NEW WORLD INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER OR NEW WORLD CORPORATE ORDER: INFORMATION FLOW WITHIN THE DOMAIN OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

AFTER 1989

BY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General

The process of the international flow of information, the basic one for creating favorable terms for cooperation, understanding, and peaceful relations among the nations, has remained controversial for more than half of the twentieth century. How can the media, exercising full freedom of expression, remain at the same time unrestrained by the commercialism? Is their function selling the product, or participating in the creation of a cultural environment? Is it possible to connect those two functions? These are just a few of the questions to be asked about one of the most powerful tools that humankind has possessed. Many answers have been suggested by different parties to the discussion since the beginning of the printed press. The world political and economic situation has been changing, different political regimes have emerged and collapsed, and radical technological and cultural developments have taken place in many regions of the world, some of which have changed the character of communication creating unexpected possibilities. Still, however, these questions remain unresolved on a global scale.

One answer, given by the strongest participant in the global media flow, the United States, is based on the liberal thought of John Stuart Mill and the ideology of

"laissez-faire," and assumes that media must be free of government control and, as an extension of free speech, they should be free to distribute information into all markets (the free flow of information doctrine). This doctrine, considering information as an economic commodity, has become one of the primary American post-World War II foreign policy goals.²

This answer, however, had many opponents. In the Cold War era, coming from the former Soviet Bloc, some were based on the ideological premises of "opposing imperialist propaganda." In the late 1970s and early 1980s they took the shape of a call for a New World Information and Communications Order, opposing an emerging situation in which different nations participating in the international flow of information were treated in an inequitable manner. The determined resistance of the United States and the radical geopolitical changes on the map of the world after the year 1989 were the main reasons that both UNESCO and most of the governments turned away from this concept.

The world, however, is observing new phenomena in the communication process, among them great technological advancements including direct satellite broadcasting (DBS), the deregulation and privatization in telecommunications in the industrialized countries of North America and Western Europe, stronger and stronger regional economic integration, concentration of media ownership in a few oligopolies and their general concern with economies rather than societies

and cultures. All this has led not only to a broader circulation of information all over the world, but also to a reassessment of the call for a serious discussion of the ways of protecting national cultures and restricting the domination of the few actors who became the main players in the process of global communication. Those calls are being heard from both the developing and the developed countries, among them the European Community and Canada. 6 The radical change in the global political situation after the year 1989 changed the international exchange of information to a very large extent. Numerous countries of Central and Eastern Europe expressed their strong commitment to freedom and willingness to become equal participants in the global market and communication exchange. At the same time, however, their cultures, having maintained the "innocence" and non-commercialism over the last 50 years, remain vulnerable and unprepared for the confrontation with the commercial communication massively flowing into those newly opened markets. This new situation calls for reopening the discussion on the international flow of information and makes this need very urgent.

Research Ouestions

This research attempted to answer the following research questions:

1. What shape has the international information flow within the domain of Western civilization taken after 1989?

- 2. What are the concepts of international communication exchange among the participants of this process?
- 3. Does the concept of New World Information and Communication Order still offer vivid and valuable ideas for the international community?
- 4. What is the most likely direction of development of international communication toward the ideals of the New World Information and Communication Order, or toward the New Corporate Order?

Limitations and Significance of the Study

The thrust of this research is limited to the process of information flow within the domain of Western civilization. As suggested by Samuel P. Huntington(1993)⁷, the "clash of civilizations" will become "the latest phase of evolution of conflict in the modern world."

The great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural...8

Western civilization, up to now the main player on the international arena, will approach challenges from seven other major civilizations. The possible conflicts between them will differ to a very large extent from those known before — first between the monarchies and nation states, then between the ideologies — going on mostly within the domain of Western civilization. The end of the Cold War,

definitely finished in 1989, is one of the reasons of this move of international relations from their "Western phase" to "the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations."

In the foreseen conflict cultural strength seems to be one of the main premises of successful competition. The spiritual resources of civilizations — traditional values, historical experience, awareness of common roots, ethnic and linguistic identity, indigenous customs and believes — are the source of this strength.

Different from, for example, Japanese civilization,
Western spirituality is very diversified, comprising
numerous cultures, including several nation states, as well
as ethnic and linguistic minorities. 10 This diversity has
important implications for civilizational unity:

[E]ach and every human tongue is a distinct window onto the world. Looking through it, the native speaker enters an emotional and spiritual space, a framework of memory, a promontory on tomorrow, which no other window in the great house at Babel quite matches. Thus every language mirrors and generates a possible world, an alternative reality.¹¹

Its two major variants are European and North American. The European one includes a number of Eastern and Central European countries, some of them previously constituting one of its cultural and intellectual cores (for example, the University of Cracow in Poland founded in XIV century was one of the first universities on the European continent).

However, not all of the countries of this region belong to the "Western family." As Huntington describes: "The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line of Europe." The conflict in Bosnia seems to prove this statement, showing at the same time that even the "Velvet Curtain" may have bloody borders.

In this new situation, as Huntington points out, it is in the interest of the whole Western community to strengthen its unity and promote greater cooperation within its own civilization. "Incorporating" the societies of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as increasing understanding between its European and North American components seem to be one of the prerequisites of this unity. Mutual communication and exchange of information is one of the ways leading towards this goal. In this context the need for reopening the discussion on the most desirable and mutually fruitful pattern of this exchange between all the participants of this process seems to be undeniable.

By analyzing the emerging patterns of international communication within the domain of Western civilization, this thesis aims at collecting data which could serve as the basis for this discussion.

Methodology

An eclectic and holistic approach was taken in conducting the study. As a result, the research design,

Television and the MEDIA Program are discussed. The American reaction to these regulations is presented.

Chapter IV outlines the phenomenon of globalization of the world media, which remains one of the most important aspects of the changes in today's international communication. The globalization of news broadcasting and the perspectives of the commercial, multinationally owned media in becoming agenda-setting factors are discussed.

Chapter V examines the ways in which commercial culture diffuses into the newly opened domain of Central and Eastern Europe, with advertising supported by multinational companies playing a role of an agent of cultural transition.

Chapter VI summarizes the research effort, draws conclusions, and makes recommendations for future research.

Definitions

The phrase <u>international flow of information</u> means the flow of information through national borders. Boguslaw Golka and Bogdan Michalski define two main types of the international flow of information:

- 1. direct flow from country A to country B (most often a result of the country's own information services activity aimed at informing foreign audiences about this country)
- 2. indirect flow through the representatives of country B in country A, to countries B, C, D etc. (the

result of the activity of foreign correspondents who make a selection of information sent to their audiences about the hosting country.)¹³

William A. Hachten, identifies four main types of direct international information flow, according to the type of the ownership and the political effect of the broadcast:

- 1. Official communications intended to influence foreign audiences; for example the activity of U.S.

 Information Agency (USIA), Voice of America (VOA), Radio
 Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Moscow, BBC World Service,
 Deutsche Welle, Radio Tirana, etc.
- 2. Official communications not intended to influence foreign audiences; for example, U.S. Armed Forces Radio and Television network that serves American forces overseas, and also is listened to by many young Europeans.
- 3. Private communications intended to politically influence foreign audiences, usually sponsored by various organizations promoting international understanding, peace, nuclear disarmament, etc.
- 4. Private communications without a political purpose. In this category are included news agencies, distributors of motion pictures, TV-programs, video-, and audiocassettes. In this category Hachten includes church groups and medical missionaries playing important roles in poor countries. 14

Globalization in economic terms means a process by which firms attempt to earn additional profits through entry into foreign markets by foreign direct investment (FDI),

export or licensing.¹⁵ It takes place in response to different forces within national and international economies, among them, the fact that companies can use the specialized work forces of other societies, which may reduce costs or allow initiation of the new areas of activity; they may be able to evade national regulations or shift the central energies of the main company from market to market as political and legal climates change.¹⁶

Civilization is defined by Samuel P. Huntington as "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have." It includes "common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and the subjective selfidentification of people." Western civilization includes a large part of Europe, the United States and Canada. On the European continent, culturally divided mainly between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity, the domain of Western civilization covers Western Europe and the following countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia and Romania.

The phrase revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern

Europe means a process that resulted in the collapse of
hegemonic regimes in that region and initiated radical and
fundamental transition of all dimensions of societies. The
political opening of the countries was followed by
establishing democratic political systems, transition from

the central planning to the market-oriented economy, as well as by a drastic cultural transformation.

ENDNOTES

⁶Kaarle Nordenstreng, Herbert Schiller, ed., <u>Beyond</u>
National Sovereignty: International Communication in the
1990s, (Norwood, New Jersey: Alex Publishing Corporation,
1993).

⁷Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 24-49.

¹ William A. Hachten, <u>The World News Prism</u>. (Iowa State University Press, 1992), 21.

²Jerzy Oledzki, <u>Procesy demokratyzacji komunikowania</u> <u>masowego w Trzecim Swiecie</u> (Processes of democratization of mass communication in the Third World) (Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1987).

³Ibid.

⁴Hachten, op. cit., 170-172.

⁵Hachten, op. cit., 188-189. Also Leonard R. Sussman, "The MacBride Movement: Old 'New Order' Leads to the New," <u>Gazette</u>, no. 50, (1992).

⁸ Ibid., 22.

⁹Ibid., 23.

¹⁰ Ibid., 24.

¹¹An observation of George Steiner, English writer and critic, as quoted in Richard Parker, "The Myth of Global News," New Perspectives Quarterly, (Winter 1994), 43.

¹²Ibid., 31.

¹³Boguslaw Golka, Bogdan Michalski. Etyka dziennikarska a kwestia informacji masowej (Journalist ethics and a question of mass information) (Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1989), 93.

¹⁴William A. Hachten, <u>The World News Prism</u>, (Iowa State University Press, 1992), 114-115.

¹⁵U.S. Department of Commerce, NTIA, <u>Globalization of Mass Media</u> (Washington, D.C., 1993), vii.

¹⁶Ibid., 4.

¹⁷Huntington, op. cit., 24.

CHAPTER II

NEW WORLD INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER

NWICO from 1973 to 1989

The origin of the concept of the New World Information and Communications Order was the 1973 Summit Conference in Algiers of Non-Aligned Countries. The participants emphasized the idea of "decolonization of information" as a pre-condition and pre-supposition for a restructuring of the international community in the field of international economic, political, and communication relations. Three years later, in 1976, the term "New International Order" was first applied to information in the Non-Aligned Symposium of Information, in Tunisia:

Since information in the world shows a disequilibrium favoring some and ignoring others, it is a duty of the non-aligned countries to change this situation and obtain the decolonization of information and initiate a new international order in information.¹

At the UNESCO Nairobi General Conference, in 1976, Western representatives voiced sharp criticism of the mass media draft declaration discussed during the previous, 18th, General Conference in 1974. The Nairobi conference, however, established the famous MacBride Commission, the task of which was to "study the current situation in the fields of communication and identify problems that call for new action

at the national level and a concerted global approach at the international level."2

In 1980 the MacBride Commission, comprised of 16 international specialists in the field of communication, media, and culture, including, among others, Elie Abel, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and Mustapha Masmoudi, issued the report Many Voices, One World. This document presented diverse and dissenting opinions from among its international contributors, and, including 82 recommendations, was dedicated with these words: "Toward a new more just and more efficient world information and communication order." The report essentially called for, inter alia, the "right to communicate" as well as to receive information; greater access to media by women, youth, and ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities; the abolition of censorship (including the conditions breeding self-censorship); awareness of the commercial, transnational corporate, market-dominated, concentration, and "one-way flow" characteristic of global media and information system.... In short, it urged a strengthening of Third World independence in the field of information gathering and transmission, as well as measures to defend national cultures against the threats of the onewav flow.3

The report was evaluated by the American side with mixed opinions. By some it was described as a philosophical document open to multiple interpretations. Mass media researcher Leonard R. Sussman considered it to be moderate,

explaining that "among sixteen members of the commission, four or five of them reflected Western journalistic tradition."

An <u>International Herald Tribune</u> commentator, Mort Roseblum, however, attacked the Report and the Commission itself sharply: "Through UNESCO those, who wanted to establish press control had found a way to dissemble," he wrote. Gerald Long, executive director of Reuters, described the Report as a "monstrosity reflecting the hatred of the freedom of information."

Consequently, in 1981, the U.S. Congress directed the Reagan administration to withdraw its contribution to UNESCO if any measures were taken to restrict the free flow of information. In the same year, concerned with the UNESCO supporting attitude in the NWICO debate, delegates from news organizations of 20 countries met in Talloires, France, issuing the Talloires Declaration. The declaration insisted that journalists sought no special protected status and were committed to the freest, most accurate and impartial dissemination of information.

