

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF WORLD PRESS  
ACTION AND MOTIVATION

By

ELISABETH HUPP SCHILLINGER

Bachelor of Science  
University of Illinois  
Urbana, Illinois  
1965

Master of Science  
Oklahoma State University  
Stillwater, Oklahoma  
1985

Submitted to the Faculty of the  
Graduate College of the  
Oklahoma State University  
in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for  
the Degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
July, 1992

Thesis  
1992D  
S334d

C O P Y R I G H T


by

Elisabeth H. Schillinger


July 1992

A DYNAMIC THEORY OF WORLD PRESS  
ACTION AND MOTIVATION


Thesis Approved:


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Thesis Adviser

  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dean of the Graduate College



## PREFACE

The decision to devote this work to the construction and presentation of a new world press theory emerged from my frustration with the inadequacy of existing world press theory and my growing awareness of the relevance of a significant body of sociological theory that has been underutilized by communication macro-theorists.

As an undergraduate, majoring in journalism and minoring in Soviet studies, I was particularly sensitive to the theoretical shunting aside of the Soviet media system into its own slot, a pariah press, a "bad" press. As my intellectual commitment to the Soviet press deepened and my knowledge of international media broadened, I came to see that it was not only the Soviet system that was maligned in the language and assumptions of these theories; it was any system that was not firmly dedicated to Western, and particularly American press values. I also wondered if it was the business of theory to malign anyone. It seemed ironic that mass communication, a discipline obsessed with the issues of objectivity and balance, could accept so blithely its own assessment of other nations' institutions.

Sociology revealed to me the power and possibility of "value-freedom"--and also its elusiveness. Max Weber excited me, not because he necessarily achieved objectivity, but because he recognized its importance--especially in observing and understanding macro structures. I also took inspiration from his ability to bring grand

theory down from the intellectual stratosphere and apply it to earthly institutions. It was Weber's ideas, above all, that served as the theoretical frame for the ideas that inform this work.

But it was the phenomenological approaches of microtheorists and empiricists that made it possible to fill in that frame. The primary strengths of the world press theory advanced here--dynamism and validity--are derived from the concept of situated actions as precursors to articulated motives. Motives provide the key to the empirical methodology required to further test this theory--which I hope others will do.

When this effort was first undertaken in the spring of 1988, few on either side of the "Iron Curtain" anticipated the imminent end of the Cold War within a few short years, nor the realigning of international priorities and the restructuring of political and economic alliances that followed in its wake. Even had these eventualities not come to pass, it was clear that a new theoretical approach was needed to come to terms with the power of the mass media in the age of the "global village." But today, given the state of the not so orderly "new world order," the need for new analytical tools must certainly be recognized. It is in this spirit that the dynamic theory is presented here.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . .	1
Endnotes . . . . .	15
II. REVIEW OF EXISTING WORLD PRESS THEORIES . . . . .	16
An Assessment of <u>Four Theories of the Press</u> . . . . .	16
Other Theoretical Perspectives on the World Press. . . . .	28
Endnotes . . . . .	44
III. METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL GROUNDING OF A DYNAMIC WORLD PRESS THEORY . . . . .	45
Derivation and Explanation of Method . . . . .	45
Introductory Thoughts on the Integration of Method, Theory, and Empiricism . . . . .	45
Reconciling Ideal Types and Grounded Theory. . . . .	46
Expectations and Assumptions Guiding Method. . . . .	56
Application of Relevant Social Thought to World Press Theory . . . . .	58
Overview of Theoretical Grounding. . . . .	58
Social Action Theory as Analytical Device. . . . .	59
Motivation Theory and the Justification of Press Activity . . . . .	64
Endnotes . . . . .	71
IV. TOWARD A DYNAMIC THEORY OF WORLD PRESS ACTION AND MOTIVATION . . . . .	72
The Centrality and Utility of Motive in Realizing Action . . . . .	72
"Subjective Interpretation" and Media Research . . . . .	72
Challenged Behavior and Identifying "Difference That Make a Difference". . . . .	75
Vocabularies of Motive as Cohesive Strategies. . . . .	79
The Situational Aspects of Motives . . . . .	82
Three Major Premises . . . . .	84
The First Premise . . . . .	84
The Second Premise . . . . .	88
The Third Premise . . . . .	100
The Triangle of Motives . . . . .	101

Chapter	Page
Ideal-Type Characteristics of Motived Press Behavior . . .	106
Survival-Motived Press Characteristics . . . . .	106
Idea-Motivated Press Characteristics . . . . .	109
Instrumentally-Motivated Press Characteristics . . .	117
Control of the Press . . . . .	120
Endnotes . . . . .	122
V. CASE SUMMARIES OF INSTRUMENTALLY-MOTIVATED PRESS SYSTEMS-- THE UNITED STATES 1776-1992 AND BRITAIN UNDER THATCHER 1979-1990 . . . . .	124
Introduction . . . . .	124
The United States . . . . .	125
National Situation and Motive . . . . .	125
Instrumental Characteristics . . . . .	126
Ideational Characteristics . . . . .	143
Survival Characteristics . . . . .	157
The U.S. Press and the Motive Triangle . . . . .	164
Britain in the 1980s . . . . .	166
National Situation and Motive . . . . .	166
Instrumental Characteristics . . . . .	172
Survival Characteristics . . . . .	174
Ideational Characteristics . . . . .	175
Britain and the Motive Triangle . . . . .	179
Endnotes . . . . .	181
VI. CASE SUMMARIES OF SURVIVAL-MOTIVATED PRESS SYSTEMS-- SINGAPORE AND NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE. . . . .	183
Introduction . . . . .	183
Singapore--1963-1992 . . . . .	185
National Situation and Motive . . . . .	185
Survival Characteristics . . . . .	190
Instrumental Characteristics . . . . .	202
Ideational Characteristics . . . . .	203
Singapore and the Motive Triangle . . . . .	206
Nigeria--1960-1992 . . . . .	206
National Situation and Motive . . . . .	206
Survival Characteristics . . . . .	211
Ideational Characteristics . . . . .	220
Instrumental Characteristics . . . . .	222
Nigeria and the Motive Triangle . . . . .	222
Endnotes . . . . .	224

Chapter	Page
VII. CASE SUMMARIES OF IDEA-MOTIVATED PRESS SYSTEMS-- IRAN 1977-1982 AND THE SOVIET UNION 1900-1991 . . . . .	226
Introduction . . . . .	226
Iran and Revolution . . . . .	229
National Situation and Motive . . . . .	229
Survival Characteristics of the Pahlavi Press . . . . .	233
Ideational Characteristics of the Revolutionary and Post-Revolutionary Press . . . . .	236
Survival Press Characteristics of the Islamic Republic of Iran . . . . .	245
Instrumental Press Characterstics of the Islamic Republic of Iran . . . . .	247
Iran and the Motive Triangle . . . . .	248
The USSR--1900-1992 . . . . .	249
Cultural Fluidity and Situated Action . . . . .	249
The Revolutionary Leninist Press--1900-1921 . . . . .	256
The Survivalist NEP Press--1921-1927 . . . . .	259
The Ideational Press of Stalin and Brezhnev . . . . .	264
The Reform Press and Glasnost . . . . .	276
Endnotes . . . . .	288
VIII. CONCLUSION . . . . .	290
Theoretical Relevance and Validity . . . . .	290
Methodological Considerations. . . . .	294
The World Press and World Press Scholarship. . . . .	296
CITATIONS . . . . .	299

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. The Motive Triangle . . . . .	102
2. Press Activity of Countries A, B, and C 1985-1990 . . . . .	104
3. Press Activity of Country X 1945, 1965, and 1985 . . . . .	104
4. U.S. Press Activity 1776-1992 . . . . .	165
A. 1776-1800 . . . . .	165
B. 1800-1830 . . . . .	165
C. 1830-1914 . . . . .	165
D. 1914-1960 . . . . .	165
E. 1960-1992 . . . . .	165
5. British Press Activity . . . . .	179
A. 1979 . . . . .	179
B. 1988 . . . . .	179
6. Singaporean Press Activity Since Independence 1963-1991 . . . . .	206
7. Nigerian Press Activity Since Independence 1960-1991 . . . . .	223
8. Iranian Press Activity and the Islamic Revolution 1977-1982 . . . . .	248
9. Russian and Soviet Press Activity 1900-1991 . . . . .	255
A. Russia and the Leninist Press 1900-1927 . . . . .	255
B. The Stalinist Press 1927-1956 . . . . .	255
C. Khrushchev and the Thaw Press 1956-1964 . . . . .	255
D. Brezhnev's "Stagnation" Press 1964-1982 . . . . .	255
E. The Glasnost Press 1985-1991 . . . . .	255
10. Comparative Analysis of National Press Systems . . . . .	293
A. The U.S. Press 1960-1992 . . . . .	293
B. The British Press Under Thatcher 1988 . . . . .	293
C. The Singaporean Press 1963-1991 . . . . .	293
D. The Nigerian Press 1960-1991 . . . . .	293
E. The Iranian Press 1979-1982 . . . . .	293
E. The Soviet Press Under Brezhnev 1964-1982 . . . . .	293

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The long-standing inadequacy of mass communication theory to make sense of the world's national press systems has become increasingly apparent in recent years as media behavior has been transformed to meet the exigencies of a new post-Cold War world. The point of departure for the present work is the assumption that underlying mass media activity in all nations is a structure of prioritized motives that continually shape and alter the character of the press. By delineating that structure and identifying its parameters, national press activity and policy can be viewed as voluntaristic responses to situations arising from social, economic, and political environments.

The centerpiece of this dissertation, presented in Chapter IV, is a definition of that structure, a comprehensive and holistic theory that assumes context to be a prerequisite for understanding the world's press. Intrinsic to this understanding is the perception of dynamism as a constant--a constant that transcends time, space, and, certainly, nationality. As background for the presentation of the "dynamic theory," Chapter II examines existing world press theory, with particular emphasis on United States and Western contributions. American theory not only forms the nucleus of journalism and mass communication scholarship and education in the United States, but throughout the world (Dissanayake, 1988).<sup>1</sup> Although empirical observation provided the impetus and

guidelines for the dynamic theory's construction, it was also informed by the interweaving of numerous strands of social theory, most notably Max Weber's social action theory and the dramaturgical concept of motives as integrative justifications for actions or behaviors already underway. Theoretical and methodological groundings of the theory are discussed in Chapter III.

In the fourth chapter, the dynamic theory is introduced by positing three "primary motives"--survival, ideas, and instrument--as both the justifications and the perceived determinants of press action in any society. From this construction, the following premises are derived: 1) Press action and values are politically and socially explained, justified, and, thereby, created by primary motives--the same primary motives are shared by society, the government, and other institutions in stable national systems; 2) National societies, institutions, and their press systems subscribe to all three primary vocabularies of motive, one of which predominates at any given time in stable systems; and 3) Nations and their presses vacillate continually from one prevailing primary motive in the direction of one or both of the other two. Significant social change can bring about a shift to another predominant motive, and a corresponding reformation of the press. Frequently, the press itself serves as both agent and object of major social upheaval. After a discussion of the premises, a visual model is proposed as a means of qualitatively conceptualizing press dynamism. Chapter IV concludes with a listing of press characteristics associated with each primary motive.

The remaining chapters are devoted to empirical analyses of several national media systems, each of which serves as an exemplar for a particular primary motive or combination of motives. With the exception



of the United States, nations whose press systems are examined in these chapters have been selected deliberately because their activity is sufficiently problematic to test the validity of the proposed theory. This approach is consistent with the inductive qualitative methodologies of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 1988) and analytic induction (Katz, 1988). Though in this work empirical analysis follows the presentation of theory, in the actual process of constructing the dynamic theory, data preceded explanation.

The germ of the dynamic theory was born as the cataclysmic upheaval in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the socialist bloc began to shake the world in the mid 1980s and to draw attention to the power of the mass media to foment and accelerate social change. Perhaps because its beginnings were so neatly bracketed by Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to power in March 1985, or because the shift in press policy was interpreted as a Cold War victory for the West, or even, perhaps, simply because a graspable and exotic label, "glasnost," was attached to the new Soviet press philosophy at its inception, American journalists and political pundits were quick to posit an irrevocable link between a pluralistic press and democratic government.

Predictably, U.S. commentators drew fewer conclusions on the meaning of the United States government's unprecedented curtailment of press access to military activity in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, which took place during approximately the same time span. Even dimmer U.S. journalistic light was shed on a host of media restrictions proposed and enacted in Britain by the Thatcher government. And virtually no metajournalistic effort has been extended to suggest shared patterns of media dynamics from a transnational perspective.

Yet a common thread unites the press phenomena noted above. In each society, national press policy is being reversed and long-standing credos of press philosophy are being ignored as the political and economic world realigns itself. Social scientists, with the luxury of longer lead times and a substantial body of press theory at their beck and recall, have been only marginally more expansive or insightful in their analyses of the world's press than journalistic commentators. Instead, academic specialists have tended to retreat into the safe haven of microanalyses--the time-worn positivistic method of seeking to capture the whole of press activity by dissecting its many parts.

In short, no overarching theoretical interpretation of the world's press has been uncovered to describe or explain the role of the media in the global tumult of the 1980s and 1990s. The concentration of media research on narrowly-defined topics at the expense of theory has been duly noted and deplored for decades. Dutch sociologist Denis McQuail has written in his classic Towards a Sociology of Communications:

Although the study of communications can claim very distinguished social scientists amongst its founding fathers--Kurt Lewin, Harold Lasswell, Paul Lazarsfeld and Carl Hovland, ... the corpus of findings about mass communications bear the marks of an entirely practical concern with two objectives: the counting and description of audiences and the measurement of direct effects on those exposed to communication (1961: 36).

Finnish organizations and systems specialist Osmo A. Wiio concludes, "Actually there has been no such thing as communication theory but a plethora of separate research findings tied together with a very loose rope called 'communication research'" (1975: 7).

J. Herbert Altschull reiterates the observation in his more recent assessment of media scholarship.

How ironical it is that although the avowed goal of communications scholars has been to build theories of communications, their research has often been so narrow that they have muddled rather than enhanced understanding (1984: 148).

Similar echoes appear in the critical work of sociologists in the 1950s, addressing their broader field. Most notable of these are Pitirim Sorokin's Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences (1956) and C. Wright Mills's The Sociological Imagination (1959). The latter warns of special pitfalls for those attempting cross-cultural analysis:

The social scientist who spends his intellectual force on the details of small-scale milieux is not putting his work outside the political conflicts and forces of his time. He is, at least indirectly and in effect, 'accepting' the framework of his society. But no one who accepts the full intellectual tasks of social science can merely assume that structure. In fact, it is his job to make that structure explicit and to study it as a whole (1959: 78-9).

New technological advances, most notably satellite and cable transmissions of television programming across national boundaries, have dramatically expanded the concepts of "mass society" and "global society" in the past 15 years, and yet the social impact of the media was recognized long before these developments. In 1910 Max Weber presented a proposal for a systematic study of the press as a societal institution at the second meeting of the German Association for Sociology (Mayer, 1956). But Weber's 1910 address was far from the first acknowledgment of the symbiotic relationship between society and the press. In fact, the core of Weber's remarks were drawn from his earlier undated plan for a press survey aimed at elucidating "the significant cultural problems of the present," including the way the press influences minds and strengthens social conformity and exerts forces for change as well as for maintenance

of the status quo (Karl Weber, 1937: 421). If, as Talcott Parsons observed (1965), conditions of successful control provide an appropriate focus of sociology for Weber, it is only natural that "the study of the press and its agents as components of a social and political institution in modern society becomes a major task of sociological research" (Hardt, 1979: 159).

In his remarks to the German sociologists, Weber attempted to arouse interest among his colleagues in pursuing an investigation of the press to determine

[w]hat does it contribute to the character of modern man? Secondly, how are the objective, supraindividual cultural values influenced, what shifts will occur, what will be destroyed and what will be created anew of the beliefs and hopes of the masses: of the "life feelings" (Lebensgefuhle) --as they say today--, what is forever destroyed and created anew of the potential point of view? (1924: 441).

Among many themes which still retain relevance for press scholars today, Weber touched upon the insights to be gained from comparative study of national media. Although largely impressionistic and limited to the media of England, Russia, Germany, France, and the United States, Weber's overview suggested the potential value of press study for acquiring understanding of different cultures. For instance, he noted that if an American woman marries an English lord,

one can find in the American press an account of the physical and psychological attributes of the American woman and, as is only suitable, a complete review of her dowry, naturally, while according to our prevailing ideas at least a newspaper with self-respect would reject this approach in Germany. Where does this difference originate? (Weber, 1924: 435).

Likewise, he notes Americans' obsession with facts, and contrasts it with the French preference for interpretation.<sup>2</sup>

For example, then, the American wants nothing from his paper but facts. Whatever opinions are published in the press about

these facts he regards as not worth reading; as a democrat he is convinced that, in principle, he can interpret as well as the newspaper writer, perhaps even better. But the Frenchman too wants to be a democrat. Where does the difference come from? In any event: in both cases the social function of the press is an entirely different one (1924: 439).

Weber also expressed concern about the threat of news monopolies resulting from the merger of smaller newspapers and the growth of giant press cartels, a phenomenon he observed in his own country and identified as "Americanization" in his earlier work (Karl Weber, 1937: 422).

In his Association address, Weber acknowledged the inspiration of a work by Emil Loebel, Kultur und Presse (Culture and the Press), which sought to promote the development of a scientific system of the periodical press (Zeitungswissenschaft) (1903). But clearly Weber's thinking was influenced by other German scholars, whose theories and thinking were also passed on to many young American sociologists who completed their advanced educations in German universities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Most notable of the early German theorists were Albert Schaffle, Karl Knies, Karl Bucher, and Ferdinand Tonnies (Hardt, 1979). Schaffle's interests included symbolic communication, communication as a cohesive social force, and the press as an agent of social control. He drew heavily upon the organicism of Spencer and Comte, and had the most direct impact on American sociologists. Schaffle saw a need to bridge interpersonal communication and mass communication, and wrote:

The spoken word and the gesture apply to what is by far the largest part of the communication of ideas, namely communication in small circles and for short-term purposes. Most of the expressions of ideas occur and end within a smaller circle and belong to the moment ... [T]he need for material symbols of longer lasting quality and with wider distribution is added ... with a rising civilization (1881: 367).

Karl Knies's interest in communication as symbolic interaction remained ill-defined (Hardt, 1979: 78); nevertheless, he anticipated an important aspect of the work of George Herbert Mead and the symbolic interactionists when he wrote in 1857:

From earliest childhood on our efforts are directed at making ourselves proficient in social intercourse, to accept others and to communicate to others; these efforts, big or small, presuppose a mutual exchange of means with which to satisfy human needs (Knies, 1857: 1).

Knies's major focus, however, was upon news itself and its transmission, both of which he saw as "forms in which men search for each other and meet" (1857: 48). He also presaged contemporary theorizing on the "knowledge gap" within societies and the unequal distribution of communication resources between northern and southern hemispheres when he wrote

not only those who cannot write or read, but also those who cannot pay, e.g., the extremely poor as those who lack disposable goods for such relatively superfluous service, are excluded from the communication of news (1857: 55).

Bucher joined Weber and Knies in his fascination with the press as a business enterprise, noting the conflict between serving the public and earning a profit. "'Public interests,'" he concluded, "are cared for by newspapers only in so far as they do not obstruct the profit motives of publishers" (1922: 12). Among the subjects Bucher explored were the relationship between the press and public opinion, the dubious role of advertising, and the ethics and practicality of shielding sources, a still problematic journalistic privilege identified by both Bucher and Weber as "Anonymität" (anonymity).

Though Tonnies' reputation in sociology is well established, his extensive commentary on the role and function of the press in society is

less known. To the theory of communication and public opinion, he introduced the idea of voluntarism. In Einführung in die Soziologie, (Introduction to Sociology) (1931), Tonnies provided a well-developed and exacting formulation of signs and symbols, emphasizing differences between interpersonal and mass communication (Hardt, 1979: 138; Cahnman and Heberle, 1971).

According to Tonnies' view the potential of the press transcended national boundaries. In a particularly visionary analysis he wrote that the press,

is definitely international, thus comparable to the power of a permanent or temporary alliance of states. It can, therefore, be conceived as its ultimate aim to abolish the multiplicity of states and substitute for it a single world market, which would be ruled by thinkers, scholars, and writers and could dispense with means of coercion other than those of a psychological nature .... [Such tendencies and intentions will perhaps never find a clear expression, let alone realization, but their recognition serves to assist in the understanding of many phenomena of the real world and to the realization of the fact that the existence of natural states is but a temporary limitation of the boundaryless society (Gesellschaft) (1963: 221).

German perspectives on the media were brought into the fold of American sociology by scholars who made their way to universities in Berlin, Leipzig, and Heidelberg. Among these were such eminent men as Albion Small, E.A. Ross, Charles Sumner, John Dewey, Robert Park, G.H. Mead, and W.I. Thomas.

However, as Jurgen Herbst noted in his study of the transfer of culture between Germany and the United States, some modification of these ideas was necessary before they could take root in America.

[The Americans who went to German universities to acquire the tools of scholarship brought home not only tools but ideas as well. When the ideas proved difficult to assimilate to American conditions, the scholars sought to modify or discard them, only to realize that their scholarly equipment, torn from

its ideological setting, would no longer serve until a new context of ideas could be developed (1965: 232).

American sociology, even more than European, came into being as a response to social problems resulting from urbanization, immigration, and industrialization--an awareness particularly marked among adherents of the Chicago School. Thus almost immediately German philosophical idealism was diluted to accommodate the Americans' pragmatic commitment to ameliorating the social evils of the time (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 2). Another influence was the wide adoption of functionalist perspectives among early American sociologists, for as Small noted in 1906, "Structural and functional analysis of activities within the state, or within society as a whole is prerequisite to classification of the associations that make up the state of society" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 8-9). One aspect of the Americanization of European ideas was a heightened emphasis on the individual and his behavior. In keeping with the individualistic perspective was an emphasis on the voluntaristic nature of all communicative actions.

As a result, almost from the beginning, American press and communication study split in two directions. One, identified most clearly with symbolic interactionism, addressed communication first on the interpersonal level, and only then proceeded to apply it to the establishment of social norms. This avenue of theory and its attendant emphasis on qualitative research has gone largely, but not entirely, unheeded by those who engage in macroanalysis of the press.

The second movement removed the study of communication from theoretical abstraction and examined it empirically as a vehicle for social betterment. Early media studies appearing in Small's American



Journal of Sociology and other academic journals made frequent reference to the fact that sociologists had "an obligation to deal with the role and function of the press in society and should address such problems in their work" (Hardt, 1979: 191). Frances Fenton, for example, explored in A.J.S. the effects of crime reporting on criminal behavior in a two part series (1910-11) and in a previous issue an anonymous author questioned whether an ethical newspaper could survive in the American marketplace ("Is an Honest and Sane Newspaper Press Possible?", 1909-1910). W.I. Thomas addressed "The Psychology of the Yellow Journal," in American Magazine, (1908) and E.A. Ross reported "The Suppression of Important News" in the Atlantic (1910). Hardt notes, "While it was mainly an ideological force that dominated the social criticism of German scholars, it was an engagement in social reform which provided the focal point for the American social sciences" (1979: 18).

This combative posture, however, is not to be confused with the social criticism that informs European scholarship in the Marxist and neoMarxist tradition. As James Carey points out,

Operating within a different national tradition of scholarship, a tradition with much more skepticism concerning the doctrines and consequences of the Enlightenment, German scholars found the press a problematic institution--its consequences unclear, its contribution to freedom and enlightenment far from automatic .... (Carey, 1979: 12).

Americans, on the other hand, born into a state established under these principles, were less questioning. U.S. press scholars seemed to operate under the general assumption that

if the conditions of freedom were maintained then the consequences of mass communications were relatively automatic--an invisible hand leading the will of the individuals to the maximization of social good (Carey, 1979: 12).

American pragmatism manifested itself in industry-sponsored research

with specific and immediate goals--thus undercutting theoretical inquiry in the formative stages of the discipline. Though the mid-level theory construction of Lasswell, Lararsfeld, Lewin, Hovland, Sherif, Ashe, and others shaped the emerging mass communication discipline beginning in the 1930s, by the late 1940s even Lazarsfeld observed

[W]e academic people always have a certain sense of tight-rope walking: at what point will the commercial partners find some necessary conclusion too hard to take and at what point will they shut us off from the indispensable source of funds and data? (1972: 124).

The provincialism of press theory in the U.S. is addressed specifically by Thomas McPhail.

Historically, American mass communication research isolated specific media purposes, messages, programs, and effects from overall social processes. It did not attempt to relate communication and communication needs to the overall social, ideological, political, cultural, and economic system in which they operated. Explanations about the specific communication data were seldom discussed in terms of the larger communication system or from a macro theoretical model. A linear, one-time analysis was indicative of the early stages of research and still afflicts the discipline (1981: 75).

James Carey argues that in the wake of World War II, when European universities, publishing houses, and research programs lay in disarray, American scholarship, priorities, and methods were exported as a kind of "intellectual Marshall Plan" (Carey, 1979: 11). Carey attributes the largely atheoretical nature of mass media research to this continuing undiluted American influence. Hardt perceives a crisis in mass media study and calls for an infusion of the major themes that traditionally have been the subject of scholarly attention--questions of power, social control, social change, social norms, and other broad issues. According to these scholars little had changed in the twenty years separating their observations from those of Bernard Berelson, who asked in 1959,

Where do we go from here? Communication research has had a distinguished past, but what about its future? ... It seems to me that the "great ideas" that gave the field of communication research so much vitality ten and twenty years ago have to a substantial extent worn out. No new ideas of comparable magnitude have appeared to their their place. We are on a plateau of research development and have been for some time (Wiio, 1975: 13).

Since these conclusions were presented, major contributions to mass communication theory have been made in a number of important areas, though empiricism continues to dominate the field. However, the development of world press theory has failed to keep pace with theory construction in other venues of media research and certainly it has proved to be inadequate to describe or explain the processes that have accompanied recent world press activity. In the following chapter, the existing body of theory that specifically and systematically links media structure and performance to world societies is reviewed and critiqued. Treated in most detail are the seminal ideas set forth in the 1956 classic Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do (Siebert et al., 1956). This normative, functionalist paradigm has had a disproportionate influence in the field. Subsequent global theories, many of which have been constructed either as extensions of or correctives for the ideas espoused in Four Theories, are then summarized and assessed.

It will be observed that in the first chapter and in those to come the term press is used interchangeably with mass media and mass communication. This follows the usage adopted by the Commission on the Freedom of the Press in their report 45 years ago (1947). In that work, the word "press" encompassed "within its scope the major agencies of mass

communication: the radio, newspapers, motion pictures, magazines, and books" (1947: v). The inclusion of television under this rubric is now conventional, despite vestigial Gutenberg images that a narrower interpretation of the term might suggest (Siebert et al., 1956; Altschull, 1984; Hachten, 1987; McQuail, 1987: 111). Also, for the sake of brevity, the world press theory presented in this work is referred to simply as "the dynamic theory," though dynamism is seen as only one of its characteristics.

## Endnotes

1. Dissanayake cites findings from an Association of South East Asian Nations study showing that 71 percent of communication theory materials used in universities are of American academic origin. He also lists the top books used in the South Asia, according to a study he conducted that showed 78 percent of theoretical press materials were authored by Americans. The combined list, compiled by this author, is presented in approximate rank order below. Asterisked titles appear on both lists (1988: 2-3).

- \*1. The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, Schramm and Roberts;
- \*2. The Process of Communication, Berlo;
- \*3. Mass Media and National Development, Schramm;
- \*4. Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, Lerner and Schramm;
- \*5. Four Theories of the Press, Siebert et al.;
- \*6. Responsibility in Mass Communication, Rivers and Schramm;
- 7. Effective Public Relations, Cutlip and Center;
- 8. Communication of Innovations, Rogers with Shoemaker; Mass Communication, Schramm;
- 9. Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication, Rogers with Svenning.
- 10. Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers
- 11. Introduction to Mass Communication, Emery
- 12. Theories of Mass Communication, De Fleur
- 13. The Effects of Mass Media, Klapper

The oldest publication date of the works cited is 1956 (Four Theories of the Press); the most recent is 1971 (Rogers and Shoemaker's Communication of Innovations.) Though the vintage of the books would seem to indicate that these undated surveys were not conducted recently, this is probably not the case, for Dissanayake reports them in 1988. Also, the titles, with a few more contemporary additions, most notably Altschull's work, comprise the central core of most U.S. theoretical communication sources today.

2. Weber's observation is supported by Alexis de Tocqueville's assessment of the American newspaper, circa 1835: "In America three quarters of the enormous sheet are filled with advertisements, and the remainder is frequently occupied by political intelligence or trivial anecdotes; it is only from time to time that one finds a corner devoted to passionate discussions like those which the journalists of France every day give to their readers" (1835a: 192).

An interesting parallel is found in the observation of Vitaly Korotich, then editor of the popular Soviet magazine Ogonek, reported in a 1989 interview: "To a large extent, Soviet journalism does not favor facts as much as interpretation of facts. Whereas in the West a newspaper includes a large number of facts, we usually have hardly any .... The Soviet press is becoming more interesting, but commentaries, rather than facts, still predominate (Shabad, 1989: 25).

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF EXISTING WORLD PRESS THEORIES

#### An Assessment of Four Theories of the Press

The point of departure for any American literature survey of world press theory must be the mass communication classic Four Theories of the Press, which appeared in print for the first time in 1956 (1956). Since its publication, the work has been reprinted without revision 17 times, most recently in 1989. Co-authored by Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, the slim volume of some 150 pages has molded scholarly perceptions and guided academic inquiry into world press systems more than any other work in the United States for close to four decades. Some significant mid-level theoretical work predated this volume but appears not to have informed it. Among the pioneering efforts were Walter Lippmann's ideas on perception and public opinion (1922), Harold Lasswell's taxonomy of press functions (Bryson, 1948: 179), Lazarsfeld's and others' studies conducted in the 1940s on media influence and the two-step flow in communication (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948 and 1968; Berelson, 1954), and Hovland's et al. army work, first published in 1949 (1965). Nevertheless Four Theories was the first American attempt to inject world politics and national culture into the theory of mass communication.

Despite its weaknesses, Four Theories remains for communication

educators and many scholars in the Western world and beyond the "rosetta stone" of world press theory. As noted by Donald Shaw and Robert Stevenson, "This typology soon powerfully fixed itself upon the Western scholarly mind" (1984: 134). John C. Merrill likewise acknowledges that the book "has been immensely influential and continues to be read by succeeding generations of aspiring mass communication scholars and practitioners" (1991: 12). A review of current undergraduate and graduate texts indicates that the typology continues to enjoy a strong, scarcely-diminished presence in the mass communication discipline.

Four Theories does not present a single cohesive model, but rather suggests two or four normative types--depending upon one's interpretation--by which press systems in various nations may be categorized. Authoritarian and libertarian systems, drawn from historical models of government, are presented as the basic two, with Soviet communist proposed as a twentieth-century offshoot of the former, and social responsibility as a further development of the latter.

The authoritarian theory, described as the "most pervasive, both historically and geographically," is grounded sketchily in the political/philosophical writings of Plato, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Hegel, and in policies orchestrated by Hitler and Mussolini. The basic philosophy of authoritarianism dictates that,

[s]ince authority rests in the state and since the responsibility for the solution of public issues follows authority, the first duty of the press is to avoid interference with the objectives of the state. These objectives are determined by a ruler or by an elite rather than in 'the market place of ideas,' as predicated by the libertarians (1956: 28).

Citing a 1954 Associated Press study, the authors note that authoritarian practices were still to be found in Latin American, the

Middle East, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (1956: 31-32).

The libertarian type, traced to the Enlightenment thinking of Milton, Locke, and Jefferson, is the most eloquently and positively presented of the four essays. In contrast to the authoritarian system in which duly-annointed authority monopolizes truth and its dissemination for the good of the state, the libertarian system is described as recognizing that man is rational. "The happiness and well-being of the individual is the goal of society, and man as a thinking organism is capable of organizing the world about him and of making decisions which will advance his interests" (1956: 40). The United States and Great Britain are credited as being the chief custodians of libertarian or "free press" ideas, but other countries are seen as seeking to adopt the philosophy. The authors acknowledge, however, that "many of the underdeveloped areas of the world found it particularly difficult to transplant the western ideals of a free press" (1956: 67-8).

The clarity of libertarian press theory becomes somewhat muddled with the overlay of a new concept, social responsibility. This philosophical latecomer is an American post-war concept articulated in the report of the Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947) and in a parallel elaboration by commission member William Hocking (1947). The concept as presented in the commission report was viewed widely by journalists of the 1940s and 1950s as an attack on the "free press," since in it the commissioners prescribed social responsibility as a self-imposed constraint on a licentious press run amok. Among the failings the commissioners set out to correct were shallow and inaccurate coverage of the days' events, insensitivity to minorities, and a blatant disregard



for such basic ideas as compassion and fairness.

A major purpose for writing Four Theories was to argue that traditional free-press values, accepted as rote by the journalistic profession, were not refuted, but reinforced by socially responsible press behavior (Tankard, 1988: 12). The basic difference between the libertarian and the social responsibility concepts is that the libertarian relies on competition and the self-righting principle to correct for the excesses of unfettered capitalism. The debate focuses on the fact that social responsibility must be enforced by someone or somebody. The Commissioners suggested that the media police themselves, but feared this role would be taken up by government.

The Soviet communist type is described by Schramm in the fourth and final essay as a mutation of the much older authoritarian press philosophy, shaped by Marxist-Leninist philosophy and Stalinist expediency. As its name suggests, this theory was seen as originating in the Soviet Union and imposed on client states in Eastern Europe and the developing world. A major difference between this system and the authoritarian is said to be that the "Communists place a greater emphasis on the positive use of the mass media as part of the agitation for the accomplishment for a world revolution" and state ownership of the media and all other property (1956: 27-28). According to Schramm,

One effect of this development is, therefore, to put basic responsibility for all mass communications in the hands of a small group of top [Communist] Party leaders. All the mass media in the Soviet Union become speaking trumpets for these leaders, and the editors and directors listen anxiously for the latest Olympian rumblings of "the truth" (1956: 119).

He continues,

There is no place in the Soviet concept for the idea of the press as a clear and independent mirror of events. Nothing is farther from Soviet intention than giving mass communication units any of the responsibility for originating public opinion or pushing the state into a policy behavior (1956: 121-122).

Long before the revolution in the Soviet press of the late 1980s, Schramm's overstatement of the monolithic and unresponsive nature of Soviet communist press structure was apparent to students of the Soviet press, but as Altschull observed in 1984,

Many examinations of the Soviet press have appeared in the capitalist world since [Four Theories was published], but it is Schramm's analysis that has become conventional wisdom in the United States and elsewhere (1984: 108).

Before addressing the weaknesses of Four Theories, the question must be asked, why has the influence of this modest functionalist work endured for so long? One answer must lie in the credentials of the men who authored it and the paucity of competitors to be found in macro-communications research and theory, particularly in the decades following World War II. Schramm was the most prolific and well-known of the three co-authors, his primary recognition being in international communication. He authored, co-authored, or edited 29 books, several of them definitive classics such as Process and Effects of Communication (1954), Responsibility in Mass Communication (1957), Mass Media and National Development (1964), and Men, Messages and Media (1973). He established communication research programs at the University of Illinois, Stanford, and the University of Hawaii, but his association with Siebert and Peterson began at the University of Illinois, where Schramm was the first dean of Communications. Siebert authored a history of press freedom in England (1952) and later became dean of the College of Communication Arts at Michigan State. Theodore Peterson followed

Schramm as dean of Communications at Illinois and wrote Magazines of the Twentieth Century (1969), among other works.

Though the value of Four Theories is being questioned by contemporary scholars with increasing regularity and vigor, even the severest critics feel compelled to pull their punches, as in Altschull's disclaimer near the end of his critique: "It is not our intention to denigrate the work of Schramm and his colleagues in Four Theories of the Press " and his insistence in the endnotes that the book is "must reading" (1984: 109 and 319).

Secondly, within the fledgling field of mass communication, loyalty appears to have enshrined the work of pioneers, such as Siebert, Peterson, Schramm, Charles Osgood, B. H. Westley, and M. S. MacLean, who made life-long career commitments to the discipline. Schramm himself lamented the fact that communication research was an oasis "where many have passed, but few have tarried. Scholars come into it from their own disciplines, bring valuable tools and insights, and later go back, like Lasswell to the central concerns of their disciplines" (Wilo, 1975: 8). Schramm listed as the "four founding fathers" of communication research sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld; political scientist Harold Lasswell, and psychologists Kurt Lewin and Carl Hovland (Tankard 1988: 16).

Finally, it appears that the longevity of Four Theories is primarily due to the provision of a common, fixed system for categorizing and labeling the unwieldy collection of national press systems and their untidy assortment of characteristics. As Altschull notes in his analysis of Four Theories, "[The authors'] efforts to impose a classification system on the press are much to be applauded" (1984: 109). In a eulogy to Wilbur Schramm, who died in 1987, James Tankard wrote that, despite

the fact that "[t]he theories developed in the book were normative, rather than quantitative, ... the volume nevertheless presented a set of standards for evaluating and comparing press performance that was used for many years" (1988: 12).

Tankard's remarks and subsequent additions to and subdivisions of the original categories by other scholars suggest that the utility of the categories themselves is of limited value; rather it can be argued that the primary value was the typological approach. That is to say, it is not the nature of the divisions per se, but the methodological construction of types that has been perceived as the most useful contribution of the Four Theories.

If the inherent virtue of typologies is their capacity to bring order out of empirical chaos; their inherent vice must be their tendency to generalize, oversimplify, and, thereby, distort the complexity of reality. Positivists, valuing parsimony in their theories, might relish the two- or four-fold divisions presented in Four Theories; but even so, a growing number of social scientists questions the validity of any generalization.<sup>4</sup> Werner Severin joins his colleague Tankard in issuing the caveat that the Four Theories are "'normative theories' derived from observation, not from hypothesis testing and replication using social science methods ... " (Severin and Tankard, 1988: 209). Subsequent modifications call into question the quality and rigor of those observations, for the categories seemingly fail to encompass the wide range of press performance and policy observed empirically. McQuail advises that, "It may be that the original 'four theories' are still adequate for classifying national media systems, but as the original authors were aware, it can often be that actual media systems exhibit

alternative, even inconsistent, philosophical principles" (1987: 111). From the foregoing discussion, one must conclude that the theoretical map doesn't match the territory and/or that the categories set forth are neither mutually exclusive nor all inclusive, though they are purported to be both. It is useful to recall the warning of Jakob Burckhardt, the Swiss historian, who railed against the "terrible simplifiers" (1898).

Flawed methodology is central to identifying the book's weaknesses, since it seems to underlie the historicism, marginalism, and atheoretical nature of the paradigm. And though more recent scholars have addressed and sought to correct other shortcomings in Four Theories, none appears to have focused on the fundamental methodological error. The decision to employ a normative typology must be examined. If, indeed, the authors envisioned their organization schemata as "ideal types," the utility of that more universally accepted approach must also be examined. Normative types are drawn from the authors' notions of how the media ought to function in certain ideological environments and of the nature of those environments. Functionalist assumptions account for the model's failure to address the dynamism of the press and to ignore the voluntaristic nature of audiences, journalists, legislators, advertisers and others associated with the operation of the media.

Preoccupation with "function," which appears frequently in the press scholarship of the German sociologists discussed above and in the writings of their American heirs, is traceable, of course, to Comte, Spencer, and Darwin. Lasswell's work on press functions and Merton's foray into the field of media dysfunctions also strengthened this approach in the 1940s. Whereas functionalism is at low ebb in most of the social sciences at this time, following the intellectual unseating of

Parsons et al. in the early 1960s, it has achieved a near-monopoly on American thinking in the province of world press theory, legitimized by the wide adoption of the normative approach presented in Four Theories. Interestingly, the term "functionalism" is not applied to this approach by mass communication scholars in general, with the known exceptions of Sri Lankan theory specialist Wimal Dissanayake and the Dutch sociologist Denis McQuail.

McQuail identifies normative theory as, in effect, a branch of social philosophy. While noting its importance in media study, (1987: 4), he nevertheless reminds his readers of the "limited value of normative theory for describing the reality even if it does shape the reality and perceptions of it, especially on the part of those who control, or work in, the media" (1987: 124). McQuail emphasizes the importance of distinctions between normative and social scientific theory of the press. He defines social scientific theory as

general statements about the nature, workings and effects of mass communication, derived from systematic and, as far as possible, objective observation and evidence about media and often reliant on other bodies of social scientific theory (1987: 4).

The exclusion of "other bodies of social scientific theory" greatly limits the scope of understanding to be derived from normative theories and accounts for what may be termed the theoretical isolation of American world press paradigms. Though the validity of all type-based methods of inquiry are subject to growing criticism because of their assumption of generalizability (Denzin, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Schwartz and Ogilvie, 1979), adoption of Max Weber's "ideal types," developed from observation rather than prescribed according to current political morality, would have helped promote the "rational understanding of

motivation, which consists in placing the act in an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning" (Weber, 1904: 8-10). As Turner observes,

Weber explicitly stated he did not intend for [ideal types] to have a normative connotation. Rather they were designed "to be perfect on logical grounds," most of the time by summarizing a "conceptually pure type of rational action" (Turner et al., 1989: 194; Weber, 1904/49: 10).

The potential contribution of Weber's methodology and social action theories will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapter III, along with other sociological and political ideas that may hold relevance for understanding how press systems work.

The perils of oversimplification inherent in deduced typologies are compounded by the power of the attached labels to exaggerate differences and reify misconceptions. Altschull observes that "one of the most critical of all difficulties we face in efforts to avoid the perils of global confrontation lies in labeling and in the language of conflict" (1984: 108). Extending social-psychological labeling theory to the macro level in his discussion of American and Soviet press analysis, he continues,

The labels we place on behavior and on ideas contribute to misunderstandings, and to passionate disputes about meanings and substance as well .... Sociologists have pointed out that "deviant behavior " is often in the eyes of the beholder, based on the way "deviant " is defined .... To the Soviet analyst, the American environment is deviant; to the American analyst, it is the Soviet environment that is deviant .... and hence the citizen is perceived to be alienated (1984: 108-109).

While the dysfunctions of labeling and stereotyping constitute "an attractive nuisance" in all normative typologies, the potential is particularly marked in Four Theories because of the Cold War assumptions that pervade the work. Published three years after Stalin's death, Four Theories was strongly colored by post-war anti-communist attitudes and

the McCarthy Era in the United States. While this bias has become particularly obvious in light of recent events, its pro-American stance was always clear and might have been expected to arouse misgivings in serious scholars from the outset. Commenting on Schramm's treatment of the Soviet communist press, Altschull describes the analysis as "hostile." "Its approach is within the us-versus-them framework that also bedevils the Soviet analysis of the American press," he observes (1984: 108). Stevenson and Shaw note that, "The book leaves little doubt as to which theories are 'good and which 'bad.' It obviously is an American study" (1984: 135-136). A manifestation of the effect that this perspective has on mass communication students is a tendency in class discussions for participants to dispense with the multi-syllabic labels prescribed in Four Theories and simply substitute the words "good" and "bad," with no loss of meaning among their classmates and considerable savings in time.

Another sign of the times apparent in Four Theories is its minimization of the special challenges and functions of media in developing nations. This neglect was probably less purposeful and less conscious than the anti-Communist bias and may have resulted in part from obsession with the East-West conflict. Also, at the time the book was written, the full import of decolonization by Great Britain and other Western allies had not yet been realized and euphemistic "development" concepts were still in their heady formative stages.

Another serious flaw of Four Theories is the authors' assumption of stasis. Although the four types are chronologically presented, thus incorporating history and time into their development, the authors do not suggest how a press system might evolve or deviate from its designated



type. Indeed, the designation for the Soviet communist type is attached nominally to a specific nation--one that no longer exists at this writing. Does the type still exist if the prototype and namesake has been dissolved? Will the "types" themselves continue to evolve in response to new technologies, new environmental constraints, and the vicissitudes of political and social reality? Will new types of press systems emerge and are they to be recognized if they do? Shouldn't theory anticipate or at least accommodate changes in situations?

In the introduction, the authors state that Four Theories is predicated on the assumption that

the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates .... especially the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted. We believe that an understanding of these aspects of society is basic to any systematic understanding of the press (1956: 1-2).

This thesis, however, seemingly overlooks the indisputable fact that the press also determines the form and coloration of social and political structures--and always has. Also to be considered are the uses and effects of foreign media on the domestic front, admittedly a more apparent phenomenon in recent decades than in the mid 1950s. While William Hachten's observation in World News Prism is essentially true, "[t]he trend toward internationalization notwithstanding, print and broadcast systems are still controlled and regulated by their own national governments" (1987: 16), the influence of transnational media on domestic affairs and on the conduct of the domestic media themselves is indisputably on the rise.

Four Theories, then, can be criticized for presenting an oversimplistic and impressionistic view of the world's press systems that

has impeded and distorted understanding and enshrined largely unexamined American perceptions and misconceptions held in the 1950s. Failure of the paradigm to acknowledge the dynamism of the press and that of the national systems with which they are affiliated has resulted in the paradox of a widely-acclaimed theoretical perspective that seldom has found application in empirical studies.

#### Other Theoretical Perspectives on the World Press

Perhaps best known of American scholarly attempts to modify Four Theories is William A. Hachten's reworking of the normative types. In The World News Prism, first published in 1981 (1987), Hachten expands the original typology to encompass five categories, which he correctly identifies as normative concepts, rather than theories. These five--authoritarian, Western, communist, revolutionary, and developmental--are less delineated than the original four and suggest some overlap. Hachten proposes that "all press systems exist somewhere along a continuum from complete control (absolute authoritarianism) at one end to no controls (pure libertarianism) at the other" (1987: 16). This hint of progression does not imply a linear dynamism, however, and indeed, analysis quickly reveals that such an evolutionary progression cannot be supported empirically.

Hachten defines the revolutionary press as "illegal and subversive communication utilizing the press and broadcasting to overthrow a government or wrest control from alien or otherwise rejected rulers" (1987: 27). Transitional by its very nature, the revolutionary concept is interesting because it links such geographically and culturally diverse phenomena as the "patriot" press preceding the American

Revolution, the pre-Revolutionary Bolshevik press, and more contemporary dissident media in the USSR, Iran, Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, and other volatile spots in both hemispheres. Hachten's most important contribution is the creation of a conceptual framework that accommodates press systems in developing countries, which he refers to sympathetically as "have nots" in terms of media resources. Another important modification is his broader definition of what he identifies as the Western press concept to include both libertarian and social responsibility.

Under the Western rubric, Hachten includes brief mention of Robert Picard's democratic-socialist press and a more detailed discussion of McQuail's democratic-participant concept. Picard suggests a revision of the original four theories by introducing democratic-socialist as a Western press subtype (1982, 1985). He argues that a democratic socialist consensus in Western Europe is legitimizing increased government intervention in press affairs, rationalized as necessary to ensure plurality of press ownership, social accountability, and public access. Interestingly, Picard locates his democratic-socialist system to the left of the libertarian and social responsibility systems, "balancing" it between the Western and communist philosophies (1985: 67-69). His interpretation of what can be viewed as the "social responsibility" concept is analogous to anti-trust legislation in the sphere of laissez-faire economics.

McQuail's democratic-participant concept represents both a reaction to existing theory and a recognition of its marginality to understanding actual practice. While embracing the Hachten's perspectives with some reservation, McQuail sees democratic-participation as a positive move

toward new forms of media organization, accompanied by a sense of disillusionment with established political parties and with a system of parliamentary democracy which has seemed to become detached from its grass-roots origins, to impede rather than facilitate involvement in political and social life (1972: 99-116; 1987: 122). McQuail focuses on the audience, rather than the media themselves. Somewhat idealistically, he identifies a movement away from "uniform, centralized, high-cost, highly professionalized, neutralized, state-controlled media," toward "multiplicity, smallness of scale, locality, deinstitutionalization, interchange of sender-receiver roles, horizontality of communication links at all levels of society, interaction, commitment" (1987: 122).

Ralph Lowenstein posits a two-tiered approach to world press theory, presented in Media, Messages, and Men (Merrill and Lowenstein, 1971 and 1979) and in Macromedia: Mission, Message, and Morality (Lowenstein and Merrill, 1990). On one tier, Lowenstein marks differences in ownership types--private, multiparty, and government. On the second level, he overlays authoritarian and libertarian press types, adding social-authoritarian, social-libertarian, and social-centralist, which correspond to Soviet communist, social responsibility, and a combination of Picard's social-democratic and McQuail's social-participant. Clearly, among Lowenstein's aims is the removal of the negative connotations and tautology associated with the term communist and a lessening of the ambiguity he perceives in the term social responsibility. At the same time, his model creates less pejoratively-defined niches for socialist and developing countries and acknowledges the potential for governmental intrusion in the social responsibility concept.

Though Lowenstein's co-author, John Merrill, considers Lowenstein's

model "more sophisticated and realistic" than the Four Theories scheme, Merrill holds that Lowenstein's social-libertarian concept lacks logical consistency because he believes a press cannot be at the same time free and subject to government regulation. He expands on this idea:

The only way a "theory" of social responsibility could have any significance in any country is for governmental power elite to be the definer and enforcer of this type of press. Since in any country the organization of society--its social and political structure--determines to a large extent what responsibilities the press (and the citizen) owe society, every country's press quite naturally considers itself (or might logically be considered) as being socially responsible (1974).

In The Imperative of Freedom (1974: 25-33) and the Dialectic in Journalism (1989: 97-130), Merrill argues that Lowenstein's model, like that of Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm and many others, has consigned press systems around the world "to various pigeonholes based on the degree of freedom they possess" (1989: 97). The model Merrill himself proposes is a "political-press circle," with libertarianism at one pole and authoritarianism at the other, and both extremes and their offshoots divided into authoritarian-tending or libertarian-tending. The two tendencies are interdependent "in the sense that the path from freedom to statism may proceed in either direction, moving through socialism or capitalism" (1991: 18).

Another less-developed model, proposed by Shaw and Stevenson, likewise seeks to eliminate the bias of Four Theories by consciously substituting the terms "pluralistic," "stable," and "mixed" for "free," "not free," and "partly free" press characteristics (1984). Their efforts at congruence ascribe differences between national types to the degree of overlap between government, press, and public, with pluralistic presses, such as the United States, Iceland, and Turkey, showing less

overlap than mixed presses, for example, Mexico, Brazil, and Egypt, and stable systems, such as the Soviet Union, Zaire, and Thailand, showing the most overlap. Their theory is employed in an empirical study of several press-coverage variables in 16 countries (1984).

As McQuail has observed, the functionalist approach, with which all of the normative typologies presented to this point can be identified, "has been beset with difficulties, both intellectual and political (because of its seeming conservatism)." McQuail notes the tautology inherent in perspectives that assume that "any recurrent and institutionalized activity serves some long-term purpose and contribution to the normal working of society" (1987: 69). The functionalist paradigm also presupposes an agreed version of society, an assumption of right and wrong, "since the same media activity (e.g. mass entertainment) can appear in a positive light in one social theory and negatively in another" (1987: 69). Though the attempts to arrive at a more value-free and "realistic" model for analyzing the world's press have succeeded in reducing some of the more egregious shortcomings of Four Theories, the fundamental contributions of this type of theory construction remain rudimentary and problematic.

Of all the American theoretical constructs, the one that comes the closest to approaching those of the European social critics is Herbert J. Altschull's. In Agents of Power: The Role of the News Media in Human Affairs, Altschull makes a conscious and largely successful effort to avoid value-laden terms in his presentation of a three-part typology that consists of market, Marxist, and advancing press systems. The three movements, which he compares to a somewhat cacophonous symphony, parallel First, Second, and Third World designations and embrace "all the

realities of the environments in which the press exists, historical, political, social, cultural, and--importantly--psychological." An important aspect of Altschull's typology is his insistence on points of congruence among the three types, shared "laws of journalism" or press roles (1984: 279-299).

Altschull brings to his theorizing an assumption not widely shared by his U.S. colleagues, that the American Constitution, and more specifically the First Amendment, may be no more than "a semantic con game whose objective is the acquisition of dollars in the grubby marketplace of the exchange of goods" (1984: 11-12). His view of the Enlightenment notion of a "self-righting principle" is, likewise, cautious and he finds less truth in Milton's (more accurately Oliver Wendell Holmes's) "marketplace of ideas" than in John Stuart Mill's more measured observation: "The dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplace, but which all experience refutes" (Mill, 1859: 189).

The real issue for Altschull is universal cooptation of the press by those in positions of power. As he writes in his chapter "Birth of a Legend," on the creation of the myth of a free and independent press,

The point to remember as we examine the folklore of the press is that the flow of information has been widely viewed over the centuries as of transcendent importance with regard to both liberty and power. Of course, there is great strength in language; words are indeed mighty instruments. The error is to proclaim the independence of the press, to fail to recognize that the news media are agencies of some else's power. The folklore, in fact, blinds us to the reality, and if on occasion evidence is assembled to direct our attention to it, the temptation (as with all legends) is to ignore the existence of the evidence (1984: 19).

Citing Weber's address to the German Sociological Association, noted

earlier in this text, Altschull notes that "Sociologist Max Weber recognized the agency role of the press early in the twentieth century. He argued that 'so-called public opinion' in a modern democratic state was for the most part stage-managed by political leaders and the press" (1984: 202). Likewise Altschull draws upon Tonnies' observation that "[t]he press is the real instrument of public opinion, a weapon and tool in the hands of those who know how to use it and have to use it; it possesses universal power as the dreaded critic of events and changes in social conditions" (1984: 202).

Thus Altschull's emphasis on commonalities and his somewhat empathetic description of press systems that differ markedly from that of the United States are not to be taken as endorsements of those systems, but rather as his recognition that power figures as a primary determining force in all national media systems. This non-partisan stance separates Altschull's analysis from that of the pro-Western theorists and the critical theorists identified with Marxist views. Altschull's work is also marked by its inclusion of a broad range of ideas and theories from other social science disciplines, most notably sociology, political science, and history. His integralist view is acknowledged in the introduction to his book From Milton to McLuhan: The Ideas Behind American Journalism (1990). Though purportedly addressing mass communications students, he might well have been lecturing his academic colleagues when he wrote:

It is among the tasks undertaken in the writing of this book to bring mainstream concepts into sharper focus by illuminating their historical roots. For the ideas described and examined in this study are products of other times, born in response to specific sets of problems and conditions and tested in the cauldron of the Great Debates of their eras before being handed down to us. As we study the origins of these ideas, we begin



to hear in our own discussions of journalism and public affairs the voices of those who have gone before us (1990: 4-5).

Though Agents of Power addresses and corrects many of the weaknesses noted in other non-critical typologies, it, nevertheless, sheds no light on how any system might move from one classification to another. It also retains labels that limit its application to the Cold-War world that prevailed at the time of its publication in 1984. By stressing commonalities, Altschull appears to transfer his own convergence attitudes to his press model, thus limiting its utility in identifying and describing the undeniably divergent behaviors of the world's presses.

