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A STUDY OF AFGE LOCAL 916.

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WHY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES JOIN UNIONS:
A STUDY OF AFGE LOCAL 916

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WHY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES JOIN UNIONS:

A STUDY OF AFGE LOCAL 916

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WHY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES JOIN UNIONS:
A STUDY OF AFGE LOCAL 916

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Over the past thirty years this nation has experienced a rapid change in the state of technology which has led to a high rate of economic growth. Under these circumstances the government plays a dual role as a regulator of economic and social activities and as a producer and consumer of a significant part of this nation's final output of goods and services. This growth in governmental activities and responsibilities has resulted in a significant increase in the number of government employees.

The total number of government employees increased to more than 3 million, or by 26 percent between 1958 and 1969.¹ The rate of increase was considerably faster in the government than in the private sector. Along with this increase in employment there has been a striking change in the occupational composition of government employees.

¹United States Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1969, Table A-1, p. 52.

Historically, blue-collar workers have accounted for over 50 percent of the government's employees. By 1968 white-collar workers numbered 1.9 million accounting for nearly 70 percent of the government's employees.²

Manpower projections for the 1965-1975 decade indicate that only a 10.8 percent increase in government employment is anticipated.³ However, the percentage of blue-collar workers will continue to decline and the need for technical and professional white-collar workers will expand to meet the demands of an increasing population and massive government commitments.⁴

The government has always perceived relations with its employees as being unique when compared to labor-management relations in the private sector. This uniqueness is manifested in the concept of sovereign immunity. The relevance of the sovereignty doctrine to government employees derives from the notion that employee pressure upon the government employer by the same methods legally accorded workers in the private sector would represent a derogation

²Ibid., Tables A-1, A-3, pp. 52, 55.

³United States Department of Labor, Manpower Report of the President, April 1967 (Washington, D. C.: 1967), Table E-9.

⁴B. Yabroff, "Trends and Outlook for Employment in Government," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 88 (March 1965), p. 287.

of the sovereign integrity of government authority.⁵

A comparison of the legal and philosophical environment surrounding unionism and collective bargaining between the federal government and the private sector shows that only a limited correlation exists. The present legal philosophical environment of labor-management relations in the government does not actively encourage government employees to join unions nor does it facilitate a meaningful collective bargaining relationship between labor and management. Exceptions to this condition exist in the Tennessee Valley Authority, Government Printing Office, and the Interior Department. Meaningful collective bargaining does not exist because of the following: the legally sanctioned institutionalized belief in government sovereignty coupled with the legal sanctioning of management's rights appears to have reinforced a historically negative attitude towards collective bargaining on the part of government management. The government's legal and philosophical attitudes toward meaningful collective bargaining is manifested in Executive Order 11491 issued on October 29, 1969. This Order specifically denies government employees the right to strike, establishes no provisions for collective bargaining over wages or hours, and strongly asserts management's rights.

In another respect the government's relationship

⁵Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal Civil Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1966), p. 17.

to its employees is unique when compared to the private sector. In 1883, the government established a civil service merit system under the administration of the Civil Service Commission. Since its inception the philosophy underlying the civil service system has been the development and maintenance of policies and procedures designed to protect government employees from management or political attack. Many of the subjects covered within the scope private sector collective bargaining were covered under civil service system regulations and procedures before collective bargaining's widespread adoption. It would appear that the civil service system would minimize general employee dissatisfaction through its establishment and protection of employees' rights and thereby reduce employees motivation to join unions.

Government employees have had the legal right to join unions since 1912 when Congress passed the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. Historically union membership among non-postal government employees has been relatively low. According to a Civil Service Assembly survey of 1939, only 19 percent of the government nonpostal employees were union members.⁶

When Executive Order 10988 was issued in January 1962, it represented the first government wide official

⁶Morton R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service: A Study in Political Pluralism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 94-95.

labor-management relations policy. Although the Order restricts the rights of unions and clearly protects government sovereignty, it had a major effect on union growth in the government. By 1963, 25.8 percent of the government's nonpostal employees were union members. For the period 1963 to 1970 nonpostal government employees represented by unions increased from 180,000 to 916,000.⁷ As of November 1970, 48 percent of the government's eligible nonpostal employees were represented by unions.⁸

Along with the increases in union membership there has been a shift in the membership composition. Historically the organizing appeals of government unions (excluding the postal unions) have primarily attracted blue-collar workers. In the past decade white-collar workers have been responsible for the majority of the increases in union membership. Today, 35 percent of the government's white-collar workers are union members. They account for over 50 percent of total union membership.⁹

The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), an industrial type union, has over the past decade experienced the highest growth rate of any union. In 1960

⁷United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: November, 1970), Table K, p. 21.

⁸Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee Relations Report, No. 390, March 1, 1971, p. D-5.

⁹Ibid.

AFGE membership was 70,300. By 1970 actual membership had increased by over 400 percent to 304,000. Government employees represented by the AFGE reached 530,550.¹⁰ White-collar workers accounted for most of the AFGE's growth over the past decade and presently approximate 50 percent of actual membership, and 59 percent of the government employees represented by the union. Today, the AFGE is the largest union in the government.

The rapid increases in government union membership, coupled with the decreases in private sector union membership have led people to speculate about why government employees join unions. Generalizations have been made that government employees join unions for the same reasons as workers in the private sector.¹¹

Conditions of work in the government preclude many explanations about the reasons why people join unions. The first condition is the historical role of the civil service system. The second condition is the government's maintenance of the sovereignty doctrine which is reflected in

¹⁰United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government, op. cit., Table K, p. 21.

¹¹For a detailed discussion, see H. J. Christrup, "Why Do Government Employees Join Unions," Personnel Administration, September-October, 1966, pp. 49-54; W. D. Heisel and J. D. Hallihan, Questions and Answers on Public Employee Negotiations (Chicago, Illinois: Public Personnel Association, 1967). These articles represent the only sources uncovered by the author that discuss why government employees join unions.

its labor-management relations policies. These legal and philosophically restrictive policies do not facilitate meaningful collective bargaining. The third condition is that the high proportion of white-collar union members in the government is in sharp contrast with the low proportion of white-collar union members in the private sector. It is also commonly believed that the traditional appeals of unions do not attract white-collar workers.

Hypotheses

In order to achieve the objectives of this study, the following testable hypotheses have been formulated.

1. The reasons why the sampled blue-collar and white-collar AFGE Local 916 members joined the union are significantly different than the reasons why workers in the private sector join unions.

2. The sampled blue-collar and white-collar AFGE Local 916 members joined the union for the same reasons.

Research Plan

The research plan for this study is divided into three parts. The first part involves a discussion of unionism in the private sector. The writings of the labor historians and contemporary empirical research studies that establish why workers in the private sector join unions will be examined. Current literature will be examined and discussed to establish the reasons why

white-collar workers are not inclined to join unions.

The second part centers around an examination and discussion of the books, monographs, articles, research studies, government documents and publications, and other published information that relate to government labor-management relations. The examination will include an evaluation of the factors which are believed by many authors to differentiate the operational environment of the government from that of firms in the private sector. These factors underlie the government's perception of its relationship with its employees as being different than the relationships between labor and management in the private sector.

The third part of this study will consist of an examination and evaluation of empirical data derived from a systematic random sample of AFGE Local 916 members' responses to a questionnaire that was sent to their homes. Local 916 was selected as the study group because of its convenient location and that it is the largest local in the government.

To determine why the sampled members joined the union and to test hypotheses 1 and 2, a questionnaire has been developed. The questionnaire was developed with advice and assistance from the following: Dr. Donald Woolf, the author's chairman, Dr. Marion Phillips, market researcher and committee member, Mr. Michael Bodi, former government

research psychologist and fellow graduate student, Mr. Kermit Tull, AFGE National Vice-President, 9th District, and Mr. Norman Nance, President, Local 916. The questionnaire was pre-tested with a group of workers to obtain a measure of its validity and reliability.

Specific subject areas in the questionnaire include the following:

1. Social background
2. Job environment factors
3. AFGE membership and participation
4. Reasons for joining the union
5. The civil service system
6. The scope of collective bargaining
7. The right to strike issue.

Chi-square analysis and any other appropriate statistical tests have been used in analyzing the data.

Sample

A brief outline of the proposed study was presented to AFGE National and Local 916 officials. After a number of meetings, officials of Local 916 agreed to participate in the study.

The author and his chairman examined the general characteristics of Local 916's blue-collar and white-collar members and decided that a 10 percent sample would be adequate to achieve the objectives of this study.

Except for 68 nonappropriated funds workers, Local

916's membership consists entirely of blue-collar and white-collar Tinker Air Force Base employees. At the time that the sample was established the union had 7,355 active members. The sample was determined by selecting every tenth blue-collar and every tenth white-collar worker carried in the union's active membership file. The sample consisted of 516 blue-collar and 220 white-collar workers. The sample's composition indicated that the union's membership is 70 percent blue-collar and 30 percent white-collar workers.

On June 3, 1971, copies of the Confidential Questionnaire were sent to the homes of the 736 members who comprised the sample. Each of the sampled members received a letter of introduction explaining the purpose of the study, guaranteeing individual anonymity, and urging his cooperation; a Confidential Questionnaire; and a postage-paid, addressed envelope for returning the questionnaire to the University of Oklahoma's Bureau of Business and Economic Research (See Appendix I for the introductory letter and the questionnaire). In addition, the union published an article in the Tinker Take Off on June 3 and June 11 explaining the purposes of the study and urging the sampled members' cooperation.

The responses to the mailing were lower than were expected. The author and members of his committee decided that a second mailing would be necessary to increase the

reliability of the study. Since the questionnaires were uncoded, it was impossible to know who had responded to the questionnaire. The cover letter used in the second mailing explained this situation, thanked those who had responded to the first mailing; asked that they disregard this questionnaire, and urged those who had not previously responded to participate in the study. On June 17, the sampled members were sent the second cover letter, a copy of the questionnaire, and a postage-paid return envelope. (See Appendix I for the cover letter used in the second mailing). On June 18, the union published another article in the Tinker Take Off urging the sampled members who had not responded to the first mailing to take advantage of this opportunity to participate in the study.

As a result of the second mailing the responses increased from 33 percent to 44.5 percent. The usable responses and the response rate for the blue-collar and the white-collar members are shown in Table 1.¹²

¹²Questionnaires sent to the homes of 4 blue-collar and 2 white-collar members were returned unanswered for various reasons. This reduced the sample size to 730. Thirteen responses were not usable for various reasons.

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF USABLE RESPONSES AND RESPONSE
RATE BY EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses
		% Response by Group
Blue-Collar	175	34.2
White-Collar	137	62.9
Total	312	42.7

Data Analysis

Except for questions 24 and 25, the responses to the questions are discrete. Discrete data limits the statistical tests that can be used for analysis purposes. Because the Chi-Square test requires no assumptions about the shape of the parameter distribution, Chi-Square was used for analyzing the responses to the questionnaire.¹³

In the first part of the data analysis the sampled members' responses to each question were tabulated by group, and tested for statistical significance, first by group response and then by total response. (See Appendix II, Tables 34 through 60). In Chapter VI the responses to the general background questions 1 through 8 were compared by group and question categories with information known about all Local 916 members and all Tinker employees.

¹³N. M. Downie and R. W. Heath, Basic Statistical Methods (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 160.

The results of the comparison were used as a check of the representativeness of the sampled members to the union population and to determine whether certain factors were present in the members' background that may have had either a positive or a negative influence on their joining the union.

The responses to questions 9 through 25 were analyzed to establish the reasons why the blue-collar and the white-collar members joined the union.

In the second part of the data analysis the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members to each question were compared. The Chi-Square test was used to determine whether any significant differences existed in the responses of the two groups. The results of this comparison were used to determine whether the reasons why the blue-collar and the white-collar members joined the union differed significantly.

Limitations

The scope of this study is subject to a number of limitations:

1. The findings of this study are based upon the assumption that the sampled members' responses to the questionnaire were a truthful reflection of their feelings.
2. Only Local 916 members participated in the study. The variance in operational environments primarily due to the differences in the objectives of government

agencies limits the findings of the study to the Local and Agency that has been studied.

Definition of Terms

Throughout this study certain terms are used repeatedly. For continuity of the meaning, the following definitions are applicable.

Collective Bargaining

The legal definition of the term collective bargaining is the following:

To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligations of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms, and conditions of employment, or in the negotiation of an agreement, or any question thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.¹⁴

Employees

Employees means any individual either white-collar (general schedule) or blue-collar (wage board) employed by the federal government except those individuals who under the law are ineligible to join unions.

Government

Unless specifically stated as meaning otherwise

¹⁴Section 8(d) Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947. Underlining of the words "wages" and "hours" is mine.

the term government refers only to the federal government as used in this study. The federal government would include the following: executive branch, all executive departments, legislative branch, judicial branch, and all independent agencies.

Private Sector

Private sector refers to all legally sanctioned formal organizations where labor-management relationships exist exclusive of those in federal, state, and local governments.

Public Sector

In this study the term may be used interchangeably with the term "government." The definition would be the same.

Strike

According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary a Strike is defined as: "a temporary stoppage of work by a body of workers designed to enforce compliance with demands (as changes in wages, hours, or working conditions) made on an employer."¹⁵ The language of the Taft-Hartley Act is explicit in what action would be considered a strike.

¹⁵Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Company, 1967), p. 2262.

The term "strike" includes any strike or concerted stoppage of work of employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement) and any concerted slow-down or other concerted interruption of operations by employees.¹⁶

Union

Executive Order 10988 (Section 2) used the term "employee organization" while Executive Order 11491 uses the term "labor organization" to describe what is commonly referred to as a "labor union" or a "union." The term "union" is germane to the private sector but its meaning is widely understood. The use of different terminology is the government's way of differentiating the legal environment between itself and the private sector. When discussing government unions the term union means:

a lawful organization of any kind in which employees participate and which for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with agencies concerning grievances, personnel policies and practices, or other matters affecting the working conditions of their employees; but does not include an organization which (1) consists of management officials or supervisors, (2) asserts the right to strike against the government, (3) advocates overthrow and (4) discriminates with regard to membership because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin.¹⁷

Organization of the Study

Summaries of pertinent writings relating to labor-management relations in the government are examined in

¹⁶Section 501(a) Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947.

¹⁷Section 2(e), Executive Order 11491, October 29, 1969.

Chapter II.

In Chapter III contributions of labor historians, and the empirical studies found by the author are examined to establish why workers in the private sector join unions. The reasons why white-collar workers in the private sector are not inclined to join unions are also examined.

Chapter IV consists of an examination and evaluation of the uniqueness of the government as an employer from the following bases:

- A. The Sovereignty Concept
- B. Past and Present Legal Environment
- C. The Role of the Civil Service Commission
- D. Existing Limitations on Collective Bargaining.

In Chapter V the AFGE, Local 916, and the environment of labor-management relations at Tinker Air Force Base are examined and evaluated.

Chapter VI consists of an examination and evaluation of the findings of the survey. The results of the comparison are used to determine if the sampled members' reasons for joining the union are significantly different from the reasons why workers in the private sector join unions. The responses to the survey of the sampled blue-collar and white-collar members are compared to determine if their reasons for joining the union are different.

Chapter VII contains a summary presentation of the findings of this study with concluding implications for

government, Air Force management, and the union, based upon the responses of the members who participated in this study. Appendices of relevant materials and a Bibliography conclude this study.

CHAPTER II

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

Books and Monographs

Prior to the 1960's little if any attention was given to the area of labor-management relations in the government.¹ One of the most comprehensive studies was conducted by a committee of the Civil Service Assembly.² The intent of this study was to develop a framework within which the labor problems of government employees might be investigated. The controversiality of the subject limited the successful achievement of the study's objective.

Sterling D. Spero's Government as Employer is considered an authoritative source on the historical

¹A comprehensive bibliography may be found in the following: U.S. Civil Service Commission, Employee-Management Relations in the Public Service, Personnel Bibliography Series No. 7 (Washington, D.C.: The Commission Library). Additional sources may be found in Morton R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service: A Study of Political Pluralism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 289-301.

²Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman, Employee Relations in the Public Service (Chicago: C.S.A. of the U.S. and Canada, 1942).

development of unions in the Postal Service and other government agencies and departments.³ Spero presents an excellent insight into the philosophical basis of government labor-management conflict. According to Spero, the base of conflict centers around the need for the unions to check management's authority and the need of management to see to it that the government services operate for the benefit of the whole public.⁴

Morton R. Godine's The Labor Problem in the Public Service: A Study in Political Pluralism is both historical and analytical in its investigation of government labor-management relations.⁵ His primary emphasis in the study is in the determination:

. . . of the extent to which the civil service may be accorded a measure of functional recognition without impairment of the inalienable duty of a representative government to retain ultimate control over the administrative machinery⁶ created for the accomplishment of public purposes.

In effect Godine views the labor-management problem in government essentially the same as Spero views it. Godine's study is more analytical than Spero's in its consideration of the basic philosophical problem in government labor-management

³ Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York: Remsen Press, 1948).

⁴ Ibid., pp. 486-7.

⁵ Morton R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service: A Study in Political Pluralism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).

⁶ Ibid., p. xii.

relations. Godine bases his analysis on the hypothesis:

that the establishment of employee relations programs in which explicit provision is made for staff participation may (a) enhance operating efficiency and (b) advance the purposes which a democratic society seeks to achieve.⁷

He does not offer any conclusive proof that his hypothesis is correct.

The last study prior to the issuance of Executive Order 10988 is Wilson Hart's Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service.⁸ This study is an excellent updating of the developments, issues, and trends in government labor-management relations that had taken place since the studies of Spero and Godine. Starting from a historical, social and legal base Hart develops a comparative analysis of labor-management relations in the private sector and in the government.

Numerous other texts pertaining to government or civil service published prior to 1962 were found to have little to add to the information already available in the writings of Spero, Godine, and Hart.⁹ Since 1962 interest in government labor-management relations increased at an accelerating rate reflecting a growing interest in the field.

⁷Ibid., p. 60.

⁸Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962).

⁹Discussions on government labor-management relations may be found in texts by Blackburn, Carpenter, Gregory, Stahl, Nigro, Mayer, Mosher, and others listed in the Bibliography.

Stimulus in part has been provided by (1) the rapid growth in size of the government's labor force and (2) the rapid growth of government unions since the issuance of Executive Order 10988.

Since 1963 the Public Personnel Association (formerly known as the Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada) has published eight monographs on collective bargaining in the public sector from 1963 to 1967, covering both theory and practice. The Association has also published three books in a series titled, Policies and Practices of Public Personnel Administration. Summaries of those monographs and books whose contents are relevant to this study are as follows:

Management's Relations with Organized Public Employees, edited by Kenneth O. Warner, is a collection of the attitudes and concepts about government labor-management relations as held by public administrators, consultants, union representatives, and scholars.¹⁰

Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal Civil Service, by Willem Vosloo, is based on two interrelated themes.¹¹

¹⁰Kenneth O. Warner (ed.), Management Relations with Organized Public Employees: Theory, Policies, Problems (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1963).

¹¹Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Federal Civil Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1966).

One theme deals with the description and analysis of the collective actions engaged in by both the federal government and organized public employees under the Kennedy program and it analyzes the conditions determining the nature, scope, and effects of these actions. The other is concerned with the development of criteria by which the significance of the consequences of this program can be clarified.¹²

Vosloo concludes that modified collective bargaining rights can be granted to government employees because the differences between government management and private sector management is one of degree rather than of kind.¹³ He does note that in the private sector every collective bargaining agreement is a result of both reason and potential force whereas in government the division of authority and the influence of political consideration exert a strong influence upon the determination of the final settlement.

Collective Bargaining in the Public Service:

Theory and Practice, edited by Kenneth O. Warner, is a collection of papers presented at the Canadian Seminar on labor-management relations by American and Canadian public officials and consultants. This monograph examines the scope of the current practices and experiences in the United States and Canada.¹⁴

Management-Employee Relations in the Public Service

¹² Ibid., p. 3.

¹³ Ibid., p. 158.

¹⁴ Kenneth O. Warner (ed.), Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and Practice (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1967).

by Felix Nigro considers the present status of labor-management relations in the United States and Canada.¹⁵ Nigro's coverage of labor-management problems is wider in scope than other publications of the Public Personnel Association. Specific consideration is given to the experiences and problems of labor and management under Executive Order 10988 with a comparative analysis of the methods and processes utilized by the private sector and foreign governments for handling labor-management relations problems.

The most comprehensive collection of information about the developments of the 1960's at federal, state, and local levels of government is in Harold S. Robert's Labor-Management Relations in the Public Service.¹⁶ This book is actually an updating and expansion of a publication prepared by Roberts in February, 1964, with revisions in August, 1964, and again in January, 1967, entitled, A Manual for Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service. The earlier publication is devoted primarily to developments on the federal level. This book enlarges the scope to include state and local developments as well.

Unlike the works of Spero, Godine, and Hart,

¹⁵Felix A. Nigro, Management-Employee Relations in the Public Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1969).

¹⁶Harold S. Roberts, Labor-Management Relations in the Public Service (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1970).

Roberts does not develop a historical analysis of labor-management relations in the government. This book is an excellent reference source for arbitration decisions issued under Executive Order 10988.

Collective Bargaining in Public Employment by Michael Moskow, Joseph Loewenberg, and Edward Koziaria is a comprehensive analysis of recent developments in government employee bargaining with emphasis on collective bargaining and labor relations rather than on government management.¹⁷ The authors' coverage includes federal, state, and local government employees, including teachers, police, and firefighters at the state and local levels. Comparisons are made among different levels of government as well as with collective bargaining in the private sector.

Unpublished Doctoral Dissertations

Over the past forty years very few dissertations have been written in the field of government labor-management relations. Nearly every dissertation that has been written in the field has been written within the past ten years. The majority of these dissertations discuss labor-management relations outside of the federal service. Of those dissertations uncovered, only three gave specific

¹⁷M. Moskow, J. Loewenberg, and E. Koziaria, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment (New York: Random House, 1970).

attention to federal government labor-management relations.

The first is Eldon Johnson's comprehensive analysis of "Unionism in the Federal Service."¹⁸ The central theme of Johnson's dissertation is the emergence, growth, objectives, and achievements of government unions. In his dissertation Johnson develops a very comprehensive analysis of the emergence and growth of government unions prior to 1938. He discusses the social, economic, and political environment surrounding the rise and fall of the National Federation of Federal Employees and the emergence of the American Federation of Government Employees. He develops a well-documented chapter on the attitudes and objectives of government unions in their attempts to play a role in the operation of the government's personnel management system. In another chapter Johnson discusses the tactics used by government unions in meeting their objectives. In this chapter he also gives an accounting of the unions' achievements.

The second dissertation is Murray Nesbitt's study on "The Civil Service Merit System and Collective Bargaining."¹⁹ Nesbitt examines the issue of the compatibility of collective bargaining by unions within the framework of

¹⁸Eldon Johnson, "Unionism in the Federal Service" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1938).

¹⁹Murray Bernard Nesbitt, "The Civil Service Merit System and Collective Bargaining" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University, 1962).

the merit system. Specifically, Nesbitt studies the conflict of traditional union policies on recruitment, promotion, and removal, to those developed under the civil service merit system at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Nesbitt concludes that union and management attitudes can be compatible under the merit system as long as neither side takes an extreme position. Extreme areas of union security, i.e., the closed shop and the union shop, were found to be incompatible with the merit system.

The third dissertation, by Mansour A. Mansour, is an analysis of the effects of Executive Order 10988, based upon pertinent Supreme Court decisions, and legal opinions issued by the Attorney General's office since 1962.²⁰ Mansour's objectives are (1) to point out the strengths and weaknesses in the existing legal environment and (2) to propose changes that will eliminate these weaknesses and strengthen government labor-management relations. Mansour concludes that both the wording and the interpretation of Executive Order 10988 do not provide the operational environment in which government employees can participate collectively in making decisions that affect their lives. The government limits the rights of its employees under the guise of sovereignty and management supremacy. Mansour

²⁰Mansour Ahmed Mansour, "The Legal Rights of Federal Employees to Unionize, Bargain Collectively, and Strike" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1969).

recommends a number of additions be made to the existing laws to bring about the equality of rights between government employees and workers in the private sector.

In view of the limited amount of research that has been conducted on government employees, it is useful to examine the research that has been conducted on workers in the private sector.

CHAPTER III

WHY DO WORKERS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR JOIN UNIONS

This chapter examines three important questions about why people join unions. The first is, what contribution did the labor historians make toward the development of a theory of why people join unions. The second is, why blue-collar workers in the private sector join unions. The third question is why white-collar workers in the private sector have not joined unions in significant numbers.

The Contribution of the Labor Historians

Until the 1930's the answer to the question why people join unions varied with the opinions of the labor historians. The historians did not adequately answer the question because they integrated an accounting of all of the factors that underlie the emergence of unions with the specific reasons why individual workers join unions. The labor historians' analysis of history from social, economic, political, and legal perspectives leads each to a personal philosophy of why workers, feeling the need to collectively organize over time resulted in the emergence

of a permanent labor movement.¹

The writings of Karl Marx centered around both the emergence of unions and their relationship to capitalistic society. Marx was the first person to develop the significance of group action. He used group action to build a theory of social change around the bourgeoisie, the capitalistic entrepreneurs, and the proletariat, the emerging class of wage-earners.²

Marx's bourgeoisie through their ownership of the means of production dominate society and exploit the wage-earners. Their factories and mills operating on classical economic doctrines view the workers as an interchangeable factor of production. In effect this system oppresses the workingmen. The government, the embodiment of society exists to protect the rights of private property and is used by one class to oppress the other.³ The working class, and therefore the individual worker, only has labor power at his disposal. The union is the functional organization of the working class and is the vehicle which will bring about social change. Social change will be brought about

¹Richard A. Lester and Joseph Shister (eds.), Insights into Labor Issues (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), Chapter 7, "The Development of Labor Organization," by John T. Dunlop, p. 174.

²Jack Ellenbogen, "Development of Labor Movement Theory" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1954), p. 4.

³Ibid., p. 5.

by overthrowing of the bourgeoisie class through a violent class struggle.⁴

Marx realized that unions developed originally out of the spontaneous attempts of the workers to eliminate internal competition for jobs and wages for the purpose of obtaining contractual conditions which would raise them above the status of slaves.⁵ Marx emphasized the fact that workers must be taught that if they were to put an end to their misery then they must realize the futility of trying to reach some general agreement with the bourgeoisie.⁶ Throughout his writings, Marx insisted that "trade unions are schools of socialism" to bring about "class solidarity."⁷

Marx's writings indicate that workers first form unions to "eliminate internal competition for jobs" but eventually the workers' actions through the union are for social change. Their primary emphasis is on the union's role in changing society.

John R. Commons believed that labor history should be understood in terms of the interaction of "economic, industrial, and political conditions with many varieties of individualistic, socialistic, and protectionistic

⁴A. Lozovsky, Marx and the Trade Unions (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 12.

⁵Ibid., p. 16.

⁶Jack Ellenbogen, op. cit., p. 7.

⁷A. Lozovsky, op. cit., p. 15.

philosophies."⁸ From an appraisal of the writings of Marx, Schmoller, and Bücher, Commons traced the gradual evolution of the employer-employee relationship from the merchant-capitalist dealings with the journeymen. The expansion of the market coupled with changes in the modes of production separated the traditional functions of the merchant-capitalist as employer producer, wholesaler, and retailer. The specialization of functions led to the emergence of new bargaining classes; the wage-earner and the employer.⁹ Commons ties the emergence of the new bargaining classes to the emergence of unions in the following manner: Competition and continuing expansion of the market limits the ability of the employer to pass increasing costs of production on to the market. The only way for the employer to remain competitive is to keep wages down. "The journeymen have no alternative but to organize into unions in order to resist the encroachments upon their standards of life."¹⁰

Commons believes that the patterns of union growth are related to fluctuations in economic conditions. Periods of prosperity produced union growth while depression saw the labor movement subside or change its form to practical or social agitation.

⁸ John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the United States (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), Vol. 1, p. 3.

⁹ Ibid., p. 106.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 107.

To Tannenbaum the:

trade-union movement is an unconscious rebellion against the atomization of an industrial society on the one hand, and the divorce of owner and workers from their historical function as moral agents on the other.¹¹

The machine threatens the workers' security and it is the need for security that compels workers to join unions.

However,

in the process of carrying out the implications of defense against the competitive character of the capitalist system the worker contributes to the well-being of present-day society--a contribution which represents a by-product of the more conscious attempt to find security in an insecure world.¹²

According to Tannenbaum, a union is not a reform movement; it is not a political party; it is not revolutionary in intent; and it is not a legislative activity. It may, at times, contribute to all of these, but it is none of them.

The union has forced a structural change in our society. Tannenbaum believed that the union movement would eventually displace the capitalistic system by buying it, and that ownership would cease to be fluid and impersonal.¹³

Selig Perlman contended that manual labor groups

¹¹Frank Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 14, 105.

