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A THEORY OF REVOLUTION AND A CASE STUDY OF THE HAITIAN
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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

A THEORY OF REVOLUTION AND A CASE STUDY OF THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

TABIRI HASANI TABASURI

Norman, Oklahoma

1981

A THEORY OF REVOLUTION AND A CASE STUDY OF THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

Koshina, Elimu, and Amani whose support, patience and continued encouragement gained my sincere gratitude and made this dissertation possible.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

The major purposes of this dissertation are as follows:

(1) to develop a general theory about the causal origins of Anti-

Colonial revolution; and (2) to "derive" or develop this theory from

an intensive case study of the Haitian Revolution, perhaps the first

"successful," slave revolution in modern history if not in all of

history.

In the course of accomplishing these tasks, the following

minor purposes or exploratory attempts to answer the following

questions will be accomplished, also. (1) Why is it that a "successful"

slave revolution occurred in Haiti and did not occur among slaves in

other French, colonial possessions in the Caribbean? More specifically,

why is it that a "successful" slave and Anti-Colonial revolution

occurred in Haiti at this time and not in such comparable places as the

Caribbean islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe? (2) Can the theory

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once derived be validly generalized to other cases of Anti-Colonial
revolution in another place and another time? For example, can the
theory be generalized to the case of the Algerian Revolution of the
Twentieth century in North Africa? It, too, was an Anti-Colonial
revolution in the French Colonial Empire but it occurred in North
Africa in the second half of the 20th century, 1954-1978. (3) How will
the theory have to be modified to better fit the cases examined above--
Martinique, Guadaloupe, and Algeria--to serve as a general theory of
all Anti-Colonial revolutions? And finally (4) to what degree can this
revised theory of Anti-Colonial revolution be generalized to fit all
types of revolutions?

The major goal of this paper is theory construction; it is not
the verification or testing of theory in any rigorous, experimental,
statistical sense. One must have a theory before it can be tested.

I emphasize that my basic task is sociological and not
historiographic. I do not take any responsibility for providing new
knowledge about the history, qua history, of the Haitian Revolution.
Fascinating to me personally as the revolution is, my present purpose
is to exploit our present historical knowledge in order to create a
general, sociological theory. To put it another way, my purpose is
not to answer the question, "What really happened in the Haitian
Revolution? but to use the historical revolution in order to derive
an explanatory (theoretical) model for revolution in general. My major
question is not what but why?

The "Temporal" Setting of the Study

Keeping the above purposes in mind, Figure 1 shows the

"temporal" location of the concern of this study within the overall

career of the revolutionary movement. In Figure 1, the diagram of the

overall career of social movements is divided into three stages--

causation, success-failure, and consequences. The three stages

represent the "temporal" sequence of revolutionary social movements,

and are also a pictorial description of a process which occurs over an

extended period of time. But more important, as evident in the

diagram, the concern of this study is the Causation Stage.

FIGURE 1

The Place of the Problem in the Overall Career of the
Revolutionary Social Movement

CAUSATION STAGE	SUCCESS-FAILURE STAGE	CONSEQUENCES STAGE
Past	Present	Future

Concern of
the Study

A serious search of the literature concerning causes of

revolution will reveal that it is indeed rare ". . . to find anyone

who explicitly and systematically offer theories of any two of these

stages let alone all three" (Silberstein and Jordan, 1977:5). An

exception is found in the work of Edwards (1927) and Brinton (1938).

Moreover, the work of these latter two authors seem to mix quite well,
in fact, Hagopian refers to this combination as the Edwards-Brinton
model of the stages of revolution (1975:105).

Having presented the "temporal" setting of the study I will
next discuss the Significance of the Study.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies primarily in its attempt
to accomplish the above stated purposes. To the extent that these
purposes are accomplished a significant contribution, I will argue,
will be made to the sociology of social revolution.

The phenomenon of social revolution in the twentieth century
is becoming a more pressing problem faced by world societies; therefore
it brings pressure to bear on the scientific community in general and
on social scientists in particular to properly address this issue.
One way to address the issue is by developing general explanatory
theories. In doing so, our knowledge about social revolution is
increased, as a result of having created ". . . a theoretical situation
which allows for the economical verification of systems of explanation"
(Jordan, 1971:10).

As implicitly stated above, the twentieth century so far is
almost without doubt the most revolutionary period in all of history.
The very frequency and variety of revolution creates a marvelous
opportunity for students of revolutionary movements--a natural
laboratory of exciting proportions lies before us.

This present period is marked by a giant, decolonization
process--the old, European, colonial system is rapidly collapsing

before our very eyes. The writer believes that in order to take advantage of this opportunity, a most important early step is the development of a general theory of revolution.

I choose to "tap into" the data by first examining the case of the Haitian Revolution. But why is the Haitian Revolution significant to study? I choose the Haitian Revolution for many reasons and some of them are: (1) It is perhaps the first successful slave revolution in history; (2) it is the second successful Anti-Colonial revolution in history; (3) it led to the establishment of the second independent country in the Western Hemisphere; and (4) it has been much studied by historians, and I have chosen to stress historical depth in this research rather than statistical breadth.

But why does this study of revolutionary movements belong in sociology at all? To begin with, the study of revolution is not exclusively sociological. Quite the contrary, a great deal is learned about revolutions from other disciplines--History, Political Science, Social Psychology, etc. Indeed the subject matter of revolution demands a multi-disciplinary approach if it is to be understood.

Although a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of revolution is appropriate, this alone does not answer the question of why Sociology is significant to the study of revolution. In response, we note that a classical and persisting concern of Sociology is to integrate scientific knowledge. That is, Sociology, as a science is concerned with interrelating the data of all other social sciences. For example, the sociologist does not claim to know more about the study of economics than the economist, or more about religion than the

professional student of religion, but he does tend to take as his subject matter the relationship between these subjects. Marx, for example, referred to religion as the "opiate of the masses," whereas Weber referred to a change in religion ideology as leading to a change in economic institutions. Both of these statements are distinctly sociological, and the difference between them is distinctively a sociological difference.

Along this line Sorokin once referred to Sociology as the (n+1) science where n equals all other social sciences and the one equals Sociology. The question of the inter-relationship between them is in part the distinctive subject matter of Sociology. Sociologists do not claim that Sociology is the only such, general social science; there are others such as Anthropology, History, and Psychology, for example.

To put the matter in another and less abstract way, Sociologists specialize in the study of groups and social systems. Obviously conflicts between revolutionaries and governments and related third parties deals directly with groups and social systems.

It will take all of the skills, I believe, of the combined social sciences to be able to explain a complex and long-lasting revolutionary social movement. Certainly, the political scientist with his expertise in government has a preeminent claim to the area, but even he with his recognition of the importance of political sociology does not deny Sociology a role here.

For all the above reasons I believe that the subject matter of the dissertation, including its limitations, is significant to

Sociology perhaps as much as it is significant to any other social science discipline. But, what are the limitations of this study?

Limitations of the Study

As we have stated previously, a major purpose of this study is theory construction. Social science theorists who attempt to construct systematic general theory are confronted with a limitation which stems from a basic assumption inherent in system analysis. This assumption assumes that the constructed theoretical system (or model) is a "closed" one. That is, all factors external to the total system are assumed to be constant and do not contribute to the variation of the variables in question. This limitation is both necessary in theory construction and other social scientific analysis.

This study is also limited by the fact that the final theories proposed will not be "tested" or verified in any rigorous statistical or empirical sense.

Also, it is not my concern to provide a comprehensive treatment nor to present a sociological theory of all the major types of social movements at all times and in all countries. The study is limited to the development of an abstract theory which attempts to explain one particular type of social movement, namely, the revolutionary social movement.

Another limitation of the study stems from the view of social movements as an on-going dynamic process which occurs over a period of time. This study is limited by its focus on one stage in the development of a revolutionary social movement, the causation stage, and initially, to one type of revolution, the Anti-Colonial Revolution.

The study is further limited by the reluctance of some social scientists to agree on the empirical applicability of general abstract theory. This being the case, the present study is limited by social scientists' terminological problems. One such problem which continues to plague the social sciences is the controversy that surrounds the operationalization of abstract theoretical concepts. More specifically, among social scientists, it is difficult to get agreement on the empirical applicability of theoretical concepts to specific events or things. Furthermore, it is also the case that, the theories presented in this study offer very little in the way of solutions to problems of this type.

Finally, the study is limited by the author's degree of sophistication in theory construction and his knowledge of the subject. This final limitation is viewed as temporary since the author's intention is to utilize this study as a basis for pursuing the problem in greater detail, depth and scope.

After presenting the major limitations of the study, I now turn to a general summary of how the remaining portion of the dissertation is to be divided. This task is accomplished in the next section labelled Divisions of the Study.

Divisions of the Study

The first task at hand after introducing the study is to present a specific explication of the Object of Study. Chapter II is devoted to this end. The definition (external boundaries) and typology (internal divisions) of social movements and revolutions are presented. Also, I present problems and solutions to questions

about how social movements differ from similar but basically different collectivities. For example, if a revolution involves organized violence, how does it differ from the violence of organized crime? How does a criminal differ from a revolutionary? Finally, an attempt will be made to provide answers for such analytical questions as: When does a revolution begin and end?

Chapter III is a presentation of the basic methodology used in the study. In utilizing theory construction methodology, I first present my general view of theory (e.g., definition, tasks, and basic elements). Second three basic modes of theory construction are compared with a final emphasis on the particular mode used to construct my theory in this dissertation.

Chapter IV presents a definition and elaboration of the Colonial situation, and a review of the relevant literature concerning social revolution. In this chapter a classification and presentation of theories of social revolution are made. Also, a critique is made of social revolutionary theories by utilizing some general criteria.

Chapter V employs a descriptive scheme which is used to present a detailed case study of the Haitian Revolution. The descriptive scheme is also used to present a somewhat less detailed case study of Martinique and Guadaloupe respectively.

Chapter VI is a presentation of the theoretical design and model. In this chapter the problem under study is formalized. Also, the conceptual scheme and theoretical propositions are presented. Finally, I set forth my formal theory of Anti-Colonial revolution.

Chapter VII is an application of the previous constructed

theory to a more modern Anti-Colonial revolution, namely the Algerian

Revolution (1954-1978). Also after applying the formal theory to the

Algerian Revolution, the theory is considered for revision.

In Chapter VIII the formal theory is raised to a higher level

of abstraction through respecifying, deleting and adding variables.

Utilizing the above procedure the formal theory is generalized to

attempt to account for all types of revolutions. Next, the final

theory in its most general form which accounts for all types of

revolutions is presented.

The final chapter presents a summary with conclusions, and

concluding remarks.

CHAPTER II

THE OBJECT OF STUDY

The major goal of this chapter is to present and establish
the object of study, the thing to be studied, or the dependent variable.
In order to do this the following tasks will be accomplished: (1) to
present the definition and typology of social movements in general;
(2) to present the definition and typology of revolutionary movements
in particular; (3) to answer the question of how to distinguish move-
ments from similar-but-different things which might be confused with
movements; (4) to answer the analytic question concerning when a
revolution begins and ends.

When investigators study social movements they are initially
confronted with the problem of distinguishing between the universe of
movements and non-movements. This problem is resolved by establishing
a formal definition (e.g., establishing the external boundary) of
social movements which enables the author to distinguish between what
movements are and what they are not.

Only after the definition of external boundary of social move-
ments has been established can the question of types and kinds of

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movements or internal divisions be properly explicated. Furthermore, the definition of social movements implies that all movements have certain things in common; however, within these limits there are many different types of movements (internal divisions).

In the first section of this chapter the definition and typology of social movements are presented.

Among the many different types of social movements some are revolutionary while others are not. The author takes the view that all revolutions are social movements but not all social movements are revolutions. Based on the latter view and since the author's major focus in this paper is revolution, it is appropriate to distinguish between a revolutionary social movement and a nonrevolutionary social movement. This distinction is largely accomplished in the second section of this chapter, by presenting a formal definition or external boundary of revolution. Next, the internal divisions or different types of revolutions are presented.

In the first and second section of this chapter I am mainly concerned with the writer's definitions and typologies of movements, and not particularly with a review of the works of others. In the second section, I shall of course take a look at the typologies of others concerning revolutions--I want to avoid being a "New Columbus."

In the third and fourth section my major concern is with distinguishing movements from similar-but-different things or collectivities and attempt to answer the question of when a revolution begins and ends.

Definition and Typology of Social Movements

A serious review of some contemporary social movement litera-
ture reveals, at least in an informal way, a convergence toward a
common definition of social movements (for example, see Turner and
Killian, 1972:246; Aberle, et al., 1966:315; Zurcher and Kirkpatrick,
1976:4; and Gerlach and Hine, 1970:xvi). This convergence is viewed
as necessary if the social movement area of concern is to eventually
become a body of cumulative, systematic knowledge. Ultimately, how-
ever, each student of social movements must take the responsibility
for choosing his/her own definition. My definition of social movements
follows.

A social movement is defined as a semi-organized collectivity
with a more-or-less distinct shared ideology and is characterized by
a concerted and continuous effort through the use of non-legitimate
means, to promote, resist, or reverse social change in the society or
group of which it is a part. This definition is meant to be definitive
not descriptive. In fact, for the moment I am not concerned with the
explanation or the why question, but with the what question, with the
establishing of the object of investigation. Later on in another
chapter I will offer an explanation as to what causes social movements;
however, I emphasize at this point that a thing cannot be explained
until it has first been identified. Moreover, it is the author's view
that the reader, at this stage, should only be concerned with judging
critically whether or not I have in fact established the external
boundaries which distinguish movements from nonmovements. I proceed
by discussing the characteristics in my definition; I will briefly

discuss ten of them, although not necessarily in the same order pre-
sented in my definition. Some of these characteristics are not
explicitly included in the definition, but can be inferred from it.

(1) A semi-organized collectivity. One of the most signifi-
cant but least understood characteristics of social movements is its
social organization. Students of collective behavior have often
attempted inappropriately to classify social movements either as some
type of inchoate mob or as a formal organization. During most of the
life-cycle of a movement, it is neither disorganized nor formally
organized. For the most part it is semi-organized. What meaning
can we attach to a semi-organized collectivity?

One meaning of a semi-organized collectivity is a high turn-
over in membership. Often during the life-cycle of a single movement
organization the membership will turn over almost completely. As a
semi-organized collectivity a movement is a group with indefinite and
shifting membership, with organizational positions determined more by
the informal response of other insiders rather than by formal proce-
dures, as in the case of a bureaucracy. It is not surprising that each
successive meeting of a single movement organization may be composed of
different people. Because of this fact, at least in part, many
observers naively conclude that these types of organizations are not
viable. Such conclusions are not warranted.

Those members who "drop out" of the movement organization
often maintain a functional role. In some instances former members
serve as a kind of "reserve army" maintaining the option to return at
a later date to a more active role in the movement. Also, these former

members may operate as agents for the movement in recruiting new members and in helping to create a less hostile environment, and they often contribute to the movement a variety of different material and non-material resources (e.g., money, skills, etc.). Moreover, the discussion of the functional role which is often played by former members is just another way of showing how movements are semi-organized.

Movements sometimes consist of very different types of "semi-organizations," and it is often the case that the same organization changes in type. Evidence for this state of affairs is provided to us by Gerlach and Hine (1972). More important, however, is that these authors provide us with useful distinctions for analyzing the changing state of movement organization. The following three distinctions or attributes are used to analyze the social organization of movements: segmentation, reticulation, and centralization (decentralization); these attributes refer both to the parts (intra-movement organization) and the whole (inter-organizational structure). Gerlach (1971:283) in a recent article describes these attributes in the following manner.

> Segmentary: a movement is composed of a range of diverse groups, or cells, which grow and die, divide and fuse, proliferate and contract.
> Polycephalous (decentralized): this movement organization does not have a central command or decision-making structure; rather it has many leaders or rivals for leadership, not only within the movement as a whole, but within each movement cell.
> Reticulate: these diverse groups do not constitute simply an amphorous collection: rather, they are organized into a network or reticulate structure through cross-cutting links, "traveling evangelists" or spokesmen, overlapping participation, joint activities, and sharing of objectives and opposition.

Gerlach and Hine define all social movements as segmentary, polycephalous (decentralized), and reticulate and they point to the

positive functions of such an organizational structure. For example,

Gerlach (1971:288):

> Such an organization is adaptive in implementing social
> change and helping the movement to survive. It makes the move-
> ment more difficult to suppress; it affords maximum penetration
> of and recruitment from different socio-economic and sub-cultural
> groups; it maximizes adaptive variation through redundancy,
> duplication, and overlap; and, finally it encourages social
> innovation and problem solving. Such an organization appears to
> generate counter-movement intelligence activity of a segmentary,
> polycephalous nature.

Although it is granted that this type of movement organization

has many positive functions, it still seems unwise to define all move-

ments as having precisely this type of organization, i.e., decentral-

ized, reticulated, and segmented. Unwise, for at least the following

two reasons: (1) some movements do not in fact have this kind of

organization, and (2) it oversimplifies an extremely complex problem

by definition instead of by actual research.

A movement which is highly centralized can also be functional.

For example, a revolutionary movement which has finally decided to give

up guerrilla tactics in favor of full-force combat with a conventional

army needs centralization. Furthermore, Gamson (1979) in his empirical

study of social movements found that the greater the degree of "bureau-

cratiziation" (centralization) of a movement, the greater its likelihood

of success. I believe that Gerlach and Hine's (1970) more "semi-

organized" type of movement organization is probably more useful in the

earlier stages of the movement, while Gamson's more "bureaucratized"

type of movement is more useful in the latter stages.

Using Gerlach and Hine's concepts I can illustrate further the

fluctuations of the movement between the extremes of the mob and the

formal organization. In the case of the Russian Revolution, for example, the rebels were defeated by the Czarist troops in the abortive revolt of 1905, which resulted in their return to their homes which were scattered throughout the country.[1] To put it in Gerlach and Hines' terms, the movement became: extremely segmented, reticulation was reduced, and the decentralization was high.

This condition held not only for the overall movement (the inter-organizational structure), but also for relations within the various movement organizations: the Mensheviks, Jewish Bunds, Bolsheviks, etc. While the movement was apparently no longer capable of action, still it was exceedingly difficult for the Czarist forces to seek out and destroy. The movement was not dead.

In 1917, the rebels emerged from their homes and launched a successful overthrow of the Czar. During this period the movement became more centralized, reticulated, and less segmented. This is not to say that there was not competition and conflict between the various segments and organizations--there usually is and it is often quite violent. It is not unusual that in "Western" type revolutions (Huntington, 1968) more violence is often generated after the takeover between the various revolutionary factions than between the old regime and the revolutionary movement as a whole.

In the final struggle between the factions, the more highly centralized Bolsheviks under Lenin won out. The Bolsheviks practiced "democratic centralism," a practice which permits free discussion

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[1]This example of the Russian Revolution was taken from a very interesting and provocative work by Tobias and Woodhouse (1977).

before the decision, but absolutely no dissent afterwards. So to sum up, while I do not agree with Gerlach and Hine's definition of movements as always being decentralized, reticulated, and segmented, still I do indeed find their distinctions useful in describing changes in the movement organization, intra- and inter-organizational, over time. More work remains to be done in this area.

Finally, part of the meaning of a "semi-organized collectivity" is that it is dynamic, or rapidly changing. When competing for the fruits of victory after the enemy has been vanquished, the various organizations often conflict. On the other hand, if the various organizations are exposed to the same threat or the same common fate, and if they believe that their own individual survival depends upon their cooperation with each other, then the conflict and competition will be replaced by "brotherly love" and coordinated collective effort.

(2) A concerted and continuous effort by members of a collectivity. This characteristic helps to distinguish a movement from most other types of spontaneous "collective behavior" and ephemeral grouping, e.g., mobs, panics, and crowds. The definite characteristic of mobs and crowds is their spontaneous, short-lived, discontinuous, and uncoordinated nature. Social movements by contrast have a longer persistence than do mobs, panics, etc.

(3) The characteristic belief system is the ideology. An ideology is an empirical-evaluative type of belief system. It involves at a very minimum the following three features: (a) a vision of an ideal society, or to use a phrase borrowed from the study of religion, a "vision of heaven;" (b) a critique of the society in terms of this

ideal, or a "vision of hell;" and (c) a means or way to get from "hell

to heaven" or a strategy and an organization. This action-related

belief system or ideology, whether simple or complex, is characteristic

of social movements.

(4) The use of non-legitimate means. For my purpose I shall

use the expressions, legitimize or legitimate and institutionalize, as

practically synonymous. Legitimation involves a process whereby members

of a social system come to reward the actions of their leaders as right

and just. Under what conditions will the average member of a social

system do this? The citizen will come to do this under the following

three conditions: cultural values, exchange value (i.e., what resources

the citizen can get in exchange for his conformity), and power. I will

discuss each in turn.

A citizen will legitimate the actions of his leaders if they

are consistent with the values and norms of the social system of which

he and his leaders are a part, often even if the action demanded is

painful. For example, a citizen will permit himself to be drafted into

the military during wartime if he feels that it is necessary and

consistent in terms of national values.

The citizen will tend to legitimate the actions of his leaders

if he feels that they have a high exchange value for him. For example,

the citizen will permit himself to be drafted and risk being killed if

he feels confident that a grateful government and nation will reward

him afterwards, for example, with a free education and a hero's honor.

Finally, the citizen will also tend to legitimate the actions

of his leaders if he feels that they have sufficient power to make him

do whatever they want him to do. But this is not always true. Under certain conditions--elite actions contrary to the cultural values and low exchange value--the citizen may resist his government, even if it has the power to arrest him for treason, and refuse to go to war. In fact, some citizens may turn against the government completely and join a revolution. An example of this is the Greencorn Rebellion which occurred in Oklahoma during the 1910-1917 period (Burbank, 1976:133-153).

People are less likely to violate cultural values if the exchange value of their compliance is high and the threat of strong punishment is low. Conversely, people are more likely to violate their cultural values if the exchange value of their non-compliance is high and the threat of punishment is low. These three factors--culture, power, and exchange--interact in dynamic terms (see Yinger, 1977:833-853).

The concept of legitimation should not be confused with either legality or violence. While it is true that illegal, violent actions are often de-legitimated, it is certainly not always so. Indeed, illegal, violent action may be highly legitimated. There is no necessary relationship between legality, violance, and legitimation. Some examples are in order.

An example of illegal violence which is legjtimated by certain segments of the population is found in successful, mass-based revolutions. In the Cuban revolution Castro used illegal violence with considerable mass support; but the Cuban dictator, Batista, when he did use legal violence against the rebels found himself further delegitimated.

When the Fidelistas attempted to export their revolution to Venezuela, Betancourt, the elected Venezuelan President, employed much more violence against the rebels, some of which was illegal, but he managed to legitimate his actions with the people, won the battle, and retained his presidency. Conversely, the Venezuelan (Fidelistas) rebels, did not legitimate their violence, and lost the war and the insurgency. Incidentally, far more violence was used by Betancourt than by Batista, yet Betancourt emerged as even more legitimate than before. The influence of the legitimacy factor is real (Gude, 1969).

In addition to considering the relationship of legality and violence to legitimacy, it is also worth pointing out that de- legitimation comes in all degrees ranging from the rejection of a particular person in a particular position (e.g., a particular President), to the rejection of the position itself (e.g., a desire for a Parliamentary type of democracy), to a rejection of all other institutions, and, finally, a rejection of the basic cultural values upon which, paradoxically enough, the original de-legitimation rested in the first place.

Illegitimate or non-legitimate means can range from a legal, unconventional, and innovative use of the legitimate channels of protest, to quasi-legal de-routinizations (e.g., a march across town which took a little longer than the police originally allowed), to the extreme, at the other end of the continuum, of military violence. Needless to say, legitimation-delegitimation are not moral concepts.

(5) Intense commitment and strong identification with group or movement goals. Movements, perhaps more than any other type of

human grouping, manage to generate the highest degree of commitment, identification, and potential for "sacrifice" for the "holy cause." Members of revolutionary movements, of course, sacrifice their time, property, friends and lives; e.g., in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1940, which went on for 30 years, over a million people were killed.

Indeed, it is because movements characteristically lack certain kinds of resources and incentives (e.g., utilitarian and material rewards) that they must generate great commitment and identification by the use of purposive incentives (promise of value attainment) if they are to succeed.

This is not to say that all movements generate very high levels of commitment, but that the successful movements on the average generate more intense commitment than almost any other kind of human grouping. Religious sects are similar to but also different from movements.

(6) Anti-authority, resistance behavior which requires perceived (real or imagined) opposition. A movement does not exist unless it has a perceived opposition; one way to deter the coming into existence of a movement is to deny it recognition. Gamson defines all movements as challenge groups, per se. The type of opposition faced has a lot to do with the type of movement which comes into existence. Indeed, a movement implies a relationship; e.g., there are no movements without opposition, just as there are no mothers without children, and children without mothers.

(7) High level of face-to-face proseltyzing and general recruitment. Movements characteristically engage in face-to-face

attempts to persuade others to join the movement and to convert to the movement's ideology. The recruiters are often neophytes (new members) themselves because it is felt that persuading others helps the neophyte to persuade himself further.

The Black Muslims (Lincoln, 1961) call their recruiters "fishermen for the dead." There is a big argument in the literature (Jenkins and Parrow, 1977:249-267) over who is most "susceptible" for recruitment: the unknown isolate and alienated strangers or those previously known to the recruiter--friends, kinsmen, or workmates--who have many ties and bonds to other groups and organizations. Indeed, some argue (Oberschall, 1973; Pinard, 1968) that perhaps the crucial element for successful movements is their ability to mobilize or be supported by other organizations qua organizations. However, this is not an issue for this paper; for my purpose I simply want to assert that movements characteristically engaged in face-to-face recruiting (whether in pre-existing communication channels or not).

(8) An outside or external beneficiary. A social movement, at least in pure form, has an external beneficiary, i.e., those who are not members of the movement but who will benefit from the movement's victory. One of the major advantages of defining a movement as a collectivity with an external beneficiary, is that this criterion helps us to distinguish movements from such similar but different collectivities as the "hippy" commune, sects, cults, etc.[2]

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[2]Distinguishing social movements from similar but different collectivities is handled in a more detailed manner in the third section of this chapter.

For example, the "hippy" commune often excludes the external, non-hippy world from the benefits of the commune. The "hippies" wish to "drop out," and "do their own thing"--they have no external beneficiary. A similar sort of attitude is to be found among many religious sects and cults; only members will be helped; those who do not join are "destined for hell." Sects and communes have no external beneficiaries almost by definition.

However, a movement is a complex object, and a particular collectivity could be movement-like in some ways and not in others. A "movement" could be identical with its beneficiaries. As Gamson puts it:

> There are many cases in which the beneficiary of the group and its constituency are identical, but this is not always true. In some cases, the changes will affect everyone more or less equally whether they are members or not. In other cases, the constituency and beneficiary may have little overlap (1975:16).

The white wing of the abolitionist movement, for example, took as its beneficiary, the slaves, many of whom had no active role in the movement. There, of course, can in fact be an internal beneficiary, too; i.e., "external" beneficiaries may be actively and successfully recruited to join the movement organization.

McCarthy and Zald (1976) distinguish between two different types of "members" of movements--adherents and constituents. An adherent is an actor, individual or organization, who believes in the goals of the movement, while constituents are those actors who contribute resources (i.e., time and money). By employing the beneficary and non-beneficiary variable, two further types are delineated: conscience adherents, adherents who are not beneficiaries, and conscience

constituents, constituents who are not beneficiaries.

Cross-classifying these two dimensions--those who believe vs. those who contribute resources with beneficiaries vs. non-beneficiaries--we can derive our four types of members.

TABLE 1

TYPES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT MEMBERS

BELIEVE IN GOALS OR PROVIDE RESOURCES:	BENEFICIARY?	
	NO	YES
BELIEVE IN GOALS	Conscience Adherents	Adherents
PROVIDE RESOURCES	Conscience Constituents	Constituents

Source: McCarthy and Zald (1976).

These distinctions have important theoretical implications. For example, McCarthy and Zald make the following point:

> This provides an account for why SMO* leaders have been skeptical of the involvement of conscience constituents-- intellectuals in labor unions, males in the women's liberation movement, whites in civil rights movements. Conscience con- stituents are fickle because they have wide-ranging concerns. . . . But organizations which attempt to involve them in face- to-face efforts may have to suffer the consequences of the differences in background and outside involvements from those of beneficiary constituents (1976:1232).

(9) The leadership of social movements. I said that movements

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* SMO is the abbreviation for Social Movement Organization.

during most of their career involve "semi-organized" collectivities--
these groups demand a certain type of appropriate leadership. Wilson
puts it this way:

> It would appear that the typical pattern of domination
> in the typical social movement is subsumed under neither the
> concept of power nor that of authority. The concept which
> seems best to describe this pattern is leadership, a form of
> domination, which while more structured than that of a naked
> power relationship based solely on the threat of negative
> sanctions, is less structured than a relationship of authority,
> which, as Parsons and Bierstedt both contend, is invariably
> associated with position (Wilson, 1973:198).

While not all movement leadership is charismatic, still the
leadership of ideal-typical movements tend in this direction. The
term "charismatic" is taken from Weber's distinction between tradi-
tional, bureaucratic-legal, and charismatic types of leadership.
Weber was concerned with the relational aspect of leadership, with the
right to exercise control as something to be established in terms of
shared values, and not merely the individual traits of the "leader."
Weber's concern, then, was with legitimate authority as a basis for
differentiating types of organization of authority by nature of the
claim to authority. These three types of legitimacy rest ultimately
on the obedience which is owed to the values of the group.

Specifically what did Weber mean by charismatic leadership?
Weber says:

> The term charismatic will be applied to a certain quality
> of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set
> apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with super-
> natural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional
> power or qualities. These are such as are regarded as of
> divine origin or exemplarly, and on the basis of them the
> individual concerned is treated as a leader (Weber, 1964:
> 358-60).

Contrary to how it might appear from this quote, Weber's intention was definitely not to stress the personality traits of the leader; his intention was to stress the relational nature of this type of leadership. The important consideration is not whether the leader really has the type of personality trait attributed to him, but rather if his followers really believe that he has. A particular person is selected as the leader because he seems to exemplify the group values and articulates the group's needs and aspirations. Leaders do not exist without their followers regardless of the leader's true personality.

The charismatic relationship by definition marks a freedom from convention and routine. The charismatic leader, too, seeks to escape from the profane world, and therefore, often preaches the abandonment or overthrow of current social system. A distinguishing characteristic of the charismatic leader is his claim to a unique source of wisdom, which is expressed through revelation. This revelation, of course, does not rely on precedent but usually contradicts it. Jesus said, ". . . it is written but I say unto you . . ." The vision of the charismatic leader seems to promise an apocalyptic (i.e., first, last, and always) transformation.

Charismatic leaders like others do not exist without their followers. There is a special quality to the relationship between his follwers and the charismatic leader which Weber summarized by the terms "trust and duty" (Wilson, 1973:204). On the other hand, the most pure type of charismatic relatsionhip requires belief and commitment on both sides. The charismatic leader takes himself seriously and seizes

power. He looks on his position, not as an opportunity but as an obligation. While there can be no election to charismatic leadership, no "mandate" from the people, still it is very much a function of the recognition given to claims of super-human stature--the idea of an unrecognized charismatic leader is a contradiction in terms (Wilson, 1973:204).

The relationship between the charismatic leader and his followers can be called a charismatic, movement community. Wilson (1973:205-9) lists several, special characteristics of this "charismatic community." (a) It has highly centralized, decision-making structures; (b) The leader must delegate responsibilities to some of his followers: lieutenants and disciples are chosen on the basis of personal devotion and not necessarily on the basis of universalistic-achievement criteria of competence. In the case of failure the leader tends to use his disciples as scapegoats--the charismatic leader must be free from blame; (c) Movement organization develop administrative staffs, but these are chosen on a personal basis; personnel, rules, offices, and regulations are subject to change arbitrarily and continuously here; (d) Incentives are purposive and solidary not utilitarian; all material resources must be seen as being donated by true believers, voluntarily. Donations are made in the leader's name. Everyday economizing and regular fund-raising are seen as despicable. And finally; (3) Movements led by pure, charismatic leaders are less prone to schism and factionation than are "movements" led by other types of leaders.

Weber's distinctions are, of course, analytic, and in many if not in most concrete cases, a particular leader may well be a mixture

of all three types: charismatic, traditional, and bureaucratic. One

of the major advantages of the charismatic movement is the fact that

the leader is not judged by ordinary performance standards, i.e., the

leader can do no wrong for his followers; therefore, objective setbacks

are not blamed on the leader, and the followers only redouble their

efforts.

All this is not to say that all movements can and must have

charismatic leaders. Leadership in "pure" movements tend toward the

charismatic, but in the concerete case the degree of charisma varies

enormously. To put it more precisely, where charismatic leaders are

found, the probability is that one will find a movement situation.

(10) Attempted social change. By definition all movements

are attempting to promote, resist or reverse social change. All move-

ments involve social change, but not all social change involves move-

ments. This fact generates the following question: What kind of

social change is social movements attempting to bring about? Since

this question involves distinguishing social movements from other kinds

of social change, I will discuss it in a more detailed form in the

upcoming third section of this chapter.

Now that I have defined social movements in general and thus

far listed ten definitive characteristics, I turn now to the question

of the different types and kinds of movements, to the internal

divisions.

Typology of Social Movements

In order to present the internal divisions of social movements

I utilize a typology constructed by Silberstein and Jordan (1977)

TABLE 2

TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Type of Movement	Direction of Change	Extent of Change	Target of Change	Amount of Change	Attempted or Actual Overthrow of Government
A. Radical					
1. Left-Wing	F*	T**	***V & SS	High	If Yes (Revolutionary)
2. Right-Wing	P	T	V & SS	High	If Yes (Revolutionary)
B. Expressive-Escapist	F or P	P	V & not SS	Variable	No
C. Reformist	F	P	V & SS	Low	No
D. Conservative	P	P	SS & not V	Low	No

Legend:
   * Direction is either future or past (F) or (P)
  ** Extent is either total or partial (T) or (P)
*** Target is one of the following: Values and Social Structure (V & SS), Values and not Social
    Structure (V & not SS) or Social Structure and not Values (SS & not V).

Source: Modified from Silberstein and Jordan, 1977:19.

although with slight modifications. In Table 2 there are five types of social movements of which two of them under certain conditions become revolutionary social movements.

The first type is a "radical left-wing" movement whose direction of change is futuristic.[3] This type of movement is concerned with bringing about total change in the values and social structure of the society. The radical left-wing movement is characterized by its determination to supplant the existing social order and to establish an unprecedented New System. Moreover, the radical left-wing movement is usually characterized by the use of a high amount of violence. When this type of movement culminates in an attempt or actual overthrow of the society's governmental apparatus, it has been transformed into a revolutionary movement to the left. Examples of this type of movement are: the movement led by Fidel Castro which overthrew the Batista government in Cuba on the 26th of July 1958, or the movement led by the Bolsheviks which culminated in a seizure of the government in Russia in October, 1917.

The second type is a "radical right-wing" movement whose direction of change is past-oriented. Like its radical left-wing counterpart, the radical right-wing movement is determined to bring about total change in the values and social structure. Since this type of movement is an attempt to bring about a radical alteration of the

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[3]The term "radical" usually carries two different meanings: (1) to change things "by pulling up their roots," and (2) a left-wing movement which creates an unprecedented new society. In this paper the term radical takes on the first meaning which includes both left and right-wing movements.

whole society, the amount of violence used is high. When the radical right-wing movement makes an open attempt or actually overthrows the existing governmental apparatus, it has transformed itself into a revolutionary movement to the right. Because this movement has a past-oriented direction of change, it can be seen as an attempt to return to the "golden age" or the old structure.

A classical example of a right-wing revolutionary movement was the Nazi revolution of 1933, led by Adolph Hitler, which resulted in the seizure of the operating government in Germany.

The third type is the "Expressive-Escapist" movement. This type of movement is often expressed through some form of religious ideology and the direction of change can either be future or past-oriented. Moreover, members of expressive escapist movements are more preoccupied with changing the values of the society than the social structure. Since these movements are not concerned with reconstructing the entire society they rarely challenge the state government. Further, the amount of violence used varies considerably from one expressive-escapist movement to the next.

An example of the expressive-escapist movement is the millenarian-messianic movement which is characterized by a fantasy of salvation or a glorious millennium that is about to dawn. The perceived divine order is to be established on earth with the elimination of sin and evil. That is, the coming millennium which is divinely inspired will transform life on earth to a state of eternal happiness and peace. True believers in the Penecostal movement accept on sheer faith that "the millennium is to be established through divine agency; believers

need only to watch and pary" (Barber, 1941:663).

The fourth type is the "Reformist" movement. This type of
social movement is characterized by a future-oriented direction of
change. Further, the extent of change in the values and social
structure which this movement accomplishes is partial. Finally,
the amount of violence is low and there is no attempt to overthrow
the state government.

A typical example of a reform movement is the contemporary
Women's Liberation Movement. In this particular movement there is an
organized attempt to "improve" the society without greatly changing
its basic values and social structure. Participants in the Women's
Liberation Movement do not advocate change in the entire system.
However, they do attempt to modify the system partially, in an effort
to resolve certain social strains produced by social and economic
inequalities.

The last type of social movement is the "conservative" move-
ment. The direction of change of this type movement is the past.
Also, the "conservative" movement is committed to the preservation of
the status-quo although with some modification in the social structure.
The degree of violence in this type of movement is usually low and
there is by definition never an active attempt to overthrow the
government.

An example of a "conservative" movement is the Townsend
Movement which began approximately 1929 and died out (or failed) about
1939. The Townsend Movement was conservative in the sense that it did
not want to do away with capitalism. In fact, a major professed goal

of the movement was to "save capitalism." Furthermore, the movement's consistent opposition to the "New Deal" lends more to its conservatism.

After having presented a definition and typology of social movements, my next task is to present a definition and typology of revolution. Moreover, since the object of study is the revolutionary social movement, i.e., the dependent variable is revolution, it is appropriate to discuss this phenomenon in a more detailed fashion. The next section is an attempt to accomplish this purpose.

Definition and Typology of Revolution

Now that I have established the key variable to be explained I must define in formal terms what is meant by a revolution. In other words, I must establish the external boundaries of revolution in order to present a more formal distinction between what revolutions are and what they are not.

Frankly speaking, it seems that only where the use of violence is directed in a concerted and continuous way toward bringing about a different form of government, can we rightfully speak of a social movement in revolutionary terms. Thus, <u>a revolution is a social movement which violently attempts or actually overthrows the government of the social system of which it is a part in order to bring about social change</u> (modified from Silberstein and Jordan, 1979:2).

After having presented the definition of revolution it is now appropriate to present the internal divisions (e.g., a typology showing the various types of revolutions). But before I present my own typology I will present and critique several current ones. Since it is virtually impossible nor desirable, given their crude state today,

to talk about every typology of revolution found in the literature, only five of the most prominent or representative ones will be presented and critiqued. These are the typologies developed by Feliks Gross, Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, Chalmers Johnson, David J. Bell and Mark N. Hagopian.

Gross's Typology

Gross distinguishes four main types of revolution (1958:38-59).

(1) A "revolution from the top" (sometimes called a revolution from above) refers to the seizure of political power by a small, well-organized group. In essence, the seizure of political power comes as a result of a well-planned, non-spontaneous action on the part of a small group of armed men at the pinnacle of the political structure. This type of revolution is characterized by a rapid takeover of the strategic centers of governmental power such as the means of violence (e.g., the military or the police establishment), and the means of communication (e.g., telephone exchanges, post offices, radio networks and railroads). Gross offers as an example of this type of revolution the seizure of political power in Egypt by the military leaders--Nasser and Naguib--in 1952 (1958:40).

(2) A "revolution from the bottom" (sometimes called a revolution from below) is characterized by a mass movement of the people as a whole against the state government. This type of revolution gradually develops into a cataclysmic upheaval leading to far-reaching socio-political change. The great French revolution, the American revolution, and the Russian revolution of February 1917 .

are examples of revolutions from the bottom.

(3) A "combined seizure" is a combination of the revolution from the top with a limited form of the revolution from the bottom or a "seizure of power from the top within the latter" (Gross, 1958:52). Simply put, when a society is experiencing mass unrest, there may emerge a group of armed men who take advantage of the situation and seizes the governmental apparatus. The Bolshevik seizure of power in October, 1917 is offered as one example of the combined seizure type revolution.

(4) A "palace revolution" refers to a change in power within the ruling elite. This change in power comes as a result of a planned seizure within the elite family or party. Although the palace revolution occurs sometimes with the use of violence, outside groups such as the military may not be involved. Also, "there is no intention to institute political or social change" (Rejai, 1973:14).

After presenting Gross's typology a few criticisms are warranted. First of all, the typology explicated by Gross is not comprehensive enough. For example, he approaches the notion of civil war in a haphazard and clumsy manner. While Gross acknowledges that civil war should be placed under one of his types of revolutions, he does not indicate which one. A civil war, according to Gross, is ". . . a variation of a revolution from below, or of a combined seizure" (1958:51). The conceptual difficulty with Gross's attempt to place civil wars under two of his types is on the abstract level. For if his types of revolutions are based on the sociological notion of the "ideal typical construct," then on a theoretical level it does

not make good sense to attempt to place civil wars under two abstract

categories. On the other hand, particular empirical cases classified

under a particular type will overlap with other empirical cases found

under other types. However, it must be understood that the fact that

empirical cases tend to overlap with others is not the issue here.

Gross's problem is one which involves the conceptual clarity in

typology construction. In more specific terms the civil war must

be classified in one and only one of the major types delineated, which

is equivalent to the requirement that a typology be comprehensive and

its dimensions mutually exclusive (Tiryakian, vol.18 :178).

Another problem found in Gross's typology concerns the War of

National Liberation or the Anti-Colonial revolution. In classifying

such revolutions Gross's typology appears to be extremely limited.

As a matter of fact, he does not even discuss the occurrence of Anti-

Colonial revolutions. In all fairness to Gross, this neglect may be

due in part to the time period in which his research was done. Gross's

work The Seizure of Political Power was first published in 1958. His

research probably began several years prior. But more important, many

Anti-Colonial revolutions (with the exception of the Haitian Revolution,

the American Revolution, etc.) occurring in developing countries,

gained widespread international exposure during the decade of the 1950's

and 60's. In essence, where the Anti-Colonial revolution is of concern,

Gross's typology appears to be limited by: (1) a time-bounded charac-

teristic (e.g., no Wars of National Liberation); and (2) a classifica-

tion of only those types of revolutions which occurred in modern and

developing societies prior to 1950.

If an attempt was made to classify an Anti-Colonial revolution under Gross's "revolution from the bottom," then one would not be able to distinguish the Great French (1789), Russian (1917), and Chinese (1949) revolutions from those more modern "Wars of National Liberation" which have characterized developing African countries during the last two decades. Moreover, it seems to me to be a tremendous stretch of the imagination to believe that the Anti-Colonial revolution which occurred in Mozambique (1965-1975) can be classified as the same type of revolution which occurred in France in 1789.

On the other hand, the only other type of revolution mentioned in Gross's typology which could possibly be suited (again stretching the imagination) to classify Anti-Colonial revolutions is the "combined seizure." However, if this particular type is used, the reader is, all of a sudden, left in a field of uncertainty. Gross does not consider the "combined seizure" type revolution as a fundamental type. It is only a variation of a "revolution from the top" and a "revolution from the bottom" (Gross, 1958:xiv-xv). This style of typology construction leaves much to be desired, for it is both confusing and unnecessary.

Contrary to Gross's intention, however, with some modification, it may be possible to salvage the "combined seizure" classification and to utilize it as a fundamentally different type of revolution. But to make this "combined seizure" type applicable to Anti-Colonial revolutions is again questionable. In effect, by utilizing the "combined seizure" type the reader is left trying to distinguish the many forms which Anti-Colonial revolutions take from other types of revolutions which could be logically placed in this category.

Tanter and Midlarsky's Typology

The next typology of revolution to be discussed is one devised

by Tanter and Midlarsky (see Table 3). They constructed their typology

based on four criteria: degree of mass participation, duration of the

conflict, amount of domestic violence, and the intentions of the

insurgents (1967:265).

(1) A "mass revolution" is characterized by high mass

participation, relatively long duration, high domestic violence, and

the introduction of fundamental social change in the structure of

political authority and the social system. Tanter and Midlarsky offer

as examples of this type the French (1789), Russian (1917), Chinese

(1949), and the Algerian (1962) revolutions.

(2) The "revolutionary coup" is marked by low mass participa-

tion, short to moderate duration, low to moderate domestic violence,

and fundamental changes in the structure of political authority and

possibly some changes in the social system. Examples of this type of

revolution are the: Nazi (1933), Egyptian (1952) and Iraqi (1958)

revolutions.

(3) A "reform coup" is distinguished by very low mass par-

ticipation, low domestic violence, and moderate changes in the structure

of political authority. Examples of this type of revolution occurred

in Argentina (1955), France and Pakistan (1958) and Turkey (1950).

(4) The "palace revolution" is characterized by the absence

of mass participation, very short duration, virtually no domestic

violence, and the absence of significant changes in both the political

structure of authority and the social system.

TABLE 3

TYPOLOGY OF REVOLUTIONS

Type of Revolution	Mass Participation	Duration	Domestic Violence	Intentions of the Insurgents
Mass Revolution	High	Long	High	Fundamental Changes in the Structure of Political Authority and the Social System
Revolutionary Coup	Low	Short to	Low to	Fundamental Changes in the Structure of Political Authority and Possibly Some Change in the Social
Reform Coup	Very Low	Short, Sometimes Moderate	Low	Moderate Changes in the Structure of Political Authority
Palace Revolution	None	Very Short	Virtually None	Virtually No Change

Source: Tanter and Midlarsky, 1967:265.

In criticizing the Tanter and Midlarsky typology the alert student would suspect at first glance that it is really a dichotomy of two fundamentally different types of revolutions (e.g., mass revolutions and coups), instead of four distinct types. Viewed in this manner, the coup is a generic type subdivided into three forms. To the student of revolutions, utilizing the terms explicated by Tanter and Midlarsky, it is extremely difficult to envision only two types of revolutions as a complete typology. Excluding the "mass revolution" type, it would have been to the advantage of Tanter and Midlarsky to have constructed a typology of coups.

But even if the above criticism of the Tanter and Midlarsky typology is unfair, there are still serious shortcomings. For example, Tanter and Midlarsky make the same mistake as Gross but in a more profound manner. Where Gross is implicit, Tanter and Midlarsky are explicit in lumping together mass revolutions (such as the ones previously mentioned) with classical Anti-Colonial revolutions such as the Algerian case.

Furthermore, in passing, the classical Anti-Colonial revolution which occurred in Haiti resulting in the overthrow of French colonial rule, would also have to be classified as a "mass revolution according to Tanter and Midlarsky's typology. This would indeed be a great disadvantage to the student of revolutions. For the Great French Revolution and the Haitian Revolution occurred in the same historical period of time (e.g., 1789 and 1791 respectively). Yet, while these two revolutions were both similar in many respects, they were still vastly different. The Great French Revolution of 1789 and the Haitian

Revolution of 1791, although reciprocally related, were not the same
type of revolution. Moreover, the Tanter and Midlarsky typology
grosses over distinctions between the "mass revolution" on the one
hand and the Anti-Colonial revolution on the other.

<p style="text-align:center">Johnson's Typology</p>

In <u>The Strategy of Revolution</u>, Rejai (1973), summarizes
Johnson's typology of revolution based on four criteria: targets of
revolution (e.g., the specific regime, the form of government, or the
larger society), the identity of the revolutionaries (e.g., elite or
mass), the ideology of the revolutionaries (e.g., reformist, nation-
alist, or messianic), and the timing of the revolution (e.g.,
spontaneous or calculated). Table 4 is a summarization of Johnson's
typology.

(1) The "jacquerie" is characterized by its limited aim
to purge the local or national elites. This type of revolution is a
spontaneous mass peasant uprising aimed at certain reforms. It is not
geared to the overthrow of the political system. Chinese peasant
uprisings are examples of this type.

(2) The "millenarian rebellion" although similar to the
jacquerie has an added dimension which gives it a messianic character.
Moreover, this type of revolution is marked by an ideology based on an
utopian ideal inspired by a leader with charismatic qualities. The
Taiping rebellion (1854-64) is offered as an example.

(3) The "anarchist rebellion" is distinguished by a desire
to bring about a pre-existing social system. This type of revolution
shows a tendency to romanticize the vanished days revealing a nostalgic

TABLE 4

TYPOLOGY OF REVOLUTION

Types of Revolution	Target	Identity	Ideology	Timing
1. Jacquerie	Government	Masses	Reformist	Spontaneous
2. Millenarian Rebellion	Varies	Masses	Millenarian	Spontaneous
3. Anarchist Rebellion	Varies	Varies	Nationalist	Spontaneous
4. Jacobin Communist Rebellion	Larger Society	Masses	Nationalist	Spontaneous
5. Conspiratorial Coup d'etat	Varies	Elites	Reformist	Calculated
6. Militarized Mass Insurrection	Varies	Masses	Nationalist	Calculated

Source: Johnson's Typology of Revolution as interpreted by Rejai, 1973:14.

reaction to social change. Examples of this type are the Boxer
rebellion (1899-1900) and the Vendee rebellion (1793-96).

(4) The "conspiratorial coup d'etat" is characterized by the
calculated attempt of a small elite group to replace another elite
group. Coups occurring in the Middle East and Latin America are often
characteristic of this type.

(5) The "Jacobin Communist revolution" is market by a
spontaneous mass movement aimed at a total transformation in the values
and social structure. Examples of this type include the French and
Russian Revolutions.

(6) The "militarized mass insurrection" is characterized by
a calculated, well organized attempt to bring about a national and
social revolution. This type of revolution is usually based on guer-
rilla warfare and shows remarkable success in recruiting broad popular
support. The revolutions which have occurred in Algeria, Viet Nam and
China are examples of this type.

After presenting Johnson's typology I take the opportunity to
present a special criticism. Johnson's typology is a good example of
how one ". . . combines the worst of both inductive and deductive
approaches" (Bell, 1973:58). Utilizing this technique certain essential
criteria are selected to construct the typology. Second, the criteria
are combined in a reductionist fashion resulting in the exclusion of
several combinations assumed by the original scheme (Bell, 1973:58).
Mathematically speaking, a typology based on two criteria each of which
is dichotomized into two categories, will yield a typology of four
units. In this connection, one simply takes the number of categories

and multiplies them together (e.g., 2 x 2 = 4). Regardless of the
number of attributes including their dichotomization, trichotomization,
etc., "a straightforward mathematical formula reveals the number of
potential possibilities" (Bell, 1973:58).

Johnson's typology consists of four attributes, two of which
are dichotomized and two of which are trichotomized, the number of
logical combinations is 36. To be sure, one may conclude that some of
these possibilities are never found in the real world or are theoreti-
cally uninteresting. If so, a reduction is made in the typology from
36 combinations to six, which are thought to be important.

The criticism aimed at Johnson's typology is not so much that
it contains only six categories. But, as a scholar he is obligated
". . . to reveal the criteria underlying the decision to exclude one or
more theoretical combinations" (Bell, 1973:59). Peter Calvert agrees
with this assessment of Johnson's typology as witnessed by his cogent
statement:

> [Chalmers Johnson's] typology suffers from a certain lack of
> theoretical rigidity, in that its categories are not clearly
> related to the matrix of social causes advanced and that there
> are gaps in that matrix that might be filled (1972:112).

In essence, Johnson commits the unpardonable "sin" by assuming
the naiveness of the reader or by being ignorant to a simple law of
mathematics. In excluding 30 categories, he ". . . fails altogether
to justify or even indicate the basis for his arbitrary exclusion"
(Bell, 1973:59).

Bell's Typology

Before I present Bell's typology of internal wars or

revolutions, it is appropriate to first present his typology of resis-
tance behavior. In this connection, it is not necessary to critique
the latter typology in that it is presented only for the sake of
clarity and to alert the reader to the specific type of resistance
behavior which Bell refers to as internal wars. After this task is
accomplished Bell's internal divisions of internal wars will be
presented and critiqued.

In Table 5, Bell's typology includes such variables as organi-
zation, means, participation and goals. This typology is mainly
concerned.with various types of resistance behavior ranging from
Thoreau's "civil disobedience" to the internal war. But what is
resistance behavior?

For Bell, resistance behavior is the result of a conscious
decision not to obey authority. Resistance behavior is directed at the
limitation and sometimes the destruction of authority (1973:3-4).
Excluded from this definition are "numerous institutional mechanisms
and processes that are built into the governmental machinery (through
constitutionalism, the party system, civil rights, etc.), to limit
authority" (Bell, 1973:3). "Authority" is simply defined by Bell as
legitimate power "including the 'right' to make decisions about
distribution and punishment" (1973:2).

Bell's ultimate concern, however, is with the noninstitution-
alized forms of resistance that constitute a central feature of
revolutionary politics. In this connection, Bell is concerned with
the internal war, which of course he uses interchangeably with
revolution (1973:9). Specifically, internal war or revolution

TABLE 5

TYPES OF RESISTANCE BEHAVIOR

GOALS OR TARGETS	ORGANIZATION	MEANS			
		Non-Violent		Violent	
		PARTICIPATION			
		limited (elite)	widespread (non-elite)	limited (elite)	widespread (non-elite)
Specific Persons or Policies	Spontaneous, unorganized	Thoreau Civil Disobedience	Non-compliance (tax strike)	Assassination (No conspiracy)	sporadic rioting
	Organized	Draft Resistance in U.S.	Obstructionism (Mill-in)	Veto Group (Greece, 1967)	
System Itself	Spontaneous (always highly) Organized	"Forced Abdication" LBJ 1968	"Nonviolent Revolution" (Ghandi's)	Reform Coup (Egypt 1952)	Internal War

Legend:
  Dimensions: Goals--persons, policies, and systems; Organization--spontaneous, organized, highly
               organized; Means--violent, non-violent; Participation--limited, widespread

Source: Bell, 1973:63

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represents the "polar case" of resistance. It is characterized by a high degree of violence, widespread participation, a high degree of organization, and it is aimed at changing the entire system.

In Table 6 the internal divisions of internal wars are broken down by cross-classifying social cleavage (e.g., horizontal and vertical) with geographical cleavage (e.g., discrete and intermixed). Bell sets forth four types of internal war.

(1) A "class revolution" is characterized by a pure horizontal cleavage coupled with a geographical intermixed distribution. This type of internal war, according to Bell, more closely approximates the classical Marxian Class Revolution (1973:116).

(2) A "civil war" is marked by a pure vertical cleavage co-existing with a geographically intermixed distribution. In this kind of situation neighbor fights against neighbor and members on both sides of the conflict come from all social classes (Bell, 1973:116).

TABLE 6

TYPOLOGY OF INTERNAL WARS

		Social Change	
		Horizontal	Vertical
	Intermixed	1 Class Revolution	2 Civil War
Geographical Cleavage			
	Discrete	3 War of National Liberation	4 War of Secession

(3) A "war of secession" is characterized by pure vertical cleavage coupled with a geographically discrete distribution. In this situation, one region in a country attempts to separate from another region. Bell cites the American Civil War (e.g., "the war between the states") as an example of this type (1973:116).

(4) Finally, a "war of liberation" is characterized by pure horizontal cleavage coexisting with a geographically discrete distribution.

After presenting Bell's internal divisions a brief note of criticism reveals that even he is uncertain about whether his typology can adequately classify real world revolutions. For example, Bell states that "just because a particular internal war falls into the quadrant marked "class revolution," we cannot be sure that a class revolution is actually taking place" (1973:117). There also seems to be a question raised by Bell himself, as to the importance of the geographical cleavage variable used in his typology. In his own words, Bell states that ". . . it is fairly evident that the major distinction among species of internal war is the question of social cleavage rather than geography" (1973:118). Based on the latter statement by Bell, more uncertainty is generated around his typology. If geographical cleavage is not very important in distinguishing the divisions of internal war, then why use it?

Finally, Bell's distinction between a civil war and a war of secession is quite vague. For example, the secessionist war between the states (1861-1865) was a classical civil war. However, Bell sees it only as the former. The American Civil War was more than a war

between two regions one which seceded from the whole. It was a war which pitched neighbor against neighbor and brother against brother. For example, General Sherman, the famous Northern military strategist known for his "March to the Sea," had a brother who fought for the South.

The purpose in criticizing Bell is not to indict him but to show the difficulty and complexity in constructing an adequate typology of revolutions. More important, when presenting the internal divisions of revolution the task becomes increasingly difficult when one attempts to distinguish between a war of secession and a civil war. Whenever this distinction is attempted one should keep in mind that all secessionist wars are civil wars but not all civil wars are secessionist in character.

After presenting Bell's view of the internal divisions of revolution and offering a brief criticism, I turn to an extensive explication of Hagopian's view as expressed in his work called The Phenomenon of Revolution (1975).

Hagopian's Typology

Although Hagopian provides a critical "summary" of existing concepts and theories of revolution, he does not offer an explicit typology of revolutions. He does, however, strongly endorse Huntington's (1970) simple dichotomy between Eastern and Western revolutions. The typology in Table 7 was constructed by the author from Huntington's work called Political Order in Changing Societies (1970), coupled with Hagopian's interpretation of this work.

TABLE 7

TYPES OF REVOLUTIONS

Dimensions	Types of Revolutions	
	Eastern	Western
Revolutionary Operation	Rural Based	Urban Based
Collapse of Old Regime	Late	Early
Place of Terror	Early	Late
Emigration	Late	Early

Source: Huntington, 1970: Chapter 5; Also see
Hagopian, 1975:103-105.

In Table 7 the revolutionary operation of Eastern revolutions
is characterized by rural based activity. This is mainly the case
because in Eastern revolutions the old regime has considerable strength
at the outbreak of the revolutionary struggle. This fact forces the
revolutionaries to withdraw to the rural areas in order to organize
their power base to eventually challenge the status-quo. If the
revolutionaries successfully build a strong rural power base and if
they feel confident of winning against the conservative forces, then
they will attempt to overthrow the old regime. If the old regime
collapses as a result of revolutionary struggle, it will be late in
the overall career of the movement.

The place of terror in Eastern style revolutions occurs early
in the game. When revolutionary activity first begins, the balance of
power is in favor of the legal government (e.g., the old regime). The

old regime exercises the "carrot and the stick" (e.g., social reform and terrorism) against the revolutionaries. Retreating from the urban areas to the hinderland, the revolutionaries build strong support among the peasants. They in turn began to wage acts of terrorism and guerrilla warfare against the old regime.

As the revolutionary struggle escalates into conventional pitched battles with the forces of the old regime; and the latter becomes weakened in its ability to crush the revolution, the final victory for the revolutionaries comes with the takeover of the capital city. Finally, it seems reasonable to expect that many people loyal to the old regime will emigrate from the country when they perceive that a revolutionary takeover is imminent.

After discussing the Eastern style revolution as defined by Huntington and Hagopian I turn to a brief discussion of its counterpart, the Western revolution.

Observing Table 7 again we find that contrary to Eastern type revolutions, the revolutionary operation in Western revolutions is primarily urban based. Revolutionaries utilize the capital city and other urban areas as epicenters for the revolution. The revolution then ". . . expands into the countryside to bring the whole country under its sway" (Hagopian, 1975:104). It was essential for the revolutionaries to secure the urban centers of Paris and Moscow-Petrograd for the success of the Great French and Russian Revolutions (e.g., two Western Revolutions). On the other hand the ". . . takeover of Peking and Havana (e.g., two Eastern Revolutions) was a more or less ceremonial coup de grace" (Hagopian, 1975:104).

In Western Revolutions the collapse of the old regime comes
early in the game. But, what are some of the causes of this collapse?
Hagopian says that:

> Financial woes, disaffection of the urban intelligentsia and
> elites, crisis of self-confidence of traditional ruling groups,
> and other factors bring about the collapse of the political
> system of the old regime (1975:103).

As a result of the collapse of the old regime a vacuum of
power is created which moderates and radicals fight to fill. If the
radicals are victorious over the moderates for control of the
revolutionary government then ". . . the revolution follows the
Edwards-Brinton pattern of the rise of the radicals, then the reign
of "terror and virtue," and finally Thermodor or return to normality"
(Hagopian, 1975:104). The major emphasis here in regard to the Western
type revolution is that terror comes relatively late after the takeover
and coincides with the radicals' victory over the moderates.

Last, emigration in Western revolutions comes relatively early
rather than late. Early emigration begins in Western revolutions when
monarchist or aristocratic conservatives sense the mounting danger from
the imminent or recent seizure of power by the revolutionaries. In
effect, they flee the country and perhaps reorganize themselves for a
counter-revolution.

After presenting Hagopian's notion of an adequate typology of
revolutions I note that even he has reservations concerning it. For
example, Hagopian summarizes his self criticism:

> . . . the Eastern-Western typology of revolution risks over-
> drawing the dichotomy by assuming that the Edwards-Brinton
> paradigm of the phases of revolution completely "fits" Western
> revolutions other than the Great French Revolution. Analysis

of the Eastern revolution belies the universality of such a
paradigm, but begs the more serious issue of the phases of
Western revolutions (1975:105).

In essence, Hagopian rejects what he interprets to be a
fundamental assumption of the Huntington typology, namely the Edwards-
Brinton paradigm of the phases of revolution. Hagopian maintains that

differences between Eastern and Western style revolutions are too great

to be explained by the Edwards-Brinton paradigm. Some of these major

differences between the East and West are: "political culture, level

of urbanization, economic development, political and military strength

of the old regime, etc." (Hagopian, 1975:231).

Hagopian believes that the Edwards-Brinton paradigm is best

applicable to the Great French Revolution. Moreover, when attempts

are made to generalize the scheme not only to Eastern revolutions but

to other Western revolutions as well, major difficulties are confronted

(1975:231-246).

A final note in reference to Hagopian's explication of

Huntington's typology of Eastern vs. Western type revolutions is his

emphasis and conclusion that only two of the four listed dimensions

can really be seen as general distinctions between the two types of

revolutions. In Hagopian's own words this point is stated more clearly:

> . . . we can conclude that it is, first, the rural versus the
> urban base of revolutionary operations; and second, the late
> versus the early collapse of the old regime which lend such
> cogency to the fully developed contrast between Eastern and
> Western revolutions (1975:105).

Having presented Hagopian's view of the internal divisions of

revolutions in terms of Huntington's typology of Eastern and Western

revolutions coupled with a brief critique; I will now present my own

typology in the next section headed: A Proposed Typology.

A Proposed Typology

In the proposed typology that follows, my view of the internal division of revolution is represented by a typology originally constructed by Silberstein and Jordan (1977).

This typology (see Table 8) is comprehensive and avoids those conceptual and practical difficulties found in the previously mentioned typologies of revolution. Moreover, the Silberstein and Jordan typology includes four major types of revolutions classified along eleven dimensions.

(1) The "pure" or "mass" (civil) revolution is characterized by its emphasis on total change in the social structure and values of a society. This type of revolution utilizes a high degree of violence and when preoccupied with the idea of establishing an unprecedented New Society it is future-oriented. On the other hand, when the desire is to bring back the "old state of affairs" or the "golden ages," the revolution is past-oriented. Furthermore, with widespread participation and the greatest percent of its members from the masses, this type of revolution makes an organized violent attempt to overthrow the state government. Moreover, the "pure" or "mass" revolution is marked by its distinct ideology of change coupled with its long duration. Examples of this type of revolution are the Great French (1789), Russian (1917), Chinese (1949) and Mexican (1910) revolutions.

(2) The "conspiracy" (military and palace coups) revolution is distinguished by its emphasis on partial change aimed not at the social structure or values but at the removal of particular governmental

TABLE 8

A TYPOLOGY OF REVOLUTIONS (BY SILBERSTEIN AND JORDAN)

DIMENSIONS	TYPES OF REVOLUTIONS			
	PURE OR MASS "Civil"	CONSPIRACY Military Coups, Palace Coups	CIVIL WAR Secessionist & Separatist	WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION "National," Anti-Colonial
Extent	Total	P	P (elite control)	T or P
Direction	F or P	F or P	P or F	F or P
Target	V & SS	personnel	SS and not V	varies
Violence, amount	High	Low	High	varies
Attempted/Actual overthrow	Yes	Yes	varies	Yes
Participation (total)	Widespread	Limited	Widespread	Widespread
Organization	Organized	Most Organized	Organized	Organized
Conflict (WG or BG)	WG	either, e.g., "insurgencies"	WG	BG
Duration	Long	Short	Long	varies
Ideology of change?	Yes	Yes, but only political.	varies	Yes
Greatest % members from elite and/or mass	Mass	Elite	Both large	Mass

Legend:
see Legend for Table 1.

TABLE 8 (concluded)

(Legend, continued)
  participation = total participation in society, and has two values, either organized or limited.
  organized = two values--either organized or spontaneous
  conflict (WG or BG) = where WG, within groups, refers to actors on both sides of the conflict, both
    of whom were socialized in the referrent social system, while BG, between groups, refers to actors
    who on one side were socialized into the referrent social system, and to actors on the other side
    who were acculturated into it.

