national bank there as well. Consequently, Fitzsimons and the five Federalist candidates were elected with ease.⁹

The second congressional district, which included the counties of Philadelphia and Bucks in southeastern Pennsylvania, was also controlled by Morris and the Federalists. There was a contest in this district between two incumbents, but both of them were Federalists. Several districts had asked the popular German politician and current Speaker of the House to run on their ticket. Frederick Muhlenberg chose to run in District two which pitted him against the Federalist Bucks County Judge Henry Wynkoop. Although Muhlenberg often professed little interest in the outcome, he diligently worked behind the scenes to insure his re-election. In a letter to Fitzsimons, Muhlenberg stated that his friends had insisted that he be a candidate. He asked Fitzsimons to use his influence to have Wynkoop withdraw from the race. When Wynkoop did not withdraw, Muhlenberg used both English and German

language newspapers to advertise his candidacy. In an obvious ethnic appeal, Muhlenberg stressed his German heritage in the German press but made no mention of it in the English language newspapers. Muhlenberg wrote several articles under the pseudonym "Brutus" in his own support. One, an "Appeal to the Electors of the Counties of Philadelphia and Bucks," is the only known personal appeal by a candidate in the 1791 campaign in Pennsylvania. Muhlenberg won his campaign for re-election, although the voting results were not reported.¹⁰

Unlike the Philadelphia area districts, those in western Pennsylvania were controlled by the Constitutionalists. The far western eighth congressional district in 1791 consisted of Allegheny, Fayette, Washington, and Westmoreland Counties. The incumbent Federalist Thomas Scott from Washington County who had been elected on an at-large ticket in 1788, declined to run since he realized he had less chance for victory in a district based contest. This was especially true in 1791 since the popular William Findley of Westmoreland County was the Constitutionalist candidate. At a large meeting in Washington County, Findley was the only candidate nominated. A participant reported to William Irvine that there was little doubt that Findley would win the election. He said that the electors "will to a man vote for Findley."¹¹ Findley was consequently elected with no opposition. There was a similar outcome in the sixth congressional district where the Constitutionalist candidate Andrew Gregg of Mifflin County won with little opposition. The sixth district was composed of the five western counties of Bedford, Franklin, Huntington, Mifflin, and Northumberland.¹²

The Federalists were victorious in three of the other four districts and the Constitutionalists in one. In district three, Chester and

Montgomery Counties, Peter Muhlenberg who had opposed several Federalist policies during the First Congress, declined to run again. He was replaced by the Federalist oriented Israel Jacobs. Daniel Hiester, elected in 1788 with Constitutionalist help, was returned to Congress from the fourth district. He defeated the Federalist candidate John Allison, who had been one of the two losers on the Lancaster ticket of 1788. Hiester would continue to oppose much of the Federalist program in the Second Congress. Hiester's district consisted of the counties of Berks, Luzerne, and Northampton. In Dauphin and Lancaster Counties, district five, the Federalist John Kittera replaced the Federalist George Clymer who had accepted an appointment from President Washington as a Supervisor of the Revenue in Pennsylvania. The Federalist Thomas Hartley was returned from the seventh district which consisted of Cumberland and York Counties. Hartley defeated William Irvine in this district, although there is little information concerning the campaign or the final results other than that Hartley was victorious. Hartley must have done extremely well in conservative York County because election returns from the town of Carlisle in Cumberland County gave Irvine 592 votes to only 49 for Hartley.¹³

Thus five Federalists and three Constitutionalist supported candidates won seats in the 1791 congressional elections. Unlike the at-large election of 1788, the district elections of 1791 permitted the Constitutionlists to elect some of their own men rather than moderate Republicans. Until the Democratic-Republicans were organized enough to compete effectively with the Federalists in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was, in some respects, a reflection of the North-South sectional conflict within Congress. Western Pennsylvania, dominated

by Scotch-Irish localist farmers who followed the Country ideology, was similar to the South while eastern Pennsylvania, controlled largely by Morris' Federalist junto in Philadelphia which was supported by cosmopolitan commercialists who were partial to the Court philosophy, was allied more with the North.

The Pennsylvania legislature failed to elect a United States Senator in 1791 to replace Maclay whose term had ended. The legislative branches fought over the method of selection, that is, whether to have a joint or concurrent vote of both houses. The House, which had more members, overwhelmingly favored a joint vote so as to increase their influence. The Senate would only consider a concurrent vote, so the election was stalemated. Not until February, 1793 was a second Senator, Albert Gallatin, elected.¹⁴

The Second Congress: Reapportionment

An important and controversial issue that confronted the Second Congress early in its first session concerned the ratio of representation for congressional representatives. According to the Constitution, the number of delegates in the House of Representatives had been set at 65. Each state was given a specific number of representatives based on the estimated population at that time. Every 10 years, beginning in 1790, a census was to be taken for the purpose of determining congressional reapportionment. The Constitution also provided that representation should not be less than one representative to 30,000 persons.¹⁵

With the population returns from the first census of 1790 in hand, Congress needed to determine the proper ratio of representatives to

population and the apportionment of representatives among the various states. Most debate during the Second Congress centered on whether the ratio should be closer to one to 30,000 or a higher ratio such as one to 33,000 or one to 40,000. It was a question that had both sectional and ideological ramifications. The outlook by each side on the ideological aspect of reapportionment showed the political views of the developing Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties and indicated how closely they followed the prevailing Court-Country dichotomy. The Court-minded advocates of a higher ratio with fewer representatives argued that it would give greater stability to the lower house. It was said that a lesser number of delegates would allow all of them to voice their opinions on issues and it would be more convenient and less expensive to maintain. They also realized that they could better control the elections if fewer persons were to be elected. A larger number of representatives would make the legislature less exclusive and more open to the common people. On the other hand, those who argued for a smaller ratio maintained that a larger representation would better reflect the interests of all the people. It was stressed that a larger number of representatives would help to resist legislative corruption. In this regard, William Branch Giles of Virginia, a leading advocate of the Country philosophy, argued that a vote for the larger representation could decide whether the nation

. . . would preserve the simplicity, chastity, and purity of her native representation and Republicanism, in which alone the true dignity and greatness of her character must consist; or whether she will, so early in youth, prostitute herself to the venal and borrowed artifices and corruption of a stale and pampered monarchy?¹⁶

The debate over the ratio to be used for reapportionment also involved practical aspects which, similar to the Court-Country split,

happened to be sectionally oriented. If the 30,000 to one ratio were implemented it would leave large unrepresented fractions in several of the northern states and particularly in the Federalist stronghold of New England. Consequently, the Federalists, led by Fisher Ames and Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, argued that the 33,000 to one ratio was the most fair since it produced smaller fractions than any other number between 30 and 40 thousand. Of course, it was also the ratio which would benefit New England the most. On the other hand, the southerners were in favor of the lower ratio which was more advantageous to them both sectionally and ideologically.¹⁷

The debate on reapportionment began on October 31, 1791 even before all the delegates had arrived for the first session of the Second Congress. William Findley was one of the early supporters of the lower ratio of one to 30,000. On November 14 he outlined his thoughts on the issue during the debate as reported in the Annals:

The representation ought as nearly as possible to express not only the will, but to participate in the wishes and interests of the people. A large representation embraces these interests more fully, and is more competent to giving and receiving information. The objects of legislation are such as come home to the doors, to the feelings of every man; the Government ought therefore to secure the confidence of the people by a large representation. The Expense he considered as trifling compared to the benefits-- and the people expect and are willing to pay for being well governed, and having their liberties secured. An increased representation, is an additional security against corruption.¹⁸

The next day the House passed a resolution in favor of the 30,000 to one ratio by a vote of 35-23. All the Pennsylvania delegation voted for it except Thomas Hartley who did not vote. After an unsuccessful attempt to change the ratio to one to 34,000, the reapportionment bill passed the House by a vote of 43-12 with the 30,000 to one ratio still

intact. The Pennsylvania delegation, except for the absent Fitzsimons, again voted with the majority.¹⁹

When the reapportionment bill reached the Senate it was amended by changing the ratio to 33,000 people for each representative. The effect of this change was to reduce the number of representatives by one in North Carolina, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts, and by two in Virginia. When the reapportionment bill was returned to the House the debate over the ratio continued. Through a series of four votes, the opponents of the lower ratio of 30,000 to one attempted to get the House to agree to the Senate amendments. However, on December 19, the House voted 32-27 to reject the Senate amendments. It was during this period in the House debate that several Pennsylvania representatives, mostly Federalists, began to vote for the higher ratio. Under Federalist pressure the number of representatives voting for the higher ratio increased steadily. From the margin of 31 which those who favored the lower ratio had achieved on the vote of November 24, it shrank to a margin of only five on the vote of December 19.²⁰

Several of the Pennsylvania delegation now embraced the Federalist position. The Federalists Fitzsimons, Hartley, Kittera, and Jacobs now supported the higher ratio. Kittera said that he changed his vote from the lower ratio because he felt it was "unjust and unequal" to "a majority of the States."²¹ In discussing the vote of December 19, Hartley, in a letter to a Pennsylvania friend, mentioned that, "The fixing a ratio of representation for members in our branch has agitated the heads of the gentlemen in both houses."²² Hartley went on to say that "at first I was for the ratio of one for 30,000 but really

considering how this would operate compared with 33,000, I change my sentiments."²³ He concluded by saying that the higher ratio failed in the vote with five of the Pennsylvania delegation in the minority. Even the Constitutionalist Andrew Gregg voted for the higher ratio on two of these roll calls. Gregg was to vote the other way on several subsequent roll calls. Hiester, who was absent for this series of votes, generally supported the lower ratio. The nominal Federalist Frederick Muhlenberg showed one of the reasons why he later became a Democratic-Republican by his support of the lower ratio. Of course, the Constitutionalist leader William Findley maintained his strong stand in favor of the lower ratio. Shortly before the vote of December 19, Findley told the House members that it was a question of justice and that "we are not to be moved by any threats; we act on principle, and we will intrench ourselves in principle; and this principle of constitutional equality is all that we can pretend to."²⁴

Because both the House and Senate refused to alter their position the first reapportionment bill was effectively blocked and the measure was dropped for a period of time. The second reapportionment bill which was presented in the House in late January of 1792 proposed an interim apportionment for five years. There was to be another census taken before then to determine the basis for distribution of representatives after March 1797. The representation ratio of one to 30,000 was to be maintained after 1797 and applied to the individual states rather than to the United States as a whole. The ratio of representation until 1797 was to be one to 34,000. Between January 24 and February 20 there were five proposed amendments, most of which attempted to increase the 30,000 to one ratio. When brought to a vote in the

House on February 21 the second reapportionment bill passed by a vote of 34-16. This compromise bill was supported by all state delegations except those of New England and some delegates from New Jersey.²⁵

The reapportionment bill was again changed by the Senate after its passage in the House. The Senate amendments gave the New England states more representation than the House bill and provided that the House of Representatives should not exceed 120 members after 1797. This, of course, would eventually negate the 30,000 to one ratio if the House could not expand its membership above a certain level. After the Senate returned the reapportionment bill the House refused at first to approve the amendments. A conference committee, of which William Findley was a member, failed to settle the issue. However, as happened to the first House bill, several representatives decided to support the Senate version which favored a higher ratio. The Pennsylvania Federalists were some of those who changed their votes to support the Senate rather than the House bill. On March 17, the proponents of the Senate version almost won on a roll call vote calling for a limit of 120 members in the House of Representatives. The vote was a close 29-31 against. In the Pennsylvania delegation those voting for the amendments were four Federalists, Fitzsimons, Hartley, Jacobs, and Kittera. Findley, Gregg, Hiester, and Frederick Muhlenberg voted against the amendment. However, by March 23 the Federalists had obtained enough votes to win passage of the Senate version by a vote of 31-29. The only Pennsylvania representative to change his vote from that of March 17 was the Federalist Muhlenberg who now voted for it. Thus, all five of the Pennsylvania Federalists who had at one time voted for the House compromise bill, now supported the Senate version with the higher ratio.²⁶

This second reapportionment bill which had traveled such a rough road to passage through the two quarreling branches now hit another snag. It was vetoed on April 5 by President George Washington. It was his first presidential veto. Washington claimed it did not conform to the Constitution in respect to apportionment or to the ratio of representation. On April 6 the Federalists in the House attempted to pass the bill over Washington's veto. The vote on the veto override failed by a count of 28-33 with the Pennsylvania delegation voting four in favor of and four against the veto. A few days later the third and final bill on reapportionment was passed by the House by a vote of 34-30. In the Pennsylvania delegation only William Findley and Frederick Muhlenberg voted against this bill which called for the higher ratio of 33,000 to one. Under this bill Pennsylvania was entitled to 13 representatives in the Third Congress, an increase of five over their present number.²⁷

In examining the 17 roll calls in the Second Congress on reapportionment, as shown on Table VII, the most obvious result is the sectional alignment which prevailed. The northern states consistently supported the higher ratio and the southern states regularly voted for the lower ratio. It is also significant, however, that Pennsylvania was the only state that had representatives voting clearly on both sides of the issue. It was the only delegation which had members voting 65 percent of the time both for and against the 17 roll calls, with three men from Pennsylvania in each of these groups. In fact, Findley and Muhlenberg were in the most negative group accompanied by 17 southerners. And several of the other Pennsylvania representatives were close to the other end of the scale in the midst of

TABLE VII

SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON APPORTIONMENT IN THE SECOND CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls															
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Gilman	NH	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Livermore	NH	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, J.	NH	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+
Niles	VT	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, I.	VT	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Goodhue	MA	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thacher	MA	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sturges	CN	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	+
Bourn	RI	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Boudinot	NJ	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dayton	NJ	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	0	+
Ames	MA	-	+	+	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+
Bourne	MA	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sedgwick	MA	-	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	0
Hillhouse	CN	-	+	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	0
Kitchell	NJ	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ward	MA	-	0	+	+	-	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	+
Clark	NJ	0	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Vining	DE	0	-	0	0	+	+	-	0	0	+	-	+	-	+	+	0
Learned	CN	-	+	-	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+
Gregg	PA	-	0	-	+	0	-	+	+	+	-	-	0	+	-	-	+
Jacobs	PA	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+
Kittera	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+
Wadsworth	CN	-	+	-	-	+	-	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+
Benson	NY	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	0	+	-	+	+	+
Gordon	NY	-	0	-	0	+	-	0	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	-
Silvester	NY	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Fitzsimons	PA	0	-	0	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+
Hartley	PA	-	-	-	+	-	0	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+
Gerry	MA	0	0	-	-	+	-	0	-	-	+	0	-	0	+	+	-
Schoonmaker	NY	-	-	-	+	+	0	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-
Tredwell	NY	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-
Barnwell	SC	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+
Steele	NC	0	0	+	-	+	+	0	-	0	+	-	-	0	+	+	-

TABLE VII (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Laurance	NY	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	0	-	+	+	-	-
Hiester	PA	-	0	-	+	0	-	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	-	+	+	
Huger	SC	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	
Smith, W.L.	SC	-	-	+	0	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	0	
Key	MD	0	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	
Madison	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	
Parker	VA	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
Grove	NC	-	-	-	-	+	+	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	
Macon	NC	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	
Tucker	SC	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	
Willis	GA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	
Findley	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Muhlenberg	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	
Murray	MD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	
Seney	MD	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	
Sheridine	MD	+	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	-	0	-	0	0	0	-	-	
Sterett	MD	0	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Brown	VA	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Giles	VA	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	
Griffin	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	
Lee	VA	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	
Moore	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	
Page	va	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	+	-	-	-	-	
Venable	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
White	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Ashe	NC	-	0	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Williamson	NC	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	
Sumter	SC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Baldwin	GA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Wayne	GA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0	0	-	

CR=.92

- Roll Call #1--To pass H.R. 147, a bill to apportion the representation at 30,000 to one--No is a positive vote--24 November 1791--Y=43 N=12
- Roll Call #2--To pass H.R. 163, a bill to apportion the representation at 34,000 to one until 1797 and then at 30,000 to one--No is a positive vote--21 February 1792--Y=34 N=26
- Roll Call #3--To amend H.R. 147 by changing the representation from 30,000 to 34,000 to one--23 November 1791--Y=21 N=38

TABLE VII (Continued)

Roll Call #4--	To amend H.R. 163 by deleting the 1797 date so as to leave the representation at 34,000 to one--24 January 1792--Y=22 N=36
Roll Call #5--	To agree to a Senate amendment to H.R. 147 which would fix a certain number of representatives for each state, instead of a ratio of 33,000 to one--14 December 1791--Y=23 N=37
Roll Call #6--	To pass the resolution that the number of representatives shall be at 30,000 to one--No is a positive vote--15 November 1791--Y=35 N=23
Roll Call #7--	To amend H.R. 163 by setting the ratio at 30,000 to one--No is a positive vote--20 February 1792--Y=29 N=22
Roll Call #8--	To recede from disagreement to the Senate amendment to H.R. 147 which would increase the ratio from 30,000 to 33,000 to one--19 December 1791--Y=27 N=33
Roll Call #9--	To adhere to the disagreement as stated in roll call #8 above--No is a positive vote--19 December 1791--Y=32 N=27
Roll Call #10--	To pass the apportionment bill over the President's veto--6 April 1792--Y=28 N=33
Roll Call #11--	To amend H.R. 163 by striking out the section providing for a second census after 1797--20 February 1792--Y=23
Roll Call #12--	To amend H.R. 147 by increasing the ratio to 33,000 from 30,000 to one--14 December 1791--Y=29 N=31
Roll Call #13--	To amend H.R. 163 by striking the 30,000 to one ratio after 1797--20 February 1792--Y=25 N=26
Roll Call #14--	To limit the number of members in the House to 120 after 1797--17 March 1792--Y=29 N=31
Roll Call #15--	To recede from disagreement with the Senate over the apportionment bill--23 March 1792--Y=31 N=29
Roll Call #16--	To amend the apportionment bill by increasing the ratio to 33,000 to one 9 April 1792--Y=34 N=30
Roll Call #17--	To amend the resolution to prepare a new apportionment bill by eliminating the phrase "and no greater ratio be reported than thirty thousand to one"--24 January 1792--Y=33 N=26

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which generally favors apportionment at the higher ratio of 34,000 or 33,000 to one rather than at 30,000 to one.

northern bloc representatives. The positions of the Pennsylvanians on the scale and their comments in the Annals, particularly those by Findley, indicate that there were basic ideological differences within the Pennsylvania delegation. Led by the Country-minded Findley, several of the Pennsylvania delegation voted to show their support for a belief in the interests and liberties of the people through wider representation. It showed greater trust in the people and a belief in quality and broader democracy. It also indicated, in the best tradition of the Country ideology, a basic distrust of government and fear of corruption and arbitrary rule by the few. Those ideas were basic to the Constitutionalist ideology since 1776 and were also part of the Democratic-Republican ideology which Findley and his Pennsylvania allies were to help form. On the other hand, the Federalist position, which was supported by several Pennsylvania Federalists, showed their continued belief in elitism and the politics of deference. This basic distrust of the people by the Federalists was evidenced throughout the 1790's in other instances and was an important cause of the rise of an opposition party and its eventual victory. The Constitutionlists had been battling such ideology since 1776 on the state level. They were now in Congress opposing it on the national level as well.²⁸

Hamilton's Financial Policies

As with the question of reapportionment, the continuing controversy over Hamilton's fiscal system (including several resolutions of censure) was sectional in character. Tables VIII and IX showing the roll calls on fiscal policy and the censure resolutions reveal that Hamilton's main support came from the northern bloc and his main opposition came

TABLE VIII

SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON FINANCES IN THE SECOND CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																																		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3		
Livermore	NH	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Bourne	MA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Thacher	MA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Learned	CN	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Benson	NY	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Goodhue	MA	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Leonard	MA	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Sedgwick	MA	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Ward	MA	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Sturges	CN	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	
Laurance	NY	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Gilman	NH	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Ames	MA	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Wadworth	CN	-	-	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Bourn	RI	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Barnwell	SC	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Hillhouse	CN	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Fitzsimons	PA	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Huger	SC	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gerry	MA	0	0	-	+	-	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Silvester	NY	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Smith, W.L.	SC	-	-	0	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

TABLE VIII (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																																	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	
Hartley	PA	-	-	-	-	-	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Boudinot	NJ	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Gordon	NY	0	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Tucker	SC	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Sterett	MD	-	-	0	-	0	+	0	-	0	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	
Kittera	PA	-	0	-	-	-	0	+	-	-	0	+	+	+	+	-	0	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	
Dayton	NJ	0	0	+	-	+	-	0	0	0	-	+	+	+	+	0	0	-	+	-	0	+	+	+	-	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Muhlenberg	PA	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	+	-	0	+	+	-	-	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Key	MD	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	+	+	+	-	+	0	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	
Murray	MD	0	-	-	-	-	+	-	0	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	0	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	0	
Jacobs	PA	-	-	0	-	0	-	+	+	-	0	+	-	-	0	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	0	+	0	-	-	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	
Clark	NJ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Smith, J.	NH	-	0	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	0	-	-	-	0	+	-	-	+	-	-	0	+	+	0	-	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	
Kitchell	NJ	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Steele	NC	0	0	-	-	-	+	-	0	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	0	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Williamson	NC	-	-	0	-	0	+	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	0	+	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	
Hiester	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	0	-	0	0	0	0	
Page	VA	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	+	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	0	-	-	-	0
White	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	
Sumter	SC	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	0	-	-	+	+	-	0	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	0	+	-	0	0	0	0	0	

TABLE VIII (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																																							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3									
Niles	VT	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Venable	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	0	0	0	0	0	
Griffin	VA	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	-	+	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	0	0	-	+	-	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0			
Willis	GA	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	+	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0			
Schoonmaker	NY	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	+	0	+	-	-	-	-	+	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Tredwell	NY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Greenup	KY	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	+	0	0	-	-	0	+	+	0	0	0	0	0				
Smith, I.	VT	0	+	-	+	-	-	-	0	0	+	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	0	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	0	-	-	+	+	0	0	0			
Lee	VA	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	+	+	0	0	-	-				
Grove	NC	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-				
Gregg	PA	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	0	-	0	-	-	0	0	0			
Moore	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0		
Findley	PA	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+		
Mercer	MD	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0		
Parker	VA	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+		
Giles	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Madison	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Ashe	NC	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Macon	NC	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0		
Baldwin	GA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		

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TABLE VIII (Continued)

Roll Call	#1--To amend S. 27, an act establishing a mint and regulating the coins of the U.S., to provide that the words "emblematic of liberty, with an inscription of the word liberty" be inserted--No is a positive vote--24 March 1792--Y=42 N=6
Roll Call	#2--To pass H.R. 214, an act to regulate claims of invalid pensions--No is a positive vote--10 January 1793--Y=36 N=13
Roll Call	#3--To amend the public debt resolution asking the commissioners to lay before the House "their resolves as commissioners, approved by the President together with a statement of all their proceedings" since their last report--19 February 1793--Y=18 N=43
Roll Call	#4--To amend H.R. 214 by providing that persons who have not complied with the regulations shall not receive a pension--No is a positive vote--9 January 1793--Y=40 N=20
Roll Call	#5--To pass the public debt resolution asking the commissioners to lay before the House a statement of all their proceedings under acts for the reduction of the public debt, since their last report--No is a positive vote--19 February 1793--Y=39 N=22
Roll Call	#6--To put the main question on passage of a House bill supplementary to the act making provision for the debt of the United States--5 May 1792--Y=24 N=35
Roll Call	#7--To recede from the House amendment to S. 27 which puts the words George Washington on coins instead of Liberty--26 March 1792--Y=24 N=32
Roll Call	#8--To amend S. 27 so as to omit the head of the President from coins--No is a positive vote--24 March 1792--Y=26 N=22
Roll Call	#9--To pass the fourth public debt resolution--3 April 1792--Y=26 N=29
Roll Call	#10--To pass H.R. 190, a bill to confirm an award of referees between the U.S. and certain contractors for furnishing supplies to the Army and Navy--2 May 1792--Y=25 N=27
Roll Call	#11--To amend H.R. 207 by reducing the Bank of the U.S. loan to the government (Speaker voting in the negative)--No is a positive vote--26 December 1792--Y=27 N=27
Roll Call	#12--To order engrossment of H.R. 217, a bill to authorize a loan in the certificates of such states as shall have balances due them upon a settlement of accounts (Speaker voting in the affirmative)--25 January 1793--Y=33 N=32
Roll Call	#13--To pass H.R. 217 (Speaker voting in the affirmative)--28 January 1793--Y=33 N=32
Roll Call	#14--To amend the public debt resolution asking the commissioners to lay before the House "their resolves as commissioners, approved by the President together with," a statement of their proceedings not heretofore furnished--19 February 1793--Y=30 N=31
Roll Call	#15--To adopt the resolution that the Secretary of the Treasury be directed to report to this House his opinion of the best mode for raising additional supplies--8 March 1792--Y=31 N=27

TABLE VIII (Continued)

- Roll Call #16--To amend H.R. 191, a bill concerning the duties on spirits distilled within the U.S. to place a duty of eight cents on certain distilled spirits--30 April 1792--Y=26
N=27
- Roll Call #17--To amend H.R. 217 to provide that no certificate of any state for services rendered during the late war "shall be considered as the debts of the state which shall not be recognized as such by the legislature thereof within 12 months after the same shall have been subscribed--No is a positive vote--24 January 1793--Y=29 N=30
- Roll Call #18--To put the main question on passage of H.R. 217 (see #12 above)--28 January 1793--Y=33 N=31
- Roll Call #19--To amend H.R. 217 by excluding from the loans all certificates so transfixed or assigned from January 1, 1793 to June 1, 1793--No is a positive vote--24 January 1793--Y=30 N=33
- Roll Call #20 To pass the first resolution on the public debt providing to extend the term allowed for receiving, on loans, that part of the domestic debt remaining unsubscribed--No is a positive vote--2 April 1792--Y=27 N=30
- Roll Call #21--To commit the resolution that the Secretary of the Treasury cause to be laid before the House, a statement of unpaid balances due by individuals of the U.S. previous to March 4, 1789--23 February 1792--Y=31 N=27
- Roll Call #22--To put the main question on passage of the resolution which provides for opening a loan to the amount of the balances which upon a final settlement of accounts shall be found due from the U.S. to the individual states, provided that no such loan shall be opened in any state without the assent of the legislature thereof--12 January 1793--Y=34 N=28
- Roll Call #23--To amend the resolution concerning the President's message which provides that measures ought to be taken for the redemption of so much of the public debt as the U.S. has reserved the right to redeem. The amendment would strike the provision to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to report a plan for that purpose--No is a positive vote--21 November 1792--Y=25 N=32
- Roll Call #24--To concur in all Senate amendments to H.R. 207, a bill to provide for the reimbursement of a loan made of the Bank of the U.S.--23 February 1793--Y=34 N=25
- Roll Call #25--To pass S. 27 (see #1 above)--26 March 1792--Y=32 N=22
- Roll Call #26--To amend the fourth public debt resolution providing that the provisions of the resolution apply "whether discharged by the Senate since the treaty of peace, or undischarged."--No is a positive vote--3 April 1792--Y=22 N=30

TABLE VIII (Continued)

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- Roll Call #27--To amend the resolution concerning the reimbursement of a loan made of the Bank of the U.S., to provide for opening a loan to the amount of the balances which, upon a final settlement of accounts, shall be found due from the U.S. to the individual states, provided "that no such loan shall be opened in any state without the assent of the legislature thereof,"--12 January 1793--Y=38 N=23
- Roll Call #28--To amend H.R. 207 by eliminating the authorization for the President to make a two million dollar loan from the Bank of the U.S. with certain provisions--No is a positive vote--26 December 1792--Y=18 N=35
- Roll Call #29--To agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the fifth official conduct resolution which states that Hamilton failed to give Congress information in due time of the moneys drawn by him from Europe--1 March 1793--Y=33 N=15
- Roll Call #30--To agree with the Committee of the Whole with their disagreement to the fourth official conduct resolution which states that Hamilton deviated from the instructions given him by the President for making loans under the acts of August 4 and 12, 1790--1 March 1793--Y=39 N=12
- Roll Call #31--To concur with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the resolution concerning the official conduct of Hamilton in making appropriations authorized by a law passed August 4, 1790--1 March 1793--Y=40 N=12
- Roll Call #32--To agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the sixth official conduct resolution which states that the Secretary has drawn more moneys, borrowed in Holland, into the U.S. than authorized under the act of August 12, 1790--1 March 1793--Y=33 N=8
- Roll Call #33--To agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the seventh official conduct resolution which states that Hamilton failed to consult the public interest in negotiating a loan with the Bank of the U.S.--1 March 1793--Y=33 N=8
- Roll Call #34--To agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the eighth official conduct resolution which states that Hamilton has been guilty of indecorum for withholding information concerning money in the Treasury accruing from foreign loans--1 March 1793--Y=34 N=7

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which generally favors the economic policies of Alexander Hamilton, i.e those which favor a strong federal government.

TABLE IX
SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON THE RESOLUTIONS AGAINST ALEXANDER
HAMILTON IN THE SECOND CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Gilman	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Livermore	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ames	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bourne	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Leonard	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Goodhue	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sedgwick	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thacher	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ward	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Learned	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sturges	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bourn	Rhode Island	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Benson	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Laurance	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Boudinot	New Jersey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dayton	New Jersey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Barnwell	South Carolina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hillhouse	Connecticut	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Fitzsimons	Pennsylvania	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kitchell	New Jersey	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gordon	New York	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hartley	Pennsylvania	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Steele	North Carolina	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, J.	New Hampshire	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gerry	Massachusetts	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Muhlenberg	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hindman	Maryland	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Key	Maryland	-	-	-	+	+	+	0	0	0
Murray	Maryland	-	-	-	+	+	+	0	0	0
Sterett	Maryland	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Williamson	North Carolina	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, W.L.	South Carolina	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Tucker	South Carolina	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Niles	Vermont	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, I.	Vermont	-	-	-	-	+	+	0	0	0
Greenup	Kentucky	-	-	-	0	+	+	0	0	0
Griffin	Virginia	-	-	+	-	+	+	0	0	0
Lee	Virginia	-	-	-	-	+	+	0	0	-
Grove	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-

TABLE IX (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Gregg	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	0	0
Orr	Kentucky	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	0	0
Moore	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Page	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Findley	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Mercer	Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Parker	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Giles	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Madison	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ashe	North Carolina	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Macon	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Baldwin	Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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- Roll Call #1--To amend the resolution calling upon the commissioners of the public debt for a statement of their proceedings, that they be directed to lay before the House "their resolves as commissioners, approved by the President together with a statement of all their proceedings" since their last report--19 February 1793--Y=18 N=43
- Roll Call #2--To pass the resolution that the commissioners for purchasing the public debt be directed to lay before the House a statement of all their proceedings under acts for the reduction of the public debt, since their last report--No is a positive vote--19 February 1793--Y=39 N=22
- Roll Call #3--To amend the public debt resolution that the commissioners be directed to lay before the House, "their resolves as commissioners, approved by the President together with" a statement on all their proceedings not heretofore furnished"--19 February 1793--Y=30 N=31
- Roll Call #4--To agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the fifth official conduct resolution which states that the Secretary of the Treasury failed to give Congress official information in due time of the moneys drawn by him from Europe into the United States and the cause of such drafts--1 March 1793--Y=33 N=15

TABLE IX (Continued)

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- Roll Call #5--To concur with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the official conduct resolution against Hamilton which states that the Secretary of the Treasury has violated instructions given him by the President for making loans under the law passed August 4, 1790--1 March 1793--Y=40 N=12
- Roll Call #6--To agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the fourth resolution against Hamilton which states that he has deviated from the instructions given him by the President in executing the authority for making loans under the acts of August 4 and 12, 1790--1 March 1793--Y=39 N=12
- Roll Call #7--To agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the sixth resolution against Hamilton which states that he drew more moneys, borrowed in Holland, into the United States than authorized by the President under the act of August 12, 1790--1 March 1793--Y=33 N=8
- Roll Call #8--To agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the seventh resolution against Hamilton which states that he failed to consult the public interest in negotiating a loan with the Bank of the United States--1 March 1793--Y=33 N=8
- Roll Call #9--To agree with the Committee of the Whole in their disagreement to the eight resolution against Hamilton which states that he has been guilty of indecorum for withholding information concerning money accruing from foreign loans--1 March 1793--Y=34 N=7

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which supports Alexander against the official conduct resolutions.

from the southern bloc. But again it is notable that Pennsylvania, unlike other state delegations, had representatives on both sides of the issue. Three Pennsylvania representatives who strongly supported the Hamiltonian policies were the Federalists Fitzsimons, Hartley, and Kittera. However, Findley, Gregg, and Hiester were almost diametrically opposed to Hamilton and his fiscal policies. Furthermore, Findley was one of the more articulate critics of Hamilton, particularly during the debate concerning the resolutions of censure against Hamilton. The positions of the Pennsylvania delegates help reveal that the party spirit which existed in Pennsylvania state politics, particularly on ideological issues, was also evident in Congress on the national level. In some respects the Pennsylvania Constitutionalist, soon to be Democratic-Republicans, had more political influence on the national level than they did on the state level. Since the Pennsylvania Federalists controlled the state legislature, some of the Constitutionalist party leaders, such as William Findley and later Albert Gallatin, found in Congress an even more effective place to voice their Country ideology. William Findley, Albert Gallatin, and others became influential in the Democratic-Republican party. And the political organization put together in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania by Alexander Dallas and James Hutchinson was to be particularly effective for the Democratic-Republicans in Congress as well as within the state.²⁹

Early in the Second Congress the House of Representative requested Alexander Hamilton to report to them concerning the need for raising additional military supplies and on the balance for the public debt. Hamilton suggested in his response that any remaining state debts should

be assumed by the federal government. The opponents of Hamilton's financial program, of course, moved to block this action. Findley even opposed asking Hamilton for his opinion on raising additional revenues. Findley felt that this was a legislative function and that it should not be transferred to an executive officer. He maintained that it impinged on the duty of the House of Representatives to exclusively prepare and originate revenue laws. Findley's Country mentality prompted fear that Hamilton's power and influence would weigh upon many of the representatives regardless of the merits of his arguments. Both Findley and Hiester spoke out early against the funding system in the debate following Hamilton's report on the public debt.³⁰

There was even opposition to the bill for the establishment of a national mint. Although the bill finally passed by a vote of 32-22, there was a debate over whether to put the word "Liberty" or the name of George Washington on the coins. It took three roll call votes to settle the issue. Those who supported the word "Liberty" maintained that only monarchies put the names of rulers on their coins. Although not of great practical importance, this episode indicated some of the deep feeling that accompanied the employment of republican symbols. As during the debate over titles in the First Congress, advocates of the Country ideology feared that the Federalist attachment to a powerful executive betrayed a fondness for monarchy. From the Pennsylvania delegation, as indicated on Table VIII, only the Federalists Fitzsimons, Hartley, Kittera, and Jacobs supported any proposals for the use of Washington's name rather than the word "Liberty."³¹

As the debate continued on the public debt, the major conflict concerned an additional assumption of state debts. The Federalists hoped to push assumption through before the first session was scheduled to adjourn while the opponents delayed or opposed the issue. At one point in the debate Hartley and Findley exchanged views over the public debt issue. Hartley said that he favored assumption because it and the funding system put the country on a sound financial basis. He compared the current favorable credit status of the United States with that of the Confederation period when it was very low. Hartley questioned why people were criticizing administration fiscal policies when the country was so economically sound. In quick response to Hartley, Findley noted that the country's present prosperity was not so exceptional as Hartley implied. Findley questioned both the constitutionality and the wisdom of assumption of state debts. He claimed that any further assumption of state debts would only be "a leap in the dark" until the final settlement of accounts for state debts was reported.³²

A few days later several roll call votes were taken concerning the assumption issue. The foes of assumption attempted to weaken the public debt resolutions by attacking various amendments, but met with little success. However, on two occasions near the end of the session the Federalists failed to master enough votes to pass further assumption of state debts. The Pennsylvanians who supported the administration on this issue were the Federalists Fitzsimons, Hartley, and Muhlenberg.³³

The second session of the Second Congress, which began on November 5, 1792 saw a continuation of the attacks against Hamilton's policies. Bolstered by a good showing in the congressional elections of 1792, the opponents of the administration wanted to postpone any

controversial legislation until the Third Congress when they hoped they would have more control. But in response to President Washington's speech to Congress, Fitzsimons moved that the House adopt a resolution directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report a plan for the purpose of redeeming the public debt. Taking a cue from Findley's argument during the first session, the opponents of Hamilton's program contended that the principle of separation of powers would be violated if the House gave up any control of financial matters to the Secretary of the Treasury. Findley, aided by James Madison of Virginia and John Mercer of Maryland, argued that the origination of money matters was a constitutional prerogative of the House of Representatives. He said that the House had a right to "call for what information was wanted to enable them to digest their own plans."³⁴ Two days later opponents of the administration moved to amend the resolution by striking out the section requesting the Secretary of the Treasury to report a plan to the House of Representatives. However, the amendment was defeated with only Findley and Hiester from the Pennsylvania delegation voting for it.³⁵

Another skirmish in the continuing battle occurred about one month later over a bill that authorized the President to make a two million dollar loan from the Bank of the United States. The question arose as to why a two million dollar loan was needed when only two hundred thousand dollars was actually due to the bank in the near future. A motion to substitute an authorization of two hundred thousand dollars in place of two million dollars resulted in a tie vote of 26-26. This tie was broken by the Federalist Speaker Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut when he voted against the substitute amendment. Only Findley and Gregg from the Pennsylvania delegation supported the

amendment. During the course of the debate, however, it was discovered that Hamilton had transferred foreign funds to the Treasury which were supposed to be used to repay the foreign debt. This shuffling of funds was technically against the original intent of the bill. The next day the House passed a resolution requesting that they be furnished an account of the loans and their disposition. Hamilton's report explaining the transactions, which will be discussed further below, was submitted to Congress on January 4.³⁶

In late January the Federalists won five closely contested votes which dealt with the final settlement of accounts and assumption of state debts. The Pennsylvania delegation was again split on these roll calls with the supporters being the four Federalists Fitzsimons, Hartley, Kittera, and Muhlenberg. The emerging Democratic-Republicans Findley, Gregg, and Hiester, were joined in opposition by the moderate Federalist Israel Jacobs.³⁷

Table VIII, which outlines the 34 roll calls concerning finances in the Second Congress, again indicates the largely sectional nature of the vote in Congress as a whole. It also shows the division within the Pennsylvania delegation. The three Federalists Fitzsimons, Hartley, and Kittera were fairly strong in their support of Hamilton's program. Conversely, the Democratic-Republicans Findley, Gregg, and Hiester were consistent in their opposition to Hamilton's policies. The other two Federalists, Muhlenberg and Jacobs, played a more moderate role between their six Pennsylvania colleagues.