¹²Frank Tannenbaum, The Labor Movement, Its Conservative Functions and Social Consequences (New York: G. P. Putnam's and Sons, 1921), p. 32.

¹³Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor, op. cit., p. 190.

have had their economic attitudes basically determined by a consciousness of a lack of opportunity, which is characteristic of these groups, and stands out in contrast with the businessmen's consciousness of unlimited opportunity.¹⁴

Labor's consciousness of scarcity provided the impetus for groups to:

practice solidarity, to an insistence upon "ownership" by the group as a whole of the totality of economic opportunity among the individuals constituting it, to a control by the group over its members in relation to the conditions upon which they as individuals are permitted to occupy a portion of that opportunity.¹⁵

In addition to labor's perceived scarcity of opportunity, Perlman contended that the philosophies of the businessmen and the intellectual influenced the emergence and growth of the labor movement.¹⁶ The expansion of business activity in a complex industrial structure causes labor to recognize a scarcity of opportunity and to collectively organize.¹⁷ The attitudes of organized labor towards the businessmen will be largely influenced by the attitudes of the intellectuals.¹⁸

In the broadest sense Robert F. Hoxie viewed unionism as a social grouping.

¹⁴Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 6.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 238.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 252.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 5.

It may exist wherever in society there is a group of men with consciousness of common needs and interests apart from the rest of the society. What distinguishes trade unionism from other forms is that it expresses the viewpoint and interpretation of groups of wageworkers.¹⁹

The union emerges because workers with common social, economic, and technological backgrounds will tend to develop a common interpretation of the social situation and a common solution of a problem of living.²⁰ The union's emergence may be spontaneous or evolutionary. The union is a means to an end not an end in itself. The union's objective is to put together a remedial program based on their common interpretation of the existing social situation. Hoxie identified this type of unionism as functional unionism.²¹

Hoxie contended that the union movement is non-unitary. He developed a classification of functional types of unions, i.e., business unionism, dependent unionism, predatory unionism, revolutionary unionism, and uplift unionism. According to Hoxie, there is no one type of unionism which all union variants approximate.²² Hoxie's analysis of the emergence of unions centered around group psychology and he completely discounted the influence of

¹⁹Robert F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1920), p. 59.

²⁰Ibid., p. 58.

²¹Ibid., p. 50.

²²Ibid., p. 75.

any environmental factors such as those emphasized by Commons.

According to Sidney and Beatrice Webb a trade union is a "continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives."²³ The union's function is to regulate the conditions of employment in such a way as to ward off from the workers the evil effects of industrial competition.²⁴ The union accomplishes its objectives through mutual insurance, collective bargaining, and protective legislation. Their course of action is largely determined by the social and economic stage of development of society. In this respect the union exists within the framework of society as a social institution. The union's permanent function is the democratization of industry in the industrial state.²⁵

The Webbs' theory of unionism is not a theory of development but rather an analysis of the consequences of a labor organization, essentially a theory of collective bargaining. Their theory of unionism centered around what they called the "Common Rule," a systematic raising of the minimal wages and working conditions of workmen by

²³ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, History of Trade Unionism (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920), p. 1.

²⁴ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1914), p. 807.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 821.

collective bargaining and legislation.²⁶ In an abstract way, their theory of unionism is tied to a country's economic development. As industrialization increases, the union emerges as a social institution for the democratization of society as a whole.

From the brief discussions of the contributions of the labor historians, it has been shown that there are many reasons underlying the emergence of unions.

Commons views the emergence of unions as being tied to a rebellion against the merchant-capitalist system while Tannenbaum views the emergence of unions as being tied to the workers' need for security against the machine.

Except for differences in language, the writings of the Webbs and Commons share a common base. They see the manifestation of economic developments as being responsible for the emergence of unions. Commons used the term expansion of the market while the Webbs used the term common rule to describe observable changes in economic institutions.

Perlman, Hoxie, and Tannenbaum, chose to emphasize the psychological state of mind of workingmen as being primarily responsible for the emergence of unions. All of the historians emphasized the workers' need for security as being the motivating factor. Perlman emphasized the rationing of available opportunity while Hoxie emphasized

²⁶Ibid., p. 795.

a common interpretation of an existing social condition.

Because no singular theory emerged from the historical writings, it was impossible for anyone to state with a high degree of validity, why individual workingmen join unions. It was not until the 1930's that primary research on this question was initiated.

Why Blue-Collar Workers in the Private
Sector Join Unions

One of the earliest studies was conducted by Edwin M. Chamberlin in 1935.²⁷ The purpose of his study was:

to attempt to determine the reactions of labor toward a number of institutions and policies which appear to be fundamental to the recently promulgated government plan to control industrial conditions of wages and hours.²⁸

The sample group consisted of 100 union and 100 non-union textile workers randomly selected from a number of Massachusetts textile plants.²⁹ Chamberlin believed that his sample was representative of the textile industry as a whole. His research design centered around personal interviews with the sample group. He asked each sample member a series of twelve questions and noted their responses. His questions centered around the following subject areas:

²⁷ Edwin M. Chamberlin, "What Labor Is Thinking," Personnel Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1935), pp. 118-125.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 118.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 119.

1. union's ability to get results
2. trust and competence of union leaders
3. main reasons for joining a union
4. labor-management relations
5. depression conditions
6. management's treatment of workers.

For the purposes of this study the following question asked by Chamberlin is significant: "What would be your main reason for joining a union?"

Reactions

	<u>Number</u>
1. Because your fellow employees did	
Total	62
Union members	13
Non-union workers	49
2. Because that is the only way you think the workingmen can get results	
Total	68
Union members	55
Non-union workers	13
3. Because you like to belong to such organiza- tions	
Total	23
Union members	16
Non-union workers	7
4. Because you feel more secure as a union member	
Total	47
Union members	16
Non-union workers	31
	<u>200</u>

Union men give, in order of frequency of responses, as their reasons for joining: (1) results; (2 and 3) a liking for such organizations and a feeling of greater security; and (4) because fellow workers joined. "Results" was placed first three and one-half times as often as the next most frequent cause.³⁰

³⁰Ibid., pp. 121-122.

In the workers' responses to the other questions Chamberlin found that union members' chief dissatisfactions were with wages, working conditions, and management. He also found that workers were not of the opinion that the only way to get results is to strike.³¹ From Chamberlin's study, it was concluded that the strongest reasons for workers to join unions have an economic base. The union was the organization that would get "results" in terms of solving the workers' dissatisfaction with low wages, working conditions, and management.

In the early 1940's the Labor-Management Center at Yale University conducted a series of extensive interviews with both union and nonunion workers in an attempt to learn why workers did or did not join a union after an organizing campaign.³²

Analysis of the series of interviews with workers indicated:

almost universal recognition that one is living successfully if he is making progress toward the experience and assurance of:

- a. The society and respect of other people,
- b. The degree of creature comforts and economic security possessed by the most favored of his customary associates,
- c. Independence and control over his own affairs,
- d. Understanding of the forces and factors at work in his world,
- e. Integrity.³³

³¹Ibid., p. 125.

³²E. Wright Bakke, "Why Workers Join Unions," Personnel, Vol. 22, No. 1 (July, 1945), p. 37.

³³Ibid., p. 38.

The researchers discovered that the foremost goal of workers was the gratification of a social need, respect of other people, rather than increases in wages and security which are primarily economic needs. Although the journal report of the Yale Center's study did not provide any percentage breakdowns of the reasons why workers joined unions, they did indicate that the workers' need for economic gains, i.e., "more wages, and more regular wages," was a strong motivating factor toward union membership.³⁴ The researchers concluded that the economic appeal would not seem likely to lose its appeal in the near future.³⁵

The results of the study are best expressed by the following statement:

A worker's willingness to join a union varies directly with the degree to which associations with and participation in the union would reinforce normal group attachments and interests, would involve practices consistent with the codes, the philosophy, the faith he shares with the group.³⁶

Since the researchers found that the dissatisfactions expressed by many of the workers centered around wages, working conditions, and hours, it can be concluded that "normal and consistent group behavior would center around the alleviation of these dissatisfactions."³⁷ Individual

³⁴Ibid., p. 42.

³⁵Ibid., p. 43.

³⁶Ibid., p. 38.

³⁷Ibid., p. 38.

workers will react favorably to union membership in proportion to how well the union, operating within the group's social system, is able to reduce worker frustration and anxieties and will further worker opportunities relevant to the achievement of the worker's standards of successful living.³⁸

In 1949-50 researchers at the University of Chicago's Industrial Relations Center conducted a study of a union having a membership of 14,000 workers who were employed in an integrated steel mill producing finished steel products.³⁹ Approximately 95 percent of the workers in the plants from which the sample was drawn were union members. The purpose of the study was to determine why and under what circumstances does a worker join a union.

The research design was based on interviews with representative groups within the local-leaders and rank-and-file active and inactive members supplemented by intensive observation.⁴⁰

The leadership group had a total of 36 of whom 28 were interviewed. Active members were defined as those who had attended from four to seven meetings in the past year and 24 of the 43 in this group were interviewed. Finally, a 1 percent random sample was taken of the union members who had not attended any

³⁸Ibid., p. 37.

³⁹J. Seidman, J. London, B. Karsh, "Why Workers Join Unions," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 274 (March, 1951), p. 75.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 75.

meetings during the previous year, and interviews were held with 62 of the 128 persons forming this group.⁴¹

The authors found that 86 percent of the leaders, 83 percent of the active members, and 61 percent of the inactive rank-and-file members had joined the union with some degree of conviction. The groups listed family background, prior experiences, and experiences in the plant as responsible for their pro-union orientation at the time of joining.⁴²

The authors did not give the percentage breakdown of the workers who listed family background as being a strong motivator toward joining. They did note that 39 percent of the leaders, 21 percent of the actives, and 15 percent of the rank-and-file inactives had joined the union because of their experiences in the plant.⁴³

Although 24 percent of the inactive members interviewed indicated that they joined the union without conviction, the authors found a fairly large number of inactive union members who reported joining the union because of informal group pressure. The authors suspected:

that had they been able to study the motives for joining the union at the time the step was taken, then they would have discovered that a larger number of the respondents joined the union without conviction and simply because it was the thing to do.⁴⁴

⁴¹Ibid., p. 76.

⁴²Ibid., p. 76.

⁴³Ibid., p. 77.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 78.

The informal group pressures or threatened unfriendliness of the informal work group were found not only to be regulators of union members' conduct but were able to coerce some workers who did not want to join the union into joining.⁴⁵

It was also found that not one of the union members in the sample groups stated that he joined the union to get higher wages.

In summary, this study found that the reasons for joining a union do not fit into any neatly preconceived motivational scheme. The social environment surrounding the work group in consonance with the worker's psychological predisposition toward the union are of critical importance in determining what motivates an individual worker to join a union. Very often the decision to join a union is not based on logical reasoning in which self-interest figures to a degree but rather upon the existing social pressures.⁴⁶

In 1949 Arnold M. Rose conducted a comprehensive survey of the Teamster's Local 688's membership attitudes and opinions. From a total membership of 8500 Rose selected a systematic random sample from the 4100 Teamster members whose shops had been organized for at least seven years. From the sample of 475 names Rose, et al., personally

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 79.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 84.

interviewed 392 persons in their homes.⁴⁷

The questionnaire included 129 questions centering around three topic areas:

(1) For what reasons can workers feel a sense of solidarity with their union? (2) To what extent can union leaders and union experiences educate the rank-and-file to have attitudes considered by the leaders to be essential for successful trade unionism? (3) To what extent can a union buck a strong cultural pattern of which their members are a part when this opposition is deemed necessary for union solidarity and successful union operation?⁴⁸

In terms of this study two questions asked by Rose to the union members are of particular importance. The first is: "Why did you join the union?"⁴⁹ The second is: "What do you consider to be the purposes of your union? (What's a union for?)"⁵⁰

In response to the first question, the Teamster members' replied as follows:

REASONS FOR JOINING THE UNION

Reason Given	Percentage of Members*
1. Had to--I work in a union shop	45.9
2. For my own benefit (general but not personal)	20.9
3. It's a good cause (general but impersonal)	16.3

⁴⁷M. S. Viteles, Motivation and Morale in Industry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 345; citing A. M. Rose, Union Solidarity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952).

⁴⁸Arnold M. Rose, Union Solidarity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952), p. vii.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 60.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 62.

4. For higher wages	7.7	
5. For better working conditions	6.6	
6. For security	4.3	
7. There is strength in numbers	3.3	
8. The majority wanted it	2.8	
9. No answer	1.3	51
Total Number	392	

*Figures add up to more than 100 percent because a person could give more than one answer

From the members' responses Rose concluded that almost half of the members believed that they had joined the union involuntarily. Another large proportion gave reasons indicating a belief in unions or for personal benefit as reasons for joining.⁵²

The union members' responses to the second question, What do you consider to be the purposes of your union? (What's a union for?) are as follows:

OPINIONS OF UNION MEMBERS ON THE PURPOSES OF THE UNION (After Rose, 1952)

Purpose Mentioned	Percentage of Members Mentioning	
1. Get specific economic benefits (higher wages)	75.3	
2. Get job security (including seniority)	31.1	
3. Gain rights (e.g., fair deal, welfare)	16.6	
4. Get benefits off the job (medical, legal)	10.7	
5. Organize labor (get solidarity for bargaining)	9.9	
6. Raise standards of living	7.9	
7. Make labor and management more cooperative	5.1	
8. Increase fellowship among workers	3.8	
9. Miscellaneous, Don't know, No answer	2.6	53

⁵¹Ibid., p. 61.

⁵²Ibid., p. 60.

⁵³M. S. Viteles, op. cit., citing A. M. Rose, op. cit., p. 348.

According to Rose, 75.3 percent of the members' first response was to "get specific economic benefits." However, substantial proportions of the members spontaneously mentioned getting job security, gaining rights, and getting benefits in response to the question.⁵⁴

Initially, Rose concluded that most of the union's members viewed the primary function of the union to be collective bargaining to gain higher wages and better working conditions. Because many of the members gave spontaneous secondary answers Rose further explored the members' attitudes with two additional questions: "(1) What do you think are the main things your union should work for right now, either through collective bargaining or through social action in the community?"⁵⁵ In response to this question 33.7 percent of the members (a significant majority compared to the percent responses to other alternative answers) indicated higher wages and/or collective bargaining.⁵⁶

In the second question, Rose asked the members if they thought that the union "should put more time and money into getting higher wages from the employers or should it put more into a health plan, social and recreational activities, an insurance

⁵⁴A. M. Rose, op. cit., p. 62.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 142.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 142.

plan, or other things of that kind?"⁵⁷

In response to this question 24.3 percent indicated "higher wages" while 38.1 percent indicated "other things."⁵⁸ Rose concluded that the members of the union feel a greater need for supplemental functions, but because they have not been sufficiently educated to think in terms of these areas they align themselves with the traditional functions.⁵⁹

M. S. Viteles in his analysis of Rose's findings disagrees with Rose's conclusions and suggests that there has been a misinterpretation of the survey's data.⁶⁰

The author of this study concurs with Dr. Viteles' opinion because Rose himself later concludes that "worker loyalty to the union is proportional to the success that the union has in achieving its goals of increasing the worker's income, security, and job satisfaction."⁶¹

In 1952 Walker and Guest published the results of their study on what workers in an automobile manufacturing plant thought about the union and why?⁶²

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 142.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 142.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 142.

⁶⁰M. S. Viteles, op. cit., p. 349.

⁶¹A. M. Rose, op. cit., p. 183.

⁶²M. S. Viteles, op. cit., p. 340, citing C. R. Walker and R. H. Guest, The Man on the Assembly Line (Harvard University Press, 1952).

In an analysis of the relative importance of the union in comparison with other job conditions rated by employees, it was found that only 2 in the sample of 180 employees gave the "union" as their first reason for liking their job at plant X, in contrast with the large number who gave "good pay" or "steady work"⁶³ as the most important reason for liking their jobs.

Walker and Guest suggested that it was not the usual reasons such as higher wages, hours, job security, etc. that motivated workers to join the union but rather that the union served to counterbalance a lack of satisfaction with the work experience. They concluded that the union met in part the social and psychological needs of the workers that the work environment left void.⁶⁴

A comparative analysis of the summarized studies' conclusions as discussed on the previous pages suggests that the reasons why individual workers in the private sector join unions are not uniform. However, the conclusions cited in the research studies are based on primary research and are somewhat more definite than the cited conclusions of the labor historians.

Chamberlin concluded that workers join unions because they view the union as the best way to get results from an economic base.⁶⁵ Rose also concluded that loyalty to the union was a function of how well the union satisfies

⁶³Ibid., p. 340, citing C. R. Walker and R. H. Guest, Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 341, citing C. R. Walker and R. H. Guest, Ibid.

⁶⁵E. M. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 122.

members' economic goals.⁶⁶

Bakke concluded that workers join unions for social, economic, and psychological reasons in that order. The strongest reasons centered around the need for economic gains in terms of wages and hours of work as high values held by social groups within the organization.⁶⁷

Seidman, London, and Karsh concluded that individuals join unions because of only one or some combination of the following: family background, previous or present work experiences, or group pressures. Seidman, et al., concluded that group pressures to join the union were a strong motivating influence.⁶⁸ In a sense this means that an individual's joining a union may be an involuntary response to social pressure.

Rose also came to the conclusion that many union members felt that they had been coerced into joining the union. It is interesting to note that in Seidman, et al. study 95 percent of the workers were organized and in Rose's study a union shop existed. Rose indicated that higher wages was a high group value but Seidman, et al. did not indicate what were the values of the work groups that exerted social pressures upon nonunion workers to join the union. Because not one of the union members in the

⁶⁶A. M. Rose, op. cit., p. 183.

⁶⁷E. Wright Bakke, op. cit., p. 42.

⁶⁸J. Seidman, J. London, B. Karsh, op. cit., p. 78.

sample group indicated that he joined the union for higher wages we can infer that higher wages was not a high priority group value.

Walker and Guest concluded that the workers' motivation to join the union were not based upon economic needs, but rather upon a lack of satisfaction with the work experience.⁶⁹

The results of two studies indicate that many workers in highly unionized organizations joined the union involuntarily. This suggests that a strong socializing force exists in highly organized work environments. If the group's values center along economic lines as indicated by Bakke and Rose in their respective studies, then individual values will tend to conform with the group's values.

Why White-Collar Workers in the Private Sector
Have Not Joined Unions in Significant Numbers

Despite the fact that impressive gains in union membership have been made in the public sector over the past ten years, the overall growth of union membership has not kept pace with the growth of total employment. In 1955 there were 17,749,000 union members or about 33.2 percent of the nonagricultural labor force. Of these 17,749,000 union members, 2,463,000 or 13.6 percent were white-collar workers. In 1955 the labor force consisted of 24,585,000

⁶⁹M. S. Viteles, *op. cit.*, citing C. R. Walker and R. H. Guest, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

white-collar workers and 24,771,000 blue-collar workers.⁷⁰ In terms of the white-collar labor force only 10.0 percent were organized.

Over the past fifteen years this nation's economy has become increasingly service-oriented. White-collar occupational sectors as trades, services, finance, and government have been responsible for the majority of the increases in total employment while the blue-collar sectors--excepting only construction--have actually registered relative employment declines.⁷¹ The latest available figures for the fourth quarter of 1970 indicate that there are 38,126,000 white-collar workers and 27,625,000 blue-collar workers in the labor force.⁷²

In absolute numbers the labor union movement has continued to grow from 17,749,000 members in 1955 to 20,258,000 members in 1968. However, in relative terms union membership has declined from 33.2 percent of the nonfarm labor force in 1955 to 27.9 percent in 1968.⁷³

⁷⁰United States Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970, p. 225, No. 334, and p. 238, No. 355. Statistics on white-collar union membership prior to 1955 are not available.

⁷¹Arthur A. Sloane, "Prospects for the Unionization of White-Collar Employees," Personnel Journal, Vol. 48 (December, 1969), p. 965.

⁷²"Current Labor Statistics: Household Data 91," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 94 (April, 1971).

⁷³United States Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970, op. cit., p. 238, No. 355. 1968 represents the latest available union membership figures.

The principal reason for the relative decline in union membership is the failure of unions to organize these new white-collar workers in significant numbers. In 1968 the number of white-collar workers in the labor force was 35,902,000, an increase of 9,317,000 since 1955. Blue-collar workers increased by 2,976,000 to 27,747,000 during the same period.⁷⁴ White-collar union membership increased by 713,000 to 3,176,000 during the 1955 to 1968 period.⁷⁵ Although white-collar union membership increased from 13.6 percent of total union membership to 15.7 percent during the same period, white-collar union membership as a percent of total white-collar employment declined from 10.0 percent in 1955 to 8.8 percent in 1968.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics started collecting data on union membership by industry in 1956. In that year 915,000 federal, state, and local government workers were union members. They comprised 5.1 percent of organized labor's 18,104,000 members. Total government employment in 1956 was 7,277,000 of whom 915,000 or 12.6 percent were organized. By 1968 federal, state, and local government employment increased to 12,202,000 with most of the gain occurring in white-collar occupations. Federal, state, and local government union membership climbed to 2,153,000

⁷⁴"Current Labor Statistics," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 94, op. cit.

⁷⁵United States Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, 1970, p. 238, op. cit.

members or 17.6 percent of all government workers. By 1968, 10.7 percent of organized labor's 20,258,000 members were federal, state, and local government workers.⁷⁶

Although some of the highest proportionate gains in government union membership were in white-collar occupations, white-collar union membership as a percent of total union membership decreased between 1956 and 1968. During the period 1956 to 1968 membership in all unions increased by 2.1 million of whom more than 1.2 million were in federal, state, and local government. At the same, gains in manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries were only 379,000 and 487,000 respectively. While federal, state, and local government unions combined increased by 135.5 percent, private sector union gains were about 5 percent.⁷⁷

An analysis of numerous articles and research studies illustrated a number of beliefs pertaining to why white-collar workers are not attracted to labor unions.

According to Arthur Sloane, irresponsible strikes, union leaders criminality, featherbedding, and unstatesman-like contract settlements all conveyed through the mass media to the public, have given labor unions a poor public

⁷⁶United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1969, Bulletin No. 1630 (Washington, D.C.), Tables 36 and 136.

⁷⁷H. P. Cohany and L. M. Dewey, "Union Membership among Government Employees," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 93 (July, 1970), p. 15.

image.⁷⁸ "This poor image may well have alienated hundreds of thousands--and conceivably even millions--of potential white-collar union joiners."⁷⁹

Publicity given to high wage settlements negotiated by unions have caused many white-collar workers to blame the unions for their low wages. In 1950 and again in 1957 the Opinion Research Corporation asked a number of white-collar workers whether their salaries (determined by management) were as high as they should have been. In 1950, 61 percent of the white-collar workers believed that their salaries were too low because of high union negotiated wage settlements.⁸⁰ In the 1957 study, the percentage increased.

The special nature and condition of white-collar work has also helped retard unionism. White-collar work has historically been less physically demanding, job security has been higher, time clock pressures have been in less evidence, fringe benefits have come at an earlier date, and salary versus wages has been a status symbol.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Arthur Sloane, op. cit., p. 966.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 966.

⁸⁰ Papers from Industrial Relations Research Association Meetings, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 87 (February, 1964), pp. 125-131, citing Opinion Research Corporation, New Jersey, "White-Collar Employee Loyalty," pp. A-6 and A-7.

⁸¹ R. L. Rowann and H. R. Northrup (eds.), Readings in Labor Economics and Labor Relations (Homewood, Illinois: R. D. Irwin Co., 1968), No. 25, "New Union Frontier: White-Collar Workers," p. 265.

According to Sayles and Strauss, "White-collar jobs are thought to have individuality in contrast to the mass character of factory work, to be 'middle class' as distinct from 'working class.'"⁸²

Because white-collar workers have perceived themselves as being different from blue-collar workers, they have tended to identify themselves with management. In the Opinion Research Corporation's 1957 study, more than three-fourths of the white-collar workers surveyed identified more with management than with production workers.⁸³

In a number of studies about white-collar workers' attitudes, the opportunity to train for higher skills and merit system promotional policies rated near the top of desirable management programs.⁸⁴ Historically, management has favored the merit system for promotion while unions have been more inclined to favor a seniority system.⁸⁵ Although the claims of upward mobility of white-collar workers into the ranks of management may be exaggerated, white-collar workers are reluctant to join unions for fear

⁸² Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, Human Behavior in Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 68.

⁸³ Papers from Industrial Relations Research Association Meeting, op. cit., citing Opinion Research Corporation, op. cit., pp. A-6, A-7.

⁸⁴ See C. Wright Mills, White-Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); ORC White-Collar Loyalty, p. 9. Charles Ginder, "Unionization in the Office," Office Executive, January, 1961, p. 13.

⁸⁵ Arthur Sloane, op. cit., p. 968.

of being identified with or constrained by the seniority system.

By its very nature unionism means collective action. In any group action there is always some loss of individuality. White-collar workers with professional identification continue to believe "that for them there is still much more to be gained from individual bargaining with their employer than from any form of collective bargaining."⁸⁶ Because the union is viewed as being contrary to individual merit rewards, the relatively few white-collar professionals having union membership are viewed as being marginal or mediocore by their associates.

There is some evidence that white-collar professionals have strong feelings against the use of the strike weapon. One notable union, the United Steelworkers of America, in their organizing brochure directed at office and technical workers, deplored strikes and emphasized that strikes are not sanctioned until every possible means has been tried in settling a problem.⁸⁷

In 1967, 54.3 percent of the organizable white-collar workers were women. In clerical occupations the proportion was almost three-fourths and in professional and in technical occupations more than one-third. In contrast, only

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 968.

⁸⁷ Bernard Goldstein, "The Perspective of Unionized Professionals," Social Forces, Vol. 37 (May, 1959), p. 325.

16.8 percent of all blue-collar workers were women.⁸⁸ The labor force attachment of women is relatively weak and tends to vary significantly by age and family attachment.⁸⁹

H. M. Douty believes that the significantly higher proportion of women in white-collar employment versus those in blue-collar employment increases the difficulty of organizing white-collar workers.

Technological change and rapid expansion of many industries particularly service oriented industries over the past ten years has caused an increase in the demand for many white-collar occupational skills. The supply has not kept pace with the demand and the wages of white-collar workers have steadily risen. Although there is recent evidence to point to a change in this situation, the highly favorable job markets of the 1960's have been an inhibiting factor to the organization of white-collar workers.

Although white-collar unionism outside of the government is relatively low, a number of authors believe that there will be substantial increases in white-collar unionism over the next decade. White-collar union membership in the government exceeds 50 percent and within the AFGE white-collar accounts for 50 percent of the actual membership.

⁸⁸H. M. Douty, "Prospects for White-Collar Unionism," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 92 (January, 1969), p. 32.

⁸⁹Ibid., citing Vera C. Perella, "Women and the Labor Force," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 91 (February, 1968), pp. 1-12.

One of the purposes of this study is to attempt to determine why white-collar workers in the government join unions in far more substantial numbers than their counterparts in the private sector.

In Chapter IV the writings of numerous authors will be examined to establish the environment of the government's labor-management relations.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNIQUENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT AS AN EMPLOYER

Numerous authors in the field of public sector labor-management relations have made the point that the government's relationship with its employees is unique when compared to the relationship between labor and management in the private sector.¹ This chapter consists of an examination and evaluation of the uniqueness of the government as an employer from the following bases:

- a. The Sovereignty Concept
- b. Past and Present Legal Environment
- c. The Role of the Civil Service Commission
- d. Existing Limitations on Collective Bargaining.

The Sovereignty Concept

The most important and widely discussed difference between private and public sector labor relations lies in the concept of sovereignty.

The concept of sovereignty is inherent in the

¹O. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). Dr. Stahl is the foremost writer in the field of public administration holding this view.

supreme power of a political state. Any state that possesses and maintains supreme power can determine whether or not an individual or a group of individuals can initiate a claim against the state. Sovereignty may be exercised by an individual, as in the form of an absolute monarchy, or by a body politic as is the case in contemporary society.²

The concept of sovereignty was deeply rooted in English common law. Absolute power rested with the king and it was essential that belief in the infallibility of the king be maintained. Once this doctrine was accepted, the doctrine of sovereign immunity became self-evident.³

The doctrine of sovereign immunity found its way into the American system of government not from a moral-legal base but rather from a political-legal base. At the time of this nation's independence the individual states who had financed the Revolutionary War were financially indebted to many private citizens of other states. In order to get the states to ratify the Constitution the founding fathers invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity whereby the states were exempted from lawsuits filed by

²Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public Management at the Bargaining Table (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1967), p. 248.

³Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 41.

private citizens unless the states consented to the suits.⁴

In 1893 the Supreme Court refused to uphold the doctrine of sovereign immunity in a decision against the state of Georgia. As a result the eleventh amendment was passed by Congress. The amendment does not specifically mention sovereign immunity but it does exempt individual states from lawsuits filed in federal court by citizens of other states. Generally the courts have upheld this doctrine.⁵

The concept of sovereignty is difficult to understand and over time this inherent difficulty has caused considerable misunderstandings in the area of government labor-management relations. Willem B. Vosloo has condensed the political studies of Andrew Hacker into an excellent discussion on sovereignty that resolves this concept's theoretical difficulty. The difficulty of the concept lies in the fact that sovereignty conveys two ideas: legal sovereignty and political sovereignty. In the legal sense sovereignty means that a governmental source of law must exist which is final and definitive.⁶

Political sovereignty is the exercise of sovereignty in an independent government system. The operation

⁴Ibid., p. 42.

⁵Ibid., pp. 42-3.

⁶Willem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States Civil Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1966), p. 19.

of the government is organized around a system of checks and balances that delimit the exercising of power by an individual or group. The check and balance system exists because of federalism, separation of power, periodic elections, and the Constitution itself. Therefore, the search for the sovereign does not stop at any one element. It must follow a continuous circular path.⁷

Andrew Hacker concludes that:

sovereignty is not something that can be identified or discovered. It is, on the contrary, a process. In other words it is the interaction of specified individuals and institutions according to specified rules and procedure.⁸

With regard to the government's relationship with its employees, the theoretical application of the sovereignty doctrine permits only the government to establish the terms and conditions of employment. Any system of collective bargaining under which unions jointly determine the terms and conditions of employment is incompatible with this doctrine.⁹

The theoretical interpretation of the sovereignty doctrine as applied to government employees has been advanced for nearly one hundred years by government

⁷Ibid., p. 19.

⁸Andrew Hacker, Political Theory: Philosophy, Ideology, Science (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 215.

⁹M. Moskow, J. Lowenberg, E. Koziaria, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 17.

officials who believed that there could be no questioning of the decisions made by the state. Their logic was based upon the belief that: "Government service is public in character, belonging to and responsible to the people of our country."¹⁰

Around the turn of this century the government attempted to implement the sovereignty doctrine on a practical basis in an attempt to restrict the efforts of organized employees in the Post Office.

The first Presidential order of this kind was issued by Theodore Roosevelt in 1902. It forbade "federal employees on pain of dismissal to seek legislation in their behalf, 'directly or indirectly or through associations' except through the departments in which they were employed."¹¹ In 1906 this order was reissued in a more broadened form to cover not only employees of executive departments but also employees of independent government establishments.¹²

Again in 1909 President Taft supplemented Roosevelt's orders with a regulation of his own that prohibited any government employee from responding to any request for information from Congress except through departmental

¹⁰United States Civil Service Commission, The Government Personnel System, Personnel Management Series No. 4, November, 1960, p. 1.

¹¹Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York: Remsen Press, 1948), p. 122.

¹²Ibid., p. 122.

channels.¹³ These Presidential orders commonly known as the "gag rule" were in effect from 1902 to 1912. In 1912 they were repealed by Congress with the passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.

Presidents Wilson, Coolidge, and Hoover all issued statements which in effect held that a strike by government employees amounted to insurrection. In 1937 President Roosevelt clearly asserted the historical contention that the government is sovereign in the letter to Luther C. Steward, president of the National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE):

The process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct and unsurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with Government employee organizations. The employer is the whole people who speak by means of the laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly administrative officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many instances, restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures or rules in personnel matters. Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of Government employees.¹⁴

The intent of this letter was to make a political point in specifically asserting that the right to strike against the government cannot exist in government

¹³Ibid., p. 136.

¹⁴Morton R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service: A Study in Political Pluralism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 84.

labor-management relations. There was no intent upon the part of President Roosevelt to eliminate the attempts of organized government employees to have a voice in the determination of their terms and conditions of employment.¹⁵ However, this author supports the opinion of Morton R. Godine "that negotiations conducted under circumstances which do not permit or resort to the strike perhaps may not warrant the appellation 'collective bargaining.'"¹⁶

Sterling D. Spero in quoting a passage from Nicholas M. Butler has presented the epitome of the government's argument of sovereignty.

Servants of the state in any capacity--military, naval, or civil--are in our Government, there by their own choice and not by necessity. Their sole obligation is to the state and its interests. There is no analogy between a servant or employee of the State and the State itself on the one hand, and the laborer and private or corporate capitalist on the other.¹⁷

More recently the Civil Service Commission has categorically maintained that the government cannot bargain away any of its sovereignty. The Commission using the definition of collective bargaining as stated in Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act states:

that any attempt to apply this definition to the Federal Service immediately raises the issue of the sovereignty of the Government . . . but for purposes

¹⁵Wilson R. Hart, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁶Morton R. Godine, op. cit., p. 85.

¹⁷Sterling D. Spero, The Labor Movement in Government Industry (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), p. 17.

of this discussion it can be stated catagorically that the Government cannot bargain away any of its sovereignty.¹⁸

The Commission does acknowledge that in the large complex governmental structure there exists substantial room for give and take in matters that do not challenge government authority. In effect the Commission has stated that collective bargaining as defined by the Taft-Hartley Act can never exist in the government.

A paradox exists when we consider that the government employee lives in a democratic society. However, when he is in the employ of the same government which guarantees and maintains his democratic rights, he finds that his rights as an employee are severely limited. Aside from the argument that the government has a sovereign status, another rationale is used to justify this paradox. This other rationale is that the government employees share in the control of his working life should be exercised through his capacity as voting citizen of the state rather than as an employee of the state. The government employee through the use of his vote can exert political pressure upon the legislative and executive branches of government which establish the conditions of employment.¹⁹ This

¹⁸United States Civil Service Commission, Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, Personnel Methods Series No. 15, August, 1962, p. 1.03.

¹⁹Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman, Employee Relations in the Public Service (Chicago: C.S.A. of the U.S. and Canada, 1942), p. 47.

argument is fallacious in that the political activities of government employees are rigidly controlled by the Hatch Acts passed by Congress in 1939 and in 1940 and administered by the Civil Service Commission.²⁰ The Hatch Acts make it illegal for government employees to be active in any real sense in political affairs. Under the Act they cannot hold office nor solicit or handle political contributions.

The practical question is whether or not government employees can exert enough pressure upon the government to influence the determination of the terms and conditions of their employment. Although only one statute gives government employees the right to exert limited pressure upon their sovereign employer, the problem is to what branches of the government should the pressure be applied?²¹ As Hacker noted: in a pluralistic contemporary society sovereignty is a circular process. In the government, employment and personnel responsibilities are shared by Congress, the president, departments, independent agencies, commissions, and even political parties.²²

The government employee is again limited in his

²⁰ Donald R. Harvey, The Civil Service Commission (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 16.

²¹ The Pendleton Act of 1883, The Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, and Executive Orders 10988 (1962) and 11491 (1969) establish the basic rights for all government employees except certain specifically excluded groups as the CIA and FBI.

²² Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public Management at the Bargaining Table, p. 249.

attempts to collectively bargain with his employer considering the fact that in the final analysis all the vital personnel matters are fixed by legislative action and as a rule government employees' salaries come from taxes. The government's position is a function of the specific power and personnel relationships between individuals and groups at any one time. Many organized pressure groups outside the government have as their main objective the reduction of taxes. In effect the reduction of taxes means either a reduction in the number of government employees or the reduction of salary levels.²³ The organized government employee is but one of many interest groups attempting to exert pressure upon the government.

For the purposes of this study the concept of sovereignty remains valid for the "purpose of legitimizing an ultimate source of authority in the political system to settle conflicting claims between competing individuals and sub-groups."²⁴ The real question is just how much sovereignty the government really requires and whether it is absolutely necessary to apply the sovereignty doctrine in each and every area of governmental decision making. We can say that the government must always be in a position to protect the national security, but is it also necessary

²³Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman, op. cit., p. 49.

²⁴Willem B. Vosloo, op. cit., p. 20.

for the government to extend the doctrine of sovereignty to support the unilateral decision-making power of the government in determining the terms and conditions of employment for its employees.²⁵

On a piecemeal basis the government has enacted legislation limiting its sovereign immunity.²⁶ However, in the area of labor-management relations the government has remained largely inflexible. This statement is based upon the fact that the past and present legal framework of government labor-management relations has been carefully shaped around the sovereignty doctrine.²⁷ It is also based upon the fact that Congress has specifically excluded government employees from coverage of all the major statutes that facilitate and regulate labor-management relations in the private sector.

In the private sector the law is structured to make the bargaining parties equal. In the government, the sovereignty doctrine makes it impossible to structure laws such that management and labor bargain as equals.²⁸ Congress

²⁵Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public Management at the Bargaining Table, op. cit., p. 250.

²⁶The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 and the Tucker Act of 1948 provide judicial redress for persons having claims against the government for tort or contract.

²⁷Mansour A. Mansour, "The Legal Rights of Federal Employees to Unionize, Bargain Collectively and Strike" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1969), p. 34.

²⁸Willem B. Vosloo, op. cit., p. 159.

has by deliberately excluding government employees from these statutes avoided situations where tests of strength between government management and labor could develop.

The Past and Present Legal Environment

The Statutes

Outside of the statutes and executive orders affecting the role of the Civil Service Commission there are only a handful of statutes and executive orders that apply exclusively to government labor-management relations.

The Lloyd-LaFollette Act, enacted in 1912, after a campaign of protest against the "gag rule" of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, was the first significant piece of legislation pertaining to government employee unionism.

It provides:

. . . That membership in any society, association, club, or other form of organization of postal employees not affiliated with any outside organization imposing an obligation or duty upon them to engage in any strike, or proposing to assist them in any strike, against the United States, having for its object, among other things, improvements in the conditions of labor of its members, including hours of labor and compensation therefor and leave of absence, by any person or group of persons in said postal service, or the presenting by any such person or group of persons of any grievance or grievances to the Congress or any member thereof shall not constitute or be cause for reduction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of persons from said service. The right of persons employed in the civil service of the United States, either individually or collectively, to petition Congress, or any member thereof, or to furnish information to either house

of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with.²⁹

The postal service is mentioned specifically because at the time of the passage of the statute the postal service unions were the only unions in the government. This statute became the basis for the principle that all government employees have the right to join or refrain from joining a union which does not assert or impose an obligation or duty upon government employees to engage in any strike against the United States. It also provided that government employees have the right to petition Congress without fear of management reprisals.

The Act does not encourage government employees to join unions nor does the Act encourage the development of any system for the joint determination of the terms and conditions of employment for government employees.³⁰

In consonance with the sovereignty doctrine and to further differentiate private and public sector labor-management relations, Congress in Section 305 of the Taft-Hartley Act, declared it unlawful for any government employee to participate in a strike. Punishment included the forfeit of civil service status and noneligibility for re-employment

²⁹Wilson R. Hart, op. cit., p. 33.

³⁰Kurt L. Hanslowe, The Emerging Law of Labor Relations in Public Employment (New York: Cayuga Press, 1967), p. 37.

by the government for three years.³¹

In 1955 Congress passed Public Law 330 repealing Section 305 of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Law made it a felony for government employees to strike or assert the right to strike the government. Government employees who either assert the right to strike or participate in a strike must be discharged and are subject to a year in jail and/or a fine of 1,000 dollars.³²

Some Signs of Change

Although President Roosevelt was unalterably opposed to collective bargaining and strikes by government employees he was positively disposed to government employee unions. In the same letter to Mr. Steward previously quoted, President Roosevelt stated "that employee organizations have a logical place in government."³³

The progressive policies of labor-management relations adopted by the Government Printing Office in the 1920's, the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930's, and the Interior Department in the 1940's gave impetus to the government labor movement.

In 1949, The Commission on Organization of the

³¹Wilson R. Hart, op. cit., p. 12.

³²Kenneth O. Warner (ed.), Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and Practice, op. cit., "When Bargaining Fails," Jacob Fenkelman, p. 132.

³³O. Glenn Stahl, op. cit., p. 273.

Executive Branch of Government, the Hoover Commission, proposed that officials of agencies and departments should be required to provide for employee participation in the formulation of personnel policies.³⁴

In a 1955 report, the Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association censured the government for its archaic labor-management relations policies. The Bar stated:

A government which imposes upon other employers certain obligations in dealing with their employees may not in good faith refuse to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably similar basis, mindful of course to meet the exigencies of public services.³⁵

In the late 1940's government unions exerted their influence in the Congress to bring about legislative changes to amend the limited scope of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.

In each session of Congress from 1949 to 1961 Representative George M. Rhodes (D) of Pennsylvania and Senator Olin D. Johnston (D) of South Carolina submitted companion bills known as the Rhodes-Johnston Bill providing for statutory recognition of government unions as the representatives of organized government employees. With variations the several versions of the bill would have

³⁴Harold S. Roberts, Labor Management Relations in the Public Service (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1970), p. 26.

³⁵Allen Wisenfield, "Collective Bargaining by Public Employees," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 89 (June, 1966), p. 610.

established the following policies:³⁶

1. The unions would legally represent their members in grievances.

2. Agency management was to develop procedures whereby union officers and management officials would confer on policy matters that affected the terms and conditions of employment.

3. Union representatives were to be protected from management redress while "carrying out any lawful activity."

4. Unresolved disputes on these policies were to be submitted to an arbitration board whose decision would be final. The board's membership would consist of one member selected by the union, one member selected by management, and one member selected by the Secretary of Labor.

5. The checkoff system for union members was to be implemented.

6. The Civil Service Commission would have the authority to enforce the statute. Agency and department heads would have been required to take remedial action if any of their officials were found by an arbitration board to have violated the law.

The bill was opposed by the administration on the

³⁶Kurt L. Hanslowe, op. cit., p. 38.

following grounds:³⁷

1. The legislation was unnecessary. Administrative regulations allowed for consultation with employee representatives on all personnel matters over which they exercise control. Under the bill the scope of bargainable issues was so ill defined that management's rights would be encroached.

2. A satisfactory grievance system where appeals can be made to the highest department level already existed.³⁸ The individual employee freedom of choice in choosing a representative in a grievance proceeding would no longer exist.

3. The section of the bill granting union officers the right to "carry on any lawful activity" has no defined boundaries. In effect, the unions could file a grievance any time their activities were questioned by management. If the union won their case in arbitration management risked demotion or termination.

4. Compulsory arbitration would deprive management of their authority to direct the agency or department in accomplishing its objectives.

5. The Civil Service Commission's authority under

³⁷Wilson R. Hart, op. cit., pp. 140-148 and Willem B. Vosloo, op. cit., pp. 45-52.

³⁸Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman, op. cit., p. 2.

the Veterans Preference Act and the Classification Act would be severely undermined if this authority was transferred to the Secretary of Labor.

Congress adjourned without ever taking action on the Rhodes-Johnston Bill.

Late in the 1960 presidential campaign John F. Kennedy in a letter to a postal union official expressed regret that the Republicans had been largely unsympathetic to the Rhodes-Johnston Bill which Kennedy had endorsed. Kennedy implied that a democratic congress and a democratic president might be more sympathetic to the union's views.³⁹

In 1961 in order to satisfy the demands for change, and to find a suitable substitute for the Rhodes-Johnston Bill, President Kennedy appointed a Task-Force on Employee-Management Relations in the Federal Service. In appointing the Task-Force, President Kennedy declared his belief that:

The right of all employees in the Federal Government to join and participate in the activities of employee organizations, and to seek to improve working conditions and the resolution of grievances should be recognized by management officials at all levels in all departments and agencies. The participation of Federal employees in the formulation and implementation of employee policies and procedures affecting them contributes to the effective conduct of public business. We need to improve practices which will assure the rights and obligations of employees, employee organizations, and the executive branch in pursuing the objective of effective labor-management cooperation in the public service.⁴⁰

³⁹ Willem B. Vosloo, op. cit., p. 59.

⁴⁰ United States Civil Service Commission, Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, op. cit., p. 1.01.

The mission of the Task-Force under the leadership of Secretary of Labor Authur J. Goldberg was to advise the President on labor-management relations in the government. In meeting its objectives the Task-Force used agency and department reports, open hearings with public, management, and union officials participating. They also sent questionnaires to nearly all government agencies and departments.

The Task-Force issued its report on November 30, 1961. They concluded that the government's personnel policies lagged far behind those in the private sector. The principal reason for this shortcoming lay in the fact that "at the present time there is no Presidential policy on employee-management relations, beyond the barest acknowledgement that such relations ought to exist."⁴¹ Because no policy existed the separate agencies and departments had adopted widely varying policies in their labor relations. Out of 57 government agencies surveyed by the Task-Force, 22 had no labor relations program and 11 had only a permissive provision for unions.⁴²

The Task-Force gave special attention to the government's grievance system. Many deficiencies were found

⁴¹Letter to the President, November 30, 1961, transmitting the Task-Force's report on employee-management relations in the federal service.

⁴²Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public Management at the Bargaining Table, op. cit., p. 79.

in the agency and departments' grievance systems which had been established in accordance with the standards prescribed in the Civil Service Commission's Federal Personnel Manual. The most important deficiencies were the limits placed upon unions, the lack of third party advice, and the discrimination between veterans and nonveterans.⁴³

The Task-Force also noted that:

there are great differences between a Federal agency as an employer and a private firm so that attempts to transfer practices or concepts wholesale from the private economy and apply them uniformly to Government would be neither wise nor practical, nor in view of the sovereign nature of Government would it really be possible.⁴⁴

Aside from the doctrine of sovereignty the Task-Force outlined the uniqueness of the government's operational environment on the basis that the authority for decision making in government is diffused by the separation of power. This observation by the Task-Force is merely a reassertion of the practical instead of theoretical aspects of the sovereignty doctrine. In discussing the diffusion of government authority the Task-Force defended the role of the Civil Service Commission and recommended that any new system of labor-management relations must be mutually compatible and complementary to the civil service system's principles.⁴⁵

⁴³Willem B. Vosloo, op. cit., p. 64.

⁴⁴United States Civil Service Commission, Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, op. cit., p. 4.01.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 4.01-4.02.

Executive Orders 10987 and 10988 with Supplements

President Kennedy accepted the Task-Force's recommendations in full and subsequently issued two executive orders.

Executive Order 10987, Agency System for Appeals from Adverse Action, signed January 17, 1962, directs each government agency to develop a grievance procedure. The Order also directs the Civil Service Commission to issue regulations along specified guidelines that are to be used by the agencies in establishing their grievance procedures.⁴⁶

Executive Order 10988, Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, was also signed on January 17, 1962. This order initiated a new area of labor-management relations at the federal level.⁴⁷ In its scope the Order covered employee rights, a tripartite scheme for recognition of labor unions, the scope and form of employee participation, management's rights, grievance and appeals procedures, arbitration, coverage, and implementation procedures. Ultimate responsibility for administering the Order was assigned to agency management.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Harold S. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 35-6.

⁴⁷United States Civil Service Commission, Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, op. cit., p. 1.01.

⁴⁸Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee Relations Report, Reference File-1, 21:1051, p. 1015, 1970.

The significance of this Order lies in the fact that "it represents the first government-wide official employer policy on collective employee representation under which a wide variety of arrangements for cooperation and consultation prevail under a mandatory regulation."⁴⁹

Under the terms of the Order, government employees (except those groups of employees specifically excluded) are granted the right to form, join, and assist any labor union or to refrain from such activity. Unions may be granted one of three forms of recognition provided that they meet the following legal conditions:⁵⁰

1. not assert the right to strike the government
2. not assist or participate in a strike against the government
3. not impose a duty or obligation to conduct, assist, or participate in a strike against the government
4. not discriminate with regard to the conditions of membership.

Labor unions meeting the legal conditions of the Order were granted one of three forms of recognition:

⁴⁹Willem B. Vosloo, op. cit., p. 2.

⁵⁰Executive Order 10988 (Section 2) uses the term "employee organization" while Executive Order 11491 (Section 2) uses the term "labor organization" to describe what is commonly referred to as a "labor union." The term labor union is germane to the private sector but its meaning is widely understood. The use of different terminology is the government's way of differentiating the legal environment between the public and private sector.

1. Informal recognition is granted when the union represents less than 10 percent of the members of the bargaining unit.⁵¹

What constitutes a bargaining unit must be decided on a pragmatic basis by the agency concerned. The essential requirement is that the members of a unit should have a clear and identifiable community of interest⁵² which enables them to deal collectively as a group.

Under informal recognition the union is accorded no more rights than the rights of individual employees and management is under no obligation to seek the views of the union.

2. Formal recognition is granted to unions with at least 10 percent of the employees in a bargaining unit where no other union has been granted exclusive recognition. The union has the right to speak for its members, but it may not speak for its nonmembers. Management is under no obligation to seek the views of the union. When agency management feels that the union has a sufficient number of locals or a significant proportion of total agency personnel in its membership it may be accorded recognition at the national level with national consultation rights. A union that has national consultation rights does not

⁵¹The terminology of Executive Orders 10988 and 11491 use the term "appropriate unit" in lieu of the term "bargaining unit." The original interpretation of "appropriate unit" under Executive Order 10988 was restrictive when compared to the common interpretation of the term "bargaining unit" in the private sector. Under Executive Order 11491 the interpretation was expanded and the term "appropriate unit" and "bargaining unit" essentially have the same meaning.

⁵²Willem B. Vosloo, op. cit., p. 70.

represent all of the agency's employees. National consultation rights means that management must consult with the union from "time to time" in matters concerning the formulation and implementation of personnel policies and practices that affect working conditions. The union may present its views on such matters to management but management is under no obligation to modify or change their position. There are no provisions for collective bargaining agreements under this form of recognition.

3. Exclusive recognition is granted to a union when it has at least 10 percent of the employees in a bargaining unit and receives a majority of all votes cast in an election participated in by a majority of the eligible employees in the unit. In its initial interpretation of the Order the Civil Service Commission stated that "at least 60 percent of all employees in a unit have to vote before exclusive recognition can be won by the vote of a simple majority."⁵³ The unions strongly protested the rule and it was amended by the Civil Service Commission to mean 60 percent of the eligible employees in the bargaining unit who are present at the time of the election. A union having exclusive recognition represents all of the employees in the bargaining unit whether or not they are union members.

⁵³United States Civil Service Commission, Federal Personal Manual System Letter No. 700-1, April 10, 1962.

The union under Section 6(B) can collectively bargain and enter into an agreement with management on matters pertaining to grievances, personnel policies and practices and working conditions. Section 6(B) of the Order further noted that the obligation to negotiate "shall not be construed to extend to such areas of discretion and policy as the mission of the agency, its budget, its organization and the assignment of its personnel, or the technology of performing its work."⁵⁴

The scope of bargainable issues was further circumscribed by Section 7 of the Order which enumerated "certain matters" in accordance with applicable laws and regulations that are management's rights. These include the right to direct employees, to hire, promote, transfer, assign, suspend, demote, discharge or discipline employees, to lay off when necessary, and to maintain operational efficiency. These subjects are negotiable on a limited basis.

In addition to the changes in the government's grievance system outlined in Executive Order 10987, Executive Order 10988 provided that agreements negotiated with exclusive representatives may include provisions in accordance with Civil Service Commission regulations for the advisory arbitration of grievances. At first glance the use of arbitration appears to be a reversal of the sovereignty

⁵⁴Executive Order 10988, Section 6(B).

doctrine. However, the Order limits the use and authority of the arbitrator by stipulating that arbitration:⁵⁵

1. shall be advisory in nature subject to approval by the agency head

2. shall only extend to interpretation of existing agreements or policy and not changes in agreements or agency policy

3. shall be invoked only with employee approval. The Order also provides for advisory arbitration for settling disputes in connection with the determination of the "bargaining unit" and majority status for union representation. Once again the arbitrator's decision is subject to agency head approval.⁵⁶ The Order does not provide for neutral arbitration of collective bargaining impasses.

Sections 10 and 11 provide for initial implementation of the Order by July 1, 1962, and directs agency management to establish bargaining units and majority representatives.

Section 12 directs the Civil Service Commission to provide technical services to assist agency managements in implementing the Order.

Section 13 directs the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor to prepare standards of conduct for unions and a code of fair labor practices for

⁵⁵Executive Order 10988, Sections 7 and 8.

⁵⁶Executive Order 10988, Section 11.

labor-management relations in the federal service. It also establishes the President's Temporary Commission on the implementation of the Federal-Employee Relations Program.

Section 14 extends to nonveterans the rights of appeal in grievances which was formerly the exclusive right of veterans under Section 11 of the Veterans Preference Act of 1944.

Section 15 preserves the validity of prior labor-management agreements.

Section 16 exempts certain classes of government employees from coverage under the Order.

On May 21, 1963 Executive Order 10988 was supplemented by the Presidential Memorandum, Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations and Code of Fair Labor Practices.

The Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations is similar to the Bill of Rights provisions of the Landrum-Griffin amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act. The unions are required to maintain democratic procedures and practices, periodic elections, membership participation, prohibit conflict of interests on the part of officers, maintain fiscal integrity, and furnish financial reports to the members.

The Code of Fair Labor Practices is similar to the unfair labor practices provisions of Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act. The government is barred from interfering

with individual employees and union rights, as outlined in statutes, executive orders, and agency or Commission policies and regulations. The unions are barred from interfering with individual employee rights, calling strikes or slow-downs, picketing, and discriminating against government employees.⁵⁷ Authority for the enforcement of the Code of Unfair Labor Practices and the Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations rested with agency management.

Executive Order 10988 and the 1963 supplements had a significant impact upon the growth of government unions. Table 2 illustrates this growth.⁵⁸ In the nine years since Executive Order 10988 was issued union representation for government employees has grown: from the 26 exclusive units in TVA and the Department of Interior, covering about 19,000 employees, which existed prior to the Order, exclusive recognition has grown to 3,010 exclusive units in 35 agencies covering 1,542,000 employees--58 percent of the total Federal workforce subject to the Order. Exclusive recognition now covers 87 percent of all postal employees, 81 percent of all blue-collar employees, and 35 percent of all white-collar employees.⁵⁹

⁵⁷Kenneth O. Warner (ed.), Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and Practice, op. cit., "The U.S. Experience in Collective Bargaining in Public Employment," Arvid Anderson, p. 25.

⁵⁸United States Civil Service Commission, Report to the President on the Status of Implementing Executive Order 10988 (Washington, D.C.: 1962, 1964, 1965), and United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor-Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: November, 1967, November, 1968, November, 1969, and November, 1970).

⁵⁹United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor-Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government, November, 1970, op. cit., p. 18-Table E, p. 21-Table K.

TABLE 2

ANNUAL INCREASE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
UNITS WITH EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION

Year	Total Number of Exclusive Units ^o	Nonpostal Employees in Exclusive Units	Total Employees in Represented
Prior to 1962	26	N.A.	19,000
1962	61	N.A.	N.A.
1963 ^o	470	180,000	670,000
1964 ^o	630	231,000	730,000
1965 ^o	830	320,000	835,000
1966 ^o	1,174	435,000	1,054,000
1967 ^o	1,813	630,000	1,239,000
1968 ^o	2,305	798,000	1,416,073
1969 ^o	2,647	843,000	1,477,302
1970 ^o	3,010	916,000	1,542,000

^oFigure for number of units includes only seven national postal units; there are also 24,500 exclusive local units in the Post Office Department.

Experience and Problems under the Order
and the Supplements

Despite the accelerated growth of unionism in the government and the unrestrained applause initially given to the Order by spokesmen for both labor and management serious limitations were soon brought to light. In September, 1967, President Johnson appointed a panel to study the accomplishments and deficiencies of Executive Order 10988.⁶⁰ The review was not completed, however, until September 10,

⁶⁰Message of President Johnson in appointing the Review Committee on Federal Employee-Management Relations, September 8, 1967.

1969, when a study committee appointed by President Nixon made its report.

During the public hearings before an advisory panel to the Committee, union officials, agency managements and other groups gave testimony on the problems they incurred under the Order. The areas receiving principal attention were impasse settlement, scope of negotiations, forms of recognition, grievances, and the neutrality of agencies to administer the Order.

The Executive Order did not provide for arbitration for settling negotiation impasses. Advisory arbitration could only be used in cases of disputes on unit determination and majority representation, and in the interpretation of the agreement. The objective of this approach was that the absence of a third party would help to establish meaningful direct relationships between labor and management and encourage them to bargain in good faith. It was the responsibility of the parties to develop techniques other than arbitration for settling impasses.

The three most common impasse procedures that evolved under the Order were fact-finding, mediation, and referrals to agency or department heads. Fact-finding was specified most often and mediation was specified the least often.⁶¹ Regardless of the technique used to resolve

⁶¹H. P. Cohany and H. J. Neary, "Summaries of Studies and Reports of Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Federal Service," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 88 (August, 1965), pp. 944-50.

the impasse, final authority rested in the hands of agency management. Without the strike weapon, the procedure for settling impasses takes on added importance to a union which is bargaining from a weak position.

