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SPANISH RELATIONS WITH THE INDIOS BARBAROS ON THE NORTHERN-
MOST FRONTIER OF NEW SPAIN IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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SPANISH RELATIONS WITH THE INDIOS BÁRBAROS ON THE NORTHERN-
MOST FRONTIER OF NEW SPAIN IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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INTRODUCTION

The subject of Spanish Indian policies is an extraordinarily intricate one, as perhaps inevitably follows from the complex nature of the forces from which they emerged. The Spanish empire in America contained a large and diverse aboriginal population, which ran the gamut of cultural development from the incredibly poor existence of the Indians of California to the fabulous civilization of the Aztecs in the Valley of Mexico. Their attitudes towards the Spanish conquerors varied from quick and eager alliance to undying hostility. The motives of the Spaniards in their dealings with the Indians were mixed and often conflicting. Determined to exploit to the fullest the wealth of their empire, they naturally seized upon the Indians as the instruments of that exploitation. This usually meant armed conquest and a kind of serfdom for the Indian population, with many concomitant abuses. There was at the same time, however, a strong consciousness of the obligation of Spain to convert the Indians to the Christian faith and to bring them the rudiments

of Spanish civilization. Converted Indians became vassals of the Crown, morally entitled to its protection. The Crown, acutely conscious of its moral responsibilities, made every effort to shape its Indian policies so as to avoid abuse of the natives by the Spanish colonials. There resulted conflicts between Crown principle and colonial practice, from which emerged compromises which became the foundation of unique and in some cases oddly practical Indian policies. But still other forces than the complex Indian and Spanish factors joined the interplay. Further compromises were made under pressures from forces far removed from the Indian frontiers--the strategic requirements of the Spanish Empire in the great power conflicts which marked the opening of the New World and the emergence of the modern European states.

The importance of the subject of Indian policy can hardly be exaggerated, for upon the degree of success or failure which Spain achieved in dealing with her varied Indian inhabitants depended the prosperity or even survival of the various parts of the empire. This study deals with the evolution of a single, unique aspect of Spanish Indian policy: the relations with the indios bárbaros on the northernmost frontier of New Spain in the eighteenth century. Much of the area considered lies within the present United States, and the tribes considered were the hostile Indians of its western frontier only a century ago. The study, then, has a dual purpose: to explore a crucial aspect of the history of Spain's

Northern Borderlands, and to emphasize a much-needed time perspective essential to historical analysis of the "Indian problem" of the western United States.

Consider briefly, then, the evolution of Spanish Indian policy on this continent. New Spain was founded upon that most basic resource of empire, a large, settled native population, already successfully exploiting the resources of the land. Initially attracted to the mainland in search of a supply of slave labor for their Caribbean island mines and plantations, the Spaniards found there a rich aboriginal empire, seething with internal discontents, as ripe for conquest as it was attractive to fortune-hunters. Hernando Cortés, with a force of only five hundred fifty-three soldiers, allied himself with malcontented nations within the Aztec state, and those Indian allies conquered the Valley of Mexico for Spain. Once in control, Cortés was able to leave essentially unchanged the economic, political, and even social structure of the Aztec empire, simply substituting the Spaniards for the Aztecs in the ruling class.

It was a highly successful policy, and, with some elaborations, remained characteristic of Spanish procedure towards the native population wherever applicable. Succeeding generations, somewhat more closely accountable to the Crown than the original adventurers, had to pay considerably more heed to their obligation to convert the natives to the Catholic faith, so the mission became an important instrument

of Indian policy. As the search for mineral wealth led to the northward expansion of New Spain, the matter of the Indian population became more problematic, for there were in the north few settled Indians ripe for exploitation. There were, instead, wandering bands of wild Indians who fled to the hills and fought tenaciously for their freedom--not a resource for empire-building, but a formidable obstacle. The Indian problem now became in large part a military one, and while the friars pressed on to "reduce" and convert the northern Indians, the mission had now to be accompanied, or even preceeded by, the presidio. As a noted viceroy later remarked of the northern frontier, "in this region the methods of the conquerors of Mexico are not applicable, excepting that of granting peace to the Indians and using them in their mutual destruction."¹

Even while the Spaniards struggled to conquer the northern mining frontier, there came tales of "another Mexico," much farther to the north. Soldiers of fortune listened avidly to rumors of mineral wealth far greater than the fabulous sums already found in Mexico; the Church friars listened no less eagerly to reports of a settled Indian village population which seemed to them ripe for conversion. The bitter failure of the Coronado expedition to New Mexico

¹Bernardo de Gálvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces of New Spain, 1786, ed. by Donald Worchester (Albuquerque, 1952), 39.

(1540-1542) cooled general enthusiasm for the northward adventure for some years, but the friars did not cease agitating for entry into the new missionary fields which had been discovered. By the end of the sixteenth century, secular interests regained enough optimism to try the New Mexican venture, and in 1598 Spanish settlement moved north to the upper Rio Grande valley.

New Mexico was then, and remained, the northernmost frontier of New Spain. It was perhaps also the most difficult of her frontiers, for it was indeed not "another Mexico." The settlers and soldiers did not find the mines they had hoped for, or even the wealthy population described in so many legends. Between their fruitless treasure hunts, the Spaniards turned to exploitation of the sedentary Pueblo Indians, exacting tribute in goods and in labor, and using them to help capture slaves from the surrounding "wild" tribes; but the colony was hardly a success in its secular aspects. The only Spaniards not grievously disappointed were the Franciscan missionaries entrusted with the conversion of the new province, for if the Pueblos did not eagerly await conversion, they at least offered a far more promising field than had the hostile wanderers of the mountains of northern Mexico. It is for these reasons that France V. Scholes states that "prior to 1680 New Mexico was not a colony in the real sense of the word. . . . The raison d'etre of the province

was the missions, and the non-aboriginal population was there mostly to sustain and defend them."²

Although the Pueblos proved to be a relatively easy conquest, the very existence of Spanish New Mexico was precarious from its beginning. It was surrounded by hostile, wandering Indians, who never ceased to harass the province, and often maintained a state of virtual siege against it. These Indians were called by the Spaniards indios bárbaros. Utes, Comanches, Apaches, Navajos, Wichitas, and more, they differed widely as to language, social organization, and ways of life. Some were totally nomadic, others relatively stable village dwellers. But their common characteristic was a consistent resistance to any acceptance of the Catholic faith which marched indivisibly with the forces of Spanish empire. The indios bárbaros, then, were the stubbornly non-Christian Indians, who spurned adoption of the faith and with it the Spanish culture which so penetrated the lives of most of the Indians of New Spain. Their story is quite distinct from that of any mission Indians, no matter how turbulent. Even the Hopi, who were obstinately apostate from 1680 onwards, were not classified by the Spaniards as bárbaros, nor was such a bloody incident as the uprising in 1751 of the Pima mission Indians sufficient to relegate a once converted peoples to the designation of bárbaros.

²France V. Scholes, "Civil Government and Society in New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century," New Mexico Historical Review, X (April, 1935), 96.

These indios bárbaros, who successfully defied either conversion or conquest throughout the Spanish period, presented the most perplexing problem in Indian policy which Spain had to face. Solution was imperative, because the security of New Spain depended upon maintenance of the New Mexican frontier as a buffer against both French and English invasion and against the waves of barbarians who might engulf the north Mexican provinces and cause a general native uprising. The mission province necessarily became a military province, responsible for a holding action while a solution was evolved. And remarkably enough, a reasonably successful policy did emerge in the late eighteenth century, strangely compounded of the philosophy of the Crown concerning the Indian inhabitants of the empire, the hard realities of frontier experience, and, inevitably, the emergencies chronic in the declining Spanish empire. This study traces the evolution of that policy.

The indios bárbaros moved upon the Spanish frontier from the north in successive waves. For this reason, each group was first dealt with by the northernmost Spanish outpost, usually Santa Fe, although in the case of the Nations of the North, Texas was the first province to meet the problem. It seems desirable, therefore, to treat the problem largely from the New Mexican perspective. It was only when the Comanche invasions of New Mexico, and later of Texas,

had pushed the Apaches to the south that the problem became acute in the lower tier of the Interior Provinces. Perhaps even more important to the shaping of policies, it was only when the New Mexicans established some control of the situation by achieving an alliance with the most formidable segment of the indios bárbaros that the more southern provinces were able to formulate and execute any effective action in regard to the indios bárbaros.

Historians of the Northern Borderlands have published many of the documents from the archives of Spain and Mexico which are fundamental to the history of the area. Much reliance has been made in this study upon the documents published and edited by Herbert Eugene Bolton, Alfred Barnaby Thomas, Charles Wilson Hackett, Lawrence Kinnaird, Vito Alessio Robles, and others. But in spite of the existence of the published collections of documents and of various short period and regional studies which touch upon the problem of the indios bárbaros, there has yet to be traced the evolution of the problem and of the solution reached by the Spaniards. This study is designed as a synthesis to meet that need, relying upon both the published sources and research in original documents to trace the story with as complete a continuity as the nature of the sources will permit. It is submitted in the hope that it will contribute yet another thread of continuity to the still-emerging history of the Northern Borderlands of New Spain. It is also hoped that, by virtue of

a deepening of time-perspectives, this synthesis may contribute towards understanding of the nature of the "Indian problem" encountered by the United States on its trans-Mississippi frontier.

CHAPTER I

SPAIN MEETS THE INDIOS BÁRBAROS: RELATIONS WITH THE APACHES AND NAVAJOS TO 1715

The problem of the indios bárbaros in New Mexico was almost entirely an Apache problem in the seventeenth century. The term Apache refers not to any one tribal unit, but to a great many rather loosely organized, autonomous wandering bands of Athapascan Indians, bands which were apparently almost as readily shifting in composition as in locale. There results a confusion in Apache nomenclature which made it difficult for Spanish colonials, as for historians today, to be entirely certain just which of the Apache groups they were dealing with at any given time. The confusion was compounded in the early period by the practice of considering the distinctly separate Athapascan people, the Navajos, as "Apaches Navajoes," for early writers often shortened the term to Apache, when actually treating the Navajos.

The Apache bands were far-flung, from the western plains to the mountains of present New Mexico and Arizona, with cultures varying as widely as their environments. The term Vaquero Apache is a general one, covering the buffalo-

hunting Apaches of eastern New Mexico and western Texas. Principal divisions among the Vaqueros were the Jicarillas, located north, northeast and east of Taos, in present New Mexico, Colorado and Kansas; the Mescaleros, ranging through east central New Mexico, Chihuahua, and Texas; the Faraones, a collective name for vagrant bands taking refuge in the Sandia Mountains in the eighteenth century; the Llaneros, who ranged the Llano Estacado of eastern New Mexico and western Texas, south into Coahuila. The Llaneros had three important subdivisions: the Llaneros proper, the Natagées and the Lipans. In the mountains southwest of the Rio Grande lived the various Chiracahua bands, including the Mimbrenos, Mogollones and Ojo Calientes. The Apaches of the White Mountains were usually called just that, Sierra Blancas, in the Spanish period, but were sometimes called Coyoters. The term Gileños, or Gila Apaches, which appears to have no specific ethnic significance, was casually applied to various peoples, usually Apache bands, who happened to live in the vicinity of the Gila River at different times.¹

There occur in documents of the Spanish period other Apache designations which are difficult to equate with divisions known in later times. The Carlanas, who lived between the Arkansas River and Taos at the beginning of the eighteenth

¹Frederick Webb Hodge (ed.) in Fray Alonso de Bena-vides' Revised Memorial of 1634 (Albuquerque, 1945), 302-305.

century, and the Cuartelejos who at that time lived beyond the Arkansas River in present eastern Colorado and western Kansas, were divisions which were driven from their ranges quite early in the eighteenth century by the Comanches. Presumably they appeared in the south under other names, perhaps as remnants which were absorbed by Apache bands already there. At any rate, those designations simply disappear from Apache history. The same is true of the term "Paloma," which early disappeared in the scrambling of Apache populations before the Comanche onslaught. The Siete Rios Apaches were probably the Natagees, who inhabited that area of present southeastern New Mexico through the larger part of the eighteenth century.

The Horse and Metals Revolutionize Apache Life

Apache hostility towards the Pueblos long antedated the Spanish colonization. The Apache bands had for many years supplemented their meager hunting and gathering economy by raiding the food supplies of the agricultural Pueblos, and their continual attacks may have been a major factor in the consolidation of the sedentary New Mexican Indians into garrison-like pueblos. The Spanish forces became embroiled in the long-standing enmity between the Apaches and Pueblos as soon as they established themselves in New Mexico, for as soon as mission life was imposed upon the Pueblos, they became vassals of the Crown, entitled to its protection.

Moreover, the advent of the Spaniards greatly sharpened the old hostilities, for they brought to New Mexican village life the horse and metal goods. At once desirable to the Apaches, those imports not only provided an added incentive for raiding, but gave them a greatly increased advantage in warfare. Borrowing heavily from the Spanish techniques, the Apaches evolved the kind of guerrilla warfare which made them for the next century the scourge of New Mexico and the western plains.²

It is estimated that the Apaches began seriously to adopt the horse around 1630.³ As the earliest of the Plains Indians to acquire the horse, they enjoyed in the seventeenth century a great advantage over neighboring tribes in the southern and eastern plains borderlands. Not only did the horse increase the range of effective warfare for the Apaches; it also greatly facilitated buffalo hunting, thus stabilizing their food supplies. The food supply was further improved because the horse, both as an improved instrument for raiding and as a medium of exchange, made it possible to acquire by theft or trade much greater quantities of corn from the Pueblos.

²France V. Scholes, "Civil Government and Society in New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century," New Mexico Historical Review, X (April, 1935), 84.

³Francis Haines, "Where Did the Plains Indians Get Their Horses?" American Anthropologist, XL (January-March, 1938), 113.

Reorientation of Apache life around the horse required a constant and ever-increasing supply of that animal, and like other essentially non-sedentary Indians, the Apaches never became successful horse breeders. They relied instead upon the Spanish horse herds in New Mexico, which thus became the target for constant Apache raids. In addition, the Apaches acquired some horses, as well as corn, cloth and metal goods, through sporadic trading with the Pueblos and Spaniards.

Metal goods were second in importance only to horses in the new patterns of Apache warfare: saber blades to tip their lances; knives for close combat; metal bits and stirrups, for the horse gear copied from the Spaniards; steel for arrowheads. Far more difficult to steal than horses, these goods constituted a tremendous trade incentive to the Apaches. They had traditionally bartered meat and hides to the Pueblos for agricultural produce. But more valuable in their trade with the Spaniards were captives taken in warfare with rival tribes to the east. Themselves frequently raided by slave-hunting Spaniards, the Apaches very early went into the slave trade. Apache horsemen, with improved metal weapons, made serious inroads against the populous agricultural Caddoan bands to the east, and their far-flung slave-raiding greatly intensified and embittered warfare in the plains borderlands.⁴

⁴Frank Raymond Secoy, Changing Military Patterns on the Great Plains (17th Century through Early 19th Century) (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1953), 9-24.

Spanish Relations with the Apaches
in the Seventeenth Century

Spanish contacts with the Apaches date as far back as the Coronado expedition of 1540-1542, but serious difficulties with them began only about 1600, when with the founding of Spanish ranches in New Mexico, the Apaches began to turn to horse theft as an occupation. By 1608 there were reports of regular raids by the Apaches, who were attacking and burning pueblos, taking a serious toll of Indian lives, and threatening every Spanish horse herd in the province.⁵ The raids gradually increased in intensity as the horse grew in importance in Apache life and Apache war potential multiplied. By the 1630's the menace was grave throughout the province, and by 1638 the friars of the frontier pueblos reported that they and their charges were subject to constant Apache attacks.⁶

Loath to send an army to defend the unprofitable mission province, the Spanish government resorted to a system of encomiendas, obliging the encomenderos to participate with their own arms and horses in the defense of the religious personnel and their mission Indians. In times of

⁵Donald E. Worcester, "The Beginnings of the Apache Menace in the Southwest," New Mexico Historical Review, XVI (January, 1941), 10.

⁶Father Juan de Prada, Petition, Convent of San Francisco, Mexico, September 26, 1638, in Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773 ed. by Charles Wilson Hackett, III (Washington, 1937), 110.

particular emergency, the encomenderos customarily hired soldiers at their own expense, giving them horses and arms, in order to assemble effective defenses. The encomenderos received no pay for their services, except for the tribute which they levied annually from their encomiendas.⁷ In addition to leading the local militia and Indian auxiliaries in campaigns against the Apaches and Navajos, the encomenderos were called upon from time to time for special guard duty in such frontier areas as Taos, Jémez and Zuñi.⁸ The manpower resources upon which they could draw were severely limited; in 1639 it was estimated that there were in all of New Mexico only two hundred persons, Spaniards and mestizos, who were able to bear arms.⁹ Under these circumstances, the quality of the defense of the province left much to be desired.

Unwise local administrative policies seem to have worsened the New Mexican situation too, though an acrimonious dispute between church and state colors the documents of the seventeenth century to such an extent that it is possible to determine only tentatively what actually did occur. The friars charged that Luis de Rosas, governor of

⁷Ibid.

⁸France V. Scholes, "Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670," New Mexico Historical Review, XII (October, 1937), 389.

⁹Francisco Martínez de Baeza, Petition, Mexico, February 12, 1639, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 119-120.

the province from 1637 to 1641, was guilty of actions which provoked intensified hostility from the indios bárbaros. He was accused of warring quite unjustly against the "Utacas," and of increasing Apache hostility by allowing treacherous attacks to be made against friendly Apaches while on an expedition to the plains of Quivira. His motive apparently was the seizure of captives to be sold in the slave-trade, in which he was personally interested. Having jeopardized the safety of the province by his actions, he then refused either to prepare adequate defenses for the pueblos or to organize counterattacks after raids.¹⁰

While the secular and religious leadership of Spanish New Mexico joined in a paralyzing feud, the troubles of the Pueblo Indians multiplied. In 1640 an epidemic among the Indians took a toll of three thousand persons, more than ten per cent of the total Pueblo population. The Apaches took advantage of the weakened condition of the Pueblos and the factional disputes of the Spaniards to raid the pueblo area, burning and pillaging, costing the Pueblos heavily in stored foodstuffs. Absorbed in the undignified church-state quarrel, the Spanish authorities afforded little of leadership or comfort to the Pueblos. Since the experience of the Pueblos was that the acceptance of the Christian faith carried with it an inescapable obligation to serve both the secular and

¹⁰Scholes, "Church and State in New Mexico, 1610-1650," New Mexico Historical Review, XI (October, 1936), 301.

religious representatives of the new régime, they were disgusted and demoralized by the unseemly wrangle. The sorely tried Pueblos returned increasingly to their old ways, finding strength in the native religion and ceremonials. The notable conservatism of the Pueblos which persists into the twentieth century may stem from the strong Apache pressures and the default of the Spaniards in the 1640's, for up to that time the missions apparently had made reasonably effective progress toward conversion of the Pueblos to Catholicism.¹¹

Throughout the 1640's the civil authorities further provoked the indios bárbaros by sending out expeditions to seize Apache and Navajo captives to be sold as slaves in the markets of New Spain. Pueblos were often forced to serve in the expeditions. Apache reprisals most often took the form of raids on the pueblos. Resentful of the troubles brought upon them by their masters, the Pueblos began to league themselves with the Apaches against the Spaniards. During the administration of Governor Fernando de Argüello in 1640, the Jémez collaborated with the Apaches to kill a Spaniard. The administration of Governor Ugarte de la Concha saw a more general conspiracy of the Indians of Isleta, Alameda, San Felipe, Cochití, and Jémez with some Apache groups. These abortive movements did little or no real damage, but they

¹¹Scholes, "Church and State in New Mexico, 1610-1650," ibid., XII, 105, and XI, 324.

were clear warnings that the Spaniards had become so obnoxious to both groups that they might at any moment, in spite of their traditional enmity, unite to drive the Spaniards from New Mexico.¹²

About 1660, the mounting need for a more effective defense against the Apaches on the lower Rio Grande, where they were especially active, led to the creation of two major subdivisions for administrative purposes: the Rio Arriba, commanded by the governor, and the Rio Abajo, commanded by the lieutenant governor.¹³ But the mounting danger signals were largely ignored by the Spaniards, and the familiar patterns were repeated with mounting intensity through the next decades: further Spanish raids to seize Apache and Navajo boys and girls; increasingly destructive retaliatory attacks on the Pueblos by the Apaches and Navajos; increasing restlessness among the Pueblos. At first the raids were against outlying pueblos like Zuñi, Jémez and the Jumanos, but by the 1670's and 1680's no portion of the province was safe from Apache or Navajo marauders.¹⁴

Although the hostilities grew ever more acute, trade continued with both the Apaches and Navajos in the intervals

¹²Scholes, "Church and State in New Mexico, 1610-1650," *ibid.*, XII, 99, 106.

¹³Scholes, "Civil Government and Society in New Mexico," *ibid.*, X, 91.

¹⁴Scholes, "Troublous Times in New Mexico," *ibid.*, XII, 144, 150.

between raids. The eastern Apaches came to trade at frontier pueblos, and were in turn visited by Spanish trading expeditions to the lower Pecos area or to the plains. Pecos pueblo had long been the scene of an informal annual fair, where Apaches exchanged buffalo hides, meat and tallow for cloth and maize. The Jumano pueblo east of Abó was the principal base for trade with the Apaches of the Siete Ríos area. Here the Apaches disposed of the captives taken in war with enemies to the east. Thus, the Pueblos frequently acquired Plains Indian slaves, whom they traded to the settlers for horses and cattle.¹⁵

The trade itself was fraught with danger for New Mexico. Spanish trading expeditions often took advantage of their presence in the Apache or Navajo country to seize captives for the slave trade. The meeting of Apaches and Pueblos for trade always held the possibility of friction which might set off a murderous encounter. It was to deal with the latter problem that the government of New Mexico in the 1660's set the precedent for the eighteenth century practice of regulating the frontier trade and drawing tribal boundaries. The action was precipitated by an incident at the pueblo of Cuarac, when two Apaches of Los Siete Ríos who had come to trade were thought to be hostile and were killed. The Siete Ríos Apaches immediately prepared to attack the pueblo to

¹⁵Ibid., 396-397.

avenge the killing, but the governor dispatched a squadron of Spaniards and another of Pueblos to prevent the attack. After reaching a settlement with the aggrieved Siete Ríos Apaches, the governor sought to ward off future incidents by decreeing that no Apache or Navajo should pass beyond a stated line of frontier pueblos when coming to trade. The action was deemed necessary because it was usually quite impossible for the Pueblos to tell which Apaches were friendly and which were not.¹⁶

Drought sharpened the New Mexican crisis after 1666. Crop failures meant famine in the pueblos, as among the Jumanos, where more than four hundred and fifty starved to death in 1668.¹⁷ The drought affected the Apaches' subsistence too, causing them to redouble their pressures on the afflicted Pueblos. Petitions from religious and lay leaders alike brought reinforcements from New Spain late in 1667. Fresh men and arms were stationed at the frontier pueblos which had been most seriously depopulated, and they managed to restrain the Apache attacks to some degree.¹⁸ But the famine worsened in 1670, a great plague carried off many people and cattle in 1671, and in 1672 the Apaches staged

¹⁶Nicolás de Aguilar, Mexico, Hearing of May 11, 1663, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 143.

¹⁷Fray Juan Bernal in a letter to the Tribunal, Convent of Santo Domingo, April 1, 1669, ibid., 271-272.

¹⁸Father Fray Francisco de Ayeta, Mexico, May 10, 1679, ibid., 297-298.

a general offensive in which they virtually sacked the province of all its cattle and sheep.¹⁹

New Mexico had been composed of forty-six pueblos of Christian Indians, and the one Spanish town of Santa Fe, with scattered Spanish ranches along the banks of the Rio Grande. In the 1670's the Apaches forced the abandonment of seven of the forty-six pueblos: Hawaiku, in the province of Zuñi; the Tompiros pueblos of Abó, Jumanos and Tabira; the Tewa pueblos of Chilili, Tajique and Quarai. The region of the salt lakes and the Manzano Mountains was totally lost to the Spaniards and Pueblos.²⁰ With the abandonment of these key frontier areas began a gradual forced contraction of the Spanish frontier, which seemed to foreshadow the total loss of the province. Now, for the first time, the Apaches did not hesitate to attack even Santa Fe. The Custodian of New Mexico, Fray Francisco de Ayeta, urged the Crown to save the province by establishing at Santa Fe for ten years a presidio of fifty men as had already been done in Sinaloa.²¹ He tried to bolster his plea by arguing that the development of New Mexico would facilitate the opening of the "contiguous

¹⁹Ibid., 302.

²⁰Fray Sylvestre Vélez de Escalante to Reverend Father Reader Fray Juan Agustín Morfi, Santa Fe, April 2, 1778, translated in The Spanish Archives of New Mexico, compiled by Ralph Emerson Twitchell (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1914), II, 268-280.

²¹Ayeta to the King, Mexico, May 28, 1679, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 309.

Californias which the Crown has been eager to exploit." But even if his arguments had won over the Crown, there was now no time to forestall disaster.

The situation exploded in 1680 with the Pueblo Revolt. The uprising was made in collusion with Apache groups, some of which harassed the Spaniards as they retreated from New Mexico.

The Pueblos maintained their freedom from the Spanish dominion for sixteen years, but it was a troubled period. Once the Spaniards were driven from New Mexico, the indios bárbaros turned with renewed enthusiasm to attacks upon the Pueblos. The Apaches maintained good relations with some of the Pueblos, but against others inflicted as much damage as they could. Apache and/or Navajo pressure was so great west of the Rio Grande that the Zuñis were forced to consolidate their remaining five pueblos into just one.²² The Utes came from the north to war upon Jémez, Taos, Picurís and the Tewa pueblos, where they wrought considerable damage. In addition, there were wars among the Pueblos.²³ The great disorder and hardship experienced by the Pueblos after the expulsion of the Spaniards may have been a factor in the comparative ease of the reconquest, completed in 1696.

²²Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, The Mercurio Volante ed. by Irving Albert Leonard (Los Angeles, 1932), 68, 72, 75.

²³Escalante to Morfi, Santa Fe, April 3, 1778, in Spanish Archives, compiled by Twitchell, II, 268-280.

Apache Wars Follow the Reconquest of New Mexico

The problem of the indios bárbaros loomed large in New Mexico from the very beginning of the reconquest. Apaches harassed Governor Diego de Vargas' first entrada, and throughout the struggle, recalcitrant Pueblos drew upon Navajo and Apache allies for support against the reoccupation forces.²⁴ When the reconquest was ostensibly completed, the bárbaros endangered the peace of the province by their very presence, for dissidents among the Pueblos knew quite well that they could turn to the Navajos and Apaches for aid any time they wished to repeat the revolt.²⁵ And all the while, Apache raids were commonplace in the lives of New Mexican Spaniards and Pueblos alike.

It seemed, then, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, that Apache hostility was an inescapable fact of New Mexican life. Fortunately, the province was now better equipped to meet that problem. In accordance with new policies of the Crown in regard to its Indian subjects, the encomienda system was not restored in New Mexico after the reconquest.²⁶ Instead, Santa Fe was given a regular presidial

²⁴Sigüenza y Góngora, Mercurio Volante, 72, 74, 79.