Giles Resolutions Against Alexander Hamilton

The resolutions against Alexander Hamilton arose out of the debate

over authorization for a loan from the Bank of the United States. When opponents of Hamilton realized that the fund transfer was not properly within the intent of the law, they seized the opportunity to attack him. On December 27, 1792, led by William Giles of Virginia, the House of Representatives passed a resolution requesting that it be furnished with an account of the authorized loans and their disposition. This resolution was evidently passed with little opposition, for there was no debate or roll call recorded on its passage. Technically there could be little objection to it since it was clearly within the responsibility of the House to investigate the matter. However, Hamilton's report triggered acrimonious dispute. Most representatives were satisfied with Hamilton's response given on January 4. However, the hard core partisan opposition to Hamilton, led by Giles, attempted to force Hamilton out of office or at least embarrass him personally. Findley and Gregg were the only Pennsylvanians who gave any substantial support to the more forceful of the resolutions against Hamilton. In fact, Findley was one of the leaders in the debate in support of the Giles resolutions. Table IX, which lists the roll calls concerning the resolutions against Hamilton, also indicates that the Federalists Fitzsimons, Hartley, and Muhlenberg gave strong support for Hamilton. These nine roll calls on Table IX are also contained in the 34 roll calls on Table VIII. They are scaled separately in Table IX for ease of discussion and to better indicate where the support for and opposition to Hamilton came from. Jacobs did not vote on any of the nine roll calls.³⁸

On January 23 Giles presented five more resolutions concerning the investigation into the Treasury Department. The resolutions

requested that the House be given papers dealing with loan authorizations, an account of foreign debts, a statement of balances between the Bank of the United States and the federal government, a report on the Sinking Fund, and a report on all revenue and money from loans. These were extremely burdensome requests but there was no protest against them. The resolutions were adopted without a recorded vote. While the resolutions were a legitimate request and within the responsibility of Congress, the tone of Giles' speech was certainly not impartial. Giles claimed that Hamilton's first report to the House was incomprehensible and did not contain all the needed information. In conclusion, Giles candidly acknowledged that "impressions resulting from my inquiries into this subject, have been made upon my mind, by no means favorable to the arrangements made by the gentleman at the head of the Treasury Department."³⁹ Hamilton, in the midst of completing the reports requested by the House, wrote to a colleague that "the spirit of party has grown to maturity sooner in this country than perhaps was to have been counted upon."⁴⁰ Hamilton responded to the resolutions by submitting three extended financial reports to the House of Representatives on February 4, 13, and 19.⁴¹

Undaunted by Hamilton's rapid compliance with the comprehensive accounting demanded by the House, Giles introduced nine resolutions of censure against Hamilton on February 27, a week before the end of the session. A number of the resolutions were quickly eliminated from consideration, but some were vigorously debated on March 1, the day before the final adjournment of the Second Congress. The debate went well into the evening and most of the roll calls on the resolutions were taken late in the night. The National Gazette reported that

"At this late hour, about midnight, it was observed, that several members had left the house, being so much fatigued, that they were not able to stay for the yeas and nays," a fact reflected in Tables VIII and IX.⁴² This high rate of absenteeism also indicated a reluctance of many to take a stand on the sensitive issue. The major defenders of Hamilton in the long debate on March 1 were Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania, John Laurance of New York, and Robert Barnwell and William L. Smith of South Carolina. Those who argued the most in favor of the resolutions were William Findley of Pennsylvania, John Mercer of Maryland, and William Giles and James Madison of Virginia.⁴³

The first two resolutions against Hamilton alleged that he violated instructions for appropriating money under the laws of August 4 and 12, 1790. The violation basically consisted of combining a foreign loan and a domestic loan. Hamilton admitted his actions were a technical violation of the law, but that it was done for the benefit of the country. The votes on these first two resolutions showed that only a small core of partisans were going to support them. Only 12 representatives, all southerners except Findley and Gregg of Pennsylvania, voted in favor of the resolutions. The resolution that charged that Hamilton had acted improperly by failing to inform the House of his actions resulted in a vote of 33-15. The Pennsylvania vote was the same as on the previous roll call, except that Gregg did not vote. Findley thus was the only Pennsylvanian left in support of the resolutions against Hamilton. The remaining three resolutions were less serious and received only a handful of affirmative votes. Findley voted for all the resolutions except the final one which charged Hamilton with "indecorum" to the House.⁴⁴

Table IX again shows the sectional nature of the voting which, except for Pennsylvania, dominated in the Second Congress. The northern states strongly supported Hamilton and the southern delegates along with the two Pennsylvanians were opposed. It was obvious that the opposition was rather weak as it consisted of only a core group of 10 southerners and the two Pennsylvanians. But the voting of the Pennsylvania delegation on the Hamilton resolutions, as shown on Table IX, was again very significant. The three Pennsylvania Federalists Fitzsimons, Hartley, and Muhlenberg gave strong support to the Federalist cause and the defense of Hamilton. On the other end of the scale were the Constitutionals Findley and Gregg as members of the small core group of opposition. In fact, Findley was one of the leaders in the debate against Hamilton. During the heated debate of the March 1 session Findley boasted that he "had the honor of seconding the resolution" against Hamilton.⁴⁵ Findley argued vigorously that Hamilton was guilty of violating the law and that his actions were inconsistent with public confidence and public safety. He claimed that Hamilton, rather than working within a government of laws, set himself up as the arbiter of what was best for the nation. In the best Country tradition Findley compared Hamilton and his reports to a "despotic Prince, who had all the political powers vested in himself--not the language of a dependent Secretary, under a free and well-ordered Government."⁴⁶

Conclusion

The Pennsylvania delegation was even more polarized in the Second Congress than in the First Congress. This divisiveness was particularly pronounced when compared to most other state delegations that still

voted as blocs. Pennsylvania consistently had men who supported both the pro and anti-administration views. This was due in great measure to the election of the two Constitutionalist Findley and Gregg who helped to sharpen the split between the Court and Country elements within the Pennsylvania delegation. The re-election of Daniel Hiester, who often continued to oppose Federalist policies, also contributed to that polarization. The voting of these three representatives indicated that on the national level, as well as on the state level, Pennsylvania had an active opposition to the Federalist policies.

In the Second Congress the continuing Court versus Country dichotomy was best exemplified by the debate and roll calls concerning reapportionment and the fiscal policies of Alexander Hamilton. In both instances Pennsylvania was easily the most polarized delegation. There were fewer divisions among the other states which still largely voted in sectional blocs. This indicates that while there was an ideological split between North and South, in Pennsylvania the ideological division was internal. This was particularly evident in the debate over the resolutions of censure against Alexander Hamilton as Pennsylvania was the only non-southern state that had representatives voting in support of the resolutions. It seems that the internal Court versus Country split which Pennsylvania had experienced since the 1770's was not as prevalent within most other states.

During the Second Congress William Findley was one of the leaders in debate for the Democratic-Republican party, particularly on the intense ideological issues of reapportionment and Hamilton's fiscal policies. In this respect the developing Democratic-Republican party in Pennsylvania was more effective on the congressional level than on

the state level since the Federalists controlled the state legislature. The election of Findley and Gregg as well as the building of a political organization in eastern Pennsylvania by Hutchinson and Dallas was just a preview of what the Federalists would have to contend with in subsequent congressional elections. In the campaign of 1792 the Federalists in Pennsylvania were very surprised to find themselves in a minority position after the national elections, although they did maintain control of the state legislature.

ENDNOTES

¹Brunhouse, Counter Revolution, pp. 226-227; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 45.

²Ibid., pp. 45-46; Miller, Federalist City, p. 42.

³Ibid., p. 43; George D. Luetscher, Early Political Machinery in the United States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1903; reprint ed., New York: Da Capo Press, 1971), p. 130); American Daily Advertiser, 19 April 1791; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 46-47.

⁴Simon E. Fagerstrom, "Political Parties During Washington's Administrations" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1930), p. 162; Miller, Federalist City, p. 43.

⁵Ibid., pp. 20-22; Raymond Walters, Jr., Alexander James Dallas: Lawyer, Politician, Financier, 1759-1817 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943; reprint ed., New York: Da Capo Press, 1969), p. 32.

⁶Ibid., pp. 32-33; Miller, Federalist City, p. 43.

⁷Charles Biddle, Autobiography of Charles Biddle, Vice-President of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, 1745-1821 (Philadelphia: E. Claxton and Company, 1883), p. 251.

⁸Walters, Dallas, pp. 32-35; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 53.

⁹General Advertiser, 27 September, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 20 October 1791; Independent Gazetteer, 23 July 1791; Miller, Federalist City, p. 43.

¹⁰Frederick Muhlenberg to Thomas Fitzsimons, 12 September 1791, Gratz Collection, HSP; American Daily Advertiser, 26 September 1797; General Advertiser, 4 October 1797; Stanley B. Parsons, William W. Beach, and Dan Hermann, United States Congressional Districts, 1788-1841 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 20; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 103-109.

¹¹James Marshall to William Irvine, 2 August 1791, Irvine Papers, HSP.

¹²General Advertiser, 20, 21 October 1791; Parsons, Congressional Districts, p. 22; Fagerstrom, "Washington's Administrations," p. 162.

¹³Ibid., pp. 162-163; Jerry Grunfest, "George Clymer, Philadelphia Revolutionary, 1739-1813" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1973), p. 380; General Advertiser, 14, 15 October 1791; Parsons, Congressional Districts, p. 22; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 47-48.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 146-149.

¹⁵Bernhard, Fisher Ames, p. 189.

¹⁶Annals, 2d Cong. 1st sess., pp. 177-178, 189-190, 270, 273, 407, 409, 548; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, pp. 162-164.

¹⁷Richard Hildreth, The History of the United States of America, 6 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1879), 4: 301-303.

¹⁸Annals, 2d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 177-178.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 148, 177-178, 191, 208-210.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 250-251, 274; Bernhard, Fisher Ames, p. 189.

²¹Annals, 2d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 270, 273.

²²Thomas Hartley to Jasper Yeates, 19 December 1791, Yeates Papers, HSP.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.; Annals, 2d Cong., 1st sess., p. 270.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 331, 335-336, 415-416, 418; Bernhard, Fisher Ames, pp. 190-191.

²⁶Ibid., p. 191; Annals, 2d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 101-106, 473-474, 480, 482-483.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 539, 541, 548-549, Appendix, p. 1359; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), pp. 440-441.

²⁸Further comments on the position of Andrew Gregg, a Constitutional supporter, on the scale should be pointed out. He scaled along with two Pennsylvania Federalists, Jacobs and Kittera, in the sixth most positive group. However, a closer look at his votes shows that he should not be in the same category as they were. By the minimum error rule Gregg could be placed either where he is at or near the other end of the scale with Hiester, Huger, and W. L. Smith. But because of the rule of middle weighing he is put in this position. However, Gregg had only seven positive votes compared to 11 for Jacobs and nine for Kittera. Of particular importance also were Gregg's negative votes on roll calls numbered 14 and 15. These were crucial votes which indicated support for either the House version with the lower ratio on the Senate version with the higher ratio. In each

instance Gregg supported the lower ratio of the House. His negative vote on roll call 10 which supported the veto of the higher ratio is also significant. Thus, while Gregg is where he "should" be according to the methodology, it must also be recognized that there is some distortion of his position.

²⁹Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, pp. 39, 42-49; Walters, Dallas, pp. 33-42, 99; Miller, Federalist City, pp. 17, 22-24.

³⁰Annals, 2d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 425, 437-452, 495-498.

³¹Ibid., pp. 483-489.

³²Ibid., pp. 428-431.

³³Ibid., pp. 532-535, 588-589, 594-597.

³⁴Annals, 2d Cong., 2d sess., p. 699.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 695-701, 711-722; Bernhard, Fisher Ames, p. 211.

³⁶Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962), pp. 20-21; American State Papers: Finance, 1: 180-183; Annals, 2d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 755-760.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 842-851.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 761, 690; American State Papers: Finance, 1: 180-183; Malone, Ordeal of Liberty, pp. 20-21.

³⁹Annals, 2d Cong., 2d sess., p. 840.

⁴⁰Alexander Hamilton to William Short, 5 February 1793, as cited in Alexander Hamilton, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett, 26 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1979), 14: 1.

⁴¹Annals, 2d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 835-840, 860, 875, 884. The reports can be seen in the Appendix to the Annals on pages 1199-1211, 1215-1255, 1267-1310.

⁴²National Gazette, 6 March 1793.

⁴³Malone, Ordeal of Liberty, p. 25; Annals, 2d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 895, 899-905, 907-963.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 955-963; American State Papers: Finance, 1: 204.

⁴⁵Annals, 2d Cong., 2d sess., p. 918.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 923.

CHAPTER V

THE PENNSYLVANIA DELEGATION IN THE THIRD CONGRESS

The Pennsylvania Congressional Election of 1792

The reapportionment bill passed by the Second Congress on April 14, 1792 meant that Pennsylvania was now entitled to elect 13 representatives to Congress. The increase of five representatives was to make the 1792 congressional election much more hotly contested than either of the previous ones. However, because the Pennsylvania legislature had adjourned shortly before the apportionment bill was passed, most of the legislators decided against holding a district election since they were not sure how many representatives Pennsylvania would be given. The Federalists, who favored a statewide general election, pushed through a bill on April 7 calling for such an election. An attempt by the western Pennsylvania legislators, mostly Constitutionalists, to hold a district election was defeated by a vote of 28-26 in the Pennsylvania House. The vote in the Pennsylvania Senate ended in an eight to eight tie which was broken in favor of the general election bill by the Federalist Speaker, Samuel Powel.¹ As passed, the general election bill directed "that every person voting for Representatives in Congress shall deliver in writing the names of so many persons as this State is or may be entitled to as Representatives in Congress."² The Federalists, who had done well under the general election format in 1788, felt that the general ticket method would again give them an

advantage. In addition to their hold in southeastern Pennsylvania, the Federalists also generally ran candidates who were better known throughout the state. Consequently, a general ticket could possibly bring some of the lesser known Federalist candidates to victory on the "coat-tails" of the well known Federalists.

The Constitutionals realized they would have to work hard in order to make a respectable showing in the election. Because of their strength in western Pennsylvania they had elected two Constitutionals, William Findley and Andrew Gregg, in the district elections of 1791. But the Pennsylvania Constitutionals, or Democratic-Republicans as they began to call themselves in 1792, were continuing to build a stronger political organization in eastern Pennsylvania.³ Based in Philadelphia and under the direction of James Hutchinson, Alexander Dallas, and John Beckley, the Democratic-Republicans began to effectively challenge the Federalists on both the state and national levels in 1792. In September, 1792 a New Jersey Federalist warned Alexander Hamilton that:

The Antis are making greater exertions than you perhaps are aware of, previous to the expected general election. Our Chief Justice says that a number from Philadelphia have been to the lower parts of West Jersey, informing the people that a strong party is forming in that city against the Secretary of the Treasury, requesting their aid, and that they will not choose a man who has supported his measures . . .⁴

By 1792 Pennsylvania had become a center for party development, both in the state and on the national level. Philadelphia, as the national capital, was the focal point of the rising partisan conflict within Congress. The most active public debate was carried out in the Philadelphia press, particularly between John Fenno's Gazette of the United States and Philip Freneau's National Gazette.⁵ It was in the

midst of congressional battles and the bitter political controversy in the Philadelphia press that the Pennsylvania Federalists and Democratic-Republicans clashed in an attempt to control the congressional elections of 1792. Statewide nominating and campaign methods were needed after the passage of the general election law. The opposing parties again chose different methods for nominating candidates and then publicly disputed which method and which slate of candidates was more representative of the people. The contest between the Federalist "Conferees" and the Democratic-Republican "Correspondents" was highlighted by many public meetings which led to much confusion and some near riots.

The acrimonious campaign began when the Federalists called for a public meeting in the State House in Philadelphia for July 19 to discuss the means of forming a congressional ticket. The meeting was attended by only about 75 persons, including the Democratic-Republican organizers James Hutchinson and Alexander Dallas. Because of the small turnout the meeting was quickly adjourned and another meeting was scheduled for the evening of July 25. This meeting was much better attended, but again Hutchinson and Dallas were on hand to watch the proceedings. The Federalist Mayor of Philadelphia, Matthew Clarkson, was chosen as chairman. A group headed by Senator Robert Morris was selected to recommend names for committees to discuss nominating candidates and to plan for a state conference. The names recommended by Morris' committee led to extended discussion and the meeting was adjourned until July 27. At this next meeting the Federalist Speaker of the Pennsylvania House, Samuel Powel, was elected Chairman. However, the meeting was also attended by many followers of Hutchinson and Dallas who tried to thwart the Federalist's plans for a state convention. The two

Democratic-Republican leaders were convinced that all the details of the previous meeting were made in advance by the Federalist junto headed by Morris and Fitzsimons. Shortly after the meeting opened, Dallas moved to reject all business done at the previous meeting. Powel called for a vote and claimed that most of the people present favored the convention plan. When opponents called for a division on the question, Powel refused the request. When many in the crowd began to hiss he quickly left his chair and adjourned the meeting.⁶

The dominant Federalist party was in reality attempting to use these "public" meetings in order to control the congressional nominations. The Federalist organizers, led by Robert Morris, James Wilson, and John Wilcox, had actually chosen all the members of the nominating committees before the meetings began. The suspicions of Hutchinson and Dallas were confirmed when at one of the meetings Wilcox read the names of the nominating committee members from a list he had taken out of his pocket. Hutchinson saw the "Federalist Plot" for what it was and decided to "rouse the people to support their independence, and to think and act for themselves."⁷ Consequently, Hutchinson and Dallas then called a meeting of their own for July 30. In announcing the meeting they made a direct appeal for support of the tradesmen and mechanics by stating that the meeting would not convene until seven o'clock when all the day's work was completed. Over 2,000 people attended the meeting and it had to be moved into the State House Yard to accommodate everyone. Hutchinson claimed that it was the largest political gathering in Philadelphia since 1779. The Democratic-Republican leaders shrewdly chose Pennsylvania Chief Justice Thomas McKean to act as Chairman. McKean had been a Constitutionalist but

had become a moderate Federalist in 1787. McKean was becoming disenchanted with Federalist policy, particularly Hamilton's fiscal program, and was moving back toward the opposition. Hutchinson told the crowd that the Federalists were trying to dupe the people with their state convention plan. He suggested instead that a committee of correspondence be appointed to send a circular letter to political leaders in each county asking for nominees for Congress and for presidential electors. Hutchinson's suggestion was readily accepted and a correspondence committee of seven members, including James Hutchinson, Alexander Dallas, and Thomas McKean, was promptly named.⁸

The Federalists, still intent on following through with their convention plan, advertised that another meeting would be held at three o'clock in the afternoon on July 31, when few tradesmen would be able to attend. The Democratic-Republicans, hoping to thwart the Federalists again, called a meeting for the same time and place. The Democratic-Republicans distributed handbills throughout the city to "the enlightened Freemen of Philadelphia" to oppose the plans of the Federalists and to uphold "the exercise of their rights, which the glorious revolution has conferred."⁹ When the large crowd met in the State House Yard both groups tried to elect one of their leaders as chairman. After several divisions and loud shouting matches failed to resolve the issue, the Federalists became apprehensive as more and more Democratic-Republican followers arrived at the meeting. The Federalists, trying to maintain control of the meeting,

. . . retired to the west part of the Yard and attempted to place Mr. Morris in the Chair, this being observed by the others occasioned a scene of confusion, they rushed forward, seized the chair and table and tore them to pieces, and it was with difficulty violences of a more serious nature were prevented.¹⁰

The meeting then broke up as the discouraged Federalists withdrew from the Yard.¹¹

Realizing that they could not successfully control a public meeting in Philadelphia against the organized opposition, the Federalists continued to plan for a state convention, but with altered tactics. The Federalists now began to hold private gatherings at which only trusted followers were invited. At two such meetings held at Epple's Tavern in early August they appointed a committee to correspond with other counties about a convention and to request opinions on congressional candidates. During the following weeks the Federalists throughout Pennsylvania held several county meetings to discuss candidates and to send delegates to a state convention planned for September 20 in Lancaster. A Democratic-Republican critic claimed that the convention movement of the Federalists was a failure because it was an attempt by a minority to prevent the majority will from being expressed.¹²

Meanwhile, the Democratic-Republicans were busily gathering names of candidates through their correspondence method. On August 3 the Democratic-Republican Committee of Correspondence sent out 520 circular letters to political leaders and grand juries throughout all 21 Pennsylvania counties. The results of their correspondence, which included responses from 18 counties, were published in the Philadelphia press in late September. Forty-four names, Federalist as well as Democratic-Republican, had been suggested as congressional candidates and 91 as presidential electors. From the congressional list the Committee of Correspondence selected 13 names and published it as the "Rights of Man Ticket." The ticket contained the names of some moderates who were acceptable to both parties and two Federalists as

well. The nine Democratic-Republicans named were William Findley, John Smilie, Daniel Hiester, Peter Muhlenberg, Andrew Gregg, William Montgomery, John Barclay, Charles Thomson, and Jonathan Sergeant. The two moderates listed were the popular Germans Frederick Muhlenberg and General William Irvine. Both soon became Democratic-Republicans. Two Federalists, Thomas Hartley and John Kittera, were also added to the ticket. The Democratic-Republicans knew the two Federalists would be on the opposing ticket and that because of their popularity they would no doubt be elected regardless of Democratic-Republican interest. The Committee of Correspondence stated that all the documents concerning their survey were open for public inspection in a local office.¹³

The Federalist nominating convention was held on schedule in Lancaster on September 20. However, only 33 delegates representing nine counties and the city of Philadelphia were in attendance. Only one county west of the Susquehanna River, York, sent delegates. The eastern-dominated convention proceeded to select both a congressional and an electoral ticket for the state. Seven of the 13 men named on the Federalist congressional slate were also on the Democratic-Republican ticket. This assured the election of those seven and in effect meant that the real contest was between the six non-matching candidates. The seven named to both tickets were Thomas Hartley, John Kittera, Frederick Muhlenberg, William Irvine, Daniel Hiester, Peter Muhlenberg, and William Findley. While Frederick Muhlenberg has been considered by many to have been a moderate Federalist at this time, he certainly did not vote a consistent Federalist line in Congress.¹⁴ It was fortunate for the Federalists, and for Muhlenberg himself, that he was Speaker of the House and thus seldom had to vote.

As stated earlier, Muhlenberg soon joined the Democratic-Republican party. If the Federalists hoped for Peter Muhlenberg and William Irvine to vote with them, they were soon to be disappointed. The two Democratic-Republicans Findley and Hiester were, like Hartley and Kittera on the Democratic-Republican ticket, added by the Federalists because of their statewide popularity. The six strong Federalists chosen were Thomas Fitzsimons, Henry Wynkoop, Thomas Scott, Samuel Sitgreaves, William Bingham, and James Armstrong.¹⁵

The newspaper campaign had begun long before the two opposing slates were published. Both parties attempted to persuade the voters that their method of nominating candidates was the best. The Federalists tried to pin the Democratic-Republicans with the unwanted Anti-federalist label. In return the Democratic-Republicans charged the Federalists with being aristocratic. "A Pennsylvanian" claimed the Democratic-Republicans were anarchists who were attempting to destroy the government. He said that only the success of the conference ticket would lead to electing men of true Federalist principles. He appealed to farmers, mechanics, and others to defeat the Antifederalists. The Country-minded "Sydney" soon answered "A Pennsylvanian" by criticizing his appeal to separate classes rather than speaking to all free men. "Sydney" said the Antifederalist label was a deception to delude the voters. He claimed that a nominating convention was a device used by men of aristocratic principles to elect their own men to office. A similar charge was made against the conferees by a broadside published on October 9. It was particularly critical of Robert Waln and William Lewis, the two Federalists from Philadelphia who attended the Lancaster Convension. Filliam Findley in a letter to

Albert Gallatin equated the conference plan of the Federalists with the electoral system which he viewed as an undemocratic method of election.¹⁶

A non-partisan writer signed "Common Sense, Jun.," claimed that both parties were led by aristocrats. He called on the citizens to vote independently rather than by party.¹⁷ In a broadside, "Mentor" claimed that the aristocratic Conferees were descendents of the "Tories of 1776." He called on the voters to support the Correspondents' ticket as they would be "forever dear to the Whigs and Republicans of Pennsylvania."¹⁸ A strong and well-written attack against the Democratic-Republicans was offered in a series of articles signed "Cerberus." The writer claimed that the Democratic-Republican candidates in reality had not been chosen by the people but had been secretly chosen earlier by a small group of party leaders, mostly from Philadelphia. "Cerberus" listed 11 men who he said had been chosen for the Democratic-Republican ticket before the circular letters had been sent out. The well-informed "Cerberus" was very close to being correct, as 10 of the 11 men he named appeared later on the Democratic-Republican slate.¹⁹

The Federalist claim by "Cerberus" and others that the Democratic-Republican ticket had been pre-arranged was partially correct. The men named by the Democratic-Republicans were chosen mostly by a small group of politicians led by James Hutchinson and Alexander Dallas. As managers of the campaign they actively took charge of the statewide coordinating efforts of the Democratic-Republicans. Centered in Philadelphia, they were in personal control of the eastern part of the state. Through correspondence they also kept in close contact with the western wing of the party, particularly with Albert Gallatin,

William Findley, and John Smilie. A month before the "Rights of Man Ticket" was publicly announced, Hutchinson sent Gallatin a list of candidates which had been suggested by the Democratic-Republican Committee of Correspondence. Hutchinson noted that they were attempting to maintain a geographic balance to the ticket. They wanted seven men from east of the Susquehanna River and six from west of it. Hutchinson also asked Gallatin for any further suggestions concerning the ticket.²⁰

Two weeks later Hutchinson mailed Gallatin a copy of "our ticket as it is now completed and filled." He requested Gallatin to circulate the list of candidates throughout western Pennsylvania. He also instructed Gallatin to write only to himself, Dallas, or other members of the committee of correspondence because he wanted to maintain confidentiality concerning the election. Hutchinson told Gallatin that he had also written to William Findley and John Smilie concerning the election. Therefore, Hutchinson said it was all right to talk to them about the contents of the letters, but that he should "not communicate it to improper persons."²¹

Dallas and Hutchinson also wrote to Gallatin and others in western Pennsylvania about the importance of "making the ticket universally known among our friends to the West of the Alleghenny."²² Dallas told Gallatin to work hard to get the voters out on election day. He said that "No exertion will be wanting here," and hoped that "all your influential characters will be active."²³ Dallas and Hutchinson also sent campaign literature to Gallatin for him to distribute in western Pennsylvania. Hutchinson mailed Gallatin copies of the "Mentor" broadside and explained to Gallatin that "I now enclose you some addresses which have been published here, and which contain the political

Characters of the Candidates, you will be kind enough to distribute them so as to promote the object in view."²⁴ Dallas likewise sent some campaign material which he requested Gallatin "to circulate as extensively and expeditiously as possible."²⁵

The campaign efforts organized by Hutchinson and Dallas in 1792 were impressive. Although often on an informal basis, they managed to control the framing of a party ticket and cooperate with the Democratic-Republican political leaders in both eastern and western parts of the state. The results of the voting showed how effective their campaign organization had been. However, as two episodes illustrated, Hutchinson's and Dallas' party control was not complete. Hutchinson was rather perturbed when Charles Thomson, one of the candidates on the party ticket, decided to drop out shortly before the election. Hutchinson, especially since it was too close to the election to choose another candidate, wrote to Gallatin about his frustrations.²⁶

But another more damaging occurrence to the party was a large meeting held in Pittsburg on August 21 which passed resolutions against the federal excise tax on liquor. John Smilie, one of the party's candidates, was a leading figure at the meeting. So also was Albert Gallatin, who helped write the resolutions. Hutchinson and Dallas were upset because they had attempted to restrain any demonstrations against the government so as to avoid charges of Antifederalism from their opponents. President Washington denounced the meeting and issued a proclamation against any opposition to the excise law. The Federalists wisely exploited the issue by circulating handbills which stressed the part that Smilie and his party had played in the episode. Hutchinson wrote to Gallatin that it was "impossible to conceive what

mischievous your Pittsburg meeting about the excise has done us."²⁷
Hutchinson predicted that between 1,000 and 1,500 votes would be lost because of it. Hutchinson told Gallatin that, "It will injure Mr. Smilie exceedingly and hurt our whole ticket. Until the event of that meeting was published our opponents were prostrate. That has served for their resurrection."²⁸

However, the Democratic-Republicans did very well in the October 9 election. Although both parties had separate tickets, seven of the candidates were named on both and were thus easily elected. For the other seats three candidates from each party were elected. Thomas Fitzsimons, Thomas Scott, and James Armstrong won contested seats for the Federalists while the three Democratic-Republicans chosen were John Smilie, Andrew Gregg, and William Montgomery. Smilie had won despite his participation in the Pittsburg excise tax protest meeting after all. Furthermore, of the seven elected to the uncontested seats only Thomas Hartley and John Kittera were strong Federalists. The nominal Federalist Frederick Muhlenberg was in the process of becoming a Democratic-Republican. The other four uncontested candidates, Daniel Hiester, William Findley, Peter Muhlenberg, and William Irvine consistently voted with the Democratic-Republicans in the Third Congress. The top vote getter in the state was the nationally prominent Democratic-Republican William Findley with a total of 33,158.²⁹

Although Hutchinson had hoped to do better, he must have been satisfied with the election results. Because of his and Dallas' handling of the campaign the Democratic-Republicans did well in both eastern and western Pennsylvania. Hutchinson happily wrote to Gallatin that, "We had a majority in Philadelphia County for the Whole,

and were close on the heels of our Opponents in the City."³⁰ This growing urban strength in eastern Pennsylvania was important for the Democratic-Republican party if they were going to succeed against the Federalists. The 1792 election results showed that they were well on their way. The defeat of William Bingham, Samuel Sirgreaves, and Henry Wynkoop must have caused the Federalists some concern. Also the election of Findley and Smilie, despite the Pittsburg excise meeting, was a sign of the Democratic-Republican party's strength.

The Democratic-Republican party, behind the organizing talents of Hutchinson and Dallas, was beginning to form an effective coalition of western Pennsylvania Country agrarians, ex-Federalists, and urban mechanics, tradesmen, and merchants. The core of the developing Democratic-Republican party in Pennsylvania resembled that of the Constitutionalist party organized after 1776. The Constitutionalist party had used a combination of western agrarians and urban mechanics to control Pennsylvania politics during much of the 1770's and 1780's. Many of the same western agrarian leaders of the Constitutionalist party, particularly William Findley and John Smilie, were also leaders of the Democratic-Republican party. And as George Bryan had done for the Constitutionalist party, Hutchinson and Dallas were organizing the middle class mechanics and tradesmen in support of the party and its ideology. However, the Democratic-Republican party was being strengthened by two other elements. Many ex-Federalists like Benjamin Rush and George Logan who were particularly upset at Hamilton's fiscal policies, were giving substantial support to the party. Moreover, Hutchinson and Dallas were also beginning to attract many recent immigrants to the party. The cultivation of these

immigrant voters was to be even more effective for the Democratic-Republicans later in the 1790's. It was partly a fear of this immigrant influence and voting strength within the Democratic-Republican party which led the Federalists to institute the immigration and naturalization acts.

In some respects the Pennsylvania congressional campaign of 1792 resembled the older political traditions of deference and consensus politics rather than that of a modern party system. This was particularly reflected in the fact that the opposing party slates contained some of the same candidates. Nor did neither party identify its ticket by a consistent party label. Furthermore, both parties often attempted to portray themselves as representatives of all the people. More important, however, are those aspects of the campaign which offer a preview of the politics of the future. The campaign was of special importance for the Democratic-Republicans because the Federalists had been the dominant party ever since the late 1780's. The Federalists were associated not only with the new and very popular state and federal constitutions but also with the respected George Washington and his administration. The stigma of Antifederalism, which the Federalists repeatedly used against the Constitutionalist, was one of the main reasons why they sought a new party label. In light of these obstacles the success of the Democratic-Republicans was indeed remarkable and certainly helped lead to the demise of the old politics, at least in Pennsylvania. In fact, the 1792 campaign ensured the evolution of the Constitutionalist party into the more formidable Democratic-Republican party.

