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CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTITUDES TOWARD THE  
SOVIET UNION, 1949-1965: A CONTENT  
ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.**

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA  
GRADUATE COLLEGE

CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION  
1949-1965  
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY  
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Norman, Oklahoma  
1968

CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

1949-1965

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

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# CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

1949-1965

## A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

### CHAPTER I

The People's Republic of China (PRC) came into existence on October 1, 1949. This new nation-state, which is generally referred to by popular news media as Communist China, was the result of years of civil war between Mao Tse-tung and his communist followers and Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalists. Chiang's forces were driven to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where they still remain as a sort of vestigial Chinese government. In fact, of course, mainland China has been firmly in the hands of the communists for more than fifteen years. The unhappy situation of two Chinese governments has meant that some countries have recognized the Mao Tse-tung group as the legitimate rulers of China while others persist in supporting Chiang Kai-shek.

The Soviet Union is one of the powers which recognized the communist claim to the official government of China, that is, the People's Republic. Moreover, for a long time the

Chinese communists hailed the Soviet Union as tutor, example, and benefactor. Under these circumstances it appeared that the two largest countries in the world--both communist--had effected a unity of friendship and purpose which might not auger well for the Western Democracies. For years a steady stream of mutually commendatory statements flowed between Moscow and Peking. Then a few notes of minor irritation began to arise. These notes piled higher, one on top of another, until Western commentators started speaking cautiously of a Sino-Soviet split. By 1963, it was no longer necessary to be cautious, since both the Russians and the Chinese were openly acknowledging the breach and were trying to put the blame for it on each other.

The general history of growing hostility between Communist China and the Soviet Union from 1949 through 1965 can be structured in traditional research fashion. There is a good deal of literature on the subject, although not as much as one might like. Few American writers got inside of China during these years because of the opposition of the United States State Department. Perhaps they would not have been welcomed by the Chinese anyway. On the other hand, a good many European authors have gone there and reported their experiences. Several hundreds of Chinese have left their homeland, and they have told their own stories. Then too, Chinese radio broadcasts have been monitored by the

West, and the Republic's newspapers, news magazines, and some official party documents are generally available to anyone who wants them. By making careful use of both of these primary and secondary sources of information, it was possible to construct a historical narrative reflecting Chinese Communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union from 1949 through 1965.

Fortunately, it was also possible to utilize one of the newer methods of research, content analysis, in determining the intensity of Chinese attitude during a part of this period. This is not to say that the traditional approach was inadequate or that content analysis is necessarily better. Rather, by combining the old and the new methodologies, additional insights and corroboration were gained.

Content analysis was originally developed by psychologists to aid them in their research. Now it has been adopted, in various forms, by many branches of social science, including political science. The form used here was the Q-Sort which produced a quantitative measurement of hostility between the two countries as seen from the Chinese point of view.

The historical narrative reveals that over the years, several PRC leaders made statements concerning their attitude toward the Soviet Union. Sometimes these statements were friendly, sometimes they were in the form of a mild

rebuke, and sometimes they were outright hostile or even vicious.

Usually, the statements were part of a general speech made upon the occasion of some party anniversary or perhaps at a plenary session of a party congress. These speeches were often printed in either Chinese or Russian newspapers, broadcast over Peking radio, or passed out to foreign delegates attending one of the congresses. In any event, most of the speeches are available to Western scholars in one form or another. In fact, one of the best sources for the documents is the United States Consulate General in Hong Kong which has, for years, collected the more important ones and published them, in English, under the general title of Current Background. With a few exceptions, it was selected passages from these documents that were subjected to the Q-Sort process.

#### SCOPE OF THE STUDY

A simple but practical way of studying Chinese Communists' attitudes toward the Soviet Union was to divide the period 1949-1965 into two parts. The first part covers roughly the first eight years, and the second part, the remaining seven. The reason for the division was not because the earlier period was friendly and the latter hostile; such was not necessarily the case. But rather it was because of the amount and type of information recorded.

In general, much of what could be said about the years from 1949 to 1957 or 1958 rested on research performed by the Western observers. Neither the PRC nor the USSR published many of their official documents that might have an important bearing on their true attitude toward each other. The result is that a good deal of inference must be drawn from what was said and done, by officials both inside and outside of these two countries. Any conclusions reached, therefore, are speculative at best, even when based, in some cases, on fairly substantial historical evidence. Of course, as one approaches 1956, the amount of material picks up dramatically so that a somewhat better picture can be made.

On the other hand, from 1959 on, the volume of published documents increases, until by 1963, it reached staggering proportions indeed. This allowed for a far greater use of primary materials which presumably made the conclusions more reliable.

At the same time, dividing the study in half provided a practical advantage in the employment of the Q-Sort exercise. Since it was necessary to build the exercise around official statements only, and since there were good reasons for not trying to cover too great a time span, the Q-Sort could be limited very nicely to just the second half of the period covered. Moreover, by a singular stroke of luck, it was these last seven years or so that produced most of the "fireworks" between the PRC and the USSR.

In short then, while the historical method of research was applied to the entire fifteen years, only the last seven years were subjected to content analysis methodology. No attempt was made to overly-formalize the division, so as not to detract from the whole.

#### OBJECTIVES

The formation and subsequent demise of an alliance between the two largest and most populous communist countries in the world is certainly a phenomenon of great interest to students of international relations. Also, when these two events take place within a relatively short period of time, a fascinating array of subjects present themselves for study. The fact that both the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China operate, most of the time, behind a veil of secrecy only heightens the curiosity. Under the circumstances, the first objective of the study was to review Sino-Soviet relations from 1949 through 1965 in order to gain some insights into Chinese Communists' attitudes toward their Northern neighbors during that period.

A second objective was to establish the efficacy of a behavioral device in performing social science research. For a long time, social scientists were pretty well limited to research in areas that lended themselves to the traditional, historical approach of investigation. It was necessary to

survey the available literature, to dig into archives, to review memoirs, and so on, in order to develop the desired information. In this way, a tremendous amount of extremely valuable research was advanced and the method will doubtlessly continue to do yeoman service in the future. However, in recent years, a number of behavioral research techniques have appeared upon the scene. They have the advantage of allowing the social scientist to subject his information to various numerical interpretations, which are more objective, and therefore more subject to tests of validity, than is usually the case with the traditional approach. Happily, it is also possible, to put the two methods together, as was done in this study. As mentioned earlier, the device tested was the Q-Sort form of content analysis. The conclusions developed from the Q-Sort and the historical approach were mutually re-enforcing.



## CHAPTER II

There is general agreement among current historians that relations between the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union during the first seven or eight years of the PRC's existence were reasonably friendly. Most of them suggest that this attitude changed to one of hostility sometime between 1956 and 1959. The following quotation from Edward Crankshaw's book, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking, is representative:

It is impossible to say with certainty the precise date at which the Chinese decided that they had to challenge Khrushchev. Later on we shall see, when we come to consider the climacteric year, 1960, that Khrushchev gave 1959 as the beginning of the conflict, accusing China of then beginning to violate the Moscow Declaration of November 1957, a policy document signed by all the bloc parties after their meeting to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Russian revolution. But the Chinese themselves gave 1956 as the critical year, the year of the 20th Party Congress at which Khrushchev made his secret speech denouncing Stalin.<sup>1</sup>

Since the "split" date is in some dispute then, it might be convenient to consider the friendly period as lasting through 1957. This is roughly the point at which the

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<sup>1</sup>Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963), p. 23.

"Great Leap Forward" was inaugurated by the Chinese and it effected a decided influence on Sino-Soviet relations.

The new Chinese Republic was established on October 1, 1949, and within a matter of hours it was recognized by the Soviet Union. While the beginning of diplomatic relations between the two Communist states was routine, there was nothing routine about the visit of Mao Tse-tung to Moscow later in the year. In the first place, Mao was in a highly unusual position. He was the leader of the most populous communist country in the world; yet he had never been to Russia--or anywhere outside China--did not speak Russian, and had largely ignored Russian advice for more than twenty years. In the second place, Stalin had given aid and comfort throughout the Chinese civil war period to Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists which must have cost many communist lives. Finally, both Mao and Stalin had learned from cruel experience how to be tough, dispassionate bargainers. It is not likely, therefore, that the Kremlin leader could view his visitor as just another relatively unimportant satellite head.

After Mao demonstrated his mastery of China beyond further doubt, Stalin hailed the Communist victory in China as the strongest blow dealt world imperialism since the October revolution . . . . Subsequently and until the day of his death, Stalin gave minimum cause for Chinese suspicion, refrained from territorial aggrandizement and unmasked intervention in internal affairs, and allowed Peking a degree of expression and action which he had previously denied to Tito.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Charles A. Buss, The Far East (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955), p. 547.

All of this would seem to indicate that the two men met in an atmosphere of mutually recognized equality. While this was partially true, it was not long before an unspoken but nevertheless clear limit was placed on Mao's position.

In the first blush of victory over the Kuomintang, the Chinese liked to speak of their way as a model for backward and colonial countries everywhere:

Echoing and developing the thesis expressed by Liu Shao-chi in a famous interview with Anna Louise Strong in 1946, they claimed in their propaganda that Mao was an independent prophet and theorist and that his writings embodied a new and independent ideology: the path marked out by them for other undeveloped countries was referred to as "Mao's Road."<sup>3</sup>

The Russians, however, easily found a way to put an end to these pretensions:

When in February 1950 a Chinese delegate travelled to Moscow to negotiate a new trade and communications agreement, the negotiations dragged on until mid-June, ten days before the outbreak of the Korean War. After that much less was heard about Mao Tse-tung as a prophet and an Asian Karl Marx.<sup>4</sup>

In short, Mao was high up the ladder of world communist hierarchy, but Stalin was at the top.

Mao Tse-tung remained in Moscow for some nine weeks. The more or less secret discussions with Stalin no doubt ranged over a wide variety of topics. A few authors have

<sup>3</sup>Crankshaw, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

suggested that the two men may have spent some of the time planning the Korean War, but absolute documentation for this is lacking.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, a number of treaty arrangements and economic agreements were made which are now a matter of public record. They signed on February 14, 1950, a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid. A main feature of that treaty was that if either contracting party was attacked by Japan or any state collaborating with Japan (meaning the United States), the other would immediately come to her aid with military and other assistance. The two powers agreed to work for an early peace treaty with Japan, to consult each other over international affairs of mutual concern, and to establish close economic and cultural ties.

In some respects the Russians were actually quite generous to the Chinese in these negotiations. They agreed to give up their claims to the Chinese-Changchun Railroad, Port Arthur, and Dairen without compensation by the end of 1952 or upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

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<sup>5</sup>One of the more interesting accounts along this line is by Harold C. Hinton of the George Washington University Institute for Defense Analyses. In his book, Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 205-11, Professor Hinton argues that Mao pushed for the war on behalf of the North Koreans. The North Koreans wanted to strike early before South Korea received important support from General MacArthur who presumably called for a re-armed Japan in a speech he made January 1, 1950. Stalin is pictured as being hesitant about the whole thing.

The transfer of all property was accomplished by 1952 except for Port Arthur. Probably, because of the Korean War, the Chinese requested that joint control and use of the naval base there continue for some time.

The USSR also extended a credit to China in the value of 300,000,000 US dollars at one per cent interest. This was to be paid out at the rate of \$60,000,000 a year for five years. The Chinese had to repay the loan in ten annual installments beginning December 31, 1954. In all probability, this was a good deal less money than the PRC had hoped for, and it could not begin to compare with the sort of funds that the US was laying out to her allies under the Marshall Plan.

A few weeks later, on March 27, 1950, additional agreements were made for joint-stock companies to exploit oil and other mineral deposits in the Sinkiang area, also to operate airlines between China and various cities in Siberia.<sup>6</sup>

In summary, it would appear that the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union certainly started out on the right note during these early months. The age-old Chinese cries of "foreign devils" and "unequal treaties" could hardly have been applied to the Russians at this stage of the game even if the loans were a bit parsimonious.

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<sup>6</sup>A good account of these agreements can be found in most modern history texts on China or Russia. The Buss book, pp. 548-549, quoted earlier is one such example.

The period from October 1949 to March 1953, when Stalin died, was, in general, a reasonably calm period in Sino-Soviet relations. As has already been noted, a number of treaty and trade agreements were completed that should have gone a long way toward eliminating or reducing any outstanding trouble areas between the two powers. Then too, most of this period coincides with the Korean War in which both countries played major roles. It is quite possible that the Chinese may have resented the use of their "volunteer" manpower as cannon-fodder while the Russians only supplied material aid, but it could be argued that this gave the PRC a chance to displace some of the Soviet influence over the North Koreans. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese received substantial additional credits from the USSR during these years, no doubt to help ease the severe economic strain of the war. The most important point to be made here is that the war probably kept the Chinese too busy to engage in any mischief with their Northern ally.

Another reason for the relatively stable years of 1949 to 1953 would be Stalin himself. As long as he was alive, his mantle of leadership over the communist world was almost indisputable. "Stalin had had the prestige of almost three

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<sup>7</sup>Harry Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars (New York: Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 150.

decades of Soviet leadership as Lenin's successor. He had led the Soviet Union to victory in World War II and had spread Communist rule in Europe and Asia."<sup>8</sup> There is general agreement that the Chinese acceded to Stalin's position and may even have been somewhat moved by his death. "No other non-Chinese figure in modern times has, through his death, occasioned the overwhelming, unspontaneous Chinese attention which Stalin called forth. There was an official mourning meeting in Peking, with over half a million people present, and a required five-minute period of silence throughout the country. Peking automatically produced a special essay, signed by Mao Tse-tung and dedicated to Stalin, entitled The Greatest Friendship."<sup>9</sup> Buss puts it quite simply by saying, "As long as Stalin lived, he was Russia to the Chinese Communists."<sup>10</sup> All of this is not to say that the Chinese viewed Stalin as some sort of Socialist Pope who was infallible and unassailable. Rather, it does suggest a pragmatic awareness that Stalin had been around a long time and that he was firmly in control of one of the two most powerful countries in the world.

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<sup>8</sup>Schwartz, p. 151.

<sup>9</sup>Howard L. Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Mosely, Benjamin Schwartz, Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 13-14.

<sup>10</sup>Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World: A History of China, Japan, South and Southeast Asia (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), p. 658.

It should also be apparent that these early years in the history of the PRC are years in which both the Russians and the Chinese were busy straightening up their own houses. The USSR was still recovering from World War II in which it had suffered enormous losses. There was the problem of consolidating control over the Eastern European satellite countries, including the trouble with Tito in Yugoslavia. Finally, the Russians were anxious to come up to the United States in nuclear weaponry (or surpass it) since the cold war was in full force. Therefore, Moscow's attention was on the West, Europe and America, and she treated the new Chinese Republic as a secondary interest.

For their part, the Communist Chinese were beset with a multitude of problems besides the Korean venture. One of the most important of these was that of establishing effective governmental control over 650,000,000 or more people spread out over 3,700,000 square miles.<sup>11</sup> Add to this the fact that both transportation and communications were extremely limited, villages, cities, and countryside were war-torn, and inflation was horrendous. Furthermore, the Chinese felt that it was necessary to move quickly into both Sinkiang province and Tibet, presumably to forestall any Russian interests in those

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<sup>11</sup>These are rounded-off estimated figures taken from Statistical Yearbook, 1965 (New York: United Nations, 1966) p. 89.



areas. Then there was the belligerent attitude of the United States with its atomic bombs plus a petulant Chiang Kai-shek sitting at the end of a short leash on the island of Formosa. It would no doubt be an understatement to suggest that Mao Tse-tung had his hands full.

In short then, both countries were well enough occupied at home as to leave little time or inclination to seriously bother each other. To be sure, there were strains in the alliance, but there was also an obvious effort to keep them within bounds. If these were fairly good years, however, the next two or three were even better. In fact, one author has called the period between 1953 and 1956 the "Post-Stalin Honeymoon"<sup>12</sup> in describing relations between the USSR and PRC.

The Communist Chinese were immediate beneficiaries of Stalin's death. Practically all of the communist rulers attended the funeral except Mao; he was represented by Chou En-Lai, who happened to be in Moscow on other business at the time.<sup>13</sup> The Russians went out of their way to thrust forward the Chinese as their principal ally. In the funeral procession, Chou walked in the front rank with Malenkov, Beria, and

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<sup>12</sup>David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchey: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 17.

<sup>13</sup>There does not seem to be any official explanation for Mao's absence. A cautious guess has been made that the weather may have not been favorable for flying. Besides, Mao, it is generally believed, does not like to fly, and the trip by train would have taken too long.

Khrushchev. When the funeral orations were given from the balcony of Lenin's tomb, Chou stood with the members of the Soviet Presidium. No other non-Russian leader was accorded these two honors.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, on March 10, a picture appeared in Pravda, the official Russian Communist Party newspaper, showing Stalin in the middle with Malenkov on one side and Mao Tse-tung on the other. The picture was a forgery, a composite! What was its purpose? A quick guess would be that Malenkov wanted to associate himself with Stalin but that would be only partly true.

The point was rather to link Malenkov with Mao Tse-tung, to identify Mao and the Chinese Communists with the succession to Stalin-Mao-Malenkov picture, even if there had not been other evidence that the Chinese Communists had been promoted almost overnight to joint leadership of the Communist camp.<sup>15</sup>

About two weeks later the Russians gave further indication of their desire to elevate the Chinese Communists by replacing their ambassador to Peking. They sent V. V. Kuznetsov, who at the same time was also named a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

He was the first Russian chief of mission assigned to Peking since 1949 who had not previously been accredited to the National Government of China, either in Chungking or later in Nanking. One might speculate about the reactions of the Chinese Communists to the fact that Stalin,

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<sup>14</sup>Floyd, p. 18.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

during his lifetime, had sent as diplomatic representatives to Peking men who had earlier been accredited to the very government in China against which the Chinese Communists had fought so long and so hard. It was clear in any case, that Moscow's assignment of a Deputy Foreign Minister to Peking definitely raised the status of the Soviet embassy there.<sup>16</sup>

The Chinese may also have gained from Stalin's death in that, four days after the funeral, Chou En-Lai suddenly announced certain concessions that made an end of the Korean War a possibility. This may have happened even if Stalin had lived, but "The Communist bloc . . . appears to have been more genuinely desirous of an armistice after Stalin's death than it had been earlier."<sup>17</sup>

There were two important events in 1954 which highlighted the "honeymoon" period. One was the Geneva Conference and the other, a visit to Peking by a very important Soviet delegation.

The war in Indo-China between the French and the Viet Minh forces of Ho Chi-minh had dragged on for a number of years. It is likely that Ho wanted to continue the struggle, confident that he could win it all, especially after his spectacular victory over the French stronghold of Dienbienphu. However, it is even more likely that both Moscow and Peking were tired of the strain on international relations and were

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<sup>16</sup>Boorman, et. al., p. 15.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

also wary of possible United States interference.<sup>18</sup> In any event, a conference was called in Geneva to end the matter and the Communist Chinese took part. This was their first good opportunity to be seen on the world stage, and they took full advantage of it.

Their delegation to Geneva was headed by Chou En-lai, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and considerably outnumbered every other delegation. The Chinese took over one of the largest hotels in the city and engaged a fleet of cars to carry them around. Chou En-lai installed himself, like the other great power delegations, in a villa and proceeded to receive and be received by British and French statesmen. There was no mistaking the concern of the Chinese to demonstrate that they knew as well as any government how to behave as a major power.<sup>19</sup>

More importantly, "Chou En-lai went far in establishing Peking's point that the settlement of Asian problems would inevitably involve Western negotiations with Communist China."<sup>20</sup>

Perhaps of greater significance to the Chinese was the Soviet delegation that arrived in Peking in October of 1954. It appears certain that Moscow was ready and willing to please the Chinese in the subsequent negotiations by the caliber of men sent to bargain. They were no less than party Presidium members Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, and Anastas Mikoyan. This was the most powerful Russian delegation to visit China since the founding of the PRC.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Schwartz, p. 152.

<sup>19</sup>Floyd, p. 21.

<sup>20</sup>Boorman, et. al., p. 20.

<sup>21</sup>Schwartz, p. 153.

A number of agreements were concluded which practically removed all traces of the Russian presence in China. One of them called for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Port Arthur with their installations going to the Chinese. Another turned over to the Chinese all Soviet shares in the joint companies that had been exploiting mineral and oil deposits in Sinkiang, the joint aviation company, and the ship building and repair company in Dairen. Of course, the Chinese had to pay for these shares, but at least they would have sole ownership. Plans were also announced for a railroad linking the Soviet Union and China across Sinkiang, giving the Chinese better access to this area and that of Soviet Central Asia than they had ever had before. Finally, the Russians extended to their ally an additional credit of \$130,000,000, plus a promise to aid in the development of more than a hundred new industrial enterprises.<sup>22</sup> A separate Sino-Soviet-Mongolian agreement concluded during this same period provided for another railroad link between the USSR and the PRC only through Outer Mongolia.<sup>23</sup> In effect, this line gave the Chinese a chance later on to penetrate that Russian Satellite in an attempt to bring it more closely into the Chinese sphere of influence.

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 153-4.

<sup>23</sup>Boorman, et. al., p. 24.

It must surely seem strange that in a mere matter of days the Russians were so willing to give up the hard-won gains in China of Tsars and Commissars alike. The official explanation, as indicated by Comrade Khrushchev upon departing Peking, is of little help. "These agreements are based on the principles of deep respect for each other, fraternal concern, and mutual assistance."<sup>24</sup> In his book, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars, Harry Schwartz offers a reflection that is much less altruistic. He thinks that the ever-practical Russians realized that it was only a matter of time before China would be strong enough to demand these concessions anyway, so the Kremlin rulers simply played Santa Claus for whatever credit it would bring them.<sup>25</sup> Schwartz bases his conclusion in part on Khrushchev's own words:

Khrushchev went to great lengths to flatter China in the major speech he delivered in Peking. Communist China, he declared, "has emerged as a great power on the international arena." In words whose emptiness he was to demonstrate only a few years later, he asserted that "without the participation of the Chinese Peoples Republic it is now impossible to decide international relations and peaceful solution of disputed problems."<sup>26</sup>

The Communist Chinese were to make gains on another front as a partial result of Stalin's death, namely the

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<sup>24</sup>Floyd, p. 220.

<sup>25</sup>Schwartz, p. 154.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

extension of their influence into Southeast Asia. While the Russians were busy solving their problems of succession, the Chinese were free to engage in diplomatic games. In June of 1954, Chou En-lai stopped in New Delhi for talks with Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister. They discussed the principles which were to govern Sino-Indian relations and agreed to consult each other plus other Asian governments on Asian problems, a suggestion of "Asia for the Asians." Of special interest was a reported statement of Chou's to the effect that "outside forces" would no longer be allowed to decide the fate of Asia.<sup>27</sup> By "outside forces" did he also mean to include the Soviet Union!

Nehru paid an official visit to China in October of the same year. There were further protestations of friendship with accompanying trade agreements. It seems clear at this point that the Indians accepted their big communist neighbor as a positive friend.<sup>28</sup>

The PRC's biggest effort to assume leadership in Asia came at the Conference of Asian and African states held in Bandung (Indonesia) in April of 1955. The Chinese did not call the meeting but they were clearly the inspiration behind it.

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<sup>27</sup>Floyd, pp. 22-3.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

Also in 1955, the Russians withdrew their troops from Austria and sent their leaders to a "summit conference" with the Western Powers at Geneva.<sup>35</sup>

In all of these activities by the two powers, it can be seen then that there was a fairly genuine effort by both to reduce world tension as well as tensions between themselves. Perhaps the only area of significant disagreement was the continuing controversy over the island of Taiwan. The Chinese Communists, for obvious reasons, wanted the island turned over to them and advanced the issue from time to time by threatening to take it by force. The United States added to the PRC's problem in 1955 by signing a mutual security agreement with the Chiang Kai-shek government, thereby establishing in principle a "two-Chinas" policy.<sup>36</sup> The Russians could usually be counted on to back Peking's claim to Taiwan, but at the Geneva Conference Khrushchev "made no belligerent moves or statements with respect to the Taiwan Strait Crisis . . . ." <sup>37</sup> This attitude probably disappointed the Chinese Communists, and Hinton goes so far as to say, "The spectre of some sort of deal between the Soviet Union

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<sup>35</sup>Schwartz, p. 154.

<sup>36</sup>Harold E. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 128.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 127.



and the West that would tend to reduce the reliability of Soviet protection of and support for the CPR must have suggested itself in Peking."<sup>38</sup>

If the Chinese Communists were unhappy about Taiwan, they most likely could view the rest of the period between Stalin's death and the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union with a good deal of equanimity. They had received substantial material aid from the Russians; they were accorded a higher position in the socialist camp than the eastern European powers; and they had carved out their own area of influence in Southeast Asia. For all of this, PRC could thank either directly or indirectly their northern ally:

In short, at the beginning of 1956 it was reasonable to regard the Moscow-Peking axis as a powerful factor in world politics, which was likely to grow stronger rather than to break up. Both Russians and Chinese seemed to have every reason for maintaining a close alliance and none at all for quarrelling.<sup>39</sup>

There were a number of dramatic events occurring in 1956 which are generally regarded as having a profound impact on Sino-Soviet relations. The more important of these were the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union and the trouble in Poland and Hungary. In the introduction to his

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid. (Note, PRC has been used in this study to indicate the Peoples Republic of China; however, some authors, like Hinton, prefer CPR, meaning the Chinese Peoples Republic.)

<sup>39</sup>Floyd, p. 31.

excellent study, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961, Donald S. Zagoria sets the scene.

I have chosen the 20th Congress as my starting point in the story of Sino-Soviet conflict for a number of reasons. First, the Congress defined Soviet policy on precisely the three issues of strategy on which the Sino-Soviet differences have subsequently centered: the way to build "socialism" and communism in states already ruled by Communist parties, the nature of the relationship among Communist parties, and the way to pursue the struggle against the West. Second, the Chinese Communists themselves, in heated private exchanges with the Russians, allegedly trace their differences with Khrushchev to the 20th Congress. Finally, and not least important, it was after the Congress--and the impact on the Communist world of Khrushchev's secret speech about Stalin--that China first began to intervene in East European Communist affairs and to speak and act as a separate source of doctrine and strategy for the Communist world.<sup>40</sup>

It can be said, with a good deal of assurance, that the best remembered event of the 20th Party Congress was Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin. This was actually the second of two major speeches he made before the delegates, and it was stated at a secret session. The gist of his remarks were soon "leaked" to the world press occasioning a good deal of surprise or even amazement. While there does not appear to be any solid evidence as to whether Khrushchev consulted the leaders of any other communist country before denouncing Stalin, the consensus is that he did not. In

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<sup>40</sup>Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 71.

the case of the Chinese Communists, Schwartz bluntly asserts "it is clear that Khrushchev had not consulted Peking before launching this attack."<sup>41</sup> As proof, Schwartz offers the fact that "The Chinese delegate to the Congress spoke highly of Stalin in his speech to his Soviet comrades."<sup>42</sup> Moreover, Schwartz is of the opinion that the Chinese would not have approved entirely of Khrushchev's remarks since their own man, Mao, might have been interested in building a "personality cult" of his own.<sup>43</sup> Hugh Seton-Watson tends to agree with Schwartz's basic premise. "As we have seen, Mao had little love for Stalin, but Khrushchev's impetuous launching of 'de-Stalinisation' was hardly to his taste."<sup>44</sup> Finally, both men are supported by the German political scientist, Klaus Mehnert, in his well documented book Peking and Moscow, where he states, "Mao let it be known, Stalin's errors were secondary as compared to his achievements. Criticism of Stalin within certain limits--that was all right; but it was 'extremely wrong' to deny the importance of leaders."<sup>45</sup>

<sup>41</sup>Schwartz, p. 157.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Hugh Seton-Watson, "The Great Schism: On Sino-Soviet Conflicts," Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur Turner and Leonard Freedman (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1964), p. 258.

<sup>45</sup>Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York: Mentor, 1964), p. 355.

Based on these comments, one can probably assume that the Chinese did not know of Khrushchev's intentions and that they were not overly enthusiastic about them when openly informed.

Khrushchev's secret speech was interesting, to say the least, "but something else happened at that Congress, even more important in the long run than the attack on Stalin, though quite overshadowed by this at the time."<sup>46</sup> The reference, of course, is to Khrushchev's first speech in which he discussed the questions of the inevitability of war and the different forms of transition to socialism.

In his comments, Khrushchev openly suggested that modern conditions, especially the atomic bomb, called for some re-thinking of classical Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Taking his text from Marx, Lenin had fully stated his belief in the inevitability of war so long as capitalism existed anywhere on the face of the earth. Economic pressures and material greed would drive capitalist societies to fight each other for markets. Moreover, this war was good for communism--the more broken eggs, the better the omelette. Similarly, the same concept holds true for internal revolutions, the more violent the better. Wars and revolutions would have to continue until the capitalists had destroyed themselves; then communism could rise from the ashes. Thus, it can be

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<sup>46</sup>Crankshaw, pp. 23-24.

seen that wars are inevitable and the transition to socialism is through the destruction of capitalism.<sup>47</sup>

Khrushchev's views amounted to a major revision of doctrine. He put "peaceful co-existence" at the center of Soviet foreign policy. "He denied that he expected a Communist world victory to come about 'through armed interference by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist country.'"<sup>48</sup> Instead he felt that communism would win because its overwhelming advantages over the capitalist system would become apparent to the working classes of all countries. Meanwhile, the strength of the socialist countries was now great enough to prevent any enemies' adventurist plans.<sup>49</sup> In other words, war was no longer inevitable.

