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VISUAL FRAMING ON ARAB SATELLITE TV: COMPARING THE CONTENT

AND STRUCTURE OF AL JAZEERA, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH, AL ARABIYA,

ALHURRA, AND BBC ARABIC NEWSCASTS

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To Teressa, Kelsey and Eli

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Abstract

Initially praised as independent voices in a region known for authoritarian control, the pan-Arab satellite news networks have been criticized for airing content that is overtly violent, and sensational. Guided by framing theory and media categorization based in press theory and political economy models, a quantitative content analysis was conducted on news programming from five networks—Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, Al Arabiya, Alhurra, and BBC Arabic—to determine if differences exist between the networks, and between 2 dimensions of a network taxonomy—western and liberal commercial—in how news selection, content, and sensational structural features are framed. The data from 6,595 shots and 438 stories reveal both similarities and differences in how the networks visually framed their daily newscasts and Arab Spring coverage. Differences were found in the nominal agenda diversity of stories aired between western networks emphasizing more sports, and liberal commercial networks emphasizing more teases. Alhurra presented more Amerocentric visuals than the other networks. The liberal commercial networks utilized more conflict visuals than western networks. In addition, the conflict visuals on liberal networks were more likely to depict explicit violence. The study also predicted differing applications of sensational production techniques among the networks. Use of sensational presentation features was found to be more likely on liberal networks. Al Arabiya utilized more sensational presentation features than the other networks. Visuals from Arab Spring coverage were also investigated. The western networks presented more non-violent visuals,

while the liberal networks presented a more explicitly violent view of the uprisings. Al Jazeera English aired the most visuals containing conflict. Al Jazeera's coverage was the most explicitly violent. No difference was found in the application of the human interest frame between western and liberal networks. However, Alhurra invoked the political frame more than Al Jazeera and BBC Arabic. Finally, use of sensational production techniques in Arab Spring coverage mirrored routine news coverage. The liberal networks relied on more sensational presentation features. Al Arabiya's presentation style was the most sensational.

Chapter 1: Introduction

After the shipwreck of communism came years of relative quiet, years of repose, years of sabbatical.

President George W. Bush, 2005 Inaugural Address

President Bush's comments aptly described the decade of the 1990s for many with an American point of view. The fall of the Berlin Wall, demise of the Soviet Union, and quick liberation of Kuwait under Operation Desert Storm had left the United States the world's lone "superpower." Convinced by the pre-eminence of U.S. "hard power"—the ability to do things and control others through force—America's attention and interest focused inward. It was widely perceived that the United States no longer faced many legitimate rivals, or serious threats (Laqeuer, 1994).

This optimism was simultaneously driven by socio-political changes, and dependence on new communication and information technologies (ICTs). These new electronic communications technologies powered by the convergence of satellite, fiber optic, computer, and telephone technologies, facilitate less expensive, near real-time, synchronous and asynchronous transmission, storage and retrieval of information, through increasingly ubiquitous transnational systems. Many proponents hailed the transforming nature of these new communication technologies to free communication from government and corporate gatekeepers and increase democratization around the globe. Kalathil (2002) described this optimism as a

"technologically enhanced Pax Americana, in which borders disintegrate and democratic values spread rapidly throughout a networked world" (p. 347).

This forecast Pax Americana was somewhat short lived. Instead the new millennium ushered in unprecedented terrorist attacks against western targets, U.S. involvement in two wars, a pre-occupation with Western/Arab relations, and a feeling that global public opinion of the U.S. had suddenly soured. At the same time, the dominance U.S. media outlets once enjoyed as the world's preeminent source for information also diminished, most notably in the Arab world. Many Americans perceived these events were correlated to the rise of pan-Arab satellite television.

The rise of pan-Arab media began rather inauspiciously in the late 1990s, but has become a driving force in the region. Recognizing Arabs can't compete militarily with the west, Arab visionaries harnessed the power of information technology to compete in a so-called battle for "hearts and minds." Abderrahim Foukara, Washington bureau chief for Al Jazeera, once said that Arab satellite television "captured a deep-seated common existential pain called Arab sensibility and turned it into a picture narrative that speaks to something very deep in the Arab psyche" (as cited in Pintak, 2011b, p. 1).

The current study seeks to explore the visuals of five transnational satellite TV news channels that broadcast to/from the Arab world for differences in the application of visual news frames in routine news coverage, and coverage of the

Arab Spring. Sensational framing, as will be discussed more fully in chapter 2, is manifest in news selection, content, and production elements.

Media Revolution

Winner argues that the introduction of new technology often "provides an occasion for flights of utopian fancy" (Winner, 1989, p. 106). Postman (1992) coined the term "Technophiles" to describe people who embrace the euphoria of new technology. He explained that these are people "who see only what new technologies can do and are incapable of imagining what they will undo" (p. 5). He further elaborated that it leads to a state of mind and culture that he referred to as "Technopoly."

> It consists in the deification of technology, finds its satisfactions in technology, and takes its orders from technology. This requires the development of a new kind of social order, and of necessity leads to the rapid dissolution of much that is associated with traditional beliefs (Postman, p. 71).

Communication and technology theorists (Innis, 1950, 1951; Mumford, 1963; McLuhan 1964; Postman, 1992) recognized that each communication technology is embedded with ideological, organizational, usage, and knowledge biases that impact society. According to Winner (1977), this examination of the link between technology and society has origins in Aristotle's discussion of inanimate instruments. Postman defined these technological biases as "a predisposition… to amplify one sense… more loudly than another" (p. 13).

The economic historian Harold Innis began examining the influence of the media after World War II. The founder of the Toronto School of thinking on media

and social change, Innis rewrote the history of civilization as the history of communication media. He theorized that every communication medium has a "bias" (time-biased, or space-biased) and that the bias of the culture's dominant medium affects the societal form (Meyrowitz, 1985). Innis recognized that throughout history new communication technologies have changed society by undermining old bases of social power (McQuail, 2000). He argued that those in control of a technology accumulate power through "knowledge monopolies" (Postman, 1992). Carey explained that in the final years of his life, Innis became increasingly pessimistic of space-biased electronic media, particularly television. "He recognized that the speed and distance of electronic communication enlarged the possible scale of social organization and greatly enhanced the possibilities of centralization and imperialism in matters of culture and politics" (Carey, 2009, p. 105).

Referred to as the "Oracle of the Electronic Age," McLuhan extended the work of his colleague Harold Innis. He is best known for his sound-byte style pronouncements "the medium is the message" (1964) and "the global village" (1962). The phrase, the medium is the message, illustrated his view that media themselves should be the central concern and that media content is only a peripheral issue. His writings focused on how new forms of communication technology extend the senses, disrupt tradition, and alter the social world (McLuhan, 1964).

Pondering the implications of transoceanic satellite news coverage of the Kennedy assassination, and subsequent funeral, McLuhan prophesied a world that is electronically connected, eliminating time and space, and giving the appearance of a

global village (Gladney, 2004). McLuhan's global village theory bestowed the electronic media with the power to "unify and retribalize the human race" (Ebersole, 1995, p. 1) McLuhan said "electric speed at bringing all social and political functions together in a sudden implosion has heightened human awareness of responsibility to an intense degree" (McLuhan, 1964, p. 5). While McLuhan generally expressed hope and optimism, "he warned that the coming changes caused by the new conditions of the global village would cause turmoil and chaos. He explained that as everyone becomes involved in the affairs of all others (integral inclusiveness) or part of a simultaneous field of human affairs, the self-image of individuals and whole cultures and societies becomes threatened, inviting a mandate for war" (Gladney, p. 17).

Elaborating on McLuhan, Meyrowitz (1985) argued "electronic media affect us, then, not primarily through their content, but by changing the 'situational geography' of social life" (p. 6). According to Mills (1956), the media provides people with new identities and new aspirations and provide models of conduct. Meyrowitz (1994) argues that television in particular has "lifted many old veils of secrecy" giving rise to increased citizen involvement in "local, national and international affairs" (p. 68).

Rheingold (2002) contends that the new communication technologies are powerful because they allow humans to organize in new ways. According to Bollier, these technologies form the "exoskeleton of a new sort of global politics and culture… a slow motion geopolitical tsunami" (2004, p. 1). In 1997, Mathews warned that ICTs were enabling a "power shift" from the traditional Westphalian

system of states to non-state actors (i.e., non-governmental organizations, terrorists, organized criminals, media outlets, social movements), which Moore (2003) referred to as the "second superpower" (p. 3). "We are outgrowing the nation-state a new form of world is emerging, a global village, a universal brotherhood of world government on a shrunken planet" (Carey, 1992, p. 170).

While the idea of an impending utopia may be premature, there is growing evidence of the intertwined nature of communication capability and the impact on socio-political institutions (Price, 1995). This discussion illustrates that the introduction of new communication systems often produce unforeseen consequences (Purcell & Kodras, 2001). As Rheingold (2002) states, the new technologies are often appropriated by end-users for purposes unimagined by both their creators and unsuspecting governments.

The so-called "CNN effect" provides one example. The CNN effect is an often-cited concept of satellite media's profound real-time effect on foreign policy decisions. The term was coined in the late Cold War period to describe the impact of CNN's coverage of international events on foreign policy decision-making (Powers & Gilboa, 2007). Livingston (1997) described three distinct influences of the CNN effect on foreign policy: (1) as policy agenda-setting agent, (2) as impediment to obtaining desired policy goals, and (3) as accelerant to decision making. Compelling images of humanitarian crises (e.g., a lone man blocking a Chinese tank in Tiananmen square, starving children in Somalia, genocide in Yugoslavia) are often referenced as examples of the CNN effect in action. Newspaper columnist Marianne

Means wrote "We went into Somalia because of horrible television images; we will leave Somalia because of horrible television images" (Kalb, 2002, p. 1).

Despite the many examples of compelling television images, the systematic examination of televised visuals is deficient (Grabe & Bucy, 2009). Most visual news analyses utilize print or web images. The deficiency may be partially explained by the difficulties associated with analysis of motion visuals, but may also reflect the perceived status of TV in the current spectrum of global communication systems. Television is often relegated to "traditional" or "old" media status with limited influence in today's social mediated world (Hoffman, 2006). This may help explain why some experts argued that the 2011 political crises in Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, and Libya were "Twitter revolutions" (Zuckerman, 2011, p. 1). While there is strong evidence to support the influence of Internet and cell phone based social networking technologies in these recent political uprisings (see Beaumont, 2011). Cottle (2011) and Pintak (2011a, 2011b) argue that satellite television was instrumental in the uprisings as well.

References to TV as old media may also explain why international relations experts recognize the increased number, and influence, of non-state actors in international politics, but rarely list transnational media organizations as non-state actors (Powers & Gilboa, 2007). Bruce and O'Hair (2009) suggested that pan-Arab satellite television serves as a non-state actor with influence that should not be discounted. Kenny (2009) goes further by arguing television is the information and communication technology that will have the most profound effect on the planet. He

refers to television as the "kudzu of consumer durables," noting that it is rapidly approaching ubiquity (p. 2).

Nowhere is the interaction of new ICTs and their impact on society currently more interesting than in the Arab world. New Arab-controlled and technology-enhanced transnational television channels are allowing information to transcend artificial obstacles of language, culture, geography, and government leading to "something much more closely resembling a single market" (Alterman, 1999, p. 2). Seib (2008) called this superseding of traditional nationalistic Arab identity by media as the "Al Jazeera effect." According to Norm Pattiz, one of the chief architects of the American public diplomacy efforts to the Arab world at the turn of the century, "Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya transcend traditional media roles..." and reflect "Arab nationalism" (as cited in Hudson, 2006, p. 237). Many American government officials have credited the pan-Arab news channels with promoting pan-Arabism and a contributing to a rise in anti-Americanism.

Pan-Arabism

It is important to classify which nation-states make up the Arab region in order to correctly examine this pan-Arab movement, and also to identify which of the recent political uprisings should be classified as part of the Arab Spring. Correctly identifying the people and/or location referred to by the word Arab can be a difficult task. The identifying terms Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim (Islamic) are often used interchangeably to reference both specific cultures and geographic

locations. However, George Hishmeh (2006), President of the Washington Association of Arab Journalists (WAAJ) argued that there are distinct differences in these terms. Distinctions can be made based on geographic location, religion, and culture.

For example, Hishmeh (2006) said that the term Middle East should refer to the geographic region that includes the Arab states, as well as Turkey, Israel, and Iran. Hishmeh (2006) said that Arabs dislike being referred to as Middle Easterners. The people and geography of this location are also commonly referenced as the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region by global agencies, academics and businesses. While no standardized list of countries exists to define this region, MENA generally refers to Arabic states in the region stretching from Mauritania on the Atlantic coast of Africa to Iran in southwest Asia. Like the term Middle East, some non-Arab nation states are included in this classification.

The people of this region are also often identified by religious terms. However, using the terms Muslim, or Islamic, for identifying the people of this region is also troublesome. Saleh (2007) points out that while most Arabs are Muslim, not all Muslims are Arab. Indonesia, in southeast Asia, has the largest population of Muslims, but is not an Arab state. Instead, Rugh (2004) argues for the use of "language and consciousness" as criteria for defining the Arab world. Saleh (2007) states that Arabs "share a common geography, religion, language, broad culture and history" (p. 19). The current study will utilize the Arab classification adopted by Boyd (1999) and Rugh (2004) which referenced the people from a

common list of nation-states: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza), Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen.

Throughout most of the last half-century, residents of these independent nation-states predominantly identified themselves by nationality. When asked to select their most important identity for the 2011 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey (Telhami, 2011), respondents narrowly selected nationality (33%) over Muslim (31%), and Arab (26%). Arab (27%) was selected as the respondent's second most important identity ahead of Muslim (26%), and nationality (24%). The survey results represent a marked decline since 2009 in the number of respondents that picked Muslim as their second most important identity.

Many experts believe the impact of new media (particularly satellite television) has helped facilitate new transnational connections among Arabs, with references to a new regional "public sphere" (e.g., Eickelman, 2003; Hahn, 2007; Lynch, 2006b, 2007; Sabry, 2007). Habermas (1989) introduced the term bourgeois public sphere to explain the development of capitalism in Western Europe and described it "as a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed" (p. 49)[1]. The term public sphere has come to refer to public opinion formation in people with a newly found shared identity of common interests, values, situations, and interdependence (Blitzer, 1978).

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[1] There is considerable debate about the applicability of Habermas' public sphere to other cultures including the Arab world (see Curran, 1991; Hahn, 2007; Sakr, 2007; Sparks, 1998).

More recently, the term has been used synonymously for new transnational media and their role in creating this shared identity through new arenas of public discourse, which bypass traditional news gates and the elites of society, help people learn about and debate the issues that impact them, and reveal potential responses to those issues (Dahlgren, 1991; Feenberg, 2002; Lynch, 2006b; Sakr, 2007). Feenberg (2002) described the public sphere as a:

> New transnational realm of civil society… an arena in which individuals participate in discussions about matters of common concern in an atmosphere free of coercion or dependencies (inequalities) that would incline individuals toward acquiescence or silence" (p. 23).

While some scholars (e.g., Lynch, 2006b) suggest that multiple public spheres exist in the Arab world, observers often refer to two distinct strata in the Arab public sphere, elites and everyone else (the so-called "Arab street"[2]). However, Friedman (2002), Khouri (2002, 2003), and Pollock (1992) make three distinctions among the Arab public. Pollock distinguishes between the "upper crust," the street, and the "fringe." Khouri's distinctions are between the palace, street; and "basement." The Arab palace represents elite or upper-crust members of society including the ruling family, government and military officials, academics, journalists and successful merchants. The Arab basement, represents the angry fringe elements of society including terrorist cells. The street is everyone else in a given society. The street represents the large number of ordinary citizens that Khouri describes as "largely poor and getting poorer" (p. 2).

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[2] This is a contested term among Arab media scholars (see Sabry, 2007).

Pollock (1992) explained that two major—and rival—camps circulate concerning the assessment of the Arab street—an underrated view and an exaggerated view. The underrated view sees opinion among the Arab masses as irrelevant due to the absence of democratic institutions in those individual countries. Subscribers to this view believe national governments, sometimes referred to as "Arab autocracy" or the "Mukhabarat[3] state" (Pollock, 1992), keep the Arab street neutralized. In addition, Friedman sees the street as largely "passive and non-violent" (2002, p. 1). Conversely, the exaggerated school sees a seething dichotomy between the street and elite that threatens to boil over at any time. People with this view often warn, "tomorrow comes the revolution" (Pollock, p. 10).

Arab Public Opinion

Due to a general lack of interest in the Arab public, and a lack of systematic opinion polling in the Middle East, not much was known about the opinion of the Arab street prior to 2000. A convergence of issues may have contributed to this including the lack of sophisticated marketing techniques in the area, the proprietary nature of polling data, the controlled nature of Arab media, a focus on Arab elites, and the widespread subscription to the "underrated view" of the Arab street by many westerners. This latter feeling is reflected in these 1991 anonymous comments by an American diplomat in which he referred to the Arab street as "more myth than potent

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[3] According to the Encyclopedia of the Middle East, a "Mukhabarat state" is a "police state." Saleem (2007) expands this definition to cover U.S.-backed heads of state, which maintain civilian control through the use of secret police.

threat" and Islamic fundamentalism as less potent than the Soviet threat (Ibrahim, 1991).

Therefore, Arab public opinion survey data prior to 2001 is largely unavailable. One of the few polls available before 2001, a 1999/2000 survey conducted by the Office of Research of the U.S. State Department, revealed favorable views of the U.S. in 24 of the 75 countries included in the survey (Kohut, 2005). Of the predominantly Muslim countries included, only respondents in Pakistan had an unfavorable opinion of the U.S., while 75% of Indonesian respondents and 52% of Turkish respondents had favorable opinions.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that sympathy and support for the United States surged worldwide immediately following 9/11 (Bernstein, 2003; Conetta, 2006). Media reports and official statements from around the world displayed a pro-American solidarity. The cover of the French daily Le Monde proclaimed "Nous sommes tous Américains," which translates to "We are all Americans" (Colombani 2001). Arab League chief Amr Mussa said the Arab world "backs the United States in its declared war against terrorism ("Arabs support war," 2001). Palestinian leadership called the attacks "an act of absolute immorality and evil" ("Palestinian leadership," 2001). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations condemned terrorism and pledged to cooperate in the war against "the menace" ("Southeast Asian leaders," 2001). In a rare joint statement, Russia and NATO agreed to "intensify cooperation to fight the scourge of terrorism" (Daley, 2001). For the first time in its history the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article V

of its charter, affirming "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" (Donovan, 2001, p. 1).

In the wake of Bush's question before a joint session of Congress, "why do they hate us," (Bush, 2001), numerous polling firms rushed to measure public opinion in the Middle East. By the time the surveys were being conducted, the U.S. -led invasion of Afghanistan had already begun. The Gallup organization was first to release results of a survey of predominantly Muslim nations. The Gallup Poll of the Islamic World surveyed 10,000 people in Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in late 2001 and early 2002. The survey found that overall, 53% of respondents had an unfavorable view of the U.S. and 58% disliked President Bush (Whitaker, 2002). Respondents "overwhelmingly labeled the United States with such negative terms as "ruthless, aggressive, conceited, arrogant, easily provoked, biased" (Newport, 2002). The Gallup organization also discovered some of the difficulties of conducting opinion polling in the Islamic world when Moroccan, Saudi Arabian and Jordanian officials ruled the question "Do you believe news reports that Arabs carried out the September 11 attacks?" too sensitive to ask. In the six countries that allowed the question, "sizable minorities" were found that doubted the official Western conclusions that Arabs were behind the attacks (Newport, 2002). Responding to a question about the Gallop poll, President Bush stated, "there is no question that we must do a better job of telling the compassionate side of the American story" (Bush, 2002, p. 302).

In addition, in 2002, the Pew Research Center released the results of the Pew

Global Attitudes Project, which surveyed 38,000 people in 44 countries. The poll

found that attitudes about the United States in the Middle East (conflict area) are

"overwhelmingly negative" (Kohut, 2002, December 4, p. 64). Findings revealed

75% of Jordanians, 69% of Pakistanis and Egyptians, 59% of Lebanese and 55% of

Turks had an unfavorable view of the United States. In addition, the same poll found

that the majority of respondents (ranging from 45% in Pakistan to 85% in Jordan)

opposed the U.S.-led "war on terror."

In 2003, Pew conducted a follow-up poll of 16,000 people in 20 countries

and the Palestinian Authority. The polling, which took place after the U.S.-led

invasion of Iraq, revealed that opinions of the United States in predominantly

Muslim countries had "gone beyond mere loathing" (Kohut, 2003, December 10).

For example, favorable opinions of the U.S. declined from 30% to 15% in Turkey.

Opposition to the U.S.-led war on terror also increased by double-digit percentages

with unfavorable ratings ranging from 67% in Lebanon to 97% in Jordan (Kohut,

2005). In addition, Pew found that clear majorities in seven of the eight Muslim

countries feared the U.S. might threaten their own country (Kohut, 2003, December

10). In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kohut (2003,

February 27) described the poor public opinion of the U.S. in the Muslim world as

the "most serious problem facing the U.S. abroad" (p. 1).

The Arab American Institute commissioned Zogby International to conduct a

survey of six Arab nations (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, UAE, Lebanon)

called "Impressions of America." Results of this 2002 poll also revealed "strong anti-American negative currents throughout the region" (Zogby, 2004, p. 2). In a 2004 follow-up survey, Zogby also found that favorable ratings of the U.S. had gone from bad to worse. However, these negative attitudes appeared to be aimed at the U.S. government and its policies rather than American ideals. As an illustration of this "dual pattern" of attitudes, a majority of respondents from Morocco, Jordan, UAE, and Egypt reported mostly favorable views of American "science and technology," "freedom and democracy," "people," "movies and TV," "products," and "education."

Results of these post-9/11 polls suggest that anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world had reached unprecedented levels (Rubin, 2002). Negative opinions of the U.S. have continually resurfaced throughout the decade. In a 2009 six country survey of Arabs, Telhami (2009) found 61% of respondents expressed somewhat to very unfavorable opinions of the U.S. Experts suggest that the public hostility not only increases the risk of attack, but also increases the ability of al-Qaeda, and like minded groups to recruit, diminishes the willingness of the public to help with the "war on terror;" and make it more difficult for the U.S. to attain it's foreign policy objectives in the region (Peterson et al., 2003; Telhami, 2005).

Nye warned that in the coming decades America would need to be less concerned about challenges from rival nation states than the "general diffusion of power" (1990, p. 155). This diffusion of power may be partially attributed to increased adoption of information and communication technologies and the resulting

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globalization of media. Experts posited numerous theories, from policy issues to superpower envy, for the rise of anti-Americanism among Arabs. Initially, U.S. government officials cited Arab media as the culprit. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, "More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims" (2006, p. 2).

Findings from a 2004 Zogby poll provide a modicum of support for this theory. The findings revealed that among Arabs who had no personal interaction with Americans and had not traveled to the U.S., the principal source of their information about the U.S. was "seeing or hearing Arab commentaries in the Arab media" (p. 13). Thus, results from these and other Arab public opinion surveys, along with anecdotal examples of sensational news content, fueled Americans' beliefs that pan-Arab newscasts were to blame for anti-American sentiment.

Pan-Arab Media

Arab media developed rather slowly compared to media in other regions of the world. The oral nature of the Arab culture, combined with relatively high illiteracy, contributed to the slow development of Arab media systems. While literacy rates for adults (age 15 years and older) vary greatly among the Arab states, the 62.2% literacy rate for the region ranks as one of the lowest literacy rates in the world (Hammond, 2005). In addition, the written press tended to focus on the Arab

elite, and reinforce barriers between Arabic speakers, which promoted nationalism (Alterman, 1999).

Government press controls also contributed to the slow development of media in the region. Historically, Arab media systems have been some of the most closed media systems in the world (Hafez, 2001). Television stations tended to be state-owned, and controlled by the national information ministry. News coverage on these state-owned stations most often reflected public relations functions—or so-called protocol news—rather than western standards of journalism (Schleifer, 1998). Protocol news consists of studio reports of official government business, important speeches, and official activities of the ruling elite (Dajani, 2007). Controlling the news systems is viewed as a means for stabilizing public opinion and political power (El Gody, 2007). Therefore, most Arab media has been categorized as Authoritarian. Authoritarian press systems can be simply defined as media systems that are continually subject to either implied or direct control by the governing system or rulers (Hacten & Scotten, 2002).

The technical requirements of television have also hampered the development of transnational broadcasting in the Arab world. Boyd (1999) stated that transnational broadcasting in the region has historically referred to radio broadcasting. The BBC's Arabic-language radio service was historically viewed as one of the most listened to sources of news by international broadcasters. Other international broadcasters including Voice of America (VOA), Radio France

Internationale (RFI), and Radio Monte Carlo Moyen-Orient also provided Arabic-language radio broadcasts in the region.

The majority of television stations operating in the region have traditionally been terrestrial-based. The technical limitations of broadcast television limited the signal availability to line-of-sight from the transmitter, except in the Gulf States where summer weather conditions improved signal reach (Boyd, 1999). These terrestrial-based channels were predominantly state-controlled.

Arab transnational broadcasting has new meaning with the development of independent satellite broadcasting in the region. Al Jazeera is generally viewed as the catalyst of these significant media changes in the Arab world. A recent survey (Al-Failakawi, 2010) found 371 satellite channels operating on the Arabsat and Nilesat satellites. The overwhelming majority of these channels (82%) were privately owned. Several channels (e.g,. Al Arabiya, Al Manar, Abu Dhabi) operate as 24-hour pan-Arab news channels.

Satellite television viewership increased in the region over the last few decades due to Arabs' media habits, the availability of relatively inexpensive direct broadcast satellite dishes, and the lifting of restrictions on satellite dish ownership among many nations in the region. For example, the BBC's David Lomax discovered that more than 7 million satellite dishes were purchased in Iraq in less than a year, following the fall of the Baathist regime (2005). An Iraqi sociologist said, "I thought Iraqi's were hungry for food, but they were hungry for television" (as cited in Lomax, pg. 2). A field study conducted for the British Council by A.C.

Nielsen (see Seib, 2007) revealed the most common media activity in the region is TV viewing (listed by 100% of respondents), followed by listening to the radio (73%), surfing the Internet (62%) and reading (55%). The survey also found that the most watched pan-Arab news channels were Al Jazeera (72%) and Al Arabiya (44%).

While Internet access in the Arab world is expanding rapidly, surveys reveal television still ranks as the most common source for international news. Fifty-eight percent of respondents to the 2011 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey (Telhami, 2011) identified television as their primary source for international news, compared to 20% for the Internet. More than a quarter of the respondents said they had only gained Internet access in the previous year.

During the Egyptian uprising in the Spring of 2011, 86% of respondents to an Egyptian survey conducted by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) listed television as the most used source of information about the protests and political developments (Broadcast Board of Governors, 2011). Pintak (2011b) argues that Arab satellite television is at the "vanguard of articulating" new political developments "that have fueled a sense of common cause among Arabs across the region every bit as real as the 'imagined communities' that are at the core of the concept of nation" (p. 1).

Despite the proliferation of pan-Arab media outlets and corresponding peak of interest by foreign policy experts and media scholars following the rise of Al

Jazeera, the 9/11 attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq war, there has been a general lack of systematic investigation of the pan-Arab satellite channels (Ayish, 2008; Hafez, 2008; Lynch, 2008). The increased attention to the Arab media sources has resulted in a number of important books, and journal articles that are, while informative, generally descriptive in nature, provide anecdotal evidence, and are mostly atheoretical. This reality has led to references to Arab media studies as "underresearched" (Hafez, p. 9), and a field of "deficiencies" (Lynch, p. 19). Hafez identified a number of reasons for the deficiencies in Arab media studies including: the interdisciplinary nature of Arab studies; western communication scholars' lack of interest in non-western media; the language barrier; the restrictive nature of Arab regimes; and fear that western communication theories may not apply in the Arab context.

Hamzawy (2005) states that Arab journalists with pan-Arabist and Islamist credos represent their own ideological views as those of the larger Arab culture. One generally accepted difference of these ideological views is that the type of coverage and standards of acceptability differ significantly from those of Western news organizations, particularly in times of extreme violence (Klopfenstein, 2006).

The current literature review reveals a void in both TV visual, and pan-Arab satellite news research. Many of the studies identified in the literature review provide cross-cultural, short-term examinations of major event coverage, through pictures in newspapers or from online news sources. There are virtually no longitudinal content analyses of the visuals contained in pan-Arab satellite newscasts. As Graber (2003)

notes, "many broad and definitive judgments about the substantive content of mass media are still made without actual content analyses of these media" (p. 140).

The present study is an attempt to fill the void by providing a theoretical examination of typical news visuals, as well as visuals from crisis coverage (e.g. Arab Spring), on Arab satellite news channels. This comparative analysis was conducted at two levels: (1) the individual network; and (2) through a two-dimensional taxonomy—western and liberal commercial—of pan-Arab stations. Five transnational satellite channels (Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, BBC Arabic, Alhurra and Al Jazeera English), broadcasting to and/or emanating from the Arab world were chosen for this analysis. These networks were chosen because they represent some of the most widely discussed examples of pan-Arab satellite news networks. In addition, these five networks fit into the two-dimensional network taxonomy, with Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya representing the liberal commercial dimension, and Alhurra, BBC Arabic, and Al Jazeera English representing the western dimension. Rationale for both the labels, and organization of these two dimensions is provided in chapter two.