At the same time the press and the governments of the Western world believed that the suggestion for NWICO was just a disguise for proposals to license the press and put communication under the control of government. This was a major source of East-West friction at the United Nations and UNESCO and also a reason of the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO in 1985.

The unbiased research, however, still pointed out that the information disparities between the First and The Third World countries were a fact, as well as was the lack of balance in the international flow of information. The study carried out by William H. Meyer (1989) on the Global News Flows revealed that 56 to 76 percent of all the international news items in the Third World papers came from the four Western international agencies combined. The results of the analysis of data taken from the issues of the Daily Nation (Kenya), Herald and Times of Zambia (Zambia) for 1984 and 1985, and from the issues of Excelsior (Mexico City), La Nacion and La Prensa (Buenos Aires) for 1985, showed that the Third World media were still much dependent on the Western information sources and, in the opinion of Mayer, the "scheme of previous imperial influence" was still to be observed.8

The Third World grievance and complaints might be well represented by Mustapha Masmoudi, the former minister of information in Tunisia and member of the MacBride Commission, in stating seven aspects of imbalance characterizing the international flow of information. In the words of Tszesun Li (1988) they were the following:

^{1.} Quantitative imbalance in the flow of information between North and South;

^{2.} Inequality in information resources: monopoly of five major trans-national news agencies;

^{3.} Hegemony and will to dominate; meaning the lack of concern of the media, especially the Western ones, to the aspirations of the developing countries;

^{4.} Lack of information on developing countries;

5. Survival of the colonial era: world events covered only when it is convenient to particular societies; 6. Western influence in the economic, social and cultural spheres through direct investment; 7. Disseminating news on the developing countries must fit the interest of the public opinion in the developed countries. 9

In short, Masmoudi pointed out a series of problems in the dissemination of information at the international level, which can be defined as: imbalance of news flow between Third World and Western countries; the content of this flow; the control of this flow.

As the result of NWICO debates on the so-called "media imperialism" and news flows, several Third World-oriented news agencies were organized around the world; among them were the Non-Aligned News Agency in Yugoslavia, the Caribbean News Agency operating since January 1976, and Inter Press Service based in Rome. The notion of "development journalism" was created.

In this context it is worthwhile to evoke the
International Program for the Development of Communication
(IPDC) adopted by UNESCO which aimed to provide developing
countries with practical aid in building up their
communications and press. This semi-autonomous body governed
by the UNESCO General Conference was proposed by the United
States in 1978 in response to concerns about inadequate
communications capabilities. Explaining the relevance of
IPDC to the United Nations system, Gunnar Garbo, journalist
and chairman of IPDC, said:

It seems to me that the most important contribution which the IPDC can render to the promotion of international peace is simply to continue to provide a convincing example of the potential of a genuine multilateral decision making. Such a demonstration is doubly needed in a situation where UNESCO, one of the leading agencies of the U.N. system, is being eroded by unilateralist tendencies.¹²

By 1988 IPDC approved 110 projects costing some eight million dollars. Among the allocations were \$80,000 to the Pan-African News Agency, \$45,000 to set up a news exchange between members of the federation of Arab news Agencies and the Latin American News Agencies Pool, and \$60,000 to Sierra Leone to establish a national press agency. IPDC, although, in principle an excellent way to resolve many conflicting communication issues in the world, did not play since then any particularly important role. "Created mainly to divert attention from the developing countries demand for a New World Information and Communication Order, it was left to its fate by the West after 1989, when the "ideological rhetoric was toned down." 14

On July 2, 1987, the U.N. Committee on Information adopted a draft recommendation calling for "establishment of a New World Information and Communication Order." It was approved by 50 developing countries and members of the Soviet bloc. Thirteen Western nations and Japan abstained the issue. The United States voted against it. In a statement to the chairman of the Committee, the U.S. alternate representative Rose Sue Berstein stated:

What my delegation very much regrets is that the draft recommendations we ultimately had before us today, and which the committee adopted over our negative vote, contain language that is fundamentally objectionable to the U.S.... The concept of a New World Information and Communications Order is alien to us. We oppose the establishment of any order, prescriptions, or guidelines which would inhibit freedom of information, freedom of press, of freedom for journalists to carry out their professional tasks. The world "order" connoted a political and economic system inherently opposed to freedom of opinion and expressions. 15

In 1988 the new secretary of UNESCO, Federico Mayor succeeded Amadou Mahtar M'Bow. In his plan for the 1990-1995 period he did not mention the NWICO at all. However, his will for change was confronted by both the membership blocs and the secretariat. At a meeting in Paris, May 25 to June 10, 1988, a number of the 51-nation executive board members opposed what they called a "too radical break with the past." Ten nations including Cuba, Senegal, the USSR and India questioned deletion of any reference to NWICO. East Germany called for "further concretization" of this concept. Evidently, the new information order's supporters did not want to give up. 16

UNESCO, however, in spite of this opposition, seemed to change its direction under the new secretary general, and it appeared that the same processes were going on in the Information Committee of the U.N. General Assembly.

1989 — the Radical Turn in the Discussion The critical changes took place in 1989, when the communist regimes collapsed in the Eastern and Central Europe, as well as in the Soviet Union. The language changed in both the United Nations and UNESCO, and their commitment to press freedom and independence became strongly accentuated. The 25th UNESCO General Conference in Paris, in November 1989, reflected this tendency in approving communication programs for the year and plans for six years ahead in which the idea of NWICO was definitely dropped. The documents of the conference were described by the mass media researcher Leonard R. Sussman as "the best ever produced by UNESCO supporting the free flow of information."17 A new strategy in the field of communication, pointing out that UNESCO wants to help developing countries to improve communication capabilities (balanced dissemination) without harming independent journalism, was adopted. Dr. Iba Der Thiam, spokesman for Group-77 (more than 100 developing countries) stated that the text was "balanced, moderate, open, and constructive. It opens a new promising era and optimism."18

At the request of the World Press Freedom Committee,
UNESCO organized a meeting of Western press leaders with
newly independent Eastern European media leaders in February
1990, to see what could be done to help the free press in
those countries. An <u>Editor & Publisher</u> editorial, referring
to the U.S. absence in the UNESCO from 1985, stressed: "It

seems to us that the United States government could assist that movement greatly by working within UNESCO."19

The same processes were going on in the United Nations. On May 2, 1990, after more than a decade of ideological struggle, the U.N. General Assembly's Information Committee unanimously approved a resolution that bade farewell to the concept of a New World Information and Communications Order. The new resolution made only a single reference to NWICO. It then listed general principles that governments should observe to insure that news organizations serve the interests of the public. Those principles include ensuring the freedom of journalists, condemning attacks on them, and reducing "disparities" in the flow of information, notably by helping poorer countries build up free news organizations. Western diplomats were predicting that even that single reference to NWICO would be eliminated next year.²⁰

This agreement within the Committee was attributed to the changes under way in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Those countries made clear at the start of the meeting that they wanted to end the dispute and reach unanimous agreement. The Executive Director of the World Press Freedom Committee, Dan Bullen, said that the resolution further removed whatever legitimacy might have been seen in the international domain for control of the news and replaced it with language supporting strong and independent media. "Nothing is perfect but this is a hell of

a good start in new direction," he commented, adding that the resolution indicates the World Information Order is "on the shelf, and I hope it stays there."²² The U.S. government joined the consensus of the resolution.

Among commentators, however, some positive voices were also heard. Leonard R. Sussman, a strong opponent of NWICO, when evaluating those events, considered the whole discussion on the idea quite fruitful:

[A]s a consequence, there were many winners in the decade-long aid in building communication infrastructures. Western coverage of their news is improving, and developing-world citizens will increasingly have access to the domestic as well as international information flows.²³

In Sussman's opinion, after dropping the idea of NWICO,
UNESCO seems to "perform [the] MacBride Movement" defined as
a synthesis of the Western-supported concept of free flow
and NWICO. Two basic factors:

- 1. the changed geopolitics of Euro-Asia and the repercussions in Africa, and Central and South America in 1989-91, and
- 2. application of the new communications technologies, that provide the possibility of access to vast stores of information to almost everyone, created the conditions favorable for a new "MacBride Movement," that leads to "wider accessibility and interaction among communicators, professional and non-professional, in developing and developed countries, and poor and rich among them."²⁴

Indeed, UNESCO's 1992-1993 budget dedicated \$36,222,900 to "communication in the service of humanity." Research programs financed from this budget were supposed to "promote 'free flow of information, at international as well as national levels' by monitoring press freedom, independence, pluralism and diversity of the media, especially in developing countries; developing training infrastructures in eastern Europe and Africa; supporting legislative processes encouraging independence, pluralism and diversity of the media in developing countries; and surveying international journalists' access to information; extending the international network of broadcasting research institutions for the preparation of regular surveys on the impact of television programs on the free flow of information, surveys in Africa and Latin America; and studying the role of Western European media in the general democratization of media culture in Eastern Europe."25

This program "fits," in the opinion of Sussman, the new world reality, in which there is no longer a "Third World"

— a "political and putative economic bloc seeking to induce support from either the First or Second Worlds." There are now only two "worlds" — he says — the richer and the poorer, and "they are to be found within industrialized countries as well as inside developing nations."

NWICO Idea Today

While abandoned by UNESCO, however, the ideals of NWICO seem vivid in the works of communication researchers, as well as some non-governmental organizations.

Two media researchers, Johan Galtung and Richard C.

Vincent (1992) in their book <u>Global Glasnost</u>, <u>Toward a New World Information and Communications Order?²⁷</u>, suggest that the NWICO debate must be reactivated within the UNESCO framework since "the issues raised in the 1970s are more relevant than ever":

Now it is time to make another attempt to foster a World Information and Communications Order dialogue. The debate is not over, and major issues have not been resolved. UNESCO should find ways to once again help lead the debate... The first step, of course, would be to depoliticize the process somewhat. The attempt to serve too many masters may have been where UNESCO went wrong the first time round.²⁸

The authors conclude in their book that:

The best way to help people overcome oppressive conditions and attitudes is to make them equal participants in the world community. A better understanding and control of the news media process can be the key to insuring that equity.²⁹

"What is needed is to bring the concerns of the MacBride Report to general attention," add Michael Traber and Kaarle Nordenstreng in their book Few Voices, Many
Worlds. Towards a Media Reform Movement, "and encourage further debate and study by concerned individuals and non-governmental organizations." "30

Those voices point out that the debate on the idea of NWICO remains alive. The process characterizing today's international communication, including drastic political changes in the region of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, commercialization of media of that region, changing national and regional communication policies, as well as transnational control of global media flows, make this debate more and more vivid.

Among the organizations supporting the idea of NWICO, the World Association for Christian Communication (WACC) is pointed out by many observers as one of the leading ones. WACC, at its first international congress in Manila in October 1989, adopted the Manila Declaration, which pointed out that "the growth of technology, the increase in the monopolization of the media and the vulgarization of content" make the discussion on the principles of communication more and more urgent. 32

One year later WACC, with the support of the Institute for Latin America (IPAL) sponsored a regional seminar on the NWICO which was held in Lima, Peru, in November 1990. The Lima Declaration stated, among other things:

... Having taken into account of the consequent and insidious danger to freedom, democracy and quality of life presented by the increase in communication oligopolies, aware of the sluggishness, academicism and wordiness of the past as well as of the new realities which today are less open to change, we invite all those institutions and persons who are concerned with the present state of communications to reflect on the most apt forms and modes of future action.³³

Similar ideas were expressed by the first of the series of the MacBride Round Tables in Harare, Zimbabwe, in October 1989. This body, consisting of communication professionalists, adopted The Harare Statement that stressed:

[T]he recent technological developments and the globalization of communication systems necessitate the creation of a multilateral regulatory framework for international communication."34

This spread of communication technologies, it was stated, has "widened the gaps between the 'haves' and the 'have nots.'"