Executive Order 10988 has been interpreted in the Civil Service Commission's rules and regulations to allow for collective bargaining at the local level.⁶² Although the Civil Service Commission's philosophy of personnel management centers around decentralization, it appears that local management's real authority to negotiate is questionable. Stephen N. Shulman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and former chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, stated:

. . . The biggest problem in the Department of Defense has been collective bargaining. . . . It is a local level problem because employee-management problems are there and contracts are negotiated there. Since the program will thus succeed or fail there . . . the government must get authority to the local level. . . .⁶³

The limited authority of local management is further evidenced by the fact that except for agency-wide agreements in the Post Office and a very limited number of agency-wide agreements in other agencies the government, all contracts negotiated at the local level must receive agency

⁶²J. Macy, "Employee Management Cooperation in the Federal Service," Industrial Relations Research Association, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, Proceedings of the Spring, 1966, Meeting, p. 63.

⁶³Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee Relations Report, No. 54 (September 14, 1964), p. A-19.

head approval. The limited authority of management and the assertion of management's rights in the Order severely limits the opportunity for even limited collective bargaining in the government. The present collective bargaining environment has ensured the fact that the unions will continue to use other channels to secure their goals.

The three forms of recognition established by the Order were intended to serve as a transitional feature in order not to disrupt existing relationships with small groups of employees. Both labor and management advocated the abolition of informal recognition. There was disagreement among the unions as to whether or not formal recognition should be retained. The unions requested that the government clarify the rights of a union having this recognition if it was to be retained. The unions were critical of the 60 percent rule for determining exclusive bargaining representatives. Their arguments were based on the fact that the 60 percent rule was a higher standard than the standards established for the private sector.

The unions criticized the grievance system on the grounds that too many problems were excluded from the grievance procedure and that agency management rarely agreed to advisory arbitration proceedings. Agency management was also criticized by the unions for rarely agreeing to arbitration for settling agreement interpretation disputes unless they were based on an individual grievance.

The Executive Order permitted each agency to determine the bargaining unit, conduct elections, to interpret the Order and the supplemental orders. The unions accused management of being bias.⁶⁴

If the union filed a charge against agency management for violating the Code of Fair Labor Practices, the agency did not have to conduct a hearing on the charge unless it found substantial basis for the complaint. If the agency decided to hold a hearing, it appointed an impartial hearing officer, which could be one of its own employees. If management was then found to be guilty of a violation under the Code and they refused to take action to remedy the violation, the Code had no provision for recourse by the union.⁶⁵

The fact that each agency interpreted the Order and the Civil Service Commission's guidance differently led all unions and many agency officials to recommend that a single independent board be created to interpret and implement the orders.

In summary, the Nixon Committee found that present conditions were far different than those that existed at the time of Executive Order 10988. Growing dissatisfaction on the part of both labor and management with the

⁶⁴M. Moskow, J. Loewenberg, E. Koziaria, op. cit., p. 71.

⁶⁵Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public Management at the Bargaining Table, op. cit., p. 83.

existing Order led the Committee to recommend that the President issue "a new executive order which retains those features of the present program that work well but update policies and provides new arrangements where needed to improve labor-management relations in the future."⁶⁶

Executive Order 11491

On October 29, 1969 President Nixon issued Executive Order 11491, revoking Executive Order 10988 as well as the 1963 supplements.

The new Executive Order embodied most of the Committee's recommendations which were based upon an analysis of seven years of labor-management experiences under the old Order. The major changes put into effect by the new Order are enumerated in the following sections.

Executive Order 10988 used the term "employee organization" to describe a "labor union" or a "labor organization." The Committee believed that the use of this term was needlessly artificial in the present environment. They recommended the adoption of the term "labor organization," in the new order "since it directly reflects the relationship of most Federal employee groups with the general labor movement."⁶⁷

⁶⁶Letter to the President, September 10, 1969, transmitting the Committee's Report and Recommendations on the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program.

⁶⁷Report and Recommendations of President Nixon's Federal Labor Relations Study Committee, August, 1969, p. 33.

Section 2 of Executive Order 11491 is the same as Section 2 of Executive Order 10988 in imposing the sovereignty doctrine upon government employees and their unions. Specifically, government employees cannot hold membership in any union that asserts, imposes, assists, or participates in a strike against the government.

Section 4 of the new Order established the Federal Labor Relations Council consisting of the Civil Service Commission Chairman who is chairman of the Council, the Secretary of Labor, an official of the Executive Office of the President and other officials the President may designate. The Council's primary function is to interpret and administer the Order. Under the new system, then, there is uniform interpretation of the Order for all government agencies and unions. The Order gives the Council authority to consider appeals from decisions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor pursuant to his functions as outlined in Section 6. The Council also has the authority to consider appeals on negotiability issues, exceptions to arbitration awards and other matters that it deems appropriate.

Section 5 establishes the Federal Service Impasses Panel consisting of at least three members appointed by the President. The Panel is organizationally located within the Federal Labor Relations Council for services and staff assistance but it has independent authority. The

Panel is authorized to take whatever action is necessary to settle collective bargaining impasses. The bargaining parties may agree on the method for settling the impasse but arbitration or third party fact finding may not be used unless it is authorized by the Panel.

Section 6 expands the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations. His functions are to decide unit representation disputes, supervise elections, and certify results. He also has the authority to decide disputes on eligibility for national consultation rights, unfair labor practice complaints, and standards of conduct cases. At his discretion he can issue cease and desist orders from violation of the Order and take any necessary action to bring about compliance.

Section 7 abolishes both informal and formal recognition agreements. Existing informal recognition agreements are to be terminated within six months. Existing formal recognition agreements are to be terminated within one year.

Section 8(a) and 24(c) eliminate national formal recognition and substitutes national consultation rights with the subject matter limited to personnel policy. Eligibility for national consultation rights are established by the Federal Labor Relations Council instead of agency management.

Section 10 deletes both the 10 percent membership

requirement and the 60 percent representative vote rule as criteria for exclusive recognition. Exclusive recognition is granted to the union selected in a secret ballot election by the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. The method for determining the bargaining unit is virtually the same as the old Order except that "consideration of effective dealings," and "efficiency of agency operations" are considered in addition to "community of interest."

Section 11 stipulates that both labor and management must "confer in good faith" with respect to negotiable issues. The scope of negotiable issues under the new Order are the same as those listed under Section 6(B) of Executive Order 10988. The nonnegotiable issues listed under Section 11 of the new Order are the same as those listed in Section 6(B) of Executive Order 10988 except for two changes. Management does not have to discuss its internal security practices; and the unions have the right to negotiate work force changes brought about by automation or technological change. Under Section 11 the union may appeal to the Federal Labor Relations Council for adjudication of disputes over negotiability issues, agency violations of law, the Order, or the regulations of authorities outside of the agency.

Section 12 reasserts management's rights as listed under Section 7 of Executive Order 10988 and adds the

prohibition of any union security clauses except the check-off from any negotiated agreement. In 1964 the Civil Service Commission authorized agency managements to initiate a dues checkoff system for unions having either formal or exclusive recognition.

Sections 13 and 14 eliminate advisory arbitration; formerly subject to agency head approval. These sections authorize the use of arbitration for settling disputes arising either from employee grievances or interpretation and application of the agreement without agency head approval.

In Section 15 collective bargaining agreements are still subject to agency head approval. However, Section 15 limits the agency's authority to disapproving an agreement only if it is in conflict with applicable laws or valid regulations.

Section 16 authorizes the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in accordance with its rules to provide mediation services to assist both labor and management in settling collective bargaining disputes.

Section 17 authorizes the Federal Service Impasses Panel to settle a collective bargaining impasse on its own or to appoint either arbitration or a third party fact-finding committee to settle the impasse.

Section 18 embodies the Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations supplement to Executive Order 10988.

In addition to the 1963 supplement section 18 adds Landrum-Griffin type financial disclosure requirements and authority to effectuate this section is transferred from agency management to the Assistant Secretary of Labor.

Section 19 embodies the Code of Fair Labor Practices supplement to Executive Order 10988. This section adds a new unfair labor practice for unions to parallel one existing for management; union refusal to consult, confer, or negotiate with agency management. Also added is the provision that management and labor must bargain in good faith. Authority to enforce the Code is transferred from agency management to the Assistant Secretary of Labor. The unfair labor practices for government unions are now the same as the unfair labor practices provisions for unions in the private sector.

In summary, the main changes brought about by Executive Order 11491 are the following:⁶⁸

1. More centralized control of government labor-management relations by transferring authority from agency heads to the Federal Labor Relations Council, the Federal Service Impasses Panel, and the Assistant Secretary of Labor.
2. More standardization of the government's labor-management relations policies.
3. Closer conformity of the government's

⁶⁸M. Moskow, J. Loewenberg, E. Koziaria, op. cit., p. 78.

labor-management relations policies to those in effect in the private sector.

In the author's opinion the government's labor-management relations programs have progressed more during the past nine years than in the past sixty years. However, the present program still falls short of the programs in effect in the private sector.

The Role of the Civil Service Commission

History

To understand the function of the Civil Service Commission in government personnel management it is necessary to briefly review the historical roots.

For more than three quarters of the nineteenth century the securing of nearly all government jobs was by political patronage. The phrase "to the victors belongs the spoils" as one of the rules of politics was widely accepted in this century.⁶⁹ Because of their political nature jobs in the government service were often staffed with unqualified personnel. Changes in the political tide often caused massive politically motivated turnovers in the government service.

Political patronage came to a head when a disappointed office seeker assassinated President Garfield in 1881. Strong criticism of political patronage in the press and the fact that the Republicans after suffering political

⁶⁹Donald R. Harvey, op. cit., p. 5.

defeat in 1882 were apprehensive about their 1884 Presidential prospects prompted the Congress to pass the Pendleton Act in 1882.⁷⁰ The President signed the Act into law on January 16, 1883. The Act's basic purpose was to remove the "downgrading influence of patronage from American politics."⁷¹

To eliminate political patronage from the government service, the Act provided for the appointment to some government jobs on the basis of merit and fitness. They are determined by open competitive examination, without regard to political affiliation.⁷² The Act established the basic philosophy behind the civil service merit system as it is understood today. Under the Act, the President has the authority to establish the rules government appointments to government jobs. To assist the President in carrying out his responsibilities the Act established a three member bipartisan Civil Service Commission with not more than two of the Commission's members being from the same political party. Appointments to the Commission are made by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate. The initial function of the Commission was to develop

⁷⁰Paul Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service (New York: Row, Peterson and Co., 1958), pp. 88-98. The Pendleton Act is popularly known as the Civil Service Act.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 137.

⁷²United States Civil Service Commission, The Government Personnel System, op. cit., p. 3.

regulatory personnel policies and practices that were in accordance with the objectives of the Act.

Because of political patronages deep historical rooting, civil service reform made little progress until the second decade of this century. By the end of the first decade the nationwide movement for administrative reform was reaching its peak. The cumulative effects of rapid increases in taxation and governmental expenditures, the impact of scientific management in the private sector, the expanding role of government, and the rising discontent of government employees caused by inflation and the "gag rule" were all responsible for the eventual expansion of the government's personnel system.⁷³

The inadequacy of the government's personnel system was brought to light by President Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency. In 1911 the Commission conducted an investigation of the administrative practices in the government. In their 1913 report the Commission recommended:

The amendment of the civil-service law so as to broaden its functions and give to the Executive a bureau of personnel which will not only have charge of the examination of applicants and the certification of their qualifications for appointment, but also will be responsible for developing individual efficiency records throughout the service; for submitting recommendations with respect to the classification of positions according to work done, and the establishment of salary grades within each classification; for promulgating general rules governing discipline; for making inspections to determine the welfare conditions under

⁷³Paul Van Riper, op. cit., p. 219.

which employees are required to work; for arbitrating disputes between officials and subordinates, in so far as in the opinion of the executive these may involve questions affecting the service as a whole; for giving attention to and representing the interests of individuals in the service as distinct from questions of economy of management and the interest of the manager.⁷⁴

The revolutionary concepts embodied in the Commission's report although never forgotten were slow in being adopted. The bulk of the necessary legislation was not enacted for many years. As legislation was enacted the responsibilities of the Civil Service Commission increased and their role in the government's personnel system expanded. However, it was not until the 1930's before the Civil Service Commission assumed its full role as the government's centralized personnel agency.

Employee Welfare and the Civil Service Commission

The Congress and the Executive branch under the sovereignty doctrines practical application of decentralized authority have historically been responsible for developing the government's personnel policies and programs. These policies and programs initiated either by congressional enactment of statutes or presidential executive orders are often the result of effective lobbying efforts by the unions. Presently, the basic rules governing hiring, hours, leave, job classification, performance rating, fringe benefits, retirement, major disciplinary

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 222.

actions, and labor-management relations have been established by statute and executive order.⁷⁵

The government's personnel policies and programs as administered by the Civil Service Commission protects many of the rights and benefits of government employees that workers in the private sector gained only through years of determined collective bargaining. Many of the statutes, executive orders, and Civil Service Commission policies and regulations that provide job protection and fringe benefits for government employees actually preceded the widespread adoption of collective bargaining in the private sector.⁷⁶ In the areas of job protection, welfare, and fringe benefits the government's programs have at least equalled and in many areas surpassed the programs initiated in the private sector.

For many years the wages of white-collar government employees covered under the Classification Act of 1949 were characteristically low in comparison to the private sector. This statement has most often been associated with the wages of higher grade level technical and professional personnel. Since the mid-1960's the wage differential between the government and the private sector for

⁷⁵John R. Macy, Jr., "Employee Management Cooperation in the Federal Service," in Industrial Relations Research Association, op. cit., p. 61.

⁷⁶George W. Taylor, "Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 20 (July, 1967), p. 621.

technical and professional personnel has been steadily shrinking. For many years the wages and benefits of white-collar government employees in the middle and particularly the lower grade levels have been comparable to the wages paid in the private sector.⁷⁷

The wages of blue-collar government employees were historically determined under separate agency wage-board systems dating back to 1862. The separate systems have been replaced by a Federal Coordinated Wage System. Both the old and the new system is based on the philosophy of paying the regional going rate for comparable skills in the private sector.

Presently, the Civil Service Commission has the responsibility for implementing and administering the government's major personnel policies and programs. In implementing and administering these policies and programs the Civil Service Commission interprets their language, drafts and pronounces for management the guidelines for personnel management, and to an increasingly more limited extent the guidelines for labor-management relations. In addition the Civil Service Commission is the guardian of the older merit systems principles--open and equal competition and equal pay for equal work.⁷⁸

⁷⁷O. Glenn Stahl, op. cit., p. 80.

⁷⁸Frederick Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 195.

There has always been some question as to whether the bipartisan Commission is an "independent agency primarily reporting to Congress or an arm of the President."⁷⁹ Congress, by requiring nonpartisanship and Senate confirmation of appointments to the Commission clearly indicated its desire to keep the civil service system free from partisan presidential control. On the other hand, "Congress did not intend that the Commission be so independent as to prohibit executive responsibility for administering the civil service."⁸⁰

Although legislative reform came slowly in the government service, expansion of the service and coverage of government employees under the merit system increased rapidly. Table 3 illustrates the growth and extent of coverage.⁸¹

⁷⁹Donald R. Harvey, op. cit., p. 9.

⁸⁰Felix A. Nigro, Modern Public Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 293.

⁸¹O. Glenn Stahl, op. cit., p. 36.

TABLE 3

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SUBJECT TO MERIT
PERSONNEL POLICIES

Year	Number of Employees in Civil Service	Number Under General Merit System	Number Under Special Merit Systems	Percentage Under Merit
1884	131,200	13,800	--	10.5
1900	208,000	94,900	--	45.6
1930	580,500	462,100	--	79.6
1950	1,934,000	1,641,900	--	84.9
1970	3,000,000	2,565,000	110,000	89.1

Note: These data are developed from information supplied by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. All figures are rounded to the nearest hundred. The 1970 figures are estimates based on data from various periods in 1969.

The total civil service employees include those in the General Accounting Office and Government Printing Office, which are in the Legislative Branch rather than the Executive Branch of the government but are subject to the general merit system.

The special merit systems are those provided by law for the Atomic Energy Commission, Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Foreign Service, Library of Congress, Panama Canal Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, and the medical and nursing employees in the Veterans Administration.

Major Employee Welfare and Fringe Benefit
Programs in the Government

Legislative reform began in 1916 when Congress enacted the Federal Employees Compensation Act providing disability benefits for government employees injured on the job. The benefits under the Act have been increased

over the years.⁸²

In 1920 Congress enacted the Retirement Act, establishing a retirement and annuity schedule for government employees based on salary and length of service. The Act was extensively revised in 1955 and has been amended several times since. The 1955 Retirement Act with amendments permits retirement on annuity at age 55 and 30 years of service, with 20 years of service at age 60 and with 5 years of service at age 62.

The annuity is based on the average of the highest three years earnings and can be as high as 56.25% of the average earnings. The 1955 amendment has a liberalized cost of living increase to permit more frequent annuity raises.⁸³

Initially administration of the Act was shared by the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of Pensions, and the Department of the Interior. In 1934 complete administration of the Act was put under the Civil Service Commission's control.⁸⁴

In 1923 Congress enacted the Classification Act which established job classifications and pay scales for white-collar government employees. The purpose of the Act

⁸²American Federation of Government Employees, Leadership Training, 1970, p. 49.

⁸³Ibid., pp. 49-52.

⁸⁴Paul Van Riper, op. cit., p. 277.

was to ensure application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work." Initially, the Act was administered by a tripartite Personnel Classification Board consisting of one member from the Bureau of Efficiency, one from the Bureau of the Budget, and one from the Civil Service Commission. In 1934 full authority to administer the Act was transferred to the Civil Service Commission.⁸⁵

The Act was rescinded in 1949 by a completely revised statute. The new Classification Act provided for preparation of standards, grade increases geared to the appraisal system with rights of appeal to the Commission, and the establishment of an efficiency award system. In attempts to maintain white-collar government employees wages at levels comparable to wages in the private sector the Act has been amended numerous times since 1949.⁸⁶

Grievance and appeals procedures for government employees dates back to 1930 when the Civil Service Commission established a Board of Appeals and Review. The Board's prewar jurisdiction had been limited primarily to cases involving the conduct and rating of examinations, civil service status, position classifications, and disputes over veterans preference.⁸⁷

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 301.

⁸⁶American Federation of Government Employees, Leadership Training, op. cit., pp. 49-53.

⁸⁷Paul Van Riper, op. cit., p. 439.

To broaden the grievance and appeals system President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 7916 requiring that government agencies establish a personnel department and an employee grievance system. The order read in part:

Effective not later than February 1, 1939, the heads of the Executive departments and the heads of such independent establishments and agencies subject to the civil service laws and rules as the President shall designate, shall establish in their respective departments or establishments a division of personnel supervision and management, at the head of which shall be appointed a director of personnel. . . . Subject to the approval of the head of such department or establishment and of the Civil Service Commission he shall establish means for the hearing of grievances of employees and present appropriate recommendations for the settlement thereof to the head of his department or establishment.⁸⁸

Pursuant to the Order the Civil Service Commission in 1941 established machinery for employee grievances beyond those already covered by the Board. Under the Commission's regulations each agency was required to establish a grievance system. In 1961 Executive Order 10987 directed the Commission to assist agency managements in establishing an appeals procedure with optional advisory arbitration.⁸⁹

The grievance and appeals procedure available to government employees is extremely broad in coverage. The government's procedure is regulated by the Civil Service Commission. Under Executive Order 11491 the unions can

⁸⁸Civil Service Assembly, Committee on Employee Relations in the Public Service, Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman, op. cit., p. 2.

⁸⁹Kurt L. Hanslowe, op. cit., p. 40.

negotiate a separate grievance system covering all grievances not mandatorially appealable through other systems. In effect government employees are covered by two separate systems for appellation of their disputes.

In 1934 the Thomas Amendment established the forty hour week for blue-collar government employees. It also made provisions for overtime past 42 hours. The Amendment was amended in 1962 to authorize overtime payments to blue-collar employees working directed overtime beyond 8 hours in a day.⁹⁰

Annual leave of a flat 30 days for government employees dates back to a statute in 1898.⁹¹ This was curtailed by executive action in 1932 and superseded in 1936 by the Annual and Sick Leave Act. The Act annually provided 26 days for annual leave cumulative to 60 days and 13 days of sick leave cumulative to 90 days for all government employees.⁹² In the name of economy the Act was amended in 1951 to permanently reduce government employees' annual leave. Partial restoration has been made by means of a graduated plan with 13 days for employees with less than 3 years of service, 20 days for those with 3 to 15 years, and 26 for those with 15 years or more. Not more

⁹⁰American Federation of Government Employees, Leadership Training, op. cit., pp. 50-52.

⁹¹O. Glenn Stahl, op. cit., p. 239.

⁹²American Federation of Government Employees, Leadership Training, op. cit., p. 60.

than 30 days of accumulated annual leave can be carried over to the following calendar year. Sick leave is still limited to 13 days per year but there is no limit on accumulation.

In 1954 Congress enacted the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act providing 1,000 dollars worth of Life and disability insurance for each 1,000 dollars of salary not to exceed 30,000 dollars. In 1967 coverage was increased to a 10,000 dollar minimum or 2,000 dollars above salary coverage, whichever is greatest. Options for purchasing an additional 10,000 dollars worth of insurance at a nominal cost was also provided by the amendment.⁹³

The 1959 Health Benefits Act authorized the government to pay part of the cost of employee health insurance plans, including the government-wide plan, labor union plans, and group practice and individual practice types of medical plans.⁹⁴

The Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 increased the wages of white-collar government employees by an average of 5.5 percent. More importantly the Act contained a new principle in the government service requiring comparability of government salaries with salaries of comparable positions in the private sector. Since the passage of this

⁹³American Federation of Government Employees, Leadership Training, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 52.

Act white-collar government employees have received salary increases in every year since 1964.⁹⁵

In 1967 the Civil Service Commission established the Federal Coordinated Wage System which established procedures for insuring that all blue-collar employees in the same wage area with the same wage grade are paid the same wage rates.⁹⁶

In 1968 Congress enacted the Monroney Wage Board amendment which gives authority to wage survey officials to go outside of the designated wage survey area to another wage survey area when it is determined that an insufficient number of comparable skills exist for a valid survey analysis.⁹⁷

Major Employee Welfare and Fringe Benefit Programs in the Private Sector

The major portion of the welfare and fringe benefits enjoyed by employees in the private sector were non-existent prior to World War II. The growth of unions in the 1930's and two factors in the 1940's are largely responsible for the existence of many of the current programs. One factor is the government's regulations of wages during 1942-1945 and the other factor is Section 9(a)

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 52-54.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 54.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 54.

"Rights of Employees" of the Taft-Hartley Act.⁹⁸

From a modest beginning in 1946, pension plans for private sector employees have grown rapidly. Negotiated pension plans exist in more than 68 percent of all labor-management contracts.⁹⁹ Most pension plans provide for retirement at age 65 on full pension. Early retirement carries reduced benefits. This typically amounts to 20 percent or more per month for retirement at age 62 and one-third or more for retirement at age 60.¹⁰⁰

A comparison of the retirement plans in the private sector to the retirement plan in the government indicates that the government's plan is better, especially for long-term government employees.

Before World War II paid vacations in American industry were something of a rarity. Today, nearly all firms in the private sector provide paid vacations for their employees. Annual five week vacations requiring

⁹⁸ A. Howard Myers, Labor Law and Legislation (New York: Southwestern Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 486 and 853. Court decisions have interpreted the "and other terms and conditions of employment" under Section 9(a) as including welfare and fringe benefits programs. The Supreme Court held that pensions were negotiable in a 1949 ruling Inland Steel Company v. United Steelworkers of America (1949), 336 U.S. 960.

⁹⁹ Bureau of National Affairs, ed., "Pension, Deferred Profit-Sharing and Savings Plans," Labor and Policy Practice, 1963, p. 227:1.

¹⁰⁰ Arthur A. Sloane and Fred Witney, Labor Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 282.

20 years of service or more are currently found in 2 percent of all contracts. Four week vacations after 20 years of service are presently included in 50 percent of all agreements. Three week vacations after 10 years of service are provided in 84 percent of all contracts.¹⁰¹ The vacation benefits provided for the majority of the workers in the private sector do not compare favorably with the government's present program.

Collective bargaining on health and insurance benefits is one of the most important post World War II developments in collective bargaining. In 1945 only 0.5 million workers in the private sector were covered under negotiated health and insurance programs. By 1960 this figure increased to 14.5 million or 78 percent of all workers under collective bargaining agreements.¹⁰² Today, nearly all workers under collective bargaining contracts are covered to varying degrees under health and insurance programs. The typical life insurance programs for workers in the private sector approximates 85 percent of the employees annual salary. While the health insurance programs in the private sector are comparable to those available in the government, the life insurance programs are not.

During the past 20 years unions in the private sector have successfully negotiated supplemental unemployment

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 285.

¹⁰²Ibid., pp. 286-288.

benefit plans for their members. These plans are a compromise to the guaranteed annual wage plans that managements have strongly resisted. The goals of the supplemental unemployment benefit plans are to supplement the states unemployment insurance plans and to provide income to workers after the states' plans have expired. About 2.5 million workers with the largest concentration in the heavy industries are covered under negotiated supplemental unemployment benefit plans.¹⁰³

The government does not provide any comparable type plans for its employees since jobs covered under the merit system have historically been more stable than jobs in the private sector.

In the private sector the establishment and operation of a grievance system is an important part of the negotiated agreement. Most often the grievance is limited to the interpretation of the subjects covered by the negotiated agreement. Negotiated agreements may allow for neutral third party arbitration if the parties themselves cannot resolve the grievance.

In individual grievances government employees are protected by two systems. One is the government's grievance and appeals system that includes numerous specific procedures covering a broad base of grievance subjects. The scope of the grievance and appeals procedure is broader

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 293.

in scope than the grievances in the private sector. The other is the union negotiated grievance procedure which is limited to working condition disputes.

Based on the preceding discussion the comparison of the welfare, and fringe benefits programs in the private sector to those in the government indicates that in nearly all areas the government's programs are superior.¹⁰⁴

The Dilemma of the Civil Service Commission

The role of the Civil Service Commission within the government's personnel management system is to protect employees' rights through the interpretation and administration of congressional statutes and presidential executive orders that pertain to personnel matters.

The unions do not view the Civil Service Commission as the protector of the employees' rights but rather as an extension of management. Recently, John F. Griner, President of the American Federation of Government Employees, stated: "Our experience has found the Civil Service Commission to be an extension of management."¹⁰⁵ The logic underlying Griner's statement is the belief that the Civil Service Commission's administration of the government's personnel management system is incompatible with collective

¹⁰⁴Donald R. Harvey, op. cit., p. 88.

¹⁰⁵"The Unions View of Public Management's Responsibilities in Collective Bargaining," Public Employees Relations Library, No. 26 (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1970), p. 5.

bargaining. This incompatibility is based on the government's sovereignty as reflected in management paternalism and the individualism of the merit system.¹⁰⁶

Some of the actual or potential areas of conflict between the merit principles and collective bargaining are illustrated in Exhibit 1.¹⁰⁷

The principles of the merit system have deep historical roots. Its maintenance restricts the development of collective bargaining in the government.

¹⁰⁶Frederick Mosher, op. cit., p. 197.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., pp. 197-198.

EXHIBIT 1

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MERIT PRINCIPLES AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Subject	Collective Bargaining	Merit Principles
employee participation and rights	union shop, closed shop, or maintenance of membership exclusive recognition	equal treatment to each employee open shop (if any recognition)
recruitment and selection	union membership and/or occupational license entrance at bottom only	open competitive examination entrance at any level
promotion	on basis of seniority	competitive on bases of merit (often including seniority)
classification of positions	negotiable as to classification plan, subject to grievance procedure as to allocation	nonnegotiable
pay	negotiable and subject to bargaining power of union	by wage survey for blue-collar workers and by Congress for white-collar workers
hours, leave	negotiable	on basis of public interest as determined by legislature and management
conditions of work	negotiable	negotiable
grievances	appealed with union representation to impartial arbitrators	by statute, regulation and negotiated grievance procedures

Existing Limitations on Collective Bargaining

Limitations of Authority

Decentralization of authority in the government constitutionally limits the power of any one branch of government through a system of checks and balances. From a macro view decentralization of authority causes a limiting of the negotiable subjects because one branch of government cannot make decisions regarding government employees when another branch may hold the power of determination.¹⁰⁸ This viewpoint is supported by the fact that the President may recommend pay increases for government employees but the Congress must grant the pay increase.

From a micro view decentralization of authority limits the bargaining authority of local agency management. Quite often many subject areas covered under collective bargaining agreements in the private sector are covered by executive orders, statutes, and Civil Service Commission policies and regulations. In these areas management often finds itself in the position where they "cannot" rather than they "will not" negotiate with the union.

The new Order has not solved the problem of the limited bargaining authority of management at the local level. Local management's authority is not only limited

¹⁰⁸ B. V. H. Schneider, "Collective Bargaining and the Federal Civil Service," Industrial Relations, Vol. 3 (May, 1964), pp. 97-120.

by both internally and externally imposed policies and regulations but also by the fact that the negotiated agreements are still subject to agency head approval.