It was largely the difference in campaign tactics in this election, which in many respects reflected the Court and Country aspects of the

parties, which laid the groundwork for the success of the Democratic-Republicans and their new politics and the eventual demise of the Federalists. The Federalists followed the older politics of deference more closely and were uncomfortable with the idea of legitimate opposition. They attempted to portray themselves as the only rightful followers of the Constitution. The Federalists made little effort to attract the votes of the common people. The tactics of the Democratic-Republicans, behind the leadership of the determined and able James Hutchinsom and Alexander Dallas, were quite different. They realized that in order to build voter support it would be best to form a ticket composed of moderate Federalists as well as opponents of administration policies. Hutchinson and Dallas also began to organize those people, particularly in Philadelphia, who had previously taken little interest in politics. By appealing to middle class artisans, unskilled workers, immigrants, and various ethnic and religious groups the Democratic-Republicans challenged the old deferential politics by indicating that all citizens, regardless of their economic status, should have equal political opportunity. The melding of this heterogeneous urban support with the more Country-minded agrarians in western Pennsylvania was largely the work of the energetic Hutchinson. The political newspaper attacks against Alexander Hamilton's fiscal policies by such writers as "Sydney", "Brutus," and "A Farmer" were also effective in mobilizing support for the Democratic-Republicans. The tactics of Hutchinson and Dallas were evidently successful as voter participation in Philadelphia increased by six percent over the previous election. The success of the Pennsylvania Democratic-Republicans drew national

attention as Thomas Jefferson, recognizing its importance, wrote to a friend that, "The vote of this state can generally turn the balance."³¹

Several Democratic-Republicans from Pennsylvania, particularly Dallas, Beckley, and John Nicholson, were also instrumental in attempting to organize the party on a national level. Interstate cooperation between Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia was fairly extensive during the 1792 Presidential election. The main objective of the Democratic-Republicans was to try to replace Vice President Adams with either George Clinton or Aaron Burr of New York. Much of the initiative for this cooperation came from Philadelphia. Dallas traveled to New York in early September to discuss the choice of a Vice Presidential candidate with the Democratic-Republicans of that state. John Beckley, with a letter of introduction to Aaron Burr from Benjamin Rush, went to New York later in September for the same reason. Rush, referring to the Court-oriented Adams, requested Burr "to take an active part in removing the monarchical rubbish of our government."³² On his return to Philadelphia Beckley wrote to James Madison that Burr had assured him of his support to try to replace Adams. In October John Nicholson wrote to Madison that the "republican interests" of Pennsylvania and New York both supported the removal of Adams. A caucus held in Philadelphia on October 16 settled on Clinton from New York as the Democratic-Republican Vice Presidential candidate. Although Clinton received only 50 electoral votes compared to Adams' 77, it did show that the emerging Democratic-Republican party was going to be a force to be reckoned with on the national level.³³

Analysis of Third Congress Roll Calls

Roll calls in the Third Congress began to scale across the majority of issues for all congressmen for the first time. This indicated a strong tendency toward party voting. It also shows that some other states had now joined Pennsylvania in a move toward party voting. Of the 69 roll calls in the Third Congress, 50 of them (or approximately 72 percent) scaled with each other.

As indicated on Figure 3 (and on Table XVIII in Appendix A) there was a well defined split within the Pennsylvania congressional delegation in the Third Congress. Of the 13 Pennsylvania representatives, 11 of them appear on Figure 3. Frederick Muhlenberg is not listed because as Speaker of the House he seldom voted. William Irvine does not appear because he did not vote on over 50 percent of the roll calls. To the left of the graph which indicates support for the Federalist position are the three Federalists John Kittera, Thomas Fitzsimons, and Thomas Hartley. They voted against only a few of the roll calls which supported the administration. The moderate Federalists Thomas Scott and James Armstrong are positioned between the extreme Federalists and the center. They voted positively on three-fifths of the roll calls which supported the Federalist party.

The main issues that separated the moderate Federalists Scott and Armstrong from the strong Federalists, as indicated by roll calls 11 through 19 (see Table XVIII in Appendix A for a detailed explanation of these roll calls), concerned commercial discrimination against Great Britain and an increase in the military forces. Scott and Armstrong did not support the administration on those issues as did the other Federalists. The issues of discrimination and support for the military

State Designators

Pennsylvania Representatives

NH = New Hampshire
 VT = Vermont
 MA = Massachusetts
 CN = Connecticut
 RI = Rhode Island
 NY = New York
 NJ = New Jersey

DE = Delaware
 MD = Maryland
 KY = Kentucky
 VA = Virginia
 NC = North Carolina
 SC = South Carolina
 GA = Georgia

P1 = Kittera
 P2 = Fitzsimons
 P3 = Hartley
 P4 = Armstrong
 P5 = Scott
 P6 = Montgomery

P7 = Gregg
 P8 = Muhlenberg, P.
 P9 = Hiester
 P10 = Findley
 P11 = Smilie




Figure 3. Roll Call Analysis of the Third Congress

State Designators

NH = New Hampshire
 VT = Vermont
 MA = Massachusetts
 CN = Connecticut
 RI = Rhode Island
 NY = New York
 NJ = New Jersey

DE = Delaware
 MD = Maryland
 KY = Kentucky
 VA = Virginia
 NC = North Carolina
 SC = South Carolina
 GA = Georgia

Pennsylvania Representatives

P1 = Kittera
 P2 = Fitzsimons
 P3 = Hartley
 P4 = Armstrong
 P5 = Scott
 P6 = Montgomery
 P7 = Gregg
 P8 = Muhlenberg, P.
 P9 = Hiester
 P10 = Findley
 P11 = Smilie




Figure 3. Continued

help to indicate the basic difference in political philosophies between the more extreme Federalists and the rest of the representatives. Those who supported these issues fully were followers of Alexander Hamilton and his Court-minded policies. Both issues were key points of disagreement in the Court-Country antagonism. While a standing army was looked on as just another means of maintaining a strong central government in the eyes of the Federalists, to the Democratic-Republican followers of the Country tradition it was viewed as a threat to the liberties of the people. Likewise, the foreign policy differences between the two parties throughout the 1790's revolved around the Federalist's sympathy with Great Britain and the Democratic-Republicans' affinity for France. The Federalists admired Great Britain as a country of order and stability but viewed France as a country torn by the excesses of democracy and anarchy. On the other hand many of the Democratic-Republicans equated the French Revolution with the American Revolution and therefore attacked Federalist commercial policies "as an attempt to ally the country with England and the league of despots against liberty and the French."³⁴

All six of the other Pennsylvania congressmen voted against the administration the majority of the time, some very consistently. The three Democratic-Republicans William Findley, John Smilie, and Daniel Hiester joined the core of that party, as is evident from their positions. Peter Muhlenberg occupied a position more toward the center, but he opposed the administration on approximately 75 percent of the roll calls. The basic issues that separated the moderate Pennsylvania Democratic-Republicans in the core group, as indicated by roll calls 38 through 47 (see Table XVIII in Appendix A for a

detailed explanation of these roll calls), concerned regulation of the militia, payment of interest on the debt, suspension of trade with the West Indies, and laying duties on various goods. Muhlenberg supported the administration on most of these roll calls while Hiester, Findley, and Smilie did not. These issues are again an indication that the most consistent of the Democratic-Republicans tended to follow more closely the Country political tradition. The more extreme Democratic-Republicans Findley, Smilie, and Hiester opposed these Courty-oriented policies of the administration, especially those on fiscal policy and relations with Great Britain, to a greater degree than did the moderate Democratic-Republican Peter Muhlenberg.

Near the middle of the graph are the more moderate Andrew Gregg and William Montgomery who opposed the administration on just over half of the roll calls. Although Gregg and Montgomery are located near the middle of the graph, they can be labeled as Democratic-Republicans. They both ran on the Democratic-Republican ticket in Pennsylvania and were not among those who appeared on both tickets. Both Gregg and Montgomery also supported the Democratic Societies during highly partisan divisions regarding the propriety of these pro-French political clubs. As will be seen, the Democratic Societies were very controversial and a delegate's posture regarding them served as an accurate indicator of party affiliation. Furthermore, Gregg voted very strongly in support of the Democratic-Republican party in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Congresses. Although Montgomery did not run again, the men from his district who replaced him in the rest of the 1790's were members of the Democratic-Republican party. The main issues that separated Gregg and Montgomery from the more consistent

Democratic-Republican Peter Muhlenberg, as indicated by roll calls 29 through 37 (see Table XVIII in Appendix A for a detailed explanation of these roll calls), concerned support for stronger public credit, for duties on vellum, parchment, and paper, and funds for a stronger navy.

Although most other state delegations were not as polarized as the Pennsylvania delegation, it is evident that the voting patterns in Congress as a whole were becoming more partisan. While the polarization within Congress was still strongly sectional, other states besides Pennsylvania were beginning to have representatives voting on both sides of the issues.

The Democratic Societies and the Whiskey Rebellion

Beginning in the Spring of 1793 a series of popular associations, usually designated as "Democratic" or "Republican," were established throughout the United States. These societies were generally formed for the purpose of involving more citizens in the political process. By the end of 1794, at least 35 of these popular Democratic Societies had been established within the country. The political impact of the Democratic Societies was substantial not only within Pennsylvania, which had the first as well as the most influential of the Democratic Societies, but in national politics as well. The national response by the Federalist administration to this Pennsylvania stimulus demonstrated to what extent the administration would go in its attempt to suppress political opposition. The debate over the validity of the Democratic Societies also indicated how each party viewed the concept of

legitimate opposition. The Federalists denounced the societies as propaganda machines for French foreign policy and as instigators of domestic violence. Even President George Washington questioned their legitimacy and tried to put them out of existence. But supporters of the Democratic-Republican party, particularly in Pennsylvania, saw them as a political force through which they could become the majority party. The societies were organized not only to spread the ideology of the "Republican interest," but also to develop political techniques and mobilize voters for the party. The Federalist response to this Democratic-Republican attempt to organize politically against them is another example of how the Federalists in the 1790's won a political battle which ultimately helped them lose the political war in 1800.³⁵

Most of the organizers of the Democratic Societies were also closely associated with the Democratic-Republican party. The first group organized was the German Republican Society which was begun in Philadelphia in late March or early April of 1793. The idea that the societies formed in response to the arrival of the French Minister Edmund Genet and were associated with the Jacobin Clubs of France is not accurate since the German Republican Society began about eight weeks before Genet's arrival. Actually their origins were closer to those of the societies formed during the American Revolution, including the old Constitutional Society which had been established by the leaders of the Constitutionalist party in the 1770's. The principal organizers of the German Republican Society were Peter Muhlenberg, Dr. Michael Leib, and Henry Kammerer. Muhlenberg, as we have seen, was a Democratic-Republican member of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation. Leib, a former Federalist, was becoming an effective

organizer for the Democratic-Republican party in Philadelphia. Kammerer, who became Vice President of the society, was an editor of the Philadelphische Correspondenz, a German-language newspaper in Philadelphia. In a circular which appeared in the Philadelphische Correspondenz on April 9 and in the General Advertiser on April 15, the society outlined its aims, many of which were basic to the Country ideology. The circular pointed out that all citizens should take an active interest in the government. It noted that political societies could help preserve the spirit of liberty through observation, education, and the expression of public opinions. Thus, knowledgeable citizens would be protected against governmental corruption and infringements of their political rights. The circular also mentioned that the society, like the Committees of Correspondence during the Revolution, was willing to correspond with distant members or other societies of a similar nature which might be established.³⁶

The Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, which became the largest and most influential of the Democratic Societies, was founded in Philadelphia in late May. It was organized by James Hutchinson and Alexander Dallas, who drafted the society's constitution. Other leading figures in the society were David Rittenhouse, Israel Israel, Michael Leib, Jonathan Sergeant, Blair McClenachan, John Swanwick, Benjamin F. Bache, George Logan, and Benjamin Rush. All of these men were or soon became supporters of the Democratic-Republican party. Within six months the society had a membership of over 300. The occupations of the members of the society indicate the basic elements of this urban movement. More than one-third of the members were artisans or craftsmen, many of whom were new to political action.

However, over 15 percent were either merchants or manufacturers. Many of these men were wealthy but were not part of the Philadelphia junto controlled by the Federalists. Many of the merchants, like John Swanwick, were engaged in trading with France. Several, including Stephen Girard and Pierre Du Ponceau, were even of French extraction. Many manufacturers were attracted to the society because it took a strong stand in favor of native manufacturing as opposed to British imports. Within two weeks of a society resolution which supported infant industries, over 40 new members entered the group. Other manufacturers joined the society because of the recent increases by the Washington administration in excise taxes. The higher taxes went against the protectionist policies of several Pennsylvania industries, particularly those producing sugar, snuff, tobacco, and carriages. Thus, we may presume that many of the manufacturers were attracted to this Democratic-Republican interest group in order to oppose Federalist policy, both foreign and domestic.³⁷

Although many other Democratic Societies sprang up subsequently in other states, those in Pennsylvania were the most active and influential. The societies in Philadelphia helped to increase the political turmoil in the capital city to a near frenzy. They loudly criticized the administration for having fallen under the influence of the British. The Philadelphia societies compared their struggles against the Federalists to those against the British in 1776. In his study of the societies, Eugen Link found that besides many young men, the societies also attracted a large number of former members of the Sons of Liberty, Committees of Safety, and Revolutionary War leaders. The societies favored a more friendly relationship with

France, the country which had helped them defeat the British. At a joint meeting of the Democratic and German Republican societies held at the country home of Israel in May of 1794 over 800 people met to celebrate victories of the French Republic. Both societies promised to support the principles of the French Revolution and to protest against the excise taxes.³⁸

The societies played an important role in Pennsylvania politics. Their influence was instrumental in the upset victory of one of their members, John Swanwick, over the Philadelphia junto candidate Thomas Fitzsimons in the Pennsylvania congressional election of 1794. The societies aroused enthusiasm for the Democratic-Republican party and supported their candidates for office. Most of the officers and organizers of the societies were also influential members of the Democratic-Republican party, particularly Hutchinson and Dallas. Although the Pennsylvania societies were created and led by long time opponents of Federalism, they also attracted to the political scene many men who had not been involved previously. Besides participating in local elections, these men joined in public celebrations and parades, particularly on the Fourth of July which became a more popular holiday because of it. By bringing out new voters the societies helped to strengthen and broaden the base of the Democratic-Republican party. This urban support added to the party's already strong agrarian base in western Pennsylvania was reminiscent of the coalition which the Constitutionlists had put together to control Pennsylvania politics after 1776. The Democratic Societies in the 1790's were one method by which the Democratic-Republican party regained the political momentum which the Constitutionlists had lost

in the mid 1780's. From 1794 on, the Democratic-Republican party was to be a worthy opponent to the long dominant Federalist, particularly on the national level.³⁹

The Federalists maintained the societies were a consequence of the French Revolution and the arrival of Genet in America. They claimed the societies were secret organizations which were seedbeds of sedition and dangerous to liberty. They criticized the societies for attempting to influence legislation and circumventing governmental institutions through popular agitation. The Federalists, in line with the Court tradition, argued that such agitation weakened the public respect for authority and therefore paved the way for anarchy. The Federalists associated the societies with the words "Democrat" and "Democracy" which were for them synonymous with anarchy and sedition. By tying the Democratic-Republicans to the "democratic" societies the Federalists hoped to discredit both the party and the societies. The Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania in 1794 gave the Federalists a golden opportunity to do so, and they made the most of it.⁴⁰

The Whiskey Rebellion in the counties of western Pennsylvania is a familiar story and will only be briefly summarized here.⁴¹ What is perhaps more important for the development of the first party system is the decision by the Washington administration to use excessive force to crush the rebellion and the attempt afterward to link the Democratic Societies and members of the Democratic-Republican party to the rebellion. Like the Federalist response to the Democratic Societies, the response to the local stimulus of the Whiskey Rebellion was carried to extremes by the Federalists, particularly by Alexander Hamilton. The Federalist response was not simply a reaction to the

intimidation and violence against excise officials in western Pennsylvania. The reaction was also an expression of the growing Federalist fear concerning the motives of their political opponents in Congress. The congressional debate over Washington's condemnation of the "self created societies" helps to illustrate the bitterness that had come to characterize national politics.⁴²

The long-standing objection by the western Pennsylvanians to the excise tax on whiskey was not the immediate cause of the local revolt. The practice of forcing those from western Pennsylvania to travel to courts in Philadelphia for trial in excise tax cases was the spark that set off the insurrection. In July of 1794 an attempt to serve court processes on a large group of distillers in western Pennsylvania led to the burning of the local excise inspector's house. An attempt by a small detachment of regular troops from Pittsburg to aid the inspector led to their surrender to a much larger force of irate "whiskey rebels." Governor Mifflin wanted the state courts or if necessary the state militia to handle the situation, but President Washington, persuaded by Alexander Hamilton, decided to use federal military force. Hamilton, who wanted to use military force against the excise tax protesters as early as 1792, used the riot as an excuse to prove that the federal government could successfully crush organized resistance to its laws. As Hamilton explained it, the whiskey rebellion "will do us a great deal of good and add to the solidity of everything in this country."⁴³ With Hamilton in command, Washington ordered 15,000 troops to march against the insurgents in western Pennsylvania. This caused the insurrection to collapse immediately. The army encountered no resistance and the result was that a few

ringleaders were captured and brought to trial. Of those captured, only two were convicted and President Washington pardoned them.⁴⁴

While these events marked the end of the rebellion in western Pennsylvania, the Federalist attack against the Democratic Societies was expanded into an all-out offensive. Even before the insurrection, the Federalists had claimed that the societies were attempting to foment rebellion against the government. The Federalists now took the opportunity to destroy the prestige and influence of the clubs. During the march of the army into western Pennsylvania, Hamilton attempted to tie Albert Gallatin and John Smilie to the insurrection and the societies. Both were Democratic-Republican candidates for Congress in 1794. And as early as August 6, 1794 Washington had stated privately that the rebellion was "the first formidable fruit of the Democratic Societies."⁴⁵ In his annual address to Congress on November 19, Washington made the accusation public. He recounted the details of the uprising and declared that "certain self-created societies" had been responsible.⁴⁶ Thus, Washington's popularity and prestige were thrown against the societies. The Senate quickly commended Washington for quelling the insurrection and condemned the "self-created societies" for their support of the rebellion. An attempt by Aaron Burr to expunge the section concerning the societies was defeated.⁴⁷

In the House of Representatives there was extensive and often bitter debate over the appropriate response to the President's message. The reply of the House, written by James Madison, contained no mention of the "self-created societies." Pennsylvania congressman Thomas Fitzsimons introduced an amendment which ignited several days of partisan debate. Fitzsimons' amendment proposed adding these words to the reply of the House:

As part of this subject, we cannot withhold our reprobation of the self-created societies, which have risen up in some parts of the Union, misrepresenting the conduct of the Government, and disturbing the operation of the laws, and which by deceiving and inflaming the ignorant and the weak, may naturally be supposed to have stimulated and urged the insurrection.⁴⁸

The debate which followed was conducted on a strictly partisan basis. William Smith of South Carolina put forth the Federalist position by declaring that "if the committee withheld an expression of their sentiments in regard to the Societies pointed out by the President, Their silence would be an avowed desertion of the Executive."⁴⁹

The response by the Democratic-Republicans, led by William Giles of Virginia, was that there was no need for censure because if the societies had broken any laws, they should be prosecuted. However, James Christie of Maryland not only opposed the amendment but defended the Democratic Societies and their membership. Christie maintained that the societies had denounced the rebellion and many members were part of the troops which helped quell the revolt.⁵⁰

One of the better defenses of the societies and an argument that indicated the Country-oriented attitude of most Democratic-Republicans was that by James Madison. While condemning the rebellion, Madison maintained that an unjustified denunciation of the societies would be a sign of danger to the Republic. He felt it would be an infringement of the right of people to express their opinions. Madison feared that if the government abused this right that perhaps they could extend their censure to liberty of speech and press. Madison argued that in a Republic "the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people."⁵¹ Madison said he had confidence in the people and doubted the societies could do much

damage by their publications. In any event, the societies would stand or fall by public opinion. Madison concluded that "The law is the only rule of right, what is consistent with that, is not punishable; what is contrary to that, is innocent, or at least not censurable by the legislative body."⁵² Shortly after the debate the astute Madison wrote to James Monroe concerning the Federalist strategy in attacking the Democratic Societies. "The game was to connect the Democratic Societies with the odium of insurrection, to connect the Republicans in Congress with those Societies," and then to put the prestige of Washington "in opposition to both."⁵³

This congressional debate over the Democratic Societies was another example of the Court versus Country ideology which separated the two parties. The Court-oriented Federalists were interested "in the operation and manipulation of the power of government."⁵⁴ The actions of the Federalists by crushing the Whiskey Rebellion and condemning the Democratic Societies was indicative of the Court philosophy that the government should have "the resources and vigor necessary to command great respect abroad and maintain order at home."⁵⁵ On the other hand, the Country-oriented Democratic-Republicans reiterated their "opposition to the exercise of power by government."⁵⁶ The Federalist response to the Pennsylvania excise protests and Democratic Societies only confirmed the Democratic-Republicans' fear that liberty would be in jeopardy if political power was not restrained. In order to safeguard liberty and control the power of the central government the Democratic-Republicans realized they not only had to be vigilant against the Federalists but that they would have to attempt to control that government through the electoral process.

The roll call votes in the House concerning the Democratic Societies, as shown on Table X, were generally very close. The first vote (see roll call number three) was on the amendment by Fitzsimons to add the words "self-created societies" to their reply to the President's message. Fitzsimons' amendment was accepted by a vote of 47 to 45. However, Gabriel Christie of Maryland quickly moved to insert the words "in the four Western counties of Pennsylvania, and parts adjacent."⁵⁷ Christie's amendment would censure only the Democratic Societies in western Pennsylvania and not any of the others in Philadelphia or elsewhere. The vote on Christie's amendment (see roll call number two) ended in a 46 to 46 tie. Speaker Frederick Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania voted with the opposition in favor of the amendment. The importance of this vote to the Federalists can be shown by the distressed response of a leading Federalist, Fisher Ames of Massachusetts. Ames maintained:

. . . that the faction in the House fomented the discontent without; that the clubs are everywhere the echoes of the faction in Congress; that the Speaker is a member of the democratic club, and gave the casting vote on adding certain words which spoiled the clause, being a member of the club.⁵⁸

The Federalists, who would accept all or nothing, moved to add the words "countenanced by self-created societies elsewhere."⁵⁹ The Federalist motion (see roll call number one) lost by a vote of 42-50. After this defeat only 19 House members voted to pass the clause concerning the Democratic Societies. The votes on the final roll call were not recorded and therefore do not appear on the table. A few weeks later the House, by a vote of 52-31, passed a resolution (see roll call number four) requesting an investigation of property losses due to the insurrection in western Pennsylvania.⁶⁰

TABLE X
SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES
IN THE THIRD CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls			
		1	2	3	4
Smith, J.	New Hampshire	+	+	+	-
Wingate	New Hampshire	+	+	+	-
Ames	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Bourne	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Cobb	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Coffin	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Dexter	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Foster	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Goodhue	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Holten	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Sedgwick	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Thacher	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Wadsworth, P.	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+
Ward	Massachusetts	+	+	+	0
Bourn	Rhode Island	+	+	+	+
Malbone	Rhode Island	+	+	+	+
Coit	Connecticut	+	+	+	-
Hillhouse	Connecticut	+	+	+	+
Learned	Connecticut	+	+	+	+
Swift	Connecticut	+	+	+	-
Tracy	Connecticut	+	+	+	+
Trumbull	Connecticut	+	+	+	+
Gilbert	New York	+	+	+	+
Glen	New York	+	+	+	+
Gordon	New York	+	+	+	+
Van Alen	New York	+	+	+	0
Van Gaasbeck	New York	+	+	+	+
Watts	New York	+	+	+	+
Armstrong	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Fitzsimons	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Hartley	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Kittera	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Scott	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+
Beatty	New Jersey	+	+	+	+
Boudinot	New Jersey	+	+	+	+
Cadwalader	New Jersey	+	+	+	+
Dayton	New Jersey	+	+	+	+
Latimer	Delaware	+	+	+	+
Hindman	Maryland	+	+	+	+
Murray	Maryland	+	+	+	0
Lee	Virginia	+	+	+	-
Smith, W.L.	South Carolina	+	+	+	+

TABLE X (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls			
		1	2	3	4
Gilman	New Hampshire	-	+	+	+
Sherburne	New Hampshire	-	+	+	-
Griffin	Virginia	-	+	+	+
Grove	North Carolina	-	+	+	+
Dawson	North Carolina	-	-	+	0
Dearborn	Massachusetts	-	-	-	+
Lyman	Massachusetts	-	-	-	+
Van Cortland	New York	-	-	-	+
Findley	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	+
Gregg	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	+
Hiester	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	+
Montgomery	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	+
Muhlenberg, P.	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	+
Smilie	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	0
Duval	Maryland	-	-	-	+
Greenup	Kentucky	-	-	-	0
Orr	Kentucky	-	-	-	+
Claiborne	Virginia	-	-	-	0
Coles	Virginia	-	-	-	0
Neville	Virginia	-	-	-	0
Parker	Virginia	-	-	-	+
Preston	Virginia	-	-	-	0
Macon	North Carolina	-	-	-	0
Pickens	South Carolina	-	-	-	+
Baldwin	Georgia	-	-	-	0
Niles	Vermont	-	-	-	-
Smith, I.	Vermont	-	-	-	-
Bailey	New York	-	-	-	-
Tredwell	New York	-	-	-	-
Christie	Maryland	-	-	-	-
Dent	Maryland	-	-	-	-
Giles	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Hancock	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Harrison	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Heath	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Madison	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Moore	Virginia	-	-	-	-
New	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Nicholas	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Rutherford	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Venable	Virginia	-	-	-	-
Walker	Virginia	-	-	-	-

TABLE X (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls			
		1	2	3	4
Blount	North Carolina	-	-	-	-
Gillespie	North Carolina	-	-	-	-
Locke	North Carolina	-	-	-	-
McDowell	North Carolina	-	-	-	-
Mebane	North Carolina	-	-	-	-
Winston	North Carolina	-	-	-	-
Hunter	South Carolina	-	-	-	-
Carnes	Georgia	-	-	-	-

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- Roll Call #1--To amend the President's message resolution to state that the Whiskey Insurrection was countenanced by self created societies elsewhere--27 November 1794--Y=42 N=50
- Roll Call #2--To amend the President's message resolution to state that the Whiskey Insurrection had its origin in the four western counties of Pennsylvania--No is a positive vote--27 November 1794--Y=47 N=46
- Roll Call #3--To amend the House answer to the President's message concerning the phrase "self created societies"--27 November 1794--Y=47 N=45
- Roll Call #4--To pass a resolution concerning an investigation of property losses sustained in the Whiskey Insurrection--19 December 1794--Y=52 N=31

An analysis of the roll calls, as shown on Table X, clearly shows the party voting on this issue. The high coefficient of reproducibility (98 percent) also indicates the consistency of the voting. All congressmen, except for William Dawson of North Carolina, voted either for or against the Democratic Societies at least 75 percent of the time. Only one representative, Grove of North Carolina, voted contrary to his normal position on the scale as shown on Figure 3 and Table XVIII in Appendix A. Some others moved out of the middle group into one of the definite party blocs. Grove moved from the moderate Democratic-Republican group into the moderate Federalist group while Gregg and Montgomery of Pennsylvania and Pickens of South Carolina moved from the middle group into the Democratic-Republican bloc. As outlined above, Gregg and Montgomery had both been elected on the Democratic-Republican ticket in 1792. Their votes in favor of the Democratic Societies were certainly to be expected.

Although the voting on this issue was still strongly sectional, there was some movement toward split delegations, particularly within the middle states. There were only four southern representatives among the 46 congressmen on the Federalist side of the scale. There were also only four representatives from New England among the 45 congressmen on the Democratic-Republican side of the scale. However, the middle state delegations of Pennsylvania, New York, and Maryland were divided over the issue. Thus, while Congress as a whole was becoming more polarized, the middle states, and especially Pennsylvania, were polarizing within their delegations. Some southern and New England states were gradually to join them.

The Pennsylvania delegation was predictably split among its usual party lines. The five Pennsylvania Federalists voted positive on all four of the roll calls. The six Pennsylvania Democratic-Republicans voted negatively on three of the four votes. And the roll call which they supported was which, since it called for an investigation of property losses in Pennsylvania, was difficult for any Pennsylvania member to oppose.⁶¹

While the Federalists managed to crush the Whiskey Rebellion with excessive force and put a stigma on the Democratic Societies, in the long run their victory did not aid them politically. The Democratic Societies were crucial in the Pennsylvania congressional election of 1794. The Philadelphia societies worked hard to help elect the Democratic-Republican John Swanwick over the incumbent Federalist, Thomas Fitzsimons. It was the first time a non-Federalist congressman was elected from Philadelphia. The Democratic Societies "contributed the techniques of democratic expression that by 1797 had become characteristic of the Democratic-Republican movement," particularly in Pennsylvania.⁶² Besides participating in elections the societies circulated petitions, memorials, and resolutions. They also participated in patriotic celebrations and other meetings at the local level. Although more democratic than the traditional Country ideology, the urban societies also contributed to that philosophy. They showed that public vigilance was needed in a Republic in order to maintain a careful watch on their representatives to whom authority had been delegated. While the Federalist Court ideology presumed that the common people should not be involved in government, the Democratic Societies emphasized the need for participation by the people in the

governmental process. The Democratic Societies were thus instrumental in helping to lay the groundwork for the eventual victory over the Federalists and their Court ideology in 1800.

Pennsylvania Senatorial Elections in the 1790's

While the Democratic-Republicans in Pennsylvania successfully challenged the Federalists in the congressional races in the 1790's, they were less successful in the Senate elections. In fact the only Democratic-Republican elected to the Senate in the 1790's was Albert Gallatin and he was denied a seat by the Federalists. (William Maclay who was a strong administration critic and later became a Democratic-Republican, was elected in 1788 as a Federalist.) The reason why the Democratic-Republicans could not elect one of their followers to the Senate was because the Pennsylvania legislature, which chose the Senators, was controlled by the Federalists until 1799. If the elections had been by direct vote of the people, the Democratic-Republicans in Pennsylvania would probably have elected some men to the Senate. But the inability to control the legislature, particularly the Pennsylvania Senate, prompted the Democratic-Republicans to concentrate on the popularly elected congressional races. Although the Pennsylvania Democratic-Republicans did not elect any Senators in the 1790's, they did have a majority in the state's congressional delegation from the Third through the Sixth Congress. This strength on the national level was one reason why Pennsylvania was the first state in congress to begin strong party voting.

As discussed above, Robert Morris and William Maclay were chosen as Pennsylvania's first two Senators in 1788. Morris received a six

year term and Maclay a two year term. A successor to Maclay was not chosen until 1793 because the Pennsylvania House and Senate could not agree on a method of selection. The larger House insisted on a joint vote while the smaller Senate argued for a concurrent vote. In February of 1793, after the Pennsylvania Senate had finally accepted the joint vote, Albert Gallatin was chosen over Henry Miller by a 45-35 vote. In spite of Gallatin's agrarian and democratic leanings, he was elected by the Federalist dominated legislature for two main reasons. With Philadelphian Robert Morris already in the Senate, the westerners, both Federalist and Democratic-Republican, were intent on supporting a western Pennsylvanian in order to maintain sectional balance in the state delegation. Before the election Alexander Addison had written to Gallatin that the "country members" should support state Senator James Ross or some other westerner.⁶³ Secondly, Gallatin was a very popular and capable legislator. After his election to the Pennsylvania House he quickly distinguished himself in financial and parliamentary matters. And because he played a vital role in supporting the House's fight for a joint vote, Gallatin was their leading choice to replace Maclay. Since the Second Congress was set to adjourn shortly after his election, Gallatin did not take his seat until the opening of the Third Congress in December, 1793.⁶⁴

However, due to the rising partisan feelings in Congress, Gallatin's right to a Senate seat was quickly challenged. The Senate Federalists, probably fearful that Gallatin's leadership qualities would further endanger their legislative programs, claimed that Gallatin had not been a citizen for the required nine years. Morris, who presented the protesting petition from several Pennsylvania Federalists, told

Gallatin that he would be neutral in the matter. The petition was assigned to a committee of five, four of whom were strong New England Federalists. The committee recommended a special Committee of Elections be appointed to decide the issue. On February 20 the Committee reported that there was insufficient evidence to show that Gallatin was a citizen and that it was his responsibility to prove when he became a citizen.⁶⁵

Gallatin, who was very capable and experienced in financial matters, probably insured his defeat in the controversy by antagonizing Alexander Hamilton. Not content to sit idly by while the Senate considered his fate, Gallatin submitted resolutions in early January requesting Hamilton to furnish detailed financial information concerning loans, governmental expenditures, and foreign and domestic debts. The Gallatin resolutions were passed by the Senate on January 20. Hamilton showed his obvious irritation in two letters to John Adams, the President of the Senate, in response to the resolutions. He said that a shortage of clerical help made it impossible to furnish parts of the information requested and complained that his departmental operations had "been interrupted in their due course by unexpected, desultory, and distressing calls for lengthy and complicated statements."⁶⁶

The debate over the validity of Gallatin's citizenship spanned the eight days from February 20 to 28. The Federalists maintained that he had to prove he was a citizen of one of the states at least nine years before he was elected. The Committee of Elections said that his oath of citizenship in Virginia in 1785 would not make him eligible. Gallatin claimed that since he had lived in the United States in 1780 that the Articles of Confederation, which provided that all free

inhabitants were to have the privilege of citizenship, conferred citizenship upon him. He also believed that he had earned citizenship status by taking part in the American Revolution. However, the matter was not decided on its merits but purely on party considerations. The Democratic-Republicans hoped for at least a tie vote since they had reason to believe that Vice President Adams, who as a man of principle might not vote only for party considerations, would break the tie in favor of Gallatin. However, shortly before the vote, Senator Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina left Philadelphia. In addition, Morris, who had earlier promised to remain neutral, cast his vote against Gallatin. The result was a 14-12 party vote against Gallatin.⁶⁷

The Pennsylvania legislature met in April, 1794 to replace Gallatin. James Ross of Washington County defeated Robert Coleman of Lancaster County by a 45-35 vote. Since both candidates were Federalists, the western Pennsylvanians supported Ross in hopes he would be the lesser of two evils. However, Ross displayed strong Federalist tendencies, particularly during the Whiskey Rebellion and in 1799 when he challenged the Democratic-Republican Thomas McKean for the governorship.⁶⁸

The retirement of the financially troubled Senator Robert Morris in 1795 led to a clearly partisan contest between William Bingham and Peter Muhlenberg. Bingham was the Federalist Speaker of the Pennsylvania Senate and Muhlenberg was a Democratic-Republican member of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation. At a joint session in February, 1795, the members chose the Federalist Bingham by a vote of 58-35. In 1797 the Federalist dominated legislature continued its string of victories by re-electing James Ross to

another term. Ross defeated the Democratic-Republican candidate William Irvine by a vote of 56-38. Although the Democratic-Republicans could not elect a party member to the Senate they more than made up for it in the House of Representatives.⁶⁹

Conclusion

The congressional election of 1792 indicated a high level of party development within Pennsylvania. Not only were separate tickets drawn up by each party, but political organization and electioneering activities were widespread. The activities of Hutchinson, Dallas, and Nicholson for the Democratic-Republicans were of particular importance. Much has been written about the organizational exploits of John Beckley concerning the election of 1796 which were indeed considerable.⁷⁰ However, little notice has been taken of Hutchinson and Dallas who were doing the same things four years before. Their organizational skills allowed the Democratic-Republicans to increase their congressional delegation strength from two of eight representatives to seven of 13 representatives. As a result, Pennsylvania's delegation changed from a strongly Federalist oriented one to a majority of Democratic-Republicans in one election. While the Federalists controlled the Senate elections they were never again to elect more representatives than the Democratic-Republicans. And the efforts of Dallas and Nicholson, with the aid of Beckley, to garner 50 electoral votes for Clinton by combining forces with New York and Virginia was a preview of the Democratic-Republicans ability to elect Thomas Jefferson as Vice President in 1796.