In like manner, he changed the rules for transition to socialism. "Times having changed, and the peace-loving masses, inspired and sustained by the Soviet Union, having grown so strong, it was more than conceivable that in 'certain countries' Communism would be achieved not through violent

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<sup>47</sup>See Crankshaw, pp. 24-25, for a brief but good account of the ideological argument raised by Khrushchev's speech.

<sup>48</sup>Schwartz, p. 156.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 157.

revolution but by natural evolution through, perhaps, parliamentary means."<sup>50</sup>

As startling as these ideas might seem in retrospect, the general belief is that the Chinese communists tended to take them in stride, at least, for a while. "On the whole, the Chinese appeared to approve the downgrading of Stalin and to be firmly behind Khrushchev's new line."<sup>51</sup> Crankshaw is of the opinion that "there was no question in 1956 of the Chinese accusing Khrushchev of betraying Marxist-Leninism, of betraying the revolution. It is to be doubted whether they know what Khrushchev was doing any more than he knew himself."<sup>52</sup> Years later, the Chinese were to hark back to the Twentieth Party Congress and to speak out against "Khrushchev revisionism" but for the moment they remained remarkably silent.

The self-imposed silence lasted until April 5, 1956. Then an article appeared in the Peking People's Daily entitled "The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." It was a carefully constrained article, but nevertheless it made it clear that Stalin had been both good and bad. In fact, his good side was emphasized more than

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<sup>50</sup>Crankshaw, p. 27.

<sup>51</sup>Floyd, p. 37.

<sup>52</sup>Crankshaw, p. 53.

his bad. What is more important is that the article suggested that Stalin might not have made mistakes if there had been more broadly based leadership, i.e. if the Chinese had been consulted. Additionally, they hinted that since Russian leadership was now in a bit of disarray, and since Chinese leadership was firmly consolidated, it might be well in the future for the "Socialist Camp" to look to Peking for direction rather than Moscow.<sup>53</sup> This last point, of course, was made in the most subtle way possible, and it is likely that they didn't really expect to get a chance to take an active leadership role for some time. However, before another three months had passed, they found themselves doing just that, and in Europe, of all places!

De-Stalinization apparently had a far greater impact on the European communist countries and parties than Khrushchev had intended or expected.<sup>54</sup> Coming as it did after nearly three years of general relaxation of Stalin's iron discipline, both at home and throughout the Socialist camp, it seemed to whet the appetites of some of the Eastern European parties for more independence. Moscow's authority was undermined, including Khrushchev's own authority and

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<sup>53</sup>See R. G. Boyd's Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York, Praeger, 1962), pp. 71-72, for a fuller interpretation of the People's Daily article.

<sup>54</sup>Crankshaw, p. 53.

de-Stalinization was certainly a direct cause of the revolts first in Poland and then in Hungary.<sup>55</sup>

When the Polish revolt flared up and Gomulka, released from prison, took over the new government, Moscow's first reaction was to restore the status quo by force. . . . Khrushchev himself, accompanied by Molotov and Malenkov (with whom he was at that time locked in conflict) descended on Warsaw and read the riot act. But the Poles stood firm. . . . Soon Chou En-lai himself flew to Moscow, then to Warsaw, to act as a moderating influence, to explain to the Russians the true inwardness of the Polish revolt, and to explain to Gomulka why he had Chinese support and just how far it would go. We do not know, but it is more than probable, that Khrushchev personally was deeply relieved. He saw his policy of reform on the edge of ruin, and he was under extreme pressure from the Stalinists, headed by Molotov, to revert to the old-fashioned terror. China saved him."<sup>56</sup>

Khrushchev's relief was not to last for long however. A few days after the settlement of the Polish question, the Hungarians staged an even more dramatic revolt. Indeed, it appeared that not only did they want to get rid of their communist leader, but that they wanted to get out of the Socialist camp altogether.

Moscow hesitated. For a short time it looked as if the Russians would stand aside; then, in convincing fashion, elements of the Red army moved in to crush the Hungarians.

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<sup>55</sup>Crankshaw, p. 53.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.



The part played by the Chinese Communists in the Hungarian crisis is in some doubt. Alexandre Metaxas, in his book, Moscow or Peking?, states flatly, "in its straits Moscow made the mistake of asking Mao Tse-tung to intervene in the Hungarian conflict."<sup>57</sup> He has support for his assertion in that the Chinese announced in 1963 that they had had to force Khrushchev's hand against the Hungarians in 1956.<sup>58</sup> It needs to be remembered though, that this claim was only made after the Sino-Soviet conflict was an open reality. Metaxas can also point to the fact that the Chinese were among the first, if not the first, countries to openly praise the Soviet action in its public press.<sup>59</sup>

A more restrained assessment of Peking's role has been written by Irwin Isenberg.

In 1956 unrest in Poland and a revolution in Hungary enabled the Chinese to play a role on the Eastern European scene. Their influence was probably only peripheral. One may doubt that, as the Chinese now maintain, their advice was the decisive element in Moscow's decision to accept Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland and crush Imre Nagy in Hungary; but certainly the influence they wielded gave them a taste for more.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>Alexandre Metaxas, Moscow or Peking? (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), 1. 77.

<sup>58</sup>Schwartz, p. 159.

<sup>59</sup>Boyd, pp. 72-73.

<sup>60</sup>Irwin Isenberg, ed., The Russian-Chinese Rift: Its Impact on World Affairs (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1966), p. 27.

Whichever position one cares to take in this matter, there is general agreement that the Chinese did have a say in the Polish and Hungarian problems. This Chinese intrusion into Eastern Europe is even more interesting when it is noted that their position vis-a-vis Poland was a liberal one, while in Hungary it was strictly hard-line. Hugh Seton-Watson offers an explanation for this apparent contradiction.

In September, 1956, a Polish delegation to the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, led by Edward Ochab, found such encouragement for the Polish party's independent attitude (including its opposition to the Soviet view of the Poznan rising of July). . . . The "liberal" elements in the Polish party were convinced that China was on their side. In reality, the Chinese were interested not in "liberalism" but in equality between parties, that is, in reducing the predominance of the Soviet party. This became clear when they came out strongly in defense of the Soviet action in Hungary. In an emergency all Communists must stand together.<sup>61</sup>

Another interesting sidelight of the Hungarian event is Tito's comments and the reaction to them by Russia, China, and Albania.

In a speech made at Pula on November 11, 1956, the Yugoslav leader had faintly praised the Soviet crushing of Hungary as being a better answer than a full-scale war. At the same time, however, he blandly maintained that the Soviets had bungled the whole thing by not taking his advice in the first place.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Turner and Freedman, ed., p. 258.

<sup>62</sup>Floyd, p. 41.

William E. Griffith has made a carefully documented study of the comments, elicited by Tito's speech, in Moscow, Peking, and Tirana. His main purpose is to illustrate the growing estrangement between Albania and the USSR plus the parallel development of alliance between Albania and the PRC. He has prepared a table showing all of the important issues that occurred from 1955 to 1959 with the positions taken by the three countries. According to the table, it can be seen that from the Pula speech onward, Albania and China took virtually the same positions on every issue.<sup>63</sup>

In his commentary, Mr. Griffith reports:

Detailed comparison of the Soviet and Chinese positions on the ideological and foreign-policy issues during the early stages of the Sino-Soviet dispute with the Albanian position on these same issues indicates . . . that Sino Albanian convergence and joint opposition to Soviet positions (above all, naturally, on the Yugoslav issue) increased rapidly after the Hungarian Revolution. . . ."<sup>64</sup>

Griffith found that the Soviet response to Tito's remarks were somewhat sharper than the Chinese and that the Albanians were the most critical of all.<sup>65</sup> Floyd has nothing to say about Albania but reports the same conclusion vis-a-vis Russia and China. The Chinese press, according to Floyd,

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<sup>63</sup>William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1963), pp. 30-32.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 29-34.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

"pointed to real differences of opinion with the Yugoslavs, these comments were noticeably milder than those made by the Russians."<sup>66</sup> It would appear that Griffith, with support from Floyd, is contradicting himself. If the USSR and the Albanians were the most critical of Tito, then they should have furthered their friendship, but instead, Tirana and Peking draw steadily closer together. There is a relatively simple explanation.

The Albanian leader, Hoxha, apparently lived in the fear that his country would fall under the complete domination of the Yugoslavs if Tito were ever given a free hand to operate in the Balkans by Moscow.<sup>67</sup> Therefore, Hoxha could breathe easier every time Yugoslav-Soviet relations took a turn for the worse. However, by the early summer of the following year, 1957, Khrushchev was once again wooing Belgrade, whereas Chinese regard for Tito remained cool or even hostile.<sup>68</sup> Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that the Albanians were forced more and more to turn to the PRC for support against first the Yugoslavs, and then the Russians.

The point of this brief departure into Albanian and Yugoslavian foreign affairs is to establish the two straw-men

<sup>66</sup>Floyd, p. 42.

<sup>67</sup>Griffith, Albania, p. 27.

<sup>68</sup>Floyd, pp. 45-46.

which were later used by the Soviets and the Chinese in denouncing each other. For a while, until the split became public, both of these great powers felt that they had to mask the barbs flying between them. For instance, the Russians would blast the "Albanian dogmatists," (meaning the Chinese) and the Chinese would snarl about the "Tito revisionists," (meaning the Russians). It would be a few years before these "subtle" euphemisms were employed but the lines were evidently being drawn in late 1956.

In reviewing the year of the Twentieth Party Congress, it has been shown that there were a number of ups and downs in Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese backed the Poles, expressed cautious disagreement over de-Stalinization, and may have forced Khrushchev's hand in Hungary. It is extremely probable that the Russians were annoyed or even embarrassed by these actions, but if they were, their internal succession troubles kept them surprisingly pliable. Perhaps the most significant factor to remember about this period is that when the need arose for the Chinese Communists to find ideological backing for their position, they could always return to the Twentieth Party Congress. Otherwise, the Sino-Soviet alliance entered 1957 still intact.

From many standpoints, most of 1957 might conceivably be considered the last really "good" period in relations between the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China.

For one thing, there were few actual contacts of any magnitude between the two powers which could stir up friction. The one notable exception was the celebration in Moscow, in November, of the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Revolution where the Chinese again suggested a hard-line approach. This event will be dealt with a little later. Of greater moment is the fact that "the attention of the leaders of both countries was taken up by internal political conflicts which were resolved only in the summer and autumn."<sup>69</sup> Khrushchev had to face the so-called "anti-party" group while the "hundred flowers" campaign apparently nudged Mao to the Left.

These elements of Russian affairs which had been promoted by Khrushchev had met with mixed results, as already indicated. For a while, his happy and partially successful junketeering to relax tensions seemed to stamp him with a golden touch, even if a bit tarnished by accounts of his prodigious drinking feats. However, all of the time that Khrushchev was riding high, a group within the Russian party Presidium was watching for an opportunity to get rid of him.<sup>70</sup> The denunciation of Stalin, followed closely by the uprising

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>70</sup>Metaxas, p. 76.

in Poland and Hungary, gave them their chance. In June of 1957, this anti-party group led by Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch and Shepilov, tried to remove Khrushchev from power. He received support from Mikoyan and the army in the form of Marshall Zhukov.<sup>71</sup> With their help he convinced a meeting of the Central Committee of the party to retain him in command and to oust his enemies.<sup>72</sup> This maneuver left Khrushchev in effective personal control of the Soviet Union, a control which became virtually complete with the elimination of Zhukov in November of the same year.<sup>73</sup> By an odd coincidence, this period, from June to November, during which Khrushchev struggled for power was almost exactly the same length of time that Mao Tse-tung had to face internal tensions in his country.

"The period between June and November 1957 was one of the most fateful and obscure periods in recent Chinese Communist history. Sometime within those six months, Chinese Communist domestic and external policy underwent a radical transformation from Right to Left."<sup>74</sup> It can be argued that

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<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 77. It is interesting to note that Bulganin is generally not included in the anti-party group (nor as a supporter of Khrushchev) although later, he was quietly forced to stand aside.

<sup>72</sup>Floyd, p. 45.

<sup>73</sup>Metaxas, p. 76.

<sup>74</sup>Zagoria, p. 66.

the reason for this shift lies in the "Hundred Flowers" campaign and the decision to launch the "Great Leap Forward."

The "Hundred Flowers" campaign is hidden in a bit of mystery so that a certain amount of guesswork is necessary in explaining its purpose.<sup>75</sup> Briefly, it appears that by early 1957, Mao must have felt his regime sufficiently consolidated as to allow open criticism by Chinese intellectuals, that is to let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred ideas contend. It has been suggested that the Chinese leader believed that the Communist Party was a genuinely popular party and that he could operate as a sort of benevolent dictator avoiding the mistakes of Stalin.<sup>76</sup> If this was the case, then the results of the "blooming and contending" period must have been a traumatic experience. The intellectuals responded to the invitation with an unnerving storm of criticism that apparently touched off wholesale defections of farmers from cooperatives and trade union people from their work.<sup>77</sup> After a scant six weeks, the campaign was brought to an abrupt halt.

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<sup>75</sup>For a thorough analysis of this campaign, plus relevant Chinese documents, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New York: Praeger, 1960).

<sup>76</sup>Zagoria, p. 67.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.



As shocking as the reaction to the "Hundred Flowers" program appears to have been, it is doubtful that it was sufficient in itself to jerk Mao to the Left. A much more serious challenge faced the Chinese in the summer of 1957 in the form of the downturn in its domestic economy.

Between 1953-57, the PRC had labored within the framework of their first five-year plan. Their accomplishments had been impressive. "For example, the annual output of many of China's basic heavy industries doubled or tripled. Total industrial production, it was claimed, rose by nearly 120 per cent. And China's gross national product increased at an average annual rate of perhaps 7 or 8 per cent. In terms of the Chinese Communists' own priority goals--particularly the goal of industrial progress--the first Plan was clearly an over-all success."<sup>78</sup>

By the end of the Plan, however, there were definite signs that things were beginning to slow down. Soviet aid was being channeled more and more into Eastern Europe, China's collectives were not producing the expected amount of food, pork and cloth rations were cut and coal miners were called upon to work harder in order to keep the factories running.

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<sup>78</sup>Doak A. Barnett, Communist China in Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 54.

Finally, the press began to speak cautiously of national calamities.<sup>79</sup>

It is at this point in the deepening economic crisis that a split in the party leadership evidently occurred. The Right Wing is generally believed to have urged caution, to follow a sound slow approach to economic development. The Left Wing, on the other hand, advocated a drastic break-neck pace, a "Great Leap Forward."<sup>80</sup> It seemingly felt that all difficulties could be overcome if only the masses could be mobilized and imbued with great ideological fervor. China would pull herself up by her own bootstraps, without increase in Soviet aid. "If . . . the Soviet model on which China's first Five Year Plan had been based had proved inadequate for China's distinctive problems, then the Soviet model must be scrapped and replaced by one which maximized the one resource that China had in abundance--labor power."<sup>81</sup>

The fight between the Left and the Right probably lasted from June, when the Right Wing dominated, to late September, when the Left Wing gained the ascendancy.<sup>82</sup> MacFarquhar has identified the leaders of the Right as Chou

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<sup>79</sup>Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," Pacific Affairs, December 1958, pp. 323-325.

<sup>80</sup>Zagoria, p. 68.

<sup>81</sup>MacFarquhar, pp. 325-327.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

En-lai and Ch'en Yi. The Left was led by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.<sup>83</sup> Mao's role is not clear but since the Left won it is reasonable to assume that he was at least willing to be pulled in that direction at that moment. The upshot of this dispute was that a decision was made to try radical economic policies in an effort to move China ahead industrially. The plans were laid for the "Great Leap Forward" and the communes even though they were not put into action until the next year. This meant that the Chinese Communists were about to wade out into ideological waters of their own which proved to be a major issue in the Sino-Soviet split. In the meantime, it also meant that Mao would go to Moscow for the November celebrations as a hard-line leftist.

Before turning to the Moscow Conference, it is necessary to add a few comments about some other interesting occurrences that colored the thinking of both Mao and Khrushchev in 1957.

In August, the Russians announced to a somewhat skeptical world that the USSR had successfully tested an intercontinental multi-stage ballistic rocket.<sup>84</sup> Since not very

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<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>84</sup>Schwartz, p. 162.

much was known about multi-stage rockets at that time, the news was only partially disturbing to Western observers. However, when the Russians put up the world's first "sputnik" on October 4, the West was quick to see the military potential of such a missile and the Americans, in particular, were cast into a deep gloom.<sup>85</sup> While Khrushchev, and the Soviet Union, was jubilant, he nonetheless went out of his way to emphasize only the deterrent value of his new weapon. On the other hand, "the Chinese, who had nothing whatsoever to do with the affair, went off their heads with joy: a Communist country, the Soviet Union, had utterly outstripped the imperialists in the development of weaponry; now was the time to exert the power of the Socialist camp and put unremitting pressure on the West in the interests of world revolution."<sup>86</sup> This difference in interpretation of the use for the new missile was carried over into the November discussions as will be shown later.

Another interesting event took place that fall. "On October 15, 1957, the two nations reached an agreement . . . which required the Soviet Union to give China a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning the manufacture. This historic agreement, by which the Soviet Union pledged

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<sup>85</sup>Crankshaw, p. 70.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., pp. 70-71.

its help to make China a nuclear power and even to give the Chinese an atomic bomb, was concluded in the deepest secrecy."<sup>87</sup> In light of the fact that the Russians had known how to make atomic bombs for over seven years without sharing that information with their Chinese ally, there is room for speculation as to why they did so at this time. The general feeling is that Khrushchev was still a little nervous over his narrow defeat of the anti-party group and wanted to buy China's support both for his policies at home and in Eastern Europe.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, the timing may have been designed to ensure Mao's cooperation at the Moscow Conference.<sup>89</sup> If those were his motives, then they certainly succeeded, at least for the short run. What is more interesting, the wily leader of the Kremlin never did pay off on his promise. In 1963, when the Sino-Soviet split was out in the open, the Chinese bitterly protested Khrushchev's treachery in renegeing on his promise of atomic aid. They claimed that he repudiated the agreement in 1959.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>87</sup>Schwartz, p. 162.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., pp. 162-163.

<sup>89</sup>William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: the MIT Press, 1964), p. 17.

<sup>90</sup>Peking Review, VI, 33 (August 16, 1963), p. 14.

One more minor episode which was carried out prior to the Russians anniversary celebration was the establishment in the USSR of a Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. Its purpose was to popularize pro-Chinese feelings among the Russian people. A counterpart organization had been active in China for years so that the absence of one in the Soviet Union was somewhat awkward. The society was founded in October and may also have been designed to help produce Mao's cooperation at the next month's meeting.<sup>91</sup>

The fortieth anniversary of the Russian revolution was celebrated in Moscow early in November. It included a full scale conference with some sixty-four Communist parties represented.<sup>92</sup> Every important red leader was there except for Tito of Yugoslavia who declined to participate at the last moment because of a "sudden" attack of lumbago.<sup>93</sup> More likely, he was afraid that he might be called upon to sign some sort of joint declaration which could possibly affect his independent stance. This would indeed have been the case had he attended.

It goes without saying that Khrushchev was most eager to embrace the celebrations and the conference. Having

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<sup>91</sup>Schwartz, p. 163.

<sup>92</sup>Floyd, p. 48.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

suffered through a year and a half of near catastrophe in trying to maintain or augment his position of leadership, he would now be able to stand center stage as the acknowledged ruler of the mighty Soviet Union. "From the Russian point of view, it was an excellent opportunity to restore Moscow's prestige in the international Communist movement. . . . The fortieth anniversary of the Revolution was a good occasion to impress on Communism's proconsuls and foreign agents Russia's seniority and experience in the business of revolution and to remind them, by means of lavish entertainment, elaborate military parades and impressive sputnik-launchings, that Russia was still the centre of Communism's material power and sustenance."<sup>94</sup>

By the same token, the Chinese welcomed the conference as a chance to do a little drum beating on their own. The mere fact that Mao Tse-tung saw fit to attend the affair in person is a solid indication that the Chinese also wanted a part of the stage. Mao almost never leaves his homeland, and seldom makes a public speech, yet he was willing to go to Moscow where he made himself visible to the whole Communist world for the first time. The belief is that he did so because he wanted to force the Soviets to the Left on the questions of internal Socialist Camp policies and global strategy.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup>Floyd, p. 48.

<sup>95</sup>Zagoria, p. 73.

The Moscow meeting produced two declarations, one a general statement on peace which everyone signed and the other one which became known as the "Moscow Declaration" or the "Declaration of 1957." This second declaration applied only to the countries that were under actual communist control and was signed by all of them except Yugoslavia. Tito had guessed right; it would have compromised him. In general, it contained two significant positions, one on foreign policy and one on internal matters. Both the Chinese and the Russians tried to shape these to suit themselves.

Mao set the tone of his thinking on foreign policy in a speech which has by now become famous. "I consider that the present world situation has reached a new turning point. There are now two winds in the world: the east wind and the west wind. There is a saying in China: 'If the east wind does not prevail over the west wind, then the west wind will prevail over the east wind.' I think the characteristic of the current situation is that the east wind prevails over the west wind; that is, the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism."<sup>96</sup>

While this comment may not sound too bellicose, it is clear that Mao was thinking about the new Russian missile,

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<sup>96</sup>Mao Tse-tung, November 18, 1957, speech in Moscow, quoted in "Mao Tse-tung on Imperialists and Reactionaries," Current Background, no. 534, November 12, 1958.



plus the atomic capability his country would soon have, and meant for the Socialist countries to use this new found preponderance to squeeze the capitalists.

Despite Mao's speech, the final statement on foreign policy came out strongly in favor of supporting the broad outline of peaceful co-existence which Khrushchev had laid down in 1956.<sup>97</sup> As a result of Mao's address and the Declaration statement, both leaders could claim, later on, that the other was guilty of misinterpretation. Since the Chinese had signed the paper, however, it would appear that the Russians had the better of the argument, for whatever it was worth.

If Khrushchev got his way on foreign policy, there is good reason for believing that he was outmanuvered by the Chinese on internal policy. The problem here was to decide the greater evil; dogmatism or revisionism.

For some time the Russians had been denouncing dogmatism. This was part of Khrushchev's plan to relax tensions. Furthermore, dogmatism was obnoxious to the Yugoslavs and the only way to bring Tito back into the fold was to deny such a relentless philosophy. Interestingly, the Chinese were just as opposed to dogmatism, which had resulted in the Hungarian

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<sup>97</sup>Floyd, pp. 52-53.

revolt and the possible shattering of the Socialist Camp. In other words, the Chinese had found revisionism useful in gaining more independence for themselves, but they were opposed to it if it meant any weakening of the Socialist Camp which might in turn mean a slow-down in aid and support to the PRC.<sup>98</sup>

Given these circumstances, it is obvious that the statement on dogmatism and revisionism was going to take much work to satisfy anybody. What emerged was a series of statements that left the whole matter wide open to individual interpretation. For instance: In one of the paragraphs it was made clear that "the main danger at present is revisionism, or, in other words, right-wing opportunism, which as a manifestation of bourgeois ideology paralyses the revolutionary energy of the working class and demands the preservation or restoration of capitalism."<sup>99</sup> No doubt, this is the way the Chinese wanted the resolution to read and probably had a big hand in its phrasing. But the Russians also were playing a role here and they must have insisted on adding the next comment: "However, dogmatism and sectarianism can also be the main danger at different phases of development in one

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<sup>98</sup>Zagoria, pp. 181-182.

<sup>99</sup>Declaration of Twelve Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, November 22, 1957, text in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 9, January 1, 1958, pp. 3-12.

party or another. It is for each Communist party to decide what danger threatens it more at the time."<sup>100</sup> In a final note the Chinese came right back with, "Modern revisionism seeks to smear the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism. . . ." <sup>101</sup> Maybe the Russians and the Chinese knew where the main danger lay, in dogmatism or revisionism, but the other parties must have left the meeting in some confusion! At any rate, this ambiguity made it possible for both powers, in the years ahead, to accuse the other of deviating from the Declaration.

Mao Tse-tung created a mild surprise while at the Moscow celebrations by his strong endorsement of the USSR as the center of power for the Communist world. On November 6, he declared "we regard it as the sacred international obligation of all Socialist countries to strengthen the solidarity of the Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union."<sup>102</sup> A few days later, he went even further by saying, "Our Socialist camp should have a leader, and this is the Soviet Union."<sup>103</sup>

These comments were surprising in that during much of 1956 the Chinese had been anxious to carve out a stance that was independent of Moscow. Certainly the Poles were led to

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Mao Tse-tung, November 6, 1957, speech, quoted in NCNA, November 6, 1957.

<sup>103</sup> Mao Tse-tung, November 17, 1957, speech, quoted in NCNA, November 18, 1957.

believe that this was the case. Now, a year had hardly gone by and Mao was championing the Russians as leaders of the Socialist Camp. It is possible that the PRC's ruler took this position in order to pay back Khrushchev for his promise of nuclear assistance and other emoluments; however, deeper inspection suggests another reason. As had already been noted, Mao wanted equality, especially for himself, but he also needed a unified camp if China was to realize her goals. He must have recognized that in 1957 at least, the USSR could guarantee such unity and China could not. Besides, the Moscow Declaration proved that he could influence Soviet policy to some extent anyway.

Thus ended the conference and the year. As far as anyone could see, the USSR and the PRC parted as the best of friends, each thinking he had understood the other's words. It would only be a matter of months before both were to learn how much they had misjudged the actual situation.

Before leaving the 1949-57 era, it might be of some value to briefly examine Sino-Soviet relations along a few other lines. Such things as cultural exchanges, reaction to Soviet advisors, trade, and Chinese guesswork vis-a-vis potential Soviet leaders might shed some additional insights on the over-all picture.

Reliable figures on cultural exchange events, number of participants and attendance are fairly difficult to come

by, particularly for the time period under consideration. However, Klaus Mehnert, a German political scientist who has lived in both the USSR and the PRC for extended periods and who speaks both languages has made a brief study of these exchanges which is useful. He has taken his figures from Russian and Chinese sources which in many cases are only official estimates and therefore need to be viewed with some reserve.

Mehnert found that between 1949 and 1959 some 295 million copies of Russian books were translated into Chinese and sold in that country. At the same time, 24 million Chinese books, translated into Russian, were placed on sale in the USSR. There were 840 films exchanged and they were seen by 2.4 billion viewers. Most of the films were Russian, while most of the audience was Chinese. Additionally, 112 Soviet stage and concert ensembles, comprising 2,301 members, were sent to China and 134 Chinese ensembles, with 2,334 members, went to Russia. Then too, there were Russian radio broadcasts that were transmitted in Chinese over Chinese stations, and vice versa, the Russian language was introduced into thousands of Chinese schools (Chinese was introduced into a few Russian schools) and there were exchanges of trade fairs, students, etc.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>104</sup>All of the figures in this paragraph were taken from Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, trans., Leila Vennewitz (New York: Mentor Books, 1964), pp. 334-335.

Mehnert is convinced that during the early years of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Chinese government was genuinely eager to have its people become fully acquainted with their great ally.<sup>105</sup> Moreover, the drive to educate the Chinese on Russian life apparently increased steadily until it reached a peak in 1957.<sup>106</sup> While visiting China in that year, Mehnert detected an attitude of growing resentment against all the pro-Soviet sentiment that the Chinese had to take. Too much had been made of a good thing. "It was clear that Soviet propaganda had over-reached itself and achieved the opposite objective: the feeling we all know after having too much of one particular dish."<sup>107</sup> For example, there were almost daily newspaper stories of visiting Russian experts giving some of their food to Chinese children, of a Soviet soldier rescuing a little Chinese girl, of Russian women doctors saving the lives of Chinese mothers and babies and so on.<sup>108</sup>

The well known China expert, A. Doak Barnett, tells a somewhat similar story in his book Communist China: The Early Years. He describes a Chinese propaganda film called Woman Locomotive Driver in which several Chinese girls are trying to learn to be drivers. They are aided in their

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<sup>105</sup>Mehnert, p. 335.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 336.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 338.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 336.

endeavors by a Russian advisor named Sedov. The heroine of the story is little Sun who nearly fails the class in coal-shoveling. Later on, she does fail the examination on the workings of a locomotive but is given a second chance. With the help of Sedov and the others, she passes the make-up test and becomes a driver. For this, she thanks Sedov and wants to give him a present, but he refuses saying that he is merely a representative of the Soviet Union and its aid to the Chinese people.<sup>109</sup>

Given these illustrations, the reader will find it easy to agree with Mehnert that after so long the traditional pride of the Chinese must have been sorely tried. Still, it must be admitted that the two countries did carry on an enormous amount of cultural exchange and that a large number of Soviet experts did contribute greatly to China's development. For the most part, it would probably be correct to assume that these contacts helped relations rather than hurt them.

The pattern of trade relations between the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China during the years 1950-1957 also reflect to some extent the total relational situation.

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<sup>109</sup> A. Doak Barnett, Communist China: The Early Years (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 82-83.

TABLE 1

SOVIET-CHINESE TRADE\*  
(IN MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)

Year	Soviet exports to China	Soviet Imports from China
1950	388.25	188.25
1951	476.25	332.00
1952	554.25	413.75
1953	697.50	474.75
1954	759.25	578.25
1955	742.50	643.50
1956	733.00	764.25
1957	544.00	738.25

\*Source: "Zu den chinesisch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," Der Ostblock und die Entwicklungslander (Hanover: Verlag fur Literatur und Zeitgeschehen GmbH) no. 7, April 1962, p. 47, quoted in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1964), p. 232.