Source: Silberstein and Jordan, 1977:20.

personnel based on political justifications. Although the amount of violence utilized in this type of revolution is quite low, compared to other types, there is an active attempt to overthrow the state government. Furthermore, the "conspiracy type revolution, with its limited participation, short duration and the greatest percent of its members from the elite, prides itself in being the most organized type. The military and palace coups which occurred in Peru (1962) and Venezuela (1948) respectively are examples of the "conspiracy" type revolution.

(3) The "civil war" (secessionist and separatist) is marked by its desire to bring about partial change in the social structure and not the values of a society. Although the amount of violence utilized is usually high, participation widespread, and the greatest percent of its members are both from the elite and mass, the "civil war" varies tremendously in its attempt to overthrow the state government. A classical example of this type of revolution is the American Civil War (1861-1865).

(4) The "war of national liberation" (anti-colonial, "national") may have a future or past direction of change and the extent of change in the values and social structure may be total or partial. The Anti-Colonial revolution has an ideology of change, is well organized, has widespread participation, and the greatest percent of its members are from the mass. Although the amount of violence used varies tremendously from one Anti-Colonial revolution to the next, there is an attempt or actual overthrow of the state government. Examples of this type of revolution are the Algerian (1954) and Haitian (1791) revolutions.

The Silberstein and Jordan typology can be illustrated another way in terms of the four graphic models presented in Figure 2 below. These four graphic models are simply a picture of the four types of revolutions which were presented in the Silberstein and Jordan typology discussed in Table 8 above. Therefore, to avoid unwarranted duplication I will not discuss them again. My only reasons for presenting the graphic models is to add clarity to my proposed typology and to allow the reader an opportunity to see a self-explanatory picture of my notion of the internal divisions (e.g., types or kinds) of revolution.

Another, perhaps more instructive way of representing the Silberstein and Jordan typology is in terms of the following two by three table (i.e., Table 9).

Looking at Table 9, a revolution from above is a coup when the conflict is within groups and an insurgency (e.g., foreign directed) when the conflict is between groups. Second, a revolution from below is a "pure," class type when the conflict is within groups and a class type War of National Liberation when the conflict is between groups. Third, a revolution from both above and below is a Civil War when the conflict is within groups and an ethnic type War of National Liberation when the conflict is between groups.

After having presented two additional ways of representing the Silberstein and Jordan typology, i.e., Figure 2 and Table 9, I must note that some criticism is warranted.

In general, much of the criticism which could be aimed at the Silberstein and Jordan typology would be concerned with its comprehensiveness. Some of the typical questions would be: Should it, i.e.,

Figure 2

Graphic Models of the Types of Revolutions

| Pure, Mass, Class, Civil | Wars of National Liberation or Anti-Colonial Revolutions | Conspiracy or Coups | Civil Wars |

From the bottom up   From the top down   Side 1 | Side 2

I   II   III   IV

TABLE 9

	REVOLUTION FROM			
	Above	Below	Above and Below	
Within Groups	Coup Peru, 1962	Pure, Class Russian, 1917	Civil War U.S., 1861	"Civil"
Between Groups	Insurgency foreign-directed U.S.-Iran, 1952	WNL Class*	WNL Ethnic**	"National"

 * Killing of upper class members regardless of ethnicity (see Model II in Figure 2 above)

** Killing of dominant "ethnic group" regardless of class (see Model II in Figure 2 above)

See Legend of Table 7 for definition of within and between groups.

the Silberstein and Jordan typology, include as much as it does? Is

there a need to have as many horizontal dimensions to specify what is,

and what is not, a revolution? Answers to questions such as these aimed

at criticism of the Silberstein and Jordan typology are not seen as

criticisms by this author. In fact, they are seen as theoretically

irrelevant.

On the other hand, however, the Silberstein and Jordan

typology cannot go without criticism. The following are seen as two

substantive criticisms of the typology: (1) Silberstein and Jordan

use many synonymous terms, paired opposites, to refer to the same thing,

insider-outsiders: within groups. vs. between-groups, "civil" vs.

"national" relations, socialized vs. acculturated, etc.; and (2) their

types of revolution vary along an insider-outsider continuum with

external war (between nation-states) and internal war (revolution).

However, some revolutions are closer to the insider end of the

continuum and some are closer to the outsider end. Also, coups can

be found at either end of the continuum (see Figure 3 below).

After having presented my views of the internal divisions of

revolutions in terms of the Silberstein and Jordan typology, I now

confront those problems which were created by my attempt to define and

classify social movements in general and revolutions in particular.

In effect, those problems which were created by the first two sections

of this chapter must now be resolved. But what are these problems?

How will they be resolved? These questions are answered in the next

section.

Figure 3

Insiders	Internal War				External War	Outsiders
	Pure-Mass Socialized vs. Socialized	Civil War Socialized vs. Socialized	Colonial or WNL Socialized vs. Acculturated	Insurgency Social Movement Controlled by Foreign Power; e.g., U.S. in Iran		

Distinction Between Revolution and Other Similar

But Different Types of Collectivities

The problems which were created by sections one and two can be compared to a "melting pot" of social phenomena. That is, in this "melting pot" one will find various types of social change and every conceivable type of "collective behavior" under the sun. The important question becomes: How do we distinguish revolutionary social movements from other similar but different kinds of collectivities? More specifically, revolution must be distinguished from the following: social change in general; deviance (e.g., crime, mental illness, etc.); organized collectivities in general (e.g., political parties, pressure and lobby groups, universities, criminal organizations, etc.); "collective behavior" (e.g., crowds, mobs, riots, panics, etc.); and political violence in general (e.g., military men, policemen, criminals, revolutionaries, and reformers).

By definition all revolutionary social movements are attempting to promote, resist or reverse social change. All revolutionary movements involve social change, but not all social change involves revolutionary movements. Since revolution is one type of social change how is it to be differentiated from other types of social change? The kind of social change brought about by revolutionary movements is both of relatively great scope and short duration. Evolutionary changes are of great scope but long duration. Fad and fashion, on the other hand, refers to change of narrow scope and short duration. And finally, to complete the typology, pattern maintenance changes are of narrow scope and long duration; e.g., the biological replenishment of the   ·

members of a social system or the repeated processes of socialization

by which each generation is socialized. Table 10 below presents this

typology in graphic form.

TABLE 10

A TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

| DURATION* | SCOPE** | |
	Narrow	Broad
Long Term	(1) Pattern Maintenance	(2) Evolution
Short Term	(3) Fad & Fashion	(4) Social Movements

Legend:
*Duration refers to time lapse.
   Short Term duration = changes of a generation or less.
   Long Term duration = changes of a generation or more, historic
     change
**Scope refers to what has been changed.
   Broad scope = structural change; change in basic, cultural
     values; redistribution of money and power; in short, change
     of the system qua system.
   Narrow scope = changes in the system and not of the system.
     Cyclical changes which enable the system to maintain itself.
     The structure of the system remains constant, e.g., Presidents
     come and go but the Presidential system remains.

To say it again, revolutionary movements involve social change

of the fourth type (see category 4 in Table 10), change of short dura-

tion but broad scope. An example of a long-term, evolutionary change

is the change from the agrarian society of the middle-ages with the

church as a dominant institution to the modern, industrial society with

the economy as a dominant institution. This "inch-by-inch" change has

lasted for centuries and it is anything but over. Indeed, it is a fateful change (i.e., of broad scope)--the fate of humankind may well be determined by the rate and degree of the industrialization of the third-world nations.

Social change of the third type (see category 3 in Table 10), fad and fashion, however, are by comparison insignificant changes (of narrow scope); e.g., changes in dress fashions, say, the length of women's skirts, have no real historic significance.

Changes of the first type (see category 1 in Table 10), pattern maintenance, refer to all those "housekeeping" functions which are necessary for a social system to survive; there must be: biological replenishment of its members, socialization of its newborn members, an economy which provides food for some of its members, a way to move its collective garbage, etc. These are functions which are necessary if a system is to survive, but are hardly sufficient if the system is to attain its goals and realize its values. One responsibility for the father of a family is pattern maintenance--providing food, clothing, security, etc.--but most fathers want much more for their families than this; e.g., they want happiness, harmony, achievement, etc.

I do not mean to suggest that every concrete case must fall within one and only one category in Table 10. Any particular case may indeed fall in all four categories. These distinctions are meant to be analytical--provided for the purpose of enabling the reader or observer to be able to describe accurately the elements involved in any particular case, to be able to analyze out the elements involved. While each one of the variables (duration and scope) are dichotomized or cut in

half, this is done only for convenience, and in reality both variables
are continuous ones. For anyone with only a smattering of analytical
geometry, it may be apparent that by numbering each variable or
dimension, we could locate any concrete case of social change any
place within this two-dimensional space.

Next, I pose the question that since revolutionary behavior
is deviant behavior in the most fundamental sense, how is it to be
distinguished from other types of deviant behavior? A classical
typology which can be used for this purpose is Merton's typology of
deviants and deviant behavior. A basic assumption inherent in this
typology is that individuals have been socialized to desire and make
an active attempt to obtain prized goals in their society, e.g., in
American society these goals involve success.

In Table 11 Merton cross-classifies various modes of adapta-
tion (e.g., conformist, innovator, ritualist, retreatist and rebel)
with institutionalized means and cultural goals. The conformist (e.g.,
the non-deviant) accepts both the means and the goals. The innovator
(e.g., the criminal, racketeer, avant-garde artist, etc.) rejects the
means but substitutes new ones and accepts the goals. The ritualist
(e.g., the pathological normals, religious compulsives, irrational
conformists, etc.) accepts the means and rejects the goals. The
retreatist (e.g., the "hippy," beatnik, vagrant, drug addict, psychotic,
alcoholic, etc.) rejects both the means and the goals. Finally, the
rebel (e.g., revolutionaries, guerrilla warriors, etc.) rejects both
the means and goals, but substitutes new means and goals.

A major implication of Merton's typology, presented in Table

TABLE 11

TYPOLOGY OF DEVIANTS AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR

MODES OF ADAPTATION:	INSTITUTIONALIZED MEANS:	CULTURAL GOALS:	Examples:
1. <u>Conformist</u>	accepts	accepts	No deviance. Ambivalence?
2. <u>Innovator</u>	rejects and substitutes	accepts	Criminal, avant-garde artist, sharp trader, scientific radical, racketeer, etc.
3. <u>Ritualist</u>	accepts	rejects	Petty bourgeois functionaries, irrational conformists, pathological normals, religious compulsives, etc.
4. <u>Retreatist</u> (high former internalization)	rejects	rejects	"Hippy," vagrant, beatnik, addict, psychotic, alcoholic, etc.
5. <u>Rebel</u>	rejects and substitutes	rejects and substitutes	Rebel, revolutionary, guerilla warrior, etc.

Source: Constructed from Merton, 1957:140.

11, is that structural sources account for some of the variation in different types of deviants (or modes of adaptation). For example, an innovator who is lower class and who has internalized middle class values uses illegitimate means to gain legitimate ends. Structural sources are suspect, especially when viewing the relationship between access to the cultural goals and one's position in the class structure. It is generally accepted that an individual's "access to the cultural goals declines as class position declines" (Wright, 1971:96). Thus, a differential opportunity structure allows more opportunity for some than others. The innovator is produced in part by this structure.

Merton further distinguishes between aberrants (e.g., criminals) and nonconformists (e.g., revolutionaries). In Table 12 the similarities and differences between aberrants and nonconformists are presented. Both are similar in the following ways: (1) they do not live up to the expectations of others; (2) others try to bring them back, to get them to conform; and (3) they run the risk of punishment.

On the other hand, some of the differences between these two types are worth mentioning. For example, the aberrants include: innovators, retreatists and ritualists while the noncomformists include only the rebellion adaptation. Also, the aberrant attempts to hide his departure from the norms, e.g., draft dodging, while the nonconformist publically announces his dissent, e.g., public draft card burning. Further, the aberrant acknowledges legitimacy of the norms but finds it expedient to violate them while the nonconformist challenges the legitimacy or applicability of the norms and, e.g., "sits in" against them. Another difference is that the aberrant departs from the norms

TABLE 12

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ABERRANTS AND NONCONFORMISTS

ABERRANCY (e.g., criminals)	NONCONFORMITY (e.g., revolutionaries)

SIMILARITIES

1. not living up to the expectations of others	1. same (deviation from in-group norms)
2. others try to bring them back, to get them to conform	2. same
3. runs risk of punishment	3. same

DIFFERENCES

4. includes innovators, retreatists, and ritualists	4. rebellion adaptation
5. tries to hide departure from norms, e.g., draft-dodger	5. public announcement of dissent, e.g., public draft-card burner

6. acknowledges legitimacy of the norms, but finds it expedient to violate them
  a. does not argue that murder is right only extenuating for him
	6. challenges the legitimacy or applicability of the norms, and, e.g., "sits-in" against them
	  a. acts on moral not expedient basis

7. departs from the norms for reasons of self-interest, and tries to avoid all negative consequences for himself	7. departs from the norms for disinterested, collectivity-oriented reasons a. acts according to principle regardless of consequences for self

8. ultimate goal is to join system--not to change or restore it
  a. goal is to join the powerful
	8. ultimate goal is to change or restore system, not to join it
	  a. goal is to go against the powerful

9. offers nothing new and proposes nothing old to restore	9. either offers something new or something old to restore

Source: Merton, 1957:279-440.

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for reasons of self-interest, and tries to avoid all negative conse-
quences for himself, while the nonconformist departs from the norms for
disinterested, collectivity-oriented reasons. Here the nonconformist
acts according to principle regardless of consequences for self.

Further, the ultimate goal of the aberrant is to join the
system not to change or restore it, while the ultimate goal of the
nonconformist is just the opposite, e.g., to change or restore the
system, not to join it. Finally, the aberrant offers nothing new and
proposes nothing old to restore, while the nonconformist either offers
something new or something old to restore.

Next, I turn to another distinction which should be made
between a revolutionary social movement and other similar but different
collectivities. Since a revolutionary movement exemplifies a structure
which is organized, how is it to be distinguished from other types of
similar organizations? Table 13 below meets this purpose by utilizing
the dimensions of goals (e.g., broad, diffuse and specific) and means
(e.g., legitimate and illegitimate) as a basis for a typology.

After cross-classifying the dimensions we find that the
revolutionary movement has broad (diffuse) goals and is characterized
by the use of illegitimate means. Political parties, universities,
etc. also tend to have broad (diffuse) goals; however, they differ from
revolutionary movements because they do not utilize illegitimate means.
There are other organizations such as interest groups, lobbies, pressure
groups, etc. who have specific goals, but who utilize legitimate means.
Last, criminal organizations such as the Mafia have specific goals and
they utilize illegitimate means.

TABLE 13

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MOVEMENTS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	Goals	
	Broad, Diffuse	Specific
Legitimate	Political Party University	Interest Groups Lobbies Pressure Groups
Means		
Illegitimate	Movements	Criminal Organizations Mafia

The next problem posed is: Since a revolutionary movement is a form of "collective behavior," how is it to be distuinghished from other forms of "collective behavior?" Traditionally speaking, the study of social movements has been placed in the area of "collective behavior." The problem, however, is that not all "collective behavior" involves social movements. Therefore, what particular type of "collective behavior" is characteristic of social movements (e.g., the revolutionary movement included)? This question is answered by presenting Table 14 below.

In Table 14 I cross-classify the intensity of identification and commitment (e.g., weaker and stronger) with the persistence or continuous action toward the group goals (e.g., longer and shorter). The result is that movements, including those of a revolutionary nature, are characterized by a stronger intensity, coupled with a longer persistence. Crowds, mobs, panics, etc. are also characterized by a stronger intensity but with a shorter persistence. "Collective behavior" which is routinized or institutionalized tends to have a

weaker intensity with a longer persistence. Large-scaled mass behavior such as mass hysteria, tends to have a weaker intensity and a shorter persistence.

TABLE 14

TYPES OF COLLECTIVITIES (OR HOW TO DISTINGUISH MOVEMENTS FROM OTHER TYPES OF "COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR")

Persistence (concerted and Continuous) action toward group goal	Intensity (of Identification and Commitment)	
	Weaker	Stronger
Longer	Routinized Institutionalized Behavior	Movements
Shorter	Masses	Crowds, Publics, Mobs, Riots, Panics, etc.

In the next typology I attempt to answer the following question. Since revolutionary movement behavior is similar to such behavior practiced by criminals, military men, policemen and reformers, how is it to be distinguished from these latter types? The typology presented in Table 15 is one way to answer this question. Hence, by cross-classifying ideology of change (e.g., Yes and No) with the use of violence (e.g., Yes and No), reasonable distinctions can be made. The results are as follows: revolutionaries have an ideology of change coupled with the use of violence. The reformer type also has an ideology of change, but does not use violence. Military men, policemen, and criminals do not have an ideology of change; however, they do

utilize violence (e.g., in the case of criminals the violence utilized is defined as illegitimate while the violence utilized by the military and/or police is seen as legitimate). The final category, _routine behavior_, which includes individual acts of violence, does not have an ideology of change and does not utilize violence.

TABLE 15

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CRIMINALS, MILITARY MEN,
POLICEMEN, REVOLUTIONARIES, AND REFORMERS

		Ideology of Change	
		Yes	No
Use of Violence	Yes	Revolutionaries	Criminals (Illegitimate Violence) Military Man Policeman (Legitimate Violence)
	No	Reformer	Routine Behavior

Now that I have cleared up certain problems concerning the meaning of a revolutionary social movement and differentiated it from other similar but different social phenomena, I turn my attention to a brief discussion of The Beginning and End of Revolution.

The Beginning and End of Revolution

While there is a relatively large literature available on the subject of revolutions, few books and articles are available that put forth explicit definitions as to when revolutions begin and end. But in an effort to bridge the gap produced by the inadequacies in the literature, I make an attempt (at least in part) to resolve the issue.

A revolution can be said to have begun: (1) when a group of people who think of themselves as revolutionaries, plan and conspire to engage in revolutionary activity; (2) when this group of people who think of themselves as revolutionaries develop an ideology of change (the ideology helps them: to focus their discontent, to criticize the present societal situation, and to realize their own vision of the future society); (3) when they utilize the threat of or actual violence against the state government apparatus; (4) when the state government regards this group as a revolutionary threat; and (5) when there exists mutual recognition and action on both sides.

After the regime recognizes the group as a revolutionary threat its alternatives for dealing with them may become dichotomous. That is, the regime will attempt to compromise the revolutionaries or increase the level of oppression. In either case, it could prove damaging for the regime. For in more ways than one, the regime is caught between the "devil and the deep blue sea." For example, revolutionaries are bent on a total alteration in the values and social structure of the society. Therefore, the regime's efforts at compromise are often viewed as weaknesses by the revolutionaries. Furthermore, this perception has the effect of increasing the level of expectation of the revolutionaries possibly to the extent that they may believe a victory against the status quo is possible.

On the other hand, however, the use of brute force is often counter-productive. For in a revolutionary situation, oppressive measures tend to increase the discontent of the revolutionaries and calls into question the loyalty of "third parties" to the status quo.

Because of the oppressive measures utilized by the regime against the revolutionaries, "third parties" may be pushed toward the dissidents eventually becoming "base constituency," and later, a part of the "movement community" (Silberstein and Jordan, 1977; Gerami, 1979:16; and Lecture Notes, 1978).

Next, a revolution has obviously ended in one way if all the members of the revolution have been either killed or eliminated from the action in some other way. However, a full-fledged revolution is highly complex and must meet specific other criteria before we can say with a fair degree of accuracy that it has indeed ended. Thus, a full-fledged revolution has come to an end when it has: (1) seized the power of the state government through the use of or the threat of violence; (2) institutionalized its ideology; and (3) legitimately transferred power and leadership succession has taken place (Silberstein and Jordan, 1977; and Lecture Notes, 1978).

The last two points mentioned above have sometimes been referred to as the "Brinton-Michels-Weber effect" and is an exceedingly difficult state in the overall career of a revolutionary movement. The new revolutionary government must stop fighting the counter-forces, tailor down its revolutionary fervor, and go about the business of routine governmental affairs. When this is accomplished, for all practical purposes, the revolution has ended.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to present the object of study. This goal was accomplished by first presenting a definition and typology of social movements. Here, the external boundary or

definition of social movements was established, distinguishing social movements from the universe of non-movements. Then, the internal divisions or types and kinds of social movements were presented.

Second, I established, for my purposes, that all revolutions are Social Movements, and I presented a definition establishing the external boundary of revolutions. In so doing I distinguished the revolutionary social movement from those social movements which are nonrevolutionary.

After briefly discussing and criticizing several prominent typologies of revolution I presented my own typology. Moreover, my proposed typology of revolutions presented the object of study (e.g., the revolutionary social movement). Additionally, the place of the Anti-Colonial revolution could now be systematically "pinpointed" among other types of revolutions.

Next, I attempted to deal with the problems which were created by establishing a definition and classification (typology) of social movements and revolutions. The problems created were associated with distinguishing the revolutionary social movement from other similar but different collectivities. Moreover, revolutionary movements were distinguished from other types of: social change, deviance (e.g., crime, mental illness, etc.), organized collectivities (e.g., political parties, pressure groups, etc.), "collective behavior" (e.g., crowds, mobs, riots, etc.), and political violence in general (e.g., military men, policemen, etc.).

By way of summarizing what I have done so far, Figure 4 is presented on the next page. Figure 4 is a graphic way by which I can

Figure 4

Summary of the Place of the Study of Anti-colonial Revolutions within the Field of Sociology

Culture	"Collective Behavior"		a
Social Structure	Social Psychology		

Sociology Universe

Routine Behavior	Social Movements	b
Masses	Crowds and Mobs	

Collective Behavior Universe

Expressive -Escapist	Radical Revolutionary	c
Consera- tive	Reform	

Social Movement Universe

Pure or Mass	Anti- Colon- ialist	d
Civil War	Coup	

Revolution Universe

Legend:
"a" refers to the "Collective Behavior" category or slice of the larger universe of sociology. The term "collective" refers to ephemeral, non-institutional behavior and not to group action, per se.
"b" refers to the Social Movement category or slice of the larger universe of collective behavior.
"c" refers to the Revolution category or slice of the larger universe of Social Movements.
"d" refers to the Anti-colonialist category or slice of the larger universe of Revolutions.

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locate the object of my study, the anti-colonial, revolutionary move-
ment, in terms of more inclusive circles or "universes" of study.
Reading from left to right the series of circles go from more inclusive
to more exclusive "universes."

The circle or "universe" on the left refers to the universe
of Sociology. Of course, there are many ways to divide up the "pie" of
Sociology, and I grant the point that the Collective Behavior category
is of a different logical status from the others since it is more of a
substantive area than an analytic one. Nevertheless, for my purposes,
its inclusion is justified on the ground that the study of "Collective
Behavior"--defined as ephemeral, non-institutionalized behavior--is
often the area which is assigned the responsibility for the study of
movements. And while I find much to disagree with about the "collective
behavior" paradigm or perspective, still there is much to learn from it,
also. There are many other substantive areas of sociology I could have
"plugged in" here, but this will have to do for purposes of illustration.

So I take out the "Collective Behavior" slice of the Sociology
pie (see the "a" arrow in Figure 4), and transform it into a universe
of its own. Here I cut up this pie into four different slices (see my
previous discussion of types of collective behavior on page 73, Table
14). Then I proceed by taking out the social movement slice (see the
"b" arrow in Figure 4) and transforming it into a universe of its own.

Then I extract the radical revolution slice of the pie (see
the "c" arrow) into a universe of its own. Thus I have derived the
major object of my study, the Anti-Colonial, revolutionary movement.
There are, of course, different types of Anti-Colonial movements, but

I do not classify them here.

Finally, an attempt was made to establish when revolutions begin and end.

Thus, I have established the meaning and the place of the dependent variable; therefore, I am now in a position to begin to provide an explanation for this object. But before I present my theory, it is necessary to discuss the whole question of theory construction. How is a theory to be validly constructed? In the next chapter the methodology of theory construction is addressed. That is, I present a discussion of some technical ways of explaining the object of investigation.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY: THEORY CONSTRUCTION

The goals of this chapter are fivefold: (1) to offer a brief
definition of "theory" within the context of sociology; (2) to indicate
the tasks of theory; (3) to examine the basic elements of any theory
and to state the importance of each to the process of theory construc-
tion; (4) to discuss briefly a criterion for evaluating all theories;
(5) to examine and compare three modes of theory construction indicating
through justification and elaboration which particular mode or combina-
tion of modes of theory construction will be used to construct my
theory.

As previously stated, a major goal of this paper is to
construct a theory about the causes of Anti-Colonial revolutions, not
to test or verify any theory. Moreover, it does not take a stretch
of the imagination to see that theory construction on the one hand and
verification (or testing) on the other involves two different proce-
dures. In sociology, however, it is all too often the case that
sociologists show a reluctance to engage in theory and hypothesis-
finding, opting for the verification of theory and hypothesis-testing

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(Bravo, 1976:20). But this choice on the part of sociologists to
overemphasize the latter is not completely warranted. This point
is made clear by Bravo:

> Having all the verified and confirmed hypotheses at one's
> fingertips is not enough. A collection of unrelated,
> verified facts is not the mark of a well developed science.
> Only a general theory can organize the myriad of our
> experiences into a manageable, explanatory whole (1976:20-21).

Although I recognize that theory has important functions for
testing and verification, this point should not be overemphasized.
In fact, I believe that when a sociologist engages in research in a
particular substantive area and is confronted with phenomena for which
there exist no partial or general theory, his task ". . . at least at
the current stage of development of sociology is primarily to invest
[construct] theories, and only secondarily to test them" (Stinchcombe,
1978:3).

Definition of Theory

In a general sense, a theory is a symbolic construction and
is defined according to the Dictionary of the Social Sciences as a
statement, using abstract language, which seeks to explain a range--
however broad or limited--of phenomena defined as social (1964:675).

This is indeed a very general definition and is indicative of
the many meanings which have been assigned to the term "theory" in the
sociological literature. Moreover, I believe that it is not necessary
or important to discuss these many meanings found in the literature,
since most competent works on "theory" deal extensively with them.
Additionally, since the definition of theory (given above) is all-
inclusive, probably an overwhelming proportion of sociologists would

tend to agree with it (at least in part) if directly confronted with it. However, one must admit that in actual practice, the notion of theory construction has very different meanings and elicits different tasks for different social scientists (Bravo, 1976:23).

My particular use of the term "theory" follows closely the distinctions developed by Hans L. Zetterberg in his work entitled On Theory and Verification in Sociology (1965).

Zetterburg (1966) maintains that the meaning of "theory" in sociology has developed from two broad traditions, i.e., humanistic and scientific.

Within the "humanistic tradition" of sociology, "theory" can mean ". . . two related but different things" (Zetterburg, 1965:21). The first of these meanings equates "theory" with the "classical" works in sociology. In this connection, those sociological writings of "older vintage" of at least a generation ago are likely to be called "theory." This is especially the case ". . . if the work is good enough to live in the memory of contemporary sociologists and to be read and cited by them" (Zetterburg, 1966:7). An example of this type of "theory," i.e., an anthology focusing on sociological criticism, is a work entitled Modern Sociological Theory: In Continuity and Change by Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff (1957).

Turning now to the "scientific tradition" of sociology, "theory" here can also mean two related but different things. The first of these meanings equates "theory" with sociological taxonomy. Seen in this manner, "theory" is ". . . an orderly schema defining anything to which sociologists and other social scientists should pay

attention" (Zetterburg, 1966:21). Additionally, after names have been
applied to those "subjects" which are deemed important by sociologists,
this type of theory encourages the reader to seek out or discover the
concrete manifestations (of those names) wherever they can be found
(Zetterburg, 1966:21). An example of this type of "theory" is found
in the work entitled Toward a General Theory of Action by Talcott
Parsons and Edward A. Shils (1959).

The second meaning given to "theory" within the scientific
tradition of sociology equates the concept with "systematically
organized, 'lawlike' propositions about society that can be supported
by evidence" (Zetterburg, 1966:22). When the concept of "theory" is
used in this paper it will be used in this last sense. However, I
note here also that the mode of formal theory construction which I
will use to accomplish my purposes do involve in part some of the other
conceptions of "theory," i.e., critique of past theories, and socio-
logical taxonomy. But, "these other conceptions or types of 'theory'
in and of themselves do not constitute full-fledged theory per se"
(Bravo, 1976:24).

After having presented a brief discussion and definition or
meaning of "theory" and alluding to how the concept will be used
throughout this paper, I turn to a discussion of The Tasks of Theory.

The Tasks of Theory

In attempting to summarize what I believe to be the tasks that
"theory" may be called upon to accomplish, I draw from two notable
works in theory construction or theorizing, i.e., that of Hans L.
Zetterburg (1966) and Jonathan H. Turner (1974). Thus, the following

are six tasks of "theory" for the social sciences.

The first task of "theory" is to provide the most parsimonious summary of actual or anticipated research findings. "In addition, a theory stated in an axiomatic mode enables the theorist to derive many theorems from a few propositions (axioms)" (Bravo, 1976:21).

The second task of "theory" is to coordinate research so that many separate findings can be arranged such that they support each other, and therefore yield the highest plausibility per finding. "In a very important sense, then, it is easier to confirm a theory than a single proposition" (Bravo, 1976:21).

The third task of "theory" is to locate the most strategic or manageable propositions for testing. By way of example of this third task of "theory" Bravo offers us a clearer understanding by summarizing Zetterburg as follows:

> . . . if we wanted to test a hypothesis for which empirical
> indicators were absent, it is still possible to test the
> hypothesis (especially if the theory is ordered in an
> axiomatic form) by "implication," i.e., by testing two or
> more propositions or hypotheses that implicate the original
> unsupported hypothesis (1976:21).

The fourth task of "theory" is to provide a limited area in which to locate the source of false propositions, when a hypothesis fails to meet an empirical test (Zetterburg, 1966:159-166). Again by summarizing Zetterburg, Bravo offers us a clearer understanding of this fourth task of "theory."

> For example, suppose that a theory is presented in an axiomatic
> form, and further suppose that we have derived from certain
> axioms a number of hypotheses or theorems to be tested. Assum-
> ing that we find one of the derived theorems to be false or
> unsupported, it is possible to backtrack and find the axioms
> or more basic propositions used to derive the false proposition,

and thus locate the source of the error--the "false" axioms from which the unsupported hypothesis was originally derived (1976:22).

The fifth task of "theory" is to first <u>explain</u> the causes of past events and second to predict when, where and how future events will occur. Reynolds (1971) gives us an example (at least in part) of this fifth task of "theory." Drawing from the symbolic logic of Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), and utilizing abstract theoretical statements independent of historical time, Reynolds is able to show in one way how past and future events can be explained and predicted (1971:4-7). For example, consider the following statement:

> <u>Statement 1</u>: If the rate of succession (changes in <u>membership)</u> in an organization is constant, then an increase in organizational size will be followed by an increase in formalization (of the structure and procedures).

In effect, the statement above says that under certain conditions (rate of succession) a change in one variable (organizational size) is followed by a change in another variable (formalization of the organization). Moreover, by applying a form of explanation adopted from symbolic logic to these types of statements, they can then be used to give added explanation and prediction of scientific events. For example, Statement 1 (stated above) can be used to explain a change in organizational characteristics.

If	the rate of succession is constant	and organizational size increases,	then organizational formalization increases.
In situation	the rate of succession in Organization Z is constant	and organizational size increased.	

Therefore   the formalization
of organization
Z increased.

(Reynolds, 1971:6)

In passing, it is also worth mentioning that statements which
are useful for explanation and prediction can also be used to organize
and classify (provide a typology). For example, the concepts contained
in the previous mentioned statement could be used to classify organiza-
tions according to their rate of succession, size, and degree of
formalization.

The sixth task of "theory" is to offer an intuitively pleasing
sense of "understandingi why and how events should occur. Further
elaboration on this sixth task of "theory" is provided in the following
statement made by Reynolds.

> . . . a sense of understanding is provided only when the
> causal mechanisms that link changes in one or more concepts
> (the independent variables) with changes in other concepts
> (the dependent variables) have been fully described (1971:7).

By merely logically deriving statements from what some social
scientists have best described as a scientific set of laws does not
provide a sense of understanding. It is only when a complete descrip-
tion of the causal mechanism has been presented that a pleasing sense
of "understanding" is provided. Utilizing the process that relates
an increase in organizational size to an increase in formalization,
a complete description of the causal process might be described as
follows:

> An increase in organizational size is considered to be an
> increase in the number of organization members.

> An increase in the number of members will cause an increase
> in the variation of training and experience of the members.

As the members vary more in terms of their training and
experience, their interpretation of rules and procedures
will vary more.

An increase in the variance in interpretation of organiza-
tional rules and procedures will cause a decrease of co-
ordination in organizational activities.

A decrease in coordination of organizational activities
causes a decrease in organizational performance.

A decrease in performance disturbs organizational administrators.

Organizational administrators attribute poor performance to a
decrease of coordination.

Organizational administrators attribute a decrease in coordination
to ambiguous rules and procedures.

To reduce the ambiguity of organizational rules, the organiza-
tional administrators increase the number of rules and make the
rules more detailed and specific. ·

An increase in the number of rules and their specificity is
generally considered an indication of an indicator of an
increase in formalization (Reynolds, 1975:8-9).

Again, the results of this process can be summarized by the

statement: as size increases, formalization increases. I also note

that even though there may be other processes that might "explain" the

relationship between organizational size and formalization, perhaps by

presenting the relationships as sucn, I have made them more explicit,

"Nevertheless, such description seems to provide a sense of under-

standing" (Reynolds, 1971:8).

After presenting my view of the tasks of "theory" I now turn

to a discussion of those elements which are basic to any theory, and

indispensable to the process of theory construction.

The Basic Elements of a Theory

As I have said elsewhere, a theory is a systematically

organized set of "lawlike" propositions about society that can be

supported by evidence. Another way of saying the same thing is that

"theory" is a system of information-packed descriptions of what is

known as a system of general explanation. Its basic unit is the

proposition, some of which must be capable of being proven true or

false, and which expresses the relationship between two or more

variables.[4]

Although the proposition is a key element of a theory, this is

not the point where one should start in order to construct the theory.

At best, the theorist must invariably pass through a series of stages

or steps that are part and parcel of the process of theory construction.

These steps to which I refer should be considered as a logic of theory

construction, and not necessarily as a psychological or temporal process

through which all previous scientific theorists have passed (Bravo,

1976:25). Nevertheless, however, we are dealing with a reconstructed

logic rather than a logic-in-use (Kaplan, 1964:10-11).[5] Moreover, it

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[4]My definition of a variable is: any concept including quan-
titative and qualitative characteristics assigned to it. This defini-
tion is significantly general to include those variables ranging from
high-level abstract theoretical terms to operationally defined research
variables. Moreover, this definition also allows for the exploration
of both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of sociological
phenomenon. This meaning is an active attempt to avoid the many fruit-
less and absurd positions associated with the meaning and use of the
term (Jordan, 1971:3). To put it more simply, it refers to anything
which varies without losing its identity.

[5]The logic-in-use depends on context to provide sufficient
closure for the particular use of the law then and there to be made.
In reconstructed logic, a formulation becomes fully specified on when
we insert an "other things being equal" clause to complete the
closure (Kaplan, 1964:95).

is all the more important that the basic steps or elements of a theory
be explicitly spelled out. It is also important to present a brief
statement about the relative importance of each element to the whole
enterprise of theory construction. According to this author there are
four basic elements involved when constructing a theory and they are
discussed in the following order: (1) the problem; (2) the conceptual
scheme; (3) the propositions; and (4) the propositional arrangement.

The first element necessary to begin constructing a theory is
the problem. This is indeed the case because of the nature of scien-
tific inquiry which is geared to the solution of problems (Selltiz,
Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook, 1959:31). But, as the first basic step in
theory construction, the problem should not be viewed as just merely
asking a question. In effect, the problem must be properly phrased in
order that the theorist can successfully construct a theory. But, what
is the proper way to phrase the problem?

The problem must be phrased in such a way that its semantical
structure produces an indeterminant or problematic experience which
demands a theoretical or empirical solution (Jordan, 1971:16). To
meet this criterion, at least in part, the problem must begin with the
phrase "why is it that . . .," and must also contain a comparison
between or a variation within, the phenomena being studied.

Now I will give an actual example of a properly formulated
problem. The reader should keep in mind, however, that the example
given will serve as the first step in the process of constructing my
own theory in this paper.

So, drawing from the Caribbean area which was known as the

French West Indies during the latter quarter of the 18th century, the problem is phrased as follows: Why is it that a "successful" slave and Anti-Colonial revolution occurred in San Domingue (Haiti) at this time and not in such comparable places as the Caribbean islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe?

Without this initial step in properly formulating the problem for investigation, any attempt at theory construction would indeed be a fruitless adventure, and would not lead to general explanatory theory as I use the term in this paper.

It seems appropriate at this point, just for the sake of clarity, to inform the reader that the research problem which I have underlined above and which will guide my theory, is formalized and laid out in a more detailed fashion in Chapter VI.

Also, for the purpose of this particular study, the problem which I have briefly discussed concerning the San Domingue Revolution, may be viewed as the indeterminate situation of the inquiry. While the theory, which I will present later in Chapter VI may be viewed as the determinate situation or solution of the inquiry.

The second element of a theory is the conceptual scheme which is sometimes referred to as the frame of reference. A conceptual scheme is a list of the most important concepts from which the complete theory will be built. Before I present some of the advantages of a good conceptual scheme to the enterprise of theory construction, it might be helpful to first clarify the term "concept."

Concepts are abstract labels applied to categories or classes of phenomena. In the process of constructing theories, they are the

basic units of analysis. In the most abstract sense, concepts are
relatively independent of time and space. Moreover, because they
denote or point to phenomena, concepts tend to isolate features of the
world which are considered to be important by the theorist.

In theory construction, abstract concepts are especially
crucial because they transcend particular events or situations and
point to the common properties of similar events and situations"
(Turner, 1974:3). The following example by Turner makes this point
explicit.

> The importance of abstractness can perhaps be illustrated by
> the fact that people watched apples fall from trees for
> centuries, but real understanding of this phenomenon came
> only with the more abstract concept of gravity, which allowed
> for many similar occurrences to be visualized and incorporated
> into a theoretical statement that explained much more than why
> apples should fall from trees (1974:3-4).

Being the building blocks of theory, concepts are flexible.
That is, they also help us to differentiate things, events, situations,
conditions and so forth (Jordan and Silberstein, 1976:13). In other
words, when transformed into variables, they provide the only means by
which the theory can be connected to concrete events in the world.[6]
This connection may be defined by using either theoretical or opera-
tional definitions. These two definitions are nothing more than two
different ways of comprehending the abstract concept (Hage, 1972:66).
To illustrate this point, I use the following example.

Suppose we take the concept of "centralization of society" and
express it in terms of the two definitions. On the one hand,

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[6]A variable implies a concept plus its attribute.

centralization of society may be defined theoretically as "the distri-
bution of power to make basic deicisions about such things as the
expenditure of national revenues, the appointment of key leaders, and
the choice of national priorities" (Hage, 1972:66). On the other hand,
defined operationally, the same concept could mean "the frequency of
turnover of parties in elections" (taken from Lipset, 1961, Ch. 2; also
quoted by Hage, 1972:66). Although each definition makes us perceive
the concept centralization in a different way, it is more important to
understand that these two types of definitions, i.e., theoretical and
operational, exist at different levels of abstraction (Hage, 1972:67).
Since my major purpose is theory construction and not verification, I
am more concerned with the theoretical definitions of concepts. How-
ever, being so concerned does not solve the problem of transforming
concepts into variables.

This transformation is accomplished when we <u>attribute</u> to
concepts specific characteristics which can vary, i.e., size, duration,
degree, amount, etc. It is this transformation which "allows the
theorist to specify and/or quantify the notion expressed in the concept"
(Bravo, 1976:27). Moreover, it is only after this transformation has
been accomplished that the theorist can refer to the conception as a
variable (Jordan and Silberstein, 1976:13). Bravo offers clarity to
this transformation in the following examples:

> [Suppose] we are interested in the relationship between
> education and prejudice, both of which are concepts, we need
> to specify or qualify these concepts more before they can be
> measured. We may speak of the "level of education" and the
> "degree of prejudice;" these variables can [now] be quantified
> and related to each other since the idea expressed in them
> vary according to certain measurable values (brackets mine)
> (1976:27-28).

And now, I shall state, as promised, some of the advantages of having

a good conceptual scheme.

The first major advantage of a conceptual scheme is that it

eliminates tautological definitions which can exist between two or more

concepts; second, it helps to locate new definitions for familiar ideas;

and third, it helps to expose primitive terms to the researcher's view

(Hage, 1972:115-116). There are two types of "primitive terms,"

"minimum" and "borrowed." The former refers to those terms which are

unique to a particular academic discipline. The latter refers to

those terms which are known in common and shared with other academic

disciplines (Bravo, 1976:28). "Derived terms," on the other hand,

refers to those terms which can be described by using primitive terms

(Reynolds, 1971:46).[7]

The third element of a theory is the proposition. Propositions

are statements of the relationship between at least two variables. The

propositions are directly concerned with the event of interest whereby

some of them may be supported or disproven by empirical evidence. A

complete proposition should have the following elements in it: rela-

tional terms (e.g., lower or higher), variables (a concept plus its

attribute, e.g., the level of political alienation), the unit of

analysis (e.g., potential participants of revolutions), and finally

empirical indicators or operational definitions (e.g., Srole's Anomia

Scale); all these are necessary for the first half of the complete

proposition, and must be repeated for the second half of the complete,

---

[7]By combining primitive terms with such logical terms as "and,"
"imply," "equal to," etc. derived terms can be formed (Bravo, 1976:28).

single proposition.

A specific illustration is in order, e.g., take the following proposition: the lower (relational) the political alienation (power-lessness) level (a variable = a concept plus its attribute) of the potential participants in revolutionary movements (unit of analysis), the greater (relational) the amount of actual participation (variable = a concept plus its attribute) in revolutions (unit of analysis). The powerlessness type of alienation could be measured by the Srole Anomia Scale (empirical indicator). In my theory which will be presented later, the empirical indicator requirement will, of course, be dropped since I am not concerned with testing or verifying the propositions in this work.

In order to add additional information to my discussion of propositions Table 16 has been constructed. In Table 16 below, by cross-classifying the degree of empirical support (e.g., low, wanting and high, sufficient) with whether the propositions are derivable from a theory (e.g., yes and no), four types of propositions are explicated.

(1) (See category one in Table 16.) Propositions which have low empirical support and are not derivable from a theory are classified as presuppositions, fantasy, non-theoretical hypotheses, imagination, and the like. Additionally, this type of proposition is ordinary and of low informative value.

(2) Propositions which have a high degree of empirical support and are not derivable from a theory are characterized as empirical generalizations. This type of proposition is also of the ordinary variety and has low informative value.

TABLE 16

TYPES OF PROPOSITIONS (i.e., statements of relationships between
two or more concepts)

DERIVABLE FROM A MEMORY?	DEGREE OF EMPIRICAL SUPPORT			
	Low, Wanting		High, Sufficient	
YES	Theoretical Hypotheses (4)		Theoretical Invariances (3) Understanding Laws	High Information Value Theoretical Propositions
	Presuposition (1) Fantasy Non-theoretical Hypotheses Imagination Serendipity		Empirical Generalizations (2)	Low Information Value Ordinary Propositions
	Hypotheses		Invariances	

(3) Propositions which have a high degree of empirical support and are derivable from a theory are classified as theoretical invariances, laws, etc. This type of proposition is theoretical and has high informative value.

(4) Propositions which have a low degree of empirical support but are derivable from a theory are characterized as theoretical hypotheses. This type of proposition also is theoretical and has a high informative value as well.

It is this last type of proposition, i.e., the theoretical hypotheses which I will almost always be dealing with in this paper.

And now I think it is appropriate to spell out some criteria which can be used to select propositions. Thus, in this paper I will employ the following criteria for selecting propositions: (1) select as propositions those statements which are not inconsistent with each other, (2) select as propositions those statements known not to be false or ultimately untestable, (3) select as propositions whenever possible, those statements that state a systematic relationship between two or more concepts taken from the conceptual scheme, and (4) select as propositions those statements that have received a high degree of empirical support or have achieved the status of laws; I will not, however, restrict my choice of propositions to only "law-like" statements (Bravo, 1976:35).

The fourth element of a propositional theory is the propositional arrangement. Here, the propositions are systematically organized and related to each other utilizing some type of deductive or logical mode such that some can be deduced from or encompassed or entailed by

others. This last element of a theory is highly significant and important. Moreover, because a theory is the interrelationship between at least two propositions, this last element is the full-fledged theory.

Furthermore, any effort which does not include this final element cannot possibly be a scientific, sociological theory as the term is used in this paper (Bravo, 1976:29).

Now that I have discussed the basic elements which make up a theory; it seems appropriate that once a theory has been defined as such, one should have some criteria for evaluating it. In the next section I present a brief discussion of criteria for evaluating all theories. However, in presenting these criteria there is some overlap with the previous section dealing with the tasks of theory.

Criteria for Evaluating All Theories

Once a theory has been constructed, there should be certain standards provided for judging it. One of the critical questions which should be asked of any theory is: How much of a theory is it? A question of this nature cannot be answered adequately unless some general standard or criterion is applied in evaluating the theory. The following is a brief discussion of five criteria for evaluating any theory. They will be presented in the following order: (1) the scope of a theory; (2) parsimony; (3) the truth value of a theory; (4) the rules of correspondence; and (5) the amount of research stimulated.

The scope of any theory ". . . is a measure of how many of the basic problems in the discipline or specialty are handled by the same theory" (Hage, 1972:178). Ideally, theories should be broad in scope. A relatively precise way of measuring the scope of a theory is to

compare the number of derived terms to the number of primitive ones. Thus, the greater the ratio of derived terms to primitive terms the broader the scope of the theory (Hage, 1972:178-179).

Another term which can be used synonymously with scope is "generality." When Merton (1968) developed his theories of the middle range they were viewed as theories of medium scope. In other words, Merton attempted to develop a theory of role conflict, a theory of status disequilibrium, and a theory of differential association. These theories are not designed specifically to be broad in scope because they only ". . . speak to one or two problems and not others" (Hage, 1972:178).

But, why is the scope or generality of a theory so important? The answer is simply that theories of broad scope tend to last much longer than those of lesser scope. If one had to choose between two competing theories which are equivalent in every aspect except scope, then the scientifically minded individual would prefer the one with the greater scope. Moreover, as theories become broader in scope, encompassing more of a particular discipline's major problems or more of the particular phenomenon under study, the theory tends to stand without revisions for longer periods of time (Hage, 1972:179).

The second criterion for evaluating any theory is parsimony. When the theorist requires that his theory be "parsimonious" it means that it should be free of redundancy. In other words, the theory should be relatively simple, especially in comparison to other possible theories accounting for the same explanation (Wallace, 1977:112). Popper offers us a clear reason why the parsimonious rule should be

used to evaluate theories:

> To understand why simplicity is so highly desirable there is·no
> need for us to assume a "principle of economy of thought" or
> anything of the kind. Simple statements . . . are to be prized
> more highly than less simple ones because they tell us more;
> because their empirical content is greater; [etc.] (brackets
> are mine), (1961:142, 145).

Additionally, when we focus on the parsimony of a theory we
are dealing with a property of the theoretical statements. In this
connection, "we are interested in explaining as much as we can with as
little as possible" (Hage, 1972:179). It is for this reason that
parsimony is sometimes referred to as the evaluation of the "power"
of a theory.

The third criterion for evaluating any theory is the truth
value of the theory. When utilizing this criterion, the theorist is
attempting to assess the accuracy of explanation of a theory. That
is, an attempt is made to determine how close the theory corresponds
to reality, i.e., the empirical phenomenon which it seeks to explain.
Sociological theory or any other type of scientific theory can best be
viewed as an explanation which approximates this reality.

The fourth criterion for evaluating any theory is the rules
of correspondence. In reference to an explanatory and predictive
theory, ". . . theoretically deduced predictions or hypotheses do not
lead immediately and unambiguously to observations" (Wallace, 1977:66).
It is for this reason that abstract concepts should be accompanied by
certain rules of correspondence or operational definitions. Nagel
agrees with this point as he concludes:

> If a theory is to be used as an instrument of explanation and
> prediction, it must somehow be linked with observable materials.

> The indispensability of such linkages has been
> repeatedly stressed in recent literature, and a variety of
> labels have been coined for them: coordinating definitions,
> operational definitions, semantical rules, correspondence
> rules, epistemic correlations, and rules of interpretation
> (1961:93).

In short, an operational definition is defined as a set of procedural

instructions which tell the investigator how to recognize phenomena in

the real world which are represented by an abstract concept (Turner,

1974:4).

Moreover, if the theory or parts of the theory is to be

verified or tested, then for sure one needs observable indicators, i.e.,

operational definitions, for at least some of the abstract concepts in

the theory. An illustration of this point is offered to us by

Zetterburg:

> Suppose that we are interested in the verification of the
> hypothesis: The greater the division of labor is in a
> society, the less the rejection of deviates in the same
> society. For its verification we first need to interpret
> the nominal definitions of an hypothesis into terms more
> acceptable for research. We may, for example, select the
> number of occupations to stand for the division of labor
> and we may select the proportion of laws requiring the
> death penalty, deportation and long prison terms (but not
> fines) to stand for the degree of rejection of deviates
> from society norms. These interpretations of the nominal
> definitions we term operational definitions. Operational
> we call the definitions that refer to measurements or
> enumerations (1954:29-30).

In sum, it seems clear that what is needed for theory are

abstract concepts which are not tied to particular temporal or spatial

settings. However, after one has constructed a theory, if the major

concern is to link the abstract concepts to the real world directly,

and for predictive purposes, then one needs to be concerned with

operational definitions.

The fifth criterion for evaluating any theory is the amount of research stimulated by the theory. It is not mere speculation that some theories generate more research than others. For example, Parsons (1951) general theory of action is hard pressed to find a competitor. Since this work was published it has generated a tremendous amount of sociological research. I note, however, that the research in this particular case has mainly been of a theoretical variety. On the other hand, however, Merton's Theory of Anomie (1949) seems to have stimulated much empirical research, especially in the study of deviance.

Finally, in order for a theory to generate research, it must obviously be stimulating to scholars in the academic world. Of course, if the theory can be evaluated highly on each of the above-mentioned criteria, then it stands a better chance of stimulating a great deal of research.

Now I turn to a discussion of three modes of theory construction with an added note on what particular mode or combination of modes I will use to construct my theory of Anti-Colonial revolution.

Three Modes of Theory Construction

In the sociological literature on theory construction investigators seem to disagree as to which mode or format should be used to organize systematically propositional statements. While this particular disagreement will probably continue for some extended period of time, the author sees no reason to become bogged down in the controversy. It seems much more appropriate to simply argue that propositional statements should be systematically organized in accordance with logical rules of the theorist's own choosing. Thus, in this section

I will present three of the most common modes of theory construction
which are: (1) the set of laws mode; (2) axiomatic mode; and (3) the
systems' mode. Drawing heavily from Reynolds (1971), Zetterburg (19650,
and Silberstein and Jordan (1976; 1977), I will discuss each of the
three modes of theory construction; however, with a greater emphasis
placed on the systems' mode. In fact, it is this mode of theory
construction, i.e., the systems' type, which will be used to construct
my theory.

<div align="center">The Set-of-Laws Mode</div>

The set-of-laws approach is based on propositional statements
which can be considered laws. Under this approach laws are those
theoretical statements which have "earned" the title of "theory" as a
result of verified, empirical research. The set-of-laws mode requires
that all concepts used in the theory must be accompanied by operational
definitions. This requirement is one which allows the "hard-nosed"
researcher the opportunity to identify the concepts in concrete
situations (Reynolds, 1971:83). If a particular theoretical concept
is viewed as unmeasurable or hypothetical, then it is not used in the
application of this mode of theory construction.

Even though the laws which characterize this mode usually
describe a causal relationship between two concepts, they (the laws)
nevertheless will all contain theoretical concepts that can be measured
directly in concrete settings (Reynolds, 1975:84).

Scientific knowledge as a manifestation of a set-of-laws does
tend to be somewhat useful for providing a typology, providing predic-
tions and low level explanations of concrete individual phenomena.

Also, "if the statements are sufficiently precise," this approach allows

the potential for statistical control (Reynolds, 1971:90).

By prohibiting the use of unmeasurable or hypothetical con-

structs in the theoretical statements, the set-of-laws mode prohibits

the use of many "dispositional" concepts. These types of concepts

". . . refer to the tendency of 'things' to create certain effects,

i.e., magnetism, authoritarianism, etc." (Reynolds, 1975:91). In

operational definition terms the investigator can only measure the

consequences of a "dispositional" concept, i.e., attraction to iron,

tendency to perceive in absolutes (good or bad), etc., but not the

actual concept itself (Reynolds, 1971:91).

Additionally, the theoretical statements which make up a set

of laws are for the most part supposed to be "independent, unrelated

to one another" (Reynolds, 1975:91). Bravo summarizes the meaning of

this point:

> This statement, . . . , should be taken to mean that the
> relationship between every set of concepts requires that
> it be raised to the status of a "law" and that one state-
> ment cannot be used in support of another. This require-
> ment has the disadvantage that a theory stated in such a
> mode would require a larger set of statements and that
> empirical support for the statements or laws is performed
> on an individual basis (1976:30).

If the set-of-laws mode was compared to other ways of sys-

tematically organizing theoretical statements, it would undoubtedly

require much more research, therefore comparatively speaking it may

be described as inefficient (Reynolds, 1971:91). Finally, this

particular approach cannot possibly provide a "sense of understanding"

to such issues as: "What social processes cause all organized

collectivities to develop oligarchial leadership structures?"

(Reynolds, 1971:90). And, what social and political processes cause all Anti-Colonial revolutions?

The Axiomatic Mode

The second mode of theory construction to be discussed is the axiomatic approach. Unlike the set-of-laws approach, the axiomatic mode does not require that all its propositions be of the "law" type. In fact, the axiomatic approach can have the best of both worlds, its theory may be composed both of propositions which have received empirical support and of propositions which have never been tested (Bravo, 1976:31). This characteristic makes it possible for the set of definitions to include both theoretical and operational ones.

The axiomatic approach to theory construction is also characterized by other important features such as: (1) a set of existence statements that characterize those situations in which the theory is applicable, (2) a set of relational statements, which can be divided into two types: axioms or theoretical statements from which all other statements in the theory can be deduced, and propositions or theoretical statements which are deduced from combinations of axioms, axioms and propositions or other propositions, and (3) a logical system which requires that all concepts be linked together to form statements, and that propositions be derived from axioms, combinations of axioms and propositions and other propositions (Reynolds, 1971:92-93).

It seems appropriate at this point to offer an example of the axiomatic mode of theory construction. The example which follows comes from a work called The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups by Terence K. Hopkins (1964). I quote directly from Reynold's summarization of

this work:

> The following concepts, all referring to the characteristics of the members in a small face-to-face group, are used by Hopkins:
>
> Rank--The generally agreed-upon worth or standing of a member relative to the other members, as evaluated by group members.
>
> Centrality--Closeness to the center of the group's interaction network; thus refers simultaneously to the frequency with which a member participates in interaction with other group members and the range of other group members he interacts with.
>
> Observability--Relative ability to observe the actual norms of the other group members and hence the norms of the group.
>
> Conformity--Degree of congruence between a member's actual belief in relation to a norm and the group position on that norm (the average of the other members).
>
> Influence--Relative influence of the member on the actions of the group members.
>
> The only scope condition is that the theory applies only to small interacting groups, where each member has the opportunity to form a personal impression of every other member.
>
> Hopkins selected nine statements as axioms:
>
> A-1 If rank, then centrality.
> A-2 If centrality, then observability.
> A-3 If centrality, then conformity.
> A-4 If observability, then conformity.
> A-5 If conformity, then observability.
> A-6 If observability, then influence.
> A-7 If conformity, then influence.
> A-8 If influence, then conformity.
> A-9 If influence, then rank.
>
> These axioms can be combined to produce new statements, or propositions. For example, axioms A-1 and A-2 may be combined to produce a new proposition as follows:
>
> A-1 If rank, then centrality.
> A-2 If centrality, then observability.
> Therefore: If rank, then observability.
>
> Another set of axioms may be combined to produce the same proposition.

A-1 If rank, then centrality.
A-3 If centrality, then conformity.
A-5 If conformity, then observability.

Using all possible combinations of axioms, it is possible to
produce eleven propositions, some in as many as four ways
(four different combinations of axioms) (1971:88-94).

When comparing the axiomatic mode with the set-of-laws mode,
the former appears to have the following advantages: (1) Since some of
the statements can be deduced from others, it is not required that all
concepts be measurable; (2) the number of statements that express the
explanatory power of the theory need not be large; (3) research in this
case tends to be more efficient, since the theory is based on an inter-
related set of statements. Hence, empirical support for any one
statement will tend to provide support for the entire theory; and
(4) the axiomatic mode of theory is compatible with the systems' mode
(or causal process mode) in the sense that one can be transformed into
the other (Reynolds, 1971:96). This last point, however, should be
clarified. For example, one should note that when the axiomatic mode
is transformed into the systems' mode the scope of the theory is
broadened; but, when the reverse occurs the theory loses some generality
(Reynolds, 1971:96; Silberstein and Jordan, 1979:11).

From my discussion of the axiomatic mode of theory construction
one may get the impression that it is a reasonably sound way to
construct a theory. I think this is a reasonable assumption. However,
when using this mode of theory construction the theorist must inevitably
confront one of the most important problems, which at this point in time
seems to be unavoidable. The problem to which I refer is--how to
select the axioms. To the author's knowledge, there exist no "hard and

fast" rules or standardized criteria in the social sciences which
governs the systematic selection of axioms.

However, until something better is developed, the author tends
to agree with the following criteria developed by Turner for the
selection of axioms: (1) axioms should be consistent with each other,
however, they do not necessarily have to be logically interrelated;
(2) the axioms should be the highest abstract statements in theory;
(3) the axioms should state causal relationships between abstract
concepts; (4) axioms should be "lawlike" causal statements in the sense
that those concrete propositions which are derived from them have not
been disproven by empirical research; and (5) axioms should contain
an "intuitive" plausibility which makes their "truth" appear to be
"self-evident" (1974:10).

And now after presenting the axiomatic mode of theory building,
I will now turn my attention to the most important mode, at least for
my purposes, i.e., the systems' mode.

The Systems' Mode

The systems' mode of theory construction is by far more
comprehensive than the two previous ones discussed. This mode of
theory construction is sometimes referred to as the "causal process"
mode (see, for example, Reynolds, 1971:83; and Turner, 1974:11).
However, for my purposes, I prefer to use the phrase Systems' Mode
as a title, and as the "best" technical way to construct a theory.
I will begin by first presenting the Reynolds (1971) view coupled with
the aid of Turner's interpretation of this work. Second, because
Reynolds does not present the systems' mode of theory construction

in a complete fashion, the work of Jordan and Silberstein (1976) and Zetterburg (1965) will be used to bridge this gap. That is, through this connection, as the alert reader might discover, a more adequate foundation will be laid for the construction of my theory.

As stated above in slightly different terms, the systems' mode of theory construction takes on a somewhat different form than the axiomatic mode. First, like axiomatic theory, it contains concepts, some of which are highly abstract, while others are more concrete. The latter types being accompanied by the appropriate operational definitions. Second, and again, much like axiomatic theory, it contains a set of existence statements that describe those situations in which the causal statements apply. Third, and unlike axiomatic theory, the systems' mode contains a set of "causal" statements which describe the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable without utilizing a strict hierarchical ordering of statements. Rather, "causal" statements are all considered to be of equal importance, although it is clear that some of the independent variables have a stronger impact on dependent variables than others (Turner, 1974:11).

Next I will present an example of the systems' (or "causal" process) mode of theory construction as presented by Reynolds. As with the axiomatic mode, the following example was also taken from the work called The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups by Terence K. Hopkins. The reader should note, however, that the definitions of the concepts in the example that follows have already been presented in the previous discussion on the axiomatic mode (see page 106). Therefore, I will not repeat these definitions. I will now quote directly.

A number of processes were described in the original version of
this theory. However, Hopkins suggested that they were all
activated in certain situations, encompassed by the following
scope statement:

In any interacting group, where each member has the opportunity
to form a personal impression of every other member, the
processes related to the exercise of influence are activated.

One statement, with enough empirical support that it can be
considered a law, has been chosen for this example:

If centrality, then rank.
The following set of statements describe the basis on which a
causal process can be used to explain this latter statement:

If centrality, then conformity.
If centrality, then observability.
If conformity, then observability.
If observability, then conformity.
If conformity, then influence.
If observability, then influence.
If influence, then rank.

They can be represented diagrammatically as a causal process as
follows:

```
                          Conformity
   (1)                   ↗↑       |↘
Centrality  ⤲                      ⤵ Influence ⟶ Rank
                       ↘ |       ↑ ↗
                         Observability
```

Given this process, a number of additional statements may be
derived:

If centrality, then influence.
If conformity, then rank.
If observability, then rank.

(Reynolds, 1971:102-103).

At this point Reynolds seems to think that because the above diagram-

matic representation (see Number 1) can also be "broken down" into four

different causal processes (see Numbers 2-5 below) that this constitutes

a problem for the systems' mode of theory construction. How so? Well,

let us first take the diagrammatic representation above and present it

as four different causal processes as follows:

(2)
Centrality → Conformity → Influence → Rank

Observability

Conformity

(3)
Centrality → Observability → Influence → Rank

---

(4)
Centrality → Conformity
Conformity ↓ Observability → Influence → Rank
Observability

Conformity

(5)
Centrality → Observability ↑ Conformity → Influence → Rank

Now Reynolds' describes what he perceives to be the problem:

> Is each of these to be considered a separate process, or is the combination of these four to be considered a single process? No definitive answer is possible, for the word "process" is used in both ways. However, one should be careful in both reading and writing when the word "process" is used, so that the exact set of statements under discussion is clear (1971: 105-106).

What does Reynolds mean here? His meaning is unclear. It appears that he is confused over the use of the term "process." There is a serious semantical problem. In fact, I can think of at least four possible things he might mean: (1) he could be referring to single or multiple processes; (2) he could be referring to the "obvious" fact that the same concepts can yield different theories: (3) he could be referring to single or multiple causation; and (4) of the five theories,

he could be asking the question: which theory is preferable? I will discuss each of these in turn.

(1) The first is unclear because each of the four theories (e.g., 2,3,4, and 5) might be viewed as a single or multiple process. Exactly what is Reynolds saying? What is his meaning of the word "process?"

(2) The second is unclear because perhaps he simply wants to distinguish between different theories derived from the same concepts as opposed to those derived from different concepts.

(3) The third is unclear because in reference to single or multiple causation, obviously, he has accepted multiple causation, but seems confused about it.

(4) The fourth is unclear because he may be asking the question: which theory (e.g., 1 through 5) is true? Put another way: which theory does one finally accept? The answer is quite "simple." One selects that formulation, "process" or system which fits (i.e., is isomorphoric with) the facts. For example, either centrality is (or is not) in fact related to observability. If it is, then a line must be drawn between them; if not--no line.

One substantive problem with the systems' mode of theory construction according to Reynolds is: "When do you stop?" (1971:107). In other words, how does one decide ". . . when all the steps, or statements, in a causal linkage have been specified" (Reynolds, 1971:197). Reynolds points out that presently there exists no objective answer to this question but perhaps one will have to settle with the "intersubjective" agreement among concerned scientists. Moreover, when an

investigator and his co-workers agree that all the steps in a causal

process have been identified, the time has come to stop working on the

theory (1971:107). In short, the theory is defined as complete.

Another note of criticism is warranted. To be frank about it,

I really don't agree with what Reynolds considers to be a "problem."

However, his difficulty does imply that theoretical thinking may be

more complex and more important than many "barefoot empiricists"

imagine. The answer to the question, when does one stop, is never.

Science does not imply absolute knowledge. A true science always

continues to theorize and to test theory. A particular scientist, may

of course, specialize in construction or verification or both.

But, what are some of the advantages of the systems' mode,

according to Reynolds, over the set-of-laws approach? Three important

advantages come to mind: (1) it allows for concepts which are

unmeasurable; (2) it paves the way for more efficient research by

making it possible to test interrelated sets of statements, and;

(3) it allows the theorist to examine all of the consequences of the

theory (Reynolds, 1971:106).

Furthermore, it is the systems' mode of theory construction

which appears to be the way that most theories in the social sciences

are implicitly developed. If this is true of course then it may

indicate that this particular mode ". . . is perhaps more manageable

and convenient than the other two modes of theory construction"

(Bravo, 1976:38).

Although Reynolds' discussion of the systems' mode of theory

construction is a reasonably adequate job, it is far from complete.