The Second MacBride Round Table was in Prague, in September 1990. The participants discussed current and future communication problems in the context of the recent changes in the political situation in the world. In the Prague Statement the disputants openly called for reopening the discussion on NWICO and its application to different needs of different regions of the world:

[T]he time had come to reassess and explore in depth the original meaning of the New World Information and Communication Order.... The ideas of the NWICO should be contextualised in the various regions. They should be applied in accordance with specific values, historical traditions and the social needs of particular cultures and regions.³⁵

The Third MacBride Round Table met at the end of a conference on "Newsmedia and International Conflict" in Istanbul, in June 1991. The recent Persian Gulf war media

coverage was of one of the main interests of the disputants. This coverage by different American channels (CNN, C-SPAN, PBS), and the role of mass media during the crisis, were assessed very critically: "Great efforts must be made to develop a culture of non-violence, of dialogue and negotiations, practicing the art of democracy, and promoting a culture of peace," stressed the Istanbul Statement. The document highlighted the urgency of renewed global discussion on information flow:

We observe with growing concern the rapidly increasing concentration, homogenization, commercialization, and militarisation of national and world cultures. The principles of the MacBride Report, "Many Voices, One World," have been countered: by the virtual monopoly of global conglomerates over the selection, production and marketing of information and entertainment products, including crucial scientific and technical data and information rights; ... and by weakening of multilateral relations and international organizations. We are confronted, therefore, with media coalescing into a centrally manufactured symbolic and cultural environment.³⁷

The Third MacBride Round Table called then for the pursuit of the thoughts and values of the New World Information and Communication Order:

The democratization of communication should built on the strength of national coalitions entering into international co-operation on the basis of independence, equality and mutually beneficial objectives. The new frontier for the advancement of human values and rights is the cultural frontier. It is there that the principles of the MacBride Report have to be recognized as more essential than ever.³⁸

The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Round Tables were organized, respectively, in Guaruja, Brazil (1992), Dublin, Ireland (1993) and Honolulu, USA (1994). The last one gave special attention to the unequal communication possibilities of indigenous people within the Third World - called sometimes the Fourth World, "marginalized from communicative links in the world and within countries." The forum of the seventh Round Table, in 1995, was focused on the global effects and implications of the information superhighway.

Conclusions

Nineteen eighty-nine, the year of revolutions in the Central and Eastern Europe and the approaching dissolution of the Soviet Union, was considered by many observers as to mark the end of the NWICO as an idea — the one which evolved from an initial concern over the imbalance in news flow and developed into a major concern of communication inequalities. Approaching the one-way free flow of cultural products, from developed to developing countries, NWICO began to view it as a threat to the cultural sovereignty of individual nations. Slowly, with the technical development of media, it incorporated such issues as the need of regulation of direct broadcast and transborder data flows. But strongly opposed by the U.S., abandoned by the dissolved Soviet bloc, the NWICO idea was put aside by UNESCO, its main forum of discussion, and left to a limited number of non-governmental organizations and the academic environment.

It happened exactly at the time when new conditions emerged due to the political processes, technological advancements and global expansion of media moguls created a new situation calling for a deep reflection on the future of the communication between the nations.

The parallel debate in Western Europe, however, according to many observers, should be considered as a continuation and extension of the debate on NWICO. Said Wolfganf Kleinwachter in evaluating Western European efforts:

In a certain way, the Council of Europe and the EEC have no other basic ideas than the NAM [Non-Aligned Movement] more than 20 years ago: to develop their own system and to protect their own identity. 40

The reaction of the U.S. government to those ideas is reminiscent to a large extent of its reaction to the NWICO. Here, however, instead of the question of free flow of information, the question of free flow of tradable (as subjects of "buy and sell activity") commodities is stressed. The next chapter will examine this debate.

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CHAPTER III

WESTERN EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

The political and economic opening of the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 also opened up their media systems, exposing them to the trends and processes happening all over the world. The post-1989 media systems of the region are characterized, on one hand, by freedom of expression, political diversity, and independence from governmental control, and on the other hand, however, by commercialization, the appearance of the "yellow press" and tabloid television, and the massive import of cheap, "trashy" programming, which have lowered the standards of television broadcasting.

The Western European experience of deregulation can be of great value for the Eastern Europeans.

Deregulation of Media in Western Europe

The "public media" are, in the opinion of many Western European observers, the ones most likely to strive towards the ideal of service for good of the society. Since the 1920s European broadcasting has conformed to a public service model. Unfortunately, this ideal seemed impossible to fulfill in the reality of the everyday life of market economies; privatization and deregulation in the industries remaining previously in the hands of the state in the Western Europe also included media industries. The first

step in this direction took place in Italy, where by the beginning of 1980s media mogul Silvio Berlusconi, won a share of half of the Italian TV public. In France a private Canal Plus started broadcast in 1984; two years later there were two more — La Cinq and TV6 — operating as commercial broadcasters. In 1987 the French public network Television Francaise 1 (TF1) was privatized. ²

Media oligopolies, starting their activity in Western Europe at the end of the 1980s, strived to replace the public service broadcasting philosophy with the philosophy of market, in which public service functions of broadcasters is marginal. Rupert Murdoch stated it clearly:

What I am arguing for is a move from the current system of public broadcasting, in which market consideration are marginal, to a market system in which public broadcasting would be a part of the market mix but in no way dominate the output in the way it does at present.³

Those "market considerations" of commercial broadcasting were explained by Robert Wright, President of NBC: "NBC is not in the business of prosecuting the public trust, or advancing a philosophical policy it believes in. It is in business to make money." 4

Fully competitive television was met by Western

Europeans with many doubts. First of all, the viewers

appreciated many achievements of their public service

broadcasting, among which BBC is still considered the best

in the world. Secondly, most European societies do not have

a "capitalist culture" — the leading force in the United

State — where an equation mark is usually posed between "greater business competition" and "more diversity, freedom, consumer welfare and democracy." Thirdly, the internationalization of TV made many Europeans feel culturally endangered. It was understood that the large public broadcasting organizations might offer stronger defenses against the inflow of cheap, low brow foreign (mostly American) productions. Many observers considered this productions at last partly responsible for such negative phenomena as violence, cynicism, sensationalism, erosion of traditional values, etc.

Vulnerable Values Endangered

The Liege Conference of November 1990 in Belgium listed seven sets of values of European broadcasting most likely to be jeopardized by the market pressures in the multichannel conditions, calling for their institutionalized protection:

- 1. Program quality, traditionally associated with the characteristics of the public service broadcasting, conceived as enabling an enriched viewing experience. 7

 Quality programming is supposed to contribute to the development of culture, and is considered as an antithesis of "fast-food-like," standardized programming consisting of "simple home-made game and entertainment shows, and American soap operas." 8
- 2. Pluralism of many kinds regional, linguistic, political, cultural and in taste levels, characterizing

public service programming all over Western Europe.

Commercial television, financed by advertising money,

"shifts the emphasis from a principled to pragmatic

pluralism," ceasing to serve groups which advertisers are

not interested in reaching. The FCC Chairman, M. S. Fowler,

stated this conflict:

Many nations view communications, especially through the new technologies, as a vehicle for achieving other national or international goals rather than as a device to meet the needs of individuals as consumers. What are these other goals? Fostering national development or preserving cultural or religious values; in many cases, encouraging or compelling loyalty to the state. 9

In his statement the notion of approaching the viewers as consumers living in markets, not as citizens whom the media are supposed to serve, is striking. Such position, however, seems to endanger the good of numerous segments of population: children, elderly, minority cultural interests, minority religions, minority ethnic groups, etc., — all those who do not have enough big purchasing power.

3. Cultural identity which should be expressed in local and national broadcasting, not only in news, but also in movies, documentaries, and entertainment. Commercial television endangers this value in two ways. Firstly, by offering foreign, mostly American, programming to the audiences, and secondly, by endangering indigenous production industries forced to compete for the market with economically powerful international media giants. Defensive

steps include creation of services for national regions (e.g. Spain, Switzerland, Belgium), licensing obligations to promote national languages, and guotas. 10

- 4. Independence of program sources from commercial influences, ensuring, in the opinion of many West Europeans, the integrity of creative and journalist work.
- 5. The integrity of civic communication, considered as responsible for "the health of the political process and for the quality of public discussion generated within it." Western Europeans try to protect this value by, for example, banning political advertising, obliging commercial networks to include daily news and current affairs programs, understanding that the political process should be fairly reflected in the media serving their audiences as citizens of certain states.
- 6. Welfare of children and juveniles, one of the priorities of public service broadcasting, dangerously abused by commercial broadcasts offering violent, aggressive cartoons mixed with the massive advertising that targets this most vulnerable audience. The European recognition of this problem incorporates a call for: satisfying children's developing educative needs; protection from unfair advertisement; and protection from exposure to overly adult content. 12
- 7. Maintenance of standards, especially in the fields of violence, sex and use of bad language. It is suspected that the more competitive conditions will lower the

standards of presentations. The most active intervention in this area was taken by Great Britain, where a new body, the Broadcasting Standards Council, was created. 13

European Regulations of Media Inflow

The protectionist measures confronted the massive inflow of American media production in Europe already by the early 1920s. The restrictive regulations were adopted first by Germany and later by France and the United Kingdom. 14

After World War II Western European countries, facing another massive wave of American films, imposed restrictions limiting the number of American films ("number quotas") and requiring the screening of both foreign and domestic films ("screen quotas"). 15

A strong trend towards liberalization of trade prevailing in Europe in the 1960s weakened those protectionist policies, opening also a new era for coproduction and co-investments between European and American film industries. Even then, however, in the late 1960s, an emerging INTERSAT satellite system raised a fear of a new cultural invasion by U.S. television through direct broadcast satellites (DBS)¹⁶ initiating a discussion in the forum of the United Nations. Western Europeans together with the Soviet Bloc and the Third World countries opposed the U.S. claim for free flow of television by satellite. "What became apparent in this debate was that Western countries were much more worried about the cultural consequences of

free flow than they were about the free flow of information and news."¹⁷

The liberal position of 1960s Europe dissolved with the radical changes in the structure of the world media industries. The increasingly hegemonic position of Hollywood caused a deep reflection on the need of protection of the indigenous cultures, as well as the local film industries, sometimes too weak to compete in a free, uncontrolled media market. The large-scale media industry mergers of the 1980s and 1990s, the potential of direct broadcast satellites, and the process of the single European market emerging in 1992 intensified those concerns and prompted the European Community to shape a pan-European policy.

European Parliament Resolutions

In February 1989 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on the dangers caused by media concentration for the exercise of freedom of expression and information and for cultural diversity in member states.¹⁸

In September 1992, another resolution was adopted by the European Parliament, calling for the regulatory measures to restrict media concentration and safeguard pluralism, to be taken by the European Commission. The Commission responded with the green paper <u>Pluralism and Media</u>

Concentration in the Internal Market, which analyzed

different options and presented different views of the parties of discussion. 19

In November 1993 the Council of Europe took the next step by proposing resolution 1003 on journalism ethics. The resolution called for establishing pan-European standards, including the right of reply; establishing of European Media Ombudsman; creation of self-regulatory bodies. The accompanying 38-point ethics package stated, among others:

"Controversial and sensational items must not be confused with subjects on which it is important to provide information."

"Television programming must avoid "glorifying violence, exploiting sex and consumerism, or using deliberately unsuitable language."

"News organizations are "socioeconomic agencies whose entrepreneurial objectives have to be limited by the conditions for providing access to a fundamental right." 20

The proposal was met with a strong American opposition. Mass media researcher, Leonard R. Sussman commented:

In 1993, only totalitarian states defended censorship, yet nowhere in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union or most of Africa was press free of threats to enforce "responsibility" as defined by government. And this year, European democracies joined that bandwagon.²¹

The International Federation of Newspaper Publishers called the resolution "one of the most profound attacks on the freedom and independence of the press in recent years"22 George Garneau in his article entitled "Free Press Threat in Europe" concluded:

On a world scale, the proposal parallels the threat of free expression posed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization's proposed New World Information Order.²³

The Directive on Transborder Television

The concern about concentration, motivated by the threat that oligopolization erodes the diversity of information and cultural production, has been also reflected in the activities of the European Community (EC). The Directive on Transborder Television adopted in October 1989 by this body urged an increase in European television production through government support and a limit on imported U.S. television programs, among foreign imports, to less than 50 percent.