²⁵"Segundo Gobierno de Vargas," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, series 3, ed. by F. García Figueroa (Mexico, 1853-1857), I, 187.

²⁶J. Manuel Espinosa (ed.) in First Expedition of Vargas into New Mexico, 1692 (Albuquerque, 1940), 38.

garrison, which it retained throughout the Spanish period. Although it was still necessary to supplement the defenses of the province by drafting Spanish settlers and Indian auxiliaries to serve in campaigns of any size, the presence of a professional military corps was an incalculable asset to the governor in the formulation and execution of policy.

Crown policy now rigidly forbade offensive war against any Indians, so any New Mexican action against the bárbaros had to be justifiable in terms of defense.²⁷ Furthermore, practical considerations ruled out a general offensive aimed at extermination or expulsion of the Apaches, for experience indicated that such an attack would result only in a general scattering of the Apaches and useless exhaustion of the men and supplies of the Spaniards. New Mexican policy in regard to the Apaches, shaped not only by the principles of the Crown but by harsh frontier realities, therefore assumed a dual aim: first, a holding action, to limit Apache hostilities and prevent their destruction of the province; and ultimately, peaceful reduction of the Apaches.

The Spanish settlers themselves greatly aggravated the problem of Apache raiding, by carrying on a trade which

²⁷Marqués de Valero, Viceroy of New Spain, to Don Antonio de Valverde Cosío, Governor of New Mexico, Mexico, July 29, 1719, in Spanish Archives of New Mexico, The Governor's Palace, Santa Fe, no. 188. Hereinafter cited as S.A. N.M. Don Francisco Fernandez de la Cueva Enríquez, Viceroy of New Spain, to Governor Francisco Cuervo y Valdéz, Mexico, July 30, 1706, S.A.N.M., no. 124.

only increased the war incentives and prowess of the Apaches. As early as 1703, settlers from the Santa Fe region were going to the Jicarilla Apaches, selling them horses and buying captives.²⁸ The raids steadily mounted in intensity, while the limited Spanish forces were still largely preoccupied with maintaining the precarious reduction of the Pueblos. Some small punitive expeditions against the Apaches were all that could be managed in defense of the province. It was in one such abortive campaign against the Faraon Apache in the Sandia Mountains east of Bernalillo that the leader of the reconquest, Governor de Vargas, died.²⁹

A flurry of alarm ran through the Spanish community at the turn of the year 1704-1705, when rumors came in from the Cañada area of a conspiracy of Pueblos and bárbaros. Jicarilla Apaches, Navajos and Utes were conferring with Jémez, Santa Clara and other Pueblo nations at the pueblo of San Juan. Governor Juan Paez Hurtado promptly sent a contingent of five soldiers from Santa Fe, under Captian Diego de Medina, to keep San Juan under control. The alliance soon exploded when some Navajos annoyed the Santa Claras by stealing a horse at that pueblo. Taken into custody, the Navajos admitted that they had made the alliance in the first place

²⁸Antonio de Aguiloa et al, Petition to the Cabildo, Santa Fe, November 26, 1703, S.A.N.M., no. 91.

²⁹"Segundo Gobierno de Vargas," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 187.

just because they wished to gain entry into the pueblos. Times were hard then in the Navajo country, and the hungry Indians had hoped to find food in the Christian pueblos.³⁰

When Francisco Cuervo y Valdes came as ad interim governor, 1705-1707, he found the Pueblos under virtual siege by various Apache groups in such outlying locations as Zuñi, Acoma, Laguna, Jémez, Pecos, Picurís, Taos, Santa Clara and La Alameda.³¹ The Apache raids were by now felt in a serious depletion of the resources of the province. Although the province was subject on all fronts to constant enemy invasions, Cuervo reported that he could not launch a general defensive war because the presidials now lacked not only arms but horses. The settlers, who must be relied upon to furnish much of the numerical strength of any expedition, were also stripped of arms and horses; indeed, many of them were also grievously short of food. A council called by the viceroy to consider the problem of New Mexico consented to aid the beleaguered province with powder and ball, and recommended that reinforcements of thirty soldiers be sent to Santa Fe.³²

³⁰Expediente concerning a reported conspiracy of the Pueblos with the Apaches and Utes, Santa Fe, December 23, 1704, to February 28, 1705, S.A.N.M., no. 104.

³¹Rael de Aguilar, Certification, Santa Fe, January 10, 1706, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 367.

³²The thirty men were to be transferred in groups of ten each from the presidios of Janos, Sonora and Sinaloa, for it was felt that the more southern frontier suffered far less from enemy attack than did New Mexico.

The council gloomily noted that New Mexico was now costing the Crown 77,500 pesos annually, in addition to any funds which the religious were able to draw into the province.³³

It is difficult to determine just how much Cuervo was able to accomplish with his reinforcements. His own reports are almost the only source of information, and they are all too clearly the work of the ad interim governor trying to secure a permanent appointment by impressing his superiors. While it might have been difficult for him to exaggerate the difficulties of New Mexico in his letters of 1705, subsequent events do not bear out his claims that his campaigns achieved a general peace with the Apaches and Navajos in 1706.³⁴ Certainly he staged a number of campaigns, beginning in April, 1705, when he mustered the settlers to punish Apache horse thieves.³⁵ His military efforts meant using on the offensive the squadrons customarily stationed to protect frontier pueblos in order to carry the war home to the Apaches. That policy aroused the opposition of the missionaries, who cried that their missions were being left defenseless during the governor's campaigns.³⁶

³³Duke of Alburquerque, Junta, Mexico, February 28, 1706, S.A.N.M., no. 122.

³⁴Id., Mexico, July 30, 1706, S.A.N.M., no 124. The efforts of Cuervo to obtain the governorship on a permanent basis failed, for the king had already given the appointment to the Marqués de la Penuela.

³⁵Cuervo, Bando, Santa Fe, March 10, 1705, S.A.N.M., no. 110

³⁶Fray Juan Alvarez, Testimonio, Santa Fe, March 10, 1705, S.A.N.M., no. 110.

New Mexico Comes to Terms with the Navajos

While the occasional retaliatory thrusts against Apache hide-aways might curb to some degree, they could hardly stop the raids of the numerous Apache groups. But the Navajos to the west afforded a somewhat better target for Spanish military operations, and it was with that hostile group that the Spaniards had their first success in the eighteenth century.

The Navajos had probably begun to practice agriculture as early as the mid-sixteenth century, and were a considerably more settled group than their Athapascan kinsmen, the Apaches. Their fields contained corn, beans, squash and chile, as did those of their Pueblo neighbors. In addition, they planted cotton and raised flocks of sheep, thus producing the fibers for the textile weaving for which they were already noted.³⁷ For purposes of defense they built their houses away from the fields, atop the adjacent mesas.³⁸ The numbers of the Navajos were considerably augmented during the period of the revolt and reconquest, when many Pueblo refugees settled among the Navajos.³⁹ Their population at

³⁷Cuervo, Santa Fe, August 18, 1706, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 382.

³⁸Willard W. Hill, "Some Navaho Culture Changes during Two Centuries (with a translation of the early eighteenth century Rabal Manuscript)," in Essays in Historical Anthropology of North America (Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, C) (Washington, 1940), 397.

³⁹Robert Neely Bellah, Apache Kinship Systems (Cambridge, 1952), 10.

the beginning of the eighteenth century was perhaps about four thousand.⁴⁰ They were known as a warlike people, who not only raided their Pueblo neighbors regularly, but also made annual slaving raids each February against the Pawnee and Wichita villages on the plains to the east.⁴¹

Cuervo lost no time in acting against the Navajos. Within two weeks after he arrived in New Mexico he sent a company of soldiers in pursuit of two large Navajo parties which had been stealing horses from San Ildefonso, Santa Clara and San Juan, and he established the practice of sending Pueblo forces with a token Spanish representation to punish Navajo raids on the Pueblos.⁴² In 1706 the governor reported that the principal captain of the Navajos had asked for peace, expressing the willingness of the tribe to accept baptism and reduction to formal settlements. Already the tribe were trading on a peaceful basis with the Spaniards and Pueblos.⁴³

The Navajos broke the peace in 1708, with a series of murders and robberies, taking many captives in the course

⁴⁰Hill, "Navaho Culture Changes," in Essays in Historical Anthropology, 396; "Apuntamientos que sobre el terreno hizo el padre Juan Amado Niel," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, 109.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Captain Rael de Aguilar, Certification, Santa Fe, January 10, 1706, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 367.

⁴³Cuervo, Santa Fe, August 18, 1706, ibid., 382.

of the hostilities.⁴⁴ Orders came from Mexico City to exercise great caution in the future in admitting either the Navajo or Hopi groups to peace, lest they feign peace only to gain access to the settlements and pueblos.⁴⁵

Throughout 1709 the Navajos stole livestock in New Mexico, making themselves particularly objectionable at San Ildefonso, San Juan and Santa Clara.⁴⁶ The Spaniards asked the Pueblos to pursue the thieves whenever possible, but the pursuit did little to diminish the robberies. The climax of the insults came when the Navajos sacked Jémez, destroying the church and desecrating its sacramental vessels.⁴⁷ Then the governor, the Marqués de la Peñuela, assembled the forces of the province, Pueblo as well as Spanish, and carried the offensive into the Navajo country.⁴⁸ The result was the establishment of a new truce with the Navajos in 1710.⁴⁹

⁴⁴"Relaciones de Nuevo Mexico, Año de 1707. Gobierno del Marqués de la Peñuela y Almirante," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 197.

⁴⁵Duke of Alburquerque to the Marqués de la Peñuela, Mexico, December 4, 1708, S.A.N.M., no. 152.

⁴⁶Marqués de la Peñuela to Sargento Mayor Juan de Uribarri, Alcalde Mayor de Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, February 21, 1709, S.A.N.M., no. 154.

⁴⁷"Relaciones de Nuevo Mexico, Año de 1707. Gobierno del Marqués de la Peñuela y Almirante," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 197.

⁴⁸Marqués de la Peñuela, Santa Fe, December 8, 1709, S.A.N.M., no. 154.

⁴⁹"Relaciones de Nuevo Mexico, Año de 1707. Gobierno del Marqués de la Peñuela y Almirante," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 197.

Old habits prevailed again, and by 1713 Navajo raiding posed a serious problem in the pueblos of San Ildefonso and Santa Clara.⁵⁰ In 1714, further robberies and the murder of a Jémez chief caused the dispatch of a punitive expedition to the Navajo country.⁵¹ Like those which had preceded it, the action produced only the most temporary and limited objectives. Yet within a few years the Navajo hostility toward the Spaniards did cease, so that by 1720 they were no longer reckoned among the enemies of New Mexico.⁵² The change was due, not to any great success of Spanish arms, but to increasing inroads upon Navajo territory and property by the Utes and Comanches. Although they persisted in their refusal to receive missionaries, the Navajos remained until the late eighteenth century among the most consistently friendly of the nations surrounding New Mexico. Their trade in textiles, skins and baskets, and in their war captives, grew to major importance in the commerce of the province.⁵³

⁵⁰Juan Ygnacio Flores Mogollón, Santa Fe, May 13, 1713, S.A.N.M., no. 193; Autos and Junta de Guerra on thefts committed by the Navajo Apaches, Santa Fe, October 18-23, 1713, S.A.N.M., no. 199.

⁵¹"Relaciones de Nuevo Mexico, Año de 1707. Gobierno del Marqués de la Peñuela y Almirante," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 205.

⁵²Donald E. Worcester, "The Navaho during the Spanish Regime in New Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review, XXVI (April, 1951), 112.

⁵³"Apuntamientos," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 108.

Apache Pressures on New Mexico Increase
on All Frontiers except the North

Although Apache raids remained commonplace, the settlers of New Mexico also managed to maintain a considerable trade with many Apache groups. Left unsupervised, the trade itself produced friction which led to further hostilities, so the New Mexican government moved to prohibit trade in areas beyond its supervisory facilities. In 1712, there was circulated throughout the province an order prohibiting settlers from going to trade with the non-Christian Indians, under penalty of two months imprisonment and loss of any office which the settler might hold.⁵⁴ The latter provision suggests that local officials were among the principal offenders.

Apache raids were generally directed against frontier pueblos, as of old, or against the scattered ranches of the Spaniards, with theft of livestock as their main objective. In practice, Spanish policy seems to have been to tolerate minor depredations by the Apaches until the toll in livestock, and sometimes in lives, became really important. When the governor felt that such a point had been reached, he set in motion the ponderous machinery of Spanish colonial government. A council of leading citizens, with particular representation for the areas most afflicted, was called to

⁵⁴Flores Mogollón, Santa Fe, December 16, 1712, S.A.N.M., no. 185.

consider the reports of damages and weigh those damages against the probable success of a punitive campaign. Most often the council decided in favor of a restricted campaign, realizing that the Apaches would neither be exterminated nor cowed enough to make a genuine peace, but hoping to deter raiders by reminding them that there did exist Spanish forces responsible for protecting the ranches and pueblos.

Expeditions against the Apaches sometimes resulted in the acquisition of captives, who were purchased by local settlers, either for resale or for service as slaves. The welfare of those captives was a matter of concern to the government, for the conversion of souls was still a prime official objective of the province, and it was decreed in 1714 that Apache slaves must be baptized just as were Negro slaves.⁵⁵

The chief offenders in the second decade of the eighteenth century were the Faraon Apaches, who lived in the Sandia Mountains, and from there preyed upon Pueblos and Spaniards from Isleta to Pecos. In July, 1714, the Faraones had taken so many cattle and horses that a council decided punishment must be made. Governor Juan Ignacio Flores Mogollón, on recommendation of the council, decreed that a force of eighty men, equipped for a two-month expedition,

⁵⁵Id., Decree, Santa Fe, September 26, 1714, S.A.N.M., no. 212.

would leave Santa Fe presidio at the end of October.⁵⁶ But through July, Faraon depredations were so serious in the Bernalillo-Alameda area that a second council recommended immediate punitive action. Flores Mogollón therefore ordered that thirty-six men leave the Santa Fe presidio on August 15, to be joined by settlers from Albuquerque and Canada and Indians from Taos, Pecos and the Queres pueblos.⁵⁷ Apparently the expeditions had some effect, for the Faraones sued for peace at Pecos and at Isleta. Soon, however, they took advantage of the peace granted them at Isleta to enter the settled area, and not only committed new robberies but kidnapped a Spanish child before retreating to their mountain camps. A council deliberated through the summer, wanting to punish the outrages but helpless before the problems of establishing the identities of the offending Apaches and of finding their mountain hide-aways.⁵⁸ The problem of defending the province was further complicated in 1715, when Apache raids in the west forced the Spaniards to disperse their limited forces even more widely by sending a squadron of twenty-five men to protect the Zuñi area.⁵⁹

⁵⁶Auto and Junta de Guerra, Santa Fe, June 30-July 6, 1714, S.A.N.M., no. 206.

⁵⁷Junta de Guerra, Santa Fe, August 9-14, 1714, S.A.N.M., no. 209.

⁵⁸Junta de Guerra, Albuquerque, and Santa Fe, June 16-September 14, 1715, S.A.N.M., no. 224.

⁵⁹Flores Mogollón, Decree, Santa Fe, September 27, 1715, S.A.N.M., no. 231b.

The Spanish expeditions against the apaches relied heavily upon the use of Indian auxiliaries, chiefly Pueblos. But the secular authorities of New Mexico did not trust the Pueblos sufficiently to acquiesce in their possession of firearms. When the military group demanded that the Pueblos be forbidden to own firearms, the religious objected that it would be quite unfair to deprive them of the advantage of guns in a province surrounded by enemies, and that in any case, the resentment which such an action would create among the Pueblos would far outweigh any good it might do. But after hearing arguments from both sides, the governor decreed that firearms might be owned in the future only by specially designated, highly trusted individuals among the Christian Indians.⁶⁰ It was, therefore, always necessary for the Crown to supply fresh arms from its own stores when Pueblo auxiliaries were called into action.

Although the general rule was that the Pueblos and Apaches were deeply hostile to each other, there were certain ties between specific groups which had to be considered with care in the selection of Indian auxiliary forces for any given campaign. For instance, it was believed that Pecos pueblo should never be allowed to send warriors on a punitive expedition against the Faraones, because many Faraones were actually Pecos Indians who had fled at the time of the

⁶⁰"Gobierno del Marqués de la Peñuela y Almirante," Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 201.

reduction of Pecos.⁶¹ The Queres, also, were considered bad risks because they might warn the enemy of the approaching force, so they were watched with great caution by the Spaniards on the occasions when they were called into service.

On the other hand, the Jicarilla Apaches had by 1714 come to Taos to make a genuine peace with the Spaniards, and they became a major reliance of the Spaniards for action against the Faraon Apaches.⁶² Again, there arose in this instance, a peaceful relationship between the Spaniards and a hitherto hostile group, not because of any success of Spanish arms, but because this northern Apache group was first to feel the brunt of the Ute-Comanche thrust from the north. They necessarily turned to the Spaniards for protection, indicating their willingness to accept pueblo life and Christianization.

⁶¹Don Gerónimo, Testimony, Santa Fe, July 29, 1715, in After Coronado, Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico 1690-1727 ed. by Alfred Barnaby Thomas (Norman, 1935), 81.

⁶²Ibid.; Auto and Junta de Guerra on the matter of war with the Apaches Faraones, Santa Fe, June 30-July 6, 1714, S.A.N.M., no. 206.

CHAPTER II

THE COMANCHES OVERTURN THE BALANCE OF POWER ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER, 1700-1762

Even while the Spaniards were largely preoccupied with their holding action against the Apaches and Navajos on the New Mexican frontier, there had occurred an important change in the native population. The emergence of newly powerful bands from the north posed a serious danger to the existence of the province, even though it drove into alliance with the Spaniards former enemies such as the Navajos and Jicarilla Apaches.

The new situation stemmed from the further spread of the use of the horse, with all of its revolutionary implications in Indian life. The first groups north of the Apaches which were affected by the diffusion were the Utes and the Comanches, who, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, suddenly threatened the very existence of both Apaches and New Mexicans.¹

The Utes had been known to the Spaniards since the administration of Governor Juan de Oñate at the beginning of

¹Secoy, Changing Military Patterns, 29.

the seventeenth century as the impoverished and relatively harmless inhabitants of the mountains north of the New Mexican settlements.² They caused little or no trouble to the Spaniards in the period before 1680, but they began to harass the northern Pueblos during the period of the expulsion of the Spaniards.³ Probably horse theft was the prime motive for their raiding activities, for de Vargas makes the earliest report of the use of horses by the Utes in 1692 at the beginning of the reconquest. Certainly, the Ute demand for horses became insatiable, for they not only supplied their own needs, but were also the principal purveyors of horses to tribes still farther north. By 1704, the horse thefts of the Utes had become a real problem to the New Mexicans.⁴

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Utes were joined by a far more powerful group, the Comanches, and their combined activities seriously menaced the northern frontier. The Comanches, a Shoshonean people, migrated south from the mountains of present Wyoming, attracted in part by the horses available in the New Mexico region, and in part, perhaps, impelled by Siouxan pressures from the north and east. The Comanches apparently established themselves among the Utes to such a degree that the two peoples

²"Apuntamientos," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 102, 107.

³See above, page 23.

⁴Alfred Barnaby Thomas (ed.) in After Coronado, 26.

were regarded almost as one by the Spaniards by the second decade of the century.⁵

The first record of combined hostilities by the Comanches and Utes is in 1706, when Juan de Ulibarri, in charge of an expedition to recover some Picurís fugitives from the Cuartelejo Apaches, found Taos pueblo and the north-eastern Apache groups fearfully awaiting an expected attack from the new enemies.⁶ The Comanche-Ute alliance did strike against two Apache rancherías,⁷ marking the beginning of an onslaught which would drive the Apaches from the region within a few years' time. Ulibarri found the Cuartelejos absorbed in a fierce enmity with the Pawnees and Wichitas, who were associating themselves with the French traders from Illinois and were beginning to receive guns from their new friends.⁸ In short, Ulibarri brought back with him news not only of mounting danger from increasing numbers of indios bárbaros, but also of approaches to the province by European rivals who were dealing in guns for the Indians. The northern and eastern Apaches, bearing the brunt of the attacks, were turning now to the Spaniards for aid. A sweeping

⁵"Gobierno de D. Felix Martínez," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 106.

⁶Juan de Ulibarri, Diary, July 13-September 1, 1706, in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 61, 65.

⁷Ibid., 76.

⁸Ibid., 68.

reappraisal, and perhaps reversal, of Spanish policy in regard to certain of the indios bárbaros was clearly in order if the northern frontier were to be maintained.

New Mexico Faces the Ute-Comanche Menace

First in urgency, if not in importance, was the Comanche-Ute problem, for those groups now menaced every pueblo and settlement north of Santa Fe. During the administration of the Marqués de la Peñuela (1707-1712), the Comanches and Utes solicited a formal peace with the Spaniards and were granted it.⁹ But the peace was frequently used only as a cloak under which to enter the province in order to steal horses. Friction between the Utes and Pueblos was climaxed in 1714 by a serious incident at Taos pueblo, beginning with horse theft and ending in bloodshed, which threatened to bring about a general war. Governor Juan Ignacio Flores Mogollón managed to arrange restitution for damages and calmed both Utes and Taos enough to avert disaster, but the situation continued to be very dangerous to the province.¹⁰

Continual robberies and murders led to a council of war at Santa Fe in 1716, when it was decided to send an

⁹Christóbal de la Serna, Opinion, in Council of War, Santa Fe, August 19, 1716, ibid., 105.

¹⁰"Gobierno del Marqués de la Peñuela," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 201.

expedition against the Utes and Comanches.¹¹ This council marks the beginning of serious consideration by the Spaniards of the possibility of an alliance with the Jicarilla and Sierra Blanca Apaches against their mutual enemies, the Utes and Comanches.

Captain Christóbal Serna led the expedition which left Taos in 1716 with a force of fifty soldiers, twelve settlers and fifty Tewa Pueblos. They achieved enough success to deter the Ute-Comanche depredations for a short time. The Utes begged earnestly for peace, and were formally granted it in 1717 by Governor Félix Martínez.¹²

Shortly thereafter, the Utes and Comanches reverted to their old habits, and by 1719 the robberies and murders had mounted to such a degree that a council of war called by Governor Antonio Valverde y Cosío concluded that the provocations were quite sufficient to justify making war against the Utes.¹³ Interestingly enough, while it was pointed out by many members of the council that the Comanches were at least as blameworthy as their Ute allies, the punishment

¹¹Council of war concerning an expedition against the Utes and Comanches, Santa Fe, July 2-October 15, 1716, S.A.N.M., no. 279.

¹²"Gobierno de Don Félix Martínez," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 107.

¹³Testimonies which were made in the matter of the campaign against the Utes for their murders and thefts in New Mexico, called by Governor Valverde y Cosío, Santa Fe, August 11, 1719, S.A.N.M., no. 301; Council of War, Santa Fe, August 19, 1719, in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 100-110.

seemed destined to fall entirely on the Utes, who were much easier to find and less dangerous to fight. Governor Valverde himself led the expedition, but both the Utes and Comanches eluded his force completely. He did encounter many Apaches who begged for aid against the Utes and Comanches, and heard further reports of Apache warfare with Pawnees and Wichitas, and of more permanent French establishments among those tribes.¹⁴ Before turning back to Santa Fe, Valverde promised the Apaches the protection of Spain against the Frenchmen.

French Intrusion Alarms the Spanish Frontier

Prevention of intrusion by the French into New Spain had been a prime consideration on the northern frontier since before the eighteenth century began. La Salle's abortive attempt to establish a French colony in Texas in 1684 alarmed the colonial authorities and brought a flurry of counter-activity in New Spain. The strategy devised for defense of the rich north Mexican mining regions was a defensive expansion of the frontier to the north, in effect the creation of a buffer zone to protect the real wealth of the empire. This was a principal motive, not only in the reoccupation in force of New Mexico, but also in the first penetration of Spanish forces into Texas in 1689-1693, and in the founding of Los Adaes in east Texas in 1716.

¹⁴Antonio de Valverde y Cosio, Diary, September 15-October 22, 1719, ibid., 110-133.

There were no further attempts to establish French colonies so near the Spanish frontier, but the wealth of New Spain was by no means forgotten by the French. More interested in commerce than in colonization anyway, they now made earnest efforts to establish trade with New Spain. Spain was firmly committed to a policy of commercial exclusiveness throughout her empire, and the overtures were officially rejected, though some local officials did encourage and profit by illicit trade on the frontiers. Natchitoches, founded on the Louisiana frontier in 1713, was established by the French primarily to open trade with northern New Spain, and its founder, Louis Juchereau de St. Denis, had some success in dealing with the Spanish border officials, though he never gained the official trade sanction which he sought.

While the French dreams of a flourishing open commerce with New Spain were thwarted, they achieved a very practical success in an area quite beyond the control of Spain, and thereby menaced the very existence of her northern frontier. From the early eighteenth century, French traders in the Mississippi Valley worked at the Indian trade on the Great Plains. The venture carried with it a considerable immediate profit, and the traders never ceased to hope that it would someday be an avenue for the opening of trade with Santa Fe. Santa Fe, in turn, might eventually

be the key to commerce with the rich and inaccessible northern mining provinces of New Spain.¹⁵

Active manifestations of the Franco-Spanish rivalry for New World empire now were concentrated in the area of the Great Plains lying between the Spanish outposts of New Mexico and Texas, and the French establishments in Illinois and Louisiana. Since neither the French nor the Spanish had the population resources which would have been necessary for effective colonization in that vast region, the rivalry took the form of a struggle for control of the Indian population. Indian policy became not only the instrument of defense, of trade, or of the missionary, but the very foundation of empire.

There probably was no formal French decision to drive out the Apaches. But they needed to make alliances with the Caddoan bands whose villages were the keys to the Plains trade, and later to conciliate the increasingly powerful Comanches. The natural way to win their gratitude and confidence was to aid them against the Apaches whom they

¹⁵In 1702, the French governor of Louisiana proposed consolidation of the "Panis" Wichita groups on the Arkansas and establishment of a post among them, not only to facilitate trade, but by strengthening the French influence, to discourage Panis raids on New Mexico. Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, "Memoire sur le pays du Mississippi, la Mobile et ses environs, leur rivières, les peuples qui habitent, sur le commerce qui s'y pourra faire dans moins de cinq à six années, en établissant ce pays, 30 juin, 1702, à bord de la Renommée," in Découvertes et Etablissements des Français dans le Sud de l'Amérique Septentrionale ed. by Pierre Margry (Paris, 1846), IV, 599.

hated, and such a course was by no means novel in the history of French-Indian relations.

The French succeeded in establishing amicable relations with the principal Caddoan groups of the present Nebraska-Kansas-Oklahoma area, the various Pawnee and Wichita bands, and their villages became the key posts in the French trade. The remaining barrier to the west then was the hostile Comanche nation which blocked the path to Santa Fe and was the terror of the village Indians. By 1724 the French were influential enough on the Plains to sponsor a general peace meeting of Otoes, Osages, Iowas, Kansas, Panis Mahas, Missouriis and Illinois with the Comanches at a Kansas village.¹⁶ In 1747 the French sponsored an alliance between the Comanches and the Wichita bands.¹⁷ The French-Indian trade flourished, the road to New Mexico was open, and French traders with Comanche escorts knocked on the doors of Taos and Santa Fe.