The following section provides background information on the five channels selected for this study. No examination of Arab television news would be complete without including Al Jazeera.

Al Jazeera. Schleifer (1998) notes that the first major impact of satellite technology in the Middle East occurred in the eighties when daily newspapers (*al-Sharq al-Awsat,* and *al-Hayat*) were beamed into the region from London. He notes that the arrival of these satellite delivered newspapers, and the television networks

that followed in the late eighties and early nineties, CNN; MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Centre); and ART (Arab Radio and Television), significantly altered the Arab media landscape.

Al-Jazeera was launched in 1996 as the first independent, pan-Arab, all-news and public affairs commercial satellite network. The Emir of Qatar created the station with $137 million in startup funding. The network's name, translated in English "the Island" or "the peninsula," is an appropriate representation of both the geographic feature of its home nation and of its status as the lone independent Arab TV channel in a sea of state-owned and controlled competitors. Al Jazeera gained immediate credibility by hiring western-trained journalists from BBC Arabic television, which was closed in 1995 (Cherribi, 2006). By the end of 2001, the network had an audience of 35 million Arabic-speaking viewers from across the region (Ajami, 2001).

The station's motto, translated in English "opinion, and the other opinion," accurately describes the station's philosophy of thoroughly presenting all sides of an issue. This editorial position helped consolidate the channel's reputation as an "equal opportunity offender" for negative coverage of governments in the region (except Qatar) and for coverage of taboo Arab subjects (Quinn and Walters, 2004, p. 58). According to Pintak (2011b), this was the Emir's mandate to Al Jazeera from the beginning, with added benefit being increased political clout for Qatar and the Emir in the region. When the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ABSU) expanded by extending membership to private Arab radio and television stations, Al Jazeera was

excluded from joining (Miles, 2005). During a tour of the station in the spring of 2000, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated "all this trouble from a matchbox like this?" (as cited in Miles, 2005, p. 11). Al Jazeera continues to aggravate regimes in the region. Recent examples have resulted in forced closures of the network's Moroccan and Kuwaiti news bureaus in 2010 (Seib, 2011).

Prior to 9/11, the network was largely unknown to most Americans, but had been generally praised by American journalists and U.S. government officials for being the only independent voice in the region (Friedman, 2001). A 2000 State Department report on human rights in Qatar listed the network as operating "freely" (Miles, 2005, p. 382). Thomas Friedman, a columnist for *The New York Times,* described Al Jazeera's influence as "Glasnost in the Gulf" stating:

> Al-Jazeera owes its success to the fact that, more than any other TV station in the Arab world, it airs free and lively debates, offers timely news, even interviews Israeli leaders, and allows anyone to criticize Arab regimes. If you polled Arab leaders and asked: Which would you get rid of first, Israel or Al-Jazeera? Al-Jazeera would win hands down (2001, p. 23).

Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, chairman of the board of Al-Jazeera said "events themselves make news channels" (Schleifer & Sullivan, 2001, p. 1). Coverage of several events in the Middle East helped Al-Jazeera gain credibility as the regional leader for Arab news, including the network's coverage of the 1998 Desert Fox Campaign in Iraq and of the Al-Aqsa, (Second) Intifada in September, 2000. Anchorwoman Muntaha Al-Ramahi stated that it was the coverage of these two events that established Al-Jazeera as the "number one Arabic channel in the world" (Sullivan, 2001).

Coverage of two post-9/11 events made Al-Jazeera a household name, and gave it global credibility. First, on October 7, 2001, the network ran a taped interview from Osama bin Laden in which the al Qaeda leader said Muslims should applaud the 9/11 attacks (Ajami, 2001). Second, due to an agreement with the ruling Taliban government, Al Jazeera was the only network allowed to operate bureaus in Afghanistan. When the American bombardment of Afghanistan began, Al Jazeera was the only foreign broadcaster inside Afghanistan. Its live coverage of the aerial attacks was picked up by other news organizations, including the American news networks, and broadcast worldwide.

Al Jazeera quickly became recognized as the flagship Arab-language news station. "Suddenly, Arabs across the region were seeing an aggressive new style of reporting, in Arabic by fellow Arabs, witnessing events long hidden and hearing from figures banned from government TV stations" (Pintak, 2011a, p. 1). Furthermore, Al Jazeera successfully represented itself as the voice of the Arab street to U.S. audiences, and policymakers (Kalathil, 2002).

Following these events, newspaper articles from around the U.S. appeared about the network (e.g., Ajami, 2001; Chafets, 2001; Curiel, 2001; Friedman, 2001; Harden, 2001; Kiefer & Tyson, 2001; Waxman, 2001; Zednik, 2002). While many of these articles were informative in nature, others were quite critical. A *Washington Post* article referred to Al Jazeera's news coverage as "sensational," and asserted that "al-Jazeera takes a consistently hostile stance toward the United States" (Waxman,

2001). In a *New York Daily News* editorial, Zev Chafets, suggested that the U.S. military should be left to deal with the station.

American officials, also upset by the tone of Al Jazeera's coverage, began pressuring the Qatari government to "restrain" the news network. On October 2, 2001, the U.S. embassy in Qatar filed a formal diplomatic complaint. Meetings followed between Secretary of State Colin Powell, and later Vice President Dick Chaney, with the Emir of Qatar in which they made their displeasure with the network known. "Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly denounced the Persian Gulf station for giving "an undue amount of time and attention to some of the most vitriolic, irresponsible kinds of statements" (Curiel, 2001, p. A2).

Public opinion polls also did little to support Al Jazeera's claims of objective reporting. In a 2002 poll of Americans, 78% of respondents expressed their belief that the unfavorable views Muslims had for the U.S. were based mostly on misinformation provided by their media and governments (Saad, 2002, March 7). A Gallup poll of Arabs in Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, also conducted in 2002, revealed that Al Jazeera viewers tended to have a higher percentage of anti-American opinions than viewers of other stations (Saad, 2002, April 23). Complaints about Al Jazeera's coverage have centered around the station's perceived anti-Western and anti-Israeli bias, promotion of pan-Arabism, lack of domestic reporting, reputation as the Osama bin Laden channel (Darwish, 2001; Taylor, 2001), and use of slanted language (Ajami, 2001; Campagna, 2001).

The official U.S. stance on Al Jazeera has softened under the Obama

administration (Doherty, 2011). A 2009 diplomatic cable from the U.S. embassy,

released by WikiLeaks, revealed the perceived market dominance and political

influence of the station.

> Al Jazeera, the most watched satellite television station in the Middle East, is
> heavily subsidized by the Qatari government and has proved itself a useful
> tool for the station's political masters. The station's coverage of events in the
> Middle East is relatively free and open, though it refrains from criticizing
> Qatar and its government. Al Jazeera's ability to influence public opinion
> throughout the region is a substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which
> it is unlikely to relinquish. Moreover, the network can also be used as a chip
> to improve relations (as cited in Doherty, p. 1).

Telhami's (2008, 2009, 2010) annual surveys of Arab public opinion also

consistently reinforce the dominance of Al Jazeera in the region. The latest survey

results (Telhami, 2011) indicated 43% of respondents preferred Al Jazeera for

international news, compared to 14% for Al Arabiya. Al Jazeera's success led to the

proliferation of Arabic-language satellite news channels. Al Arabiya was the first

serious rival to Al Jazeera (Dajani, 2007).

Al Arabiya. Al Arabiya (Arabic for the "The Arabic One" or "The Arab

One) began broadcasting as a 24-hour Arabic-language commercial satellite news

channel in February 2003 with the explicit task of challenging the domination of Al

Jazeera (Sakr, 2006). Saudi owned Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) operates

the network from Dubai Media City, United Arab Emirates.

The story of Al Arabiya is reminiscent of Saudi Arabia's initial foray into

transnational media in the 1960s. Kraidy (2012) notes that Saudi Arabia embraced

transnational media then to counter the influence of Egyptian radio on the Arabian

Peninsula. Sheik Walid al-Ibrahim, the brother-in-law of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia,

started the network as a moderate, objective voice in the Arab world ("Al Arabiya: A

Balanced Alternative," 2003). In a *Washington Times* interview, he said he wanted

his network "to make a difference in the world" and "get rid of the Taliban

mentality" ("Al Arabiya Seeks Media Niche," 2003 (p. 1). In a later interview, al-

Ibrahim stated, "after the events of Sept. 11, Afghanistan and Iraq, people want the

truth… they don't want their news from the Pentagon or from Al Jazeera" (as cited in

Shapiro, 2005, p. 1). Schleifer described Al Arabiya's approach as more cautious,

professional, and mannered (Shapiro). According to Al Arabiya managers, this

means presenting the truth, "but no sensationalism" (Feuilherade, 2003, p. 1).

General manager Abdul Rahman al-Rashed, who joined the network in 2004,

described Al Arabiya as "one of the most important TV stations in a very troubled

region" (Interview with Abdul Rahman al-Rahsed, 2007, para. 1). Dajani stated that

Al Arabiya initially resembled Al Jazeera, but with "flashier graphics." The network

quickly established a reputation for breaking news coverage, as well as, for

innovative use of technology in the delivery of television news (Al-Saggaf, 2006). Al

Arabiya won four awards at the Fourth Arab Media Festival including "Best Website

of an Arab News Channel" (Golden, 2006, p. 1).

Although created to counter the more sensational aspects of Al Jazeera's

coverage, Al Arabiya was also heavily criticized by U.S. officials for its coverage of

the war in Iraq. Criticism centered around the network's airing of taped messages

from Sadam Hussein in hiding, and for giving air time to masked men who threatened members of the U.S.-backed Iraqi Governing Coalition (Sakr, 2006). At a news conference in November, 2006, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called Al Arabiya "violently anti-coalition" and later said:

> There are so many things that are untrue that are being reported by irresponsible journalists and irresponsible television stations, particularly like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, that are leaving the Iraqi people with a totally imbalanced picture of what is happening in their country (as cited in Ibish, 2006, p. 227).

Despite early U.S. criticism, Al Arabiya has developed a reputation among Arab media critics for being pro-American, and has been referred to as Al Hebraia (Arabic for The Hebrew) (Worth, 2008). Al-Rashed is an outspoken critic of Islamic fundamentalism. One of the network's regular programs "Sina'at al Mowt" (Arabic for The Death Industry) focuses on terrorism (Worth, 2008). Network policy has banned the use of loaded terms (e.g., calling the coalition forces in Iraq "invaders") in its coverage of politically sensitive issues (Sakr, 2006). In addition, Al Arabiya has been the chosen media outlet when U.S. presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama addressed the Arab world.

Early evidence suggests Al Arabiya quickly found an audience in the region. The network was particularly popular in Iraq. A 2003 U.S. State Department poll conducted in seven Iraqi cities, found 37% of satellite news viewers ranked Al Arabiya as their top choice for news, followed by Al Jazeera (26%). A field study conducted for the British Council by A.C. Nielsen (Seib, 2007) found the most watched pan-Arab news channels were Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. Lynch (2008)

referred to Al Arabiya as a challenger to Al Jazeera in the region. Telhami's (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) annual survey of six Arab countries also consistently found Al Arabiya ranked as one of the most watched pan-Arab news channels. The 2011 survey revealed a marked increase, from 2010 (3%) to 2011(14%), in the number of respondents who chose Al Arabiya as the station they watch most often for international news coverage (Telhami, 2011). Research by the BBG (2011) also found Al Arabiya was ranked the most watched and most reliable Arab network by Egyptians during the 2011 political uprising. Of the eight channels listed in the survey, Al Arabiya ranked the highest with 65% of respondents stating that they used the network for information during the crisis.

International Broadcasting

In addition to the numerous pan-Arab satellite networks, a number of international broadcasters are also beaming Arabic-language news into the region. The term international broadcasting generally refers to government sponsored broadcasting aimed at audiences in another nation-state or region. Germany's Deutsche Welle, France 24, Russia TV Today, and China Central TV (CCTV) have all joined the evolving and congested Arab media environment.

Two of the most talked about Arabic-language foreign channels are Alhurra and BBC Arabic. However, this section also includes a discussion of Al Jazeera English, which originates English-language newscasts from the Middle East which are broadcast around the world.

Alhurra. Spurred by policies of protectionism and peace dividends, American soft power (which was an effective element of the U.S. cold war strategy)—"when one country gets other countries to want what it wants" (Nye, 1990)— began to atrophy. In terms of national security, this mentality resulted in reduced interest and spending on foreign affairs, public diplomacy and military intelligence operations. The roughly ten years of relative peace and prosperity, between the fall of the Soviet Union and 9/11, brought multiple reorganizations within the public diplomacy apparatus and continual declines, as much as 40%, in the resources available to public diplomacy (Slavin, 2002). Richard Holbrooke's comment about Osama bin Laden's communication skills may have best summed up America's communication problem at the turn of the century: "How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world's leading communications society?" (Holbrooke, 2001, p. B07).

Writing in 1994, Walter Laqueur warned that a major crisis could have a "salutary effect… putting an end to lethargy and indifference" (p. 24). The terrorist attacks of 9/11, growing anti-Americanism, and numerous private and government reports (e.g., Armitage & Nye, 2007; Blinken, 2003; Bollier, 2004; Djerejian, 2003; Johnson & Dale, 2003; Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2002) woke many government officials from their sabbaticals of reason. They quickly realized that the American public diplomacy "machinery" had begun, in the words of The Washington Post, "to cough, sputter, misfire" (Moeller, 2005, p. B5).

While America's failure to utilize its soft power resources was a universal

problem, it was most pronounced in the Arab and Muslim world. The slice of public

diplomacy resources dedicated to the Arab world was focused on elites. (Ross &

Slavin, 2002). This strategy meant, for one thing, that less than 2% of the Arab

population was able to hear Voice of America broadcasts (Blinken, 2003). By early

2002, communicating with the Arab world had become a priority for American

diplomacy. President Bush charged the office of the under-secretary of state for public

diplomacy and public affairs with the task of improving the U.S. image overseas. Public

diplomacy is defined as the "promotion of the national interest by informing,

engaging, and influencing people around the world" (Djerejian, 2003, p. 13). "There

is no question that we must do a better job of telling the compassionate side of the

American story. We've got work to do" (Newport, 2002, p. 1)

The President appointed a series of high-profile communication experts

(Charlotte Beers, Margaret Tutwiler, Karen Hughes) to the public diplomacy post.

The result was a number of initiatives designed to sell "brand America" to the

Muslim world including—the Shared Values public service announcement (PSA)

campaign, *Hi* magazine, and Radio Sawa.

The backbone of the Bush administration's "battle for hearts and minds,"

however, was a new 24-hour satellite network called Alhurra[4]. "The Bush

administration viewed satellite television as a so-called soft-power tool for building

good will toward the United States" (Morgan, 2005, p. 1). On the outskirts of the

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[4] There are various spellings/capitalizations for the name of the network. The author
has chosen to follow the conventions dictated by the BBG.

Capitol beltway, in Springfield, Virginia, the government-funded Alhurra Television

Network began beaming Arabic language programming to the Middle East on

February 14, 2004. The network, which received $100 million in startup funding

from the U.S. government, was launched to counter the pan-Arab satellite networks

and promote freedom. The establishment of Alhurra marked a significant turning

point in the way the U.S. government would communicate policy to the Arab world.

Alhurra (and Radio Sawa) is operated by the Middle East Television Network

(MTN). MTN is a "grantee organization" which receives federal funding through the

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The BBG mission is "to promote freedom

and sustain freedom and democracy by broadcasting accurate and objective news and

information about the United States and the world to audiences overseas"

(Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2005, p. 2). The network provided evidence of

the Bush administration's renewed commitment to communication technology in the

global war on terror.

Alhurra targets a young (under 30 years-of-age) general audience in the

Middle East. In addition to news, programming includes fitness, fashion,

entertainment news, science and technology, and sports. In April 2004, Alhurra Iraq

was launched to provide programming specifically designed for an Iraqi audience.

Even before Alhurra debuted, there was widespread speculation about the

effectiveness of this public diplomacy effort, both from home and abroad. The first

hurdle for the network would be to find an audience in an already congested Arab

media landscape. An additional challenge was "to persuade a world cynical about

spin that the U.S. is not just pushing good news stories but is being straightforward; and explaining policies many will not like" (Deluca, 2005, p. 17). In contrast, the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Djerejian (2003) wrote that if Alhurra "succeeds in attracting and influencing a significant audience, it will become a critical U.S. Government-sponsored voice in the Arab world. That would be an important accomplishment" (p. 31).

After a few years of operation, there is widespread disagreement over Alhurra's effectiveness in reaching the "hearts and minds" of the Arab world. Sources of disagreement involve the size of the station's audience, effectiveness of programming and news coverage, competitiveness among pan-Arab broadcasters, and limitations of the network's organizational structure. An evaluation of the network, conducted at the bequest of the BBG, revealed Alhurra's news product was considered uninteresting, weak journalism, biased, propaganda, which lacked connection to the Arab street (USC, 2008).

BBC Arabic. Much like Alhurra, the new BBC Arabic was revived by the British government to compete with Al Jazeera in the pan-Arab satellite news market. In the mid-1990s, the BBC maintained an Arabic-language satellite news presence in the region when it operated BBC Arabic Television on the Orbit network. Orbit is a commercial pay TV satellite network controlled by Saudi Arabian interests. The Saudis cancelled BBC Arabic Television in 1996 after the network aired programming deemed critical of the Saudi kingdom (Boone, 2004). Al Jazeera was born from the ruins of the BBC/Orbit joint venture. Many of the BBC-trained

journalists working at BBC Arabic Television went on to work for Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya after its demise.

The new BBC Arabic began broadcasting in March 2008. Like Alhurra, it is a government-funded entity, receiving funds from the British Foreign Office. Some Arab critics dismissed BBC Arabic as a propaganda tool before it ever began broadcasting (Jarrah, 2008). However, BBC World Service director Nigel Chapman dismissed the notion that the new channel would be a political mouthpiece for the British government stating it would report "without fear or favour" (as cited in BBC launches Arabic TV channel, 2008).

Due to their Arabic-language radio service, and experience with Orbit TV, the BBC is a respected name in the Arab world, and BBC Arabic hoped to capitalize on this reputation. The head of the BBC's Arabic Service, Hosam El Sokkari said, that the network will "adhere to BBC values that our audience in the Middle East has known since 1938" (as cited in Pintak, 2007, p. 6). Chapman stated:

> BBC Arabic is renowned for broadcasting impartial and accurate news and information, which is strong on analysis and expertise. [An] enhanced multimedia service meets the needs of an audience with a very strong appetite for news and debate (as cited in BBC launches Arabic TV channel, 2008, p. 1).

Research conducted in several Middle Eastern capitals by the BBC before the launch of the new channel suggested that a clear majority of the people sampled would watch the channel often (Pintak, 2007). British officials hoped the new channel would attract an audience of 20 million viewers per week by 2010. However, during the political uprising in Egypt, the channel ranked at the bottom of

the eight channels listed in the BBG survey of channel use. Only 13% of respondents listed the channel as one they were currently using.

Al Jazeera English. While all of the satellite news channels mentioned to this point have been concerned with broadcasting into the Arab world, Al Jazeera English (AJE) was created to broadcast from the Middle East to the rest of the world. AJE was launched in November 2006, as the first international English-language network based in the Middle East. Just as he was with its sister network, Al Jazeera, the Emir of Qatar was the principal source of the more than $1 billion initial budget for AJE (El-Nawawy & Powers, 2008). AJE rotates its broadcasts from four news centers (Doha, Kuala Lumpur, London, and Washington DC) and operates twenty-one news bureaus.

AJE was originally conceived as a provider of "international perspectives" on the news, but was re-focused early on to emphasize "Arab perspectives" with "non-Western" voices delivering the news (Pintak, 2006, p. 1). Although AJE was created to compete with CNN International and BBC World, its mission is to provide different points of view and new perspectives (Potter, 2007; Rao, 2007; Turner, 2006). A task made easier since, according to former managing director Nigel Parsons, AJE is a non-commercial entity (Kolesnikov-Jessop, 2007). This affords AJE the opportunity to cover stories ignored by other networks, and to devote more time to those stories (Potter, 2007).

The AJE website states that the channel "aims to balance the information

flow between the South and the North." El-Nawawy and Powers (2008) point to

AJE's attempt to balance the global flow of information as an example of Sakr's

"contra-flow" (2007). Sakr describes contra-flow as "reversed or alternative media

flows… that are also counter-hegemonic" (p. 117). Khamis (2007) states that AJE

provides a "counterflow" of information from the Arab world back to the Western

world. Al Jazeera English managing director, Al Anstey referred to AJE having "the

same DNA" as its parent network with a commitment to being "comprehensive in

our coverage of the Middle East" (as cited in Seib, 2011, p. 22).

Khamis (2007) identified several challenges facing AJE including its sister

station's "image problem" and an "unwillingness to listen" from the American

audience (pp. 47-48). In fact, AJE is hard to find in the U.S. due to reluctance among

major U.S. cable TV and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers to carry it. A poll

commissioned by the conservative media watchdog group Accuracy In Media

(Accuracy in Media, 2006) found that 53% of surveyed Americans did not believe

the network should be made available in the U.S. Like its sister station, AJE has also

offended governments. In May 2012, AJE was forced to close its news operations in

China and recall its correspondent (Wines, 2012).

Despite the challenges, AJE's reach is estimated at 220 million households in

more than 100 countries. Seib (2011) identified the 2008-2009 Gaza war and the

2011 uprisings in Egypt as coverage that meliorated the AJE brand. During the most

intense protests in Egypt, traffic on the network's website increased dramatically,

with much of the traffic coming from the U.S. (Burman, 2011). Powers (2011b)

described AJE's coverage of the Egypt uprising as "world-class" (p. 26). He is one of many media experts that tout AJE as a pre-eminent example of "networked journalism" [5] (Powers, 2011a).

Summary

Rugh (2004) identified the population explosion, rapid urbanization, and high illiteracy rates in the region as reasons for studying Arab television. Despite more than a decade of scrutiny, little comparative systematic analysis has been conducted on these channels. The purpose of this paper is to explore, through framing, the visuals on five pan-Arab and international satellite news channels during a typical news cycle. Before discussing how the study will be conducted, a review of the literature on visual content analysis, Arab media studies, and framing will be provided.

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[5] The term networked journalism was coined by Jeff Jarvis in 2006 to describe the collaboration of journalism professionals and amateurs in the coverage of news stories (McGann, 2010).

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Most of us do not have first hand experience with countries from the Middle East, mass media are responsible for providing "reality" of those countries and television news is especially powerful.

Chris A. Paterson, Framing Public Life

Arab Media Studies

Historically, the Arab media has been one of the most closed media systems in the world (Hafez, 2001), and by extension, has suffered from a lack of research by media scholars. Through a non-exhaustive meta-analysis, Ayish (2008) examined 100 content research studies conducted on Arab media by Arab scholars over the last forty years. He found the body of research centered on nine themes: national development, cultural globalization, politics, terrorism, women, children, military conflict, gatekeeping practices, and new media.

In general, the majority of research on Arab electronic media prior to the "Al Jazeera age" largely consisted of a few broad categories: surveys of MENA media systems (al-Halwani, 1984; Amin, 1997/98; Boyd, 1982, 1993a, 1993b, 1999; Foote & Amin, 1993; Head, 1976, 1985; Kamalipour & Mowlana, 1994); media use and influence during the first gulf war (Al-Makaty, Boyd, & Tubergen, 1994; Boyd, 1994; Weisenborn, 1992); the diffusion and influence of technology including videocassettes (Amin & Boyd, 1993; Boyd, 1987; Boyd & Straubhaar, 1985; Boyd, Straubhaar, & Lent, 1989); direct broadcast satellite usage in the region (Amin & Boyd, 1994; Ayish & Qassim, 1995; Marghalani, Palmgreen & Boyd, 1998);

transnational broadcasting (Boyd, 1976, 1983, 1986, 1993a, 1993b, 2001; Boyd &

Asi, 1991); and Arab press theories (Ayish, 2002; Hachten & Scotten, 2002, 2007;

Rugh, 1979, 2004). Historical background on the evolution of press theories[6] is

provided here because they serve as a foundation for the network taxonomy utilized

in the present study.

While not limited to the Arab world, press theories emerged from media

scholars' attempts to discover why the media operate differently, and serve different

purposes in different countries. These theories use categories, or taxonomies, to

represent differing functions of media based on such factors as the political system,

economic model, and historical development of the societies in which they operate

(Hachten & Scotton, 2002). In their classic work, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm

(1956) identified four theories of the press: (1) authoritarian, (2) libertarian, (3)

social responsibility and (4) Soviet Communist (sometimes referred to as

totalitarian). They acknowledged that Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist

theories were simply modifications of the two most basic theories of the press—

libertarian and authoritarian—that have applied to media since the development of

the printing press.

Through the years, several variations, extensions, and re-conceptualizations

of these concepts have been advanced. For example, Hachten and Scotten (2002,

2007) extended the work of Siebert, Peterson and Schramm to five "ideologies" of

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[6] Although the word press is most often used in the titles of these theories, and
implies the printed media, they are frequently universally applied to all mass
communication media.

the press: (1) authoritarian, (2) western, (3) communist, (4) revolutionary, and (5) developmental. Rugh (1979) identified four press systems: (1) authoritarian, (2) libertarian, (3) social responsibility, and (4) totalitarian. He used four press characteristics and three political characteristics as determining factors for his typologies. While scholars (Amin, 2001; Ayish, 2002; Boyd, 1999, Rugh, 1979) have historically placed Arab media under the authoritarian press system, Rugh (1979) argued that the authoritarian description is too broad to represent the full range of media dynamics present in the Arab world. Thus, he applied three subtypes to the authoritarian press system: (1) mobilization, (2) loyalist, and (3) diverse. Later, Rugh (2004) added a fourth Arab media subtype: transitional.

More recent attempts to compare media systems have also utilized the political economy of the news media. In their book, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Media,* Herman & Chomsky (1988) presented a model for evaluating the news media's—as primarily economic institutions—impact on culture. Their propaganda model is composed of five characteristics that they contend serve as filters on the news that reaches audiences: (1) size, ownership and profit orientation; (2) advertising license; (3) sourcing news; (4) flak and enforcers; and (5) anti-communism (terrorism after 9/11).

Despite these numerous extensions, Hallin and Mancini (2004) questioned the usefulness of these comparative models, stating they were hampered by the dominant Cold War ideology of U.S.-Soviet systems. *"Four Theories of the Press* has stalked the landscape of media studies like a horror-movie zombie for decades

beyond its natural lifetime" (Hallin & Mancini, p. 10). According to Hallin and Mancini, this ideological framework hinders the establishment of sophisticated and comparative models that account for the rich diversity present in the world's current media systems. Hallin (1994) also suggested many comparative models did not do enough to account for the media as cultural institutions and emphasized the work of Habermas as a means of developing a systematic approach for comparative media analysis.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) presented a framework for comparing North American and Western European media systems based on four major dimensions: (1) the development of media markets; (2) level of media-political parallelism; (3) degree or journalistic professionalism; and (4) role of the state in the media. Their historical analysis using these four dimensions resulted in three models called the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist, the North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist, and the North Atlantic or Liberal models. Their findings indicated five forces of homogenization—(1) Americanization of media; (2) technological dependence; (3) modernization; (4) secularization; and (5) commercialization— resulted in a "historic shift" that propelled some European media systems toward the Liberal model. They define liberal media as "commercialized, politically unaligned, and 'catch-all' media" (Hallin & Mancini, 2012, p. 7).

Unlike former press theories, Hallin and Mancini (2004) stated they did not intend their models to serve as general categories for analysis of other media systems from around the globe. However, their edited book *Comparing Media Systems*

Beyond the Western World (2012) presents cases in which these models are applied in other media contexts. In one chapter, Kraidy (2012) conducts comparative analysis of national and supranational forces in Lebanese and Saudi Arabian media systems. Kraidy argues that the Arab media operate in a mix of national political systems and media systems that are increasingly influenced by regional forces. He placed the pan-Arab media system as a mix of the Polarized Pluralist and the Liberal models. He joins other scholars (see Hallin, 2009; and Livingstone, 2003) in advocating a transnational approach for comparative media analysis.

These conceptualizations have often been based on the empirical analysis of historical and structural elements of media systems with the nation state serving as the unit of analysis (Hallin & Mancini, 2012). However, the present study will focus on media content as the unit of analysis. Still, the conceptualizations presented by Hallin and Mancini served as a guide for identifying the two-dimensional network taxonomy, and for making predictions about the visual content and structure of transnational Arab television.