Another set of normative theories known as the political, neoMarxist, or "critical" school of communication evolved in tandem with the general revival of Marxist ideas in the late 1960s. As Wilio reports, primary support for this perspective was found in Scandinavia, Western Germany and England "with some names in U.S.A., Canada, France, etc." (1975: 14).

Much of the tradition of this perspective can be traced back to the Frankfurt School and the culturalist approach framed by Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1972) and Herbert Marcuse (1964). Marcuse used the term "one-dimensional" to describe society created by the "culture industry," and, paraphrasing Tunstall, for these theorists, the "culture industry" is American.

The goal of critical theorists is, in Wilio's words, "to make people aware of their suffering, needs and interests" (1975: 14). Their main emphasis is on determining how those occupying positions of wealth and power implant social values by using the media. The phenomenon is observed both within societies or nations, and cross-culturally--as

industrialized nations impose their culture and ideas on less-developed societies. Though sharing some basic assumptions with Altschull, the authors of this body of work differ in that they see Western media policy and performance as not only deceiving the masses in the core, but also as blocking advances in the periphery and semi-periphery, to use Wallerstein's designations. Interestingly, these scholars are particularly opposed to positivism or positivistic empiricism and tend to dismiss other schools of thought out of hand (Wiio, 1975: 14). Herbert Schiller, in a 1974 UNESCO report, charged the Western powers with employing the media to reimpose cultural imperialism:

If these comments suggest that we are introducing values into the discussion, I say "yes," we introduce values at all times .... It is equally desirable to recognize that there is no such thing as an objective, valueless television system, a system in which decisions are made by experts who have absolutely no relationship to the social order. I consider the notion of value "neutrality" to be fraudulent. Is it possible, really, to conceive of TV programming anywhere, that is unaffected by the social system within which the TV establishment operates? (Wiio, 1975: 14).

In a similar vein, Nordenstreng (1968 and 1974), Ahmavaara (1974), and Tunstall (1977), and Soviets Grachev and Yermoshkin (1984) and Petrusenko (1976) in their pronouncements reiterated the Frankfurt School's and Marxist notion of praxis, that is the blending of theory and practice, particularly in their analysis of the Western press and its impact on developing countries.

Other neoMarxist perspectives on media and society reflect tension between ideological and economic determinism. Perhaps most well-known of those who emphasize economic structure over ideology is British sociologist Raymond William, usually identified as a Marxist. His typology, presented in Communication (1966) and elaborated in "Base and

"Superstructure" (1973) is premised on the assertion that, in practice, no press system can be totally free (1966: 124). He argues,

In one way, the basic choice is between control and freedom, but in actual terms it is more often a choice between a measure of control and a measure of freedom, and the substantial argument is about how these can be combined (1966: 24).

Williams then proceeds to define authoritarian, paternal, and commercial press types, which correspond in a less naive way to the Four Theories' authoritarian, Soviet communist, and social responsibility. Williams also describes a utopian democratic type which, "we can only discuss and imagine" (1966: 128). The major contribution of Williams is his recognition of the potential for tyranny in profit-based (commercial) systems, a propensity toward control that rivals that of authoritarian and paternal systems. Nevertheless, he prefers a commercial system, but one in which there is no private ownership. Williams calls for a "public system," overseen by a series of councils made up of government and media representatives.

Similar views on the tyranny of personal ownership inform the work of N. Garnham (1979) and G. Murdock and P. Golding (1977). The latter hold that those who profit from the media work consistently to exclude "those voices lacking economic power or resources" (1977: 37). Golding argues that

the underlying logic of cost operates systemically, consolidating the position of groups already established in the main mass-media markets and excluding those groups who lack the capital base required for successful entry. Thus the voices which survive will largely belong to those least likely to criticise the prevailing distribution of wealth and power (1977: 37).

Other proponents of the critical approach advocate policy in their writings and are active in the production of position papers and

critiques; however, little systematic theory has emerged from their work. NeoMarxists who see more control vested in ideological rather than economic monopoly and manipulation are said to subscribe to the hegemonic media theory, hegemony being Antonio Gramsci's term for a ruling ideology (1971). Although Stuart Hall is more clearly identified with the less politically strident social-cultural approach, he nevertheless shows an understanding for the hegemonic perception that

the direct imposition of one framework, by overt force or ideological compulsion, on a subordinate class, was not sophisticated enough to match the complexities of the case. One had also to see that dominance was accomplished at the unconscious as well as the conscious level: to see it as a property of the system of relations involved, rather than as the overt and intentional biases of individuals in the very activity of regulation and exclusion which functioned through language and discourse (1982: 95).

With Altschull, L. Althusser and N. Poulantzas are, perhaps, most clearly identified with focusing attention on the mass media as conduits of state power and social control. In "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (1971), Althusser examines linguistic tools to reveal how underlying meaning and covert language structure have given legitimacy to the relationships of capitalism.

Though considered an outgrowth of the Frankfurt School and generally Marxist in outlook, the social-culturalist approach to the press and the social sciences in general takes a far more positive approach to mass culture and their interpretation than Adorno, Horkheimer, or Marcuse. Adherents tend to see little distinction between economic and ideological hegemony, and, therefore, reject some aspects of classic Marxism (Hall et al., 1987: 7-11). Located at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, England, these qualitative scholars come from a variety of disciplines in the humanities and social studies. The focus

of their work is upon audiences and messages, with special priority given to the effects upon minorities and other subgroups of society. The assumption that the media are power conduits in capitalist societies is central to the culturalist paradigm. Stuart Hall, recognized spokesman for the Birmingham School, stresses the holistic nature of the School's approach.

[I]n its different ways ... , [social culturism] conceptualises culture as inter-woven with all social practices; and those practices, in turn, as a common form of human activity .... It is opposed to the [Marxist] base-superstructure way of formulating the relationship between ideal and material forces, especially where the base is defined by the determination by the 'economic' in any simple sense (Gurevitch, 1982: 26-27).

An intellectual perspective that has some potential for world press theorizing is information-society theory, though its application to empirical research or practical policy-making is not well-developed at this time. Information society theory discards many of the assumptions that underlie both functional and critical theory, focusing not on the content of messages, the intent of senders, or the interpretation of receivers, but rather on the means of conveying the message (McQuail, 1987: 75-78). The work of Marshall McLuhan, though now out of vogue, best summarizes this view (1964, 1967). McLuhan maintained that it is the technology of communication that has the greatest impact on humans and the way they think and not the content of that communication. For instance, McLuhan maintains that the printing press (and the alphabet) ushered in a rational, linear way of thinking that characterized the "modern age." Rationality has become obsolete with the all-around, three-dimensional perception called for in the video or "information age." McLuhan viewed this development with some alarm and saw civilization returning to the aural patterns of traditional and "Third

World" societies. Obviously, the concept of nationalism has little meaning in the context of a single, global information society.

Nevertheless, J.L. Salvaggio proposes a world press theory that defines four primary international models: competition, public utility, communist, and Third World. The major determinants in the scheme are ideology, economy, political party, and external factors (1985). Information-society views are also incorporated in many of the writings of postmodernist sociologists (Giddens, 1990; Stauth and Turner, 1988).

A final approach, the contingency model, was presented with some optimism by Osmo Wiio in 1975 (1975: 7-22) and included in L. John Martin and Anju Chaudhary's Comparative Mass Media Systems (Martin and Chaudhary, 1983; Wiio, 1983); however, it has received minimal attention in the United States, perhaps because it yields unpredictable and ambiguous conclusions. The contingency theory proposes that the number of internal and external variables accompanying any communication act make it impossible to establish cause or predict outcomes in all situations. Based on research conducted at the Helsinki Research Institution for Business Economics, of which Wiio is director, the contingency model is derived from organization theory. The primary assumption is defined in the "motto":

Rather than searching for the panacea of the one best way to organize under all conditions, investigators have more and more tended to examine the functioning of organizations in relation to the needs of their particular members and the external pressures facing them. Basically, this approach seems to be leading to the development of a "contingency" theory of organizations with the appropriate internal states and processes of the organizations contingent upon external requirements and member needs (Lorsch and Lawrence, 1970: 1).

The communication theory Wiio proposes for the world's press is comprised of two-by-two comparisons of variable pairs. For example,

press systems might be examined to determine whether they have open or closed receiver system (anyone can be the audience or a select few can be in the audience), or an open or closed messenger system (it is easy or it is difficult to send messages). Other variable pairs are ownership (public or private) and control (centralized and decentralized). The binomial pairings are thus similar to the on-off programming of computer circuits.

Wiiio views the contingency model as freeing press study from the constraints of more rigid typologies. Using his model, national press systems might find themselves categorized with different bedfellows in different studies, depending upon the dimension or variable used to measure them. He concludes that, for example, "there really is no 'Western model' for mass communication; it all depends on what dimensions have been selected for analysis. Possibly the clearest difference is between a "monolithic model' and a 'pluralistic model' (1983: 92). This model has heuristic potential for dynamism and, more than any other non-critical approach, avoids the pitfalls of functionalist paradigms.

In reviewing the ideas and concepts that define current approaches to understanding the world's media, it becomes clear that the vast body of social theory that has informed and united scholarship in other social science disciplines has not been incorporated into the study of mass media. With the exception of Herbert Altschull and, perhaps, John Merrill, most of those probing the mysteries of the international press have approached their task without the benefit of the historical maps that guide theorists in other fields. Perhaps these mass communication scholars, most of whom spent their early years in the trenches as professional journalists, have brought with them into academe the

philosophy of the "burning present," or retained the notion, as Gaye Tuchman writes, that "[p]rocessing news leaves no time for reflexive epistemological examination" (1972: 662).

Many of the social phenomena that have attracted recent theoretical attention, e.g., agenda setting, the knowledge gap, two-step flow, cognitive consistency, attitude-change, diffusion, uses and gratifications, and cultivation theory, were identified and, at least, tentatively explored by sociologists and other scholars early in the 20th century before mass communication became a recognized discipline. The contributions of these early thinkers and relevant ideas from other disciplines go uncited in many recent mass communication works. This phenomenon, which Sorokin has identified as the "discoverer's complex," is the manifestation of "a sort of amnesia." Sorokin might well have been addressing directly the communication scholars of today when he wrote that the new generation of social scientists

claims that nothing important has been discovered in their fields during all the preceding centuries; that there were only some vague "arm-chair philosophies"; and that the real scientific era in these disciplines began only in the last two or three decades with the publication of their own researches and those of members of their clique (Sorokin, 1956: 3-4).

Three centuries ago, Sir Isaac Newton conceded, "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." Robert Merton explained: "In its figurative meaning, [Newton's remark] explains the growth of knowledge and culture in virtually every area of learning you can mention. Newton's aphorism means that no investigator starts out with a tabula rasa or clean slate" (Whitman, 1976).

In the following chapter, a number of areas of social theory will be explored that hold promise for the construction of a dynamic and holistic



theoretical model of the world's press. Among methodological and theoretical ideas examined will be Weber's ideal types, grounded theory, social action theory, phenomenological and situational analysis as applied in macroanalysis, symbolic interactionism and dramaturgy, dramaturgical motive, and the sociology of knowledge.

## Endnotes

1. The attraction of simplicity in theory can be compared to the tendency of media gatekeepers to select simple, clear, and unambiguous new stories over more complex ones that may be deserving of attention, but are inconsistent with newsroom needs, e.g., speed of reporting, ease of verification, and audience expectation (Galtung and Ruge, 1970; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1972, 1978).

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL GROUNDING OF A DYNAMIC WORLD PRESS THEORY

#### Derivation and Explanation of Method

#### Introductory Thoughts on the Integration of Method, Theory, and Empiricism

Were this text to be chronologically ordered, the process of grounding the dynamic theory would begin with a summary of empirical observations on the world's press. A panoply of variables might be examined to illustrate how one national system could be distinguished from another or how characteristics of a single national system today might differ from those it exhibited at some previous point in time. Among the findings that could be reported would be analyses of media content; ratios of information, entertainment, and persuasion; definitions of news; breakdowns of audiences and audience effects; financing and ownership patterns, organizational structure, news gathering processes, newsroom socialization, attitudes toward foreign media fare, proportional coverage of international news, historical traditions, relations to other social institutions, and myriads of other quantitative and qualitative analyses generated by mass media researchers.

Clearly the blitz of data that could be brought to bear on a subject

as broad as national press systems has the capacity to overwhelm and frustrate understanding, as well as the potential to facilitate meaningful interpretation. Observation not only preceded, but also outweighed theoretical and methodological components in the construction of this theory. However, the end product of this endeavor is informed by existing methodologies and social theories--as well as by empirical evidence on how press systems go about their daily business. And since an ultimate goal of all theory is to enable observers to assign contextual meaning to fact, the empirical portion of the present work, comprised of case summaries, follows the presentation of the theory itself. In this way the dynamic theory provides an interpretive frame for observations and the case summaries test and illustrate the credibility of the theory.

Paradoxes apparent from the outset of the project dictated the use of an eclectic methodology derived from micro- and macroanalytical approaches and positivist as well as postpositivist perspectives. Jack Katz, in his essay on analytical induction, warns of the risk of "ignor[ing] diversity in methods and focus[ing] on one qualitative research strategy" (1988: 130).

#### Reconciling Ideal Types and Grounded Theory

The methodology used in the formulation of the dynamic theory is a blending of Max Weber's ideal types (1904; 1921a), and the more recently formulated "grounded theory," a systematic approach to theory construction first articulated by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967). Weber's and Glaser/Strauss's approaches are compatible; that is,

grounded theory's "categories" may be equated with Weber's types and both champion the inductive process. However, the former is generally associated with the construction of middle-range substantive theory emerging from fieldwork, such as Charmaz's study of people suffering from chronic illnesses (1980, 1982), Glaser and Strauss's treatment of the terminally ill (1964) and, in retrospect, Howard Becker's ethnography of medical students, Boys in White (1961). In contrast, ideal types tend to be identified with more detached observation, macro structures, and formal theory, notably Weber's classic works on forms of legitimized power (1921b: 941-1372) and the links between Protestantism and the development of capitalism (1905/1906); Durkheim's writings on solidarity (1884) and suicide (1897); and Merton's analysis of the nature of social deviance (1957). Despite the formal overtones of these studies, their focus on substantive issues must be acknowledged.

The chief value of the grounded theory method as a qualitative strategy is its integration of fact, theory, and process and its rejection of logico-deductive reasoning. Data collection and analysis proceed simultaneously, though data retain the upper hand. Analysis (theorizing) leads to new strategies of data collection and theoretical, or purposive, sampling, which in turn redirect or sharpen the focus of analysis. Thus a cyclical process is prescribed, from which meaningful categories emerge as "core variables" which, as Charmaz notes, "fit the data, rather than forcing the data" (1988: 112). The process continues until all conceptual categories are exhausted, fully elaborated and refined. Termination of the process is problematic, since purposive sampling is potentially infinite. Nevertheless, the systematic application of the method results in higher and higher levels of

abstraction. The degree of abstraction, then, eventually suggests an end point.

Though Glaser and Strauss enumerate step-by-step procedures for coding, memo-writing, categorizing, filing, and shuffling, in practice, the grounded-theory process took on a life of its own, for distinctions between observation, theory, and process soon blurred among the flurry of notes and diagrams. As Charmaz suggests, "Each researcher who adopts the approach likely develops his or her own variations of technique" (1988: 125).

In the final chapter of Grounded Theory, the authors conclude that

The root source of all significant theorizing is the sensitive insights of the observer himself. As everyone knows, these can come in the morning or at night, suddenly or with slow dawning, while at work or at play (even when asleep); furthermore, they can be derived directly from theory (one's own or someone else's) or occur without theory (1967: 251).

As its micro focus suggests, the grounded theory method is commonly associated with perspectives of the Chicago School and symbolic interactionism (Charmaz, 1988; Rock, 1979). However, by centering so fixedly on the priority of data, Glaser and Strauss imply that the data speak for themselves. A more phenomenological approach, such as that advocated by Charmaz, yielded more fruitful findings (1988: 112). Charmaz's reference to the notion that actors' accounts can be accepted at face value (Schutz, 1967; Blumer, 1969) may also be applied at the macro level (Weber, 1921b: 941-1372; Mills, 1940; Merton, 1957), particularly in the study of mass media, whose stock in trade is symbolic communication.

Ideal-type methodology, though more obviously germane to the endeavor at hand because of Weber's interest in "big empirical

questions" (1904: 80), is far less specific in its instructions than Grounded Theory. Whereas Glaser and Strauss present a research instruction manual, Weber provided a philosophy--or rather philosophies, for his conception of ideal types embraced two approaches with different analytical goals. Most of his writing on ideal types advocated the construction of historical types based on specific events and situations. His last work, however, signaled a radical reconceptualization to broader, universally-applicable types that were intended to encompass all social action. (These are discussed and differentiated below.)

For Weber always, the sociologist's task was to concern himself "with the interpretive understanding of social action" and ideal types were seen as providing an "analytical ordering of reality"--an abstracted and streamlined construction intended to elicit "rational" meaning from the complexity of the social world, but not to recreate the social world. For, as Weber insisted, the delineation of types was not to be confused with "historical reality nor even the 'true' reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance," he wrote (1904: 93).

Weber's views on "causal explanation for the course and consequences of social action," are often misinterpreted as a search for social laws that parallel the force of physical laws recognized in the natural sciences. But that kind of causation, Weber maintained, could only be apprehended by logic and the artificial rationality inherent in ideal types. However, he wrote, "sociological investigation attempts to include in its scope various

irrational phenomena, such as prophetic, mystic, and affectual modes of action" (1921a: 20). Clearly, Weber was not concerned with establishing absolute causality in the "narrower exact natural science sense, but [rather] with adequate causal relationships expressed in rules and with the application of the category of 'objective possibility'" (Weber, 1904: 80). One need not accept Weber's inference of the apprehension of absolute rationality on a theoretical plane to understand his argument that absolute causality cannot be imputed to or derived from observed social action.

Weber saw ideal types, then, as theoretical constructs based on the fiction or "ideal" of rational social action. In a sense, ideal types serve as hypothetical control groups against which "real" social action can be measured. The work of the analyst is, as Weber argued, to measure, compare, and eventually understand how and, "approximately," why observed social action deviates from these theoretical constructions.

While adopting Weber's general methodological strategy, the dynamic theory does not adhere to Weber's notion that ideal types embody "true" rationality, as indicated in his observation, "The construction of a purely rational course of action in such cases serves the sociologist as a type (ideal type) which has the merit of clear understandability and a lack of ambiguity." He follows this assertion by juxtapositioning "actual action" to assess its deviation from the ideal caused by "irrational factors of all sorts, such as affects and errors" (1921: 6). Weber's implication that "actual action" is deviant or, by inference, "pathological," must be rejected.



In his earlier methodological writings and in his well-known substantive works, Weber proposed and utilized time- and space-specific ideal types in the analysis of historical events (1904; 1905/1906; 1921a<sup>1</sup>). His rationale for the emphasis on "pure" or historical types was stated in terms of their utility in providing concrete understanding of historical events. At this point Weber was critical of more expansive typological schemes, arguing that

[f]or the knowledge of historical phenomena in their concreteness, the most general laws, because they are most devoid of content are also the least valuable. The more comprehensive the validity,--or scope--of a term, the more it leads us away from the richness of reality since in order to include the common elements of the largest possible number of phenomena, it must be necessarily be as abstract as possible and hence devoid of content. In the cultural sciences, the knowledge of the universal or general is never valuable in itself (1904: 80).

Had Weber's development of ideal types stopped here, he might have endorsed the narrow perspective of world-press typologies that order the world's press into political- and time-specific categories that reproduce "the richness of reality" to their time and place.

However, as Weber also observed in The Methodology, the danger of such historical specificity lies in the fact that "historical knowledge here appears as a servant of theory instead of the opposite role. It is a great temptation for the theorist to regard this relationship either as the normal one or, far worse, to mix theory with history" (1904: 102). Weber also wrote that such specificity necessitates "attempts to discover ever new aspects of significance by the construction of new ideal-typical concepts .... " (1904: 97).

Arguing against the concept of "normative types"--presumably of the

nature of the press types presented in Four Theories and its derivatives--, Weber wrote that the "ideas" of a given historical epoch are not interchangeable with the abstracted "ideals" of that epoch.

In this sense, however, the "ideas" are naturally no longer purely logical auxiliary devices, no longer concepts with which reality is compared, but ideals by which it is evaluatively judged. Here it is no longer a matter of the purely theoretical procedure of treating empirical reality with respect to values but of value-judgments which are integrated into the concept .... (1904: 98).

He also suggested that the scholar

who on one hand seeks to "understand" the epoch of which he speaks "in its own terms," and on the other still seeks to "judge" it, feels the need to derive the standards for his judgment from the subject-matter itself, i.e. to allow the "idea" in the sense of the ideal to emerge from the "idea" in the sense of the "ideal" type (1904: 98).

In his last writings, Weber seemingly abandoned the notion of historical types, perhaps because of the historicity and bias he saw as unavoidable in their derivation and application. In Part One of Economy and Society Weber advocated deriving more generally-applicable ideal types that might be applied to all social action.

We have taken for granted that sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process. This distinguishes it from history, which is oriented to the causal analysis and explanation of individual actions, structures, and personalities possessing cultural significance .... An important consideration in the formulation of sociological concepts and generalizations is the contribution that sociology can make toward the causal explanation of some historically and culturally important phenomenon. As in the case of every generalizing science the abstract character of the concepts of sociology is responsible for the fact that, compared with actual historical reality, they are relatively lacking in fullness of concrete content (1921a: 19-20).

Weber sought to distinguish the focus of the sociologist more clearly from that of the historian. As Turner et al. note, "There is some indication that Weber intended to rewrite the earlier material in

terms of the system of concepts he had recently developed" (Turner, et al., 1989: 196). The most outstanding feature of his revised approach was apparent acceptance of the notion that useful generalization was possible on a broader though more abstract level.

Another intended aim of ideal type methodology was the maximization of objectivity, for Weber remained committed to the disputed proposition that value-free research was indeed feasible. Carrying this point further then, as Weber himself did in his later elaborations, it would seem that researchers constructing ideal types on the basis of behavior or actions (or their justifications) would be less prone to confuse the substance/subjects of analysis with the heuristic device of ideal types. In the present work, action-derived ideal types are adopted as analytical tools for understanding the world's press systems, directing attention to what national media do and are perceived to be doing rather than to who each nation is and to which geopolitical camp it belongs. This shift in perspective carries with it the corollary assumption that a nation's media behavior is more subject to fluctuation and change than its geopolitical identity.

In his initial discussion of ideal types, Weber's only bow to dynamism was his admission that the development of new types may be necessary from time to time (1904: 97). In The Protestant Ethic, which Weber conducted as a quasi-experimental study with other major religions serving as control variables, categories were mutually exclusive. That is, Weber assumed that societies or individuals were either all Protestant, or all Roman Catholic or all Taoist. The assumption of mutual exclusivity also informed Durkheim's typologies on suicide and solidarity. In his conceptualization of power reification, however,

Weber does suggest movement, as from charismatic leadership to either traditional or rational systems. A significant contribution of this last work is the acknowledgment of overlap in empirical findings. Citing as illustration the likelihood that the same historical phenomenon may be "in one aspect feudal, in another patrimonial, in another bureaucratic, and in still another charismatic," Weber observes that "it is probably seldom if ever that a real phenomenon can be found which corresponds exactly to one of these ideally constructed pure types" (1921a: 20).

Although it is always difficult to "type" Weber himself, he is generally associated with positivism because of his perceived emphasis on empiricism, causality, generalizability, and objectivity. However, there is ample reason to question this characterization, as the foregoing discussion suggests. Weber's view of sociological inquiry incorporates many of the postpositivist views espoused by Glaser and Strauss. Ironically his emphasis on "subjective meanings" is perhaps more in tune with the phenomenological approaches of Schutz and Garfinkel than Glaser and Strauss are--though in fact Weber had difficulty incorporating this strategy into his research.

Furthermore, Weber's concern with establishing "approximate" causal explanations is mirrored in grounded theory's tendency to "focus on constructing models which serve both to describe and explain the system." (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 205; Reason and Rowan, 1981: 185-86). Explanation in this sense is viewed simply as identification of observed patterns of relationship or interconnectedness; predictability, then, extends to the likelihood, but not the certainty, that such patterns will be repeated under similar conditions. On the subject of generalization, naturalistic inquirers Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba acknowledge that

"many [of today's postpositivists] have subscribed to the proposition that generalization is among the most basic of scientists' goals" (1985: 111)--this despite their stated view that "the only generalization is there is no generalization." The suspicion raised here is that, except for the level of theory addressed, little separates the methods proposed by postpositivists Glaser and Strauss, Lincoln and Guba from those advocated by Weber.

In acknowledging and stressing the centrality of "subjective meaning," Weber argued that social action can only be understood when "it is placed in an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning" (1921: 8). Lincoln and Guba embrace grounded theory because of its rejection of all "a priori assumptions" and because "grounded theory is more likely to be responsive to contextual values" (1985: 36-37, also see 202-211).

At the same time, Lincoln and Guba note in their discussion of "emergent design" that theorists bring with them a bank of tacit knowledge of both a factual and theoretical nature.

The investigator may possess a great deal of tacit knowledge that is germane to the phenomena to be studied. And as the inquiry proceeds, it becomes more and more focused; salient elements begin to emerge, insights grow, and theory begins to be grounded in the data obtained." (1985, 209).

Tacit knowledge, both factual and theoretical, undoubtedly colored the selection of methods employed in the construction of the dynamic theory. Separating theory from facts may well be a linguistic illusion. Lincoln and Guba write,

It seems clear that in a naturalistic investigation tacit knowledge can and does come into play; the units of data upon which grounded theory is ultimately based may emerge because of the investigator's implicit apprehension of their importance

rather than because a specific theoretical formation brought them into focus (1985: 208).

### Expectations and Assumptions Guiding Method

With tacit and expressed knowledge come opinion, assumptions, and perhaps most important, expectations for the utility of the theory to be derived. Without some minimal expectations, no serious theorizing would ever be undertaken. In contemplating the creation of a new world press theory, many of the expectations represented reaction to the perceived failure of existing theory. Discussed below are the five most salient expectations, that were noted at the outset of this project. Assumptions inherent in each expectation are also included.

Foremost among these was the expectation that the theoretical map must closely match the actual territory, a somewhat less ambitious goal than Katz's desire to establish "a perfect relation between data and explanation" (1988: 130). Implicit in this expectation is the assumption that what people perceive and symbolically define as "real" is "real," and that this reality can be cognitively snared and understood.

Second, a new theory was expected to address and accommodate the potential dynamism and potential transformational capacity of the press. The assumption is that the press is a social institution and necessarily adjusts to and justifies social change. Press activity that works to maintain the status quo is viewed as process and a form of ongoing adjustment. Concomitant with this assumption is another: all social institutions, the press among them, behave in a voluntaristic manner, as extension of personal interaction.

Third, an evolving theory was expected to be bring about an

"analytical ordering of reality" from the chaos of empiricism. The assumption arising from this expectation is one that all would-be theorists must make--that the distortion inherent in a parsimonious model is significantly less than the error inherent in the interpretation of unstructured and unrelated findings.

Fourth, in reaction to the Cold War biases that polarized the world since 1945, and to a lesser extent since 1917, a new theory was expected to be politically "value-neutral." That is, the theory might and would be applied in an interpretive way, but in its conception it must be value neutral so as to not preclude the possibility of objectivity, as elusive as that goal might be. This expectation carries with it the assumption that objectivity is achievable and desirable at the theoretical level. A corollary assumption is that objectivity cannot be achieved in empirical research if the theoretical grounding is skewed.

Finally, a new theory was expected to be holistic in scope and accommodate all the world's presses across time--hence the attraction of a social-action frame. Not ruled out was the possibility that a holistic theory might also be extended to describe and contrast different communication industries and practices within national systems. The assumption implicit in this expectation is that press behavior and national policy toward the press can be generalized across time and space.

The present work to some degree reconciles postpositivist and positivist approaches, merging the former's quest for a network of "'working hypotheses' that describe the individual case" with the Weberian notion of ideal-types and generalization drawn from his later interpretations. For it is proposed here that, within an overarching

macro canopy, press motivation may be regarded as springing from a universal social action scheme--a non-deterministic typology that is sufficiently broad to withstand the onslaughts of time, geopolitics, and other manifestations of social change.

Though press systems themselves denote cultural and institutional constructs in the macro realm, the emphasis on situational contingency, voluntarism, and subjectivity of social action incorporates the social-psychological focus stressed by Mead and symbolic interactionists.

The great appeal of this multi-layered approach was its potential for deriving a theory general enough to include all of the world's press behavior, yet specific enough to be of some actual use. The challenge was to avoid what C. Wright Mills identified in Parsons's work as "a level of thinking so general that its practitioners cannot logically get down to observation" (1959: 33).

### Application of Relevant Social Thought to World Press Theory

#### Overview of Theoretical Groundings

Nowhere is the linkage between method and theory more clearly illustrated than in Weber's presentation of social action theory as an extension of ideal types (1921a), for as Turner *et al.* point out, Weber's scheme enabled the achievement of two goals: increased understanding of the elements of social action and discovery of unique variations in specific empirical cases (1989: 198). In this section, the basic frame for the dynamic theory is grounded in basic ideas advanced in Weber's



social action theory. Modifications to Weber's typology are appended from similar ideas proposed by Bronislaw Malinowski in A Theory of Culture and Other Essays, published posthumously (1944). Motive theory, more specifically the dramaturgical concept of motive as subsequent to action, is another body of existing social thought that informs the emerging construct. Although dramaturgical and phenomenological perspectives on motives and accounts are generally associated with micro levels of analysis, motives and motive vocabularies are interpreted as essential strategies for coordinating social action at the macro level. They are also shown to be consistent with Weber's central notion of "subjective meaning" and "interpretive understanding."

Although treated in less detail, aspects of the sociology of knowledge and symbolic interactionism are also noted in this section. The relevance of these concepts to the process of understanding the world's press is illustrated in the course of the theoretical grounding, although their relationship to the dynamic theory is documented in Chapter IV, in which the dynamic theory is formally presented and explained.

#### Social Action Theory as Analytical Device

As a prelude to presentation of his social action theory, Weber paid minimal tribute to the utility of the functionalist frame of reference for "purposes of practical illustration and for provisional orientation." However, he maintained, "if [functionalism's] cognitive value is overestimated and its concepts illegitimately 'reified,' it can be highly dangerous".<sup>2</sup> Weber observed that whereas the study of biological

organisms must be restricted to observation of functional relationships (from which generalizations may be made), "subjective understanding is the specific characteristic of sociological knowledge." He wrote,

We can accomplish something which is never attainable in the natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of the action of the component individuals .... This additional achievement of explanation by interpretive understanding, as distinguished from external observation, is of course attained only at a price--the more hypothetical and fragmentary character of its results (1921a: 15).

Clearly Weber went to special pains to disassociate his action theory from the functionalist-organicist paradigm; yet because Talcott Parsons traced his functional determinism to Weber's work,<sup>3</sup> there is a tendency in the discipline to identify all approaches to social action and, occasionally, symbolic interaction (Huber, 1973; Kanter, 1972; Nicolaus, 1970) with structural-functionalism. This indiscriminate view is reinforced by Malinowski's association with both functional anthropology and social action theory.

Functionalist assumptions are rejected in the dynamic theory. Rather, the bases of the new construct are motive, rather than function; voluntarism and situation rather than determinism.

Although the formal nature of the dynamic theory perhaps suggests broad application to various national institutions, such breadth is beyond the scope of this work. By deliberately focusing the substantive content of this work on national press systems, the intention is to minimize the abstract, "hypothetical and fragmentary character" of the explanation the theory provides and to test its utility by employing it to describe and explain specific behaviors and characteristics of the mass media.

In his analyses, Weber defined social action as including overt

behavior, failure to act, and passive acquiescence to the behavior of others. Furthermore, he believed that social action "may be oriented to the past, present, or expected future behavior of others" (1921a: 22). However, he did narrow his interpretation by excluding action solely oriented toward inanimate objects and actions where behavior is not meaningfully oriented to that of others. He cited as an example an unanticipated collision between two cyclists, which he compared to "a natural event" (1921a: 23).

In interpreting the world press, "social action" of the media is manifest in media content, editorial and advertising policy, codes of ethics, financial and organizational structures, response to available technology, and interaction with various constituencies, such as domestic audiences, government, the economic community, and world opinion.

Weber saw social action, and indeed all action, as oriented in four ways: 1) instrumentally rational; 2) value-rational; 3) affectual, that is, emotional; and 4) traditional. While affectual orientation, to which Weber gave only cursory treatment, is relevant to the behavior of individuals, it has little if any application to institutions and macro structures, the focus of the present study. Affect, it may be argued, is subsumed by the other ideal types and Weber minimizes it by considering such behavior as only marginally meaningful (1921a: 24-25).

Traditional action, Weber maintained, is determined by ingrained "habituation," and, like affectual action, "lies very close to the borderline of what can justifiably be called meaningfully oriented action." It is the "almost automatic" nature of traditional behavior, suggesting action that is not self-conscious, that accounts for Weber's lack of interest in in-depth examination of this type, which he

identified somewhat dismissively with "the great bulk of everyday action" and with primitive, "pre-industrial social systems" (1921a: 24-25).

Despite his expressed interest in interaction at the personal level, Weber's primary concentration throughout his work was on institutional and other macro social structures, and more pointedly on what he saw as the "rational" action of modern, industrialized nations, or "rational-legal societies." His analysis, therefore, focused on instrumentally rational and value-rational action, the dualism he saw as circumscribing contemporary capitalist institutions in Western Europe and the United States.

Instrumental behavior, then, was described by Weber as action prescribed by "expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings ... for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends" (1921a: 24.) Economic, or perhaps more broadly, material attainment for its own sake, rather than to satisfy the most basic physical needs for subsistence, was posited as one of the two primary justifications of social action in industrialized nations. The other, in opposition to Karl Marx's more narrow determinism, was value-rational behavior, "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects for success" (1921a: 25).

The dynamic theory incorporates these two orientations--referred to hereafter as instrumental and value (or ideational) orientations--as essential bases for understanding and describing the world's press systems. However, Weber's scheme does not adequately account for social action and press behavior in less developed, less industrialized nations

in what is now commonly, if unfortunately, labeled the Third World. The proposition that social action in these countries is "determined by ingrained habituation" and is, therefore, governed by some mysterious, non-reasoning instinct cannot be credited. The very concept of nationhood is incompatible with non-self-consciousness and habituated instinct. And certainly any national society that aspires to communicate with itself via the mass media has broken with tradition.

Yet, the behavior of developing nations does exhibit characteristics that indicate a primary orientation other than the values and material attainment that Weber ascribes to industrialized nations. Bronislaw Malinowsky proposed three "system levels" that meet the basic requisites of social systems. His functionalist scheme posited the "structural system level," paralleling Weber's instrumental orientation; "symbolic level," comparable to Weber's value orientation; and "the biological level." The biological level, as Malinowsky viewed it, formed the base of a hierarchy upon which instrumental and symbolic needs represent successively higher levels of development. Whereas both Weber and Malinowsky concentrated on instrumental and value-oriented action, it is proposed here that survival itself is perceived as justification for national action in a large portion of the world.

Survival is usually viewed by organicists and functionalists as an underlying precondition of human existence, necessarily antecedent or concomitant with other needs (Maslow, 1970: 35-58; Parsons, 1978; Spencer, 1895, among others). Here it is argued that survival is perceived as a legitimate justification for action that usually, but not always, takes precedence over instrumental and value motives. When continued survival of the nation, its society, institutions, and/or its

leadership are seen as being in jeopardy, action tends to be predicated almost totally on survival. Obviously, survival orientation comes into play not only in the highly vulnerable emerging nations of the Third World, but in "rational-legal" nations as well, when military or economic threat is perceived as imminent. In integrated and stable societies, press systems are seen as sharing and embodying these national orientations--instrumental, ideational, and survival.

Motivation Theory and the Justification  
of Press Activity

The central component of the dynamic theory is the linkage of motive and motive vocabularies to the action types of of instrumental, value, and survival strategies. McQuail sees the focus on motive as providing common ground in comparative press study that functional analysis is unable to deliver. He strengthens his argument by suggesting that motive-based theories can be tested 1) by observing "media activity (a 'task' of the media), which can be more or less objectively named;" and 2) by examining "statement[s] of purpose, value, utility or end provided by one or other of the users, or expected beneficiaries." In the second point, media content and self-analysis must be included, for as McQuail adds,

Although there is an objective element in this version of media function, the construct as a whole is essentially subjective .... Thus what the audience member thinks he or she derives from media is part of "commonsense theory" and what media practitioners think of as their purpose is part of "working theory", while sociologists or social theorists try to render what society expects or receives from the activities of the media (1987: 70).

John Dewey's description of human activity obtains to a description of its institutions, and he might well have been describing the activity of the media when he wrote of "man" in 1922,

In truth, man acts anyway, he can't help acting. In every fundamental sense, it is false that a man requires a motive to make him do something ... It is absurd to ask what induces a man to activity generally speaking. He is an active being and that is all there is to be said on that score (1922: 119).

In contemplating the world's press, the assumption is made that simply by existing and functioning, media and media systems act, that is, they engage in activity that can be observed and commented upon. If media or media organizations fail to act it can only be because they no longer exist. The focus then moves to motives--that is verbal and subjective justification of acts already underway or completed. The stuff of motives is words, or "accounts," to use Marvin Scott and Stanford Lyman's term. More specifically, the term "motives" refers to the ability of talk (or written words) "to shore up the timbers of fractured sociation, its ability to throw bridges between the promised and the performed, its ability to repair the broken and restore the estranged (Scott and Lyman, 1968: 46).

Within the context of this dramaturgical definition of motive, stress is placed not on how activity originates, but how it is directed and interpreted by the actor/s. As Dennis Brissett and Charles Edgley observe in Life as Theatre, motives are viewed as ways people rationalize acts "to make conduct meaningful to those around them and to themselves, and typically they do so retrospectively" (1974: 152). The interpretation of motive adopted in this text and incorporated into the dynamic theory is that people likewise rationalize after the fact the acts of institutions such as the press, with which they interact.

The acceptance of the articulated motive as the "real motive" is an essential tenet of this perspective, for as C. Wright Mills argues, "There is no way to plumb behind verbalization." The only empirical check on "motive-mongering," Mills maintains, is noting an articulated motive's conformity to typical "vocabularies of motives that are extant in types of situations of actions" (1940: 910). Mills's allusion here is parallel to Weber's identification of motive as

a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question. The interpretation of a coherent course of conduct is "subjectively adequate" (or "adequate on the level of meaning") insofar as, according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component parts... are recognized to constitute a "typical" complex of meaning. It is more common to say "correct'" (1921a: 11).

For Weber this situational pattern constitutes only a small leap to approximate causality. The dramaturgical interpretation, bypassing causation and seeking only to establish linguistic connections between similar situations, obviously finds greater resonance in the phenomenological search for subjective meaning in actors' first-hand accounts.

A second assumption of the motive-based dramaturgical theory of action is that most human acts are performed automatically and non-consciously, until and unless that activity is challenged or questioned. Motive arises then to justify and defend action that is problematic. Because disputed actions are frequently embedded in the context of belief, beliefs too may require justification when they are flagged by questionable behaviors. A motive succeeds when the threat is removed or when disputed acts are accepted by a significant constituency a significant portion of the time. The logical corollary of this



assumption is that unchallenged acts or behaviors are unmotivated.

Weber's views support this general proposition, for he writes,

In the great majority of cases actual action goes on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness or actual unconscious of its subjective meaning. The actor is more likely to "be aware" of it in a vague sense than he is to "know" what he is doing or be explicitly self-conscious about it" (1921a: 21).

Motives are hierarchically ordered and operate at all levels of social relationships. Individuals subscribe to multiple motives and their attendant vocabularies, encompassing personal, familial, social, religious, political, and national motives. Because motives are constructed to justify challenged acts or behaviors, by definition there are no universal motives--whereas there are many shared patterns of behavior.

Ironically, the dramaturgical perspective on motive does not find consistent support in the work of George Herbert Mead. His interpretation of motive or "impulse" in the Philosophy of the Act places it as the first of four "stages of the act," culminating in consummation (1938: 3-25). Tamotsu Shibutani describes the impulse phase of the act as "the condition of disequilibrium that first sets an organism into motion (1962: 65). Nevertheless, Mead's impulse is sharply differentiated from instinctive response, being proscribed by social conditioning and selective perception.

Weber's use of the words "motive" (das Motiv) and "motivation" (die Motivierung) in his discussion of the impetus for social action is close to Mead's interpretation, though on the whole, Weber's treatment of the concept is rather casual and peripheral to other closely-related concerns, namely causality, generalization, and rationality. In much of Weber's writing, motive is assumed to precede the act in the very way

that he perceives likely cause as preceding effect. For example, he observes that "we understand the motive of a person aiming a gun if we know that he has been commanded to shoot as a member of a firing squad, that he is fighting against an enemy, or that he is doing it for revenge" (1921: 9). Weber's emphasis on "subjective explanation" comes closest to the idea of motivation that informs the dynamic theory, for his concept of action is confined to behavior to which "the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning"--although that meaning may or may not be verbalized to others.

The extension of the basically interactionist perspective on motives to the macro sphere is made most convincingly by Mills. In his classic essay, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," motives and complexes of motives, that is vocabularies of motives, are described as action strategies consciously employed to "undo snarls and integrate social actions." For as Mills explains, "In many social actions, others must agree, tacitly or explicitly .... Diplomatic choice of motive is part of the attempt to motivate acts for other members in a situation" (1940: 907).

"Stable and widely shared vocabularies of motives link anticipated consequences and specific actions," he writes. "Through such vocabularies, types of societal controls operate" (1940: 906).<sup>4</sup> This view of "constructed" mass response evokes comparison with Karl Mannheim's concept of ideology, developed in Ideology and Utopia, (1936) and with other works associated with the sociology of knowledge (Bell, 1960; Merton, 1957 and Nietzsche, 1901; Scheler, 1925). Similar theoretical grounding informs sound empirical works on the international media by Herbert Altschull (1984) and the Soviet media by Thomas

Remington (1988). Clearly, mass media have played and will continue to play an essential role in creating, maintaining, changing, and adhering to national vocabularies of motive.

An interactionist who expands and adds dynamism to the concept of motive vocabularies imposed on the individual is R.S. Perinbanayagam. In an especially insightful but little-known article, he proposes that in social relationships, "there are standard vocabularies of motive for standard identities: identities in fact are predicated on vocabularies of motives" (1967: 68). Among these he includes individual identity strongly defined by religious affiliation, nationality, and ethnicity--going so far as "see the point of" Marx's view of false consciousness embodied in his maxim that religion is the "opiate for the masses" (1967: 69). The crucial link between micro and macro structures for Perinbanayagan is the assumption that man is a symbol-using animal. Changing identities and changing society are accomplished through redefinition of vocabularies of motives, he maintains. Other interactionists employ motives to explain individual action within the context of social norms (Burke, 1945; Foote, 1951; Hewitt and Stokes, 1975; Stokes and Hewitt, 1976; Hall, P.M., 1987).

The integration of dramaturgical-phenomenological motivation theory with the modified interpretation of Weber's social action theory forms the theoretical structure for the dynamic theory of world press motivation. However, whereas Weber perceived four ideal types of "rational" social action, the new construct posits three ideal types of motives that rationalize and order an infinite array of media acts, behavior, beliefs, laws, policies, and responses. The selection of the press as the substantive focus of this formal theory is particularly apt,

for the world's media content presents an abundance of spoken and written motives and vocabularies of motive, provided by media practitioners, audience, the courts, corporate actors, and disproportionately, the state apparatus. In the following chapter, the dynamic theory of the world's press is presented and explained.

## Endnotes

1. According to Turner et al., "Economy and Society (1921a and 1021b) was left in a highly disorganized state at Weber's death in 1920 .... Part 1 is actually the last section he wrote, apparently between 1918 and 1920, while part 2 appears to have been written several years earlier, between 1910 and 1914" (1989: 196).
2. Echoing Weber's interpretation, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann identify "reification" as "an extreme step in the process of objectivation, whereby the objectivated world loses its comprehensibility as a human enterprise and becomes fixated as a non-human, non-humanizable, inert facticity" (1966). Reification of abstraction is widely perceived to be the great flaw that deflated the value of Talcott Parsons' major works.
3. As Joseph F. Scott argued in American Sociological Review, Parsons's attempt to come to terms with "social reality" shifted markedly during the course of his long career (1969). Parson's first major work, The Structure of Social Action (1937), is drawn most directly from Weber's "Conceptual Exposition" (1921a), or his interpretation of it. Consequently its assumptions about the voluntaristic nature of the social world, the salience of symbolic structuring of reality, the rejection of causality, and the mutability of social norms stand at odds with his later ideas.
4. In The Sociological Imagination, Mills traces what is, in essence, his concept of motive vocabulary as strategy for social control to well-known political and philosophical ideas, among them Locke's "principle of sovereignty," Sorel's "ruling myth," Durkheim's "collective representations," Marx's "dominant ideas," and Rousseau's "general will." Nietzsche's "horizons" also seem appropriate to this grouping.

## CHAPTER IV

### TOWARD A DYNAMIC THEORY OF WORLD PRESS ACTION AND MOTIVATION

#### The Centrality and Utility of Motive In Realizing Action

This chapter begins with a discussion of motive, the theory's central and most highly-evolved construct. Following this exposition, three major premises are introduced. In the process, ideal motive types are posited at the macro-national level and a dynamic conceptual model is proposed. In the concluding section, the three ideal motive types are then operationally defined in terms of national situations and associated characteristics of press behavior.

#### "Subjective Interpretation" and Media Research

Max Weber's identification of motive with "subjective understanding" and C. Wright Mills's view of motive as "the vocalized expectation of an act" (1940: 907) underscore the phenomenological underpinnings of motives as verbal constructions that rationalize and give meaning to action. In the present work, the focus of analysis is on characteristic world press behaviors. Included in behavior are activities, policies, ethics, beliefs, and taboos. While characteristic behaviors may be identified by analyzing and interpreting media acts and media content, such observations are enriched by drawing upon verbal accounts provided by the

actors themselves, that is metajournalism. Related to these self-justifying explanations are the challenges that inspired them, issued by various media constituencies--that is, by domestic and foreign audiences, governments, critics, scholars, advertisers, and other vested interests--economic and ideological. Accepting Mills's dictum that it is not possible to plumb behind verbalization to determine the "real motive" or the "real reasons" for behavior (1940: 910), it is proposed that the character of a nation's press is what people say it is.

Several properties of the press as national institution tend to make its analysis particularly amenable to the interactionist, phenomenological approach. First of all, public communication is the stock-in-trade of media organizations. Media serve as chroniclers of public events and issues, and their record is readily accessible across time and space in print, microfilm, and video archives.

Secondly, the press is hardly a faceless institution. Like the arts, media structures are associated with and represented by "personalities" and, for purposes of analysis, they may be identified as actors. And just as Howard Becker was able to perceive organizational structure through the study of individual actors in Art Worlds,<sup>xiz</sup> the press provides a similar bridge between interaction and structure in political and economic spheres. Stokes and Hewitt propose that motives are key to the resolution of a major issue for contemporary sociology theory--"inconsistencies and contradictions between two major paradigms of sociological analysis, the structural and the interactionist" (1976: 838).

Thirdly, throughout the history of mass communication, the media have exhibited an inordinate preoccupation with self-analysis and

introspection, and an almost neurotic sensitivity to criticism--real or anticipated. Perhaps the earliest illustration of this response appears in what is widely believed to be Johan Gutenberg's colophon (in Latin) to Catholicon, a 13th century Italian manuscript, which would be the third and last book Gutenberg published in his brief but legendary career as a printer. Standing at the brink of the Modern Age, catalyzed by his revolutionary invention, Gutenberg sought to justify his innovation to those who identified its mysteries with the Devil's work. The vocabulary of motives he employed was drawn from the late Medieval period that comprised the only world he knew:

By the help of the Most High, at whose will the tongues of infants become eloquent, and who oftentimes reveals to the lowly that which He hides from the wise, this noble book, Catholicon, in the year of the Lord's Incarnation, 1460, in the bonteous city of Mainz of the renowned German nation, which the clemency of God has deigned with so lofty a light of genius and free gift to prefer and render illustrious above all other nations of the earth, without help of reed, stilus, or pen, but by the wondrous agreement, proportion, and harmony of punches and types, has been printed and finished.

Hence to Thee, Holy Father, and to the Son with the  
Sacred Spirit  
Praise and glory be rendered, the threefold Lord and One;  
For the praise of the Church, O Catholic,  
applaud this book,  
Who never ceasest to praise the devout Mary.  
Thanks be to God (Berry and Poole, 1966: 15).

The proclivity to justify and legitimize its own activity seemingly is intrinsic to the press in all societies--as inherent as its practitioners' compulsion to verbalize. In contrast, other national institutions--governmental bodies, economic enterprises, the law, education, organized religion, and other social entities--tend to be premised on members' discretion, and external communication usually is filtered through subsidiary public relations organizations. In the United States some forms of "institutional loyalty" are enshrined in law



and court decisions that prohibit the public airing of institutional dirty laundry--rationalized by national security and protection of personal privacy and industrial secrets.<sup>2</sup>

Challenged Behavior and Identifying "Differences  
That Make a Difference"

In his classic general semantics text, People in Quandaries, Wendell Johnson approached his analysis of interpersonal communication with the assumption that "we are set to expect differences--because in a process-reality no two things turn out to be the same and no one thing stays the same" (1946: 37-38). William James created a pragmatic rationale for concentrating on differences that matter when he wrote,

If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right (1907: 45).

These notions guide the present inquiry, for, indeed the nettlesome suspicion that with sufficient effort one can detect "differences that make a difference" is the impetus for most sociological attempts to create cognitive order--on micro and macro scales--out of apparent human chaos.

However, the tendency to overgeneralize is another outgrowth of that compulsion. In an admirable attempt to correct for Cold-War analyses that have exaggerated the disparity between world press types, J. Herbert Altschull likens the roles assigned to various national media to movements of a global symphony, "with their many themes, melodies, and variations." He continues, "One perhaps surprising truth that emerges ... is that their similarities are often as great as their differences"

(1984: 279). In the hope that the world's media might cease serving as a divisive force and instead unify the international community, Altschull presents "The Seven Laws of Journalism," which, he suggests, transcend national boundaries. First among these is his assertion that, "In all press systems, the news media are agents of those who exercise political and economic power" (1984: 279). Other shared characteristics he observes are the linkage of media content to financial interests; espousal of beliefs in press freedom and social responsibility, variously defined; a perception that other national press systems are deviant; the legitimization of press ideology and social values in journalism education; and the imperfect alignment of press theory and practice.<sup>3</sup>

A less politically conscious analysis by Harold Lasswell posited three functions of the mass media in all societies: surveillance of the environment, correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment, and the transmission of the social heritage to new generations (1948). To this, Charles W. Wright added the function of entertainment (1959: 16). Others have identified a number of universal media dysfunctions (Boorstin, 1961; Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1948; Severin and Tankard, 1988: 217-220).

As commendable as Altschull's efforts may be, and as irrefutable as the dysfunctionists' conclusions may appear, these approaches yield universalities of such broad and inclusive nature that they do little to increase understanding of the world's press. In the case of Altschull's laws, essential manifestations of difference are glossed over, such as which elements of various societies exercise political and economic power, what are the interests of those who finance the press, and how is social responsibility defined in different countries. Similarly,

Lasswell's functions mask important distinctions: how does the perception of threat differ from one national environment to the next and from one time period to another? And why are some norms and values handed down from one generation to the next while others are stripped away and replaced? Though both Altschull and Lasswell recognize the media to be agents of the powerful, neither can account for such apparent aberrations as a charismatic Soviet leader who exhorted the press to call into question the very power structure that brought him to office.

Still broader in application are a number of mathematical and stimulus-response models that purport to illustrate the communication process at all levels--from the intrapersonal and interpersonal to mass communication. The most well known of these all-purpose diagrams are Claude Shannon and W. Weaver's "Mathematical Theory of Communication" (1949) and Bruce Westley and Malcomb MacLean's "A-B-C-x feedback" model (1957). These were joined by an array of similarly mechanistic constructs proposed by well-known scholars in the 1950s (Gerbner, 1956; Newcomb, 1953; Osgood, 1954; and Schramm, 1954). Of the lot of their ideas, Altschull writes dismissively,

Borrowing from the truth trees of philosophers, the stimulus-response diagrams of psychologists, and the mathematical models of physicists, communications scholars have adopted as their universal symbol the arrow. Some run in straight lines; some are curved; some even bend back upon themselves. They are alleged to describe the flow of communications from source (stimulus) to receiver (response), with elaborate cross-arranged mechanisms to illustrate single or multiloop feedback systems. The arrows have the fortuitous characteristic of impressing fellow scholars with the rigor behind the graphic design but do lamentably little to resolve the crucial international (and domestic) peril that lies at hand (1984: 148).

The fact that these schemata raise more questions than they answer is illustrated most clearly in Lasswell's "verbal model," widely hailed as

catalyst for the profusion of cryptotheories that followed: "Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect?" (1948).

By focusing theoretical analysis on ideal types of motives used to justify press behavior, the notion of challengeable--and therefore different and significant--behavior is brought into sharp relief. It is proposed here that differences in perceived consequences of actions, articulated as vocabularies of motive, account for observed differences in the world's press systems. As Mills noted, "[T]here are different areas of population with different vocabularies of motive (1940: 906). Universally shared press "laws" and actions are not challenged and, therefore, play a minimal role in the dynamic theory. Altschull's "law" that "press practices always differ from theory" brings as little insight to international media study as Lasswell's universal who-what-which queries, or the empirical observation that "newspaper copy is printed in black ink all over the world." All may be true, but none expands understanding of the workings of the world's media.

At the same time, the concept of motive-based ideal types tends to distinguish "differences that make a difference" from national and cultural idiosyncracies, that, though adding color and personality to the study of national media, in fact deflect attention from fundamental and meaningful variation. For example, whether television anchors conclude their broadcasts with humorous anecdotes or prefer more staid sign-offs undoubtedly reflects national mores and conventions, but is unlikely to elicit international challenge. The size and frequency of newspaper photographs are more likely to indicate the level of press technology and financial resources than deliberate choice subject to question.

While the major determinant of press behavior is identified as

situational, cultural influences are incorporated into the dynamic theory as aspects of situation and as macro-level equivalents of voluntarism on the personal/psychological level. Stokes and Hewitt refer to motives as "aligning actions" and see them as "crucial to the process in which people create and sustain joint action by aligning individual lines of conduct when obstacles arise in its path." Thus they propose that vocabularies of motive play a major role in "sustaining a relationship between culture and conduct (1976: 838).