Nonnegotiable Subjects: Wages,
Fringe Benefits, and Hours

In the private sector wages, length of the work week, the scheduling of such hours, and fringe benefits are all subject to collective bargaining. These areas are subject to broad limitations under federal and state minimum wage laws and social security legislation. However, these laws serve more in setting minimum bases rather than collective bargaining constraints. In the government, white-collar employees' wages are established under the Classification Act of 1949, as amended. Wage rates in job classifications are fixed by law, and are, therefore, not subject to collective bargaining. However, there is limited room for union representation in determining the wages of blue-collar employees.

Blue-collar employees' wages are determined under the 1967 Federal Coordinated Wage System. The System is centrally controlled by the Civil Service Commission's National Wage Policy Committee composed of five agency management members, five union members, and a chairman. The Committee recommends the policies and rules which govern the System. The lead agencies, who are designated by the Commission, are responsible for planning and executing

the area wage surveys, analyzing survey results, and developing area wage schedules.

Each lead agency appoints an agency wage committee with equal union and management representation to provide advice on the establishment of wage schedules and coverage of surveys. The committee has no authority; it can only make recommendations to lead agency management.

The local wage survey committee consists of three members. Two are designated by agency management and one by the union having the greatest number of blue-collar employees covered by exclusive recognition. The committee selects those individuals who will collect the information needed to establish the wage scale in the wage area. The union representative on the committee selects one-half of the people and the management representatives select the other half of the people comprising the data gathering group. The committee reviews the information collected by the data gathering group to establish the wage scale. Lead agency management retains the final authority for establishing the area wage scales. In effect the System does not provide for collective bargaining in determining the wages of blue-collar employees.

Only tradition and not statute or executive order prevents management from collectively bargaining over the

wages of government employees.¹⁰⁹ The Tennessee Valley Authority adopted collective bargaining over wages in 1935 for blue-collar employees and in 1943 for white-collar employees.¹¹⁰ The Government Printing Office began collective bargaining over the wages of printing trade employees in 1924 under the Kiess Act.¹¹¹ The Department of the Interior inaugurated collective bargaining for both white-collar and blue-collar employees in 1948.¹¹² The predominately white-collar Postal Service began collective bargaining over wages under the 1970 Postal Reorganization Act.¹¹³

In the private sector retirement pension plans, vacations, sick leave, insurance plans, and other fringe benefits must be determined by collective bargaining under the Taft-Hartley Act. In the government all of the major areas of fringe benefits are controlled by statute and Civil Service Commission regulation and are therefore not

¹⁰⁹R. T. Woodworth and Richard B. Peterson (eds.), Collective Negotiation for Public and Professional Employees (Illinois: Scott, Foresman Company, 1969), Bob Repas, "Collective Bargaining Problems in Federal Employment," p. 104.

¹¹⁰Kenneth O. Warner (ed.), Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and Practice, op. cit., "The TVA Experience," Louis J. Van Mol, pp. 87-88.

¹¹¹Wilson R. Hart, op. cit., p. 86.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 89.

¹¹³Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee Relations Report, Reference File 12, p. 41:1, 1971.

subject to collective bargaining.

In the private sector working hours subject to federal and state maximum hour laws are negotiable. In the government the total hours in the work day and the work week have been established by statute and Civil Service Commission regulations. There has been some limited collective bargaining over the work schedules.¹¹⁴

Negotiable Subjects: Grievances and Working Conditions

Under Executive Order 11491 the establishment and operation of an employee grievance procedure with optional provisions for arbitration is subject to collective bargaining.

A Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 685 negotiated contracts in effect during 1967 covering over one million government employees indicated that over one-half of the agreements studied covering about two-thirds of the employees, contained negotiated grievance procedures. Seventy percent of the negotiated grievance procedures contained advisory arbitration arrangements; these applied to four out of every five employees covered by negotiated

¹¹⁴W. Heimback, "Panel Discussion: Is Private Sector Industrial Relations the Objective in the Federal Service," in Industrial Relations Research Association, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, Proceedings of the Spring, 1966, Meeting, p. 61.

grievance procedures.¹¹⁵

The negotiated grievance process for government employees has been narrowed in scope by the Civil Service Commission's distinction between a grievance and an appeal. The Commission regards as grievances only those complaints that relate to working conditions. Subject areas excluded from grievance procedures fall into five general categories:

1. Discrimination or national security;
2. Complaints caused by an alleged violation of law, Civil Service Commission regulations, agency regulations or directives;
3. position classification cases, and
4. adverse and disciplinary actions.

An appeal is a request for reversing an adverse action or an administrative decision.¹¹⁶

Appeals are heard either by agency review boards or the Civil Service Commission. However, when the Commission or the review board is hearing an appeal, it is passing on the application by an operating agency of regulations issued by the Commission pursuant to law. It is enforcing its own regulations.¹¹⁷ Neutral third party

¹¹⁵R. W. Glass, "Impasse, Grievance, and Arbitration, in Federal Collective Bargaining," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 93 (April, 1970), p. 56.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 609.

¹¹⁷Kenneth O. Warner (ed.), Developments in Public Employee Relations, Legislative, Judicial, Administrative (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1965), Chapter 7, "Employee Grievance Procedures," John E. Massey, p. 65.

arbitration is allowed, but it is rarely used.¹¹⁸ The union negotiated grievance procedure can provide for neutral third party arbitration.

The term working conditions has been broadly interpreted in both the private sector and the government. In the government, the following subject areas within the scope of working conditions have been subject to collective bargaining: "1. work environment: rests, cleanup, clothing; 2. work shifts, tours of duty, and leave; 3. promotion systems; 4. training; 5. safety; 6. employee services; 7. parking control."¹¹⁹

Although the negotiable subjects themselves adequately cover the area of working conditions, the scope of bargainable issues under each subject is limited by management rights under agency regulations and Civil Service Commission policies and regulations.

In the Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 209 contracts covering nearly 600,000 government employees, 109 contracts covering 88,507 employees were in the Department of Defense. Nearly all of the 209 negotiated contracts either did not cover a majority of the working condition subjects, noted that Civil Service Commission regulations would be followed, or made broad general statements

¹¹⁸ Donald R. Harvey, op. cit., p. 112.

¹¹⁹ United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Federal Service, August, 1965, p. 10.

about consulting the union before taking any action.¹²⁰

The Bureau of Labor Statistics Report indicates that government management does not collectively bargain with the unions over a wide range of working conditions subjects. While it is true that local management's authority to collective bargain is limited by internally and externally imposed constraints, the attitudes of management towards the union has a definite influence upon their flexibility in either negotiations or settling labor-management disputes.

The Right to Strike

In accord with the sovereignty doctrine the government has by statute and executive order denied its employees and their unions the right to assert, assist, or participate in a strike against the government.¹²¹

The logic underlying the government's position consists of two points:

1. Strikes against the government cannot be tolerated since the government is sovereign and cannot share its sovereign authority with its employees or their unions. Any strike against the government is an attack upon the state and a challenge to the government's authority.

¹²⁰Ibid., pp. 10-28.

¹²¹See Public Law 330, p. 73 and Executive Order 11491, Section 2, p. 94 cited previously.

The government employer is the whole society who speaks by laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administration officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many cases restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters.¹²²

2. In the private sector the use of the strike by labor and the lockout by management are economic and social weapons used for testing the strengths and weaknesses of the bargaining parties when impasses occur. The government does not use the politically infeasible lockout because the government provides essential services to society. Any disruption of these essential services by a strike would repudiate the function of government. Therefore, the strike is not an appropriate means for settling collective bargaining impasses in the government.

Even if some government services are not essential it is impossible or infeasible to attempt to differentiate between nonessential and essential services permitting strikes in the former but not in the latter.¹²³

On the other side of the coin there are those who believe that government employees should have the right to strike.

One of the earliest writers to express this view

¹²² Ann M. Ross, "Public Employee Unions and the Right to Strike," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 92 (March, 1969), p. 15.

¹²³ John F. Burton, Jr., "Can Public Employees Be Given the Right to Strike?," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 21 (August, 1970), pp. 469-70.

was Sterling D. Spero. He stated:

When the state denies its own employees the right to strike merely because they are its employees, it defines ordinary labor disputes as attacks upon public authority, and makes the use of drastic remedies and even armed forces the only method for handling what otherwise might be simple employment relations.¹²⁴

W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, observed that government employees are:

employed today on terms dictated by dogma traceable directly to the medieval doctrine of the divine right of kings, and that employment relations in most public agencies in this country are 30 years behind those in private employment. . . . Ten million government employees will not accept an employment relationship built upon the proposition that their employers exercise a "sovereignty" which makes it lese majeste to file a grievance and equates disagreement--at least organized disagreement--with disloyalty.¹²⁵

Jerry Wurf, International President of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees stated:

Strike prohibitions are not simply ineffectual, though they are undeniably that. What is far more serious, they warp the very vital process of collective bargaining. They bring employees to the bargaining table, but as inferiors. Simultaneously, they provide false reassurance to management representatives and induce less than genuine negotiations. Ironically, they create the very tensions, exacerbate the very situations, provoke the very strikes they were allegedly formulated to prevent.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer, op. cit., p. 16.

¹²⁵ Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public Management at the Bargaining Table, p. 249, citing W. Willard Wirtz.

¹²⁶ John Bloedorn, "The Strike and the Public Sector," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 20 (March, 1969), p. 153, citing Jerry Wurf.

Although the government continues to assert its sovereignty by imposing severe penalties on individuals and groups who strike the government, there is some doubt as to whether or not government sovereignty is enforceable.

Successful strikes against the government date as far back as 1835 when employees of the Washington, D.C. Navy Yard went out on strike for the ten hour work day.¹²⁷ In 1861, bookbinders in the Government Printing Office successfully struck for higher wages.¹²⁸ In 1915, the entire staff of the Fairmont West Virginia post office resigned en mass in a protest against supervisory conditions. The incident known as the "Fairmont Strike" was unsuccessful because Post Office officials arrested the 25 men who had resigned on the charge of "conspiracy to obstruct the mails." The men after not receiving any support from organized labor pleaded guilty to the charge and were fined accordingly.¹²⁹ In 1937, 70 AFGE members and the Workers' Alliance staged an 11 day strike in the San Francisco area in an unsuccessful attempt to get a 10 percent wage increase. The strike was not sanctioned by the AFGE's national office.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ American Federation of Government Employees, Leadership Training, op. cit., p. 46.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 85.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 19.

¹³⁰ Eldon Johnson, "Unionism the Federal Service" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1938), pp. 199-200.

During the period 1958-1968 eight strikes occurred in the government. Five strikes in 1962 involving 4,190 government employees resulted in 33,800 lost man-days. Three strikes in 1968 affecting 1,680 government employees resulted in 9,600 lost man-days.¹³¹ In only one of these strikes was a government employee discharged. In 1962, 81 blue-collar employees in the Tennessee Valley Authority were discharged for their strike activity.¹³²

On March 18, 1970, Postal Service employees in the New York City area successfully carried out a week long strike for higher wages. The strike affected over 200,000 postal workers and crippled Post Office Department operations. It was the most widespread strike in government history. Public Law 330 was not invoked and the strike was instrumental in hastening enactment of the Postal Reorganization Act which gave to postal employees virtually every labor relations benefit accorded workers in the private sector--except the right to strike.¹³³

During the past few years a number of successful sickouts and slowdowns have appeared among government

¹³¹Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee Relations Report, op. cit., Reference File 1, p. 1015, 1971.

¹³²John V. Madden, "To Strike or Not to Strike: Does the Government Already Have an Alternative," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 21 (May, 1970), p. 313.

¹³³Bureau of National Affairs, Government Employee Relations Report, Reference File 12, op. cit., p. 41:1, 1971.

employees in the Postal Service, the Environmental Science Services Administration and among air traffic controllers. Although these activities are within the scope of the definition of a strike under the Taft-Hartley Act, the government has not classified these activities as strikes.¹³⁴

In August of 1970 the historically conservative AFGE followed the precedent set earlier by the postal service unions and deleted the no-strike clause from its constitution. The AFGE maintains that the deletion of the no-strike clause is not an assertion of the right to strike the government. The national policy of the AFGE is to abide by the law.¹³⁵ However, deletion of the no-strike clause was the first step taken toward strike action by the postal unions.

Even the courts' historical acceptance of the sovereignty doctrine is showing some signs of change. Until recently government employees as a condition of their employment were required to sign a four part appointment affidavit. Parts A, B, and D pertain to loyalty, subversive activities and political patronage. Part C denies employment to any government employee who either individually or as a member of a union asserts the right

¹³⁴John V. Madden, op. cit., p. 313.

¹³⁵Comments made by Mr. Kermit Tull, AFGE National Vice-President, 9th District in an interview with the author on July 1, 1971.

to strike against the government.

In 1969 two District of Columbia District Court decisions declared parts B and C of the appointment affidavit unconstitutional. In the first case, *Stewart v. Washington*, part B of the affidavit was declared unconstitutional. In the second case, *Blount v. National Association of Letter Carriers*, part C of the affidavit was declared unconstitutional. The latter case was appealed to the Supreme Court but was dismissed by stipulation of counsel. On September 28, 1970, the Civil Service Commission ordered all government agencies and departments to delete parts B and C from the appointment affidavits.¹³⁶

The events of the past few years gives the impression that not only is the sovereignty doctrine unenforceable but that it is slowly dying.

The other argument that has been advanced by the government for denying its employees the right to strike is that the government provides essential services to society. The essentiality of government services is subject to some question.

Essentiality of service means that the consumers demand for the service is inelastic. Except for some limited functions as the armed forces there is no empirical evidence demonstrating differences in elasticity of

¹³⁶United States Civil Service Commission, Federal Personnel Manual System, Letter No. 295-3, September 28, 1970.

demand between private sector services and government services.¹³⁷ Government services are expanding in scope and increasingly the services provided are similar to those available from private industry. As far as the public is concerned, a strike is the same whether it is in a privately operated hospital or a government operated hospital, in a transportation system privately operated or government operated.¹³⁸

The government's denial of strike rights to any of its employees in any of its services makes no distinction between the essentiality or nonessentiality of the service. Some state and local governments are a step ahead of the federal government in this area of degrees of essentiality of services. John F. Burton's analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics strike data for 1965-68 showed that state and local governments' differentiate between a strike in an essential service and a strike in a nonessential service by their use of countersanctions.¹³⁹ Five states now permit some, but not all of their employees the right to strike. Recently the Governor's Commission in Pennsylvania recommended that a limited right to strike be given to all public employees except police and

¹³⁷John F. Burton, Jr., op. cit., p. 475.

¹³⁸George W. Taylor, op. cit., p. 625.

¹³⁹John F. Burton, op. cit., p. 474.

fire employees.¹⁴⁰

Impasse Settlement

In an attempt to make collective bargaining more meaningful while maintaining its sovereignty, the government under Section 17 of Executive Order 11491 established the Federal Service Impasses Panel with authority to engage either third party fact-finding or arbitration to settle collective bargaining impasses. Fact-finding or arbitration by a third party can only be used when specifically authorized by the Panel and if the Panel has decided not to settle the impasse itself.

Although the government appoints the members of the Federal Service Impasses Panel, the seven members presently serving on the Panel are skilled arbitrators with extensive broad based experience outside of government. Criticism is not directed at the Panel itself, but rather at the fact that in the final analysis either the Panel or an independent third party settles the impasse, and not the parties themselves.

Some writers believe that compulsory arbitration in lieu of the right to strike spells an end to collective bargaining. Herbert R. Northrup stated:

Fearing that to settle will mean a less attractive "package" than an arbitrator would give, that it will be a sign of weakness, . . . unions and companies

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 474.

prepare for the arbitration procedure instead of for collective bargaining and private settlement. The aim is to force intervention. The more adamant, obdurate, and intransigent the parties, the more pressure upon the arbitrator. The payoff is the greatest to those willing to take the most extreme position.¹⁴¹

In Chapter V the AFGE National and AFGE Local 916 are discussed to give the reader a further understanding of the union's role in government labor-management relations.

¹⁴¹Kenneth O. Warner (ed.), Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and Practice, op. cit., "When Bargaining Fails," Jacob Fenkelman, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

CHAPTER V

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND AFGE LOCAL 916

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the history, growth, strategy, tactics, organization, accomplishments, and goals of the following: 1. The American Federation of Government Employees, the largest union in the government, 2. AFGE Local 916, the largest union local in the government and the exclusive bargaining agent for nearly all of the civilian employees at Tinker Air Force Base.

The AFGE

Jurisdiction over government employees not covered by any craft unions was given to the National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE) in 1917 by the American Federation of Labor (AFL). In 1931 the NFFE, the largest union in the government, withdrew from the AFL in a dispute with the AFL's Metal Trades Department over support of personnel classification legislation pending in Congress. Although the split occurred over the classification bill, the underlying reason for the split was the mutual fear and

suspicion that existed between the craft-dominated AFL and the industrial NFFE. The craft unions in the AFL feared the passage of the bill which had the NFFE's support would "undermine craft union methods of wage determination, and otherwise surreptitiously advance the course of dangerous industrial unions throughout the federal service."¹ When the split occurred a number of NFFE local lodges voted to remain affiliated with the AFL. "On August 15, 1932, the AFL issued a charter to 26 locals to be known hereafter as the American Federation of Government Employees."²

The New Deal programs brought many people with strong labor sympathies into the government service. Many of these new employees turned to the AFGE rather than the NFFE because of the AFGE's affiliation with the AFL.

In its early years the AFGE was beset by internal dissention between conservative and militant factions. This difference in attitudes manifested in the John L. Donovan case. Donovan, technical advisor to the Labor Advisory Board and president of the AFGE's National Recovery Administration lodge, was fired by General Hugh S. Johnson in June, 1934. The reason given for Donovan's being fired was inefficiency, insubordination, and

¹Eldon Johnson, "General Unions in the Federal Service," Journal of Politics, Vol. 20 (February, 1940), p. 28.

²Ibid., p. 30.

unauthorized absence from duty. The real reason according to the AFGE was Donovan's union activity. As a result of Donovan's being fired, AFGE and NFFE members picketed the headquarters of the NRA. Donovan was later reinstated when his case was heard by the National Labor Relations Board.³

The leadership of the AFGE although obliged to support Donovan, strongly disapproved of the picketing tactics. This split between the militant and conservative factions widened at the 1934 national convention when the conservative President Babcock was successful in his efforts to amend the AFGE's constitution to read: "The American Federation of Government Employees is unequivocally opposed to and will not tolerate strikes, picketing, or other public acts against governmental authority which have the effect of embarrassing the government."⁴ The struggle for control of the union continued until 1937 when seven suspended locals founded the Federal Workers of America and affiliated with the newly formed Congress for Industrial Organizations.⁵

From its earliest days the AFGE has been a conservative union. This conservatism is reflected in the AFGE's strategy and tactics for securing benefits from the

³ Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York: Remsen Press, 1948), p. 192.

⁴ AFGE Constitution Article II, Section 3.

⁵ Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer, op. cit., p. 194.

government for its members.

Government unions and in particular the AFGE consider themselves as devices for unified employee expression or as channels of communication, through which collective opinion can travel up to the Congress, and government officials, and information can travel down to individual members.⁶

The unions do not view the government as the all-wise benevolent employer. There is no denying that for the most part government employees are well treated, but the unions' contention is that the government's benevolence is proportional to the amount of encouragement it receives from the unions. "The impetus for reform has come from within, not from without, from pressure, not from paternalism."⁷

The AFGE's belief that reform has only taken place because of union pressure is reflected in AFGE literature. In its organizing literature the AFGE has taken credit for every major piece of employee welfare and fringe benefit legislation enacted by the government since the 1930's.⁸

The AFGE's strategy and tactics for bringing about

⁶Eldon Johnson, "General Unions in the Federal Service," op. cit., p. 37.

⁷Ibid., p. 37.

⁸AFGE organizing literature sent to the author by Mr. Stephen A. Koczak, Director of the AFGE's Research Department.

reform from within the government is a reflection not only of its conservatism but also of the institutional arrangements of its environment. The AFGE's basic strategy still in effect today was laid down by President Stengle in 1939 in the following terms: "We cannot engage in collective bargaining as the process is commonly understood. We must achieve our most substantial gains through legislation rather than by negotiation."⁹

This strategy has taken form in four different types of tactics: 1. legislative, 2. administrative, 3. publicity, and 4. direct negotiation. The first three date back to the 1930's while the fourth originated with Executive Order 10988.

Legislative tactics have been and still are the most important tactics because of the decentralized authority in the government. All government unions are well aware of the fact that Congress is the primary decision maker on personnel matters. By petitioning, lobbying, and exerting pressure through affiliation the unions have brought about legislative reform.

Lobbying techniques have taken various forms over the years. The AFGE's national officers, usually the presidents, are the union's chief legislative representatives. Records of congressional testimony indicate that

⁹"Objectives of an Employee Union," Personnel Administration, Vol. 2 (March, 1939), p. 5.

they spend a considerable amount of time testifying on behalf of their members before congressional committees.

Other lobbying techniques consist of various means of congressional ingratiating; favorable articles in union publications, banquets, testimonial dinners, engrossed testimonials, and honorary union memberships.¹⁰

Although the unions claim credit for all of the reform legislation there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that all or even a majority of the reform legislation originated as a direct result of union pressure tactics. However, it is safe to state that the unions have influenced the Congress. The degree of influence that they exert upon the Congress appears to be contingent upon a number of factors such as the social and economic state of the country, the strength of the unions, the countervailing pressures from other lobby groups, and other political exigencies.

An example of the union's success and failure in Congress is in the following: Where union pressure was not strong enough to bring about passage of the Rhodes-Johnston Bill, it was strong enough to bring about passage of a pay raise bill which the economy-minded Eisenhower administration had vigorously opposed. In his veto message President Eisenhower made some caustic comments about the

¹⁰Eldon Johnson, "General Unions in the Federal Service," op. cit., p. 43.

lobbying activities of the unions.¹¹ Overall, lobbying tactics have been effective and the AFGE will continue to use them as long as authority in the government is decentralized.¹²

The main difference between the legislative and administrative tactics is the type of government official to whom the pressure is directed. Getting a law enacted is only half of the battle. The other half is getting the law transformed into regulations that assure equitable administration of the law. The unions apply pressure to the Civil Service Commission, agency management, and at times even the President's office to bring about changes in the policies, regulations, and procedures that interpret the laws. Union pressure on any one or all three of these groups often results in amended regulations, procedures, and new presidential executive orders.¹³

The AFGE strongly believes in publicizing its views for both educational and tactical purposes. At the national level the AFGE uses its official publication, The Government Standard, which is published every two

¹¹Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 26.

¹²Opinion expressed by Mr. Tull, AFGE National Vice-President, 9th District during an interview with the author on July 2, 1971.

¹³Each annual report of the U.S. Civil Service Commission lists the presidential executive orders issued during that year that affect government employees.

weeks, and the AFGE Washington Letter, which is published between issues of The Government Standard. These publications are used to keep the AFGE's members informed about the activities of the Federation. They are also used to express the union's official views on personnel matters in the government. At the local level, Local 916 publishes a monthly AFGE Bulletin and a weekly article in the Tinker Take Off, Tinker Air Force Base's house organ. The AFGE has also engaged in rallies, published leaflets, and pamphlets, and advertised in the media to express its views.

Officials of the AFGE at both the national and local levels expressed the view that publicity for both educational and tactical purposes has been very effective.¹⁴ Since some of the AFGE's legislative, administrative, and publicity tactics border on politicking the AFGE is pushing for amendment of the restrictive Hatch Acts.¹⁵

Direct negotiation with agency management has only come about since the issuing of Executive Order 10988. Although the present scope of negotiable subject matter under Executive Order 11491 is limited, AFGE officials believe that the right to negotiate by executive order has brought about a significant number of changes in both

¹⁴Opinions expressed during interviews with Mr. Tull on July 2, 1971, op. cit., and Mr. N. J. Nance, President Local 916, AFGE, on July 2, 1971.

¹⁵Interview with Mr. Tull on July 1, 1971, op. cit.

Civil Service Commission and agency policies and regulations. They believe that there is still a long way to go because of management's paternalism.¹⁶

The AFGE in an attempt to broaden the limited scope of collective bargaining has organized nationwide bargaining units. At the present time there are six nationwide agreements in effect.¹⁷ In the June 25, 1971, issue of The Government Standard, the AFGE announced its drive to gain national exclusive recognition for the Veterans Administration's 140,000 employees. The AFGE believes that when contracts are negotiated at the agency level "all regulations and policies which affect the employees in relation to their jobs are subject to collective bargaining. At these levels important changes can be made."¹⁸

The acceptance and endorsement of the AFGE's strategy and tactics by government employees is clearly evidenced by the AFGE's growth. The AFGE's spectacular

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ American Federation of Government Employees, Collective Bargaining, p. 5. Agency wide agreements exist between the following:

1. Council of Field Labor Locals and the Department of Labor
2. Council of Border Patrol Locals and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
3. National Joint Council of Food Inspection Locals and the Department of Agriculture
4. Council of AFGE Locals and the Railroad Retirement Board
5. National Council of Immigration and Naturalization Locals and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
6. National Council of Federal Prison Locals and the Bureau of Prisons

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

growth since the issuing of Executive Order 10988 is of particular significance.

The AFGE represents only nonpostal government employees. Table 4 illustrates the AFGE's growth in terms of actual membership and total employees represented in relation to the growth of nonpostal government employment.

TABLE 4
GROWTH OF THE NONPOSTAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE,
MEMBERSHIP IN THE AFGE, AND GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED BY THE AFGE

Month and Year	Total Nonpostal Government Employees	Month and Year	Total Membership in the AFGE	Month and Year	Total Represented by the AFGE
6-32	298,795	9-32	550*	--	--
6-35	460,657	8-35	20,038	--	--
6-40	707,671	3-40	26,221	--	--
6-45	3,391,837	1-45	39,644	--	--
6-50	1,465,769	6-50	56,512	--	--
6-55	1,885,655	6-55	54,468	--	--
6-60	1,835,836	6-60	70,714	--	--
6-65	1,932,429	6-65	159,817	--	N.A.
6-66	2,083,596	6-66	197,199	--	N.A.
6-67	2,285,858	6-67	239,903	11-67	326,432
6-68	2,318,213	6-68	281,929	11-68	453,155
6-69	2,337,412	6-69	304,856	11-69	482,357
6-70	2,300,000*	6-70	304,000*	11-70	530,550
4-71	N.A.	4-71	305,000*	N.A.	N.A.

*Estimated number of members.

¹The figures for total nonpostal government employees were developed by subtracting the total number of employees in the postal service from the total number of government employees in the following Civil Service Commission annual reports: 1932 Table A, p. 11, 1935 Table A, p. 4, 1940 Table 11, p. 137, 1950 Table 2, p. 65 for 1945 figures and Table 1, p. 64 for 1950 figures, 1955 Table A-3, p. 176, 1960 Table A-1, p. 16, 1965 Table A-1, p. 37,

1966 Table A-1, pp. 26-27, 1967 Table A-1, pp. 24-25, 1968 Table A-1, pp. 66-67, 1969 Table A-1, p. 52, 1970 U.S. Civil Service Commission Office of Labor-Management Relations Union Recognition in the Federal Government, November, 1970, p. 21, Table K.

Membership figures for the AFGE were developed from information supplied by Mr. Stephen A. Koczak, Research Director, AFGE, and Mr. Kermit Tull, AFGE National Vice-President 9th District.

The dues paying membership is approximately 305,000 with 50 percent classified as white-collar and 50 percent classified as blue-collar. The 305,000 members are in over 1400 locals.¹⁹

The AFGE represents 530,550 nonpostal government employees. Of the 530,550 represented government employees, 314,657 or 59 percent are white-collar and 215,768 or 41 percent are blue-collar.²⁰ The AFGE also represents a limited number of the government's nonappropriated funds (NAF) employees.

The AFGE has successfully negotiated 683 current agreements covering 342,233 of the 530,550 government employees that it represents. In the Department of the Air Force the AFGE represents 128,496 or 47 percent of the Air Force's employees. There are presently 60 negotiated agreements in effect covering 60,460 Air Force employees.²¹

¹⁹Telephone conversations with Mr. Tull on July 7, 1971, and July 16, 1971.

²⁰U.S. Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor-Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government, November, 1970, p. 19, Table H.

²¹Ibid., Table A, p. 12, p. 30, Table M.

Under the existing Civil Service Commission regulations the only union security allowable for the unions is the dues checkoff system. The net result of the non-negotiability of union security clauses is that approximately 230,000 government employees represented by the AFGE are not paying dues to the AFGE's treasury. AFGE officials believe that if the Federation is to continue to grow that it must obtain the right to negotiate on union security clauses. AFGE officials believe that the agency shop would be the most acceptable form of union security to both labor and management.