The opposing parties in Pennsylvania also used newspapers and handbills extensively to argue their case before the people. Within the campaign rhetoric and tactics could be seen the philosophical differences between the parties which coincided with their Court and Country attitudes. Hutchinson's and Dallas' victory of 1792 was largely due to their ability to rebuild the coalition of Country-minded supporters similar to that of the Constitutionalist party in the 1770's and 1780's. The Democratic-Republicans drew strong support not only from artisans, laborers, and agrarians but also managed to attract a significant number of well known Federalists who were becoming disenchanted with the Court policies of Alexander Hamilton and the Federalist administration. The use of the name "Sydney" by one of the Democratic-Republican supporters is particularly relevant to the Court versus Country dichotomy. Algernon Sydney was one of the three British Commonwealthmen (along with James Harrington and John Locke), to whom Americans looked as originators of the Country-oriented Whig political philosophy they followed.⁷¹

The electoral methods the opposing parties used were also suggestive of the Court-Country split. The Federalist Conference method, as the opposition pointed out, was controlled by the elite with little chance that the common man could influence the outcome. Controlled from Philadelphia, the Federalists' "state" convention drew only 33 members from nine of the state's 21 counties with none from the far western agrarian areas of the state. The Democratic-Republican Correspondence method allowed more people to become involved in the political process. Furthermore, they sought out the support of the laborers and immigrant voters. These differences in campaign tactics reflect the continued

reliance of the Federalists on the idea of deference and distrust of the people while the Democratic-Republicans were quickly moving toward the idea of egalitarianism which would become even more prevalent after 1800. Several newspaper articles by Democratic-Republicans also reflected back to 1776 by referring to the Federalists as Tories while calling themselves Whigs and Patriots. The attitude of the Court-minded Federalists could also be seen when they went to private meetings when they had trouble controlling those open to the public. The near riot at one of the Federalist called meetings revealed not only the elitist response of the Federalists but also the non-deferential attitudes of the Democratic-Republicans. And the Federalists no doubt remembered when such mob action had led to violence in the 1770's and 1780's.

An analysis of roll calls in the Third Congress shows important results for both the Pennsylvania delegation and for congress as a whole. Not only was Pennsylvania highly polarized but some other states, particularly New York, were beginning to follow the same pattern. Strict sectional voting, which dominated in the first two congresses, was somewhat less widespread in the Third Congress and was the beginning of a trend which continued through the next three congresses. Furthermore, unlike the first two congresses which scaled only by particular issue, the roll calls in the Third Congress scaled across the majority of issues for all representatives. Thus, for the first time the high level of polarization and voting cohesion indicated that party voting had appeared.

The roll call votes and debate in congress concerning the Democratic Societies and Whiskey Rebellion again show the Court-Country aspects of the two parties. The excessive force and repression

used by the Federalists in both instances indicated not only their belief in a strong central government but also an inability to handle political dissent. The Federalists failed to understand that the opposition was legitimate in that it was aimed at the policies of the government and not at the government itself. This failure by the Federalists to acknowledge political action by dissenting groups was used by the Democratic-Republicans throughout the 1790's to strengthen support for their party. The Federalist reaction also indicated their continued belief in deferential politics as opposed to the more egalitarian philosophy of the opposition which emphasized the need for participation by the people in the governmental process. The Federalist response to the state and local stimuli of the Whiskey Rebellion and Democratic Societies helped to weaken them politically in both Pennsylvania and throughout the country.⁷² The Federalist Court-minded reaction, which would be expected given their philosophy, eventually helped lead to their defeat by the Country-oriented opposition they were fighting against.

ENDNOTES

¹Annals, 2d Cong., Appendix, p. 1359; Leutscher, Early Political Machinery, p. 131; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 51; American Daily Advertiser, 3 April 1792.

²American Daily Advertiser, 14 April 1792.

³They usually called themselves Republicans but I will use the term Democratic-Republicans, which was also used, so as not to confuse them with the earlier Pennsylvania Republicans, the vast majority of whom became Federalists.

⁴Elisha Boudinot to Alexander Hamilton, 13 September 1792, as cited in Harold Syrett, ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 26 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1797), 12: 369.

⁵For a further discussion of the influence of the press in Philadelphia in the 1790's see: Noble E. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789-1801 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957); John Zvester, Political Philosophy and Rhetoric: A Study of the Origins of American Party Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978); and Donald H. Stewart, The Opposition Press of the Federalist Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1969).

⁶American Daily Advertiser, 18, 20, 27 July 1792; General Advertiser, 30, 31 July 1792; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 55-56; Raymond Walters, "The Origins of the Jeffersonian Party in Pennsylvania," PMHB 66 (1942 October): 446-448.

⁷James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 19 August 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

⁸General Advertiser, 30 July 1792; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 56-57; Walters, "Jeffersonian Party," pp. 446-448; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, pp. 38-39.

⁹General Advertiser, 1 August 1792.

¹⁰James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 19 August 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

¹¹Ibid.; General Advertiser, 1 August 1792; Walters, "Jeffersonian Party," pp. 448-449; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 57-58.

¹²John Montgomery to William Irvine, 28 August 1792, Irvine Papers, HSP; General Advertiser, 14 August 1792; Walters, "Jeffersonian Party," p. 450.

¹³National Gazette, 29 September 1792; General Advertiser, 4 August 26, 27 September 1792; Leutscher, Early Political Machinery, p. 132.

¹⁴In fact some historians label Frederick Muhlenberg as much anti-administration as pro-administration during his four terms in Congress. Rudolph Bell lists him as pro-administration only in the First Congress and anti-administration in Congresses Two, Three, and Four; see Rudolph M. Bell, Party and Faction in American Politics: The House of Representatives, 1789-1801 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 252-256. See also Stanley B. Parsons et al., United States Congressional Districts, 1788-1841 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 22, 58, where Muhlenberg is listed pro-administration in the first two congresses and anti-administration in the Third and Fourth.

¹⁵Gazette of the United States, 26 September 1792; General Advertiser, 25 September 1792; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 64-65.

¹⁶"A Pennsylvanian," General Advertiser, 31 July 1792; "Sydney," General Advertiser, 9 August 1792; William Findley to Albert Gallatin, 20 August 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

¹⁷"Common Sense, Jun.," General Advertiser, 14 August 1792.

¹⁸"Mentor," Broadside, 1792, Broadside Collection, HSP.

¹⁹"Cerberus," General Advertiser, 5, 7, 14 September 1792.

²⁰James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 19 August 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

²¹James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 14 September 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

²²James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 25 September 1792, Alexander James Dallas to Albert Gallatin, 25 September 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, pp. 43-44.

²³Alexander James Dallas to Albert Gallatin, 25 September 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

²⁴James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 25 September 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

²⁵Alexander James Dallas to Albert Gallatin, 25 September 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

²⁶James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 24 October 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

²⁷William Findley to William Irvine, 17 August 1792, Irvine Papers, HSP; James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 14, 25 September 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS; Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," pp. 372-374.

²⁸James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 14, 25 September 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

²⁹General Advertiser, 11 October 1792; Pennsylvania Archives, 4th ser., 4: 227.

³⁰James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, 24 October 1792, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.

³¹Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, 16 November 1792, LC; Miller, Federalist City, pp. 46-49; Walters, Dallas, 440-445; Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," p. 344.

³²Benjamin Rush to Aaron Burr, 24 September 1792, as cited in Butterfield, ed., Rush Letters, 1: 623.

³³James Beckley to James Madison, 17 October 1792, John Nicholson to James Madison, 3 October 1792, Madison Papers, LC; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, pp. 45-48; Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," pp. 387-391.

³⁴Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, pp. 210-211.

³⁵Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, pp. 62-63; Walters, Dallas, p. 45. For a fuller discussion of the Democratic Societies see: Eugene Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942) and Philip Foner, Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800: A Documentary Sourcebook (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976).

³⁶Ibid., p. 6; Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, pp. 6-8; General Advertiser, 15 April 1793.

³⁷Foner, Documentary Sourcebook, p. 7; Miller, Federalist City, p. 56; Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, pp. 72, 77-78; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 85-86, Minutes of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, HSP.

³⁸Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, pp. 98-99; Miller, Federalist City, pp. 60-61; Independent Gazetteer, 7 May 1794; Margaret Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia, 1789-1801 (Northampton, Mass.: Department of History of Smith College, 1920), p. 71.

³⁹Alfred F. Young, The Democratic-Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763-1797 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 411; Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, p. 206; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, pp. 63-65; Foner, Documentary Sourcebook, p. 10.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 23-25; Young, Democratic-Republicans of New York, p. 414; Regina Morantz, "'Democracy' and 'Republic' in American Ideology, 1787-1840" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971), pp. 147-152.

⁴¹For a comprehensive study of the Whiskey Rebellion see Leland Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels: The Study of a Frontier Uprising (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1939).

⁴²Richard H. Kohn, "The Washington Administration's Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion," Journal of American History 59 (December 1972): 568.

⁴³As quoted in Jacob E. Cooke, "The Whiskey Insurrection: A Reevaluation," Pennsylvania History 30 (October 1963): 326.

⁴⁴Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, pp. 260-264; Cooke, "Whiskey Insurrection," Insurrection," p. 326; Kohn, "Crush the Whiskey Rebellion," pp. 580-581; Foner, Documentary Sourcebook, pp. 28-29.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 30-31; William Miller, "The Democratic Societies and the Whiskey Insurrection," PMHB 62 (July 1938): 334-336; Annals, 3d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 787-791, 794.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Miller, "Democratic Societies and Whiskey Insurrection," pp. 334-336; Foner, Documentary Sourcebook, pp. 30-31.

⁴⁸Annals, 3d Cong., 2d sess., p. 899.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 901.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 899-901, 908-909; Foner, Documentary Sourcebook, pp. 31-32; Miller, "Democratic Societies and Whiskey Insurrection," pp. 337-338.

⁵¹Annals, 3d Cong., 2d sess., p. 934.

⁵²Ibid., p. 935.

⁵³James Madison to James Monroe, 4 December 1794, Madison Papers, LC.

⁵⁴Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution," p. 357.

⁵⁵John Murrin, "The Great Inversion, or, Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and American (1776-1816)," in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 379.

⁵⁶Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution," p. 356.

- ⁵⁷Annals, 3d Cong., 2d sess., p. 944.
- ⁵⁸Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, 29 November 1794, 12 cited in Beth Ames, ed., Works of Fisher Ames, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1854), 1: 153-154.
- ⁵⁹Annals, 3d Cong., 2d sess., p. 944.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 943-945, 1000.
- ⁶¹Daniel Hiester was obviously a Democratic-Republican, although Harry Tinkcom lists him as a Federalist even as late as the 1794 election. Hiester voted strongly with the Democratic-Republicans in both the Third and Fourth Congresses, after which he retired from the House. See Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 142.
- ⁶²Foner, Documentary Sourcebook, p. 40.
- ⁶³Alexander Addison to Albert Gallatin, 20 January 1793, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.
- ⁶⁴Leonard Sneddon, "State Politics in the 1790's" (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1972), pp. 18-19; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 147-150.
- ⁶⁵Walters, Gallatin, pp. 59-61; Annals, 3d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 9-10, 19, 28-29; Albert Gallatin to Hannah Gallatin, 3, 15 December 1793, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.
- ⁶⁶Alexander Hamilton to the Vice President of the United States, 22 February 1794, Gallatin Papers, NYHS; Sneddon, "State Politics," pp. 19-20; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 151.
- ⁶⁷Walters, Gallatin, pp. 59-63; Henry Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1879; reprint ed., New York: Peter Smith, 1943), pp. 114-120.
- ⁶⁸Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution," pp. 361, 366; Walters, Gallatin, p. 60; Alexander Hamilton to the Vice President of the United States, 6 February 1794, in American State Papers: Finance, 1: 274; Annals, 3d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 34-36.
- ⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 47-61; Walters, Gallatin, pp. 61-63; Albert Gallatin to Thomas Clare, 5 March 1794, Gallatin Papers, NYHS.
- ⁷⁰See Bernard Fay, "Early Party Machinery in the United States: Pennsylvania in the Election of 1796," PMHB 60 (October 1936): 375-390; Philip M. Marsh, "John Beckley, Mystery Man of the Early Jeffersonians," PMHB 72 (January 1948): 54-69; Noble E. Cunningham, "John Beckley: An Early American Party Manager," WMQ, 3d ser., 13 (January 1956): 40-52; and Edmund Berkely and Dorothy Berkely, John Beckley: Zealous Partisan in a Nation Divided (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1973).

⁷¹See Daniel W. Howe, "European Sources of Political Ideas in Jeffersonian America," Reviews in American History 10 (December 1982): 28-44; and Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthmen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).

⁷²Harry M. Tinkcom in his important study on Pennsylvania politics in the 1790's maintained, as his subtitle indicates, that Pennsylvanians responded to national stimuli rather than the other way around. This study attempts to show that it was certainly a two way street in that the national government, as can be shown in respect to the Whiskey Rebellion and Democratic Societies, often was responding to stimuli from the state and local level as well. See Harry M. Tinkcom, The Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania, 1790-1801: A Study in National Stimulus and Local Response (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1950).

CHAPTER VI

THE PENNSYLVANIA CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION IN THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH CONGRESSES

The Pennsylvania Congressional Election of 1794

In 1794 Pennsylvania returned to the district system of election which that state had employed in the congressional elections of 1791. Both parties generally favored this change after the chaotic experience under the general election system in 1792. The Federalists were disturbed by the strong showing of the Democratic-Republicans in the congressional elections of 1792. The conference method had not worked well for the Federalists in 1792. With most of their strength in eastern Pennsylvania, they wanted to try to maintain control of that area in face of the growing organizational power of the Democratic-Republicans behind Alexander Dallas, John Beckley, and Michael Leib. The Democratic-Republicans, who controlled most of western Pennsylvania, believed they could now challenge the Federalists successfully on their own ground as well. The time consuming correspondence method had been difficult for them to implement on a statewide basis. Furthermore, James Hutchinson, one of their most able organizers, had died in the yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia in the summer of 1793.¹

In April, 1794 the state legislature divided the state into 12 districts. Each district was to elect one representative except for the fourth district, composed of Bucks, Montgomery, and Northampton

Counties, which was to elect two representatives. However the representatives did not necessarily have to live in the district in which they ran. With the reversion to the district system the necessity for statewide campaigning was gone. The parties could now concentrate on the county and district level of organization rather than the cumbersome procedures used in 1792. But it also meant that in some areas of the state the level of partisanship was lower than during the exciting statewide race of 1792.²

Of the 13 Pennsylvania representatives elected in 1794, six were re-elected and seven were newly chosen. The closest and most hard fought campaign was in district one which was comprised of the city of Philadelphia. The Democratic-Republicans were intent on defeating the incumbent Federalist Thomas Fitzsimons who had a record of strong support for Federalist policies during his three terms in Congress. The Democratic-Republicans believed that Fitzsimons no longer represented the majority of the citizens of Philadelphia. In June the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania appointed an election committee to report to the people concerning which congressional representatives should be maintained and which dismissed. Three of the five men appointed were leading Democratic-Republicans including Alexander Dallas, Michael Leib, and Benjamin F. Bache. The candidate whom they selected to oppose Fitzsimons was John Swanwick, another member of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania.³

John Swanwick, the son of a loyalist wagon maker, had become a wealthy merchant through his Philadelphia-based shipping company. A former associate of Robert Morris', Swanwick had supported the Federal Constitution and had initially been in favor of Hamilton's




Figure 4. Pennsylvania Congressional Districts, 1794-1800

fiscal policies. However, as early as 1792 when he was elected to the state assembly, he began to align with the Democratic-Republicans who had opposed the excise taxes. Swanwick disliked the English and their practice of preying on American ships, particularly his own. Although wealthy, Swanwick was an outsider who had not been accepted into the Philadelphia social elite. Furthermore, he joined the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania and was elected treasurer. Thus, both politically and socially Swanwick was a natural choice to oppose the Philadelphia junto candidate Fitzsimons.⁴

The campaign tactics of Swanwick and his Democratic-Republican supporters in Philadelphia shocked the Federalists. They claimed that Swanwick, perhaps the first of the "modern" politicians, used new and unfair campaign practices. A Federalist, who signed himself "T.T." in his newspaper protest, claimed that "a total innovation has been effected in our mode of election" under Swanwick, including the use of secret meetings in "obscure corners" of the city to plan election strategy.⁵ Swanwick was attacked for openly and publicly seeking office, especially with the aid of organized groups, rather than the traditional way of having friends bring his name up for nomination. "T.T." attacked Swanwick, who "was the first to move forward in this new style," as a tool of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania.⁶ Swanwick was unlike previous genteel candidates who observed a "reserve and decorum" which "evinced a becoming respect for public opinion and permitted it to take its own direction without an unfair bias."⁷ Swanwick directed his efforts toward capturing the votes of the artisans, laborers, and ethnic minorities in the city. His supporters campaigned in working class taverns and shops where they

told voters that Swanwick had opposed the excise taxes and debtor laws. They likewise told people that he advocated a strong stand against England in retaliation for their raids against American trade. The Democratic-Republicans held several ward meetings, particularly in North and South Mulberry where the middle and lower classes resided, hoping to encourage a large turnout for Swanwick.⁸

The Federalists tried to discredit Swanwick, especially for his involvement with the Democratic Societies which they tied to the Whiskey Rebellion. The Federalists attempted to picture Swanwick as a greedy political upstart who was a manipulator of the masses. Fitzsimons, who was running for his fourth consecutive term, was presented as an ally of the Washington administration and as the law and order candidate, while Swanwick was accused of being "the greatest insurgent in the state."⁹ The Federalist Philadelphia junto recognized the importance of the militia vote and campaigned hard for it, particularly among those who had been summoned to quell the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania. In fact, what was also probably another political first, a pre-election poll was taken among the Philadelphia militia companies. Fitzsimons outpolled Swanwick by about a five to two margin among the more elite city troops. However, in the artillery units which were composed mostly of members from the middle and lower classes, Swanwick was favored by a ratio of five to one.¹⁰

The result of the congressional race was an upset victory for Swanwick who won by only 58 votes out of almost 2,500 cast. The election results show that most of Fitzsimons' support came from the older and wealthier wards in the city center. Of the 12 wards,

Fitzsimons carried only one outside the exclusive wards of Chestnut, Walnut, Dock, and Highstreet. Most of Swanwick's support came from the fringes of the city which were more newly settled and contained higher proportions of artisans, laborers, and ethnic minorities. The 255 vote majority Swanwick compiled in the North and South Mulberry wards were very important for his victory. The capturing of the less exclusive but faster growing areas of the city by the Democratic-Republicans in 1794 was an important preview of the urban strength which the party was to maintain in the future. It seems that the Democratic-Republican party had finally made the idea of an opposition party acceptable to many Philadelphia voters.¹¹

In the second congressional district, which was comprised of the county of Philadelphia, the candidates were the incumbent Frederick Muhlenberg and Samuel Miles. Both men were moderates who had some contacts with both parties, although Miles was considered to be closer to the Federalist party. Muhlenberg, who began as a Federalist, was not yet openly identified with the Democratic-Republican party as he would be later. He did, however, receive the support of the Democratic-Republican party against Miles. Muhlenberg was endorsed in the race by Benjamin F. Bache, a leader of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania and editor of the anti-administration General Advertiser. The Democratic-Republicans in the county, like those in the city, were also well organized. They formed a nominating group which was called the Committee of the Northern Liberties and Southwark District. The Democratic-Republicans held various meetings throughout the county to nominate candidates, including Muhlenberg. Muhlenberg received the support of the Democratic-Republicans largely because, besides being a

popular German, he had voted against the excise taxes in 1794. The incumbent Muhlenberg was re-elected by a vote of 656 to 510.¹²

In the two Federalist-controlled counties of Chester and Delaware to the west of Philadelphia, which made up the third congressional district, the newly elected congressman was the Federalist Richard Thomas. This result was not surprising since a majority of the population in these counties were Anglicans and Quakers of English descent. In district four to the north of Philadelphia, which included the counties of Bucks, Montgomery, and Northampton, there were to be two representatives elected. This district, particularly Bucks and Montgomery Counties, was more heterogeneous than the third as it contained large numbers of Germans and English as well as some Scotch-Irish. The dominant ethnic group in Northampton County was the Germans, although the northern part had been settled mostly by Connecticut Yankees. The three counties, through the use of township meetings, elected men to make up a committee in order to nominate candidates. Although little campaign information is available, the two candidates elected were the Federalist Samuel Sitgreaves and John Richards, a Democratic-Republican.¹³

The Democratic-Republicans did well in the far western districts of Pennsylvania where anti-Federalist feelings were high because of the excise taxes and the Whiskey Rebellion. Furthermore, these districts were dominated by farmers of Scotch-Irish descent who followed the Country political philosophy. In the counties of Westmoreland and Fayette, which made up district 11, the popular Democratic-Republican William Findley was elected with little opposition. The voters of district 10 chose the Democratic-Republican Reverend David Bard to

represent them from the counties of Bedford, Franklin, and Huntington. From district six, Dauphin and Northumberland Counties, the Democratic-Republican Samuel Maclay, a relative of William Maclay, was elected. The most interesting contest in western Pennsylvania was in district 12, Allegheny and Washington Counties, where the Federalists had some support, particularly in the Pittsburg area. Two Federalists, the incumbent Thomas Scott and John Woods, were opposed by two Democratic-Republicans, Hugh Brackenridge and Daniel Hamilton. Woods was a strong Federalist while Scott was more moderate although he was not currently popular because of his vote for the excise tax. The popular Brackenridge was believed to be the leading candidate since Hamilton was too closely associated with the whiskey rebels. However, about two weeks before the election John McMillan, a Presbyterian minister, organized a meeting at Cannonsburg for the purpose of nominating Albert Gallatin. Ballots with Gallatin's name were quickly printed and distributed throughout the district. Even though Gallatin did not live in the district, as he was from Fayette County, he won the election by a comfortable margin.¹⁴

The incumbents from the four districts in the middle of the state were returned by the electorate. The two Federalists John Kittera and Thomas Hartley were re-elected from districts seven and eight, the counties of York and Lancaster. These two counties generally voted conservatively, as they were made up largely of prosperous farmers of English and German background, although some Scotch-Irish had also settled there. District five, which was comprised of the heavily German populated counties of Berks and Luzerne, re-elected the Democratic-Republican Daniel Hiester. And the Democratic-Republican

Andrew Gregg was again chosen from district nine, an area dominated by Scotch-Irish farmers of Presbyterian religious persuasion.¹⁵

The congressional elections of 1794 again showed the strength of the Democratic-Republicans on the national level in Pennsylvania. Despite the fact that the Federalists maintained control of both houses of the Pennsylvania legislature in the same elections, the Democratic-Republicans managed to elect a majority of their state delegation to the national Congress. Of the 13 representatives elected, four (Hartley, Kittera, Sitgreaves, and Thomas) were definite Federalists and eight (Gallatin, Bard, Findley, Gregg, Maclay, Richards, Hiester, and Swanwick) were Democratic-Republicans. Frederick Muhlenberg, who was inclining toward the Democratic-Republican party, can be labeled a moderate. A look at the roll call analysis for the Fourth Congress (see Figure 5) shows that he opposed Federalist policy just over 50 percent of the time.¹⁶

The Federalists were stunned by the strong showing of the Democratic-Republicans in Pennsylvania and especially by Swanwick's defeat of Fitzsimons in Philadelphia. The Democratic-Republicans were jubilant of course. James Madison wrote to James Monroe that "The election of Swanwick as a Republican, by the commercial and political metropolis of the U. S., in preference to Fitzsimons, is, of itself, of material consequence, and is so felt by the party to which the latter belongs."¹⁷ Besides their traditional strong support from western Pennsylvania the Democratic-Republicans were beginning to consolidate their gains in the east as well. The Democratic-Republicans Hiester, Richards, Maclay, and Gregg were all from middle or eastern Pennsylvania. The combination of a strong agrarian and urban base was to make the

Democratic-Republicans the majority party in the Pennsylvania congressional delegation for a long time to come. And such issues as the Jay Treaty and the Alien and Sedition Acts did not increase the Federalists' chances of success. The emerging Democratic-Republican party attracted a large number of voters by using national issues to win elections.¹⁸

Analysis of Fourth Congress Roll Calls

Continuing the trend begun in the Third Congress, the roll calls in the Fourth Congress scale across a wide range of issues for all congressmen. Of the 83 roll calls in the Fourth Congress, 64 scale with each other, a percentage of 77 as compared to the 72 percent for the Third Congress. Not only did a higher percentage of roll calls scale, but the movement toward party voting was also stronger than in the Third Congress. Of the 93 congressmen in the Fourth Congress who scale only eight fell into the middle group between the parties.

As indicated on Figure 5 (and on Table XIX in Appendix A), the polarization within the Pennsylvania congressional delegation in the Fourth Congress was even stronger than that in the previous congress. In the Fourth Congress Pennsylvania again had 13 seats but there were 14 different representatives because George Ege replaced Daniel Hiester from the fifth district during the course of the Fourth Congress. Of the representatives, 12 of them appear on Figure 5 and Table XIX in Appendix A. Neither Hiester nor Ege scale because they did not vote on over 50 percent of the roll calls. But the position of the other 12 Pennsylvanians on the graph is very indicative of the party voting within the delegation. On the left side of the graph which signifies

State Designators

Pennsylvania Representatives

NH = New Hampshire
 VT = Vermont
 CN = Connecticut
 MA = Massachusetts
 RI = Rhode Island
 NY = New York
 NJ = Jew Jersey
 DE = Delaware

MA = Maryland
 KY = Kentucky
 TN = Tennessee
 VA = Virginia
 NC = North Carolina
 SC = South Carolina
 GA = Georgia

P1 = Sitgreaves
 P2 = Hartley
 P3 = Kittera
 P4 = Thomas
 P5 = F. Muhlenberg
 P6 = Richards
 P7 = Findley
 P8 = Swanwick
 P9 = Gregg
 P10 = Bard
 P11 = Gallatin
 P12 = Maclay




Figure 5. Roll Call Analysis of Fourth Congress

State Designators

Pennsylvania Representatives

NH = New Hampshire
 VT = Vermont
 CN = Connecticut
 MA = Massachusetts
 RI = Rhode Island
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 NJ = New Jersey
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MA = Maryland
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 P8 = Swanwick
 P9 = Gregg
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 P11 = Gallatin
 P12 = Maclay




Figure 5. Continued

support for the administration are the strong Federalists Sitgreaves, Hartley, Kittera, and Thomas. They voted in favor of the administration on well over 80 percent of the roll calls. In fact, Sitgreaves supported the Federalist position on all 64 of the votes for a 100 percent rating.

The closest Pennsylvanian to these four strong Federalists is Frederick Muhlenberg who is near the center of the graph among the moderates. The scale position of Muhlenberg, who voted against the administration over 50 percent of the time, indicates his movement away from the policies of the Federalist administration. His scale position is actually closer to the moderate Democratic-Republicans in the Pennsylvania delegation than to the Pennsylvania Federalists. The difference between the support which the four Pennsylvania Federalists and the moderate Muhlenberg gave the administration can readily be seen by examining the roll calls which separate them. The main issues which separated them, as indicated by roll calls 12 through 34 (see Table XIX in Appendix A for a detailed explanation of these roll calls), concerned the Jay Treaty, support for the military, increased salaries for government officials, and admission of Tennessee to statehood. While the strong Pennsylvania Federalists supported the administration on those issues, Muhlenberg did not.

The other seven Pennsylvania representatives voted against the administration the majority of the time, some very consistently against. The closest Pennsylvania congressmen to the right of Muhlenberg on the scale were the Democratic-Republicans Richards, Findley, and Swanwick. These three moderate Democratic-Republicans voted against the Federalist administration between 73 percent (Richards) and 79 percent

(Swanwick) of the time. The main issues which separated them from Muhlenberg, as indicated by roll calls 36 through 46 (See Table XIX in Appendix A for a detailed explanation of these roll calls), were support for a stronger military, final passage of the Jay Treaty, and the sale of land in the Northwest. Muhlenberg supported the Federalist administration on these roll calls while the three moderate Pennsylvania Democratic-Republicans did not.

The other four Pennsylvania congressmen, Gregg, Bard, Gallatin, and Maclay, easily fell into the strong Democratic-Republican category. They all opposed the Federalist administration at least 88 percent of the time. And Maclay even opposed Federalist policy 100 percent of the time. The four roll calls which separated the moderate Pennsylvania Democratic-Republicans from the strong Pennsylvania Democratic-Republicans dealt with issues of higher salaries for administration officials and appropriations for naval vessels.

Of the 12 Pennsylvania congressmen who scale in the Fourth Congress roll call analysis, four supported Federalist policies, seven supported Democratic-Republican policies, and one fell into the middle group between the parties. These results follow very closely the results of the elections of 1794 as discussed above. Unlike the elections for the Third Congress, in which several representatives were listed on the tickets of both parties, the 1794 candidates, except perhaps for Frederick Muhlenberg, were supported by only one party. All Pennsylvania congressmen besides Muhlenberg had thus made a definite party commitment, both as to party label in the election and as to party ideology as shown on the roll call analysis. This strong party commitment within the Pennsylvania delegation was to be maintained throughout the 1790's.

The movement toward party voting in Congress as a whole also continued in the Fourth Congress. Most representatives had indicated a commitment for one party or the other. And a look at Table XI shows that other states besides Pennsylvania, particularly New York, had split delegations. In fact, many of the states had at least one person in each party. There were only five states, all but one in the South, which had no men in the moderate Federalist or strong Federalist groups. On the other hand, there were only three states which had no men in the Democratic-Republican groups.

In the Fourth Congress the Federalists were easy to classify as can be seen by looking at Figure 5 or Table XIX in Appendix A. There was a large break of 14 roll calls between Gilman of New Hampshire at roll call number 16 and Samuel Smith of Maryland at roll call number 30. It is obvious that all the congressmen from Gilman toward the more positive side of the scale were Federalists. And conversely, all those from Smith and going toward the negative side of the scale were not Federalists. It is more difficult to make a determination between who was in the middle group and who was a Democratic-Republican since there were no sharp breaks. However, dividing the scale into fifths gives a good indication of the relative position of each congressman. Furthermore, in the Fifth and Sixth Congresses the determination is much easier because there are less men in the middle and the breaks become sharper between both sides. The roll calls in the Fourth Congress on the Jay Treaty appropriations illustrate that party commitment is often easier to judge when dealing with a controversial issue.

TABLE XI
 PARTY COMMITMENT IN THE FOURTH CONGRESS

	Federalists	Moderate Federalists	Middle	Moderate Democratic- Republicans	Democratic Republicans
New Hampshire	2	1		1	
Vermont	1			1	
Massachusetts	7		1	1	1
Connecticut	5				
Rhode Island	1				
New York	5		1	1	3
Pennsylvania	4		1	3	4
New Jersey	3				
Delaware					1
Maryland	2	1	3		1
Kentucky				1	1
Virginia			2	6	11
North Carolina				2	8
South Carolina	2			1	2
Georgia				2	
TOTAL	32	2	8	19	32

The Jay Treaty Votes in the Fourth Congress

Similar to the votes concerning the Democratic Societies in the Third Congress, the nine roll calls in the Fourth Congress relative to the Jay Treaty brought party commitment in the House to a very high level. The Jay Treaty and its ratification are familiar stories and will not be discussed here.¹⁹ However, as shown on Table XII, the results of the nine votes concerning the appropriations to carry out the treaty indicate for the Pennsylvania delegation, as well as for Congress as a whole, the high level of party cohesiveness and loyalty. Although the Democratic-Republicans had several defectors on the two most important votes (see roll calls numbered 8 and 9), there were very few representatives who assumed a neutral position on this issue.

An analysis of the nine roll calls, as shown on Table XII, shows the strong party voting on the Jay Treaty issue. The very high coefficient of reproducibility (99 percent) likewise illustrates the consistency of the voting. The first seven roll calls dealt with resolutions requesting the President to submit correspondence concerning the treaty negotiations and procedural moves leading up to a vote on the passage of appropriations to carry the treaty into effect. All but a few representatives voted either for or against all seven of these roll calls. It was only on roll calls numbered eight and nine that there was any loss of party commitment. Roll call number eight was a Democratic-Republican backed resolution which would have added a preamble to the treaty appropriation bill which stated that the House found the treaty objectionable but would pass the bill considering all the circumstances involved. Roll call nine was for passage of appropriations to carry the treaty into effect.