It can be seen from the table that Soviet exports increased steadily through 1954. They leveled off somewhat in 1955 and 1956 and then suffered a serious dip in 1957. Soviet imports increased through 1956 with a slight reduction in 1957. Looking ahead a bit, Chapter III will present a table showing that both exports and imports moved upward again in 1958 and reached dramatic proportions in 1959. This would seem to indicate that Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate in 1955, but a further examination is needed. The reductions in Soviet trade with China during 1955-56 are matched by



increases of Russian aid elsewhere, particularly the middle-East and India.<sup>110</sup> The large loss in 1957 has already been mentioned earlier in this chapter as a casualty of the revolts in Poland and Hungary. The Russians found it necessary to pour more aid into those countries in order to stabilize that area. The leveling off of Soviet imports from China in 1957 is probably due to the slowdown of Chinese production in that year. In other words, it can be argued that had the Russians not been forced to send aid to these other countries, their trade figures with the PRC should have continued upward. The Chinese, no doubt, disapproved of this shift in resources from their door, especially to India, but there really was not anything that they could do about it.<sup>111</sup> On balance then, the trade figures for 1950-1957 are not very useful in pinpointing the Sino-Soviet split. Later on, as will be seen, in the early 1960's, they are much more revealing.

There is another point of reference for considering relations between the two communist powers during these first eight years and that is the matter of the Chinese's preference of Stalin's successor. Any conclusion drawn here must, of course, be highly speculative and should not be over-emphasized,

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<sup>110</sup>Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 233-234.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

but it might be interesting to look at the available material.

To begin with, there seems to be some agreement that the Chinese did indeed favor Khrushchev. Myron Rush feels that this is so because of Khrushchev's early insistence on the development of heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods.<sup>112</sup> Zagoria boldly suggests that "it was the Chinese who in all likelihood contributed greatly to Khrushchev's triumph over Malenkov in 1954."<sup>113</sup> The historian Buss thinks that the Chinese liked Khrushchev in 1954, but that within a year they had changed their minds and from then on steadily became disillusioned with him.<sup>114</sup>

To some extent, at least, the Chinese have provided the best answer themselves. In November of each year, virtually all communist parties send congratulatory telegrams to the Russian party on the occasion of the anniversary celebration of the USSR's revolution. These telegrams, following diplomatic protocol, are addressed by the communist parties to whichever Russian leaders are believed to be in command. All of these telegrams are published in Pravda. Klaus Mehnert

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<sup>112</sup>Myron Rush, The Rise of Khrushchev (Washington, D. C.: 1958), pp. 6-7.

<sup>113</sup>Zagoria, p. 21.

<sup>114</sup>Buss, Asia in the Modern World, p. 659.

has made a study of the Chinese telegrams and has paraphrased them in the following manner:<sup>115</sup>

- 1953: From Mao to Prime Minister Comrade Malenkov
- 1954: From Mao and Chou En-lai to President Voroshilov
- 1955: From Mao, Liu Shao Ch'i, and Chou to President Voroshilov, Prime Minister Bulganin and Foreign Minister Molotov
- 1956: From Mao, Liu, and Chou to President Voroshilov, Prime Minister Bulganin, and Foreign Minister Shepilov
- 1957: No telegram was sent, perhaps because Mao was in Moscow for the celebrations although all other countries sent telegrams even if their leaders were in Moscow.
- 1958: From Mao, Liu, and Chou to Prime Minister and Party Leader Khrushchev and to President Voroshilov
- 1959: From Mao, Liu, Marshal Chu Teh, and Chou to President Voroshilov and Khrushchev (in that order)
- 1960: As in 1959
- 1961: From the same four to Party Leader and Prime Minister Khrushchev and President of State Brezhnev
- 1962: As in 1961

It can immediately be noted that the Chinese did not consider it proper to include Khrushchev in their greetings until 1958 although Mao no doubt was aware that Khrushchev was in control of things by the time of the 1957 Moscow celebrations. The reason for this may very well be that the

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<sup>115</sup>Mehnert, pp. 318-319.

Chinese were simply following correct protocol by always addressing the current President, Prime Minister, and sometimes the Foreign Minister. Since Khrushchev did not have a state office for some time, there would be no need to include his name in the telegrams. However, by digging further, Mehnert found that in both 1955 and 1956, most of the East European countries did include Khrushchev. This was even true of Outer Mongolia.<sup>116</sup> It is hard to believe that the PRC could be less sophisticated in such matters than these other countries, particularly Outer Mongolia!

Again, trying to determine the Chinese choice of a successor to Stalin is risky business. It is even possible that they did not really prefer anyone. All the telegrams actually indicate is that the Chinese were committed to correct diplomatic procedure. On the other hand, one could read into this formalism either a desire to play a waiting game or a certain reserve toward Khrushchev. Putting everything together, there appears to be a slight consensus in favor of the latter vein.

A summation of Chinese Communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union from 1949-1957 reveals a pattern of general deference on the part of the PRC but with growing attempts at independence as well. The Stalin era, 1949-1953, was a

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<sup>116</sup>Mehnert, pp. 318-319.

rather rugged austere period with the Chinese struggling to establish their control at home while fighting a debilitating war in Korea. It is safe to say that they quite willingly accepted the USSR as the senior partner in their relationship during this period.

When the old Russian dictator died, there was a certain amount of confusion in Moscow for a time which translated into a loosening of reins. The PRC was quick to seize this opportunity by moving vigorously into the international theater and by elevating itself a bit within the framework of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. This period lasted from the middle of 1953 through 1955.

In many respects 1956 was a crucial year. At the Twentieth Russian Party Congress, Khrushchev issued his brutal denunciation of Stalin which apparently encouraged the later uprisings in Poland and Hungary. For a time the Kremlin's leaders seemed paralyzed and the Chinese boldly assumed the initiative. Presumably, their reward was acceptance of China's unique path to Socialism as well as a nearly co-equal position in the leadership of the Socialist Camp, a reward which was shrugged off the following year.

Internal difficulties in both the Soviet Union and Communist China combined to make 1957 a transitional year. Perhaps without either side realizing it, the leadership of the USSR moved to the Right while Peking moved to the Left.

The result was that both parties could leave the Moscow Conference in November thinking that they had understood each other when in reality they were miles apart.

1957 closed with the Communist world in reasonable order. Mao, himself had declared to all the parties at Moscow that the Socialist Camp had but one leader and that was the Soviet Union. If there was any reason for suspecting an imminent break in Sino-Soviet relations at this point in history, it was well hidden. Writing in early 1957, Benjamin Schwartz asserted that "the immediate prospects for the relations between Moscow and Peking do not necessarily point to any 'break.'"<sup>117</sup> Yet a break did come and sooner than anyone expected. The very next year, 1958, the Chinese were to launch themselves into deep ideological waters revolving around the communes and the Great Leap Forward. This was the beginning of a fairly steady drive to an open split. In retrospect, then, it is possible that after 1957, there was no turning back.

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<sup>117</sup>Boorman, et. al., p. 140.

### CHAPTER III

The view from Peking, as the year 1958 opened, must have been a considerably satisfying one. Mao Tse-tung had returned from the Moscow Conference held during the previous November with additional stature and prestige for himself and his country.

His influence on Soviet policy stood higher than ever before and it was to persist into the summer of 1958. At the Conference itself he could take credit for restoring the United Communist front. . . . Mao had reached the position at which he alone among world Communist leaders had been invited by Moscow to cooperate in laying down the law to the lesser Parties: All Communist Parties were equal, of course, but the Soviet Party had always been more equal than the others; now the Chinese Party was more equal too.<sup>1</sup>

This general state of euphoria was further manifested in a broad policy statement issued by Chou En-lai in February.<sup>2</sup> His remarks clearly reflected the Chinese belief in the "East wind now prevailing over the West wind." As explained in Chapter II this feeling stemmed largely from the Soviet Union's development of a new ICBM. He suggested that the imperialists now had to face an invincible socialist camp

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<sup>1</sup>Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963), p. 74.

<sup>2</sup>New China News Agency, February 10, 1958. (Hereafter NCNA)

that was stronger and more united than ever before.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the United States was faced with serious economic recessions and political crises. It was also having trouble with NATO. In fact the total American effort to dominate its allies, Chou maintained, was meeting with rejection and the United States was likely to find itself isolated if it did not mend its ways.<sup>4</sup> Under these circumstances, according to the policy statement, the Western (and especially the United States') presence in Korea and Vietnam should not be allowed to continue. However, Chou's strongest attack came over the issues of Taiwan and the "two Chinas" concept. Once again, he called for the liberation of Taiwan but in stronger terms than had been used for some time. In particular he rallied against the "two Chinas" concept, which was gaining some small popularity, as being totally unacceptable.<sup>5</sup>

This attitude of socialist superiority permeated Chinese actions throughout the next several months. It was reflected in their renewed attack on the Yugoslavs in May, in their statements at the Warsaw Pact Meeting, their position concerning the Middle East Crisis later in the summer, and above all, the Taiwan Straits crisis. In every one of these

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<sup>3</sup>NCNA, February 10, 1958.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.



instances the Russians had some say too, and most of the time they agreed with the Chinese. Yet a closer inspection will show that Peking was always the more bellicose and probably actually alarmed their ally in the case of Taiwan.

It will be recalled that the Yugoslavs had refused to sign the Moscow declaration. This apparently touched nerve endings in both Moscow and Belgrade. The Russians soon launched an anti-revisionist campaign, although without directly naming Yugoslavia, and Tito sought strong support for his views from Gomulka and Kadar who appeared to be listening. Also, the Yugoslavs issued copies of the draft program for their upcoming party congress to all socialist countries. While sections of it had been toned down to placate the Russians, it was still much too independent to suit Kremlin tastes. The result of all of this activity was that the Soviet leaders, by the middle of April, felt called upon to refuse to attend the Yugoslav congress and to denounce its program.<sup>6</sup> Their total attack took them to the very edge of a break with Belgrade, but they seemed to want to leave the door open just a crack to a future rapprochement. A few days after the Yugoslav Party Congress opened, Soviet Presidium member Furtseva said in a speech in Warsaw, "We have been and we will be friends with Yugoslavia--always."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>For a full account of this period see Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury (eds.), The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958 (New York: Prospect Books, 1959), pp. 104-7.

<sup>7</sup>Full text in New York Times, April 25, 1958.

The Chinese Communists must have viewed the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict with a good deal of pleasure, but they held their fire until after the Belgrade Congress had concluded. On May fifth, they jumped in with both feet. An editorial appeared in Jen-min jih-pao of that date which lashed out at Tito and his group as the worst kind of revisionists.<sup>8</sup> Among other things, it was suggested that the Yugoslav program was actually dictated by the Americans and that Tito was out to undermine the whole Bloc with his brand of revisionism. The Chinese denunciation was much more severe than anything the Russians had said up until then, and it was fairly implicit that Peking was forcing the Russians to say more. The Soviet Union did indeed respond by calling a plenum meeting of the Central Committee to discuss the Yugoslav crisis, by publishing an editorial in Pravda which was strongly anti-Belgrade, and by postponing credit agreements with that country.<sup>9</sup> At the last minute, however, the Russians would temper their remarks just enough to make it clear that they were still not ready to make a clean break.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>"Modern Revisionism Must Be Condemned," Peking Review, IX (May 13, 1958).

<sup>9</sup>Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury (eds.), The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958 (New York: Prospect Books, 1959) pp. 189-190.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

The Chinese felt no such compunction. Early in June an article appeared in Hung ch'i, (Red Flag), a new Chinese Journal, written by Ch'en Po-ta, in which Tito was accused of having been bought by the American Imperialists.<sup>11</sup> Near the end of the same month the Chinese openly called Tito a traitor and began to refer derisively to the "Tito clique" as wanting to disintegrate the Bloc.<sup>12</sup> June ended with both the Chinese and the Yugoslavs withdrawing their respective ambassadors. From this time to the present the PRC has never relented in its uncompromising attitude toward Belgrade.

From this brief recitation of Yugoslav-Russian and Yugoslav-Chinese relations during the early part of 1958, it is reasonably clear that the Chinese were experiencing a new mood of exuberance and belligerency. In their minds the time was ripe for pushing hard against the decaying capitalist countries. But first, the Socialist camp had to have absolute unity; therefore Tito had to make up his mind--he had to get in or get out. When Tito made it plain that he preferred sitting on the fence, Peking was perfectly willing to dump him.<sup>13</sup> For their part the Russians were certainly harsh enough in their criticisms of the Yugoslavs, but as

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<sup>11</sup>Peking Review, XVI (June 17, 1958), p. 9.

<sup>12</sup>Peoples' Daily, June 26, 1958.

<sup>13</sup>Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict; 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 181-182.

matters rapidly reached a head, Khrushchev quietly withdrew from the field and began to recommend that Tito simply be ignored.<sup>14</sup>

The interesting point here is why the Chinese pushed the Russians so persistently in the direction of an open break with Tito. The answer to this question, as Professor Zagoria sees it, is that they needed complete Bloc unity to achieve Chinese goals in the Far East. More specifically they needed the support of the Soviet Union with its missiles and nuclear weapons. Therefore, Peking could not tolerate the slightest easing in East-West tensions. "Although Camp David was still more than a year away, the signs of a Soviet move in this direction were already perceptible. By preventing a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, the Chinese probably believed that they could make more difficult a Moscow-Washington rapprochement."<sup>15</sup> In other words the Chinese attack on Yugoslavia was actually an attack on the Soviet Union! Peking was telling Moscow not to go soft, not to become revisionist, not to play ball with the American imperialists, and the "Tito Clique" was simply a handy euphemism. The slowly widening breach between the two countries had received another push.

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<sup>14</sup>Zagoria, p. 184.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 185.

At a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries held in Moscow in May of 1958 the Chinese Communists advanced virtually the same arguments that they used during the Yugoslav incident--namely that the East wind now prevailed over the West wind. According to his speech which was published in SCMP (Survey of the China Mainland Press) Ch'en Yun, the principal Chinese "observer" at the conference, the United States was approaching an economic crisis, the Western allies were falling into disarray, and the United States was really only a "paper tiger."<sup>16</sup> This was practically the same speech that Mao had made at the Moscow Conference the year before, and like Mao, Ch'en called for stern pressure against the West. When Khrushchev presented his address, it also was a repeat of remarks that he had made in November. He spoke of the vast devastation that would result from a nuclear war and suggested the need for a summit meeting to settle international tensions. Interestingly, he also held out the promise to the West of vast markets in the USSR, the Middle East, and China!<sup>17</sup> Here again, it is evident that the Chinese were eager to follow a strong left wing policy while the Russians had moved to the middle of the road.

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<sup>16</sup>No. 1787, June 9, 1958, pp. 49-51.

<sup>17</sup>"For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism," (collection of speeches by Khrushchev), (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc.) 1960, pp. 394-433.

The first really good chance for the Socialist camp to flex its muscles came with the Middle East crisis in July of 1958. For a time, this situation threatened to bring Russian troops into direct confrontation with British and American troops. The whole world anxiously watched and waited, and the Chinese Communists, in particular, followed each Soviet move.

The crisis was the result of a coup in Iraq which overthrew a pro-Western government. When the rebellion showed signs of spreading, the British sent troops to Jordan, and the United States sent men to Lebanon. For a time, no one was certain as to what these troops were to do. If they simply stabilized things in those two countries, then the problem was not too serious, but if they also tried to move into Iraq, then they were sure to run up against Russian forces. Furthermore, the problem was complicated by the fact that the Iraqi rebellion fitted, to some extent, the pattern of a "national liberation" movement which communist countries were supposed to aid. Therefore, should American forces move into Iraq, could the Soviet Union dare to stand aside?

To avoid this dilemma, Khrushchev was determined to use every conceivable political pressure to prevent the Western powers from carrying out their supposed intentions while at the same time evading a military commitment of his own. Although he hurried to recognize the new Iraqi government and promised Nasser support in the unlikely event of a Western attack on the U.A.R., he sent no "volunteer" fighters and instead issued his

appeal for an emergency summit meeting with Indian participation on 19 July.<sup>18</sup>

His proposal failed, but both sides did agree to submit the problem to the U. N. Security Council and gradually the Middle-East crisis calmed down.

It is easy to see that the Kremlin response was a carefully measured one. While attempting to appear "tough" on the one hand, they left open the possibility of a graceful way out for everyone on the other. The evidence is that this did not suit the Chinese at all.

To the leaders of the People's Republic of China, the Middle-East crisis presented a perfect excuse for asserting the Socialist Camp's superiority. There could be only one response: military action must be met with military action. If the West were not stopped now, it would only be encouraged to move on to new adventures. Besides, the U. N. was probably incapable of removing the West from Lebanon and Jordan. Most of these sentiments were expressed in an editorial published in Peoples Daily on July 20. "If the U.S.--British aggressors refuse to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan, and insist on expanding their aggression, then the only course left to the

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<sup>18</sup>Richard Lowenthal, "Shifts and Rifts in the Russo-Chinese Alliance," Problems of Communism, January, February 1959, p. 19.

people of the world is to hit the aggressors on the head! . . . The only language they understand is that of force."<sup>19</sup>

Significantly, the Chinese refused to endorse Khrushchev's call for a summit meeting until July 22. From then on, they tended to follow the Kremlin line once again, probably because the crisis was diminishing gradually anyway.<sup>20</sup> This episode displayed another instance in which the PRC was ready to go farther than the Soviet Union and actively urged their ally to follow them.

Possibly the most dramatic divergence of opinion in foreign affairs between the USSR and the PRC occurred over the Taiwan Straits crisis. Unfortunately, scholars who have written about the affair are in some disagreement on many of its aspects, which makes any conclusions subject to some dispute. For instance, there does not seem to be any consensus as to whether the Russians knew ahead of time just what the Chinese were about to do. Alexandre Metaxas states flatly that they did not. "Without warning Moscow, Peking gave orders for an intensive bombardment of Quemoy."<sup>21</sup> Barnett takes note of the fact that Khrushchev visited Peking at the beginning of August and wonders if the Chinese might not have asked for Moscow's backing of its proposal at that time.

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<sup>19</sup>Jen-Min Jih-pao, July 20, 1958.

<sup>20</sup>Zagoria, p. 199.

<sup>21</sup>Alexandre Metaxas, Moscow or Peking? (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), p. 85.



However, he makes no conclusion, saying simply: "Whether or not a specific agreement on this subject was concluded between Mao and Khrushchev, within three weeks after their meeting, the Chinese Communists did, in fact, open up an intense bombardment of Quemoy. . . ." <sup>22</sup> These same two authors are in disagreement over the probable outcome of the crisis as far as relations between the two countries is concerned. Metaxas thinks that it left them further apart than ever and caused considerable bitterness. <sup>23</sup> On the other hand, Barnett maintains that, "in this crisis the Russians gave Peking stronger political and diplomatic backing than ever before. They fully endorsed all of the Chinese Communists' claims, and at the height of the crisis Khrushchev stated that 'an attack on the People's Republic of China . . . is an attack on the Soviet Union.'" <sup>24</sup>

One of the most detailed and well written accounts of the entire crisis period can be found in Donald Zagoria's book, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961. He offers several reasons for the venture which can be boiled down to mean mainly that Mao wanted to give East-West tensions another vigorous push and apparently felt that the off-shore islands

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<sup>22</sup>A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy (New York: Harper and Brother, 1960), p. 367.

<sup>23</sup>Metaxas, pp. 89-90.

<sup>24</sup>Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 368.

in Taiwan Straits were a relatively safe target. In this, Mao was mistaken. The Americans and the Nationalist Chinese found ways of defending the islands which obviated Peking's plans. The attack lasted from August 23 to September 6, when the PRC agreed to negotiate. Of great interest is Zagoria's observation that Soviet diplomatic support during this period was loud but not overly belligerent. After September 6, when the crisis was all but over, Soviet diplomatic support increased markedly, including the threat to use atomic weapons if the Americans also did so. If Zagoria's assessment is correct, and he offers fairly solid supporting evidence, one could only conclude that the Russian response was cautious and even cynical.<sup>25</sup>

As was stated at the beginning of the discussion of the Taiwan Straits crises, the whole matter is still in some dispute. On balance, however, Professor Zagoria probably made the best over-all evaluation.

All that can be safely concluded is that Mao Tse-tung, having undertaken a venture on the basis of a calculation of the balance of power which was not shared by Khrushchev, was forced to make a public and humiliating withdrawal. Judging by the secret documents exchanged between the two parties in 1960, there seems good reason to believe that the Russians did fear that the Chinese might drag them into a war and that Peking resented insufficient Soviet support. It seems likely that the Strait venture left much ill feeling on both sides.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Zagoria, pp. 206-16.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

The Taiwan Straits crisis was the last major point of contention between the USSR and the PRC in the foreign policy field to occur in 1958. As serious as some of the differences had been over the various foreign policy issues during the year, it is not likely that they had the profound impact which was to result from a purely domestic decision of the Chinese. The reference, of course, is to the introduction of the "people's communes."

Some mention was made in the last chapter as to the general reasons for advancing the commune idea. Briefly again, the feeling among many top Chinese party leaders was that the economy (especially industry) was beginning to flag, not nearly enough aid was being received from Russia, and, perhaps, the entire revolutionary spirit needed to be revitalized in a "Great Leap Forward."

These sentiments, voiced mostly by the Left-wing, were formalized into the commune program. The 500,000,000 Chinese peasants living in the countryside would be herded onto communes where they would all share equally and each give freely of his labor.<sup>27</sup> Living conditions were to be highly regimented, and there was hope that each commune would be mostly self-sufficient--hence the rather notorious "backyard furnaces."

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<sup>27</sup>David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 63.

And, "In so far as the scheme made economic sense at all, it could be seen as an attempt to deal with the pressing problems of food shortage and lagging industrial plans by exploiting the one resource of which China had no shortage: unskilled manpower."<sup>28</sup>

The resolution of the Chinese Communist Party which established the leap forward came on August 29, and almost immediately extravagant claims for the success of the leap were put forward. The press spoke glowingly of the food problem being basically solved in 1958 and completely solved in 1959. Mao himself announced that grain production would double in 1958 and double again in 1959!<sup>29</sup> On October 1, the Peoples' Daily editorialized that "a happy prosperous life of abundant food and clothing is no longer a remote ideal and can be realized within two or three years."<sup>30</sup>

As fantastic as all of this must have sounded to the Russians, there is no overwhelming evidence that the reports particularly bothered the leaders of the Kremlin. In fact,

Soviet articles approved of the mass use of labor power for the construction of irrigation and other facilities in the countryside, seeing in this another peculiarly Chinese response to capital shortage. . . . Thus, Soviet journals seemed to approve of the new Chinese economic

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Zagoria, pp. 89-90.

<sup>30</sup>The Peoples' Daily, October 1, 1958.

policies which ultimately led to the communes--despite the fact that these policies varied considerably from past and present Soviet economic practice.<sup>31</sup>

It should be noted, however, that this was before the Russians fully understood what was going on.

Quite early in the commune program, the Chinese began to advance some far-reaching political conclusions which had major significance to Sino-Soviet relations. For one thing, Peking started saying that their commune program would put them within early reach of Marx's promised land. "Less than ten years after taking over a backward country largely devastated by war they were claiming to be within sight of Communism. This was a goal which the Russians, for all their industrial achievements over the previous forty years, had only just dared to name, and even then in the vaguest terms."<sup>32</sup> It is easy to imagine what Moscow must have thought of this impertinence, once it became obvious.

A corollary assumption, which would no doubt occur to the Soviets, would be the possible gains in foreign influence of the Chinese experiment. If the PRC could leap so quickly to Communism, might not other backward nations see the Chinese way as a better road to socialism than the Russian? William E. Griffith has stated it this way: "The communes also represented a Chinese claim to ideological primary as

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<sup>31</sup>Zagoria, p. 91.

<sup>32</sup>Floyd, p. 64.

the creators of a rapid and effective road to communism, particularly for the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America."<sup>33</sup>

In addition to these potentially troublesome issues, Peking returned to the theme that Mao had thought all of this up and was therefore something of a prophet. In fact, it was asserted that he was clearly on a par, as a theoretician, with Marx and Lenin. This was probably the beginning of the gradually developing concept that Mao was much more important than Khrushchev. As David Floyd put it, the Chinese "were led by Mao Tse-tung who was a 'prophet' and an original Marxist thinker. Who else could compete with him? Khrushchev was by comparison a petty party official, with no 'works' to his name."<sup>34</sup> C. P. Fitzgerald has suggested that "when Mao became not only a prophet for Asia, but the senior and sole surviving 'contributor to the treasury of Marxist thought,' the relationship between Asian and European Communism was very greatly changed."<sup>35</sup> With occasional periods of relaxation, the persistent building of a "cult of Mao" has continued right up to the present.

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<sup>33</sup>William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1964), p. 18.

<sup>34</sup>Floyd, p. 64.

<sup>35</sup>C. P. Fitzgerald, The Birth of Communist China (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 261.

There is some speculation as to just when the Russians became aware of what the commune program was all about. A few observers think that Mao may have discussed the subject with Khrushchev, around the first of August, when the Soviet leader was visiting Peking, but it was probably not a major agenda item. Mehnert's statement is typical:

We do not know whether Peking gave the Kremlin advance information on the people's communes. If during the visit to Peking in July and August 1958 Chrushev was told by Mao what was going on, certainly nothing was said publicly about it. If Mao concealed from his guest the mass movement which was then already under way, or even its scope (and there are many indications that this is what happened), this must have been an additional reason for Moscow's anger.<sup>36</sup>

Of course, the commune resolution was made public, and, as already indicated, the Chinese press spoke almost daily about the wonderful expectations of such a plan. All of this was available to the Russians, so they obviously knew about the communes. The point is, they did not fully understand then.

Professor Zagoria has made the plausible deduction that the Soviet Union was adequately aware of Chinese difficulties in agriculture and industrial production, and therefore hailed The People's Communes as a realistic effort to overcome these problems. Moreover, it is probable that the Russians initially believed the communes to be some sort of

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<sup>36</sup>Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, trans. by Leila Vennewitz (New York: Mentor Books, 1964), p. 261.

higher-type cooperative, incorporating both agricultural and industrial enterprise.<sup>37</sup> He tentatively concluded that "if the Chinese had chosen to call the 'communes' by some other name, if they had made no ideological claims for them, and if they had not pushed the 'egalitarian' aspect of the experiment as far as they did, the communes would not have caused the considerable friction in Sino-Soviet relations that they did."<sup>38</sup> In short then, it would appear that the Kremlin was not aware of the threat to its leadership position until after the communes had been in operation for the better part of three months.

Even when the Russians finally saw the full significance of the People's Communes, they reacted in a carefully restrained manner, at least for the balance of 1958. Some of their criticism, quite naturally, was rather pointed, as, for example, T. A. Stepanyan's articles in Voprosy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy) of October 16, 1958. In it, he alleged that the Soviet Union and its East European allies would reach perfect communism first, and only later would the Asian Communist countries follow.<sup>39</sup> Also, in December, Mr. Khrushchev is

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<sup>37</sup>Zagoria, pp. 112-15.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>39</sup>T. A. Stepanyan, "Oktyabrskaya revolyuttsiya i stanovlenie kommunisticheskoi formatsii," Voprosy Filosofii, 10, 1958, p. 34, as quoted in Harry Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), p. 196.



supposed to have told (then) Senator Hubert Humphrey, who was in Moscow at the time, that communes were "reactionary" and "old fashioned."<sup>40</sup> Presumably, Khrushchev felt certain that the remark would get back to the Chinese and wanted it that way. (Later, Khrushchev generally denied having made the comment.)

The basic response, however, was almost total silence. The word commune was practically eliminated from all Russian news items concerning China, and even the scholarly journals were extremely sparing in using the word. Soviet leaders in particular abstained from any reference to the communes in their official speeches from the middle of October on.<sup>41</sup> Soviet Ambassador Yudin made two public speeches in Peking on the occasion of the October Revolution anniversary. In both cases he completely ignored the communes while stressing the official Russian line on the transition to communism.<sup>42</sup> Interestingly, it is at about this same time that the Chinese themselves began to retreat somewhat from their positions. It has been suggested that Yudin may have received instructions from Moscow to tell the Chinese to back off.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Schwartz, p. 169.

<sup>41</sup>Zagoria, p. 111.

<sup>42</sup>NCNA, November 6 and 7, 1958.

<sup>43</sup>Zagoria, pp. 111-12.

An example of a subtle and perhaps amusing reproach that the Kremlin used against the PRC came in October. It involved the CPSU's October Revolution anniversary slogans as they appeared each year from time to time in Pravda. Generally, all of the Satellite countries received the same slogan except China, which was treated separately. Following is a brief table showing the various slogans:

TABLE 2  
SOVIET SLOGANS ON SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION\*

Year	China	Satellites
October 1955	successfully struggling for . . . construction of the foundations of socialism	struggling for . . . the construction of socialism
May 1956	successfully realizing a socialist transformation	struggling for . . . the construction of socialism
October 1956	successfully building socialism	struggling for . . . the construction of socialism
May 1957	builder of socialism	building socialism
October 1957	builder of socialism	building socialism
May 1958	builder of socialism	building socialism
October 1958	building socialism	building socialism

\*Source: All statements abbreviated from the full slogans as they appeared in various issues of Pravda, as quoted in Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 112.