Previous research utilizing television content as the unit of analysis should also inform predictions for the current study. In one of the few systematic studies of the news content of national and transnational Arab television channels, Ayish (2002) examined news content from three networks—Syrian Satellite Channel, Abu Dhabi Satellite Channel and Al Jazeera—representing three different political patterns of communication. He referred to the differing media systems as political patterns of television and labeled the channels traditional government-controlled

television, reformist government-controlled television, and liberal commercial television respectively. The latter he described as a new transnational pattern characterized by professional standards, presented in western-styled "critical and pluralistic views of society" (p. 142), and highly volatile commercial competition. He assigned the liberal commercial label to Al Jazeera.

Ayish used framing to examine news selection, newscast formats, areas of coverage, and attitudes toward political players among the three stations. He found that news on the Arab satellite channels shared many of the features of western broadcast journalism. The study was an extension of a previous content analysis. In that study (Ayish, 2001a), he examined news formats, news topics, and areas of coverage during a five day sample of nightly newscasts from five Arab TV channels: MBC, Al-Jazeera, LBC, Abu Dhabi and Syrian satellite channel. The findings revealed: political topics were the most covered news items; stations presented pro-Palestinian attitudes; and coverage of the United States was mostly negative.

Jasperson and El-Kikhia (2003) conducted one of the first cross-cultural content studies that included Al Jazeera programming. Their qualitative framing analysis compared the use of three news frames—governance, military, and humanitarian—on CNN and Al Jazeera. Their findings revealed that CNN coverage emphasized governance and military frames, while Al Jazeera's coverage emphasized humanitarian frames. In addition, they found that Al Jazeera video footage emphasized collateral damage including visuals of dead and wounded civilians.

Aday, Livingston, and Hebert (2005) also conducted a cross-cultural analysis of television news coverage. They compared news coverage of the 2003 Iraq war from Al Jazeera, ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox News. The researchers examined more than 1,800 stories that aired during the spring of 2003, for objectivity and tone of the coverage. While their findings did reveal differences in coverage between U.S. networks and Al Jazeera, the authors concluded that Al Jazeera's coverage was objective and generally neutral in tone, except when dealing with civilian casualties. The authors concluded that Al Jazeera's casualty coverage was generally negative and carried an anti-American tone. The Aday et al. study also examined differences in the use of visuals by embedded and unilateral journalists. They found unilateral reporters used more visuals of civilian and Iraqi casualties. They concluded that the American networks provided a "sanitized" view of the war (p. 18).

Lynch (2007) examined the content of more than one thousand episodes of political talk shows from a five year period on Al Jazeera. He found four broad topics—Palestine, Iraq, reform, and America—monopolized Al Jazeera's agenda. Lynch (2006a) concluded that "negative images of the United States clearly predominated over positive images" (p. 218).

While content analysis of Arab satellite news broadcasts are somewhat rare, and difficult to conduct, a few research studies have examined differences of coverage on the websites of Arab satellite news channels instead. Douai (2007) used framing to examine coverage of the Danish cartoon controversy on the websites of the Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya satellite networks. He identified "transgression" as the

dominant frame used in the coverage. Loomis (2009) conducted a content analysis on the webpages of BBC, CBS, CNN and AJE. He found AJE's coverage was similar to that of the other networks. Barkho (2006) compared online content from the BBC, CNN and Arabic Al-Jazeera. He found that Al-Jazeera prioritized news stories and used language that was uniquely meaningful to its Arab audience. In another content analysis of English language news websites, Barkho (2008) found differences in the discourse structures and layers employed by AJE when compared to BBC, and CNN news coverage.

In 2008, Ayish stated that content analysis research has failed to "adequately" examine the new Arab communication systems, including Al-Jazeera and similar satellite news channels (p. 118). Content analysis research has also largely failed to adequately investigate the role of the image in television news broadcasts.

Television News Images

The Project for Excellence in Journalism (2005) reported that we are in the midst of an "epochal transformation" of news media. Over the last two decades, the rapid "convergence" of satellite, fiber-optic, video, computer, and phone technologies has allowed the synchronous transmission and rebroadcast, as well as asynchronous sorting and retrieval of, audio, video, communication, and data on a global scale. This convergence of technology has also brought about the decentralization of news production, allowing virtually anyone with access to make and distribute mediated communication, thus empowering citizen journalists (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2005).

Communication and technology theorists (Innis, 1950, 1951; Mumford, 1963; McLuhan 1964; Postman, 1992) recognized that each communication technology is embedded with ideological, organizational, use, and knowledge biases that impact society. According to Winner (1977), this examination of the link between technology and society has origins in Aristotle's discussion of "inanimate instruments." Postman defined these technological biases as "a predisposition… to amplify one sense… more loudly than another" (p. 13). Innis stated that throughout the course of history, new communication technologies have undermined old bases of social power (McQuail, 2000). These technological biases are what McLuhan's, often misunderstood, statement "the medium is the message" referred to (1964, p. 7). McLuhan argued that the content of a message could be subjugated by the inherent characteristics of the message's transmission technology.

Lippmann (1922) also discussed the progression of influence—from the spoken word, to the written word, to the photograph—which has taken place over the last few centuries of Western technological advancement. He described images as a key ingredient to public opinion formation because they appear "utterly real" and provide "effortless food for the mind" (p. 92). Grabe and Bucy (2009) state that there is credible evidence of the effect of images on public opinion formation.

The French philosopher and semiotician, Roland Barthes, referred to the unavoidable nature of pictures to instantaneously impose meaning (as cited in Hall 1973 p. 176). Zelizer (2001) stated "Western epistemology has always been ocular-centric or vision-based. With 'the seen' taken as a primary ground of knowledge in

Western thought, 'seeing' has become in many cases a metaphor for perspective"
(Zelizer, 2001, pp. 1-2). Rosen (2005) states that due to this inherent power of
visuals to influence, those in power have historically tried to control the distribution
of images.

Scholars (Adams, 1978b; Arlen, 1969; Brosius, Donsbach, & Birk, 1996;
Epstein, 1973; Kepplinger, 1991; Klijn, 2003; Lang & Lang, 1970; Stoel, 1996;
Tuchman, 1978; Wax, 1970; Wolfsfeld, 2004) have told us that good visuals are
essential for television news. As Perlmutter (1999) notes, the news that really counts
"is visually prominent" (p. 178). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that news
directors seek to fill their newscasts with compelling visuals. TV news critics coined
the term "if it bleeds, it leads" as one example. News correspondent Jim Lederman
(1992) referred to television as "enslaved to images" (p. 132). Walter Cronkite once
said, "If we can illustrate all stories there is no further need of a news broadcaster to
read half the items to the public" (as cited in Klijn, 2003, p. 124).

Throughout the history of television news, the news organizations have made
huge expenditures on state-of-the-art technology enabling electronic newsgathering,
satellite newsgathering, and Internet protocol based news delivery practices. These
expenditures testify to the desire for live reporting and images of important stories.
The result has been the prioritization and promulgation of visuals in international
news (Clausen, 2003).

Visual News Research

The scholarly disciplines of the neurosciences and cognitive psychology have devoted a significant amount of attention to the role of image processing in individuals. (Gibson, 2003; Rosen, 2005). This research (Anderson & Paulson, 1978; Barry, 1997; Gehring, Toglias, & Kimble, 1976; Graber, 1987; Nickerson, 1968; Paivio, 1971, 1986; Zhou, 2005) has revealed that the brain processes visual and audiovisual stimuli differently, and more quickly, than text or verbal stimuli (Gibson, 2003; Pfau et al., 2008; Rosen, 2005). Arpan et al. (2006) state visuals alone can affect how people process news content and their perception of issues.

Gibson (2003) notes that visual research has also examined the effect of news images on information acquisition and recall. In arguing that visuals are more memorable than verbal components of TV newscasts, Graber (1990) stated, "seeing is remembering." Numerous studies have found the use of visuals on television news aided viewers' recall (Berry & Brosius, 1991; Brosius, 1993; Brosius, Donsbach, & Birk, 1996; Cowan, 1984; Edwardson, Grooms, & Pringle, 1981; Graber, 1990; Grimes, 1990; Gunter, 1979; Kipper, 1986; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Renckstorf, 1977; Son, Reese, & Davie, 1987). Drew and Grimes (1987) found that visual redundancy improves auditory recall. In addition, visuals have been found to improve understanding (Stoel, 1996); improve credibility and authenticity (Brosius et al.); capture and sustain attention (Detenber, Simons, & Bennett, 1998; Lang, Dhillon, & Dong, 1995; Lang, Newhagen, & Reeves, 1996; Nisbett & Ross, 1980); and draw attention when there is a conflict in the audio and video messages (Drew & Grimes).

Recent studies of visual news elements have tended to examine photographic depictions of conflict and crisis event content (Barnett & Reynolds, 2009). These events have included natural disasters (Fahmy & Johnson, 2007), 2009 Gaza conflict (Dobernig, Lobinger, & Wetzstein, 2010); terrorist attacks (Cho et al., 2003; Fahmy, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2010; Huddy, Feldman, Lahav, & Taber, 2003; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Yung-Soo & Smith, 2003), the war in Afghanistan (Fahmy, 2004, 2010; Fahmy, 2005a, 2005b; Griffin, 2004; Zelizer, 2005), the 1991 Gulf War (Griffin, 2004; King & Lester, 2005; Moriarty & Shaw, 1995), the Sri Lankan Civil War (Neumann & Fahmy, 2010), patriotism (Pyka, Fosdick, & Tillinghast, 2010), and the War in Iraq (Aday, 2004; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Griffin, 2004; Keith, Schwalbe, & Silcock, 2009, 2010; King & Lester, 2005; Pfau et al., 2008; Schwalbe, 2006; Schwalbe, Silcock, & Keith, 2008; Silcock, Schwalbe, & Keith, 2008). Of these studies, only a few (Cho et al.; Huddy et al.; Lerner et al.; Pfau et al.; Keith et al., 2009, 2010; Schwalbe et al., 2008; Silcock et al., 2008) included video or television images in their analysis.

Lester (2005) identified four qualities of images—color, form, depth and movement—which stimulate the visual cortex. In terms of media, television utilizes three of these four qualities: movement, color, and form. Zettl (1990) stated that motion is "one of the strongest forces operating within the screen" (p. 119). Research on motion visuals has revealed that they increase arousal (Detenber, Simons, & Bennett, 1998; Detenber and Reeves, 1996; Reeves et al., 1985) and produce stronger affective responses than still pictures (Detenber et al.).

A number of scholars have examined the influence of visuals on viewer's emotional responses. Culbertson (1974) found pictures had greater emotional impact than words. Moeller states that news photographs are extremely influential during times of war (1989), and without pictures there often is not a story (2009). Zelizer (2004) refers to war photographs as "among the most powerful visuals known to humankind (p. 115). Experimental research (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischoff, 2003), and survey research (Huddy et al., 2003) conducted on 9/11 coverage revealed that TV content influenced emotional reactions of fear and anxiety, perceptions of risk, and public policy preferences.

Researchers have found that TV news in general (Cho et al., 2003), and TV news visuals (Graber, 1987, 2001; Nabi, 2003; Newhagen & Reeves, 1992; Strivers, 1994) communicate more emotion, and influence audience reactions more than news narratives. In an experimental study, Crigler, Just, and Neuman (1994) found participants were most emotionally impacted by the combination of audio/visual stimuli, which is the essence of television.

A series of studies have examined the impact of televised emotion-laden negative news images on audience memory (Lang, Newhagen, & Reeves, 1996; Newhagen, 1998; Newhagen & Lewenstein, 1992; Reeves et al., 1985). Newhagen and Reeves (1992) found that placement of the negative image and story have varying effects on memory. In a later experimental study, Newhagen (1998) separated negative news images into anger, fear, and disgust categories. His findings

suggest that images eliciting feelings of anger and fear are more memorable, while images that elicit disgust are more commonly avoided.

These studies lend support to Gitlin's statement that "both positive and negative associations are television's distinct forte: emotionally charged images in which an entire narrative is instantly present" (1991, p. 127). Even media critics have recognized the emotional influence of the television image.

> The camera cannot unravel complex intellectual issues, it cannot distinguish important from trivial detail, it cannot follow an argument to a reasoned conclusion… in these respects, one word is worth a thousand pictures. What television can do, however—and do with extraordinary power—is to mobilize the audience's emotions around a vivid, simplified, essentially melodramatic vision of the political world, in which praise and blame are the magnetic poles. What television can do, in other words, is what demagogic rhetoric used to do less efficaciously (Kristol, 1972, p. 51).

Despite the scientific and anecdotal evidence of their importance, visuals have not received the same level of systematic research attention that has been devoted to the verbal, or textual, news elements (Domke, Perlmutter, & Spratt, 2002; Graber, 1989, 1990; Matthes, 2009). Graber (1989) argues that ignoring visual news elements is detrimental to a complete understanding of the audiovisual message because the analysis not only loses the meaning contained in the visuals, but also misses the verbal meanings that are modified by the interaction of the visual content. Thus, as Grabe and Bucy (2009) explain, much of the meaning of television news is disregarded.

Graber (1990) stated that several "theoretical and methodological reasons" hamper research on visuals in TV news (p. 134). She notes that some scholars presume visuals convey purely secondary or peculiar meanings, which are

scientifically inconsequential. While samples of U.S. network news broadcasts are available from the Vanderbilt News Archive, local and international news samples can be difficult to obtain and manage. Even when samples are readily available, visual coding is by nature a tedious process (Graber, 1990). Visual analysis of news content may be further hindered by the high degree of overlap between the domains of mass communication, public opinion, political science, political communication, cognitive psychology, sociology, and visual communication. Finally, there is inconsistency over examining the visual content, the visual structure, or both.

For many years, researchers have discussed the two-fold nature—content and structure—of television's audio/visual messages (Adams, 1978a; Lang, 2000; Tuchman, 1978). The message content carries the manifest story information. In terms of visuals, content refers to what images are shown. This has traditionally been the basis of most television news research (Barnett & Grabe, 2000; Lang, 2000). The following quote by then Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew reflects the thrust of most criticism of television content:

> No medium has a more profound influence over public opinion… a narrow and distorted picture of America… the abridged view… which tends to emphasize scenes depicting the more dramatic moments of violence, lawlessness and embittered dissent (as cited in Epstein, 1973, p. 6).

Tuchman's statement, "news is perpetually defining and redefining, constituting and reconstituting social phenomena" (1978, p. 184), echoes Agnew's concern about the influence of TV news on public opinion. However, Tuchman is also referring to the structural features of TV news, not just the content. Tuchman described how the manipulation of various structural features of news, primarily

space and time, could lend elements of distortion or credibility (which she called "facticity") to the news product (p. 112). Her analysis of news production led to a description of a "framing" process, which she described as operating through a series of codes, and equated with bias. McQuail (2000) states that news structure has historically been described as a form of structural bias.

In recent years the term bias has given way to the related concepts of sensationalism and vividness. These terms can reference both the content and formal features of TV news. Nisbett and Ross (1980) defined vividness as information that is "(1) emotionally interesting, (2) concrete and image-provoking, and (3) proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way" (p. 45). Graber (2001) stated that vividness lends itself to audiovisual material, is a common feature of television news, is a form of dramatic framing, and can be applied to content and/or presentation style.

Grabe, Zhou, & Barnett (2001) state that sensationalism "amuses, titillates, and entertains" (p. 637). In terms of content, sensationalism often refers to stories about crime, sex, disasters, accidents, public fear, fires, and violence (Adams, 1978c; Ehrlich, 1996; Grabe, et al.; Hofstetter & Dozier, 1986; Vettehen, Nuijten, & Beentjes, 2005). However, several systematic investigations (Grabe, Zhou, Lang & Bolls, 2000; Grabe, et al., 2001; Klijn, 2003; Vettehen, et al.; Zhou, 2005) have focused on the explication of the structural features of sensationalism. Sensational journalism is designed to appeal to emotion, attract attention, and is driven by market pressures (Grabe et al., 2001; Graber, 2001; Vettehen et al.).

Scholars examining the structural features of images have struggled to find a theoretical home for their analysis. This is illustrated by the variety of theories that have been applied to the examination of image content and structural features. For example, Kaid and Davidson (1986) outlined a measure of political candidates' "videostyle," which they said comprises the analysis of verbal content, nonverbal content and production techniques used in political candidates' campaign ads (see also Kaid, 1999; Kaid & Johnston, 2001; Kaid & Tedesco, 1999; Kaid, Tedesco, & McKinnon, 1996; Kaid, Tedesco, Chanslor, & Roper, 1993). Newhagen and Lowenstein (1992) applied cultivation theory to image-laden news coverage of the 1989 Loma Pietra earthquake. The limited capacity model of television viewing has been used to examine the effects of negative video images (Lang, Newhagen, & Reeves, 1996); audio video redundancy (Lang, 1995); production pacing and arousing content (Lang, Bolls, Potter, & Kawahara, 1999); and sensational content and form (Grabe, Lang, & Zhao, 2003) in TV news.

The common thread that has emerged from this discussion of Arab media studies, TV news research, and visual content and structure has been news frames. Macro-level framing should serve as an appropriate theoretical framework for examining the content and structure of visuals in Arab satellite newscasts.

Framing

The origins of mass communication research are largely a development of the 1920s and 1930s from scholars who were concerned with the influence of mass media (radio and newspapers) and wartime propaganda on the attitudes and

behaviors of the audience (Miller, 2002). Two scholars in particular, Walter Lippman and Harold Lasswell, were instrumental in the development of mass communication research. In his 1922 book, *Public Opinion,* Lippman used the analogy of "pictures in our head and the world outside" to explain that the media shape people's perceptions and opinions (p. 25). He stated that twentieth-century individuals do not act on certain knowledge (first-hand knowledge), or knowledge gained from relational bonds, but rather on knowledge given to him by the media. In *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (1927), Lasswell also espoused the influence of the media to mold mass reaction. He theorized that the content of propaganda messages could "meld thousands and even millions of human beings into one amalgamated mass" (p. 221).

What emerged from the early work in mass communication was a theory of strong, direct and universal cause and effect between the stimulus (message) and social behavior, referred to as the "magic bullet" or "hypodermic needle" effect (Meyrowitz, 1985; Miller, 2001). As a result, the focus of communication research became a study of what the media injects (the content) into the audience.

When little evidence was found to support this strong effects model, mass communication scholars switched to a limited effects model, in which the content's interaction with variables could change or eliminate its influence. Thus, much of mass communication research remains focused on the media content. Some of the most heavily used mass communication theories of the last forty years are

predominantly focused on message content rather than the potential effects of a specific medium.

In a journal article addressing "the state of the art in mass communication theory and research," Bryant and Miron (2004, p. 602) identified uses and gratifications, agenda setting and cultivation theory as the "triumvirate" mass communication theories in terms of usage over the past half-century (p. 673). However, their findings, as well as those from Riffe, (2004) and Weaver (2007), reveal that framing has become one of the most frequently applied, and discussed, mass communication theories in recent years.

While uses and gratifications, agenda setting, and cultivation originated from research traditions in mass communication, the origins of framing are more diverse (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007). Van Gorp traces the origins of framing to Bartlett's (1932) work in cognitive psychology, Bateson's (1955) work in anthropology and Goffman's (1974) work in sociology.

Many mass communication scholars recognize Goffman's concept of frame analysis (1974) as the cornerstone upon which modern framing theory is built. Although he is recognized as one of the "seminal figures" in the development of this mass communication theory (Edy & Meirick, 2007, p. 122), his original work was primarily concerned with sense making in interpersonal interactions. For frame analysis, Goffman drew heavily on the work of Bateson and on his own earlier work on the management of impressions during these social interactions (Goffman, 1959, 1967). Goffman argued that individuals constantly struggle to make sense of the

world around them and thus rely on the "schemata of information," which he labeled "frames," "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" (1974, p. 21).

Currently, framing is typically associated with the fields of mass communication and political communication (e.g., Entman, 1991; Gitlin, 1980; Iyengar, 1991). However, scholars (Edy & Meirick, 2007; Entman, 1993; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007) recognize that framing literature is ubiquitous throughout disciplines within the social sciences including: economics (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); linguistics (e.g., Lakoff, 2004; Tannen, 1979); psychology (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984); social-movements research (e.g., Snow & Benford, 1988); public relations (e.g., Hallahan, 1999); health communication (e.g., Rothman & Salovey, 1997); media hegemony (e.g., Entman, 1991), media effects (e.g., Iyengar, 1987); and news making (e.g., Tuchman, 1978).

Communication scholars argue that the theory's wide-ranging background has resulted in "conceptual diversity and imprecision" (Kinder, 2007, p. 158); "scattered conceptualization" (Entman, 1993, p. 52); "plethora of meanings" (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001, p. 79); "passé-partout" (Van Gorp, 2007, p. 60); and a "polysemic nature of the word framing" (Maher, 2001, p. 89). Matthes (2009) argues that this diversity of definitions is the result, at least in part, to the type of definition—general or operational—used to describe frames. According to Maher (2001), these imprecise conceptualizations are also perpetuated when scholars fail to distinguish between the locations of the frames they are examining.

Researchers have identified multiple frame sources in the communication process. The number of frame locations varies from two—message producer and message receiver (Entman, 1991; Friedland & Zhong, 1996; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Gitlin, 1980; Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Scheufele, 1999; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007); three—the media, the audience, and cultural actors (Scheufele, 2006); and four—the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture (Entman, 1993). By contextualizing the definitions of framing within one of these frame locations, the framing concept becomes clearer.

The most common distinctions are made between message producer and message receiver frames. The term framing refers to organizing structures used by both media professionals and audiences to simplify complex issues (Gitlin, 1980; Gamson et al., 1992; Reese, 2001). When specifically applied to the news, frames have been considered "schemes" for both presenting and comprehending the news.

As noted above, Scheufele (1999) and Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) described framing as a dual-level construct. They used the terms micro-level and macro-level to distinguish between individual applied frames and media applied frames. Scheufele (1999) equates micro-level framing with frames located at the individual level. Definitions commonly applied to individual framing include "schemata of information" (Goffman, 1974, p. 21); "internal structures of the mind" (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 74); "mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals' processing of information" (Entman,1993, p. 53); "lenses through which social reality is viewed" (Dillard, Soloman, Samp, 1996, p. 706). Micro-level frames,

then, represent the ways individuals use, make sense of, and gain meaning from the communication they receive.

However, the term framing is more commonly used to describe media-located, or macro-level, frames. At the macro-level, frame building is concerned with message producers' organizing structures, which are used to present complex events and issues, and, in the process give their stories meaning (Kosicki, 2003; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Many of the most widely referenced metaphors for framing apply to this context, including: "primary frameworks" (Goffman, 1974, p. 24); "narratives" (Manoff, 1987, p. 228); "scenario" (Bennett, 1975); central organizing ideas (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss, & Ghanem, 1991); interpretive "schemata" (Reese, 2001, p. 14); "organizes everyday reality" (Tuchman, 1978, p. 193); package (Gamson & Stuart, 1992; Gitlin, 1980); and promotion of "particular definitions and interpretations of political issues" (Shah, Watts, Domke, & Fan, 2002, p. 343).

"To frame," Entman said, "is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (1993, p. 52). The choices journalists make in presenting the news not only affect the salience of issues, but also how the issues are interpreted by the audience (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

Frames have the potential to alter what audiences perceive the issue to be, how important the issue is, and what should be done about it (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Jasperson, Shah, Watts, Faber, & Fan, 1998). Chong and Druckman (2007) refer to this ability of media handlers to produce significant opinion changes through subtle presentation changes as "framing effects" (p.104). Scholars (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Jasperson, et al., 1998) have recognized the effect of word choice on opinion changes. For example, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) examined how two different news frames (word phrasings) affected audience attitudes of the same event. They examined the effect of news frames on tolerance for a Ku Klux Klan rally. Research participants were shown news stories on the Klan rally framed either as a free speech issue or as a disruption of public order. Their findings revealed more tolerance for the Klan by participants that saw the rally framed as a free speech issue. According to Tankard (2001), the power of news producers is enhanced by their ability to "to define the terms of the debate without the audience realizing it is taking place" (p. 97).

Iyengar (1991) and Iyengar and Simon (1993) described two broad organizing structures of media framing, episodic and thematic. Episodic framing is an organizing structure that provides specific examples of the issue or event being covered, including live, on-the-spot coverage. Thematic framing, also called "backgrounder," is broader coverage and provides more background information and talking-head analysis of a historical, cultural, or other context (p. 370). Fahmy

(2004) suggested visual choices journalists make can also indicate whether coverage is episodic or thematic. She states that a thematic style can be visually achieved by providing more archive images along with current images. While news stories may contain elements of both episodic and thematic framing, Iyengar and Simon (1993) state that most stories utilize a dominant frame. Furthermore, they argue that the dominant organizing structure in most television news stories is episodic framing. They state the commercial nature of television news anticipates the networks' use of more episodic coverage.

Iyengar and Simon (1993) also identified two levels of attributions of responsibility in media framing. The first level, causal, identifies who or what caused or is responsible for the event or issues being covered. The second level, treatment, identifies who can resolve the issue, or who is preventing the resolution of the issue. Their discussion of previous research revealed relationships between the application of episodic or thematic frames in news coverage, and attributions of responsibility. Specifically, under thematic framing viewers attributed responsibility to general societal factors while under episodic framing viewers attributed responsibility to specific agents. The styles of frames and attributions of responsibility reveal methods members of the media use to reduce complex issues into easily understood reports, which is a macro-level function.

Framing and Second-Level Agenda-Setting. The most intense debate surrounding framing is the relationship to agenda-setting theory. More specifically,

debate involves whether framing is a separate phenomena, or simply an extension—or so-called second-level—of the agenda-setting effect.

Rogers and Dearing (Dearing & Rogers, 1992; Rogers & Dearing, 1987) described three traditions of agenda-setting research: (1) media agenda setting which examines what news is and how issues become prominent in the media; (2) policy agenda setting which examines the influences of the media and the public on public-policy changes; and (3) public agenda setting which examines the relationship between issues of media importance and issues of public importance. The latter was the focus of the pioneering work on agenda-setting by McCombs and Shaw (1972) and is typically identified by a research design combining mass media content analysis with public opinion surveys (Rogers, Dearing, Bregman, 1993).

The original McCombs and Shaw study, referred to as the "Chapel Hill study" examined the relationship between media coverage and voter attitudes during the 1968 presidential election. Their research was influenced by several ideas for the relationship between media coverage and audience attitudes advanced by leading communication scholars including "The World Outside and Pictures in Our Heads" (Lippman, 1922); "attention frames" (Lasswell, 1948); and "the mass media force attention to certain issues" (Lang & Lang, 1966, p. 468). Cohen (1963) expressed the statement that best sums up the idea behind agenda setting when he said, "the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (p. 13).

Findings from the Chapel Hill study revealed that the issues given attention in the media (media agenda) were highly correlated to the issues the audience was thinking about (public agenda). McCombs and Shaw attributed these correlations to the direct transfer of issue salience (the importance or prominence of an issue) from media to public. In discussing their findings, McCombs and Shaw gave name to their theory when they called for future research to examine communication and political "agenda-setting" (1972, p. 187).

In their second study, McCombs and Shaw (1977) attempted to replicate the findings of their first study and elaborated on their theory by introducing contingent conditions, which can either heighten or attenuate agenda setting. McCombs and Shaw referred to these early years of agenda setting research as attempts to answer the question "who sets the public agenda—and under what conditions?" (1993, p. 60). Early agenda-setting studies of a similar vein were later referred to as first-level agenda setting.

They also suggested that messages contain an agenda of both objects (issues, candidates, personalities, events) and attributes (properties associated with the objects), which can both be transferred from media to public (Maher, 2001). McCombs (2005) identified several early studies (Becker & McCombs, 1978; Benton & Frazier, 1976; McCombs & Shaw, 1977; Weaver, Graber, McCombs, & Eyal, 1981) that found evidence for attribute agenda setting. The study by Weaver et al. is credited as the trailblazing study of attribute-agenda setting (McCombs & Evatt, 1995; Takeshita, 1997). McCombs and Evatt referred to agenda attributes as a

"second dimension" of agenda setting (p. 12). Later, Ghanem (1997) described

attribute-agenda setting as a "second level of effects" (p. 3). Ghanem defined

attributes of an object as "perspectives or frames that journalists and the public

employ to think about each object" (p. 5), thus tying second-level agenda setting to

framing.

Many studies (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Entman, 1993; Ghanem, 1997;

Japserson et al., 1998; McCombs, 2005; McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, & Rey,

1997; McCombs & Estrada, 1997; McCombs & Evatt, 1995; McCombs & Ghanem,

2001; McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1977; Wanta, Williams, & Hu, 1991; Weaver et al.,

1981; Zaller, 1992) have equated framing with a second-level agenda-setting effect.

McCombs and Shaw (1993) stated the significance of subsuming framing within the

agenda-setting framework when they said:

> Bernard Cohen's classic summation of agenda setting—the media may not
> tell us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to
> think about—has been turned inside out. New research… suggests that the
> media not only tell us what to think about, but also how to think about it, and,
> consequently, what to think (p. 65).