Thus, for the theorist and researcher, attention to motive rather than behavior is rewarded by the identification of problematic and, therefore, meaningful characteristics of world press behavior. As these discernments are made, clusters of motivated, meaningful activity appear from which ideal types emerge.

#### Vocabularies of Motive as Cohesive Strategies

Thus far, the discussion of motives has focused on their heuristic value for social scientists seeking to identify and distinguish significant action. In their social context, motives and vocabularies of motive (complexes of compatible motives) have utility in synthesizing public opinion, promoting social harmony, and justifying social control. Shared vocabularies of motive are essential for shared identity and are key to the creation and maintenance of overarching national identity that unites disparate ethnic, class, age, and gender interests (Foote, 1951; Perinbanayagam, 1967).

The mass media are the primary conveyors of national vocabularies of motive. In this capacity they play a pivotal role in selecting elements of a motive vocabulary to emphasize or play down. In times of radical

paradigm shift, the press is the primary vehicle for promulgating whole new motive vocabularies. Some scholars and media critics, alarmed by what they see as an overextension of press power, believe that the media create motive vocabularies and, thereby, construct social reality. An example of such reasoning was observed in a message displayed on an electronic signboard in front of a Chevrolet dealership in Roanoke, Virginia, in the spring of 1991: "Want to stop the recession? Quit watching the 6 o'clock news!" A more positive, but equally deterministic view of media power was expressed by Vladimir Lenin in 1901 as he sought to implement his party's revolutionary goals in tsarist Russia:

In our opinion, the starting point of all our activities, the first practical step toward creating the organization we desire, the threat that will guide us in unswervingly developing, deepening and expanding that organization, is the establishment of an all-Russian political newspaper .... Unless we are able to exercise united influence upon the population and upon the government with the aid of the printed word, it will be ... impossible to fulfill our task, namely, to concentrate all the elements of political discontent and protest, and with them fertilize the revolutionary movement of the proletariat (1901: 313-314).

Whereas structuralists and functionalists seemingly perceive shared motives as an organic--almost biological--force, and interactionists tend to concentrate on individual responses to entrenched norms, Mills suggests that motive vocabularies are constructed deliberately by power interests (his power elite). Similar ideas are expressed by Marx's false consciousness and Mannheim's ideology. "Through such vocabularies types of societal controls operate," Mills writes, and continues

Diplomatic choice of motive is part of the attempt to motivate acts for other members in a situation. Such pronounced motives undo snarls and integrate social actions .... When an agent vocalizes or imputes motives, he is influencing others .... Motives are common grounds for mediated behaviors." (1940: 906-907).

Describing urban America at the end of the 1930s, Mills identified individualistic, sexual, hedonistic, and pecuniary motive vocabularies and contrasted them with religious motives of the medieval period (1940: 910). (Similar comparisons, though not identified with motives, are made by Pitirim Sorokin in his utopian works on ideational and sensate cultures [1941]).

At the macroanalytical level, abstract and parsimonious action schemes take on relevance. One reason the structure of social action is more readily apparent on the national level than on the personal level is that for most people involvement is physically and emotionally distanced from action. Another is that those who define national motive vocabularies and the media who promulgate them seek to engage the masses by communicating on a general rather than a specific plane and by framing complex events and interconnected structures in their simplest, most "common-denominator" terms.

The emphasis on macro interpretation, appropriate to press analysis, is not meant to deny the operation of motives at interpersonal levels of social interaction. Individuals subscribe to multiple and sometimes conflicting layers of motive vocabularies. At the interpersonal level, these categories are obscured by the multitude of behavioral options that arise in the course of social interaction, e.g., rationales for smoking or not smoking, driving a domestic or foreign automobile, attending church or sleeping in on Sunday mornings. In contrast, at the macro level, abstraction frequently and conveniently obscures the micro activities of those in power positions, reversing the process as it occurs in the micro sphere, in which complexity obscures structure. In all cases, though, vocabularies of motives are constructed to justify

action to someone else and can be viewed as persuasive, coordinating devices.

### The Situational Aspects of Motives

It is the situational specificity of motivation that gives the concept its dynamism. New situations elicit unaccustomed and, therefore, conscious actions that may be at odds with existing motives. The implication here, as Mills argues, is that motives are not "fixed elements 'in' an individual," but rather responses to unanticipated or previously unexperienced situations. Echoing Mead's anti-Freudian idea of approaching human conduct socially and from the outside, Mannheim too notes that "both motives and actions very often originate not only from within but from the situation in which individuals find themselves ...." (1940: 249).

When applied at the level of nation states and their institutions, the dynamic theory redirects attention from the geopolitical identity of states and their "bloc"-defined roles to actions taken in response to domestic and international situations. When problematic situations prompt actions involving minor or infrequent change, they do minimal damage to the existing motive rationale and are regarded as mere "blips" in otherwise normal patterns of behavior, explained away as "disclaimers" by Hewitt and Stokes (1975).

In the case of national press systems, focus on behavior as adaptative strategy facilitates the perception of change as ongoing and inevitable. Furthermore, observed press similarities and differences are seen to be as temporal and temporary as the situations that spawn them. To center on the political philosophies "out of which" the world's press



developed, as Siebert et al. do in Four Theories of the Press, (1956) is an ill-conceived attempt to explain "why" they developed. The relevant question is "how" they developed and are continuing to develop in today's rapidly changing world. This is not to propose an ahistorical approach, but rather to suggest a processual approach that recognizes that history did not end with the Enlightenment ideas of John Milton or Thomas Jefferson, or with the revolutionary visions of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin, with the United States' Commission on Freedom of the Press, or even with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall.

The question arises then, if motivated behaviors emerge from problematic situations and not from intrinsic qualities of the actor, is the process a mechanistic one resulting in a predictable, chartable end-product? The answer is no--though action-based analysis certainly provides greater correspondence between "reality" and theory than retro-theoretical pigeon-holing. Clearly, the voluntaristic assumptions of Herbert Blumer inform the present work to a far greater degree than the more deterministic views of Manford Kuhn and the Iowa School of symbolic interactionists. As Stokes and Hewitt observe,

The way in which cultural standards apply to a particular problematic situation is a matter of negotiation among people interacting with each other and not simply a question of applying rules or principles of conduct. If culture exists, its application to any particular problematic situation is established through interaction among people who are as likely to disagree as agree about its relevance and not by a simple process of "looking up" a particular situation in a "cultural catalogue" of problematic situations and events (1976: 844).

Nevertheless, it is proposed here that situations are significant determinants of action that have long been overlooked in theoretical explorations of the international media. Mills wrote more than 50 years ago, "It is a hypothesis worthy and capable of test that that typical

vocabularies of motive for different situations are significant determinants of conduct" (1940: 906). The present work accepts Mills's challenge in its attempt to differentiate significant world press conduct. In the next section, the dynamic theory's three premises are presented, serving as extensions of his "worthy" hypothesis.

### Three Major Premises

1. Negotiated vocabularies of motives link press activity with actions of other national structures and social institutions.
2. Nations and their press systems subscribe simultaneously to three primary vocabularies of motive--survival, ideational, and instrumental, one of which usually predominates at a given time.
3. Nations and their press systems vacillate continually from one prevailing primary motive in the direction of one or both of the other two.

### The First Premise

To generate a theory that has the capability to discern, describe, and, to some degree, explain world media systems, it is necessary to acknowledge not only the fact that governments, institutions, and society are linked, but how that linkage has come about and how it is maintained. To do so motives must be identified that have preceded or accompanied the development of national structures. This is not to deny the on-going effects that these structures and the press have on each other, but rather to probe more deeply, in the hope of identifying underlying rationales that have been successfully negotiated in response to commonly-experienced situations. By accepting connections as faits

accomplis, the larger question is ignored: why do certain press systems tend to co-exist with certain patterns of governments, that is, with certain economic/political/value structures.

Hachten voices the widely accepted view that "all press systems reflect the values of the political and economic systems of the nations within which they operate" (1987: 16). While not disputing the logic and supportability of this observation, it must be noted that this perception is incomplete, for it does not take into account that connectedness is not an organic function of states, their institutions, and their people, but the consequence of negotiated response to shared events and situations.

Altschull emphasizes that verbalized justifications of action are the creation of the political and economic elite and that media impose these views on the public. For, he writes,

the abstractions that people believe come not from within themselves but from without, from their parents, their friends, their teachers, their leaders, and from what they read in their newspapers, hear on radio, and see on television (1990: 206).

The "trickle down" theory of press influence does not acknowledge sufficiently the reciprocal nature of interaction between between the people and the press, government, and economic sectors. The masses, that is the citizenry, voters, work force, consumers, and audiences, are both subject and object of social institutions, including the press. Mass power, by dint of sheer numbers, is exhibited in electoral choices, public opinion polls, purchasing behavior, and audience ratings--as well as more direct and radical physical actions.

One well-known historical example of national action rationalized by popularly-based ideational motives is the 18th and 21st amendments to the

U.S. Constitution, first creating and then repealing the ban on the manufacture, sale, or transportation of alcoholic beverages. The situation in which temperance activities arose was the social betterment obsession of the 19th century, including public education, the abolition of slavery, and expanded suffrage. The about-face on prohibition was rationalized in terms of a modified vocabulary of motives that emerged from situations that came about during the enforcement period of the Volstead Act--increase in crime, decline of rural values (decrease in rural population), large non-Protestant immigration, and a perception that temperance advocates were growing increasingly radical. The impact of public opinion was also evident in popular rejection of government-defined survival motives used to justify prolonged Soviet and American military involvements in Afghanistan and Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the dominant direction of power and influence in all societies is from the top down, and certainly government-defined actions are implemented more quickly than popular ones. As media access grows more costly and complicated, the hegemony of those who can garner its resources increases over the masses who cannot. But even in traditional and absolutist societies, public opinion cannot be and is not ignored. For as Niccolo Machiavelli advised princely colleagues in 1513, "Not to be hated by his subjects is the best fortress a prince can have. If the people hate him, a fortress will not save him .... (1513: 76). Furthermore, he explained, rational perception of consequences of action is not a monopoly of the highly-placed:

And it is not without reason that the voice of the people has been likened to the voice of God, for popular opinion is amazingly reliable in its prognostications, so much so that the people would seem to have hidden powers by which to foresee their future ills and triumphs (1513: 110)

Stability of motive vocabularies is a relative concept, achievable only on a theoretical plane. For perfect stability, in this sense, refers to a perfect correlation of motive vocabularies among national institutions and social sectors. Nations may be described as unstable when different structures or social segments subscribe to different motives to a significant degree. Northern Ireland and South Africa are unstable nations at this time, because major institutions and segments of their society perceive the same situation differently and subscribe to different motives. Nazi Germany, from the early 1930s until defeat in the mid 1940s, and Israel today, though beset with military and economic problems, can be described as relatively stable nations because their structures were/are aligned along shared motive vocabularies.

The concept of stability employed in the dynamic theory, however, does not preclude adaptation and change, which are continuous, but rather indicates that the various national institutions' response to change is rationalized in similar terms, that shifts occur in tandem. Motive vocabularies can change dramatically and swiftly as new situations arise, as when a war suddenly looms or when economic downturns occur, but national stability is retained when the motive switch occurs uniformly through all social structures.

If situations remain relatively constant over extended periods of time and challenge abates, the actions, ideas, knowledge, and beliefs justified by the vocabulary become reified into "culture" in the traditional sense.<sup>4</sup> No longer subject to question, actions are no longer in need of rationalization or defense. The Cold War is a recent example of a situation of several decades' duration which lulled many

observers into reified thinking. One consequence has been shown to be a proliferation of world press theories that could not accommodate a new order of things.

### The Second Premise

The dynamic theory establishes survival, ideational, and instrumental motives and the actions they justify as ideal types. Motive vocabularies are consciously created by national leaders, the press, and persons associated with other macro structures to justify problematic actions likely to affect and engage large numbers of people. More specifically, governments and their press systems rationalize problematic actions in terms of how these strategies sustain and preserve the existence of the nation, reinforce its ideas and values, or contribute to the attainment of goods and services. Though all three primary types combine to characterize national patterns of action, usually one motive vocabulary predominates at any given time.

As elaborated in Chapter III, the action scheme is derived from theories proposed by Max Weber and Bronislaw Malinowski, who argued that all rational human action falls within similarly delineated categories. The primary difference between the theoretical concepts informing the dynamic theory and the earlier typologies is that the latter identify nations according to their political stripe and global associations. Here, the typology is drawn from action--revealed to a large degree through articulated motives. Indeed, the clusters of press characteristics that the present theory seeks to recognize are patterns of behavior; however, motives are viewed as surrogates and equivalents of

action. Thus the motive types proposed here are winnowing devices to separate out meaningful subjectivized action from the chaff of unconscious, objectivized action.

As Weber reiterated, ideal types are constructions and do not represent reality. Whereas specific behaviors can be typed with some degree of confidence as motivated by survival, ideas, or instrument, the notion that any nation, by virtue of its behavior can serve as a pure example of an ideal type is an illusion.

National vocabularies of motives, though articulated primarily by power and economic interests, are promulgated and interpreted by the press. Mass media are guardians of the predominant national motive and apologists for alternative motives--thus justifying acts and attitudes to domestic and foreign challengers--real and apparent. The success and longevity of motives are measured by the duration of problematic situations and by public receptivity, assuming situations are sufficiently sustained and intrusive to elicit feedback.

The Survival Motive Vocabulary. The presence of an external threat--real or apparent--is the situational stimulus for national behavior that is justified by survival motive vocabularies. The threat to national security or survival may be economic or military or both. Challenge to survivalist behavior is frequently issued by foreign powers or international organizations; or it may take the form of "world opinion," reported in the international media. More commonly, however, survivalist actions must be defended at home, for the most direct and unavoidable challenges and the most persistent doubts arise from the effects of survival strategies on domestic policy and programs.

The main tenet of the government's survival vocabulary intended to satisfy domestic critics is that collective and cohesive action is essential to insure the continued existence of the nation. Government, as chief coordinating body, is characterized by high visibility and low accountability--an efficient strategy that facilitates swift decisive action, but also arouses suspicion and opposition if sustained over a significant period of time or if ineffective in achieving the collective goals. When survival vocabularies dominate, threats to the rulers, government, or nation are seldom differentiated from threats to the citizenry and national institutions.

Countries throughout the world are imperiled by chronic economic backwardness and entrenched poverty. Developing nations tend to attribute their precarious economic situations to the colonial legacy, foreign exploitation, and unfair international monetary and trade practices. This is particularly the pattern in emerging nations of the southern hemisphere with histories of colonial domination, such as Iraq, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Haiti.

Such reasoning finds support in Peter Worsley's analysis of the economic problems confronting many impoverished former colonies. A dependency theorist, he traces underdevelopment in former colonial nations to capitalist economic tyranny and usurpation of resources. In The Three Worlds, he writes:

[Third World] underdevelopment, today, is not a natural condition, but an unnatural one, a social state which is the product of history; not a passive condition, but the consequence of conscious action; not something that just happened, governed by the logic of an impersonal system, but something that was done to people by other people (1984: 3).

Because motives are social constructions meant to influence the



actions of other people, they arise in response to social challenges, rather than from threats situated in the natural environment--earthquakes, floods, crop failures, and, formerly, pestilence--which do not respond to human reasoning. Since economic vulnerability often attracts military intervention from neighboring states, impoverished nations are frequently twice-afflicted.

But even the most prosperous nations respond quickly and decisively to threats to their national security, and survival usually emerges immediately as the primary motive in time of war. Instrumental and ideational behaviors subsequently become subordinate to the expediency of survival. However, survivalist goals are limited in scope and focus, and struggling governments expend little energy or attention monitoring activity that falls outside the realm of strategic concerns. Though cohesion is vital to survival, social control is limited to prohibiting and restraining negative activities that weaken or subvert survival efforts.

Functionalists and other social analysts using organistic metaphors tend to see the survival motive as the first or underlying motive of all nations. However, nations and nationalism are creations of the Modern Age; and national identities and loyalties are social constructions, not the product of biological drives. The proliferation of newly-created countries following divestment by imperialist powers following World War II, the break-up of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union illustrate just how tenuous national survival is and how subject national loyalty is to redefinition.

Many newly-created governments must struggle not only with self-perpetuating economic problems exacerbated by poor infrastructures,

poor agricultural production, illiteracy, and inadequate health and educational programs, but also with ethnic and tribal unrest. While leaders seek to build national identity and strive for social cohesion as bulwarks of survival, ancient cultural identities and allegiances play havoc with the "nation-building" strategies of national leaders.

Interestingly, survival motives prove to be ineffective in quieting dissent and putting down domestic insurrection, since the opposing side has no interest in preserving the nation under the incumbent regime--or perhaps under any circumstance. Rather, ideational motives in support of a belief or cause are used by both sides in internal conflicts to win adherents to their positions. The absolutist nature of belief systems justifies stronger social controls and demands more commitment than survival vocabularies.

Though history does not abound with examples of peoples or nations that willfully submit to extinction, the 900-day German siege of Leningrad in World War II, like the two-year siege of the Masada garrison by the Roman legion in AD 70, indicate that ideational motives sometimes supplant survival motives in selling problematic courses of action. (In much the same way, Durkheim's altruistic suicides choose values over survival at the individual level and the Jonestown sect opted for group suicide over anticipated dispersal in 1978.) In addition, the growth of transnational companies in recent years suggests that national identity is not always a predominant value and that instrumental motives may be used to validate alternative loyalties.

More frequently, when instrumental or ideational motives predominate over the survival motive it is because nations do not perceive threat as imminent. Not all countries have their existence challenged to the same

degree or with equal consistency at all times. Consequently some nations may have the luxury of making either of the other two motives predominant much of the time.

The Ideational Motive Vocabulary. Values, in the sense that the term is used to describe the ideal type, are an extension of German idealism and the Weberian notion of ideational as opposed to economic determinants of behavior. The most basic tenet of this ideal motive type is that all behavior and all truth is oriented by a pervasive idea or belief system. Ideational motives rationalize and justify behavior undertaken for its own sake in light of these values, independent of the apparent logic of survival considerations and material attainment, or the chance of success. Because of their transcendent and absolutist presumptions, idea-dominated nations tend to be viewed as fanatic and irrational by nations which do not share the belief system. Idea-dominated nations perceive alien ideas and influences as heretical and potentially evil.

Weber wrote that "value rational action always involves 'commands' or 'demands' which, in the actors' opinions are binding." Thus, in idea-dominated nations, a unified idea system constitutes the basis for all social and personal actions and relations. Ironically, from this perspective, economic or instrumental considerations are relegated to what Karl Marx identified as the "superstructure."

Weber associated values most closely with religious belief and, indeed, fundamentalist Islam, Catholicism, and other religions with evangelical aspirations are met with challenges that elicit elaborate vocabularies of motive. In the 20th century, other nationally-seated

ideas that have required international justification are Marxism-Leninism, Zionism, the quest for a Palestinian homeland, apartheid, fascism, and Irish home-rule. Challenge is the catalyst and condition of motive formulation and only value systems that elicit challenge acquire the strength of motive.

Idea-dominated nations allow and encourage activity that strengthens strict adherence to the value system, prohibit activity that would erode or corrupt it, and correct detached, uncommitted behavior. The concepts of relativism and pluralism are rejected. Even compatible or neutral values are viewed with suspicion because they dilute the force of the "idea." Even more than in survival-motivated nations, collective and cohesive action is essential and individualism is viewed as irrational and immoral. In the Soviet Union, communist derision of individualism was expressed in the old peasant proverb: "In a field of wheat, only the head that is empty of grain stands above the rest." Social control extends not only to prohibiting negative activity, but to imposing positive courses of action. Total authority is given to the judgment of those entrusted to guard, interpret, and enforce the belief system. Moral leaders prevail over political leaders or may preside over both ideational and political affairs.

Clearly, ideational motives do not predominate in all countries, though all nations espouse ideational vocabularies. The more pervasive a belief system is in terms of the demands it makes on its adherents' social and personal behavior, the more influence it exerts on national policy and goals, and the closer that nation comes to the ideal type.

In deference to the idea of "national sovereignty," instrumentally-oriented nations are not likely to challenge other

nations' belief systems as long as they do not interfere with instrumental activity or threaten national security. For instance, the U.S. government might be expected to question the morality of incorporating unpaid prison laborers into the national workforce of the Peoples Republic of China. Certainly slave labor is at odds with the American belief system. However, no challenge is issued because other situational exigencies assume priority, such as the anticipated instrumental consequences of interrupted trade with China. In contrast, during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the moral value of "human rights" assumed priority over instrumental behavior, as when the decision was made to prohibit the sale of American grain to the U.S.S.R. as a protest to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. This motive shift did not succeed on the American homefront and was abandoned by the Reagan administration. In contrast, rationales for restricting less-lucrative economic intercourse with South Africa, in response to racist policies, have been widely accepted by the majority of the world community, based on the belief that the human rights of the black majority are being violated.

Historians view the medieval period in Western Europe as dominated by a single idea--the Christian religion. Francis Fukuyama argues that the demise of communism signals the advent of a single world idea--democracy (1992). Wallerstein gives universal status to the economic idea of capitalism (1976, 1979). All of these single-idea interpretations deny the impact of differently situated societies. If ideas become truly universal, they are not challenged, at which point they lose their motivation and potency.

Thus, in the dynamic theory, unlike other world press typologies,

Marxism or Soviet Communism does not constitute an ideal type, though the U.S.S.R. was an ideationally-dominated nation throughout most of its history. The assumption here is that it is not the specific content of a pervasive idea that produces its effects, but the accompanying behavior it rationalizes and justifies--conformity, social cohesion, social control, and intolerance for other ideas and motives,--that is, absolutism.

The Instrumental Motive Vocabulary. Nations that are not required to focus their primary activity on survival, that have achieved a level of economic sufficiency that transcends subsistence, and whose energies are not concentrated on strengthening a non-economic idea system, orient their primary activity to the attainment of wealth and material goods. Although instrumental activity may be advanced via other approaches, the "invisible hand" economic strategies of laissez-faire capitalism characterizes the ideal type. The ideal type is most closely exemplified by motive vocabularies embraced by the United States, and to a lesser extent, by Western Europe.

Instrumental activity is justified by selective adoption of Enlightenment philosophies and, more specifically, utilitarian and pragmatic rationales which hold that behavior and beliefs are morally correct when they maximize pleasure and minimize pain for the greatest number of people. Mills, in his explanation of situated actions and motives wrote, "The 'profits motive' of classical economics may be treated as an ideal-typical vocabulary of motives for delimited economic situations and behaviors" (1940: 908). He then noted that "noneconomic behavior and motives" are modifications added to advanced monopolistic

and regulated capitalism.

Unlike the ideal types of survival and idea motives, the instrumental ideal type places great emphasis on the individual and sanctifies individualism in the motive vocabulary. In Wealth of Nations, the Scottish economic philosopher Adam Smith wrote,

[The individual] intends only his own gain ... he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is not part of his intention .... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it (1776: 423).

Andrew Skinner, in the introduction to a recent edition of Wealth of Nations, notes that critics of capitalism charge that Smith's arguments "lend a certain sanctity to the self-interested pursuit of gain, by showing that such activity was productive of benefit to society at large (1985: 11). Regarded as a philosophical empiricist, Smith's major work may be regarded as a constructed vocabulary of motives justifying the unfettered commercial activity he saw developing in Western Europe and "our North American colonies" during the latter half of the 18th century. Innovation and efficiency are seen as central to instrumental vitality and are promoted by actions and ideologies articulated in a motive vocabulary that justifies weak government, a strong work ethic, differential reward, and competition. Ideal-typical instrumentalists regard government with mistrust and the motive vocabulary rationalizes action aimed at restraining and decentralizing centralized authority.

A unique characteristic of the instrumental ideal type is its accommodation of conflicting ideational motives that run counter to the predominant motive. Religious tolerance is one example. Christianity and Asian religions, despite some interpretations to the contrary

(Bellah, 1957; Morishima, 1982; Weber, 1905/1906) encompass many anti-materialist, collectivist values that are at odds with instrumental orientations.

At the present time in the United States racial tolerance and sexual equality are moral ideas coexisting uneasily with the Spencerian notion of "survival-of-the-fittest"--an instrumentalist rationalization for competition. Ideas opposing racism, sexism, homophobia, agism, ablism, and most other politically-correct but economically-irrational causes of the late 1980s and early 1990s require constant reiteration and justification; whereas, the non-economic ideas of motherhood and apple pie are less subject to challenge and do not acquire motive status. Pluralism of opinion and acceptance of divergent beliefs are viewed as consistent with instrumental orientations because diversity of ideas breeds innovation and effects "self-righting" market principles. Also, relativism--the belief that all truth is relative to the individual and to the time or place in which he or she acts--fragments the power of any single idea. In an instrumentally-motivated society, non-economic ideas tend to make themselves marketable by accommodating or absorbing elements of instrumental vocabularies.

The primary focus of instrumentalism, the accumulation of wealth, is an ongoing displacement and redistribution activity whose vitality is dependent upon unequal concentrations of capital. Counter-instrumental activity, when deemed necessary to correct for widening economic and social inequity, is rationalized by the adoption of non-economic ideas. These ideas, such as egalitarianism and minority rights, have manifested a stronger impact on the conduct of instrumental activity in the social democracies of Western Europe than in the United States. Examples of



value-based economic activity include efforts to redistribute income and lessen class polarity by instituting negative-taxation policies for lower income groups, establishing welfare programs to benefit needy people, and subsidizing public transportation. Western and Northern European social democracies may be differentiated from communist countries because material attainment, not social and material equality, is the primary rationalization for public ownership and subsidization of many enterprises.

Adam Smith appears to have been cognizant of the force of morals in harnessing the excesses of self-interest. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, which preceded Wealth of Nations by five years, Smith acknowledged the essential selfishness of humans, but proposed,

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it (1771).

Instrumentally-motivated nations cannot sustain an overarching and intrusive belief system, such as Marxist-Leninism or fundamentalist Islam, because of the incompatibility of pluralism and absolutism. Also competition and differential reward are not compatible with overarching ideas dependent upon social conformity and centralized enforcement.

Another form of instrumentalist activity that falls farther from the ideal type is pursued in Japan and other newly prosperous nations of the Pacific Rim, such as Taiwan and South Korea. Though oriented toward the attainment of wealth and material goods, these nations' economic activities are not premised on individual self-interest, but rather upon coordinated collective interests. The nation is the competitor, not the individual entrepreneur or enterprise. This divergence from the ideal

instrumental type has resulted in part from the pervasiveness of ideational motives enshrined in indigenous religions that place value on social cohesion, ethnic and racial solidarity, and central authority. The geographical vulnerability of these island nations also diminishes the utility of individualism and increases the perception of need for centralized authority and concerted action--justified by survival motive vocabularies. Emerging as economic powers in the 1980s, a period of unprecedented global trade, the coordinated strategies are seen as more effective for competing in international markets than competitive domestic strategies that promote efficiency and innovation.

When an instrumentalist nation's security is imminently threatened, the primary motive can be rapidly supplanted by survival motives, and if the reorientation is sustained over a sufficient period of time, instrumental rationales are replaced with values of social cohesion and collective loyalty, "big" government, and strong central leadership.

### The Third Premise

Nations and their press systems, forced to act and respond to constantly evolving situations, exist in a state of perpetual flux. Technological advances in communication and transportation have greatly accelerated international interaction and increased the volatility of national situations and the dynamism of motivated action. And motive realignments and adjustments, "remedial work," to use Irving Goffman's micro-level term, are facilitated within shorter and shorter time spans. This motility did not always exist to the extent it does today. The acceleration of events is compounded by global interconnectedness, and is said by some to signal a revolutionary rescaling of human affairs to new

concepts of time and space, a transition identified as the post-modern age by Anthony Giddens (1990) and the information age by Marshall McLuhan. More than 25 years ago, McLuhan wrote,

We have had to shift our stress of attention from action to reaction. We must now know in advance the consequences of any policy or action, since the results are experienced without delay. Because of electric speed, we can no longer wait and see. George Washington once remarked, "We haven't heard from Benj. Franklin in Paris this year. We should write him a letter" (1967: 63).

Rationalized response to real and perceived challenges on domestic and international fronts is an ongoing process, and selection of the most efficacious motive to justify situated action is never certain. As Mills pointed out, shifts in motive are commonplace occurrences and should be no more suspect than original motives given to justify the same action, since they may strengthen the act and win new allies for it (1940: 907). Adoption of different primary motives and redefinitions of prevailing ones are necessary accompaniments to gradual and radical social change.

### The Triangle of Motives

To illustrate these theoretical premises and their interaction, a visual model is proposed. It consists of a triangle of primary motives, whose three defining points represent survival, ideational, and instrumental ideal motive types. The larger, yet more descriptive motive zones are more useful than the ideal-type points in locating and describing observed press behavior. (See Figure 1 below.)

National structures, including the press, may be conceived of as moving along and within the perimeter of the triangle, usually, though not always, in tandem. In unstable nations or in unstable times, press, government, and society tend to be out of sync. Although the triangle

may be useful in conceptualizing political, economic, and social change, in the present work its application is confined to press systems.




Figure 1. The Motive Triangle

The model is offered with some reluctance, because of concern that it may be applied too mechanistically in press analysis. It is intended to serve merely as a conceptual device and not as a scheme for numerically appraising press performance, attitudes, or goals. Its heuristic value, if taken too literally, may be as limited as the arrow-punctuated diagrams proposed by communication scholars in the 1950s, previously cited. Certainly it is no more receptive to quantification and exactitude than Hegel's and Marx's "dialectic" or Korzybski's "ladder of abstraction." Interpretation is acknowledged to be a key component and a major strength of phenomenologically-based methodology; interpretation is likewise viewed as inherent in all

empirical research.

The motive triangle provides an analytical framework that takes into account the constant fluidity and frequent ambiguity of press policy and behavior. Although press systems are identified in terms of their predominant activity, specific national behavior never correlates perfectly with ideal types because action is predicated on varying and conflicting situation, priorities, and cultural repertoires of responses, corresponding to the voluntaristic options exercised in all human behavior. The behavioral range of isolated press activity (e.g., U.S. coverage of "Desert Storm" in January 1991; anti-drug advertising campaigns in Columbia in 1991) might be confined to one or two sides of the motive triangle that originate from the point of prevailing motive. On the whole, it is expected that the smaller and more specific the unit of analysis, whether in terms of time span, subject category, or media organization, the smaller the area of press activity would be. Thus a motive-triangle summary of NATO countries' press behavior would no doubt occupy more area on the motive triangle than a single member country's press, for broader analysis encompassing extended periods of time reveal that press behavior is tugged in all three directions simultaneously.

Figure 2, shown on the following page, is offered as illustration of how the model may be used to indicate press activity of countries A, B, and C, (or media organizations A, B, and C,) in a comparative study within a specified time span. In Figure 3, longitudinal study findings are shown, summarizing the characteristics of a single national press system over a 40-year time span. The subscript notation system presented perhaps facetiously by Wendell Johnson in People in Quandaries (1946), has utility in designating observed changes in press behavior.




Figure 2. Press Activity of Countries A, B, and C--1985-1990




Figure 3. Press Activity of Country X 1945, 1965, and 1985

While it is theoretically and geometrically possible to ascertain the precise point within the motive triangle where a press system might lie by quantifying and weighting observed press characteristics, such

procedures are beyond the scope or intention of this qualitatively-based construct. For the focus of the dynamic theory is on discerning press behavior exhibited by nations in a multiplicity of contexts and situations. This hermeneutical perspective in no way denies the influences of political, economic, and social philosophies posited as primary determinants in existing world press theory, but it reduces the relevance of their origin in a rapidly-changing world of unprecedented situational fluidity. Using Japan as illustration of an instrumentally-motivated nation, attempts to understand the Japanese media in the 1990s by fixating on Enlightenment ideas of Smith and Locke is to enter a time warp, further skewed by Occidentism. By the same token, concentration on the cultural groundings, such as indigenous religions, offers only interesting speculation on why the Japanese media function as they do. More relevant are actions triggered and rationalized by American occupation following World War II. And even more meaningful are actions taken in response to favorable world market conditions beginning in the 1970s. The suspicion is that before "why" can be answered, if, indeed, it needs to be, "how" must be addressed first. Finally, the lack of logic in classifying Japan as a Western nation for the sake of tidy philosophy-based typologies need not be argued.

The motive triangle is intended to serve as a frame for identifying observed press behavior in relation to ideal typical behavior. In the next section, ideal-type behavioral characteristics are described and briefly illustrated.

Ideal-Type Characteristics of  
Motivated Press Behavior

Survival-Motivated Press Characteristics

National Motive and the Press. The primary activity of survivalist press systems is to encourage and support leaders' efforts to prevail against military and economic threats to the nation. The mass media play a central role in identifying and reifying the perceived threat, strengthening national identity, unifying public opinion, and integrating action of all social sectors. The media provide high, positive visibility for the government and are viewed as partners and agents of authority.

Dramatic examples of sudden shifts to survival from instrumental vocabularies and behaviors in the 1980s are illustrated by U.S. press activity in recent short-lived military activities in the Persian Gulf, Panama, and Grenada, as well as Britain's Falkland Island crisis. Situations of longer duration, such as the Soviet Union's battle against invading Fascist forces in World War II and England's ongoing conflict with Irish separatists, result in the justification of survivalist press strategies that supercedes or compromises ideational and instrumentalist rationales for press behavior that might normally prevail.

News. News is information, either domestic or foreign in origin, that does not undermine the survival or strength of the nation. A proclivity toward positive presentation of national activities and events is characteristic of the survival press; however, news and information unrelated to national survival appeals to a broad range of national tastes, interests, and needs. Objectivity in the reporting of events



associated with national survival issues is irrelevant at best and may be counterproductive or even disastrous. Timeliness itself is not a virtue, though the timing of news may be manipulated to strengthen the impression of government infallibility.

Education and Morality. Media content places disproportionate emphasis on educating the public with the goal of strengthening national cohesion and development of the survival agenda.

Advertising, Financing and Ownership. The media may be owned by the state, individuals, or political parties. The distinction is not important because it has little impact on press activity due to the ubiquity of the national agenda and the effectiveness of self-censorship based on the assumption of cohesive action. When the threat to survival is economic, lack of resources severely limits private ownership and inhibits press diversity and effectiveness even when media are government- or party-owned and have access to public funds. Advertising is encouraged, though scarcity of goods and the absence of a consumption-oriented middle class limits its financial impact.

Entertainment and Art. Domestic and foreign entertainment are not perceived as threatening, unless the content itself is perceived as undermining national security. Though vociferous spokesmen, such as Mustafa Masmoudi of Tunisia (1978), inveigh against the "cultural imperialism" of foreign (predominantly Western) television programs, feature films, and tour companies, imported entertainment is facilitated by the state. A 1975 UNESCO study, reported by Jeremy Tunstall in The Media Are American, showed that of the seven African countries surveyed,

including Masmoudi's Tunisia, American feature films accounted for 26 percent of all officially-imported films, and that U.S., Western European, and other developed countries' films together comprised 83 percent of imported films. Similar percentages describe imported television programs. The pattern is duplicated to a greater and lesser extent throughout Latin America and South Asia (Tunstall, 1977: 280-281). As L. John Martin and Angu Chaudhary observe, "As Third World nations move toward more developed status, their reliance on imports decline. The irony here is that the poorer a country is, the more dependent it is on foreign imports for entertainment" (1983: 223).<sup>5</sup> However, economic conditions do not dictate reliance on foreign entertainment in ideationally-motivated nations, as the next section makes clear.

Local and Small Media. Survival-motivated nations view their primary threat as external and the government encourages internal communication in order to unify the country and promote cohesion. Rural and local networks are generally encouraged to utilize available technologies, such as newspapers, broadcast media, newsletters, public address systems, criers, and even more primitive instruments, such as drums, to assist in horizontal communication of information and education.

Foreign Journalists and Outgoing Media Fare. The government exerts strict control over entry and access of foreign journalists and is empowered to order expulsion, detainment, and imprisonment of personnel on the grounds of national security/survival. Strenuous effort is expended to manage outgoing news and to shape the reporting of internal events for international audiences. These activities are justified on

the basis of minimizing national vulnerability.

Foreign Media Fare and the Domestic Audience. Incoming news receives less rigorous scrutiny, though foreign media that pointedly address domestic concerns may have pages excised, issues pulled, etc. Offensive wire copy from international news agencies is heavily edited for style and content. Nevertheless, financially-strapped survivalist nations turn to foreign news services for international news, even of adjoining countries. The most common sources are usually Western services, primarily the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France Presse, as well as international broadcast services and, increasingly, commercial television networks and video services.

#### Idea-Motivated Press Characteristics

National Motive and the Press. The press, as messenger and "transmission belt" of the idea, enjoys a sanctified position among social institutions and is highly developed and well financed; for the media are entrusted with promulgating, interpreting, and maintaining the belief system, while simultaneously building unanimity and exposing deviation. The press is an integral part of the belief system and plays a quasi-official role in advancing the idea and its accompanying vocabulary of motives.

Existing press typologies have identified the Soviet Communist or Marxist press type and many characteristics associated with that designation are observed in the idea-motivated ideal type. Media behavior of the People's Republic of China, Cuba, and North Korea in early 1991 are primarily justified by ideational vocabularies based on

Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism. The fundamentalist state of Iran is another example of an idea-dominated nation and its media embody that orientation.

In South Africa, international and domestic challenge to apartheid elevated that sociopolitical policy to motive status, necessitating a strengthening of the motive vocabulary in the mid-1980s intended to turn aside objection at home and abroad. South Africa's government, between 1986 and 1989, increasingly pursued lines of action that included extreme measures to enlist the mass media, particularly the privately-owned press, in service to the idea of segregation of the races and the supremacy of the white race. Failure of the print media, South African citizens, and the world community to accept the rationales of apartheid motive vocabulary led to the defeat of the idea's proponents and the apparent phasing out of the idea beginning in the early 1990s.

News. In ideational systems, news is regarded as information that explains, interprets, strengthens, and illustrates the correctness of the idea. It also includes selective reporting of events that show the wrongness and ill-consequences of other beliefs. A marked tendency to orient all information to serve ideational ends is observed. The practice of highlighting "good" news and underplaying or omitting the reporting of "bad news" further characterizes the ideational press. Assuming that two-sided (or multi-sided) messages subvert the idea, ideational presses reject the notion of objectivity. Timeliness is not a priority and is superceded by an emphasis on interpretive caution and accuracy. As a consequence, media reports are delayed while they undergo scrutiny by ideational authorities. Interpretation rather than facticity

characterizes media content. With the exception of spiritual leaders, individual achievements and activities receive scant attention, since focus on individuals is seen as subverting the idea.

Education and Morality. Disproportionate emphasis is placed on educating and enlightening the masses. Even information that pertains to daily life and appears to be irrelevant to the belief system is presented as instruction that offers the audience an opportunity to demonstrate compliance and cooperation.

Advertising, Financing, and Ownership. Because all other beliefs are perceived as endangering and weakening the idea system, the mass media are owned or funded, and under total state management. The mission of the media is viewed as too important to be subject to the vagaries of the market. Display and classified advertising serve an instrumental purpose by making the audience aware of how goods and services may be obtained, but it is not a significant source of media income. All foreign advertising is prohibited, except that which originates in countries sharing the value system. Control is centralized and multi-layered, but the main force at work is the ingrained self-censorship of media professionals.

Entertainment and Art. All forms of entertainment and art are viewed as possible and likely vehicles for purveying heretical ideas. Foreign entertainment is prohibited, unless it originates in a nation sharing the belief system. Exceptions are selected works that are sympathetic to the national idea or that reveal the error of competing ideas. The 1975 UNESCO study reported by Tunstall revealed that almost

50 percent of foreign feature films imported by seven Eastern European countries came from other communist countries; U.S. films comprised a carefully-selected 10 percent of imported films; Western European films comprised 25 percent.

Local and Small Media. Local media activity is suspect and is carefully orchestrated by and patterned after central media. Small media are prohibited or closely controlled. Access to photocopying, fax machines, public address systems, and even telephones may be licensed and otherwise restricted.

Foreign Journalists and Outgoing Media Fare. Strict control is exercised over foreign journalists and authorities have the power to order expulsion, detainment, and imprisonment of foreign personnel whose reports endanger or belittle the idea system. Strenuous effort is expended to manage and manipulate outgoing news. The ideational press is central in disseminating the idea system and its motive vocabularies to foreign audiences via well-financed international broadcasts, wire services, newspapers, and magazines. John Merrill reports that Iran broadcasts readings from the Koran and other religious discussions in 13 languages to Europe, the Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, and parts of the United States (Merrill, 1991: 139).

Foreign Media Fare and the Domestic Audience. Incoming news from foreign sources is greatly suspect and rarely appears in the domestic media. Those foreign items that are made available for domestic consumption are selected because they portray other beliefs in a negative light, indicate instances of foreign solidarity with the cause, and/or

otherwise lend support to the national idea. Sophisticated and expensive technologies are used to jam shortwave signals from international broadcasting organizations, such as Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Company, Deutsche Welle, Radio Havana, and Radio Peking.

Two Manifestations of Ideational Press Behavior. Two special instances of ideational press activity merit additional discussion. These are revolutionary presses and advertising/public relations activity.

The revolutionary press concept, identified by Hachten (1987: 27-30), represents a counterforce to prevailing national motive. However, revolutionary movements do not set as their goal the destruction of the nation or the worsening of its economic situation, but rather its amelioration and strengthening. Therefore, survival vocabularies advanced by incumbents are ineffective in responding to the challenge of revolutionary ideas. Domestic opposition, reaching its apex in civil war, is combatted using highly affective ideational motives.

Because of a revolutionary press's fixation on propagating an "idea," its own behavioral characteristics are those of an ideational type. "By its very nature, the Revolutionary concept is a short-term affair," Hachten writes. ".... Once goals are achieved, the gains must be consolidated, and then another concept takes over (1988: 30). As the present author observed in a study of the Soviet weekly newspaper, Moscow News, "all revolutionary presses ... are processual, on their way to becoming something else" (Schillinger, 1991: 147). Certain parallels can be recognized between the Weberian concept of charismatic leadership and the revolutionary press, because both represent transitional phases

between more enduring ideal types. A successful revolution brings about institutionalization (routinization) of a media system aligned with national motives.

The dynamic theory also recognizes more limited revolutionary ideas whose aims challenge prevailing motive vocabularies, but fall short of rooting out existing political/economic structures and replacing them with new ones. Any iconoclastic idea that utilizes the media to challenge existing vocabularies of motive can be viewed as revolutionary. A revolutionary press goes underground, however, only when it meets with official prohibition and becomes "outlawed." The fact that it is socially or culturally repugnant may account for its lack of success or adaption, but it takes government intervention to drive a revolutionary press underground.

Government response to a revolutionary press that threatens the prevailing national motive is usually swift and accompanied by vigorous reiteration of the prevailing motive vocabulary "to convince others" of the irrationality of questioning ongoing activity. Risk inherent in government-outlawed press behavior increases group cohesion, centralization, control, and intolerance for competing ideas. Among prime historical examples are the press activity of the highly factional pre-Revolutionary press in Russia, 1880-1917; the equally impassioned and intolerant anti-Tory political pamphleteering preceding the American Revolution; and the underground press in Nazi-occupied France during World War II. The samizdat (self-publishing) press in the Soviet Union, utilized most effectively by Jewish dissidents in the 1960s and 1970s, was targeted largely to an external audience.

The single-mindedness and cohesion of revolutionary media frequently



offset restrictions imposed by limited financial resources, namely primitive technologies. Though targeted at "mass" audiences, revolutionary media often fall within the purview of "small media," characterized by dependence upon personal interaction. "Print" media is frequently handwritten or machine-produced in limited quantities to be passed from hand to hand. In recent decades photocopying, inexpensive offset printing processes, and telefax machines have expanded the reach of small print media. Audio and video cassettes and mobile broadcasting equipment have likewise multiplied domestic and transborder audiences.

Underground revolutionary media activity usually occurs in nations in which idea motives predominate. In survival and instrumentally-ordered systems, the "revolutionary idea" is perceived by authorities as threatening only when its content specifically targets survival or instrumental motive vocabularies; whereas, in idea-oriented nations, any such idea is perceived as a threat that must be eradicated. Thus, the "revolutionary idea" of homosexual rights is likely to be officially tolerated in survival and instrumentalist systems; whereas it is likely to be driven underground in ideational systems. Whereas media promoting the idea of transnational tribal loyalty are viewed as revolutionary and threatening to survival-motivated nations, the U.S. ethnic press, with financial and cultural ties to foreign countries, presents no threat to instrumental assumptions in the United States. During World War II, when survival motives prevailed in the United States, little tolerance was extended to ethnic Japanese and German publications.

The so-called underground press that operated in the United States in the 1960s was not truly underground, for it was not actively opposed

or banned by authority. Opposition to the Viet Nam War did not imperil the national instrumental vocabulary of motives. Likewise, censorship of materials that attacked the government in power and even the political structure did not occur, because tentative efforts to suspend the prevailing motive vocabulary against free expression could not be rationalized by the public. In contrast, rebellious activity that targetted U.S. businesses and property was not tolerated. In Africa and Asia, the economic benefits of colonial policies had become sufficiently ambiguous to imperial powers in the post-World War II years that British authorities tolerated revolutionary nationalist, anti-colonial press activity to a surprising degree.

The instrumentalists' tolerance for diverse ideas and actions, essential for economic dynamism, tends to make underground activity unnecessary. The media provide a forum for the airing of revolutionary ideas that do not seriously imperil instrumentalist tenets. The impact of revolutionary media in a pluralistic media environment is diffused, and revolutionary movements are more likely to die out because of sociocultural disaffection and lack of risk-inspired cohesion, rather than because of official opposition. Revolutionary ideas that repudiate secondary and tertiary motives frequently run up against public opinion and social censure that can rival the force of government prohibition.

Advertising and public relations activities likewise are ideationally motivated, though these activities ultimately and collectively promote instrumentalist values, such as competition and consumerism. Neither the advertising account executive nor the public relations speech writer is advocating pluralistic views, objectivity, or the "self-righting" principle--enshrined in instrumentalist press

ideology. Rather, the goal of advertising professionals is to implant and support as effectively as possible one idea--the product or service of his/her client--to the exclusion of competing products or services. Consequently the day-to-day activity and ideology of advertising and public relations professionals is at odds with that motivating journalists. One memorable example is NBC newsman Tom Brokaw's refusal to sully his reputation for accuracy and objectivity by advertising "dog food" on the Today Show.

Yet textbook writers and industry spokesmen feel compelled to fit advertising and public relations into a procrustean bed of journalistic motives that practitioners disdain and adopt only at their own financial peril. The disparity in motives between print and broadcast journalists on one hand and advertising and public relations practitioners on the other accounts for the rivalry and distrust commonly observed between these contradictory yet interdependent professions (Altschull, 1988; Gans, 1979; Hiebert et al., 1979; O'Mara, 1989; Ryan and Martinson, 1988).

#### Instrumentally-Motivated Press Characteristics

National Motive and the Press. The press is a competitor in the economic market and seeks to maximize profit by appealing to large audiences. Like other businesses, the media seek to limit government authority. In addition, the press is legally entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring government decisions and policy and with exposing malfeasance and poor judgment. "The public's right to know" is the centerpiece of instrumental press motivation, a rationale that has proved to be more efficacious is gaining societal acceptance than "the

press's right to sell information."

News. In instrumentally-dominated press systems, news is any timely information, domestic or international in focus that can be marketed profitably to the public. Unusual and exceptional events, including "bad" news, are disproportionately represented in media content because of their common appeal and saleability. Primary among newsworthy items is information that assists those engaged in market activities operate more effectively--even though such persons may comprise a small percentage of the audience. News is also any information that tracks the activity of government or government leaders.

Objectivity, multi-sided coverage, and an emphasis on facts over interpretation are rationalized as "good," in the utilitarian/pragmatic sense, because they are least likely to alienate significant segments of the audience. Likewise, timeliness, accuracy, simplicity and clarity of style, and attention to graphics and illustrations are stressed because these strategies succeed in attracting audiences in a field of media competitors.

Education and Morality. Moralizing and overt instruction are avoided, as they are seen as having little audience appeal and violate the motive of relativism. Materials that tend to specify correct courses of action are confined to signed columns and editorials, and are thus identified as "opinion". Opinion pieces are the primary vehicle for reiteration of the instrumental vocabulary motives, but the motive vocabulary is also reinforced in the selection of news and in the ordering of information in these accounts. Thus the instrumental vocabulary of motives infiltrates all media fare, but does not depend on

instructive devices for its diffusion.

Advertising, Financing, and Ownership. Media are owned by private individuals, domestic or foreign chains, and conglomerates. Government controls over media monopolies are minimal. The vast majority of mainstream media revenues are provided by advertising. Advertising rates are determined by audience size, based on ratings and circulation. Thus the content of media fare is influenced by the public and by advertisers, as well as by media professionals and owners. Government influence on programming is minimal, though self-censorship and entrepreneurial self-interest tend to keep media content in line with audience and government expectation.

Entertainment and Art. All media forms from domestic and foreign sources alike are viewed as products to be sold. Thus selection of entertainment by media organizations is based on predicted marketability and profitability. As such, mainstream media tend to target entertainment at the masses, resulting in an appeal to the lowest common denominator, a "cultural" manifestation of the "tyranny of the majority."

Local and small Media. No attempt is made to control or limit local or small media activity. The availability of comparatively sophisticated technologies in most of today's instrumentally-oriented countries encourages a broad spectrum of specialized small-media efforts, particularly in print.

Foreign Journalists and Outgoing Media Fare. In instrumentally-oriented nations, foreign journalists and their work do not receive any special treatment or attention. When survival motives

take precedence over instrumental vocabularies, government immediately assumes greater authority and visibility and foreign journalists may be deported, detained, or imprisoned.

Foreign Media Fare and the Domestic Audience. Incoming news and information from foreign sources does not undergo special scrutiny. The media downplay international coverage when they believe it holds little interest for the public and emphasize it when it is perceived to have a wide market and to be profitable.

#### Control of the Press

In examining the characteristics of survival-, idea-, and instrument-dominated press systems, no special category was set aside for noting the means by which governments exercise control over the press--prior restraint, censorship, fines, law suits, imprisonment, expulsion, etc. Note is taken of the fact that ideational press systems are more subject to control than survivalist systems, and that an ideal-typical instrumental system exercises no form of press control.

It is the general assumption of the dynamic theory that it is national situation that determines national action and the degree of government intrusion into press operation. The assumption is that government action is determined primarily by situations. Any government, when forced to act in response to a given situation, will invoke the appropriate motive vocabulary and exercise whatever measures that vocabulary justifies to bring press behavior into line. When dealing with the domestic press, coercion is usually unnecessary, since the press too is caught in the same situation and aligns itself with the new motive

vocabulary. It is in seeking to control the foreign press that more severe measures must be applied.

Thus to speak of free-press nations versus controlled-press nations is to confuse nations with situations. To paraphrase Mills, the propensity of a government to control the press is not a fixed element in the government or the nation; but a rationalized response to a perceived situation. The attribution to a nation of qualities of forbearance or brutality toward the press is exacerbated and its faulty conclusions reified when situations remain largely unchanged for several decades, as occurred during the extended period of the Cold War. In the case summaries that follow, the premises and tenets of the dynamic theory illustrate how situated actions, occurring at specific points in time, determine government and press behavior.

## Endnotes

1. Among other works which have utilized the concept of motive and motive vocabularies in efforts to integrate interactionism, social organizations and "extended temporality" are: Robert Faulkner's study of the film industry (1983), Norman Denzin's portrait of the liquor industry (1977), and Farberman's analysis of the automobile industry (1975). For further interpretation see Peter M. Hall's "Interactionism and the study of social organization (1987) and Randall Stokes and John Hewitt's "Aligning Actions" (1976).

2. The Freedom of Information Act, passed by Congress in 1966 and subsequently liberalized, broadens access to government information, but exempts the president and his immediate advisers, Congress, its committees, and agencies under its direct control, such as the Library of Congress and the General Accounting Office, and the federal judicial system. Seven additional exemptions include among them "trade secrets and commercial or financial," "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes," "geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells" (Holsinger, 1991: 351-371).

The Supreme Court has supported the government's right to censor books and articles even when no breach of national security is involved. Contractual agreements between the CIA, FBI, and some other government agencies and employees prohibit publication of agency-related materials, even after employees have left the agency. The Supreme Court generally has supported the government position on these contracts in opinions handed down in *United States v. Marchetti*, 1972; *Alfred A. Knopf v. Colby*, 1975; and *Snepp v. United States*, 1980 (Holsinger, 1991: 74-76).

3. Altschull's "Seven Laws of Journalism" are:

1. In all press systems, the news media are agents of those who exercise political and economic power. Newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting outlets thus are not independent actors, although they have the potential to exercise independent power.
2. The content of the news media always reflects the interests of those who finance the press.
3. All press systems are based on belief in free expression, although free expression is defined in different ways.
4. All press systems endorse the doctrine of social responsibility, proclaim that they serve the needs and interests of the people, and state their willingness to provide access to the people.
5. In each of the three press models [that Altschull proposes: Market, Marxist, and Advancing], the press of the other models is perceived to be deviant.
6. Schools of journalism transmit ideologies and value systems of the society in which they exist and inevitably assist those in power to maintain their control of the news media.
7. Press practices always differ from theory.



4. The term culture, as employed here, is static and non-problematic, corresponding to the notion of non-motivated, unconscious acts. The concept is defined by Stokes and Hewitt as follows: "Culture thus consists of recognized and preferred ways of thinking, feeling and acting that can be designated by and acted toward by those who are participants in a given culture. Conceived in this way, it must be stressed, culture is a set of objects: ideas, knowledge, beliefs, ways of acting, roles, institutions, norms, activities--all may be designated and acted towards as objects" (1975: 843).

5. The debate over "cultural imperialism," a central theme in the New World Information Order controversy, is largely one based on principle rather than real concern that Third World peoples are being flooded with Western films, videos, and print media. In Ghana, a relatively media-rich developing nation, three television sets per 1,000 population and 164 radio receivers per 1,000 were reported in 1982. Per capita newsprint consumption was 1.5 pounds. (Kurian, Vol. I, 1982: 389). Indonesians had 5.1 television sets and 47 radio receivers per 1,000 and newsprint consumption was less than one pound per capita (Kurian, Vol. I, 1982: 495). Other sources indicate that motion picture theatres are few and far between outside urban areas. By way of extreme comparison, the United States was reported to have 988 television sets per 1,000 and 2,200 radio receivers per 1,000 in 1982 (Kurian, Vol II, 1982: 945).

## CHAPTER V

### CASE SUMMARIES OF INSTRUMENTALLY-ORIENTED PRESS SYSTEMS--THE UNITED STATES 1776-1992 AND BRITAIN 1979-1990

#### Introduction

The instrumentally-oriented press systems of the United States and Britain were selected for analysis because their comparison illustrates the dynamic theory's capacity to discern significant differences between similar systems that more static theoretical approaches do not distinguish. By concentrating on situated actions revealed through articulated motives rather than on historical bonds and contemporary political associations, a certain theoretical detachment can be achieved that precludes or, at least, reduces international bias and stereotyping.