The Federation maintains its National Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Figure 1 illustrates the organization structure and the Federation's relationship with the AFL-CIO.²²

The basic policies of the AFGE are established at the National Convention which is held every two years. Each permanently chartered local is entitled to send delegates to the Convention on a prorata basis. The Convention also elects the Federation's national officers who presently serve for two year terms. Between conventions the National Executive Council has been authorized to modify policies

²² American Federation of Government Employees, Leadership Training, op. cit., p. 69. The organization chart presented in the manual was re-arranged to a more esthetic form. None of the relationships were changed.

FIGURE 1

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION CHART



*The dotted line indicates that the AFGE's national headquarters or the locals as illustrated hold membership and participate to varying degrees in these groups.

to meet changing conditions. The National Executive Council consists of the National President, Executive Vice-President, National Secretary-Treasurer, and the 15 National Vice-Presidents.

The AFGE is divided into 14 National Districts and 1 Overseas District. Each District is headed by an elected National Vice-President. Mr. Kermit Tull is the National Vice-President of District 9 which has approximately 20,000 AFGE members and includes the states of Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma. Aside from serving on the National Executive Council, the National Vice-Presidents are responsible for managing their Districts and implementing the Federation's programs. Each National Vice-President maintains a staff to assist him in carrying out the Federation's programs and to assist the Locals on an ad hoc basis.

The National Headquarters in Washington, D. C. is staffed by the President, Executive Vice-President, Secretary-Treasurer and 13 staff departments. The President is responsible for transforming the Federation's policies into operational programs. He is assisted by the Executive Vice-President and the staff departments. The Secretary-Treasurer is responsible for the AFGE's financial integrity. The operational budget is derived from membership dues and AFGE insurance premiums. The annual budget is between 5 and 6 million dollars.

The AFGE's organizing department is of particular

importance to this study. This department is responsible for the recruitment of members into the union. They develop recruiting programs, supply the necessary professional organizers, and provide promotional material to assist the district and local union representatives in their recruiting campaigns. The AFGE's basic recruiting appeal centers around the psychological and economic need for collective representation to get better working conditions. The following quotes from a current AFGE organizing leaflet illustrates the tone of the union's appeal:²³

INDIVIDUALS BENEFIT THROUGH UNITY. History illustrates how difficult it is for individual employees to bargain effectively with management. But working together through their union, employees can make their wishes known to management and can obtain justified improvements in working conditions, pay and other benefits. Strong, effective, responsible government employee unions benefit all concerned--the employees, the government and the public.

YOU CAN CHANGE YOUR FUTURE. As a federal employee you now have the opportunity to improve your working conditions by uniting yourself with your fellow government employees in the union composed exclusively of and for government workers--the AFGE.

AFGE officials believe that membership in a strong union is the best way for individual government employees to protect their rights. They also believe that a strong union is the best way for government employees to get wage and fringe benefit increases.²⁴

²³ AFGE promotional leaflet, "Grow with AFGE," 1968.

²⁴ Interviews with Mr. Tull on July 1, 1971, and Mr. Nance on July 2, 1971.

In a number of its promotional leaflets the AFGE noted that it has been responsible for the wage and fringe benefit increases that government employees have received over the past ten years. The literature also noted that future goals included the obtaining of more wage and fringe benefits for government employees. The AFGE's increasing emphasis on wage and fringe benefit increases was brought out by Mr. Tull in an interview with the author. Mr. Tull expressed the opinion that the AFGE will soon follow the postal unions in obtaining wage and fringe benefit collective bargaining rights for all of the nonpostal government employees that they represent.²⁵

Since the AFGE's actual membership over the past 2 years has remained stable, the recruiting appeals have taken on increased importance. The government's granting of negotiable agency shop security rights will certainly increase the AFGE's actual membership. However, whether or not those who are members or become members maintain their membership will depend largely upon the strategy and tactics that the AFGE develops.

Local 916 of the AFGE

Local 916 of the American Federation of Government Employees is the Federation's largest local. Since 1968 Local 916 has been the exclusive bargaining agent for

²⁵Interview with Mr. Tull, July 1, 1971.

civilian government employees at Tinker Air Force Base. Presently, Local 916 represents 21,000 of Tinker's 23,078 civilian employees.²⁶ The 21,000 Tinker employees represented by Local 916 are covered under a two year negotiated contract that expires on December 14, 1972.

From its official charter date, June 26, 1946, Local 916 has had a sporadic growth rate. In 1963 membership was estimated to be between 200 and 250. By 1965 membership had increased to between 500 and 600. In late 1965 the Local initiated a membership drive to gain formal recognition under Executive Order 10988 which would entitle it to the dues checkoff system. This goal was met in May, 1966, when membership exceeded 2000. By 1966, Local 916 was the largest union local at Tinker Air Force Base.²⁷

Shortly after formal recognition was granted the AFGE's National Headquarters sponsored an intensive organizing campaign to increase the Local's membership for eligibility for exclusive recognition. On September 25, 1968, the date of the representation election, 19,651 Tinker

²⁶This figure was quoted to the author in a telephone conversation with Mr. David Brown, Assistant Labor Relations Officer TAFB on July 16, 1971.

²⁷Ronald Merrill, "Collective Bargaining at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1966), p. 62. Although the author's Local 916 membership figures do not agree with Merrill's, they are believed to be correct since they were obtained in interviews with AFGE officials. Merrill's figures were obtained from management estimates.

employees were eligible to vote. Of the 16,869 votes cast 15,352 were valid and unchallenged. The results of the election indicated that 11,424 or 73 percent of the workers voted for representation by the AFGE. At the time of the granting of exclusive recognition, Local 916's actual membership was estimated to be 8,300 to 8,500. Shortly thereafter, the Local's membership peaked at a record high of 8600. Since 1969 Local 916's membership has fluctuated between 7000 and 8000 dues-paying members.²⁸

At the time this study was conducted the dues-paying membership was 7,555.²⁹ Of the 7,364 actual employed dues-paying white-collar and blue-collar members, 5,156 or 70 percent are blue-collar and 2,209 or 30 percent are white-collar employees at Tinker Air Force Base.³⁰

In comparison to the National's white-collar and blue-collar membership proportion of 50-50, Local 916 is atypical with its 30 percent white-collar and 70 percent blue-collar membership. At Tinker Air Force Base the

²⁸Membership figures were obtained in interviews with Mr. Tull on April 28, 1971 and July 1, 1971 and with Mr. Nance on July 2, 1971.

²⁹Local 916's membership report as of June 1, 1971. This figure included 25 new members not in the records, 68 nonappropriated fund members, and 98 retired members.

³⁰Because of the limited information contained in the Local's records these figures are subject to a 1 percent error margin.

white-collar and blue-collar employee distribution is approximately 55 percent white-collar and 45 percent blue-collar.³¹ Comparison of Local 916's white-collar and blue-collar membership distribution with Tinker's white-collar and blue-collar employee distribution indicates that Local 916 has a greater percentage of Tinker's blue-collar employees than its white-collar employees. Local 916 has approximately 17.4 percent of Tinker's white-collar employees and 49.5 percent of Tinker's blue-collar employees in its membership. Although the 17.4 percent actual white-collar membership figure is far below the AFGE's national average of 50 percent white-collar membership, it is still more than double the 8.8 percent white-collar union membership in the private sector.

As exclusive bargaining agent for 21,000 of Tinker's 23,078 employees, Local 916 has the same membership and representation problems that plague the National.

Most of Tinker's employees are represented by Local 916 without any obligation to pay membership dues. Since the Local must serve all of the members of the bargaining

³¹Ray Grimes, Economic and Social Characteristics of the Oklahoma City Air Material Area Labor Force, U. S. Air Force, Oklahoma City: August, 1968, p. 3. Grimes notes that his figures are approximations for the following reasons: 1. respondent reporting errors, 2. 1,584 of Tinker's 23,885 employees were unavailable and 3. 3,099 did not respond to the survey. Mr. Ken Lowe, Branch Chief of Employee Relations at Tinker expressed the opinion that Grime's 1968 figures are accurate for 1971 employee characteristics.

unit it often finds its financial and human resources strained to their limits. Mr. Nance, President of Local 916, believes that the union would be more effective if it could negotiate a union security clause (agency shop) in the contract.³²

For a union local the size of Local 916, it maintains a relatively small full-time staff. The full-time salaried staff consists of the President, First Vice-President, Business Agent, Chief Steward, Personnel Representative, and two secretaries. The Chief Steward has approximately 200 part-time stewards reporting to him. Under the conditions of the current agreement a maximum of 243 stewards can be appointed. Mr. Nance expressed a strong need for a comprehensive steward training program. The Local is assisted on an ad hoc basis by both the District and National staffs.³³

The Local schedules an open membership meeting at the end of each month. Attendance at these meetings rarely exceeds 150 members. The Local's general policies are established by the 12 member Executive Council which

³²Opinion expressed by Mr. Nance during an interview with the author on July 2, 1971, op. cit.

³³Ibid.

meets twice a month. The members of the Executive Council are elected for two year terms by the membership.

Local 916 officials are concerned about their inability to increase the dues-paying membership. Aside from the agency shop they believe that an expansion of the scope of bargainable issues would attract more members. They feel that the AFGE's influence in getting the Monroney Amendment through Congress despite strong Air Force opposition is one of the reasons why approximately 50 percent of Tinker's blue-collar employees are AFGE members. The Local's influence in the operation of the area wage-board under the Federal Coordinated Wage System is also credited for the high percentage of blue-collar members. Local 916 officials are satisfied with the wage-board's present operation although they admit that a collective bargaining arrangement does not exist. In the area of wages of Tinker's white-collar employees the Local's influence is confined mainly to representing employees in position classification grievance cases.³⁴

At the local level, the Local's primary appeal and role is protecting the rights of all represented Tinker employees. Local 916 officials believe that since they

³⁴Ibid.

have been the exclusive bargaining agent for Tinker employees that management's attitudes towards both its employees and the union has changed. They believe that the major problem at Tinker was management's either overlooking or misinterpreting Air Force and Civil Service Commission regulations. This situation was particularly true in appraisal, promotion, and grievance procedures.³⁵

Both Mr. Nance and Mr. Holloway believe that the union has been instrumental in bringing about a number of changes in Air Force policies and regulations. Changes in the Air Force's AFR 40-771 Appraisal and Grievance Procedure revised May 1, 1971, and the OCAMA Merit and Promotion Program revised August 31, 1970 were cited as examples of the union's influence.³⁶ Mr. Nance believes that the changes in Air Force policies and regulations over the past few years have been so gradual that the average Tinker employee does not realize that without the union's steady pressure these changes would have never occurred.

Both Tinker management and Local 916 officials believe that the present merit promotion program established in 1962 at Tinker has its problems. However, their views on the nature of the problems differ. The System's

³⁵Opinions expressed by both Mr. Nance and Mr. Holloway--Local 916's Personnel Representative during a number of informal conversations with the author between June 2, 1971 and July 2, 1971.

³⁶Ibid.

operation centers around an EDP Civilian Skills Locator System, commonly referred to as the "Profile System" by Tinker employees. The System is designed to maintain promotion information on a master tape for every employee.

This information includes experience, education, test scores, appraisals, and many more items which are used to determine the best qualified for promotion. This system automatically compares qualifications and requirements for each position against the qualifications of employees.³⁷

Available positions can be filled by any qualified government employee but qualifying rules effectively limit the System to Tinker employees only. The pamphlet describing the System's operation does not disclose the exact weighting that is given to the promotion eligibility factors.

The Air Force's Merit Promotion Program regulation 40-1 notes that the supervisors appraisal is the first of the primary factors for promotion eligibility. Education, training, and experience (TRAEX) are ranked second and tests are ranked third. Secondary factors include three categories of performance awards.³⁸ Management indicated to the author that the factors were not evenly weighted and that seniority had a low weighting while the supervisor's appraisal had a high weighting. Management believes that the System is basically sound and that the problems

³⁷Civilian Personnel OCAMA Merit Promotion Program, Tinker Air Force Base, 1970, p. Foreward. This pamphlet was distributed to all Tinker employees.

³⁸OCAMA-TAFB Regulation 40-1, September 18, 1970, pp. 7-8, OCAMA-TAFBR (CL), no date or page number.

have arisen because of employees "distrust of computers" and that consideration of all eligible Tinker employees for any promotion or open position often encompasses too many people.³⁹

Local 916 officials believe that the System is biased against the employees because of the high weighting given to the supervisor's appraisal. They feel that many of the supervisors' appraisals are subjective rather than objective. One of the union's goals is to negotiate the modification of promotion system to give the seniority factor the highest weighting.⁴⁰

Relations between Tinker management and Local 916's officials are cordial. Both Mr. Barnett and Mr. Nance expressed mutual respect for each other's personal attributes and abilities.⁴¹ Although the personal atmosphere is cordial, management's overall attitude of sovereign paternalism still follows the theme expressed by Merrill in 1966. "Tinker officials encourage worker participation and are diligent in adhering to the spirit and letter of the executive order. True, they have not rushed forth to

³⁹Opinion expressed by Mr. Ken Lowe, branch chief of employee relations, during an interview with the author on July 1, 1971.

⁴⁰Interview with Mr. Nance on July 2, 1971.

⁴¹The author was privileged to sit in on an informal discussion between Mr. Barnett, Mr. Brown, Mr. Nance, and Mr. Holloway on settling a grievance condition. In separate interviews Mr. Nance and Mr. Barnett expressed their mutual respect for each other.

give away anything; nothing requires them to."⁴²

Local 916's officials are well aware of management's attitudes. The union's countervailing power is manifested in either one of two courses of action. When the union secures no cooperation from first and middle-level management they circumvent these levels and negotiate directly with the Commanding General. This method has proven to be very effective. When this course of action either fails or is blocked the union gives publicity to their problem either in the Tinker Take Off which is widely circulated outside the base area. On occasion the union has used the local media. The Local's use of publicity as a political weapon has been especially effective since Air Force management is very image conscious, both nationally and in the Oklahoma City area.⁴³

The Air Force's continued sovereign paternalism is reflected in the current labor-management agreement. The spirit of the agreement parallels the spirit of Executive Order 11491. Sovereignty transformed as management's rights and nonnegotiable subjects paraphrase Sections 11 and 12 of the Order. However, the overall subject matter covered in the agreement is broad when compared to the agreements negotiated by other AFGC Locals and other unions.

⁴²Ronald Merrill, op. cit., p. 127.

⁴³Informal discussions between the author and Mr. Nance during the period June 2, 1971 to July 2, 1971, op. cit.

The agreement has 37 articles with 23 of these articles pertaining specifically to the terms and conditions of employment at Tinker. A few of the subjects covered are charity drives, tests, disciplinary action, health and safety, publicity, and reductions in force.⁴⁴ Although the agreements coverage is broad, management's major concession to the union in most of the articles is that they will consult with the union before taking action, and that applicable Air Force and Civil Service Commission regulations will be followed.

The union's only real success in the agreement is the negotiated employee and union grievance procedures.⁴⁵ The Civil Service Commission and the Air Force's distinction between a grievance and an adverse action appeal is applied to limit the scope of the negotiated grievance procedure.⁴⁶ Under the terms of the agreement Tinker employees may choose either the negotiated grievance procedure or the Air Force's 40-771 grievance and appeal procedure but not both. The negotiated grievance procedure has three intermediary steps and a fourth step of binding arbitration. Arbitration extends only to the application and interpretation of the agreement and the Air Force's policies and

⁴⁴Labor-Management Agreement, between Tinker Air Force Base and Local 916 American Federation of Government Employees.

⁴⁵Ibid., Articles 35 and 36.

⁴⁶Ibid., Article 35, Sections B and C.

regulations. Exceptions to the arbitrator's award may be filed by either the union or management with the Federal Labor Relations Council subject to their regulations.⁴⁷ Under the terms of the agreement the union may refer disputes over the interpretation and application of the agreement to arbitration.⁴⁸

Summary

The AFGE stands at a crossroad. Its conservative strategy and tactics in representing government employees by working through legislative and administrative channels has been effective for many years in attracting members and getting welfare, and fringe benefits for government employees. The question is: Are these conservative strategy and tactics in need of re-evaluation? The AFGE's dues-paying membership in absolute numbers has been stable for nearly two years while the number of government employees that it must represent has increased by 50,000.⁴⁹ One possible reason for the lack of real growth may be that the AFGE's tactics bring slow results when compared to the results recently gained by the more militant postal unions.

Local 916 also has the same problem of static growth that plagues the National. In fact, Local 916's

⁴⁷Ibid., Article 35, Step 4, D-E.

⁴⁸Ibid., Article 36.

⁴⁹See Table 4, p.145.

growth has actually declined. In the past three years they have lost nearly 1,000 members. The Local's strategy and tactics parallels those of the National except for modifications to meet local conditions. Again, it appears that there is a need to re-examine those strategy and tactics that have in the past appealed to Tinker employees.

Local 916 also suffers from internal dissention. The Local's officers expressed concern for the fact that internal dissention diverts the union from properly representing its members. Management also expressed concern for the stability of the union. They believe that a stable union helps to maintain labor-management harmony. They expressed concern about the possibility of unqualified people assuming the union's leadership. An unqualified leader's lack of knowledge about labor-management relations could cause the leaders to adopt unreasonable positions.⁵⁰

In the following chapter the reasons why the sampled Local 916 members joined the union will be examined.

⁵⁰This concern by both Local 916 officers and Tinker management was expressed during separate interviews on July 2, 1971.

CHAPTER VI
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTORS THAT
CAUSED THE SAMPLED UNION MEMBERS
TO JOIN AFGE LOCAL 916

The primary research for this study centered around a Confidential Questionnaire that was sent to the homes of 736 AFGE Local 916 members.¹ The sample was established by a systematic random sample of every tenth blue-collar and white-collar union member. The questionnaire was sent on two separate occasions; June 3, 1971 and June 17, 1971. To complement the study the union published a series of articles in the Tinker Take Off. The articles described the purpose of the study and urged the sampled members to participate.

This chapter is devoted to the presentation and analysis of the sampled AFGE Local 916 members' responses to the Confidential Questionnaire. The responses to the questionnaire will be analyzed to determine why the sampled blue-collar and white-collar union members joined the AFGE. The results of the data analysis will be used

¹Confidential Questionnaire, Appendix 1.

to test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The reasons why the sampled members joined the AFGE are different from the reasons why workers in the private sector join unions.

Hypothesis 2: The reasons why the sampled blue-collar and white-collar members joined the AFGE are the same.

Each individual's response to the 25 questions in the Confidential Questionnaire was coded for frequency distribution and statistical analysis. The nature of the population sample limited the design of the questionnaire to discrete responses. Therefore the shape of the frequency distributions are nonparametric.

In many cases a cursory examination of the data was sufficient to indicate whether the sample groups' responses were significantly different. In some cases a cursory examination of the data did not indicate whether the responses were significantly different than what might have been expected from some theoretical or expected response. In these cases Chi-Square analysis was used.

Nonparametric or distribution-free statistics are limited in terms of the useful statistical tests that can be used for data analysis. The Chi-Square test for significance is an excellent test for analyzing discrete

nonparametric statistics because Chi-Square assumes no assumptions about the shape of the parameter distribution.²

Chi-Square analysis provided a method whereby significant differences in the responses of the sampled blue-collar and white-collar members could be determined. This analysis provided information to determine if the frequency distribution observed in the sample groups' responses deviated significantly from some theoretical distribution.

The general formula for Chi-Square is:

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(O-E)^2}{E} \quad \begin{array}{l} O = \text{observed frequency} \\ E = \text{expected frequency} \end{array}$$

To test whether the observed frequencies deviate significantly from some theoretical frequency, an expected frequency distribution was necessary. This was accomplished by two methods.

Using the first method the frequency distribution of each question, listed separately the expected frequency distribution based on the hypothesis that the total number of responses per question would occur an equal number of times in each cell. The formula used in the analysis is:

$$\frac{R(\text{total \# of responses})}{N(\text{total \# of cells})} = F(\# \text{ of responses per cell})$$

Except for question 5 this method was used in analyzing the responses to the questionnaire as shown in Tables 34 through

²N. M. Downie and R. W. Heath, Basic Statistical Methods (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 160-175.

60 in Appendix II. In Question 5, "Is your job classified as: 1. wage-board, 2. general schedule?," the sample consisted of 70 percent blue-collar and 30 percent white-collar AFGE members. The expected response distribution from the sample was 70 percent blue-collar and 30 percent white-collar instead of the 50 percent blue-collar and white-collar based upon the formula. The exception occurs in this question because the expected response distribution was known.

By using a second method the existence of significant differences in the blue-collar and white-collar members' responses were determined. Their responses were compared to each of the 24 questions. To test whether a significant difference exists between the proportional responses of the blue-collar and white-collar members to each question a null hypothesis was formulated. The null hypothesis became: there is no significant difference between the observed and expected responses of the sampled blue-collar and white-collar members. The following general format is used to test the null hypothesis:

Blue-Collar and white-collar AFGE Members	(O) Observed Frequency	(E) Expected Frequency
1. Blue-collar	O_1	E_1
2. White-collar	O_2	E_2
Total (N)	O_N	E_N

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{O^2}{E} - (N)$$

Where (O) is the observed frequency in each cell O

Where (E) is the expected frequency in each cell E

Where (N) is the total number of responses $O_N = E_N = N$

Expected cell frequencies for any size matrix are obtained by using the following formula:

Expected cell frequency =

$$\frac{(\text{Marginal column total}) (\text{Marginal row total})}{\text{Total Number}}$$

Observed Frequency				Expected Frequency			
A	B	C	R	$\frac{MR}{T}$	$\frac{NR}{T}$	$\frac{PR}{T}$	R
D	E	F	S	$\frac{MS}{T}$	$\frac{NS}{T}$	$\frac{PS}{T}$	S
G	H	I	W	$\frac{MW}{T}$	$\frac{NW}{T}$	$\frac{PW}{T}$	W
M	N	P	T	M	N	P	T

Based upon the Chi-Square value obtained, the null hypothesis of no significant difference between the proportion of observed and expected responses of the blue-collar and white-collar members is either rejected or accepted. The results of the Chi-Square test based on this null hypothesis are shown at the bottom of Tables 5 through 33 in this chapter. The minimum probability value for rejection of the null hypothesis of this study is $P \leq .05$.

Using this nondirectional method of statistical

analysis the survey results as discussed in this chapter will be used to determine which factors either influenced or did not influence the sampled members' decision to join the union and whether the reasons of the blue-collar and white-collar members differed significantly.

Survey Findings and Analysis

The sampled AFGE members' responses to each of the 25 questions in the Confidential Questionnaire are compiled in Tables 34 through 60 in Appendix II. Unless specifically noted as being otherwise, all of the responses discussed in both Appendix II and this chapter are only those of the sampled union members who responded to the questionnaire. The data in Tables 34 through 60 in Appendix II show the distribution of the responses for the blue-collar members, the white-collar members, and the total for both groups. The distribution of responses for each group, and the group totals are tested separately using Chi-Square analysis. The total response to each of the questions, except questions 4, 6, and 25 as shown in Tables 39, 41, and 60 (Appendix II) respectively, are significantly different from the theoretical or expected distribution. The responses to questions 4 and 6 when presented in Tables 11 and 13 respectively in this chapter will be compared to the related distributions for all Tinker employees to determine if the data are representative of the population. If significant comparisons exist then the responses to all of the questions except number 25 will be

significant. If all of the relevant data are significant then valid conclusions can be drawn from the data.

In highly industrialized states collective association is a way of life. Early in life children raised in labor intensive industrial areas or major population centers are exposed to group values and associations. As population centers have become more concentrated dependence upon group associations has become a means for surviving. In states such as West Virginia, Washington, Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan, Indiana, Missouri, and Illinois either labor intensive industries or major population centers exist. In these states unions have historical roots and union membership among nonfarm workers is the highest in the country.³ In these states the children of families where either or both parents may belong to a union are more inclined to join unions than children raised in states where industrial bases or populations centers do not exist and unionism is low.

Oklahoma is a predominately rural state where neither labor intensive industries nor major population centers exist. As a general rule Oklahomans do not join unions. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that Oklahoma ranked number 41 in the nation with 16.7 percent of the nonagricultural labor force having

³U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, Bulletin No. 1665, p. 76, Table 10, 1970.

union membership.⁴ Being either born and educated or educated in Oklahoma is viewed as a factor that might retard union growth at Tinker. The proportion of the sample who were born and educated in Oklahoma and the proportion of all Tinker employees who were born in Oklahoma are shown in Tables 5 and 6 respectively.

TABLE 5
WERE YOU BORN IN OKLAHOMA?*

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses			
		Yes		No	
		#	%	#	%
Blue-Collar	175	122	70	53	30
White-Collar	137	81	59	56	41
Total	312	203	65	109	34
Chi-Square	4.208	Significant Level		.05	

*All of the members who were born in Oklahoma were also educated in Oklahoma.

From the data presented in Table 5 the null hypothesis is rejected. A significant difference exists in the birth places of the blue-collar and the white-collar members. A comparison of the data in Tables 5 and 6 shows that the sample's distribution of native-born Oklahomans corresponds to the distribution for all Tinker employees.

⁴Ibid.

TABLE 6

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL TINKER
EMPLOYEES BORN IN OKLAHOMA

Group	Percent Born in Oklahoma ⁵
Blue-collar	66.02
White-collar	59.37
Total	63.02

⁵Ray Grimes, Economic and Social Characteristics of the Oklahoma City Air Material Area, Table 22, p. 44, 1968.

This means that the sampled data are representative of all Tinker employees.

Table 7 shows the proportion of the sampled members who were educated in Oklahoma schools during their formative years 7 through 18.

TABLE 7

WHILE YOU WERE BETWEEN 7 AND 18 YEARS OLD:
DID YOU ATTEND SCHOOL IN OKLAHOMA?

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses			
		#	Yes %	#	No %
Blue-collar	175	142	80	33	20
White-collar	137	99	72	38	28
Total	312	241	77	71	22
Chi-Square 3.209		Significant Level N.S.			

A cursory examination of the data shows that there is no significant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members.

The data presented in Table 5 show that 65 percent of the members are native-born Oklahomans. All of those members born in Oklahoma were educated in Oklahoma. Of the 109 who were not born in Oklahoma, 38 were educated in Oklahoma. In total 77 percent of the sampled members were either born and educated or educated in Oklahoma. No significant difference in the distribution of the two groups exists.

Whereas only 16.7 percent of Oklahoma's nonfarm labor force are union members, 33 percent of Tinker's employees are AFGE members. Considering that 77 percent of the respondents were either born and educated or educated in Oklahoma, and that 63 percent of all Tinker employees were born in Oklahoma, the fact that the union received a majority of all of the votes cast in the election to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for Tinker employees is significant.

Seidman, London, and Karsh in their study about why workers in a steel mill joined the union concluded that family background was a factor. The workers parents' membership and satisfaction with unions had a positive effect upon the workers views about unions.⁶

⁶See Chapter III, p. 43 of this study.

If the sampled members parents were union members during the members' childhood it is assumed that the parents attitudes had some effect on the childrens' values. If the parents' experience with unions was beneficial to them their children are believed to be more inclined to join a union than children whose parents either were not union members or were dissatisfied with their experiences with unions.

Table 8 shows if the members came from a union or a nonunion family.

TABLE 8
DID EITHER OF YOUR PARENTS BELONG TO A UNION?

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses					
		Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	175	31	18	124	71	20	11
White-collar	137	21	15	106	77	10	7
Total	312	52	16	230	73	30	9
Chi-Square	2.429	Significant Level N.S.					

The data show that 73 percent of the respondents did not come from a family with a union background. The 230 respondents who came from nonunion families were not favorably predisposed toward joining the AFGE because of any influences from their parents being union members. The Chi-Square value shows there is no significant

difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members.

Table 9 shows the parents' experience with unions for the 52 members whose parents had been union members.

TABLE 9
IF YES, DID THEY FEEL THAT THE UNION WAS
HELPFUL TO THEM?

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses					
		Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	31	26	84	1	1	4	13
White-collar	21	16	76	0	0	5	24
Total	52	42	80	1	1	9	17
Chi-Square	2.573	Significant Level N.S.					

The data show that 42 of the 52 members believe that their parents were satisfied with their union experiences. Only one person indicated that his parents were dissatisfied with their union experience. The only conclusions that can be drawn from the data are that 42 members of the sample group probably had favorable attitudes about unions before joining the AFGE. There is no significant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members.

Past union membership is a factor that influences a persons decision to join another union. If a persons

past experience with a union was beneficial, then he is inclined to join a union again. If a persons past experience with a union was not beneficial, then that person is less inclined to join another union.

Table 10 shows if past union membership was present in the sample groups background.

TABLE 10
BEFORE YOU CAME TO WORK AT TINKER
DID YOU EVER BELONG TO A UNION?