¹⁶Etienne Veniard de Bourgmont, Relation du Voyage de la Rivière Missouri, sur le Haut de Celle des Arkansas et du Missouri aux Padoucas, June 25, 1724, November 1, 1724, ibid., 312 ff.

¹⁷Autos fhos sre averiguar que rumbo han ttraido trres franzeses que llegaron al Pueblo de taos con la Nazn Cumanche q benian a hazer sus acostumbrados regattes, and Testimonio de los Autos fhos a Consulta del Govor del nuevo Mexco sobre haver llegado dos franzeses cargados de efectos que conduzian de la Nueva Orleans, Archivo General y Pública de la Nacion (Mexico City), Provincias Internas, Tomo XXIV [William Edward Dunn Transcripts, Library of the University of Texas]. Hereinafter cited as Autos de los Franceses.

Local officials in Santa Fe naturally reacted in terms of meeting an immediate danger to the existence of their province. But they were subordinate to the policy makers at the viceregal court and in the Council of the Indies, who had to deal with the French threat in terms not only of the entire frontier, but also of the prevailing foreign policies of Spain.

Although Bourbons ruled in both Spain and France after 1700, the two countries were twice at war with each other in the early part of the century: from 1718 to 1720, followed by a period from 1721-1725 when Spain and France were formally allied; and from 1727 to 1729, when France and England were allied against Spain. In 1733 there was formed the first Family Compact between France and Spain. Following this alliance with France, Spain then remained almost constantly at war, being involved in the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1738), the War of Jenkins Ear (1739-1741), and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). During the periods of war with France, the possibility of invasion of New Spain from the neighboring possessions of France had constantly to be considered by the colonial government. Perhaps even more difficult were the periods in which France and Spain were formally allied in Europe, for the French colonials never ceased their attempts to achieve at least a commercial penetration of New Spain. Convinced that the survival of New Spain depended upon the entire exclusion of

the French from the viceroyalty, the policy makers had nevertheless to exercise utmost care to give no overt offense to their nominal allies. One tragic factor was constant and ultimately overwhelming: the constant wars of Spain in Europe, while exposing her colonies to possible attack from every power on the continent, so drained Spanish resources that the forces which might once have defended the vast empire dwindled at last to pitiful inadequacy. Meanwhile, faced with the responsibility of maintaining an empire already extended far beyond the defensive capabilities of the mother country, the government could devise only one defense: further expansion.

Texas Is Occupied as a Buffer against French Expansion

One move against the French was the reoccupation in force of the eastern Texas settlements which had been temporarily abandoned in 1719 during the brief war of Spain and France. The Marqués de Aguayo led an expedition in 1721 which reoccupied the area of eastern Texas, re-establishing the six missions and the presidio of Dolores, and establishing at Los Adaes a presidio of one hundred men. This was the capital of the province.

While the prime objective of the reoccupation was to prevent total French ascendancy among the populous sedentary Indians of east Texas, the province soon became another front in the struggle with the indios bárbaros. In the period

1722-1727, the hostilities of the Apaches against the San Antonio area increased markedly, although they were officially at peace with the province of Texas. This probably reflected the growing pressures of the Comanche and Caddoan groups which were steadily pushing the Apaches southward. The first formal campaign of the Spaniards from San Antonio was made in 1723,¹⁸ but the forces of Texas were too small to be at all effective against the scattered Apaches. In answer to appeals for assistance, the viceroy only urged upon Governor Fernando Pérez de Almazán the use of reason and kindness to control the Apaches, a policy which proved wholly impracticable.¹⁹ Unfortunately, the Texans were not only denied the reinforcements which they requested, but the defenses of the province were weakened by Visitador Pedro de Rivera, who reduced the presidial garrison of San Antonio by ten men. Rivera considered the Apaches in the hills around San Antonio, then not very numerous, to be no real danger except to the horse herds. If all the soldiers of the presidio had to do was to punish the occasional horse thief, Rivera was unwilling to spend the king's funds to support a very strong garrison in Texas.²⁰ Unfortunately, the penny-

¹⁸Herbert Eugene Bolton, Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century (Berkeley, 1915), 27.

¹⁹Fray Juan Augustín Morfi, History of Texas, 1673-1779 ed. by Carlos Eduardo Castañeda (Albuquerque, 1935), II, 243.

²⁰Pedro de la Rivera, "Informe y Proyecto" in Diario y Derrotero de lo Caminado, Visto y Observado en la Visita

wise policy of Rivera left Texas quite unprepared to face a greatly aggravated Apache problem in the succeeding decade.

There began in the 1720's some effort to coordinate the Indian policies in New Mexico and Texas. Even while Aguayo prepared his expedition for the reoccupation of Texas, the fiscal recommended that he be informed that the Apaches had come to solicit Spanish allegiance throughout New Mexico. Aguayo was ordered to strive for such a settlement with the Apaches in Texas.²¹

Apache outrages in Texas in 1731 were so bad that a formal campaign was undertaken against them in 1732 at the order of the Marqués de Casa Fuerte, then serving as Viceroy of New Spain. It is interesting to note that Casa Fuerte acted on the recommendation of Rivera in ordering the campaign, although Rivera had depreciated the dangers of the Apaches in Texas at the time of his general inspection. The expedition found and defeated a large Apache camp. The Apaches sued for peace, which they promptly violated.²²

The Apache depredations in Texas continued until 1749, when the Apaches again asked for peace. They then

que hizo a los Presidios de la Nueva España Septentrional el Brigadier Pedro de Rivera ed. by Vito Alessio-Robles (Mexico, 1946), 168.

²¹Juan de Oliván Revollo to Marqués de Casa Fuerte, Mexico, April 10, 1724, in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 192-193.

²²Morfi, History of Texas, II, 280-281.

almost ceased hostilities in Texas during 1749 and 1750. The Lipans still felt friendly enough in 1750 to inform San Antonio that the Natagéés were preparing for the warpath, and while the warning came too late to save the life of the missionary at the Rio Grande presidio, it did help to avert serious losses along the rest of that frontier sector.²³

New Mexico Meets the French Intruders

Santa Fe very early felt the repercussions of the new situation on the plains to the east. First rumors of French intrusion came in 1695, when Apaches trading at the pueblo of Picurís reported that many Frenchmen were coming to the Plain of Cibola. The Apaches claimed that they were being attacked so constantly by the French that they were being forced to retreat closer to the Pueblos.²⁴ In 1700, there came to Santa Fe rumors that a French force had attacked and destroyed a village of Jumanos on the eastern plains.²⁵ Confirmation of French activities among the Plains Indians came with the reports of the Ulibarri expedition of 1706 and the Valverde expedition of 1719.²⁶

²³Ibid., 308-309.

²⁴Luis Granillo to Governor Diego de Vargas, Santa Fe, September 29, 1695, in Frederick Webb Hodge, "French Intrusion toward New Mexico in 1695," New Mexico Historical Review, IV (January, 1929), 73.

²⁵Twitchell, Spanish Archives, II, 189.

²⁶See above, 41, 44.

The reaction in Santa Fe, like that in Mexico City, was akin to panic. Drilled in the long-standing policy of commercial exclusiveness, themselves lacking the French commercial genius, and terrified at the thought of guns in the hands of new waves of indios bárbaros, the New Mexican Spaniards could give no credence to the notion that the French actually were trying to halt raiding activities against New Mexico.²⁷ Indeed, they contended that the devil himself was at work against them on the French frontier. The theory was bruited about that the French traders were Huguenots rather than good French Catholics and were therefore not to be entrusted with the welfare of the souls of any Indian population.²⁸ So missionary zeal was enlisted to support the opposition to the French encroachments. The Marqués de Valero, in his capacity as viceroy, urged the duty of the missionaries to aid in "subjugating and entertaining" the Apaches in order to use them against the French.²⁹

Valverde's reports of French hostilities against the Cuartelejo Apaches, in alliance with the Pawnees and Wichitas,

²⁷An example of the sincerity of the French in this matter is that Fabry de la Bruyere's official errand for the governor of Louisiana on his expedition in 1741 was to exhort the Osages, Panis and Comanches to quit attacking New Mexico. Jean Baptiste Le Moyne Bienville et Salmon, Lettre, New Orleans, April 30, 1741, in Découvertes ed. by Margry, VI, 468.

²⁸"Apuntamientos," in Documentos para la Historia de Méjico, ser. 3, I, 108-109.

²⁹Marqués de Valero, Order, Mexico, August 1, 1719, in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 138-139.

added to news that France and Spain were now at war in Europe, brought action from the viceroy. To obstruct the French approach to New Mexico, in 1720 the viceroy ordered Valverde to establish a presidio at El Cuartelejo. The garrison was to be made up of twenty-five of the best soldiers from the Santa Fe presidio, married men who were to take their families with them to the new post for a permanent assignment. Several missionaries were to work there for the conversion of the Apaches, and a perpetual alliance was to be formed with the Apaches for the protection of the frontier. "In view of the fact that these Indians are so widely dispersed that they extend as far as the Texas and the Mississippi River, we can make use of their assistance in those parts for defense and for impeding the ingress of the French."³⁰ This order, coupled with those to Aguayo in Texas, shows the idea of alliance with the Apaches to be well accepted in Mexico City in 1720 as one possible answer to the pressures on the north.

Valverde protested the order, and called a council of experienced New Mexican leaders, who testified in support of his arguments.³¹ El Cuartelejo was one hundred thirty leagues to the northeast, at such an exposed location that

³⁰Junta de Guerra, Mexico, January 2, 1720, in Pichardo's Treatise on the Limits of Louisiana and Texas ed. by Charles Wilson Hackett (Austin, 1934), III, 204-205.

³¹Valverde to Valero, Santa Fe, May 27, 1720, in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 154-156; Council of War, Santa Fe, June 2, 1720, ibid., 156-160; Valverde to Valero, Santa Fe, June 15, 1720, ibid., 160-162.

only an extraordinarily large garrison could hope to survive. To supply it at that distance from New Mexico was impractical, and the site was so poor that it could not possibly furnish the total subsistence for the proposed mission and presidio. Valverde and the council urged that instead the presidio be established at La Jicarilla, only forty leagues northeast of Santa Fe, where the Apache population had for some time been very well inclined toward Christianity. A presidio among the Jicarilla could serve not only to counter the French activities, but also to protect the sorely pressed Jicarillas from the Utes and Comanches, and from the Faraon Apaches.

The New Mexicans won their point. On the advice of his council, the viceroy ordered Valverde to establish the presidio at La Jicarilla. There he was to provide for the conversion of the Jicarillas and establish a "perpetual alliance" with them.³²

Meanwhile, the Spanish forces in New Mexico suffered a devastating loss. In 1720, Valverde sent his lieutenant, Pedro de Villasur, with a reconnaissance group to determine the location of the French establishment. Near present North Platte, Nebraska, the force was almost wiped out by a group of Pawnees and Frenchmen. Only a dozen Spanish survivors made their way back to El Cuartelejo to be succored by the

³²Valero, Order, Mexico, September 26, 1720, ibid., 234-239.

Apaches. The fiasco cost New Mexico a third of its best soldiers, leaving it open not only to French invasion, but an easy mark for the Utes, Comanches and Faraones, who lost no opportunity to prey on the frontiers.³³

Mexico City found even more grave implications in the Villasur disaster. The war with France was already over, ended by the Treaty of the Hague in February, 1720. The French attack upon Villasur's force amounted to an outright violation of the truce, and might therefore portend a general renewal of hostilities between the two countries. In a flurry of alarm, the viceroy planned to send immediate reinforcements to New Mexico and ordered the prompt establishment of the projected presidio at La Jicarilla.³⁴

Valverde protested that after losing thirty-two presidials in the Villasur action, he could hardly spare twenty-five men for the founding of La Jicarilla presidio. He insisted, too, that it would be suicidal to send only twenty-five men to an isolated outpost among the Apaches, who could assemble two or three thousand warriors against them in a few days' time if they should ever turn against the Spaniards.³⁵ The council in Mexico City authorized Valverde to

³³Valverde to Valero, Santa Fe, October 8, 1720, ibid., 162-167.

³⁴Master Sainz to Valero, Mexico, November 4, 1720, ibid., 167-169.

³⁵Valverde to the Viceroy, Santa Fe, February 3, 1721, in Pichardo's Treatise ed. by Hackett, III, 215.

increase the number of soldiers for La Jicarilla to fifty, recruiting them wherever he could. It further ordered that the soldiers be supplied with provisions in advance of the winter season.³⁶

But of course there were in New Mexico neither the potential recruits nor the supplies with which to implement the order of the council. Valverde turned his attention instead to mustering the forces of the province for a campaign against the Apaches (probably in this instance the Faraones) in the hope that vigorous punishment might make them regret their "continuous insults and robberies on the frontiers and population of the province." All settlers, as good vassals of the king, were called upon to present themselves with their arms and horses, to carry out the campaign.³⁷

Officials in Mexico City ceased to pursue the matter of the Jicarilla presidio after June, 1721, when Spain made an alliance with France. Action in New Mexico was paralyzed by a public outcry for a scapegoat for the Villasur fiasco, which led first to Valverde's dismissal from the governorship, then to an investigation by the Visitor General, Pedro de Rivera, which ultimately resulted in a verdict of criminal negligence and fines totaling two hundred pesos.³⁸

³⁶Junta de Guerra, Mexico, July 14, 1721, *ibid.*, 218-219.

³⁷Valverde, Bando, Santa Fe, August 9, 1721, S.A.N.M., no. 313.

³⁸Revolledo to Casa Fuerte, Mexico, May 29, 1727, in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 241-244.

But the northern Apaches did not so easily forget the presidio project, for to them it now seemed to be the only chance of survival. Late in 1723, Captain Carlana led an Apache delegation to Santa Fe to appeal for protection against the Comanches. They offered to obey the Spanish king, to accept baptism, and to settle at La Jicarilla in pueblos like those of the Christian Indians of New Mexico.³⁹ Governor Juan Domingo de Bustamante suspended a projected campaign against the Faraones in order to call a council to consider the new Jicarilla appeal. The council, concurring with Bustamante, thought the opportunity too good to permit delay. They hoped that the example of the Jicarillas might influence others of the Apaches to become settled Christian vassals of the king, and regarded the Apache settlements as valuable buffers against the French advance. Therefore, the council recommended that Bustamante proceed at once to La Jicarilla with fifty soldiers to establish the proposed pueblo.⁴⁰

The expedition convinced Bustamante of the sincerity of the Jicarillas and of the desirability of a presidio in their location. He promised the protection of Spanish arms, and tools to cultivate the soil. Upon his return to Santa

³⁹Juan Domingo de Bustamante, Decree, Santa Fe, November 8, 1723, ibid., 193-195.

⁴⁰Council of War, Santa Fe, November 9, 1723, ibid., 195-197.

Fe, he urged the viceroy to sanction the request of the Apaches.⁴¹ Casa Fuerte ordered the governor to keep the Jicarillas happy while the proper authorities in Mexico City deliberated upon a course of action.⁴² Unfortunately, while policy was debated at the viceregal level, the Comanche pressures on the Jicarillas grew even worse.

A council of New Mexicans called in February, 1724, considered the reports of Comanche attacks on a Jicarilla ranchería. They had to decide whether the newly professed Christians of La Jicarilla should be considered vassals of the king, and therefore entitled to the protection of his arms. The council saw a clear obligation to defend the Jicarillas, and decided in favor of war on the Comanches.⁴³ A force dispatched from Santa Fe restored sixty-four Jicarillas to the band, thus winning their strong gratitude to the Spaniards. But since the presidio had yet to materialize, the frightened Jicarillas seriously considered moving to the Navajo country.⁴⁴ It was generally realized, not only in Santa Fe but also in Mexico City, that this would result in the loss of a valuable buffer against the French, and might

⁴¹Bustamante to Casa Fuerte, Santa Fe, January 10, 1724, ibid., 201-203.

⁴²Id. to Id., Santa Fe, May 30, 1724, ibid., 208.

⁴³Junta de Guerra, Santa Fe, February 1-February 11, 1724, S.A.N.M., no. 324.

⁴⁴Bustamante to Casa Fuerte, Santa Fe, May 30, 1724, in After Coronado ed. by Thomas, 208-209.

also mean the loss forever of the opportunity to Christianize the Jicarillas. The fiscal proposed that the Jicarillas be held in New Mexico by the gift of lands upon which to settle near the pueblos, along with subsistence for the first two years.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, the viceroy decided at this point to refer the entire matter to Visitor General Rivera, who was then preparing to undertake a general tour of inspection of the entire northern frontier.⁴⁶

This meant, in the first place, a long delay, for it was not until June, 1726, that Rivera reached Santa Fe. Rivera's opinion was that the Jicarillas were not sincere in their professed desire for baptism, but feigned it only to obtain protection from the Comanches. Recognizing that they must flee, and that they could turn only to New Mexico, he endorsed the suggestion that the Jicarillas be assisted to relocate in the vicinity of Taos. But he strongly recommended against the establishment of a presidio at La Jicarilla, arguing that it would only mean a useless expense for the expansion of a province whose resources were too sparse even to make the most of its present extent.⁴⁷ His recommendations were accepted in Mexico City, and as a result, New

⁴⁵Fiscal to Casa Fuerte, Mexico, October 20, 1724, ibid., 209.

⁴⁶Casa Fuerte, Order, Mexico, October 21, 1724, ibid., 209.

⁴⁷Pedro de Rivera to Casa Fuerte, Presidio del Paso del Norte, September 26, 1727, ibid., 209-217.

Mexico lost a valuable buffer to the north. Some of the Jicarillas settled in the vicinities of Taos and Pecos, others dispersed to unknown locations. The Comanches took over the region of La Jicarilla, and for more than fifty years the New Mexicans found them dangerous neighbors indeed.⁴⁸

Inspection by Rivera Checks Expansion
of the Frontier

The Rivera expedition is a landmark in the history of the northern frontier. The Marqués de Casa Fuerte had held the office of viceroy for only a short time when he realized that the remote northern frontier was in a state of serious deterioration. Vast sums were being spent on the maintenance of garrisons at various presidios, but his office was constantly besieged with reports of impending disaster and appeals for further reinforcement. The new crises now arising, in the matters of foreign threats and shifting Indian alignments, clearly required a reappraisal of policies and procedures on the frontier. A personal visit by the viceroy to the remote interior provinces was totally impracticable, and it was highly unlikely that truly objective evaluations could be obtained from the frontier officials themselves. Therefore, in May, 1723, Casa Fuerte asked the permission of the king to investigate conditions in the remote frontier outposts and to reform their administration.

⁴⁸Thomas (ed.), ibid., 45-46.

The request was authorized by the king in February, 1723, and Casa Fuerte selected as his inspector general Brigadier General Pedro de Rivera y Villalón. Then serving as governor of Tlaxcala, Rivera was a veteran of thirty-four years' army service and an experienced administrator. After receiving the new appointment in July, 1724, he wound up his affairs in Tlaxcala and then went to Mexico City to receive his instructions from the viceroy. He left the capital on November 21, 1724, on a journey which lasted three years and seven months and covered some 3,082 Spanish leagues.⁴⁹

An unfortunate aspect of the Rivera visita, as noted above in the case of the proposed presidio at La Jicarilla, was that it caused something of a hiatus in policy on the northern frontier during a period of grave crisis. The journey itself took almost four years, and the deliberations of viceroy and council on Rivera's reports and recommendations took still more time. As a result, Casa Fuerte's reglamento, based upon Rivera's recommendations regarding the presidios, was not issued until 1729. In the interval there was a tendency in Mexico City to postpone decisions concerning the north until the results of the general inspection were received.

⁴⁹Rivera, Diario y Derrotero, 25-26; Lawrence G. Wroth, "The Frontier Presidios of New Spain: Books, Maps, and a Selection of Manuscripts Relating to the Rivera Expedition of 1724-1729," The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America, XLIII (New York, 1951), 191-194.

It was not until 1726 that Rivera made his visit to New Mexico. On the way from El Paso to Isleta the party encountered no one, but Rivera repeatedly commented in his diary on the ruins of abandoned pueblos and ranches which they passed. On June 1 he reached the pueblo of Isleta, and a little further north the village of Albuquerque, whose population was largely dispersed on ranches. Proceeding further north the next day, he was met just above Santa Domingo pueblo by Governor Bustamante with a welcoming party. Bustamante had been informed five days earlier of Rivera's approach by the Faraon Apaches, who had seen Rivera's departure from El Paso on May 20 and had watched him, quite without his knowledge, throughout the journey.⁵⁰

Rivera remained in Santa Fe from June 4 to August 24, making his visita and completing reports to send back to Mexico City. Meanwhile, between July 6 and August 5, the engineer of the expedition, Francisco Barreiro, was engaged in mapping the province.⁵¹ The Barreiro maps, which constitute a major contribution to the cartographical development of the west, are perhaps the most lasting results of the Rivera inspection.

Rivera created considerable consternation in Santa Fe, as he did in many of the presidios which he visited.

⁵⁰Rivera, Diario y Derrotero, 51-52.

⁵¹Ibid., 52.

Investigating the conduct of the garrison, he found corrupt practice at every turn. In Santa Fe, as in the presidios of Sinaloa, Los Adaes and Coahuila, the governor acted also as head of the presidio. In each case, the governor received the full pay of a presidial captain as well as his gubernatorial salary. Rivera thought that the services rendered hardly justified such lavish compensation.⁵² In addition, the governors followed a practice of appointing many more subalternate officials than were really needed in the province, charging the Crown for their salaries and presumably getting a nice share of the proceeds.⁵³

Before the Rivera inspection, the number officially allowed for the garrison at Santa Fe was one hundred men. Rivera dismissed twenty of these, on the ground that they were such poor soldiers that they only prejudiced the safety of the province. He recommended that the garrison be reduced permanently to eighty, including subalterns, as sufficient to garrison the province. He was convinced that the manpower among the more than seven hundred Spanish families and the Christian Indians were adequate reserves for times of crisis. There was a general protest from the population of the province against this recommendation, but Rivera argued that the opposition stemmed only from self-interest.

⁵²Rivera, Informe, ibid., 142.

⁵³Ibid., 106.

The fundamental weakness of the New Mexican economy was that practically all of the commerce consisted of that between the governor and soldiers. The few settlers who could get any merchandise also depended largely on trade with the military personnel. The suppression of twenty positions, which cut the payroll at the presidio by eight thousand pesos, was a telling blow. The fears of the friars in the frontier pueblos were dismissed by Rivera, on the grounds that they could send for additional help from Santa Fe if an emergency should arise. Recalling that New Mexico in rebellion had been reconquered by a presidial force of only one hundred men, Rivera ridiculed suggestions that eighty might not be an adequate number to garrison the province.⁵⁴

Rivera reported briefly on the Indian situation in New Mexico. He was very well impressed by the Pueblos, whom he counted at 9,747, living in twenty-four pueblos. He found them to be hard workers, with no poverty or drunkenness among them, and was quite charmed by their general use of the old greeting form, "Ave María."⁵⁵ Apparently, in matters of strategy, Rivera chose to consider the Pueblos solely as an excellent source of auxiliary manpower for the province. He differed sharply in this respect from the New Mexican Spaniards, who knew that a repetition of the 1680

⁵⁴Ibid., 153-155.

⁵⁵Rivera, Diario y Derrotero, 54.

Revolt was always possible, and therefore wanted sufficient military strength to police the Pueblos as well as to fend off the indios bárbaros and possible French invaders.

As to the indios bárbaros, Rivera's comment ran as follows: "The enemy nations of this province are the Apaches, Pharaones, Natajees, Gilas, Mezcaleros, Coninas, Quarteleros, Palomas, Jicarillas, Yutas, Moquinos and others, and all of them make peace when it is worthwhile and break into war any-time they find a convenient occasion."⁵⁶ He noted also that the Comanches, "as barbarous as they are bellicose," entered New Mexico annually to trade, never in numbers less than fifteen hundred. They were described as perpetual wanderers, at war with all nations.

Rivera's reports to Viceroy Casa Fuerte resulted in the Reglamento of 1729, the earliest body of rules for the administration of the frontier presidios which is known to have been formulated. With some modifications, it remained effective until superseded by a new code in 1772. Retro-active to January 1, 1729, it provided for the abolition of two presidios and two guard posts, and reduced, in some instances very sharply, the garrisons of the remaining posts. It fixed the salaries of officers and men, and attempted to protect soldiers from exploitation by their officers. It also regulated the conduct of war against the Indians, and

⁵⁶Ibid., 55.

set rules for their just treatment in time of peace. The economies resulted in annual savings of 160,953 pesos.⁵⁷

The missionaries reacted bitterly against Rivera's reductions in garrisons and suppressions and relocations of presidios. Their case was stated some years after the event in an eloquent refutation of Rivera's report written by the Franciscan historian, Fray Juan Agustín Morfi.⁵⁸ He charged that Rivera's penny-wise approach in the late 1720's had laid the entire northern frontier open to hostile invasion. This, believed the Franciscans, had cost the missionaries their early chance to Christianize the Apaches and ultimately took a tremendous toll of the wealth of all the northern provinces.

Tendentious though the Morfi statement certainly is, the situation in regard to the indios bárbaros on the northern frontier did deteriorate gravely in the period following the Rivera inspection and the resultant reforms.

It was the missionaries who finally moved to retrieve the fading opportunity to convert the Jicarillas. Fray Juan Mirabal was in charge of the mission which was founded on the Río Trampas in the Taos area in 1733.⁵⁹ The friar appealed for government backing for the establishment

⁵⁷Wroth, "Frontier Presidios of New Spain," Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America, XLIII, 201-202.

⁵⁸Morfi, History of Texas, II, 260-274.

⁵⁹Twitchell, Spanish Archives, I, 19-20.

on the grounds that the Jicarillas could be used in warfare against the Comanches and Utes, a course which he justified with the argument that as Christians they had a sound moral right to make war on the non-Christian Indians. The governor, Gervasio Cruzat y Góngora, seems to have endorsed the project in the beginning, but he dealt the venture a death blow when he suddenly cut off the trade in hides which was the livelihood of the Jicarilla neophytes. This act led to a dispersal of the disheartened Jicarillas.⁶⁰

The Comanche Trade in New Mexico

By 1730 the Comanches and Utes had managed to sweep the Apaches from the northern part of their old range. Now the dispersal of the Jicarillas, erasing the last barrier between the Comanche-Ute strongholds and New Mexico, gave the invaders virtually unlimited access to the province. They came both to raid and to trade.

Commercial opportunities in New Mexico were so limited that officials and settlers alike encouraged the Comanche trade, despite the fact that it might risk the destruction of the province. The missionaries criticized the trade, particularly the zeal with which the secular officials participated in it, but to no avail. The Taos fair became the hub of the commerce of the western plains.

⁶⁰Morfi, "Geographical Description of New Mexico," in Forgotten Frontiers: A Study of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of New Mexico, 1777-1787 ed. by Thomas (Norman, 1932), 97.