What about it is incomplete? For example, Reynolds is unclear about whether his "causal process" method requires causal relations (in the classical sense) or whether "causal" here simply refers to any systematic relationship. He fails to provide us with any classification of relationships. Can different types of relationships, causal or non-causal, be found legitimately within the same theory?

My answer to these and other associated questions will be organized as follows: (1) an elaboration of the need to specify the type of relationship; (2) the construction of a typology of relationships (which will require a prior typology of the different dimensions or attributes of all linkages, e.g., direction, certainty, etc.); and (3) a more detailed focus on the feedback type of relationship.

Thus, when Reynolds discusses the relationships between concepts (variables), he is sometimes vague and not specific. This in turn weakens his discussion as to exactly what constitutes a systems' (or a "causal" process) theory. This weakness is seen through Reynolds' use of Hopkins' theory. Bravo summarizes this weakness as follows:

> Reynolds does not really explicitly state whether all the relationships in the theory have to be "causal" relationships in the classical sense, e.g., where a variable "A" is directly related to another variable "B," "A" always precedes or is an antecedent of "B," and in which an increase or decrease in "A" will produce a similar effect on "B" (1976:39).

Although Reynolds does not explicitly state his position on allowing other types of relationships, he nevertheless implicitly suggests that not all relationships need be restricted to "causal" types. This indication is given in his presentation of Hopkins' theory (see page 106) where he shows for example, that a reciprocal

relationship between conformity and observability is theoretically

viable in a systems' theory.

Although the reciprocal relationship mentioned is an intricate

part of Hopkins' theory, it is not discussed in any substantial way by

Reynolds. In fact, in his work called A Primer in Theory Construction

(1971), the only place where he considers it important enough to put

forth written expressions about reciprocal relationships is in a brief

and unclear footnote (1971:109).

It is the author's view that one of the major advantages in

utilizing the systems' mode of theory construction is that it allows

the use of several different types of relationships between variables.

It is on this point that Reynolds is vague and unclear. Moreover, the

author sees no logical reason why "independent" variables cannot inter-

act with each other in various types of relationships to help explain

a "dependent" variable.

In a reciprocal relationship, for example, the independent-

and-dependent-variable distinction is less than useful or at best

awkward since the same variable is both independent and dependent in

rapid alternation.

And now I attempt to bridge the gap which was created by

Reynolds' failure to discuss certain other kinds of relationships

between variables that are part and parcel of the systems' mode of

theory construction. My intention here is not to indict Reynolds but

to add additional information which is necessary in order that the

writer may construct more complete theory utilizing the systems'

approach.

Before I present the types of formal relationships between variables, I think it is wise to present first the formal dimensions among variables.

Zetterburg (1965) generates several questions concerning the linkages between any two variables: What is the direction of the linkage? How certain is it? Is time involved? Does the relationship depend on other variables? How necessary is the relationship? In Table 17 below these questions have to do with: "Direction," "Certainty," "Time," "Contingency," and "Necessity."

Additionally, these questions are capable of dichotomous answers, i.e., a "usual" and an "unusual" set. Considering the dimensions in respective order, there are two basic assumptions associated with these two arrangements. For example, the "usual" set assumes that social relationships are generally reversible: if X, then Y; and if Y, then X, stochastic: if X, then probably Y, sequential: if X, then later Y, contingent: if X, then Y, but only if Z, substitutable: if X, then Y; but if Z, then also Y, and interdependent: composed of reversible, sequential and contingent linkages.

On the other hand, the "unusual" set which seems to have a better fit for non-social or physical relationships, makes the assumption that these relationships are generally irreversible: if X, then Y; but if Y, then no conclusion about X, deterministic: if X, then always Y, coextensive: if X, then also Y, sufficient: if X, then Y, regardless of anything else, and necessary: if X, and only if X, then Y. This constitutes a list of dimensions which the investigator can utilize when attempting to specify the linkages between variables.

TABLE 17

DIMENSION OF LINKAGES BETWEEN VARIABLES

LINKAGES: Refers to the type of relationship which exists between the variables of a proposition. There are six basic types.*

DIMENSIONS	USUAL SET	UNUSUAL SET
1. "Direction"	Reversible: if X, then y; and if Y, then X	Irreversible: If X, then Y; but if Y, then no conclusion about X
2. "Certainty"	Stochastic: if X, then probably Y	Deterministic: If X, then always Y
3. "Time"	Sequential: if X, then later Y	Coextensive: If X, then also Y
4. "Contingency"	Contingent: if X, then Y, but only if Z	Sufficient: if X, then Y, regardless of anything else
5. "Necessity"	Substitutable: if X, then Y; but if Z, then also Y	Necessary: If X, and only if X, then Y
6. "Special Case"	Interdependent: (composed of reversible, sequential and contingent linkages)	

EXAMPLE: Max Weber's famous thesis about the relation between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism may be viewed as an irreversible, stochastic, sequential, contingent, and substitutable proposition in its linkages among its variables.

*Adopted from Zetterburg, 1965:69-74 by Leonard H. Jordan, Jr.

But what we need now is additional analysis which will allow us to specify more formally the relationships between variables. In essence, what we need is a typology of relationships. The information presented in Table 18 meets this need. It should be noted, however, that the dimension of temporality has been added to Zetterburg's original dimensions which were presented in Table 17. "Temporality refers to whether or not the flow of influence among variables is specified" (Jordan and Silberstein, 1976:16). For example, in terms of time, both the causal and the teleological relationships are sequential, but in terms of the flow of influence one is from past to future (causal), and the other is from future to past (teleological). Another way of looking at this latter relationship is that "future oriented ends account for, or determined present means" (Jordan and Silberstein, 1976:16).

The formal relationships created by the typology presented in Table 18 allows me to clearly and systematically specify the linkages involved in the classical forms of logic: causal, teleological, functional, and feedback.

A causal relationship can be specified as irreversible, deterministic, sequential, sufficient, necessary, temporally specified and with the flow of influence from past to future, i.e., "A" in the past leads to "B" in the future.

A teleological relationship (although not used in science) can be specified as irreversible, deterministic, sequential, sufficient, necessary, temporally specified, with the flow of influence from future to past, i.e., "B" in the future leads to "A" in the past. To put it

TABLE 18

A TYPOLOGY OF FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS

DIMENSIONS	TYPES OF FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS			
	CAUSAL	TELEOLOGICAL	FUNCTIONAL	FEEDBACK
Direction	Irreversible	Irreversible	Reversible	Reversible
Certainty	Deterministic	Deterministic	Either	Either
Time	Sequential	Sequential	Coextensive	Sequential
Contingency	Sufficient	Sufficient	Either	Either
Necessity	Necessary	Necessary	Either	Either
Temporarily	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

P^* F   P   F   ----------   P   F/P   F

A ⟶ B   A ⟶ B   A ◀- - -▶B

*P = Past; F = Future; T_1, T_2, etc. = Time One, Time Two, etc.

Source: Modified from Zetterburg (1965) by Jordan and Silberstein (1976:46).

another way, future oriented end account for or determine, present

means" (Jordan and Silberstein, 1976:16).

A functional relationship can be specified as reversible,

stochastic or deterministic, coextensive, sufficient or contingent,

necessary or substitutable, and temporally not specified. In functional

relationships the variables are "mutually interactive," i.e., where "A"

and "B" influence each other in the present.

A feedback relationship can be specified as reversible,

stochastic or deterministic, sequential, sufficient or contingent,

necessary or substitutable, temporally specified, and the flow of

influence is a combination of the "causal" and functional types. That

is, "A" influences "B" at Time 1 and "B" at Time 2 influences "A" at

Time 3. It should be noted that the feedback relationship consists of

mutually interactive variables, however, the relationship, unlike a

pure functional relationship, can be characterized by a sequence of

time, i.e., Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3 (Bravo, 1976:41).

The previous discussion has been an attempt to spell out to

the reader some of the possible types of formal relationships which are

utilized to construct theory using the systems' approach. I emphasize

here that as long as one is able to utilize causal, functional and

feedback relationships in a "composite" or systems' mode of theory

construction, the explanatory power and social significance of the

produced theory is heightened. The systems' or "composite" approach

allows us to describe in a much more efficient manner that "process"

that eventually relates to the dependent variable.

Diagrammatically, a composite or systems' model is presented

in Figure 5 where W, X, Y, and Z are variables and the signs, plus or minus, are indicative of the value of the relationship, i.e., an increase in W leads to an increase in Z:

Figure 5

Source: Jordan and Silberstein, 1976:48.

The systems' mode of theory construction had the advantage of allowing the investigator the opportunity to combine causal, functional and feedback relationships into "feedback loops." But what is a "feedback loop?"

A "feedback loop" is a relationship between three or more variables in which each variable is either directly or indirectly related to every other variable (Silberstein and Jordan, 1977:12). For example, in the systems' model presented in Figure 5, there is a "feedback loop" relationship between the variables W, X, Y, and Z. Variable "W" has a direct effect on variable "Z" and an indirect effect on variables "Y" and "X," while variable "Y" has an indirect effect on variable "W" through variable "X."

One of the major advantages in utilizing the systems' mode of theory construction is that it allows the investigator to use a "composite" model consisting of causal, functional and feedback

relationships. This flexibility is especially rewarding when dealing with complex phenomena that occur over a period of time. That is, it allows the investigator a chance to consider the effects of <u>deviation amplification</u> (positive feedback) and <u>deviation counteraction</u> (negative feedback) between the "independent" variables as they relate to the "dependent" variable. Later in Chapter VI, I will give some examples of these types of effects in addition to illustrating some of the other types of relationships previously discussed.

Lest I mislead the reader I wish to make it quite clear here that I believe quite strongly that theory in sociology today must in order to be most useful include <u>some</u> of the following types of propositions: those not yet tested; those whose method of testing is at present quite unclear; non-empirical or purely analytical propositions; tautological propositions; non-causal relationships; etc. Obviously, a "theory" which contains no ultimately testible, empirical propositions is <u>not</u> a scientific theory. But I do operate out of the assumption that we spend too much of our time in sociology testing or verifying hypotheses and not enough time constructing theory. A single verified hypothesis is of little value until it is placed in a theoretical context.

In summary, the major goal of this chapter was to identify and clarify an adequate method of theory construction for this paper. In the course of accomplishing this goal I established for my purposes the definition, tasks and basic elements of theory. I then presented some criteria by which any theory may be evaluated. Finally, I compared three basic modes of theory construction, i.e., set-of-laws, axiomatic,

and systems' theory. I opted for the systems' mode. I did so, however, because it is my belief that this particular format corresponds more closely to actual real world phenomena through the utilization of functional, feedback and feedback loop relationships. Moreover, this flexibility which is characteristic of the systems' mode seems to offer, on the face of it, greater plausibility for constructing a substantive theory of Anti-Colonial revolution.

In all due modesty, by opting for the systems' mode of theory construction to construct my theory, I believe that the most significant step toward accomplishing the original goals of this chapter, will be accomplished.

The following chapter contains a review of the literature which will serve as the foundation for the theory of this paper.

CHAPTER IV

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The major goal of this chapter is to present a review of the
relevant literature that deals with revolution. In order to accomplish
this goal the following tasks will be completed: (1) a brief presenta-
tion of the colonial situation (elaboration and definition of the term);
(2) the presentation of a classification scheme, grouping the major
theories and related works of revolution, coupled with the presentation
of a criterion for critiquing any theory of revolution; and (3) the
explication of some of the major theories and related works of revolu-
tion coupled with a critique of selected theories.

The Colonial Situation

One of the most phenomenal events in the history of humankind
is the colonial expansion of European peoples throughout the entire
world (G. Balandier in Wallerstein, 1966:34). This colonial expansion
began in the 15th century and continued into the present 20th century.
European colonialism brought about the subjugation, and in some
instances the disappearance, of virtually every people who were regarded
as primitive, backward or uncivilized. In effect, European colonialism

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". . . overturned in a brutal manner the history of the peoples it

subjugated," creating what I and some others call the colonial

situation (G. Balandier in Wallerstein 1966:34; Cullison, 1975).

In discussing the colonial situation it is important to focus

on the term colonialism. But strange as it may seem, the term has not

always been used in exactly the same way. For example, colonialism has

been used by some to refer to a factor which tends to promote and in-

tensify conflict between the major Western powers (Hobson, 1905). Used

in this manner the "problem" became one of attempting to reduce inter-

national rivalries and tensions between Western powers, in order to

reduce the potential for world war.

Another usage of the term colonialism has been to denote what

specific ends should be sought along with the best administrative

methods to be used by the Western powers to improve the conditions

in their territorial possessions. A major implication in the usage

of the term here is that in some form, Western authority over colonial

territories would continue for an indefinite period (Hodgkin, 1951:9).

Also, colonialism has been used to refer to the adjustments,

compromises, etc., that Western powers--and their settlers--must make

in the face of claims made by colonial peoples (Hodgkin, 1951:10).

Because the latter usage of the term colonialism is related to

the reactions of colonial peoples to the colonial powers, it is much

more relevant than the other usages to this study. However, this

third usage should not be taken as my definition of colonialism.

Before I offer my own definition, I must emphasize that the three ways

in which colonialism is used above exemplifies either implicitly or

explicitly those characteristics which are inescapable from the follow-

ing devastating critique by O'Dell, to which this writer fully agrees:

> Generally speaking, the popular notion about colonialism is
> one of an overseas army and an overseas establishment set
> up by the colonial power thousands of miles away from its
> home base. Thus, the idea of colonialism is a rigid one
> and does not allow for its many varieties. A people may be
> colonized on the very territory on which they have lived
> for generations or they may be forcibly uprooted by the
> colonial power from their traditional territory and colonized
> in a new territorial environment so that the very environment
> itself is "alien" to them. In defining the colonial problem
> it is the role of the institutional mechanisms of colonial
> domination which are decisive. Territory is merely the
> stage upon which these historically developed mechanisms
> of super-exploitation are organized into a system of
> oppression (1967:8).

One of the major points which O'Dell makes in his discussion

is that colonialism is a particular kind of institutional arrangement

or social system, "and this system does not necessarily have to be tied

to a specific disposition of territory" (Allen, 1969:8). Working from

this thesis then, colonialism may take a variety of forms. But more

important, however, is that I now have a relatively sound basis for

explicating my definition of colonialism.

Colonialism may be broadly defined as the direct or indirect

overall subordination of one people, nation, or country to another

with the state power apparatus firmly controlled by the dominating

power.

Establishing such a broad definition as mentioned above takes

into account the many forms that colonialism takes. Additionally, my

definition gives the reader an idea as to what I mean by colonialism

as the term is used throughout this paper.

After presenting this brief elaboration and definition of the

term colonialism, I now turn to the next section wherein the initial second and third task will be completed.

Classification, and Critique of
Theories of Revolution

In this section I will first present a classification scheme grouping the theories of revolution under appropriate headings. Second, I will present a criterion for evaluating any theory of revolution. Third, I will present the various theories and related works of revolution, coupled with an evaluation or critique of selected theories, using my previously presented criteria.

But, before I begin to complete my tasks here, it is appropriate to point out to the reader some additional information which should enhance the understanding of this section.

The theories and other related works which I am about to present in this section will focus largely on the etiological factors or the causal origins of revolutions. The reader should keep in mind that this section is not a complete survey of all the literature on revolutions--not even of all the recent literature. There are at least three reasons for this. The first and foremost reason has already been mentioned above (i.e., my concern for the etiological or causal factors of revolutions).

Second, and of course being rather frank, some of the literature is beneath consideration or more simply put, is so haphazard that it does not measure up to what the writer believes to be high academic standards. Third, there is considerable duplication, such that, to treat the ideas of one writer, say "A", explicitly, is often the same

as treating implicitly the ideas of writers B, C and D (Freeman, 1972: 339-340).

Although both the theoretical and other related works presented in this section share some common interest in the causal origins of revolutions, they are nevertheless vastly different. Moreover, I have chosen to classify and discuss these works in such a way that provides for their maximum comparability along with maintaining their unique features.

Thus, drawing from several notable works which have attempted to classify theories about the causal origins of revolution (see for example, Freeman, 1972:339-359; Cohan, 1975; Gurr, 1973:363-368; Orum, 1978:347-366; and Skocpol, 1979:3-43), I have taken the liberty of constructing Table 19 below. Table 19 is a classification scheme which serves the purpose of grouping the various theories and related works of revolution under four major types, along with designating some of the Principle Proponents who are associated with each type of theoretical view.

(1) "Social Structural Theories" are divided into three subdivisions: (A) Systems/Value Approach, with Chalmers Johnson (1966) the principle proponent; (B) Natural History Approach, with Crane Brinton (1965) the chief proponent; and (C) Comparative Historical Approach, with Theda Skocpol (1979) the principle advocate.

(2) "Social Psychological Theories" has no subdivisions and the principle proponent, here, is Ted Robert Gurr (1970).

(3) "Conflict Theories" are divided into two subdivisions: (A) Marxian Approach, with Karl Marx the chief proponent; and

(B) Resource Mobilization Approach, with Charles Tilly (1978) the

principle proponent.

TABLE 19

CLASSIFICATION SCHEME FOR THEORIES AND
RELATED WORKS OF REVOLUTION

Type of Theory	Principle Proponent
(1) Social Structural Theories	
(A) Systems/Value Consensus Approach	Chalmers Johnson (1966)
(B) Natural History Approach	Crane Brinton (1965)
(C) Comparative Historical Approach	Theda Skocpol (1979)
(2) Social Psychological Theories	Ted Robert Gurr (1970)
(3) Conflict Theories	
(A) Marxian Approach	Karl Marx (n.d.)
(B) Resource Mobilization Approach	Charles Tilly (1978)
(4) General Works	e.g., James Geschwender (1968), Mark N. Hagopian (1975), etc.

(4) "General Works" is a residual category of sorts, which

contains other related books and articles that pertain to the causal

origins of revolution. Unlike the other three categories, the

"General Works" category does not contain works that explicate

fulfledged revolutionary theory. Nevertheless, these works do make

some significant contribution, small or large as it may be, to our

understanding of those factors that give rise to revolutions. In

this category I put such writers as: James Geschwender (1968), Mark N. Hagopian (1975), etc.

In the next table, 20, I present my criteria for critiquing or evaluating any theory of revolution. In Table 20 I have listed and defined eleven criteria which are based on what a complete theory of revolution entails. It follows that any complete theory of revolution should present: a definition of the object of study, a typology specifying the internal divisions or types of revolutions, a theory for the typology which accounts for the different types of revolutions, and a movement career based on a temporal process, divided up into stages and phases, complete with a theory for each stage and phase.

Additionally (looking at Table 20 again), a complete theory of revolution should be able to predict: the frequency or how often revolution will occur, the duration or how long a revolution will last, the intensity or how many people will be killed and the amount of property that will be destroyed, the scope or the number of people who will participate, the direction or which way the revolution will go--left or right, and the range or the amount of geographical land-space that will probably be covered by the revolution. Finally, the last criterion, which of course is the Scale, is really a composite measure of the frequency, duration, intensity, scope, and the range.

And now after presenting my classification scheme for the theories and related works of revolution and my criteria for critiquing or evaluating any theory of revolution, I now turn to the explication and critique of the various theories and related works as outlined previously.

TABLE 20

CRITERIA FOR CRITIQUING OR EVALUATING ANY THEORY OF REVOLUTION

Criterion	Meaning
(1) Definition	Designating the external boundaries of revolution so that revolutions can be distinguished from non-revolutionary phenomena.
(2) Typology	An analytical classification of the internal divisions or different types of revolutions.
(3) Theory for Typology	The general theory should be able to account for or explain the differences between types of revolutions.
(4) Career: Stages and Phases (A theory for each)	Revolutions are temporal processes occurring over a period of time. This time period is divided up into stages and phases and is designated as the career of the movement. Any complete theory of social movements or revolutions should consist of a theory for each stage and phase.
(5) Frequency	Given a particular historical period of time, frequency refers to the number of times revolution occurs. A complete theory of revolution should be able to predict not only the occurrence of revolutions in general, but the occurrence of any particular types of revolution.
(6) Duration	Refers to how long the revolution lasted.
(7) Intensity	Refers to the number of people killed and the amount of property destroyed.
(8) Scope	Refers to the number of people who participated in the revolution.

TABLE 20--Concluded

Criterion	Meaning
(9) Direction	A complete theory of revolution should be able to predict which direction the movement will go-- left or right.
(10) Range	Refers to the amount of geographical land-space covered by the revolution.
(11) Scale	This criterion represents a composite measure of most of the other criteria (i.e., 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10).

Social Structural Theories

Social structural theories of revolution are distinguished from other types of theories based upon their principle mode of explanation. Social structural theories look for the causal origins of revolution largely in the structural conditions of society. This particular body of theories looks at such phenomena as economic trends, patterns of stratification, etc., and regards these as exceedingly important for the development of revolution. Recently, however, social structural theory of revolution has been expanded to include international and world contexts. In this connection, the external influence of international social structures on the causal origins of revolutions is assessed.

And now I will discuss and critique each of the three theorists (see Table 19) who represent each of the three subdivisions of the social structural view.

In Revolutionary Change (1966) Chalmers Johnson explicates the Systems/value consensus approach in explaining why revolutions occur. Another name for this particular approach is structural functionalism. Hence, in explaining the occurrence of revolutions, Johnson deals with the concepts of structure, process, function, role, status and system. Johnson proposes that the loss of societal consensus and cohesion may ultimately lead to social revolution. Thus, the stage for revolution is the disequilibrated social system.

But, first, how does the social system become disequilibrated? Further, what are the specific factors that lead to revolutionary insurrection? These questions can be best answered by presenting a graphical diagram of Johnson's theory with an explication of the relationships which he envisioned. Looking at Figure 6 below, we see that Johnson presents a fourfold typology which consists of endogenous and exogenous value-changing forces and endogenous and exogenous environment-changing forces.

When these sources of change impinge on the social system, the latter will either sustain the produced pressure through the process of homeostasis or the pressure will be too great for the system's homeostatic capacity. When the second condition occurs, the system's routine institutional arrangements have been incapacitated. That is to say, the pressures of the change has crippled the system's ability for self-maintenance. There now exist value environmental dissynchronization and system disequilibrium.

When a social system is disequilibrated the result is power

FIGURE 6

THE CAUSES OF REVOLUTION

Sources of Change	The Disequilibrated Social System	Status Protesters	Accelerator		
Cause changes in structure of values, or pattern of the division of labor, or both	Structure of Values Symbolic interpretations of Social Action ⟿ Dissynchronous ⟿	Interest in recasting the status hierarchy	Breaches logic of deterrence based on force		
a) Exogenous value-changing, e.g., rise of external reference groups b) Endogenous value-changing, e.g., religious innovation c) Exogenous environment-changing, e.g., foreign conquest d) Endogenous environment-changing, e.g., technological innovation	Failure to Fulfill Functional Requisites 1. Incoherent Socialization 2. Inappropriate ensemble of roles 3. Dissensus on goals 4. Failure to resolve conflicts peacefully ⟿ Relationship ⟿ Division of Labor Pattern of Adaptation to the Environment	The Decision-Making Arena in Power Deflation Elite Courses of Action 1. Conservative change 2. Co-option of Status Protesters 3. Business as Usual 4. Intransigence	Loss of Authority (the result of the course of action chosen by the elite) Integration of System Maintained by Use of Force	Revolutionary Insurrection Its outcome depending on the attitudes of the armed forces and/or the validity of the transfer culture	
		Status Protesters Interest in restoration of old status hierarchy			

Routine homeostasis fails to create a new synchronization between value structure and pattern of environmental adaptation

TIME

Source: Johnson, 1966:106.

deflation (i.e., during periods of change the integration of a system becomes increasingly dependent on the use of force for formal authorities). At this point, if the vested leadership fails to develop key policies which would maintain the confidence of third party members (e.g., non-deviant actors) and move the system toward a resynchronization of the value-environmental discrepancy, then a loss of power will result.

The loss of power simply means that the elites' use of force is no longer accepted as legitimate. Even though the elite may suffer a loss of power they still maintain control of the system as long as they can utilize the military to coerce social interaction. In a situation such as this a "police state" would be the appropriate phrase.

On the other hand, if the elite is deprived of its chief weapon for enforcing social behavior (e.g., a vertical or horizontal split in the ranks of the military) or the revolutionaries develop the belief that they actually have a chance for success, then a revolution will ensue. The factors which are considered to be the final causes of revolution are referred to as "accelerators." For Johnson, accelerators ". . . are the pressures, . . . which when they impinge on a society experiencing power deflation and a loss of authority immediately catalyze it into insurrection" (1966:91).

In reference to the success or failure of a revolutionary movement Johnson states that it all depends on the armies of the status quo elites. In a society where power deflation and loss of authority has occurred the elite may still maintain its position of

power only if it possesses a well disciplined army with troops and officers loyal to the status quo. Any potential or actual revolutionary insurrection aimed at overthrowing the state government will in most instances be put down by a well trained, loyal army. Hence, in a situation where the army of the status quo emerges as victorious, the revolution, in Johnson's terminology, has certainly failed.

On the other hand, one may suggest that armies are not always effective or loyal. Johnson agrees with this suggestion by attempting to answer the analytical question of: why professionally trained armed forces sometimes lose their effectiveness (1966:102). Moreover, Johnson states that fraternization with the populace is a factor which will weaken the unity of the army. Also, army/populace fraternization will tend to weaken the decision making ability of the elite by creating the uncertainty of a military victory against the revolutionaries.

Another army-connected factor which weakens the army's ability to do its job, is a mutiny. Johnson notes that when mutinies occur they are directly related to conditions of service and intramilitary elite struggles. The implication of a mutiny occurring within the ranks of an army should be clear. It follows that military effectiveness will be muted, primarily because of factionalism. Consequently, this type of situation (e.g., an army mutiny) serves as a windfall for the revolutionaries.

Finally, the most salient factor which tends to stifle the effectiveness of the armed forces is a defeat in war. The agony of defeat shakes the confidence of even well trained military forces. Further, when an army returns from an unsuccessful war, its morale

is at its lowest and its rank and file has been virtually disintegrated.

Johnson quotes Charley in order to put greater emphasis on this issue:

> . . . there can be little doubt that under modern conditions
> the last stages of an unsuccessful war provide the surest
> combination of circumstances for a successful revolutionary
> outbreak (1943:108).

Although the elite can sometimes mobilize enough loyalty and
commitment from a defeated army to put down a domestic insurrection, it
is a rare occurrence. A defeat of the elite's armed forces in war will
have more than just a crippling effect on army personnel. The defeat
will also serve to enhance the beliefs or theories held by the
revolutionaries about their chances of a successful overthrow.

As a final note, I emphasize that all the factors mentioned
above which tend to influence the effectiveness of the armed forces of
the elite are nothing more than accelerator effects. In effect, they
are events which when they occur ". . . in disequilibrated societies
lead men to believe that coercion can no longer be maintained over
them" (Johnson, 1966:105).

And now I turn to Johnson's explication of: why a revolution-
ary movement goes left or right. I do realize that this question is a
part of my criteria for critiquing or evaluating any theory of
revolution (i.e., the direction, see Table 20). But it is important
to discuss the direction of the revolution here, for the simple reason
that it is a part of Johnson's theory (see the status protest circles
in the graphic presentation of the theory in Figure 6).

To be sure, those status protesters who are primarily
interested in recasting the status hierarchy can be seen as partici-
pants in a leftist oriented movement. On the other hand, those status

protesters who are interested in the restoration of the old status

hierarchy are seen as participants in a <u>rightist</u> movement. For Johnson,

the determining factor which causes a movement to go left or right is

the movement's ideology. It follows that when a social system is

disequilibrated, it tends to polarize into various interest groups,

who began to accept alternative ideologies to the existing value

structure.

As the social system becomes increasingly disequilibrated

(e.g., increasing dissynchronization between values and the environ-

mental) the various interest groups will either begin to form

alliances or dissipate without significantly influencing the social

structure. If the former is the case, then the society will tend to

polarize into two distinct groups. This polarization of groups occurs

when the latent interest of the members becomes manifest, and when

they develop a general ideology. As a result, one group develops an

interest in maintaining the status quo and another develops an interest

in altering the status quo.

As alluded to before, the development of a general ideology

appears to be the key to Johnson's notion of leftist or rightist

revolution. When an ideology is developed to the extent of becoming

a "full-blown" revolutionary ideology it will contain an image of a

new value-environmental synchronization (e.g., what Wallace calls a

"goal culture") and "a system of operations (e.g., a "transfer

culture") which if carried out will transform the existing culture

into the goal culture" (Johnson, 1966:84; taken from Wallace, 1961:

148).

In Johnson's scheme the terms revolution and rebellion are used to indicate a leftist and rightist oriented movement respectively. Revolutions and rebellions are distinguished internally, leading to two major types for each (see Table 21 below).

TABLE 21

THE RELATIONSHIP OF IDEOLOGY TO REVOLUTION AND REBELLION

Revolution

Ideology

Restricted	Full-Blown
Simple Revolution	Total Revolution

Rebellion

Motivated by an Ideology

No	Yes
Simple Rebellion	Ideological Rebellion

Source: Constructed from Johnson, 1966:Chapter 7.

For Johnson a revolution occurs "when the goal culture of an insurrectionary ideology envisions the recasting of the social division of labor according to a pattern which is self-consciously unprecedented in the context of a particular social system" (1966:38). A total revolution is aimed at supplanting the entire structure of values and at recasting the entire division of labor. It is to be distinguished from a simple revolution by having a full-blown rather than a

restricted ideology. Because of the restricted nature of its ideology, a simple revolution can only make fundamental changes in a few values such as, values governing access to statuses of authority, economic exchange, etc. These simple revolutions cannot alter such values that control religious beliefs, basic political identity and the like. Finally, a total revolution is to be distinguished from its nearest rival, the ideological rebellion, by its espousal of an unprecedented new social order.

The ideological rebellion is characterized by its espousal for ". . . the revival or reintroduction of an idealized society that allegedly existed in the society's own past" (Johnson, 1966:136).* The distinction between ideological rebellions and those classified as simple is that the former is motivated by an ideology and the latter is not. The goal culture of a simple revolution ". . . is actually a fully elaborated structure of values that the rebels believe is still capable of organizing their communal life" (Johnson, 1966:137). Consequently, the simple rebellion may be characterized as ". . . an act of social surgery . . . intended to cut out one or more members who are offending against the joint commitments to maintain a particular social structure" (Johnson, 1966:136).

After summarizing the major components of Johnson's theory, I now turn to criticizing it utilizing my previously established criteria (see Table 20).

In terms of a definition of the object of study, Johnson does present one. However, his definition of revolution is somewhat muddled and restricted. Johnson's definition of revolution is aimed at the

total revolution (see Table 18). Further, Johnson does present a
typology of revolution (i.e., presented and criticized back in Chapter
II). In Johnson's theory there is no theoretical accountability for
the different types of revolutions. This fact, explains, at least in
part, his unclear and misleading treatment of coups. For example,
Johnson somestimes classifies military and palace coups as revolutions,
while at other times they are simply ". . . international policies of
subversion disguised as revolutions" (1966:151).

After placing coup-d'etats in a tenuous category, Johnson
complicates the issue even more in his classification of rebellions.
In categorizing a simple rebellion, he leaves the impression that he
is referring to a military or palace coup. The target of change for a
simple rebellion (including a coup d'etat) is personnel, which is
usually the simple removal of unwanted individuals (e.g., an act of
"social surgery"). Thus, Johnson appears to be confused, that is to
say, he fluctuates back and forth--he does not seem to be able to
adequately explain military and palace revolutions. More important,
however, Johnson does not present a theory for his typology.

On a positive note, Johnson does seem to see revolution as a
temporal process, and at one point he even touches on the question of
success/failure. But he does not really deal with dividing the
revolutionary process into distinct stages and phases. Furthermore,
he does not have a theory that accounts for the stages and phases of
revolution. Frankly speaking, Johnson's theoretic formulation is
basically weak. His theory is not expressed in the form of proposi-
tions. Further, the dependent and independent variables are not

explicitly delineated (Morales, 1973:22). Also, the theory is not clearly specified (i.e., the variables need to be related to one another in terms of some defined attribute such as degree of importance, amount, etc.

Additionally, Johnson's theory does not deal explicitly with the criteria of frequency, duration, intensity, scope, range and scale. However, one could venture to say, that through implication, Johnson's total revolution would be high in intensity, broad in scope, broad in range, etc. But Johnson does not spell this out in his theory. He does, however (as discussed previously) give us some indication as to the direction of the revolution, i.e., whether it will go left or right.

But Johnson should not be given too much credit on this latter point. Although he is rather shrewd, he is also misleading. He attempts to show why a revolution will go left or right by simply defining a revolution as leftist and a rebellion as rightist. According to Johnson, given a disequilibrated social system, a movement will go left or right depending on the type of ideology which it develops. However, he fails to show: what factors are involved, which causes a movement to develop a particular ideology in the first place. We may of course speculate on this point and suggest that the answer may depend, in part, on a particular ratio between the structure of values and the environmental. If this is so, then Johnson chooses to ignore it or he is simply not aware of this point.

In terms of my criteria Johnson's theory has some serious discrepancies. But his theory does make some "positive" contributions to the study of revolution. For example, within his theoretical

framework there seems to be room (after further elaboration) for

". . . significant causal and explanatory relationships between

variables" (Morales, 1973:24). Also, the theory seeks to ". . . explain

a revolutionary event within a systemic and societal whole, emphasizing

the relationship between values and structure, and between conditions

and evaluations" (Morales, 1973:24). Finally, Johnson's theory

". . . does not confuse macro/micro levels of analysis, nor [does it

overemphasize] psychological variables at the expense of [structural]

ones" (Morales, 1973:24).

And now after discussing and critiquing Johnson's theory or

the Systems/Value Consensus Approach, I now turn to the discussion and

critique of another type of social structural theory.

Natural History Approach

The Natural History Approach attempts to develop generaliza-

tions about the typical revolutionary process by examining several

cases of revolution. The major goal of the natural historians is not

so much to explain the causal origins of revolutions as it is to

explain ". . . the characteristic cycle or sequence of stages, that

should typically occur in the process of revolutions" (Skocpol,

1979:37).

The Natural History Approach is represented in the work of

Crane Brinton called The Anatomy of Revolution (1965). The above work

first appeared in 1938 and subsequently has been reprinted several

times.

Brinton began his analysis by refusing outright to give an

explicit definition of revolution. His reason for not giving much

attention to defining revolution is summed up in his own words.

> We do not entangle ourselves unduly with the exact
> definition of "revolution," nor with the borderline
> between revolutionary change and other kinds of
> change (1966:24).

Although Brinton commits a serious error in not explicitly

defining revolution, this fact should not hamper the presentation of

his work. Moreover, a definition of revolution seems to be implicit

throughout his work. For example, Orum has managed to draw out the

implicit definition which he finds so well hidden in Brinton's work.

> Revolution for [Brinton] is radical transformations in
> the leadership and government of a society, and
> consequences of these changes filter into other
> institutions of a society. Revolutionary movements
> are those organizations, beliefs, and actions that
> have produced the revolution (brackets are mine;
> Orum, 1978:348).

In studying four revolutions which occurred in modern states

(i.e., the English Revolution of the 1640's, the American Revolution,

the great French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution), Brinton

attempts to establish certain approximations and uniformities in order

that revolutions may be more adequately explained (1966:7).

Probably the most important aspect of Brinton's work is his

explication of five uniform stages which he believed to be common to

all great revolutions. They are: (1) the economic and political

weaknesses of the old regime; (2) the colapse of the old regime and

the rise of the moderates; (3) the rise of dual power; (4) the coming

to power of the radicals manifested in the reign of terror and virtue;

and (5) the Thermidorean reaction. I will now discuss each of these

stages in turn.

As far as the causal origins of revolution are concerned the

first stage of Brinton's scheme is most relevant. Here the old regime

becomes saturated with economic and political weaknesses. On this last

note, however, Brinton is quick to point out that ". . . it is the

government that is in financial difficulties, not the societies them-

selves" (1966:29). For Brinton, the revolutions which he studied did

not occur in societies undergoing widespread and long-term economic

misery. It was just the opposite--economic conditions were improving

rather than worsening. For example, in 1789 France was a striking

example of a relatively rich society with an impoverished and corrupt

government (Brinton, 1966:30). Another example was the American

Revolution. In America, prior to the revolution there was really no

evidence of widespread poverty and misery, but there was considerable

evidence of prosperity (Orum, 1978:349).

Another interesting point about the relationship between

revolutions and economically progressive societies is that the observed

prosperity was most unevenly shared. But it was not the "down and

outers" who led the cry for revolution. It was those who were

prosperous (e.g., merchants, bankers, businessmen, lawyers, etc.)--the

middle class--who ". . . were loudest against the government, [and]

most reluctant to save it by paying taxes or lending it money"

(Brinton, 1966:31).

Next, Brinton finds a high degree of both class antagonism

and class conflict immediately prior to revolution. Another important

point to mention here is that class conflict and class antagonism were

stronger between those classes that were nearer to each other in the

stratification system (Brinton, 1966:50-64).

Also, immediately prior to revolution there is usually a large number of intellectuals who become disaffected with the governmental apparatus. For example, prior to the American Revolution such intellectuals as James Madison, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson became so alienated from the British Government that they desserted the ranks of its supporters, and took part in the creation of a set of values and organizational apparatus for an unprecedented new system of government (Orum, 1978:349).

One of the most visible features of a country which is about to undergo a revolution is the ineffectiveness or incompetence of the established governmental apparatus. Here, the reigning powers are beginning to lose legitimacy because of their ineffective rule. When various interest groups begin to protest, the reigning authorities attempt to repress the dissent. In many cases the increase in restrictions against political protest serves as a stimulant to those who were protesting in the first place. In other words, the protesters return with greater vigor (Brinton, 1966:28-39).

Soon, the governmental leaders begin to vacillate in their decision making efforts. They are unable to decide which policy is best to use in dealing with the dissidents. Moreover, in dealing with these so-called "undesirables," the leaders become split over whether to: use compromise, make outright concessions or use more coercive force. Additionally, the governmental apparatus began to lack for funds thus turning to such measures as increased taxation, which only provokes the public more (Brinton, 1966:28-39; Orum, 1978:350). Brinton found that political and economic developments immediately

prior to revolution ". . . began to outstrip the government's capacity
to handle problems attendant upon these developments" (1966:36-39;
Orum, 1978:350).

Among the final preconditions before the outbreak of revolution
was increased conflict within the ruling classes of the society. Both
bickering and indecision became rampant in the various sectors of the
political and economic elite. In France it became the rule of the day
for the middle classes to criticize governmental policy. The same was
the case in Russia with the nobility becoming increasingly antagonistic
toward the Tsar and his family. In sum, Brinton is saying that previous
loyalty and trust of the old regime became supplanted by cynicism and
contempt. Many members of the middle classes and nobility began to
openly sympathize with the lower classes and peasants than with the
ruling class (Orum, 1978:350).

Based upon the preconditions of revolution in the first stage,
dissident groups become more and more organized and they begin to make
revolutionary demands, which if granted would mean the abdication of
the government. After the government's use of force fails, Brinton's
second stage comes into effect. Here, the revolutionaries overthrow
the state apparatus, ". . . acting as an organized and nearly
unanimous group" (Brinton, 1965:253).

After the overthrow or the collapse of the old regime the
appearance of disunity within the ranks of the revolutionaries becomes
apparent. Moreover, it is the revolutionary moderates who become
dominant immediately after the takeover. According to Brinton, the
moderates constitute those who had higher rank in the old regime's

stratification system (1965:134). But the moderates, once in power, are faced with many difficult problems, such as: reforming existing institutions or making a new constitution and at the same time, just going about the everyday work of governing. In some cases the moderates are confronted with armed enemies and often find themselves involved in a foreign or civil war, or in both together (Brinton, 1965:122).

One very important result which stems from the many problems faced by the moderates, is their increased tendency toward factionalism, which really sets the stage for Brinton's third stage, i.e., the rise of dual power. This phase (dual power) simply means that the most radical and extremist groups began to share power with the moderates, with the hope of eventually taking over completely. But what additional evidence, besides the many problems already mentioned above, that can possibly increase our understanding of why the moderates become so factionalized at this critical juncture in time. Hagopian's interpretation of Brinton, on this matter, gives us added information concerning the plight of the moderates.

> Swept up perhaps more by events than by pre-formed
> revolutionary ideology, the moderates never entirely
> lose hope of some last ditch grasp at reconciliation
> to avert or cut short civil war. These sentiments,
> however, are joined with others that go far to explain
> the vacillation, indecision, and division of moderates
> in many revolutions (1975:195).

Soon after the weaknesses of the moderates begin to become obvious, the strong and intransigent group of radicals and extremists begin to publicly proclaim that the moderates are incompetent and incapable of guiding the revolution. The more radical elements might

insist that the moderates are trying to stop the revolution, that they have betrayed it, that they are as bad as the previous rulers of the old regime--". . . indeed, much worse, since they were traitors as well as fools and scoundrels" (Brinton, 1965:122).

After the radicals become successful in shaping public opinion against the moderates, a "showdown" occurs between the two groups. Here, the radicals come to power (i.e., Brinton's fourth stage) either through the use of force or through the threat of force. In either case, the radicals assume complete control over the direction of the revolution. After coming to power, they begin to purge the system, utilizing tactics that have formally been referred to as the Reign of Terror and Virtue (Brinton, 1965:176-204). During this stage, many of those who previously opposed the more radical elements of the revolution, flee the country, and those who are caught--are imprisoned ultimately to face the scaffold, guillotine or firing squad (Brinton, 1965:122). In sum, the Reign of Terror and Virtue is perceived by the more radical revolutionaries as a saving device for the revolution. They believe that ". . . the revolution is on the point of being wiped out in blood and [they] save it by wiping out its opponents in blood" (Edwards, 1927:150).

After the radical revolutionaries become firmly established via the Reign of Terror and Virtue the revolution eventually moves into Brinton's fifth stage (i.e., the Thermidorean Reaction Stage). This particular stage marks the ebbing away of revolutionary energies, tne return to normalcy, a winding down of the revolution etc. During this period reaction against certain radicals takes place--the high point of

the action is over. The new social order must go about the everyday business of running the government (Brinton, 1965:205-236).

Some of the other symptoms of the Thermidorean Reaction are: a depoliticization of everyday life, relaxation of puritanical type standards, concessions made to the traditional religions, return of political exiles, etc.

One of the implications which appear to inherent in Brinton's explication of the Thermidorean Reaction is that it can be explained by utilizing such processes as "institutionalization," "routinization," "bureaucratization," and even the "Iron Law of Oligarchy." In other words, Brinton's last stage of the revolutionary process is very similar to the ideas of both Weber (1964) and Michels (1949). That is to say, individuals who come to power (i.e., the new elite) have historically shown the reluctance to risk what they have gained. These individuals tend to reorganize the social order in such a way that will reflect their image and sustain their economic and political interests.

And now after presenting Brinton's model of the revolutionary process, I now turn to a critique of his model utilizing my criteria previously presented in Table 20. But, before I begin this critique I would like to point out that Hagopian's criticism of Brinton's stages and phases of revolution have already been presented in Chapter II of this study.

As I have stated before, Brinton refuses to become "entangled" with trying to define revolution. He leaves it to the reader to "dig out" his implicit meaning of the term.

Next, he focuses mainly on revolutions which have occurred in Western countries--and he does not see the necessity for presenting a typology or a theory for a typology. Brinton does, however, see revolution as a temporal process--and the importance in dividing it up into stages or phases. Further, there seems to be some implied subdivisions of these larger stages. For example, the Reign of Terror and Virtue may be seen as a subdivision of the Coming to power of the radicals or vice versa. In any case, Brinton is not explicit in dealing with the notion of the subdivisions of stages.

Next, Brinton does not present a theory (as the term is defined in this paper) for the different stages. This is not to say that his explication of the stages of revolution have not stimulated much needed research in the field of social movements and revolutions.

In terms of the other criteria such as frequency, intensity, scope, direction, range, and scale, Brinton falls short as well. But, there is some indication that Brinton was, at least, aware of some of these factors, although he did not state this position explicitly. For example, the Reign of Terror and Virtue does imply a rather high intensity. To support this point, Edwards observed that during the terror of the French Revolution one hundred and seventy-eight revolutionary tribunals were established in various parts of the country. Moreover, just in Paris alone 2,625 persons were guillotined. The total number of people executed by revolutionary tribunals in France was approximately 17,000, including 1,200 women (1927:180).

Also when Brinton talks about the middle classes becoming more sympathetic to the lower classes and peasants he seems to be

implying that the revolution was becoming broader in scope and range.
In sum, Brinton's work is a definite contribution, but his major
handicap is that he does not offer us a fulfledged theory of revolution
outlined in detailed and explicit terms.

And now I turn to presenting and critiquing the last
theoretical approach which I previously listed under the Social
Structural View.

Comparative Historical Approach

The major goal of the Comparative Historical Approach is to
establish the causal origins of revolutions (Skocpol, 1979:37). The
emphasis in this approach is to establish the causes of revolution by
making comparisons among positive cases, and between positive and
negative cases. Moreover, an attempt is made to identify and validate
causes as opposed to descriptions (Skocpol, 1979:38).

The Comparative Historical Approach to the study of revolution
is best explained in the work of Theda Skocpol called States and Social
Revolution (1979). For Skocpol "social revolutions are rapid, basic
transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are
accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from
below" (1979:4). I must say, that this is an interesting definition
given the tremendous magnitude and potential influence of Skocpol's
work. It certainly falls short of expectations--but I save further
criticism until after I present her theory in full.

Skocpol uses four dimensions, i.e., societal structural
change, class upheaval, political transformation and social trans-
formation, to distinguish social revolutions from other kinds of

conflicts and transformative processes (1979:4). I have taken the

liberty of constructing Table 22 below to give the reader a better

understanding of the particular distinctions which she makes.

In Table 22, "Social revolutions" are characterized by social

structural change, class upheaval, and both political and social

transformation. The important point here is that in order for a social

revolution to take place, a "yes" must be exemplified for the four

dimensions, indicating their definite presence.

If "political revolution" occurs social structural change and

class upheaval may or may not take place, i.e., the two dimensions

vary from one political revolution to the next. But when political

revolutions do occur, they are characterized by political transforma-

tion (i.e., "yes") and not social transformation (i.e., "no").

When "Rebellions" occur, social structural change, political

transformation, and social transformation does not take place (i.e.,

"No" on these dimensions). But, class upheaval may or may not occur

(i.e., it "varies").

Finally, with "industrialization," social structural change

and class upheaval may or may not take place (i.e., they vary).

Further, when industrialization occurs, political transformation does

not take place (i.e., "No")--but social transformation does (i.e.,

"Yes").

One very important way in which Skocpol's conception of

social revolution differs from many others is that her definition

focuses on Successful sociopolitical transformation. That is to say,

the ". . . actual change of state and class structures is part of the

TABLE 22

SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER TYPES OF CONFLICTS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

Dimension	Social Revolution	Political Revolution	Rebellion	Industrialization
Social Structural Change	Yes	varies	No	varies
Class Upheaval	Yes	varies	varies	varies
Political Transformation	Yes	Yes	No	No
Social Transformation	Yes	No	No	Yes

Source: Constructed from Skocpol, 1979:4.

specification of what is to be called a social revolution" (1979:5).

Skocpol explains her basic rationale in the following way:

> The rationale is my belief that successful social revolutions
> probably emerge from different macro-structural and historical
> contexts than do either failed social revolutions or political
> transformations that are not accompanied by transformations of
> class relations (1979:5).

From the above discussion it is rather obvious that Skocpol

restricts her conception of social revolution tremendously--but this

is really her prerogative as long as her definition is internally

consistent and does not contradict her explanation of social

revolutions. I will speak more on this point later in the critique.

But, now, the big question is: How are social revolutions

to be explained? Well, to begin with, Skocpol argues that social

revolutions should be explained from a structural perspective, with

special attention given to the role of international contexts and to

internal developments at home and external pressures from abroad

". . . that affect the breakdown of state organizations of old regimes

and the buildup of new, revolutionary state organizations" (1979:5).

Further, any adequate explanation of social revolution, according to

Skocpol, should be facilitated by a comparative historical approach

which makes it possible ". . . to develop explanations of revolutions

that are . . . historically grounded and generalizable beyond unique

cases" (1979:6).

But, Skocpol is much more specific in designating what a

theorist must do in order to explain social revolutions utilizing the

comparative historical approach discussed here.

To explain social revolutions, one must find problematic,

> first, the emergence (not "making") of a revolutionary
> situation within an old regime. Then one must be able
> to identify the objectively conditioned and complex
> intermeshing that shapes the revolutionary process and
> gives rise to the new regime. One can begin to make
> sure of such complexity only by focusing simultaneously
> upon the institutionally determined situations and
> relations of groups within society and upon the inter-
> relations of societies within world-historically
> developing international structures (1979:18).

The above quote indicates that Skocpol is convinced that in order to explain social revolutions one must utilize an impersonal and nonsubjective viewpoint, i.e., one that focuses on patterns of relationships among groups and societies. The implication here, is that this view is a necessary and sufficient condition for analyzing social revolutions (1979:18).

In addition, social revolutions cannot be explained without some systematic account of the influence or impact of international structures and world historical developments. Further, an adequate explanation of social revolution should be based on the perception of states as administrative and coercive organizations--organizations that are potentially autonomous from interest and structures (Skocpol, 1979:14).

Skocpol's theory is constructed and generalized from social revolutionary situations which occurred in France, Russia, and China. One may ask, however: Why France, Russia, and China? Well, one of the basic premises of Skocpol's work is ". . . that France, Russia, and China exhibited important similarities in their old regime and revolutionary processes and outcomes," which warrant their treatment together as one pattern calling for coherent causal explanation (1979:41).

Skocpol found the following similarities between France, Russia, and China to be important in studying social revolutions:

(1) All three revolutions occurred in wealthy and politically ambitious agrarian states, none of which was ever colonially subjugated.

(2) All three Old Regimes were protobureaucratic autocracies that suddenly had to confront more economically developed military competitors.

(3) In all three revolutions, the externally mediated crisis combined with internal structural conditions and trends to produce a conjuncture of: (A) the incapacitation of the central state machineries of the Old Regimes; (B) widespread rebellions by the lower classes, most crucially peasants; and (C) attempts by mass-mobilizing political leaderships to consolidate revolutionary state power (1979:41).

The result of social revolution in each country (i.e., France, Russia, and China) was the establishing of a highly centralized, bureaucratic, and mass-incorporating nation-state with increased power potential in international relations. Moreover, the New Regimes curtailed the power of the landed upper class to prevent social change, and created greater potential for development and mass incorporation (Skocpol, 1979:41).

Skocpol shows that the conditions which were crucial in producing social revolutions in France, Russia, and China were absent or not present at all at specified periods in Japan, Prussia/Germany, and England. In effect, what Skocpol is trying to say here, is that her theory can explain why social revolutions occurred in France, Russia, and China and not in Japan, Prussia/Germany, and England (1979:43).

In Table 23 below Skocpol's theory of the causes of social revolution is presented. Subsection "A" of Table 23 is concerned with

TABLE 23

CAUSES OF REVOLUTION IN FRANCE,

RUSSIA, AND CHINA

A. Conditions For Political Crises

	Monarch/ Dominant Class	Agrarian Economy	International Pressures
France	Landed-commercial dominant class has leverage within semibureaucratic absolue monarchy.	Growing, but no break- through to capitalist agriculture	Moderate. Repeated defeats in wars, especially due to competition from England.
Russia	Highly bureaucratic absolutist state; landed nobility has little political power.	Extensive growth; little devel- opment in core regions.	Extreme. Defeats in 1850s and 1905. Prolonged partici- pation and defeat in WWI.
China	Landed-commercial dominant class has leverage within semi- bureaucratic absolutist state.	No developmental breakthrough; near limits of growth, given population and available land.	Strong. Defeats in wars and imperialist intrus- ions.

Contrasts

Prussia/ Germany	Highly bureaucratic absolutist state: landed nobility has little extralocal political leverage.	Transition to capitalist agriculture.	1806-Strong 1848-Mild
Japan	Highly bureaucratic (though not fully centralized) state. No true landed upper class.	Productivity increasing within traditional structures.	Strong; Imperialist intrusions.
England	No bureaucratic state. Landed class dominates politics.	Transition to capitalist agriculture.	Mild

TABLE 23—Continued

B. Conditions For Peasant Insurrections

	Agrarian Class Structures	Local Politics
France	Peasant smallholders own 30–40% of land; work 80% + in small plots. Individual property established, but peasant community opposes seigneurs, who collect dues.	Villages relatively autonomous under supervision of royal officials.
Russia	Peasants own 60%+ and rent more; control process of production on small plots; pay rents and redemption payments. Strong community based upon collective ownership.	Villages sovereign under control of tsarist bureaucracy.
China	Peasants own 50% + and work virtually all land in small plots. Pay rents to gentry. No peasant community.	Gentry landlords, usurers, and literati dominant local organizational life; cooperate with Imperial officials.

Contrasts

Prussia/ Germany	West of Elbe: resembles France. East of Elbe: large estates worked by laborers and peasants with tiny holdings, and no strong communities.	Junker landlords are local agents of bureaucratic state: dominate local administration and policing.
Japan	Communities dominated by rich peasants.	Strong bureaucratic controls over local communities.
England	Landed class owns 70% +. Peasantry polarizing between yeomen farmers and agricultural laborers. No strong peasant community.	Landlords are local agents of monarchy; dominate administration and policing.

TABLE 23—Concluded

C. Societal Transformations

	Results of A plus B
France	1787-9: Breakdown of absolutist state; and widespread peasant revolts against seigneurial claims.
Russia	1860s-90s: Bureaucratic reforms from above. 1905: Unsuccessful revolutionary outbreak. 1917: Dissolution of state; widespread peasant revolts against all private landed property.
China	1911: Breakdown of Imperial state; spreading agrarian disorder, but no autonomous revolts by peasants against landlords.
Contrasts	
Prussia/ Germany	1807-14: Bureaucratic reforms from above. 1848: Failed social revolution; bureaucratic monarchy stays in power.
Japan	Political revolution centralizes state; followed by bureaucratic reforms from above.
England	Political revolution establishes parliamentary predominance within nonbureaucratic monarchy.

Source: Skocpol, 1979:155-157.

the Conditions which led to political crisis in the Old Regime. These

conditions are: Monarchy/dominant class relations, the temporal

development of the agrarian economy, and international pressures.

Next, subsection "B" of the table is concerned with the

Conditions for peasant insurrections, which of course are: the nature

of the agrarian class structure and the state of local politics.

Last, subsection "C" of the table is concerned with the

Societal transformation. That is to say, the conditions in both

subsection "A" plus "B" yields the particular societal transformation

incurred for any particular country listed. It should be remembered

however, that social revolution only occurred in the first three

societies listed in the table, i.e., France, Russia, and China. And

again, Skocpol uses the last three countries (i.e., Prussia/Germany,

Japan, and England) as contrasts or negative cases.

In order to show the reader how to read Table 23, we will take

a look at France and follow (across) the particular conditions which

led to social revolution and subsequently societal transformation.

During the years immediately leading up to 1789 in France, the

Monarchy/dominant relations were such that the landed-commercial

dominant class had gained some leverage within the French semibureau-

cratic absolute monarchy. At the same time the agrarian economy was

growing, but there was no major breakthrough, as yet, to capitalist

agriculture. But, what was most profound, given these latter conditions,

was the effects of international pressures on the Old Regime. In this

connection, France suffered repeated defeats in war, especially due to

competition with England. In sum, the Old Regime began to show signs

of weakness and decline.

With the Old Regime in trouble, signs of unrest became manifest within the agrarian class structure, particularly among the peasants. In effect, the peasant smallholders owned 30 to 40% of the land, in which 80% or more was divided into small plots. Although individual property was established, the peasant community as a whole opposed the collection of taxes. In terms of local politics, the villages were relatively autonomous and under the supervision of representatives of the Monarchy. Moreover, between 1787 and 1789 the Old Regime broke down and widespread peasant revolts against Seigneurial claims took place. In effect, social revolution began to transform French society.

And now after presenting Skocpol's theory of the causes of social revolution, I will critique it using my criteria.

In reference to a definition of revolution, Skocpol does offer one. However, as alluded to before, her definition is highly restrictive and to some extent contradictory. For example, Skocpol's definition of social revolution is restricted to only a class type revolution from the bottom. In order words, using her definition, only when there is social structural change with class upheaval coupled with both political and social transformation can there be a social revolution. But, Skocpol complicates the issue by identifying another type of revolution, i.e., political, which of course is inconsistent with her definition.

Another more basic contradiction in Skocpol's definition is that a social revolution cannot be such unless it is "successful." But, she turns right around and speaks about unsuccessful social

revolutions, almost in the same breath (1979:5). In effect, Skocpol's
definition is in need of re-evaluating--it should be thought out more
carefully.

Skocpol presents no typology for designating the different
types of revolutions, nor does she present a theory for a typology. In
addition, there is some explicit indication that she is aware of
dividing the revolutionary process into stages and phases. This aware-
ness is indicated in Table 23 with the subsections subdivided and could
amount to phases. The subsections A and B are sequential conditions
which lead in their turn to C (i.e., Societal transformation or Social
revolution). Skocpol also presents an explanation for each stage and
phase, although a bit cryptic. Further, there is no explicit indication
in her theory that she even attempts to deal with the other criteria
(i.e., frequency, duration, intensity, scope, direction, range and
scale).

On the other hand, I could argue rather convincingly that
Skocpol, in her preoccupation with the revolution from the bottom,
implies a certain frequency of occurrence, a certain intensity which
of course would be high, a broad scope, and a relatively broad range.
But, implication is not the "name of the game" in my criteria for
evaluating different theories of revolutions. Therefore, I must say,
that although Skocpol's work will probably become a classic in the
study of revolutions (and I agree, it should be) it falls short of
being a complete theory of revolutions.

And now I turn to the explication of the next major division
of theories named in the Classification Scheme.

Social Psychological Theories

Social psychological theories that deal with the explanation of revolutionary action, are best represented by the work of Ted Robert Gurr. In Why Men Rebel, Gurr ". . . integrates a [tremendous] amount of psychologically oriented literature on rebellion and revolution under the rubric of a single theory" (Salert, 1976:51). When Gurr pulls together a large portion of this literature he exemplifies his scholarship. In this connection, he shows how the multiple social and psychological factors which have been used to explain different aspects of the revolutionary process can be brought together into a single coherent theory of political rebellion (Salert, 1976:51).

Gurr bases his theory on the frustration-aggression hypothesis which was first developed in psychological studies. In effect, Gurr just extends this particular hypothesis into the political realm. The hypothesis in simplified form states that the higher the degree of frustration among people, the more likely they are to respond in an aggressive manner.

Gurr argues for a similar relationship in the political realm between relative deprivation and political violence. As Salert so rightfully phrased it, Gurr sees relative and political violence as the analogues of frustration and aggression (1976:51). Moreover, "like the frustration-aggression relation, the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence may be mediated by numerous other factors" (Salert, 1976:51).

Gurr defines political violence as ". . . all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime,

its actors--including competing political groups as well as incumbents--
or its policies" (1970:4).

In constructing his theory, Gurr attempts to answer three
basic questions:

> What are the psychological and social sources of the
> potential for collective violence? What determines the
> extent to which that potential is focused on the political
> system? And what societal conditions affect the magnitude
> and form, and hence the consequences, of violence? (1970:8).

The theory itself is concerned with four objects of analysis,
two of which are intervening variables: the potential for collective
violence and the potential for political violence. The former is
defined as "the scope and intensity of the disposition among members
of a collectivity to take violent action against others" (Gurr, 1976:
29). And the potential for political violence is concerned with the
degree to which discontents are blamed on the political system and its
agents (Gurr, 1970:8). The remaining two objects of analysis are
dependent variables: the magnitude of political violence (scope,
intensity, and duration) and the forms of political violence (turmoil,
conspiracy, internal war, and minimal violence) (Gurr, 1970:335).

Because Gurr has many variables (50 or more) in his theory I
will only discuss the most important ones. For a more detailed list,
the reader need only to refer to Gurr's diagrammatic expositions which
I will present later.

But first, I would like to present Gurr's definition of his
major independent variable, relative deprivation.

> Relative deprivation is defined as a perceived discrepancy
> between men's value expectations and their value capabilities.
> Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to

which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value
capabilities are the good and conditions they think they
are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social
means available to them. Societal conditions that increase
the average level or intensity of expectations with
increasing capabilities increase the intensity of discontent
(1970:13).

According to Gurr relative deprivation has two dimensions,

intensity and scope. The former is defined as the average intensity

of relative deprivation experienced by individuals in the society.

And the scope of relative deprivation is defined as the proportion of

people in a society who experience fairly high intense degrees of

relative deprivation (Salert, 1976:53; Gurr, 1970:83).

Next, since I have already mentioned the different _forms_

exemplified by political violence, I think it is appropriate to present

Gurr's definition of these forms before I proceed further.

1. Turmoil--Relatively spontaneous, unorganized political
   violence with substantial popular participation,
   including violent political strikes, riots, political
   clashes, and localized rebellions.

2. Conspiracy--Highly organized political violence with
   limited participation, including organized political
   assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale
   guerilla wars, coups d'etat, and mutinies.

3. Internal War--Highly organized political violence with
   widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow
   the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by
   extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism
   and guerrilla wars, civil wars and revolutions.

4. Minimal Violence--Consists of small insignificant mob-
   actions, riots, etc. (1970:11, 335).

In Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10, Gurr's theory is presented in dia-

grammatic form. The theory may be divided into four parts. Figure 7

is basically concerned with explaining the major dependent variable

(magnitude of political violence) by showing the development, politici-

Figure 7

A Causal Model of the Primary and Secondary
Determinants of the Magnitude of Political
Violence.

Source: Gurr, 1970:320

Figure 8

A Complex Causal Model of the Psychological and Societal Determinants
of the Potential for Collective Violence.

Source: Gurr, 1970:324.

Figure 9

A Complex Causal Model of the Determinants of the Potential
for Political Violence.

Source: Gurr, 1970:328.

Figure 10

A Causal Model of the Societal Determinants of
Magnitude of Political Violence.

Source: Gurr, 1970:332.

zation, and actualization of discontent within a society (Salert, 1976:
53; Gurr, 1970:320).

Figure 8 is concerned with those factors which affect the
development of discontent or the potential for collective violence. As
an example, we see that the development of discontent is a function of
the intensity and scope of relative deprivation. And the intensity of
relative deprivation is affected by a host of other variables.

Figure 9 is chiefly concerned with those factors which affect
the politicization of discontent or the potential for political violence.
In Gurr's scheme the idea seems to be that in societies that have a high
potential for collective violence should also have a high potential for
political violence. There are other variables as well that affect the
politicization of discontent, the reader need only to observe Figure 9.

Figure 10 is the final part of the theory, and it concerns
the determinants of the form of political violence. That is to say,
the conditions under which a particular type of political violence
(i.e., turmoil, conspiracy, internal war, and minimal violence) will
occur. According to Gurr the same factors which determines the magni-
tude of violence also determines which particular form of political
violence will occur. In more specific terms the form of political
violence is determined by the combinations of particular levels or
degrees of relevant variables (Gurr, 1970:334).

"The first determinant of the forms of political violence
concerns the types of people who suffer from severe relative depriva-
tion" (Salert, 1976:56). In this connection, Gurr divides the popula-
tion into the mass and elite, and then proceeds to predict particular

forms of political violence. For example, when the intensity and scope of _mass_ relative deprivation is _low_, coupled with the _low_ intensity and scope of elite relative deprivation, then the political form of violence will be _turmoil_.

Moreover, _conspiracy_ occurs when the intensity and scope of mass relative deprivation is _low_ coupled with the _high_ intensity and scope of elite relative deprivation.

Last, the _internal war_ (Gurr's closest approximation to revolution) occurs when the intensity and scope of mass relative deprivation is _high_, coupled with the _high_ intensity of elite relative deprivation (1970:335).

A second major determinant of the forms of political violence is the ratio of dissident to regime coercive control (Salert, 1976:56). Internal war is the most likely form of political violence when the ratio of dissident to regime coercive control approaches equality (Gurr, 1970:366). But, when the coercive forces of the regime is high (i.e., maintaining an edge over the dissidents), either turmoil or conspiracy may occur. If the coercive forces of the regime is low (i.e., the dissidents have a slight edge), then conspiracies are the most likely form of political violence that will occur (Gurr, 1970:366). Finally, the nature of institutional (or noncoerced) support is an important factor (Salert, 1976:366). Here again, internal wars are most likely to occur when the level of dissident to regime institutional support approaches equality. "If dissidents have a rather low degree but wide scope of support, widespread turmoil is likely" (Salert, 1976:56). However, when the degree of dissident institutional support is high and

its scope is low, conspiracy is the most likely form of political violence that will occur (Gurr, 1970:366-367).

The above explication of Gurr's theory was by no means complete, but the major variables and the relationships among them have been outlined and discussed. Gurr's theory is a highly complex social psychological theory of political violence, and does justice in representing this particular approach. The diagrammatic representations of his theory (refer back to Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10) are complete with all of his variables. If the reader desires a more in depth understanding of the relationships among other variables not discussed here, I encourage a more intense study of Gurr's diagrams.