The decision to place the instrumental case studies before the examples of survival and ideational systems, which follow in Chapters VI and VII, was based on the fact that the inherent pluralism of the instrumental orientation provides meaningful insights into these ideal types as well. Also, it is assumed that American readers will gain greater understanding of the dynamic theory if it is first demonstrated by examples with which they are likely to have some familiarity. The fuller treatment given to the U.S. and British systems is a consequence of the theory's grounding in phenomenology and motive theory. Because

understanding of national press activity is derived primarily from motives articulated by working media professionals, audiences, and policy makers in the countries under study, ready access to American and British accounts enriches and lengthens these analyses. The less detailed treatment of the survival-dominated media systems of Singapore and Nigeria and the ideationally-motivated press behaviors of Iran and the former Soviet Union are limited by the scope of these illustrative studies, rather than by the capacity of the dynamic theory.

### The United States

#### National Situation and Motive

Jamestown, the first permanent British settlement in North America was founded in 1607--just two years before the world's first printed newspaper came off the press in Germany and 150 years after Johan Gutenberg's invention gave birth to the Modern Age. Though the first short-lived newspaper in the American colonies did not appear until 1680, the new world would serve as a laboratory for the development and testing of French and English Enlightenment ideas, combining them with the revolutionary concept of mass communication.

Throughout most of its national history, the press of the United States has subscribed to an instrumental vocabulary of motives and today comes closest in its behavior and rationales to the instrumental ideal type. While fluctuation and change are observed in the course of American press history and for some periods and in some contexts ideational and survival characteristics rival and even surpass instrumental characteristics, in no other nation has press activity been so consistently rationalized by a single prevailing motive type for such

an extended period of time.

Because of its constancy of motive, continually reiterated and adjusted, a wide-angle approach has been applied to analysis of the U.S. media, beginning with underlying situations, that is with contextual and historical conditions that are still relevant to today's instrumental press. To illustrate oscillations and aligning actions, event-specific situations are noted and elaborated in more detail.

The great paradox of the American media is found in the frequent conflict between two major Enlightenment concepts--free enterprise and free expression. This dichotomy, as well as a motive for balanced and objective reporting, is addressed by Benjamin Franklin in a 1731 essay, "Apology for Printers," appearing in his Pennsylvania Gazette:

Printers are educated in the Belief, that when Men differ in Opinion, both Sides ought equally to have the Advantage of being heard by the Publick; and that when Truth and Error have fair Play, the former is always an overmatch for the latter: Hence they chearfully serve all contending Writers that pay them well [emphasis added], without regarding on which side they are of the Question in Dispute .... That hence arises the peculiar unhappiness of that Business, which other Callings are no way liable to; they who follow Printing being scarce able to do any thing in their way of getting Living, which shall not probably given offence to some, and perhaps to many ... (1731).

Attempts to make the two concepts consistent if not identical have been a preoccupation of media practitioners, publishers, and theorists ever since. The identification of the American and other industrial nation's press systems as "free presses" rather than "capitalist presses" is an indication of the tendency of most analysts to place emphasis on Milton's "self-righting principle" over Smith's "laissez faire" beliefs.

#### Instrumental Characteristics

In contrast, it is the premise of this analysis that the U.S. media

since about 1830 have been primarily motivated by an instrumental, market-oriented vocabulary, and that the ideational tenet of press freedom and the public's right to know have been co-opted to win adherents to the instrumental vocabulary. Similarly, democratic press values have been aligned to accommodate instrumental actions. According to C. Wright Mills, "The 'Real Attitude to Motive' [in this case, the instrumental orientation] is not something different in kind from the verbalization or the 'opinion.' They turn out to be only relatively and temporally different" (1940: 908). More simply, most of the time profit motives and free-press ideas are compatible; when the two orientations collide, instrumental motives tend to prevail over ideational ones. The triumphs of free-press ideas over instrumentalism are discussed along with other non-instrumental values in the next section, in which the ideational characteristics of the U.S. press are examined.

The First Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1791 along with nine other amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, is viewed as the cornerstone of U.S. press activity. Press rights are listed among other natural rights in the First Amendment, which reads:

Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or of the right of the public peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.<sup>1</sup>

The ambiguity of that spare negatively-worded statement has encouraged endless scrutiny, and one interpretation suggests that the authors may have intended to reserve the privilege of press oversight for state and local governments. The Bill of Rights was an addendum to the original Constitution, created to win ratification by state legislatures fearful that the federal government might usurp state authority. James Madison

recorded in his diary that when it was proposed at the original Constitutional Convention that the new document might address the issue of press freedom, the delegates voted unanimously against it (Koch, 1966: 630).

The Constitutional Convention took place behind locked doors and great pains were taken to keep the press at bay. Coming across a carelessly discarded copy of agenda proposals, George Washington reportedly chastised the delegates, saying, "I must entreat gentlemen to be more careful, lest our transactions get into the newspapers and disturb public repose by premature speculations" (Clines, 1985). The notion of an independent press is likewise absent in the Federalist Papers, a series of partisan writings by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, arguing for ratification of the Constitution.

A strongly ideational press played a decisive role in arousing anti-British sentiment during the decades leading up to the American Revolution and fueled popular support for the colonial cause during the dark days of the war itself. For the first 50 years following independence, national press activity was rationalized by both ideational and instrumental motives. Altschull argues convincingly that the founding fathers anticipated that the press of the fledgling nation would serve primarily as a vehicle for their political ideas.

The ideas expressed in the newspapers [of their day] were, not surprisingly, the ideas of the social and cultural elite. If the publications were read by the masses, then, it was assumed the masses would be influenced by the ideas and political principles supported by the press. In this way, the press was seen as an instrument of social control, an agency for the improvement and benefit of society (Altschull, 1984: 30).

In the closing years of the 18th century, the Federalist Congress found the country's sovereignty threatened by the refusal of France to

recognize America's right to the seas. The Sedition Act was one of four laws passed by Congress and signed into law by President John Adams in 1797 to restrict the activities of resident aliens and quell opposition from the minority Republican party. The Sedition Act made seditious libel a criminal offense and imposed fines and imprisonment on those convicted of "writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States, or the President of the United States, or either house of Congress of the United States ...." (Folkerts and Teeter, 1989: 112). Though the law was allowed to expire in 1801, prosecutions continued as late as 1803. In that year, President Thomas Jefferson, tormented by the Federalist political press wrote:

So abandoned are the tory [Federalist] press that ... even the least informed of the people have learnt that nothing in a newspaper is to be believed. This is a dangerous state of things, and the press ought to be restored to its credibility if possible. The restraints provided by the laws of the states are sufficient for this to be applied. And I have therefore long thought that a few prosecutions of the most prominent offenders would have a wholesome effect in restoring the integrity of the presses<sup>2</sup> (Altschull, 1984: 28-29).

Excised from national memory and the motive vocabulary is the ambivalence towards an independent press exhibited by the country's founders. Rather, emphasis is placed upon the Enlightenment ideas of Hume, Locke, Rousseau, Smith, and their American disciples, codified for the first time in the U.S. Constitution. Free of England's authoritarian rule and largely unfettered by tradition, social hierarchy, economic strictures, and legal constraints,<sup>3</sup> the country set out to test the basic tenets of the Modern Age. These included glorification of the individual over the collective, rationality over metaphysics, relativism over absolutism, and pragmatism over idealism. All of these

"innovations" were seen as consistent with and essential to the development of Adam Smith's laissez faire capitalism and John Locke's "great chief end" of men, "the preservation of their property" (Locke, 1690: 184).

Another situation that worked in concert with these ideas and influenced the activity of the new nation and its press was geographical isolation, which allowed American institutions to establish themselves with minimal foreign interference and with infrequent need for centralized authority to coordinate military efforts against foreign foes. The immense size of the nation, rapidly expanding to fulfill its "manifest destiny," and a constant influx of immigrants further diminished dependence upon and respect for a strong centralized government. At the same time, attention was concentrated upon local issues and upon the local press as a means of coordinating community activity and establishing community identity. Alexis de Tocqueville attributed the robustness of the local press in America to the decentralized nature of administrative power.

The extraordinary subdivision of administrative power has much more to do with the enormous number of American newspapers than the great political freedom of the country and the absolute liberty of the press .... [W]ithin the great national association lesser associations have been established by law and every village, for the purposes of local administration. The laws of the country thus compel every American to co-operate every day of his life with some of his fellow citizens for a common purpose, and each one of them requires a newspaper to inform him what all the others are doing (1835b: 121).

Progressive historian Jackson Turner's Frontier Thesis, advanced as an explanation of the American characters, suggests other geographically-determined responses. These national qualities--inventiveness, efficiency, strength, straight-forwardness,



pragmatism, energy, and willingness to take risks--are elevated to virtues in the instrumental motive vocabulary (Turner, 1894).

The American vocabulary of motives establishes inexorable ties between press profits and press freedom. Advertising notices appeared in American newspapers from the earliest times and by 1800, 20 of the 24 dailies bore the word Advertiser in their name plates (Folkerts and Teeter, 1988: 93). However, until the 1830s, American newspapers were partisan political vehicles, targeted at the prosperous commercial elite and financed by subscriptions and party subsidies.

The turnabout came with the "penny press." It was only the emergence of a literate and financially solvent urban middle class that enabled Ben Day's innovative New York Sun, sold on streetcorners for a penny, to prosper on the basis of advertising revenues, rather than on reader subscriptions. In the first issue, dated September 3, 1833, Day announced:

The object of this paper is to lay before the public, at a price, within the means of every one, ALL THE NEWS OF THE DAY, and at the same time afford an advantageous medium for advertising. The sheet will be enlarged as soon as the increase of advertisements requires it--the price remaining the same (Day, 1833: 1).

The success of Day's experiment attracted scores of imitators. Within a decade, large-circulation metropolitan dailies had proliferated and were competing against each other in major cities. Almost immediately the motive vocabulary was restructured to accommodate the change. Democratization of the press became a key concept and aggressiveness and reportorial "hustle," skills already valued in commerce, acquired heightened status. As financial statements clearly showed, high circulation and high advertising rates and revenues waxed

and waned in tandem.

By mid-century, publisher Samuel Goodrich could note that books and newspapers "are now diffused even among the country towns, so as to be in the hands of all, young and old ... " (1857, Vol. 2: 284). Just as an unregulated economic market was seen to result in the production of high-quality goods and services and the winnowing out of the unfit, so, it was reasoned, the desire to maximize profits would result in the most satisfactory and consumer-oriented media content. The press fell under the jurisdiction of the law of supply and demand.

Appealing to the "lowest common denominator," as press critics charged, newspaper sensationalism reached its apogee in the circulation wars between Joseph Pulitzer's New York World and William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal at the end of the 19th century. The function of the American mainstream press was not only to inform and persuade, but perhaps, above all, to entertain. The excesses of "yellow journalism," so called because of "The Yellow Kid" comic strip that ran in the World, are usually credited with fomenting the Spanish-American War and even prompting the assassination of President William McKinley--linked by the press and the public to inflammatory words against the president appearing in the Journal. Newspaper historian Frank Luther Mott characterized "yellow journalism" as the sensationalized coverage of crime, scandal, sex, disaster, and sports--featuring lurid headlines, an abundance of photographs, stunts, faked stories, Sunday supplements, comic strips, and crusades on behalf of the lower classes (Hiebert, Ungurait, and Bohn, 1979: 223). While the more controversial characteristics of the yellow journalism era were abandoned by the mainstream press, others have been adopted and have become standard fare.

Supermarket and New York tabloids and, more recently, television news and talk-show exposes continue the yellow journalism tradition under the updated buzzword "infotainment."

In a 1961 speech to television broadcasters, Newton Minow, then chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, referred to television's mass-oriented content as a "vast wasteland," in which one might see

a procession of game shows, violence, audience-participation shows, formula comedies about totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, western badmen, western good men, private eyes, gangsters, more violence and cartoons .... And most of all boredom" (Whelton, 1982: 465).

A similar conclusion is drawn by Bill McKibben in a tongue-in-cheek review of one 24-hour period in 1990 of nearly 2,000 hours of programming taped from Fairfax, Virginia's, cable system. "We believe that we live in 'the age of information,'" McKibben writes. However, he continues,

While in a certain sense this is the case, in many important ways just the opposite is true. We also live at a moment of deep ignorance, when vital knowledge that human beings have always possessed about who we are and where we live seems beyond our reach; we live in an age of missing information (1992: 41).

The intellectual accessibility and mass appeal of American television and film entertainment, determined by the U.S. market, transcends national culture and borders. Exports comprise more than 50 percent of the total annual revenue for most American motion pictures (Hiebert et al., 1979: 273). The attraction and affordability of taped and satellite-transmitted television programs have prompted the establishment of quotas limiting American media fare by the European Economic Community, Canada, and other countries.

The U.S. press labels its penchant for disasters, problems,

political upheavals, and negative news in general "the journalism of exception," or "crisis news." The social benefit is rationalized in the instrumental vocabulary as informing the public of situations in need of correction, that is "the public's right to know." The motive was articulated by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who observed, "It is the mark of a democracy that its press is filled with bad news. When one comes to a country where the press is filled with good news, one can be pretty sure that the jails are filled with good men" (1971).

As transportation and mass production created national markets for goods, the media responded by restructuring their content to appeal to a potential national readership. The magazine industry, in particular, felt compelled to expand its target audience and thus expanded itself, beginning in the late 19th century. Likewise, with the advent of radio and television, national brand sponsors encouraged nationwide networking and diminished the profitability of independent local stations. Only newspapers have remained largely local in focus, though the high cost of modern print technology has reduced competition and choice in that arena too. With the exception of the Wallstreet Journal, which targets the economic elite, the United States was without a national newspaper until 1982, when Gannett founded USA Today, now the nation's second largest-circulation paper.

The growth of national audiences and the accompanying increase in diversity of views exacerbated the dilemma identified by Franklin in his "Apology,"--that is how to "buy and sell with Jews, Turks, Hereticks and Infidels of all sorts, and get Money by every one of them, without giving Offense to the most orthodox, ... or suffering the least Censure or Ill will .... (1731). While the solution proposed by Franklin, drawn from

Milton, was the balanced presentation of opposing views, a more contemporary and more distinctly American approach was the objective presentation of news. The stress was to be on facts, not on opinion--the assumption being that facts are facts, objective, and undebatable, whereas opinion is merely one man's interpretation.

The supposed amoral nature of facts is in keeping with the instrumental endorsement of the dissemination of information as a legitimate activity and its rejection of education as subversive and manipulative. The motive thus justifies media concentration on information, a saleable commodity, as opposed to education, which has more limited market appeal. It should be noted that the distinction is indiscernable to those who do not share the instrumental orientation.

Editorials and opinion columns, which do contain opinion and a certain amount of lecturing or preaching, are spatially separated or otherwise set off from objective facts as an alert to the audience to be on guard. The American Society of Newspaper Editors declares in its Statement of Purpose that "[s]ound practice ... demands a clear distinction for the reader between news reports and opinion. Articles that contain opinion or personal interpretation should be clearly identified" (1973). "Commentary and analysis should be clearly identified as such," the National Association of Broadcasters states in its Television Code (1978).

American media's obsession with facts is rationalized and grounded in the ideas of skeptics Hume and Voltaire, who believed that truth lies in the search for clear, empirical evidence, rather than in the interpretations of persons involved. Max Weber, in a comparative study of French, English, German, and American newspapers, attributed the

American obsession with facticity to the belief in democracy, noting,

For the American ... wants nothing but facts from his paper. Whatever opinions are published in the press about these facts he regards as not worth reading; as a democrat he is convinced that, in principle, he can interpret as well as the newspaper writer, perhaps even better (1904: 439).

However, in his well-known social study of the American newsroom, Warren Breed traces the emphasis on news and facts to more pragmatic inducements:

[Newsmen] are not rewarded for analyzing the social structure, but for getting news. It would seem that this instrumental orientation diminishes their moral potential (1955: 328).

Inseparable from the notion of facts is the persistent idea that facts represent objective reality. University of Missouri journalism Professor Theodore Glasser bemoans "the journalist's naively empirical view of the world, a belief in the separation of facts and values, a belief in the existence of a reality--the reality of empirical facts ... their belief that news is 'out there ....'" (1984: 16). In its "Code of Ethics" adopted in 1973, the Society of Professional Journalists includes the following among its declarations of standards: "Objectivity in reporting the news is another goal, which serves as the mark of an experienced professional. It is a standard of performance toward which we strive. We honor those who achieve it" (Society of Professional Journalists, 1973).

In 1977 a federal appellate court for the first time explicitly recognized objective reporting--"neutral reportage"--as a standard of journalism meriting First Amendment protection. Handing down its opinion in favor of the New York Times' right to report erroneous and libelous statements made by officers of the National Audubon Society, the court ruled,

[W]hen a responsible, prominent organization like the National Audubon Society makes serious charges against a public figure, the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their validity (Edwards v. National Audubon Society, 1977).

Despite the fact that since the 1950s the morality as well as the possibility of objectivity and objective facticity have been subject to growing challenge, "value-free" reporting remains an important ingredient in the newswriting formula, along with the "inverted pyramid" structure and the who-what-where-when-why-how lead.

Historically, the very concept of American formulaic newswriting came about as an accommodation to the cost of telegraphy and the competing wire-services' emphasis on speed and efficiency. Objective facts can be formulated and transmitted more rapidly than subjective analyses and opinion. Glasser argues that objectively-reported news is "biased in favor of the status quo; it is inherently conservative to the extent that it encourages reporters to rely on what sociologist Alvin Gouldner so appropriately describes as the 'managers of the status quo'--the prominent and elite" (1984: 14). Glasser concludes,

[O]bjectivity is largely a matter of efficiency--efficiency that serves, as far as I can tell, only the needs and interests of the owners of the press, not the needs and interests of talented writers and certainly not the needs and interests of the larger society (1984: 16).

The social role of advertising--ignoring that of creating profits--has been enunciated and adopted into the instrumental vocabulary. An article appearing in Advertising Age in the 1970s listed six social contributions of advertising: selling the consumer, creating new markets, lowering costs to consumers, spurring product improvement, forcing competition, and encouraging scientific research (Hiebert,

Ungurait, and Bohn, 1979: 418-419).

The emergence of chain ownership began in the last decade of the 19th century and hit its stride in the early 1920s. The number of daily newspapers peaked in 1909, with 2,600 newspapers and declined thereafter, as the less competitive died or were bought up by chains and conglomerates (Folkerts and Teeter, 1988: 340). Competition from news magazines, radio, and television also contributed to the shrinking number of dailies, which numbered 1,611 in 1990 (Editor & Publisher, 1991). Weekly newspapers showed a similar decline. In 1900, 13 chains owned 62 dailies; by 1930, 55 chains owned 311 dailies, comprising almost 43 percent of all daily circulation. Today, 167 chains own 1,047 daily newspapers, accounting for 71 percent of circulation (World Almanac, 1991: 312-313).

The paradox of a commercialized press viewing itself as independent of commercial influence has not gone unchallenged--or undefended. When a reader in 1836 protested the qualities of a Dr. Brandeth's tonic, advertised in James Gordon Bennett's New York Herald, the feisty editor responded,

Send us more advertisements than Dr. Brandeth does--give us higher prices--we'll cut Dr. Brandeth dead--or at least curtail his space. Business is business--money is money ... we permit no blockhead to interfere with our business (Altschull, 1984: 63).

Another early advocate of advertising support for the media, the New York Morning Courier, expressed the view that " ... commercial patronage is best, safest and most unstraying of any, and less affected by prejudice, whim, or petulance than any others" (Altschull, 1984: 62).

With the exception of investigative magazine reports exposing the greed and exploitation of big business during the short-lived Muckraking



Age, 1900-1915, the relationship between business and the press can be viewed as a fairly cozy one, though business does not always share this perception (Dreier, 1983; Hoge, 1984; Smith, 1985). Altschull maintains that "those voices being heard in the business community about a bias in the press against business are off the mark. The bias is against anything that is neither conflictual nor heart-warming" (Altschull, 1972: 5).

Though the public periodically indicates concern about the commercial bent of the media, the severest critics have been journalists themselves, most notably Will Irwin, A.J. Liebling, Harold Ickes, Lincoln Steffans, and George Seldes. The latter claimed in 1980 that great press lords were "in bed with business in almost all respects and are using their papers mainly to advance the commercial and political interests of themselves and their cronies" (Dennis and Bertrand, 1980). Perhaps the harshest judge was Upton Sinclair, who compared the press to a prostitute serving big business in his book, The Brass Check, a muckraking attack on the media which he had intended to subtitle, "A Study of the Whore of Journalism" (1920).

Just as government intervention is viewed as a threat to free enterprise in the United States, it is also viewed as the major threat to American media independence. The adversary or watchdog role of the media is one which successfully encompasses the Enlightenment democratic idea of the press as the "bulwark" of freedom against oppressive government and at the same time justifies surveillance and limitation of centralized authority on the domestic front.

The coining of the term "fourth estate" generally is credited to the English philosopher and statesman, Edmund Burke. Of him Thomas Carlyle

wrote, "Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important by far than they all" (1841: 164). The concept of a tab-keeping press is articulated most forcefully in the writings of Locke, Jefferson, Madison, and Mill. In 1974 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart went so far as to argue that a primary purpose of the First Amendment was to "create a fourth institution outside the government as an additional check on the three official branches" (Altschull, 1990: 121).

The intensity of press vigilance tends to be cyclical, tempered by public opinion seemingly as sensitive to the excesses of media power as to the excesses of political power. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the U.S. press increasingly has taken upon itself the task of ferreting out corruption in government and malfeasance in office. These efforts reached their zenith in recent decades with the Washington Post's unraveling of the Watergate mysteries and the consequent resignation of President Richard Nixon. The proliferation of ethics codes in the 1970s was an attempt by media organizations to check improprieties or the appearance of improprieties and assuage public concern over unbridled press power.

Other significant instances of press oversight of government were the New York Sun's "turn the rascals out" campaign against the administration of President Ulysses Grant; the New York Times's role in exposing the Tweed ring that bilked New York City out of some \$30 million in the 1870s; Edward R. Murrow's famous rebuke of Senator Joseph McCarthy on CBS-TV's "See It Now," in the spring of 1954; and freelance journalist Seymour Hersh's revelation of the My Lai massacre by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War.

The instrumental motive vocabulary reinforces the separation of press and state. In the "Conflict of Interest" section of the Washington Post's "Standards and Ethics," reporters and editors are pledged to

avoid active involvement in causes of any kind--politics, community affairs, social action, demonstrations--that could compromise, or seem to compromise, our ability to report and edit with fairness (Washington Post, 1977).

Perhaps no American journalist can surpass Washington Post executive editor Len Downie's commitment to the code of detached observer. Downie is not registered to vote and does not take part in any election on any governmental level--fearing that partisanship would jeopardize his objectivity on public issues (Downie, 1989).

Sociologist Daniel Bell has linked the "bad news syndrome" of the U.S. media to the adversarial relationship between press and government and journalists' proclivity to brood on "themes of despair, anomie, and alienation" (1976: 40-41). Vice President Spiro Agnew's memorable 1969 characterization of newsmen as "nattering nabobs of negativism" found unexpected resonance among the public, to the consternation of media practitioners.

A more positive spin has been placed on investigative journalism by the press itself. "Informed skepticism" is the byword and as Max Frankel of the New York Times explained in 1971, "We practice this skepticism not in the spirit of persecution or prosecution, but from a sense of wishing to serve our readers with reports of what is really going on"--again, by reporting the facts (1971: 18). Informed skepticism is expressed in the Washington Post's professed belief that "[t]he claim of national interest by a federal official does not automatically equate with the national interest. The claim of community interest by a local official does not

automatically equate with the community interest (Washington Post, 1977: 299).

While a growing number of media critics and scholars question the separation of press and government and, in fact, see complicity in their actions (Altschull, 1984: 193-201; Bethell, 1977; Moynihan, 1971), public resentment against the media seemingly focuses on press arrogance and on excessive antagonism against government. Michael Novak in his article, "Why the Workingman Hates the Media," writes,

What people resent is the new economic power of the media, the myth-making which erects great new realities. They also resent the arrogance that tells people every day: "We're smarter, better-informed, more critical, more skeptical than you" (1975: 110).

The instrumental vocabulary of motives constantly reiterates the "bulwark-of-liberty" defense to quiet its challengers. Because scholarly observations on the chummy relations between government and the media are not perceived or shared by the public, little effort has been expended to construct a rationale to explain the close personal and social relationships that commonly exist between journalists and public officials.

Traditionally, American media have abdicated a substantial portion of their fourth-estate privilege and responsibility in the international sphere--that is the oversight of the federal government's conduct of foreign policy, international relations, and wars against foreign enemies. One reason for this is the economic burden of providing on-the-ground coverage overseas. Until recent technological developments in communication and transportation lowered the cost of international reporting, a skeletal national press corps actually kept tabs on government activity abroad. In many parts of the developing world, U.S.

State Department emissaries continue to be the primary source of news and information for the American media. Lieblin, in one of his regular columns on the "Wayward Press," a critical series that ran in the New Yorker magazine between 1944 and 1963, noted the irreconcilability of international news gathering and profitable media operations:

The function of the press in society is to inform, but its role is to make money. The monopoly publisher's reactions, on being told that he ought to spend money on reporting distant events, is therefore exactly that of the proprietor of a large, fat cow, who is told that he ought to enter her in a horse race (1961: 7).

Perhaps an even more important determinant of performance abroad is the idea that the cause of America and democracy must not be jeopardized by over-zealous reporting or overly critical commentary. The instrumental motive cannot be extended to include the abrogation of the watchdog role in the international arena. In the next two sections, analysis focuses on the impact of ideational and survival motive vocabularies as they are employed to justify international news coverage and other activities of the American media which cannot be accounted for by the instrumental motive vocabulary.

### Ideational Characteristics

The idea of a free and democratic press, rooted in Enlightenment political and social philosophy, is emotionally embraced by the American media and their practitioners. The "informed skepticism" that informs journalistic efforts in other arenas rarely surfaces in the examination of the central mission of the press. The heartfelt attachment to the tradition of press freedom largely precludes the detachment so highly valued in the treatment of other subjects. Few American journalists

would take issue with the opinion handed down by U.S. District Judge Murray Gurfein upholding the New York Time's right to publish the "Pentagon Papers:"

A cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom of expression and the right of the people to know (Shapiro, 1972: 9?).

As previously noted, most of the ideas associated with Enlightenment thinking are consistent with the instrumental orientation and have been coopted to strengthen the latter. When disparity occurs, instrumental action is likely to supercede the canons of democracy, including the public's right to know. This "right" is a widely-held but only sketchily documented concept that occasionally justifies deviation from instrumentally-oriented action. An example is the practice of network television to interrupt sponsored programming to offer extended pro bono coverage of unscheduled national events of social or political importance, such as the Challenger disaster or the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings.

The public's right to know is cited by journalists to justify almost all of their doings, whether it be revealing the sexual indiscretions of presidential candidates, shielding a source involved in criminal activity, providing instructions for the construction of a hydrogen bomb, revealing the financial indiscretions of Congressmen, or appealing to the public's appetite for sexually-provocative photographs. The American public, however, has not bought into this centerpiece of free-press value with the same gusto as the media themselves. Many object to what they see as press manipulation of the electoral process by excessive coverage of candidates' personal lives and premature release and interpretation of

election returns. Others were offended by the media's gavel-to-gavel coverage of the seamy Senate Judiciary committee hearings involving Judge Clarence Thomas and Professor Anita Hill, closely followed by the Florida rape trial of a young Kennedy cousin a few weeks later.

Altschull cites several newsmen and media analysts who scoff at the notion of the public's right to know as

something invented by journalists in the hope that they could badger the courts and the legislatures into guaranteeing the press access to confidential information (1990: 251).

Among the detractors is Kurt Luedtke, who told his journalistic colleagues in 1982:

The public knows what you choose to tell it, no more, no less. If the public did have a right to know, it would then have something to say about what it is you choose to call news (1982).

Inasmuch as the American public, the government, and many in the business sector are more concerned about "the public's right to not-know-too-much," the idea of the public's right to know is one that most media professionals constantly defend and rationalize. The passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1964, its subsequent liberalization, and numerous court decisions clarifying the right of journalists to pursue (as well as report news) have buttressed the idea from a legal standpoint, but have done little to remove ongoing public skepticism.

The First Amendment's guarantees of press freedom are of monumental historical significance and have been duly noted; however, less attention has been directed at what the First Amendment did not specify. It did not charge the press to be fair, unprejudiced, or balanced in its coverage; nor did it constrain the media to be truthful, accurate, thorough, or vigilant. Whether the Founding Fathers considered such standards to be

desirable or achievable is largely a matter of conjecture; however, the only mechanism for effecting press responsibility and ethical behavior was the "invisible hand" of a non-regulated profit-driven economic system.

Thousands of laws, regulations, and court decisions have been required to curb the excesses and malfunctioning of free enterprise--most notably, the tendency toward the unequal concentration of wealth and the ever-widening gap between the upper and lower economic classes. So too has a voluminous body of legislation been created to correct for the imperfections of democracy--most notably the tyranny of the majority and the alienation of large sectors of society from the body politic. Clearly, American society holds some moral values too dearly to trust them to the vagaries of the "invisible hand."

The doctrine of "social responsibility" is the primary value system through which the press has sought to correct for the malfunctions and imperfections of an instrumentally-motivated press. Though certainly notions of press ethics, morality, and social obligation were well in place long before the 1947 publication of the report of the Commission on Freedom of the Press, (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947), that slim document brought into sharp focus and, indeed, redefined the division between ideationally and instrumentally-motivated press activity.

The problem, as the Commission saw it, was that the freedom of the press was in danger,

in part the consequence of the economic structure of the press, in part the consequence of the industrial organization of modern society, and in part the result of the failure of the directors of the press to recognize the press needs of a modern nation and to estimate and accept the responsibilities which those needs impose upon them (1947: 2).

Headed by Robert M. Hutchins, the commissioners argued that popular



access to the media forum was decreasing at the same time the importance of the media was increasing; that press and the "few" who controlled it were not adequately serving the needs of society; and that many press practices were offensive to society. The Commission predicted that the public would find a way to regulate or control the media if these activities were to continue (1947: 1).

The Commission was the brainchild of Henry R. Luce, of Time, Inc., which provided the major portion of the funding for the three-year project. Robert M. Hutchins, then chancellor of the University of Chicago, and twelve other luminaries from various academic disciplines were selected because Luce believed "adequate criticism of an activity cannot come from within that activity" (Adams, 1947).

The Hutchins Commission challenged the press to offer the public five basic services: 1) a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; 2) a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism; 3) the projection of a representative picture of the constituent groups in society; 4) the presentation and clarification of the goals and values of society; and 5) full access to the day's intelligence (1947: 20-29). The media's response to the findings was lukewarm at best, in part because the heart of the report focused on press shortcomings, rather than on the Democratic administration's curtailment of press freedom during the New Deal and World War II.

Writers for Time, The Nation, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Star, the Detroit Free Press, and even venerated columnist Walter Lippmann took issue with the Commission's conclusions (Lyons, 1947). In an editorial, Luce's Fortune magazine labeled the report "an important,

balanced meaty difficult document." It continued.

The commissioners are philosophers and obviously not journalists, and achieved brevity at great cost to clarity. Statement after statement invites argument or challenge that might have been unnecessary had there been more elaboration ("Dangers to Press Freedom," 1947).

The challenge that Luce and his colleagues issued to the Hutchins Commission was in fact a counter-challenge, for at the heart of the new doctrine was the espousal of an ideational motive vocabulary that was in conflict with the prevailing instrumental orientation. David Rubin, chair of the Journalism Department at Columbia University, perceived the notion of press obligation as incompatible with press freedom, as he stated in a roundtable discussion in 1983:

Very rarely will you hear a publisher or an editor say, "We have a right in our publication to say whatever we want, even if it's wrong, even if it's basically opinionated; each of us has a right to print what we want" ... [Rather,] they say, "We have a right to noninterference by the government," but at the same time they also say, "We mean to be fair with you, to give a reasonable hearing to all major sides of the controversy." By saying both things at the same time, they water down that First Amendment freedom .... (Reed, 1983).

Altschull finds little value in the doctrine of social responsibility and argues that it operates as a mechanism of social control. He proposes that one of its primary values may be that "it enables the journalist to ignore the economic realities of his or her trade." Another, he adds, is that "it heads off the threat of government intervention, a threat of primary concern to the Hutchins Commission" (1984: 303).

Though the impact of the report itself appears to have been minimal, it proved prescient in its depiction of the direction the media would take in order to preserve their existing autonomy. The "requirements" or "ideal demands" that the public makes upon the press, as specified in the Commission report, suggest a framework for examining ideally-motivated

press activity in the United States.

"It is no longer enough to report the fact truthfully," the Commissioners wrote. "It is now necessary to report the truth about the fact" (1947: 22). The idea of providing context along with the facts was not a new one, though it had been stoutly opposed and continues to be resisted by those who link context to interpretation and indoctrination.

The growing successes of the American public relations industry since its inception in the early years of the century and the successful propaganda efforts of the Fascist war machine created rising doubts about the neutrality of facts and the achievability of objectivity. Senator Joseph McCarthy's rapid rise to prominence was subsequently attributed in part to the press's straightforward reporting of his unsubstantiated charges against people and agencies he claimed were controlled by Soviet Communists. An early master of press deadlines and time pressures, he released sensational charges shortly before wire-service deadlines. Refutations appeared in later issues if at all.

Though newspaper editorials railed against McCarthy's vendetta by a ratio of 10 to 1, it was the headlines and front-page "facts" that propelled the junior senator from Wisconsin into national prominence. And it took four years, six weeks of Senate hearings, and CBS's Edward R. Murrow to bring him down. Devoting his entire weekly "See It Now" program of March 9, 1954, to unmasking McCarthy, Murrow dealt a mortal wound to the aspirations of the Senator and breathed life into the idea of interpretive journalism.

McCarthy (questioning author/professor Reed Harris): You know the Civil Liberties Union has been listed as a front for the Communist Party?

Murrow: The Attorney General's List (visible in McCarthy's hand) does not and never has linked the A.C.L.U. as subversive. Nor does the F.B.I. or any other federal government agency.

As Folkerts and Teeter note, "Murrow here stepped far beyond the featureless objectivity that McCarthy had fed upon (1989: 492).

The Commission argued that "the great agencies of mass communication should regard themselves as common carriers of public discussion" (1947: 23). Issues of access, right of reply, and the provision of a forum for debate of current issues would appear to obtain equally to print and broadcast media; however, the print media have claimed First Amendment immunity against the imposition of such constraints and the courts have supported this interpretation. It is the broadcast media, and particularly television, which have been held responsible for offering a viable arena for the discussion of controversial issues.

Regulations and enforcement of broadcasting's responsibility to the public have been the charge of the Federal Communications Commission, made up of presidential appointees drawn from the media industry. Created in the early 1930s, the establishment of the F.C.C. was justified by the "scarcity principle," the idea that since broadcasting bands were finite, it was incumbent upon the federal government to see that the public interest was served by fairly allocating these bands through the granting and rescinding of licenses. Though the advent of cable television has made the scarcity principle obsolete, the F.C.C. remains, its authority rising and falling with successive administrations and changing regulatory climates. Broadcasters have long chafed under the clear implication that the First Amendment afforded them less protection from government meddling than afforded their colleagues in print. This resentment is voiced by Ithaca de Sola Pool in his book Technologies of Freedom. "The first

principle is that the First Amendment applies fully to all media," he wrote. "It applies to the function of communication, not just to the media that existed in the 18th century (1983: 246).

Ideational motives were used by Congress to justify the imposition of the Fairness Doctrine from 1979 to 1988 "to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views of issues of public importance," as stated in Article 315[a] of the Communications Act. Under threat of losing their licenses, broadcasters were required to provide coverage of controversial community issues and to offer reasonable opportunity for contrasting views. The rescinding of the Fairness Doctrine occurred during the general deregulation of the Reagan years and was based partially on the growth of cable channels. Earlier the F.C.C. had ruled that broadcast license holders could not even broadcast their own views on public issues, for fear of unduly influencing the public. In a similar but narrower vein, since 1927 radio and television networks and local stations have been required to extend equal opportunities and "reasonable time" on the airwaves to competing political candidates. Cable companies are also subject to must-carry programming regulations to serve the public interest.

In addition to the public's right to know and the provision of forums for discussion, the nurturing and protection of children provide ideational justification for prescribing broadcasting behavior, including grants to develop programming and limits on the airing of obscene materials and sexually oriented programming during prime-time hours. The 1967 Carnegie Commission on Public Broadcasting envisioned public television as a noncommercial forum, which would be, in the words of essayist E.B. White, "our Lyceum, our Chautauqua, our Minsky's, and our

Camelot. It should restate and clarify the social dilemma and the political pickle" (Aufderheide, 1991: 61).

The twelve white male commissioners were among the first quasi-official bodies to recognize and censure the perpetuation of radical and ethnic stereotypes in the media. Slurs against Negroes and Asians had appeared regularly in the mainstream press and entertainment media. The tyranny of an insensitive and unsympathetic white majority not only resulted in radically-prejudiced content, also dictated media fare that had little to offer non-whites. Oswald Villard, who was editor of the magazine The Nation between the world wars, said the newspaper "was unsurpassed [as] a teacher of race hatred [that left] no stone unturned to make clear its belief that there are two kinds of American citizens--the privileged and the disadvantaged--the whites and the blacks" (1923: 11-12).

While African-American and other ethnic newspapers and a handful of magazines and radio stations tried to serve the information needs of minority audiences, the mainstream media found little incentive to broaden or liberalize their content. The Civil Rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, accelerated by television coverage of black/white confrontations in the South, and the Women's Liberation movement, revitalized the ideas of equality and "equality of opportunity" for all Americans. Heightened identity among minorities and awakened consciousness among whites also resulted in financial incentives to broaden media content, particularly for magazine, urban-based newspaper, and motion pictures.

the 1968 report of the national Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, appointed by President Lyndon Johnson and headed by former Illinois governor Otto Kerner, charged the media with failure "to report

adequately on the causes and consequences of civil disorders and the underlying problems of race relations" (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968: 101). The Kerner Commission also recognized an underlying distrust of the white-controlled media by blacks and noted that only a dozen blacks were employed in television production positions and only one above the production level.

Starting in 1978, the F.C.C. gave priority to license applicants who were black, Asian, native American, Hispanic, or female. A law to the effect, subsequently passed by the Congress, was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1990 (Holsinger, 1991: 430-31). Despite legal reversals in the past decade, the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 resulted in several class action suits by women in the media and by 1982 almost a third of the journalistic work force was female, although blacks and hispanics made few gains. Nevertheless, the idea of equality significantly changed the content and policy of the mass media, reinforced by recognition of new markets comprised of previously overlooked minorities--particularly in the entertainment media.

Another "constituent group" that had lost out to the majority was the intellectual and cultural elite. "Highbrow" art, drama, and music did not attract a large enough audience to snare sponsors. In 1965 Congress created the National Endowment for the Arts, providing "aspects of the good life not taken care of by market forces" (Mattick, 1990: 348). In 1967 a law was passed authorizing the creation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Under its aegis National Public Radio was formed and the Public Broadcasting Service was established to link television stations nationwide. Federal, state, and local taxpayers contribute about 40 percent of PBS's billion-dollar-plus annual budget, and viewers and

corporations cover the remainder (Aufderheide, 1991). The federal subsidy in 1992 is a quarter of a billion dollars and proposed increases would bring the subsidy to \$1.1 billion for 1994-96 (Will, 1992).

A growing number of instrumentalist voices are challenging continued government funding of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Columnist George Will refers to public television as "an upper-middle-class entitlement" and claims that the government is unfairly subsidizing competition against private print and broadcasting enterprises. Will's primary objections center on the bottom line, that is the return on government's financial investment:

The original rationale for public television ... was that government had to subsidize such programming precisely because so few people wanted it .... [PBS] stations claim 5.2 million voluntary donors. If each would give another \$70 a year ... , they would raise the \$1.1 billion without requiring taxpayers to subsidize their entertainment (1992).

Laurence Jarvik of the Heritage Foundation can see no justification for government-subsidized media and dismisses public television as "a solution in search of a problem," arguing that it should be sold to private investors (Will, 1992).

A slightly different challenge is issued by David Horowitz, chairman of the Committee on Media Integrity, who charges that PBS has become politicized, coopted by liberal factions in the Democratic Congress and by leftist filmmakers, producers, and commentators. "In creating the new system in the late 60's, its architects attempted to square the circle of a government-funded institution that could be independent of political influence," he writes (1991: 26). Calling for objective reporting and balanced programming, Horowitz predicts a rocky future

so long as public television fails to live up to its statutory mandate by presenting a fair balance of views reflecting the



broad interests of the population that is being taxed to help support it (1991: 32).

Similar charges of politicization have been made against the National Endowment for the Arts, a program originally rationalized in political terms. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., adviser to President John Kennedy, spoke in favor of a government arts policy in the early 1960s, arguing, "We will win world understanding of our policy and purposes not through the forces of our arms or the army of our wealth but through the splendor of our ideals" (Mattick, 1990: 350). In recent years, debated has focused on the NEA's domestic impact, particularly subsidies on art depicting controversial homosexual, sadomasochistic and sacrilegious acts. From the instrumentalist perspective, unconventional art that cannot garner popular support in the market should not be artificially supported with government funds. The ideational response is that critics are seeking to control and limit the arts and, by extension, public taste. "The idea that there exists an aesthetic sphere untouched by social and political meaning is an ideological fiction ... ," Paul Mattick wrote in a 1990 article appearing in The Nation .

The problem is not that art has been politicized; the existence of state funding shows that the generally hidden political side of the arts has existed all along. The struggle over the N.E.A. is a struggle for control of this political side (Mattick, 1990: 357).

Society needed a greater amount of current information than required in earlier times, the Commissioners argued, in order to insure the preservation of government by consent. Cable-TV, first viewed as a way to enhance network signals in remote areas, mushroomed in the 70s and 80s and now reaches more than 53 million subscribers, nearly 58 percent of households with TV sets. The network's audience here comprises about

two-thirds of viewers at any one time (Broadcasting, 1990). Cable technology virtually insures community monopolies and heavy FCC and local government regulation is thus justified.

Some form of "must-carry" regulations that require cable companies to air "significantly viewed" local stations and Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-Span) have been in force during most of cable TV's existence, justified on the basis of serving the public interest. Cable systems are required to provide free public access channels in about 1,500 communities, encouraging innovative and unorthodox entertainment and opinion options. On the whole, regulations against sexually-oriented programming are less stringent for cable than for the national networks.

Fuller and more diverse coverage and interpretation of events is also provided by a number of newspapers, journals, and magazines targeted at small, specialized audiences. Although made more affordable by inexpensive computer and printing technologies, these publications are not intended to make a profit, but rather to promulgate ideas and opinions unlikely to receive prominence in the mainstream media. Like the American press of the 18th and early 19th centuries, these advocative publications, such as The Nation, The National Review, The Oklahoma Observer, and others of a more parochial or radical persuasion receive little or no advertising revenue and base their viability upon subscriptions and gifts from a core of committed supporters.

Although the Hutchins Commission report is largely a moribund document, better known today to media scholars than media practitioners, its reasoning informs an ideational motive vocabulary that justifies media behavior justified by social, ethical, and moral values which run contrary to the economic interests of media organizations. Detractors point out

that the imposition of these values, cherished as they may be, imposes constraints on the practice of a "free press;" whereas, advocates believe that adherence to ideas empowers a "free press" by liberating it from the influence of commercial sponsors and corporate owners. Juxtaposing the two motive vocabularies underscores the ambiguity of the concept of press freedom and suggests why its definition differs so radically from nation to nation, situation to situation, and from age to age.

### Survival Characteristics

In the United States, instrumental and ideational motives coexist under the shared rationale of the "public's right to know"; however, press behavior justified by the survival motive contradicts the basic tenet of the other vocabularies. As a consequence, it is subject to constant challenge from the media themselves and from aggrieved parties who lodge their complaints in the courts. Survival tactics include prior restraint on publishing and broadcasting, censorship and post-publication fines and prosecutions, news management by public officials and the military, the dissemination of false and misleading information, and the general cooptation of the media as organs of government.

The key concept of the survival motive is the emphasis given to "national security" over the "public's right to know." In the landmark case, *Schenck v. United States* (1919), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that First Amendment rights should be curtailed in situations in which unrestrained expression might constitute a "clear and present danger" to the nation or society. Writing for a unanimous court, Holmes compared Socialist Charles Schenck's distribution of leaflets urging resistance to the World War I draft to the hypothetical instance of

"falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Though subsequent interpretations have cited the Schenck decision as a precedent for establishing a high level of threat to justify state interference (Abrams v. United States, 1919; Gitlow v. People of the State of New York, 1925; Dennis v. United States; Yates v. United States, 1957), the ruling against Schenck underscored the preferred position of the government's obligation to "provide for the common defense" over the individual's right of free expression.

Those who challenge survival motives are most skeptical of the tendency of public officials at all governmental levels to link their own political survival to that of the areas under their jurisdiction. With the exception of the Civil War, the media and the courts have tended to reject survival reasoning when the perceived threat was domestic, rather than foreign in origin.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps best known is the Supreme Court's speedy decision to lift Attorney General John Mitchell's restraint on publication of the 7,000-page top-secret "Pentagon Papers," materials chronicling years of administration handling and mishandling of the Vietnam War. In the Court's view, the government failed to show that the nation would be imperiled by the publication of these aging documents, though certain public officials might be embarrassed by them (New York Times Co. v. United States, 1971).

The emphasis upon foreign threat effectively eliminates survival orientation from press news and commentary of state and local government activity. In 1969 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a Ku Klux Klansman charged with sedition for making televised threats against state officials who advocated racial integration. The decision had the effect of making all state sedition laws unconstitutional (Brandenberg v. Ohio,

1969). The Cable Communications Policy Act, which authorizes public access channels, forbids censorship except for the prevention of obscene programming. The American Nazi party and the Klan are among a number of fringe groups that produce programs shown on public access channels in many U.S. communities, despite complaints from mainstream viewers (Holsinger, 1991: 487).

The danger posed by socialism and communism was grounded in identification with foreign ideology and was used by President Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s as justification for managing information and suppressing press opposition to New Deal programs. Much of the federal legislation authorizing limitations on press activity was enacted during Roosevelt's third term, when domestic economic and political unrest was perceived by the three branches of government as a "clear and present danger" to national security. Among these are the Smith Act of 1940 and the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, both of which remain "on the books."

It was the Smith Act which legitimized McCarthy's efforts to uncover communist agents in the early 1950s and which, after a lapse of 30 years, authorized unsuccessful prosecutions against Puerto Rican nationalists (Bishop, 1988), white supremacists ("Jury Acquits 9," 1988), and American Marxists ("Judge Declares Mistrial," 1989) under the Reagan administration. In the 1980s, provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act were cited by the Department of Justice to authorize requests that three Canadian documentaries be labeled "political propaganda" before distribution in the United States. The films fell into the category of "films of warning" and spoke out against nuclear proliferation and U.S. industrial practices that resulted in acid rain in

Canada--views seen as attacks on Reagan policies. Media scholar Maureen J. Nemecek links administration reaction to its entrenched Cold War opposition to any weakening of a strong defense posture (Nemecek, 1991: 5-8). It is noteworthy that the views expressed in the three Canadian "progaganda" films have been regularly and forcefully presented in U.S. documentaries.

In general, U.S. restrictions against foreign journalists in the United States are minimal. From time to time, foreign journalists are denied entry or expelled from the country when their presence is associated with espionage or subverting the political process. Also non-U.S. citizens are prevented from holding controlling interests in American media--a restriction circumvented by Australian publisher Rupert Murdoch, who acquired U.S. citizenship in 1985 order to legalize his purchase of seven television stations from Metromedia, Inc.

The survival motive is most clearly applicable and least likely to elicit challenge when it is employed to justify constraints on press activity in the context of reporting and commenting on wars and war-related events.<sup>5</sup> Because the Cold War dominated United States international policy for almost 50 years, preceded by World Wars I and II, it can be argued that the survival orientation inhibited and influenced media coverage of almost all international events for a substantial portion of the century.

Perhaps the survival orientation was summarized most eloquently by Winston Churchill who, in the course of planning the Normandy invasion, uttered the famous aphorism, "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies" (Brown, 1975: 10). Prior restraint and post-publication penalties are intended to prevent

media accounts and commentaries that could compromise military efforts by giving succor to the enemy, weaken the resolve of the armed forces, or dampen support and morale on the homefront. In addition, since World War I, the U.S. government has employed an army of propaganda agencies, often overseen by appointed media professionals, to deliberately portray military efforts and the American cause in a positive light. Frank Capra's "Why We Fight" film series, used in World War II in an attempt to bolster military morale and commitment, is a well-known example of the latter.

Margaret Blanchard identifies control of media coverage of the 1991 Persian Gulf War with "a long and disturbing lineage for managing ... free expression, especially when the nation is caught up in armed conflict" (1992: 5). Citing wars and political administrations from the Revolution and the War of 1812 and continuing through the Mexican War and the Civil War, Blanchard argues that press censorship, deliberate misinformation, and manipulation of public opinion were tactics utilized in the 18th and 19th centuries that have been extended and amplified in the current era.

Self censorship, always the most effective form of press restraint, was billed as a voluntary mechanism during WW II; however, its enforcement was insured by a vast network of government agencies. FBI director J. Edgar Hoover focused special attention during the war years on the African-American media, whose commitment to the national agenda in both world wars was seen as less than wholehearted. The extent of government control of all American media in the 1940s was, in fact, so comprehensive that it even pervaded the wage scale of press employees. A regional War Labor Board in 1943 imposed a four-tiered structure

specifying merit-raises for New York Times reporters based upon the degree to which individual journalists might be trusted not to reveal sensitive military information<sup>6</sup> ("Fourth Estate: Times ABC's," 1944).

President John F. Kennedy's manipulation of the press, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis, underscored the pressure on the media to act as accomplices in effecting administration policy (LeoGrande, 1987). As Daniel C. Hallin observed in his study of the U.S. media and the Vietnam War, "American news media are both highly autonomous from direct political control and, through the routines of the news-gathering process, deeply intertwined in the actual operations of government" (Hallin, 1989: 8).

Although the press always has objected to imposed wartime restrictions, the Vietnam War, because of its unpopularity and its duration, provided an arena for proponents of instrumental press motives to challenge the survival orientation of the administration. Whereas the government, the military, and the majority of the American people link the United States' defeat in the Vietnam War to irresponsible press performance, media and media analysts believe that

government unwillingness to act as if the nation was really at war ... including being honest with the people about the status of events in Vietnam--was the cause of the American problems there rather than press coverage (Blanchard, 1992: 171; also Hammond, 1988; Hallin, 1989; Turner, 1985.)

Government perception of the media as a threat to national security in Vietnam has been used to rationalize even stronger measures in subsequent military ventures--measures that have outraged many journalists, but have met with the overwhelming approval of the public, according to opinion polls. The Reagan administration's unprecedented



press blackout during the invasion of Grenada in 1983 kept the closest reporters 160 miles away on the island of Barbados for two days and no combat video or on-site newspaper dispatches were relayed for three days ("Keeping the Press from the Action," 1983).

In the wake of Grenada, a "National Press Pool" was created by the Defense Department, consisting of 11 preselected reporters--designated to enter a combat zone "on a moment's notice" in time of military emergency. A quota system assigned six to the television networks, one to radio, two to the wire services, and one to the weekly new magazines. Said Albert Hunt of the Wall Street Journal, "I have never heard of a pool arrangement that excludes newspapers. It would appear that they are not anxious to give any opportunity for in depth reporting" ("War Zone Media Pool Designated," 1985: 773).

A somewhat larger pool of reporters arrived in Panama four hours after the short-lived conflict began. Proponents of the "public's right to know" argue that press constraint allowed U.S. government claims of low Panamanian fatalities to go uninvestigated, despite reports to the contrary ( Garneau, 1990; Rangel, 1990; Teeter, 1992).

Media coverage of the Persian Gulf War by pool arrangements was orchestrated by the U.S. military and generally acquiesced to by the press. Malcolm Browne of the New York Times attributed the near bloodless portrayal of that war to the fact that "[f]or the first time since World War II, correspondents must submit to near-total military supervision" (Browne, 1991: A8). The mainstream establishment media chose not to participate in an unsuccessful legal challenge against the Department of Defense calling for an injunction against military-controlled reports (Nation Magazine v. U.S. Department of


Defense: 1991) Summing up the past decade of American warfare, academician Dwight Teeter concluded,

Military censorship of U.S. actions in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and in the Persian gulf (1991) also showed situations in which the U.S. government used a monopoly of force and assertions of national security to be, to borrow a fine British phrase, economical with the truth (1992: 21).


One less obvious use of the survival motive to justify press activity at the local level is the "booster press" of the American frontier. The primary purpose of the frontier newspaper, according to historian Daniel Boorstein, was to advertise nonexistent towns by recruiting sorely-needed settlers (1965: 127). These euphoric publications championing the opportunities and progress of their struggling communities can be seen as analogous to the media in much of the developing nations of the world. As settlement occurred in the American West and levels of economic prosperity climbed, the booster press allied with the local business community and gradually assumed an instrumental orientation--but only after it reached a point of economic and strategic stability that enabled it to indulge in this luxury.

#### The U.S. Press and the Motive Triangle


The challenge of summarizing the motivations of American media behavior is best met by analyzing and identifying discrete time periods, media forms, and situations. On the following page, Figures 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, and 4E summarize U.S. press activity over five periods of its history selected by the author. Other analysts might choose different periods or to narrow their focus to individual media organizations or coverage of specified issues, but these indicate one approach. Comparative assessment of U.S. press behavior illustrates that since the advent of




A. 1776-1800




B. 1800-1830



C. 1830-1914



D. 1914-1960



E. 1960-1992

Figure 4. U.S. Press Activity 1776-1992

the penny press in the 1830s, instrumental motives have prevailed over increasingly significant ideational influences associated with heightened social consciousness and press responsibility. The fact that some press activity is survival-motivated is indicated by the fact that the U.S. press cannot be represented by a single point falling on the line between the instrumental and ideational type; however, the fact that survivalist behavior generally is restricted to wartime activity results in relatively small impact on press activity.

#### Britain under Thatcher--1979-1990

##### National Situation and Motive

Because American political tradition traces its roots to the Magna Carta and British common law and because the framers of the U.S. Constitution were inspired by British thinkers, there is a tendency to overidentify similarities between the two nations' instrumentally-oriented press systems. In fact, throughout its history, Britain and the British people have had difficulty reconciling a strong, independent press with the national interest. Britain has never embraced with anything approaching American enthusiasm the watchdog role of the press, "the public's right to know," journalistic privilege in the courts, shield laws, strictures against "prior restraint," or, with a few highly-visible exceptions, the notion that mass taste is a credible gauge of appropriate media content.