TABLE XII

SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON THE JAY TREATY IN THE FOURTH CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Foster, A.	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, J.	New Hampshire	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Buck	Vermont	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bradbury	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Foster, D.	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Goodhue	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lyman, S.	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Reed	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sedgwick	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thacher	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Wadsworth	Massachusetts	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Coit	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Goodrich	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Griswold	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hillhouse	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, N.	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Swift	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Tracy	Connecticut	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bourn	Rhode Island	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Malbone	Rhode Island	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cooper	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gilbert	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Glen	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Van Alen	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Williams	New York	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hartley	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kittera	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+
Sitgreaves	Pennsylvania	+	0	0	+	+	0	0	+	+
Thomas	Pennsylvania	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, Isaac	New Jersey	+	0	0	0	+	+	0	+	+
Thomson	New Jersey	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hindman	Maryland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Murray	Maryland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Harper	South Carolina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, W.L.	South Carolina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Henderson	New Jersey	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+
Dent	Maryland	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gilman	New Hampshire	+	-	-	0	+	+	+	+	+

TABLE XII (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Kitchell	New Jersey	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	+	+
Claiborne	Virginia	-	0	0	0	-	-	0	+	-
Sherburne	New Hampshire	-	-	-	+	0	-	-	0	0
Findley	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0
Richards	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	+	+
Patten	Delaware	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	0
Crabb	Maryland	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
Smith, S.	Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	+	+
Sprigg, T.	Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Hancock	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Heath	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Parker	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Bryan	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
Bailey	New York	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Van Cortlandt	New York	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Gregg	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Muhlenberg, F.	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Christie	Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Grove	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Smith, Israel	Vermont	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dearborn	Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
Lyman, W.	Massachusetts	-	-	-	0	0	-	0	-	-
Varnum	Massachusetts	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
Hathorn	New York	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Havens	New York	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Livingston	New York	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-
Bard	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gallatin	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hiester	Pennsylvania	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-
Maclay	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Swanwick	Pennsylvania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greenup	Kentucky	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	-	-
Orr	Kentucky	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brent	Virginia	-	0	0	-	0	-	0	-	-
Cabell	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clopton	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Coles	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Giles	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Harrison	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jackson, G.	Virginia	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE XII (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Madison	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Moore	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
New	Virginia	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-
Nicholas	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Page	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Preston	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rutherford	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Venable	Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blount	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burges	North Carolina	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-
Franklin	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gillispie	North Carolina	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-
Holland	North Carolina	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-
Locke	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Macon	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tatom	North Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Benton	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Earle	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Harriston	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Winn	South Carolina	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-
Baldwin	Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Milledge	Georgia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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- Roll Call #1--To pass the resolution to discover the nature of the President's instructions to the minister to Great Britain concerning the Jay Treaty--No is a positive vote--24 March 1796--Y=62 N=37
- Roll Call #2--To pass the resolution which maintains the prerogative of the House to deliberate concerning the Jay Treaty--No is a positive vote--7 April 1796--Y=57 N=35
- Roll Call #3--To pass the second Jay Treaty resolution which informs the President that it is not necessary for the House to state the purpose for which information is desired--No is a positive vote--7 April 1796--Y=57 N=35
- Roll Call #4--To resolve into the Committee of the Whole to consider the President's message concerning the Jay Treaty--No is a positive vote--6 April 1796--Y=57 N=36
- Roll Call #5--To refer the President's message concerning the Jay Treaty to the Committee of the Whole--No is a positive vote--31 March 1796--Y=55 N=37

TABLE XII (Continued)

-
- Roll Call #6--To amend the Pinckney Treaty resolution by striking out "it is expedient to pass the laws necessary" and insert "provision ought to made by law"--14 April 1796--Y=37 N=55
- Roll Call #7--To put the main question on passage of the resolution in answer to the President's message concerning the Jay Treaty; said resolution states that the House does not intend to infringe upon the treaty making power vested in the President and Senate by the Constitution; but the House maintains that when a treaty relates to a subject under the power of Congress, it is the constitutional right of the House to deliverate the expediency of said treaty--No is a positive vote--7 April 1796--Y=54 N=37
- Roll Call #8--To pass the Jay Treaty preamble which states that the House finds the treaty objectionable, yet under the circumstances will agree to it--No is a positive vote--30 April 1796--Y=49 N=50
- Roll Call #9--To pass the resolution that it is expedient to pass the laws necessary for carrying the Jay Treaty into effect--30 April 1796--Y=51 N=48

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which is supportive of the Jay Treaty.

All but two men, Gilman of New Hampshire and Kitchell of New Jersey, voted consistently (at least 67 percent of the time) either for or against the Jay Treaty. However, as shown on Table XIII, there were very few men who fell in the moderate Federalist or moderate Democratic-Republican categories. Dent of Maryland was the only representative in the moderate Federalist group as all of the others supported the treaty at least 89 percent of the time. In fact, 34 of the 35 strong Federalists voted for the treaty 100 percent of the time. As shown in Tables XII and XIII, there were only 12 men in the moderate Democratic-Republican group and all but one voted against the Jay Treaty 78 percent of the time. And of the 49 men in the strong Democratic-Republican bloc, 43 voted against it 100 percent of the time. The strong party commitment on this issue is evident since of the 99 men on the scale, 77 of them voted for or against the treaty 100 percent of the time.

A comparison of Table XII with Figure 5 (or Table XIX in Appendix A) helps to reveal the consistency of party commitment and polarization within the Pennsylvania delegation. Hartley, Kittera, Sitgreaves, and Thomas were again in the strong Federalist category. One change in the pattern for the Pennsylvania delegation was that Frederick Muhlenberg, who was in the middle group on Figure 5 (and Table XIX in Appendix A), shifted to the strong Democratic-Republican group on the Jay Treaty issue. This was a good indication that Muhlenberg was moving closer to the opposition party. Another change for the Pennsylvania delegation was that Hiester, who is not on Figure 5 (or Table XIX in Appendix A) because he did not participate in enough of those roll calls, was also within the strong Democratic-Republican group. Findley and

TABLE XIII
 PARTY COMMITMENT ON THE JAY TREATY ROLL CALLS

	Federalists	Moderate Federalists	Middle	Moderate Democratic- Republicans	Democratic- Republicans
New Hampshire	2		1	1	
Vermont	1				1
Massachusetts	8				3
Connecticut	7				
Rhode Island	2				
New York	5				5
Pennsylvania	4			2	7
New Jersey	3		1		
Delaware				1	
Maryland	2	1		3	1
Kentucky					2
Virginia				4	15
North Carolina				1	9
South Carolina	2				4
Georgia					2
TOTAL	36	1	2	12	49

Richards were again in the moderate Democratic-Republican bloc. Gallatin, Gregg, Bard, and Maclay remained in the strong Democratic-Republican group and were joined by Swanwick who was in the moderate Democratic-Republican category on Figure 5 (and Table XIX in Appendix A).

The Jay Treaty controversy, similar to that over the Democratic Societies in the Third Congress, illustrated the ideological split between the two parties. And once again the Democratic-Republicans employed the Country ideology when criticizing the administration. As James Hutson has pointed out, "The essence of Country ideology--fear of power and jealousy of those in a position to use it--was the visceral reaction of victims of real or perceived oppression."²⁰ The Democratic-Republicans were fearful that the Jay Treaty was part of an orchestrated attempt to revert to the British system of government. Lance Banning has noted that:

In Federalist foreign policy, they inevitably detected a desire to preserve the financial sources of the domestic system of corruption while moving closer to a concert, perhaps a reunion, with the English fount of Federalist ideas.²¹

The Jay Treaty seemed to make their fears a reality.

The debate over the Jay Treaty was part of a larger struggle over how republicanism was to be instituted. The Democratic-Republicans believed that the Federalist abuses of power, corruption, speculation, and their promotion of commercial banking interests would lead to a subversion of true republican ideals. Many of these Democratic-Republican fears were outlined by Albert Gallatin in a pamphlet written to protest the Federalist Court-oriented ideology:

The spirit which animated our country to resist British tyranny and to declare independence is, alas, paralyzed by systems artfully contrived to render the mind pliant to the views of an insidious and ambitious administration. Funding

and banking systems, with the speculations which have grown out of them have substituted an avarice of wealth for the glory and love of country. Had America in the year of 1775 been what she is now, a nation governed by stock jobbers, stock-holders, and bank directors, we should have hugged the fetters which Great Britain had forged for us.²²

The Jay Treaty controversy also embodied a Court-Country conflict concerning the balance within the national government. The Court-oriented Federalists favored a strong and active executive supported by the wealthy class. Thus the Country-minded Democratic-Republicans saw the treaty, which was signed by the "monarchical" Washington and ratified by an "aristocratic" Senate, as an attempt to subordinate the House of Representatives. The President and Senate left only the House to fight for the rights of the people. Accordingly Jefferson hoped that:

. . . the popular branch of our legislature will disapprove of it, and thus rid us of this infamous act, which is really nothing more than a treaty of alliance between England and the Anglomen of this country, against the Legislature and people of the United States.²³

Another aspect of the Court-Country conflict was reflected in the views of the commercial interests versus the landed interests concerning the Jay Treaty. Most of the Court-oriented commercial interests were based in the northern and middle states, particularly in the seaport areas. As shown on the roll call analysis, these areas strongly favored the Jay Treaty. Conversely the Country-oriented landed interests were concentrated more in the South and in the western sections of the other states. These areas strongly opposed the Jay Treaty. This was clearly true in Pennsylvania as can be seen on the map in Figure 6. Those districts in which congressmen voted for the passage of the Jay Treaty are marked with diagonal lines. As noted, the areas favoring the treaty were concentrated in the east and




Figure 6. Congressional Districts Voting for the Jay Treaty

southeastern parts of the state near Philadelphia and the river and port facilities. The only congressmen from the Philadelphia area to vote against passage of the Jay Treaty was the strong Democratic-Republican John Swanwick.

Pennsylvania Congressional Elections of 1796

The Pennsylvania congressional elections of 1796 resembled those of 1794. Pennsylvania was still allotted 13 seats and the 12 districts remained the same. The Democratic-Republicans repeated their strong showing in the congressional elections as they won seven seats and the Federalists six. Ten of the men elected in 1796 were incumbents. The Democratic-Republican strength was again in western Pennsylvania and in the city and county of Philadelphia. The Federalists continued to receive their main support from the rest of southeastern Pennsylvania and the middle counties. (See Figure 6 or Figure 4 for an indication of the election districts.)

The Federalists returned their five incumbent congressmen with little difficulty. Hartley and Kittera were re-elected easily from the heavily Federalist counties of York and Lancaster respectively. Hartley was elected for the fifth straight time and Kittera for his fourth. Another strong area for the Federalists was that of Chester and Delaware Counties which returned Congressman Richard Thomas to a second term. Thomas, Kittera, and Hartley were from districts three, seven, and eight which consisted largely of commercial farms. A majority of the population in these areas were Quakers and Anglicans of English descent, although there were also a large number of Germans. George Ege, who replaced Hiester in the middle of the Fourth Congress won

re-election from district five, the counties of Berks and Luzerne. The majority of people in district five were of German descent, particularly Berks County. The other incumbent Federalist was Samuel Sitgreaves who was one of two representatives chosen from district four which included the counties of Bucks, Montgomery, and Northampton. The only new Federalist representative chosen was John Chapman also from the fourth district. District four was more ethnically diverse as it contained many people of German and English ancestry as well as some Scotch-Irish.

Just as the Federalists continued their control of the southeastern counties surrounding Philadelphia, the Democratic-Republicans maintained their strength in western Pennsylvania. Andrew Gregg, David Bard, William Findley, and Albert Gallatin were all re-elected with little difficulty from the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth congressional districts in far western Pennsylvania. And John Hanna replaced Samuel Maclay as the Democratic-Republican congressman from district six, the counties of Dauphin and Northumberland. These farming districts were composed largely of Scotch-Irish Presbyterians who had long supported the Constitutionists and Democratic-Republicans.

The closest and most interesting races were again in the city and county of Philadelphia which made up districts one and two. There was more political organization in these contests since, unlike many of the other districts, both parties had a good chance to win the seats. Once again the political organization and campaign tactics of the Democratic-Republicans were to tell the difference in the results. Although James Hutchinson, the primary campaign organizer in 1794, had died, the Democratic-Republicans again appointed a state committee to coordinate the party's efforts. Dr. Michael Leib of

Philadelphia was named chairman of this state committee which also included John Beckley, Albert Gallatin, Thomas McKean, William Irvine, and David Rittenhouse.²⁴

The Federalists, while not as well organized on a statewide basis, were well prepared in Philadelphia. Learning from the Democratic-Republican tactics of 1794, the federalists developed ward committees to stir up support for the administration. Some Federalist shipbuilders quietly informed their craftsmen that a vote for the Federalist ticket would help maintain their employment. The Federalists nominated Edward Tilghman as their candidate at a meeting held in Dunwoody's tavern in August. Tilghman was a wealthy lawyer who was related to well known loyalists from Maryland, a fact which the Democratic-Republicans wisely exploited. Many of Tilghman's clients were merchants who belonged to the Federalist party in Philadelphia.²⁵

The Democratic-Republicans ran the incumbent John Swanwick against Tilghman. They held small meetings throughout the city, as they had done in 1794, at which Swanwick received the support of the party faithful in attendance. The Democratic-Republicans, under the leadership of Leib, conducted what was probably the first voter registration drive in United States history. In 1795 Swanwick was named President of the "Philadelphia Society for the Information and Assistance of Persons Emigrating from Foreign Countries." Swanwick's own ships even helped to bring in immigrants, particularly Irish. Since naturalized male citizens of age could vote in Pennsylvania, the society helped the newcomers find city hall in order to become eligible voters. In 1796 167 new citizens were enrolled, including 60 Irishmen.²⁶

In Philadelphia County the incumbent Frederick Muhlenberg was not invited to run by either party. Although a moderate who voted slightly toward the Democratic-Republican side, he was not considered by the Democratic-Republicans because of his vote for the Jay Treaty. The Federalists nominated Robert Waln, a Federalist member of the state legislature. The Democratic-Republicans nominated Blair McClenachan, an Irish merchant and former President of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania.²⁷

After a hard fought campaign which John Beckley labeled as one of "the most violent exertions ever made in this city," the Democratic-Republicans won both the city and county congressional seats.²⁸ There was so much interest in the races that voter turnout was high and newspapers even printed a ward by ward breakdown of the votes. The strategy of Swanwick, McClenachan, and Leib to concentrate on the votes of the laboring class and the immigrants was again successful. However, while McClenachan won by a fairly large margin, Swanwick won by only 70 votes out of 2,934 cast. The election returns showed that Swanwick had won only five of the city's 12 wards, but the majorities he obtained there made up for his losses elsewhere. The wards he won were the outlying wards of the city where the workers and immigrants resided, particularly North and South Mulberry where he won about 65 percent of the vote. Likewise, McClenachan's strongest areas were the recently settled areas of the Northern Liberties and Southwark where laborers of German and Irish descent were predominant.²⁹

The Democratic-Republicans were also well organized in the campaign for the 15 presidential electors. The main force behind the statewide effort to win Pennsylvania for Jefferson was John Beckley who was

aided by Leib and other members of the state committee. They surprised the Federalists by winning 14 of the 15 presidential electors. The presidential campaign strategy of the Pennsylvania Democratic-Republicans was very effective. Many of the party leaders, including the Pennsylvania congressional delegation, met in Philadelphia after the Pennsylvania legislature had adjourned and chose the men to run on the "Republican" electoral ticket. The men named as electors were all well known and respected men such as Thomas McKean, Peter Muhlenberg, Joseph Hiester, William Maclay, William Irvine, and John Smilie. The Democratic-Republicans also had numerous campaign meetings in the urban areas and distributed thousands of handbills and printed tickets throughout the state. John Beckley stressed that it was important to get as many voters out as possible.³⁰

As another example of the Court-Country dichotomy the Democratic-Republicans attacked the monarchical views of John Adams and the Federalist ticket. One handbill, signed by "A Republican," connected Adams to such ideas as monarchy, aristocracy, and the corrupt British influence but associated Jefferson with the ideas of liberty, independence, and republicanism. The Democratic-Republicans also continued their campaign for the votes of the laborers and immigrants. This tactic was very effective as they won the city and county of Philadelphia by large margins. The Federalists in Pennsylvania were so upset by the Democratic-Republicans' control of the immigrant vote that they passed a law restricting the rights of naturalized citizens in 1797. Only a veto by Governor Mifflin kept the law from going into effect.³¹ And John Adams, who was President when the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed two years later, maintained that the

presidential ticket against him was composed of "the lowest dregs of the mob of Philadelphia."³² His administration soon attempted to remedy that situation.

Pennsylvania politics seemed rather incongruous at times in the 1790's. One might wonder why despite the Federalists' control of the state legislature, particularly the state Senate, and the United States Senators that the Democratic-Republicans managed to keep up with or even surpass the Federalists in the congressional races. Furthermore, in 1796 the Democratic-Republicans won 14 of 15 electoral votes for Jefferson. The Federalists' supremacy in the state legislature was largely because they controlled the more populous counties in eastern and southeastern Pennsylvania which were allotted more state legislative seats than the more sparsely settled areas of western Pennsylvania. The populous counties in the Philadelphia area also remained strongly Federalist for several years after 1787 because of the popularity of the Federal Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. The Federalists controlled the Senate elections because the Senators were chosen, not by the people, but by the state legislators. The Democratic-Republicans fared better in the congressional races because the elections were usually by district, which ensured that they would do well in western Pennsylvania. Also the congressmen were voted on directly by the people and the Democratic-Republicans consistently showed that they were closer to the people than the Federalists. In this regard the Democratic-Republicans were especially aided by the organizational talents of such men as James Hutchinson, Michael Leib, Alexander Dallas, and John Beckley. The Court-Country split was also of some significance because the Pennsylvanians tended to be quickly

moving away from the politics of deference and the Democratic-Republicans' Country philosophy was definitely closer to this attitude than the Court-minded Federalists. This was particularly so in the presidential election of 1796 when the Democratic-Republicans painted John Adams as a "King" and Thomas Jefferson as a friend of liberty.

Analysis of Fifth Congress Roll Calls

In the Fifth Congress the polarization of members into two cohesive voting blocs was very evident. Of the 155 roll calls in the Fifth Congress, 143 of them scaled with each other for a percentage of 92 as compared to the 77 percent in the Fourth Congress. The level of party voting also increased over the already significant level reached in the Fourth Congress as can be seen in Table XIV. There were fewer men in the middle and moderate groups than there were in the previous Congress. Of the 99 representatives who scaled in the Fifth Congress only three were in the middle group. All of the other 96 men were aligned with one party or the other. In fact, as shown on Table XIV, 88 of the 96 men have made a very strong commitment while the other eight were in the moderate groups.

The Pennsylvania delegation, as indicated on Figure 7 (and on Table XX in Appendix A), was strongly polarized. As in the entire Congress, polarization increased over the previous Congress. Pennsylvania had 13 seats in Congress but because of several replacements, 16 men served during the Fifth Congress. However, only 12 of the representatives scaled. Swanwick died during his term and was replaced by Robert Waln, the Federalist whom McClenachan had defeated in 1796. Neither Swanwick nor Waln voted on 50 percent of the roll

State Designators

NH - New Hampshire
 VT - Vermont
 CN - Connecticut
 MA - Massachusetts
 RI - Rhode Island
 NY - New York
 NJ - New Jersey
 DE - Delaware

MD - Maryland
 KY - Kentucky
 TN - Tennessee
 VA - Virginia
 NC - North Carolina
 SC - South Carolina
 GA - Georgia

Pennsylvania Representatives

P1 - Sitgreaves
 P2 - Thomas
 P3 - Kittera
 P4 - Hartley
 P5 - Chapman
 P6 - Hanna
 P7 - Findley
 P8 - Gallatin
 P9 - Bard
 P10 - Gregg
 P11 - Hiestler
 P12 - McClenachan




Figure 7. Roll Call Analysis of Fifth Congress

State Designators

NH - New Hampshire
 VT - Vermont
 CN - Connecticut
 MA - Massachusetts
 RI - Rhode Island
 NY - New York
 NJ - New Jersey
 DE - Delaware

MD - Maryland
 KY - Kentucky
 TN - Tennessee
 VA - Virginia
 NC - North Carolina
 SC - South Carolina
 GA - Georgia

Pennsylvania Representatives

P1 - Sitgreaves
 P2 - Thomas
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P7 - Findley
 P8 - Callatin
 P9 - Bard
 P10 - Gregg
 P11 - Hiester
 P12 - McClenachan




Figure 7. Continued

State Designators

NH - New Hampshire
 VT - Vermont
 CN - Connecticut
 MA - Massachusetts
 RI - Rhode Island
 NY - New York
 NJ - New Jersey
 DE - Delaware

MD - Maryland
 KY - Kentucky
 TN - Tennessee
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 P10 - Gregg
 P11 - Hiester
 P12 - McClenahan




Figure 7. Continued

State Designators

NH - New Hampshire
 VT - Vermont
 CN - Connecticut
 MA - Massachusetts
 RI - Rhode Island
 NY - New York
 NJ - New Jersey
 DE - Delaware

MD - Maryland
 KY - Kentucky
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 P6 - Hanna
 P7 - Findley
 P8 - Callatin
 P9 - Bard
 P10 - Gregg
 P11 - Hiester
 P12 - McClenachan

DEMOCRATIC-
 REPUBLICANS




Figure 7. Continued

calls so they do not appear on the scale. George Ege retired to become a judge and was replaced by Joseph Hiester, a Democratic-Republican. Ege did not scale but Hiester did. Robert Brown, a Democratic-Republican replaced Sitgreaves late in the term. Sitgreaves scaled, but Brown did not.

The scale positions of the 12 Pennsylvania representatives were indicative of the high level of party commitment within the delegation and are what would be expected given the party labels under which the candidates ran for office. Again within the strong Federalist group were the incumbents Hartley, Sitgreaves, Kittera, and Thomas. They voted in favor of the administration on 94 percent or more of the roll calls. The only other Pennsylvanian who voted with the administration was Chapman who was located amid the group of six moderate Federalists. The main issues which separated the moderate Federalist Chapman from the four strong Pennsylvania Federalists, as indicated by roll calls 10 through 43 (see Table XX in Appendix A for a detailed explanation of these roll calls), concerned trade restrictions and war preparations against France and increases in various taxes or duties. However, Chapman still supported the administration on approximately 70 percent of the roll calls.

As expected, the other seven Pennsylvania congressmen were located on the negative side of the scale. Six of the seven Pennsylvanians were in the strong Democratic-Republican bloc as they voted against the administration at least 87 percent of the time. John Hanna, who was the only representative in the moderate Democratic-Republican category, voted against the administration on about 79 percent of the roll calls. The main issues which separated Hanna from his Democratic-Republican

colleagues, as shown by roll calls 114 through 125, dealt with military fortifications and French foreign policy.

Table XIV shows that party polarization was not only prevalent within Congress, but was also present in several states as they had people in both parties. However, sectionalism persisted. The New England states were strongly Federalist and the southern states were strongly Democratic-Republican. It was the middle states, particularly Pennsylvania and New York, which had the most balanced delegations. Table XIV indicates that the two parties were fairly evenly balanced. Of the 88 men who took strong party stands, 45 were Federalists and 43 were Democratic-Republicans. There were only eight men who took a moderate stance and only three men failed to make a party commitment and were therefore in the middle bloc.

Roll Calls on the Alien and Sedition Acts in the Fifth Congress

The debates and votes on the roll calls concerned with the Alien, Sedition, and Naturalization Acts in the Fifth Congress were another example of the Court-Country conflict between the two parties. This was especially true in Pennsylvania where the Democratic-Republicans sought to naturalize as many immigrants as possible, particularly the Irish, for political purposes. A major source of Democratic-Republican electoral strength in Philadelphia and the surrounding areas after 1790 was provided by foreign born votes. As Samuel E. Morison has stated: "By 1798 the alliance between the native democracy and the Irish vote, which has endured to this day, was already cemented."³³ It has been estimated that the population of

TABLE XIV
 PARTY COMMITMENT IN THE FIFTH CONGRESS

	Federalists	Moderate Federalists	Middle	Moderate Democratic- Republicans	Democratic- Republicans
New Hampshire	4				
Vermont	1				1
Massachusetts	10	1			2
Connecticut	7				
Rhode Island	1	1			
New York	5	1			4
Pennsylvania	4	1		1	6
New Jersey	4				
Delaware	1				
Maryland	3	2	2		1
Kentucky					2
Tennessee					1
Virginia	3		1		14
North Carolina		1			8
South Carolina	2				2
Georgia	—	—	—	—	2
TOTAL	45	7	3	1	43

Philadelphia and its suburbs grew by approximately 13,240 immigrants between 1790 and 1800, including about 7,415 Irishmen. The number of aliens naturalized in Philadelphia between 1790 and 1800 was 1,856. Of this total, 1,019 were Irish. A large number of these new voters were skillfully recruited by leaders of the Democratic-Republicans, particularly Blair McClenachan, Michael Leib, John Beckley, John Swanwick, and William Duane. Furthermore, some Democratic-Republican merchants helped immigrants to pay their taxes in order to cultivate their vote.³⁴

Even before the rise of the quasi-war with France and the implementation of the Alien and Sedition Acts, and as a prelude to them, the Pennsylvania Federalists made some attempts to control the alien population in Philadelphia. Just before the 1796 elections in Pennsylvania, William Rawle, the Federalist United States District Attorney for Philadelphia, and Jared Ingersall, the Federalist Attorney-General for Pennsylvania, moved to limit the access of naturalized citizens to vote. Although it was estimated that more than 300 Philadelphians were disenfranchised by Federalist election judges due to the Attorneys' restricting regulations, the Democratic-Republicans, as shown above, won a majority of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation and captured 14 of the 15 presidential electors. In the next legislative session the Federalists passed a bill to disenfranchise anyone considered an alien under the Naturalization Act of 1795 or who was unable to prove he was a citizen. However, Governor Mifflin vetoed the bill. Given the results of the 1796 election the hostile attitude of the Pennsylvania Federalists towards aliens was understandable. In Southwark, an Irish dominated suburb of

Philadelphia, the Democratic-Republicans captured 91 percent of the ballots cast in the 1796 election.³⁵

The heavy urban immigrant vote, particularly Irish, for the Democratic-Republicans in 1796 indicated to the Federalists that some legislative measures were needed to limit the influx of aliens or to disenfranchise for a longer period of time those who did arrive. Shortly after the failure to disenfranchise aliens in Pennsylvania, the attack against them began in the House of Representatives. The Federalists openly admitted their fears of an alliance between the Democratic-Republicans and the aliens. The Federalists proposed a tax of 20 dollars on certificates of naturalization, a large sum for most immigrants. Harrison Gray Otis from Massachusetts, in his "Wild Irish" speech, acknowledged the restrictive nature of the proposal and defended its goals.³⁶ Otis maintained that the country should not invite "hordes of wild Irishmen, nor the turbulent and disorderly of all parts of the world, to come here with a view to disturb our tranquility, after having succeeded in the overthrow of their own Governments."³⁷ Otis also wrote home that, "If some means are not attempted to prevent the indiscriminate admission of wild Irishmen and others to right of suffrage, there will soon be an end to liberty and property."³⁸ Although this Federalist attempt to control aliens was not successful, the attack had only just begun. And with the passage of the Naturalization, Alien, and Sedition Acts the next year, the Federalists' Court ideology appeared to be in the ascendency.

The Naturalization, Sedition, and Alien Acts were passed in June and July of 1798 amid the war hysteria against France. These acts have been covered extensively by historians and will only be briefly

outlined here.³⁹ In April of 1798 Joshua Coit, a Federalist from Connecticut, proposed that the Naturalization Act of 1795 be amended or suspended due to the poor relations between the United States and France. Two days later the Pennsylvania Federalist Sitgreaves recommended that a law regulating aliens might also be considered and reported on. Sitgreaves also suggested that the residence requirement for naturalization should be extended "to prevent them from even becoming citizens."⁴⁰ By July 14, four new acts had been passed carrying into effect these ideas on naturalization and alien control, along with a law on domestic sedition. The Naturalization Act increased the residency requirement from five to 14 years. The Alien Friends Act gave the President power to deport aliens who were dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. The Alien Enemies Act gave the President power to arrest and deport citizens of a hostile nation. The Sedition Act made it a crime to oppose legal measures of the government or to print any scandalous or malicious writing against the government.⁴¹

In passing these laws the Court-minded Federalists made it obvious that they associated opposition to the administration with opposition to government. The Federalists equated resistance to their policies with treason. One Federalist representative from Connecticut, John Allen, even referred to Albert Gallatin as a "foreign agent" during congressional debate. As stated by Manning Dauer, "these laws were a manifestation of the Federalist belief that they alone were fit to rule, and a resentment of all criticism of their policy." The Country-minded Democratic-Republicans had reason to believe that the Federalists were transforming the Constitution and the liberties of

1776 into the oppressive British system which they had fought against. Parts of the Alien and Sedition Acts were patterned after the British legislation and common law.⁴³

The Democratic-Republicans opposed the Federalist Alien and Sedition Acts both politically and ideologically. They believed that the government rested on the people and public opinion. The government was instituted to carry out the will of the people not to subdue and control their will. Many Democratic-Republicans considered the laws a federal usurpation of powers that belonged to the states. They believed that Federalists had violated the Constitution. Gallatin maintained that the Federalists had attacked the basis of government by making criticism of the rulers and their policies a criminal offense. Without a means to express popular opinion, which depended on a free press, republican government was not possible.⁴⁴ In the words of Lance Banning:

Just as the Alien Act was the ultimate expression of the Federalists' habit of bending the Constitution in the direction of uncheckable executive power, so the Sedition Law was the conclusive demonstration of their lack of confidence in the people and their irreducible enmity to a representative regime.⁴⁵

The Democratic-Republicans believed that the Alien and Sedition Acts were an example of British repression which could be traced back to the time of the Revolution. One opponent wrote that the Alien and Sedition laws "originated in a funding system and were perfected in a British treaty, the supporters of the one having been the uniform advocates of the other."⁴⁶ Another critic, who signed himself "A Countryman," maintained that the Federalist party was trying to enslave the people in an alliance with Great Britain,

. . . which would destroy the true principles of republicanism. They have endeavored to create as many salary men as possible, increasing foreign ministers, building a navy, and extending the power of the executive, the next thing in view will be to raise a standing army.⁴⁷

Although the Federalists managed to pass the Alien and Sedition Acts, the laws contributed to their defeat in 1800.

Similar to the analysis of the 143 roll calls for all of the Fifth Congress, an analysis of the 23 votes on the Naturalization, Alien, and Sedition Acts indicates two cohesive voting blocs (see Table XV). All but four representatives out of the 94 who scaled voted either for or against the roll calls at least 70 percent of the time. Only two men, Mathews of Maryland and Machir of Virginia, occupied the middle ground between the two parties. Of the remaining 92 men, 82 of them fell into the strong Federalist or strong Democratic-Republican categories which left but 10 moderates.

Table XVI indicates the continuing polarization within many state delegations. However, some sectional voting still remained, as the New England states favored the Federalist party while the southern states supported the Democratic-Republicans. Only three states, Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, have no Federalists listed, and in each case only one person from each of these states is on the scale. Six states (New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Delaware) have no Democratic-Republicans listed. Of these six states Vermont and Delaware had only one representative who scaled. The middle states, particularly Pennsylvania and New York, continued to be the delegations which were the most balanced.

Tables XV and XVI indicate the usual polarization within the Pennsylvania delegation. The five Pennsylvania Federalists (Kittera,

TABLE XV

SCALE OF ROLL CALLS ON THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS IN THE FIFTH CONGRESS

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3
Foster, A.	NH	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Foster, D.	MA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Parker, I.	MA	+	+	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thacher	MA	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Wadsworth	MA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Griswold	CN	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Van Alen	NY	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kittera	PA	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	0	0	0
Rutledge	SC	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sprague	NH	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Edmond	CN	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Goodrich	CN	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Waln	PA	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Hindman	MD	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Morris	VT	0	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+
Otis	MA	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Champlin	RI	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+
Williams, J.	NY	0	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Imlay	NJ	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gordon	NH	-	+	-	+	+	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Reed	MA	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sewall	MA	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Shepard	MA	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dana	CN	-	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, N.	CN	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hosmer	NY	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thomas	PA	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Schureman	NJ	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sinnickson	NJ	0	-	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thomson	NJ	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+
Pinckney	SC	0	-	-	+	+	0	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Freeman, J.	NH	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bullock	MA	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	+
Lyman	MA	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	+
Allen	CN	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	0
Brace	CN	0	-	+	-	+	0	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+

TABLE XV (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	2	2	2	
Brooks	NY	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Cochran	NY	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Glen	NY	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Chapman	PA	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Bayard	DE	0	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	
Craik	MD	-	-	+	-	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Bartlett	MA	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Tillinghast	RI	-	-	-	-	0	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Hartley	PA	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Baer	MD	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	
Evans	VA	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Harper	SC	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Grove	NC	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	
Mathews	MD	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Machir	VA	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	+	-	0	+	+	0	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	
Dent	MD	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	
Parker, J.	VA	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	0	-	+	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	
Spaight	NC	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	+	-	0	+	-	+	-	+	
Davis	KY	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	0	+	0	-	-	0	+	0	+	0	+	
Smith, S.	MD	-	-	-	+	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	+	+	-	0	-	-	+	-	0	-	0	
Williams, R.	NC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	+	
Skinner	MA	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	-	0	-	0	-	0	+	
Livingston	NY	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	
Brown	PA	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	+	-	+	-	-	0	-	+	-	-	-	
Hanna	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	
Brent	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	0	-	0	-	0	0	0	0	
Claiborne, T.	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	
Clay	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
Harrison	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
McDowell	NC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	

TABLE XV (Continued)

Representatives	State	Roll Calls																						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3
Varnum	MA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Gregg	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Hiester	PA	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Dawson	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Holmes	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Jones	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+
Trigg, J.	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	+
Baldwin	GA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	+
Elmendorf	NY	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	0	-	-
Havens	NY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Bard	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Findley	PA	0	-	-	-	0	0	-	0	0	-	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	0	-
Gallatin	PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
McClenachan	PA	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sprigg	MD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Claiborne, W.	TN	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clopton	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eggleston	VA	0	-	-	-	0	0	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
New	VA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nicholas	VA	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trigg, A.	VA	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
Venable	VA	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blount	NC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gillespie	NC	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-
Locke	NC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Macon	NC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Stanford	NC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Smith, W.	SC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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- Roll Call #1--To amend S. 31, an addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the U.S., to provide that the jury shall be judge of the law as well as the fact--No is a positive vote--9 July 1798--Y=67 N=15
- Roll Call #2--To refer to the Committee of the Whole a petition from Amelia County, Virginia, complaining against the British Treaty and the Alien and Sedition Acts--No is a positive vote--30 January 1799--Y=73 N=20
- Roll Call #3--To amend H.R. 141, a bill against usurpation of executive authority, to provide that it shall not abridge the right of a citizen to apply to a foreign government for justice--No is a positive vote--16 January 1799--Y=69 N=27

TABLE XV (Continued)

Roll Call	#4--To amend H.R. 141 to include any officer or agent of the U.S. government as well as any citizen--No is a positive vote--16 January 1799--Y=61 N=35
Roll Call	#5--To recommit H.R. 141 to a select committee with instructions to modify the bill--No is a positive vote--11 January 1799--Y=49 N=44
Roll Call	#6--To amend S. 31 by eliminated the clause which would punish anyone who writes, prints, speaks or threatens an officer or person in public trust--No is a positive vote--9 July 1798--Y=43 N=39
Roll Call	#7--To recommit H.R. 94, to secure or remove aliens from the U.S., to committee--No is a positive vote--23 May 1798--Y=46 N=44
Roll Call	#8--To refer to the Committee of the Whole a petition from a number of aliens, natives of Ireland, praying for a repeal of the alien laws--12 February 1799--Y=51 N=48
Roll Call	#9--To amend the resolution to print 20,000 copies of the alien laws, to provide that the Constitution shall be printed with said laws--No is a positive vote--14 December 1798--Y=35 N=41
Roll Call	#10--To pass S. 31 (see #3 above)--10 July 1798--Y=44 N=41
Roll Call	#11--To pass the resolution that it is expedient to repeal an act concerning aliens--25 February 1799--Y=52 N=48
Roll Call	#12--To pass the resolution that it is inexpedient to repeal the act concerning sedition--24 February 1799--Y=52 N=48
Roll Call	#13--To pass S.24 to secure or remove aliens from the U.S.--21 June 1798--Y=46 N=40
Roll Call	#14--To amend H.R. 141 to prevent this law from reaching individuals in their attempts to obtain justice from a foreign government--No is a positive vote--9 January 1799--Y=37 N=48
Roll Call	#15--To pass the printing resolution--No is a positive vote--14 December 1798--Y=34 N=45
Roll Call	#16--To amend H.R. 141 so as to confine the operation of the bill until March 3, 1800--No is a positive vote--16 January 1799--Y=41 N=56
Roll Call	#17--To amend the printing resolution so as to have printed all amendments of the Constitution--No is a positive vote--14 December 1798--Y=32 N=45
Roll Call	#18--To amend H.R. 141 to make guilty any person with "intent to defeat or impede the amicable adjustment of said disputes"--No is a positive vote--9 January 1799--Y=35 N=51
Roll Call	#19--To amend H.R. 141 by making the law apply to any person having intent to usurp the authority of the government by meddling in any dispute or negotiation between the U.S. and a foreign nation--No is a positive vote--16 January 1799--Y=39 N=57
Roll Call	#20--To reject S. 31 (see #3 above)--No is a positive vote--5 July 1798--Y=36 N=47

TABLE XV (Continued)

-
- Roll Call #21--To pass H.R. 141 (see #8 above)--17 January 1799--Y=58
N=36
- Roll Call #22--To amend the printing resolution by enumerating several
clauses and articles to the Constitution to be printed
with said laws--No is a positive vote--14 December 1798--
Y=29 N=47
- Roll Call #23--To pass the resolution to appoint a committee to consider
the propriety of amending the act for the punishment of
certain crimes against the United States, so as to provide
a penalty for any citizen who shall usurp the executive
authority--28 December 1798--Y=65 N=23

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which is
supportive of the Alien and Sedition laws.