The mechanism that causes the agenda-setting phenomena to function in

individuals is related to information processing. (Downs, 1957) referred to people as

"cognitive misers." He suggested that individuals look for shortcuts for processing

information. Iyengar (1990) stated that both agenda-setting and priming were

functions of an "accessibility bias." Iyengar's argument is that the amount and

recency of coverage an issue receives in the media will influence the salience of an

issue. He went on to add that the more salient an issue, the more accessible that

information is to an individual. Nisbet, Nisbet, Scheufele, and Shanahan (2004) state that the accessibility bias is based on three assumptions: 1) some information is cognitively more accessible; 2) opinion is formed from more easily accessible information; 3) recency and level of coverage affect accessibility.

However, Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) and Kosicki (1993) argue that framing should not be subsumed by agenda-setting. They state that micro-level framing is a result of an applicability effect, which has to do with connections of information. What is being described is how information is organized. Edy and Meirick (2007) state that the second level of agenda-setting is concerned with "what" people think about, while framing describes "how" people make sense of issues. Thus, framing is an organizing function, rather than a cognitive-processing (accessibility) function.

Van Gorp (2007) and Gamson (1992) argue that framing is based in large part on culture. Van Gorp says that to link framing to agenda-setting (cognitive-processing) is to deny Goffman's cultural-based approach to the phenomena. He insists that instead of being causal and focused on issues (like agenda-setting), framing is concerned with mutually "constructed" frames. Van Gorp suggests that framing is sense-making based on the interaction of four levels: (1) textual (media applied frames); (2) cognitive (schemata in the audience); (3) extramedial (discourse of frame sponsors); and (4) the store of frames available in the culture.

Framing, then, is a necessary organizing function for both the media and the audience. According to Norris, Kern, and Just (2003) "the essence of framing is selection to prioritize some facts, images, or developments over others, thereby, either consciously or unconsciously, promoting one particular interpretation of events" (p. 11). Macro-level framing describes journalists' attempts to condense complex issues into reports that a lay audience can make sense of. It is often the result of the interplay of journalistic routines, organizational structures, cultural proclivities and what Shah, Domke, and Wackman (2001) refer to as "extramedia" influences. Gurevitch and Levy (1985) described the media as a battleground in which various interested parties struggle to promote competing views (frames) of the same media covered reality. According to Herman and Chomsky (1988) this media frame plays a significant part in establishing how an event is understood. Gamson, et al. (1992) refer to this mediated process as the "production of images" because it emphasizes the importance of visuals and vivid language (p. 374).

The frame manifests itself in media content through various framing devices. Norris et al. (2003) refer to these news frames as "interpretive structures" (p. 10). Gamson & Lasch (1980) identified five framing devices: metaphors, exemplars, catch-phrases, depictions, and visual images. Others have reinforced (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Van Gorp, 2007) or extended framing devices by adding rhetorical flourishes, and justifications (Kinder, 2007); certain keywords, stock phrases, and sources of information (Entman,1993). Tankard (2001) identified 11 framing mechanisms: headlines, subheads, photographs, photo

captions, leads, selection of sources, selections of quotes, pull quotes, logos, statistics and charts, and concluding statements and paragraphs. The visual image is a recurring theme in these lists of framing devices.

Visual Framing. Scholars (Fahmy, 2010; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Messaris, 1992; Messaris, 1994; Messaris & Abraham, 2001 have recognized that visuals operate differently form verbal narratives in the way meaning is transferred from media to the audience. Messaris has written extensively about the role of images in communication, and the differences from verbal language in the framing process. Messaris and Abraham identified three properties of visual images—analogical quality, indexicality, and lack of an explicit propositional syntax—that make visual framing distinct from verbal framing.

Messaris and Abraham (2001) argue that the analogical quality of images is what most clearly differentiates them from words. They recognize that this is a seriously contested notion among visual communication scholars (see Eco, 1975; Gombrich, 1960; Goodman, 1976; Messaris, 1994; Worth, 1982). The essence of this analogical quality is the idea that images are similar to, or analogous to, the things they represent. Therefore, unlike words, visuals can be interpreted without prior familiarity or culturally based conventions. The consequences to viewers is that "images appear more natural, more closely linked to reality than words" and can cause them to ignore the fact that "all images are human-made, artificial constructions" (p. 217). This results in what Kepplinger (1991) describes as people taking images at face value.

Indexicality refers to similar qualities of images that are specifically associated with photographic media (including film, television, and video). Messaris and Abraham (2001) acknowledged the writings of philosopher C. S. Peirce who referred to photographs as "signs" or "indices" of the world they represent. They argue that the indexicality of photographs presents a "true-to-life" quality that appears free from "human agency" and results in visuals being perceived as more believable than other communication sources (p. 217). They note that the use of images in the framing process could "diminish the likelihood that viewers would question what they see" (p. 217).

The danger of indexicality in news images is manifested when viewers are misled by outright deceptive practices or through the subtle, often unintentional, process of image selection and editing. Messaris and Abraham (2001) recognize the Chicago MacArthur Day study (Lang & Lang, 1968) as one of the earliest studies on the systematic evaluation of the effects of the photographic selection process. The study examined how television editors shaped viewers' perceptions of the MacArthur Day event. They found shot selection in the television coverage of the event made the crowds seem larger and much more enthusiastic than they actually were. Lang and Lang determined that the discrepancy between the mediated event and the actual event was a result of selective editing. Messaris and Abraham cite the Langs' findings as a "paradigmatic illustration of the relationship between visual indexicality and framing" (p. 218).

While the first two properties reference the individual image, the third distinct property—lack of an explicit propositional syntax—refers to relationships between multiple images, or "visual syntax" (Messaris & Abraham, 2001, p. 218). They note that within the communication process, verbal languages rely on specific syntactic devices for making propositions about causality, comparison, generalization, or other connections. Visual communication does not rely on an explicit syntax for making these propositions. Therefore, the various visual presentation techniques (i.e., editing, transitions, juxtaposition) can convey multiple meanings to viewers. For example, associational juxtaposition is an editing device that allows the characteristics of the subject in one image to be transferred to the subject in the next image (Reynolds & Barnett, 2002). Tuchman (1978) referred to juxtaposition as a framing technique used in news film to create relationships among various story elements. This shifts the impetus for appropriate interpretation of visual messages from the messenger to the viewer.

These three properties of the visual image create a sense of "this event really happened and this photo is the proof of it" (Hall, 1973, p. 188). This effect has been referred to as "having-been-there" (Barthes, 1978, p. 44); "aspects of nature" or "actuality" (Hall, 1973); and "photographic verisimilitude (Zelizer, 2005, p. 5). Even Barnhurst's definition of photojournalism—"the depiction of real events and the promulgation of the result to a wide audience" (Barnhurst, 1994, p. 38)—focuses on the reality, or actuality of captured events. Thus, scholars suggest that images presented through the media often appear to be free of ideological biases by

appearing to capture reality (Hall, 1973; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Woollacott, 1982). This may explain why visual depictions are considered to be objective (Sontag, 1977; Tirohl, 2000), more believable (Graber, 1987; McLuhan & Fiore, 1967; Pfau et al., 2008). Thus, scholars (Dobernig, Lobinger, & Wetzstein, 2010; Huxford, 2001; Tirohl, 2000) suggest journalists use news images to support the credibility and accuracy of their reports. Dobernig, Lobinger, and Wetzstein state the image becomes "a piece of evidence" (p. 90). As a result, images have been found to have greater influence over opinion change than verbal or textual depictions (Kepplinger, 1991). Fahmy and Wanta (2007) go further suggesting the way the media reports visuals becomes an important part of the event per se" (p. 20).

Reviews of the framing literature reveal a number of methodological approaches for conducting framing studies, which are generally categorized as inductive or deductive content analysis (Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). In addition to these distinctions, Matthes and Kohring further identified four inductive approaches: hermeneutic approach, linguistic approach, manual holistic approach, and computer-assisted approach. The inductive approach is described as an exploratory method used to identify the wide variety of frames that may be present in the sample (Semetko & Valkenburg). They note that it is an effective approach for small samples. Entman's (1991) discovery of contrasting frames—technical, and moral-outrage—in the coverage of the KAL and Iran Air incidents serves as a good example of the inductive approach.

The deductive approach is used to search for the occurrence of certain pre-defined frames among the variables under analysis. The benefits of the deductive approach are the ability to cope with large samples, easy replication, and usefulness in cross-media analysis. Scholars (De Vreese, 2005; Matthes, 2009; Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) have also recognized sub-categories—generic, or issue-specific—of deductive frames[7]. In a systematic analysis of 131 framing studies in the leading communication journals, Matthes (2009) identified 29 different generic frames and 561 different issue-specific frames. The conflict and human interest frames were two of the most commonly used generic frames. Regardless of the frame type, Matthes and Kohring state that valid and reliable deductive measurement relies on identification of the elements that comprise the frame a priori.

Researchers have differed widely on conceptualizations for visual frames, discourse units, and methods for reliably identifying the variety of visual news frames (Matthes, 2009; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Scholars (Entman, 1993; Fahmy, 2004; Fahmy, 2010; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Ghanem, 1996; Vujakovic, 1998) suggest that the frequency and prominence of visual depictions are key elements of examination in studies of visual framing. Entman states that "by providing, repeating, and thereby reinforcing words and visual images that reference some ideas but not others, frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so-and others entirely invisible" (p. 7). Thus, he refers to frequency as the most

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[7] See De Vreese (2005) for a thorough discussion of generic and issue-specific frames.

powerful framing mechanism because it promotes a particular issue's importance to the audience. Matthes and Kohring (2008) note frequency is one method for examining frames. Referencing Entman, they interpret frames as single aspects of mediated communication grouped together in systematic patterns over multiple messages. Gitlin (1980) referred to this process as "persistent selection, emphasis, and exclusion" (p. 7).

Prominence, on the other hand, refers to how the news visual is presented. Because the majority of visual framing studies are based on print or Internet sources, prominence generally refers to the size of the photograph and placement on the page. Fahmy (2010) notes that the prominence of news photos has been found to indicate the perceived importance of an event. The author of the present study suggests that in television news, sensational visual structures (operationalized as acquisition and presentation production techniques) are a form of visual prominence. Therefore, sensationalism is not a frame per se, but can enhance—"juice"— the frames that are present (J. Edy, personal communication, November 29, 2012).

Even though images are regularly referenced as a framing device, they are often ignored in studies of television news (Grabe & Bucy, 2009; Messaris & Abraham, 2001), and framing (Bell, 2001; Gandy, 2001). Matthes' (2009) analysis confirmed this notion. He found that textual elements were generally treated as the main units of analysis. Only 5% of the studies had directly coded visuals, and only 3% used visuals as the main unit of analysis. Eighty-three percent of the studies ignored visuals completely. He found that the dominance of textual-based analysis

even held true for studies dedicated to the examination of television content. Seventy-two percent of television content studies completely ignored the visual elements.

Messaris and Abraham (2001) identified a number of studies (Boskin, 1980; Campbell, 1995; Entman, 1994a; Entman, 1994b; Ettema & Peer, 1996; Gray, 1989; Martindale, 1996; Van Dijk, 1988) that examined how "implicit visual imagery" was used to frame race in stereotypical and prejudicial manners without overt verbal references (p. 221). Grabe and Bucy (2009) conducted a longitudinal visual framing analysis of network TV news coverage of presidential elections from 1992-2004. They identified three visual frames that were present in the general election news coverage—the ideal candidate, the populist campaigner, and the sure loser. Their findings suggest, among other things, that Republicans received more favorable visual coverage than Democrats. They concluded that the visual dimension of television news is still under researched.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The literature review revealed that visual news content and structural elements are important and under-researched framing elements. Politically and culturally bound audience interests and expectations are important considerations in the news selection and framing process (Burgoon et al., 1982; Entman, 1993; Kratzer & Kratzer, 2003; Tai & Chang, 2002; Wanta & Roarke, 1993; Wolfsfeld, 2004). Wolfsfeld notes that news stories are framed to be "culturally resonant and professionally worthy" (p. 38). He concludes that the political environment of a

media outlet helps establish cultural resonance, while professional worthiness is established via the media environment. The current study is an attempt to add to the systematic analysis of Arab media through deductive content analysis of media frames.

Network Taxonomy

A number of factors were used to determine the network taxonomy designation (western or liberal commercial) of each of the five networks. The primary factor was each network's intended audience. audience. I borrowed the term liberal commercial[8] from Ayish (2002) to describe these networks. The liberal commercial label was used to identify the networks that broadcast to an audience that was culturally similar to the origin and location of the network. This describes both Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, which broadcast from Arab nations, in Arabic, to a pre-dominantly Arab

The commercial status of each network was also considered when grouping the networks. While it is true that all five networks have benefactors that ultimately guarantee their continued operation, both Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya were originally intended to be commercial networks. Even though it is unclear how much of each network's budget actually comes from advertising revenue, both networks carry some degree of commercial messages. The commercial undertones, and resulting

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[8] While these networks may not reflect the classical application of the term liberal media (e.g. journalistic freedom), Ayish (2002) notes that Al Jazeera represents an example of an Arab-based transnational network operating relatively free of editorial control.

competitiveness of these networks tends to contribute directly to other characteristics found in the liberal model. For example, Hallin (1994) states that the intensely competitive forces associated with television result in media populism. Both, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya overtly cater programming to the ordinary citizen in an effort to increase viewership, which is a hallmark of populist media.

Alhurra, BBC Arabic, and Al Jazeera English were grouped together to represent the western style because they are all non-commercial international broadcast networks. The term western was appropriated from the press theory literature and originally chosen to classify the western-based Alhurra and BBC Arabic networks. Considering the network's stated mission, it may be argued that AJE more appropriately fits into some other dimension. However, these three networks are similar in that they each broadcast from a culture that is different from the culture of their intended audience. Alhurra and BBC Arabic broadcast from the west to an Arab audience, while Al Jazeera English broadcasts from the Arab region to an international audience. Therefore, AJE is considered western for the current study due to the network's intense effort to reach an international audience, including the United States, and its attempts to distance itself in subtle ways from its Arabic-language sister station.

Story Type

The German-based media research organization, Media Tenor, has carried out long-term cross-cultural content analysis of television news on American

networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX), European networks (BBC, ARD, ZDF, RTL, SAT.1, ProSieben, DW Journal), South African networks (SABC, E-TV), and Arab networks (Al Ikhbariya, Al Alam, Al Manar, Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya). An analysis of programming aired between April 2004 and June 2005 revealed that more than 80% of the content of Arab newscasts is focused on political issues, while political issues on American, German and South African news made up less than sixty percent of the content (Media Tenor, 2006). Other research supports these findings. Ayish (2001a, 2002) found that news selection on Arab satellite networks was predominantly framed from a political perspective. Nötzold (2008) also found that political and religious programming dominated on Lebanese television. On the other hand, American TV newscasts have become increasingly entertainment oriented (Hacten, 1998) with 25% to 30% of stories comprising sensational topics (Grabe, et al., 2001).

The literature review outlined above provides evidence that political framing dominates the patterns of news content presented on Arab television networks. Allen and Izcaray (1988) used the term "nominal agenda diversity" to describe the number, or diversity, of issues found in news coverage. The first research question is designed to explore whether this propensity to focus on news coverage from a political perspective also carries over to the western-styled networks that are operating in the region.

RQ1: Is there a difference in the nominal agenda diversity of visuals between western-styled networks and liberal commercial networks?

Amerocentric Coverage

Groshek (2008) used the term Amerocentric to identify media accounts framed in the interest of Americans. As noted in Chapter 1, Alhurra was launched by the Bush administration as a "soft-power tool" (Morgan, 2005) to counter the perceived anti-American influence of the pan-Arab networks and to promote American ideals of freedom in the Middle East. According to Brian Conniff, former Executive Director of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the role of the BBG (Alhurra's parent organization) has been to explain U.S. policy—"not to promote or defend it"—and improve America's image abroad (2006).

Alhurra's skeptics often refer to the network's content as biased to the American perspective, or worse, propaganda. Jon Alterman, Middle East director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said, "This is a region where people are generally skeptical of the news and Alhurra smells to many people as government spin from a government they don't particularly trust to begin with" (as cited in Wise, 2005, Doubly Damned?, para. 1). The analysis of Alhurra, commissioned by the BBG and conducted by the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School (2008), confirmed that Alhurra has suffered from this kind of identity crisis. The researchers suggested that Alhurra's credibility problem could be reduced by emphasizing objectivity through (1) broadening the pool of sources in news stories and interviews to include those who may counter U.S. positions on the issues, and (2) expanding coverage to include events and issues of interest to a

Middle Eastern audience regardless of the issues' significance in terms of U.S. foreign policy (USC, 2008).

Since the report, Conniff has stated that Alhurra has carved out a niche in the region by "providing objective and accurate news, covering topics rarely seen on other local channels" (2010, para. 1). However, the implication from critics is that Alhurra's coverage is framed from an American perspective and reflects American interests. Despite a lack of formal intervention from the state, the traditional American news media have operated with a high degree of veneration for the U.S. government (Hallin, 1994). Therefore, considering Alhurra's unique position as the American public diplomacy mouthpiece to the Arab world, it is expected that:

H1: The level of Amerocentric visual framing will be higher on Alhurra than on AJE, BBC-Arabic, Al Jazeera, and Al Arabiya.

Conflict and Explicit Violence Content

Like framing studies in general, many of the visual framing studies have focused on images of natural disasters, conflict, war, or terrorism. Conflict and violence are often listed as frames in deductive framing studies. Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992) found that conflict frames were the most common frames in U.S. news. Wolfsfeld (2004) identified several possible reasons for researchers' interests in examining conflict coverage: (1) researchers find conflict coverage more interesting, (2) short-term event coverage is easier to examine, (3) conflict and disruption comprise normal TV news fare.

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The previous chapter outlined some of the news topics that are often considered to be sensational. Several of these topics—sex, celebrity, crime—are still considered taboo subjects on pan-Arab media and receive limited coverage. However, it is assumed that images of conflict and violence regularly appear on pan-Arab newscasts. Furthermore, images of conflict and violence are of particular interest in the current study because they represent the sensational content elements that have received the most criticism from Westerners. Several recent cross-cultural examinations of the visual content of conflict/disaster news coverage provide support for these conclusions.

Borah (2009) examined visuals from newspaper coverage of Hurricane Katrina and the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Results revealed different visual framing treatments between the two natural disasters. King and Lester (2005) compared visual coverage from the start of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War in three American newspapers. They concluded that the U.S. military received the kind of visual coverage it wanted through the use of embedded journalists during the initial stages of the Iraq War.

Media Tenor (2003) conducted a cross-cultural framing analysis of coverage of the 2003 Iraq War on European, South African and American TV news, which included an analysis of visuals of American and Iraqi casualties. Their findings suggest American news reports avoided images of American casualties while presenting images of Iraqi casualties.

Fahmy has conducted numerous research studies on visuals in the news media, including visual framing studies of the sources of news visuals (Fahmy, 2005a), and the visual themes (Fahmy, 2004) used in coverage of the 9/11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan in the English-language *International Herald Tribune* and Arabic-language *Al-Hayat* newspapers. She found differences in how each newspaper visually framed both events, and concluded these differences were politically and culturally bound.

To further explore political and cultural implications of visual conflict coverage, Fahmy and Johnson (2007) surveyed Al Jazeera viewers about the network's perceived use of graphic visuals in its coverage of the Iraq War and Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The Arabic-language, web-based survey, revealed that 70% of respondents reported seeing graphic images of these conflicts on Al Jazeera, while 69.2% supported the network's decision to show these images. One respondent said:

> Al Jazeera should show those video/images, because that's what realities/consequences of war and occupation or any civil unrest are. Self-censorship is only a dis-service to the millions of viewers who depend on it for honest, un-sanitized and un-beautified news (Fahmy & Johnson, p. 258).

The results of this study would seem to re-enforce Robertson's (2004) claim that Al Jazeera editors knew their audience expected to see graphic images. According to Wolfsfeld (2004), journalists react to the events they are covering and construct stories that are "politically acceptable to their readers" (p. 29). Kenney (1988) stated that audience expectation is a key consideration when a network is

trying to build the largest audience possible. This knowledge is likely not lost on Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, which are locked in a battle for a share of the pan-Arab TV news audience.

Western-styled news organizations, particularly American networks, are also mindful of audience preferences. Those preferences tend to include less tolerance for violent images. For example, Zelizer (2005) states that American audiences were exposed to fewer violent images of conflict in the last decade. A Pew Research Center survey (Kohut, 2004) found that 70% of Americans favored U.S. media coverage of military action in Fallujah, Iraq that avoided showing gruesome images. Silcock, Schwalbe, and Keith (2008) note that western-based news decision-makers must wrestle with "showing the raw truth of harsh visuals while remaining compassionate and inoffensive to the audience" (p. 38).

Scholars (Aday et al., 2005; Griffin, 2004; King and Lester, 2005; Silcock et al., 2008; Youssef, 2009; Zelizer, 2005) found that media outlets show few images of injury and death when covering war. Decision-makers at Alhurra, and to a lesser extent BBC-Arabic, must not only consider the preferences of their Arab audience, but may also be influenced by the western preferences of visual decency, differences in standards of professionalism, and by additional pressures inherent in public diplomacy entities. As an international broadcaster seeking a large non-Arab audience, AJE may also be influenced by audience preferences that include use of less violent images. Therefore, Alhurra, BBC-Arabic, and AJE news coverage may rely on fewer visuals of conflict and violence.

Since they operate in different political and media environments, it is expected that the networks included in the present study will differ in their visual framing of conflict and violent content. Images of conflict and violence are of particular interest in the current study because they represent the sensational content elements that have received the most criticism from westerners. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:

H2: The Arab networks represented by the liberal commercial pattern of broadcasting will display more visuals of conflict than the networks representing the western-style.

H3: Violent imagery in the content of conflict coverage will be more explicit on the liberal commercial networks than on the western-style networks.

Visual Structure and Sensationalism

The literature review revealed that accusations of sensationalism in the media could be levied based on the message content—as the previous hypotheses are designed to examine—as well as, the structural features of the message. Tuchman (1978) referred to the organizing structures of TV news as a form of bias and referenced Goffman, while referring to the process as framing.

More recent examinations of structural news features have abandoned the traditional "bias" label for more descriptive labels of presentation elements, and their influence on audiences. For example tabloid, or sensational, news packaging, which has traditionally been considered a form of bias resulting from content selections,

have instead been operationalized as structural features in several recent studies (e.g., Grabe et al., 2000; Grabe, Zhou, & Barnett, 2001, Grabe, et al., 2003; Lang, 1995; Lang et al., 1996; Lang, et al., 1999; Vettehen et al., 2005; Zhou, 2005).

Structural features of TV messages include music, sound effects, cuts, edits, luminance levels, movement, time manipulation (fast or slow motion), animation, zooms, pans, motion graphics, and field of view selections (Grabe et al., 2000; Lang, Geiger, Strickwerda, & Sumner, 1993; McQuail, 2000; Tuchman, 1978). Research on structural features of film and TV images has included investigations of editing techniques (Hobbs, Frost, Davis, & Stauffer, 1988; Hobbs & Frost, 1989; Messaris, Eckman, & Gumpert, 1979); space/time transitions (Barnett & Grabe, 2000); paraproxemics and subjective camera (Galan, 1986; Meyrowitz, 1986); and angle of view (Messaris, 1992; Zettl, 1990).

Vettehen et al. (2005) applied the concept of vividness to a content analysis of sensational production techniques in Dutch television newscasts. Results revealed a general trend of increased sensational production techniques on Dutch TV networks between 1995-2001.

Silcock (2007) used field observations, interviews, and questionnaires to investigate cross-cultural differences in editing routines. His findings also suggest that news editors operate using cultural routines that result in stories that are visually framed from a structural standpoint for their specific cultural audience.

In addition to cultural pressures, increased competition may also affect the use of sensational production techniques in TV newscasts. Epstein (1973) stated that

the primary purpose of TV news was not to inform, but to keep the audience interested enough to stay tuned in. Even though the majority of these networks are government funded, their continued operation is dependent upon the ability to attract and hold an audience. In some cases, news managers resort to sensationalism, which can be accomplished through the application of sensational production techniques. Therefore, it is expected that:

H4: News visuals on the liberal commercial networks will contain higher

levels of sensational framing than on western-style networks.

Vettehen et al. (2005) note that increased competition may put pressure on broadcasters to increase the attractiveness of their newscasts. They state that in addition to competition, sensationalism may also be driven by technological innovation and journalistic routines. From its beginning, Al Arabiya has embraced technological innovation for the purpose of covering breaking news and creating newscasts which utilize cutting-edge production techniques. In addition, Al Arabiya is a for-profit network and relies on advertising revenue. Due to the network's reliance on advertising and embrace of technological innovation, it is expected that:

H5: News visuals on Al Arabiya will contain higher levels of sensational

framing than shots on the other networks.

Visuals in Arab Spring Coverage

The original intent of this project was to examine the visuals of "normal" or "routine" news coverage in transnational, pan-Arab television. While it was expected

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that there would be several major international news stories during the sample frame—the World Cup, the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq—it was impossible to predict in advance that a single issue—the Arab Spring—would have such an important impact on the news agenda for more than half of the sampling period.

The term Arab Spring[9] refers to the series of popular uprisings against repressive governments that spread across the MENA region in late 2010 and early 2011. The first civil demonstrations were organized in Tunisia on December 18th after a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire to protest his harassment at the hands of police. The wire services quickly picked up on the Tunisian demonstrations that followed. The first report describing the demonstration from the Reuters news agency appeared on December 19, 2010 ("Witnesses Report," 2010). As the demonstrations spread across Tunisia, the Arab media covered the events extensively (Pintak, 2011b).

Over the next few months, the civil unrest spread across the region resulting in demonstrations, strikes, clashes with government officials, violence, and the overthrow of several regimes. Sources disagree on the total number (possibly as high as twenty) of nation states impacted by civil unrest resulting from the Arab Spring.

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[9]Arab Spring is also referred to as the "Arab Awakening," "Arab Rebellions," "Arab Revolutions," and "Arab Uprisings." The term Arab Spring was originally used in 2005 by western journalists to describe the potential for a democratic movement spreading across the Middle East following the invasion of Iraq (see Devine, 2005; Jacoby, 2005; Krauthammer, 2005a, 2005b; Walker, 2005).

For example, Blight, Pulham and Torpey (2012) included seventeen countries in their interactive timeline of Middle East protests.

The uprisings that began in 2010 have continued into 2012. The most notable demonstrations have occurred in Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Because the coverage of the Arab Spring was so prevalent during the second half of the sample period, it seems prudent to include some comparison of visuals from the Arab Spring coverage to the current study.

The recent political unrest in the Middle East provides an opportunity to examine potential differences in how visuals have been presented to their audiences. According to Fahmy (2010) these differences should be more apparent as international crises magnify differences in visual news coverage.

Conflict Frames

The intensity at which the political uprisings of the Arab Spring played out varied from relatively peaceful demonstrations to civil war (Libya and Syria). Yet, they all involved some level of conflict. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) recognized conflict as one of the most explored, and identified news frames. News images of intense conflict are of interest to media scholars because (1) they tend to draw intense public attention, (2) they highlight the application of professional norms and practices to the presentation of highly charged content; (3) they reflect cultural perspectives and reproduce traditions of cultural representation (Griffin, 2010).

While the literature review on conflict coverage outlined above suggests that media outlets frame conflict differently based on the political and cultural

environments in which they operate, predicting the framing of Arab Spring conflict by these networks is complicated by several factors. First, in recent years Alhurra reversed its policy and began covering breaking news. CNN, *Time,* and the leading pan-Arab newspaper *Al Hayat* each recognized the quality of Alhurra's Arab Spring coverage. Second, media coverage during the height of the protests was often hampered by official and unofficial disruptions. Journalists reported difficulty communicating with the outside world, were harassed, and had tapes confiscated. In Egypt for example, the Mubarak regime knocked Al Jazeera off the government controlled Nilesat satellite, in an effort to thwart the channel's coverage. Also, pro-Mubarak supporters passed out fliers (referring to Alhurra) stating "we are going to kick you out of Egypt" (Wimbush, 2011, p. 2). Third, Fahmy (2010) postulates that differences in visual coverage will be magnified during significant international events.

These research questions are intended to explore how the networks visually framed conflict in their Arab Spring coverage:

RQ2: Are there differences in the level of conflict/violence in visuals of the Arab Spring between the liberal commercial and western-styled networks?

RQ3: Are there differences in the level of conflict/violence in visuals of the Arab Spring between Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, Al Arabiya, BBC Arabic and Alhurra?

Human Interest Versus Political Framing

Findings from several scholars suggest that different media outlets follow different visual strategies in the coverage of conflict events (Dobernig, Lobinger, and Wetzstein, 2010; Fahmy, 2010; Konstantindou, 2008). A review of the literature reveals the diversity generic and issues-specific frames identified in news content studies, including: conflict, violence, graphic, human interest/human impact, economic consequences, morality, moral-outrage, responsibility, casualty, political strategy, public engagement, public opinion, terrorism, victory, defeat, race/religion/culture, technical, anti-war, pro-war, and self-referential.

Next to the conflict frame, the human impact (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992) or human interest frame is a common frame found in news coverage (Matthes, 2009; Neuman, et al., 1992; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). The human interest frame "brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem" (Semetko & Valkenburg, p. 95). The human interest frame has also been identified as a of tabloid television news (Ehrlich, 1996).