American newspaper columnist Anthony Lewis observed in a lecture before a British audience in the late 1980s that in Britain the public right of free speech is not a prime value:

Judges often speak of it as a treasured right, but the results of case after case are to the contrary. Freedom to argue the facts of public policy loses out to the claims of confidentiality, foreign policy, legal order, and so on. Even the most direct assault on press freedom seems to evoke little outrage (Neil, 1988: 24).

It is the premise of this analysis that ideational motives account for these differences--which are concentrated primarily in the relationship between press and government. Though the content of the British ideational vocabulary and the press activity it justifies are elaborated in a later section, it is necessary to note at the outset that the traditional British value system is often at odds with weak government/strong press rationales. As a consequence, British press behavior falls somewhat farther from the ideal instrumental type associated with American press behavior, and more closely resembles that of its European neighbors and Japan.

The prevailing instrumental vocabulary came under particularly strong verbal and legal challenge during the 1980s, when Margaret Thatcher headed the Conservative government--the years on which this case summary focuses. While the clash may have been exacerbated by the moralistic thrust of Thatcher politics, conflict between ideational and instrumental press activity is ongoing, fueled by powerful and somewhat incongruous institutions--the monarchy, the House of Lords, and the vestiges of a landed aristocracy, on one hand, and an elected House of Commons on the other. Both forces exert significant influence not only on the press policies of the British government and the mammoth bureaucracy that serves it, but on the attitudes and actions of practitioners and the public as well.

In the 1980s, a small but vocal body of British journalists and

libertarians rose to challenge new policies advocated by the Thatcher administration to tighten control over the media. In 1988, "Charter 88," a two-page manifesto signed by more than 250 writers and intellectuals, attacked the "untrammelled mandate of Margaret Thatcher" to curtail press independence and declared that "[t]he time has come to demand political, civil and human rights in the United Kingdom." Though Charter signatories were dismissed by Tory columnists as the "chattering classes," outraged journalists, literati, and libertarians of every political stripe took to the media and the courts in the late 1980s to lodge their complaints (Atlas, 1989). Andrew Neil, editor of The London Sunday Times, summarized the issue in a 1989 lecture, entitled "Britain's Free Press: Does It have One?" (1989). His predecessor at the Sunday Times, Harold Evans, had asked a similar question and concluded that Britain had a "half-free" press (Walker, 1983: 16; Neil, 1989: 36). Another answer might well be found in Mill's 19th century observation, "There is, in fact, no recognized principle by which the propriety or impropriety of Government interference is customarily tested" (1859: 67).

British writer Piers Brendon, author of The Life and Death of the Press Barons, attributes what he sees as the embattled status of the press to the fact that its social and political value has no legal underpinnings, since there is no British Constitution and no codified journalistic license analogous to the United States' First Amendment (1991). Press advocates frequently describe the British form of government as an "elective dictatorship," a reference to a charge Conservatives leveled against the Labor government in the 1970s (Brendon, 1991; Neil, 1989; Walker, 1985).

Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights comes closest

to providing a legal guarantee of British press rights, critics contend. Article 10 declares that freedom of expression should not be limited unless strictly necessary to preserve an overriding public interest (Brendon, 1991: 70). A British reporter is currently appealing a decision handed down in 1991 by the law lords of the House of Lords, Britain's highest court. Bill Goodwin was held in contempt of court and fined 5,000 pounds for shielding a source who revealed plans for refinancing a privately-owned computer company. The information has been suppressed by a court injunction gagging its publication nationwide (Brendon, 1991: 70). Commenting on the controversy, Martin Walker observed,

It is a matter of some national embarrassment when British citizens must seek protection of their rights in European statutes and European courts, rather than in those of her Majesty's government--England being the Mother of Parliaments and all that (1992).

In the 1960s, a famous legal battle pitted pharmaceutical companies against media wishing to publicize study findings that showed the deforming effects of the tranquilizer thalidomide on human fetuses. After years in the British courts, court-imposed injunctions were lifted by a ruling from the European court seated in Strasbourg (Neil, 1988: 23).

Though a series of events, proposals, and legislative actions in the Thatcher years catalyzed protests and charges from "quality" media practitioners that threatened to overload the courts, the disputed measures were generally the result of vigorous enforcement of policies already in place. Lord Rees-Mogg, chairman of the Broadcasting Standards Council, said he did not find "the political climate [of the Thatcher years] so 'very sinister. I can't remember when it wasn't so'" (Atlas,

1990: 97).

The 1989 Official Secrets Act, while not as all-encompassing in its definition of government secrets as its 1911 predecessor, nevertheless extends to the attorney general broad discretionary powers while disallowing the public-interest defense, commonly used in U.S. courts. The new act, not yet tested in the courts, is directed not only against those who obtain and reveal privileged information, but against any media organization that reports it (Neil, 1988; Walker, 1992). Because the Official Secrets Act specifies jury trial, during the 1980s the government frequently turned to the hundreds of confidentiality laws that require only a judge's ruling to censor information if the "balance of convenience" supports the plaintiff--that is, if a plaintiff convincingly claims the information is confidential in nature. A declaration of confidentiality is enforced by the serving of injunctions to prevent publication or broadcast of the information in question. Those convicted of violating the confidentiality laws or the Official Secrets Act can be fined and imprisoned.<sup>7</sup> The 1981 Contempt of Court Act also facilitates gag orders, giving judges the power to quash reporting of evidence and threatening journalists with imprisonment if they approach jurors after a trial.

The thalidomide injunction was upheld in British courts in the 1970s because judges ruled that pharmaceutical interests had a right to keep findings from scientific studies confidential. In the 1980s, the government was plaintiff in two of the most controversial applications of confidentiality laws. The first focused on official action the London Sunday Times from publishing excerpts from Spycatcher, a candid memoir by former British intelligence officer Peter Wright<sup>8</sup>. Serialization of



the banned book was prohibited in Britain--though it was published in Australia and in the United States, where editor Andrew Neil purchased serialization rights (Atlas, 1989; Campbell, 1987; Neil, 1988). The second controversy was over the banning of a six-part BBC documentary on the planned launching of "Zircon," a British spy-satellite, and a subsequent 28-hour police raid on BBC offices in Glasgow, during which 30 boxes of film, videotape, and documents were confiscated (Blowup Over the BBC," 1987; Brendon, 1991; Campbell, 1987; Laver, 1987).

Other debates raged over ultimately unsuccessful attempts to pass legislation authorizing the "right of reply," for persons who felt they had been unfairly treated by the media; and a privacy bill, aimed at inhibiting the tabloids. Such proposals received rather widespread public support because of objection to the sensationalism of popular tabloids, which are somewhat akin to those of American "supermarket tabloids." "It is sometimes difficult, when one sees the shenanigans of the British tabloids, to feel quite as strongly about press freedom as you do in the United States,"<sup>9</sup> London Sunday Times editor Andrew Neil explained to a group of American media professionals in 1988. He continued,

The libel laws in Britain are tougher [than in the United States.] I would like them to stay tougher because they are one way of making sure that the tabloids have some limits to what they can write, and they must stick with some semblance of the truth (Neil, 1988: 25).

Existing law in Britain places the burden of proving the truth of potentially libelous material on defendants, rather than on plaintiffs--the reverse of American procedure. Whereas, Neil says that tough libel laws "pose no problems to trying to root out government wrongdoing" (1988: 25), Brendon argues that the threat of libel suits and

high damage awards cause the press to "pussyfoot about politicians (1991: 70). Cecil King, member of a prominent British newspaper family, claims that libel laws are an "absolute nightmare" for journalists and that, because of the threat of costly libel suits, "inefficient hospitals are not named, doubtful share flotations pass without comment, and some fraudulent individuals go unexposed ... " (Brendon, 1991: 70).

### Instrumental Characteristics

Despite these controversies and challenges, most day-to-day British press activity is motivated by instrumental vocabulary. Indeed, British commentators argue that the print media are even more competitive and market-driven than their U.S. counterparts. Neil claims that it is, ironically, the rivalry among the media that makes it possible for the government to retain the upper hand.

The highly competitive nature of British newspapers means that it is very difficult for the press ever to take a common front, and editors are more prone to score points rather than stand firm in defence of their basic freedoms (1989: 24).

A case in point was the charge of "treason" leveled against the BBC by Murdoch's Sun, for questioning the government's version of the Falkland War sea battles.

The prevalence of the instrumental orientation is acknowledged somewhat bleakly by parliamentary correspondent Chris Moncrieff, who said of himself and his journalistic colleagues, "I think we are part of the entertainment industry at the downmarket end. We do it for the money. And if that serves the public at the end of the day--well that's a bonus" (Brendon, 1991: 70).

In justifying the extraordinary means he went to in order to

circumvent the government and acquire serialization rights to Spycatcher. Neil relied on instrumental motives, linking them with the idea of serving "the public's right to know":

Large sums are spent to secure these serial rights because they can be important circulation-builders and because of the interest to readers of the quality press. So I was not surprised to discover that many others were also in the running for Spycatcher (1988: 8).

The very fact that the media provide the main forum for unrestrained debate on press policy weakens the credibility of charges decrying censorship and control. As Tory columnists noted, dissenting journalists and writers were making lots of money and wrote whatever they pleased (Atlas, 1989: 97). Even the tabloid press appears to shrug off most attempts to rein it in.

Under Thatcher, deregulation and the weakening of labor unions provided an environment in which market mechanisms flourished, ushering in a decade of unprecedented media profits; widespread, if belated, adoption of new technologies and innovations; movement away from the legendary Fleet Street hub; and new entries into print and broadcasting industries. Martin Walker, though an opponent of recent government press policies, acknowledges that the prosperity of the 1980s resulted in two revolutions that invigorated the print media and widened the media voice--the success of the popular tabloids and the doubling in readership of quality newspapers (1992).

Beginning with the Falklands War in 1982, the British Broadcasting Corporation saw its highly-valued independence increasingly compromised by government meddling in programming decisions. Thatcher endeavored to bring an end to the company's near-monopoly by calling for the sale of more commercial television franchises and proposed a plan for financial

restructuring based on subsidy-free "pay-your-own-way" principles. Thatcher said her proposals were intended to increase competition and private enterprise in order to improve television quality.

### Survival Characteristics

The survival vocabulary of motives was employed by the British government to rationalize censorship, official dissembling, and delay of press reports filed during the Falklands War of 1982. Thatcher took to task certain BBC reporters critical of government handling of the war for failing to acknowledge it was "their duty to stand up for our boys" (Atlas, 1989: 38). BBC correspondent Brian Hanrahan testified at a parliamentary inquiry that an agreement was struck with commander Admiral John Woodward, "where he was entitled to stop us reporting things, but we were not prepared to report things that were incorrect" (Downie, 1982: 269). Similar rationales were used to explain the managing of coverage in the Persian Gulf War.

American editor James Atlas attributes the media crackdown during the Thatcher years to the ongoing battle between England and Irish secessionists. He writes, "Indeed, it's the doings of the [Irish Republican Army], I suspect, that have impelled the Prime Minister to strengthen her hand." He pointed to the fact that an I.R.A. bombing in 1984 at a Tory conference killed several government officials and almost killed Thatcher. "England, to her way of thinking, is under seige," Atlas concluded (1989: 38).

Indeed a controversial ban on broadcasting interviews with Sinn Fein speakers was imposed after a Thames Television documentary, "Death on a Rock," aired conversations with three Irish activists gunned down by the

Special Air Services in Gibraltar in 1988. Thatcher fought to have the program suppressed and threatened to suspend the network's license, denouncing the production as "trial by television" (Atlas, 1988: 37; Brendon, 1991: 71).

Though clearly survival motives account for some characteristics of the British press, the broad net of government secrecy and control encompasses areas that media practitioners do not accept as essential to national security. "Secrecy, as a tool of government, has very little to do with foreign affairs, and even less to do with national security," Martin Walker has written. "Secrecy is a system of self-protection that governments and bureaucracies wear like a skin" (1985: 22).

#### Ideational Characteristics

The idea system that rivals the instrumental orientation and tends to elide with survival rationales is derived from the remnants of a class system rooted in the feudal period. Similar cultural memories and manners inform ideational motives and continue to rationalize press behaviors in Europe and much of Asia as well. Among the values emerging from entrenched class divisions are paternalism on the part of the social and political elite; a sense of loyalty verging on fealty that permeates the aspiring middle and lower classes (from whose ranks most journalists are recruited); and a sense of propriety and etiquette that adds a unique dimension to British press ethics. These values rely upon communal, rather than individualistic, orientation.

One manifestation of paternalism is the presumption that the content of the media is best overseen by "the great and the good," a pool of the intellectual and social elite that Walker compares to the Soviet

"nomenklatura" (1992). An interesting illustration of belief in this idea was broadcasters' concern that Thatcher's plans to further privatize the television industry would produce "an era of game shows and soap operas." Stuart Prebble of the Campaign for Quality Television called the Prime Minister's proposal "a detailed epitaph for the television which has been the envy of the world" (Atlas: 1989: 38).

Oversight of media content extends beyond entertainment and is most pervasive in the disclosure of government activity. The long-established "D"-notice system routinely alerts the media to news items judged by the Defense Ministry as threatening to national security. The practice results in "censorship by wink and nod from the Ministry of Defence," according to British author Geoffrey Robertson (Brendon, 1991: 71).

Writing in 1956, American sociologist Edward Shils observed that

[T]he acceptance of hierarchy in British society permits the government to retain its secrets, with little challenge or resentment .... The deferential attitude of the working and middle classes is matched by the uncommunicativeness of the upper middle classes and of those who govern .... No ruling class discloses as little of its confidential proceedings as the British (Brendon, 1991: 68-69).

Shils noted the general acceptance in the mid-20th century of a rationale articulated 400 years before by Sir Roger L'Estrange, Charles II's press censor, who opposed the newspapers because they make "the multitude too familiar with the actions and counsels of their superiors" (Brendon, 1991: 68).

Brendon argues that among the panoply of government measures restricting the modern media--taxation, licensing, legislation, and court injunctions--the most efficacious has been that which the elite exert "through their superior social positions." Reporters belonging to an exclusive club known as the "lobby" are privileged to attend regular

"off-the-record" briefings from members of the government and their information officers--briefings that set the agenda for the presentation of information without holding newsmakers accountable. According to Walker,

When they are called together for their regular meetings with the Prime Minister's spokesman, they write down what is said, but the code of the lobby does not permit them to let their readers know who said it. Hence the absurd fictions of "Cabinet sources" and "senior Ministers believe ... " and so on (1983: 22).

"Court correspondents fancy themselves as royal retainers, the gentlemen-in-waiting of the press," Brendon writes. "Editors behave as though they are part of the governing mandarinat, accepting knighthoods as orders of merit instead of badges of shame, rewards for having prostituted their organs to this or that party" (Brendon, 1991: 69). Neil, who engineered the publication of one installment of the Spycatcher memoir in the London Sunday Times before it was quashed, notes that a number of people were "ennobled" for services to suppressing publication of the memoir--adding, "We call them 'Spycatcher peers!'" He himself was awarded the "Buckingham Palace Award" by Fleet Street colleagues, presented to the editor judged least likely to ever receive a knighthood. "This is a badge I wear with pride," Neil said (1988: 9).

The willingness of the media to conform to official expectations is acknowledged in an anonymous poem recollected by Walker:

You can't hope to bribe or twist  
The honest British journalist.  
But seeing what the men will do  
Unbribed, there is no reason to (1992).

The ideational motive vocabulary extends the upperclass social value of genteel discretion across all levels of elite activity in both public and private spheres. Brendon relates the rationale to the "inhibition

about talking freely in front of servants, social inferiors, and (in the empire) 'natives' (1991: 69). Neil draws a similar conclusion, noting,

In Britain, no information is made available unless the ruling elite decides that it should be, and they get very angry when newspapers like [The London Sunday Times] and others attempt to get information out that they do not want distributed. It is very much a paternalistic, "not in front of the children" attitude (1988: 26).

While dozens of statutes authorizing stiff fines and imprisonment reinforce this aristocratic idea on civil servants and the press, it has been absorbed into the national belief system at all social levels. Investigative reporting carries with it a tinge of vulgarity and aggressiveness, frequently identified with U.S. press performance. A Thatcher spokesman was proven right when he predicted that "Charter 88" would be met with "massive public indifference and ridicule to the whole thing." He continued,

The press simply doesn't have the power in England that it does in the United States; it doesn't go about its business with the same investigative zeal. The practice of leaking information from Government sources is virtually unknown .... [T]he press has become a courier between the Government and the public (Atlas, 1988: 97).

Though the articulation of instrumental, ideational, and survival motives cited in this analysis of the British press justify different press behaviors and indicate different views on how the press should have acted in the 1980s, together they construct a consistent triangulated picture of how the press, in fact did act. The dynamic theory is not intended to determine the correctness or incorrectness of press activity or, even less, to provide a measure of the support for conflicting viewpoints. The instrumentalist arguments cited here were made by opposition voices from the "quality" media, railing against the actions of the government, the "popular" media, and the public. They were



minority voices, raised in response to what was perceived as significant challenge; in turn, they elicited ideational and survival motives to justify the actions under attack in the 1980s. A three-dimensional view of the British press in the 1980s is a by-product of this interaction.

### Britain and the Motive Triangle

British media activity is shown to be less focused in its motivation than the U.S. press, in part because the institution of the press was appended to a society already shaped by historical priorities and values, and in part because any close-up view, in this case a decade, reveals details and aberrations that broader analysis excludes. On the motive




Figure 5. British Press Activity

triangle summarizing British press behavior at the beginning of Margaret Thatcher's administration, shown in Figure 5A on the preceding page, instrumental motives are shown to be less diluted by survival activity than at the end of her term, when protest against British press policies

reached its height, shown in Figure 5B. The increasing impact of survival considerations, occasioned by two foreign wars and ongoing threat from Irish separatists, is revealed through analysis and visually conceptualized on the motive triangle.

## Endnotes

1. In the original draft of the Bill of Rights, press freedom was addressed in the fourth amendment. Madison wrote, "The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable" (Altschull, 1984: 26).
2. Americans are more familiar with the words Jefferson wrote to his friend, Colonel Edward Carrington in 1787, "... were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."
3. The 18th century British doctrine against prior restraint, as opposed to post-publication penalty, has been incorporated into American common law and informs many court decisions, among them, *Near v. Minnesota* (1931), *Bantam Books v. Sullivan* (1963), and *New York Times Co. v. United States* (1971)--the latter common known as the Pentagon Papers case. The doctrine, articulated by Sir William Blackstone in his *Commentaries*, reads in part, "The liberty of the press ... consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, but not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published" (Blackstone, 1766-1769: 151).
4. Government attempts to prosecute American citizens on charges of sedition and seditious libel rarely succeed--whether those detractors are members of the Communist party, Vietnam war protestors, or a Texas woman who, upon hearing of the assassination attempt against President Ronald Reagan, expressed the wish that "If they go after him again, I hope they get him" (*Rankin v. McPherson*, 1987).
5. In contrast, the various pseudo-"wars" against poverty, drugs, pollution, etc., which are actually domestic social campaigns, do not elicit survival behavior from the press. On the contrary, the substance and implementations of these policies are subject to rigorous media scrutiny and criticism.
6. Four white fixtures in the Times men's room were mysteriously labeled A, B, C, and D by a cynical wag, Newsweek reported. Also, the following bit of doggerel appeared on an employees' bulletin board:

In this great reportorial waste  
There are classes of skill and of taste;  
If you're not libel-free  
You are graded Class D  
And the chances are you are not chaste  
(Fourth Estate: *Times ABC's*, 1944).

7. In 1983, Sarah Tisdall, a government clerk, leaked to the Manchester Guardian a memorandum from the Ministry of Defense that U.S. cruise missiles were about to be installed in England. Without publishing or confirming the information, a Guardian editor passed her communication on to authorities and she subsequently was sentenced to six months in jail (Atlas, 1989: 38; Jackman, 1992).
8. U.S. federal employees with access to classified information must agree to not disclose information acquired in the course of their employment, and former employees must submit for security clearance any books, articles, or speeches they write based on their previous work. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these "contracts" in Snepp v. United States (1980). The decision required former CIA agent Frank W. Snepp to turn over to the government all earnings from a book he wrote about U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, which was published without government clearance in 1977. Lower court ruling detail procedures for appealing decisions on disputed materials and place the burden on the author to prove that national security would not be threatened by publication.
9. Martin Walker attributes the success of the "trash tabloids" to the fact that they are openly targeted at working people. Irreverent, gossipy, sexually explicit, and highly entertaining, they are at the same time unabashedly partisan and patriotic, regularly combining news and views in the European tradition. These publications fill a market vacuum seized upon by foreign-born entrepreneurs Rupert Murdoch and Robert Maxwell that had been ignored by "quality" print and broadcasting organizations, Walker says (1992).

CHAPTER VI  
CASE SUMMARIES OF SURVIVAL-ORIENTED  
PRESS SYSTEMS--SINGAPORE AND  
NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Introduction

In the introduction of Powers of the Press, Martin Walker considers the "privileged" role of the Anglo-American press, and asks "is it not the atypical outcome of two nations lucky enough to have known wealth without revolution and war without invasion for the last few centuries?" He then wonders, "why is it so much of the world is following another model?" (1983: 16).

The press behavior most nations exhibit most of the time is rationalized by survival motive vocabularies. The characteristics associated with this ideal type of press activity most closely resemble those assigned to the authoritarian type, defined in Four Theories of the Press, (Siebert et al., 1956) and the developmental concepts identified by Schramm (1964), Lerner and Schramm (1967), and Hachten (1987), among others. As has been pointed out in analyses of the U.S. and British press systems, however, a nation need be neither authoritarian in its political structure nor "developing" in its economic potential to find survival strategies efficacious.

The distinction in nomenclature is significant in view of the essential purpose of motives, which is to influence others to accept a

problematic action strategy. As C. Wright Mills notes, "In many social actions, others must agree, tacitly or explicitly. Thus, acts often will be abandoned if no reason can be found that others will accept" (1940: 907). While motives espousing the individual's duty to obey authority may have been credited in the medieval period when the "divine right of kings" was accepted as rote, no nation today that is sufficiently "modern" to support a mass media system can effectively employ authoritarian rationales to justify elite secular control of the press. Survival or national security, however, retains currency in all national situations where the public or the masses can be convinced that imminent threat looms.

Likewise, the notion that "developing" countries adhere to a distinctive set of press behaviors reserved for "have-not" nations is dispelled by the periodic observation of survivalist press activity in the most industrially and technologically advanced nations. To illustrate the point, this chapter presents a case summary of the survival-dominated press of the prosperous island-nation of Singapore, focusing on its press behavior since it ceased being a British colony in 1963. A second study over roughly the same period summarizes the press behavior of Nigeria, a survival-oriented nation whose media system is more representative of former European colonies and Third-World Systems in general. Though not examined here, the highly-centralized Israeli press also has been dominated by survivalist rationales since the nation's founding after World War II.

## Singapore--1963-1992

National Situation and Motive

Singapore is a city-nation occupying an island roughly 14 miles across and 26 miles up and down, an area slightly more than half as large as Oklahoma City. It is located at the tip of the Malay Peninsula in the Straits connecting the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Seventy five percent of its 2.5 million people are of Chinese descent, 15 percent are Malays, and 7 percent Indians. Established as a British trading and commercial center in 1819, it became a crown colony in 1867. In preparation for independence almost a century later, Singaporeans elected their first legislative assembly in 1959, dominated by the nationalistic People's Action Party (P.A.P.) and its leader Lee Kuan Yew. After separating from Britain in 1963, Prime Minister Lee maneuvered Singapore into a federation with Malaya and North Borneo that lasted only two years. The Republic of Singapore emerged as an independent republic in 1965.

Under Lee's strict stewardship, Singapore has emerged as a major Asian economic power, an upwardly mobile "First-World" phenomenon that can boast of virtually no poverty, no homelessness, no begging, little crime, no unemployment, negligible inflation, and no pollution. Its annual per capita income of \$12,000 is exceeded in Asia only by Japan, while more abundant residential space makes the standard of living actually higher. It was not always so. When Lee came to power, he recalled in a recent interview, "there was no sanitation and no running water, hot or cold, for many not even electricity" (Sesser, 1992: 37). With characteristic pragmatism and lack of sentimentality, Lee has

directed the tearing down and bulldozing of its teeming ethnic neighborhoods and replaced thousands of two-story "shophouses" with sparkling office towers and high-rise apartment buildings. William Hachten writes that, since the early 1970s, Singapore has become "an efficient, corruption-free country where telephones work, streets are safe, air is clean and water is pure" (1989: 822).

The island is hailed as a bastion of capitalism, despite the fact that a not-so-invisible governmental hand beckons and smoothes the way for transnational corporations, international banks, and high-tech manufacturing for foreign contractors--which comprise the base of the surging economy. More than 80 percent of the country's capital comes from foreigners and foreign-exchange reserves now total \$27 billion. Whereas other former colonies have shunned TNCs, Singapore has seized upon them, creating a world market for "made-in-Singapore" goods. By catering to the entrepreneurs of the industrial core, the island nation has become the world's second-largest port, third-largest oil refiner, the manufacturer of half of the world's computer disk drives, and "a major center of shipbuilding, telecommunications equipment, electronic components, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment" (Sesser, 1992: 50).

The great paradox of Singapore is the coupling of its capitalist economy with an authoritarian political system that pays scant lip-service to Western ideals of participatory democracy and countenances only token political opposition. The synthesis has been achieved by a dedicated commitment to social order, a perhaps uniquely tit-for-tat interpretation of the social contract in which growing economic success and social tranquility correlate with increasing social control. The enforced order pervades private as well as public spheres, producing a



placid yet efficient commercial environment that appeals to foreign investors and that Lee says is consistent with widely-held Asian values. The corporate structure that Singapore suggests has earned it the soubriquet "Singapore, Inc.," with Lee its undisputed and omnipresent C.E.O.

When political tensions arose in Singapore in the 1980s, Barbara Crossette reports, the Confucian scholar Wu Teh Yao told an interviewer that "individualism may not rank high in this social system, but that this did not mean an acceptance of authoritarianism, especially amid prosperity." Wu said,

In all human societies, once the tummy is full, the mind begins to think. So whoever is going to rule, even in Japan or China, will have to pay attention to the people's needs and wishes" (Crossette, 1992).

Yet Western observer Stan Sesser reports little expression of needs or wishes by Singapore's expanding middle class.

The government tells Singaporeans what books and magazines they can read, what movies they can see, and what television programs they can watch, and the result is a cultural desert in a nation so wealthy that it could easily be a showcase for the arts. Residents of Singapore pursue but one activity with passion--a passion so great that it sometimes seems to constitute recreation as well as vocation. This is the making of money (1992: 37).

In this environment, it is not surprising that the media are expected to contribute to the maintenance of an orderly society, to assist in the task of nation building, and to serve as the government's vehicle for social campaigns that range from appeals to citizens to say "please" and "thank-you," to reminders to flush public toilets, to exhortations to "Speak Mandarin," avoid obesity, and, in the case of university-educated couples, to have larger families. Though the press's role is a subservient one, it is an ever-present servant and Singaporeans

enjoy a rich media environment of local and international fare. For the government recognizes that a strong communication infrastructure is essential for the efficient conduct of international business, as well as the pleasure and convenience of international businessmen. As Hachten notes in a 1989 article, "Singapore is a rare success story in media development, one that has been achieved without press freedom" (1989: 822). Thus while mass communication has flourished, a press that functions independently of government--commonly associated with instrumental activity--has regressed in recent decades.

Central to all spheres of Singaporean life and all its institutions is 68-year-old Lee Kuan Yew, known by his countrymen as P.M., for the position he held for three decades before stepping down in 1990. Following a succession plan he had drafted years before, Lee has retained the post of senior minister and continued to serve as secretary-general of the dominate P.A.P. Lee's micromanagement is unremitting and in no way constrained or contradicted by his successor, former deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. Lee explains,

Multinational corporations and banks expect things to work properly. That is only possible with continuity. So my colleagues and I phased ourselves out in a graduated, controlled way to avoid any lurching .... I hope the transition will pass imperceptibly. If you can feel a lurch, that's contrary to my intentions (Sesser, 1992: 45).

Despite Lee's attempt to institutionalize his government's succession process, Singaporean law, in fact, operates at Lee's discretion. Most commonly, the rule of law is maintained by rewriting the British-inspired codes to align with Lee's interpretation of current situations. For example, jury trials were eliminated in 1969 and most judges are closely tied to government leaders who appoint them (New York

City Bar Association, 1990). Under The Essential Control of Publications and Safeguarding of Information Regulation, the government prohibited print discussion of the abolition of juries. It is Lee's intolerance for graft and corruption that makes the "soft authoritarianism"<sup>1</sup> of Singapore more palatable to its citizens and foreign investors than similarly structured charismatic regimes in Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma. Chinese by birth, educated at Cambridge University in England, and fluent in Mandarin Chinese and two Chinese dialects as well as his native English, Lee mirrors the conflict between Western and Eastern values that characterizes the schizophrenia experienced by many former colonial countries.

It is in response to Western challenge to the way the Singaporean press operates, particularly as it affects Western publications and Western journalists, that Lee has constructed a motive vocabulary that reiterates the presence of multiple threats to his country's survival. That this vulnerability is not appreciated or comprehended by Western or even other Asian observers does not diminish its reality in the eyes of Singapore's leadership or its citizenry. As Asian-based writer and author Ian Buruma observes, "Big Brother in Singapore is less a tyrant than an authoritarian father worried that his family will one day disappear"<sup>2</sup> (1988: 25). He then quotes from a national address Lee made in 1982:

My deepest concern is how to make the young more conscious of security. By security I mean defense against threats to our survival, whether the threats are external or internal .... Civilization is fragile. It is especially so for an island city-state (Buruma, 1988: 25).

In the analysis below, the survival motive vocabulary is explored and illustrated as explanation for Singaporean media activity. The

lesser impact of the instrumental orientation is then examined, followed by the minimal influence of ideas and moral values on press behavior.

### Survival Characteristics

Threats to Survival. The notion of fear is central to virtually all analyses of Singaporean society. The epithet "city of fear" is so widely employed it needs no citation; frequently "paranoid" is attached to the label by Westerners. For purposes of analysis, the threats to Singaporean survival articulated by Singaporean leaders, media, and citizens may be divided into the following categories, though all, in fact, overlap and are perceived as part of an all-encompassing precariousness. These are: the threat of domestic political subversion from the left; military threat posed by China and other envious neighbors in the region; cultural subversion from the West; geographical isolation and the encroachment of the surrounding jungle; demographic tensions produced by conflicting races and religions; and economic vulnerability.

In 1987 twenty-two young social activists, several of them Catholic lay workers, were arrested and detained without trial under the Internal Security Act, a remnant of British colonial law. They were charged with being part of a "Marxist conspiracy to subvert the existing social and political system in Singapore through Communist united-front tactics to establish a Communist State" (Sesser, 1992: 57), though they claimed to be merely "do gooders," fighting for greater democracy (Buruma, 1988: 118). Most were released late in 1987, after confessing their crimes on Singapore television. When nine later released a public statement claiming they were mistreated in prison, they were promptly rearrested. By June of 1990 all were said to have been rehabilitated and were

released, except for their lawyer, who after being charged with several crimes, including being in "close contact" with an American Embassy diplomat, opted for self-imposed exile in the United States (Buruma, 1989; Sesser, 1992).

Lee dismisses Western press interpretations that the crackdown was directed against opposition forces that threatened P.A.P.'s parliamentary majority. Rather, Lee said, the young people were trying to create social unrest that would lead to bombings and assassinations. The threat as Lee perceives it was not to his own political base, but to the stability of the country. In a 1991 interview with Sasser, Lee recalled his instructions to his cabinet at the time of the crisis. "I told the younger ministers," he said,

"Look, as I see it, this takes about five years before it gets going. You can wait for it to mature and you might find out the ramifications. But you'll run the risk of many more innocent people being drawn in" (Sesser, 1992: 60).

The need for government supervision of content, staffing, and licensing of domestic media is rationalized on the basis of the threat of leftist insurgents, all of which fall under the label of "communists" in Lee's vocabulary. Lee allied himself with any and all nationalistic political groups in the 1950s, when his primary goal was ending British rule, professing, "I would vote for Communism if I had to choose only between Communism and colonialism," (Sesser, 1992: 46); however, he now opposes communism with the Cold-War vehemence and tenacity exhibited in the United States in the early 1950s. As he sought to consolidate power as prime minister, all dissent and all dissenters, including his former allies, became suspect and "communists." His Internal Security Department, whose job it is to ferret out dissent, is described by Sesser

as "ruthlessly efficient and intrusive" (1992: 40).

During the unrest of the early 1960s, many of Singapore's poor Malays and its intellectual Chinese elite were inspired by the idealism of Mao's cultural revolution. While Western press accounts make repeated reference to the fact that Singapore is without enemies since the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, Lee and political supporters appear to be nervously aware of China's well-armed presence at the opposite shore of the South China Sea.

A look at the map lends substantial credibility to this fear and perhaps offers an explanation for the pains Lee takes to not direct his assaults on the "sleeping giant" itself. As Sesser reports, in a 1990 address to international journalists in Hong Kong "[Lee] blamed television for the deaths in Tiananmen Square, saying that it was television coverage of demonstrations in the Philippines and South Korea, rather than a desire for freedom which had spurred the Chinese students to protest" (1992: 64). The proximity of China may also account for the fact that Singapore maintains one of the largest armies in the world proportionate to population and that all young men are required to devote two years to military service.

In 1990 Russell Heng noted in a Rockefeller Foundation study:

Two years ago, a Cabinet Minister urged academics and professionals to speak up. But when two reporters tried to get the reaction of eighteen of them to the Minister's encouragement, six preferred to keep their views to themselves. Of the remaining twelve, six spoke only on condition of anonymity (Heng, 1990).

Though the economy and Singapore's standard of living are dependent upon its ties to the large, highly developed nations, the threat of "cultural imperialism," of fragmentation of its own culture by the influx

of Western values and products suggests the country's lingering attachment to Third World identity crises. The construction of a motive vocabulary to justify this contradictory position is discussed in the section on ideational characteristics.

Buruma attributes the fear that pervades Singaporean society to geographic and demographic factors. He writes,

It has to do with being a prosperous little island, a minute modern enclave surrounded by millions of Malays, whose relative backwardness could so easily--so the [Singaporean] Chinese fear--turn to hostility (1988: 23)

Indeed, government censors take extraordinary precautions to make sure that media material is not offensive to Singapore's Muslim Malays or the largely Muslim populations of neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia. In 1965 Lee remarked, "[The Indonesians] live in a tenement area and they want to come into my little suburban house with its fruit trees" (Sesser, 1992: 63). The murder of thousands of Chinese minorities in Indonesia in 1965 and racial tensions at home during that time have left indelible impressions on Lee and many other Chinese Singaporeans. Government officials fear that the lower economic status and less pervasive work ethic of Singapore's Malays could lead to a permanent underclass, ripe for revolt. To counter this, until recently, Malay college students were provided full tuition scholarships.

The surrounding jungle itself, Buruma believes, constitutes a perceived peril for Singapore. He writes of "a deep, Conradian fear of being swallowed up by the jungle, a fate that can only be avoided by being ever more perfect, ever more disciplined, always the best" (1988: 23-24). A similar fate is alluded to by B.G. Lee, who contemplating the effects of eroding confidence in his father and his P.A.P. government,

predicts, "Far from cheerfully muddling through, we would vanish without trace, submerged into the mud of history" (Buruma, 1988: 25).

Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, for many years foreign minister of Singapore and numbered among the republic's founding fathers, thinks it crucial to establish a national identity in this nation of immigrants, but thinks an unfettered press and conflicting interpretations would "make it go bonkers." "[A]ll of this can break up and disappear totally. All might be totally lost," he told Buruma in an interview. "Raja" continued, "How many Singaporeans really want free speech, anyway? They want orderliness, a decent living." Likening society to an organism and the airing of sensitive issues of race, religion, and language to a tuberculosis virus, he argues, "We must keep them under control. If your constitution is weak, TB will take over and kill you" (Buruma, 1988: 25, 54).

Perhaps most tangible to Singaporeans is the threat of economic collapse, of sliding back into the post-colonial category of backward nations from which it propelled itself not three decades ago. To Westerners, and particularly American political analysts, 30 years represents a substantial chunk of national history; 30 years of economic stability carries with it the American assumption that it is time to put the more basic issue of economic survival on a back burner.<sup>3</sup> The Singaporean concept of time seemingly embraces a more traditional Asian view. For it was only in 1960 that Asia Scene, a travel magazine wrote: "The Chinese, who constitute the main current of [Singapore,] the city, live in utter filth and poverty. Their poverty is phenomenal. One must see with his own eyes to believe it" (Sesser, 1992: 44).

Vincent Cheng, the leader of the twenty-two social activists



arrested for dissent in 1987 and 1988, won his release by confessing on national television to economic, not political, wrong-thinking:

My leftist thinking always left me biased against multinationals. What I didn't understand was whether Singapore can exist without multinationals' contributing to our economy .... During my detention, I was given the opportunity to understand Singapore better .... I realized it is very important I take into account the reality of Singapore--Singapore's vulnerability for example (Sesser, 1992: 58).

Press Characteristics. Today Singaporeans may choose from seven daily newspapers, three of which are in English, three in Mandarin Chinese, and one small-circulation newspaper in the Indian language dialect, Tamil. All six of the English and Chinese-language newspapers are published by Singapore Press Holdings, a conglomerate through which the government exercises near absolute control, down to the hiring and firing of editors and staff (Hachten, 1989; Sesser, 1992). Its current chairman is also chairman of the Port of Singapore Authority, a government agency. Those who wish to own more than 3 per cent of Holdings stock must seek approval from the Minister of Communications and the Arts, who also wields veto power over the choice of directors. Among the largest stockholders are government-owned companies and agencies (Sesser, 1992: 63).

The leading English-language paper is the Straits Times, with a circulation of more than 269,000 and an estimated daily readership of 600,000. The major Chinese-language dailies are Lianhe Zaobao and Wanbao, with a combined circulation of 264,000 and an estimated readership of 980,000, according to Survey Research of Singapore (Hachten, 1989: 824).

Sesser, after examining the Straits Times, questions why such an

extensive network of state control is necessary since self censorship seemingly precludes the need for direct pressure from government officials. "One day during my stay, for instance," Sesser writes, a five-column headline over the lead story read "PM: LET'S MAKE THIS THE FINEST NATION" (1992: 63-64). A 1984 headline in the newspaper, enthusiastically backing one of the government's crusades, warned readers: "DON'T SPIT IN PUBLIC--AFTER THE CAMPAIGN, CULPRITS WILL BE FINED. The article that followed corrected a well-meaning tailor who had promised henceforward to confine his spitting to drains. "But experts say that wherever it is done, spitting is unhygienic," the account read. "It spreads a lot of germs that cause illnesses like tuberculosis, cough and cold, influenza .... " (Sesser, 1992: 44).

Since 1969, literacy has climbed at the rate of 1 percent per year and is now more than 86 percent. Although Malay is still the official language, emphasis is placed on Mandarin Chinese and English, both of which are taught in the schools. Many Singaporeans read publications in both languages. Forty-seven percent of all adults read Chinese newspapers, and 43 percent read English newspapers. In all, 84 percent read a daily newspaper, compared to 78 percent who watch television on a daily basis, Hachten reports (1989: 823).

Since Lee came to power, the number of national newspapers has declined from 12 dailies to its current level, largely through consolidation and forced closure. Despite this, circulation has remained approximately constant at about 269 issues per 1,000 population, compared to about 195 per 1,000 in the United States (Parker, 1982: 785). In May 1971, Lee closed two English language dailies, The Eastern Sun and the Singapore Herald, and detained four senior executives of a Chinese

language newspaper, Nyang Siang. All three newspapers were targeted for voicing criticism of his policies. In another crackdown in 1982 several editors were punished for giving disproportionate coverage to the political opposition, represented by only one member in the 81-seat parliament.<sup>4</sup> At this point, Lee put his former director of national intelligence to oversee the offending Straits Time and forced the sale of its afternoon paper, New Nation, to a rival publisher (Hachten, 1989: 823).

The Newspaper and Print Presses Act of 1974 requires that all newspapers apply for an annual license, which may be withdrawn by the government if content is shown to be not in accord with the law. Those printing, selling, distributing, or possessing an unlicensed paper are subject to fines and/or imprisonment (Parker, 1982: 788). In effect, licensing poses fewer constraints on domestic publishing than the self-censorship that results from the frequent firing of journalists and the constant threat of libel. Lee himself has initiated 13 libel suits in 30 years and won everyone of them--either in court or through out-of-court settlement. A Singaporean journalist revealed to Sesser, "I never ask questions at a press conference, because if you do they take note of you. A number of journalists have lost their jobs" (1992: 57).

Since 1980 radio and television have been under the aegis of the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation (SBC), a quasi-official board, subsidized by the government and subject to the pressures of Lee and the P.A.P. Radio broadcasts in English, Mandarin, Malay, and Tamil total over 500 hours a week. SBC television broadcasts 140 hours per week on three channels and 40 percent of these programs are domestically produced. Hachten reports that, according to SBC's public relations

director, U.S. shows sometimes attract audiences of 300,000 to 400,000, but locally-produced dramas in Chinese draw twice that number (1989: 824). In 1986, almost a half million home television licenses were issued, indicating that television reaches nearly every household.

Although similarly high domestic media penetration was reported in the formerly Socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc, important differences distinguishes the media content of survivalist countries from that of idea-motivated countries. In Singapore over 3,700 publications are imported, as well as hundreds of video tapes, music, and film. And while some censorship occurs, as discussed below, the overriding concern of the Singapore government and other survival-oriented governments is strategic information about the country "going out" rather than contaminating ideas and foreign entertainment "coming in." Also, even though government controlled and subsidized, media rely on foreign as well as domestic advertising for their major operating revenues.

The government's Board of Film Censors must clear all videotapes that enter Singapore legally. A film distributor operating on Singapore's pricey Orchard Road reports that all of his deliveries go first to the Censor Board. All excerpted materials are described on sheets taped to the inside of each cassette so that customers can identify what is missing. Books, magazines, and music are also subject to censorship, though most entertainment excisions appear to be more cultural, if not quirky, rather than political. Yet Singaporeans experience little difficulty in purchasing uncensored books, magazines, and videotapes from thriving shops and stalls located across the causeway from Singapore in the Malaysian city of Johore Bahru (Sesser, 1992: 63). Furthermore, the government's broadcasting monopoly has been breached by

the extraordinary increase in video cassette players which by 1987 reached 75 percent of Singaporean homes--the highest average in Asia, surpassing even Tokyo and Sydney (Survey Research Group, 1988: 12)

A heavier hand is evident in censors' treatment of foreign political material--particularly that perceived as interfering with domestic political activity and reflecting poorly on the country in the international community. Information, rather than entertainment, clearly resonates more strongly with the survival orientation.

In the past five years, Western media and media scholars have focused their attention on the impact of a 1986 amendment to the Newspaper and Print Presses Act, empowering the Minister of Communication to cut the Singaporean circulation of foreign publications "engaging in domestic politics." Under the revised law, Time magazine's circulation was halved from 18,000 to 9,000 and later to 2,000 for an article reporting government action against P.A.C. opposition leaders (Hachten, 1989: 825). In 1987, The Asian Wall Street Journal, the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review, and Asia Week had their Singapore circulations cut by more than 90 percent based on various specific charges alleging distorted reporting on Singaporean affairs. In 1987 a Malaysian New Straits Times journalist was among several people arrested for allegedly participating in a Marxist conspiracy and detained without charge for a month. Nigel Holloway of the Far Eastern Economic Review was expelled for no stated reason (Committee to Project Journalists, 1988: 38).

In 1989 foreign accounts of successful Singaporean court battles against these publications and their local printers resulted in a flurry of further legal reprisals against the foreign media, including charges

of contempt of court and the curtailing of visa privileges and work permits (Committee to Protect Journalists, 1990: 106-107).

In 1990 the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists reported the imposition of new restrictions requiring all but 14 foreign publications which "report on the politics and current affairs of Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries" to post a bond and obtain a permit to circulate. Both the Chinese and English-language versions of Asiaweek were included in the ban. Those exempted escaped restriction because "they do not report regularly on Singapore and have not interfered in Singapore's domestic affairs" (Committee to Protect Journalists, 1991: 104-105). The Committee also noted that the Singapore government prohibited Asian Wall Street Journal and Far Eastern Economic Review correspondents from attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in July 1990.

As an additional sidelight on its attitudes toward media fare, it should be noted that the Singaporean government brooks little opposition to the importation of American television and film dramas, such as "Dallas" or "LA Law," that appear on SBC; but it has effectively banned the live transmission of Cable News Network broadcasts, except at the discretion of the SBC. Regional businessmen complain that CNN can be viewed in communist Beijing, but not in capitalist Singapore. This ban has been accomplished by prohibiting satellite-reception dishes and may not be targeted specifically at the U.S. news channel, but at all live foreign television.

While Singapore's curb on foreign media coverage cannot be dismissed, it also should not be exaggerated. For it is the conclusion of this analysis that though the multiple threats to the country's

survival are perceived and articulated by the governing elite, their impact on foreign press activity is narrowly focused on strategic issues. Intervention patterns indicate that fear of increasing the country's vulnerability to outsiders outweighs its concern with the impact on the domestic audiences, given the lopsided circulation lead of domestic political fare over imported content. Furthermore, cognizance must be taken of the actual scope of foreign and domestic media censorship--keeping in mind the prevalence of self censorship among Singapore's media professionals. In 1979, the last date for which inclusive figures could be obtained, 76,346 publications were submitted for examination and 391 were subsequently banned on moral grounds; 1,300 films were reviewed and 4.5 percent banned. Approximately one-third required cuts or editing "on moral, violent, political, or ethnic grounds" (Parker, 1982: 788-789). Subsequent information indicates less restrictive censorship policies.

Although Hachten suggests that many measures curtailing foreign media activity in Singapore may bring about negative financial consequences for islanders, there is little to suggest that the cutbacks of a few thousand issues will have much impact on the printing and publishing industry in Singapore, which grossed \$327 million in 1982 and employed 13,000 (Hachten, 1989: 827). In 1990 Lee reportedly told international pressmen in Hong Kong that "come 1997 [when Hong Kong reverts to Chinese rule], his country would offer the most congenial perch from which Western correspondents could cover Asia," according to a column in the Far Eastern Economic Review (Sesser, 1992: 64).

### Instrumental Characteristics

The instrumental orientation of money-minded Singapore is never disputed, though some dissenters question the morality of instrumental action and charge that materialistic values undermine traditional Asian beliefs. The minimal challenge to the instrumental motive vocabulary elicits little justification for government and press behavior. One of the more telling interpretations of Singaporean instrumentalism is found in Singaporean journalist Mary Lee's observation:

Underneath everything is the housing policy. An ordinary office worker can own his own apartment--a situation that would be the envy of anyone in the United States. The government decided that the way to keep the population quiet was to give everyone a stake (Sesser, 1992: 53).

Clearly, the Singaporean concept of instrumental activity excludes many of the ideological tenets attached to the American instrumental vocabulary. Lee defends his country's closely monitored press by showing American-style press freedom to be only one option available to those nations committed to bettering the material lives of their citizens.

Democracy countered communism by sponsoring what has been advanced as the axiomatic truths of free society, which includes freedom of the press and human rights. But are they universal values? Can you prove their universality? If they are in fact of universal relevance, will they not win just by a process of Darwinian evolution?" (Sesser, 1992: 60).

As Prime Minister Goh observed, in noting why university demonstrations are banned,

[I]f you have several such demonstrations, right away the impression is created that government is not in control of the situation--that the place may become unstable. That will have an impact on foreign investors (Sesser, 1992: 57).

Clearly, the Japanese government's interventionist economic policies align more closely with Singaporean priorities than America's more



ideal-typical model. In some ways, the Singaporeans may be said to have out-maneuvered and out-pragmatized the Western nations at their own game. Buruma reports that admiration for the Japanese is widely voiced in the city, despite the fact that the majority of Chinese were especially targeted by the Japanese during the war. He noted a conversation with a Singaporean businessman of Chinese descent, who claimed, in Buruma's words,

The Japanese, now they have spirit. They are strong, they work hard, they sacrifice, they are No. 1 in the world. Their cars, their machines, their technology, all No. 1 (Buruma, 1988: 23).

As many Singaporeans and most other observers are quick to note, the islanders are obsessed with success, not with alien ideas of freedom--or at least not yet. An independent press is one Western import Lee and his supporters believe they cannot afford. Goh foresees a time when a less intrusive government might be possible, but acknowledges,

The rules would be there, but they would not be intruding into your consciousness every day. That means a newer generation must be put through schools, to be socially educated that this is the norm of behavior. I think it would require twenty or twenty-five years before we can move to that situation (Sesser, 1992: 68).

### Ideational Characteristics

The ideational motive vocabulary plays a minor role in rationalizing Singaporean government and press activity. It is vested in two main value currents that merge. The first, a carryover from its colonial and anti-colonial past, is Singapore's recurring resentment against Western values and culture, that flies in the face of 34 McDonald restaurants, jukeboxes fitted with Western CDs, all-night discos, and European home decor. In the media, anti-Westernism is exhibited in the banning of

Playboy and Cosmopolitan and in the censorship of Western videos to rid them of decadence and violence.

Video distributor Albert Odell explains,

The censors have a yardstick to go by: certain words are one hundred per cent taboo. They allow "fuck" but never "motherfucker." If "mother" is involved it goes. Any frontal bare breast is out, but a side view is O.K. All references to Allah go. In "Young Guns," a guy might be shot twelve times, and they'll say, "Reduce it so he's shot only five times" (Sesser, 1992: 62).

British and US recordings that refer to drugs are prohibited, including "Yellow Submarine" and other songs by the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Eric Clapton, and Elton John.

Most importantly, anti-Western motives justify the country's tightly controlled information media. A Singaporean sociologist of Chinese descent was questioned by Buruma about the government's agenda. Suddenly she lashed out, "Foreigners are always hostile to Singapore, always judging us by Western standards. Why? Just because we are modern, should we be an open society, why?" (Buruma, 1988: 58).

Lee and his countrymen appear to take particular pleasure in besting their powerful Western partners and former mentors. The P.M. boasts, "I speak to Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys as equals. At Cambridge I got two firsts and a star for distinction. Harold Macmillan did not" (Buruma, 1988: 58). Lee's occasional skirmishes with the U.S. State Department arouse pride at home, despite the fact that Americans are the largest importers of Singaporean goods.

The second value system Lee and his ministers are seeking to construct is a revival and repackaging of Confucianism, in order to strengthen efforts to establish a solid Singaporean identity in this heterogenous nation of immigrants and to make Singaporean society more

like the Japanese. These pervasive Asian values are being injected along with exhortations to speak Mandarin in the social campaigns and in the schools, using simplified, less abstract language and glossier, more colorful pictures than traditional texts. Dr. Lau Wai Hart directs the five-year-old "Confucian Ethics (Conthics) Project Team." She explained, "English is for getting on in life, for practical use. But for moral behavior we must learn Chinese, our own language" (Buruma, 1988: 58). Producing a flashy Confucian ethics book, she added, "I am Western educated, so I know all the modern techniques .... We have slides, we have TV, we have cassette tapes, we have video (Buruma, 1988: 118).

Critics of the Conthics Project claim "There is more continuity between the Renaissance, the Reformation and modern Europe than between Confucianism and modern Singapore" (Buruma, 1988: 118). Buruma likewise dismisses the possibility of imposing the ancient Chinese value system on money-driven Singapore. "Pragmatism, the twisted logic of Cambridge and Confucianism, are not really ideas at all; they are tactics to maintain order and achieve prosperity. They are not part of any moral universe (1988: 118).

Yet despite these opinions, the emergence of a Singaporean identity is detectable--particularly among young people. One of 22 students detained as a dissident in 1987 and later released, observed,

The Government achieved the opposite effect to what they intended. Through educational and national service, we felt more Singaporean than our parents. Which is why we wanted more than money--more participation, more responsibility (Buruma, 1988: 118).

### Singapore and the Motive Triangle

Though some fluctuation has occurred in the use of motives in response to changing domestic and international situations, the activity of Singapore's press system has never strayed far from the survivalist orientation. Its position falls in the survival-instrumental motive zone, pulled away from the perimeter by minimal idea-motivated activity, as illustrated in Figure 6 below.




Figure 6. Singaporean Press Activity  
Since Independence: 1963-1991

Nigeria--1960-1991

### National Situation and Motive

Portuguese merchant explorers were first drawn to the West African region that now comprises Nigeria in the mid-16th century by the prospect

of lucrative slave trading. British rule began in 1861 with the annexation of the slave depot at Lagos and expanded over the next 50 years to include the entire 374,000 square-mile area. Over the course of a century, British missionaries and entrepreneurs planted the germ of a national press system that would become the colony's first and most persistent voice for independence. As early as 1881, the Lagos Times and Gold Coast Advertiser advised in an editorial,

We are not clambering [sic] for immediate independence, but it should always be borne in mind that the present order of things will not last forever. A time will come when the colonies on the west coast will be left to regulate their own internal and external affairs (Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 687).

Africa's first vernacular newspaper and modern print journalism were introduced in Nigeria in 1859 by the Rev. Henry Townsend in Abeokuta, in Ogun State. Here the printer priest established the bi-weekly Iwe Irohin Fun Awon Ara Egba Ati Yoruba, (Newspaper in Yoruba for the Egba and Yoruba People), (Omu, 1978).

At the ceremony launching the maiden issue, Townsend declared: [My object is to get the people to read ... that is to beget the habit of seeking information by reading ... I have set on foot a Yoruba Newspaper (Coker, 1970). Townsend is credited not only with being the "father of Nigerian journalism" but also a pioneer in the conversion of spoken vernaculars into written languages. Heavily subsidized by the Church of England, his eight-page paper sold for less than a penny (120 cowries) and its early paternalistic emphasis on health, hygiene, morals, education, and local news is carried forward in today's survivalist press (Akinfeleye, 1984). Among the subjects Townsend stressed was attention to proper attire, as shown by the following paragraph from a 1864 issue:

To wear a shirt without trousers and jacket looks odd; to wear a jacket or coat without a shirt looks still more singular and out of place. It does not look well to see a soldier's helmet or any other head dress worn with country clothes or a soldier's red jacket with naked legs and feet (Okigbo, 1987: 630).

Under British statutes colonial administrators were given broad authority to control African press enterprises and to punish those that voiced opposition to imperial rule. In 1909, a colonial officer said that the purpose of the new Seditious Offense Bill was to provide the state with "power to punish publications ... designed to influence an excitable and ignorant populace ...." (Omu, 1968: 293). Nigerian journalist O.S. Coker wrote,

It was a strong-handed administration, with a you-cannot-do-anything-that-the government-does-not-approve-of philosophy. Within the law of the country, the newspaper is allowed to say so much and at the same time of colonial rule, that much was very little (1968: 43).