The directive was adopted after several years of debate and was aimed to ease the flow of television programming across European national borders, creating a base for the common European market to be established in 1992 by harmonizing various national rules. The minimum standards in the areas of advertising, sponsorship, protection of minors, and right of reply were set. One of the elements of the directive, however, was proposing a quota system which set minimum standards for the proportion of EC-produced programming in the European broadcasts (known later as a "soft quota"):

Member States shall ensure where predictable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works ... a majority proportion of their

transmission time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services.²⁴

That part of the directive was vigorously opposed by the United States. This opposition, strongly supported by the American Congress, was led by Carla Hill, then the U.S. Trade Representative, who wrote a number of letters to the EC officials expressing "strong objection" to the measure, claiming its enactment "would almost certainly have a disastrous effect on the U.S. industry's substantial European earnings."25 She was soon joined by Jack Valenti, President and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America and a number of Hollywood production companies.²⁶ The proposed quotas were denounced as an attempt at restraining a free trade and excluding American exporters from the European market. Some opponents even said that strict limits could start a trade war between the United States and Europe, by unfairly threatening the \$2.5 billion U.S. trade surplus (in which Hollywood sales played an important role; in 1988 the sale of American TV programming in European Community exceeded \$600 million).²⁷

Robert Ross, at that time managing director of CNN International Sales, revealed the background of such a drastic opposition on the American side:

Access to the European marketplace for U.S. products and service associated with new satellite and cable media is an issue, just as is access for U.S. beef and agricultural products. Indeed, as important as fair trade for U.S. agricultural products may be, the future

of the U.S. export economy is not going to be characterized by a vast expansion of our agricultural exports. To the contrary, we can expect that the telecommunications, information, entertainment and advertising sectors of our economy will contribute substantially to our economy. It is here that we must place the emphasis in removing trade barriers.... The new media market of the new Europe will be the first, and perhaps the most important, test of our resolve in this regard. We cannot afford to fail.²⁸

Explanations of the European Community that the directive has rather to do with the protection of the local cultures than with trade issues was rejected by the Americans.

MEDIA Program

A new EC initiative in the area of audio-industry, attempted to connect both cultural and economic aims more clearly. It was a MEDIA Program adopted by the Council of Ministers of the European Community in December 1990. With a budget of 200 million ECU's (\$256 million) for a period of five years (1991 - 1995) it was designed, in the words of Jean Dondelinger, European commissioner for culture, to "develop the economic aspects of two cultural activities: cinema and television." It was to "help to exploit the new European dimension: a single economy but a multicultural and plurilinguistic society."²⁹

The MEDIA Program primarily consisted of 17 initiatives (in 1993 there were already 19), none of which was devised at once, but rather developed over a period of time. These 17 ventures can be grouped into four areas: training,

production, distribution and exhibition, and cinema heritage. 30

The group of training aimed ventures included:

- 1. European Audiovisual Entrepreneurs (EAVE), a main training program, offering workshops to young producers in the field of project development, packaging, marketing and co-production, and
- 2. <u>Media Business School</u> launched as a center of research, offering seminars and courses in different areas of audiovisual industry, including marketing, financing and legal aspects of co-production.

The production group consisted of seven different programs:

- 1. Script Fund offering loans to film projects,
- 2. Documentary, and
- 3. <u>Cartoon</u> devoted to supporting documentary and animated-films,
- 4. Media Investment Club aimed at promotion of new media, involving digital and interactive techniques,
- 5. <u>Scale</u> aiming to help film and TV production in smaller countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal and Greece),
- 6. MAP-TV developed to support co-productions based on the use of European archival footage,
- 7. <u>Euro Media Guarantees</u> providing part of the credit and guarantees for co-production loans.

Distribution and exhibition were the areas of interest of the third group consisting of:

- 1. European Film Distribution Office aiming to widen the distribution of European films within Europe, by providing interest-free, conditionally repayable loans that help distributors launch films
- 2. <u>Babel</u> assisting in dubbing and subtitling European productions,
- 3. <u>Media Sales</u> aiming to increase the quality of service in European cinemas and promote screening of European films by the movie theaters,
- 4. Euro Aim promoting, marketing and distributing European independent productions, as well as matching projects to available co-production sources,
- 5. $\underline{\text{EVE}}$ set up to help the video release of European films,
- 6. <u>Greco</u> supporting the international co-production and distribution of different-language versions of high-quality drama.

The last group, was aimed to protect the cinema heritage, and included:

- 1. European Film Academy aiming to develop an awareness of European cinema through the annual Felix Awards, publications and master class for young filmmakers,
- 2. Project Lumiere aimed at preserving the film libraries and establishing a central catalog of all European film productions since 1885.

The MEDIA Program was described by the <u>Variety</u> as "the best idea anyone yet had to assist Europe's struggling film industry."³¹ With its five-year budget of \$256 million, it could not have a strong financial input on a \$30 billion a year European market. It had, however, an important role as an initiator of the movement leading to strengthening the European audio-industry. Holde Lhoest, head of the program, explained it: "The best mark of MEDIA's success would be for it to be dead."³²

The midterm audit evaluated the program positively. In many countries national feature production has markedly increased: in France from 136 features produced in 1989 to 155 produced in 1992, in Italy from 117 in 1989 to 127 in 1992. 33 European Film Distribution Office supported 133 European productions and 682 distribution operations. 34

American observers, however, immediately accused Europeans of anti-Americanism, looking at the MEDIA Program as a tool to combat the growing influence of Hollywood. (It should be recalled that in 1980 Hollywood's share of the EC box office was about 46%, while in 1991 it reached 69%) 35 The EC representatives responded that a strong European audiovisual industry could serve the interests of the American industry by promoting a more balanced partnership.

The Role of Media in Society:

Two Concepts

Those strong reactions of the United States to any attempts at regulating the European media market clearly show a deep division between the American and European concept of the role of the media in society. The former wish to use broadcasting primarily as a means to reach consumers living in the markets, the second believe that broadcasting systems should address their viewers first of all as citizens living in the communities. The complexity of the second concept, in the opinion of Duncan H. Brown, "contrasts sharply with the simplistic statements of those who characterize it as paternalism, a case of the government giving the people what they are thought to need rather than what they really want."

The opponents of the European concept of media approach the EC's regulations as a free trade issue. The cultural dimension of the problem is sometimes absolutely rejected:

"I don't know what European culture is as opposed to world culture," said a Deputy U.S. Trade Representative.³⁸

In her article on "Trade and Information Policy" Sandra Bramon commented this policy:

[T]he focus on information as a commodity by the U.S. is part of an overall rejection of cultural or political valuation of international information flows that is embodied in background studies for policymakers, congressional hearings and policy statements in a quite self-conscious way.³⁹

The debate on the international flow of information, abandoned in UNESCO after 1989, has been moved by those policy makers to GATT. It is there, where American negotiators promote the idea of media productions as marketable commodities. By demanding that world trade in audiovisual products follow the principles of free trade policy, the American government provides a strong support to the media oligopolies. William H. Melody explains this relationship between the governments and the Trans National Companies (TNCs):

In attempting to achieve the long-term dominant market positions, the TNC's are assisted by the governments of their respective home-base countries. The home governments adopt policies and positions that assist their respective TNCs. Thus the oligopolistic rivalry among TNCs involves a strong element of nationalism and direct government involvement on both the demand and supply sides of the market exchange.⁴⁰

Indeed, as the Report of U.S. Department of Commerce entitled <u>Globalization of the Mass Media</u>, (January 1993) recommends:

Government's role in encouraging free and open markets is to move aggressively to eliminate regulations that are simply inhibiting the development of competition and to reform or refocus regulations that may be playing some role in preventing anticompetitive conduct or serving some other important public purpose, but are doing so in an unnecessarily restrictive, efficiency-reducing fashion.⁴¹

Representatives of the French media industry to the GATT Uruguay Round protested this policy and called for excluding audiovisual products from GATT. 42 They were hoping

to protect, by doing so, the European film and entertainment industries. A strong lobby against their initiative was led again by Jack Valenti, the President of the Motion Picture Association, and Steven Spielberg, movie director and producer. As a result, although Article IV of the GATT agreement recognizes the non-commercial, educational, artistic, or socio-cultural goals of media production, big media exporters media productions in the terms of commercial commodity only.⁴³

Canadian Experience

Canada, which, like other democratic states, believes in the free flow of information and free press, is also aware of the dangers posed by the globalization of media industries giving primacy to American-style commercial programming. As the closest neighbor, it has observed the most clearly the diffusion of American commercial broadcasts across its borders, endangering its local production.

Canadian minister Marcel Massee in his speech delivered to communication students at the University of Ottawa in 1990, said:

The government of Canada is conscious of the socioeconomic risks which the free circulation of cultural products can bring. Our market is small and we are face to face with an invasion of foreign products, notably American, in the areas of publishing, film, recorded sound and in television. If not corrected, such a situation could take our own culture out of the mainstream even in Canada.

He continued:

As the United States constantly searches out new markets for its entertainment products, which constitute its second largest export category, the access of Canadians to their own cultural products is threatened more and more. English Canada now understands that it is a cultural minority and is therefore now turning to the only authority it deems able to defend and promote its cultural identity: the federal government. 44

His argument appears close to that of the New World
Information and Communication Order, and makes it clear that
the discussion on NWICO ideas continues in different forums,
even without direct addressingthis particular concept,
considered by many to be "dead."

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⁶Ibid., 30.

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²⁶Brown, op. cit., 2.

²⁷"Signs Of Truce Between Europe And U.S.," Broadcasting, 31 July 1989, 22.

²⁸Robert Ross, "Monday Memo," <u>Broadcasting</u>, 6 February 1989, 20.

 $^{29}\text{Terry Ilott, "Aims Cultural and Economic,"} \ \underline{\text{Variety}}, \ 8$ June 1992, 37.

30"Seventeen Pieces." Variety, 8 June 1992, 42-46.

 $^{31}\text{Terry Ilott},$ "Priming the Euro Pipeline," <u>Variety</u>, 8 June, 1992, 37.

³²Ibid., 40.

³³Chris Fuller, "EC's Media Maps New Direction For 2000," Variety, 29 November 1993, 56-62.

³⁴Chris Fuller, "Politics Subvert EC Goals," <u>Variety</u>, 29 November 1993, 59-60.

35Terry Ilott, "Priming the Euro Pipeline." op. cit.

36Brown, op. cit., 1.

37 Ibid.

on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Television Broadcasting and the European Community. 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1989, p. 28. This position is strongly opposed by many European scholars. An interesting model explaining the differences between Norwegian and American cultures has been proposed by Norwegian communication researcher Steinar Bryn:

NORWEGIAN CULTURE is/emphasizes:

AMERICAN CULTURE is/emphasizes:

COMMUNITY ORIENTED SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY MODEST INDIVIDUALISTIC SELF-REALIZATION SELF-ASSURE TRADITIONAL
WORKER-ORIENTED
PEOPLE-ORIENTED
ROOTED
EQUALITY
JUSTICE
COOPERATIVE PARTICIPATION
NORWEGIAN REALITY
SOCIAL SECURITY
SCARCITY OF RESOURCES

EXPERIMENTAL
CONSUMER-ORIENTED
PROFIT-ORIENTED
MOBILE
FREEDOM
OPPORTUNITY
COMPETITION
AMERICAN DREAM
SOCIAL INSECURITY
LAND OF PLENTY

In Steinar Bryn, "The Americanization of the Global Village. A Case Study of Norway." Paper delivered at a conference Aspects of the American Influence on Sweden, (Uppsala University, 30 November 1990), 3.

³⁹Quoted in Kondakamrla Ramesh, <u>The Role of Canada in</u> the UNESCO Communication Program. Master's thesis, Carleton University, Canada, 1992 (Master Abstracts International, ProQuest AAC MM76017).

⁴⁰William H. Melody, "The Information Society: The Transnational Economic Context and Its Implications" in Gerald Sussman and John A. Lent, op. cit., 30.

41Report of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Globalization of the Mass Media, January 1993, 71.

42Hamelink, The Politics Of World Communication, op. cit., 180.

⁴³Ibid., 181.

⁴⁴Quoted in Ramesh, op. cit., 105-106.

CHAPTER IV

GLOBALIZATION OF TELEVISION BROADCASTING

Marshall McLuhan's prophecy about the global village is coming true in today's world; this global village has a global marketplace. The concept of multinational business of the 70's seems to be obsolete. A new type of company is evolving — the global company. The mass media industry, as with other businesses aimed at making money, is undergoing the same transition. New technologies make this extension to the international and global levels possible.

But only the largest national and transnational corporations (TNCs) and government agencies are able to take the advantage of these new opportunities. Smaller companies and less powerful countries cannot stand this competition, in which all but the largest and strongest firms lose.

International communication scholar William H. Melody explains:

The firms that can now leap across market boundaries are already dominant in their respective product and geographic markets. Their entry has a major impact on the structure of the supply side of the market and prompts a strategic response from the established dominant firm(s). This is not atomistic competition responding to market forces that reflect consumer demand, as assumed by market theory, but rather a type of medieval jousting for territorial control.²

New communication technologies, which, besides the traditional terrestrial broadcasting, include cable systems, multichannel multipoint distribution systems and direct

broadcast satellites (DBS), play an important role in the process of globalization of media industry which extends its activities geographically, and, inevitably, develops into an oligopoly of few global media companies. The financial scale of this process limits the access of smaller, independent organizations: "We will all deficit-finance these projects for now," revealed Bob Ross, Turner Broadcasting vice president of international business and network development, talking about CNN's expansion on the Asian market, "but a company like ours, which will do \$2.7 billion this year, can afford to spend \$25 million on a [long-term] investment. At the end of the day, "he added, "it will be very difficult for small guys to make moves into the [global] market."