Numerous studies have examined the specific breakdown of visual frames in conflict coverage from various national and international contexts. Griffin and Lee (1995) found photographs of the first Gulf War overwhelming focused on military technology and virtually ignored the human impact of the war. King and Lester (2005) found pictures in three U.S. newspapers from the first and second gulf wars were pro-military. Fahmy and Kim (2008) explored differences in the coverage of

the second Gulf War from *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*. They found

numerous differences in the visual coverage of the war. For example, *The New York*

times focused on images of the U.S. military and government officials while *The*

Guardian ran more photos of material destruction in Iraq. Konstantindou (2008)

found that visuals in Greek coverage of the second Gulf War focused on spectacular

images of victims. Fahmy (2005a) found that even though many of the images of

9/11 and the War in Afghanistan carried in the Arab-language *Al Hayat* and English-

language *The International Herald Tribune (IHT)* transnational newspapers came

from western news agencies they were framed differently by these organizations.

More specific analysis of Afghan War coverage revealed *Al Hayat* depicted the

human suffering and tragedy of the war (human interest frame), while *IHT* presented

a more sanitized view (Fahmy, 2010). Fahmy (2010) concluded that the military

(Griffin & Lee, 1995; King & Lester, 2005), or technical frame (Fahmy, 2005a,

2010) is more commonly used to portray conflict on western media outlets, and is

distinct from the human interest frame.

Grabe, et al., (2001) state that dichotomies, including human interest versus

public affairs, are often used to emphasize the differences between standard and

sensational news topics. Although their study was not limited to visuals, Hamdy and

Gomaa (2012) found social media posts during the Egyptian uprisings emphasized

the human interest frame. Analysis by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) of European

political coverage, found the human interest frame was more common in TV news

than in print news media, and also more common on sensationalist news outlets than

on traditional news outlets. Brantner, Lobinger, and Wetzstein (2011) explored the differences in visual effects elicited between the dichotomous human interest and political news frames.

Dobernig, et al. (2010) explored differences in the coverage of the 2009 Gaza crisis in four print news sources and found the Palestinian side was visually represented by individual civilians which provoked a sense of empathy, while the Israeli side was represented by visuals of political or governmental officials portraying statesmanship. These results suggest differing visual framing strategies based on the actors that are presented in the news coverage.

Since the human interest frame has been found more prevalent in coverage on sensational news outlets, and in Arab media portrayals of conflict, it is hypothesized that:

H6: Visuals on the liberal commercial networks will be more likely to emphasize the human-interest frame in coverage of the Arab Spring than western-styled networks.

In contrast to the human interest frame, the public affairs frame, or political strategy frame (Nisbet and Huge, 2007) emphasizes the actions of presidents, government agencies, political officials and authorities. Haigh (2010) found that the political strategy frame was one of the most common frames used in news coverage of the alternative energy debate. Brantner et al. (2011) found images of Israelis from

the 2009 Gaza conflict represented the political frame and emphasized "institutional power and statesmanship" (p. 528).

Hallin (1994) emphasized that modern American journalism explicitly recognizes political authority, particularly in times of celebration or upheaval. Benson & Hallin (2004) state that in such times newsgathering turns to political authority to define the primary viewpoints on the issues. Their comparative analysis of American and French news media revealed a greater level of "indexing" to the viewpoints of the political elite in American coverage than in French coverage (p. 19). They also found that reliance on political authority in both American and French coverage had increased between the 1960s and 1990s.

Alhurra as a western-based public diplomacy entity of the U.S. government—which had close ties to some of the regimes targeted in the Arab Spring uprisings (e.g. Egypt)—should be more likely to emphasize statesmanship and political perspectives in Arab Spring coverage. Therefore it is predicted:

> H7: Visuals on Alhurra will be more likely to emphasize the political frame
>> in coverage of the Arab Spring than Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, BBC
>> Arabic and Al Arabiya.

Sensational Production Features

Coverage of political crises has often provided news organizations with opportunities to distinguish their programming from competitors (e.g. CNN's coverage of the 1991 invasion of Iraq on CNN; Al Jazeera's coverage of the 1998

Desert Fox Campaign, the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan; and Al Jazeera English's coverage of the 2008-2009 Gaza war). In a highly competitive media environment, efforts to attract and maintain an audience often include being the first to report breaking developments, providing visuals that give the audience "a sense of presence" (Cho, et al., 2003, p. 312), and creating sophisticated packaging techniques to identify the story. As events drag on for weeks and sometimes months, sophisticated packaging techniques (identifying graphics, animation, music, and other productions enhancements) are often employed to define the coverage.

Based on the status of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya as commercial stations in a highly competitive media environment, it is expected that:

H8: News visuals from the coverage of the Arab Spring on the liberal commercial networks will be more likely to contain elements of sensational structural features than in coverage on western-style networks.

From its inception Al Jazeera has shown a preference for emphasizing viewership over political and religious programming considerations. While similar trends are occasionally evident on transnational Saudi media, these outlets are simultaneously constrained by a strong state influence (Kraidy, 2009; 2012). Due to the hyper-competitive forces of Arab Spring coverage, and contravening political sensitivities of most of the networks, it is predicted:

H9: News visuals in Al Jazeera's coverage of the Arab Spring will be more

likely to contain elements of sensational structural features than

coverage on Al Arabiya, Alhurra, Al Jazeera English and BBC Arabic.

Summary

In light of the explosion of Arab satellite media and the absence of systematic studies of visuals contained in Arab newscasts, a visual analysis of transnational Arab newscasts is appropriate. Some researchers (e.g., DeVitt, 2002), suggest that framing provides an appropriate mechanism for exploring differences in both the content and structure of news coverage. The current study proposes to use framing to examine the visual images that navigate within the changed communication climate of the Arab world. The most appropriate method for the proposed research is the content analysis.

Chapter 3: Method

Comparative research, it must be said, is easy to do badly and difficult to do well.

Jay G. Blumler, The Media and Neo-Populism

Adams (1978) identified three distinct areas of inquiries for television news research: (1) production research, (2) content research, and (3) effects research. According to Adams, content research examines the composition of newscasts in order to determine the agenda and nature (depiction) of newscasts (Adams, 1978a). By the late 1980s, content analysis had developed into one of the most commonly used research methodologies for examining mass media and political messages (Kaid & Wadsworth, 1989).

Berelson (1952) provides one of the most commonly cited definitions for content analysis. He defined content analysis as a "research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (p. 18). Other scholars (Holsti, 1969; Kaid & Wadsworth; Paisely, 1969) have also defined content analysis. Each of their definitions tends to emphasize the elements of quantification, objectivity, systematic methods, and generalizability. According to Holsti the goal of content analysis is generalization with the benefit of being unobtrusive.

While not explicitly stated in Berelson's definition, basing content analysis on theoretical notions is also implied. Historically, broadcast news content research has been criticized for lacking theoretical underpinnings (Paletz and Pearson, 1978;

Patterson, 1978). As discussed in the literature review, this practice is still all too common.

The most common objections to Berelson's definition relate to his inclusion of the terms quantification and manifest content in his definition (see Krippendorff, 1980). Holsti (1980) argues that quantification is an important element of content analysis because frequency counts of phenomena are powerful. The quantitative methods prevent the novelty of observed phenomena from being substituted for importance (Kaid & Wadsworth, 1989). Similarly, manifest content refers to what lies on the surface, is simple, or easily observable in the content. Use of latent content requires a "deeper" (Holsti) examination of the "inferences" being drawn from communication content by the audience, or "motives and intent of the source" (Kaid & Wadsworth, p. 198).

Kaid and Wadsworth (1989) have detailed a seven-step research procedure for content analysis. The seven steps are: (1) developing research questions and hypotheses, (2) selecting the sample, (3) defining categories, (4) developing a coding system and training coders, (5) implementing coding, (6) assessing reliability and validity, and (7) analyzing the results.

The current study is grounded in Berelson's definition of content analysis and Kaid and Wadsworth's seven-step process. A quantitative content analysis, guided by deductive framing, was conducted on the news programming of Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, Alhurra, Al Jazeera English and BBC Arabic.

Sample

The sample frame consists of more than ten months of news programming from August 1, 2010, to June 15, 2011. A one-hour late evening newscast was recorded live via satellite from Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, AJE, and BBC Arabic on each weekday, and many weekends, for the duration of the sample period. Due to differences in each networks' schedule, and the different time zones from which the newscasts originated, all newscasts could not be recorded during the exact same time each day. However, all the newscasts aired within a few hours of each other. Alhurra's broadcasts are not available via satellite in the United States. The Alhurra broadcasts were recorded from daily archives available on the Alhurra website. The resulting sample frame consists of more than 1,100 hour-long newscasts.

Matthes (2009) conducted a systematic analysis of 131 framing studies in the leading communication journals. The analysis revealed that most studies (79%) used a purposive sample, 5% used random samples, 2% a constructed week sample, 3% other samples, and 12% provided no information about sampling methods. Studies of cross cultural media content examined in the literature review ranged from simple 5-day samples, (Ayish, 2002; Keith et al., 2009); a constructed two-week period (Vettehen et al., 2005); a constructed month (Groshek, 2008); and the duration of a crisis event (Aday, 2004).

The goal was to create a sample that represents longitudinal "normal" or "routine" news coverage, and minimizes the impact of a single major news event on the sample. As already mentioned, there were several major international news

stories during the sample frame. These events generally did not demand the kind of live 24-hour coverage that would have interrupted the normal news cycle. However, some news coverage during the Arab Spring was an exception. During the most intense periods of political unrest in Egypt, and Libya, the international news networks interrupted their normal news cycles to provide 24-hour, live, breaking-news style coverage. The bulk of this atypical coverage occurred between January 29, and February 20, 2011. Newscasts airing between these dates were excluded from the sample. This research design should result in a sample that controls for stories that overwhelmed the news agenda.

For the current study, a nonprobability sample of broadcasts was drawn for three days from the entire sample frame to construct the sample of routine news coverage. A random date generator was used to pull the sample. The selected dates were Wednesday, December 29, 2010, Thursday, January 27, 2011, and Tuesday, June 14, 2011. The programming from all five networks was analyzed for each selected day in the sample. The resulting sample comprised 438 stories and 6,595 shots in 15 hours of news programming.

Each story from the sample ($n = 438$) was also coded for Arab Spring coverage. Stories were coded Arab Spring if they contained coverage of the uprisings in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, or Yemen. This coding resulted in an Arab Spring sample of 89 stories (22.6%) comprising 1,951 shots (29.6%).

Measurement

The unit of analysis for RQ1 was the individual story. For RQ1 each story (n = 438) was coded into one of 16 possible categories that have been outlined in previous studies (Groshek, 2008; Natarajan & Xiaoming, 2003; Weaver, Porter & Evans, 1984). The categories used to measure the nominal agenda diversity of stories are as follows: (1) accidents/natural disasters, (2) agriculture, (3) business/economics, (4) crime/criminal justice/law and order, (5) ecology/environment, (6) education, (7) health care, (8) military/national defense, (9) politics, (10) race/religion/culture, (11) social problems/services, (12) sports, (13) technology, (14) war/terrorism, (15) oddities and (16) undecided. One additional category, (17) tease, was added to handle pre-show, re-join, commercial break, and closing tease elements.

The unit of analysis for the remaining research question and hypotheses involving the entire sample was the individual image or shot (n = 6,595). For this study, the description of the individual shot followed the description set forth by Keith et al. (2009). Using their guidelines, a shot was counted "each time the shot (subject) changed by video editing or, in the case of a pan, each time the subject changed" (p. 7).

Each unit of analysis (story or shot) was analyzed for the presence of multiple frames (e.g. conflict, human interest, political, sensational elements). In other words, a single shot could simultaneously represent the conflict frame and political frame. This approach to frame extraction is not uncommon. While numerous studies look

for the presence of a single primary frame per discourse unit (e.g. Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012), Matthes (2009) found that 34% of framing studies extracted more than one frame per unit of analysis.

RQ2 compares Amerocentric framing among the five networks. Using methodology similar to Groshek's (2008), images were coded for the presence of four American signifiers. First, the visual contained an image of a person that was clearly identifiable as an American. Second, the visual contained a textual reference to the United States (i.e. the words United States or similar on the screen). Third, the visual contained an American symbol like a U.S. passport or the American flag. Fourth, the visual is located in the United States or its property (i.e. an overseas American embassy or military base). The shot was coded present if it was found to contain one of the four criteria. A shot was coded as absent of an American image if none of the four criteria were present. In addition shots containing American images were coded as positive, neutral, or negative. Dimitrova, Kaid, Williams, and Trammell (2005) utilized a similar measure for tone of coverage to analyze support for the Iraq War. Amerocentric framing was operationalized as shots containing positive American images.

Depictions of conflict and violence as sensational content were explored in all the visuals (H2 & H3) and Arab Spring visuals (RQ2 & RQ3). For these analyses, conflict was defined as "disagreements between or among parties…and needed to be obvious and clear from a casual viewing" (Groshek, 2008, p. 60). In addition to coding for the presence or absence of conflict, images were also coded for their level

of violence. Klijn (2003), using a modified definition of violence from the National

Television Violence Study (1996, 1997, 1998), defined violence as:

> any evidence of a *credible threat* of physical force or the *actual use* of such a force intended to physically harm or intimidate an animate being or a group of animate beings. Violence also includes certain depictions of *physically* or *emotionally harmful consequences* that occur as a result of the use of violent means against an animate being (or group of beings) (p. 132).

Fishman and Marvin (2003) note that this is a representative description of explicit

violence found in most systematic studies of violent content.

The current study utilized a five category coding scheme for conflict and

violence developed by Fishman and Marvin (2003) and refined by Groshek (2008).

The categories are as follows: (1) No Conflict Frame, (2) Conflict Frame/Not

Violent, (3) Conflict Frame/Dramatic Violence, (4) Conflict Frame/Latent Violence,

and (5) Conflict Frame/Explicit Violence. The no conflict frame indicates the

absence of conflict or violence in the image. The not violent frame contains images

of conflict being handled in a peaceful manner, such as protest signs and marches.

The dramatic violence frame includes images of violence that are "performed but not

seriously intended" such as for sport or entertainment (Fishman & Marvin, p. 34).

Images containing latent violence do not show the "immediate application of direct

physical force" but suggest "that such force could be applied" (Fishman & Marvin,

p. 34). Examples of latent violence include the presence of police, military

personnel, and weapons. Finally, Fishman & Marvin refer to images of explicit

violence as those showing either the direct application of, or consequences resulting

from, violence which is "seriously intended and performed" (p. 34). Explicit

violence includes images of firefights, damage to buildings or property, and injuries. The harmful aftermath of violence including the image of anguished victims or eyewitnesses was also included as explicit violence. Violence caused by non-manmade agents (natural disasters, animals, weather) was excluded.

Structural features of newscast visuals were explored for all shots (H4 & H5) and in Arab Spring shots (H8 & H9). Two scales of sensational structural features were developed to consolidate findings from a number of individual indicators. These indicators were divided into two groups: (1) acquisition features, and (2) presentation features. The indicators are dichotomous and were recorded as either present or absent in each shot.

Acquisition Features. Acquisition features, or video maneuvers (Grabe, et al., 2001), refer to specific image characteristics that are established during the recording, or acquisition phase of television news. These characteristics are generally the result of camera operation decisions. They are considered sensational because they alter, what Tuchman (1978) referred to as, the "facticity" of news. Six features of the basic news shot were determined to comprise the acquisition features category: (1) zoom movements; (2) eyewitness camera; (3) extreme close-up; (4) dramatic sounds; (5) high-angle shots; and (6) low-angle shots.

Zoom movements were coded present if either a zoom-in or zoom-out movement occurred in the shot. Previous studies (Grabe et al., 2001; Vettehen et al., 2005) have included both movements as indicators, but have differentiated between

zoom-in and zoom-out movements. Grabe et al. cited research that suggests these two movements differ in their effect on audience involvement. However, for the current study, no differentiation was made between zoom-in and zoom-out camera movements. The rationale is that both movements have been coded in previous studies and these camera movements are non-traditional elements of a newscast.

The eyewitness camera perspective, also referred to as subjective camera, or point-of-view camera, occurs when a photographer takes the camera off the tripod and moves with the camera. It provides a view from the audience's point of view. Images of the camera running with contestants in reality shows like the *Amazing Race* or *Survivor* provide examples of eyewitness camera movements. The presence of eyewitness camera was coded if shaky video, or a movement of the camera with the action, was identified.

Field of view refers to how close or how close or far an object appears to be from the viewer (Zettl, 2011). Zettl explains there are five steps to field of view: the extreme long shot (ELS), long shot (LS), medium shot (MS), close-up (CU) and extreme close up (ECU). The MS (composition of subject from the waist up) and the CU (composition of subject from the chest up) are two of the more commonly used field of view compositions on American television. On the other hand, the ECU is used sparingly, particularly on TV news. The ECU is a tightly framed shot of a subject's face—roughly comprising the area between the chin and forehead—that occupies the bulk of the screen. ECU's are generally reserved for conveying the intense emotion of the subject. Tightly framed shots have been used in past studies as

indicators of proximity (Vettehen et al., 2005) and vividness (Klijn, 2003). Presence of an ECU was coded if a shot of a human face occupied more than one-third of the screen.

Changes in viewing angle, also related to field of view, are effective in distorting perceptions of power and powerlessness (Messaris, 1992; Tuchman, 1978). Tuchman explains that "facticity is established by keeping the camera at eye level to the subject whenever possible. High and low angle shots were included as separate indicators because each of these shots imply different meanings to the audience. Low angle shots (worm's eye) can make the subject look more powerful, while high angle shots (bird's eye) can make the subject appear weaker. However, Tuchman notes that shooting acts of violence, disasters, demonstrations, and riots from distorted perspectives symbolically objectifies the participants. Presence of a high angle shot was coded if a subject was shot from above. Presence of a low angle shot was coded if a subject was shot from below.

Although technically not a visual element, dramatic sounds were included as elements of sensational packaging by Vettehen et al. (2005). They defined dramatic sounds as "sounds of exploding ammunition, gunshots, as well as sounds of people who were crying, screaming, yelling, or applauding" (p. 288). These sounds represent natural sounds (nat sound or NATS), or background sounds, that the camera microphone picks up while recording the visuals of the event. As such, nat sound is an acquisition element. The present study adds the sounds of sirens, and military vehicles/aircraft to the list of dramatic sounds identified by Vettehen et al.

Dramatic sounds were coded as present if any of the sounds occurred in the shot.

Presentation Features. These features have been referred to as "tabloid packaging" and "dramatic editing" (Vettehen et al., 2005, p. 289), or "decorative effects" (Grabe et al., 2001, p. 642). Presentation features refer to elements that are added to news items after acquisition, generally through editing (post-production), or as the visuals are presented on a newscast. Following examples from previous studies on sensational elements (Grabe et al., 2001; Vettehen et al., 2005), eight features of the news shot were determined to comprise presentation features: (1) decorative transitions; (2) slow-motion; (3) visual enhancements; (4) audio manipulations; (5) graphics; (6) animations; (7) split screen or boxes; and (8) monitor or video wall backgrounds.

The standard transition between shots in television news is the cut. Use of other types of transitions, including the dissolve, fade-in, fade-out, wipe, and flash, are less common and considered more sensational. Grabe et al., (2001) identified these "decorative" transitions as "indicative of a sensational production style" (p. 648). Decorative transitions were coded present if one or more of these transitions were used between shots.

Grabe et al. suggest their findings reveal the slow motion effect is a "formal feature" of sensational news presentations (p. 648). Slow motion was coded present if the effect occurred in a shot.

Visual enhancements refer to post-production techniques that are designed to

draw attention to, or away from, particular elements in an image. These include the freeze frame, highlight, and mosaic. The freeze frame occurs when the video image is frozen, or stilled, for the duration of the shot. The highlight occurs when part of the image is highlighted, or spotlighted, to emphasize and area of the screen. The mosaic occurs when part of the image is blurred, or otherwise rendered unrecognizable, in order to protect someone's, or something's identity. The presence of any one of these techniques in the shot was coded as a visual enhancement.

"Audio manipulations" (Grabe et al., 2001, p. 288) refer to sound effects and music added to news items. Sound effects are sounds that have not been recorded during the acquisition phase, but are instead added during the post-production process. Music and sound effects are rarely utilized in shots during a standard newscast. Audio manipulations were coded as present if either of these was added to a shot.

Graphics and animations are created to visually illustrate the elements of a news story. Graphic and animation effects have been identified as elements of sensational or tabloid news (Cremedas & Chew, 1994). A graphic was coded present if a full-screen image containing, video, text, or photo-based images were shown. Animation was coded present if 2D or 3D images in motion were shown.

Finally, split-screen/boxes, and monitor/video walls were included as sensational presentation features. Split-screen/boxes are used to divide the audience's video screen into multiple display areas, with separate subjects in each

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area. For example, a split-screen may contain a shot of the anchor on one side of the screen while the other side of the screen may include footage (b-roll) of the story the anchor is discussing. The monitor/video wall effect refers to graphics or other visual elements that are presented on a video wall behind, or monitor next to, an anchor or interview subject. Monitor/video wall was coded present if compelling visual images appeared on the video wall or monitor. Generic background images, network logos, and cityscapes displayed on a monitor/video wall were not considered compelling and were therefore coded not present.

H6 and H7 explored the differences between human interest (H6) and political (H7) frames in visuals from Arab Spring coverage. For all Arab Spring stories the dominant actor in each shot, if identifiable, was coded into one of seven categories similar to those used by Dobernig et al. (2010). The categories were: (1) individual politician; (2) political party/government; (3) authorities/military/police; (4) individual civilian; (5) civilian population; (6) foreign politician/authority; and (7) other. In cases when the dominant actor could not be identified, the shot was coded as "other." These categories describe the parties portrayed in the visuals. The seven-category indicator for subject of Arab Spring coverage was collapsed into a dichotomous indicator of human interest frames (individual civilians, or civilian population) and political frames (individual politicians, political party/government, military/police/authorities, foreign politician/authority).

Coding and Inter-coder Reliability

Before coding could begin, the author, aided by a research assistant,

determined the parameters of each news story and also the in and out (beginning and end) points for each shot. The actual coding was conducted by the author and a second coder. A codebook (see Appendix) was developed as a reference for the coders to use to operationalize choices. Training consisted of two separate pre-test samples that were used to develop definitions and clarify agreement issues. After successfully completing pre-testing, with high inter-coder raw percentage agreement, the coding was conducted. For reliability purposes, it was determined that at least 10% of the sample would be double coded, which is the percentage often recommended (Neuendorf, 2002; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998). The reliability scores were calculated using Krippendorff's alpha. Agreement on use of American images and the tone of American images was 0.96. Determination of Arab Spring content had an agreement of 0.97. Agreement for story and tease type was 0.90. The level of agreement for conflict and violence was 0.81. Agreement for sensational presentation features and acquisition features was at 0.77 for each. Scores for all categories were above the acceptable level of 0.70 identified by Frey, Botan, and Kreps (2000).

Chapter 4: Results

What God hath woven together, even multiple regression analysis cannot tear asunder.

David Brooks, The New York Times

A total of 6,595 shots from 438 stories were analyzed from three hour-long newscasts on five pan-Arab satellite TV networks. The breakdown of shots by network is Al Jazeera (n = 1,445); Al Jazeera English (n = 1,457); Alhurra (n = 1,431); BBC Arabic (n = 840); and Al Arabiya (n = 1,422). The following chapter presents the results of the inferential statistical analysis that aimed to assess the research questions and hypotheses. The nature of the purposive sample precludes generalizing claims about the larger population of network newscasts. Therefore, the analysis is used for the purpose of determining the strength of associations.

Analysis Strategy

A limited number of statistical tools were employed in the analysis of the data. Specifically, for the research questions cross-tabs were utilized to determine frequency and percentage of categories by each independent variable. A chi-square test of independence was calculated to evaluate whether the differences were significant. A combination of multi-level linear and multi-level logistic regression models was used to analyze all of the hypotheses. Multilevel regression was needed for analyzing the data since this sample was based on nested sources of variability. The unit of analysis, the shot, is nested within stories giving the data a multilevel, or

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hierarchical, structure. To ignore the structure of this data and collapse the data across the shots or to analyze the data without consideration for the multilevel structure could lead to an increase in either alpha (false positive) or beta (false negative) errors (Hox, 2002). The specific type of multilevel regression used, logistic or linear, was determined based on the dependent variable. Linear regression was utilized when the dependent variable was metric (e.g., interval or ratio). Logistic regression, a variation of ordinary regression, was used when the dependent variable was binary. The binary variable usually represents the presence or absence of the visual feature under investigation. Logistic versus another form of analysis (e.g., probit) was the proper choice for this particular analysis given the *underlying* structure of the dependent variable is likely not dichotomous (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). For example, the first hypothesis examines a dichotomous dependent variable, Amerocentric. This variable, while coded in degrees of coverage (positive, neutral, or negative), was reduced to a dichotomous measure of either absent (neutral and negative), or present (positive). A research project/coding system that had as its focus Amerocentric reporting might try to analyze degrees of this variable at a finer level (i.e., more than just a dichotomy). Given the broader goals of this project a blunt measure of Amerocentrism was utilized and consequently logistic regression is the proper choice. Logistic regression relies on the mathematical concept of the logit, or the natural logarithm of an odds ratio (Peng, Lee, Ingersoll, 2002). The outcome of logistic regression is a prediction of the probability (reported as the natural logarithm of an odds ratio) of the occurrence based on the given independent

variables.

Historically, the most common methods for fitting hierarchical regression models are based on likelihood estimation methods. Iterative generalized least squares (IGLS) is one such model fitting method that has been popularized because of its computational speed and efficiency. For the current study the Bayesian method, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), was used for fitting all multilevel models. Brooks (1998) identified the MCMC method as an alternative sample method that avoids approximation by performing direct posterior sampling to "obtain sample estimates of the quantities of interest" (p. 3). Browne and Draper (2006) note the ability to perform calibration within the model makes MCMC a more attractive approach, particularly now that upgrades in computer technology have improved the speed of performing the necessary computations. Ultimately, MCMC should provide a more precise estimation. This increased level of precision is practically the case for the hypotheses that tested a binary outcome variable (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Goldstein, 2009). It should be noted that the estimation procedures outlined above (e.g., logit) were still utilized to determine starting values for the MCMC estimation procedure. A careful comparison of results from the traditional form of estimation with the MCMC estimates reveals only minor differences. For example, if predictors were "non-significant" in the traditional analysis they stayed non-significant in the MCMC procedure.

MCMC estimates are the mathematical averages for a particular parameter (e.g., B) across a number of sampling iterations. Iterations represent a repetition of

the estimation procedure that result in convergence at the maximum likelihood estimate (Jackman, 2000). The number of iterations an analysis is run is determined by when the analyst deems convergence—the differences between log likelihoods are small—has been achieved (Browne, 2012). Browne suggests a number of graphical and numerical indicators of convergence, but there are no ironclad rules. The analyses reported below follow the Browne guidelines. Therefore, in the reporting of the results the number of iterations is reported along with the "burn-in" value/period. The burn value is the number of iterations the analysis runs until the estimates start to stabilize (Browne). The estimates calculated during the burn-in period are disregarded in the calculation of the final estimates. The MLwiN statistical software package was utilized to determine the MCMC multilevel regression estimates.

RQ1: Story Agenda Diversity

The first research question examined the nominal agenda diversity of stories between the liberal commercial networks (Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya) and western-styled networks (Al Jazeera English, Alhurra, BBC Arabic). To test RQ1, story type was cross-tabulated with network taxonomy. Both the liberal commercial networks and western-styled networks had at least one story for each of the 17 story types. However, in order to conduct the chi-square analysis, story types with cells containing less than five stories were collapsed into a single category called "other." These eight story types comprise the other category: accidents/natural disasters, agriculture, ecology/environment, health care, education, military/national defense,

race/religion/culture, and undecided. The frequency and percentages of story types

on western and liberal commercial networks are shown in Table 1.

A chi-square test of independence was also performed to examine the

percentage differences between story type and network taxonomy. The relationship

between these variables was statistically significant (χ^2 = 21.30, df = 9, p = .011,

Cramer's V = .22). There is a statistically significant difference in the nominal

agenda diversity of stories between western-styled networks and liberal commercial

networks. Further analysis (presented in the discussion section) reveals the

significant differences involve the increased dependence on sports stories for western

networks and teases for liberal networks.