After explicating Gurr's theory, I will now critique it using my criteria.

In terms of a <u>definition</u> of the object of study, Gurr does offer one, but it deserves a brief discussion. Strictly speaking the definitions offered by Gurr are not specifically about revolution. His definition of <u>political violence</u> is confusing. One reason for the confusion is that the concept of political violence includes too many things. For example, "...the definition suggests inclusion of government aggression under the category of political violence" (Salert, 1976: 59). However, Gurr's theory, itself, does not show that these particular types of acts fall within its scope. Furthermore, Gurr uses such terms as "attacks" in his definition, which, of course, is quite vague. The concept of "aggression" in Frustration-aggression theory is concerned with many different types of aggression (i.e., hostile thoughts, verbal aggression, and physical aggression). According to Salert "if we

interpret attacks in this sense, such things as newspaper attacks, if written by two or more people, constitute a form of political violence" (1976:59).

Also, Gurr does not do too much better when he offers his definition of internal war. Here again he includes many things. Revolutions are often viewed as highly distinctive phenomina..."that differ in fundamental ways from other types of political violence" (Salert, 1976: 59). But Gurr's definition of internal war mixes revolutions together with such phenomena as large-scale terrorism. I realize that revolutions are indeed similar to other types of political violence. But just as they are similar, they are also different, and Gurr's assertions on this matter does require some justification (Salert, 1976:59).

Next, Gurr does present a systematic typology, but not of revolutions per se. Gurr's typology is of the different forms of political violence of which revolution is one. Also, Gurr's theory explains the typology which he puts forth.

Further, there is no real indication that Gurr is concerned with stages and phases of the revolutionary process. But, there is some indication that he is aware of a temporal process by explicating, first the development of discontent; second, the politicization of discontent; and third, the actualization of discontent. However, I would be giving Gurr too much credit if I suggested for even a moment that he explicated stages and phases in the revolutionary process.

In terms of frequency, Gurr's theory does not contribute here. He does, however, find room in his theory to deal with intensity, scope, and scale. But as far as duration and direction, the theory falls short.

And now I will turn to the discussion and critique of the next major division of theories; namely, the conflict theories.

CONFLICT THEORIES

Conflict theories of revolution base their view on the notion that conflict is endemic to society. These theories emphasize the divergent interests that divide society into different strata. Turner's explication of Lockwood's view adds additional clarity to our understanding of conflict theories.

> Lockwood insisted there were "mechanisms" in societies that make conflict inevitable and inexorable. For example, power differentials assured that some groups would exploit others, and constituted a built-in source of tension and conflict in social systems. Additionally, the existence of scarce resources in societies would inevitably generate fights over the distribution of these resources. And finally, the fact that different interest groups in social systems pursued different goals, and hence often had to vie with one another, assured that conflict would erupt (1974:78).

At least two implications can be drawn from the above quote, which concerns the emergence of revolutionary conflict. The _first_ is to ..."attribute violent conflict, at least in its revolutionary form, to disparaties in the shares of valued goods held by different horizontally stratified classes" (Gurr, 1973:375). The _second_, stems from the question..."that asks how and why groups in societies come into conflict" (Gurr, 1973:372). Assuming that the latter question is a valid implication of the previous quote by Turner, it follows that:

> The interests and conflict behavior of "elites" and "regimes" are as important a subject for inquiry as those of any other social group. The basic premise of (this approach) is that violent conflict and revolution arise out of group competition over valued conditions and positions (Gurr, 1973:372; Brackets are mine).

The first position mentioned above is represented by the
Marxian Approach to revolution. The second position is represented by
a relatively new approach called Resource Mobilization or Resource
Management. I will discuss and critique each of these views in turn.

Marxian Approach

The Marxian Approach to revolution is a model based primarily
on the idea of fundamental contradictions in society. For Marx, society
is not a smooth functioning social system in a state of equilibrium.
To the contrary, Marx's vision of society is one which is continuously
changing—"not only its elements, but its very structural form"
(Cohan, 1975:67). In the marxian model, the contradictions serve as
a basis for class struggles. In this connection, the exploited class
or the have-nots become alienated to the extent of developing class
consciousness, which in turn makes it politically aware enough to take
direct action to overthrow the dominant or ruling class (Cohan, 1975:67).

For Marx, historical stages of economic organization are
inevitable. Moreover, it is revolution that marks the transition between
the historical stages. Bourgeois Capitalism gives way to the classless
society. But this change, according to Marx, will only come about through
revolution. Marx's explicates his view on the origins of revolution:

> In the social production of their means of existence men
> enter into...productive relationships which correspond to
> a definite stage of development of their material productive
> forces. The aggregate of these productive relationships
> constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis
> on which a juridical and political superstructure arises.
> ...The mode of production of the material means of existence
> conditions the whole process of social, political and
> intellectual life...At a certain stage of their development
> the material productive forces of society come into con-
> tradiction with the existing productive relationships, or,

what is but a legal expression of these, with the
property relationships within which they had moved
before. From forms of development of the productive
forces these relationships are transformed into their
fetters. Then an epoch of social revolution opens.
With the change in the economic foundation the whole
vast superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed...
A social system never perishes before all the productive
forces have developed for which it is wide enough; and
new, higher productive relationships never come into
being before the material conditions for their existence
have been brought to maturity within the womb of the
old society itself... In broad outline, the Asiatic,
the ancient, the feudal and the modern bourgeois modes
of production can be indicated as progressive epochs in the
economic system of society. Bourgeois productive
relationships are the last antagonistic form of the
social process of production (1859:367-368).

Drawing from the Communist Manifesto (1846), the specific

contradiction that brings about revolution (e.g., the replacement of the

capitalist system of production) is the progressive immiserization

(misery) of the working class. In other words, a truly revolutionary

situation involves a high degree of discontent among the work class.

This discontent is created by a high degree of deprivation.

The phase "progressive immiserization" refers to a structural

condition in a society that bi-polarizes the stratification system into

two distinct classes: a small shrinking bougeoise who controls most of

the wealth, and a large increasing working class being reduced (in terms

of wages) further and further below the subsistence level. Here, I am

talking about absolute deprivation, which is certainly the idea you get

from reading the Communist Manifesto. It follows that revolution,

interpreted in these terms, cannot be possible unless the working class

is reduced to below the subsistence level.

But a student of revolution should be cautious in utilizing

only one specific work of such a man as Marx to discuss his theory of

revolution. Moreover, it is appropriate to take into account Marx's later works, in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of how he invisioned revolution in general and such concepts as human deprivation in particular.

One of the most controversial concepts in Marx's work is: the role of relative deprivation. I will discuss this concept rather briefly and afterward present a diagrammatic representation of a systems' model of the Marxian theory of revolution.

In considering some of the later works of Marx there is evidence that he unambiguously changed his mind about the importance of absolute deprivation. In other words, I am saying that as time passed Marx became more predisposed toward the use of the concept relative deprivation rather than absolute deprivation. This insight is witnessed by Friedman as he says:

> Yet Marx substantially revised his theory (the progressive immiseration thesis) by the time Capital was completed. Where Marx once saw only two objective classes existing in advanced capitalistic countries about to undergo revolutions, the theoretical and journalistic writings completed after the Communist Manifesto display considerably less rigidity. In analyzing and prophesizing revolutionary situations, Marx largely abandons his earlier two-class structural model, and refines his image of the ever more miserable economic position of the workers. During the late 1840's Marx primarily predicted an absolute decline in working class wages; during the late 1850's and 1860's, however, he concludes that workers' wages and their standard of living — even in revolutionary situations — can improve (1974: 326; italics mine).

To be sure, after the Communist Manifesto, Marx changed his conceptions of the following: polorization became a political condition of conflict rather than merely a division between classes, deprivation became relative deprivation, and the progressive decrease in the wages

of workers, became a _rate_ of decrease. However, it is important to

point out that even when relative deprivation is prevalent, individuals

or groups of individuals may still fall below the subsistence level. In

other words, "...a long term, progressive relative deprivation, i.e., a

rise in the value expectations, can be followed by a short term fall of

the value capabilities below the poverty line" (Silberstein and Jordan,

1978:8). In sum, the notion of relative deprivation was alluded to by

Marx in the following three ways: (1) human needs are relative; (2) the

dynamic relationship between the workers and the Capitalists' standards

of living was a very basic creator of relative deprivation and worker

discontent; and (3) Capitalism created needs it could not satisfy.

Although there are other concepts which Marx used (e.g.,class

consciousness) that tend to stimulate controversy, I will not discuss

them here. But, I will present a diagrammatic representation of Marx's

theory of revolution as I promised before. The systems theory, which I

present, in Figure 11 below,was drawn from the work of Silberstein and

Jordan (1978) of which I have already utilized earlier in my discussion

of Marx.

Figure 11 below is an attempt to give a Marxian answer to the

following question: How is it possible for an advanced Capitalist society

in a relative state of "equilibrium" to experience a revolution which

will transform it into a socialistic society? Looking at Figure 11 again,

the reader should focus on how to get from the large rectangle at the

lower left-hand corner of the page, "Advanced Capitalism," to the cross-

hatched box at the right-hand side of the page, "Revolution." Moreover,

the intervening variables constitutes the answer to the above question.

Figure 11. A Systems' Model of the Marxian Theory
of Revolution.

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Although there are other variables which could be contained in the model, they are perceived at this point as minor. The important point, here, is that most of the major variables invisioned by Marx are present.

Further, the model includes both sequential-historical variables (the rectangles) and coextensive-contemporary variables (the circles and elipses). As we go from left to right we go from past to future. Moreover, the sequential variables must occur in the prescribed temporal order, and each is a function of the contemporary variables which influence it.

I have presented a diagrammatic representation of a systems model of the Marxian theory of revolution. This was done mainly to reveal to the reader the enormous complexity in understanding Marx and to make it a little easier from hence forth to invision the various relationships between variables that Marx is believed to have invisioned during his lifetime. A better understanding of the type of model which was presented here, will be gained, later in Chapter VI, when I construct my own theory.[*] But now, it is appropriate to see how the Marxian theory of revolution stacks up against my criteria for critique.

In terms of a definition of revolution, Marx does not offer one. That is to say, he does not offer a clear-cut, explicit definition. On the other hand, however, he does infer that a revolution is a social movement involving at least two elements: the overthrow of a State

---

[*] For a definition of the concepts used in the model presented in Figure 11, coupled with a more comprehensive discussion, see Silberstein and Jordan, 1978.

apparatus followed by social change which involves structural trans-
formation. It seems that a Marxian type revolution involves a broad
based working class (or proletarian) majority overthrowing a minority
bourgeois class with narrow support. But, what about an ethnic based
anti-colonial revolution where class is not so important? Are we to
exclude other types of revolutions just because they are not the Class
type?

On the latter note, I observe that Marx does not offer a
systematic typology of revolutions. But, he does mention another type
called the Bonapartist revolution. This type is essentially one which
favors neither the lower or upper classes. This situation permits the
arrival to power of a "man on horseback", who maintains his power by
playing off one class against the other. This type of revolution was
used by Marx to explain the emergence to power of Louis Napoleon
Bonaparte in France in 1851. Also, the same type of revolution was
applied to the coming to power of Simon Bolivar, the South American
liberator. Thus, we see here that the notion of a Bonapartist revo-
lution can be either to the left or to the right.

But to really be fair to Marx, any other type of revolution--
Bonapartists, coups, etc. -- were only temporary interruptions
of the "inevitable" march of history, which of course would lend to
the full-fledged class revolution.

Next, Marx does not present us with a theory for a typology,
nor does he offer a systematic set of concepts to deal with the career
of revolutions. Marx really does not divide the process of revolution
into distinct stages or phases. While, he does have a considerable lot

to say about the long term consequences of revolution, I cannot in all
fairness give Marx high points for dealing in problems associated with
the career of revolutions.

Further, on the criteria of <u>frequency</u>, <u>duration</u>, <u>intensity</u>,
<u>scope</u>, <u>direction</u>, <u>range</u>, and <u>scale</u>, Marx fails hopelessly. Some of
these criteria, however, are implied in Marx's scheme. For example,
since Marx was basically talking about a class type revolution (i.e.,
a revolution from the bottom), high intensity, broad in scope, and broad
in range appears to be implied. In terms of <u>direction</u> he says very
little, except for the notion that working movements tend to go left
while bourgeois types tend to go to the right.

Again, Marxist theory is not well developed in the areas
specified in my criteria, but the theory is put together in such a way
that after a considerable amount of work, it can at least be casted
in a systems model.

The next approach which I will discuss is also a conflict
theory. It is a newly emerging body of literature called <u>Resource</u>
<u>Mobilization</u>.

<u>Resource Mobilization Approach</u>

The <u>Resource Mobilization Approach</u>, also called resource
management, is a relatively recent addition to the study of social
movements in general and revolutions in particular. Theorists of this
approach regard conflict and violence as endemic to social life
(Orum, 1978:358). Further, resource mobilization deals "...with the
dynamics and tactics of social movement growth,decline, and change"
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1213). Also, a strong emphasis is placed on

"...both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena"

(McCarthy and Zold, 1977:1213). Additionally, the resource mobilization

approach is concerned with the various resources that must be mobilized,

the linkages that connect social movement to other groups,"the dependence

of social movements upon external support for success," and the strat-

egies that tactics used by the legal agencies of social control to elemi-

nate or control social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1213).

Probably, the most representative spokesman for the resource

mobilization approach is Charles Tilly. From his work called From

Mobilization to Revolution his theory may be explicated.

To begin with Tilly has seven major variables in his theory,

and I will list and present his definition of them in turn.

> (1) "Interest" - The shared advantages or disadvantages likely to
> accrue to the population in question as a consequence of
> various possible interactions with other populations.
>
> (2) "Organization" - The extent of common identity and
> unifying structure among the individuals in the population;
> as a process, as increase in common identity and/or
> unifying stucture (we can call a decline in common identity
> and/or unifying structure disorganization).
>
> (3) "Mobilization" - The extent of resources under the
> collective control of the contender; as a process, an increase
> in the resources or in the degree of collective control
> (we can call a decline in either one demobilization).
>
> (4) "Repression/Facilitation" - The costs of collective action
> to the contender resulting from interaction with other
> groups; as a process, any action by another group which
> raises the contender's cost of collective action; an action
> which lowers the contender's cost is a form of facilitation;
> we call repression or facilitation political if the other
> party is a government.
>
> (5) "Power" - The extent to which the outcomes of the populations'
> interactions with other populations favor its interests
> over those of the others; acquisition of power is an increase
> in the favorability of such outcomes, loss of power a
> decline in their favorability; political power refers to the

outcomes of interactions with governments.

(6) "Opportunity/threat" - The extent to which other groups,
including governments, are either (a) vulnerable to new
claims which would, if successful, enhance the contender's
realization of its interests or (b) threatening to make
claims which would, if successful, reduce the contender's
realization of its interests.

(7) "Collective action" - The extent of a contender's joint
action in pursuit of common ends; as a process, the joint
action itself (1978:54-55).

The seventh variable (collective action) is the dependent

variable or the variable which Tilly is trying to explain. In moving

closer to conceptualizing revolutionary phenomena, Tilly points out that

collective violence is a useful indicator for collective action in general.

For Tilly, collective violence within a population under the control of

a particular government is concerned with war, full-fledged games,

individual violence, and to highly discontinuous interactions (1978:92).

The diagrammatic representation presented in Figure 12 below

is the theoretical model put together by Tilly specifying the causal

relationships between his seven variables. In effect, his dependent

variable (collective action) covers an extremely wide variety of

phenomena -- from strikes to revolutions. I will get back to his notion

of revolution as a form of collective action, later.

Turning to the theoretical model in Figure 12, we note that

the main determinants of a group's mobilization are its organization,

its interests, the group's subjection to repression, and the current

opportunity/threat of interactions. The model says that a group's sub-

jection to repression is explained by the type of interests it represents.

Further, the extent of a contender's collective action is a result of

its mobilization, its power, and the current opportunities and threats

Figure 12

The Mobilization Model

Source: Tilly, 1978:56

confronting its interests, etc. (Tilly, 1978:46).

Tilly acknowledges that it is possible to add other relationships to his model (e.g., organization affecting repression/facilitation). But he rationalizes not puting an arrow between these to variables on the basis "that such effects are secondary as compared with the particular interest embodied in the contender"(1978:56-57).

Further, Tilly also recognizes that a number of his relationships or connections are reciprocal over time. He gives the example of "...a contender's form, pace, and extent of mobilization affecting the repression which other groups apply to it" (1978:57). Other examples of the reciprocal effects over time are: the group's form of organization and mobilization affecting its interest, and mobilization affecting power. Here, again, Tilly treats these types of effects (reciprocal) as secondary, and does not include them in his explicit model.

Tilly calls his theoretical model a "short-run model" (i.e., "it deals with the determinants of collective action at the moment of action" (1978:57).

But, how does revolution emerge as a particular form of collective action (and violence)? First of all, Tilly is murky at best in his attempt to define revolution. He states that there is so much significant disagreement about the proper way to define revolution, that an adequate definition obviously must fall somewhere between <u>revolutionary situations</u> and <u>revolutionary outcomes</u>. Tilly elaborates:

> A revolutionary situation begins when a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing,mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities. It ends when a single sovereign polity regains control over the government (1978:191).[*]

---

[*] A <u>polity</u> consist of the collective action of the members and the government.

Tilly concludes that <u>multiple sovereignty</u> is the definitive feature of revolutionary situations (1978:191).

Next, he explains that a revolutionary outcome is the displacement of one set of power holders by another (1978:193).

Tilly goes on to assert that a revolutionary situation can occur without a revolutionary outcome. He says that this could happen if the ruling polity is successful in "beating" down their challenger . Additionally, it is also possible for a revolutionary outcome to occur without a revolutionary situation. This could happen, for example, "...through the gradual addition and/or substraction of members from the polity" (1978:193).

Next, Tilly combines the notion of a revolutionary situation with that of a revolutionary outcome to form a continua. In other words, a situation or outcome can be more or less revolutionary. After putting forth the latter idea, Tilly then cross classifies revolutionary situation (<u>no split</u> vs an <u>irrevocable split</u> between alternative polities) with revolutionary outcome (<u>no displacement</u> vs <u>complete displacement</u> of existing members). His purpose here is to show the connection between situations and outcomes as they are related to different types of power transfers. The reader should also keep in mind that when Tilly talks about power transfers he includes different types of revolution.

In Figure 13 below, Tilly's diagram is explicated. Immediately, we can see that a rather broad view of revolution is taken. One interesting aspect in his diagram is his explication of different types of revolutionary situations and outcomes. The four types of revolution mentioned in the model is <u>full-scale revolution</u>, <u>civil war</u>, <u>coups</u> and

insurrection. In the lower left-hand corner of Figure 13, a place is designated for routine politics. Routine politics are distinguished from revolutionary phenomena by its outcome being specified as no displacement and its situation being designated as no split.

All the four types of revolutions mentioned above overlap, although not completely. Tilly claims that each type has its own distinctive range of revolutionary situations and outcomes. The fundamental "...difference among them (i.e., the different types of revolutions) regard the identities of the parties to the transfer of power" (1978:198-199). For example, in the coup members of the polity displace each other; in a full-scale revolution most of the dominant or ruling class loses its power. Further elaboration of Figure 13 is stated in Tilly's own words:

> Although the diagram does not say so explicitly, the oblong for "civil war" brushes the extreme revolutionary situation, irrevocable split, to remind us that one common outcome of civil war is the permanent division of a territory previously controlled by a single government into two or more autonomous territories. The diagram indicates that extensive revolutionary outcomes do not occur without extensive revolutionary situations. But, it denies the converse; extremely revolutionary situations do not necessarily produce extremely revolutionary outcomes (1978:199).

Next, Tilly explicates three proximate causes of revolutionary situations: (1) the appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government which is currently exerted by the member of the polity; (2) commitment to these claims by a significant segment of the population; and (3) incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of the government to suppress the alternative coalition and/or the commitment to its claims (1978:216).

Likewise, three proximate causes of revolutionary outcomes are put forth: (1) the presence of a revolutionary situation; (2) revolu-

Figure 13

Situations and Outcomes in Different Types
of Power Transfers

Source: Tilly, 1978:198.

tionary coalitions between challengers and members of the polity; and
(3) control of substantial force by the revolutionary coalition (Tilly,
1978:216).

By putting together the items both from the revolutionary
situation and the revolutionary outcome, Tilly claims to have a recipe
for revolution. In other words, by putting all the items together,
Tilly asserts that he has developed an <u>idealized revolutionary sequence</u>
(1978:216). Moreover, this revolutionary sequence is explicated below.

> (1) gradual mobilization of contenders making exclusive
> claims to governmental control and/or unacceptable to the
> member of the polity;
>
> (2) rapid increase in the number of people accepting those
> claims and/or rapid expansion of the coalition including
> the unacceptable or exclusive contender;
>
> (3) unsuccessful efforts by the government (at the behest
> of members of the polity) to suppress the alternative coa-
> lition and/or the acceptance of its claims; this may well
> include attempts at forced demobilization - seizure, de-
> valuation, or dispersion of the resources at the disposal
> of contenders;
>
> (4) establishment by the alternative coalition of effec-
> tive control over some portion of the government - a
> territorial branch, a functional subdivision, a portion
> of its personnel;
>
> (5) struggles of the alternative coalition to maintain or
> expand that control;
>
> (6) reconstruction of a single polity through the victory
> of the alternative coalition, through defeat, or through
> the establishment of a <u>modus vivendi</u> between the alterna-
> tive coalition and some or all of the old members; frag-
> mentation of the revolutionary coalition;
>
> (7) reimposition of routine governmental control throughout
> the subject population (1978:216-217).

Tilly emphasizes that he did not lay out the above sequence
to propose a new "natural history" type model of revolution, but to

identify and summarize the logic of his view of revolution.

And now I turn to the critique of Tilly's theory.

In terms of a definition of revolution, Tilly seems to be somewhat at a loss. He defines a revolution as somewhere between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome. Although he does define what a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome is, he never actually captures the specific phenomena. Furthermore, Tilly's difficulty in defining what a revolution is may be a result, in part, to his attempt to cover too much territory (i.e., his attempt to explain collective action which includes everything from strikes to revolution). Tilly seems to make the very same mistakes as the collective behaviorists in their effort to explain revolution by attempting to explain every conceivable form of collective behavior. In effect, Tilly tries to explain too much. This fact can be further elaborated and understood more clearly in his attempt to classify revolutions. Moreover, Tilly does not put forth a clear-cut typology of revolutions. His classification scheme has already been explained (see discusson on Figure 13). One of the major problems easily recognized, even if Tilly admits that his scheme is not meant to be a typology, is the fact that a full-scale revolution cannot really be distinguished from a civil war using the revolutionary situation dimension. The two revolutions are basically located on the same point on the no split/irrevocable split continuum. Likewise, the coup cannot be distinguished from the insurrection using the revolutionary outcome dimension. As in the latter mentioned types, these too (i.e., the coup and the insurrection) are located on approximately the same point on the no displacement/complete displacement continuum.

In terms of a _theory for a typology_, Tilly obviously falls short here as well. Also, there is no attempt to divide the revolutionary process up into stages or phases -- and no attempt is made to present a theory of stages or phases. Tilly's theoretical model is a recursive one (i.e., all causal paths go in one direction -- there is no reciprocal feedback). Although he does suggest that reciprocal causation can be added to his model, this thought appears to be only lip service - for he never really incorporates them. Furthermore, the major dependent variable which he uses (collective action) is vague and too all encompassing.

In an attempt to quantify and operationalize the dependent variable (collective action), along with the assessment of its magnitude, Tilly also attempts to incorporate measures of _frequency_, _intensity_, _scope_, _duration_, and _scale_ (1978:94-97). Here, he drew strongly from the work of Sorokin (1962), Gurr (1970) and Sugimoto (1973).

In reference to assessing the _direction_ and _range_, there is no indication that Tilly made any attempt to deal with these two criteria. The only _implicit_ reference found in Tilly's work, which could possibly be related to one of the latter two criteria (i.e., the range) is his rather brief discussion concerning civil war and full-scale revolution. Both of these types of revolution are usually relatively broad in range.

In sum, Tilly's resource mobilization theory is not constructed at a very high level of theoretical endeavor. It seems obvious that he has opted to be more predisposed toward testing and verification of theory rather than _constructing_ explanatory theory.

And now after discussing and critiquing Tilly's theory, I now

turn to the discussion of works that fall in the final classification
category, General Works.

GENERAL WORKS

The General Works section does not represent a catch-all
category -- for the works which are presented here, have all made sub-
stantial contribution to the study of social movements and revolutions.
This section simply brings under its heading all those relevant books
and related articles that cannot be placed under one of the other
major headings. The most definitive characteristic that serves as a
basis for selecting a particular work to belong here, is the theoretical
makeup. Additionally, some of the works which should be placed here, can
be described as taking one particular theoretical concept and after
operationalization attempting to explain some specific attitudinal or
behavioral form related to social movements (e.g., the attempt to ex-
plain participation in political protest organizations using the indepen-
dent variable, status inconsistency).

And now I will discuss two works which fall under the general
works category. I will first discuss the concept of status inconsisten-
cy mainly through the work of James A Geschwender and afterward the work
of Mark N. Hagopian called the Phenomenon of Revolution. Finally, since
these works do not fall under one of the other major theoretical divi-
sions, I will not critique them using my criteria. However, during the
course of the discussion, some critique is warranted.

James A. Geschwender

After Lenski's (1954) formulation of the concept of status in-

consistency social scientists have shown a substantial theoretical inter-

est in utilizing it as an explanatory variable to account for both the

changes in the societal distribution of power and the disproportionate

number of people found in the leadership and rank and file of social

movements.

In defining status inconsistency it is important to first en-

vision a series of vertical status hierarchies (e.g., education, income,

ethnicity, etc.) which can be measured from low to high. Status incon-

sistency refers to the relations among the statuses of an actor. More-

over, some of the same individuals' statuses must be higher or lower

than others in order to have status inconsistency.

After Lenski, one of the most prolific writers in the area of

status inconsistency is James A. Geschwender. As a single explanatory

concept, he explicates the status inconsistency hypothesis in the follow-

ing way: a group which possesses a number of status attributes which

are differently ranked on the various status hierarchies will be dis-

satisfied and prone toward rebellion (Geschwender, 1964·249).

In a 1967 article Geschwender summarizes several articles that

support the status inconsistency hypothesis. For example, Benoit-

Smullyan (1944) had previously declared that there was an historical

basis "...supposing that when legal, customary, or other barriers

seriously hamper the equiliberating tendency, social tensions of

revolutionary magnitude may be generated" (1944:160). He drew evidence

from supporters of the Nazi Party, who began to gain considerable

power in Germany a decade before the outbreak of World War I. These

supporters were said to have "...come from large classes of persons who

became impoverished but retained their former prestige statuses"
(Geschwender, 1967:166). Here, status inconsistency is seen as a vari-
able that explains, in part, the coming to power of the Nazi Party which
in turn lead to considerable social change in German society.

Geschwender also notes other examples of status inconsistents
who have sought to give their support to social movements. It follows
that support for such organizations as the NAACP tends to come from the
Black middle-class. This particular example was drawn by Geschwender
from E. Franklin Fraizer's work called the Black Bourgeoise (1959)
(1967:166). But, more important is the fact that the type of status
inconsistency that predisposes Blacks to join such movement organizations
as the NAACP is low ascribed vs high achieved.

Lipset (1950) is cited as concluding that urban middle-class
leaders who joined the C.C.F. were primarily from minority groups. Like-
wise, Michael's (1949) observed that middle-class Jews were over-represented
in European Socialist parties (Geschwender, 1967:166).

In another article by Geschwender, Blumer is cited as relating
the concept of status inconsistency to both the notion of structural
strain and social movements:

> Blumer's analysis of the development of social movements
> parallels Smelser's approach at two points. Individual
> unrest corresponds to individual reactions to structural
> strain and transformation of individual unrest into social
> unrest corresponds to one aspect of the growth and spread
> of a generalized belief. Thus, the hypothesis, "status
> inconsistency predisposes one toward participation in
> social movements," may be reduced to the hypothesis,
> "status inconsistency is a type of structural strain
> which produces symptoms of individual unrest in status
> inconsistents" (1968a:478).

Also, Sorokin (1962) is cited by Geschwender as using the
concept of "multibonded stratification" to assess the relationship

between status inconsistency and revolutionary behavior (1968b:131).

Sorokin saw stratification in terms of a series of status ranks bonded

together to form affine or disaffine strata. Affine strata are those

groups whose series of status ranks are mutually congenial, leading to

similar behavior and mentality. Disaffine strata are those groups whose

multiple status ranks are noncongenial or inconsistent (1968b:131).

When two double disaffine groups appear simultaneously in a

given population, the potential for revolutionary change is created.

The French Revolution is cited as a prime example of a revolution which

was caused, in part, by this state of affairs -- also, status inconsis-

tency or disaffine groups are not denied a causal role in the Russian

and Chinese revolution as well. Geschwender, drawing from Sorokin states:

> The nobility was a politically powerful group which had little
> economic wealth, while the third estate was a wealthy group
> virtually powerless in the political arena. The French
> Revolution was the decomposition of these two double
> disaffine strata and the creation of two new affine strata.
> Sorokin claimed that similar sets of circumstances prevailed
> in the case of the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Communist
> Revolution, and numerous other examples (1968b:132).

Finally, Geschwender has attempted to bridge the gap between

status inconsistency and individual dissatisfaction sufficiently intense

to produce protest or participation in social movements. He has attempt-

ed to integrate status inconsistency literature, Homan's (1961) Theory

of Distributive Justice, and Festinger's (1957) Theory of Cognitive

Dissonance into a set of seven assumptions followed by seven predictions

"...regarding the manner in which status inconsistency may contribute

to the assumptions followed by the predictions are drawn directly from

Geschwender's work and presented below:

(1) All individuals hold sets of cognitions which include some that are reality-based, some that are definitional, and some that are normative.

(2) Any set of cognitions may stand in a relation of dissonance, consonance, or irrelevance, depending upon the internal relations which hold among reality-based and normative cognitions. If the conjunction of a reality-based and a normative cognition implies the negation of another reality-based cognition, then a state of dissonance exists.

(3) Reality-based cognitions will include perceptions of one's status in the educational, occupational, income, and ethnic hierarchies. Definitional cognitions will include the definition of ethnicity as an ascribed investment, education as an achieved investment, occupation as a social reward, and income as a material reward. Normative cognitions will include the belief that rewards received should be proportional to investments.

(4) Dissonance is an upsetting state and will produce tension for the individual. This tension will lead to an attempt to reduce dissonance by altering cognitions, adding new cognitions, or deleting old ones. Attempts to alter reality-based cognitions will involve attempting to change the real world.

(5) Status inconsistents whose rewards received are less than believed to be proper for their investments will feel anger and inconsistents whose rewards exceed investments will feel guilt. Anger is a sharper form of dissonance than guilt. The intensity of dissonance-reducing behavior will be directly proportional to the sharpness of dissonance.

(6) Dissonance-reducing attempts will take the form of coping responses, attempts to change the real world, when possible.

(7) Dissonance-reducing attempts will move from the simple to the complex. The most complex form of attempting to change reality is attempting to alter society.

The predictions:

(8) Reality-based cognitions will include perceptions of present socioeconomic circumstances, past socioeconomic circumstances, and time lapse between the two. A higher level of socioeconomic circumstances will be defined as preferable to a lower level of socioeconomic circumstances.

(9) Individuals whose present socioeconomic circumstances are at a higher level than past circumstances will be aware

of the fact that they have experienced improvement
and will define further improvement as possible and
desirable. The discrepancy between anticipated future
circumstances and present circumstances will produce
dissonance. Anticipation of future rate of progress
will be determined by rate of past progress (time lapse
cognition).

(10) Reality-based cognitions will include perceptions
of present and past socioeconomic statuses of relevant
reference groups. Comparisons will be made between
rates of progress of self and relevant reference groups.
Discrepancies between perceived rates of progress will
produce dissonance.

(11) Individuals whose present socioeconomic circum-
stances are at a lower level than past circumstances
will be aware that they have experienced a worsening
of conditions and will be fearful of further deterior-
ation. A comparison of present circumstances and
past circumstances will produce dissonance.

(12) Attempts to reduce dissonance will take the form
of attempting to change society when it is believed
that sufficient power is, or can be, harnessed to
bring this about. They will take a rightest direction
when present circumstances are at a lower level than
past circumstances and a leftist direction when present
circumstances are at a higher level than past circum-
stances.

(13) The intensity of dissonance experienced will be
inversely proportional to the time span during which
the discrepancies developed and will be directly pro-
portional to the size of the discrepancies. The in-
tensity of change attempts will be directly proportional
to the intensity of dissonance.

(14) Change-oriented, dissonance-reducing attempts on
the part of status inconsistents will take a rightest
orientation when high ethnic status is combined with
lower levels of occupation or income: they will take
a leftist orientation when high educational status
is combined with a lower level of occupation or income.
(1968b:132-133).

After connecting the concept of status inconsistency to the

origin of social movements through the work of Geschwender and other

notable writers, I now turn to the final work to be presented in this chapter.

Mark N. Hagopian

In seeking out the causes of revolution, Hagopian in The Phenomenon
of Revolution (1975), attempts to avoid the pitfalls of monistic theories
on the one hand and "pure" skepticism on the other. Thus, he chooses a
middle path which leads to "...conceive of revolutions as a particu-
lar sort of social change produced in its turn by different sorts of social
change." (1975:129).

In more specific terms, for Hagopian,

A revolution is an acute, prolonged crisis in one or more
of the traditional systems of stratification (class, status,
power) of a political community, which involves a purposive,
elite-directed attempt to abolish or to reconstruct one or
more of said systems by means of an intensification of
political power and recourse to violence. (1975:1).

Further, Hagopian suggests that any theory of the cause of
revolutions should not be based on a one-sided conception of society,
e.g., a theory that stresses harmony at the expense of conflict and
vice-versa. Presumably, for Hagopian a more reasonable approach is to
have the best of both worlds. Consequently, his explication of the causes
of revolutions favor the assessment that "...while there [may be] some
overall unity in society," the various subsystems may at times "...be
seriously out of phase with each other." (1975:130).

Following MacIver (1964), Hagopian makes a distinction between
three subsystems found in all human societies. (1) The social subsystem
refers to the three basic stratification systems of society (e.g., class,
status, and power), plus the kinship system and primary and secondary
group affiliations. (2) The cultural subsystem can be compared to what
Marx meant by "ideology" as part of a society's superstructure. The cul-

tural subsystem is composed of ideas concerning patterns of group living, and operative valuations and goals. These ideas are revealed in the society's folkways, mores, and traditions. (3) The technological subsystem refers to the ways in which men interact to exploit their environment. One implication here is that various tools, processes, and technologies are used to extract from the environment amenities which satisfy man's needs and wants. Included in this category is the reified notion of a division of labor (e.g., distinguished from social hierarchy).

Hagopian finds that in traditional societies there is a tendency for the three subsystems to change at more or less the same pace (i.e., change is synchronous). However, "...as societies become more complex and subject to outside influences, there is a tendency for the three subsystems to change at various rhythms and tempos (i.e., change is dissynchronous)" (1975:130).

It follows from Hagopian's argument that the more modern the society, the greater its vulnerability to revolution. Moreover, when a society experiences a considerable amount of rapid dissynchronous change, the chances of revolution is enhanced in two fundamental ways: (1) by the exacerbation of one or more of the following types of social conflict (e.g., class conflict, status group conflict, stratification inconsistency and power struggles among elites); and (2) "by promoting a generalized sense of discontent." (1975:131).

For Hagopian, revolution results from the peculiar interactions between the three subsystems, which in turn produces social psychological responses from individuals and groups within society, which in turn leads to revolution.

Also, Hagopian cites three types of causes that are associated
with the processes of change within the social, cultural, and technolo-
gical subsystems. These three types of causes, i.e., long-term causes,
middle-term causes, and precipitating causes "produces the conjuncture
of forces which in the end is precipitated into open revolution."
(Hagopian, 1975:134-135).

The major consideration in determining long-term causes is how
far back should one take as a point of departure or as the point when
"equilibrium" begins to break-down. Hagopian says that the figure of
100 years is typical in many studies as a starting point for examining
the long-term causes of major revolutions (1975:136). Thus, he lists
seven long-term causes of revolutions: (1) economic growth (i.e., rapid);
(2) technological inovation; (3) the growth of science; (4) democrati-
zation; (5) secularization; (6) growth of the modern state; and the
growth of modern nationalism (1975:136-150).

Hagopian admits the difficulty in distinguishing between middle-
term and long-term causes of revolution. But, nevertheless, he asserts
that "chronologically, middle-term causes emerge into full prominence
during the last decade or two before the outbreak of revolution" (1975:
150). Hagopian lists five middle-term causes of revolution which are,
in part, ramifications or consequences of long-term factors: (1) econ-
omic depression; (2) alienation of the intellectuals; (3) division and
ineptitude in the "ruling class"; (4) war; and (5) government financial
crisis.

Last, precipitant causes are the final level before the out-
break of revolution. Hagopian distinguishes between two types, i.e.,

accidental precipitants and planned precipitants. The former are those

whose revolutionary significance and consequences are basically unanti-

cipated by the legal agents of social control. The latter "...are those

riots, strikes, mutinies, assassinations, attacks, attempted coups, and

so forth, which revolutionary activists instigate in the expressed hope

of triggering a broader revolutionary response." (Hagopian, 1975:166-167).

After presenting Hagopian's views concerning The Phenomenon of

Revolution, I must emphasize that his work makes a significant contribu-

tion to the study of revolutions. I have chosen to put him in the General

Works category, mainly because of his own uncertainty about where his

work belongs. In describing his own owrk, Hagopian asserts that "though

it is something less than a didactic monograph with a tightly integrated

theory of revolution, it is something more than a survey of the litera-

ture." (1975:viii).

<div align="center">Summary</div>

The major goal in this chapter was to review the "relevant"

literature which deals with revolution. The goal was not to review all

the literature about revolution. For my purposes, the following tasks

were completed: (1) A brief explication of the colonial situation was

made in order to familiarize the reader with my use of the term through-

out the paper; (2) A presentation of a classification scheme which was

used to group or classify the major theories which deal with the causal

origins of revolutions. Here, I drew from some of the notable works

in the field and put together a relatively sound classification scheme.

Further, each major theoretical view presented in the classification

scheme was represented by a major proponent of that view. Also, I pre-

sented a criteria by which any theory of revolutions could be critiqued; and (3) an explication of some of the major theories and related works of revolution was presented. Here, I discussed and critiqued selected theories that represented each major theoretical view.

Table 24 has been constructed to summarize the critique of the major theories. Looking at Table 24, we note that there are ten criteria for critiqing or evaluating a theory. A "yes" indicates a given theory or approach meets the criteria of concern. A "no" is indicative of a theory or an approach not meeting a particular criteria. At first glance, Gurr and Tilly appears to meet more of the criteria than the others (i.e., they have more yeses). But, this may be misleading-- why? Gurr and Tilly are not explaining revolutions per se. The former is attempting to explain political violence in general--while the latter seeks to uncover the causes of political action. Both these concepts are extremely vague and they tend to generate numerous conceptual and analytical problems when one attempts to explain revolution by explaining either of the two.

None of the theories presented, meet all of the criteria--and certainly this comes as no great surprise, given the reluctance of theorists to attempt to construct full-fledged systematic theory.

When reviewing the literature on social movements and revolutions, one cannot help but notice the "starving" need for a classification scheme and a criteria for critiqing or evaluating any theory of revolution. In part, this chapter has attempted to meet that need head-on, coupled with the presentation of some very basic theoretical and related works about the causal origins of revolution.

Table 24

SUMMARY TABLE OF COMPARISON BETWEEN THE THREE MAJOR DIVISIONS OF THEORIES OF REVOLUTION,
USING A CRITERIA FOR A COMPLETE THEORY OF REVOLUTION

	Social Structural Theories			Social Psychological	Conflict Theories	
	Johnson	Brinton*	Skocpol	Gurr**	Marx	Tilly***
Definition	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Typology	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Theory for typology	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Career: Stage and phase and theory for each.	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Frequency	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Intensity	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Duration	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Direction	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Scope	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Scale	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes

** Gurr's definition, typology, etc. is concerned with political violence not revolutions, per se.

* Brinton does divide the revolutionary process into stages or phases, but he does not offer a theory for each.

*** Like Gurr, Tilly is not concerned with revolution per se; his dependent variable is collective action, revolution is but one aspect of the larger whole which he studies.

CHAPTER V

THE DESCRIPTIVE SCHEME

The goals of this chapter are threefold: (1) to present a
descriptive scheme, i.e., a set of criteria by which all or any kind
of revolution can be described; (2) to use the descriptive scheme to
present a detailed case study of the Haitian Revolution (sometimes
referred to as the San Domingue or San Domingo Revolution) and; (3) to
use the descriptive scheme to present a somewhat less detailed case
study of Martinique and Guadaloupe respectively.

Before I present the descriptive scheme, however, perhaps it
may be useful to discuss rather briefly why a scheme is needed in the
first place. To begin with, the alert student of revolutions, after
only a casual review of the literature, should be able to recognize
the existence of a certain naiveness on the part of authors toward the
systematic comparison of revolutions. More specifically, one should
have little difficulty in recognizing that the systematic study of
revolutionary movements in general and anti-colonial movements in
particular has long been retarded by the lack of any systematic organi-
zation of the primary data, i.e., the case histories of revolutions.

It is true, however, that the literature is full of

idiosyncratic accounts of particular movements. It is also true that

these movements are usually not described in terms of a standardized

scheme of repeatable categories which allow for systematic comparison

(Silberstein and Jordan, 1977:13). Take, for example, the work of

Eric Wolf called Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (1968), wherein

he treats the following revolutions: Mexican, Russian, Chinese,

Vietnamese, Algerian, and Cuban. In short, Wolf's work is typical

of a contemporary attitude which is manifested in the failure of

investigators to establish set criteria for which to compare the

similarities and differences between revolutions. Silberstein and

Jordan recognize the difficulty in constructing theories and testing

hypotheses by utilizing works like that of Wolf:

> . . . it is impossible to construct theories or test
> hypotheses with his "data"--his materials are simply
> not comparible. For example, if one wishes to test
> the common hypothesis that severe fiscal problems of
> government are important catalysts for all revolutions,
> he cannot do it because the book does not offer this
> information on all his revolutions, nor does he offer
> any explanation for its presence or absence (1977:14).

In an effort to avoid those types of problems mentioned above,

I present the following scheme for the description of all revolutions

within the same set of categories. Thus, the source of my "primary"

data is the descriptive scheme applied in detail to the Haitian

Revolution, then in a less detailed way to Martinique and Guadaloupe.

By using the descriptive scheme a major purpose is to illustrate the

above three cases.

<u>The Scheme</u>

I. <u>Narrative</u> or what happened.

II. <u>General Characteristics of the Movement</u>

    A. Identifying symbols: uniforms, insignias, banners, music, etc.

    B. Type of movement

    C. Size and scope

    D. Duration

    E. Intensity

    F. Success/failure

III. <u>The Origins and Contexts</u>

    A. Historical stages or periodization

    B. Social conditions

        1. Cultural traditions

            a). revolutionary tradition

            b). traditions of self-help through violence

            c). political traditions such as democratic, dictator, etc.

        2. Stratification systems

        3. World power structure, and the place of nation being studied in this structure

        4. National economic situation

        5. Ethnic strains and stresses, etc.

    C. Biographical information concerning the leaders

IV. <u>The Movement</u>

    A. Ideology

       1. Values, criticisms of old regime, and ideal type of

           strategic organization advocated

B. <u>Means</u>--the mobilization and employment of resources

       1. Internal--building the organization

       2. External--fighting the enemy

C. <u>Consequences</u>

       1. Success or failure, manifest and latent

           a). short term

               1. did the movement succeed in seizing power and in

                    getting its program accepted or not

           b). long term

               1. what were the effects of the movement on history

                    after it ended

The Haitian Revolution, 1791-1820

I. The Narrative

The major purpose of this section is to give a journalistic or popular-historical account of what happened during the course of the Haitian Revolution. Thus, the following historical account of the ups and downs of the revolution is told in common language so that almost any audience can read it.

To begin with, it should be noted that by 1789 (the year of the outbreak of the French Revolution), the Old Monarchical Regime in France had made the colony of San Domingue (Haiti) an integral part of the economic life of France.[8] San Domingue had become the greatest

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[8] In this paper, the terms San Domingue, and Haiti are used interchangeably.

colony in the world, the pride of the mother country, and the envy of
all other imperialist nations (James, 1963:IX). The importance of this
French West Indian colony can be seen by the fact that by 1789, it
supplied over two-thirds of the overseas trade of France and was the
greatest individual market for the Eruopean slave trade (James,
1963:ix).

It is well to note that from 1787 onward the colony was bring-
ing in more than 40,000 slaves a year to perform the labor (James,
1963:55). This enormous increase of slaves was virtually overloading
the colony with Native Africans, more hostile, more discontented, and
presumably more ready for rebellion than their counterpart, i.e., the
free people of color. Of the half-million slaves in the colony in
1789, more than two-thirds had been born in Africa (James, 1963:55-56;
Stoddard, 1914:53).

Between 1789-1791 the colonial bureaucracy and the wealthy
landowners, i.e., the planters, etc. began to feel the effects of the
French Revolution. In essence, they began to split, i.e., growing
disorganization, factionalism, alienation, anticipation of events
happening at home, etc. During this same period there was a general
increase of oppression and brutality launched against the free people
of color (i.e., the mulattoes and free blacks) and the African slaves.
The former group, however, being almost equal in number with the whites,
were extremely wealthy. In fact, by 1789 the free people of color as
a group possessed approximately one-third of the landed wealth and
owned one-fourth of the slaves of San Domingue.

A major point which I should make here concerns the free people

of color. Although barred by law from professional occupations, and
suffering from other forms of prejudice and discrimination, the free
people of color did have some advantages other than their wealth.
One very important advantage by 1789 was the fact that out of 156
companies of the militia the free people of color formed 104 of them
(Ott, 1973:13). Although they were only rank and file members, they
were in a sense ". . . physically sharpened for the coming conflict"
(Ott, 1973:13).

So, when the white caste began the oppression and brutality
it was "natural" that such attacks would result in bitter resentment
among a class of people who were, for the most part, beginning to
approximate, in wealth and numbers, to the position of the resident
white planters in San Domingue (Parry and Sherlock, 1971:157).
Moreover, the injured pride of the free people of color ". . . was
potentially as explosive as the resentment of slaves against their
enslavement" (Parry and Sherlock, 1971:157).

Initially, the social structure of San Domingue society began
to crumble from the top down. In 1789 the creole planters (grands
blancs) tried to make their voice for local self-government heard in
the convening Estates-General in France. In fact, their major goal
was to gain control over the colonial government. They demanded
liberty and freedom to rule their own destiny. Their grievances against
the colonial regime were "not particularly warranted," for the govern-
ment was lax, and taxes were not overbearing. Furthermore, the economic
monopoly over the island's commerce had been broken ". . . France opened
the colony's ports to foreign ships and concluded commercial treaties

with England and the United States" (Fagg, 1965:120).

By sending delegates or representatives to France to speak out in the Estates-General (later the National Assembly) was an uncalculated error made by the planters. The mother country was undergoing a mass (civil) revolution and the Estates-General was becoming quickly filled with reformers from the radical Jacobin Party. These creole planters inadvertently brought to the attention of men whose hearts burned for radical change, the appalling conditions of San Domingue. Without intentionally doing so, they gave the French revolutionaries another cause to exploit.

The French based abolitionist society known as the _Amis des Noirs_ (Friends of the Blacks) began to flood the colony with propaganda urging liberty, equality and fraternity. The effect of the propaganda was tremendous, especially as it interacted with the social conditions of the colony. The poor whites, Mulattoes and slaves alike were stirred to a feverish pitch.

In September 1789 the French National Assembly surprised the planters and decreed that they could run San Domingue with an assembly of their own. In October 1790, a French educated Mulatto named Oge, feeling the brute heel of exploitation, led a major revolt in the North Province. The revolt was quickly suppressed and Oge and his brother Chavannes were put to death on the wheel. The news of the death of the two Mulatto freedom fighters stirred support in the French National Assembly. In May 1791 the National Assembly granted by decree full equality to all free people of color born of free parents (Tyson, 1973:23). Immediately, the creole planters began to apply as much

pressure as they could muster in an effort to influence the National

Assembly to repeal the May degree. The planters were successful.

In September of the same year strong planter pressure led to

the revocation of the May decree. And it was ". . . just in time to

spoil a promising union of white and Mulatto forces against the blacks,

who had rebelled a month before" (Fagg, 1965:120).

The rising of the slaves in the North Province in August 1791

marked the turning point in the history of slave revolts in the Western

Hemisphere. The slave revolt in San Domingue did not aspire to bring

back some lost African world or build an isolated Afro-American enclave,

which was characteristic of those which occurred previously. To the

contrary, the San Domingue revolt developed a bourgeois-democratic

ideology and attempted "to forge a modern black state based on an

economy with a vital export sector oriented to the world market"

(Genovese, 1979:88).

The revolution was sparked by voodoo priests who used their

drums to communicate the messages throughout the Northern plantation

area. The agents of social control were caught completely by surprise.

From the beginning, more than 100,000 blacks participated, burning the

plantations, destroying crops and machinery, and torturing, raping, and

killing the ruling caste. Those whites who were fortunate to escape

the plantations, huddled in the fortified towns, terrified, because

their deepest fears had suddenly been realized (Tyson, 1973:10).

The town of Le Cap François was threatened, but for the time

being it stood firm. As the whites, and often Mulattoes, regrouped

they committed attrocities of their own, resulting in the collapse of

the social structure and plantation economy of the North. In September 1792 the National Assembly dispatched 6,000 troops. These troops had been indoctrinated by the French Revolution, and most of the Commissioners who accompanied them as legitimate representatives of French authority were Jacobins. The Commissioner which seemed to have had the most impact on the San Domingue Revolution was Sonthonax. He not only sided with the rebellious blacks, but went so far as to defy both the royalist governor and the planter assembly (Fagg, 1965:121).

The situation in San Domingue became so desperate for the whites that approximately 10,000 migrated away from Le Cap to the United States (Fagg, 1965:121; Tyson, 1973:11). Also, in an effort to stay on the good side of the rebellious blacks, Sonthonax proclaimed the end of slavery in the colony, an action which was confirmed in 1794 by the National Convention.

Meanwhile, Britain and Spain being at war with France and anxious to take over the rich colony, sent large military expeditions to San Domingue "and allied with whatever forces they could" (Fagg, 1965:121). In 1795 Spain decided to withdraw from the war with France largely as a result of defeats by black revolutionary troops in San Domingue (Rotberg, 1971:45). With the signing of the Peace of Basle, Spain agreed to cede its portion of Hispaniola to France along with the evacuation of Spanish troops. The British, however, stayed on until 1798, to lose in her San Domingue campaign some 40,000 troops. The white and Mulatto castes, at least those individuals who had survived up to this point, were now faced with an experienced black army led by Toussaint Louverture.

Born into slavery in 1743, Toussaint had been recognized early in life for his intelligence, taught to read and write, and elevated from a stable boy to the position of foreman. When the revolution began, he organized 4,000 blacks into a private army. Soon Toussaint's army became an ally of the French royalists and the Spanish. The reason for Toussaint's collaboration with the Spanish seems to lie in his distrust of the Jacobin commissioners who were sent to the colony after the slaves had rebelled. Toussaint focused on the fact that slavery had not been officially abolished by the French National Assembly. Moreover, when Sonthonax used his own personal authority to proclaim the abolition of slavery, Toussaint was still somewhat skeptical. It was not until 1794 when the French National Assembly upheld Sonthonax's previous proclamation abolishing slavery, that Toussaint switched from the Spanish to the French and fought effectively against the former to prevent a colonial restoration (Fagg, 1965:121).

Toussaint had exceptional abilities as a military strategist. In a methodical way, he defeated members of the old regime (i.e., the royalists), the Spanish and the British, establishing himself as the major black leader by 1798. Although the British evacuated the colony they were reluctant to do so. In fact the British Commander General Maitland had reasoned that a total British defeat in San Domingue would pose a threat to their interests in Jamaica. Moreover, one could not be certain that Toussaint would not ". . . attempt to break the shackles of slavery throughout the West Indies" (Ott, 1973:101).

But Toussaint was in a much better bargaining position than the British. Through a shrewd piece of diplomacy, he got the British

to withdraw all their forces from the colony. In return, Toussaint

negotiated a treaty in which he agreed to not invade Jamaica and to

allow the British future trading privileges. Toussaint knew, however,

that the treaty would enhance his prestige and substantially improve

his bargaining position with France ". . . by raising the possibility

of an alliance with England" (Tyson, 1973:16). In 1799, he managed

to convince the Directory in France that he was loyal both to the

Revolution and to France. Consequently, he was officially appointed

Governor General.

After establishing control in the North, Toussaint proceeded

to the West and South Provinces to defeat the Mulattoes, who had

removed the majority of the whites. Toussaint's subordinate,

Dessalines, was given the mission to "pacify" the Mulattoes. By

appointing Dessalines to purge the area, Toussaint could avoid direct

involvement and a possible loss of some popularity while feeling assured

that his program would be thoroughly completed (Ott, 1973:116).

Dessalines having been instructed to "pacify" the area followed up

the campaign with numerous executions. The various estimates of the

number of people killed range from two hundred to ten thousand.

Dessalines was reproached but not disciplined by Toussaint. The latter

remarked in a mild manner, "I told him to prune the tree, not uproot

it" (Rodman, 1954:1).

Meanwhile, another general under Toussaint's command,

Christophe, began to put many of the ex-slaves back to work producing

sugar cane and coffee in the North Province. The black Governor-

General himself firmly believed that the ultimate guarantee of liberty

was the prosperity of agriculture. He therefore maintained the planta-
tion system although reorganizing it on a new basis (Tyson, 1973:18;
James, 1963:242). With slavery abolished, Toussaint sought to solve
the labor problem by confining the blacks to the plantations, but giving
them their keep and a fourth of the produce. On this latter point,
Toussaint has been criticized by some as organizing the same type of
system as his predecessors, i.e., the slave masters. But this is an
unfair criticism. Toussaint was confronted with the colossal task of
transforming a slave population, after years of bondage, ". . . into a
community of free laborers, and he was doing it in the only way he
could see" (James, 1963:242). Furthermore, Toussaint made sure that
the interests of the laborers were always served, i.e., they were paid
their quarter of the produce. This fact alone was sufficient to mark
the change from the old regime to the new . . ." (James, 1963:242).

Although Toussaint guaranteed the interests of the black
majority, he nevertheless firmly believed that regardless of the color
of one's skin, he/she would receive equal protection and equal punish-
ment under the law. The black Governor-General was convinced that
San Domingue could not progress without white assistance. Of course,
white assistance was manifested in the form of capital, expertise, and
advice, therefore he pursued a policy of racial harmony (Tyson, 1973:19).

Because the whites and the free people of color, on the whole,
were better educated than the blacks, they were favored with important
governmental positions. Moreover, ". . . Toussaint relied heavily upon
their counsel" (Tyson, 1973:19).

Initially, Toussaint's policies reaped rewards. The plantations

flourished and the previous economic prosperity of the colony was revived to two-thirds of its prerevolutionary height. This brought a favorable response from the colonial whites. After all, Toussaint had not broken up their estates. They had a reasonably disciplined labor force. Moreover, the New Regime appeared to have brought them the gains they had sought to obtain at the beginning of the revolution: local self-government and free trade (Tyson, 1973:20).

Toussaint was also equally successful in his diplomacy. He not only understood the importance of reviving the economy, but of maintaining friendly relations with France, England and the United States. Many foreign diplomats, however, made the crucial error of consistently underestimating him, flattering him and misunderstanding his intentions and determination. To Toussaint, however, it was a zero sum game, i.e., their error was his gain. He was not successful in convincing the French that a black government was more capable than a white to govern San Domingue. However, his diplomacy did earn him the necessary time: to launch massive public works projects, to begin the building of new cities, and to open the schools to all races. But more important, Toussaint's diplomacy gave him time ". . . to prepare the defenses of the island and to encourage the development of a national consciousness" (Tyson, 1973:20).

By establishing free trade policies, the black Governor-General could rest assured that agricultural products from San Domingue would reach the most favorable markets, and indeed they did. Utilizing these profits, Toussaint purchased essential military hardware. "Indeed, it was in these years (i.e., 1800 to 1802) that the foundation of an

independent nation was securely laid" (Tyson, 1973:20).

As a result of the many massive campaigns which were attempted in San Domingue after the takeover, a black ruling class began to emerge. Also, the black population at large (or the masses) had begun to acquire a significant degree of self-confidence and pride (Tyson, 1973:20).

In January 1801, Toussaint made good the title of France to Spanish Santo Domingo by occupying that colony with black revolutionary troops.

The black Governor-General, being at the peak of his power put San Domingue on a firm course toward economic recovery and had his authority legalized with a Constitution.

On February 5 Toussaint appointed a Central Committee of ten members to draft the constitution. The committee was composed of seven whites and three Mulattoes. "Such favorable representation for the whites and the Mulattoes was part of Toussaint's scheme to win their support" (Ott, 1973:118-119). With Toussaint being the symbol of power in San Domingue, blacks were more than favorably represented without a single one being on the committee (Korngold, 1965:220). The Constitution was adopted on May 9, 1801 with Toussaint being appointed Governor-General for life, with the right to choose his successor. He was given the power to fill all vacancies in military and civil offices and held the highest rank in the Army. Toussaint was authorized to submit to the Committee a draft of laws which would be used to govern the colony. Also, the Constitution decreed that in the event of Toussaint's death the term of office for future governors would be five years. And in

the case of resignation of a governor, the highest ranking General in

the Army would assume the office until the election of a new governor

Leger, 1907:108-109).

Civil and criminal courts and a Supreme Court (i.e., Tribunal

de Cassation) were organized and put on a sound footing. However,

military court martials were authorized to try certain cases (e.g.,

robbery, murder, arson, conspiracies, etc.). In terms of religion,

Catholicism was ". . . proclaimed the religion of the State; and

divorce was prohibited" (Leger, 1907:109).

But, the black leader was soon faced with more difficult

problems. Moreover, by the end of 1801 he was confronted with grave

domestic and international crises. On the domestic side, Toussaint

was faced with a growing restlessness among some of his key generals.

Also, a significant number of the masses of blacks in the North were

becoming disillusioned with his rule. They resented Toussaint's

seeming partiality to the whites and his reliance upon white and

Mulatto advisors. The blacks began to feel more and more alienated

thinking that Toussaint had abandoned their interests (Tyson, 1973:20).

But it was Toussaint's adopted nephew and rumored successor,

Moise, who took the lead and organized a major revolt against the

whites in the North Province. Moise was in favor of breaking up the

large plantations and destroying the whites, and he saw no other

alternative except rebellion. On the other hand, Toussaint wasted no

time. He quickly crushed the uprising and had Moise brought before

a military tribunal. The most damaging evidence presented against the

rebellious nephew was his execution of potential witnesses, shouts

from rebel friends and the like. In any case, the military tribunal
acquitted him. Not being satisfied, Toussaint personally reversed
the court's decision and had Moise executed (Ott, 1973:148-149).

After executing his nephew, Toussaint began to purge the area.
Soon the black leader had two thousand people put to death, even those
who were remotely associated with his nephew (Ott, 1973:149).

Soon after the execution and purge, Toussaint recognized his
error (James, 1963:278). But the die had already been cast. The black
governor-general's influence over the blacks was on the decline. More
evidence on this point occurred when he prohibited his soldiers from
visiting the plantation except to see their parents, and then only for
a short period of time. As a result of his handling of the Moise
revolt, Toussaint was now afraid of the contact between the revolution-
ary army and the masses. Indeed, this was a sure sign of revolutionary
degeneration (James, 1963:279).

During this critical time, instead of bringing the black ex-
slave laborers closer Toussaint drove them further away from him. Even
after Moise's revolt it was not too late. Lenin with a strong hand,
crushed the Kronstadt revolt and subsequently proposed a new economic
policy. It is believed by some that this quick recognition of danger
is what saved the Russian Revolution. But Toussaint after crushing the
revolt, did not recognize its origin. In fact, he should have realized
that the revolt occurred in part from the fear that the black laborers
had of the same enemy that he was arming against. He was more rigid
with the revolutionaries than he had ever been before (James, 1963:285).
In effect, Toussaint, like Robespierre, struck a tremendous blow which

in part destroyed his own left wing.

And now, turning to the international side, there is no doubt that the timing of Moise's rebellion was disastrous for Toussaint. It happened that the day on which Moise was executed, November 21, 1801, was the very day fixed by Napoleon Bonaparte as the departure date of a French expeditionary force to retake San Domingue (James, 1963:285). On December 2, in the midst of his purge, Toussaint received news that France and England had signed a preliminary Treaty of Amiens. Here was the first significant indication that the international basis of his rule had collapsed. The second indication came as a result of a change in the presidential administration of the United States. The new Jeffersonian administration became more responsive to the Southern slaveowners than to the Northern industrialists. Moreover, the new administration desired to improve relations with France and became ". . . cooled toward the idea of an independent black republic" (Tyson, 1973:20-21).

Toussaint had gambled on the continued involvement of France in foreign wars (Ott, 1973:150). But now, he knew that Bonaparte might attempt to spoil the revolution in San Domingue by using counter-revolutionary tactics.[9] Furthermore, Toussaint believed that any counter-revolutionary move from France would be manifested in an attempt to destroy him and re-institute slavery." Consequently, he

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[9]Although Napoleon Bonaparte was not a figure from the Old Regime (i.e., the regime of Louis XVI) his actions toward the San Domingue Revolution were nontheless counter-revolutionary. This was also the case with Petion after he assumed power of the South in 1806 as a result of a Mulatto inspired coup.

decided to fight the First Consul if he must; with one eye on France

and the other on San Domingue, [coupled with his declining popularity

among the black masses], he had no easy task" (Ott, 1973:150).

By mid-December 1801 rumors began circulating throughout the

colony of an approaching French fleet. There was little doubt that

the rumors were not true. In fact, ". . . some [of the] whites despite

the fact that Toussaint had just saved them from death, gleefully

predicted the restoration of French authority" (Ott, 1973:150).

Napoleon Bonaparte, encouraged by the mercantile bourgeoise

and by his own personal dreams of a vast empire in the Western

Hemisphere had indeed launched what was possibly the largest military

expedition ever to sail directly from Europe to America (Tyson, 1973:

21; Fagg, 1965:122).[10] Bonaparte despatched General Victor Leclerc,

his brother-in-law, to San Domingue with 45,000 of the best soldiers

of France, to depose the "gilded African."[11] Leclerc's secret

instructions were explicit: first, win over Toussaint's generals by

flattery and promotions; second, arrest and deport Toussaint; third,

eliminate all resistance and disarm the blacks; fourth, restore

slavery, i.e., the old regime (Perusse, 1977:60; Tyson, 1973:21).

Leclerc, arriving in January 1802 accomplished the first goal, at

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[10]In order to ensure the British and the United States that
this massive military expedition was not a threat to their interests,
the First Consul's official statement was that Toussaint had to be over-
thrown in order to guarantee the security of the Western Hemisphere.
Napoleon's statement, coupled with a previous treaty with England and a
shift to a proslavery administration in the United States earned him
support from the former and neutrality from the latter (Tyson, 1973:21).

[11]The majority of Leclerc's soldiers were drawn from the
famous Army of the Rhine (Korngold, 1965:234).

least in part. The second goal he accomplished completely, but failed in his attempt to accomplish the third and fourth.

After a series of battles between Leclerc's forces and those of Toussaint's, the former had received more casualties, when a decision was made by the two Commanders to compromise. Although Toussaint retired to a plantation with his family he still kept alert as to what was happening in the colony.

When news leaked out in July 1802 that Napoleon Bonaparte had restored slavery in Guadaloupe, restlessness became general. Fearful that Toussaint might lead the blacks to revolt again, Leclerc's subordinate, General Boudet, invited him to partake of the social hospitalities of his home. But Toussaint, instead of finding the domestic civilities that he expected, was bound in chains, sent on board a French frigate and shipped to France (Holly and Harris, 1970:51). A few months later (April 7, 1803), Toussaint died in the French prison called Fort de Joux. But, by the time Leclerc himself had died of yellow fever in November 1802, black rebellion had again flamed all over the land. The French forces under Leclerc had not been successful in disarming the blacks. In fact, black military units including both the officers and the rank and file remained intact. The only difference, however, was that these military units were officially approved as part of the Army of France, by the First Consul's representative, General Leclerc.