The governors did take steps to supervise the trade in the hope of minimizing friction. As early as 1725, Governor Bustamante gave notice that while the alcaldes mayores in the areas where any of the bárbaros came to trade should not interfere with the right of the settlers to trade freely with the Indians, they were to exercise careful supervision in order that incidents growing out of the trade might not lead to disturbances of the peace.⁶¹ That there was some attempt to enforce the decree is evidence by records of proceedings against seven Spaniards who had caused trouble with some indios bárbaros who were selling captives and skins at Pecos in the summer of 1726.⁶²

Later came even more elaborate trade regulations, setting such details as the hours in which settlers might trade with the Indians, in order to avoid controversy by giving rival traders an equal chance to bid for the hides.⁶³ Eventually, no one was allowed to trade with the Indians without a royal license, because unsupervised trade, especially with the "gentile" rancherías, had proved too dangerous to the welfare of the province. The provision applied to

⁶¹Bustamante, Bando, Santa Fe, September 17, 1725, S.A.N.M., no. 340.

⁶²Proceedings against seven Spaniards, Santa Fe, August 3-September 7, 1726, S.A.N.M., no. 340a.

⁶³Criminal proceedings against Diego Torres, Theniente de Alcalde Mayor of the Chama jurisdiction, on charges of violating trade regulations, Santa Fe, April 13-May 7, 1735, S.A.N.M., no. 402.

the Pueblos as well as the Spanish and mestizo population, and all violators were subject to very stiff fines.⁶⁴

In the 1740's there was a wave of Comanche hostilities against the eastern frontier, which gradually caused the depopulation of that area. Settlers who could no longer bear the pressure against their ranches or villages abandoned them, and many came to live in Santa Fe, where the population grew from one hundred twenty families in 1744 to two hundred seventy-four families in 1779.⁶⁵

The Comanche depredations necessitated punitive action by the Spaniards, and some expeditions were undertaken during the 1740's.⁶⁶ The hatreds engendered by such warfare apparently led to violent excesses on the part of some individual Spaniards, which the government sought to curb. It was ordered in 1741 that defenseless enemy camps, that is, those occupied by women, children and the infirm, were not to be maltreated, as such conduct was not consistent with Catholic principles. The order applied to settlers as well

⁶⁴Governor Henrique de Olavide y Michelena, Bando, Santa Fe, January 7, 1737, S.A.N.M., no. 414.

⁶⁵Morfi, "Geographical Description of New Mexico," in Forgotten Frontiers ed. by Thomas, 91-92.

⁶⁶There are wide gaps in the documentary records for the 1740's. According to Twitchell, Spanish Archives, II, 213, large numbers of the documents covering the administration of Governor Joachin Codallos y Rabal (1743-1749) were removed from the Santa Fe archives in the 1870's by a collector, Alphonse Pinart, of whose collection they became a part.

as soldiers.⁶⁷ The order was reiterated by a new governor three years later, with a reminder that the chief objective of Spanish policy wherever possible was to attract the infidels to the faith. All violators were subject to heavy fines, and soldiers guilty of violating the orders were to receive heavier penalties. A second offense by a soldier was punishable by beating and expulsion from the presidio.⁶⁸

The Comanche trade finally became so dangerous that in 1746 all trade and commerce with the Comanches was forbidden to the New Mexicans.⁶⁹ It was believed in Santa Fe that the Comanches were carrying on a clandestine commerce at Taos pueblo, and that the Taos Indians were giving the Comanches information on Spanish troop movements, thus facilitating their considerable depredations against the Spaniards. To break up the dangerous coalition, it was decreed that any Taos Indian going more than one league from the pueblo should be executed.⁷⁰

The exclusion of the Comanche trade, however, seems to have been too great a strain on the economy of the province. In 1748, Governor Joaquin Codallos y Rabal submitted to the viceroy a report of proceedings relative to permitting

⁶⁷Governor Gaspar de Mendoza, Bando, Santa Fe, March 21, 1741, S.A.N.M., no. 438.

⁶⁸Governor Joaquin Codallos y Rabal, Bando, Santa Fe, May 30, 1744, S.A.N.M., no. 455.

⁶⁹Id., Santa Fe, February 14, S.A.N.M., no. 495.

⁷⁰Ibid.

the Comanches to enter the pueblo of Taos for purposes of barter and trade.⁷¹

However, the restoration of trading relations did not mark an end of the hostilities. For instance, late in 1749, on the very day that ten parties of Comanches left Taos after a peaceable trading mission, there was a big Comanche attack on the pueblo of Galisteo and many other lesser depredations in the area. The Spanish authorities in the region wavered, totally uncertain which of the Comanches to punish for the offenses. At any rate, they feared that any move against them would result in a general assault on the province, so they decided that it simply was not practicable to punish the Comanches at that time.⁷²

The all-conquering Comanches sometime during this period offended their former close allies, the Utes. The reason is not recorded, but by 1735 the two peoples were bitter enemies,⁷³ and remained so throughout the century.

The Apaches Retreat before the Comanche Onslaught

Comanche arrogance bore hardest of all upon the Apaches. The Comanche superiority derived in part from

⁷¹Twitchell, Spanish Archives, II, 227. The document, no. 497 in the Twitchell catalog, is now missing from the archives in Santa Fe.

⁷²Lieutenant Carlos Fernandez to Governor Don Thomás Vélez Cachupín, Taos, December 31, 1749, S.A.N.M., no. 509.

⁷³Proceedings against Diego de Torres on charges of violating trade regulations, Santa Fe, April 13-May 7, 1745, S.A.N.M., no. 402.

their access to guns, which the Apaches were not able to acquire in any significant quantity. In the early stages, however, the Comanche advantages resulted even more from cultural differences between the groups. The Comanches, when they adopted the horse, became complete nomads, abandoning agriculture entirely. The Apaches, on the other hand, continued to settle down in the spring and summer to a relatively sedentary agricultural phase of their annual cycle. The Comanches easily located the horticultural campsites of the Apaches, and concentrated their forces against the small encampments in surprise attacks which took a devastating toll. Attempts of the Apaches to retaliate were handicapped by the difficulty of locating the erratically moving Comanches.⁷⁴

The Comanche pressures not only drove the Apaches much closer to the Spanish frontiers, but left them in a sadly impoverished state. The Comanche raiders were making a great drain on the horse herds of the Apaches, and also were carrying off significant quantities of metal goods from the Apache rancherías which they attacked. At the same time, the hunting operations of the Apaches were seriously curtailed by the supremacy of the Comanches on the buffalo ranges, and the weakened Apaches were no longer able to seize the large numbers of war captives whom they had previously

⁷⁴Secoy, Changing Military Patterns, 30-31.

sold in Spanish markets. They thus had neither the quantities of hides and meat nor those of slaves which had previously been their chief stock in the trade with the Spaniards. In addition, the Apaches now ardently wished to possess guns, which the Spaniards refused to sell to them. As a result of all these factors, the Apaches were driven increasingly to steal the articles which they needed, rather than to depend as much on trade as formerly. This meant a continual raiding activity, which resolved by the 1740's into an almost constant state of war between the Spaniards and Apaches. In the past, raids had usually been concentrated largely on running off horses, without much close contact or loss of life on either side. But it was now necessary to come into close contact, often killing the enemy, in order to seize from his person or dwelling the guns, ammunition and metal goods which the Apaches needed. The result was a pattern of larger raiding parties and of much greater loss of life, particularly for the Spaniards.⁷⁵

The Spaniards could only resort to periodic punitive expeditions to check the raids. In 1724, Governor Bustamante, in the midst of the French and Jicarilla crises, had to send a party of two hundred (fifty soldiers and one hundred fifty Indians) to the Sandias to punish the Faraones for their livestock thefts in the vicinity of Albuquerque.⁷⁶ As a

⁷⁵Ibid., 83-84.

⁷⁶Bustamante to Captain Antonio Tafoya, Santa Fe, June 20, 1724, S.A.N.M., no. 329.

result of this and perhaps of supplemental expeditions, the Faraones were moved to make a formal peace with the province. They then continued their raids from the Sandias, entering the settled areas under the convenient cloak of friendship, and by 1731 their damages to the province were so severe that a council met in Santa Fe to consider a course of action. A token expedition was sent to the Sandias to find and punish the offending rancherías, but with no genuine hope of success.⁷⁷ The Faraon offenses continued until in 1744 the governor was driven by mounting complaints to send a reconnaissance force of twenty soldiers, thirty settlers and a number of Pueblo auxiliaries to comb the mountains to the south (the Ladrones and Magdalenas), with orders to punish such Apaches as they might find.⁷⁸ While these occasional expeditions seemed essential to keep the Apaches from becoming so arrogant as to override the province completely, they could hardly contribute to a definitive settlement of the Apache problem. The Spanish soldiers, unaccustomed to foot travel and handicapped by the very short range of their firearms, were woefully ineffective in mountain combat against the Apaches, even in the rare event that they were able to locate their rancherías at all.

⁷⁷Junta de Guerra, Santa Fe, July 15-July 18, 1731, S.A.N.M., no. 362.

⁷⁸Codallos y Rabal, Santa Fe, December 2, 1744, S.A. N.M., no. 495.


The Apaches Attack the Southern Tier
of the Interior Provinces

Distressing though the Apache problem was in New Mexico, it became even more acute in the south at this time. The mines, missions and ranches of the north Mexican provinces were a source of plunder which inevitably attracted the Apaches as they were pushed south by the Comanches. The horse herds at these establishments suffered especially, for as the Apaches lost their hold on the good buffalo ranges, they turned to horse meat as a substitute.

The Apache raids in the El Paso jurisdiction became serious by 1707. There, as further to the south, the danger to the Spaniards went far beyond any immediate damages which the raiders might inflict. The disturbances created a grave danger of uprising by the tribes native to the area, who were nominally reduced to mission life, but who might explode at any moment to destroy the interior provinces.⁷⁹

Apache raids in Sonora, beginning just before the close of the seventeenth century, found the Spaniards there preoccupied with serious native unrest. The Pimas of the Pimería Alta revolted in 1695, and from 1696 to 1697 there was a general uprising by the Indians of the eastern Sonora missions. In 1699 there began a long series of wars with

⁷⁹Autos compiled for the Marqués de la Peñuela, Santa Fe, October, 1707, S.A.N.M., no. 135.



the perennially troublesome Seris.⁸⁰ The Spanish forces could give at best only peripheral attention to the new Apache problem. As a result, by 1724 the Apaches had become so bold and their raids so frequent that unless more effective defenses could be devised, the entire province of Sonora was threatened with ruin. The forces of the province were still occupied in keeping the Seris in order, and protecting them from the attacks of the Pimas. The viceroy therefore ordered that the forces of Sonora confine their efforts against the Apaches to purely defensive warfare. That is, they must wait until the Apaches attacked, and then punish the offenders promptly and on the spot. Since the Apaches never attacked a point where there were soldiers, the order meant in effect abandonment of any military action against them. Records do not show how far this suicidal policy was carried out by the Sonoran authorities, but the very existence of the instruction demonstrates the appalling lack of understanding of the Apache problem at the viceregal level in the early years.⁸¹

By the 1730's the constant Apache attacks had led to the abandonment of many mines in the province. Prospectors no longer explored the hills for metals, lest they be

⁸⁰Charles Edward Chapman, The Founding of Spanish California: the Northwestward Expansion of New Spain, 1687-1783 (New York, 1916), 17.

⁸¹Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Texas and the North Mexican States (San Francisco, 1890), I, 516-517.

ambushed; even traffic on the roads fell to a very small volume. Mission life was disturbed because the converted Indians had to have arms in constant readiness to defend themselves from Apache and Seri attacks.⁸² The northern missions and ranches had lost most of their livestock, and if they were abandoned, nothing would remain to impede Apache passage to the very remote interior. The fifty soldiers at the lone presidio of Corodeguachi, already occupied in watching the Seris and Pimas Altas, had to patrol three hundred leagues of hostile frontier.⁸³

A very brief respite came in 1733 when the Apaches sued for peace at Corodeguachi. Captain Juan Bautista de Anza, mindful of the orders of king and viceroy that "Christian charity ordains that every effort be made to conciliate them by kindness," accepted the overtures, making generous gifts of goods and restoring captive women and children to the Apaches. It seemed at first a success, for some eighty Apache families settled in the neighborhood of the presidio, but they soon left under the pretext of visiting their homes, and stole some horses on the way. They then began to terrorize

⁸²Ignaz Pfefferkorn, Sonora. A Description of the Province ed. by Theodore E. Treutlein (Albuquerque, 1949), 207.

⁸³Don Agustín de Vildosola, Statement, Real Nuestra Señora de Aranzazu, July 26, 1735, in Donald Rowland, "The Sonora Frontier of New Spain, 1735-1745," in New Spain and the Anglo-American West: Historical Contributions presented to Herbert Eugene Bolton (Lancaster, Pa., 1932), I, 156.

the province, and the truce was only a memory.⁸⁴ Anza and other Sonorans appealed for new presidios, insisting that they could no longer hold the province without reinforcements. As a result, two new presidios were founded in 1741: Pitio, or San Pedro de la Conquista, on the site of modern Hermosillo, to check the Yaquis, Seris, Pimas and Tepocas; and Terrenate, or San Bernardo Gracia Real, designed to protect the missions of Pimería Alta from Apache raids.⁸⁵

1747 marked the first attempt at concerted action by New Mexican and Sonoran forces against their common enemies. Viceroy Marqués de Altamira ordered New Mexico's Governor Codallos to cooperate in a campaign against the Gila Apaches and their confederates, to be launched from the presidios of Terrenate, Fronteras, Janos and El Paso, under the command of Captain Rubin de Celis of El Paso.⁸⁶ Santa Fe's assigned quota was thirty soldiers, forty settlers and seventy Indian auxiliaries. The governor issued the necessary orders to assemble the force with arms, horses and provisions, for about a four month campaign.⁸⁷ Unfortunately,

⁸⁴Juan Bautista de Anza, Statement, Pueblo del Glorioso San Miguel Arcangel de los Ures, August 13, 1735, *ibid.*, 158-159. Captain Anza, commandant of the presidio of Santa Rosa de Corodeguachi, was the father of the Governor Juan Bautista de Anza who distinguished himself in Sonora and California in the 1770's and in New Mexico in the 1780's

⁸⁵Bancroft, North Mexican States, I, 528.

⁸⁶Marqués de Altamira to Codallos, Mexico, June 22, 1747, S.A.N.M., no. 497. ⁸⁷Codallos, Santa Fe, August 4, 1747, S.A.N.M., no. 495.

in September, just as the force was ready to depart for El Paso, Abiquiú was attacked by Utes, and all the resources of the province were required to defend that northern sector. Not until December 10 was Governor Codallos able to send a small force south against the Gilas: thirty soldiers, fifteen settlers and ten Indians.⁸⁸ As the force moved south, the Apaches simply retired into canyons in the mountains, made even less accessible than usual by heavy snows. To continue such a campaign was pointless, so the governor ordered his men back to Santa Fe.⁸⁹

Far from being checked, the Apache depredations spread into further interior provinces. The marked decline of Nueva Vizcaya dated from persistent Apache warfare beginning in 1748. There resulted a serious depopulation of the province, and a dangerous lowering of the morale of the remaining residents. Some ranches were so deprived of livestock, particularly mules, that their work was sharply curtailed.⁹⁰ Also in 1748 came a Seri revolt that devastated all of southern Sonora.⁹¹

The northern frontier suffered a serious blow with the Pima uprising of 1751. The Pimería Alta, an area of some

⁸⁸Id., Santa Fe, December 6, 1747, S.A.N.M., no. 483.

⁸⁹Id., Santa Fe, December 26, 1747, S.A.N.M., no. 483.

⁹⁰Informe de Hugo de O'Connor sobre el Estado de las Provincias Internas del Norte, 1771-1776 ed. by Francisco R. Almada (Mexico, 1952), 20-22.

⁹¹Pfefferkorn, Sonora, 151.

four hundred square miles lying between the Gila River to the north and the Magdalena to the south, had been the scene of peaceful mission development. The Pimas who lived there had only recently assisted the Spaniards in campaigns against the Apaches and Seris. But the infection of revolt spread from the surrounding area, and November, 1751, saw a sudden uprising which took the Spaniards completely by surprise. The reconquest took some months, and consumed resources of men and supplies whose diversion from the Apache wars Spain could ill afford. The result was the founding of two new presidios in the Pima country: Tubac, in 1752, and Altar, in 1753.⁹²

Despairing of ever tranquilizing the unruly natives, the government of New Spain hit upon the idea that hostile elements must be removed from the northern frontier. The Seris, Pimas and particularly the Apaches were considered most eligible for the program of deportation to the Tres Marias Islands.⁹³ This panacea failed, however, for the Spanish forces were unequal to the task of catching enough Apaches to deport them in significant quantities.

Some improvement was made during the brief time that Don Bernardo de Gálvez was commandant on the northern frontier.

⁹²Charles Russell Ewing, "The Pima Uprising of 1751: A Study of Spanish-Indian Relations on the Frontier of New Spain," in Greater America: Essays in Honor of Herbert Eugene Bolton (Berkeley, 1945), 273-279.

⁹³Chapman, Spanish California, 36-37.

At his orders, Coahuila made war on the Mescalero Apaches, and succeeded at least in containing them. But the inactivity of the Coahuila forces following the transfer of Gálvez soon undid all that he had accomplished.⁹⁴

Texas Becomes Embroiled in the War of the Apaches
and the Nations of the North

A considerably different situation prevailed in Texas, for the balance of power among the Indians in that province had been importantly altered. The Comanches continued to push their range ever southward and eastward. In addition, the Wichita bands, who had lived in the region of present Kansas and northern Oklahoma since the time of Coronado, now moved to the northern frontiers of the province of Texas. Hard pressed by the hostilities of their northern neighbors, the Osages, and at the same time strongly attracted by the trading opportunities offered by the French traders at the Louisiana post of Natchitoches, the sedentary Wichita bands completed their southward migration to the Red River region in the 1750's. The most powerful of the bands, the Taovayas, established a village on Red River at the Cross Timbers, in present Montague County, Texas, and from that vantage point, for the rest of the century they exercised an influence far out of proportion to their numbers on the history of the northern frontier. Since 1747, the Taovayas

⁹⁴Ibid., 33-34.

had been allied with their former enemies, the Comanches, under the auspices of the French. Their village served as the chief center for trade between the French and Comanches; thus its establishment on the Red River attracted the eastern Comanche divisions much more closely into the Texas sphere.⁹⁵

The southward movement of the Wichita bands and the Comanches drove the Lipan Apaches, who had ranged the Red River region, back onto the Spanish frontier in Texas. Although Apache hostilities had been a continual problem in Texas in the period 1723 to 1749, the pressures from the Nations of the North (as the Comanches and their allies came to be called) were so severe as to drive the Apaches to the Texans for protection. The Comanches were seen in the vicinity of San Antonio for the first time in 1743.⁹⁶ Not long after, in 1749, the Lipans and their allies made a peace with the Spaniards at San Antonio. Some Apache groups then crossed over into Coahuila to continue their raiding activities unhampered by the Comanches, but those who remained in Texas, largely Lipans, did a reasonably good job of keeping their peace with the Spanish Texans.⁹⁷ As the strength of

⁹⁵Elizabeth Ann Harper, "The Taovayas Indians in Frontier Trade and Diplomacy, 1719 to 1768," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXI (Autumn, 1953), 277 ff.

⁹⁶Morfi, History of Texas, II, 294.

⁹⁷Al B. Nelson, "Juan de Ugalde and the Rio Grande Frontier, 1777-90" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of California, 1937), 183.

the Comanches was considerably augmented by the arrival on the Red River of the Wichita bands in the 1750's, the anxiety of the Apaches to attach themselves to the Spaniards grew. They professed an ardent desire for conversion to Christianity, and in spite of understandable skepticism on the part of both secular and religious authorities, their appeals were answered in 1756 with the founding of a mission and presidio on the San Saba River at present Menard, Texas. The Apaches boasted far and wide about the strength and splendor of their new refuge. This earned for the Spaniards of Texas the confirmed hostility of all the numerous enemies of the Apaches, without accomplishing the reduction of the Lipans, who were quite faithless about settling at the mission as they had promised to do.⁹⁸

March, 1748, saw a disastrous attack of more than two thousand mounted warriors of the Nations of the North against the San Saba mission. The punitive expedition sent by the Spaniards to the Taovayas villages on Red River was a dismal failure, and the attack marked the beginning of a prolonged series of hostilities by the Nations of the North against Texas.

The hostilities of the Nations of the North in Texas were motivated by more than their resentment of the refuge given the Apaches by the Texas Spaniards. The Taovayas

⁹⁸Morfi, History of Texas, 372.

villages became a center where the Nations of the North were able to trade hides, livestock and captives to the French traders of Louisiana in exchange for guns and the other articles of European manufacture which were becoming important in the Indian economy. The Texas settlements were a natural source of plunder for the powerful Nations of the North, and the fact that their booty could so readily be exchanged for French goods stood as a constant and powerful incentive to raiding activities. The volume of trade was such that the Nations of the North were usually far better equipped with guns than were the Spaniards of Texas. This made it quite impossible for the Texans to deal effectively with the Nations of the North, for they were too powerful to be coerced by Spanish arms and had too much at stake in their profitable system of raiding and trading to consider seriously a peace with the Texans. The problem of the Nations of the North thus quite overshadowed that of the Apaches in Texas in the 1750's and 1760's.

New Mexico Sees the First Effective Comanche-Spanish Peace Settlement

The first encouraging developments on the northern frontier came in New Mexico, with the administration of Don Thomás Vélez Cachupín, who became governor in 1749. In 1751 Vélez Cachupín followed and defeated a force of some three hundred Comanches who had attacked Pecos pueblo after promising the governor at the Taos fair that they would

refrain from all hostilities while in the province. After administering a decisive defeat, Vélez Cachupín treated the survivors kindly, and persuaded them that a real peace with New Mexico would be highly desirable. He then sent them back to their people in the hope that they might bring the rest to treat for a formal peace.⁹⁹

Reports of the victory were enthusiastically received in Mexico City, where it was thought that there might at last be a real chance of friendship with the Comanches and relief for the northern frontier. If the restored captives should be able to persuade their fellow tribesmen to make a real peace, the viceroy proposed the use of all possible means to cement the good relations with the Comanches. Although necessary precautions against the guns of the Comanches would have always to be maintained, the Comanches were to be freely permitted to enter New Mexico to trade their hides and captives, and were to be conciliated by frequent and handsome gifts.

The reports of Vélez Cachupín had apparently clarified the Comanche problem to an unprecedented degree in official circles in Mexico City. The viceroy now saw alliance with the Comanches as a potential key to friendship with many

⁹⁹Thomás Vélez Cachupín to Conde de Revilla Gigedo, Santa Fe, November 27, 1751, in The Plains Indians and New Mexico, 1751-1778: A Collection of Documents Illustrative of the History of the Eastern Frontier of New Mexico ed. by Alfred Barnaby Thomas (Albuquerque, 1940), 68-76.

less powerful nations, which would not dare resist the Spaniards if they were effectively allied with the Comanches. He also realized the necessity of dealing with the various bands of the Comanches according to their individual deserts, acknowledging that the autonomy of the separate bands meant that the nation would almost never be unanimous either in hostility or in friendship towards the Spaniards. This new comprehension at the viceregal level of the nature of the Comanche problem argued well for official support for possible new approaches which the governor of New Mexico might devise.¹⁰⁰

While waiting to see whether his victory in the field would result in a solid peace with the Comanches, Vélez Cachupín took measures to protect the province in case they sought vengeance instead. In the summer of 1752 he organized a formal militia of one hundred and fifty settlers, instructing them in the use of arms and cavalry tactics. The governor was quite convinced that any future Comanche attack would, in view of their growing commerce with the French, be a well-armed one on a very large scale, quite possibly in concert with the Taovayas with whom they were now allied. In that case, forces with some concept of order and discipline would be essential to the defense of the province. In another measure to strengthen his province against a possible Comanche

¹⁰⁰Marqués de Altamira, Opinion, Mexico, April 26, 1752, in ibid., 76-80

onslaught, the governor encouraged the Carlana, Paloma and Cuartelejo Apaches to remain in the Pecos area, where they had come to winter with their families. He counted on their support in case of Comanche attack, and meanwhile used them as spies to keep him informed of Comanche activities.¹⁰¹

The hard-won tranquillity of the province was sometimes disturbed through the folly of subordinates. For instance, in 1752 the Apaches joined mission Indians in the El Paso district in an uprising occasioned when a Spanish captain killed his Zuma servant for stealing fifty ears of corn. The servant's kinsmen were understandably incensed, and the consequences were serious losses to the entire region.¹⁰²

But, on the whole, the firmness and caution of the governor bore fruit. He was able to turn over the province to his successor in 1754 with not only the Comanches, but also the Utes and certain Apache groups at peace with the province.¹⁰³

The Utes particularly required very careful handling, because in the period just preceeding the governorship of

¹⁰¹Vélez Cachupín to Revilla Gigedo, Santa Fe, September 29, 1752, ibid., 118-125.

¹⁰²Father Fray Juan Sanz de Lezaún, "An Account of Lamentable Happenings in New Mexico and of Losses Experienced Daily in Affairs Spiritual and Temporal, written . . . in the year 1760" in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 477.

¹⁰³Vélez Cachupín, Instruction to his successor, Don Francisco Marín del Valle, August 12, 1754, in Plains Indians ed. by Thomas, 129-143.

Vélez Cachupín they had suffered a treacherous massacre at the hands of a Spanish force from New Mexico with which they were presumably allied against the Comanches. Vélez Cachupín managed to rewin their confidence. His policy was that an individual offense by a Ute, such as the stealing of a horse, should not occasion punishment for the whole tribe. Rather, the Ute chiefs were to be induced to punish the culprits and, if possible, make proper restitution.

The Comanches required protection in trade from the settlers and Pueblos, whose bent for extortion constantly threatened to upset the good relationship which Vélez Cachupín had achieved with that tribe. He had found it wise to provide a guard for their ranchería and horse herd when they attended the Taos fair, and the Comanches had responded most gratefully to that courtesy.

The Carlanas, Cuartelejos and certain other eastern Apaches lived at peace in the Pecos region. Vélez Cachupín urged that care be exercised to prevent their making alliance with the Natagées and Faraones. The two latter were behaving fairly well in New Mexico at the time, but were stealing horses in Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora.

In the unlucky event that the Comanches, Utes and Apaches all came to Taos to trade at the same time, the Utes and Apaches had to be prevented from annoying the Comanches. Vélez Cachupín claimed that he had managed this delicate trick, even supervising exchanges of horses and arms and

ransoming of captives between the enemy groups without altercation.

The administration of Vélez Cachupín also saw Ute-Navajo warfare on a considerable scale. The Navajos wiped out a Ute encampment, and in revenge the Utes made such frequent and effective raids into the Navajo country as nearly to force the Navajos to abandon it. The Navajos were taking refuge at La Cebolleta, in the Laguna and Zuñi neighborhoods. Vélez Cachupín sympathized with the justice of the Ute cause, and hoped to use the occasion to persuade the Navajos to move to the abandoned missions of the Socorro region on the El Paso road. Efforts to reduce the Navajos to mission life consistently failed, however, because the Navajos were quite convinced, from their observation of the Pueblos' lot, that to become Christians would mean the loss of their liberties.¹⁰⁴

Having achieved such a favorable equilibrium among the most dangerous of the indios bárbaros in his jurisdiction, Vélez Cachupín felt that the arms of the province should whenever possible be used against the Faraones to punish their invasions of Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora. He was thus anticipating the policy of coordinated action which would become effective on the northern frontier only with the creation of the Provincias Internas some twenty years later.