Satellite broadcasting is not for small entrepreneurs for many other reasons: placing a satellite in orbit costs about \$300 million; a monthly rent of one of its channels was already about \$200,000 in 1989.

The money necessary to support such an undertaking is to be found only among biggest advertisers. One of the global media owners, Rupert Murdoch, explained this close relationship:

Of course advertising is just one aspect of the problem of developing a global media network. But it's an extremely important one if we are going to find a way to pay for what will be a very expensive exercise. So are mergers and the freeing up of nationalistic controls if we're to have any hope of getting there soon...[Global media] will be demand-driven by multinational marketing companies, the IBMs, Sonys, Toyotas, Volvos, Coca-Colas of this world.⁵

Ben H. Bagdikian described this relationship of the emerging media oligopolies as a "powerful troika: themselves, the worldwide advertising agencies and the multinational manufacturers of consumer goods," adding:

[T]his troika is already changing the cultural, social, and political values in much of the world. ... How quickly all this develops will depend on tenacity of those who want to project their global message — and there is every indication that many companies do. 6

Emerging Oligopolies

The race of media powerhouses like the Cable News
Network, Silvio Berlusconi, Rupert Murdoch and Robert
Maxwell to become global had already started with the
beginning of the 1990s. The potential of the global market
is clear: an estimated 210 million TV homes — approx. 35%
of the global total — in Eastern and Western Europe,
roughly 76 million in Latin America, and an estimated 140
million in Asia. There are predictions that by 2000 the
international media market could reach the US three trillion
dollar mark. While advertisers were the ones who first
understood it clearly, the same attitude has started to
prevail among TV broadcasters: "Over the next 10 years,
international is where long-term growth has to come from;
the U.S. market is saturated, " said Bob Ross from Turner
Broadcasting.9

Different companies are trying to eclipse each other in becoming the world's foremost network. 10 Rupert Murdoch and his News Corporation linked the Fox studio, network, and library with his Sky TV in Europe and his Star TV satellite system in Asia.

NBC already has two channels in Asia, NBC Super Channel in Europe and Middle East, Canal de Noticias NBC and TV Azteca in Central and South America, being the only one of three American broadcast networks trying to build its own worldwide system (ABC also wants to "go global", but in another way, concentrating more on software than on distribution). In 1996 NBC News is supposed to reach three times as many viewers overseas as CNN. In 1994 CNN distributed its service in 78 million households in over 200 countries outside the U.S. 12

This marketplace has expanded to a large extent due to the concurrent processes of the deregulation of broadcasting and the commercialization of media institutions which are the effects of political processes, among them the transformation of the Eastern and Central Europe.

Anthony Smith listed in 1992 the following media giants: the Time-Warner Merger, Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, the Walt Disney Company, Silvio Berlusconi (mostly active in Europe), Sony Corporation of Japan, and German magazine giant Bertelsman.¹³

Each of these, called by Smith "planetary corporations," plans to gather under its control every step

in the information process, from creation of the product, which is news, information, ideas, entertainment and popular culture, and deliver it to the global public.

The Patterns of Globalization in the Mass Media Industries

Media companies, according to the report <u>Globalization</u> of the <u>Mass Media</u>, prepared in 1993 by the U.S. Department of Commerce, ¹⁴ globalize their operations by three main methods: "complementary expansion," "horizontal expansion," and "vertical expansion."

- 1. Complementary expansion takes place when a company is engaged in the production of "complementary products" in different countries through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), including merger, acquisition, or joint venture. (Products are complementary when a price increase for one of them causes decrease in the quantity demand for the other product, and vice versa. Compact discs and CD players are an example of complementary goods the increase in price of one reduces the demand for the other.)
- 2. <u>Horizontal expansion</u> occurs when a company serves at least two different foreign markets through either Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or exports, selling the same product in each of them. In this manner of expansion firms use their competitive advantages over the local rivals like superior management skills, developed distribution networks and technological advancement. In the case of export,

additionally, the "public good" nature of media products plays an important role. ("Public good" nature means that one person's viewing of a program does not restrict another person's ability to view the same program.) Producers can reduce the per-viewer cost of production by distributing the product as widely as possible.

Exports have played a major role in the globalization of media industries and the U.S. industry has been a major participant in this process. The export of American TV programs generates annual revenues of \$2,5 billion to \$3 billion. The products — motion pictures and TV programs — with the largest domestic market in the world, have a strongly advantageous position when entering the international marketplace.

3. <u>Vertical expansion</u> takes place if a company is engaged in successive stages of the production chain through either FDI or long-term contracts, when one or more of those stages are located in different countries. Firms may avoid by these means a dependence on other firms operating at various stages of the chain. A development of Rupert Murdoch's media emporium, where, among others, News Corp. purchased Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., and then, in 1992, established a Fox Cable Channel, is an example of vertical expansion where one company performs TV program production, distribution and transmission.

The Cultural Aspect of Globalization

Globalization is not only an economic, but also a cultural phenomenon. The barriers previously posed by time, space, national boundaries, or political constraints are eroding, resulting in rapid and pervasive sharing of information around the world, and causing stronger and stronger cultural, but also political interdependence between the nations. "The principle of 'national sovereignty' dissolves in the era of new communication technologies which do not respect national boundaries." ¹⁶ In the process of this worldwide expansion, according to Anthony Smith,

cultural and political decisions are made in ways that outmaneuver the democratic process.... The energy behind this process emerges from a democratically made decision — that of deregulation — but it is an unforeseen consequence of this policy that raises a range of questions that are of rather more moment perhaps than the originating intention. 17

This shared information, spread through the globally linked webs of cables, is often a result of selection relating to audience appeal rather than to the political or cultural significance of the story, its educational value, or its broad social purposes. This is particularly true in the case of commercial television, where "TV news, for one thing, is both journalism and show business, a key political institution as well as a seller of detergent and breakfast cereal." Those choices are sometimes quite out of touch

with the reality of the global audiences. As an example it is worthwhile to evoke the poll carried out in 1995 by Associated Press, in which hundreds of U.S. editors and broadcast-news directors pointed out the Top 10 stories of 1994: 1) O.J. Simpson; 2) U.S. elections; 3) Baseball and hockey labor troubles; 4) Susan Smith case; 5) Nancy Kerrigan - Tonya Harding; 6) Haiti; 7) Failed health-care reform; 8) Southern California earthquake; 9) Rwanda; 10) Palestinians replacing Israeli occupiers in Gaza and Jericho. 19 Those findings show that the agenda set up by the American media people did not reflect many of the real problems and important events that the world was facing in 1994. Of course, as Walter Lippman suggested, media are not a mirror reflecting the reality, they are more like a searchlight; "where the searchlight is shining can be affected by groups with special interest in an issue, by pseudoevents to get attention, and by certain habits and rituals of journalists."20 However, the experience of international broadcasters shows more and more clearly that there is no a global pattern of what is interesting for the audience; the regional differences seem to be undeniable.

Indeed, when talking about information flow within the domain of Western civilization, it remains clear that the difference between the American and European media cannot be underestimated. Different understanding of newsworthiness, different journalistic ethics, different media law systems, different political agendas, different approaches to the

information (cultural good or product for sale), result from different cultures and different approaches to life, history and reality. The fact that at the end of 1992, CNN International, the international arm of CNN, "realizing that it was too American for audiences outside the U.S.," set itself a quota of 70% of original programming specifically created for an international audience, and only 30% of American programming, indicates that the reflection of the reality proposed by the American commercial news is not relevant to the foreign audiences.²¹

Globalization of the Television Broadcast

The flow of television programming had already been incorporated into the NWICO debate by the 1970s, thanks largely to the study conducted by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis (1974) who focused on the direction of the information flow in the world. Their research revealed that a few Western nations controlled this international flow of television programs, with the U.S., the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany as the biggest exporters. The globalization of TV broadcasting has changed that pattern to a large extent, giving primacy to the American-style commercial broadcast offered by most of today's global networks.

Peter Arnett looks at this process as the triumph of American-style broadcasting. In his speech at the University of Arizona in 1992, when accepting the John Peter

Zenger Award for Freedom of the Press and the People's Right to Know for his coverage of the Gulf War in CNN, he said:

Our television news programming leads the world. Our movie industry, at its best, is uniquely capable of touching the sensitivities of a whole world audience. Imagine a world that wants all what we just take for granted, and you see what lies ahead for those willing to help pioneer this new age of internationalism.

He continued:

Throughout Europe entrepreneurs are putting together deals to develop cable television programming, overcoming years of entrenched opposition by xenophobic governments trying to control the flow of information and programming. I am telling even about Western Europe, where France, Britain and so on in the guise of preventing what they called 'cultural imperialism' stemmed the flow of television news and entertainment, U.S. style. Now the marketplace is talking.²²

The region of Central and Eastern Europe, by opening its economies and political systems, has inevitably become a part of this marketplace.

Eastern Europeans were always very interested in getting access to Western media productions. In the pre-1989 era only a limited amount of programming was imported, which was due not only to the ideological constraints, but also to financial limitations. This is why, while the amount of purchases was remaining quite scarce, only the best and most valuable productions were shown by the state-owned televisions and cinemas. It means that, while the Eastern Europeans did not see any of James Bond movies, they could

see not only all the American classics, but also recent high-brow productions, including the winners of Academy Awards (due to financial reasons with a 3-4 years delay), as well as many Western European productions, including not only French, Italian, and British, but also smaller cinematographies, like Scandinavian or Spanish. Access to the foreign satellite TV broadcast, however, was impossible due to imposed restrictions on the satellite dish ownership. Those restrictions were supposed to "protect" the viewers from the "bad" ideological influence of the Western broadcast and maintain the hegemonic control over the viewers: "The enemy of the people stands on the roof," said once Walter Ulbrich, former East German Communist Party dignitary, about antennas. 23 N. J. Nicholas, Jr., Co-Chief Executive Officer of Time Warner Inc. approached this "enmity" from a different perspective, explaining:

Television is the living nightmare of every dictator and oppressor. They can't communicate without it, yet they can't control it. TV slips through their fingers. It subverts the isolation with which the repressive regimes tries to insulate itself.²⁴

However, by the end of the 1980s the ownership of satellite dish became legal in some of the countries of the region (e.g. Poland, Hungary), and restrained only by financial reasons. Satellite and cable reception grew fast. At the beginning of 1990s the percentage of households with

access to the foreign satellite broadcast become fairly high.

In Poland with almost 10 million television households, there were 18,000 satellite dishes (0.18%), in Hungary 15,000 out of 2.6 million television households had satellite dish (0.6%), in Czechoslovakia with 4.3 million TV households there were 30,000 satellite dishes (0.7%). For the contrast, in Romania with 3.9 million television households there were only approximately 100 satellite dishes (.003%). After five years, in 1995, more than three million Poles are receiving satellite broadcast via cable. More than 10 percent of Polish households own a satellite dish. Similarly rapidly cable and satellite services expanded in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. In Czech Republic more than 250,000 homes are already linked by the "Kable Plus" offering CNN, SkyNews, MTV, Eurosport, TV 5 Europe, and 16 other television channels. E

By mid-1991 parliaments throughout Central and Eastern Europe were working on new legislation to design media systems including commercial broadcasting. Global media moguls "waiting to capitalize on the liberalization of this potentially lucrative market" were preparing themselves to enter the region. For example, in Hungary, with 65 radio and 55 TV licenses available, applications poured at that time

mostly from such media players as Silvio Berlusconi, Rupert Murdoch, Robert Maxwell and Axel Springer. 28

Today many of newly created channels have indeed passed into the control of global companies, creating a situation where a big part of media playing a crucial role in the political and cultural life of each country, is controlled by people who are not resident in those societies. In the words of Anthony Smith, "we are seeing whole sections of entertainment industry — traditionally part of national, city, local, regional, or ethnical life and manners — pass into the hands of managements whose outlook is exclusively global."²⁹

The offerings of those commercial media is comprised of second and third-rate movies (mostly American, but also, for example, Italian, depending on the ownership of the channel) and low-quality entertainment. At the same time the state owned televisions, forced to compete for the audience, and facing financial constraints, lowered their standards, and narrowed their offerings to mostly American productions, thus depriving the audience of the possibility of contact with previously common Western European, Eastern European, and other productions. "Dynasty," "Dallas," become hits of the small screen; "Terminator" and "Rambo"-style movies conquered cinemas. These are the kinds of productions that

bring income to distributors; they are watched by the largest share of the audience.