Even after receiving heavy reinforcements, the French forces were unable to contend with the black revolutionary army, now led mainly by Dessalines with the support of Christophe. "The blacks

cherished their hard-earned freedom and thanks to Toussaint, knew how

to defend it" (Tyson, 1973:21). The black commanders made peace with

the Mulattoes who were regrouping in the South under the leadership of

Petion, they then launched a relentless offensive against the already

badly beaten French. Moreover, with renewal of war with Great Britain,

the French troops that remained in San Domingue had the alternatives

of dying in the colony or surrendering to the British; they chose the

latter. By November 29, 1803 the French had been completely decimated

and forced to evacuate San Domingue, leaving perhaps 60,000 of their

dead comrades on the island.

After publishing a preliminary declaration of independence on

November 29, Dessalines and his generals met in the town of Gonaives.

There, the black and Mulatto leaders renamed the new state Haiti to

emphasize the break with France. Also, Dessalines was made Governor-

General for life. Moreover, on January 1, 1804, the convention members

officially declared the independence of Haiti, the second republic in

the Western Hemisphere (James, 1963:370; Ott, 1973:182).

After proclaiming the independence of Haiti, Dessalines settled

down to the task of restoring order and prosperity in a land devastated

by twelve years of continuous combat. With respect to the problem of

restoring order and productivity to Haiti, Dessalines followed

Toussaint's lead. Highest on his list of priorities were cultivation

and defense. He wasted no time in attempting to put Haiti back on a

sound economic footing. The black leader, like Toussaint, seemed to

realize the value of white technology in the reconstruction of the newly

independent state. He, therefore, invited "redeemed planters" to

return, but with a strict warning that those persisting in their traditional attitudes and behavior toward blacks would have to answer with their blood.

The Army under Dessalines was given two basic tasks: to construct fortified positions on the mountains behind the seaport areas as a warning to France that any attempt to establish the Old Regime would be resisted; and to set the rest of the population to the task of rebuilding Haiti's economic prosperity. Dessalines was successful in bringing about complete order and restoring a large measure of the old economic prosperity.

But in October 1806, a Mulatto uprising occurred in the South Province and Dessalines headed toward the area to administer control, only to be ambushed and killed by a group of Mulattoes led by Petion (Rotberg, 1971:57). Dessalines' death was indeed a blow to the Haitian Revolution mainly because it encouraged the North and South to follow separate social, political and economic paths (Rotberg, 1971:57).

After the assassination of Dessalines, Christophe was generally presumed to be the rightful successor. A constitutional assembly met in December 1806 and appointed him president. But Petion and his largely educated Mulatto following were highly resistant to allowing Christophe and his black soldiers and white advisors to profit from the Mulatto inspired coup (Rotberg, 1971:57).

Therefore, in the southern part of the West Province and the South Province proper, the Mulattoes rallied around Alexandre Petion and elected him to govern. Hence, Haiti was now divided into two political entities, North and South, with Christophe ruling the former

and Petion the latter. Moreover, "after inconclusive fighting, a

stalemate was accepted in 1810" (Fagg, 1965:123).

The two men were radically different, and so were their methods

and approaches to the problems of nation building (Rotberg, 1971:58).

Christophe was a black who had worked as hotel waiter and had had some

previous military experience. He also had a fantastic memory ". . . and

great skill in picking the brains of men who were more knowledgeable

than he" (Fagg, 1965:124). "Christophe combined the best qualities of

Toussaint and Dessalines with an enhanced appreciation of the nature

and pressures of the international system" (Rotberg, 1971:58). The

accomplishments brought about by Christophe in the early years of his

rule were solid. Without changing the overall system of state lands

and labor policies implimented by Toussaint and Dessalines, he permitted

tenant-proprietors (or planters) to make a profit after paying twenty-

five percent of their yearly crop yield to the National treasury and

twenty-five percent in wages (Rodman, 1961:17).

Under Christophe's administration the laborer's work day was

marked by regular hours, and they were given Saturday afternoons and

Sundays off. Further, he encouraged commerce and foreign trade. He

established a sound currency, encouraged the printing of books, and

made education under the latest British system compulsory (Rodman,

1961:17). In sum, Christophe, like Toussaint and Dessalines, attempted

to build a modern state. And despite the intermittent conflicts with

the Mulattoes in the South and occasional disputes with England, he

restored a high level of prosperity to the North. Once more, sugar,

coffee, indigo, etc. ". . . flowed profitably from the plantations

to the market of the United States and Europe" (Rotberg, 1971:59).

The northern city of Le Cap Henri (previously known as Le Cap François)

became a flourishing commercial and cultural center under the patronage

of Christophe. Thus some of the aspirations which Toussaint held for

Haiti had begun to become a reality under Christophe's regime. But,

unfortunately in August 1820, he was partially paralyzed by a stroke,

which led to his death by suicide in October of the same year.

Under Petion, by contrast, the South with the exception of

Bonaparte, ushered in one of history's most grimly ironical counter-

revolutions (Genovese, 1979:88). In effect, prior to Petion's rule,

Haiti had known only large landed estates. The revolution under the

leadership of Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe had as a major

economic focus land appropriation on behalf of the state, worked in

the manner of plantations. Even during the first few years of Petion's

demi-republic in the South Province, he assisted the landed gentry.

For example, he modified the tax structure in their favor. Further,

he subsidized their operating costs during years of oversupply or

drought (Rotberg, 1971:60).

But, in 1809 Petion began to parcel out the arable property of

the state to smallholders. According to Rotberg this policy may have

been indicative of the republic's shortage of cash and an attempt to

meet its dire financial obligations by distributing the assets of the

state (1971:60).

Regardless of the reason which may be cited to explain Petion's

actions, the fact still remains that ". . . the entire agricultural

base of the society was greatly altered by [his policy]" (Rotberg,

1971:61). Moreover, the introduction of subsistence agriculture by
Petion accelerated decay. The majority of the cultivators of the South
were no longer willing to cultivate sugar, coffee and indigo. Instead,
they grew various garden crops for their own personal consumption. In
essence, the agricultural economy of the South was rapidly becoming
more subsistence than cash-oriented (Rotberg, 1971:61).

Furthermore, the few owners of the large estates which had not
yet been broken up became aware that it was becoming increasingly
difficult to obtain labor. Again, Petion came to the rescue and further
deteriorated the society by introducing tenant-farming. This policy
had the effect of further limiting the number of land parcels which
continued to be devoted to export crops. Moreover, coffee as a
previous export crop continued to be harvested ". . . but only where
it grew wild" (Rotberg, 1971:61).

The paradox of Petion's place in history is that he was beloved
by the common man (especially in the South) and the architect of his
country's economic ruin. After first coming to power in 1806, Petion
was re-elected in 1811 and subsequently in 1815 remaining in office
until his death in 1818. With Christophe's death occurring two years
later, internal war came to an end. In 1820, under Jean-Pierre Boyer,
Petion's Mulatto successor, the North and South merged back together
marking the conclusion of revolutionary adjustment.

Upon the death of the revolutionary generation, Boyer built
upon the foundations of Petion. Further, with a threat of fresh
hostilities from France, Boyer agreed to pay a crippling annual
indemnity. For the most part, Haiti became a land of smallholding,

black, creole-speaking peasants more predisposed toward subsistence farming than in producing for the cash economy (Rotberg, 1971:63).

II. General Characteristics of the Movement

A. Identifying symbols refer to distinctive, obvious ways in which the movement can be recognized. The first obvious symbol of the Haitian revolution was Toussaint himself. In effect, he became a living symbol when in those early months of 1792 he organized out of the thousands of ignorant and untrained blacks an army capable of fighting and defeating European troops. Toussaint and his troops also utilized French military uniforms, insignias, ribbons, etc., which they found on the plantations or took from the enemy killed in battle. There were generals, colonels, marshals, commanders, etc. (The rank of these officers, including Toussaint's was eventually approved by the French government.) During the revolution the ritualistic practices of Voodoo were used as a means to tighten the bonds of revolutionary brotherhood. While Toussaint carried out preliminary military training maneuvers, the Voodoo priests (the black ones) chanted the "Wanga" and the women and children sang and danced in a frenzy.[12]

B. Type of movement refers to how it fits into any common typology. In classifying the type of movement which took place in San Domingue, I am forced by the facts to classify it as a radical

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[12]The "Wanga" is a voodoo chant used in coordination with drums, dances, and bodily movement. It should be noted that I am not saying that voodoo rituals were used as a symbol of ultimate dedication and loyalty to the revolution. All Haitians did not partake; however, those that did were bound together by the blood of the sacrificial animal, which was the traditional blood pact of Dehomey (see Muntu by Janheinz Jahn: pages 29-61).

left-wing social movement analytically distinct from other types (i.e.,

expressive escapist, reformist, radical right-wing and conservative).

This radical social movement's direction of change was the future. The

extent of change was total; the target of change was the values and the

social structure. The amount of violence was extremely high and the

colonial government was overthrown. Expanded meaning given to the term

radical denotes that the San Domingue Revolution: (1) was the only

successful slave revolt (black or white) in recorded history; (2) ended

or abolished slavery, i.e., more than a mere change of color of the

masters and slaves; and (3) was a full scale rebellion which resulted

in broad social change.

In terms of my typology of revolutions (see Table 8, page 56),

the social upheaval which occurred in San Domingue would be also

classified as an anti-colonial revolution. Also, as an anti-colonial

revolution it had widespread participation; it was organized; the

conflict was between groups rather than within groups; and the greatest

percent of its members were from the mass of slaves.

C. Size and scope refer to the number of people who were

involved in the revolution. In the San Domingue Revolution almost

every individual living there was either actively or passively involved.

Although confessing a bit of ignorance in terms of a specific number,

I must say that from a total population of approximately 560,000 there

was broad participation in the Haitian Revolution.

D. Duration refers to how long the revolution lasted.

According to my criteria (see page 73) the Haitian Revolution began

in 1791. In fact, there seem to be much more agreement on when the

revolution began than when it ended. Utilizing my three criteria which designates when a revolution ends (see page 74), I maintain that the Haitian Revolution ended in 1820. This would account for approximately 28 continuous years.

E. <u>Intensity</u> refers to the number of people killed and to the amount of property destroyed. From the start, Ott maintains that ". . . few wars have been so completely destructive as was the Haitian Revolution" (1973:190). During the course of the revolution approximately 120,000 foreign military troops were killed at the hands of Toussaint's army. Further, there was widespread property damage during this period. It was common for a large or small plantation to explode overnight and the slaves to take control of the plantation and burn it down and kill all the whites. Of the numerous plantations which once dotted the prosperous countryside in San Domingue, only a small number remained (Ott, 1973:190). "The few which are still worked," replied a British writer, "are cultivated by women, children and old men; and all the sugar works and distilleries, except for a few instances, have been destroyed" (The London Times, June 18, 1804).

The colony was devastated by 12 years of continuous civil strife and foreign war. Of the 30,000 whites in 1789 only 10,000 remained by 1800. The rest had been killed or had emigrated. Of the 30,000 free mulattoes and free blacks there were still about 20,000; while of the 500,000 black slaves approximately one-third had perished (James, 1963).

F. <u>Success/failure</u> refers to the answer to the following question: when can it be said that a social movement had failed or

succeeded? The commonly held but seldom expressed melodramatic view

has it that a successful revolution has occurred when the good, moral

people violently overthrow the bad, immoral rulers and provide goodness

and happiness for everyone forever after.

When put in this bald form it is obvious that no social

scientist could accept such an elliptical and value-ridden "definition."

Its meaning would, of course, vary with every actor. For any observer,

the meaning problem aside, it implies that there never has been and

never will be a successful revolution. It is "romanticism" in its

worst and most primitive form.

What is needed is a more "value-neutral," scientific defini-

tion. Gamson attempts to derive one by the cross-classification of the

following two variables: advantages and recognition. Table 25 below

presents this typology.

TABLE 25

A TYPOLOGY OF SUCCESS/FAILURE IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

		RECOGNITION?	
		NO	YES
	YES	Preemption (1)	Success (2)
NEW ADVANTAGES?	NO	Failure (3)	Cooptation (4)

SOURCE: Gamson, 1975:29.

Category 2 (recognition plus new advantages) implies success.

That is to say, the movement has been recognized by the establishment

as the spokesman for the cause, and has managed to gain new advantages

for its constituency. Obviously, there could be various degrees of

success.

Category 3 (no recognition and no new advantages) represents

failure. The movement has not been recognized by the establishment,

and has gained no new advantages for itself and its constituents.

Obiously, there could be various degrees of failure. Complete failure

might involve the successful labeling (from the standpoint of the

establishment) of the movement leadership as simple criminals, and

their ultimate neutralization, incarcertaion, or destruction. The

followers could be destroyed all so. The members of a movement could

survive unrecognized and could fail to gain any advantages and even

suffer other kinds of losses.

Category 1 (no recognition but the gaining of new advantages

in spite of this) implies some limited success in spite of non-

recognition; i.e., the establishment often takes over and institution-

alizes the program of the dissidents without ever having recognized

them or even after having destroyed them. History recognizes many

cases of preemption.

And finally, category 4 (recognition without the gaining of

advantages) is also quite common. The leaders of the movement are

"brought off," taken into the administration of the old regime without

securing any new advantages for their followers and constituents.

Gamson's scheme is very useful and pithy, but it fails to

define or specify which kind of new advantages he is talking about.

It is clear, however, that new advantages are to be defined from the

standpoint of the movement's ideology. What type of new advantages constitute success for a revolutionary movement? For the purposes of this paper, I shall deal with two types of new advantages as outlined below:

SUCCESS:

 1. Military-Political

 2. Social Change Goals

SUCCESS:

 1. Military-Political

  a. Successful, violent overthrow of the state, old regime.

  b. Sufficient power to meet external threat (armed intervention from abroad) and internal threat ("Civil War") following the takeover.

  c. More political autonomy and control within the society.

  d. More political power with reference to the world or international situation.

  e. Enough of whatever military power it takes to institutionalize ideological goals.

 2. Social Change Goals

  a. Institutionalization of ideological goals.

  b. Legitimate transfer of power to next, non-revolutionary generation.

  c. Increased economic development.

  d. The creation of a broader and/or more relevant base of support for the new regime.

  e. Delivery of promised rewards to the movement's constituency.

a. Not just, as Weber would have it, increased control of

the economy by the bureaucracy. This is possible without

any of the other social change goals being attained.

By these standards the Haitian Revolution was certainly

successful by the military-political criteria: it did achieve military

victory over the French and all other comers; and it did establish an

independent republic. In terms of the social change criteria: it did

bring about an end (indeed a true abolition) to slavery and it did

achieve control over its own economy.

In terms of Toussaint's desire for increased economic develop-

ment, notable gains were made after he assumed power. Increased

economic development continued under Dessalines and Christophe's reign

respectively, as they attempted to carry out Toussaint's policy.

However, under Petion (President of the South 1806-1818) economic

development deteriorated. Therefore, given the success of Toussaint,

Dessalines and Christophe and the failure of Petion, the increase in

the economic sector as a whole, can hardly be said to be overwhelming.

Indeed, since Haiti is today one of the poorest countries in the

Western Hemisphere, some argue that the revolution was a dismal failure

in this way. I reject this argument since it assumes that Haiti's

poverty was caused by only one factor--revolution. This hardly follows.

However, it is true that soon after the final defeat of the French

military, Haiti did plunge into a kind of "Civil War," which had a

dampening effect on economic development. This conflict between North

and South was in part based on the external, international situation

rather than on endogenous factors alone, e.g., Napoleon Bonaparte's

betrayal of the revolution, the development of world colonialism, etc.

III. Origins and Contexts

The major purpose here is to provide some basic information from which the general explanation will come. This is not the explanation and I am aware of the ancient fallacy of propter hoc ergo post hoc.

A. Historical stages or periodization. For my purposes the Haitian Revolution is divided into historical stages or periods in order to explicate a clearer understanding as to what took place.

1. 1715-1774: Period of Political and Social Instability.

2. 1774-1792: The Old Regime: The French Colonial Government under Louis XVI.

3. 1789-1791: The Precursor Movement.

4. 1791-1804: The Political Revolution, Violent Phase: Rebellion, Civil War and Political Independence.

5. 1804-1820: Social Revolution and Problems of Succession.

B. Social conditions refers to all sociological conditions or to braod social, cultural and ecological factors which influenced the Haitian Revolution and which might have some bearing on its explanation.

1. Cultural traditions refers to the normative system of the society. First and foremost, the institution of slavery was an intricate part of the normative structure of San Domingue society. In reference to the existence of a revolutionary tradition one may talk first of the numerous slave conspiracies which occurred on the island

prior to 1791. This may very well indicate that slave revolts in

San Domingue had become an intergenerational phenomena. Second, one

may talk of the influence of revolutionary ideas from the mother

country (France) given the fact that a reciprocal relationship existed

between her and the colony. And now I will discuss each of these in

turn.

In San Domingue, there were numerous slave conspiracies prior

to the major upheaval which occurred in August, 1791. For example,

slave conspiracies took place in the following years: 1679, 1691,

1700, 1703, 1704, 1758, 1775, and 1778 (Tyson, 1973:7; Ott, 1973:18).

The attempted revolt of 1758 was probably the most well known. It

was organized by a highly charismatic and religious oriented maroon

named Mackandal, who had developed widespread influence among the

slaves.[13] In fact, as far back as 1689 the Maroons were a constant

threat to the plantations and this threat had increased significantly

by 1789. James states that in 1720 approximately 1,000 slaves, from

plantations in San Domingue, ran away to the mountains to join the

Maroons (1963:20). In 1751 this number had increased to 3,000 (James,

1963:20).

After uniting the maroons in 1758, Mackandal's plan was a call

to all plantation slaves to rise up and systematically poison the slave

masters and their families, then, those whites who managed to survive

were to be driven from the colony. Although some poisonings did take

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[13]Maroons were groups of fugitive slaves who had run away from
the plantation to the mountains where they had a subsistence economy
based on a traditional African pattern (Williams, 1970:66-67).

place the revolt was largely aborted. In fact, it never fully

materialized because Mackandal was betrayed, captured and burnt alive

(Ott, 1973:18).

Nevertheless, Mackandal's conspiracy of 1758, among others

that preceeded and followed it, seems to imply that the slaves of

San Domingue were a highly volatile lot and exemplified ". . . a

vigorous tradition of resistance" (Tyson, 1973:7).

Coupled with a tradition of slave conspiracies, the Great

French Revolution also had its influence on the events in San Domingue.

But, this relationship is a highly complex matter and cannot truly be

given justice short of a book. However, in a rather crude and

simplistic manner the major point which I want to make here is summed

up in the following statement made by Phillip D. Curtin:

> The reception of the French Revolution in the colonies presents
> an interesting series of case studies in the relationships
> between ideas and actions as well as the relationships between
> ideas and their background in a given social system. An aspect
> of this problem is shown in the reaction of the colonists and
> slaves in Saint Domingue to the Declaration of the Rights of
> Man (1950:157).

In short, the Declaration of the Rights of Man was a document which

represented the goals and aspirations of the French Revolution, and in

a sense it became a matter of interest to all Frenchmen including the

half-million African slaves in San Domingue (Curtin, 1950:157).

But let me make myself clear, which means that I am not

suggesting that the Declaration of Rights filtered down to the slaves

as a refined theory, constantly reminding them that they had a natural

right to be free. Quite the contrary, however, to the degree that the

Declaration worked itself down to the bottom caste ". . . it must have

been in the form of vague ideas that there was a revolution and that people were achieving liberty and equality" (Curtin, 1950:171).

Thus, the question which should be answered is: Did this vague feeling of liberty and equality have some effect on dissolving the force of opinion among the slaves, which, was one effective force keeping them in subjection (Curtin, 1950:171)?

One way to approach the question is by examining the sentiments of the slaves prior to the revolution in an effort to determine the degree to which the Declaration of Rights represented a new idea. To begin with, the feeling of revolt was much higher among many of the slaves of San Domingue than among individuals who were born into slavery. More than two-thirds of the slaves had once been free, i.e., born in Africa (Stoddard, 1914:53; Curtin, 1950:171). Having been born free coupled with having been made slaves by force, the San Domingue slaves, if the opportunity arose, ". . . were much more likely to see the possibility of making themselves free again by force" (Curtin, 1950:171; Moreau de Saint-Mery, 1979:Volume I, 15). This consideration is substantiated in part by the many slave conspiracies which occurred for a century or more prior to the revolution.

There were also other sources of ideas about liberty and equality. For example, soldiers coming from France full of revolutionary spirit and ideas of fraternity, and ignorant of the color restrictions in the colony, would often ". . . go through the streets of Port-au-Prince giving the fraternal embrace without regard to the color line" (Waxman, 1931:74). Although this blatant betrayal of the caste system was extremely alarming to the white colonists, they nevertheless

repeated the same "mistake," but in a slightly different way. In other words, the planters themselves often served as the medium through which the revolutionary ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity were passed on in recognizable form, to the slave (Waxman, 1931:74). The Baron de Wimpffen, commenting on the conditions just before the revolution, remarked in horror at the amount of freedom and naiveness exemplified by the planters during their meals at the table: "To discuss the Rights of Man before such people, what is it but to teach them that power dwells with strength and strength with numbers" (1817:235-236).

The planters, although seemingly unaware of the potential consequences and certainly unintentionally, taught the slaves the idology of the French Revolution, and as a result, the slaves became more sensitized to their power resources, i.e., numerical strength.

Another carrier or source of the revolutionary ideas which influenced the slaves of San Domingue was the Societe des Amis des Noirs. The friends of the blacks, as it was commonly called, was a very powerful French-based, political, protest organization which was established in 1778 by Brissot de Varville. In short, this organization advocated the ideal of equality and the ultimate abolition of slavery. Further, the Amis des Noirs had a direct connection to the colony through the free people of color. Although originally organized in imitation of the Clarkson abolition society in England, the Amis des Noirs was much ". . . more radical and more vociferous" (Perry and Sherlock, 1971:162). For example, the leadership of the organization was staffed with members from the radical Jacobin party, who were a part of the revolutionary vanguard of the French Revolution (1789).

Numbered among its members were such figures as Mirabeau, the Duke De
La Rochefouchauld-Liancourt, Robespierre, Danton, Lafayette, the Abbe
Gregoire, Condorcet and many others of high stature (Alexis, 1949:18).

By 1789, in San Domingue, although hated with a full passion
by the whites, the Amis des Noirs had begun an active campaign to free
the Blacks (Davis, 1936:30). In effect, in saturating the colony with
their pamphlets, they took advantage of the fact that "On nearly every
plantation there were groups of slaves thoroughly aware of what had
been going on in the political world" (Waxman, 1931:74).

One seemingly important result of the relationship between the
Amis des Noirs and the San Domingue colony was that the slaves did
receive a rather crude but significant new installment of ideas about
liberty and equality from a highly revolutionary organization (Curtin,
1950:172).

Another factor which not only helped to sustain the slaves
in an environment of calculated cruelty and debasement, but also aided
in the spread of militant ideas, was the cult of voodoo. Roberts
states that the early phase of the Haitian Revolution was plotted at
meetings of the voodoo cult (1942:194). Of course, one should not
conclude from this that voodoo was a cause of the Haitian Revolution.
In the author's view this would be nonsense.

But let's give Roberts the benefit of the doubt. He goes on
to say that the voodoo rituals served to enflame the hesitators, i.e.,
the slaves (1942:194). Contrary to the view held by many historians
voodoo is not a mere hocus-pocus of sorcery. Roberts explains:

It is a primitive religion transplanted, chiefly by Dahomean

blacks, to the New World. The worship of the snake, the
offering of . . . animal sacrifices, the pulsing drums, the
orgiastic dancing; these are only the outward manifestations.
A hierarchy of gods commands the devotion of the faithful,
and the voodoo papaloi and mammaloi, priest and priestess,
exert great authority (1942:194).

Robert's belief that the slaves in San Domingue plotted the

insurrection during their participation in voodoo ceremonies is

confirmed by Waxman in the following long oration:

All through the early summer, certain planters here and there
noticed that their slaves seemed to be holding numerous
gatherings at night. They could hear the drums echoing from
the hills, and frequently they could see the gleam of torches
flickering through the gloom. But when they asked what it all
meant their overseers explained with a tolerant smile that the
slaves were holding voodoo meetings where they danced and
chanted and gave themselves up to orgies and savage superstitions
which passed for religious rites with the uncouth creatures.
It was nothing to bother about.
     And so nobody interfered with the slaves as they kept on
holding their weird night ceremonies off in the hills. It was
nothing to bother about. Black drums kept on rumbling warnings
to ears that would not hear. Torches kept on flashing danger
signals to eyes that would not see until one night in the middle
of summer the world burst into flames and Toussaint L'Ouverture
came nearer and nearer to his hour (1931:75-76).

An important point to remember here is not such nonsense as

the cult of voodoo causing the Haitian Revolution, but quite the con-

trary, it was in these revolutionary times that the power of the

establishment had been greatly de-legitimated amid a smoldering

discontent and increased expectations in all classes and castes. In

effect, what the ruling white caste failed to realize was that in the

cult of voodoo the slaves possessed an intact religion and a priesthood

of their own which had the flexibility to absorb and spread the

revolutionary ideology of the French Revolution. The voodoo cult

maintained a rudimentary organizational structure which aided the

spread of revolutionary ideas from plantation to plantation. Some

voodoo leaders were preaching freedom immediately prior to the Haitian

Revolution (Revue de L'histoire des Colonies Francaises, XVII, 1929:

72074). One could argue, however, that "whether or not . . . voodoo

served as a special cadre of organizations, the fact that slaves lived

together in groups explains the spread of ideas" (Curtin, 1950:171).

This latter alternative explanation to the spread of revolutionary

ideas would be much more plausible if voodoo was not the most widely

practiced religion in Haiti today (Rodman, 1954:64-77).

Also a typical view at this time (1789-1791) held by the

planters was: that the slaves, for the most part, had accepted the

idea of the inevitability of slavery because of the traditional force

of the omnipotent French state and the power of the king as manifested

in the rigid enforcement of the Code Noir (Black Codes) (Curtin,

1950:172). If one takes this view seriously, then the whole succession

of events on San Domingue since the Fall of 1788 must have undoubtedly

weakened this idea. In effect, by 1791 (i.e., the outbreak of the

Haitian Revolution) it was obvious that the French state was either

impotent or no longer interested in supporting the social order in

San Domingue. This appeared to be the case especially since the French

State allowed intra- and inter-caste fights, first between the whites

themselves and second between whites and the free people of color

(Curtin, 1950:173).

What the slaves could have very well assumed in August, 1791

was that the continuance of slavery in the colony was in the hands of

the colonists alone, which in a legal sense was the case: since the

National Assembly in France had issued a decree on May 13, 1791, which

constitutionally shifted the decision on the status of persons "not free" to the colonial assembly (Curtin, 1950:173).

At this point I would not conclude that the slaves of San Domingue knew specifically about the constitutional change, however, it is clear that they did know that the power of France was no longer effective in the colony. To put it another way, the power of the establishment became weak and de-legitimated in the eyes of the slaves. Thus, by 1791 the social order in San Domingue was in a state of disorderliness. The planters could not pull it together. More important, however, was that this chaotic state of affairs had the effect of increasing the slaves' expectations, and their desire to launch a major revolt of which they had come to believe could be successfully waged and won. In effect, the slaves in San Domingue came to believe that they had the ability and power to bring to an end the institution of slavery, and indeed they did.

2. <u>Stratification system</u>. In San Domingue, prior to the revolution, the stratification system was a closed one. More specifically, in contemporary sociological terms, the stratification system was a mixture of two distinct types, i.e., a caste and a slave system. The terms in sociology in this area are hardly standardized. For some writers all slave systems are caste systems since all caste systems imply inequality, no mobility, and status ascription; (the structural approach); however, for other writers, caste and slave systems are different types of <u>systems</u> since members of the caste systems have rights and duties while in the slave systems masters have no duties and slaves no rights (the normative or cultural

approach). In this paper I generally take the normative approach to the definition.

Stratification in the San Domingue colony meant the existence of a caste system based on the system of slavery.

In the San Domingue colony there were three major castes: the whites, the free people of color, i.e., free Mulattoes and free blacks, and last, the slaves. I will discuss each of these in detail.

The ruling white society was highly diversified and divided, especially along social and economic lines. However, these 30,000 whites were united primarily by color. At the apex of the white caste stood the colonial bureaucracy composed almost entirely of Frenchmen from France. The heads of the bureaucracy were the Governor and the Intendant. The Governor was the official representative of the king of France. Being both a soldier and an aristocrat he was the general administrator over the island and directly responsible for law and order, i.e., the standing garrison of approximately 2,000 regular French troops were directly under his command.

Next to the Governor was the Intendant who was a bureaucrat. His responsibilities included the administration of justice, and finance and general administration (James, 1963:34). The Intendant's duties were mainly civil. Collectively, however, both the Governor and the Intendant represented the authority of the king and the commercial interest of the French bourgeoisie (James, 1963:34).

It may be well to note that before the beginning of the French Revolution the Governor and the Intendant in San Domingue were for the most part united on most matters below their class. This bureaucratic

structure dominated the local whites. But the relationship between the Governor and the Intendant was not always to be manifested in collective action. In fact, toward the last quarter of the eighteenth century and especially at the onset of the French Revolution, the relationship between the Governor and the Intendant increasingly deteriorated. With the French Revolution underway the Governor became increasingly nervous and security conscious, therefore he began to increase the policing activities of the militia giving them far-reaching powers in the out-lying districts. This type of action, to say the least, ". . . frequently encroached on the Intendant's administration of justice and finance" (James, 1963:35). The Intendant's response to these types of actions was usually one of sympathy toward the local whites and hostility toward the Governor. This hostility usually took the form of some extreme action. For example, it was not uncommon for the Intendant, when dissatisfied with the Militia's policing activities in a given district, to dissolve the Militia altogether and appoint "syndics," or his own police, to carry on the local government (James, 1963:35).

This type of conflict, increasing in degree, between the two major components of the bureaucratic government in San Domingue increased their de-legitimation and eventually caused others in their caste to challenge their authority.

The next group in the white ruling caste were the grands blancs or the "great whites." Foremost among this group of whites were the San Domingue planters. The great merchants and the wealthy agents of the maritime bourgeoisie were also included with the planters as

"great whites." An overriding desire of this class was to make a quick fortune and then to "lavish it in the cultured ease of a Parisian life" (Ott, 1973:10). This lure of the metropolis often resulted in a high degree of absenteeism, especially among the wealthy planters.

Thus, at the onset, colonial society in San Domingue was deprived of a prime source of leadership both morally and socially. Moreover, this fact frequently led to a more harsh treatment of slaves because no one was there to protect them from the overseer (Roberts, 1942:69).

Nevertheless, a substantial group of "great whites" who remained in the colony were primarily responsible for setting the societal standards which were characterized as: the ruthless pursuit of wealth, an independent spirit, a pattern of conspicuous consumption, licentiousness, and brutality (Tyson, 1973:4).

Below the "great whites" was the last group in the white caste, usually referred to as the petits blancs or the "small whites." This group was composed of plantation overseers, artisans, grocers, shopkeepers, small planters, city "rabble" and the like (Tyson, 1973:4; Ott, 1973:11). Because of the emphasis on color, these individuals enjoyed social and economic privileges which were not given to their counterparts in France. Additionally, because of their close proximity to the blacks they were often carriers of a militant racism (Tyson, 1973:4). In this connection, the "small whites" were constantly insecure, especially where the free people of color were concerned. This was so because the petits blancs knew that the free people of color were their superiors in every aspect except color. Thus, they

hated the free people of color and the slaves with a feverish passion

which earned them the title of "Aristocrats of the Skin" (Vaissiere,

1909:229).

The white caste being composed of representatives of the king,

great whites, and small whites soon found that the only thing they had

in common was the color of their skin. Thus their antipathies not only

speeded the coming of the revolution in San Domingue but contributed to

their inability to cope with it (Ott, 1973:12). James clarifies this

point in the following manner:

> Here then was the first great division, that between great
> whites and small whites, with the bureaucracy balancing
> between and [often] encouraging the small whites. Nothing
> could assuage or solve this conflict. The moment the
> revolution begins in France these two will spring at each
> other and fight to the finish (brackets are mine) (1963:36).

The second caste consisted of the Affranchis or the free

people of color, i.e., free mulattoes and free blacks. Situated between

the dominant caste of whites and the subordinate slaves, the free

people of color numbered approximately 30,000 (Mills, 1889:13).

The acquired wealth of the free people of color was in part a

result of Louis XIV's Code Noirs (Black Codes) of 1685, which stated

that a slave who acquired freedom either by gift or purchase was to

become a full French citizen, with all the rights, including ownership

of slaves (Rodman, 1954:7; Ott, 1973:12).

Because the free people of color could amass large amounts of

wealth and real estate, imitate the whites by sending their children

to France to be educated, acquire large numbers of slaves, and adopt

other white cultural habits, they were often viewed as potential

competitors by the grands blancs.

The free people of color's greatest desire was to obtain equal status with the planters, and to eliminate their connection with the slaves (Ott, 1973:13). There were grounds for a coalition between the free people of color and the grands blancs: both were usually large property holders, both disliked the small whites, and both desired French acculturation (Ott, 1973:13).

If the planters could have possibly overcome their color prejudice the potential alliance between these two groups could have possibly become a reality. They might have even been able to forestall, although not necessarily prevent, the Haitian Revolution. The free people of color were aware of their position in the caste structure just as much as they were aware of the prejudice and discrimination practiced against them by the whites. This may explain in part their constant fear of being pushed back into the unprivileged ranks of the slaves.

But, the free people of color pushed upward becoming more and more frustrated in their effort to penetrate a seemingly invulnerable white caste. They wanted equality; however, they were held in check by a less industrious but politically dominant and socially secure ruling caste of "pure" whites.

The attempt to keep the free people of color in "their place" was done so, according to Rodman, by the ". . . imposition of the most humiliating and cruelly enforced racial legislation ever, up to that time, conceived by man" (1950:7). More specifically, from approximately 1763 up to the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution (1791), the free people of color witnessed an increasing abrogation of what was thought

to be their "guaranteed" civil rights (Mills, 1889:16-18). The

eighteenth century contemporary writer Moreau de Saint-Mery enumerates

the steps by which the white planters discriminated against the free

people of color:

> One by one his rights in the code were abrogated. He might
> not fill any responsible office either in the courts or the
> militia, for that would elevate him above white persons.
> Certain careers, such as goldsmithing, were closed to him
> because they brought wealth; others, notably medicine and
> the apothecary's art, were forbidden on the ground that
> whites might be poisoned; law and religion were barred to
> him because of their public and horrorific nature. Colored
> women were forbidden in 1768 to marry white men. In 1779
> began a series of laws designed to humiliate the colored
> person in public: his clothes must be of a different
> material and cut from the white person's; he must be indoors
> by nine o'clock in the evening; he might not sit in the same
> section of churches and theaters with whites (1797:Volume I,
> 71).

Initially the free people of color acquiesed in these

persecutions, by directing their efforts into greater economic and

cultural competition with the whites. However, when success in these

pursuits did not bring them any closer to equality and as other channels

of mobility were closed by new laws, they became increasingly embittered

(Tyson, 1973:5). But prior to 1789 the free people of color did not

emerge in direct confrontation with the whites. A plausible explanation

is that they, too, were "fearful of provoking a wider social upheaval

that would involve the slaves" (Tyson, 1973:5).

So, on the eve of the French Revolution, the free people of

color found themselves in a cruel dilemma. On the one hand, they

craved equality with the whites for obvious economic, social, and

cultural reasons. While on the other hand, they had come to accept the

institution of slavery (Tyson, 1973:6). This dilemma in which the free

people of color found themselves carried the implicit notion of "at least a tacit acceptance of the very color line they hoped to overcome" (Tyson, 1973:6). Moreover, Tyson explains the meaning of the dilemma faced by the free people of color in a more direct manner:

> [The dilemma] meant that their status depended less upon their own exertions than upon the attitude of their white patrons toward the threat of the black masses. As long as this threat persisted the whites would resist their claims to equality, and as long as the free coloreds refused to make common cause with the slaves they had little alternative but to remain quiescent in the face of discrimination (brackets mine) (1973:6).

But the French Revolution struck the colony like a thunderclap changing attitudes and relationships. In fact, it solved the dilemma which had ensnared the free people of color. Those contradictions which had rendered them incapable of decisive actions on their own behalf had radically changed. By this time they had convinced others like themselves that it was impossible to extricate themselves from their ambiguous condition as long as the old social order survived (Tyson, 1973:6). In short, the major Mulatto revolt which occurred in March, 1790 followed by another in October of the same year, indicated that the free people of color were in arms and ready to attempt to take by force what they had not received by less violent means.[14]

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[14]The revolt which occurred on October 28, 1790 was led by a young Mulatto named Oge with the aid of his brother Chavannes (mentioned in the Narrative, page   ). With a few hundred men Oge and Chavannes attacked the northern industrial town of Le Cap. They were defeated and eventually captured by the whites, then led to a parade-ground where their arms, legs and elbows were broken on a scaffold. They were then beheaded and their heads were placed on poles for all the free people of color to see. This action caused the Affranchis to become more militant.

The third caste was formed by the slaves. They were at the bottom of the social hierarchy, some half-million of them. African slavery in San Domingue, as in other parts of the hemisphere, was harsh and brutalizing, especially after sugar became a major commodity in the mid-eighteenth century (Tyson, 1973:6).

In San Domingue the slave master's power was absolute and the treatment of slaves was dependent on his whims and economic considerations. From these, at least two factors guaranteed that conditions would be generally unfavorable for the slave. First was the fact that slavery as an institution rested upon the imposition of terror and dehumanization. And in San Domingue where the slaves outnumbered the whites by more than 16 to one, left little doubt in the minds of the whites that it was absolutely essential to convince the blacks constantly of their position of powerlessness. Second, was the fact that profit considerations often worked to the slave's disadvantage (Tyson, 1973:6). From the slave master's point of view, it was much more economical (i.e., cheaper) to replace a slave than to raise slave children (Parry and Sherlock, 1971:95). Ott agrees with this point as he elaborates:

> . . . the master found it more economical to work his slaves to death and replace them than to encourage their reproduction; slaveholders in many of the West Indian colonies. . . ., shared this practice. After all, they wanted quick wealth and a fast return to Europe (1973:17).

As a consequence, a common statistic among slaves in the French colony of San Domingue was a higher death rate than birth rate (Waddel, 1967:52-53; Ott, 1973:17; and Parry and Sherlock, 1971:95).

Because the colony after 1783 was benefitting tremendously

from a constant increase in sugar prices meant that in the years immediately prior to the Haitian Revolution ". . . the slaves were driven harder than ever" (Tyson, 1973:6).

3. The world power structure. This factor had a profound effect on the Haitian Revolution. If we examine the actions of France (the mother country), Britain, Spain and the newly established United States, we will see that much of the turmoil and the revolution which took place in Haiti was a direct result of the foreign policy efforts of these four countries. Haiti was sought after because of its tremendous economic potential for cash crop production. This is documented by the many efforts made by Britain, Spain and the United States to undercut the control that France had over the colony. The Americans, British and Spanish would sell Toussaint guns and other military equipment from time to time. The reason was obvious. Even at times these individual countries would fight against each other in an iffort to determine who could better control San Domingue. There was a "balance of power" between these nations such that France was prevented by these international competitors from deterring the Haitian Revolution in the first place and from repressing it once it had started in the second place.

4. The national economic situation. Economically speaking San Domingue was a colony of France. It was considered to be the most economically productive colony in the world at that time. For example, the colony's economic progress from 1783 (the year of the independence of the United States) to 1789 (the year of the outbreak of the French Revolution is typically viewed as one of the most astonishing phenomena

in the history of European imperialism. Its exports in 1788 amounted
to 41,607 tons of brown sugar, 31,350 tons of clayed sugar, 30,425 tons
of coffee, 2,806 tons of cotton, 415 tons of indigo; the total value
amounted to 193 million livres or approximately eight million pounds
sterling. Moreover, San Domingue contained 800 sugar plantations,
3,000 coffee, approximately 800 cotton, and 2,950 indigo (Williams,
1970:237). Additionally, the colony supplied half of the countries in
Europe with tropical exports. Its exports were approximately 33 percent
more than those of all the British West Indian colonies combined; its
commerce employed 1,000 ships and 15,000 French sailors. In effect,
the French colony of San Domingue was undisputably the world's ". . .
premier sugar producer, the gem of the Caribbean" (Williams, 1970:238).

After explicating the national economic situation of San
Domingue, it is also interesting to note the influence of the colony's
economy on the bringing about of the French Revolution. For just as
the revolutionary ideas associated with the Declaration of the Rights
of Man eventually found their way to the colony, so did the tremendous
amount of capital generated by the San Domingue economy find its way
into the hands of the powerful, French bourgeoisie, who were instrumen-
tal in bringing about the French Revolution. In other words, it was
the Haitian economy which was, in part, the foundation of the mother
country's prosperity. And no one knew this better than the emerging
French middle class. San Domingue was indeed a major source of their
wealth. So when the conflict began between the peasants and the
aristocracy, it was no surprise that the powerful maritime bourgeoisie
along with others of their class took the lead in the French Revolution

(James, 1963:58).

    5. <u>The ethnic strains and stresses</u>. The ethnic strains and stresses were obvious in San Domingue. From the early eighteenth century considerable tensions began to develop between bureaucrats and <u>grand blancs</u>, <u>grand blancs</u> and <u>petit blancs</u>, whites and free people of color, free people of color and blacks, and blacks and whites. When the French Revolution began (1789) each group began to play a role in the move toward revolution.

    Between 1789 and 1791 the white caste as a whole created explosive conditions as a result of their intracaste conflict. From 1790 to 1799 the free people of color sought to become equal in status to the whites while remaining ignorant and naive to a similar move by the blacks.

    For example, before Toussaint unified the Island the powerful free people of color who were concentrated in certain towns in the South (e.g., Jacmel) had to be virtually defeated in battle. The free people of color hated the whites (e.g., especially the <u>petit blancs</u>) and did not want to be reminded of their consaguine relationship with the blacks. In those towns where they had considerable power, the mails witnessed these relationships. In such towns as Jacmel, no Mulatto could be convicted of any crime against a black slave or a white.

    But overall, the group which ultimately benefitted more than the others, from the strains and stresses of social, ethnic and racial conflict were the blacks. The middle caste, free people of color, was the key. The conflict between the free people of color and the whites forced the blacks onto a course of freedom and independence which

might have otherwise been forestalled.

Eventually, however, Toussaint brought together the Mulattoes and the blacks and the San Domingue revolution was given greater ethnic clout.

C. Biographical information about leaders. Toussaint L'Ouverture, a slave, entered the revolution at 45 years of age. He was gifted with superb intellect. He was a one-woman man in his middle age. Toussaint and his wife lived together in harmony and friendship. James (1963:92) describes Toussaint as a small, ugly and ill-shaped man with eyes of steel. Toussaint never doubted his destiny to lead the slaves to freedom. Also, in terms of occupational prestige, he was a member of the "privileged" slave strata (i.e., a foreman).

Dessalines was the most famous of the black generals. In military encounters he was superb. It was late in life before he learned to sign his name. Dessalines had no sympathy with Toussaint's policy of reconciliation with the whites. However, he was firmly dedicated to Toussaint. He married one of the most beautiful black women on the Island. Upon Toussaint's departure from the scene Dessalines was his immediate successor.

Christophe, a general under Toussaint, was an ex-waiter who could not read or write. He was not on a personality level a violent type. He ruled with ease. He loved luxury, governed well, and was friendly to the whites as long as they cooperated with Toussaint's policy. When Dessalines was assassinated in 1806, the country split, and Christophe became president of the North.

Moise was a dashing general--a "bonny lad." He was fond of

women. He was the most popular soldier in the Army. He was beloved by the blacks of the North for his ardent support of the blacks against the whites. He was Toussaint's adopted nephew.

Maurepas was a remarkable black general. He was the only one who had not been a slave, and came from an old free family. He read widely, was a man of great culture, and knew the military art to the last point. He governed his district with justice and fairness to all.

Belair was Toussaint's favorite nephew. It was once believed that he would be Toussaint's successor. He fought with distinction against the British and in the civil war against the South. Handsome, with distinguished manners, he loved military parades and display. He did not like the whites, and Sanite, his wife, hated them and encouraged him to treat them harshly.

Petion was the son of a black mother and white French jeweler. He was educated in France. He fled to France when Toussaint conquered the South Province and returned with Leclerc in the latter's expedition against the blacks in 1802. When Napoleon began to discriminate against the Mulattoes, Petion joined the blacks. He participated in the Haitian declaration of independence at Gonaives. Taking an oath of allegiance to Dessalines, Petion was appointed the military commander of Port-au-Prince. As a military man he tended to be mild-mannered and conciliatory rather than aggressive like Dessalines. After leading a Mulatto coup against Dessalines in 1806, which resulted in the latter being assassinated and the country being split into two geopolitical regions, Petion assumed full power in the South.

IV. The Movement

A. _Ideology_ refers to a system of ideas which sanctions a set of norms. Ideologies tend to advocate some futuristic ideal type of "strategic organization." Further, they tend to present criticism of the "old regime." In the case of the Haitian Revolution the ideology was deeply rooted both in the ideology of the French Revolution and the slaves' desire to be free. One must not casually by-pass this fact, for the slaves in San Domingue came to realize and believe in the same universal principles which were involved in the French Revolution (i.e., equality, liberty and fraternity). In France, this ideology condemned the French Monarchy, while in San Domingue it condemned the colonial elite and other wealthy property owners. When slavery was abolished in San Domingue the ideology stood as a firm reminder to the former black slave that slavery would never be reinstituted. The ideology coupled with other factors produced a "bloody revolutionary war" in the colony which overthrew French colonial rule. The ideology in part paved the way for political and individual independence.

Toussaint in particular and the Haitian Revolution in general embraced a bourgeois democratic ideology which developed in part from the socio-economic and political conditions of San Domingue coupled with the influence of the Great French Revolution. Furthermore, the Haitian Revolution occurred within a rapidly increasing worldwide capitalist mode of production. Hence, it contributed significantly toward the radical through still bourgeois movement for freedom, equality, and democracy, while [foreshadowing] the movement against

capitalism itself" (Genovese, 1979:1-2). This "foreshadowing" characteristic of the revolution, however, remained a potentially explosive tendency; but could not manifest itself as such, possibly, because in this epoch a socialist alternative had not fully developed. Therefore, ideologically speaking, the Haitian Revolution seen in this context can ". . . be understood primarily as part of the most radical wing of the struggle for a democracy that had not yet lost its bourgeois moorings" (Genovese, 1979:2).

But, what was Toussaint trying to accomplish? What were his goals and values? This question has already been answered in part in the Narrative Section (page 219) where I discussed Toussaint's constitution of 1801. But, here I will further elaborate in hopes of making Toussaint's position much clearer. One important ideological goal of the black Governor-General was not just the mere abolition of black slavery in Haiti, but the complete overthrow of slavery as a social system. Toussaint wanted Haiti to be recognized as an equal in the modern system of nation states. The revolution in Haiti guided by its bourgeois democratic ideology was unlike any other slave revolt (i.e., black or white) which had occurred in the past.

Another major goal of Toussaint was to restore Haiti's previous economic prosperity. In this endeavor he made tremendous progress. By sending the slaves back to the plantations (not as slaves, but as paid laborers), Toussaint stimulated the economy and put it back on a sound road to recovery. Table 26 shows the economic improvements made by Toussaint for selective crops during the height of his power in Haiti. Given the fact that the revolution had devastated economic production,

TABLE 26

EXPORTS FROM HAITI FOR THE YEARS 1791, 1801 AND 1802*

	SUGAR	COFFEE	COTTON	COCOA	MOLASSES
Under Colonial Rule 1791	163,405,220 lbs	68,515,180 lbs	6,286,126 lbs	150,000 lbs	30,000
Under Toussaint 1801	---	---	---	648,518 lbs	99,419
Under Toussaint 1802	53,400,000 lbs	34,370,000 lbs	4,050,000 lbs	---	---
Percentage of Total	33%	51%	68%	432%**	331%**

SOURCE: Leyburn, 1966:302; Leger, 1970:111.

*There is no significant difference between the figures for 1790 and 1791.

**Figures for these commodities could not be found for the year of 1802; therefore, calculation of the percentage of total is based on the year 1801.

Toussaint was well on his way to bringing crop exports back to their
pre-revolutionary total; coffee exports were 51%; cotton exports were
68%; and cocoa and molasses exports were above their pre-revolutionary
heights of 432% and 331% respectively.

Another ideological goal of Toussaint was his desire to main-
tain a working relation with France. After the abolition of slavery,
Toussaint saw himself and the black masses as French citizens dedicated
to the principles of the newly founded French Republic. But Toussaint
was not prepared to compromise the freedom of the blacks. Therefore,
while the black Governor-General communicated indirectly to Bonaparte
through French agents, the latter could not conceal his counter-
revolutionary actions. So, while Toussaint prepared to defend Haiti,
he also laid the basis for its independence. The situation was simple,
if Bonaparte would have been willing to compromise (without the rein-
stitution of slavery) then Toussaint would have been willing to listen.
However, the First Consul was blinded by his racism which precluded his
consideration of alternatives, other than black slavery, as a means to
restore Haiti's previous economic progress.

Although in reality Toussaint's constitution of 1801
exemplified local independence, it also indicated in writing the kind
of relationship he wanted with France, i.e., Haiti was to remain in
the "orbit" of France. Hence, without breaking legally or overtly
with France, Toussaint's constitution ". . . made it clear that France
was welcome to assist and advise but never to govern" (Rotberg, 1971:
52). Here, Toussaint was attempting to accomplish two basic goals:
(1) to satisfy pro and con attitudes toward complete independence that

existed within his newly formed revolutionary government (Dessalines,

for one, wanted "real" independence); and (2) to retain valuable

French assistance which Haiti needed while at the same time

preventing any decrease of indigenous control (Rotberg, 1971:52).

But, Napoleon refused to play the role that Charles de Gaulle later

played with reference to the creation of the Madagascan Republic

(Fanon, 1967:149; Rotberg, 1971:52). Therefore, the First Consul

made an attempt to counter the Haitian Revolution by sending a

massive expeditionary force to retake the island. However, in

this extraordinary venture Napoleon Bonaparte was badly defeated.

In effect, he failed in his counterrevolutionary effort to reinstitute

the old regime.

Another ideological concern of Toussaint was his efforts

to create a multi-racial society. This issue was also alluded to in

the Narrative. One associated issue which seemed to pop up in the

literature is the notion of racism. Toussaint is usually viewed as

a non-racist, mainly because of the conciliatory attitude which he

had toward whites coupled with his vision of a multi-racial society.

But what about Toussaint's generals, namely Dessalines, Moise and

Maurepas--were they racist or not? Certainly, in the literature

concerning the Haitian Revolution these latter three revolutionaries

have often been described as racists. This view seems to be based on

the viciousness and contempt that these three revolutionaries had for

whites during the course of the revolution. This author rejects the

view that Dessalines, Moise, and Maurepas were racists. The author's

rejection is based on the fact that in all revolutions it is not

unusual for extreme acts of brutality, cruelty and terror to take place. Dessalines, Moise, and Maurepas were revolutionaries who simply reacted to whites as the initiators and perpetuators of a hated, brutal and exploitative economic system of slavery in San Domingue. They were not unlike their white Jacobin counterpart, Sonthonax, who at one time ". . . held a series of conferences with Toussaint in which he advocated . . . white extermination" (Ott, 1973:89). Just because the ruling caste in San Domingue at this particular time (1791) happened to be all white, and a goal of the revolution was to eliminate that caste arrangement, does not justify referring to the above three revolutionaries as racists.

After all, if the French Monarchy in 1789 had been all black, would we be justified in calling Robespierre, Danton, and Marat racists because they helped to guide the French Revolution toward the elimination of that monarchical arrangement? I think not.

Last, some recognition must be given to the basic ideological differences within the overall movement, e.g., between the blacks and the Mulattoes. The ideological differences between these two groups seem to be related in part to the different positions which they occupied in the social structure of the colony. The blacks, who were the bottom caste were represented ideologically by Toussaint's goals and values (already discussed). The Mulattoes, however, being a middle caste and considerably wealthy, identified culturally with the whites. Therefore, as a group they would support the blacks only after they had been rejected by the grand blancs. From an ideological point of view the Mulattoes were more pro-slavery than not, and if they had not

been victims of prejudice and discrimination, continuously, they might

not have become an important third party element in the cause of the

revolution. But, being situated between the whites and the black

slaves, the Mulattoes' support of the blacks was largely problematic.

Therefore, they wavered back and forth continuously, especially from

August, 1791 to 1800.

The Mulattoes' ideological stance and their instability seem

to lie not in their blood but rather in their identification with

Anglo-French culture and their intermediate position in the stratifi-

cation system. The French and Toussaint were aware of the Mulattoes'

plight, and during the course of the Haitian Revolution they both

exploited it. However, in the end Toussaint was victorious.

B. Means refers to the mobilization and employment of

resources and the action phase of the movement. The means section is

further subdivided into internal and external means. Internal means

refers to the mobilization of resources prior to subsequent actions.

Also, under this subsection one might be concerned with the movement's

task of mobilizing its constituency for action by building facilities

and creating commitment. Under the internal means subsection one

should proceed by addressing the issue of the overall organization of

the general movement in terms of how much bureaucratization (or

centralization), segmentation, reticulation and factionalization

there was?

The external means refer to the actual conflict with the

enemy; here the movement's organization is evaluated as a combat group.

To create commitment (internal means) is one thing, but to activate

this commitment (external means) is quite another. The difference

between these two types of means are analytical and in any given

concrete case they are interrelated. Once a high-level commitment

has been created (with other factors being equal), it leads to a higher

level of successful activation. Moreover, in the external means

subsection one should describe the major battles and incidents of

conflict.

And now I will illustrate the internal and external means in

turn, by applying them to the Haitian Revolution.

Toussaint's army was highly centralized in the sense that it

was he who "called the shots." Toussaint's army consisted of a cadre

of approximately 500 dedicated men in 1792. Through consistent train-

ing Toussaint created a strong core of dedicated revolutionary soldiers.

It was characteristic of Toussaint to begin with a few hundred men

picked by him and devoted to him, who learned the art of war with him

from the beginning, as they fought side by side against the French and

the colonists. Toussaint had been criticized for not communicating

enough with his officers and men. While this may be a valid criticism,

one must not forget that Toussaint knew these men. In effect, they

had been hand-picked by him. He had worked with them personally. In

essence, they knew him and he knew them. Toussaint obviously believed

that it was not necessary to communicate his underlying motives to his

generals. He had created the army to win, not to argue over subjective

issues. In the sense of describing the movement organization of the

Haitian Revolution in the action phase, I conclude that it was not

highly segmentary. In saying this however, I do realize that it is

also possible for a movement organization to be highly centralized and highly segmentary, but this was not the case for the Haitian Revolution. Although the various districts of San Domingue fell under different generals, they were not independent in any sense of the word. Toussaint L'Ouverture travelled more than 125 miles per day by horseback in order to maintain a rigid centralization of military might. The Haitian Revolution also had a highly <u>reticulate</u> structure.

When Toussaint first formed his revolutionary army, members were associated through pre-existing ties of kinship, friendship, and other close relationships. For example, Toussaint had two generals who were his nephews. Ritualistic activities of a religious nature also served as a means for linking individuals and groups into close personal relationships.

In examining the possibility of factionalism in the revolution in Haiti, I conclude that within the <u>core</u> revolutionary army it was minimal, especially in the early phases. However, before Toussaint came on the scene to form the core revolutionary army, some faction-alism did occur. For example, when the slaves first revolted they were divided into two large bands--one led by Biassou, the other led by Jean Francois. A third leader was Jeannot. Jean Francois and Biassou were capable leaders, who were not afraid to use the iron discipline needed to maintain order among a heterogeneous body of men just released from slavery (James, 1963:94).

Jeannot on the other hand was extremely cruel and often fanatical in his treatment of white victims. For example, it has been said that for Jeannot, it was not unusual for him to kill a white and

afterward drink his/her blood. But Jeannot's behavior was not tolerated. He was arrested by Jean Francois, tried and executed. The importance associated with describing this particular case lies in the fact that it was the first, but not the last, indication of factional disputes within the ranks of the revolutionaries.

When Toussaint first joined the rebellious slaves (approximately one month after they had rebelled) he was appointed to the position of Physician to the Armies of the King. This appointment was made on account of Toussaint's knowledge of herbs (James, 1963:94). But, more important, the position of Physician gave Toussaint immediate access to what was rapidly becoming a full-fledged revolutionary army.

When the masses of slaves in San Domingue revolted they had been aroused to a feverish revolutionary pitch. All they needed was a clear and vigorous direction. Jean Francois and Biassou did reasonably well in keeping order during the initial phase of the revolution. However, after gaining control over the Northern plain, Jean Francois and Biassou began to quarrel among themselves and did not have the faintest idea about what action to take next (James, 1963:95-96). It was Toussaint L'Ouverture who brought to these bewildered political leaders an end to factionalism coupled with the superior knowledge and political vices necessary to sustain and accelerate the revolution. Hence, Toussaint began to build a core revolutionary army.

In the later phases of the revolution factionalism emerged again. One important case was the rebellion and execution of Toussaint's nephew, Moise. Also, when the French invaded the island

in 1802 under Leclerc, some of Toussaint's generals temporarily

switched to the French side when given assurance that they could

maintain their command, but as French soldiers.

Also, the periphery of the movement would sometimes become

very factionalized, especially when agents provocateurs from the

British and the Spanish were effective in inciting the people in a

given area. When Toussaint came upon an area that was rent with

factionalism, he only had to speak; then what was previously disorder

quickly turned to order. The one factor which seems to stand out more

than others in reference to curtailing factionalism was the issue of

slavery. The African slaves in San Domingue were linked together by

the common socioeconomic and psychological conditions of servitude.

It was Toussaint L'Ouverture who emerged on the scene at the right time,

at the right place, and with the right attitude to organize a successful

revolution which toppled the French colonial regime.

Again, in reference to the internal means the organizational

structure of the Haitian Revolution was characterized by a high

centralization of power, high reticulation and low segmentation.

And now I turn to an illustration of the external means in

order to account for the battles and other conflicts which the revolu-

tionary combat unit encountered during the course of the Haitian

Revolution.

After the slaves of the North Province had revolted on

August 20, 1791, the revolutionary government in France sent Jacobin

commissioners to the colony to restore order. When the Commissioners

reached the colony, they found it difficult to bring the situation

under control. In effect, planter support for the Old Regime had increased, especially, after the execution of Louis XVI. Also, the slaves, sometimes aided by the Spanish, continued to wage an effective guerilla warfare campaign.

In June of 1793 the Commissioners were confronted with a new threat. This threat materialized when the petite blancs (small whites) of the North, feeling jealous and envious of the increasing influence and power of the free people of color, and being resentful over the dissolution of the Colonial Assembly by the Commissioners, revolted in the Northern town of Le Cap (Tyson, 1973:11). In order to quell this unexpected revolt of the small whites, the Jacobin Commissioner, Sonthonax, made a compromise with the armed slaves, promising them the keys to the city if they would attack and put down the white revolt. So the slaves attacked the town of Le Cap, killed many of its white inhabitants, and burned most of the buildings to the ground. For many of the whites (although not all), the destruction of Le Cap was symbolic of the end of white supremacy in San Domingue. Thus, a mass migration of whites began to take place (Tyson, 1973:11).

After the Blacks destroyed Le Cap, Sonthonax's position had become greatly delegitimated in the eyes of the slaves. After failing to come to terms with them (the slaves) and acting partly out of fear, Sonthonax, acting on his own last vestige of authority proclaimed slave emancipation on August 29, 1793. This action, in part, paved the way for the slaves' eventual control over most of the Northern towns and provinces, and also spoiled the free people of color's plan to become the vanguard of the revolution. As a result of Sonthonax's proclamation

of manumission, Riguad, who was the most able and influencial leader of

the free people of color, broke with the Blacks. Riguad, then began to

develop strong Mulatto military power in the southern part of the

island, which would eventually be met head-on and subdued by the

advancing Black vanguard of the revolution.

When France went to war with England and Spain in 1793,

Toussaint joined the Spanish with approximately 600 well disciplined

blacks. He surrounded himself with such excellent subordinate officers

as Jean Jacques Dessalines, Christophe, Charles Belair, Moise and

others. Toussaint also managed in that same year to induce or coopt

a number of French regular troops to join his growing army (Rodman,

1954:10). Toussaint joined the Spanish mainly as a counter move to

control for what he believed to be a conspiracy by the Jacobin

commissioners to suppress the revolution. Thus Sonthonax's decree

abolishing slavery in the colony was viewed largely with suspicion and

skepticism by Toussaint, therefore failing to impress him (Tyson,

1973:15).

As Toussaint's revolutionary army increased in number, its

power and influence also increased.

In the southern part of the colony previous caste arrangements

were broken and blacks fought both white and Mulatto soldiers. In the

West the free people of color managed to gain temporary control, and

in the North and East the revolutionary army under the command of

Toussaint and the other ex-slave generals campaigned successfully

against the French (Rotberg, 1971:44). By December, 1973, Toussaint's

had captured Gonaives, Plaissance and had accepted the surrender of the

French military garrisons of St. Marc, Verrettes and Arcahaie.

Toussaint's capture of Gonaives gave him an outlet on the Gulf of Gonave and severed the French forces, Laveaux and Sonthonax commanding those in the North and Rigaud those in the South. One possible explanation to Toussaint's rapid military victories was his wise decision making and control of able subordinates. Two subordinates, namely Jean Jacques Dessalines and Moise, represented the radical limits of the Haitian Revolution (Ott, 1973:79).

On February 4, 1794 the French National Assembly upheld Sonthonax's previous position and officially abolished slavery. This action influenced Toussaint to drop the Spanish and to cast his lot with the French Republic (Tyson, 1973:15; Ott, 1973:82).

Then, after utilizing a series of brilliant military maneuvers Toussaint drove the advancing Spanish army out of the Northern part of the colony. He then formed a coalition with the powerful Mulatto leader Rigaud, in order to contain an already advancing British occupation army in the South and West seaport areas of the colony. As Toussaint and Rigaud rose in power, the British plan of conquering San Domingue grew nearer to total collapse (Ott, 1973:87). Moreover, as a result of these victorious campaigns against the Spanish and British, the French became more and more dependent on the ex-slaves, and Toussaint gained considerable personal influence over the French military governor General Laveaux (Tyson, 1973:15).

But Rigaud, the powerful leader of the people of color, was extremely resentful of Toussaint's increasing power. In fact, he (Rigaud) saw General Laveaux as the basis of that power. Furthermore,

Rigaud firmly believed that if he could manage to overthrow the French Governor, Mulatto supremacy would result. In effect, Rigaud believed that success in this attempt would enable the free people of color to gain control of the direction of the revolution.

In the summer of 1795, Rigaud conspired with his Mulatto commander of Le Cap, Villatte, to overthrow the French Governor. On March 20, 1796, with the support of the free people of color, Villatte staged a coup in Le Cap and arrested General Laveaux. With Laveaux in prison the conspiracy neared success. "But what appeared to be a Mulatto victory actually became nothing more than a stepping stone to Toussaint's quest for power" (Ott, 1973:87). With the many agents previously placed throughout the colony, Toussaint was informed of the plot. He then ". . . struck one of his characteristic lightning blows" (Ott, 1973:87). Toussaint ordered Dessalines, Moise and Belair to surround Le Cap with ten thousand revolutionary troops. As soon as Toussaint's troops were in place, Villatte was ordered to release Laveaux within a half-hour or the city would be stormed. On March 22 the Mulattoes responded by releasing Laveaux, and once again their attempt to gain control of the revolution had failed.

After being released from prison the French Governor was now permanently in Toussaint's debt. On April 1, 1796, Laveaux rewarded Toussaint by appointing him Lieutenant Governor of San Domingue and promising ". . . to do nothing thenceforth without his advice" (Rodman, 1954:10; Tyson, 1973:15). The fact that Toussaint became the new Lieutenant Governor gave him the opportunity to expand his military strength at will. He increased his army with five new regiments and

a personal bodyguard of one hundred well trained men. Soon Toussaint had created a well disciplined revolutionary army of more than twenty thousand men (Ott, 1973:88).

As European power declined in San Domingue a power vacuum began to appear. Toussaint, being militarily strong, aspired to fill the void. "One by one he eliminated his strong rivals for power with amazing finesse" (Ott, 1973:86). The forced abdication of Villatte, Mulatto commander of Le Cap, was indicative of Toussaint's desire to obtain control over the colony's destiny.