¹⁰⁴Benturo, Christian Genízaro Indian, Declaration of the state in which he found the Navajo Province and its inhabitants, Santa Fe, June 20, 1748, S.A.N.M., no. 494; Father Sanz de Lezaún, "An account of lamentable happenings in New Mexico," in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 471-474.

The stakes involved in the complex administration of Indian affairs in New Mexico were succinctly stated by the retiring governor:

The condition of this government and its circumstances, due to its organization and the diversity of the nations which surround it, must be ruled more with the skillful measures and policies of peace than those which provoke incidents of war; the latter is never favorable and may be calamitous. The small forces which this province has would be crushed by tribes of their size if they conspired against it. As the province, the bulwark of La Vizcaya and Sonora, is remote from the rest, support for it is the most precarious task that the king has in New Spain.¹⁰⁵

It was particularly important that the administration of Vélez Cachupín saw the beginnings of successful dealings with the Comanches, for it saw also a new wave of intrusion by French traders from Illinois and Louisiana. The Mallet brothers blazed the trail from Illinois to Santa Fe, thence to Louisiana in 1739, causing a new upsurge of French interest in the northernmost Spanish outpost.¹⁰⁶ In 1749 there came the first to exploit the new route, a party of three French traders with Comanche escorts. Seven more followed in 1750. Another party of four arrived in 1751, and two more in 1752.¹⁰⁷ The men were arrested, interrogated

¹⁰⁵Vélez Cachupín, Instruction, in Plains Indians ed. by Thomas, 137.

¹⁰⁶Voyage des Freres Mallet, avec Six Autres Français, depuis la Rivière de Panimahas dans le Missouri jusqu'a Santa-Fé (1739-1740), Etrait du Journal, in Découvertes ed. by Margry, VI, 457.

¹⁰⁷Bolton, "French Intrusions into New Mexico, 1749-1752," in The Pacific Ocean in History ed. by H. Morse Stephens and Herbert Eugene Bolton (New York, 1917), 389-407.

and eventually deported, some being taken to Spain. But the alarm which the visits aroused was deepened by the traders' accounts of a French-sponsored alliance between the Comanches and Taovayas.¹⁰⁸ This meant not only a significant numerical reinforcement of the Comanche war potential, but also a permanent trade connection between the Comanches and the French, through the Taovayas villages. The French trade meant guns in abundance, and Vélez Cachupín warned that the horrors of Comanche warfare would be greatly increased in the future.

But the successes of Vélez Cachupín with the Comanches did not long survive his retirement from office. Certainly his successor, Governor Francisco Marín del Valle, went through the motions of observing the instructions in regard to supervision of the Indian trade. He proclaimed severe penalties to be imposed upon any who did not treat the Indians fairly and in good faith, explaining to the settlers that failure to keep the rules would surely result in robberies and murders in the province. Prices were regulated, and the sale of arms, horses, mules and burros to the indios bárbaros was banned.¹⁰⁹

The regulations seem, however, not to have been enforced very long, as appears from this description of the

¹⁰⁸Autos de los Franceses.

¹⁰⁹Marín del Valle, Santa Fe, November 26, 1754, S.A.N.M., no. 530.

Taos fair seven years later:

The Indian trading embassy . . . is . . . some 200, or at the very least, 50, tents of barbarian, heathen Indians, Comanches as well as other nations, of whom the multitude is so great that it is impossible to enumerate them. Here the governor, alcaldes, and lieutenants gather together as many horses as they can; here is collected all the ironware possible, such as axes, hoes, wedges, picks, bridles, machetes, belduques, and knives (for the enemy does not lack iron and these other commodities).

Here, in short, is gathered everything possible for trade and barter with these barbarians in exchange for deer and buffalo hides, and, what is saddest, in exchange for Indian slaves.¹¹⁰

Out of this explosive trade situation grew some incident which broke the peace, and Marín del Valle soon assembled Ute and Pueblo allies to campaign against the Comanches.¹¹¹ The Comanches harried New Mexico through the remainder of Marín del Valle's administration, but when he was succeeded in 1760 by a two-year ad interim governor, Don Manuel del Portillo y Urrisola, they apparently hoped for a restoration of the peace which they had enjoyed with Vélez Cachupín. A party of Comanches came to Taos to negotiate for a peace. At the order of the new governor, all were captured and the men of the party were killed.¹¹² Naturally,

¹¹⁰Father Fray Pedro Serrano to the Marqués de Cruillas, Report in regard to the Custodia of New Mexico, in the year 1761, in Historical Documents ed. by Hackett, III, 489.

¹¹¹"Information Communicated by Juan Candelaria, Resident of this Villa de San Francisco Xavier de Alburquerque, born 1692--age 84" trans. by Don Isidro Armijo, New Mexico Historical Review, IV (July, 1929), 288-297.

¹¹²Ibid.; Vélez Cachupín to Marqués de Cruillas, Santa Fe, June 27, 1762, in Plains Indians ed. by Thomas, 149-150.

even more serious hostilities occurred in the following months.

The news from New Mexico and other portions of the Bishopric of Durango of the incursions of the indios bárbaros aroused the concern of Bishop Pedro Tamarón y Romeral, who set forth in the autumn of 1759 for a visitation of his vast diocese.¹¹³ The New Mexican portion of the visitation began in April, 1760. Tamarón considered the helplessness of New Mexico before the indios bárbaros one of its gravest problems, and he observed the situation carefully. At El Alamo, near the pueblo of Santo Domingo, he was visited by the "captain of the peaceful Apache Indians," who was highly regarded throughout the province because of his long-established loyalty. He was relied upon to warn of the coming of the Comanches, and he and his men were trusted allies.¹¹⁴ In the valley of Taos, Tamarón observed further encampments of peaceful Apaches, who had come there to be protected by the Spaniards from the Comanches.¹¹⁵

The hostilities of the Comanches were, of course, a source of the deepest concern to Tamarón. He left Taos in June, just a few days before the Comanches began drifting

¹¹³Bishop Pedro Tamarón y Romeral to his Majesty, Durango, October 5, 1759, quoted in "Bishop Tamarón's Visitation of New Mexico, 1760" ed. by Eleanor B. Adams, New Mexico Historical Review, XXVIII (April, 1953), 101.

¹¹⁴Tamarón, "The Kingdom of New Mexico, 1760," ibid., (July, 1953), 203.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 215.

in for the annual summer trade fair, but he was well aware that this did not mean the end of hostilities.

The character of these Comanches is such that while they are peacefully trading in Taos, others of their nation make warlike attacks on some distant pueblo. And the ones who are at peace, engaged in trade, are accustomed to say to the governor, 'Don't be too trusting. Remember, there are rogues among us, just as there are among you. Hang any of them you catch.'¹¹⁶

The Bishop's forebodings were quite justified. He left New Mexico at the beginning of July, and on August 4, nearly three thousand Comanches made an attack on the valley of Taos. They meant to finish off the ranches and pueblo, moved to revenge because earlier that summer the Taos Indians had staged a scalp dance for them, using Comanche scalps. The pueblo survived the attack, but many ranches were abandoned after the furious onslaught.¹¹⁷ Governor Marín del Valle pursued the Comanches with a large force for nearly two hundred leagues, but in vain.

Nonetheless, the bishop recognized the peculiar usefulness of the Comanches to Spanish New Mexico:

Intelligent persons have told me that they [the Comanches] are useful in holding the rest of the Indians in check, because they all fear them and realize that the method of defending themselves against them is to resort to the Spaniards for aid. The Ute tribe is very numerous on the New Mexico border. Formerly they waged

¹¹⁶Ibid., 216.

¹¹⁷Francisco Atanasio Dominguez, The Missions of New Mexico, 1776: A Description, with Other Contemporary Documents ed. by Eleanor B. Adams and Angelico Chavez (Albuquerque, 1956), 251.

war, and now they are at peace because of their fear of the Comanches. The same applied to the Faraon Apaches.¹¹⁸

Fortunately, Vélez Cachupín returned to the governorship of New Mexico in 1762, and set at once about restoring the broken peace with the Comanches. He found the Comanches discussing plans for a general war on the province. Hearing their grievances, and acknowledging that they had suffered some injustices from certain governors, he was able to persuade them to restore the peace. But he warned his government that it would be short-lived "unless the governors who are sent to this frontier assignment are zealous and exact in the observance of the laws and possess the charity and discretion with which they must conceive the pious, Christian intentions of the king" ¹¹⁹

Vélez Cachupín had struck at the very heart of the problem, for the quality of the administrators proved to be the key to successful Indian policy. A solution to the Indian problem was begun only when men of extraordinary perception and integrity attacked the problem at every level from the provincial to the viceregal. The next quarter-century saw the emergence of a few such men on the scene in New Spain.

¹¹⁸Tamarón, "Kingdom of New Mexico, 1760," New Mexico Historical Review, XXVIII (October, 1953), 301-302.

¹¹⁹Vélez Cachupín to the Marqués de Cruillas, Santa Fe, June 27, 1762, in Plains Indians ed. by Thomas, 148-154.

CHAPTER III

THE PROVINCIAS INTERNAS UNITE TO MEET THE THREAT OF THE BÁRBAROS, 1762-1786

The mid-century brought major changes in the Spanish Empire, the impact of which was soon felt even on the remote northern frontier.

First came a new emperor, Charles III, who succeeded to the throne in 1759. An exemplar of the "enlightened despots" of the era, he undertook at once an extensive program of economic and administrative reform throughout his decaying empire. To lay the basis of reforms in New Spain he sent a corps of inspectors, of whom the chief was the visi-tador general, José de Gálvez. Gálvez found that the northern frontier posed one of the principal problems, both administrative and economic. In order to collect the information necessary for the planning of basic reform, the Marqués de Rubí was assigned to inspect and report on the military defenses of the frontier.

Re-examination of the frontier could not have been more timely, for the events of mid-century had totally altered the context in which it existed. The second Family

Compact with France was signed in 1761, and in the following year Spain joined France in her Seven Years' War with England. In the Treaty of Paris, 1763, a victorious England gained the Spanish possessions of Minorca and Florida, and virtually drove France from the North American continent. Toward the close of the war, when it became apparent that France could not hold her American colonies, she offered her vast province of Louisiana to Spain. Spain, already burdened with more territory than she could effectively control, was reluctant to accept the gift. But the alternative was a British Louisiana, and such a danger to the northern mining provinces of New Spain had to be avoided at any cost. The contract for the cession of Louisiana to Spain was made in 1762, although the actual transfer was not completed until 1769.

A new situation now prevailed in New Spain. The old French threat had, of course, been eliminated with the departure of France from the continent. But there was substituted perhaps an even more formidable danger of aggression from the new neighbor, England, on the Mississippi River frontier. In addition, there emerged new hazards in the northwest, where England was rumored to have plans for expansion and the Russians were becoming alarmingly active. In January, 1768, the king ordered Viceroy Antonio de Bucareli to resist Russian aggression at any cost. Bucareli and Visitador General Gálvez concluded that the only

practicable defense would be to forestall Russian, or for that matter English, expansion by occupying Upper California. There resulted an extension of the Spanish system of missions and presidios, with a few colonists, into Upper California, with emphasis on the occupation of strategic harbor locations. The expansion began with the founding of San Diego in 1769, and by the end of the century there were twenty-one missions in the new province. Contact with these distant outposts of the empire depended in the beginning entirely upon sea communication between Mexico and California, but authorities in Mexico City were eager to open a land transport route from Sonora to California. Such a route was pioneered by Juan Bautista de Anza in 1774, though the problem of defending the traffic from the indios bárbaros was never solved sufficiently to make the road very useful.

The problems involved in administering such a vastly extended frontier area were staggering. Louisiana was inhabited by numerous Indian groups, most of which had prospered under the French commercial system. They were resentful of the change of government, and totally unwilling to submit to the mission system which had thus far been Spain's only effective method of controlling an Indian population. If Spain failed to establish satisfactory relations with the Indians of Louisiana, the vacuum left by the French would be filled by the English, who would presumably use the Indians to undermine Spain's control of her North American

territories. But the only hope of keeping the tribes at peace was to maintain the flow of trade goods around which their economies were now oriented, and Spain was woefully short of the necessary resources. Even the routine administrative costs for a province as vast as Louisiana were great, and the necessity of maintaining an effective defense of the frontier against the English meant tremendously increased expenditures.

The implications for the provinces of the old northern frontier were overwhelming. Once the strategic frontier of New Spain, they now found themselves relegated to the position of rather remote interior provinces. The exception to that rule was New Mexico, the far northern outpost, which now was alerted to the danger of English incursion and was in addition newly important as a possible key to land communication with the newly occupied province of Upper California. But on the whole, at a time when the interior provinces desperately needed reinforcements in their crucial struggle against the indios bárbaros, it became necessary to economize at their expense in order to maintain the new frontiers of Spain in America. Fortunately, there were compensations. While some of the economies crippled the provincial defenses, the accompanying administrative re-organization resulted in the first unified formulations of policy for the entire region, and in much more effective coordination of military operations against the Indians.

The Rubí Inspection

The basis of the reforms in the northern provinces was the report of the Marqués de Rubí, whose tour of inspection of the frontier began in 1766.

The Rubí party was in Santa Fe from August 19 to September 15, 1766. The province was found in seriously weakened condition, and the engineer of the party, Nicolás de Lafora, urged that the population and economy be strengthened so that New Mexico could be made "an impenetrable barrier" against those Indians who threatened to destroy Spain's interior provinces.¹

The total population of the province was 20,104, of whom only 9,580 were Spaniards, and 10,524 were Pueblo or genízaro² Indians. Santa Fe itself had a population of 2,324 persons, including the company of eighty soldiers maintained at the presidio at an annual cost of 34,070 pesos.

¹Nicolás de Lafora, Relación del viaje que hizo a los presidios internos, situados en la frontera de la América septentrional, perteneciente al rey de España ed. By Vito Alessio Robles (Mexico, 1939), 105.

²In New Mexico, the term genízaro was applied to non-Pueblo Indians who lived in more or less Spanish fashion. Many of them were captives who had been acquired from the indios bárbaros, and their mixed New Mexico-born descendants inherited the designation. Records concerning genízaros show such diverse origins as Apache, Comanche, Navajo, Ute, Kiowa, Wichita and Pawnee. Many had some Spanish blood. All of the genízaros bore Christian names from baptism and Spanish surnames from their former owners. Belonging no longer to any Indian tribe, they spoke a broken Spanish. Adams and Chavez (eds.) in New Mexico Missions, footnote 72, page 42.

Lafora regarded Santa Fe as quite indefensible. He wanted a small fortification built at once in order to safeguard persons and property in case of a general uprising. Failure to do so, he thought, invited a general disaster which could result in the loss of the province.

The ill-armed settlers depended largely on the lance, which they had learned to handle quite well. Guns were used very little, because powder was scarce and costly. Since the settlers were required to furnish powder at their own expense when called upon for military duty, they usually carried very small charges when they went on campaign. They thus lost the advantage of firearms, which might have helped to equalize the disparity between the small numbers of the Spanish forces and the infinite numbers of the hostile Indians.

According to Lafora, in 1766, the only really hostile Indians in New Mexico were the Gila and Faraon Apaches. There was also "a little trouble" with the Comanches, but they were coming every year to the Taos trade fair. Thanks to the guns which they were supplied by the still-active French traders of Louisiana through the Taovayas, the Comanches were better armed than the New Mexican Spaniards.³ Rubí's impression of the problem of the indios bárbaros was strongly influenced by the lull in hostilities with the Comanches which he saw in New Mexico.

³Lafora, Relación, 81 ff.

The Rubí reports were the basis not only of important changes in the military procedures of the northern provinces, but also of very fundamental changes in Indian policy. Having observed that the Comanches were at peace in New Mexico, and that they seemed to know how to keep their obligations, while the Apaches seemed totally unreliable in their peace agreements, Rubí recommended a policy designed to conciliate the Comanches and exterminate the Apaches. Texas was to cultivate the friendship of the Nations of the North, including the Comanches, in order to parallel the peace established in New Mexico. This would presumably drive the Apaches to the frontier missions and presidios for refuge, but Rubí strongly advised against peace with them unless they would agree to re-settlement in very small groups far south in Mexico. There they could be expected to disappear, or be assimilated by other tribes. This would leave the Comanches in a very strong position on the northern frontier, but Rubí considered them far more desirable as neighbors than the amorphous Apache bands, for he was convinced by his observations in New Mexico that the Comanches were a reasonable people, capable of making and keeping formal treaties.⁴

As for specific military recommendations, Rubí suggested that the frontier be guarded by fifteen presidios, to

⁴Thomas (ed.) in Plains Indians, 36-37.

be spaced at regular intervals so as to form a cordon from the Gulf of California to the Bahía del Espíritu Santo in Texas. This meant relocation of all but three of the existing presidios. In New Mexico, a new presidio was to be founded at Robledo, near present Fort Selden, in order to restrain the Gila Apaches from joining the Natagées.⁵ The El Paso garrison was to be shifted eighty leagues south to Carrizal.⁶ These recommendations, effected by the Reglamento of 1772, resulted in the movement of many of the presidios far beyond the line of actual settlement, on the theory that they would prevent Indian raiders from reaching the settled region. The results were appalling, for the enemy easily slipped through the line of defense and virtually had a free hand in the unprotected interior.⁷ Rubí's impressively orderly approach to the military problem of the northern frontier apparently stemmed from an impressive ignorance of the realities of Apache warfare.

The tragic consequences of the policy were described in 1775 by two noted frontier priests, who appealed for an increase in the number of troops on the frontier at least long enough to punish, or even exterminate, the Apaches who

⁵Worcester (ed.) in Gálvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces, 10-13.

⁶Thomas, "Antonio de Bonilla and Spanish Plans for the Defense of New Mexico, 1772-1778," in New Spain and the Anglo-American West, I, 186.

⁷Nelson, "Juan de Ugalde," 53-54.

had reduced the provinces to such deplorable conditions. The frequent assaults by the Apaches had left the presidios almost without saddle animals, and thus unable to pursue the marauders. Such strong detachments were required to guard the remaining horse herds, that the effective fighting forces of the frontier were seriously depleted. Furthermore, many soldiers were occupied in moving their presidios, in compliance with the Reglamento of 1772. This left almost no soldiers available to pursue their ostensible objective, the defense of the frontier against the Apaches.⁸

The picture drawn by the priests was painfully accurate, and it was eventually necessary for the government to recognize that the relocation plan was a failure. The attempt to salvage an effective line of defense began in 1781, when Commander General Teodoro de Croix authorized the abandonment of the Monclova, Aguaverde, La Bahía, and San Sabá posts, with their troops to be concentrated in the villas of Monclova, Santa Rosa and San Fernando. The Coahuila posts were restored to the positions which they had occupied before 1772.⁹

⁸Fray Francisco Garcés and Fray Juan Díaz to Viceroy Antonio de Bucareli, Ures, March 21, 1775, in Anza's California Expeditions ed. by Herbert Eugene Bolton (Berkeley, 1930), V, 282.

⁹Worcester (ed.) in Gálvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces, 17.

The responsibility for carrying out the Rubí plan was given initially to Hugo O'Connor, appointed in 1772 to become commandant inspector. His time was occupied entirely with effecting the presidial transfers and with campaigning against the Apaches, two entirely incompatible activities, since troops engaged in the one project could hardly work effectively at the other. The Apache problem was complicated because they now had some firearms, which they were obtaining from the Bidais Indians of Texas, and had a plentiful supply of stolen horses. In 1773, however, the Lipans made a peace, which, on the whole, they kept tolerably well, although some individuals from the band joined the Mescaleros in occasional breaches of the peace.¹⁰

O'Connor met with some military success in 1773 when he led a campaign into the Bolsón de Mapimí and drove the Apaches north. This relieved the Apache pressure on Nueva Vizcaya, but the Apaches then simply increased their activities further west. In 1775, O'Connor assembled the troops of Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya for a general campaign against the Apaches. New Mexico was unable to meet its quota of troops because it was almost destitute of horses, and Sonora did not participate because all of its resources were needed to mount the Anza expeditions to California. Nevertheless, some fifteen defeats were inflicted on the Apaches, and two

¹⁰O'Connor, Informe, 79-80

thousand horses were recovered. With that encouragement, in 1776 O'Connor led another joint effort to exterminate the Apaches. New Mexico sent two hundred fifty men this time, having received a fresh supply of fifteen hundred horses in the preceeding year. But the campaign met with little success. O'Connor's health broke under the severe strain of the job, and he appealed for transfer, which he was granted by the Crown.¹¹

Mendinueta's War with the Comanches in New Mexico

Perhaps the most disturbing developments in the period following Rubí's inspection were those in New Mexico. The peace which prevailed with certain indios bárbaros, particularly the Comanches, at the time of his inspection had greatly impressed Rubí and had influenced his recommendations concerning Indian policy. But within a year after Rubí's visit to New Mexico those conditions no longer existed. Governor Vélez Cachupín was succeeded in 1766 by Don Pedro Fermín de Mendinueta, who for some unknown reason found it necessary within a year to campaign against the Comanches.¹² New Mexico then remained at war with the Comanches for the next two decades.

¹¹Worcester (ed.) in Gálvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces, 8-12; Thomas (ed.) in Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1776-1783 (Norman, 1941), 16-17.

¹²Thomas (ed.) in Plains Indians, 38.

While the reason for the initial breach with the Comanches seems not to be recorded, Mendinueta's own reports document the years of his administration as a dreary series of Comanche attacks on pueblos and towns. Mendinueta continually organized punitive campaigns, occasionally inflicting some damage on the Comanches when he could catch them.¹³ He took considerable pride in his achievements against the Comanches, and apparently considered war with them such a normal state of affairs that he refused to entertain any idea of peace. A Comanche delegation which sought peace at Taos in 1774 was seized at the governor's order. When the prisoners attempted to escape, they were killed. Mendinueta congratulated himself that as a result they did not succeed in giving any news to their tribe!¹⁴ In 1775 he ordered the trade of the province closed to all but chiefs who came to Santa Fe to make peace with him in person, but in view of the fate of the Comanche peace party in 1774, the Indians showed no enthusiasm for treating with him.¹⁵

Viceroy Bucareli, however, began to entertain serious misgivings about Mendinueta's activities.

¹³Pedro Fermín de Mendinueta to Marqués de Croix, Santa Fe, June 18, 1768, ibid., 159-162; Croix to Arriaga, Mexico, January 30, 1769, ibid., 165-168; Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, September 30, 1774, ibid., 169-173.

¹⁴Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, October 20, 1774, ibid., 175-176.

¹⁵Id. to id., Santa Fe, August 18, 1775, ibid., 180.

Although the successes so happily won on the three principal occasions against the barbarous Comanches appear to overcome the injuries received, according to your lordship's account of everything, these reports have disturbed me, both because I consider these faithful settlements assaulted too much and exposed to the sacrifice of the inhumanity and fury of the enemies who attacked them and because, in place of teaching them lessons, the punishment can have exasperated them and thus be the motivating reason for their uniting to seek the vengeance to which they are accustomed. Otherwise terror would occupy their minds or the fear of greater defeats restrain them. This fearful situation, I assure your lordship, leaves me with considerable concern until I have contrary reports.¹⁶

The viceroy's concern for New Mexico was entirely justified. In addition to the many encounters with the Comanches, Mendinueta found it necessary, at least by 1774, to campaign against the Navajos. The Comanches were able to stage a major raid on the Albuquerque area in August, 1774, virtually unopposed, because the militia of the jurisdiction were absent on campaign against the Navajos.¹⁷ Gila Apache raids also became a problem in the Albuquerque vicinity at this time.¹⁸

An exception in Mendinueta's general war with the bárbaros were the Natagée and Sierra Blanca Apaches, who came to Albuquerque in May, 1768, to seek peace.¹⁹ They

¹⁶Bucareli to Mendinueta, Mexico, February 8, 1775, ibid., 177.

¹⁷Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, September 30, 1774, ibid., 172.

¹⁸Id. to id., Santa Fe, May 12, 1775, ibid., 175.

¹⁹Mendinueta to Marqués de Croix, Santa Fe, June 18, 1768, ibid., 162.

observed their agreement quite well for a time, to the governor's great surprise. It was later learned from a captive who escaped them that the reason these Apache groups sued for peace was that the Comanches had made a particularly severe raid against the Natagées, and that they had learned about the same time that armed forces from Nueva Vizcaya were being sent against them.²⁰ In peace with the New Mexican settlements, therefore, the Apaches saw their only possible refuge from converging enemy forces.

The Utes, also suffering at the hands of the Comanches, remained friendly to the Spaniards, but Mendinueta tampered with that relationship too. In 1775, he prohibited any settler or friendly Indian from going to the Ute country to trade, operating on the theory that if the Utes were forced to come to New Mexico the trade could be supervised to prevent abuses and the extension of the Christian faith would be facilitated. Since the Ute trade was vital to the commercial life of the northern settlements, the order was subject to repeated and flagrant violations, often with the collusion of the local officials responsible for enforcing it.²¹ It was also in 1775 that Mendinueta reported that he had persuaded the Utes to attack the Gilas and Navajos, with

²⁰Marqués de Croix to Don Julián de Arriaga, Mexico, January 30, 1769, ibid., 167-168.

²¹Governor Francisco Trebol Navarro, Bando, Santa Fe, September 13, 1778, S.A.N.M., no. 740

whom "they had always been friends," for fear they might otherwise be persuaded to join in concerted raids against the province, and that Ute pressure had forced the Navajos to make a new peace with New Mexico.²² Since large-scale warfare between the Utes and Navajos had been so marked during the first administration of Vélez Cachupin that the Navajos were nearly forced to abandon their country, the report of Mendinueta in this matter indicates that he was either extraordinarily ill-informed about the indios bárbaros with whom he dealt, or that he deliberately misled the viceroy in the hope of forwarding his own career.

Viceroy Bucareli became so concerned about the survival of the province that he urged Commander Inspector O'Connor to consider whether reinforcements should not be sent to New Mexico from the troops of Nueva Vizcaya. He himself offered to send arms from the royal warehouse to be sold at cost to the settlers, if the governor felt that this would help to strengthen the defenses of the province.²³ Mendinueta replied that the settlers were not destitute of arms, since they had been able to barter produce for the old arms of the presidial soldiers. The governor had counted some six hundred guns and one hundred fifty pairs of pistols

²²Council of War, Chihuahua, June 9-15, in Plains Indians ed. by Thomas, 199.

²³Bucareli to Mendinueta, Mexico, February 8, 1775, ibid., 178.

in fair condition in the province. However, the enemy raids had resulted in the theft or destruction of all the breeding stock, so that the Spaniards were left almost entirely without horses, and thus were quite unable to pursue the enemy. A horse herd of perhaps fifteen hundred was essential to the maintenance of the province.²⁴ So impressed by the New Mexican emergency were the authorities who deliberated the request that it was granted with unusual promptness in the fall of 1775.²⁵

Mendinueta wanted more than reinforcements, however, to cope with the general war which faced the province. The dispersed ranch homes of the Spaniards were quite indefensible, and as a result, many were being abandoned in panic and some advantageous frontiers were thus being lost. Mendinueta wished the settlers to congregate in pueblos built around plazas or streets, in order that their homes could more easily be defended against attack.²⁶ But he found the antagonism of the settlers to such a move so great that no mere gubernatorial order by Mendinueta could accomplish the resettlement, and he urged a firm viceregal order for the consolidation of the settlers. The governor asked also for

²⁴Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, August 19, 1775, ibid., 184.