TABLE XVI
 PARTY COMMITMENT ON THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ROLL CALLS

	Federalists	Moderate Federalists	Middle	Moderate Democratic- Republicans	Democratic- Republicans
New Hampshire	4				
Vermont	1				
Massachusetts	10				2
Connecticut	7				
Rhode Island	1	1			
New York	6				3
Pennsylvania	4	1			8
New Jersey	4				
Delaware	1				
Maryland	2	2	1	1	2
Kentucky					1
Tennessee					1
Virginia		1	1	1	14
North Carolina		1		1	7
South Carolina	2	1			1
Georgia					1
TOTAL	42	7	2	3	40

TABLE XVII
 PARTY COMMITMENT IN THE SIXTH CONGRESS

	Federalists	Moderate Federalists	Middle	Moderate Democratic- Republicans	Democratic- Republicans
New Hampshire	3				
Vermont	1				1
Massachusetts	10				2
Connecticut	7				
Rhode Island	2				
New York	4				6
Pennsylvania	4				8
New Jersey	2				3
Delaware	1				
Maryland	4			2	2
Kentucky					2
Tennessee					1
Virginia	4	1		1	12
North Carolina	1	3		1	5
South Carolina	3	2			1
Georgia					2
TOTAL	46	6	0	4	45

Waln, Thomas, Chapman, and Hartley) supported the votes on the Alien and Sedition Acts at least 78 percent of the time. All eight of the remaining Pennsylvania delegates are in the strong Democratic-Republican category as they voted negatively on the Alien and Sedition Acts at least 87 percent of the time. Brown had replaced the Federalist Sitgreaves who retired earlier in the session.

Pennsylvania Congressional Elections of 1798

On the national level the Democratic-Republican party lost ground in the congressional elections of 1798. This Federalist victory was due mostly to the war hysteria and XYZ affair with France which hurt the Democratic-Republicans in many areas, including the South. In Pennsylvania, however, the Democratic-Republicans actually increased their strength. In the Fifth Congress there were seven Democratic-Republicans and six Federalists, but in the Sixth Congress there were eight Democratic-Republicans and five Federalists. Pennsylvania's resistance to the Federalist upsurge was not so much because of the Alien and Sedition Acts, which were protested by many, but because of the passage of excise and land taxes by the Federalists. The Democratic-Republicans used the hatred of the land tax and the threatened loss of property to very good advantage in their 1798 campaign. This tactic was particularly effective in many of the heavily German areas which had normally voted for the Federalist party. In fact, the German consternation over the land tax helped lead to the Fries Rebellion the next year.⁴⁸

Eight of the 13 men elected in the Pennsylvania congressional election of 1798 were incumbents, four from each party. The biennial

favorites Hartley and Kittera were easily re-elected from the solidly Federalist counties of York and Lancaster respectively. This was the sixth straight victory for Hartley and the fifth for Kittera. Richard Thomas was likewise returned from district three, which was comprised of the counties of Chester and Delaware, another preponderantly Federalist area. The other Federalist incumbent was Robert Waln from the first district of the city of Philadelphia, for the Democratic-Republicans could not find a strong candidate to run against Waln after the death of Swanwick. The eventual Democratic-Republican candidate was Samuel Miles, a former Federalist who had been one of the 14 Pennsylvania presidential electors for Jefferson in 1796. The Federalists captured Philadelphia in 1798 for several reasons. A severe outbreak of yellow fever kept voter participation to a minimum as well as causing the death of the leading Democratic-Republican editor Benjamin F. Bache. The Federalists blamed the French crisis and XYZ affair on the Democratic-Republicans. An economic recession also helped the Federalist cause, as they blamed the hard times on the Democratic-Republicans and the French raids on American commerce. Waln won all 12 wards of the city, including the usually strong Democratic-Republican areas of North and South Mulberry. The remaining Federalist elected in 1798 was Henry Woods, a first time congressman from district 10 which was made up of Franklin, Huntington, and Bedford counties.⁴⁹

While the Federalists continued to control Philadelphia and the counties of southeastern Pennsylvania, the Democratic-Republicans maintained their mastery over western Pennsylvania. In district 11, Fayette and Westmoreland Counties, the Democratic-Republican John Smilie

was easily elected to replace the retiring William Findley. However, Findley still had great influence on the election, as General Arthur St. Clair discovered. St. Clair, hoping to run in that district, asked the Federalist Senator James Ross about his chances. Ross replied that it would be almost hopeless to win against Findley and his "sans Culottes." Ross said that there was a "small but firm Federal party" in Fayette County but in Westmoreland County there was "no such thing as a Federal party."⁵⁰ The Federalists believed they had a good chance to defeat the incumbent Gallatin in district 12, comprised of the counties of Allegheny and Washington, especially since Gallatin did not even live in the district. Furthermore, given the anti-French feeling of the period, the Federalists attacked the Swiss born, French speaking Gallatin as a French sympathizer. In August the Federalists met to nominate "a suitable character free from foreign influence."⁵² After some bickering, the Federalists chose John Woods to run against Gallatin for the third consecutive time. To the Federalists chagrin, Woods again lost to Gallatin, by even a greater margin than in 1796.⁵²

The incumbent Democratic-Republicans Andrew Gregg and John Hanna were returned with little difficulty from districts six and nine in mid-western Pennsylvania. Gregg was re-elected for the fifth straight time and Hanna for his second. A more interesting race was held in district five which included the counties of Berks and Luzerne, northwest of Philadelphia. The Democratic-Republicans ran Joseph Hiester who had replaced the Federalist George Ege after the latter's resignation. Since Berks County was heavily German, the Federalists decided to run Daniel Clymer, who like Hiester was of German ancestry. The campaign was largely based on ethnic politics, with the

Democratic-Republicans using that tactic with greater skill than their opponents. With the aid of Jacob Schneider, editor of the German newspaper Readinger Adler, the Democratic-Republicans formed a political club to support Hiester. Schneider maintained that the best way for the Germans to uphold their liberties and to ensure that the English and Irish did not control the county was to support Hiester and the Democratic-Republican party. On the other hand, he claimed that the Federalists were planning a counter-revolution aimed at taking away their land, the first step of which had been the onerous land tax of 1798. Hiester had voted against it, he reminded the electorate. In the October election almost 70 percent of the eligible voters came out to defend their property. Hiester, of course, won a smashing victory.⁵³

The congressional election in the heavily German fourth district, which included the counties of Bucks, Montgomery, and Northampton, was even more important because two representatives were to be chosen from there. The Federalists had won both of these seats in the 1796 election to the Fifth Congress. The two Federalist candidates were John Chapman, a Quaker, and Jacob Eyerle, a Moravian. Chapman was an incumbent and Eyerle was chosen to replace Sitgreaves who had resigned late in the Fifth Congress. The Democratic-Republican candidates were both Revolutionary War heroes, as opposed to the pacifist candidates of the Federalists. One was Robert Brown, a Presbyterian who had finished out the term of Sitgreaves. The other Democratic-Republican candidate was the popular German General Peter Muhlenberg who had served in the First and Third Congresses. The campaign was almost a rerun of the old rivalries during the American Revolution between the peace sects and the German church people. Many areas of the district

were designated by inhabitants as either Whig or Tory depending upon which group tended to dominate. The Democratic-Republicans used the fear of the land tax to arouse the voters against the Federalists. Blair McClenachan from Philadelphia spent several weeks in the district spreading rumors about the tax and the Federalists' intentions. He warned that more taxes would be forthcoming if the Federalists were not defeated. Although complete election returns from the district are not available, both Democratic-Republican candidates were elected.⁵⁴

Although the Democratic-Republicans lost the city of Philadelphia, they did manage to retain their seat in Philadelphia County. The incumbent McClenachan decided not to run but instead helped to organize the Democratic-Republican campaign in Philadelphia and the surrounding districts. In his place the party chose Michael Leib, another party organizer at the grass roots level. The Federalists chose the wealthy Quaker Anthony Morris, a former state senator. The results were closer than the previous Democratic-Republican victory in 1796 largely because of Federalist efforts to screen out immigrant voters in the Irish dominated Southwark district. However, Leib managed to win by attracting over 70 percent of the votes in the German dominated Northern Liberties area.⁵⁵

Analysis of Sixth Congress Roll Calls

The roll calls in the Sixth Congress reveal the culmination of the ideological battles and party disputes of the earlier congresses. In the Sixth Congress there was no middle ground as all congressmen had chosen to vote with one party or the other. In fact, there were even very few moderates in either party. As shown in Figure 8 (and in

State Designators

Pennsylvania Representatives

NH = New Hampshire
 VT = Vermont
 CN = Connecticut
 MA = Massachusetts
 RI = Rhode Island
 NY = New York
 NJ = New Jersey
 DE = Delaware

MD = Maryland
 KY = Kentucky
 TN = Tennessee
 VA = Virginia
 NC = North Carolina
 SC = South Carolina
 GA = Georgia

P1 = Woods
 P2 = Thomas
 P3 = Waln
 P4 = Kittera
 P5 = Gregg
 P6 = Hanna

P7 = Callatin
 P8 = Hiester
 P9 = Muhlenberg, P.
 P10 = Brown, R.
 P11 = Leib
 P12 = Smilie




Figure 8. Continued

State Designators

NH = New Hampshire
 VT = Vermont
 CN = Connecticut
 MA = Massachusetts
 RI = Rhode Island
 NY = New York
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MD = Maryland
 KY = Kentucky
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Pennsylvania Representatives

P1 = Woods
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 P6 = Hanna

P7 = Gallatin
 P8 = Hiester
 P9 = Muhlenberg, P.
 P10 = Brown, R.
 P11 = Leib
 P12 = Smilie

DEMOCRATIC-
 REPUBLICANS




Figure 8. Continued

Table XXI in Appendix A), there were only six men in the moderate Federalist group and only four men in the moderate Democratic-Republican category. All the other 91 men were in either the strong Federalist or strong Democratic-Republican blocs. Thus of the 101 members who scaled in the Sixth Congress, 91 of them made a strong party commitment. And like the Fifth Congress, 92 percent (88 out of 96) of the roll calls scale against each other.

Of the 46 men in the strong Federalist group, the least committed member, Page of Virginia, still voted for the policies of the Federalist party 84 percent of the time. Conversely, the least committed strong Democratic-Republicans, Alston of North Carolina and Taliaferro of Georgia, still supported their party 83 percent of the time. Thus, 90 percent of the congressmen in the Sixth Congress were supporting their party over 80 percent of the time.

Table XVII shows that party polarization within states was still prevalent as nine of the 16 states had men in both parties. And two of the other states, Delaware and Tennessee, had only one representative each and so no division was possible. The remaining states without any Democratic-Republicans were New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island in New England while Kentucky and Georgia in the South had no Federalists. Thus, while New England remained strongly Federalist and the South strongly Democratic-Republican, the middle states continued to be much more balanced. However, there were some significant changes from the previous Congress, particularly in the South and New Jersey. In the Fifth Congress North Carolina had only one moderate Federalist and eight Democratic-Republicans. However, in the Sixth Congress North Carolina had four Federalists and six Democratic-Republicans.

Virginia also increased its Federalist representation, as there were five Federalists in the Sixth Congress as opposed to three in the Fifth. South Carolina, which had only two Federalists in the Fifth Congress, increased the number to five in the Sixth. The New Jersey delegation changed its composition from four Federalists and no Democratic-Republicans to two Federalists and three Democratic-Republicans.

The increase in Federalist strength in the South can be seen by comparing the party commitment tables in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Congresses. Table XI for the Fourth Congress shows only two Federalists from states south of Maryland. In the Fifth Congress, as shown on Table XIV, there were six Federalist representatives from states south of Maryland. However, on Table XVII in the Sixth Congress, the number of Federalists had increased to 14. On the other hand, the Democratic-Republican party was still very weak in New England. Table XVII shows only three Democratic-Republicans from states north of New York.

As shown on Figure 8 (and on Table XXI in Appendix A), the Pennsylvania delegation was polarized as usual. Only 12 of the 13 Pennsylvania representatives scaled in the Sixth Congress, four Federalists and eight Democratic-Republicans. The Federalist Hartley resigned his seat because of ill health before his term expired. Consequently neither he nor his replacement, the Democratic-Republican John Stewart, are on the scale because they voted on less than half of the roll calls. The party positions of the 12 Pennsylvanians were to be expected given the results of the 1798 election. The four Federalists were among the strong Federalist bloc and voted with the administration at least 86 percent of the time. Conversely, the eight

Democratic-Republicans were in the strong Democratic-Republican bloc and voted against the administration at least 90 percent of the time.

Conclusion

The last three congressional elections in Pennsylvania in the 1790's indicated that parties were becoming increasingly involved in electoral maneuvering. The use of newspapers, handbills, and correspondence for party propaganda during the campaigns was widespread. Candidates were being nominated and elected by party labels. And an analysis of the tables showing party commitment in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Congresses indicates that the development of parties began earlier and was more consistent in Pennsylvania than in most other states. Party organization, particularly for the Democratic-Republicans, was becoming commonplace. And even some of the party organizers, such as Blair McClenachan and Michael Leib were themselves elected to office. It was the more flexible style and ability of the Democratic-Republican party to attract diverse ethnic and social groups in different areas of the state which helped lead to their victories at the polls and their eventual defeat of the Federalists in the election of 1800. The Democratic-Republicans had learned much from the failure of the earlier Constitutionalist party. The Democratic-Republican organizers realized that in order to win elections it was often necessary to form coalitions of various ethnic or social groups. This was particularly true in the Philadelphia area where there was a heterogeneous population. While the Democratic-Republicans did not deny the existence of religious and ethnic differences (in fact they often used them to their advantage), they put more emphasis on the rights of all people to liberty and

equality. The result of this strategy was that instead of meeting the needs of one group only, they could stress policies and issues that affected all citizens. Thus, rather than being unresponsive to the diversity of the Pennsylvania electorate, as the Constitutionals had been, the Democratic-Republicans took advantage of that diversity.⁵⁶

The Democratic-Republicans also eventually won the political battle against the Federalists because their Country philosophy attracted more support than the Court policies of the Federalists. As the Constitutionals had done in the 1780's, the Federalists antagonized several groups by forcing such issues as the attack on the Democratic Societies, the Jay Treaty, the excise and land taxes, and the Alien and Sedition Acts. In each case the Democratic-Republicans exploited the disenchantment of the victims of Federalist policy and thereby helped to strengthen their own party. A good example was seen by the land tax which was particularly upsetting to the Germans. As a result several areas which had previously voted for the Federalists became supporters of the Democratic-Republicans. Consequently, Blair McClenachan not only campaigned by spreading propaganda about the tax throughout the German areas surrounding Philadelphia, but he even gave up his seat in Congress so the German candidate Leib, who won because of the German vote, could replace him.

Whether accurately or not, the Democratic-Republicans believed that the Federalist Court-oriented party would establish policies that could destroy their ideals of American liberty. Since many of the Federalist measures in the 1790's were seen as oppressive by a large part of the electorate, the Democratic-Republican party gained supporters because of their criticism of those policies. These

attacks by the Democratic-Republicans against Federalist measures

. . . appealed to the deepest fears and the highest aspirations in Anglo-American political thought. They appealed, at once, to the hesitations of agrarian conservatives as they experienced the stirrings of a more commercial age, to the desires of rising men who felt excluded by monopolists of privilege, and to a democratic people's confidence in itself.⁵⁷

Thus, the "Revolution of 1800," at least in Pennsylvania, can be seen as a victory for the Country in the continuing Court-Country conflict which had roots in the battles between the Constitutionalist and Republicans during the Revolutionary period. And it was perceived as such then as Thomas Jefferson himself stated that it was "as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its form."⁵⁸

ENDNOTES

¹Miller, Federalist City, p. 57; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 138-139.

²Ibid.; Parsons, United States Congressional Districts, pp. 58-61.

³Minutes of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, 12 June 1794, HSP; Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," pp. 482-483; Miller, Federalist City, pp. 62-63.

⁴Ibid., p. 62; William B. Wheeler, "Urban Politics in Nature's Republic: The Development of Political Parties in the Seaport Cities in the Federalist Era" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1967), p. 89; Ethel Rasmusson, "Capital of the Delaware: The Philadelphia Upperclass in Transition, 1789-1801" (Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1962), pp. 99-102; Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," p. 499.

⁵"T.T", "Gazette of the United States, 11 October 1794.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 148-150; Miller, Federalist City, p. 63.

⁹Mary Meredith to David Meredith, 6 December 1794, Meredith Papers, HSP.

¹⁰Philadelphia Gazette, 5 November 1794; Wheeler, "Urban Politics," p. 90.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 90-92; Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," pp. 504-506; Miller, Federalist City, pp. 65-66.

¹²American Daily Advertiser, 8, 13 October 1794; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 151-155; Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," pp. 506-507.

¹³General Advertiser, 15 August, 4 September 1794; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 139-140; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 37-44; Parson, United States Congressional Districts, p. 58.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 60-61; Walters, Gallatin, p. 84; Russell J. Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1938), pp. 132-134; Barbara C. Wingo, "Politics, Society, and Religion: The Presbyterian Clergy of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, and the Formation of the Nation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1976), pp. 345-436.

¹⁵Parsons, United States Congressional Districts, p. 60; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 37-44.

¹⁶See Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 142, wherein he claims that Hiester, Richards, and Muhlenberg were all Federalists. A look at Figure 5 and/or Table XIX in Appendix A will show that such is not the case.

¹⁷James Madison to James Monroe, 4 December 1794, Madison Papers, LC.

¹⁸Miller, Federalist City, p. 69.

¹⁹For a fuller discussion of the Jay Treaty see: Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); and Samuel F. Bemis, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

²⁰Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution," pp. 366-367.

²¹Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, p. 234.

²²Ibid., p. 341.

²³Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge, 30 November 1795, LC; John Zvesper, Political Philosophy and Rhetoric: A Study of the Origins of American Party Politics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 153.

²⁴Aurora, 8 October 1796; Walters, Dallas, p. 74; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 171, 178.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 175-176; John Beckley to William Irvine, 30 September 1796, Irvine Papers, HSP; Aurora, 8, 17 September, 7, 11 October 1796; Miller, Federalist City, p. 80.

²⁶Ibid.; Gazette of the United States, 5, 6 October 1796; Aurora, 11 August, 7, 11 October 1796; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 177-178; Edward C. Carter, "A Wild Irishman Under Every Federalists Bed: Naturalization in Philadelphia, 1789-1806," PMHB 94 (July 1970): 338.

²⁷Aurora, 6, 10, 11 October 1796; Miller, Federalist City, p. 82; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 161.

- ²⁸ John Beckley to William Irvine, 17 October 1796, Irvine Papers, HSP.
- ²⁹ Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 178-179; Miller, Federalist City, pp. 82-86; Aurora, 13 October 1796; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, p. 161.
- ³⁰ John Beckley to William Irvine, 15 September 1796, Irvine Papers, HSP; Circular, 25 September 1796, Broadside Collection, HSP; John Smith to Tench Coxe, 14 December 1800, Coxe Papers, HSP; Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, pp. 103-106.
- ³¹ Ibid., pp. 98-100; Handbill signed "A Republican," 3 October 1796, Broadside Collection, HSP; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 180-185.
- ³² John Adams to John Quincy Adams, 5 December 1796, as quoted in Miller, Federalist City, p. 90.
- ³³ Samuel E. Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913), p. 107.
- ³⁴ Carter, "A Wild Irishman," pp. 332-342.
- ³⁵ Ibid., pp. 338, 344; Aurora, 7 November 1796; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 181-185.
- ³⁶ Carter, "A Wild Irishman," pp. 333-334; James M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 23-24.
- ³⁷ Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, pp. 107-108; Carter, "A Wild Irishman," p. 334; Smith, Freedom's Fetters, pp. 24-25.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ For a discussion of the Alien and Sedition Acts see: John C. Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951); and Smith, Freedom's Fetters.
- ⁴⁰ Annals, 5th Cong., 2d sess., p. 1572.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 1427, 1453, 3739-3742, 3744-3746, 3753-3754, 3776-3777.
- ⁴² Dauer, The Adams Federalists, p. 153.
- ⁴³ Ibid., pp. 157, 165; Annals, 5th Cong., 2d sess., p. 1483; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, p. 255; Smith, Freedom's Fetters, pp. 419-421.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 418-421; Annals, 5th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 2110, 2139-2145; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, pp. 256-261.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 260-261.

- ⁴⁶"Sidney," Independent Chronicle, 24 September 1798.
- ⁴⁷"A Countryman," Independent Chronicle, 12 February 1799.
- ⁴⁸Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, p. 134.
- ⁴⁹Philadelphia Gazette, 25 August, 18 September 1798; Gazette of the United States, 16 October 1798; Miller, Federalist City, pp. 108-109.
- ⁵⁰James Ross to Arthur St. Clair, 5 July 1798, as cited in W. H. Smith, Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke and Company, 1882), 2: 422-426.
- ⁵¹Pittsburgh Gazette, 21 July 1798, as cited in Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania, p. 145.
- ⁵²American Daily Advertiser, 30 October 1798; Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania, pp. 145-148; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 185-187.
- ⁵³Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 225-226.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 229-233; Aurora, 11, 13 April, 13 December 1799.
- ⁵⁵Gazette of the United States, 10 October 1798; Miller, Federalist City, pp. 106-109; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, pp. 187-188; Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," p. 222.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 254-255.
- ⁵⁷Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, p. 269.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 261, 269, 274; Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, 6 September 1819, Jefferson Papers, LC.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The role that Pennsylvania played in the development of the first American party system in the 1790's was significant. It has been shown that the Pennsylvania congressional delegation polarized more rapidly than other state delegations. This party development occurred as a result of both local and national stimuli. Although Pennsylvania had an excellent opportunity to continue its role as the swing state, which it had effectively done in the Continental Congress and on some occasions in the First Congress, the delegation quickly polarized into two opposing ideological voting groups. This two-party pattern initiated by Pennsylvania gradually evolved in many other state delegations and helped to develop the party system on the national level.

One of the main reasons for Pennsylvania's quick development of partisan voting behavior in the new Federal Congress was their previous experience with political parties within the state. The struggle for political power in Pennsylvania over the revolutionary Constitution of 1776 led to the establishment of the Constitutionalist and Republican parties. The party system within Pennsylvania was strengthened and sharpened by subsequent political, religious, and economic issues which climaxed with the conflict over national and state constitutional reform between 1787 and 1790. The political controversies in Pennsylvania between 1776 and 1790 were so intense that the opposing groups not

only assumed names but also nominated candidates, contested elections, and voted with relatively high cohesion in the legislature.¹

This state party structure, which many thought had died with the beginning of the new government, was quickly revitalized once Congress got under way. Since many of the political struggles and conflicts in the 1790's were a continuation of those in the 1770' and 1780's, it is understandable that the same groups would again align against each other. The percentage of Constitutionlists who became Democratic-Republicans was extremely high. Even such Constitutionlists as Thomas McKean who favored the Federal Constitution generally became Democratic-Republicans once the ideological battles were revived. Although not as high a percentage of Republicans became Federalists, the great majority did so.² As the congressional election results and roll call analyses indicate, many of the same party leaders of the Constitutionlist and Republican party system became party leaders in the Federalist and Democratic-Republican party system of the 1790's. Such leading Constitutionlists as William Findley, Albert Gallatin, John Smilie, Blair McClenachan, Alexander Dallas, James Nicholson, and James Hutchinson were also the backbone of the Democratic-Republican party in Pennsylvania. Likewise, leading Republicans as Robert Morris, Thomas Hartley, Thomas Fitzsimons, John Kittera, George Clymer, James Wilson, Samuel Sitgreaves, and William Bingham became stalwarts of the Federalist party in Pennsylvania.

One of the reasons for Pennsylvania's developing political parties in advance of other states was the cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity of the state. As noted by Paul Goodman, "Demographic change and heterogeneity were sources of differentiation that promoted political competition."³ Settled initially by Quakers, the policies of

religious and social toleration helped Pennsylvania to become the most ethnically mixed and one of the more populous of the colonies. From Germany came many Lutherans and Calvinists as well as members of the German sects such as Moravians, Mennonites, and Dunkers. From England came many Anglicans and Episcopalians. Another numerous ethnic group was the Scotch-Irish, most of whom were Presbyterians. Immigrants from Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, and other countries were also attracted to Pennsylvania. This ethnic diversity led to much political conflict, particularly after the revolutionary upheaval of 1776 when the political control of the English Quakers and Anglicans was overthrown by the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians. Ethnoreligious diversity thus helped lead to the development of the Constitutionalist and Republican party system. This political division continued into the 1790's and was likewise an important facet of the Federalist and Democratic-Republican party system in Pennsylvania. As Goodman has noted, Pennsylvania was a state "with a high degree of social differentiation and social change," and "experienced tensions that weakened habits of deference and generated rivalry which promoted party development."⁴

There were geographical, economic, and occupational as well as ethnoreligious factors which influenced the rise of the two political groupings. As shown by the Constitutionalist and Republican conflict as well as by the congressional election campaigns in the 1790's between the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, certain types of people tended to give their support to one party or the other. The Republicans and later the Federalists tended to receive support from Philadelphia and the surrounding counties in southeastern Pennsylvania.

Those who were attracted to the Republican and Federalist parties were generally more cosmopolitan types such as merchants, large manufacturers, professional men, and commercial farmers. On the other hand, those who were attracted to the Constitutionalist and Democratic-Republican parties were usually men of a more agrarian and localist outlook, particularly farmers and laborers. Because of these particular tendencies there were various geographical areas which normally received the support of one party over the other.

Although there were some anomalies, the basic geographical split in Pennsylvania was between the east and the west. As noted several times in the text, the Susquehanna River was often a geographical dividing line between the two parties. The counties west of the Susquehanna River were strongly Constitutionalist before 1790 and just as supportive of the Democratic-Republicans afterwards. In the first six congressional elections the western counties elected 19 anti-administration and 12 pro-administration candidates. However, in the first two elections mostly Federalists were chosen because of the head start they had due to the ratification of the Federal Constitution of 1787 and the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. After party organization and electioneering reached a fairly high level beginning with the Third Congress, the Democratic-Republicans won 18 out of 25 contests. And of the seven seats which the Federalists won, four of them were in conservative York County (district eight) where Thomas Hartley was returned every two years. And in the far western districts (six, nine, eleven, and twelve) there were no Federalists elected after the Second Congress.

Most of the eastern counties were just as supportive of the Federalists, although there were some areas of Democratic-Republican strength. Philadelphia and the populated counties of southeastern Pennsylvania were the main areas of Federalist support. Except when John Swanwick broke the power of the Philadelphia junto with his appeal to immigrants and laborers, the city of Philadelphia voted for a Federalist in each election. The surrounding counties of Chester, Delaware, and Lancaster (districts three and seven), which were made up largely of English and German farmers, voted consistently for the Federalists. In Philadelphia County, which did not include the city of Philadelphia, the congressional races were often close. But as time went on the Democratic-Republicans organized the suburbs of Northern Liberties and Southwark, where many Irish and German immigrants lived, for their party. North of Philadelphia in districts four and five, where many farmers, both German and Scotch-Irish, lived the congressional contests were generally close until the passage of the land tax which helped insure Democratic-Republican victories.

Another reason for the faster development of parties in Pennsylvania as compared to other states was the fact that the national capital was located in Philadelphia during the 1790's. Philadelphia, the center of Pennsylvania politics, was also the center of national politics until 1800. The adoption of new federal and state constitutions and a new city charter strengthened the Federalists in Philadelphia. The struggle of the Democratic-Republicans in Pennsylvania to win control of Philadelphia was similar to the fight of the Democratic-Republicans to defeat the Federalists on the national level. The organization and growth of the Democratic-Republicans in Pennsylvania was largely

influenced by such Philadelphia party organizers as Alexander Dallas, James Hutchinson, James Beckley, and Michael Leib. The battle of the "outs" against the "ins" in Pennsylvania and Philadelphia was indicative of a more fully developed political system. As noted by Paul Goodman, political parties not only "hastened the decline of deference by legitimizing and institutionalizing competition for the electorate's favor" they also enhanced "the likelihood that challenges might success in ousting established elements."⁵ And since several newspapers were attracted to the national capital to support or oppose administration policies, the party rivalry in Philadelphia was even more intense. The fact that a significant number of important issues in the 1790's were of vital concern to Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, such as the fight over the capital, the Bank of the United States, the Whiskey Rebellion, and as it happened also the Democratic Societies, the Alien and Sedition Acts, funding and assumption, and the land tax, made the state a center of controversy and political activity.

The above mentioned social, cultural, and demographic divisions which led to the early development of political parties in Pennsylvania achieved significant coherence from the Court and Country concepts that had permeated Revolutionary ideology and persisted into the 1790's. The importance of these concepts has been emphasized by John Murrin who stated that, "The Court-Country paradigm heavily colored nearly all participants' perceptions of the issues and personalities of the era."⁶ After the adoption of the Constitution, the Federalists, behind the leadership of Alexander Hamilton, attempted to "duplicate England's Revolution Settlement within minimal republican constraints."⁷ The long list of "repressive" and "corrupt" Court-oriented measures of

the Federalists led their Country-minded opponents to combine in opposition against them. The Democratic-Republicans subsequently attacked the Federalists for subverting the Constitution. It was the fight for control of the government within the framework of that Constitution which led to the development of parties in the 1790's. It is perhaps ironic that while in the 1780's the Constitutionalist party had not accepted opposition and consequently antagonized many ethnic and social groups, that in the 1790's it was the Federalists who played that role. According to Murrin the Federalist Court-oriented policies "alienated every major ethnic minority in the republic within a decade, except the Hudson Valley Dutch and probably the sect Germans of Pennsylvania."⁸ And actually many of the Pennsylvania Germans were alienated by the land taxes passed in 1798.⁹

The Court versus Country differences in Pennsylvania went back at least as far as the Revolutionary era and the development of the Constitutionalist and Republican party system. This Court-Country dichotomy continued on even a stronger basis in the 1790's both in Pennsylvania and on the national level. Although the roll call analysis of the first six congresses shows that sectionalism declined throughout the period, the analysis also demonstrates that New England was supportive of administration policies and more closely attuned to the Court philosophy while the South gave expression to the Country ideology of opposition. The evidence from the roll calls confirms Murrin's conclusion that New England became "the bastion of nationalist Court politics," while the South "became the regional home of Country principles."¹⁰ However, in Pennsylvania both the northern commercial Court-oriented ideology, especially in the Philadelphia area, and the

Southern agrarian Country-oriented philosophy flourished and found expression in Congress. Thus, instead of a continuation of the regional blocs as was prevalent in the Continental Congress and for a short while in the First Congress, Pennsylvania, which had experience with political parties on the state level, led the way toward modern party development. The struggle for political control after ratification of the Federal Constitution was similar to the struggle in Pennsylvania for political control after the constitutions of 1776 and 1790. While Pennsylvania was the most democratic and radical in the Revolutionary period, it was also the democratic leader in the 1790's. The cultural diversity and the experience with political parties in Pennsylvania led them to an acceptance of legitimate opposition and a questioning of deference in advance of other states. Pennsylvania helped to broaden the political process in important ways, particularly by increasing suffrage and leading the way in political organization and electioneering.

As mentioned in the Introduction, there has been some criticism, particularly by Ronald Formisano, of the labeling of the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans in the 1790's, both in Pennsylvania and on the national level, as parties in the "modern" sense. Using Frank Sorauf's definition of party as a "tripartite organization" which includes the party organization, the "party in office," and the "party in the electorate," Formisano claimed that "the early republican era is best viewed as a deferential-participant phase somewhere between traditional forms and mass party politics, having some features of both."¹¹ While this is probably true of the "first party system" as

a whole, the parties in Pennsylvania, and particularly the Democratic-Republicans, came very close to the "modern" concept of party.

Any understanding of the more modern, that is non-deferential or egalitarian, aspects of party which were developed in Pennsylvania in the 1790's must begin with an examination of political activity at least as far back as 1776. While many aspects of the more traditional politics of deference and striving for consensus were evident between 1776 and 1790, and even some vestiges of it in the 1790's, there was an important shift concerning political thinking and processes in Pennsylvania during the Revolutionary period. The radical Constitution of 1776 not only led to the rise of opposing political parties but many of the egalitarian ideas which it contained were incorporated into the Constitution of 1790. This was particularly true of the broad voting franchise, the guarantee of civil liberties, the abolition of qualifications for officeholding, and the reapportionment of the legislature based upon population. The traditional deferential attitudes were also lessened by the ideals and activities of the largely Scotch-Irish Presbyterian Constitutionalists who were newcomers and "outsiders" to the political process in Pennsylvania. Richard Ryerson has persuasively indicated that the democratic achievements in Pennsylvania made other states seem aristocratic in comparison as well as "advancing that political condition to a Jacksonian level 50 years before Jackson."¹²

The Republicans and Constitutionalists in Pennsylvania from 1776 to 1790 met some of the criteria for parties. While party organization was not as advanced as later party systems, there was a high level of party cohesion on roll call votes, party labels were used,

electioneering practiced, and involvement of the electorate was widespread. However, it was also obvious that the Constitutionalist party had not accepted the modern idea of a legitimate opposition as they stubbornly clung to exclusionary policies which weakened them politically. This failure of the Constitutionlists was best exemplified by the controversies over test oaths and the College of Philadelphia. In this regard, the Republicans who accepted diversity were more modern.

Pennsylvania politics became even less deferential and more egalitarian in the 1790's. In addition, there was an inversion concerning the idea of legitimate opposition as the Constitutionlists, now out of power, began to cater to various social and ethnic groups while the Federalists, as successors of the Republicans, began to stifle opposition to their policies. This Federalist attitude was best expressed in their attack on the Democratic Societies and the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts.