Next in line to be eliminated by Toussaint was the French commissioner, Sonthonax. But Toussaint knew that because of Sonthonax's influence in San Domingue it would not be a simple matter to eliminate him. He would have to outwit the notable commissioner. Toussaint knew at this particular time that the French Constitution had given San Domingue the opportunity to be represented in the Council of Five Hundred. So he nominated Sonthonax and Laveaux. Although Laveaux was by now nothing more than a puppet governor, he was still potentially dangerous mainly because of his position (Ott, 1973:89). But Toussaint took no chances, he threatened to destroy the town of Le Cap if the two French officials did not accept his choices. Laveaux feeling no remorse toward Toussaint accepted the nomination and left for France. Sonthonax accepted the nomination but remained in San Domingue.[15]

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[15]Sonthonax was the type of politician who could maintain his power under the most adversed conditions. Because of past activities in San Domingue, he was once called back to France to be tried by the National Convention (e.g., on August 2, 1794). At this particular time Sonthonax was in danger of following Robespierre to the

Now, Toussaint was faced with either letting Sonthonax stay or openly flouting French authority by forcing him to leave the colony. Toussaint decided to wait until the conditions in San Domingue changed in such a way that would allow him to more successfully manipulate Sonthonax. But the French Commissioner was his own worst enemy. He failed to provide adequate control over valuable trade relations with the United States. This neglect caused Toussaint to order him to stop all privateering against American vessels, ". . . otherwise a major trade artery might be cut off" (Ott, 1973:89). Even the black cultivators had begun to protest, i.e., resorting to economic boycotts and civil disobedience, against Sonthonax's policy toward American shipping.

With the periodic emotional attacks upon Sonthonax by the French National Convention, centering on emancipation and loss of colonial prosperity, coupled with his political and economic blunders in San Domingue, Toussaint felt more and more obligated to expedite him back to France.

At the last minute Sonthonax seemed to realize in part what was happening to him. In an effort to stave off the rapid collapse of his power, he appointed Toussaint as the new Governor-General in place of Laveaux, on May 2, 1797 (Ott, 1973:91). But this appointment did not undermine Toussaint's determination to rid the colony of

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guillotine. However, he was able to convince the Convention that his actions were just. On August 6 he was acquitted and given a seat in the Convention. Although Sonthonax was periodically attacked afterward by certain individual Convention members he was selected as the head Commissioner to be sent to San Domingue, ". . . probably because he stood a good chance of controlling Toussaint and the blacks" (Ott, 1973:97-98).

Sonthonax. Therefore, on August 16 Toussaint surrounded the town of Le Cap with considerable military force and demanded that Sonthonax return to France as a delegate representing San Domingue. Seeing himself hopelessly outnumbered or realizing the futility of resistance, Sonthonax had no other choice but to leave San Domingue. Accompanied by his mistress and several officers friendly to him, Sonthonax traversed the streets of Le Cap making his way to his ship. "It was the end of Sonthonax" (James, 1963:188). But more important, Toussaint had eliminated a major opponent (Ott, 1973:91; Korngold, 1965:133-37).

Further, the black Governor-General was developing his own conception of who should govern San Domingue. He had watched with a careful eye the fall of the Jacobins in France and the rise of colonial interests groups who increasingly assumed greater prominence within the French government. Toussaint believed that this reactionary trend which had emerged in France would result some day in an attempt to restore slavery in San Domingue. He was convinced that in order to ensure the social gains made by the revolution in San Domingue, black unity and the revival of economic prosperity was a necessity (Tyson, 1973:15-16). Toussaint believed that these goals could only be accomplished by a black government which materialized as a result of a genuine national revolutionary movement. Therefore, by 1797, he had decided to make his move to obtain absolute political power and to identify the cause of the black ex-slaves with the revolutionary movement for local self-government ". . . that had been successfully defused in 1794 when the French government freed the slaves" (Tyson, 1973:16).

Because of the increasing counter-revolutionary sentiment in France toward the revolution in San Domingue, Sonthonax's forced return was viewed with increasing suspicion. It was because of this suspicion which influenced the French government to despatch a new French agent, General Hedouville, to the colony.

Arriving in San Domingue in April 1798, his main purpose was to bring the black Governor-General under control. In other words, Hedouville was to use counter-revolutionary tactics to prevent the San Domingue Revolution from continuing in the direction desired by Toussaint.

Immediately before Hedouville's arrival in San Domingue, Toussaint had enjoyed a period of solidarity with the Mulatto chief Rigaud. Together they fought against the British who were holding the coast from Jeremie to Mole Saint Nicolas. Taking the offensive, Toussaint, with the close support of the Mulattoes in the South, launched major attacks at the British defense extending from Port-au-Prince to Mirebalais and at Jeremie. The black commander-in-chief knew that success in these attempts would virtually collapse the British center and right flank (Ott, 1973:100).

Early in February 1798, Toussaint launched two military detachments, one toward Mirebalais and the other toward Jeremie. The former was led by Toussaint himself accompanied by Dessalines and Moise. Although the black army met with stiff resistance they continued to storm the British garrison and after twenty days and thirty-five assaults the British defense collapsed. The road to Port-au-Prince was opened. The other black military detachment had less success

although not entirely. They assaulted Jeremie on February 19, but failed to capture the city. Although they suffered many casualties, they still managed to cut key communication networks connecting Jeremie and Port-au-Prince. This action isolated two large groups of the British army making them more vulnerable to eventual annihilation (Ott, 1973:101).

Meanwhile, in England, feeling had already mounted against British military intervention in San Domingue. On May 18, 1797, a shrewd politician named St. John pointed out before the House of Commons ". . . the need for reinforcements at home and the great expense of the San Domingue campaign" (Ott, 1973:93). England's West Indian campaign had cost over ten million pounds and had resulted in as many as 100,000 casualties. Although the House of Commons voted to continue British activity in San Domingue, they did so with the assumption that the involvement would be less than before. After all, since the revolution began, the forces of Toussaint and Rigaud had inflicted ". . . a series of crushing defeats upon the English" (Tyson, 1973:16).

But the British did not give up easily. In fact, the British Commander General Maitland reasoned that total British defeat in San Domingue would pose a threat to their interests in Jamaica. Moreover, one could not be certain that Toussaint would not ". . . attempt to break the shackles of slavery throughout the West Indies" (Ott, 1973:101).

But Toussaint was in a much better bargaining position than the British. Through a shrewd piece of diplomacy, he forced the British

to agree to withdraw all their forces from San Domingue. In return, Toussaint signed a treaty agreeing not to invade Jamaica and to allow the British future trading privileges. Toussaint knew, however, that the treaty would enhance his prestige and substantially improve his bargaining position with France ". . . by raising the possibility of an alliance with England" (Tyson, 1973:16).

France, although becoming increasingly aware of Toussaint's military and diplomatic ingenuity, displayed her true intentions toward the San Domingue revolution through her agent General Hedouville. Upon his arrival in the colony he immediately began to conspire with Rigaud in an effort to undermine Toussaint's goal to forge a truly nationalist revolutionary movement. Hedouville, finding himself hopelessly out-maneuvered by Toussaint, reacted by openly encouraging racial conflict between the blacks and the free people of color. This action on the part of the French agent was a major reason why Toussaint expelled him from the island in October 1798. However, before Hedouville left the island he publicly encouraged Rigaud to strongly resist Toussaint's policies, ". . . pledging official French support for such an effort" (Tyson, 1973:16).

From February to March 1799 Toussaint and Rigaud laid the foundation for civil war. In effect, they aimed numerous charges at each other. "Each claimed the other to be a rebel: Toussaint accused Rigaud of insubordination; Rigaud indicated Toussaint for disloyalty to France" (Ott, 1973:111). After becoming tired of verbal combats and of course having been encouraged by Hedouville, Rigaud broke off all communications with the black Governor-General in early June.

Toussaint responded by pressuring the new French agent Roume (i.e.,
Hedouville's replacement) to declare Rigaud a rebel. A great silence
seemed to fall over the colony which was about to be broken by a bloody
civil war.

Rigaud struck the first blow and took Petit and Grand Goave
June 16, 1799. He did so after slaughtering many whites in the South
province to protect his rear. Laplume, Toussaint's commander in the
area narrowly escaped capture. Rigaud and his Mulatto army took no
captives. They put both blacks and whites to the sword. This blood
bath has been often referred to as the "war of knives" (Ott, 1973:112;
James, 1963:231).

Toussaint responded to the offensive military drive of Rigaud
by marching an army of twenty thousand men to Leogane, (i.e.,
approximately twenty miles from Petit-Goave). But before he could
put his counteroffensive into action, the Mulattoes of the North and
West provinces revolted after having been signaled to do so by Rigaud
(Ott, 1973:112). Toussaint was forced temporarily to break off his
Southern campaign until the rebellious Mullatoes in the North and West
were effectively pacified. The black Governor-General began his purge
at Port-au-Prince executing many Mulatto conspirators. He then
executed fifty Mulatto civil and military officials who had been
instrumental in an attempt to seize the city of Le Cap on August 4.
On October 29 Toussaint recaptured Mole Saint Nicolas and executed
five hundred free people of color. After bringing under control other
sporadic attempts by Mulattoes to rebel in the Northern and Western
provinces, Toussaint was once again ready to concentrate his efforts

on Rigaud's southern stronghold (Ott, 1973:112).

By the early part of November Toussaint had massed a black army of over fifty-five thousand men to attack the Mulatto South. The offensive was a two-pronged attack. One wing was led by Christophe against the town of Jacmel and the other was led by Dessalines with the goal to recapture Grand and Petit Goave. Toussaint's effort to break the Mulatto resistance was given support by an American fleet. The Americans, believing that a French/Rigaud connection represented a threat to American commerce, ". . . destroyed Rigaud's marauding barges, transported blacks to the Southern front, and bombarded Mulatto positions" (Ott, 1973:113).

Toward mid-November it became evident that the war at last rested on the fate of Jacmel which was blocked by land and sea (James, 1963:232). Indeed, this southern San Domingue city was the symbol of Mulatto resistance. Under one of Rigaud's ablest commanders, Alexandre Petion, the Mulattoes refused to submit to the frequent and slashing attacks of the famed Dessalines.

By July 29, 1800 through a coordinated attack, Toussaint broke the determined resistance of the Mulattoes, forcing Rigaud to flee the island. Toussaint entered Les Cayes on August 1 proclaiming victory.

Even while defeating the Mulattoes in the South province, Toussaint realized that there was only one other obstacle which remained before he could become master of the situation. It was the Eastern part of the island, namely, Spanish San Domingo. The Spanish part of the island had been long used as a base by the Spaniards to sell captive blacks from the French colony into slavery (Ott,

1973:116). Using this as a pretext, Toussaint massed an invasion force
of eight thousand soldiers. Moise was directed to attack the Northern
part of the Spanish colony and Paul Louverture (Toussaint's brother)
was to defeat Spanish forces in the South. With the Spanish army
defeated, by the latter part of January 1801, Toussaint entered the
Spanish capital. He abolished slavery but left other Spanish institu-
tions intact.

Now, with the entire island under his control, Toussaint
turned his attention to the establishment of a constitution, to the
problem of reconstruction and to protecting the populace from internal
and external foes (Tyson, 1973:17).

Toussaint, not knowing when or where Bonaparte would strike,
began to deploy his forces. He first hid numerous supplies in the
interior and subsequently spread his forces out along the coast lines.
He assigned his brother Paul Louverture and Clairvaux to Santo Domingo,
Laplume to the South Province, Dessalines and Age to the West Province,
and Christophe and Maurepas to the North Province. Toussaint's
strategy was sound. He had given his generals explicit orders that
wherever the French forces land, the particular commander concerned
". . . was to destroy the coastal resources and retreat toward the
interior, in an effort to exhaust the invaders" (Ott, 1973:151).

General Leclerc under the strict orders of Bonaparte launched
a four-pronged attack on the island. The French commander, Kerversau,
was to land in Santo Domingo, Darbois in the South Province, Boudet to
disembark in Port-au-Prince and Leclerc himself, with approximately
five thousand troops planned to seize the Northern town of Le Cap

François (Stoddard, 1914:303-304).

On February 2, 1802 the sails of twenty-three French warships appeared on the horizon of Le Cap (James, 1963:295; Ott, 1973:151). Leclerc sent a message to Christophe demanding him to allow the French to occupy the city immediately. Christophe warned the French that if they made any hostile move toward the city he would burn it to the ground. Meanwhile, Leclerc realized that Le Cap must be seized by force. When Leclerc began to land his forces, Christophe fired the city and retreated to the interior. When the French General entered Le Cap he found nothing but charred, crumbling ruins (Ott, 1973:152).

War being a continuation of politics, Toussaint began to reap the rewards of his policy during the previous years. With the advancement of a French occupation army, the black Governor-General called on the masses, but they were reluctant to respond to his calling. After all, the masses had been alienated as a result of the execution of Moise. Furthermore, they (the masses) could not understand why Toussaint should call on them to fight these whites, when his policy in part favored their interests (James, 1963:297). This gap between the masses and the revolutionary army was a setback for the revolution, and it was not bridged completely until rumors (which were true) that slavery had been re-instituted in Guadaloupe, began to circulate in San Domingue.

Meanwhile the French Commander Boudet attacked Port-au-Prince and eventually broke through Age's defenses and the city soon fell into French hands. In Santo Domingo, Paul Louverture and Clairvaux quickly surrendered to the General Kerversau. The surrender came as

a result of the French intercepting a message from Toussaint and changing it to meet their purposes, then forwarding it on to Toussaint's officers in Santo Domingo.

In the South Province, Laplume surrendered to the French rather than follow his orders to destroy the countryside, resist, and retreat to the interior. Even Dommage, Dessalines' cousin who was Commander of Jeremie, followed the advice of the local planters and surrendered. Everywhere the French army appeared to be exceeding even the expectations of Leclerc himself (Ott, 1973:152).

But Toussaint did find some encouraging signs in some of his early defeats. For example, Maurepas showed great valor in his resistance at Port-au-Paix. The French General Humbert attempted to dislodge the black general repeatedly. But it was not until the French had received massive reinforcements that Port-de-Paix was finally captured. Upon entering the city, the French found it in ruins and the battle had cost them four hundred men. Toussaint's Ninth Regiment, commanded by Maurepas, remained intact and retreated toward the interior (Ott, 1973:153).

Another encouraging sign for the revolution was the defiant Dessalines. With a strong determination to stop the French, he maneuvered his troops all over the South and West Provinces striking crippling blows to the French forces. Wherever Dessalines went he left a trail of burning plantations and corpses. It was Dessalines and Maurepas who gave much to convincing the French that the blacks were better fighters than they had previously thought (Ott, 1973:153).

Even with the defeats encountered by Toussaint's army, the war

was becoming more and more costly to the French. On the average, the
French casualty rate per battle was much higher than Toussaint's. In
realizing this point, Leclerc decided to open negotiations with the
black Governor-General. However, both men used this effort in order
to stall for time. Leclerc wanted his army to be at full strength
in order to launch an attack into the interior. In less than four
days an additional eight thousand French troops landed at Le Cap.
On the other hand, Toussaint needed time to re-organize his troops
(Ott, 1973:154).

From Le Cap François, on February 18, Leclerc launched his
offensive toward the interior. In doing so, however, he left General
Humbert and Debelle to face Maurepas. Leclerc's strategy was to
converge on Toussaint's headquarters at Gonaives. According to this
plan Desfourneaux would come from Plaisance, Hardy from Dondon, Boudet
from Port-au-Prince, and Rochambeau from Saint-Raphael. But Leclerc
seriously underestimated the fighting ability of the blacks and before
he could accomplish his goal the French forces had to wade through
"fire and bayonets" (Ott, 1973:154).

Dessalines, had been monitoring Boudet's advancement from
Port-au-Prince all along. As he drew Boudet further and further into
the interior, the black General burned Leogane and Croix-des-Bouqueets;
moreover, he put the torch to all the plantations in his path and left
a visible trail of dead white captives.[16] At one point, Boudet thought

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[16]Although Dessalines was particularly brutal, one should not
forget that acts of brutality and cruelty were widespread on both
sides (Ott, 1973:167).

he had cornered the black General; but, Dessalines ". . . slipped away to Saint Marc, destroyed it, and began to double back on Port-au-Prince" (Ott, 1973:154). Boudet would have lost his base of supplies in this area if he had not been aided by two Maroon bands. These particular bands of Maroons were hostile to Dessalines because he had half destroyed their forces for raiding and for practicing Voodoo, which at this late stage of the revolution was strictly forbidden by Toussaint (James, 1963:309).[17] After being ambushed, Dessalines lost his advance guard. He put up a stiff fight then withdrew his troops in good order into the interior (Ott, 1973:155).

In the meantime, in the North Province Maurepas defeated the French Commander Debelle in the Battle of Trois Pavillons. But, Hardy and desfourneaux temporarily abandoned their drive toward Gonaives and came to the aid of Debelle. They surrounded Maurepas and soon he surrendered and afterward he actually joined the French expedition. Why did Maurepas and other officers in Toussaint's command defect to the French? One possible explanation lies in the fact that Toussaint had always taught them that they were French citizens fighting for France. And when Leclerc's commanders offered them their same command intact (i.e., rank and all), with the only exception being that they were now in reality fighting for France, they capitulated. This leads

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[17]Although Toussaint knew that the original slave revolt was sparked by a Voodoo priest, he nevertheless became increasingly intolerant of this practice. As Toussaint rose in political power he wanted to eliminate any potential threat to his command over the black populace. Within the cult of Voodoo, the potential threat was real. Those individuals who practiced it paid tribute to the Voodoo priest first and to Toussaint second.

one to suspect that the <u>caudillo</u> ethic, i.e., the desire for individual

military power, was at least in part an explanation for these defec-

tions. However, one must not forget that France had abolished slavery

back in 1794 and these black commanders had no reason to suspect that

an attempt would be made to re-enslave them. Furthermore, the French

commanders insured them that they were free men.

As Rochambeau approached Toussaint's headquarters at Gonaives,

the black Governor-General decided to ambush him in the <u>Ravin-a-</u>

<u>Couleuvre</u> (Snake Gully) approximately seven miles from Gonaives. On

February 23, 1803, Toussaint opened fire on Rochambeau's columns as

they came through the ravine. In this battle thousands of men died

on both sides. But, Toussaint broke off the action and ordered the

burning of Gonaives, then retreated to Crete-a-Pierrot, the strategic

entrance to the Grands Cahos Mountains (Ott, 1973:156).

Toussaint's strategy was to concentrate his forces in the

mountains and to launch guerrilla raids against the French. The black

Governor-General believed that this action if it had been successful

might tire the enemy and result in a deadlock. The strategy did seem

logical since the French were already suffering ". . . from a manpower

shortage and from the need of more supplies" (Ott, 1973:156).

While the French closed in on Crete-a-Pierrot with approxi-

mately twelve thousand soldiers, the black commander Magny with only

twelve hundred men had the responsibility of holding the position.

Meanwhile, Toussaint being aware of the situation dispatched Dessalines

to Crete-a-Pierrot and ordered him to hold it at all cost. Toussaint

himself attempting to lure the French away from the fortress, swung

back to the North Province to unite with Christophe and to incite the
black laborers against the French (Ott, 1973:157).

Eventually, Toussaint's forces gave up Crete-a-Pierrot and
retreated further into the interior. In this particular battle the
French losses were considerable, while Toussaint's were minimal. More
important, however, was the fact that the battle of Crete-a-Pierrot
increased the blacks' sense of nationalism (Ott, 1973:158).

After Crete-a-Pierrot Toussaint continued his struggle against
the French invasion forces. Charles Belair held the Cahos Mountains,
while Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe sought to regain control
of the territory extending from the Artibonite Valley to Le Cap
François.

After drawing the French into the interior, Toussaint began to
accelerate his use of guerrilla tactics and avoided pitched battles.
The black Governor-General's strategy seemed to have worked, because
in a short time the French were being forced out of areas which he
had designated for reconquest.

At Dondon, Christophe decisively defeated the French forces
of General Hardy driving them back into Le Cap. Moreover, Toussaint
and his black revolutionary army soon recaptured Saint Michel, Saint-
Raphael, Marmelade and Limbe. Toussaint's hit and run tactics quickly
cut off the logistical supply and communication routes of the French.
In effect, the French were crippled. Leclerc did receive some rein-
forcements, however, these additional troops from the Batavia Division
did nothing to offset his losses.

To make the situation worse, Leclerc alienated the Mulattoes

by deporting Rigaud. The French general accused the Mulatto leader of plotting a separatist movement. As a result, the Mulattoes began to leave the ranks of the French army in a noticeable amount.

Meanwhile, Toussaint was now aware of Leclerc's specific mission. He knew that Leclerc would offer the blacks anything that they wanted in exchange for a compromise. Also, Toussaint had instilled in his men that they were fighting for France and to never compromise their newly found freedom (i.e., he taught them to remain armed at all cost).

Militarily speaking Toussaint's army had decisively defeated Bonaparte's invading forces under General Leclerc. When the badly beaten Leclerc offered to compromise, Toussaint agreed. After all, as far as Toussaint was concerned there was nothing to lose. That is to say, the black military units would remain intact, the rank of all black officers would be confirmed in the white army and last, but not least, the blacks would be guaranteed freedom.

Later, after Toussaint's arrest and the reinstitution of slavery in Guadaloupe by Napoleon, the blacks renewed their struggle under the guidance of Dessalines and annhilialted the French forces and declared the independent Republic of Haiti.

C. Consequences refer to short and long range results. Short range consequences refer to the relative success or failure of the movement in accomplishing its own goals. The short range consequences of the Haitian Revolution have already been spelled out in considerable detail in the subsection called Success/failure (see page   ). There is no reason to rehash this information. But, I will point out again

that the Haitian Revolution was a "successful" one. The blacks, led

by Toussaint L'Ouverture and others were able to seize total power and

to abolish the colonial system and slavery. Also, the power of foreign

business enterprises was drastically reduced. The plantations were

reorganized under the new regime. The small shop owners were brought

under rigid control. The classical colonial system in San Domingue

had been broken.

A very important short range consequence of the Haitian

Revolution became manifested when Leclerc was decisively defeated by

Toussaint's army. When Napoleon lost San Domingue he also lost interest

in the Louisiana Territory. As Healey puts it:

> Napoleon's defeat was Jefferson's opportunity. By the
> Louisiana Purchase the United States secured all of the
> Indian Territory, all of Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wyoming,
> Montana, Washington, Oregon--and most of Colorado and
> Minnesota. Toussaint L'Ouverture was indirectly responsible
> for doubling the area of the United States . . . (1953:450).

Long term consequences refer to the effects of the movement on

history after it has ended. Although (by my criteria) the Haitian

Revolution ended in 1820, the long term effects are very difficult to

assess. There are many factors which are independent of the Haitian

Revolution that tend to affect the polotical and economic role that

Haiti plays in relation to other countries. Haiti today is one of the

poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere. But, based on the avail-

able facts one cannot conclude that this phenomena is a long range

consequence of the revolution. This question should be explored more

fully as an adequate topic for future research, in an effort to find

reasonable explanations for this occurrence.

One long (and short) range effect of the Haitian Revolution was its influence on other slave holding countries in the Western Hemisphere. For example, from 1792 to 1845 the Cuban slave population grew from approximately 44,000 to 350,000. This fantastic increase in the slave population in Cuba was coupled by an increasingly oppressive system with the slave masters becoming extremely fearful of a slave revolution. Even by 1850 the planters in Cuba were still spreading propaganda among themselves about the "horrors" of the San Domingue Revolution (Ott, 1973:194).

Also in the United States, as in Cuba, the Haitian Revolution had a profound effect on the advocates of slavery. Many Southerners feared that once the slaves got a taste of freedom they would not easily abandon the enterprise (Ott, 1973:195). Many writers believe that the Denmark Vesey rebellion in the United States in 1822 was directly related to the Haitian Revolution.

In South Carolina during the 1820's and 1830's some of the planters from San Domingue relocated bringing with them many stories of the dangers that slaves presented.

Ott believes that the Haitian Revolution had a lingering effect upon whites in the United States (especially those who advocated racism) even after the abolition of slavery (1973:197). "During reconstruction in the American South, defenders of white superiority feared a [black] uprising, a Haitian Revolution in Dixie" (Ott, 1973:197).

The Haitian Revolution also seemed to have had a profound effect on such black leaders and intellectuals as Frederick Douglas

and Benjamin Brawley. The _former_ was once a slave and later became
the American Ambassador to Haiti from 1889-1891. The latter was an
historian during the 1920's. He reminded his readers that the United
States owed much to Haiti for making it possible to obtain the
Louisiana Purchase. Moreover, Brawley took pride in lecturing about
the black Governor-General, and to him, Toussaint was one of the
greatest black leaders of the nineteenth century (Ott, 1973:198).

Martinique

The French colonial possession of Martinique during the latter
eighteenth century did not experience a revolution. This was in spite
of the fact that the mother country experienced a mass, civil
revolution and its major colony, San Domingue, experienced an anti-
colonial one. In part, because the Descriptive Scheme is designed to
describe complete social movements, I will only use the "Narrative"
part of the scheme to present a brief description of Martinique and how
it fared during the critical period of the eighteenth century.

The island of Martinique has an area of approximately 431
square miles and is situated in the eastern Caribbean. It forms part
of the Windward Islands and is included in the Lesser Antilles island
chain.

The first European to discover the island was Columbus, and he
did so on his last voyage in 1502 (Fiske, 1899:330). When Columbus
first came to the island, it was inhabited by a group of warlike Carib
Indians. By 1692 there were only 160 Indians left on Martinique. In
their contact with the Europeans, they were decimated mainly as a
result of war and disease (Wagley and Harris, 1967:96).

Martinique was sold by the Spanish to a French citizen in 1635,
after which in 1674 it was made a part of the French Crown domain, i.e.,
a French colony. Prior to becoming a colony, however, sugar cane was
introduced in 1654 by a group of Dutch refugees from Brazil (Wagley and
Harris, 1967:96). Immediately after this cash crop introduction more
African slaves were brought to fill the labor shortage, i.e., to work
the sugar plantations. By the beginning of the eighteenth century,
Martinique had become a wealthy sugar island (Wagley and Harris,
1967:96).

Like San Domingue, colonial society in Martinique was a rigid
caste structure with three principle divisions: whites, free people of
color and the slaves. Table 27 exemplifies the population breakdown in
Martinique for the years 1779 and 1789 respectively. Looking at Table
21 one can witness a decrease in the white population from 11,019 to
10,634 (or -385). Among the free people of color there was an increase

TABLE 27

POPULATION BREAKDOWN OF MARTINIQUE FOR YEARS 1779 AND 1789

Year	Whites	Free People of Color	Slaves (blacks)
1779	11,019	2,892	71,268
1789	10,634	5,779	83,965
	-385	+2,887	+12,697

SOURCE: constructed from Priestley, 1939:267.

LEGEND: Decrease = minus sign; Increase = plus sign.

from 2,892 to 5,779 (or +2,887). Finally, among the slaves there was also an increase from 71,268 to 83,965 (or +12,697). Two factors to note here are the significant increase in number of the wealthy free people of color and an increase in the ratio of slaves to whites.

Among the white caste was the colonial bureaucracy which consisted of those Frenchmen who were born in France. Chief among these bureaucrats were the Governor and the Intendant. While the former was responsible for military operations, the latter was more preoccupied with civil duties. By 1789 these two bureaucratic representatives were constantly in conflict over colonial policy. Because of the revolution at home these bureaucrats were often not able to generate sound governing policy.

Next in the white caste were the powerful planters of Martinique who, like San Domingue, were referred to as grand blancs. When the French Revolution began, it found these planters seething with political and social discontent. For example, the planters of Martinique, like those of San Domingue, with the United States' independence before them, had come to feel that they, too, need no longer tolerate exploitation at the hands of French officials and traders (Lokke, 1932:119).

At first, however, the white planters did not want complete independence from France, provided the mother country would allow them a reasonable degree of self-government. The fact that the planters were given permission in 1787 to form colonial assemblies indicated that the mother country was sympathetic to their cause. But, one month after the storming of the French Bastille (July 14, 1789) the

radical Jacobin party quickly assumed power in France.

For the French colony of Martinique (including San Domingue and Guadaloupe as well), the French Revolution had come too soon. Before the planters had had time to establish themselves as symbols of white authority through the colonial assemblies, the National Assembly in France declared the Rights of Man. In essence, this Declaration had the tendency to undermine or de-legitimate white authority in the French Caribbean in the eyes of the free people of color and the slaves. The opening sentence of the Declaration of the Rights of Man was: "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights" (Lokke, 1932:119). As a result, the expectations of the free people of color were raised significantly but the grands blancs were infuriated.

At this point the grands blancs and the colonial bureaucracy in Martinique were not prepared to allow the free people of color the right to enjoy civil and social equality with the whites. Although the revolution was progressing in France the planters in Martinique had not yet learned, in any significant sense, racial toleration (Priestly, 1939:275).

The last of the white caste in Martinique were the petit blancs or small whites. These individuals, like their counterparts in San Domingue, were overseers of plantations, small merchants, artisans, rabble rousers and the like. The petit blancs in Martinique played a less significant role in politics than in San Domingue. Although the petite blancs were always ready for trouble, it was because of their powerless position that they always left the management of affairs to the grands blancs.

The second division of the caste system in Martinique consisted of the free people of color, i.e., Mulattoes and free blacks. Although the free people of color in Martinique were victimized by prejudice and discrimination, they, nevertheless, seemed to prosper by excelling in those occupations which were open to them. For example, they acquired large amounts of wealth in such areas as farming, crafts, commerce and property ownership. By 1790, the free people of color in Martinique were a potential, or in fact, an actual threat to the economic interests of the grands blancs (Wagley and Harris, 1964:106).

But the free people of color wanted to exercise their civil rights which had been re-emphasized and guaranteed under the revolution- ary document--the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Consequently, they pushed against a strong opposition of whites for these rights.

The third and last division of the caste system were the slaves. In 1789 the ratio of slaves to whites in Martinique was approximately eight to one. Although in San Domingue this ratio was much larger, it was nevertheless a significant difference in Martinique as well.

Although I am certainly not prepared to argue that slavery as an institution, per se, was essentially humane, there does seem to be some evidence that slaves in Martinique had a better "go of it" than those in San Domingue. However, this point should not be exaggerated. At the turn of the eighteenth century the slave population in Martinique was approximately 13,292, which among these 32 percent were children (Wagley and Harris, 1964:98). In the San Domingue colony, as stated previously, less emphasis was put on the rearing of slave

children.

Also among the slaves in Martinique the African cultural influence seemed to be less marked than in San Domingue. Wagley and Harris substantiate this view as they state unequivocably that there was no doubt that most of the formal institutions as well as the dominant value system that finally prevailed in Martinique were those imposed by the Europeans (1964:99).

The following factors seem to be ones which may possibly add to the explanation of why African cultural survivals were relatively less in Martinique than San Domingue. Chief among these factors is that Martinique is a small island. Also, slaves who escaped were not able to form maroon communities--as in San Domingue--which could perpetuate African traditions. Supervision of slaves was more strict and close contact with whites was the rule rather than the exception. And, last, unlike the San Domingue slave population, in Martinique among the slaves, the Catholic church was one of the strongest forces working toward their acculturation (Wagley and Harris, 1964:99). But Martinique was not without its share of rebellions by the free people of color and the subjugated slave.

In the early years of the French Revolution, events in Martinique appeared to be taking the same course as those in San Domingue (Parry and Sherlock, 1971:170). For example, the great Revolution was followed by slave uprisings in Martinique, but these were put down (Roberts, 1940:238). Also, in 1790 Martinique experienced the first major revolt from the free people of color. It was on June 8 when the whites in Martinique discovered plans for a widespread

rebellion against the establishment (Ott, 1973:35). As a result, the whites set out to exterminate all the free people of color who resided in the town of Fort Royal. Although falling short of their mark, and before order could be restored, the whites had executed two hundred Mulattoes without a trial (State Gazette of South Carolina, July 22, 1790; Boston Independent Chronicle, July 1, 1790).

In the early part of October, 1790, Martinique experienced another major revolt. This time it involved ten thousand slaves and Mulattoes against the white citizenry. Although hundreds of soldiers arrived from Guadaloupe to help suppress the rebellion, the violent conflict continued to rage for an extended period of time (Ott, 1973: 36). However, eventually it was brought under control. Ott claims that the reason these revolts did not become widespread, revolutionary attempts was mainly because the free people of color lacked the necessary leadership to attract political attention in the National Assembly in France (1973:36). In San Domingue, however, this was not the case. In fact, the powerful political protest organization, i.e., Amis des Noirs, which was based in France, had several Mulattoes from San Domingue as active members. Vincent Oge, the Mulatto who led a major rebellion in San Domingue, was one of its most vocal members.

There were other factors in Martinique which tended to retard widespread revolutionary activity which did not seem to be character- istic of San Domingue society. For example, Martinique was a much older colony, more unified and socially stronger. "They had a much higher proportion of resident planters and did not suffer in the same degree from the ferocious hatreds of race and class" (Parry and

Sherlock, 1971:170).

Further, when the French National Assembly decreed on March 8, 1790 to leave the question of the rights of the people of color to the Colonial Assembly, San Domingue became torn by factions of whites who sided either with the Old Regime or with the Revolution. Troubles in Martinique, however, were similar but less violent (Priestley, 1939:320).

But in Martinique the factionalism between the whites came to an end when on March 4, 1794 the French Assembly officially abolished slavery in all French possessions. At this point the planters of Martinique refused to accept the principles of the French Revolution (Wagley and Harris, 1967:107). They turned to the British for military aid in an effort to maintain the caste system based on the institution of slavery. With Martinique being in a strategic military location and in close proximity to the British colony of Barbados, a British attack was imminent. This appeared to be the case, especially if the planter's behavior could be interpreted as an implicit or explicit invitation to the ready and willing British forces. On the other hand, however, whether the planters of Martinique did or ". . . did not actually invite the British to take over the island, they at least offered no resistance to the invading forces" (Wagley and Harris, 1967:107). Consequently, a British fleet and 20,000 soldiers easily took Martinique in April, 1794 (Priestley, 1939:338). It was primarily by this means that slavery endured in Martinique through-out the revolutionary period (Wagley and Harris, 1967:107).[18]

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[18]At various times the island of Martinique was subjected to

After the successful revolt of the slaves in San Domingue and the independence of the "new" Haiti in December 1803, the slaves in Martinique became increasingly restive. That is, with the example of a free Haiti to stir the slaves and drive fear into the hearts of the whites, Martinique was plunged into a period of considerable tension, exemplified by open slave rebellions in 1822 and 1824 (Wagley and Harris, 1967:107).

From this viewpoint of metropolitan France the maintenance of the system of slavery in Martinique became increasingly expensive and unrewarding. For example, during these critical times the French government had to maintain a standing garrison of 3,000 regular troops to keep the approximate 80,000 slaves under control. This endeavor was becoming more and more difficult to do.

But, with the development and growth of the beet-sugar industry in France coupled with the problem of social control of slaves, cane sugar began to lose its appeal as a desirable colonial product. Although opposed bitterly by the planters, in 1848 slavery was abolished in Martinique (Wagley and Harris, 1967:107-108). More important, however, is the fact that Martinique, although similar to San Domingue in many ways, was yet different enough to avoid an anti-colonial revolution during the latter eighteenth century, i.e., the

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attack by foreign countries. An attack by the Dutch was repelled in 1674; attacks by the British repelled in 1693 and 1759. In 1762, however, the British captured the island, but returned it to France under the terms of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The English recaptured Martinique in 1794 occupying it until 1802, after being captured again by the British in 1809, it was definitively restored to France in 1814.

period wherein the mother country and its major colony plunged into violent revolutionary change.

Guadaloupe

Like Martinique, the French colony of Guadaloupe did not experience a revolution during the critical upheavals in the French world in the latter eighteenth century. It is in part for this reason that only the Narrative part of the Descriptive Scheme will be utilized to describe what was happening in Guadaloupe during this critical period.

Guadaloupe is actually a group of islands located in the eastern Caribbean Sea. Most of the islands form a part of the Windward Islands and all are included in the Lesser Antilles Island chain. For my purposes I will be mainly concerned with the largest territory in Guadaloupe which, of course, are the two twin islands called Basse-Terre (to the West) and Grande-Terre (to the East). These two islands are separated by a narrow channel approximately 100 feet wide at their nearest junction (Fiske, 1902:318-319). The total land area of Guadaloupe is 687 square miles and it lies approximately 74 miles north of Martinique.

The first European to discover Guadaloupe was Columbus, on November 4, 1493. The Spanish made unsuccessful attempts to establish a colony in 1515, 1520, and 1523. They were repelled by the war-like Carib Indians who had replaced the Arawak inhabitants. Finally, by 1626 the Spanish had managed to establish a small outpost on the coast; however, they were driven away by Frenchmen.

In 1635 a French colony was established and later in 1674

Guadaloupe was made a royal domain of France. In the early seventeenth century tropical plants such as tobacco, cotton, cacao, and sugar were grown in the colony (Priestley, 1939:85). It was the latter crop, i.e., sugar, which became the most important. In the beginning, the French colonists on Guadaloupe attempted to use white indentured servants and Carib Indians as their source of labor. However, the colonists quickly concluded that these two groups created too many problems and therefore were not adequate to fill the labor shortage.

In 1642 sixty African blacks were sold on Guadaloupe, mainly to work on sugar plantations (Priestley, 1939:85). After 1655, as sugar became more and more a dominant plantation crop, the condition of the slaves grew increasingly worse. This is explained in part by the fact that as plantation agriculture grew in extent the relationship between master and slave became less personal in character (Priestley, 1939:85).

By the mid-seventeenth century the planters of Guadaloupe had certainly gained favor in the eys of those back home, by making the colony a highly productive one. For example, in 1767 the island possessed 10,025 horses and mules, 17,378 horned cattle, 14,895 sheep and goats and 2,669 hogs. There were 1,582 plantations raising cotton, coffee, cacao and other provisions; 401 were growing sugar, and 150 had sugar mills. Approximately 21,474 "squares of land" were covered by sugar cane (Priestley, 1939:267).[19]

Like San Domingue and Martinique, the tremendous productivity

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[19]The figures for Martinique were comparable (Priestley, 1939: 267).

of Guadaloupe owed its origin and continuation to a rigid caste struc-
ture based on the institution of slavery. This caste structure also
had three major divisions: whites, free people of color, and slaves.
Table 28 gives a breakdown of the general population of Guadaloupe
for the years 1779 and 1789. Looking at Table 28 we find that the
group which proportionately had the smallest increase in population
size over time were the whites. In fact, that increase amounted to an
additional 451 persons from 1779 to 1789. Further, the free people of
color, who were a wealthy lot, more than doubled in population size
between 1779 and 1789. Also, during this same period there was an
increase in the slave population of 4,196 persons. The ratio of the
number of slaves to the number of whites was six to one in 1779 and
approximately seven to one in 1789, i.e., a slight increase.

TABLE 28

POPULATION BREAKDOWN OF GUADALOUPE FOR YEARS 1779 AND 1789

Year	Whites	Free People of Color	Slaves (blacks)
1779	13,261	1,382	85,327
1789	13,712	3,058	89,523
	+451	+1,676	+4,196

SOURCE: Constructed from Priestley, 1939:267

LEGEND: Increase = plus sign

Again, at the top of the white caste were the French-born
bureaucrats who usually dominated the major administrative positions.

As in San Domingue and Martinique the Governor and the Intendant were the chief administrators of the island. While representing the king, the former was mainly responsible for military operations and the latter was more concerned with civil administration. Toward the beginning of the French revolution, the bureaucratic officials in Guadaloupe as well as other French colonies were in an increasingly shaky position.

Next in the white caste were the grands blancs who were French citizens born on the island. These were planters and wealthy merchants. Also, included in this class of whites were those top bureaucrats who, for whatever reason, stayed in office only temporarily and afterward settled and married in Guadaloupe (Priestley, 1939:273). The "bourgeoisie" was another term used for this class in Guadaloupe. They reveled in show and pomp and surrounded themselves with many slaves or traveled in France to prove how important they were. The ruling class (i.e., the French bureaucrats and the creole planters) in Guadaloupe was often rife with conflict and social discontent. When incompetent naval officers served as governors they often quarreled with the Intendants and councils, thereby increasing discontent and hostility in the higher social atmosphere. In critical times, this type of conflict in the top echelon of the bureaucracy often produced reactionary (to the right) and even radical (to the left) responses from the powerful planters of Guadaloupe.

In effect, conflict between Governor and Intendant often resulted in arbitrary economic policy which was against the interests of the planters. When the planters lost confidence in particular

bureaucratic officials and could not remove them by political means, they would often encourage or openly invite British occupation. This was also the case in Martinique and to a very limited extent in San Domingue.[20]

For example, in the Spring of 1759 a combined British naval and military force under Moore and Barrington was sent to attack and occupy the French West Indian colonies of Guadaloupe and Martinique. The British found the latter too strong to be taken, but they seized the wealthy island of Guadaloupe. Because the planters offered almost no resistance, they were allowed to capitulate on very favorable terms (Parry and Sherlock, 1971:120). In effect, the planters of Guadaloupe agreed to remain neutral between France and England as long as the war lasted. Moreover, their commodities were to be accepted in British markets; their slaves were exempted from the corvee, i.e., the head tax; they were allowed to retain French law under a British occupation army and their property rights were fully protected. Furthermore, British planters were not allowed to settle and in general, nothing was done to alter French culture in the colony (Parry and Sherlock, 1971:120).

During the British occupation (1759-1763) the planters enjoyed a new prosperity. English and American merchants rushed in to blance

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[20]After the Haitian revolution began, two years later in 1793, England and Spain went to war with France, plans were made to send a British expeditionary force to San Domingue. In fact, the first detachment of 900 men from Jamaica landed at Jeremie on the South Coast, where they were greeted as deliverers by the whites. In San Domingue, the English soon gained control of the Gulf of Port Au Prince including the Seaboard area (Sherlock, 1973:210). However, the revolution under Toussaint L'Ouverture eventually defeated the English and expelled them from San Domingue.

the demand for food, timber and most of all, slaves. Under English occupation the planter's fear of slave revolts was decreased and they were able to escape from debts owed to French commissioners. They were allowed to run up new debts under the English. A most important result was the fact that the planters of Guadaloupe found a safe and profitable North American and European market for their sugar (Parry and Sherlock, 1971:120). Finally, one overall result of English occupation and planter compromise was that it engendered envy from the planters of Martinique. This may explain in part why the latter planters were ready for English occupation for three consecutive times after 1759.

The third and last class in the white caste structure were the petite blancs or the small whites. In Martinique as well as Guadaloupe these whites were basically a powerless group when matched against the grands blancs. In terms of wealth, they were also powerless when compared to the free people of color, although benefitting from a caste system based in part on race. The petite blancs were similar to those of San Domingue and Martinique, especially in terms of occupation and position in the caste system. Just as the Mulattoes were a buffer between the petite blancs and the slaves, the petite blancs were a buffer between the grands blancs and the conscientious Mulattoes--each fulfilling their socially designed purpose--that of maintaining the rigid lines of caste. Thus, it is not surprising that the petite blancs in Guadaloupe, Martinique and San Domingue as well, often exemplified the worst form of racial prejudice and discrimination against Mulattoes and slaves.

But the political activity of the petite blancs during the

French and Haitian revolutionary era was largely insignificant in Guadaloupe as well as Martinique. But in San Domingue this was not the case. For example, during the times when tensions were high, i.e., the beginning of both the French Revolution (1789) and the Haitian Revolution, the petite blancs in San Domingue often clashed violently and aggressively with the striving Mulattoes on the one hand, and the planter-controlled militia on the other.

It is apparent after examining the facts that, prior to February 4, 1794 (official abolition of slavery in all French colonies), the colonial system in Guadaloupe maintained its legitimacy in the eyes of the petite blancs. This was also the case in Martinique although not to the same degree. But, in San Domingue, where the revolution tore at the very seams of colonial society, the system became highly de-legitimated in the eyes of the petite blancs (and other classes and castes as well). In San Domingue, "vive le revolution" became the order of the day.

The second caste in Guadaloupe was composed of the free people of color, i.e., Mulattoes and free blacks. The free people of color, not unlike their brethren in San Domingue and Martinique, were a wealthy lot. These individuals, for the most part, were descended from freed men, or from unions between white men and black women. Indeed, there was no doubt that the free people of color in Guadaloupe as elsewhere formed one of the prosperous elements of colonial society, but the whites kept them subjugated (Priestley, 1939:274). This was extremely antagonistic to a group who felt themselves equal to the whites, in most cases, where wealth and culture were considered.

In Guadaloupe, the whites resisted manumission, expressing the attitude usually more often found in Protestant countries: "Once an African, always an African." The free people of color in Guadaloupe in contrast to those in Martinique ". . . could not remain where they had once been slaves, but had to move to another area" (Wagley and Harris, 1967:103). The difference between Guadaloupe and Martinique in the handling of the free people of color may be explained in part by the class differences of the original French colonizers. For example, according to Roberts ". . . more gentlemen went to Martinique and more peasant farmers to Guadaloupe, so that a distinction was soon noted: Les Messieurs de la Martinique and Les bonnes gens de la Guadaloupe" (1942:89).

But regardless of the difference in the handling policies of the free people of color between Guadaloupe and Martinique, the "mixed bloods" or the free people of color of San Domingue suffered a lower general status than those in other French colonies (Ott, 1973:12).

The last division of the caste system in Guadaloupe was the subjugated slaves. This position of African blacks was much the same in all French colonies at that particular time (i.e., from the founding of each individual colony: 1635 for Guadaloupe and Martinique, 1505 for San Domingue under the Spanish, 1697 for San Domingue under the French to 1804 for San Domingue and 1848 for Guadaloupe and Martinique).[21]

Guadaloupe did experience some slave revolts, but this is not

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[21]The date 1804 (January 1) is the date of Haitian official independence; 1848 is the date when slavery was abolished in Martinique and Guadaloupe.

the same as saying that a tradition of slave revolts existed. One major slave revolt occurred early in the island's history. In 1656 a general slave revolt occurred at Cape Terre in Guadaloupe. The slave leaders were two blacks from Angola. Their plan was to kill all the white males, and select two from their lot to reign over the island. The blacks from the other half of the island (Basse Terre) were to join the insurrection. But, the natives on Basse Terre were mainly from other parts of Africa and were hostile to the Angolans; therefore, they remained neutral. The Angolan slaves on Cape Terre went it alone (Williams, 1970:194).

For fifteen days the slaves brought havoc and depredations to the property and life of the island. The revolt was eventually put down, and the two "kings" were captured, isolated, and literally ". . . torn to pieces alive, hanged and flogged," along with several followers (Williams, 1970:194). Another major slave revolt occurred in 1737; however, it too was eventually put down, but not until considerable damage had been brought about.

But what are some of the other factors which one may point to perhaps to aid us in better understanding the similarities and differences between Guadaloupe, Martinique and San Domingue? One of the most obvious similarities was that Guadaloupe also experienced several Mulatto revolts during the revolutionary era; however, they, like the Mulatto revolts of Martinique were quickly put down. A major reason for the Mulattoes' failure here (like Martinique) was due to the lack of political representation on the island itself and in the French National Assembly. Another way of putting it is, that the Mulattoes

in Guadaloupe unlike those in San Domingue did not have proper political
leadership. But, comparatively speaking, when the Mulattoes and
planters of Guadaloupe found themselves in conflict with each other,
they were much more likely to compromise than those Mulattoes in similar
situations in San Domingue.

Guadaloupe, like Martinique, was also older, more unified and
more socially stable than San Domingue (Parry and Sherlock, 1971:170).
The ratio of resident planters to absentee planters was much greater
in Guadaloupe (and Martinique) than in San Domingue. Also, Guadaloupe
and Martinique had been long-time, great, French commercial centers in
the Caribbean. There social, economic and political life had been well
established. Further, Guadaloupe, like Martinique, but unlike San
Domingue, was not plagued by roving bands of runaway slaves, i.e.,
Maroons. During the revolutionary period, while the Maroons continued
to harass the planters of San Domingue, they also served the function
of presenting an unconquerable and militant role model to the planta-
tion slaves.

Also, at the beginning of the Haitian Revolution, the planters
of Guadaloupe had begun to entertain, more strongly, the view that
British occupation was the most logical alternative to ward off any
possible slave insurrection. In effect, when the slaves of the north
plain in San Domingue revolted, Guadaloupe appeared to be edging toward
the same fate (Ott, 1974:46). By this time, there had already
developed a sharp divergence of interests between the merchants of
Basse-Terre and Saint-Pierre and the planters. The free people of
color (who here as elsewhere were always striving for equality) were,

in fact, a third party in the conflict. The free people of color seemed to be predisposed to follow the white planter assemblies. The reason to them was obvious--for many were planters themselves, plus they also feared slave insurrections (Parry and Sherlock, 1971:170).

If the planters and the Mulattoes would have been left alone, together they might have been able to work out their differences with the merchants. However, in 1792 the revolutionary party in France sent Jacobin commissioners to Guadaloupe to resolve the conflict. These radical commissioners still full of zest from the revolution in France, rallied with the merchants and the petite blancs in support of the Republic. They compelled the governors (who supported the planters) to submit. Consequently, these activities alienated the planters and predisposed them toward their "ace in the hole," i.e., a British occupation army.

When the French National Assembly abolished slavery in all French colonies, in February, 1794, the whites in Guadaloupe united (as they did in Martinique). They had no respect for the manumission decree--they looked to the British for help. In April, 1794 a British occupation army of some twenty thousand soldiers easily took Guadaloupe and Martinique (Priestley, 1939:338). This could have been the event which did much to calm the servile caste.

In retaliation, the French sent the famed Mulatto corsair and Jacobin, Victor Hugues, to Guadaloupe. His mission was to retake the islands which had been lost to the English. After arriving in Guadaloupe in June, 1794, Hugues immediately emancipated the slaves in the name of France and proceeded to engineer a major slave revolt,

not only against the British but against the planters as well. In this campaign several hundred white planters were killed (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 8, 1979:448). By September 29, 1794, Hugues had reconquered Guadaloupe, but Martinique was still under British control (Priestley, 1939:338).

When Napoleon Bonaparte re-instituted slavery in Guadaloupe in 1802, it served as an impetus to the revolution in Haiti. That is, it "tore the veil away from the hypocritical assurances to the people of San Domingue" (Williams, 1970:254). But, the Haitian Revolution also had effects on Guadaloupe. One such effect according to Williams, was that the militancy of the slaves in Guadaloupe was strengthened by the events in Haiti (1970:325).

In 1802, the slaves of Guadaloupe revolted against the restoration of slavery. This revolt culminated in the heroic act of the antislavery forces, who blew themselves up at Matouba when threatened by Frency forces led by General Richepanse; Richepanse had been sent to Guadaloupe by Napoleon Bonaparte to pacify the slaves, but in the same year he was overcome by yellow fever and died.

The British occupied Guadaloupe again in 1810, which after some temporary changes in its status, it was definitively restored to France in 1816. The institution of slavery was abolished in 1848 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 8, 1979:448).

Summary

The major goals of this chapter were threefold: (1) to present a descriptive scheme by which all or any revolutionary social movement can be described; (2) to use the descriptive scheme to present

a detailed case study of the Haitian Revolution, which occurred between 1791 and 1820; (3) to use the descriptive scheme in a more informal manner to present a less detailed case study of Martinique and Guadaloupe respectively, during the same era.

In the case of Martinique and Guadaloupe, only the narrative part of the descriptive scheme was applied. This was largely the case because, in Martinique and Guadaloupe a full-fledged revolutionary movement did not occur. But, nevertheless, the descriptive scheme and the information presented provided a means by which the three eighteenth century French colonies could be compared.

After reading this chapter the reader should now be alert to some of the similarities and differences which existed between these three highly prized French colonies. But, in order to highlight these similarities and differences more clearly, I present them in summary form in Table 29 below. I must add, however, that the dimensions presented in Table 29 are either explicitly stated or implicitly implied in the chapter. Furthermore, the dimensions are a modification of Genovese's factors taken from his work called From Rebellion to Revolution (1979:11-12).

Looking at Table 29, I have outlined ten dimensions ranging from owner (planter) absenteeism to International intervention. Haiti, when compared to Martinique and Guadaloupe ranks "Yes" (or higher) on the first eight dimensions, compared to a "Less so," "Smaller" or "No" for Martinique and Guadaloupe. The ninth dimension, i.e., economic distress, seen in terms of class differences existing in the three colonies immediately prior to the Haitian Revolution, was essentially

Table 29

Summary Table of Comparison Between Three Caribbean, French Colonial Nations: Similarities and Differences.

Dimensions	Haiti	Martinique	Guadaloupe
1. Owner(planter) absenteeism	Yes	Less so	Less so
2. Large Plantation units	Yes	Smaller	Smaller
3. Conflicting ruling class	Yes	Less so	Less so
4. Blacks heavily outnumbered whites	Yes	Less so	Less so
5. African born slaves outnumbered those slaves born in the colony	Yes	Less so	Less so
6. Existence of autonomous black leadership	Yes	No	No
7. Suitable geographic terrain	Yes	No	No
8. Existence of an organized Marroon force	Yes	No	No
9. Economic distress	Yes	Yes	Yes
10. International Intervention	Yes	More so *	More so

* "More so" implies that the international situation prevented rather than caused revolution.

the same. While the tenth dimension, i.e., International Intervention, was certainly relevant to all three colonies, it played a much bigger role in preventing a revolution from occurring in Martinique and Guadaloupe. In Haiti, foreign military occupation never really occurred in a complete sense. But, Martinique and Guadaloupe were at various times completely occupied by British military forces.

Finally, I think it is important to point out to the reader that the descriptive scheme, presented in this chapter, was meant only to describe what happened in each individual case not to explain the occurrence or non-occurrence of revolution.

In the next chapter (Chapter VI) I present my theory of Anti-Colonial Revolution. The theory presented will explain why an Anti-Colonial Revolution occurred in San Domingue (Haiti) and not in the other two French colonies, namely Martinique and Guadaloupe.

CHAPTER VI

THEORETICAL DESIGN

The major goal of this chapter is to present my theory of
anti-colonial revolution. In order to accomplish this goal, the
following steps are necessary: (1) a presentation of the problem
(formalized); (2) a presentation of the conceptual scheme; (3) a
list of the theoretical propositions; and (4) the propositional
arrangement, i.e., the theory.

The Problem (Formalized)

The brief presentation of the problem given in Chapter III
served the function of exposing the reader to the type of explanation
sought in this paper. At this point, however, it seems more appropriate
to present to the reader a more formalized approach to the problem.
In order to accomplish this task I will briefly discuss the problem
statement in terms of the following things: semantical structure,
form or logic, content, and problem set.

In addition, after presenting the formalized version of the
problem statement, I will present in the subsequent subsection the
theoretic viewpoint of the theory.

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But first, let me present again the problem statement in its correct semantical form: <u>Why is it that a successful anti-colonial revolution occurred in the French Caribbean island of San Domingue (Haiti) at this time (1791-1820) and not in the French Caribbean islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe?</u>

Semantically speaking, the phrase: Why is it that . . .? demands a "because." A because in turn produces a need for an explanation. Moreover, the notion of similarities producing or causing differences, or differences producing or causing similarities results in cognitive dissonance when these relationships are otherwise (Jordan, 1971:16). When cognitive dissonance is present there is usually a tendency to reduce it. If one reformulates a badly worded question so that it produces cognitive dissonance, it then reinforces the desire to resolve the problematic nature of the question. It also follows that when the semantical structure of the quetsion is reformulated into a problem statement this enhances its further articulation and solution (Jordan, 1971:16). Jordan explains by offering the following example:

> The question: Why do birds fly? is not as semantically
> demanding of a solution as the question: Why is it that
> birds fly in some instances and not in others? This latter
> phrasing of the question contains the common-sense notion
> that all birds have wings and all birds can therefore fly
> (similarity). But it also contains the notion that all birds
> do not fly in all instances (difference). It thus contains
> an element of cognitive dissonance (similarities producing
> differences), and a comparison (flying and not flying). The
> result of this type of phraseology is to further articulate
> the problem by reducing the dissonance and to demand an
> explanation in the variation in the behavior. In other
> words, the problem statement is so structured as to "set-up"
> an indeterminate situation which demands that it be resolved
> into a determinate one (1971:16).

Now that I have properly phrased the problem and briefly discussed its

semantical structure, I now turn to the form or logic the problem takes.

In discussing this aspect of the problem I will refer to the similarity

difference situation as conditions and variations. By utilizing this

approach the form or logic of the problem statement contributes to its

solution.

Although problem statements may take a number of different

forms, there seems to be four which stand out among the rest. These

four forms also contain a conditional phrase and a variable phrase.

These forms are presented in Figure 14 as follows:[22]

Figure 14

Four Possible Forms which Problem Statements Take

Source: Jordan, 1971:19.

The form which my problem takes is the first type. Here I am

suggesting that seeming similar conditions are producing dissimilar

_____

[22]In the diagrams (1 through 4 C = condition; V = positive
variability; and $\overline{V}$ = negative variability.

variations or two mutually exclusive results. My "task is to explain the dissimilarity between the two varying results" (Cullison, 1975:122).

The problem statement also contains reference to substantive social reality: its content. Using form one in Figure 14 above, I substitute the terms of my problem into its logical form:

Conditional   Variable

                                        Occurred in Haiti

"Successful"
Anti-Colonial
Revolution
                                        Did not occur in
                                        Martinique or
                                        Guadaloupe

When the problem statement is viewed in the logical form presented above it demands an explanation in the variation of the occurrence of revolutions under the condition that they are anti-colonial in orientation.

Because the problem statement is an important phrase of sociological inquiry, it seems appropriate, to at least, attempt to avoid ambiguity and misconception and add greater clarity and precision by specifying both the form the problem takes and its content. In doing so, one actually avoids many of the theoretical and methodological difficulties which can be traced back to the lack of attention given to the problem statement (Jordan, 1971:20-21).

Another important aspect of the problem statement is the formal problem set. In this connection, the following questions might be asked: What manner of phenomenon is an anti-colonial revolutionary movement? To what general class of phenomena does it belong? And, conversely, what range of subsidiary phenomena or subclass does the

anti-colonial revolutionary movement embrace? These questions are important because a particular problem under study may very well be related to other problems within the same class of phenomena, despite the fact that they may vary in specific content. Also, by specifying the general class of phenomena, i.e., the unit(s) of analysis, carries special significance for the theoretical propositions. That is, those propositions "which hold true for the specific problem statement under investigation should also hold true in part for the more general class to which the problem belongs" (Jordan, 1971:21).

So, in essence, the formal problem set acts as a formal tool which the investigator uses to locate his problem within a logical framework of related cases, some more general and others more specific in nature (Cullison, 1976:123). Moreover, since I accept the assumption that it is the scope of a theory (i.e., the range of specific phenomena which meet the conditions of the theory) which gives it its power to explain, ". . . to specify this range adds the value of theoretical relevance to that of clarity" (Jordan, 1971:21). Further clarification as to why a problem set is needed is given in the following statement by Jordan:

> . . . this type of specification [the formal problem set]
> is one necessary step in relating theories to one another ⸺
> although at different levels of analysis or abstraction:
> the problem of retroduction. And, finally, to specifically
> come to grips with the class of things to which the problem
> statement belongs enhances the decisions involving what
> conceptual tools are most appropriate for a given problem
> (Brackets mine) (1971:21).

The formal problem set for this paper is constructed by taking into account the sociological properties of both the conditional and the variable parts of the problem statement, which was presented in

diagrammatical form above. In effect, by moving up and down each side of the diagram in terms of levels of abstractness and specificity, it is possible to articulate a wide range of related questions.

a. Why is it that social movements have occurred in some places and times in the world and not in others?

b. Why is it that radical social movements have occurred in some places and times in the Western World and not in some other places and times in the Eastern World?

c. Why is it that radical left-wing social movements have occurred in some places and times in the colonial world and not in some other places and times in the non-colonial world?

d. Why is it that revolutionary social movements have occurred in the French colonial empire and not in other colonial empires?

e. Why is it that a "successful" anti-colonial revolution occurred in the French Caribbean island of San Domingue (Haiti) at this time (1791-1820) and not in the French Caribbean islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe?

f. Why is it that a slave-based anti-colonial revolution occurred in the Haitian slave society and not in the slave societies of Martinique and Guadaloupe in the late 18th and 19th centuries?

g. Why is it that a "successful," slave-based, anti-colonial revolution, which overthrew the slave system, occurred in the Haitian slave society and not in any other slave society in history?

h. Why is it that a "successful" anti-colonial revolution occurred in the mid-20th century in the French North African colony of Algeria and not in some other colonies at the same time?

I have now set the problem in a logical framework of other sociological concerns and have specified the exact social phenomena I wish to explain. My next task is to develop an answer to the key problem, which of course is the underlined statement "e" above. The theory which I construct to answer the key problem statement will also be used to generalize downward to problem statement "h" or the Algerian Revolution, and finally upward to problem statement "d" or to all revolutions.

But before I develop my answer to the key problem statement, I think it is appropriate to alert the reader to the type of theoretic viewpoint which best describes the model.

Theoretic Viewpoint of the Theory

In describing the theoretic viewpoint of the model I will simply say that my theory is eclectic. That is, it takes concepts from many theoretical perspectives, i.e., conflict structuralism, structural functionalism, social psychology (e.g., symbolic interaction), etc. It should be noted, however, that initially I did not start out in this investigation with a strong commitment to eclecticism, but nevertheless my theory did end up this way. Moreover, eclecticism may prove to be much more beneficial in the study of such a complex social phenomena as the revolutionary movement. In fact, it may be much more plausible to utilize concepts drawn from different theoretical perspectives than to be restricted only to those concepts which are drawn from any one particular theoretical perspective.

Although the viewpoint of my theory ended up eclectic, it nevertheless seems to offer a great deal of flexibility, breadth and explanatory power to my analysis.

After presenting the theoretic viewpoint of my theory by broadly characterizing it in terms of various theoretical perspectives or paradigms, I now present the conceptual scheme, the list of concepts used in the theory. These concepts are used to construct the propositions, and the logical arrangement of the propositions from the theory, my theory of anti-colonial revolution.

The Conceptual Scheme

As I have indicated earlier in Chapter III, concepts are the
building blocks of theory. However, before concepts can be used to
actually construct a theory, they must be first transformed into
variables. This transformation is accomplished by attaching attributes
to the concepts, thereby formalizing and specifying them as precise
variables.

In this section I derive specific, precise variables from the
basic concepts drawn primarily from the review of literature and other
parts of this study. In the Conceptual Scheme which follows (see
Figure 15 above) I list the basic concepts which are used to construct
the theory of anti-colonial revolution. Also, in the conceptual scheme,
I carefully define the concepts (variables) and attach to them their
qualitative or quantitative dimensions, i.e., their attributes are
specified.

After the presentation of the conceptual scheme I will present
a note on the subphases of revolution followed by a note on Genovese
and his "theory" of slave revolts.