Profit-driven market distributors cannot be blamed for providing the mass audience with the programming that the viewers would choose. This is why the phenomenon of "Americanization" of the Eastern European media cannot be approached simply as an "intrusion on the natives." It seems that to a large extent this process resonates with the native mass audiences, willfully choosing certain kind of this kind of programming. However, what is lacking on this new media map, is a valuable alternative which could successfully compete with this commercial pulp.

Conclusions

The opening of Central and Eastern Europe which brought international and global media players to that region changed the reality of media systems in each of the countries. On one hand, the amount of programming become significantly bigger, offering the viewers a broad choice not known there before. This aspect of transition can be accurately described by the words of N. J. Nicholas, Jr. from the Time Warner Inc.:

[t]elevision — especially cable television — is the electronic version of the Declaration of Independence. It proclaims individual equality. It does so every time you push the remote and create caleidoscope of passing images — of presidents, performers, diplomats, singers, preachers, pundits, all juxtaposed, all of

them competing for attention. The viewer — the individual — is always the one to decide who's worth listening and who's not. 30

At the same time, however, this diversity of programming becomes misleading when the offering of each of the available commercial channels is virtually the same. This uniformization of the commercial broadcast calls for reflection on the means of protection against the implementation of homogeneous standards into the cultural lives of the Eastern European societies. The answers are diverse. An American media researcher, Leonard R. Sussman who does not consider the phenomenon of uniformization as dangerous, suggests that "a more sophisticated citizenry," "educated from kindergarten up to want more than pap and conformity in its news and cultural products" will be and effective key to "real diversity."

Also suggestions of Western Europeans who have faced this phenomenon long before Eastern Europe may be of the teaching value. One of them was offered by Norwegian researcher, Steinar Bryn, when discussing the Americanization of Norway:

If young Norwegians see the American Way of Life as more magic, more exciting — and start to look at American movie heroes for inspiration instead of their own history — our task is to revitalize our own heroes. When Indiana Jones becomes more of an archeologist, more of an adventurer than Thor Heyerdahl, and when Rambo looks like he has got more guts than Fritdjof Nansen — we might have to blame ourselves for cutting the heads of our own heroes through childhood education. 32

Still another suggestion was made by American Ben H. Bagdikian who, already observing the increasing globalization of media monopolies by 1989 wrote:

It is time for the nations of the world to meet again and make a new Declaration of Freedom of Information, this time establishing antitrust principles that will apply at home as well as across national borders.

Calling for limiting how many media outlets could be controlled by one person or corporation, Bagdikian added: "unrestrained activity by a few often damages many." The mega-corporations create a danger of polluting the cultural environment with "a new mutation of that familiar source of the free spirit, centrally controlled information," which endangers the freedom of information. The answer to this danger, however,

...is not some international standard of censorship. It is no gain for freedom to replace national censorship with international censorship. The answer must be directed solely at the size of corporations, not the content of what they issue; at the restraint of economic activity that reduces voices, not at what the voices say.³³

All those voices, stressing the need of education; support of the national media industries; protection of cultural heritage; maintaining the diversity of choice and freedom from monopolies; while coming from different ideological backgrounds, remind to a very large extent the ideals incorporated into the concept of New World Information and Communications Order.

ENDNOTES

¹William H. Melody, "The Information Society: The Transitional Economic Context and Its Implications" in Gerald Sussman and John A. Lent, ed., <u>Transnational Communications</u>. Wiring the Third World, (Newbury Park, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), 28-29.

²Ibid., 29.

³Meredith Amdur and Nick Bell, "The Boundless Ted Turner:Road To Globalization," <u>Broadcasting & Cable</u>, 11 April 1994, 34-36.

⁴Ben H. Bagdikian, "The Lords of the Global Village," The Nation, 12 June 1989, 816.

⁵Rupert Murdoch, quoted in Duncan H. Brown, "Citizens or Consumers: U.S. Reactions to the European Community's Directive on Television, " <u>Critical Studies in Mass Communication</u>, 8 (1991): 1-12.

⁶Bagdikian, op. cit., p. 816.

⁷Meredith Amdur, "Cable Industry Wants The World On A Wire," Broadcasting & Cable, 24 January 1994, 114.

⁸Quoted in Cees J. Hamelink, <u>The Politics Of World Communication</u>, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), 178.

⁹Amdur and Nick Bell, op. cit.

 $^{10}\mbox{Ken}$ Auletta, "The Race For A Global Network," The New Yorker, 6 March 1995, 53-83.

¹¹Ibid., 81.

¹²Amdur and Nick Bell. op. cit.

of Mass Media Firms, (New York: Priority Press Publ., 1991), 21-40. The recent mergers of Time-Warner and Turner Broadcasting System, as well as ABC/Capital Cities with Walt Disney change this configuration to a very large extent.

14U.S. Department of Commerce, <u>Globalization of the Media</u>, National Telecommunications and Information Administration Special Publication (Washington D.C.: 1993), 53-66.

¹⁵Louise McElvogue, "Before it Can Toast Film, Cannes is Corralled by TV," <u>The New York Times</u>, 10 April 1995, sec. C, p. 9.

16Howard H. Frederick, Global Communication &
International Relations, (Belmont, Ca.: Woodsworth
Publications Co., 1993), 121

¹⁷Anthony Smith, <u>The Age of Behemoths. The Globalization Of Mass Media Firms</u> (New York: Priority Press Publications, 1991), 58.

18 Daniel C. Hallin, "We Keep America On Top Of The World," in Todd Gitlin, ed., <u>Watching Television</u>. A <u>Pantheon Guide To Popular Culture</u>, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 14.

¹⁹"The Top 10 Stories of 1994," <u>World Press Review</u>, February 1995, 26-27.

²⁰Walter Lippman, "The World Outside And the Pictures In Out Heads" in Donald F. Roberts, ed., <u>The Process And Effects of Communication</u>, (Urbana: University of Delinois Press, 1971): 265-286.

²¹Meredith Amdur, Nick Bell, "The Boundless Ted Turner: Road to Globalization," <u>Broadcasting & Cable</u>, 11 April, 1994, 35.

²²Peter Arnett, Exporting The First Amendment To The World, a speech presented at the University of Arizona, 22 April 1992, (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona, 1992), 5.

 $^{23}\mbox{Elaine}$ Attias, "Liberation on the Airwaves," The Christian Science Monitor, 14 February 1991, 12.

²⁴N. J. Nichols, Jr., "The Boob Tube Gets Smart. TV and the Future of Mass Communications." A speech delivered at the Executives' Club Luncheon, Chicago, Illinois, 15 March 1991, in Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 June 1991, 536.

²⁵Leonard Zeidenberg, "USIA Publishes Guide to TV in Eastern Europe," <u>Broadcasting</u>, 5 March 1990, 58-59.

²⁶John C. Merrill, ed., <u>Global Journalism</u>. <u>Survey Of</u> International Communication, (N.Y.: Longman, 1995), 159.

²⁷Csaba Osgysni, Krzysztof T. Toeplitz, Michael Malek, "Private TV Stalled in East Europe," <u>Variety</u>, 15 April 1991, M104.

28 Ibid.

²⁹Smith, op. cit., 2.

³⁰Nichols, Jr., op. cit., 536.

³¹Leonard R. Sussman, "The MacBride Movement: Old 'New Order' Leads to the New," Gazette 50, (1992): 82.

³²Steinar Bryn, "The Americanization of the Global Village. A Case Study of Norway," op. cit., 16.

33Bagdikian, op. cit., 820.

CHAPTER V

GLOBALIZATION OF ADVERTISING — THE CASE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The issue of the international flow of advertising under multinational control entered the agenda, as had that of the flow of television programming, in the 1970s. By then it was considered by many observers as furthering not only products and services, but also values and a way of life "generally centered on the acquisition of consumer goods."

In spite of those voices, advertising has remained one of the leading kinds of messages crossing national borders. Today, it is suggested, only global advertising can adequately respond to increasing global operations of business.

Indeed, dominated by less than two dozen transnational, mostly U.S.-owned, advertising agencies², global advertising works for their global clients in any accessible market.

Their development in the region of Central and Eastern

Europe can be observed as the model of the process.

Opening of the Market

The economic and political opening of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 was a signal for advertising agencies to establish their presence there as soon as possible. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, defined at that time, alphabetically, as Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, collectively added up to a market about 400 million consumers. The region's population appeared to be barely smaller than the 430 million in Western Europe. This number could not be ignored by the transnational companies.

These opening markets promised a new domain for the advertisers, who seized the approaching opportunity of operating in the newly created environment of commercial media. Norman Vale, Director of the International Advertisers Association, said:

It is clear to us that we are really on the threshold of some very exciting opportunities and I think next series of questions we have to ask ourselves and that you should ask yourselves as well, is: 'How do we plan our business strategies to take advantage of the enormous market potential that is dramatically evolving there?'³

Long before the political changes, two of the most "American" products, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, were present in the region. Pepsi entered Romania in 1965. In 1972 the company signed a landmark agreement with the Soviet Union and Pepsi-Cola became the first Western consumer product ever sold in that country.

Foreign advertising agencies started entering the region before the liberalization as well, but usually they could not own or buy companies and were forced to create alliances with one of the government-owned advertising agencies.

Inflow of Multinational Capital

Soon after 1989 quite a number of foreign investors started entering the region. The first McDonald's restaurant in the Soviet Union opened on January 31, 1990. Nineteen more were planned to be built over an unspecified period of time. The chain expected a rapid expansion in East Germany; As a major advertiser on West German TV, McDonald's was a recognized name throughout the Eastern part of the country, where West German TV signals were received. Procter & Gamble Co. and Colgate-Palmolive Co. followed this vanguard, increasing their exports and preparing themselves to set up manufacturing facilities. The Procter & Gamble's first commercial was broadcast in the Soviet Union on February 12, 1990. "We will sell as much if not more Crest in the Soviet Union than we will sell in Canada this year," expected Terry Loftus, P&G spokesman.⁵ In the mid-1991, Procter & Gamble became a major advertiser in Central and Eastern Europe; 6 their product advertising tailored specifically for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland made them the first international company executing full-fledged marketing programs aimed at the consumers of the region.

Inflow of Multinational Advertising

All these activities had to be followed, or sometimes preceded, by multinational advertisers: "International agencies open branches in places like East Europe because they simply cannot afford to say no to their big clients,"

explained Alan Gottesman of Paine Webber Inc. In 1990, 16 large agencies opened 31 offices in the region.

McCann-Erickson made its first move into the region in 1988 by opening McCann-Interpress Hungary in Budapest to handle Coca-Cola, Nestle, and Camel. By the end of 1990, it opened five offices in the region to serve such clients as Coca-Cola Co., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Camel cigarettes, McDonald's and L'Oreal.

Ogilvy & Mather's expansion in the region was planned to take place over period of ten years. The dynamism of the changes, however, "created a sense of urgency in getting there." "Eastern Europe doesn't need all the leading 50 agencies from abroad," explained Alexander Brody, Ogilvy's head of international operations.

Leo Burnett was the last major American agency to enter the region (March 1991). Its entrance into that market was requested by the agency's international clients, including Marlboro and McDonald.¹⁰

The 1990 soccer World Cup become the first international event to carry advertising in Central and Eastern Europe. The event's audience was estimated at 100 million for each of 52 matches. Eastern Europe's International Organization of Radio & Television (OIRT) signed an agreement with ISL Marketing giving it the exclusive rights to sell TV commercial packages for the region. Each package was sold for \$238,000 and consisted of a total of 12 minutes of commercial breaks and 80 seconds of

billboards within four matches. These numbers clearly show that TV advertising for the region of Central and Eastern Europe became an expensive tool of persuasion. Only multinational companies entering the market could pay those enormously high prices for promotion of their goods.

Local Markets, Global Players

High-priced advertising time prohibited widespread participation from the local clients. Additionally, because local business lacked a clear understanding of the advertising agencies' role, they were less likely to cooperate with the emerging advertising: "The idea of appointing an agency to a long-term communications program is unknown" explained Mike Ferrier, McCann's regional director for Europe. But, even though the role of ad agencies has become obvious, the financial constraints remained, in most cases, impossible to overcome.