In what ways did the political battles between the Pennsylvania Federalists and Democratic-Republicans in the 1790's help to modernize the party system in that state? Even using the tripartite concept of party, as suggested in Formisano's model, the advancement of democratic political processes for Pennsylvanians in the decade of the 1790's was remarkable. The "party in office" or party in the legislature aspect was certainly fulfilled as can be seen by the rapid polarization of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation as depicted on the analyses of roll calls. In addition to this high voting cohesion both parties had a well defined leadership, both in Congress and within the state. As shown by the roll call analysis of the first six congresses, the high level of party voting, which reached a significant level as early

as the Third Congress, indicates that the "party in office" aspect was fairly substantial even for the "first party system" as a whole. By the Sixth Congress, 90 percent of the representatives were supporting one party or the other over 80 percent of the time. This high rate of party cohesion was very rarely reached by later parties, and certainly has not been matched by today's modern parties. Formisano implies that sectionalism and boardinghouse residences, rather than party, was the reason for this high level of voting cohesion. However, it has been shown that sectionalism actually decreased over the span of the first six congresses. And, as noted by John Hoadley, the boardinghouse theory of James Young does not work for the 1790's since in Philadelphia representatives were scattered among a large number of residences with many living alone. Instead, Hoadley suggested that boardinghouse partners voted together because they had already voted as a party in the 1790's in Philadelphia.¹³

The development of party organization on the state level was also notable during the 1790's. In addition to the Constitutionalist party leaders, particularly William Findley, John Smilie, and Blair McClenachan, who continued to organize opposition to the dominant Federalists, several new political organizers were attracted to the Democratic-Republican party in the 1790's. This group of political newcomers, which included such men as James Hutchinson, Alexander Dallas, Michael Leib, and John Swanwick, gave the party a more urban and democratic outlook. These dedicated organizers helped shape the party into a coherent political organization. Furthermore, most of these leaders, because of their own success, were capable of attracting middle class followers from various social and ethnic groups within the

state. The Democratic-Republican organizers used democratic techniques, such as ward and town meetings, parades and patriotic celebrations, and public petitions and newspaper campaigns to manipulate nominations and organize voter support. The result of these activities led to an expanded party leadership and an increase in voter participation. An excellent example of such tactics was the establishment of the Democratic Societies which enabled the Democratic-Republican leadership to express party ideology, make nominations, and increase its following.¹⁴

An even more effective method of increasing political control was the leaders' ability to attract followers from many diverse ethnic and social groups. This attempt to attract voters or the "party in the electorate" was a central reason for the success of the Democratic-Republican party in the 1790's. Each time the Federalists alienated a particular group by their repressive and Court-oriented policies, the organizers of the Democratic-Republican party in Pennsylvania were quick to respond to the needs of the "oppressed." This concentration on pluralistic politics by the Democratic-Republicans made the political process in Pennsylvania more responsive to the state's complex diversity. Party organizers were successful in both urban and rural settings in this regard. James Hutchinson, Alexander Dallas, and John Swanwick were particularly adept at organizing the artisans, mechanics, workers, and immigrants in and around Philadelphia. An example of their success in rural areas was their ability to attract those voters who were disenchanted with the land and excise taxes, especially the Germans in the election of 1798. Democratic-Republican Congressman Blair McClenachan spent eight weeks traveling across heavily German populated Northampton County while alerting the farmers to the Federalist

instituted taxes. Consequently both the Democratic-Republican candidates from the fourth district were elected in the fall congressional elections. In moving towards the modern idea of a mass-based political party the Democratic-Republicans tried to persuade voters to be concerned about civil liberties and governmental policies instead of just ethnic, religious, or local issues.¹⁵

Another way to view the concept of party, as John Hoadley has done, is along a continuum from pre-party politics to a highly institutionalized party system. The four stages of development are factionalism, polarization, expansion, and institutionalization. It is the contention of this study that the Pennsylvania parties between 1776 and 1800, and particularly the Democratic-Republican party in the 1790's, went through the first three stages and into the beginnings of the institutionalization stage. Some of the criteria of this final stage are: existence of a party ideology, party labels, regular means for operating in the electoral process such as nominations, and some type of national organization. From the evidence contained in this study it appears that the Pennsylvania parties in the 1790's met at least some requirements of the first three criteria. That they did not meet the last criterion was largely due to the fact that few other states had advanced as far as they along the continuum of party development. As stated by Hoadley, "The end of this continuum is one which has probably been attained at few points in history and present-day American parties clearly fell short." And while the Pennsylvania parties of the 1790's did not reach the end of the continuum, they were certainly a long way from the beginning of it.

Thus, while Pennsylvania parties may not have met all the requirements for a modern party system, they did represent an advanced development. The existence of a more fully developed two party system in Pennsylvania is also evident from the distinctive behavior of the Pennsylvania delegation in the House of Representatives. There would be less confusion about whether a modern party system did exist in the 1790's, particularly from the standpoint of the "party in office," if all state delegations in Congress had behaved similarly from the outset.

ENDNOTES

¹See Jackson Turner Main, Political Parties Before the Constitution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973); and Wayne L. Bockelman and Owen S. Ireland, "The Internal Revolution in Pennsylvania: An Ethnic-Religious Interpretation," Pennsylvania History 41 (April 1974): 125-129.

²See Bowling, "Politics," pp. 276-277, 345-347; and Main, Political Parties, pp. 432-439.

³Paul Goodman, "The First American Party System," in William N. Chambers and Walter D. Burnham, eds., The American Party System: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 66.

⁴Ibid., p. 65.

⁵Ibid., p. 59.

⁶John M. Murrin, "The Great Inversion, or Court Versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)," in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 421.

⁷Ibid., p. 405.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., pp. 405-406.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 404.

¹¹Formisano, "Deferential-Participant Politics," p. 473. See also Frank J. Sorauf, "Political Parties and Political Analysis," in William N. Chambers and Walter D. Burnham, eds., The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 37-38.

¹²Ryerson, "Republican Theory," p. 133.

¹³Formisano, "Deferential-Participant Politics," pp. 473-478; John F. Hoadley, "The Development of American Political Parties: A Spatial Analysis of Congressional Voting, 1789-1803" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1979), p. 387. See also James S. Young, The Washington Community, 1800-1828 (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1966) which, as the subtitle denotes, dealt only with boardinghouse practices after 1800.

¹⁴Baumann, "Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," pp. 575, 583-585.

¹⁵Keller, "Diversity and Democracy," pp. 231-232, 255.

¹⁶Hoadley, "American Political Parties," pp. 27-29, 386.

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New York, New York

New York Historical Society
Albert Gallatin Papers

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

American Philosophical Society
James Hutchinson Papers
Muhlenberg Family Papers
Benjamin Rush Correspondence
Miscellaneous Manuscripts

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

Tench Coxe Papers
William Irvine Papers
Thomas McKean Papers
Meredith Family Papers
Richard Peters Papers
Jasper Yeates Papers
Broadside Collection
Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, Minutes
Dreer Collection
Gratz Collection
Miscellaneous Papers
Society Collection
Wallace Collection

Library Company of Philadelphia

Benjamin Rush Papers
Manuscript Collection

Washington, D. C.

Library of Congress
Thomas Jefferson Papers

Library of Congress (cont.)

James Madison Papers
 Benjamin Rush Papers
 Shippen Family Papers

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American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
Carlisle Gazette (Carlisle, Pennsylvania).
Federal Gazette (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
Freeman's Journal (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

SCALES OF ROLL CALLS FOR THE THIRD, FOURTH,
FIFTH, AND SIXTH CONGRESSES

TABLE XVIII (Continued)

Roll Call #17--To put the main question on passage of the resolution to prohibit all commercial intercourse between the citizens of the U.S. and Great Britain--No is a positive vote--15 Apr. 1794--Y=53 N=44
Roll Call #18--To postpone until March the resolution concerning privileges and restrictions on the commerce of the U.S. in foreign countries--No is a positive vote--5 Feb. 1794--Y=51 N=47
Roll Call #19--To order third reading of S. 8, a bill for the compensation of the widow and children of Robert Forayth--21 May 1794--Y=37 N=40
Roll Call #20--To reject S. 30, an act to prevent depredations on the Indians South of the Ohio River--No is a positive vote--27 Feb. 1795--Y=43 N=37
Roll Call #21--To amend the resolution to appoint a committee to report the naval force necessary to carry out a treaty with Morocco and establish peace with Algeria; amendment to add "and the ways for defraying the same"--No is a positive vote--2 Jan. 1794--Y=46 N=44
Roll Call #22--To disagree to the Senate amendment to the House resolution for protection of the frontier; amendment provides a bonus of \$20 for any person enlisting--No is a positive vote--7 June 1794--Y=30 N=28
Roll Call #23--To amend the President's message resolution to state that the Wiskey Insurrection had its origin in the four western counties of Pennsylvania--No is a positive vote--27 Nov. 1794--Y=47 N=46
Roll Call #24--To amend the House answer to the President's message concerning the phrase "self created societies"--27 Nov. 1794--Y=47 N=45
Roll Call #25--To pass a resolution that a naval force be provided for the protection of U.S. commerce against Algerine cruisers--21 Feb. 1794--Y=43 N=41
Roll Call #26--To amend the resolution to prevent depredations on certain Indians by providing for the punishment of unauthorized persons found on lands secured to Indians by treaty--No is a positive vote--28 Feb. 1795--Y=40 N=46
Roll Call #27--To amend the public credit resolution by eliminating the duty on tobacco manufactured in the U.S.--No is a positive vote--8 May 1794--Y=41 N=45
Roll Call #28--To amend H.R. 106, a bill to regulate the military establishment, by adding the words "for the protection and security of the U.S. against foreign invasions, and against the Indian tribes"--No is a positive vote--13 Feb. 1795--Y=36 N=44
Roll Call #29--To amend H.R. 110, a bill to make further provision for the public credit, by striking out the phrase "and shall be vested in the commissioners, as property in trust to be applied according to certain provisions, to the redemption of the debt"--No is a positive vote--21 Feb. 1795--Y=39 N=49
Roll Call #30--To pass S. 15 providing authorization for the President to purchase or build vessels to be equipped as galleys--4 June 1794--Y=42 N=32
Roll Call #31--To order engrossment and third reading of H.R. 53, a bill to lay duties on stamped vellum, parchment, and paper--26 May 1794--Y=44 N=35
Roll Call #32--To pass H.R. 14, a bill for the protection of American commerce against Algerine cruisers--10 Mar. 1794--Y=50 N=39
Roll Call #33--To amend the public credit resolution by striking out the 25 cent tax on deeds--No is a positive vote--10 May 1794--Y=30 N=44
Roll Call #34--To consider S. 4, an act for the punishment of certain crimes in the U.S.--31 May 1794--Y=49 N=32
Roll Call #35--To amend the public credit resolution by striking out the resolution to impose stamp duties--No is a positive vote--8 May 1794--Y=35 N=58
Roll Call #36--To pass H.R. 39, a bill to make provision for the payment of the interest on the balances due to certain states--16 May 1794--Y=52 N=33

TABLE XVIII (Continued)

- Roll Call #37--To amend the public credit resolution by striking out the resolution for a specified carriage tax--No is a positive vote--7 May 1794--Y=34 N=53
- Roll Call #38--To pass a resolution concerning an investigation of property losses sustained in the Whiskey Insurrection--19 Dec. 1794--Y=52 N=31
- Roll Call #39--To postpone until next October the third reading of H.R. 39, a bill to make provision for the payment of the interest on the balances due to certain states--No is a positive vote--14 May 1794--Y=33 N=53
- Roll Call #40--To pass H.R. 54, a bill to make compensation for the services of Robert Forsyth--3 June 1794--Y=46 N=26
- Roll Call #41--To disagree to the resolution to appoint a committee to bring in a bill to regulate the pay of militia--15 Dec. 1794--Y=50 N=29
- Roll Call #42--To pass the resolution that Henry Latimer is entitled to a seat in the House from the State of Delaware--14 Feb. 1794--Y=57 N=31
- Roll Call #43--To pass H.R. 50, a bill to lay a duty on manufactured tobacco and refined sugar--No is a positive vote--19 May 1794--Y=31 N=56
- Roll Call #44--To pass the resolution to suspend commercial intercourse with the British West Indies--No is a positive vote--23 May 1794--Y=24 N=46
- Roll Call #45--To pass S. 58, an act laying duties on property sold at auctions--31 May 1794--Y=55 N=27
- Roll Call #46--To amend H.R. 39 by providing "that payment of interest shall cease after 1798, when the balance due will be appropriated for payment of interest and principal due said states"--No is a positive vote--14 May 1794--Y=27 N=60
- Roll Call #47--To amend H.R. 106, a bill for regulating the military by providing for the reduction of troops when there is peace with the Indian tribes--No is a positive vote--13 Feb. 1795--Y=25 N=58
- Roll Call #48--To pass H.R. 55, a bill to lay duties upon carriages--29 May 1794--Y=49 N=22
- Roll Call #49--To amend the public credit resolution by making the duty on tonnage of British vessels twice the duty on all others--No is a positive vote--10 May 1794--Y=24 N=55
- Roll Call #50--To amend the resolution to authorize an Indian treaty by providing for the reimbursement of money and relinquishment of lands bought in Indian Territory--No is a positive vote--30 Jan. 1795--Y=14 N=56

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which generally supports the positive of the administration, i.e., Federalists.

TABLE XIX (Continued)

- Roll Call #15--To order the main question on the amendment to the House reply to the President's address; to strike the words "while we participate in the full reliance you have expressed in the patriotism of our countrymen", and insert "we assure ourselves that your confidence in our citizens will not be disappointed"--15 Dec. 1796--Y=30 N=49
- Roll Call #16--To resolve into the committee of the whole to consider the President's message concerning the Jay Treaty--No is a positive vote--6 Apr. 1796--Y=57 N=36
- Roll Call #17--To amend S. 43, an act to provide a naval armament, by striking out the provision to complete three frigates--No is a positive vote--8 Apr. 1796--Y=55 N=36
- Roll Call #18--To agree to the report to print copies of reports to the President from the Secretaries of State and Treasury--No is a positive vote--17 Jan. 1797--Y=53 N=36
- Roll Call #19--To pass an act to repeal the third section of the bill to fix the military establishment of the U.S.--No is a positive vote--1 Mar. 1797--Y=55 N=36
- Roll Call #20--To reject the bill to raise the salaries of government officers--No is a positive vote--9 Feb. 1797--Y=58 N=38
- Roll Call #21--To agree to the resolution granting the citizens of Tennessee equality with citizens of other states in regard to statehood--No is a positive vote--6 May 1797--Y=43 N=30
- Roll Call #22--To amend the compensation report to grant a 25% salary increase to various public officers--No is a positive vote--27 Jan. 1797--Y=57 N=32
- Roll Call #23--To refer the President's message concerning the Jay Treaty to the committee of the whole--No is a positive vote--31 Mar. 1796--Y=55 N=37
- Roll Call #24--To amend the Pinckney Treaty resolution by striking out "it is expedient to pass the laws necessary" and insert "provision ought to be made by law"--14 Apr. 1796--Y=37 N=55
- Roll Call #25--To amend H.R. 164, a bill to provide for the payment of U.S. debts, by providing that only 25% of the bank stock belonging to the government, be offered for sale--25 May 1796--Y=33 N=49
- Roll Call #26--To amend the committee report regarding the admission of Tennessee into the Union, by admitting the state before a census is taken--No is a positive vote--28 May 1796--Y=48 N=30
- Roll Call #27--To put the main question on passage of the resolution in answer to the President's message concerning the Jay Treaty; said resolution states that the house does not intend to infringe upon the treaty making power vested in the President and Senate by the Constitution, but the House maintains that when a treaty relates to subject under the power of Congress, it is the constitutional right of the House to deliberate the expediency of said treaty--No is a positive vote--7 Apr. 1796--Y=54 N=37
- Roll Call #28--To adopt the resolution relating to H.R. 234, that the injunction of secrecy previously imposed, be removed, and that further proceeding be conducted with open doors--No is a positive vote--21 Feb. 1797--Y=50 N=36
- Roll Call #29--To concur with the Senate amendment to H.R. 236, a bill to appropriate money for the military; which amendment eliminates the restriction to confine the expenditure of money to the specific objects for which each sum is appropriated--3 Mar. 1797--Y=36 N=52
- Roll Call #30--To pass the committee resolution regarding the contested election of Israel Smith; that Mr. Smith, was not duly elected, and so is not entitled to a seat in the House--31 May 1796--Y=28 N=41
- Roll Call #31--To agree to the Senate amendment to H.R. 166, which retains the rank of Major General in the dragoons--21 May 1796--Y=34 N=49
- Roll Call #32--To concur in the Senate amendment to H.R. 164, which would authorize the commissioners to sell U.S. bank stock--No is a positive vote--25 May 1796--Y=45 N=35
- Roll Call #33--To amend the committee report regarding the admission of Tennessee into the Union, by authorizing Tennessee to send one representative to Congress--No is a positive vote--28 May 1796--Y=41 N=29
- Roll Call #34--To agree to the committee amendment to the compensation report which strikes out the provision denying extra compensation to the Secretary of War--No is a positive vote--27 Jan. 1797--Y=51 N=39
- Roll Call #35--To postpone consideration of an amendment to H.R. 188, an act to prevent the sale of prizes brought into the U.S. by vessels belonging to any foreign state--No is a positive vote--31 May 1796--Y=40 N=34

TABLE XIX (Continued)

- Roll Call #36--To amend H.R. 135, a bill to provide for the sale of land in the Northwest Territory by providing that half of the 640 acre tracts shall be sub-divided into tracts of 320 acres each--5 Apr. 1796--Y=40 N=45
- Roll Call #37--To agree to the Senate amendment to H.R. 166, which amendment retains the rank of Major General--23 May 1796--Y=37 N=45
- Roll Call #38--To amend H.R. 135, a bill to provide for the sale of land in the Northwest Territory by providing that tracts shall be sub-divided into tracts of 160 acres each--No is a positive vote--5 Apr. 1796--Y=45 N=42
- Roll Call #39--To pass the Jay Treaty preamble which states that the House finds the treaty objectionable, yet under the circumstances will agree to it--No is a positive vote--30 Apr. 1796--Y=49 N=50
- Roll Call #40--To amend the resolution to fix the military establishment, by reducing the number of infantry regiments from four to three--No is a positive vote--24 Jan. 1797--Y=44 N=39
- Roll Call #41--To postpone consideration of the resolution that a provision ought to be made for the appointment of an agent to supervise the foreign expenditures of the U.S.--No is a positive vote--27 May 1796--Y=40 N=35
- Roll Call #42--To pass the resolution that it is expedient to pass the laws necessary for carrying the Jay Treaty into effect--30 Apr. 1796--Y=51 N=48
- Roll Call #43--To amend H.R. 228, by providing an appropriation to finish the hulls of the frigates--No is a positive vote--2 Mar. 1797--Y=45 N=47
- Roll Call #44--To amend the military resolution which strikes out the provision allowing the President to rearrange certain regiments--7 Feb. 1797--Y=50 N=44
- Roll Call #45--To agree to the Senate amendment which requires newspapers to be sufficiently dried before mailing--2 Mar. 1797--Y=39 N=31
- Roll Call #46--To amend the committee report on the state of naval equipment, to provide that a committee be appointed to bring in one bill relating to the purchase of land for a navy yard--No is a positive vote--10 Feb. 1797--Y=38 N=47
- Roll Call #47--To amend H.R. 137, a bill to regulate intercourse with Indian tribes and preserve peace on the frontiers, by preventing forfeiture of land by anyone who shall enter upon it to survey or mark out Indian lands--No is a positive vote--11 Apr. 1796--Y=36 N=47
- Roll Call #48--To concur in the committee amendment to a report concerning compensation to public officers, which amendment augments the pay of the Secretary of War and Attorney General by \$500--No is a positive vote--27 Jan. 1797--Y=39 N=49
- Roll Call #49--To agree to a Senate amendment to H.R. 164, that a moiety of the 6% stock to be created should be sold under par if necessary--28 May 1796--Y=45 N=35
- Roll Call #50--To amend the report of the committee of elections concerning the contested election of Joseph Varnum; by adding "that the conduct of Varnum has been fair and honorable throughout the whole transaction"--25 Jan. 1797--Y=44 N=28
- Roll Call #51--To pass H.R. 216, a bill to mitigate or remit the forfeitures, penalties, and disabilities accruing in certain cases therein mentioned--25 Feb. 1797--Y=50 N=34
- Roll Call #52--To pass the resolution to increase the salaries of certain public officers for the year 1797--9 May 1796--Y=51 N=34
- Roll Call #53--To amend the bill to make further provisions for foreign intercourse for the year 1796, by appropriating a sum for the replacement of resident ministers by ministers plenipotentiary to Madrid and Lisbon--31 May 1797--Y=39 N=25
- Roll Call #54--To pass H.R. 187, a bill to provide an additional allowance for certain public officers--16 May 1796--Y=49 N=30
- Roll Call #55--To pass H.R. 228, appropriations for two frigates--2 Mar. 1797--Y=58 N=32
- Roll Call #56--To pass H.R. 237, a bill to make an appropriation for prosecuting the claims of certain citizens for property captured by the belligerent powers--27 Feb. 1797--Y=54 N=27
- Roll Call #57--To amend the House reply to the President's address by striking the last paragraph, which expresses the hope that the President's example may guide his successors--No is a positive vote--15 Dec. 1796--Y=24 N=54
- Roll Call #58--To amend S. 40, by providing for the building of only two frigates, rather than three--No is a positive vote--8 Apr. 1796--Y=25 N=57
- Roll Call #59--To pass S. 52, a bill to make provisions for further accommodation of the President's household--27 Feb. 1797--Y=63 N=27
- Roll Call #60--To pass S. 40, to provide naval armament--9 Apr. 1796--Y=62 N=23
- Roll Call #61--To pass H.R. 214, a bill to repeal part of the act for laying a duty on distilled spirits, and for imposing instead, certain duties on the capacity of stills--15 Feb. 1797--Y=57 N=19
- Roll Call #62--To pass H.R. 234, appropriations for negotiations with the Mediterranean powers--22 Feb. 1797--Y=63 N=19
- Roll Call #63--To amend S. 53, an act concerning U.S. circuit courts, by repealing certain specified sections, and to hold the district court of North Carolina at Newburn--2 Mar. 1797--Y=54 N=15
- Roll Call #64--To adopt the House reply to the President's address on the state of the Union--15 Dec. 1796--Y=67 N=12

A positive response to each of the roll calls indicates a vote which generally supports the position of the administration, i.e., Federalists.

TABLE XX

SCALE OF ROLL CALLS FOR THE FIFTH CONGRESS

Representatives (State)	Roll Calls																																																										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9										
Inlay (NJ)	+	0	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+					
Foster, A. (NH)	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+				
Foster, D. (MA)	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+			
Sitgreaves (PA)	0	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+			
Parker, I. (MA)	-	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+			
Thacher (MA)	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+			
Wadsworth, P. (MA)	-	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+			
Griswold (CT)	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Van Alen (NY)	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Gordon (NH)	+	-	-	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Edmond (CT)	-	0	-	+	+	0	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Goodrich (CT)	+	-	-	+	0	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Glen (NY)	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Hindman (MD)	-	-	-	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Allen (CT)	0	-	-	-	+	+	0	+	-	-	0	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Champlin (RI)	-	+	-	0	-	+	+	+	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brooks (NY)	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Thomas (PA)	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bayard (DE)	0	+	0	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Craig (MD)	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Morris (VT)	-	-	0	-	0	0	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Olis (MA)	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lyman (MA)	-	-	-	0	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Morgan (VA)	0	-	0	0	-	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	-	+	0	+	0	-	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Shepard (MA)	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	0	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Coit (CT)	0	-	+	0	0	-	0	+	+	+	0	0	-	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, N. (CT)	-	+	+	0	-	-	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kittera (PA)	0	0	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sinnickson (NJ)	-	0	0	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

TABLE XX (Continued)

Roll Call	#1--To receive the report of the managers of the House concerning the impeachment of William Blount--21 Dec. 1798--Y=11 N=69
Roll Call	#2--To amend H.R. 8, a bill to lay a stamp duty on vellum, parchment, and paper, by eliminating the clause exempting bank notes from duty-- No is a positive vote--1 July 1797--Y=76 N=11
Roll Call	#3--To amend S. 31, an addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the U.S., to provide that the jury shall be judge of the law as well as the fact--No is a positive vote--9 July 1798--Y=67 N=15
Roll Call	#4--to refer to the committee of the whole a petition from Amelia County, Virginia, complaining against the British Treaty and the Alien and Sedition Acts--No is a positive vote--30 Jan. 1799--Y=73 N=20
Roll Call	#5--To pass H.R. 197, a bill to provide arms for the militia--No is a positive vote--16 June 1798--Y=55 N=17
Roll Call	#6--To amend S. 4, a bill to protect the trade of the U.S., to strike the provision that authorized the President to procure a number of vessels, not to exceed nine--No is a positive vote--23 June 1797--Y=72 N=25
Roll Call	#7--To order third reading of H.R. 25, to suspend the second section of the act regulating foreign coins--No is a positive vote--20 Dec. 1797-- Y=68 N=25
Roll Call	#8--To amend H.R. 141, a bill against usurpation of executive authority, to provide that it shall not abridge the right of a citizen to apply to a foreign government for justice--No is a positive vote--16 Jan. 1799--Y=69 N=27
Roll Call	#9--To amend S. 19, a bill to authorize the President to raise a provisional army, by eliminating the authority of the President to raise the army as he sees fit--No is a positive vote--17 May 1798--Y=64 N=26
Roll Call	#10--To pass the resolution that the President be requested to communicate to this House, the instructions to and dispatches from the envoys to the French Republic--No is a positive vote--2 April 1798--Y=65 N=27
Roll Call	#11--To pass the resolution that this House will consider it a breach of privilege if either of the members enter into any personal contact until a decision of the House shall be had, and that Mathew Lyon be considered in the custody of the sergeant-at-arms until the further order of the House--30 Jan. 1798--Y=29 N=62
Roll Call	#12--To agree to the Senate amendment to H.R. 140, a bill to further suspend our intercourse with France, to eliminate the sections giving the President power to suspend intercourse with certain Spanish and Dutch ports--No is a positive vote--5 Feb. 1799--Y=59 N=32
Roll Call	#13--To amend H.R. 141 (see #8 above) to include any officer or agent of the U.S. government as well as any citizen--No is a positive vote-- 16 Jan. 1799--Y=61 N=35
Roll Call	#14--To amend H.R. 109, a bill to authorize the defense of the U.S., to give commanders of U.S. vessels the right to attack any French vessel which may have made a capture of any U.S. ship--12 June 1798--Y=28 N=47
Roll Call	#15--To amend H.R. 140 (see #12 above) so as to confine the operation of this act to March 3, 1800--No is a positive vote--25 Jan. 1799-- Y=57 N=32
Roll Call	#16--To amend S. 22, a bill for the more effectual protection of the commerce and coasts of the U.S., so as to authorize the capture of all French vessels--2 July 1798--Y=31 N=52
Roll Call	#17--To disagree to the Senate amendment to H.R. 137, an act for the enumeration of the inhabitants of the U.S., to substitute the words "April 1800" for "next May"--No is a positive vote--21 Jan. 1799--Y=54 N=33
Roll Call	#18--To amend S. 19 (see #9 above) by reducing the number of men to 10,000 from 20,000--No is a positive vote--17 May 1798--Y=56 N=35
Roll Call	#19--To amend H.R. 140 (see #12 above) to prevent the law operating to suspend commerce of the Western country by the Mississippi--No is a positive vote--25 Jan. 1799--Y=55 N=34
Roll Call	#20--To order third reading of H.R. 131, to supplement the act for suspending the intercourse between the U.S. and France--13 July 1798-- Y=29 N=43
Roll Call	#21--To amend S. 19 (see #9 above) by providing that the act go into effect before the next session of Congress--No is a positive vote-- 17 May 1798--Y=53 N=35
Roll Call	#22--To amend the House answer to the President's speech, to acknowledge the President's approach to a fresh attempt at negotiation with France--No is a positive vote--2 June 1797--Y=58 N=40
Roll Call	#23--To pass the stamp duties resolution--No is a positive vote--26 Feb. 1798--Y=52 N=36

TABLE XX (Continued)

Roll Call	#24--To disagree to S. 3, a bill to raise an additional corps of artillerists and engineers--No is a positive vote--20 June 1797--Y=57 N=39
Roll Call	#25--To postpone the report of the committee of privileges relating to the resolution to expel Roger Griswold and Matthew Lyon, which suggests that the resolution be disagreed to--28 Feb. 1798--Y=38 N=53
Roll Call	#26--To pass the resolution that the President lay before the House any information touching the suspension of the decree of the French Directory relative to the citizens of neutral nations found on board British ships of war--No is a positive vote--14 Feb. 1799--Y=52 N=38
Roll Call	#27--To amend the House bill to provide for an additional armament for the protection of the trade of the U.S., by reducing the number of vessels to be used as convoys--No is a positive vote--20 April 1798--Y=45 N=37
Roll Call	#28--To disagree with the Senate resolution granting leave to Mr. Pinckney, late ambassador to Britain and Spain, to receive certain presents from the courts on his taking leave--No is a positive vote--4 May 1798--Y=49 N=37
Roll Call	#29--To postpone H.R. 7, a bill to prohibit citizens from entering into the military of any foreign state--No is a positive vote--21 June 1797--Y=52 N=44
Roll Call	#30--To disagree to various Senate amendments to H.R. 66, a bill respecting the compensation of clerks--No is a positive vote--25 April 1798--Y=39 N=31
Roll Call	#31--To postpone the resolution to instruct the committee of ways and means to bring in a bill to repeal the act laying duties on stamped vellum, parchment, and paper--26 Feb. 1798--Y=41 N=52
Roll Call	#32--To pass H.R. 56, to repeal the stamp act--No is a positive vote--28 Feb. 1798--Y=51 N=42
Roll Call	#33--To amend S. 45, giving eventual authority to the President to augment the army, by striking the words "but the said volunteers shall not be compelled to serve out of the state in which they reside, unless their voluntary services shall have been previously obtained"--No is a positive vote--1 March 1799--Y=51 N=44
Roll Call	#34--To amend S. 4 (see #6 above) by limiting the continuance of the act to one year--No is a positive vote--23 June 1797--Y=53 N=43
Roll Call	#35--To amend the Senate bill for the reorganization of U.S. troops, by striking the phrase "the number of privates raised shall not exceed the number for which provision hath been made by law", and to insert "no part of the increase provided by this act shall take place"--No is a positive vote--27 Feb. 1799--Y=52 N=45
Roll Call	#36--To recommit H.R. 141 (see #8 above) to a select committee with instructions to modify to make the bill more acceptable--No is a positive vote--11 Jan. 1799--Y=49 N=44
Roll Call	#37--To pass H.R. 135, a bill to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the U.S.--15 Jan. 1799--Y=44 N=47
Roll Call	#38--To amend H.R. 143, a bill to amend the act for valuing lands and houses and for the enumeration of slaves, by eliminating the pay increase for assessors--No is a positive vote--1 Feb. 1799--Y=47 N=45
Roll Call	#39--To amend S. 4 (see #6 above) by eliminating the words "with-in the jurisdiction of the U.S.", so as to leave to the President the employment of the cutters--23 June 1797--Y=46 N=52
Roll Call	#40--To amend S. 31 (see #3 above) by eliminating the clause which would punish any person who writes, prints, speaks or threatens an officer or person in public trust, with any danger to his character, person, or estate--No is a positive vote--9 July 1798--Y=43 N=39
Roll Call	#41--To amend H.R. 17, a bill to lay an additional duty on salt, by eliminating the limitation clause relating to the drawback of vessels employed in the fishing trade--No is a positive vote--5 July 1797--Y=47 N=43
Roll Call	#42--To agree to eliminate the first section of H.R. 139, for encouraging the capture of French privateers, by allowing a bounty on guns, thereby repealing the bill--No is a positive vote--19 Feb. 1799--Y=52 N=48
Roll Call	#43--To pass S. 35, a bill to encourage the capture of French armed vessels by armed vessels belonging to U.S. citizens--13 July 1798--Y=34 N=36
Roll Call	#44--To amend S. 4 (see #6 above) to provide that frigates shall not be employed as convoys to any foreign port or place--No is a positive vote--23 June 1797--Y=50 N=48
Roll Call	#45--To postpone the stamp duties resolution for one week--26 Feb. 1798--Y=44 N=49
Roll Call	#46--To pass the resolution that a committee be appointed to prepare a bill for giving a bounty on the capture of French armed ships by armed ships owned by U.S. citizens--13 July 1798--Y=40 N=41

TABLE XX (Continued)

Roll Call	#47--To refer the resolutions from Portsmouth, Virginia, expressing their opinion of government measures and of the present situation between the U.S. and France, to the committee of the whole on the state of the Union--No is a positive vote--15 May 1798--Y=46 N=43
Roll Call	#48--To amend the House answer to the President's speech, by eliminating certain references of relations with France--1 June 1797--Y=49 N=50
Roll Call	#49--To pass the resolution to authorize the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House to adjourn the present session on the 28th of June--No is a positive vote--22 June 1797--Y=51 N=47
Roll Call	#50--To amend the House answer to the President's speech, by eliminating the reference to the expression of indignation at the derogatory remarks made by the President of the Directory of France in his speech to the minister of the U.S., substituting more diplomatic references to the speech--No is a positive vote--1 June 1797--Y=48 N=46
Roll Call	#51--To permit committee to bring in a bill respecting the arming of merchant vessels--11 Dec. 1797--Y=46 N=45
Roll Call	#52--To postpone to March 4m the report of a select committee for amending the standing rules of the House--21 March 1798--Y=44 N=44
Roll Call	#53--To recommit H.R. 94, to secure or remove aliens from the U.S., to committee--No is a positive vote--23 May 1798--Y=46 N=44
Roll Call	#54--To authorize the committee for the protection of commerce and defense of the country to report by bill on the resolution to grant general reprisals and letters of marque--8 June 1798--Y=41 N=42
Roll Call	#55--To amend the House resolution to authorize the President to raise additional companies of military by increase the regiments from eight to twelve--5 July 1798--Y=40 N=40
Roll Call	#56--To amend H.R. 116, a bill to make the tax on houses and land bear a proportion to each other, by preventing land from being taxed higher than the rate laid upon houses of the lowest value--No is a positive vote--29 June 1798--Y=38 N=39
Roll Call	#57--To amend H.R. 113, a bill to enable the President to borrow money for the public service, by limiting the amount of the loan and to stipulate conditions for its use--No is a positive vote--25 June 1798--Y=37 N=38
Roll Call	#58--To amend H.R. 8 (see #2 above) by eliminating the clause which forbids receiving any paper not legally stamped, in any court of justice, in evidence--No is a positive vote--1 July 1797--Y=37 N=40
Roll Call	#59--To refer to the committee of the whole a petition from a number of aliens, natives of Ireland, praying for a repeal of the alien laws--12 Feb. 1799--Y=51 N=48
Roll Call	#60--To order the main question on consideration of the House answer to the President's message--2 June 1797--Y=51 N=48
Roll Call	#61--To pass the resolution that it is inexpedient to repeal an act concerning aliens--25 Feb. 1799--Y=52 N=48
Roll Call	#62--To pass the resolution that it is inexpedient to repeal an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the U.S.--24 Feb. 1799--Y=52 N=48
Roll Call	#63--To pass the resolution to expel Matthew Lyon from the House for certain specified seditious and libelous actions--22 Feb. 1799--Y=49 N=45
Roll Call	#64--To pass S. 31 (see #3 above)--10 July 1798--Y=44 N=41
Roll Call	#65--To amend H.R. 8 (see #2 above) by reducing the proposed tax on certificates of naturalization--1 July 1797--Y=46 N=42
Roll Call	#66--To amend H.R. 111, a bill to supplement an act authorizing the President to raise a provisional army, by authorizing the President to appoint such officers as he seems necessary--15 June 1798--Y=42 N=39
Roll Call	#67--To pass H.R. 17, a bill to lay an additional duty on salt--5 July 1797--Y=45 N=40
Roll Call	#68--To disagree to the Senate amendment to H.R. 44 to appropriate a sum for an Indian treaty, said amendment provides that the act not be construed to admit an obligation on the part of the U.S. to extinguish Indian claims to any lands lying within the territory of the U.S.--No is a positive vote--21 Feb. 1798--Y=46 N=48
Roll Call	#69--To put the main question on passage of the resolution that Roger Griswold and Matthew Lyon, for disorderly behavior in this House, are highly censurable, and that they be reprimanded by the Speaker in the presence of the House--No is a positive vote--23 Feb. 1798--Y=47 N=48
Roll Call	#70--To refer the resolution that Matthew Lyon committed a violent attack and gross indelicacy upon Roger Griswold while sitting in the presence of the House, to a committee to inquire into the matter--30 Jan. 1798--Y=49 N=44
Roll Call	#71--To pass the resolution to lay a duty of eight cents per bushel on salt--4 July 1797--Y=47 N=41
Roll Call	#72--To amend S. 22 (see #16 above), so as to eliminate the section authorizing the fitting out of privateers against French vessels--No is a positive vote--2 July 1798--Y=39 N=43