Table 1

Frequency and Percentages of Story Types by Network Taxonomy

Story Type	Network Taxonomy		Total
	Western	Liberal	
Tease	55 (22.3%)	66 (34.6%)	121 (27.6%)
Political Unrest/War/Terrorism	57 (23.1%)	39 (20.4%)	96 (21.9%)
Sports	49 (19.8%)	16 (8.4%)	65 (14.8%)
Other	22 (8.9%)	20 (10.5%)	42 (9.6%)
Politics	26 (10.5%)	13 (6.8%)	39 (8.9%)
Business/Economics	10 (4.0%)	14 (7.3%)	24 (5.5%)
Technology	7 (2.8%)	6 (3.1%)	13 (3.0%)
Crime/Law & Order	9 (3.6%)	5 (2.6%)	14 (3.2%)
Humanitarian/Social Problems	7 (2.8%)	5 (2.6%)	12 (2.7%)
Entertainment/Oddities	5 (2.0%)	7 (3.7%)	12 (2.7%)
Total	247 (100%)	191 (100%)	438 (100%)

H1: Amerocentric Visuals

The first hypothesis predicted Amerocentric visuals would be more likely to appear on Alhurra than Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, BBC Arabic, and Al Arabiya. A multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression model was used to test this hypothesis. The dependent variable, originally a categorical indicator (positive, neutral, negative) was dichotomized into the presence of Amerocentric (positive) visuals or not within a given shot. The analysis controlled for story type (a dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, conflict *or not* one of these), and shot length in seconds. Control variables were included in order to rule out the influence of these extraneous factors. This is a conservative assessment, which results in more confidence that the control variables are not interfering with the focus variables under investigation. The five networks were dummy coded with Alhurra as the reference category. Therefore, the predicted B (logged odds) for each of the four networks is an indicator of the difference between the particular network and Alhurra controlling for the other variables in the model.

An examination of the two control variables in the model (see Table 2) indicates as shot length increased the likelihood of Amerocentric framing significantly decreased ($B = -.55$, $SE = .25$, $p = .024$), but story type did not predict the likelihood of Amerocentric framing ($B = -.15$, $SE = 1.33$, $p = .910$). The results partially support the hypothesis. Al Jazeera ($B = -7.37$, $SE = 2.74$, $p = .007$), Al Arabiya ($B = -6.47$, $SE = 2.37$, $p = .006$), and Al Jazeera English ($B = -3.74$, $SE =$

1.93, p = .053) were significantly less likely to have pro-American images in their shots when compared to Alhurra. While this trend was also found in shots from BBC Arabic (B = -1.98, SE = 2.16, p = .360), the trend was not statistically significant. H1 was mostly supported.

Table 2

Level of Amerocentric Framing by Network

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	p
Constant	-11.86	2.38	4.98	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-7.37	2.74	-2.69	0.007
Al Jazeera English	-3.74	1.93	-1.94	0.053
BBC Arabic	-1.98	2.16	-0.92	0.360
Al Arabiya	-6.47	2.37	-2.74	0.006
Shot Length	-0.55	0.25	-2.26	0.024
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.15	1.33	-0.11	0.910

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). The story type variable had to be collapsed from the original seventeen types to a dichotomous measure. This was the case because the dependent variable, Amerocentric framing, did not vary (i.e., did not appear) for some story types. Iterations = 300,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 56.35 (χ^2 = 4.60, df = 1, p = .032).

H2: Conflict Visuals

The second hypothesis predicted visuals of conflict would more likely appear in the newscasts of the liberal commercial networks than on the western-styled networks. In the multi-level logistic regression model (see Table 3) the five-category dependent variable was collapsed into a dichotomous indicator of the presence

(conflict/not violent, conflict/dramatic violence, conflict/latent violence,

conflict/explicit violence) or absence (no conflict) of conflict. The network

taxonomy of western styled networks (AJE, BBC Arabic, and Alhurra) and liberal

commercial networks (AJZ, and Al Arabiya) was dummy coded with western as the

reference category. The model also included controls for shot length and story type.

The seventeen story types were collapsed into four dummy coded variables[10]:

politics/crime, business/technology, humanitarian, entertainment/other, with

politics/crime as the reference category. Analysis of the control variables reveals that

as shot length decreased the likelihood of conflict visuals increased ($B = -.05$, $SE = .01$, $p < .001$). Similar results were found with the controls for story type. The

business/technology ($B = -3.28$, $SE = .51$, $p < .001$), humanitarian ($B = -3.10$, $SE = .64$, $p < .001$), and entertainment/other ($B = -1.55$, $SE = .32$, $p < .001$) story types

were significant predictors of conflict visuals. In other words, explicit violence was

less likely for these story types when compared to the reference category

(politics/crime story type). Turning to the results of the hypothesis, visuals of

conflict are significantly more likely to appear in the newscasts of the liberal

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[10]The seventeen story types were collapsed into the following four dummy coded
variables: (1) politics/crime (politics, political unrest/war/terrorism, military/national
defense, crime/criminal justice/law); (2) business/technology (business/economics,
technology, education, agriculture, accidents/natural disasters); (3) humanitarian
(humanitarian/social problems, health care, race/religion/culture,
ecology/environment); (4) entertainment/other (oddities, sports, tease, undecided).
This was the case because the dependent variable did not vary (i.e., did not appear)
for some story types.

commercial networks (B = .57, SE = .29, p = .05) than on the western-styled

networks. H2 is supported.

Table 3

Conflict Visuals by Network Taxonomy

Variable	B	$S.E.$	Z	p
Constant	-1.21	0.26	-4.60	< 0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.57	0.29	1.96	0.050
Shot Length	-0.05	0.01	-3.62	< 0.001
Story Type - Business/Tech.	-3.28	0.51	-6.50	< 0.001
Story Type – Humanitarian	-3.10	0.64	-4.86	< 0.001
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	-1.55	0.32	-4.87	< 0.001

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 300,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 6.97 (χ^2 = 58.99, df = 1, p < .001).

H3: Explicit Violence

H3 also examined conflict in visuals. H3 predicted the liberal commercial

networks would utilize more images of explicit violence in conflict coverage than the

western-styled networks. A multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic

regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western-styled

networks as the reference category, and controls for shot length, and story type—was

utilized (see Table 4). The five-category indicator for conflict and violence was

collapsed into a dichotomous indicator of the presence or absence of explicit

violence. The control variable shot length (B = -2.80, SE = .66, p = .960) was not a

significant predictor of explicit violence. As with H2, story type does appear to be a

predictor of explicit violence. Each of the story type categories, business/technology

(B = -3.54, SE = .95, p < .001), humanitarian (B = -1.66, SE = .41, p < .001), and

entertainment/other story types (B = -2.80, SE = .66, p < .001) were significant

predictors of visuals of explicit violence in conflict coverage. Once again, this

reveals explicit violence was less likely for these story types when compared to the

reference category (politics/crime story type). Results from the hypothesis testing

suggest that the liberal commercial networks (B = 0.74, SE = .36, p = .041) were

significantly more likely to present images of explicit violence in conflict coverage

than the western-styled networks. H3 is also supported.

Table 4

Visuals of Explicit Violence by Network Taxonomy

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	p
Constant	-4.03	0.35	-11.65	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.74	0.36	2.04	0.041
Shot Length	-2.80	0.66	-4.24	0.960
Story Type - Business/Technology	-3.54	0.95	-3.74	<0.001
Story Type – Humanitarian	-1.66	0.41	-4.07	<0.001
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	-2.80	0.66	-4.24	<0.001

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 30,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 2,142.83 (χ^2 = 28.96, df = 1, p < .001).

H4: Sensational Features by Network Taxonomy

The next two hypotheses examined the prevalence of sensational framing

between network taxonomies (H4), and each of the five networks (H5). Sixteen

indicators were used to examine sensational framing within each shot. These sixteen

indicators were collapsed into two counts of event dependent variables: acquisition features (zoom in/out, eyewitness camera, extreme close-up, dramatic sounds, low-angle shot, and high angle shot); and presentation features (decorative transition, slow-motion, visual enhancement, audio manipulation, graphic, animation, split screen/box, and monitor/video wall). Each of the sixteen indicators was weighted equally. This is consistent with previous studies (Grabe, et al., 2001; Vettehen, et al., 2005) that have also examined sensational formal features in TV programming.

In addition to the above features, shot length (editing pace) was also included as a seventeenth indicator of sensationalism. Specifically, the shot length in seconds (M = 6.47 seconds, SD = 7.18) was dichotomized and added to the above mentioned counts. Shots with durations under six seconds[11] were included as an indicator of sensational presentation features. In studies by Grabe, et al. (2001), and Vettehen, et al. (2005) shot length in seconds was analyzed as a separate ratio scale indicator of sensational program features. For the current study, dichotomizing shot length at the mean afforded the opportunity to include this indicator in the regression analysis (i.e., including this dichotomy with the other 16 dichotomies previously mentioned).

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[11] While mean shot length was an arbitrary choice for dichotomizing the variable, previous research indicates that six seconds represents a reasonable division for sensational pacing. For example, Grabe, et al. (2001) found an average shot length of four seconds for the sensational program *Hard Copy* compared to seven seconds for the non-sensational *60 Minutes*. Similarly, Vettehen, et al. (2005) found shot length was significantly shorter on the more sensational Dutch commercial network RTL (M= 6.59) than on the public Netherlands Broadcasting Corporation (NOS) network (M = 10.73).

Since editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length in seconds was not included as a control variable.

According to H4, shots on the liberal commercial networks would be more likely to contain sensational features than on the western-styled networks. A multi-level linear regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western-styled networks as the reference category, and controls for story type—was used to examine both acquisition and presentation features. Statistically significant differences in the application of acquisition features between western and liberal (B = -0.001, SE = .05, p = .983) networks were not found (see Table 5).

Table 5

Sensational Acquisition Features by Network Taxonomy

Variable	B	$S.E.$	T	p
Constant	0.58	0.05	12.63	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	-0.001	0.05	-0.02	0.983
Story Type - Business/Technology	-0.16	0.07	-2.28	0.024
Story Type – Humanitarian	-0.23	0.09	-2.46	0.015
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	-0.004	0.05	-0.08	0.936

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 0.16 (χ^2 = 119.94, df = 1, p < .001).

In looking at sensational presentation features for H4 (see Table 6), entertainment/other (B = .64, SE = .08, p < .001) was the only story type control variable found to vary significantly with the dependent variable. The implication is sensational presentation features were more likely in shots from entertainment/other stories than from politics/crime stories (reference category). In analyzing the

hypothesis, sensational presentation features were found to differ significantly by network taxonomy. Use of sensational presentation features was more likely on the liberal networks (B = .47, SE = .07, p < .001) than on the western networks. Partial support for H4 is found for presentation features only.

Table 6

Sensational Presentation Features by Network Taxonomy

Variable	B	$S.E.$	T	p
Constant	1.40	0.07	19.11	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.47	0.07	-6.73	<0.001
Story Type - Business/Technology	0.10	0.10	1.00	0.317
Story Type – Humanitarian	-0.05	0.15	-0.30	0.764
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	0.64	0.08	8.19	<0.001

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 40,000, Burn-in = 2,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 0.48 (χ^2 = 153.42, df = 1, p < .001).

H5: Sensational Features Between Networks

H5 predicted visuals on Al Arabiya would be more likely to contain sensational elements than visuals on Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, Alhurra, and BBC Arabic. The multi-level linear regression models controlled for the same four levels of story type. The five networks were dummy coded with Al Arabiya as the reference category. Results from the model for acquisition features (see Table 7) reveal no statistically significant differences in the application of sensational acquisition elements between Al Jazeera (B = .07, SE = .07, p = .360), Al Jazeera

English ($B = .07$, $SE = .06$, $p = .254$), Alhurra ($B = .04$, $SE = .07$, $p = .538$), BBC

Arabic ($B = -.14$, $SE = .08$, $p = .099$), and Al Arabiya.

Table 7

Sensational Acquisition Features by Network

Variable	B	S.E.	T	p
Constant	0.57	0.05	10.48	<0.001
Al Jazeera	0.07	0.07	0.92	0.360
Al Jazeera English	0.07	0.06	1.14	0.254
Alhurra	0.04	0.07	0.62	0.538
BBC Arabic	-0.14	0.08	-1.65	0.099
Story Type - Business/Technology	-0.17	0.07	-2.42	0.016
Story Type – Humanitarian	-0.24	0.09	-2.65	0.008
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	-0.01	0.05	-0.18	0.860

Note. Shots ($n = 6,595$). Stories ($n = 438$). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 0.16 ($\chi^2 = 114.81$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

The regression model for sensational presentation features in H5 reveals a

significant relationship for only one of the control variables (see Table 8). Once

again, the presence of sensational presentation features was more likely in shots from

the entertainment/other story type ($B = .67$, $SE = .10$, $p < .001$) than from the

reference category (politics/crime). In terms of the hypothesized relationships, a

significant difference was found between networks for sensational presentation

features. The prediction Al Arabiya ($B = 1.60$, $SE = .08$, $p < .001$) would utilize

more sensational presentation features than BBC Arabic ($B = -.55$, $SE = .13$, $p <$

.001) Al Jazeera ($B = -.59$, $SE = .11$, $p < .001$), Al Jazeera English ($B = -.67$, $SE =$

.10, $p < .001$), and Alhurra ($B = -.80$, $SE = .10$, $p < .001$) was confirmed. H5 is partially supported for presentation features, but not acquisition features.

Table 8

Sensational Presentation Features by Network

Variable	B	S.E.	T	p
Constant	1.60	0.08	19.75	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-0.59	0.11	-5.38	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	-0.67	0.10	-6.91	<0.001
Alhurra	-0.80	0.10	-8.18	<0.001
BBC Arabic	-0.55	0.13	-4.35	<0.001
Story Type - Business/Technology	0.11	0.10	1.10	0.273
Story Type – Humanitarian	-0.00	0.14	0.02	0.983
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	0.67	0.08	8.74	<0.001

Note. Shots ($n = 6,595$). Stories ($n = 438$). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 0.44 ($\chi^2 = 148.71$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

RQ2: Conflict in Arab Spring Visuals by Network Taxonomy

Each story from the three-day sample ($n = 438$) was also coded for Arab Spring coverage. Stories were coded Arab Spring if they contained coverage of the uprisings in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, or Yemen. This coding resulted in an Arab Spring sample of 89 stories (22.6%) comprising 1,951 shots (29.6%) from the original sample. The breakdown of shots by network is Al Jazeera ($n = 508$); Al Jazeera English ($n = 213$); Alhurra ($n = 383$); BBC Arabic ($n = 386$); and Al Arabiya ($n = 461$).

The second research question examined differences in levels of conflict and violence in visuals used between liberal commercial networks and western-styled

networks in coverage of the Arab Spring. To test RQ2, level of conflict and violence was cross-tabulated with network taxonomy. The frequency and percentages of conflict/violence types on western and liberal commercial networks are shown in Table 9.

A chi-square test of independence was also performed to examine the percentage differences between story type and network taxonomy. The Conflict/Dramatic Violence category was removed from the analysis since the normal minimum cell count is five ($n = 1947$). The chi-square was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 26.58$, $df = 4$, $p < .001$, *Cramer's V* = .12). There is a difference in level of conflict/violence in visuals used between western-styled networks and liberal commercial networks. Further analysis (presented in the discussion section) reveals liberal networks were more likely than western networks to use conflict visuals.

Table 9

Frequency and Percentages of Conflict by Network Taxonomy

Level of Conflict/Violence	Network Taxonomy		Total
	Western	Liberal	
No Conflict	454 (46.2%)	425 (43.9%)	879 (45.1%)
Conflict/Not Violent	307 (31.3%)	235 (24.3%)	542 (27.8%)
Conflict/Dramatic Violence	2 (0.2%)	2 (0.2%)	4 (0.2%)
Conflict/Latent Violence	113(11.5%)	142 (14.7%)	255 (13.1%)
Conflict/Explicit Violence	106 (10.8%)	165 (17.0%)	271 (13.9%)
Total	982(100.0%)	969 (100.0%)	1,951 (100.0%)

RQ3: Conflict in Arab Spring Visuals Between Networks

The third research question examined differences in use of conflict visuals among each networks' Arab Spring coverage. For RQ3, level of conflict/violence was cross-tabulated with all five networks. The frequency and percentages of conflict/violence types by network are shown in Table 10.

A chi-square test of independence was also performed to examine the percentage differences between story type and the networks. The Conflict/Dramatic Violence category was removed from the chi-square analysis since the normal minimum cell count is five (n = 1947). The relationship between these variables was statistically significant (χ^2 = 98.72, df = 16, p < .001, *Cramer's V* = .11). Findings reveal a difference in level of conflict/violence in visuals between the networks. An additional procedure was conducted to decompose the chi-square by cell (see discussion section), which revealed where significant differences lie. Some of the more interesting findings were that visuals on BBC Arabic were the least violent, while visuals on Al Jazeera were the most violent.

Table 10

Frequency and Percentages of Conflict by Network

Conflict Level	Network					Total
	Al Jazeera	Al Arabiya	Alhurra	BBC Arabic	AJE	
No Conflict	246 (48.4%)	179 (38.8%)	170 (44.4%)	213 (55.2%)	71 (33.3%)	879 (45.1%)
Not Violent	102 (20.1%)	133 (28.9%)	136 (35.5%)	106 (27.5%)	65 (30.5%)	542 (27.8%)
Dramatic Violence	2 (0.4%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.5%)	4 (0.2%)
Latent Violence	70 (13.8%)	72 (15.6%)	28 (7.3%)	33 (8.5%)	52 (24.4%)	255 (13.1%)
Explicit Violence	88 (17.3%)	77 (16.7%)	48 (12.5%)	34 (8.8%)	24 (11.3%)	271 (13.9%)
Total	508 (100.0%)	461 (100.0%)	383 (100.0%)	386 (100.0%)	213 (100.0%)	1951 (100.0%)

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H6: Human Interest Framing in Arab Spring Coverage

H6 predicted liberal commercial networks would emphasize the human interest frame more than western networks. A logistic multi-level (shots nested within stories) regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western-styled networks as the reference category, and controls for story type—was utilized (see Table 11). Shot length was not included as a control variable for H6, as it caused instability in the model (endless iterations) due to the smaller number of shots in the sample. The seven-category indicator for subject of Arab Spring coverage (politician, government/political party, police/military/authorities, individual civilian, civilian population, foreign authority, other) was collapsed into a dichotomous indicator of the presence or absence of human interest visuals (individual civilians, or civilian population). Results from the model for human interest reveal no statistically significant differences between liberal-commercial ($B = .54$, $SE = .34$, $p = .110$) and western networks. H6 is not supported.

Table 11

Human Interest Visuals in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	p
Constant	0.55	0.22	2.50	0.013
Liberal Commercial	0.54	0.34	1.60	0.110
Story Type - Business/Technology	-0.40	0.52	0.78	0.434
Story Type – Humanitarian	1.89	1.37	1.38	0.168
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	0.94	0.50	1.89	0.059

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations = 25,000, Burn-in = 1,500. The variance of the constant across stories is 1.47 ($\chi^2 = 15.06$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

H7: The Political Frame in Arab Spring Coverage

H7 predicted visuals representing the political frame in Arab Spring coverage would be more likely to appear on Alhurra than Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, BBC Arabic, and Al Arabiya. A logistic multi-level (shots nested within stories) regression model was used to test this hypothesis. The same seven-category indicator for subject of Arab Spring coverage used for H6 was collapsed into a dichotomous indicator of the presence or absence of political figures (individual politicians, political party/government, military/police/authorities, foreign politician/authority) as the main subject of a shot or not. The analysis controlled for story type (a dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, or conflict or not), and shot length in seconds. The five networks were dummy coded with Alhurra as the reference category. The predicted B (logged odds) for each of the four networks is an indicator of the difference between the particular network and Alhurra controlling for the other variables in the model.

An examination of the two control variables (see Table 12) in the model indicates as shot length increased the likelihood of political framing significantly decreased ($B = .03$, $SE = .01$, $p = .012$). For the story type control variable, the business/technology story type significantly predicted political framing ($B = -3.34$, $SE = 1.68$, $p = .046$). This means the political frame was less likely to be found in business/technology stories when compared to the reference category (politics/crime story type). Turning to the hypothesized predictions, only Al Jazeera ($B = -2.12$, $SE = 1.05$, $p = .045$) and BBC Arabic ($B = -2.27$, $SE = 1.01$, $p = .024$) were significantly

less likely to utilize the political frame in their shots of the Arab Spring when compared to Alhurra. H7 is partially supported.

Table 12

The Political Frame in Arab Spring Coverage Between Networks

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	p
Constant	-2.63	0.61	4.29	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-2.12	1.05	2.01	0.045
Al Jazeera English	-0.33	1.01	0.33	0.743
BBC Arabic	-2.27	1.01	2.26	0.024
Al Arabiya	0.23	0.80	0.29	0.776
Shot Length	0.03	0.01	2.50	0.012
Story Type - Business/Technology	-3.34	1.68	1.99	0.046
Story Type – Humanitarian	-0.50	2.44	0.20	0.839
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	-0.58	1.03	0.56	0.574

Note: Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 100,000, Burn = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 5.18 (χ^2 = 10.55, df = 1, $p < .001$).

H8: Sensational Arab Spring Features by Network Taxonomy

Analysis of H8 and H9 followed the same protocol established for H4 and H5. The seventeen indicators for sensational structural features were collapsed into two counts of event dependent variables: acquisition features (zoom in/out, eyewitness camera, extreme close-up, dramatic sounds, low-angle shot, and high angle shot); and presentation features (decorative transition, slow-motion, visual enhancement, audio manipulation, graphic, animation, split screen/box, and

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monitor/video wall, editing pace), with each weighted equally. Since shot length (a dichotomous variable of less than 6 seconds or not) was included as one of the indicators for sensational presentation features (editing pace), it was not used as a control variable for these two hypotheses.

H8 stated news visuals from coverage of the Arab Spring on liberal networks would more likely contain sensational features than visuals from western networks. Multi-level linear regression models—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western-styled networks as the reference category, and controls for story type—were used to examine Arab Spring stories for both sensational acquisition features and presentation features (see Table 13).

Once again only partial support for the predicted results was found (see Table 14). Statistically significant differences in the application of acquisition features between western and liberal commercial networks ($B = .06$, $SE = .10$, $p = .567$) were not found.

Table 13

Acquisition Features in Arab Spring Coverage Between Networks

Variable	B	S.E.	T	p
Constant	0.72	0.07	9.97	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.06	0.10	0.57	0.567
Story Type - Business/Technology	-0.28	0.18	1.56	0.119
Story Type – Humanitarian	0.18	0.43	0.42	0.675
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	0.21	0.17	1.20	0.231

Note: Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 99$). Iterations = 20,000, Burn = 2,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 0.162 ($\chi^2 = 24.20$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

The examination of sensational presentation features for H8 reveals a significant relationship for only one control variable (see Table 14). As the presence of the entertainment/other story type ($B = 1.39$, $SE = .24$, $p < .001$) increased the use of sensational presentation features also increased. In other words, sensational presentation features were more likely in entertainment/other type stories when compared to the control category (politics/crime stories). As for the hypothesized relationship, significant differences in the use of sensational presentation features were found, providing partial support for H9. As predicted, the use of sensational presentation features was determined to be significantly more likely on liberal networks ($B = .70$, $SE = .16$, $p < .001$) than on western networks.

Table 14

Presentation Features in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy

Variable	B	S.E.	T	p
Constant	0.85	0.11	8.13	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.70	0.16	4.45	<0.001
Story Type - Business/Technology	-0.32	0.31	1.03	0.304
Story Type – Humanitarian	-0.07	0.71	0.10	0.920
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	1.39	0.24	5.87	<0.001

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 99$). Iterations = 95,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 0.51 ($\chi^2 = 34.43$, $df = 1$, p < .001).

H9: Sensational Arab Spring Features between Networks

According to H9, Arab Spring visuals on Al Jazeera would be more likely to contain sensational structural features than Al Jazeera English, Alhurra, BBC Arabic, or Al Arabiya. The multi-level linear regression model controlled for four levels of

story type. The five networks—dummy coded with Al Jazeera as the reference category—were analyzed for the presence of both sensational acquisition features and presentation features.

Sensational acquisition features for H9 were found to differ significantly for one network (see Table 15). None of the story type control variables had a significant relationship for acquisition features. Looking at the hypothesized predictions, significant differences in the use of sensational acquisition features were only found between BBC Arabic (B = -0.42, SE = .15, p < .004) and Al Jazeera. The use of sensational acquisition features was determined to be significantly more likely on Al Jazeera than on BBC Arabic.

Table 15

Acquisition Features in Arab Spring Coverage Between Networks

Variable	B	S.E.	T	p
Constant	0.89	0.11	8.06	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	0.19	0.17	1.16	0.248
Alhurra	-0.11	0.14	0.77	0.441
BBC Arabic	-0.42	0.15	2.86	0.004
Al Arabiya	-0.13	0.13	-1.00	0.317
Story Type - Business/Technology	-0.32	0.18	1.80	0.072
Story Type – Humanitarian	0.13	0.41	0.31	0.760
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	0.09	0.16	0.56	0.574

Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 200,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 0.13 (χ^2 = 19.42, df = 1, p < .001).

In terms of presentation features, only limited support was found for the hypothesized prediction (see Table 16). First, an examination of the control variables reveals the entertainment/other control variable was more likely ($B = 1.40$, $SE = .24$, $p < .001$) to contain sensational presentation features when compared to the reference category (politics/crime). When evaluating the results of the hypothesis for sensational presentation features, only partial support for the predicted results was found. In this case, Al Jazeera was significantly more likely to air shots containing sensational presentation features than Alhurra ($B = -0.47$, $SE = .23$, $p < .042$), but significantly less likely to air shots containing sensational presentation features than Al Arabiya ($B = 0.68$, $SE = .22$, $p < .002$).

Table 16

Presentation Features in Arab Spring Coverage Between Networks

Variable	B	S.E.	T	p
Constant	1.15	0.18	6.26	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	-0.21	0.28	0.76	0.445
Alhurra	-0.47	0.23	2.03	0.042
BBC Arabic	-0.18	0.25	0.71	0.478
Al Arabiya	0.68	0.22	3.13	0.002
Story Type - Business/Technology	-0.20	0.30	0.66	0.510
Story Type – Humanitarian	0.10	0.71	0.14	0.886
Story Type - Entertainment/Other	1.40	0.24	5.89	<0.001

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations $= 200,000$, Burn-in $= 5,000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 0.45 ($\chi^2 = 31.88$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

Chapter 5: Discussion

Opposing rooters at a football game do not experience the 'same' game.

Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis

Using framing theory, this study set out to explore the differences in story selection, sensational content, and production form on five transnational Arab satellite TV channels in routine news coverage, and coverage of the Arab Spring. Distinct differences in the application of story types, shot content, and structural features of news visuals were found between the network taxonomies (western and liberal commercial), as well as, between the individual networks (Al Arabiya, Alhurra, Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, and BBC Arabic). The current chapter provides: (1) summary of the results; (2) interpretations of results; (3) limitations and directions for future research.

Summary of Results

The findings revealed differences in the nominal agenda diversity of stories aired between western-styled networks and liberal commercial networks (RQ1). The prediction that Alhurra would be more likely to air pro-American visuals than the other networks was supported for three (Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera English, and Al Arabiya) of the networks (H1). The liberal commercial networks were more likely to utilize conflict visuals than the western-styled networks, providing support for H2. In addition, conflict visuals on liberal commercial networks were more likely to depict explicit violence than on western networks (H3). The study also predicted differing

applications of sensational production techniques among the networks. Use of sensational presentation features (but not sensational acquisition features) was found to be more likely on the liberal networks than on western networks (H4). Likewise, Al Arabiya utilized more sensational presentation features than the other four networks (H5).

The study also investigated differences in the use of visuals for Arab Spring coverage. Differential use of conflict and violence in visuals of the Arab Spring was found between western networks and liberal commercial networks (RQ2), and between the individual networks (RQ3). The predicted reliance by liberal commercial networks on the human interest frame in Arab Spring coverage was not supported (H6). Alhurra was much more likely to invoke a political frame than Al Jazeera and BBC Arabic providing partial support for H7. As predicted, the use of sensational production features in Arab Spring coverage differed by network taxonomy and individual networks. Use of sensational presentation features was determined to be significantly more likely on liberal networks than on western networks (H8). At the level of individual networks (H9), the use of sensational acquisition features was determined to be significantly more likely on Al Jazeera than on BBC Arabic. Also, Al Jazeera was significantly more likely to air shots containing sensational presentation features than Alhurra but significantly less likely to air shots containing sensational presentation features than Al Arabiya.

Interpretation of Results

This study expands framing theory by examining the visual interplay of story selection, content, and production forms from transnational Arab television news outlets in the context of routine news visuals and conflict-specific news visuals. A review of the literature reveals that both pan-Arab television news and news visuals are under-researched framing elements in mass communication scholarship.

Systematic analysis of Middle Eastern news visuals is generally performed through cross-cultural comparisons of Arabic-language and English-language media. These studies have provided important insights into differences in the framing of print, web-based, and less-often, television news visuals. However, they rarely provide insight into differences in the application of television news frames by Arab news outlets trying to reach the same Arab audience. The current study provides a rare comparison of visual frames, and sensational production techniques among competing pan-Arab news networks.

Furthermore, a significant contribution to framing theory is made by the incorporation of sensationalism and television form in the current study. Tuchman (1978) asserted that both content and form operate as media frames. Here, content and form were primarily explored through the lens of sensationalism. As indicated in the literature review, sensationalism has been explicated as a separate theoretical approach, and through numerous other theoretical applications. However, sensationalism fits within framing theory as an example of "symbols and visual images emphasized in a news narrative" (Haigh, Bruce, & Craig, 2008). While both

framing and sensationalism have been recognized as factors of cultural and political considerations, scholars (Tuggle & Huffman, 1999; Vettehen, 2005) also point to a coalescence of technology, journalistic practices, and competition. The current study provides additional support for this conceptual premise.