²⁵Bucareli, Order, Mexico, October 31, 1775, ibid., 189.

²⁶Actually, the movement for consolidation of the settlements dates back to the administration of Governor

the establishment of a presidio at Taos, "a pueblo of warlike Indians," to protect from Comanche raiders the pueblos of Abiquiú, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso and Picurís, as well as the various districts of Spanish settlers in the jurisdiction of La Cañada. Such an establishment in the north should then leave the presidial force at Santa Fe free to look after the rest of the frontiers and to carry on the Apache wars.²⁷

Not only the settlers but also the Pueblos were alleged to be reluctant to cooperate with Mendinueta in the defense of the province. He reported that the Pueblos of Zuñi, Ácoma and Laguna were quite numerous, but that they refused to help in the campaigns against the bárbaros, since they themselves were at a great distance from the worst threats, and had to make very little effort to defend themselves from the Apaches.²⁸ Mendinueta blamed the Ácomas, Lagunas and Zuñis for only defending themselves from the Gilas and leaving the way open for Gila raids against the Navajo country. Mendinueta felt that this aroused Navajo suspicion of the Spaniards, and feared they would start a

Vélez Cachupín, who had in 1754 congregated the settlers of Truchas around two plazas in order to protect them from Comanche incursions. Domínguez, Missions of New Mexico, 83.

²⁷Mendinueta to Bucareli, Santa Fe, March 26, 1772, in "Governor Mendinueta's Proposals for the Defense of New Mexico, 1772-1778," ed. by Thomas, New Mexico Historical Review, VI (January, 1931), 27-30.

²⁸Ibid., 28.

new war against the province. The governor persisted in his request for the Taos presidio, and now urged one at Socorro as well in order to stop raids of the Sierra Blanca Apaches.²⁹

The effect of the crisis on the morale of the New Mexicans was devastating, and by 1770, a paralytic despair gripped much of the Spanish population. Terrorized by the constant attacks of the indios bárbaros, ever more urgently in need of supplies and reinforcements, they began to doubt that human succor would ever reach them. They began to seek some powerful patron saint who might adequately represent their sufferings and obtain a miraculous divine intercession to save the province.³⁰

These, then, characterized the temper of the settlers under stress: an intense religiosity, and a stubbornly conservative resistance to Mendinueta's attempts to reorganize the settlements on a more defensible basis. But neither mysticism nor obstinacy sufficed to spare any sector some serious upheaval.

By 1770 the Comanches raids had become so severe that a block of settlers at the present site of Fernández de Taos had abandoned their plaza and, with the consent of

²⁹Mendinueta to Croix, Santa Fe, November 3, 1777, ibid., 36-37.

³⁰"Information Communicated by Juan Candelaria," New Mexico Historical Review, IV, 294.

the Indians, moved to the pueblo. They were still living there in 1776, waiting for Governor Mendinueta to furnish the plaza which he had promised to build for them amidst their farms, apparently at the present Ranchos de Taos.³¹ The church at Picuris pueblo was torn down at Mendinueta's order in 1769, and in 1776 the congregation was still waiting for the new building which he had promised to erect for them in a safer place.³² The Tiwa and Hopi groups who had maintained separate plazas at Sandía pueblo were ordered to move together to consolidate their defenses against the Comanches.³³

Comanche pressures forced the Pecos Indians to abandon the use of their irrigated fields north of the pueblo, and as a result they were suffering famines every year after January because their small harvest was no longer sufficient to last until a new crop could be produced.³⁴ Even harder pressed were the Indians of Galisteo pueblo, who, giving way before the combined forces of the Comanches and famine, were beginning to leave their pueblo by 1776. By 1792 the pueblo was extinct, and the remnants of the population lived at Santo Domingo.³⁵

³¹Dominguez, Missions of New Mexico, 112-113.

³²Ibid., 92.

³³Ibid., 143.

³⁴Ibid., 215.

³⁵Ibid., 217.

Other districts were equally injured by Apache wars. The friars of Acoma reported that the population of that pueblo, thanks to the Apaches and various epidemics, had declined by more than one half.³⁶ Carnué and Nutria, settlements in the Sandias east of Albuquerque, were abandoned because of Apache raids, though they had good irrigated farmlands and excellent pastures. Navajo uprisings in 1774 forced the abandonment of the Río Puerco settlements, six leagues northwest of Albuquerque.³⁷

So grave was the threat to the existence of the province that even the long-standing quarrel between church and state authorities was momentarily suspended. Many friars felt that the province was on the verge of being wiped out, and the Franciscans gave their strong support to the campaigns of Mendinueta against the Comanches and of O'Conor against the Apaches.³⁸ Father Sylvestre Vélez de Escalante urged that the Gila Apaches be driven by the joint forces of New Mexico, Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya eastward toward the Buffalo Plains, "where are found the two most obnoxious tribes, the Comanches and Apaches, who by their fighting would soon destroy each other."³⁹

³⁶Ibid., 195.

³⁷Ibid., 254.

³⁸Domínguez to Provincial Fray Isidro Murillo, El Paso, November 4, 1775, ibid., 270-272.

³⁹Sylvestre Vélez de Escalante, Pageant in the Wilderness: the story of the Escalante Expedition to the

Authorities above the provincial level realized that if New Mexico were lost now, reconquest would be far more difficult than it had been in 1694. Antonio de Bonilla, adjutant-inspector of the northern presidios, pointed out the danger in 1776:

The Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and Apaches do not consider being converted nor even the rest of the heathen nations. Their idols are liberty and war. The frequent trade, unwisely permitted with the Spaniards, had made them lose that respect which the first conquerors could instill in them, whom they looked upon as people immortal and unusual. Firearms do not intimidate them, because they use and manage them with more dexterity than their masters and the successful results which they enjoy in all their attacks, interruptions and undertakings have made them unconquerable.

The important barrier of New Mexico lost, the Indians master of that immense country, and accustomed to live by robbery, will undoubtedly come nearer to us. If today an army is needed only to make war on the numerous and vagrant body of Apaches, what forces will be sufficient to hold back the rest of the nations, and even the very Indians who are conquered, who, lovers of liberty, will throw off the yoke and attack us as domestic enemies in the same manner in which they have done and are doing in the various uprisings suffered in all time?⁴⁰

Repercussions of the hostilities reached ever further into Mexico proper. By 1776, both the Lipan Apaches and the Comanches had begun sporadic raids into Nuevo Leon and Santander.⁴¹ In 1774, the remote presidio of Altar

Interior Basin, 1776, including the Diary and Itinerary of Father Escalante ed. by Herbert Eugene Bolton (Salt Lake City, 1950), 247.

⁴⁰ Antonio de Bonilla, "Notes Concerning New Mexico," in Thomas, "Antonio de Bonilla and the Defense of New Mexico," in New Spain and the Anglo-American West, I, 202.

⁴¹ Morfi, Viaje de Indios y Diario del Nuevo Mexico ed. by Vito Alessio Robles (Mexico, 1935), 213-214.

had been considered quite safe from the Apaches,⁴² but two years later the coast road to Altar had been made entirely unsafe by their constant attacks.⁴³

Croix Establishes the United Command
of the Provincias Internas

The continued deterioration of the entire northern region led to a drastic governmental reorganization in 1776, when the provinces of New Mexico, Texas, Coahuila, Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, Sinaloa and California were detached from their normal relationship to the viceroyalty of New Spain and placed under a new military government called the Commandancy-General of the Interior Provinces of New Spain. Teodoro de Croix was appointed as first commander general of the new unit.⁴⁴ A veteran of many years' military service, Croix had also had some New World administrative experience during the period 1766-1770, when his uncle, the Marqués de Croix, was viceroy of New Spain. However, he had no personal knowledge of the northern frontier, and he had spent the last four years in Spain. There was, therefore, a considerable lapse of time while Croix studied the problems of his new charge, both in the archives and by a personal tour of inspection. Pending the formulation and

⁴²Juan Bautista de Anza, Diary, 1774, in Anza's California Expeditions ed. by Bolton, II, 11.

⁴³Pedro Font, Diary, ibid., IV, 517.

⁴⁴Thomas (ed.) in Teodoro de Croix, 17.

activation of the new policies, the beleaguered provinces simply held on as best they could against the indios bárbaros.

Croix, beginning his inspection of the frontier in 1777, faced a major decision at once. The Apaches, having been pushed by the Comanches and allied nations to the very threshold of the Spanish settlements, began to sue for peace all along the frontier. Strongly influenced by the Rubí reports, which he had studied thoroughly before leaving Mexico City, Croix was quite skeptical of the good faith of the Apaches. He preferred, rather to bet against them on the Comanches, hoping to make allies of the latter and use them to destroy the former. However, bound by the king's standing order that gentle means must be preferred to war with the Indians whenever possible, Croix outlined the terms upon which the Apaches would be admitted to peace. He required that they settle themselves in pueblos in designated locations and accept instruction in Christianity. As expected, the offer produced no peace agreements, and Apache depredations became even worse for a time. Croix then resolved upon a policy of carrying the war to the enemy country with well-coordinated expeditions which he proposed to launch from all affected provinces.⁴⁵

To gain the counsel and support of experienced personnel on the frontier, Croix called a series of councils

⁴⁵Thomas (ed.) in Forgotten Frontiers, 15-19.

during the course of his inspection tour. The council at Monclova in December, 1777, and the one at San Antonio in January, 1778, both deliberated the pros and cons of alliance with the Comanches against the Apaches, and vice versa. Both bodies were decisively opposed to any suggestion that confidence be placed in agreements with the Apaches, and both were willing to gamble on the Comanches as possible allies.⁴⁶ The third and final council, at Chihuahua in June, 1778, agreed that "in none of the provinces should peace be extended to the Apaches because their friendship will always produce very funereal effects."⁴⁷ The reasoning in regard to the Apache problem ran thus:

. . . the known bad faith of the Apache does not give any hope that they may ever reduce themselves or maintain the friendships which they promise; secondly, that they found it necessary to maintain their rancherías upon our frontier to protect themselves from the raids of their enemies, the Indians of the north; thirdly, that they can not subsist without incessant robberies,
 . . . ⁴⁸

Deciding in favor of alliance with the Nations of the North, including, of course, the Comanches, the council arrived at this argument:

⁴⁶Report of the Council at Monclova, December 11, 1777, in Athanase de Mézières and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1768-1780 ed. by Herbert Eugene Bolton (Cleveland, 1914), II, 152-163; Report of the Council at San Antonio de Béxar, January 5, 1778, ibid., 163-170.

⁴⁷Council of War, Chihuahua, June 9-15, 1778, in Plains Indians ed. by Thomas, 199.

⁴⁸Ibid., 201.

Finally, in support of the useful alliance with the nations of the north, it was recalled that these Indians live in very open and fertile lands abounding in deer and buffalo, which are delicacies in their diet; that, accustomed to live on the plains and make war in plains country, it would be difficult for them to accommodate themselves in territories of rough hills, arid and scarce in all kinds of food. This is the reason why the Apaches eat the larger part of the mules and horses which they steal. Further, it is only when the nations of the north find themselves driven back by their enemies, the Osage, that they would be obliged to approach our frontiers. These frontiers would breathe easily for a long time, and that would be sufficient for them to be on guard against these new enemies.⁴⁹

The officials of the northern frontier, then, united to back Croix in the calculated risk of attempting alliance with the Nations of the North in order to launch an all-out campaign against the Apaches. Reviewing the devastation of the provinces at the hands of the Apaches in recent years, the assembled officials bitterly assailed the relocation of the presidios according to the strategy of Rubí as a costly error. This marked the first official step toward restoring the defenses of the province to a basis practicable for Apache warfare.

De Mézières Strives to Win the Comanches
to Spanish Allegiance

Fortunately for Croix's plan, some progress toward conciliating the Nations of the North had already been made in Louisiana and Texas, chiefly through the efforts of Athanase de Mézières. A veteran in the French colonial service

⁴⁹Ibid., 202-203.

at the border post of Natchitoches, de Mézières had transferred his services to the Spanish government at the time that the ownership of Louisiana changed. De Mézières had met with remarkable success in his difficult assignment of reconciling the Indians of the Red River region to the change in masters. In 1771, he had made a treaty with the Taovayas, the foremost of the Wichita bands allied with the Comanches since 1747, in which they had agreed to transfer their allegiance from the French to the Spanish crown, and to stop their hostilities against Spanish establishments and citizens.⁵⁰ The Taovayas had also signed the treaty as mediators for the Comanches, who on that front, at least, now appeared willing to relax their enmity towards the Spaniards. The Taovayas had agreed to suspend intercourse with and consider as enemies any allied tribes, particularly the Comanches, which committed hostilities against the Spaniards.

In the spring of 1772, a Taovayas delegation had appeared as promised, in San Antonio to ratify the treaty before Governor Juan María de Ripperdá and receive presents from him.⁵¹

Actually, since their economic dependence remained entirely upon the Louisiana post of Natchitoches, which was

⁵⁰Treaty with the Taovayas, Natchitoches, October 27, 1771, in Athanase de Mézières ed. by Bolton, 256-260.

⁵¹Governor Juan María de Ripperdá, Certification, San Antonio, April 27, 1772, ibid., 260.

still run largely by the old French personnel, the northern Indians did not take very seriously their treaty obligations to the Spanish settlements of Texas, and their raiders continued to harass that province. But de Mézières had proved to the Spaniards that it was possible to deal with the Norteños, and he was commissioned by Croix's council of 1778 at San Antonio to negotiate with the northern bands for the Texans, and to advise the province on practicable means of cooperating with the Norteños against the Apaches.⁵²

Croix thought that it might be possible to launch an offensive against the eastern Apaches at once, if there were assembled a body of Norteño warriors, to be recruited and handled by de Mézières, and three or four hundred Louisianans led by Governor Bernardo de Gálvez. This force was to act jointly with the army of the Provincias Internas under Croix's personal command.⁵³ Gálvez, however, felt unable either to leave Louisiana or to spare the men asked for by Croix, because his province bordered upon the growing American-English conflict.⁵⁴ Thus, Croix encountered the first of the series of obstacles to his work in the Interior Provinces which sprang directly from the American conflict.

⁵²Report of the Council at San Antonio, January 5, 1778, *ibid.*, II, 163-170.

⁵³Croix to Bernardo de Gálvez, Chihuahua, September 11, 1778, *ibid.*, 137.

⁵⁴Bernardo de Gálvez to Don Josef de Gálvez, New Orleans, June 9, 1778, in Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794 ed. by Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington, 1946), I, 286-287.

There also arose difficulty in the critical matter of establishing the authorized alliance with the Comanches. De Mézières, who traveled as far as the Taovayas villages on Red River in 1778 to lay the groundwork for Croix's proposed campaign, became very discouraged about the prospects of making a substantial peace with the Comanches. He found that, in spite of their commitments to the contrary, they were again perpetrating outrages in Texas. Abandoning his plan to visit them, he sent instead a threat that he would go to war against them if they did not reform, and he began to speculate about the possibility of turning lesser tribes like the Taovayas against the Comanches to fight Spain's battle in the north.⁵⁵

Pending the arrival of reinforcements which would enable Croix's troops to launch the projected offensive against the Apaches, de Mézières was transferred from Louisiana to Texas to maintain good relations with the Nations of the North and to try to win the Comanches to Spanish allegiance. But the campaign was postponed indefinitely in 1779, when Croix received a royal order to avoid open war with the Indians where possible and to use only gentle means of winning them to Spanish allegiance.⁵⁶ A short time later came

⁵⁵De Mézières to Croix, Taovayas, April 19, 1778 [Letter No. 8], in Athanase de Mézières ed. by Bolton, II, 212-214.

⁵⁶Thomas (ed.) in Teodoro de Croix, 43.

the news that no additional troops could be assigned to the Provincias Internas, for Spain was about to enter the American war and must concentrate all her resources against the English.⁵⁷ Croix now faced the painful fact that, as commander of an interior frontier, he would not only lack the forces to carry out his elaborate plans for an all-out offensive against the enemy; he would even be denied the reinforcements which seemed vital to an effective defense of his command.

The crowning blow to Croix's ambitious plans came in November, 1779, with the death of de Mézières, who had just been appointed governor of Texas.⁵⁸ No Indian diplomatist of comparable ability existed in Texas, or even in Louisiana, so prospects for winning the Norteños to Spanish allegiance in that region became dim indeed.

Anza Achieves Peace with the Comanches
in New Mexico

Fortunately, Croix found an administrator for New Mexico who was able to triumph over the Comanche problem. Governor Mendinueta resigned just as Croix was taking charge of the Provincias Internas, and Colonel Don Juan Bautista de Anza, appointed in May, 1777, to succeed him, took office

⁵⁷Croix to Gálvez, Chihuahua, September 10, 1778, in Athanase de Mézières ed. by Bolton, II, 218-219.

⁵⁸Bolton (ed.) ibid., 118-121.

in Chihuahua on August 8, 1778.⁵⁹ Croix advised Anza to make peace with the Comanches if possible, in line with the recommendations of the councils of war, but he recognized the extreme difficulties which would prevail. The disheartened commander general therefore outlined the minimum objectives to be achieved in the province: that the Comanches make less frequent visits to the territories of New Mexico; that the Utes remain faithful to their alliance with the Spaniards; and that the Navajos be deterred from taking sides openly with the Apaches against the Spaniards.⁶⁰

Anza determined at once that it would be impracticable to carry out the Rubí recommendations to which the Reglamento of 1772 still bound the province. He found the proposed location of a presidio at Robledo entirely impractical, and suggested Socorro as an alternative. Croix concluded that the limited resources at his disposal did not warrant the establishment of a new presidio at this time, and, contrary to Rubí, it was decided that the military contingents at Santa Fe and at El Paso each should be kept undivided for maximum effectiveness in the defense of the province.⁶¹

⁵⁹Royal Title of Appointment, Aranjuez, May 19, 1777, in Forgotten Frontiers ed. by Thomas, 115-119.

⁶⁰Croix, General Report of 1781, in Teodoro de Croix ed. by Thomas, 114.

⁶¹Ibid., 107.

Anza found his new command in a pitiful condition. The Comanches had swept over the province in the year 1778, meeting virtually no resistance from the widely dispersed Spanish settlers. The result was that in a single blow the province lost one hundred twenty-seven persons, dead or captured.⁶² The arrogance of the successful Comanches now knew no bounds. To prevent a recurrence of the disaster, Anza at once pushed forward the plan, advanced by Mendinueta and endorsed by Croix, of reorganizing the population in defensible plazas. Progress toward consolidation of the settlers was made at Encinal, Albuquerque, Cañada, Taos and at Ojo Caliente.⁶³

Certain that the Comanches would be in no mood to make peace until the New Mexican forces humbled them with a decisive defeat, Anza took the field against them in August, 1779. Pursuing a Comanche force well beyond the Arkansas River in present eastern Colorado, Anza inflicted a telling blow by killing the chief Cuerno Verde, who was responsible for much of the Comanche activity against New Mexico. Cuerno Verde's hatred for the Spaniards reputedly stemmed from the fact that his own father had been killed in action against the Spaniards. The removal of that bitter

⁶²Ibid., 111.

⁶³Thomas (ed.) in Forgotten Frontiers, footnote 59, 379-380.

and influential personal hostility was a first step in the betterment of Spanish-Comanche relations.⁶⁴

Anza continued to improve the defenses of the province, and to pursue and punish the Comanches whenever possible. By May, 1780, he was able to report to Croix that the Comanches had repeatedly requested peace.⁶⁵ Anza consistently told Comanche delegates asking for peace that the Spaniards would be happy to treat with them, but that negotiations would be feasible only when all their groups should unite to seek a binding peace between all Comanches and all Spaniards.⁶⁶

Croix felt encouraged by the reports which he received from Anza, and did everything in his power to support the governor's policies with the resources of the Provincias Internas. The commander general attached prime importance to the job of keeping the Comanches peacefully in their own area, in order to end their devastating hostilities against

⁶⁴Anza, *Diario de la Expedition Que Sale a Practicar Contra la Nacion Cumancha El Infraescripto Teniente Coronel, Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governador y Comandante de la Provincia de Nuevo Mexico con la tropa, milicianos e indios, Santa Fe, September 10, 1779, in ibid., 121-139.*

⁶⁵Croix to Anza, Arispe, July 14, 1780, S.A.N.M., no. 799.

⁶⁶Pedro Garrido y Duran, *An Account of the Events which Have Occurred in the Provinces of New Mexico Concerning Peace Conceded to the Comanche Nation and Their Reconciliation with the Utes since November 17 of Last Year and July 15 of the Current, Chihuahua, December 21, 1786, in Forgotten Frontiers ed. by Thomas, 294.*

the Spanish settlements. But he was gravely disturbed by a realization that the well-established friendship of the Spaniards with the Utes and the Jicarilla Apaches might be a major obstacle in the way of making peace with the Comanches. Loath to risk a proven alliance for a tentative, experimental one, Croix therefore urged that even while Anza conciliated the Comanches, he must carefully conserve the friendship of the Utes and Jicarillas. If the Comanche problem were solved, it was hoped that the older allies might then be used against the hostile Apaches. If the Comanche peace failed, then the loyalty of the Utes and Jicarillas would be essential to the preservation of New Mexico.⁶⁷

Croix tried to support Anza's efforts with a peace offensive aimed at the Comanches from the adjoining province of Texas. Acting in accord with the governor of Texas, he sent Don Nicolás de la Mathe to visit the friendly Nations of the North, in the hope of regulating their activities and reaffirming their friendship for the Spaniards. If the diplomatic climate in the north seemed at all propitious, de la Mathe proposed to go on to the camps of the Comanches to see whether they would listen to his peace proposals. Such a journey could carry the agent to the Santa Fe region, in which case Anza was enjoined to give him all possible aid.⁶⁸

⁶⁷Croix to Anza, Arispe, July 14, 1780, S.A.N.M., no. 799.

⁶⁸Id. to id., Arispe, March 25, 1781, S.A.N.M., no. 819.

By February, 1783, Croix was able to report that his Texan agents were actually treating for a general peace with the Comanches and other Nations of the North. If the Comanches broke it, they were to be deprived of their trade with the Taovayas, who now seemed in a mood to cooperate with the Spaniards. Anza was urged to back up the Texan efforts by negotiating with the Comanches as much as possible in his own region.⁶⁹

The eventual success with the Comanches was won in New Mexico rather than in Texas. In accordance with Anza's requirement the principal groups of the Comanche nation in the New Mexico region met in council in November, 1785, determined that they all wished a general peace, and appointed representatives whose treaties with the Spaniards they all agreed to honor. The meeting was promoted by chief Ecuercapa, of the Cuchanec branch, and was attended by the Yupe and Yamparica divisions of the Comanche nation. The only Comanches not represented were those far to the north, who were prevented by deep snows from traveling to the council on the Arkansas River, and the easternmost branch who lived near the Taovayas in the jurisdiction of Texas.⁷⁰ The

⁶⁹Id. to id., Arispe, February 24, 1783, S.A.N.M., no. 858.

⁷⁰Garrido y Duran, An account of the events . . . concerning peace conceded to the Comanche nation . . ., Chihuahua, December 21, 1786, in Forgotten Frontiers ed. by Thomas, 294-295.

negotiations, conducted between Ecueraçapa and Anza, progressed without dissension, and were climaxed in February, 1786, with a peace treaty signed at the pueblo of Pecos.⁷¹ The treaty represented a total triumph for Anza, for in addition to the long-desired peace between the Comanches and New Mexicans, there was effected at least a paper reconciliation of the explosive quarrel of the Utes and Comanches. Furthermore, the Comanches agreed to take the offensive in cooperation with the Spaniards against the hostile Apaches. The terms of the treaty thus operated to fulfill all the highest hopes of Commander General Croix.

The Spaniards exerted every possible influence to assure that Ecueraçapa, whom they considered a man of proved reliability, would continue to act as commissioner-general in charge of the Comanches. They were quite prepared to rig the tribal election in order that they could deal with some recognized, stable authority representing their new allies. Don Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, now in command of the Provincias Internas, urged that the peace be cemented by turning the Comanches to war against the Apaches as soon as possible. At the same time that their warlike proclivities were being exploited, however, the Spaniards hoped to work gradually

⁷¹Articles of peace agreed upon and arranged in the villa of Santa Fe and the pueblo of Pecos between Colonel Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of the Province of New Mexico, and the Comanche captain, Ecueraçapa, Commissioner-General of the nation on the days, 25th and 28th of February of 1786, *ibid.*, 329-332.

toward inducing the Comanches to settle down and accept an agricultural way of life. To allow the Comanche way of life to remain totally oriented around war and hunting would be to invite serious trouble for Spain once it was no longer desirable for her to use the Comanches as warriors. Looking towards the future, then, every effort was to be made to teach the Comanches the Spanish language, customs and religion. It was planned that, if possible, some Spanish settlers and Pueblo Indians should be established near the Comanches to serve as examples of the way of life which they were expected ultimately to adopt.⁷²

On the heels of Anza's treaty with the Comanches at Pecos in 1786, came the news that the eastern rancherías of the Cuchanec had made peace with the Texans. If Anza were now able to call in to ratify the peace the northernmost Yamparicas, who had been unable to attend the winter negotiations because of snow, the Spaniards would have in their grasp the long-sought objective of a general peace with the Comanches.⁷³

Although Anza's principal fame in New Mexico rests upon his success in making peace with the Comanches, he faced the problem of the bárbaros on all fronts, as had all of his predecessors. The Navajos, though nominally at

⁷²Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola to Anza, Chihuahua, October 5, 1786, S.A.N.M., no. 943.

⁷³Ibid.

peace with the Spaniards, frequently took advantage of the obvious weakness of the province to make damaging raids. The temptation was overpowering because the Navajos lived in such sterile desert country that they were almost obliged to rob in order to live. Only by the constant threat of turning the Utes upon them were the Spaniards able to hold them in check at all.⁷⁴

During the Anza administration, it became apparent that the Navajos were secretly operating in collusion with the Gila Apaches against New Mexico. Breaking up that dangerous combination was Anza's job, and he put such pressure on the Navajos that they were obliged not only to reaffirm their peace treaties with the Spaniards, but to make war on their erstwhile Gila allies. Following the same policy which he used so successfully in dealing with the Comanches, Anza required the Navajos to elect a superior chief who would be the authority responsible to the Spaniards for the maintenance of the peace.⁷⁵

The Navajos at that time were the victims of the conflicting forces which so often plagued a tribe caught in

⁷⁴Croix, General Report of 1781, in Teodoro de Croix ed. by Thomas, 113-114.

⁷⁵Garrido y Duran, Account received of what was done in the province of New Mexico by Governor Don Juan Bautista de Anza to break the secret alliance which the Navajo nation maintained with the Gila Apaches, their separation, and allegiance of the former to our side having been assured, Chihuahua, December 21, 1786, in Forgotten Frontiers ed. by Thomas, 345-350.

a squeeze between the power of the Spaniards and that of a neighboring group of Indians. Although their natural sympathies lay with their Gila kinsmen, in becoming owners of flocks, fields and other tangible wealth, the Navajos had acquired a stake in the Spanish order. A cold-blooded analysis of the situation written early in 1786 by ad interim Commander General Joseph Antonio Rengel shows that certain officials responsible for Indian policy on the northern frontier clearly understood the dilemma of the Navajos and were prepared to exploit it to their fullest advantage. The new insight into the problems of dealing with the indios bárbaros marked a significant step in development of effective Spanish policies toward them.