A brief look at the table immediately reveals that the PRC was always treated a little better than the satellites and from May of 1957 was accorded the high station of "builder of socialism." It is hard to imagine that the Soviet Union would have applied a much stronger accolade to itself. Then in October of 1958, the USSR not only downgraded China to a status of only "building socialism" but put the Chinese on the same level as, presumably, Bulgaria. There does not seem to be any evidence that Peking took any special note of their demotion, but it is clear, given the sometimes strange world of communist jargon, that they had been given a distinct slap on the wrist.

For the most part then, the Russian reaction to the communes during the latter part of 1958 was usually subtle, academic, or simply silence. They would make much more severe and even sinister attacks in 1959 as will be shown. Oddly enough, by then, the need for reaction was probably already greatly reduced.

The "great leap forward" and communization program started out auspiciously enough, and spectacular gains were apparently made in many areas. Most of these, however, were short-term gains, and very quickly, enormous shortcomings in over-all planning began to appear. Soon, confusion, frustration, and resentment set in. A. Doak Barnett has aptly described the situation:

For a brief period after the start of the "great leap," Communist China did experience an outburst of organized human activity that probably has few parallels in history, at any time or in any place. But clearly the Chinese Communists attempted to do too much too fast, and they made some very serious mistakes. Economic planning and administration, in effect broke down. Many of the new economic experiments were failures; notable among these were the much-publicized "backyard steel furnaces" and other hastily promoted rural industries. After being worked to the point of exhaustion, and organized to the point where they were deprived of almost all individual incentives, the Chinese people began to react in the only way that they could--by dragging their feet.<sup>44</sup>

By December 10, 1958, party rulers vaguely, but nonetheless officially, hinted that things were not going well. On that date a resolution was passed by the Central Committee which strongly implied that the communes, as an organizational unit, would most likely have to be dropped. Of course, the resolution spoke in terms of high praise for the communes, but at the same time, words such as "impetuous," "premature," "hastily," or "Utopian" were applied to their implementation. Moreover, the peasant was told that he should be allowed to keep his clothing, bedding, small livestock and poultry, his bank savings, and his right to work on his own for extra income if it did not interfere with his assigned tasks.<sup>45</sup> Thus a retreat from the "great leap forward" was begun only a few

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<sup>44</sup>A. Doak Barnett, Communist China in Perspective (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 55.

<sup>45</sup>See Chinese Communism: Selected Documents, Dan N. Jacobs and Hans H. Baerwald, eds. (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 111-132, for full text.

months after the program was started. On the surface, the Chinese continued to support the communes in their speeches and news released for the next couple of years, but with less and less frequency. After late 1960, it was obvious that even vocal support was being quietly dropped.

In late January 1959, Khrushchev struck his first, more or less open, official blow at the communes. The Russians were holding their twenty-first party congress "which may well have been summoned specifically for the purpose of putting the Chinese in their place."<sup>46</sup> Khrushchev did not mention the PRC by name, but his target was unmistakable. "Society, he said, cannot leap from capitalism to communism."<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, he let it be known that it was improbable that one country would achieve full communism ahead of all others. "The socialist countries will enter the higher phase of communist society more or less simultaneously."<sup>48</sup>

Perhaps Khrushchev's most direct attack on the communes came in July, during a speech that was made in Poland. There, he ridiculed the idea that communes were necessary to build communism, and declared that people who thought so obviously "did not properly understand what communism is and how it is built."<sup>49</sup> This was virtually the last comment made by a top

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<sup>46</sup>Floyd, p. 64.

<sup>47</sup>Full text in Pravda, January 28, 1959.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Pravda, July 21, 1959.

Kremlin official, or, indeed, any Russian, on the communes, so that as far as they were concerned, the matter was at an end.

Although the Chinese apparently took no real note of Khrushchev's remarks in Poland, they continued to support their experiment, but in a more constrained manner. Partly, this was because the leap forward was not working but also because Peking's attention was now required to meet more dramatic problems. The dispute over the "great leap forward" and the "people's communes" was short but bitter. It is entirely possible that it was the single most important event in the deepening Sino-Soviet split.

One of the problems the PRC had to face, which was by no means new but which had been exacerbated by the leap forward, was the need for more aid. Their frantic pace of industrialization had created an enormous shortage of all sorts of goods that presumably could come only from the Soviet Union. An interesting but undocumented speculation on the USSR's being the only major source of supply has been advanced by Alexandre Metaxas in his book Moscow or Peking? He suggests that early in 1959

Khrushchev heard talk of certain negotiations which were taking place, in utter secrecy, between Peking and Formosa that is, in fact, between Mao Tze-tung [sic] and Chiang Kai-shek, under the auspices of Mme. Sun Yat-sen, widow of the great statesman and sister of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek.

A reconciliation between the two Chinas, though difficult to envisage, might lead directly to a reconciliation between China and the United States.<sup>50</sup>

If true, then it would be conceivable that Mao might seek aid from the United States rather than the Soviet Union. To forestall this eventuality, Metaxas believes that Khrushchev precipitated a crisis over Berlin only to withdraw later in exchange for the promise of a summit conference. The Eisenhower administration could hardly talk peace with the Kremlin while at the same time it tried to wean the Chinese out of the Soviet orbit. Thus, China was isolated from the West and could only make the best deal possible with the Russians.<sup>51</sup>

Whether or not Metaxas is right, the record does show that Peking concluded a new trade agreement with Moscow during the early part of 1959. Typically, however, the Chinese got far less than they wanted and had to pay a hard price for that. Soviet trade to China increased by 50% over 1958, but Peking was forced to pay cash. In fact, the Chinese actually sent more to the USSR than it received, achieving a trade surplus which helped to pay off some of its back debts.<sup>52</sup>

A related aspect of the Chinese need for industrial goods was their desire to become a nuclear power. As indicated

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<sup>50</sup>Metaxas, pp. 92-93.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>52</sup>Schwartz, p. 171.

in Chapter II, the Russians had promised Peking assistance in this area and had agreed to supply them with an actual sample bomb. But in June 1959, Khrushchev suddenly canceled the entire arrangement. All of this was done in the utmost secrecy, so that Western observers did not learn of the agreement or its subsequent cancelation until several years later. For that matter, not all of the details are clear even now. Under the circumstances, it is necessary to speculate on the motives behind Moscow's action. Griffith believes that Khrushchev probably meant to drive the PRC back into line. "In June, presumably both as penalty for the past and as threat for the future, he formally abrogated the Soviet commitment to give China aid in its atomic weapons."<sup>53</sup>

Jumping ahead to 1963, when the Sino-Soviet dispute was out in the open, the Chinese themselves reported:

As far back as June 20, 1959, when there was not yet the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was done as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet leader went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower in September.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1964), p. 18.

<sup>54</sup>Peking Review VI (August 16, 1963), 7-15.



While the Chinese are not quite saying that Khrushchev told Eisenhower the full story, their use of the term "presentation gift" strongly suggests that this was the case. Enough so, Schwartz has theorized that the "gift" accounted for the "sudden sprouting of the 'Spirit of Camp David' in September 1959 and the subsequent extraordinary, if short-lived, Soviet-American cordiality. . . ." <sup>55</sup> Since the Chinese statement was made well after the fact and in a mood of deep resentment, it should probably be treated with a bit of skepticism. On the other hand, it is fairly certain that Peking did not receive any further nuclear aid from the USSR after June 1959.

Another problem the PRC had to face during this same year was one of internal politics. The "great leap forward" had not been a unanimous decision and, as failures mounted, its detractors began to challenge openly the Left wing of the party

In April, 1959, coinciding with the period of economic rethinking after the setbacks of the previous year, certain changes were made in the Peking Government. Mao Tse-tung resigned his position as 'Chairman' or President in favour of Liu-Shao-chi, an expert in Communist theory rather than a practical statesman. Mao, who like Stalin had held the key posts of both government and party, continued as chief of the latter, so that in effect he retained supreme power. <sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Schwartz, p. 172.

<sup>56</sup>J. V. Davidson-Houston, Russia and China: From the Huns to Mao Tse-tung (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1960), p. 166.

Whether Mao was forced to resign his position or whether he simply thought it expedient to disassociate himself from the Left, is still open to some question. At any rate, his action seemed to signal much more determined attacks on the Left wing, which finally came to a head in late summer.

The group opposed to the "great leap forward" and therefore, the Left wing, was headed by Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, Minister of Defense, a member of the Politburo and a man of considerable influence within the party. He was joined by such men as Chang Wen-tien, a Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and General Huang Ko-cheng, Chief of Staff of the Army, as well as several lesser lights who collectively became known as the "anti-party" group.<sup>57</sup>

Marshal P'eng submitted a resolution at the Lushan meeting of the eighth plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Party. He apparently criticized the lack of thought that had gone into the planning for the new economic policies and ridiculed the exaggerated claims that were being made for them. Not all of the facts are known, but it is believed that at one point during the two week session, Mao's leadership itself was called into question, and he had to throw

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<sup>57</sup>For a full account of this episode see David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," The China Quarterly, VIII (October-December, 1961), 63-76.

all of his personal prestige on the line in order to win the battle.

It appeared likely that the Soviet Union played a role in this drama in the sense that both Khrushchev and Marshal P'eng were in Tirana, Albania, at the same time in May. Not everyone is agreed on this, but Edward Crankshaw asserts that the two men met there and that P'eng let Khrushchev see his resolution. "In Tirana he took the opportunity of showing this memorandum to Khrushchev, before presenting it to his colleagues at home."<sup>58</sup> The assumption is that Khrushchev gave the Marshal encouragement but in strict confidence, of course, "It is still not clear whether the Chinese colleagues knew of P'eng's 'treachery' before his arrest, or whether it did not come out until he was under duress."<sup>59</sup> The important thing is that P'eng lost the game and his position, and the Chinese had one more reason for their growing enmity toward the Soviet Union.

Foreign affairs created some awkward moments between the two red powers during 1959 even though the resultant friction was soft-pedaled at the time. Two of these moments revolved around the Sino-Indian dispute and Khrushchev's visit to America.

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<sup>58</sup>Crankshaw, p. 83.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

Early in the year, the Tibetans had revolted against their Chinese overlords and were rather brutally defeated. Many of the Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama, fled to India, where they were granted political asylum.<sup>60</sup> The Nehru government remained neutral in this dispute, but its pro-Tibet sympathy was obvious, and popular expressions of support for the Tibetans were permitted in the newspapers. This angered the Chinese, and there were several border incidents involving Chinese and Indian troops over the next few months. Finally, in September, Peking laid official claim to parts of India--east of Bhutan, and also in the states of Jammu and in Kashmir.<sup>61</sup>

Throughout this period of Sino-Indian contention, the Russians had refused to take sides:

The Russians' unwillingness to commit themselves in this issue or to identify themselves with Chinese criticisms of the Indian government followed naturally from the pains they had taken to restore friendly relations with India in the post-Stalin period. They had no intention of undoing the results of years of diplomatic and economic effort for the sake of China's southward expansion. Indian neutrality was a delicate flower.<sup>62</sup>

Moscow's position was outlined in a statement issued by Tass, official Soviet news agency on September ninth. The following excerpts are especially notable:

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<sup>60</sup>Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 700.

<sup>61</sup>R. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 78.

<sup>62</sup>Floyd, p. 72.

One cannot fail to express regret at the fact that the incident on the Sino-Indian frontier took place. The Soviet Union is in friendly relations both with the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India. The Chinese and Soviet people are linked by indestructible bonds of fraternal friendship, based on the great principles of socialist internationalism. Friendly collaboration between the USSR and India is developing successfully in accordance with the ideas of peaceful coexistence.

In Soviet ruling circles the assurance is being expressed that the government of the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India will not permit this incident to give comfort to those forces who do not want an improvement of the international situation but its worsening, and who are trying not to admit the planned slackening of international tension in relation between states. In the same circles the assurance is being expressed that both governments will adjust the misunderstanding that has arisen, taking account of their mutual interests in the spirit of the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and India.<sup>63</sup>

It is clear that while the Russians were at great pains to establish their neutrality in this situation, they nonetheless wanted an end to the hostilities which could only come with Chinese willingness. In effect, the statement put a certain amount of pressure on Peking which apparently was not appreciated although not much was said at the time.<sup>64</sup> Four years later, the Chinese referred back to the Tass statement in an effort to prove that it was the Russians who first openly exposed the Sino-Soviet rift to the whole world.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>Tass, September 9, 1959.

<sup>64</sup>Floyd, p. 73.

<sup>65</sup>"Whence the Differences?" Peoples Daily, February 27, 1963.

The Indian question died down in another month or two, but it was to pop up again with even greater intensity in the early nineteen sixties.

Khrushchev's visit to America around the middle of September evoked only lukewarm enthusiasm from the PRC for a proposed summit meeting the following year, but the Chinese were not at all convinced that imperialism would be any less dangerous just because its leaders agreed to talk. This was part of Peking's continuing desire to push a militant policy against the West.

Shortly after the Russian leader returned to Moscow, he left for the Chinese capital to take part in the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic. While Khrushchev was wined and dined in a befitting manner, it was evident to observers that relations between the two countries had definitely cooled. Even the Soviet press was surprisingly candid. On September 31, Pravda reported that the talks had been "cordial" and on October 1, the talks were termed "frank," and on October 2, they stated only that talks had taken place.<sup>66</sup> To experienced Kremlinologists this was a sure sign that the meetings had steadily deteriorated. Moreover, it is now generally believed that Khrushchev took this opportunity to schold the Chinese for their aggressive policy towards the

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<sup>66</sup>Pravda, September 31, October 1 and 2.

offshore islands, India, and the West in general. The People's Daily said as much in 1963:

After the Camp David talks, the heads of certain comrades were turned and they became more and more intemperate in their public attacks on the foreign and domestic policies of the Chinese Communist Party. They publicly abused the Chinese Communist Party as attempting 'to test by force the stability of the capitalist system' and as 'craving for war like a cock for a fight.' They also attacked the Chinese Communist Party for its general line of socialist construction, its big leap forward and its people's communes, and they spread the slander that the Chinese Party was carrying out an 'adventurist' policy in its direction of the state.<sup>67</sup>

Of course, this comment was written some three and one-half years after the fact and probably reflected greater bitterness than was actually felt in 1957. Nevertheless, the Chinese were not overly pleased with their Russian guest, and, perhaps significantly, this was the last time that Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev saw each other.

Based on all of the events discussed above, it would appear safe to believe that by the beginning of 1960, the existence of a widening rift in Sino-Soviet relations was known to most, if not all, of the important communist leaders throughout the world. Most of the lesser communist officials were probably only half aware of any difficulties, and Western observers could hardly have had more than the slightest of suspicions. However, by the end of 1960, the whole communist

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<sup>67</sup>"Whence the Differences?"

world was agog at the bitter exchanges that took place between the Russians and the Chinese at closed party conferences, and even the West could see unmistakable, if incredible, evidence of a serious split. Perhaps the watchword of this year would be competition: competition between the two powers on the international scene, within the communist bloc and over ideological leadership.

On the international level, this competition took several different forms. Early in the year, Khrushchev made a quick trip through India, Indonesia, Burma, and Afghanistan, passing out economic aid to all takers. Right on his heels came Chou En-lai and later Chen Yi, spreading good will and the offer of enlarged trade agreements. These trips were not necessarily unusual, but such close shadowing of the Russian leader could have been interpreted as Chinese anxiety.

In May, Chou En-lai visited Outer Mongolia and extended a fair sized loan to that country. A couple of months later, Vyacheslav Molotov, an old Khrushchev critic, was withdrawn from the Soviet embassy in Ulan Bator, which, perhaps, was significant. The Russians gave a loan of \$35 million to the new state of Guinea in Africa; the Chinese gave Guinea \$25 million. Castro in Cuba received an undisclosed amount of economic and military aid from Moscow; the Chinese loaned



him \$21 million.<sup>68</sup> In short, everywhere the Russians went, with money, friendship, and trade, the Chinese soon followed with the same commodities. It is possible that all this indicated was close cooperation between Russia and China in their foreign aid programs. However, given the hard pressed Chinese economy, which could have used the money at home, it is more likely that Peking was determined to seek influence in the same places as Moscow. Probably such competition was not welcomed by the Russians, since much of the money the Chinese were throwing around had almost certainly come from the USSR!

The breakup of the Paris summit conference provided another spark of dissention. Khrushchev, as previously stated, wanted this conference very much, to prove that his ideas on disarmament and peaceful coexistence could work, whereas the Chinese were skeptical. When the conference collapsed because of the crash of an American U-2 "spy" plane in Russian territory, the Chinese must have rejoiced. Peking had said all along that the Western imperialistic nations were not to be trusted, particularly the United States. "No sooner had Khrushchev packed his bags in Paris than the Chinese launched

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<sup>68</sup>All of the above figures and events were taken from Floyd, p. 81. It should be noted that many authorities doubt the reliability of both Russian and Chinese aid figures.

a campaign, even more intensive than before, against Soviet strategic views."<sup>69</sup> It is hard to imagine that the Russian leader appreciated the Chinese equivalent of "I told you so."

Later in the year, Khrushchev announced his intention to lead the Soviet delegation to the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Several interesting vignettes resulted from this decision that point up the split. For example, the Russians had long maintained that the PRC should be included as a member of the UN. Yet Khrushchev, "in his main speech to the Assembly it was noted that he dismissed the question of Chinese representation in a very few words. It was left to the Albanian delegate to make the most impassioned plea for the Chinese Communists."<sup>70</sup> Also, he was observed in the corridors carrying on friendly discussions with Tito while pointedly ignoring the Albanians.<sup>71</sup> Finally, the Soviet press, understandably, praised Comrade Khrushchev's work at the United Nations, but the Chinese press complained that the United States had once again "pushed around" the Socialist Camp, headed by the Soviet Union.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>Zagoria, pp. 316-17.

<sup>70</sup>Floyd, p. 84.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>72</sup>See Pravda, October 27, 1960 and People's Daily, October 19, 1960.

One of the best open instances of Sino-Soviet conflict that occurred during the year that the West could see, was the precipitous withdrawal of Soviet advisors from the PRC. Elsewhere in this study it was stated that thousands of Russian scientists, engineers, and technicians of one sort or other had been sent to China to aid that country's struggling scientific and industrial complex. Now, suddenly, around the middle of July, the Kremlin issued orders telling all of these people to return home.<sup>73</sup> Worse yet, they either destroyed or took with them practically all of their notes, plans, or blueprints which, of course, caused the Chinese no end of grief. (This fact, however, was not generally known until years later.) Travelers coming out of China during this episode reported the Russian departure, but the West could only guess at the numbers leaving. Moreover, while Western observers could now clearly see that something serious was going on between the USSR and China, they could not have seen the monumental fury with which Peking viewed the event, since officially the Chinese press remained silent. Even more importantly, the reason for the withdrawals remained a secret from the outside world for some time to come.

An interesting inside account of the advisor recall has been written by Mikhail A. Klochko, a Russian scientist

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<sup>73</sup>Thousands of Soviet military advisors were also in China but they apparently were not recalled at this time.

working in China when the orders came. He reports that on August fifth, he was brought into the office of two of his Chinese colleagues and given a copy of the official Soviet note to the Chinese government pursuant to the advisors recall. Professor Klochko was returned to Russia and, a year later, was sent to Canada as part of a scientific delegation. He managed to elude his supervisors long enough to ask for and receive political asylum. He has reconstructed the salient points of the Soviet note as follows:

1. The Chinese had not followed the technical advice of the Soviet specialists: They preferred to do things their own way, which was often exactly the opposite of what the Russians had advised them to do.
2. The Chinese were often scornful of the Soviet prescriptions: They crossed out passages, tore them up, and threw away the instructions given them.
3. The Chinese had created intolerable conditions and a painful psychological climate around the Soviet specialists: They spied on them, eavesdropped, searched their belongings, opened their mail, etc.
4. There had been instances of Soviet specialists being molested and even attacked. This proved that the specialists had not been adequately protected by the Chinese authorities.
5. All these things had happened despite the great assistance the Soviet government had given China. Therefore, the Soviet government had decided to call back all Soviet advisors in China in the course of July and August--all engineers,

technicians, skilled workers, scientists, and other Soviet citizens working in China.<sup>74</sup>

Oddly enough, Klochko agreed that these allegations were more or less true, but he still did not think conditions were bad enough to warrant the withdrawal. He guessed that there must be some larger explanation, a suspicion that was confirmed about a week later when he was summoned to the Russian embassy in Peking. Ambassador Chervonenko had evidently received orders from Moscow to call in all Soviet specialists who were also communist party members and to inform that fully on the real reason behind the withdrawal. Since Klochko was a party member, he became privy to an extraordinary confession of the Kremlin's inability to bring the Chinese to heel.

Chervonenko proceeded to recite a long list of Chinese errors beginning as early as 1957. The "hundred flowers" campaign had been a mistake, as were the "peoples communes" later. Chinese foreign policy was a disaster. The Chinese had alienated the Indians and Indonesia. They unjustly attacked the Yugoslavs while supporting the intractable Albanians. The PRC's attitude toward America was contradictory. On the one hand, they called the United States a "paper tiger," while on the other, they accused the United States of wanting

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<sup>74</sup>Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in Red China, trans. Andrew Mac Andrew (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 177-78.

to launch a nuclear holocaust. Finally, the Ambassador repeated the five charges listed above as well as maintaining that the Chinese were trying to spread subversive propaganda among the Soviet advisors!<sup>75</sup> Because of these errors, Chervonenko concluded, "The Soviet Union was forced to recall its technical assistance and to give the Chinese government the opportunity to ponder its actions and perhaps to mend its ways."<sup>76</sup>

There is one more aspect of the withdrawal of advisors from the PRC which has relevance: namely, the timing of the matter. The order was issued some time in the first or second week of July; this put it only a couple of weeks or less after the conclusion of the Bucharest Conference. On that occasion "the break was finally declared and made public within the Communist movement at the fateful Congress of the Rumanian party in Bucarest [sic] where Khrushchev himself faced the Chinese delegates and, with a great release of pent-up feeling, told them what he thought of them--and received as good as he gave."<sup>77</sup> In other words, it is possible that Khrushchev cooled his temper, developed at Bucharest, by ordering

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<sup>75</sup>Klochko, pp. 183-86.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 187.

<sup>77</sup>Crankshaw, p. 96.

the withdrawal of Soviet advisors. Obviously, Bucharest is an extremely important story, but first it would be profitable to look briefly at other meetings that preceded the Rumanian conference before pursuing that part of the dispute.

The Warsaw Pact countries met in Moscow in February 1960. The PRC was not a member of this group, but was allowed to send an observer named Kang Sheng. As usual, at the end of the session, a "Declaration" was issued which reputedly expressed unanimous approval.<sup>78</sup> The Declaration was full of optimism over East-West relations, and Khrushchev's visit with Eisenhower that had "broken the ice of the cold war." War was ruled out; peaceful coexistence, and especially personal encounters between world statesmen, represented the best way to assure world peace. Under these circumstances, disarmament proposals ought to move ahead.

Kang Sheng was permitted to make a speech to the meeting which was later published in the Chinese press.<sup>79</sup> He admitted that East-West relations were better, and that Khrushchev's visit had been successful, but denied that this was due to any change of heart by the West. Indeed, he argued that the United States remained the "arch enemy of world

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<sup>78</sup>Full text of the Declaration of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty, Pravda, February 5, 1960.

<sup>79</sup>Peking Review, VI (February 9, 1960), 6-9.

peace." Relations had improved only because the Communist Camp had become so strong--the East wind was still prevailing over the West wind. This, then, was no time to be talking about disarmament.

During the course of his address, Kang Sheng made two important but somewhat contradictory points. First, he wanted it clearly understood that any agreement made with the West without Chinese participation--presumably over disarmament--would not be considered binding by the PRC. This suggests a desire for some independence, so the delegates must have been a little surprised when Kang next proceeded to a renewed call for unity. The Chinese Communists, he declared, "have always taken the safeguarding of the unity of the Socialist camp as their sacred international duty."<sup>80</sup> Actually, from the Chinese viewpoint, Kang Sheng was not being contradictory at all. As stated many times before, Peking wanted bloc unity, with Soviet leadership, but only so long as this led in the direction that the Chinese wanted it to go and only if unity contributed to Chinese growth. Whenever these things were not the case, then Peking would refuse to be bound. So it is hard to see how the Kremlin could agree to such a philosophy.

Peking used the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth on April 22, 1960 to issue a series of

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<sup>80</sup>Peking Review, VI (February 9, 1960), 8.



of articles and speeches that fully spelled out their ideological position as opposed to the "modern revisionists," i.e. Khrushchev. The most important of these broadsides was printed in Hung Ch'i (Red Flag) and was entitled "Long Live Leninism."<sup>81</sup>

It is discouragingly long, painfully tedious, repetitious, and so heavily overlaid with communist jargon and rhetoric as to be nearly unintelligible in places. Fortunately, most authorities, including Professor Zagoria, believe that the whole thing can be boiled down to a few main ideas.

The three principal targets of the Chinese fire were the very three basic ideological innovations which Khrushchev had personally presented to the 20th Party Congress and which provided the doctrinal backdrop for his more flexible post-Stalin global strategy. These were Khrushchev's new doctrines on peaceful co-existence, on the non-inevitability of war, and on the possibility of peaceful roads to power in non-Communist countries.<sup>82</sup>

In effect, what the Chinese did was to simply search through the rather voluminous writings of Lenin, picking out those quotations which best proved Peking's point of view. However, this was a game that the Russians could also play.

Less than a week later, Otto V. Kuusinen, a member of the party Presidium, answered the Chinese in an anniversary speech that he made in Moscow.<sup>83</sup> He too quoted from Lenin,

<sup>81</sup>Full text in Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960.

<sup>82</sup>Zagoria, p. 299.

<sup>83</sup>Full text in Pravda, April 23, 1960.

only this time, of course, he picked just those that supported Moscow's position. Kuusinen even quoted Lenin's wife Krupskaya. She conveniently recalled having heard her husband say that the time would come when war would be so destructive as to make it impossible. Presumably, this backed Khrushchev's three new doctrines, and anyone who didn't think so was just being dogmatic. Unfortunately, the Chinese did not have available an appropriate widow that they could throw into the fray.

The total effect on the Kremlin's leaders of "Long Live Leninism" must have been abrasive, to say the least, but the whole affair was quickly submerged by other events. Almost on the heels of the exchange came news of the Soviet downing a United States U-2 "spy" plane, and the subsequent aborting of the Paris summit meeting in May. In the ensuing flap, the Hung Ch'i polemic lost much of its sting.

Peking got another chance to needle the Russians when the World Federation of Trade Unions met in the Chinese capital early in June. In many ways, it was one of their better chances, since the meeting was in their own backyard where they could better impress the delegates, the WFTU tended to be Left-wing rather than Right, and the fiasco of the Paris summit meeting made the Chinese look like prophets.

Chou En-lai and other PRC speakers took full advantage of their position by lambasting the Soviet Union's theories

at every turn. Chou denounced United States' imperialism and mocked Khrushchev's efforts at summitry by declaring: "Peace can never be achieved by begging it of imperialism."<sup>84</sup> The main Chinese delegate, Liu Chang-sheng, spoke on war and disarmament. He agreed with Khrushchev that general world war might no longer be inevitable, but all other wars were still possible and should not be denied. Disarmament, he thought, was also in the realm of possibility, but the Chinese had grave reservations. "It is of course inconceivable that imperialism will accept proposals for general and complete disarmament."<sup>85</sup>

Despite these comments and the careful behind the scenes wooing of foreign delegates, the Chinese do not appear to have gained much from the WFTU conference. On the other hand, they had again succeeded in annoying the Russians, as evidenced by Khrushchev's remarks a couple of weeks later at Bucharest.

One of the best accounts of the Rumanian Party Congress held in June of 1960 has been written by Edward Crankshaw in his book The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking.<sup>86</sup> By carefully analyzing the statements of satellite leaders as well as the

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<sup>84</sup>People's Daily, June 7, 1960.

<sup>85</sup>Peking Review, Vol. XXIV, 1960.

<sup>86</sup>See chapter Ten.

official publications of the Soviet and Chinese press, Mr. Crankshaw has been able to reconstruct the events at Bucharest. Since he wrote his book, the Chinese themselves have made available evidence which strongly corroborates Crankshaw's narrative.

The Bucharest Conference started out well enough with the first two or three days given over to the usual stereotyped speeches from one delegate after another. However, the Russians apparently used this time to lay a subtle behind the scenes framework from which to attack the PRC. Each delegation was invited to visit with key Russian delegates at which time they were quietly told of the growing Sino-Soviet split and informed that the Chinese were to blame. At the conclusion of each of these sessions, the Russians passed out a long "letter" to each participant, detailing the history of the struggle and listing the many Chinese errors. It ran to over eighty pages and "was stiff in tone, sometimes extremely blunt, but always closely argued. It came as a deep shock to most of the delegates to realize that the two greatest parties in the Communist movement were very seriously at loggerheads on points of basic policy."<sup>87</sup>

Once the letter had been circulated, the conference took on a different meaning. The Russians called for a

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<sup>87</sup>Crankshaw, p. 103.

secret session where the leaders of various delegations got up and more or less denounced the Chinese. The Soviets softening-up process had worked.