The organization of this section deviates from the order of research questions and hypotheses examined in the results sections. Instead, this section is organized to provide more general insights into the major components of newscast visuals: story selection, content, and production form.

Story selection. First, this study explored differences in the nominal agenda diversity of news stories presented on both western networks and liberal commercial networks. The literature review suggested a propensity among liberal commercial networks to focus on political news stories. What was previously unknown was whether this propensity also carried over to the western-styled networks that operated in the region. The chi-square analysis revealed significant differences in story selection do exist, but not where those differences lie.

A ranking of story topics between western and liberal networks (see Table 17) provides additional insight into where these differences reside. In general, there appear to be only minor differences in the preferences for story types between western and liberal networks. The sports and tease categories are obvious exceptions.

Table 17

Rank Comparison of News Topics on Western and Liberal Commercial Networks

Story Type	Western Rank	%	Liberal Rank	%
Political Unrest/War/Terrorism	1	23.1	2	20.4
Tease	2	22.3	1	34.6
Sports	3	19.8	4	8.4
Politics	4	10.5	6	6.8
Other	5	8.9	3	10.5
Business/Economics	6	4.0	5	7.3
Crime/Law & Order	7	3.6	9 (tie)	2.6
Technology	8 (tie)	2.8	7	3.1
Humanitarian/Social Problems	8 (tie)	2.8	9 (tie)	2.6
Entertainment/Oddities	10	2.0	8	3.7

In order to determine if these differences were statistically significant, an additional procedure was conducted to decompose the chi-square by cell. The resulting standardized Pearson residuals provide a more meaningful cell-by-cell analysis regarding the differences and where they lie. Regarding the standardized Pearson residuals, Agresti (2002) states that absolute values greater than two indicate where there is a greater likelihood of difference. The results (see Table 18) confirm teases are significantly more likely on liberal than western networks |2.85| and sports stories are significantly more likely on western than liberal networks |3.35|.

Table 18

Standardized Pearson Residuals for News Topics on Western and Liberal Networks

Story Type	Network Taxonomy	
	Western	Liberal
Political Unrest/War/Terrorism	0.67	-0.67
Tease	-2.85	2.85
Sports	3.35	-3.35
Politics	1.36	-1.36
Other	-0.55	0.55
Business/Economics	-1.50	1.50
Crime/Criminal Justice/Law & Order	0.61	-0.61
Technology	-0.19	0.19
Humanitarian/Social Problems	0.14	-0.14
Entertainment/Oddities	-1.04	1.04

Note. The squares of the non-standardized Pearson residuals for all cells sum to the table chi-square value. With just to columns the standardized Pearson residuals have the same absolute value.

While statistically significant differences in story selection exist between western and liberal networks, the differences are—with the exception of sports and teases—subtle. Story selection on "serious" news topics (i.e., political events in the region) is very similar. This could reflect evidence of what scholars (Groshek, 2008; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Plasser, 2005) refer to as increasing global news homogenization. Hallin & Mancini note that a homogenized journalistic culture is increasingly prevalent as journalists from around the globe emulate western-styled

journalism, which has historically been viewed as the "standard" (p. 257). Further evidence of potential homogenization of news is reflected in similar levels of entertainment, technology, and humanitarian stories between western and liberal networks. These story types would have been rare under the previously state-controlled newscasts, which featured protocol news.

The starkest differences in story selection have less to do with political motivations and more to do with cultural and market based factors. Even though sports stories were featured in newscasts from all five networks, they were much more prevalent on the western networks. The main difference appears to be that the sports culture prevalent in western society manifests in increased coverage of sports on the western networks. Sports coverage seems to be one area of western news culture that is easily exported to an Arab audience. In addition, the analysis of Alhurra, commissioned by the BBG and conducted by the USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School (2008), suggested that Arab audiences are interested in such cultural material.

On the other hand, the liberal networks relied much more heavily on tease elements. Teasers, or bumpers, serve as transitions between production elements, and promote upcoming stories by grabbing and holding the attention of the audience (Cohler, 1985; Yoakam & Cremer, 1985). As is common in most newscasts around the globe, all five networks utilized teases and bumpers to varying degrees. While not all teases are necessarily sensational, the most provocative types of teases often contain sophisticated audio and visual production treatments combined with

sensational content. Teases for high-profile stories are often sensational as they interrupt the flow of a newscast with music, graphics, and visual elements that serve as an attention-gaining device. As an example, Al Arabiya used visually alluring teases composed of still image montages, graphics, and music to lead into, and out of, several high-profile stories. Tovares (1997) notes that provocative teases—once the exclusive domain of American daytime talk shows—utilize alluring elements to "titillate" the audience into continued viewing (p. 1). The combination of market pressures, and commitment to technical sophistication led to significant increases in the number of teases on the liberal networks. Reliance on tease elements also increased the level of sensationalism on the liberal networks, particularly on Al Arabiya.

Content frames. Not only were significant differences found in the nominal agenda diversity of western and liberal networks, there were significant differences in the framing of visual content. When it comes to conflict coverage, portrayals of conflict actors can provide insight into differences of human interest versus political framing. Past studies of culturally bound media have often found differences in the portrayals of conflict actors (Aday, et al., 2005; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahren, 2007; Dimitrova, et al., 2005; Dobernig, et al., 2010; Fahmy, 2005a, 2010; Fahmy & Kim, 2008; Griffen & Lee, 1995; King & Lester, 2005; Konstantindou, 2008; Silcock, et al., 2008). Table 19 illustrates the primary conflict actors broken down by network for all shots. Of these shots, 320 (16.4%) portray politicians, government, authorities, or foreign authorities as the primary conflict actor (political frame), while 1,006

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(51.6%) portray individuals, or groups of civilians (human interest frame) as the primary conflict actor. It was assumed that network taxonomy would influence the application of the human interest frame in Arab Spring conflict coverage. Surprisingly, the differences were not statistically significant. Visual references to civilian actors were relatively constant across the networks. The coverage universally emphasized the individual civilians involved in the uprisings.

Table 19

Frequency of Primary Conflict Actor Visuals by Network

Actor	Network					
	Al Jazeera	AJE	Alhurra	BBC Arabic	Al Arabiya	Total
Politician	14 (2.8%)	14 (6.6%)	22 (5.7%)	8 (2.1%)	23 (5.0%)	81 (4.2%)
Government	10 (2.0%)	7 (3.3%)	9 (2.3%)	1 (0.3%)	5 (1.1%)	32 (1.6%)
Police/Military	43 (8.5%)	13 (6.1%)	30 (7.8%)	20 (5.2%)	53 (11.5%)	159 (8.1%)
Individual	23 (4.5%)	11 (5.2%)	60 (15.7%)	18 (4.7%)	44 (9.5%)	156 (8.0%)
Civilians	260 (51.2%)	112 (52.6%)	161 (42.0%)	132 (34.2%)	185 (40.1%)	850 (43.6%)
Foreign Authority	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	15 (3.9%)	18 (4.7%)	15 (3.3%)	48 (2.5%)
Other	158 (31.1%)	56 (26.3%)	86 (22.5%)	189 (49.0%)	136 (29.5%)	625 (32.0%)
Total	508 (100.0%)	213 (100.0%)	383 (100.0%)	386 (100.0%)	461 (100.0%)	1951 (100.0%)

Note. The primary conflict actor, if recognizable, was coded for every shot.

However, significant differences in the portrayal of political frames were revealed for Alhurra when compared to the other networks. Officials—government, politicians, police and military authorities—appeared in 19.8% of the Arab Spring shots used on Alhurra, which was significantly more often than on Al Jazeera (13.2%) or BBC Arabic (12.3%). While visuals on Alhurra still emphasized the human interest frame (57.7%) more often than the political frame, visuals representing the political frame were more prevalent on Alhurra than on the other networks. Increased coverage of U.S. government officials (e.g., Secretary of State Hillary Clinton), images of government leaders in the affected areas (e.g., Hosni Mubarak), and opposition leaders (e.g., Mohamed ElBaradei) contributed to the findings. Alhurra's use of the political frame seems to reflect its organizational mandate, the U.S. government's interest in the region, and America's close ties to several of the governments targeted by the uprisings.

There were several unexpected findings as well. First, visuals of foreign authorities were noticeably absent from coverage on Al Jazeera and Al Jazeera English. The findings seem to be consistent with other research (e.g., Dobernig, et al., 2010), which found a visual emphasis on civilians could be intended to evoke sympathy from the audience. Next, the political frame was found more often in Al Arabiya (20.9%) coverage than any of the other networks, including Alhurra. Images of foreign authorities were portrayed more evenly on Alhurra, BBC Arabic and Al Arabiya. Along with images of Arab Spring protestors, the western networks presented images of NATO military forces, U.S. and British government officials,

and the leaders of neighboring Arab states. These findings suggest that Alhurra and Al Arabiya presented more balanced coverage of the crises by visually presenting a wider view of stakeholders. As an example, Alhurra in particular, aired numerous man-on-the-street interviews with Egyptian protestors. These networks' more balanced coverage could be the result of more objective journalistic philosophies, and a reflection of the political sensitivities of the networks' benefactors.

These two principles, objective journalism and sensitivity to the organizational mission, are also likely at play in Alhurra's use of Amerocentric visuals. Since Alhurra is charged with presenting the American perspective to its Arab audience, it was expected that the network would present significantly more positive toned visuals of America and Americans. This turned out to be the case as the use of Amerocentric visuals on Alhurra differed significantly from all the other networks, except for BBC Arabic. Of all the visuals coded from Alhurra ($n = 1,431$), 322 (22.5%) contained a reference to America or Americans. Of those, 185 images (12.9%) had a positive tone. The fact that nearly a quarter of all visuals on Alhurra contained images of America or Americans reveals that the network takes its mandate to present the American story to its Arab audience seriously. However, this promotes the double-edged image problem that has plagued the network since its inception. While surveys reveal members of the Arab audience want to know more about America, the positively toned coverage likely contributes to accusations from the same audience that Alhurra airs propaganda.

This discussion of visual content is incomplete without focusing on images of conflict and violence. Al Jazeera has been heavily criticized for presentation of graphic news visuals. However, there have been few systematic comparisons of conflict visuals between pan-Arab satellite channels. Therefore, the differential use of conflict and violence in visuals was an important element of the current research design. Figure 1 illustrates differences in the use of conflict and violence in the visuals of the daily newscasts. In general, the overwhelming majority of images on both western and liberal networks did not contain cues to conflict related visuals. This finding runs contrary to the popular belief that the majority of visuals aired on a daily basis by Arab networks, like Al Jazeera, are violent. However, significant differences in the use of conflict and violence do exist between the liberal and western networks. The liberal networks were significantly more likely than western networks to use conflict visuals. In addition, when they used conflict visuals, the liberal networks were also more likely than western networks to use images of explicit violence.

Figure 1. Frequency of conflict and violent imagery by network taxonomy as represented in H2.

Findings from the analysis of conflict visuals from the Arab Spring were even more specific. Differences were found between the use of conflict visuals on western-styled networks and liberal commercial networks. Looking at the standardized Pearson residuals (Table 20), the "no conflict" category is the only difference not likely to be significant. Differences in the use of conflict/not violent visuals between western and liberal networks were likely statistically significant |3.46|. Statistically significant differences for latent violent images were more likely for liberal networks |2.06| than for western networks. Differences for use of violent

images on western and liberal |3.98| networks were also likely significant. Just as

with the daily topics, the results reveal that Arab Spring visuals on all the networks

were predominantly conflict free. However, when Arab Spring conflict was shown,

the western networks were more likely to use non-violent visuals while the liberal

networks were more likely to present a view of the uprisings that was more explicitly

violent.

Table 20

Standardized Pearson Residuals for Arab Spring Conflict Visuals on Western and
Liberal Commercial Networks

Level of Conflict/Violence	Network Taxonomy	
	Western	Liberal
No Conflict	1.05	-1.05
Conflict/Not Violent	3.46	-3.46
Conflict/Latent Violence	-2.06	2.06
Conflict/Explicit Violence	-3.98	3.98

Table 21 further breaks down the standardized Pearson residuals for

significant differential use of conflict and violence in Arab Spring coverage at the

network level. The table reveals BBC Arabic is more likely to air conflict free

visuals |2.93| and less likely to air visuals of latent violence |-2.47| and explicit

violence |-2.69| than the other four networks. Alhurra was less likely to use latent

violence visuals |-3.11| and more likely to air not violent visuals |2.88|. Aljazeera

English was less likely to present no conflict visuals |-2.53| but more likely to show

visuals with latent violence |4.60|. Al Arabiya was less likely to air no conflict

visuals |-2.02|. Al Jazeera was less likely to use not violent |-3.27| shots, but the only network significantly more likely to use shots of conflict/explicit violence |2.09|. These results reveal a clear progression from the network airing the least violent visuals (BBC Arabic) to the network airing the most graphic visuals (Al Jazeera) in Arab Spring coverage. Figure 2 illustrates this progression of violent visuals between all five networks.

Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya depicted a more violent image of the Arab Spring than Alhurra and BBC Arabic. Stories airing on the same day on Alhurra and Al Jazeera illustrate these differences. Each story, which focused on the Libyan rebels, used the same footage from the same source. However, due to editing decisions at each network, the stories differed visually. Both networks included at least a few explicitly violent visuals (e.g., rebel forces firing artillery). However, Al Jazeera aired more footage (number and length of shots) and more shots containing explicit images, including shots of material destruction and injured civilians.

This study produced results that corroborate the findings of a great deal of the previous work from cross-cultural comparisons of conflict visuals. The liberal networks depicted more violent images of conflict while images on the western networks presented a more sanitized view of conflict. Despite obvious preferences for violent images, the overwhelming majority of visuals aired on pan-Arab networks are not as graphic as critics portend.

Table 21

Standardized Pearson Residuals for Arab Spring Conflict Visuals by Network

Conflict Level	Network				
	Al Jazeera	AJE	Alhurra	BBC Arabic	Al Arabiya
No Conflict	1.16	-2.53	-0.19	2.93	-2.02
Conflict/Not Violent	-3.27	0.78	2.88	-0.14	0.41
Conflict/Latent Violence	0.46	4.60	-3.11	-2.47	1.50
Conflict/Explicit Violence	2.09	-1.01	-0.71	-2.69	1.60

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
Figure 2. Frequency of conflict and violent imagery of Arab Spring coverage by network as represented in RQ3

Television form. In addition to content differences, this study examined differences in the application of sensational production features between the two dimensions of network taxonomy, and between the individual networks. The research design adds to framing theory by providing a more simplified methodological approach for examining the production features of news visuals. Two scales of production features (acquisition and presentation) were utilized for the analysis rather than relying on a multiplicity of elaborate scales, or the separate analysis of each individual variable. This two-scale design provides a comprehensive measure of the variables associated with the acquisition of visuals, or the presentation of visuals to the audience. It is important to note that none of the individual variables making up these scales should necessarily be considered sensational production elements on their own. Instead, these independent elements likely have a cumulative effect on sensationalism, which has been referred to as "tabloid packaging" (Grabe, et al., 2000, p. 595), and a "superfluity of attention-getting devices" (Klijn, 2003, p. 127). Klijn suggests having multiple production features applied to a shot is more indicative of a sensational production style, which boosts attention but reduces comprehension.

Acquisition features. The prediction that there would be significant differences in the use of sensational production features between liberal and western networks, and individual networks was partially supported. Acquisition features are a result of techniques applied during the acquisition of news images and fall into six

categories: (1) zoom movements; (2) eyewitness camera; (3) extreme close-up; (4) dramatic sounds; (5) high-angle shots; and (6) low-angle shots.

Significant differences were not found in the sensational acquisition features used between western and liberal networks in routine, or Arab Spring coverage, or between the individual networks in routine news. In order to gain a richer understanding of whether any individual indicators might contribute to differences in the scale of acquisition features, additional regression analysis was conducted on many of the individual variables that comprise the scale of acquisition features. The results of these additional analyses on sensational acquisition and presentations features in routine and Arab Spring newscasts can be found in the appendices[12] (see Appendices B through E).

Breaking down the analysis to the level of individual variables does reveal some minor differences between networks. As one example, shots on Al Jazeera English were more likely to contain zooms than on Al Arabiya (see Table C1). While dramatic sounds were significantly more likely in shots from Al Jazeera and Al Jazeera English than in shots from Al Arabiya (see Table C3).

In Arab Spring coverage at the network level, significant differences were only found between Al Jazeera and BBC Arabic. BBC Arabic was less likely to use sensational acquisition features than Al Jazeera. When looking at differences in the

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[12] These results must be interpreted with caution as the large number of multiple significance tests dramatically increases the likelihood of type 1 error.

individual variables of sensational acquisition features, even fewer significant

differences were found. The findings revealed the liberal networks were more likely

to use zooms in shots during Arab Spring coverage (see Table D1) than the western

networks.

The lack of statistically significant differences in the use of sensational

acquisition features was somewhat surprising. The author expected to see greater

differences across the board in the application of these features because western—

specifically American—TV news visuals generally conform to a standard set of

codes (Tuchman, 1978). The eyewitness camera technique provides a good

illustration of these codes. The frequent use of eyewitness camera has traditionally

been discouraged in American TV newscasts because it violates what Tuchman

(1978) referred to as visual neutrality. Therefore, it was expected that shots from the

western networks would reflect this proclivity. However, eyewitness camera was

heavily utilized in shots from all the networks in the sample. In summary, the

approach for acquiring news footage is not that different among these five

transnational networks.

There are several possible explanations for the overall lack of difference in

the use of acquisition features, particularly when it comes to conflict or breaking

news coverage. First, the rather shaky, eyewitness camera appearance of some of the

conflict footage may be the result of journalists getting so close to the action that it is

impractical to achieve more stable and objective shots. Second, in some cases, this

footage may have originated form laypersons using cell phones or amateur recording

devices to capture the events rather than from professionally trained journalists. Third, the availability of news footage from breaking news events is often limited to a small number of sources. A network may not always have a news crew in an area where breaking news occurs. In such instances, a network may air footage acquired from another network, or a news agency. For example, scholars (Fahmy, 2005a; Paterson, 2001; Pavlik, 2001; Wanta, 2002; Wanta & Roarke, 1993) have found that competing print media outlets often use visuals acquired from the same news wire services, and that the news source can impact the media frame. Finally, the cultural sensitivities and professional standards of media professionals at the various networks may not be as diverse as expected. Scholars have documented the significant numbers of both western-trained (BBC), and professional Lebanese journalists (Kraidy, 2012) spread throughout Arab media outlets. These factors have likely contributed to similar journalistic routines and codes at each of the transnational Arab networks for the acquisition of visuals.

Presentation features. Conversely, significant differences in the use of sensational presentation features were universally found. Presentation features are the "bells and whistles" of news production that are applied after shots are acquired and before they are delivered to the audience for viewing (Grabe, et al., 2001, p. 652). The results from the analysis of H4, H5, H8 & H9 show liberal networks were more likely than western networks to apply sensational presentation techniques in both normal coverage and Arab Spring coverage. Additional analysis of the individual variables that make up the scale of presentation features revealed the

liberal networks were more likely to use decorative transitions (see Table B5), audio manipulations (see Table B6), graphics (see Table B7), animations (see Table B8), and a quicker editing pace (see Table B11) than western networks. Additional analysis of the H5 variables revealed Al Arabiya was more likely to use decorative transitions (see Table C5), animations (see Table C7), and monitor/video wall backgrounds (see Table C10) than the other networks. Al Arabiya also utilized more audio manipulations than Alhurra and Al Jazeera English (see Table C6), was more likely than Al Jazeera and Alhurra to use graphics (see Table C7), and more likely than Al Jazeera English and BBC Arabic to have a quicker shot pace (see Table C11).

When it comes to application of presentation features in Arab Spring coverage, the liberal networks were more likely to use graphics (see Table D7), animations (see Table D8), and a quicker shot pace (see Table D11). At the network level, Al Arabiya was more likely to use decorative transitions (see Table E5), and graphics (see Table E7) in Arab Spring coverage. Al Jazeera was more likely to use a quick shot pace than BBC Arabic (see Table E10).

The analysis of presentation features reveals a distinct separation between western and liberal networks. Visuals on the liberal networks emphasized a more provocative production style reflected in attention grabbing visual treatments, sound enhancements, and a quicker shot pace. These production treatments increase the prominence of visuals. Among the individual networks, shots on Al Arabiya were more likely to emphasize sensational presentation features. These distinctions were

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also found to a lesser extent in Al Arabiya's Arab Spring coverage. The author had predicted that the competitive forces inherent in the coverage of conflict and breaking news by competition driven media outlets would lead to increased reliance on sensational presentation features by Al Jazeera. Contrary to expectations, this prediction was only partially supported. Al Arabiya's coverage still utilized more sensational presentation features in Arab Spring coverage.

In retrospect, these findings should not be surprising in light of statements by Al Arabiya's management that their news product would emphasize technological innovation and "flashy graphics." A segment of story detailing an insurgent attack on a government compound in Baquba, Iraq, illustrates the network's commitment to technologically sophisticated news visuals. The story starts with full-screen video footage from the aftermath of the attack and then transitions to shots of the anchor standing in front of a large video wall in the studio. The anchor describes the attack while a montage of still images scroll across the screen behind him. This transitions to a minute and one-half long visual reenactment of the attack. The animated reenactment illustrates the location of the attack and how the attack was carried out. The animation is complete with burning vehicles, exploding suicide bombers, and muzzle flashes from the weapons of insurgents and Iraqi military engaged in a firefight. These visual techniques are beyond the level of just "flashy graphics." Instead, they increase the prominence of news visuals on Al Arabiya.

Limitations and Future Directions

While this study generated some important and interesting findings, a number of limitations need to be considered. The limitations presented here focus on the (1) sampling frame; (2) the deductive content analysis method; (3) theoretical considerations; and (4) networks. An understanding of these limitations should be useful in the development of future research.

In terms of the sampling frame, there are limitations to both the size of the sample and content of the sample. From the beginning, the approach of this project was to analyze every single news image from each newscast in the sample. Most visual studies use a more restrictive unit of analysis like individual stories, or shots from specific selections within a newscast. This approach limits the cumulative impact of images that are repeated multiple times in a single newscast, or over a series of newscasts. While this holistic visual approach provides opportunity to see continuing symbols in news coverage, it introduces other limitations. One limitation is that all visuals, regardless of type (e.g., graphics, animations, studio shots, field shots), were treated the same. Future research could make distinctions based on the type of visual using a visual prominence score similar to those utilized by Doyle (1982), and Nimmo and Combs (1985). Another limitation of this approach involves the sample size. In order to keep the size of the project manageable, the purposive sample consisted of only three days of programming selected from the ten-month sampling frame. The resulting fifteen hours of programming provided thousands of images for the analysis. However, these three days do not necessarily provide a representative sample of visuals on pan-Arab satellite TV channels. This is even

more problematic for Arab Spring coverage as the sample excluded the non-routine breaking news coverage from the most contentious days of the Egyptian and Libyan uprisings.

Future research should focus on a more detailed visual analysis of Arab Spring coverage that includes the non-routine (breaking news) newscasts from the height of the Egyptian and Libyan uprisings. Such an analysis could also be expanded to include Arab Spring coverage on other networks including state TV outlets (e.g. Egyptian TV) and international commercial broadcasters (e. g. CNN). For example, Pintak (2011a) noted that at times Egyptian TV broadcast panoramic views of the city to avoid showing the conflict taking place in the streets. Ali Hashem, a former Al Jazeera correspondent, accused Arab channels of adopting some Arab Spring revolutions while avoiding others (2012). He suggests that Arabs are increasingly relying on western media outlets for news. His statements suggest that an analysis of how the networks framed different uprisings in the region should be considered.

Matthes (2009) noted a lack of reliability reporting in many framing studies. While the reliability reported in this study was quite high, it is influenced by the deductive content analysis approach. As already noted in the method section, this approach is used to search for the occurrence of certain pre-defined frames among the variables under analysis. The downside to this approach is the potential to overlook frames that were not identified prior to the analysis stage (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Dependence on this deductive approach resulted in reliable

measures, but may have done so at the expense of additional overlooked visual

frames. For example, post-study analysis reveals usefulness for an additional

acquisition feature category labeled "movement" (e.g. camera tilts, pans, elevation

changes).

There are also a few theory-based limitations associated with the current

study. First, a limitation of framing to the current study is the suggestion by media

scholars that Western communication theory does not adequately account for the

societal and cultural structures of the Middle East (Hafez, 2001). This echoes

criticisms by Hallin (1994) that the political economy approach does not account for

the impact of culture in non-western media. Second, the study does not explore how

the differing application of frames affects public opinion in the Middle East. While

the rationale presented in chapter one for this study is based primarily on the

perceived influence of pan-Arab newscasts on Arab public opinion, the results

presented here cannot be used to draw those kinds of causal links. As an example,

the influence of Allhura's Amerocentric framing on Arab public opinion toward the

U.S. and the network remains unexplored.

Finally, issues related to three of the networks require further elaboration.

While all the newscasts were approximately an hour long, BBC Arabic's newscast

provided more in-depth news and analysis on a smaller number of stories. This

production style led to significantly fewer stories and shots from BBC Arabic for

making comparisons. Another issue related to production style involves Alhurra. The

network revamped its daily news show "The Global" with a new look during the

sample period. Alhurra newscasts in the sample include the old (two shows) and new (one show) visual styles. The new style featured new graphics, decorative enhancements, and other production features. An analysis based only on newscasts featuring the new look could lead to different results. Also, Al Jazeera English was included in the current analysis because of its ties to Arabic Al Jazeera and its growing popularity as an international broadcaster. Placement of Al Jazeera English in the western dimension of the taxonomy may not have been ideal. AJE aired the lowest percentage of non-conflict visuals, but the highest percentage of latent violent images out of all the networks. In addition, AJE had the highest percentage of violent images when latent and explicit violent images were combined. In terms of violent content, AJE may have a lot in common with its sister-network. Another commonality between the sibling networks was found in use of dramatic sounds in Arab Spring coverage. There may be other similarities that were not fully explored in this study. The current implication of these similarities is that Al Jazeera English may be closer to the liberal commercial pattern than the western pattern. These similarities suggest a couple of avenues for future research. A more detailed visual analysis could be conducted to explore similarities and differences between Al Jazeera English and Al Jazeera. In addition, more systematic analysis of network structure should guide future categorization of the individual pan-Arab networks. These findings reveal the need for additional systematic analysis of visuals, and the factors shaping transnational Arab media.

Ayish (2002, 2008) has made repeated calls for systematic analysis of Arab

media in order to develop solid theoretical frameworks of pan-Arab television. A decade later, systematic analysis of pan-Arab newscasts linked to media system characteristics is still under-developed. Matthes (2009) has noted that many scholars claim significant numbers of framing studies are too descriptive and atheoretical. Development of sophisticated models like those advanced by Hallin and Mancini (2004) require a rich understanding of the factors that affect television news production. The present study does not approach the level of analytical framework championed by these scholars. Rather than focusing on the nation state as a unit of analysis, the intention was to examine the content of newscasts by utilizing stories and shots as the units of analysis. This approach generally appeals to a theoretical base through the use of hypotheses grounded in organizational factors, which have been called for by other visual scholars (e.g., Fahmy, 2010). The findings, while somewhat descriptive, provide important benefits over the anecdotal evidence often presented concerning pan-Arab media. Insights gained here can serve as building blocks for the future development of more sophisticated models of Arab broadcasting, which should be the ultimate goal. Thus, future attempts at building macro-theoretical frameworks of pan-Arab television must more fully account for the cultural, political, historical, technological, and competitive factors that shape each network.

Conclusion

For more than a decade, events have rippled through the Arab world like a "political tsunami" powered by information and communication technology (Cottle,

2011, p. 249). The Pan-Arab satellite channels have been simultaneously hailed and derided for expanding the range of news and views available to the Arab public (Khouri, 2001). The current study sought to provide in-depth analysis of the visual content of five pan-Arab satellite news networks.

The current study adds to the catalog of visual framing research by exploring an under-researched aspect of television news through predictions informed by press theory and political economy models. As the literature revealed, visual framing differs from verbal or textual framing, and has been explored through a number of differing approaches. Like many visual framing studies, the current research utilizes frequency and prominence to establish frames. In addition, the current study is one of the few to emphasize sensational, or tabloid, TV production features. Furthermore, the current study introduced a simplified methodology for extracting sensational production features in TV news.

The main conclusion is that differences exist in how the networks visually frame their newscasts. As expected, notable differences were found in terms of story selection, content, and production form, particularly in regards to sensational attributes. Analysis of the data from the three days of newscasts also revealed unique characteristics of each network's newscasts, suggesting that homogenization of transnational Arab news media is not yet a reality.

Alhurra presented visuals utilizing a more objective journalistic approach laced with U.S. perspectives on the important issues. BBC Arabic appeared to be the

most visually conservative of all the networks in terms of presentation of both conflict and violence, and sensational production techniques. However, the differences between Alhurra and BBC Arabic may not be as overt as BBC Arabic management intended, since it is assumed that BBC Arabic was conceived as an alternative to Alhurra (Jarrah, 2008).