In Poland the prevailing trends became clear: In 1993, among the ten biggest advertisers in the country, only two of them were operated by local capital. In a group of the ten biggest TV advertisers there was the only one that was Polish: a TV weekly magazine (Table I).¹³

TABLE I
TEN BIGGEST TV ADVERTISERS IN POLAND, 1993

Name	Percentage of advertising in the overall spending
Procter & Gamble	16%
Lever Poland	13.5%
Benckiser	7.5%
Masterfoods	5%
Henkel	4%
Johnson & Johnson	3%
Antena*	2.5%
Colgate - Palmolive	1.7%
L'Oreal	1.8%
PepsiCo	1.8%

* The only advertiser with local capital.

At the same time there were no local experienced advertisers in the region. Consequently the advertising industry was easily dominated by mostly international branches of American agencies (Table II). 14

TABLE II:
TWENTY BIGGEST ADVERTISERS AND THEIR AGENCIES (1993)

Name of the company	spending on advertising (in billion zlotys)	Agencies employed
1. Procter & Gamble	257	BSB Saatchi & Saatchi DMB & B Present Service Euro RSCG Grey Phase II Leo Burnett
2. Lever Poland	223	Lintas J. Walter Thompson Studio 66 Image Art Phase II Pentor D & M ZPR
3. Benckiser	122	McCann Erickson Marcom GGK Danter OTO Kennedy-Janssen- Nowicki Young & Rubicam
4. Masterfoods	80	BSB Saatchi & Saatchi DMB & B Pentor Radio Kielce
5. Henkel	71	BBDO PDF Siloe DDB Needham Optimum Media Business Consulting

		5.5
6. Johnson &	52	BSB Saatchi &
Johnson		Saatchi
İ		McCann Erickson
		Present Service
		Lintas
		Studio 66
		OTO
	İ	ARC
		AIC
7. Antena	42	no data
/. Ancena	42	110 data
8. Home Shopping	35	Pura
a. Home Shopping	33	Byra
9. Colgate -	34	Young & Rubicam
Palmolive		
10. L'Oreal	30	McCann & Ericson
11. PepsiCo	27	Publicis FCB
		Marcom
		BSB Saatchi &
		Saatchi
		BBDO
ł		Ogilvy & Mather
		Plakanda
		Pentor
12. Tchibo	23	BSB Saatchi &
12. ICIIIDO	4.5	1
1		Saatchi
13. PZU S.A.	21	D & M
1	1	Byra
		Phoenix
-		.
		B-Tronic
		Mazur Film
		Magit
14. Jacobs Suchard	19	Burson- Marsteller
		Pentor
ļ		1
		Demoskop
1E 23.64	17	Colina
15. Fiat	17	Galicja
]		B-Tronic
		Pentor
		Armando Testa
		Plakanda
ĺ		Plakat Technic
16. Warta	17	D & M
············· ·		

17. Coca - Cola	17	McCann Erickson Lintas Promocja 2000 AIDA RRM J.J.R. Eberta
18. LOTTO	16	Corporate Profiles J.J.R. Eberta Promocja 2000
19. Alexan	15	no data
20. Centertel	15	Ogilvy & Mather Burson- Marsteller Phoenix RRM

This reciprocal relationship between international business and international agencies has led to the situation where the leading agencies in the Polish market are the multinational ones (Table III).¹⁵

TABLE III:

INTERNATIONAL ADVERTISING AGENCIES IN POLAND ACCORDING TO

THE SALES IN 1993

Name	City of placement	Sales (in billion
		of zlotys)
1. J. Walter	Warsaw	272
Thompson		
2. Leo Burnett	Warsaw	228
3. BSB Saatchi &	Warsaw	181
Saatchi		

4. Lintas	Warsaw	173
5. McCann Erikson	Warsaw	170
6. Ogilvy & Mather	Warsaw	119
7. DMB & B	Warsaw	102
8. Publicis FCB	Warsaw	82
9. Young & Rubicam	Warsaw	74
10. BBDO	Warsaw	43
11. DDB Needham	Warsaw	36
12. IDEAPIU - MAPP	Warsaw	34
13. GGK	Warsaw	31
14. Armando Testa	Warsaw	7
Poland		
15. Grey	Warsaw	no data

Advertising's Influence on the Audience

Eastern Europeans observed the Western advertising from the beginning with very mixed feelings. They were both fascinated and resentful. A survey carried out in 1991 in Eastern Germany revealed that 58% of Eastern Germans (versus 52% of the Western Germans) believed that advertising takes advantage of them; 87% believed that advertising made them buy things they did not need; 64% expressed the opinion that advertising gives people the wrong impression of a product. Most of the Western brands launched on the market were, however, virtually unknown, so commercials at the beginning were informative, focused on lengthy and clear

explanation of product's benefits and quality. This was what the audience, brought up without experiencing the reality of the competitive market, seemed to need and appreciate. A survey carried out by the Leo Burnett Prague office two years later, in mid-1993, found that 89% of the audience believed that ads give valuable information, especially about new products.¹⁷

Quite soon, however, the markets became more and more competitive, and advertisers started to offer lifestyle and image oriented productions, imitating or just using the patterns of Western, especially American, advertising. A few voices expressed concerns about the dangers of this process. Gerard Puttner, the President of the Vienna unit of Backer & Spievogel & Bates (BSB) said:

It would be a major mistake to try lifestyle advertising, because their lifestyles are just beginning... They must develop their own style by drawing from their own heritage. 18

On the one hand these ads were often the productions imported by multinational agencies from other markets. On the other hand, however, the process of "interiorization" of production and distribution norms and models (meaning the acceptance of the foreign norms for the local markets) was going on. Due to that phenomenon the nationally-produced commercials offered by both the local, and the multinational agencies, started to reflect in every way the "Western logic." Advertising started to promote new patterns of

behavior and life styles, as well as new values — sometimes alien to the indigenous cultures. The ownership of the Barbie Doll became a necessity, as well as the name brand of a car or cigarettes.

The means of protection undertaken locally were often just ignored by foreign advertisers; many of the advertising campaigns were carried out against the existing laws. For example, Western tobacco companies openly defied advertising ban on their products in Hungary. Among them R. J. Reynolds Tobacco did not obeyed order of the Hungarian Consumer Protection Agency to remove illegal advertisements of cigarettes. Additionally, the "Hungary's chapter of the International Advertising Association decided [on]... 'carpet bombing' the media with illegal ads if talks with officials don't loosen restrictions."²⁰

By 1993 Western-style, image-oriented ads produced by the international agencies become dominant in the Eastern European media. Neil Postman described this kind of advertising in his "Conservative's Manifesto":

You must banish from your mind the naive but commonplace notion that commercials are about products. They are about products in the same sense that the story of Jonah is about the anatomy of whales. Which is to say they aren't. They are about values, myths and fantasies. One might even say they form a body of religious literature, a montage of voluminous, visualized sacred texts that provide people with images and stories around which to organize their lives.²¹

Advertising became, in the region of Central and Eastern Europe a "Mass Ideologizer," an agent for ingestion of Western commercial values. Neil Postman ironically characterized those "values" by a "few impious commandments which will be added to the future Decalogue by commercial television." Among them:

"thou shalt have no other gods than consumption, thou shalt despise what is old, thou shalt seek to amuse thyself continuously, and thou shalt avoid complexity like the ten plagues that afflicted Egypt."²²

More and more Eastern Europeans, especially the young generation, hoping to become more "westernized," to belong to the "better, richer," colorful, sparkling world of commercial spots, have already incorporated those commandments into a set of moral principles governing their lives. These are the unintended costs of opening up to the Western world.

Conclusions

As discussed before, globalization has not only an economic, but also a cultural aspect. And this aspect makes the protection of indigenous cultures more and more important in the context of the described expansion of culturally-oriented Western advertising. Each of those traditions, national identities, local symbols, and values constitute a piece of the mosaic necessary for the clear and complete picture of Western culture. Imposing the homogenous

commercialism means losing the richness of this picture. Protection of this diversity seems to be in the interest of the whole Western community.²³ Interestingly, the Eastern Europeans themselves seem to choose the messages based on the local cultures rather, than those based on the alien experience: "We observe that it is worth being more local, more Polish in ads," commented in 1993 Jacek Slotala, chairman of Parintex - J. Walter Thompson.²⁴ This observation, based on the commercial stipulations, seems to point out at the same time that the ideals the New World Information and Communications Order calling for the preservation of local cultures are reflected in the audience's choices. Respect for the cultural diversity proves to be an answer also in the commercial undertakings.

ENDNOTES

¹ Sean MacBride and Colleen Roach, "The New International Information Order," in <u>The Global Media Debate</u>. Its Rise, Fall and Renewal, ed. George Garbner, Hamid Mowlana and Kaarle Nordenstreng, op. cit., 3.

²World's Top Ten Advertising Organizations by Worldwide Gross Income

Organization	Worldwide Gross Income (millions of dollars)
1. WPP Group, London	\$ 2,813.5
2. Interpublic Group of Cos., New	1,989.2
York	
3. Omnicom Group, New York	1,806.7
4. Saatchi & Saatchi Co., London	1,696.5
5. Dentsu Inc., Tokyo	1,387.6
6. Young & Rubicam, New York	1,072.3
7. Euro ESCG, Neuilly, France	951.2
8. Grey Advertising, New York	735.4
9. Foote, Cone & Belding Comm.,	682.7
Chicago	
10.Hakuhodo, Tokyo	661.1

Source: Data from Advertising Age, 14 April 1993, p. 12, quoted ib Shirley Biagi, Media/impact. An Introduction to Mass Media, (Belmond, Cal.: Woodsworth Publishing Co., 1994), 524.

³Symposium of International Communication Studies' Global Studio Project, <u>Broadcast Diversity in Eastern Europe</u>. Challenges for the 1990, (Washington, D.C., November 1990),231.

⁴Patricia Winters and Scott Hume, "Pepsi, Coke: Art of Deal-making," Advertising Age, 19 February 1990, 45.

⁵Thid.

⁶Jennifer Lawrence, "P&G marches into E. Europe," Advertising Age, 30 September 1990, 10.

⁷Kim Foltz, "Y.& R. Buys An Agency In Prague," <u>The New</u> York Times, 16 August 1990, sec. D, p. 21.

*"Cautiously, Advertising Rush To Eastern Europe," The New York Times, 1 April 1991, sec. D, p. 8.

⁹Joanne Lipman, "Ogilvy Maps Eastern European Expansion," Wall Street Journal, 6 August 1990, sec. B,p. 4.

¹⁰Kim Foltz, "Feeling the Time Is Right, Burnett Enters East Europe," The New York Times, 26 March 1991, sec. D, p.20.

"Soccer Offers TV Ads in East,"
Advertising Age, 5 March 1990, 6.

¹²Laurel Wentz and Nancy Giges, "McCann, DDB Grow in E. Europe," Advertising Age, 26 February 1990, 12.

"Polski Rynek Reklamy" (The Polish Advertising Market), special report of The Businessman Magazine, (Warsaw: Business Press Ltd., Winter 1994), 6.

¹⁴Ibid., 44-45.

¹⁵Ibid., 14.

¹⁶Jeff Kaye, "As Democracy Spreads in Eastern Europe, So Do Hordes of Advertisers," <u>Los Angeles Times</u>, 8 December 1991, sec. D, p.3.

17 Ibid.

New York Times, op. cit. The

19 Ken Kasriel, "Western tobacco firms spur Hugary's ad ban," Advertising Age, 14 September, 1992, 60.

²⁰Ibid. A description of similar activity of Western tobacco companies on the Russian merket is presented by Fred Hiatt in "New Marlboro Country. West's Tobacco Firms Race to E. Europe," The Washington Post, 14 August 1993, sec. A, p. 1, 17.

²¹Neil Postman, "A Conservative's Manifesto: Why Capitalism, Technology, And Television Are a Threat to Our Traditional Values," <u>Clinton St. Quarterly</u>, Winter 1988-89),9

²²Ibid.

²³This concern was clearly expressed by Jack Lang, the former French Minister of Culture, who appealed before a UNESCO-organized meeting in Mexico City in July 1982, for

a real cultural resistance, a veritable crusade against—let us call things by their true name—the financial and intellectual imperialism that rarely appropriates territories, but appropriates consciousness. It appropriates way of thinking and way of living.

Lang, bitterly criticized for these remarks, replied that he was not attacking individual artists and that it was essential to distinguish between creative individuals and the multinational firms that run international-cultural industries. In "Le discours de Mexico," Le Monde, 7 August 1982.