A survey of the African press during British rule suggests, however, that these policies further inflamed discontent among the educated elite. The tradition of a highly-partisan and highly-interpretive press emerged in the opposition press, which reached the heights of contentiousness during the colonial era. In 1917 Governor Lord Lugard attempted to impose censorship on "the mendacious native press," which Nwankwo and Kurian describe as the "equivalent of the African drum, a unique means of communication, a sounding board for African ideas and opinions" (1982: 687-688). They attribute the virility of the early native Nigerian press to growing literacy and the ambivalence of colonial authorities, torn between encouraging a British-style institution and putting down a vehicle of insurrection.

In 1937 Nnamdi "Zik" Azikiwe, a dynamic and committed nationalist,

launched the daily newspaper, the West African Pilot, proclaiming "Independence in All Things and Neutral in Nothing Affecting the Destiny of Africa." By the 1940s, circulation exceeded 24,000 daily copies with a readership estimated at between 10 and 20 per copy (Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 688). The Pilot became the flagship for Africa's first chain, the Zik Group, comprised of six daily papers. Zik's newspapers were frequently targeted by the colonial government, periodically shut down and denied lucrative government advertising. One British bureaucrat complained in an official memorandum to the home office: "[The Zik newspapers] are like a plague. They are afflicting the whole country" (Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 688). In the pre-independence years, the Zik newspapers and other native-owned and operated papers were, in fact, idea-motivated and revolutionary in nature. Azikiwe, like other nationalist African newspapermen, became the first president of his country after independence.<sup>5</sup>

Between 1947 and 1974 Cecil King and Lord Roy Thomson, among other Britishers, introduced modern technology to Nigerian printing and also provided training for some of the country's finest journalists. King purchased the Lagos Daily Times and its two magazines and Thomson formed the Amalgamated Press of Nigeria and ran the Daily Express of Lagos with his financial partner, Chief Obafemi Awolowo. In 1974, the last British presence in the Nigerian press was removed with passage of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree, requiring that all stock in domestic companies be owned by Nigerians.

Most international media scholars would not take issue with Ralph Akinfeleye's assessment that by African standards, "the Nigerian Press is by far the oldest and richest in media uses, traditions, developments and

diversities" (Akinfeleye, 1984: 26; Hachten, 1971; Martin, 1991; Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982). As Akinfeleye notes, a 1979 study of African communication infrastructure rated Nigeria's press first in all categories. The tribal rivalries and religious divisions in this Christian-Muslim federation, comprised of disparate states that now number 30,<sup>6</sup> have resulted in a pluralistic press that is at the same time united by a restive nationalism, a phenomenon that Sylvanus A. Ekwelle describes charitably as "the channeling of ethnicity into higher patriotism (1986: 149). Lateef Jakande, publisher of the Nigerian Tribune attributes the comparative vigor of Nigeria's news media to "three things: the tradition of press freedom instilled by Zik and others, the courage and professional spirit of Nigerian editors and publishers and the good sense of some of those in authority" (Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 689). While Ekwelle credits the 1979 Constitution with establishing a framework in which a strong press might operate, he notes that "Nigeria's ethnic cleavages, political pluralism and occasional judicial activism appear to provide a stronger bulwark against press harassment than ... statutory guarantees" (1986: 98).

Despite these indications of vitality, further examination reveals that the activities of the Nigerian press are dominated by survival motives that have prevailed to varying degrees since independence and the achievement of the long-sought revolutionary goal. Since acquiring sovereignty in 1960, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has experienced a succession of civilian and military governments, and for the past seven years the country has been ruled by the 29-member Armed Forces Ruling Council, headed by President (and Air Force General) Ibrahim Babangida. This federal mandate is scheduled to pass to an elected civilian



government in 1992.

Since 1980 Nigeria's population has increased by 56 percent and is now estimated to total 118.7 million (Hunter, 1992: 943).<sup>7</sup> With petroleum accounting for 95 percent of its exports, the nation has been struggling to stabilize its currency, control double-digit inflation, and reschedule its \$34 billion foreign debt, all measures designed to prepare the country for the return to civilian rule. Confronted with frequent government turnovers, overnight about-faces in press policies, and until late 1991, a panoply of economically- and ethnically-based political parties, journalists have clung to the one standard that remains constant in the stormy seas of its colonial legacy--the government-prescribed role of the media as partners in nationbuilding. As private media ownership has dwindled in the declining economic situation, the utility of instrumental action strategies has decreased and all but disappeared--as is the case in almost all sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>8</sup> And while ideational motives account for considerable pointedly political behavior, the survivalist image of the press as "the anchor for the protection of Nigeria's national unity" (Momoh, 1987: 54) is supported in the analysis that follows.

### Survival Characteristics

In The World News Prism, Hachten reports the following exchange between the international press corps in Lagos and a government official, an account attributed to a 1978 report by Sean Kelly:

The Nigerian press spokesman smiled at the roomful of reporters, paused dramatically, and said: "Gentlemen, I've got good news for you today. We are lifting press censorship." In the commotion that followed, one newsman was heard to shout: "Can we report that?" "Unfortunately not," replied the

spokesman. "You see, we never really said publicly that we were imposing press censorship. Therefore, we can hardly announce today that we are lifting it" (Hachten, 1987: 108; Kelly, 1978).

The event is revealing because it underscores the chasm that separates Third and First World logic concerning objective and subjective reality. From the Nigerian government's point of view, the precariousness of the country's new-found sovereignty outweighs any other considerations and, typical of survival-motivated nations in general and former colonial states in particular, living up to the expectations of First Worlders assumes priority only when doing so can result in the achievement of strategic goals.

In a 1987 article, Prince Tony Momoh, then Nigeria's Minister of Information and Culture,<sup>9</sup> argues that "the interest of the nation overrides any other interest." He continues,

[T]he press has a duty to win, maintain, and perpetuate support for the nation as the apex of the collective vested interest of the operators within the pyramid ... at the apex of the pyramid, countries mobilize the media to the well-being of the nation with an approach that may be capitalist, communist, or even hybrid (1987: 54-55).

Like spokesmen from other underdeveloped nations, Momoh alludes to the irrelevance of the East-West political conflict to the southern hemisphere and voices the resentment of those who believe the prolonged Cold War deflected attention from the more pressing economic divisions separating North and South. Distinctions between free and planned economic philosophies hold little interest for countries, such as Nigeria, which must focus their problem-solving resources on more imminent threats. According to Momoh, problems that must be addressed include:

the need to strengthen national unity, the need to express our

faith in the survival of this country as an indivisible, viable entity both politically and economically, and the need to revamp the nation's economy. Others are the needs to increase the national literacy level, update health care delivery, and eliminate the crime syndrome in our society. The national goals and priorities invariably include the achievement of national unity, economic self-reliance, a just and stable society, minimization of indiscipline and corruption, and the adoption of a leadership role in Africa (1987: 56).

As Momoh observes, the aims and objectives are so all consuming "they even define our foreign policy, that is, our vested interest as a nation" (1987: 55).

During the period of the unpopular civilian regime headed by President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983), Momoh, then editor of the Daily Times, gained some national notoriety for refusing to reveal an information source in response to a Senate summons--action that was upheld in court, but ultimately led to his demotion to manpower training manager (Ekwelie, 1986: 99). Despite these independent leanings, Momoh stresses that the rights of the press carry little weight on their own. Rather he describes the media as one of "many links in a chain, each link as strong as the other, each in dedicated service to the chain" (1987: 55). The role of the press is determined by its position "in a division of labor situation," he wrote.

The Nigerian Constitution of 1979 guarantees freedom of expression under Section 36, while adjacent sections protect personal liberty, privacy, and freedom of conscience (Ekwelie: 98). However, Chapter 2 of the document, "Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy" nullifies many of these rights, by spelling out the incumbent duties that accompany them. Specifically, Chapter 2 proclaims that

the press must uphold the aims and objectives of Nigeria as a nation; that the press must ensure that all organs of government (legislative executive, and judiciary) uphold these

aims and objectives and perform the duties imposed in furtherance of nationbuilding; that the press must also hold the government accountable to the people in performance of these duties (Momoh, 1987: 55).

In practice, these articulated responsibilities have served to legitimize government intervention in press activity, on the grounds of dereliction of duty.

Overall, media content is directed at internal events to a far greater degree than is evident in instrumentally-motivated nations. International news receives little attention and even news of nearby countries is considered a waste of limited media resources. The term "Afghanistanism" is used pejoratively to refer to "a misapplication of proximity as a news value." As Ekwelie explains, "It implies reporting on items that can go unreported without an appreciable loss to home readers" (1984: 25). Though Ekwelie concedes that sports, entertainment features, and advertising appeal to readers, he justifies a classic survival press strategy when he advises,

But it is a civic responsibility that a publication give the readers what they are capable of wanting. If we depend on what children want, we may feed them little more than varied confectionery around the age of three. In spite of all protestations to the contrary, human beings love sensational and light-mood news items. If a publisher wants his paper to sell as hot as akara balls in a school premises, he should go hot and heavy into juicy stories. The question must be: Can a developing nation afford the luxury of too much entertainment and titillation in its newspapers and periodicals? (1984: 17).

In 1989 Nigeria published 18 daily newspapers and 30 weeklies, as well as some 40 magazines and journals. The aggregate circulation of newspapers totals about 1 million, or approximately eight copies per thousand population, though in fact, shared readership multiplies the audience to as much as 160 per thousand. The phenomenon of print matter changing hands many times has prompted Ekwelie, a mass communications

professor at the University of Nigeria, to suggest the replacement of cheap newsprint with costlier but more durable paper. He explains,

But in much of Africa, and for obvious reasons, a newspaper copy would make the rounds until it is torn and beyond handling. Even by the time it gets into the hands of groundnut and fish sellers, it is still a source of useful information. Magazines are treated as consumer durables and are kept first on the occasional table but later stored away on the shelf or in the cupboards (1984: 16).

The Lagos Daily Times accounts for about 400,000 of the total daily circulation of newspapers. Other dailies with circulations exceeding 25,000 are the New Nigerian, Nigerian Chronicle, Evening Times, the evening edition of the Daily Times, the Nigerian Tribune, The Renaissance, the Daily Sketch, and the West African Pilot (Hunter, 1992: 947; Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 688). All but one of the dailies are written in English, the lingua Franca and official language of the polyglot country. Five of the 18 are published in Lagos; the others are divided among three state capitals. In general the print media is geographically dispersed and Momoh notes with pride, "Even before UNESCO started creating awareness of the need for rural coverage, the Nigerian press had started to penetrate the hinterland" (Momoh, 1987: 56). The promotion of a regionally- and locally-based media presence, though to a degree a natural outgrowth of Nigeria's geographical size and federal structure, also illustrates a survivalist tolerance for diversity which ideationally-motivated systems do not share.

However, in a nation in which literacy hovers at about 25 percent and is much lower in rural areas, radio is the most pervasive medium. Statesman's Yearbook reports a total of 15.7 million radio receivers (Hunter, 1992: 947) for a population of 118.7 million in 1985, roughly one set for every nine persons. Loudspeakers are frequently mounted in

village centers to increase access to radio broadcasts. Television remains an elite medium with only a half million sets, a growth of only 50,000 since 1977 (Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 687; Hunter, 1992: 943). Ekwelle takes cognizance of television's potential, concluding, "If we believe pop-psychologists, we will regard the African as a visualist. If he is, he should see more pictorial communication than boring verbiage" (1984: 17).

The issue of state versus private ownership is largely a moot question in Nigeria. Between 1960, the year in which independence from Britain was won, and 1975, private ownership declined by 70 percent. Only three dailies remained in private hands by 1975, the year 60 percent of the stock of the largest circulation paper, the Daily Times, was obtained by the federal government (Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 690). Further consolidation and nationalization of the print media have occurred since these figures were published; however, as Akinfeleye notes, "the dismal lack of information [about the media] is so evident in almost every aspect of human endeavor in Africa" (1984: 27). All newspapers are required to be registered with the government and signed copies of each issue must be provided to authorities at the time of publication.

Government ownership includes not only federal holdings, but state and regional ones as well. For instance, the New Nigerian, published in Kaduna and Lagos, was owned by six Northern State governments in 1975 (Sobowale, 1984: 96). Many government-owned papers actually function as tax-supported party organs.

Likewise, public broadcasting is financed by federal and state governments and overseen by agencies at both levels. Radio, television,

and mobile film theatres are widely used in the educational system. Although radio and television are heavily subsidized by the government, revenues are also derived from advertising and license fees. The country is served by seven radio stations and nine television stations.

Ekwelie, though mindful of Western wariness of government-owned media, regards a privately-owned press as "wasteful and a luxury a developing nation can ill-afford" (1984: 15). Rather, he advocates a combination of government and private investment, a partnership following British colonial patterns in which that government seed monies "keep [the press] afloat during the inchoate stages and nurse it to a solvency stage" (1984: 20). Citing a UNESCO publication that reported 14 African nations without a single daily newspaper, he argues that "it will take more than just patriotism for a businessman to invest in so risky a business as newspapering (1984: 19). In a memorable metaphor, Ekwelie acknowledges,

[I]t is a practice civil libertarians may deplore because it would necessarily stand between the press and its role as a watch-dog. But where the dog is physically absent, not much watching can be done (1984: 20).

A 1975 content analysis comparing newspaper coverage by privately-owned and government-owned newspapers of two potentially embarrassing national events showed no significant difference in the thoroughness of coverage. However, researcher Idowu Sobowale concluded, government papers were less likely to report information unfavorable to the image of the government (1984).

It is telling that Nigerian commentaries on government censorship and post-publication reprisals--at least those available in the West--invariably focus on events occurring under previous regimes and

administrations. Likewise, charges of journalists' extracting bribes and otherwise behaving in "unprofessionally" are usually reported in the past tense. Yet, summaries of more current press activity, compiled by Western human rights organizations, such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, indicate that government press advisories are frequently violated and that rather pointed media attacks on government policies continue. The inference may be made that government crackdowns are sufficiently sporadic and arbitrary to not deter those journalists committed to monitoring official activity, though certainly government measures encourage self-censorship. In any event, Nigerian analyses of government-press interaction that appear in international publications shed little light on current government-press relationships.

In his 1986 interpretation of his country's press under civilian rule (1979-1983), Ekwelie cited examples of the Shagari administration's efforts to control the mass media, including firings, demotions, transfers, detention, and even "caning" of journalists. In addition, he documented the practice of required insertion of officially-sponsored articles, the purposeful distribution of newsprint and other raw materials to favored newspapers, and the frequent harsh application of sedition, libel, and official secrets laws. When the armed forces moved in and deposed the civilian government in 1984, suspending parts of the Constitution, Ekwelie notes that the transition brought "a sigh of relief to the beleaguered newsmen and women, who in their editorials, gave the intervention a chorus of approval" (1986: 105).

As information minister on President Babangida's cabinet, Momoh concluded his analysis of the mid-1980s Nigerian press by noting that the achievements of the press were less the result of journalists themselves



than the "outcome of the open and humane nature of President Ibrahim Babangida's administration, which has consistently regarded the press as a true partner in progress" (1987: 57).

To locate examples of government intervention and more detailed reports of press activity during incumbent administrations, it is necessary for Westerners without access to the Nigerian media themselves, to turn to other sources. During 1989 and 1990, the Committee for the Protection of Journalists reported the closing of seven newspapers (for up to two months); the detention of 46 print journalists, publishers, broadcasters, or technical engineers; and the firing of three radio newscasters. In January 1989 a new law was passed giving the self-regulatory Nigerian Press Council the power to register journalists--a move greeted with alarm in newspaper columns. In 1990, official retribution against the press was directed primarily against over-zealous reporting of an April 22 coup-attempt, in particular the broadcast and printing of speeches by coup plotters (Committee to Protect Journalists, 1990: 88-90; 1991, 88-90.)

In comparison with its neighbors, Nigeria's attitude toward foreign journalists is rather benign. Under the current military administration, a journalist for Agence France-Presse was threatened with expulsion for objectionable reporting of domestic affairs and a Newsweek staff writer was expelled as a "prohibited immigrant" in 1987 (Committee to Protect Journalists, 1988: 25). The following year a New York Times correspondent was arrested and detained for several hours for investigating a story on toxic waste dumping in West Africa; his film and notes were confiscated (Committee to Protect Journalists, 1989: 68).

Since 1979, immigration authorities are no longer authorized to ban

foreign correspondents, though embassies and consulates frequently exercise slow caution in granting visas. While some monitoring of foreign reports going out of the country occurs, little attention is given to incoming materials. The major international news agencies operate in Nigeria and foreign broadcasts are not interfered with. International publications, such as Time, The Times of London, and the New York Times, are available, as well as foreign films and videos--though limited viewing facilities limit their exposure and impact (Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982). In view of the country's shifting domestic situation, it appears that authorities are kept too busy diffusing the political and cultural conflicts of Nigeria's own diverse population to worry about the impact of less germane notions from abroad.

#### Ideational Characteristics

Current efforts by the Babangida government to ease political and social tensions in preparation for resumption of civilian rule at the end of 1992 are focused on aligning administrative jurisdictions with traditional tribal territories. In August 1991, nine new states were created, bringing the total to 30, plus a Federal Capital Territory. Other initiatives reduced the number of political parties that have served as political mouthpieces for ethnic and religious beliefs. The choice of parties, which totaled at least five in 1986, was legally limited to two in 1991 state elections. The National Republican Convention, favoring free-market economics, garners support in the Islamic northern states; whereas the left-leaning Social Democratic Party is more popular in the Christian southern states. Another indication of official attempts to reduce tribal feuding was the omission of questions

concerning ethnicity and religion in the recent census.

The strongly politicized Nigerian press mirrors the divisiveness that threatens to tear the country apart. More than 200 different ethnic groups comprise the country's population, each speaking a different language or dialect. The Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo tribes are the largest and their languages are spoken by more than 50 percent of the population. Indigenous enmities contribute substantially to the ideational activity of the press. Added to this are decades of vociferous opposition to British colonial rule that inculcated a tradition of intemperate, highly inflammatory media rhetoric and a predilection for social change. That British influence would result in a views-centered press rather than an American-style news-centered press is not surprising. Though the activity of Nigeria's press today is somewhat reminiscent of the United States' early ideational press, for example, the elitist composition of the audience and high subscription rates,--this is more likely the consequence of a shared linkage to British imperial policies and residual revolutionary zeal rather than an indication that Nigeria is proceeding along some predetermined modernization path.

As Ekwelie emphasizes, "Interpretative journalism is something the present generations of Africans cannot have too much of" (1984: 21). But even this observation is colored by the notion that the alien idea of national sovereignty must be diffused among the provincial masses in order to better the chances for Nigeria's survival. Journalistic interpretation is especially necessary, he writes, in handling wire stories from international news agencies. Not only must terms like "automatic telephone exchange, "satellite communication," and "electrical fuse" be explained in terms the audience can understand, but foreign

phrases that have no meaning for Nigerians must be edited. He illustrates the latter point with a rather convincing example of a cultural non-sequitur,

A "winter of discontent" conjures up a picture of double misery to an inhabitant of the temperate region. A "harmattan of discontent" may be the nearest thing to this seasonal misery for a Sahelian African (Ekwelie, 1984: 22).

Ideational tribal identification strengthens opposition to government efforts to build national cohesion. Ironically the same idea-based tradition that helped bring about Nigeria's statehood today threatens its stability.

#### Instrumental Characteristics

Though economic stability and a higher standard of living are important goals of the Nigerian government, instrumental activity and economic progress are frustrated by the need to first establish economic and social stability. At the present time, instrumental press activity is most evident in the publicly-condemned but widely-practiced journalistic expedient of extracting bribes from those wishing to publicize or conceal information. Public officials who control newsprint allocations and other sources of press funding engage in similar forms of profit taking (Momoh, 1987).

#### Nigeria and the Motive Triangle

On the motive triangle shown in Figure 7 below, the position of Nigeria's press system differs from those of other nations examined here because it is essentially two-dimensional.




Figure 7. Nigerian Press Activity  
Since Independence 1960-1991

Preoccupied by survival, the nation necessarily finds itself engaged in some ideational activity intrinsic to its struggle. The potentially splintering effects of an instrumentally-motivated press are perceived as yet another threat, an optional risk that cannot be justified in Nigeria's current situation.

## Endnotes

1. Chinese academicians refer to Lee's formula of quelling discontent by freeing its economy, but not its political system, as "neo-authoritarianism." Russell Heng believes that neo-authoritarianism could emerge as the primary challenge to democratic capitalism in Asia (Heng, 1990; Sesser, 1992: 60).
2. Ian Buruma is also the author of God's Dust: A Modern Asian Journey, (1989) in which many observations taken from his New York Times Magazine article (1988) first appeared.
3. Particularly striking evidence of the Western proclivity to project long-term eventualities from short-term patterns can be found in American Francis Fukuyama's proclamation of the triumph of Western political ideas and capitalist economics based on international events since the 1970s, and most strikingly, since Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms starting in 1985. Fukuyama labels this perceived climax to the historical dialectic "the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992).
4. Gerrymandering of electoral districts distorts the level of the political opposition to the P.A.P. In August 1991, opposition parties garnered almost 40 percent of the popular vote, but won only four seats in Parliament--nevertheless the largest number held by Lee's opponents since the early 1960s. Persecution of opposition leaders and elected members and occasional prosecution further discourages support for rival parties (New York Bar Association, 1990; Sesser, 1992.)
5. Dr. Francis Kwame Nkrumah, a journalist, became Ghana's first prime minister in 1957, with the cessation of British rule. Jomo Kenyatta (ne Kamau wa Ngengi), one of the first African editors in Kenya under the British, became his country's first president, while in exile, in 1960. All of these men rose to national prominence through their journalistic activity.
6. In the 1960s, the eastern Ibo state of Biafra sought to withdraw from the federation and establish its own sovereignty. The civil war that resulted extended from 1967-70 and ended in the defeat of the secessionist movement.
7. On November 28, 1991, Nigeria undertook a new census. Seven hundred census takers across the country conducted the canvass, during which time shops, factories, and schools were closed, borders, sealed, and a curfew imposed to keep people at home. The last official census was conducted in 1973 and its results nullified because of charges that figures had been inflated artificially ("Nigeria: Census Taken," 1991).

8. As Dennis Wilcox observes, "The Kenyan press is an anomaly among the press systems of the Black African states in that private and commercial interests still control and operate the mass and popular press" (1982: 569)

9. In January 1992, a new cabinet was sworn in by President Babangida and Momoh was replaced as minister of information and culture by Sam Oyovbaire.

CHAPTER VII  
CASE SUMMARIES OF IDEA-ORIENTED PRESS SYSTEMS  
--IRAN 1977-1982 AND THE SOVIET UNION  
1900-1991

Introduction

In the concluding chapter of Four Theories of the Press, Wilbur Schramm wrote that, to the Soviets, "there are not 'two sides to every question.' There are only a focused and an unfocused lens on reality .... [T]he basic concepts and goals are regarded as absolute and unchangeable .... " (1956: 120-121). Schramm's assertion that the Soviet press was subordinate to an all-encompassing idea system and that its guardians were seen as holding a monopoly on the ability to discern absolute truth is basically accurate for most of the country's history. The dynamic theory breaks with Schramm over his assumption that this pattern was or is unique to the communist bloc or to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.

As shown, idea-motivated action is exhibited by all nations and informs press behavior in all systems to some degree. However, ideational vocabularies of motives prevail in societies in which the value order is given priority over economic and material goals and in situations in which survival concerns are not paramount or can be subsumed by the idea--as, for example, in Israel, where Zionism and



national security are inexorably linked, or in South Africa, where apartheid and the preservation of the minority white government are perceived to be concomitant.

Because all information, morals, ethics, beliefs, philosophies, and rules of behavior fall within the purview of the overarching idea, any activity that is not prescribed is regarded as heretical or at least suspect. For this reason, ideationally-dominated systems exhibit less tolerance for pluralistic thinking than survival- or instrumentally-oriented systems, and they display the most antipathy toward press independence. Day-to-day media activities typically reveal little fluctuation from the ideal type on the motive triangle. One indication of this is that though examples of ideational media behavior are present in survival and instrumental systems, press features commonly found in the other types of media may be totally absent in ideational systems. For example, until Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost' Soviet newspapers carried no society news, no pictures of brides, no astrological advice, no cartoon caricatures of Soviet public officials, no top-40 radio, no sexually-titillating photos, no daily stock-market reports, and almost no display advertising. In contrast, economic news, nature and travel features, crossword puzzles, sports scores, winning lotto numbers, letters-to-the-editor, television documentaries, morning exercise shows, and virtually all other items in the Soviets' media repertoire, including occasional features on happy, productive workers, can be found somewhere in the vast assortment of U.S. media fare.

Ideationally-motivated systems are illustrated first in a case summary of the Iranian press from the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in 1977 to the triumph of the grassroots opposition two years later and

the routinization of the theocratic government in the early 1980s. Iran's press activity appears to more closely approximate the ideal type than the Soviet Union's, the subject of the second study, because its shorter history has provided less time and opportunity for divergence, and because the belief-system itself is more pervasive and intrusive than Marxist-Leninism. Iran's experience is also informative because it indicates the effectiveness of traditional and "small" media and horizontal modes of communication in the modern or, perhaps, post-modern era.

The scope of the Soviet press analysis, 1917-1991, parallels that of the U.S. press study, for an attempt is made to summarize press activity over the course of its 84-year history. It was the determination to develop a theoretical structure that could accommodate the Soviet press system along with the rest of the world's systems that ultimately led to the construction of the dynamic theory. Since this lengthy project began with the Soviet press, it seems only fitting that it should end with the Soviet press, albeit during the course of this work both that superpower and its media system have ceased to exist--at least in their previous form.

One feature of ideationally-dominated nations that played an undeniable role in the selection of subjects for this chapter is the difficulty a foreign-based researcher encounters in attempting to gather phenomenological accounts originating in the media of idea-oriented nations. Xenophobia and ideaphobia, inherent in such systems, raise barriers rarely encountered even in the most repressive survivalist countries. The temptation to rely on the more accessible commentaries of vocal opponents, e.g., Soviet-Jewish dissidents, anti-apartheid activists

abroad, and Iranian monarchists in exile--is to be resisted in data gathering, though these views may add depth to the interpretive component of the research process.

The focus on two countries whose sovereignty was established by social/political revolution is not meant to imply that only nations born of revolution are motivated primarily by ideas. The controlled press activity of South Africa, particularly between 1986 and 1991, is rationalized as essential to the maintenance of a reactionary idea firmly rooted in the nation's historical memory. Again, it must be noted that it is not only the primacy of an overarching idea or action that begets the motive vocabulary, but challenge to the idea and the activity it inspires.

## Iran and Revolution

### National Situation and Motive

The overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in January 1979, closely followed by the return of the exiled Shi'a leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran came as an unexpected surprise to outside observers, despite the fact that these events had been preceded for two years by a highly-visible urban revolution. As the noted scholar of revolutions, Theda Skocpol, acknowledged in 1982, the Iranian experience "challenged expectations about revolutionary causation that I developed through comparative-historical research on the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions" (1982: 266). The overthrow shook Skocpol and others' assumption that successful revolutions evolve from a confluence of social

forces which includes economic discontent at home, military pressures from abroad, and political splits between the ruling apparatus and the economic elite.

The triumph of a mass rebellion fueled and organized by old-fashioned "turban-headed" clerics (ulama) over an efficient modern police state with powerful foreign friends forced Skocpol to rethink her conviction that revolutions are not "made," but simply come "unintentionally on all concerned." For, she explained, it was the strength and cohesion of the Shi'ite belief system that ultimately brought down the Pahlavi dynasty. "[T]his remarkable revolution also forces me to deepen my understanding of the possible role of idea systems and cultural understandings in the shaping of political action," Skocpol said (1982: 268).

Iran's (or Persia's) 2700-year history chronicles the competition for land and power that continues to define political relations in the Middle East. Located at the center of a number of ancient empires, the region has witnessed a succession of invading and occupying Macedonians, Turks, Arabs, and Romans who vied for control with ambitious Persian emperors. In the 19th century Britain and Russia competed for political influence, culminating in both countries occupying Iran during World War II. In the 20th century, superpower and other core attention was drawn to Iran because of its plentiful oil resources; however, its underlying attraction was strategic--proximity to its next-door neighbor to the north, the Soviet Union. Although its last foreign occupation had ended almost 35 years before, the hands-on intervention of foreign powers continued to have an impact upon domestic agenda up to the 1979 revolution when the U.S.-backed Shah was forced out.

The Pahlavi dynasty came into being in the 1920s with a successful coup d'état led by Colonel Reza Kahn against the 130-year-old Qajar dynasty. The colonel crowned himself Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1925 and ruled over an anachronistic constitutional-feudal state that combined centralized government with a landed aristocracy. It was the Reza Shah who changed the country's name from Persia to Iran in 1935.

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, foreign influence combined with domestic agitation had sped the country's adoption of several modern political and social institutions, including the Constitution of 1906, the formation of political parties, the establishment of a National Assembly in 1925, and the emergence of an active and public-minded press--all of which atrophied somewhat during the course of Reza Shah's dictatorship. In 1941 British occupiers forced Reza Shah, a German-sympathizer, to abdicate, and by the end of the war the Allied powers had established his son, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, on the peacock throne. After almost a decade of persistent domestic opposition to the resurrected monarchy, the second and last Pahlavi Shah's power over rival factions was consolidated in 1953 with the assistance of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

An acute awareness of history, kept alive by rich written and oral traditions, has strengthened the ethnic and national pride of the Iranian people and periodically renews their fear and distrust of foreigners. Though acknowledging the influence of their Arab and Turkic neighbors and the many common bonds they share, Iranians nevertheless do not consider their nation to be an Arab state. Sixty-six percent of Iranian citizens, according to a 1970 census, are of Indo-European descent, recognized as the true Persian "race"; 25 percent are Turks; 5 percent Kurds; and only

4 percent semitic Arabs. The Persian identity thus insulated Iran against the pan-Arab enthusiasm that gripped much of the Middle East in the period from the 1950s to the 1970s.

The last Shah's absolutist reign was characterized by ostentatious pro-Western habits and pro-modernization strategies that catered to state bureaucrats, foreign investors, and wealthy landowners. The pursuit of international petrodollars oriented the country to an export economy that employed few domestic workers but lavished large sums on the military, modern construction, and on development programs that benefited the lifestyles of the economic elite while squeezing the middle and lower classes. In the "White Revolution" of the 1960s, selective land reforms were implemented that rewarded wealthier peasants, but dispossessed many rural workers. Opposition to the Shah's economic policies arose among the growing urban population, many of whom retained rural ties. The Shah responded by strengthening the arm of the secret police (SAVAK). Other measures to stifle dissent and tighten social control included tightening control over the mass media, disempowering the Shi'ite clergy, and, when these devices failed, declaring martial law.

Measures against the clergy alienated a social institution that had provided structure and continuity across classes and generations for centuries. It was Shi'ite organization that linked the merchants' bazaar with urban intellectuals and rural peasants. Land reform in the 1960s adversely affected many Shi'ite clerics and institutions, while welfare, educational, and legal reforms removed the clergy's traditional patrimonial functions and placed these responsibilities under the control of state agencies. Islamic religious education was restricted to a few traditional centers and influential leaders were sent into provincial and

foreign exile. From these sequestered points, their activist messages were relayed to less controversial and less suspect clerics in the major cities, who conveyed the words on to the masses at public and private gatherings.

#### Survival Characteristics of the Pahlavi Press

Blind to the efficacy of traditional communication networks and low-tech media used by the ulama to mobilize the masses, the Shah and his ministers concentrated their attentions on the modern mass media to turn aside growing opposition to his policies and calls for ouster. Overestimation of the power of mass media and underestimation of the impact of traditional modes of communication were indications of the extent to which the Shah had cut himself off from daily life in Iran. At the time of the Revolution, only 37 percent of the population of 38 million were literate. The daily newspaper circulation was approximately 12 per 1000 population, and annual newsprint consumption was less than two pounds per capita, less than half that of neighboring Egypt with a similar population and 30 percent literacy. Radio receivers numbered 263 sets per 1000 population and television 55 per 1000 (Kurian, Vol. I: 307; Vol. II: 1070).

Nevertheless, press activity under the Shah in the late 1970s appears to have been fairly vigorous with 20 daily and 21 weekly newspapers and more than 70 magazines published in the capital of Tehran alone. Eighty-five provincial newspapers were registered. In addition to newspapers in the native language, Farsi, a handful of English-, Armenian- and French-language papers were also published. With the

exception of a few political organs and official publications, all newspapers were owned by private individuals. Eleven of the most influential newspapers were owned by three major groups controlled by wealthy Iranian families (Kurian, Vol. II: 1071).

Despite these signs of press profitability, press laws enacted in the 1950s and 60s underscored the Shah's survivalist orientation. One law specified the educational and character requirements for journalists; another outlawed publication of newspapers with circulations less than 3,000 and magazines falling below 5,000. The 1965 "Reporters' Code of Journalism" imposed mandatory licensing of all print media with the Ministry of Information and banned all communist publications in the country. The threats to Iran's security and the Shah's legitimacy which motivated the Shah to tighten official control over journalistic enterprise were perceived Soviet expansionism, intensified by the activities of the Communist Party of Iran (Tudeh) and the appeal of Socialist pan-Arabism, then sweeping Muslim countries. To the Western-looking Shah, this movement appeared to be an invitation back to the primitive living conditions of the Crusades.

Interestingly, as the threat of overthrow became imminent in spring 1978, the tottering regime authorized a liberalization of the press. Prime Minister Jaafar Sharifemami brushed aside the new restrictions imposed under martial law in an effort to stop the flood of rumors that circulated in the politically-charged environment. "[Rumors] are our worst enemy," a high SAVAK official confided to a Washington Post correspondent and "anything," even an unfettered press, was preferable. An editorial in the Tehran Journal noted: "The country's press enjoys a minimal reputation for objectivity and people came not to trust what the



press says and rumor mills flourish" (Kandal, 1978). Prime Minister Sharifemami ordered stunned editors to liberalize and expand their coverage of all public occurrences, warning them, "If you do not report such events the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation ... ) will!" (Kandal, 1978.)

Thus the "public's right to know," commonly associated with instrumental rationales, was adopted into the survivalist vocabulary of motives to justify a desperate action strategy. As the Washington Post's Kandal reported, the papers quickly made up for lost time, targeting the rich and powerful and threatening to focus their sights on the imperial family itself. Government owned and operated broadcast media also participated in the liberalization, adding coverage of demonstrations and other protest activity to official releases about the Shah. Nevertheless, editors agreed to continue their ban on certain taboo subjects, among them "the banned Tudeh or Iranian Communist Party, demonstrators' slogans such as 'Down with - and death to the Shah' or criticism of the Shah himself or the military" (Kandal, 1978).

The last-ditch adoption of a Western concept to save his government may be interpreted as a further example of the Shah's cosmopolitan proclivities, but perhaps better serves as an illustration of his failure to comprehend the actual workings of Western political life.

Kazem Zarnegar, editor of the Kayhan International, took advantage of the thaw to discuss previous press policies that prevailed under the Shah.

The minister of information used to call regularly to say what could and couldn't appear and on what page and with what size headline. The prime minister and other ministers used to call up at 5 o'clock in the morning and [ask], "Why did you write this?" (Kandal).<sup>1</sup>

During the Shah's reign, imported Western newspapers, magazines, and motion pictures were widely available in major cities. The middle and upper classes turned to foreign media for information and even for news of their own country. Mowlana reports that "American and European 'girlie' magazines overflowed Tehran's newsstands" and that National Iranian Radio and Television hired Los Angeles and London disc jockeys for their English-language broadcasts (1979: 108). The liberal policy toward imported media fare is consistent with survivalist behavior that tends to focus more attention on outgoing reports than on incoming fare. It was the failure of the cosmopolitan Shah to focus early enough on the domestic threat in the streets of his own city that would be his undoing.

#### Ideational Characteristics of the Revolutionary and the Post-Revolutionary Press

While a plethora of poor judgment calls, policy shortcomings, and social insensitivities can be cited to explain the fall of the Pahlavi monarchy, the ultimate capitulation of the Pahlavi regime was due to a failure to establish legitimacy. In contrast, the Shi'ite clerics who led the revolution and would lead the Islamic Republic of Iran never lost theirs.

Shi'a Islam is the more conservative and fundamental of the two major branches of Islam, but at the present time Iran and Iraq are the only Muslim states in which the majority of believers are Shi'ites rather than Sunni. According to the most recent Statesman's Yearbook, 96 percent of Iranians are Shi'ites, 3 percent are Sunnis, and 1 percent are non-Moslem<sup>2</sup> (Hunter, 1991: 710). The duty of religious leaders to resist unjust secular authority is grounded in the founding myth of the

religion, in which the martyr Husayn willingly sacrificed himself in the cause of resisting a usurper caliph, Yazid. Skocpol interprets the Husayn myth as providing legitimation for efforts against the Shah, identified as the evil tyrannical "Yazid of the present age."

Shi'ite ulama share authority with secular political leaders, and Islam recognizes no distinction between religion and state. Mowlana writes, "Islam is not a religion per se; it is a total life view with an ideology and political economy" (1979: 111). In an interview with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, Khomeini said, "[T]he word Islam does not need adjectives such as democratic. Precisely because Islam is everything, it means everything. It is sad for us to add another word near the word Islam, which is perfect" (Fallaci, 1979). Many emperors in Iran's history have enlisted the support of the clergy and incorporated them as political allies. It was the Shah's deliberate disembedding of the Shi'ite clergy from the state apparatus and the landholding aristocracy that drove the ulama to seek reaffirmation of their influence over the masses (Arjomand, 1981; Skocpol, 1982).

The intertwining of spiritual and secular spheres is particularly apparent in the teeming life of the urban bazaar, which as of 1977 continued to dominate the growing import trade by which most urban Iranians fed and clothed themselves. It also accounted for the employment of an estimated 72 percent of all domestic workers in the mid 1970s (Halliday, 1979: Chapter 7). "The power of the bazaar is due not only to the economic importance of the merchant class, but also to its political and social influence," Mowlana notes (1979: 109). And it was in these narrow-streeted enclaves that the traditional communication infrastructure of the Shi'a clergy directed and channeled opposition to

the Shah. The collective rituals brought Iranian men together for daily and weekly public prayer meetings at the country's 100,000 mosques, as well as at shrines, theological colleges, missions and discussion groups (doreh.) among other places (Mowlana, 1979: 110). These familiar and well-understood centers for the outpouring of expression provided opportunities for unobtrusive participation by the devout and non-devout alike. The gatherings, led by clerics, also provided a conduit for the ideas passed on to the exiled Khomeini. Other traditional public locations for fusing and fomenting revolutionary ardor, Mahmud Bigdely maintains, were the tea shops, public baths, and sports arenas. (Bigdely, 1989).

In his analysis of the Iranian Revolution," American academic Hamid Mowlana writes,

"Small media"--cassette tapes, xerox, tape recorders, and telephone--could be used to communicate and still escape the control of the regime. From Paris, Ayatollah Khomeini sent his messages through telephone and tapes to Iran, where they were copied by the thousands and made their way through the informal and traditional communication network to the nation. This method of communication provided both the credibility and excitement of oral messages and the permanence and accessibility of written messages (1979: 111).

Mahmud Bigdely, who was a schoolteacher in Iran at the time of the revolution, recalls that small media, including megaphones, loudspeakers, and wall writing, drew far larger audiences than the mass media, but went largely unnoticed by authorities. He writes,

[t]he long tradition of secret societies in Iran has made it possible for communication networks through small media to be less visible. Through the centuries people have learned how to maintain the exchange of news and rumors despite considerable control and censorship .... Revolutionary leaders relied heavily on small media due to the ability of people to maintain their secrecy and security (1989).

The primacy of interpersonal communication versus mass communication

in Muslim society is traced by Islam media analyst Imtiaz Hasnain to the habits of Muhammed himself. He writes,

Oratory (al khitabah) and letter writing (al risalah) have been the source of communication ever since the advent of Islam. They are the forms of persuasive communication used by the Prophet Muhammed (pbuh) and other Muslim savants for the propagation and dissemination of the faith of Islam through speeches delivered to various congregations and through letters written to different kings and Arab chiefs. It was through oratory that the Prophet preached his new religion to the Arabs (Hasnain, 1988: 187).

The return of "Imam" Khomeini from France established continuity between revolutionary strategies and the new political order. For some believers the Ayatollah's arrival on the scene fulfilled the messianic yearning for the return of the "Twelfth Imam," destined, according to Shi'ite myth, to reappear at the coming of a perfect Islamic community.<sup>3</sup>

Two months after the Ayatollah's arrival and the appointing of a provisional government, the Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed, replacing the former Empire of Iran. The constitution, which sought to reconcile democratically-elected and clerical authority, was ratified in December 1989. Under its provisions, supreme authority was given to the Spiritual Leader (wali faqih), but other clerical bodies shared power with an elected president and parliament. Khomeini occupied the position of Spiritual Leader until his death in June 1989.<sup>4</sup>

Defending the proposed constitution to newswoman Fallaci, the Ayatollah said,

This law, which the people will ratify, is in no way in contradiction with democracy. Since the people love the clergy, have faith in the clergy, want to be guided by the clergy, it is right that the supreme religious authority should oversee the work of the prime minister or the president of the republic, to make sure that they don't make mistakes or go against the Koran (Fallaci, 1979).

For Khomeini and other spiritual guardians of the faith, their interpretations of the Koran and Islamic divine law (Shar'iah) is infallable and not subject to question. As Teheranian notes,

The Shar'iah has no life of its own independently of its custodians--the Islamic Ulama. There is no priesthood in Islam, but for all practical purposes, the community of preachers, jurists, judges, and leading Ulema--all constitute a communication elite of learned people who act as ministers of Islam (1988: 196).

In 1979 a new legal system, based on the Shar'iah was implemented under the new constitution. In this system, court officials are appointed by the Spiritual Leaders. The harshness of the legal codes is consistent with the absolutism that typifies ideationally-oriented nations. In 1990 economic crimes were added to the 109 offences that carry the death penalty." The belief-system and its rituals extend into virtually every sphere of human activity in this life and in the projected behavior in the hereafter. They also are applied at the most personal levels of behavior, resulting in an all-encompassing ideational net that surpasses Marxist-Leninist dictates in its detail and scope.

Not surprisingly, the elaborate motive vocabulary justifies almost total clerical authority of the mass media, though the print media remain privately owned. Abdullah Schleifer, a Beirut-based former NBC correspondent now teaching mass communication in Cairo, maintains that a major tenet of Muslim media is the importance of distinguishing good from evil. Schleifer claims that the "public's right to know" and the notion that "nothing is sacred" are as inherently anti-Islamic as the interest-based core (usury) of modern banking (Schleifer, 1986: 122). In a similar vein, Siddiqi paraphrases Pakistani Muqhees-ud-din's instruction to Muslim journalists to

not be satisfied merely by putting into print all that is fit to print in the common man's interest. Rather, he should always fight the evil and promote the right. The criteria for the evil and the right should of course be based on the principles of Quoran [the Koran] (Siddiqi, 1991: 21; Muqhees-ud-din, 1980: 89.)

These statements attesting to the existence and discernability of absolute truths and absolute values are elements in the Islamic vocabulary of motives that justify the practice of controlling media content. They are responses to the ongoing instrumental challenge, implicit in BBC broadcasts and other Western media fare, recalled from pre-revolutionary days in Tehran. The absolutist motive weakens the force of Article 24 of the 1979 constitution, which states that print media are free to "print all matters except those that are detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public," (Shoar-Ghaffari, 5).

During the first few months of the Islamic republic, the provisional government, made up mostly of Western-educated liberals, sought to frame press guarantees similar to those found in the United States. However, growing public opposition to arbitrary newspaper policies began to surface in the summer of 1979, Shoar-Ghaffari reports. The most concerted influence on new press law was exerted by Islamic committees made up of media employees pledged to "purge their staff[s] in order to prevent publication of stories harmful to the revolution" (Shoar-Ghaffari, 1991: 4). A strike against the prominent newspaper, Kayhan, by an Islamic committee was reported to the Ayatollah Khomeini, who responded by praising the committee and demanding that the press write "what people want" not what journalists see fit, Shoar-Ghaffari reports.

So, during the pre-constitution period despite the disposition of the provisional government and some support from moderate

religious leaders ... , the government proved ineffective and unable to protect the press from mob attacks attacks and Islamic pressure groups (1991: 4).

The first press law, passed late in 1979, met with opposition from media organizations. An open letter of complaint, signed by 258 journalists, complained that the new draft legislation was based on the constitution of the old monarchy and was more reactionary than press policies passed during the previous 60 years. The day the law was passed armed members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards occupied the offices of the newspaper Ayandeghan, and government officials promised to prosecute its staff for counter-revolutionary policies and acts (Shoar-Ghaffari, 1991: 4). During August and September 1979, 41 newspapers and magazines were closed, 33 of them permanently and 18 foreign correspondents were expelled. A month later 28 new newspapers were licensed. Especially targeted were left-wing publications of Iran's communist and Marxist parties that had allied with the revolutionary movement. The government Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance was created in 1980 to censor and manage the media (Kurian, Vol. II, 1982: 1071).

Kurian reports that hundreds of journalists were jailed in 1980 and that the now prohibited National Union of Iranian Journalists had estimated that more than 75 percent of 4,000 Iranian journalists were either in exile, jail, or unemployed by the end of the second year of the Islamic Republic. In November of that year, a ban on journalists working for U.S. and British news organizations was lifted, but all American journalists had left Iran in July when their credentials were not renewed (Kurian, Vol. II, 1982: 1071).

The press law that eventually was drafted under provisions of the new constitution was not concluded until January 1985. Consisting of six



chapters and 38 articles, among other things the lengthy document contains an outline of the role and mission of the press. These are to enlighten public opinion and increase knowledge; to promote the constitution and its goals; to deemphasize racial, ethnic, and regional differences among people; and "to fight against the manifestations of colonial culture (i.e., prodigality, waste, vanity, luxury, spread of prostitution) and to diffuse and propagate the genuine Islamic culture and to strengthen the policy of 'Neither East, nor West'" (Shoar-Ghaffari 1991: 5).

In 1987 the major dailies were all printed in Tehran and included Humhori-yi Islami, Resalat, Kayhan, Abrar, and Etalaat. The Tehran Times and Kayhan International are published in English. Circulation figures are unavailable, but Shoar-Ghaffari estimates that Etalaat, the leading daily has a circulation range between 350,000 to 500,000 copies daily, with much higher exposure assumed because of multiple readership (1991: 7).

In these dailies, some latitude is provided for debate on secular issues, U.S. government press researcher Helen Metz reports. "While all these newspapers are considered to be appropriately Islamic, they do not endorse every program of the central government (1989: 220). She notes that one paper presents the official government line of the prime minister, whereas another is consistently critical of government policies, especially economic policies. She adds that other newspapers are critical of government, but do not espouse a consistent position (Metz: 220).

Today every newspaper and periodical must be licensed and these documents are denied to any suspect publication. Shoar-Ghaffari reports

additional controls that include strong press laws, control of newsprint supply, foreign exchange, governmental advertising, and other essential goods and services. He also notes new gatekeeping devices and "centralized news management mechanisms such as the Islamic Republic News Agency and a newly formed Central News Unit (Shoar-Ghaffari, 1991: 6).

At present, all broadcasting activity is government-controlled and, presumably, government-owned. Television and radio stations are located in Tehran and the major provincial cities and some broadcasts are conducted in Azeri and Kurdish languages. Several banned political groups broadcast into the country from stations in Iraq or the Caucasus states of Azerbaijan and Armenia. BBC and the Voice of America broadcast in Farsi on FM radio channels, Metz reported (1989: 221).

The least intrusive government policies appear to govern book publishing. No prior censorship of nonfiction exists, though books contrary to Islam may be confiscated. Fiction is subject to prior censorship. Undoubtedly, the death sentence imposed by the Spiritual Leader on Solomon Rushdie upon publication of his Satanic Verses in Britain in 1989 has provided a strong incentive for self-censorship among would-be novelists, and Metz notes that private publishing houses restrict their lists to subjects that "will not arouse official ire." Nevertheless, she writes that numerous new books in history, science, and geography, as well as editions of classical poetry and literature have been published since 1987. Many traditional manuscripts banned under the Shah have appeared in recent years (1989: 220-221).

As might be expected, the flood of Western magazines, music, films, and newspapers have all but dried up. A recent report describes occasional confiscation of Newsweek magazine, such as a 1990 issue with a

cover story on "The Future of Gay America." The report indicates that normally a total of only 500 copies of the magazine are distributed to newsstands (Committee to Protect Journalists, 1991: 66). In 1990 a UN special representative was permitted to enter Iran to monitor human rights--the first such investigator allowed in the country since the revolution. At the present time, it appears that virtually no Western news organizations have offices in the country. This treatment of foreign media and foreign journalists is consistent with the ideational distrust of non-believer influences.

A final example of the application of the action rationalized by ideational motives is the intensified scrutiny of incoming and outgoing mail to and from foreign destinations. Though no Iranian source has been located to confirm this observation, Bigdely and two other Iranian-born graduate students reported to the author in a 1989 graduate class at Oklahoma State University that audio tapes and photocopied tracts are banned from the mails and that even the playing of music is prohibited on Iranian television and radio. These students said that religious authorities claimed that such materials are contrary to Islam, though students expressed considerable skepticism over this rationale. In any event, the attention to the power of the audio cassette and other interpersonal means of communication in Iran indicates that the Spiritual Leader has learned from the Shah's mistake.

#### Survival Press Characteristics of the Islamic Republic of Iran

In a 1981 assessment of the Islamic republic's press, Kurian cautioned that the Iran-Iraq War which broke out in 1980 "offered the

hardliners a fresh opportunity to destroy the remaining vestiges of a free press" (1982, Vol. II: 1071). In fact, survival motives do not appear to have been used to justify the conduct of the military or the sacrifices of the people. Rather, the conflict was viewed as a qihad (holy war), and ideational rather than nationalist survival rationales were used to inspire and sustain public support. It appears unlikely that the Iran-Iraq war had significant impact on press performance or policy.

Ideational motives that had proved valuable in the struggle against the Shah were employed to justify government action throughout the ten-year war against the Shi'a Iraqis. Islam teaches that those who go to their deaths in qihad are immediately transported to heaven. Additional motivation was drawn from Shi'a's Husayn myth to glorify martyrdom in the service of a just political cause. Ideational motives, Skocpol suggests in her commentary on the struggle against the Shah's forces, may prove to be more efficacious than survival motives in strengthening commitment in battle.

Thus, the huge mass demonstrations were often led by men wearing white shrouds to symbolize their readiness to risk death at the hands of the army. It did matter that the Iranian crowds were willing to face the army again and again--accepting casualties much more persistently than European crowds have historically done--until sections of the military rank-and-file began to hesitate or balk at shooting into the crowds (1982: 275).

Survival rationales do take precedence over ideational motives in Iran's ongoing efforts to cement relations with its Sunni neighbors--a compromise undoubtedly rationalized by passages found in Islam's vast reservoir of holy writ. Iran considers itself to be a leader of the Islamic and developing worlds, "capable of standing up to Euro-American

economic, political, and cultural power," as Shoar-Ghaffari observes (1991: 5-6). (The assumption that Pakistan-born Solomon Rushdie, a British citizen, was considered to fall under Iranian jurisdiction supports this assessment.) According to Shoar-Ghaffari,

Islamic Republic leaders make special efforts to express their appreciation of the cultural ties between Iran and the Arab world. In this regard they deemphasize Sunni-Shi'a differences among the Muslims (1991: 5-6).

The coming together of Sunni and Shi'ite nations for strategic purposes is confirmed in Judith Miller's recent article in the New York Times Magazine, "The Islam Wave." Gilles Kepel, a French expert on Islamic extremism, told Miller, "To a certain extent, Islamic forces have already won. What we're seeing is the re-Islamization of the entire region, the alteration of basic patterns of life" (Miller, 1992: 24).

Since differences between the two Islam sects are difficult for non-Muslims to perceive and distinctions seem to be blurring for believers as well, this analysis does not attempt to identify effects that the survival-motivated rapprochement might have on Iranian media activity.

#### Instrumental Press Characteristics of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The social importance of the bazaar reflects the instrumental orientation of Iranian society and its compatibility with the Shi'a belief system. Because the concept of market activity is not challenged and was not challenged before the revolution, no strong motive vocabulary has been formulated. When instrumental and ideational actions conflict, as, for example, if a merchant were to seek to make money selling black

market pornographic films, or if a newspaper were to publish a lucrative advertisement for El Al (Israeli) Airlines, the ideational motive would be sure to prevail. Harsh penalties for such violations would further reduce the likelihood of their occurrence.

### Iran and the Motive Triangle

Since the Shah was deposed in 1979, the Iranian press appears to have not strayed far from the ideational point on the motive triangle shown below in Figure 8. The survivalist press of the Pahlavi regime in its last two years is contrasted with that of the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran in its first three years.




Figure 8. Iranian Press Activity and the Islamic Revolution 1977-1982

Though a privately-owned press indicates that instrumental activity was occurring during the early years of the Islamic Republic, the pervasiveness and dominance of the Islam belief system made it unlikely that the type of instrumental activities engaged in challenged the prevailing motive or required justification. Thus they were largely subsumed within the belief system. Survival-motivated activity was likewise co-opted by the belief system.

Lack of information makes it impossible to interpret later developments with any degree of confidence. From Western reports, it appears that liberalization of attitudes toward other branches of Islam and, perhaps, a downshift in animosity toward non-Muslim powers represents some retreat from ideational motives to survival motives.

#### The USSR--1900-1992

##### Cultural Fluidity and Situated Action

Throughout the Cold War, kremlinologists in the West have looked to the Soviet domestic press to track political currents and trace the economic course of the massive continental power. If Tsar Peter the Great looked upon St. Petersburg as his "window on the West," the West came to regard the Soviet media as its window on the veiled comings-and-goings of the nation Ronald Reagan once called "the Evil Empire" and Winston Churchill described with scarcely more charity as a "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."

Trying to understand the workings of this central institution that united more than 270 million people, spread across a sixth of the world's land mass over a span of 11 time zones, Sovietologists began by examining

the character of the Soviet media within the context of the Soviet social structures. Deeper insights were sought by linking press development to the Russian Empire's long social history, dominated politically by Tsarist autocracy, spiritually by the Russian Orthodox Church, intellectually by a late-blooming, Westward-looking intelligentsia, and economically by agrarian feudalism vested in a landed aristocracy presiding over millions of communal serfs and peasants, first legally then economically tied to the land. At the time of the 1917 revolutions, Russia was only beginning to feel the impact of its entry into the modern age of industrialization and urbanization, which began in the wake of the Crimean War a half-century before. Many of the characteristics of the pre-Gorbachev Soviet press were attributed to the cultural legacy of Russian traditionalism--its servility, absolutism, xenophobia, child-like optimism, and paternalism.