Al Jazeera English clearly shares elements with both the liberal and western networks. AJE presented a slick, high-tech newscast that emphasized more conflict than any of the other networks. Furthermore, AJE seems to be looking for a place in the increasingly crowded international news environment. Although its mission is to "reverse the flow of information to the south" (al-Najjar, 2009), AJE also covered significant U.S. news stories, including a lengthy story on an early Republican presidential debate.

The liberal networks were found to emphasize both sensational content and production techniques. Al Jazeera was the network found mostly likely to utilize images of explicit violence. Al Arabiya has embraced the glitz of sensational production techniques. While the liberal networks were generally more violent, the visual differences did not appear to be as stark and pervasive as western government officials and media critics have let on over the past decade. Furthermore, the vast majority of visuals on all the networks were conflict free. The findings from this study suggest much of the recent criticism of pan-Arab satellite newscasts could be attributed to nothing more than hyper-, over-reaction.

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Appendix A: Visual Framing Codebook

1. Coder name: (1) M. Bruce (2) T. Bruce (3) Hartwig   **2. Air Date:** ___/___/___

The newscast # will be provided for you on the video file.

3. Newscast #_____

4. Day:

(1) Sunday (2) Monday (3) Tuesday (4) Wednesday (5) Thursday (6) Friday (7) Saturday

5. Network:

(1) Al Jazeera (2) Al Jazeera English (3) Alhurra (4) BBC Arabic (5) Al Arabiya

Story # will consist of the newscast # plus the two-digit number of the story, numbered consecutively as they appear on the newscast. For example: if the newscast # is 15 and you are coding the first story, the story number would be 1501. To differentiate the stories, begin watching the newscast. You can generally tell when a story changes by listening for pauses and or changes in the anchor's delivery, and watching for changes in the video that accompanies the stories (changes in graphics, video subject matter, etc…).

6. Story # _____

To determine the story type, watch each story all the way through. There are often several visual cues that can help you determine the correct type. Tease generally refers to a video montage that appears at the beginning of the newscast, before or after a commercial break, or before a new high-profile story. If you are unclear about the story type, circle undecided.

7. Story:

(1) accidents/natural disasters (2) agriculture (3) business/economics/tourism

(4) crime/criminal justice/law and order (5) ecology/environment (6)

education (7) health care (8) military/national defense (9) politics (10)

race/religion/culture (11) humanitarian/social problems/services (12) sports

(13) technology (14) war/terrorism/political unrest (15)

entertainment/oddities (16) undecided (17) tease.

Tease types: opening appears at the beginning of the newscast, break will occur as the newscast goes to a commercial break, rejoin occurs after a commercial break, high-profile story occurs as a lead-in to a story.

8. Tease Type. If the answer to question 7 was 17, provide the type of tease below. If not, skip to question 9.

(1) opening (2) break (3) rejoin, (4) high-profile story (5) close

9. Length of Story: _____

Select yes if the story covers the uprisings in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, or Yemen.

10. Is the subject of the story about the Arab Spring?

(1) Yes   (2) No

The following criteria apply to the coding of all shots. Only visuals appearing in the newscast will be coded. Commercial breaks and sponsored messages within the newscast will not be coded. Using the guidelines set forth by Keith et al. (2009), a shot was counted "each time the shot (subject) changed by video editing or, in the case of a pan, each time the subject changed" (p. 7). When there are multiple images on the screen, for example if there is a 2-box shot with one box containing an interview shot and another box containing b-roll footage, only code the larger, more predominant shot.

Shot number will consist of the story number plus a 2-digit number for the shot. For example, if you are logging the first shot in story #1501, the shot number will be 150101.

11. Shot Number:_____

12. Shot Length:_____

If clearly identifiable, code the dominant actor in the visual shot.

13. If the answer to question 12 was "yes", answer the following questions. If not, skip to question

> (1) individual politician (2) political party/government (3)
> authorities/military/police (4) individual civilian (5) civilian population (6)
> foreign politician/authority (7) other

Select yes if the visual contained an image of: a person that was clearly identifiable as an American, a textual reference to the United States (i.e. the words United States or similar on the screen), an American symbol like a U.S. passport or the American flag, or the visual is clearly located in the United States or its property (i.e. an overseas American embassy or military base).

14. Images of US citizens, symbols, property used in the shot?

> (1) Yes   (2) No

15. If yes, what was the tone of the US image. If no, skip to #16.

> (1) Positive   (2) Neutral   (3) Negative

Select the correct level of Conflict/Violence for each visual based on the following criteria established by Fishman and Marvin (2003) and Groshek (2008):

No Conflict if there is no visual evidence of conflict in the image.

Conflict/Not Violent if the frame contains images of conflict being handled in a peaceful manner, such as protest signs and marches.

Conflict/Dramatic Violence if the shot contains images of violence that are performed but not seriously intended such as for sport or entertainment.

Conflict/Latent Violence shows the immediate application of direct physical force but also suggests, that such force could be applied. Examples include the presence of police, military personnel, and weapons.

Conflict/Explicit Violence images show either the direct application of, or consequences resulting from, violence which is seriously intended and performed. Explicit violence includes images of firefights, damage to buildings or property, and injuries. The harmful aftermath of violence including the image of anguished victims or eyewitnesses was also included as explicit violence.

Violence caused by non-manmade agents (natural disasters, animals, weather) will not be coded.

16. Conflict/Violence Frame:

(1) No Conflict   (2) Conflict/Not Violent (3) Conflict/Dramatic (4) Conflict/Latent

(5) Conflict/Explicit

For the following structural features code each feature as either present (1) or absent (2) by writing the correct number in the blank. Zoom in/out if the camera zooms.

Eyewitness camera is present if the image is shaky or the camera moves with the action from the perspective of the participants.

XCU is present if a person's face occupies more than one-third of the screen.

Dramatic sounds should be coded as present if the background sounds (natural sound) includes sounds of people crying, screaming, yelling, or applauding, Dramatic sounds should be coded as present if the background sounds (natural sound) includes sounds of people crying, screaming, yelling, or applauding, sounds of exploding ammunition, gunshots, sirens and military vehicles/aircraft. Low-angle shot is a shot taken from below looking up at the main subject. High-Angle is a shot from above looking down at the main subject.

Acquisition Features used in shot:

16._____ Zoom In/Out   17._____ Eyewitness camera

18._____ XCU   19._____ Dramatic Sounds

20._____ Low-angle shot   21._____ High-angle shot

Decorative transitions will be coded present if one or more of these transitions: dissolve, fade-in, fade-out, wipe, or flash was used between shots. Because the transitions are used between two or more shots, rather than as part of a single shot, the transition effect will be coded with the shot that precedes it. Slow motion will be coded present if the effect occurred in a shot. Visual enhancements refer to post-production techniques that are designed to draw attention to, or away from, particular elements in an image. The freeze frame occurs when the video image is frozen, or stilled, for the duration of the shot. The highlight occurs when part of the image is highlighted, or spotlighted, to emphasize and area of the screen. The mosaic occurs when part of the image is blurred, or otherwise rendered unrecognizable, in order to protect someone's, or something's identity. Code the visual enhancements present if a freeze frame, highlight, or mosaic is applied to the shot. Audio manipulations are coded as present if sound effects or music is added to news items.

A graphic is a full-screen image that may contain, video and text, but is primarily photo based. Animation refers to 2D or 3D images in motion created to illustrate the elements of the story.

Split-screen or box When a split-screen or box appears, code the images in the largest frame.

Monitor or video wall background

Do not code as present if the image contains just a generic background, network logo, or cityscape.

Presentation Features used in shot:

22._____ Decorative Transitions   23._____ Slow-motion

24._____ Visual Enhancements   25._____ Audio Manipulations

26._____ Graphic   27._____ Animation

28. _____ Split screen / box   29._____ Monitor/video wall

Appendix B: Logistic Regression Tables for H4 Individual Indicators

To analyze the individual features in routine news at the level of network taxonomy, a multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western-styled networks as the reference category, and controls for shot length, and story type—was utilized. Each analysis controlled for story type (a dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, conflict or not), and shot length in seconds. Indicators of acquisition and presentation features that represented less than 5% of the total shots in the sample (XCU, low-angle, slow motion, and visual enhancement) were generally excluded from this additional analysis. Five percent was chosen as the threshold that would produce stable logistic regression models. This was the case because the dependent variable, did not vary (i.e., did not appear) for some networks.

Table B1

Zoom Shots by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.66	0.15	-18.23	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.32	0.19	1.73	0.084
Shot Length	0.02	0.01	3.43	<0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.38	0.19	-2.00	0.046

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 30,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 1.97 (χ^2 = 54.14, df = 1, p < .001).

Table B2

Eyewitness Camera Shots by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.60	0.20	-12.83	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	-0.27	0.24	-1.14	0.253
Shot Length	-0.05	0.01	-6.71	<0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	1.14	0.24	4.75	<0.001

Note. Shots ($n = 6,595$). Stories ($n = 438$). Iterations $= 20,000$, Burn-in $= 1,000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 4.07 ($\chi^2 = 59.97$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

Table B3

Dramatic Sound by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	B	$S.E.$	Z	P
Constant	-4.45	0.33	-13.56	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	-0.46	0.36	-1.30	0.195
Shot Length	-0.02	0.01	-2.10	0.036
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	0.28	0.33	0.86	0.390

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 7.02 (χ^2 = 34.99, df = 1, p < .001).

Table B4

High Angle Shots by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.66	0.17	-15.49	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	-0.36	0.23	-1.55	0.121
Shot Length	-0.04	0.01	-4.67	<0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.37	0.22	-1.67	0.095

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 2.88 (χ^2 = 51.25, df = 1, $p < .001$).

Table B5

Decorative Transitions by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-3.53	0.26	-13.57	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	1.27	0.31	4.13	<0.001
Shot Length	0.01	0.01	0.55	0.585
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-2.04	0.32	-6.33	<0.001

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 80,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 5.51 (χ^2 = 43.30, df = 1, p < .001).

Table B6

Audio Manipulations by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	B	$S.E.$	Z	P
Constant	-4.39	0.71	-6.15	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	2.39	0.79	3.04	0.002
Shot Length	0.03	0.01	2.17	0.030
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-3.64	0.69	-5.31	<0.001

Note. Shots ($n = 6,595$). Stories ($n = 438$). Iterations = 150,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 39.69 ($\chi^2 = 25.81$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

Table B7

Graphics by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	P
Constant	-4.28	0.29	-14.84	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.78	0.32	2.42	0.016
Shot Length	0.04	0.01	5.86	<0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	0.38	0.33	1.18	0.240

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 200,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 6.52 (χ^2 = 45.56, df = 1, p < .001).

Table B8

Animation by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-4.20	0.31	-13.58	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	1.05	0.36	2.92	0.003
Shot Length	0.03	0.01	2.73	0.006
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-2.07	0.41	-5.06	<0.001

Note. Shots ($n = 6{,}595$). Stories ($n = 438$). Iterations = 150,000, Burn-in = 5,000.
The variance of the constant across stories is 7.15 ($\chi^2 = 37.55$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

Table B9

Split Screen / Box by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-8.68	0.83	-10.40	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.01	0.62	0.01	0.994
Shot Length	-0.03	0.01	-3.71	<0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	2.69	0.68	3.95	<0.001

Note. Shots ($n=$ 6,595). Stories ($n=$ 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 23.42 ($\chi^2 = 28.55$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

Table B10

Monitor by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-3.73	0.26	-14.33	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.03	0.33	0.09	0.926
Shot Length	0.02	0.01	2.88	0.004
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.37	0.33	-1.13	0.260

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 5.92 (χ^2 = 42.21, df = 1, p < .001).

Table B11

Shot Pace by Network Taxonomy in H4

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	P
Constant	0.78	0.08	9.56	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.33	0.11	3.09	0.002
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.40	0.11	-3.76	<0.001

Note. Shots ($n = 6,595$). Stories ($n = 438$). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is .62 ($\chi^2 = 52.26$, $df = 1$, p 0.003). Since editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length in seconds was not included as a control variable.

Appendix C: Logistic Regression Tables for H5 Individual Indicators

To analyze the individual features in routine news at the network level, a multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring Al Arabiya as the reference category, and controls for shot length, and story type—was utilized. Each analysis controlled for story type (a dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, conflict or not), and shot length in seconds. Indicators of acquisition and presentation features that represented less than 5% of the total shots in the sample (XCU, low-angle, slow motion, and visual enhancement) were generally excluded from this additional analysis. Five percent was chosen as the threshold that would produce stable logistic regression models. This was the case because the dependent variable, did not vary (i.e., did not appear) for some networks.

Table C1

Zoom Shots by Network in H5

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.15	0.21	-10.29	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-0.43	0.29	-1.51	0.131
Al Jazeera English	-0.61	0.27	-2.29	0.022
Alhurra	-0.33	0.27	-1.24	0.214
BBC Arabic	-0.64	0.35	-1.86	0.064
Shot Length	0.02	0.01	3.43	0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.40	0.19	-2.05	0.041

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 1.91 (χ^2 = 48.44, df = 1, p <.001).

Table C2

Eyewitness Camera by Network in H5

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-3.10	0.28	-10.94	<0.001
Al Jazeera	0.48	0.40	1.21	0.225
Al Jazeera English	0.68	0.35	1.93	0.053
Alhurra	0.56	0.35	1.60	0.110
BBC Arabic	-0.32	0.46	-0.69	0.493
Shot Length	-0.05	0.01	-6.86	<0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	1.21	0.24	4.99	<0.001

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000 Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 4.09 (χ^2 = 62.06, df = 1, p <.001).

Table C3

Dramatic Sound by Network in H5

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	P
Constant	-5.77	0.56	-10.23	<0.001
Al Jazeera	1.81	0.62	2.94	0.003
Al Jazeera English	1.77	0.58	3.08	0.002
Alhurra	0.92	0.60	1.53	0.126
BBC Arabic	0.59	0.71	0.84	0.403
Shot Length	-0.02	0.01	-2.10	0.036
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	0.39	0.39	1.00	0.316

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 60,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 6.95 (χ^2 = 33.76, df = 1, p < .001).

Table C4

High Angle Shots by Network in H5

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.93	0.25	-11.70	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-0.20	0.34	-0.60	0.547
Al Jazeera English	0.37	0.31	1.18	0.237
Alhurra	0.45	0.33	1.36	0.174
BBC Arabic	-0.62	0.46	-1.35	0.176
Shot Length	-0.04	0.01	-4.30	<0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.32	0.23	-1.40	0.162

Note. Shots (*n* = 6,595). Stories (*n* = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 2.79 (χ^2 = 49.92, *df* = 1, *p* <.001).

Table C5

Decorative Transitions by Network in H5

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	P
Constant	-1.62	0.28	-5.82	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-1.61	0.43	-3.76	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	-2.15	0.43	-5.00	<0.001
Alhurra	-1.19	0.39	-3.04	0.002
BBC Arabic	-3.07	0.64	-4.81	<0.001
Shot Length	0.01	0.01	0.55	0.585
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-2.05	0.31	-6.54	<0.001

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 75,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 4.97 (χ^2 = 105.20, df = 1, p <.001).

Table C6

Audio Manipulations by Network in H5

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-1.669	0.76	-2.196	0.028
Al Jazeera	-3.385	0.98	-3.454	0.001
Al Jazeera English	-3.385	0.98	-3.454	0.001
Alhurra	-3.384	1.118	-3.027	0.002
BBC Arabic	-0.611	1.509	-0.405	0.686
Shot Length	-0.049	0.096	-0.510	0.610
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-3.714	0.673	-5.519	0.000

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 30,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 40.45 (χ^2 = 29.79, df = 1, p <.001).

Table C7

Graphics by Network in H5

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	P
Constant	-2.59	0.29	-8.98	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-2.26	0.48	-4.73	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	-0.35	0.38	-0.93	0.353
Alhurra	-4.62	0.64	-7.21	0.002
BBC Arabic	-0.81	0.52	-1.55	0.122
Shot Length	0.04	0.01	5.88	<0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	0.32	0.31	1.03	0.305

Note. Shots ($n = 6{,}595$). Stories ($n = 438$). Iterations = 50,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 5.05 ($\chi^2 = 39.66$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

Table C8

Animation by Network in H5

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.69	0.34	-8.01	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-1.21	0.51	-2.38	0.017
Al Jazeera English	-1.22	0.48	-2.53	0.011
Alhurra	-1.52	0.49	-3.07	0.002
BBC Arabic	-1.91	0.69	-2.77	0.006
Shot Length	0.03	0.01	2.73	0.006
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-2.12	0.41	-5.22	<0.001

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 90,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 6.99 (χ^2 = 36.05, df = 1, p <.001).

Table C9

Split Screen / Box by Network in H5

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-8.46	0.81	-10.46	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-0.92	1.26	-0.73	0.468
Al Jazeera English	-0.28	0.99	-0.28	0.776
Alhurra	-0.90	0.99	-0.91	0.362
BBC Arabic	1.73	0.99	1.75	0.080
Shot Length	-0.03	0.01	-3.25	0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	2.42	0.80	3.01	0.003

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 24.43 (χ^2 = 20.69, df = 1, p <.001).

Table C10

Monitor by Network in H5

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	P
Constant	-2.26	0.26	-8.65	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-5.07	0.74	-6.89	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	-0.01	0.34	-0.02	0.986
Alhurra	-3.17	0.47	-6.78	<0.001
BBC Arabic	-1.54	0.50	-3.12	0.002
Shot Length	0.02	0.01	2.88	0.004
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.56	0.30	-1.88	0.060

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 95,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 4.08 (χ^2 = 40.05, df = 1, p <.001).

Table C11

Shot Pace by Network in H5

Variable	B	S.E.	Z	P
Constant	1.16	0.11	10.41	<0.001
Al Jazeera	-0.11	0.16	-0.71	0.479
Al Jazeera English	-0.39	0.15	-2.64	0.008
Alhurra	-0.21	0.15	-1.43	0.153
BBC Arabic	-0.68	0.19	-3.50	<0.001
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.39	0.11	-3.61	<0.001

Note. Shots (n = 6,595). Stories (n = 438). Iterations = 45,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is .61 (χ^2 = 52.74, df = 1, p <.001). Since editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length in seconds was not included as a control variable.

Appendix D: Logistic Regression Tables for H8 Individual Indicators

To analyze the individual features in Arab Spring coverage at the level of network taxonomy, a multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring western networks as the reference category, and controls for shot length, and story type—was utilized. Each analysis controlled for story type (a dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, conflict or not), and shot length in seconds. Indicators of acquisition and presentation features that represented less than 5% of the total shots in the sample (XCU, low-angle, slow motion, and visual enhancement) were generally excluded from this additional analysis. Five percent was chosen as the threshold that would produce stable logistic regression models. This was the case because the dependent variable, did not vary (i.e., did not appear) for some networks.

Table D1

Zoom Shots in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.72	0.61	-4.46	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	1.34	0.46	2.93	0.003
Shot Length	0.01	0.01	1.22	0.222
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.70	0.58	-1.21	0.228

Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 100,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 2.78 (χ^2 = 12.08, df = 1, p < .001).

Table D2

Eyewitness Camera in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-0.41	0.63	-0.65	0.513
Liberal Commercial	-0.68	0.50	-1.36	0.176
Shot Length	-0.01	0.01	-1.29	0.199
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.34	0.62	-0.55	0.586

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations $= 20,000$, Burn-in $= 1,000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 3.79 ($\chi^2 = 15.10$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

Table D3

Dramatic Sounds in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-3.23	0.83	-3.90	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	-0.76	0.54	-1.40	0.163
Shot Length	-0.02	0.01	-1.55	0.122
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	0.27	0.79	0.35	0.729

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 4.52 ($\chi^2 = 10.01$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.002$).

Table D4

High Angle Shots in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-3.74	0.54	-6.97	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.24	0.42	0.56	0.577
Shot Length	-0.01	0.01	-0.70	0.484
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	0.98	0.50	1.96	0.050

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations $= 20,000$, Burn-in $= 1,000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 2.16 ($\chi^2 = 10.00$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.002$).

Table D5

Decorative Transitions in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-4.099	2.134	-1.921	0.055
Liberal Commercial	3.144	1.495	2.103	0.035
Shot Length	-0.026	0.028	-0.929	0.353
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-4.979	2.194	-2.269	0.023

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations = 30,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 27.24 ($\chi^2 = 4.18$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.040$).

Table D6

Audio Manipulations in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.82	2.67	-1.06	0.291
Liberal Commercial	2.18	2.39	0.91	0.361
Shot Length	0.01	0.03	0.17	0.863
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-10.28	3.33	-3.09	0.002

Note. Shots ($n = 1{,}951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations $= 20{,}000$, Burn-in $= 1{,}000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 62.65 ($\chi^2 = 3.92$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.048$).

Table D7

Graphics in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-6.05	1.79	-3.38	0.001
Liberal Commercial	2.76	1.21	2.28	0.023
Shot Length	0.03	0.01	2.08	0.038
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	0.32	1.56	0.20	0.840

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations = 200,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 21.31 ($\chi^2 = 8.36$, *df* = 1, $p = 0.004$).

Table D8

Animations in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-7.03	1.22	-5.78	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	2.46	0.95	2.59	0.010
Shot Length	-0.001	0.03	-0.41	0.679
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.25	1.04	-0.24	0.811

Note. Shots (*n* = 1,951). Stories (*n* = 89). Iterations =125,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 250.46 (χ^2 = 4.28, *df* = 1, *p* = 0.039).

Table D9

Split Screens / Boxes in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-11.32	3.55	-3.19	0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.68	1.79	0.38	0.703
Shot Length	-0.02	0.01	-2.11	0.035
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	5.11	2.36	2.16	0.031

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 40.13 ($\chi^2 = 3.81$, *df* = 1, $p = 0.050$).

Table D10

Monitors in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-7.47	1.62	-4.60	<0.001
Liberal Commercial	0.60	1.17	0.51	0.609
Shot Length	-0.001	0.02	-0.06	0.956
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	1.77	1.47	1.20	0.229

Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 404.50 (χ^2 = 11.97, df = 1, p = 0.005).

Table D11

Shot Pace in Arab Spring Coverage by Network Taxonomy in H8

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	1.02	0.34	3.03	0.002
Liberal Commercial	0.63	0.26	2.45	0.014
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.92	0.33	-2.79	1.995

Note. Shots (*n* = 1,951). Stories (*n* = 89). Iterations = 145,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 0.89 (χ^2 = 14.52, *df* = 1, *p* <.001). Since editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length in seconds was not included as a control variable.

Appendix E: Logistic Regression Tables for H9 Individual Indicators

To analyze the individual features in Arab Spring coverage at the network level, a multi-level (shots nested within stories) logistic regression model—with a dummy coded taxonomy featuring Al Jazeera as the reference category, and controls for shot length, and story type—was utilized. Each analysis controlled for story type (a dichotomous indicator of stories concerning politics, crime, conflict or not), and shot length in seconds. Indicators of acquisition and presentation features that represented less than 5% of the total shots in the sample (XCU, low-angle, slow motion, visual enhancement, and monitors) were generally excluded from this additional analysis. Five percent was chosen as the threshold that would produce stable logistic regression models. This was the case because the dependent variable, did not vary (i.e., did not appear) for some networks.

Table E1

Zoom Shots in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-1.71	0.63	-2.71	0.007
Al Jazeera English	-0.40	0.77	-0.51	0.609
Alhurra	-0.89	0.73	-1.23	0.221
BBC Arabic	-1.19	0.76	-1.57	0.116
Al Arabiya	0.86	0.64	1.35	0.178
Shot Length	0.01	0.01	1.10	0.271
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.90	0.54	-1.67	0.095

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations $= 20,000$, Burn-in $= 1,000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 2.87 ($\chi^2 = 11.84$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

Table E2

Eyewitness Camera in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-0.90	0.61	-1.47	0.141
Al Jazeera English	0.58	0.83	0.70	0.484
Alhurra	0.61	0.64	0.96	0.340
BBC Arabic	-1.33	0.75	-1.77	0.077
Al Arabiya	-1.12	0.67	-1.66	0.096
Shot Length	-0.01	0.01	-1.29	0.199
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	0.27	0.59	0.45	0.651

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations $= 20,000$, Burn-in $= 1,000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 3.29 ($\chi^2 = 13.85$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$).

Table E3

Dramatic Sound in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-3.32	0.74	-4.50	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	1.57	0.95	1.66	0.097
Alhurra	-0.86	0.83	-1.04	0.297
BBC Arabic	-0.69	0.90	-0.76	0.445
Al Arabiya	-1.48	0.83	-1.79	0.074
Shot Length	-0.02	0.01	-1.64	0.102
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	0.48	0.77	0.63	0.529

Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 4.14 (χ^2 = 8.01, df = 1, p <.005).

Table E4

High Angle Shots in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.62	0.51	-5.10	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	0.42	0.71	0.60	0.550
Alhurra	-0.23	0.62	-0.37	0.714
BBC Arabic	-0.63	0.71	-0.88	0.378
Al Arabiya	0.10	0.59	0.17	0.867
Shot Length	-0.01	0.01	-1.18	0.237
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.54	0.35	-1.54	0.124

Note. Shots ($n = 1{,}951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations $= 20{,}000$, Burn-in $= 1{,}000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 2.22 ($\chi^2 = 7.98$, $df = 1$, $p < .005$).

Table E5

Decorative Transitions in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-4.338	1.919	-2.261	0.024
Al Jazeera English	3.764	2.623	1.435	0.151
Alhurra	0.626	2.389	0.262	0.793
BBC Arabic	-0.112	2.905	-0.039	0.969
Al Arabiya	6.167	2.344	2.631	0.009
Shot Length	0.03	0.01	2.08	0.038
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-5.732	1.934	-2.964	0.003

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations $= 150,000$, Burn-in $= 5,000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 23.30 ($\chi^2 = 3.79$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.052$).

Table E6

Audio Manipulation in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-2.997	2.939	-1.020	0.308
Al Jazeera English	-0.282	5.992	-0.047	0.962
Alhurra	-7.555	6.841	-1.104	0.269
BBC Arabic	2.698	5.25	0.514	0.607
Al Arabiya	4.268	3.91	1.092	0.275
Shot Length	0.004	0.029	0.138	0.890
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-11.557	3.203	-3.608	0.000

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations $= 20,000$, Burn-in $= 1,000$. The variance of the constant across stories is 84.67 ($\chi^2 = 2.04$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.153$).

Table E7

Graphics in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	B	$S.E.$	Z	P
Constant	-5.43	1.83	-2.97	0.003
Al Jazeera English	1.66	1.99	0.83	0.405
Alhurra	-5.52	2.88	-1.92	0.055
BBC Arabic	2.27	1.93	1.18	0.239
Al Arabiya	4.42	1.81	2.45	0.014
Shot Length	0.03	0.01	2.08	0.038
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.48	1.66	-0.29	0.773

Note. Shots ($n = 1,951$). Stories ($n = 89$). Iterations = 200,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 19.91 ($\chi^2 = 6.75$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.009$).

Table E8

Animation in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	B	$S.E.$	Z	P
Constant	-5.38	1.36	-3.95	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	-0.6	1.72	-0.35	0.726
Alhurra	-3.99	2.14	-1.87	0.062
BBC Arabic	-2.45	1.88	-1.30	0.193
Al Arabiya	0.94	1.28	0.73	0.466
Shot Length	-0.01	0.03	-0.41	0.679
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.21	1.19	-0.18	0.858

Note. Shots (n = 1,951). Stories (n = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 8.92 (χ^2 = 3.69, df = 1, p = 0.05).

Table E9

Split Screen / Box in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	-7.27	1.52	-4.78	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	0.64	2.79	0.23	0.818
Alhurra	-3.28	2.80	-1.17	0.242
BBC Arabic	1.70	2.93	0.58	0.562
Al Arabiya	0.53	1.90	0.28	0.779
Shot Length	-0.02	0.01	-2.11	0.035
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	1.37	1.76	0.78	0.436

Note. Shots (*n* = 1,951). Stories (*n* = 89). Iterations = 20,000, Burn-in = 1,000. The variance of the constant across stories is 33.57 (χ^2 = 8.07, *df* = 1, *p* = 0.005).

Table E10

Shot Pace in Arab Spring Coverage by Network in H9

Variable	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z*	*P*
Constant	1.67	0.37	4.53	<0.001
Al Jazeera English	-0.74	0.46	-1.60	1.890
Alhurra	-0.55	0.39	-1.41	0.158
BBC Arabic	-0.86	0.42	-2.08	0.038
Al Arabiya	-0.11	0.39	-0.29	0.774
Story Type – Politics/Conflict	-0.85	0.34	-2.51	0.012

Note. Shots (*n* = 1,951). Stories (*n* = 89). Iterations = 100,000, Burn-in = 5,000. The variance of the constant across stories is .92 (χ^2 = 13.91, *df* = 1, *p* <.001). Since editing pace was included as an indicator for presentation features, shot length in seconds was not included as a control variable.