Figure 15

Conceptual Scheme and Glossary

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Acceleration	Acceleration refers to a subphase of a movement. The acceleration subphase is usually referred to as the precipitating crisis which accelerates the activity on both sides. When acceleration occurs in the revolutionary process people become polarized or forced to take sides.	Intensity
Access	Access refers to the degree to which members of a movement have both communicative and physical access to one another in their daily lives. One very pronounced way in which the slaves of San Domingue had access to each other was through large plantation units (Genovese, 1979:11).	Degree
Alienation	Alienation is a social psychological factor which refers to the individual's estrangement from and disenchantment with the social structure. Just as there are different types of alienation, e.g., powerlessness, cultural estrangement, etc., there are different patterns of alienation, e.g., low powerlessness and high cultural estrangement, etc.	Degree and Level

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Autonomous Leadership	Autonomous leadership refers to the self-governing influence in a shared direction by a member or members of a group. I use the term in its sociological and not in its psychological sense. Autonomous leadership refers to a social relationship between the led and their leaders. In successful revolutionary movements I recognize and postulate the necessity of charismatic leadership at some stage in the movement.	Amount
Coercive Balance	Coercive balance refers to the degree to which each side perceives the other as being relatively equal to it with respect to its overall coercive power. The greater this coercive balance, the more likely the movement is to take-off, ceteric paribus.	Degree of Equality
Coercive Power of the Establishment	Coercive power of the establishment refers to the perceived military power of the establishment in relation to its total potential effective coercion. The perceived military power of the establishment can include the establishment's loss of powerful friends and its gaining of powerful enemies.	Amount

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Commitment	Commitment refers to a social psychological state resulting from an identity-altering experience and a bridge-burning act. Commitment is manifested as: (a) an intensive concern with the movement's belief system; (b) participation in the social organization of the movement; (c) a degree of charismatic influence on others; (d) a willingness to risk a wide range of sanctions from those who are in opposition to the movement; and (e) noticeable behavioral change (Gerlach and Hine, 1970:158). Commitment will vary with individual members in a movement. Some participants will be highly committed, while others only slightly. One way to distinguish between leaders and the rank and file of a movement is to do so in terms of the level of commitment. One can surmise, that the higher the level of commitment, the greater the likelihood of a leadership function (Jordan, 1971:73).	Level
Conflicting Ruling Elite	A ruling elite is defined as all those persons who occupy positions of power and authority from which the important decisions are made which are binding on the social system as a whole. A conflicting ruling elite is a condition which occurs when the members of this class cannot agree on common policies, cannot agree on the rules of entry and departure into the ruling elite, cannot agree upon who in the ruling elite is to pay for the reformist or repressive response to the movement's challenge, etc.	Extent

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
De-ligitimation of the Establishment	De-legitimation of the establishment refers to the process whereby the action of the authorities is perceived by the members of a social system to be incongruent with the norms of that system. Hence, when the establishment is de-legitimated the authorities and often by generalization the normative structure, per se, receive high negative reaction from its members. De-legitimation sometimes occurs across class lines.	Degree
Discontent	Discontent refers to any negative effect on the part of individuals and can range from a mild anxiety or dissatisfaction to intense rage or anger and the expectation of a continuation of that negative effect. For discontent to be relevant to the movement it must be mobilized and focused on a perceived causal agent.	Intensity and
Ideology	Ideology refers to the characteristic belief system of a movement. It is an action related set of ideas which are both empirical and evaluational, and which defines for the believers the ideal state toward which the movement is heading, a critique of the existing society and the agents responsible, and a means by which the members can move from the present "evil" to the future ideal good.	Scope

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Mobilization	Mobilization refers to the process whereby any collectivity organizes its resources for action. In reference to any general theory of anti-colonial revolution mobilization refers only to the movement. Mobilization refers to resource management, to the converting and transferring of resources from one group and social sector, to another.	Degree
Movement	A social movement may be defined as a semi-organized collectivity with a more-or-less distinct shared ideology and is characterized by a concerted and continuous effort through the use of non-legitimate means to promote, resist, or reverse social change in the society or group of which it is a part.	Frequency
Multipenetration	Multipenetration refers to the extent to which the movement spreads its membership across class, religious, political, sectional, regional, and other sociocultural boundaries. The multipenetration of a revolutionary movement gives it variety, and complexity and enhances significantly its growth (Gerlach and Hine, 1970:69).	Scope

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Organizational Balance	Organizational balance refers to the degree to which the members of one side or the other believe that the influence involved by supporting organizations, associations, and institutions approaches equality or balance. The greater this organizational equality, the more likely the movement is to take-off, ceteric paribus.	Degree of Equality
Power of the Establishment	Power of the establishment refers to the "total" power of the establishment. Total power is a composite measure of the de-legitimacy of the establishment and its coercive power. I am aware that there are other power resources besides those related to legitimacy and guns, but nevertheless total power use here refers only to coercive power and the degree of de-legitimation.	Degree
Power Resources of the Outs	Power resources of the outs refers to the perceived change in the power resources of the "outs," i.e., the members of the emergent movement. This variable is a social psychological conception and with the perception of changing power resources, the probability of a movement starting or "taking-off" is greatly increased. Some of the power resources which increased the likelihood of a full-fledged anti-colonial revolution in Haiti were: increasing international aid to the outs, suitable geographic terrain, African born slaves outnumbering creole born slaves, blacks outnumbering whites, etc.	Degree

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Relative Deprivation	Relative deprivation is to be contrasted with objective deprivation and refers to a discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities in which the value expectations are always greater than the value capabilities.	Level
Restrictions Against Political Protest	Restrictions against political protest refers to the wide range of legal and institutional rules and regulations which prevent dissident citizens from engaging in more or less active disagreement with their authorities. In colonial society this variable reaches a high extreme. For example, the colonial elite in San Domingue would not tolerate any political dissent from the wealthy Mulattos or the enslaved blacks.	Number
Revolutionary Movement	A revolutionary movement may be defined as a social movement which violently attempts or actually overthrows the government of the social system of which it is a part in order to bring about social change.	Frequency

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Social Class	The meaning of the term is not standardized. It has at least four somewhat distinct meanings. (1) The most general meaning is as a synonym for stratification; an aggregation or group of people whose overall statuses are similar and who are ranked in an evaluative hierarchy; (2) a particular type of stratification system, a "class" system, i.e., one based on an ideology of the equality of opportunity; (3) economic differences or strata; however, sometimes statuses are included such as occupational and educational differences; (4) the more dynamic meaning which focuses not on static differences between strata but on an active, conflict relationship between two antagonistic "classes." Only at this point according to Marxists does true class exist. The following traits are usually associated with this state of affairs: (a) large stratum differences; (b) sharp "class" boundaries; (c) strong "class" antagonism (a psychological conception); (d) high intra-class solidarity and inter-class hostility; and (e) actual, on-going, social conflict.	
Social Conflict	A struggle between two or more parties or actors over Scarce and valued resources in the course of which the actors attempt to gain the contexed goal by neutralizing, injuring, or eliminating their rivals.	Degree

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Social Mobility	Social mobility refers to the upward or downward movement of individuals or groups into different positions in a social hierarchy based on power, wealth or any other scarce social resource. Here, the emphasis is placed almost entirely on upward mobility.	Amount
Social Organization	Social organization refers to the causal, functional, logical and meaningful interactions of human beings that give rise to form or unity in a practical and meaningful way (Jordan, 1971:72). The central trait of an organized interaction (group, institution, or social system) is . . . the presence in it of law-norms as the conduct-regulating and behavior-controlling aspect of the component of meanings-values (Sorokin, 1962:70). A semi-organized collectivity (or group) such as a revolutionary social movement gains its reality, individuality, continuity, and self-determination from its socially organized interactions (Sorokin, 1962:	Degree
Status Achievement	Status achievement refers to the awarding or assignment of rewards, status, rights and privileges on a basis over which the individual has some control (i.e., education, income, occupation, etc.).	Amount

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Status Ascription	Status ascription refers to the awarding or assignment of rewards, status, rights, and privileges on a basis over which the individual has no control (i.e., sex, race, age, etc.	Amount
Status Inconsistency	Status inconsistency refers to a horizontal or diagonal dimension of a stratification system. It is used as a structural variable and refers to relations among the status ranks of an actor. For any given individual to be status inconsistent, some of his statuses must be higher or lower than others.	Amount
Status Resentment	Status resentment refers to the feelings of envy, injured pride, and frustrated self-esteem that individuals or groups at one level in the status hierarchy feel towards individuals or groups at another level (Hagopian, 1975:90). Status resentment may also refer to feelings of hostility towards one's own position in the status hierarchy manifested outwardly toward individuals or groups who are higher in the status hierarchy.	Amount
Structural Blockage	Structural blockage refers to those barriers in the social structure that prevent or limit people from experiencing upward social mobility or from removing the sources of their discontent. One such example is institutionalized racism (Stockdale, 1970: Knowles and Prewitt, 1969).	Degree

Conceptual Scheme

Concept	Definition	Attribute
Third Party Support	Third party support refers to the passive or active support provided to an emergent movement by previously uncommitted Third Parties or "audiences." Third party support is a crucial factor in the genesis and success of any social movement. This support may come from organized or unorganized collectivities or from collectivities external to or internal to the social system in which the movement is taking place. In San Domingue third party support came from the Mulattos and the Maroons.	Amount
Value Capabilities	The value capabilities refer to the average value positions to which the members of a collectivity perceive themselves realistically capable of attaining or maintaining. Contrast with value expectations that deal with aspirations; value capabilities involve perceived realistic anticipations (Gurr, 1970:23).	Intensity and Scope
Value Expectations	Value expectations refer to the average value positions to which the members of a collectivity believe they are justifiably entitled. Value position is nothing more than the amount or level of a value actually attained. The emphasis here is placed on justifiable value expectations, those which are usually derived from the normative system (Gurr, 1970:23).	Intensity and Scope

A Note on the Subphases of Revolutions

As stated previously in Chapter I, it is appropriate to view revolutions in terms of a temporal process which occurs over a period of time. With the exception of the Edwards-Brinton model of the Stages of Revolution few students of revolutions have endeavored to take this gigantic step.

Although the Edwards-Brinton model is indeed a major step in the right direction the criticisms against it prevent it from being used as a general model for all types of revolutions. These criticisms have already been presented in Chapter II under the subsection Hagopian's Typology. Consequently, there is no reason to present them again.

On the other hand, my model is a much more plausible view of the stages of revolution (see Figure 1, Chapter 1). It goes almost without saying that all revolutions must have causes (e.g., the Causation Stage). Second, all revolutions must either succeed or fail (e.g., the Success-Failure Stage). Third, all revolutions, whether they success or fail, must have consequences (e.g., the Consequences Stage).

Moreover, my concern is with the Causation Stage of the revolutionary movement and not with its dynamics. With this being the case, the final theories proposed should be viewed as systematic attempts to explicate the causes of anti-colonial revolutions in particular, and after modification, all types of revolutions in general.

In addition, as stages are divisions in the career of

revolutionary movements, so phases are the subdivisions of these stages

(Silberstein and Jordan, 1977:5). But how can these stages be

subdivided into phases? Focusing only on the Causation Stage I divide

it up into four phases or subdivisions: I. Predisposing, II. Structural

Strain, III. Manipulative, and IV. Take-Off, or the time when the

movement first appears. Figure 16 below presents a picturial summary

of the phases in the Causation Stage.

Figure 16

Phases in the Causation Stage of Revolutionary Movements

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV
Predisposing	Structural Strain	Manipulative	Take-Off
Long Term	Middle Term	Short Term	Present

Each phase in Figure16 can be further subdivided into sub-

phases or conditions under which revolutionary movements occur.

Furthermore, these conditions can be characterized as a set of abstract

concepts, some of which are contemporary or coextensive, while others

are historical or sequential. The conditions under which revolutionary

movements occur can be characterized as stated above in light of the

fact that ". . . the phases are analytical and theoretical ones, and

not natural history phases" (Silberstein and Jordan, 1977:6).

The set of abstract concepts which I have referred to above is

the foundation of my formal theory. Moreover, these concepts are the

very same ones explicated in the conceptual scheme. Thus, Figure17

below is a summarization of the phases in the Causation Stage and the

associated Sequential and Coextensive Conditions (concepts).

Figure 17

A Summary of the Phases and Associated Conditions
within the Causation Stage

	The Conceptual Scheme	
	Conditions	
Phases	Sequential	Coextensive

I. Predisposing	Value Expectations
	Value Capabilities
	Class Differences
	Class Antagonism
	Status Ascription
	Status Achievement
	Coercive Power of
	    the Establishment
	De-legitimation of
	    the Establishment	

II. Structural Strain	Relative Deprivation Structural Blockage Class Conflict Status Inconsistency Power of the Establishment	

III. Manipulative	Discontent	Alienation
		Social Mobility
		Status Resentment
		Restrictions Against
		    Political Protest
		Power Resources of
		    the Outs

	Mobilization	Ideology Commitment Autonomous Leadership Social Organization Access Third Party Support
	Acceleration	Crisis Multipenetration

IV. Take-Off	The Anti-Colonial
	    Revolutionary
	    Movement
		Coercive Balance
		Conflicting Ruling
		    Elite
		Organizatioal
		    Balance

After presenting a note on the subphases of revolution along with a summary of the phases and associated conditions within the Causation Stage, I will now fit Genovese's conceptual scheme concerning slave revolts into the conceptual scheme which I explicated in Figure 17.

Note on Genovese

Genovese, in his book on slave revolts and rebellions (From Rebellion to Revolution, 1979), offers us a conceptual scheme involving eight factors or concepts. These independent variables are intended to explain why slave revolts occur or do not occur.

So according to Genovese, slave revolts will occur if: (1) the master-slave relationship had developed in the context of absenteeism and depersonalization as well as greater cultural estrangement of Blacks and Whites; (2) slaveholding units approached a large size, i.e., an average size of 100 to 200 slaves, as in the Sugar Colonies, rather than the twenty or so, as in the Old South; (3) the ruling class frequently splits either in warfare between slaveholding countries or in bitter struggles within a particular slaveholding country; (4) Blacks heavily outnumbered whites; (5) African born slaves outnumbered those slaves born into the colony (Creole); (6) the social structure of the slaveholding unit permitted the emergence of an autonomous Black leadership; (7) the geographical, social and political environment provided terrain and opportunity for the formation of colonies of runaway slaves (Maroons) strong enough to threaten the plantation regime; and (8) economic distress and famine occurred. These are Genovese's original eight; however, his seventh factor really splits

into two--geographical terrain and Maroon force--thus giving nine factors. A tenth factor is implied in his discussion, international intervention. A summarization of these factors has already been presented in Table 29 in Chapter V.

Strictly speaking, of course, a conceptual scheme does not contain hypotheses (propositions), but here I cannot resist taking practical advantage of the context. The Genovesean "theory," and strictly speaking, a set of unrelated propositions is not a true theory, does supply a plausible answer to our question; and it does seem to be consistent with the historical facts as I know them. I will not supply this historical evidence here since hypothesis testing and verification are not my goal in this paper.

I have omitted the depersonalization and cultural estrangement factors alluded to in Genovese's first proposition. It is not clear what he means by them, and he really does not make systematic use of them. In terms of general, theoretical perspectives or "paradigms" the "theory" belongs in the Conflict School (Turner, 1978). In the context of social movement theory Genovese can be placed in the Resource Mobilization perspective (Silberstein and Jordan, 1980).

What is wrong with Genovese's "Power Resources" theory? In terms of its Neo-Marxist and Conflict perspective, one with which I have considerable ideological sympathy, it characteristically "fails" to consider in almost any way at all any "cultural" factors (normative, ideological, social psychological or superstructural). I believe that some such factors must be included--even Marx and Engels, contrary to popular opinion, did not think of the superstructure as a mere

ephiphenomenon (Silberstein and Jordan, 1978).

For example, Genovese's eighth factor, economic distress and famine, implies absolute deprivation. I believe that such a hypothesis was wrong. Over the long haul the Haitian economy was improving by leaps and bounds; and there was in fact a short-term downturn; but this best fits a relative deprivation thesis (Gurr, 1970). Also the increase in power-resources thesis implies relative deprivation. One more example, the French Revolution and its Rights of Man and Citizen ideology was indeed a major source of increasing value expectations or aspirations.

In the context of a Resource Mobilization approach Genovese's theory deals nicely with the external resources but fails to deal at all with the internal resources (mobilization). External resources deal with all resources which exist prior to the occurrence of the movement and out of the consciousness of potential movement members. But potential, external resources must be mobilized and used in effective and skillful ways. This can only be done if the members who are committed and skillful get together in a movement organization. External resources while related are hardly the cause of movement organization.

In a more general way I criticize Genovese's theory on the following grounds: (1) it provides no sequence. What comes first? Do all movements--slave or not--go through the same career? (2) It provides no coextensive or contemporary conditions. Under which condition will a conflict in the ruling class, e.g., spark off a revolution. Obviously not all splits in the elite lead to mass-bound

revolution. And (3) it provides no feedback loops. For these and many other reasons I believe that Genovese's "theory" is an over-simplification and is <u>inadequate</u> for my more general <u>purposes</u>.

My immediate goal is to create a theory of anti-colonial revolution and ultimately to create a theory which will explain all revolutions.

Utilizing my conceptual scheme as presented in Figure 17, I shall try to plug Genovese's concepts into mine. Figure 18 presents the same conceptual scheme as previously presented in Figure 17 with the addition of Genovesean concepts "plugged in." Genovese's concepts are almost entirely power resources variables, and while my scheme includes more than power resources, still they are a very important part of my scheme.

But a conceptual scheme, no matter how suggestive, is not a theory. The concepts must be put into propositions, and the propositions must be arranged into a deductive system. I do exactly this, respectively, in the next two sections.

Figure 18

Genovese's "Theory" As Translated Into The Author's Conceptual Scheme

	The Conceptual Scheme		
Phases	Conditions		Genovese's Concepts (see Table 23)
	Sequential	Coextensive	
I. Predisposing	Value Expectations Value Capabilities Class Differences Class Antagonism Status Ascription Status Achievement Coercive Power of the Establishment De-legitimation of the Establishment		(American and French Revolutions)* Conflicting Ruling Elite
II. Structural Strain	Relative Deprivation Structural Blockage Class Conflict Status Inconsistency Power of the Establishment		Owner Absenteeism

*Not in Genovese's original list.

Figure 18 (concluded)

The Conceptual Scheme

| Phases | Conditions | | Genovese's Concepts (see Table 23) |
	Sequential	Coextensive	

III. Manipulative	Discontent	Alienation
		Social Mobility
		Status Resentment
		Restrictions Against
		  Political Protest
		Power Resources of
		  the Outs
			Blacks heavily outnumbered
			  Whites
			African born slaves outnumbered
			  those slaves born in the
			  Colony
			Suitable geographic terrain
			Organized Maroon Force

	Mobilization	Ideology Commitment Autonomous Leadership Social Organization Access Third Party Support	Toussaint and the Black Generals Large Plantation Units International Intervention
	Acceleration	Crisis Multipenetration	Economic Distress

IV. Take-Off	The Anti-Colonial
	  Revolutionary
	  Movement
		Coercive Balance
		Conflicting Ruling
		  Elite
		Organizational
		  Balance
			International Intervention
			Conflicting Ruling Elite or
			  (Split-Elite)

Theoretical Propositions

And now that I have presented the formalized version of my problem statement, the conceptual scheme along with important subsections such as the theoretic viewpoint of the theory, etc. I am now ready to list the theoretical propositions.

If I utilized the mathematical formula $\frac{N(N-1)}{2}$, it would allow me to mathematically arrive at the total number of logical propositions that can be derived using the 34 variables presented in the conceptual scheme. Substituting the number of variables, i.e., 34, for the "N" in the formula above and solving, gives us a total number of 561 propositions. Moreover, what this latter number really means is that 561 logically valid propositions can be derived utilizing the 34 variables.

But, while logic is essential, there is much more involved in constructing valid theories than mere "logic." For example, as Bravo correctly observed: that ". . . logical propositions can turn out to be factually false or highly questionable theoretically" (1972:152).

In order for the reader to understand the theoretical model which I am about to present, it is not necessary for me to spin out the total possible number of propositions. Therefore, I will present only a _partial_ list of the logically and valid propositions which can be derived from the conceptual scheme. But, before I do it is appropriate to remind the reader that the criteria used to select these propositions, have already been presented in Chapter III.

In addition, the ordering of those propositions to be presented

is by the chronological order of the determinants or independent variables. Thus, the following is a partial list of the theoretical propositions inherent in my theory of anti-colonial revolution. Moreover, some of these propositions are multivariate in form.[23]

1. Value Expectations

1.1 The greater the intensity and scope of the value expectations and the less the intensity and scope of the value capabilities: the greater the level of relative deprivation.

1.2 The greater the intensity and scope of the value expectations: the greater the scope of the ideology.

2. Class Differences

2.1 The greater the degree of class differences and the greater the degree of class antagonism: the greater the degree of class conflict.

2.2 The greater the degree of class differences and the greater the degree of class antagonism: the greater the degree of structural blockage.

3. Status Ascription

3.1 The less the amount of status ascription for the outs and the greater the amount of status achievement for the outs: the greater the amount of status inconsistency for the outs.

4. Coercive Power of the Establishment

4.1 The less the amount of coercive power of the establishment and the greater the degree of de-legitimation of the establishment: the less the degree of total power of the establishment.

4.2 The less the amount of coercive power of the establishment and the greater the degree of de-legitimation of the establishment: the greater the intensity and scope of value expectations.

---

[23]Using the colon in the propositional statements does not have the usual punctuational significance. Here, it simply serves to separate the determinant part of the statement from the resultant part.

4.3 The less the amount of coercive power of the establishment:
the greater the degree of equality (coercive balance) between
that establishment and the emergent revolutionary movement.

5. Status Inconsistency

5.1 The greater the amount of status inconsistency: the greater
the level of relative deprivation.

5.2 The greater the amount of status inconsistency and the greater
the degree of power resources of the outs: the greater the
amount of status consciousness.

5.3 The greater the amount of status inconsistency and the less the
total power of the establishment, and the greater the degree of
class conflict, and the greater the level of relative deprivation,
and the greater the degree of structural blockage: the greater
the intensity and scope of discontent.

6. Total Power of the Establishment

6.1 The less the degree of total power of the establishment:
the greater the level of relative deprivation.

6.2 The less the degree of total power of the establishment:
the greater the degree of power resources of the outs.

6.3 The less the degree of total power of the establishment and the
greater the amount of status inconsistency, and the greater the
degree of structural blockage, and the greater the degree of class
conflict and the greater the level of relative deprivation: the
greater the intensity and scope of discontent.

7. Relative Deprivation

7.1 The greater the level of relative deprivation: the greater the
degree and level of alienation.

7.2 The greater the level of relative deprivation, and the greater
the degree of structural blockage, and the greater the degree of
class conflict, and the greater the amount of status inconsistency,
and the less the total power of the establishment: the greater
the intensity and scope of discontent.

8. Commitment

8.1 The greater the level of commitment: the greater the scope of
ideology.

9. Restrictions Against Political Protest

9.1 The greater the number of restrictions against political protest:
    the greater the level of alienation.

9.2 The greater the number of restrictions against political protest:
    the greater the amount of third party support.

9.3 The greater the number of restrictions against political protest
    and the greater the level of alienation: the greater the
    intensity and scope of discontent.

10. Status Resentment

10.1 The less the amount of social mobility and the greater the amount
    of status resentment: the greater the intensity and scope of
    discontent.

10.2 The greater the amount of status resentment on the part of emergent
    movement members: the greater their level of discontent.

And now after having presented a partial list of the theoretical propositions, I think that it is important to point out to the reader that the propositions should not be interpreted as syllogisms. This is mainly the case because the propositions are not in fact syllogisms and the latter (i.e., syllogisms) are usually associated with the axiomatic mode of theory construction. The reader is therefore reminded that the preferred mode of theory construction is the general systems approach.

And now I turn to the arrangement of the propositions into a theory.

The Propositional Arrangement (The Theory)

In this section I will present the theory of anti-colonial revolution. Because I take the view that all slave revolutions are in part anti-colonial, but not all anti-colonial revolutions are of the

slave type, my theory, _ceterus paribus_, has specific explanatory power
for slave revolutions in particular and for anti-colonial revolutions
in general.

The theory will be presented in terms of three different types
of diagrammatic or graphic models: (1) an oversimplified, "linear" or
straight-line model, (2) the "linear" or sequential model with the
coextensive conditions sketched in; and (3) a more complete systems
model which adds feedback relations and loops to the model. Addition-
ally, in a subsequent subsection the theory will be applied to the
Haitian Revolution by plugging into the theory relevant historical
events taken from the case history of the revolution.

The first "linear" or "causal" model is presented in Figure 19
below. It is composed of nothing but the sequential-historical
variables from the conceptual scheme in Figure 17. It posits a career
for all anti-colonial revolutionary movements. It follows that the
variables in the predisposing phase influences the variables in the
Structural Strain Phase, which in turn influences the level of
discontent, which is one of the subphases of the Manipulative Phase.
Discontent then influences mobilization, which in turn influences
acceleration. The anti-colonial revolutionary movement emerges as a
result of the antecedent influence of the acceleration variable.

But, what is wrong with this so-called "linear" or "causal"
model. From the standpoint of theory construction, the most glaring
and significant defects are: (1) the failure of the model to state
any of the coextensive-contemporary conditions under which one
sequential variable leads to another; and (2) the total absence

Phase I
Predisposing

Phase II
Structural Strain

Phase III
Manipulative

Phase IV
Take-Off

Value (+)
Expectations

Value (−)
Capabilities

Class (+)
Differences

Class (+)
Antagonism

Status (−)
Ascription

Status (+)
Achievement

Coercive Power (−)
of Establishment

De-legitimation (+)
of Establishment

Relative (+)
Deprivation

Structural (+)
Blockage

Class (+)
Conflict

Status (+)
Inconsistency

Total Power (−)
of Establishment

(+)
Discontent

(+)
Mobilization

(+)
Acceleration

Anti-Colonial
Revolutionary
Movement

Figure 19. A "Linear" Model of the Causation Stage of
a Theory of Anti-Colonial Revolutionary Move-
ments.

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of any feedback relations and loops.

Figure 20 below is a response to the first criticism. Note that Figure 20 presents the coextensive conditions (the ellipses and circles) under which one sequential variable (the boxes and rectangles) will lead to another sequential variable. For example, observe that discontent will lead to mobilization only if a variety of coextensive conditions obtain, e.g., an increase in the power resources of the outs, an increase in ideology, etc. But doesn't mobilization also lead "back" to discontent? Yes, it does! But nowhere is this represented in this model. Moreover, this lack of feedback is the defect of this model. Figure·21 below attempts to eliminate this problem (i.e., it is a response to the second criticism mentioned above).

Figure 21 presents a more realistic systems model which meets all the criticisms I have made against the other two models. Moreover, my systems theory represents the interrelationship between propositions, (i.e., those propositions listed in the partial list and others that can be validly deduced). In addition, the notation system which I have outlined in Figure 22 below should be helpful to the reader in better understanding the relationships presented in the diagrammatic representation of the theory in Figure 21.

The diagrammatic model presented in Figure 21 is a highly complex systems theory of slave and anti-colonial revolutions. The theory is an explanation to the original formalized problem statement. That is: Why is it that a "successful" anti-colonial revolution occurred in the French Caribbean island of San Domingue (Haiti) at

Figure 20. The "Linear" Model (with coextensive conditions)
of a Theory of the Causation Stage of Anti-Colonial
Revolutionary Movements.

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**Phase I
Predisposing**

**Phase II
Structural Strain**

**Phase III
Manipulative**

**Phase IV
Take-Off**

Value (+)
Expectations

Value (−)
Capabilities

Class (+)
Differences

Class (+)
Antagonism

Status (−)
Ascription

Status (+)
Achievement

Coercive Power (−)
of Establishment

De-legitimation (+)
of Establishment

Relative (+)
Deprivation

Structural (+)
Blockage

Class (+)
Conflict

Status (+)
Inconsistency

Total Power (−)
of the Establishment

(+) Ideology

(+) Commitment

(+) Crisis Planned

(+) Alienation

(+) Crisis Unplanned

(+) Autonomous Leadership

(+) Social Organization

(+) Multipenetration

(+) Social Mobility

(+) Discontent

(+) Mobilization

(+) Acceleration

(+) Status Resentment

(+) Access

(+) Restrictions Against Political Protest

(+) Third Party Support

(+) Power Resources of the Outs

(+) Coercive Balance

(+) Organizational Balance

(+) Conflicting Ruling Elite

Anti-Colonial Revolutionary Movement

T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8

Figure 21. A Systems' Theory of the Causation Stage of
Anti-Colonial Revolution.

Figure 22

THE NOTATIONAL SYSTEM

= Indicates a point of demarcation between stages, phases, or subphases of a movement which is not always a clearcut or definite period of time. In general the variables involved are continuous and not discrete.

☐ = ◯ = ⬭ = independent and intervening variables

▨ = dependent or focus variable

P = Past time;   F = Future time

T_1, T_2, T_3, T_n... = Time one, Time two, Time three, etc.

────── = connectedness or relationship among variables

─────▶ = Causal relationship: Past to Future time

◀─ ─ ─ ─ ─▶ = Functional relationship: No time flow

A_{T_1} ⟲ B_{T_2} C_{T_3} = Feedback relationship: Past to Future/Past to Future

OR

◀─────▶ = Feedback relationship: P to F/P to F.

A_{T_1} ⟳ B_{T_2} C_{T_3} = Simple Feedback Loop

T_1 T_2 A B T_5 T_3 C_{T_4} = Complex Feedback Loop with direct and indirect reversibility

(+) & (-) = Signs such that (+) = greater than, increase in, etc., (-) = less than, decrease in, etc.

X, Y, Z, = Any given variable of a system or model, or A, B, C

> = Greater than   < = Less than

this time (1791-1820) and not in the French Caribbean islands of

Martinique and Guadaloupe?

One of the most striking features of the systems theory slave

and anti-colonial revolutions is the fact that by definition it is a

composite model. As discussed in Chapter III, a composite (or systems)

model is one which contains a variety of types of theoretical relation-

ships and variables within it: functional, causal and feedback

relationships along with sequential-historical and coextensive-

contemporary variables. Moreover, within the context of revolutionary

theory in general and anti-colonial revolutionary theory in particular,

we need the flexibility which is inherent in a systems theory in order

to adequately explain such a complex phenomena. In sum, the reality

of revolutionary movements is so complex that we need to construct

theories which are based on those kinds of theoretical relationships

that increase our power of explanation.

Feedback relations and loops fit the latter description. In

effect, these types of relations (feedback) give us a major advantage

when used in the context of explaining revolutionary movements. When

comparing my systems model (Figure 21) with the model in Figure 20 the

reader can observe that I have added no new concepts! It cannot be too

strongly stressed that the identical concepts and some of the same

propositions can be used or arranged in many different ways to create

many different kinds of theories. True theorizing begins at this point.

So while Figure 21 contains no new concepts, it does enable us to look

for and to represent feedback relations and loops.

In my theory of anti-colonial revolution (Figure 21) a typical

feedback relation can be observed in the <u>intraphase</u> relationship
between mobilization and acceleration. Hence, an increase in
mobilization produces an increase in acceleration, which in turn feeds-
back to further increase mobilization. Of course in this particular
feedback relation, as well as others, several time dimensions are
implied.

In utilizing feedback relations and loops in my theory, once
a particular phase has been reached, for example Phase IV, it sometimes
feedsback to influence, i.e., amplify or counteract, previous phases.
This type of feedback relation may be referred to as <u>interphase</u>.

An example of this latter type of feedback relation can also
be drawn from my theory (see Figure 21). Thus, looking at the diagram-
matic representation of the theory, it follows that: an increase in
conflict within the ruling elite (Phase IV) feedsback to amplify the
restrictions against political protest (Phase III). Another example of
the interphase type feedback relation occurs as a result of an increase
in accelerated activity on the part of the revolutionaries, which leads
to an increase in conflict within the ruling elite. This increased
conflict within the ruling elite in turn feedsback to further increase
acceleration of the emergent movement.

But, let us look at a more complex type of feedback relation-
ship, i.e., the <u>feedback loop</u> (see cross-hatched linkages in Figure 21).
Utilizing the Haitian Revolution as our example, we see that at time one
(T_1) an increase in mobilization has produced accelerated activity on
the part of the revolutionaries. At time two (T_2) the accelerated ac-
tivity has produced an increase in the conflict within the ruling elite.

Further, at time three (T_3) the increased conflict within the ruling elite has caused them to respond by increasing the number of restrictions against political protest. At time four (T_4) an increase in restrictions against political protest leads various third party groups to withdraw their support of the ruling elite, and to increase their support for the emergent revolutionary movement.

Further, at time five (T_5) an increase in third party support of the revolutionaries in an emergent conflict, leads to an increase in the de-legitimation of the establishment and to a decrease in the coercive power of the establishment. Given this latter situation, at time six (T_6), it leads to a decrease in the overall or total power of the establishment.

And at time seven (T_7) a decrease in the total power of the establishment leads to an increase in discontent with that establishment. Finally, to complete the feedback loop we notice that at time eight (T_8) the increased and focused discontent leads to an increase in mobilization of the emergent movement's resources.

After an increase in the mobilization of the emergent movement's resources at time eight (T_8), "a sufficient increase in accelerated activity can and often does kick off the whole cycle all over again" (Jordan and Silberstein, 1976:38).

But, utilizing the theory, when can it be said that a full-fledged anti-colonial revolutionary movement has emerged? Under what conditions will accelerated activity of an emergent anti-colonial revolutionary movement erupt into the "real thing?" Assuming that all other prior conditions have been met, once the coercive balance and the

organizational balance between the revolutionaries and the establishment
has become relatively equal and there is increased conflict within the
ruling elite, then a true anti-colonial revolutionary movement has
indeed emerged, i.e., the Take-Off Phase has materialized.

In addition, when the revolutionary movement has successfully
emerged, it feedsback to alter the power structure of the host society
(as represented in Phase I).

Coming back to the previous question concerning the conditions
under which an anti-colonial revolutionary movement will emerge,
warrants further discussion. Putting the question on a more abstract
level we may ask: under what conditions will one phase (or subphase)
lead to another subsequent phase (or subphase)? Once a subphase (let's
say Acceleration) reaches a certain threshold as a result of its being
part of a deviation-amplifying feedback loop, and if all the coextensive
conditions have been met, i.e., increased conflict within the ruling
elite and coercive balance and organizational balance between the
revolutionaries and the establishment, only then can we categorically
conclude that we have moved from the end of the previous Manipulative
Phase to the end of the Subsequent Take-Off Phase (Jordan and
Silberstein, 1976:38-39). Hence, the latter phase is the emergence
of a true anti-colonial revolutionary movement.

Application of the Theory to the Haitian Revolution

The goal of my discussion here is to take various historical
events from the Haitian Revolution (i.e., from the Descriptive Scheme
in Chapter V) to illustrate the theory of anti-colonial revolution.
The historical events taken from the case history of the Haitian

Revolution are plugged into: (1) the "causal" model with the coextensive conditions added (i.e., Figure 20); and (2) the systems model (i.e., Figure 21).

Now, let us look at Figure 23 below. Figure 23 will be limited to explaining only one portion of the Haitian Revolution: the initial take-off in 1791 (and the coming to power of Toussaint L'Ouverture in 1794). The purpose of Figure 23 is simply to illustrate the theory with actual, historical events and conditions.

Moreover, in utilizing Figure 23 I will confine my efforts to illustrating more concretely the same feedback loop (see cross-hatched linkages in Figure 21) which I examined more abstractly before. In addition, the reader can probably best follow this discussion by focusing mostly on the latter mentioned Figure.

The logic of my model "simply" asserts that mobilization "causes" acceleration at T_1, assuming of course that all the coextensive conditions have been met. Much of the credit for starting the mobilization phase must go to the unintended consequences of the first visit of the grands blancs or great white planters to the National Assembly in France, the action of the French Radicals (e.g., the French Abolitionist Society), and the initial pre-revolution revolts of Machandal and others.

Once the movement accelerated its activity the elite began (or continued) to experience conflict within at T_2. The grands blancs and the colonial bureaucracy fell out. Relations between them, those born in France (the higher bureaucrats) and those born in the new world (the creoles), had never been good. The great whites saw their

Phase I Predisposing

General Enlightenment Ideology. American and French Revolutions.

Decline and fall of Louis XVI and Old Regime. Gain of powerful enemies and loss of old friends.

Tremendous disparity in wealth and power between social classes

(+) Class Antagonism

Conflict and decline of French nobility and system. Decline of Feudal Economy.

Rise of Bourgeois economy and utilitarianism. Commercialization of agriculture.

French Revolution. Social conflict in Haiti. More Blacks than Whites. Support from French radicals.

Arrival of French Jacobin troops. National Assembly revoke rights. End of French Nobility.

Phase II Structural Strain

(+) Relative Deprivation

(+) Structural Blockage

(+) Class Conflict

(+) Status Inconsistency

(−) Total Power of the Establishment

Phase III Manipulative

Increases with industrialization and the commercialization of agriculture.

No upward movement of individuals or groups from the masses to higher positions of power, wealth, etc.

Liberal Bourgeois Ideology. The Enlightenment. The Rights of Man and Citizen.

Toussaint and his Black Generals

Toussaint's rules of military discipline as conduct regulating and behavior controlling law-norms

Members of emergent movement become more willing to die for the cause.

The French Revolution (1789)

(+) Function of 5 sequential and 5 coextensive variables. DISCONTENT

(+) Function of 1 sequential and 6 coextensive variables MOBILIZATION

(+) The Uprisings: 1789, 1791, Oge, Toussaint, etc. ACCELERATION

National Assembly revokes franchise for Free People of Color

Rebellions, Friendly French Troops and aid from French Officials, e.g., Sonthonax.

Increasing resentment of slavery by slaves and of middle-caste position by Mulattes.

Voodoo subculture, church organization and large plantation units

French Radicals and Abolitionists. Shifting European political coalitions.

Execution of Oge and his brother.

Membership of emergent movement spreads across various socio-cultural boundaries.

Phase IV Take-Off

Varied with European political situation and with Haitian military/ political situation.

Voodoo Church, British and Spanish Political support, and Maroon force.

Beginning of the Haitian Revolution and the rise of Toussaint.

Colonial Bureaucracy vs. Grand Blanks vs. French-born officials.

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Figure 23. An Illustration of the "Linear" Model (with coextensive conditions) Using the Haitian Revolution.

opportunity and attempted to take over or eliminate the position of the colonial bureaucracy. Added to this strain the grand blancs succeeded in alienating the Free People of Color and the French officials who were sent over to put down the revolts. The split or conflict was deep and irreparable.

This conflict in the elite "caused" it at T_3 to increase the restrictions against political protest. The National Assembly under pressure from the white planters revolked the newly granted rights (e.g., suffrage, etc.) given to the Free People of Color. This action led larger numbers of Haitians to further de-legitimate the Old French Government and to begin to take up arms against it at T_5. Vacillation of the National Assembly and its representatives in the new world further alienated the slaves. The international strategies and tactics of the Spanish and the British further weakened the power of the French. Thus at T_6 the total power of the establishment had declined significantly.

A decline in the total power of the establishment (a sequential condition) usually leads to a sharp increase in discontent at T_7 on the part of the "outs." For example, we hypothesize that the slave with a gun is more hostile than a slave without one. The French Commissioner and the Jacobin French troops sided with the rebels thereby increasing the power resources of the "outs" (a coextensive condition).

Discontent at T_7 is a necessary conditions for mobilization at T_8. Mobilization is predicted to increase at this historical point given the spread of the Ideology (i.e., the Rights of Man and Citizen),

Toussaint's emerging leadership, and the access provided by large

plantation units and by the slaves' own Voodoo Church Organization

(the latter all coextensive conditions). Increased mobilization under

the conditions present here leads to increased activity or acceleration

at T_1.

Thus we have completed one trip around the loop. This is the

only loop we shall describe here, but there are others in this model.

Before the revolution was over many trips had been made around this

loop. In the language of General Systems Theory positive feedback and

deviation amplification occurred.

Granted all this is complex and "messy," and incomplete, but

so is our knowledge about complex, revolutionary social movements.

Our knowledge will improve dramatically, we believe, if we face up to

the complexity of revolutionary change, and resist the temptation to

be neat and "complete" by confining our efforts to those static events

we already understand.

Summary

The major purpose of this chapter has been to present a theory

of the causation stage of anti-colonial revolutions. In order to do

this a formalized version of the problem statement was presented in all

of its elaborate detail. The purpose here was to expose the reader to

the particular type of explanation sought by the author. In specific

terms this goal was accomplished by discussing the formal version of

the problem statement in terms of its semantical structure, form or

logic, content, and problem set.

Next, I presented in a follow-up subsection the theoretic

viewpoint of my theory. Here I characterized my theory as basically

eclectic. Although not starting out this way, my theory ended up as

one composed of variables drawn from several theoretic perspectives.

Hence, the reader was exposed to a characterization of the various

types of independent variables used in the theory to explain the

social event--anti-colonial revolution.

The next Section dealt with the conceptual scheme. In this

section the concepts were explicitly defined and converted to variables

by specifying their attributes. The conceptual scheme was designated

as a list of those variables that make up the theory. The following

Subsection was a note on the subphases of revolution. The purpose

here was to take the phases of revolution and subdivide them into

various subphases or conditions under which revolutionary movements

occur. These conditions were then characterized in terms of the set

of abstract concepts presented in the conceptual scheme. Some of the

concepts, of course, being contemporary or coextensive while others

were designated as historical or sequential.

In the next Subsection I presented a Note on Genovese. The

theoretical Concepts listed by Genovese in From Rebellion to Revolution

(1979), used to explain the occurrence of slave revolts, were "plugged"

into my conceptual scheme. Genovese's concepts were presented by him

in an unsystematic form. However, when the concepts were plugged into

my conceptual apparatus the reader could see their importance in

systematic explanation.

Next I presented a partial list of the theoretical propositions.

created primarily from the variables of the conceptual scheme. Although

I did not present a full list of all the propositions, the reader was still exposed to how they were constructed and ordered.

Finally, the arrangement of propositions or the theory was presented. The theory was presented in terms of three different types of graphic or diagrammatic models: (1) an oversimplified, "linear" or straight-line model; (2) the "linear" or sequential model with coextensive conditions sketched in; and (3) a more complete systems model complete with feedback relations and loops.

My theory of anti-colonial revolution was then illustrated-- not tested--by applying it to the more concrete details of the Haitian Revolution.

In the next chapter the Algerian Revolution will be presented. Since my theory is abstract, broad in scope, and not bounded by time and place, it should be easily generalizable to all anti-colonial revolutions. More specifically, I believe that only minor adjustments-- if any--need be made to my theory in order for it to explain more modern anti-colonial revolutions--such as the Algerian--which occurred in Northern Africa approximately one hundred and sixty-three years after the Haitian Revolution.

CHAPTER VII

THE FORMAL THEORY APPLIED TO A MODERN REVOLUTION

The major goal of this chapter is to apply my previously constructed theory of anti-colonial revolution to a more modern case, namely, the Algerian Revolution. In accomplishing this goal I will complete three tasks. The first task is the presentation of an historical or narrative account of the Algerian Revolution. The major justification for this briefer treatment of the Algerian Revolution is the fact that it was initially stated as a minor purpose (back in Chapter I), and at that time I did not promise to accomplish all my minor purposes in any great detail.

The second task is the application of the theory to historical events and conditions of the Algerian Revolution; and finally, the third task is the revision of the theory in the light of the Algerian Revolution.

Narrative of the Algerian Revolution, 1954-1978

Algeria is a country in the northern part of Africa, bounded on the north by the Mediterranean, on the south by the Sahara, on the west by Morocco and on the east by Tunisia.

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After French occupation in 1836 the country was rapidly colonized, although not without continued resistance on the part of the indigenous Muslim population. In fact, the French, throughout the 19th century were plagued with a succession of well planned rebellions. The particular areas of continued unrest were the Moroccan border area, the high Plateaus, the Aures Mountain region, and the hinderland (i.e., the rural countryside). It was in these areas that indigenous cultural institutions remained relatively intrenched. But more important, however, is the fact that the continued wave of rebellions reflected the bitter resentment and discontent on the part of the indigenous population to the encroachment of French colonization and the increasing interference of French civil administration on customary local self-government.

Despite attempts made by the indigenous population to ward-off French encroachment, the French, nevertheless, were able to set up a rigid colonial social structure by the turn of the 20th century. In colonizing the country the French showed little regard for the native population. On many occasions entire villages were destroyed, whole tribes were massacred, and others were dispossessed of their lands, which in turn were redistributed to European settlers. Others of the indigenous population found themselves deprived of their lands with little or no compensation through the French dominated legal structure (Mansell, 1961:13).

Soon the French colonial social structure exemplified a huge cultural, political, and socio-economic gap between the European community and the indigenous population (Dunn, 1972:165).

At the top of the pyramid structure there was a small, minority group of European colonists known as the grands colons (i.e., great colonists). These were the self-made men who (with their fathers before them) had radically altered the traditional Algerian subsistence economy by implementing a capitalist mode of economic production and land tenure. Moreover, with this change, vineyards producing wine exports became the mainstay of the colonial economy, which in turn was heavily dependent on the French market (Hutchinson, 1978:2).

After driving the Algerian peasants onto infertile lands in the mountainous and desert regions, the grands colons developed and operated vast agribusinesses and industrial enterprises, using the displaced indigenous population as a source of cheap labor. Moreover, the grands colons, through their rugged pursuit of wealth and profit, accumulated large landed estates and defrayed well over half of the state's expenses to the Algerian masses through taxation (Nyrop et al., 1972:23). It was this higher echelon of the European community in Algeria (i.e., the extremely wealthy colonists) coupled with the French military officers and bureaucrats who were the senior civil servants and administrators of the colony--they were the ruling elite.

At the other end of the European community continuum were the unskilled. These Europeans were basically laborers, and if it had not been for the fact that they were Europeans they would not have been much better off than the average Muslim. But between the extremes of wealth and poverty lay the majority of Europeans. These were the teachers, shopkeepers, small businessmen, clerks, technicians, etc. (O'Ballance, 1967:25).

Although antagonisms and distinctions between the three groups
of Europeans tended to become amplified immediately prior to the
revolution, the Europeans as a whole felt an inborn sense of
superiority toward the Algerian Muslims, tinged with the fear of
being heavily outnumbered by them.

Table 30 below is explicit in revealing the tremendous
population disparity between the indigenous Algerians and the Europeans.
Although the population of the two groups increased over time, the
Algerians still greatly outnumbered the Europeans for each selected
year. In 1954 the population ratio between the two groups was
approximately 9.5 to 1 in favor of the Algerians.

TABLE 30

POPULATION OF ALGERIA FOR SELECTED YEARS

Year	European	Algerian
1856	150,000	2,600,000
1856	150,000	2,600,000
1886	470,000	3,800,000
1911	725,000	5,500,000
1936	940,000	7,200,000
1948	910,000	8,800,000
1954	1,000,000	9,500,000

SOURCE: Adapted from Dorothy Good, 1961:3-32.

From 1881 on, the indigenous population, being completely
without rights was subjected to the so-called code de L'Indigenat

(i.e., the Native Codes). These were a group of arbitrary rules and regulations put forth by the Colonial administration giving it the right to subject Algerians to any kind of repression without trial. Algerian Muslims were not permitted to join together in political parties and trade unions or to join organizations established by Europeans. Even campaigns of passive, civil disobedience and the emergence of the Young Algerians, a political protest organization, that arose at the turn of the 20th century, seeking concessions for Algerians as French citizens, did little to change the situation.

In effect, there was no doubt that the administration of northern Algeria was firmly in the hands of the wealthy colons. They revealed their power by blocking or delaying the implementation of even the most modest French reforms directed from Paris. The only individuals from the indigenous Algerians who played any part in governmental affairs were those who followed without question the direction and leadership of the grands colons. These Algerians were often referred to by their fellow countrymen as "Beni-oui-ouis" (i.e., yes men) of the Colonists (Nyrop et al., 1972:24).

But due to the failure of small scale experiments with bilingual and bicultural education which had been attempted by the French Government in the 1870's and 80's (and after the skeptical approval from the Colons), efforts were made to educate a small number of Muslims with European students, in French schools (i.e., as a part of France's "civilizing mission" in Algeria). Within a generation a class of well educated, gallicized Muslims--the evolués (literally, the evolved ones) had been created.

It is important to note that the handful of Algerian Muslims who accepted French citizenship during the course of French colonization were evolués. But more significantly, it was from this privileged group of Muslims, strongly influenced by French culture and political attitudes that a new Nationalist self-consciousness began to develop (Nelson, 1978:39).

But in an effort to maintain control over the governmental affairs of Algeria and at the same time maintain a high degree of social distance between themselves and the Algerian masses, the wealthy Colons use various techniques. For example, they would deliberately thwart contact between the evolués and the Muslim traditionalists on the one hand and between the evolués and official circles in Paris on the other. In effect, the Colons feared and mistrusted the educated Muslims, who were at the time classified as assimilationists, insisting on acceptance as French citizens but on their own terms, or as integrationists, with the desire to forge a distinct Muslim elite on equal terms with Frenchmen (Nelson, 1978:40).

The new Muslim leadership which had emerged immediately prior to and during World War I (1914-1918) grew rapidly to maturity during the 1920's and 1930's. This class of evolués now included those Algerians whose perception of themselves and their country had been shaped by wartime experiences and an important group of religious reformers and teachers. The leadership included such names as Mohammed Bendjelloul, Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben Badis, Ferhat Abbas, and Ahmed Messali Hadj, who were all "die heart" political activists that pressed the Colonial administration for greater Muslim participation in the

political process. Moreover, it was these leaders and others who were rapidly becoming instrumental in changing the course of history through their development of modern Algerian Nationalism, first calling for assimilation, integration, or equality with Europeans and eventually opting for Algerian independence (Nelson, 1978:40).

Some of the individuals who formed the small but influential class of evolués came from wealthy Algerian families that had managed although with much difficulty, to succeed in obtaining for their sons a French education (alluded to before). Others were among the 173,000 Algerians (25,000 of whom died) who served in the French Army during World War I or the nearly 200,000 more who were sent to France to support the French war effort by working in factories.

In France these Algerians became exposed to a higher standard of living and the democratic political concepts taken for granted by Frenchmen in France. Some became acquainted with the Pan-Arab Nationalism which was rapidly growing in the Middle-East. Others became exposed to the French Communist Party which meant exposure to the ideological principles of the Russian Revolution. Moreover, these factors and others had the effect of raising the expectations of Algerians, only to have these expectations radically lowered when these same individuals focused on the conditions in, or when they actually returned to their native land.

Although the French administration refused to consider any fundamental reforms during the first three decades of the 20th century, it nevertheless abolished the discriminatory Native Codes in 1919. The result was a simplification of the rules under which certain limited

categories of Muslims could obtain French citizenship. Also Muslims
gained the right to elect representatives to selected advisory councils.
But even so, Muslim representation was restricted by the imposition of
a two-college system under which the majority of members were elected
by the European minority.

The 1920's brought disillusionment to many of the educated
Muslims. They became preoccupied with the absolute economic gains and
failed to realize that the gap in relative terms between themselves
and the Europeans was actually getting bigger. But the depressed
1930's brought them (the Muslims) back closer to reality. Consequently,
they increased Nationalist agitation requesting across-the-board
reforms.

In 1936 the French Premier Leon Blum (representing the Popular
Front Government in France) decided to support the demands for civil
rights made by moderate Algerian Muslims. These civil rights would
have permitted a small number of educated Muslims to become French
citizens without giving up their personal status under Muslim laws
on marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.

But the grands colons had become discouraged and disillusioned
with gains already made by the Algerians. Therefore they resisted the
so-called Blum-Violette Proposal (so named after the Premier and one
of his Ministers). Their resistance came in a form which they had
practiced so many times before, i.e., threats of separatism and boycott
of French products. The Colons knew that they were in the "driver's
seat," and their resistance was so strong and effective that the
proposal was never formally discussed in the French Parliament

(Gillespie, 1960:11). But, more important, however, was the fact that the failure of the proposal meant greater disillusionment and alienation for many educated Algerians who were devoted to French culture (Gillespie, 1960:24).

Some of these educated Algerians, along with others, soon began to realize that they could do little to give substance to their aspirations by working within Colon-dominated parties and unions. Therefore, they began to increase their support to various Nationalist parties of various political shadings and social orientations. For example, the ENA (North African Star) was a Nationalist party which began in France in 1925 with the help of the French Communist Party.

In France, the ENA recruited its membership from what had rapidly become a fully-fledged Algerian proletariat with strong and enduring ties with the rural Algerian countryside. The most dominant personality in the organization was Messali Hadj. Moreover, within a working-class milieu, the ENA's left-wing party and trade-union activities, which was associated with its experience in urban France provided the Algerian migrant workers both with models of organization and with fragments of a Socialist ideology which they found useful in interpreting the conditions of their homeland (Wolf, 1969:233; Bromberger, 1958:80). The ENA after becoming highly radical was declared illegal by the French government in 1935. However, the organization surfaced again in the same year under a different name--the PPA (Algerian People's Party).

The PPA rapidly increased its membership and was relatively strong both in France and in Algeria. But it too was eventually

declared illegal and went underground in 1939.

Other Algerian Nationalist organizations which came into
existence between the two World Wars were: the PCA (Algerian Communist
Party in 1937; and the Ulama Association which was organized in 1930
by Ben Badis. Ulama set out to "purify" Islam and free it from
administrative dependence on the French authorities to found schools
in which classes would be taught in Arabic as opposed to French, and
to take any other step necessary to promote the revival of Arabic as
the national language.

But Algerian national feeling was greatly accelerated and
intensified in the period preceding and during the Second World War.
Even so, there was still some hope among Algerian Muslims that reform
in France could bring about greater liberty and autonomy. Addition-
ally, there also remained some hope that the heightened expectations
of the assimilationists, integrationists, and radicals could be met
without the use of force and violence.

But as time went on it became increasingly clear to more and
more Algerian Muslims that the French Government was unwilling to
institute significant reforms in Algeria. As a result, the Militant
Nationalists gained ground. Moreover, as "French unwillingness and
inability to make concessions hardened, the tendency toward clandestine
operations also gained momentum" (Wolf, 1969:235).

Added to this growing unrest was the impact of certain domestic
trends. For example, after 1930 the number of small Muslim owners
began to significantly decrease, and the number of Muslim day laborers
increased significantly. Furthermore, during and after World War II

wine production decreased, harvests were poor, and livestock production was extremely poor (Wolf, 1969:235).

Even more significant, undoubtedly, were certain political factors which influenced greater Muslim support of a growing Algerian Nationalism. France fell to the mercy of Germany in 1940, suffering a crushing defeat and "revealing her weakness to all who had eyes to see" (Wolf, 1969:235). German propaganda was also highly effective in reinforcing the impression that France was weak. Furthermore, the French nation was internally divided in the sense that half of its people were engaged in fighting while the other half was involved in resistance operations. This had the effect of raising, rather sharply, the level of all-round uncertainty and illegality. Also with the advent of Fascism in France as a result of German occupation, the Colons were supported in their increased violence against the Algerian population.

Other factors of a political nature that influenced the growth of Algerian Nationalism were: the fact that (like World War I) thousands of Algerians were mobilized to fight for France during World War II, giving them valuable military training, and enhancing the feeling that they had achieved "a level of significant equality with French fellow-combatants" (Wolf, 1969:235); Allied propaganda for self-determination; the renaissance of the Muslim countries in general; the occupation of Algeria by the German Vichy regime later liberated by British and American troops; general dissention among French politicians governing postliberation Algeria under Allied protection, etc.

After the weakness and de-legitimation of the French government

had become apparent as a result of the above mentioned factors and others, the Muslim political leaders saw the possibility of gaining complete independence from France or at least a great deal of political autonomy in a federation with France (Walpole, 1964:28).

In 1943 Ferhat Abbas, an Algerian Nationalist leader who had long since abandoned assimilation as a viable alternative to self-determination, presented the French administration with his Manifesto to the Algerian People, signed by fifty-six Algerian Nationalist and internationalist leaders. This Manifesto requested the establishment of an Algerian state federated with France in which political power would be divided between Muslims and Christians.

General de Gaulle and General Giraud, who had become co-chairmen of the French Committee of National Liberation (in Algeria), brushed aside the Algerian Manifesto using vague promises and other excuses. A few months later, however, General de Gaulle announced that certain categories of Muslims could obtain French citizenship without giving up their Islamic status. Two months later (March 1944) voting rights were granted to most of the adult Muslim population, but a Muslim vote was not equal to that of a European coupled with the fact of separate electoral colleges (O'Ballance, 1967:32). Although the representatives of Muslims in local assemblies slightly increased, the European minority maintained a numerical majority. In sum, none of these condescending measures gave satisfaction to the Algerian Nationalists.

The rejection of the Algerian Manifesto caused Abbas to organize the AML (Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty). The AML's

basic goal was to work for autonomy and social reforms, but within the French political framework. Political organizations were allowed to function again openly, which greatly increased the AML's membership to approximately 500,000. The PPA, although still legally banned, resurfaced, but had reservations about the moderate AML program, instead it opted for direct action in the countryside as the only possible way to achieve independence from the French (O'Ballance, 1967:32).

Although Ferhat Abbas favored non-violent means for change, he soon began to become heartened as a result of external pressure to persuade Colonial powers, including France to grant independence to Colonial territories. For example, Syria and Lebanon became independent in 1943 and were encouraging precedents. Abbas had hoped for a peaceful solution, but other Algerian Nationalists did not agree with him. About this time several attempts were made to bring the Nationalist organizations together in unity, but these attempts failed. There was simply too much disagreement between those who wanted revolution and those who favored non-violent evolution (O'Ballance, 1967:32-33). Abbas's old desire for integration had become greatly overshadowed by his desire for autonomy.

On May 8, 1945, the long awaited Allied victory in Europe was celebrated. Tension had mounted between the Algerian Muslim and Colon communities. In the town of Setif, an Algerian Nationalist procession, organized by the AML and the still outlawed PPA, clashed with the police. Nelson gives a vivid description of the Setif incident revealing the Algerians' hostile reaction to French Colonial rule:

Against police orders, placards were displayed proclaiming
"We Want to Be Your Equals!" and more provocatively, "Long
Live Free and Independent Algeria." The Police attempted
to wrest the placards from the crowd, shots were fired, and
a number of police and demonstrators were killed. Marchers
rampaged through the streets of Setif, indiscriminately
killing Europeans in their path. Word spread in the
countryside that a holy war had begun, and riots were
staged in other cities (1979:45).

In reaction, the French army and police, eagerly aided by
civilian vigilantes, proceeded to conduct a systematic search and
destroy operation or _ratissage_ (literally, raking over) of suspected
centers of dissidence. The French military forces used aerial and
naval bombardment against the indigenous population in retaliation for
the Setif incident. Official figures put the number of Europeans
killed at 103 and the number of Muslims killed at somewhere between
6,000 and 15,000. Other estimates of the number of Muslims killed
go as high as 40,000 (O'Balance, 1967:33).

After the Setif incident had been ruthlessly suppressed, the
authorities banned the AML and arrested over 4,000 Muslims, including
Abbas. Although most Muslims in Algeria remained relatively indifferent
and in many instances hostile to Nationalist attempts for self-
determination, the Setif incident did define much more clearly the
cleavage ". . . between the Colons and often harrassed the vacillating
French government on one side and the committed response of Algerian
Nationalism on the other" (Nelson, 1978:45).

The French government, recognizing the deteriorating political
situation in Algeria opted to bring about some (although not fundamen-
tal) reforms. Hence, Algerian Muslims were permitted to elect thirteen
delegates to join the thirteen European delegates in the constitutional

assembly which was called to formulate the constitution for the Fourth

French Republic. But because of the restrictions of the two-electoral

college system, Muslims were unable to gain support for any of their

proposals which were directed toward bringing about an effective

integration between the Algerian Muslim and European community (Nelson,

1978:45). Here again the wealthy Colons were the deciding factor.

They insisted on maintaining the two electoral college system and they

applied enough pressure against the provisional French government

(e.g., the usual threats of separatism, boycott of French goods, etc.)

to get their way.

In the words of the Colons--they had to prevent themselves

from "drowning in a Muslim sea" (Nelson, 1978:45). But on the other

hand the Algerian Nationalists interpreted the action of the French

government as an attempt to perpetuate the Muslim majority in its

subordinate status (Nelson, 1978:45).

In April 1946 Abbas asserted once again the demands of the

Algerian Manifesto through a new political protest organization called

UDMA (Democratic Union for the Algerian Manifesto). Abbas called for

a free, secular and republican Algeria loosely federated with France.

The UDMA won eleven of the thirteen seats which had been previously

allotted to the Muslim College for a second constituent assembly held

in Paris in June 1946. But because of strong French resistance to

reform, Abbas was unable to make significant progress. Consequently,

many of the activists judged UDMA's efforts a failure. The organiza-

tion began to decline in strength which resulted in a shift of popular

support to more militant groups.

In October 1946 Messali Hadj was released from house arrest
in France where he had been subject since 1941. Subsequently, he
returned to Algeria. Upon his return, he "formed the MTLD (Movement
for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties). The MTLD was formed by
Messali to replace the prewar PPA, which had also survived underground
during the war. The MTLD was committed to unequivocal independence
and it firmly opposed the integrationist program of Abbas's UDMA.

Meanwhile the political divisions between the European and
Muslim communities were clearly evident in the 1947 French Parliament
debates which resulted in the imposition of the so-called "Organic
Statutes." For all intents and purposes the "Organic Statutes"
embodied a formula which created an Algerian Assembly of two houses
of equal size, elected on a communal basis. The first electoral
college included 500,000 eligible French citizens (Europeans) and
a few selected assimilated Muslims, and the second electoral college
comprised the remaining 9 million Muslims (Nelson, 1978:46).

Those delegates in the first house who represented the Colons
denounced the government's statutes as compromising the security of
Algeria. They argued vehemently that it was theoretically possible
for the indigenous population to obtain a majority of seats in the
proposed assembly as a result of the additional 60,000 Muslims who had
been permitted to vote with the European electoral college by the
French governmental decree of 1944 (Nelson, 1978:46).

After the French government had created the Algerian Assembly
by instituting the "Organic Statutes," it also replaced the mixed
communes with elected local councils, abolished military rule in the

Algerian Sahara, recognized Arabic as an official language with French, and even went so far as to propose equality for Muslim women. But Muslims were dissatisfied with these reforms because they fell short of their expectations. On the other hand the Colons were against the reforms because they felt that they went too far.

Meanwhile Messali Hadj's proindependence MTLD organization capitalized on the 1947 reforms and won significant victories in municipal elections. But the grands colons being frightened of the prospects, undertook measures to ensure a more satisfactory result in the critical up-coming (1948) election to the first Algerian Assembly (Nelson, 1978:47).

Despite all the formal "guarantees of the rights" of Algerians explicated in the "Organic Statutes" of 1947, all democratic freedoms were violated. The 1948 elections were rigged and falsified. (Also, the later elections of 1951 and 1953 were similarly "arranged") (O'Balance, 1967:35). Furthermore, Algerian activists who sought independence were subjected to cruel reprisals. National oppression became bound up with economic oppression to such an extent that two-thirds of the peasants were deprived of their land, unemployment reached massive proportions in the urban areas, and Algerian Muslims were systematically subjected to discrimination in hiring and in pay for work equal to that done by Europeans.

Table 31 is but one indication of the vast economic disparity and class differences which existed in Algeria between the Muslim and European populations three years prior to the outbreak of revolutionary war. Table 31 shows that the vast majority of Muslims had an average

annual income of only about $45. And only some 50,000 Muslims earned as much as $502 a year, compared to 545,000 Europeans. On the other hand, no Europeans were found to be in the two lowest classes of the population and none earned less than $240 a year. Finally, there were 15,000 wealthy European Colons who earned $3181 a year. There were no Algerian Muslims found in this latter class.

TABLE 31

ALGERIAN POPULATION CLASSES AND INCOMES, 1951

Income Per Person*	Muslim	European	Total	Class
$ 45	5,840,000	--	5,840,000	Traditional Agriculture
$ 121	1,600,000	--	1,600,000	Urban Muslims
$ 240	510,000	440,000	950,000	Small and medium wage-earners, craftsmen and businessmen
$ 502	50,000	545,000	595,000	Middle class
$ 3181	--	15,000	15,000	Wealthy class
	8,000,000	1,000,000	9,000,000	Total

SOURCE: Gillespie, 1960:34.

*At the official 1951 exchange rate of 350 francs to $1 (U.S.A.).

Meanwhile, universal discontent with the colonial regime began to broaden and assume the form of a general national protest. The manipulation of the elections by the Colons had just given fuel to those Algerian Nationalists who wanted direct action. Moreover,

partisan bands of Algerian Muslims began to develop in the rural
countryside and mountain regions preparing for what was to become
a violent anti-colonial revolutionary war.

Previously, within the MTLD, there had developed tension
between Messali Hadj and an impatient left-wing composed almost
entirely of younger cadres wishing to pass from the polite world of
politics to the use of more subversive activities. These particular
individuals, as previously alluded to, became predisposed toward the
use of direct means to obtain independence (Heggoy, 1972:31).

The young left-wing radicals formed a clandestine paramilitary
force known as the OS (Special Organization) within the MTLD. The OS
was composed of active militants, dedicated to the use of violence and
force to gain independence. The first leader of this highly militant
organization was Hocine Ait Ahmed (O'Ballance, 1967:35).

The young militants formed the OS in spite of Messali Hadj's
objections (Heggoy, 1972:31). In effect, Ait Ahmed and the other young
militants wanted to restructure the MTLD as well as the remnants of the
PPA. They wanted the organization to be more manageable and signifi-
cantly more revolutionary. In order to accomplish this goal they first
infiltrated the PPA by creating a network of complicity. By the time
they were through, a three level nationalist proletarian party had been
created.

On the surface or the first layer was the MTLD run by the
authoritarian Messali Hadj. The MTLD being a legal organization was
active in political elections and had had some limited success
especially in 1946 and after. It was estimated that the Majority of

Algerian Muslims were under the direct or indirect influence of the
MTLD or at least were sympathetic to its aims. Below the surface or
the second layer was the secret organizational structure of the PPA.
This latter organization was composed of highly militant individuals
and had been previously banned by the French government. However, it
had managed to survive the official sanctions taken against it by the
authorities. The third layer and in deeper secrecy was the OS, which
defined itself as the fundamental basis of the Nationalist proletarian
organization. The OS was meant to direct the activities of the PPA
and to support the MTLD through the use of sabotage and terrorism
(Heggoy, 1972:32).

Further, the OS served as a check on the activities of the
PPA and MTLD members. In a way it was ". . . a parallel and secret
hierarchy which official party leaders could not always control"
(Heggoy, 1972:32). A major goal of the OS was to avoid the destruction
of the legal arm of the Nationalist proletarian structure which of
course was the MTLD. The latter organization was useful in the sense
that it had been instrumental in having some of its members elected
to different levels of government who in turn would ". . . broadcast
useful propaganda, even in international congresses" (Heggoy, 1972:32).
In effect, the OS tolerated the MTLD until a point could be reached to
launch a revolution. But before that point was reached the MTLD was
seen as useful, and it was used accordingly.

An important point to be understood here is that behind the
facade of the MTLD a highly revolutionary organization had been set up.
Furthermore, the hold that Messali Hadj had over the MTLD had begun to

weaken as a result of his being forced into exile by the French

government at a time when the OS itself was rapidly changing (i.e.,

becoming more revolutionary).