The servility of Soviet journalists was observed in their acceptance of hierarchical chains of command that extended party priorities into the selection of news and injected official interpretation into its presentation from the central media in Moscow down to the smallest and most distant raion (ward or precinct). This abrogation of responsibility was traced to centuries of subjugation under foreign invaders and oppressive tsarist rule. Marx once dismissed Russia as a locus for revolutionary activity because of what he saw as a Slavic proclivity to numbly submit to authority. It was held that such passivity, which poet Evgenii Evtushenko in 1988 attributed to an overabundance of preterpelost' (docile, unquestioning patience) (1988) was responsible for the Soviets' "bullet theory" approach to mass communication, the notion (discredited by Hovland's and Lazarsfeld's work in the 1940s) that if the



same message is shot at enough people repeatedly it eventually will hit home.

Western analysts identified the monolithic quality of the Soviet press as an extension of the belief in absolute irrefutable truths. This characteristic was linked not only to communist discipline but to the absolutist beliefs of Eastern Christian Orthodoxy and the doctrine of Caesaropapism which prevailed for nine centuries in Holy Russia. Whereas the church was the revealer of daily truths on the personal and commune level, tsarist authority presided over the domain of public and national truths. In a 1985 radio interview, just before the advent of dramatic press reforms, Soviet Embassy information officer Evgenii Zykov said in a radio interview,

I think that truth is one truth and that rumors and speculations sometimes distort truth. But the prestige of the newspapers that it conveys and has to convey only one truth and nothing but truth, should never be undermined (1985).

Ingrained xenophobia, observable in the Soviet media's scant coverage and slanted interpretation of international news and in their wary and restrictive treatment of foreign journalists was explained by centuries of onslaught from Eastern, Western, and Scandanavian marauders who took advantage of the fact that the country has no natural protective borders. The most pervasive foreign influence on the country's psyche and its institutions was the two-hundred year Tatar yoke, from 1238 to 1480, that left an overlay of Asian values and customs and effectively broke commercial and intellectual ties with Europe. This rupture distanced Russia from the tumultuous transformations brought about by the growth of urban centers, universities, Humanism, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Reformation, and the glimmerings of constitutional

democracy. The Tatar occupation brought to an end a pattern of economic and political growth that had rivaled that of England and Germany. The settlement of towns and cities did not return to pre-Tatar levels until the 19th century. Coupled with the fear and distrust of foreigners was a sense of admiration for their power, and a sense of Russia's own inferior position.

In 1518 Maxim the Greek, invited to Muscovy by Grand Prince Vasili II to revise liturgical texts, was denied permission to return home when his mission was completed. He was told, "We are in fear: thou a man of learning, comest to us and hast seen here of our best and worst, and when thou goest hence thou wilt tell of everything." He died in a Muscovy monastery 38 years later (Miliukov, 1942: 31-32). David K. Shipler, for several years New York Times correspondent in Moscow, reported a 1977 incident between a Moscow police lieutenant and a German television journalist assigned to cover the giant Rossiia Hotel Fire in Moscow in which at least 20 people died. The policeman stopped the filming, explaining, "We do not want to let foreigners laugh at our misfortune" (Shipler, 1984: 18).

The determinedly up-beat and optimistic character of the Soviet media and their concentration on good and wholesome stories was said to be rooted in an old Russian proclivity to ignore the unpleasant realities of life. The Russian diminutive pokazukha is the term commonly used to describe "a pretense that all is well." Interpreted negatively, pokazukha means a "snow job," or "whitewashing;" in its positive connotation it may be seen as "putting one's best foot forward." Though to foreign observers, the practice of playing loose with the facts seemed to fly in the face of absolute truth, from the Soviet standpoint

pokazukha, like Aesop's fictions, pointed the way to absolute truth.


The prototype of pokazukha was provided by Prince Grigorii Potemkin, favorite of Tsarina Catherine the Great and creator of the renowned "Potemkin villages." The prince erected stage-prop villages along the banks of the Dnieper River to impress the near-sighted sovereign as she glided downstream under the illusion that the wilderness surrounding her was prosperous and densely populated. When President Gerald Ford visited the Soviet Union in 1974, he was brought into the city by limousine along highways lined with towering pines, all freshly-cut by the Soviet Army and propped upright in the deep Siberian snow (Shipler, 1984: 25). Innumerable similar efforts for the benefit of foreign visitors--such as freshly turning the soil in orchards and painting buildings overnight--have been recounted by observant dignitaries and tour members.

In addition, the highly emotive, interpretive nature of Soviet journalism, reportazh, utilized patterns of speech that were at once patronizing and at the same time imbued with lofty verbal grandure. This high style, referred to as krasnaia rech' (literally, "red" or "beautiful" speech), was the antithesis of efficient, objective American journalistic writing. Mark Hopkins, in his ambitious 1970 press classic Mass Media in the Soviet Union, noted that in training journalists, "the weight of opinion still favors the broadly educated man of letters, in the Russian tradition of writer-journalist, and the committed, activist journalist, in the Soviet tradition of political publicist" (1970: 156). The literary tradition framed the academic discipline of journalism at the nation's preeminent College of Journalism, Moscow State University, which grew out of the College of Philology in the early 1950s, indicating its curricular linkage with the study of language and literature rather


than with the social sciences (Schillinger, 1988: 53). The emphasis on interpretation over objectivity was attributed to the inculcation of the European publicistic tradition, embedded among the intelligentsia along with other French intellectual tastes during the 18th and 19th centuries. Former Ogonek magazine editor-in-chief Vitalii Korotich told an American interviewer in 1989, "The Soviet press is becoming more interesting, but commentary, rather than facts, still predominate (Shabad, 1989: 25; also see this work, Chapter 1, Note 2).

Of the features noted above, only the preference for commentary over fact continues to characterize the Soviet media today. The culturally-ingrained traits identified with the Soviet press between 1928 and 1985 seem to have evaporated as national hallmarks during glasnost. The radical turnover in official attitudes and ensuing press and political activity supports Berger and Luckmann's premise that culture is fluid and that language, not culture, "constitutes both the important content and the most important instrument of socialization" (1966: 37).


It has been customary to consider the Soviet communist press as an unchanging, monolithic institution. However, in the accompanying analysis the dynamic theory suggests a series of motive combinations employed over the course of the nation's history to justify changing responses to domestic and international situations. The shifting pattern is best followed by referring to the Figures 9A, 9B, 9C, 9D, 9E, and 9F, which appear together on the next page. (Precedent for placing the model ahead of the account, rather than at the end, as in other case studies, is found in the literary practice of introducing the cast of characters at the beginning of translated Russian novels to serve as a guide and ready reference for the prose that comes after.)




A. Russia and the Leninist Press 1900-1927




B. The Stalinist Press 1927-1956



C. Khrushchev and the Thaw Press 1956-1964



D. Brezhnev's "Stagnation" Press 1964-1982



E. The Glasnost Press 1985-1991

Figure 9. Russian and Soviet Press Activity 1990-1991

### The Revolutionary Leninist Press--1900-1921

As previously observed, revolutionary media activity is ideationally motivated and its singleminded, fanatic, and reckless devotion to the promulgation of an idea system without regard for instrumental or survival considerations can make this transitory phase virtually synonymous with the ideal type. In Russia, a spine-tingling awareness of the precarious position of the 300-year-old Romanov dynasty nurtured a flurry of revolutionary press activity beginning in the 1880s. Aligned in one broad faction were political parties committed to reform via a constitutional democracy; in opposition were an equally insistent group of political activists seeking the overthrow of the anachronistic regime and the establishment of a totally new social and economic order. Among the latter were the Marxists and, chief among them, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, whose views on the overthrow of the tsars were radicalized by the 1887 execution of his older brother as a terrorist by Alexander III's reactionary regime.

Lenin helped establish the Marxist League of the Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and was arrested in 1895 for his attempts to publish an underground newspaper, Rabocheye Delo (Workers' Affairs). Four years in jail and exile gave Lenin the opportunity to formulate plans and ideas and to begin what would become a collection of writings that included 700 pages on the press (Florinsky, 1955: 1186 and 1238-1239).

Returning to St. Petersburg from Siberia, the 29-year-old Lenin wrote articles and feuilletons for the short-lived Social-Democratic newspaper Rabochnaia Gazeta (Workers' Newspaper,) and edited Iskra (The

Spark.) an illustrious newspaper in revolutionary history. It was Lenin's belief that the primary purpose of a newspaper was not to provide a forum for the debate of economic philosophies, but to serve as an organizational vehicle for coalescing mass revolution. The statement of purpose, appearing in the first issue in 1901 announced,

We do not intend to make our organ an ordinary storehouse of diverse views. We will conduct it, on the contrary, in a spirit of a strict, definite school of thought. This school can be expressed in a word: Marxism (Lenin, 1941-1952, Vol. IV: 329).

Lenin's most famous press diktat appeared in the fourth issue in a piece entitled "Where to Begin?" ("S chego nachat'?):

The first step toward ... transforming several local movements into a united all-Russian movement is the establishment of a national all-Russian newspaper. But the role of the paper is not confined solely to the spreading of ideas, to political education, and to attracting political allies. A paper is not merely a collective propagandist and collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer [emphasis added] (Lenin, 1941-1945, Vol. V: 11).

Between 1901 and 1912, Lenin edited and contributed to dozens of publications and newspapers of various radical stripes. On his passport he listed his profession as journalist, though he was a lawyer by education. In his writings, however, he referred to his profession as "revolutionary."

Over the years, intellectual fervor further fractionalized the opposition movement and in 1903, Lenin took up the leadership of the most radical wing of the Social-Democratic Party, the self-styled Bolshevik (Majority) Party. Significantly, rupture from the main-line party occurred over the issue of Lenin and his adherents' belief that political activity must be masterminded by an elite intellectual vanguard and not by the consensus of a mass-based movement (Lenin, 1941-45, Vol. V:

384-392). The first issue of the official Bolshevik organ, Pravda (Truth) appeared on May 5, 1912, a day that would be celebrated as press day in the Soviet Union for 89 years. Josef Stalin, an obscure Georgian, was among the newspaper's organizers and served briefly as editor.

Upon seizing power on November 7, 1917, the Bolshevik Party moved immediately to close down anti-socialist Petrograd<sup>s</sup> newspapers, and on November 10 the Council of People's Commissars issued a sweeping decree authorizing the suppression or closure of any newspaper opposing the new government, to be rescinded "when normal conditions prevailed." A month later all advertising was declared a state monopoly in the hope of financially strangling non-Bolshevik competition. Early in 1918 the seizure of printing plants was legalized throughout Russia, the press's contribution to the state requisitioning policy of War Communism. Later in the year private press ownership was abolished, as well as all other private property over a set value.

Opposition to the suppression of newspapers came not only from conservative newspapers, but from other socialist parties, who claimed the action violated the socialist belief in press freedom. Lenin responded to socialist editors, saying their access to printing should be in proportion to their numerical strength. His justification of seizure and shutting down of conservative papers was an articulation of the absolutist fear of ideational contamination:

Everyone knows that the bourgeois press is one of the most powerful weapons of the bourgeoisie. Especially at this critical moment, when the new state, the state of workers and peasants is consolidating itself, it is entirely impossible to leave this weapon in the hands of the enemy, at a time when it is no less dangerous than bombs and machine guns (Lenin, 1957: 24).

The 1918 decrees would mark the high-water mark of ideational press



activity in Lenin's lifetime. The fledgling government had no sooner extricated the country from allied participation in World War I, than it became caught up in defending its newly-won revolution in a three-year civil war, complicated by the intervention of military detachments from other countries hoping to topple the new regime, including British and Japanese forces and 21,000 U.S. troops.<sup>6</sup>

#### The Survivalist NEP Press--1921-1927

In 1921 the Civil War ended with the triumph of the Red Army. Civil disruption coupled with War Communism's raids on privately owned goods and commodities had brought with them dramatic crises in agriculture and manufacturing shortages, and wreaked havoc with the distribution systems. Famine struck the Ukraine with special vengeance, and in 1921 5 million people died. Peasant uprisings were commonplace and a rebellion at the Kronstadt naval base had to be put down with armed force. Even Pravda, the darling of the party faithful, was plagued by newsprint shortages and for a time was forced to go from four to two pages (Berezhnoi, 1956: 12).

In this environment the fiery rhetoric of revolution came head to head with the hard realities of survival. Establishing a stable government and initiating a new economic order required the cooperation of more than just the committed party vanguard. The struggle would also require compromises in Marxist goals and principles in order to secure the new nation's stability and feed its starving masses. Confronted with the unraveling of the fragile new state, Hopkins wrote, "creation of a 'people's press' and press freedom were farthest from Lenin's thoughts (1970: 72). The shift to survival motives was signified by the adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. Drafted under Lenin and Leon

Trotsky's direction, NEP called for the reestablishment of limited free enterprise activity and the implementation of financial incentives in industrial production in order to jump-start the declining socialist economy. The new policy was angrily challenged by Marxist idealists, who saw NEP and the abandonment of War Communism as retreats from Marxist beliefs. Lenin sought to justify the shift in priorities to outraged party members in October of that year:

Carried away by a wave of enthusiasm, rousing popular enthusiasm at first political and later military, we thought we could achieve directly on the basis of this enthusiasm economic tasks just as great [as the political and military ones] .... Life showed us our mistake. A series of transitional stages were needed: state capitalism and socialism, in order to prepare--by the work of a long series of years to prepare--the transition to communism .... Personal incentive raises production; we need increases in production more than anything .... (Clarkson, 1961).

American correspondents reported dramatic changes as a result of NEP.

Within weeks after Lenin's decree ... the impact of his New Economic Policy could be seen in the city, materially changing the lives of the correspondents. Shops were reopened, repaired, and rapidly filled with goods that had been hoarded or lost in the red tape of bureaucracy. Restaurants with elaborate menus sprang up overnight, offering French champagnes and wines .... Most important, for the first time in years, peasants came from the countryside and set up sidewalk stands to sell fresh fruit and vegetables (Bassow, 1988: 48).

NEP would be in effect until 1927, surviving Lenin by three years.

Exigency had forced another policy reversal. In August the government agreed to permit American journalists to enter Russia and travel freely in exchange for desperately needed American grain, field hospitals, ambulances, and medical supplies. During the Civil War reporters from the United States and other countries opposing the Soviet state had been banned from Russian soil.

Lenin conceded at a party meeting that the subjugation of the

opposition press and the ban on advertising had been "naive and in a certain sense mistaken," though consistent with socialist goals (Hopkins, 1970: 64). In response to NEP, beginning in January 1922 the state moved to require state-owned newspapers and magazines to become self-sufficient, raising revenues primarily through sales and subscriptions, an activity managed by the central apparatus. By July the number of newspapers still surviving had fallen to 313, down from 803 at the first of the year. Immediately state subsidies were appropriated and party members were required to subscribe to at least one state-owned paper (Hopkins, 1970: 73).

Though laws and decrees had proclaimed an end to the era of private press ownership, in fact, of 678 print plants existing in mid-1923, 233 were privately owned (1961: *Sovetskaia pechat' v doumentakh*: 212). For Lenin, the task of "nation-building," not yet a term in currency, had become the major task at hand. Educating the masses, 80 percent of whom were illiterate, bringing electricity to rural areas and remote cities, and above all producing a committed, technically-competent work force to help realize the potential of a "workers' and peasants' paradise" were the leader's overriding concerns.

"What Lenin wanted at this time was a functional press in the sense of a vocational school for building a new society," Hopkins observed (1970: 66). Lenin claimed that the newspapers under Bolshevik control were boring, full of dull decrees and unappealing articles. Because most of the professional journalists who had supported the Bolshevik cause had been drawn into the service of the new government, newspapers were being run by undereducated novices. Many of the new pressmen, especially those working outside of Moscow, the new capital, had no special loyalty to the

Bolsheviks or their policies and little direct contact with the hierarchy of officially overseers, though Pravda was officially ordered to direct the local press.

Lenin, renowned as the eloquent wordsmith of the revolution, told newspaper editors:

We have begun to make newspapers tools for educating the masses and for teaching them how to live and how to build their own economy without landowners and capitalists. Less political trivia in the press, less general discussion and abstract slogans by which the inexperienced are charmed. More propaganda for production, but most of all, more businesslike, skillful recounting of practical experience fitted to the level of development of the masses (Hopkins, 1970: 72).

Though legally the press appeared to be totally under the aegis of the Communist Party, with agencies and mechanisms regularly being created to extend control and censorship, the infrastructure of the press, along with other sectors of the economy, was in such desperate financial straits that these measures seemed to be of little consequence. From 1913 to 1918 the number of newspapers fell from 1,055, with a circulation of 3.3 million or 21 per 1,000 population, to 884 newspapers totaling 2.7 million circulation or 18 per 1,000 (Hopkins, 1970: 81).

One innovation in communication technology that appealed especially to Lenin was radio, and in 1922 the central radio-telephone station transmitted the first concert. Regular broadcasting began two years later, though its reach beyond Moscow and a handful of other cities would not take place until the next decade. As in many of the developing nations today, radio listening was a collective experience, and loudspeakers were commonly connected to sending stations by telephone lines. Lenin looked forward to radio as a tool for educating people in isolated rural areas, and he is said to have looked forward to a time

when "we will have hundreds of radio receivers and all of Russia will be able to listen to a newspaper read in Moscow" (Fedotova, 1967).

Although conclusions vary, evidence suggests that Lenin lost none of his zeal for the Marxist ideas he had championed with such passion for three decades. However, with the achievement of revolutionary goals, the focus of his attention shifted to the more pragmatic concern of survival. The task of building a nation called for a different approach to planning, action, and mobilizing the masses than tearing down a monarchy. Though strong social cohesion was required for both efforts, the building of socialism was seen as a deliberate and orderly process, far different from the ideationally-motivated strategies of conducting a revolution. The shift in priorities and approaches required constant justification from Lenin in his final years to win the support of the masses, but more importantly, meet the objections and garner the votes of his revolutionary colleagues; for many of these still envisioned themselves at the Winter Palace, battling against the Romanovs.

Robert Tucker argues that Lenin's revolutionary goals were realized with the unseating of the tsar and the defeat of his supporters (1987: 72-79). Leon Trotsky wrote from exile in the 1930s that revolution had been fought to bring about the "break with the Asiatic, with the Seventeenth Century, with Holy Russia, with icons and cockroaches" (1960: 94). "Old Bolshevik" Nikolai Bukharin on the five-year anniversary of Lenin's death, claimed that Lenin had warned against a revolutionary approach to creating a socialist state by instigating "change which breaks the old order to its very foundations, and had enforced policies that cautiously, slowly and gradually remodels [the old order], taking care to break as little as possible" (1929).

The issue of press freedom was widely debated within the party during the years Lenin was alive. Interestingly, Lenin is said to have used the word glasnost in calling for press scrutiny of bureaucratic mismanagement, bringing red tape before the "court of glasnost" (Lenin, 1986). After his death, the three-year power struggle among would-be successors was waged and reported in spirited essays and letters in the pages of Pravda and other central newspapers; but the role of the press as forum for discussion, permitted and encouraged during the NEP years, ended abruptly when Josef Stalin emerged the victor in 1927.

Change in press activity under Lenin is illustrated on the motive triangle shown in Figure 9A on page 255. During the travails of War Communism the ideational rationales that had guided the revolution were combined with survival and instrumental justifications for expedient, non-socialist actions. The abrupt shift to survival-dominated motives from 1921 to 1927 denotes the dominance of survival strategies and increased instrumental activity during the NEP years.

#### The Ideational Press of Stalin and Brezhnev

In responding to a magazine editor's claim that the press should perform a watchdog function by exposing corruption and inefficiency in government, Stalin sought to add legitimacy to his views on the press by linking them to positions Lenin had espoused during his days as a revolutionary and publicist for the Marxist Cause. In 1923 Stalin told the editor of the magazine Zhurnalist (Journalist):

It is not only that the press agitates and criticizes, but above all that it has a large network of workers, agents and correspondents throughout the country, in all industrial and agricultural areas, in all districts and villages, so that the thread from the party, through the newspaper, extends to all

worker and peasant districts without exception, so that the interaction of the party and state, on the one hand, and industrial and peasant districts on the other is complete (Stalin: 1925: 13).

Under Stalin, the ideational orientation that had prevailed during the revolution and the period of War Communism once again became dominant. But the cause for which Stalin sought to enlist the masses and arouse devotion was a radical strategic vitalization of Soviet industry and military sectors described in a Communist Party publication, edited by Stalin himself, as "a profound revolution, a leap from an old qualitative state of society to a new qualitative state, equivalent in its consequences to the revolution of [November] 1917 (Short Course, 1945: 305). The changes in focus and priorities, American Sovietologist Stephen Cohen observes, "were not simply amendments but a new ideology that was changed in its essence and that did not represent the same movement as that which took power in 1917" (1985: 52). Even though the activity of the "second revolution" was essentially instrumental, it was rationalized by Marxist-Leninist vocabularies of motive, which, as an economic-based belief system, subsumed instrumental action. Thus, the building of the socialist state was explained not as a strategy to increase the standard of living for the people, but as a means of realizing ideational goals.

In 1931 Stalin declared, "We are 50 or 100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years" (Hopkins, 1970: 92). The effort centered on the collectivization of agriculture, in the belief that more efficient social organization would increase agricultural productivity and create surpluses for export that would fuel the other sectors. Consolidation of 25 million individual

farmsteads into 200,000 collective and state farms resulted in millions of deaths from famine and brutality. The kulak class of the more successful, wealthier peasants was especially targeted, and millions were killed or sent to prison camps in Siberia. At the same time, industrial structures and priorities were revamped to maximize the production of military and capital goods, resulting in new shortages in consumer goods. The austerity program was enforced by heightened internal police activity and the "purging" of dissenting party policy-makers.

If the knock on the door in the dead of night brought the bad news, the newspaper each morning could be counted on to provide the good news, for the ideational press presented a persistently up-beat message to shore up public confidence in Stalin's undertakings. Show trials in which "old Bolsheviks" were prosecuted for "crimes against the people" were played in the press as great victories for the cause; persecution of rank and file dissenters and saboteurs of the party's efforts were not reported. By the early 1930s, the mechanisms of control were institutionalized--vested in the centrifugal party organization that incorporated all administrative levels and social organizations. Among the most effective and essential agents of party control were the internal police and the press.

This "second revolution" was, in fact, a revolution imposed from above, a recurrent pattern in Russian history that could be traced back to Ivan IV and Peter the Great (or projected forward to Mikhail Gorbachev). Its legitimacy was grounded in Marxism-Leninism and in Lenin, the father of the country, whose early revolutionary writings were exhumed to strengthen the ideational rationale. At the same time, the threat of foreign invasion, heightened by the country's isolated



political position as the world's only Marxist state, raised fear that intensified national paranoia and increased social cohesion.

Stalin believed that the mass media must be utilized to mobilize the masses and shape their commitment. As he saw it, the informational function of the press was extraneous to the essential business of educating and inspiring the masses. He was equally adamant in believing that ideas from beyond the borders (za granitsei) not be allowed to dilute the force of these beliefs. Foreign periodicals were banned, except for a few socialist publications, such as the British communist newspaper, Daily Worker. Likewise foreign literature was confined to a handful of works that portrayed the rapaciousness and "soullessness" of capitalist societies, such as the selected writings of Theodore Dreiser, Mark Twain, and Jack London.<sup>7</sup>

During the decade the number of newspapers increased almost tenfold. The total circulation of dailies and weeklies combined rose from 9.4 million to 34.7 million in the first five years (Pechat' SSSR za sorok let: 123). Much of the growth resulted from the establishment of hundreds of factory and farm newspapers, which were more like newsletters. Radio broadcasting likewise developed fairly rapidly and by 1940, 90 radio stations and about 7 million registered receivers brought radio to most urban locations and some rural ones (Hopkins, 1970: 94). Just as capital goods received priority over consumer goods in the manufacturing sector because of their strategic importance, so the media were developed and funded disproportionately over other sectors of society, such as education and health care.

The success of the austerity program was vindicated when the country found itself prepared to resist the German onslaughts of World War II.

Soviet military might, backed by a resolutely stubborn and patriotic citizenry, endured mammoth civilian suffering and an estimated 20 million deaths to achieve Allied victory on the Eastern Front virtually unassisted. The Soviets' reward was hegemony over the Eastern European countries they had marched through and fought in enroute to Berlin.

During the course of the war, less central control was exerted on the civilian media because of lack of manpower, resources, and attention; but also because the survival motive vocabulary was revived and became dominant, for Marxism-Leninism proved less efficacious than nationalism in rallying support for the war effort. Even the name of the conflict reflected this motive shift, for in the Soviet Union it is called the Great War of the Fatherland (Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina or V.O.V.). The number of newspapers and magazines fell precipitiously from 1941 to 1945 and, though no figures are available for 1941 to 1945, the total number of newspapers dropped from almost 9,000 in 1940 to less than 6,500 in 1946. Circulation levels would not equal the pre-war levels until 1952 (Pechat' SSSR za sorok let: 123). Mother Russia, rather than Marxism-Leninism, clearly found resonance among the masses, and during the war the party press became strongly nationalistic. Other concessions to the national survival orientation were the opening of churches closed since the Bolsheik takeover and the expansion of collective farm lands that could be devoted to private farming.

After the war, the press rapidly returned to its ideational orientation and the scope of its activity caught up with and surpassed pre-war levels. Threat to the belief system was now focused on the capitalist West, the recent allies that had celebrated together victory over the Fascists. Shunning offers of Marshall-Plan aid and the

ideational strings attached to it, Stalin now targeted war recovery and reindustrialization as primary goals, using the reestablishment of a Marxist-Leninist state to justify ongoing sacrifice from the Soviet people and stepped-up purging and persecution of party heretics and dilatory citizens. Stalin emerged from the war as the beloved and lionized "Greatest Genius of Geniuses," "Leader of Nations," "The Omnipotent," and "Nearest and Dearest Little Father" (Solzhenitsyn, 1969), who had foreseen the coming calamity and prepared his backward children to handle it.

It was during the pre- and post-war decades of Stalinist rule that the single-minded, ideationally-dominated Soviet media acquired the traits that dominated world perception until the mid 1980s. This characterization was reinforced during the long tenure of the Brezhnev government, particularly the last decade of that 18-year span. In the interim between Stalin's death in 1953 and Brezhnev's ascension in 1964, Nikita Khrushchev reigned over a comparatively tumultuous period that included the triumphant launching of the world's first artificial satellite in 1957 and the disgrace of capitulation to U.S. demands to stay out of the Western hemisphere. However, Khrushchev's most dramatic and long-reaching act was the denunciation of Stalin in the never-published "Secret Speech," delivered before a stunned session of the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. Almost immediately word gushed down the hierarchal party pipeline into the republic and oblast' organizations, and from there to the rank-and-file. Soon accounts of Stalin's brutality began to surface and make their way into the central press. Intimation of the possibility of fallability in the leadership of the party, especially the absolutist Stalin, called into question the

validity of the belief system the guardians were entrusted to interpret and protect. For the first time in two decades a murmur of dissent arose, fostered and encouraged by a perceptible shift in motives that rationalized the press as a forum of debate. Reforms in press and publishing of that period, known as the "Thaw," are discussed in the next section, where their significance is assessed as precursor to Gorbachev's glasnost era.

Ascending to power following the forced retirement of Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev and his lieutenants set out to restore stability and order to a society they believed to have been traumatized by Khrushchev's "hare-brained" schemes and erratic attempts at social and economic reform. It was recognition of a "crisis in belief," and not Soviet humiliation at the handling of the Cuban missile crisis or the paring down of the party and military structure, that justified the removal of Khrushchev by a coalition of highly-placed members of the Politburo.

As Brezhnev saw it, the situation called for a reassertion of the primacy of Marxism-Leninism and the infallibility of its guardians. He had participated in Stalin's "second revolution," joining the Communist Party at the age of 25 in 1931 and working as an engineer and party activist in his native Ukraine. He had served in Stalin's army as well, rising to the rank of major general during the War of the Fatherland. If Stalin's ideational strategies had succeeded in turning a backward, semi-feudal society into a world industrial-military power within a decade, Brezhnev would adopt Stalin's strategies to achieve less ambitious goals of social stability and cohesion. To be sure, striking differences existed between the two regimes, but as Tucker has observed, "[s]tructurally, they restored the system to something close to the form

it possessed in Stalin's time, minus the autocracy at the top and police supremacy over the party hierarchy (1987: 126).

The focus of Brezhnev's ideational revitalization in the 1960s and 1970s was the restoration of party authority. The strength of the country's war machine, despite cutbacks in military appropriations under Khrushchev and a shaky detente with the West, allowed Brezhnev to bring the ideational orientation into even sharper focus than had Stalin, since survival activity resumed a low profile and instrumental activity came to a virtual standstill. A depiction of press activity under Stalin and Brezhnev is shown on the motive triangles in Figure 9B and 9D on page 255. The broadening of motivations and the dilution of the idea system during Khrushchev's "Thaw" are illustrated in Figure 9C.

Stalin's reputation was partially restored, in particular, his contribution to victory in the war. The aparatchiki, that is, the professional party workers, made skittish under Khrushchev's sporadic assaults, were reassured of their tenure, and their ranks were swelled to the point that Stalin's bureaucratic legions appeared lean and mean by comparison. Full-time paid party officials rose to an estimated half-million, spread across an overlapping party-government flow chart that linked 23 Central Committee departments and 60 ministries to the general secretary of the party and the political bureau (politburo). Whereas the general secretary was thought of as the "first secretary," the "second secretary" was the politburo member in charge of ideology. "Trust in cadres," one of an on-going stream of imperative that typified domestic propaganda and sloganeering campaigns, was Brezhnev's way of reassuring the people that their belief system was in good hands.

Thus, the strengthening and expansion of the political organization

was rationalized as necessary to reestablish the legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism that had eroded during Khrushchev's eight-year tenure. The same motive justified the enlargement and extension of the mass media. Whereas Lenin, and more markedly Stalin, had used the media to implant the belief system and strengthen commitment to the achievement of essentially instrumental and survival goals, Brezhnev employed the media to revitalize and shore up an aging ideational system that had lost its luster. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet media infrastructure came to be among the most pervasive in the world.

As in Stalin's day, the Soviet mass media system outstripped other sectors of the economy in efficiency and technological sophistication, reflecting the importance that the government placed on the press. The national or all-Union media, centered in Moscow, pervaded the entire country with same-day distribution of All-Union newspapers and magazines, made possible by computer transmission of type. Pravda, for example, was printed in 43 different locations during the Brezhnev era, and simultaneous and delayed broadcasts of selected programs on the two all-Union channels in Moscow were transmitted across all time zones, supplementing local and ethnic offerings.

Surveys indicate that during the Brezhnev era reading newspapers was the number-one leisure time activity of Soviet citizens, even outdistancing television viewing (Shlapentokh, 1970a). There were 25 All-Union newspapers, all published in Moscow. These included Pravda, with a circulation of 11 million; Izvestia, with 8 million; and other papers targeted for various segments of society: young people, farmers, sports fans, and trade unionists--all with circulations in the millions. The aggregate circulation of daily papers reached almost 104 million, or

400 newspapers per 1,000 persons in 1978, making it the second most newspaper-rich country, behind Japan (Karch, 1982: 901).

Newspapers were also published at the republic, province, city, and district levels, as well as by factories, collective and state farms, and the military. A total of more than 8,000 newspapers were printed daily, compared with about 1,800 in the United States. Weekly newspapers numbered more than 7,600.

In addition, over 500,000 wall newspapers were produced by amateur journalists, including some 5 million worker-peasant correspondents. The local party bureau was responsible for this pervasive, if not particularly skillful, form of mass communication, and a committee of five to seven people was assigned usually to get them out. Wall newspapers were typed or handwritten, sometimes illustrated with snapshots and original art. They appeared, sometimes in a glass display case, as often as a dozen times a year.

Television grew increasingly pervasive during the 1970s, although outlying sections of the country received fewer channels. In addition to the All-Union channels originating in Moscow, stations which produced local programming and relayed selected All-Union broadcasts were located in 90 provincial capitals. Sixty-seven percent of Soviet households possessed a television set, and 6.5 million sets were being purchased each year. Ninety percent of households in urban areas--"zones of secure reception"--had televisions. Surveys indicate that 3 percent of households did not want a television and the rest could not afford one (Mickiewicz, 1981: 19).

Spravochnik Zhurnalista (The Journalist's Handbook), written by two obscure party functionaries, was published for the first time in

1965. It set forth in rank order of importance the six ethics of Soviet journalism, that is, those traits to which Soviet journalists and their organizations should aspire in their daily work. These are to be distinguished from the "functions" of the press--propagandizing, agitating, and organizing--which Lenin enshrined in his 1901 editorial. The book came out a year after Leonid Brezhnev came to power. Its timing is important because it signaled the end to Khrushchev's tentative press experiment and a return to the classic pattern established by Stalin. The ethics book presents and then cites examples to illustrate the vocabulary of motives that rationalized press behavior under Stalin and Brezhnev, and beyond. Viewed in retrospect, it also offers some understanding of the discomfort experienced by many Soviet journalists when Gorbachev suddenly replaced the six ethics with a single concept--openness or glasnost.

The six ethics that were to inform the work of Soviet journalists were party orientation (partiinnost'), high moral substance (vysokaia ideinnost'), truthfulness (pravdivost'), popular orientation (narodnost'), mass character (massovost'), and criticism and self-criticism in the press (kritika i samo-kritika v pechati).

As the first of the Soviet press codes, party-orientation was the most important and pervasive of the journalistic ethics because it served to legitimize the party leadership and thereby Marxism-Leninism.

The party values highly the press, as its faithful and powerful ideological weapon, as a genuine national platform for the building of communism, and considers the work of the press a very powerful partner in social realization (Bogdanov and Viazemskii, 1971: 21).

Party orientation was guaranteed by state ownership of media, party administration and control of all media, the education and politicization



of journalists, and censorship.

Thus, even though the ideational motive shifted slightly during the Khrushchev years, and was more responsive to public demand and more open to public debate, the old pattern triumphed again under Brezhnev when press activity, if anything, adhered even more closely to the promulgation of the belief system. Brezhnev responded to the detente in East-West relations, which he engineered, by stepping up ideational activity, offering more slogans, more exhortations, and more optimistic accounts of Soviet life, since it was thought that the reduction of military threat might weaken public resistance to alternate belief systems. Journalists were prohibited from writing on scores of sensitive issues enumerated in a widely-documented list (perechen'), that included crime, suicide, alcohol and drug abuse, ecological threats, emigration from the country, public health, accidents and disasters, as well as more conventional coverage constraints on military activity, the schedules of top leaders, and other issues of national security. Sociologist Tatiana Zaslavskaia suggested that during the Brezhnev era, prohibited topics outnumbered the permitted ones (1987). These restrictions were enforced not only by the official censorship agency, Glavlit, but by savvy editors and media professionals who censored themselves.

Brezhnev's conservative policies led increasingly over the course of his rule to the prioritizing of stability and the maintenance of the status quo in the party hierarchy. This policy, bolstered by the first ethic of the Journalist's Handbook, partiinnost', would result in the Brezhnev period being labeled the "Era of Stagnation" ("Era Zastoia").

### The Reform Press and Glasnost

Western sovietologists and government kremlinologists have had difficulty understanding "why" Gorbachev would jeopardize a prestigious and virtually unassailable sinecure by assailing the belief system that brought him to power. The reason for their bafflement stems from a deeply-rooted instrumentalist and utilitarian conviction that rational beings always act in their own best interest. Evidence suggests, however, that Gorbachev, indeed, may not have been acting in his own best immediate interest, but rather in what he perceived to be the best long-term interest of the kollektiv, a concept in which he was well-schooled. The significant difference between Gorbachev's press reform policy and others that preceded it lay in the fact that it represented an unprecedented shift in primary motive, from ideational to instrumental--that is, a major paradigm shift.

Reforms initiated by Nikita Khrushchev, beginning in 1956, focused on encouraging literary experimentation, but also had several profound effects on the media. In retrospect, the policies that produced the "Thaw" seem timid and halting, but Hopkins, writing from the perspective of 1970, interpreted the era as "a political and cultural evolution in Soviet society as dazzling as the economic revolution under Stalin" (1970: 102).

For without an iron-willed, singleminded Stalin reigning over it, the press showed a spark of individuality. It underwent its own partial rehabilitation. If the press was servile in Stalin's time, it became more of a servant in Khrushchev's. But the transition was made in a remarkably few years, and it seemed irreversible (1970: 104).

In fact, many of Khrushchev's moves toward a less absolutist, less

ideationally-determined press were rolled back during the Brezhnev years, but the notion of the press as a forum for discussion of issues was to remain, though the content of those exchanges grew progressively less heated and narrower in scope after Khrushchev's removal.

Of some significance, though not widely noted, was the reemergence of the academic discipline of sociology, which had been conducted "on a relatively large scale not only before the revolution, but also in the first decade thereafter" (Shlapentokh, 1987: 14-15). Suspected as a "bourgeois" science because of its potential for challenging political authority and manipulating social policy, sociology nevertheless emerged as independent from Marxism-Leninism under Khrushchev, and would not return to its ideational constraints until Brezhnev had been in power for seven years. This development is significant to press analysis because the study of the mass media falls under the auspices of sociology in the Soviet Union (Shlapentokh, 1987: 13-32 and 167-180).

A rather impressive series of studies utilizing Western methodologies were undertaken and their results published during the early Brezhnev years, 1965-1972, which sociologist and media scholar Vladimir Shlapentokh describes as the "golden age" of Soviet sociology (1987: 13). Among the findings were indications that the tactic of bombarding the airwaves and printed page with the same repeated moralistic messages was not as effective as had been supposed. Furthermore, it was revealed that both newspaper and television audiences were bored with the daily diet of economic news, features on manufacturing and farming, and "how-to" lectures on topics ranging from child rearing to home health care to conserving electricity (Kogan and Skvortsov, 1970; Lubsanov et al., 1972; Shlapentokh, 1970a and 1970b ;

Strukov, 1971; and Vooglaid, 1967, among others).

Writing during the final years of the Brezhnev era, Mickiewicz noted:

It is no longer assumed that just because a message has been broadcast, televised, or printed, it has been received, understood, and assimilated .... [T]he Russian public when examined scientifically, turns out to be much less homogenous, monolithic, and malleable than the Soviets (and Western observers who were, perhaps, persuaded by the Stalinist theories of their communication efficacy) had thought (1981: 6).

One effect of the proliferation of media studies launched under Khrushchev was the recognition by Brezhnev of the stultifying and ineffective use of the media (Fisher, 1979: K2). The attack, delivered in a 1978 televised address, was taken to heart by media professionals and their party overseers. Within weeks of Brezhnev's criticism, the press, but especially television, began to undergo a surprising transformation that within three years would include a heavy infusion of game shows, cartoons, talk shows, dramas, and in the early 1980s, music video.

The period between Brezhnev's death in 1982 and Gorbachev's ascension in 1985 is generally regarded as a time-marking interregnum during which the aged World War II generation of leaders competed for power against the younger "Twentieth Congress" generation--a reference to younger party aparatchiki who came of age during and after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the party meeting in 1956 (Doder, 1986). Nevertheless, the short period of Yuri Andropov's rule also saw a change in press policy, as he used the media to publicize and draw attention to widespread graft and corruption that had come to dominate the political structure on Brezhnev's dozing watch. Andropov's unexpected illness and

death brought about the brief, reactionary tenure of Konstantin Chernenko, who died after only a year in office. His passing cleared the way for Mikhail Gorbachev, who, at the age of 54, was not only a generation younger than his predecessor, but the first national leader to have been too young to serve under Stalin in World War II.

The centerpiece of Gorbachev's agenda was the making over of the economy, the acceleration of productivity, and improvement of the standard of living. Other policies he pursued were ancillary to this instrumental agenda--political reform and democratization; institutionalization of the legal process and the dismantling of a justice system based on connections, influence, and bribery; and the creation of a press forum for the exchange of views. The primacy of the instrumental motive as a justification for glasnost, rather than the Western ideational motives of "press freedom" and "the public's right to know," was expressed by a provincial party secretary, Boris Volodin, who wrote in September 1986,

It goes without saying that all our work in expanding glasnost, improving informedness, is not an end in itself. In the last analysis it should actively contribute to the accomplishment of [the economic] tasks set by the Twenty-seventh Party Congress, the June 1986 Central Committee Plenum, and develop the initiative of labor collectives, rousing in people the aspiration to achieve higher results" (1986: 24).

In his 1987 book, Perestroika, Gorbachev wrote that the implementation of glasnost was essential to arrive at a broader vision of "truth." In a very real sense, glasnost was a diffusion strategy to inculcate new processes for determining economic policy, based on realistic assessments of national strengths and weaknesses.

Truth is the main thing .... As never before, we need no dark corners where mold can reappear and where everything against which we have started a resolute struggle could start

accumulating .... We have come to realize the necessity of learning to overcome the inveterate discrepancy between the reality and the proclaimed policy. It is this major shift in the moral sphere that makes up the emotional content and the essence of the present socialist revolutions in our society ... so that all citizens have a say, so that socialist pluralism, as it were, is represented in each publication in its entirety .... (1987: 77).

At a meeting of editors and journalists at the Central Committee of the CPSU early in 1988, Gorbachev advised: "Publish everything. There should be a pluralism of opinions" (Gorbachev, 1988: 2). The confusion this injunction caused in the minds of a people steeped in the absolutism of Stalin and Brezhnev is revealed in a question to Gorbachev from the floor of the first session of the Congress of Deputies, covered on Soviet television: "Pluralism, pluralism! Tell me, Mikhail Sergeevich, what is this new word that is suddenly so popular?"

In a 1989 issue of Moskovskie novosti ( Moscow News), a Soviet historian wrote:

Not so long ago the word "pluralism" was mainly heard among scholars. Other mortals who looked it up in the dictionary discovered that it was a "false, idealistic philosophy." Pluralism seemed to be something abstract and outlandish. Now it seems to be an essential quality of our life, a quality each of us has. For a long time we were made to believe that there was only one truth, only one spiritual value, only one progressive trend in art, only one main road of development. The rest was heresy, alien, vicious and to be eradicated (Shastiko, 1989: 3).

In the normal progression of human events, social change precedes dogma, creating a new set of social conditions out of which new realities emerge and are articulated, justified, and legitimized. But when an existing belief system has been insistently propagated and inculcated over a long period of time, the new reality may have to be invented first in order to make way

for social change. The possibility of this transposition is suggested by Berger and Luckmann.

Theorizing about identity will [normally] then seek to take cognizance of the transformations of identity that have actually occurred, and will be transformed in the process. On the other hand, identity may become problematic on the level of theory itself, that is, as a result of intrinsic theoretical developments. In that case, psychological theories will be concocted "before the fact", so to speak (1966: 164-65).

Further support for this scenario is found in Mannheim's suggestion that pluralism is crucial for the functioning of market-driven economies, a belief that Gorbachev may have shared. Mannheim wrote,

Success on the free competitive market demands a continuous awareness of social change. The necessary adaptation to these shifts requires immediate responses and independent judgment free from conventional or mythological delusions. The individual who must live by his wits and seize his opportunities as they arise no longer feels committed to a prescribed way of life. The immediate effect of this new state of affairs is an increased rationality, first in economic behavior, then in certain derivative situations, and finally in the conceptualization of one's own interests. These situations teach men to orient themselves from their own point of view ... the first step towards social self-awareness (1936: 99).

Whereas Brezhnev's ideationally-motivated administration had concentrated on revitalizing existing Marxist-Leninist beliefs, Gorbachev's policies were motivated almost totally by instrumental goals. From his perspective, focus on material conditions of life was consistent with the socialist priorities, and in the early years of his rule Gorbachev repeatedly grounded his ideas in Lenin and in the NEP program. The continuity Gorbachev sought to affirm, however, was overpowered by the social trauma that accompanied the dramatic shift in primary motives.

From 1985 until the time of the failed coup in August 1991, the glasnost press grew, first gradually and then in great leaps, to rival and then overtake the influence of the ideational press that proved

stubbornly resistant to change. The primary characteristics of the instrumental press that separated it from the ideational press were: emphasis on criticism and sensationalism over "high idea-ism" and social harmony; the questioning of central authority and direct attacks on the Marxist-Leninist belief system; and, above all, the public's right to know and be informed of both the current condition of society and the history of the country.

From the Soviet audience's point of view, an obsession with national self-criticism was the primary hallmark of the liberal and radical press. In 1987 economist Shmelev wrote in the political and literary journal Novyi Mir (New World).

There is such a disgusting proliferation of [industrial ministries] and they are so top-heavy with administrators that they frequently have to invent something to do and actually end up interfering with the work of the enterprises. The ministries themselves have become a serious political problem ... demanding the swiftest, most radical solution.

In his time Lenin wrote: "Everything is sinking in the lousy bureaucratic swamp of the ministries .... The ministries are all shit, and so are their decrees .... " (1987: 151).

In a 1989 article appearing in Moskovskie novosti (Moscow News) a woman published a first-person narrative of her recent legal abortion and attacked the lack of sex education and contraceptives in the country. An adjacent article addressed the widespread problem of divorced fathers' refusing to pay child support. Homosexuality, AIDS, prostitution, and drug abuse were other subjects addressed routinely in the later years of the decade (Schillinger, 1991: 139). Even the national hymn was subject to criticism, as journalist and literary critic Stanislav Rassadin asked in an editorial reprinted in the monthly British edition of Moscow News. "Why is the [Soviet] national anthem so insipid?" (1988: 3).

Religion and tales of the fantastic and supernatural (ekstrasents).



previously taboo, were also given liberal coverage by many glasnost publications. An account in Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Newspaper) reported that on the first anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, "the face of the Mother of God appeared in Grushevo," her features emerging from an arrangement of the roof tiles of a villager's house, and that thousands of pilgrims went there to witness the miracle. The writer then chastised local authorities who ordered authorities to disperse the crowd and make arrests (Sergeiev: 1987). An article in the government newspaper Izvestia, reported proceedings from the All-Union Conference on Mental Health Problems in Moscow and noted:

The conference concluded that the country needs to create a network of mental health centers and develop a system of care by medical psychologists. They protect people from stress-related breakdowns. This occupation has long existed abroad. Nor should we close our eyes to the fact that the church and specialists in psychoanalysis are quite active there. But here, even mental-health "hot lines" are very rare (Manucharova, 1989).

A near obsession with reexamining Soviet history represented a sharp break with Soviet press tradition during the glasnost period. The weekly newspaper Argumenty i fakty (Arguments and Facts) emerged from obscurity as an organizational newsletter to become the world's highest circulation newspaper, after the Ministry of Education ruled that it would serve as the serialized history text for the nation's schools while textbooks were being rewritten. (Schillinger, 1991: 146). At its peak in 1990 circulation was reported to be 31 million. Typical of the kind of revelation to be found in press accounts was a 1989 article in Moskovskie novosti (Moscow News) that noted, "It has long been necessary to admit openly what the whole world as known for many years, but what for millions of Soviet people only has been a secret--that Trotsky was

murdered on Stalin's order and its immediate executor was Ramon Mercader del Rio" (Cobo, 1989: 15). An Izvestiia article revealed in 1987,

There are currently 340 million items in the USSR State Archives. How accessible is this treasure to researchers studying our past and present? What must be done to strengthen the information base of the social sciences? Of the 1,109,086 files to which access is restricted in the central state archives, 767,195 will now be available to researchers upon request, for use in reading rooms, of course (Andreev, 1987).

The glasnost phenomenon was a domestic phenomenon that had little to do with the international community, though great international interest was focused on the process. Glasnost was manifested primarily in a score of national newspapers and magazines typified as "radical." A few television programs also reflected the change in motive, though effects were less dramatic in broadcasting than in print. The effects of glasnost were magnified because they were accompanied by massive shifts in subscription pattern as Soviet readers abandoned the traditional favorites, of Pravda and Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia) and even the more moderate liberal newspapers, Izvestiia and Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Newspaper), for the more controversial print offerings, such as Moskovskie novosti, Ogonek (Little Flame), Argumenty i fakty and Nash sobesednik (Our Fellow-Conversationist), and others (Schillinger, 1991: 146-150). Still more political and polemical were hundreds of "informal" or unregistered newspapers and newsletters nominally attached to a proliferating number of political organizations of various political persuasion.

On the whole, it was the national press that carried out the press revolution and the provincial press that remained resistant and under the ideational influence of provincial party officials. A disgruntled Kievan wrote in a 1988 letter to Pravda,

If in Moscow the barometer of glasnost points to a gale, in some union republic capitals it only shows breakers, in province capitals it predicts ripples, and as for the regional level, the pointer there shows dead calm. In my opinion, the farther you get from Moscow the more the level of glasnost changes, and not for the better (Korevich, 1988: 1)

However, proximity to Moscow did not necessarily guarantee probing press activity. A comparative study of two local Moscow newspapers, the morning daily Moskovskaia pravda (Moscow Pravda) and the evening Vecherniaia Moskva (Evening Moscow), both organs of the Moscow City Committee, revealed significant differences between them. The morning paper was found to be far more negative in its reporting of domestic events and significantly more likely to publish in-depth reports and analyses of substantive economic and political issues than the evening paper (Schillinger, 1989). Likewise, a Soviet press critic noted that the conservative nature of Vecherniaia Moskva (Evening Moscow) was "far closer to the classic type of publication" than the livelier Vecherniaia Odessa (Evening Odessa), published in the Ukrainian port city, which confined its content to "only that which is really interesting" (Derevitsky, 1988: 38).

Not only did many journalists find it difficult to adopt the new instrumental orientation, many Soviet readers were discomfited by the shift in motives and the activity it sanctioned. In a letter appearing in Izvestia, a Leningrad teacher, N. Shchurokova, pleaded for a return to the more positive journalism of the past:

Our children are growing up and their personalities are being shaped in a setting in which supreme values, such as homeland, labor, society, history, revolution, citizen, comrade, old age and love are increasingly derided. They are growing up in an atmosphere in which all those who have abandoned our homeland in search of "the good life" are revered. They see all people of greatness and all authorities being brought down. Teenagers and young adults are awash in a heavy flow of licentiousness

and vulgarity .... Children don't realize that the men and women who have scabbled their way to pen, publishing house, editorial board, screen and stage are concerned not about the "truth" but about lining their pockets (Shchurokova, 1989.)

Perhaps, as eloquently as any scholarly analysis, Shchurokova's letter spoke to the social disequilibrium brought about by the shift in motives and the role played by the press in effecting that transformation.

The widely and highly polemical nature of many Soviet journalists' response to glasnost makes it clear that the ideational orientation did not disappear, but pluralized and diffused the ideas. The media, decrees and bold statements of intention to the contrary, were never able to survive on the basis of subscriptions; and the concept of advertising as a revenue source made little sense in a country where consumer goods were in such short supply they would vanish from the shelves before ad copy could be written.

The glasnost press was an ideational press, in much the way that the early American press was an ideational press, with each newspaper expressing one-sided views and accepting financial and political support from patrons eager to encourage views similar to their own. The forum for the exchange of diverse ideas was not offered by any individual newspaper or periodical in this strongly partisan environment, though Gorbachev had wished "socialist pluralism" to be "represented in each publication in its entirety (1987: 77). Rather, pluralism and the "marketplace of ideas" existed in the totality of press activity. At the same time, the preoccupation with instrumental and economic concerns, the increasingly bitter attacks on centralized power, and the espousal of a belief in pluralism indicate that the press had adopted many elements in the instrumental vocabulary of motives.

Most interesting, from the perspective of history and the dynamic theory, is the fact that almost no press activity was motivated by survival--either the newspapers' own survival or that of the government. The dissolution of the Soviet Union following the failed August 1991 coup and the utter chaos of today's media environment in the Commonwealth of Independent States is, in large part, a consequence of the rejection of the survival vocabulary of motives. Figure 9E on page 255 summarizes press activity during the glasnost period. Media activity since August 1991 is not analyzed here, although it continues. The fact that no coherent motive unites the press, the audience, or the country/countries of the former Soviet Union would be represented by a totally-shaded triangle, indicating the competing action-strategies now struggling for dominance.

It was the swiftness of the motive transformation, a swiftness made possible by "revolution from above," as much as by the scope of the transformation of a centuries-old mindset, that made Gorbachev's press policy such a daring and, ultimately, dangerous one. Writing almost 150 years ago, Auguste Comte observed,

The social destiny of government appears to me to consist particularly in sufficiently containing, and preventing, as far as possible, this fatal disposition towards a fundamental dispersion of ideas, sentiments, and interests, ... so as to recall to [the people] unceasingly the feeling of unity and the sentiment of common solidarity (1842:430-431).

## Endnotes

1. According to Kandal, during the liberalization period, the circulation of Kayhan, the most popular Persian-language daily, doubled, going from 350,000 to 700,000 or more. He noted that in August circulation went over a million, occasioned by the printing of a four-column front-page article on Khomeini. Copies of the issue sold for \$2.50 (1978).
2. At the present time, the only other Muslim nation with a militant Islamic government is Sudan, a Sunni nation. The Sudanese government recently has undertaken to establish peaceful ties with Shi'ite Iran, "a development that reflects the closing of a historic rift," according to Arab analysts (Miller, 1992: 40).
3. Belief in the "Twelfth Imam," that is Imam Mahdi, represents an important distinction between the Shi'ites, "the so-called Twelvers," and the Sunni Muslims, who believe in the "Four Rightly Guided Caliphs," who prepared the ground for Prophet Muhammad by achieving military and political victories over the Byzantine and Persian Empires. Thus, Teheranian concludes, "A belief in the unity of spiritual and temporal authorities is thus common to both Sunni and Shi'a Islam," although, he notes, the problem of positioning authority gave rise to the great schism between the two powerful branches of Islam (1988: 198).
4. Khomeini was succeeded by Ali Khamenei, the third popularly-elected president who resigned his elected post to assume his new duties the day following Khomeini's death. The new president is Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was sworn in on August 3, 1989, as the nation's fourth president. The president appoints a cabinet of ministers, subject to the approval of the Assembly of Experts (Majlis). The popularly-elected Majlis is comprised of 83 members, whose candidacies are approved by the Council of Guardians.  
The republic's first president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr served from February 1980 to June 1981, when he was deposed by the clergy. The newspaper he owned, Enquelaab Eslami, was one of three closed down at the time of his forced exile in an effort to silence the last opposition papers, Kurian reported (1982, Vol. II: 1071-1072). The second president, who preceded Khamenei, was assassinated a month after he took office in July 1981.
5. The name of the Russian capital city was changed from the Germanic St. Petersburg to the Slavic Petrograd by the Fourth Duma when Russia entered the war in 1914.
6. A study of British and U.S. newspaper coverage of the Bolshevik takeover indicated no in-depth questioning of the political implications of a projected Bolshevik society. "Only two questions were confronted: how long would these 'fanatic pacifists remain in power' and were they really going to take Russia out of the war in repudiation of the Pact of London (Schillinger, 1967: 15). Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz reported in a famous study that between November 1917 and November 1919,

the New York Times reported that the Bolshevik government had fallen or was about to fall 91 times; that Lenin and Trotsky were preparing to flee or had fled the country seven times; that Lenin had been imprisoned three times; and that Lenin had been killed once (1920).