Finally, the time came for the Chinese to take the floor. Their delegation was headed by Peng Chen, a leading member of their party hierarchy and the mayor of Peking. Peng was visibly shaken by the united attack on his country's policies, but he nevertheless maintained his poise. His comments were restrained, reasonable, and conciliatory. Mainly, Peng pleaded for more sympathetic understanding of his government's actions while, at the same time, he denied that they were in any way wrong. All in all, his carefully measured speech had a calming effect on the conference, and things might have ended there except that the Chinese now decided that two could play the "letter" game as easily as one.

Apparently, the Russians had actually written two letters, both attacking the Chinese, but in different language. The first one, sent privately and exclusively to the Chinese, was accusatory, savage, and downright degrading. The second one, the one distributed to all of the delegations at Bucharest, has already been described as sometimes blunt but closely-argued. This second letter could be considered altogether proper and well within the framework of constructive criticism, but the first letter was clearly insulting and hardly the type of thing that one comrade would write

of another. In effect, it showed off the Kremlin leaders to be nothing but loud-mouthed brutes trying to sledgehammer the poor Chinese into the Russian line of thought.

What the Chinese did, following the closed session, was to run off copies of this violent letter and distribute it to the other delegations. They made no comment of their own, but let the letter speak for itself. Of course, this revelation now placed Moscow's version of the split in a new light. Seemingly, the Russians had been hung on their own petard.

It is easy to see that the distribution of these two letters produced conditions that could only lead to a showdown, and one was not long in coming. After another day of open public speeches the Congress met for the second closed session. Khrushchev himself took the floor and, according to Crankshaw's information, the Russian leader's performance was extraordinary.

He had in front of him a prepared speech, but, as so often on lesser occasions, it was soon clear that he was departing from that speech. . . . He did not observe the twenty-minute rule. . . . He abandoned reasoned argument and, indeed, all pretense of judicious analysis of differences and embarked on a violent tirade couched in purely personal terms which was foreign not only to the spirit of Marxist-Leninism but also to the spirit of great power diplomacy.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>88</sup>Crankshaw, p. 107.

On balance, Khrushchev simply repeated the same list of grievances that had previously been indicated in both letters, only by stating them publicly in a bitter personal attack he displayed the depth of which the split had run. If there were any remaining doubt about the split, Peng Chen removed it in his answer. While keeping his remarks less personal and on a higher plane, Peng minced no words in demonstrating that it was the Russians who were wrong and not the Chinese. In fact, his defense was so eloquent that Khrushchev offered no rebuttal and appeared willing to let the conference run its course. There were a few more speeches, mostly in support of the USSR--only Albania supported the PRC--and then the delegates approved the usual joint communique before adjourning. The last thing they did was to approve a conference of all Parties to be held in Moscow the following November.

Eighty-one of the world's communist parties participated in the Moscow conference and virtually every important communist leader was there with the notable exception of Mao Tse-tung of the PRC and Palmiro Togliatti of Italy. China was represented by Liu Shao-Chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, while the Italian party sent Luigi Longo. The meeting was held in secrecy to the extent that the Soviet press did not even admit it had been held until several days after it was over.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup>Floyd, p. 111.

However, shortly after returning home, several satellite leaders made extensive statements, both publicly and semi-privately, which have enabled Western observers to describe the event in good detail.<sup>90</sup> As a matter of fact, the unusually large number of interesting "leaks" suggests that perhaps Moscow encouraged some of the leakers to say what they said.<sup>91</sup>

A brief analysis of these sources indicates that the conference may have been a bit less explosive than one might have expected. Both the Russians and the Chinese reiterated all of the same old arguments concerning peaceful co-existence versus world revolution, etc., that had been gone over before. Also, there were endless speeches from all of the other parties present which made the whole thing tedious, indeed. According to Crankshaw's account of the meeting, the only real fireworks came when Enver Hoxha of Albania made a personal attack on Khrushchev, much to everyone's astonishment.<sup>92</sup> The most important result of the Moscow Conference was that the entire communist world--not just a few of its leaders--now knew the depth of the Sino-Soviet split. They also knew that, except for Albania, China stood almost alone.

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<sup>90</sup>The English text of many of these statements, made especially by communist officials from Italy, France, and Belgium, may be found in The Sino-Soviet Dispute, documented and analysed by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar (London: China Quarterly, 1962).

<sup>91</sup>Floyd, p. 112.

<sup>92</sup>Crankshaw, p. 131.



At the conclusion of the meeting, a declaration was issued which, in the words of Professor Zagoria, "represented, not a real compromise of Soviet and Chinese views, but a collocation of them."<sup>93</sup> In other words, both sides won a little and lost a little, but both agreed to paper over their differences in an outward show of unity.

For the next ten or eleven months, virtually nothing was done directly by either Moscow or Peking to exacerbate their continuing conflict. It is possible that each party wanted to live up to the Moscow declaration of 1960, but, more likely, external pressures were at work.

The Kremlin had to concern itself during the first half of 1961 with problems of agriculture, Khrushchev's brief and largely unproductive visit with President Kennedy, and the Berlin wall. At the same time, "China was in the midst of economic crisis so severe that it was forced to turn to Canada and Australia for grain. There were increasing reports of perilously low food supplies on the mainland. The commune system had been all but abandoned. . . ."<sup>94</sup>

By October, however, the Russians were ready to return to the fray. Khrushchev used the occasion of the Twenty-second Russian Party Congress to read the Albanians practically right out of the Socialist Camp. Throughout all of 1961,

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<sup>93</sup>Zagoria, p. 367.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

prior to the Twenty-second Congress, relations between the Soviet Union and tiny Albania had steadily deteriorated.<sup>95</sup> Bitter comments were made by both sides, and the Russians finally withdrew nearly all of their experts from Albania, as well as stopping aid to that country. The PRC promptly seized this opportunity of establishing a satellite of its own in Eastern Europe by sending aid and Chinese experts to Tirana. Thus, when Khrushchev attacked the Albanians at the Twenty-second Congress, he was in actuality delivering a left-handed slap at the Chinese. Moreover, he made certain the Chinese understood his meaning. In his speech, which was broadcast over Moscow radio, Khrushchev stated that the Russians would never compromise the principles established at the Twentieth Party Congress "either to the Albanian leaders or to anyone else."<sup>96</sup> Naturally, the "anyone else" could only have been China, and Chou En-lai, the PRC's representative to the Congress, clearly got the message.

Chou answered the challenge in three ways. First, he made a speech to the Congress in which he defended the Albanians as best he could, while at the same time chiding Khrushchev for making a public attack.

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<sup>95</sup>See William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1963) for a full account of the dispute.

<sup>96</sup>Moscow Radio Home Service, October 18, 1961.

We hold that if a dispute or difference unfortunately arises between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of equality and unanimity through consultation. Any public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful in resolving problems.<sup>97</sup>

If this statement were cautious and discreet in its criticism of the Soviet leader, Chou's next action was anything but subtle. A day or two after the speech, he made the rather traditional trip to Red Square to lay a wreath at the foot of Lenin's encased body, which was a perfectly acceptable act, but then Chou moved on to also place a wreath at Stalin's feet.<sup>98</sup> Obviously, this act was designed to embarrass and perhaps infuriate Khrushchev and the anti-Stalinists. Shortly after this event, the Russians removed Stalin's remains from Lenin's tomb and placed them in a simple undistinguished grave, thereby making any future wreath-laying virtually impossible.<sup>99</sup> It is extremely likely that the two events are related.

Peking's representative did one final thing to answer Khrushchev's challenge which was simply to pack up and return home long before the Congress ended. Moreover, Chou pointedly refused to give any reason for his sudden departure so that it appeared to everyone as if he were walking out.<sup>100</sup> In a

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<sup>97</sup>NCNA, October 19, 1961.

<sup>98</sup>Floyd, p. 147.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid.

<sup>100</sup>Zagoria, p. 370.

sense, this gesture may have been more prophetic than it seemed at the time. The two powers would be "walking out" on each other much more often in the future.

Throughout the remainder of 1961 and for the first half of 1962, the Sino-Soviet conflict was considerably muted. This was the principal period, already alluded to, in which the Russians would occasionally publish editorials criticizing the "Albanian dogmatists"--meaning the Chinese--and the Chinese would sometimes publish critical comments about the "Yugoslav revisionists"--meaning the Russians. It is now generally believed that the main reason for the temporary lull was a private plea made by the North Vietnamese Party, that both Moscow and Peking stop attacking each other in their press and radio and try to settle their disagreements through a new world communist conference.<sup>101</sup> Significantly, such a conference was never held, although both sides took turns calling for one. The standard procedure was for the Russians to push for a conference whenever they felt conditions best for them; of course, the Chinese would then refuse. Conversely, whenever the Russians were suffering some embarrassment, such as the Cuban Crisis, the Chinese would promptly agree to a conference only to have the Soviets demure.

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<sup>101</sup>Harry Gelman, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict," Communist China, ed. Franz Schurman and Orville Schell (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 283.

Near the end of summer, 1962, Peking apparently decided to heat up the debate once again. In late August and early September, the Chinese press printed three or four violent new attacks on "modern revisionism."<sup>102</sup> Some probable reasons for the renewed onslaught are that, by this time, the PRC had learned that it was not going to receive much, if any, aid from the Soviet Union. Also, Khrushchev was once more actively wooing that arch-revisionist--Tito. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Prime Minister Nehru of India announced that his country would shortly receive Soviet built MIG fighter planes as well as a MIG production plant itself.<sup>103</sup> The first two reasons are easy to understand, and the last one recalls the Sino-Indian border dispute which had never been fully resolved.

There were two events that took place in late October that strained Sino-Soviet relations even more. One was the Chinese attack on India, and the other involved Soviet missiles in Cuba. Curiously, these two crises began within a couple of days of each other.

In October 20, the PRC launched a fairly large-scale invasion of India in the areas of Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency. After scoring some surprisingly easy

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<sup>102</sup>Gelman, p. 285.

<sup>103</sup>Floyd, p. 158.

victories, the Chinese agreed to a cease-fire in November, thereby allowing the situation to return more or less to normal. The war forced the Soviet Union into a most embarrassing position, which was probably one of the goals Peking had in mind. Moscow had to decide whether to aid a fraternal communist country--China--or to aid a strictly neutral non-communist country--India.

Their embarrassment was apparent in the way the Soviet press almost ignored the Sino-Indian conflict although the world's press was full of it at the time, and from the Russian's obvious reluctance to take sides in the dispute. . . . For once, the Soviet propagandists . . . found themselves tongue-tied and unable to do much more than urge a "peaceful" solution to the dispute.<sup>104</sup>

The Chinese had made an extremely important point, but unfortunately for them, before they could exploit it fully, the Cuban crisis erupted.

Khrushchev's decision to secretly place Soviet missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy's firm insistence that they must be removed, and the subsequent withdrawal of the missiles is a story that has been told many times by now.<sup>105</sup> The importance of all of this action to this study lies in the effect it had on Sino-Soviet relations. In actuality, there were two reactions from the Chinese: the first occurred when the

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<sup>104</sup>Floyd, p. 159.

<sup>105</sup>For a detailed summary, see the New York Times, November 3, 1962.

discovery of the missiles was announced, and the second when the Russians retreated.

Peking's initial response was to leap immediately to Khrushchev's side by firing off editorial broadsides against the United States.<sup>106</sup> Perhaps the Chinese were anxious to prove that they were not afraid to back Russia in Cuba even though the Russians were reluctant to back the Chinese in India. Temporarily it appeared as if an outside crisis had pulled the socialist camp together again.

A few days later, however, when it began to look as if Moscow were retreating, the PRC started to sing a different tune.

The Chinese staged enormous parades to protest American actions (and, implicitly, Soviet policy) against Cuba; They flattered and exhorted Castro to maintain his radical stance; and behind the thinnest veil of esoteric phrases they charged Khrushchev with having staged "another Munich" at the cost of Cuban independence and the international Communist and revolutionary movement.<sup>107</sup>

Worse yet, they added a new word to the communist lexicon to describe Khrushchev's humiliating defeat--"capitulationism."<sup>108</sup> In the end, the effect of the Sino-Indian and the Cuban affair was to deepen the rift between the USSR and the PRC. The real shouting match was now just around the corner. A

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<sup>106</sup>People's Daily, October 24 and 25, 1962.

<sup>107</sup>Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 61.

<sup>108</sup>Jen Ku-ping, "The Tito Group's Shameful Role," Peking Review V (November 16, 1962), 7.

series of congresses held by the Communist Parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Czechoslovakia in November and December as well as the East German congress in January, gave Moscow and Peking additional forums for continuing their polemics. In each case, the speeches were pretty much the same with most delegates denouncing the Albanians outright and the Chinese by implication. Peking's representative, Wu Hsiu-chuan, in turn, would criticize the "Tito Clique" and "the modern revisionists."<sup>109</sup> An interesting sidelight to these meetings is that at each succeeding congress, Wu seemed to have been subjected to a steadily increasing amount of adverse audience reaction. Finally, at the East German congress, he was greeted with what appeared to be well organized booing, whistling and foot-stamping.<sup>110</sup> No doubt such conduct added to the bitterness of the dispute.

The Russians found one more chance to annoy Peking before 1962 came to a close. Tito, the Yugoslav president, visited Moscow in December where he was received with "almost unprecedented party as well as state honours."<sup>111</sup> With

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<sup>109</sup>For a well documented account of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Italian, and Czechoslovakian congresses, see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, chap. 7. The East German account appears in chap. 10.

<sup>110</sup>Floyd, p. 166.

<sup>111</sup>Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 85.



Tito looking on, Khrushchev made a speech before the Supreme Soviet, outlining the improved state of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.<sup>112</sup> At the same time, he leveled a double blast against the Chinese. For one thing, he answered the Chinese taunt that the Russians were afraid to fight the Americans over Cuba by implying that the Chinese were afraid to take either Hongkong or Macao.

Macao is situated at the mouth of the Chu Chiang river on the coast of China. It is a small territory and not easily spotted on the map. . . . There is also the British colony of Hongkong there; it lies in the delta of the Hsi Chiang river, literally below the heart of such an important town as Canton. The smell coming from these places is by no means sweeter than that released by colonialism in Goa. . . . If the government of the Chinese People's Republic tolerates Macao and Hongkong, it clearly has good reasons for doing so. Therefore, it would be ridiculous to level against it the accusation that this is a concession to British and Portuguese colonialists, that this is appeasement.<sup>113</sup>

These few sentences of finely-honed sarcasm clearly established the PRC as capitulationists themselves. Khrushchev's second blast was even less subtle.

The contemporary left-wing opportunists and sectarians, the most outspoken mouthpieces of whom are the Albanian leaders, disguise their struggle against the Leninist policy of peace and peaceful coexistence by shrill pseudo-revolutionary phrases. As has already been said, they have slid down to a Trotskyite position. . . . If one scratches these loud-mouthed leftist dogmatists, one can easily discover that behind their brave facade

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<sup>112</sup>Full text in Pravda, December 13, 1962.

<sup>113</sup>Pravda, December 13, 1962.

lies nothing but fear of imperialism and lack of faith in the possibility of beating the capitalist system in peaceful economic competition.<sup>114</sup>

After a barrage of this sort, it appears obvious that the Chinese would have to strike back and strike back hard if they hoped to regain the initiative. They had been rebuffed repeatedly by the European Party Congresses; Khrushchev had reviled them in Moscow; and a month later, they would be booed in East Berlin. Peking's answer was to open the gates and let forth a torrent of words that reiterated the correctness of Chinese views ad nauseam. From the end of December, 1962, to March, 1963 (and even beyond), Chinese party writers were kept busy publishing massive editorials designed to defend every criticism of their views that had ever been leveled against them by the Russians or anyone else. Of course, the Russians were provoked into answering these editorials with some of their own, which seemed to stir the Chinese to even greater efforts.

Any attempt to examine all of the statements that poured out of either Peking or Moscow would require an enormous amount of space without adding greatly to an understanding of the developing split. Both sides simply argued over and over again the issues that had stood between them for the past four or five years. Perhaps the only difference

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<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

in these new papers, from previous ones was that the language was sometimes much clearer, and the Chinese particularly displayed an obsession to refute every charge made against them. One example of this would be the "paper-tiger" theme.

Mao Tse-tung was reported to have said at one time that imperialists were all "paper-tigers." At a later date, Khrushchev had occasion to reply that if imperialists were paper-tigers, at least, they had nuclear teeth. Thereafter, the paper-tiger theme became a prominent part of the shouting match, with the Chinese generally being at a disadvantage. Now, shortly after the beginning of the new round of polemics, Peking decided once more to explain the paper-tiger.

No matter what kind of teeth imperialism may have, whether guns, tanks, rocket teeth, or any other kind of teeth, that modern science and technology may produce, its rotten, decadent and paper-tiger nature cannot change. In the final analysis, neither nuclear teeth nor any other kind of teeth can save imperialism from its fate of inevitable extinction.<sup>115</sup>

Not only did both sides write monumental editorials, but they also sent long letters to each other, normally being in the form of a letter from the central committee of one communist party to the central committee of the other. Actually, there was nothing new about this as the two countries had long exchanged letters. What was new was that the Chinese communists, for the first time, published their

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<sup>115</sup>"The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," People's Daily, December 31, 1962.

letters in their open press. Moreover, they also published the secret letters that were sent to them by the Russians.<sup>116</sup> It is highly probable that Peking took this course in the hope that Moscow would feel compelled to do the same, since the Chinese had long complained that the Soviet Union, and presumably the Eastern European satellites, were not printing the Chinese arguments. In other words, the peoples of those countries were only hearing one side of the story. By trying to force the Russians to present Peking's case, the Chinese could gain a vastly wider audience.

The initial thrust was made in February of 1963, but it elicited little or no reaction from Moscow. In March, the Chinese tried again. They issued another of their lengthy editorials entitled "More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us--Some Important Problems of Leninism in the Contemporary World."<sup>117</sup> Near the end of that article appears the most violent and sensational language employed up to that point in the split.

The doughty warriors [the Russians] who claim to possess the totality of Marxist-Leninist truth are mortally afraid of the articles written in reply to their attacks by the so-called dogmatists, sectarians, splitters, nationalists and Trotskyists [meaning the Chinese] whom they have so vigorously condemned. They dare not publish these articles in their own newspapers and journals. As cowardly as mice, they are scared to death . . . .

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<sup>116</sup>Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, ed., pp. 287-288.

<sup>117</sup>Red Flag, November 3 and 4, March 4, 1963.

Dear friends and comrades who claim to possess the whole truth! Since you are quite definite that our articles are wrong, why don't you publish all these erroneous articles and then refute them point by point so as to inculcate hatred among your people against the "heresies" you call dogmatism, sectarianism and anti-Marxism-Leninism. . . ? You are divorced from the masses. That is why you fear the truth and carry your fear to such absurd lengths. Friends, comrades! If you are men enough step forward! Let each side in the debate publish all the articles in which it is criticised by the other side and let the people in our own countries and the whole world think over and judge who is right and who is wrong. This is what we are doing, and we hope you will follow our example. We are not afraid to publish everything of yours in full. We publish all the "masterpieces" in which you rail at us. Then in reply we either refute them point by point or refute their main points. Sometimes we publish your articles without a word in answer, leaving the readers to judge for themselves. Isn't that fair and reasonable? You, modern revisionist masters, do you dare to do the same? If you are men enough, you will. But having a guilty conscience and an unjust case, being fierce of visage but faint of heart, outwardly as tough as bulls but inwardly as timid as mice, you will not dare. We are sure you will not dare. Isn't that so? Please answer!<sup>118</sup>

By the end of March, 1963, it was easy for everyone, both East and West, to see that the Sino-Soviet rift was very real and deep. A few more attempts at reconciliation were made after that point, but they tended to be rather desultory and were probably aimed at gaining a propaganda advantage more than producing any actual results. In late January and early February of 1964, the Chinese began to formally recognize "pro-Chinese factions which had rebelled and seceded from the established Communist Parties of such countries as

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<sup>118</sup>Red Flag, November 3 and 4, March 4, 1963.

Ceylon, Peru, Belguim and Switzerland as the official Communist Parties in those countries."<sup>119</sup> Approximately one month later, "Peking openly called for the removal of the 'greatest revisionist of all time'--Khrushchev."<sup>120</sup> But even Khrushchev's eventual removal did not placate the Chinese for very long. They published the event in their press, waited a while to see what the new leaders of the Kremlin would do, then satisfied that things would pretty much remain the same, Peking resumed its customary stance.<sup>121</sup> Most of the first half of 1965 was relatively quiet, but a full-scale exchange of polemics during the second half, testified to the fact that "Khrushchev revisionism" was still the main target even though Khrushchev himself was gone. At this writing, prospects for change in this situation do not appear bright.

A summary or review of Chinese Communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1965 shows a surface pattern of many ups and downs. Relations were fairly good during much of 1958 only to turn downward for part of 1959. They improved again for the early part of 1960 but

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<sup>119</sup>Franz Schumann and Orville Schell, ed., p. 289.

<sup>120</sup>Irwin Isenberg, ed., The Russian-Chinese Rift: Its Impact on World Affairs (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1966), p. 34.

<sup>121</sup>Harry Hamm, China: Empire of the 700 Million, trans. Victor Anderson (Garden City, New York: Double Day and Company, 1966), pp. 245-46.

suffered a relapse that summer with the withdrawal of Soviet experts. There were brief periods of relaxation in 1961 and 1962, but they always were followed by renewed outbreaks of charge and counter-charge until, by the middle of 1963, the dispute was almost totally out in the open and almost totally unsolvable. The last two years of the period, 1964-1965, saw virtually no real efforts at reconciliation; rather, the dispute was allowed to solidify.

Beneath the surface, however, there is a somewhat different picture. It seems reasonably clear in retrospect that the Chinese were intent on moving their revolution to the Left, both economically and diplomatically. They wanted to stake their claim to ideological leadership by leaping forward to communism, ahead of everyone else, through the use of communes. If the experiment had worked, Peking could have served as a shining example to the underdeveloped peoples of the world, everywhere. On the diplomatic front, the Chinese wanted the Russians to use their supposed nuclear missile superiority to put capitalism in its place, once and for all. Only, the Soviet Union was much more interested in peaceful coexistence than world revolution. Severe economic crisis at home and Russian caution abroad forced the Chinese into retreat, humiliation, and isolation. When viewed in this light, the pattern of ups and downs, mentioned above, becomes more of a straight line. Once Moscow comprehended--

sometime in 1959--the Chinese intent, relations deteriorated at an accelerated rate. Even the available trade figures reflect the straight-line trend.

TABLE 3  
SOVIET-CHINESE TRADE\*  
(IN MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)

Year	Soviet Exports to China	Soviet Imports from China
1958	634.0	881.3
1959	954.0	1100.3
1960	816.3	847.3
1961	367.0	550.9
1962	233.2	515.8

\*Source: Uneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR for corresponding years as quoted in Schwartz, p. 248.<sup>122</sup>

Again, the point being made is that between 1958 and 1965 the Peoples Republic of China turned to the Left, while the Soviet Union turned to the Right. As the angle of divergence grew greater, so too did the degree of hostility. What started out as one Socialist Camp became two or three or four. Perhaps both the Chinese and the Russians should have heeded President Lincoln's advice that "a house divided against itself, cannot stand."

<sup>122</sup>Apparently, the Soviet Union stopped publishing trade figures after 1962 or else their exports to China were too insignificant to announce.



## CHAPTER IV

In the material presented up to this point, an earnest attempt has been made to develop a reasonably comprehensive picture of the Sino-Soviet split. No doubt it has been noted that the burden of the effort has been focused on Chinese Communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union. To have fully recorded reciprocal Soviet attitudes toward the Chinese would have required vastly more space and might well have obscured one of the primary objectives of the study.

As might be expected, standard methodology was used in building up the historical narrative. A large amount of available literature was surveyed, particularly the works of acknowledged authorities. Whenever possible, primary source materials were used, although it was necessary to rely on English translations of Chinese statements.<sup>1</sup> Finally, a certain degree of cautious selectivity was employed in trying to pick out the important from the purely trivial.

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<sup>1</sup>Many Chinese newspapers, magazines, party statements, etc., have been translated into English by the Chinese themselves, or by British or American government translators. In a few cases, a comparison of translations revealed minor discrepancies.

When properly done, research based on this type of traditional methodology is usually both interesting and informative.

It has served social scientists well for decades, if not centuries, and will probably continue to do so far into the future. By marshalling facts and chronicling events, the social scientist can gain valuable insights into the story of man's behavior. It has been possible to investigate, to record, and to theorize--often with a very high degree of accuracy. But, perhaps this is not enough. Perhaps it would be extremely valuable if the researcher had available some more precise measurement of behavior. Fortunately, a number of new techniques are now being applied to social science research. One of these is content analysis.

Put very briefly and simply, "content analysis is the statistical tabulation of the things that have been said."<sup>2</sup> The technique was probably first used extensively by psychologists and has only fairly recently been employed by social scientists.<sup>3</sup> As a matter of fact, political scientists in particular have been rather slow in adopting the technique to their discipline, and this may very well be one of the

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<sup>2</sup>Ithiel de Sola Pool, Symbols of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>See Charles Osgood, et al, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957) for one good example of a psychological study employing content analysis.

first dissertations in that field to incorporate content analysis as a major part of the study.

In early content analysis studies, social scientists leaned heavily on the practice of statistically determining the number of times certain key words or symbols appeared in the speeches, writings, etc. of key texts. This was referred to as "counting-frequencies," and from the statistics, the researcher could draw conclusions.

Counting frequencies was the main activity of content analysts in the 1930's and 1940's. Indeed, for many people that is how content analysis was defined. Berelson's book minus one chapter is almost wholly devoted to such frequency counts. Lasswell's content analyses were frequency counts of symbols; so for the most part were the RADIR studies at the Hoover Institute. The units could vary greatly: there were counts of column inches, of key words, of themes, of literary forms, of types of characters, etc. But up to ten years ago almost all studies had for their basic logic a comparison of the frequency of certain types of symbolic expression in different segments of text.<sup>4</sup>

The RADIR studies, mentioned above, were carried out by Ithiel de Sola Pool, with the collaboration of Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and others. They counted the frequency of certain key symbols appearing in the editorials of leading newspapers--"Prestige Papers"--of five countries. One of the things they found was that

There is, for example, a remarkable degree of reciprocity in the attitudes of states toward each other. This

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<sup>4</sup>Ithiel de Sola Pool, Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 195-96.

reciprocity is not necessarily immediate, but in the long run if elite editorial opinion in state A is hostile to state B, then state B will become hostile to state A to almost exactly the same degree. Since this process takes time, the attitudes of each state toward the other may at no moment be exactly alike, but over the years they seem to approach a common reciprocal attitude. Somehow in this interdependent world the attitudes of the elite in one state come to be known and returned by the elite of other states.<sup>5</sup>

Another interesting study was performed by Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and associates. They were interested in pursuing, among other things, the idea that the language of politics, i.e. speeches of certain decision-makers, followed style patterns. These style patterns changed under the press of events and therefore an analysis of the patterns might be indicative of political changes.

In the long run, however, the study of style may make its largest contribution in relation to the problem of interpreting significant political trends. Certain changes in style may indicate the gradual decline of democratic feeling, or reveal the ground swell of gathering crisis. Style characteristics may prove to be diagnostic criteria for the disclosure of destructive or creative political personalities.<sup>6</sup> For style is not to be dismissed as ornamentation.

These two brief illustrations should suggest in a very small way the type of research that can be attempted and has

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<sup>5</sup>Ithiel de Sola Pool, Symbols of Internationalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), p. 61. For a fuller background to this study see also, Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Prestige Papers: A Survey of Their Editorials (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).

<sup>6</sup>Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and Associates, Language of Politics (Cambridge, the MIT Press, 1965), p. 38.

been completed using content analysis. Of course, content analysis has undergone a good deal of sophistication in the past few years and will probably receive further improvement in the years ahead.

The basic use of content analysis in this study revolved around an attempt to measure the attitude of hostility (or lack of it) expressed in official Chinese documents toward the Soviet Union over a specified period of time. Key statements were selected from the speeches of leading Chinese statesmen plus party pronouncements, etc., and then judges were asked to scale the statements according to the degree of hostility expressed.

An orderly approach to utilizing this type of research requires that the range of content under examination be clearly defined. A group of researchers working at the Stanford International Conflict and Integration Studies Center has suggested eight categories of content or perceptions. Paraphrased, they are:

1. Perceptions of Policy Conditions: goals, aims, preferences, choices, means to achieve goals.
2. Perceptions of Resolution of Conflict: means of resolution, expected results of resolution.
3. Perceptions of Capability: numerical (not qualitative) estimates of state capability.
4. Perceptions of Power: qualitative and relative estimates of state capability.
5. Perceptions of Friendship: approval, cooperation, and support.

6. Perceptions of Hostility: enmity, obstructionism.
7. Perceptions of Satisfaction: success, contentment, confidence.
8. Perceptions of Frustration; failure, disappointment, anxiety about goals.<sup>7</sup>

The same collection of source material might be used to study several or all of the above categories. The same statement, for example, might say something about policy, about conflict resolution, about capability, power, etc.

Before the degree of hostility contained in the various Chinese speeches, documents, etc., can be scaled, it is necessary to break down the source statements into basic unit or capsule statements.<sup>8</sup> For example, Chou En-lai delivered a speech in Moscow in 1959, saying in part: "We share a common destiny, our interests are identical and the close friendship of our two peoples can never be broken."<sup>9</sup> This source statement would produce the following capsule statements:

1. We (PRC) share a common destiny with the (USSR).
2. Our (PRC) interests are identical (with the USSR).

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<sup>7</sup>Robert C. North, et al., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 42-45.