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses			
		Yes		No	
		#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	175	70	40	105	60
White-collar	137	45	33	92	67
Total	312	115	36	197	63

From the data we can infer that 115 of the members who belonged to a union before coming to Tinker were satisfied with their past union membership. Otherwise, they would not have joined the AFGE since no union security clause such as the union shop or the agency shop exists at Tinker. For the 197 members who had no experiences with unions it can be said that past union membership was not a factor in their joining the AFGE. There is no significant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members.

The data presented in Table 11 will be analyzed to see if there is any relationship between the number of years a sampled member has been employed at Tinker and his joining the AFGE.

TABLE 11
HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED AT TINKER?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses									
	N	Years								
		less than 5		5-10		11-15		Over 16		
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Blue-Collar	175	43	25	50	29	20	11	62	35	
White-Collar	137	14	10	33	24	26	19	64	47	
Total	312	57	18	83	26	46	14	126	40	
Chi-Square	15.269		Significant Level						.01	

The null hypothesis is rejected. A significant difference exists in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members.

A comparison by number of years employed at Tinker (Table 11) of the sampled members with all Tinker employees (Table 12) will show if any relative proportional differences in the union's membership exists. Table 12 shows the number of years employed at Tinker distribution for all Tinker employees.⁷

⁷Ray Grimes, op. cit., Table 18, p. 41.

TABLE 12

NUMBER OF YEARS EMPLOYED AT TINKER
DISTRIBUTION FOR ALL EMPLOYEES

Group	N	Years			
		less than 5 %	5-10 %	11-15 %	Over 16 %
Blue-collar	100	39.9	12.1	10.0	37.9
White-collar	100	32.7	20.2	13.5	33.7
Total	100	36.7	15.8	11.6	36.0

Results of the comparisons indicate, with one exception, that the proportion of sampled blue-collar members corresponds proportionally for all blue-collar Tinker employees. The exception occurs in the 5 to 10 years interval where the proportion of the blue-collar respondents is two and one-half times greater than the proportion of all Tinker employees.

A comparison of the sampled white-collar members with all white-collar Tinker employees shows that proportional differences exist in all intervals. In the less than 5 years interval the respondents percentage is less than one-third the interval percentage of all Tinker employees. As the number of years employed at Tinker increases the proportional membership in the AFGE increases and in all cases exceeds the interval percentage for all Tinker employees. The data show the AFGE has had a higher proportional success in organizing white-collar

members who have worked at Tinker for more than five years, than with those who have worked at Tinker for less than five years.

Since the union membership sample was determined by systematic random sampling and the characteristics of the nonrespondents are known it can be inferred that the longer a white-collar worker is employed at Tinker the greater his chances are of joining the AFGE.

The survey data presented in Table 13 will be analyzed to determine if there is any relationship between the respondents' ages and their joining the AFGE.

TABLE 13
HOW OLD ARE YOU?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses											
	N	Years								Over 50		
		less than 30	30-40	41-51					#	%		
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Blue-Collar	175	28	16	32	18	56	32	59	33			
White-Collar	137	10	7	22	16	52	37	53	38			
Total	312	38	12	54	17	108	34	112	35			
Chi-Square	6.030		Significant Level								N.S.	

A cursory examination of the data shows that there is no significant difference in the blue-collar and the white-collar members' responses.

A comparison by grouped age intervals of the sampled

members with all Tinker employees will show if any proportional differences in AFGE membership exists in the intervals. Table 14 shows the age distribution for all Tinker employees.⁸

TABLE 14
AGE DISTRIBUTION FOR ALL TINKER EMPLOYEES

Group	N	Years			
		less than 30 %	30-40 %	41-50 %	Over 50 %
Blue-collar	100	20.8	21.4	33.3	24.5
White-collar	100	18.8	25.8	34.9	20.6
Total	100	19.9	23.4	34.0	22.7

The results of the comparisons indicate that only in the over 50 years of age group of the sample does the proportion of blue-collar membership exceed the corresponding age group proportion of all blue-collar Tinker employees. The survey data show that 24 percent of the sampled over 50 years of age blue-collar members have been employed at Tinker from 5 to 10 years. This partially explains the high proportional success that the AFGE has had in organizing the 5 to 10 years group.

Comparisons of the sampled white-collar members with all Tinker white-collar employees show that the AFGE has not been proportionally successful in organizing

⁸Ibid., p. 41.

white-collar employees under 40 years old. The highest proportional success has been with those Tinker employees who are over 50 years old. The data was further analyzed to show that for the members in the sample over 50 years old 27 percent have worked at Tinker between 5 and 10 years, 38 percent between 11 to 15 years and 48 percent over 16 years. This explains the higher proportional success that the AFGE has had in organizing white-collar Tinker employees in those intervals.

From the data it appears that the AFGE's membership appeals are most likely to attract Tinker employees over 50 years old and least likely to attract Tinker employees under 30 years old. The importance of these findings is that the median age of Tinker employees has been decreasing since 1960. The latest figures indicate that the median age for all employees is 43 years.⁹ If this trend continues and the AFGE's organizing appeals continue to hold the highest proportional attraction for Tinker employees over 50 years old then Local 916 will continue to lose members.

The data presented in Tables 15 and 16 are used as checks upon the representativeness of the sample's respondents. Local 916 records indicate that approximately 70 to 80 percent of the current members joined the union within the past 5 years. According to Local 916 officials attendance

⁹Ibid., p. 3.

at the Local's monthly meetings is usually less than 150.

TABLE 15

HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN A MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (AFGE)?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses									
	N	Years								
		less than 2		2-5		6-10		Over 10		
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Blue-collar	174	46	26	89	51	33	18	6	3	
White-collar	137	20	14	82	59	30	21	5	3	
Total	311	66	21	171	54	63	20	11	3	
Chi-Square	7.300		Significant Level						N.S.	

TABLE 16

HOW MANY OF THE SCHEDULED MEETINGS OF THE
AFGE DO YOU ATTEND EACH YEAR?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses							
	N	Meetings per Year						
		less than 3		4-7		8-12		
	#	%	#	%	#	%		
Blue-collar	175	122	69	41	23	12	6	
White-collar	137	116	84	15	10	6	4	
Total	312	238	76	56	17	18	5	
Chi-Square	9.438		Significant Level				.01	

The responses to these questions show that the

distributions of the sampled members membership and participation in the union are representative of the populations membership and participation distributions. No significant difference exists in the number of years either the blue-collar or the white-collar members have been members of the union. A significant difference exists in the blue-collar and the white-collar members attendance at the union's monthly meetings. The data show that the blue-collar members' active participation in the Local is twice that of the white-collar members. This observation corresponds with the fact that the majority of the Local's present administration are blue-collar workers.

It can be stated that in the private sector, social factors, i.e., group associations and group pressures, are reasons that influence workers joining unions. Chamberlin, Bakke, Seidman, et al., and Rose all found that social pressures were a factor in workers joining unions. Chamberlin found that 7 percent of the union members that he studied joined the union because of their friends. However, he discounted the social factor and concluded that the union members reasons for joining the union were economically based.¹⁰ Bakke found that workers were inclined to join the union if "association and participation in the union would reinforce normal group attachments and

¹⁰Chapter III, op. cit., p. 40.

interests. . . ."¹¹ Seidman, et al., conducted their study in highly organized steel plants and found that a large number of inactive union members reported joining the union because of informal group pressure.¹² They concluded that the strongest reasons for the workers joining the union was based upon existing social pressure.¹³ Rose, in his study of the highly organized Teamsters found that almost one-half of the workers indicated that they had joined the union involuntarily.¹⁴

The data presented in Tables 17, 18, and 19 will be analyzed to determine if either informal, group formal, or external formal pressures were reasons for the sampled members joining the union.

TABLE 17
DID YOU JOIN THE AFGE BECAUSE YOUR FRIENDS
WERE MEMBERS? (INFORMAL PRESSURE)

Group	AFGE Members' Responses							
	N	Yes		No		Don't know		
		#	%	#	%	#	%	
Blue-collar	175	19	10	154	88	2	1	
White-collar	137	14	10	123	89	0	0	
Total	312	33	11	277	88	2	0	
Chi-square	1.095	Significant Level						N.S.

¹¹Ibid., p. 41.

¹²Ibid., p. 43.

¹³Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 45, Reasons: number 1.

The data show that only 11 percent of the members feel that informal social pressure was a factor in their joining the AFGE. This figure approximates the 7 percent that Chamberlin found in his study. Compared to the findings of Seidman et al. and Rose the proportion is low. A cursory examination of the data in Table 17 shows that there is no significant difference in the blue-collar and the white-collar members' responses.

TABLE 18

DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU WERE PRESSURED BY YOUR FRIENDS INTO JOINING THE AFGE? (GROUP FORMAL PRESSURE)

Group	AFGE Members' Responses							
	N	Yes		No		Don't know		
		#	%	#	%	#	%	
Blue-collar	175	1	0	172	98	2	1	
White-collar	137	2	1	135	98	0	0	
Total	312	3	0	307	98	2	0	
Chi-Square	2.007		Significant Level					N.S.

From the data it can be stated that formal pressure from the social group was not a factor in the members joining the union. This statement is true for both the blue-collar and the white-collar members because no significant difference exists in their responses.

TABLE 19

DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU WERE PRESSURED BY PEOPLE
OTHER THAN YOUR FRIENDS INTO JOINING
THE AFGE? (EXTERNAL
FORMAL PRESSURE)

Group	AFGE Members' Responses						
	N	Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-Collar	175	15	8	158	90	2	1
White-Collar	137	4	2	131	95	2	1
Total	312	19	6	289	92	4	1
Chi-Square	5.797		Significant Level N.S.				

From the data it can be stated that formal pressure outside of the social group was not a factor in joining the union for 92 percent of the members. This statement is true for both the blue-collar and the white-collar members because no significant differences exist in their responses.

The responses shown in Tables 17, 18, and 19 indicate that informal and external social pressure was a factor for only 11, 0, and 6 percent of the sampled members respectively. Bakke, Seidman, et al., and Rose in their respective studies concluded that social pressure was a causal factor for significantly higher percentages of the workers joining the union. This study concludes that the sampled members did not join the AFGE for social reasons.

The responses to questions 12 through 21 in Tables 20 through 31 examine the presence of psychological and

economic reasons for joining the AFGE. The responses to question 12 are presented in Table 20. This is a broad question and the responses do not provide clues to any specific psychological or economic reasons for the individuals joining the union. This question was included in the study to allow for comparison with the responses given to Chamberlin and Rose in their studies. The responses to questions 12 and 13 cannot be compared with the findings of Bakke, and Seidman et al. because they did not ask similar questions to their study groups.

TABLE 20

DID YOU JOIN THE AFGE BECAUSE YOU BELIEVE
THAT IT CAN HELP YOU PERSONALLY?

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses					
		Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	175	150	85	17	9	8	4
White-collar	137	112	81	18	13	7	5
Total	312	262	83	35	11	15	4
Chi-Square	1.165	Significant Level		N.S.			

Because there is no significant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members, it can be stated that over 80 percent of the members believe that there is something to be gained by having membership in the AFGE.

There is a significant difference in the findings of this study when compared to the findings of Chamberlin and Rose in their studies. Chamberlin found that 36 percent of the union members joined the union for some form of personal gain.¹⁵ Rose found that 42.8 percent of the workers joined the union for some form of personal gain.¹⁶

TABLE 21

DID YOU JOIN THE AFGE BECAUSE YOU BELIEVE
IN THE PURPOSES OF LABOR UNIONS?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses							
	N	Yes		No		Don't Know		
		#	%	#	%	#	%	
Blue-collar	175	152	86	14	8	9	5	
White-collar	137	110	80	15	10	12	8	
Total	312	262	83	29	9	21	6	
Chi-Square	2.827	Significant Level					N.S.	

The responses show that 83 percent of the members joined the union because they believe in the purposes of unions. At this point the specific purposes of unions are not known; therefore the only conclusion that can be made is that the members believe in the purposes of unions. There is no significant difference in the responses of the two groups. There is a significant difference in the

¹⁵Ibid., p. 39. Reasons: total for nos. 2 and 4.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 45-46. Reasons: total for nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7.

findings of this study when compared to the findings of Chamberlin and Rose. Chamberlin found that 8 percent of the union members joined the union because "they like to belong to such organizations."¹⁷ This is inferred to mean that they believe in the purposes of unions. Rose found that 16.3 percent of the members joined the union because of some form of impersonal benefit which is inferred to mean a general belief in the purposes of unions.¹⁸ From the data it appears that a larger percentage of the sampled members in this study joined the union because they believe in a union's purposes than the percentages found by either Chamberlin or Rose.

The surveys findings for questions 14 and 15 as presented in Tables 22 and 23 respectively will be used to determine if the members joined the union because of a need for protection against management's authoritarian and paternalistic attitudes.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 39. Reasons: number 3.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 45. Reasons: number 3.

TABLE 22

BEFORE JOINING THE AFGE, DID YOU FEEL THAT
MANAGEMENT HAD BEEN UNFAIR IN DEALING
WITH WORKERS?

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses					
		Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	175	140	80	21	12	14	8
White-collar	137	90	65	35	25	12	8
Total	312	230	73	56	17	26	8
Chi-Square	10.296	Significant Level		.01			

The responses show that 73 percent of the members believe that management is unfair in dealing with Tinker employees. These results are significant because one of the functions of the Civil Service Commission is to protect the rights of government employees.¹⁹ These findings suggest that the members may feel that the Civil Service Commission does not adequately protect them from unfair treatment by management.

Although there is a significant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members, the need for protection is a reason for joining the union for the majority of both groups. However, the need for protection is strongest among the blue-collar members. The difference in the groups responses was not unexpected

¹⁹Chapter IV of the study, The Role of the Civil Service Commission, pp. 99-119.

since white-collar workers have historically identified with management.²⁰

TABLE 23

BEFORE JOINING THE AFGE, DID YOU FEEL THAT
MANAGEMENT WOULD NOT PAY ATTENTION
TO WHAT WORKERS HAD TO SAY?

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses					
		Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	175	147	84	17	9	11	6
White-collar	137	95	69	32	23	10	7
Total	312	242	77	49	15	21	6
Chi-Square	11.784	Significant Level		.01			

The data show that 77 percent of the members do not believe that management allows for worker participation in decision making. The significant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members was not unexpected because of white-collar workers historical identification with management.²¹

The data in Tables 22 and 23 clearly show that a majority of the blue-collar and the white-collar members believe that management is unfair and does not listen to the workers.

²⁰Chapter III, op. cit., footnote 84, p. 56.

²¹Ibid.

Chamberlin, Bakke, Seidman et al., Rose, and Walker and Guest all to varying degrees found that psychological reasons for joining the unions existed. Chamberlin found that 8 percent of the union members joined the union for job security.²² Bakke indicated the workers' frustrations and anxieties were secondary reasons for their joining the union.²³ Seidman, et al. found that experiences in the plant were reasons for joining the union for between 15 and 39 percent of the workers.²⁴ Rose found that 14.2 percent of the workers joined the union for numerous psychological reasons.²⁵ However, 52.8 percent of the workers in Rose's study indicated that the unions purpose was to "get job security," a psychological factor.²⁶ Walker and Guest stated that the workers joined the union because the union met in part the social and psychological needs of workers that the work environment left void.²⁷

Comparison of the findings of this study with the findings of the studies conducted in the private sector show that union members in this study joined the union for psychological reasons in larger percentages. It appears that

²²Ibid., p. 39. Reason: number 4.

²³Ibid., p. 41.

²⁴Ibid., p. 43.

²⁵Ibid., p. 46. Reasons: numbers 5, 6, and 7.

²⁶Ibid., p. 46. Opinions: numbers 2, 3, and 7.

²⁷Ibid., p. 49.

the psychological factor is a major reason for the members in this study joining the union.

Questions 16 and 17 were asked to see if the members feel that labor-management relations at Tinker have improved since they joined the union. Tables 24 and 25 present the members' responses to questions 16 and 17.

TABLE 24

SINCE THE AFGE HAS BEEN THE EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING
AGENT FOR TINKER EMPLOYEES, HAS MANAGEMENT
TREATED THE EMPLOYEES MORE FAIRLY?

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses					
		Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-Collar	175	128	73	21	12	26	14
White-Collar	137	66	48	30	21	41	29
Total	312	194	62	51	16	67	21
Chi-Square	20.845	Significant Level		.001			

The responses show that 62 percent of the members believe that since they joined the union that there has been some improvement in working conditions at Tinker. A significant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members exists. Forty-eight percent of the white-collar members believe that Tinker's employees are being treated more fairly. Seventy-three percent of the blue-collar members believe the same. It appears that a larger percentage of the white-collar members are still either dissatisfied with working conditions at Tinker or

believe that union membership has not benefited them.

TABLE 25

SINCE YOU JOINED THE AFGE, DO YOU FEEL THAT
MANAGEMENT PAYS MORE ATTENTION TO WHAT
YOU HAVE TO SAY?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses							
	N	Yes		No		Don't Know		
		#	%	#	%	#	%	
Blue-Collar	175	97	55	52	29	26	14	
White-Collar	137	55	40	52	37	30	21	
Total	312	152	48	104	33	56	17	
Chi-Square	7.543	Significant Level					.05	

The data show that 48 percent of the members feel that since they joined the union that management pays more attention to what they have to say. A smaller percentage of both the blue-collar and white-collar members believe that the changes in working conditions at Tinker that have come about since they joined the union have directly affected them. It appears that some of the improvements have been indirect rather than direct. A significant difference in the responses of the two groups exists. The smaller percentage response of the white-collar members is inferred to mean that a majority of the white-collar members are either dissatisfied with working conditions at Tinker or believe that union membership has not benefited them. When the responses presented in Table 25 are compared with the responses in Table 24 a larger percentage of the blue-collar

members view the improvements in conditions at Tinker as being more indirect.

In the analysis of the responses presented in Table 22 it was suggested that the members may feel that the Civil Service Commission does not adequately protect the rights of government employees. Questions 18 and 19 were included in the questionnaire to determine if the members feel that the civil service system as administered by the Civil Service Commission protects their rights and whether the system should be discontinued.²⁸

A negative response to question 18 and a positive response to question 19 will indicate that the members feel that the civil service system does not protect the rights of government employees and should be discontinued. This would mean that the union when acting to protect the members rights is fulfilling a void left by the civil service system. A positive response to question 18 and a negative response to question 19 will indicate that the members feel the need for both the civil service system and the union to either protect government employees rights and/or give government employees a more effective voice in decision making. Table 26 shows the members' responses to question 18 and Table 27 shows the members' responses to question 19.

²⁸Confidential Questionnaire, Appendix I, op. cit.

TABLE 26

DO YOU FEEL THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM PROTECTS
THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses						
	N	Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	175	61	34	85	48	29	16
White-collar	137	63	45	59	43	15	10
Total	312	124	39	144	46	44	14
Chi-Square	4.877	Significant Level		N.S.			

The data show that 46 percent of the members feel that the civil service system does not protect government employees rights. No significant difference exists in the responses of the two groups. Based on the responses to this question it appears that most of the members are either dissatisfied with the civil service system or are not sure about its ability to protect the rights of government employees.²⁹

²⁹Table 53, Appendix II, Chi-Square values.

TABLE 27

DO YOU FEEL THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE
SYSTEM SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses							
	N	Yes		No		Don't Know		
		#	%	#	%	#	%	
Blue-collar	175	19	10	113	64	43	24	
White-collar	136	11	8	101	74	24	17	
Total	311	30	9	214	68	67	21	
Chi-Square	3.801	Significant Level						N.S.

The data show that 68 percent of the members feel that the civil service system should not be discontinued. From the data in both Tables 26 and 27 it appears that the members are not sure about the system's ability to protect their rights but they do not want to see the system discontinued. The data suggests that the members want both the union and the Civil Service Commission to safeguard their rights.

Question 20 will be analyzed to determine if the members joined the union for economic reasons. Table 28 presents the responses to this question.

TABLE 28

DO YOU FEEL THAT MEMBERSHIP IN THE AFGE IS THE
BEST WAY TO GET WAGE AND FRINGE BENEFIT
INCREASES FROM THE GOVERNMENT?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses						
	N	Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	175	146	83	14	8	15	8
White-collar	137	105	76	15	10	17	12
Total	312	251	80	29	9	32	10
Chi-Square	2.362	Significant Level		N.S.			

The responses show that economic reasons, i.e., wages and fringe benefits were factors in 80 percent of the members joining the union. Chamberlin, Bakke, and Rose in their studies found the workers joined the unions for economic reasons. Chamberlin found that 36 percent of the workers had joined the union to get economic "results."³⁰ He concluded that the main reason that the workers joined the union was to get economic benefits. Bakke found that within a social framework the workers need for "more wages, and more regular wages" was a significant reason for their joining the union.³¹ Rose found that 7.7 percent of the workers joined the union to get higher wages but 75.3 percent of the total sample believed that the union's purpose

³⁰Chapter III, op. cit., p. 39. Reasons: number 2.

³¹Ibid., p. 41

was to "get specific economic benefits."³² It should be noted that neither Seidman et al. or Walker and Guest in their studies found that workers joined the union for economic reasons.

The findings of this study were compared with the findings of the studies conducted in the private sector. The results of the comparisons show that economic factors had a higher appeal for the sampled members joining the union than for the sampled workers in the private sector joining unions. This is true for the blue-collar and the white-collar members since there is no significant difference in their responses.

The responses to Question 21 will be analyzed to determine if the members expect the AFGE to secure the right to collectively bargain with management for wage and fringe benefit increases. Lobbying and not collective bargaining is the only real way that the AFGE can get wage and fringe benefit increases for blue-collar and especially white-collar government employees. A positive response to Question 21 will add significance to the economic reason for joining the union. Table 29 presents the responses to Question 21.

³²Ibid., Reasons: number 4, p. 46, and Opinions: number 1, p. 46.

TABLE 29

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE AFGE ACTING FOR YOU
SHOULD BARGAIN WITH MANAGEMENT TO GET
WAGE AND FRINGE BENEFIT INCREASES?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses						
	N	Yes		No		Don't Know	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	175	157	89	11	6	7	4
White-collar	137	110	80	11	8	16	11
Total	312	267	85	22	7	23	7
Chi-Square	7.059		Significant Level		.05		

The data show that 85 percent of the members believe that the AFGE should collectively bargain with management over wages and fringe benefits. Although a significant difference exists in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members 89 and 80 percent respectively believe that the union should have the right to collectively bargain over wages and fringe benefits. These findings add significance to the economic reason for joining the union.

The right to strike as a social and economic weapon in labor-management relations has been legally accorded unions in the private sector since 1935. Without the right to strike, unions in the public sector are limited in their ability to effectively negotiate with management. By law government unions are expressly denied the right

to strike. In lieu of the right to strike the AFGE has used political pressure to meet its objectives. The limitation of political pressure is that it does not bring about results as quickly as striking.

Question 22 was included in the questionnaire to find out if the members believe that the AFGE should have the right to strike the government. The members' responses to this question are shown in Table 30.

TABLE 30

DO YOU FEEL THAT, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO ON STRIKE THE SAME AS WORKERS OUTSIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE ALLOWED TO STRIKE THEIR EMPLOYERS?

Group	AFGE Members' Responses							
	N	Yes		No		Don't Know		
		#	%	#	%	#	%	
Blue-collar	175	62	35	94	53	19	10	
White-collar	137	35	25	87	63	15	10	
Total	312	97	31	181	58	34	10	
Chi-Square	3.718	Significant Level					N.S.	

Fifty-eight percent of the members do not believe that they should have the right to strike the government. The fact that this response is not higher is significant because 80 percent of the sampled members have worked at Tinker for over 5 years, and all signed the loyalty oath

when they were first employed by the government.³³ There is no significant difference in the responses of the two groups. However, the data show that the white-collar members are less inclined to want the right to strike. This appears to substantiate the belief of the United Steelworkers that white-collar workers have strong feelings against the use of strikes.³⁴

Question 23 was included in the questionnaire to see if the members would be willing to participate in a strike in spite of the severe penalties for striking. The members responses to this question are shown in Table 31.

TABLE 31

IF THE AFGE CALLED A STRIKE, BECAUSE OF A PROBLEM WITH MANAGEMENT, WOULD YOU GO OUT ON STRIKE?

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses						
		Yes		No		Don't Know		
		#	%	#	%	#	%	
Blue-collar	175	46	26	80	45	49	28	
White-collar	137	25	18	72	52	40	29	
Total	312	71	22	152	48	89	28	
Chi-Square	3.282	Significant Level				N.S.		

The data show that a lower percentage of the

³³Chapter IV, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

³⁴Chapter III, op. cit., p. 57.

blue-collar and white-collar members who indicated that they should have the right to strike are willing to participate in a strike. This result was not unexpected considering the severity of the penalties for striking. There is no significant difference in the responses of the blue-collar and the white-collar members.

As a check against a possible deficiency in the questionnaire as a tool for measuring why the members joined the union, Question 24 was included in the questionnaire. The responses to Question 24 are shown in Table 32.

TABLE 32

THE MAIN REASON THAT I JOINED THE AFGE WAS:

AFGE Members' Reason Given:

1. Protection of individual rights from being violated by management. This desire for protection exists because of 1) a past or present problem or 2) a possible future problem.
2. Protection against the unfair promotion system at Tinker. The system's rules are violated either by politics or by management's overlooking the regulations.
3. Representation (strength in numbers) either at the local or national level to improve working conditions or to get better treatment. It is inferred that improvements in working conditions and better treatment may include wages and fringe benefits. This is because of the AFGE's use of pressure politics by lobbying in Congress for wage and fringe benefit increases.
4. Representation either at the local or national level to get wage and fringe benefit increases. In this case wages and fringe benefits were specifically mentioned by the respondent.

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses*							
		1		2		3		4	
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Blue-collar	125	56	45	4	3	37	29	28	22
White-collar	112	51	45	14	13	34	29	13	11
Total	237	107	45	18	7	71	29	41	17
Chi-Square	12.553	Significant Level		.01					

*Reasons number 1 and 2 are psychological. Reason number 3 is either psychological, economic, or a combination of psychological and economic. Reason number 4 is economic. Not one of the 237 members who answered this question indicated that he joined the AFGE for social reasons.

The data show that 52 percent of the 237 respondents to this question joined the union because of their belief that management is unfair in dealing with Tinker's employees. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents joined the union to get improvements in working conditions and/or better treatment. This can be inferred to mean that the 29 percent believe that working conditions at Tinker could be improved. Better treatment can also be inferred to mean higher wages and fringe benefits. Seventeen percent of the respondents joined the union specifically to get wage and fringe benefit increases.

The null hypothesis is rejected because a significant difference in the members' responses exists. The data show that a larger percentage of the white-collar members joined the union for economic reasons. The responses to this question are inconsistent with the findings for questions 14, 15, 20 and 21 where the sampled blue-collar members indicated in larger percentages than the white-collar members psychological and economic reasons for joining the union. The inconsistency in the data can be explained in a number of ways. Twenty-nine percent of the responses were classified in reason number 3. The members meaning of improved working conditions and better treatment could be either psychological, economic, or both. The nature of the question itself, i.e., "The main reason that I joined the AFGE was: " placed the

members in a position where they had to make a choice. Lastly, the fact that 29 percent of the blue-collar members who participated in the study did not answer this question. This could have easily changed the response percentage to be consistent with earlier findings.

Question 25 was included in the questionnaire to give the members an opportunity to express their opinions. Their opinions could provide additional information for the study that was not specifically covered in the questionnaire. No conclusions can be made from the members' responses to Question 25 because of the following conditions. The Chi-Square value for the responses to Question 25 show that the data are not statistically significant. Questions 4 and 6 were the only other questions in the questionnaire whose responses were not statistically significant.

The data became representative only when it was compared with the social and economic characteristics of all Tinker employees. The data in question 25 cannot be compared to any other data to determine its validity. Lastly, only 43 percent of the members who participated in the study answered this question. Table 33 shows the responses of the members who answered this question.

TABLE 33

IS THERE ANYTHING YOU MIGHT TELL ME
THAT MIGHT BE HELPFUL?

AFGE Members' Reasons Given:

Comments about the Union

1. The union does not represent the members; it does not do enough for them. The union is mismanaged; too much internal fighting.
2. The union's stewards are unqualified; they do not stand up for the worker.
3. The union either at the local or national level has helped government employees by protecting workers rights and improving working conditions.

Comments about Management

4. Tinker management is unfair in dealing with Tinker employees. They discriminate against the workers.
5. Tinker's personnel system is unfair to the workers in the following respects: a. promotion system, b. job classification, or c. performance appraisals.

Additional Comments

6. The Civil Service Commission does not protect the workers' rights.
 7. Emphatically against strikes in the government.
-

Group	N	AFGE Members' Responses						
		1 #	2 #	3 #	4 #	5 #	6 #	7 #
Blue-collar	66	16	4	13	12	13	5	3
White-collar	70	13	2	19	21	9	3	3
Total	136	29	6	32	33	22	8	6
Chi-Square	8.044	Significant Level N.S.						