²⁴Dan Michaels, Shailagh Murray, "East Europeans Adjust to Western Ads; Information After Years of Propaganda," The Wall Street Journal, 19 July 1994, sec.D, p. 3.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Summary

Communication, one of the most powerful tools that humankind has possessed, remains at the same time one of the most diverse and complicated phenomena of today's world. As described in the MacBride Commission's Report,

[c]ommunication can be an instrument of power, a revolutionary weapon, a commercial product, or a means of education; it can serve the ends of either liberation or the oppression, or either the growth of the individual personality, or the drilling of human beings into uniformity.¹

This complicated character of communication is the basis for the discussion going on different international forums.

The idea of NWICO most succinctly put forward by the Non-Aligned Movement in the mid-1970s, calling for the balanced flow of information, protection of indigenous cultures and support of local media systems, defined much of the agenda for the information policy considerations as well as the research in the field for more than two decades.

Discussed in international forums, first of all in UNESCO, it was paralleled in the 1980s by the debate going on in Western Europe which started to face the problems in many aspects surprisingly similar to those of the Third World countries. The Directive on Transborder Television and the

MEDIA Program adopted by the European Community reflect the results of this debate.

In both of these debates the United States, basing the policy on the doctrine of free flow of information, opposed any attempts of regulation of its international flow, considering it as a violation of the principle of freedom.

Nineteen eighty-nine, the year of revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the approaching dissolution of the Soviet Union, brought many radical changes on the map of world media. Eastern Europeans, opening politically and economically their countries, become the "have-nots" of the Western world. The processes earlier recognized by their Western European neighbors, as well as the Third World countries, approached the region very quickly. Their newly opened market became a target of foreign style advertising and commercial productions. On one hand, it brought a diversity of choice and financial support of the media; on the other hand, however, started an erosion of locally cherished values, traditions, and indigenous cultures. As Cees J. Hamelink states in, evaluating today's status of international communication,

^{... [}t]he most recent developments justify a new international political-regulatory debate on such issues as the commercialization, oligopolization and internationalization of the provision of information in the world. This is all the more important given the prevailing deregulatory political climate that favors liberalization and privatization,²

In this debate within the domain of Western civilization, the abandoned Marxist Theory of the press, which shaped the media systems in the region of Central and Eastern Europe before 1989, will not play any role. However, the Western Concept of the media, based on the liberal thought of John Milton, John Locke, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and John Stuart Mill, and shaping media systems of the "Western world" does not remain a monolithic one. Its oldest form — Libertarian Theory of the press — is challenged by a number of modifications, including the Social Responsibility Theory, and the concept of media as a Democratic Participant. This diversity of theoretical approaches within the Western Concept proves that cherishing the same ideals of "individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free market, the separation of church and state"4 does not contradict the existence of differences in approaching certain problems, among them the problem of the role of media in the society.5

The calls for the unrestricted, "free flow" of information on the global scale is rooted in the Libertarian Theory within the Western Concept, which considers the "marketplace of ideas" — the unrestricted diversity of views and news sources available to citizens — to be the

only guarantee in enabling individuals to "differentiate between truth and falsehood." No one has a monopoly of this truth — no government or any other body should obstruct the communication between the nations. "Only news media free of official restraints... will be credible to readers and viewers here and abroad."

This approach, however, is challenged by the concept that, besides the media obligations to inform, entertain, and sell (as in the libertarian theory), obliges them to "rais[e] the issues to the plane of discussion." The Social Responsibility Theory points out that a mission of public service transcends media's commercial role. According to this concept, their obligation is to maintain the highest ethical and professional standards, as well as to ensure that every member of the community can express his or her opinions. Those premises shape media systems of a number of Western European countries. At the same time, they serve as the theoretical background of the calls for the New World Information and Communications Order.

As a reaction "against commercialization and monopolization of the privately owned media, as well as against the centralism and bureaucratization of public broadcasting," the Social Responsibility theory has developed into the concept of media as a Democratic Participant. It calls for media's service for their

audiences, for the right to communicate of every minority group in the society, for decentralization of media and their freedom from state bureaucratic control, as well as for promotion of small-scale and local orientation of mass communicators. 11

Interestingly, this concept does not contradict the phenomenon of the commercial, as well as the global media. 12 In the contemporary situation, those two theories will serve as an intellectual background for the approaching debate. The reflection on the ideals of New World Information and Communication Order applied to the contemporary situation of the global media, and removed from the political context of the debate before the year 1989, seems to offer still vivid and valuable ideas for this discussion.

Conclusions

The developments in the media systems within the domain of Western civilization, including the commercialization in Central and Eastern Europe, deregulation and then protectionism in Western Europe, as well as a strong support for commercial media expansion in the United States, reflect the need of search for new paradigms of communication among those participants.

The discussion on the future development of the information flow within the Western civilization should draw on the experience of existing media systems in different

countries, which have been based on different premises. The common civilizational identity, if rediscovered among the discussants, will make this debate much less difficult. All parts belonging to the same, Roman-Christian roots, share the common heritage that makes them understand each other and cooperate much easier. Communication, as a means of spreading a cultural message, plays enormous role in establishing this necessary civilizational awareness.

The fall of the Soviet Bloc in 1989 opened the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, which had opposed for more than 50 years the imposition of the "soviet culture," to the influence of their "Western brothers." Free communication, besides economic cooperation, became for them a way to find for themselves what they had lost for more than 50 years — their place on the map of the domain of Western civilization. The dangers they encounter include erosion of national cultures, locally cherished values, national identities, and cultural heritage. By recognizing those dangers, the Eastern Europeans enter a long-lasting debate between Americans and Europeans, as well as Canadians, over whether, and how the international flow of information should be designed. Any initiative toward regulating this flow coming from the European Community, Canada, or, recently, the Eastern European countries, is invariably met by the United States with strong opposition; the media import restrictions proposed by the European international bodies are met by the American observers as

the possible replacement of "Communist-era censorship with Big Eurobrother."¹³ The calls for regulating and establishing standards for accuracy and taste that have started to emerge in Eastern Europe provoke similar comments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck, during the seminar held by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1993, said in Warsaw:

The United States doesn't believe the regulatory approach makes sense even in a mature democracy, but it is particularly dangerous in countries just emerging from state control. 14

This American aversion to the regulation and state involvement in the process of the flow of information can be derived from the history of this the U.S. As Joel Smith explains it in his book <u>Understanding the Media</u>. A Sociology of Mass Communication:

The review of the conditions in which states originated and that subsequently affected their development indicates that in almost every country but the United States the interest of states in communication is not idiosyncratic and arbitrary. It reflects a fundamental concern of all states with developing and preserving an infrastructure that enables them to maintain their societies. Because the U.S. developed in an environment in which it was not pressed to compete with other states for resources and space, it was less burdened by situational constraints and tradition in its formative period. Relative isolation and the minimization of the threats are a factor in uniqueness.¹⁵

This historical background, however, so clearly shaping the American approach toward the regulation of international

information flow, is not shared by the other parts of the discussion, burdened with different experience of the past and present. It is obvious that this heritage constitutes national identity and character. Respect for the differences of opinion resulting from the different historical background seems to be a basic premise for the dialogue between the nations. As Cotgrove (1982) said:16

Change[s] in consciousness — in values and moral reasoning — is what moves men to change their social arrangements and institutions.

A part of this change is an understanding that, while so diverse, all those national cultures remain valuable parts of Western spirituality which, like single pieces of mosaic, create a whole, rich and unique picture of Western civilization. Each of those pieces is important to maintain the richness and clarity of the picture. The cultural wealth offered to Western civilization by Poles, Norwegians, or Americans, all of them being a part of Western legacy, is equally valuable and important.

As the example of a number of the Central and Eastern European countries shows, the strength of their cultural traditions weakened the socialist, "bloc culture" from within, protecting their nations from total sovietization (here, especially, countries belonging to the domain of Western civilization like Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and

Croatia). This turn towards the local cultural heritage is, perhaps, an answer again, in the time of commercial culture exerting a stronger influence all over the world.

As Michael Traber states it:

Communication is about human relationships... The mass media are an offer of, or a proposal for communication, but not communication as such. They are, metaphorically speaking, like the physical environment in which we live. ¹⁷

In the context of the approaching challenge from the other civilizational communities, all the parts of the Western community should be able to derive from this environment valuable messages, enriching their understanding of the world, and strengthening them as the parts of the world cultural exchange.

Recommendations for Further Research

Today's mass media, on the one hand a product of highly developed states, on the other hand play a vital role in international and intercultural communications. This role provokes many questions: Do contemporary mass media further international and intercultural interactions, or do they endanger diversity by imposing the worldwide domination of the most powerful communicators? Are culture and media inherently imperialistic? Are technological achievements facilitating cultural exchange, or are they rather becoming more advanced, sophisticated tools of "cultural imperialism"? What will be the trend of development in the

world media: toward globalism, or, in contrary, toward localism of the broadcast? Subsequently, will there emerge a global, homogeneous audience, or will the local interests of the viewers prevail? Have the global media a chance of setting an agenda for local audiences?

Those trends should be studied to collect data necessary for a serious, responsible and future-oriented discussion on the shape of international media flow. The region of Central and Eastern Europe, currently undergoing the radical change of the pattern of participation in this process, may provide a laboratory of interesting research material. The local cultures of this region have encountered the same dangers of deterioration, as both the economically underdeveloped countries of the Third World, and the technologically advanced (characterized by rich and ancient cultural heritage), Western Europe, Eastern Europe, economically underdeveloped, but with a strong historical legacy of cultures, traditions, and national identities, bears both characteristics of Western Europe and the Third World. Analyzing their experiences will be of great value for the Eastern Europeans who face an urgent need of defining their policy objectives in international communication exchange.

At the same time, observation of the processes occurring in that region may provide interesting data for analysis of global trends occurring in the global information exchange. This analysis should help to answer

the question of where the future development of world communication will head: toward the ideals of the New World Information Order, or toward a New World Corporate Order.

This answer constitutes a basic premise for the discussion on the desirable pattern of information exchange within the domain of Western civilization.

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ENDNOTES

²Cees J. Hamelink, "Human Rights", in George Gerbner, Hamid Mowlana, and Kaarle Nordenstreng, ed., <u>The Global Media Debate: Its Rise</u>, Fall, And Reneval, (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1993), 145.

³William A. Hachten, <u>The World News Prism</u>, (Iowa State University Press, 1992), 23.

⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 40.

⁵The difference in the approaches towards liberalism and their political implications are thoroughly discussed by Richard M. Merelman in <u>Partial Visions</u>. Culture and Politics in Britain, Canada, and the <u>United States</u>, (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 13.

Werner J. Severin, James W. Tankard, Jr., Communication Theories: origins, Methods, And Uses In the Mass Media, (Longman, 1992), 288.

At the same time the informative and educative role of the media is clearly differentiated. Herbert J. Altschull described it in his article "The Symphony of the Press":

In the United States, there is some uneasiness over describing the press as a source of education; the preferred word is information. But this seems to be more quibbling, since information is one of little use unless it increases the level of education of the audience. Aside from the United States, the capitalist countries seem little inclined to draw distinctions between information and education.

See also, in Herbert J. Altschull, <u>Agents of Power</u>, (New York: Longman, 1984), 280

⁷Hachten, op. cit., 20.

⁸Werner J. Severin, James W. Tankard, Jr., op. cit., 289.

⁹Hachten, op. cit., 22.

¹⁰Hachten, op. cit., 22-23.

¹ Sean MacBride, et. al., <u>Many Voices, One World:</u> Communication and Society, Today and Tomorrow, op. cit.

¹¹Ibid., 23.

12The "CNN World Report" may serve here as a good example. Also the increasing trend towards locallism present among other numerous broadcasters seem to support this thesis. Christian Dutoit, the executive vice president of LCI (French news channel) commented in 1994: "People want to know what is happening near to home, preferably in their own language." (In Michael Williams, "Euros race to lose with news," Variety, 12 September 1994, 1, 70.)

¹³Carol J. Williams, "Next Step: Big Eurobrother?" <u>Los</u> <u>Angeles Times</u>, 9 November, 1993, sec. 4, p. 4.

14 Ibid.

¹⁵Joel Smith, <u>Understanding the Media. A Sociology of Mass Communication</u>, Creshill, N.J.: Hampton, 1995), 295.

¹⁶Quoted in L. Ripley Smith, "Media Networking. Toward a Model for the Global Management of Sociocultural Change," in Felipe Korzenny and Stella Ting Toomey, ed., "Mass Media Effects Across Cultures," <u>International Communication Annual</u>, Newbury Park, London, New Delhi: Sage, 1992):201-228.

17Michael Traber, "Communication Ethics, " in The Global Media Debate, George Gerbner, Hamid Mowlana, and Kaarle Nordenstreng, ed., op. cit., 153.

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