<sup>8</sup>The concepts and structure of this chapter relies heavily on an unpublished Exercise Guide on Content Analysis, prepared by Dr. Oliver Benson of the University of Oklahoma in 1965. He has generously agreed to its use.

<sup>9</sup>Current Background, No. 572 (January 28, 1959), p. 7.

3. Our (PRC) close friendship can never be broken (with the USSR).

Put another way, the elements which make up a capsule statement are:

1. The Perceiver--Chou En-lai in the above example--who is speaking for the Chinese.
2. The actor whose action is perceived--again it would be Chou En-lai.
3. The target, or recipient of the action--the USSR.
4. The descriptive-connective, or the action or attitude expressed which relates or connects the action--"share a common destiny," "interests are identical," "close friendship can never be broken." It is this element of the unit statement which is the focus of attention in coding the statement as a whole, since it is the only element which can vary in intensity on any scale set up to describe the category of hostility.

A unit statement must not contain more than one perceiver, one perceived, one target, or one descriptive-connective, although the perceived and the target may be missing from some statements. Compound sentences, with two or more targets must be broken down into two or more unit statements.

Another factor which must be kept in mind when preparing statements for scaling, is the matter of coding and/or masking. Generally, it is convenient to place each unit statement on a separate card which has been coded in such a way as to prevent the judges, who do the scaling, from being influenced in their opinions. This was especially

important in the exercise used here, since the judges were asked to scale the intensity of hostility over a period of time. Details of this process are dealt with in a later chapter.

It may also be necessary, in some cases, to mask parts of the statements which might influence the judges' decisions. For instance, if a Chinese statement were to say, "in 1960, the Russians unjustly withdrew all of their experts, . . ." it is obvious that the date would have to be masked by perhaps replacing it with an X. Fortunately, in this study, the coding of the cards by years eliminated nearly all need for masking.

All unit statements will be found to fall into two distinct groups--those which express an attitude or evaluation, and those which describe an action. If a statement maintains that "The Russians are treacherous," it is considered an affect statement. On the other hand, "The Russians have moved military forces across our borders," is an action statement. It is not possible to scale a set of statements consistently if the set includes statements from both types. The first expression of the Russians' being treacherous, is rightly a measure of hostility, but the second expression of troop movement, better illustrates belligerency or aggressiveness. Great care was taken to use affect statements only.



The next step in the process is to select a scaling system. A number of effective systems have been developed, but the one presented here is the Q-Sort. It can be both reasonably simple and reasonably reliable if the proper procedures are followed. Mainly it requires well-formed unit statements and well-qualified judges. More will be said about the judges a little later.

The Q-Sort was originally devised for clinical psychological research, but is adaptable to content analysis if the universe of statements is not too great. It has the virtue of forcing the judges to evaluate the entire group of statements and to rank them by a predetermined rank-order. The procedure reduces the influence of individual personality differences in judges.

Once the unit statements have been developed and coded, the judges are asked to assign an intensity value to each statement of from one to nine. The least hostile statement would rate a one, with the most hostile receiving a nine. The Q-Sort makes use of fixed proportions as to the exact number of statements that may be awarded the same value of intensity. These proportions, given in the table below, are based on a universe of seventy-five statements and approximates the normal distribution or "normal curve."

TABLE 4  
Q-SORT DISTRIBUTION

Intensity Category	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Percentage	5	8	12	16	18	16	12	8	5
Number from Universe of 75	4	6	9	12	13	12	9	6	4

\*Source: Robert C. North, et al., p. 59, for the first two lines. The last line was computed.

The reason for this forced distribution is to avoid "bunching" of relatively similar statements into a high or low category. Since the Sino-Soviet split did not fully appear in the open Chinese press until 1963, it is likely that many of the statements prior to that time might be awarded a low intensity rating by the judges, with the statements after 1963 being awarded a high intensity value. This would lead to bunching at the 1, 2, and 3 categories and the 7, 8, and 9 categories. Obviously, greater discrimination in sorting is desirable in order to make more meaningful comparisons. Use of the Q-Sort distribution table forces the judges to keep sorting until the proper number of statements have been placed in each value category. In other words, the judges are not asked to assign absolute measures

of hostility but rather to determine the relative position of each statement in the entire universe of seventy-five statements.

After the judges have completed the task of assigning relative values to each statement, the analysis can begin. Because the study involves a comparison across time, the cards containing the statements are coded in such a way that the judges are unaware of the date on which the source statement was made. Now, by use of the code, the cards can be rearranged according to year. For purposes of illustration, assume that nine representative statements have been selected for each year. Further, assume that the judges have decided that for 1959, three of these statements best fit the 2 category, three best fit the 3 category, and three best fit the 5 category. By finding the total sum of intensity values assigned and dividing that number by the number of statements (nine), the average intensity of the statements made in 1959 can be found. Thus,  $3 \times 2 + 3 \times 3 + 3 \times 5 / 9 = 3.3$ . In this fashion the average level of hostility expressed by the Chinese, in any given year, toward the Russians can be mathematically determined and graphically illustrated.

Before the move to the actual exercise, which forms a major part of this study, can be made, it is necessary to add a few words of caution. The Q-Sort does possess some definite limitations which need to be fully understood in

order to establish as high a level of reliability as possible. As already indicated, these limitations revolve around the selection of source statements, the selection of judges, and the size of the universe employed.

In a sense, the selection of source statements is not necessarily a true limitation due to the fact that the researcher is only using the words of other people and has no discrimination as to what is being said. A problem arises, however, when a good many speeches, documents, etc., are available, and the researcher must then discriminate as to what is most representative of the lot. Fortunately, there are some perfectly valid methods for narrowing down the choices so that subjective judgments can be held to a minimum. These methods will be introduced later.

Finding judges who are well qualified to assess the materials presented to them is, of course, of critical importance. Even this factor, however, may not prove to be as difficult as it sounds. Almost any academically trained person will normally possess the tools of reasoning that are required to discriminate between a hostile and a non-hostile statement. Moreover, once three or four such persons have been selected, they can be carefully "coached," in what they are to do, in several pre-sessions. Naturally, they should not be allowed to practice on the actual statements to be used in the research study. If it becomes

apparent in the pre-sessions that any of the judges is unable to perform his role, then he can be excused, and another person can be brought in. Happily, judges used in this study were professional Political Scientists with strong backgrounds in the Far East and the Soviet Union. It is presumed that their special competencies lent more reliability to the results than might otherwise have been the case.

A final problem connected with the use of the Q-Sort is the selection of the universe. Generally, this is simply a mechanical, or perhaps it would be better to say mental, problem of making pair-wise comparisons between too many statements. If too large a number of statements are used, it is obvious that the discrimination capacity of the judges will break down. One hundred statements seem to be about the practical limit of a universe. In order to improve reliability, it was decided to stop a little short of that practical limit by settling on seventy-five.

Earlier, it was stated that in doing their work, the judges were not being asked to assign absolute values to the unit statements, but, rather, relative ones. This point needs to be emphasized again. The Q-Sort does not result in absolutes. In similar fashion, the entire concept of Content Analysis is not being presented here as a new, perfect methodology of research. It has limitations, just as does

the historical method. What is hoped, is that the blending of these two methods in this one study has produced better results than might have been achieved by using only one.

## CHAPTER V

The application of content analysis, in determining hostility across a period of time, can be handled in a number of ways. The ideal situation is to bring together the optimum period of time and the optimum distribution of unit statements across that time period. For instance, from the establishment of Communist China in 1949 to the end of this study, 1965, is sixteen years. If an analysis of hostility were to be made of that whole period, and assuming a universe of seventy-five statements, then only four or five unit statements could be taken from each year. While such a study could technically be made, with fair results, the reliability factor would rest heavily on the selection of those four or five statements picked from each year. There might well be a real question in the mind of the researcher whether a state's total attitude of hostility can be measured on the basis of such a small per-year universe.

A second approach to the problem could be to "squeeze" the time period together. This would be accomplished by

taking statements from every other year, or perhaps every third year, or every fifth year. The result of such squeezing of course is that the total universe of seventy-five statements could be divided over fewer years, so that each year would have a much larger per-year universe. On the other hand, squeezing incorporates the obvious danger that any number of the years skipped may have been years of sharp and dramatic change in attitude. But, since these years had been passed over, the change might not appear in the study.

Neither of the two approaches discussed so far would seem to provide the type of discriminating insights desired. Fortunately, a third approach can be followed which should not materially affect the objectives of the study. The analysis can be limited to just the last seven years, that is 1959-1965. Limiting the analysis to just seven years is admittedly an arbitrary decision, but such a limitation does possess strong advantages to commend it. For one thing, the mathematical computations will most certainly be far more precise and meaningful. The suggested ideal of combining an optimum time period with an optimum distribution of unit statements will have been realized. Also, the years covered are probably more dramatic, in recording the attitude of hostility, than any other comparable time span. This assertion is based on the historical narrative which indicated that no apparently irreversible steps were taken by the



Chinese until their movement to the Left in 1958. However, the Russians did not fully understand what had happened or was happening until the following year, so 1959 would seem to be a good point to begin the analysis.

Another potentially bothersome area in applying content analysis is the proper selection of source statements. The two major questions encountered in this exercise developed over what use, if any, should be made of editorial-type statements, versus official ones, and what use should be made of once-secret materials which are now available.

Upon examination, one aspect quickly became obvious: the Chinese daily newspapers were invariably much more critical or even vicious than were the official Chinese spokesmen. In other words, Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister, might go to some sort of anniversary party where he could deliver a speech, saying perfectly wonderful things about the Russians. Yet, the very next day, an unsigned editorial (or one signed by an editor using a pseudonym) might appear in People's Daily accusing "certain people" (Russians) of being the worst kind of revisionists. To make matters even worse, there were several occasions when People's Daily or Red Flag would headline a lead article "A Government Spokesman said today . . ." without ever identifying who the government spokesman was. This was particularly true of articles published in 1963.

After a good deal of reflection, the decision was made to use only official statements, speeches, etc., rather than editorial-type statements. Both consistency and authenticity should be better for it.

The decision over use of statements which were at one time made in secret, but which are now public, was a good deal easier to resolve. Quite simply, they were not used, since to do so would have grossly distorted the Q-Sort. Western observers did not know in 1960 what secret messages were sent back and forth between the PRC and the USSR; therefore, it would be unrealistic for the Q-Sort judges to have this information, just because it was published in 1963. Moreover, one could not be certain that the Chinese might not have embellished the truth a bit, once they had the advantage of hindsight.

Once all of the above decisions had been made, the actual selection of source statements could begin. The whole process was aided immensely by the apparent penchant communists have for making speeches on certain anniversary dates. Usually, they would speak on the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, on the anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, on the anniversary of the Russian revolution, and so on. Then too, they would generally issue a major policy statement or speech at any one of

a number of party congresses, whether held in China or elsewhere. So in these more or less annual events, important source statements were relatively easy to spot.

As often as possible, statements used were those that were made by leading Chinese figures such as Chou En-lai, Ch'en Yi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, and Lin Piao. In a few instances, it was necessary to quote some of the lesser lights of the Chinese hierarchy, but it is reasonable to assume that their speeches were cleared with the party before delivery, in any event. Oddly enough, Mao Tse-tung himself rarely makes speeches, and this accounts for his absence from the above list. It should also be noted that some statements were taken from published, official party pronouncements or letters. Some of these may have been written by Liu Shao-chi, the party theoretician, and most likely had the approval of Mao. Again, these are not unsigned editorials, but official documents.

For a number of years, the United States Consulate in Hongkong has published a series entitled Current Background. It includes the English translation of all important Chinese statements as gathered from their press, radio broadcasts, news agencies, and so on. Nearly all of the source statements used in this study were researched from Current Background. In a few instances, fuller treatment of important policy statements or speeches were located in Peking Review,

a Chinese publication, issued in five different languages including English. Actually, excerpts from Peking Review appear regularly in Current Background, but sometimes in abbreviated form. Reprints from People's Daily, the main Chinese newspaper, and Red Flag, the official party paper also occur in both series, which means that an enormous amount of Chinese communication is readily available in English.

During the course of a year, the Chinese quite naturally spoke and wrote tens of thousands of words. Therefore, trying to isolate roughly eleven short sentences, expressing their current degree of hostility toward the Soviet Union for that year, would seem like an impossible task. Several things helped, however, to make the task infinitely easier than it sounds. In the first place, surprisingly few statements were made in some years, outside of editorials, that reflected on the USSR at all. Almost immediately then, the overwhelming bulk of statements could be eliminated.

Secondly, many of the reprints that did mention the Soviet Union, fell into the category of purely routine statements which were repeated in similar fashion almost every year, at least until the split came out into the open. Below is an example of one such routine speech:

In celebrating the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic, the Chinese people would like in particular to thank the Soviet Union which helped our country build 166 construction projects in the first Five-Year Plan, signed with China last year and this year new agreements to help us build another 125 projects and has sent us more than 10,800 experts in the economic, cultural and educational fields to work in China in the last 10 years.<sup>1</sup>

Generally statements of this sort were ignored.

Some statements, when arranged in proper order, revealed most interesting if subtle changes in attitudes as expressed by the Chinese toward the Russians:

1959 The Chinese people will always deem it their sacred international obligation to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

1960 In the past ten years, China and the Soviet Union together with the other Socialist countries. . . .<sup>3</sup>

1961 . . . We have received assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. . . .<sup>4</sup>

1962 . . . the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement.<sup>5</sup>

1963 Together with all other revolutionary people and parties in the world, the Communist Party of China stands in the forefront of the fight against imperialism. . . .<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Chou En-lai, Current Background, No. 598 (October 6, 1959), p. 16.

<sup>2</sup>Ch'en Yi, Current Background, No. 595 (October 3, 1959), p. 34.

<sup>3</sup>Mao Tse-tung, Current Background, No. 613 (February 13, 1960), p. 2.

<sup>4</sup>Liu Shao-chi, Current Background, No. 655 (June 30, 1961), p. 8.

<sup>5</sup>Ch'en Yi, Current Background, No. 705 (November 6, 1962), p. 67.

<sup>6</sup>Chou Yang, Current Background, No. 726 (December 31, 1963), p. 1.

Notice that in 1959, the Soviet Union headed the Socialist Camp, but in 1960, both China and the Soviet Union were leading the pack. One year later, the Soviet Union was placed on the same level as the other socialist countries, and in 1962, they were not mentioned at all. By 1963, not only were both the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp dropped from sight, but China now stood firmly in the forefront of revolutionary people and parties!

Of course, it is not possible to use full statements of this type in the Q-Sort. Nor would the judges be allowed to view the dates. Some of these statements could be capsulized, but others had to be discarded.

Through these processes of elimination, the total number of useable speeches, papers, etc., was narrowed down to only relatively few for each year. The next problem was to select, out of what remained, the final source statements from which the unit statements would come.

There were really just two guidelines that needed to be followed at this point. The first was very simply the fact that five years had to have eleven statements, and two years, ten statements, in order to fill the universe of seventy-five statements for the Q-Sort. In other words, only enough source statements could be used, from any one year, to provide the ten or eleven statements wanted. All the rest of the material was surplus.

Since not all of the material could be used, the second guideline was to attempt to pick out the most representative source statements. Obviously this involved a certain amount of personal judgment, but here again, the Chinese Communists themselves were of immense assistance. Their speeches or party pronouncements followed a fairly standard formula.

Sometime during the year, for example, a leading member of the party would make a major address, or the party would issue a major paper; from then on, for months, any other party member making a speech, generally just repeated what had already been said. This was not always true, of course, but it happened enough to keep personal judgment to a minimum. As a matter of fact, it was possible in some years to take nearly all of the sources from a single speech or party pronouncement, since that was the one which set the pattern, and all subsequent comments displayed no significant deviations.

Presented below are the source statements which were selected from each year. After each source statement, appear the unit statements, structured in the general manner in which they were placed on the Q-Sort cards. These unit statements are numbered consecutively from one through seventy-five.

1959

It is a fundamental policy of our country to strengthen our unity with the Soviet Union and with all other socialist countries.<sup>7</sup>

1. It is a fundamental policy of our PRC country to strengthen our unity with the Soviet Union.

We have united as one and worked in close cooperation for the common cause of safe-guarding world peace and promoting the progress of mankind.<sup>8</sup>

2. We PRC have united as one with the USSR.
3. We PRC have worked in close cooperation with the USSR.

We share a common destiny, our interests are identical and the close friendship of our two peoples can never be broken.<sup>9</sup>

4. We PRC share a common destiny with the USSR.
5. Our PRC interests are identical with those of the USSR.
6. Our PRC close friendship with the USSR can never be broken.

During these ten years we have received fraternal aid from the great Soviet Union.<sup>10</sup>

7. During these N years, we PRC have received fraternal aid from the great Soviet Union.

<sup>7</sup>Chou En-lai, Current Background, No. 559 (April 18, 1959), p. 24.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Chou En-lai, Current Background, No. 572 (January 28, 1959), p. 7.

<sup>10</sup>Liu Shao-chi, Current Background, No. 594 (September 28, 1959), p. 8.



The great Soviet Union is the most faithful friend of the Chinese people as the PRC sees it.<sup>11</sup>

8. As the PRC sees it the great Soviet Union is the most faithful friend of the Chinese people.

With the Soviet Union . . . our country has established a friendship and unity which is indestructible and is growing daily.<sup>12</sup>

9. Our country PRC has established a friendship and unity with the Soviet Union . . . which is indestructible and is growing daily.

In celebrating the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic, the Chinese people would like in particular to thank the Soviet Union which helped our country build 166 construction projects in the first Five-Year Plan period. . . .<sup>13</sup>

10. The Chinese people would like in particular to thank the Soviet Union for construction help. . . .

This concludes the statements used for the year 1959.

It should be noted that unit statement seven has been masked by changing the number ten to the letter N. This is to prevent an astute judge from guessing that the speech was made on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China--that is, in 1959. Actually, there probably is no real need to include the words "During these N years"

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<sup>11</sup>Teng Hsias-ping, Current Background, No. 595 (October 2, 1959), p. 23.

<sup>12</sup>Liu Shao-chi, Current Background, No. 595 (October 1, 1959), p. 16.

<sup>13</sup>Chou En-lai, Current Background, No. 598 (October 6, 1959), p. 16.

on the sorting card at all, since they do not add materially to the information that the judges use in arriving at their decisions. The best procedure is to eliminate all superfluous words from the sorting cards, and most of the statements presented here did receive some additional refining. Statements two, four, and five are good examples of statements containing virtually no superfluous words.

Below are the statements for 1960. It is interesting to note that a couple of the source statements were made by "lesser lights" in the party hierarchy.

### 1960

The Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists, starting from fundamentally different stands and viewpoints, draw fundamentally different conclusions on this situation /revolution/.<sup>14</sup>

11. The Marxist Leninists /PRC/ draw different conclusions than the modern revisionists /USSR/ on revolution.

We support the disarmament proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. It is of course inconceivable that imperialism will accept proposals for general and complete disarmament. . . . But there are people who believe that such proposals can be realised when imperialism still exists and that the "danger of war can be eliminated" by relying on such proposals. This is an unrealistic illusion.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Lu Ting-yi, "Unite Under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner!", in Long Live Leninism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), pp. 103-04.

<sup>15</sup>Liu Chang-sheng, Current Background, No. 621 (June 27, 1960), p. 62.

12. We PRC support the disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union.
13. PRC perceives that people USSR have an unrealistic illusion about disarmament, imperialism, and war.

Although the greatest possible help from abroad should be obtained in socialist construction, the Party has consistently held that we should rely on our own efforts.<sup>16</sup>

14. We PRC should rely on our own efforts in socialist construction not rely on USSR.

The Sino-Soviet alliance Treaty of Friendship, Albania, and Mutual Assistance is invincible in the world and is a strong bulwark for safeguarding world peace.<sup>17</sup>

15. The Sino-Soviet alliance is invincible in the world as the PRC sees it.
16. The Sino-Soviet alliance is a strong bulwark for safeguarding world peace as the PRC sees it.

The Chinese people firmly support the efforts made by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to oppose imperialist aggression and safeguard world peace. . . . Peace can never be obtained by begging it of imperialism.<sup>18</sup>

17. The PRC firmly supports the efforts of USSR to oppose imperialist aggression and safeguard world peace.
18. The PRC perceives the USSR as begging peace of imperialism.

<sup>16</sup>Li Fu-ch'un, Peking Review, No. 34 (August 23, 1960), p. 15.

<sup>17</sup>Ch'en Yi, Current Background, No. 619 (February 13, 1960), p. 8.

<sup>18</sup>Chou En-lai, Current Background, No. 620 (June 9, 1960), p. 10.

In the struggle to safeguard peace, our two countries have effected reciprocal assistance and close cooperation.<sup>19</sup>

19. The PRC and USSR have effected reciprocal assistance to safeguard peace.

Any aggression and provocation against the Soviet Union is aggression and provocation against the PRC and the entire socialist camp.<sup>20</sup>

20. The PRC perceives any aggression and provocation against the USSR as an attack against us.

That is why our cause has won the support of all peoples, and first of all of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.<sup>21</sup>

21. The PRC has won the support, first of all, of the USSR.

A quick review of the 1960 statements reveals a rather mixed bag of sentiments. On the one hand, the Chinese were plainly irked at Khrushchev's drive toward a summit meeting and his insistence on peaceful co-existence. Their answer was to permit Lu Ting-yi, a rising star in the party hierarchy and a member of the politburo, to deliver a speech before the Central Committee of the CCP on April 22, in which he clearly identified the Russians as modern revisionists. It was general practice for leading party members to speak about modern

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<sup>19</sup>Chu Teh, Current Background, No. 613 (February 14, 1960), p. 24.

<sup>20</sup>Teng Hsiao-ping, Current Background, No. 631 (May 20, 1960), p. 8.

<sup>21</sup>Chou En-lai, Current Background, No. 638 (September 30, 1960), p. 4.

revisionists, but they were usually careful to add "headed by Yugoslavia" or "such as the Tito Clique." Lu took no such pains. Moreover, he referred several times to the fact that the modern revisionists were trying to make deals with the imperialists; since Khrushchev was the major communist trying to make deals with the United States at that time, it is plain that Lu meant the Kremlin leader. This speech was later published as part of the larger work called Long Live Leninism and distributed around the world. Oddly enough, Lu's speech seems to have gotten lost in the shuffle of events and does not appear to be widely quoted.

Another grating comment was made by Liu Chang-sheng, propaganda minister at that time. Khrushchev's long sought after summit meeting had just collapsed, and Liu was unkind enough to remark that there were "people" who had unrealistic illusions about disarmament, imperialism, and the inevitability of war.

On the other hand, the Chinese were beginning to realize the extent of the economic disaster caused by the Great Leap Forward and the communes. Also, they could probably see that their position was gaining little support among the other communist countries, which may have somewhat alarmed them. Under the circumstances, they could not afford to become too nasty, and, indeed, most of their comments were quite friendly. Even after the Russians withdrew their "experts" from China

in July and August, the Chinese remained tractable. One would have thought that they would cry out in fury, but the strongest statement made by Li Fu-ch'un, an economic planner, was simply to say that, henceforth, China would have to rely more on itself. Obviously, the Chinese still needed the Russians.

1961

No matter what happens in the world, the Chinese people remain forever the most faithful and most reliable comrades-in-arms of the Soviet people. . . . History dictates that we must develop and consolidate the friendship and solidarity of the two big countries of China and the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup>

22. The Chinese people will remain forever the most faithful and reliable comrades-in-arms of the Soviet people. . . no matter what happens in the world.

23. History dictates that we PRC must develop and consolidate friendship and solidarity with USSR.

Here we wish to pay high tribute to the great Soviet people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. . . .<sup>23</sup>

24. We PRC pay high tribute to the great Soviet people.

The achievements of China's socialist construction are inseparable from the tremendous assistance of

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<sup>22</sup>Liao Cheng-chih, Current Background, No. 647 (February 13, 1961), p. 11.

<sup>23</sup>Liu Shao-chi, Current Background, No. 655 (June 30, 1961), p. 8.

the Soviet people. . . . We shall never forget your assistance.<sup>24</sup>

25. China's achievements, in socialist construction, are inseparable from the tremendous assistance of the Soviet people.

26. We PRC shall never forget your USSR assistance.

Our country is closely united by unbreakable fraternal bonds with the great Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries.<sup>25</sup>

27. Our country PRC is closely united with the great Soviet Union . . . by unbreakable bonds.

Our socialist camp, comprising twelve fraternal countries, is a single entity, from the Korean Democratic People's Republic to the German Democratic Republic, from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Albanian People's Republic. . . . Any public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful to resolving problems. To lay bare a dispute between fraternal parties or fraternal countries openly in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. . . . Profound friendship has long existed between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union. . . . This great unity and friendship of the people of our two countries will flow on eternally like the Yangtse and the Volga.<sup>26</sup>

28. The PRC perceives the socialist camp as a single entity . . . including Albania which has been censured by the USSR.

29. The PRC perceives that any public, one-sided censure by the USSR of a fraternal party Albania does not help unity.

<sup>24</sup>Liu Hsiao, Current Background, No. 665 (September 29, 1961), p. 24.

<sup>25</sup>Peng Chen, Current Background, No. 664 (October 1, 1961), p. 6.

<sup>26</sup>Chou En-lai, speech before the CPSU's Twenty-second Congress, Moscow, October 19; full text released by NCNA, October 19, 1961.

30. The PRC perceives that the censure action by the USSR cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude.
31. Profound friendship has long existed between the peoples of PRC and USSR as the PRC sees it.
32. The PRC perceives that the great unity and friendship of the people of China and the Soviet Union will flow on eternally . . . like the Yangtse and the Volga.

There are three important insights to be gleaned from the 1961 comments. First, outside of unit statements twenty-eight, twenty-nine, and thirty, there is a discernible return to almost maudlin sentimentality. The Chinese seem to be falling all over themselves in saying how friendly and united are Russia, China, and the rest of the socialist camp when, of course, this was not true. The explanation lies, in part, in the Moscow conference, held near the end of 1960, that was supposed to patch things up, and, in part, in the natural calamities that struck China throughout much of 1961. The Chinese had such a poor year, economically, that they were hardly in a position to offend anyone.

Even with all of their bowing and scraping, however, Peking still managed to insert a subtle knife-thrust into virtually every comment. Notice that most of the expressions of friendship and unity are addressed to the Soviet people; it is not to the Soviet Union, not to the Soviet government, but to the Soviet people. This is a fairly common diplomatic



euphemism for saying that the people are all right, but the government leaders are terrible, i. e. Khrushchev is terrible.

Finally, Chou En-lai's speech to the Twenty-second Party Congress was made only a day or two after Khrushchev had literally read the Albanians right out of the socialist camp. Chou blandly read the Albanians right back in again and scolded Khrushchev in the process, for having aired dirty communist linen in public. Chou did this in spite of the fact that his own speech was promptly distributed by the New China News Agency. Yet even here, the Chinese Premier considered it prudent to close his remarks with profound expressions of friendship and unity between his people and the Soviet people.

1962

The unity and friendship of the Chinese and Soviet people which is based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism can be broken by no force, will grow with each passing day, and will be everlasting. . . . We cherish it like the apple of our eye.<sup>27</sup>

33. The unity and friendship of the Chinese and Soviet people . . . can be broken by no force as the PRC sees it.
34. The unity and friendship of the Chinese and Soviet people . . . will grow with each passing day as the PRC sees it.
35. The unity and friendship of the Chinese and Soviet people . . . will be everlasting as the PRC sees it.

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<sup>27</sup>Lin Feng, Current Background, No. 684 (February 13, 1962), p. 15.

36. We PRC cherish it unity and friendship of Chinese and Soviet people like the apple of our eye.

We will continue to hold high the revolutionary banner of Marxism-Leninism . . .<sup>28</sup> and thoroughly oppose modern revisionism. . . .

37. We PRC will continue to thoroughly oppose modern revisionism USSR's revisionism

The imperialists, the reactionaries of various countries, and the modern revisionists have, in collaboration with one another, continually launched anti-Chinese campaigns in an attempt to isolate China and compel China to change the just stand it takes in international affairs. . . . But their attempt is completely futile. It is they themselves, not China, that have become more and more isolated. The Chinese people will never submit to any pressure, much less bargain away principles.<sup>29</sup>

38. The PRC perceives that. . . the modern revisionists have . . . continually launched anti-Chinese campaigns in an attempt to isolate China.
39. The PRC perceives that. . . the modern revisionists have . . . continually launched anti-Chinese campaigns . . . to compel China to change the just stand it PRC takes in international affairs.
40. But their USSR's attempt to isolate and compel China to change its just stand in international affairs is completely futile.
41. The PRC perceives that it is they themselves USSR, not China, that have become more and more isolated.
42. The Chinese people will never submit to any pressure.

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<sup>28</sup>Chen Yi, Current Background, No. 692 (October 1, 1962), p. 7.

<sup>29</sup>Chou En-lai, Current Background, No. 692 (September 30, 1962), pp. 8-9.

43. The Chinese people will never bargain away principles.

The year 1962 is also something of a mixed bag, but the tone is definitely more militant than in 1961. The speech by Lin Feng, who at one time was Vice-Chairman of the powerful standing committee of the CCP, was made at a diplomatic function in the presence of the Soviet Ambassador, Chervonenko. It is representative of the diplomatic speeches, congratulatory telegrams, letters of greetings, and so on, that were issued. The Chinese people were apparently still interested in unity and friendship with the Soviet people. The only "gimmick" the Chinese added was that this unity and friendship had to be based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism--but not revisionism.