The data show that 64 percent of the sampled members who answered this question believe that either management is unfair in dealing with the workers or that the union protects their rights. There is no significance in the data even though the responses correspond with those responses discussed earlier in this chapter.

The following chapter will summarize the study and propose conclusions to be drawn from the findings.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study was developed around 312 responses from the 736 Local 916 members who were mailed a Confidential Questionnaire. The findings of the survey were used to determine if the reasons for their joining the union differed from the reasons why workers in the private sector join unions. The findings were also used to see if the reasons for joining the union expressed by the blue-collar members differed significantly from the reasons expressed by the white-collar members.

Chapter II shows that only a limited amount of research has been conducted in the field of government labor-management relations. The majority of the publications examined in this chapter have been published since Executive Order 10988, the event that signalled the incredibly rapid expansion of unionism in the government.

Chapter III reviews the reasons why workers in the private sector join unions. The reasons why white-collar workers have historically been less inclined to join unions were also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter IV developed the basic framework for the study centering around the author's belief that government

labor-management relations are unique when compared to labor-management relations in the private sector. This uniqueness was studied from a number of bases. It was this belief in the uniqueness of government labor-management relations that sparked initial interest in the study.

Chapter V provided insight into the AFGE, Local 916, and the environment of labor-management relations at Tinker Air Force Base. The AFGE was selected for this study because it is the largest union in the government. Local 916 was chosen for the study because it is the largest local in the AFGE. Union officials and management at Tinker are of the opinion that the environment of labor-management relations at Tinker sets the tone for labor-management relations in the Air Force. This study has not investigated this condition.

Chapter VI presents the findings of the survey. The survey findings centered around the responses of 312 of the 736 Local 916 members who were mailed a copy of the Confidential Questionnaire. The responses were analyzed and tested for statistical significance and used to determine why the sampled members joined the union. The reasons why the members joined the union were compared with those reasons discussed in Chapter III to test Hypothesis 1: the reasons why the sampled members joined the union are different than the reasons why workers in the private sector join unions. The responses were further analyzed

to test Hypothesis 2: that the sampled blue-collar and white-collar members joined the union for the same reasons.

The Confidential Questionnaire was developed with the assistance of a number of professionals with extensive academic and field experience. The questionnaire was pre-tested to determine its validity. The results of the pre-test indicated that the questionnaire is a valid instrument for determining why the sampled members joined the union. Even though the sample was structured using a systematic random sampling technique and demographic information as well as AFGE and Local 916 officials' opinions suggest that there is no difference between the respondents and the non-respondents, implications for the entire Local or other groups of government employees must be made with caution.

The findings of this study show that the 33 percent of all Tinker employees are members of the AFGE. The appeals of union membership are strongest with Tinker employees over 50 years old, the age group where the union has the highest proportional membership when compared to the percentage of all Tinker employees in the same age group.

Enough evidence exists to suggest that previous union membership had some influence on 36 percent of the members joining the union. The possibility of a member's joining the union because he may have been influenced by either of his parents' experiences with unions was present in only 16 percent of the responses. The 16 percent

response is very small when compared to the members' responses to other questions in the survey and the findings of the studies conducted in the private sector. For these reasons this factor is discounted as a reason for the members joining the union.

The researchers who conducted studies in the private sector found that workers join unions for multiple reasons. However, Chamberlin, Rose, and Walker and Guest in each of their respective studies were able to conclude that a single reason was responsible for a majority of the workers joining the union. Chamberlin concluded that economic "results" was the main reason for the workers joining the union. Rose concluded that a workers joining the union was a function of social pressure but the workers' perception of the union's function was the satisfaction of economic needs. Walker and Guest concluded that the workers joined the union for psychological reasons. Bakke and Seidman, et al., in their studies, were unable to conclude that a majority of the workers expressed a dominant reason for joining the union. Bakke concluded that interrelated social, economic, and psychological reasons in that order were responsible for the workers joining the union. The strongest reasons centered around the need for economic gains. Seidman, et al., concluded that the workers joined the union for social and psychological reasons. They did not join the union

for economic reasons.

The findings of this study show that nearly all of the sampled members joined the union for psychological and economic reasons. A maximum of 15 percent of the members joined the union because of some form of social pressure. The 15 percent response is very small when compared to the members' responses to the psychological and economic related questions and the findings of the studies conducted in the private sector. For these reasons the presence of some form of social pressure as a causal factor for the members joining the union is discounted.

Eighty-three percent of the members believe in the purposes of unions and that membership in the union can personally benefit them. The responses to question 24 were used to infer that the members see the purposes of the union and the benefits from membership as psychological, i.e., protecting their rights, and economic, i.e., wage and fringe benefit increases. This conclusion was further validated by the members' responses to the questions that related to psychological and economic reasons for joining the union.

Seventy-three percent of the members believe that management does not treat them fairly. Seventy-seven percent of the members believe that management does not give them a chance to participate in decision making. Although significant differences exist in the responses of the

blue-collar and the white-collar members to both questions, a clear majority of each group feel the same way towards management.¹

Eighty percent of the members believe that membership in the union is the best way to get wage and fringe benefit increases. No significant difference exists in the responses of the two groups. Eighty-five percent of the members believe that the union should have the right to collectively bargain with management over wages and fringe benefits. A significant difference does exist in the responses of the two groups. However, in each group a clear majority believe in the unions having the right to negotiate over wages and fringe benefits.²

For both groups of members a higher percentage response occurred in the economic related questions (20, 21) than in the psychological related questions (14, 15). A comparison between the groups and the questions shows that the percentage differences are not large enough to conclude that one reason was more significant than the other. This study concludes that both the economic and the psychological reasons were the major reasons for the sampled members joining the union.

Based on the findings of this study Hypotheses 1

¹Chi-Square values in Tables 49 and 50 in Appendix II show that the responses of each group are significant.

²Chi-Square values in Tables 55 and 56 in Appendix II show that the responses of each group are significant.

and 2 are accepted. Hypothesis 1 is accepted because the findings of this study when compared with each of the findings of the studies conducted in private sector indicate that the sampled workers did not join the union for the same reasons that workers in the private sector join unions. The almost total absence of social pressure as a reason for joining the union and the close relationship between the psychological and the economic reasons were not present in any of the findings of the studies conducted in the private sector. Hypothesis 2 is accepted because the reasons for the blue-collar and white-collar members joining the union are the same. Although a significant difference in the two groups' responses occurred in questions 14, 15, and 21, examination of the data shows that for each question a high majority of each group answered "yes."

The findings of this study show that 62 percent of the members believe that since the union has exclusively represented Tinker employees that they have been treated more fairly. Only 48 percent of the members believe that since they joined the union that their personal relations with management have improved. Significant differences in the responses of the two groups exist in both questions. The significant differences show that a lower percentage of the white-collar members believe that membership in the union has helped to improve their personal

relations with management. The reason for their feelings may be because initially their working conditions were better than the working conditions of the blue-collar members.

Forty-six percent of the members feel that the civil service system does not protect their rights. Although the 46 percent are not a majority of the members this response is significant because the Civil Service Commission's operational philosophy has centered around the protection of workers rights and sound principles of personnel management. Considering that another 14 percent of the members "don't know" if the system protects their rights it can be concluded that a majority of the members have some doubts about the Commission's ability to meet one of its basic objectives.

The members' dissatisfaction with the civil service system is not deep enough for them to feel that the system should be discontinued. Nine percent of the members believed that the system should be discontinued while 21 percent indicated that they "don't know."

Fifty-eight percent of the members do not believe that they should have the right to strike. In effect only a slight majority of the members believe that strikes should not be allowed in the government. Considering the government's position on strikes, this response is significant because it is not higher.

To examine the strength of the members belief in having the right to strike, they were asked if they would participate in a strike. Only 48 percent of the members indicated that they would not. Twenty-eight percent (which was the highest "don't know" response to any question in the survey) of the members did not know if they would participate. This indicates that the members who did not know if they would participate in a strike would have to examine the conditions that led to the strike before making a decision. The fact that a smaller percentage of the members indicated that they would not strike than those who did not even want the right to strike is somewhat inconsistent with logical expectations. The only explanation that is offered is that some of the members feel a deep sense of loyalty to the union. Even though they do not want the right to strike, some of the members are willing to consider participating in a strike.

These results are very significant considering that government employees who participate in a strike are subject to very severe penalties under Public Law 330.

The responses to the opinion question were grouped into 7 categories. The responses were not significantly different than the expected distribution of responses and are therefore not statistically significant. The majority of the responses paralleled the responses to other related questions in the survey. This added some validity to the

conclusions that were drawn from the findings.

Concluding Remarks

The findings of the survey indicate that a majority of the respondents are dissatisfied with management's paternalistic attitude toward them. Obviously the Air Force's opinion of itself as a good employer is not shared by the respondents.

As discussed in Chapter V, the union is constantly trying to revise and amend the Air Force's personnel policies and practices. Although they have had a moderate degree of success in bringing about changes, they have not been as successful in seeing that the changes have become part of management's standing operating procedure. While a majority of the members believe that working conditions at Tinker have improved in recent years there is enough evidence to suggest that more could be accomplished.

Management's attitudes toward the union are manifested in the present negotiated contract which is largely a repetition of Executive Order 11491. If management continues to maintain this paternalistic attitude towards the members they can expect the union to negotiate for more changes. Union officials indicated that they intend to negotiate for a more equitable contract in the next bargaining session. Management indicated that they do not intend to relinquish any of their authority to the union. If this trend continues, labor and management may

eventually reach a serious impasse.

The union is a voluntary organization and as with all voluntary organizations membership and participation is a function of the organization's ability to satisfy individual needs. Since the union has been losing members over the past few years it is quite possible that the present policies governing their relations with management are not accomplishing the results expected by the workers.

In order to survive and grow the union must attract more members. Although the needs of nonunion Tinker employees are not known, the adoption of more militant policies and the winning of a confrontation with management may give the union the opportunity to add new members. There is some evidence to support this conclusion. Air Force management was opposed to the Monroney Amendment which expanded the blue-collar workers' wage survey area to include similar skills. This eventually meant substantial retroactive pay raises for Tinker's blue-collar employees. Because of the union's influence the Amendment passed through Congress despite the Air Force's strong opposition. The immediate result was that the union's membership increased in substantial numbers.

The government's adherence to the policy of establishing wages and fringe benefits for its employees appears to be headed for problems. A significant majority of the members indicated that membership in the union is the best

way to get wage and fringe benefit increases. They also feel that the union should have the right to negotiate directly with management over wages and fringe benefits. It appears that the members feel that the present methods of lobbying in Congress are not as effective as direct negotiations with management. Union officials indicated that within the next few years they expect to have the right to collectively bargain with management over wages and fringe benefits. There is little doubt that the union's securing of this right will increase its membership.

Union officials stressed the need for the right to negotiate with management for union security agreements beyond the present negotiable checkoff system. They feel that many workers do not join the union because the union already represents them by having exclusive recognition. The workers rightfully feel that there is little to be gained by paying union dues. The union officials believe that they will have the right to negotiate union security within the next few years based on comparable developments at the state and local levels of government. When this occurs, social pressure will become a more prevalent reason for workers joining the union.

The findings of this study have implications for the Civil Service Commission. The Commission is trapped in a box. On one side the members are dissatisfied with the civil service system's ability to protect their rights.

On another side the union sees the Commission as an extension of management. On a third side some authorities believe that the Commission has failed to properly discharge its responsibilities to either labor or management.³ On a fourth side the Department of Labor to an increasing extent is assuming the major role in labor-management relations. From the findings of this study it is concluded that as the scope of collective bargaining expands, the need for more decentralized authority will cause the Commission to continue its policy of forcing decision making, at the lowest level possible.

For nearly 200 years the government has asserted its sovereignty over its employees. The findings of this study and the events of the past few years indicate that government employees are redefining this doctrine. The recent successes of the postal unions resulting from the successful mail strike have certainly affected all of the other government unions. The AFGE has been a conservative union. However, the deletion of the no-strike clause from the constitution and the findings of this study suggest that the conservatism of the union may be lessening. If the government continues to assert its sovereignty there is a real possibility that the AFGE on a local level may

³Daniel H. Kruger and Charles J. Schmidt, Jr. (eds.), Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 139-161; Wilson R. Hart, "The Impasse in Labor Relations in the Federal Civil Service."

test the applicability of this doctrine.

The implications for government management, the Civil Service Commission, and the AFGE National are extensions of this study. Without the benefit of more research these implications can only be accepted as generalizations.

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- Mr. Kermit Tull, AFGE National Vice-President, 9th District, Telephone Conversation, July 16, 1971.

APPENDIX I

CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Please check the one best answer.

1. Were you born in Oklahoma?
A. Yes B. No

2. While you were between 7 and 18 years old:
 - A. Did you attend school in Oklahoma?
 Yes No

 - B. Did either of your parents belong to a labor union?
 Yes No Don't Know

 - C. If yes, did they feel that the union was helpful to them?
 Yes No Don't Know

3. Before you came to work at Tinker, did you ever belong to a union?
A. Yes B. No

4. How long have you worked at Tinker?
 - A. less than 5 years C. 11 to 15 years
 - B. 5 to 10 years D. over 16 years

5. Is your job classified as:
 Wage Board General Schedule

6. How old are you?
 - A. less than 30 years C. 41 to 50 years
 - B. 30 to 40 years D. over 50 years

7. How long have you been a member of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE)?
- A. less than 2 years C. 6 to 10 years
B. 2 to 5 years D. over 10 years
8. How many of the scheduled meetings of the AFGE do you attend each year?
- A. less than 3 C. 8 to 12
B. 4 to 7
9. Did you join the AFGE because your friends were members?
- A. Yes B. No C. Don't Know
10. Did you feel that you were pressured by your friends into joining the AFGE?
- A. Yes B. No C. Don't Know
11. Did you feel that you were pressured by people other than your friends into joining the AFGE?
- A. Yes B. No C. Don't Know
12. Did you join the AFGE because you believe that it can help you personally?
- A. Yes B. No C. Don't Know
13. Did you join the AFGE because you believe in the purposes of labor unions?
- A. Yes B. No C. Don't Know
14. Before joining the AFGE, did you feel that management had been unfair in dealing with workers?
- A. Yes B. No C. Don't Know
15. Before joining the AFGE, did you feel that management would not pay attention to what workers had to say?
- A. Yes B. No C. Don't Know
16. Since the AFGE has been the exclusive bargaining agent for Tinker employees, has management treated the employees more fairly?
- A. Yes B. No C. Don't Know

17. Since you joined the AFGE, do you feel that management pays more attention to what you have to say?
- A. () Yes B. () No C. () Don't Know
18. Do you feel that the Civil Service System protects the rights of individual government employees?
- A. () Yes B. () No C. () Don't Know
19. Do you feel that the Civil Service System should be discontinued?
- A. () Yes B. () No C. () Don't Know
20. Do you feel that membership in the AFGE is the best way to get wage and fringe benefit increases from the government?
- A. () Yes B. () No C. () Don't Know
21. Do you believe that the AFGE acting for you should bargain with management to get wage and fringe benefit increases?
- A. () Yes B. () No C. () Don't Know
22. Do you feel that, when all else fails, government employees should be allowed to go on strike the same as workers outside of the government are allowed to strike their employers?
- A. () Yes B. () No C. () Don't Know
23. If the AFGE called a strike, because of a problem with management, would you go out on strike?
- A. () Yes B. () No C. () Don't Know
24. The main reason that I joined the AFGE was:
-
-

25. Is there anything else that you might tell me that might be helpful?
-
-

Dear M

As a student studying about labor unions under Dr. Donald A. Woolf at the University of Oklahoma, I am writing a paper on federal government union members' attitudes and opinions. You can help me learn more about your problems.



Bureau for Business
and Economic Research
(405) 325-2931

The enclosed questionnaire will only take a minute to answer and requires only that you check the best answer. Your answers will be strictly confidential and will in no way be related to you individually. Please do not sign your name to the questionnaire.

Since I need to complete this work by early June, your completing and returning the questionnaire to me at the University in the addressed postage paid envelope will be greatly appreciated.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

Louis V. Imundo, Jr.

Enclosure

Dear M


This letter is a follow-up to the introductory letter and confidential questionnaire that I recently sent to your home.

Since the questionnaires are uncoded I have no way of knowing whether or not you answered it. If you did, then I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation. If you did not answer the first questionnaire would you please take a moment to complete this questionnaire? We have sent a second questionnaire because the results of the first mailing were a little short of the percent that we feel is necessary to know the feelings of the majority.

As you know from the recent articles in the Take-Off, this study has the backing of the AFGE's officers. They are very interested in your opinion. Your feelings when put together with the feelings of many other AFGE members will help the AFGE in determining future policies.

Would you please take a minute to complete this questionnaire and return it to me at the University.

Sincerely,



Louis V. Imundo



Bureau for Business
and Economic Research
(405) 325-2931

APPENDIX II

TABLE 34
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 1.

Were you born in Oklahoma?

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>		<u>Number Expected</u>	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Blue-Collar	122	53	87	87
White-Collar	81	56	68	68
TOTAL	203	109	156	156

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.302	0.460	13.605	1	.001 *
White-Collar	1.408	0.493	2.284	1	N.S.
TOTAL	1.349	0.477	14.160	1	.001 *

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 35
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 2A.

While you were between 7 and 18 years old:
 Did you attend school in Oklahoma?

Group	Number Observed		Number Expected	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Blue-Collar	142	33	87	87
White-Collar	99	38	68	68
TOTAL	241	71	156	156

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.188	0.392	33.948	1	.001*
White-Collar	1.277	0.449	13.583	1	.001*
TOTAL	1.227	0.419	46.314	1	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 36
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 2B.

While you were between 7 and 18 years old:
 Did either of your parents belong to a labor union?

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	31	124	20	58	58	58
White-Collar	21	106	10	45	45	45
TOTAL	52	230	30	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.937	0.537	37.308	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.919	0.470	40.306	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.929	0.508	77.102	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 37
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 2C.

If yes, did they feel that the union was helpful to them?

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	26	1	4	10	10	10
White-Collar	16	0	5	7	7	7
TOTAL	42	1	9	17	17	17

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.290	0.692	12.032	4	.015
White-Collar	1.476	0.872	6.380	4	N.S.
TOTAL	1.365	0.767	18.173	4	.001

TABLE 38
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 3.

Before you came to work at Tinker,
 did you ever belong to a union?

Group	Number Observed		Number Expected	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
White-Collar	70	105	87	87
Blue-Collar	45	92	68	68
TOTAL	115	197	156	156

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.600	0.491	3.502	1	N.S.
White-Collar	1.671	0.471	8.065	1	.005
TOTAL	1.631	0.483	10.775	1	.001

TABLE 39
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 4.

How long have you worked at Tinker?

Group	Number Observed In Years				Number Expected In Years			
	Less Than 5	5-10	11-15	Over 16	Less Than 5	5-10	11-15	Over 16
Blue-Collar	43	50	20	62	43	43	43	43
White-Collar	14	33	26	64	34	34	34	34
TOTAL	57	83	46	126	78	78	78	78

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	2.577	1.205	5.365	9	N.S.
White-Collar	3.021	1.060	9.963	9	N.S.
TOTAL	2.772	1.163	12.160	9	N.S.

TABLE 40
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 5.

Is your job classified as:

Number Observed		Number Expected	
<u>Wage Board</u> (Blue-Collar)	<u>General Schedule</u> (White-Collar)	<u>Wage Board</u> (Blue-Collar)	<u>General Schedule</u> (White-Collar)
175	137	218	94

Group	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
TOTAL	312	1.439	0.497	28.304	1	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 41
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 6.

How old are you?

Group	Number Observed In Years				Number Expected In Years			
	Less Than 30	30-40	41-50	Over 50	Less Than 30	30-40	41-50	Over 50
Blue-Collar	28	32	56	59	43	43	43	43
White-Collar	10	22	52	53	34	34	34	34
TOTAL	38	54	108	112	78	78	78	78

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	2.834	1.067	4.405	9	N.S.
White-Collar	3.080	0.916	10.255	9	N.S.
TOTAL	2.942	1.009	13.564	9	N.S.

TABLE 42
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 7.

How long have you been a member of the
 American Federation of Government Employees?

Group	Number Observed In Years				Number Expected In Years			
	Less Than 2	2-5	6-10	Over 10	Less Than 2	2-5	6-10	Over 10
Blue-Collar	46	89	33	6	43	43	43	43
White-Collar	20	82	30	5	34	34	34	34
TOTAL	66	171	63	11	77	77	77	77

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.994	0.771	20.655	9	.015
White-Collar	2.145	0.702	24.503	9	.005
TOTAL	2.061	0.744	43.437	9	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 43
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 8.

How many of the scheduled meetings of the AFGE
do you attend each year?

Group	Number Observed			Number Expected		
	Less Than 3	4-7	8-12	Less Than 3	4-7	8-12
Blue-Collar	122	41	12	58	58	58
White-Collar	116	15	6	45	45	45
TOTAL	238	56	18	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.371	0.610	37.148	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.197	0.497	54.467	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.294	0.569	88.641	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 44
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 9.

Did you join the AFGE because
your friends were members?

Group	Number Observed			Number Expected		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	19	154	2	58	58	58
White-Collar	14	123	0	45	45	45
TOTAL	33	277	2	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.902	0.333	79.274	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.897	0.304	43.364	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.900	0.320	145.429	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 45
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 10.

**Did you feel that you were pressured by
your friends into joining the AFGE?**

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	1	172	2	58	58	58
White-Collar	2	135	0	45	45	45
TOTAL	3	307	2	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	2.005	0.131	110.748	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.985	0.120	64.562	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.996	0.126	198.121	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 46
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 11.

**Did you feel that you were pressured by people
other than your friends into joining the AFGE?**

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	15	158	2	58	58	58
White-Collar	4	131	2	45	45	45
TOTAL	19	289	4	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.925	0.303	85.628	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.985	0.209	79.751	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.951	0.267	164.903	4	.001*

Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 47
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 12.

Did you join the AFGE because you believe
that it can help you personally?

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	150	17	8	58	58	58
White-Collar	112	18	7	45	45	45
TOTAL	262	35	15	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.188	0.495	72.257	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.233	0.532	48.627	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.208	0.511	120.660	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 48
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 13.

Did you join the AFGE because you believe
in the purposes of labor unions?

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	152	14	9	58	58	58
White-Collar	110	15	12	45	45	45
TOTAL	262	29	21	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.182	0.503	75.274	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.284	0.617	45.357	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.227	0.558	120.121	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 49
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 14.

**Before joining the AFGE, did you feel that management
had been unfair in dealing with workers?**

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	140	21	14	58	58	58
White-Collar	90	35	12	45	45	45
TOTAL	230	56	26	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.280	0.603	57.308	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.430	0.650	23.459	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.346	0.627	77.769	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 50
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 15.

**Before joining the AFGE, did you feel that management
would not pay attention to what workers had to say?**

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	147	17	11	58	58	58
White-Collar	95	32	10	45	45	45
TOTAL	242	49	21	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.222	0.548	67.491	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.379	0.619	28.423	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.291	0.585	92.814	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 51
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 16.

Since the AFGE has been the exclusive bargaining
agent for Tinker employees, has management
treated the employees more fairly?

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	128	21	26	58	58	58
White-Collar	66	30	41	45	45	45
TOTAL	194	51	67	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.417	0.737	41.674	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.817	0.867	4.978	4	N.S.
TOTAL	1.592	0.820	39.352	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 52
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 17.

Since you joined the AFGE, do you feel that
management pays more attention to
what you have to say?

Group	Number Observed			Number Expected		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	97	52	26	58	58	58
White-Collar	55	52	30	45	45	45
TOTAL	152	104	56	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.594	0.735	14.748	4	.01
White-Collar	1.817	0.769	2.729	4	N.S.
TOTAL	1.692	0.757	14.769	4	.01

TABLE 53
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 18.

**Do you feel that the Civil Service System protects
the rights of individual government employees?**

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	61	85	29	58	58	58
White-Collar	63	59	15	45	45	45
TOTAL	124	144	44	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.811	0.698	8.760	4	N.S.
White-Collar	1.649	0.670	10.364	4	.035
TOTAL	1.740	0.689	17.826	4	.01

TABLE 54
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 19.

**Do you feel that the Civil Service System
should be discontinued?**

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	19	113	43	58	58	58
White-Collar	11	101	24	45	45	45
TOTAL	30	214	67	103	103	103

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	X ²	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	2.142	0.574	28.348	4	.001*
White-Collar	2.095	0.500	34.801	4	.001*
TOTAL	2.122	0.542	62.109	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 55
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 20.

Do you feel that membership in the AFGE is the
 best way to get wage and fringe benefit
 increases from the government?

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	146	14	15	58	58	58
White-Collar	105	15	17	45	45	45
TOTAL	251	29	32	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.251	0.601	65.880	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.357	0.693	38.569	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.298	0.644	103.903	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 56
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 21.

**Do you believe that the AFGE acting on your behalf
should bargain with management to get
wage and fringe benefit increases?**

Group	<u>Number Observed</u>			<u>Number Expected</u>		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	157	11	7	58	58	58
White-Collar	110	11	16	45	45	45
TOTAL	267	22	23	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	X ²	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.137	0.446	85.171	4	.001*
White-Collar	1.313	0.672	45.416	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.214	0.563	129.314	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 57
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 22.

**Do you feel that, when all else fails, government employees
should be allowed to go on strike the same as workers
outside of the government are allowed to strike their employers?**

Group	Number Observed			Number Expected		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	62	94	19	58	58	58
White-Collar	35	87	15	45	45	45
TOTAL	97	181	34	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	1.754	0.636	16.188	4	.005
White-Collar	1.854	0.588	20.175	4	.001*
TOTAL	1.798	0.616	34.865	4	.001*

*Significant beyond the .001 level.

TABLE 58
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 23.

**If the AFGE called a strike, because of a problem
with the management, would you go out on strike?**

Group	Number Observed			Number Expected		
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Yes	No	Don't Know
Blue-Collar	46	80	49	58	58	58
White-Collar	25	72	40	45	45	45
TOTAL	71	152	89	104	104	104

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	2.022	0.734	4.451	4	N.S.
White-Collar	2.109	0.682	8.423	4	N.S.
TOTAL	2.060	0.712	12.121	4	.015

TABLE 59*
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 24.

The main reason that I joined the AFGE was:

AFGE Members' Responses Given:

1. Protection of individual rights from being violated by management. This desire for protection exists because of 1. a past or present problem, or 2. a possible future problem.
2. Protection against the unfair promotion system at Tinker. The systems' rules are violated by politics or by management's overlooking the regulations.
3. Representation (strength in numbers) either at the local or national level to improve working conditions or to get better treatment. It is inferred that improvements in working conditions and better treatment may include wages and fringe benefits. This is because of the AFGE's use of pressure politics by lobbying in Congress for wage and fringe benefit increases.
4. Representation either at the local or national level to get wage and fringe benefit increases. In this case wage and fringe benefits were specifically given.

Group	<u>Number Observed Reason</u>				<u>Number Expected Reason</u>			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Blue-Collar	56	4	37	28	31	31	31	31
White-Collar	51	14	34	13	28	28	28	28
TOTAL	107	18	71	41	59	59	59	59

*Note: 125 of the 175 blue-collar sampled AFGE members responded to this question.
112 of the 137 white collar sampled AFGE members responded to this question.

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	2.296	1.250	11.192	9	N.S.
White-Collar	2.080	1.108	8.803	9	N.S.
TOTAL	2.194	1.187	18.789	9	.025

TABLE 60

**FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AFGE MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO
QUESTION 25.**

**Is there anything else you might tell me
that might be helpful?**

Comments about the Union:

1. The union does not represent the members; it does not do enough for them. The union is mismanaged; too much internal fighting.
2. The union's stewards are unqualified; they do not stand up for the worker.
3. The union either at the local or national level has helped government employees by protecting workers' rights and improving working conditions.

Comments about Management:

4. Management is unfair in their treatment of Tinker employees. They discriminate against the workers.
5. Tinker's personnel system is unfair to the workers in the following respects: (a) promotion system, (b) job classification, and (c) performance appraisals.

Additional Comments:

6. The Civil Service Commission does not protect the workers' rights.
7. Emphatically against strikes in the government.

Group	Number Observed Reason							Number Expected Reason						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Blue-Collar	16	4	13	12	13	5	3	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
White-Collar	13	2	19	21	9	3	3	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
TOTAL	29	6	32	33	22	8	6	19	19	19	19	19	19	19

*Note: 66 of the 175 blue-collar sampled AFGE members responded to this question.
70 of the 137 white-collar sampled AFGE members responded to this question.

TABLE 60 (Continued)

Group	Mean	Std. Dev.	χ^2	df	Sig. Level
Blue-Collar	3.439	1.807	2.530	36	N.S.
White-Collar	3.457	1.575	5.342	36	N.S.
TOTAL	3.448	1.685	6.860	36	N.S.