7. In the mid-1980s, a harbinger of Gorbachev's policies was the appearance of a Russian translation of Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind in Soviet bookstores. It was received with the same tumultuous enthusiasm that had rocked the United States at its the time its initial publication 50 years before.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION

#### Theoretical Relevance and Validity

In the opening chapter of Communication Theory: The Asian Perspective, editor Wimal Dissanayake addresses the issue of Asian and African dependence upon Western communication theory and reports that more than 70 percent of materials used in communication courses taught in universities in South and Southeast Asia are American in origin. After acknowledging the substantial contributions of scholars such as Schramm, De Fleur, and Lasswell, and the value of such classic works as Four Theories of the Press, Dissanayake quickly turns to his main point and the theme of the book: "If Asian communication scholars are to engage in more productive and relevant research, it is indeed imperative that they address their minds to the question of formulating alternative theories and models" (1988: 7).

Dissanayake's call for Asian perspectives on communication theory is predicated on two cultural biases that he believes permeate U.S. constructions and make them less than appropriate frames for the study and understanding of much of the world's media. The first bias, he argues, is the "essentially conservative and status-quo-maintaining nature" of American communication theory, which, because of its functionalist bent, is ill-equipped to "handle, and indeed stimulate social change" (1988: 6-7). The second problem with American theory, he



continues, is its positivistic assumptions, resulting from its methodological identification with the natural sciences.

It is precisely because of this discrepancy that I think Asian communication scholars should turn more towards philosophical approaches like phenomenology which do not accept the rigid division between appearance and reality and which, in addition, emphasize imagination, intuition and values. The fact that Western social scientists are increasingly beginning to question the validity and usefulness of functionalism only underlines the need for Asian communication scholars to shake off this influence (1988: 7).

If the dynamic theory succeeds in transcending the functionalism and positivism that has previously limited the utility of world press theory it is because it has incorporated Dissanayake's interpretation of Asian epistemology. It would be argued, however, that the perspectives he and his colleagues advance are not alien to American or Western thought and need not be alien to American communication theory and certainly not to American world press theory.


Ideally, a world press theory should be international in its conceptualization and its method. Ideally, it should be temporally neutral, politically neutral, culturally neutral. The formulation of ideal types based on actions and behaviors, rather than on types of political systems subscribed to, is one manifestation of the determination to retain theoretical neutrality and enhance validity. The phenomenological approach to discerning and signifying action is another mechanism employed to minimize observer bias. Timeless, horizonless neutrality is or should be the aim of any formal or grand theory. But perhaps even this assumption carries with it the imprimatur of its time and place--American relativism, 1990's globalism, academic liberalism, and a post-Cold War euphoria that may one day caricature and date current truths. And then again, there is another catch--one that Max Weber mused

upon in his final writings--that any theory sufficiently broad to encompass all events and eventualities may be also so vague as to provide little meaningful understanding of them (Weber, 1904: 80).


A central element of the dynamic theory is its attempt to incorporate and identify change, certainly one of the most salient consideration in its evolution and in the creation of the motive triangle model. As Dissanayake observes, social change is an essential and natural component of national policy and everyday life in developing countries; however, it is an intrinsic characteristic of all 20th century societies.

Thus, while the construct provides theoretical tools for identifying and examining dramatic change, as shown in the Soviet analysis of Gorbachev's reform press, it also suggests sensitizing devices for detecting more subtle social evolutions and fluctuations, such as the U.S. press's growing ideational-motivated activity beginning in the 1960s in response to Great Society idealism and the move toward more interpretive news reporting. The dynamism of the construct also can be applied to the discernment of significant distinctions between press systems conventionally described as similar, such as the those of the United States and Britain. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the motive triangle is that it demonstrates that no two national media systems align perfectly within its perimeters, and that indeed no single system or organ within that system occupies the identical position on two consecutive days. For comparisons of the model summaries of the six nations analyzed in this work, see Figure 10 on the next page.)


An appraisal of the validity of the case summaries here can offer no further insights and could hardly be credited. But it is perhaps worth




A. The U.S. Press  
1960-1992




B. The British Press Under  
Thatcher 1988




C. The Singaporean Press  
1963-1991



D. The Nigerian Press  
1960-1991



E. The Iranian Press  
1979-1982



F. The Soviet Press Under  
Brezhnev 1964-1982

Figure 10. Comparative Analysis of National Press Systems

suggesting that the analyses greatest value may lie in the challenge they present to others inspired to add to their data bases or reinterpret their recent findings. The intent of the case reports was partially to illustrate the dynamic theory's validity, but more importantly to demonstrate that theory can and should play an essential part in framing empirical research. As Dissanayake notes, "Theory unites research and research refines theory" (1988: 7). But all too often, particularly in the comparative studies of international communication, the two exist as two separate entities--one a body of knowledge to be memorized, the other a skill to be practiced.

Throughout the empirical process of presenting data in the case-summary chapters, overweening care was taken to avoid the use of value-laden words--a time consuming and artificial precaution. Even such terms as "free press" and "suppression" were employed sparingly, usually appearing in quotations. This was done not because it is believed that value judgments should not accompany and interpret international press study, but to show that judgment should not be inherent in a theoretical frame. "Survival," "ideational," and "instrumental" motives carry with them no moral or political taint. They are simply ways to identify action prompted by situation. But the voluntarism inherent in all motivated human action invites interpretation and challenge, and with it the approbation or condemnation of the researcher.

#### Methodological Considerations

The dynamic theory was constructed in the belief that it would provide cognitive structure to empirical study of the world's media, an activity that is widely agreed to have been particularly atheoretical.

And while it appears to have achieved this goal, the procedures it entails do not lessen the demands of the researcher, but, on the contrary, expand them. For the hermeneutical fixation on deep description, context, and wholeness inextricably links examination of the media to their social, political, economic, and historical milieux. Thus the scholar who sets out to examine the press of a nation, a region, or an era must also address the multifaceted "situation" in which that press is embedded. The challenge for any student of the communication is to extricate the media from the tangled nest of its national culture and institutions.

The emphasis on articulated motives, drawn from the media themselves, their intended audiences, and those who oversee or control them raises the possibility of researcher bias and the deliberate or unintended skewing of the "sample" collected. The only guard against this likelihood is the thoroughness of the data gathering and its limitation to indigenous, native sources in the empirical stage of the research process that precedes and attends interpretation.

The holistic, phenomenological approach suggests a further imposition on international media scholars that may be compared to a professional expectation of international correspondents undertaking to report and interpret events abroad. High quality international journalism is best achieved when reporters immerse themselves in a given culture or region and make it their specialization. Criticism is aimed at "parachute" journalists who land in unfamiliar news "hot spots" with their mini-cam lights aglow and their tape-recorders whirling and attempt to tell the world what's going on.

While international correspondents and international media scholars

need not be rooted to one area of specialization for a lifetime, acquiring an understanding of a society and its structures is not an overnight assignment. Interestingly, however, the insights of non-native analysts may be ultimately richer and more instructive than those provided by domestic commentators inured to the uniquenesses of their own familiar turf, as international news organizations have long ago discovered. In the case summaries presented here, the author's intellectual commitment to Soviet studies produced a more textured and interpretive analysis of the Soviet press than of any of the other systems examined. Experience in the country and knowledge of the Russian language contributed substantially to that analysis. In contrast, daily immersion in her own media-saturated American culture from birth complicated and slowed and perhaps muddied the empirical process.

The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that while the processual and holistic assumptions and methodology of the dynamic theory enable the search for understanding and rich, highly-textured interpretation, they also impose a heightened burden of commitment on the researcher. While the press characteristics associated with each ideal type of press activity, as defined in Chapter IV, make it possible for researchers to flag some significant patterns of press behavior, they in no way delineate the investigative trail, which must be mapped anew to fit the terrain of each analysis.

#### The World Press and World Press Scholarship

When the rudiments of the dynamic theory were first presented at a professional meeting in 1988, the response of those in attendance encouraged the author's belief that the time was at hand for the

introduction of a new, phenomenological, hermeneutical approach to researching and understanding the world's press. Subsequent world events and students' experience in applying the theory in graduate school classes at Oklahoma State University, Iowa State University, and Mount Vernon College have strengthened that conviction and also contributed to refinement and expansion of the theory.

The arguments offered here do little to confirm the validity of the dynamic theory. The interpretations of one individual, especially one who has grown perhaps overly committed to the theory, mean little in the intellectual life of a new idea. For the past several years the social sciences have been experiencing a major paradigm shift, perhaps of Kuhnian proportions, from a positivistic, quantitative, functionalist, objective approach to a phenomenological, hermeneutical, interpretive, post-modern perspective. Though the dynamic theory was derived according to the emerging perspective, it has yet to be shown that it will be incorporated by media scholars into the new paradigm.

That determination will be made by the packaging and marketing of the dynamic theory and by the utility of its application to empirical and theoretical researchers who have the temerity to test it. Thus the invitation is extended to specialists in various geographical regions of the world's press to reexamine again their previous data and findings and to engage in new studies using the dynamic theory as a guide; to scholars of narrower media topics, such as advertising, public relations, film, international broadcasting, or local newspapers, to explore the capacity of the theory to provide stronger societal grounding for their observations; and to sociologists, political scientists, and historians to stretch the theory's potential to shed new light on other social

institutions and phenomena over time and space. Only then, when these findings are in, would it truly be appropriate to draw conclusions concerning the lasting value of the dynamic theory.



## CITATIONS

- Abrams v. United States  
1919 250 U.S. 616, 40 S.Ct. 17, 63 L.Ed 1173.
- Adams, Frank S.  
1947 "4-year study finds free press in peril." New York Times  
(March 27): 24.
- Adorno, Theodore and Horkheimer, Max  
1972 "The culture industry enlightenment as mass deception." In  
The Dialectics of Enlightenment. New York: Herder and Herder.
- Ahmavaara, Y.  
1974 "A theoretical commentary." In Nordenstreng, 1974.
- Akinfeleye, Ralph A.  
1984 "Religious publications: pioneers of Nigerian journalism. Pp.  
26-34 in Onurora E. Nwuneli (ed.), Mass Communication in Ni-  
geria: A Book of Reading. Lagos: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
- Althusser, L.  
1971 "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses" in Lenin and  
Philosophy and Other Essays. London: New Left Books.
- Altschull, J. Herbert  
1972 "Journalists aren't anti-business, just pro-drama."  
Business Horizons (September-October): 5.
- 1984 Agents of Power: The Role of the News Media in Human Affairs.  
New York: Longman.
- 1990 From Milton to McLuhan: The Ideas Behind American  
Journalism. New York: Longman.
- American Society of Newspaper Editors  
1975 Statement of Principles. Pp. 289-291 in Rivers, Schramm,  
and Christians, 1980.
- Andreev, I.  
1987 Izvestia (May 23).
- Arjomand, Said  
1981 "Shi'ite Islam and Revolution in Iran. Government and Opposi-  
tion 16 (Summer): 293-316.

"Arts and Media--Magazines, Newspapers"

1991 World Almanac. New York: Facts on File.

Atlas, James

1989 "Thatcher puts a lid on." New York Times Magazine (March 5):  
36-38 and 97.

Aufderheide, Pat

1991 "A funny thing is happening to TV's public forum." Colum-  
bia Journalism Review (November/December): 60-63.

Bantam Books v. Sullivan

1963 372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584.

Bassow, Whitman

1988 The Moscow Correspondents. New York: William Morris.

Becker, Howard

1982 Art Worlds. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Becker, Howard, Blanche Geer, Everett C. Hughes, and Anselm L. Strauss

1961 Boys in White. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bell, Daniel

1960 The End of Ideology. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

1976 The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York:  
Basic Books.

Bellah, Robert N.

1957 Tokugawa Religion. Boston: Beacon

Berelson, B.R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and W.N. McPhee

1954 Voting: A Study of Opinion Formulation in a Presidential  
Campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Berezhnoi, A.

1956 K istorii partiino-sovetskoi pechati. (On the History of  
the Party-Soviet Press). Leningrad: Lenizdat.

Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann

1966 The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the  
Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books, 1989.

Berry, W. Turner and H. Edmund Poole

1966 Annals of Printing. London: Blanford Press.

Bethel, Tom

1977 "The myth of an adversary press: journalist as bureaucrat."  
Harper's (January): 50.

- Bigdely, Mahmud  
1989 Untitled paper submitted for graduate course in international communications at Oklahoma State University, taught by the author.
- Bishop, Katherine  
1988 "U.S. dusts off an old law." *New York Times* (March 27).
- Blackstone, Sir William  
1765-79 *Commentaries*, Book 4. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Chapter 11.
- Blanchard, Margaret  
1992 "Free expression and wartime: lessons from the past, hopes for the future." *Journalism Quarterly* 69,1 (spring): 5-17.
- "The Blowup Over the BBC"  
1987 *Newsweek* (February 16): 43.
- Blumer, Herbert  
1969 *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Bogdanov, N.G. and G.A. Vlazemskii  
1971 *Spravochnik Zhurnalista (Journalist's Handbook)*. Leningrad: Lenizdat.
- Boorstin, Daniel  
1961 *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*. New York: Atheneum.  
  
1965 *The Americans: National Experience*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Brandenberg v. Ohio  
1969 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430.
- Breed, Warren  
1955 "Social control in the newsroom." *Social Forces* (May): 326-335.
- Brendon, Piers  
1991 "Amendment envy: a report on the mother country's unfree press." *Columbia Journalism Review* (November/December): 68-71.
- Brissett, Dennis and Charles Edgley  
1974 *Life as Theatre: A Dramaturgical Sourcebook*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Brown, Anthony Cave  
1975 *A Bodyguard of Lies*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Browne, Malcolm  
1991 "Conflicting censorship upsets many journalists." *New York Times* (January 21): A8.

- Bryson, L.  
1948 *The Communication of Ideas*. New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies.
- Bucher, Karl  
1922 *Zu Frage der Pressreform (On the Question of Press Reform)*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Bukharin, Nikolai  
1929 "Politicheskii zavet Lenina" ("Lenin's Political Testament"). *Pravda* (January 21).
- Burckhardt, Jakob  
1898 *Griechische Kulturgeschichte (Greek Cultural History)*. Berlin: W. Spemann (quoted in Altschull, 1984: 109).
- Burke, Kenneth  
1945 *A Grammar of Motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Buruma, Ian  
1988 "Singapore." *New York Times Magazine* (June 12): 23-25, 54-58, 118.  
  
1989 *God's Dust: A Modern Asian Journey*. New Yorker: Farrar Strauss.
- Cahnman, Werner and Rudolf Heberle (Eds.)  
1971 *Ferdinand Tonnies, on Sociology: Pure, Applied, and Empirical*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Campbell, Duncan  
1987 "The imperial reach." *The Nation* (December 5): 670-71.
- Carlyle, Thomas  
1841 *Heroes and Hero Worship*. Lincoln, Nebraska; University of Nebraska Press, 1966.
- Carey, James W.  
1979 "Foreward." Pp. 9-14 in Hanno Hardt, *Social Theories of the Press: Early German and American Perspectives*.
- Charmaz, Kathy  
1980 "The social construction of self-pity in the chronically ill." Pp. 123-145 in Norman L. Denzin (ed.), *Studies in Symbolic Interaction*. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press.  
  
1982 "Chronic illness and single women: an exploration into support and betrayal." Paper presented at combined meetings of Society for the Study of Social Problems and Sociologists for Women in Society, San Francisco.  
  
1988 "The Grounded Theory Method: An Explication and Interpretation." Pp. 109-126 in Robert M. Emerson (ed.), *Contemporary Field Research*.

- Clarkson, Jesse D.  
1961 A History of Russia. New York: Random House.
- Clines, Francis X.  
1985 "Celebrating a constitution or violating its spirit?" New York Times (November 3): 4E.
- Cobo, Juan  
1989 "Trotsky's assassin: executioner or victim?" Moscow News, 12: 15-16.
- Cohen, Stephen  
1985 Rethinking the Soviet Experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coker, Increase  
1968 "Mass media in Nigeria." In Perspectives on Mass Media Systems. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
  
1970 Landmarks of the Nigerian Press. Apapa, Nigeria: Nigerian National Press Ltd.
- Commission on Freedom of the Press  
1947 A Free and Responsible Press, A General Report on Mass Communication: Newspaper, Radio, Motion Picture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
- Committee to Protect Journalists  
1988 Attacks on the Press 1987: A Worldwide Survey. New York: Committee to Protect Journalists.  
  
1990 Attacks on the Press 1989: A Worldwide Survey. New York: Committee to Protect Journalists.  
  
1991 Attacks on the press 1990: A Worldwide Survey. New York: Committee to Protect Journalists.
- Comte, Auguste  
1842 Course de Philosophie Positive, pp. 430-431. In Durkheim, 1885: 358.
- Crossette, Barbara  
1992 "Across Southeast Asia, Awakenings to Democracy." New York Times (May 24): E3.
- Curran, J., M. Gurevitch, and J. Woollacott (Eds.)  
1977 Mass Communication and Society. London: Edward Arnold.
- "Dangers to Press Freedom"  
1947 Fortune (April 21): 2.

- Day Benjamin  
1833 New York Sun (September 3: 1.
- Dennis, Everett E. and Claude-Jean Bertrand  
1980 "Seldes at 90: they don't give Pulitzers for that kind of criticism." Journalism History 7 (Autumn-Winter).
- Dennis v. United States  
1951 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed 1137.
- Denzin, Norman K.  
1977 "Notes on the criminogenic hypothesis: a case study of the American Liquor Industry." American Sociological Review 42: 905-920.  
  
1989 The Research Act. (Third ed.) Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Derevitsky, V.  
1988 "Vecherniaia gazeta: vzgliad iznutri i so storony" ("The evening newspaper: view from the inside and the sidelines"). Zhurnalist (Journalist) 2: 38-41.
- Dewey, John  
1922 Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Dissanayake, Wimal (Ed.)  
1988 Communication Theory: The Asian Perspective. Singapore: Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre.
- Doder, Dusko  
1986 Shadows and Whispers: Power Politics Inside the Kremlin from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. New York: Random House.
- Downie, Leonard J.  
1982 "How Britain Managed the News." Washington Post (August 20). Reprinted in Hiebert and Reuss (eds.), 1988, pp. 267-273.  
  
1989 Panel discussion at the national conference of Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communications, Washington, August 8 (attended by the author).
- Dreier, Peter  
1983 "The corporate complaint against the media." Quill (November). In Hiebert and Reuss, 1988.
- Durkheim, Emil  
1884 The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press, 1947.  
  
1885 The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York: Free Press, 1938.  
  
1897 Suicide: A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press, 1951.

- Editor & Publisher National Yearbook  
1991 New York: Editor & Publisher.
- Edwards v. National Audubon Society  
1977 566 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.)
- Ekwelie, Sylvanus A.  
1984 "Evolution of the print medium: the African experience. Pp. 1-25 in Onuora E. Nwuneli (ed.), Mass Communication in Nigeria: A book of Reading. Lagos: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
- 1986 "The Nigerian press under civilian rule. Journalism Quarterly 63,1 (Spring): 98-105, 149.
- Emerson, Robert M. (Ed.)  
1988 Contemporary Field Research: A Collection of Readings. Chicago Heights: Waveland Press.
- Evtushenko, Evgenii  
1988 "Preterpelost'." Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Newspaper) (May 11): 13.
- Fallaci, Oriana  
1979 Interview with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, reprinted in the International Herald Tribune (October 15): 5.
- Farberman, Harvey A.  
1975 "A criminogenic market structure: the automobile industry." The Sociological Quarterly 16: 438-456.
- Faulkner, Robert R.  
1983 Music on Demand. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Featherstone, Mike (Ed.)  
1985 Theory Culture & Society: Postmodernism. London: Sage.
- Fedotova, L.N.  
1967 "Stanovlenie reportazha na radio" ("Views on radio reporting"). Zhurnalistika XI, 6.
- Fenton, Frances  
1910/1911 "The influence of newspaper presentations upon the growth of crime and other anti-social activity." American Journal of Sociology 16.
- Fisher, Dan  
1979 "Change in the air on Soviet TV." Washington Post (January 21): K2.
- Florinsky, Michael T.  
1955 Russia: A History and an Interpretation Vols. I and II. New York: MacMillan.

- Folkerts, Jean and Dwight L. Teeter  
1989 *Voices of a Nation: A History of Media in the United States.*  
New York: MacMillan.
- Foote, Nelson N.  
1951 "Identification as the basis for a theory of motivation."  
*American Sociological Review* 16: 14-21.
- "Fourth Estate: Times ABCs."  
1944 *Time* (March 6): 47.
- Frankel, Max  
1971 Response in the "letters" section to Daniel Moynihan's March,  
1971, article "The press and the presidency" in *Commentary*  
(July): 12-16.
- Franklin, Benjamin  
1731 "Apology for printers." *Pennsylvania Gazette* (June 10).  
Quoted in Folkerts and Teeter, 1989, pp. 35-36.
- Fukuyama, Francis.  
1992 *The End of History and the First Man.* New York: The Free Press.
- Galtung, Johan and Mari H. Ruge  
1970 "The structure of foreign news," in Jeremy Tunstall (ed.),  
*Media Sociology.* London: Constable Press, pp. 259-98.
- Gans, Herbert J.  
1979 *Deciding What's News.* New York: Vintage Books, p. 146-181.
- Garneau, George  
1990 "Panning the Pentagon." *Editor & Publisher* (March 31): 11.
- Garnham, N.  
1979 "Contribution to a political economy of mass communication."  
*Media, Culture and Society* 1,2: 123-46.
- Gerbner, George  
1956 *Toward a general model of communication.* *Audio-Visual  
Communication Review* 4: 171-199.
- Giddens, Anthony  
1990 *Consequences of Modernity.* Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Gitlow v. People of the State of New York  
1925 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138.
- Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm Strauss  
1964 *Awareness of Dying.* Chicago: Aldine.
- 1967 *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative  
Research.* Chicago: Aldine.



- Glasser, Theodore L.  
 1984 "Objectivity precludes responsibility." *The Quill* (February): 13-16.
- Goodrich, Samuel  
 1857 *Recollections of a Life Time*, 2 vols. New York. Quoted in Folkerts and Teeter, 1989, p. 46.
- Gorbachev, M.S.  
 1987 *Perestroika*. New York: Harper and Row.  
 1988 "At the new stage of restructuring." *Pravda* (September 25): 1-2.
- Gramsci, Antonio  
 1971 *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Grachev, A. and N. Yermoshenkin  
 1984 *A New Information Order or Psychological Warfare*. Moscow: Progress.
- Gurevitch, M., T. Bennet, J. Curran, and J. Woollacott (Eds.)  
 1982 *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Methuen.
- Hachten, William A.  
 1971 *Muffled Drums: The News Media in Africa*. Ames: Iowa State University Press.  
 1987 *The World New Prism: Changing Media, Clashing Ideologies*, second edition. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press.  
 1989 "Media development without press freedom: Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore." *Journalism Quarterly* 66,4 (Winter): 822-827.
- Hall, Peter M.  
 1987 "Interactionism and the study of social organization" (ASA Presidential Address). *The Sociological Quarterly*, 28,1: 1-22.
- Hall, Stuart  
 1982 "The rediscovery of ideology: return of the repressed in media studies." Pp. 56-90 in Gurevitch *et al.* (eds.), *Culture, Society and the Media*.  
 1987 *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Methuen.
- Halliday, Fred  
 1979 *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Hallin, Daniel C.  
 1989 *The Uncensored War: the Media and Vietnam*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Paperback edition.

- Hammond, William M.  
 1988 Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968. U.S. Army in Vietnam Series. Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army.
- Hardt, Hanno  
 1979 Social Theories of the Press: Early German and American Perspectives. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Hasnain, Imtiaz  
 1988 "Communication: an Islamic approach." Pp. 183-203 in Wimal Dissanayake (ed.), Communication Theory: The Asian Perspective.
- Heng, Russell  
 1990 "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Wealth." New York: Rockefeller Foundation.
- Herbst, Jurgen  
 1965 The German Historical School in American Scholarship: A Study in the Transfer of Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University.
- Hewitt, John P. and Randall Stokes  
 1975 "Disclaimers." American Sociological Review 40:1, pp. 1-11.
- Hiebert, Ray, Donald F. Ungurait, and Thomas W. Bohn  
 1979 Mass media II: An Introduction to Modern Communication. New York: Longman.
- Hiebert, Ray and Carol Reuss  
 1988 Impact of Mass Media, Second Edition. New York: Longman.
- Hinkle, Roscoe C., Jr. and Gisela J. Hinkle  
 1954 The Development of Modern Sociology: Its Nature and Growth in the United States. New York: Random House.
- Hocking, William E.  
 1947 Freedom of the Press: A Framework of Principle. Chicago: Aldine.
- Hoge, Jim  
 1984 "Business and the media: stereotyping each other." American Society of Newspaper Editors Bulletin (February). Reprinted in Hiebert and Reuss (eds.), 1988.
- Holsinger, Ralph L.  
 1991 Media Law. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Hopkins, Mark  
 1970 Mass Media in the Soviet Union. New York: Pegasus.
- Horowitz, David  
 1991 "The politics of public television." Commentary (December): 25-32.

- Hovland, C.I., A.A. Lumsdaine, and F.D. Sheffield  
1965 Experiments on Mass Communication. New York: Wiley.
- Huber, Joan  
1973 "Symbolic interactionism as a pragmatic perspective: the bias of emergent theory." American Sociological Review 38 (April): 278-284.
- Hunter, Brian (Ed.)  
1991 The Statesman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1991-1992. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- "Is an honest and sane newspaper press possible?"  
1909/1910 American Journal of Sociology 15: 321-334.
- Jackman, Ian  
1992 Telephone conversation with the author, May 6, 1992. (Jackman is a British editor, now with Random House publishing company, New York.)
- James, William  
1907 Pragmatism. New York: Longmans, Green.
- Johnson, Wendell  
1946 People in Quandries. New York: Harper & Row.
- "Judge Declares Mistrial for 3 After Jury Deadlocks in Sedition Case"  
1989 New York Times (November 30).
- "Jury Acquits 9 of Conspiracy Against the U.S."  
1988 New York Times (April 7).
- Kandal, Jonathan C.  
1978 "Shah prefers a freer press to opposition in streets."  
Washington Post (October 28): A15.
- Kanter, Rosabeth  
1972 "Symbolic interactionism and politics in systematic perspective.  
Sociological Inquiry 42: 77-92.
- Karch, John  
1982 "USSR." Pp. 901-921 in Thomas L. Kurian (ed.), World Press Encyclopedia Volume II.
- Katz, Jack  
1988 A Theory of Qualitative Methodology: The Social System of Analytic Fieldwork," pp. 127-148. In Robert M. Emerson, Contemporary Field Research.
- "Keeping the Press from the Action."  
1983 Time (November 7): 63-66.

- Kelly, Sean  
1978 Access Denied: The Politics of Press Censorship. Washington Papers, 55: 10.
- Knies, Karl  
1857 Der Telegraph als Verkehrsmittel. Mit Erörterungen über den Nachrichtenverkehr überhaupt. (The Telegraph as Conveyance: With Discussion of News Conveyance in General) Tübingen: Verlag der Laupp'schen Buchhandlung.
- Koch, Adrienne (Ed.)  
1966 Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, Reported by James Madison. New York: Norton.
- Kogan, V.Z. and Yu. I. Skvortsov  
1970 "Stroki, temy, zhanry" (Lines, themes, genres). Pp. 30-56 in Problemy sotsiologii pechati II (Problems of the Sociology of the Press). Novosibirsk.
- Korevich, L.  
1988 "Barometr glasnosti: ispytanie vremenem" (Barometer of glasnost: a measure of the times). Pravda (May 5): 1.
- Kurian, George Thomas  
1982 World Press Encyclopedia, Vol. I and II. New York: Facts on File, Inc.
- Lasswell, Harold  
1948 "The structure and function of communication in society." In L. Bryson (ed.) The Communication of Ideas.
- Laver, Ross  
1987 "BBC says, 'No, prime minister'." MacLean's (February 16): 45.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F.  
1972 "The role of criticism in the management of mass media." In Qualitative Analysis, Historical and Critical Essays. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Robert Merton  
1948 "Mass communication, popular taste, and organized social action." In L. Bryson (ed.), The Communication of Ideas.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., B.R. Berelson, and H. Gaudet  
1968 The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. Third edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lenin, V. I.  
1901 "Where to begin." May 1901. In Stefan T. Possony (ed.), The Lenin Reader: The Outstanding Works of V.I. Lenin. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1969.

- Lenin, V. I.  
 1941-45 Polnye Sobranie Sochineniia, Tekst 35 (Completed Collected Works, 35 Vols.) Moscow, Third Edition.
- Lenin, Vladimir I.  
 1957 "Dekrety o pechat'." In Dekrety o sovetskoi vlasti, Vol. I. ("Decrees about the press" in Decrees on Soviet Power.) Moscow.  
 1986 Quoted in Pravda (June 16).
- LeoGrande, William  
 1987 Uneasy Allies: The Press and the Government During the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Center for War, Peace and the News Media, New York University.
- Lerner, Daniel and Wilbur Schramm  
 1967 Communication and Change in Developing Countries. Honolulu: East-West Center press.
- Lewis, Anthony  
 1988 "At home abroad: how tyranny creeps." New York Times (May 22): E29.
- Liebling, A.J.  
 1961 The Wayward Pressman. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Lincoln, Yvonna S. and Egon G. Guba  
 1985 Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Lippmann, Walter  
 1922 Public Opinion. New York: Macmillan.
- Lippmann, Walter and Charles Merz  
 1920 "A test of the news." New Republic Supplement (August 4): 1-42.
- Locke, John  
 1690 Second Treatise on Government. Thomas I. Cook (ed.), New York: Hafner, 1947.
- Loebel, Emil  
 1903 Kultur und Presse (Culture and the Press). Leipzig: Dunker & Humbolt.
- Lorsch, J.W. and P.R. Lawrence  
 1970 Studies in Organizational Design. Homewood, Illinois. Quoted in Wiio, 1975: 7.
- Lowenstein, Ralph L. and John C. Merrill  
 1990 Macromedia--Mission, Message, and Morality. New York: Longman.

- Lubsanov, D.D., G.I. Balkhanov, E.A. Golubev, and E.O. Dobilova  
 1972 "Nekotorye problemy izucheniia effektivnosti sredstv massovoi propagandy v Burliatii" ("Some problems of researching the effectiveness of mass propaganda in Buryatia"). Pp. 45-109 in Iz opyta konkretno-sotsiologicheskikh issledovaniï (From the Works of Concrete Sociological Research). Ulan-Ude: Buriatskii Institut Obshchestvennykh Nauk.
- Luedtke, Kurt  
 1982 "The twin perils: arrogance and irrelevance." Paper read at a convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, San Francisco.
- Lyons, Louis M.  
 1947 "The press and the critics." Atlantic Monthly (July): 15-16.
- Machiavelli, Nicolo  
 1513 The Prince. New York: Bantam Books, 1981.
- McKibben, Bill  
 1992 "Reflections: what's on?" New Yorker (March 10): 40-80.
- McLuhan, Marshall  
 1964 Understanding Media. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
 1967 The Medium Is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects. New York: Bantam Books.
- McPhail, Thomas L.  
 1981 Electronic Colonialism: The Future of International Broadcasting and Communication. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- McQuail, Denis  
 1961 Towards a Sociology of Mass Communications. London: Collier-MacMillan Publishers.  
 1972 Sociology of Mass Communications. Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
 1987 Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction. London: Sage. Second Edition.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw  
 1944 A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Mannheim, Karl  
 1936 Ideology & Utopia. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
 1940 Man & Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  
 1956 Essays on the Society of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Manucharova, Ye.  
 1989 "Psychiatry without zones of silence." Izvestia (April 18): 3.

- Marcuse, Herbert  
1974 One Dimensional Man. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Martin, L. John  
1991 "The world's regions: Africa." Pp. 155-204 in John C. Merrill, Global Journalism.
- Martin, L. John and Anju Grover Chaudhary  
1983 Comparative Mass Media Systems. New York: Longman.
- Maslow, Abraham H.  
1970 Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper and Row.
- Masmoudi, Mustafa  
1978 The New World Information Order. Document 31, UNESCO MacBride Commission.
- Mattick, Paul  
1990 "Art and the state." The Nation (October 1): 348-358.
- Mayer, J. P.  
1956 Max Weber and German Politics: A Study in Political Sociology. London: Faber and Faber, pp. 67-68.
- Mead, George H.  
1938 The Philosophy of the Act. Charles Morris (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Meese v. Keene  
1983 95 L.Ed. 2d 415. Quoted in Maureen J. Nemecek, 1991: 4 and 8.
- Merrill, John C.  
1974 The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy. New York: Hastings.  
  
1989 Dialectics in Journalism: Toward a Responsible Use of Press Freedom. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.  
  
1991 Global Journalism: A Survey of International Communication. Second edition. New York: Longman.
- Merrill, John C. and Ralph D. Barney (Eds.)  
1975 Ethics and the Press: Readings in Mass Media Morality. New York: Hastings House. First edition. Second edition, 1979.
- Merrill and Ralph Lowenstein  
1971 Media, Messages, and Men: New Perspectives in Communication. New York: David McKay. Second edition. White Plains: Longman, 1979.
- Merton, Robert  
1957 Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

- Metz, Helen Chapin  
1989 Iran: A Country Study. Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, and U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Mickiewicz, Ellen P.  
1981 Media and the Russian Public. New York: Praeger.
- Miliukov, Paul  
1942 Outlines of Russian Culture, Part 1: Religion and the Church. In Michael Karpovich (ed.), Valentine Ughet and Eleanor Davis (trs.), Philadelphia.
- Mill, John S.  
1859 On Liberty. New York: Penguin Books, 1985.
- Miller, Judith  
1992 "The Islamic wave." The New York Times Magazine (June 2): 23-26 and 38-42.
- Mills, C. Wright  
1940 "Situated actions and vocabularies of motive." American Sociological Review V (December): 904-913.  
  
1959 The Sociological Imagination. London: Oxford University Press.
- Momoh, Prince Tony  
1987 "Nigeria: the press and nation-building. Africa Report (March-April): 54-57.
- Morishima, Michio  
1982 "Why Has Japan Succeeded?: Western Technology and Japanese Ethos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mowlana, Hamid  
1979 "Technology versus tradition: communication in the Iranian revolution. Journal of Communication 29,3: 107-112.
- Moynihan, Daniel  
1971 "The presidency and the press." Commentary (March): 41-52.
- Mughees-ud-din, Mohammad  
1980 "Islamic concept of mass communication." Journal of Research (Humanities), University of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan 15,2: 89. Cited in Siddiqi, 1991.
- Murdock, G. and P. Golding  
1977 "Capitalism, communication and class relations." Pp. 12-43 in J. Curran et al., Mass Communication and Society.
- Nation Magazine v. U.S. Department of Defense  
1991 762 F. Supp. 1558.



- National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders  
 1968 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.  
 Washington: Government Printing Office.
- National Association of Broadcasters  
 1978 The Television Code, Twentieth Edition. Pp. 321-340 in Rivers,  
 Schramm, and Christians, 1980.
- Near v. Minnesota  
 1931 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357.
- Neil, Andrew  
 1988 "Britain's free press: does it have one?" Lecture at the  
 Center for Strategic International Studies, Washington, D.C.,  
 November 29. (Transcript published by World Press Freedom  
 Committee and CSIS.)
- Nemecek, Maureen J.  
 1991 "Warning visions: a case study of three Canadian documentaries.  
 Paper read at American Journalism Historians Association  
 annual meeting, Philadelphia, October 3.
- Newcomb, T. M.  
 1953 "An approach to the study of communicative acts." Psychologi-  
 cal Review 60: 393-404.
- New York City Bar Association  
 1990 Report on the Legal System of Singapore by the Committee on  
 International Human Rights of the New York City Bar Associa-  
 tion. New York: New York City Bar Association.
- New York Times Co. v. United States  
 1971 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822.
- Nicolaus, Martin  
 1970 "Text of a speech delivered at the A.S.A. Convention. Pp.  
 274-278 in Larry and Janice Reynolds (eds.), The Sociology  
 of Sociology. New York: McKay.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich  
 1901 Will to Power. New York: Random House, 1967.
- "Nigeria: Census Taken"  
 1991 Facts on File (December 31): 1007.
- Nordenstreng, K. (Ed.)  
 1968 "Communication research in the United States: a critical  
 perspective." Gazette 14: 207-216.
- 1974 Informational Mass Communication. Helsinki: Tammi.

- Novak, Michael  
 1975 "Why the workingman hates the media." Pp. 108-117 in John Merrill and Ralph D. Barney (eds), *Ethics and the Press: Readings in Mass Media Morality*.
- Nwankwo, Robert L. and George Kurian  
 1982 "Nigeria." Pp. 687-697 in George Thomas Kurian (ed.), *World Press Encyclopedia*, Vol. II.
- Okigbo, Charles  
 1987 "Death and funeral ads in the Nigerian press. *Journalism Quarterly* (Summer/Autumn): 629-633.
- O'Mara, Richard  
 1989 "Let's separate the press from the media." *Editor & Publisher* (February 11): 64 and 50 [sic].
- Omu, Fred  
 1968 "The dilemma of press freedom in colonial Africa." *Journal of African History* 9,9: 279-298.  
 1978 *Press and Politics in Nigeria: 1880-1937*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Longman Press, Historical Series.
- Osgood, C.E.  
 1954 "Psycholinguistics: a survey of theory and research problems." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology Supplement* 49 (October).
- Parker, Elliott S.  
 1982 "Singapore." Pp. 785-792 in George Thomas Kurian (ed.), *World Press Encyclopedia*, Vol. II.
- Parsons, Talcott  
 1937 *The Structure of Social Action*. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
 1965 "Max Weber 1864-1964," *American Sociological Review* 30, 2: 74.  
 1978 *Action Theory and The Human Condition*. New York: Free Press.
- Pechat' SSSR za sorok let: 1917-1957 (Press of the USSR for 40 Years)  
 1957 Moscow: Izdatel'stvo.
- Perinbanayagam, R.S.  
 1967 "Towards a theory of social change: a delineation of an approach." *Transactions of Missouri Academy of Science* I: 66-74.
- Peterson, Theodore  
 1964 *Magazines in the Twentieth Century*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Petrusenko, Vitaly  
 1976 *The Monopoly Press*. International Organization of Journalists.

- Picard, Robert G.  
1982 "Revisions of the 'four theories of the press.'" *Mass Communications Review*, winter/spring: 27.
- 1985 *The Press and the Decline of Democracy*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood.
- Pool, Ithaca de Sola  
1983 *Technologies of Freedom*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Postman, Neil  
1975 *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business*. New York: Viking Penguin.
- Poulantzas, N.  
1975 *Classes in Contemporary Society*. London: New Left Books.
- Rangel, Charles  
1990 "The Pentagon pictures." *New York Times* (December 20): A19.
- Rassadin, Stanislav  
1988 "Why is the Soviet anthem so insipid?" *Moscow News* (September): 3. British monthly edition.
- Reason, Peter and John Rowan (Eds.)  
1981 *Human Inquiry: A Sourcebook of New Paradigm Research*. New York: John Wiley.
- Reed, Barbara S. (ed.)  
1983 "Roundtable on media criticism." *Nieman Reports* (Winter): 36.
- Remington, Thomas  
1988 *The Truth of Authority: Ideology and Communication in the Soviet Union*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Rivers, William L., Wilbur Schramm, and Clifford G. Christians  
1980 "Appendices." Pp. 289-350 in *Responsibility in Mass Communication*. Cambridge: Harper and Row.
- Rock, Paul  
1979 *The Making of Symbolic Interactionism*. Towata, New Jersey: Roman and Littlefield.
- Ross, E.A.  
1910 "The suppression of important news." *Atlantic Monthly* (March): 303-311.
- Ryan, Michael and David L. Martinson  
1988 "Journalists and public relations practitioners: why the antagonism?" *Journalism Quarterly* 65,1 (Spring): 131-140.

- Salvaggio, J.L.  
 1985 "Information technology and social problems: four international models." In B.D. Ruben (ed.), *Information and Behavior*, Vol. I. Rutgers: Transaction Books, pp. 428-454.
- Schaffle, Albert E.F.  
 1881 *Bau und Leben des Sozialen Körpers (The Construction and Life of Social Bodies)*, Vol. 1. Tübingen: Verlag der H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung.
- Scheler, Max  
 1925 *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (Knowledge Formation and Society)*. Berne: Francke, 1960.
- Schenck v. United States  
 1919 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470.
- Schillinger, Elisabeth  
 1967 "British and U.S. newspaper coverage of the Bolshevik revolution." *Journalism Quarterly* 43,1 (Spring): 10-16 and 24.  
 1988 "Journalism at Moscow State: the impact of glasnost." *Journalism Educator* (Summer): 52-56.  
 1989 "Two Moscow dailies: content changes and glasnost, 1985-1987." *Journalism Quarterly* 66,4 (Winter): 828-835.
- Schillinger, Elisabeth and Catherine Porter  
 1991 "Glasnost and the transformation of Moscow News." *Journal of Communication* 41,2: (Spring) 125-149.
- Schleifer, S. Abdullah  
 1986 "Islam and information: need, feasibility and limitations of an independent Islamic news agency." *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 3,1: 122. Cited in Siddiqi, 1991.
- Schoar-Ghaffari, Pirouz  
 1991 "News of the outside world in the post-revolutionary Iranian press." *Gazette* 47: 1-18.
- Schramm, Wilbur  
 1954 "How communication works." In Wilbur Schramm (ed.), *The Process and Effects of Communication*. Urbana, University of Illinois Press. Revised edition, 1971.  
 1957 *Responsibility in Mass Communication*. New York: Harper and Row. And with William L. Rivers, second and third editions, 1969 and 1980.  
 1964 *Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information on Developing Countries*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Second edition, 1974.

- Schramm, Wilbur  
 1973 *Men, Messages and Media*. New York: Harper and Row. And with William E. Porter, *Men, Women, Messages and Media*, 1982.
- Schutz, Alfred  
 1967 *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- Schwartz, Peter and James Ogilvy  
 1979 "The emergent paradigm: toward an aesthetics of life. Paper presented at ESOMAR meeting, Barcelona. Discussed in Guba and Lincoln, 1985.
- Scott, Joseph F.  
 1969 "The changing foundations of the Parsonian Action Scheme." *American Sociological Review* 28: 716-735.
- Scott, Marvin B. and Stanford Lyman  
 1968 "Accounts." *American Sociological Review* 33,1: 46-62.
- Self, Charles C.  
 1990 "The flight from Fleet Street: causes and consequences." *Gazette* 45: 49-64.
- Sergeiev, K.  
 1987 *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Literary Newspaper) (August 19).
- Sesser, Stan  
 1992 "A reporter at large (Singapore)." *New Yorker* (January 13): 37-68.
- Severin, Werner and James Tankard  
 1988 *Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, Uses*. Second edition. New York: Longman.
- Shabad, Steven  
 1989 "There is no alternative to democracy: Korotich talks about his magazine and his mission." *World Press Review* (May): 24-26.
- Shannon, C. and W. Weaver  
 1949 *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Shapiro, Martin (ed.)  
 1972 *The Pentagon Papers and the Courts: A Study in Foreign Policy-Making and the Press*. San Francisco: Chandler.
- Shastiko, N.  
 1989 *Moscow News* 6: 3.
- Shaw, Donald L. and Robert L. Stevenson  
 1984 "Leaders and conflict in the news in 'pluralistic' and 'stable' political systems." Pp. 130-147 in Robert L. Stevenson and Donald L. Shaw (eds.), *Foreign News and the New World Information Order*.

Shchurokova, N.

- 1989 "Glasnost: bane or boon for education." *Izvestia* (November 29): 3.

Shibutani, Tamotsu

- 1962 "Self-conscious participation in groups," pp. 63-95. In *Society and Personality: An Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Shipler, David K.

- 1984 *Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams*. New York: Penguin.

Shlapentokh, Vladimir

- 1970a "Vybor sposobov provedeniia svobodnogo vremeni" ("Choice of ways to spend free time"). Pp. 148-163 in *Sotsiologlia dlia vsekh* (Sociology for All). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaia Rossiia".

- 1970b "K voprosy ob izuchenii esteticheskikh vkusov chitatelia gazety" ("On the question of research concerning the aesthetic taste of the newspaper reader"). Pp. 57-73 in *Problemy sotsiologii pechati II* (Problems of the Sociology of the Press II). Novosibirsk.

- 1987 *The Politics of Sociology in the Soviet Union*. Boulder: Westview.

Shmelev, Nikolai

- 1987 "Avansy i dolgi" ("Credits and debts.") *Novyi Mir* (New World) 5 (June): 147-158.

Short Course

- 1945 *In History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union/Bolsheviks*. Moscow. Cited in Tucker, 1987: 75 and 103.

Siddiqi, Mohammad A.

- 1991 "Muslim media: present status and future directions." *Gazette* 47: 19-31.

Siebert, Fred S.

- 1952 *Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1775*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Siebert, Fred S., Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm

- 1956 *Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do*. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1973.

Sinclair, Upton

- 1919 *The Brass Check*. Muscatine, Iowa: Norman Baker, 1928.

- Skinner, Andrew  
1979 "Introduction." Pp. 11-106 in Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Skocpol, Theda  
1982 "Rentier state and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution." *Theory and Society* 11: 265-283.
- Smith, Adam  
1771 *A Theory of Moral Sentiments*. In Benjamin A. Roegge (ed.), *The Wisdom of Adam Smith*. Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1976.  
  
1776 *Wealth of Nations*. Edwin Cannan (ed.). New York: Random House, 1937.
- Smith, Ward  
1985 "Business and the media: sometimes partners, sometimes adversaries." *Vital Speeches of the Day* 52 (November 1): 49-51.
- Snepp v. United States  
1980 444 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 763, 62 L.Ed 2d 704.
- Sobowale, Idowu  
1984 "Influence of ownership on Nigerian newspaper coverage on national al issues. Pp. 94-103 in Onuora E. Nwuneli (ed.), *Mass Communication in Nigeria: A book of Reading*. Lagos: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
- Society of Professional Journalists  
1973 *Code of Ethics*. Pp. 291-294 in Rivers, Schramm, and Christians, 1980.
- Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr  
1968 *First Circle*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Sorokin, Pitirim A.  
1941 *Crisis of Our Age*. New York: Dutton.  
  
1956 *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.
- Sovetskaia pechat' v dokumentakh  
1961 Moscow: Kniga.
- Spencer, Herbert  
1895 *The Principles of Sociology*, 3 Vols. New York: Appleton.
- Stalin, I.V.  
1925 *O pechati*. (On the Press). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Proletarii.
- Stokes, Randall and John P. Hewitt  
1976 "Aligning actions." *American Sociological Review* 41 (October): 838-849.

- Strauth, Georg and Bryan S. Turner  
 1985 "Nostalgia, postmodernism and the critique of mass culture."  
 Pp. 2-3 in Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Theory, Culture & Society: Postmodernism*, 1988.
- Strukov, G.  
 1971 "Gazeta, chitatel', zhizn'" ("The Newspaper, the Reader, Life").  
 Pp. 102-142 in *Gazeta, chitatel', zhizn'*. Voronezh: Tsentral'-nogo-Chernozemnoe Knizhnoe Isdatel'stvo.
- "Summary of Broadcasting and Cable."  
 1990 *Broadcasting* (July 2):61.
- Survey Research Group  
 1988 "Singapore Leads VCR Ownership," *Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre Bulletin* (March/April): 12.
- Tankard, James W.  
 1988 "Wilbur Schramm: definer of a field." *Journalism Educator* 43,3: 11-13.
- Teeter, Dwight L.  
 1992 "The First Amendment at its bicentennial: necessary but not sufficient?" *Journalism Quarterly* 69,1 (Spring): 18-27.
- Tehrani, Majid  
 1988 "Communication Theory and Islamic Perspectives." Pp. 191-203 in Wimal Dissanayake (ed.), *Communication Theory: The Asian Perspective*.
- Thomas, W.I.  
 1908 "The psychology of the yellow journal." *American Magazine*, March: 491-496.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de  
 1835a "Liberty of the press in the United States." Pp. 188-197 in *Democracy in America*, Vol. I. Phillip Bradley (ed.). New York: Vintage, 1945.  
 1835b "Of the relation between public associations and newspapers." Pp. 119-122 in *Democracy in America*, Vol. II. Phillip Bradley (ed.). New York: Vintage, 1945.
- Tonnies, Ferdinand  
 1931 *Einführung in die Soziologie* (Introduction to Sociology). Stuttgart: Ferdinand Encke, as reported in Hanno Hardt (1979).  
 1963 *Community & Society* (Gemeinschaft und Gellschaft). Charles P. Loomis (ed. and tr). New York: Harper Torchbooks.
- Trotsky, Leon  
 1960 *Literature and Revolution*. Ann Arbor: Ardis.



- Tuchman, Gaye  
 1972 "Objectivity as strategic ritual: an examination of newsmen's notions of objectivity." *American Journal of Sociology* 77 (January): 4.
- 1978 *Making News: A Study in the Social Construction of Reality*. New York: The Free Press, pp. 39-63.
- Tucker, Robert  
 1987 *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev*. New York: Norton.
- Tunstall, Jeremy  
 1977 *The Media Are American*. London: Constable.
- Turner, Jonathan H., Leonard Beeghley, and Charles H. Powers  
 1989 *The Emergence of Sociological Theory, Second Edition*. Chicago: Dorsey.
- Turner, Frederick Jackson  
 1894 "The significance of the frontier in American history." Pp. 199-227 in 1983 *American Historical Association Annual Report*, Washington, D.C.
- Turner, Kathleen J.  
 1985 *Lyndon Johnson's Dual War: Vietnam and the Press*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Villard, Oswald  
 1923 *Some Newspapers and Newspapermen*. New York: Knopf.
- Volodin, Boris  
 1986 "Rasshirenie glasnosti--vopros politicheskii" ("Expansion of glasnost--a political issue"). *Partiinaia zhizn'* (Party Life) 17 (September): 23-24 and 27.
- Vooglaid, IU (ed.)  
 1967 *Metodologicheskie problemy issledovaniia massovoi kommunikatsii* (Methodological Problems of Research of Mass Communication). Tartu: Tartuskii Universitet.
- Walker, Martin  
 1983 *Powers of the Press: Twelve of the World's Influential Newspapers*. New York: Pilgrim Press.
- 1992 Interview with the author, April 13, 1992, Washington, D.C.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel  
 1976 *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.
- 1979 *The Capitalist World-Economy*. New York: Cambridge University.

"War Zone Media Pool Designated"

1985 Facts on File (October 19): 773-774.

Washington Post

1977 Standards and Ethics. Pp. 296-300 in Rivers, Schramm, and Christians, 1980.

Weber, Karl

1937 "Zur Soziologie der Zeitung" ("On the sociology of the newspaper" in Festgabe Fritz Fleiner zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag (Presentation to Fritz Fleiner on His Seventieth Birthday). Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag.

Weber, Max

1904 "'Objectivity' in social science and social policy." In The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (trs.), New York: Free Press, 1949.

1905/1906 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Talcott Parsons (tr.). New York: Scribner's, 1958.

1924 Gessammelte Augsatze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik von Max Weber (Collected Essays on Sociology and Social Policy by Max Weber). Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), pp. 433-441.

1921a "Part 1, Conceptual Exposition." Pp. 1-307 in Economy and Society, Vol. I. And "Appendix, Types of Social Action and Groups." Pp. 1375-1384 in Economy and Society, Vol. II. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.), Johannes Winckelmann (tr.). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

1921b "Part 2, The Economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers." Pp. 311-469 in Economy and Society, Vols. I and II. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.), Johannes Winckelmann (tr.). Berkeley: University of California Press 1978.

Westley, Bruce and Malcolm MacLean

1957 "A conceptual model for mass communication research." Journalism Quarterly 34: 31-38.

Whelton, Clark

1982 "The guilt edge." Channels of Communications (February/March). Pp. 465-470 in Hiebert and Reuss (eds.), 1988.

Whitman, A.

1976 "Newton's other law is hailed on its tercentary." New York Times, Feb. 6, p. 21.

Wiio, Osmo A.

1975 Systems of Information, Communication, and Organization. Helsinki: Research Institute for Business Economics.

- Wiio, Osmo A.  
1983 "The mass media role in the western world." Pp. 85-94 in L. John Martin and Anju Grover Chaudhary (eds.), *Comparative Mass Media Systems*.
- Wilcox, Dennis L.  
1982 "Kenya." Pp. 569-577 in George Thomas Kurian (ed.), *World Press Encyclopedia Vol. I*.
- Williams, Raymond  
1966 *Communication*. London: Chatto and Windus.  
1973 "Base and superstructure." *New Left Review*, 82.
- Will, George F.  
1992 "Who would kill Big Bird?" *Washington Post* (April 22): 17.
- Worsley, Peter  
1984 *The Three Worlds*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Wright, Charles W.  
1959 *Mass Communication*. New York: Random House.
- Yates v. United States  
1957 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed. 2d 1356.
- Zaslavskaja, T.I.  
1987 "Perestroika i sotsiologija" ("Restructuring and Sociology"). *Pravda* (February 6).
- Zykov, Evgenii  
1985 KOSU radio interview, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, April 8.

VITA

Elisabeth Hupp Schillinger

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis: A DYNAMIC THEORY OF WORLD PRESS ACTION AND MOTIVATION

Major Field: Sociology

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Springfield, Illinois, March 28, 1943, the daughter of W. Wayne and Joyce Hupp. Married to John Schillinger on August 28, 1965.

Education: Graduated from Springfield High School, Springfield, Illinois, in June 1961; received Bachelor of Science degree in Journalism from the University of Illinois in June 1965; received Master of Science degree from Oklahoma State University in August 1985; completed requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at Oklahoma State University in July 1992.

Professional Experience: Technical Editor, Engineering Publications Office, University of Illinois, September 1965 to July 1967; Magazine Editor, Writer, and Graphic Designer, Editor's Office, University of Wisconsin, September 1967 to July 1970; Assistant News Director and Lecturer, Saginaw Valley College, September 1970 to May 1973; Free Lance Writer and Designer August 1973 to January 1975; Engineering Editor, Engineering Dean's Office, Purdue University, January 1975 to March 1981; Manager, Engineering Publications Office, Purdue University, March 1981 to July 1982; Administrative Associate, Department of Industrial Engineering, Oklahoma State University, August 1982 to October 1983; Publications Specialist, Public Information Office, Oklahoma State University, October 1983 to August 1984; Lecturer, August 1984 to August 1985; Assistant Professor, August 1985 to July 1990, School of Journalism and Broadcasting, Oklahoma State University, August 1985 to July 1990; Assistant Professor of Communication, Mount Vernon College, August 1990 to present.