. . . the Navajos are not entirely resolved to break with the Gilas, although they do not refuse it, knowing our friendship is more useful to their interests than that of the latter; but they might wish to enjoy the one without losing the other. This being incompatible with our principles, it is necessary that they decide. . . .
 . . . the irresolution of the Navajos is more from being accustomed to the trade of our enemies, with whom they have old contacts of kinship; and because their close situation makes it hard for them to violate these relationships. To this is added not a little the fear of experiencing all the force of their Gila attacks with which they have been threatened since they began to manifest and prove by acts their disposition in our favor. Although there predominates in the minds of the majority the consideration of the good which they have enjoyed in their trade with the pueblos of New Mexico, from which they are recently cut off, and of the danger of losing, if they displease us, their herds, woven goods and cultivated fields, possession of which they all have some, the opposite idea still sustains itself among some of distinction who are holding back their case . . . ⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Joseph Antonio Rengel to the Conde de Gálvez, Chihuahua, February 4, 1786, ibid., 264.

The succeeding commander general, Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, was enormously relieved to hear that the Gila-Navajo coalition had been broken, and he urged that all resources now be mustered to exert maximum pressure on the Gilas. Navajo and Comanche warriors were to be used to the fullest extent possible; the commander general hoped thus to assemble enough Spanish forces and Indian auxiliaries to hit every Gila rancheria at least once in a general campaign. Ugarte y Loyola recommended that trade be used to tie Navajo interests firmly to those of the Spaniards, and ordered that grave punishment be meted out at once to any settler who jeopardized the peace by sharp trading practices.⁷⁷

Navajo wars created still another problem for the Anza administration. The Navajos had long warred upon the isolated Hopi pueblos, which had maintained their independence since the revolt of 1680. Spanish friars visiting the Hopis had reported in 1776 that the hostilities had reached a severe intensity.⁷⁸ By 1780, the Navajo pressure and droughts had reduced the Hopi population to such a degree that their survival as a people was in grave doubt. Anza went to the Hopis to offer aid, at the price, of course, of their return to the life of the Spanish missions. A hard

⁷⁷Ugarte y Loyola to Anza, Chihuahua, October 5, 1786, S.A.N.M., no. 942.

⁷⁸Escalante, Pageant in the Wilderness, 235; Dominguez to Murillo, Zuñi, November 25, 1776, in Dominguez, New Mexico Missions, 289.

core were adamant in their resistance to reconversion, preferring to remain on their mesas and await death at the hands of the Navajos or of famine. Some two hundred did return to New Mexico with the governor, and were settled on land grants at various pueblos. Anza felt that it might be necessary to force the remainder to come to the settled region of New Mexico for protection, in order that they not be captured by the Navajos and thus increase the numbers of that troublesome nation. He was forbidden, however, to use any means other than peaceable persuasion for the reduction of the Hopis.⁷⁹

Despite his own reservations regarding the Hopi problem, with its implication of an ultimate increase in Navajo strength, Anza had in large part solved the problem of the indios bárbaros in New Mexico. Having brought the Comanches to Spanish alliance without disrupting the Spanish friendship with the Utes and Jicarilla Apaches, Anza now had his province in a position to concentrate its resources against the hostile Apaches. Indeed, the forces would now be so strongly augmented by powerful Indian allies that unprecedented pressures could be exerted against the Apaches.

The consequences were far-reaching throughout the Provincias Internas. With the Comanches and Navajos substantially under control at Santa Fe, the rest of the

⁷⁹Croix, General Report of 1781, in Teodoro de Croix ed. by Thomas, 109-110.

provinces could join with renewed hope in a concentrated offensive against the Apaches. Long denied effective reinforcements of Spanish troops, the Provincias Internas now had a much more effective weapon against the Apaches. The Comanches, who had for two generations threatened the very existence of the northern frontier, would now be the instrument by which New Spain at last effected control of her turbulent northern borderlands.

CHAPTER IV

A SUCCESSFUL INDIAN POLICY EMERGES, 1786-1800

Teodoro de Croix was not present on the northern frontier to see the successes achieved by Anza in New Mexico, for in 1782 his services to the Crown were rewarded with the appointment as viceroy of Peru. Upon the departure of Croix in 1783, his ad interim successor as commandante general of the Provincias Internas was Felipe de Neve, who served until his death in 1784. Neve was followed by another ad interim appointee, Joseph Rengel, who lasted until a general shake-up in the administration of the Provincias Internas occurred in 1785.

Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez Attacks the Problem of the Northern Frontier

In 1785 there arrived in Mexico a new viceroy, Bernardo de Gálvez, who had already served with distinction as governor of Louisiana, and who had very early in his career displayed conspicuous merit as commander of the frontier of Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora. With the beginning of the Gálvez administration in New Spain, supervisory authority over the

Provincias Internas was restored to the viceroy. Since Gálvez believed that the Provincias Internas was too vast a unit to be supervised effectively by one man, he divided it into administrative districts. Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola became commandante general. Juan de Ugalde was appointed comandante de armas, in charge of the districts of Texas and Coahuila. Rengel was made comandante inspector, in charge of Nueva Vizcaya and New Mexico. Commandante General Ugarte y Loyola himself was to take charge of Sonora and the Californias, and to exercise direct authority over Rengel and Ugalde. Because of its remoteness from the other Provincias Internas, New Mexico was left very much on its own. For instance, the governor of New Mexico was made sub-inspector of troops in his own province in order that Rengel and his aides should not be required to attempt frequent trips to New Mexico.¹

During the period of ad interim administrations, there had been a great deal of confusion and insecurity in the Provincias Internas. Some progress had been made, however, in the war against the Apaches. For instance, in the years 1781 to 1783, Juan de Ugalde, then governor of Coahuila, had led three campaigns against the Apaches, driving them temporarily from the Bolsón de Mapimí and closing one of their favorite entrances to the more populous regions of the

¹Gálvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces ed. by Worcester, 28-34.

Provincias Internas. The campaigns did much to restore the morale of the Spaniards on the eastern frontier and impressed upon the eastern Apaches a new respect for Spanish arms.²

It was generally feared on the northern frontier that the restoration of the Provincias Internas to direct viceregal authority might seriously hamper the conduct of the wars against the Apaches. However, Gálvez was unique among viceroys in his extensive frontier experience and his grasp of the problems of Indian relations. His extraordinary perspectives stemmed in part from his experiences in Louisiana, where he had observed the effects of French Indian policies which differed radically from traditional Spanish approaches, but which were in general much more applicable to the indios bárbaros. In Louisiana, Gálvez gained not only fresh ideas about dealing with the Indian population, but also a realization that the Apaches and Comanches represented only the initial waves of a succession of indios bárbaros who would sweep toward the Spanish frontier. A knowledge of the Osage and Pawnee menaces, with some idea of the Siouxan pressures which fermented still further north of those nations, gave Gálvez a new appreciation of the urgency of solving the immediate Apache problem, if only to gird the northern frontier against fresh onslaughts.

²Nelson, "Juan de Ugalde," 60-65.

Gálvez Issues a Definitive Statement
of Indian Policy

The statement of policy which Gálvez issued in 1786 to govern the conduct of war and peace with the Indians is a landmark in the history of Spanish Indian policy, the fruit of two and a half centuries of Spain's experience in dealing with the people of the New World, heavily seasoned with the practical French approach.

With the Comanches, Utes and Navajos at peace in New Mexico, and with the Nations of the North behaving relatively well in Texas, there now existed an unprecedented opportunity to muster all of the resources of the northern frontier to meet the Apache menace. Gálvez was prompt to exploit the advantage.

War [he insisted] must be waged without intermission in all of the provinces and at all times against the Apaches who have declared it. They must be sought out in their rancherias, because it is the only method of punishing them, and the only one by which we may be able to achieve the pacification of the territories.³

Appraising the military problem involved, Gálvez pointed out that troops and presidios had never been sufficient for the defense and security of the Provincias Internas. In 1729 the presidios had seven hundred thirty-four men, with an annual pay of 283,930 pesos. With gradual increases over the years, by 1786 there were approximately

³Gálvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces ed. by Worcester, 34.

four thousand men in the presidios, not counting those in the Californias, at an annual cost of more than one million pesos. Nonetheless, there were still the "same complaints of sanguinary hostilities, approaching ruin, and complete desolation" which had been raised from the beginning.⁴ In view of the clear inadequacy of the prevailing procedures, therefore, Gálvez intended to reform existing military practices on the northern frontier, and perhaps more importantly, to institute a new approach to the problem of the Apaches.

The viceroy pointed out that the very nature of Apache warfare almost precluded pitched battles between opposing forces. Unlike European armies, the Apaches "never concern themselves with glorious demonstrations of power against power." Aspiring to nothing more than killing and robbing with impunity, they simply took advantage of negligence or weakness wherever they found it among the Spaniards. Skilled in self-preservation for centuries, they watched with utmost care from their hidden rancherías to avoid being surprised by Spanish forces, and avoided battle whenever possible. Apache warfare, then, called for extraordinary skill and experience on the part of the Spanish military leaders.⁵

Perhaps because of his own experience as a frontier commander, Gálvez allowed extraordinary local leeway in the

⁴Ibid., 36.

⁵Ibid., 83.

planning of military actions. Ugarte y Loyola, Rengel and Ugalde were to distribute the troops of their respective commands in the posts which seemed most advantageous to them. Commandants of detachments or independent forces on campaign were to be allowed complete freedom of action, unlimited by any restrictions. Wherever possible, troops were to be excused from such unnecessary duties as escort, courier and care of animals. Extreme care was to be exercised to garrison the remount stations adequately, and any commander who was careless in the matter would be required to replace at his own expense any losses which were suffered.⁶

No displays of temperament by the officers would be tolerated. Newly arrived officers, no matter how senior or experienced elsewhere, were to recognize that they were novices in Apache warfare, and they were to learn the techniques at once from veterans of the campaign, regardless of considerations of rank or seniority.⁷ Because pursuit of the Apaches was useless unless carried out with the utmost skill, Gálvez resolved that the commands of the detachments would be confided only to officers of proved experience in Indian warfare, well acquainted with the country, and again without regard for seniority. The viceroy notified all officers in advance that no complaints or appeals in this matter would be heard.

⁶Ibid., 35.

⁷Ibid., 56.

Gálvez demanded that all attention now be concentrated on the Apache problem. The Tarahumares of Nueva Vizcaya were to be offered a general amnesty so as not to divert troops of that province which should be campaigning against the Apaches. The settled Indians of Sonora were to be kept busy in the mines, in order that idleness should not lead them to imitate the escapades of the Apaches. Unless a matter of extreme urgency arose, there was to be no attempt to open travel between Upper California and Sonora, because the necessity of protecting the road would create a shortage of troops in Sonora. The Seris, Tiburones and the tribes of the Colorado River were to be ignored as far as possible, because "once the Apaches are conquered, or at least severely punished, the other domestic enemies could be subjected with less difficulty, and the menace of the tribes of the Colorado would be negligible."⁸

But warfare was by no means the sole, or even the most important, aspect of Gálvez's Indian policy. He had comprehensive plans for peaceful dealings with even the Apaches. Because his analysis of the factors in Indian policy is perhaps the most cogent ever presented by a top-ranking authority on this or any other North American frontier, there are presented at this point extensive quotations from his work:

⁸Ibid., 58.

Provided that our incessant campaigns produce desired results of intimidating and disheartening the Indians to such a degree that one or more of the Apache groups sue for peace, it should be conceded to them immediately under definite rules and points of capitulation. An account of the terms should be sent to me in order that I may warn others that they must observe them. For it is my intention to establish with the Indians a commerce which will attract them to us, which will interest them, and which in time will put them under our dependency.

It is permissible to refer to the wiles, the advantages, and the security with which the barbarous Indians wage war against us. We well know that this is their unrivalled occupation, and that they execute it with courage, swiftness and dexterity. They never fail in their attacks; but even if we should be able to dislodge them from the rough mountain ridges and impenetrable woods which cover the immense territories of these frontiers, they would seek better asylum in the fastnesses of the Sierra Madre.

In the event that this should happen, the number of our enemies may be augmented by the addition of those infidels who now live peacefully in the great gorges of the same sierra, and by those malcontents in the mission pueblo, extending the hostilities to the quietest provinces of the viceroyalty. In such a case there would not be sufficient forces with which to prevent the cruel outbreaks of a multitude of barbarians.

I am certain that the vanquishment of the heathen consists in obliging them to destroy one another. They are not capable under their present system of being reduced to the true religion or to vassalage, without a miracle of the Almighty, or of preserving constant faith in their armistices; but I also understand that in the state in which they keep our provinces a bad peace with all the tribes which ask for it would be more fruitful than the gains of a successful war.

It should not seem strange that in these provinces they should make peace with the Indians. All the Nations of the North are at peace in Texas; so are the Lipan Apaches in the same province and in Coahuila, as well as the Jicarillas, Navajos, Utes, and even the Comanches in New Mexico; and the Seris and Tiburones in Sonora. In 1771, the Apaches made peace in the town of El Paso, as did the Gileños with the presidio of Janos and with Nueva Vizcaya.

No one can ignore the fickleness and bad faith of all the Indians, but good faith has not always been encountered in our own actions. There are a thousand ancient and very recent examples of this truth that never should be mentioned.

Peace is founded, as everything else, on private interests, and the Indians, in general, have not been able to have advantages in peace treaties which they have enjoyed up to now. They live by hunting and warfare. These are not enough to supply the prime necessities of existence. And so, if they do not rob, they perish of hunger and misery.

This is the motivating cause by which we might have peace by deceit, and it actually comes to this. For our grants are sufficient to maintain them, nor can other assistance, which is absolutely necessary for their existence, be lent.

They lack horses and mules, and the Apaches suffer the greatest risks in their efforts to acquire these animals to eat, because they are their favorite food. And all of the Indians desire them for hunting and for campaigns against us and against each other.

They desire most anxiously to provide themselves with guns, powder, and munitions; for by the use of these arms they find pleasure and security in hunting, and they believe mistakenly that they are the most advantageous in war.

They also have other whims that can only be classed as folly. They attempt to cover their nakedness, to make the men fierce and the women attractive, with paints or vermilion, and they adorn themselves with ornaments which to our sight appear ridiculous.

We shall benefit by satisfying their desires. It will cost the king less than what is now spent in considerable and useless reinforcements of troops. The Indians cannot live without aid. They will go to war against one another in our behalf and from their own warlike inclinations, or they may possibly improve their customs by following our good example, voluntarily embracing our religion and vassalage. And by these means they will keep faith in their truces.

We always have these experiences in our colonies and newly conquered territories; and the truth is that also

in the Provincias Internas the deceitful peace pacts of the Indians produce better results than open war.

In time of peace the Indians alleviate their necessities partially with our limited gifts and with the miserable barter of skins, seeds, and wild fruit. They receive no affronts from our arms which incite them to vengeance, and as a natural consequence hostilities are fewer.

Some hostilities are usually experienced in the province, presidios, or town where peace has been established, and the Indians never desist from committing outrages in other territories. All these arise from the same causes: the unsatisfied necessity which obliges them to rob in order to eat and greediness to acquire the things that they desire--liberty, idleness, and the same poverty that engenders and foments their perverse inclinations. If their hunger is great, they do not relieve it by committing robberies where they have been offered friendship. If it is not great, they preserve the peace with good faith, and truly they do not break it, for they commit their hostilities in other places. More than once they have made this candid confession, persuading themselves that they do not offend their friends by the harm which they impute to other subjects of the king who live in territories where actually no peace has been made. This happened with all the Apaches in the town of El Paso and the presidio of Janos, with the Mescaleros in Nueva Vizcaya, with the Jicarillas, Navajos, Utes, and Comanches in New Mexico, with the Lipans in Coahuila, and with the Nations of the North in Texas, and the practice continues.

One can see that this brings some inconveniences which make problematical the utility of peace; for it is manifest that where the Indians proclaim it, they leave their families in safety in order to operate with greater peace of mind in their outbreaks; and also they undertake them with greater confidence, because they are better informed concerning our ideas, customs, and movements. These are the interests which today stimulate the Indians to solicit our friendship; and undoubtedly, it would be more advantageous for us to wage war if we do not find better means to establish peace.

The interest in commerce binds and narrows the desires of man; and it is my wish to establish trade with the Indians in these provinces, admitting them to peace wherever they ask for it.

Peace will be broken many times because of their volatile character, the difficulty of compromise by some people who do not recognize anything greater than their unbridled impulsiveness or their whims, or because it will be necessary to punish them justly. But once war is declared and prosecuted with vigor, the Indians will again seek peace, and we should always concede it whenever they ask for it.

Meanwhile, being at peace, we should for our part observe scrupulously the terms made and endeavor to compel the Indians to do the same, overlooking certain trifling defects which arise from their ignorance, rough character, and bad customs. Serious defections should be punished when there is an opportunity to teach them a lesson and when there is no peril of risking the respect of our arms.

One should also foment skillfully the discord and hostility between the factions of the same tribe and the irreconcilable hatred of the Nations of the North for the Apaches.

In the voluntary or forced submission of the Apaches, or in their total extermination, lies the happiness of the Provincias Internas; because they are the ones who have destroyed these provinces, live on their frontiers, and cause the apostatism and unrest of the reduced Indians.

I do not believe that the Apaches will submit voluntarily (God alone could work this miracle), but we may contribute to the means of attracting the different factions of this tribe, making them realize the advantages of rational life, which should please them. They should be made accustomed to the use of our foods, drinks, arms, and clothing, and they should become greedy for the possession of land⁹

Gálvez favored encouragement of the old feud between the Lipan and Mescalero Apaches in order to weaken both groups. He believed that in time intra-tribal hostility and the inroads of the Norteños might combine to exterminate the Apaches. Then the Provincias Internas would

⁹Ibid., 36-43.

at least have time to strengthen and consolidate their forces, in preparation for the hostilities of the other powerful tribes which, in view of his observations in Louisiana, Gálvez thought were undoubtedly approaching the Spanish frontiers.¹⁰

The peace with the Norteños in Texas was to be carefully preserved, almost any lengths being justified to prevent their becoming annoyed. To forestall action against the Norteños by some rash frontier official, Gálvez reserved to himself alone the power to decide whether infractions by the Norteños should be punished by Spanish forces.¹¹

Gálvez urged the immediate establishment of the trade with the Apaches. He realized that it would not be easy, but thought that the Lipans at least might cooperate. "The Lipans have better opportunities for acquisition and profit from the fur trade, and because of this frequent intercourse with the Spaniards they are more inclined to barter."¹²

Trade with the Apaches could be carried on by any one of three methods: private traders; government traders; a free trade open to all settlers of the provinces. Gálvez, acknowledging that all had their drawbacks, insisted that

¹⁰Ibid., 44.

¹¹Ibid., 75.

¹²Ibid., 45.

the important thing was that only one must be established, and then, whichever method had been chosen, "it will require the vigilance of the government to prevent the harmful results that arise from the excesses of cupidity."¹³

In return for the furs of the Indians, the viceroy proposed to trade the following items: horses, mares, mules, cattle, dried meat, sugar loaves, maize, tobacco, brandy, guns, ammunition, knives, clothing or coarse cloth, vermilion, mirrors, glass beads and other trinkets. No more radical departure from the traditions of Spanish practice could be imagined than to trade the Indians livestock and guns. But Gálvez argued that to trade livestock to the Apaches would enable them, under peaceful conditions, to develop abundant herds to supply their needs. This would remove the primary cause of their robberies, and thus contribute significantly to the establishment of lasting peace.¹⁴

Gálvez observed that, although the Norteños already liked liquor, the Apaches did not yet know it. He felt it important that they should be taught the use of brandy or mescal, for once they acquired a taste for liquor, it would become the most profitable item for the merchants in the Indian trade.

After all, the supplying of drink to the Indians will be a means of gaining their good will, discovering

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., 47.

their secrets, calming them so that they will think less often of conceiving and executing their hostilities, and creating for them a new necessity which will oblige them to recognize their dependence upon us more directly.

They will admit the dependence without doubt in the barter of guns and munitions, which the Lipans wish with great anxiety, and it is an error to believe that firearms used by the Indians do us greater harm than bow and arrow.

Nobody is ignorant of the agility and certainty with which they discharge their arrows without interruption, the force and power of this arm, the havoc which it causes, and that the Indians provide themselves with them wherever they can without need for factory or supplies.

Firearms, on the other hand, require much careful attention in order to preserve them in a useable condition, continuous exercise to handle them with dexterity, knowledge to avail oneself of the good qualities of these arms and to correct their defects, and finally, opportunity to repair and replace those that become damaged or useless.

All this is very difficult for the Indians who, as vagrants in their nomadic life, suffer the inclemencies of the elements, and they will not be able to preserve their firearms. They need our aid for the use and acquisition of them, as . . . has been affirmed by my own observations and experience.

Firearms will be advantageous to them in their hunting, as I have already said, and in the warfare of the heathen tribes with one another, but not in their hostility to us; for if the Indians should abandon the arrow for the firearm, they would give us all the advantages.¹⁵

Considering all these factors, Gálvez made the suggestion, revolutionary in Spanish practice, that guns be furnished in the Apache trade. He specified that they should be long and ornate, but of weak construction. The

¹⁵Ibid., 47-48.

size would be awkward on horseback and thus result in frequent breakage. He wished powder supplied regularly and abundantly, in order that the Indians would use guns to the exclusion of the bow and arrow, and would begin to lose their skill with their native weapons. Then, if a war began, the Spaniards could check the Apaches quite effectively simply by cutting off their ammunition supplies. Admitting that it would be necessary for the government to lose quite heavily in the Indian trade at first, Gálvez argued that it would be a relatively small price to pay to diminish hostilities and restore the prosperity of the beleaguered northern provinces.

Gálvez summarized his policy as follows:

By proceeding unceasingly against the declared enemies it will be possible to punish, restrain, and intimidate them to the point that they will depart from our frontiers or solicit peace. By conceding peace to them they may be attracted gently to the advantages of rational life and to necessary dependency on us by the interesting means of commerce and by discreet and opportune gifts. If peace is broken by the fickleness of the Indian or because of his intolerably bad faith we should rightly return to incessant and harsh war, alternating war and peace as often as the haughty or humble behavior of the barbarous Indians requires.

These essentially are the rules on which the proposed system is based; they appear to me just, and they employ the ancient hatred, factional interest, and inconstancy and perfidy of the heathen tribes to their mutual destruction.

I am very much in favor of the special ruination of the Apaches, and in endeavoring to interest the other tribes and even other Apache bands in it, because these Indians are our real enemies in the Provincias Internas; they cause its desolation and are the most feared because of their knowledge, cunning, warlike

customs (acquired in the necessity of robbing in order to live), and their number.¹⁶

Gálvez did not live to see his plans executed, for he died within the year that the Instruction was issued. But the policy had been endorsed by the king, and it remained the official guiding principle in the Apache wars through the remainder of the century. The next viceroy, Manuel Antonio Flores (1787-1789), protested strongly to the king against the idea of making treaties with any Apache tribe, and he declared the proposed Apache trade to be totally impracticable.¹⁷ But his objections apparently did not impress the Crown, for upon his retirement in 1789 Flores instructed his successor that the principles of Gálvez on Indian policy which had been approved by the king were still in effect.¹⁸ In 1788, Flores notified the new governor of New Mexico, Fernando de la Concha, that the Gálvez Instruction was still to be vigorously pursued.¹⁹ A year later, Ugarte y Loyola, transmitting to New Mexico the orders of the new viceroy, the Conde de Revilla Gigedo,

¹⁶ Ibid., 79-80.

¹⁷ Bancroft, North Mexican States, I, 649.

¹⁸ Don Manuel Antonio Flores to Conde de Revilla Gígedo, August 26, 1789, in Instrucciones que los Vireyes de Nueva España Dejaron a Sus Sucesores: Añadense Algunas que los Mismos Trajeron de la Corte y Otros Documentos Semejantes a las Instrucciones . . . (Mexico, 1873), I, 642.

¹⁹ Flores to Governor Fernando de la Concha, Mexico, January 2, 1788, S.A.N.M., no. 981.

ordered the scrupulous observance of the Gálvez order, particularly in the matter of war and peace with the Apaches.²⁰

Flores did carry further the administrative division of the Provincias Internas which Gálvez had begun. Croix had stated very early in his administration that the Provincias Internas was too unwieldy for effective administration, and had recommended that it should be divided into eastern and western parts, each under its own commandante.²¹ Gálvez had divided the administration of the Provincias Internas among the commander general and two high-ranking assistants.²² Now Flores made the absolute division recommended by Croix, establishing the Provincias Internas del Oriente (Coahuila, Texas, Nuevo Leon, and Nuevo Santander) under Commander General Juan de Ugalde, and the Provincias Internas del Occidente (Californias, Sonora, New Mexico, and Nueva Vizcaya) under Commander General Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola.²³ In 1790, Brigadier General Pedro de Nava succeeded to the post of commander general in the west, and also ad interim in the east. Three years later the Provincias Internas were again consolidated into a single command, but

²⁰Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Chihuahua, November 21, 1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1067.

²¹Nelson, "Juan de Ugalde" (citing Croix to Gálvez Chihuahua, June 29, 1778), 190.

²²See above, 141.

²³Flores, Instruccion, in Instrucciones que los Virreyes de Nueva España Dejaron a Sus Sucesores, I, 644.

the Californias, Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander were detached and placed directly under viceregal control. The Provincias Internas were again made independent of the viceroy, although Revilla Gigedo objected vigorously. No further important changes were made in administrative organization during the eighteenth century.²⁴

The New Mexican Alliances with the Bárbaros
Survive a Change in Administration

There were also changes in the government of New Mexico just as the new policies were promulgated. Anza was succeeded as governor by Fernando de la Concha, who apparently took office in 1787. Concha found that the Gálvez instruction had delegated to the governor of New Mexico an extraordinary amount of discretion and responsibility. "In New Mexico, as the province is very distant and surrounded in all directions by different enemies, the troops must operate, if not by themselves, with only the aid of the Spanish settlers and the Indians of the pueblos."²⁵ The governor was to command the war operations of the province freely, but to combine movements when possible with those of Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya. The primary aim was to press hard against the hostile Apaches. El Paso was to be used as a center "for establishing peace and maintaining commerce with the Apaches,"

²⁴Worcester (ed.) in Gálvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces, 26.

²⁵Gálvez, ibid., 72.

and also as a post for spying on Apaches who were at peace there in order to prevent their attempting hostilities in Nueva Vizcaya. The hostilities of the Navajos against the Gilas were to be promoted vigorously, using trade to bind the interests of the Navajos firmly to the Spaniards. The Utes were to be carefully cultivated, in order that they might be used against the Comanches or Navajos if either should act in bad faith. The peace with the Jicarillas was to be conserved, and no effort was to be spared to keep the Comanches happy.

The task outlined for Concha was a formidable one, but the New Mexican alliances with the former enemies of the province seem to have been built on astonishingly stable foundations, and Concha achieved remarkable success in carrying out the Gálvez order.