In 1949 Ahmed Ben Bella replaced Ait Ahmed as the leader of the

OS. In 1950 the French Police accidently discovered the supersecret

paramilitary OS, and proceeded in an all out attempt to eradicate it.

Although Ben Bella, Zirout, Ben Boulaid and some others were arrested,

the French Police were never successful in completely destroying the

organization. The main reason for this was that initially the OS had

been constructed as a carefully compartmentalized secret organization

with many sections and cells. Therefore, many local cell members

escaped entirely without being noticed and simply waited for leaders

to contact them, and for an occasion to reorganize (Heggoy, 1972:34).

Then in 1952 Ben Bella, Mahsas, Zirout and Ben Boulaid escaped

from prison and managed to make it to Cairo. Here they joined with

Ait Ahmed and Mohammed Khider, both of whom had fled Algeria in 1950

(Heggoy, 1972:35). All of these men, whether in Algeria or Egypt, were

leaders in the highly secret revolutionary OS. More important, however,

was the fact that these ". . . ex-OS leaders acquired a safe and

friendly sanctuary from which to plan the liberation of Algeria"

(Heggoy, 1972:36).

1954 was the year of revolutionary outbreak. Expressions

of discontent and "rising expectations" entered the various local

elections and were rigged to defeat; or they found their way to the

Algerian Assembly and died there at the hands of the Beni-Oui-Ouis

and Colon predominance. The confidence of the Algerian Nationalists

toward peaceful development dimmed greatly and the thoughts of force

and violence increased dramatically. Dissension and divergence were

reaching their maximum extension (Gillespie, 1960:93-94).

Below this abstraction were the great reservoir of Algerian

Muslims--some 6,000,000 close to starvation, and others not far from

it. Outwardly, however, the masses of Algerians seemed to be quite

calm. Moreover, they were enclosed between a rising birth rate and

insufficient economic development--however, they waited without active

resistance. But the daily contact that the masses had with the much

richer, privileged Colons served as an ever present reminder of an

inferior position. Additionally, the inadequate treatment of Muslim

victims during an earthquake at Orleansville in the summer of 1954,

underscored the Colons' racialist discrimination (Gillespie, 1960:94).

On the international scene, the Algerian Nationalist leaders

kept a close watch on the events which were taking place. There were

rumors heard of many new independent nations which had come into

existence since the Second World War despite heavy opposition. In

Tunisia in 1954, a handful of rebels were indicating that the use of

force and violence might yield great results. In Morocco to the west

rebels were using terror to exemplify ". . . their disapproval of the

French deposition and exile of their sultan" (Gillespie, 1960:94).

In sum, from the Nationalist view, the whole Muslim world seemed to

be stirring.

With change on the horizon, the Colons seized every opportunity

to convince the French government of the need to increase restrictive

measures against the emergent independence movement. The French

government, however, often vacilated back and forth, and on numerous

occasions declared its intentions of recognizing the right of the

people--Muslims as well as Europeans--as long as the struggle was

kept within the framework of the existing French political system.

But this broad and general statement of intent satisfied

neither the Colons nor the Algerian Nationalists. It did, however,

indicate that the colonial ruling elite (i.e., French bureaucrats,

military officials and Colons) were deadlocked in what seemed to be

an irreconcilable conflict over issues pertaining to the destiny of

Algeria under French colonial rule. This fact was indeed an advantage

for the emergent anti-colonial revolutionary movement. At this stage

of the game, ". . . the channelling of the deep Algerian currents of

dispossession into a [widespread] rebellion required, then, only

leaders and arms" (Gillespie, 1960:94). The needed leadership was

to come from that highly secretive and militant OS organization,

which had been initially created within the MTLD.

After Messali Hadj's expulsion or exile from Algeria the MTLD

became increasingly divided over tactical questions. Messali's

authoritarian methods had already alienated many of the members. While

the MTLD was foundering in factionalism, the young militants who had

been members of the highly secretive OS prepared for direct action.

In the spring of 1954 Ben Bella created a new revolutionary

organization to replace the OS, which had to some extent been uncovered

by the French Police in 1950. The new organization named CRUA

(Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action) was based in Cairo where

Ben Bella and others had fled in 1952 to escape the French following

his arrest for an attack on the post office at Oran.

The nine Algerian militants who made up CRUA were: Ahmed
Ben Bella, Mohamed Khider, Mohamed Boudiaf, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mustapha
Ben Boulaid, Mourad Didouche, Rabah Bitat, Mohammed Larbi Ben M'Hid,
and Belkacem Krim (Matthews, 1961:40-41). These men are considered by
almost every source as the "historic chiefs" of the Algerian revolution.
Some have also referred to these individuals collectively as the
"historic nine." Further, all of these men had certain things in
common. All of them came from the lower or middle class. All had
fighting experience, either in the French army, the OS or both. All
of them were in their early thirties or late twenties and most of them
had seen the inside of French prisons (Matthews, 1961:41).

But in regard to the emerging conflict between the Algerian
Nationalists and the French Colonial regime, it was particularly
through Ben Bella's close contact with Egyptian President Abdel Gamal
Nasser, that CRUA received encouragement from the increasing influential
Arab League.

In July 1954 CRUA organized a military network which divided
Algeria into six military regions (Wilayas). These Wilayas can be seen
in graphic form by looking at Figure 24 below. Wilaya 1 included the
Aures and Nementchas mountain regions and was placed under the command
of Mustapha Ben Boulaid. Rabah Bitat took charge of Wilaya 2, which
consisted of the northern half of the department of Constantine.
Wilaya 3 was placed under the command of Belkacem Krim, which consisted
of the Kabylia area where traditional armed bands were already
entrenched. Wilaya 4 was placed under the command of Mourad Didouche,

Figure 24

TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF REBEL COMMAND IN ALGERIA

Source: Heggoy, 1972:62.

which included the important city of Algiers. But Didouche quickly
exchanged his post with that of Bitat, who had been assigned to command
the largely rural area of Constantine. Bitat, being more ambitious,
saw a chance to advance himself through the use of expert urban
terrorism, while Bitat, a less ambitious man, felt more at ease in a
provincial situation (Heggoy, 1972:63). Finally, Wilaya 5 was put
under the command of Mohammed Larbi Ben M'Hid, which included the
important commercial port of Oran. The less significant desert area,
which included the entire Algerian Sahara was designated as Wilaya 6,
and was left without a commander (Heggoy, 1972:63).

After the five commanders had been assigned their regions of
specific responsibility by CRUA, they were then designated as the
Internal Delegation and sent back to Algeria to prepare for the armed
insurrection. Ben Bella, Khider, and Ait Ahmed formed the External
Delegation in Cairo whose specific role was to gain foreign support
for the revolution and to acquire arms, supplies and money to send to
the five Wilaya commanders. Mohamed Boudiaf was designated by CRUA
to act as liaison between the Internal and External Delegations.

Shortly after midnight on October 31, 1954 the revolution
hit Algeria like a sudden explosion. The European settlers and the
colonial administration were caught completely by surprise. The ALN
guerrillas had launched their attack on a day that was observed in
French colonial society as a legal holiday, i.e., All Saint's Day.
The ALN launched some 70 separate, well coordinated attacks in various
parts of Algeria against military installations, police posts, ware-
houses, communications facilities and public utilities.

From Cairo, Algerian revolutionaries made political radio broadcasts calling for all Muslims in Algeria to join the national liberation struggle for the "restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam" (Nelson, 1978:48).

The violent outburst shocked the European settlers and colonial administration, even while rebels in the neighboring protectorates to the east (Tunisia) and west (Morocco) fought against France.

But in practical terms the outburst should have been expected given the development of events both internal and external to Algerian society. For example, French Colonialism had divided the society into two distinct parts--one Muslim and the other European. The former or the majority (Muslims) suffered high unemployment or underemployment and lacked effective political representation. The latter or the minority (Europeans) constituted one-tenth of the population and they controlled the Algerian institutional structure (Heggoy, 1972:71).

Being wretchedly poor themselves, the Muslims observed wealthy Europeans daily. Additionally, there existed a political gap that paralleled the economic disparity, in the sense that one European vote was equivalent to eight Muslim ballots. Also, other factors, e.g., the unexpected loss of the Indo-China war--the defeat of the French army at Dien Bien Phu (1954), gave the revolutionaries added confidence that they could launch a successful campaign to overthrow the French Colonial regime.

When the insurrection started, approximately 500 rebels faced

some 56,000 French soldiers who were stationed in Algeria at the time.
Although the uprising was planned and calculated, it was only gradually
that the French administration both in Paris and in Algiers recognized
that the violence signaled the start of a general insurrection against
French rule in Algeria (Nelson, 1978:48).

The French authorities soon adopted a series of measures for
the immediate suppression of the uprising. Large units of the French
army were transferred to Algeria, bringing the total number to over
400,000 by July 1955. By this time the rebel command consisted of
8,050 regulars and approximately 21,000 auxiliaries. The rebels
remained elusive as ever, mingling with the population at large
(Heggoy, 1972:80).

While the French had committed an extremely large number of
troops to the field in an attempt to suppress the revolution, they
also suffered discipline problems and low morale within the rank and
file. To the French soldier it seemed preposterous that the modern
Frency army could not crush these ill-equipped irregulars whom it
outnumbered 40 to 1. But the rebels fought on their own terms,
combining a strategy of defense with offensive tactics. They would
stand and fight only when they were sure to win or when a good escape
route existed. Otherwise they would simply filter through the French
forces and fade back into the hinderland far from roads and other
facilities. Against such guerrilla tactics the French army ". . . was
severely hampered by the same modern equipment which armed it so well
for a conventional conflict" (Heggoy, 1972:80).

Those Frenchmen who had fought in Indo-China began to perceive

their inadequacies and consequently quickened the pace. But the rebels held the initiative, forcing the French to fight their kind of war (Heggoy, 1972:80).

While the French army ponderously adjusted to the conditions of the war, they also began to deal brutally with the peaceful population. French troops began to destroy villages and carry out mass population relocation programs in an attempt to isolate the masses from the rebels. But despite the superior forces that the French administration threw into battle against the rebels, the revolution gradually spread over all of Algeria. In effect, not only were the revolutionaries effective in spreading their political doctrines throughout the country, but they were also effective in enlarging their operations as a whole.

Soon those Muslims who lived in the urban areas who were middle class, working class, and students, began to follow the poor peasants of the mountain regions and hinderland in support of the revolution. Solidarity with the Moujahedes (the fighters of the National Liberation Army--ALN) assumed various forms: mass anti-colonial strikes, the collection of money, clothes, and medicine for the revolutionaries, and boycott campaigns against the Colonial establishment. Further, urban underground workers (the Fedayeen) and auxiliary fighters (the mousabili) operated actively by carrying out anti-colonial terror and acts of sabotage against persons and property. Between 1955-1956 almost all the Nationalist organizations who had hesitated to act before, dissolved themselves and joined the FLN. The mass National organizations of students, merchants, trade

unions which had been created in the mid-1950's, and other groups began

to render broad support to the FLN. More important, however, was that

by the end of the summer of 1956, the French Colonial structure was up

against a fully developed anti-colonial national-democratic revolution.

On October 22, 1956 five leaders of the FLN headed by Ben

Bella, one of the original organizers of rebellion, were captured by

French authorities, while flying from Cairo to Morocco over inter-

national waters. Because of the dubious character of the capture, Ben

Bella and the others were never brought to trial. They were incarcer-

ated as political prisoners rather than as rebels. However, the French

attitude toward Algerian Nationalist insurgents hardened.

The French had predicted that the capture of the FLN leaders

would seriously curtail the Nationalist movement. Although some

temporary disorganization occurred, the capture of Ben Bella and the

other four leaders did not stop the revolution. In fact, the opposite

seems to have occurred--the revolution gained momentum. The political

work of the FLN among the masses and the effectiveness of the actions

of the ALN increased dramatically. But the increased momentum of the

revolution was explained not by the capture of Ben Bella and the

others, but in part by the stimulation it received in the FLN Congress,

which was held in Soummama (August 1956), i.e., two months before the

capture. Moreover, it was during this FLN Congress that the National

Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) was chosen. The CNRA was

effective in: defining the structure of the ALN--adopting official

military ranks; and adopting a political program for the FLN. This

latter program provided for the attainment of national independence,

the implementation of agrarian reform, the nationalization of "large scale means of production," and equal rights for both Algerians and Europeans.

After holding conferences both in Morocco and Tunisia in 1958, the leaders of the National Liberation Front constituted itself as the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). The GPRA, an Algerian government formed in exile and based in Tunis, was headed by the moderate Ferhat Abbas (i.e., Premier). Ben Bella was appointed first deputy premier, and the other leaders who had been incarcerated with him were appointed ministers of state. Ben Khedda succeeded to the premiership in 1961, following a reshuffle of the GPRA. The GPRA called for a resolution of the Algerian problem by negotiation with France. The GPRA was recognized internationally by a host of Asian and African countries. Also the USSR gave the GPRA de facto recognition in October 1960 and de jure recognition in March 1962 (Nelson, 1978:56).

Although France had committed in excess of 400,000 soldiers to suppress the revolution, its forces were unable to achieve a military victory, in part, because of the mountainous terrain, the guerrilla warfare of the rebels, and the support given to the revolution by the Algerian Muslim population. The European population in Algeria, being in a state of constant fear of being swallowed up by the Muslim masses, not only solicited support from the French political and military sectors, but they actively opposed any change in the status quo. In short, the Europeans wanted Algeria to remain French.

On May 13, 1958 the Colons of Algiers and Oran, supported by the French military, rebelled against the central government in Paris,

fearing that negotiations with the National Liberation Front were about to take place. The rebellion set the stage for the return of General Charles de Gaulle to power in France. The Colons, however, had apparently achieved their goals by forcing a major change in the French government in Paris. When de Gaulle came to power in June 1958 he dissolved the Committee of Public Safety which was run by the Colons, and subsequently restored civil authority in Algeria, at least for the time being.

The turmoil in Algeria had claimed 1.5 million men (killed), 2 million had been thrown into concentration camps and prisons, and over 9,000 villages had been burned. But even so, the revolution continued. However, France became convinced that it could not suppress, militarily or otherwise, the National Liberation movement in Algeria. Therefore, in September 1959, the French government recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. But the war between the rebels and the establishment continued, mainly as a result of the pressure of Colonialist reaction both in Algeria and France, which organized Colon rebellions in Algeria (e.g., the revolt of the Colons in January 1960 and the attempted coup on the part of several military generals in April 1961).

It was only after the repression of these reactionary rebellions that the French government could begin effective negotiations with the GPRA. On February 18, 1962 the Evian Agreement was reached between the revolutionaries and the French government. The Evian Agreement provided for a cease fire, the self-determination of Algeria by means of a referendum, and future economic and cultural

collaboration between the two countries. Further, France pledged: to withdraw its troops from Algeria within three years (they were withdrawn in two years); to evacuate its military installations in the Algerian Sahara within five years (they were evacuated by July 1, 1967); and to evacuate its military and naval base at Marsa-al-Kabir within fifteen years (this particular military base was evacuated nine years ahead of time, February 1968).

Attempts were made by the military right-wing organization called OAS (Secret Army Organization) (created in 1961 by extremist Colons who had gone underground) to thwart the implementation of the Evian Agreements. This resistance on the part of the Colons, although unsuccessful, came in the form of mass acts of urban terrorism against the Algerian Muslim population.

During the referendum which was held on July 1, 1962, some 6 million Algerians out of a total of 6.5 million electorate cast their ballots. An overwhelming majority of Algerians voted for independence. Charles de Gaulle proclaimed Algeria an independent country on July 3, 1962. The GPRA, however, proclaimed Algeria independent on July 5, marking the 132nd anniversary of French entrance into the country (Nelson, 1978:64).

At a conference in Tripoli (Libya) in May 1962 the CNRA adopted a new program for the FLN. The committee which was responsible for initiating the program was headed by Ben Bella. The committee recommended agrarian reform, including the outright seizure of large estates and the creation of peasant cooperatives. Transportation, banks, insurance, and heavy industry were to be nationalized, and the

new government was to exercise a monopoly over foreign trade. In terms. of international relations, a strongly anti-colonialist line was to be advocated in Africa, Asia and other places, along with supporting the goal of Maghribi or North African Unity (Nelson, 1978:64).

But during the first few months of independence political differences within the FLN increased as factions struggled for national leadership. The reshuffling of the leadership in the GPRA in Tunis in 1961 had made Ben Khedda the dominant figure in the FLN, but his leadership position was threatened at the end of the war by the release of Ben Bella and the other leaders who had been imprisoned in France. In July Ben Khedda and his cabinet upon arriving in Algiers established themselves as the new government of Algeria (i.e., the Provisional Executive). But Ben Bella who had already been appointed previously as a deputy premier, allied himself with Colonel Houari Boumediene, who was the Chief of Staff of the ALN in Morocco (Nelson, 1978:65).

Ben Bella and Boumediene set up their headquarters in the city of Tlemcen, where the former created the Political Bureau as a rival governmental executive to the GPRA. The ALN external forces located both in Tunisia and Morocco were in opposition to the GPRA. Also, there were some internal units who backed Ben Bella as well. But there were others (e.g., the commander of Wilaya 4) who sided with the GPRA against the Political Bureau.

After redesignating the ALN as the ANP (National People's Army), Ben Bella and his armed forces occupied Constantine and Annaba in eastern Algeria. This action moved Ben Bella's forces closer to Algiers and also enabled him to persuade Ben Khedda to give up the

executive functions claimed by the GPRA to the Political Bureau. More
and more Algeria moved toward civil war (Nelson, 1978:65).

On August 30, 1962, Ben Bella ordered his military forces
stationed in Oran, under the leadership of Boumediene, to converge on
Algiers. After some heavy fighting Boumediene entered Algiers on
September 9, 1962, where he was immediately joined by Ben Bella. The
Political Bureau conducted elections for a Constituent Assembly, which
proclaimed the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. In August
1963 an Algerian National Assembly convened and approved of a consti-
tution that conformed to the guidelines dictated by Ben Bella. A
referendum was held in September of the same year endorsing the
constitution and subsequently electing Ben Bella as president for a
five year term. The important position of Minister of Defense was
given to none other than Ben Bella's faithful comrad, Boumediene.

Under the new constitution the FLN was confirmed as the only
official party, Islam was declared as the religion of the state, and
Arabic was designated as the official language.

The new governmental apparatus which had been created through
the enlistment of FLN cadres and former ALN officers was put to work
rebuilding a war torn country. The government began to rebuild
villages, city buildings and other structures which had been destroyed
during the years of war. Also, work was resumed at many of the
enterprises and farms which had been abandoned by European Colons who
fled the country. Previously, the workers, farm laborers and peasants
had begun to organize committees of self-management to regulate the
work performed on the farms and in the industrial sectors. The

Committees of Self-Management which had developed spontaneously were taken over by the government and put under legal regulation. The immediate result was that the self-management idea became relatively widespread.

All property which had been abandoned or was not fully utilized by its owner was turned over to Committees of Self-Management. These Committees by law became the legitimate managers of the property including existing enterprises, and had the right to distribute surplus profit (after governmental taxation) among the workers. Committee elections were to be held annually in order to renew membership by at least one-third. Furthermore, by the fall of 1963 after the government had nationalized all the previous property of the European Colons and that of the few Algerian capitalists, 2.7 million hectares of the most fertile Algerian land, which provided 60 percent of all marketable agricultural commodities, and more than 1,000 commercial, industrial, and other enterprises were in the hands of Committees of Self-management.

But Ben Bella's ascent to office did not satisfy all. Opposition came from a number of former FLN leaders who were connected with the Algerian middle class and who were oriented toward French policies of assimilation and integration or who were simply pursuing their own personal goals. This opposition became active after the National Assembly's approval of the Constitution which gave far-reaching powers to Ben Bella and his Political Bureau (e.g., FLN candidates were appointed to all elected posts in the state). Opposition to Ben Bella's government culminated in continued revolts in the Kabylie

region right up to the summer of 1965.

In April 1964, the FLN held a constituent assembly in Algiers and adopted a new program document, the Algerian Charter. This document having been initiated by Ben Bella, critiqued the past mistakes of the FLN, defined the type of relations which should exist between the state, party (FLN) and army. Also the Algerian Charter laid the foundation for Algerian Socialism based on Self-management (Nyrop, 1965:49).

As alluded to before, opposition to Ben Bella's rule was becoming more and more apparent. He had given fuel to the fire of hostility against his rule by ousting traditional leaders in favor of his select comrads, making public his dislike of the General Union of Algerian Workers, his failure to make the FLN an efficient mass based party, his suspicion of plotters behind every door, and his increasingly dictatorial tendencies. More important, however, was the fact that, even before the FLN Congress in April 1964, Ben Bella had alienated the silent strong man within his own regime--namely, Defense Minister Boumediene (Nyrop, 1965:50). Ben Bella wanted to eliminate the army as a political threat to his rule, and Boumediene was indeed the strong man here. Ben Bella tried to form a "people's militia" as a counter-force to the army's power. His intention was to utilize some of the old "internals" (ALN officers) to create anti-Boumediene "clans." Also Ben Bella began to dismiss cabinet officials who were close associates to Boumediene (e.g., the dismissal of Ahmed Medeghri as Minister of Interior). He also had endeavored to transfer pro-Boumediene army officers to isolated, unimportant posts (Nyrop,

1965:50).

Added to Ben Bella's problems was his delay in carrying out

agrarian reform, and the lack or inadequacy of practical measures

backing up his Socialist program produced increased discontent among

the Algerian masses. In part, this discontent was reflected in the

Congress of Algerian Trade Unions held in March 1965 where they

adopted a Charter that gave significant attention to Algeria's

economic conditions. Additionally, a new leadership staff who were

defined as more sensitive to Algeria's economic needs was appointed.

On June 19, 1965, Ben Bella's government was overthrown by a

swift and bloodless coup d'etat, led by none other than Colonel Houari

Boumediene. As alluded to earlier, Ben Bella had attempted to undercut

Boumediene's authority in the army. But Boumediene and his colleagues

had struck first. Ben Bella was arrested and placed in prison in the

Sahara.

Immediately after the coup the Revolutionary Council with

Boumediene as president was announced as the "Supreme political body"

in Algeria. The twenty-six member council was made up of mostly

military personnel (i.e., former guerrilla leaders, senior officers

·of the ANP and close friends of Boumediene). On July 10 Boudemiene

announced a new trenty-member cabinet government in which he held the

posts of Premier and Defense Minister. Nine of the posts were held by

former members of Ben Bella's Cabinet. But more important was the fact

that the new Cabinet represented a broad base of Algerian politics

(i.e., military and civilian personnel, technicians, and members from

the radical wing of the FLN (Nyrop, 1965:50-51).

Also, in an effort to revitalize the functioning of the FLN
party Boumediene set up a party secretariat under Belkacem.
Boumediene's new government soon announced that the previous foundation
of Socialism that had been laid by Ben Bella along with his foreign
policy would not be changed. The basic difference between Boumediene
and his predecessor was the shift of primary attention, on the part of
the former, to internal affairs especially the development of the
economy (Nyrop, 1965:51).

In accordance with the declaration of the Revolutionary Council
that it would follow the guidelines explicated in the Tripoli program
(confirmed by the Algerian Charter), mines and insurance companies were
nationalized in May 1966. During the summer months of 1967 American
oil interests were nationalized, and in early summer 1968 11 out of 12
French banks which were previously operating in Algeria were placed
under state control. Also, during this same period (summer 1968) 74
foreign (mostly French) industrial enterprises were nationalized.

In early February 1967 elections were held for the popular
communal assemblies and in May 1969 for the popular departmental
assemblies. These assemblies were designed to control the administra-
tion of government on the local level along with the regulation of
local cooperatives and self-managed farms that had been reorganized
starting in 1965.

Although the newly independent country had serious economic
and social problems to be solved, it wasted no time in attacking these
problems. Algeria received foreign aid from the USSR, France and the
Peoples Republic of China. Further, under Boudemiene Algerian oil

production was developed. In 1971 the government nationalized all French oil companies.

Mainly because of the potential for oil production, Algeria acquired significant influence in world affairs. It became a close ally to Egypt and advocated Arab and third-world unity. In 1969 Algeria became a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and it began to flex its strength by being instrumental in the 1973-1974 quadrupling of oil prices and the anti-Israel oil embargo.

In November 1976 a new constitution was adopted maintaining essentially the same governmental program and structure which had been specified under the 1963 (Ben Bella) constitution. Boumediene continued as president and as prime minister and the FLN remained, the only political party. Although Boumediene was reelected president for a six year term on December 10, 1976, he died two years later on December 27, 1978. He was succeeded by Chadii Benjedid, who at the time was General Secretary of the FLN. Although Benjedid was an army colonel, he did not play an active role in the revolution. With his selection as head of the country the Algerian Revolution for all practical purposes had come to an end. In effect, Benjedid's ascent to power was widely accepted as a defeat for the FLN's radical wing.

But it was the Algerian radicals (the <u>Historic Nine</u>) who confronted the French Colonial regime head on and subsequently waged and won a war of national liberation.

Application of the Theory to the

Algerian Revolution

In this subsection my goal is to take various historical events from the Algerian Revolution to illustrate the generalizability of my theory of anti-colonial revolution. The historical events taken from the Algerian Revolution are plugged into: (1) the "causal" model with coextensive conditions added (i.e., Figure 20, page 352); and (2) the systems model (i.e., Figure 21). This is the same procedure which I used in Chapter VI to illustrate the applicability of the theory to the Haitian Revolution.

Now let us look at Figure 25 below. Figure 25 (like Figure 23 in Chapter VI) will be limited to explaining only the initial take-off of the Algerian Revolution in 1954. Additionally, to avoid confusing the reader and for the sake of maintaining consistency, I will utilize Figure 25 to illustrate the same feedback loop (see cross-hatched linkages in Figure 21) which was discussed in Chapter VI. But as before, the reader can best follow the discussion by focusing on Figure 21.

After the six coextensive conditions were met in Algeria, mobilization caused the emerging movement to accelerate at T-1. The mobilization phase started initially by the Grand Colons' blatant abrogation of the rights of Algerian Muslims which had been previously guaranteed by the National Assembly through its passage of the Organic Statute of 1947. Also, the Algerian Muslims both educated and non-educated increasingly resented their subordinate political and economic position. Additionally, there was little upward movement of individuals

Phase I
Predisposing

Phase II
Structural Strain

Phase III
Manipulative

Phase IV
Take-Off

Phase I boxes:
- General Muslim Nationalism in Middle-East, World War II and the Egyptian Revolution
- Decline and fall of France and German Regime (1943) in Algeria. Gain of powerful enemies and loss of old friends.
- Tremendous disparity in wealth and power between social classes.
- (+) Class Antagonism
- Conflict and Decline of landed Aristocracy
- Rise of modern Bourgeois Economy and Utilitarianism. Commercialization of Agriculture. Increased Technological innovation.
- Germany's Defeat of France in World War II. Social conflict and Muslims outnumbering Europeans. Support from French Radicals.
- Algerian soldiers return after fighting for France in World War II. Celon Reaction to Organic Statue causes them to falsify elections, and abrogate other rights of Algerians.

Phase II boxes:
- (+) Relative Deprivation
- (+) Structural Blockage
- (+) Class Conflict
- (+) Status Inconsistency
- (−) Total Power of the Establishment

Central process boxes:
- (+) Function of 5 sequential and 5 coextensive variables. Discontent
- (+) Function of 1 sequential and 6 coextensive variables Mobilization
- (+) The Uprising 1954 Acceleration
- Beginning of The Algerian Revolution

Coextensive conditions (ovals):
- Increases with the Industrialization and Commercialization of Agriculture
- Little upward movement of individuals or groups from the Algerian masses to higher positions of power, wealth, etc.
- Liberal ideology during and at the end of World War II, e.g., Allied propaganda for self-determination. Renaissance of Muslim countries in General
- The "Historic Nine" Revolutionary leaders, Ben Bella, Krim, etc. The External and Internal Delegations.
- The rules of Political and Military discipline explicated by the "Historic Nine" as conduct regulating and behavior controlling law norms.
- Unexpected loss of the Viet-Nam War, i.e., the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
- Membership of movement spreads across various socio-cultural boundaries.
- Varied with European Political situation and with Algerian Military/Political situation.
- Gross Abrogation by the Colons, of the rights of Algerian Muslims guaranteed under the "Organic Statue" of 1947.
- Increasing Resentment of a subordinate, Political and Economic position by Algerian Muslims both educated and non-educated.
- Prerevolutionary Rebellions e.g., 1945 Setif Rebellion. Aid from Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.
- French Radicals both in France and Algeria. Support from conservative and moderate Muslim Organizations.
- Members of the emergent movement become willing to die for the cause.
- Islamic subculture and Religious organization. Large urban "cabashes" or ghettos.
- Colonial Bureaucracy vs. Grands Colons vs. French born officials.
- Systematic Terror campaigns by Colon vigilante units.
- Belief by militants that islamic institutions and Nationalist Political organizations approximated in Strength those of the French.

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Figure 25. An Illustration of the "Linear" Model (with coextensive conditions) Using the Algerian Revolution.

or groups from the Algerian masses to positions of power, wealth, etc. coupled with an increase in alienation resulting from increased industrialization and the commercialization of agriculture. Added to all of this was the pre-revolutionary revolts (e.g., the Setif revolt of 1945).

Once the emerging movement had accelerated its activity, increased conflict became apparent within the elite at T-2. While the Colonial bureaucrats often vacillated in the midst of a growing Algerian Nationalism, the grands colons became more and more intransigent. Relations between the two became increasingly strained. In effect, the split between the colonial bureaucracy and the Colons became irreconcilable in that they could not agree on a common policy that would deal effectively with the growing Algerian Nationalism and the socioeconomic problems of the masses.

The increased conflict within the ruling elite "caused" it at T-3 to increase the restrictions against political protest. Although the Organic Statute of 1947 was passed by the National Assembly in Paris giving Algerian Muslims a few additional rights, delegates representing the Colons denounced the government statute as compromising the security of Algeria. The Colons then proceeded to assure themselves that the Organic Statute would not be enforced in Algeria. They rigged the upcoming elections in their favor, abrogated all the guaranteed rights of the Algerians, and utilized systematic torture and other cruel reprisals in an attempt to bring political protest to a standstill.

These increased restrictions against political protest brought

certain third parties to the aid of the rebels at T-4. The somewhat reluctant French radicals both in France and in Algeria began to increase their support of the movement in light of the action by the Colons. Additionally, several moderate and conservative Muslim organizations denounced their previous position in favor of a more militant stance and subsequently began to support the emergent movement.

The increase in third party support led much larger numbers of Algerians to further delegitimate the old French, Colonial regime at T-5. Algerians who had previously stood for assimilation and integration began to accept the idea that direct confrontation was the only solution to solve their problems. Also the French government constantly vacillated back and forth on critical policy toward reform, yielding to Colon reactionary pressure. Moreover, the Algerian masses became further alienated. Thus, at T-6 the total power of the establishment had been reduced significantly.

The deline in the total power of the establishment led to a sharp increase in discontent at T-7 on the part of the "outs." Gaining support from Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in preparing for direct action, the power resources of the "outs" (a coextensive condition) began to increase. Also at this time there was an increase in resentment (another coextensive condition) by both educated and non-educated Muslims of their subordinated political and economic position.

Once the other specified coextensive conditions had been met, discontent at T-7 led to Mobilization at T-8. Mobilization of the emerging movement increased given the spread of the ideology, the emerging leadership of the "Historic Nine," the access provided by the

Islamic subculture, religious organization and large urban "cabashes"

or ghettos, etc. Once mobilization had increased, it in turn led to

an increase in acceleration at T-1, thus completing one trip around

the loop. But here again the reader should be alerted to the fact

that before the Algerian Revolution came to an end several trips

around the loop had been made.

And now after having applied the theory to the Algerian

Revolution by plugging in relevant historical events and conditions,

I now turn to the question of the generalizability of the theory in

the light of new data provided by the Algerian Revolution.

Revision of the Theory in the Light of

the Algerian Revolution

In this section I must consider whether or not my theory needs

to be revised in order for it to fit the Algerian case. However, the

procedure which I shall employ in making this consideration is not

necessarily self-explanatory. Additionally, the reader will soon

observe, later, that the Haitian and Algerian Revolutions tend to be

much more similar than different. It is for the above two reasons, in

part, that I believe the procedure which I shall employ here should be

made more clear to the reader, before a consideration to revise the

theory, to fit the Algerian case, is made.

In order for the reader to better understand the procedure

which I am utilizing here, I will briefly illustrate hos the values of

the variables in my present theory might be respecified for a revised

theory of social movements.

Let us compare, for example, two ideal types of social

movements (e.g., the "pure" class type revolution with the non-violent action movement). One of the most general analytical differences between these two types of social movements is the magnitude of violence used to achieve the ideologically defined goals.

The "pure" class type revolution utilizes a relatively high degree of violence while the non-violent action movement utilizes little or no violence at all. Another obvious general difference between the two movements is the particular form exemplified by each. To be sure, the "pure" class type is a revolutionary movement, while the non-violent action type is a non-revolutionary movement. Moreover, any adequate comparison between these two ideal types of movements should reveal some rather sharp detailed differences.

In Table 32 below these two polar types of social movements are compared. The independent variables of my theory are presented under the appropriate heading using a scale ranging from 0 to 12 with corresponding quantitative values of: Extremely Low = 0, Low = 3, Medium = 6, High = 9, and Extremely High = 12.

Table 32 also shows that the values of the variables have been respecified to account for the differences between the "pure" class revolution and the non-violent movement. Moreover, in the case of the "pure" class revolution, my theory asserts that: class differences are high to extremely high, class antagonism is also high to extremely high, coercive power of the establishment is low, delegitimation of the establishment is high to extremely high, structural blockage is high, class conflict is high to extremely high, power of the establishment is low, third party support is high (excluding the

TABLE 32

SUMMARY TABLE OF COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

	Independent Variables		Social Movement	
	Sequential	Coextensive	"Pure" Class Revolution	Non-violent Movement
I. Predisposing	Value Expectations		High	High
	Value Capabilities		Medium-Low	Medium-Low
	Class Differences		High-Extremely High	Medium
	Class Antagonism		High-Extremely High	Low
	Status Ascription		Low	Low
	Status Achievement		High	High
	Coercive Power of the Establishment			
	De-legitimation of the Establishment		High-Extremely High	Medium
II. Structural Strain	Relative Deprivation		High	High
	Structural Blockage		High	Low-Medium
	Class Conflict		High-Extremely High	Low
	Status Inconsistency		High	High
	Power of the Establishment		Low	High

TABLE 32 --Continued

	Independent Variables		Social Movement	
	Sequential	Coextensive	"Pure" Class Revolution	Non-violent Movement
III. Manipulative	Discontent	Alienation	High** (High)*	High** (High)*
		Social Mobility	Low-Medium	Medium
		Status Resentment	High	High
		Restrictions Against Political Protest	High	High
		Power Resources of the Outs	Extremely High	High
	Mobilization	Ideology	High** (High)*	High** (High)*
		Commitment	High	High
		Autonomous Leadership	High- Extremely High	High- Extremely High
		Access	High	High
		Third Party Support	High	High
	Acceleration	Crisis Planned	High** (High)*	High** (High)*
		Crisis Unplanned	High- Extremely High	Medium
		Multipenetration	High- Extremely High	Medium

TABLE 32 --Concluded

| | Independent Variables | | Social Movement | |
	Sequential	Coextensive	"Pure" Class Revolution	Non-violent Movement
IV. Take-Off		Coercive Balance	Extremely High	Low
		Conflicting Ruling Elite	Extremely High	Medium-High
		Organizational Balance	Extremely High	Extremely High

**The value associated with the relevant coextensive variable.

*The value associated with the relevant sequential variable, with the parentheses symbolizing that the value enclosed remains constant in each phase.

The dash (-) between two variable values is defined as (to). For example, Medium-Low would be interpreted as Medium to Low.

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upper classes), and coercive balance is extremely high.

But in the case of the non-violent movement my theory asserts that class differences are medium, class antagonism is low, coercive power of the establishment is high, de-legitimation of the establishment is medium, structural blockage is low to medium, class conflict is low, power of the establishment is high, third party support is high (not excluding upper classes), and coercive balance is low.

After comparing the "pure" class revolution with the non-violent movement by respecifying the values of the variables, the reader should now be alert as to how one might go about generalizing my theory to fit all social movements. In Table 32 there was really no need to add any new variables to the theory nor was there any need to delete any. I think the theory did a reasonably "good" job in handling the differences between the "pure" class type revolution and the non-violent action movement. For example, the fact that the non-violent action movement is void of the use of massive violence may be explained, in part, by the Coercive imbalance being in favor of the elite.

Also, by respecifying the values of the variables for a theory of social movements, I accomplished the goal of showing how one might go about exemplifying the initial theory at the highest level of generalizability specified in the original problem set (Chapter VI: Theoretical Design).

The above discussion about respecification for a theory of social movements was not entirely exhaustive. One reason for this somewhat limited discussion was that the goal of showing how the

initial theory might be generalized to a general theory of social

movements was neither a major or minor goal in this paper. But

nevertheless the discussion does reveal to the reader the tremendous

potential inherent in my initial theory (i.e., its ability to be

generalized to a theory of social movements). Additionally, the

discussion carries the implication of a warning against the dangers

of undergeneralization, the conventional wisdom notwithstanding.

Further, I think the reader is now alert as to the particular

procedure which I shall now employ in my consideration of whether or

not my initial theory needs to be revised in the light of the data

presented for the Algerian Revolution.

But, before I proceed any further I would like to point out

that the two anti-colonial revolutions (i.e., the Haitian and Algerian),

which I am about to consider here for analytical purposes, occurred in

two different societies that were marked by some rather gross, general,

descriptive differences.

Probably, the most profound of these differences between Haiti

and Algeria was the fact that the former had a socio-economic structure

based on the institution of slavery. Here, the labor demands of the

economy were fulfilled by the forced importation of thousands of

African slaves. On the other hand, however, Algeria's socio-economic

structure was not based on slavery, and its labor demands were

fulfilled by the contract and wage labor of indigenous workers.

Taken at face value, descriptive differences, such as the one

described above between Haiti and Algeria, are really not all that

illuminating at this point. The reason for this is that for my

purposes, analytical differences between the two revolutions, which occurred in the two societies, are much more important, here. I am referring to those differences in form, magnitude of violence, success, etc., between the two revolutions.

And now I think it is appropriate to present Table 33 which will sharpen the focus of this discussion. Table 33 below, like the previous Table, 32, presents the independent variables of my theory under the appropriate heading utilizing the same scale of variable values. Here, the Algerian Revolution is compared to the Haitian Revolution revealing their similarities and differences.

I do not think that it is necessary for me to cite in the text every prediction which is associated with each independent variable. I will cite only a few of the predictions for the sake of clarity.

Table 33 reveals that value expectations were relatively high both in Haiti and Algeria at the beginning of the revolution. Also the Coercive power of the establishment was low in both French colonies. But, while relative deprivation was medium to high in Haiti, it was high in Algeria. Further, Structural blockage was extremely high in Haiti--it being a racial caste and slavery system, but high in Algeria. In Haiti class conflict was medium, while in Algeria it was high. Also in Haiti Social mobility was extremely low, while in Algeria it was low. In terms of access Haiti was high and Algeria was also high. On the Crisis unplanned variable both Haiti and Algeria was extremely high, i.e., for the former it was the Great French Revolution itself which had started two years prior to the outbreak of Revolution in Haiti; and for the latter it was the unexpected loss of the Viet-Nam War by the French

TABLE 33

SUMMARY TABLE OF COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO ANTI-COLONIAL REVOLUTIONS:
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

| Phases | Independent Variables | | Revolutions | |
	Sequential	Coextensive	Haitian	Algerian
I. Predisposing	Value Expectations		High	High
	Value Capabilities		Medium-Low	Medium-Low
	Class Differences		High	High
	Class Antagonism		High	High
	Status Ascription		Medium	Low
	Status Achievement		High	High
	Coercive Power of the Establishment		Low	Low
	De-legitimation of the Establishment		High	High
II. Structural Strain	Relative Deprivation		Medium-High	High
	Structural Blockage		Extremely High	High
	Class Conflict		Medium	High
	Status Inconsistency		Medium	High
	Power of the Establishment		Low	Low

TABLE 33 --Concluded

| Phases | Independent Variables | | Revolutions | |
	Sequential	Coextensive	Haitian	Algerian
III. Manipulative	Discontent	Alienation	High** (High)*	High** (High)*
		Social Mobility	Extremely Low	Low
		Status Resentment	High	High
		Restrictions Against Political Protest	High	Medium-High
		Power Resources of the Outs	High	High
	Mobilization	Ideology	High** (High)*	High** (High)*
		Commitment	High	High
		Autonomous Leadership	High	High
		Social Organization	High	High
		Access	High	High
		Third Party Support	High	High
	Acceleration	Crisis Planned	High** (High)*	High** (High)*
		Crisis Unplanned	High	High
		Multipenetration	High	Medium-High
IV. Take-Off		Coercive Balance	High	High
		Conflicting Ruling Elite	High	High
		Organizational Balance	High	High

**The value associated with the relevant coextensive variable.

*The value associated with the relevant sequential variable, with the parentheses symbolizing that value enclosed remains constant in each phase.

The dash (-) between two variable values is defined as (to). For example, Medium-Low would be interpreted as Medium to Low.

army in 1964. Finally, <u>Organizational balance</u> was <u>high</u> in both

colonies.

After presenting Table 33 , comparing the Haitian and Algerian

Revolutions, I must now answer the crucial question, which is: How

well does my theory apply to the Algerian Revolution? Well, after a

thorough search to discover important differences (i.e., negative

instances) between the two revolutions, I found relatively none.

Moreover, the fact that there are so few differences, and that those

which do appear are so small forces me to conclude, on the basis of

the facts, that my theory of anti-colonial revolution applies to the

Algerian Revolution amazingly well.

I also emphasize, here, that no new concepts had to be added,

nor did any old ones need to be deleted, in order for the theory to

apply to the Algerian Revolution. Further, the fact that my theory

fits the Algerian case rather well is indicative of its flexibility

and scope. Additionally, the theory's "good" fit allows me to

generalize downward in the <u>Problem Set</u> to the last problem statement,

h. What this means, intuitively, is that my theory can answer the

question of: Why is it that a "successful" anti-colonial revolution

occurred in Algeria and not in some other colonies at the same time?

Put in a slightly different way, my theory can <u>explain</u> substantially

the causal origins of the Algerian Revolution.

Finally, at this point I think it is important to point out

that the "good" fit of the theory to the Algerian case is not just a

result of the procedures which I have employed. In the <u>first</u> place

my efforts have been focused on <u>constructing</u> a theory--not to

empirically test or verify one. Second, I deliberately selected a

rather similar type of revolution, and I am relatively pleased with

the results. Third, the reader will be exposed to further explication

concerning the ability of the theory to be generalized, in the next

Chapter, VIII.

Summary

The major goal of this chapter has been to apply the previously

constructed theory of anti-colonial revolution to a more modern case of

anti-colonial revolution. In this regard the theory was applied to the

Algerian Revolution. In accomplishing the major goal of the chapter, I

first presented a case history or narrative of the Algerian Revolution.

Here the reader was exposed to historical events and conditions which

transpired during the entire course of the revolution.

Next, I took various historical events and conditions from the

revolution and applied them to the theory (i.e., I plugged the relevant

historical events and conditions into the independent variable places

in the model).

In the final section of the chapter consideration was given to

whether or not the theory was in need of revision in the light of the

data presented on the Algerian Revolution.

Before I made this major consideration about the possibility

of having to revise the theory, I familiarized the reader with the

procedure which I intended to utilize in this effort. By comparing

two polar types of social movements, i.e., a "pure" class revolution

with a non-violent action movement I revealed to the reader how one

might go about generalizing my theory to a general theory of social

movements. In this effort my procedure was made explicit.

I then used the same procedure, as before, to compare the Haitian Revolution to the Algerian Revolution.

After assessing the similarities and differences between the Haitian and Algerian Revolution, the reader could see in specific terms the actual predictions associated with each independent variable for both revolutions. Finally, my theory was found to fit the Algerian Revolution amazingly well. This "good" fit gave added confidence to the generalizability of the theory to explain past and modern, i.e., all, anti-colonial revolutions.

In the next chapter, my previously constructed theory of anti-colonial revolution will be generalized to explain the causal origin of all revolutions.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FORMAL THEORY GENERALIZED

The major purpose of this chapter is to take my previously

constructed theory of anti-colonial revolution and attempt to

generalize it to explain all revolutions. The procedure which I shall

use to accomplish this task (i.e., respecification of the values of

the variables and/or addition of new concepts, and/or deletion of some

of the "old" concepts) was utilized and explained in the previous

chapter, VII. Further, I promised the reader that the present chapter

would offer further exposure to the ability of my theory to be

generalized.

Theory of All Types of Revolutions

In an earlier chapter (i.e., Chapter II, Table 8) I indicated

via a typology that there are four basic types of revolutions. They

are: Conspiracies (i.e., Military and Palace Coups), Wars of National

Liberation (i.e., Anti-Colonial), Civil Wars (i.e., Secessionist and

Separatist), and "Pure or Mass" (i.e., Civil).

One question which seems to follow from this explication is:

How can my theory handle the differences in types of revolutions? In

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other words, can respecification of the values of the variables, alone, explain which form or type of revolution that will occur? Or, in addition, do I need to add new concepts to the theory and/or delete some of the existent ones in order to account for the different types of revolutions? In an attempt to answer these questions I have constructed Table 34 below.

Table 34 is a summary table of comparison between the four general types of revolutions mentioned above. As before, all the independent variables of the theory are listed under the appropriate heading. Additionally, I have listed the values that are associated with each variable for each type of revolution. There is really no need to discuss each independent variable in reference to its value across each type of revolution. But, on the other hand, I do think a few example are warranted, especially those that reveal some differences between the types.

Looking at Table 34 the reader can observe that the value of the independent variable--Class Antagonism has a value of extremely low to low for Conspiracies, medium for Anti-Colonial, low for Civil Wars, and extremely high for Pure or Mass type revolutions. Class Conflict has a value of low for Conspiracies, medium to high for Anti-Colonial, low for Civil Wars, and high to extremely high for Pure or Mass types.

The independent variable Social Mobility has a value of low for the Conspiracy type, extremely low to low for the Anti-Colonial, and medium for both the Civil War and the Pure or Mass type. Multi-penetration has a value of low for the Conspiracy, medium to high for the Anti-Colonial, and high to extremely high for both the Civil War

TABLE 34

SUMMARY TABLE OF COMPARISON BETWEEN FOUR TYPES OF REVOLUTIONS:
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Phases	Independent Comparables		Conspiracy Military Coups, Palace Coups	Wars of National Liberation Anti-Colonial	Civil War Secessionist, Separatist	Pure or Mass "Civil"
	Sequential	Coextensive				
I. Predisposing	Value Expectations		High	High	High	High
	Value Capabilities		Medium-Low	Medium-Low	Medium-Low	Medium-Low
	Class Differences		High	High	High	High
	Class Antagonism		Extremely Low-Low	Medium	Low	Extremely High
	Status Ascription		Medium-Low	Medium-Low	Medium-Low	Medium-Low
	Status Achievement		Medium-High	Medium-High	Medium-High	High
	Coercive Power of the Establishment		Low	Low	Low	Low
	De-legitimation of the Establishment		High	High	High	High

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TABLE 34--<u>Continued</u>

Phases	Independent Comparables		Conspiracy Military Coups, Palace Coups	Wars of National Liberation Anti-Colonial	Civil War Secessionist, Separatist	Pure or Mass "Civil"
	Sequential	Coextensive				
II. Structural Strain	Relative Deprivation		High	Medium-High	High	High
	Structural Blockage		High	Medium-Extremely High	Medium-High	Medium-High
	Class Conflict		Low	Medium-High	Low	Extremely High
	Status Inconsistency		High	Medium-High	High	High
	Power of the Establishment		Low	Low	Low	Low
III. Manipulative	Discontent	Alienation	High** (High)*	High** (High)*	High** (High)*	High** (High)*
		Social Mobility	Low	Extremely Low-Low	Medium	Medium
		Status Resentment	High	High	High	High
		Restrictions Against Political Protest	Medium-High	High	High	Medium-High
		Power Resources of the Outs	High	High	High-Extremely High	Extremely High

TABLE 34--Continued

Phases	Independent Comparables		Conspiracy Military Coups, Palace Coups	Wars of National Liberation Anti- Colonial	Civil War Secessionist, Separatist	Pure or Mass "Civil"
	Sequential	Coextensive				
	Mobilization	Ideology	Low** (High)*	High** (High)*	High** (High)*	High** (High)*
		Commitment	High	High	High	High
		Autonomous Leadership	Extremely High	High	High	High
		Social Organization	Extremely High	High	High	High- Extremely High
		Access	Medium	High	High	High
		Third Party Support	Low	High	High	High
	Acceleration	Crisis Planned	Medium** (High)*	High** (High)*	High** (High)*	High** (High)*
		Crisis Unplanned	High	High	High	High- Extremely High
		Multi- penetration	Low	Medium-High	High- Extremely High	High- Extremely High
IV. Take-Off		Coercive Balance	Low	High	High	Extremely High
		Conflicting Ruling Elite	High	High	Extremely High	Extremely High
		Organizational Balance	Medium	Medium- Extremely High	Extremely High	Extremely High

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TABLE 34--Concluded

	Independent Comparables		Conspiracy Military Coups, Palace	Wars of National Liberation Anti-	Civil War Secessionist, Separatist	Pure or Mass "Civil"
Phases	Sequential	Coextensive	Coups	Colonial		

**The value associated with the relevant coextensive variable.

*The value associated with the relevant sequential variable, with the parentheses symbolizing that the value enclosed remains constant in each phase.

The dash (-) between two variable values is defined as (to). For example, Medium-Low would be interpreted as Medium to Low.

and the Pure or Mass type. Another interesting prediction is the
coercive balance, where the value is low for the Conspiracy, high for
both the Anti-Colonial and the Civil War, and extremely high for the
Pure or Mass type revolution.

Next, let us consider the ideology variable which of course
has a value of low for the Conspiracy and high for the other three
types. Looking across the different types of revolutions, the values
of the ideology variable appear to be somewhat consistent, with the
exception of the value associated with the conspiracy type revolution.
But more important is the fact that these values, which are associated
with the ideology variable, conceal major differences which are
significant in explaining why one form of revolution occurs rather
than another.

But what are these differences that are concealed by the
apparent values of the ideology variable? Well, to begin with we must
consider what an ideology really is. My definition of ideology (see
the Conceptual Framework in Chapter VI) is comprehensive and encompasses
both revolutionary and non-revolutionary ideologies. In this particular
chapter, I am concerned with the former types of ideology.

It is important, however, to note that just as there are
different types of revolutions, there are also different types of
revolutionary ideologies. Two of the most definitive characteristics
of any social movement ideology are that: (1) it defines the goals
(i.e., targets of change, extent of change desired, etc.) toward which
the movement will attempt to accomplish; and (2) it designates the
specific means (i.e., violence in the case of revolutionary movements)

to be used to accomplish the goals.

Moreover, it is the goals of the emerging revolutionary move-
ment, specified by its particular ideology, along with the values of
other designated variables, that determine, to a large extent, the
form which a revolution will take.

Now let us look at Table 34 again, this time considering the
ideology variable as discussed above, along with the differences in
values of certain other variables, across different types of revolu-
tions. My theory makes the following predictions as to which type of
revolution will occur and under what conditions:

(1) If the ideology of the emerging revolutionary movement is aimed at
total change in the values and social structure, and the values of the
variables--Class Antagonism, Class Conflict, and Coercive Balance are
extremely high, then a Pure or Mass ("Civil") revolution will emerge.

(2) If the ideology of the emerging revolutionary movement is aimed at
partial change in the social structure and not the values and the value
of the Class Antagonism variable is low, then a Civil War will emerge.

(3) If the ideology of the emerging revolutionary movement is aimed at
total change in the values and social structure or partial change (i.e.,
changing the social structure and not the values or changing the values
and not the social structure) coupled with the value of medium on Class
Antagonism and medium to high on Class Conflict, then an Anti-Colonial
revolution will emerge.

(4) If the ideology of the emerging revolutionary movement is aimed at
partial change focusing only on the removal of key personnel in the
political apparatus, and Class Antagonism is extremely low to low,
Autonomous Leadership and Social Organization are both extremely high,
Access is medium, Third Party Support, Multipenetration and Coercive
Balance are all low, then a Conspiracy type revolution will emerge.

After the above discussion, I must point out that I think my
theory does a reasonably good job in handling the differences between
the types of revolutions. In more specific terms, my theory offers
some predictability as to why one particular form of revolution occurs
as opposed to another. Yet my discussion, here, was not entirely

exhaustive. But on the one hand, I cannot take total responsibility, mainly because my major goal was to explain the Causation Stage and not the types.

On the other hand, however, I did feel an obligation to at least show the reader in a preliminary way how my theory might be generalized to account for the differences in types of revolutions. Moreover, the ability of my theory to accomplish this type of generalizability is an exceedingly important endeavor and has almost no precedent in the literature on social movements and revolutions. Another important point to be made here is that there was no pressing need to add or delete concepts from the theory.

And now I think it is appropriate to say something about those variables in my theory whose values do not change at all or change very little across the different types of revolutions (see Table 34 again). For example, the independent variable, Value Expectations, has a value of high for all four types of revolutions. Value Capabilities has a value of medium to low for all four types. Additionally, Discontent and Alienation both have values of high for each type of revolution. There are, obviously, other examples, but I do not think I need to present them here in the next--the reader can simply look at Table 28 if further verification on this point is needed.

My immediate response to those variables whose values show little or no change across the different types of revolutions is that they do not contribute anything to explaining the different forms that revolutions take. Then why do I need these particular variables that exemplify little or no change? I need them, my theory asserts, in

order to explain the onset of all revolutions (the "causation stage")
and not the differences in form.

The fact that my theory can be generalized to explain all
revolutions is also related to the problem set frame-of-reference in
Chapter VI. In this connection, my theory is generalized upward from
the main problem statement, e, to problem statement, d, explaining why
revolutions occur.

And now after having respecified the values of some of the
independent variables along with presenting the predictions associated
with the four types of revolutions and giving further elaboration, I
turn to a brief note concerning the final theory.

The final theory which explains all types of revolutions is
the same theory which I initially constructed (see Figure 12, Chapter
VI) to explain Anti-Colonial revolutions. There is no need to present
a graphic or diagrammatic representation of the final theory here, for
the reader need only to refer to the above-mentioned Figure and Chapter.
Again, I note that through a respecification of the values of some of
the variables in the initial model, the theory was transformed into one
which could explain all revolutions.

Summary

This chapter has been a rather brief but specific discussion
about my final theory in so far as it explains all revolutions. The
major goal which I accomplished here was a respecification of the
values of some of the variables for each type of revolution, such that
the initial theory of anti-colonial revolution became generalizable to
explain all types of revolutions, i.e., Conspiracy (Military and Palace

Coups), Wars of National Liberation (Anti-Colonial), Civil Wars (Secessionist and Separatist), and Pure or Mass (Civil).

Furthermore, it was neither necessary or desirable to add new variables to the model or to delete old ones. In effect, the basic task of this chapter was accomplished by explicating a full-fledged theory that begins to explain all types of revolutions.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Having finally come to the end of my task, it is now time
to recapitulate, evaluate, and speculate on the efforts made in my
investigation. This final chapter, therefore, summarizes the major
contents of the study together with its major conclusions, draws out
some important implications for future research followed by some
concluding remarks.

The major goals of this study have been: (1) to develop a
general theory about the causal origins of anti-colonial revolution;
and (2) to "derive" or develop the theory from a detailed case study
of the Haitian Revolution--which was perhaps history's first successful
slave revolution.

In the process of accomplishing the major goals of the study
the following questions (seen as minor goals) were also answered.
(1) Why is it that a "successful" slave and anti-colonial revolution
occurred in Haiti and not in the other French colonial islands of
Martinique and Guadaloupe? (2) Can the theory once "derived" be
validly generalized to explain other cases of anti-colonial revolution

in another place and time--namely the more modern, Algerian Revolution?
(3) How will the theory have to be modified to better fit the Algerian
case in order to serve as a theory of all anti-colonial revolutions?
(4) Can the theory of anti-colonial revolutions be generalized to
explain all types of revolutions?

Defining the basic task as one of theory construction and not
verification, the major and minor goals of the study were accomplished
in the following manner.

First of all, revolution was characterized as a "temporal"
process which occurs over a period of time. It was therefore deemed
appropriate to speak of "stages" in the revolutionary process (i.e.,
Causation Stage, Success-Failure Stage, and Consequences Stage). It
was also further indicated that the location of the concern of this
study, within the overall career of the movement, was the Causation
Stage.

Second, the object of study was presented by explicating a
definition and typology of social movements. Here, the external
boundary of social movements was established which allowed a distinction
to be made between what social movements are and what they are not.
Then the internal divisions or the different types of social movements
were also presented.

Since the view was taken in this study that all revolutions
are social movements, but not all social movements are revolutions, a
definition of revolution was presented establishing its external
boundary. Hence, a distinction could not be made between a
revolutionary social movement and one which is nonrevolutionary.

Next, a brief discussion ensued criticizing some of the major typologies of revolution. Subsequently, I presented my own typology which revealed the Object of Study (i.e., the revolutionary Social Movement). I could now "pinpoint" the place of the anti-colonial revolution.

Third, it was concluded that before an investigator can adequately confront such complex theoretical issues as the explanation of the causal origins of revolution, it is imperative that he/she develop systematic procedures for doing so. Thus, an adequate method of theory construction used in the study was both identified and clarified. Here, the definition, tasks and basic elements of theory were presented. The four basic elements which were defined as necessary for constructing a theory were: the problem, the conceptual scheme, the propositions, and the propositional arrangement.

Additionally, a set of criteria which could be used to evaluate any theory was presented. Finally, three basic modes of theory construction, i.e., set-of-laws, axiomatic, and systems were presented and compared. Moreover, the systems mode was selected for use in this study mainly because of its closer approximation to social movement phenomena through the use of functional, feedback and feedback loop relationships. The systems mode of theory construction was seen as having the most potential for producing the desired end result, which of course was the flexibility and comprehensiveness to allow the construction of a theory which could explain anti-colonial revolutions in particular and, later, "all" revolutions in general.

Fourth, a review of the relevant literature was presented.

Here the idea was to first define and elaborate the colonial situation. This was done mainly to alert the reader to the meaning of the term colonialism, as it is used throughout the study. Next, a classification scheme was derived in order to classify the various theories of revolution. The theories were classified under one of the following headings: Social Structural Theories, Social Psychological Theories, Conflict Theories, and General Works (i.e., other relevant books and articles). Subsequently, a criterion for the critique of any theory of revolution was presented. Moreover, at least one major theory from each of the first three classification types was critiqued utilizing this criterion.

Fifth, a descriptive scheme which could be used to describe any revolutionary movement was presented. The descriptive scheme was developed in light of the need for some systematic organization of the primary data (e.g., the case histories of revolutions). Also, the scheme was especially designed to compare one revolution to another.

After explicating the descriptive scheme, it was used to present a detailed case study of the Haitian Revolution. In the case of Martinique and Guadaloupe only the narrative part of the scheme was used. Additionally, drawing from the work of Genovese (1979), Table 23 was presented, comparing the similarities and differences which existed between the three French colonies (i.e., Haiti, Martinique and Guadaloupe).

Sixth, the theoretical design was presented, utilizing the four basic steps of theory construction mentioned before. The problem statement was presented in detail, exposing the reader to the specific

type of explanation sought. Subsequently, the theoretic viewpoint of the theory was explicated and found to be eclectic.

Next the Conceptual Scheme was presented. Here, the concepts used in the theory were defined and converted to variables by specifying their attributes. Then a brief note pertaining to the subphases of revolution and their relationship to the abstract concepts in the Conceptual Scheme was presented. In effect, it was shown that the previously mentioned "stages" of the revolutionary process could be broken down into phases which in turn could be broken down into subphases. These subphases were characterized as abstract concepts or conditions under which revolutionary movements emerge and develop.

After presenting a brief note, which revealed how Genovese's theoretical concepts, that he used to explain the occurrence of slave revolts, could be plugged into my own Conceptual Scheme, a partial list of the theoretical propositions was explicated. These propositions were arranged to form my theory of anti-colonial revolution. The theory was presented first in terms of an oversimplified "linear" model; second, by a "linear" or sequential model with coextensive conditions sketched in; and third, by a more complete systems model complete with feedback relations and loops. It was concluded that revolutions cannot be adequately explained by using oversimplified "linear" models or linear models with coextensive conditions. Only the complex systems model was deemed appropriate and viewed as indispensable for studying revolutions.

The formal theory of anti-colonial revolution was then illustrated with events from the Haitian Revolution. This was done

by plugging into the variable places of the theory relevant historical events and conditions associated with the Haitian Revolution itself.

Seventh, the formal theory was then applied to the more modern Algerian Revolution. Here, a narrative of the entire revolution was presented, followed by the application of the theory to concrete historical events and conditions. Here again the historical events and conditions of the revolution (this time the Algerian case) were plugged into the appropriate variable places in the theory. Next, I alerted the reader to the procedure which I used in considering whether or not my theory should be revised in the light of the Algerial Revolution. My procedure (respecification of variable values) was made explicit by showing the reader how one might go about generalizing the theory to a general theory of social movements. Next, a further generalization or applying of the theory to the Algerian Revolution was made by respecifying the values of some of the variables. In this endeavor, no new concepts were added or deleted. The theory became one which hopefully could explain all anti-colonial revolutions.

Eighth, the formal theory of anti-colonial revolutions was generalized to explain all types of revolutions, i.e., Conspiracies (Military and Palace Coups), Wars of National Liberation (Anti-Colonial), Civil Wars (Secessionist and Separatist), and "Pure" or Mass (Civil) types. Moreover, through a respecification of the values of some of the variables for each type of revolution, the theory was made or shown to be more generalizable. In sum, without introducing new concepts or deleting old ones and through the respecification of variable values, my previously constructed theory of anti-colonial

revolution became one which could hopefully explain <u>all</u> revolutions.

This study contains several general implications that should be made explicit because they suggest guidelines for future research.

One of the major implications of the study has to do with theory construction as a major sociological endeavor. The discipline of sociology has reached a point in time where there is an increased need for more and better theoretical work. But because theory construction is a difficult task, this may explain in part why certain other investigators are reluctant to utilize it. Moreover, it is true that formal theory construction requires the learning of certain skills, techniques and attitudes which are somewhat different from those required in strictly verification type work. But this difference only exemplifies the complexity of the discipline, which requires a certain degree of specialization. Because theory construction as opposed to verification requires different types of skills, it should not be concluded that one is more important than the other, which of course is all too often the case.

I must say, that formal theory construction is here to stay. Furthermore, a major implication of this study is that it is a useful enterprise. In fact, in this study theory construction is seen as indispensable to the systematic development of sociology as a science. As utilized in this study, the techniques of theory construction should be used to construct complex, sophisticated theory to explain social patterns of behavior. Only when this is done, can verification techniques be made more fruitful and rewarding. It is indeed true that one must first have a theory before it can be tested. But the

real question might be: Does sociology intend to become a more sophisticated science in the future? If the answer is yes, then it is necessary that the techniques of theory construction be applied to the enormous amount of accumulated knowledge that sociology has already developed.

Another general implication of the study has to do with the particular social phenomenon under study, i.e., the revolutionary social movement. When surveying the literature one is immediately confronted with the enormous amount of information concerning revolutions. Surprisingly enough, however, there exists very little systematic theoretical work. Although a theory was constructed in this study to explain the causal origins of revolutionary social movements, the reader should not conclude that the analysis of the problem under study has been exhausted. This would indeed be a serious error--for as I have alluded to elsewhere--the revolutionary social movement is a temporal process divided up into stages, and these latter stages-- success/failure and consequences--remain yet to be explained. I do not mean to imply here that I have offered the absolute, complete and eternal explanation for the Causation Stage.

Moreover, a complete theory of the revolutionary process as a whole would have to take into account all the stages. The implication here is that revolutionary phenomenon, as an object of study, is exceedingly complex--calling for sophisticated techniques in the task of theory construction. As an immediate starting point, however, future research could focus on developing a theory to explain each successive stage in the revolutionary process. A typical future

research project could involve constructing a theory which could explain the Success-Failure of revolutionary movements. The problem statement could be phrased in the following manner: Why is it that some revolutionary movements succeed while others fail?

Another implication of this study for future research is related to the descriptive scheme. The descriptive scheme can be used to compare revolutions in a systematic fashion. One of the major handicaps recognized in the literature on revolutions was the lack of some systematic scheme for organizing the case histories of revolution. This discrepancy has made the systematic comparison of two or more actual revolutions virtually impossible. The descriptive scheme was designed to eliminate this discrepancy. The scheme allows the investigator to compare revolutions using the exact same categories.

In summary then, the major implications of the study amount to this: more attention needs to be given to the task of theory construction and more in depth theoretical analysis needs to be applied to the general area of revolutionary social movements.

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