Chou En-lai's speech, which was made about three weeks before the Sino-Indian border war (also the Cuban missile crisis), is representative of the new hard line the Chinese began to take in late 1962 and which forecast the massive polemics of 1963. A rather interesting departure from past practice is the inclusion, in the opening sentence, of "reactionaries of various countries." Chou does not bother to say who the reactionaries are, but it appears likely that the Chinese now wanted to distinguish between the Titos and the Khrushchevs. Thus, Tito becomes a reactionary and the Russians--or Khrushchev--becomes a modern revisionist.

One can only speculate as to which title was considered the more demeaning!

The Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, also delivered an address at about this time which was allegedly aimed at Tito. In it, he totally confused the issue as to who was a reactionary, and who was a revisionist.

The imperialists need the help of reactionaries in various countries and the latter are serving imperialism in a less dignified way. The modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique precisely meet these needs. . . .

The fighting peoples of the world can in no way be lulled into inaction. The reaction of various countries and the Yugoslav modern revisionists will only further reveal their ugly features. . . .

The imperialists, the reactionaries of various countries, and the modern revisionists gloated over the difficulties encountered by our country. They have attempted by every means to vilify, sabotage, subvert, and invade our great motherland. . . . But all their wishful thinking has come to naught. The criminal activities of the imperialists and their running dogs against the People's Republic of China, far from overwhelming the Chinese people, have heightened their revolutionary fervour in building and defending the motherland.<sup>30</sup>

According to Chen Yi, Tito and others like him, are: reactionaries, modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique, Yugoslav modern revisionists and just plain modern revisionists--not to mention running dogs. Even though this is a most remarkable diatribe, it evidently did not receive

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<sup>30</sup>Speech at National Day Celebration, Peking, October 1, 1962, as quoted in David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 324.

wide currency in 1962, and is hardly representative of the general statements made during that year.

1963

We welcome your letter. We welcome the desire for unity and cohesion. We welcome the normal attitude of equality towards fraternal parties shown in it. . . . We will from now on temporarily suspend public replies . . . to the public attacks which were directed by name against the Chinese Communist Party by comrades of the CPSU. . . .<sup>31</sup>

44. We PRC welcome your USSR conciliatory letter.
45. We PRC welcome your the desire for unity and cohesion.
46. We PRC welcome the normal attitude of equality towards fraternal parties shown in it USSR's letter.
47. We PRC will . . . temporarily suspend public replies to public attacks . . . directed against us by you USSR.

The Chinese Government hopes that the Soviet government will not take further rash steps detrimental to Sino-Soviet unity and the relations between the two states. . . .<sup>32</sup>

48. The Chinese Government hopes that the Soviet government will not take further rash steps detrimental to Sino-Soviet unity.
49. The Chinese Government hopes that the Soviet government will not take further rash steps detrimental to . . . relations between the two states.

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<sup>31</sup>Excerpts from letter of the Central Committee of the CCP in the Central Committee of the CPSU of March 9, 1963. Full text in Peking Review, VI, No. 12 (March 22, 1963), pp. 6-8.

<sup>32</sup>PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Current Background, No. 721 (June 2, 1963), p. 48.

Apparently the Soviet leaders have already become so degenerate that they now depend on telling lies for a living.

Their practice is one of moving from adventurism to capitulationism.

. . . We shall continue to criticize you, and we hope you will have the courage to argue the matter out with us.<sup>33</sup>

50. [The PRC perceives that] apparently the Soviet leaders have already become so degenerate that they now depend on telling lies for a living.
51. [The PRC perceives that] their [USSR] practice is one of moving from adventurism to capitulationism.
52. We [PRC] shall continue to criticize you [USSR].
53. We [PRC] hope you will have the courage to argue the matter out with us [PRC].

. . . They resort to various dirty tricks to isolate the Chinese People's Republic.<sup>34</sup>

54. [The PRC perceives that] they [USSR] resort to various dirty tricks to isolate the Chinese People's Republic.

In the historical narrative, mention was made that 1963 was the year when the Chinese opened the floodgates and let loose an enormous torrent of words to support their arguments with the Soviet Union. The bulk of these words appeared in the form of letters from the Central Committee of the

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<sup>33</sup>Chinese Government Spokesman, Current Background, No. 712 (September 1, 1963), p. 1.

<sup>34</sup>Lo Shih-kao (PRC ambassador to Albania), Current Background, No. 718 (October 1, 1963), p. 1.

Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, there was also a stream of anti-Soviet pronouncements that issued from the PRC's foreign ministry or government headquarters in general.

By and large, both the official letters and the foreign ministry pronouncements were reasonably temperate, although they did carry a bite. Statements attributed to a "Chinese Government Spokesman" very often bordered on the vicious. Unfortunately, the Chinese did not identify any of the authors of the letters or statements, but almost certainly, the foreign ministry spokesman would have to be Chen Yi. The March 9 letter was handed to the Soviet Ambassador, personally, by Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CCP. This does not prove that he wrote it, but it does directly tie the letter to an official name.

1964

Grave differences exist between us and the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party on a series of principled questions concerning Marxist-Leninism. . . .<sup>35</sup>

55. Grave differences exist between us [PRC] and the leadership of the CPSU . . . on a series of principled questions concerning Marxist-Leninism.

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<sup>35</sup>Chen Yi, Current Background, No. 748 (June 20, 1964), p. 23.

Revisionism remains the principal danger in the international communist movement. We must concentrate on opposing modern revisionism. . . .<sup>36</sup>

56. The PRC perceives that revisionism USSR's thinking remains the principal danger in the international communist movement.
57. We PRC must concentrate on opposing modern revisionism USSR's thinking.

Khrushchev is the chief representative of modern revisionism. He has betrayed Leninism, betrayed proletarian internationalism, betrayed the path of the October Revolution, and betrayed the interests of the Soviet people. . . .

We are convinced that the difficulties that have temporarily appeared between China and the Soviet Union and between the two parties are, after all, only a historical episode and can be gradually resolved. . . .

The fraternal and militant friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples is eternal. No one and no force can destroy this friendship. . . .<sup>37</sup>

58. The PRC perceives that Khrushchev is the chief representative of modern revisionism.
59. The PRC perceives that he Khrushchev has betrayed Leninism.
60. The PRC perceives that he Khrushchev has betrayed proletarian internationalism.
61. The PRC perceives that he Khrushchev has betrayed the path of the October Revolution.
62. The PRC perceives that he Khrushchev has betrayed the interests of the Soviet people.

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<sup>36</sup>Peng Chen, Current Background, No. 774 (October 1, 1964), p. 8.

<sup>37</sup>Excerpts from Statement of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, distributed by NCNA, November 6, 1964.



63. We the PRC are convinced that the difficulties that have temporarily appeared between China and the Soviet Union . . . are a historical episode and can be resolved.
64. The fraternal and militant friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples is eternal as the PRC sees it.
65. The PRC perceives that no one and no force can destroy this friendship between the PRC and USSR.

The Chinese appear to have cut back drastically on the amount of anti-Soviet polemics published in 1964, over the previous year. Probably they felt that the issues had been brought out into the open, for the whole world to see, enough times so as to make any further comment redundant--not that that probability had bothered them in the past. Also, the Russians were no longer answering every charge made against themselves, which no doubt made Chinese rejoinder somewhat more difficult. The most important reason for the cut-back, however, must have been China's view of both the foreign and domestic scene.

In the foreign scene, the PRC had by 1964 become nearly totally isolated and found herself in the position of having to look for friends. The Vietnam situation had heated-up considerably with the Bay of Tonkin incident, so that American planes would be flying close to China's borders. The most dramatic event, of course, to Peking's eyes, was the ouster of Khrushchev as the leader of the Kremlin.

Understandably, the Chinese would want to relax the shouting-match a bit until they could ascertain the path of the new Russian leaders.

At home, the PRC may have experienced a gradual improvement in their prolonged economic crisis. They were still buying large amounts of wheat from the West, especially Canada, but there were far fewer reports of natural calamities coming out of China during this period. More importantly, 1964 is the year the Chinese exploded their first atomic bomb. Unquestioningly, this single event added immeasurably to their sense of pride and security. Under all of these circumstances, Peking may have decided that the dispute with the Soviet Union could be reduced in rancor and violence, at least for the time being.

Quite clearly, the most interesting revelation to come out of the 1964 statements, is that the Chinese, for the first time, admitted that when they said "modern revisionist," they meant Khrushchev. In a way, the admission is somewhat anticlimatic, since they waited until after Khrushchev had been removed from power before naming him. In fact, it can be argued that there was little point in naming him at all, once he was no longer in a position to revise anything. A possible conclusion is that Peking wanted to put the new Kremlin leaders on notice that Khrushchev was the only one held to blame for the split, in case Moscow wanted to attempt a rapprochement.

The 1964 statements, in general, seem to reflect a partial willingness by the Chinese to moderate the dispute.

There may be some concern over the open use of Khrushchev's name in the statements, since this would tend to tip-off the judges as to the approximate year in which they were made. Unfortunately, any attempt to mask his name would seriously weaken the impact of the statements. However, unless the judges were extremely knowledgeable, it is not likely that they would know whether these comments were made in 1963, 1964, or 1965. In fact, it is possible that the judges could be even further off than that.

Some concern might also be expressed over the general cadence of a few of the comments made not only in 1964 but in one or two other years. For example, statements fifty-nine through sixty-two all begin "Khrushchev has betrayed." Here again the judges might be alerted to the fact that all such statements belong to the same year; however, by shuffling the cards, the judges will probably not recognize any pattern of similarity until after they have already made most of their decisions.

In the final analysis, it should be noted that it is not the intent of the Q-Sort to fool the judges into making wrong decisions. On the contrary, it would be entirely acceptable if astute judges stumble onto clues that lead them to make the right decisions.

1965

More than six months have elapsed since the new leaders of CPSU came to power. . . . We had hoped that they would correct their mistakes and return to the path of Marxism-Leninism, or at least prove a little better than Khrushchev. But all their actions have turned out contrary to our hopes. . . . They are still stubbornly clinging to the line of Soviet-U.S. cooperation for the domination of the world. . . . They are still stubbornly clinging to the divisive line.

From a host of facts we cannot but draw the conclusion that Khrushchev's successors are still carrying out Khrushchev revisionism, the only difference being that in their tactics they are more crafty than Khrushchev.

Precisely because the Khrushchev revisionists are putting on more subtle camouflage and are more deceptive, it is all the more incumbent on the Marxist-Leninists to expose the essence behind their false appearance and the deeds of betrayal concealed by their fine words.<sup>38</sup>

66. We [PRC] had hoped that they [certain Russian leaders] would correct their mistakes.
67. [We--PRC--had hoped that they] [certain Russian leaders] would return to the path of Marxism-Leninism [PRC's path].
68. [We--PRC--had] hoped that they--[certain Russian leaders] would [at least prove a little better than [another Russian leader]].
69. . . . all their [certain Russian leaders] actions turned out contrary to our [PRC's] hopes.
70. [PRC perceives that] they [certain Russian leaders] are still stubbornly clinging to the

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<sup>38</sup>Peng Chen, Current Background, No. 763 (May 28, 1965), pp. 9-10.

line of Soviet-U.S. cooperation for the domination of the world.

71. PRC perceives that they certain Russian leaders are still stubbornly clinging to the divisive line.
72. We PRC draw the conclusion that X's successors are still carrying out X's revisionism.
73. We PRC conclude that . . . they certain Russian leaders are more crafty than X, another Russian leader . . . in their tactics.
74. . . . it is incumbent on the Marxist-Leninists PRC to expose the essence behind their certain Russian leaders false appearances.
75. . . . it is incumbent on the Marxist-Leninists PRC to expose the deeds of betrayal concealed by their certain Russian leaders! fine words.

The above statements were taken from a major speech made by Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking and important party member, in May. Early in September, Lin Piao, who is thought by some to be Mao's successor, made a speech which is remarkably similar to Peng's. Approximately four weeks later, Chou En-lai delivered a major address which is also like the first two, only a bit more veiled. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that Peng announced the new party-line to be followed in the Sino-Soviet dispute, after the Chinese had assessed the results of Khrushchev's removal.

They had waited more than six months in the hope that Moscow would see things as Peking did, but it apparently had all been in vain. Now the Chinese were ready to renew the

flow of polemics. The themes are still the same, except that "Khrushchev revisionism" has completely replaced "modern revisionism," and the Chinese are again willing to put their names to their statements, rather than hiding behind the party.

It will be noted, that a good deal of masking was now necessary, in capsulizing these statements, so as to obscure the fact that they were spoken after Khrushchev had been dismissed from office. However, most of the masking can be removed before placing the statements on the Q-Sort cards, since the judges will be made abundantly aware that in every case, it is the Chinese speaking to the Russians. Thus, statement number sixty-six, for example, can be written simply: "We had hoped that they would correct their mistakes." Only statements sixty-eight, seventy-two, and seventy-three need to retain the masking technique.

In a review of the seventy-five statements presented above, it should be pointed out again that they are the product of an exhaustive sifting of published Chinese speeches, radio broadcast reprints, party statements, and so on. While a framework of reference was adopted which narrowed down the field considerably, it was, nevertheless, necessary to examine literally thousands of irrelevant speeches on agriculture, foreign policy statements, congratulatory telegrams, etc., in order to make certain that the mass of material available was thoroughly mined. The goal was to uncover ten or eleven

statements that would be representative of all official statements made in any given year. Hopefully, that goal was met. Perhaps it would also be wise to caution against any pre-guessing of the judges' work. The format used above whereby the statements are numbered in order and according to years makes it relatively easy to follow the ups and downs of Chinese hostility toward the Soviet Union. There may be a temptation to assume that the judges will have little difficulty in assigning values to any statement. It should be remembered, however, that after being placed on the Q-Sort cards, the statements are extensively shuffled so that their year-order is completely confused. Moreover, all of the statements are subjected to additional refining, as indicated before, so that the judges will constantly have to bear in mind the import of the descriptive-connective factor. Finally, the forced-array nature of the Q-Sort will commit the judges to full use of their discriminatory powers.

## CHAPTER VI

Three judges were used in the Q-Sort. All had academic training, and the areas in which they were trained varied considerably. Judge A, possessed perhaps the best-suited background with a strong concentration on the Far East and minor competency on the Soviet Union. Judge B would presumably be the second-best prepared, because he had an excellent command of Russian affairs but no direct competency on the Far East. Judge C's political science training was limited almost exclusively to the American government and would, therefore, normally be considered the least well-qualified of the three. While this is a purely subjective evaluation, it will be seen, later on, that the three judges did perform at about the level suggested for them with, however, some interesting variations.

Physical preparations for the Q-Sort and instructions to the judges were kept fairly simple. The statements, having been refined to an absolute minimum amount of words, were typed on the blank side of cards measuring roughly three by four inches. Around three edges of the side of the cards, there appeared a series of evenly spaced holes. On the



reverse side of the card, these holes were numbered in order. By punching out the leading edge of a hole, it was possible to code the card according to the year desired. Thus, ten cards had their number nine hole punched out, and these cards were used for the ten 1959 statements. The same process was followed for all the other years. Nine boxes, each large enough to easily accommodate fifteen to twenty statement cards, or more, were placed in a row and prominently numbered one through nine. A smaller, unobtrusive number was also placed on each box indicating the number of statements that should finally be awarded to that box. The cards were thoroughly shuffled and placed in one stack in front of the boxes. Finally, the judging was done in a quiet comfortable room with the judges being allowed to smoke, drink coffee, etc., so that they would feel no pressure to hurry their decisions.

Each judge was informed, briefly, of the general nature of the entire study, as well as the background of content analysis. Next, they were introduced to the mechanics of the Q-Sort. They were asked to run through a few sample cards to make absolutely certain that they understood the Chinese were doing the talking, and the Russians were the ones being talked about. Of some interest is the fact that, after the Q-Sort was completed, both Judges B and C announced that they had experienced some difficulty in maintaining their role of

impartiality. They both felt that some statements, which might appear rather bland on the surface, could have been intended as most insulting by the Chinese. The question was whether the judges should try to see these statements through their own eyes or through the eyes of the Chinese. Apparently, both judges decided, during the sorting, to answer this question in their own way, which may account in part for the different conclusions they reached. Judge A never expressed any concern over the matter.

The judges all worked alone, one each day for three days, and, of course, were not told of each other's results until the Q-Sort was finished. While no time limits were imposed, it was observed that Judge A took about one and one-half hours, Judge C, one hour and three-quarters, and Judge B needed a little more than two hours to sort the cards.

There probably is no way to assess the effect of attitude on the part of the judges toward their duty. Certainly, every effort was made to secure personnel who would approach the task in a friendly and cooperative manner. In this respect, it can be reported that all three people were indeed most gracious and even eager to serve. Once the actual sorting began, however, Judges A and C gave the appearance of falling into a purely workman-like pattern and exhibited some feelings of relief upon completing their work. They simply dug right in and got the job done. On the other hand, Judge B seemed

to thoroughly enjoy the Q-Sort process, and he gave every evidence of being reluctant to finish. Perhaps the only point to be made here is that all of the judges came into the study with a positive attitude which, presumably, would be a plus factor.

Earlier, mention was made of the fact that the Q-Sort was limited in the size of the universe that could be employed. Accordingly, a decision was made to set the universe at seventy-five statements. This appears to have been a proper decision in the sense that none of the judges complained, at all, of the size of the universe. Not one of them exhibited any difficulty in keeping "track" of all seventy-five statements.

Some concern was also expressed that the repetitive nature of the first few words in some of the statements might give away the fact that all of those statements came from the same year. Therefore, particular attention was given, at the end of each Q-Sort, to the final location of these repetitive-type statements to determine what effect they might have had on the judges' decisions.

Close inspection of Judge A's Sort revealed that few repetitive-type statements had wound up in the same boxes. Moreover, when asked, Judge A acknowledged that he had recognized the similar cadence in several statements, but

that he had tended to attribute the phenomenon to typical communist jargon usage.

Judge B admitted to being partially influenced by the similar cadence statements, particularly on the low side of the intensity scale. Oddly enough, on the high side of the intensity scale, he thought that the repetitive nature of some of the statements was actually a plot to throw him off the track, and, therefore, he refused to put a few of these statements in the same boxes!

Judge C was clearly influenced the most by the repetitive-type statements with perhaps half of them showing up in the same boxes. This could reflect the much lower level of competency in Chinese and Russian affairs possessed by Judge C, which may have provoked a desire to seize upon any clues discovered in order to make the "right" decisions. Even so, the influence was not overwhelming, and, on balance, it is reasonably safe to say that none of the three judges was unduly led astray by repetitive-type statements.

All seventy-five statements were apparently structured well enough to satisfy the needs of the judges. There were no questions or comments concerning the meaning of any statement either during or after the sorting process. The masking technique had been explained to the judges, so when masked statements turned up in the course of running the cards, there was no hesitation or confusion. Very likely,

the over-all ease in running the three Q-Sorts attests to the value of the pre-session instructional period.

Once everything was in readiness, the judges were told that they could proceed in any manner they chose. That is, they could immediately attempt to assign to the proper number of cards a final value, which would be a difficult if not impossible way to proceed, or they could lay out all of the cards and try to fit them into the proper boxes, much like a jigsaw puzzle, and so on. Interestingly, all three judges spontaneously decided to pick up the entire deck of cards, to read the statement on the top card and then to place it, temporarily, into whichever intensity level box they thought it fit. They continued in this manner until all seventy-five cards were gone. While Judge B followed this procedure, he did read through all of the cards first. Judges A and C only read eight or nine cards to "get the feel of the statements" before plunging ahead. Experience would probably show that the judges had quite wisely and naturally settled upon the most efficient method for running the Q-Sort. At least, that appeared to be the case in this study.

It should appear obvious that at the conclusion of this first quick run-through, some of the boxes contained far more cards than should finally be placed there, and some boxes had far fewer. In Table IV, information was

provided to show that boxes, that is intensity levels, one and nine should have four cards, that boxes two and eight should have six cards, and so forth.

While the results of this first run-through are largely unimportant, it might be interesting to see how the judges made their initial decisions. Table V gives the intensity values, the desired number of cards that should be assigned to each value, and the number of cards each judge assigned to each value. These figures were quickly jotted down while the judges took a short break, and they were hardly aware of the interruption.

TABLE 5  
RESULTS OF INITIAL RUN

Intensity Value	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Desired Number of Cards	4	6	9	12	13	12	9	6	4
Card Distribution by Judge A	9	8	7	9	7	11	10	8	6
Card Distribution by Judge B	9	11	7	10	8	8	7	8	7
Card Distribution by Judge C	1	7	11	10	9	15	16	6	0

All three judges displayed a striking reluctance to assign the proper number of cards to the number five box.

One would think that it would be easier to decide middle-level intensity statements, but it appears to have been the most difficult part of the Q-Sort. At the same time, Judges A and B had a tendency to distribute the cards rather evenly throughout all of the boxes. Moreover, their distributions are remarkably alike. Both Judges A and C put most of their cards on the high-intensity side of the scale, whereas Judge B put most of his on the low-intensity side, although the total variation is not great. Judge C preferred to bunch the cards closely toward the center with a marked unwillingness to place cards at the two extreme ends.

A hasty conclusion might be made at this point that Judges A and B, because of the similarity of their initial runs, were thinking pretty much along the same lines, while Judge C was operating at a different level. This would tend to re-enforce the earlier supposition that A and B were "better" qualified than C. However, such a conclusion would be extremely vulnerable, for a variety of reasons. For instance, C may simply have felt a stronger obligation to try to fill the boxes in the prescribed manner, than either A or B did. If this were indeed the case, then one could argue that Judge C had actually run the best initial sort! Of course, no conclusions are really in order, based on such a limited part of the Q-Sort.

The next thing the Judges had to do, after finishing the initial run-through, was to re-sort the cards with greater discrimination, until the final forced array had been achieved. For example, Judge A had initially placed nine cards in the number one box, but the forced array only permits four. Consequently, A then had to decide which five statements did not belong there and put them in some other box. Obviously, this was the hardest part of the Judges' work. Judge A filled up the middle box first and then worked outward to the extremes. Judges B and C chose to start at the extreme ends and work inward.

Once the Judges had finished their work, a tabulation was made of their Q-Sorts. This was done by taking cards out of the boxes, and determining, by use of the code on the reverse side, where all of the cards for 1959 had been placed, where all of the cards for 1960 had been placed, and so on. Thus, Judge A had placed one 1959 card in box number one, one 1959 card in box number two, five 1959 cards in box number three, and three 1959 cards in box number four. Table VI contains the complete tabulation of the cards according to their location as determined by Judge A.

By using the information found in Table 6, it is possible to calculate the average hostility of the statements for each year according to Judge A. This can be done by multiplying the years' statements by their number, adding them



TABLE 6  
LOCATION OF CARDS BY JUDGE A

Box Number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Year									
1959	1	1	5	3	0	0	0	0	0
1960	1	0	0	6	2	1	1	0	0
1961	2	0	3	3	0	3	0	0	0
1962	0	3	1	0	2	2	1	2	0
1963	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	2	4
1964	0	2	0	0	3	3	3	0	0
1965	0	0	0	0	3	2	3	2	0

all together, and then dividing that sum by the total number of statements for the year. In this fashion, 1959 can be read as  $(1 \times 1) + (1 \times 2) + (5 \times 3) + (3 \times 4) = 30$ ; or, more simply, 1959 could be read as  $1 + 2 + 12 + 12 = 30$ . The total values for each year are expressed in Table 7.

Now all that remains to find the average hostility value for each year is to divide the below total values by the total number of statements used for each year. It should be remembered that 1959 and 1965 have ten statements, while all other years have eleven. Judge A's average hostility values are found in Table 8, on page 187.

TABLE 7  
TOTAL YEARLY VALUES AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE A

Year	Total Value
1959	$1 + 2 + 15 + 12 = 30$
1960	$1 + 24 + 10 + 6 + 7 = 48$
1961	$2 + 9 + 12 + 18 = 41$
1962	$6 + 3 + 10 + 12 + 7 + 16 = 54$
1963	$15 + 6 + 7 + 16 + 36 = 80$
1964	$4 + 15 + 18 + 21 = 58$
1965	$15 + 12 + 21 + 16 = 64$

TABLE 8  
AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE A

Year	Total Value	Divided By	Average Hostility
1959	30	10	3.00
1960	48	11	4.36
1961	41	11	3.72
1962	54	11	4.90
1963	80	11	7.27
1964	58	11	5.27
1965	64	10	6.40

A cautious conclusion that might be developed from Table 8 is that Judge A arrived at very satisfactory hostility averages. Since 1959 is being assumed as the rough beginning of the Sino-Soviet break, then, of course, it should have the lowest average. The year the Russians withdrew their experts from China, 1960, could not help but show an increase in hostility, even markedly so. In 1961, the Chinese had to retreat and retrench because of economic pressures, and the downward trend in hostility reflects that fact. Near the end of 1961, the Russians ran little Albania out of the Socialist camp. This caused a new wave of antagonism, which carried over into 1962. Then there was the Indian and Cuban Crises of 1962 that added fuel to the fire, so that the hostility factor rises once again. As a matter of fact, one could probably suggest that Judge A's hostility average for the year 1962 ought to be somewhat higher than it is. All of the available evidence presented in the historical narrative would lead to the belief that 1963 was the year of greatest conflict, and Judge A has correctly come to the same conclusion. The next year, the Chinese held off a bit until they could determine the course of Khrushchev's successors. But in 1965 they renewed their attack since they became convinced that things were not going to change very much.

In summary then, it certainly appears as if Judge A has performed well in agreeing with the picture seen in the historical narrative. One might argue with some of his specific figures, but, on the whole, he has matched the ups and downs of the Sino-Soviet split rather nicely. These ups and downs can be better visualized by viewing Graph 1 which follows on page 192.

The next three tables reveal the information gained from an inspection of Judge B's Q-Sort. Table 9 carries the location of the cards; Table 10, the total values assigned; and Table 11, the hostility averages. These tables follow on pages 190 and 191.

It should be clear that Judge B also did well with his Q-Sort in that he too agrees rather closely with the historical evidence. What is more, his values for 1961, 1962, and 1963 could easily be considered a better representation than Judge A's. Of course, that is debatable since there are no absolute values involved. On the other hand, Judge B rated 1964 more hostile than 1965 which does not mesh with the apparent situation or with Judge A's Q-Sort.

According to the historical narrative, the Russians tended to lose interest in the Sino-Soviet split fairly steadily from the year 1963 on. By a strange coincidence, Judge B, with a strong background in Russian affairs, reflects the same loss of interest in his hostility averages.

TABLE 9  
LOCATION OF CARDS BY JUDGE B

Box Number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Year									
1959	0	5	2	2	1	0	0	0	0
1960	1	0	1	4	3	1	1	0	0
1961	1	1	3	4	2	0	0	0	0
1962	1	0	2	1	0	2	4	1	0
1963	0	0	0	1	2	4	0	2	2
1964	1	0	1	0	1	2	1	3	2
1965	0	0	0	1	3	3	3	0	0

TABLE 10  
TOTAL YEARLY VALUES AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE B

Year	Total Value
1959	$10 + 6 + 8 + 5 = 29$
1960	$1 + 3 + 16 + 15 + 6 + 7 = 48$
1961	$1 + 2 + 9 + 16 + 10 = 38$
1962	$1 + 6 + 4 + 12 + 28 + 8 = 59$
1963	$4 + 10 + 24 + 16 + 18 = 72$
1964	$1 + 3 + 5 + 12 + 7 + 24 + 18 = 70$
1965	$4 + 15 + 18 + 21 = 58$

TABLE 11  
 AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE B

Year	Total Value	Divided By	Average Hostility
1959	29	10	2.90
1960	48	11	4.36
1961	38	11	3.45
1962	59	11	5.36
1963	72	11	6.54
1964	70	11	6.36
1965	58	10	5.80


This must be purely coincidental, however, since Judge B did not know which statements were made in which years, but it is an interesting phenomenon.

Judge B's hostility averages exhibit a somewhat smoother rise and fall pattern than Judge A's. Graph 2, which can be found on page 193, illustrates the pattern.

Figures compiled from Judge C's Q-Sort appear in the following Tables 12, 13, and 14. Table 12 presents the location of cards; Table 13, the total values assigned; and Table 14, the hostility averages.

GRAPH 1

AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE A



GRAPH 2

AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE B





TABLE 12  
LOCATION OF CARDS BY JUDGE C

Box Number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Year									
1959	1	2	2	5	0	0	0	0	0
1960	0	1	2	3	4	0	1	0	0
1961	2	0	4	2	3	0	0	0	0
1962	0	3	1	0	0	2	0	2	3
1963	0	0	0	2	4	2	2	1	0
1964	1	1	0	0	2	2	1	3	1
1965	0	0	0	0	0	6	4	0	0

A careful analysis of the hostility averages displayed in Table 14, found on page 195, suggests something of a paradox. Both Judges A and B determined that 1963 was the year of greatest hostility, which seems to square with the historical data; yet Judge C awarded that honor to 1965. One would be immediately tempted to conclude, therefore, that Judge C's Q-Sort is of less value than Judge A's or Judge B's, and that Judge C is indeed the "least" well-qualified of the three. However, Judge C's averages are in close agreement with those of one or both of the other two judges, in four out of the seven years, and even a

TABLE 13

TOTAL YEARLY AVERAGES AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE C

Year	Total Value
1959	$1 + 4 + 6 + 20 = 31$
1960	$2 + 6 + 12 + 20 + 7 = 47$
1961	$2 + 12 + 8 + 15 = 37$
1962	$6 + 3 + 13 + 16 + 27 = 64$
1963	$8 + 20 + 12 + 14 + 8 = 62$
1964	$1 + 2 + 10 + 12 + 7 + 24 + 9 = 65$
1965	$36 + 28 = 64$

TABLE 14

AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE C

Year	Total Value	Divided by	Average Hostility
1959	31	10	3.10
1960	47	11	4.27
1961	37	11	3.36
1962	64	11	5.81
1963	62	11	5.63
1964	65	11	5.90
1965	64	10	6.40


fifth year is not too far off the mark. The key, of course, is the average for 1963. If it were one full point higher, then Judge C's distribution would look just as "good" as Judge A's, and "better" than Judge B's.