The Comanches were a bit wary of the change in administration, but Concha was able to assure them that he would carry out Anza's commitments to them in perfect faith. The agreement was formalized in November, 1787. Concha also managed to continue uninterrupted the peaceable relations with the Utes and Navajos.²⁶

Concha faced the difficult task of managing the use of the new Indian allies in the all-out offensive against

²⁶Flores to Concha, Mexico, January 2, 1788, S.A. N.M., no. 981.

the Apaches. The policy of the Provincias Internas was that in order to maintain constant control over the campaigns of the gentile allies against the Apaches, their chiefs should be required to give an account of all their campaigns.²⁷ The Comanches cooperated quite willingly in that matter, giving accounts of casualties, prisoners and livestock taken, and usually informing Concha of their movements in advance when practicable.

The Comanche campaign against the Apaches began in earnest in July, 1787, with action against the Faraon Apaches.²⁸ In 1789 they campaigned against the Llanero and Sierra Blanca Apaches. Interestingly enough, at least one of their forays was inspired by information which the Jicarilla Apaches gave to their old enemies, the Comanches, about the locations of the rancherías of other Apache groups.²⁹

The Comanches were rewarded for their cooperation with the Spaniards. In the fall of 1789, Concha provided at the expense of the province a supply of corn which the Comanches needed to prevent a winter of hunger in their camps. The act was enthusiastically endorsed by the commander general.³⁰

²⁷Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Arispe, January 23, 1788, S.A.N.M., no. 998.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Concha to Ugarte y Loyola, Santa Fe, November 20, 1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1066.

³⁰Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Chihuahua, November 21, 1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1067.

Concha went even further in demonstrating his gratitude to the Comanches in 1790, when he acceded to their request for a Spanish military escort to protect them from the Pawnees when they went far to the northeast to hunt buffalo.³¹ Fortunately, no contact with the Pawnees occurred. Commander General Nava was alarmed at the venture, and reprimanded the governor in a severe letter which caused Concha to acknowledge that aiding the Comanches against the Pawnees might only serve to attract the Pawnees to the New Mexican frontier in search of the Comanches.³² The Comanches were an invaluable barrier between the Pawnees and New Mexico, but Nava vigorously rejected any course of action which risked attracting their distant enemies by going far afield to hunt them.³³ Concha promised that there should be no repetition of the incident.

The concerted pressures of the Spanish offensives from the south and the Comanche forays from the north began to tell on the Apaches. They were no longer able to arrange exchanges of prisoners at their pleasure in order to regain lost Apaches, as had usually been true in the past, because

³¹Juan de Dios Peña, Diary and Derrotero of the campaign made at Concha's order with the Comanches against the Pawnees, Santa Fe, August 8, 1790, S.A.N.M., no. 1089.

³²Concha to Pedro de Nava, Santa Fe, November 1, 1791, S.A.N.M., no. 1164.

³³Nava to Concha, Chihuahua, December 17, 1791, S.A.N.M., no. 1178.

in 1788 the Provincias Internas adopted a policy of deporting Apache captives in chains to Mexico.³⁴ By the summer of 1789, both the Gila and Sierra Blanca Apaches began to inquire about making peace in New Mexico. Concha put them off while he inquired about their raiding activities in the south, for he was determined that they should not be allowed to make peace in his province only to use it as a base for continuing hostilities to the south in greater safety.³⁵ Some of the results of the inquiry apparently satisfied Concha, for a year after the initial request, he admitted a group of Gila Apaches to peace under the following terms:

The Apaches agreed to keep a firm peace; to tell the Spaniards at once of entrance by the Natagées or other Apaches not included in this peace, and to aid the Spaniards in expelling them; to turn in any of their own members who should violate the peace by horse theft or other crimes; always to be ready to aid Concha in campaigns against the Natagées and other hostile Apaches; to exhort their people not to commit hostilities against El Paso, Fronteras or Nueva Vizcaya; to report to Concha any such infraction, and not to permit the offenders to come back into the rancherías; to establish themselves on the bank of the Rio Grande, from

³⁴Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Arispe, January 23, 1788, S.A.N.M., no. 993.

³⁵Concha to Flores, Santa Fe, July 6, 1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1052.

Cebolla to Socorro, ten leagues from the southernmost New Mexico settlement; to try agriculture, for which the necessary tools would be furnished by the Spaniards. Concha hoped that the good example of the Navajos and Jicarillas would facilitate the "civilization" of this Gila group, and that the new peace would do much to relieve the pressures on Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya.³⁶

Experiments in Reducing the Bárbaros
to Village Agriculture

Concha's optimism was not unjustified. In November, 1790, he was able to report that the Gila Apaches who had made peace in July had scrupulously observed their agreement in New Mexico.³⁷ In July of the following year, Concha reported that the Gilas were keeping their promise to settle down to agriculture on the Rio Grande, south of Sabinal, and were receiving Spanish aid in the project.³⁸ They had demonstrated anew their good faith in keeping the peace treaty when they warned Concha of some depredations which the Natagéés planned on the New Mexican frontier.³⁹

Late in July, Concha held a council with the Apaches at Sabinal about their taking up agriculture. Local settlers

³⁶Concha to Ugarte y Loyola, Santa Fe, July 13, 1790, S.A.N.M., no. 1086.

³⁷Id. to id., Santa Fe, November 19, 1790, S.A.N.M.,

³⁸Concha to Revilla Gigedo, Santa Fe, July 12, 1791, S.A.N.M., no. 1132

³⁹Ibid.

who were able were each contributing to the project livestock, which was to form the foundation of the herds of the Apache farmers. Already the Apaches were regularly cultivating three fields, and Concha felt quite encouraged about their progress toward a settled agriculture. He saw this as the only method for establishing a stable peace, because when the Apaches lived scattered in the mountains, depending for subsistence upon natural products and the scant agriculture which they could manage under pressure by Comanche raiders, they had to rob in order to live.⁴⁰

The experiment was a more durable one than many skeptics believed possible. The Apaches remained in their settlement at Sabinal until the autumn of 1794, when they broke their treaty for the first time by withdrawing to the mountains. Commander General Nava ordered that they be brought back if possible, with no particular punishment for this first offense, and with the greatest vigilance by the Spaniards to prevent a second withdrawal.⁴¹ The Apaches did return to Sabinal before the end of 1794.⁴²

The same policies had earlier led to two experiments in settling the indios bárbaros, one among the Comanches

⁴⁰Id. to id., Santa Fe, July 22, 1791, S.A.N.M., no. 1203.

⁴¹Nava to Governor Fernando Chacón, Chihuahua, October 11, 1794, S.A.N.M., no. 1290a.

⁴²Id. to id., Chihuahua, December 31, 1794, S.A.N.M., no. 1303a.

and another among the Navajos. Concha decided early in his administration that in order to establish a permanent peace with the Navajos, it would be necessary to settle them in formal pueblos in the vicinity of New Mexico, not only to strengthen the influence of the Spanish and Pueblo examples, but also to protect the Navajos from the depredations of the Gila Apaches.⁴³ Despite the severity of the Gila raids, by 1791 the Navajos were settling down nicely in substantial houses, tilling the soil in the Spanish fashion and possessing a great deal of livestock.⁴⁴ They were also engaged in a flourishing trade with New Mexico in skins and textiles.⁴⁵ Until 1796 the Spanish officials had reason to feel quite optimistic about the progress in the "civilization" of the Navajos.

Although the Comanche alliance ultimately proved more durable than the Navajo one, an experiment in settling them down to agricultural pursuits was very short-lived. Chief Paruanarimuco, of the Yupes Comanches, came twice in July, 1787, to urge Anza to aid his people to settle themselves in permanent dwellings on the Arkansas River. Anza agreed to the experiment, and by October the Comanches, with

⁴³Concha to Ugarte y Loyola, Santa Fe, November 12, 1788, S.A.N.M., no. 1022.

⁴⁴Concha to Revilla Gigedo, Santa Fe, July 12, 1791, S.A.N.M., no. 1132.

⁴⁵Revilla Gigedo to Concha, Mexico, December 14, 1791, S.A.N.M., no. 1176.

Spanish aid, had completed nineteen dwellings. Many more were in various stages of construction. The Spaniards contributed sheep, oxen, maize, and seed to subsidize the new agricultural economy. The pueblo, christened San Carlos de los Jupes, apparently was located well within present Colorado, on the Arkansas River near a lesser stream, and on rich lands. Unfortunately, just as the experiment was getting well underway, Anza retired from the governorship of New Mexico, and the distressed Comanches thought that this automatically meant the end of Spanish support for the pueblo. They returned the implements to the Spaniards who had been sent to the village to help them, and sent them all back to New Mexico.

Ugarte y Loyola, who had followed the experiment with great interest, ordered Governor Concha to go ahead with the Yupe pueblo project. Concha won the confidence of the Comanches, and they stayed on, completing their houses with the aid of the Spaniards. However, in January 1788, they abruptly abandoned the pueblo, and all efforts to persuade them to return were fruitless. Concha learned that the favorite wife of the chief had died there, and that the superstitions of the Comanches surrounding death required them to leave the spot.⁴⁶

⁴⁶"Expediente sobre la Poblacion de San Carlos de los Jupes en el Nuevo Mexico, Año de 1788," in Thomas, "San Carlos, A Comanche Pueblo on the Arkansas River, 1787," Colorado Magazine, VI (May, 1929), 79-91.

Ugarte y Loyola was so distressed at the thought of losing the strategically located establishment on the Arkansas that he ordered it settled by a Spanish population, to facilitate the "civilizing" of the Comanches if they could be persuaded to return, and to be fortified as a base of operations against them if they should break the peace.⁴⁷ Concha managed to convince Ugarte y Loyola that the expense involved in occupying the site with Spanish settlers would far outweigh any advantage gained, and the commander general contented himself with ordering Concha to make every effort to persuade the Comanches to return to the site.⁴⁸ The governor, realizing the psychological harm which might be done by trying to make the Comanches defy one of their well-established superstitions, quietly let the matter drop.

Dissension among the Indian Allies
in New Mexico

While the Concha administration saw no break in the excellent relations of the Spaniards with all four of the friendly bárbaros nations, Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and Jicarillas, there were troubles among the Indian allies. As early as 1789, there were repeated incidents all caused by Ute raids on the Comanche horse herds. The Comanches,

⁴⁷Ugarte y Loyola to Concha, Chihuahua, July 22, 1788, S.A.N.M., no. 1015.

⁴⁸Id. to id., Valle de San Bartolome, January 28, 1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1039.

becoming thoroughly annoyed, followed the Utes after one raid in July, 1789, and destroyed a Ute ranchería. The Ute survivors fled to Concha, who managed to call in representatives of both nations and smooth over that particular incident. The governor had no conviction that real tranquility could be established, however, because it was extremely difficult to control the young men of either nation. All he could do was to minimize friction between them, avoiding the general war which would inevitably place New Mexico in the center of the battle, and could quite possibly destroy the province.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the Comanches pursued with considerable zest their campaigns against the Apaches. In combination with campaigns by Concha's forces, the offensive was so effective that in July, 1790, the governor could report that the Natagées had made only two entradas into New Mexico since the previous November; in one of those instances, the raiders had been successfully followed and punished for having stolen three animals at Bernalillo.⁵⁰ A Spanish party of one hundred fifty men left Santa Fe in July, 1790, to campaign against the Natagées, but they combed the mountains until August ended without finding any Apaches at all.⁵¹

⁴⁹Concha to Ugarte y Loyola, Santa Fe, November 18, 1789, S.A.N.M., no. 1064.

⁵⁰Id. to id., Santa Fe, July 14, 1790, S.A.N.M., no. 1087.

⁵¹Id. to id., Santa Fe, September 7, 1790, S.A.N.M., no. 1090.

The following year saw pressure on the Apaches from still another direction, with one thousand Comanche warriors assembled in the Taovayas region to campaign against the eastern division of the Apaches (Lipans, Mescaleros, and Lipianes.)⁵²

The Natagées were impressed enough to come in May, 1792, to El Paso to dicker almost a week about peace. But they returned to their rancherías without making any commitment, and the Spaniards soon learned that the Natagées, Lipans, and Llaneros had contracted an alliance with the Utes against the Comanches. Their immediate objective was a campaign for vengeance into the Comanche country.⁵³ The viceroy was so disturbed at the report of the combination of the Utes with the hostile Apaches that he ordered, if the rumor be true, that the Lipan chief Calvo be taken into custody and sent to Chihuahua to prevent him from carrying out the plan.⁵⁴

The Comanches apparently solved the problem for themselves by maintaining such a strong offensive against the Apache country that the Ute-Apache coalition never had a chance to mount its proposed campaign. In May, 1792,

⁵²Pedro de Nava to Concha, Chihuahua, July 22, 1791, S.A.N.M., no. 1135.

⁵³Don Domingo Díaz to Nava, El Paso, April 30, 1792, S.A.N.M., no. 1196

⁵⁴Nava to Concha, Janos, December 8, 1792, S.A.N.M., no. 1219.

Ecueraacapa came by Santa Fe to inform the governor that he was leading a war party of one hundred warriors against the Lipans, Lipiyanes and Llaneros, in the region of the Nueces and San Saba rivers.⁵⁵ Concha contributed forty carbines and a supply of munitions to the war party. Many of the Apaches from the Nueces and San Saba area were at that time camped near El Paso, waiting to see whether the viceroy would grant the peace which they had come to solicit.⁵⁶ However, Ecueraacapa's force successfully raided the three rancherías which they found, and put to flight some Apache parties which they encountered on the plains. They brought home thirteen captives and many horses, winning the congratulations of the Spanish government on their success.⁵⁷

The ascendancy of the Comanches continued to annoy the Utes. Since nothing had come of their alliance with the Apaches, the Utes turned in 1793 to their old enemies, the Navajos, and those two nations joined forces to attack the Comanches. Finding a Comanche camp where the men were absent on a buffalo hunt, they destroyed it, capturing or killing the women and children, and stealing all the horses. A considerable Comanche force set out for vengeance, found

⁵⁵Concha to Revilla Gigedo, Santa Fe, July 20, 1792, S.A.N.M., no. 1200.

⁵⁶Nava to Concha, Chihuahua, August 6, 1792, S.A.N.M., no. 1205.

⁵⁷Concha to Nava, Santa Fe, November 10, 1792, S.A.N.M., no. 1218.

a Ute ranchería, and destroyed it. Concha, relieved that both battles had taken place at a great distance from New Mexico, and that the score seemed even on both sides at the moment, hoped to reconcile the quarrel before the Comanches had time to seek vengeance in the Navajo country. To that end, he ordered the Navajos to bring all their Comanche captives into Santa Fe to be restored to their tribe.⁵⁸

Governor Concha was succeeded by Fernando Chacón in 1794. After that time a deterioration seems to have begun in the New Mexican relations with the indios bárbaros. Whether this was due in part to the change in administration, or solely to the increasing tensions surrounding the province, is problematical. As noted above, the ascendancy of the Comanches goaded their traditional enemies, the Utes and Navajos, into hostilities against the Comanches, and almost certainly into some resentment towards the Spanish government as well.

New Pressures from the North Test the Comanches
and the Spaniards Alike

The Comanches themselves were subject to increasing pressures from powerful and well-armed plains tribes to the north, the Osages and Pawnees. New Mexico tried to meet the Pawnee threat in 1794 by sending Pedro Vial to establish good relations with the Pawnees, but no permanent connection

⁵⁸Concha to Revilla Ggedo, Santa Fe, May 6, 1793, S.A.N.M., no. 1234.

was achieved.⁵⁹ In 1795, Vial, then an employee of the Spanish government in New Mexico, returned to the Pawnee villages and established a peace agreement between the Pawnees and Comanches.⁶⁰ In the same year, the Osages were turned over to the trader, Pierre Chouteau, who managed to establish an unprecedented degree of tranquillity among them. He made peace agreements between his Osage charges and the Kansas, Pawnees, and Comanches.⁶¹ These measures helped in some degree to relieve the pressures upon the Comanches, and therefore upon New Mexico.

The Comanches gained reinforcements on their northern perimeter about 1790 when they made peace with the Kiowas, newcomers to the plains. The two nations held much territory in common thenceforth, although the Kiowas usually camped more in the northwest in the region of the Arkansas River, while the Comanches now inclined to range more in the region of the Llano Estacado, from the Texas frontier to New Mexico and far to the south.⁶²

⁵⁹Nava to Governor Fernando Chacón, Chihuahua, December 31, 1794, S.A.N.M., no. 1303a.

⁶⁰Zenon Trudeau to Señor Baron de Carondelet, St. Louis, July 4, 1795, in Before Lewis and Clark: Documents Illustrating the History of the Missouri, 1785-1804 ed. by A. P. Nasatir (St. Louis, 1952), I, 329-330.

⁶¹Id. to id., St. Louis, April 18, 1795, ibid., 320-321.

⁶²James Mooney, "Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians," Seventeenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Pt. 1 (Washington, 1898), 162.

The new pressures from the north and east made the Comanche alliance more vital than ever to the New Mexicans, for the Comanches constituted the buffer which protected New Mexico from the warlike Osages and Pawnees, and from the increasingly aggressive Americans and Englishmen operating in the fur trade in the Mississippi Valley. The Comanche peace in Texas was broken in 1791,⁶³ but since this had always been quite imperfect, and the real center of control had been in New Mexico, the incident did not cause deep alarm. Real concern arose among the Spaniards in 1794, when there occurred the first breach in the New Mexican peace with the Comanches. A Comanche war party, operating in the area of the Rio Grande presidio to attack the Lipan Apaches, stole some horses at the presidio. Other little robberies by the Comanches occurred in the region of the presidio of Aguaverde, and all along the Coahuila frontier. The acts were called to the attention of the chiefs, who were thus given a chance to control and punish their own people, but with the warning that future offenses would be punished by Spanish troops.⁶⁴

The uneasy Spaniards feared that the American strategy now would be to gain the friendship and alliance of the

⁶³Luis de Blanc to Don Estevan Miró, Natchitoches, March 30, 1791, in Spain in the Mississippi Valley ed. by Kinnaird, II, 409.

⁶⁴Nava to Chacón, Chihuahua, January 27, 1795, S.A. N.M., no. 1308.

Indians of New Mexico, especially the Comanches, as a first step to conquest of New Spain. Chacón was ordered to keep in close contact with the Comanches, keeping them dependent on the Spaniards and forestalling all American moves in their direction.⁶⁵ Fortunately, though some depredations continued, no real break with the Comanches occurred, and they continued through 1800 to cooperate with the Spaniards in campaigns against the hostile Apaches.⁶⁶ That the Comanches continued to honor the terms of their peace with Anza was evidenced in 1799, when the eastern chief, Jampirinanpe, came to Pecos. He had been elected the general chief by all the other Comanche chiefs, so he came to Pecos to receive the baton which would be the insignia of his authority, and royal recognition. He received also the lavish gifts which were designed to identify his interests with the Spanish cause.⁶⁷

New Mexican relations with the Navajos were far from satisfactory during the Chacón administration, although as late as 1795 they were actively aiding in policing New

⁶⁵Id. to id., Chihuahua, January 31, 1795, S.A.N.M., no. 1309.

⁶⁶Chacón to Nava, Santa Fe, November 19, 1797, S.A. N.M., no. 1405; Joseph Manuel de Ochoa to Chacón, Río de Pecos Abajo del Bosque, December 27, 1800, S.A.N.M., no. 1521.

⁶⁷Chacón to Nava, Santa Fe, November 18, 1799, S.A. N.M., no. 1404.

Mexico against Apache incursions.⁶⁸ The powerful pressures of the Gilas upon them continued strong.⁶⁹ In 1796 there occurred a Navajo uprising, staged in concert with the Gila Apaches. Some breakdown in Spanish intelligence occurred, so that Chacón had no idea that an insurrection was pending in the Navajo country. The governor was ordered to do everything in his power to win the Navajos back to peace, and if that failed, to concentrate on preserving the alliance with the Comanches, Jicarillas and Utes, and to use them against the Navajos.⁷⁰ By 1799 the Navajos were brought to a very shaky peace with New Mexico, but they were continuing to rob in the Jémez area. Chacón tried to keep friction to a minimum by preventing settlement near the Navajo country.⁷¹ In May, 1800, the Navajo situation had grown so troublesome that Chacón led a force of five hundred men into the Navajo country. The Navajos soon came to terms, promising to end their hostilities and their alliance with other bárbaros, and to resume their general trade with New Mexico.⁷² But

⁶⁸Id. to id., Santa Fe, July 15, 1795, S.A.N.M., no. 1335.

⁶⁹Id. to id., Santa Fe, November 19, 1793, S.A.N.M., no. 1266.

⁷⁰Nava to Chacón, Chihuahua, July 8, 1796, S.A.N.M., no. 1366.

⁷¹Chacón to Nava, Santa Fe, November 18, 1799, S.A.N.M., no. 1471.

⁷²Id. to id., Socorro, June 21, 1800, S.A.N.M., no. 1492.

they began hostilities again in 1803,⁷³ and several Spanish campaigns were necessary before they sued for peace in 1805.⁷⁴ This settlement marked a reasonably stable renewal of their alliance with the Spaniards.

No general peace with the Apaches was ever achieved in the Provincias Internas. In 1796, Apache depredations occurred in the lower Rio Grande settlements of New Mexico.⁷⁵ In 1797 the Mescaleros treacherously broke the peace which they had contracted at El Paso, and united with the Lipiyanes and Faraones to harry the Spanish settlements.⁷⁶ Gila Apache groups continued their depredations in New Mexico to the end of the century, although they frequently protested intentions of making peace in the province.⁷⁷ Bad faith was so often displayed by the Apaches that in 1798 the commander general ordered Chacón not to admit to peace in New

⁷³Pedro Bautista Pino, Exposición, in Three New Mexico Chronicles: The Exposición of Don Pedro Bautista Pino, 1812; the Ojeada of Lic. Antonio Bareiro, 1832; and the additions by Don José Agustín de Escudero, 1849, ed. by J. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard (Albuquerque, 1942), 132-133.

⁷⁴Governor Joaquín del Real Alencaster to Comandante-General Nemesio Salcedo, Santa Fe, May 15, 1805, S.A.N.M., no. 1828.

⁷⁵Nava to Chacón, Chihuahua, July 8, 1796, S.A.N.M., no. 1366.

⁷⁶Id. to id., Chihuahua, October 19, 1797, S.A.N.M., no. 1399.

⁷⁷Chacón to Nava, Santa Fe, November 18, 1799, S.A.N.M., no. 1471.

Mexico the Lipans, Lipiyanes, Llaneros, or Mescaleros. They had too often pretended to make peace in order to take refuge at Spanish presidios from Comanche invasions. In February, 1798, the Lipanes had made peace at the Rio Grande presidio, then made war posing as Faraones and Llaneros. Their common practice of making peace in one Spanish province and using it as a safe base for depredations against other provinces had finally led to a policy which virtually excluded consideration of Apache peace overtures.⁷⁸

Conclusions

Obviously, then, the successes of New Spain in dealing with the indios bárbaros on her northern frontier were never perfect. But if total peace with the bárbaros was never achieved, certainly by the end of the eighteenth century there no longer existed the state of siege which had almost destroyed the interior provinces in the first eighty years of the century. That no general outbreak of the bárbaros ever occurred was in itself a triumph for the Spaniards, and the sporadic Apache depredations could now be countered with effective action by the forces of Spain and her Indian allies.

This equilibrium of the forces of Spain and the indios bárbaros evolved over the eighteenth century in a series

⁷⁸Nava to Chacón, Chihuahua, April 19, 1798, S.A.N.M., no. 1416.

of distinct stages. The initial stage saw the Spaniards falling heir to the traditional warring-trading relationship which their Pueblo vassals had long maintained with the Apaches and Navajos who lived on the periphery of the Rio Grande agricultural region. The second stage became much more complex, for the Utes and Comanches pressed in from the north, driving the Apaches from their northern and eastern ranges into the Spanish frontier, where they had to fight for their existence. Trade with the Apaches was almost totally disrupted, and war with them became far more serious. However, the Apache problem became secondary in New Mexico to that of survival against the Utes and Comanches who now threatened the very life of the province. The Apaches, driven steadily to the south, began to menace the existence of the southern tier of the Provincias Internas.

Overwhelmed by the diversity and numbers of the indios bárbaros, the Spaniards could survive only by playing off Indian enemies against each other. In the 1720's there was briefly considered the possibility of alliance with the Apaches to halt the Comanche-Ute invasion. But the problems of dealing with the amorphous Apache bands were deemed insurmountable. The Spaniards decided at mid-century to gamble instead on alliance with the Comanches to vanquish the Apaches.

The pattern of Spanish alliances with the indios bárbaros dates back to 1720, when both the Navajos and the

Jicarilla Apaches were driven to Spanish alliance as the only refuge from the Comanches. By 1740, the Utes broke with the Comanches and turned to Spanish alliance to bolster them against their former allies. The system of alliances became truly effective in 1786, when Anza brought the Comanches into firm alliance with the Spaniards. The Comanches were then used to break the power of the Apaches, and also to hold less powerful tribes to Spanish allegiance for protection from the Comanches. The peace achieved with the Comanches in New Mexico was probably as important to the survival and control of the Provincias Internas as the first alliances of Cortés had been to the conquest of the Aztec empire.

This represents, however, only a skeletal outline of the story of Spain and the indios bárbaros. The story is richly illustrative of the importance and effectiveness of personal diplomacy in dealing with Indian populations, for the Spanish successes were due not to great military force but to the creative diplomacy of a few outstanding officials, such as Thomas Vélez Cachupín, Athanase de Mézières, Juan Bautista de Anza, and Bernardo de Gálvez.

Underlying this history of manipulation of Indian populations to establish control of a strategic frontier are the ethical assumptions upon which Spanish Indian policy was based. The Crown required that all of its Indian populations should be regarded as potential converts and vassals,

and honestly tried to protect the native peoples from the Spanish settlers and soldiers. Throughout the eighteenth century, wars of conquest against the Indians were barred, and only defensive actions were permitted. It was required that gentle means be preferred to force in dealing with the Indians whenever possible. Violence against women, children, and infirm members of the indios bárbaros was prohibited, with severe penalties assessed against colonials who were guilty of such excesses. All possible material assistance was given to encourage groups of the indios bárbaros who were willing to try settled agricultural life. In commerce, steps were taken to protect the indios bárbaros from the extortionate practices of the settlers and Pueblos.

The study embodies as well the effect upon the Spanish frontier and its Indian population of the expanding French, English, and American frontiers. International rivalries, sometimes for local wealth and sometimes for considerations of world empire, operated at all times to shape the relations of Spain and the indios bárbaros.

The ethno-historical importance of this segment of northern borderlands history is far-reaching. Here are shown the impacts of European livestock and technology on the indios bárbaros, and the ferment of Indian population movements which were set in motion by the diffusion of those elements and by the encroachments of European immigrants.

The significance to the history of the United States frontier of the eighteenth-century relations of Spain with the indios bárbaros can hardly be exaggerated. As the United States acquired the territories ranged by the Comanches, Apaches, and other bárbaros, they acquired Indian tribes which had been dealing for more than a century with the European powers represented on this continent. These Indians had in a very brief span of time revolutionized their cultures under the European impact, and they had in some cases assumed definite responsibilities as parties to treaties and as allies. That these factors were not well comprehended by the United States government was the root of tragedy in the latter nineteenth century. An understanding of that historical background is today vital to sound perspective in the writing of the history and ethno-history of the Indians of the United States.

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