TABLE XX (Continued)

Roll Call #73--	To recede from the House amendment to S. 4 (see #6 above), said amendment prohibiting frigates from being used as convoys--29 June 1797-- Y=51 N=47
Roll Call #74--	To amend S. 38, to better organize the troops of the U.S., by providing that no addition force be raised unless further provision is made or war breaks out--No is a positive vote--27 Feb. 1799--Y=52 N=45
Roll Call #75--	To adhere to the House amendment to S. 4 (see #6 above), to prohibit the frigates from being used as convoys--No is a positive vote-- 27 June 1797--Y=46 N=50
Roll Call #76--	To amend H.R. 41, a bill to provide the means of intercourse with foreign nations, by limiting the salaries of ministers to London, Paris, and Madrid to \$9,000 a year and all others to \$4,500--No is a positive vote--5 March 1798--Y=48 N=52
Roll Call #77--	To pass H.R. 8 (see #2 above)--3 July 1797--Y=47 N=41
Roll Call #78--	To order third reading of S. 18, a bill to establish an executive department to be the department of the Navy--25 April 1798--Y=47 N=41
Roll Call #79--	To pass S. 24, to secure or remove aliens from the U.S.--21 June 1798--Y=46 N=40
Roll Call #80--	To amend the resolution to print 20,000 copies of the alien and sedition laws, to provide that the Constitution shall be printed with said laws--No is a positive vote--14 Feb. 1797--Y=35 N=41
Roll Call #81--	To amend H.R. 80 which provides an additional regiment of artillery and engineers, by limiting the act to one year--No is a positive vote-- 16 April 1798--Y=36 N=45
Roll Call #82--	To amend the House answer to the President's speech, to eliminate the words "foreign nations" so as not to offend said nations--No is a positive vote--2 June 1797--Y=45 N=53
Roll Call #83--	To amend H.R. 138, a bill to amend the Stamp act, to allow a compensation to supervisors for stamping and selling stamps--31 Jan. 1797-- Y=49 N=40
Roll Call #84--	To order the main question on passage of H.R. 1 which prevents the exportation of arms and ammunition for a limited time--15 June 1797-- Y=48 N=41
Roll Call #85--	To pass H.R. 158, to augment the salaries of certain executive officers--27 Feb. 1799--Y=52 N=40
Roll Call #86--	To pass H.R. 150, a bill to augment the Navy and to fix the pay of the captains of vessels of war--11 Feb. 1799--Y=54 N=42
Roll Call #87--	To pass S. 29, declaring the treaty between France and the U.S. void--6 July 1798--Y=47 N=37
Roll Call #88--	To pass the printing resolution--No is a positive vote--14 Dec. 1798--Y=34 N=45
Roll Call #89--	To pass S. 45, a bill to give authority to the President to augment the Army--1 March 1799--Y=54 N=41
Roll Call #90--	To amend the breach of privilege resolution, to confine the punishment to a reprimand by the Speaker, rather than expulsion--No is a positive vote--12 Feb. 1798--Y=44 N=52
Roll Call #91--	To pass the breach of privilege resolution--12 Feb. 1798--Y=52 N=44
Roll Call #92--	To agree to the amendment to S. 19 (see #9 above), to strike the words "within three years after the passing of this act" and insert "before the next session of congress"--No is a positive vote--17 May 1798--Y=40 N=50
Roll Call #93--	To order third reading of S. 22 (see #16 above)--26 May 1798--Y=50 N=40
Roll Call #94--	To amend H.R. 150 (see #86 above) by eliminating authority to construct six ships of war--No is a positive vote--8 Feb. 1799--Y=40 N=54
Roll Call #95--	To amend H.R. 141 (see #8 above) to prevent this law from reaching individuals in their attempts to obtain justice from a foreign government--No is a positive vote--9 Jan. 1799--Y=37 N=48
Roll Call #96--	To pass S. 19 (see #9 above)--18 May 1798--Y=51 N=40
Roll Call #97--	To reject S. 31 (see #3 above)--No is a positive vote--5 July 1798--Y=36 N=47
Roll Call #98--	To amend H.R. 73, a bill to make appropriations for the military establishment, by increasing appropriations for some departments and adding an appropriation for contingencies--7 June 1798--Y=46 N=34
Roll Call #99--	To amend H.R. 111 (see #66 above) by confining the loan of arms to pieces of artillery alone--No is a positive vote--15 June 1798-- Y=35 N=46
Roll Call #100--	To amend H.R. 91, a bill to provide compensation to marshals, clerks, attorneys, jurors, and witnesses in the courts of the U.S., by striking the provision for an extra compensation to certain named attorneys--No is a positive vote--22 May 1798--Y=35 N=45

TABLE XX (Continued)

Roll Call #101--To amend the printing resolution so as to have printed all amendments of the constitution--No is a positive vote--14 Dec. 1798--Y=32 N=45
 Roll Call #102--To amend S. 19 (see #9 above) by replacing the phrase "company or companies of volunteers" with the phrase "militia corps" established by law in any state--No is a positive vote--17 May 1798--Y=39 N=51
 Roll Call #103--To order third reading of S. 22 (see #16 above)--26 May 1798--Y=51 N=39
 Roll Call #104--To amend H.R. 141 (see #8 above) to make guilty any person with "intent to defeat or impede the amicable adjustment of said disputes or controversies"--No is a positive vote--9 Jan. 1799--Y=55 N=51
 Roll Call #105--To disagree to the last two motions contained in the select committee report regarding the amendment of the standing rules of the House--21 Mar. 1798--Y=50 N=36
 Roll Call #106--To amend S. 45 (see #33 above) to eliminate the President's power to immediately appoint officers to the regiments to be raised in event of war--No is a positive vote--1 March 1799--Y=39 N=56
 Roll Call #107--To pass H.R. 140 (see #12 above)--28 Jan. 1799--Y=55 N=37
 Roll Call #108--To amend H.R. 141 (see #8 above) so as to confine the operation of the bill until March 3, 1800, when it shall become null and void--No is a positive vote--16 Jan. 1799--Y=41 N=56
 Roll Call #109--To amend H.R. 140 (see #12 above) by eliminating Presidential authority to suspend commercial intercourse between the U.S. and certain West Indies ports--No is a positive vote--Y=36 N=53
 Roll Call #110--To pass H.R. 111 (see #66 above)--16 June 1798--Y=42 N=30
 Roll Call #111--To amend H.R. 113 (see #57 above) to limit the rate of interest to be paid--No is a positive vote--25 June 1798--Y=34 N=48
 Roll Call #112--To amend H.R. 116 (see #56 above) by making the tax equal on houses and land and all other improvements--No is a positive vote--29 June 1798--Y=32 N=46
 Roll Call #113--To amend the bill to provide for the further protection of the U.S. trade, by including the provision that the frigates shall not be employed as convoy to any foreign port--No is a positive vote--20 April 1798--Y=32 N=50
 Roll Call #114--To amend H.R. 141 (see #8 above) by making the law apply to any person having intent to usurp the authority of the government by meddling in any dispute or negotiation between the U.S. and a foreign nation, or with intent to defeat or counteract any measure of the U.S. government--No is a positive vote--16 Jan. 1799--Y=39 N=57
 Roll Call #115--To pass H.R. 1, a bill to provide for the fortifications of ports and harbors of the U.S.--16 June 1797--Y=54 N=35
 Roll Call #116--To pass H.R. 100, a bill to regulate the compensation of the officers employed in the collection of the internal revenue and to provide for the more effectual settlement of their accounts--7 June 1798--Y=49 N=32
 Roll Call #117--To amend H.R. 125, a bill to augment the army, by reducing the number of additional regiments to eight from twelve--No is a positive vote--7 July 1798--Y=29 N=43
 Roll Call #118--To pass H.R. 141 (see #8 above)--17 Jan. 1799--Y=58 N=36
 Roll Call #119--To refer the resolution to inquire into the expediency of augmenting the salaries of the officers of the executive department of the committee on ways and means--28 Jan. 1799--Y=53 N=33
 Roll Call #120--To set aside the act of limitations in a bill for the relief of Ary Darden in a claim for the value of her horse pressed into the service of the U.S. and killed--No is a positive vote--19 Feb. 1798--Y=35 N=55
 Roll Call #121--To amend H.R. 143 (see #38 above) by authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to increase the pay of assessors--23 Feb. 1799--Y=57 N=36
 Roll Call #122--To amend the printing resolution by enumerating several clauses and articles of the constitution to be printed with said laws--No is a positive vote--14 Dec. 1798--Y=29 N=47
 Roll Call #123--To amend H.R. 79, supplementary to the act providing for the defense of the ports and harbors of the U.S., by eliminating the ports at which the money appropriated should be expended, and allowing the President the power to expend said sums when he deems proper--No is a positive vote--11 April 1798--Y=32 N=54
 Roll Call #124--To pass the House answer to the President's speech--2 June 1797--Y=62 N=36
 Roll Call #125--To pass the resolution to request the President to instruct the envoy at Paris to proceed in the negotiations with France, and to conclude a treaty consistent with the instructions of the President--No is a positive vote--3 July 1798--Y=30 N=51

TABLE XX (Continued)

Roll Call #126--To pass S. 39, to vest the power of retaliation in certain cases in the President--2 March 1799--Y=56 N=30
 Roll Call #127--To amend H.R. 91 (see #100 above) by striking the provision for an extra \$300 compensation to all marshalls--No is a positive vote--
 22 May 1798--Y=26 N=45
 Roll Call #128--To order third reading of H.R. 36, to grant an annuity to the daughters of the late Count De Grasse--5 Jan. 1798--Y=55 N=25
 Roll Call #129--To postpone consideration of S. 4 (see #6 above)--No is a positive vote--27 June 1797--Y=29 N=61
 Roll Call #130--To pass H.R. 102, to suspend the commercial intercourse between the U.S. and France--1 June 1798--Y=55 N=25
 Roll Call #131--To amend H.R. 116 (see #56 above) by providing to tax each slave at a rate of fifty cents--29 June 1798--Y=54 N=24
 Roll Call #132--To pass S. 4 (see #6 above)--24 June 1797--Y=70 N=25
 Roll Call #133--To pass the resolution that an address be presented by the House to the President in answer to his speech to Congress, containing
 assurances the House will take into consideration the matters recommended to them--24 Nov. 1797--Y=57 N=20
 Roll Call #134--To pass the resolution to appoint a committee to consider the propriety of amending the act for the punishment of certain crimes against
 the U.S., so as to provide a penalty for any citizen who shall usurp the executive authority--28 Dec. 1798--Y=65 N=23
 Roll Call #135--To pass the resolution to authorize the President to provide galleys for the defense of our coast--10 June 1797--Y=68 N=21
 Roll Call #136--To amend the House answer to the President's speech so as to object to the expression "mutual spirit of conciliation" in relation to
 France--2 June 1797--Y=78 N=21
 Roll Call #137--To pass H.R. 116 (see #56 above)--2 July 1798--Y=62 N=18
 Roll Call #138--To pass H.R. 105 to provide for the valuation of houses and lands and the enumeration of slaves--13 June 1798--Y=30 N=51
 Roll Call #139--To amend S. 22 (see #16 above) by making the instructions to our vessels general against all cruizers, as well as against the French--
 No is a positive vote--26 May 1798--Y=20 N=70
 Roll Call #140--To recommit H.R. 140 (see #12 above) with instructions to expunge a proviso excluding the port of New Orleans--No is a positive vote--
 28 Jan. 1799--Y=18 N=74
 Roll Call #141--To pass H.R. 126 (see #117 above)--9 July 1798--Y=60 N=11
 Roll Call #142--To amend S. 4 (see #6 above), to increase the strength of the cutters and extend additional compensation allowed to the men--23 June 1797--
 Y=82 N=14
 Roll Call #143--To pass S. 1, to prevent the exportation of arms and ammunition for a limited time--8 June 1797--Y=74 N=8

TABLE XXI (Continued)

Roll Call #1--	To postpone until the next session, the resolution to suspend in part, the act to augment the U.S. Army--	23 Jan. 1800--	Y=10	N=82	
Roll Call #2--	To concur in the Senate amendment to S. 58, a bill prescribing the mode of deciding disputed elections of President and Vice President, which changes the word "rejecting" to "admitting"--	9 May 1800--	Y=15	N=73	
Roll Call #3--	To pass H.R. 306, a bill to provide for a naval establishment--	No is a positive vote--	27 Feb. 1801--	Y=69	N=18
Roll Call #4--	To postpone H.R. 221, a bill to establish a military academy--	No is a positive vote--	28 Apr. 1800--	Y=64	N=23
Roll Call #5--	To order engrossment and third reading of H.R. 306, a bill to provide for a naval establishment--	No is a positive vote--	26 Feb. 1801--	Y=70	N=27
Roll Call #6--	To postpone the resolution related to the Robbins resolution which calls for the record of the district court of South Carolina of the trial of Jonathan Robbins--	27 Feb. 1800--	Y=32	N=63	
Roll Call #7--	To reject H.R. 302, a bill to extend the suspension of commercial intercourse with France--	No is a positive vote--	10 Feb. 1801--	Y=59	N=37
Roll Call #8--	To agree to add an additional rule in relation to the Presidential election; that 600 tickets each with the names of Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr be printed--	10 Feb. 1801--	Y=36	N=59	
Roll Call #9--	To concur in the amendment to H.R. 275 to leave the jurisdiction of the federal courts as it now stands--	No is a positive vote--	13 Jan. 1801--	Y=55	N=35
Roll Call #10--	To amend an amendment to H.R. 275 to include promissory notes and bonds as an exception to the conditions of the bill--	13 Jan. 1801--	Y=36	N=53	
Roll Call #11--	To concur in the report of the committee concerning H.R. 218, an act supplementary to the act entitled "an act for an amicable settlement of the limits of the state of Georgia and for authorizing the establishment of a government in the Mississippi Territory"--	No is a positive vote--	18 Mar. 1800--	Y=54	N=37
Roll Call #12--	To postpone until Monday, H.R. 302, a bill to continue in force an act further to suspend the commercial intercourse between the U.S. and France--	10 Feb. 1801--	Y=40	N=59	
Roll Call #13--	To amend the Randolph resolutions that sufficient cause does not appear for the further interposition of this house on the grounds of a breach of its privileges--	No is a positive vote--	29 Jan. 1800--	Y=61	N=39
Roll Call #14--	To disagree to the Senate amendment to H.R. 218, a bill concerning settlement of limits within Georgia and a Mississippi government; which would authorize the commissioners to settle individual claims--	No is a positive vote--	25 Apr. 1800--	Y=46	N=34
Roll Call #15--	To amend the Senate amendment to H.R. 270, a bill to erect a mausoleum to George Washington, in order to increase the amount appropriated--	2 Mar. 1801--	Y=34	N=49	
Roll Call #16--	To amend H.R. 201, a bill to suspend trade between the U.S. and France, by preventing any neutrals from carrying on any trade from the U.S. with France--	19 Feb. 1800--	Y=39	N=56	
Roll Call #17--	To amend H.R. 306, by giving the President authority to discharge any part of the Marine Corps which may be unnecessary for the naval service--	No is a positive vote--	26 Feb. 1801--	Y=53	N=40
Roll Call #18--	To recommit the fourth section of H.R. 291, an act to amend the uniform system of bankruptcy in the U.S., to committee for reconsideration and discussion--	No is a positive vote--	28 Feb. 1801--	Y=50	N=42
Roll Call #19--	To amend H.R. 218, a bill to settle the limits of the state of Georgia in the Mississippi Territory; by eliminating that part of the bill which abrogates the power of the governor to prorogue the general assembly at his pleasure--	24 Apr. 1800--	Y=42	N=49	
Roll Call #20--	To reconsider the vote to pass the privilege resolution--	No is a positive vote--	6 Jan. 1801--	Y=45	N=42
Roll Call #21--	To agree to the second of the Randolph resolutions to exonerate Captain McKnight and Lieutenant Reynolds of charges of disrespect to a member of the House--	29 Jan. 1800--	Y=49	N=51	
Roll Call #22--	To order the third reading of H.R. 309, a bill to repeal part of an act for the punishment of crimes against the U.S.--	20 Feb. 1801--	Y=49	N=53	
Roll Call #23--	To pass the resolution that there does not appear cause for further proceedings on the matter of complaint for maladministration against Winthrop Sargeant, Governor of the Mississippi Territory--	3 Mar. 1801--	Y=38	N=40	
Roll Call #24--	To pass the resolution to procure information regarding the trial of three men in the New Jersey circuit court on charges of piracy committee on a British Frigate--	No is a positive vote--	5 Mar. 1800--	Y=46	N=46
Roll Call #25--	To pass the resolution to continue in force the act commonly called the Sedition law--	23 Jan. 1801--	Y=48	N=48	

TABLE XXI (Continued)

Roll Call #26--	To pass H.R. 222, a bill to settle the claim for use of the Rhode Island College by U.S. troops--	24 Mar. 1800--	Y=41	N=41	
Roll Call #27--	To agree to the report of the select committee that it is not expedient for the house to make any order granting permission to reporters to be admitted within the bar--	9 Dec. 1800--	Y=45	N=45	
Roll Call #28--	To amend H.R. 201 preventing persons residing in the West Indies who owned foreign vessels, from obtaining a clearance bound to any port of the French Republic--	19 Feb. 1800--	Y=50	N=46	
Roll Call #29--	To pass H.R. 186, an act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy--	21 Feb. 1801--	Y=50	N=49	
Roll Call #30--	To reject H.R. 4309, a bill to repeal part of the Sedition act, and to continue in force part of it--	No is a positive vote--	19 Feb. 1801--	Y=50	N=49
Roll Call #31--	To postpone H.R. 215, a bill to provide for the better establishment of the courts of the U.S.--	No is a positive vote--	14 Apr. 1800--	Y=48	N=46
Roll Call #32--	To pass the first part of the resolution to repeal the second section of "an act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the U.S."--	No is a positive vote--	21 Jan. 1800--	Y=50	N=48
Roll Call #33--	To amend H.R. 208, a bill for the better government of the Marine Corps, by eliminating the provision that officers violating this act will be tried in a court of law--	12 Mar. 1800--	Y=47	N=44	
Roll Call #34--	To postpone H.R. 253, a bill for appointment of admirals in the Navy--	No is a positive vote--	21 Apr. 1800--	Y=44	N=45
Roll Call #35--	To amend S. 58, a bill prescribing the mode of deciding disputed elections, by providing to settle any disagreeing questions of the joint committee by taking a yea and nay vote--	No is a positive vote--	1 May 1800--	Y=43	N=46
Roll Call #36--	To postpone S. 58, a bill prescribing the mode of deciding disputed elections of President and Vice President--	No is a positive vote--	18 Apr. 1800--	Y=48	N=52
Roll Call #37--	To adopt the resolution that the power of the Speaker, or chairman of the committee of the whole, shall not be construed to extend to the expulsion of any person--	No is a positive vote--	20 Feb. 1801--	Y=50	N=53
Roll Call #38--	To amend H.R. 306, a bill to provide for a naval establishment, by eliminating the section to pay certain officers half their monthly pay if unemployed upon reduction of the Navy--	No is a positive vote--	26 Feb. 1801--	Y=48	N=49
Roll Call #39--	To order engrossment of H.R. 270, a bill to erect a mausoleum to George Washington--	23 Dec. 1800--	Y=44	N=40	
Roll Call #40--	To pass the resolution that the thanks of the House be presented to Theodore Sedgwick for his conduct as Speaker--	3 Mar. 1801--	Y=40	N=35	
Roll Call #41--	To agree to the reply of the committee to the President's speech in relation to negotiations with France--	26 Nov. 1800--	Y=36	N=32	
Roll Call #42--	To decide if the motion to take up a resolution is in order; said resolution states that the Speaker has assumed a power not his, in directing the expulsion of Samuel H. Smith from the gallery of the House--	No is a positive vote--	20 Feb. 1801--	Y=48	N=54
Roll Call #43--	To recommit H.R. 200, an act relative to the military, to a select committee with instructions to eliminate the exemption given to non-commissioned officers from arrest for any debt entered into before their enlistment--	No is a positive vote--	12 Feb. 1800--	Y=43	N=51
Roll Call #44--	To postpone H.R. 215, a bill to provide for the better establishment of the courts of the U.S., until December--	No is a positive vote--	25 Mar. 1800--	Y=44	N=50
Roll Call #45--	To amend H.R. 276, a bill to continue in force the acts laying duties on licenses for selling wines and foreign distilled spirits by retail, on property sold at auction, and on carriages, by putting a time limit on the duration of the bill to March 3, 1803--	No is a positive vote--	15 Jan. 1801--	Y=41	N=47
Roll Call #46--	To amend H.R. 182, a bill to provide for the enumeration of the citizens of the U.S., by eliminating the power of direction accorded the Secretary of State--	No is a positive vote--	30 Dec. 1799--	Y=39	N=45
Roll Call #47--	To amend S. 63, a bill to augment the army, by eliminating the responsibility imposed on the President to wait until the preliminaries of peace were signed with France, thereby discharging the additional army now--	No is a positive vote--	10 May 1800--	Y=38	N=42
Roll Call #48--	To postpone H.R. 215, a bill to provide for the better establishment of the courts of the U.S., until next session--	No is a positive vote--	28 Mar. 1800--	Y=46	N=52
Roll Call #49--	To adopt the resolution related to the Robbins resolution requesting the records of the trial of Jonathan Robbins from the district court of South Carolina--	No is a positive vote--	27 Feb. 1800--	Y=44	N=51

TABLE XXI (Continued)

- Roll Call #50--To amend the resolution to continue in force an act laying an additional duty on imported salt, by reducing the duration to two years instead of ten years--No is a positive vote--18 Apr. 1800--Y=44 N=50
- Roll Call #51--To pass H.R. 281, a bill to incorporate the persons therein named as a mine and metal company--30 Jan. 1801--Y=50 N=44
- Roll Call #52--To amend H.R. 275, a bill for the more convenient organization of the courts, by defining districts for the eastern and western districts of Virginia--12 Jan. 1801--Y=49 N=42
- Roll Call #53--To amend S. 58, a bill for deciding disputed elections of President and Vice-President, by eliminating the provision that the House and Senate choose by ballot four members to form a committee having power to investigate disputes other than such as may relate to the number of votes--No is a positive vote--1 May 1800--Y=41 N=47
- Roll Call #54--To consider the resolution to request the President to send the House information relating to three men who were tried on charges of piracy of a British frigate--No is a positive vote--4 Mar. 1800--Y=46 N=54
- Roll Call #55--To adopt the second part of the resolution to repeal the second section of "an act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the U.S., which part makes sedition punishable by common law"--23 Jan. 1800--Y=51 N=47
- Roll Call #56--To disagree to the fourth rule of the report of a committee concerning rules in the election of a President; said rule states that "after commencing the balloting for President, the House shall not adjourn until a choice is made"--No is a positive vote--9 Feb. 1801--Y=47 N=53
- Roll Call #57--To pass H.R. 275, a bill to provide for the more convenient organization of the courts--20 Jan. 1801--Y=51 N=43
- Roll Call #58--To recommit the report concerning the letter from Mr. Randolph to the President relating to a personal assault--No is a positive vote--28 Jan. 1800--Y=43 N=50
- Roll Call #59--To pass the resolution to reduce the second regiment of artillery from four to three battalions--No is a positive vote--17 Dec. 1800--Y=39 N=46
- Roll Call #60--To pass H.R. 270, a bill to erect a mausoleum to George Washington--1 Jan. 1801--Y=45 N=37
- Roll Call #61--To disagree to the fifth rule of the committee report concerning rules in the election of the President; said rule states that the doors of the House be closed during the balloting--No is a positive vote--2 Feb. 1801--Y=45 N=54
- Roll Call #62--To order third reading of H.R. 291, a bill to amend and continue in force "an act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy"--27 Feb. 1801--Y=49 N=42
- Roll Call #63--To pass the privilege resolution--6 Jan. 1801--Y=50 N=38
- Roll Call #64--To amend the Randolph resolutions to reprimand Captain McKnight and Lieutenant Reynolds in their action as being improper--No is a positive vote--29 Jan. 1800--Y=42 N=56
- Roll Call #65--To agree to the resolution to authorize the clerk of the House to pay the doorkeeper and sergeant of arms \$200 for extra services--3 Mar. 1801--Y=39 N=28
- Roll Call #66--To pass H.S. 210, an act to enable the President to borrow up to \$3,500,000 for the public service--18 Mar. 1800--Y=52 N=39
- Roll Call #67--To sustain the decision of the chair that a new resolution reprimanding McKnight and Reynolds was not in order--29 Jan. 1800--Y=56 N=42
- Roll Call #68--To postpone H.R. 193, an act concerning fisheries of the U.S.--No is a positive vote--7 Apr. 1800--Y=36 N=54
- Roll Call #69--To commit the resolution to extend an act entitled "an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the U.S."--2 Jan. 1801--Y=47 N=33
- Roll Call #70--To order the previous question on postponement of the report concerning H.R. 186, a bill to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy in the U.S.--No is a positive vote--31 Jan. 1800--Y=41 N=56
- Roll Call #71--To sustain the decision of the chair to call a member of the House to order--20 Feb. 1801--Y=60 N=42
- Roll Call #72--To pass H.R. 225, a bill to authorize the President to accept a cession of the territory west of Pennsylvania, called the Western Reserve--10 Apr. 1800--Y=54 N=36
- Roll Call #73--To pass S. 58, a bill prescribing the mode of deciding disputed elections of President and Vice-President--1 May 1800--Y=52 N=37
- Roll Call #74--To concur in the resolution to continue in force an act laying an additional duty on imported salt--14 Apr. 1800--Y=54 N=38
- Roll Call #75--To pass H.R. 276, a bill to continue in force the acts laying duties on licenses for selling wines and spirits, on property sold at auction, and on carriages--16 Jan. 1801--Y=46 N=31

TABLE XXI (Continued)

Roll Call #76--To agree not to pass the resolution to repeal so much of the act previously passed authorizing the President to raise 12 additional regiments of infantry--10 Jan. 1800--Y=60 N=39

Roll Call #77--To amend the resolution to suspend, in part, the act to augment the U.S. Army by providing that officers not necessary in the discretion of the President, be discharged and allowed one month's pay--No is a positive vote--21 Jan. 1800--Y=38 N=57

Roll Call #78--To pass S. 68, an act concerning the District of Columbia--24 Feb. 1801--Y=56 N=36

Roll Call #79--To agree with the committee of the whole to reject the Robbins resolution--8 Mar. 1800--Y=61 N=35

Roll Call #80--To amend S. 63, a bill to augment the army, by allowing one month's pay more as compensation for services and expenses in returning home--10 May 1800--Y=47 N=27

Roll Call #81--To discharge the committee of the whole from further consideration of the Robbins resolution--10 Mar. 1800--Y=62 N=35

Roll Call #82--To postpone H.R. 225, a bill to authorize the President to accept a cession of territory called the western reserve--No is a positive vote--4 Apr. 1800--Y=30 N=57

Roll Call #83--To pass the resolution that it is not expedient to take further action concerning the letter of Joseph Wheaton, sergeant-at-arms, relating to his arrest--6 Jan. 1801--Y=58 N=30

Roll Call #84--To pass the resolution to lay an additional duty on imported brown sugar--7 May 1800--Y=54 N=28

Roll Call #85--To pass H.R. 201, a bill to suspend trade between the U.S. and France--20 Feb. 1800--Y=68 N=28

Roll Call #86--To pass H.R. 268, a bill to erect a mausoleum for President Washington--10 May 1800--Y=54 N=19

Roll Call #87--To amend H.R. 275, by fixing a minimum of \$400 in any action or suit against any alien or citizen--13 Jan. 1808--Y=71 N=18

Roll Call #88--To amend a memorial concerning the conduct of Governor Sargeant in enacting unconstitutional laws in Mississippi Territory, by appointing a committee to investigate the matter--22 Dec. 1800--Y=70 N=11

APPENDIX B

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this appendix is to help explain the procedures used in analyzing the roll call voting in this study.¹ Unlike most studies of congressional roll call voting that have selectively chosen one issue or a particular subset of votes, this study attempts to incorporate all roll calls for each of the first six congresses as long as they are scalable. The term "to scale" means the process of ranking individuals along a unidimensional attitude continuum. By using the scale one can discover and describe situations in which all (or almost all) legislators vote according to a personal attitude on one fundamental issue. A perfect scale would result in a series of votes that range from total support to total opposition to an issue. In the first two congresses the roll calls scale only by one particular issue or a set of related issues. However, from the Third Congress through the Sixth Congress the roll calls scale across all issues for the majority of congressmen. Of course, all unanimous or nearly unanimous (cases where there is more than 90 percent agreement) votes are eliminated because they establish little variance among the congressmen.

Each "Yes" and "No" vote for each roll call must be given a positive or negative value. Therefore, each roll call motion or resolution must be analyzed in order to assign a value. A "No" vote does not always result in a negative response, nor a "Yes" vote a positive one. For example, in analyzing support for funding and assumption, a bill or motion proposing discrimination for government certificates changes the value of the votes. In this case, a "Yes" vote is coded as a negative (-) response and a "No" vote as a positive (+) one. All absences or abstentions are recorded as (0). Since this study is an investigation of the Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties in

the 1790's, votes in favor of administration or Federalist policies are coded as positive responses, while votes in opposition to Federalist policies are coded as negative ones.

After all votes for a particular congress are assigned the proper code, they are tested for scalability, that is whether or not they are related to each other by a particular variable. The method used to determine the scalability was the SPSS computer subprogram Crosstabs which correlates a gamma or Yule's Q coefficient value.²

The coefficient is based on a 2 x 2 table in which pairs of roll calls are cross-tabulated in terms of the consistency of responses.

The coefficient is expressed in the following equation:

$$Q = \frac{ad - bc}{ad + bc}$$

		Roll Call X	
		+	-
Roll Call Y	+	a	b
	-	c	d

The value of Q can range from -1 to +1, depending on the strength of the relationship between pairs of roll calls. For the purposes of this study a Q value of +0.70 has been selected as the lowest permissible level of correlation.

For a particular roll call to qualify, it must correlate with all or the majority of the other roll calls. In most other studies Yule's Q has been used to determine a subset of roll calls which all correlate with each other. However, because this study attempts to include all roll calls in each of the first six congresses, scales will be

established in which most of the roll calls correlate with each other but which also include some roll calls which correlate with most but not all of the other roll calls. These roll calls are also included in the final scale, as long as a large number of errors do not occur. When enough representatives change their pattern of voting so as to indicate an inconsistency which results in the roll call not meeting the prescribed standards, it is not included in the scale. The analysis in this study indicates that practically all roll calls, except the nearly unanimous ones, in the Third through the Sixth Congresses scale with each other. In the first two congresses the roll calls scale only by one issue or a subset of related issues. This indicates that beginning with the Third Congress the level of voting cohesion, one strong indication of party, was at a fairly high level.

After the roll calls have been correlated they are arranged by their marginal frequency in a Guttman scale. The method used to arrange the scale was a computer program entitled Roll Call, which was specifically designed for this study.³ The roll calls are, as shown below, set horizontally in descending order of their marginal frequency. Roll call one has the lowest marginal frequency and roll call six the highest. The congressmen are listed vertically and positioned on the table according to their voting sequence in the actual voting blocs. The blocs are arranged with the states listed from North to South, which helps to show the sectional nature of the voting, and the individuals if more than one from a state, are listed alphabetically. Double spaces help define the breaks between the various voting blocs. All representatives who do not vote on over 50 percent of the roll calls

are eliminated since their responses are not numerous enough to position them properly in the voting blocs.

	<u>Roll Calls</u>					
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>
A	+	+	+	+	+	+
B	+	0	+	+	+	+
C	+	+	+	+	+	+
D	-	+	+	+	+	-
E	0	+	+	+	+	+
F	-	-	+	+	-	+
G	-	0	+	+	+	+
H	-	-	-	+	+	+
I	-	-	0	-	+	+
J	-	-	-	0	-	+
K	-	-	-	-	-	+
L	-	-	-	-	-	+
M	-	0	-	-	-	-
N	-	-	-	-	-	-

In order to explain the method used for scaling congressmen who did not vote in a definitive pattern, several deviant patterns are included in the above example. Representatives A, B, and C consistently voted in favor of Federalist policy while representatives M and N consistently opposed it. Even though congressmen B and M were absent for roll call two, we can assume on the basis of their voting record that B would have voted positively (+) and M negatively (-) had they been present. However, representatives D, E, and F provide different problems. Congressmen D was not consistent in his pattern of voting on roll call six, but despite this inconsistency he still remains in this bloc and his vote on roll call six is considered an error.

Representative E can be placed either in the first or second bloc because of his absence or abstention on roll call one. However, it is best to follow the rule of middle-weighting which holds that a congressman registering an absence or abstention in this manner should be placed in the bloc toward the middle position rather than one of the extremes. Congressman F has a non-scale response on roll call five. If placed in the third bloc, he would have one error. If he was placed in the sixth bloc, he would have two errors. Thus, according to the minimum error rule he is placed in the third bloc because this position involves the least number of changes. If a representative has several non-scale responses and can be placed in two different blocs because both have the same number of errors, then the minimum error rule takes effect and he is placed in the bloc toward the middle of the scale.

After the scale has been completed, the validity of the results are tested by determining the Coefficient of Reproducibility (CR). The Coefficient of Reproducibility is expressed in the following equation: one (1) minus the number of positive and/or negative responses divided by the total number of errors. If the Coefficient of Reproducibility is 0.90 or above the scale is considered valid.

Because the scales from the Third through the Sixth Congresses are quite large they have been reduced and placed in Appendix A. When discussing the roll calls from those congresses in the text, graphs (figures) have been used as a visual aid in place of the scales.

ENDNOTES

¹The following works were helpful in preparing this explanation: Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll Call Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966); Michael Foley, The New Senate: Liberal Influence on a Conservative Institution, 1959-1972 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); and Richard C. Rohrs, "Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 1848-1952" (M.A. thesis, University of Nebraska, 1973).

²Norman H. Nie et al., SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), pp. 218-248.

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VITA

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