Judge C's averages have been plotted on Graph 3, which can be found on page 197. It is followed by Graph 4, found on page 198, which contains the averages of all three judges in order that a visual comparison of their Q-Sorts can be made. Significantly, the three are in close agreement for the years 1959 through 1962. A survey of Tables 4, 9, and 12 reveals that these are the years to which more low-intensity statements were assigned than high ones. Perhaps it would be fair to conclude that the judges found it easier to decide on what constituted a low-intensity statement than what constituted a high-intensity statement.

Earlier, mention was made that the judges worked alone. Had they worked together, it is possible that they might have collectively produced a "better" Q-Sort than was produced by any one of them. However, collectivity would have introduced the element of personality into the Q-Sort, so that Judge A might have persuaded B and C to see things his way, or Judge B might have unduly influenced C, and so on. Nevertheless, some degree of collectivity can be computed by putting together the results of the three Q-Sorts and finding the average. This information is given in Table 15, which is found on page 199 of this study.

GRAPH 3

AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR AS DETERMINED BY JUDGE C



GRAPH 4

AVERAGE HOSTILITY FOR EACH YEAR  
AS DETERMINED BY JUDGES A, B, AND C




TABLE 15  
COLLECTIVE Q-SORT


Year	Judge A's Results	Judge B's Results	Judge C's Results	Total	Divided By	Average
1959	3.0	2.9	3.1	9	3	3.0
1960	4.36	4.36	4.27	12.99	3	4.33
1961	3.72	3.45	3.36	10.53	3	3.51
1962	4.90	5.36	5.81	16.07	3	5.36
1963	7.27	6.54	5.63	19.44	3	6.48
1964	5.27	6.36	5.90	17.53	3	5.84
1965	6.40	5.80	6.40	18.60	3	6.20

The average of the three judges' results again reveals the same up and down pattern of hostility that was discovered by Judge A alone. See Graph 5, which is on page 201, for a visual presentation of this information. However, Judge A's numerical values vary considerably from the average, in some cases. While Judge B and Judge C are still out of step with Judge A and the average, their numerical values match the average much more closely than do A's. The important factor, of course, is that the collective results of the thinking of these judges, with diverse backgrounds, produced an average that fits remarkably well the historical evidence produced in the first part of the study. When it is remembered that none of the Judges ever saw any part of the historical evidence and were not even told what they were going to do until they arrived for the Q-Sorting, it would seem in order to suggest that Content Analysis can be a useful tool in this type of research.

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GRAPH 5

COLLECTIVE Q-SORT





## CHAPTER VII

There are at least two ways in which one can compute mathematically the reliability of the judges' Q-Sort runs. One of these, a pair comparison, is rather simple to develop but perhaps not too significant. The other method is to employ Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation, a fairly standard statistical device.

After each judge had completed his Q-Sort, a coded notation was made on the back of each card indicating the value assigned to it. Then it was possible to determine to what extent the judges had agreed on a card by card basis. To illustrate: the card containing the statement, "no one and no force can destroy this friendship between us," was awarded to the number 1 box by both Judges B and C, but to the number 2 box by Judge A. Thus B formed one pair with C, while A paired with neither of them. The point then is to discover how many pairs A formed with B, how many pairs A formed with C, and how many pairs B formed with C. This information can be applied to the formula  $R = A / N$ . In this formula, R = reliability index (zero to 1.00); A = agreements (pairs); and N = total number of responses (75).

Inspection of the cards revealed that Judge A agreed with Judge B on 49 cards; Judge A agreed with Judge C on 41 cards, and Judge B agreed with Judge C on 48 cards. Table 16 displays the reliability indexes.

TABLE 16  
RELIABILITY OF JUDGING AS DETERMINED  
BY PAIR COMPARISON

Judges	Agreements	Divided By	Reliability Index
A with B	49	75	.653
A with C	41	75	.547
B with C	48	75	.640
Average			.613

Obviously the indexes obtained from the pair comparison technique are only moderately high, which would suggest that the reliability of the judging itself was good but not outstanding. However, given the fact that there were nine shadings of judgment within the Q-Sort for each statement and that the judges were forced to discriminate between many similar appearing statements, then the indexes take on a better light. As a matter of fact, a strong case could be made for scoring as "agreement" any judgments that came within one step of each other. Then, in the illustration given above,

all three judges would be paired, since B and C put the card in the 1 box and A put the card just one step away in the 2 box. Under this arrangement, A agreed with B on 62 cards; A agreed with C on 59 cards, and B agreed with C on 63 cards. The resulting indexes are in Table 17, below.

TABLE 17  
RELIABILITY INDEXES INCLUDING AGREEMENTS  
ONE STEP APART

Judges	Agreements	Divided By	Reliability Index
A with B	62	75	.827
A with C	59	75	.787
B with C	63	75	.840
Average			.818

By adding the "one step apart" agreements to the formula, the indexes are brought up to very acceptable levels. Interestingly, Judge C came out better in the pair comparison test than in the earlier analyses.

There is another body of information that can be derived from a pair comparison, and it may be even more significant than the reliability indexes. By reviewing the paired statements, one can prepare a listing of typical statements

for each of the nine intensity categories which will help to establish the intuitive validity of the judging.

In categories 2 and 9, there were no statements on which all three judges agreed. These were, of course, the extreme ends of the scale where agreement would be most difficult. On the other hand, even in those two categories, there were several statements on which two judges agreed, with the other judge being only one step away. The following is a list of two statements from each category in which there was complete or nearly complete intuitive agreement.

## 1

1. The great unity and friendship of the people of China and the Soviet Union will flow on eternally, like the Yangtse and the Volga.
2. Any aggression and provocation against the USSR is an attack against us.

## 2

1. The great Soviet Union is the most faithful friend of the Chinese people.
2. We have established a friendship and unity with the Soviet Union which is indestructable and is growing daily.

## 3

1. Profound friendship has long existed between the peoples of PRC and USSR.
2. We have united as one.

## 4

1. The Sino-Soviet Alliance is a strong bulwark for safeguarding world peace.

2. We have worked in close cooperation.

5

1. We are convinced that the difficulties that have temporarily appeared between China and the Soviet Union, are a historical episode and can be resolved.
2. We welcome the normal attitude of equality towards fraternal parties shown in your letter.

6

1. The Marxists-Leninists draw different conclusions than the modern revisionists on revolution.
2. They are still stubbornly clinging to the divisive line.

7

1. Grave differences exist between us and the leadership of the CPSU.
2. All their actions have turned out contrary to our hopes.

8

1. Khrushchev has betrayed the path of the October Revolution.
2. The modern revisionists have continually launched anti-Chinese campaigns to compel China to change the just stand it takes in international affairs.

9

1. Apparently the Soviet leaders have already become so degenerate that they now depend on telling lies for a living.
2. They resort to various dirty tricks to isolate the Chinese People's Republic.

In many of the middle categories there was complete agreement by all of the judges on several statements.

However, by presenting only two from each category, one gains a representational picture of the type of statement assigned to each intensity level as well as a capsule view of the shifting attitude of the Chinese toward the Russians.

A second way of measuring the reliability of the judging is to use Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation. The average intensity value that each judge found for each year gave, in effect, a rank to that year of from 1 to 7. Thus, Judge A found that 1959 had the lowest average intensity value and would then rank number one. He also found that 1963 had the highest average intensity level, so it would be number seven. In similar fashion, the other years were also ranked by Judge A as well as the other two judges. Finally, the judging can be compared according to the way in which the three ranked the years. The Spearman formula is:  $R = 1.00 - 6 \text{ Sum } d^2 / n^3 - n$ ;  $R$  = reliability index,  $\text{Sum } d^2$  = summation of number of differences between judgments squared, and  $n^3 - n$  = number of years covered or  $(7^3 - 7)$  or 336.

From Table 18 it can be seen that the summation squared of differences between the rankings of Judges A and B is 2. This figure can now be applied to the formula;  $R = 1.00 - 6 \times 2 / 336 = .964$ .

Table 19 reveals that the summation squared of differences between Judge A and Judge C is 12. Application of this

TABLE 18

## RANK CORRELATION OF JUDGE A WITH JUDGE B

Year	Rank by Judge A	Rank by Judge B	Difference	Sum $d^2$
1959	1	1	0	0
1960	3	3	0	0
1961	2	2	0	0
1962	4	4	0	0
1963	7	7	0	0
1964	5	6	-1	1
1965	6	5	1	1
		Total	0	2

TABLE 19

## RANK CORRELATION OF JUDGE A WITH JUDGE C

Year	Rank by Judge A	Rank by Judge B	Difference	Sum $d^2$
1959	1	1	0	0
1960	3	3	0	0
1961	2	2	0	0
1962	4	5	-1	1
1963	7	4	3	9
1964	5	6	-1	1
1965	6	7	-1	1
		Total	0	12

figure to the formula yields:  $R = 1.00 - 6 \times 12 / 336 = .786$ . Obviously, this coefficient is significantly lower than the one relating to Judge A and B and would again tend to re-enforce the idea that Judge C had a somewhat "poorer" preparational background than the other two.

TABLE 20  
RANK CORRELATION OF JUDGE B WITH JUDGE C

Year	Rank by Judge B	Rank by Judge C	Difference	Sum $d^2$
1959	1	1	0	0
1960	3	3	0	0
1961	2	2	0	0
1962	4	5	-1	1
1963	7	4	3	9
1964	6	6	0	0
1965	5	7	-2	4
		Total	0	14

When Judge B is compared with Judge C, the summation squared of difference is 14. Using this information, from Table 20, in the Spearman formula, the coefficient of Rank Correlation between the two judges becomes:  $R = 1.00 - 6 \times 14 / 336 = .750$ .

These three coefficients of Rank Correlation as determined by the Spearman formula would seem to fall within



significant boundaries. Judges A and B particularly come out very well indeed.

Using this same process, it is possible to calculate the coefficients of Rank Correlations for all three judges, when compared with the composite ranking for the same years. It will be recalled that Judge A's average intensity values matched, reasonably well, the composite average intensity values. That is, both Judge A and the Composite ranked 1959 as number 1, then 1960 as number 3, and so on. When compared with the composite, the three judges display the following coefficients:

Judge A with Composite: 1.000

Judge B with Composite: .964

Judge C with Composite: .786

In summarizing the computations on the reliability of the judging, there appears to be sufficient reason for stating that all of the figures are adequately impressive. This is especially true of the results obtained with the Spearman formula which should be regarded as somewhat more valid than the pair-comparison test.

## CHAPTER VIII

Chinese Communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1965 ran the gamut from being very friendly to being very hostile with periods of readjustment along the way. The initial alliance of these two great powers with their immense territories and populations presented the Western world with a rather bleak outlook indeed. It was fairly common practice to bemoan the fact that approximately one-half the peoples of the world were now living under the red banner of communism. In certain parts of the West, notably the United States, a sort of anti-communist hysteria gripped the people, a hysteria which was further heightened by the Korean War. In such a milieu, it would have taken a most courageous commentator to suggest that the Sino-Soviet alliance was narrowly based and that a split was a definite future possibility. Yet, a split did occur, perhaps sooner than anyone suspected. From the evidence presented, some conclusions about Chinese attitudes toward their Russian ally are in order.

One of the most important conclusions to be reached is that the original basis of alliance between the two powers was the commonality of ideology rather than the commonality of national interests. This factor manifested itself in the early Russian response to the Chinese Communist takeover, as opposed to Moscow's later actions, and in the Chinese attitude toward their northern neighbor during the early period versus the later period.

The initial Soviet response to the Chinese Communist takeover was certainly lukewarm, to say the least. Technically, the Russians maintained diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists until almost the last minute. Even after recognizing the new government, it was years before Moscow picked a top-level party member to be ambassador to Peking.

In the areas of trade and economic assistance, the Russians displayed an equal lack of interest. The Chinese desperately needed and probably expected massive amounts of aid from a seemingly rich Soviet Union. What they received was niggardly in size, and the terms of repayment were suitably strict. On the other hand, trade figures did show a nice increase for several years, although they never reached what might be called staggering proportions, considering the size of the two countries. Moreover, the Chinese people paid a dear price for the trade, in some instances, since they had

to export short supply foodstuffs to balance their trade deficits and to pay off their loans.

There were other ways in which the Russians indicated their low-level enthusiasm for the new People's Republic of China during the first four years. The number of Soviet experts sent to help China industrialize was significant, but not as large as the number sent later on. Not too much military equipment was given to the Chinese, and it tended to be obsolete. Some modern MIG fighter planes were sent to China during the Korean War, but few planes were sent later, and they were mostly of the older variety. Russia promised to give back Port Arthur and make other concessions, but found excuses for hanging on to them for several years more. Finally, Moscow was particularly hazy about promises to help the Chinese Communists oust the Nationalists from Taiwan.

In short then, it is extremely difficult to sense in the Russians' behavior, any compelling national interest in joining hands with Communist China. Stalin especially, seems to have viewed the new China as a sort of impecunious brother-in-law, who has to be tolerated simply because he is a member of the family.

Part of the answer to the Soviet attitude at this time might be that they felt their Far Eastern flank was temporarily secure. After all, powerful Japan had been defeated, the British and the French were not likely to maintain a presence

East of Suez, and India was not much of a threat whether colonial or free. True, the United States was in Korea and Japan, but perhaps a Korean War would send the Americans scurrying back to Japan or even further. Hopefully, they would at least be driven off the mainland. This left only China, and China was poor, war-torn, and communist. Therefore, China could be welcomed into the Socialist Camp, but there was no need to turn her into a major power. In fact, it would probably be better not to.

As far as the Chinese communists were concerned, there probably was never any real doubt that they would turn to the Soviet Union, just as soon as possible, after seizing control of mainland China. One might argue that the Sino-Soviet alliance was simply a matter of expediency, that the Chinese actually had no where else to go, but that would not necessarily be true. Of course, the United States was heavily committed to Chiang Kai-shek, but the corruption within his administration and its rapid disintegration had left many Americans thoroughly disenchanted with Chiang. It is at least conceivable that had the communists decided to launch a powerful peace offensive aimed at the United States, they might have brought American public opinion around to a tacitly neutral or even friendly position. In fact, the official recognition of the PRC by Great Britain could very well have been used as Peking's opening shot in such an offensive.

It is difficult to say, with exactitude, just where China's greatest national interests lay in 1949. Certainly, with the Russians sitting on the back doorstep, it would be necessary to maintain friendly relations with them. However, the PRC's overwhelming need in late 1949 and for years thereafter, was capital for industrial expansion. Without question, the United States had the greatest amount of distributive capital of any nation in the world. On the basis of this one issue alone, it would appear that China had more reason for being friendly with the United States than the Soviet Union. Yet they chose the Soviet Union, a fact which suggests that commonality of ideology was more important to the Chinese than national interest.

More evidence of the Chinese Communists preoccupation with ideology can be found in their relations with the Russians and the Western powers during the first few years. The Chinese went out of their way to emulate and praise everything Russian, to the point of being almost maudlin. All of their slogans carried pro-Russian statements; students by the thousands were sent to Russia; Russian language instruction was introduced into Chinese schools; Russian movies, plays, ballets, and so on, were all the vogue. In addition, the PRC was the strongest supporter of any foreign policy statement issued by Moscow.

Chinese relations with Western powers were almost universally bad. Even the British and the Portuguese were not treated especially well, despite their recognition of the new regime. But it was the United States which received the brunt of Peking's most slashing vocal attacks, much to the astonishment of many Americans who had been led to believe that Mao was a simple agrarian reformer. In fact, the Chinese were almost eager to outdo everyone else in vilifying the United States, although part of the justification was, no doubt, the Korean conflict.

In summary, the first three or four years of the Sino-Soviet partnership rested more on a sharing of ideology than a sharing of national interest. This is not to say that national interest was not important, only less important. From a purely practical standpoint, the Soviet Union was stuck with a partner with an insatiable need for economic aid, while the PRC was stuck with a partner that was more interested in Europe than with the Far East. Neither one gained any tremendous benefit from the partnership; indeed, they may both have lost! The Russians tolerated the situation since, as leaders of the Socialist Camp, it was the only decent thing to do. The Chinese viewed the partnership as a natural right, and their attitude toward the Soviet Union during this period was the friendliest it ever became.

A second conclusion developed in the study is that Stalin's death, and the subsequent struggle over a successor, unintentionally presented the Chinese with an opportunity to do some independent thinking. There is no doubt that the Chinese benefited enormously from the three or four years that it took Nikita Khrushchev to gain control of the Kremlin. They benefited both internally and externally, while at the same time, they were free to re-evaluate their position in the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The Chinese benefited internally because of the general relaxation of control that accompanied the period of struggle. The new Russian leaders were anxious to please their satellite neighbors in every way possible in order to prevent any defections. The amount of trade and economic assistance that flowed into China was greater than ever before. Moreover, in Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese had an "old revolutionary" who could command a certain degree of respect within the Socialist Camp, now that Stalin was gone. They began to suggest that China had found a new path to socialism that other backward countries might want to emulate. It is doubtful that Stalin would have permitted such boasting.

Externally, the Russian power struggle gave the Chinese room to maneuver in foreign affairs. They were able to mount a diplomatic offensive in both Southeast Asia and Africa with fairly good results. The evidence indicates



that Peking may even have played a vital role in quieting the uprisings in Eastern Europe. All of this activity added greatly to the stature of the PRC at a time when the rather rambunctious exploits of Buganin and Khrushchev were probably costing the Soviet Union some loss of prestige.

Clearly, the most important result of these three or four years, is the change in relationship that existed between the PRC and the USSR. While Stalin was alive, the Chinese made virtually no effort to acquire equal status with the Soviet Union, within the Socialist Camp. Indeed, their fawning adulation of their great Northern ally came close to saying that China never thought of equalling the position of the Soviet Union. With Stalin out of the way, however, it slowly began to dawn on the Chinese that they could make an impressive case for ideological parity. In a sense, the Chinese had matured. Their aid and advice was being sought in many of the capitols of the world, including Moscow, which must have been a most satisfying sensation. Of course, the PRC was by no means equal to Russia in most respects, but by 1957, the Chinese began to think that they could move ahead of Moscow ideologically. In retrospect, it might not be far-fetched to say that the Sino-Soviet alliance began to crumple with the death of Stalin.

By all odds, the six years running from 1958 through 1963, are the most exciting and dramatic covered in the

study. They are also paradoxical in that national interest became much more important for both countries in different ways, but not too much was directly said about it. On the other hand, ideology became less important in holding the alliance together, but it was an almost constant topic of conversation. In reality, these two factors, ideology and national interest, would practically merge into one and the same thing for a time, while at other times, they would separate into distinct categories. On still other occasions, the one factor would tend to blur the other and vice versa. On balance, however, it is reasonably safe to conclude that these are years in which both the PRC and the USSR pushed their own national interests behind a smoke screen of ideology, particularly the Chinese.

There can be little doubt that the Russians turned to the Right during these years. Equally apparent is the fact that the turn was made to satisfy national interests at the expense of communist ideology. The repeated attempts at some sort of rapprochement with Tito, Khrushchev's visit to the United States, the drive toward the Summit meeting, Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban Crisis, as well as the Taiwan Straits Affair, and many, many more instances, all testify to a new Russian mood. Whether it was motivated by a maturing industrial society or by recognition of the realities of

the nuclear balance of terror, or some other reason, is outside the scope of this study. However, the enunciation of the new doctrine of peaceful coexistence meant that the Kremlin was now ready to place the interests of the Soviet Union ahead of the interests of the rest of the Socialist Camp if, indeed, that had not always been the case.

While the Russians were seeking a relaxation of international tensions, the Chinese repeatedly advocated a "get-tough" policy toward the West. Peking gave every indication of a real belief in the East wind prevailing over the West wind, based in large measure on the Russian ICBM superiority. The Chinese maintained that the capitalist, imperialist powers could not be trusted, that wars of national liberation ought to be aided and encouraged, and that world revolution was inevitable. They castigated the Yugoslavs unmercifully, attacked India twice, constantly threatened Taiwan, and sought atomic weapons from Russia. In short, the Chinese assumed an uncompromising posture of belligerency which they tried to force on the Soviet Union as well, but without much success. The two countries were simply pursuing their own differing national interests, and it drove them apart.

The motivation behind China's belligerent attitude appears to revolve around two closely related ideas. First, Peking probably felt that if the Soviet Union, with its big rockets, and the rest of the Socialist Camp were to keep a

constant pressure on the West, then the West might be made to grant concessions especially favorable to China. A jittery world might demand that the PRC be admitted to the United Nations. Hopefully, this would weaken the Taiwan government and suggest to the United States that it ought to remove its fleet from the Formosan Straits. All of Southeast Asia would then presumably be open to Chinese penetration, as well as the Indian subcontinent. The possibilities were endless, once the American policy of containment was shaken.

Second, if the Russians could be induced to follow such a path, they would no doubt have to draw closer to the PRC. Then Moscow would need Peking's support and would be compelled to build up her ally with massive infusions of aid, including the sought-after nuclear capability. More importantly, this close tie between the two communist giants would certainly preclude any Russo-American detente, which seems to have been a growing fear of the Chinese. Thus, China clearly needed international tension to enhance its own position and to preserve its own special relationship with the USSR.

Again, the paradox in all of this is that both sides sought to mask their real intentions behind a blizzard of ideological polemics. In such a contest, one would expect the Russians to be easy winners. Yet, the motherland of Lenin found itself on the defensive, charged, and quite properly, convicted of revisionism. However, the Chinese

victory was a hollow one. By 1963, Peking's power and influence within and without the Socialist camp was fantastically lower than it had been only a few years earlier. It is easy to conclude, therefore, that Chinese hostility toward the Soviet Union reached its peak during this period, not because of ideological differences, but because of diverging national interests.

An interesting sidelight to the entire polemical exchange of this period carries enough importance to be noted by itself. That is the question of peaceful coexistence versus world revolution. In spite of the endless Chinese arguments in favor of world revolution, there is no solid evidence that Peking really wanted an all out nuclear holocaust that would destroy the better part of the world. In fact, the Chinese made several attempts to clarify their position by explaining what they meant by world revolution. They believed that unrelenting pressure on the West, support for national liberation movements, and encouragement to disadvantaged peoples everywhere to revolt could produce enough turmoil to approximate world revolution. Unfortunately, Mao's paper tiger theme and his alleged statement about losing half the people of China but still surviving in better shape than imperialism, left the Chinese open to the charge that they took a callous attitude toward life. Also, the Chinese unwisely boasted that they were not afraid of nuclear war,

whereas they thought the Russians were. In summary, Peking was perfectly willing to see the world limp from crisis to crisis in a sort of rolling world revolution, but they did not want a full scale war. After 1963, of course, the whole issue became purely academic.

Only a few comments need to be made about the years of 1964 and 1965 that relate to Chinese communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union. For one thing, the split showed definite signs of solidifying in 1965 after a brief relaxation in 1964. The Chinese hesitated just a bit, to see what Khrushchev's successors would do, before pushing ahead with their anti-Russian stance. However, the nature of the attack changed. Before, the Chinese had shouted with outraged indignation that they were right, and Moscow was wrong. However, they had tried by fair means or foul to make the Russians and the rest of the Socialist Camp admit it. During these last two years, on the other hand, Peking seems to have recognized that the game was lost, and a pervading note of bitterness crept into the argument. The Chinese had painted themselves into a corner where name-calling was about the only pleasure left to them. Ironically, the man they were personally berating the most, Khrushchev, was removed from the scene in late 1964. Alas, for the Chinese, even the target would not hold still!

There is a rather intriguing speculation that presents itself at this point. By the end of 1965, the Chinese communists had succeeded in driving virtually all "foreign devils" from her land. This is something that Chinese rulers had been trying to do for more than one hundred and fifty years. Of course, it is doubtful that the PRC had such a goal in mind when they began tilting with the Russians, but such a result did come to pass. To a large extent, China is once again the China of old, isolated, withdrawn, the center of her own universe. It is not likely, however, that Peking's current rulers want it that way or will leave it that way.

The behavioral part of the study produced several conclusions of its own. Some of them relate to the general subject matter under discussion, while others bear on the utility of content analysis as a research device in political science.

One of the more significant conclusions developed by the behavioral treatment is that, officially, the Chinese Communists behaved themselves quite well during the period of greatest stress, from 1959 to 1963. One could even argue that the Chinese were much more loyal to the Russians than the Russians were to the PRC. It should be remembered that the Chinese were under enormous pressure at home, because of the dismal failure of the commune system, natural calamities, and a desire to show other underdeveloped countries what it could do. At the same time, they had to look on as the

Kremlin wooed America and gave more economic aid to neutralist countries than to China. Furthermore, in 1959, Khrushchev reneged on his promise to give the Chinese an atomic bomb; in 1960, he withdrew his industrial experts, along with many of their blueprints for running the new factories; and in 1961 and 1962, he virtually stopped all trade with the PRC. In spite of his incredibly shoddy treatment, the Chinese backed Khrushchev's drive to the Summit in the year 1959; they backed him in 1960 when the Summit meeting collapsed; and they initially backed him in 1962 over the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is not to say that the Chinese were happy at the prospect of always having to turn the other cheek, but it does illustrate that they displayed an amazing degree of restraint under trying circumstances. This restraint was discovered by a careful analysis of the content of official documents and statements issued from Peking. Of course, it might also have been discovered by a discerning review of the historical evidence, but it would not have been as dramatic or apparent.

An important contribution of the Q-Sort technique is that it was possible to determine, mathematically, the degree of hostility as expressed by the Chinese Communists toward the Soviet Union for the years 1959-1965. Even though the values derived are not absolute, they are, nonetheless, relative and as such, offer a better conception of the change



in attitudes than might otherwise be the case. For instance, it may be perfectly valid to surmise from the mass of historical data that 1963 was a year of greater hostility than 1962, and 1962 was more hostile than 1961, and so on. But would not it be stronger, and perhaps more valid, to say that a mathematical process has determined that the hostility value for 1961 is 3, for 1962 it is 4, for 1965 it is 5, and so on. Certainly in this situation, where the date of the Sino-Soviet split is still in some dispute and where the evidence is somewhat fragmentary, it can be concluded that the use of a behavioral device was extremely helpful in lending substance to the study.

A couple of relatively minor comments need to be made about the Q-Sort itself. In essence, they have been stated before, so it will not be necessary to deal with them in any length.

Earlier, it was suggested that all aspects of the Q-Sort must be performed well if good results are to be expected. That is, the source material has to be properly selected, the unit statements written in the correct manner, and so forth. Based on the very limited experience of this one exercise, it would appear that the judges' individual competencies had more bearing on the results than had been expected. Presumably, if the three judges had possessed a more uniform background, they might have produced more uniform results, but that is a very tentative conclusion.

Another rather minor conclusion that may be related to the comment above, is that the judges agreed much more at the low-hostility end of the scale than at the high-hostility end. That is, they seemed to agree quite easily on what constituted a friendly statement, but they differed considerably on the hostile ones. Oddly enough, the friendly statements should have required greater discrimination than the hostile statements, but the judges apparently did not see it that way. In any event, both this comment and the one immediately above, are meant to be informative rather than critical.

The final and most important conclusion to be reached has to do with the efficacy of content analysis as a research device in political science. A review of the exercise presented in this study should leave little doubt that content analysis can be a tremendous research technique in that discipline. It was possible, through extensive examination of a large body of available literature, to build up a historical narrative suggesting the changes in Chinese attitudes toward the Soviet Union from the year 1959 through 1965. Virtually the same suggestions were reached by examining a much smaller body of literature, namely official documents. Moreover, the conclusions drawn from the historical narrative were based on the observations of twenty or more "China experts," whereas the conclusions based on the Q-Sort were

based on the judgment of three people, only one of whom could be considered as something of a "China expert." In short then, when properly performed, content analysis produced, both more quickly and easily, the same results as the historical approach in this case. It should be made absolutely clear, however, that no claim is being made that behavioral research is "better" than historical research. In fact, it may well be that they are both "best" when they are used to re-enforce each other. The only point being made is that the political scientist can submit a body of evidence to content analysis and expect good results. He does not need to rely exclusively on traditional methods of research.

In summary, Chinese Communist attitudes toward the Soviet Union underwent a remarkably swift change from 1949 through 1965. In just a little over fifteen years, these attitudes went from friendly subserviance, to feelings of equality, to a position of hostility, and, eventually, to a sort of resigned estrangement. The behavioral exercise indicates that during the final seven years under study, 1963 was the year of greatest hostility. Finally, the close corroboration of conclusions gained from the historical narrative and the behavioral exercise covering these seven years, suggests that either research method is a viable tool for use by political scientists.

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